

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LATIN AMERICA

❖ VOLUME IV ❖

The Age of Globalization
(1900 to the Present)

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THOMAS M. LEONARD
GENERAL EDITOR AND VOLUME EDITOR

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**Encyclopedia of Latin America
Volume IV: The Age of Globalization**

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

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Havana

Cuba

Greater Antilles

Jamaica

Kingston

Haiti

Port-au-Prince

Santo Domingo

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St. John's

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St. Kitts and Nevis

Lesser Antilles

Roseau

Dominica

Martinique

St. Lucia

Castries

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Kingstown

Barbados

Bridgetown

Grenada

St. George's

Port-of-Spain

Trinidad and Tobago

Venezuela

Colombia

Panama

Nicaragua

Aruba

(The Netherlands)

Netherlands Antilles

Bonaire

Curaçao

Caribbean Sea

Atlantic Ocean

0 150 miles

0 150 km

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South America



❧ PREFACE TO THE SET ❧

How does one define Latin America? Geographically, Latin America stretches from the Rio Grande River on the U.S.-Mexican border and Cuba, bordering the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, to Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America. The area is two and one-half times the size of the United States. Brazil alone is slightly larger than the continental United States. Within this vast geographic region there is enormous human and physical variety.

In historical terms, Latin America includes those parts of the Americas that at one time were linked to the Spanish, Portuguese, and French Empires and whose people speak a Romance language (a language derived from Latin, such as Spanish, Portuguese, French, and the derivative Creole). When Napoleon III popularized the term *Latin America* in the 1860s, he implied a cultural relationship between France and those countries of the Western Hemisphere where these language traditions existed: Mexico, most of Central and South America, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Haiti, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana. A literal interpretation of Napoleon III's definition would also include portions of the Southwest United States, Florida, and Louisiana; Quebec in Canada; and the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off of Newfoundland's coast. English is the first language of most Caribbean islands, and Papiamentu, a form of Creole, is predominant in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Amerindian dialects remain the primary languages in parts of Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

The mixture of languages illustrates the diversity of race and culture across Latin America. The Amerindians, or Native Americans, dominated the pre-Columbian time period. In the 21st century, their descendants are still prevalent in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and the upper reaches of the Amazon River in the Andes Mountains. Latin America was colonized primarily by the Spanish and to a lesser degree by the Portuguese, first and foremost in Brazil. British, French, and Dutch interlopers followed, and in the 20th century,

the United States had a profound impact across the region. For economic reasons, slavery was practiced most notably in Brazil, along the Ecuadoran coast, and in the Caribbean Islands. Each of these ethnic groups—and the descendants of interracial relationships—produced its own culture with unique religious traditions, family life, dress styles, food, art, music, and architecture. With accelerated globalization throughout the 20th century, Western ideas and culture have had a significant impact upon Latin America.

Geography and climatic conditions also play a major role in the development of societies, their cultures, and economies. Latin America is no exception. For example, the Andes Mountains that traverse the west coast of South America served as the centerpiece of the Inca Empire in the pre-Columbian period, the source of gems and ores during the Spanish colonial period, and the ores and petroleum essential for modern-day industries. The Andes westward slopes and coastal plains provided agricultural products since the earliest of times. The rolling plains, or pampas, of north-central Argentina, southern Brazil, and Uruguay coupled with a Mediterranean-type climate turned those areas into highly productive cattle and grain centers. In contrast, the Amazon rain forest in Brazil, while still home to undiscovered Native American groups, offered little economic advantage until the 20th century, when the logging industry and land clearing for agricultural expansion cut deep into the rain forest's expanse. The tropical climate of the Caribbean and the coastal areas of Central America offered fertile ground for sugar, tobacco, and tropical fruits.

People, geography, language and culture, and economic pursuits transformed Latin America into one of the world's most diverse regions. Yet, the 41 countries and foreign dependencies that make up Latin America share four distinguishable historical time periods: the pre-Columbian period, followed by nearly three centuries of colonial rule; the struggle for national identity during the 19th century; and the quest for modernity since 1900.

The *Encyclopedia of Latin America* takes a chronological approach to the examination of the Latin American experience. Divided into four volumes, each devoted to one of the four time periods that define Latin American history, this unique reference work contrasts sharply with traditional encyclopedias. It provides students and general readers the opportunity to examine the complexity and vastness of the region's development and culture within a given time period and to compare the time periods.

Volume I, *Amerindians through Foreign Colonization*, focuses on the pre-Columbian period from the earliest Native American societies through the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores. Scholars continue to debate the number of Native Americans, or "Indians" as Christopher Columbus labeled them, who resided in the Americas when Columbus first reached the region in 1492. Estimates range from a low of 10 million to a high of slightly more than 100 million. While most scholars agree that the earliest waves of migrants came to the Americas across the Bering Straits land bridge as early as 40,000 years ago, there is continued debate over both the dates of settlement and descent of the earliest settlers. More recent scholarship in Chile and Brazil place the earliest New World migrants to 33,000 B.C.E. and suggest them to be of South Asian and Pacific Islander—rather than Eurasian—descent.

By the time of the European arrival on Latin America's mainland in the early 1500s, three highly organized Native American societies existed: Aztec, Maya, and Inca. Mexico's central valley was home to the rigidly stratified Aztec society, which by the time of the conquest reached southward and eastward to the Caribbean coast. The Aztecs had earned a reputation for their military prowess, for the brutal exploitation of the peoples brought into the empire, and for ceremonial city building, evidenced by its capital, Tenochtitlán, the site of contemporary Mexico City. From Peru's Cuzco Valley, the Inca Empire in South America stretched 3,000 miles (4,287 km) through the Andes mountain chain and inland to the east from Ecuador, in the north, to Chile, in the south. Through a tightly controlled bureaucracy, the Incas exercised control of the conquered communities. The Maya civilization began approximately in 1000 B.C.E. and, through a system of independent city-states, extended from Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula through Guatemala. For reasons not yet fully understood, Classic Maya civilization began its political collapse around 900 C.E., but Mayan society and culture remained intact. Aside from the three major groups, many other Native American societies existed throughout Latin America, such as the Arawaks and Tainos in the Caribbean and the Mapuche and the Guaraní in Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile.

Marked differences separated groups within the larger society and each group from the other. For example, even today, the Mexican government reports nearly 200 different linguistic groups; Guatemala, 26 different Mayan dialects; and an estimated 10 million Native Americans speak some form of the Quechua language in the high

Andes along South America's Pacific coast. Elaborate ceremonies that included human sacrifice characterized the Aztec, Inca, and Maya religions. Agriculture was the primary economic pursuit of all Native American groups, while hunting and fishing were pursued by some groups. Textiles and metalwork usually contained designs peculiar to each indigenous group.

Volume II, *From Colonies to Independent Nations*, focuses on the Spanish colonial period, from the early 16th century through the early 19th century. At the beginning of this time period, the Spanish explored the South and North American continents, laying out an empire in the name of the king and queen of Spain and the Roman Catholic Church. Despite the vastness of the empire, which stretched from Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America to the far reaches of the northwest Pacific Coast, eastward to the Mississippi River and into the Floridas, the Spanish attention focused on the areas of modern-day Mexico and Peru. Both were home to significant Native American societies and rich in mineral wealth, particularly gold and silver. The colonies existed for the benefit of Spain, and the application of mercantilist economic policies led to the exploitation of natural resources, regulation of manufacturing and agriculture, and control of international trade, all of which contributed to a pattern of large land holdings and abuse of labor. In effect, the system drained the colonies of its specie and other wealth and negated economic development and the emergence of a significant entrepreneurial class in the colonies. The Spanish imposed their political and cultural systems on the colonies, including the Native Americans. A highly centralized governmental structure provided little opportunity for political participation by the Spanish colonial residents, except in matters at the local level. The colonial laws and rules were made in Spain and enforced in the New World by officials appointed by the Crown. During the colonial period, the Catholic Church became an entity unto itself. It administered education, hospitals, social services, and its own court system. It tithed its followers and charged fees for religious services. Because the church was exempt from taxes to the Spanish Crown, it emerged as a colonial banker and a benefactor of the Spanish colonial system. The church, therefore, was not anxious to see the system change.

In theory, the Brazilian colonial experience paralleled the Spanish model, but in application, the Brazilian model was much different. The states established on Brazil's Atlantic coast were administered like personal fiefdoms by the king of Portugal's appointed authorities. Because the colony lacked natural resources for mass exploitation and a Native American population to convert to Catholicism, Portugal gave little attention to its New World colony.

Latecomers to the New World, the British, French, and Dutch colonization schemes were confined to the Caribbean region. As with the Spanish and Portuguese,

each island fell victim to the political system of the mother country. Over time, the local governments of the British became more representative of the resident population. The economic focus on sugar production caused the importation of slave labor from Africa.

New World discontent in the mid-17th century led to reforms in the Spanish colonial system, but it took European events in the early 19th century to bring about Latin America's independence by 1826. Only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish rule, and the British, French, and Dutch maintained control over their Caribbean island positions. Brazil received its independence on September 7, 1822, but continued to be governed by a member of the royal Portuguese family until November 15, 1889.

The legacies of colonial rule became evident immediately following independence. The establishment of governmental institutions and the place of each nation in the growing global economy that characterized 19th-century Latin America are the subject of volume III, *The Search for National Identity*. In addressing these issues, political and religious leaders, intellectuals, and foreigners who came to Latin America were confronted by the legacies of Spanish colonial rule.

The New World's Spanish descendants, the creoles, replaced the Spanish peninsulars at the apex of the rigid social structure and sought to keep political power confined to themselves. Only conflicting ideologies separated the elite. One group, the Conservatives, remained tied to the Spanish tradition of a highly centralized government, a privileged Catholic Church, and a hesitancy to reach out to the world. In contrast, the Liberals argued in favor of a greater decentralization of political power, the curtailment of church privileges, and greater participation in world affairs, particularly trade. Liberals and Conservatives, however, did not want to share political power or wealth with the laboring classes, made up of mestizos, Native Americans, or blacks. The dispute over the authority of central governments played out in different ways. In Argentina and Chile, for example, Conservatives Juan Manuel de Rosas and Diego Portales produced constitutions entrenching the Spanish traditions. In Central America, it signified the disintegration of the United Provinces by 1839 and the establishment of Conservative-led governments. The contestants for Mexican political power took to the battlefield, and the struggle produced 41 presidents from 1822 through 1848.

The Latin American world began to change in the 1860s with the emergence of Liberal leaders. It increasingly contributed raw materials to industrialized Europe. The heads of state welcomed foreign investment for the harvesting and processing of primary products and for constructing the supportive infrastructure. And, while the Liberals struck against church privileges, as in Chile during the 1880s, they still retained political power and continued to discriminate against the working classes.

Brazil and the colonized Caribbean Islands fell within the same purview as Spanish America. Although Brazil peacefully achieved independence in 1822, it continued its monarchical form of government until 1889. During that same time period, Brazil participated in the world economy through the exportation of sugar, followed by rubber and coffee. Meanwhile, the Caribbean Islands from Cuba southward to Trinidad and Tobago continued to be administered as part of European colonial empires. Administrators from Spain, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands arrived to govern the island and to oversee the exportation of primary products, usually sugar, tobacco, and tropical fruits.

Latin America's participation in the global economy accelerated in the 20th century, but the new era also brought new players in the region's economic and political arena—the United States and Latin America's lower socioeconomic groups. These concepts form the basis for the entries in volume IV, *The Age of Globalization*.

The U.S. entry into Latin American affairs was prompted by the Cuban struggle for independence from 1895 to 1898 and the U.S. determination to construct a trans-isthmian canal. The U.S. three-month participation in the Cuban-Spanish War in 1898 and its role in securing Panama's independence in 1903 also confirmed long-standing assumptions regarding the backwardness of Latin American societies, owing to the legacies of the Spanish colonial system. More obvious was the need to secure the Panama Canal from foreign interlopers. U.S. policymakers combined the two issues—political and financial irresponsibility and canal security—to justify U.S. intervention throughout the circum-Caribbean region well into the 1920s. U.S. private investment followed the government's interventions and together led to the charge of “Yankee imperialism.”

The entrance or attempted entrance into the national political arena by the middle and lower socioeconomic groups remained an internal affair until after World War II, when they were considered to be part of an international communist movement and again brought the United States into Latin America's internal affairs. Argentina and Chile provide early 20th-century examples of the middle sector entering the political arena while the governments continued to suppress labor. The results of the Mexican Revolution (1911–17) provided the first example of a Latin American social revolution addressing the needs of the lower socioeconomic class at the expense of the elite. In the 1920s and 1930s, small Communist or communist-like political parties or groups emerged in several countries, including Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, and Peru. While of concern at the time, the presence of communism took on greater importance with the emergence of the cold war in 1945, when the “generation of rising expectations” fused with the Communists in their call for a complete overhaul of the socioeconomic and political structures rooted in Spanish colonialism. In the ambience of the cold war, however, the 1954 presidential

election of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Fidel Castro's actions in Cuba in 1959 and 1960, the 1963–65 political crisis in the Dominican Republic, the administration of Chilean president Salvador Allende from 1970 to 1973, and the Central American wars during the 1980s were intertwined into the greater context: struggles of freedom against international communism based in Moscow. To "save" these countries from communism, the United States intervened but in so doing restored and propped the old order. The struggle against communism also resulted in a generation of military governments across South America.

Beginning in the 1980s, democratic governments replaced military regimes across Latin America, and each

of the countries experienced the growth of new political parties, mostly left of center. The new democratic governments also accepted and implemented the neoliberal, or free-market, economic model in vogue at the time. By the mid-1990s, many of the free-market reforms were in place, and Latin America's macroeconomic picture had vastly improved. Still, the promised benefits failed to reach the working classes: Half of all Latin Americans remained poverty stricken. In response to their personal crisis, beginning in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela, the Latin American people started placing so-called leftists in their presidential palaces. Latin America may be at the precipice of another change.

❖ HOW TO USE THIS ENCYCLOPEDIA ❖

The *Encyclopedia of Latin America* explores broad historical developments within the context of four time periods that together make up the complete Latin American historical experience. For example, the student or general reader can learn about a given country, when it was a “location” during the pre-Columbian period (volume I), a part of the Spanish colonial empire (volume II), a new nation struggling for its identity (volume III), or in its search for modernity (volume IV). The same can be done with political ideas and practices, economic pursuits, intellectual ideas, and culture patterns, to mention just a few of the themes that are explored across the four volumes. To locate topics in each of the four volumes, the reader should utilize the list of entries in the front matter of each volume. Words set in SMALL CAPITAL LETTERS in the body of a text indicate that an entry on this topic can be found in the same volume. At the conclusion of each entry are cross-references to related entries in other volumes in the set. For further help with locating information, the reader should turn to the comprehensive set index that appears at the end of volume IV.

Within each volume, the entries focus on the time period at hand. Each volume begins with an introduction providing a historical overview of the time period, followed by a chronology. A glossary of terms can be found in the back matter of the book. Each entry is followed by a list of the most salient works on the subject, providing the reader the opportunity to further examine the subject. The suggested readings at the end of each entry are augmented by the select bibliography appended to each volume, which offers a listing of the most important works for the time period. The further readings for each entry and selected readings for the volume together form a comprehensive list of Latin America’s most important historical literature.

Each volume also includes a collection of documents and excerpts to illustrate the major themes of the time period under consideration. Offering eyewitness accounts of significant historical events and personages, they perhaps will encourage the user to further explore historical documentation.

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❧ INTRODUCTION ❧ TO THIS VOLUME

At the dawn of the 20th century, international attention was focused on Latin America. Europeans and North Americans alike viewed the nations from the Rio Grande River south to the Straits of Magellan as a source of raw materials to feed the demands of industrialization and foodstuffs to feed their people; as a market for their manufactured goods; as an investment opportunity for the exploitation of natural resources; and as a region to construct badly needed infrastructure and develop banking and commercial institutions. The British, Germans, and French led the way in the late 19th century. The North Americans were latecomers, but as the 20th century progressed, they became the most influential foreign interloper in Latin American affairs.

Latin America's governing class welcomed the foreign business community, which was viewed as the vehicle to the modernization of their respective countries. In need of capital to exploit, transport, and market their primary products, Latin American governments created an attractive environment for foreigners. Corporations could bring into the countries, duty free, all the necessary equipment, tools, and machinery for their operations. Thus, the British and North Americans shipped rails to Argentina and Mexico, respectively, to construct railroads that reached into the interior of each nation to bring beef and wheat to the international market. The Chileans permitted U.S. companies such as Anaconda, Braden, and Kennecott to bring in heavy equipment to harvest copper and construct railroads to port cities for its shipment abroad. The same was true for the banana industries in Central America and the sugar industries in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. Early in the 20th century, Latin America lacked the managers and skilled workers essential for the administration of these economic pursuits. To fill the void, foreign companies transferred personnel to Latin America, having successfully argued that special privileges would entice them to come. The companies negotiated supplemental

agreements that permitted the duty-free entry of foreign-made clothing, furniture, specialty foods, fine china and jewelry, and even particular Scotch whiskies and U.S. bourbons. The privileges granted to the United States in the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty paralleled those granted to individual companies, commercial houses, and businessmen.

The economic changes across Latin America in the first half of the 20th century also resulted in demographic changes. Among the most obvious were the growth of cities across the continent. While the rapidity of population growth was most notable in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago de Chile, other cities had similar experiences, including Bogotá, Lima, Veracruz, and Santo Domingo. In urban centers, primary products were processed, ancillary products and some consumer goods were manufactured, and banking and other commercial houses were established. The coastal port cities also benefited from their role in international trade.

The urban centers attracted native rural labor and in some instances, such as Buenos Aires, also European workers looking to improve their own quality of life. Latin American labor laws militated against urban workers, however. The laws did not protect workers from various forms of exploitation, including low wages and poor working conditions, and mitigated against unionization. When workers attempted to organize, as they did in Mexico from 1906 to 1908 and in Buenos Aires in 1919, they were forcefully repressed by their respective governments, and foreign-born labor leaders were deported. Rural labor fared no better. Large estates, or *latifundios*, dominated the production of fruits and vegetables in Chile, bananas in Central America, and sugar in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Without legal protection, rural workers also were exploited. Additionally, both unskilled urban and rural labor suffered from a lack of health care and adequate housing. Local elites and foreign investors were the only real beneficiaries of this system.

While the lower socioeconomic groups remained a potential source for political change, Latin America's political system remained closed before the 1930s to all but the elite, except in Mexico. The Mexican Revolution (1910–17) was an attack on the privileged landed elite and the country's primary foreign investor, the United States. As a result of the revolution, the Mexican government gained the constitutional right to control land and natural resources and to protect workers' rights and improve their quality of life. The Mexican Revolution was followed by the emergence of a plethora of "leftist" political parties in the 1930s in Latin America that appealed to the lower socioeconomic groups. Political populists such as Argentina's Juan D. Perón, Brazil's Getúlio Vargas, and Panama's Arnulfo Arias emerged and railed against the workers' plight and the elite's privileges.

For two generations following the end of World War II in 1945, Latin America experienced sociopolitical challenges to the traditional order that became entangled in the complex issues of the cold war. These challenges were interpreted either as legitimate nationalist movements for change or as part of an international communist conspiracy. In 1948, José Figueres did not draw much international attention when claiming that he had saved Costa Rica from communism through his victory in a 48-day civil war, but six years later, in 1954, when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency sponsored the overthrow of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz, the world took notice. Arbenz's land reform program promised to benefit the rural Native Americans and mestizos at the expense of the landed elite and the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company, and he was accused of being a communist. Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution ran afoul of similar interpretations. Initially viewed as a guerrilla striking out against elitist and corrupt government and U.S. dominance of the Cuban economy, Castro came to be seen as a communist because of his land distribution program, wage controls, and government organization of society and control of economic policy. The same issue surrounded Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front and El Salvador's Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in Central America during the 1980s. While these movements can be considered extreme responses to political and social rigidity, the same cannot be said about Chile, with its traditional democratic political system. Chilean governments became so gridlocked after World War II that they failed to adequately address the socioeconomic needs of urban and rural laboring groups, and in so doing, they paved the way for the democratic 1970 presidential election of self-professed Marxist Salvador Allende.

The cold war's leading characteristic—communism versus democracy—brought the United States directly into Latin America's internal affairs, but that involvement did not begin until the beginning of the 20th century. The 1898 Cuban war for independence and the decision to construct a transisthmian canal at Panama

vaulted the United States directly into the internal affairs of the circum-Caribbean region. For the first generation and a half, the United States based its Caribbean policy on securing the Panama Canal from external threats that could come from European gunboats sent to collect overdue debts or from regional political turmoil that could spill into Panama and threaten the canal's operation. The U.S. government pursued policies that sought to bring political and fiscal responsibility to Latin American nations, as seen in the 1902 Platt Amendment that was embedded in the Cuban constitution and at the 1907 and 1923 Central American conferences. The policies failed to bring political and fiscal order, but they did contribute to growing anti-U.S. sentiment across the continent and to the U.S. pronouncement of its good neighbor policy in 1933. Global events, however, contributed to a continued close relationship between the United States and Latin America's elite rulers.

For the most part, Latin Americans cooperated with U.S. policies during World War II, including measures against Axis residents and descendants. The anti-Axis attitude of the Latin American elite quickly transformed into an anticommunist one as the war drew to a close and the ambitions of the "generation of rising expectations" emerged. While the middle sector sought its own participation in the closed political systems, the workers' spokesmen demanded socioeconomic improvements for the wider populace. The elite accepted the small middle sector into the system and in turn received its support to resist workers' "communist" demands. Within the cold war's perspective, U.S. policy makers determined that communist labor leaders were capitalizing on workers' demands to gain legitimate control of governments. Thus, from the late 1940s until the mid-1980s, the United States continued to support the elite's continuation in power. With the exception of the Alliance for Progress, U.S. economic assistance and military programs helped secure the established order. The Latin American elite came to oppose many of the Alliance for Progress's programs—land distribution, creation of a new entrepreneurial class, a transparent legal system, and a broader-based and more open democracy—and therefore contributed to the Alliance's failure because it threatened their privileged position.

Events during the latter part of the 20th and early 21st century suggest that Latin America is on another precipice of change. The path to change began with the winding down of the international cold war that put communism's appeal to rest. In this new era, Latin Americans accepted, as did the rest of the world, the neoliberal economic model that required free market and financial reforms. During the same time period, Latin America became increasingly democratic, which led to a plethora of new political parties, mostly appealing to the lower socioeconomic groups. The two collided in the late 1990s, and this carried over into the 21st century. By the mid-1990s, neoliberal economic reforms were in place,

but workers' quality of life had not improved. In the new democratic climate, workers supported populists such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega. Mexicans voted for change in 2000 with the presidential election of Vicente Fox of the rightist National Action Party, which ended 70 years of rule by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. At the same time, as Latin America's political dynamics were changing, so too were its global affiliations.

The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 that anticipated a Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. free market within a decade, in reality mirrored other regional economic arrangements. Led by Brazil, Latin Americans resisted the U.S. vision for a Free Trade Association of the Americas as a continuation of U.S. hegemonic efforts in the hemisphere. Instead, Latin Americans set out to strengthen their own regional arrangements and to complete trade agreements with other nations.

ORGANIZATION AND COVERAGE

The entries contained in this volume convey the wide range of Latin America's internal developments in the 20th century and the region's place in the international community. Broad topical entries on economics, politics, and women, for example, augment the text on individual nations, persons, and events. The entries on significant persons such as Castro, José Carlos Mariátegui, and Perón highlight their contributions to the Latin American experience. Entries reflecting the arts—art, music, and literature—explain the broad parameters of their changing scope throughout the 20th century. Those on inter-

national events, from the independence of Panama in 1903 to treaty discussions between the European Union (EU) and MERCOSUR in the late 20th century, not only discuss the event itself but place it within the larger parameters of hemispheric and global relations.

Users of this volume can expand their understanding of a given entry by referring to the cross-references included in each one. These direct the reader to individuals and topics that relate to the specific entry at hand. For example, to appreciate the stagnation of Chilean politics after World War II and the 1970 election of Allende, the reader should refer not only to the Chile and Allende entries but also to those on political parties and economics. Likewise, for a better understanding of the EU-MERCOSUR linkage, the reader might also refer to entries on economics and trade patterns. The reader might also use the complete list of entries in the front of this volume, as well as the end-of-entry references to cross-volume related entries, to find the historical roots of selected topics.

The readings suggested at the conclusion of each entry are the most germane to the given topic and the most detailed studies of it. The bibliography at the back of the volume provides the reader a further opportunity to explore the tapestry of the Latin American experience by augmenting these specialized works with works of a broader perspective. Meanwhile, the appendix brings together a collection of readings and documents that illustrates the broader themes suggested at the beginning of this introduction: Latin America's challenge to U.S. hegemony in the region and the challenge to the elite's dominance of the internal affairs by the emerging middle and lower socioeconomic groups.

❧ TIME LINE ❧

(CA. 1900–PRESENT)

1897

- General Eloy Alfaro becomes president of Ecuador, setting in motion a 30-year period of Liberal rule and marking the beginning of Ecuador's modern history.

1898

- With assistance from the United States, Cuba wins its war for independence from Spain, and the United States gains permanent control of Puerto Rico.
- The United Fruit Company is established and over the next half century exerts significant economic and political influence in several circum-Caribbean nations, particularly in Central America.

1902

- Cuba becomes an independent nation with Tomás Estrada Palma as its first president after its acceptance of the Platt Amendment, which grants authority to the United States to intervene in its political and fiscal affairs.

1902–04

- European gunboats blockade the Venezuelan coast to force debt repayments to continental financiers.

1903

- With U.S. support, Panama achieves independence from Colombia. Panama then signs the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which permits the United States to construct a transisthmian canal through Panama.
- José Batlle is elected to his first term as president of Uruguay. He sets the nation on a socialist course that for the most part remains in place at the start of the 21st century.

1904

- In his annual message to Congress, U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt announces his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
- General Rafael Reyes becomes the first of a series of Conservative presidents who govern Colombia until the Great Depression in 1930.

1906

- U.S. troops begin a three-year occupation of Cuba that results in new electoral laws and the election of José Miguel Gómez as president.

1907

- Meléndez family comes forward to dominate politics in El Salvador until 1931.

1908

- General Juan Vicente Gómez seizes control of the Venezuelan government and begins a 27-year military dictatorship.
- Building on the research of a Cuban doctor, U.S. Army surgeon William Gorgas eradicates malaria in the Panama Canal Zone.

1909

- Following a decade of labor-government conflict, Chilean workers form the Gran Federación de Obreros de Chile.

1910

- With his major opponent, Francisco Madero, jailed, Porfirio Díaz wins his last presidential election; it is followed by an insurgency that marks the beginning of the Mexican Revolution.
- Division of Latin American Affairs is established in the U.S. State Department.

1911

- Porfirio Díaz is ousted from the Mexican presidency and is replaced by Francisco Madero.

1912

- U.S. Marines land in Nicaragua to quell three years of civil disorder following the 1909 overthrow of strongman José Santos Zelaya.
- Argentina implements the Sáenz Peña Law that mandates universal male suffrage and the use of secret ballots in elections.

1913

- Mexican president Francisco Madero is killed during a coup d'état engineered by General Victoriano Huerta.

1914

- Panama Canal opens to world shipping.
- In Jamaica, Marcus Garvey founds the United Negro Improvement Association.

1915

- United States begins its 19-year occupation of Haiti.

1916

- In the midst of the Mexican Revolution, rebel Francisco “Pancho” Villa attacks Columbus, New Mexico.

1917

- A new Mexican constitution is adopted that grants the central government extensive powers over the national economy.
- Brazil becomes the only South American nation to declare war against Germany during World War I.
- Oil is discovered in Venezuela and within 10 years becomes the country's leading export.
- For \$25 million, the United States purchases the Danish Caribbean Virgin Islands.

1919

- In Peru, the 25-year period of relative political peace and economic prosperity known as the “Aristocratic Republic” comes to an end with the start of the “Ocenio,” the 11-year dictatorship of Augusto B. Leguía.

1920

- Through constitutional manipulation, Manuel Estrada Cabrera is removed from the Guatemalan presidency after 22 years in office.

1921

- According to the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, the United States compensates Colombia \$25 million for its loss of Panama and provides for free transit of Colombian ships through the Panama Canal.

1923

- The Conference on Central American Affairs ends in Washington, D.C., with agreements to withhold diplomatic recognition from revolutionary governments and to replace standing armies with national guards.
- In Mexico, Peruvian Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre establishes the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana.
- Mexican revolutionary Francisco “Pancho” Villa is assassinated.

1924

- Anglo Ecuadorean Oilfields, Ltd., discovers oil on the Ecuadorean coast.
- Following the Dominican Republic's ratification of a financial agreement that establishes a U.S.-controlled customs receivership, marines are withdrawn from that country.

1926–29

- Cristeros conduct a campaign against the Mexican government and the anticlerical provisions of the 1917 constitution.

1927

- In Nicaragua, Augusto César Sandino ignites a six-year guerrilla war against the U.S. presence in the country.

1928

- Following his election victory in November, President-elect Herbert Hoover makes a 10-week goodwill tour of Latin America.

- Through unconstitutional means, Gerardo Machado is reelected president of Cuba and extends his term to six years, setting off a political crisis.

1929

- Chile and Peru settle the territorial Tacna-Arica dispute.
- A global depression commences. It will last until the outbreak of World War II.

1930

- The U.S. State Department publishes the Clark Memorandum, which refutes the 1904 Roosevelt corollary as a legitimate extension of the Monroe Doctrine.
- In Peru, Lieutenant Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro ousts President Augusto B. Leguía, a move that begins a period of economic and political instability.
- In Brazil, a coup d'état elevates Getúlio Vargas to head of state.
- The commander of the Dominican Republic's army, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, seizes control of the government, marking the start of a 31-year dictatorship.

1931

- Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador and Jorge Ubico in Guatemala establish dictatorships that last until 1944.
- Panama's national police assist the nationalistic group Acción Comunal to overthrow President Florencio Harmodio Arosemena, marking the military's entry into national politics.

1932

- Bolivia and Paraguay commence the Chaco War.
- A peasant uprising led by Agustín Farabundo Martí in El Salvador is brutally repressed by the military.
- Tiburcio Carías Andino becomes president of Honduras, commencing a dictatorship that lasts until 1948.

1933

- At the 7th Pan-American conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull announces the good neighbor policy that forswears further U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations.
- In Cuba, Fulgencio Batista leads the "Sergeant's Revolt" that results in socialist Ramón Grau Martín becoming president.

1934

- Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto César Sandino is assassinated by government troops in Managua.
- With U.S. encouragement, Fulgencio Batista directs the ouster of Ramón Grau Martín as Cuban president and replaces him with Carlos Mendieta.
- In a new treaty, the United States and Cuba abrogate the Platt Amendment and provide for the continued U.S. occupation and use of its naval base at Guantánamo Bay.
- A new Brazilian constitution extends the presidency of Getúlio Vargas for another four years.

1934–40

- Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas nationalizes the foreign-owned rail and oil industries and implements a 44-million-acre land distribution program.

1935

- Bolivia and Chile agree to a truce in the Chaco War.

1936

- Anastasio Somoza de García gains control of the Nicaraguan government, establishing a family dynasty that will last until 1979.
- Getúlio Vargas declares a Novo Estado, or "new state," in Brazil that grants government control over a corporate economic state.
- Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo directs the killing of an estimated 12,000 Haitians in the northern border region of the two nations.

1938

- The Mexican government nationalizes U.S.- and British-owned oil companies.
- The Communist and Socialist Parties form an alliance to create a Popular Front in Chile.
- Integralists fail in their fascist putsch against Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas.
- A peace treaty formally ends the Bolivian-Paraguayan War and grants Paraguay ownership of the disputed Chaco territory.

1939

- Following the outbreak of the European war, the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere meeting at Panama declare the establishment of a safety zone around the Western Hemisphere.

1940

- In response to German victories in Europe, the Western Hemisphere's foreign ministers meet in Havana, where they approve a "no-transfer" principle designed to deny Germany access to French, Dutch, and potentially British possessions in the Caribbean.
- A new constitution, considered the most progressive in Latin America at the time, is instituted in Cuba, after which Fulgencio Batista is elected to a four-year presidential term.
- Rexford Tugwell is appointed governor of Puerto Rico and introduces Operation Bootstrap to foster the island's industrial development.

1941

- Mexico and the United States agree to a compensation package for the 1938 nationalization of U.S.-owned oil companies.
- U.S. involvement in World War II begins after the Japanese attack the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Brazil and Mexico subsequently send troops abroad to fight on the Allied side.
- The Panamanian National Police replace populist president Arnulfo Arias, a critic of the United States, with Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia, who is sympathetic to U.S. interests in the canal zone.
- Peruvian troops defeat Ecuadorean forces in their ongoing border dispute.

1942

- The Western Hemisphere's foreign ministers adopt measures that place civil rights restrictions on Axis residents in Latin America.

1942–45

- President Manuel Ávila Camacho uses U.S. World War II economic assistance to initiate Mexico's industrialization.

1943

- The Argentine military establishes a dictatorship that includes Colonel Juan Perón as secretary of labor.

1944

- Violent demonstrations and protests and the loss of military support force the resignation of Presidents Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador and Jorge Ubico in Guatemala.
- The government-established House of Ecuadorian Culture significantly increases educational, artistic, and scientific opportunities throughout Ecuador.

1945

- Juan José Arévalo becomes Guatemala's first civilian president in 14 years.
- In Peru, José Luis Bustamante y Rivera is elected president with support from the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, legalized as a political party for the first time since 1932.
- The military forces the ouster of Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas.

1946

- Juan Perón is elected president of Argentina; his subsequent nationalization of foreign-owned industries includes compensation.
- Brazil's first national steel plant, Volta Redonda, is inaugurated.

1947

- Latin American and U.S. delegates meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, agree to the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Pact, which calls for cooperation should there be an attack on one of the hemispheric nations.
- Evita Perón spearheads a campaign in Argentina that results in women receiving the right to vote.

1948

- Colombian labor leader Jorge E. Gaitán is assassinated during rioting in Bogotá that contributes to the emergence of guerrilla groups claiming to represent the interests of the nation's poverty-stricken people.
- Organization of American States is established.
- Military coup in Venezuela leads to the dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez.
- A 44-day civil war in Costa Rica results in the emergence of José Figueres as a prominent political figure for the next generation.
- Chile's Law for the Defense of Democracy outlaws the Communist Party.
- Ecuador's "banana boom" begins, making the country a major player in the global market.
- Luis Muñoz Marín becomes the first Puerto Rican to be elected governor of Puerto Rico.

1950

- Jacobo Arbenz is elected president of Guatemala, and his administration is characterized by reform, particularly land distribution.
- Puerto Rican nationalists fail in their attempt to assassinate U.S. president Harry S. Truman.

1952

- Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz signs into law a sweeping land reform bill that provides for the distribution to peasants of privately held unused land.
- Realizing that he cannot win a fair presidential election, Fulgencio Batista seizes control of the Cuban government.
- Bolivian army caves into public pressure and permits Victor Paz Estenssoro to assume the presidency following his electoral victory. Paz will implement sweeping government-sponsored socioeconomic programs.

1953

- Fidel Castro is sentenced to 15 years in prison for his leadership role in the unsuccessful July 26 attack on the Moncada military barracks in Santiago de Cuba.

1954

- The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency engineers the ouster of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz, paving the way for military rule and nearly 40 years of civil strife.
- General Alfredo Stroessner seizes control of the Paraguayan government, beginning his 35-year dictatorship.
- Brazilian president Getúlio Vargas commits suicide in his office.

1955

- In a general amnesty, Fidel Castro is released from prison in Cuba and flees to Mexico.
- Argentine military ousts President Juan Perón, who flees first to Paraguay and then to Spain.

1956

- Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza de García is assassinated. His son Luis ascends to the presidency.
- Fidel Castro returns to Cuba and escapes into the Escambray Mountains, where he conducts a three-year guerrilla war against President Fulgencio Batista.

1957

- Construction of Brasília begins. It will replace Rio de Janeiro as Brazil's capital city.
- Great Britain grants internal self-government to Jamaica.
- François Duvalier comes to power in Haiti's first universal suffrage election and subsequently keeps control through a reign of terror.

1958

- During a goodwill tour of Latin America, U.S. vice president Richard M. Nixon meets with Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek, who proposes an economic development plan for Latin America.
- Venezuelan military ousts President Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Elections bring civilian Rómulo Betancourt to office.
- Central American foreign ministers agree to the establishment of a Central American Common Market that goes into effect two years later.
- Facing a loss of civilian and military support, on New Year's Eve, President Fulgencio Batista flees Cuba for the Dominican Republic.

1959

- Fidel Castro victoriously marches into Havana to introduce Cuba to a revolutionary and dictatorial regime.

1960

- Venezuela is among the founding members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States.
- Amid soaring tensions, the United States imposes a sugar embargo on Cuba that prompts Castro to nationalize U.S.-owned industries on the island; this is followed by a U.S. trade embargo that continues to the present day.

1961

- Before leaving office, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower severs diplomatic relations with Cuba.
- The Sandinista National Liberation Front is established in Nicaragua.
- U.S. president John F. Kennedy announces the Alliance for Progress.
- Fidel Castro's forces repel the U.S.-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.
- Vice President João Goulart becomes Brazil's president following the resignation of Jânio Quadros.
- The family of Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo flees the country following his assassination.

1962

- At its meeting in San José, Costa Rica, the foreign ministers vote to expel Cuba from Organization of American States activities.
- The United States forces the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

1962–83

- Beginning with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 1962, Great Britain grants independence to Guyana (1966), the Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), Dominica (1978), St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1979), Belize and Antigua and Barbuda (1981), and St. Christopher and St. Nevis (1983).

1963

- Fidel Castro makes his first visit to the Soviet Union.
- Under the auspices of Alliance for Progress funds, the School of the Americas opens in the Panama Canal Zone to train Latin American military officers.

1964

- Anti-American riots erupt following a failed effort by Panamanian students to fly their national flag at Balboa High School in the canal zone.
- Organization of American States approves a hemispheric embargo against and the severing of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
- With clandestine U.S. financial support, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei is elected president of Chile, but throughout his six-year term, Frei is unable to deliver on socioeconomic reform promises.
- With tacit U.S. approval, Brazilian military ousts João Goulart, marking the beginning of a 21-year military dictatorship.

1965

- United States sends 40,000 troops to the Dominican Republic in order to prevent an alleged communist takeover of the country.

1966

- Joaquín Balaguer is elected president of the Dominican Republic and rules until 1978.

1967

- Ernesto “Che” Guevara is killed by Bolivian forces in a remote area of the Andes.
- Panamanian military officer Manuel Noriega begins a near 20-year career as an informant for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
- U.S.-based oil giant Texaco-Gulf makes a major oil discovery in Ecuador’s Amazon region that within a decade triggers a period of prosperity.

1968

- Fidel Castro directs the nationalization of the estimated 55,000 private businesses operating in Cuba.
- General Juan Velasco Alvarado seizes control of the Peruvian government and begins a seven-year period of social and economic reform.

1969

- Lieutenant Colonel (later general) Omar Torrijos becomes Panama’s head of state.

1970

- Self-professed Marxist Salvador Allende wins the Chilean presidential election.
- Fidel Castro’s goal of a 10-million-ton sugar crop fails to materialize, bankrupting the Cuban economy and forcing him to turn to the Soviet Union for economic assistance.
- Panama banking laws are changed so that it can become one of the world’s largest “offshore” banking centers.

1971

- Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeds his father as Haiti’s dictator.

1972

- Michael Manley is appointed prime minister of Jamaica.

1973

- Chilean president Salvador Allende is killed during a military coup d’état led by General Augusto Pinochet, who sets in motion a 15-year brutal and nondemocratic regime.
- Amid the country’s economic and political turmoil, the Argentine military permits the return of Juan Perón from Spain to be elected president of Argentina for the third time.

1974

- Colombia’s political violence is replaced by the emergence of warfare between competing drug cartels and the cartels and the government for the next 35 years.

1975

- Argentina’s military government begins an eight-year “Dirty War” against “radicals” that results in uncounted deaths and an estimated 10,000–30,000 disappeared persons.
- Venezuelan government nationalizes the oil industry.

1976

- Isabel Perón, who succeeded her husband to the Argentine presidency in 1974, is ousted by the military.

1977

- U.S. president Jimmy Carter and Panama's head of state, Omar Torrijos, sign the Panama Canal Treaties that provide for the United States to relinquish control of the canal and canal zone to Panama by the end of 1999.
- Cuba and the United States establish “interests sections” in each other's capitals.
- In Argentina, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo begin their silent marches in front of the presidential offices to protest the dictatorship and the “disappeared ones,” those unaccounted for in the military's Dirty War to eliminate all leftists from the country.

1979

- Strongman Anastasio Somoza flees Nicaragua, ending a 43-year family dynasty. The Sandinistas take control of the Junta of National Reconciliation that governs the country.

1980

- In El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front is founded. In San Salvador, Archbishop Oscar Romero is assassinated by a right-wing death squad.
- Approximately 250,000 Cubans flee the country in the Mariel boatlift. Fidel Castro uses the exodus as a means to deport criminals and mentally and physically ill people.
- Anastasio Somoza DeBayle is assassinated in Asunción, Paraguay, by Argentine radicals.
- General Manuel Antonio Noriega succeeds General Omar Torrijos as head of state in Panama following the latter's death in an airplane crash.
- In Peru, the radical guerrilla group known as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, unleashes a “people's war” in Andean indigenous communities that eventually spreads into the cities.

1981

- U.S. president Ronald Reagan terminates U.S. financial assistance to Nicaragua and approves the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's plan to direct a counterrevolutionary movement against the Sandinistas. Reagan also approves a massive military assistance program to the Salvadoran government to battle the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.

1982

- In an eight-week war, British forces defeat Argentine troops to maintain control over the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean.
- Mexico's suspension of service payments on its international debt obligations triggers a Latin American debt crisis.

1983

- Pope John Paul's visit to Central America is marred by a confrontation with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the execution of six guerrillas in Guatemala.
- The political unrest that follows Argentina's loss to Britain in the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982 leads to the election of Raúl Alfonsín as president.
- With support from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the United States sends military forces into Grenada to rescue U.S. students on the island but also to prevent the emergence of an alleged communist regime.

1984

- Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte defeats right-wing candidate Roberto D'Aubisson in El Salvador's presidential election.

1985

- Alan García becomes the first Aprista candidate to be elected president of Peru.
- José Sarney becomes Brazil's first civilian president in 21 years.

1986

- The inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo as president of Guatemala marks the country's return to civilian government.
- In Ecuador, indigenous groups band together to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities to defend and promote Indian land rights, religion, and culture.
- Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier and his family flee the country's turmoil, eventually finding haven in France.

1987

- Central American presidents accept the proposed peace plan of Costa Rican president Oscar Arias to end the fighting in Central America.

1988

- Contras agree to terminate their war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

- General Manuel Antonio Noriega seizes control of the Panamanian government and uses the military to crush opposition groups.
- Noriega is indicted by Miami and Tampa, Florida, grand juries on drug trafficking and racketeering charges.
- In a national plebiscite, General Augusto Pinochet loses his bid to govern Chile for an additional eight years.
- Carlos Salinas de Gortari becomes president of Mexico after a contested election. In a break with Mexico's past, Salinas will accept neoliberal economic policies and initiate discussions that lead to the North American Free Trade Agreement.

1989

- The United States initiates Operation Just Cause, which results in the arrest of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega and returns him to Miami to face drug charges.
- Government forces defeat an uprising in San Salvador sponsored by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and kill six Jesuit priests and their housekeeper at the Universidad Centroamericana.
- Ousted from office by a military coup d'état, Paraguayan dictator General Alfredo Stroessner flees to Brazil.
- Patricio Alwyn, candidate of the left-of-center 17-party Consternación coalition, becomes Chile's first civilian president in 17 years; the coalition continues to govern the country into the 21st century.

1990

- Violeta Barrios de Chamorro defeats Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua's presidential election.
- Political unknown Alberto Fujimori is elected Peru's president. He initiates an economic austerity program and launches an all-out war against the Shining Path.
- A massive demonstration by indigenous groups and sympathizers throughout Ecuador illustrates their importance in the nation's political dynamics.
- U.S. president George H. W. Bush launches the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative that envisages a Western Hemispheric free trade zone.
- For the first time, Cuban trade relations with the Soviet Union are conducted in "hard currency."

1991

- *Peronista* Carlos Saúl Menem becomes president of Argentina, but to the disappointment of his urban labor supporters, he implements neoliberal economic policies.
- Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay establish the Southern Cone Common Market, or MERCOSUR.

- With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba loses its major benefactor and enters a "special period" of economic hardship.
- Guatemala extends diplomatic recognition to an independent Belize.
- An outbreak of cholera, not seen since the 19th century, symbolizes Peru's decades-old socioeconomic woes.
- Jean-Bertrand Aristide assumes the Haitian presidency but is overthrown by the military eight months later. A crisis follows when the U.S. government refuses the admission of thousands of Haitians fleeing the country.

1992

- The governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua begin the implementation of the Central American Peace Accords.
- In an "*autogolpe*," or self-coup, Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori suspends the constitution and closes Congress.
- Peruvian military capture Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán in Lima.

1993

- Juan Carlos Wasmosy becomes Paraguay's first civilian president in 40 years.

1994

- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) goes into effect on January. It establishes a common market between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. On the same day, Zapatista National Liberation Army in Chiapas violently awakens Mexico to protest the government's lack of assistance to the country's indigenous peoples and the implementation of NAFTA.
- U.S. president Bill Clinton hosts the first Summit of the Americas to initiate planning for a Free Trade Association of the Americas.
- Argentine president Carlos Saúl Menem successfully maneuvers a constitutional adjustment that permits his election to a second consecutive term.

1995

- Following the August exodus of an estimated 20,000 *balestros* from Cuba to the United States, the two governments reach an agreement to control immigration across the Florida Straits.
- With 88 percent of the popular vote, René Preval wins the Haitian presidential election and enters office in the first peaceful transfer of power in the nation's history.

1996

- The Guatemalan government concludes a peace agreement with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity to end the country's 36 years of civil strife.
- Pope John Paul II visits El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

1997

- An estimated 2 million Ecuadoreans demonstrate across the country to force President Abdalá Bucaram to resign and flee the country.

1998

- Pope John Paul II becomes the first Catholic prelate to visit Cuba. He publicly denounces Cuba's human rights record and calls on the United States to lift its trade embargo on the country.
- Former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet is arrested and detained in Great Britain on a Spanish warrant charging him with responsibility for the death of Spanish citizens residing in Chile during his administration.
- In response to previous government corruption and drastically low living standards, Hugo Chávez is elected president of Venezuela.
- Ecuador and Peru settle their border dispute, a controversy that dated to the Spanish colonial period.

1999

- Mireya Moscoso, the widow of Arnulfo Arias, becomes the first female president of Panama.
- In a mass before 10,000 people at Mexico City's Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe, Pope John Paul II rails against the global culture of violence.
- At noon on December 31, the United States formally hands over control of the Panama Canal to Panama.

2000

- General Augusto Pinochet is released from house arrest in Great Britain and returns to Chile.
- Vicente Fox, candidate of the rightist Partido de Acción Nacional, is elected president of Mexico, the first non-member of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional since 1929 to become president.
- In accordance with Venezuela's new constitution, Hugo Chávez is reelected president.
- Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori flees to Japan amid corruption charges.

2001

- Following a financial crisis, the Argentine economy collapses, and its effects spill into Brazil. Economic recovery begins in 2006.

2003

- Former leftist labor leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is elected president of Brazil. Despite his socialist philosophy, he implements moderate socioeconomic programs.

2004

- United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement goes into effect.

2005

- Free trade agreement is concluded between the United States, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

2006

- Owing to an unidentified illness, Fidel Castro “temporary” passes Cuban leadership to his brother, Raúl Castro.
- Evo Morales is elected president of Bolivia, the first person of indigenous descent to hold this office.
- Despite growing opposition that included demonstrations, work stoppages, and a national referendum to remove him from office, Hugo Chávez is reelected president of Venezuela.
- Consternación candidate Michelle Bachelet is elected the first female president of Chile.
- Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias is elected to a second term as president of Costa Rica.
- Sandinista strongman and leader against the U.S.-sponsored Contra War during the 1980s, Daniel Ortega wins Nicaragua's presidential election.
- The Dominican Republic and Haitian governments conclude an agreement to end 200 years of racially motivated conflict between the two nations.

2007

- To meet the needs of larger ships, construction begins on a third set of locks for the Panama Canal.
- Alberto Fujimori returns to Peru from Chile on an extradition warrant to face corruption charges during his presidential administration.
- United States–Peru Free Trade Agreement goes into effect.
- The Venezuelan electorate rejects proposed constitutional amendments that would have tightened Hugo Chávez's grip on government.

2008

- Cuban president Fidel Castro officially resigns, owing to illness, and is succeeded by his brother, Raúl Castro.
- Bolivian president Evo Morales survives a recall referendum.
- Twelve South American nations—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela—join to create the Union of South American Nations, modeled after the European Union.
- Brazil's National Petroleum reports the discovery of large oil deposits off its Atlantic coast.
- Russia dispatches ships, planes, and troops to conduct joint military exercises with Venezuela.

2009

- U.S. president Barack Obama promises closer U.S. relations with Latin America at the Summit of the Americas meeting in Trinidad and Tobago.
- On January 12, 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale strikes 15 miles west of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, killing approximately 225,000 and injuring another 300,000.
- On February 27, 2010, an 8.8 magnitude earthquake, followed by aftershocks and tsunami waves, strikes south-central Chile, claiming hundreds of lives and hundreds more injured and missing.

✿ ENTRIES A TO Z ✿



Acción Comunal Initially a secret society founded by middle-sector professionals in Panama City, PANAMA, on August 19, 1923, the organization came to represent Panamanian nationalists who challenged the ruling elite and the country's relationship with the United States. Outside the milieu of the traditional Liberal-Conservative elite politics that had dominated Panama since independence in 1903, Acción Comunal represented the small businessmen, engineers, lawyers, medical personnel, and bureaucrats who labored outside the Panama Canal Zone and wanted greater economic and political opportunities. The society was influential in the 1924 election to the National Assembly of Harmodio Arias Madrid and subsequently was responsible for the 1931 coup d'état that vaulted him to the presidency and for the election to the presidency of his brother, ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID, in 1940 and 1949.

Acción Comunal advocated for a greater government role in society and an EDUCATION program that stressed traditional Panamanian values and culture, including the teaching of the Spanish language. It called for government programs to assist Panamanian, but not West Indian, laborers in gaining jobs in the canal zone and to aid the rural poor through land acquisition programs. The founding of the National University in 1935 ensured the education of a new generation of intellectuals imbued with these nationalist concepts, which in turn increased demands for government action. Their nationalist rhetoric blamed the United States and West Indians for all that was wrong in Panama. After World War II, Panamanians throughout the country increased their nationalistic demands for Panamanian control of the canal and found expression in the events leading to the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Treaties (see PANAMA CANAL TREATIES).

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Act of Chapultepec (1945) The Act of Chapultepec was a resolution adopted at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace convened at Mexico City, Mexico, from February 21 to March 8, 1945, that called for the consultation of American states when one of those states was attacked directly or indirectly or when its political independence or sovereignty was threatened. Following the consultation, the American states would respond in unison, including in taking military action.

The resolution was another in a series of Latin American efforts to limit U.S. unilateral action in the hemisphere and particularly in the Caribbean. In their desire for greater Latin American input in hemispheric policy and actions, the delegates were also concerned that the upcoming San Francisco Conference, scheduled for April 25 to June 26, 1945, to establish the United Nations (UN) would grant that organization the authority to supersede any regional action. The issue was settled with Article 51 of the UN's charter, which provided that regional self-defense action could be taken provided it was immediately reported to the UN Security Council for consideration. Significantly, the article did not obligate the UN to take any action. These restrictions, however, did not prevent subsequent unilateral interventions in the Caribbean by the United States.

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Adams, J. M. G. M. "Tom" (b. 1931–d. 1985) *prime minister of Barbados* Born on September 24, 1931, in Spooner's Hill, BARBADOS, John Michael Geoffrey Manningham Adams, better known as Tom Adams, was the only son of Grantley Adams (b. 1898–d. 1971), the founder of the Barbados Labour Party (BLP). After studying at Harrison College in Barbados, Adams earned an M.A. in politics, philosophy, and economics at Oxford University in 1965. After briefly working for the British Broadcasting Corporation, he returned to Barbados in 1966 to pursue a political career. Adams was elected to the House of Assembly in 1966, and in 1971, after his father died, he became the leader of the opposition.

The BLP defeated ERROL BARROW's Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in the 1976 parliamentary elections, and Adams became prime minister (1976–85). One of his first acts was to rename the Seawell Airport the Sir Grantley Adams International Airport. Adams pursued a foreign policy closely aligned with the United States and supported OPERATION URGENT FURY, the U.S.-led invasion of GRENADA in 1983, by sending a contingent of the Barbados Defense Force to accompany American troops. Following the invasion, the United States agreed to expand the infrastructure of the international airport in Barbados and the development of the Regional Security System, based at the Sir Grantley Adams International Airport, to provide security for the eastern Caribbean. The greatly expanded runway made the Sir Grantley Adams International Airport one of the few places in the world where the Concorde made regular flights. The four-hour flight from London to Barbados was especially popular with British tourists.

Adams's decision to support the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada was the subject of intense political debate in Barbados. Barrow, the leader of the opposition, sharply criticized Adams's policy and accused the prime minister of being a puppet of Ronald Reagan's administration. The majority of the Barbadian population, however, eventually supported Adams's initiative in the conflict. Political analysts believed that Adams would easily win the 1986 parliamentary elections. Adams, however, died following a heart attack in Bridgetown on March 11, 1985. He was succeeded by his deputy prime minister, Bernard St. John. In the 1986 elections, St. John lacked mass popular appeal, and Barrow's DLP was swept back into office.

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agriculture Agriculture has long been the primary economic pursuit of working Latin Americans. Pre-Columbian societies cultivated a wide variety of crops including avocados, chili peppers, maize (corn), potatoes, and tomatoes; they also raised guinea pigs and turkeys for domestic consumption. Many of these items remain part of Latin America's traditional diet. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Spanish and Portuguese brought new food items from Europe to Latin America, including barley and other grains, citrus fruits, and table vegetables. They also brought livestock and subsequently coffee, sugarcane, and bananas from Africa. Over time, the economic interchange transformed the character of pre-Columbian agriculture.

The Spanish economic system also altered landholding patterns. Indigenous community-owned lands (*ejidos*) were replaced by large Spanish-owned tracts known as *encomiendas* (and later haciendas) with the title holder gaining labor rights to the NATIVE AMERICAN tenants. Latin America's independence from Spain did not significantly alter landholding patterns, and by mid-19th century, the term *latifundio* was used to describe large, privately owned estates. Peasants who remained tied to a landowner had little, if any, opportunity to improve their quality of life, and those who drifted deeper into the countryside eked out a living on poor soil without the benefits of mechanization, fertilizers, or other modern



A young woman inspecting growth of coffee beans, a staple export crop of several nations in the circum-Caribbean region and Brazil (*Office of Inter-American Affairs, Photography and Research*)

farming methods. This process also led to a closed political system that was directed by the elites at the expense of the poor.

Advances in technology and TRANSPORTATION again changed the face of Latin American agriculture in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Europe's industrial revolution resulted in the rapid rise of urban centers that lured rural workers to factories and prompted the overseas search for foodstuffs. Steam-powered and subsequently motorized vessels, along with refrigeration technology, made Latin America's agricultural produce readily available to the world's markets. As a result, Argentine beef, wheat, and wool were exported to Europe. BRAZIL sent sugar, rubber, and most important, coffee. European colonies and other states in the Caribbean produced sugar, coffee, and tropical fruits for foreign consumption. Central American coffee was a common site on the docks at Hamburg, Germany. Two countries, CUBA and MEXICO, became tied to the U.S. market. Although Cuba was still a Spanish colony until 1898, the primary market for its sugar and tobacco was the United States. When Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz (b. 1830–d. 1915) opened his country to foreign investment in the late 19th century, U.S. businesses invested heavily in the grain and cattle industries to feed both U.S. and European consumers. Two U.S. companies with circum-Caribbean-wide holdings were the United Fruit Company, which specialized in bananas and other tropical fruits, and the Knight Sugar Company. The primary beneficiaries of this system were Latin America's large landowners and foreign agricultural investors. Furthermore, with time's passage, the financial costs of modernization and construction of supporting infrastructure could not be met locally, which created new opportunities for foreign investment. During this same time period, Latin American governments found ways to move the indigenous and peasants off their lands and make them part of the *latifundio* system. The loss of small farms adversely affected the local food supply.

The Great Depression that dominated the 1930s followed by World War II stung Latin America's agro-export sector. Not all countries could strike barter agreements for their primary products, as ARGENTINA did with Great Britain, thus providing a safety valve for its wheat and beef. Germany used the Aski mark, a special currency system of bank credits to purchase Latin American foodstuffs, but Aski marks could only be spent on German manufactured goods. U.S. reciprocal trade treaties had minimal impact, as most Latin American goods already entered that country under most favored nation status. Except for certain primary products, such as Argentine beef and wheat, Brazilian rubber, and Cuban and Caribbean sugar, Latin America's agro-export sector further deteriorated during World War II.

The years immediately after World War II did not improve for agriculture. Latin Americans were advised to await Europe's economic recovery from the war, when that continent could again import Latin American pro-

duce; in fact, European demand for Latin American agricultural products never returned to pre-depression levels, as Europe had found a more amenable trading partner in the United States. Two countries, Brazil and Mexico, used U.S. wartime aid to stimulate industrialization, while others such as Argentina and CHILE used profits from the international sale of their primary products to do the same (see INDUSTRY). In Cuba, an odd combination of legislators representing local sugar interests and Communist-led urban LABOR unions voted against accepting U.S. grants and loans to diversify the postwar ECONOMY. The Cuban sugar growers wanted only to continue the benefits of the wartime economy. They did not accept the fact that the new world sugar producers would come back to the market and instead demanded that the government in Havana seek new markets for the products. The Communists, wanting to maintain their socioeconomic prominence and place in the political system, mistrusted the United States.

In response to the 1959 CUBAN REVOLUTION, the UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID) promoted rural development and agrarian reform in Cuba in the 1960s and early 1970s. While the United States received much criticism for its loss of interest in the program following President John F. Kennedy's death in 1963, Latin America's elite also created obstacles. They had no interest in sacrificing any of their landholdings to peasants, much less see them provided with the financial credits and supplies to make those holdings successful. Peasants themselves were wary of the unknown. The elite did benefit from USAID's modernization programs, however, which increased production through such things as mechanization and the use of fertilizers. Government and nongovernment organizations sponsored rural development programs were not the only means attempted to bring about change. Revolution was another.

The Mexican, Guatemalan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan upheavals shared the common objective of land redistribution to the rural poor. The Mexican CONSTITUTION OF 1917 provided the legal cover for the government to acquire the country's vast *latifundio* system and to redistribute those lands in small tracts and *ejidos* to peasants. An estimated 44 million acres (17.8 million ha) alone were redistributed in the 1930s. Guatemalan president JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN's land redistribution program led directly to the 1954 U.S.-sponsored invasion of GUATEMALA and restoration of the old order. FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's various initiatives to create farmer's cooperatives never satisfied the local demand for food, while the world market found its sugar elsewhere. The model implemented in NICARAGUA suffered from administrative ineptitude and a 10-year U.S.-sponsored guerrilla war.

From the 1970s onward, Latin American countries experienced mass MIGRATION to urban areas so that by the end of the 20th century, only about one-

third of the workforce labored in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, agriculture today still employs more people than any other single sector in Latin America, and agricultural exports account for slightly over half of the region's exports. The neoliberal economic model adopted in the 1980s accounts for the increased global demand for certain Latin American products: soybeans and other grains, beef, and forest products, all of which are grown on large estates, including domestic and foreign corporations. During this agro-export growth, urban centers faced food shortages that led to the introduction of urban farming in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, and elsewhere. In the early 21st century, governments across the region were examining ways to open new lands in order to produce foodstuffs for domestic consumption.

See also AGRICULTURE (Vols. I, II, III); COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE (Vols. I, II); LATIFUNDIO (Vol. III).

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Alfaro Delgado, José Eloy (b. 1842–d. 1912) *dominant Ecuadorean politician from 1897 to 1911* Born in Montecristi in Manabí Province, ECUADOR, José Eloy Alfaro Delgado was the son of a Spanish immigrant businessman and a mixed-blood Ecuadorean woman. At age 22, Alfaro became involved in revolutionary politics on behalf of the Liberal cause between 1865 and 1871, after which he fled to PANAMA and became a successful businessman, married, and fathered eight children. From Panama, he disbursed funds to Liberal causes throughout Latin America, earning an international reputation as a stalwart against Conservative governments. He returned to Ecuador in 1895 to led the successful Liberal Revolution. A constituent assembly elected him president in 1897, setting in motion 30 years of Liberal rule. He returned to the presidency in 1906 for a second term. Alfaro initiated many anticlerical measures, including the nationalization of CATHOLIC CHURCH properties, secularization of EDUCATION, limitations on the public activities of the clergy, and establishing state control over marriage and divorce. During his term, U.S. entrepreneur Archer Harman completed the construction of a railroad between Guayaquil and Quito. Alfaro attempted to determine the future of Ecuadorean politics following

the untimely death of President-elect Emilio Estrada (b. 1855–d. 1911) on December 21, 1911. Condemned by the public for attempting to use the government for his own purposes, Alfaro and his followers were taken from a Quito jail by a mob and brutally murdered on January 18, 1912.


See also CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III).

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Allende Gossens, Salvador (b. 1908–d. 1973) *president of Chile* Born into a middle-class family in Valparaíso, CHILE, Salvador Allende Gossens was educated in local public schools and, in 1933, earned a medical degree from the University of Chile, where he was active in student politics and accepted the principles of socialism. With others, including MARMADUKE GROVE VALLEJO, Allende was a leader in the coup that resulted in the 10-day Socialist Republic of Chile in June 1932. A year later, he was a founding member of the Socialist Party, and in 1937, at age 29, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The Socialists became part of the Popular Front that led to the 1939 presidential election of Pedro Aguirre Cerda (b. 1879–d. 1941), who appointed Allende minister of health. Allende was elected four times to the Senate between 1945 and 1969, earning a reputation as an excellent parliamentarian, and was president of the Senate from 1965 to 1969. During his time in the Senate, Allende authored or coauthored many pieces of legislation that displayed his understanding of a government's social responsibilities: New legislation established a medical college; family and pregnancy assistance for the poor; and social security for workers, peasants, widows, and orphans.

Until 1952, Allende also held several offices in the Socialist Party, including that of secretary-general. However, he and some of his colleagues left the party following the decision to support the presidential candidacy of CARLOS IBÁÑEZ DEL CAMPO. Allende's group founded the People's Front and nominated him for the presidency that same year, but he garnered only 4 percent of the popular vote. In 1956, Allende's People's Front joined with the Communist, Socialist, and small leftist parties to form the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular, or FRAP), which supported Allende's presidential bids in 1958 and 1964. Allende lost to Jorge Alessandri (b. 1896–d. 1986) by only 35,000 votes in the 1958 contest, a result that raised expectations for his next bid. But, changing world conditions by 1964 militated against a FRAP victory. The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a peak: After the nuclear arms race that followed the Soviet launching of *Sputnik* in 1957 and the raising of the Berlin Wall in 1961, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ had begun his CUBAN



A statue of President Salvador Allende in Santiago, Chile. Elected on September 4, 1970, Allende served until ousted by a military coup d'état on September 11, 1973. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

REVOLUTION, and the subsequent 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION and the 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS not only threatened the world with war but raised the specter of the spread of communism across Latin America.

Allende's 1964 campaign was plagued by these new global conditions, in particular Castro's revolution in Cuba. The Christian Democrats, the CATHOLIC CHURCH, and the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties, all painted a frightening picture of Cuba. They asserted that if Allende won the 1964 election, the same political tyranny, lack of civil and political rights, attack on the Catholic Church, and depressed ECONOMY would prevail in Chile. The U.S. government agreed: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funneled \$3 million into EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA's campaign. Allende was roundly defeated in the September 4, 1964, elections. Frei captured 55.6 percent of the popular vote, and Allende, 38.6 percent.

At best, Frei had a mixed record of success during his six-year presidency. In the 1970 presidential election, Allende, now running under the Popular Unity (UP) banner, received 36.3 percent of the vote; Conservative Jorge Alessandri, 34.9 percent; and Christian Democrat,

Radomiro Tomić (b. 1914–d. 1992), 27.8 percent. While awaiting congressional approval of the election results in November, there was a significant amount of political maneuvering by Conservatives and the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano [PDC]) to deny Allende the presidency. Additionally, the Conservatives and the United States were linked to coup plots. Amid the uncertainty, rich Chileans began withdrawing their funds from local banks, depositing them abroad for safekeeping. No action was taken to deny Allende his victory, and on November 3, 1970, Congress confirmed him as president of Chile.

Allende's first actions as president only proved to his critics their belief that he was a tyrant. He decreed a one-time wage increase and then a price freeze. He used the funds from Frei's "Chileanization" program to support his own housing, education, and medical assistance programs. For a year, Allende's economic policies appeared successful: Industrial growth increased by 8.3 percent, and agricultural output, by 5.3 percent, and the government was adequately managing the \$315 million balance of payments deficit. The optimism changed to pessimism in 1971 with the nationalization of U.S.-owned businesses such as copper companies, International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T), Ford Motor Company, W. R. Grace, and the Bank of America. Castro's visit to Chile on November 10–11, 1971, only confirmed the worst fears that Allende belonged to the international communist movement.

The 1970 government mandated that wage increases remain frozen, thus wages did not keep pace with rising prices caused by a shortage of consumer goods and foodstuffs. Unemployment increased, and government revenues decreased following U.S. president Richard M. Nixon's edict to halt U.S. importation of Chilean copper. Nixon also successfully maneuvered to prevent the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank from extending further credits to the Allende administration. Clandestinely, the CIA provided financial support for antigovernment demonstrations and other forms of protest in Chile and paid truck drivers not to deliver foodstuffs to the cities. By the end of 1972, the Chilean economy hit new lows. Inflation stood at 323 percent, agricultural imports were up 84 percent over 1970, and real wages had dropped by 7 percent in the same period. Allende's proposal to replace Congress with a one-house legislature of the people struck at the heart of the nation's political history of democracy and threatened the elite and middle sectors. By summer 1973, rumors abounded about a possible coup d'état. It came on September 11, when Army Chief of Staff AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE engineered Allende's ouster. Allende died during the fighting, possibly by his own gun. With Allende's death, Chile's socialist experiment came to an abrupt end. Pinochet would replace it with a brutal military dictatorship and a neoliberal, or free market, economy.

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Alliance for Progress On March 13, 1961, U.S. president John F. Kennedy pledged that the United States would work to satisfy the basic human needs of all Latin Americans and that these socioeconomic improvements would be carried out within a democratic framework. Kennedy cautioned that “those who do not make evolutionary change possible make revolution probable.” Kennedy’s warning addressed not only the historical roots of Latin America’s socioeconomic and political disparities but also international and local events such as the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the spread of communism after World War II, and FIDEL CASTRO RUZ’S 1959 CUBAN

REVOLUTION. Occupied with containing communist expansion in Western Europe, Korea, and Southeast Asia, the United States ignored pleas from Latin America’s leadership for a program similar to the 1948 European Recovery Program (ERP), or Marshall Plan, as it was popularly known. Only after the U.S.-sponsored invasion of GUATEMALA in 1954, which restored the old order, did U.S. policy change (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). In 1956, Brazilian president JUSCELINO KUBITSCHKE DE OLIVEIRA warned U.S. authorities that if it did not support socioeconomic changes, it faced the probability of hemispheric turmoil. A 1959 U.S. congressional report reaffirmed Kubitschek’s view.

Kennedy envisioned a \$20-billion, 10-year U.S. commitment in public and private capital and another \$80-billion effort from Latin American governments, the world’s other industrial nations, and international financial institutions. On August 17, 1961, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) met in Punta del Este, URUGUAY, to draft the Charter for the Alliance for Progress, as envisioned by Kennedy and Kubitschek.

The Alliance for Progress’s charter called for long-term economic planning, balanced production, and Latin



“Barrio Alianza” Alianza in Bogotá, Colombia, a housing project constructed with funds provided by the Alliance for Progress (*United States Information Agency*)

American economic integration to bring about price stability, prevent price swings in the commodity markets, and prevent sharp fluctuations in exchange rates that discouraged exports and reduced foreign investment throughout the region. Ultimately, these economic measures would result in a minimum 2.5 percent annual increase in the per capita income.

The Alliance for Progress also called for an extensive agrarian reform program, more equitable distribution of national income, more low-income housing, increased medical services in both urban and rural areas, increased educational opportunities, and a reduction in Latin America's high population growth rates. Kennedy also encouraged cultural exchanges that included bringing Latin Americans to the United States to educate North Americans about Latin America's cultural richness and diversity.

The Alliance for Progress furthermore called on Latin American governments to curtail MILITARY spending and use those funds for socioeconomic improvements. To achieve this objective, the military would take on a new role by conducting counterinsurgency programs designed to alter its traditional brutal image and to build popular loyalty to the state rather than to communists who promised a better world through the destruction of the existing order. Under this program, the military would engage in civic action programs that included providing medical care, constructing health and sanitation facilities, clearing forests and jungles for agricultural purposes, building houses and roads, and conducting literacy and technical skills training. The military would also shift its emphasis from defending against possible border attacks to internal security.

The Alliance for Progress did not achieve its lofty goals for several reasons. Following its initial euphoria, the United States lost interest in the program as it became more involved in the Vietnam War. Despite his Great Society program at home, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson did not share Kennedy's interest in social reform in Latin America and dismantled much of the U.S. government infrastructure that administered the program. President Richard M. Nixon had even less interest in the region. Believing in military solutions to guerrilla conflict, both presidents increased arms sales to Latin America. Although there were some improvements in health, education, and welfare, Latin America's elite and middle sectors opposed using national taxes to go beyond the U.S. expenditures. The elite opposed land redistribution programs and along with the middle sector, resisted the implementation of a progressive tax program. Equally strenuously, the elite and middle sectors refused the democratization requirements that the Alliance for Progress called for, such as broadening the electoral base, ending rigged elections, and holding elections free of intimidation. They had no interest in sharing political power with the lower socioeconomic sector. Instead of democracy, during the 1960s, there were 16 extraconstitutional changes in government throughout Latin America resulting in military regimes. As the decade

progressed, the military also altered its focus from civic action programs to crushing suspected and real guerrilla groups. In that process, the police and military used U.S. military assistance to brutalize the population.

Given these conditions, in 1970, the U.S. Congress began to cut funding for the Alliance for Progress until its closure in 1973. During that three-year period, the UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT transferred many of its activities to a private-sector initiative called Partners for the Americas.

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Amazon Regional Cooperation Agreement

(Amazon Pact) (1978) Popularly referred to as the Amazon Pact, the Amazon Regional Cooperation Agreement was signed on July 3, 1978, by representatives of the governments of BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, GUYANA, PERU, SURINAME, and Venezuela to promote the harmonious development of the Amazon region and to share the benefits of that development among the contracting parties. While the pact intended to curtail foreign development of the Amazon region, the member nations lacked sufficient financial resources to develop it on their own. In the mid-1980s, the member states turned to world financiers but faced environmental requirements as prerequisites for loans and grants. This led to the establishment in 1989 of a committee on natural resources and the environment to design environmental projects that would satisfy lenders' requirements. It also led to discussions on economic integration, which resulted in the creation of the ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS in 1996.

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American Popular Revolutionary Alliance

(Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana; APRA; Aprista Party) The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, or Aprista Party, was founded by Peruvian VICTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE on May 1, 1924, while he

was in exile in Mexico City. Originally, Haya de la Torre envisioned a continent-wide organization that would advocate a return of the Panama Canal to PANAMA, stand against U.S. imperialism, and oppose the ruling elites throughout Latin America. While the Aprista Party subsequently did influence several Latin American political parties, most notably COSTA RICA'S NATIONAL LIBERATION PARTY (PLN) and BOLIVIA'S NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MNR), it is identified with PERU. APRA originally appealed mainly to the sugar workers who had lost their jobs to mechanization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but subsequently attracted many university students and middle-sector people, who wished to change Peru's closed and corrupt political system. At one time, APRA was populist, anti-oligarchical, reformist, and nationalist. It called for control of foreign capital, agrarian reform, industrialization, and the redistribution of wealth. According to Peru's ruling military-elitist clique, APRA was nothing more than a communist organization that it would never permit to take political power.

Haya de la Torre stood as APRA's presidential candidate in 1931, after which the party was outlawed until 1945 because its leftist orientation challenged Peru's established order. A constant target of the ruling MILITARY, Haya de la Torre was forced to seek refuge in the Colombian embassy in 1948, where he remained for five years. In 1956, he negotiated an agreement with ruling general Manuel A. Odría (b. 1897–d. 1974), under which APRA was permitted to participate in politics in return for “modifying” its position on reform. The pact did not prevent the *apristas* from continuing to oppose government policies.

Finally, APRA's ALAN GABRIEL LUDWIG GARCÍA PÉREZ won the 1985 presidential contest. His administration fell on hard times in part due to global economic conditions adversely affecting his program at home. The economic doldrums also led to the election of ALBERTO KEINYA FUJIMORI. Fifteen years after completing his first term, García returned to the presidency on July 28, 2006, after winning a runoff election against Olineta Humala, candidate of the left-of-center Union of Peru Party.

Throughout its existence, APRA has experienced a significant amount of infighting, with those with more “leftist” or radical tendencies leaving to establish new parties or movements such as the Popular Action Party (AP) in 1956, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in 1965, and the TÚPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) in 1984. Although APRA has held the Peruvian presidency only twice in its existence, its influence in shifting national politics from oligarchic control to more inclusionary democratic regimes has been significant.

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Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones; CAN) On May 26, 1969, the Treaty of Cartagena formed a trade bloc that included BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, PERU, and CHILE. By 2008, members of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) had a combined gross domestic product of \$745.3 billion and included an estimated 120 million people. In 1976, Chilean president AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE announced the withdrawal of his nation from CAN on the grounds of economic incompatibility, and Chile was quickly replaced by VENEZUELA. In 1993, an operational free trade zone came into being among Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. A 1997 agreement provided for Peru's gradual incorporation into the Andean Free Trade Zone.

Following the initiation of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT in January 1, 1994, and U.S. president Bill Clinton's pursuit of a FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA), several Latin American nations saw a need to band together to counter what they perceived to be another U.S. effort to exert influence in the Western Hemisphere. To resist this, CAN joined with the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR), established in 1992, to unite all of the South American nations before dealing with the United States on an FTAA, and in 2005, each country became an associate member of the others' trade bloc. On September 20, 2006, Chile returned to CAN as an associate member with the stated intention of seeking full membership, which was done a year later. Today, Venezuela's status remains unclear. On April 23, 2006, that country's president, HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS, announced his nation's withdrawal from CAN because Peru and Colombia had completed free trade agreements with the United States, his avowed enemy. Chávez hesitated three days later, when on April 26, 2006, he announced that he would reconsider his decision. Today, Venezuela has not completed the paperwork to withdraw, and its Foreign Ministry says that the process might take five years.

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Anthony, Kenny (b. 1951–) *prime minister of St. Lucia* Born on January 8, 1951, in Laborie, SAINT LUCIA, Kenny Anthony earned a B.S. in government and history from the University of the West Indies in 1976. He returned to ST. LUCIA and began teaching at the Vieux Fort Secondary School. In 1977, he was elected president of

the St. Lucia Teachers' Union. In reward for his support of the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP), he was appointed minister of education in 1980, a position that he held until 1981. Anthony earned a Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham in England in 1988. He taught law at the University of the West Indies from 1988 to 1996.

In 1996, he returned to St. Lucia and was elected leader of the SLP. He won the 1997 parliamentary elections and became prime minister on May 24, 1997. One of his first acts in office was to break official diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognize the People's Republic of China. Although Anthony was successful at strengthening the national economy, and especially the tourism industry, the distribution of wealth became more skewed during his tenure. Anthony suffered a surprise defeat in the December 2006 parliamentary elections. Although the United Workers Party (UWP) won 11 of the 17 seats in Parliament's House of Assembly, the popular vote was marginal. Anthony, however, retained his seat representing Vieux Fort South with a substantial majority and continued as leader of the SLP. When Prime Minister John Compton became incapacitated as a result of a series of heart problems in May 2007, Anthony


opposed the appointment of Stephenson King (1958–) as acting prime minister and, in September 2007, as prime minister. Instead, Anthony called for new elections, in which he would be a candidate.

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Antigua and Barbuda Located in the Leeward Islands, Antigua and Barbuda achieved independence from the United Kingdom on November 1, 1981. The nation consists of several islands, of which Antigua is the largest and most populous. Barbuda, the other major island, is located to the north of Antigua.

Occupying 171 square miles (443 km²) of territory, Antigua and Barbuda is located southeast of Saint Barthélemy, Saint Martin, and Anguilla; east of SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS; northeast of Montserrat; and north of Guadeloupe, DOMINICA, Martinique, SAINT LUCIA, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES. The capital and largest city, St. John's, is on the island of



View of Antigua's English Harbour from Shirley Heights (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

Antigua. More than 90 percent of Antigua and Barbuda's population of 83,000 is composed of people of African or mixed African and European descent. Whereas increasing numbers of Antiguan and Barbudans have left the islands to seek economic opportunities in the United States, over the past 25 years, some 5,000 U.S. citizens have moved to Antigua and Barbuda. The official language of Antigua and Barbuda is English. Antiguan Creole, a blend of West African languages and English developed during the 18th century, is spoken by the general populace. EDUCATION, however, is delivered in standard English. Upper-class Antiguan and Barbudans tend to deny the ability to speak or understand Antiguan Creole.

Christopher Columbus discovered the islands in 1493, naming the larger island Santa María de la Antigua, hence its current name. English settlers arrived in 1632 and quickly set about establishing plantations (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH). Christopher Codrington, who established the first large sugar estate on Antigua in 1674, leased the island of Barbuda to grow food for his slaves. The only town on Barbuda is named after Codrington. During the 18th century, Antigua was the headquarters of the British Caribbean Fleet. Although the British ended slavery in 1834, the economic opportunities for the freed blacks were limited. In 1939, the British government, in an attempt to improve the plight of the local population, urged the formation of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU). The ATLU became the political vehicle for VERE CORNWALL BIRD. Elected president of the ATLU in 1943, Bird was elected to the colonial House of Assembly in 1945. He established the Antigua Labour Party (ALP), which became the majority party in 1951. Bird served as chief minister from 1960 to 1967 and as premier from 1967 to 1971, when he was defeated by the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), led by George Walter. Bird, however, returned to power in 1976 and served as premier until Antigua and Barbuda gained independence. During the 1970s, internationally renowned cricketer VIV RICHARDS, a native of St. John's, became a hero for the people of Antigua and Barbuda.

Whereas Queen Elizabeth II is the head of state who appoints a governor to oversee the political system, the leader of the main political party in the House of Representatives is the prime minister. Bird served as prime minister from 1981 until he retired from politics in 1994. In the March 1994 parliamentary elections, power passed to Bird's son, Lester Bird, who was prime minister until 2004. The United Progressive Party (UPP), a coalition party formed in 1992 by the PLM, the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement, and the United National Democratic Party, led by BALDWIN SPENCER, won 12 of the 17 seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 parliamentary elections. A significant portion of the Antiguan and Barbudan population felt that the ALP was rife with corruption and nepotism. Antiguan author Jamaica Kincaid compared the Bird family to the Duvalier dictatorship in HAITI in her prose essay *A Small*

Place. Tourism, which accounts for more than 50 percent of all government revenue, has declined in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

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APRA See AMERICAN POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE.

Arantes do Nascimento, Edson See PELÉ.

Arbenz Guzmán, Jacobo (b. 1913–d. 1971) *president of Guatemala* The son of a Swiss immigrant farmer and a Guatemalan mother who resided in Quezaltenango, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán received his education at the Guatemalan Military Academy, where, in 1937, he became a social studies instructor. In 1939, he married María Cristina Vilanova, who had socialist sympathies despite her wealthy background.

Arbenz was an active participant in the demonstrations that led to the overthrow of JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA on July 1, 1944, and in the organization of the December 17–19, 1944, presidential election won by JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO. Shortly after Arévalo appointed him minister of defense, Arbenz began maneuvering to become GUATEMALA's next president. Allegedly, both men conspired to have army Major Francisco Javier Arana assassinated on July 18, 1949, in order to remove the last obstacle to Arbenz's election to the presidency, which occurred on November 5, 1950. Arbenz's electoral support came from lower-ranking MILITARY officers, urban labor, students, government workers, and some peasants. His campaign rhetoric, particularly the call to control foreign investment and the need for agrarian reform, could be interpreted as that of a populist, but in the climate of the cold war, the communist label stuck (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA).

Once in office, Arbenz proposed the construction of a government-owned Caribbean port at Livingston to challenge the United Fruit Company's (UFCO) operation at Barrios and to break the same's railroad monopoly, the International Railways of Central America (IRCA). Arbenz proposed a government-owned hydroelectric plant to offer cheaper electricity than did U.S. operations. While these proposals struck largely at the primary role of U.S. companies in the Guatemalan ECONOMY, his call for progressive income tax and the distribution of land to peasants stuck at the elite.

The catalyst to oust Arbenz came on June 17, 1952, when the legislature approved his Agrarian Reform Law, which provided for the expropriation of idle land on government and private estates for redistribution to peasants in plots ranging from 8 to 33 acres (3.2–13.4 ha). Under this program, 1.5 million acres (607,000 ha) of land were purchased for \$8.3 million in government bonds and redistributed to an estimated 100,000 peasants. The new owners would pay for the land at a 5 percent rate of the value of their production. These actions alarmed Guatemalan landowners. In March 1953, Arbenz struck at UFCO when the government took over 209,842 acres (84,920 ha) of its uncultivated land and offered \$525,000 in compensation, which was based on the land's value as reported by UFCO to taxing authorities. UFCO claimed that the land was worth \$16 million.

UFCO appealed to Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration in Washington and conducted its own public relations campaign in the United States. The company portrayed Arbenz as a communist, and the Eisenhower administration agreed, particularly after a Swedish shipment of Czech-made small arms was discovered in May 1954. While the U.S. secretary of state maneuvered to gain approval of the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) for his country's intervention in Guatemala, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency plotted the attack upon Guatemala with the intention of removing Arbenz from the presidency (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). The attack came on June 18, 1954, under the leadership of General Carlos Castillo Armas (b. 1914–d. 1957) from bases in HONDURAS. Arbenz resigned on June 27, and Armas assumed the presidency on July 8. Arbenz fled Guatemala and traveled throughout Europe before settling in MEXICO, where he died on January 27, 1971.

See also COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA; GUATEMALA (Vols. I, II, III, IV).


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architecture During the first three decades of the 20th century, several trends characterized Latin American architecture: modernism, national restoration, and art deco. The first, modernism, found acceptance in only a few places, such as ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and MEXICO. As a result, few examples remain today. The second, national restoration, also had few immediate results but was the first attempt at purely American architecture that led to the study of architectural heritage. Art deco led to



The entrance to the Presidential Palace in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, reflects European influence on Latin American architecture in the early 20th century. (U.S. Army Signal Corps)

the development of modern architecture, with its simplification of geometrical designs and use of reinforced concrete.

Modern architecture took hold after World War I in 1919 when native Latin American students went abroad for university study and put their training into practice upon returning home. Leaders in this movement included Chilean Emilio Duhart (b. 1917–d. 1984) and Venezuelan Carlos Villanueva (b. 1900–d. 1975), whose work took root during the 1930s and early 1940s.

Also during the generation following World War II, a sense of rationalization found its way into the modern design of hospitals, housing complexes, educational facilities, and government buildings. From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, there was greater experimentation with design and construction thanks to new technologies. This was evident in new and larger bank buildings and commercial centers, housing complexes, and research institutes. Latin American architecture suffered from a lack of imagination and creativity during the last generation of the 20th century owing to a more difficult economic climate. CUBA is a unique case. The urban decay seen there is most evident in Havana. "Old Havana," the center of Spanish influence, has been restored to help attract tourists, as have older city hotels, such as the Capri, while new hotels have been

constructed. Havana's once glittering waterfront, the Malecón, is currently under United Nations–sponsored restoration and renovation.

See also ARCHITECTURE (Vols. I, II, III); MODERNISM (Vol. III).

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Arévalo, Juan José (b. 1904–d. 1990) *president of Guatemala* BORN in GUATEMALA's Santa Rosa Province, Juan José Arévalo graduated in 1922 from the government's Normal School, a training ground for teachers, and thereafter worked in the Ministry of Education. Following JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA's election to the presidency in 1931, Arévalo went into exile in ARGENTINA, where he earned a doctorate in philosophy in 1934. He remained in Argentina until shortly after the July 1, 1933, coup that ousted Ubico. The middle-sector coup leaders encouraged Arévalo to return home and supported his successful bid for the presidency in the December 17–19, 1944, election. Arévalo took office on March 15, 1945.

Arévalo's socialistic philosophy and subsequent legislative program challenged Guatemala's traditional oligarchy made up of landowners, the MILITARY, and the CATHOLIC CHURCH. Coming to office at a time when the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union was beginning, both the Guatemalan oligarchy and U.S. policy makers came to see Arévalo as a communist, though for different reasons. The Guatemalan oligarchy wanted to maintain its privileged position in society, while the United States sought to stop the tentacles of international communism from reaching CENTRAL AMERICA (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA).

Designed to improve the quality of life mainly for urban workers, Arévalo's program included a social security law with worker's compensation, maternity leave, and minimum health care. LABOR unions and their right to strike were legalized. Hospitals and clinics were built throughout the country, and a government agency, the National Production Institute (INFOP), provided assistance to small farmers. Legislation in 1949 permitted peasants to rent unused land on large estates and the government to distribute German lands confiscated during World War II to peasants. Diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union on April 20, 1945, and the subsequent emergence of known local Communists, such as Manuel Gutiérrez Garbín (d. 1966) and José Manuel Fortuny (b. 1916–), as union leaders sealed the perception that Arévalo was taking Guatemala down the road to communism.

Arévalo came under increasing attack over time. The landed elite and their media spokespeople branded him as a communist. The archbishop of Guatemala, Mariano Rosell y Arellano (b. 1894–d. 1964), spoke out against

Arévalo and instructed the lower clergy to do the same. Arévalo survived 20 known coup attempts. U.S. ambassador Edwin J. Kyle viewed Arévalo's program within the local context. That perception changed in 1947 with the arrival in Guatemala City of a new ambassador, Richard C. Patterson. Patterson and his immediate superiors in the State Department saw Arévalo's programs within the larger Eastern and Central European context. Communism, they believed, had arrived in Central America.

Arévalo completed his term and was succeeded by JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN, who was ousted in a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency–designed and –led coup in 1954 (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). On the completion of his term in 1951, Arévalo resided in MEXICO. Arévalo's political career came to an end in 1963 when the military prevented his return to Guatemala to seek reelection. He did return in 1981, to reside in Guatemala City until his death on October 7, 1990.

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Argentina Consisting of approximately 1.1 million square miles (2.8 million km²), Argentina is located on South America's southeast coast, bordered by URUGUAY and the Atlantic Ocean to the east and CHILE to the west. BOLIVIA lies directly north and PARAGUAY and BRAZIL to the northeast. Today, nearly 85 percent of Argentina's 34 million inhabitants reside in urban areas. Nevertheless, its rich fertile lands, known as the Pampas, provided the primary products that gave the country entry into the global marketplace in the late 19th century, when technological advances such as refrigeration enabled Argentina to supply the rapidly industrializing western European nations, particularly Great Britain, with beef, wheat, and wool. For the first couple of decades of the 20th century, this TRADE relationship brought Argentina's landed elite newfound wealth, enabling them to enjoy lavish lifestyles and significantly contribute to Argentina's golden age.

During the same time period, the government opened the country to badly needed foreign capital for the construction of the infrastructure necessary to get the products to market. British and, to a lesser extent French, capital went toward building railroads and highways to connect the interior with the port at BUENOS AIRES, where foreign capital was used to build meat processing plants, warehouses, and port facilities. The British also entered

ancillary businesses in Argentina, such as banking and insurance. Many of the Britons who came to Argentina to manage these investments formed an “informal alliance” with the Argentine elite. Together, the two groups sought to maintain the system that served them well.

The export-based economy also produced a middle-sector group made up of white-collar workers such as managers, accountants, statisticians, skilled labor, and shopkeepers. As the 20th century progressed, the middle sector came to include others who benefited from liberal economic policies, particularly in education, including professors and students, and other professionals such as architects, doctors, lawyers, and journalists. With increasing economic power, this broad-based group sought participation in the political system to secure its own place in Argentine society.

A third group made up of urban laborers began to develop as the country’s economic focus started to shift from agriculture to export and industry. Urban labor subsequently became the largest group in Argentina’s socioeconomic structure. Argentina was never inhabited by large numbers of native Americans and thus lacked a local base from which to draw the labor required to work in the new urban industries. To fill the vacuum, Argentina opened its doors to thousands of European immigrants, mainly from Italy and Spain (see migration). By 1914, these immigrants accounted for approximately three-fifths of Argentina’s working class. However, the labor class lacked a political voice and faced opposition from the upper and middle sectors.

EXPORT-BASED ECONOMY (1880s–1930)

As elsewhere in Latin America after independence, in Argentina, elite Conservatives dominated the political process until the 1880s, when the Liberals took over. The Liberals opened the country to foreign trade, encouraged and protected foreign investment, and modernized Buenos Aires, which took on a European, and particularly French, atmosphere. Whether Conservative or Liberal, however, the elite had no intention of sharing political power. Argentina was a democracy only on paper until the election of Radical Party candidate Roque Sáenz Peña (1910–14) in 1910. The Radicals also held a majority in Congress and a year later approved Sáenz Peña’s proposal for universal male suffrage, the secret ballot, and compulsory voting, thus satisfying the middle sector’s demand for participation in the political system. In 1916, Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916–22, 1928–30), longtime leader of the Radical Civic Union (popularly known as the Radical Party), captured the presidency. Initially, his administration appeared favorable to labor. That changed in 1918–19, when Argentina experienced high inflation owing to Europe’s increased postwar demand for agricultural products, which in turn led to violent labor strikes, demonstrations, and protests in Argentina over wages. President Yrigoyen used the police and the military to suppress labor activities and intern labor leaders. The

violence also contributed to an antilabor hysteria that the Argentine Patriotic League, a right-wing organization formed at the time, capitalized on. The Patriotic League gave expression to the upper and middle sectors’ dislike and fear of foreign-born laborers and the anarchist, communist, and socialist ideas espoused by their leaders. Fearing repeated labor violence, the Radical Party—which controlled the presidency, the national legislature, and most provincial governments—continued its harsh policies toward labor in the decade preceding the Great Depression. Feuding among its leaders—Yrigoyen and the more moderate Marcelo T. de Alvear—stymied the government’s effectiveness.

EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS (1930–1943)

Argentine politics took a new turn on September 6, 1930, when a coalition of leftist groups ousted Yrigoyen from the presidency, charging that his government was illegal. It also ushered the military into politics. The Argentine military reflected the country’s social hierarchy: Promotion to the upper ranks was based on family status, while those from the middle and lower socioeconomic social sectors could not advance beyond mid-level officerships. The military was also split along ideological lines. General Agustín P. Justo (b. 1876–d. 1943) and his followers wished to turn the clock back to the pre-1910 days of oligarchic rule, while lower-ranking officers who followed General José F. Uriburu (b. 1868–d. 1932) favored the establishment of a corporate state, whereby the government controlled the agricultural, industrial, and labor sectors while permitting private enterprise to continue. In rigged elections, Justo captured the presidency in 1932, and fellow Conservatives followed him to the presidential palace, where they remained until 1943.

Despite the political stagnation, the government introduced important changes in economic policy. Most notable was the 1933 Roca-Runciman Agreement, which continued Argentina’s protected position in the British marketplace, while British goods received preferential treatment in Argentina through lower tariffs, currency manipulation, and quotas. Critics, then and now, argue that the agreement prevented the diversification of the Argentine economy while keeping it dependent on Great Britain. Nevertheless, the Roca-Runciman Agreement enabled Argentina to weather the Great Depression better than other nations. It also encouraged the country’s industrial development. By 1944, Argentina produced at home most of what it used to import from elsewhere.

During the same time period, the state undertook a vast public works program. Air- and seaports, waterworks, railroads, and all-weather roads to the country’s interior were constructed, and the state-owned oil monopoly Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) was expanded. The Conservative administrations also introduced modern social legislation, such as government-subsidized housing for the poor, pensions for government employ-

ees, indemnification of dismissal from work, and a five and one-half day workweek. This legislation reflected the growing importance of the urban labor force, which by the 1940s had become increasingly vocal. An estimated 90 percent of workers were literate and understood their political isolation, and they cast about for leadership.

PERÓN'S POPULISM (1943–1976)

The Conservatives' political corruption, urban labor's frustration, public concern that Argentina might abandon its neutral stance during World War II, and the military's ambition threatened Argentina's fragile political structure. Since the 1930 coup, the military had continued to divide into factions united only by their growing distrust of professional politicians. One such faction was the Group of United Officers (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, or GOU). On June 4, 1943, in response to "popular demand," the GOU engineered a coup d'état and installed General Arturo Rawson (1943) as provisional president. The coup began a three-year period of military governance. Congress was shut down, political parties were outlawed, and professional politicians were dismissed from the cabinet. The feuding generals, however, lacked a clear vision regarding Argentina's future and slowly granted increased power to Colonel JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN (1946–55, 1973–74), until he became vice president in 1944.

The 49-year-old Perón came from a middle-class background and was a strong nationalist, evidenced by his membership in the Argentine Patriotic League. For his participation in the 1930 coup, Perón was made an aide to the war minister and was subsequently sent to Italy, where he studied with Benito Mussolini's alpine troops. As a reward for his role in the 1943 GOU coup, Perón received his wish to be secretary of labor, and for the next two years, he courted laborers, who came to form his political base. He understood workers' needs for increased wages and improved working conditions. To achieve those objectives, Perón often encouraged workers to strike, and then in his position as labor secretary, he would negotiate a favorable settlement for them. Perón was assisted in his work by his mistress and later wife, MARÍA EVA DUARTE DE PERÓN, popularly known as Evita, who came from the lower socioeconomic class. With labor's support and the public efforts of the U.S. ambassador, Spruille Braden, Perón overcame opposition from Argentina's elite and middle sectors and won the 1946 presidential election with 54 percent of the vote.

As president, Perón capitalized on his charisma to implement a corporate state, uniting the nation's three economic sectors—agriculture, industry, and labor—under government control. He also created the Institute for the Promotion of Trade (Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio, or IAPI), which purchased the primary agricultural goods from the producers at fixed, below-market prices and sold them globally at mar-

ket prices. Perón used the profits to carry on many of the social programs begun in the 1930s and spread them into the country's interior. Urban labor continued to be the focal point of his politics. Continued strikes resulted in higher wages. Perón's wife, Evita, proved an invaluable ally. Spurned by the elite WOMEN of Argentina, she established the Eva Perón Foundation, which received government aid, as well as forced support from industry and the upper class. She used these funds to improve conditions for the poor, her projects ranging from food distribution to the payment of medical bills. The government also exhibited a strong sense of nationalism. It bought out the British-owned railways, the U.S.-owned International Telephone and Telegraph Company, and the French-owned docks and warehouses in Buenos Aires. Moreover, in July 1947, Perón paid off Argentina's foreign debt. Perón's popularity significantly increased, and he capitalized on this to eliminate political opposition. "*Personalismo*" (the popularity of a person, not his ideology) came to characterize the Perón administration.

Perón's economic program worked well as long as world demand and prices for Argentina's agricultural goods remained high. Ravaged post-World War II Europe needed to be fed, and global demand for beef and wheat spiked again as a result of the Korean War in 1950–51. Despite these periods of demand, several factors contributed to the program's failure and ouster of Perón in 1955. World agricultural productivity increased from 1949, lessening the demand for Argentine goods. Argentina's *estancieros* (large landowners) held back on the production of wheat and beef. Urban labor continued to press for higher wages from industries that were unable to meet their demands. Against this economic backdrop, the Peronists amended the 1853 constitution to make Perón eligible for a second term, but the military and elite successfully resisted his efforts to have Evita run as his vice president. Although Perón understood the need for fiscal orthodoxy in his second term, urban labor did not, and demonstrations became increasingly violent. The death of Evita in 1952 deprived Perón of a strong ally. He infuriated nationalists by granting oil contracts to Standard Oil of California. His attempt to reduce the influence of the CATHOLIC CHURCH by placing its schools under state control and legalizing divorce not only resulted in his and his cabinet's excommunication but fed the violence. With the nation falling into chaos, Conservative military officers acted in September 1955 by forcing Perón to resign the presidency and leave the country. He went first to Paraguay and then to Spain, where he remained until 1973.

Perón may have left the country, but Peronism did not. The Peronists significantly contributed to the election of economics professor Arturo Frondizi (1958–62) as president, and their abstention from the polls enabled medical doctor Arturo Illia (1963–66) to move into the Casa Rosada, the seat of the government, with only 26 percent of the vote. Both were members of the Radical

Party. Their economic policies of fiscal orthodoxy and opening the country to foreign investment did not sit well with urban labor. The workers again resorted to street demonstrations and violence, which resulted in the ouster of Illia in 1966 and the implementation of the military's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. A succession of three generals managed the country until 1973. By then, Argentina was wracked by stagflation and faced an incipient guerrilla war. Under these conditions, the military permitted Perón to return to Argentina in 1973, after 18 years in exile. His popularity remained.

Perón persuaded the government to permit his third wife, ISABEL MARTÍNEZ DE PERÓN (b. 1931; president 1974–76), to run as his vice presidential candidate in the September 1973 elections, which they won with 62 percent of the vote. This time, however, Perón attempted to restrain the worker's demands, outlawed extreme left-wing groups such as the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, or ERP), and continued the policy of fiscal orthodoxy. Furthermore, falling export revenue coupled with rising oil prices negatively affected people's quality of life and inflamed the opposition. When Perón died of a heart attack on July 1, 1974, Isabel Perón replaced him. However, she lacked Evita's charisma and Juan Perón's ability to deal with the conflict among the labor, political, and military sectors. Amid increasing violence and worsening economic conditions, the military ousted Isabel from the presidency on March 24, 1976.

MILITARY RULE AND NEOLIBERALISM (1976–PRESENT)

General Jorge Rafael Videla's military regime lasted from 1976 until 1981. Its first objective was to eliminate all opposition via a "DIRTY WAR" that resulted in the disappearance of an estimated 10,000–20,000 people. Claiming to be saving the country from communism, the regime eliminated leftist groups such as the ERP and the Montoneros. It also shut down the Congress and judiciary, imposed censorship, and otherwise ignored civil and human rights.

On the economic front, Finance Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz (b. 1925–) imposed neoliberal economic policies that resulted in wage losses, tightened credit, and lower tariffs on imported industrial goods and directed state and parastatal (semiprivate) industries to be sold. These policies lowered Argentina's inflation rate to 88 percent in 1980 and brought about a surplus in the balance of payments. The situation changed a year later, however. In 1981, industry operated at half its capacity, inflation again accelerated, and real wages dropped to less than those in 1970. Unable to confront these challenges, Videla turned over the presidency to General Roberto Viola (b. 1924–d. 1994) in 1981, who in turn passed it on to General LEOPOLDO GALTIERI (1981–82). Galtieri reasoned that a successful war to reclaim the Malvinas (known as the Falkland Islands in English) would stir Argentine nationalism and

buy the regime time to deal with the economic crisis (see MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR).

The British had occupied the Malvinas since 1833, but Argentina rested its claim to them on the original Spanish occupation and argued that with its independence in 1810, ownership of the islands had passed to the government at Buenos Aires. In 1982, Galtieri reasoned that Britain no longer had an interest in the islands some 8,000 miles (12,875 km) from home and that the United States would stand aside because the Argentine military was training the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan Contras in their effort to oust the Sandinista government in Managua. He judged incorrectly on both counts. Initial successes in the Argentine invasion of the islands on April 2, 1982, ended with the arrival of highly trained British troops and sophisticated military equipment. Argentina was forced to surrender in June. The United States provided the British with the Argentine military maneuvers, sophisticated missile weapons, and diplomatic support of the British cause within the international community.

The Argentine people, whipped into an anti-imperialist frenzy by the eve of the war, were disillusioned with its outcome despite the government's control of the media during the conflict. As a result, retired general Reynaldo Bignone (1982–83) replaced Galtieri. Bignone promised a transition to democracy by 1984. Radical Party leader Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) won the following election with 52 percent of the vote. Alfonsín faced near insurmountable problems: Inflation was at 400 percent, wages had declined by 25 percent between 1981 and 1983, and the government was effectively bankrupt. The public also demanded the immediate prosecution of those responsible for the Dirty War's "disappeared ones." A government commission subsequently verified the death or disappearance of 8,906 people during the Dirty War, and five of the nine military officers charged with crimes received long prison terms after their trials. Faced with a possible military revolt, the government followed a course of inaction beginning in 1987. Alfonsín failed to address the country's economic distress. Despite an austerity program imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1989, inflation continued to plague the economy, gross domestic product (GDP) had dropped 6 percent, and per capita income had declined by nearly 25 percent.

The *peronistas* seized the moment and captured the 1989 presidential elections with CARLOS SAÚL MENEM (1989–99) as their candidate. Argentina reached a potential political watershed: Menem could either roll back the clock or continue on the rocky course of neoliberalism. He chose the latter. State-owned airlines, railroads, subways, ports, the electrical company, coal, natural gas, and a portion of YPF went up for sale. Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo (b. 1946–) introduced a "convertibility plan" that restricted government expenditures to revenues on hand and, most important, established a one-to-one exchange rate with the U.S. dollar. Cavallo also

continued the IMF-imposed austerity program. By 1994, inflation had dropped from a 1989 high of 4,900 percent to 4 percent, and the GDP rose by 6 percent during the same time frame. The downside, however, proved severe. Due to the overvaluation of the Argentine peso, the trade deficit stood at \$6 billion, and unemployment doubled to 12.5 percent in 1994. One study reported that one-half of the middle class slipped into the lower socioeconomic group in that same six-year period. The working classes took to the streets, only to have their demonstrations and strikes broken by the Menem government. In the international arena, Menem approved Argentina's participation in the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR), an agreement that linked his country with Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in what was hoped would become a common market similar to the European Union. Menem also became a supporter of U.S. global policies by, for example, distancing Argentina from CUBA and supporting U.S. interventions in HAITI and the Balkans. Both actions, however, stoked the fires of Argentine nationalism.

Despite the conflicting economic signals and debatable foreign policy, in 1994, Menem pushed through Congress constitutional changes that enabled him to run for the presidency again. He won the presidential contest a year later with 49.5 percent of the vote. His second administration continued the same economic policies with similar results: increased inflation, higher unemployment, and lower living standards. Government corruption increasingly became a public issue and along with the continued economic decline led to two opposition groups—banded together as the Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education—gaining control of the Chamber of Deputies. The Alliance supported neoliberal economic policies; however, by focusing on government corruption, their candidate, Fernando de la Rúa (1999–2001), won the presidency in 1999. Argentina's economy continued to worsen. Flight capital increased, and foreign investment came to a halt.

De la Rúa instituted several measures to cut the fiscal deficit and instill confidence, and Argentina again received IMF assistance, but nothing stemmed the tide. The government's attempt to halt the run on bank deposit withdrawals led to violence. Argentina's economy collapsed in 2001, and de la Rúa resigned from office in December that year. Eduardo Duhalde became president in January 2002. He brought a degree of economic recovery by ending the one-to-one peg of the peso to the U.S. dollar, freezing utility tariffs, curtailing creditors' rights, and imposing high tariffs on exports. Duhalde also set elections for 2003, which were won by NÉSTOR KIRCHNER (2003–07), who continued the austerity programs that helped pay off IMF loans and revitalize the economy by 2006.

For unexplained reasons, Kirchner did not seek reelection in 2007. Instead, his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–), stood as the candidate of the

ruling Front for Victory Party (Frente Para la Victoria, or FPV). She captured the December 10 elections with 44.92 percent of the popular vote, and the FPV gained control of both houses of the national legislature. There will be few, if any, policy changes. President Fernández de Kirchner indicated that she will continue her husband's austerity policies, nor does she intend to pursue the government's recovery of industries that were privatized during the 1990s. She began her presidency confronted by significant socioeconomic issues that have adversely affected the nation's poor: wage differentials, housing, education, and medical delivery systems.

To meet the costs of the social programs, the Cristina Kirchner administration imposed an export tax on agricultural goods that the farming community strongly resisted by cutting production. The situation was exacerbated by a drought that began in 2008 and lasts until today. The situation is so serious that Argentina may have to import wheat in 2010, the first time since records have been kept. Kirchner's party paid the price in the June 28, 2009, congressional elections, losing control of the House of Representatives and its narrow majority in the Senate.

See also ARGENTINA (Vols. I, III).

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Argentina, economic collapse in (1998–2002)

Beginning in 1998, the Argentine ECONOMY precipitously worsened to the point where a \$4-billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout in December 2000 could not alter its course. Between 2000 and 2002, worker productivity fell by 15 percent, the Argentine peso lost 75 percent of its value, the official unemployment rate reached 25 percent, and more than half of the population fell below the poverty line. The longer-term origins of the crisis can be traced to 1991, while the immediate contributor was a 1998 international monetary debacle.

To stem the tide of hyperinflation that had plagued ARGENTINA since 1989, on April 1, 1991, President CARLOS SAÚL MENEM (1991–99) implemented a plan designed by his minister of the economy, Domingo Cavallo, which established parity between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar. In addition to parity, the new Argentine peso was fully convertible with the dollar and backed by international reserves. In the short term, this “convertibility plan” restored price stability and investor confidence and within a year brought down inflation to single digits. By the end of 1992, economic growth had been rekindled, and the country had gained access to international financial markets.

The initial euphoria over the convertibility plan meant that little attention was given to its flaws until 1998. Until then, Argentine inflation remained well above the U.S. rate. This, in turn, led to an overvalued peso with the associated consequences of making Argentine producers less competitive in the world marketplace, contributing to lower interest rates in Argentina, which made the country less attractive to foreign investors and led to a further borrowing of dollars abroad. In addition, from 1991 to 1998, industrial production plummeted, unemployment soared, and Argentina endured a highly unsatisfactory balance of TRADE. Total external debt doubled to \$140 billion in this seven-year period. Yet, the worst was still to come.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and BRAZIL in 1998 and prompted the Brazilian government to devalue its currency, making its products cheaper than those of Argentina. This not only negatively affected international trade, but also the Argentine-Brazilian economic connection; the two countries were the largest trading partners within the MERCOSUR trading bloc (see SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET). As the Argentine economy neared collapse in late 1991, its government sought a financial bailout from the United States similar to the one granted to MEXICO in 1994. President George W. Bush refused. He attributed the crisis to irresponsible Argentine government officials and private businesspeople. The IMF advanced Argentina \$8 billion in early 2002, but this was not enough to prevent the country’s economy from collapsing by the end of the year. There was a run on banks, prompting a law that limited withdrawals to 250 pesos per week, while dollar accounts were frozen. Nearly a quarter of all bank deposits were

sent out of the country. Without a tax base, the government cut expenditures, further restricting the social safety net, which in turn led to demonstrations and then riots in the major cities. The statistics in the table below indicate the social cost of Argentina’s economic collapse.

Following a period of intense political confusion in 2001 and 2002 that saw four men move into and out of the presidential residence, NÉSTOR KIRCHNER (2003–07), a minor *peronista* and ex-governor of Santa Cruz Province, was elected president on May 18, 2002. Despite his modest credentials, Kirchner promptly earned popular support by asserting his independence from the *peronista* political machine and condemning the MILITARY’s past human rights abuses. The national economic hardship had reached its nadir, and over the next four years, Kirchner’s policies provided relief from the economic crisis that had beset the country.

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Arias Madrid, Arnulfo (b. 1901–d. 1988) *president of Panama* Born into a lower-middle-class rural family, Arnulfo Arias Madrid became one of PANAMA’s most controversial political leaders. He is sometimes erroneously linked to the Arias family that helped gain independence for Panama in 1903. Following his graduation from Harvard Medical School, Arias returned to Panama in 1925 and joined his brother in ACCIÓN COMUNAL, a secret nationalist society that engineered a coup in 1931 that vaulted his brother, Harmodio Arias Madrid (b. 1886–d. 1962), to the presidency a year later. Arnulfo served as minister of agriculture in that administration and subsequently as ambassador to Germany and Italy. Arnulfo won the October 1, 1940, presidential election as a candidate of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) and immediately directed the writing of a new constitution, which went into effect on January 2, 1941. The new document placed limitations on foreign ownership of commerce and guaranteed employment of Panamanians

Social Consequences of Argentina’s Economic Collapse, 1998–2002

	1998	2002
Poverty rate	23.6%	51.4%
Poor population	11.2 million	18.2 million
Destitute people	3.2 million	7.7 million
Number of people who became poor daily	2,404	20,577
Number of people who became destitute daily	1,461	16,493

over foreigners. It also strengthened presidential power at the expense of the legislature, extended the presidential term to six years, and extended suffrage to women. Subsequent actions intensified opposition from both the local elite and United States. He forced farmers to sell their produce to the state, hinted at the nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises, and had the National Assembly enact a land reform program and a social security system. He ordered that only Spanish be spoken in public places and that bars be fined for playing foreign music, as well as the censorship of newspapers and the deduction of PNR dues from government employees' pay checks. He also refused to meet U.S. demands for a defense sites agreement in late 1940. Arias was ousted from power on October 9, 1941, while visiting his mistress in CUBA. He spent the remainder of World War II exiled in ARGENTINA.

Arias returned to Panama to run for the presidency again in 1948 as a candidate of the Authentic Panameñista Party (PPA) against Domingo Díaz Arosemena (b. 1875–d. 1949). Representing the elite, Arosemena's supporters resorted to violence to overcome Arias's popularity and suppress his followers following Díaz's alleged victory. The national electoral board turned to Arias when Díaz died in office on July 18, 1949. Arias's short-lived administration was marred by nepotism and corruption. With no sons of his own, he rewarded those of his brother Harmodio with government positions and gave fellow Panameñistas cash and contracts, as well as protection for their gold- and drug-smuggling operations. Political enemies were forced to sell their properties at below-market value. The economic downturn that followed World War II resulted in high unemployment in the canal zone and a generally sluggish Panamanian ECONOMY. Unable to address the country's economic woes, Arias sought to strengthen his hand by abolishing the National Assembly, a proposal that ignited broad-based opposition to him and resulted in his ouster on May 9, 1951. He again went into exile.

In return for the Panameñistas supporting Liberal elitist Roberto Chiari (b. 1905–d. 1981) for the presidency in 1960, Arias's political rights were restored, and he again sought the presidency in the 1964 election, only to lose to another Liberal, Marcos Robles (b. 1905–d. 1990). Robles benefited from the U.S.-sponsored ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS program that provided benefits to Panama's poor laboring and rural sectors between 1962 and 1964. Still, the number of poor had grown to more than 1 million since the end of World War II, and their needs remained largely unmet. After the election, Arias stirred these people into demonstrations, blaming both Robles and the United States for their plight. He also supported the students and their fellow nationalists in the 1964 flag riots. Elite opposition to Robles emerged after he proposed income tax reforms that were required of recipients of Alliance for Progress assistance. These crosscurrents played into Arias's successful bid for the

presidency in 1968. However, Arias's attempt to manipulate his control over the military backfired, and on October 11, 1968, 10 days after he was inaugurated, the upper echelon of Panama's National Guard ousted him. Arias took refuge in the canal zone before heading into exile in the United States. When he returned to Panama in 1978, a small number of his Panameñista Party had joined the pro-OMAR EFFRAÍN TORRIJOS HERRERA ruling coalition. Those who remained loyal to Arias formed the Authentic Panameñista Party.

In the mid-1980s, Arias became a leading critic of Panamanian strongman MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA MORENO and again sought the presidency in the 1984 elections. When exit polls indicated that Arias had a substantial lead, Noriega manipulated the results and had his own candidate, Nicolás Barletta Andino (b. 1938–), declared the victor. Arias moved to Miami, Florida, where he died of natural causes on August 10, 1988. Five days after his death, his supporters used his funeral in Panama to protest against Noriega, and following the U.S. invasion in 1989, his party resurfaced as the Arnulfista Party and in 2005 assumed its original name, the Authentic Panameñista Party.

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Arias Sánchez, Oscar (b. 1941–) *president of Costa Rica and Nobel Peace Prize winner* Born in Heredia, COSTA RICA, into a FAMILY with a long history of success in coffee planting and political participation, Oscar Arias Sánchez earned his bachelor's degree at the University of Costa Rica in 1966 and his doctorate in 1974 from Great Britain's University of Essex, after which he returned home to teach at the University of Costa Rica. He is married to Margarita Peñón Góngora, with whom he has two children.

Arias first became active in national politics in 1966 when he worked in the unsuccessful presidential campaign of the National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Nacional, or PLN). He vaulted into the political spotlight as a leading supporter of JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER in his successful bid for a second presidential term in 1970. As minister of national planning and political economy from 1971 to 1976, Arias earned a reputation for being fair minded and attempting to de-ideologize social problems. Arias also rose in the PLN party structure, first to international secretary in 1975 and then to general secretary in 1979. Elected to the national legislature in 1978, Arias sought to make the government more accessible and responsive to the general populace. He left that position to help the PLN standard-bearer Daniel Obudar (b. 1921–d. 1991) win the 1982 presiden-

tial election, and in 1984, Arias resigned as PLN general secretary to organize his own presidential campaign for the 1986 election.

Arias won the 1986 presidential contest with 52 percent of the popular vote. In an effort to fulfill his promise to make the government more accessible to the people, Arias frequently drove his own car throughout the country, stopping at cafés and stores to talk with people. He also held a weekly television call-in show. Arias favored an open market ECONOMY, in contrast to many of his party colleagues. He shifted emphasis on coffee and bananas as the primary agricultural exports to nontraditional products such as fruit and flowers. The tourist INDUSTRY was developed and subsequently brought the largest amount of foreign currency into the country. Costa Rica also benefited from the general global prosperity. By 1990, its annual growth rate reached 4 percent, and unemployment dropped to 5.6 percent, the best in the Central American region at the time.

The economic progress was offset by the continuing wars in NICARAGUA and EL SALVADOR, which brought many refugees from those countries into Costa Rica, where they strained the nation's social safety net beyond its financial limit, and in turn, the national debt worsened. For this reason, and out of concern that his country might be dragged into the conflict, Arias sought to bring an end to those conflicts (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS). He put forward a peace plan in 1986 that earned him the Nobel Peace Prize the following year and led to the signing of an accord at Tela, HONDURAS, on August 9, 1989. It provided for the demobilization of the guerrilla forces throughout the region and an end to external MILITARY support for them and opened the door to elections in each country.

Arias used the funds from the Noble Peace Prize to establish a foundation that bears his name. The foundation aims to further democratize CENTRAL AMERICA, end gender discrimination, and resolve conflicts. After leaving the presidency in 1990, Arias became an active participant in several nongovernmental organizations designed to resolve conflicts and ensure fair elections around the globe, including the Carter Center, the Gorbachev Foundation, and the Advisory Council of Transparency International.

Arias returned to national politics in 2004. He captured the February 7, 2006, presidential contest by an 18,169 popular vote margin (1.2 percent) over Ottón Solís. Accepting the neoliberal economic model as the means to successful development, on June 1, 2007, he changed Costa Rica's recognition of Taiwan to the People's Republic of China and is working to overcome resistance to the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. While the agreement promises to bring badly needed investment capital into Costa Rica to further diversify and develop its economy, the Costa Rican public wants to preserve the country's generous social service system and labor laws and protect its small farmers.

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Seth Rolbein. *Nobel Costa Rica: A Timely Report on Our Peaceful Pro-Yankee Central American Neighbor* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953–) *president of Haiti* Born on July 15, 1953, in the popular tourist town of Port Salut, HAITI, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first educated at Salesian schools in Port-au-Prince. In 1974, he graduated from the Collège Notre Dame du Perpétuel Secours, an all-male secondary school run by the CATHOLIC CHURCH in Cap Haitien. Upon graduation, he took a course in novitiate studies in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. After returning to Haiti, Aristide studied philosophy at the Grand Séminaire Notre Dame and psychology at the State University of Haiti, graduating in 1979. He subsequently studied in Italy and returned to Haiti in 1983, where he was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in the Salesian order. Aristide was initially appointed to serve a small parish in Port-au-Prince before being moved to a larger parish in a slum in La Saline. Known for his fiery oratory skills, Aristide was an advocate of liberation theology and became a popular figure. His sermons, which were broadcast on the nationwide Catholic radio station, made him a leading figure of the radical wing of the Catholic Church in Haiti.

In 1990, while still a priest, Aristide ran for and won the presidency with 67.5 percent of the vote. His political vehicle, the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie, or FNCD), won the largest block of seats in the Congress, but not a majority. Aristide took office on February 7, 1991, five years after the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship, hoping to implement political, economic, and social reforms. Aristide's first term as president, however, was ended by a military coup staged by Raoul Cédras (b. 1949–) on September 30, 1991. Following massacres of Aristide supporters, tens of thousands of Haitians attempted to flee to the United States, but the U.S. government refused to grant them refugee status. Regardless, the U.S. government placed an economic embargo on Haiti, which, ironically, increased the suffering of the wider populace there. On September 18, 1994, a U.S. delegation led by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, as part of OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, convinced Cédras to resign or face the possibility of a U.S. MILITARY intervention. Cédras resigned, went to live in exile in PANAMA with a generous stipend

from the U.S. government, and Aristide returned from the United States to rule Haiti on October 15, 1994. Aristide disbanded the army and established a civilian police force. Aristide left the priesthood in 1995 and in 1996 married Mildred Trouillot (b. 1963–), a U.S. citizen born to Haitian parents who had fled the Duvalier regime. They had met while Aristide was living in the United States. Aristide's first term ended in February 1996, and the constitution did not allow him to serve consecutive terms. René Prével (b. 1943–), Aristide's prime minister in 1991, won the 1995 elections with 88 percent of the vote.

Prével implemented International Monetary Fund economic reforms and began the privatization of state-run industries. In late 1996, Aristide, who strongly disagreed with Prével's economic policies, formed the Fanmi Lavalas, a popular leftist political party that criticized neoliberal economic reforms. In the 2000 elections, Aristide won 91.8 percent of the vote and assumed the presidency for the second time on February 7, 2001.

Aristide's three-year presidency proved tumultuous. From its start, political opposition groups refused to work on Aristide's legislative program. They would accept nothing short of Aristide's resignation. By mid-2003, a campaign of terror reigned as both sides assassinated journalists, politicians, and innocent civilians, with charges that arms were imported from the Dominican Republic. Throughout this period, the economy spiraled downward, and food shortages became common. The situation appeared hopeless. Finally, on February 5, 2004, the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti took control of Gonaives, Haiti's fourth largest city. By February 22, the rebels had taken control of Cap-Haitien, the country's second largest city, and the end of the month were at the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Aristide has subsequently claimed that U.S. ambassador to Haiti James Foley forced him to resign and exiled him from Haiti. Aristide and his family now live in South Africa. In 2006, President Prével announced that the Haitian constitution does not prohibit Aristide's return to Haiti. For the next three years, Haitian politics descended into turmoil, as the presidency became a revolving door. The national economy flattened, and inflation and scarcity of goods prevailed. By 2008, continued violence resulted in the United Nations posting a 7,000-person military force in Haiti to stem the violence.

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Arron, Henck (b. 1936–d. 2000) *prime minister of Suriname* Born on April 25, 1936, in Paramaribo, SURINAME, Henck Arron, a Creole, worked in banks in the Netherlands and in his homeland before entering politics in 1963. Elected prime minister in 1973, Arron participated in the negotiations leading to Suriname's independence. The election of 1973 revealed the ethnic polarization of Surinamese politics. There were no Asians on the government bench and no Creoles on the opposition bench. Following independence from the Netherlands in 1975, thousands of Asian Surinamese, unwilling to lose their Dutch citizenship and fearful of a government controlled by Creoles, migrated to the Netherlands. On independence, Arron became the nation's first vice president and prime minister. Johan Ferrier (b. 1910–d. 2010) became the nation's first president. As the leader of the Suriname National Party (NPS), a predominantly Creole party established in 1946, Arron attempted to lead the new nation. The growing perception that the government was corrupt and inept, however, led to civil unrest.

In February 1980, a military coup led by DÉSI BOUTERSE overthrew Arron. A group of 16 noncommissioned officers, all but one of whom was a Creole, overthrew the Creole-dominated government. In 1985, after Bouterse legalized political parties, Arron was invited to join the MILITARY regime's Supreme Council. In the 1987 elections, Arron's NPS joined the anti-Bouterse coalition known as the Front for Democracy and Development, which triumphed at the polls. Arron returned to political power as vice president and prime minister (1988–90) during the administration of Ramsewak Shankar (b. 1937–). Following Bouterse's 1990 military coup, Arron lost his position. In 1991, Arron retired from politics for health reasons, having undergone heart-bypass surgery in Houston, Texas. He turned over control of the NPS to RONALD VENETIAAN. Arron died on December 4, 2000, in Alphen aan den Rijn in the Netherlands.

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art At the beginning of the 20th century, several trends characterized Latin American art as it moved away from the visual and meticulous realism of the 19th century. Much of new art was highly self-conscious, with an emphasis on aesthetic value rather than subject matter. For example, the Mexican Saturnino Herrán (b. 1887–d. 1919) pictured indigenous life using visible outlines around bright colors, such as bright green. Some Latin American painters, such as the Peruvian Teófilo Castillo (b. 1857–d. 1922), were influenced by European impressionist painters who emphasized human beauty. Castillo's work focused on people of European descent during the

colonial period. Other Latin American artists followed the regionally influenced art emerging in Spain at the time. Cuban painter Leopoldo Romañach's (b. 1862–d. 1951) painting of a young, middle-class woman going to church is often pointed to as an example of this genre. The painting focuses on Spanish traditions in Cuba.

The MEXICAN REVOLUTION prompted artists to focus more closely on the downtrodden, wider populace. On the eve of the revolution, for example, José Guadalupe Posada (b. 1852–d. 1913) mocked the elite's foibles in his zinc and woodcut images, which paralleled photographs of the abuse of indigenous and mestizo workers shown in paper broadsides. More avant-garde than Posada was Diego Rivera (b. 1886–d. 1957), who studied cubism in Europe before returning home in 1915 during MEXICO's social revolution. Rivera's work, such as his *Zapatista Landscape*, depicted the straw-hatted, serape-draped followers of EMILIANO ZAPATA struggling to regain the lands taken from them by the government and the landowning elite, both native and foreign. The Mexican murals produced after the revolution became famous around the world (see MURALISTS, MEXICAN). In 1921, Education Secretary José Vasconcelos (b. 1882–d. 1959) invited Mexican artists to participate in government-sponsored projects to turn the walls of public buildings into didactic inspiration for the people. The three most notable contributors to Mexican muralism were Rivera, José Orozco (b. 1883–d. 1949), and David Siqueiros (b. 1896–d. 1974), whose works can still be seen in MEXICO CITY and Guadalajara. As a result of the mural renaissance, Latin American works, for the first time, had an impact on Western art. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, U.S. government-sponsored painting programs were directly influenced by the Mexican experience. South American countries with a strong background and presence of NATIVE AMERICANS, such as ECUADOR, PERU, and COLOMBIA, followed the Mexican themes.

The nonindigenous countries east of the Andes became more receptive to avant-garde styles from Europe, as seen in the works of Argentine Emilio Pettoruti (b. 1882–d. 1971), Uruguayan Joaquín Torres-García (b. 1874–d. 1949), and Brazilian Tarila de Amaral (b. 1886–d. 1973).

European surrealism, which emphasized the emotional, irrational, and personal, also found a receptive audience in Latin America after 1940. In general, surrealist artists examined the folk arts to reveal the instinctive spirit. For example, the works of Frida Kahlo (b. 1907–d. 1954), who was married to Rivera, illustrate this style. Her *Two Fridas*, a double self-portrait, shows a "proper"

19th-century Western woman on one side and a swarthy indigenous woman on the other. The surrealists also contributed to a revival of indigenous art that took on greater significance after World War II.

European surrealists attracted many Latin American artists to the Continent before World War II. Economic realities and political dictatorships contributed to a greater outmigration of artists in the postwar years. Not until Latin America's return to democracy in the 1980s did a more creative environment and economic opportunity emerge. Today, for example, BUENOS AIRES has more than 60 galleries dedicated to contemporary art and is home to Latin America's major auction house. Only in CUBA are artists denied free expression.

See also ART (Vols. I, II, III).

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Arthur, Owen (b. 1949–) *prime minister of Barbados*
Born on October 17, 1949, Owen Arthur was educated at the University of the West Indies, where he earned a B.A. in history and economics in 1971 and an M.S. in economics in 1974. After graduation, he worked in JAMAICA at the National Planning Agency and the Bauxite Institute. Arthur returned to BARBADOS to work as an analyst in the Ministry of Finance and Planning in 1981. He subsequently served as chairman of the Agricultural Development Corporation, from 1982 to 1984. The Barbados Labour Party (BLP) supported his appointment to the Senate in 1983 and his election to the House of Assembly in 1984. BLP officials chose Arthur to lead the party in 1993. The BLP won 19 of 28 seats in the 1994 elections, and Arthur became the fifth prime minister of Barbados. The BLP subsequently won 26 seats in the 1999 elections and 23 seats in the 2003 elections.

Since 2003, Arthur, as prime minister, has promoted the idea of replacing British queen Elizabeth II with a Barbadian as official head of state. The majority of the Barbadian population, however, sees no need to make Barbados a parliamentary republic since the queen's role is purely symbolic.

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B

Bahamas An archipelago of more than 700 islands in the Atlantic Ocean, the Bahamas gained its independence from the United Kingdom on July 10, 1973. Located to the southeast of Florida and the northeast of CUBA, less than 40 of the islands that make up the Bahamas are inhabited. More than 4 million tourists visit the Bahamas each year, making tourism the most significant component of the ECONOMY.

The Bahamas occupy 5,358 square miles (13,877 km²) of territory. The most important islands are Bimini, located 50 miles (80.5 km) off the coast of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; Andros, the largest island; New Providence, the site of Nassau, the nation's capital and largest city; Grand Bahama, the site of Freeport, the second-largest city; Great Abaco; Great Inagua, the second-largest island; San Salvador, widely believed to be the first land sighted by Christopher Columbus in 1492; and Mayaguana. While the Gulf Stream provides a pleasant climate conducive to tourism, it also proves to be dangerous in the late summer and early fall when hurricanes pass through the islands.

The first permanent settlers came to the Bahamas from Bermuda in 1647. The British made the Bahamas a crown colony in 1717. Following the American Revolution, more than 8,000 Loyalists (and their slaves) moved to the Bahamas. When the British abolished slavery in 1834, hundreds of runaway slaves from the U.S. South made their way to the Bahamas. Although blacks and mulattoes made up the majority of the population, whites (who never accounted for more than 20 percent of the population) dominated the political scene until 1967. In addition, a group of influential white merchants known as the Bay Street Boys controlled the local economy. In 1953, a group of black politicians formed the Progressive

Liberal Party (PLP) to oppose the power of influential whites. Five years later, white politicians officially formed the United Bahamian Party (UBP). In 1964, the British granted the Bahamas internal self-government. The PLP, led by LYNDEN PINDLING, defeated the UBP, led by ROLAND SYMONETTE, in the 1967 parliamentary elections. Although both parties captured 18 seats in the House of Assembly, one of the two independent representatives chose to sit with the PLP, enabling Pindling to form a government. Pindling, who led the nation to independence in 1973, encouraged tourism, developed the local infrastructure, and initiated numerous social welfare services.

Great Britain's queen Elizabeth II, the head of state, is represented by a governor who oversees the political system. The prime minister, usually the leader of the majority party in the 41-member House of Assembly, is the actual political force in the Bahamas. Pindling was prime minister from 1973 to 1992. Despite allegations of abuse of state-owned companies, nepotism, and involvement in international drug trafficking during the 1980s, Pindling was able to maintain control of the government in free elections. In the 1992 elections, although Pindling retained his South Andros seat in the House of Assembly, his party was defeated by the Free National Movement (FNM), a socially liberal and economically conservative political party formed in 1971 by conservative dissidents from the PLP and former members of the UBP. FNM prime minister Hubert Inghram (b. 1947–) began privatizing the Bahamian economy, including all of the government-owned hotels, which had fallen into a state of disrepair during Pindling's administration. Inghram lost the 2002 elections to PLP candidate Perry Christie (b. 1944–). Elections in 2007 returned Inghram to power.

The majority of the 4 million tourists who visit the Bahamas each year come from the United States. Virtually all food and manufactured imports come from the United States. Since Bahamians do not pay income or sales tax, most government revenue comes from import tariffs. The advent of hemispheric free trade zones poses a major challenge for the Bahamian government.

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Balaguer, Joaquín (b. 1906–d. 2002) *president of the Dominican Republic* Born on September 1, 1906, in Navarrete, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Joaquín Balaguer was the only boy in a family of several daughters. He had a strong attraction to LITERATURE in his youth and eventually wrote several books. In 1929, he earned a law degree from the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo. A prominent official during the RAFAEL TRUJILLO dictatorship (1930–61), he held positions in both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Relations. From 1957 to 1960, he was the vice president of the Dominican Republic. He ascended to the presidency in 1960 when Trujillo's brother, Héctor, bowing to U.S. pressure for democratization in the aftermath of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's 1959 revolution, resigned. After Rafael Trujillo's assassination on May 30, 1961, Balaguer began the transition to democracy.

Following a period of political turmoil, Balaguer went into exile in the United States after a MILITARY coup on January 16, 1962. In April 1965, a leftist-inspired insurrection to bring former president JUAN BOSCH, who had ruled for seven months in 1963, back to power was seen by U.S. officials as counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy goals. To forestall a potential "second Cuba," U.S. president Lyndon Johnson authorized OPERATION POWER PACK, which resulted in the United States sending 23,000 marines to intervene militarily in the Dominican Republic. In 1966, in elections supervised by the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Balaguer, viewed by U.S. politicians as the candidate most likely to preserve order and protect U.S. hegemony, defeated Bosch.

From 1966 to 1978, Balaguer, who relied more on persuasion than force (notwithstanding the occasional political murder), maintained order and stability while simultaneously protecting U.S. interests in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer's political style can be described as "popular caudillismo." Unlike most of his contempo-

aries, Balaguer did not use public office to enrich himself. As the leader of the Social Christian Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano, or PRSC), Balaguer was able to initiate economic growth and embarked on a massive public works campaign fueled by high sugar prices, a generous sugar quota from the United States, and the MIGRATION of thousands of Dominicans to the United States, which alleviated social pressure at home. A successful manipulator, Balaguer was able to coopt the military and appease foreign investors. By the end of the 1970s, however, the popularity of artificial sweeteners in the United States destabilized the Dominican economy, which was based on sugar exports. Following elections in 1978, Balaguer relinquished power, albeit grudgingly, to Antonio Guzmán (b. 1911–d. 1982) the leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, or PRD).

Notwithstanding the PRD's attempts at political liberalization, economic pandemonium and excessive political corruption facilitated Balaguer's return to power in 1986. From 1986 to 1994, Balaguer attempted to revive the Dominican economy while simultaneously paying greater respect to political liberties and human rights. Attempts were also made at agricultural diversification. Investments were made in developing the tourism INDUSTRY, which has since become the largest income generator in the Dominican Republic. Remittances from the hundreds of thousands of Dominicans working in the United States also became a substantial revenue generator. Notwithstanding massive infrastructure projects, fuel shortages generated civil unrest, which resulted in frequent blackouts. The construction of the Columbus Lighthouse in 1992, which cost \$200 million, led to increased criticism of Balaguer's regime. Balaguer, virtually blind but still intellectually alert, won the 1994 election, although most observers considered the contest



Dominican Republic president Joaquín Balaguer (left) and U.S. vice president Hubert H. Humphrey toast each other on July 1, 1966. Balaguer served as president for 22 of the next 30 years. (United States Information Agency)

fraudulent. To quell political tumult, Balaguer agreed to call for early elections in 1996. Prohibited from running in the election and certain that the PRSC could not beat the PRD candidate, who was of Haitian ancestry, Balaguer supported Leonel Fernández (b. 1953–), the leader of the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Dominicana, or PLD), who won the election. Although blind, Balaguer unsuccessfully ran for president in the 2000 presidential elections. He died of heart failure at the Clínica Abreu in SANTO DOMINGO on July 14, 2002.

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balseros *Balseros* is a term used to describe the people who attempted to flee CUBA via raft (*balsa*) to seek refuge in the United States. While an estimated 63,000 *balseros* reached the United States between 1979 and 1994, it was the mass exodus in the summer of 1994 that received most notoriety. Then, approximately 36,000 Cubans found haven in the United States, while countless others were lost at sea. The crisis ended with a U.S.–Cuban agreement on September 9, 1994. Under the terms of the agreement, an orderly process was instituted to permit 20,000 Cubans to legally enter the United States annually. Deliberate delays on the part of the Cuban government, however, mean that the quota has never been fulfilled. Cubans continued their attempts to escape the island. The most famous incident was that of ELIÁN GONZÁLEZ in 1999–2000. He was the sole survivor of a group of *balseros* brought to Miami, Florida, by U.S. fishermen. The case created an international outcry before the U.S. government ordered González’s return to Cuba. A second consequence of the 1994 *balsero* crisis was the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms-Burton Law), which further tightened the U.S. embargo on Cuba (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF).

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Banzer Suárez, Hugo (b. 1926–d. 2002) *president of Bolivia* Born into a pure-blood Spanish family in the then sparsely populated town of Santa Cruz, Hugo Banzer Suárez went on to become a respected MILITARY officer and president of BOLIVIA. He was educated at

La Paz Military College and later studied at military academies in ARGENTINA and BRAZIL; the U.S. School of the Americas, which was then located in the Panama Canal Zone; and the U.S. Cavalry School at Fort Hood, Texas. He served as minister of education and culture and later director of the Military Academy during the 1964–69 presidency of General René Barrientos (b. 1919–d. 1969).

Banzer headed a conservative coalition of military officers and landowners who were determined to bring order to Bolivia’s chaotic political arena. Banzer engineered the overthrow of President Juan José Torres (b. 1920–d. 1976) on August 21, 1971, and assumed the presidency the next day. For the next seven years, he ruled as a dictator. He banned all left-leaning political parties, suspended the Bolivian Workers Central, and closed the nation’s universities. During his term, known as the Banzerato, uncounted thousands of Bolivians left the country, an estimated 3,000 political opponents were imprisoned, at least 200 were killed, and countless others were tortured at the hands of the military.

At the urging of the United States, Banzer severed relations with the Soviet Union in 1972; this was also a requirement for International Monetary Fund assistance and its concomitant required austerity programs. The Bolivian populace rejected these measures. Banzer also introduced a five-year economic plan in 1973 and, thanks to increased global demand and prices for Bolivian oil and tin, along with increased exports of cotton and sugar, the country experienced an economic boom through 1976. The working classes did not benefit from this, however. Having lost popular support, Banzer did not want to risk reelection in 1974 and thus extended his presidency, propped up by the military and members of Bolivia’s most prominent families. In an effort to add a sense of legitimacy to the regime, these groups formed the Nationalist Democratic Action Party (Acción Democrática Nacionalista, or AND), which nominated Banzer in his unsuccessful electoral bids for the presidency in 1979, 1980, 1985, and 1993. He finished third in the first two contests and second in the last two.

Finally, on August 6, 1997, at age 71, Banzer began his second and last presidential term. It was marred by popular unrest caused by the U.S.-sponsored drug eradication program, the failure of neoliberal economic reforms to benefit the people, and the loss of the global tin market, which contributed to workers’ protests and demonstrations. Diagnosed with lung cancer, Banzer was forced to resign from office on August 7, 2001. He died nine months later on May 5, 2002.

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Barbados After centuries of British colonialism, Barbados, the most British of all Caribbean islands, achieved independence from the United Kingdom on November 30, 1966. Completely surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, Barbados is the easternmost island in the Caribbean.

The pear-shaped island of Barbados, which occupies 166 square miles (430 km²) of territory, is also the easternmost of the Windward Islands. Located 270 miles (435 km) northeast of the South American coast, Barbados's island neighbors include TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO to the south, GRENADA to the southwest, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES to the west. The capital and largest city is Bridgetown, in the parish of St. Michael. With 280,000 inhabitants, Barbados is one of the most densely populated nations in the Western Hemisphere. More than 90 percent of Barbadians, locally known as Bajans, are descended from African slaves brought to the island during the colonial era to work on the sugar plantations. Whereas English is the official language, most people in Barbados speak a local Creole known as Bajan. In the aftermath of GUYANA's independence in 1966, thousands of Indo-Guyanese have resettled in Barbados. After the United States and the United Kingdom, the largest expatriate Guyanese community can be found in Barbados.

Early in the 16th century, the Portuguese called the island Ilha dos Barbados (island of the bearded ones),

most likely referring to the long, hanging roots of the bearded fig trees found throughout the island. Unlike many Caribbean islands that changed European masters during the colonial period, from the arrival of the first British colonists in 1627 to independence in 1966, Barbados experienced uninterrupted British control (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH). British rule was relatively benevolent, and the Barbadians had a great degree of local autonomy, having a House of Assembly since 1639. After the British abolished slavery in 1834, the white population continued to dominate local politics because voting was restricted to those with high incomes. After World War I, black journalist Clennel Wilsden Wickham (b. 1895–d. 1938) published numerous articles in the *Barbados Herald* calling for black suffrage and increased social services for the larger populace.

It was not until the 1930s, however, during the economic dislocation caused by the Great Depression, that the majority of the black population achieved political rights. In 1938, seeking adult suffrage, better housing, and free EDUCATION, a group of black political rights advocates led by Grantley Adams (b. 1898–d. 1971) established the Barbados Labour Party (BLP). A strong supporter of the British monarchy, Adams sought political rights for the disenfranchised black population. In 1942, the British government removed income qualifications as a prerequisite for voting privileges and granted



A biscuit (cookie) factory in Bridgetown, Barbados, that distributes its product throughout the eastern Caribbean region. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

WOMEN the right to vote. In 1949, the BLP took control of the local government from the white plantation owners. In 1954, Adams was elected premier. Barbados was a member of the ill-fated WEST INDIES FEDERATION from 1958 to 1962. Adams served as the first and only prime minister of the federation, which was dissolved in 1962 after JAMAICA and Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the association. In 1961, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), founded by ERROL BARROW in 1955 as a progressive alternative to the BLP, won the parliamentary elections. Barrow served as premier from 1961 to 1966, when he became the first prime minister of Barbados, following independence from the United Kingdom. While Queen Elizabeth II appointed a governor to oversee the government, de facto power was held by the prime minister, usually the leader of the majority political party in the House of Assembly. During his tenure, Barrow supported many progressive social reforms.

In 1976, the BLP, led by Adams's only son, J. M. G. M. "TOM" ADAMS, returned to power. Tom Adams pursued a foreign policy closely aligned with the United States and supported OPERATION URGENT FURY, the U.S.-led invasion of GRENADA in 1983, by sending a contingent of the Barbados Defense Force to accompany American troops. Barrow, the leader of the opposition, sharply criticized Adams's policy. Adams died of a heart attack in 1985 and the DLP, still led by Barrow, returned to power in the 1986 parliamentary elections. Barrow, however, died in 1987 and was succeeded by ERSKINE SANDIFORD, the deputy prime minister. In 1994, the BLP, led by OWEN ARTHUR, returned to power. Arthur subsequently won elections in 1999 and 2003. Since 2003, Arthur has proposed that Barbados become a republic with a Barbadian as the official head of state, replacing Queen Elizabeth II. But, as the queen's role is purely ceremonial and Barbados and the United Kingdom have friendly diplomatic and economic relations, most Barbadians see no reason for the proposed change.

Since independence, Barbados has transformed itself from an ECONOMY dependent on the sugar industry to one based in tourism. More than 1 million tourists, mainly from the United Kingdom and the United States, visit Barbados each year. The best beaches and hotels are located on the western coast, although the eastern beaches are popular with surfers. Barbados receives generous economic and military aid packages from the United States.

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George Gmelch and Sharon Bohn Gmelch. *The Parish Behind God's Back: The Changing of Rural Barbados* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2001).

Barrow, Errol (b. 1920–d. 1987) *prime minister of Barbados* Born on January 21, 1920, in the parish of St. Lucy, BARBADOS, Errol Barrow was born into a family of civil rights activists. In December 1939, he won a scholarship to study at Codrington College but chose to decline the scholarship and enlist in the Royal Air Force. Barrow served in the European theater during World War II, flying more than three dozen missions. In 1945, he was appointed personal navigator to William Sholto Douglas, the commander of the British Zone of Occupation in Germany. After the war, he studied law at the London School of Economics, earning a degree in 1950. After returning to Barbados, he joined Grantley Adams's (b. 1898–d. 1971) Barbados Labour Party (BLP) and was elected to the House of Assembly in 1951. Displeased with Adams's laudatory statements about the British monarchy and his preference for a gradual path toward independence, Barrow broke from the BLP in 1955 and formed the Democratic Labour Party (DLP).

Barrow's party won the 1961 parliamentary elections, defeating Adams. Barrow served as premier from 1961 until 1966, when independence from the United Kingdom was achieved. He served as the first prime minister of Barbados from 1966 to 1976. During his tenure, Barrow supported many progressive social reforms. He encouraged industrial development, expanded the tourist INDUSTRY to reduce the island's economic dependence on sugar, introduced national health insurance and social security programs, and expanded free EDUCATION. Barrow, who supported greater political and economic integration in the eastern Caribbean, supported the creation of the CARIBBEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION in 1965.

Following a controversy over a change in the constitution regarding the appointment of judges and an economic downswing, Barrow's party was defeated in the 1976 parliamentary elections by the BLP, led by Adams's only son, J. M. G. M. "TOM" ADAMS. Tom Adams supported OPERATION URGENT FURY, the U.S.-led invasion of GRENADA in 1983, by sending a contingent of the Barbados Defense Force to accompany American troops. Barrow sharply criticized the policy. In 1986, Barrow's party won 24 of the 27 seats in the House of Assembly. As prime minister again, Barrow criticized the administration of U.S. president Ronald Reagan and sought to pursue a foreign policy less subservient to the United States. Barrow's second term as prime minister, however, ended on June 1, 1987, when he collapsed and died at his home in Bridgetown. Subsequently proclaimed a national hero, his portrait was placed on the Barbadian \$50 bill.

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Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio (b. 1901–d. 1973) *president of Cuba* The son of a railroad worker in Oriente Province, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar held several different jobs before joining the Cuban army in 1921. In 1928, he was promoted to sergeant and appointed a stenographer at Havana's Camp Colombia. The frustrated Batista understood that he had little opportunity for further advancement in the MILITARY because the upper ranks were reserved for the sons of CUBA's elite families. By 1933, he and his fellow sergeants were also anguished that they had received no pay increase since 1929. These factors gave Batista and his followers reason to join with students to oust President Carlos Manuel de Céspedes on September 4, 1933, and install RAMÓN GRAU SAN MARTÍN as provisional president. Grau, however, lacked support from Cuba's elite and, more important, from the United States, which did not recognize him. Subsequently, U.S. emissaries to Cuba Sumner Welles and Jefferson Caffrey encouraged Batista to overthrow Grau, which Batista did on January 14, 1934. From then until his own election to the presidency in 1940, Batista was the power behind the scenes.

Batista provided for the election of a constitutional convention that convened in 1940. The resulting 1940 Cuban constitution was considered Latin America's most progressive at the time, as it provided for sweeping government-sponsored social programs. Elected president later that year, Batista and his government benefited from high wartime prices for Cuban sugar and used the increased income to implement many EDUCATION, public health, and social welfare programs. Public opinion turned on Batista, however, because the sugar wealth also led to government graft and corruption. The adverse image was further exacerbated by Batista's recognition of the Communist Party and bringing two of its members into his cabinet as ministers without portfolio. These actions also angered U.S. policy makers and prompted Ambassador Spruille Braden to publically criticize Batista in Havana. The criticisms, however, did not prevent Batista from cooperating with the United States throughout the war.

Because the 1940 constitution prevented Batista from serving a successive second term as president, he permitted his old nemesis, Grau, to assume the office following his 1944 electoral victory. Batista then settled in Daytona Beach, Florida, until elected to the Cuban congress in 1948. Shortly thereafter, he formed his own political party in preparation for the 1952 presidential election. When public opinion polls indicated that he would not win the election, Batista, with military colleagues, engineered a coup d'état against the sitting president, Carlos Prío Socarrás (b. 1903–d. 1977), on March 10, 1952. As a consequence of the coup, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ determined that Cuba's political institutions could be changed only through force under his own leadership. Castro's war on Cuba's past began with the raid on the Moncada army barracks on July 26, 1953. Batista further aided Castro's cause when he rigged his own election to the presidency in 1954.



Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, Cuban military and political leader, pictured here as the president of Cuba in 1940 (*Courtesy of the Organization of American States Libraries*)

As president for the second time, Batista's crackdown on alleged pro-communist labor unions satisfied the Cuban elite, U.S. businesses, and the U.S. State Department and contributed to a rise in foreign investment in the country. Batista also initiated a massive public works program to employ sugar workers during the low season. But, government income was insufficient to meet the needs of a growing, largely poor population. The U.S. Commerce Department and the Cuban National Bank understood that Cuba's dependence on income from sugar exports was the root of the problem.

Opposition to Batista increased throughout the 1950s. Not only did he confront Castro's guerrilla forces in the countryside after the latter's return to Cuba in December 1956, but he faced several urban groups that came forward to challenge his dictatorship. In a 1957 attack on the presidential palace, one student group nearly succeeded in assassinating Batista. Batista's brutal reaction to the urban groups only served to intensify the opposition against him and led church officials and Cuban businessmen to call for his resignation in February 1958. Instead, Batista implemented a "final" military offensive against Castro that summer. Rather than fight, the Cuban army melted into the jungle. In late November and early December 1958, U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower's administration secretly attempted to mediate Batista's

resignation, but Batista rejected the proposal. Finally, Batista fled the country on the evening of December 31, 1958, going first to the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and then to Spain, where he died in 1973.

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Batlle y Ordóñez, José (b. 1856–d. 1929) *president of Uruguay* José Batlle y Ordóñez belongs to one of URUGUAY'S prominent political families. His father, Lorenzo Batlle y Grau (b. 1810–d. 1877) served as president from 1868 to 1872. José was also uncle to Luis Batlle Berres (b. 1897–d. 1964), who served as president from 1947 to 1951 and again in 1955–56, and great uncle of Jorge Batlle (b. 1947–), president from 2000 to 2005.

José Batlle y Ordóñez opposed Uruguay's elitist and MILITARY governments of the late 19th century and used his newspaper, *El Día*, as a mouthpiece for the Colorado Party. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1893 and to the Senate in 1896, Batlle worked to organize party support from among Uruguay's working classes. Immediately after his presidential election on March 1, 1903, Batlle faced a civil uprising led by Blanco Party leader Aparicio Saravia (b. 1856–d. 1904). A period of political tranquillity followed Saravia's defeat on September 1, 1904, at the Battle of Mosoller, leaving Batlle free to focus on measures to improve the lot of the common people.

Batlle came to office at a time of prosperity in Uruguay after the invention of refrigeration facilitated the export of beef to Europe. He continued to promote the agro-export INDUSTRY and through tax incentives opened additional arable land to large landowners at the expense of land distribution in smaller plots to individual farmers. Batlle also expanded the government's role in the banking, insurance, electric, and chemical fertilizer industries. Other reforms included the expansion and improvement of public EDUCATION, including the construction of new primary and secondary schools and the establishment of commerce, agronomy, and veterinary schools at the national university. The death penalty for criminals was abolished, and divorce was legalized. Batlle further separated church and state by banning crucifixes from hospital rooms and references to God in public oaths. Following the completion of his first presidential term in 1907, he spent the next four years traveling throughout western Europe, where he was influenced by government-sponsored social programs. Batlle returned

to Uruguay in February 1911 in time to be elected to a second presidential term on March 1.

During his second term, Batlle achieved social reforms that went far beyond what were the accepted norms in Latin America. An eight-hour workday and retirement programs in both the public and private sectors were implemented. Full legal and civil rights were granted to children born out of wedlock, and WOMEN received the right to initiate divorce. Both capital punishment and cruelty to animals used in the entertainment industry were abolished. Batlle, whose term ended in 1915, directed a new constitution in 1918 that replaced the 1830 document and, with it, the single presidential executive with a nine-member National Council of Administration. Largely through the use of protective tariffs, Batlle encouraged small entrepreneurs to develop manufacturing plants that would serve domestic needs. Owing to the prosperity generated by the agro-export market, Batlle's programs continued throughout the 1920s, but with the onset of the global depression in 1929, the foreign demand for Uruguayan produce rapidly diminished, and Batlle's programs fell under public assault.

Batlle's endeavors left their mark on Uruguayan society well past World War II. Civil and human rights continued to be practiced and defended. Workers' benefits, from wages to pensions, and government-owned or partially owned industries remained a mainstay of Uruguayan life and ECONOMY despite the assault from neoliberal free market economic principles in the late 20th century.

See also BLANCO PARTY (Vol. III); COLORADO PARTY, URUGUAY (Vol. III).

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Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) The Bay of Pigs invasion was a U.S.-designed and -supported plan to oust Cuban leader FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Amid growing U.S.-Cuban tensions over the direction of the CUBAN REVOLUTION, in March 1960, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) proposal to train Cuban exiles in GUATEMALA for an invasion of the island nation. The CIA anticipated that

early successes in the invasion would ignite an internal popular uprising that would topple Castro. This proved to be incorrect.

Newly elected President John F. Kennedy learned of the plan shortly after his election in November 1960. He came to office determined that Castro be removed from office for betraying the ideals of the revolution, which had brought an end to FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR's dictatorship in 1959 and, with it, CUBA's old order. In response to Kennedy's request for an assessment of the plan, on March 19, 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that it could be carried out without U.S. public involvement but that its success depended on that of the anticipated uprisings inside Cuba. The presidential adviser on Latin American affairs, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, cautioned against the plan. They did not think the United States could escape identification with the invasion and that the plan would therefore have a disastrous effect on U.S. relations with Latin America.

The Cuban brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos) in the early morning of April 17, 1961, five days after departing by ship from Puerto Cabazes, NICARAGUA. Without additional supplies or air cover, some 1,200 soldiers of the invading force surrendered to Castro's army within two days. Another 114 were killed.

At the time, several reasons were given for the invasion's failure. Castro had long anticipated an attack, and he, like others, had witnessed the brigade being trained in Guatemala on U.S. television newscasts. (On February 1961, CBS news learned about the training site and broadcast pictures of it on Walter Cronkite's evening news.) Additionally, his spies had infiltrated the Cuban community in Miami, who spoke about the plan. In response, Castro rounded up and interned known dissidents across Cuba, thereby limiting the possibility of an internal uprising. On the military side, two diversionary landings scheduled for April 14 and 15 had to be aborted because of bad weather, and an exiled pilot had landed his damaged aircraft at Homestead, Florida, the day before the invasion, where he announced that he and others had strafed Castro's military planes at the Havana airport. Kennedy canceled a follow-up air attack. The remaining Cuban planes kept the exile brigade pinned down until Castro's army arrived at the invasion point. Once the attack began, Cuban shore batteries destroyed two supply ships sitting offshore.

The CIA Inspector General's report, which became public in 1999, placed responsibility for failure at the highest levels of U.S. government for inadequately planning the attack, having no contingency plan or plans, and failing to commit adequate resources to the operation. A second report appeared in 2000. The Taylor



A sign reading "First defeat of Yankee imperialism in Latin America" at Playa Girón, one of the entrance points to the Bay of Pigs, where the Cuban army blunted the 1961 invasion of CIA-sponsored Cuban exiles who hoped to overthrow Fidel Castro (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

Commission, named after its chairman, General Maxwell Taylor, repeated most of the CIA's findings but placed greater responsibility on those who designed the plan. Significantly, the Taylor Commission reported that the Soviets were fully aware of the plan's details on April 9, 1961. (What those details were remains unknown, as the Soviet documents are not yet available and the only source is the Taylor Commission.) As the Soviets were friendly with Cuba at this time, they did not want to see Castro succumb to U.S. power, thus the commission assumed that they passed the information to Castro.

In the aftermath of the attack, Castro strengthened his hand at home by taking steps to further silence his critics. His international prestige significantly increased, particularly in Latin America, for having thwarted the United States. To other Latin Americans, particularly the upper and middle sectors, Castro's success at the Bay of Pigs and the strengthening of his hand within Cuba served to encourage opponents, including revolutionaries, who opposed the static societies across Hispanic America. This increased threat to the status quo prompted the elite and middle sectors to initially support the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. The international criticism that Kennedy endured did not deter him from continuing to seek the ouster of Castro from power in Cuba. In December 1962, 1,197 members of the Cuban brigade imprisoned by Castro received their freedom in exchange for \$35 million worth of food, medicine, and agricultural equipment from the United States.

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Belaúnde Terry, Fernando (b. 1912–d. 2002) *president of Peru* Born into a middle-class intellectual and politically active family in LIMA, Fernando Belaúnde Terry accompanied his father and uncle to Paris when President AUGUSTO B. LEGUÍA banished them from PERU in 1924. There, Belaúnde completed high school and commenced his university training. When his father relocated to Miami, Florida, in 1930 Belaúnde completed his studies in ARCHITECTURE at the University of Texas at Austin. He returned to Peru in 1936, where he became a notable urban architect, urban planning consultant, and university professor.

Belaúnde began his political career in 1944 as a founding member of the National Democratic Party, which led to the presidential election of José Bustamante (b. 1894–d. 1989) in 1946 and Belaúnde's winning a congressional seat. Both served until General Manuel

Odría's (b. 1897–d. 1974) October 29, 1948, coup d'état. Belaúnde vaulted onto Peru's national political scene in 1956 after the electoral board refused to certify him as the presidential candidate of the Democratic Youth Front. Students challenged the MILITARY with massive demonstrations in Lima that were quelled by Belaúnde, who armed with only with a Peruvian flag marched between the two groups during a confrontation. A photo of the scene appeared in publications around the world, making Belaúnde an instant hero as he stood against the military government. His efforts, however, did not prevent Manuel Prado (b. 1889–d. 1967) from becoming Peru's 41st president on July 28, 1956.

Belaúnde immediately capitalized on his newfound fame. He went to Chincheros, in Cuzco State, where he founded the Popular Action (Acción Popular, or AP) party in July 1956. His claim that he wanted to recapture the Inca tradition of community and cooperation in a modern democratic society placed him between the right-wing oligarchy and the left-wing communists. After the party's founding, Belaúnde traversed the country to plead his case to the people and found a responsive chord. In defiance of the military government, Belaúnde presided over the AP's annual convention in 1959, for which he was arrested and jailed. He was held for 12 days before the government caved in to public pressure and released him. This opened the door for Belaúnde's June 10, 1962, presidential bid. Although he lost by some 14,000 votes to VÍCTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE, the election was turned over to Congress for a decision because no one candidate received the constitutional minimum of one-third of the vote to win outright. The military again intervened to establish a caretaker government, which ruled until the June 9, 1963, elections were won by Belaúnde.

During his first administration (1963–68), Belaúnde initiated several infrastructure projects including the construction of a highway connecting the Pacific coast enclave Chiclayo with the isolated northern Amazon region, the building of several hydroelectric facilities, and the establishment of the Peruvian National Bank. He also promised a government urban housing program for the poor. While these programs were applauded by most Peruvians, along with the expansion of social services for the poor and initiatives to spur manufacturing, they contributed to inflation and a devaluation of the sol, Peru's currency, in 1967. While Congress emasculated Belaúnde's proposal for agrarian reform, the peasants began to seize land in the countryside, prompting the elites to respond with force and Belaúnde to send government troops into the countryside. The conflict that followed took an estimated 9,000 peasant lives and left another 19,000 homeless and 34,600 acres (14,000 ha) of land destroyed. Also in 1968, controversy erupted over the International Petroleum Company (IPC), which was at the time owned by Standard Oil, which owed taxes to the Peruvian government. In return for the back

taxes, Belaúnde settled the government's claims with the company, granting IPC the right to drill for oil in new locations. The Peruvian public demonstrated against the agreement.

Under these adverse economic conditions, the Peruvian military again intervened, removing Belaúnde from office on October 3, 1968. He took refuge in the United States, where he taught architecture at Harvard University. Belaúnde returned to Peru in 1979 and made a successful bid for the presidency a year later. After a promising beginning, the economic problems left over from 12 years of military rule again came to the fore. Inflation and unfavorable TRADE balances persisted, and unemployment climbed. The 1982–83 El Niño caused widespread flooding in coastal areas and severe droughts inland and wreaked havoc on the fishing industry. Guerrilla activities intensified; in particular, civil and human rights violations by the Shining Path prompted the government to declare a state of emergency in the Ayacucho and Apurímac regions. On the positive side, Belaúnde oversaw the completion of the same highway he had begun during his first administration.

As provided by the 1979 constitution, Belaúnde became a senator for life at the completion of his presidency on July 28, 1985. He died in Lima on June 4, 2002.

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Belize The only official English-speaking country in CENTRAL AMERICA, Belize achieved complete independence from the United Kingdom in 1981. Known as British Honduras until 1973, Belize, whose name is derived from the Maya for “muddy water,” is a parliamentary democracy. The only Central American country without access to the Pacific Ocean, Belize is bordered to the north by MEXICO and the west by GUATEMALA. The Caribbean coast is lined with a coral reef and 450 islets. The capital, Belmopan, located 50 miles (80.5 km) inland, was constructed during the 1960s after a hurricane devastated Belize City, the former capital and still the nation's largest city. Initially, foreign governments were unwilling to move their embassies to Belmopan, but, for example, the United States eventually opened an embassy there in 2006.

With just under 9,000 square miles (23,310 km²) of territory and less than 300,000 inhabitants, Belize has the lowest population density of any nation in Central America. Nevertheless, it is ethnically and linguistically

diverse. Mestizos, mulattoes, and NATIVE AMERICANS make up roughly 50 percent, 25 percent, and 10 percent of the Belizean population, respectively. The remainder is composed of Asians, North Americans, Europeans, and Garifuna, people of mixed indigenous (Carib and Arawak) and African heritage. Given that Belize was a British colony, the official language is English; nevertheless, the two most widely spoken languages are Spanish and Belizean Creole (a lyrical English-based language), which are spoken by 43 percent and 37 percent of the population, respectively. Almost 300,000 Belizeans live abroad, for the most part in the United States. The majority of those who have emigrated are Creole and Garifuna speakers. Although all religions are tolerated in Belize, half of the population practices Roman Catholicism.

Belize became a self-governing territory within the British Empire in 1964, but independence was delayed because of territorial disputes with neighboring Guatemala, which initially refused to recognize Belize's right to exist as an independent nation. After Belize achieved independence on September 21, 1981, the British government maintained a MILITARY presence there. In early 1993, citing Guatemala's recognition of Belizean independence in 1991, the British announced plans to remove its troops. A June 1993 military coup in Guatemala, however, temporarily renewed Guatemalan demands for Belizean territory. On October 1, 1994, upon the removal of British land forces from Belize, the British established the British Army Training Support Unit Belize (BATSUB) to maintain a military presence in Belize. Although Guatemala recognizes Belizean independence, border disputes continue.

Queen Elizabeth II, the official head of state, is represented in Belize by a governor general. Officially, the cabinet, led by the prime minister, advises the governor general; in practice, however, the prime minister exercises executive authority. The prime minister and the cabinet ministers, most of whom hold elected seats in the House of Representatives, are members of the major political party. The National Assembly is divided into the popularly elected House of Representatives and the Senate, consisting of members appointed by the governor general. GEORGE PRICE, the nation's first prime minister, cofounded the People's United Party (PUP) in 1950. Price was prime minister from 1981 to 1984 and from 1989 to 1993. MANUEL ESQUIVEL, the leader of the United Democratic Party (UDP), was prime minister from 1984 to 1989 and from 1993 to 1998. SAID MUSA took over leadership of the PUP in 1996 and won the majority in parliament in 1998 and 2003.

Belize's ECONOMY is primarily agricultural. Sugar is the main crop and represents half of the nation's exports. The banana industry, however, is the country's largest employer. Recently, the citrus industry has also expanded. The tourism INDUSTRY, enhanced by the 200-mile- (322-km-) long Belize Barrier Reef (the second

longest coral reef in the world), has greatly expanded during the Musa government.

See also BELIZE (Vols. I, II, III).

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Belize–Guatemala territorial dispute The territorial dispute between BELIZE and GUATEMALA can be traced to a series of 18th-century British–Spanish agreements under which Spain retained administrative control over modern-day Belize, a then-desolate Caribbean coastal territory, and granted the British logging rights and permission to introduce a black LABOR force to work in the lumber industry. This labor force, brought to Belize by the British, came from southern Caribbean islands where they had become victims of the decline of the Caribbean sugar industry. The 1786 Convention of London affirmed Spanish sovereignty over the territory, but after 1798, Spain made no attempt to reclaim it. By the time Spain lost control of Central America and Mexico in 1821, the British had extended their control inland from the Caribbean coast; they proclaimed the territory as the crown colony of British Honduras in 1871.

With the disintegration of Spain's New World empire in the 1820s, several of the newly independent nations claimed the right of inheritance to Spanish territories. Thus, Guatemala claimed control over British Honduras and subsequently strengthened this claim under the terms of the 1859 Wycke–Aycinena Treaty. The Guatemalans then agreed to recognize British sovereignty over the crown colony provided the British government completed a road from Guatemala's northeast Petén region to the Caribbean coast. The road was never built, and in 1884, the Guatemalan government announced that it would terminate the treaty. These matters stood until 1940, when the Guatemalan government declared the treaty void. Five years later, the 1945 Guatemalan constitution declared British Honduras to be Guatemala's 23rd department. After 1954, Guatemala's military governments used the controversy to stir national emotions, but this was largely to keep the public mind off their brutal rule and the country's malfunctioning ECONOMY. Otherwise, Guatemalan authorities had little interest in the underdeveloped state with a large black population.

From 1961 until 1963, British and Guatemalan diplomats attempted to resolve the problem, but elected Belizean officials refused to participate in the talks. Belizean premier GEORGE PRICE rejected any suggestion that would tie his state to Guatemala. Independence from

Britain and international recognition remained Price's only objectives. In 1965, Britain and Guatemala asked the United States to broker a solution. The latter proposed that Belize be granted its independence with Guatemalan control over its internal security, defense, and external affairs. The proposal did not differ from British colonial control, however, and the Belizeans refused it. They then demanded independence, including control of all defense matters. A series of meetings were held between 1969 and 1972 but abruptly terminated when the British dispatched an aircraft carrier and 8,000 troops to Belize for amphibious exercises. Guatemala took this as a threat to itself and stationed troops along its common border with Belize. The discussions ended, and tensions increased amid the military maneuvering.

As the decade progressed, Belizeans made a concerted effort to gain support from the international community. Belizean leaders appealed to the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations (UN) to accept the state's independence and recognition of its border. Finally, in 1980, the UN approved a resolution calling for Belize's independence and Britain's defense of the country. The British were prepared to accept this, but the Guatemalans were not. Thus, when Belize received its independence from Great Britain on September 21, 1981, Guatemala refused to recognize it and promised to continue pushing its claim to the territory. Finally, on August 14, 1991, Guatemala accepted the right of the Belizean people to self-determination but also announced that it would continue to press for a final legal solution to the issue. On December 10, 2008, the Belizean and Guatemalan governments agreed to submit their claims to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands.

See also BELIZE (Vols. I, II, III).

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Betancourt Bello, Rómulo Ernesto (b. 1908–d. 1981) *president of Venezuela* Born into a modest family in the small town of Guatire, east of CARACAS, Rómulo Ernesto Betancourt Bello's political activism began at age 20 when he joined the "Generation of '28," which opposed the dictatorship of JUAN VICENTE GÓMEZ. For this, he was exiled from VENEZUELA. The experience abroad sharpened his democratic ideals and belief that new doctrines were needed to address his own country's socioeconomic

problems. Betancourt returned to Venezuela shortly after Gómez's death in 1935. Six years later, Betancourt joined with others to found the Democratic Action Party (Acción Democrática, or AD) on September 11, 1941. Betancourt vaulted on to the national scene on October 18, 1945, when a MILITARY coup ousted the sitting president, Isaías Medina (b. 1897–d. 1953), and installed Betancourt in the presidency. During his three-year presidential term, Betancourt provided for universal suffrage, permitted the organization of labor unions, and used oil profits to initiate social programs. He increased taxes on oil companies that effectively prevented them from making greater profits than the Venezuelan government took in via tax revenues. Betancourt earned international acclaim for opening Venezuela to thousands of World War II European refugees. He also called for a constituent assembly that produced a new document on December 5, 1947, containing the framework of a democratic government and for a presidential election in 1948, which was won by another AD candidate, Rómulo Gallegos (b. 1884–d. 1968). Gallegos's presidency lasted only nine months, ending with another coup on November 24, 1948, that set in motion the 10-year military dictatorship of MARCOS PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ.

Betancourt again went into exile, spending time in COSTA RICA, CUBA, and PUERTO RICO and only returned after the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez on January 23, 1958, to successfully capture the December 7, 1968, presidential elections. Another event of equal importance that year was the Pact of Punta Fijo, signed by the leaders of the AD and Social Christian Party (COPEI) on October 31. The pact provided for a sharing of administrative authority between the two parties and remained in place until the 1998 presidential election of HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS.

On taking office on February 19, 1959, Betancourt faced a bankrupt treasury. Despite low prices for oil on the global market and a quota limitation placed on Venezuelan oil by U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower, he put the government's financial house in order and continued to implement social programs for the poor. The U.S. quota system that favored Canada and MEXICO prompted Betancourt to initiate talks with other oil producers, which led to the founding of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries at the Baghdad Conference between September 11 and 14, 1960. Betancourt considered his greatest triumph to be the peaceful transfer of the presidency on March 13, 1964, to AD colleague Raúl Leoni (b. 1905–d. 1972), the first such electoral change in Venezuelan history. He declined the AD's invitation to be its presidential candidate in 1973, instead supporting CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ.

Betancourt remained a force within the AD and continued to envision democratic governments throughout Latin America. After suffering a stroke during a visit to New York City, Betancourt was brought home and died in Caracas on September 28, 1981.

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Bird, Vere Cornwall (b. 1910–d. 1999) *prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda* Born on December 7, 1910, in St. John's, on the island of Antigua, Vere Cornwall Bird, with no formal EDUCATION beyond primary school, became the president of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (ATLU) in 1943. Using the ATLU to mobilize political support, Bird was elected to the colonial legislature of ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA in 1945. He subsequently established the Antigua Labour Party (ALP). His biggest battles were fought in the sugar INDUSTRY, where he achieved better wages for workers and recognition of the right of workers to have paid annual holidays. A tall, imposing, charismatic figure, Bird served as the first and only chief minister of Antigua and Barbuda from 1960 to 1967. A supporter of a Caribbean united politically and economically, Bird ardently supported the WEST INDIES FEDERATION. When the British granted Antigua and Barbuda self-government in 1967, Bird became premier. Defeated by the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM) in the 1971 legislative elections, he returned to power in 1976 and led the nation to independence on November 1, 1981.

Bird served as prime minister from 1981 to 1994, when he retired for health reasons. In 1985, in an attempt to secure his legacy, Bird convinced the legislature to rename Antigua's international airport in his honor. He was succeeded by his son, Lester Bird (b. 1938–), who served as prime minister until the ALP lost political power in 2004. One of Lester Bird's first acts of government was to declare his father a national hero. Antiguan and Barbudan critics of the ALP accuse the Bird family of corruption (which has never been proven in a court of law) and nepotism. In her prose essay *A Small Place* (1988), Antiguan author Jamaica Kincaid compared the Bird dynasty to the Duvalier dynasty in HAITI. Bird died at Holburton Hospital in St. John's on June 28, 1999.

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Bishop, Maurice (b. 1944–d. 1983) *prime minister of Grenada* Born on May 29, 1944, to Grenadian parents

in Aruba, Maurice Bishop and his family returned to GRENADA, and in 1957, he won a scholarship to study at Presentation Boys School, a Roman Catholic secondary school. President of the Students' Union, the Debating Society, and the Historical Society, and editor of the school newspaper, Bishop won the Principal's Gold Medal for outstanding academic and overall ability in 1962. Bishop and Bernard Coard (b. 1944–) cofounded the Grenada Assembly of Youth after Truth, a student group dedicated to political awareness, in 1963. After nine months of hosting weekly talks and seminars, Bishop went to London University to study law, while Coard went to Brandeis University to study economics. While in London, Bishop married Angela Redhead, a nurse. Bishop returned to Grenada with his wife in 1970 and began to practice law. In 1972, Bishop and several urban professionals, including his future girlfriend Jacqueline Creft, established the Movement for Assemblies of the People (MAP), a political organization influenced by Tanzania's Julius Nyerere's brand of socialism, which advocated grassroots organizations to increase the political awareness of the larger populace.

On March 11, 1973, Bishop's MAP merged with the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation of Unison Whitman (1939–83) to form a leftist alternative to Premier ERIC GAIRY's Grenada United Labour Party. The New Jewel Movement (NJM) called for a program to raise the standard of housing, living, education, health, food, and recreation for all people. The Manifesto of the New Jewel Movement (1973) stated: "The people are being cheated and have been cheated for too long—cheated by both parties, for over twenty years. Nobody is asking what the people want. We suffer low wages and higher costs of living, while the politicians get richer, live in bigger houses, and drive around in bigger cars." In addition, the NJM called for the nationalization of all foreign-owned hotels. In 1976, Bishop won a seat in the House of Representatives and became leader of the opposition.

On March 13, 1979, while Gairy was out of the country, the NJM staged a virtually bloodless revolution and established the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). Although the NJM called for a form of popular socialism based on grassroots, democratic local councils, it suspended the constitution, ruled by decree, arrested the political opposition, closed newspapers, and rapidly militarized the nation. Bishop obtained MILITARY assistance from the Soviet Union and CUBA and enlisted Cuban aid in constructing an international airport. Whereas Bishop claimed that the airport was being built to expand the tourism INDUSTRY, U.S. president Ronald Reagan believed that it was a potential Cuban-Soviet air base. On October 18, 1983, the NJM imploded. Minister of Finance Coard, who wanted to pursue a more pro-Soviet, anti-U.S. policy, overthrew Bishop with the support of the army. Bishop and many of his closest associates, including his girlfriend Creft, were arrested and executed

the next day. On October 25, 1983, Reagan unleashed OPERATION URGENT FURY, a U.S. military intervention supported by BARBADOS, JAMAICA, and several members of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, which defeated Grenadian and Cuban resistance and overthrew Coard's government. Pro-Bishop survivors of the 1983 coup organized the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, an insignificant leftist political party that has since virtually disappeared.

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Bogotá Bogotá is the capital of COLOMBIA. Founded by the Spanish in 1538, the settlement was originally known as Santa Fe. The city sits on an 8,563-foot (2,610-m) high plateau of the eastern Andes. Approximately 7 million people reside within its limits and another 1.2 million in the greater metropolitan area. In addition to national and city government buildings and operation centers, Bogotá is home to several universities, the oldest being the Universidad Santo Tomás, founded in 1580; followed by the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, founded in 1867; and the prestigious private Universidad de los Andes, established in 1948. Bogotá also has a rich tradition in the arts, LITERATURE, and theater.

Bogotá has more than 1,000 neighborhoods laid out in square grids that date to Spanish colonial times. Affluent neighborhoods are found to the north and northeast; the middle class is located largely in the western and northwestern parts of the city; and the poorer neighborhoods are in the south and southeast. The last include several squatter communities. Given the city's size, its TRANSPORTATION system of buses, a subway, and taxis is today severely strained. The population has grown exponentially since the 1930s when Colombia adopted the Import-Substitution Economic Model and Bogotá developed into a manufacturing center. By 1975, 75 percent of the nation's industrial output was produced in the city. After World War II, the violence that characterized Colombia's rural areas caused many unskilled people to migrate to the city, which contributed to the growth of shantytowns. In the 1980s, Bogotá became known as one of Latin America's crime-ridden cities, but a concerted government effort in the 1990s made it one of Latin America's more secure environments today.

See also BOGOTÁ (Vols. I, II, III).

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Bogotazo See COLOMBIA.

Bolivia Bolivia is a 424,162 square mile (1.09 million km²) landlocked country bounded on the north and east by BRAZIL, the south and east by PARAGUAY, on the south by ARGENTINA, and on the west by PERU and CHILE. It has three distinct regions: the eastern fertile lowlands, the central high plateau (the altiplano), and the central ranges of the Andes, home to some of the highest peaks in the Western Hemisphere. Quechua and Aymara Indians account for 60 percent of Bolivia's 9.1 million inhabitants; mestizos, 25 percent; and whites, 15 percent. Bolivia has long been one of Latin America's most impoverished nations but has developed somewhat economically since reforms were instituted beginning in the 1980s. Today, La Paz is the government's administrative capital, and Sucre serves as the country's judicial headquarters.

The Tiwanaken (near Lake Titicaca) and the Moxo (near La Paz) indigenous peoples can be traced to about the second century B.C.E. but had been replaced by the Quechua by the time the Spanish conquistador Diego de Almagro passed through what is now Bolivia in 1535. During most of the Spanish colonial period, the territory was known as Charcas or Upper Peru and was administered by the viceroy at Lima through the Audiencia of Charcas, the contemporary city of Sucre. The mines at Cerro Rico (rich mountain) produced about 90 percent of the silver discovered by the Spanish in South America and made Potosí the largest city in the Western Hemisphere at that time. While NATIVE AMERICANS had used coca as a stimulant prior to the arrival of the Spanish, its use was encouraged among indigenous laborers who worked in the mines. Bolivia's independence on August 6, 1825, was anticlimactic following the fall of Peruvian rebel forces earlier that year. The country was named after the famous South American liberator, Simón Bolívar.

Political instability plagued Bolivia from the time of its independence in 1825 well into the 20th century, as seen in the nearly 200 political coups and countercoups. Three issues have prevented a cohesive nation from developing out of diverse components: 1) the failure to incorporate indigenous peoples into the nation's political and economic systems, 2) the emphasis on an export-based ECONOMY at the expense of internal development, and 3) the failure of creole political leaders to extend government control over its frontier. Discrimination against the indigenous dates to the Spanish colonial period, while territorial losses came with Bolivia's failure in the War of the Pacific (1879–84) with Peru and Chile and in the CHACO WAR (1932–35) with Paraguay.

Although the mines had long been overworked, silver continued to be Bolivia's major export until the start of the 20th century, when it was replaced by tin. The MINING industry was dominated by three national companies until 1952. Silver mining brought prosperity to the northern sector of Bolivia but also encouraged the Liberal Party to

sell off indigenous communal lands during the first part of the 20th century. These were then purchased by the elite to use as collateral in buying shares in silver-mining ventures. During the 1920s, Conservative governments slowed these land sales but permitted the expansion of privately owned haciendas into indigenous and peasant communities. This process also occurred in Bolivia's eastern, rubber-tree rich sector. The MILITARY brutally suppressed indigenous protests. The only exceptions before 1952 came during the two-year administration (1937–38) of DAVID TORO RUILOVA and his immediate successor Germán Busch (b. 1904–d. 1938), which also set the stage for the 1952 revolution. Beginning in 1940, the POLITICAL PARTIES became more sharply divided and radical and moderate leftist groups emerged, including the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario, or PIR), the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, or POR), and the NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MNR). PIR and POR addressed rural issues, calling for an end to indigenous servitude and the *latifundio* (a large tract of land, privately held) system through the nationalization of haciendas. Based on European fascist principles, the MNR focused on the establishment of a corporate state. All groups called for the nationalization of the tin mines.

On December 20, 1943, General Gualberto Villarroel (b. 1908–d. 1946) engineered a coup and placed himself in power. In cooperation with the MNR and POR, Villarroel permitted the formation of a national miner's union under the leadership of JUAN LECHÍN OQUENDO. Villarroel subsequently decreed an end to unpaid LABOR services that kept the indigenous bound to haciendas, as well as the building of schools in the Indian communities. While these decrees were not implemented, the tin miners' union later became a potent political force. In 1945, Villarroel convened a national congress to hear Native Americans' complaints. While attracting thousands of Indians from around the country, it stirred the ire of the Conservative elite, who encouraged the president's ouster. An angry crowd hanged Villarroel from a lamppost on July 21, 1946. Conservative governments followed thereafter, but they could not dampen the ever-increasing leftist opposition.

The MNR grew sufficiently strong for its candidate, VICTOR PAZ ESTENSSORO, to win the May 15, 1951, presidential election. Nevertheless, the military prevented Paz from taking office. Not to be denied, the MNR organized its followers, particularly miners, who stormed La Paz on April 12, 1952. Three days later the military relented, and Paz assumed the presidency. Over the next four years, Paz Estenssoro implemented a social revolution by decree. A 1953 land reform program led to the expropriation of large and medium-size landholdings, particularly in the altiplano, for redistribution to the Indians. The indigenous were also tied to the MNR through rural labor syndicates. As landowners,

they became conservative about many social issues and therefore were willing to support government attempts to dampen tin miners' demands. Their new status also led these indigenous groups to withhold support for the Cuban revolutionary ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA when he arrived in 1967 hoping to foment a national uprising. In the eastern lowlands, the large landowners held on to their estates and, in fact, benefited from U.S. economic aid that stimulated sugar and cotton production rather than assist in the relocation of Native Americans from the overcrowded highlands.

The MNR remained in power until November 5, 1964, when General René Barrientos (b. 1919–d. 1969) assumed the presidency. He remained in office until his death on April 27, 1969, in a helicopter accident. From then until 1993, Bolivia endured a series of military governments or civilian administrations whose fate depended on the military. Whoever governed relied on a combination of political parties to remain in power. Throughout this period, successive Bolivian governments were condemned by the international community for denying the people their civil rights and for human rights violations. The country experienced economic advancement in the mid-1970s largely as a result of government policies including the expansion of agricultural exports and the development of infrastructure including airports and roads. However, when tin prices dropped precipitously in the 1980s, the economy spiraled downward. By 1985, inflation had reached 40,000 percent annually.

Paz Estenssoro returned to the presidency on August 6, 1985, but this time as a neoliberal. He opened the country to foreign investment, dismantled the state mining company (Comibol), and broke the miner's unions by relocating many miners and their families to subtropical lands. Others moved to the Chaparé region, where they joined local farmers in the growing of coca, a crop that grew in importance with the explosion in global drug trafficking (see DRUGS). With U.S. assistance, in the 1990s, the Bolivian government conducted a program to eradicate the crop. It was sufficiently successful that by 2001, Bolivia had won economic assistance and debt forgiveness from the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Nonetheless, Bolivia's widespread poverty and concomitant social problems were not relieved either by these monetary changes or by the nationalization of the country's hydrocarbon industries in 2004.

Playing on the plight of the indigenous, JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA of the Movement Toward Socialism Party (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS) won the December 18, 2005, presidential election, with 54 percent of the votes. On May 1, 2006, he increased the amount of land to be used for legal coca growing from 30,000 acres (12,000 ha) to 50,000 acres (20,000 ha) and in November 2006 completed contract renegotiations with hydrocarbon companies to increase the Bolivian share of their

profits by 82 percent. While the new contracts satisfied Morales's domestic supporters, they have created problems with Bolivia's MERCOSUR neighbors who have TRADE agreements for the purchase of its natural gas (see SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET). A recalcitrant congress coupled with regional resistance to the increased power of the central government have blunted Morales's plans for further nationalization.

See also ALMAGRO, DIEGO DE (Vol. I); BOLÍVAR, SIMÓN (Vol. II); BOLIVIA (Vols. I, III); CHARCAS (Vol. II); POTOSÍ (Vols. I, II); QUECHUA (Vol. I).

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
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Bosch, Juan (b. 1909–d. 2001) *president of the Dominican Republic* Born on June 30, 1909, in La Vega, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Juan Bosch was an early critic of Dominican dictator RAFAEL TRUJILLO. In 1931, he published his first of many books. Although eventually known primarily as a politician, Bosch was one of the most prominent Dominican writers (see LITERATURE). During the early years of Trujillo's dictatorship, Bosch was arrested for conspiracy against the regime and spent three months in jail. In 1938, fearing that Trujillo would try to either bribe or coerce him into supporting the regime, Bosch fled into exile in PUERTO RICO. Spending the next 24 years in exile, he settled in CUBA in 1939 where he founded the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, or PRD) with other Dominican exiles. Bosch was an organizer of the ill-fated 1949 Cayo Confites invasion of the Dominican Republic to overthrow Trujillo. After the uprising, Bosch fled to VENEZUELA, where he continued his anti-Trujillo activities. Eventually returning to Cuba, Bosch was jailed after FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR led a military coup in 1952. After a brief incarceration, Bosch sought exile in COSTA RICA. He spent the rest of the 1950s traveling throughout Latin America campaigning for democracy.

Concerned that the impoverished populace in the Dominican Republic would find FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's radical approach to social and economic change appealing, U.S. president John F. Kennedy's administration sought to transplant democracy to the Dominican Republic. In 1962, several months after Trujillo's son RAMFIS TRUJILLO fled into exile, Bosch returned to the Dominican Republic to campaign for the U.S.-supervised



On February 7, 1963, U.S. vice president Lyndon B. Johnson (right) congratulates Juan Bosch, the first elected president in the Dominican Republic in 34 years, on taking the oath of office. (United States Information Agency)

presidential elections scheduled for December 20, 1962. Bosch won 60 percent of the vote, defeating his rival, Viriato Fiallo (b. 1895–d. 1983), in what many observers called the first democratic elections in the history of the Dominican Republic. Bosch took office on February 27, 1963, and was heralded by the Kennedy administration as a promoter of constitutional democracy. Bosch immediately set out to implement sweeping political, economic, and social reforms, which quickly alienated the Dominican elite, Roman Catholic hierarchy, and MILITARY, as well as U.S. diplomats and businessmen who perceived Bosch as being soft on communism. On September 25, 1963, the Dominican military, with little protest from the Kennedy administration, overthrew Bosch after only seven months in office. Bosch went into exile in Puerto Rico.

In April 1965, a group of pro-Bosch military officers known as Constitutionalists staged a revolt to return the exiled Bosch to power. Loyalists within the army, who were supported by the nation's elites, rallied around General Antonio Imbert (b. 1920–) one of Trujillo's assassins. On April 28, the United States sent 400 marines to restore order. U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson, under the initial pretense of humanitarian concerns, eventually sent a further 23,000 U.S. troops. Code-named OPERATION POWER PACK, U.S. military intervention restored order and set the stage for democratic elections in 1966. Bosch was defeated at the polls by JOAQUÍN BALAGUER. Believing that the PRD was not actively pursuing a revolutionary agenda, Bosch subsequently left the party in 1973 and founded the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, or PLD). He ran unsuccessfully for the presidency in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, and 1994. Bosch died on November 1, 2001, in SANTO DOMINGO. His protégé Leonel Fernández (b. 1953–), the current leader of the PLD, has been president of the Dominican Republic since 2004.

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Bouterse, Dési (Desiré Delano Bouterse)

(b. 1945–) chairman of the National Military Council and de facto ruler of Suriname Born on October 13, 1945, in Domburg, SURINAME, Dési Bouterse joined the Surinamese MILITARY in 1975. On August 13, 1980, Bouterse was one of 16 noncommissioned officers who orchestrated the military coup that overthrew the civilian government led by Prime Minister HENCK ARRON. Bouterse, as chairman of the National Military Council, soon became the dominant figure in the new regime. Although erroneously welcomed as a reformer, he promptly banned opposition parties, brutally suppressed dissent, suspended the 1975 constitution, and dissolved the legislature.

On December 8, 1982, several prominent citizens in Suriname were arrested in their homes by military authorities. Included in the roundup were Cyril Daal (d. 1982), the leader of the largest TRADE union in Suriname; Kenneth Gonçalves (b. 1940–d. 1982), the dean of the Bar Association; and Gerard Leckie (b. 1943–d. 1982), the dean of the University of Suriname. On December 9, the 15 detainees were executed at Fort Zeelandia. Although the victims of the “December murders” were all shot at close range through the front of the head or chest, Bouterse claimed that they were shot while trying to escape. In 1986, Bouterse brutally repressed an uprising of Maroons (blacks living in their own communities in remote regions) who resisted the government's attempt to relocate them to urban areas. In 1987, Bouterse, in an attempt to obtain economic aid from the Netherlands, allowed democratic elections, which were won by the opposition. Bouterse overthrew that government in 1990 when the president sought a peaceful settlement with the Maroon revolutionaries.

In 1990, after large quantities of cocaine began to arrive in the Netherlands, a Dutch investigation revealed that Bouterse was involved in the export of Colombian cocaine (see DRUGS). The Dutch government suspended their massive aid infusions, which resulted in the removal of Bouterse as commander of the military and democratic elections in 1991. In late 1997, Bouterse was tried in absentia in a Dutch court for drug smuggling and found guilty. Regardless, Surinamese law prohibits Bouterse's extradition. In 2007, Bouterse, who has reinvented himself as a populist political candidate, announced his interest to again seek the Suriname presidency, but those

plans were stymied a year later when preliminary court hearings concerning his role in the 1982 massacre that involved Daal began. The trial itself was postponed in February 2009.

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Bracero Program The Bracero Program was a series of agreements from 1942 to 1964 between the United States and MEXICO that provided for the legal entry of Mexican agricultural workers (braceros) into the United States. The program had its origins in World War II, when the United States experienced a LABOR shortage as men were drafted and recruited into MILITARY service and women were drawn to industrial labor. Under the terms of the 1942 agreement, Mexican workers received permits to work in the United States for between four weeks and six months. The permits could be renewed for up to 18 months. The U.S. Agricultural Department administered the program, initially through the War Food Administration. Some 300,000 braceros participated in the program during World War II, and when the program ended in 1964, an estimated 4 million Mexicans had worked in the United States.

As the contractor, the U.S. government paid for the workers' travel expenses to recruitment centers located throughout Mexico and all travel expenses to the work sites, usually in the southern United States. Once located with stateside employers, the braceros signed standardized work contracts under which they were paid the local prevailing wage and were guaranteed work for 75 percent of the time of the contract. During any idle time, the workers received a subsistence wage. U.S. employers also provided free housing, adequate meals at low cost, and medical care. To participate in the program, U.S. private employers, as subcontractors, were required to prove that resident labor was not available and they would pay the braceros as required. At the insistence of the Mexican government, the braceros were not to be subjected to discrimination, and for this reason, none worked in Texas (where all nonwhites were discriminated against at the time) for the first five years of the program.

The braceros labored under several disadvantages. Most contracts were written in English and therefore were easily violated by subcontractors. The language barrier meant that many Mexicans did not fully understand the terms of their agreement. The braceros were most often employed in "stoop labor," which included picking cotton, vegetables, and fruit; thinning sugar beet fields; and, on occasion, repairing railroads. While they had the right to complain about withheld wages and working conditions, the braceros most often did not, fearing deportation if they did so. By the early 1950s, the braceros faced

competition from Mexicans who migrated illegally into the United States and could be employed more cheaply (see MIGRATION). When the Mexican government refused to assist in controlling illegal border crossings, the U.S. government expelled from the program any employer caught using illegal workers. At the same time, the U.S. government deported illegal workers, often by plane to Central Mexico, in an effort to discourage their return.

Despite its problems, the program enabled the U.S. agricultural industry to benefit from cheap labor. For Mexico, the program served as a safety valve for its excess labor force, and the remittances home gave many poor residents badly needed money. Since its termination in 1964, illegal immigration of Mexicans into the United States has become a significant political issue.

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Bradshaw, Robert (b. 1916–d. 1978) *premier of St. Christopher and Nevis and St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla* Born on September 16, 1916, in St. Paul Capesterre on the island of St. Christopher, Robert Bradshaw was a LABOR activist who sought to politicize sugar workers in SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS. The collapse of sugar prices triggered by the Great Depression precipitated the birth of organized labor in St. Christopher and Nevis. Dedicated to the struggle for independence from the United Kingdom, Bradshaw founded the St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party in 1940. Bradshaw was elected to the Legislative Council in 1946 and dominated the political life of St. Christopher and Nevis for the next three decades.

From 1958 to 1962, St. Christopher and Nevis was a province of the WEST INDIES FEDERATION as St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla (the latter island considered to form part of a single political entity). Bradshaw was elected to the Federal House of Representatives and served as the federation's minister of finance. After the dissolution of the federation in 1962, Bradshaw returned to St. Christopher (also known as St. Kitts) from TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. In 1966, he became the chief minister of St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla. The British granted the islands greater local autonomy in 1967, and Bradshaw became the first premier of St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla. A major secession movement was immediately launched in Anguilla. Although initially repressed by Bradshaw, Anguilla broke away from St. Christopher and Nevis in 1971 (see BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES).

Bradshaw nationalized all sugar estates as well as the main sugar mill on St. Christopher. He faced opposition from the former sugar estate owners, who formed the People's Action Movement (PAM), and the people of Nevis, who felt that Bradshaw neglected Nevis and denied it revenue and investment opportunities. Bradshaw ignored their complaints. In 1977, he went to London to engage in independence talks. He died on May 23, 1978, on St. Christopher of prostate cancer. He was succeeded by Paul Southwell, who died on May 18, 1979. The Labour Party suffered a leadership crisis, and PAM won the 1980 parliamentary elections. In 1997, Bradshaw was named the first national hero of St. Christopher and Nevis.

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Brazil Brazil is located along the eastern coast of South America, bordering the Atlantic Ocean. Its northern and western borders link it with every other South American nation except CHILE and ECUADOR. With approximately 3.3 million square miles (8.5 million km²) of land, Brazil occupies 47 percent of South America's landmass and is the world's fifth-largest nation. Approximately 190 million people reside in Brazil, a nation with a high mortality rate due to AIDS and infant deaths, as well as lower population growth than elsewhere on the continent. While most of the country has a tropical climate, the southeast lies in more temperate zones, a factor that has affected economic development.

Evidence suggests that early humans first inhabited Brazil some 8,000 years ago, although not all archaeologists agree with this date. An estimated 1–2 million NATIVE AMERICANS inhabited the territory when Portuguese explorer Pedro Álvares Cabral landed on the easternmost tip of South America around April 21, 1500. Because the indigenous peoples were nomadic and lived in small clusters, the Portuguese were unable to subjugate them, a fact that led to the subsequent importation of African slaves, as well as immigration from Europe and Asia. Brazil was not as rich in the natural resources that took the Portuguese to Africa and South Asia, thus it received less attention. These same factors—population and resources—contributed to Portugal's defiance of the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas by which Pope Alexander VI divided the New World between the Catholic nations of Portugal and Spain. If enforced, the treaty would have limited Portugal's claims to the easternmost tip of Brazil, or its "hump," as it is commonly known. Instead, the Portuguese pushed Brazil's borders westward to

the Andes Mountains. Only after independence from Portugal on December 7, 1822, did the ill-defined boundaries become the subject of conflict.

Brazil's political development was haphazard until King John VI's rule. Portuguese king John III (b. 1502–d. 1557) had divided Brazil into hereditary captaincies, each approximately 150 miles (240 km) along the Atlantic coast but without interior lines of demarcation. In addition, the king had appointed Portuguese noblemen as *donatários* to govern each state. The ruling donatary had complete civil and criminal jurisdiction over the territory, including political appointments, land allocations, defense, and conversion of the Native Americans. The system did not work well, as the *donatários* battled each other and contested the Crown's central authority. When King John VI arrived in Brazil in 1808 after fleeing the invading French on the Iberian Peninsula, he attempted to establish a centralized administration, but to no avail. The prevalence of state power was entrenched. King John returned to Portugal in 1821, leaving behind his son Dom Pedro to govern. Pedro declared Brazil's independence on September 7, 1822, and ruled as its emperor. Ultimately Pedro I's incompetence and unpopularity forced him to abdicate on April 7, 1831, in favor of a regent until his own five-year-old son was deemed mature enough to rule as Pedro II, beginning on July 18, 1841. Considered a more astute ruler than his father, Pedro II successfully steered Brazil through the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–70) and the abolition of slavery but drew opposition from Liberals who wanted independence. The MILITARY forced him out on November 15, 1889, a move that ended the Empire of Brazil and commenced its modern history as a republic.

THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1889–1930

General Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca, who had led the military coup that ousted Pedro II, became Brazil's first de facto president. A civilian constituent assembly produced a new constitution, which went into effect in 1891. While it largely replicated the U.S. Constitution, suffrage was severely restricted: Only white, literate, landowning males could vote. In effect, only 3.5 percent of the population could vote in 1891, a figure that rose to 5.7 percent by 1930. The assembly also elected Deodoroda Fonseca as the country's first president, with Floriano Peixoto (b. 1839–d. 1895) as vice president. Political instability followed as the new government confronted several unsuccessful revolts. The 1894 elections, won by Prudente de Morais, set in motion a pattern that lasted until 1930 and provided a sense of political tranquillity at the national level. Morais, like most of his successors, identified with the republican movement that had led to the end of the monarchy in 1889. For the most part, these men came from Brazil's two most economically important states: São Paulo and Minas Gerais. By the start of the 20th century, both states were leading exporters of coffee and exercised state authority over it. State taxing

policies favored the development of the coffee and ancillary industries, discriminated against interstate TRADE, and imported workers, mainly from eastern Europe, who labored in the fields without the benefit of government or union protection. In effect, the federalist constitution permitted states to become political powers unto themselves. At the local level, the coffee barons, known as the “colonels,” ruled as political bosses and turned out the vote for governors at the national level and, in turn, usually agreed among themselves who would be the “official” candidate in presidential elections.

Opposition to the system increased over time. A small middle sector surfaced with the growth of the export-based ECONOMY. Lawyers, bankers, and other white-collar workers, as well as skilled laborers, were angered by the political corruption. Younger army officers who found the door to promotion closed and who sought greater compensation initiated a series of “barracks revolts” between 1922 and 1924, before being driven far into Brazil’s interior. One of their leaders, Luis Carlos Prestes (b. 1898–d. 1990), later served as leader of Brazil’s Communist Party for some 30 years. All of these groups often issued manifestos calling for free elections, broader suffrage that included WOMEN, and the remedy of various social ills. More practical were the Democratic Party and workers’ organizations. Founded in São Paulo in 1926, the Democratic Party wanted privileges for its members similar to those enjoyed by its European counterparts, including legitimate participation in the political process, an end to corruption, and greater economic opportunity. Workers’ unions had met with little success since 1889 and in the early 1900s, were superseded by anarchists and anarchosindicalist unions that staged several strikes, all of which failed to attain their goals, including improved salaries and working conditions. In 1919, as had occurred in ARGENTINA, these groups became associated with foreign ideas, and many of their leaders were deported. Together, however, these varied groups demonstrated that the old order was under serious political attack by the end of the 1920s.

From the time of its colonization until 1930, Brazil had experienced cycles of economic development that emphasized the exportation of primary products to markets in the Northern Hemisphere. The exportation of brazilwood, the source of the red dye for which the country is named, dominated the early colonial period, but by 1600, the invention of synthetic dyes in Europe had ended the demand for this product. Sugar became the most lucrative economic pursuit in the 1700s and early 1800s for the plantation owners in the northeast of the country. By 1830, it accounted for 30 percent of the nation’s exports but slowly declined thereafter, to just 5 percent by 1900. The cultivation of sugar by the British, Dutch, and French in their Caribbean possessions and the cultivation of sugar beets in the United States and that country’s link to CUBA for sugarcane lessened global demand for Brazil’s product.

Rubber production can be traced to the early 19th century in Brazil’s tropical Amazon region. By 1853, the port of Belém alone exported 2,500 tons of natural rubber, and by 1913, the product accounted for nearly one-third of Brazil’s exports. Owing to rapid industrialization in Europe and the United States, the demand for rubber latex intensified and continued to strengthen on the introduction of the vulcanization process in 1839, which prevented it from getting too sticky in hot weather and too brittle in the cold. The demand for Brazilian rubber declined in the 1920s as the British turned to their Southeast Asian colonies for the product and again during the Great Depression and with the introduction of synthetic rubber by the DuPont company in 1931. World War II accelerated the demand for Brazilian rubber. After the war, however, synthetic rubber replaced natural rubber, and by 1960, the former had replaced the latter as the world’s primary rubber product. The Brazilian rubber INDUSTRY went into permanent decline.

Coffee had been introduced to Brazil from the Caribbean in the early 19th century. It flourished in the southern states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais and subsequently in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Brazil’s local coffee barons, often referred to as “the colonels,” dominated the socioeconomic-political scene from 1900 to 1930. Europe, particularly Germany, became the country’s major coffee market. The growing foreign demand for coffee increased the need for laborers to satisfy increased production and transport of the coffee crop to the Atlantic coast ports for shipment to Europe. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, immigrant laborers came mainly from Italy and Spain, with others from eastern and central Europe. Little thought was given to relocating black sugar workers from the Amazon area to the southern coffee region. Northern agriculturalists envisioned a rebirth of their rubber and sugar industries, while southern coffee growers were reluctant to transport blacks southward for racial reasons. On the eve of the Great Depression, coffee was Brazil’s leading crop, accounting for nearly 70 percent of total exports.

Brazil changed in other ways from 1889 to the 1920s. The population increased by 162 percent during the time period, with most of the growth centered in the urban and industrialized coastal cities, such as SÃO PAULO and RIO DE JANEIRO. A nascent LABOR movement emerged in the 1920s. Because the national political system served mainly agricultural interests, the state proved unresponsive to the needs of the urban poor. The CATHOLIC CHURCH and private organizations attempted to fill the void with charities, recreational clubs, and the like, but they were incapable of dealing with the problem’s immensity. Brazil stood at the precipice of sociopolitical change.

ERA OF GETÚLIO VARGAS, 1930–1964

In 1930, the system that had characterized Brazilian politics since 1894 broke down and provided an opening for the Liberal Alliance to nominate GETÚLIO DORNELLES

VARGAS, from Rio Grande do Sul, to challenge the coffee barons' "official" candidate, Júlio Prestes (b. 1882–d. 1946), from the state of São Paulo. Amid charges of fraud, Prestes won the March 1, 1930, presidential contest but never took office. On October 24, three weeks before the scheduled end of his administration, the military ousted President Washington Luís (b. 1865–d. 1957) and on November 3, installed Vargas as provisional president. The military also shut down the national legislature, enabling Vargas to rule by decree. He immediately dismissed all state governors, replacing them with men loyal to him, and when *paulistas* (people from the state of São Paulo) revolted against the centralization of power, the federal army suppressed them. That same year, 1930, Vargas suppressed the *tenente* movement within the military, a group of younger officers focused on state-sponsored social reform whom Vargas considered a threat. In 1933, Vargas also called for a constituent assembly. A year later, it presented the nation with a new document that provided for the direct popular election of a president and congress. Nationalist provisions placed restrictions on foreign land ownership and immigration. Over the next three years, Vargas quashed two national ideological groups: the Integralists, a middle-class organization supported by naval officers who espoused traditional Brazilian values but were secretly funded by the Italian embassy, and the National Liberation Alliance (Ação Libertadora Nacional, or ALN), a populist coalition of socialists, communists, and other radicals run by the Brazilian Communist Party. The groups militated against each other, and their demonstrations often became violent. Beginning in July 1935, the government directed a military crackdown against both groups, and arrests, torture, and summary trials followed. The violence, however, continued to escalate. Finally, on November 10, 1937, Vargas dissolved Congress and, in a national radio address, promulgated a new constitution that paved the way for a new national government, or *Estado Novo*, that effectively shut down all government institutions save the presidency. Vargas now ruled as a dictator but promised not to stand as a candidate in the next elections, scheduled for 1943. When that time came, Vargas extended his presidency due to the "wartime emergency."

Under the *Estado Novo*, the military had a free hand to suppress all subversives, real or suspected, and these individuals endured torture, long prison terms, and other injustices, without legal recourse. The media was censored, making the government's Department of Press and Propaganda the only source of news.

Vargas moved Brazil toward the Allied cause prior to the outbreak of World War II and declared war on the Axis powers on August 22, 1942. Brazilian troops were sent to fight with the Allies in Italy. Brazil benefited economically from the war, as its natural resources, such as rubber and quinine, were needed by the Allies. The war, however, also caused the loss of European markets

for Brazil's primary products: rubber, quinine, and coffee. Although the European coffee market disappeared with the outbreak of war, the United States engineered a 1941 international coffee agreement that provided growers with a limited northern marketplace and continued income. The Brazilian government subsequently established cartels over the cacao, coffee, sugar, and tea industries in an effort to increase the marketability and price of these products. In exchange for defense sites on Brazil's northeastern "hump," the United States provided for the construction of the country's first steel mill at Volta Redonda. Other Brazilian industries spurred on by World War II included automobiles, airplane engines, and textiles. Industrialization increased the urban labor force, and Vargas moved to control it. The 1943 Labor Code stipulated that only one union was permissible in each plant and that it be sanctioned by the Ministry of Labor, which also supervised its finances. Labor bosses received financial rewards in exchange for their cooperation. Vargas had effectively established a corporate state not much different from Benito Mussolini's Italy or Juan Perón's Argentina.

As World War II moved toward its conclusion in 1945, Vargas attempted to establish an electoral base on the left that included the Brazilian Communist Party. He also edicted laws that granted the government control over future foreign investment in the country. These actions only strengthened opposition to him. State political authorities resented national political control, labor leaders opposed the government control of unions, younger military officers decried the lack of promotion opportunities and pay increases, and the middle sector and other literate persons, stirred by democratic objectives, clamored for an end to the Brazilian dictatorship. Finally, on October 29, 1945, the military forced Vargas to resign, and he returned to his remote ranch in Rio Grande do Sul.

In a clear indication of how much Brazil had changed since 1930, three new political parties immediately surfaced: the United National Democratic Party (União Democrática Nacional, or UDN), the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático, or PSD), and the Brazilian Worker's Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, or PTB). Liberal constitutionalists, the backbone of the anti-Vargas forces, dominated the UDN. The PSD consisted of political bosses, bureaucrats, and some industrialists, while the Vargas-based PTB aimed to appeal to urban labor. Vargas supporters contributed significantly to the election of air force general Eurico Dutra (b. 1883–d. 1974) as president on January 1, 1946. Dutra directed the country toward its traditional agricultural roots and oversaw the implementation of a new constitution in 1946 that restored state power at the expense of the national government. Dutra also returned to a reliance on coffee exports at the expense of industrialization. Despite a vast infrastructure program that included the construction of roads and public buildings such as educational facilities and the expansion of electrical and other

transmission systems, Dutra was criticized for failing to modernize and industrialize Brazil.

Vargas returned to national prominence when he won the October 3, 1950, presidential elections on a promise to accelerate industrialization and expand government social services. Because Vargas maintained that private capital had been too slow in the development of the country's energy resources, he directed the establishment of Petrobras, the Brazilian petroleum company, but not without bitter debate. Throughout his second term, Vargas faced corruption charges and military demands for his resignation. On August 24, 1954, he committed suicide in the presidential office. His death, however, did not prevent the movement to the left in Brazilian politics over the next 10 years.

A caretaker government ruled Brazil until the December 15, 1955, election in which the PSD candidate JUSCELINO KUBITSCHKE DE OLIVEIRA came out the winner with only 36 percent of the popular vote. Kubitschek built a congressional working coalition with the PTB and promised to accomplish 50 years of economic progress in five. Instead, when he left office in 1961, Brazil was experiencing rampant inflation and faced huge international debts. Kubitschek gained recognition for two other acts: He oversaw the construction of the futuristic city of Brasília, the country's new capital some 600 miles west of the old capital at Rio de Janeiro, and warned U.S. treasury secretary C. Douglas Dillon in 1957 that if the United States did not address the issue of hemispheric-wide economic and social disparities, all Latin America would soon confront violent social upheaval. The following president, member of the PTB, Jânio Quadros (b. 1917–d. 1992), unexpectedly resigned on August 25, 1961, only seven months after his inauguration. He was succeeded by João Goulart (b. 1917–d. 1976), Vargas's former labor minister, a populist, and an anathema to the conservative military. From the day Goulart took office, the military sought to force him out. Military and political conservatives became increasingly concerned with the radical left, which sought to unionize the rural peasantry and noncommissioned military officers. Lacking congressional votes to impeach Goulart, the conservatives and the United States approved a military coup on April 1, 1964, to save the country from communism. For the next 20 years, a variety of military officers governed Brazil.

FROM MILITARY TO NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTS (1964–PRESENT)

The military officers who engineered the coup quickly elected one of their own as president. Humberto Castillo Branco (b. 1867–d. 1967) outlawed his political opponents. Peasant leagues and labor unions were dissolved, and in some states, governors were removed from office. The media was placed under strict censorship, while universities were purged of “outspoken” professors and courses on moral and civic education were added to curriculums at the expense of social sciences that emphasized

critical thinking. Old political parties were extinguished and replaced by the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, or MDB) and the National Renewal Alliance (Aliança Renovadora Nacional, or ARENA). While the former allegedly represented the opposition and the latter the government, as long as the president had the power to shut down Congress, expel its members, and deny individuals political rights, the parties had little meaning. With expanded powers, the secret police and military courts were granted jurisdiction over political crimes. The denial of civil rights and violations of human rights, including torture, became widespread. Brazil became a pariah country.

The military government also believed in economic expansion through government austerity and by encouraging the accumulation of investment capital in the hands of the elite and through the exportation of manufactured agricultural goods and raw materials. By 1974, their efforts showed great progress and were referred to as Brazil's “economic miracle.” Inflation had dropped to a 20 percent annual rate by 1974, exports rose from \$2.7 billion to \$6.2 billion, and Brazil held \$1 billion in exchange reserves. However, the 1974 global oil crisis contributed to Brazil's economic slowdown for the remainder of the decade, which in turn increased public demand for a return to civilian government.

President Ernesto Geisel (b. 1907–d. 1996) began the “redemocratization” process during his presidential term from 1974 to 1979, and it accelerated under President João Figueiredo (b. 1918–d. 1999) from 1979 to 1985. New political parties emerged, and states were permitted to elect their own governors. The ruling PSD had lost control of the Chamber of Deputies by 1984, and candidates from the new Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, or PMDB) elected governors in the most significant states, including Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. Tancredo Neves (b. 1910–d. 1985), a longtime opponent of the military government, captured the January 15, 1985, presidential election but died before his inauguration. His running mate José Sarney (b. 1930–) took office. Since then, presidents have been elected by popular vote.

In the 1991 Treaty of Asunción, Brazil joined with Argentina, PARAGUAY, and URUGUAY to form the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR) with the goal of economic integration by 2005. While progress had been made by 2001, the financial crisis that plagued Argentina and Brazil slowed the process until 2005, when both economies began to recover. While in 1994 the Miami Summit of the Americas had called for the establishment of a FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, most Latin American countries, including Brazil, mistrusted U.S. intentions. Brazil took the lead in organizing all the nations of South America save Chile into a negotiating bloc to deal with U.S. heavy-handedness.

Brazilian politics moved further to the left with the election to the presidency of LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA

of the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) on October 27, 2002, and again on October 26, 2006. Lula's victory was attributed to the popular discontent with his immediate predecessors' neoliberal economic policies. The liberalization of Brazil's economy had not brought prosperity to the wider populace, as promised.

Although Lula's victory caused hesitancy among the international financial institutions and businesses in Brazil, the avowed socialist focused on long-term economic development rather than more immediate social reform. Brazil's economy has enjoyed reasonable economic growth since 2003, reaching a 3.7 percent annual growth rate in 2006. Characterized by large and well-developed agricultural, MINING, manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil's economy outweighs that of all other South American countries and has a growing presence in world markets.

While Brazil is rich in natural resources, agricultural exports still account for the major portion of its gross domestic product (GDP), at 40 percent, and a favorable trade balance in 2006 of \$49 billion. The country's major trading partners are the European Union, the United States, and its MERCOSUR partners. Brazil also signed trade agreements with several other Latin American countries as part of the newly launched South American Community of Nations and with China. Brazil is not without problems: Internal government debt amounts to 50 percent of the total GDP, a shortage in electric power is common due mainly to a lack of rainfall for the hydroelectric system, and the country's rain forests continue to disappear, with far-reaching consequences.

See also BRAZIL (Vols. I, II, III); BRAZIL, EMPIRE OF (Vol. III); CABRAL, PEDRO ÁLVARES (Vol. I); DEODORA DA FONSECA, MANUEL (Vol. III); JOHN VI (Vol. II); MORAIS, PRUDENTE DE (Vol. III); PEDRO I (Vol. III); PEDRO II (Vol. III).

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Brazil, 1964 coup d'état in During a three-day period, March 31 to April 2, 1964, Brazilian MILITARY forces ousted elected president João Goulart (b. 1919–d. 1976), allegedly to save the country from communism. The coup established military men as BRAZIL's political rulers for the next 20 years.

The long-term origins of the coup can be found in Brazil's industrialization, which began during World War II and accelerated thereafter, and LABOR's right to organize, as first spelled out in the ESTADO NOVO in 1937 and sanctified in the 1946 constitution. Labor's political influence emerged during the second presidential term of GETÚLIO DORNELLES VARGAS from 1950 to 1954 thanks to the efforts of Vargas and his labor minister, João Goulart. The labor movement gained further strength from the alliance of the Brazilian Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, or PTB) and the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático, or PSD), at the expense of rural labor. One of the consequences of the emphasis on urban labor was MIGRATION from the countryside to urban centers, which contributed to mass unemployment and the growth of slums, as well as disease and violence.

The short-term causes of the coup d'état are found in the seven-month presidency of Jânio Quadros (b. 1917–d. 1992), who resigned on August 25, 1961, in a confrontation with the National Congress over the loss of presidential authority to the legislative branch. Vice President Goulart succeeded to the office. He was born into a ranching family in São Borja in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where he had befriended Vargas on the latter's return following his ouster from the presidency in 1945. Goulart became a PTB activist, and his success in organizing local unions had contributed to his appointment as Vargas's labor minister in 1953. Goulart continued to work on behalf of workers, often intervening in strikes to gain significant wage increases for them. At the time of Quadros's resignation, Goulart was in China; the military and conservative elite used his absence to permit his ascendancy to the presidency, but with limited authority, as cabinet ministers now reported directly to Congress.

Goulart assumed the presidency on September 7, 1961, determined to end the restrictions placed on his role. He had his way in a January 1963 plebiscite, when full executive authority was restored. Once in control, Goulart freed labor unions from government bureaucracy. Their newfound independence contributed to increased demands for wage raises and support for Goulart's proposals for educational and housing reforms. Goulart also proposed land and tax reforms that struck at the power and wealth of the rural elite but found support from rural labor federations that also called for greater political awareness and peasant participation in the political system. The direction of Goulart's program became clear on March 13, 1961, when he signed decrees expropriating privately owned oil refineries and underutilized lands near federal projects. Comparing Goulart's proposals to FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's administration in CUBA, the Brazilian elite and senior military officers feared that another communist revolution was in the making.

Goulart's conspirators also had an ally in the United States, whose opposition to him can be traced to John F.

Kennedy's administration. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson was determined to see Goulart go. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon held discussions with the conspiring officers and on March 27 requested that the United States supply them with petroleum, arms, and ammunition and that a U.S. task force (consisting of an aircraft carrier, helicopter support group, destroyers, and oil tankers) be placed offshore in case civil war erupted. The Johnson administration directed the assemblage of the task force and launched it on March 31 under the name Operation Brother Sam.

Goulart signaled his opponents into action in a March 30 televised speech to a group of sergeants, calling on them to disobey their commanding officers should they feel that their orders were not in the best interest of the nation. In Minas Gerais, an incensed army general, Olimpio Mourão Filho (b. 1900–d. 1972), ordered his troops to move on Rio de Janeiro the following day. Other army commanders, led by General Humberto Castello Branco (b. 1897–d. 1969), joined the movement. Goulart fled to URUGUAY, and by April 2, the coup was complete.

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British overseas territories Under British sovereignty but not part of the United Kingdom, the inhabitants of British Overseas Territories have full British citizenship. The term *British overseas territory* was introduced by the British Overseas Territory Act of 2002 and replaced the term *British dependent territory*, coined in the British Nationality Act of 1981. Prior to 1981, these territories were called “colonies” (see CROWN COLONY). All that remains of the once-extensive British colonial empire in the Caribbean are six overseas territories: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH).

ANGUILLA

Anguilla, located to the east of PUERTO RICO and north of Saint Martin, consists of the main island of Anguilla and several tiny islets, most of which are uninhabited. The territory is 39 square miles (101 km²) and has a population of 14,000. The beautiful beaches along the territory's coastline, in addition to the virtual lack of crime on the island, make Anguilla an ideal tourist

destination. The majority of Anguilla's inhabitants are descendants of African slaves. Only 10 percent of the island's people live in The Valley, the island's capital. Anguilla is an associate member of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES.

Anguilla was first colonized by English settlers from St. Christopher in 1650. Historically incorporated into a single administrative unit with SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, on February 27, 1967, the British granted the territory of St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla the status of associated state in preparation for independence. On May 30, 1967, the Anguillan people, who strongly objected to subservience to the St. Christopher government, evicted the St. Christopher police from the island. The provisional government's request for annexation to the United States was declined. On July 11, 1967, in an island-wide referendum, virtually the entire population voted for secession from the St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla federation. Unhappy with British efforts to ameliorate the situation, the local population held another island-wide referendum on February 7, 1969, resulting in a vote of 1,739 to 4 against returning to the St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla federation. Local politician Ronald Webster (b. 1926–) declared Anguillan independence. Although most people did not desire independence, they found it preferable to domination by St. Christopher. Political confrontation between the Anguillan and St. Christopher groups increased. On March 19, 1969, the British militarily intervened to restore order, resulting in a plan that allowed Anguilla to secede from the St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla federation in 1971. It was not until 1980, however, that Anguilla formally left the federation and became a separate British dependency. Whereas British officials are responsible for defense and foreign relations, local elected officials are responsible for all internal affairs. Queen Elizabeth II is represented by a governor, appointed by the British government, who oversees the popularly elected House of Assembly. Although appointed by the governor, the chief minister, Osbourne Fleming (b. 1940–) since 2000, is normally the leader of the majority political party in the House of Assembly. Since the 1980s, the House of Assembly has emphasized a policy of revitalizing the island's ECONOMY through tourism and foreign investment.

BERMUDA

Bermuda, located in the North Atlantic 670 miles (1,078 km) east of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, and 690 miles (1,110 km) south of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, is the oldest and most populous of the remaining British overseas territories. Although commonly referred to in the singular, in reality Bermuda is a configuration of 138 islands occupying 20 square miles (52 km²) of territory. Main Island, the largest island and the location of Hamilton, the capital, is fre-

quently called Bermuda by tourists. Officially, the name of the territory is the Somers Isles, in honor of George Somers, who established the first English colony in Bermuda in 1609.

During the American Revolution, the British improved the natural harbors and developed Bermuda as its principal naval base guarding North Atlantic shipping lanes. Given Bermuda's geographic location, during the U.S. Civil War, Confederate blockade runners obtained supplies in Bermuda. In the 20th century, wealthy British, Canadian, and U.S. tourists began to visit Bermuda. Bermuda's thriving economy, based on the tourist INDUSTRY and the financial sector, provides the territory's 66,000 people with the world's highest per capita income. The island's population is roughly 55 percent black, 35 percent white, and 10 percent multiracial or Asian. More than 10,000 non-Bermudians, primarily from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, live and work in Bermuda.

Queen Elizabeth II is represented by a governor, appointed by the British government, who oversees the popularly elected House of Assembly. The British control foreign affairs and national defense, while a premier, usually the leader of the majority party in the House of Assembly, is the actual head of government. Ewart Brown (b. 1946–), the leader of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), has been premier since the October 2006 elections. Although the PLP supports independence from the United Kingdom, political polls indicate that the majority of people prefer that Bermuda remain an overseas territory. American influence in Bermuda is substantial. The United States is Bermuda's largest trading partner, providing 80 percent of total imports, 85 percent of tourist visitors, and billions of dollars in the Bermudian financial sector.

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

The British Virgin Islands, located to the east of Puerto Rico, are part of the Virgin Islands archipelago. Although they are officially the Virgin Islands, since 1917, when the United States purchased the UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS from Denmark, the British have called them the British Virgin Islands to avoid confusion. The main islands—Tortola, Virgin Gorda, and Anegada—and more than 50 islets, many of which are uninhabited, occupy 59 square miles (153 km²) of territory. The largest island, Tortola, is also the location of Road Town, the capital. Approximately 18,000 of the British Virgin Island's 22,000 residents live on Tortola. The British initially occupied the islands during the 17th century for strategic reasons. British colonists, however, developed a plantation economy based on sugarcane production.

In 1950, the British government granted the British Virgin Islands limited self-government. Given the power to administer their own legislative council, the

people of the British Virgin Islands voted against joining the WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958. In 1967, the British granted the islands complete local autonomy. Local politicians developed an economic strategy based on tourism and offshore financial services. As such, the British Virgin Islands is one of the world's leading offshore financial centers, providing the inhabitants of the islands with one of the highest per capita incomes in the Caribbean (see OFFSHORE BANKING). Queen Elizabeth II, the head of state, appoints a governor to oversee political affairs. The leader of the majority party in the Legislative Council, Ralph O'Neal (b. 1933–) since 2007, is the premier.

CAYMAN ISLANDS

The Cayman Islands, located 150 miles (241 km) south of CUBA and 180 miles (290 km) north of JAMAICA, are a leading offshore financial center and tourist destination. Although the 45,000 inhabitants of the Cayman Islands enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the Caribbean, the islands also have the distinction of being the most vulnerable to Caribbean hurricanes. A three-island archipelago consisting of Grand Cayman (the largest island and the location of the capital, Georgetown), Cayman Brac, and Little Cayman, the islands occupy 100 square miles (259 km²) of territory. Significantly, the islands lack freshwater resources and must rely on rainwater catchment and desalination for drinking water. The islands were governed as a single colony with Jamaica until 1962, when Jamaica achieved independence. Notwithstanding the split from Jamaica, more than 40 percent of the population is of Jamaican origin, and more than 8,000 Jamaicans work in the Cayman Islands. Whereas Queen Elizabeth II appoints a governor to oversee the political situation, local affairs are controlled by the Legislative Assembly, led by the leader of government business, William McKeever Bush (b. 1955–) since 2009. Unlike other British overseas territory constitutions, the governor in the Cayman Islands can exercise complete executive authority if the need arises.

MONTSERRAT

Montserrat, which means "jagged mountain," is named after a mountain of the same name in Barcelona, Spain. Located between Antigua to the north and Guadeloupe to the south, Montserrat is a pear-shaped island in the Leeward Islands. The 39-square-mile (101-km²) island is inhabited by 4,500 people, most of whom are of African descent. Owing to uncertainty about the island's economic future, most of Montserrat's people do not favor independence. Although the British are responsible for defense and foreign relations, local elected officials are responsible for all internal affairs. Queen Elizabeth II, the head of state, is represented locally by a governor who oversees the Legislative Council. The chief minister,

Lowell Lewis (b. 1952–) since 2006, is normally the leader of the majority political party in the Legislative Council.

In 1958, Montserrat joined the ill-fated West Indies Federation. Beginning in the 1960s, hundreds of British and U.S. citizens began to arrive on the island and build luxury homes. Real estate development and construction became a key component of Montserrat's economy. The dominant figure in Montserrat's political system since the 1970s has been John Osborne (b. 1936–), whose People's Liberation Movement (PLM) was the largest political presence in the Legislative Council during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1984, Osborne startled the people of Montserrat by suddenly calling for independence. His pronouncement was based on the British government's veto of Montserrat's decision to send a police force to participate in the police action in GRENADA after the 1983 U.S.-organized invasion following the overthrow of Maurice Bishop. Although most of Montserrat's people supported the U.S. invasion of Grenada, they were against independence. Osborne subsequently promised that no decision on independence would be made until a referendum was held. In 1991, Osborne's main rival, Reuben Meade (b. 1952–), leader of the National Progressive Party (NPP), became chief minister. A reinvigorated PLM returned to power in 2001.

In 1995, the Soufriere Hills volcano began to show signs of volcanic activity. In 1996, minor eruptions led to the evacuation of the southern third of Montserrat, where Plymouth, the capital, was located. Fortunately, all 3,500 inhabitants of Plymouth were evacuated. Subsequent eruptions in August 1997 covered the capital with lava and ash, and the island's only airport was destroyed. More than 8,000 of the island's 11,000 inhabitants fled to neighboring islands and the United Kingdom. A large portion of the island's annual income, therefore, comes from remittances by overseas citizens. In 1998, the British government moved the capital to Brades in the north of the island. Since 1998, thousands of Montserrat's refugees have returned to their homeland. The government's tourist bureau has also made energetic attempts to lure tourists back to Montserrat. The British have implemented a multi-million-dollar recovery program to help reconstruct the economy.

THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

The Turks and Caicos Islands, occupying 161 square miles (417 km²) of territory, are inhabited by 32,000 people. Although geographically contiguous to the Bahamas, the islands are a separate political entity. The two island groups forming the territory—the Turks and the Caicos—are separated by the Caicos Passage. Although the Caicos Islands possess 96 percent of the territory and 80 percent of the population, the capital, Cockburn Town, is located on Grand Turk. In 1799, the British

annexed the islands and administered them as part of the Bahamas. In 1848, the islands were placed under the supervision of the British governor in Jamaica. When Jamaica gained independence in 1962, the islands were made a crown colony. A British governor oversaw local politics. In 1980, the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), a proindependence party that controlled the Legislative Assembly, made an agreement with the British government providing for independence in 1982 if the PDM won the 1980 elections. The PDM, however, lost the elections to the Progressive National Party (PNP), which supported continued British rule. Political power subsequently alternated between the PNP and the PDM. In 2003, Michael Misick (b. 1966–), the leader of the PNP, became chief minister of the Legislative Assembly. In 2006, following the granting of greater autonomy, Misick became the first premier of the Turks and Caicos Islands.

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Colville Petty. *Anguilla: Where There's a Will, There's a Way* (The Valley, Anguilla: CLPetty, 1984).

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Bryan-Chamorro Treaty (1916) Originally negotiated in 1911 between the U.S. ambassador in Managua, George T. Weitzel (b. 1873–d. 1930), and NICARAGUA's foreign minister, Diego Chamorro (b. 1861–d. 1923), the treaty provided for a one-time payment of \$3 million to the Nicaraguan government in return for U.S. exclusivity to construct a canal across Nicaragua, a 99-year renewable lease on the Corn Islands in the Caribbean Sea, and the right to build a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca. The projected canal followed the proposed 19th-century route using the San Juan River and Lakes Managua and Nicaragua, with a possible outlet on the Gulf of Fonseca. Owing to U.S. political machinations at the time, the treaty awaited U.S. Senate consideration until a more favorable moment.

The U.S. desire for the treaty grew out of its larger Caribbean policy from 1900 until 1933. Having opted to construct a canal across PANAMA, it also needed to ensure that the Caribbean was safe from European interventions and local political turmoil that might spill into Panama's domestic political arena. Nicaragua was no exception to either policy premise. U.S. bank loans to Nicaragua in 1911, 1913, and 1917 kept the government afloat. U.S. bankers also negotiated a reduction

in the interest owed by the Nicaraguan government to British bankers.

From the time the United States selected Panama over Nicaragua as the canal site, Nicaraguan dictator JOSÉ SANTOS ZELAYA scorned U.S. policy initiatives in the region. In 1908, rumors abounded that he was intending to grant canal construction rights to Japan. Zelaya also endured constant opposition from Nicaraguan Conservatives, who, with U.S. assistance, finally ousted him in 1910. Conservative president Adolfo Díaz (b. 1875–d. 1964) understood the need for a U.S. presence in the country but also that the Liberals would maneuver to oust him from office if he allowed this. Bundy Cole, the manager of the National Bank of Nicaragua, correctly observed that the Díaz administration “would last until the last coach of [U.S.] marines left the Managua station,” and that “Díaz would be on that coach.” Anxious to secure his position, Díaz dispatched a private emissary to Washington, D.C., who hired a friend of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, Charles A. Douglas, to lobby for the Nicaraguan cause. Bryan sympathized with the Nicaraguan need for U.S. financial assistance to ward off a European presence and accepted the existence of the Díaz regime as a means to political stabilization and possibly democracy. For these reasons, Bryan accepted an amendment to the treaty similar to the U.S.-imposed PLATT AMENDMENT to the 1903 Cuban constitution granting the United States the right to intervene in Nicaraguan politics. Nevertheless, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to consider a treaty with such an amendment.

The canal issue moved back to center stage in June 1914 when Germany reportedly offered \$9 million to Nicaragua for canal rights across the country. Anxious to keep Europeans out of the region, the U.S. State Department reopened negotiations in November 1915 and concluded the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty on April 16, 1916, without the intervention amendment. During the U.S. Senate’s public debate on the treaty, attention focused on the legality of the Nicaraguan government and the potential abrogation of the treaty should the Liberals return to power. Only during the executive session in February 1916 did the full Senate discuss the potential security threat from Germany and ratify the treaty. In contrast, the Nicaraguan legislature acted quickly, in anticipation of an economic windfall. The Nicaraguans received only 30 percent of the \$3 million, as the bulk of the funds were used to pay off British debts. The U.S. 100-man legation guard that remained served only to fuel the flames of Nicaraguan nationalism.

COSTA RICA challenged the treaty for granting rights to the San Juan River, which formed part of its border with Nicaragua. HONDURAS and EL SALVADOR protested the granting of U.S. rights in the Gulf of Fonseca, where each of those countries had interests. They took their

complaint to the Central American Court of Justice. Although the court declared on behalf of the plaintiffs, it had no power to enforce its decision. In July 1970, the United States and Nicaragua terminated the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty.

See also CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); TRANSISTHMIAN INTERESTS (Vol. III).

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Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA, was founded by the Spanish explorer Pedro de Mendoza on February 2, 1536, in the district today known as San Telmo, south of the city center. Located at the southern end of the Río de la Plata river system, Buenos Aires became an important port and in 1772 the capital of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata of the same name. On the eve of independence, in 1816, approximately 40,000 people lived in Buenos Aires. Owing to the expansion of the agro-export ECONOMY and its ancillary industries in the late 19th century, the city had grown to 1.5 million residents on the eve of World War I, in 1914. In 1880, Buenos Aires became a federal city.

From the late 19th century onward, the city was modernized with electric, water, and sanitation systems, TRANSPORTATION facilities, wide boulevards and parks, and museums and theaters. LITERATURE and the arts took root, and Buenos Aires earned the title “Paris of the Americas.” The population initially swelled with the influx of foreign workers to serve the agro-export industry. Starting in the 1930s, rural Argentines flocked to Buenos Aires in search of jobs in the manufacturing sector, which continued to grow well past World War II. Today, nearly one-third of Argentina’s population resides in Buenos Aires. Influenced by the influx of people, the city’s ARCHITECTURE took on a new look with multistory apartment and office buildings. By the 1970s, a well-conceived public transportation system was in place, including a subway system, buses, trolleys, and taxis.

As the seat of national government, Buenos Aires has seen many political demonstrations, which have often turned violent, such as during the era of JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN in the early 1950s and following Argentina’s MILITARY defeat in the 1982 MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR. The city remains a vibrant cultural and economic center that Argentines affectionately refer to as “B.A.”

See also BUENOS AIRES (Vols. I, II, III); MENDOZA, PEDRO DE (Vol. I).



Aerial view of Avenida 9 de Julio in central Buenos Aires, Argentina. The 220-foot- (67-m-) high obelisk (*far right*) was built in 1936 to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the city's founding. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

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Richard Walter. *Politics and Urban Growth in Buenos Aires, 1910–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Burnham, Forbes (b. 1923–d. 1985) *prime minister of Guyana* Born on February 20, 1923, in Kitty, a suburb of Georgetown, the capital of GUYANA, to middle-class Afro-Guyanese parents, Forbes Burnham earned a law degree from the University of London in 1947. Burnham played a major role in establishing both major political parties in Guyana. He was an initial member of the People's Progressive Party (PPP), established in 1950 by CHEDDI JAGAN. Burnham became the party chairman, while Jagan led the PPP's parliamentary group. By establishing the PPP, Jagan hoped to increase the pace of decolonization in Guyana. Guyana's ethnic conflict, a result of British Guiana's colonial past when European planters imported vast numbers of African slaves and indentured servants from India to work on the sugar plantations, however, threatened to slow the process of decolonization. The PPP, therefore, was initially a

coalition of lower-class Afro-Guyanese and rural Indo-Guyanese. Personal rivalry between Jagan and Burnham, however, led Burnham to split from the PPP in 1955 and form the People's National Congress (PNC). Whereas Jagan advocated a socialist path toward independence, Burnham initially pursued a more moderate path.

During the early 1960s, as the independence movement gained momentum, the United States became increasingly concerned about Jagan's socialist rhetoric. Prior to the 1964 parliamentary elections, the British changed the electoral rules and provided for proportional representation. Although Jagan's PPP won 46 percent of the vote in the 1964 elections, he lacked a clear majority. Burnham's PNC, which won 40 percent of the vote, allied itself with the United Force (UF), a conservative party, which had won 12 percent of the vote. With the UF's votes, Burnham was elected prime minister. In 1966, following independence, Burnham became the first prime minister of Guyana. Although initially viewed as a moderate, Burnham's rule became increasingly authoritarian and leftist. In 1970, Burnham proclaimed the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, thus ending Guyana's status as a commonwealth realm. In 1980, he unveiled a new con-

stitution providing for an elected president and a prime minister elected by the president. Burnham immediately proclaimed himself president. Human rights abuses were rampant during his rule, and elections were viewed as fraudulent. Burnham also nationalized most major foreign and domestic industries in Guyana. In response, U.S. president Ronald Reagan excluded Guyana from participation in the CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE.

Burnham's authoritarian control over Guyana was placed in the global spotlight following the November 1978 JONESTOWN MASSACRE. While undergoing a throat operation in Georgetown, Burnham died on August 6, 1985. His successor, Vice President Desmond Hoyte (b. 1929–d. 2002), gradually began to disband Burnham's authoritarian excesses, which paved the way for democratic elections, which were won by Jagan in 1992.

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Bustamante, Alexander (William Alexander Clarke) (b. 1884–d. 1977) *prime minister of Jamaica* Born on February 24, 1884, in Hanover, JAMAICA, to an Irish father and a mestizo mother, William Alexander Clarke adopted the surname *Bustamante* to honor a man he knew in his youth. Working in a variety of jobs throughout the hemisphere since 1905, he returned to Jamaica in 1932. Bustamante supported LABOR movements and wrote numerous newspaper articles against colonialism. In 1937, he was elected treasurer of the Jamaica Workers' Union. During the 1938 labor riots, Bustamante was a vocal supporter of the workers' demands. In 1938, he

founded the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. The British government imprisoned him for subversive activities from 1940 to 1942. After his release from prison, he founded the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) in 1943. His cousin Norman Manley (b. 1893–d. 1969) had founded Jamaica's other main political party, the People's National Party (PNP), in 1938.

The JLP won the 1944 elections, and Bustamante became the minister of communications. In 1953, after the British government granted greater autonomy, Bustamante became chief minister. He served until 1955, when the PNP became the majority party in the legislative assembly. Jamaica joined the WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958, a move opposed by Bustamante, who believed that Jamaica would be underrepresented in the West Indies Parliament. Manley, who supported the federation, bowed to local pressure to hold a referendum on September 19, 1961, which resulted in Jamaica's withdrawing from the federation. In a general election on April 10, 1962, the JLP was returned to power with 26 of 45 seats in the assembly, and Bustamante was appointed premier. Jamaica achieved independence on August 6, 1962, and Bustamante became the nation's first prime minister. Bustamante favored close relations with the United States and supported increased foreign investment in the MINING sector. He retired in 1967, but the JLP continued to rule until defeated in the 1972 elections by the PNP. Bustamante died on August 6, 1977, the 15th anniversary of Jamaica's independence.

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CACM See CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET.

Calderón Guardia, Rafael See COSTA RICA; MORA VALVERDE, MANUEL.

Calderón Hinojosa, Felipe (b. 1962–) *president of Mexico* Felipe Calderón Hinojosa was elected president of MEXICO in the summer of 2006. He is a member of the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN) and is only the second non-Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) president to be elected since the latter party was formed in 1929.

Calderón was born in Morelia, Michoacán, on August 18, 1962, to one of the founders and leaders of the PAN. He studied economics and public administration and attended graduate school at Harvard University. Calderón rose to prominence within the PAN, holding several leadership positions in the 1990s. He represented his party in Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute and helped push for important electoral reforms during the presidency of ERNESTO ZEDILLO (1994–2000). After 2003, Calderón served as a cabinet minister in the administration of the first PAN president, VICENTE FOX (2000–06). He became the PAN presidential candidate in 2005.

Calderón won the July 2006 election with the closest margin of any president in Mexico's history, with just six-tenths of a percent over his closest challenger, Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, or PRD). López Obrador challenged the election results, and his supporters staged protests in MEXICO CITY, effec-

tively shutting down the city center for several months. In the first years of his presidency, Calderón had to deal with enormous price increases in tortillas—a staple of the Mexican diet—and the issue of immigration reform in the United States. His term expires in 2012.

During the first year of his administration, Calderón garnered sufficient opposition support to legislate pension and fiscal reform but since has been unable to gain legislative approval for improving the nation's aging infrastructure, to modernize labor laws, and to permit private investment into the energy field. The global recession of 2008–09 also adversely affected Mexican imports and cut the number of migrant workers making their way into the United States as illegal aliens. The latter practice significantly cut into the remittances sent home, an important component of Mexico's economy, and also put increased strains upon the government's social services. In addition, Calderón faces growing violence caused by the narco-traffickers that has spilled over into civilian society.

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Calles, Plutarco Elías (b. 1877–d. 1945) *revolutionary leader and president of Mexico* Plutarco Elías Calles was born on September 25, 1877, in the state of

Sonora, MEXICO. He began an early career as a teacher and eventually became a local politician. Calles joined the MEXICAN REVOLUTION alongside ÁLVARO OBREGÓN against the dictatorship of VICTORIANO HUERTA in 1913. He continued to hold local political offices and then helped lead the revolt that ousted President VENUSTIANO CARRANZA in 1920. After Obregón was elected president later that year, Calles became minister of the interior. He and Obregón defeated the rebellion led by ADOLFO DE LA HUERTA in 1923, and Calles was elected president the following year.

As president, from 1924 to 1928, Calles continued many of the policies initiated by his predecessor, including favoring specific LABOR groups, expanding EDUCATION, and redistributing *ejido* land. He introduced modern social reforms with some success, expanding the nation's road system, making improvements to health care, and creating a network of government inspections in food production and other services.

Calles also implemented anticlerical policies that provoked local insurrections known collectively as the CRISTERO REBELLION by ardent Catholics throughout the country. Calles's administration put down the revolt violently, but tensions were still simmering when Obregón won another term as president in 1928. Before he was inaugurated, however, Obregón was assassinated by José de León Toral, a disgruntled Catholic and follower of the Cristeros. The assassination of the president-elect created a political crisis, which Calles solved by placing three successive puppet presidents in power while he ruled from behind the scenes in an era known as the Maximato. Calles was forced into exile by the newly elected LÁZARO CÁRDENAS (1934–40) in 1936.

Calles was eventually invited back to Mexico in 1941 by President Manuel Ávila Camacho (b. 1896–d. 1955) in an attempt to encourage national unity during World War II. Calles died in Mexico City in 1945.

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CAN See ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

CANF See CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION.

Caracas Caracas is the capital of VENEZUELA and the Federal District that was created in 1909. Caracas sits in a narrow valley about 15 miles (24 km) long in the country's northern sector. In 2005, 3.1 million people resided in the Federal District and another 1.6 million in the metropolitan area that today encompasses the entire valley. The city's grid was laid out in 1567 by Spanish conquistador Diego de Losada. Approximately 40,000

people resided in Caracas at the time of independence in 1811. In the late 19th century, Antonio Guzmán Blanco, who ruled over Venezuela from 1870 to 1888, directed the architectural modernization of the city.

Venezuela's oil INDUSTRY has continued to expand from the late 1920s, in line with world demand for petroleum. The oil wealth provided for another building spurt in the 1950s and 1960s so that modern skyscrapers now dot the city's skyline. Caracas is divided into four districts. The downtown commercial center is home to Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the government-owned oil company, and the national stock exchange, banks, and other commercial activities. The arts center, with theaters, museums, and galleries surround the city center. Between the center and the far-flung suburbs of the wealthy (Altamira and La Castellana) are the bustling middle-class residential areas. The city boasts several universities, including the Central University of Venezuela, founded in 1721 and named a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 2000. Important industries located in Caracas include chemicals, textiles, leather, food, and iron and wood products. Despite the city's affluence, one cannot escape the poverty of its shantytowns, which line the hillsides approaching the city from the international airport located on the Atlantic coast at Maiquería.

See also CARACAS (Vols. II, III); GUZMÁN BLANCO, ANTONIO (Vol. III).

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Cárdenas, Lázaro (b. 1895–d. 1970) *president of Mexico* President Lázaro Cárdenas is best known for aggressively implementing revolutionary reforms in MEXICO in the 1930s. He was considered a man of the people, a protector of the poor, and a defender of Mexican nationalism.

Cárdenas was born on May 21, 1895, in Jiquilpán, Michoacán, to a family of modest means. He received a basic EDUCATION and eventually joined forces with PLUTARCO ELÍAS CALLES during the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. Cárdenas remained loyal to Calles during the latter's presidency (1924–28) and throughout the years of the Maximato. He became governor of Michoacán in 1928, and Calles supported his successful bid for the presidency in 1934. However, unlike his three predecessors, who had ruled as puppets of Calles, Cárdenas began devising a strategy for breaking Calles's hold over the nation's political scene. By 1936, Cárdenas had consolidated his own political authority and sent Calles into exile in the United States.

Cárdenas began implementing the social reforms prescribed by the CONSTITUTION OF 1917. He redistributed 49 million acres (19.8 million ha) of land—mostly in the

form of *ejidos*—to Mexico’s rural peasants. He expanded funding for public education and became known for advocating a socialist-style curriculum. Cárdenas also cultivated a close relationship with LABOR groups under the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM) and championed a variety of reforms to benefit Mexican workers. In 1938, Cárdenas took drastic steps when he nationalized the railroad and petroleum industries (see PEMEX). His actions against oil companies produced a surge of nationalism within Mexico but caused years of diplomatic disputes between Mexico and the United States (see U.S.–MEXICAN RELATIONS).

After his presidency, Cárdenas returned to public service when he became secretary of defense after Mexico joined the Allies in World War II. He retired in 1945 and led a quiet life until his death on October 19, 1970. Cárdenas’s son, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (b. 1934–), founded the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Party de la Revolución Democrática, or PRD), served as mayor of MEXICO CITY from 1997 to 1999, and ran for president in 1988 and 2000.

See also *EJIDO* (Vol. III).

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Carías Andino, Tiburcio (b. 1876–d. 1969) *president and dictator of Honduras* Born and educated in the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa, Tiburcio Carías Andino received his law degree in 1898 from the Central University. He subsequently taught law at the university level and to poor children and workers. He became active in the Liberal Party, founded by his father, Calixto Carías, and participated in the political conflicts at the end of the 19th century. In 1903, Carías left the Liberal Party to join Manuel Bonilla (b. 1849–d. 1913) in founding the National Party. Subsequently, he became a skillful political activist and utilized the MILITARY to build and maintain a political machine, a well-disciplined organization led by an authoritarian base. Carías served as a congressman and state governor before making an unsuccessful bid for the presidency of HONDURAS in 1923. He then directed the military to seize the capital and prepare the nation for new elections in 1924, but before that could happen, the United States intervened. This resulted in Miguel Paz Barahona (b. 1863–d. 1967) becoming president. Carías lost his second bid for the presidency in 1928, but defeated Liberal Party candidate José Ángel Zúñiga Huete (b. 1878–d. 1953) in 1932.

Subsequently, by manipulating the constitution, Carías extended his presidency to 1949.

Once in the presidential palace, Carías moved quickly to consolidate his control. While not as brutal as other dictators of the time, he silenced opposition through intimidation, imprisonment, and exile. The national legislature rubber-stamped his programs. Despite the loss of global markets due to the Great Depression, disease among banana plants in the 1930s, and World War II, Carías managed to maintain a debt-free budget, pay off Honduran foreign loans, and make progress in rural road construction and the building of schools and medical clinics.

Carías supported the Allied cause during World War II, including cooperation with the United States in the deportation and incarceration of Nazis, suspected or real (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). As the United States requested, Carías placed many German-owned properties under government control to keep profits from going back to Germany, but in time, Carías quietly turned these properties over to his political friends. While he received assistance from the United States regarding air TRANSPORTATION, he was very reluctant to permit U.S. officers to train his ground troops. Carías feared that a U.S. command structure might serve as an impetus for Honduran military officers to challenge his own control over them.

In 1944, Carías’s fellow Central American dictators faced increasing opposition. EL SALVADOR’S MAXIMILIANO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ and GUATEMALA’S JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA were forced to resign, and NICARAGUA’S ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA did not seek the presidency again in 1947. Carías survived the political storm, although he faced WOMEN- and student-led demonstrations in Tegucigalpa and more widespread protests in the northern city of San Pedro Sula. During the next four years, the protests increased, which contributed to Carías’s announcement that he would not seek the presidency again in the 1948 elections. In 1954, Carías made an unsuccessful presidential bid, after which he lived quietly in retirement until his death on December 23, 1969.

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Caribbean, British In the post–World War II period, the United Kingdom granted independence to ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA (1981), the BAHAMAS (1973), BARBADOS (1966), BELIZE (1981), DOMINICA (1978), GRENADA (1974),

GUYANA (1966), JAMAICA (1962), SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS (1983), SAINT LUCIA (1979), SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES (1979), and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (1962). Only six territories—Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands—remain as BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES in the Caribbean.

While the entire Western Hemisphere experienced European colonialism, the Caribbean islands were subjected to the most pervasive, diverse, and longest-lasting European colonial experience. Since the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the region in 1492, European nations, and the United States after 1898, vied with one other to establish colonies there for a plethora of economic and strategic reasons. The English, interested primarily in developing sugar plantations and constructing naval bases, established a geographically expansive colonial system in the Caribbean. As a result, by 1900, the majority of the people in the British Caribbean were of African descent. People descended from workers brought to the British Caribbean from the Indian subcontinent during the 19th century also made up a significant component of the population in many of the British colonies. During the Great Depression, political and economic unrest in those colonies led the British to begin granting the islands greater internal autonomy. Regardless, in 1945, the entire Caribbean region with the exception of HAITI, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, and CUBA was still controlled by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands.

Following World War II, the British government, continuing to control foreign policy and national defense of its Caribbean colonies, granted those colonies increased internal autonomy in preparation for independence. Universal suffrage was instituted, and local populations were able to elect representatives to parliamentary assemblies based on the British model of government. Cultural norms, such as the English language and cricket, were also grafted on to the Caribbean islands under British control during the colonial era. After contemplating a variety of plans for political unity in the British Caribbean, on January 3, 1958, the British unveiled the WEST INDIES FEDERATION, a political and economic union of 10 British Caribbean territories occupying 24 main islands and more than 200 minor islands, with a total population of 3.5 million people. The 10 colonies—Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica (which included the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands), Montserrat, St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago—were to form a single political unit that would eventually become independent from the United Kingdom. Five British colonies—the Bahamas, Bermuda, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, and Guyana—chose not to join the federation. Issues concerning representation, however, led to the collapse of the West Indies Federation in 1962 when Jamaica withdrew from it.

Within weeks, on August 6, 1962, the British granted Jamaica independence. The Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands, however, were severed from Jamaica and remained British colonies. Jamaican independence set the stage for the 11 above-mentioned countries. Independence movements in the six remaining British colonies are negligible. At the time of independence, all 12 of the independent nations chose to join the Commonwealth of Nations. In addition, 11 of the states chose to be Commonwealth realms with Queen Elizabeth II as the official head of state. Dominica, unlike the other former British colonies in the Caribbean, chose to become a parliamentary republic at the time of independence. The queen's power, however, was primarily ceremonial, with de facto power vested in a prime minister. Since independence, two former British colonies have become republics but chose to remain within the Commonwealth of Nations. Guyana became a republic in 1972; Trinidad and Tobago followed in 1976. Notwithstanding that all three of the republics have a president, a largely ceremonial position similar to that previously held by the queen, the prime minister exerts executive power.

On August 1, 1973, Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago established the CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET (CARICOM) to promote regional economic and political integration in the Caribbean. Currently, all independent nations in the British Caribbean and all of the British overseas territories in the Caribbean are either full members or associate members of CARICOM. The ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES was formed on June 18, 1981, by Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines to promote greater economic and political integration in the eastern Caribbean. The British Virgin Islands and Anguilla became associate members in 1984 and 1995, respectively. Although all of the members are former British dependencies, membership is open to all islands in the eastern Caribbean.

See also CARIBBEAN, BRITISH (Vol. III).

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Caribbean, Dutch During the 20th century, Dutch possessions in the Caribbean included SURINAME, which

became independent in 1975; Aruba, which was part of the Netherlands Antilles until 1986 when it became a self-governing part of the Netherlands; and the Netherlands Antilles, which consists of Bonaire, Curaçao, and three Leeward Islands (Saba, Saint Eustatius [Sint Eustatius], and Saint Martin [Sint Maarten]). The Netherlands Antilles was disbanded on December 15, 2008. Curaçao and Saint Martin, like Aruba, will become associated states within the Netherlands. Bonaire, Saba, and Saint Eustatius will become a direct part of the Netherlands as special municipalities.

During the 17th century, the Dutch West India Company established bases for the slave trade in the Caribbean. It also sought to develop tropical agricultural plantations to benefit the Netherlands. By the 20th century, the Dutch established a separate colonial administration for Suriname. In 1954, the six Dutch islands in the Caribbean were granted greater local autonomy and placed in the Netherlands Antilles, an associated state within the Netherlands. The concept of the Netherlands Antilles as a state, however, never gained complete support in most of the islands. Political relations between the six islands were frequently strained.

On January 1, 1986, Aruba, which occupies 75 square miles (194 km²) of territory and lies off the coast of VENEZUELA, seceded from the Netherlands Antilles and became an autonomous self-governing part of the Netherlands. Movement toward full independence had been indefinitely postponed. As a constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands is the head of state in Aruba. The Dutch monarch appoints a governor, but power rests with a prime minister elected by the parliament. The 21 members of Aruba's parliament are elected by direct, popular vote. The Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba form a commonwealth. Inhabitants share Dutch citizenship and use Dutch passports. Nelson O. Oduber (b. 1947–) has been prime minister since 2001. Aruba's 105,000 inhabitants enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the Caribbean, primarily because of the island's successful tourism INDUSTRY.

Between 2000 and 2005, each of the five islands in the Netherlands Antilles had a referendum on their future status. The four options for voters were closer ties to the Netherlands, remaining in the Netherlands Antilles, autonomy as a country within the Netherlands, and independence. Significantly, the vote for independence was virtually nonexistent. Saint Martin occupies the southern half of the island of Saint Martin (13 square miles [33.7 km²]). It is inhabited by 35,000 people, yet almost 70 percent of the voters chose to make the island a constituent country within the Netherlands. Like Saint Martin, Curaçao, which occupies 138,000 square miles (357,418 km²) of territory, also voted, by a similar margin, to become a constituent country within the Netherlands. The 138,000 inhabitants have a high standard of living, primarily because

of oil refining, tourism, and financial services. Saint Martin and Curaçao, therefore, will attain the same political status held by Aruba.

Saba and Bonaire voted for closer ties to the Netherlands. Saint Eustatius was the only island to vote to stay in the Netherlands Antilles. On October 12, 2006, the Netherlands reached an agreement with Saba, Bonaire, and Saint Eustatius. This agreement would make these islands a direct part of the Netherlands as special municipalities. The Dutch province of North Holland has invited the three new municipalities to become officially part of the province. Virtually everyone in Saba voted for closer ties (86 percent) to the Netherlands. The rest of the voters were content with the previous form of government. The smallest island in the Netherlands Antilles, occupying only 5 square miles (13 km²) of territory, Saba is occupied by less than 1,500 people. Bonaire, located off the coast of Venezuela, occupies 111 square miles (287.5 km²) of territory inhabited by 14,000 people. Together with Aruba and Curaçao, it forms a group known as the ABC islands. Whereas 75 percent of the voters supported either closer integration with the Netherlands or a continuation of the Netherlands Antilles, 25 percent of the voters wanted to become a constituent country like the other ABC islands. Saint Eustatius, which occupies 8 square miles (21 km²) of territory, is populated by 2,500 people. Unlike the other islands in the Netherlands Antilles, the overwhelming majority of voters (76 percent) favored a continuation of the Netherlands Antilles, with the remaining voters favoring closer ties. Since support for independence or the establishment of a constituent country was virtually nonexistent, and given that none of the other islands wished to continue the Netherlands Antilles, the people of Saint Eustatius have decided to become a direct part of the Netherlands as a special municipality. These special municipalities will resemble other Dutch municipalities. Residents of the three islands will vote in Dutch and European elections.

See also CARIBBEAN, DUTCH (Vol. III); DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY (Vol. II).

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Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was initially authorized as an amendment to the 1983 U.S. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and eventually came to embrace CBERA's extension in 1990 and the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTA). The CBI was designed to stimulate economic growth and promote democracy throughout the circum-Caribbean region. It also sought to deter the MIGRATION of people to the United States for

economic reasons. CBI provided an emergency appropriation of \$350 million for currency relief and provided for permanent tariff-free and reduced-tariff entry into the United States for most products shipped by the 24 eligible nations in 1992. In a clear reference to CUBA and NICARAGUA at the time, communist-ruled countries were not eligible for the program. Subsequently, Nicaragua became a participant.

U.S. president Ronald Reagan signed the CBERA legislation on August 5, 1983. CBERA sought to protect U.S. industries from lower-priced competition by excluding from the preferential list such items as footwear, handbags, luggage, cloth materials, work gloves, leather apparel, and canned tuna, as well as certain petroleum products. Fearing job losses, U.S. LABOR unions pressured Congress into jettisoning tax incentives for industries to relocate to the Caribbean. To protect U.S. industries with operations in PUERTO RICO that enjoyed similar tax preferences with the United States, the CBI permitted those manufacturers to establish subsidiaries throughout the membership nations.

Because the Caribbean countries benefit from other U.S. tax programs, such as the 807 tariff code, the Generalized System of Preferences, and the Special Access Program, it is difficult to measure the precise impact that the CBI had on those nations. The “807 industries” became particularly important. They provide for the duty-free import into the United States of clothing and electronic and pharmaceutical goods produced in the Caribbean but made entirely of U.S. components. In effect, U.S. firms built assembly plants in duty-free zones in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, and GUATEMALA, where U.S. components are made into final products and shipped back to the United States for sale. U.S. textile, flat cloth, clothing, and electronic manufacturers have benefited most from this arrangement. The benefits to the host CBI nations have been in job creation and the concomitant wages spent in the local economies.

The U.S. Congress altered the tax code again in 1989, when it replaced the 807 classification with section 980 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which equalized tariffs and tariff exemptions for global manufacturers. Latin America and Asia benefited the most, accounting for 68 percent of the dollar amount imported by the United States in 2001, with MEXICO accounting for 23 percent. Combined, the Dominican Republic, COSTA RICA, El Salvador, and Honduras accounted for another 8 percent.

The Reagan administration used the CBI to drum up support for its policies in the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s, a fact illustrated by the massive amount of CBI assistance that went to Costa Rica and El Salvador. The CBI countries feared the loss to Mexico of the 807 industries with the implementation of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT on January 1, 1994. That did not occur, but the list of 807 industries was not expanded

in the 1990s. Unexpected was the loss of U.S.- and foreign-owned assembly plants in Mexico to cheaper labor markets in China and South Asia. The 2005 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (DR-CAFTA) is expected to have little impact on these assembly industries because its focus is to provide for U.S. access to the local markets. DR-CAFTA did not alter any of the TRADE preferences already available to the Caribbean nations.

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Caribbean Community and Common Market

(CARICOM) The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas on July 4, 1973, and was signed by the prime ministers of BARBADOS, GUYANA, JAMAICA, and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. A year later, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BELIZE, DOMINICA, GRENADA, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES became members. CARICOM expanded again in 2004, this time bringing in the BAHAMAS, SURINAME, and HAITI as full members, and Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, and the Turks and Caicos as provisional members.

Modeled after the European Economic Community, CARICOM seeks to achieve economic integration by the voluntary removal of duties, quotas, and other tariff and nontariff barriers to free TRADE and to adopt a common external tariff (CET) and common protective policies (CPP). The CET was envisioned as a stimulus to industrial production by lowering duties on imported raw materials and machinery, while the CPP would protect existing industries. By working together, the CARICOM states hoped to overcome the problems of regional competition, economic fragmentation and dependence, and economies of scale and as a unit, to better deal with nonregional trading partners. CARICOM members also agreed to cooperate in advancing educational opportunities and community health services and to pursue a common foreign policy.

While the annual conference of the heads of government serves as the highest decision-making body, a comprehensive infrastructure of committees and councils are assigned responsibility for presenting it with unified policy recommendations. CARICOM’s secretariat is located in Georgetown, Guyana.



United States researchers (William Wilson, Jeffrey Steagall, Stephen Paulson, Thomas Leonard, and Edward Carroll) discuss CARICOM trade issues with the Barbadian permanent secretary for industry and transportation Stanley Bradshaw. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

CARICOM's origins can be traced to the immediate post-World War II years as Great Britain prepared to abandon its Caribbean colonies. The London government intended for its former colonies to band together, which they did in the short-lived WEST INDIES FEDERATION, from 1958 to 1962. Individual state nationalism and a lack of historical political and economic relationships among the newly independent islands contributed to the federation's failure. Shortly after its disintegration, Trinidad and Tobago took the lead in bringing about a more clearly defined association, as found in the CARIBBEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (CARIFTA) established in December 1965. Because CARIFTA suffered from focusing solely on intraregional trade, the more economically advanced member states—Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—took the lead in forming CARICOM. From this perspective, CARICOM is part of a process that might ideally result in political integration, but this remains an unknown.

CARICOM's 35-year history has produced a sense of solidarity among its members in dealing with nations and agencies external to the region and has produced cooperation in regional EDUCATION, health, and TRANSPORTATION endeavors. For the moment, however, CARICOM's success or failure will rest on its efforts toward economic integration. There now is free movement of people between states for economic reasons, but otherwise, the record is mixed. Intraregional trade has altered little during CARICOM's existence, and significant economic development is yet to occur. Although its primary banana market, the European Union (EU) remains protected by the LOMÉ CONVENTION, trade with other nations is affected by forces beyond CARICOM's control. Large trading blocs such as the EU, the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET and the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT aim not only to integrate the markets of

their member states but also to seek foreign export markets. CARICOM also must deal with the impact of the 2005 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT with the United States. Internally, CARICOM continues to be plagued by parochial national interests, which has resulted in the failure to develop a common policy regarding foreign investment, a monetary union, or common stock market. Surrendering any amount of state sovereignty to a regional authority remains a difficult challenge.

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Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)

Created under the Dickinson Bay Agreement on December 15, 1965, the Caribbean Free Trade Association, or CARIFTA, came into being on May 1, 1968, with 11 member states divided into two groups: 1) medium developed countries, being BARBADOS, GUYANA, JAMAICA, and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO; and 2) lesser developed states, being ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, Montserrat, SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES. Members pledged to eliminate tariffs and quota systems on one another's products. It was the first realistic effort at integration among the Commonwealth of National Caribbean states.

The initiative dated to the end of World War II, when independence of Great Britain's Caribbean colonies appeared inevitable. The British government anticipated the establishment of a confederation into a single political entity. This led to the WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958, but it lapsed four years later largely because the island states lacked any historical precedent and their TRADE was directed toward Britain, not among themselves. The immediate cause for CARIFTA was Britain's flirtation with joining the European Economic Community. If it did so, the islands would lose preferential treatment for their primary exports—bananas and sugar—to Great Britain.

CARIFTA suffered from its concentration on intraregional trade and its reliance on consensus for policy adoption and implementation. It also gave little attention to renegotiating trade pacts with nations outside the agreement. These weaknesses led the more developed member nations to deepen integration. The effort led to the development of the CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET on July 4, 1973.

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Caribbean Legion The Caribbean Legion was a loosely organized group that carried out a series of MILITARY operations against dictators in the circum-Caribbean region after World War II, particularly from 1946 to 1950. The first use of the term was during the 1948 Costa Rican civil war, when a small group of *tico* (Costa Rican) exiles were airlifted from GUATEMALA to seize Puerto Limón on COSTA RICA's Caribbean coast (see CIVIL WAR OF 1948, COSTA RICA). The democratic and human rights principles enshrined in World War II's Atlantic Charter and U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" proclamation served as the ideals of the Caribbean Legion. The legion's spokespersons—such as Guatemala's JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO, CUBA'S RAMÓN GRAU SAN MARTÍN and Carlos Prío Socarrás (b. 1903–d. 1977), VENEZUELA'S RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO, and Costa Rica's JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER—argued that democracy, with its commitment to human and civil rights, should be spread throughout Latin America.

Although no trace of a formerly established legion army exists, one could trace its origins to 1946 and Dominican general Juan Rodríguez García (b. 1910–d. ?), who commanded a group of exiles to oust DOMINICAN REPUBLIC dictator RAFAEL TRUJILLO. One of the Caribbean Legion's most publicized efforts came in July and August 1947: After training in Cuba, the exile group launched an unsuccessful attempt to invade the Dominican Republic and overthrow Trujillo. Cuban dictator FIDEL CASTRO RUZ claims to have played a significant role in this invasion, but there is no verification of this. In April 1948, Nicaraguan strongman ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA appeared ready to intervene in Costa Rica's "civil war" to prevent alleged communists, led by Figueres, from seizing power. The Caribbean Legion also reportedly played a part in the 1949 assassination of the chief of the Guatemalan armed forces, Francisco Arana (b. 1905–d. 1949), and plots against Honduran strongmen TIBURCIO CAÍAS ANDINO and Somoza.

By 1950, the Caribbean Legion's phantom army disappeared for two fundamental reasons. As the cold war intensified, the United States became more interested in political tranquillity throughout the Caribbean region and therefore was willing to tolerate dictatorial regimes. Furthermore, the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES imposed on the Caribbean governments a series of principles that severely restricted the activities of political exiles.

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CARICOM See CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET.

CARIFTA See CARIBBEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION.

Carnival in Brazil (Carnaval) Carnival in BRAZIL is a three-day celebration that begins on Ash Wednesday, which is the first day of Lent, the 40-day fast before Easter. Originally, the MUSIC-and-dance celebration was a mixture of Christian, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman religious feasts; these later combined with those of the African and Amerindian cultures found in Brazil.

Carnival appeared in Brazil in the 1830s and mimicked the festivals of Europe, particularly of Paris. Initially confined to the saloons in urban centers and frowned on by the authorities, it quickly grew in popularity. By the 1930s, street festivals were common. The first were organized by samba clubs, because of the popularity of that dance in Brazil. With the country's modernization in the 1960s, neighborhood groups known as *bloco*s (blocks) determined the floats, dances, and music that would represent each *bloco* in the street festival. While cities throughout Brazil hold their own carnivals, that in RIO DE JANEIRO has received international attention thanks to television.

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Carranza, Venustiano (b. 1859–d. 1920) *revolutionary leader and president of Mexico* Venustiano Carranza was born to a wealthy landowning family in the state of Coahuila, MEXICO. He became a MILITARY leader during the MEXICAN REVOLUTION and advocated a return to the democratic principles of the Constitution of 1857. As governor of his home state, Carranza supported the political reform efforts of FRANCISCO MADERO. He assumed leadership of the Constitutionalists when VICTORIANO HUERTA overthrew Madero and installed himself as dictator. Carranza eventually deposed Huerta in 1914 and proclaimed himself "first chief." He made a nominal attempt to bring the various revolutionary factions together in the CONVENTION OF AGUASCALIENTES, but when delegates did not select him as interim president, he withdrew his delegates.

Carranza led his Constitutionalist Army in a bloody civil war against the forces of EMILIANO ZAPATA and FRANCISCO VILLA from 1914 to 1915. The Constitutionalists advocated a simple program of political reform, while the forces of Zapata and Villa—known initially as the "Conventionists"—insisted on more progressive social and agrarian reforms. With the help of military leader ÁLVARO OBREGÓN, Carranza's forces brought much of the country under control and convened a convention to draft the CONSTITUTION OF 1917. Despite Carranza's hopes that the new document would closely resemble the

Constitution of 1857, delegates introduced a wide array of sweeping social reforms. After serving for several years under the title of first chief, Carranza was elected president in 1917. He served until 1920 and ignored many of the most radical aspects of the constitution. Obregón led a revolt against the outgoing president in 1920 when Carranza attempted to name his own successor. Carranza escaped MEXICO CITY with part of the national treasury. He was captured and executed in May 1920.

See also CONSTITUTION OF 1857, MEXICO (Vol. III).

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Castro Ruz, Fidel (b. 1926–) *Cuban revolutionary and dictator* Fidel Castro Ruz was a lawyer by training and a revolutionary by profession. Castro led a guerrilla movement that ousted Cuban dictator FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR on December 31, 1958. One of seven children born to successful farmers Ángel Castro and Lina Ruz González, Castro was educated at a boarding school in Santiago de Cuba and at Belén High School in HAVANA. In 1950, he earned a law degree from the University of Havana, where as a student he was involved in the often-violent conflicts between student groups. Following graduation, Castro married Mirta Díaz Balart, a member of a prominent Cuban FAMILY. Before their divorce in 1954, they had one son, Fidelito. Subsequently, and despite rumors of Castro's numerous affairs, his revolutionary compatriot Cecilia Sánchez remained closest to him and was his most trusted adviser until her death in 1980.

Castro's university experience brought him into the reality of Cuban politics. A student of political ideologies, he was most attracted to the Orthodox Party (also known as the Cuban People's Party), which called for economic independence from the United States, political liberty, social justice, and an end to government corruption. These concepts were in the tradition of José Martí, and Castro used them when he spoke in his own defense during his 1953 trial for the raid on the Moncada Barracks.

In 1947, Castro joined with others in a failed attempt to oust RAFAEL TRUJILLO, dictator of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. A year later, Castro was in BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA, when the assassination of labor leader JORGE ELIÉCER GAITÁN touched off the riots known as the Bogotazo. Castro took part in the demonstrations. Ideology and violence converged in the coup d'état that brought Batista to power in CUBA on March 10, 1952, and his cancellation of the forthcoming elections, in which Castro was a candidate for the Cuban congress. Castro became convinced that the only way to reform the corrupt Cuban political system was through violent revolution.



Fidel Castro as a young revolutionary (circa 1957) in Cuba's Sierra Maestra mountain range (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

Following Batista's assumption of the presidency, Castro set about organizing a cell-styled opposition group (an organization made up of different "cells," each not knowing the other's membership but united by one leader, in this case, Castro). The following year, he determined it was time to act. He plotted and carried out armed attacks on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953. The plan was a complete failure. While the majority of Castro's 160 colleagues were killed either during the assault or shortly after being captured by the Cuban army, Fidel and his brother RAÚL CASTRO RUZ were held for trial. Fidel's self-defense, published later as *History Will Absolve Me*, correctly summarized all that was wrong with Cuba's economic, political, and social structures. For their actions, the Castro brothers were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on the ISLE OF PINES (later renamed Isla de la Juventud). Released as part of a general amnesty granted by Batista in 1956, the Castro brothers removed themselves to MEXICO CITY, where they found many other expatriate Cubans who were disgusted with conditions on the island. These others supported Castro financially and helped in the purchasing and storing of arms as he prepared to return to Cuba. The brothers also met the Argentine ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, a medical doctor turned revolutionary,

who earned their friendship for their shared revolutionary ideals.

The Castro brothers and Guevara, along with 81 guerrilla fighters, returned to Cuba on December 6, 1956, in a poorly planned invasion that anticipated a popular uprising in Havana, which never occurred. The three escaped into the Sierra Maestra mountains, where they organized a guerrilla army, which battled against Batista's national army for the next three years. Castro's popular image grew steadily as Batista's army failed to capture the revolutionary. Most damaging to Batista's claims about Castro's failing effort came in February 1958, when *New York Times* reporter Herbert Mathews visited Castro in the mountains of eastern Cuba. The carefully staged interview intensified opposition to Batista. Havana's most influential businessmen and the CATHOLIC CHURCH attempted to mediate a settlement, but Batista refused to compromise. In June 1958, Batista ordered his army to open the "final offensive" against Castro. Within two months, it proved a disaster. The Cuban army melted away into the countryside, and some of its soldiers even joined Castro's army. In early December, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to mediate a settlement between Batista and Castro, but again, the former refused to compromise. Isolated and deserted by his supporters, Batista finally left Cuba on December 31, 1958.

During the three years after his march into Havana, Castro worked diligently to consolidate his power. He had Manuel Urrutia (b. 1901–d. 1981) appointed president and then Osvaldo Dorticós (b. 1919–d. 1983), while remaining the real power himself. He directed the elimination of Cuba's elite families and Batista loyalists through exile, internment, or execution. Castro's consolidation of power, postponement of elections, and attack on the elite prompted thousands of middle-class Cubans to abandon the CUBAN REVOLUTION and Castro's subsequent political noose. Castro absorbed Cuba's Communist Party into his 26th of July Movement, not because he was a communist, but because he needed the party structure and discipline to impose his will. In 1964, he shut the party down and organized the new Communist Party of Cuba under his own control. Following the failed BAY OF PIGS INVASION in April 1961, Castro further clamped down on opposition, and following the October 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, standing alone between the superpowers, he recognized the need for full control over Cuban society. He directed that every sector, from labor and teachers to professionals, artists, the press, and so, be grouped into various organizations headed by people loyal to the revolution. Increasingly, he relied on persons loyal to him rather than creative advisers. With his brother Raúl in charge of the MILITARY, political opposition was silenced. Devoid of political opposition and surrounded with weak advisers, Castro used his charisma to capture the attention of the Cuban population.

In his rush to silence political opposition, Castro permitted many of the Cuban elite to go into self-

exile immediately following Batista's overthrow in 1959. When it became apparent in early 1960 that Castro did not intend to implement the democracy he had promised, members of the middle class fled the island. These two groups included medical personnel, engineers, scientists and other university-trained individuals, business managers and professionals—people essential for administering government and the economy. Recognizing this loss, in 1961 Castro closed the door to mass out-migration and for the next eight years tightly restricted the outflow. Almost all of these people, many who came to the United States, were Spanish whites, or *criollos*, with skills that permitted them to meld into U.S. middle-class society. This was not true of those who came in the 1979 Mariel boatlift and the *balseros* (rafters) who came in the 1990s. These people were mostly nonwhites and of mixed race, and most often without skills that permitted their easy adaptation to U.S. society. Cuba's out-migrations also established the fact that Castro, not the U.S. government, controlled emigration from Cuba.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fragility of Cuba's socioeconomic structures beamed apparent. Although Castro loosened the economic chains by permitting joint ventures with foreign companies in MINING and tourism, allowing individuals to earn money by hiring themselves out or driving their own cars as taxis or using their homes as small restaurants, Castro never gave up on his goals. "Socialism or Death" became his rallying cry despite food and medical shortages, increased unemployment, and broken-down infrastructure. While international and private organizations donated medical supplies to Cuba, Castro took advantage of loopholes in the U.S. embargo to purchase food from the United States in 2000 (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF). Through 2006, the Cuban government paid cash for approximately \$500 million in U.S. foodstuffs. Castro's permissiveness resulted in visits to Cuba by Pope John Paul II in 1998 and former U.S. president Jimmy Carter in 2003. While both men criticized the continuing U.S. embargo, they also chastised Castro for the lack of civil and HUMAN RIGHTS on the island. Some groups, such as gays and lesbians, are harassed and jailed solely for their sexual orientation. Others, such as artists and writers, are singled out because their works express anti-Revolutionary ideas. Their public lectures did not move Castro to loosen the controls. Indeed, the arrests and detentions of notable persons continued.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, widespread speculation emerged over who would succeed Castro. Such individuals as longtime Castro supporters Roberto Alarcón (b. 1937–) and Carlos Lage (b. 1951) have been suggested, but the Cuban constitution and Castro are quite clear that Raúl Castro stands next in line. When Fidel became ill with what were reported as stomach disorders in July 2006, he announced that Raúl was temporarily taking control of the government reins. A year later, as his health appeared to improve, Fidel still

made no public announcement or showed any intention of returning as Cuba's head of state. Finally, in February 2008, Castro resigned from his political positions, effectively elevating his younger brother Raúl to the Cuban presidency.

See also MARTÍ, JOSÉ (Vol. III).

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Castro Ruz, Raúl (b. 1931–) *revolutionary and president of Cuba* While less athletic, outspoken, and concerned with personal recognition than FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, Raúl Castro Ruz followed his older brother to La Salle Academy in Santiago de Cuba, to Belén High School in HAVANA, and to the University of Havana, where he was drawn to Marxism and joined the Young Socialists, an affiliate of the Moscow-oriented Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular). While still a student, in 1953, Castro participated in the Soviet-sponsored World Youth Congress in Vienna, which was followed by a trip behind the iron curtain.

Castro joined his brother Fidel in the ill-planned attack on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, and, like his brother, was captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison on the ISLE OF PINES. The brothers were released in a general amnesty issued by President FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR in 1956. The Castro brothers quickly departed for MEXICO CITY, where they met ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA and plotted to oust Batista from CUBA by force. Landing in the swamps along the coast of Oriente Province on December 6, 1956, the Castro brothers, Guevara, and 81 followers proved no challenge for the Cuban army but escaped capture or death by retreating into the Sierra Maestra mountains, where they organized and conducted a three-year guerrilla war against Batista (see CUBAN REVOLUTION).

During the insurgency, from 1956 to 1959, Raúl Castro was put in charge of the Second Eastern Front (Segundo Frente Oriental), which operated throughout northeastern Cuba. Castro battled Batista's army with equal ruthlessness, often to the displeasure of Fidel. For a time after January 1, 1959, Castro ordered the execution of several hundred *batistianos*. His battlefield demeanor and role as executioner, combined with his commitment to Marxism, added to his reputation as a hardliner and brutal Marxist.

Batista fled Cuba on the evening of December 31, 1958, and a week later, Fidel Castro and several of his fol-

lowers marched triumphantly into Havana. Despite the establishment of a temporary ruling council, Fidel Castro quickly emerged as its leader. Among Fidel's initial appointments was Raúl as minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, a position he used to organize the guerrilla forces of the 26th of July Movement into a modern army equipped with weapons purchased from Western Europe and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, Castro directed the dispatch of several thousand Cuban troops to the African war zones in Ethiopia and Angola. Into the 1980s, he made several visits to the Soviet Union to study military tactics and strategy. Over time, Castro acquired additional government assignments: president of the Agrarian Reform Institute, minister of the interior, minister of public health, and secretariat to the president. Castro also served as vice premier and vice president of the Council of Ministers and Council of State during the institutionalization of the revolution in the 1970s and is presently a member of the Politburo and second secretary of the Communist Party.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Castro became an advocate of limited market incentives for Cuban producers and opening the country to limited foreign investment, actions that contradicted his longstanding image as a hardline ideologue. As designated by the Fifth Party Congress in October 1997, the premiership passed to Castro in July 2006 when Fidel was hospitalized for unknown stomach disorders. A year later, when his health appeared to be improving, there was no talk of Fidel returning to an active leadership role. However, in February 2008, Raúl Castro became president of Cuba.

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Catholic Church Today, an estimated 90 percent of Latin Americans are Roman Catholic, having been baptized into that church, a fact often attributed to the Spaniards' imposition of Catholicism on NATIVE AMERICANS, their intolerance of other RELIGIONS, and the special privileges they granted to the church during the colonial period. Over time, many factors led to a variety of beliefs and opinions within the Catholic community. Indigenous, African, and other religious practices and beliefs fused with Catholic theology and practices. Politics often affected the church's position in society. This was most evident in the 19th century, when political conservatives sought to maintain the privileged status of the Catholic Church, while liberals wished to strip it of those privileges. When liberals came to power after the mid-19th century, the church lost its control over keeping vital statistics to civil governments, which also took over establishing public educational systems, hospitals, orphanages, and similar social service institu-

tions that were once the sole province of religious orders. Additionally, ecclesiastical courts lost their right to adjudicate civil issues. This liberal movement conflicted with the teachings of Pope Leo XIII, who administered the church from 1878 to 1903 and is considered the originator of modern Catholic social thinking. A critic of laissez-faire capitalism, he called on political leaders to intervene on behalf of free capital's victims—the workers. For example, he called for just wages and the legalization of workers' unions.

The liberal-conservative conflict had a profound influence on Latin America in the early 20th century. With its privileged position slipping away, the church hierarchy remained outside the political arena in hopes of avoiding further public attacks. Church attendance dwindled, and the number of people entering the church as priests and nuns precipitously declined. Increasingly, church schools and other church social institutions served society's middle and upper sectors. In effect, a wide divide separated the Catholic Church from Latin America's general populace.

In an effort to revive the church, in the 1930s, Pope Pius XI called on every parish to establish a Catholic action group to defend the church and emphasize its doctrine of social justice. Among the important laymen who led such movements were EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA in CHILE, Victor Andrés Belaúnde (b. 1883–d. 1966) in PERU, and Archbishop Sebastião Leme (b. 1882–d. 1942) in BRAZIL. Many of the leaders of these action groups eventually headed Christian Democratic POLITICAL PARTIES. For the moment, however, they organized workers into unions and designed social welfare programs to assist the poor.

During their papacies, from 1939 to 1963, Pope Pius XII and his successor, John XXIII, called on missionaries from Europe and the United States to go to Latin America. Thousands of religious and lay volunteers heeded this call, bringing development and reform agendas with them. The most notable U.S. group was the Maryknoll fathers and sisters, who arrived in 1943. Notable Latin American church reform leaders included several archbishops: Hélder Câmara (b. 1909–d. 1999) in Recife, Brazil, from 1952 to 1999; Manuel Larraín (b. 1900–d. 1966) in Talca, Chile, from 1937 to 1966; Juan Landázuri Ricketts (b. 1913–d. 1997) in LIMA, from 1955 to 1990; and José María Caro (b. 1896–d. 1958) in SANTIAGO DE CHILE, from 1939 to 1958. They and others built medical posts, as well as water and sanitation facilities in the growing urban shantytowns across Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s.

In 1955, the CONFERENCE OF LATIN AMERICAN BISHOPS was established to coordinate pastoral activities on an annual basis. The CUBAN REVOLUTION further awakened the need to address Latin America's socio-economic problems. Although Latin American bishops contributed little to the theological discussions at the Second Vatican Council meeting in Rome from 1962

to 1965, they came away with the understanding that the church had to do much more to reach people across Latin America. The mandate for greater social action came with the 1968 Medellín Bishop's Conference, which directed the clergy to work for social justice for the poor. Influenced by liberation theology, the bishops approved an active church in assisting the poor in improving their quality of life.

This call for change contradicted the church's long-standing support of oligarchic governments. It also brought it into conflict with many of the MILITARY dictatorships that directed Latin America's governments at the time. The clergy's experience in applying the dictates of liberation theology met with varied fates. In Peru, for example, General Juan Velasco Alvarado (b. 1910–d. 1977), who governed Peru from 1968 to 1975, sympathized with the church's social goals. At the same time, in ARGENTINA, the church's hierarchy stood by silently while the military tortured and eliminated progressive thinkers and advocates during the so-called DIRTY WAR, from 1976 to 1983. In Brazil, many clergy paid the ultimate price for challenging military brutality and suppression and calling for a return to democracy. In BOLIVIA, Chile, and PARAGUAY, the clergy played a major role in organizing opposition to the military governments. The Central American clergy clearly illustrated the split among the ruling cardinals and bishops. For example, in EL SALVADOR, Archbishop Oscar Romero (b. 1919–d. 1980) was assassinated during mass on March 24, 1980, allegedly by right-wing death squads for his avowed support for democracy and social change and criticism of the military. The same charges resulted in the deaths of four U.S.-based Maryknoll nuns and laywomen near San Salvador on December 3, 1980, and the killing of 11 Jesuit priests at San Salvador's University of Central America on November 16, 1989. In neighboring NICARAGUA, the clergy were also split. Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo (b. 1926–), criticized both the Somoza regime and the Sandinistas for their excessive use of power. He joined the pope in lashing out against priests such as Ernesto Cardenal (b. 1925–), Miguel d'Escoto (b. 1933–), and Fernando Cardenal (b. 1934–) for taking positions in the Sandinista government.

CUBA's experience paralleled that of Latin America until the arrival of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ in HAVANA on January 7, 1959. Among his early actions was to expel foreign-born Catholic clergy, charging that they did not understand Cuban culture, politics, or history. He withdrew all state financial support for the church and its institutions, such as schools, orphanages and hospitals. Finally, in 1968, Castro declared the country atheistic, although he did not close the Catholic or other churches operating on the island. The impact of such dictates is difficult to measure, particularly when thousands of Cubans turned out to greet Pope John Paul II on his visit to the island nation from January 21 to 25, 1998.

In the midst of this change in Latin America, Pope John Paul II visited the region 14 times, each time advising the bishops and the clergy to steer clear of political activism. The contemporary church is split between liberal-progressive clergy who pressure for socioeconomic reforms and more representative government and more conservative clergy who wish the church to attend strictly to religious affairs. Nevertheless, during his 1998 visit to Cuba, Pope John Paul II held out the promise for a more active role in Cuban affairs and for better relations between the Vatican and Havana. Today, the church continues to be active in Latin American politics by issuing periodic reports and analyses of socioeconomic conditions, while not suggesting concrete solutions. At the parish level, priests continue to press governments for improved services, including water and sanitation facilities, electricity, schools, transportation, and medical clinics.

While research at the end of the 20th century reveals that between 85 and 92 percent of all Latin Americans identify themselves as Catholic, only 10 percent of them regularly attend religious services. At the same time, there is a strain on the number of religious personnel to serve the estimated 250 million Catholics: 1,000 bishops, 53,000 priests, 126,000 religious women, and another 8,500 religious men. Across the hemisphere, on average, one priest serves approximately 7,000 churchgoers. In addition to a dwindling number of practicing Catholics and clergy, during the last generation of the 20th century, Protestants, particularly evangelical religions, have made inroads among Latin America's poor, with the inference that the Catholic Church has not done enough to improve their lives.

See also CATHOLIC CHURCH (Vols. I, II, III); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III).

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Cato, R. Milton (b. 1915–d. 1997) *prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines* Born on June 3, 1915, on the island of St. Vincent, Robert Milton Cato served in the Canadian army during World War II. After the war, Cato returned to St. Vincent and became involved in politics. An avowed socialist, Cato rejected Marxism. He sought to organize workers and cofounded the Saint Vincent Labour Party (SVLP) in 1955. Cato was elected chief minister when the British government granted SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES local autonomy in 1967. While St. Vincent and the Grenadines was still a British colony, Cato was elected prime minister in 1969. The British, however, continued to control foreign rela-

tions and national defense. Cato lost the 1972 elections to JAMES MITCHELL, the leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP), but subsequently won the 1974 elections and regained his position as prime minister. With the support of the middle class, he pursued a conservative policy based on law and order.

Cato was prime minister when the British granted St. Vincent and the Grenadines complete independence on October 27, 1979. Elections held shortly after that date reaffirmed Cato's mandate. During the nation's first months of independence, Cato's government, with the MILITARY assistance of BARBADOS, suppressed a Rastafarian-influenced military revolt on Union Island led by Lennox "Bumba" Charles (b. 1946). Although a socialist, Cato distanced himself from socialist governments in CUBA, GUYANA, and GRENADA. He pursued a pro-Western foreign policy and followed a political and economic path similar to the policy followed by such Caribbean states as Barbados. Cato's suppression of TRADE unions and opposition groups, however, cost him political support. He lost the 1984 elections to the NDP, which held power until 2001. He died in the capital, Kingston, on February 10, 1997.

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CBI See CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE.

CELAM See CONFERENCE OF LATIN AMERICAN BISHOPS.

Central America Central America includes the five countries of COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, and NICARAGUA, totaling approximately 162,669 square miles (421,311 km²) and with nearly 38 million inhabitants in 2008. The region is bordered to the north by MEXICO, to the east by BELIZE and the Caribbean Sea, to the west by the Pacific Ocean, and to the south by PANAMA. Central America was once the Spanish colonial administrative unit the Audiencia of Guatemala and the postindependence United Provinces of Central America. Geographers are correct in pointing out that Belize and Panama are within Central America as a geographic region, but because of Belize's historical experience, it is usually placed within the sphere of the BRITISH CARIBBEAN. Panama has been linked to COLOMBIA in the 19th century and during the colonial period to the Viceroyalty of New Granada, and its mod-



Banana plantations were the dominant industry in early 20th-century Central America, prompting the region's nations to be dubbed "banana republics." (*U.S. Army Signal Corps*)

ern history begins with its independence in 1903, and since then, it has been inextricably tied to the United States, which constructed the PANAMA CANAL.

Central America's agro-export-based economies—coffee, bananas, tobacco—which propelled the five countries into the global marketplace in the late 19th century, with its concomitant sociopolitical structures, continued to characterize the five countries in the 20th century. With the exception of Costa Rica, elitist and/or military rule continued to be the norm of government in the other four countries. By mid-20th century, Costa Rica was identified as the "Switzerland of the Central America" with its democratic government and generous social safety nets. The socioeconomic disparities and closed political systems erupted into violence, first in Guatemala in the mid-1950s, followed by Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras from the 1970s to the 1980s. Asserting that it needed to stem the tide of communism, the United States intervened in these conflicts with economic and military assistance (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS; GUATEMALA,

U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). These conflicts ended by 1991, and for the most part, the traditional elites returned to power. Also during the 1990s, each country accepted the neoliberal economic model and in 2005 ratified the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT with the United States.

See also CENTRAL AMERICA (Vol. III); UNITED PROVINCES OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Vol. III).

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Central American Common Market (CACM)

The Central American Common Market (CACM) is an economic organization established on December 13, 1960, between four Central American countries: EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, and NICARAGUA. A year later, COSTA RICA joined. During the 1950s, Latin American nations had accepted the precepts of the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch (b. 1901–d. 1986) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA [later, ECLAC]) that emphasized increased private and public investment in manufacturing and infrastructure to overcome the dependence on the exportation of primary products. ECLA also encouraged the establishment of common markets and common external tariffs (CETs). Guided by ECLA, the five Central American nations signed two agreements that provided for interregional free TRADE on specified items to be implemented over a 10-year period and for regional integration of protected industries. Although Costa Rica signed the accords, its legislature did not ratify them, making them inoperable. This was followed by the U.S.-encouraged 1960 Treaty of Economic Association (TEA) that committed El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to establish a common market over a five-year period. TEA provided the impetus for a larger region-wide agreement that resulted in the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, signed in December 1960, which established CACM. At the time, Costa Rica gave economic reasons for not ratifying the treaty but in reality was acting out its sense of distinctiveness from the other four countries.

In the 1960s and 1970s, CACM recorded significant gains in intraregional trade, with its value rising from \$33 million in 1960 to \$1.1 billion in 1980. Urban industrial growth averaged 5.8 percent a year under CET protection. These figures, however, conceal some major difficulties. The bulk of the intraregional trade consisted of consumer goods, mostly in processed foods. By 1970, food processing accounted for 50 percent of CACM's industrial activities. In the agricultural sector, U.S. assistance provided for increased production per acreage and introduced mechanization that displaced unknown numbers of farmworkers, who made their way to cities in search of jobs. However, industrial development was capital, not LABOR, intensive and centered in El Salvador and Guatemala, CACM's most developed countries. The displacement of rural labor not only strained the urban sector's infrastructure but also prompted some, such as Salvadorans, to seek economic opportunity in Honduras. The influx of Salvadorans strained Honduran society and significantly contributed to the outbreak of the SOCCER WAR in 1969. The war prompted Honduras to withdraw from CACM and to suspend economic relations with El Salvador, acts that contributed to its demise. The CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s further affected regional development. ECLA's scope was broadened in 1984 to include the Caribbean.

CACM languished until the Esquipulas II peace accords in August 7, 1987, brought the Central American

conflicts to an end and laid the groundwork to reignite the economic integration process. On June 15–17, 1990, at the Antigua, Guatemala, summit, the Central American presidents approved an economic action plan that emphasized the insertion of the region into the global marketplace. The plan included the modernization of the region's industrial base and development of nontraditional exports in order to effectively compete in the global market. The CET would be reduced from 40 to 20 percent in order to encourage the importation of current technology and machinery. The European Economic Community established a fund of 120 million euros to assist in the stabilization of trade balances and another 30 million euros to assist with infrastructure development. Panama joined on a limited basis in 1991, and Honduras rejoined the fold a year later.

Optimism characterized CACM's early efforts to enter the global market. Guatemala's recognition of BELIZE in 1991 opened the way for trade discussions with CACM. Negotiations for a free trade agreement with MEXICO began in 1992. In 1993, CACM actively sought participation in the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) and with the so-called G-3 (MEXICO, COLOMBIA, and VENEZUELA). The optimism faded as the decade progressed. The structural changes brought about by the acceptance of neoliberalism were in place, but industry was not modernized to a significant degree not only in CENTRAL AMERICA but also across Latin America. Mexico became more concerned with the loss of assembly industries to China and South Asia than with a Central American Free Trade Agreement, while Colombia and Venezuela focused on internal politics rather than foreign relations.

The arrival of George W. Bush at the U.S. White House on January 20, 2001, presented new challenges to CACM. Although firmly committed to NAFTA, Bush had no interest in pursuing the FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS as envisioned by his father, President George H. W. Bush, and pursued by President Bill Clinton. Instead, the younger Bush pursued the completion of bilateral or regional free trade agreements, such as the 2005 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. Not all of Central America's socioeconomic sectors, particularly middle-sector businesspeople, small farmers, and laborers, looked favorably on the agreement. They feared the diminishment of their economic status. In addition to the U.S. presence, China is surveying trade possibilities in the region. And, the assembly industries, particularly textiles, are under constant threat from lower-wage countries, such as China and South Asia. CACM faces a challenging future.

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Central American conferences of 1907 and 1923 Hosted by the United States government in Washington, D.C., these conferences attempted to stave off domestic political violence that had characterized the five Central American republics—COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, and NICARAGUA—since their independence in 1823. The conferences illustrated the larger U.S. policy toward the entire Caribbean region, which sought political tranquillity and financial responsibility to keep European nations from intervening in the region and potentially threatening the PANAMA CANAL.

The first conference (Central American Peace Conference) resulted from Nicaraguan president JOSÉ SANTOS ZELAYA'S efforts to spread his influence over the region, which were both an affront to his regional presidential colleagues and a threat to regional peace. The Central American heads of state accepted the joint U.S.-Mexican offer to mediate a solution, and their representatives convened in Washington, from November 14 to December 20, 1907. The conference produced several agreements, three of which satisfied the U.S. policy objective. The General Treaty of Peace and Amity provided for the nonrecognition of governments that came to power via a coup d'état and banned the Central American governments from interfering in one another's internal affairs. Another agreement established the Central American Court of Justice, located in San José, Costa Rica, and envisioned as a nonpolitical instrument for settling disputes among the five nations. On paper, the agreements achieved the U.S. objective of regional political stability guaranteed by a treaty system. On the other hand, the Central Americans were more pleased with other treaty provisions that pointed toward a regional union. They considered the establishment of the Central American Bureau as most important because it offered the opportunity for cooperation in modernizing legal systems and educational institutions, improving agriculture and industrialization, and developing regional TRADE. Although the 1907 agreements brought momentary tranquillity to the region, it also demonstrated the differences in objectives between the United States and CENTRAL AMERICA.

Over the next 15 years, U.S. presidents attempted different policies to force constitutionalism on the region, while at the same time the Central American Court of Justice proved ineffective in settling interstate differences. Following World War I, the United States would make another effort to institutionalize Central American political tranquillity and, in the fervor of the time, make

local militaries apolitical and limit their portions of national budgets.

The second Washington conclave came about when the Liberal governments in Tegucigalpa and Guatemala City threatened the Conservative governments in El Salvador and Managua immediately after the overthrow of Guatemalan president Carlos Herrera (b. 1886–d. 1930) on December 10, 1921. Fearing that U.S. Marines might be needed to maintain the peace amid the increasing tensions, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes proposed another regional conference (Conference on Central American Affairs), which convened in Washington from December 4, 1922, until February 7, 1923. The conference produced 12 agreements and as in 1907 represented the divergent objectives of the United States and the Central Americans. Five reflected the U.S. policy objective of regional political tranquillity. Additionally, there would henceforth be no recognition of regional governments that came to power through a coup d'état or revolution, even if eventually legitimized by free election. Individuals who could not serve as heads of state under these circumstances included revolutionary leaders, their close relatives, and high-ranking civilian and MILITARY officials who had been in power six months before or after the event. The Central Americans promised not to assist revolutionaries or harbor exiles and again agreed not to interfere in one another's affairs. Furthermore, disputes among states would be settled by internationally appointed commissions or judges if they could not be resolved through diplomatic channels. Election commissions would be appointed to codify procedures, observe the electoral process, and verify the results. In effect, the agreements attempted to address all of the unresolved issues from the 1907 convention.

Influenced by the post-World War I disarmament and the success of the 1922 Washington Naval Disarmament Conference, U.S. policy makers insisted on arms limitation agreements designed to depoliticize Central American militaries and eventually replace them with nonpolitical national constabularies or national guards. In the end, the Central American signatories agreed to a formula that fixed the size of each national army: Costa Rica, 2,000 individuals; Honduras and Nicaragua, 2,500; El Salvador, 4,200; and Guatemala, 4,500.

The treaties met the same disappointing fate as the 1907 accords. None of the Central American governments ratified all the provisions; political exiles found havens in neighboring states from which they launched attacks on their homeland; elections became shams; only El Salvador and Nicaragua established constabularies, but these eventually served dictators; and the United States again found itself intervening in regional political affairs in the late 1920s. Also during the 1920s, U.S. policy toward Latin America underwent a significant change that led to the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY in 1933 and to the decertification of the 1923 Central American treaty system two years later.

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Central American wars (1980s) In 1977, several factors placed CENTRAL AMERICA'S existing order under severe pressure, but regional analysts in the U.S. State Department did not anticipate any serious problems in the near term. EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, and HONDURAS were under MILITARY rule. The Somoza family dynasty was still in power in NICARAGUA. Only COSTA RICA, a social welfare state described as the "Switzerland" of this tumultuous region, maintained a democratic government. Four years later, in 1981, brutal warfare gripped the region and threatened Costa Rica's peaceful ambience.

The 1977 U.S. State Department assessment belied reality, as the region was already in the throes of violence. The majority of Central American analysts place the events of the 1970s and, subsequently, the 1980s, within the region's historical setting. With the exception of Costa Rica, which had a practicing democracy, the other four nations had long histories of elitist governments propped up by the military at the expense of the middle and lower socioeconomic sectors. The initial challenges to this system came in 1944, when the middle sector attempted to oust the dictators and in Costa Rica the people elected a "leftist" president, Teodoro Picado (b. 1900–d. 1960). The reform efforts of Guatemalan president JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN in 1954 led to a U.S.-sponsored invasion of the country and restoration of the old order but also initiated a guerrilla war that was still being fought in 1977 (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). At the same time, El Salvador and Nicaragua engaged in vicious guerrilla conflicts. When the military reversed the outcome of the February 22, 1972, presidential election reportedly won by a reformist Christian Democrat, JOSÉ NAPOLEÓN DUARTE, many Salvadorans became convinced that the existing system would not permit legitimate political change and concomitant socioeconomic improvement for all. The devastating earthquake on December 23, 1972, that leveled Managua, led to an outpouring of international aid, which ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE used to placate the military and elite rather than help the impoverished in Managua, who were most hard hit. In both cases, government opposition groups used these events to strengthen their positions. In El Salvador, the variety of opposition groups coalesced around the FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, or FMLN), and in



A street poster in San Salvador calling upon the Salvadoran army to immediately release captured revolutionary supporters (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

Nicaragua, the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, or FSLN). In addition, throughout the 1970s, the Guatemalan military conducted a brutal campaign to rid the country of several guerrilla groups. Because these groups challenged the existing socioeconomic and political order, the local elites labeled them communists and, in 1981, found an ally in U.S. president Ronald R. Reagan.

A traditional cold warrior, Reagan and his administration viewed the conflict as a Soviet effort to extend communism into Central America via CUBA (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA). President Reagan asserted that a communist victory in Central America would spread to MEXICO and hence threaten the United States. Reagan also wanted to restore U.S. global prestige, which he claimed had been greatly tarnished by his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. Initially, the Reagan team believed that a clandestine Central Intelligence Agency operation could topple the Sandinista regime, which had come to power in July 1979 in Nicaragua, and sufficiently strengthen the Salvadoran military to crush the FMLN. The U.S. arranged for the Argentine military to train the Nicaraguan resistance, known as the Contras, in Honduras, from where they would return home to destroy the country's infrastructure and croplands. In 1981, Reagan also asked for and received from Congress

increased military aid for the Salvadoran military to meet the challenges of guerrilla warfare. Guatemala, which did not want a U.S. presence in its battle against the guerrillas, received U.S. military assistance under the guise of battling drug trafficking. Honduras became the storage depot for U.S. military supplies and a training ground for the antiguerrilla forces. The vastness of the effort contributed to its exposure.

The Central American wars touched off debates within the United States and the international community. Those critical of the Reagan policy pointed to the historical internal dynamics of the region that had resulted in socioeconomic disparities and elitist rule. In other words, these guerrilla groups were legitimate movements to correct long-standing ills. The academic community and members of the Democratic Party were among the leading U.S. critics, and they found support from Latin American governments such as BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, Mexico, PANAMA, and VENEZUELA, as well as European governments and socialist parties in Germany, France, and Spain. The Reagan administration justified the 1983 invasion of GRENADA as further proof of Soviet-Cuban expansion in the Caribbean Basin. Rather than win converts to his cause, the invasion intensified the debate over President Reagan's policies in the Caribbean.

The debate's ebb and flow was reflected in congressional support for the war. The December 1982 Boland Amendment forbade the administration from providing any kind of military advice or assistance intended for the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Sandinista government or to provoke a conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras. However, when FSLN leader and head of the Nicaraguan government DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA visited Moscow in 1985, the U.S. Congress appropriated \$27 million for nonlethal aid to the Contras and a year later, in 1986, with evidence of increased Soviet assistance to Nicaragua, appropriated \$100 million in military aid for the Contras. In addition, members of the Reagan administration arranged for clandestine military assistance to the Contras from ARGENTINA, Brunei, Israel, Taiwan, and private U.S. sources.

On the ground in Central America, it became clear that the Contras could not depose of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua or that the military could eliminate the guerrilla movement in El Salvador. Central American leadership also became nervous. In 1983, Costa Rican president Louis Alberto Monge (b. 1925–) declared his country's neutrality in the conflict. In 1986 and 1987, the Honduran government of President José Azcona Hoyo (b. 1927–d. 2005), concerned with a possible Nicaraguan invasion to rout the Contras, distanced itself from the United States. Also, in 1986, the Guatemalans elected their first civilian president in 15 years, Vinicio Cerezo (b. 1942–), who preferred to focus on domestic human rights issues and the presence of the military in politics rather than pursue alleged communist guerrillas in the countryside.

Amid these cross-currents, the Central Americans settled their own conflict. On August 7, 1987, they accepted a plan that had been put in motion by Costa Rican president OSCAR ARIAS SÁNCHEZ that February. It provided for a cease-fire within 90 days, cut off arms supplies to insurgent groups, granted amnesty to combatants who laid down their arms, restituted civil rights, and established commissions of national reconciliation in each of the five republics. Each nation had its own motivation for accepting the peace program. The Sandinistas solidified their position in Nicaragua. The arms cutoff would end El Salvador's guerrilla conflict. Cerezo could now place greater emphasis on limiting the military presence in Guatemalan politics. Honduras would be secure from a Nicaraguan attack and thus reduce the strain on Costa Rica's social safety net from refugees escaping the conflict to the north. The agreement provided the U.S. Congress with the opportunity to momentarily cut military assistance to Central American countries. The final peace accords were signed at the old United Fruit Company compound at Tela, Honduras, on August 7, 1989.

These conflicts took a heavy toll on Central America. Uncounted thousands of civilians (some estimate as many as 200,000) lost their lives, while others remain unaccounted for. Families were disrupted, and thousands of children were orphaned. The national infrastructures of El Salvador and Nicaragua lay in ruins. Costa Rica's generous social system teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. During the 10-year period of the conflicts, 1980–90, the Nicaraguan gross domestic product declined by 43 percent; El Salvador's, 19 percent; Honduras's, 14 percent; and Costa Rica's, 4.7 percent.

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Chaco War (1932–1935) The Chaco War was fought between BOLIVIA and PARAGUAY between 1932 and 1935 over the area officially known as the Chaco Boreal, a 100,000-square-mile (259,000-km²) region that borders the two nations and over which each historically claimed sovereignty. The territory is a vast scrubland that is rich in the quebracho, a hardwood tree and source of tannin. A portion of the Paraguay River forms its western boundary, and after the loss of its Pacific coast in the War of the Pacific (1879–83), Bolivia desired control of

the Chaco to ensure it had water access to the Atlantic Ocean. Paraguay earned important foreign exchange through the exportation of quebracho bark and cattle hides from the Chaco. Tensions over the region intensified after World War I, when rumors of oil deposits in the region arose.

Border skirmishes had long plagued the northern Chaco boundary, but it was a 22-day siege of Fort Boquerón by an estimated 14,000 Paraguayans (against 600 Bolivian occupants who surrendered on September 29, 1932) that ignited a three-year war between the two nations. Although each side had long prepared for a conflict, their plans ignored the physical and climatic realities of the Chaco. Logistical support became a nightmare, and the dehydration of troops, overwhelming. Bolivia's strategy was significantly hampered by conflicts between President Daniel Salamanca (b. 1879–d. 1935) and the MILITARY command staff, which worsened as the war progressed. In contrast, Paraguayan president Eusebio Ayala (b. 1888–d. 1942) permitted General José Estigarribia (b. 1888–d. 1940) to prosecute the war as he saw fit and in the process become a war hero.

Following the Bolivian surrender at Fort Boquerón in September 1932, Paraguayan forces went on the offensive, driving the Bolivians from the central Chaco and forcing their retreat to their homeland. By early 1935, Estigarribia's forces had captured almost the entire disputed Chaco region and placed the Bolivian town of Villa Montes under siege but in the process overextended their lines. By this time, both sides were physically exhausted, and their treasuries, bankrupt. A cease-fire was declared on June 12, 1935. Total casualties approximated 100,000.

The war also produced some notables. The Bolivians used three Vickers six-ton tanks in the first-ever cross-border armored warfare in the Western Hemisphere, but these were ill suited to the Chaco's terrain and became easy prey for Paraguay's forces. The war also was the first instance of hemispheric air combat, with both sides using outdated, single-engine biplane bombers. Despite a League of Nations embargo, Bolivia purchased German-made Junkers Ju 86 and had their U.S.-made Curtiss C-20 Condors intercepted by PERU. Both models were twin-engine bombers. The Paraguayans capitalized on the native Guaraní language to radio-broadcast military instructions, knowing the Bolivians did not understand the language. They also used trained pigs to transmit handwritten messages between battle groups.

The inter-American system was also put to test during the Chaco War. A 1929 protocol for arbitration had established the Washington Commission of Neutrals (COLOMBIA, CUBA, MEXICO, United States, and URUGUAY) to mediate disputes such as the Chaco, but Bolivia and Paraguay shrugged off the commission's August 2, 1932, call for arbitration of their dispute and announcement that any territory taken by force would not be recognized. The League of Nations offered to fill the void,

which delegates to the Seventh International Conference of American States meeting in Montevideo December 3–26, 1933, agreed to on December 24. The League of Nations appointed a commission consisting of representatives from France, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico, and Spain, whose proposed peace treaty was rejected on May 12, 1934. The League then imposed an arms embargo on Bolivia and Paraguay and appointed a neutral commission of six nations (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, PERU, the United States, and, subsequently, URUGUAY) to supervise demobilization of the two sides. Although Bolivia was receptive to the plan, it prompted Paraguay to withdraw from the League of Nations on February 25, 1935. The League then gave the South American countries until May 20 to diplomatically bring the conflict to an end under the threat of the application of further sanctions. The six American nations convened a conference on the Chaco in BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, that resulted in the peace protocol of June 12, 1935. It was ratified by Bolivia and Paraguay on June 21, and demobilization was completed by October 20. Nevertheless, the disputants could not agree on a territorial settlement.

During the next three years, 18 negotiating sessions of the Chaco Peace Conference were held until the July 21, 1938, signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries, with the proviso that the Chaco boundary be determined by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Their decision, announced on October 10, 1938, awarded the Chaco region to Paraguay, the war's victor. The decision put to rest the nonrecognition principle of the August 3, 1932, declaration by the Latin American Commission of Neutrals that land seized by force would not receive legal status. The settlement also made a sham of the League of Nations and the OAS inter-American mediation efforts. Hemispheric confidence in the inter-American security system reached a new low.

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Chamorro, Violeta Barrios de (b. 1929–) *president of Nicaragua* Born in Rivas, NICARAGUA, into a wealthy landowning and Conservative family, Violeta Barrios attended Catholic schools. In 1950, she married newspaperman and harsh critic of the Somoza regime, PEDRO JOAQUÍN CHAMORRO CARDENAL, and together they had two children.

Although Violeta Chamorro, as she is popularly known, supported her husband's attacks on the corruption and tyranny of the Somoza regime, she did not come to the forefront until after her husband's assassination in 1978. Following his death, she took over the editorship of his newspaper, *La Prensa*, and assumed his leadership role



A campaign poster for National Opposition Union presidential candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and her vice presidential running mate, Virgilio Reyes Godoy. They won the election on February 4, 1990, which brought to an end 12 years of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

in the middle-class opposition to the government. After the overthrow of ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE in July 1979, Chamorro served as a member of the interim Junta of National Reconstruction but in April 1980 resigned from the post because of the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT's (FSLN) dominance of the government and its policies. During the 1980s, Chamorro used *La Prensa* to criticize the Sandinista government and its leader, DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA. Chamorro supported the U.S.-funded Contras against the FSLN (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS). The government censored *La Prensa* by withholding newsprint and forcing the deletion of stories and editorials critical of it. Reportedly, secret U.S. assistance kept the newspaper financially solvent.

The 1989 peace accord that brought the Central American wars of the 1980s to a conclusion also paved the way for elections in Nicaragua in February 1990. Chamorro headed the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora, or UNO), a 14-party coalition that defeated FSLN leader Ortega, with 55 percent of the vote. Although the United States heavily supported her campaign, Chamorro distanced herself from Washington, D.C., as a practical matter in war-torn Nicaragua. During her tenure, Chamorro often worked with the leftist FSLN to achieve legislative success, something that angered her conservative supporters. Government appointments were made on the basis of competency, not political affiliation. Through a national reconciliation program, Chamorro brought a sense of calm to a nation torn apart by war. She placed more than 5 million acres (2 million ha) of Caribbean coastal lands under government protection. The government collected

weapons and burned them. The size of the MILITARY was greatly reduced, although its leadership remained under the control of FSLN general Humberto Ortega (b. 1951–).

Like other leaders in Latin America, Chamorro accepted the neoliberal economic model but during her administration brought little benefit to Nicaragua. In particular, the quality of life for the poor did not improve. Chamorro directed the devaluation of the currency, the cordoba, and had wages lowered by 25 percent to bring runaway inflation under control. The threat of political instability and an inept justice system discouraged foreign investors from pursuing projects in Nicaragua.

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Chamorro Cardenal, Pedro Joaquín (b. 1924–d. 1978) *journalist and newspaper editor in Nicaragua* Born into a prominent Conservative family in Granada that had produced four Nicaraguan presidents, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal would come to be one of the country's most outspoken critics of the Somoza family regime. He was married to VIOLETA BARRIOS DE CHAMORRO, herself a future president, and together they had four children.

While still a law student in 1944, Chamorro was jailed for making a speech during a demonstration against President ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA. Subsequently, Chamorro fled to MEXICO, where he remained for two years. Upon his return to NICARAGUA in 1948, he went to work for *La Prensa*, the Managua newspaper his father, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Zelaya, had founded in 1926. Upon his father's death in 1952, Chamorro assumed the paper's editorship. For the next 26 years, *La Prensa* became the leading media critic of the Somozas, railing against their political intrigue, treatment of political opponents, rigged elections, nepotism, corruption and graft, and control over the ECONOMY. For this, *La Prensa* was often censored but never shut down. During the regime of ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE, *La Prensa* often appeared with few columns on its front page and occasionally a blank front page due to government censorship.

Chamorro also participated in several efforts to oust the Somozas by force. In 1948, he founded the short-lived National Union of Popular Action and Justice. He took part in the 1954 attempt to overthrow the elder Somoza, and in 1959, he participated in a Costa Rican-based invasion of Nicaragua for the same purpose. Chamorro paid dearly for his many anti-Somoza activities. He was often jailed and tortured.

Chamorro drew international attention to the wrongs of the Somoza dynasty following the 1972 earthquake that destroyed the capital of Managua and the subsequent corruption by President Somoza and his National Guard in the distribution and misuse of the international aid that poured into Nicaragua. He organized the Democratic Union for Liberation that brought together the middle-class groups opposed to Somoza. On January 10, 1978, Chamorro was gunned down while sitting in his car waiting for a red light to change. The Nicaraguan public dismissed Somoza's explanation that Pedro Ramos, a dissident Cuban American, whose business had come under attack by Chamorro, was responsible for the newspaperman's murder. Instead, *nicas* (people from Nicaragua) looked to Somoza himself as the culprit. An estimated 30,000 people attended Chamorro's funeral, testimony to both him and the country's displeasure with Somoza. A year later, in 1979, Somoza fled Nicaragua and eventually to his own bloody death in Asunción, PARAGUAY. Thirteen years later, on February 25, 1990, Chamorro's wife, Violeta, was elected president of Nicaragua.

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Chapultepec, Act of See ACT OF CHAPULTEPEC.

Charles, Mary Eugenia (b. 1919–d. 2005) *prime minister of Dominica* Born on May 15, 1919, in Pointe Michel, Saint Luke Parish, in DOMINICA, Mary Eugenia Charles was a member of the so-called colored bourgeoisie. She never married or had children. After attending Catholic schools in Dominica and GRENADA, Charles studied at the University College of the University of Toronto where she earned a B.A. in law in 1946. Charles subsequently pursued graduate studies in London. Returning to Dominica in 1949, she was the first female lawyer on the island. When the Dominica Labour Party (DLP) forcibly tried to limit dissent in 1968 by passing a series of sedition acts, she became active in politics. Charles was one of the founding members of the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) in 1968. In 1970, after failing to win an elected seat to the House of Assembly, she was granted an appointed seat. In 1975, she won the Roseau Central seat in the House of Assembly and became leader of the opposition. In 1977, Charles was a delegate to the constitutional convention held in London, which paved the way for Dominica's independence in 1978.

After the DFP won the 1980 parliamentary elections, Charles served as prime minister from July 21, 1980, to June 14, 1995. Charles was dedicated to rebuilding the island's infrastructure, which had been destroyed by Hurricane David in 1979. She also initiated economic reform programs. In 1981, Charles staved off an invasion of Dominica launched by former prime minister Patrick John (b. 1938–), who had secured the assistance of the Ku Klux Klan. Fearful of the growing influence of socialism in the Caribbean, Charles strongly supported the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in 1983. As chairman of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, she appeared on television with U.S. president Ronald Reagan to support U.S. policy. Because of her strong will, journalists quickly dubbed Charles the "Iron Lady of the Caribbean," an obvious reference to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher.

Although Charles encouraged tourism, she was determined to protect Dominica's ecology and national identity. In 1991, she was awarded a damehood by Queen Elizabeth II. Charles retired from politics in 1995 shortly before her party lost the parliamentary elections to Edison James (b. 1943–), the leader of the Dominica United Workers Party (DUWP). Charles Savarin (b. 1943–) was chosen to lead the DFP after Charles's retirement. Immediately following the 1995 elections, Charles took a 10-day cruise in Alaska and enrolled as a student at the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies. In a surprise move following the 2000 elections, Savarin allied the DFP with the DLP, which gave the DLP enough votes to form a coalition government. Although Charles continued to take an interest in politics, her mind gradually faded. On August 27, 2005, she fell at home and broke her left hip. Charles was flown to Martinique for hip replacement surgery on August 30. She died there from complications on September 6, 2005.

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Chávez Frías, Hugo Rafael (b. 1954–) *president of Venezuela* The second son of schoolteachers in Sabaneta, VENEZUELA, Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías is of mixed Amerindian, Afro-Venezuelan, and Spanish descent. He attended primary school and high school in Barinas before entering the Venezuelan Military Academy in 1971. Chávez graduated four years later as a sublieutenant and subsequently pursued graduate studies at Simón Bolívar University, where he was attracted to the Liberator's vision of Latin American unity and to

the communist ideas of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. During his 17-year MILITARY career, Chávez rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel, held several staff and command positions, and taught at the Military Academy, where he spoke out against the shortcomings of the Venezuelan government, particularly the corrupt administration of CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ. Chávez sprang to national attention on February 4, 1992, when he led five army units into CARACAS in a failed attempt to overthrow Pérez. For his coup attempt, Chávez was sentenced to two years in jail.

In 1997, Chávez organized the Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento V [Quinta] República, or MVR) and as its candidate captured the December 6, 1998, presidential elections. Despite pledges to tear down the old order and eradicate government corruption, reform the public sector, and expand economic and social opportunities for the poor, Chávez initially focused on usurping political power. He dismissed the bicameral Congress, then initiated a constituent congress that wrote a new constitution providing all Venezuelans with the right to EDUCATION, housing, health care, and other social benefits while also increasing his own power as president. The constitution also provided for new elections on July 30, 2000, which returned Chávez to the presidency for a new six-year term.

The MVR gained control of the new unicameral legislature (National Assembly) in the elections and on November 7, 2000, the legislature approved an act that permitted the president to rule by decree for one year. Chávez issued 49 decrees during that time, which among other things established the national business federation Fedecámaras, the government-supervised Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), and the Hydrocarbons Law, which increased the price band for a barrel of oil from \$22 to \$28. The increased government income that resulted from these acts enabled Chávez to reach out to his base support group—the poor—through programs to lower the infant mortality rate, implement a free government health program, and provide free education through university level. During the same time period, the ECONOMY grew at a steady 4 percent annual rate, and inflation was brought down to 12 percent per year, the lowest rate since 1986.

Opposition to Chávez surfaced immediately after he took office on January 10, 2001. Upper- and middle-sector Venezuelans chafed at the concentration of power in the presidency, the intimidation tactics and civil rights violations Chávez used to silence his critics, and his economic and social policies. Organized LABOR, particularly in the petroleum INDUSTRY, vehemently objected to coming under government control. On December 10, 2001, a general business and labor strike failed to persuade Chávez to engage in dialogue on his policies. The protests continued until April 11, 2002, when a combination of military, business, and media sectors forced Chávez to resign. A countercoup led by loyal military officers 47

hours later restored him to power. Chávez charged that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had assisted in the coup, an assertion denied by the CIA and the U.S. State Department.

Sporadic protests against Chávez continued until December 2, 2002, when the management of the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), withheld oil revenue from the government and all workers in the oil industry went on strike, shutting down all oil operations. When the shutdown ended on February 17, 2003, Chávez dismissed approximately 18,000 PDVSA managers and workers and tightened government control over its administration. At the same time, Chávez reached out to the poor, instituting an adult reading program for an estimated 1.5 million illiterate Venezuelans, a remedial program to enable an estimated 5 million high school dropouts to earn their diplomas, and programs for the protection of indigenous culture, RELIGION, and civil rights.

Still undeterred, the opposition to Chávez continued for the next two years. During 2003–04, a volunteer group collected 2.4 million signatures, more than double the number required, to activate the presidential recall provisions contained in the 1999 constitution. An international supervisory committee monitored the August 15, 2004, referendum in which 59 percent of voters called for Chávez to remain in office. Following the referendum, Chávez continued his socioeconomic programs for the poor but placed new emphasis on foreign policy.

Always a critic of U.S. presence in Latin America, Chávez's rhetoric now increased in vehemence, best illustrated by the personal attack on U.S. president George W. Bush before the United Nations on September 20, 2006. Chávez also visited several foreign countries critical of U.S. policies, including Iran. He denounced the U.S.-proposed FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS and in its



Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (*left*) and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva share thoughts on issues common to both nations: the need for social reforms, the control of foreign investments, and limiting U.S. influence in South America. (AP Photo/Eraldo Peres)

place, on December 14, 2004, announced the launching, in cooperation with CUBA, of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas. To curtail dependency on U.S. military assistance, he began to purchase arms from BRAZIL, Russia, China, and Spain. By April 30, 2007, Chávez had withdrawn Venezuela from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, denouncing them as instruments of U.S. imperialism. His anti-American policy directives have not improved his standing in Latin America, where opinion polls indicate that only 25 percent of people support him.

Chávez nevertheless remained popular at home, receiving 63 percent of the vote in the internationally supervised presidential election of December 3, 2006. His hand was further strengthened when the compliant legislature extended his right to rule by decree for 18 months. On November 2, 2007, the legislature approved 69 amendments to the 1999 constitution that would push Venezuela further toward a socialist state and enhance Chávez's power over the country. Following congressional approval of the measures, they were submitted to the Venezuelan public. The measures were narrowly defeated in a national referendum on December 2, 2007, in which 44 percent of the eligible voters abstained from participation.

With his political ambitions stymied, at least momentarily by the December 2nd referendum, Chávez's domestic social policies were slowed by the 2008–09 global recession that resulted in a decreased demand for petroleum and its products and concomitantly less government income. But these political and economic adversities did not prevent Chávez from continuing his verbal assaults on the United States and taking international actions—continuing friendship with the Castros in Cuba, claiming to be an ally of Iran, hosting a Soviet naval visit—that further distanced Venezuela from the United States.

See also BOLÍVAR, SIMÓN (Vol. II).

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Chicago Boys The Chicago Boys were a group of 30 Chilean economists who studied at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman (b. 1912–d. 2006) and Arnold Harberger (b. 1924–) during the late 1950s and early 1960s. They returned home to train a generation of Chilean economists at the Universidad Católica

and to implement their economic philosophy during the regime of AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE. Economists from other Latin American countries—ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, COSTA RICA, MEXICO, and URUGUAY—also advocated the implementation of a free market ECONOMY, but none had the opportunity to influence government policy as the Chicago Boys did in CHILE. Neoliberal policy came into vogue throughout the developing world during the 1980s. It advocated an end to government interference in the economy, free and open markets, and privatization of state-owned and parastatal (semiprivate) industries. The unfettered principles of supply and demand would dictate the market, and these changes would ultimately lower inflation and increase employment. Starting in spring 1975, the Chicago Boys implemented their program in Chile. The money supply was contracted, government spending was drastically curtailed, and all but 27 state-owned industries were privatized, as were services, including social security. The market was deregulated and open to free TRADE, and wage demands were contained.

Ever since Pinochet left office in 1989, economists have debated the effectiveness of the program. Supporters point to the expansion and diversification of the Chilean economy owing to extensive foreign investment, the precipitous drop in inflation, and low unemployment. Critics point to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, the loss of profits to foreign countries, the loss of a government social safety net, and LABOR's inability to improve wages and the quality of life for workers.

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Chile Chile is located on South America's southwest coast. It stretches 2,600 miles (4,184 km) north to south but is no more than 264 miles (425 km) wide at its deepest point from the Pacific coast to the border with ARGENTINA in the Andes. PERU lies directly to the country's north and BOLIVIA to its northwest. Totalling 292,183 square miles (756,750.5 km²), including Easter Island and Isla Sala y Gómez, Chile is not quite twice the size of the U.S. state of Montana. As the world's 38th largest country, it is comparable in size to the African nation of Zambia. Chile has five distinct geographic regions. The northern Atacama Desert is rich in natural resources, particularly nitrates and copper. The small Central Valley is the nation's agricultural center. Southern Chile is rich in forests and grazing lands and features a string of volcanoes and lakes, while the southern coast is a collection of fjords, twisting peninsulas, inlets, and lakes. The Andes Mountains form Chile's eastern boundary. Chile also claims 482,628 square miles (776,714 km²) of territory in Antarctica. Of Chile's 16.3 million inhabitants, 95 percent are white, 3 percent are Amerindian, and 2 percent are identified as "other."

Nearly one-half of all Chileans live in the Central Valley, which includes the capital of SANTIAGO DE CHILE and the country's main seaport at Valparaiso.

FROM COLONY TO NATION

The Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan discovered Chile's southern tip in 1520 when attempting to circumnavigate the globe, but it was the Spanish conquistador Diego de Almagro who came south into the Central Valley in 1535. Although Almagro did not find the gold he sought, he discovered hundreds of Mapuche villages. Over the next 125 years, the Spaniards expanded their control over present-day Chile, and in the process, Mapuche and other NATIVE AMERICAN societies were driven farther north and south from the Central Valley. In 1542, Chile became part of the Viceroyalty of Peru administrative unit. The fertile lands of central Chile produced foodstuffs that found their way into marketplaces in Peru and ECUADOR and in the 1840s and 1850s in California.

Chile became an independent nation on February 12, 1818, under the leadership of Bernardo O'Higgins, but independence did not alter the country's sociopolitical structure. The 1833 conservative constitution established a centralized government directed by the Central Valley's wealthy landowners. Like other Latin American nations in the 1870s and 1880s, Chile adopted a liberal political philosophy. Presidents could no longer serve two consecutive terms, cabinet ministers became accountable to Congress, all literate males over age 25 received the right to vote, non-Catholics received the right to establish churches and schools, and the federal government replaced the CATHOLIC CHURCH as the keeper of vital statistics. The primacy of Congress over executive power was reaffirmed in the 1891 civil war. During the same time period, Chile developed an export-based ECONOMY that focused first on nitrates and subsequently copper, two primary products the industrial world needed for its own development. Participation in the world economy also saw a new player enter Chilean politics, this being urban LABOR.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXPORT-BASED ECONOMY

Nitrates had long been important in the production of fertilizers and gun powder and other explosives. Chile's northern nitrate fields were enhanced by its success in the War of the Pacific (1879–83), through which it acquired additional nitrate-rich territories from Bolivia and Peru. Foreign investors, for the most part British, developed not only the nitrate mines but also the supportive infrastructure, including railroads to get the product to port. The demand for Chilean nitrates intensified with expanded AGRICULTURE, urban construction and its ancillary needs, and the warfare that culminated in World War I (1914–19). The invention of synthetic nitrates in the 1920s and the global depression in the

1930s led to a permanent decline in demand for Chilean nitrates. Copper MINING had a more lasting impact on the country. Although copper mining could be traced to pre-Columbian times, global demand for the metal coincided with new mining technology in the early 20th century that made the Chilean copper more accessible. Its primacy in the Chilean economy lasted well into the post-World War II years. Foreign investors, this time from the United States, developed the copper and ancillary industries. By the 1920s, three U.S.-owned companies—Andes Copper, Braden Copper, and the Chile Exploration Company—dominated the INDUSTRY.

While the mining and TRANSPORTATION of nitrates and copper created jobs, these activities did not necessitate the importation of a foreign labor force, as they did in Argentina, for example. Whereas Argentina's percentage of foreign-born workers approached 28 percent in 1914, only 3 percent of Chile's labor force at that time was foreign born. Nonetheless, Chile experienced labor strife. Labor organizations and demonstrations could be traced to the late 1880s, but not until 1905 did these confrontations involve the MILITARY. Violence and bloodshed erupted in the northern city of Iquique in 1907 when troops fired into crowds of striking workers. The violence was repeated in Santiago in 1910, in Puerto Nogales in 1919, and at Magellanes in 1920. During 1919, Santiago faced a series of prolabor rallies that brought out as many as 100,000 protesters. These demonstrations represented a momentary high-water mark in the Chilean labor movement. The government attempted to counter labor's demands with a series of laws. For example, in 1916, Congress approved a workmen's compensation law; in 1917, an employee's liability law; and in 1919, a retirement system for railroad workers. A 1919 executive order known as the Yáñez Decree granted the president authority to mediate labor disputes. He did so over the next two years, usually in favor of the workers. By the end of 1921, however, President Arturo Alessandri (b. 1868–d. 1954) had begun ruling in favor of employers. His 1924 proposal for legislation granting the government control over labor became a victim of the conservative-liberal struggle that characterized congressional politics and led to military intervention in the national political arena between September 1924 and March 1925. The same conflict led to the presidency of Colonel CARLOS IBÁÑEZ DEL CAMPO, who manipulated the political system to rule as a dictator from 1927 to 1931.

The global demand for nitrate and copper decreased until the world economy collapsed in 1929. At this time, labor unions also lost their leverage, the wealth of the Chilean government disappeared, and in 1931, the tenure of the Ibáñez presidency came to an end. The evolution of Chilean politics between 1930 and 1973 can be found in many provisions of the 1925 constitution. It reduced congressional authority over cabinet members by denying Congress the right to depose of cabinet members through a censure vote and by preventing a person from

simultaneously serving as a minister and a member of the national legislature. The president and cabinet became responsible for making annual budgets and directing their spending. The electoral base expanded significantly with the granting of voting rights to all literate males over the age of 21 (a 1949 amendment extended this right to women). The government would henceforth also ensure the protection of labor and industry and guarantee each citizen “a minimum of well-being.” Government would continue to protect private property rights but in accordance with social need. These last provisos were considered advanced by many social analysts at the time. They also set the groundwork for later debate about government-sponsored social welfare programs, although they ultimately fell victim to the new provision for proportional representation of POLITICAL PARTIES in the national legislature. Within Chile’s emerging multiparty system, it would be extremely difficult for any one party to gain control over one-third of the legislature and, hence, enforce its will. Rather, political coalitions, increasingly composed of diverse interest groups, came to characterize Chile’s political landscape. Increasingly, between 1930 and 1970, Chilean politics moved to the left. The dominant Conservative and Liberal Parties dated to the country’s independence in 1818. Representing the elite, the only argument that remained between them concerned the powers of a centralized government. Of most importance to both groups was their retention of political power, particularly in relation to labor groups. In 1966, they merged into the Nationalist Party.

THE FRAMEWORK OF CHILEAN POLITICS

The Radical Party was the first to challenge Conservative-Liberal dominance in Chile. Founded in 1857, many of its leaders came from the Liberal Party and from the emerging nitrate-mining elite to oppose authoritarian government and call for a secular state. In the 20th century, the Radicals called for state-sponsored welfare programs to end national poverty, which brought them into competition with Chile’s first middle-sector party, the Democratic Party, which emerged in 1887. Considered to be right of the political center, the Democratic Party brought together Santiago’s artisans, small merchants, and skilled laborers to successfully protest a proposed tariff increase on Argentine beef. Thereafter, the party called for laws that would aid workers and for compulsory free EDUCATION and the implementation of democratic procedures in elections. It reached its zenith in the 1932 congressional election, when 13 of its candidates won seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Thereafter, it gradually disappeared from the political arena, its ideas on behalf of labor being absorbed by the Socialist Worker’s Party, which in turn melded with the Popular Action Party in 1957. In the 1930s, there were two other leftist parties: the Communists and the Socialists, each an anathema to the far right and the more centrist moderate parties. In the center was the Christian Democratic Party

(Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or PDC), founded by a group of university students who offered themselves as a viable alternative to the extreme right and extreme left. The PDC advocated that social justice for all Chileans could be attained without sacrificing the constitutional government. In other words, it presented itself as a reasonable alternative to the extremism found on both sides in Chilean politics. In the 1930s and 1940s, all of these parties competed not only in the political arena but also in the effort to organize and lead labor unions.

The movement to the political left was seen in the three presidential elections beginning in 1939, each of which was won by the Popular Front candidate. When founded in 1938, the Popular Front brought together the Confederation of Chilean Workers and the Communist, Democratic, Radical, and Socialist Parties. The Radicals were, in fact, the least radical of these groups, being more concerned with internal and infrastructure development as a means to national prosperity than the communist-socialist call for government control of the economy. The three successive presidents—Pedro Aguirre Cerda (b. 1879–d. 1941), elected in 1939; Juan Antonio Ríos (b. 1888–d. 1946), elected in 1942; and Gabriel González Videla (b. 1898–d. 1980), elected in 1946—all were originally members of the Radical Party. World War II shaped the course of Chilean politics from 1939 to 1945. The Chilean economy benefited from the uptick in global, and particularly Allied, demand for copper. Increased employment contributed to greater purchasing power, while export taxes on copper contributed to a marked increase in government revenues. Fears that the Japanese might take advantage of Chile’s long and undefended coastline, coupled with concerns about the intentions of Germans residing in the country, led the government to take a neutral position in the war until January 19, 1943. Chile’s refusal to crack down on German and Japanese espionage activities in the country brought U.S. condemnation. Historically, Chilean political right and centrist groups mistrusted communists and socialists, therefore avoiding political confrontations. That changed in 1943 when Moscow directed Communist parties abroad henceforth to work within existing political systems by connecting to popular causes. After World War II, the international struggle against global communism further intensified the pressure on Chile’s political left. Because he captured the 1946 presidential race with Communist support, President Videla appointed three of its party members to cabinet posts. As international anticommunist rhetoric intensified during the cold war, Videla turned on the Communists. He ordered their dismissal from all government positions. Finally, in 1948, the rightists and centrists came together to approve legislation that outlawed the Communist Party and banned its members from seeking public office.

From 1952 to 1964, Chile was presided over by two presidents from the political right: former president

Ibáñez and Jorge Alessandri (b. 1896–d. 1986), a son of the former president. Their acceptance of International Monetary Fund financial programs to stabilize the national currency and bring inflation under control also required cuts in government spending, which hit the lower socioeconomic sectors the hardest; the cost of public transportation increased, as did the cost of public utilities (electricity, heat, water, sewerage), for example. These hardships drove the underclass further to the political left; they came to support the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular, or FRAP) and its chief spokesman and self-professed Marxist SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS. When the younger Alessandri took office in 1958, he fell victim to the proportional representation scheme devised by his father. During his administration, Congress was hopelessly deadlocked. The shortcomings of economic orthodoxy and political stagnation were worsened by the influx of rural people to urban centers that offered few employment opportunities and inadequate housing, schools, and medical care. Their political power could be measured by the fivefold increase in voter registration, to 2.5 million people from 1938 to 1964.

FROM SOCIAL DEMOCRACY TO COMMUNISM

The 1964 Chilean presidential election stood not only as a high point in the nation's history but also as a measuring stick of the free world's battle against communism. The FRAP again nominated Allende as its candidate, while the PDC put forward EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA. As an avowed Marxist, Allende promised an all-out attack on capitalism. In contrast, Frei spoke of reforming rather than destroying the capitalist system. For the United States, already stung by the success of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ in CUBA, a Marxist victory in Chile was unacceptable. It openly supported Frei's candidacy and through the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) clandestinely paid 50 percent of his campaign costs. Frei won the September 4, 1964, elections with 56 percent of the vote; Allende received 39 percent. From the Chilean people, Frei received a mandate to bring about change. At the moment, most observers failed to recognize that the PDC did not have command of the legislature.

Frei began his presidency by fulfilling two of his campaign promises. The first was the nationalization, or "Chileanization," of the copper companies. In November 1965, the Chilean government purchased 25 percent of the Anaconda and 51 percent of Kennecott copper companies. Ultimately, the profits from these investments would be used to pay for housing and social programs, but in the meantime, they paid for the purchase of the companies themselves. Over the next five years, however, global demand for copper stagnated, making it difficult for the government to sell copper at a profit. Second, Frei had promised to distribute arable farmland to 100,000 Chilean families over the course of his presidency. Only about 20,000 families actually benefited from the program, however, as landowners were reluctant to sell

portions of their land and peasants were reluctant to purchase land, partly because they distrusted banks, which they were not familiar with. The Frei administration also received some \$500 million from the UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT to support the construction of housing, schools, medical clinics, and the like, along with the supporting infrastructure. The administration fell victim to the national congress, however, which had fractured into several political parties. The failure of Frei's programs, no matter the political dynamics, contributed to his lower approval ratings in the late 1960s, which, in turn brightened Allende's presidential prospects.

Allende captured the September 4, 1970, presidential elections with only 36.3 percent of the popular vote. Conservative Jorge Alessandri received 34.9 percent, and Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomić (b. 1914–d. 1992), 27.8 percent. At the time, many observers believed that the Chilean military would not permit a communist to assume the presidency, and indeed, some Chilean military officers had planned "preventative action." The military ultimately decided not to act, and Allende took office on November 3, 1970. He immediately froze prices and increased wages. While the nation went on a buying spree, merchants and producers held back stock, awaiting an end to the price controls. Allende went on to nationalize the U.S.-owned copper companies, W. R. Grace, Ford Motor Company, International Telephone & Telegraph, and others without compensation on the premise that they already had taken sufficient profits from the country. The government also took control of 60 percent of U.S.-owned banks. Chilean ownership, Allende and his advisers rationalized, would provide the government with the funds necessary to improve Chileans' quality of life. Allende apparently went too far in spring 1973, however, when he proposed abolishing the current congress and replacing it with a unicameral legislature whose composition would favor the urban working and underclass that formed the basis of his support. His proposal struck hard at the middle class, which cherished its own political participation. The proposal moved the military to act: On September 11, 1973, the military moved on the presidential offices in Santiago, and Allende lost his life shortly after making a radio address to the nation. Conventional wisdom maintains that Allende took his own life by gun, but others contend that he was shot by an advancing soldier.

Aside from the internal machinations that militated against the Allende regime were the actions of the United States. Richard M. Nixon's administration had severed trade relations with Chile immediately after Allende took office. At the time, the United States was Chile's biggest trading partner. The United States also used its power to prevent the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank from advancing loans and credits to Chile. When Allende turned to Eastern Europe for assistance, Nixon used that request, as he did Castro's 1971 visit to



Located in central Santiago, La Moneda is the working office for Chilean presidents. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

Chile, to label Allende an international Marxist. In the meantime, the CIA provided opposition groups with funding for antigovernment radio broadcasts and printed material and to subsidize strikers, particularly truck drivers, from bringing foodstuffs to Santiago.

COMING FULL CIRCLE: DEMOCRACY TRIUMPHS OVER MILITARISM

The military junta that succeeded Allende set out to dismantle Chile's political system. Congress was dissolved, the constitution was suspended, and political parties were made illegal. A state of siege was declared, a 9 P.M. curfew was imposed, and the media came under the junta's control. The government also took direct control of labor unions. During its 17-year existence, the junta violated human rights in its suppression of opposition, real or imagined. Estimates of people either killed or kidnapped and "disappeared" during that time period range from 3,000 to 10,000.

The junta took on a sense of permanency when its leader, General AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, declared on January 22, 1974, that the military would remain in power for at least five years. National plebiscites in 1978 and 1980 appeared to reflect public confidence in Pinochet and permitted him to remain in power until 1990. As the generals consolidated their power, they turned to a group of economic advisers, the so-called CHICAGO BOYS, to implement far-reaching economic changes. Made up of former students of Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger at the University of Chicago, this group adhered to the principles of a free market economy, free of government involvement. It fit within the neoliberal, or Washington Consensus, eco-

nomical model that gripped the world in the 1980s. Their policies reduced inflation from a 500 percent annual rate in 1973 to 10 percent in 1981 and contributed to an annual 7 percent economic growth rate. Latin America's 1982 financial crisis, caused by MEXICO's default on foreign debt, reversed Chile's progress and prompted Pinochet to install a new group of economic advisers, who took the reform measures to a new height. While new policies stimulated foreign investment, increased exports, and decreased unemployment, wages lagged and cuts in government social services left many Chileans without essentials. Despite these weaknesses, by 1988, the Chilean economy had recovered to the point where Pinochet was confident of winning another plebiscite that would again extend his term in office. Chileans, however, were not satisfied with his economic program. The needs of the poor, estimated at nearly 40 percent of the population, remained unmet. Small businesspeople had lost out to international conglomerates. Intellectuals, journalists, students, and working professionals lamented the loss of civil and human rights and wanted a return to democracy. On October 5, 1988, Chileans voted that Pinochet must go, and following a tense year of speculation regarding his future, he stepped aside after the December 14, 1989, presidential election, which was won by Patricio Aylwin (b. 1918–), a Christian Democrat, and part of the 17-party coalition known as Concertación. This left-of-center party has captured every presidential election since 1989: Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (b. 1942–), son of the former president, in 1994; Ricardo Lagos (b. 1938–), in 2000; and Michelle Bachelet (b. 1951–), in 2006, the latter being Chile's first woman president. Concertación

gained control of both houses of the national legislature in the December 11, 2005 elections.

Concertación continued the neoliberal economic policies throughout the 1990s that were credited with the high (7 percent) annual growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDP) through 1998, when factors beyond the government's control adversely affected the economy. The 1997 Asian financial crisis and a severe drought that limited agricultural production and exports and led to the rationing of electricity and a general economic slowdown caused the GDP to drop to about 3 percent through 2004, when a recovery began. In addition to a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, which went into effect in January 2004, Chile has FTAs with several other countries. Beginning in 2007, Chile expanded its trade with other Asian countries, which already accounts for 30.8 percent of Chile's exports. The EU takes in 24.4 percent, and the United States, 23.7 percent of Chilean exports.

Chile continues to enjoy a high standard of living and has a well-trained labor force but confronts a number of important economic and social issues. Chile's population is aging, which will present unique challenges in the future. For example, while the privatized national pension system accounts for approximately 21 percent of the domestic savings rate, critics point out that only 55 percent of workers participate in the program. Participants can withdraw, without penalty, unlimited funds for hous-

ing, higher education, and the like. Chile continues to enjoy an influx of foreign direct investment (FDI), which stood at \$3.4 billion in 2006, but 80 percent of this goes into only four sectors: electricity, gas, water, and mining. That year, most of the remainder went toward mergers and acquisitions, meaning little FDI contributed to job creation. In addition to addressing these issues, President Bachelet created a special study commission to determine new areas of economic development, while continuing to advocate the FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS.

On February 27, 2010, an 8.8 magnitude earthquake, followed by tsunami waves, struck south-central Chile, claiming more than 400 lives and hundreds more injured and missing. The Chilean government declared the epicenter region at Bio-Bio and Maule that includes the major port of Concepción "catastrophe zones." Initial estimates placed damage at \$15 to \$30 billion, or up to 20 percent of the Chilean GDP.

See also ALMAGRO, DIEGO DE (Vol. I); ARAUCANIANS (Vol. II); CHILE (Vols. I, II, III); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); MAGELLAN, FERDINAND (Vol. I); O'HIGGINS, BERNARDO (Vol. II).

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One of several pedestrian zones in Santiago de Chile, where shoppers may purchase consumer goods from around the world (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

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Chileanization See CHILE.

China and Latin America, People's Republic of Speaking before an audience of government and United Nations officials in SANTIAGO DE CHILE on April 6, 2001, China's president Jiang Zemin predicted that his country's friendship and economic links with Latin America would grow significantly in the 21st century. Jiang's highly publicized 13-day visit to Latin America was followed by equally high-profile visits by President Hu Jintao in November 2004 and Vice President Zeng Qinghong in March 2005. Although China's TRADE with Latin America stood at \$13.5 billion in 2001, just slightly above China's total trade with Africa, it represented a 10-fold increase since 1993.

China's interest in Latin America is motivated by the need for commodities to feed its booming ECONOMY. These include oil, iron, and other ores; soybeans and soybean oil; copper, iron, and steel; and integrated circuits and other electrical machinery. This need contributed to a 600 percent growth in China's imports, from \$3 billion in 1999 to \$21.7 billion in 2004, while Chinese exports grew from \$5.3 billion to \$8.4 billion over the same period, leaving China with a Latin American trade deficit. Chinese exports to Latin America include electrical appliances, woven and knitted apparel, computers, office and industrial machinery, and mineral fuels. China's major Latin American trading partners are ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXICO, and PERU. Despite these increases, Chinese imports from Latin America stood at 3.88 percent of its total global imports and 3.09 percent of its global exports in 2004.

Chinese global foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to \$33.2 billion in 2003, just 0.48 percent of

global FDI stock, with \$1.04 billion in Latin American extractive, manufacturing assembly, telecommunications, and textile industries. During his November 2004 visit, President Hu stated that China would invest \$100 billion in Latin America over the next 10 years, \$20 billion alone in Argentina. Some of the anticipated investment projects include railways in Argentina, a nickel plant in CUBA, a copper mine in Chile, and a steel mill in Brazil. Given the net decline in overall FDI in Latin America from \$78 billion to \$36 billion from 2000 to 2004, Chinese investments appear to be a welcome relief. In addition, China now permits its citizens to travel to Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Acquisition of energy resources is China's current main objective. In November 2004, China concluded a \$10-billion agreement to purchase Brazilian oil. Also, Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned energy company, and China's National Offshore Oil Company reportedly are exploring the feasibility of joint operations in exploration, refining, and pipeline construction around the world. During his visit to Beijing, Venezuelan president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS signed a series of energy-related agreements on January 29, 2005, that among other things, commits the China National Petroleum Corporation to spend more than \$400 million in developing Venezuelan oil and gas fields. China has also completed oil and gas contracts with Argentina, BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, and PERU.

Not all Latin American countries are pleased with the Chinese presence in the region. Mexico is the leading critic. Since the implementation of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT in 1994, China has viewed Mexico as the entry point to the United States for its goods. The Mexicans oppose this. They claim a loss in U.S. market share to China and believe that many Mexican assembly jobs have been relocated to China's cheap LABOR market. The fear of competition from Chinese apparel and textile exports significantly contributed to the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT with the United States in 2005. Within the region, Chinese companies are insular and do not interact with local businesses and services and have faced challenges from local labor unions regarding working conditions and wages. Opinion in the United States on China's expansion ranges from one of a potentially serious threat to little more than benign but limited competition.

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civil war of 1948, Costa Rica The 1948 civil war was a 44-day conflict that began after the February 8, 1948 presidential election. This election pitted National Republican Party (Partido Republicano Nacional, or PRN) candidate Rafael Calderón Guardia (b. 1900–d. 1970) against the unified opposition candidate, Otilio Ulate Blanco (b. 1891–d. 1973). As in the past, *personalismo*, rather than issues, dominated the campaign. The day of the election itself was uneventful. Ulate enjoyed a victory by a 54,931 to 44,398 count; however, charges of fraud and corruption sent the election results to the PRN-controlled congress, which declared the election null and void. Violence immediately broke out on the streets of San José, but more important, businessman and politician JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER gathered his forces, along with others who were disenchanted with the election results, in San Isidro del General on COSTA RICA's central plateau. On March 12, Ferrer struck against ill-prepared government troops, largely volunteers mustered by Communist leader MANUEL MORA VALVERDE, who had supported both president Calderón during his 1940–44 administration and President Teodoro Picado (b. 1900–d. 1960) from 1944 to 1948. Publicly, Figueres declared he was fighting to validate the February elections, but privately, he declared his actions were to rid Costa Rica of communist influence. After initial battles on March 13 and 14, Figueres appeared content to fight a war of attrition, as his troops remained at San Isidro until April 10. Within two days, they captured Altamiera, Puerto Limón, Cartago, and the government headquarters as San Isidro de Coronado. Picado and his cabinet resigned on April 12, leaving Mora and his forces to fight alone until the final capitulation on April 21. Picado and his cabinet were joined by Calderón and his followers in finding asylum in NICARAGUA, where they established a government in exile.

Figueres immediately established a ruling junta, which he controlled. He quickly froze the assets of all *calderonistas* and *picadistas* on the grounds that they had conducted corrupt administrations. The junta also dismissed all PLN government bureaucrats, university professors, and LABOR leaders. Figueres then declared that communists could not be dealt with like “normal” people and ordered the party offices and newspapers closed and the arrest, without charge, of the top 35 Communist Party leaders, including Mora. When the party itself was outlawed on July 17, Mora and his colleagues were released from jail and advised that any future “insurrectionist” activity would lead to a 10-year banishment from the country. U.S. ambassador Nathaniel P. Davis found Figueres's assault on communism ironic, given that his social philosophy paralleled that of Mora's.

Figueres also provided for the election of a constitutional convention, which began its work on September 8, 1948. The new constitution provided for the sanctification of social legislation, which subsequently prompted one U.S. diplomat to characterize Costa Rica as the “Switzerland of the Americas.”

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Colombia Colombia is South America's fourth largest country. Encompassing 440,000 square miles (1.13 million km²), it is about three times the size of the U.S. state of Montana. Colombia is bounded on the north by VENEZUELA, the northeast by the Caribbean Sea, the south by ECUADOR and PERU, and the east by BRAZIL. Of Colombia's 44.4 million people, 58 percent are mestizo; 20 percent, white; 18 percent, Afro-Colombian; and 12 percent, other. While grasslands characterize the coastal plains along the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, three mountain ranges dominate Colombia's interior and have adversely affected the country's political unity and economic development.

Some historians suggest that NATIVE AMERICANS inhabited the lands of present-day Colombia some 22,000 years ago. It is certain that Mesoamerican Indians arrived in the region about 1200 B.C.E. Their descendants resisted the Spanish thrust inland after Rodrigo de Bastidas established a foothold at Santa María in 1525 and Pedro de Heredia founded Cartagena in 1533. In 1538, BOGOTÁ was established, and in 1717, it became the capital of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, which included present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Although Colombia declared independence from Spain on July 20, 1810, it was not until August 7, 1819, that the Republic of Gran Colombia, which included all the territory of the colonial viceroyalty, was established. Owing to the individual nationalisms of three states, Gran Colombia split apart in 1830 to form the three independent nations of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. From the beginning of nationhood in 1830, Colombia experienced the liberal-conservative conflict that characterized Latin American politics elsewhere.

MODERN COLOMBIA

The end of the War of the Thousand Days (1899–1903) and the independence of PANAMA in 1903 mark the beginning of modern-day Colombia. The civil war ended in a Liberal defeat, cost an estimated 100,000 lives, and left the nation too weak to retain Panama, even if it so wished. The war also prompted Liberals and Conservatives to reconcile their differences, with the latter including members of the opposition in their governing regime. Conservative general RAFAEL REYES set the tone in 1904. He encouraged industrialization, the expansion of agricultural exports including coffee, and foreign investment and implemented fiscal policies that improved Colombia's global credit standing. Colombian nationalism, however, prevented its acceptance of the

1909 Root-Cortés agreement, under which it would have recognized Panama's independence. Colombia finally recognized Panama's independence in 1921. Reyes's policies began a period of economic prosperity that lasted until the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. They also led to the growth of cities, the movement of rural laborers to the cities, and a nascent LABOR movement that espoused European socialist ideas.

The depression exacerbated existing social problems, which in turn contributed to political change in 1930 with the election of the first Liberal Party president in the 20th century, Olaya Herrera (b. 1880–d. 1937), and began 15 consecutive years of Liberal administrations. The most significant president of the Liberal period was ALFONSO LÓPEZ PUMAREJO, who during his first term (1934–38) introduced many economic reforms that reflected the import substitution model and contributed to Colombia's industrial development and an increasing urban labor force and, concomitantly, to the formation of labor unions. The foreign markets for Colombian coffee were also expanded under López Pumarejo. This progress, however, came to an end with the outbreak of World War II, which closed the European markets and prevented the importation of the raw materials that were essential for the industrial base. López Pumarejo came under criticism when Colombia declared war on the Axis powers on November 20, 1943. His second term in office (1942–45) also coincided with the economic downturn that developed at the end of the war and contributed to his unpopularity. López Pumarejo resigned the presidency on August 7, 1945. He was replaced by the first presidential designee, Alberto Lleras Camargo (b. 1906–d. 1990), who served until the inauguration of Conservative Mariano Ospina Pérez (b. 1891–d. 1976) on August 7, 1946.

Amid the political and economic changes that began in the 1930s, JORGE ELIÉCER GAITÁN emerged as a labor leader and spokesperson for the general populace. Gaitán orchestrated large street demonstrations throughout the country that were brutally suppressed by the MILITARY. Colombia appeared to be in chaos and politically ripe for the Liberals to retake the presidency in the 1948 elections, with Gaitán as their candidate. That was not to be. Gaitán was assassinated on April 9, 1948. His death ignited two days of rioting, during which an estimated 2,000 people lost their lives and downtown Bogotá was destroyed. The Bogotazo, as these riots came to be known, also signaled the start of La Violencia, or 15 years of armed conflict across the country that claimed an estimated 200,000 lives. Both reflected the population's frustration with the government's failure to address extremely poor socioeconomic conditions in the country.

DOMINANCE OF DRUG CARTELS

When the violence subsided in 1957, the Conservatives and Liberals reached a power-sharing agreement, with the presidency to alternate between them every four years.

This arrangement, known as the National Front, lasted until 1974. Although it may have solved the Liberal-Conservative political conflict, it contributed to government inaction and voter apathy. The plight of the poor worsened, and several guerrilla organizations formed, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN), the People's Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, or EPL), and the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril, or M-19). These groups momentarily appeared to be on the wane when the National Front came to an end, which was about the same time that Colombian DRUG cartels surfaced.

From the 1970s until the end of the 20th century, drug cartels became the dominant factor in Colombia's economic, political, and social development. Pablo Escobar (b. 1949–d. 1993) founded the Medellín cartel. According to U.S. government estimates, in the 1970s and 1980s, the cartel earned an estimated \$60 million weekly in U.S. drug sales, and in 1989, *Forbes* magazine named Escobar the 10th richest man in the world. While the United States was the cartel's major market, its tentacles reached throughout South America, into Europe, and, reportedly, also into Asia. Intimidation and violence became the cartel's modus operandi. During the 1980s, 30 Colombian judges and 457 police constables were killed, plus on average another 20 deaths per year. In 1991, Escobar surrendered to Colombian authorities to avoid extradition to the United States, but his confinement in a luxury estate was short lived. He escaped on July 22, 1992, which led to a massive manhunt by Colombian authorities, with U.S. military assistance. It ended on December 2, 1993, with his death.

The Cali cartel, founded by brothers Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela (b. 1942–) and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela (b. 1946–), took over Escobar's operation. Operating through unrelated cells, the Cali cartel focused on the manufacture and distribution of cocaine and heroin, making an estimated \$7 billion annually in the 1990s. It used much of those funds to invest in legitimate operations in Colombia, including 30 radio stations and a chain of pharmaceutical stores valued at \$216 million. While the Medellín group had killed its opponents, the Cali cartel bribed an estimated 2,800 government officials, including judges. It did, however, use violence to rid Cali and surrounding towns of "desechables" (discardable people), namely, prostitutes, abandoned children, and the homeless. Both cartels engaged in kidnappings and in violence against Colombia's various guerrilla groups operating in drug-growing and -processing areas and for attempting to recruit peasants into their forces. The 1995 arrest of the Orejuela brothers and other Cali leaders slowed drug production and trafficking until newer, smaller groups emerged after 2000. The drug barons were extradited to the United States in 2004, where they pled guilty to conspiracy to import cocaine into the

United States. Each received a 30-year prison term and forfeited their assets, including the pharmaceutical chain and radio stations.

With U.S. economic and military assistance, in 2004, President ÁLVARO URIBE VÉLEZ (b. 1952–) commenced a two-pronged plan to combat drug-related activities in Colombia. He provided the military with sufficient means to subdue guerrilla groups unwilling to negotiate with the government, many of which were now linked to drug-production and -trafficking operations. As a result, drug production and trafficking markedly decreased between 2004 and 2006.

While confronting the cartels and guerrilla groups, the Colombian government committed the nation to the neoliberal economic policies practiced by other Latin American countries. Beginning in 1991, President César Gaviria (b. 1947–) switched from the import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) economic model to export-led growth. This resulted in reduced tariffs, financial deregulation, the privatization of state and parastatal (partially government-owned) businesses, and a more liberal foreign exchange rate. These policies, along with the decrease in violence, were credited with reducing unemployment by four percentage points to 11 percent between 2002 and 2006 and increasing foreign investment by 294 percent to \$6.3 billion during the same time period. While coffee continues to be the country's primary agricultural product, it also now exports processed foods, textiles, paper and paper products, metal and metal products, and fresh-cut flowers. Colombia also has rich deposits of coal and emeralds. Colombia anticipated greater access to the U.S. market when it signed a free trade agreement with the United States on February 27, 2006. Because of a growing public backlash to globalization, the debates surrounding the November 2008 U.S. presidential election, and the nearly yearlong debate about health care reform, the agreement remains stalled in the U.S. Congress.

See also BASTIDAS, RODRIGO DE (Vol. I); COLOMBIA (Vols. I, III); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); GRAN COLOMBIA (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); NEW GRANADA, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); THOUSAND DAY WAR (Vol. III).

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communism in Latin America An active communist movement in Latin America can be traced to the World War I era, when LABOR groups aggressively sought to achieve their objectives, including the legalization of unions and the right to bargain for improved wages, working conditions, and benefits. In the atmosphere of the time, however, Latin American governments did not tolerate labor activism, as demonstrated by government action in ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and CHILE from 1916 to 1920, when labor groups were suppressed in an effort to bring them under government control because of their alleged communist influence.

The successful Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917 and the Comintern (an international Communist organization) in 1919 sent shockwaves throughout western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. Two important issues related to communism in Latin America guided policy toward that region. First, communism threatened to replace the established social order, including a privileged elite, with a more egalitarian society. Latin America's elite therefore resisted communism, real or imagined, at any cost. The second issue focused on the extent of Soviet, or subsequently Cuban or Chinese, influence in local movements. Before World War II, a few Latin American Communist leaders attended Soviet-sponsored conferences and the Soviet embassy in MEXICO CITY served as a distribution center for Soviet propaganda, but the Moscow government did not formulate any specific hemispheric plans. Nevertheless, Communists and alleged communists were linked to any attack on the established order.

The MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1911–20) produced a constitution that provided the basis for the government to protect labor's rights, confiscate and redistribute property to the rural poor, and control the exploitation of natural resources and foreign investment (see CONSTITUTION OF 1917). A strong case could be made that these legalities were a reaction to the Porfiriato (1876–1911), as the era of Porfirio Díaz's dictatorship is known. But, in the 1920s, as the Mexican government instituted democratic centralism and implemented the legal provisions for land confiscation, many contemporary analysts, including U.S. assistant secretary of state Richard Olds, described the government as communist. By the 1930s, Communist Parties had appeared in several Latin American countries, but in CENTRAL AMERICA, they drew most of the elite's attention and were driven underground or out of existence, except in COSTA RICA. The fate of alleged communist leaders AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO in NICARAGUA and AGUSTÍN FARABUNDO MARTÍ in EL SALVADOR illustrates the point. In Costa Rica, MANUEL MORA VALVERDE founded the Communist Party in 1932. Caribbean coastal banana workers who labored for the United Fruit Company formed its largest support base. The party had sufficient strength to influence the outcome of Costa Rica's 1940 and 1944 presidential elections.



Office of the national student headquarters of the Brazilian Communist Party in 1964 (United States Information Agency)

During the 1930s and early 1940s, “the generation of rising expectations” made its way into Latin America’s political arena. Led by the middle sector and rural and urban labor leaders, they demanded participation in a more democratic government process and the protection of labor. Some political groups, such as the Communist Parties of Chile, Costa Rica, and Cuba, made no effort to hide their identity. Others, including Brazil’s Social Democratic Party and GUATEMALA’s Labor Party, included Communist spokesmen and espoused a communist philosophy.

As before World War II, these so-called leftist groups demanded social and political reforms. This time, however, their demands were judged against a cold war backdrop: The Soviet Union, many believed, was determined to bring the world under Communist control. In 1954, on the eve of the U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF GUATEMALA, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland advised his fellow policy makers of the need to distinguish between legitimate movements for change and communism. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration ignored Holland’s advice and approved the Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored

invasion and restoration of the old order. Eisenhower’s policy makers, like those of other Western governments, as well as Latin American elites, had framed Guatemalan president JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN’s land distribution programs and control of foreign investment against the backdrop of Soviet actions at home and in Eastern Europe and Mao Zedong’s programs in China. Arbenz was thus considered a communist by these groups.

FIDEL CASTRO RUZ’s CUBAN REVOLUTION (1956–61) brought Holland’s observation into sharper focus. Since CUBA’s independence in 1898, the country’s elite had controlled national government and permitted private U.S. business interests to dominate the economy. After World War II, Cuba’s younger generation clamored for a more democratic government and intensified this demand after FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR’s March 10, 1952, coup d’état and subsequent brutal dictatorship. Castro was among the young revolutionaries whose experiences growing up in rural Cuba and attending Belén High School in HAVANA contributed to his anti-elite attitude. His *History Will Absolve Me*, a personal defense plea he used at his 1953 trial, clearly described Cuba’s socioeco-

conomic disparities. On taking power in 1959, his brutal treatment of the elite and his political opponents, land confiscation, and rent and wage policies made the West suspicious of him. The doubt disappeared in 1960 when, in response to a U.S. sugar embargo, he nationalized U.S. companies on the island and signed a TRADE agreement with the Soviet Union. From thereon, Castro was branded a communist. His subsequent personal dictatorship, control over all aspects of Cuban life, along with a state-directed economy confirmed the allegation but did not end the debate, which lingers until today. Viewing JUAN BOSCH as another Castro, U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson landed 20,000 marines in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC on August 14, 1965, reportedly to prevent the spread of communism in the hemisphere.

The United States initiated the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS on August 17, 1961, to provide opportunities for Latin America's underclasses to improve their quality of life and participate in the political system. But, Latin America's elite would not open the political system, which significantly contributed to the Alliance's eventual failure. Castro's revolution also ushered in military governments across the hemisphere that intended to squelch alleged communist movements. In the 1980s, events in GRENADA and Central America led U.S. president Ronald R. Reagan to conclude that communism had again reared its ugly head, prompting him to direct U.S. interventions to suppress the movements. This time, however, U.S. intervention did not have broad-based support at home or abroad. Vociferous critics, particularly in Central America, believed the long-standing socioeconomic disparities and closed political system caused the crisis, not communism.

Latin America's acceptance of the neoliberal economic model in the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 contributed to the belief that communism had passed into history. However, the socioeconomic promises of neo-liberalism did not improve the quality of life for most Latin American people, which in turn led to the election of leftist political leaders or parties, among them HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS in VENEZUELA, JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA in BOLIVIA, NÉSTOR KIRCHNER in Argentina, and LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA in Brazil. While some political commentators see their emergence as a response to the shortcoming of neoliberalism, others assert that communism has resurfaced in the region.

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Compton, John (b. 1926–d. 2007) *prime minister of St. Lucia* Born on April 29, 1926, on the island of Canouan in SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, John Compton was an attorney and economist by profession. Compton's family had moved to SAINT LUCIA, where he received his primary school education, and in 1954, he graduated from the London School of Economics. In 1964, Compton founded the conservative United Workers Party (UWP). Following elections in 1964, Compton defeated the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) candidate, George Charles (b. 1916–d. 2004), and became premier of St. Lucia. When the United Kingdom granted St. Lucia independence on February 22, 1979, Compton became the island's first prime minister. Following the nation's first postindependence elections later in the year, Allan Louisy (b. 1916–), the leader of the SLP, took office on July 2, 1979. Louisy's government, however, was brief. Facing the rejection of his financial plan for the nation and the resignation of most of his cabinet, Louisy resigned on May 4, 1981, and was replaced by Attorney General Winston Cenac (b. 1925–d. 2004). Michael Pilgrim (b. 1947–), the leader of the Labor Progressive Party, a small pro-Cuban socialist party, served as acting prime minister after Cenac's resignation on January 17, 1982. Pilgrim resigned on May 3, 1982, in favor of Compton.

Compton ruled St. Lucia until 1996. Concerned about the possibility of political and social unrest in the Caribbean, Compton sent members of St. Lucia's Special Services Unit into active duty during the 1983 U.S.-sponsored invasion of GRENADA. In 1996, Compton resigned as prime minister and leader of the UWP. That same year, he was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II. Compton was succeeded by VAUGHAN LEWIS, who was defeated by SLP candidate KENNY ANTHONY in 1997. In a bitter leadership struggle, Compton ousted Lewis as leader of the UWP in 2005, which resulted in Lewis joining the SLP. In the period leading up to the 2006 elections, Compton's opponents claimed that Compton's age made him an unsuitable candidate. Compton, however, argued that since he was not preparing to participate in the Olympics, his age was not relevant. Coming as a surprise to most political analysts, Compton won the December 11, 2006, elections. Nevertheless, on May 1, 2007, Compton suffered a series of strokes, which left him partially impaired. After spending time in a New York City hospital, Compton returned to St. Lucia on May 19, 2007. Although Compton was still prime minister, Stephenson King (b. 1958–) became acting prime minister until Compton's death on September 7, 2007. Two days later, King became prime minister.

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Conference of Latin American Bishops (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano; CELAM) The Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM) was established in 1955 in RIO DE JANEIRO to promote communications on religious issues across Latin America via annual conferences, publications, and training institutes. Among the bishops was a small group who advocated church involvement in people's social affairs. This group was encouraged by the work of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) and prompted the progressive bishops to set the agenda for the 1968 bishop's conference in Medellín, COLOMBIA. At Medellín, the bishops agreed that the CATHOLIC CHURCH should take a more active role in addressing Latin America's social realities, which resulted in the concept of liberation theology. In the broadest sense, this meant that the bishops would direct the church away from serving the needs of the elite and seeking to preserve the status quo. In application, it meant that parish priests organized the Christian communities to pressure government for improved sanitary conditions, better housing and EDUCATION, medical care, and other basic needs. Because the priests attacked the established order, the elite labeled them communists. The priests became victims of state brutality during the 1970s and 1980s.

The movement within CELAM that began at Medellín ended in 1972 with the election of Colombian cardinal Alfonso López Trujillo (b. 1935–d. 2008) as CELAM's general secretary. A conservative backlash had set in: From the Vatican, Pope Paul VI tried to slow the movement by announcing that the teachings of liberation theology were antithetical to the Catholic Church's global teachings. The change in CELAM's goals was complete in 1979 when the bishops convened in Puebla, MEXICO, for their annual conclave, which was attended by Pope John Paul II, himself a critic of liberation theology. Critics produced a 20-page refutation of liberation theology and parish priests' activism. At his stop in Managua, NICARAGUA, on March 16, 1983, Pope John Paul II condemned those clergy who supported the Sandinistas.

The reformist Latin American priests continued their cause throughout the 1980s but largely disappeared from the forefront of Latin American politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the acceptance of economic globalization by the Latin American governments. When Joseph A. Radzinger, a longtime critic of church political activism in general and liberation theology in particular became Pope Benedict XVI on April 25, 2005, it signaled the end of a popular movement.

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Constitution of 1917, Mexico The 1917 constitution of MEXICO was promulgated by leaders of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION in an attempt to address the reforms being demanded by numerous revolutionary factions. The document was drafted at a convention in Querétaro led by First Chief VENUSTIANO CARRANZA. Despite Carranza's attempts to influence the delegates to accept a modified version of the Constitution of 1857, they instead approved a radical document that included some of the most progressive social reform provisions of its time.

Numerous provisions within the document took up social reform issues. Article 27 addressed the demands for agrarian reform made especially by the followers of revolutionary leader EMILIANO ZAPATA. This provision called for *ejido* lands seized during the Porfiriato to be returned to indigenous communities and outlined the social responsibilities of land ownership. Article 123 stipulated sweeping LABOR reform, including an eight-hour workday, a six-day workweek, wage regulations, and safety measures in the workplace. The constitution also guaranteed workers' rights to organize, allowing them to use collective bargaining and work stoppages to negotiate with employers. Article 3 of the constitution called for a national secular EDUCATION program that was free and compulsory through primary school. Article 28 aimed to safeguard a reasonable standard of living by prohibiting monopolies and price gouging for rent, food, health care, and other basic services.

The Constitution of 1917 aimed to prevent the rise of another dictator like Porfirio Díaz. The document called for a six-year presidency; presidents could not seek reelection. It also attempted to curb the influence of the CATHOLIC CHURCH. Members of the clergy were prohibited from all political participation, including forming or joining POLITICAL PARTIES and voting. Finally, the constitution aimed to protect Mexican national interests against foreign competition. It restricted non-Mexican ownership of property and businesses and provided provisions for expropriating property owned by foreigners. Although the Constitution of 1917 addressed nearly all the demands of the various factions, its provisions were inconsistently implemented, causing numerous conflicts throughout the 20th century.

See also CONSTITUTION OF 1857, MEXICO (Vol. III); DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); *EJIDO* (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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Contras See CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS; NICARAGUA.

Convention of Aguascalientes (1914) The Convention of Aguascalientes was a special meeting called in MEXICO by VENUSTIANO CARRANZA in 1914 during the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. Carranza was serving as first chief after the overthrow of VICTORIANO HUERTA and invited delegates from the revolutionary factions to participate in electing a provisional president. The Convention of Aguascalientes was intended to resolve the question of the succession of power peacefully but instead accentuated the deeply rooted divisions among revolutionary leaders.

Delegates met in Aguascalientes, considered to be a neutral town, in October 1914. It quickly became evident that the delegates representing FRANCISCO VILLA and EMILIANO ZAPATA would clash with those representing Carranza and ÁLVARO OBERGÓN. Carranza was so displeased with the direction the convention seemed to be taking that he refused to attend. In his absence, convention delegates voted to remove him as first chief and elected Eulalio Gutiérrez as provisional president. In November, Carranza withdrew his delegates and installed his military in Veracruz to defend what would become known as the Constitutionalist government. Villa and Zapata departed for MEXICO CITY to instate Gutiérrez as president and to defend what became known as the Conventionist government.

By the end of the year, Mexico was embroiled in a full-scale civil war between the Constitutionalist Army and the forces of Villa and Zapata. The Conventionist alliance broke down, however, and throughout much of 1915, Mexico was plagued by a multisided war with shifting alliances and constantly splintering factions. By 1917, the Constitutionlists had mostly quashed the Villista and Zapatista armies. Carranza called for a new convention. It was held in Querétaro, and delegates drafted the CONSTITUTION OF 1917.

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Correa, Rafael (b. 1963–) *president of Ecuador* Born in Guayaquil, ECUADOR, Rafael Correa earned a degree in economics at the Catholic University in the same city, a master's in economics from Louvain University in Belgium, and a doctorate, also in economics, from the University of Illinois. Correa served as Ecuador's minister of the economy and finance for four months in 2005 under President Alfredo Palacio (b. 1939–). In the October 15, 2006, general election, Correa won 22 percent of the popular vote, enough to force a runoff with Álvaro Noboa (b. 1937–) on November 26. Correa won the election with

56 percent of the popular vote. He took office on January 15, 2007, the seventh person to do so in 10 years.

As a doctoral student at the University of Illinois, Correa claimed that an unchecked free market would concentrate solely on the generation of wealth at the expense of other socioeconomic needs. This philosophy made him skeptical of Ecuador's proposed 2005 free trade agreement with the United States while he was finance minister and caused him to reject financial advice from the International Monetary Fund. President Noboa forced Correa's resignation on August 22, 2005, because he proposed to issue bonds at lower-than-current interest rates, with the Venezuelan government purchasing half of the issue. Some Ecuadorean analysts suggest that the link to Venezuelan president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS prompted the United States to force President Noboa to act.

During his campaign for the presidency in 2006, Correa criticized the neoliberal economic policies of his predecessors and called for the formation of a constituent assembly, renegotiation of contracts with foreign oil companies, and a restructuring of Ecuador's international debt. Political bickering delayed voting for a constitutional assembly, which finally began its deliberations on November 20, 2007. Correa has as yet not renewed talks with the United States regarding a free trade agreement, which he personally opposes. On May 15, 2006, the Ecuadorean government nationalized the U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Company, but final settlement awaits the decision of international arbitrators. In October 2007, Correa decreed that foreign oil companies should pay 99 percent of "extraordinary income" to the Ecuadorean government. Although Ecuador fully serviced its international debt in 2007, Correa has promised that any international obligations will be met only after domestic spending obligations are satisfied; these have shifted to health, EDUCATION, and basic infrastructure.

In shifting government emphasis from protecting the interests of foreign and native elites to servicing the needs of the nation's poor, Correa has challenged Ecuador's political tradition. He was reelected president in 2009. He began his second term on August 10, 2009.

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Costa Rica Costa Rica occupies 19,730 square miles (5,100 km²) of land on the Central American isthmus. Three topographical regions characterize the country:

the Central Highlands, wherein lies the Central Meseta, which is home to the majority of Costa Ricans, and the tropical Atlantic and Pacific coastal plains. Costa Rica's political history and its population are very different from those of its neighbors. Today, 94 percent of the 4 million Costa Ricans are classified as white and 3 percent are classified as black, while smaller percentages of Amerindians, Chinese, and other racial groups make up the remainder.

Christopher Columbus visited and named the land Costa Rica (rich coast) during his fourth voyage to the New World in 1502. Because of its sparse population and lack of natural wealth, Spain failed to colonize it, leaving it to fall into obscurity throughout the colonial period. Although Costa Rica joined its Central American neighbors in declaring its independence from Spain in 1821, and subsequently joined the United Provinces of Central America, it remained on the fringe of regional political affairs. Costa Rica declared itself a republic in 1849. Costa Rica subsequently developed a representative government, but political power remained in the hands of the landed elite. During the same period, government

lands were sold off cheaply and in small plots, usually of 10–20 acres (4–8 ha) each. This led to the emergence of a large number of small landowners, who like their richer brethren engaged in the exportation of coffee. Late in the 19th century, the United Fruit Company developed an extensive banana INDUSTRY on the Caribbean coast. The fissures in Costa Rica's socioeconomic and political systems did not become apparent until 1914.

In 1914, when voters failed to give any of the candidates a majority in the nation's first direct election of a president, Congress selected Alfredo González Flores (b. 1877–d. 1962) to fill the office. González Flores's reform agenda failed to materialize because the outbreak of World War I in August 1914 closed the European market to Costa Rica's exports and this in turn resulted in a drastic reduction in government income. The landed elite and United Fruit Company did not embrace González Flores's social philosophy, which called for improvement in the quality of life for the poor. Corruption scandals that permeated throughout his administration further eroded his support and led to his ouster on January 27, 1917, by his war minister, General Federico Tinoco



For their study of comparative social patterns among indigenous peoples, anthropologists prepare to enter a rural village near Tortuguero in northeast Costa Rica. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

(b. 1870–d. 1931). Tinoco's government was considered illegal, thus there were student demonstrations, persistent rumors of assassination attempts and coup d'états, and consistent U.S. pressure for free and open elections, which led to Tinoco's resignation on August 13, 1917. Tinoco immediately departed for Europe and remained in Paris until his death. With Tinoco gone, the United States pressed for elections, finally held on December 16, 1917, and resulting in a victory for Julio Acosta García (b. 1872–d. 1963). The end of World War I and the restoration of legitimate government did not prevent the widening of Costa Rica's socioeconomic fissures, however.

Beginning in 1924, for the next 12 years, the presidency alternated between two of Costa Rica's elder statesmen: Ricardo de Jiménez Oreamuno (b. 1859–d. 1915) representing the Republican Party, renamed the National Republican Party (Partido Republicano Nacional, or PRN) in 1932, and Cleto González Víquez (b. 1858–d. 1937) of the National Union Party (Partido Unión Nacional, or PUN). *Personalismo* (personal popularity), rather than political ideology, characterized both parties. Suffrage broadened and the secret ballot was introduced during the 1920s. When in power, each party concerned itself with the conduct of foreign affairs, the construction of infrastructure, improving EDUCATION, protecting civil liberties, maintaining law and order, and collecting the taxes and tariffs necessary for financing government operations.

Beneath the mirage of tranquility, however, the public's social consciousness had been awakened. Jorge Volio Jiménez (b. 1882–d. 1955) was the first to come forward. Considered by some to be unstable and erratic, Volio studied for the priesthood in Rome, where he had fallen under the influence of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. Volio went on to preach "social Christianity" in Costa Rica, which called for broad social reforms, legalization of LABOR unions, an end to monopolies, limits on foreign companies operating in the country, and higher taxes on the wealthy. Although Volio drifted out of the political arena after his unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1924, his social Christianity remained a viable alternative to the existing system for the intellectual element of Costa Rica's emerging middle class.

In 1929, a 19-year-old student and member of a prominent FAMILY, MANUEL MORA VALVERDE, founded Costa Rica's communist movement: the Workers and Peasants Bloc (Bloque Obreros y Campesinos, or BOC). Three years later, it fielded candidates in the presidential election. Initially, the party appealed to middle- and upper-class intellectuals and students, but by the late 1930s, it had made significant inroads into the laboring groups, particularly those on the United Fruit Company's banana plantations. The strengthening of the communist party was seen in the significant increase in votes its candidates received from the 1932 election (1,132) to the 1942 election (17,060), which

sent Mora to the national congress. A year later, Mora directed through the Legislative Assembly a labor code that he reportedly designed and in part wrote. The law required that 90 percent of the workers employed in any given firm must be Costa Rican and that they should receive 80 percent of the payroll. Other provisions stipulated that dismissed employees receive a month's salary for each year worked and that all laborers, including household servants, be covered by contract. Recognizing Mora's political clout, the 1944 PRN presidential candidate, Teodoro Picado (b. 1900–d. 1960), struck a deal with him. In return for Mora's electoral support, Picado pledged to continue his reform program. Although Picado won the 1944 election and his alliance with Mora became tenuous, Picado's proposed social legislation over the next four years fell on deaf ears in the conservative-dominated congress.

During the 1940s, issues related to World War II also confronted Costa Rica. The government supported the Allied cause and followed U.S. directions in implementing restrictions on the resident community. Costa Rica also suffered from the loss of European markets and the concomitant loss of taxes and tariffs and endured food shortages and inflation. In the midst of the war and Costa Rica's political turmoil, the Center for the Study of National Problems (CEPAN) surfaced as an important political critic. Founded by university students in the 1930s, its membership expanded in the 1940s to include schoolteachers, news reporters and writers, office workers, and the like. It published a weekly news sheet and sponsored a weekly talk show featuring one its leaders, JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER. In addition to condemning government corruption and the restrictive political arena, CEPAN called for social reform. As the 1948 election approached, Figueres was convinced that the PRN would not let any opposition group gain control of the government.

The 1948 presidential contest pitted former president and PRN leader Rafael Ángel Calderón against Otilio Ulate Blanco (b. 1891–d. 1973), a liberal journalist and head of PUN. Ulate was declared the victor of the February 8 contest, but the PRN-controlled congress nullified the election. Both sides charged fraud. The whole affair prompted Figueres on March 12 to lead his rebel forces against the government's ill-prepared army (see CIVIL WAR OF 1948, COSTA RICA). Discussions among the protagonists began almost immediately and culminated in an agreement between Ulate and Figueres on May 2. The agreement provided for a Figueres-led junta to govern the country for 18 months, during which a constitutional convention would be convened. New elections were held on October 2, 1949, and again, Ulate captured the presidency. He went on to serve a full four-year term and was succeeded by Figueres in 1953. For the next two generations, Figueres's National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Nacional, or PLN) dominated Costa Rican politics.

Figueres also set Costa Rica's social agenda, which extended into the 21st century. Initially, aided by high prices for coffee on the global market, the government expanded public education, established a social security program, and built hospitals and other infrastructure throughout the country. In late 1957, coffee prices plunged, and with this, government debt increased. Neither the CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET nor the U.S.-sponsored ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS brought economic, and particularly industrial, development to Costa Rica in the 1960s. By 1974, Costa Rica's economy had stagnated, prompting President Daniel Obudar Quirós (b. 1922–d. 1991) to change the direction of development, to reemphasize agricultural modernization and expansion. The Costa Rican economy continued to worsen, however. By 1981, the country's foreign TRADE debt stood at \$3 billion, and inflation had climbed to an annual rate of 50 percent. Under these conditions, President Rodrigo Alberto Carazo Odio (b. 1926–) turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In return for its financial assistance, the IMF required the government to cut public spending, lift price controls on utilities and gasoline, and devalue the currency. These measures sparked a negative response in Costa Rica, causing the government to renege on the agreement.

The Costa Rican economy worsened throughout the 1980s because of war in NICARAGUA. Thousands of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica, further straining government social services and contributing to inflation. These conditions prompted President OSCAR ARIAS SÁNCHEZ to lead the way to a negotiated settlement of the Nicaraguan conflict, which was finally resolved in 1989.

Despite continuing economic plight since the end of the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s, Costa Ricans have maintained a democratic political system. Presidents since 1990, including Arias, who was elected to his second term on February 7, 2006, have grappled with economic development. Tourism has replaced AGRICULTURE as the primary economic industry, and electronic and garment manufacturing have broadened the economic base. According to 2006 statistics, however, the public debt is 53.4 percent of the gross domestic product, and external debt stands at \$6.4 billion. Costa Rican labor laws, beneficial to and protective of labor, discourage foreign investment. Unlike their Central American counterparts, many of Costa Rica's political leaders do not view the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (DR-CAFTA) as a promise for a brighter economic future. Rather, they see it as a threat to Costa Rica's social service system, labor guarantees, and small farmers. For these reasons, the Costa Rican congress refused to ratify the DR-CAFTA and prompted President Arias to conduct a national referendum on October 7, 2008. The majority of Costa Rican voters (52 percent) ratified the regional trade agreement.

See also COSTA RICA (Vols. I, II, III).

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Cotonou Agreement The Cotonou Agreement is a 20-year agreement that was signed on June 23, 2000, in Cotonou, Benin, between the European Union (EU) and 77 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, all former European colonies. It came into force in 2002. The agreement replaced the LOMÉ CONVENTION that governed the relationship from 1975 to 2000. Caribbean states included in the Cotonou Agreement are ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BELIZE, CUBA, DOMINICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GRENADA, GUYANA, HAITI, JAMAICA, SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, SURINAME, and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. Haiti received “lesser-developed” status.

The Cotonou Agreement focuses on reducing poverty through political dialogue, development aid, and closer economic and TRADE cooperation. Discussions of development issues are to move beyond governmental persons and agencies to include representatives of the private sector, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and the general public. New issues outside development will be added to the agenda, including peace and security, the arms trade, and MIGRATION. The agreement also focuses on private-sector initiatives for development and provides a mechanism by which such initiatives can receive funding from the European Investment Bank.

Whereas the Lomé Convention provided for nonreciprocal trade preferences for the ACP partners, beginning in 2008, the ACP countries were required to open their markets, duty free, to European exports. The lesser developed countries (LDCs) will not be required to open their markets to duty-free trade and will instead be transferred into the EU's Generalized System of Preferences.

Another change from the Lomé Convention is the introduction of performance-based partnerships, under which the EU will evaluate a country's needs and past performance before granting any new financial assistance. In practice, this means that “good performers” might be rewarded at the expense of those not performing to expectations or stated goals. Allocations for this program are to be made for five-year periods; the initial (2002–07) allocation was set at approximately \$27 million.

In June 2005, the partnership agreed to several technical revisions regarding trade and also addressed political issues. The new revisions required the partners to mediate disputes among themselves, combat arms proliferation and terrorism, and prevent mercenary activities from organizing within their borders. The provision that called for ACP partners to use the International Criminal Court (ICC) prompted Sudan to withdraw from the Cotonou Agreement because it did not hold membership in the ICC. The second round of revisions are scheduled for 2010.

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Creelman, James (b. 1859–d. 1915) *American journalist in Mexico* James Creelman was an American journalist writing for *Pearson's* magazine, who conducted the famous “Creelman interview” with Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz in 1908. In the interview, Díaz announced that he would not run for office again in the 1910 presidential election and that he welcomed candidates from an opposition party to participate in the political process. In response to Creelman’s interview, FRANCISCO MADERO published his book *The Presidential Succession in 1910* (*La sucesión presidencial en 1910*) and announced his candidacy. The Creelman interview is considered one of the precursors of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION.

Creelman’s interview, which was intended for a U.S. audience, came in the final years of the Porfiriato (1876–1911). Díaz’s comments throughout the interview were intended to demonstrate to foreigners that MEXICO had progressed during his rule of more than three decades. Díaz spoke of the violence and political chaos that had plagued the nation in the 19th century and argued that his administration had brought peace and stability. He then promised that he would step down at the end of his presidential term.

A number of local politicians reacted to the interview with enthusiasm and began to organize opposition movements in preparation for the 1910 election. Madero, from the northern state of Coahuila, quickly rose to prominence as the most likely winner. On the eve of the election, Díaz retracted the promise he had made during the interview with Creelman. The dictator arrested Madero and easily won the presidency in a highly questionable election. The political corruption demonstrated by Díaz following his interview with Creelman compelled many to support Madero’s call to revolution in November 1910.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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crime and punishment Latin America’s return to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s brought with it the popular anticipation that judicial systems and criminal codes would be reformed and that professionalism within the police system would result in the thorough investigation of crimes and fair treatment of suspects. These things did not happen on a uniform basis. Crime has increased, from the kidnapping for ransom of foreign and native business executives and government officials to petty larceny. Violent crime increased throughout the 1990s. This has led to enormous growth in the private security business. In 2002, the number of homicides per 100,000 people reached 55 in SÃO PAULO and RIO DE JANEIRO, 95 in San Salvador, 101 in Guatemala City, and 248 in Medellín. MEXICO CITY averaged 543 daily reported crimes in 2000.

As elsewhere in the world, poverty, unemployment, the rapid growth of crowded urban areas, the availability of DRUGS, and the presence of organized crime are among the most common reasons for the increase in crime. Youth gangs are a recent phenomenon and operate freely in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Tegucigalpa, and San Salvador. Some analysts suggest that radical Islamists have set up training camps along the border of ARGENTINA and BRAZIL and are recruiting disgruntled Latin Americans to carry out terrorist attacks throughout the hemisphere.

The problem of crime is compounded by the lack of public confidence in the judicial and law enforcement systems. According to *Latinobarómetro*, in 2001, a hemispheric average of 64 percent of the people had little or no trust in the police force and judicial system. Amnesty International points out that the criminal justice system has built-in biases against the poor, the indigenous, and WOMEN. Among the problems most commonly cited are police brutality, forced confessions, poor prison conditions, and long incarcerations before trial. Justices are inadequately trained and are often political appointments; they may be open to bribery and face intimidation, including death threats, which affects their decisions.

Since the 1980s, international agencies such as the UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT and the INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK have conducted ongoing training programs that aim to reform the police and judiciary. Argentina and CHILE are given high marks as models for steadily improving their criminal justice systems.

Inadequate criminal justice systems and the causes of increased crime present Latin America with a double-edged sword. Each contributes to slow economic growth. Some economists suggest that five percentage points could be added to Latin America’s overall economic growth if crime were cut in half. Without economic growth, the problems of social injustice cannot be addressed, while increasing crime contributes to a lack of economic growth.

See also CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Vols. I, II, III).

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Cristero Rebellion (1926–1929) The Cristero Rebellion was an armed insurrection led by devout Catholics against the anticlerical policies of the Mexican government. Rallying to the call of “¡Viva Cristo Rey!” (Long live Christ the King!), the Cristeros mounted a bloody revolt throughout MEXICO from 1926 to 1929.

In the years immediately following the MEXICAN REVOLUTION, national leaders only selectively implemented the various anticlerical measures contained in MEXICO CONSTITUTION OF 1917. President PLUTARCO ELÍAS CALLES, however, began enforcing restrictions against the CATHOLIC CHURCH shortly after taking office in 1924. As church leaders protested, Calles cracked down even harder against Catholic privileges. In response, Mexican bishops announced a general strike, suspending all religious services throughout the country. As tensions mounted, several local insurrections erupted as armed Catholics confronted the federal army throughout the last half of 1926.

Cristero leaders René Capistrán Garza (b. 1898–d. 1974), Anacleto González Flores (b. 1888–d. 1927), and Enrique Gorostieta (b. 1889–d. 1929) organized a formal resistance movement in January 1927, and the Cristero Rebellion began targeting representatives of the Mexican government. Some of the worst atrocities were committed against young rural teachers who had replaced parish priests as the main educators in remote villages. Cristero violence was met with even greater repression by government troops. The bloodshed had not yet subsided when ÁLVARO OBREGÓN was elected to a second term as president in 1928. Before his inaugural date, Cristero supporter José de León Toral (b. 1900–d. 1929) assassinated the revolutionary leader at a public luncheon. A later investigation revealed that León Toral may have been part of a larger conspiracy led by a Catholic nun named Madre Conchita. Toral was executed, and Madre Conchita spent many years in prison before she was exonerated in 1940.

The Cristero Rebellion officially came to an end in 1929 under an agreement orchestrated by U.S. ambassador Dwight Morrow, although sporadic hostilities continued for several years.

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Crowder, Enoch (b. 1839–d. 1932) *U.S. Army general and ambassador to Cuba* Crowder shared the common U.S. view of Cuban politics at the end of the 19th century: Cubans were incapable of democratic self-government and in need of U.S. guidance until they attained political maturity.

Crowder accompanied Governor General Charles Magoon to CUBA in October 1906 as head of the Advisory Law Commission charged to revise Cuba’s confusing legal system. The commission’s revisions included a civil service law patterned after that of the United States and the establishment of several executive departments including justice, treasury, and state. The commission’s electoral reform package, designed to ensure fair elections, received most attention. Crowder supervised the implementation of these reforms in the spring and summer during Cuba’s municipal, provincial, congressional, and presidential elections, the last being won by Liberal Party candidate José Miguel Gómez (b. 1858–d. 1921) in what all considered to be fair elections. However, following the withdrawal of the Magoon mission on January 1, 1909, Cuba’s political leaders reverted to fraudulent electoral practices.

U.S. president Woodrow Wilson dispatched Crowder in 1919 in a second effort to correct electoral abuses in Cuba. Crowder’s efforts resulted in a new electoral law in August 1919 with rules and procedures designed to mold Cuba into a two-party system similar to that in the United States. The reforms were to be introduced during Cuba’s 1920 election, but the realities of Cuban politics doomed them to failure. Outgoing Conservative Party president Mario G. Menocal (b. 1866–d. 1941) amended the electoral code to ensure that his friend and fellow Conservative Alfredo Zayas (b. 1861–1934) was on the ticket. Menocal then had Liberal Party candidates harassed during the campaign, prevented Crowder from supervising the election, and appointed electoral judges who favored Zayas. Under such conditions, the Liberals withdrew from the process.

In 1921, U.S. president Warren G. Harding appointed Crowder as his special envoy to the government in HAVANA, a position Crowder held until being appointed ambassador in 1923. His first assignment was to deal with Cuba’s financial crisis, which was caused by the precipitous drop in world sugar prices following World War I and related government debt. To secure a \$65 million loan from J. P. Morgan and Company, Crowder convinced Zayas to introduce government austerity measures. Next, Crowder persuaded Zayas to replace corrupt officials with more honest men. The Cuban situation brightened in 1923. Economic recovery was under way, and with Crowder’s “honest cabinet” government, graft and corruption markedly decreased. Nevertheless, the optimism was short lived. In 1924, Zayas ignored Crowder’s suggestions, replaced the “honest cabinet” with his own appointees, and did nothing to check lavish spending by the Cuban congress.

Crowder remained in Cuba until 1929 but did not intervene in Cuban political affairs because of changing U.S. policy toward the Caribbean, which resulted in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's pronouncement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY in 1933.

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crown colony See BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES.

Cuba With an area of 44,218 square miles (114,524 km²), Cuba is the largest and westernmost island of the Greater Antilles; it is only slightly smaller than the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. Of the 11.3 million people residing on the island, approximately 70 percent are between the ages of 15 and 64 years. Today, the name of Cuba is synonymous with its dictator, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Cubans live in a political dictatorship, and the majority are poor.

PERIOD OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT, 1902–1933

In Paris, on December 10, 1898, U.S. and Spanish peace commissioners signed a treaty to end the Spanish-American War, which began in 1895. When the Treaty of Paris went into effect 15 months later, the United States faced the difficult challenge of preparing Cuba to become a self-governing democracy. Nearly 300 years of Spanish centralized authority had left Cuba's white elite, the creoles, without much governmental experience and the more numerous and less educated (in most cases illiterate) mulattoes and Afro-Cubans with even less. Because of their greater numbers, however, the mulattoes and Afro-Cubans prevailed in the U.S.-sponsored and -supervised 1900 municipal elections and the 1901 election of a constituent assembly. Fearing a political and economic disaster, the United States sought another way to ensure that the creoles, or "better classes," as they were referred to, controlled government. To achieve that goal, the chief U.S. administrator in Cuba, General Leonard Wood, implemented voting restrictions and property qualifications in order to minimize political participation on the part of nonwhite Cubans. In addition, to ensure political stability and secure Cuba from foreign interlopers, the United States required the Cuban government to accept the PLATT AMENDMENT as part of its constitution, as a prerequisite to becoming a republic on May 20, 1902. The Platt Amendment gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba to maintain political order, as well as

the right to control its financial affairs and limit its independence in foreign affairs. The Platt Amendment also became a characteristic of U.S.-Caribbean policy for the next generation. The Cuban *independentistas* reluctantly gave way to U.S. demands, whereupon General Wood authorized the withdrawal of the U.S. MILITARY from the island on May 20, 1902. (The U.S. military had begun its occupation and administration of government functions in Cuba on January 1, 1899.)

Until the emergence of FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR in 1933, Cuba's political arena remained the domain of creoles. Party names and ideology meant little. *Personalismo*, or charisma, characterized politics and contributed to political turmoil, which in turn contributed to U.S. intervention in the country's political affairs from 1906 to 1920. Tomás Estrada Palma (b. 1835–d. 1908) became Cuba's first president on May 20, 1902. While Palma's efforts to unify the various political factions were applauded by many, his efforts to extend his presidency in 1906 led to disorder and prompted U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt to send in marines to maintain public order and Charles Magoon as provisional governor until 1909. Magoon accomplished much during his tenure, including the construction of roads, public schools, and water and sewerage systems; he also established a public health system and revived the worn-torn ECONOMY. He developed a detailed electoral code and a modern judicial system and defined the structure and responsibilities of municipal government. Like his superiors in Washington, D.C., Cuba's elite were satisfied with Magoon's work when he left Cuba on January 28, 1909, immediately after José Miguel Gómez (b. 1858–d. 1921) assumed the presidency.

Cuba's next three presidents shared characteristics with their predecessors. Each came from the Cuban elite and had served in the Cuban liberation army during the war for independence. They also fell under the shadow of U.S. interests in Cuba affairs. When violence threatened in the months leading up to the 1913 election, U.S. Marines landed, which cooled the tempers of the opposing political factions. When President Mario García Menocal (b. 1866–d. 1941) wanted to extend his presidency in 1917, opposition groups again threatened revolt. Once again, U.S. Marines were dispatched to Cuba, along with a warning from U.S. president Woodrow Wilson that his administration would not recognize a government that came to power by force. While these actions helped stem the violence, they did not stop the electoral fraud that returned Menocal to office in 1916 and brought Alfredo Zayas (b. 1861–d. 1934) to the presidency in 1921. With the Cuban government plagued by debt and in need of a financial bailout, Zayas accepted U.S.-imposed reforms, which included a momentary end to government corruption and the implementation of a balanced budget in order to receive a \$65 million loan from the J. P. Morgan Company. By 1923, however, corruption

and nepotism again came to the fore in Cuban politics. GERARDO MACHADO Y MORALES (b. 1874–d. 1937) succeeded Zayas in 1925 following elections in 1924. Early in his presidential tenure, Machado delivered on his campaign promises for economic development through government-sponsored agricultural diversification and industrial programs; infrastructure projects, particularly road building; and improved EDUCATION, especially at the University of Havana. Machado's supporters used intimidation and coercion to ensure he was reelected to the presidency in 1928, but at the same time, the Cuban sugar market collapsed, a situation that only worsened in the early 1930s. Most Cubans blamed Machado rather than the global depression for the country's lost market share. Machado's opponents used reports of the administration's financial and political corruption to fuel protests against him.

In the 30 years following independence in 1902, the Cuban economy underwent significant changes, the most evident being the dominance of U.S. firms across the economic spectrum. In 1902, U.S. investments on the island totaled \$100 million, twice what they had been in 1895, but still far less than the \$1.5 billion on the eve of the Great Depression that began in 1929. North Americans owned tobacco and sugar properties, sugar mills, railroads, factories, and public utilities, while sugar remained Cuba's primary export product and the United States its primary market. Cubans were dependent on the United States as the source of bank loans, consumer goods, and machinery.

U.S. firms contributed significantly to the growth of Cuba's middle sector, an amorphous group of people that included skilled workers, white-collar managers, professional people, educators, and the educated, as well as the many small businessmen and shopkeepers who serviced the urban centers. During the 1920s, many urban sector groups formed their own organizations; these included the Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba (CNOC), or the national labor union; the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario, which was made up of university students; and the Partido Nacional Sufragistas, which called for WOMEN'S suffrage. In Cuba's closed political system, however, these groups lacked the opportunity to achieve their goals. Many also considered that the United States was using the Platt Amendment as a vehicle to maintain power in the Cuban elitist regimes that protected their own economic interests at the expense of Cuban economic development and sovereignty.

As the Great Depression deepened in the 1930s, Cubans became increasingly frustrated at the government's failure to alleviate their economic hardship. By spring 1933, the situation had become so tense that U.S. economic interests on the island appeared to be under threat. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt dispatched Sumner Welles to Cuba to find a solution to the crisis. Welles labored unsuccessfully from May until August 12, 1933, when the Cuban army ousted Machado and placed

Carlos Manuel de Céspedes (b. 1871–d. 1939) in the presidency. He could control neither the economic chaos nor the street violence, which culminated on September 5, 1933, with the so-called Sergeant's Revolt, led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. Céspedes was replaced by a five-man junta known as the pentarchy, of which RAMÓN GRAU SAN MARTÍN was the leading figure.

At the same time, many Cubans believed that Grau, a former university professor who had been exiled for opposing the Machado regime, would be able to unite the various political factions. He did not and instead turned to the ideals of José Martí, the father of Cuban independence. In what some analysts have called the "Revolution of '33," Grau envisioned an anti-imperialistic social revolution that appealed to Cuban nationalistic spirit. His unilateral suspension of the Platt Amendment satisfied many Cubans' anti-imperialistic nationalism. Grau appealed to LABOR with decrees that implemented an eight-hour workday, required that 50 percent of all employees in any given company must be Cuban, and prohibited any more Haitian and Jamaican workers from entering the country. These actions also struck at U.S. economic interests in Cuba, but President Roosevelt demurred to Welles's request not to intervene, as this would be contrary to the forthcoming announcement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY. Welles and his successor, Jefferson McCaffrey, went on to encourage Batista to seize power, and on January 14, 1934, Batista's military ousted Grau from the presidency.

THE BATISTA PERIOD, 1934–1959

Batista remained at the center of Cuban politics for the next 25 years. From behind the scenes, he ruled Cuba from 1934 to 1940 through puppet presidents and in 1940 was elected to the presidency in his own right. Unable to seek immediate reelection in 1944, Batista turned over the presidential sash to his old nemesis, Grau. The latter was succeeded by Carlos Prió Socarrás (b. 1903–d. 1977). While the three presidential elections were relatively free of corruption by Cuban standards, other government actions signaled important changes in the country's socioeconomic structure. In 1934, Batista negotiated an end to the Platt Amendment, which fueled Cuban nationalism. Before the decade ended, Batista had directed the implementation of a state-sponsored health program, the establishment of consumers' cooperatives, government control of rents and utilities, and a modest agricultural reform program. Batista also oversaw the writing of the 1940 constitution, considered Latin America's most progressive at the time. It included provisos for universal suffrage, civil liberties, and workers' rights. The wealth generated by the demand for Cuban sugar during World War II supported a vast public works program, but the winds of economic change surfaced in 1947 as other prewar sources of cane and beet sugar, such as eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, returned to the global market. The various health issues associated

with the consumption of sugar led to a dramatic increase in the popularity of sugar substitutes, which hit Cuba's sugar industry hard. At the same time, Cuba remained economically dependent on the United States not only as a market for its sugar but as a source for consumer and industrial goods. U.S. companies maintained their control over the TRANSPORTATION, communication, sugar-refining, and tourism industries in Cuba, which fueled anti-American nationalism.

Anti-Americanism forced the Cuban congress to reject U.S. financial assistance. In 1946 and 1947, U.S. assistance and grant programs were designed to help diversify the Cuban economy and therefore decrease the country's dependence on sugar. In what many observers described as a strange marriage, Communist Party congressional delegates joined with Liberal and Conservative Party representatives to reject the offer. The Communists described the financial aid package as just another example of U.S. imperialism, while the landowning Conservatives and Liberals preferred to pressure the government to find additional outlets for the country's sugar in the increasingly competitive world market.

Grau and Prío Socarrás soon lost the idealism that had brought them to the presidency in 1944 and 1948, respectively, and once again embezzlement, graft, corruption, and malfeasance of public office permeated every branch of national, provincial, and municipal government. Cronyism and nepotism contributed to the employment of 11 percent of the working population in government posts. During the same time period, organized violence gripped Cuban cities. Gangs made up of armed gunmen, or *pistoleros*, found a haven on the University of Havana campus. The U.S. MAFIA made inroads into the Havana tourist INDUSTRY and by the 1950s had increased its gambling and prostitution operations across the island.

In the midst of this violence and corruption, a student leader in the 1933 Sergeant's Revolt, Eduardo Chibás (b. 1907–d. 1951), organized the Orthodox Party in 1947 and garnered public attention with a call to uphold the ideals of Martí and the "Generation of 1930," these being social justice, political freedom, economic reform, and public honesty. Chibás drew support from the middle class and university students, including Fidel Castro, who demanded an end to political corruption. Chibás used a weekly radio program to stir the public, but this came to an abrupt end on August 5, 1951, when he committed suicide during a broadcast. Cubans' emotional response to his death remains as the public high-water mark of their disgust with their politicians. Chibás's death also directly contributed to the coup d'état engineered by Batista on the morning of March 21, 1952, and to Castro's determination to destroy the existing political apparatus.

Batista returned to Cuba from Florida to assume a senate seat to which he had just been elected and to form his own political party. Batista ran for the presidency in 1952, but when opinion polls indicated that he would not win, he found support among a group of younger army

officers to stage a coup d'état on March 10, 1954. Batista subsequently rigged the November 1954 election and returned to office for another four years.

A native of Birán in Oriente Province, Castro entered Cuba's turbulent political arena shortly after receiving his law degree from the University of Havana in 1950. Although drawn to the ideology of Chibás's Orthodox Party, the party shunned him because of his affiliation with student gangs at the university, his participation in the 1947 attempted coup d'état against the Dominican dictator RAFAEL TRUJILLO, his association with the 1948 riots in BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA, and his vehement public criticisms of the Cuban government since graduation. Nevertheless, Castro campaigned for a congressional seat in the 1952 elections as a self-professed *ortodoxo* until Batista's coup on March 10, which convinced Castro that the only way to reform the Cuban political system would be to rebuild it after its destruction.

Following the Batista coup, Castro set about organizing a revolutionary group that led an unsuccessful attack on the Moncada army barracks in Oriente Province on July 26, 1953. Most of Castro's followers either died in the battle or were executed later by Batista's army. Fidel and his brother RAÚL CASTRO RUZ were captured and imprisoned after show trials. Fidel defended himself with an appeal that described Cuba's socioeconomic and political injustices. For many analysts, Castro's statement, later published as *History Will Absolve Me*, foreshadowed Castro's policies once he himself came to power. In 1955, after serving only 11 months of their 15-year sentences on the ISLE OF PINES, the Castro brothers departed for MEXICO CITY, where they found comfort with several other disgruntled expatriates who helped finance the acquisition of arms that would be used on Castro's return to the island. In the meantime, in Cuba, several groups opposed to Batista had formed. For the most part, these were made up of university students and the urban middle class who wished to see a democratic Cuba. Batista's brutal attempts at suppressing these groups only served to embolden them.

Only 11 of Castro's 86 followers survived after landing on the beaches of Oriente Province the night of December 2, 1956. These 11, along with the Castro brothers and ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, an Argentine doctor turned revolutionary, escaped to the Sierra Maestra mountains, from which they conducted a guerrilla war against the Batista regime until Batista fled the country on December 31, 1958 (see CUBAN REVOLUTION).

CASTRO AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Shortly after arriving in Havana on January 7, 1959, Castro set about manipulating events to ensure his rise to power. Many of the elite and military officers who did not immediately flee the island after Batista's downfall faced "kangaroo courts," which condemned them to death by firing squad or to long prison terms. Presidents Manuel Urrutia (b. 1908–d. 1981) and Osvaldo Dorticós

(b. 1919–d. 1983) served in name only before their resignations; Castro was the real power behind the scenes. In spring 1959, Castro nationalized large landed estates and turned them into farmer's cooperatives, pegged rents to salaries, lowered the salaries of Cubans working for U.S. companies, and owing to "threats to the regime" announced the need to postpone elections. These actions prompted many from the middle class to leave the country. In June 1960, Castro nationalized U.S. oil refineries on the island for refusing to refine Soviet oil, on President Dwight D. Eisenhower's directions. This came at a time when the U.S. Congress voted to cut imports of Cuban sugar, and when that law was enacted on July 3, 1960, Castro began nationalizing all U.S. business operations in Cuba. The confrontation reached its peak in January 1961 when Castro demanded drastic cuts in the U.S. embassy staff in Havana. Eisenhower responded by severing diplomatic relations altogether.


Castro became something of a pawn in the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the failed BAY OF PIGS INVASION in April 1961, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev publicly declared that the Soviets would defend Cuba and a year later convinced his reluctant generals to approve placing missiles on the island. This had more to do with a global balance of power than it did with Cuba's defense against invasion, as Castro despairingly learned when the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS ended in October 1962. Until Cuba's near economic collapse at the end of the decade, the Soviets remained reluctant to become involved in the island's affairs (see SOVIET UNION AND CUBA).

During the years 1962–70, the Cuban economy spiraled downward. As minister of industry, the idealistic Guevara failed to persuade Cuban workers to toil for something other than money. With the U.S. embargo, Cuba could not earn sufficient foreign income to purchase the machinery necessary to build an industrial base (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF). To meet this need, Castro determined that there would be a 10-million-ton sugar crop by 1970, which would be sold on the world market. The government plowed under thousands of acres of land that had been devoted to growing other foodstuffs, citrus, and timber, yet the goal was not met. With the economy in ruins, Castro had no choice but to accept the implementation of Soviet-style five-year plans if he hoped to move the nation out of the economic doldrums. By the mid-1970s, the Cuban economy had recovered sufficiently to satisfy the basic needs of most Cubans, though there was no excess and only limited consumer goods. Improvements in EDUCATION, health care, sanitation, and medicine, however, earned Cuba high regard in the international community.

Castro had consolidated his power in the political arena by 1964. No rival parties existed to challenge his own Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Committees for the defense of the revolution (CDRs) appeared in every

neighborhood, workplace, and school to inform on those discontented with the revolution. All elements of society were organized into groups controlled by the state: Women came under the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, or FMC); athletes were placed under the National Institute for Sports, Physical Education, and Recreation (Instituto Nacional de Deportes, Educación Física y Recreación, or INDER); and the film and art industry came under the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry (Instituto Cubano de Arte e Industria Cinematográfica, or ICAIC). Additionally, the press was censored. Having consolidated his control over Cuban society and with his brother, Raúl, in charge of the military, Fidel could admit his shortcomings and offer to resign in 1970 over the failed economy. There was no one to step forward.

Disparities of wealth surfaced in the mid-1970s. The government had failed to satisfy people's housing needs, there was a lack of consumer goods, and only high-ranking Communist Party members could travel abroad. These problems became evident in the April to September 1980 MARIEL BOATLIFT, when approximately



The wall painting at the entrance to Cuba's national museum in Havana sarcastically comments to U.S. president Ronald Reagan: "Thank you, cretin, for helping to continue the [Cuban] revolution." (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

250,000 Cubans left the island for the United States. The quality of life in Cuba did not improve in the 1980s. The Soviet Union, now splintering, could no longer afford to underwrite the Cuban economy at an estimated \$2 million annually. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Cuba entered a period of particular economic hardship. Shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies became widespread, and although the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997 deprived Castro of some decision-making power, he retained his position. "Socialism or Death" was his battle cry to save the revolution.

By the late 1990s, a number of interconnected economic reforms had brought about a semblance of economic recovery. Joint ventures with European firms resulted in the construction of luxury hotels, which in turn brought tourists to the island and stimulated job creation in the service sector; many private homes were turned into restaurants and pensions as well. Other joint ventures included the mining of bauxite and foreign operation of port facilities. The government permitted cash-only farmer's markets to compete with state-run food stores. Those with skills, such as television, radio, and bicycle repair people, found themselves making more money than medical doctors on the state payroll. Still, there were shortages, and by 2000, taking advantage of new U.S. legislation, Cuba began to purchase U.S. foodstuffs. Electricity and fuel shortages continued to hamper both the economy and the quality of everyday life, however. Petroleum grants from VENEZUELA's president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS alleviated the situation somewhat. Still, the government silenced protesters and dissenters when Castro fell ill in summer 2006. Raúl Castro assumed the presidency in February 2008.

See also CUBA (Vols. I, II, III); MARTÍ, JOSÉ (Vol. III); WAR OF 1898 (Vol. III).

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Cuba, U.S. trade embargo of On July 6, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the stoppage to U.S. imports of Cuban sugar for the remainder of the 1960s. The sugar embargo was in retaliation for FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's nationalization of U.S. oil refineries in CUBA. As Castro continued his nationalization, on October 30, 1960, Eisenhower stopped all TRADE

with Cuba, except for food and medicines. Adverse public reaction to the implementation of Castro's CUBAN REVOLUTION in the United States and President John F. Kennedy's determination that Castro be ousted made the embargo complete on September 4, 1961. Two years later, in July 1963, some \$33 million in Cuban assets were frozen in U.S. financial institutions. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson then successfully persuaded most European and Latin American nations to curtail their trade with Cuba. By 1968, Cuba stood in near economic isolation.

The embargo began to crumble in the early 1970s as Latin American nations including ARGENTINA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, PERU, and VENEZUELA reopened diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. In 1972, the European Economic Community extended special trade privileges to the country. As a result, by 1975, Cuba's trade with the noncommunist world accounted for 41.2 percent of its total trade. Despite pressure from the U.S. business community, Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford kept the U.S. embargo in place. Ford also attempted to prevent subsidiaries of U.S.-based companies from sending their manufactured goods to Cuba, but President Jimmy Carter lifted those restrictions, along with Kennedy's travel restrictions on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. The changes were short lived. Presidents Ronald R. Reagan, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush reinstated the trade embargo, and during the 1990s, the Cuban Democracy Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act further tightened the restrictions. Only the loophole on food and medicine trade remained in place by 2001, and U.S. agricultural interests capitalized on it. To the consternation of President George W. Bush, representatives of U.S. agrobusiness and governors of Midwestern agricultural states attended Cuba's agricultural affair in September 2001 and have done so each year through 2008. In all, some \$700 million in contracts provide for the sale of U.S. foodstuffs, agricultural products, and cattle to Cuba. U.S. policy direction took another turn with the presidential election of Barack Obama in November 2008. Once in office, by executive order, Obama removed the limits on dollar remittances to the island by Cuban Americans and permitted unlimited travel by Cuban Americans to visit their island relatives. These gestures await indicators from Cuba before exploratory talks take place on lifting other portions of the U.S. embargo.

Largely because the Soviet Union propped up the Cuban ECONOMY through 1991, the U.S. trade embargo failed to bring economic chaos to Cuba or force Castro's overthrow (see SOVIET UNION AND CUBA). While the Cuban economy has worsened since 1991, the government's policy of joint ventures with foreign-, but not U.S.-, owned businesses and its emphasis on tourism, along with remittances from Cuban Americans, have kept the Cuban economy afloat, although barely.

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Cuban American National Foundation (CANF)

Founded in 1981 by Jorge Mas Canosa (b. 1939–d. 1997) and a group of prominent Cuban exiles in Miami, Florida, the Cuban American National Foundation, or CANF, came to influence and advise U.S. foreign policy makers regarding CUBA in the latter part of the 20th century. After participating in the failed 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION, Mas Canosa returned to Miami, where he became a prominent businessman.

Recognizing that the United States would not overthrow FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, Mas Canosa founded CANF initially to enlighten the U.S. public about the harsh economic, social, and political conditions in Cuba. Subsequently, CANF turned its attention to the implementation of harsh measures against Cuba in an effort to topple Castro by economic strangulation. Mas Canosa found a sympathetic ear in Presidents Ronald R. Reagan and George H. W. Bush and is credited with the harsh stance each took toward Castro. The U.S. government's National Endowment for Democracy provided financial support for CANF's anti-Castro programs. In 1985, the U.S. government established and financed Radio Martí and in 1990 TV Martí to broadcast programs into Cuba (see RADIO AND TV MARTÍ). U.S.-based Cuban exiles dominated their supervisory boards, which were chaired by Mas Canosa. CANF members also lobbied Congress for the passage of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Bill) and the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Act (Helms-Burton Bill).

Reportedly, Mas Canosa envisioned himself as president of a post-Castro Cuba and toward that end assembled a team of economists, engineers, and other specialists to plan a market economy directed by CANF. This proposal caused a split in the Cuban-exile community and led to the establishment of more moderate groups that called for negotiation with the Castro regime. CANF also struck out against its critics, a fact best illustrated by its 1992 demonstrations against the *Miami Herald* for an alleged pro-Castro editorial policy. *America's Watch*, which usually criticized foreign dictators, accused Mas

Canosa and CANF of creating a repressive atmosphere within the Cuban-exile community.

Jorge Mas Santos (b. 1962) succeeded his father as chairman of CANF's board of directors in 1997, but he represented the growing generational differences within the Cuban-exile community. Many of the younger exiles, born in the United States, favored an accommodation with the Communist-led island government. The older exiles, such as CANF president Francisco Hernandez, continued to advocate a "hard" policy toward Castro and viewed Mas Santos as favoring the younger generation. In protest, 12 senior members of CANF's directorship resigned in 2001. A year later, CANF and its hardline supporters found solace in U.S. president George W. Bush's tightening of the economic embargo on Cuba. The generational split on U.S.-Cuban policy remains.

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Cuban missile crisis (1962) On October 14, 1962, photographs from a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane confirmed the construction of Soviet missile sites in CUBA. For the next two weeks, the world stood on the brink of nuclear war. Several reasons have been advanced to explain why the Soviets sought to construct the sites. For FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, the answer was simple: Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev was making good on his promise to defend Cuba against a possible U.S. invasion. The Soviets' reasons were more complex (see SOVIET UNION AND CUBA). So, too, were the reasons behind U.S. president John F. Kennedy's response.


President Kennedy's acceptance of responsibility for the April 1961 failed BAY OF PIGS INVASION and his nervousness in the face of Khrushchev's arrogant taunts at the June 1961 Vienna summit conference left the Soviet premier with the impression that he was dealing with a weak U.S. president. Thus, placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba beginning in the spring of 1962 not only challenged the perception of Soviet missile inferiority but also provided the Soviets with a counterbalance to U.S. missiles situated in Western Europe. Immediately, the Soviets gained leverage in the ongoing discussions to make Berlin a free city. Khrushchev had recently pro-

posed that West Berlin become a free city under United Nations (UN) control rather than continuing as an example of Western economic success—a free society situated in the Soviet sector of East Germany. Thus, missiles in Cuba could be used as a bargaining chip to achieve this goal in Berlin. While the Kennedy administration understood the Soviets' reasoning, particularly the final point, Berlin, the missiles also directly threatened U.S. urban centers within a 1,000-mile (1,609-km) range. Beyond that, Kennedy reasoned that the missiles contradicted the Monroe Doctrine, which had guided U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere since 1823. The doctrine declared the hemisphere off-limits to European encroachment. At the same time, Kennedy confronted a recalcitrant congress that was stalling his domestic initiatives and presented him with a then two-year-old resolution authorizing the use of force to rid Cuba of communism. Additionally, congressional elections were scheduled for November 1963. Forcing the Soviets to back down on the missiles in Cuba would improve Kennedy's image as a strong president. He argued that he needed more Democrats in Congress not only to support his domestic policies but to play a tougher diplomatic game with the Soviets.

Immediately after confirmation of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, Kennedy formed an executive committee (EXCOM) to deal with the crisis. During its meetings between October 16 and October 21, EXCOM divided

into two groups. The "hawks" included former secretary of state Dean Acheson, presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McCone, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor. The "moderates" included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Undersecretary of State George Ball. The hawks recommended an immediate air strike, while the moderates favored a blockade. Secretary of State Dean Rusk went further. He proposed a blockade against only offensive weapons because that would be more acceptable to the international community, whose support the president desired. EXCOM accepted the proposal and the entire National Security Council approved a plan of action that included a presidential address on the matter to the American people and, at the same time, announcing the implementation of a naval blockade against offensive weapons being introduced to Cuba. Presidential emissaries were dispatched to Great Britain and France before Kennedy's address to the nation. The U.S. case would be presented to the UN and the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS).

As Kennedy implemented the plan, throughout the week, his brother Robert met with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, in the hope of keeping channel communications open. Dobrynin came away from these meetings convinced that the hawks



The Soviet ship *Metallurg Anosov* carrying missiles out of Cuba at the conclusion of the 1963 missile crisis (Courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library)

would prevail and force the president to order bombing raids of the Soviet missile sites in Cuba.

On October 22, Rusk gained OAS support for the quarantine and, if necessary, the use of force to end the crisis. At the UN, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson indicted the Russians before the Security Council but sought no action because the Soviets had the power to veto council decisions.

Against this backdrop, the Soviets formulated their response. On October 23, Khrushchev sent out two contradictory messages. To Kennedy, the Soviet premier denounced the blockade and accused the president of taking the world to the brink of nuclear war. In a second message, to British pacifist Bertrand Russell, Khrushchev again blasted Kennedy but also recognized the consequences of war, which suggested that a top-level meeting had taken place to settle the crisis. On October 25, 20 of 25 Soviet cargo ships turned away as they approached the U.S. naval blockade. The other five were searched for missiles and, not carrying any, were permitted to continue on to Cuba.

The crisis came to a head on October 26, when Kennedy received a personal letter from Khrushchev in which the latter offered to remove the missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. promise not to invade the island. Later that day, ABC newscaster John Scali met with Soviet KGB agent Aleksandr Fomin in a Washington, D.C., coffeeshop, during which Fomin outlined the Soviet plan for a settlement. It repeated Khrushchev's points to Kennedy and added that the removal of missiles would be supervised by UN observers. Before receiving Scali's report, Kennedy received a more formal note from Khrushchev, who now demanded that the United States remove its missiles from Turkey in return for the Soviet missile removal from Cuba. Kennedy agreed to do so but not publicly out of concern for adverse reaction from North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) members. The deal was struck. Castro, who had not been consulted during the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations, was so furious that he refused to admit the UN observers into Cuba. Therefore, U.S. reconnaissance planes witnessed the Soviet missile withdrawal instead.

Subsequent documentation in the 1990s revealed that the Soviets actually had 42,000 troops and nine short-range tactical nuclear weapons on the ground in Cuba and that local commanders planned to use the weapons if the United States had invaded the island. The world was closer to nuclear war than most realized in 1962.

See also MONROE DOCTRINE (Vol. III).

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Cuban revolution (1933) See GRAU SAN MARTÍN, RAMÓN; MACHADO Y MORALES, GERARDO.

Cuban Revolution (1956–1961) FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's arrival in HAVANA on January 7, 1952, marked the culmination of events that had begun with FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR's coup d'état on March 10 of that year and also marked the beginning of the consolidation of the revolution that changed CUBA from the 1960s into the early 21st century. Batista's coup convinced Castro that only through violence could Cuba's old order be changed and a new system based on the ideals of José Martí be instituted. Castro's defense of the raid on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, published as *History Will Absolve Me*, is testimony to this belief. Released from prison after serving only 11 months of a 15-year sentence for leading the Moncada attack, Fidel and his brother RAÚL CASTRO RUZ departed for MEXICO CITY, where they planned to return to Cuba to change the old order. They were not alone.

As the Castros plotted in MEXICO, several groups did the same in Cuba, including José Antonio Echeverría's (b. 1930–d. 1957) university student group, the Revolutionary Directorate, and Frank País's (b. 1934–d. 1957) underground 26th of July Movement, which initiated violence against the Batista regime. The latter reacted with ever-increasing repression. When the Castros returned to the island along with Argentine revolutionary ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA and 81 other men on December 2, 1956, the anticipated general uprising against Batista did not occur. Alerted to the plan, Batista's army closed down Havana and awaited Castro's landing in Oriente Province. The Castro brothers, Guevara, and 18 others escaped into the Sierra Maestra mountains in southeastern Oriente Province, where they quickly learned that socioeconomic hardship and the central government's repression of mainly Afro-Cuban agricultural workers could be used to build a popular resistance movement. Early victories over the government's Rural Guard at La Plata and El Uvero in 1957 and the guard's terroristic response increased popular support for the revolutionaries' cause. Throughout 1957 and into early 1958, the size of the insurgent force grew, and new fronts were opened, headed by Raúl Castro in the north; Juan Almeida (b. 1927) near Santiago de Cuba; Camilo Cienfuegos (b. 1932–d. 1959?) on the Holguín plains; and Guevara around Turquino Peak. By February 1958, these groups

had destroyed railroads, bridges, and large sections of highways.

While guerrilla warfare gripped the countryside, in Havana, protests, demonstrations, and violence became commonplace. Faculty and students closed down the University of Havana. The students almost succeeded in assassinating Batista during an attack on the presidential palace on March 13, 1957. In a coordinated attack on a Havana radio station, Echeverría lost his life. Otherwise, the urban insurgents exploded bombs, set fires, cut power lines, derailed trains, and kidnapped and killed their alleged or real enemies. Batista responded with equal ferocity toward insurgents, real or imagined. Echeverría's death and Batista's repression allowed Castro to seize the leadership role of the insurgency, which he did in the Caracas Pact, concluded in the Venezuelan city of that name on July 28, 1958. Accordingly, the various insurgent groups agreed to cooperate in overthrowing Batista and implementing a program of economic, social, and institutional justice for the Cuban people.

In mid-1958, Batista launched a military offensive against the rebels in the countryside, but by summer's end, his army had withered away, mostly without fighting the Castro-led forces in eastern Cuba. By late November 1958, Batista's army no longer existed. After refusing last-minute U.S. mediation efforts to reach an accommodation with Castro, Batista fled for the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC on December 31, 1958, leaving Colonel Ramón Barquín (b. 1914–d. 2008) to order a cease-fire and then surrender his troops to the Army of Liberation.

The government established by Castro in January 1959 included several moderates, including Manuel Urrutia (b. 1901–d. 1981) as president and José Miró Cardona (b. 1903–d. 1974) as prime minister. These appointments, however, concealed the fact that Castro was the real power. As the moderates resigned in protest, they were replaced by Castro's followers, including Augusto Martínez Sánchez (b. 1923–) as labor minister, Guevara as director of the National Bank, and Castro himself as prime minister. Castro became the focal point of the revolution.

During the first nine months of his administration, Castro took every opportunity to denounce U.S. dominance of the Cuban ECONOMY and support for the elite rulers of the past. He set out to consolidate his control over the country. *Batistianos* and other alleged opponents of the revolution faced summary trials, followed by execution, exile, or long jail sentences. Committees for the defense of the revolution (CDRs) were placed in every workplace, housing project, and classroom to ferret out opponents of the revolution. Castro turned to the Communist Party for its leadership and discipline to find individuals for government, commercial, and industrial positions. His people took control of

the Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Cubano) and University Students' Federation (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria). Castro also directed the formation of other groups, including the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, or FMC) and the National Association of Small Farms (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños, or ANAP). Supporters of the revolution learned that loyalty to Castro had its rewards, such as government positions, access to government loans for economic activities, and admission to higher education. As Castro later remarked: "Within the Revolution, everything is possible; outside, it is improbable."

Beginning in March 1959, Castro also focused on the needs of the urban poor. Over the next nine months, he decreed drastic rate cuts for rents, electricity, telephone, and water and sewerage services. The homes of Batista government and army officials and other elites were confiscated and distributed among the poor. An import luxury tax was placed on television sets, jewelry, and cars, which curtailed the spending of those among the wealthy who had not yet left the island and were not in prison. The salaries of Cuban nationals employed in U.S.-owned businesses were slashed to equal those of other Cubans. The Agricultural Reform Law, passed on May 17, 1959, restricted land holdings to 1,000 acres (405 ha), except for cattle grazing. The confiscated lands were divided into 67-acre (27-ha) plots for distribution to peasant farmers. Reading and medical programs sent thousands of Cuban youth into the countryside to supply these basic needs to the rural poor.

By the time of the BAY OF PIGS INVASION in April 1961, Castro had institutionalized his revolution. Political opposition had been eliminated, and his brand of *personalismo* dominated the political arena. Castro solidified his support from lower socioeconomic groups through his urban and agrarian reform decrees. The Bay of Pigs invasion served to tighten his control over the island, which he accomplished before the weaknesses of his system manifested in the mid-1960s.

See also MARTÍ, JOSÉ (Vol. III).

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D

D'Aubuisson, Roberto See DUARTE, JOSÉ NAPOLEÓN; EL SALVADOR; FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

de la Huerta, Adolfo (b. 1881–d. 1955) *revolutionary leader and interim president of Mexico* Adolfo de la Huerta was a leader in the MEXICAN REVOLUTION and served as governor of the state of Sonora. He helped steer MEXICO away from the fighting phase of the revolution after 1920 but was expelled from the country after leading an unsuccessful revolt in 1924.

De la Huerta was born on May 26, 1881, in Hermosillo. He became a loyal ally to FRANCISCO MADERO and contributed to the local 1910 insurrection against Porfirio Díaz. After Madero was overthrown and executed in 1913, de la Huerta joined forces with VENUSTIANO CARRANZA against the dictatorship of VICTORIANO HUERTA (1913–14). De la Huerta rose to prominence in Sonoran politics and formed an alliance known as the Sonoran Triangle with ÁLVARO OBREGÓN and PLUTARCO ELÍAS CALLES. The three leaders overthrew Carranza's government in 1920, and de la Huerta served as interim president until Obregón was elected in November of that year.

Between 1920 and 1923, de la Huerta served as finance minister and worked to stabilize the nation's postrevolutionary ECONOMY. When Obregón announced in 1923 that he would support Calles for president in the upcoming election, de la Huerta rose in revolt. The ensuing rebellion threatened the delicate peace the Sonoran Triangle leaders had managed to achieve in the aftermath of the violent revolution. De la Huerta's revolt was defeated after just a few months. Calles became

president, and de la Huerta fled into exile in the United States. De la Huerta returned to Mexico in 1935 and died in MEXICO CITY on July 9, 1955.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III).

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Devil's Island Prison One of the world's most infamous prisons, the Devil's Island Prison in French Guiana was the inspiration for the 1973 movie *Papillon*, starring Steve McQueen and Dustin Hoffman.

During the 19th century, Emperor Napoléon III of France decided that penal settlements in French Guiana, one of the FRENCH OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS, would reduce the cost of maintaining prisoners in France and contribute to the development of the colony. Devil's Island (Île du Diable) is the smallest (35 acres [14 ha]) and northernmost of the three Îles du Salut lying off the coast of French Guiana. Devil's Island Prison opened in 1852, and the French eventually constructed prisons on the other two islands, as well as on the mainland at Kourou. Over time, the entire penal system in French Guiana became collectively known as Devil's Island.

Between 1852 and 1938, the French sent more than 80,000 prisoners to Devil's Island. Prisoners sentenced to a term of less than eight years had to spend an equal period of time living in the colony after their release from prison. Those whose sentence was more than eight years had to remain in the colony permanently. Regardless, as 90 percent of the prisoners died of disease

and abuse, the prison population did little to augment the colony's struggling population. Although escape was arduous and the punishment for a failed attempt severe, prisoners such as Henri "Papillon" Charrière frequently tried to escape. In 1938, the government ceased sending prisoners to Devil's Island, and the penal settlement was eventually closed in 1952. French Guiana has never fully escaped its negative image as a former penal colony with an unhealthy climate and an impenetrable hinterland. In 1965, the French government transferred control of Devil's Island to the Centre National d'Études Spatiales (CNES), the French government's space agency, which had been established in 1961.

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Díaz, Félix (b. 1868–d. 1945) *Mexican political leader and counterrevolutionary* Félix Díaz was the nephew of dictator Porfirio Díaz, who ruled MEXICO from 1876 to 1911, and led an insurrection against the presidency of FRANCISCO MADERO (1911–13) after his uncle had been deposed at the beginning of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. Díaz's rebellion eventually led to Madero's overthrow and execution, and Díaz contributed to the rise of dictator VICTORIANO HUERTA (1913–14).

Díaz was born in 1868 in Oaxaca. His father, also named Félix Díaz, was the younger brother of Porfirio. The elder Félix became governor of Oaxaca in 1870 and carried out a number of aggressive Liberal reforms. Shortly thereafter, he was tortured and killed following an unsuccessful revolt against Benito Juárez. The younger Félix pursued a career in the MILITARY and later entered politics. He eventually rose to the rank of general and briefly became governor of Oaxaca during the Porfiriato.

Félix Díaz supported his uncle when widespread rebellion broke out in 1910 and continued to challenge Madero after the revolutionary leader was elected president. In 1912, Díaz allied with another Porfirian general, Bernardo Reyes (b. 1850–d. 1913), and led a counter-revolutionary revolt against Madero. Madero assigned Victoriano Huerta to put down the revolt, but the shrewd general betrayed the president and joined forces with Díaz after a 10-day standoff in MEXICO CITY. Díaz hoped to become an integral part of Huerta's administration after the overthrow of Madero, but the newly installed dictator sent him on a diplomatic mission to Asia. Díaz returned in the later years of the revolution but found few supporters for his attempts to overthrow VENUSTIANO CARRANZA. Díaz died in obscurity in 1945.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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Dirty War (1974–1983) The Dirty War in ARGENTINA was a nine-year conflict between Argentina's MILITARY governments and leftist opposition groups that reached its height between 1976 and 1978 during the administration of General Jorge Rafael Videla (b. 1925–). During the conflict an estimated 9,000 persons lost their lives and another 10,000–30,000 simply "disappeared."

Following the 1966 coup d'état, a string of ruling military generals sought to break the political strength of Argentine LABOR unions. Government repression of the workers only emboldened the opposition, which became increasingly combative, as seen in the May 1969 confrontation in Córdoba between middle-sector labor groups and the military over Argentina's declining economic well-being. Four significant guerrilla groups emerged out of the violence: the Peronist Montoneros, the Peronista Armed Forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the People's Revolutionary Army. Each determined to destroy the country's existing political order. Over the next several years, these groups, acting independent of one another, carried out kidnappings for ransom, bank robberies, and assassinations, including the killing of former president Pedro Aramburu (b. 1903–d. 1970). The continuing violence and worsening economic conditions led to the return of JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN as president in 1973. He died in 1974 and was succeeded by his vice president and wife, ISABEL MARTÍNEZ DE PERÓN, who quickly lost control over labor unions and was deposed by the military on March 24, 1976. Against this backdrop of political turmoil, urban violence, and a down-spiraling ECONOMY, the military carried out its Dirty War.

The Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Triple A), supplemented by antiguerrilla units in the national military, had initiated the war in 1973 and by 1975 was responsible for 458 assassinations. Four executive "decrees" in 1975 directed the military to "annihilate" subversives throughout the country. The country was divided into five zones, each of which was further divided into subdistricts, all under military control. The Argentine security services, which started counting its victims in 1975, reported that 22,000 people "disappeared" during the Dirty War. The Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, or CONADEP) put the number at 9,000, while some human rights groups place it at 20,000 to 30,000. The operation included murder, rape, imprisonment, torture, and, for some, being dropped from an airplane over the Atlantic Ocean. Young children who survived their parents' "disappearance" were placed in the homes of

military officers and their civilian colleagues. Families were denied information about relatives who had disappeared. The disappeared included prominent labor leaders, journalists, trade unionists, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens who came under military suspicion.

Although CONADEP issued its report in 1984, it was not until 1995 that some military officers admitted their roles in the Dirty War. President Raul Alfonsín (b. 1927–), who headed the first Argentine civilian administration after the 1982 MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR, successfully prosecuted several of the military officers, including Videla, who had directed the death squads or implemented the orders of those who did. Alfonsín's successor, CARLOS SAÚL MENEM, pardoned Videla and other officers on December 29, 1990. Many Argentines condemned this action as a violation of the nation's constitution, which does not permit the president to pardon persons already convicted of a crime. Others viewed the pardon as a pragmatic decision to heal national wounds and prevent possible future uprisings over the Dirty War resulting from the revisitation of past events during trial hearings. Videla did not escape prison, however. In 1998, he received a prison sentence for fraudulently arranging the adoption of children whose parents had disappeared by military families. And, in 2005, President NÉSTOR KIRCHNER approved the congressional repeal of Menem's pardon.

New laws also led to charges against Argentine cardinal Jorge Bergoglio (b. 1936–) for conspiring with the 1976 junta in the disappearance of two Jesuit priests and in the 2006 charges against Ford Motor and Daimler-Chrysler company officials of cooperating with military officials in the disappearance of workers.

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Dominica The largest and northernmost of the Windward Islands, Dominica occupies 290 square miles (751 km²) of territory. The oblong-shaped island lies between Guadeloupe to the north and Martinique to the south. Geographically, Dominica is unlike its neighbors. The country has one of the most rugged landscapes in the Caribbean and is mostly covered by rain forest. The capital, Roseau, is located on the southwestern coast. The nation became independent from the United Kingdom in 1978.

Virtually all of Dominica's 72,000 inhabitants are descended from African slaves. Dominica, however, is



Dominica prime minister Eugenia Charles meets with U.S. president Ronald Reagan (to her left) and his cabinet on October 25, 1983, the eve of the U.S.-sponsored invasion of Grenada. (Courtesy of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

the only eastern Caribbean nation that still has an Indian population. About 3,000 Caribs live on the eastern coast in eight villages. Since Dominica was initially colonized by the French and lies between two FRENCH OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS, about 80 percent of the island's people speak a French-based Creole. Nevertheless, English is the official language. Also as a result of the island's colonial past, about 80 percent of the people are Roman Catholic.

Following the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the British took possession of Dominica. The French unsuccessfully tried to regain the island in 1795 and 1805. In 1831, the British granted political rights to free blacks. Following the abolition of slavery in 1838, Dominica became the only British colony in the Caribbean to have a legislature controlled by blacks. White planters, however, who felt threatened by black rule, convinced the British government in 1865 to replace the elected assembly with one composed of half elected and half appointed legislators. Black political power was temporarily stymied. Demand for black political rights dramatically increased after World War I and were finally restored during the Great Depression. From 1958 to 1962, Dominica was part of the ill-fated WEST INDIES FEDERATION. In 1961, the Dominica Labour Party (DLP), led by Edward Oliver LeBlanc (b. 1923–d. 2004), came to power. LeBlanc served as chief minister from 1961 to 1967 and premier from 1967 to 1974, when he unexpectedly resigned. LeBlanc was replaced by Patrick John (b. 1938–), who became the first prime minister following independence from the United Kingdom on November 3, 1978. By 1979, political discontent forced John to resign. MARY EUGENIA CHARLES led the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) to victory in 1980. John, supported by white supremacist groups, unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the government in 1981. Edison James (b. 1943–) led the Dominica United Workers Party (DUWP) to victory in 1995, but the DLP returned to power in 2000. After two DLP prime ministers died in office, Roosevelt Skerrit (b. 1972–) became prime minister in 2004. Skerrit has joined Venezuelan president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS's Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.

Unlike other former British colonies in the region, Dominica became a republic following independence. The president is the ceremonial head of state, while executive power lies with the cabinet, led by the prime minister. The unicameral House of Assembly consists of 21 directly elected members and nine appointed members who may be chosen either by the president or the other members of the assembly.

Economic development has been complicated by the severe impact of hurricanes. During the 1990s, problems in the banana industry, the main agricultural crop, weakened the ECONOMY. The lack of a large international airport and sandy beaches has limited the development of the tourism industry. The island's vast rain forests, however, hold out the potential for the development of ecotourism.

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Dominican-Haitian relations Foreign relations between the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and HAITI have been plagued with conflict for almost two centuries. This tension has been exacerbated by geographic proximity, cultural differences, and authoritarian political regimes.

Tense relations have frequently erupted into violence since 1821, when the Dominican Republic first declared its independence. At the root of Dominican-Haitian conflict is the vast cultural divide between people who share a small Caribbean island. These cultural differences stem from the colonial period when France established a colony on the western third of the island of Hispaniola, and Spain established a colony on the eastern two-thirds of the island. The French created a lucrative sugar-producing colony based on slavery, whereas the Spanish, who found virtually no gold on the island, allowed their colony to languish as a peripheral component of the Spanish Empire in the New World. By the end of the 18th century, the French colony was primarily populated by black African slaves who spoke Kreyòl, a language derived from West African languages, and practiced Vodou, a religion influenced by West African spirituality. The people living in the Spanish colony, however, who represented less than one-fifth of the French colony's population, were primarily white and mulatto Spanish-speaking Roman Catholics who emphasized their European cultural traditions.

In 1795, following the Treaty of Basel, Spain surrendered its portion of the island to France. Nevertheless, Toussaint Louverture (b. 1743–d. 1803), a black leader of the Haitian Revolution, convinced that the island should be united under one government, invaded the eastern portion of the island in 1801. He was forced to withdraw in 1802 to return to Haiti to fight troops sent by Napoléon Bonaparte to subdue the revolution. Following Haiti's declaration of independence in 1804, Haitian leaders contended that the continued French presence in the eastern part of the island was a threat to Haitian independence and unsuccessfully invaded the eastern part of the island in 1805. Spanish settlers were able to expel the French in 1808 and restore Spanish colonial rule, only to declare independence on November 30, 1821. Within weeks, Haitian troops invaded and militarily occupied the Dominican Republic from 1822 to 1844. To change the racial composition in the Dominican Republic, the Haitians encouraged

the immigration of thousands of freed blacks from the United States to the eastern section of the island. Much Dominican hostility towards Haitians stems from this period. Following the second Dominican declaration of independence in 1844, Haiti made frequent attempts to reconquer the Dominican Republic. Haitian leader Faustin Soulouque made numerous attempts to reunify the island. Fear of Haitian military power convinced many political leaders in the Dominican Republic that the solution to the Haitian threat was annexation to a more powerful power, such as France, Great Britain, Spain, or the United States. This fear led to reannexation to Spain (1861–65) and an attempt to annex the Dominican Republic to the United States, which was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1870.

During the 1870s, the Dominicans began to develop a liberal export-led economy based on sugar production. Haitians were recruited to work on the Dominican sugar plantations, many of which became American-owned during the U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916–24). The presence of large numbers of Haitians in the Dominican Republic was viewed as a necessary evil, since most Dominicans refused to cut sugarcane. During the Great Depression, however, the need for Haitian cane cutters diminished, and the Dominican government, led by RAFAEL TRUJILLO, unleashed a wave of terror against Haitians in the western sector of the Dominican Republic. Fearful of the “Haitianization” of the Dominican Republic, Trujillo, using the excuse that the Haitians were engaging in illicit activities, orchestrated the death by machete of more than 15,000 Haitians.

Following the overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship in 1961, relations with Haiti did not improve. Dominican president JUAN BOSCH, who only ruled for seven months in 1963, threatened to invade Haiti and overthrow brutal Haitian dictator FRANÇOIS DUVALIER. Haitian cane cutters continued to play an important role in the Dominican economy, although during the 1970s, Dominican president JOAQUÍN BALAGUER repeatedly warned that the Haitian presence in the Dominican Republic threatened Dominican national identity. Notwithstanding the decline of the Dominican sugar industry during the 1980s, Haitians continued to seek employment in the Dominican Republic. Following the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, frequent political and economic chaos in Haiti convinced the Dominican government to close the border between the two nations. During the first decade of the 21st century, massive Haitian MIGRATION has resulted in the presence of more than 500,000 Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Accusations by human rights agencies that Haitians in the Dominican Republic are mistreated have increased tension between the two nations.

See also DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (Vol. III); HAITI (Vol. III); HAITIAN OCCUPATION OF SANTO DOMINGO (Vol. III); HISPANIOLA (Vols. I, II); SOULOUQUE, FAUSTIN (Vol. III).

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Dominican Republic Occupying the eastern two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic shares the island with HAITI. Culturally different, the two nations have experienced tense relations for almost two centuries (see DOMINICAN-HAITIAN RELATIONS).

The Dominican Republic occupies 18,810 square miles (48,718 km²) of territory, making it the second largest nation in the Caribbean after CUBA. The nation’s capital and largest city, SANTO DOMINGO, lies on the southern shore. The Caribbean’s highest peak, Pico Duarte, and the largest lake, Lago Enriquillo, are located in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic’s population of 9.4 million people, which includes more than 500,000 Haitians, is 75 percent mulatto, 15 percent white, and 10 percent black. Although more than 90 percent of the Dominican population has some degree of African ancestry, most Dominicans identify themselves as mixed-race or mulatto to distinguish themselves from the black population in neighboring Haiti. Dominicans use a variety of terms to indicate variations in skin tones, which are reinforced on their national identity cards. A substantial number of Dominicans have migrated to other lands in search of economic prosperity. Currently, more than 1 million Dominicans reside either legally or illegally in the United States, primarily in the greater New York City region.

A TRADITION OF INSTABILITY

Whereas the entire island of Hispaniola was initially a Spanish colony, in 1795, Spain ceded the western third to France. In 1821, Spanish-speaking colonists on the eastern side of the island declared themselves independent but were conquered by neighboring Haiti the following year and did not regain independence until 1844. After a brief period of economic and political pandemonium, the Dominican government voluntarily petitioned to return to Spanish colonial status in 1861. Realizing that Spanish colonial status was not the panacea for their economic and political woes, Dominican elites proclaimed independence in 1865. Although the Dominican Republic, pursuing a liberal economy based on exports of raw materials to Europe and the United States, experienced a brief period of economic and political stability during the last two decades of the 19th century, political and economic chaos had returned to the nation by 1900. In 1905, the United States implemented a U.S. CUSTOMS

RECEIVERSHIP, which placed the collection of Dominican customs revenues in the hands of U.S. government officials, who dispersed money to the Dominican government while simultaneously paying the Dominican foreign debt. Ongoing economic and political chaos, which directly threatened U.S. investment in the sugar industry, the threat of European intervention, and the desire to protect access routes to the Panama Canal, convinced the United States to militarily occupy the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924.

The groundwork for U.S. military intervention was laid on May 13, 1916, when the United States sent 700 U.S. Marines to the country to restore order and stability. On August 16, 1916, the U.S. government suspended payments to the Dominican government after President Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal (b. 1859–d. 1935) refused to accept a U.S. government official as his financial adviser. The cessation of funds caused further economic chaos and resulted in U.S. president Woodrow Wilson sending more marines to the country in November. The U.S. military government attempted to implement fundamental changes in the nation's political, economic, and social life in the hope of creating a stable neighbor that would safeguard U.S. strategic and economic interests. The marines disarmed the Dominican population and created a theoretically apolitical National Guard. The U.S. military government also facilitated the expansion of U.S. investment in the sugar industry. In 1922, U.S. secretary of state Charles Evans Hughes and former Dominican minister of finance Francisco J. Peynado (b. 1867–d. 1933) announced the Hughes-Peynado Plan, which paved the way for presidential elections in the country and the withdrawal of U.S. Marines. In 1924, after Dominicans ratified the Dominican-American Agreement, which guaranteed the U.S. Customs receivership until the foreign debt was paid to American banks, U.S. Marines left the Dominican Republic.

THE TRUJILLO DICTATORSHIP

In 1930, RAFAEL TRUJILLO, the leader of the U.S.-created National Guard, overthrew the government and established an authoritarian dictatorship that lasted for more than three decades. Ruthlessly suppressing all opposition to his regime, during the Great Depression, Trujillo was faced with governing a poverty-stricken nation with an empty treasury, a huge foreign debt, and a capital city destroyed by a hurricane. Within two decades, Trujillo paid off the nation's foreign debts, developed a national infrastructure, and laid the groundwork for economic development by promoting industrialization. Sugar exports accounted for the majority of government revenue. In the process, he accumulated a personal fortune of almost \$1 billion. The cost of fiscal solvency during the era of Trujillo was the loss of personal freedom for the Dominican people: Trujillo's seven intelligence agencies enabled the dictator to establish one of Latin America's most brutal authoritarian dictatorships. One of Trujillo's

most notorious acts was the massacre of 12,000 Haitians in the northern border region in 1937. To deflect criticism of his regime, Trujillo offered sanctuary to 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe.

By the end of the 1950s, Trujillo had lost the support of the nation's elites, the CATHOLIC CHURCH, and the U.S. government. In 1956, Trujillo authorized the kidnapping of Jesús Galíndez in New York City. An outspoken critic of the Trujillo regime, Galíndez had just completed his doctoral defense at Columbia University. The doomed Galíndez was flown back to the Dominican Republic on a small plane piloted by American Gerald Lester Murphy. After Murphy became vocal about his participation in the abduction of Galíndez, Trujillo's henchmen concocted an elaborate scheme to kill him and cover up his death. They claimed that Dominican pilot Octavio de la Maza had killed Murphy, and then himself, after Murphy refused to end their homosexual love affair. U.S. authorities, as well as de la Maza's wife and Murphy's girlfriend, were unconvinced. Trujillo's failed attempt to assassinate Venezuelan president RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO in 1960 further convinced the United States that continued support of the Trujillo dictatorship could damage U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. The murder of three elite sisters—Minerva, Patria, and Maria Teresa Mirabal—on November 25, 1960, convinced elite sectors of the Dominican population to increase anti-Trujillo activities. On the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by a group of conspirators made up of both former accomplices and victims of the dictatorship. The conspirators, armed with weapons provided by the United States, assassinated Trujillo as he was preparing to visit one of his numerous mistresses. Attempts by Trujillo's son RAMFIS TRUJILLO to continue the dictatorship were futile, and the entire Trujillo family had fled the island by the end of 1961.

THE BALAGUER YEARS

In December 1962, the Dominican people began their first experiment in democratic government. In U.S.-supervised elections, JUAN BOSCH, who had lived in exile for most of the Trujillo dictatorship, was elected president with 60 percent of the vote. Initially hailed by John F. Kennedy's administration as a potential showcase for democracy, the Bosch administration soon lost the support of the Dominican military and the United States. Even U.S. ambassador John Bartlow Martin, who initially believed that the democratic experiment could work, became disillusioned with Bosch. U.S. officials were disturbed by Bosch's rhetoric, which they interpreted as being soft on communism. When Bosch attempted to limit the power of the Dominican military, General Elías Wessin y Wessin (b. 1923–d. 2009) orchestrated a military coup that removed Bosch from office on September 25, 1963. Bosch left the country, and the United States severed diplomatic relations and suspended all economic and military assistance.

In December 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson recognized the governing junta led by Donald Reid Cabral (b. 1923–d. 2006) and appointed W. Tapley Bennett Jr. to serve as U.S. ambassador. Reid Cabral's government, which implemented austerity measures, received extensive support from the U.S. government. In April 1965, a group of pro-Bosch military officers known as Constitutionalists and led by Francisco Caamaño Deñó (b. 1932–d. 1973) staged a revolt to return the exiled Bosch to power. Loyalists within the army, who were supported by the nation's elites, instead rallied around General Antonio Imbert (b. 1920–), one of Trujillo's assassins. Civilians stole weapons from the National Police and began to kill police officers. The counterrevolution, launched on April 24, 1965, which took Ambassador Bennett by surprise, resulted in a civil war.

On April 28, the United States sent 400 marines to restore order. Johnson, under the initial pretense of humanitarian concerns (the protection of U.S. citizens), eventually sent 23,000 U.S. troops, led by General Bruce Palmer, to restore order and stability. Although the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES quickly sanctioned the intervention, code-named OPERATION POWER PACK, this was the first overt use of U.S. military forces in Latin America since marines were withdrawn from Haiti in 1934. Johnson rationalized his decision to intervene as an attempt to prevent the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. His decision, however, was also based on domestic political concerns as well as manipulation by the Dominican elite of U.S. government officials. On August 31, 1966, the United States implemented the Act of Dominican Reconciliation with prominent Constitutionalists and Loyalists. Héctor García Godoy (b. 1921–d. 1970), who had been Bosch's foreign minister and was acceptable to both sides in the conflict, was chosen as president of a provisional government until elections could be held. Both Wessin y Wessin and Caamaño Deñó were sent into exile.

U.S.-supervised elections in 1966 were won by JOAQUÍN BALAGUER, who closely aligned the Dominican Republic politically and economically with the United States. All subsequent Dominican governments have pursued a foreign policy closely tied to that of the United States. In return for his pro-U.S. foreign policy, Balaguer was rewarded with generous sugar quotas and increased economic aid. To alleviate economic and social pressures on Balaguer's government, the United States relaxed its immigration policy. The result was a massive influx of Dominicans to the United States. Remittances from the more than 1 million Dominicans living in the United States contributed substantially to the Dominican economy. During Balaguer's administration, the Dominican Republic experienced the most spectacular growth of any Latin American nation during the 1970s. The nation's economic boom was made possible by political stability and a revitalized sugar industry.

High inflation and unemployment undermined Balaguer's hold on power during his third term. In 1978, he lost the presidential elections to the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, or PRD). Although the following administration of Antonio Guzmán (b. 1911–d. 1982) implemented numerous health and EDUCATION projects, by 1980, the economy had fallen into a recession. Plagued by the rising cost of oil imports, a sharp decline in profits from sugar exports, and accusations that his daughter Sonia was involved in corrupt activities, Guzmán decided not to run for reelection in 1982. PRD candidate Salvador Jorge Blanco (b. 1926–) won the 1982 elections. The day before leaving office, Guzmán committed suicide. Jorge Blanco's administration experienced a tremendous loss of popularity and legitimacy when it implemented International Monetary Fund austerity measures in May 1984. A series of violent riots broke out, which led to the death of dozens of Dominican citizens. Given the poor performance of the PRD governments, Balaguer returned to office in 1986. Balaguer won subsequent elections in 1990 and 1994. Acknowledging that there were voting irregularities in the 1994 election, Balaguer agreed to step down from the presidency in 1996 and hold new presidential elections.

PROBLEMS OF MODERNITY

The 1996 elections pitted PRD candidate José Francisco Peña Gómez (b. 1937–d. 1998) against Bosch protégée Leonel Fernández (b. 1953–), who represented the Dominican Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Dominicana, or PLD). Fernández, a young lawyer who had grown up in New York City, won and initiated a series of reforms designed to modernize the political economy and infrastructure. Sugar exports no longer represented a substantial component of Dominican revenue; instead, tourism, MINING (especially nickel), and remittances from Dominicans living abroad, primarily in the United States, accounted for the majority of Dominican revenue. Attempts were made to convert the sugar-growing lands to the production of other agricultural crops, such as pineapples, for export. Fernández was barred by the constitution from running for reelection in 2000. PRD candidate Hipólito Mejía (b. 1941–) won the 2000 presidential elections. Mejía's administration was characterized by excessive corruption, rising inflation, and a greatly devaluated national currency.

Fernández was elected to a second term of office in the presidential election held on May 16, 2004. With 59 percent of the vote, he had a clear mandate to rule. Fernández's victory was due to both his charismatic appeal and the virtual collapse of the Dominican economy, which can be attributed to high oil prices, excessive borrowing initiated by Mejía, and the failure of three of the Dominican Republic's largest banks. His greatest challenge was to resolve the nation's chronic energy problems. As the Dominican constitution was amended during the Mejía administration to allow sitting presidents

to run for reelection, Fernández, in a highly controversial move, sought the PLD's presidential nomination in May 2007 and won a third term in the May 2008 presidential elections. On March 1, 2007, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (DR-CAFTA) went into effect under Fernández's mandate. The goal of DR-CAFTA is the creation of a free trade zone similar to the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. For many, it is seen as a step toward the FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, an agreement that would involve all nations in the Western Hemisphere except CUBA and VENEZUELA.

Merengue, a lively, fast-paced dance hall music, was declared the national music of the Dominican Republic during the Trujillo era. Dominican merengue singers Juan Luis Guerra, Fernando Villalona, and Milly Quesada are internationally recognized and popular throughout the Western Hemisphere. Unlike most Latin American nations, baseball, not soccer, is the most popular sport in the Dominican Republic (see SPORTS). Dominican Major League Baseball players in the United States include Sammy Sosa, Pedro Martinez, and David Ortiz. After the United States, the Dominican Republic has the second highest number of baseball players in Major League Baseball. Whereas the Dominican Republic has a well-developed communication network and entertainment industry, Dominicans are especially fond of *telenovelas* (soap operas) imported from MEXICO, COLOMBIA, Venezuela, and BRAZIL.

See also DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (Vol. III).

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Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) Signed on December 17, 2003, in the main hall of the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) in Washington, D.C., the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) brought together four isthmian republics—EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, and NICARAGUA—under a free trade agreement with the United States. Subsequent negotiations incorporated the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC in the pact on October 4, 2004. Initially fearing the loss

of sovereignty over many of its state-owned commercial operations, the government of COSTA RICA later joined after holding a public referendum on the treaty in 2007. All six countries had a sense of urgency, as the CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE was set to expire on December 31, 2008.

Modeled after the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) provided for the immediate elimination of Central American and Dominican Republic tariffs on about 80 percent of U.S. exports to the region and for the elimination of tariffs on all industrial goods over a 10-year period and most agricultural goods, services, and investment over an 18-year period. The treaty also provided for parallel intellectual property rights laws in print, audio-visual, and medical drugs and for greater commercial transparency in order to end corrupt practices. The treaty called for the privatization of government-owned telecommunication services including Internet and wireless services so that private companies could compete for contracts. It also called for governments to withdraw from other government-sponsored social services, ranging from subsidized TRANSPORTATION to social security. Effectively, the agreement exemplified the neoliberal economic policies espoused by George W. Bush's administration.

The origins of the DR-CAFTA treaty can be traced to the collapse of the September 2003 World Trade Organization meeting in Cancún, MEXICO, when a “Group of 21” developing nations walked out in protest over U.S. and European agricultural subsidies, and to the November 21, 2003, ministerial meeting in Miami, Florida, at which the Bush administration faced strong opposition, led by BRAZIL and VENEZUELA, to a FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS. In March 2004, the Bush administration pursued a new strategy to reach free trade agreements with single nations or with clusters of nations. The DR-CAFTA pact falls into the latter category.

Legislative ratification of the agreement faced difficult obstacles in each country, including the United States. For example U.S. textile workers, particularly in North and South Carolina and Alabama, feared the loss of their jobs. Central American workers in the same industries feared likewise, because henceforth their industries would have to compete against those in low-wage Asian countries, particularly China. U.S. sugarcane and beet sugar growers foresaw the importation of unprotected raw sugar from the signatory countries. The undercurrent to these protests were allegations of U.S. imperialism from think tanks and academics but also by Central American farmers and small businessmen who envisioned the loss of their livelihood to U.S. commercial giants. While administrative cajoling resulted in narrow congressional approval of the DR-CAFTA treaty on July 27, 2005, the Central American governments confronted large-scale and sometimes violent demonstrations against the treaty by workers, small farmers, and businessmen.

In Costa Rica, the public debate over the DR-CAFTA resulted in a national referendum on October 7, 2007, where it won approval with only 51.6 percent of the popular vote. Only the Dominican Republic escaped large public demonstrations.

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Douglas, Denzil (b. 1953–) *prime minister of St. Christopher and Nevis* Born on January 14, 1953, in the village of St. Paul's on the island of St. Christopher (St. Kitts), Denzil Douglas earned a B.S. in surgery before earning a doctorate in medicine from the University of the West Indies in TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO in 1984. After a two-year internship in Trinidad and Tobago, Douglas returned to St. Christopher and established a private medical practice. In 1987, Douglas was elected deputy chairman of the Labour Party. In 1989, he won a seat in the National Assembly and became the leader of the Labour Party. Douglas restructured and reinvigorated the party, which facilitated its victory in the 1995 elections in SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS. He was subsequently reelected to office in 2000 and 2004.

During Douglas's tenure as prime minister, the secession movement on Nevis gained momentum. According to the nation's constitution, Nevis can secede from the Federation of St. Christopher and Nevis if two-thirds of the Nevis Island Assembly, composed of five representatives, and two-thirds of the voters agree. In 1996, the autonomous government of Nevis, led by Premier Vance Amory (b. 1949–) of the Concerned Citizens' Movement (CCM), initiated steps to withdraw Nevis from the federation. A referendum in 1998, however, failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority for secession. While against the secession of Nevis, Douglas acknowledges the right of Nevisians to determine their future. In 2006, Joseph Parry's Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) won the local elections and became premier of Nevis, essentially ending the push for independence in Nevis.

Douglas's government has an excellent human rights record. As the sugar industry has all but disappeared, Douglas has pursued economic diversification programs and supports the expansion of the tourism industry. Offshore finance and service industries (numbering more than 17,000) have become an important source of revenue for the government (see OFFSHORE BANKING).

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DR-CAFTA See DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.

drugs In Latin America, drugs have been used as stimulants and in religious ceremonies since at least 3000 B.C.E. During the colonial period, Spanish administrators allowed Amerindian workers in the Andes Mountains to chew coca leaves as a stimulant to work. Until the late 19th century, cocaine in the United States was dispensed by pharmacists and used in the manufacture of the popular soft drink Coca-Cola. At that time, medical and scientific research in Latin America and the United States demonstrated that drugs, particularly cocaine, could become habit forming and contribute to erratic behavior and ill health. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Latin America and the United States have engaged in a struggle over the growing and the trafficking of now-illegal drugs. The struggle at first focused on cocaine produced in BOLIVIA's Chaparé region and PERU's Huallaga Valley, but has now extended to ECUADOR, COLOMBIA and MEXICO.

By the early 20th century, drugs had become a transnational issue. Cocaine from Latin America and South Asia, along with opium from China, made their way to the United States and Europe. The first effort to control the traffic was the 1912 Hague Opium Convention, which addressed international trade in narcotics, but the producer states refused to cooperate with its implementation. The United States then acted on its own and also determined to battle drug use from within. By 1914, 49 states had regulations on the use of cocaine, and 26 states had laws prohibiting the use of opium, morphine, and cocaine. The federal government went further with the December 17, 1914, Harrison Narcotic Act, which required all persons growing, processing, and distributing any drugs, or their derivatives, to register with federal tax collectors and to pay a series of heavy taxes. While doctors were free to prescribe addictive drugs for medical purposes, the law was interpreted to mean that they could not do so to addicts, as drug addiction was not considered an illness at that time. These efforts sought to curtail domestic use of illegal drugs, which in turn would reduce demand for production in foreign countries, including Latin America. These laws did not have the effect the authorities had anticipated, however.

World War I curtailed the importation into the United States of Asian drugs, but it also encouraged increased production of cocaine and marijuana in Mexico

and accelerated production in Bolivia and Peru. The failure to limit consumption at home led to a new U.S. policy: eliminate drugs at the source. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) pursued this policy when it was established in June 14, 1930. In the pursuit of eradicating cocaine production in Mexico, Peru, and HONDURAS, U.S. officials now had to confront corrupt government officials who protected the growing and transportation operations. The U.S. policy of going to the “source” of illicit drugs contributed to expanding operations throughout Latin America. World War II added a new twist to the problem, as U.S. MILITARY personnel, particularly those fighting in Southeast Asia, became addicted to drugs, in particular cocaine. The use of illegal drugs in the United States reached epidemic proportions in the counterculture movements of the 1960s and 1970s, a problem exacerbated by ground troops returning from the Vietnam War, during which drugs and particularly cocaine were available on the battlefield. By the 1960s, drug cultivation in Latin America had become a significant factor in local economies. Rural farmers earned more money from growing marijuana and coca than they did from traditional fruits and vegetables. In devising policies to deal with drug production, the changed economic status of rural farmers needed to be addressed.

In the 1970s, the United States focused on drug interdiction at its borders and providing financial support for rural farmers in the Andean regions to grow alternative crops that would earn them sufficient income to abandon the cultivation of coca and marijuana. Neither tactic appeared effective. Drug use in the United States continued to rise. In response, Ronald Reagan’s and George H. W. Bush’s administrations declared a “war on drugs” that included the eradication of drug crops at the source, expanded interdiction beyond the U.S. border, and doled out harsh treatment of drug users at home. The Reagan and Bush administrations spent \$65 billion on these programs. By 1992, the U.S. National Institute for Drug Abuse reported that the number of drug users had been cut in half, from 24 million in 1979 to 11.4 million, leading their supporters to claim a victory in the war on drugs. Critics, however, quickly pointed out that Latin American drugs now made their way to European countries, including Russia.

Bill Clinton’s administration initially altered emphasis from elimination at the source and drug interdiction to one of EDUCATION. Forty-one percent of the record-high \$13.5-billion antidrug budget went to education and training. Clinton’s drug czar, Lee Brown, also targeted the environment of inner-city youth in an effort to eliminate drug-related crime and drug use. Interdiction, except at the Mexican border, was deemphasized.

The “victory,” if there was one, left indelible marks on Latin America. The pursuit of drug growers, processors, and traffickers enhanced the power of the MILITARY, which expanded its influence in government policy, particularly in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Alternative

crop programs failed, as small farmers continued to cultivate coca and marijuana. These societies also became increasingly violent, with thousands of innocent civilians losing their lives. As drug crops and processing centers were destroyed in Colombia and Peru, narco traffickers moved their operations to other countries, including Ecuador and Mexico (see DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO). As the U.S. sealed its border more tightly, narco traffickers delivered their product via small aircraft through BELIZE and GUATEMALA, or by speed craft, jumping from island to island up the Caribbean island chain to Florida.

By the end of the 1990s, drug use in the United States had again increased. At the end of his administration in 2000, Clinton pushed through Congress a \$1.3-billion assistance package to battle drugs in Colombia, Ecuador, Aruba, and Curaçao. The preponderance of the aid package was for military assistance, including airport construction and improvement in the latter three countries. Sixty-five percent of the funding went to Colombia, where guerrilla groups worked with drug-growing farmers and narco traffickers. By 2008, Colombia had become less violent but now faced a new threat: Venezuelan president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS has been linked to aiding Colombian guerrillas. Also in 2008, many analysts suggested that Mexico had become the focal point for drug production and trans-shipment to the United States and that the cartels, in feuding among themselves, have increased civil violence and corruption in the country. In May 2008, U.S. president George W. Bush asked Congress to appropriate \$500 million in military aid for the Mexican army to quell the problem.

On June 28, 2008, Congress approved \$400 million for Mexico and \$65 million for Central America. The funds were part of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) budget. No funds were dispersed before the presidential election in November 2008, and when the Obama administration approved the payment of \$65 million to Mexico, human rights groups and Senator Patrick Leahy (D.-Vt.) resisted the disbursement; no funds had been paid by end of 2009.

See also COCA (Vols. I, II, III); DRUGS (Vols. II, III).

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drug trade in Mexico The trafficking of illegal DRUGS has been a major source of contention in U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS in the 20th and early 21st centuries. A drug trade between MEXICO and the United States has

always existed, but developments in the past hundred or so years have drawn increasing attention to the issue.

In the early 20th century, the U.S. government passed the Harrison Narcotics Act, which made the sale and distribution of certain drugs without a license a criminal offense. Additional restrictions went into effect in the 1920s and 1930s and attempts to regulate the flow of controlled substances resulted in an increase in the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico into the United States. By the 1960s, recreational drug use in the United States was fueling an enormous demand for illicit substances, and the U.S. government created several agencies devoted to enforcing drug laws. Those agencies eventually merged to become the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1973.

U.S. policies aimed at stemming the tide of illegal drugs have relied on eradication and interception. Operation Intercept in 1969 shut down the U.S.-Mexican border for several weeks as drug enforcement officials inspected all crossing traffic. Operation Condor in 1975 used chemical defoliants to wipe out marijuana and opium crops in Mexico. Both of these policies were controversial and failed to bring the desired results, as the flow of drugs continued to grow and powerful drug cartels emerged throughout Mexico. During periods of economic crisis, in particular, drug cultivation has offered a lucrative financial opportunity to many farmers and others who would otherwise suffer the effects of high inflation and currency devaluation.

Mexico's drug trade is characterized by growing violence and corruption. Many government officials and police officers accept bribes from cartel leaders, making law enforcement efforts largely ineffective. Drug lords have grown increasingly violent, kidnapping and torturing government agents, politicians, journalists, and even high-profile entertainers to demonstrate that no one is safe from their reach. A drug culture has flourished, particularly in the border regions. Narcotics traffickers are often the subject of local legends, as well as folk songs known as *narcocorridos*.

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Duarte, José Napoleón (b. 1925–d. 1990) *president of El Salvador* Born into an upper-middle-class family, José Napoleón Duarte joined the student groups in 1944 that pushed for the ouster of then-President MAXIMILIANO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ. Following his 1948 graduation with an engineering degree from the University of Notre

Dame, Duarte returned to EL SALVADOR to work in his father-in-law's construction business and as a part-time university lecturer.

Duarte reignited his political activism in 1960 when he founded the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrática Cristiano, or PDC). During the 1960s, Christian Democratic Parties were seen as a viable alternative to the extremist political groups on both the right and the left across Latin America. As elsewhere, the Christian Democrats in El Salvador advocated socioeconomic betterment for the poor within the nation's constitutional system. At that time, El Salvador's landowning elite and MILITARY stood opposed to any such change. Drawing his support from the urban middle and lower classes, Duarte won successive two-year terms from 1964 to 1970 as mayor of San Salvador. He did not seek another term in 1970 in order to prepare for the 1972 presidential election.

In 1972, Duarte became the presidential candidate of the United Opposition Front (Unión Nacional Opositora, or UNO), a PDC-led coalition that ran against Arturo Armando Molina (b. 1922–) of the National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional, or PCN), and a military-based party on the extreme right. In disputed results, Duarte allegedly lost by 10,000 votes; when he charged electoral fraud, he was arrested, tortured, and then deported to VENEZUELA, where he remained until 1979.

Duarte returned to El Salvador following a coup d'état on October 15, 1979, that ousted the 5-month-old repressive regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero (b. 1924–). Moderate military officers, allegedly supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), engineered the coup. The 1979 coup also ignited El Salvador's simmering guerrilla groups, and the following year saw the beginning of a 12-year civil war.

Duarte joined the junta in March 1980 and became its provisional president in December, justifying his decision on the junta's plans to nationalize the Salvadoran banking system and implement agrarian reform. When ousted from office in December 1982 by right-wing politicians who controlled the newly elected constitutional assembly, Duarte prepared for the 1984 presidential contest. His chief opponent was Roberto D'Aubuisson (b. 1944–d. 1992), candidate of the right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, or ARENA), which represented the conservative landowning elite and was supported by the military. D'Aubuisson had ordered the 1980 execution of Archbishop Oscar Romero (b. 1919–d. 1980). The differences between Duarte and D'Aubuisson represented the dichotomy that characterized Salvadoran society and was playing out with increased violence between the guerrilla groups and the military and its death squads.

Following a violent and bitter campaign, Duarte won the May 8, 1984, runoff and internationally supervised election with 57 percent of the popular vote. Duarte was

El Salvador's first elected civilian president in 51 years. Through the CIA, the United States pumped uncounted millions into Duarte's campaign. U.S. president Ronald Reagan's administration saw Duarte and the PDC as the only alternative to a guerrilla victory, led by the Marxist group, the FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional, or FMLN).

Duarte's five-year presidency achieved little. Despite continued economic assistance from the United States, his efforts at economic reform and land distribution were resisted by ARENA and the traditional elite families it represented. He also had to deal with a war-torn national economy that only worsened during his presidency. While he sought to negotiate with the guerrillas, Duarte was challenged by a U.S.-supplied military that was determined to crush the FMLN. He was further weakened in 1985 when guerrilla bandits kidnapped his daughter, freeing her only after Duarte released some 100 political prisoners and provided for their safe travel out of El Salvador.

The constitution forbade Duarte from seeking immediate reelection, thus his political career ended in 1988. That same year, he was diagnosed with cancer, and two years later, on February 23, 1990, he succumbed to the disease.

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Duarte Frutos, Óscar Nicanor (b. 1956–) *president of Paraguay* Born in Coronel Oviedo, PARAGUAY, Óscar Nicanor Duarte Frutos became affiliated with the Colorado Party (PC) at age 14, while in high school. He earned a bachelor's degree in 1974 and a law degree in 1984 from the Catholic University and, in 1989, a doctorate from the National University in Asunción. He served as minister of education and culture in the administration of JUAN CARLOS WASMOSY (b. 1938–). As a result of a political controversy, Duarte resigned from the Colorado Party in February 1997 to join the Colorado Reconciliation Movement (MRC). In January 2001, he rejoined the ruling Colorado Party and stood for the presidency as its candidate in the April 27, 2003, election, which he won with 37.1 percent of the popular vote. When he took office on August 15, 2003, he became the 11th consecutive PC president. An opponent of free TRADE, Duarte advocated a greater government role in the ECONOMY and in addressing social problems.

Three days after his inauguration, the INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK advanced his administration a \$23.4 billion loan to improve and expand early childhood EDUCATION, particularly in rural communities.

Duarte's "leftist" social programs and affinity with Venezuela's HUGO CHÁVEZ and Bolivia's EVO MORALES brought him strong political opposition that stalled his legislative program. Under duress, Duarte resigned the presidency on June 23, 2008, but Congress failed to convene the required quorum to validate it. After two months of political manipulation, Congress accepted Duarte's resignation on September 4, 2008. Duarte was appointed senator for life, and Jorge Céspedes succeeded him as president.

See also COLORADO PARTY, PARAGUAY (Vol. III).

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Duvalier, François (Papa Doc) (b. 1907–d. 1971) *dictator of Haiti* Born on April 14, 1907, in Port-au-Prince, HAITI, François Duvalier was the son of Duval Duvalier, a black justice of the peace. His mother was mentally deficient, so he was raised by his aunt. Growing up during the U.S. military occupation of Haiti (1915–34), Duvalier was outraged by the racism exhibited by American soldiers. He became a supporter of the philosophy of *noirisme* (Negritude), which held that Haitian blacks should be proud of their African ancestry and fight racial injustice. Although he was a member of a black middle-class family who practiced Roman Catholicism, Duvalier studied Vodou and actively practiced the RELIGION, eventually becoming a *houngan*, or Vodou priest. Through hard work, Duvalier earned a degree in medicine from the University of Haiti in 1934. For the next decade, he worked as a hospital physician. In 1943, during World War II, Duvalier enrolled in a U.S.-funded program to control the spread of tropical diseases in Haiti. He spent a year studying at the University of Michigan and subsequently returned to Haiti, where he achieved fame in eradicating yaws, a tropical infection of the skin, bones, and joints caused by a spirochete bacterium. Part of a worldwide eradication campaign, the number of people in the world afflicted with yaws declined from more than 50 million to virtually none by the 1950s.

In 1957, espousing the doctrine of *noirisme*, Duvalier challenged the mulatto elite's control of political and economic power in Haiti and won the country's first universal suffrage elections. Initially heralded by Haiti's black population as a democratic reformer, Duvalier instituted a brutal, corrupt authoritarian regime. His goon squad of

25,000 henchmen, the Volunteers for National Security, better known as the TONTON MACOUTES, implemented a wave of terror and crushed political opposition. Duvalier also used Vodou to terrorize, physically and psychologically, the Haitian population. He deliberately modeled his image on that of Baron Samedi, a powerful spirit of the Vodou religion who guarded the crossroads between life and death. Duvalier frequently wore a black tuxedo and dark glasses, a popular depiction of Baron Samedi representing a corpse dressed and prepared for burial in Haitian fashion. As both a medical doctor and a Vodou priest, he earned the nickname Papa Doc, a title that evoked both fear and respect.

Duvalier created the Tonton Macoutes in early 1959, after having survived a coup attempt by the Haitian military the previous year. By 1961, the Tonton Macoutes, who both created and bolstered support for the Duvalier regime, had more power than the Haitian military. After suffering a massive heart attack on May 24, 1959, which was complicated by diabetes, Duvalier lay unconscious for nine hours. During this time, it is suspected that oxygen deprivation caused neurological damage and affected his sanity. Afterward, Duvalier's actions were conditioned by paranoia and were much more brutal. In 1961, he rewrote the Haitian constitution and held elections in which he was the only candidate. In 1964, he convinced the Haitian National Assembly to declare him president for life.

Under the guise of nationalism, Duvalier expelled all foreign Roman Catholic bishops from Haiti and replaced them with black supporters. In response to Duvalier's brutality, thousands of middle- and upper-class Haitians, especially mulattoes, fled the country during the 1960s, causing a brain drain and lowering literacy levels. Duvalier's patronage of rural blacks earned him popularity, and his patronage of urban blacks resulted in the expansion of the black middle class. Notwithstanding his increased brutality, Duvalier's anticommunist rhetoric earned him military and economic assistance from the United States. Most of the economic aid, however, was diverted into the coffers of Duvalier's political supporters. Malnutrition and illiteracy became endemic in Haiti's growing urban slums. Duvalier brought an already poor nation into much worse poverty, making Haiti the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere.

Duvalier died on April 21, 1971, in Port-au-Prince and was buried in a magnificent mausoleum. He was succeeded by his son, JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER. Whereas the father was called Papa Doc out of fear and respect, the son was mockingly called Baby Doc out of derision. François Duvalier's burial place was destroyed by Haitians after the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986.

See also VODOU (Vol. III).

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Duvalier, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) (b. 1951–) *dictator of Haiti* Born on July 3, 1951, in Port-au-Prince, HAITI, Jean-Claude Duvalier was the only son of Haitian dictator FRANÇOIS DUVALIER. Never exhibiting a strong aptitude for academics, Duvalier studied at prestigious schools in Port-au-Prince. After graduating from secondary school, he briefly studied law at the University of Haiti. Duvalier, however, demonstrated no interest in continuing his education. He was equally uninterested in Haitian politics and grudgingly assumed the presidency when his father died in 1971. Content with attending ceremonial events and living a playboy lifestyle, Duvalier left the administration of the government in the hands of his mother, Simone (b. 1913–d. 1997), and his older sister, Marie-Denise (b. 1942–).

Whereas his father was called Papa Doc out of fear and respect, Duvalier was mockingly called Baby Doc out of derision. He possessed neither the skills of Western academia nor the ability to manipulate Vodou for his own self-serving interests, as his father had. Most Haitians, who could not believe that the new regime could be more brutal and corrupt than the previous one, were surprised. In 1980, much to the chagrin of Haiti's black population, Duvalier married Michèle Bennett (b. 1950–), a divorced mulatto with an unsavory reputation. Following their wedding, which cost the Haitian government \$3 million, Duvalier's wife promptly took an interest in Haitian political and economic affairs. As Duvalier's mother's political power diminished, Bennett's increased. Frustrated by her husband's political ineptitude, Bennett, supported by her corrupt businessman father and his associates, squandered what little wealth Haiti possessed. Bennett engaged in monthly shopping trips to Paris and hosted lavish parties in the National Palace while the majority of Haiti's population experienced the worst poverty in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps most onerous to Haiti's black population was the expectation that Duvalier's mulatto son would become president after Duvalier's death.

As the brutality and corruption increased, thousands of poor Haitians began to flee the nation. Attempts to reach the United States in small boats, however, were actively repelled by the U.S. Coast Guard. Duvalier and his wife seemed indifferent to the plight of Haiti's people. In 1983, following a state visit to Haiti by Pope John Paul II, the pope announced that the political and economic system in Haiti must change. In January 1986, the U.S. government actively petitioned Duvalier to abandon the Haitian presidency. Unwilling to offer Duvalier asylum, the U.S. government offered to facilitate his flight into exile. On

February 7, 1986, political turmoil and the loss of U.S. support forced Duvalier and his family to flee to France. Although initially living a luxurious lifestyle, Duvalier quickly exhausted his resources. He divorced his wife in 1990, citing immoral acts. Since his exile, Duvalier has voiced his intent to return to rule Haiti if the people there so desire. As of 2007, Duvalier lived in a small apartment in Paris with his girlfriend, Veronique Roy, the granddaughter of former Haitian president PAUL MAGLOIRE.

See also VODOU (Vol. III).

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earthquake of 1985, Mexico On September 19, 1985, a major earthquake hit MEXICO shortly after 7:00 A.M. With the epicenter in the state of Michoacán, the temblor measured 8.1 on the Richter scale and was felt throughout much of the country. The earthquake caused considerable damage, especially in MEXICO CITY, just over 200 miles away. What occurred in the aftermath of the earthquake is often cited as one of the most shocking examples of government corruption and ineptitude in Mexico in the late 20th century.

The force of the earthquake demolished hundreds of buildings and damaged thousands more in Mexico City. Estimates reported that up to 10,000 people were killed, and as many or more were left homeless. During the cleanup and recovery phase, it became clear that many structures had not been built according to the required safety standards in Mexico City, which was both earthquake prone and built on a swampy lake bed. Many construction companies with connections to high-ranking politicians had cut corners, their owners and corrupt politicians profiting from this. The destruction was made worse by the fact that Mexico was in the midst of a major economic crisis. A massive peso devaluation in 1982 had set off a devastating recession with high rates of unemployment and rising inflation. Social services agencies did not have sufficient money to aid the many in need, and the government was unable or unwilling to provide further resources. As a result, grassroots organizations began to form to provide basic support to the needy. Political opposition groups such as the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN), used the opportunity to build a local support base and in the coming decades was able to challenge the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) for power.

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Echeverría, Luis (b. 1922–) *president of Mexico* Luis Echeverría was the president of MEXICO from 1970 to 1976. During his presidency, the Mexican ECONOMY suffered a series of crises, and people began to question the leadership of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI), which had dominated the presidency since 1929.

Echeverría was born on January 17, 1922, in MEXICO CITY. He studied law and began a career in public service within the PRI. In 1968, Echeverría was serving as minister of the interior when government troops opened fire on a large gathering of demonstrators who were part of the 1968 STUDENT MOVEMENT IN MEXICO. The Tlatelolco massacre—as the episode came to be known—occurred just two weeks prior to the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympic Games in Mexico City, and the government downplayed the incident to national and foreign reporters. Echeverría was elected president two years later, and during his presidency, several other confrontations took place between government troops and student or worker demonstrators. Decades after he left office, prosecutors brought genocide charges against him on three different occasions for his alleged role in the Tlatelolco massacre and other government repression. Echeverría was cleared of all charges on July 8, 2006.

Despite his suspected involvement in silencing opposition to the government, Echeverría was known for moving Mexico to the left through social programs

and increased government spending. He resurrected the rhetoric of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION that had been abandoned in earlier decades and devoted large sums of money to social reform. Nevertheless, corruption and misspending also defined his presidency, and Echeverría's term ended amid high inflation, currency devaluation, and high unemployment. After he left office, Echeverría continued to work in public service.

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economy The economies of contemporary Latin America are as diverse as the region's geography, climate, natural resources, and population and are intertwined with the global marketplace. Three largest countries—ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and MEXICO—account for approximately 58 percent of Latin America's gross domestic product (GDP). A middle group—CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, PERU, URUGUAY, and VENEZUELA—account for approximately 23 percent. Fourteen others—BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BOLIVIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, SURINAME, and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO—have GDPs of less than 1 percent each of the region's total. In addition, there are wide variances in the literacy rate and per-capita income, which reflect the level of economic development, a point further confirmed by the fact that Latin America has the widest disparity in income distribution in the world. In 2007, 35 percent of the population lived in poverty. This figure does not include CUBA, for which accurate economic data is difficult to ascertain.

Spain and Portugal directed the colonial economies to serve their own purposes, and at independence, most Latin American nations were bankrupt financially, devoid of a dynamic entrepreneurial class, and without the infrastructure necessary to participate in the global economy. From 1820 to 1850, as the new nations struggled to establish governments, the creole *hacendados* retreated within their estates (haciendas) where they could maintain themselves, while local merchants watched the political conflict from the sidelines. The sense of political stability imposed by caudillos after the mid-19th century permitted the exportation of coffee, sugar, and ores from some countries. Yet, significant changes had occurred by the 1880s. Domestically, elite landowners emerged to participate in and dominate politics. They also accepted the “liberal” philosophy that permeated industrial western Europe and the United States at the time. In application, liberalism granted entrepreneurs a free hand in developing the economies. According to the liberal thought, the benefits of economic expansion would pass to the working class, and the whole of

society would advance. Latin American elites accepted liberal economic principles but not the anticipated social consequences. As western Europe industrialized, its rural workers poured into urban centers to seek employment. This demographic change meant that foodstuffs needed to be imported, along with raw materials required for industrial growth. Advances in shipping and technology, particularly refrigeration, made Latin America an attractive place to European businessmen. From approximately 1880 to the onset of the Great Depression in 1930, Latin American economies developed in accordance with European demands. Within Latin America, the elite benefited from the exchange at the expense of workers, as evidenced by the vast disparities in income, lifestyles, and access to medical services. The economic and social disparities spilled over into politics in the years after World War II and despite approximately 25 years of MILITARY rule remain evident in the 21st century.

EXPORT-BASED ECONOMIES, 1880–1930

Each of the Latin American countries sent one or two primary products into the world market. For example, Argentina sent wheat and beef; Brazil, coffee and rubber; Chile, nitrates and copper; Mexico henequen and sugar for industrial purposes; Peru, guano and subsequently metal ores; Cuba and the Dominican Republic, sugar and tobacco; and CENTRAL AMERICA, coffee and bananas. An expansive infrastructure was needed to support the transport of produce from agricultural fields and ores from the depths of the mines to overseas markets (see AGRICULTURE; MINING). Because the Latin Americans lacked the capital to do so, Europeans, primarily the British, and then North Americans filled the vacuum. Banks, exchange houses, legal firms, railroads, warehouses and docks, ships, and electrical and processing plants provided lucrative opportunities for foreign investors and, to a lesser degree, local elites. The foreigners were attracted by generous offers: no tariffs on imported machinery, raw materials, and even luxury consumer goods to satisfy the foreigners' tastes, which were considered essential for the success of an operation. Political and LABOR tranquility, guaranteed by Latin American militaries and police, ensured a favorable investment climate. Host countries benefited from taxes imposed on the exported items that were passed on to the consumer. Elite and foreign landowners profited greatly from the system, but the rural and urban working classes did not. The system also produced a middle sector (middle class) made up of lawyers, doctors, white-collar office workers, small shopkeepers, and skilled labor who sought and gained entrance into the political system through POLITICAL PARTIES such as the Democrats in Chile and the Radicals in Argentina or government control over middle-sector labor groups, as in Mexico following the MEXICAN REVOLUTION.

The success of export-based economies remained dependent on the foreign demand for primary products, which in turn determined Latin America's ability



A copper strip mine in Chile, illustrating Latin American countries' dependence on a single primary product as the basis for an export-oriented economy between 1880 and 1930 (*Office of Inter-American Affairs, Photography and Research*)

to consume foreign manufactured final products and its ability to pay its debts to European and North American financiers. The system collapsed with the onset of the Great Depression in 1930. The value of Latin American exports declined by 48 percent between 1930 and 1934 as compared to the 1925–29 period. Overall, exports declined by nearly two-thirds of predepression levels.

IMPORT SUBSTITUTION AND MILITARY DICTATORS, 1930s–1980s

Programs designed to correct the losses from the Great Depression did not bring about economic recovery and served only limited interests. For example, on May 1, 1933, Argentina brokered the Roca-Runciman barter agreement with Great Britain that provided for the exchange of Argentine beef and wheat for British machinery and spare parts for its nascent industrial base. Germany's Aski mark system and the U.S. Trade Reciprocity program during the 1930s were designed to generate those countries' own industries, not Latin America's. While Germany continued to purchase Latin American goods, these were paid for in Aski marks, essentially credits in the German national bank to be used for

the purchase of German manufactures. Latin America did not benefit from the U.S. Trade Reciprocity program that called for a mutual reduction in tariffs. Latin America's primary products already entered the United States under most-favored-nation status, and with their depressed economies, Latin Americans had little funds for the purchase of U.S. goods. While the larger Latin American nations shied away from trade reciprocity agreements, dictators throughout the hemisphere signed the agreements as means to legitimize their extraconstitutional governments.

Astute political leadership in Brazil and Mexico capitalized on U.S. wartime economic largesse to initiate the development of their own industrial base. Argentina, Chile, and Cuba benefited from World War II as the Allied demand for beef, grains, copper, and sugar skyrocketed, owing to the loss of other sources under Axis control. Shortly after the war ended in 1945, however, the prosperity disappeared with wartime markets, and Latin American pleas for an economic recovery program similar to that in Europe fell on deaf ears in Washington, D.C. U.S. policy makers advised the Latin Americans that, as the European economies recovered, their need

for Latin America's primary products would rekindle their economies.

Equally significant during the 1930s was the Latin American adoption of the import-substitution model of economic development. Henceforth, Latin America would produce at home, particularly, consumer goods that had previously been imported. The state assumed an active role in stimulating industrial growth by placing high tariffs on imported goods, thus protecting native producers from foreign competition and driving up the cost of imported products. Governments also favored local manufactures in their procurement practices, and most important, national governments increased their direct investment in and ownership of industries.

By 1960, two factors, one economic and the other political, converged, which led to a generation of military governments across Latin America. The limited size of domestic markets, beset by significant wage disparities, contributed to a slowdown in industrial production. Efforts at economic cooperation and integration, such as the 1960 establishment of the CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET, were stymied by national jealousies among the partners. This came at a time when global prices and demand for Latin America's primary agricultural products stagnated. Politically, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ successfully engineered the 1959 CUBAN REVOLUTION, which immediately set off alarm bells throughout Latin America. The region's history of a closed political system, huge disparities in wealth distribution, and lack of economic opportunity and social betterment converged at the same time to threaten the very fabric of Latin America's existence. The U.S. response, the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, was an attempt to advance and modernize industrialization, carry out land reform, and train business managers, technocrats, and medical personnel. To benefit from the program, Latin America's elite had to share political power with the workers, make the political process transparent and democratic, and make some of their idle lands available for redistribution to rural peasants. The elite would not budge and turned to the military to suppress "leftists and communists" (that is, almost anyone who called for socioeconomic and political reform). From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, all of Latin America endured military or bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. Civil and human rights were violated, and thousands "disappeared." Governments also suppressed labor unions and political parties and at the same time increased their role in directing and controlling the national economies.

To revive their stagnant economies, these bureaucratic authoritarian regimes turned to international private banks and other creditors, including the World Bank and the INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. As a result of this borrowing, Latin America's cumulative international debt rose from \$27 billion to \$231 billion between 1970 and 1980, with an annual debt service obligation of nearly \$18 billion. These countries faced the improb-

ability of repayment, and in fact, Mexico defaulted on its foreign debt in 1982. While the United States bailed Mexico out of its financial difficulties, other countries were forced to renegotiate their loans with international creditors and turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to revamp their currencies. These two actions—renegotiating debts and turning to the IMF—resulted in government austerity measures that led to severe cuts in government assistance for EDUCATION, health care, infrastructure development, and the like.

At the same time as the LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS of the 1980s, the industrialized world, led by the United States and Great Britain, accepted the principles of the neoliberal economic model, or the "Washington Consensus," as it was often referred to. Latin American governments fell into line and, in accordance with those principles, sold off most state-owned and parastatal (semiprivate) industries and used the windfall profits to pay down international debts. The governments also eliminated tariffs and other restrictions, which increased the likelihood of foreign investment. Structural reforms in banking, investment laws, and commercial activities were put in place by the mid-1990s. By the end of the 20th century, Latin America's macroeconomic picture had improved, but not the quality of life for the most people, particularly the lower classes. This factor contributed to the movement to the left in political elections and raises the question of whether Latin America is on the precipice of another change in economic policy.

See also CAUDILLO (Vol. III); ECONOMY (Vols. I, II, III); HACIENDA (Vols. II, III); INDUSTRIALIZATION (Vol. III); LATIFUNDIO (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III).

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Ecuador Ecuador is situated on the Pacific Ocean in the northwest corner of South America. COLOMBIA lies directly to its north and PERU to its east and south. Ecuador includes the Galápagos Islands, which are located nearly 600 miles (966 km) west of the mainland in the Pacific Ocean. Approximately 13.7 million

people reside within Ecuador's 98,985 square miles (256,370 km²), which is about the size of the U.S. state of Colorado. The country's most populous regions are the coastal lowlands and the central highlands. Quito, the national capital, has 2 million residents, while the major port city of Guayaquil has 2.28 million inhabitants. The tropical, or Amazon, region to the east of the Andes remains sparsely populated. Mestizos account for 65 percent of Ecuador's total population, followed by NATIVE AMERICANS, 25 percent; Spanish and other whites, 7 percent; and blacks, 3 percent. Ecuador's substantial petroleum resources account for 40 percent of its gross national product and 33 percent of the government's budget revenues. Other important exports are bananas, seafood, flowers, sugar, and tropical fruits.

Long before the Spanish conquistador Juan Pizarro arrived in 1531, highly advanced Amerindian cultures flourished throughout Ecuador as part of the vast Inca Empire that extended from the Ecuadorean Andes to present-day BOLIVIA. In 1534, three years after Pizarro's arrival, the Spanish had conquered the indigenous peoples. Initially, Ecuador became part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but with Spain's reorganization of its South American empire in 1563, the Ecuadorean city of Quito became the seat of an *audiencia* in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Thereafter, until independence in 1822, the Spaniards exploited Native American labor via the *encomienda*, hacienda, and *mita* systems to cultivate agricultural produce and extract gold and other resources that supported the Spanish mercantile system. Owing to a shortage of Spanish WOMEN during the same time period, intermarriage between the Spanish and Amerindians produced a large mestizo population.

Ecuadorean independence came in two stages. In May 1821, Antonio José de Sucre, a lieutenant in Simón Bolívar's liberating army that was sweeping through South America, arrived in Guayaquil. A year later on May 24, 1824, in a battle on the slopes of the Pichincha Volcano, Sucre defeated the Spanish, and Ecuador became part of the Confederation of Gran Colombia with Venezuela and Colombia, with BOGOTÁ as its capital. Ecuadorean separatist tendencies continued from then until May 13, 1830, when a new constitution went into effect, declaring Ecuador's independence from the confederation.

Political turmoil characterized Ecuador's postcolonial experience until the 1860s when Gabriel García Moreno secured conservative rule over the country. At the same time, demand for coca pushed Ecuador into the global trading arena. Conservative power came to an end with the 1895 Liberal Revolution led by General JOSÉ ELOY ALFARO DELGADO. Alfaro and his successors took the country further into the global marketplace through the exportation of bananas and coca. During the 30 years of Liberal governance, a combination of coastal agricultural and private banking interests—known as "*la argolla*"—determined both the Liberal Party's and the nation's fate. Party infighting, however, continued.

Agriculturalists demanded that the central government seek foreign export markets for Ecuador's major produce and that the government use its resources for the construction of roads and railroads that served the agro-export INDUSTRY. During this same time period, the central government was unable to control the actions of private banks, which included the printing of their own money to meet *la argolla's* private needs. The combination of the overbuilding of infrastructure and the printing of unsecured paper money contributed to Ecuador's bankruptcy by 1925.

The increased exportation of commodities also contributed to a more active LABOR movement, although Ecuador's Liberal government was not tolerant of its demands, brutally suppressing labor strikes in Guayaquil in 1922 and in the central Sierra region in 1923. The government did, however, outlaw debt peonage and imprisonment for failure to pay debts. The Liberals also significantly altered church-state relations, stripping the CATHOLIC CHURCH of privileges it had held since the colonial period. The concordant with the Vatican was terminated, and foreign clergy were expelled. The church and its clergy no longer could censor reading material, EDUCATION was secularized, and the state took control of marriage and divorce. The 1929 constitution, Ecuador's 13th since 1830, reflected the nation's changing political and social dynamics. It enhanced the power of the legislature at the expense of the executive and in so doing recognized the new groups emerging in the political arena, whose philosophies tended to the left of those held by the old guard, the coastal elites. The 1929 constitution also paved the way for legislation in the 1930s that protected workers from unscrupulous employers and improved working conditions.

The Liberal era disintegrated after 1925, and for the next generation, Ecuador again experienced a high degree of political turmoil, which was exacerbated by the loss of markets during the Great Depression. Ecuador's ECONOMY did not begin to recover until the early 1940s, thanks to U.S. economic assistance. This period also was marked by Ecuador's involvement in international affairs. First, it accepted the advice from the U.S.-sponsored 1926–27 advisory commission headed by Edwin F. Kemmerer. This resulted in the establishment of a central bank, which ended the freedoms of private banking institutions. Kemmerer also reorganized the state budgeting and customs agencies that *la argolla* had previously controlled. That alone provided the government with a financial windfall, which for the next 15 years it put toward infrastructure projects, education, and the establishment of a retirement system for government workers.

As World War II approached, Ecuador accommodated U.S. concerns over the defense of the Panama Canal. President Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Río (b. 1893–d. 1969) permitted the United States to construct a naval base in the Galápagos Islands and an air sta-

tion at Salinas on the Ecuadorean coast. But, in 1941, Ecuador was unprepared to repel the Peruvian invasion that began on July 5 and terminated 16 days later. In the Protocol of Peace signed at the Foreign Ministers Conference January 15–28, 1942, in RIO DE JANEIRO, Ecuador renounced its claim to nearly 30,000 square miles (77,700 km²) of border territory. Arroyo del Río came under increasing attack as a result of this loss. He weathered the storm until May 28, 1944, when he was forced to resign, to be replaced by the populist José MARÍA VELASCO IBARRA. (The Ecuadorean-Peruvian border problem festered until 1995, when war again erupted in the upper Cenepa Valley. A cease-fire was brokered by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. A comprehensive settlement was signed in October 1998, ending a dispute that dated to 1830, and confirming Peru's ownership of the majority of the disputed territory [see ECUADOR-PERU BOUNDARY DISPUTE].)

Ecuadorean politics after World War II continued to be tumultuous. The 1967 discovery of oil fields in the Oriente region resulted in a surge of export earnings from \$43 million in 1971 to \$350 million in 1974 and an annual 9 percent increase in the gross domestic product. The government, however, used the income to leverage additional foreign loans, which soared from \$324 million in 1974 to \$4.5 billion in 1979. As a result, inflation became the overriding economic and political issue for the next generation, whether the military governments

of the 1970s or the subsequent civilian leadership that alternated between moderate leftists and neoliberal administrations from 1979 to 1996. Whoever governed faced a continuing economic crisis that included high inflation, budget deficits, a falling currency, uncompetitive industries, and mounting debt service.

Neoliberalism and globalization did not bring prosperity to Ecuador's working classes. After 1996, the pressure to improve the quality of life for the wider populace led to rapid changes in the presidency, with each new leader's programs attempting to improve life for the under-represented and volatile lower classes. Populist Abdalá Bucaram (b. 1952–) of the Ecuadorean Rodolsista Party (Partido Rodolsista Ecuatoriano, or PRE) won the May 9, 1996, presidential election with a promise to end elitist rule and redistribute the national wealth but was ousted on February 19, 1997. His successor, Quito mayor Jamil Mahaud (b. 1949–), proposed to replace the Ecuadorean sucre with the U.S. dollar, a plan neither popular nor widely understood. In the confusion, the military ousted Mahaud on June 22, 2000. Vice President Gustavo Noboa (b. 1937–) took over the presidency and is credited with bringing temporary political stability to the country. He completed Mahaud's dollarization scheme and secured congressional approval for the construction of a second oil pipeline into Ecuador's interior. Hopes for continued political stability ended on January 22, 2003, however, when Noboa turned the presidency over to former



An *urbano*, or slum area, in Guayaquil, Ecuador (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

army colonel Lucío Gutiérrez (b. 1957–). The latter's conservative fiscal policies, complete makeover of the Supreme Court, and declaration of a state of siege only intensified the opposition against him and finally led to his ouster on April 20, 2005. Political chaos followed until RAFAEL CORREA (b. 1963–) of the Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance (Alianza PAIS) won the presidency on November 26, 2006. When he took office on January 15, 2007, opposition parties controlled the National Congress. Hopelessly deadlocked, Correa dismissed the congress on March 1, which was replaced with a constituent assembly on October 1, 2007. The assembly was to produce Ecuador's 20th constitution since independence but was dismissed by President Correa on November 30, 2007. Since then, Correa has governed without a legislature. Correa was elected to another term in 2009.

Despite the political turmoil, Ecuador's elite remains the dominant political force. While highly fractured around their own interests, the elite demonstrates a willingness to compromise on major issues. Beginning in the early 1990s, Ecuador's indigenous people entered the political arena and played an important voting bloc in the 1996 presidential election and secured six representatives in the 2007 constituent assembly. Ecuador's place in the global economy continues to rest, however, on its ability to successfully deal with its historic problems, including class and regional differences, government corruption, and to develop a diversified economy.

See also BOLÍVAR, SIMÓN (Vol. II); ECUADOR (Vols. I, III); GARCÍA MORENO, GABRIEL (Vol. III); GRAN COLOMBIA (Vol. III); MITA (Vols. I, II); NEW GRANADA, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); PIZARRO, JUAN (Vol. I); SUCRE, ANTONIO JOSÉ DE (Vol. III).

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Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute On October 26, 1998, in the Brazilian capital of Brasília, Ecuadorean president Jamil Mahuad (b. 1949–) and Peruvian president ALBERTO FUJIMORI signed a treaty that ended a dispute over 48 miles (77 km) of the Ecuador-Peru border between the Marañón and Putumayo Rivers in the Condor Mountains. The dispute over this largely uninhabited territory dated to colonial times. According to the agreement, PERU ceded four-tenths of a square

mile (1 km²) of territory, known as Tiwinza, to ECUADOR as private property without relinquishing sovereignty. The agreement, brokered by ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, and the United States, opened the door to \$3 billion in investment in oil, electric power, roads, and other projects in this impoverished border area.

Spain's failure to clearly demark the boundaries of its colonial possession served as the starting point of the conflict that remained one of the hemisphere's most resistant to resolution. The two nations appeared to have settled the dispute with the December 17, 1823, Mosquera-Galdiano Treaty, which reaffirmed the 1809 Spanish colonial boundary. This was reaffirmed in 1829 and 1830 agreements that also granted Ecuador access to the Amazon River. For nearly a century, the governments of Ecuador and Peru persisted in pressing their claims, which included warfare in 1859–60 and the stationing of Peruvian naval ships at Iquitos in 1864. By the terms of the June 21, 1924, Ponce-Castro protocol, the feuding parties agreed to settle the dispute by arbitration. The resultant July 6, 1936, Ulloa-Viteri Accord established a border based on the possession of territory that each nation had at the time. Ecuador rejected the accord, claiming that it demonstrated how much territory Peru had seized over the preceding century. Following a series of border incidents, Peruvian forces occupied several border locations by 1940 and prompted Peruvian president Manuel Prado (b. 1899–d. 1967) to establish a six-battalion MILITARY unit on its northern frontier, plus artillery and air support units. Exactly who fired the first shot on July 5, 1941, remains unclear, but the undermanned and ill-equipped Ecuadorean army retreated. As Peruvian airplanes bombed villages on Ecuador's northern coast and its army advanced on the important port of Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean government sought peace. At the time, the guarantors of the 1924 accord—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States—were preoccupied with World War II and therefore used the 1942 Rio Conference to broker a deal that left Ecuador no choice but to sign the agreement reached at Rio. Ecuador lost some 80,000 square miles (207,200 km²) of the disputed territory, as well as its access to the Amazon River.

From 1943 to 1946, U.S. military reconnaissance airplanes flew over the area to determine a common boundary acceptable to both Ecuador and Peru. Because the reconnaissance flights discovered that the Cenepa River is much longer than previously thought, all but 78 miles (125.5 km) of a common border were clearly marked. The disputed border caused two more military confrontations, in 1981 and 1995, before the four guarantors worked out the 1998 Brasília Accords.

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education A 2007 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK report asserted that only one-third of Latin American young people manage to obtain a secondary school education, compared to about 80 percent of Southeast Asian children. The gap is one of many issues that confront Latin American governments and educational leaders in an increasingly globalized and technology-laden world.

Education in Latin America from colonial times until the late 19th century remained mainly in the hands of the CATHOLIC CHURCH, whose narrow curriculum did not introduce new scientific theories or humanistic knowledge. Given the social structure during the same time period, these schools served mostly the children of the elite and some members of the fledgling middle class. The laboring masses, both urban and rural, were outside this venue. As liberals entered the political arena beginning in the 1850s, efforts at mass education were introduced, such as that of BENITO JUÁREZ in MEXICO and DOMINGO F. SARMIENTO in CHILE. By the end of the 19th century, liberals were encamped in most presidential palaces across Latin America, and among their social reforms was the introduction of public education and laws that made grammar school (grades 1–8) mandatory for all children, but the laws were not evenly enforced throughout the hemisphere, particularly in rural areas. Education also suffered from insufficient funding, as ruling elites resisted efforts to increase levies on themselves.

The vacuum in quality was filled by “foreign” schools, such as British and German institutions. The British schools in ARGENTINA, for example, were a natural outgrowth to Great Britain’s dominant presence in the nation’s agro-export ECONOMY. The German schools, as in GUATEMALA, served as a means to maintain German culture and to preach German superiority over the local population, but in each instance, these quickly emerged as excellent academic institutions. Children of local elites and the children of managers of other foreign companies were enrolled in these schools. Not until World War II did the United States become involved in Latin American education. Through the OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. efforts focused on English-language and nursing and book-keeping schools, but its longest-lasting contribution came with the establishment of agricultural institutes. The war’s end momentarily halted the U.S. effort.

Higher education followed a similar pattern. Universities were few, and all were linked to a religious order or directed by the archbishop of each country. The liberals introduced public university education in the late 19th century, but as with kindergarten through 12th grade, it suffered from insufficient funding and a largely part-time faculty. For these reasons, the elite sent their children abroad for university training.

As the cold war intensified in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s, a new emphasis on education broadened the effort to reach more children at the lower

level and to improve the quality of university training. In addition, specialty schools appeared in urban centers for computer and technology training, office administration, and management skills and to improve and expand the skilled labor force. Despite educating more people, broadening the base of education, improving the quality of teaching and research at all levels, and the use of specialized education, Latin America, like other parts of the developing world today, confronts continued funding problems, inadequately trained teachers and researchers, and up-to-date technology to prepare young people for the globalized economy.

See also EDUCATION (Vols. I, II, III); JUÁREZ, BENITO (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); SARMIENTO, DOMINGO F. (Vol. III).

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El Salvador With nearly 7 million inhabitants living within its 8,008 square miles ([20,740 km²] about the size of the U.S. state of Massachusetts), El Salvador is CENTRAL AMERICA’s most densely populated country. When the world demand for indigo collapsed in the mid-19th century, coffee became the nation’s major export crop. With this, government policies encouraged private ownership at the expense of the rural poor and the production of traditional foodstuffs. As the 20th century began, an estimated 2 percent of the population controlled nearly 80 percent of the productive lands. This set in motion political and socioeconomic patterns that continue to characterize the country.

From 1900 to 1930, the elite class, popularly known as the “14 families,” dominated national politics. The government served the interests of these landed elite, using the military to keep the impoverished, larger populace in subjugation. When LABOR unions surfaced in the 1920s, brutal government-sponsored repression prevented their development. The Great Depression that began in 1929 drastically reduced the global demand for coffee, worsened the plight of Salvadoran peasants, and contributed to the founding of the Liberal Party by Alberto Masferrer (b. 1878–d. 1932) and the 1930 presidential election of its candidate, Arturo Araujo (b. 1878–d. 1967). His election triggered a year of chaotic government and labor demonstrations that prompted the vice president, army general MAXIMILIANO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ, to engineer a coup d’état on December 2, 1931, and establish a dictatorship that lasted until 1944. A month later, in January 1932, Hernández Martínez

directed the MILITARY suppression of a peasant uprising led by communist-leaning AGUSTÍN FARABUNDO MARTÍ. Although exact numbers are impossible to obtain, an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 peasants lost their lives. As a result of La Matanza (massacre), the elite came to associate any suggestions for social change on behalf of the peasants as communist-inspired. The peasants abandoned any public expression of their Amerindian heritage out of fear for their safety. The global depression and World War II continued to lessen the global demand for coffee which, in turn, increased the elite's discontent with Hernández Martínez. But it was the rising discontent of university students and professionals of the middle sector that finally led to the overthrow of Hernández Martínez on May 8, 1944. Nevertheless, political reform did not occur. With the exception of Eusebio Rodolfo Cerdón Cea (b. 1899–d. 1966) in 1962, the military occupied the presidential palace until 1984.

While coffee remained El Salvador's primary export after World War II, cotton, sugar, rice, and cattle entered the mix and led to the elite's expansion of their landholdings, particularly along the Pacific coast. Cognizant of limited opportunities for further agricultural expansion, the elites used their profits to invest in manufacturing and service industries beginning in the 1950s. Salvadoran INDUSTRY further benefited from the establishment of the CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM) in 1960 and the implementation of the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS two years later. Both stimulated the development of the manufacturing sector, albeit one that was capital intensive rather than labor intensive. El Salvador also benefited from U.S. foreign economic policy during the 1950s; the United States provided funding for roads and storage and port facilities to support the agro-export industry. On the downside, by 1960, El Salvador's population had increased by 1 million persons since 1900. With farmlands locked into agro-export products, urban centers such as San Salvador, Usulután, Sonsonate, Santa Ana, and La Unión swelled with people who demanded jobs, housing, and supporting infrastructure.

Historically, El Salvador relieved population pressure by permitting the outmigration of peasants to HONDURAS. Since the 1920s, these people had occupied unused farmland in that country without major incident. By the 1950s, however, Honduras confronted similar internal population pressures as El Salvador, and large landowners there demanded the expulsion of the squatters. A 1968 Honduran agrarian reform law authorized just that. The returning refugees further strained the quality of life for El Salvador's poor. In addition, the Central American Common Market mitigated against the weak Honduran ECONOMY, as the government could not protect its infant industries from Salvadoran imports. Tensions between the two countries reached a climax when riots broke out at a June 1968 World Cup soccer game in Tegucigalpa. During the monthlong SOCCER WAR that followed, the Honduran air force inflicted

heavy damage on El Salvador's Pacific coast ports. At the same time, the Salvadoran MILITARY reemphasized loyalty to the institution at the expense of dealing with the nation's serious socioeconomic ills.

While the discredited Liberal Party disappeared along with its leader, Hernández Martínez, in 1944 and the military continued to dominate national politics, there was greater tolerance of labor unions and middle-class POLITICAL PARTIES that sought to address the nation's socioeconomic problems. The most significant of these groups was the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Cristiano, or PDC), led by JOSÉ NAPOLEÓN DUARTE. With support from the Catholic clergy and middle-sector groups, Duarte was elected mayor of San Salvador in 1968.

The military's resurgent patriotism, however, soon conflicted with the desire for popular government, as evidenced by the PDC's broad-based appeal. When the PDC joined forces with other popular based groups to form the National Union of Opposition that enabled Duarte to win the 1972 presidential election, the military overturned the results to install their own man, Arturo Molina (b. 1922–), in the presidential palace. Duarte was exiled to VENEZUELA, while his running mate, Guillermo Ungo (b. 1931–d. 1991), joined the FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional, or FMLN), a fledgling group that subsequently engaged the government in more than a decade of guerrilla war.

The Salvadoran conflict became part of the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s that brought U.S. pressure and military advisers and assistance into the conflicts in an effort to prevent an alleged communist takeover of Central America. Ronald Reagan's administration attempted to turn the Salvadoran conflict into a crusade for democracy by engineering Duarte's presidential election in 1984. In all, the United States spent an estimated \$221 billion on a war that significantly damaged the Salvadoran economy and took an estimated 75,000 Salvadoran lives. A 1989 Central American peace initiative led to a peace accord between the government and the guerrillas in 1992.

The peace accords provided for a drastic reduction in the Salvadoran military. By 2000, it numbered approximately 32,000 men and no longer played a role in national politics. A national police force replaced the military's internal security forces, and the judiciary became independent of political influence. Since then, the far-right Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, or ARENA) dominated the presidency until the 2009 elections, when Mauricio Funes (b. 1959–) of the FMLN won with 51.3 percent of the popular vote.

Socioeconomic issues remain the country's main challenge. The devastation of the agricultural sector resulted in high unemployment and significantly contributed to the MIGRATION of farmworkers to the United States, where an estimated 2 million Salvadorans now reside. Remittances

from Salvadorans residing in the United States, estimated at \$2.8 billion in 2006, go to about 22.3 percent of El Salvador's families. The remittances also accounted for 16.2 of the gross domestic product. El Salvador under ARENA's leadership followed the world into globalization by selling state-owned industries and opening the country to foreign investment, particularly in *maquila* plants, tax-free industrial complexes that take advantage of cheap labor to produce textiles, electronic goods, and pharmaceuticals for sale on the world market (see MAQUILADORA). The *maquilas* generated an estimated 70,000 jobs. The retail and financial service sector have also grown markedly and now employ approximately 48 percent of the labor force. In an effort to ease credit restrictions, in 2001, the U.S. dollar circulated equally with the Salvadoran colon, and in 2004, the latter went out of circulation. But the conversion to a dollarized economy also restricted fiscal policy and contributed to El Salvador's willingness to sign the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT with the United States in 2006. El Salvador is also seeking similar agreements with MEXICO and the European Union in the hope of bringing into the country foreign investment that will increase employment opportunities.

See also EL SALVADOR (Vols. I, II, III).

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El Salvador–Honduras War See SOCCER WAR.

Esquivel, Manuel (b. 1940–) *prime minister of Belize* Born on May 2, 1940, in Belize City, BELIZE, Manuel Esquivel earned a B.S. in physics at Loyola University in New Orleans in 1962. He then returned to Belize and taught math and physics at St. John's Junior College. In 1967, he earned a post graduate certificate in physics education from Bristol University in England.

During the early 1970s, Esquivel began to take an interest in politics and joined the newly formed Liberal Party. On September 27, 1973, the Liberal Party merged with the National Independence Party and the People's Development Movement to form the United Democratic

Party (UDP) to oppose GEORGE PRICE's People's United Party (PUP). In January 1983, an internal power struggle led to Esquivel being named leader of the UDP. Esquivel's UDP won the general elections in December 1984, and Esquivel became prime minister. He attempted to expand the ECONOMY by increasing exports and encouraging foreign investment, especially from the United States and Taiwan. The PUP, however, won the 1989 elections, thus Esquivel became leader of the opposition.

A few weeks before Belize's June 30, 1993, elections, the MILITARY in GUATEMALA overthrew Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano Elías (b. 1945–), who had established diplomatic relations with Belize in 1991, and renewed claims to Belizean territory. Playing on Belizean fears of Guatemala and accusing Price of allowing too many Latino immigrants into the country, the UDP narrowly won the 1993 elections, and Esquivel returned as prime minister. Allegations of corruption, however, led to the UDP's defeat in the 1998 elections. Esquivel lost his seat in the House of Representatives and resigned as UDP leader. He was replaced by Dean Barrow (b. 1951–), the current leader of the UDP and prime minister of Belize since 2008.

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Estado Novo (New State) The Estado Novo was established during BRAZIL's fascist-style dictatorship under GETÚLIO DORNELLES VARGAS. After coming to power in 1930, Vargas oversaw the writing of Brazil's 1934 constitution, which did not permit his reelection in 1938. To overcome that obstacle, he and his advisers fabricated the so-called Cohen Plan, a "communist plot" to overthrow the Brazilian government. To thwart the alleged coup, in a radio address to the nation on the evening of November 10, 1937, Vargas announced a new constitution. The document combined the fascist principles of António de Oliveira Salazar's government in Portugal and Benito Mussolini's in Italy. The hope for democracy was gone. The MILITARY shut down the Congress, and the 1938 elections were canceled. Vargas announced that he would serve a six-year term, but that he would not be a candidate in the 1943 election. That election was not held; owing to wartime conditions, Vargas again extended his term. The new 1937 constitution granted him complete control over the newly formed congress and judiciary. Political opposition was silenced, and the media, heavily censored. Individual civil and human rights were regularly violated.

The Estado Novo also enabled Vargas and his advisers to carry out state-sponsored economic development. The state played the dominant role in organizing and strengthening cartels in the marketing of cacao, coffee, sugar, and tea and in creating new state enterprises, including the National Motor Factory, National Iron Smelting Company, National Oil Advisor, and the São Francisco Hydroelectric Company. Although World War II limited the exportation of primary agricultural products and Brazil lacked the financial capital to implement the latter, the seeds were planted for the country's post-war industrialization.

Despite its fascist ideology, Brazil identified itself with the United States and initially adopted a neutral stance upon the outbreak of the European war on September 1, 1939. For a price, Vargas allowed the United States to set up military bases on Brazil's northeast coast to guard the PANAMA CANAL and VENEZUELA'S oil fields against a potential German air assault. Subsequently, Brazil supplied the United States with rubber and quinine, which were essential for the war effort, and manufactured uniforms and vehicles for the Allies. Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy on August 22, 1942, after the sinking of Brazilian ships by German submarines. Later that year, Vargas dispatched troops to fight with the Allies in Italy.

The war's idealistic objectives of democracy and freedom fed opposition to Vargas and the Estado Novo at home. Despite setting a date for another presidential election, granting a general amnesty for political opponents, allowing the formation of other political parties, and committing to a new constitutional convention, Vargas could not stem the tide of opposition against him. He was deposed by the military on October 29, 1945.

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Estrada Cabrera, Manuel (b. 1857–d. 1924) *president of Guatemala* Manuel Estrada Cabrera had an undistinguished career as a lawyer in his native city of Quetzaltenango, GUATEMALA, and as a Supreme Court justice prior to his election to the national legislature in 1885. President José Reina Barrios (b. 1835–d. 1889) appointed Estrada Cabrera interior and justice minister in 1892, and his loyalty, more than his competency, led to his being named vice president in 1898, the same year Reina was assassinated. Estrada Cabrera's 22-year presidency began with a constitutional amendment that lifted

the one-term restriction on presidents and was followed by rigged elections.

A disciple of liberalism as espoused by former Guatemalan president JUSTO RUFINO BARRIOS, Estrada Cabrera favored large landed estates and an agro-export ECONOMY. He encouraged the development of a new coffee elite in the western highlands at the sacrifice of NATIVE AMERICANS, whose lands were confiscated and made available to the new elite, who in turn hired the same indigenous peoples to work the coffee plantations. He supported the expansion of United Fruit Company landholdings and the construction of its subsidiary, the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), and its port and warehouses at Puerto Barrios on Guatemala's Caribbean coast. The construction of public health facilities and schools in rural cities benefited mainly the middle and upper classes rather than indigenous workers. The impact of liberalism in Guatemala was the same as elsewhere in Latin America. Modernization benefited the upper and middle sectors, although the two groups remained outside the political system. They became increasingly opposed to Estrada Cabrera's tyrannical and closed regime. Those military officers not in the president's inner circle also sought change in order to create promotional opportunities within the MILITARY. A nascent LABOR movement had arisen by the mid-1910s to demand better wages and working conditions for workers.

The dissatisfaction with Estrada Cabrera dramatically increased following his government's apathetic response to earthquakes that struck Guatemala City in late 1917 and early 1918. Church leaders joined the middle sector in forming the Unionist Party, which demanded that Estrada Cabrera resign, which he finally did on April 15, 1920.

See also BARRIOS, JUSTO RUFINO (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III).

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European Union and Latin America From the time of Latin American independence in the 1820s to the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Europe and particularly Great Britain and Germany were the major foreign players in the economies of Latin American nations. The war itself and the prostrate continental economies opened Latin America to a U.S. economic presence. Then, in the late 1950s, several European countries revived their contacts with ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and MEXICO, but only a trickle of investment followed.

Despite the establishment in 1958 of the European Economic Community (EEC, subsequently identified as the EC), Europe made no concerted effort to implement an economic assistance program or to explore avenues of economic cooperation with Latin America. Not until 1971, and only at the urging of the Special Commission for Latin American Coordination (Comisión Especial de Coordinación Latinoamericana, or CELA), did the EEC take special notice of the region. The EEC declared 1971 “Latin America’s Year” and established a “mechanism for dialogue” for annual discussions with Latin American ambassadors in Brussels. Nevertheless, real progress remained elusive. Several factors contributed to Europe’s inability to develop a relationship with Latin America, including nationalistic problems within Western Europe, the impact of détente on Western European trade with the Soviet Union, the impact of the “oil shocks” during the 1970s, and problems within Latin America itself. Governments were run by military dictators whose nationalistic economic programs did not bode well for cooperative external economic relationships, except in the case of CHILE. Latin America’s early attempts at regional economic integration, such as the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1960, the CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET in 1961, and the CARIBBEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION in 1965, at best served as forerunners to future endeavors. Additionally, most Latin Americans were disturbed by the EC’s support for Great Britain in the April 1982 MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR.

The situation changed in the mid-1980s with the admission of Spain and Portugal to the EC. Spain and, to a lesser degree, Portugal wished to develop a special relationship with their former colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Although the Iberian colonies had achieved independence nearly 175 years earlier, Spain determined to lead the European Community to Latin America in the late 20th century. Other issues contributed to Europe’s revived interest in the region. The CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s led to Europe’s participation in the Contadora Peace Process to end the conflict, a commitment that was reinforced with the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

During the 1980s, democratic governments replaced MILITARY regimes in Latin America, and these new governments embraced the neoliberal economic model. The Latin Americans were anxious for new global contacts. By 2000, several bilateral trade agreements were signed, even with CUBA, despite U.S. consternation at this. The European Union (EU) also completed a trade agreement with Mexico and pursued policies to end drug trafficking in COLOMBIA. As these bilateral efforts continued, the EU determined that the best possibility for significant economic cooperation rested with the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR).

MERCOSUR’s 300-million-plus consumer market, with an annual economic output of \$1.3 trillion, attracted

the EU. The Europeans and MERCOSUR partners were also drawn together by the anticipated U.S. plan for FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA). If successful, the FTAA would limit Europe’s economic access to MERCOSUR and other Latin American nations. For the Latin Americans, the proposed FTAA was another example of attempted U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere. The Brazilians led the charge to unite all of Latin America into a single trading bloc before dealing with the United States on any FTAA agreement. The process began with the signing of an inter-institutional agreement on May 29, 1993, that provided for EU technical assistance, personal training, and institutional support for MERCOSUR’s integration process. Owing to a wide range of issues, minimal progress was made at subsequent meetings in Madrid (1995), RIO DE JANEIRO (1999), BUENOS AIRES (2000), Brussels (2000), and Brasília (2000). The process also slowed because of the European Union’s expansion to incorporate former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. By 2008, the EU totaled 25 member states whose interests needed to be preserved. Similarly, Latin America experienced traumatic crisis at the turn of the 21st century that affected MERCOSUR’s growth and stability. MERCOSUR’s integration process was hampered by arguments over the harmonization of LABOR and investment laws, while the Argentine and Brazilian financial crises from 1999 to 2001 led to currency devaluation that adversely affected those countries’ TRADE. Events in the United States also contributed to a decline in the haste for the EU and MERCOSUR to complete a free trade pact. Largely for political reasons, the U.S. Congress refused to concede fast-track negotiating authority to President William J. Clinton so that he could complete a free trade agreement with Chile. Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, dismissed the FTAA vision. Instead, Bush pursued free trade agreements with individual states, such as Colombia, or small groups of nations such as the Andean and Central American groups.

In 2005, the EU recommitted itself to a MERCOSUR linkage. While the lure of a large market remains, several challenges need to be overcome before an agreement can come into being. MERCOSUR politics have become increasingly nationalistic, and demands for an improved quality of life for the majority have intensified. Because the benefits of the neoliberal economic model have not reached all social sectors, further expansion of free trade is subject to popular opposition. MERCOSUR has yet to harmonize its trading, investment, and intellectual property rights laws, much less implement its anticipated common external tariff. The EU wants Argentina and Brazil to end protective tariffs on their textile industries, just as the South Americans want the EU to terminate their protective agricultural policies.

Since the 2000 Argentine and Brazilian economic crisis, the interests of the MERCOSUR countries have increasingly diverged. Brazil, for example, continues to

cast about for its own trading partners. Venezuelan president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS typifies the strident nationalism that now characterizes Latin American politics and, coupled with his confrontational style in challenging the U.S. presence in Latin America, may harm Brazil's effort to bring about Latin American economic unity. Moreover, China has entered the Latin American marketplace (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF). In 2009, U.S. president Barack Obama promised renewed interest in Latin America, but the playing field has changed significantly since 2000.

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EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional; Zapatista Army of National Liberation) The EZLN is a revolutionary movement based in Chiapas, southern MEXICO, whose name translates to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. The EZLN attracted world attention when they rose in revolt on January 1, 1994, to protest the implementation of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. Members of the EZLN oppose neoliberalism and globalization, two phenomena epitomized by the free trade agreement with the United States and Canada.

The EZLN is made up mostly of the rural indigenous of Chiapas who witnessed the erosion of the agricultural

protections guaranteed by the CONSTITUTION OF 1917 under the presidency of CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI. The group named itself for national hero EMILIANO ZAPATA, who fought in the MEXICAN REVOLUTION to bring about agrarian reform. EZLN followers evoke the memory of Zapata by calling themselves Zapatistas and by drawing parallels to his cause in their platform.

The EZLN is led by a group of *comandantes*, or commanders. The most visible leader is Subcomandante Marcos, who has become an iconic figurehead and spokesperson for the movement. Following their initial uprising in Chiapas in 1994, the Zapatistas quickly gained control over some areas of Chiapas. The surprising successes of the EZLN forced the Mexican government to engage in a long series of frustrated negotiations with the rebels. While Zapatistas initially rose in armed revolt, they later adopted a strategy of peaceful revolution. They have published numerous manifestos, or declarations, and have disseminated their message using modern technologies such as radio and the Internet. Many observers have credited the EZLN for contributing to the electoral overthrow of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI), Mexico's dominant political party, in 2000.

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
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F

Falklands War See MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR.

family Conventional wisdom points to the primacy of family throughout Latin America. While this assumption is correct, family patterns began to alter with the industrialization and urbanization of the region in the late 19th century. The commercialization of AGRICULTURE

lessened producers' need for workers and had the double consequence of dissolving consensual unions and forcing men to migrate to urban areas in search of employment, leaving WOMEN behind to tend for themselves and any children (see MIGRATION). As Latin America's export-based economies grew in the early 20th century, rural and urban elite and middle-class families who did not benefit from the boom often took in boarders to assist



A Honduran middle-class family vacationing on a Caribbean beach (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

with household duties or to supplement family income, rather than as a status symbol.

As Latin America's economic development and urbanization continued after World War II to the present day, family patterns continued to change. The middle sector expanded with the professionalization of women, which contributed to a delay in the average age of marriage. Coupled with the legalization of divorce, the number of households headed by women increased. These factors, as well as scarcity of space in urban centers, contributed to a decline in the birthrate. Urban workers, traditionally ignored by the political system, became one of Latin America's most potent political forces during the last half of the 20th century and demanded wage guarantees, improved housing, health care, EDUCATION, and other government social services. Family size among the rural and urban poor remained high, largely through economic necessity.

A focus on children's rights were one consequence of Latin America's modernization. The PAN-AMERICAN UNION sponsored regular conferences on children's issues beginning in 1913. Several countries, including ARGENTINA, COSTA RICA, MEXICO, and VENEZUELA held similar conclaves that often led to legislation to provide for abandoned children, granting the right to intervene in family matters for moral reasons, recognizing the problem of child delinquency, and the like. However, over time, owing to insufficient government income as well as government indebtedness, these programs were not always implemented, which is considered a significant factor in the rise of teenage gangs across the region.

See also FAMILY (Vols. I, II, III).

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Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional; FMLN) The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed in 1980 as the umbrella for five leftist groups in EL SALVADOR that aimed to overthrow the MILITARY government and replace it with a communist one. Membership included the Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos), People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo), Farabundo Martí Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación), Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional), and the Communist Party of El Salvador's Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación). The FMLN pooled the resources of these groups and coordinated the strategy and tactics of the countrywide insurgency.

The FMLN was divided into two main branches: one for propaganda and public diplomacy and the second

for military operations. Initially, the FMLN adopted a three-pronged strategy: 1) secure its rural support base, 2) delegitimize the regime with attacks on government infrastructure and military forces and installations, and 3) conduct an urban propaganda campaign in hopes of inciting a popular uprising against the government. Financial support came from communist groups outside El Salvador, particularly in NICARAGUA and CUBA, which enabled the FMLN to conduct two offensives in 1982. These were unsuccessful in part because of limited resources and easily interrupted supply lines, exacerbated by communications difficulties and internal disputes over command authority and strategy. With some 12,000 men under its command, in September 1983, the FMLN launched what some called its "final offensive," but this failed largely because of U.S. military advice and equipment given to the national army. As U.S. assistance to the Salvadoran government continued, the FMLN further removed itself from direct confrontation with Salvadoran troops. It reorganized into smaller groups for attacks on key infrastructure sites, such as electric stations, bridges and roads, and crops, particularly coffee and cotton. The FMLN also moved into the cities to destroy factories, assassinate government officials and members of elite families, or kidnap the same for ransom. Often, these and other people were tortured and killed. The Salvadoran army reacted in kind, often attacking rural villages that served as havens for FMLN guerrilla bands. The December 11, 1981, tragedy at El Mozote best illustrates the point. There, the Salvadoran army's U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion massacred an estimated 1,000 villagers for their alleged support of the FMLN guerrillas.

The FMLN's most significant and, in fact, last major offensive of the war came in 1989 when it caught the government's military off guard, taking control of large sectors of the country and carrying the fight into San Salvador. Although the battle did not bring down the national government, most analysts agree that it was the turning point in the war. The U.S. government was already under tremendous public pressure to bring the war to an end, and the newly elected president, George H. W. Bush, supported a negotiated settlement that was finally concluded on January 16, 1992. In the meantime, the U.S. Congress cut off continued military funding for the Salvadoran government. As a result of the peace treaty, the FMLN disarmed itself under United Nations supervision and turned itself into a political party, which today is the second most important party in El Salvador's unicameral legislature.

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Ferré, Luis A. (b. 1904–d. 2003) *engineer, industrialist, and governor of Puerto Rico* Luis A. Ferré was a strong advocate for PUERTO RICO becoming a state of the United States. After earning his master's degree in 1925 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he returned to Puerto Rico to pursue business interests. His cement company significantly benefited from the construction boom generated by OPERATION BOOTSTRAP.

Ferré entered politics when elected mayor of Ponce in 1940 but lost his bid for resident commissioner in 1948 on a statehood platform. He was elected a delegate to the 1952 Constitutional Convention, which led Puerto Rico to becoming a commonwealth a year later. On three successive occasions, Ferré unsuccessfully ran for the island's governorship as the candidate of the Republican Party of Puerto Rico (Partido Republicano de Puerto Rico). After his 1964 defeat, Ferré founded the New Progressive Party and won the 1968 election with a call for changing Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States. After his failed bid for reelection in 1974, Ferré continued to be active in politics and a champion for Puerto Rican statehood until his death in 2003, despite rejection of this by the Puerto Rican people in 1993 and 1998 referendums.

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Figueres Ferrer, José (b. 1906–d. 1990) *president of Costa Rica* The son of Spanish immigrants to COSTA RICA, José Figueres Ferrer went on to govern the nation on three separate occasions. With little formal EDUCATION, he came to the United States ostensibly to pursue electrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology but never matriculated. According to Figueres's own account, he used the Boston Public Library to become widely read in social philosophy, studying the works of Miguel Cervantes, Immanuel Kant, José Martí, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Figueres returned to Costa Rica in 1928 and established Lucha Sin Fin *finca* (Endless Fight ranch) to grow hemp and make it into rope and bags. The workers earned some of the profits. He was expelled from the country for two years in 1942 for asserting that President Rafael Calderón

Guardia (b. 1900–d. 1970) sympathized with the Nazis by permitting a German submarine to attack Puerto Limón on July 2, 1942, which resulted in the sinking of the *San Pablo*, a U.S. cargo steamer. While exiled in MEXICO, Figueres joined with other Caribbean exiles to form the CARIBBEAN LEGION, which subsequently sought the ouster of FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR in CUBA, RAFAEL TRUJILLO in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA in NICARAGUA, and RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO in VENEZUELA.

On returning to Costa Rica in 1944, Figueres immersed himself in national politics. He joined the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento Nacional de Liberación), an organization of intellectuals critical of the landed elite's control of the political arena at the expense of lower socioeconomic groups. He equally disliked MANUAL MORA VALVERDE and his Popular Vanguard Party (Partido de la Vanguardia Popular, or PVP) because of its alleged communist philosophy. Figueres linked Mora to Calderón, largely because of the 1943 Labor Code, and to President-elect Teodoro Picado (b. 1900–d. 1960) for his campaign alliance with the communist Manual Mora. When Calderón attempted to steal the 1948 presidential election from the opposition's standard-bearer Otilio Ulate Blanco (b. 1881–d. 1975), Figueres determined to break the Calderón-Mora alliance permanently.

A 44-day civil war ensued, and at its conclusion, Figueres headed a junta that ruled Costa Rica for 18 months (see CIVIL WAR OF 1948, COSTA RICA). During that time period, the junta abolished the army, outlawed communism, nationalized the banking system, imposed a 10 percent tax on the wealthy, and provided for the election of a constituent assembly that drafted a new constitution in 1949. The new document embraced Figueres's social philosophy and stipulated that a president could not seek reelection until 12 years after his initial term. With his program in place, Figueres turned over the government to Ulate on November 8, 1945.

During his second term as head of state, but first as elected president, 1953–59, Figueres promoted private INDUSTRY and worked for completion of the PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY through Costa Rica. He labored for the expansion of the middle class as a means to improve the lot of the poor without threatening the privileged position of the elite. But, his continued matériel and moral support for the Caribbean Legion, and his criticism of U.S. support for Latin American dictators, prompted Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration to distance itself from Figueres.

Figueres's third term (1970–74) was marred by revelations of his links to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Soviet counterpart, the KGB, and to corrupt U.S. financier Robert Vesco. Figueres created the Inter-American Democratic Social Movement (INADESMO), a CIA front organization to support left-of-center political groups in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela,

GUATEMALA, Nicaragua, HONDURAS, and PANAMA. He accepted \$300,000 from the KGB to help finance his 1970 presidential campaign and shortly after taking the presidency, extended diplomatic and trade relations to the Soviet Union. In 1974, he took another \$10,000 to start his own newspaper with a promise to print stories favorable to the Soviet Union. In 1974, Figueres granted political asylum to Vesco, who allegedly had looted millions of dollars from U.S. mutual funds. These embarrassments, plus the World Bank-imposed financial bailout program to keep the Costa Rican economy afloat, contributed to the National Liberation Party's loss of the 1978 presidential race to Social Christian Unity Party candidate, Rodrigo Carazo (b. 1926–).

Until his death on June 8, 1990, Figueres remained a spokesman for democratization throughout Latin America in general and in Costa Rica in particular. He was well liked and received in many Latin American countries for his left-of-center political ideals. He supported the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT in Nicaragua in its effort to oust dictator ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE. He became one of the region's most ardent critics of U.S. policy regarding the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s.

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Flores Magón brothers *anarchists and activists in Mexico* Ricardo Flores Magón (b. 1873–d. 1922), Enrique Flores Magón (b. 1877–d. 1954), and Jesús Flores Magón (b. 1871–d. 1930) were anarchists who became advocates of radical reform in MEXICO during the late Porfiriato and built their reputation as opponents of the dictator Porfirio Díaz (in power from 1876 until 1911). As journalists and social activists, the brothers inspired resistance movements throughout the country that eventually coalesced in the MEXICAN REVOLUTION.

The Flores Magón brothers were born to a poor indigenous father and a mestiza mother in the state of Oaxaca. Ricardo was influenced by the indigenous struggle during the liberal reform era of the late 19th century in his home state. The brothers founded the newspaper *Regeneración* in 1900 to give voice to those being exploited

under the policies of Díaz. Ricardo and Jesús were later arrested and imprisoned for speaking out against Díaz's administration, and the newspaper was shut down. They were eventually released, and in 1904, the brothers fled to Texas. They later relocated to Saint Louis, Missouri, and continued publishing *Regeneración* from there. They also established the Mexican Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Mexicano, or PLM), as a formal resistance organization to challenge the Díaz dictatorship.

In the late years of the Porfiriato, the Flores Magón brothers published strong denunciations against Díaz. They advocated land and labor reform, and their writings appealed to large numbers of exploited workers throughout Mexico. LABOR unrest and work stoppages at the Cananea Copper Company and the Río Blanco Textile Factory may have been inspired by writings in *Regeneración*. After the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, Ricardo Flores Magón stayed in the United States, where he attempted to organize other anarchists to return to Mexico and fight for that cause. He was arrested on several occasions and died in a U.S. prison in 1922.

Enrique returned to Mexico a year after his brother Ricardo's death, and he fell out of favor with other *magonistas*. After assisting with the founding of Confederación Campesina Mexicana in San Luis Potosí, Enrique withdrew to private life until his death in 1954. Jesús, a lawyer and political moderate, served as undersecretary of justice in the Madero administration until Madero's overthrow and murder in 1913, when he left the country for the United States. In 1917, after the revolution ended, Jesús returned to Mexico and continued to practice law until his death on December 7, 1930 in Mexico City.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III); REFORMA, LA (Vol. III).

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Foraker Act (1900) Officially known as the Organic Law Act of 1900, the Foraker Act was signed into law by U.S. president William McKinley on April 2, 1900. The law became known by its sponsor's name, Joseph B. Foraker, a Republican from Ohio. Under its terms, Puerto Ricans regained their government, as was established by the Charter of Autonomy granted by Spain in 1897, just prior to U.S. entry into the Cuban war for independence in 1898.

Under the terms of the Foraker Act, Puerto Ricans were administered by a governor, a secretary, and five cabinet members, all of whom were named by the president of the United States. A 35-member Legislative Assembly represented the people. The act also provided for the election of a resident commissioner to serve as a nonvoting representative of PUERTO RICO in the U.S. Congress. On May 1, 1900, Charles H. Allen was inaugurated as the first civilian governor of Puerto Rico.

In effect, Puerto Rico remained in its colonial status, with the United States replacing Spain as the metropole power. The island's status would change under the terms of the JONES ACT in 1917.

See also PUERTO RICO (Vol. III); WAR OF 1898 (Vol. III).

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FMLN See FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

Fox, Vicente (b. 1942–) *president of Mexico* Vicente Fox became president of MEXICO in 2000 and was the first non-PRI politician to win the highest office since the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) inception in 1929. Fox represented the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN) and is remembered for his part in a major democratic transition in Mexican history.

Fox was born on July 2, 1942, in MEXICO CITY and was raised in the state of Guanajuato. He studied business administration at the Universidad Iberoamericana and at Harvard University. Fox pursued a career with the Coca-Cola Company and eventually ran the company's Mexican operations. He ventured into politics in the 1980s and became involved with the PAN during a time when opposition POLITICAL PARTIES were gaining momentum in the nation. Fox won the governorship of Guanajuato in 1995 as a PAN candidate. In 2000, he ran for president, promoting a campaign of change and honesty. Fox won the election on his birthday, with more than 42 percent of the vote.

Fox attempted to curb corruption during his administration. He brought in advisers to clean up bureaucratic inefficiencies and commissioned special security forces to pursue the ringleaders of the DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO. Fox often found himself at the center of controversy during his presidency. He was a vocal advocate of immigration reform in the United States and appeared to cultivate a close relationship with U.S. president George W. Bush (see IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES). Fox continued to be a public figure after his presidential



Mexican presidential candidate Vicente Fox casts his vote in the 2000 election. (AP Photo/Victor R. Caivano)

term expired in 2006, appearing at public events and publishing an English-language autobiography in 2007.

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Franco, Rafael (b. 1897–d. 1973) *president of Paraguay* Rafael Franco emerged as a military hero of the CHACO WAR and used this to his advantage on February 17, 1936, in the coup d'état that drove PARAGUAY's president Eusebio Ayala (b. 1874–d. 1942) from office. As president, Franco initiated a reform program that included the disbursement of 495,000 acres (200,320 ha) to peasant families, while for urban laborers he mandated an eight-hour workday and granted them the right to strike. Military officers loyal to the

Liberal Party ousted Franco 18 months after he took office. He fled to ARGENTINA, where he continued to influence the Febrerista Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Febrerista, or PRF). In 1946, President HIGINIO MORÍNIGO invited Franco to return home as part of a planned coalition cabinet. Subsequently, President ALFREDO STROESSNER invited him back to lead the Febreristas as a token opposition political party in several elections. Franco accepted this as the only way to keep the PRF in the Paraguayan public's eye. With his death in 1973, the Febreristas lost all viable leadership.

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Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) The concept of a Western Hemisphere TRADE ZONE can be traced to the administration of U.S. president George H. W. Bush (1989–92). Bush was attempting to placate Latin Americans' fear that their countries would be economically hurt by the 1991 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA), which was designed to integrate the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican markets. Bush's successor, President William J. Clinton, pursued the project with the first Summit of the Americas conference in Miami, Florida, December 9–11, 1994. The Miami Declaration pledged the nations to rid the hemisphere of poverty, provide for sustainable economic growth, commit to democratic government, and set a date of 2005 for the completion of an FTAA agreement. To reach that deadline, negotiations began in 1998 among the various technical committees representing economic sectors, such as AGRICULTURE, textiles, and telecommunications, and various issues including LABOR and intellectual property rights. National interests prevailed, however, and there was insufficient progress by 2005. An FTAA agreement remains elusive.

Not everyone was happy with the proposed FTAA. Most Latin Americans saw it as another U.S. attempt to dominate hemispheric affairs and to profit most from it. BRAZIL led the charge and instead aimed to unite the Latin Americans into one trading bloc before confronting the United States over the FTAA. By 2008, BOLIVIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, PERU, and VENEZUELA had become associate members of the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR). Latin American governments also sought economic agreements outside the hemisphere. Discussions with the European Union began in 1995 but have stalled over protective measures, such as agriculture and textiles, within each group (see EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN AMERICA). After 2000, China completed trade agreements with several Latin American countries, including ARGENTINA, Brazil, Chile,

Ecuador, and MEXICO (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF). The MERCOSUR economies were adversely affected by Brazil's devaluation of the real and the Argentine financial crisis between 2000 and 2002 (see ARGENTINA, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN).

The United States became increasingly hesitant to rush to a new free trade agreement amid allegations that NAFTA had already cost thousands of jobs in Mexico and had adversely affected certain economic sectors, such as south Florida agriculture. Intellectual property rights, telecommunications, and information technology sectors also contributed to U.S. concerns. At the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Miami on November 21 and 22, 2003, these differences became divisive. As a result, President George W. Bush determined to seek trade agreements with smaller groups or individual Latin American nations, such as the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, the ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, and Colombia. Because of these myriad issues, in 2008, FTAA discussions were at a standstill as the U.S. presidential elections approached in November. Throughout the campaign, the Democratic candidate Barack Obama pledged a renewal of U.S. interest in Latin America and called for a new and fair commitment to inter-American trade, a promise he repeated at the Fifth Summit of the Americas Conference in TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO from April 16 to 19, 2009.

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Frei Montalva, Eduardo (b. 1911–d. 1982) *president of Chile* Born into a middle-class family in SANTIAGO DE CHILE, Eduardo Frei Montalva was educated in local schools and in 1933 earned his law degree from the Universidad Católica. Shortly after his graduation, Frei married María Ruíz-Tagle, and together, they had five children. Originally a member of the Conservative Party, Frei became disenchanted with its indifference toward the needs of the working class. In 1938, Frei and several of his colleagues founded the Falange Nacional to rally behind Popular Front (Frente Popular, or FP) candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda's (b. 1879–d. 1941) successful bid for the presidency. In 1945, President Juan Antonio Ríos (b. 1888–d. 1946) appointed Frei minister of public works, and in 1949, Frei became the Falange's first elected senator. A political pragmatist, Frei recognized that the Falangist name was associated with the political right and that the Socialist and Communist Parties were identified with the extreme left. In order to offer a middle position, in 1957, he helped found the Christian

Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or PDC), which brought together wealthy Catholic industrialists, professionals, small businessmen, and other members of the middle sector, as well as industrial workers, miners, peasants, and agricultural laborers. The PDC became a centrist party, offering itself as an alternative to the extreme left and extreme right. Frei appealed to a wide audience through his belief that capitalists and workers were not natural enemies and that social reform and justice could be accomplished within a capitalistic-democratic framework.

Frei lost his bid for the presidency in 1958, but six years later, he defeated FP candidate SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS by a large margin, with 56 percent of the popular vote. Frei took office on November 3, 1964. The campaign was cast within the framework of the cold war, as a struggle between capitalism and communism. Frei and his supporters placed Allende in the latter category and pointed to the political tyranny and economic decline of CUBA caused by communist FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided \$3 million to the Frei campaign. In congressional elections a year later, the Christian Democrats gained a majority of the legislative seats but not enough to prevent its programs from being blocked by coalitions on the right and the left.

The centerpiece of Frei's program was the "Chileanization" of the copper industry, which was dominated by U.S. firms. Frei reasoned that outright nationalization with compensation would be too expensive, and to encourage further U.S. investment in the country would only expand U.S. influence in CHILE'S ECONOMY. The centrist choice, according to Frei, was for the Chilean government to buy into the companies, with compensation to be paid to the original owners from the income earned from increased production. Once the payments were completed, the Chilean government would use the income to invest in the country's infrastructure, including homes, schools, medical clinics, and so forth for the poor. With the PDC majority in Congress in November 1965, the Chilean government purchased 51 percent of the Kennecott and 25 percent of the Anaconda copper-MINING companies. Frei's plan fizzled over the next five years, however. Copper production increased by only 10 percent, and although copper prices increased, this was due to inflation rather than higher productivity. The expected income was based on the latter, a point not lost on leftist politicians.

Frei's second initiative, agrarian reform, also failed to meet its objective. He expected to place 100,000 peasant families on their own farms by 1970, but only an estimated 28,000 peasants became farm owners. While large landowners were reluctant to part with any of their land, the peasants, having long mistrusted government institutions, were hesitant to borrow funds from government banks to purchase available plots. The Frei administration also received a mass infusion of foreign capital from the United States, the INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

BANK, and the World Bank for infrastructure projects, but congressional opposition, largely from conservative POLITICAL PARTIES and the FP that had no interest in Frei succeeding, refused to appropriate the required Chilean portion of the reform programs.

By 1970, the high expectations of Frei's "Revolution in Liberty" had not been realized, which contributed further to the frustration of the people and to Allende's election that same year. Nevertheless, Frei's legacy lived on beyond his death in 1982. His eldest son, Eduardo Frei Ruíz-Tagle (b. 1942–), served as president of Chile from 1994 to 2000, and the PDC continues to be Chile's largest party into the 21st century.

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French overseas possessions French territory in the Caribbean region currently consists of three overseas departments—French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique—and two overseas collectives—Saint Martin and Saint Barthélemy. The Guadeloupe department currently includes the adjacent islands of Les Saintes, Marie-Galante, and La Désirade.

Prior to the 20th century, France lost many of its colonies in the Caribbean. Whereas HAITI declared its independence from France in 1804, islands such as DOMINICA, GRENADA, SAINT LUCIA, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES were captured by the British. Until 2007, there were three French overseas possessions (commonly known in French as *départements d'outre-mer*). These regions are officially part of France and use the euro as their official currency. On February 22, 2007, however, Saint Martin and Saint Barthélemy, feeling no cultural affinity toward Guadeloupe, seceded from Guadeloupe and became overseas collectives. Saint Martin, which occupies 20 square miles (52 km²) of territory, consists of several islets and the northern part of the island of Saint Martin. The southern part of the island is currently a part of the Netherlands Antilles (see CARIBBEAN, DUTCH). The island, inhabited by 35,000 people, has an elected Territorial Council, which has been led by Frantz Gumbs (b. unknown) since 2009. Saint Barthélemy, commonly known as St. Barts, occupies 8 square miles (21 km²) of territory and is inhabited by 7,000 people. The island also has a Territorial Council, which has been led by Bruno Magras (b. 1951) since 2007.

After more than five centuries of European colonialism in the Americas, French Guiana, which lies between SURINAME to the west and BRAZIL to the east and south,

remains the only nonindependent state on the South American mainland. Over 90 percent of French Guiana's 33,399 square miles (86,503 km²) of territory is covered by tropical forest. Most of French Guiana's 202,000 inhabitants live along the coast. During the 19th century, Emperor Napoléon III decided that penal settlements in the colony would reduce the cost of prisons in France and contribute to the development of the colony. Between 1852 and 1938, more than 56,000 prisoners, including Alfred Dreyfus of the notorious Dreyfus Affair, were sent to the DEVIL'S ISLAND PRISON. Although the prison closed in 1952, French Guiana has never fully escaped its negative image as a former penal colony with an unhealthy climate and an impenetrable hinterland.

In 1946, after more than three centuries as a French colony, French Guiana was transformed into an overseas department. Unlike the peoples of other European colonies in the Caribbean who loudly clamored for independence during the post-1945 era, the people of French Guiana wanted to remain part of the French nation, primarily for economic reasons. In theory, French Guiana was to be equal and identical to any other French department. Beginning in 1958, French Guiana underwent a significant economic transformation. The traditional AGRICULTURE-BASED ECONOMY was replaced by a consumer-oriented economy based on massive cash infusions from France. By 2000, over three-fourths of the population was involved in the service sector. The most dynamic sector of French Guiana's economy is the fishing industry. By 2000, shrimp represented 60 percent of French Guiana's total exports. Since 1982, the French government has encouraged French MIGRATION to the territory. Many of these recent immigrants, who make up 25 percent of the population, are working for the European Space Agency, which launches its communication satellites from the GUIANA SPACE CENTER at Kourou. Antoine Karam (b. 1950–) has been president of the Regional Council since 1992.

Guadeloupe, which occupies 629 square miles (1,629 km²) of territory, is an archipelago of five principal islands—Basse-Terre, Grande-Terre, La Désirade, Les Saintes, and Marie Galante—in the Leeward Islands. It is located between Montserrat to the north and Dominica to the south. A narrow channel divides Guadeloupe proper into two islands, Basse-Terre and Grande-Terre. The resulting landmass is butterfly-shaped. The capital, Basseterre, is located on the western island of Basse-Terre. Most of Guadeloupe's 410,000 people are French-speaking Catholics of African descent. In 1946, Guadeloupe became a French overseas department. Although the overwhelming majority of Guadeloupe's people prefer continued association with France, albeit for economic reasons, a small, violent secessionist movement has resorted to terrorism to make itself heard. Victorin Lurel (b. 1951–) has been president of the Regional Council since 2004. Agriculture is the single most important economic activity in Guadeloupe. During the post-World

War II period, bananas replaced sugarcane as the most important crop. Over 50 percent of the revenue from agricultural exports comes from bananas. Revenue from tourism is enhanced by the number of U.S. cruise ships visiting Guadeloupe. France provides huge subsidies that allow the people of Guadeloupe to have a higher standard of living than would be possible if they were independent.

Martinique, which occupies 436 square miles (1,129 km²) of territory, is the northernmost of the Windward Islands. Martinique is located between Dominica to the north and St. Lucia to the south. Fort-de-France, the capital, is located on the western side of the island. Most of Martinique's 400,000 people are French-speaking Catholics of African descent. Repeated attempts by the inhabitants of Martinique during the 20th century to gain greater autonomy often resulted in violence. A significant number of people on the island began to embrace the philosophy of Negritude, which urged black people to reject cultural assimilation and emphasize their African heritage. Author Aimé Césaire (b. 1913–d. 2008), the mayor of Fort-de-France from 1945 to 1983, consistently sought greater autonomy for the island. Basing his ideas on a blend on Negritude, anticolonialism, and communism, Césaire believed that the political assimilation of the French colonies into the French Republic would guarantee the human rights of the people of Martinique.

In 1946, Martinique became a French overseas department. Although Martinique was offered independence in 1958, the inhabitants, motivated by economic factors, voted to continue their relationship with France. Alfred Marie-Jeanne (b. 1936–) has been president of the Regional Council since 1998. Agriculture, once the mainstay of the island's economy, generated only 5 percent of the island's revenue in 2007. Although limited attempts at light industry have been implemented, tourism has become the most important source of foreign exchange. France continues to provide huge subsidies that allow the people of Martinique to have a higher standard of living than would be possible if they were independent.

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FSLN See SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

FTAA See FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS.

Fujimori, Alberto Kenya (b. 1938–) *president of Peru* According to the official account, Alberto Kenya Fujimori was born to working-class parents who had migrated to PERU from Japan. Subsequent allegations, never proven, charged that Fujimori was born in Japan and came to Peru with his parents when they immigrated in 1934, which would have made him ineligible for the presidency. What is certain is that he attended local public schools and earned a degree in agricultural engineering in 1957 from the Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina. Fujimori subsequently pursued graduate studies in France and the United States. In 1974, he married Susana Higuchi, also of Japanese descent. They divorced in 1994. For 15 years prior to his presidential candidacy in 1990, Fujimori held several academic positions in Peru and from 1987 to 1989 hosted a popular television show that gave him wide public exposure.

In 1989, Fujimori joined with a group of middle-sector professionals, small businessmen, and Protestant evangelicals to form a new political party, Change 1990 (Cambio 90), to challenge Peru's traditional elite-MILITARY leadership and political corruption. Fujimori beat Peru's renowned writer Mario Vargas Llosa (b. 1936–) in the June 11, 1990, election. Contrary to his campaign promises, Fujimori implemented a neoliberal economic program. His austerity measures included the firing of 400,000 government employees. Changes in existing laws opened the oil, gas, and MINING sectors to foreign investment, while new government agencies were established to set pollution standards on a case-by-case basis in those industries. Critics assert that this leniency significantly increased environmental degradation in the Amazon region, the Andean highlands, and national parks. In contrast, Fujimori's supporters point out that the measures reduced the annual inflation rate from 7,650 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 1993, increased foreign direct investment by more than \$2 billion, and generated a 7 percent annual economic growth rate by 1994. Fujimori granted the military, the police, and the government intelligence service a free hand in repressing the SHINING PATH and TÚPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

Opposition POLITICAL PARTIES controlled the Chamber of Deputies and Senate and opposed Fujimori's programs and his desire for more centralized authority to direct a government assault on guerrilla organizations, Fujimori engineered a self-coup (*auto golpe*) on April 2, 1992. The constitution was suspended, the congress dismissed, and the judiciary purged. No significant popular protest surfaced against the action or Fujimori's call for a new constituent assembly on January 31, 1993. The new constituent assembly permitted him to seek a second presidential term, which he won in new elections held on April 9, 1999. Among his immediate actions were to pardon all military personnel of human rights violations in the campaign against guerrilla organizations and to strip universities of their autonomy. Fujimori now became known as a dictator, and concerns over the loss of civil and human rights intensified.



Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori takes office in 1990. (AP Photo/Alejandro Balaguer)

The pro-Fujimori Congress approved a new constitution, which the Peruvian people ratified on December 31, 1999. The document contained a provision that made Fujimori eligible to seek a third presidential term in the April 9, 2000, elections, which the electoral board claimed he narrowly won by wide enough margin to prevent a runoff election on May 28. Fujimori had won amid charges of voter intimidation and government fraud. Complicating matters countless numbers of Alejandro Toledo's (b. 1946–) Possible Peru Party had submitted blank ballots to protest the alleged voter intimidation and government voter fraud. In any case, the debated election results became a moot point when, on September 14, 2000, television station Canal N broadcast a video showing the director of Peru's National Intelligence Service (SIN) accepting a bribe. Over the next two months, both allegations and verifications of corruption in Fujimori's administration intensified, and his support base collapsed. Fujimori left Peru for a meeting of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Brunei but wound up in Tokyo, Japan, from where he faxed his resignation to Congress. Fujimori remained in Japan until November 6, 2005, when he arrived in SANTIAGO DE CHILE via a private jet from Tokyo and Tijuana, MEXICO. His intention was to return to Peru to participate in the 2006 presidential elections despite a Peruvian law that prevents him from participating in national politics until 2011.

Fujimori remained in Santiago while the Chilean Supreme Court considered the Peruvian request to extradite him on a warrant for human rights violations during his presidency. On September 21, 2006, the Peruvian request was granted, and the next day Fujimori returned to LIMA to face charges of corruption and human rights violations. Fujimori received a six-year sentence on

December 10, 2007, stemming from corruption charges. On April 7, 2009, Fujimori received a 25-year sentence for human rights violations.

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G

Gairy, Eric (b. 1920–d. 1997) *prime minister of Grenada* Born on February 18, 1920, near Grenville, GRENADA, Eric Gairy was a schoolteacher and TRADE union leader. From 1941 to 1942, Gairy worked at the U.S. naval base at Chaguaramas in Trinidad. He subsequently worked for the Lago Oil Company in Aruba from 1943 to 1948. In 1950, he formed the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). Gairy served as chief minister of the House of Representatives from 1954 to 1960. Herbert Blaize (b. 1918–d. 1989), leader of Grenada National Party (GNP), established in 1953 to oppose GULP, was appointed chief minister in 1960 but lost power to Gairy in 1961. Blaize, however, was reappointed chief minister when Gairy was dismissed for corruption in 1962. In 1967, shortly after the British granted Grenada more internal self-government, Blaize lost power to Gairy, who became premier. To solidify his hold on power, in 1970, Gairy formed the Mongoose Gang, a private army under his command that terrorized political opposition, especially those who supported the Black Power movement.

On February 7, 1974, after the United Kingdom granted Grenada independence, Gairy became prime minister. In the 1976 elections, Blaize temporarily allied his center-right GNP with MAURICE BISHOP's left-wing New Jewel Movement (NJM). Regardless, Gairy won the elections. Critics of Gairy's government accused him of becoming increasingly authoritarian. In 1977, Gairy obtained MILITARY assistance from CHILE's AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, who provided counterinsurgency training to the Grenadian military and police. At the same time, Gairy facilitated the establishment of St. Georges Medical School. In 1977, while addressing the United Nations, Gairy called for the establishment of

an agency to study unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and the Bermuda Triangle. On March 13, 1979, while Gairy was out of the country attending a UFO seminar at the United Nations, Bishop's NJM launched a coup that overthrew Gairy's government. Gairy stayed in exile, first in New York City, then in San Diego, California, until after the U.S.-led military intervention of Grenada known as OPERATION URGENT FURY ousted the NJM from power. Gairy's attempts to regain power in the 1984, 1990, and 1995 elections met with failure. He died on August 23, 1997, after suffering a stroke in Grand Anse, Grenada.

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Norma Sinclair. *Grenada: Isle of Spice* (Northampton, Mass.: Interlink Publishing, 2003).

Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (b. 1898–d. 1948) *Colombian labor activist and politician* The son of a BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA, bookseller and schoolteacher, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán did not begin his formal education until age 11. He went on to earn a law degree from the National University in 1924 and two years later, a doctorate in jurisprudence at the Royal University in Rome, Italy. Exposed to Liberal Party ideas since early childhood, Gaitán became a party activist in 1919, at age 21. He became a national figure for his leadership role in the 1928 banana worker's strike against the United Fruit

Company (UFCO) in Magdalena. The army crushed the strike, killing an uncounted number of unarmed workers. This prompted Gaitán to travel throughout the country, using his oratory skills to speak out against the MILITARY action, the elite government it represented, and U.S. capitalism as represented by UFCO. Gaitán's reputation as a defender of laborers' rights contributed to his election as mayor of Bogotá in 1936 and to his appointments as minister of education in 1940 and labor minister in 1943 and 1944 (see LABOR). Having built an extensive following among Colombia's lower socioeconomic group, the Liberal Party judged him too far to the political left to support him in his bid for the presidency in 1946, which was unsuccessful. A year later, however, Gaitán became the undisputed leader of the Liberal Party and was considered by most analysts to be its candidate for the presidency in the 1950 election. However, on April 9, 1949, Juan Roa Sierra (b. 1927–d. 1948) assassinated Gaitán as he left his law office in Bogotá. Roa was immediately murdered by an angry mob, leaving behind a host of unsubstantiated theories about his motive for the crime. Gaitán's death touched off nationwide rioting known as the Bogotazo and unleashed a 15-year period of unrest known as La Violencia. Gaitán's legacy as a spokesman for Colombia's underclass remains.

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Galtieri, Leopoldo (b. 1926–d. 2003) *de facto president of and commander of the armed forces in Argentina* Born into a working-class family in BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, Leopoldo Galtieri entered the Argentine MILITARY academy at age 17 to study engineering. Subsequently, he studied at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. In 1975, he became commander of the Argentine engineer corps; in 1976, a major general; and in 1980, commander in chief of the army.

Galtieri supported the military coup that ousted President ISABEL PERÓN on March 24, 1976, and became a member of the ruling junta. As the junta's repressive DIRTY WAR and failed economic policies generated opposition to it, he became *de facto* president of Argentina on December 22, 1981, replacing General Roberto Viola (b. 1924–d. 1994). Galtieri also remained as the army's commander in chief. The political change did not stymie the opposition, whose demonstrations turned increasingly violent. From the start of his "presidency," Galtieri planned to invade the Malvinas, or Falkland Islands, thinking that in current world conditions Great Britain would not come to the defense of the archipelago some 8,000 miles from London. While Argentina's invasion on April 2, 1982, stirred

Argentine nationalism to reclaim islands the British had occupied since 1833, the British did come to the South Atlantic and with their superior force overwhelmed the underprepared Argentine military. The Argentines surrendered on June 14, 1982. Galtieri resigned from the presidency three days later.

President Raúl Alfonsín (b. 1927–) came to office on December 10, 1983, with a reputation as a battler for human rights during the military regimes. Determined to rectify the past, he directed the arrest of Galtieri and other junta leaders on charges of human rights violations during the Dirty War and for mismanagement of the MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR. Evidence at Galtieri's trial revealed that while he was not among the worst violators of human rights, he did lead Battalion 601, the unit in charge of the Dirty War. Nevertheless, it was his mismanagement of the Malvinas/Falklands War that sent him to prison in 1988. Galtieri served five years before receiving a pardon from President CARLOS SAÚL MENEM.

While never regretting his role in either the Dirty War or admitting to any wrongdoing in the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, Galtieri spent his remaining years living quietly in a Buenos Aires suburb. He died of heart failure at the age of 76 on January 12, 2003.

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García Pérez, Alan (b. 1943–) *president of Peru* Born into a middle-class family in LIMA, PERU, Alan García Pérez received his primary and secondary education in local schools and pursued undergraduate studies at the Catholic University in Lima before earning a law degree at the National University of San Marcos in 1971. He also earned a doctoral degree in political science at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid, Spain, and a degree in sociology from the University of Paris. At the urging of AMERICAN POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE (APRA) leader VICTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE, García returned to Peru in 1978 and was elected to the constituent assembly that year and to the Chamber of Deputies in 1980.

García captured the presidency in the April 14, 1985, elections, the first APRA candidate to do so in the party's 60-year history, and at age 36, he was the youngest president in the region, which earned him the title "Latin America's Kennedy." During his term, the ECONOMY was wracked by continuing inflation that totaled 2.2 million percent, the percentage of people living in poverty climbed 13 percentage points to 55 percent of the total

population, the annual per-capita income dropped to \$720, the gross domestic product (GDP) slipped by 20 percentage points, and the national reserves were put at -\$900 million. The international financial community abandoned Peru when García declared that the country would annually put only 10 percent of its GDP toward payment of its foreign debt. The García regime was also plagued by rumors of graft, corruption, and nepotism, and some appointees were said to have links to Colombian drug dealers.

In addition to a continuing economic crisis during his first term, García confronted a rising tide of violence from the SHINING PATH guerrilla organization. While the brutal and repressive MILITARY response did not put down the guerrillas, it did result in violations of human rights and massacres, such as those at Accomarca in August 1985, Santa Bárbara in June 1986, and Cayara in May 1988. Additionally, an estimated 1,600 people “disappeared” during García’s administration. García left office on July 28, 1990, under a cloud of suspicion. On April 9, 1992, President ALBERTO KENYA FUJIMORI directed the military to arrest García on charges of corruption, but García escaped to COLOMBIA and then to France, where he earned a minimal income, yet lived an ostentatious lifestyle, his daughter attending a prestigious private school.

Following Fujimori’s resignation on November 22, 2000, García returned to Peru on January 27, 2001, and again confronted charges of corruption during his first presidential term. While García denied the allegations, Peru’s Supreme Court ruled that the statute of limitations had run out. During these machinations, Congress approved legislation that barred anyone who had been investigated for corruption during their public careers from seeking the presidency.

Once cleared of corruption charges, García began campaigning for the presidency and lost the race in a close runoff election on June 4, 2006, to Possible Peru Party candidate Alejandro Toledo (b. 1961–). Nevertheless, García came away from the election as APRA’s undisputed leader. As APRA’s candidate, García again campaigned for and won the presidency in the June 4, 2006, runoff election with 53 percent of the popular vote. He came to office promising to balance economic stability with spending on social programs, a difficult challenge in a country where 44.5 percent of the people live below the poverty line and where an estimated 49.5 percent of the workforce is underemployed.

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 Carlos Reyna. *Alan García, 1985–1990* (Lima, Peru: DESCO, 2000).

Gomes, Albert (b. 1911–d. 1978) *chief minister of Trinidad and Tobago* Born on March 25, 1911, in Belmont, a suburb of Port of Spain, Trinidad, to middle-class Portuguese immigrant parents, Albert Gomes studied journalism at the City College of New York between 1928 and 1930. Following his return to Trinidad, he established *The Beacon*, a provocative literary magazine financed by his father. After his father suspended support of *The Beacon* in 1933, Gomes went to work in a pharmacy owned by his father. During the 1930s, he became involved in the growing LABOR movement in Trinidad and Tobago.

Gomes served on the Port of Spain city council from 1938 to 1947 and was elected to the Legislative Council in a special by-election in 1945. In the 1950 elections, the British Empire Citizens’ and Workers’ Home Rule Party, led by Tubal Uriah “Buzz” Butler (b. 1897–d. 1977), won seven of the 18 available seats, but the British governor, fearing that Butler’s political agenda was too radical, asked Gomes to form a coalition government. Gomes served as chief minister of Trinidad and Tobago from 1950 to 1956. The People’s National Movement (PNM), led by ERIC WILLIAMS, won the 1956 elections. Joining the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 1957, Gomes was elected to the WEST INDIES FEDERATION parliament. After Trinidad and Tobago achieved independence in 1962, Gomes, a 300-pound white man, realized that he had no political future in Trinidad and Tobago. He moved to England where he wrote his autobiography, *Through a Maze of Colour* (1974). Gomes died of stomach cancer on January 13, 1978.

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 Eric Williams. *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492–1969* (New York: Vintage, 1984).

Gómez, Juan Vicente (b. 1857–d. 1935) *dictator and president of Venezuela* Juan Vicente Gómez served as Venezuelan dictator and as president on three occasions between 1908 and 1935. One of 14 children born into a ranching and business family in Táchira State, at age 14, Gómez was thrust into a position of responsibility with the death of his father. Gómez assumed the directorship of his father’s business pursuits and inherited his position on the state’s municipal council. In the late 1880s, Gómez developed a friendship with Cipriano Castro (b. 1858–d. 1924) and as an officer in Castro’s army entered CARACAS with him in 1899 to seize the presidency. As a loyal supporter, Gómez suppressed Castro’s political

opponents and in the process earned a reputation as an efficient yet brutal administrator. Castro departed for Europe on November 23, 1908, for medical treatment, and in his absence, Gómez seized power, on December 19. Gómez went on to govern VENEZUELA as an iron-fisted dictator for the next 27 years, manipulating the constitution six times to remain in office. For his brutal suppression of political opponents and his violation of civil and human rights, Gómez earned the title “Tyrant of the Andes.” His economic policies encouraged ownership of large estates to produce the primary export crops, coffee and cacao. After the discovery of oil in Lake Maracaibo in 1918, Gómez made generous concessions to foreign oil companies, including Royal Dutch Shell, Sinclair of Indiana, and Standard Oil of California. In the process, Gómez and his family and close friends personally profited.

Gómez has been the subject of significant historical debate. Earlier scholars were extremely critical of his political dictatorship and economic policies that benefited the landed elite at the expense of Venezuela’s middle and lower sectors. While acknowledging Gómez’s mistakes, more recent scholars portray him as a major stepping stone to Venezuela’s modernization. These scholars place Gómez alongside RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO as Venezuela’s most important 20th-century political leader.

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Thomas Rourke. *Tyrant of the Andes: The Life of Juan Vicente Gómez* (New York: W. Morrow & Co., 1936).

Gómez, Laureano (b. 1889–d. 1965) *president of Colombia* Born into a middle-class family in BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA, Laureano Gómez graduated from the National University in 1909 with an engineering degree. With an interest in politics, from 1911 to 1916, he worked as editor of the conservative newspaper *La Unidad*, at the same time serving as an elected member of the national Chamber of Deputies. During the 1920s, he served as minister to CHILE and ARGENTINA and minister of public works. Following the Liberal electoral victory in 1930, Gómez proselytized the conservative cause through newspaper editorials and criticized Presidents Olaya Herrera (b. 1880–d. 1937), ALFONSO LÓPEZ PUMAREJO, and Eduardo Santos (b. 1888–d. 1974). Gómez fled to Spain after he nearly lost his life in the Bogozato on April 9, 1948. He returned to capture, unopposed, the November 27, 1949, presidential election as the Conservative Party candidate. Governing without a congress, he directed infrastructure improvements including

roads, oil pipelines, and soccer stadiums and dispatched troops to fight on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean War (1951–53). Nevertheless, his regime was better known for its repression. When public order collapsed around him, on June 13, 1953, General GUSTAVO ROJAS PINILLA ousted Gómez, who again departed for Spain. Although exiled, Gómez remained the recognized leader of the Conservative Party. In that position, in 1956 at Siges, Spain, Gómez signed an agreement with the Liberal Party by which each shared political power for 15 years starting in 1958. Following the agreement, Gómez returned to Colombia, residing in Bogotá until his death in 1965.

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James D. Henderson. *Conservative Thought in Latin America: The Ideas of Laureano Gómez* (Athens: Ohio University, Center for International and Center for Latin American Studies, 1988).

González, Elián (b. 1994–) *refugee from Cuba* Elián González was a five-year-old Cuban native rescued by a U.S. fisherman three miles (5 km) from the Florida coastline on Thanksgiving Day, November 25, 1999, an event that triggered a seven-month political and legal battle between the United States and the Cuban governments. The rescue of González became an emotional battle for Cuban-exile communities, particularly those in Miami, Florida, and Union City, New Jersey, that was played out in the international media.

With several others, young González had secretly left CUBA in a small boat on November 22, 1999. Two days later, it sank in the Florida Straits, with only three survivors. González’s mother and stepfather were among the dead. After receiving medical treatment from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), González was put into the temporary custody of his grandfather’s stepbrother, Lázaro González, himself a Cuban exile living in Miami’s Little Havana. In December, Elián’s blood father, Juan Miguel González, requested that his son be returned to Cuba. A debate followed over issues such as children’s rights, the state of civil rights in Cuba, educational systems, the rule of law, and the possibility that Elián’s father could immigrate to the United States. Emotions flared as the Cuban-American community staged demonstrations in Miami, Union City, and elsewhere, while FIDEL CASTRO RUZ orchestrated mass turnouts in Cuba calling for the return of González. The situation intensified in January 2000 when González’s two grandmothers arrived in the United States with the intention of taking him home. It reached new heights when Juan Miguel González arrived in the United States in April. Lázaro González refused to grant the Cubans visitation rights and publicly vowed never to turn the boy over to U.S. authorities. His protestations led Attorney General Janet Reno

to order the abduction of Elián from Lázaro González's home on April 22, 2000, to unite him with his father in Washington, D.C. Finally, both the Atlanta Appeals Court and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider asylum petitions for Elián González. On June 22, he, his grandmothers, and his father returned to HAVANA to a tumultuous welcome. While it was a triumph for the U.S. legal system, Castro used the incident to further stir anti-Americanism in Cuba.

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good neighbor policy In his March 4, 1933, inaugural address, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the United States henceforth intended to be a "good neighbor" in its relations with other nations around the globe. Secretary of State Cordell Hull made a similar announcement before the Seventh Inter-American Conference of American States, meeting in Montevideo, URUGUAY, December 3–26, 1933. At that conference and again at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in BUENOS AIRES December 1–23, 1936, the U.S. delegations pledged their government to nonintervention in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors can be traced to the 1898 war for Cuban independence and its role in PANAMA's 1903 independence and subsequent interventions to maintain political order in both nations; the CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFERENCES OF 1907 and 1923; and the U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean region since 1900, which brought charges of imperialism from critics in both North and South America.

Several factors contributed to a change in policy in the decade after World War I. Europe no longer posed a threat to the Caribbean region. Furthermore, the larger Latin American nations—ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, and MEXICO—had called for an end to U.S. interventionist policies. As secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover called for the withdrawal of marines from the Caribbean countries to improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere, claiming that this would result in improved economic relations. State Department Latin American specialists, frustrated with the failed U.S. effort to democratize the region, had also called for the marines' withdrawal. J. Reuben Clark's *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine* rejected the Roosevelt Corollary that justified U.S. preemptive intervention under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine. The mounting death toll among U.S. Marines as the result of the chase for NICARAGUA's alleged revolutionary AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO further contributed to public protest against intervention.

In applying the good neighbor policy, Roosevelt directed the withdrawal of marines from the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HAITI, and Nicaragua, and the United States did nothing to interfere with the emergence of dictators TIBURCIO CARÍAS ANDINO, MAXIMILIANO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ, ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA, RAFAEL TRUJILLO, and JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA in HONDURAS, EL SALVADOR, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and GUATEMALA, respectively. The policy also led to a new Panama Canal treaty that was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1936 (see PANAMA CANAL TREATIES). Roosevelt sidestepped the policy in relation to CUBA, however. There, presidential envoy Sumner Welles encouraged FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR to overthrow President RÁMON GRAU SAN MARTÍN on January 15, 1933. Welles's TRADE reciprocity agreements were used by dictators to legalize their positions, but nothing more. The United States did not directly intervene in the internal affairs of a Latin American country until its sponsored 1954 invasion of Guatemala (see GUATEMALA, U.S. SPONSORED INVASION OF).

See also MONROE DOCTRINE (Vol. III); PANAMANIAN INDEPENDENCE (Vol. III); WAR OF 1898 (Vol. III).

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Goulart, João Belchoir See BRAZIL; BRAZIL, 1964 COUP D'ÉTAT IN.

Grau San Martín, Ramón (b. 1887–d. 1969) *president of Cuba* Beginning in 1927, Ramón Grau San Martín became a vocal critic of corrupt president GERARDO MACHADO Y MORALES, which resulted in his jailing in 1931 and then exile in the United States. Following the "Sergeant's Revolt" on September 4, 1933, Grau served in the short-lived, five-man junta known as the pentarchy, and upon its collapse, he became provisional president, a post he held until January 14, 1934. As a Cuban nationalist, Grau unilaterally terminated the PLATT AMENDMENT, legalized LABOR unions, established an eight-hour workday, and declared that 50 percent of the workers in all firms operating on the island had to be Cuban. Grau also announced a land reform program to appease the peasant class. These programs were popular among laborers and students but not among the Cuban elite, U.S.-owned companies operating on the island, and the U.S. government, whose economic interests in CUBA were threatened. Grau's pronouncements prompted U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt's special envoy to Cuba, Sumner

Welles, to request that the U.S. intervene on the island. Owing to the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, Roosevelt refused, but he did not extend U.S. recognition to the Grau government and did not prevent Welles from speaking with the political opposition, including FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR, whom Welles encouraged to oust the provisional president. Batista did just that on January 14, 1934, and commenced a 25-year run as the most dominant political figure in Cuba until FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

For his part, Grau escaped to MEXICO, from where he criticized the United States for intervening in Cuban affairs and Cuba's corrupt political system. He returned to Cuba to be elected to the 1940 constitutional commission, which he eventually chaired. Cuba's 1940 constitution was considered Latin America's most progressive at the time. Grau lost the 1940 presidential election to Batista but won the 1944 contest in what most considered to be the fairest election in Cuban history.

During his four-year presidency, Grau San Martín confronted a Cuba stuck in the past as the world around it rapidly changed. Because Cuba remained the free world's primary source of sugar from 1941 to 1947, the landed elite consistently pressured the government to find new sugar markets, even after production in other regions of the world increased from 1947. Cuba's Communist-led labor movement had also benefited from World War II and wanted those gains protected in the postwar world, but at the same time, it became stridently anti-American. Despite their divergent interests, these two groups—sugar growers and labor—became strange bedfellows in the Cuban congress in rejecting U.S.-funded programs designed to diversify AGRICULTURE and develop INDUSTRY on the island. Each group viewed the U.S. proposals as potential opportunities for its further penetration into the Cuban ECONOMY.

As a nationalist, Grau refused to negotiate with the United States and extend its World War II air base rights on the island, but this did not stop him from purchasing U.S. MILITARY equipment and supplies, which he used to thwart various coup attempts against him. Grau again sought unsuccessfully the presidency in 1954 and 1958. Following Castro's 1959 revolution, Grau San Martín retired to his HAVANA home, where he died on July 26, 1969.

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Grenada The southernmost nation in the Windward Islands, Grenada became independent of the United

Kingdom on February 7, 1974. Grenada is the largest and southernmost of the Grenadines, a vast archipelago of more than 600 mostly uninhabited islets divided between Grenada and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES.

Known as the Spice Isle because of its production of nutmeg and mace, Grenada occupies 132 square miles (342 km²), making it one of the smallest independent nations in the Caribbean. Most of the country's 105,000 people live on Grenada. Over 80 percent of those people are of African ancestry. Significantly, there are at least 200,000 Grenada-born people living abroad. St. George's, the capital and largest city, is located on the western side of Grenada. Grenada also possesses the Grenadine Islands south of the Martinique Channel, the most significant being Carriacou, Petit Martinique, Ronde Island, Diamond Island, Large Island, Saline Island, and Frigate Island. The Grenadine Islands north of the Martinique Channel are part of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO is Grenada's southern neighbor.

In the 1763 Treaty of Paris, France ceded Grenada to the United Kingdom. The British made Grenada a CROWN COLONY in 1877. Grenada was part of the ill-fated WEST INDIES FEDERATION from 1958 to 1962. In 1967, Grenada became an associated state, when Britain granted the local population self-government. The United Kingdom, however, continued to control foreign relations and national defense. On February 7, 1974, the British granted Grenada independence, and the premier, ERIC GAIRY, the head of the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), became the nation's first prime minister. Queen Elizabeth II, the official head of state, appointed a governor, who served as an adviser to the prime minister, who is usually the leader of the majority party in the House of Representatives.

On March 13, 1979, while Gairy was out of the country, the New Jewel Movement (NJM) led by MAURICE BISHOP, staged a virtually bloodless revolution and established the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). One school of thought holds that the charismatic Bishop was merely a figurehead for a group of pro-Soviet sympathizers within the NJM intent on encircling the Caribbean in a Communist net, in addition to NICARAGUA and CUBA. Another school of thought holds that Bishop truly wanted democratic reform, but that hostility from the United States and neighboring Caribbean states pushed him into an alliance with Castro. Whereas the NJM called for a form of popular socialism based on grassroots local councils, it suspended the constitution, ruled by decree, arrested hundreds of political opponents, closed newspapers, and militarized the nation. The PRG turned Grenada into a Soviet-Cuban client state. The stockpiling of vast quantities of Soviet-supplied weapons was a matter of great concern to Grenada's neighbors.

On October 18, 1983, the PRG imploded. Minister of Finance Bernard Coard (b. 1944–), who wanted to pursue a more pro-Soviet, anti-U.S. policy, overthrew Bishop with the support of the army. Bishop and many

of his closest associates were arrested, then executed the next day. Following several days of pandemonium, on October 25, 1983, U.S. president Ronald Reagan launched OPERATION URGENT FURY, a U.S. military intervention with the support of several English-speaking Caribbean leaders, most notably DOMINICA prime minister MARY EUGENIA CHARLES. The joint U.S.-Caribbean force promptly restored order and removed Coard and his supporters from power. British governor-general Paul Scoon (b. 1935–), who had been placed under house arrest by Coard and liberated by U.S. forces, appointed Nicholas Brathwaite (b. 1925–), a member of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), to reestablish the Grenadian government. In December 1983, when U.S. forces withdrew, Brathwaite became interim prime minister. Herbert Blaize (b. 1918–d. 1989), the leader of the New National Party (NNP), won the 1984 elections and served until his death in 1989. In elections held shortly after Blaize's death, Brathwaite's NDC returned to power in 1990. Keith Mitchell (b. 1946–), the new leader of the NNP, won the 1994, 1999, and 2003 elections and has served as prime minister since 1995.

Tourism is the nation's leading foreign exchange generator. Grenada is known for its cultivation of spices such as cinnamon, cloves, ginger, mace, and nutmeg. Grenada produces 20 percent of the world's supply of nutmeg, making it the second-largest producer after Indonesia, which produces 75 percent of that supply.

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Grove Vallejo, Marmaduke (b. 1878–d. 1954) *Chilean military officer and senator* Born into a middle-class family in Copiapó, CHILE, Marmaduke Grove Vallejo entered the National Naval College in 1892, only to be dismissed two years later. In 1896, he enrolled in the National Military School and graduated in 1898 as a second lieutenant. He later studied in Germany and at Chile's Army Staff School. Grove rose quickly through the ranks and became subdirector of the National Military School in 1920 and in 1925, the director of the newly established Air Force Academy.

From an early age, Grove identified with the causes of Chile's workers, believing they were exploited by the country's agricultural and industrial elite. Grove's political philosophy surfaced publicly on September 3, 1924, when he represented 56 military officers before President Arturo Alessandri (b. 1868–d. 1950) to demand not only

wage increases for the officers but changes in the employment code and income tax system that would benefit the working class. Alessandri caved into Grove's first demand but not those he made on behalf of LABOR. Nevertheless, because he no longer controlled the military officers, Alessandri resigned and departed for Europe. Lieutenant Colonel CARLOS IBÁÑEZ DEL CAMPO headed the military junta that succeeded Alessandri. Recognizing Grove as a potential threat, Ibáñez forced him into exile in Europe.

Grove returned to Chile in 1932 determined to seize power, which he did on June 4, 1932. He proceeded to establish the Socialist Republic of Chile, but in the prevailing political turmoil, his administration lasted only 10 days. During that time the government granted the Central Bank the authority to extend credit to small MINING and agricultural businesses, and government-owned pawn shops were required to return pawned articles to their owners. Following the overthrow of his government on June 13, 1932, Grove went into exile on Easter Island. He returned to Chile only two weeks before the October 30, 1932, presidential election in which he stood as a candidate and finished second behind Alessandri with 17.7 percent of the popular vote. On April 13, 1933, Grove cofounded Chile's Socialist Party and was elected to the Senate on May 9, 1934, a position he held until his 1949 electoral defeat, after which he retired from public life. As a senator, Grove proposed Chile's first agrarian reform law in 1939 and remained a champion of workers' rights. On May 15, 1954, at the age of 75, Grove died in SANTIAGO DE CHILE.

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Guantánamo Naval Base Located on CUBA's southeast coast, in Oriente Province, standing watch over the Windward Passage that connects the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, Guantánamo Naval Base is a 45-square-mile (116.5-km²) facility and is the oldest U.S. overseas naval base. Article 7 of the 1902 PLATT AMENDMENT granted the United States the right to acquire a naval base in Cuba, and on July 2, 1903, an agreement was reached with the Cuban government to lease 28,700 acres (11,614.5 ha) of land and water in the Guantánamo Bay area for an annual payment of \$2,000.

From the start, the U.S. presence at Guantánamo stirred Cuban nationalism, which prevented any future agreements to expand the base. Even cooperative presidents such as GERARDO MACHADO Y MORALES and FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR understood that the Cuban congress would never approve such agreements. Although provisional president RAMÓN GRAU SAN MARTÍN unilaterally proclaimed the termination of the Platt Amendment in 1933, it was formally abrogated a year later with the PERMANENT TREATY of 1934. The new treaty, however,

provided for continued U.S. use of the Guantánamo naval facility for an annual payment of \$14,000. Since coming to power in 1959, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ has repeatedly claimed that he intends to reunite the base with the nation but never took any action in this direction.

Despite its importance to U.S. security, Guantánamo Naval Base initially could not meet its daily water needs. The hot, dry, and arid region receives about 25 inches (635 mm) of rainfall per year. U.S. troops destroyed the base's only well in 1898, fearing that the Spanish had poisoned it. Subsequent efforts to drill artesian wells met with failure. Purchasing water in Cuba or shipping it into the base proved costly and unsatisfactory. Finally, in 1940, the navy reached an agreement with the Bacardi Rum Company to supply the base with 3 million gallons of water from the company's pumping stations on the Yataras River, 12 miles (19 km) away. The issue reached a climax on February 6, 1964, when Castro closed the Yataras River pumps in retaliation for the U.S. Coast Guard seizure of a Cuban fishing vessel inside U.S. territorial waters. Although that incident was resolved peacefully within a month, U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the construction of desalination plants on the base. When completed in December 1968, the plants produced 3 million gallons of water and 800,000 kilowatts of electricity daily. Another casualty of the 1968 water crisis was the estimated 600 Cuban workers who lost their jobs on the base, costing the Cuban ECONOMY \$1.2 million annually, along with the \$14,000 annual lease fee the U.S. paid to the Cuban government for use of the site. Since 1964, Castro has instigated incidents along the fence line separating the base from Cuba in order to keep the ownership issue in the public spotlight.

Traditionally, the Guantánamo Naval Base served as a guardian of the Caribbean and its sea and air routes to the Panama Canal and beyond, but during the Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations, the United States conducted MILITARY maneuvers on or near the base, which Castro charged were preparations for a U.S. invasion of Cuba. When the cold war ended in 1991, the base was used to house 45,000 Haitian refugees and another 60,000 Cuban *BALSEROS* trying to escape political tyranny and economic deprivation. Under current policy, all Cubans escaping the homeland and caught on the high seas are returned to Guantánamo and then to Cuba. Since the United States commenced its "war on terrorism" in 2001, an estimated 400 alleged terrorists have been held in special facilities at the base.

The end of the cold war also touched off a debate in the United States regarding Guantánamo's military usefulness. This argument focuses on security needs, a concept that has come to include control of drug trafficking and the movement of terrorists.

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Guatemala Guatemala encompasses 42,092 square miles (109,018 km²) making it similar in size to its southeastern neighbor HONDURAS and to the U.S. state of Tennessee. Approximately 12.7 million people inhabit this mountainous and volcanic country, which also has fertile coastal plains. People of Amerindian-Spanish descent, locally identified as *ladinos*, and those of European descent make up 54.9 percent of the population. The remainder of the populace are Maya or other NATIVE AMERICANS and are usually identified by one of the 24 indigenous dialects spoken throughout Guatemala. Research of the Mayan culture that dominated the region in the preconquest period continues to attract scholars to Guatemala today.

Spanish conquistador Pedro de Alvarado conquered Guatemala in 1524, after which it became the major state in the Audiencia of Guatemala during the colonial period. Following independence from Spain in 1821 and the Mexican Empire in 1823, Guatemala City served as the capital of the short-lived United Provinces of Central America, until its collapse in 1838. Throughout the remainder of the 19th century, the landed elite developed the nation's coffee-based export ECONOMY.

MANUEL ESTRADA CABRERA assumed the presidency in 1898 and through constitutional manipulation, governed until April 15, 1920, when he was forced from office. During Estrada Cabrera's administration, the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO) developed the lucrative banana industry and its subsidiary, International Railways of Central America (IRCA), which laid track that connected GUATEMALA CITY, the coffee highlands, and EL SALVADOR to UFCO's wharves and ships at Puerto Barrios. Although the banana industry created new jobs for indigenous laborers, in the absence of protective LABOR laws and other government measures, for the most part, they remained poverty stricken. Also during Estrada Cabrera's tenure, coffee growers replaced Guatemala City's merchants in political prominence, while UFCO's economic influence made it the most important factor in Guatemala's political arena. Following Estrada Cabrera's ouster in 1920, Guatemala experienced a decade of political turmoil despite its thriving export-based economy. The economy spiraled downward following the onset of the Great Depression in 1929; the concomitant political turmoil ended when General JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA won unopposed elections and assumed the presidency on February 14, 1931.

Ubico's government depended on support from the MILITARY, the coffee-growing elite, and UFCO. Political opposition was silenced, the legislature rubber-stamped Ubico's proposals, and the press was censored. Vagrancy laws forced the peasantry to work on coffee *fincas*. With the

outbreak of World War II in 1939, Ubico became decidedly pro-Allies. He implemented the U.S.-inspired anti-Nazi program that led to the confiscation, and eventual nationalization, of German-owned properties; the deportation of Nazis, real and suspected; and severe restrictions on those Germans who remained in Guatemala.

Middle-sector opposition to Ubico emerged in 1942. Students and intellectuals and, subsequently, small shopkeepers, lawyers, and medical doctors protested against Ubico's oppressive political regime, wartime-prompted inflation, and apparent uncritical support of U.S. wartime policies, particularly the confiscation of German-owned properties. The protests and demonstrations reached a peak in the late spring of 1944, as Ubico again sought to extend his presidency by constitutional manipulation. A period of political turmoil followed Ubico's forced resignation on July 1, 1944. Finally, elections on December 17–19, 1944, brought to the presidency JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO, a university professor who had spent the preceding 12 years exiled in ARGENTINA.

Arévalo's administration, from 1945 to 1950, set in motion allegations that communists controlled the government. Arévalo's call for social security, minimum wages, and maintenance of peasant homes, combined with the fact that many Guatemalan Communists held key government and labor union positions, ignited an elite-based backlash that asserted international communism had infiltrated the country. The anticommunist campaign intensified after the election of JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN to the presidency on March 15, 1951. Arbenz's campaign promises to control foreign investment in Guatemala, expand legal protections for labor unions and workers, and endow indigenous peasants with land, threatened the traditional socioeconomic order. Arévalo's and Arbenz's rhetoric and programs also reflected the changing nature of Guatemalan society. The middle sector that inspired Ubico's ouster in 1944 demanded a more broadly based democracy, while labor leaders, many of them Communists, pressed for workers' and peasants' rights. Not only was Guatemala's elite under attack, so, too, was UFCO. To many, including the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration in the United States, the challenge to Guatemala's traditional order was seen as a microcosm of larger Communist successes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China.

Arbenz came to the attention of the international community with the passing of Decree 900 on June 27, 1952, which provided for the nationalization of unused lands for distribution to peasant families. Initially, public lands were redistributed, but when 15 percent of UFCO's 650,000 acres were earmarked for confiscation, U.S. officials concluded that Arbenz had brought communism to Central America. UFCO initially protested the payment of approximately \$525,000 and expanded it into a larger "communist" plan. The Eisenhower administration drew the same conclusion and directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to engineer Arbenz's overthrow, which it

did on June 18, 1954 (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). Carlos Castillo Armas (b. 1914–d. 1957), who commanded the Guatemalan army troops that ousted Arbenz, succeeded him as president. Although he set in motion nearly 40 years of military rule in Guatemala, he did not terminate the intra-army struggles for dominance of that institution and hence the country.

Castillo Armas revoked Arbenz's reform measures and suppressed the labor movement. By the early 1960s, middle-class hopes for a more democratic government and an independent judicial system had vanished. The traditional oligarchy—elite landowners, the military, and the CATHOLIC CHURCH—remained entrenched. The military governments became increasingly brutal. Any individual who challenged the existing order—rural and urban labor, intellectuals, university students, and other middle-sector members and politicians—faced death, prison, or exile. In the countryside, the Guatemalan military confronted guerrilla groups, initially, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, or FAR), which during the 1970s melded into the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, or EGP). The brutality in the countryside by both government and guerrilla forces drew international criticism. Uncounted numbers of rural Native Americans found refuge in Chiapas State, MEXICO.

In the decade following Castillo Armas's seizure of power, Guatemala's economy benefited from post-invasion U.S. economic assistance in the form of the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS and the CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM). AGRICULTURE was diversified, and the industrial base expanded, which contributed to greater employment and increased exports. Guatemala also escaped the depths of the oil shocks in the early 1970s by relying on the minimal petroleum reserves in the Petén. Nevertheless, when the price of crude oil quadrupled in 1979, triggering a global recession, demand for Guatemala's primary exports decreased. The country's economy spiraled downward, and its TRADE deficit climbed to \$409 million in 1981. Furthermore, the violence in Guatemala led to a drastic drop in tourism. During this time period, the middle sector emerged to publicly press for a democratic government. A constitutional convention held in 1985 resulted in an amended document and a presidential election on December 8, 1985. Christian Democrat VINICIO CEREZO (b. 1942–) became the first civilian to hold the presidency since JULIO CÉSAR MÉNDEZ MONTENEGRO (b. 1915–d. 1996), from 1968 to 1972. Cerezo and Christian Democrat Jorge Serrano Elías (b. 1945–), who succeeded him in 1992, pursued neoliberal policies, including austerity measures, selling the national airline, Aviateca, and devaluing the national currency, the quetzal. The last contributed to further inflation and, with the military lurking in the background, further suppression of labor leaders, intellectuals, and the military. When Serrano illegally attempted to disband Congress on May 25, 1993, he was forced from office, leaving Congress as the dominant political

player until January 7, 1996, when National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional, or PAN) candidate Álvaro Arzú (b. 1946–) captured a runoff presidential election. Arzú's major accomplishment was concluding a peace agreement that brought Guatemala's 36-year-old civil war to an end. He is also credited with improving the country's human rights record. Still, Arzú and his three successors—Alfonso Portillo (b. 1951–) and Óscar Berger Perdomo (b. 1946–), both of the Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco, or FRG), and current president Álvaro Colom (b. 1951–) of the National Unity of Hope (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza, or UNE)—confronted serious economic and social problems. While the private sector now accounts for 85 percent of the national economy, continuing confrontation between that sector and the national government, government corruption, and unreliable mechanisms for enforcing contracts deter foreign investment. An estimated 56 percent of Guatemalans live below the poverty line, and with a median age of 18.9 years for its 12.7 million inhabitants, there is an urgent need for job creation. The Guatemalan government hopes that its ratification on March 10, 2005, of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT will help address these issues.

See also ALVARADO, PEDRO DE (Vol. D); GUATEMALA (Vols. I, II, III); UNITED PROVINCES OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Vol. III).

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Guatemala, U.S.-sponsored invasion of (1954)

On June 18, 1954, Guatemalan colonel Carlos Castillo Armas (b. 1914–d. 1957) led a rag-tag army of about 300 men across the Honduran border toward GUATEMALA CITY, while, in the capital, U.S. ambassador John Puerifoy directed an air assault on MILITARY and radio outposts and a propaganda campaign to advise the Guatemalan people that a massive army had entered the country to oust President JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN. Arbenz resigned on June 27 and fled the country. While some argued

that Arbenz's programs were designed to address the country's ills, the elite, middle sector, and Archbishop Mariano Rosell y Arellano (b. 1894–d. 1964), as well as leading policy makers in Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration, believed that Arbenz was attempting to extend the reach of international communism (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA).

The ouster of longtime dictator JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA on July 1, 1944, brought to the forefront GUATEMALA's historic sociopolitical and economic ills. The government had long been dominated by elite landowners, whose decision making was greatly influenced by the U.S.-based United Fruit Company (UFCO). The initial challenge to this structure came during the 1945–50 presidency of JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO, whose changes to social security, rent control, the LABOR code, and income taxes were aimed at improving life for the nation's poor, estimated at 80 percent of the population. These programs were largely opposed by the elite and middle classes, who initiated the overthrow of Ubico in 1944. These groups also desired greater participation in the political system; to them, Arévalo and his programs were communistic.

In the 1950 presidential campaign, Arbenz promised greater socioeconomic benefits for the poor, greater government control of foreign investments in Guatemala, and a land distribution program. Again, the elite and middle sectors warned of a communist regime, and Archbishop Rosell threatened to excommunicate those who voted for Arbenz on the grounds that communism and Catholicism were incompatible. Nevertheless, Arbenz won the election, his victory coming at a time of significant change in world politics. By 1950, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a cold war that spawned the European Economic Recovery Program (Marshall Plan, as it was popularly known) and North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) in Europe. The first was designed in part to keep the populace from turning to communism, while the latter was a military barrier aimed at preventing Soviet expansion on the continent (see SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICA). Meanwhile, in the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy had begun his investigation into alleged communists in government service. Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected to the U.S. presidency in November 1952. His administration dismissed the suggestions of State Department analysts, who considered Arbenz a socialist attempting to address Guatemala's long-standing social problems. Rather, the administration agreed with those who considered Arbenz a communist.

For many, Arbenz was confirmed as a communist when he implemented a land distribution program in June 1952. It provided for the confiscation of idle land on estates of more than 223 acres and its distribution to peasant families. Compensation to the owners would be in 25-year bonds at 3 percent at the rate of their most recent tax declarations, which often grossly undervalued a property's value. Arbenz claimed his plan was to increase local food production, which would lower food prices and

increase people's purchasing power. Guatemala's elite and middle sector, however, considered it communism. So did UFCO, particularly after Arbenz confiscated 400,000 acres of its unused land and offered compensation of \$1.18 million, the amount UFCO declared on its May 1952 tax assessment. UFCO undertook a public relations campaign in the United States promoting the idea that communism had come to Central America. Others also supported the UFCO claim about communism, even though many U.S. Latin American academics at the time viewed Arbenz more as a nationalist, reacting to Guatemala's historic conditions, rather than supporting an expansion of global communism.

In March 1954, U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles took the matter to the Tenth Inter-American Conference meeting in CARACAS, VENEZUELA. Rather than address the socioeconomic issues in Guatemala, which were also common in other Latin American countries at the time, Dulles charged that while communists did not threaten the Americas directly, they sought to gain control through subversion. While Dulles never mentioned any country by name, it was understood that he was referring to Guatemala. Dulles obtained a resolution that sanctioned preemptive military strikes against subversive forces.

The ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) resolution enabled Eisenhower to go forward with the Central Intelligence Agency's "Operation PBSUCCESS." Once the operation began, the United States delayed the arrival of the OAS's Inter-American Peace Committee in Guatemala until after the Castillo Armas victory and

successfully argued before the United Nations (UN) Security Council that Article 51 of the UN Charter permitted regional organizations to settle regional disputes. In this case, the OAS had sanctioned the U.S. action. The United States had manipulated events to serve its own interests, and its actions led to widespread condemnation in Latin America.

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Guatemala City Guatemala City became the capital of GUATEMALA on January 3, 1776, following the destruction of the original colonial capital of Antigua, some 25



Entering "El Centro" in Guatemala City, Guatemala (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

miles (40 km) to the west, in an earthquake. The city grew slowly into the 20th century and after World War II expanded rapidly, both physically and in terms of population. The original city covered just 3.5 square miles (9 km²), while today the metropolitan area encompasses approximately 40 square miles (103.5 km²), while the population has grown from 10,841 in 1778 to more than 4.5 million inhabitants today. Surrounded by four active volcanoes, Guatemala City is affected by both minor and major eruptions, the last major one being in 1976, which caused heavy damage to the city. Heavy rains often cause mudslides, particularly in the poorer districts, or *barrios*.

Because the city is divided into 25 zones, each with its own street numbering system, identification of buildings, markets, and houses is relatively easy, while moving from zone to zone is hampered by congested streets. Buses are the only means of public TRANSPORTATION. President JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA oversaw the completion of the presidential palace during World War II. Located in the city center, the palace is close to the Metropolitan Cathedral, the national archives and library, the national congress building, and the central market. An anthropological museum, a Maya dress museum, and the national zoo are among the many cultural attractions in the city. Several SPORTS parks and sports clubs are also located in the city. U.S. troops stationed in Guatemala City during World War II introduced baseball and basketball, and each has grown in popularity. Nevertheless, soccer, or *fútbol*, remains the most popular sport.

Guatemala City is the country's commercial, financial, and industrial center. The last has prompted the relocation of indigenous peoples to the city. Many of the city's small businesses are operated by descendants of German immigrants who came to Guatemala starting in the late 19th century and Koreans, who arrived after World War II.

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Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (b. 1928–d. 1967) *Argentine revolutionary and commander in Cuban Revolution* A native of ARGENTINA, where he earned his medical degree, Ernesto Guevara became one of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's most trusted advisers during the early years of the CUBAN REVOLUTION. El Che, as he was known, was influenced by the writings of Chilean Communist Pablo Neruda and his own extensive travels throughout Latin America before he left Argentina for good in 1953.

His first stop was GUATEMALA, where he became a supporter of reformist president JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN until his overthrow by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954 (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). The experience only strengthened Guevara's



An Argentine revolutionary idealist, Che Guevara became a confidante of Cuban leader Fidel Castro. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

ideas about eliminating elitist governments across Latin America, while keeping the United States at a distance. Guevara left Guatemala for MEXICO, where he teamed up with the Castro brothers for their return to CUBA in December 1956. He subsequently led a guerrilla unit in the battle against FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR and was one of the first revolutionary leaders to arrive in HAVANA in January 1959. In June 1959, he married Aleida March, a fellow revolutionary. They had four children, the youngest of whom, Celia, would have no memory of him. Guevara also had a daughter, Hildita, from his first marriage.

As director of the Industrial Department of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, president of the National Bank of Cuba, and, finally, minister of industry, Guevara played a significant role in developing Cuba's economic policies in the early days of the revolution. His plan for a centralized ECONOMY requiring government ownership of the means of production contributed to the nationalization of landed estates and foreign-owned industries. His plan for Cuba's industrial development failed due to a lack of investment capital and funds to purchase needed machinery, as well as a lack of skilled workers, many of whom had fled Castro's revolution.

Guevara's hope to establish a currency-free economy and create a "new socialist man" who would work for the moral fiber of the revolution rather than money or material goods faded in 1965. At this point, Guevara lost his influence within Castro's inner circle. Some analysts attribute this to a personal split between Guevara and Castro. Others point to the former's failed economic policies, and yet others claim that Guevara wanted to spread revolutionary ideas beyond Cuba. Guevara completed diplomatic missions to the Soviet Union and Africa, where he worked with revolutionaries in the Congo and Angola in 1965 and 1966. But, his brand of revolution was not compatible with the divisions that plagued Africa's tribal groups. Disheartened by politics and ill from jungle disease and climate, he returned to Cuba for a brief period in 1966 before again leaving. He first considered going to PERU and VENEZUELA, but their socioeconomic structures would not accommodate his revolutionary ideas. Instead, he traveled to BOLIVIA, where the large peasant class had been long exploited by a small landed elite, as in Cuba. He hoped to inspire the impoverished and politically ostracized NATIVE AMERICANS to revolution. His efforts failed for several reasons. The Bolivian Communist Party did not support him, believing that reform could best be achieved by winning at the ballot box, not by the bullet. In addition, Castro, apparently, offered little assistance, particularly when the Bolivian MILITARY trailed Guevara in the Andes with the assistance of the CIA. On October 8, 1967, Bolivian troops captured Guevara and a day later executed him. Guevara's body remained in an unmarked grave until 1997, when his remains were exhumed and returned to Cuba to a hero's interment in Santa Clara.

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Guiana Space Center A French space and rocket launching facility near Kourou, French Guiana, the Guiana Space Center has been operational since 1968. In 1964, the French government selected Kourou, in one of its FRENCH OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS, as the site for its new space program. The French government allocated some 330 square miles (855 km²) of territory, including the land previously used as a penal colony known as DEVIL'S ISLAND PRISON, to the Centre National d'Études Spatiales (CNES), the French government's space agency, established in 1961. Due to its proximity to the equator and the fact that the most favorable direction of launches is over water, Kourou was an ideal site for the new space center.

When the European Space Agency (ESA) was established in 1975, the French government offered to share

its facilities. The ESA currently pays two-thirds of the Guiana Space Center's annual budget. ESA also provided the funding to upgrade facilities in preparation for the Ariane launchers currently under development. Since it became operational in 1968, the Guiana Space Center has also undertaken launches for private companies in Europe, the United States, Japan, Canada, India, and BRAZIL. The thousands of European workers at the facility have strengthened the economic viability of French Guiana and transformed the infrastructure of its coast. Devil's Island, now a popular tourist site, is under the launching trajectory and must be evacuated during launches.

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Guyana Formerly known as British Guiana, Guyana gained independence from the United Kingdom on May 26, 1966. Culturally, Guyana, the only English-speaking nation in South America, is more closely associated with the Caribbean than South America (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH).

Occupying 83,000 square miles (214,969 km²) of territory, Guyana is bordered to the east by SURINAME and the west by VENEZUELA. Guyana's northern border is the Atlantic Ocean, and it shares its southern border with BRAZIL. Almost 70 percent of Guyana's territory is disputed by Venezuela, a dispute that dates back to the 19th century. Guyanese ethnicity is a reflection of the nation's colonial past. English and Dutch sugarcane planters used slaves from Africa and indentured servants from India. These imported plantation workers and their descendants make up the majority of Guyana's population. Ethnic and racial divisions between the Afro-Guyanese and the Indo-Guyanese have dominated Guyanese society since independence.

In 1928, the British government made British Guiana a CROWN COLONY. In the aftermath of riots during the Great Depression, the British sent Lord Moyne to investigate. In 1938, the Moyne Commission, which pointed out the growing polarization between the Afro-Guyanese and the Indo-Guyanese, recommended increased democratization and the formation of TRADE unions in the colony to alleviate social strife. Regardless, ethnic and racial divisions, based on mutual suspicion, have dominated Guyanese society since the end of World War II. Politics have been dominated by two politicians: CHEDDI JAGAN and FORBES BURNHAM. Jagan, born to Indian immigrants, formed the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950. To broaden support for the PPP, Burnham, an Afro-Guyanese, was invited to join the party. Burnham became the party chairman, while Jagan led the PPP's parliamentary group.

In 1953, the British government supervised local elections, which were won by the PPP. The socialist



Nelson A. Rockefeller (at podium) with Forbes Burnham (far left) at the Timuhuri Airport in Georgetown, Guyana, on July 4, 1969 (Courtesy of the Rockefeller Archive Center)

agenda of the PPP, especially the Labour Relations Act, frightened conservative elements in the business community. Following a series of riots, the British suspended the constitution, and an interim government led by conservative business interests was installed, which survived until 1957. During this period, the personal rivalry between Jagan and Burnham led to a split within the PPP. The 1957 elections were won by Jagan's faction. Jagan's veto of British Guiana's participation in the WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958 caused him to lose Afro-Guyanese support, which enabled Burnham to form the People's National Congress (PNC).

In 1961, Jagan, who was influenced by Marxist ideology, won the newly created position of prime minister. His administration sought a nonaligned path and refused to support the U.S. embargo against CUBA. U.S. president John F. Kennedy vehemently opposed an electoral system, however democratic, that would allow Jagan to rule an independent Guyana. Much to the chagrin of Jagan, the British decided to delay independence until after the 1964 elections, which would be based on proportional representation. Although Jagan obtained 46 percent of the vote,

he lost his position when Burnham's PNC and the United Force (UF) combined their votes to form a coalition government. Burnham led Guyana from independence, first as prime minister then as president, until his death in 1985. Burnham, whose politics became more authoritarian and leftist after Guyana's independence, declared Guyana a republic in 1970. In 1978, the JONESTOWN MASSACRE placed Guyana in the global spotlight.

After Burnham's death, PNC vice president Desmond Hoyte (b. 1929–d. 2002) ruled until 1992, when the PPP, led by Jagan, won national elections. Presenting himself as a progressive, Jagan opened Guyana to U.S. foreign investment. Jagan ruled until he died of a heart attack in March 1997. Prime Minister Samuel Hinds (b. 1943–) replaced him, and Jagan's widow, Janet, became prime minister. Janet Jagan won the December 1997 presidential elections but resigned for health reasons in August 1999. She was succeeded by Finance Minister BHARRAT JAGDEO, who had been named prime minister the day before Jagan resigned. Jagdeo subsequently won elections in 2001 and 2006. Whereas its relations with Spanish-speaking Latin America are minimal, Guyana

has encouraged greater unity among the English-speaking Caribbean nations. Guyana is a member of CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET (CARICOM), and CARICOM's headquarters are located in the capital of Guyana, Georgetown.

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H

Haiti The first independent nation in Latin America and the second in the Western Hemisphere (after the United States), Haiti occupies the western third of Hispaniola in the Caribbean, sharing the island with the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

Haiti, which consists of 10,714 square miles (27,749 km²) of territory, is one of the poorest nations in the world. Haiti, which means “mountainous” in Taino (the language of the Amerindians who occupied the island before the arrival of Europeans), became independent from France on January 1, 1804, following the only successful slave revolt in the Western Hemisphere. It is imbued with a heavy footprint of African culture because of the French colonial system based on sugarcane cultivation by African slaves. The majority of Haiti’s 9 million people are descended from African slaves. More than 2 million Haitians currently live abroad, primarily in the Dominican Republic and the United States. Whereas French is the official language, most Haitians speak Haitian Kreyòl, which is based on French and West African languages. Although most Haitians are nominally Catholic, the vast majority practice Vodou (Vodun), a syncretization of Catholicism and West African spiritual belief systems. Inhabited by 3 million people, the capital and largest city of Haiti is Port-au-Prince.

Following independence in 1804, Haiti experienced more than a century of brutal, corrupt authoritarian regimes. Nearly the entire white population was killed or exiled during the violent Haitian Revolution (1791–1804). At this time, the nation’s economic infrastructure was also destroyed so that on independence, Haiti had a severely dislocated economic and educational system. Although often ruled by black leaders during the 19th century, the small educated mulatto elite dominated the

political and economic system. Freedom from slavery did not significantly improve the quality of life for most black Haitians. During the 19th century, Haiti frequently attempted to dominate the Dominican Republic, militarily occupying that nation from 1822 to 1844. Haitian militarism has resulted in tense DOMINICAN-HAITIAN RELATIONS, which persist in the contemporary period.

By the beginning of the 20th century, local mulattoes and foreigners, primarily Germans, dominated the nation’s ECONOMY. In addition, the Haitian government had extensive debts to foreign banks, most of which were French and German. In 1904, following the proclamation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and the initiation of construction on the Panama Canal, the United States took a greater interest in the fiscal stability of Haiti. Fearful that economic mismanagement could lead to European intervention, in 1910, the National City Bank of New York, encouraged by the U.S. government, purchased a controlling interest in the National Railroad Company of Haiti. By 1915, following the outbreak of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson was alarmed by the growing German military and economic presence in Haiti. In 1915, black president VILBRUN GUILLAUME SAM attempted to curtail the power of the mulatto elite and strengthen commercial and diplomatic ties with the United States. Faced with riots, Sam ordered the execution of 167 political prisoners on July 27, 1915. A mulatto-led revolt erupted, and Sam fled to the French embassy, where he was captured by rebels, who publicly dismembered his body.

News of events in Haiti convinced Wilson, fearful that pro-German mulatto rebels would come to power, to order the U.S. Marines to occupy Haiti on July 28, 1915. The U.S. military occupation, which lasted until 1934,

sought to restore stability, develop the nation's infrastructure, and eradicate tropical diseases. The National City Bank, which acquired a controlling interest in the National Bank of Haiti, consolidated Haitian foreign debt under American control and took responsibility for the collection of Haitian customs revenues. A similar U.S. CUSTOMS RECEIVERSHIP was established in the Dominican Republic the following year. In 1917, the United States imposed a constitution written by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt and enforced a law demanding compulsory LABOR. The virtually complete financial reorganization of Haiti from Europe to the United States paved the way for expanded American investment in Haiti. The Haitian-American Sugar Company acquired German sugar estates and the United Fruit Company acquired German banana plantations. Notwithstanding U.S. efforts, the majority of the nation's black population resented U.S. military occupation, which was often colored by racism and ethnocentric attitudes.

During the American military occupation, the philosophy of *noirisme* (Negritude), or the glorification of Haiti's African heritage, imbued the black population with bitter self-pride in the face of racism. When the U.S. occupation ended in 1934, the Americans turned over political control to Sténio Vincent (b. 1874–d. 1959), an elite mulatto who had been nominal president since 1931. His government, however, was insensitive to the plight of Haiti's oppressed. For example, in 1937, when the Dominican dictatorship of RAFAEL TRUJILLO unleashed a wave of violence on Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic that resulted in the death of more than 12,000 Haitians, the Haitian government, which had encouraged workers to go to the Dominican Republic, merely issued a critical diplomatic note. After Trujillo's government offered an indemnity to the families of those butchered in his country, the Haitian government kept the payment.

In 1941, after Vincent resigned, ÉLIE LESCOT came to power with the assistance of the mulatto elite, Trujillo, and the United States and established a brutal dictatorship. Lescot supported U.S. war efforts during World War II. For example, in 1941, Lescot agreed to support the SOCIÉTÉ HAÏTIENNE-AMÉRICAINNE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE (SHADA), an American company that would supply raw materials for the U.S. war effort. Haitian land was expropriated. More than 40,000 rural Haitians were evicted from their farms, and more than 80,000 who were formerly engaged in subsistence AGRICULTURE were now employed in the production of rubber and sisal for the Americans. The plan, which was an economic failure, resulted in food shortages and destroyed Lescot's popularity among rural peasants. In 1946, PAUL MAGLOIRE led a military coup that brought Dumarsais Estimé (b. 1900–d. 1953) to power. For the first time since the end of the U.S. military occupation, a black leader ruled Haiti. Estimé nationalized SHADA after the U.S. government lost interest in the project, emphasized the production of coffee, and sup-

ported legislation to protect workers. His reform efforts and attempt to extend his term beyond 1950, however, sparked a military coup by Magloire, who ruled Haiti until 1956. Magloire established a close relationship with the United States, adopted an anticommunist foreign policy, encouraged tourism, and attempted to develop the nation's infrastructure. Following the devastation caused by Hurricane Hazel in 1954, however, accusations that he stole relief funds decreased his popularity, and he fled into exile in 1956.

In 1957, FRANÇOIS DUVALIER, a black medical doctor espousing the doctrine of *noirisme*, came to power in Haiti's first universal suffrage elections. Initially heralded as a democratic reformer, Duvalier instituted his own brutal and corrupt authoritarian regime. His goon squad of 25,000 henchmen, the Volunteers for National Security, better known as the TONTON MACOUTES, implemented a wave of terror and crushed political opposition. Duvalier, a Vodou priest, also used Vodou to physically and psychologically terrorize the Haitian population. As both a doctor and a priest, he earned the nickname Papa Doc. In 1964, Duvalier proclaimed himself president for life. In response to Duvalier's brutality, thousands of middle- and upper-class Haitians fled during the 1960s. Regardless, Duvalier's anticommunist rhetoric earned him military and economic assistance from the United States.

Following Duvalier's death in 1971, he was succeeded by his son, JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER. Whereas the father was called Papa Doc out of fear and respect, the son was mockingly called Baby Doc out of derision. Most Haitians, who could not believe that the new regime could be worse than the previous, were surprised. As the brutality and corruption increased, the economy declined. Thousands of lower-class Haitians began to flee the nation. Attempts to reach the United States in small boats, however, were actively repelled by the U.S. Coast Guard. Duvalier and his mulatto wife, Michelle Bennett, seemed indifferent to the plight of Haiti's people. Indeed, Bennett's frequent shopping trips to France drained the national treasury. On February 7, 1986, political turmoil and the loss of U.S. support forced Duvalier and his family to flee into exile.

After Duvalier's overthrow, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy (b. 1932–) served as president of the National Ruling Council, an interim governing council composed of six civilian and military members. Although Namphy promised political and economic reform, his critics referred to his rule as Duvalierism without Duvalier. On January 17, 1988, scholar Leslie Manigat (b. 1930–), with just over 50 percent of the vote, won the elections orchestrated by Namphy. Political and economic chaos, however, inhibited Manigat's ability to rule, and Namphy overthrew him on June 30, 1988, after Manigat tried to remove Namphy as army commander. A group of young officers led by Prosper Avril (b. 1937–) in turn overthrew Namphy on September 17, 1988. Avril served

as president until March 10, 1990, when riots forced him to resign. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (b. 1943–), the chief justice of the Haitian Supreme Court, became president and supervised the 1990 presidential election, which international observers considered the first democratic election in Haiti's history. JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE, a Catholic priest imbued with the philosophy of liberation theology, won 67.5 percent of the vote and assumed office on February 7, 1991.

Aristide's first term as president, however, was ended by a military coup staged by Raoul Cédras (b. 1949–) on September 30, 1991. Following massacres of Aristide supporters, tens of thousands of Haitians attempted to flee to the United States, but the U.S. government refused to grant them refugee status. Nevertheless, the U.S. government placed an economic embargo on Haiti, which only increased the suffering of the Haitian population. On September 18, 1994, a U.S. delegation led by former president Jimmy Carter, as part of OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, convinced Cédras to resign or face the possibility of a U.S. military intervention. Cédras resigned, went to live in exile in PANAMA with a generous stipend from the United States, and Aristide returned to rule Haiti on October 15, 1994. Aristide disbanded the army and established a civilian police force. René Préval (b. 1943–), Aristide's prime minister in 1991, won the 1995 elections with 88 percent of the vote, and the first peaceful and democratic transition of power in Haitian history followed. Préval implemented International Monetary Fund economic reforms and began the privatization of state-run industries.

In late 1996, Aristide, who disagreed with Préval's economic policies, formed the Fanmi Lavalas, a popular leftist political party that criticized neoliberal economic reforms. In the 2000 elections, which were considered fraudulent by the U.S. government, Aristide won 91.8 percent of the vote. Then, on February 5, 2004, the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti took control of Gonaïves, Haiti's fourth-largest city. By the end of February, rebel forces were on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Aristide has subsequently claimed that U.S. ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley (b. 1957–) forced him to resign and exiled him from Haiti. Regardless, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre (b. 1936–), became acting president on February 28, 2004, and petitioned the United Nations (UN) for an international peacekeeping force. The UN troops, led by the Brazilians, eventually numbered more than 7,000. The international community pledged more than \$1 billion in economic aid.

On February 7, 2006, Préval won the presidential elections with 51 percent of the votes. He immediately signed an oil deal with VENEZUELA and visited leaders in the United States, France, and CUBA. His first international visit, however, was to the Dominican Republic. Haitian and Dominican leaders have pledged to end two centuries of hostility between their countries. Since 2006, Préval has implemented significant economic and social reforms.

On January 12, 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale struck 15 miles west of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, killing approximately 225,000 and injuring another 300,000 people. An estimated 250,000 homes and 30,000 commercial properties were destroyed. Poorly constructed infrastructure, including sea and land transportation and communication systems, hampered international relief and recovery efforts.

See also HAITI (Vol. III); HISPANIOLA (Vols. I, II); VODOU (Vol. III).

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Hassanali, Noor (b. 1918–d. 2006) *president of Trinidad and Tobago* Born on August 13, 1918, in San Fernando, Trinidad, Noor Hassanali was a member of an Indo-Trinidadian family. A graduate of Naparima College, a secondary school established by Canadian Presbyterians in San Fernando, he taught at the college from 1938 to 1943, when he went to study law at the University of Toronto. While in Canada, he was a member of the Canadian Officers Training Corps until the end of World War II. After passing the bar exam at Gray's Inn in London in 1948, he returned to TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO and established a private law practice. Hassanali was appointed a magistrate in 1953, a senior magistrate in 1960, a judge on the High Court in 1966, and a judge on the Court of Appeals in 1978. After a legal career spanning almost four decades, Hassanali retired on April 14, 1985.

Following the landslide victory of the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) in 1986, Prime Minister A. N. R. ROBINSON selected Hassanali to be the second president of Trinidad and Tobago in 1987. The first Indo-Trinidadian to be president of Trinidad and Tobago, Hassanali was also the first Muslim head of state in the Americas. Notwithstanding the 1991 victory of the People's National Movement (PNM), led by PATRICK MANNING, the PNM government reappointed Hassanali president when his term expired in 1992. Hassanali served as president until 1997, when BASDEO PANDAY, who had won the 1995 elections, selected Robinson to be the third president of Trinidad and Tobago. Admired by both Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians for his jurisprudence and honesty, Hassanali died at home on August 26, 2006.

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Havana Havana was named CUBA's colonial capital in 1553 by royal decree and quickly became an important port for ships returning to Europe from the New World because of the northwest-flowing Gulf currents. By the mid-18th century, some 70,000 people resided in Havana, making it the third-largest city in the New World after MEXICO CITY and LIMA. By the time of Cuba's independence in 1902, the city also had become a cultural center with a lyceum, or public hall, for artistic and literary use. In 1953, the same year that FIDEL CASTRO RUZ attacked the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, Havana marked its 400th anniversary as Cuba's capital. Today, 4.5 million people reside in metropolitan Havana, about one-fifth of the nation's population.

For 30 years after Cuba's independence from Spain in 1898, Havana fell under U.S. influence, as North American businesses—banking, electricity, communications, retail operations, and TRANSPORTATION—set up operations in the capital, alongside illegal activities—gambling, prostitution, alcohol, and DRUGS—conducted by the U.S. Mafia. These interests remained in Havana until the CUBAN REVOLUTION began in 1959. Although Havana remains the country's commercial, shipping, and industrial center, Castro directed the dispersal of many business activities to other cities across the island.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the termination of its subsidy to the Cuban government, Cuba fell on hard economic times. This was most evident in Havana in broken infrastructure and the deterioration of buildings and homes, including the grand residences of the earlier Cuban elite along the Malecón. Cuban government officials, foreign diplomats, and businessmen reside in the better-maintained sections of the city, such as Vedado and Miramar. The government's emphasis on tourism to earn income led to the refurbishing of Old Havana and its colonial edifices. United Nations and international private funds have been used to restore historic buildings along the Malecón and older hotels, such as the Capri in the central city. Construction of new office buildings and hotels suggests a brighter future for the city.

The city is also home to the University of Havana, once considered Latin America's most prestigious institution of higher education, and several interesting pro-revolutionary museums. The government-run SPORTS facilities are world class, as Cuba continually seeks international recognition in sports venues.

See also HAVANA (Vols. II, III).



The Habana Libre Hotel, known as the Havana Hilton prior to the 1959 Cuban Revolution (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

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Haya de la Torre, Víctor Raúl (b. 1895–d. 1979)

Peruvian politician Born into a prominent family in the city of Trujillo on PERU's northern coast, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre studied at local schools before pursuing law studies at the national universities in Trujillo and LIMA. As he matured, Haya de la Torre witnessed the adverse impact that foreign-owned commercial AGRICULTURE, largely cotton, had on small farmers in the Trujillo area. He also came to sympathize with the plight of urban workers in 1919 during their strike in Lima for higher wages. In 1929, Haya de la Torre founded the González Prada Popular University, a night school for urban workers. Also during his student days, Haya de la Torre joined the rising socialist movement and collaborated with the Socialist intellectual JOSÉ CARLOS MARIÁTEGUI. For speaking against the ideas of President AUGUSTO B. LEGUÍA, Haya de la Torre was imprisoned in 1923 and 15 months later deported to MEXICO CITY, where on May 7, 1924, he founded the AMERICAN POPULAR

REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE (APRA). Intended to be a Latin America-wide party that appealed particularly to NATIVE AMERICANS, APRA instead became a Peruvian political party that significantly influenced that country's transition from oligarchic-MILITARY governments to a more popular-based democratic system.

Haya de la Torre lost his initial bid for the presidency in 1931 to Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro (b. 1889–d. 1933). A year later, he played a leadership role in workers' resistance to the military's suppression in Trujillo of a LABOR demonstration for higher wages that took the lives of four soldiers and an estimated 1,000 civilians. For 12 years thereafter, Haya de la Torre's political activities were largely clandestine until the 1945 presidential election when APRA supported the National Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nacional, or FDN) candidate José Luis Bustamante (b. 1894–d. 1989). Haya de la Torre then resumed his public politicking, speaking out on behalf of labor until 1948, when *apristas* staged a violent uprising in the port city of Callao. Haya de la Torre sought refuge in the COLOMBIA embassy in March 1948 and remained there until 1954. He then traveled throughout Europe for two years. Haya de la Torre returned home again to become politically active and prepare himself for the 1962 presidential contest. Fearing that Haya de la Torre might triumph, the military staged another coup d'état. Aware of the growing indigenous pressure for change, successive presidents Fernando Belaúnde Terry (b. 1912–d. 2002) and Juan Velasco Alvarado (b. 1910–d. 1977) instituted socioeconomic reforms based on Haya de la Torre's ideas.

Haya de la Torre's last political acts included serving on the 1979 constituent assembly. It produced a progressive document that returned Peru to a democratic nation. Haya de la Torre died before he could stand as the *aprista* presidential candidate in 1980. He left a legacy of standing for worker's rights and a government that represented their interests.

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Hernández Martínez, Maximiliano (b. 1882–d. 1966) *dictator of El Salvador* Born in San Salvador, Maximiliano Hernández Martínez was educated at GUATEMALA's Military Academy. After returning to EL SALVADOR in 1899, he joined the national army and rose quickly in rank, becoming a brigadier general in 1919. A highly regarded strategist, Hernández Martínez spent most of the 1920s as a professor at Salvador's Military Academy and in the office of chief of staff.

In 1930, Hernández Martínez withdrew his presidential candidacy to serve as the vice presidential running mate of the eventual winner, Arturo Araujo (b. 1868–d. 1967). Although a wealthy planter, Araujo sympathized with LABOR's demands. Araujo's presidency was short lived, however. On December 2, 1931, a MILITARY coup ousted him, and in the process, Hernández Martínez was arrested. On recognizing that he was next in line to the presidency according to the constitution, the coup leaders released Hernández Martínez, and he became provisional president on December 5. Coup leaders intended that Hernández Martínez be a figurehead only, but he eventually outmaneuvered them to gain control in his own right.

Hernández Martínez strengthened his position as a result of an uprising that began on January 22, 1932. Instigated by AGUSTÍN FARABUNDO MARTÍ, peasants in western El Salvador struck out against the landowning elites on their estates and in local towns and villages. Hernández Martínez, who doubled as war minister, sent in the army to put down the revolt. Because records of the La Matanza (massacre) subsequently disappeared from government offices, the official death count remains unknown, but an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 peasants were killed. Following the revolt, the remaining NATIVE AMERICANS, fearing reprisals, deliberately abandoned their cultural heritage. La Matanza also strengthened Hernández Martínez's standing among the Salvadoran elite.

Although Hernández Martínez himself was not part of the 1931 coup, the United States withheld recognition of his government because it allegedly violated the 1923 Central American Treaty, which called for nonrecognition of illegal governments. That ceased to be an issue in 1933, when JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA won Guatemala's presidential election unopposed. Despite Hernández Martínez engineering his own reelection in 1934, in violation of the Salvadoran constitution, the other Central American governments extended recognition both to the Ubico regime and Hernández Martínez's. The United States followed suit in 1935.

In 1938, Hernández Martínez again manipulated the constitution to extend his presidency and ruled by sheer force and intimidation. The national legislature rubber-stamped his proposals, the press was censored, and any threat against government officials was punishable by death. But, plagued by the loss of global coffee markets because of the Great Depression and World War II, the regime had little currency to spend on the country's development. Nevertheless, Hernández Martínez undertook a public works program that included paving highways and constructing government buildings, schools, and hospitals. In addition, much of the Salvadoran portion of the PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY, the building of which was financed largely by the United States, was completed by 1944. Because of its location on CENTRAL AMERICA's west coast, El Salvador was on the periphery of U.S. military planning during World War II, and

Hernández Martínez reluctantly placed restrictions on local Germans, in accordance with U.S. wishes, for the training of his army.

In time, Hernández Martínez became his own worst enemy. Always distrusted by the landowning elite, he became a near recluse within the presidential palace, where he practiced theosophy and prescribed colored waters to cure himself of a variety of illnesses. In early 1944, when he appeared set on extending his presidency by extralegal means, Salvador's middle class found sympathizers among the army's younger officers to oust him on May 8, 1944. Hernández Martínez was sent into exile in HONDURAS, where he died on May 15, 1966.

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Honduras Totalling 43,277 square miles (112,087 km²), Honduras is approximately the size of the U.S. state of Tennessee. It also is one of the poorest nations in the Western Hemisphere, with an extraordinarily unequal distribution of wealth. The Honduran economy remains largely underdeveloped, with bananas and coffee its major export commodities. In recent years, the development of light industry, particularly in textiles and clothing, has helped alleviate unemployment, which is officially estimated at 27.9 percent of the 2.5-million-person labor force. The government anticipates that the 2007 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT will bring further economic progress to Honduras.

In 1504, Christopher Columbus landed near the present-day town of Trujillo to claim the territory for Spain. Honduras became part of the Kingdom of Guatemala during the Spanish colonial period and belonged to the short-lived United Provinces of Central America following its independence from Spain in 1821. Honduras had a largely noneventful history until late in the 19th century, when it experienced a brief silver-mining boom and the banana industry was developed along its north coast, from Tela to La Ceiba.

For the first 30 years of the 20th century, three factors significantly influenced the Honduran experience. In 1903, conservative general Manuel Bonilla (b. 1849–d. 1919) engineered a coup d'état that ousted President Tenencio Sierra (b. 1833–d. 1907). Bonilla's coup marked the beginning of political turmoil, with the presidency changing more through military interference than the



Worker tapping a rubber tree, a secondary industry in Honduras and elsewhere in Latin America through the mid-20th century (*U.S. Army Signal Corps*)

ballot box. Throughout the period, the U.S. fruit companies—Standard, Cuyamel, and United Fruit—gained concessions from compliant presidents, including land grants with special privileges along extensive right of ways, lower taxation on imported goods and exported bananas, and avoidance of labor laws for the ever-increasing number of black Caribs hired to work the banana plantations. Taken together, the plantation expansion and economic concessions earned Honduras the title of a “banana republic.”

The third factor was the increasing U.S. presence in Honduras during the 20th century. The same year that Bonilla overthrew Sierra, 1903, the United States helped PANAMA gain independence from COLOMBIA for the purpose of building a transisthmian canal. Thereafter, the United States was determined to prevent regional political turmoil and financial mismanagement, as political turmoil could spill into Panama and international indebtedness could bring navies into the Caribbean for the purpose of debt collection. In both instances, the United States believed that its canal interests might be threatened and thereby justified its military interventions in Honduras in 1907, 1910, and on several instances during the 1920s, when local uprisings marred the political landscape. To prevent the possibility of European gunboat diplomacy, in 1911, the U.S. government dispatched Thomas C. Dawson to Tegucigalpa,

where he designed a plan under which U.S. banks paid off Honduran loans to European lenders, and Honduran customs receipts were used to pay back the U.S. banks (see U.S. CUSTOMS RECEIVERSHIP). In an effort to force constitutional government on the entire region, the United States sponsored the CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFERENCES OF 1907 AND 1923.

Honduras took another political turn in 1932 with the election of TIBURCIO CARIÁS ANDINO to the presidency. He governed the country until 1948, extending his term by constitutional adjustments and suppression of the opposition. The Great Depression and World War II caused the banana industry to lose its export markets, thus the government lost tax revenues. Nevertheless, Cariás managed to keep the national budget in the black, built roads into rural areas, and initiated an air service system to the country's most remote areas. He retired from politics in 1948.

Military rule returned to Honduras for the next 30 years, but the military's control of the political arena was overshadowed by the 1954 U.S. invasion of GUATEMALA and the 1969 SOCCER WAR between Honduras and EL SALVADOR (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). In the first instance, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency used Honduras as its staging area for the invasion of Guatemala to overthrow the allegedly communist government of JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN. The invasion simultaneously served as the impetus for the Honduran government to suppress the peasantry's calls for land distribution programs. The Soccer War began in the summer of 1969 after a Honduran agrarian reform law led to the expulsion of Salvadoran squatters, many of whom had arrived in the country during the 1920s. Both conflicts illustrated an underlying socioeconomic problem that characterized all of CENTRAL AMERICA during the 20th century: unequal land distribution.

Civilian government returned to Honduras in 1982 with the election of Roberto Suazo Córdova (b. 1927–), but the military continued to lurk in the background in large part because Honduras had become the staging area for the U.S.-led counterinsurgency wars in NICARAGUA and EL SALVADOR in the 1980s (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS). During the conflicts, Honduras became home to thousands of exiles from the battleground states, which strained the national budget as well as the country's social institutions and infrastructure. The massive U.S. presence also contributed to persistent inflation, which lasted until the end of the 20th century.

Additionally, Honduras is plagued by earthquakes and hurricanes. In 1998, for example, Hurricane Mitch wrought massive destruction on cities and towns throughout the country, including the capital, Tegucigalpa. Among the other problems facing current president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales (b. 1952–) are overcrowding in urban centers, deforestation, land degradation, and soil erosion brought about by uncontrolled development and improper land use practices, as well as the polluting with

heavy metals of the country's major source of freshwater, Lake Yojoa, and surrounding rivers and streams.

In addition to the monumental problems that Zelaya inherited, he promised to improve the quality of life of the nation's poor, a promise identified by the Honduran wealthy with Venezuela's HUGO CHÁVEZ, Bolivia's EVO MORALES, and Nicaragua's DANIEL ORTEGA. This viewpoint was confirmed in March 2009 when Zelaya sought a national referendum on a proposed constitutional change that would permit him to seek a second consecutive presidential term. A crisis developed on June 24 when the military refused to deliver ballot boxes to the polling places. Four days later, on June 28, the military ousted Zelaya and sent him packing to Costa Rica, with the threat of arrest if he returned to Honduras. Following the constitutional process, the Honduran congress installed Roberto Michelletti (b. 1943–) as interim president. Many members of the international community, including the United States, refused to recognize Michelletti as the legal head of state and withheld financial assistance to Honduras. The Organization of American States (OAS) and Costa Rican President OSCAR ARIAS SÁNCHEZ failed in their attempts to mediate the crisis. Zelaya demanded that he return to complete his presidential term that ends on January 27, 2010. Michelletti and the military are determined to prevent that from happening. In late October 2009, the Honduran political future remained unclear.

See also HONDURAS (Vols. I, II, III); UNITED PROVINCES OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Vol. III).

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Huerta, Victoriano (b. 1854–d. 1916) *revolutionary leader and dictator of Mexico* Victoriano Huerta was a MILITARY general who initially supported FRANCISCO MADERO (1911–13) after the fall of Porfirio Díaz in the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. He later betrayed Madero and became dictator of MEXICO. During Huerta's brief rule, a coalition of revolutionary leaders formed to overthrow him in defense of democracy.

Huerta was born on March 23, 1854, in Jalisco. He rose within the ranks of the military during the Porfiriato (1876–1911) and fought alongside Díaz after Madero's revolution broke out in 1910. Although he had been loyal

to Díaz, Huerta was one of the many military leaders who kept their position after Madero was elected president in 1911. Madero called on him to put down several local revolts that erupted in the first months of his presidency. Huerta appeared to be a loyal and trusted ally to Madero. But, when a rebellion led by FÉLIX DÍAZ overran MEXICO CITY for 10 days in 1913, Huerta made a deal that brought him to power after ousting Madero.

The manner in which Huerta rose to power defied the democratic ideals of many local revolutionaries, and rebellions against his dictatorship sprang up throughout the country. VENUSTIANO CARRANZA formed the Constitutionalist alliance with ÁLVARO OBREGÓN and FRANCISCO VILLA, and in July 1914, Huerta was forced to resign. Huerta fled to the United States, where he and PASCUAL OROZCO attempted to plan another uprising. They were arrested by U.S. authorities. Huerta died while in custody on January 13, 1916.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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human rights Violations in Latin America of human rights can be traced to colonial times and the Spanish abuse of NATIVE AMERICANS and African slaves. Although the religious orders, notably the Dominicans and Jesuits, attempted to protect these groups from abuse and the national constitutions that followed Latin America's independence in the 1820s outlawed slavery, the persecution of minorities continued. By the 20th century, these groups, along with immigrant minorities, were socially and politically marginalized and had little recourse to government or private protection. This was most evident during the Central American dictatorships of the 1930s, when labor and middle-sector protests were muted, and in the strong-armed governments of LAUREANO GÓMEZ in COLOMBIA and JUAN VICENTE GÓMEZ in VENEZUELA. Likewise, political opposition was not tolerated in MEXICO's single-party state.

The awakening of the labor movement in the 1930s and the impact of the Allies' idealistic goals during World War II gave rise to the "generation of rising expectations" immediately after that conflict ended in 1945 (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN's appeal to and support from urban labor, the plethora of POLITICAL PARTIES claiming to represent Brazilian labor, and the significance of "leftist" political parties in CHILE evidenced labor's growing importance. The middle sector's successful political challenge to Central American dictators from 1944 to 1946 illustrates

the second point. As the Latin American economies slowed in the 1950s and workers' demands could not be met, and after 1959, as FIDEL CASTRO RUZ engineered his revolution in CUBA, Latin America's elite feared the loss of their privileged position. Reportedly for national security reasons, MILITARY dictatorships replaced civilian governments across Latin America, except in Mexico, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) continued to rule, and in Cuba, where Castro tightened his control over society. The human rights violations of the military governments brought them international attention.

The most notable atrocities were committed during the 17-year regime of Chilean general AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE and successive military governments in ARGENTINA and BRAZIL during the 1960s and 1970s (see DIRTY WAR). In each instance, people were arrested and detained, abused and tortured, and oftentimes put to death if they had not already died from the brutality. The horrors that occurred during the 25-year reign of PARAGUAY's dictator ALFREDO STROESSNER were uncovered with the 1999 discovery of his "Archive of Terror," a detailed accounting of the treatment prisoners endured.

Concomitant with the human rights violations during the late 1960s and 1970s were the loss of civil rights. If not fraudulent, elections were, at best, monitored to ensure the desired outcomes. The media fell under government censorship; public protests and demonstrations were outlawed. Universities came under government control, and professors lost their jobs, or worse, for speaking out against government policies. People had no legal recourse. Courts fell under the military's control or were shut down.

Despite these constraints, protests surfaced in some of the countries. In Argentina, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) received worldwide attention. Wearing blue head scarves, these mothers, daughters, and others peacefully paraded weekly in front of the presidential palace to demand information about the fate of their "disappeared ones" (*los desaparecidos*). Other protest groups included Brazil's Comissão de Justiça e Paz; Chile's Vicaría de la Solidaridad; Paraguay's Comité de Iglesias para Ayudas de Emergencia; and NICARAGUA's Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos. The civil and human rights violations drew the attention of international organizations, such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and U.S. nongovernment organizations, including Washington Office on Latin America.

As the violence subsided in the 1980s and 1990s, governments attempted to document and place responsibility for the inflicted terror. In Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, responsibility was placed on the military, but the new civilian governments often pardoned military officers to save their nations from emotional public trials. The case of Chilean president Pinochet stood as a potential model for other participants who would travel abroad in the future. In London in 1998 for medical treatment,



Mothers began a weekly march in the Plaza de Mayo in central Buenos Aires, Argentina, to demand that the government provide information about the “disappeared ones” from Argentina’s Dirty War. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

a Spanish court indicted Pinochet for the execution of Spanish citizens in Chile during his dictatorship and sought his extradition to Spain to stand trial for the alleged crimes. Following lengthy negotiations with the British government, Pinochet was returned to Chile, where he was eventually charged with human rights violations but died before going to trial. Cuba remains a peculiar model. Although annually condemned by the U.S. State Department and other international organizations for human rights violations, the Cuban government ignores the condemnations and asserts that it does not violate its citizen’s rights.

In 1973, the U.S. Congress authorized the State Department to issue annual reports on conditions throughout Latin America and authorized the president to cut U.S. military and socioeconomic assistance to governments that violated human rights. Starting in 1977, President Jimmy Carter implemented the policy, slicing military assistance to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The cuts had the unintentional consequence of encouraging those countries to develop their own small arms industries. Carter also banned arms sales to the governments of Nicaragua, EL SALVADOR, and GUATEMALA. In the first instance, Carter’s

decision accelerated the Sandinistas overthrow of dictator ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE. El Salvador and Guatemala satisfied their needs in the global arms market. President Ronald Reagan abandoned Carter’s practice, arguing that Latin America’s struggle against communist insurgent groups took precedence over human rights.

Since the end of the cold war in 1991, human and civil rights violations continue in Latin America but on a much reduced scale. They also have received less attention in the international community, with the focus shifting to other issues such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, chaos in the Middle East, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

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IADB See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.

Ibáñez del Campo, Carlos (b. 1877–d. 1960) *president of Chile* A native of Linares, CHILE, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo began his military career in 1896. Following a checkered start that took him to military school, the War Academy, and assignments at Tacna, Iquique, and the Central American country of EL SALVADOR, Ibáñez returned to SANTIAGO DE CHILE at the invitation of President Arturo Alessandri (b. 1868–d. 1950) to direct the military's Cavalry School. By 1925, Ibáñez had become politically well connected. He and MARMADUKE GROVE VALLEJO directed the political maneuvering in 1924 and 1925 that led to his being promoted to general and becoming war minister. Two years later, Alessandri resigned under duress, opening the door for Ibáñez to win the presidency in the May 22, 1927, election with a full 98 percent of the vote.

Using executive powers set out in the 1925 constitution, Ibáñez ruled with an iron fist until 1931. He brooked no opposition and forced Congress to comply with his wishes. With massive financial assistance from U.S. banks, Ibáñez undertook an extensive public works program that resulted in the construction of public health, education, and transportation facilities and the implementation of social security and welfare programs. Nevertheless, when the Great Depression struck in 1929, Chile was the hardest-hit nation in the world, according to the League of Nations. The calamity also forced Ibáñez's retirement from office.

In the 1930s and 1940s, Ibáñez was linked to fascist and Nazi groups in Chile, and this was used against him when he stood as a candidate for the presidency in 1938

and 1942. During the same time period, Chilean politics began its drift to the left, a movement that prompted right-wing elements to plot coups in 1939, 1944, and 1946, each of which involved Ibáñez.

In 1952, running as the presidential candidate of the Agrarian Reform Party, Ibáñez mustered enough strength to win the election with 47 percent of the popular vote. Confronted with rampant inflation, he turned to the International Monetary Fund for relief. While the bank approved loans to stabilize the Chilean currency, the cost proved enormous. As part of the required austerity measures, the Chilean government had to lift its controls on the cost of electricity, but the managers of the state-owned companies refused to pass the costs on to the consumers, which led to demonstrations and LABOR strikes. The economic disruptions contributed to widespread political opposition that effectively made Ibáñez a lame duck president one year into his term. Ibáñez abandoned politics at the conclusion of his term in 1958. He died in 1960 at his home in Santiago.

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immigration from Mexico to the United States

Immigration from MEXICO to the United States defined U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS throughout the 20th century and has had an enormous cultural and economic impact on both countries. The advent of a Mexican-American ethnicity in the United States dates back to the end of the U.S.-Mexican War in 1848, when Mexico was

forced to cede large expanses of territory to its northern neighbor. The movement of people continued during the 20th century.

Immigration from Mexico to the United States can be divided into three main waves. The first coincided with the outbreak of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. Large numbers of people migrated north to escape the violence that plagued Mexico between 1910 and 1920. Mexican immigration continued in the 1920s as many people relocated temporarily, moving back and forth across the border with relative ease. Many of those in this early wave were agrarian workers who found temporary work in rural areas of the U.S. Southwest. Mexican immigration during the 1920s came to an abrupt end with the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. In an effort to protect American workers, the U.S. government deported large numbers of Mexican migrants. Those who remained in the United States often relocated to the cities in search of better employment opportunities. By the end of the 1930s, many U.S. cities had become home to Mexican immigrant communities.

A second wave of immigration was precipitated by LABOR shortages in the United States during World War II. In 1942, the U.S. and Mexican governments entered into an agreement that allowed Mexican workers to seek temporary employment in the United States as part of the BRACERO PROGRAM. The guest worker program was enormously popular on both sides of the border and continued after the war. Millions of braceros worked legally in the United States as part of the program, while even more undocumented workers ventured across the border. Although most braceros worked as farmhands, some were employed in urban industries. By 1964, concerns over the influx of undocumented workers and the exploitation of braceros brought an end to the guest worker program. Faced with the prospect of reabsorbing millions of workers into its labor sector, the Mexican government created the Border Industrialization Program, which allowed for the construction of U.S.-owned MAQUILADORAS in the border region. In 1965, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson signed immigration reform legislation that made it easier for immigrants to sponsor family members to move to the United States and become U.S. citizens.

A last wave of Mexican immigration began in the late decades of the 20th century; it continues today. The decline of the Mexican ECONOMY that began in the late 1970s compelled many displaced laborers to seek employment in the United States in an effort to offset their financial problems. The numbers of undocumented Mexican immigrants grew precipitously in the 1980s, and in 1986, U.S. president Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act. The law granted amnesty to some illegal immigrants but also attempted to reinforce laws aimed at curbing illegal immigration. Despite the 1986 legislation, documented and undocumented immigration from Mexico increased in the 1990s. As the 2000 U.S. presidential election approached, U.S.

lawmakers considered revising immigration laws, but the issue got pushed forward to the presidency of Barack Obama which began on January 20, 2009.

In April 2009, the Obama administration planned to introduce legislation that would establish an orderly system of immigration and provide a path to legal citizenship for the estimated 12 million illegal immigrants already in the United States, but the national debate over health care reform delayed any such proposal. Although precise statistics are unavailable, immigration authorities reported that the number of Mexicans and others illegally crossing the U.S. southern border dropped significantly, owing to the deepening U.S. recession.

See also GADSDEN PURCHASE (Vol. III); U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (Vol. III).

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
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industry Owing to the mercantilist economic policies of the Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, and Dutch, the industrialization of Latin America and the Caribbean was a 20th-century phenomenon. Historically, the colonies existed to serve the economic purposes of the mother country through the exportation of primary products and precious metals. The local industries that developed satisfied only local needs, supported those who assisted in the production and shipment of the products back to Europe, or served the needs of neighboring colonies. Examples include cordage for shipping, hardwoods for shipbuilding and, in the case of CHILE, wines and foodstuffs for its northern neighbors. Craftspeople at the local level included carpenters, seamstresses, and blacksmiths who met only local needs. Otherwise, the colonies were to purchase finished goods from the mother country. Many colonists circumvented the system to expand production but only for local consumption, not for the international market. The Latin Americans were unprepared for economic independence, but because the British assisted with financing the cause, they capitalized on it. Throughout the 19th century, the British enjoyed a privileged position in supplying Latin America with finished goods, followed by the Germans and the French. North America did not close the gap until the eve of the 20th century.

With the development of export-based economies by Liberal politicians in the late 19th century, Latin American entrepreneurs became involved in ancillary industries related to export crops. For example, Brazilians dominated the coffee-shipping supply industry; Argentines produced spare parts and hand tools



The steelmaking industry in San Vicente, Brazil (*United States Information Agency*)

for the British-controlled beef-processing, electric, and warehousing industries. MONTERREY, MEXICO, developed as an industrial center, and its businessmen subsequently would have significant influence in national politics. Still, Latin Americans remained dependent on outside demand for their raw materials and consumer goods.

World War I and the weak postwar European economies contributed to a continuing loss of world market share for Latin American producers (see *WORLD WAR I AND LATIN AMERICA*). The Great Depression of the 1930s unraveled each nation's *ECONOMY*. In response to these changed conditions, governments turned to the import-substitution model of development, meaning that countries would now produce at home what they had once imported. To do that, however, Latin America had to import the required heavy machinery from abroad but over time went on to produce consumer goods ranging from textiles to furniture and electronic goods to satisfy local demand. Significantly, a few countries—BRAZIL, Chile, and Mexico—capitalized on U.S. largesse during World War II to build steel, cement, and electric plants; undertake infrastructure projects; and otherwise lay the basis for industrial development (see *WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA*). Under these circumstances, the

number of industrial plants greatly expanded from the end of World War I in 1919 to the onset of the cold war in 1947; from 40,000 to 83,000 in ARGENTINA, and from 13,000 to 78,000 in Brazil. The smallness of their economies prompted the Central American republics to form the *CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET* in 1960, but it collapsed nine years later due to continuing national rivalries and the 1969 *SOCCER WAR*. During that period, *ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS* investments developed the region's industries, but these were capital intensive and did not generate sufficient jobs to satisfy the available *LABOR* pool. Cuba, however, provides a unique model. Since the 1920s, small businessmen and entrepreneurs clamored for government assistance to help diversify the *ECONOMY* and to industrialize. At the end of World War II, the United States offered grants and loans to do the same, but the Cuban congress rejected this offer. Instead, the Cuban land barons, who dominated the legislature, insisted on continuing the profitability of the sugar market and after World War II found strange bedfellows in the Communist labor leadership that described the U.S. offer as another act of imperialism. Subsequently, *FIDEL CASTRO RUZ* could not break Cuba's dependence on sugar. The world market did.

Industrialization also produced a dramatic growth in the middle class, which demanded a greater voice in the political system, and in the unionization of labor, which increasingly sought government-sponsored social programs. These demands collided with the stagnation of the import-substitution economic model by the late 1960s and early 1970s and coincided with the implementation of the *CUBAN REVOLUTION* and Castro's subsequent turning to the Soviet Union for economic assistance in 1970 (see *SOVIET UNION AND CUBA*). These events resulted in the emergence of *MILITARY* governments until the 1980s. The military regimes not only brutally suppressed any opposition but increased the government's role in the economy. Economic expansion came from international investments that resulted in a collective Latin American debt of \$231 billion in 1981.

Latin America's economic stagnation and ever-growing international debt reached a climax in the early 1980s and contributed to the region's so-called return to democracy. The political change came at a time when the world accepted the principles of the neoliberal economic model. Latin American countries were no exception and, like other nations around the globe, tore down their protective barriers and opened their doors to foreign investment. By the end of the 20th century, most Latin American nations had implemented the structural changes in banking, monetary policy, investment, and the like advocated under the neoliberal economic model. Acceptance of the model enabled Latin American countries to become more engaged in international *TRADE* and diversify their economies. Not all attained the success of Chile, which is often pointed to as the model of neoliberalism. Critics point out that it was imposed by a military

dictatorship. Furthermore, the benefits of neoliberalism have not passed down to the working classes, and this may account for their voting “leftist” candidates into the presidential palaces in recent elections.

Recent U.S. trade policies, such as the CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, and DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, are viewed in the circum-Caribbean region as opportunities to expand employment and in the United States as a way of curtailing illegal immigration into the country.

See also INDUSTRIALIZATION (Vol. III).

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Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)

With initial capitalization of \$1 billion, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was established on December 30, 1959, by 19 Latin American countries and the United States to support Latin American and Caribbean economic and social development and regional integration by lending mainly to governments and government agencies, including state corporations. The bank is headquartered in Washington, D.C. In 1989, the bank’s membership approved an amendment to the charter providing for loans to the private sector.

The idea for an institution to support economic development can be traced to the First Inter-American Congress, held in Washington, D.C., in 1889–90, which approved a resolution calling for such an institution. Nothing materialized until 1933 when the Seventh Inter-American Conference, meeting in MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, called for the establishment of an inter-American bank to function mainly as a regional central bank. Given the global depression at the time, the U.S. Congress had no interest in considering such a proposal. Furthermore, in the years immediately following WORLD WAR II, the reconstruction of Europe took priority. Latin America’s economic decline in the late 1940s and early 1950s, coupled with the growing awareness of its potential sociopolitical consequences, raised government awareness of the need for economic development assistance. A report by Chilean Raúl Prebisch (b. 1901–d.

1986) called for the creation of an agricultural and industrial development bank. Brazilian JUSCELINO KUBITSCHKE DE OLIVEIRA and Colombian ALBERTO LLERAS CAMARGO (b. 1906–d. 1990) promoted the concept at a 1954 meeting of the hemisphere’s finance ministers, who endorsed it as Operación Panamericana. With a U.S. endorsement in 1958, the IADB began operating a year later.

From its original 20 members, the IADB expanded to include 46 member states, 20 of which are nonborrowing members: United States, Canada, Israel, Japan, and 16 western European nations. In early 2008, China initiated discussions to become an IADB member. Each nation’s voting power is based on its subscription to the bank’s capital stock. Latin America and the Caribbean represent 50 percent of the voting stock; the United States, 30 percent; Japan, 5 percent; Canada, 4 percent; and the other nonborrowing countries, 11 percent. Owing to its 1999–2002 financial crisis, ARGENTINA defaulted on its assessment, the only country to do so.

Initially, the IADB funded small business projects, including farming, that could generate employment, as well as projects to provide the supporting infrastructure, such as roads and water, sanitation, and electric systems. The debt crisis of the 1980s prompted the IADB to change its philosophy so that its lending practices came to reflect the so-called Washington Consensus, or the neoliberal economic model. The democratization that accompanied Latin America’s economic changes in the 1980s also prompted the IADB to support programs in developing civil society; these are related to legal and judicial reform, the protection of human rights, and transparency in government activities. By 2000, the IADB had approved more than 2,000 projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, disbursed as follows: 29 percent for health and sanitation, urban development, EDUCATION, environment, and micro-enterprise; 28.1 percent for energy, TRANSPORTATION, and communications; 22.2 percent to AGRICULTURE, fisheries, INDUSTRY, MINING, and tourism; 15.6 percent to modernization of the state; and 5.1 percent to export financing.

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Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

See RIO PACT.

Isle of Pines (Isla de Pinos) The Isle of Pines is a 1,182-square-mile (3,061-km²) island off CUBA’s south-

west coast in the Caribbean Sea that retained its name until 1976, when the Cuban government changed it to the Isle of Youth (Isla de Juventud). At the time of Cuba's independence in 1898, the governments in HAVANA and Washington, D.C., both claimed ownership. As the two governments wrestled with the legal question, the United States lost interest when the Navy Department determined that the island would not serve its needs. The United States relinquished its claim in the 1904 Hay-Quesada Treaty, but owing to pressure from people living on the island and an estimated \$15 million in U.S. business, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty at that time. For the next generation, the U.S. government showed little, if any interest, in the island. During the same period, U.S. island residents, fearing negative consequences if they fell under Cuban rule, plotted several revolts with the goal of annexation to the United States. Finally, the U.S. secretary of state took an interest in the problem, which led him to steer the 1904 treaty through the Senate until its ratification on March 13, 1925. By 1935, all North Americans had left the island. In 1926,

Cuban president GERARDO MACHADO directed the construction of the Presidio Modelo (Model Prison) on the Isle of Pines to house 3,000 men. Owing to the Great Depression, the complex was completed 10 years later. Prisoners began to arrive in 1929, when the complex was only half completed. Approximately 13,000 persons were incarcerated in the Presidio before its closure in 1978. The Presidio housed Fidel Castro (b. 1926) from 1956 to 1958 for his having led the rebel attack on the army's Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1956. Castro subsequently used the prison to incarcerate opponents to his revolution, including gays and lesbians. After changing names in 1975, the Island of Youth became home to Cuban government-sponsored academic and vocational schools for training students from Third World countries and to a Cuban air force base.

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Jagan, Cheddi (b. 1918–d. 1997) *president of Guyana* Born on March 22, 1918, in Plantation Pont Mourant, GUYANA, Cheddi Jagan was the son of Indo-Guyanese plantation workers. In 1943, after earning a degree in dentistry from Northwestern University and marrying Janet Rosenberg (b. 1920–d. 2009), a Jewish woman from Chicago, Jagan returned to Guyana and immersed himself in politics. In 1946, Jagan was elected to the colony’s legislative body. In 1950, Jagan formed the People’s Progressive Party (PPP). To broaden support for the PPP, Jagan invited FORBES BURNHAM, who came from an upper-middle-class Afro-Guyanese family, to join the party. Burnham became the party chairman, while Jagan led the PPP’s parliamentary group.

By establishing the PPP, Jagan hoped to increase the pace of decolonization in Guyana. Guyana’s ethnic conflict, a result of British Guiana’s colonial past, when European planters imported vast numbers of African slaves and indentured servants from India to work on the sugar plantations, however, threatened to slow the process. The PPP, therefore, was initially a coalition of lower-class Afro-Guyanese and rural Indo-Guyanese. During the 1953 elections, campaigning on a center-left platform, the PPP won 18 of 24 seats in the Legislative Assembly, a new institution created by the Waddington Constitution, which granted a limited degree of local autonomy to the Guyanese people. The PPP’s introduction of the Labour Relations Act, however, sparked a confrontation with the British, who saw the legislation as a threat to order and stability. On October 9, 1953, the day after the act was passed, the British government suspended the colony’s constitution.

By the time the British scheduled new elections in 1957, an open split had developed between Jagan

and Burnham. Jagan’s faction of the PPP won the 1957 elections. Jagan and his supporters in the new government pushed for more rice land, improved union representation in the sugar industry, and more government posts for Indo-Guyanese. Jagan’s veto of British Guyana’s participation in the 1958 WEST INDIES FEDERATION resulted in the total loss of Afro-Guyanese support. In the 1961 elections, under the new Internal Self-Government Constitution, the PPP won 20 of the 35 seats in the Legislative Assembly, and Jagan was named prime minister. Jagan’s government, however, which was friendly with FIDEL CASTRO RUZ’s government, refused to observe the U.S. economic embargo on CUBA and signed TRADE agreements with Hungary and East Germany. In 1962, Jagan admitted that he was a Communist. Concerned about his Marxist ideology, the United States and the United Kingdom conspired to remove Jagan from office before granting Guyana independence. In 1964, the introduction of proportional representation facilitated Jagan’s removal from power. A constant presence in the Guyanese political arena, Jagan won the 1992 presidential elections. By this time, however, he had abandoned his socialist philosophy and began to move Guyana toward a free-market capitalist system. He was dedicated to neoliberal economic policies and privatization of the state-run industries. Within four years of taking power, Jagan had reduced the nation’s inflation rate from more than 100 percent to less than 5 percent a year. He lured foreign investors to Guyana’s agricultural, MINING, and timber sectors. Before his term was finished, however, Jagan, after suffering a massive heart attack, died in the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., on March 6, 1997. Initially succeeded as president by Sam Hinds

(b. 1943–), Jagan's wife, Janet, was elected president in December 1997.

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Jagdeo, Bharrat (b. 1954–) *president of Guyana*
Born on January 23, 1964, in Unity Village, GUYANA, to Indo-Guyanese parents, Bharrat Jagdeo entered politics at the age of 13 when he joined the Progressive Youth Organization, the youth arm of the People's Progressive Party (PPP). He earned an M.A. in economics from the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow in 1990. After returning to Guyana, he worked as an economist in the State Planning Secretariat. Following CHEDDI JAGAN's election in 1992, Jagdeo served as an adviser to the minister of finance. In 1995, Jagdeo was appointed minister of finance and was responsible for overseeing the nation's economic restructuring program.

During the government of Jagan's widow, Janet (1997–99), Jagdeo continued to serve as minister of finance. The day before President Janet Jagan resigned in August 1999, she named Jagdeo prime minister. According to the constitution, Jagdeo became president after her resignation. Elections held on March 19, 2001, were won by Jagdeo and the PPP. Like all previous elections in Guyana, the opposition claimed that the elections were fraudulent. Race riots erupted when the Afro-Guyanese claimed that the PPP, the vehicle for Indo-Guyanese political aspirations, had rigged the election. Jagdeo was subsequently reelected in 2006. Surprisingly, the pre- and post-election period was relatively free of violence, a unique historical experience in Guyana. As Jagdeo has attempted to heal the rift with the Afro-Guyanese community, some PPP supporters have criticized his efforts to include People's National Congress advisers in his government.

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Jamaica The third most populous English-speaking nation in the Western Hemisphere, after the United

States and Canada, Jamaica achieved independence from the United Kingdom on August 6, 1962. Jamaica was the first British colony in the Caribbean to gain independence, followed by TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO three weeks later.

Jamaica, which occupies 4,244 square miles (10,992 km²) of territory, is an island in the Greater Antilles that measures 146 miles (235 km) in length and 50 miles (80.5 km) in width at its widest point. Jamaica is the third largest island in the Caribbean, after CUBA and Hispaniola. The island is located 90 miles (145 km) south of Cuba and 120 miles (193 km) west of HAITI. The nation's name is derived from the Taino name for the island, *Xaymaca*, which means "land of springs." Most major towns and cities, including Kingston, the capital and largest city, are located along the coast.

With a population of 2.7 million people, Jamaica is the largest English-speaking nation in the Caribbean. Since independence, more than 1 million Jamaicans have emigrated abroad, primarily to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Over 90 percent of Jamaica's people are of West African descent. Whereas English is the official language, most Jamaicans speak Jamaican Creole, locally referred to as Patois. The question of whether Jamaican Creole is a separate language or a dialect of English is contested by scholars and linguists. Over 65 percent of the Jamaican people are Christians, primarily Anglican, Pentecostal, Baptist, Seventh-Day Adventist, and Church of God (see RELIGION). Roughly 10 percent of the population practices RASTAFARIANISM, a belief system founded in Jamaica during the 1930s that reveres former Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie I. The spread of Rastafarianism is closely associated with REGGAE, a music style born in the ghettos of Kingston. Reggae artists such as BOB MARLEY facilitated the spread of the genre worldwide. Demographers estimate that there are more than 1 million Rastafarians spread throughout the world.

Initially a Spanish colony, the British captured Jamaica in 1655. The expansion of the sugar industry using African slaves made Jamaica one of the United Kingdom's most valuable colonies (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH). The Great Depression was especially harsh in Jamaica. In 1938, sugar workers and dockworkers, many of whom were influenced by the new doctrine of Rastafarianism, initiated a revolt against British political and economic domination. Although it suppressed the revolt, the colonial government enacted a series of reforms that allowed for the formation of an organized LABOR movement and the development of a representative political system. Norman Manley (b. 1893–d. 1969) established the People's National Party (PNP) in 1938 and ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE established the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) in 1943. After the British granted Jamaica full adult suffrage, Bustamante's party won the 1944 elections. When the British increased Jamaican autonomy in 1953, Bustamante became chief minister, a position he held until the PNP won the 1955 elections,

and Manley became chief minister. Jamaica joined the WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958, a move opposed by Bustamante, who preferred independence. Manley, who supported the federation, bowed to local pressure to hold a referendum regarding the federation in 1961, which resulted in Jamaica withdrawing from the federation and the return of the JLP to power.

When Jamaica achieved independence on August 6, 1962, Bustamante became the nation's first prime minister. Queen Elizabeth II became the official head of state, but de facto power rested with the prime minister, usually the leader of the majority political party in the parliament. Bustamante, who favored close relations with the United States, retired in 1967, but the JLP continued to rule until defeated in the 1972 elections by the PNP, led by MICHAEL MANLEY, the son of the party's founder. Manley decided that Jamaica had to reorient its foreign policy away from the United States and granted diplomatic recognition to FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's regime in CUBA. Relations between Jamaica and the United States deteriorated when Manley supported Cuban interventionism in Africa. In 1980, the JLP, led by EDWARD SEAGA, defeated Manley's party. Seaga restored friendly relations with the United States and worked closely with Ronald Reagan's administration. Reagan made Jamaica the centerpiece of the CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE. Seaga supported OPERATION URGENT FURY, the U.S.-led military intervention of GRENADA in 1983. Manley returned to power following the 1989 elections. Citing health reasons, he retired in 1992 and was succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister PERCIVAL PATTERSON, who served as prime minister until 2006.

In February 2006, when Patterson announced his impending retirement, Portia Simpson-Miller (b. 1945–), the vice president of the PNP since 1978, became the party's leader and was sworn in as prime minister on March 30, 2006. She was the third female leader in the English-speaking Caribbean, after DOMINICA's MARY EUGENIA CHARLES and GUYANA's Janet Jagan. In the September 2007 elections, however, the PNP won only 27 seats. The JLP, led by Bruce Golding (b. 1947–), won 33 seats. Golding was sworn in as Jamaica's eighth prime minister on September 11, 2007. Jamaica's ECONOMY, a mixed free-market economy with state enterprises, is dominated by MINING (specifically bauxite) and tourism.

See also JAMAICA (Vol. II).

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Japan, economic interests in Latin America

Peoples of Asian descent, including Japanese, have long been migrating to Latin America; the modern influx dates to the 19th and 20th centuries. The more recent migrants came as contract workers, while others arrived as economic or war refugees. In the early 21st century, an estimated 4.5 million Latin Americans are of Asian descent. The majority of the Asians are Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, followed by Filipinos, Indians, and Vietnamese. Most who are of Japanese descent reside in BRAZIL (1.3 million), PERU (82,000), ARGENTINA (35,000), MEXICO (20,000), BOLIVIA (12,000), and PARAGUAY (10,000), with much smaller communities scattered across Latin America. Although immigrants continued to arrive in Latin America, the Japanese diaspora ended after World War II (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). Following the war, Japanese communities in Latin America became more unified, creating their own social and cultural organizations and running businesses to serve their needs. Since the 1980s, upward of 250,000 Japanese descendants have left Latin America for their homeland in search of better economic opportunities.

In modern times, Japanese migrants came to Latin America in two waves. The first, at the beginning of the 20th century, resulted from Japan's growing population and poverty in the countryside. The second wave came in the 1920s to work as agricultural field hands. Over time, the Japanese descendants of these people have worked in menial jobs, operated small businesses, and entered various professions. Some have achieved international notoriety, such as ALBERTO KENYA FUJIMORI, a former Peruvian president; María Hiromi Hayakawa (b. 1982–), a Mexican singer; Bárbara Mori (b. 1978–), an Uruguayan actress; and Pedro Shimose (b. 1940–), a Bolivian poet. During World War II, most Japanese endured various discriminations, including arrest, deportation, and the loss of civil rights as suspected enemy aliens.

Japan's economic interests in Latin America are a more recent phenomenon that followed its recovery after World War II. In 1974, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka demonstrated this newfound economic interest when he visited Mexico and Brazil to secure oil and other raw materials. In addition to obtaining the materials needed to sustain its own ECONOMY, Japan looked to Latin America as a market to sell its manufactures and as a place in which it could establish a cheap LABOR base for the exportation of its goods to other markets, particularly the United States. Mexico's MAQUILADORA program fit neatly into the Japanese plan. Japanese electronic and textile assembly plants quickly moved to Mexico's border with the United States in order to capitalize on the program. As a result

of these pursuits, Japan is Latin America's second-largest trading partner, after the United States.

Japanese direct investment and development assistance followed TRADE to Latin America but never in significant amounts for several reasons. Since the end of World War II, Japan has largely accepted U.S. hegemony over Latin America and has deferred to Washington policy decisions. Japan also has little understanding of Latin American cultural and political dynamics and clings to the conventional wisdom that the political situation in the region is unstable. The Japanese government lacks a centralized agency for foreign economic development assistance. The LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1980s adversely affected trade and investments and prompted the Japanese to focus on Asia. As the benefits of neoliberal policies made Latin America a more attractive trading partner, Japan again focused on the region in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but this was short-lived, as Latin America's overall economic recovery had stalled by the end of the 20th century. Based upon the historical record, as the 21st century begins, Latin America understands little of the needs and demands of the Japanese market. Industries could be developed to cater to that market, and the region could move beyond the exportation of primary products. Latin America is yet to capitalize fully on the Japanese market and assistance largesse.

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Jones Act (Jones-Shafroth Act) (1917) Officially known as the Jones-Shafroth Act, signed into law by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson on March 2, 1917, the Jones Act simply amended the 1900 FORAKER ACT. Pressure for a change in PUERTO RICO's status in relation to the United States emanated from the question of whether the islanders were entitled to U.S. citizenship. Their resident commissioner, Luis Muñoz Rivera (b. 1858–d. 1916), found many congressional supporters for the Puerto Rican request of U.S. citizenship during his five-year term, from 1911 to 1916.

Under the Jones Act, Puerto Rico became an organized but unincorporated territory of the United States, and Puerto Ricans became statutory citizens of the United States, which meant the cancellation of Puerto Rican citizenship and the U.S. congressional granting of citizenship. Puerto Rican citizenship was reestablished in 1927 for residency purposes only.

Puerto Rico's government structure now paralleled the U.S. model, with executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The governor, the attorney general, and the commissioner of education remained appointees of the U.S. president, with U.S. Senate approval. The other departmental heads—agriculture, finance, interior, and labor and health—were appointed by the governor and approved by the Puerto Rican Senate. A bicameral legislature was created: a 19-member Senate and a 39-member House of Representatives, with all members elected to four-year terms by manhood suffrage, restricted by property ownership. The resident commissioner remained subject to an election every four years. The commissioner continued to represent Puerto Rico as a nonvoting member in the U.S. Congress and before the various government departments and agencies. The separate court system paralleled that of the United States. The U.S. Congress retained the power to reject any Puerto Rican legislative act, and the U.S. president retained control over immigration, defense, fiscal and economic matters, and other government services.

The Jones Act was amended in 1948 to permit Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor and in 1952 to permit them to elect their own constitutional convention, which led to greater autonomy for the island government.

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Jonestown massacre (1978) The authoritarian regime of GUYANA's FORBES BURNHAM was placed in the global spotlight following the November 1978 Jonestown massacre. American Jim Jones, leader of the People's Temple of Christ, had established an agricultural community with more than 1,000 of his followers in western Guyana with Burnham's approval. Following an investigation by U.S. congressman Leo Ryan into claims of abuse committed against its members, Jones and more than 900 of his followers committed suicide. Investigations into the cult's activities led to allegations that the Burnham government had links to the fanatical cult.

Jim Jones established the People's Temple in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1955. During the late 1960s, the cult moved to California, eventually settling in San Francisco. Jones preached a doctrine of social justice and racial equality. By the mid-1970s, however, allegations arose that members were abused. The U.S. government also accused the People's Temple of tax evasion. In 1974, Jones implemented plans to relocate the church to Guyana, where he had leased more than 3,800 acres

of jungle from the Burnham government. In 1977, after building his utopian community in the jungle, Jones went back to California and encouraged his followers to move to Jonestown, Guyana. Although many of the members initially thought that they were going to a paradise, they ended up working in agricultural fields six days a week in a tropical climate. Dissent was not tolerated. Armed guards patrolled the compound and enforced obedience to Jones.

Jones controlled the financial life of the community. All private wealth, including monthly welfare checks, was confiscated by Jones, who eventually developed a belief called “translation,” in which he and his followers would die together and thereafter move to another planet for a life of bliss. Jones periodically conducted mass suicide drills. Everyone was made to line up and drink a small glass of fruit-flavored poison. After the drill, Jones informed everyone that it was just a test and that there was no poison in the drink. On November 14, 1978, California representative Ryan flew to Guyana with a team of 18 people (including members of the press) on a fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of HUMAN RIGHTS abuses. After arriving in Georgetown, Guyana’s capital, lawyers for the cult informed Ryan that Jones refused to allow Ryan to visit Jonestown. Regardless, on November 17, Ryan and his entourage flew to Port Kaituma, about six miles (10 km) from Jonestown. That evening, Jones held a reception for the Ryan delegation. On the morning of November 18, several members of

the People’s Temple indicated to Ryan and his party that they wished to leave Jonestown. That afternoon, at the Port Kaituma airstrip, Jonestown loyalists attacked Ryan and the defectors. Ryan, three members of his entourage, and one of the defectors were killed. The survivors gathered together and spent the night in a restaurant until they were rescued by Guyanese government troops the next morning.

On the evening of November 18, Jones announced a suicide drill. This time, however, cyanide and Valium were mixed into a grape drink. Jones convinced his inner circle that the Guyanese MILITARY would execute everyone, and that night the poison was distributed. Death came within minutes. Although some people were able to avoid the poison, the final death count reached 909. Those who resisted committing suicide were shot, strangled, or injected with cyanide. The mass suicide has become known as the Jonestown massacre. As local Guyanese people refused to live in Jonestown after the event, the jungle quickly reclaimed the area.

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K

Kirchner, Néstor (b. 1950–) *president of Argentina*
Néstor Kirchner captured the presidency of ARGENTINA by default in 2003 when incumbent CARLOS SAÚL MENEM withdrew from the scheduled May 18 runoff election. Born into a middle-class family in Río Gallegos in the Patagonian province of Santa Cruz, Kirchner was educated in the local public schools and the Colegio Nacional República de Guatemala. In 1976, he gained his law degree from La Plata National University and immediately targeted the MILITARY for its HUMAN RIGHTS violations, after which he became active in Santa Cruz state politics as a member of the left-of-center Jusicialista Party (Partido Justicialista, or PJ). As a lawyer and administrator of a charitable trust fund, Kirchner earned sufficient public credibility to run for and win the mayoralty of Río Gallegos in 1984. His performance as mayor (1987–91) earned him the PJ nomination for the state governorship in 1991, a contest he won with 61 percent of the popular vote. By this time, his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (b. 1953–), was a member of the provincial congress. In 1995, Néstor Kirchner engineered an adjustment to the state's constitution that enabled him that same year to capture a second race for the governorship with 65 percent of the popular vote.

As governor, Kirchner inherited a state economic crisis that mirrored that of the nation: low productivity, high unemployment, and a \$12-billion budget deficit. His programs brought a marked improvement in the state ECONOMY by arranging for substantial investments in job creation and government consumption. He also brought the state budget into balance with cost cutting and by closing tax loopholes. During his second term, Kirchner became a critic of the corruption that char-

acterized the presidency of Menem, as well as Menem's neoliberal economic policies, which adversely affected the working class. Although his critics asserted that oil-rich and sparsely populated Santa Cruz State (population of 200,000) was no preparatory stage for national politics, Kirchner sought the presidential nomination of PJ in 1999. He was not successful; instead, the party chose the governor of Buenos Aires Province, Eduardo Duhalde (b. 1941–), who was defeated by the Alianza coalition party candidate, Fernando de la Rúa (b. 1937–) in the October 24, 1999, national elections. Duhalde inherited an economy in recession and that by the end of 2000 was on the verge of collapse. Over the next two years, Argentina's economy and social conditions worsened (see ARGENTINA, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN). Despite the charges of corruption against him and his previous administration and public disenchantment with his pardoning of military officers responsible for the DIRTY WAR, Menem thought his standing as a Peronista would be sufficient to win him the April 27, 2003, presidential election. He did, but with only 24 percent of the vote. Kirchner finished second, two percentage points behind. This forced the May 18 runoff election, but Menem withdrew three days before it, when opinion polls indicated that he would lose by a large majority.

As president, Kirchner first made political changes. He reshaped the Supreme Court by appointing justices more sympathetic to his views. He also abolished Menem's laws that protected Dirty War military officers from prosecution. A more daunting problem was the \$178-billion government debt, \$84 billion of which was owed to international organizations. With his economy minister, Roberto Lavagna (b. 1942–), on March 3, 2005, Kirchner restructured 76 percent of this debt at

approximately one-third of its value and on December 15, 2005, announced the cancellation of Argentina's debt to the International Monetary Fund with a lump-sum payment of \$9.8 billion.

Kirchner's bold moves challenged the conventional wisdom of international bankers, but his programs restored confidence in the Argentine economy. Foreign investment soon followed, and the flight of capital decreased. The gross domestic product grew by more than 8 percent in the last three years of Kirchner's presidential term, and during the same time period, unemployment declined to 8.9 percent from its 2002 high of 51.4 percent.

The economic success provided Kirchner with sufficient popularity to seek a second term in the 2007 presidential election, but for reasons he did not make public, he chose not to run. His wife, Cristina, stood in his place. Her campaign avoided discussing issues and gave only promises to continue her husband's programs. She captured the October 28, 2007, election and was sworn in as president of Argentina on December 13, 2007, for a four-year term.

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Kubitschek de Oliveira, Juscelino (b. 1902–d. 1976) *president of Brazil* Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira was born into poverty in the colonial MINING town of Diamantina in Minas Gerais, BRAZIL. He received his education in local schools before going to medical college in Belo Horizonte in 1922. After earning a medical degree in 1927, Kubitschek used funds from his subsequent practice to undertake a year of specialized medical studies in Europe in 1930. Upon returning from



Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek (*left*) and U.S. vice president Richard M. Nixon at the Volta Redonda Steel Plant, Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil, on February 3, 1956 (*United States Information Agency*)

Europe, he opened his own practice in Belo Horizonte and in 1932 married Sarah Gomes do Lemos.

Kubitschek began his political career in 1933 as chief of staff to the governor of the state of Minas Gerais, Benedito Valadares (b. 1892–d. 1973), who identified with the needs of the working classes. Kubitschek then served as an elected deputy to the National Congress, from 1934 to 1937, but withdrew from politics because of his opposition to the *ESTADO NOVO* implemented by President *GETÚLIO DORNELLES VARGAS*. He returned to politics in 1940 when his old friend Valadares appointed him mayor of Belo Horizonte in 1940, a position he held until 1945. As mayor, Kubitschek earned good marks for improving the city's infrastructure and encouraging industrial development. As a member of the pro-Vargas Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrático*, or PSD), Kubitschek was elected to the National Congress in 1946 and to the governorship of Minas Gerais in 1950. In the latter post, he orchestrated a state-sponsored infrastructure program, expanded electric distribution, built schools and clinics with federal funds, foreign capital, and private-public joint ventures, a pattern he would later use as president of Brazil.

Following Vargas's death in 1954, Kubitschek set his sights on the presidency, using the fallen president's political base. Kubitschek won the October 25, 1955, election with only one-third of the popular vote, owing to the extent of the country's anti-Vargas sentiment. As president, Kubitschek delivered on his promise of "50 years of progress in five years." Targets for the components of the planned industrial base—electric, infrastructure, cement, and steel—were met. Industrial expansion

followed, and the annual economic growth rate averaged slightly more than 7 percent in the final years of his administration. Also, as promised, the futuristic city of Brasília was completed, and in April 1960, the capital was moved there from *RIO DE JANEIRO*.


Inflation was a consequence of the rapid economic growth. In 1959, Kubitschek refused an International Monetary Fund corrective program that would have required austerity measures, thus subjecting Brazilians to continuing inflation. Between 1955 and 1960, the cost of living increased by 500 percent, and in 1960, the national debt totaled \$3.8 trillion. This opened the door to other charges against Kubitschek: corruption, graft, and nepotism. The constitution barred Kubitschek from seeking reelection in 1960. Because of runaway inflation, opposition candidate Jânio da Silva Quadros (b. 1917–d. 1992) won the October 25, 1960, election.

Kubitschek was elected senator from the state of Goiás in 1960. In 1964, he lost his political rights for 10 years when the military took control of the government (see *BRAZIL, 1964 COUP D'ÉTAT IN*). He then traveled to Europe and the United States before returning to Brazil and becoming an investment banker in 1967. Kubitschek died in an automobile accident on August 22, 1976.

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Marianne Cohen. *J. K.: Juscelino Kubitschek, o presidente bossa-nova* (São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Globo, 2006).



labor Organized Latin American labor movements appeared in the mid-19th century, but not until the emergence of export-based economies toward the end of that century did these have an impact on commercial operations. Railroad workers and dockworkers, along with miners, were among the first to organize, and any work stoppage on their part adversely affected the local economy and, therefore, was generally harshly repressed by local and state authorities. The influx of European workers beginning at the turn of the 20th century brought many Spanish, Italian, and eastern European laborers with socialist ideas. The ruling elites were in no mood to appease them and also suppressed their strikes, as occurred in 1907, when Mexican workers struck against U.S.-owned railroads, and in 1919, when the Argentine government rounded up and deported foreign labor leaders. Governments used legal means to bring labor under their control, as occurred in Chile with the 1917 Yáñez Decree, which provided for government mediation of labor disputes that had reached a stalemate. During the first generation of the 20th century, governments and the agrarian and commercial elites had the advantage of an excess labor pool and, therefore, could respond harshly to labor unrest. In addition, the governing authorities, who were themselves elite or who represented the elite, promised labor tranquility to foreign investors in the export-based economies. Thus, until the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, urban labor worked under horrific conditions for poor pay, lived in inadequate housing, and lacked health care. Much of this found expression in the literature of the period.

The MEXICAN REVOLUTION at first seemed an isolated incident but eventually proved to be a turning point in labor history across Latin America. The CONSTITUTION

OF 1917 that resulted from it provided for the “human dignity” of Mexican people, granted the government the right to control the distribution of land, and permitted labor unions to organize. Two government-run organizations controlled labor: the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, or CTM) and the Confederation of Peasants (Confederación de Campesinos, or CTC). Government’s catering to labor came to fruition under President LÁZARO CÁRDENAS from 1934 to 1940. In 1938, the foreign-owned oil companies Sinclair, Standard Oil, and Royal Dutch Shell refused to meet worker’s demands for higher wages. In response, Cárdenas nationalized them on March 15, 1938, for denying the workers their “human dignity.” Also during his administration, Cárdenas directed the distribution of some 44 million acres (17.8 million ha) of land to Mexican peasants. While these examples illustrate the state’s appeal to the Mexican labor force, they are also examples of MEXICO’s control of the labor movement through the principles of democratic centralism. The government controlled all labor unions from the top down, from the Ministry of Labor to the local labor union in each economic activity. The system worked well until the 1960s, when the Mexican government could no longer satisfy laborers’ demands or create sufficient jobs to meet the needs of the growing labor pool.

Labor was awakened elsewhere in Latin America during the 1930s, when some countries turned to the import-substitution model of economic development to manufacture goods that they had formerly imported. Industrialization led to a rise in organized labor, particularly in the Southern Cone countries. This came at a time when there was a proliferation of POLITICAL PARTIES, particularly on the left, including the Communist Party.

These new groups made significant inroads into urban labor at the end of World War II, making it a significant player in national politics.

ARGENTINA'S JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN is the most vivid example of a populist leader who successfully appealed to the needs of urban labor for political purposes. Perón's claim that he saved the labor movement from Communist control impressed neither Argentina's traditional elite nor its MILITARY, however, who engineered his ouster in 1955. Still, the *peronistas* remain a significant force in Argentine politics. In BRAZIL, President GETÚLIO DORNELLES VARGAS imposed a new constitution in 1934 that legalized labor unions. Vargas tightened his control over labor in 1938. The labor sector grew in size during World War II, as Brazil benefited from U.S. economic assistance for industrial development. In that country's newfound political freedom after World War II, new political parties, such as the Brazilian Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores Brasileiros, or PTB) and the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrática, or PSD), came forward to represent labor's interests. These parties had become significant forces by 1964 when, during the presidency of João Goulart (b. 1919–d. 1976), a former Vargas labor minister, was suspected of communist leanings. This was also a time of high inflation and political instability, however. Brazil's traditional

elite and military officers, with the approval of the U.S. government, engineered Goulart's ouster on March 31, 1964. In Chile, the Popular Front (Frente Popular, or FP) was established in 1938. It included the Communist, Radical, and Socialist Parties and drew its support largely from urban labor. Its influence was felt in the 1946 presidential election of Gabriel González Videla (b. 1898–d. 1980). In the cold war environment of the time, however, Congress outlawed the Communist Party, forcing Videla to dismiss Popular Front administrators from office. From then until 1970, Chilean politics grid-locked, as no one party or combination thereof could command a working congressional majority, effectively preventing the legislature from developing programs to improve life for the laboring classes. Certainly, during this period, Chilean politics drifted to the left, and in 1970, Marxist SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS was elected to the presidency. He immediately came under pressure from the Chilean elite and the United States, who had no desire to see another CUBA in the hemisphere. On September 11, 1973, General AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE engineered Allende's ouster and set in motion a 17-year brutal military dictatorship that silenced the labor movement. Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American countries also came under the control of military dictators during this time.



A union delegation of small farmers demands agricultural reform during a demonstration in Brasília, Brazil. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

In contrast, beginning in the 1930s, Communist labor unions flourished elsewhere in the hemisphere. In COSTA RICA, MANUEL MORA VALVERDE organized workers at the United Fruit Company and successfully bargained for improved working conditions and wages. His party also became a significant player in the 1940 and 1944 presidential elections, and he is credited with writing Costa Rica's progressive 1943 labor law. Both the party and the union continue to function into the 21st century, though their platform has been taken over by other groups. In Cuba, Blas Roca (b. 1898–d. 1994) organized urban labor and successfully dealt with the U.S. companies that dominated the country's ECONOMY. Neither he nor his workers supported FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's rise to power. By 1962, Castro's government controlled all labor groups in the country.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that controlled most Latin American nations from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s suppressed labor unions so that on the return to democracy in the 1980s organized labor was too weak and divided to play an important political role. That began to change in the late 1990s as the promises of the neoliberal economic model failed to materialize. Workers looked to leftist populists such as HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS in VENEZUELA, JUAN ÉVO MORALES AYMA in BOLIVIA, and the left-of-center coalition Consternación in Chile.

See also LABOR (Vols. I, III).

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Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s

Between 1975 and 1982, Latin America quadrupled its external debt from \$75 billion to \$314 billion, a total equal to 50 percent of the region's gross domestic product. During the same time period, debt service rose from \$12 billion to \$66 billion. Commodity prices declined globally, and interest rates rapidly climbed, making bankers increasingly reluctant to extend further credit to the region. Complications quickly followed. Latin American nations found it difficult to service their debts. Finally, in August 1982, MEXICO defaulted on its loans. Other nations followed, led by ARGENTINA.

The 1982 debt crisis resulted from the convergence of several factors. In 1971, the Bretton Woods Agreement collapsed. It had established, in July 1947,

a system of fixed exchange rates locked into a gold standard. Nations unable to remain on the gold standard, including the United States, moved toward a managed floating exchange rate of their national currency, but this proved unworkable. As a result, international capital markets reemerged, and commercial banks increased their lending activity. The situation became more complicated when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States quadrupled the price of crude oil in 1973 and again in 1979, which increased member states' income beyond their capability to spend it at home. The excess was deposited in international commercial banks. Throughout the 1970s, loans from private commercial banks to Latin America replaced those from international agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Between 1975 and 1982, Latin American debt to commercial banks increased to \$314 billion. During the same time span, Latin American exports grew by only 12 percent per year, while debt service for each nation ranged from 18 to 24 percent and only widened the gap between income earned from exports and the cost of servicing international debt. Latin Americans turned to borrowing in order to satisfy current service accounts, a factor complicated by inflationary pressures and fluctuations in the cost of loans in each country. These factors came together in August 1982, when Mexico defaulted on its international loan obligations. The other Latin American governments soon found themselves cut off from international credit markets.

The credit crunch forced Latin American governments to curtail expenses, which led to increased unemployment, drastic cuts in social safety net programs where they existed, and capital flight. As the debt crisis unfolded, the Latin American governments also accepted the principles of the neoliberal economic model that came into international vogue in the early 1980s. Neoliberalism called for the sale of state-owned and parastatal (semiprivate) industries to earn monies essential to reduce debt, the opening of national markets by removing protective tariffs, and a renewed emphasis on the exportation of primary products. These policies had brought a reduction in debt and a recovery in TRADE balances by the early 1990s but at excessive human costs. Some analysts suggest that the leftward drift of Latin American politics in the early 21st century can be linked to the failure of neoliberalism to improve the quality of life for the region's larger populace.

Latin America has endured continual financial crises. Spain and Portugal extracted all possible wealth from the region, leaving it with empty treasuries upon independence in the early 19th century. For generations after independence, Europeans extended credit to the new nations for the acquisition of European manufactured goods, construction of internal infrastructure, and, into the 20th century, the development of export-based

economies. Plagued with trade imbalances and shortages of currency, the Latin Americans could not always service their debts. Stemming from its construction of the Panama Canal from 1900 to 1914 and the need for its security, the United States became involved in circum-Caribbean politics (see PANAMA CANAL, CONSTRUCTION OF; U.S. CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS, 1900–1934). It used U.S. private banks and the U.S. Marines occupation of customhouses to satisfy the European financiers and keep their gunboats from collecting loans from various Caribbean nations. In practice, private U.S. banks paid the European debt and the marines' collection of custom duties ensured payment to the banks. Similar situations arose during the Great Depression in the 1930s, and unable to meet their debt obligations, Latin American governments defaulted on their foreign loans.

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Lechín Oquendo, Juan (b. 1914–d. 2001) *labor leader and vice president of Bolivia* Born to an immigrant Lebanese father and a mestizo mother in Corocoro in La Paz Department, Juan Lechín Oquendo became BOLIVIA's most famous and influential LABOR leader and served as the country's vice president between 1960 and 1964. Following his education in local schools, Lechín worked in Bolivia's tin mines, where he experienced firsthand the difficult work conditions of the mines and poor pay of the workers (see MINING).

In 1944, Lechín helped found the Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, or FSTMB) and served as its general secretary until 1987. He also joined the NATIONALIST REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria, or MNR), but remained linked to the Trotskyite political party, the Revolutionary Worker's Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, or POR). Following the MNR's ascendancy to power on April 15, 1952, President VÍCTOR PAZ ESTENSSORO appointed Lechín minister of mines and petroleum. Lechín advocated arming the miners to serve as a counterbalance to the power of the MILITARY. The proposal contributed to his increasing popularity among Bolivia's lower socio-economic groups and contributed to the government's establishment of the Bolivian Labor Federation (Central Obrero Boliviano, or COB) under Lechín's direction until 1987. The COB served as an umbrella for the various miners' unions and given its strength and influence became a partner in government policy and in COMIBAL, the Mining Corporation of Bolivia, the state agency that directed the nationalized tin mines.

Lechín's popularity prompted his selection as Paz Estenssoro's running mate in 1960, with the assumption that Lechín would be the MNR's presidential candidate in the 1964 contest; however, the two men soon split. In addition to his popularity, Lechín's advocacy of Trotskyite ideas set him apart from the MNR leadership. He was expelled from the party at its 1964 convention, causing him to establish the Revolutionary Party of the National Left (Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional, or PRIN) and then support the November 4, 1964, military coup that removed the MNR from power and forced its leadership and other leftists, including Lechín, into exile.

When Lechín returned to Bolivia in 1978, his popularity was still relatively intact, which prompted him to seek the presidency in the June 29, 1980, election as PRIN's candidate. He fared poorly. His performance did not matter to the military leaders, who again forced him into exile until 1982. Opposed to the neoliberal policies that militated against labor by Presidents Hernán Siles Zuazo (b. 1914–d. 1996) and Paz Estenssoro, who returned to the presidency for a fourth term on August 6, 1985, Lechín called for crippling miners' demonstrations and strikes. These came at a time when the global market and price for tin had plummeted. The diminished demand for tin caused high unemployment among tin miners, led to labor violence, and contributed to intra-union power struggles that resulted in Lechín's resignation from the FSTMB and his electoral loss for the continued leadership of COB in 1987. Thereafter, he became a marginal player in union affairs until his permanent retirement in SANTIAGO DE CHILE, where he died at age 83 on August 27, 2001.

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Leguía, Augusto B. (b. 1863–d. 1932) *president of Peru* Born into a prominent oligarchic family in Lambayeque, PERU, Augusto B. Leguía received his education at a British school in Valparaíso, CHILE. His marriage linked him to the agro-export elite, which in turn provided him the opportunity to use his accounting skills with local and foreign banks and insurance companies. Leguía was a highly successful businessman and served as president of the National Bank of Peru. He entered Peru's political arena when he was appointed finance minister in the early 1900s for Presidents Manuel Cándamo (b. 1841–d. 1904) and José Pardo (b. 1864–d. 1947). In that position, he pursued policies designed to enhance Peru's economic development.

As the Civilista Party candidate, Leguía won the uncontested November 6, 1908, presidential election. As

president, Leguía focused on creating an orderly society. When his opponents bungled a coup d'état in 1909, the president ordered the conspirators to long prison sentences. During his first presidency, Leguía settled long-standing boundary disputes with BRAZIL and BOLIVIA. He also established state control over the guano industry, which by the 20th century served mainly the domestic market. Upon completion of his term in 1912, he departed for the United States and Great Britain, where he pursued banking and other financial interests.

When he returned to Peru in 1918, Leguía broke with the Civilistas over the course of Peru's future economic development. He became the presidential candidate of the newly formed Democratic Reformist Party (Partido Reformista Democrático, or PRD). Fearful that the Civilistas would prevent him from taking office, Leguía turned to the MILITARY to ensure his presidency. After taking office, Leguía immediately called for a constituent assembly, which presented a new constitution in 1920. It enhanced presidential powers and granted the government wide-ranging powers over the ECONOMY. Leguía silenced his opposition through intimidation, incarceration, exile, and censorship of the press. In 1923, Leguía sent in the army to crush an indigenous uprising in the sierra. He was reelected in rigged elections in 1924 and 1929.

During his second presidency, Leguía settled remaining boundary disputes with COLOMBIA and CHILE, although he was strongly criticized for compromising on the latter. Leguía undertook an ambitious infrastructure program financed by foreign loans in LIMA and other cities throughout the country. The nation's health care was improved with the construction of new hospitals and drainage systems in Peru's larger cities. However, a drop in exports following World War I contributed to an economic slowdown that climaxed when the Great Depression began in 1929.

In response to his dictatorial rule and the economic calamity, General Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro (b. 1889–d. 1933) engineered a coup d'état on August 22, 1930. Leguía was arrested on charges of misappropriating government funds and remained incarcerated until his death on February 6, 1932.

See also CIVILISTA PARTY (Vol. III); GUANO AGE (Vol. III).

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Lescot, Élie (b. 1883–d. 1974) *president of Haiti* Born on December 3, 1883, in Saint-Louis du Nord, HAITI, Élie Lescot was a member of a wealthy mulatto fam-

ily. He served as Haitian ambassador to the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC during the 1930s and to the United States immediately prior to being selected president. During the 1930s, Lescot formed a close friendship with Dominican dictator RAFAEL TRUJILLO, which lasted until 1943, when for unknown reasons, Trujillo and Lescot became enemies. In 1944, Trujillo supported an unsuccessful coup against Lescot. While in Washington, D.C., Lescot formed a close friendship with Franklin D. Roosevelt. During Lescot's years in power (1941–46), he consistently pursued a pro-American foreign policy and declared war on the Axis Powers after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

In 1941, after Sténio Vincent (b. 1874–d. 1959) resigned, Lescot came to power with the assistance of the mulatto elite, the Haitian National Guard, Trujillo, and the United States. Although he established a brutal dictatorship, Lescot supported U.S. war efforts during World War II and received American economic and MILITARY assistance. In 1941, Lescot agreed to support the SOCIÉTÉ HAÏTIENNE-AMÉRICAINNE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE (SHADA), an American plan that would supply needed raw materials to the United States. Haitian land was expropriated from peasants for the production of rubber and sisal. Lescot's policies, which resulted in food shortages, decreased his popularity among rural peasants. A devout Catholic, Lescot attempted to limit the practice of Vodou, which also alienated him from the wider population. Trujillo's revelation of the bribes he paid Lescot further undermined Lescot's popularity. In the aftermath of World War II, Lescot's undemocratic political tactics became an anachronism in a world order supposedly dedicated to democratic principles. In 1946, PAUL MAGLOIRE led a military coup that brought Dumarsais Estimé (b. 1900–d. 1953) to power. Lescot died in Port-au-Prince on October 20, 1974.

See also VODOU (Vol. III).

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leva The *leva* is a forced MILITARY draft, and the term is commonly associated with the MEXICAN REVOLUTION, when local and national leaders often filled the ranks of their militaries by forcibly conscripting prisoners, vagrants, and drunks. Citizens who had been arrested for petty crimes were easy targets for the *leva*. Military leaders often patrolled the streets late at night, detaining anyone not behind closed doors after certain hours. Favorite recruiting spots in urban areas included cantinas, cinemas, and even factories after the night shift left work. Many rural villages saw a large percentage of the male population forcibly conscripted either by the national army or by militias of the various revolutionary

factions. In some regions, indigenous men were specifically targeted for the *leva*.

Forcible conscription was a policy used by 19th-century dictator Porfirio Díaz throughout his rule (1876–1911), known as the Porfiriato. Relying on large numbers of soldiers serving involuntarily and treating those soldiers in a harsh manner resulted in a poorly trained and ineffective fighting force. VICTORIANO HUERTA (1913–14) became notorious for using the *leva* to keep the national military supplied with fresh recruits. Huerta's tactics provoked numerous uprisings throughout MEXICO as people came to despise the *leva* and the leaders associated with it. The *leva* tore families apart and removed able-bodied workers from poor communities. Frequently, those carried off were never seen or heard from again by their loved ones. After the violence of the revolution subsided, memories of the *leva* caused many in Mexico to protest any notion of returning to a system of forced conscription.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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Louis A. Perez Jr. "Some Military Aspects of the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1911." *Military Affairs* 43, no. 4 (December 1979): 191–194.

Lewis, Vaughan (b. 1940–) *prime minister of St. Lucia* Born on May 17, 1940, on SAINT LUCIA, Vaughan Lewis earned a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Manchester in England. He subsequently taught politics, government, and international relations at the University of the West Indies and Florida International University. Lewis was director general of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES

(OECS) from 1982 to 1995. He resigned his position at OECS in December 1995 and returned to St. Lucia.

On January 21, 1996, in anticipation of Prime Minister JOHN COMPTON's retirement, Lewis was elected leader of the United Workers Party (UWP). On February 16, 1996, Lewis was elected to Parliament to represent Central Castries. As Compton's handpicked successor, he became prime minister on April 2, 1996. Lewis, however, was defeated on May 23, 1997, by KENNY ANTHONY's St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP). While remaining leader of the UWP, Lewis continued his academic career. He subsequently taught at the University of Florida and the University of the West Indies. In 2005, Compton regained leadership of the UWP, which left Lewis embittered. Following months of speculation, Lewis left the UWP and joined the SLP. In 2006, Lewis, supported by the SLP, lost his bid to secure the seat in Parliament representing Central Castries. He returned to the University of the West Indies, where he currently teaches. Lewis has published significant studies of Caribbean political systems.

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Lima Lima, PERU, was founded in 1535 by the Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro. Eight years later, in 1543, it became the capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru, and following its declaration of independence from Spain on July 21, 1828, Lima became the capital of the new nation. Originally located in the Rimac river valley, the city continually expanded in the 19th century until the 1920s, when the international market for Peruvian cotton



The affluent area of Miraflores in Lima, Peru (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

and sugar collapsed. Urban expansion continued in the years after World War II, as rural NATIVE AMERICANS migrated to Lima in search of jobs in the textile, clothing, oil derivatives, chemicals, and food-processing industries. In 2005, an estimated 9.6 million people resided within Lima's 310 square miles.

Lima is divided into several clearly defined districts. The city center is home to the presidential palace, government buildings, the cathedral, and museums that date to the Spanish colonial period. In 1988, the United Nations declared El Centro, as this sector is called, a World Heritage Site. Lima has two upscale neighborhoods, San Isidro, the city's financial center, and Miraflores, which is built on cliffs overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Both are noted for their culture and nightlife, shopping, cafés and restaurants, and schools. The two most densely populated areas are located on the northern and southern ends of Lima, where Andean indigenous migrants have squatted. Known as *pueblos jóvenes*, or "young towns," these slum areas often lack basic services such as electricity, water, and sewerage. Lima's industrial sector lines the highway leaving the city for the nearby port at Callao. The majority of Lima's population is mestizo, the descendants of white and Amerindian unions that date to colonial times, followed by Native Americans, whites, and Asians.

Intracity TRANSPORTATION is difficult. A metropolitan bus system moves people but not in the most efficient manner. Construction of a metropolitan rail transit system and intracity highway started in the 1980s but stalled a decade later due to a lack of government funding.

See also CALLAO (Vol. II); LIMA (Vols. I, II, III); PERU, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); PIZARRO, FRANCISCO (Vol. I).

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
Lily Ludeña Uquiroy. *Lima: Historia y urbanismo, 1820–1970* (Lima, Peru: Ministerio de Vivienda, 2004).

literature The nationalism and romanticism that characterized 19th-century Latin American literature gave way to modernism on the eve of the 20th century. Influenced by the French Parnassian and symbolist schools, Latin American writers suddenly believed in ART for art's sake. Accordingly, they often presented exotic themes and experimented with language. They also created a truly Latin American literature for the first time. Nicaraguan Rubén Darío's (b. 1867–d. 1913) *Azul* (1888) is often cited as the first work of Latin American literary modernism. Uruguayan Enrique Rodó (b. 1872–d. 1917) awakened Latin Americans to their own culture in "Ariel" (1900).

Twentieth-century modernism, which encompassed the years 1900 to 1945, was greatly influenced by World War I (1914–18), the Russian Revolution (1917), and the Mexican Revolution (1910–17), which ushered in new groups of writers. One group—the *vanguardistas*—rejected the established order and its elitist privileges. Truth and

beauty became antiquated concepts to be replaced by the free and disorderly flow of the mind. The most important *vanguardista* figure was the Chilean Vicente Huidobro (b. 1893–d. 1948), who argued that the writer, and the poet in particular, possessed divine powers in his own realm of endeavor. A second dominant *vanguardista* was the Peruvian César Vallejo (b. 1892–d. 1948), whose works took a political stance that highlighted a tragic vision of human existence. Chilean Nobel laureate Pablo Neruda (b. 1904–d. 1973) abandoned theoretical visionary concepts in favor of the ever-changing world around him. His works spanned five decades, and poetry proved his most fertile genre. His most famous work remains *Viente poemas de amor y una canción desesperada* (1924). Neruda's later works demonstrated his commitment to Marxism. His *Canción de gesta* (1960), a favorable view of the CUBAN REVOLUTION, and his scathing attack upon the United States in *Incitación Nixonicidio* (1973) illustrate that point.

The modernists also championed the plight of Latin America's indigenous and poor peoples. Many authors produced novels and short stories depicting their cultures and the injustices they endured. Writers in PERU and MEXICO, with their large indigenous communities, pursued this theme with vigor: Peruvians Manuel González Prada (b. 1844–d. 1918) and JOSÉ CARLOS MARIÁTEGUI (b. 1894–d. 1930) dealt with the plight of NATIVE AMERICANS in their writings; Mexican Rosario Castellanos (b. 1925–d. 1974) presented the case of Mexico's indigenous in her autobiographical *Balún Canán* (1957). The plight of European immigrants in Latin America's urbanization process during the early 20th century was described by Robert Arlt (b. 1910–d. 1932) in several longer works and more than 2,000 newspaper columns. Pedro Henríquez Ureña (b. 1884–d. 1946) described the poverty endured by Africans and Afro-Dominicans in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. The MEXICAN REVOLUTION produced many firsthand accounts of the poor during the revolution, such as Mariano Azuela's (b. 1873–d. 1952) *The Underdogs* (1915).



Cuban literary scholar José B. Fernández (center) with colleagues at the University of Havana in Cuba (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

After World War II, Latin American writers were influenced by the works of North American and European writers, such as William Faulkner, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf. Coinciding with a period of Latin American economic prosperity, these works presented a form of magic realism (magical realism). Illustrative of this writing trend were GUATEMALA'S Nobel Prize-winning Miguel Ángel Asturias's (b. 1899–d. 1974) *The President* (1946) and Cuban Alejo Carpentier's (b. 1904–d. 1980) *The Lost Steps* (1953). Some literary critics suggest that this boom in Latin American literature peaked in 1974 with the publication of Augusto Roa Bastos's *I, the Supreme*. Other notable writers during this period included recipients of the Nobel Prize in literature: Mexicans Octavio Paz (b. 1914–d. 1998) and Carlos Fuentes (b. 1928–), Colombian Gabriel García Márquez (b. 1927–), and Chilean Pablo Neruda (b. 1904–d. 1973).

By the end of the 20th century, critics around the world applauded the style and content of Latin American literature. Many works have been translated into English and other languages.

See also "ARIEL" (Vol. III); LITERATURE (Vols. I, II, III); MODERNISM (Vol. III); ROMANTICISM (Vol. III).

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Lomé Convention The Lomé Convention was actually a series of four conventions entered into by the European Community (EC) and eventually the European Union (EU) with 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries between 1975 and 1999. Through TRADE with and grants from the EC, the underdeveloped countries were to advance their economies. At the time of the initial convention signing in Lomé, Togo, the plan was applauded as an effort to create a more equitable world.

The convention provided for the duty-free introduction of ACP agricultural and mineral exports into the EC. A quota system for sugar and beef was put in place so they would not compete with the same European products, and the EC advanced some 3 million British pounds for aid and development. The amount of funds increased with each agreement, with a total of 27 million European currency units (ECUs) committed through 1999. The European Development Bank distributed development aid, and the European Investment Bank channeled investment monies to the ACP countries.

The Lomé Convention included the Caribbean countries of ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BELIZE, CUBA, DOMINICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GRENADA, GUYANA, HAITI, JAMAICA, SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS,

SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, SURINAME, and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. With the exception of the Bahamas, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, the primary exports of these countries included sugar, tobacco, and bananas and other tropical fruits. The world market prices for these products frequently fluctuated. With Europe as a protected market, the Caribbean share of total EC imports increased by 11 percent from 1975 to 1985. Each Caribbean country also turned to tourism as a means of earning valued hard currency to be used for purchasing manufactured goods from abroad, but given the high protective tariffs throughout the Caribbean, imports from Europe dropped by nearly 5 percent during the same period. Economically, the Bahamas, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago did better than most other Caribbean nations. The Bahamas tourist industry capitalized on its proximity to the United States, but more important, the Bahamas became a center for OFFSHORE BANKING. Barbados, at the far end of the Caribbean, developed a technologically savvy workforce, which enabled it to become an important service center for the global ECONOMY. Oil refining and its ancillary industries set Trinidad and Tobago apart from its neighbors. In addition to fluctuations in the global price of the Caribbean countries' primary products, there was no accountability for the development monies advanced by the EC. Nonetheless, European banks continued to extend grants and soft loans to the island nations.

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty that established the EU led the Caribbean island nations to argue for continued privileged access for their produce to EU countries. They argued that without such protection, Europe would be flooded by African and Asian sugar, bananas, and other tropical fruits at the Caribbean's expense. After a year of negotiations, the EU agreed to extend the protected market privilege until 1999, the end of the Lomé IV convention. The United States took issue with the EU decision because it discriminated against its Central American friends who produced the same goods. The United States took the case to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 1995, the WTO ruled against the EU protective shield as a violation of WTO guidelines. As a result of that decision, the EU and the ACP countries began negotiations in 1997 that resulted in the COTONOU AGREEMENT, signed on June 23, 2000.

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López Portillo, José (b. 1920–d. 2004) *president of Mexico* José López Portillo was a lawyer and politician who served as president of MEXICO in the late 1970s. He

is best known for overseeing the discovery and development of extensive oil reserves in the Gulf of Mexico and for implementing economic policies that set off the nation's debt crisis in the 1980s.

López Portillo was born on June 16, 1920, in MEXICO CITY. He studied law and political science and worked for a time as a professor at the National University of Mexico. López Portillo later pursued a political career and worked in the administrations of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70) and LUIS ECHEVERRÍA (1970–76). López Portillo won the presidency in 1976, inheriting an ECONOMY in decline and a recently devalued peso. The new president faced the prospect of having to impose austerity measures and accept an assistance package from the International Monetary Fund. But, shortly after he took office, López Portillo announced that PEMEX—the state-owned oil company—would develop large oil reserves that had been discovered two years before. The expectation of large oil profits was enough to lure foreign banks into making sizable loans to Mexico.

López Portillo's presidency was characterized by massive government spending. Expenditures on public works and social services increased, but much of the spending was surrounded by corruption. López Portillo sank money into ventures that offered little profit and by the final years of his presidency was facing an unprecedented economic crisis. One of López Portillo's last acts as president in 1982 was to devalue the peso, thus beginning an era of economic decline known as the “lost decade.”

López Portillo died in Mexico City on February 17, 2004.

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López Pumarejo, Alfonso (b. 1886–d. 1959) *president of Colombia* Alfonso López Pumarejo was born in Honda, in COLOMBIA's western department of Tolima. After completing his primary and secondary education in Colombia, he studied business and economics at Bright College in England and worked for business firms in New York before returning to Colombia on the eve of the Great Depression in 1929.

López Pumarejo was the second Liberal president in the 1930s on his inauguration on August 7, 1934, after Enrique Olaya Herrera (b. 1880–d. 1937). Needing to address the continuing problems caused by the depression and the economic-social issues that were legacies of the Spanish colonial period, López Pumarejo determined to carry out his “revolution on the march.” Sanctified by constitutional amendments, the program guaranteed the government's role in the diversification of exports; the expropriation of lands for the common good; and

the protection of LABOR, including the right to strike. López Pumarejo also sought to implement a progressive income tax, grant titles to squatters on unused state and private land, and further separate the church and state. From 1904 to 1909, he also sought to advance INDUSTRY through tariff and tax protection, similar to the policies of President RAFAEL REYES (b. 1849–d. 1921). Coffee grower's benefited from Germany's Aski mark system, whereby credits were established in the German Central Bank for the purchase of coffee, but the funds could be spent only in Germany. The protectionist policies and shortage of manufactured goods in the global market momentarily spurred industrial growth. The industrialization also brought rural families to the cities and contributed to the growth of labor unions. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 temporarily halted economic development.

López Pumarejo returned to the presidency on August 7, 1942, succeeding Eduardo Santos (b. 1888–d. 1974). His second administration was not as effective as the first. Wartime economic hardships were exacerbated by López Pumarejo's pro-Allies foreign policy, which not all Colombians accepted (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). Conservative congressional strength was sufficient to block López Pumarejo's legislative initiatives. Public discontent became so strong that in July 1944, López Pumarejo and some of his cabinet officers were held prisoner during an abortive military coup d'état. Finally, on July 19, 1945, López resigned in favor of his first presidential designate, Alberto López Camargo (b. 1906–d. 1990). López Pumarejo died in London on November 20, 1959, while serving as Colombia's ambassador to Great Britain.

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lucha libre *Lucha libre* is a type of professional wrestling practiced in MEXICO and some other areas of Latin America. Wrestlers (*luchadores*) wear masks and take on alternate identities in the ring. Many hide their true identity throughout their career. They perform a series of sophisticated and generally unscripted acrobatic moves in the ring, although the outcome of most matches is choreographed to conform to a predetermined soap opera-like storyline.

Lucha libre grew in popularity in Mexico in the 1930s, and with the advent of television after World War II, the sport became a nationwide phenomenon (see SPORTS). Wrestlers take on a specific personality and are charac-

terized as either a “*rudo*” (bad guy) or “*técnico*” (good guy) in the ring. Mexican professional wrestling has produced a number of star performers, the most notable of whom is El Santo (The Saint) who first appeared in the 1940s. El Santo took on a type of superhero status, appearing in comic books and movies in the 1950s and 1960s. He remained active until 1982 and died only two years later. His son became a professional wrestler, taking the name El Hijo del Santo (The Son of the Saint), and also has led a successful career.

One *luchador*-turned-activist gained notoriety when he donned his mask and cape and went on missions to help local neighborhoods in MEXICO CITY after the EARTHQUAKE OF 1985. Known as Super Barrio, this *luchador* helped mobilize the people to demand social and political reform in the late 1980s and 1990s.

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Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio (b. 1945–) *president of Brazil* Born in Garanhuns, Pernambuco, BRAZIL, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula, as he is popularly known, had little formal education. He did not learn to read until the age of 10 and quit school a year later. Eventually, he earned a high school equivalency degree. At age 14, Lula began working in a copper factory and subsequently became a lathe operator and a LABOR leader. His first wife, Maria de Lourdes, died of cancer in 1969. In 1974, Lula married Marisa, with whom he had three sons. He also had a daughter out of wedlock. In 1982, he legally added the nickname *Lula* to his full name.

As president of the Metallurgical Workers Union in SÃO PAULO between 1979 and 1981, Lula gained notoriety for leading several labor strikes. He was elected a federal deputy in 1986, which enabled him to participate in the 1988 constitutional convention. He voted in favor of the nationalization of Brazil’s mineral reserves and for agrarian reform, protection of national enterprises, and a 40-hour workweek, all of which railed against the principles of the conservative elite. He also advocated direct election of the president.

The Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) nominated Lula to challenge Fernando Collor de Mello (b. 1949–) for the presidency in 1989. Although Lula lost, he received 47 percent of the vote. Lula again

lost presidential bids in 1994 and 1998 to Fernando Henrique Cardoso (b. 1931–) but in each contest received 44 percent of the popular vote. Finally, in 2002, he defeated the government-sponsored candidate José Serra (b. 1942–) in a runoff election on October 27. His campaign called for linking payment of Brazil’s foreign debt to a thorough audit, which raised fears of a possible Brazilian default similar to that of ARGENTINA during its financial crisis of 2001–02. Lula’s background, record, and appeal to the working class also raised concern that his administration would pursue socialistic policies. These issues diminished demand for government bonds and led to an attack on the Brazilian currency, the real, and an inflationary spike.

The anxiety lessened as Lula’s cabinet took form and with the appointment of market-oriented economist Henrique Meirelles (b. 1945–) as president of Brazil’s Central Bank. Lula continued the austerity measures the Cardoso administration had agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, he pursued an aggressive export policy, which led to a \$49-million favorable balance of TRADE by 2006. The continued government austerity and increased revenues from trade enabled the Brazilian government to pay off its IMF loan in 2005, two years ahead of schedule.

In addition to trade agreements with the European Union (EU), China, and South Africa, Lula challenged U.S. leadership in the creation of the FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, and his strong opposition to farm subsidies within the EU and the United States led to a walkout of developing nations from the 2003 Cancún talks of the World Trade Organization.

As the 2006 elections approached, Lula’s administration was plagued by scandals, but investigations could not link the president to them. With campaign promises to address the nation’s social ills, Lula remained popular, as evidenced by his reelection in the October 28, 2006, presidential contest.

Continued corruption within the Brazilian Worker’s Party and, although caused by the global recession that began in 2008, Lula’s inability to rapidly implement continued social reform programs tarnished the president’s image. Lula’s popularity slipped further in August 2009 when he attempted to secure the party’s 2010 presidential nomination for his chief of staff, Ms. Dilma Rouseff (b. 1945). The maneuver smacked of traditional Brazilian politics.

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M

Machado y Morales, Gerardo (b. 1871–d. 1939) *president of Cuba* Born into a planter class family, Gerardo Machado y Morales became a successful tobacco grower. He joined the Cuban Liberation Army and rose to the rank of brigadier general during the war of independence. After the war, Machado returned to farming but also participated in several U.S. joint economic ventures in CUBA. He gained control of the Liberal Party in the early 1920s and was elected president in 1924.

Machado came to the Cuban presidency promising economic development and improvement in EDUCATION but was well aware of the rising tide of Cuban nationalism that demanded an end to the U.S. presence on the island. Thanks to the high price of sugar on the world market, Machado's government was able to carry out an extensive public works program, encouraged Congress to pass the 1927 Tariff Law designed to promote agricultural diversification and industrialization, and directed increased funding for the University of Havana. After 1927, the world sugar price plummeted, however, and Cuban growers were further hurt by the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which cut the Cuban share of the U.S. sugar market from 40.9 percent to 25.3 percent. The weakening Cuban ECONOMY contributed to increased public dissatisfaction with the Machado administration.

Numerous interest groups appeared on the scene during the 1920s. For example, the merchant organization, the National Association of Retailers (Asociación Nacional de Detallistas), demanded an end to the monopolies enjoyed by company stores and foreign-owned sugar firms. The Junta Cubana de Renovación called for a new TRADE treaty with the United States that would protect Cuban industry and commerce. A variety

of LABOR groups came forward and in 1925 convened a national labor congress that resulted in the establishment of the National Workers' Confederation of Cuba (Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba, or CNOC). That same year the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Comunista Cubano, or PCC) was founded. Several student groups also emerged. All had one thing in common: disdain for the PLATT AMENDMENT that permitted U.S. intervention in Cuba's internal affairs. As the Cuban economy worsened with the Great Depression that began in late 1929, these groups increased their pressure on Machado to address the country's problems.

As the 1928 election approached, Machado determined to extend his term in office. Although the U.S. government did not favor the idea, it did nothing to stop Machado from having the constitution amended to make him eligible for another six-year term, ending in 1935. Machado won the November 1, 1928, election unopposed, which fueled the opposition's demand for his resignation. As the pressure increased, Machado became increasingly repressive, particularly against student groups. To bring political stability and to protect U.S. interests on the island, in May 1933, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Cuba to mediate a solution. Machado would not budge and, in fact, called Welles's bluff regarding possible U.S. intervention by asserting that he would arm the Cuban people to defend national sovereignty against it. An August 12, 1933, Havana bus drivers' strike escalated to the point where the national TRANSPORTATION system was paralyzed, which prompted the Cuban army to act. It engineered a coup against Machado on August 22, 1933, who immediately left for Miami, Florida, where he died in 1939.

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Madero, Francisco (b. 1873–d. 1913) *revolutionary leader and president of Mexico* Francisco Madero initiated the MEXICAN REVOLUTION when his Plan de San Luis Potosí sparked widespread revolts throughout the country. He is often considered the “Apostle of Democracy” in MEXICO for his insistence that political reform would eventually lead to the sweeping and varied changes that disparate revolutionary factions were demanding.

Madero was born on October 30, 1873, to a wealthy hacienda-owning family in the state of Coahuila. He was educated in the United States and became increasingly convinced that Mexico needed democratic reform to correct the social injustices rendered by the Porfiriato. When dictator Porfirio Díaz declared in a 1908 interview to U.S. journalist JAMES CREELMAN that he would not seek reelection in 1910, Madero announced his candidacy and began campaigning throughout the country. He published a book entitled *The Presidential Succession of 1910* (*La sucesión presidencial en 1910*) in which he called for democratic reform. Díaz, however, reneged on his word and had Madero arrested on the eve of the presidential election. After Díaz was elected once again, Madero escaped to the United States and issued a call to arms in his Plan de San Luis Potosí. Rebellions sprang up throughout Mexico in November 1910, led by FRANCISCO VILLA and PASCUAL OROZCO in the north and EMILIANO ZAPATA in the south. Within six months, the revolutionaries had forced Díaz from office, and he fled the country.

Madero’s revolution seemed to achieve early success. He was elected president in a special October 1911 election and began implementing modest social reforms. Some revolutionaries who had initially supported Madero argued that his reforms did not go far enough. Zapata and Orozco both rose in rebellion, and other counterrevolutionary revolts destabilized Madero’s presidency. In 1913, a major rebellion led by Díaz’s nephew, FÉLIX DÍAZ, shut down MEXICO CITY in a 10-day siege. Madero’s trusted general VICTORIANO HUERTA turned on the president and led a coup that placed himself in power. Madero was executed on February 22, 1913, most likely on Huerta’s orders.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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Mafia in Cuba As the growth of U.S. investments in CUBA reached a peak in the late 1920s, Cuban hotels, nightclubs, and gambling facilities attracted U.S. workers to the island, along with well-to-do Cubans and North American tourists. While this “rumba era,” as it was known, fizzled with the Great Depression in the 1930s, the presence of U.S. organized crime in Cuba did not. U.S. syndicate interest in Cuba began during the Prohibition era of the 1920s, when the island served as a source of alcoholic beverages surreptitiously brought into the United States. Following the end of Prohibition in 1933, the Mafia shifted its emphasis to gambling. In 1937, a member of the Mafia’s leadership, Meyer Lansky, established control over gambling operations at Havana’s Hotel National, and after WORLD WAR II, Lansky was the mob’s designated “boss” in Cuba.

Shortly after World War II ended, Lansky convened a meeting in HAVANA that was attended by leading crime figures including Frank Costello, Lucky Luciano, Alberto Anastasia, Tommy Luches, Joe Banana, Vito Genovese, and Santo Trafficante. The Mafia steadily expanded its operations until FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR’s coup d’état in March 1952. President Batista was then brought under the mob’s control: He personally received up to \$250,000 for issuing gambling licenses to Mafia members, and his brother-in-law, army general Roberto Hernández y Miranda, regularly collected 20 percent of each club’s profits and deposited them into private offshore bank accounts. Havana also experienced a building boom in the early 1950s, which included numerous Mafia-operated hotels: the Capri, the Riviera, the International, the Commodore, and the Hilton. Reportedly, Lansky provided \$14 million for the Riviera’s construction, operated the Capri Hotel, and had interests in several others. Lansky also established a casino school at his Montmartre Club to teach young Cubans the art of cards and other games. By the time FIDEL CASTRO RUZ began his revolution in 1956, the Mafia had expanded its Havana operations into horse racing, prostitution, and abortion clinics and had begun plotting to expand their activities across the island. One measure of their success was the 80 flights per day arriving in Cuba from the United States.

On January 1, 1959, the day after Batista fled the island, thousands of euphoric Cubans took to Havana’s streets where they broke into casinos, gambling houses, and brothels, destroying everything in their path, including U.S.-made parking meters, which had become a source of private income for Batista’s brother-in-law Hernández. While the destruction of these “symbols of corruption” represented Castro’s call for morality, they also represented Cuban nationalism, which opposed U.S. dominance of the island’s ECONOMY. With a false passport, Lansky was spirited off the island to Miami, Florida,

eventually settling in Las Vegas, Nevada, where he died in 1983. Subsequently, Castro decreed an end to gambling and prostitution as part of the CUBAN REVOLUTION'S moral crusade but later permitted gambling houses to reappear, as they became a source of funds for the financially strapped government, particularly after the loss of Soviet support in 1991.

One of Batista's corrupt policemen, José Miguel Battle, also escaped to the United States in 1959, where he established working relationships with the New York Mafia. Battle soon introduced the illegal lottery (*botila*), a game popular among expatriate Cubans and Puerto Ricans. The game netted Battle some \$45 million per year in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, Battle relocated to Miami, from where, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he directed the 2,500-man East Coast operation that netted him \$175 million annually. In 2004, Battle was arrested on racketeering charges and was convicted of the same on March 4, 2007. He is currently serving a 16-year term at a Miami correctional facility.

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Anoinette Giancana, John R. Hughes, and Thomas H. Jobe. *JFK and Sam: The Connection between the Giancana and Kennedy Assassination* (Nashville, Tenn.: Cumberland House, 2005).

Magloire, Paul (b. 1907–d. 2001) *president of Haiti* Born on July 19, 1907, in Cap-Haïtien (Cape Haitien), HAITI, Paul Magloire was the son of General Eugène Magloire, a black peasant who rose through the ranks of the MILITARY and died in a shooting accident in 1908. During the 1920s, Magloire earned a degree in arts and letters from the National School in Port-au-Prince. After teaching school for a year, Magloire decided that he could not earn enough money to support himself through this job and joined the U.S.-organized Haitian National Guard. Like his father, he rapidly rose through the ranks, increasing his social and economic status. A member of the growing black middle class, Magloire participated in the overthrow of mulatto elite president ÉLIE LESCOT in 1946 that brought Dumarsais Estimé (b. 1900–d. 1953) to power. Estimé, the first black president of Haiti since the end of the American military occupation in 1934, encouraged social reforms and promoted blacks to high official positions, which angered the mulatto elite. In 1950, the mulatto elite convinced Magloire, who had come to enjoy the elite lifestyle, to overthrow Estimé.

During Magloire's rule (1950–56), Haiti became a popular destination for American tourists. Magloire's attempts to develop the ECONOMY were facilitated by high prices for coffee on the world market. He initiated

numerous infrastructure projects and granted women the right to vote. Magloire's staunch anticommunist foreign policy during the early years of the cold war earned him the support of the U.S. government, especially after the election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. The early years of Magloire's rule were a time of peace and prosperity. Increased corruption and ostentatious consumption, however, cost Magloire the support of the large black population. Magloire was fond of wearing elaborate military uniforms and staging vast military reenactments of battles fought against French forces during the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804). Following the devastation of Hurricane Hazel in 1954, which killed more than 1,000 Haitians and destroyed 40 percent of the coffee trees, accusations that Magloire stole relief funds further decreased his popularity.

By 1956, Magloire had lost the support of the Haitian National Guard and fled into exile in the United States. After he came to power in 1957, FRANÇOIS DUVALIER, who had opposed Magloire's 1950 coup, denied Magloire his Haitian citizenship. Magloire lived in New York City until 1986, when he returned to Haiti after the overthrow of JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER. In 1988, the military honored Magloire by naming him an adviser to the Haitian military. By the end of that year, however, Magloire had retired. During the turbulent 1990s, he refused to make comments on the political situation and seldom appeared in public. Magloire died on July 12, 2001, in Port-au-Prince.

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Malvinas/Falklands War (1982) The 54-day (April 21–June 12, 1982) conflict between Great Britain and ARGENTINA revolved around possession of two main islands (East and West Falkland) and another 776 smaller and largely uninhabited nearby islands. The islands are located in the South Atlantic Ocean, 300 miles (483 km) east of the Argentine coast and 600 miles (966 km) north of Britain's Antarctic Territory. The British refer to them as the Falkland Islands and the Argentines as the Malvinas. Wool, fishing, and tourism are the main industries pursued by the islands' nearly 3,000 residents, 70 percent of whom are of British descent. In 2007, the Argentines withdrew from an agreement with the British for joint exploration of oil in the region. This will now be undertaken by the world's largest primary resource company, BHP, an Australian-British conglomerate. The Falklands/Malvinas also serve as an important reference point for ships traversing the South Atlantic and house a tracking station for the U.S. outer space program.

With independence in 1822, Argentina claimed jurisdiction over the islands but was expelled by the British in 1833. Sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas was disputed thereafter. The Argentines began to press their claim aggressively in the early 1900s, and during the post-World War II nationalistic presidency of JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN, “*Las Malvinas por los argentinos*” became a popular slogan, at least until the 1982 war. The Argentine case was strengthened with two United Nations resolutions: 1) Number 1514 in 1960 called for self-determination for colonial possessions, and 2) Number 2065 in 1965 urged direct Argentine-British negotiations, but with consideration for the islands’ inhabitants. For the next 17 years, talks remained stalemated. The Argentines insisted on sovereignty over the islands, while the British argued that the islands’ inhabitants preferred British rule.

The situation came to a head in early 1982 as the Argentine economy sputtered and the Argentine people pressed for an end to military government. The president, General LEOPOLDO GALTIERI (b. 1926–d. 2003), persuaded his colleagues that a victory in the Falklands/Malvinas would ease the pressures on the government. The Argentine leadership gambled that the British would not defend the bleak islands so distant from the homeland and that the United States would, at best, remain neutral because Argentine army officers were busy training the Contras in HONDURAS for their guerrilla war against the Sandinistas in NICARAGUA. The generals were wrong on both counts.

On April 2, 1982, the Argentines commenced Operation Rosario with an assault on East Falkland Island. By the month’s end, 12,000 Argentine army troops were scattered throughout the islands, and in BUENOS AIRES, the government declared Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, to the delight of Argentineans. As the Argentines scurried troops across the islands, U.S. secretary of state Alexander Haig shuttled between Buenos Aires and London in an effort to mediate an end to the conflict and to tell the Argentine generals that the United States would support the British should Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher decide to act. The international community was of divided opinion on the matter. United Nations Security Council Resolution 502 on April 3, 1982, called for the Argentine withdrawal from the Malvinas/Falkland Islands and for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. In contrast, on April 26, the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) membership, except for CHILE, COLOMBIA, and the United States, which abstained from voting on the resolution, supported the Argentine cause.

Thatcher wasted little time in responding to the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas/Falklands. On April 6, she ordered a 28,000-strong task force to set sail on the 8,500-mile (13,680-km) journey to the islands. The United States provided the British with logistic and intelligence support and cooperated with the European Economic Community in imposing economic sanctions on Argentina. On May 27, the British launched an assault

at Goose Green on Argentine conscripts, who were no match for the British forces. The British announced the end of the war on June 20, 1982. The British lost 256 troops, another 777 were wounded, and the destroyer *Sheffield* was sunk. The Argentines lost 746 troops, 1,336 were wounded, and 11,400 became temporary prisoners of war. Argentina also lost its major battleship, the *Belgrano*.

The loss of the war forced the Galtieri government to resign, putting Argentina back on the path to democratic government. In Britain, Thatcher enjoyed renewed popularity, while the United States endured harsh criticism from its Latin American neighbors.

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Manley, Michael (b. 1924–d. 1997) *prime minister of Jamaica* Born on December 10, 1924, in St. Andrew, JAMAICA, Michael Manley was the second son of Norman Washington Manley (b. 1893–d. 1969), the founder of the People’s National Party (PNP). In 1943, while studying at McGill University in Montreal, he volunteered for the Royal Canadian Air Force. After the war, he studied politics and economics at the London School of Economics. After graduation in 1950, he worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation for a year before returning to Jamaica. In 1953, he became a member of the PNP Executive Committee and helped form the National Workers’ Union. Primarily representing sugar workers and miners, it was an alternative to ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE’s Industrial Trades Union. In 1962, Manley was elected president of the Caribbean Bauxite and Mineworkers Union. In 1967, he won a seat in Parliament, representing East Kingston Central.

Manley became the leader of the PNP a few months before his father’s death in 1969. He easily defeated the unpopular Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) prime minister Hugh Shearer (b. 1923–d. 2004) in the 1972 elections. Although he was a light-skinned member of an elite family, Manley was a dynamic leader who felt comfortable with Jamaica’s black population. Abolishing the jacket and tie requirement for members of Parliament, he encouraged representatives to wear bush jackets and other informal attire. Whereas the previous JLP government sought a close diplomatic and economic alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom, Manley decided that Jamaica needed to reorient its foreign policy. He established close diplomatic relations with CUBA and developed an amicable working relationship with FIDEL CASTRO RUZ and other socialist leaders. Relations between Jamaica and the United States deteriorated when Manley supported Cuban interventionism in Africa. In

1979, at a meeting of the nonaligned movement nations, Manley called for closer ties with the Soviet Union to counteract Western imperialism (see SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICA).

The PNP won the 1976 elections, which were plagued by political violence. Manley declared a state of emergency and accused the JLP of attempting to overthrow the government. During his second term, Manley attempted to limit private enterprise and implement state-run industries. Purchasing virtually all of Jamaica's sugar plantations at a time when the international demand for sugar had plummeted due to overproduction and the introduction of artificial sweeteners, Manley's government was plagued by economic difficulties. Further complicating the nation's economic woes was the oil crisis during the 1970s, as Jamaica was an importer of oil.

The JLP defeated the PNP in the 1980 elections and EDWARD SEAGA became Jamaica's fifth prime minister. Manley was an outspoken critic of Seaga's conservative government. Following Seaga's support of OPERATION URGENT FURY, the U.S.-led military invasion of GRENADA in 1983, Manley gave a series of lectures in American and British universities denouncing what he perceived as a manifestation of Western imperialism. In the 1989 elections, Manley, who had softened his socialist platform and advocated a greater role for private capital, won the elections and returned as prime minister. In 1990, Manley was diagnosed with cancer. In 1992, citing health reasons, he retired and was succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister PERCIVAL PATTERSON. Despite his illness, Manley led the Commonwealth Observer Mission to oversee the 1994 South African elections that ended apartheid in that country. Manley died of prostate cancer in Kingston on March 6, 1997, the same day as GUYANA'S CHEDDI JAGAN, a man who had followed a similar socialist agenda that was later tempered with a more moderate approach.

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Philip M. Sherlock and Hazel Bennett. *The Story of the Jamaican People* (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1998).

Manning, Patrick (b. 1946–) *prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago* Born on August 17, 1946, in San Fernando, Trinidad, to Afro-Trinidadian parents, Patrick Manning worked as a geologist for Texaco Trinidad, Ltd., after graduating from the University of the West Indies in 1969. A member of People's National Movement (PNM), an Afro-Trinidadian political party led by ERIC WILLIAMS, Manning won a parliamentary

seat representing San Fernando East in 1971 and is currently the longest continuously serving member of the House of Representatives in TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. From 1981 to 1986, he served as minister of energy and natural resources.

In the parliamentary 1986 elections, the PNM was defeated by the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR). Manning was one of only three PNM candidates to retain his seat. As George Chambers (b. 1928–d. 1927), Trinidad and Tobago's second prime minister, lost his seat in those elections, Manning became the leader of the opposition. In 1987, the PNM elected Manning to the leadership of the PNM. In 1991, the PNM won the elections, and Manning became Trinidad and Tobago's fourth prime minister. In November 1995, Manning called early elections. The PNM and the United National Congress (UNC) both won 17 seats, and the NAR won two seats. The NAR allied with the UNC, which allowed BASDEO PANDAY to become the first Indo-Trinidadian prime minister.

In the 2001 elections, the PNM and the UNC both won 18 seats. President A. N. R. ROBINSON appointed Manning prime minister, despite the fact that Panday was the sitting prime minister and the UNC had won the popular vote. In the 2002 elections, Manning's party won 20 of the 36 seats in the House of Representatives. During Manning's second administration, taxes were drastically cut, primarily due to high natural gas and oil prices, as well as increases in natural gas production. Construction of government-funded low-cost housing in marginal neighborhoods has increased Manning's popularity. In 2007, Manning won his third term as prime minister.

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maquiladora A maquiladora is an assembly plant, usually located along the U.S.-Mexican border, that manufactures goods for export using low-cost LABOR in MEXICO and taking advantage of duty-free tax laws. In 1965, the Mexican government developed a plan to reabsorb laborers returning to Mexico after the termination of the BRACERO PROGRAM. The Border Industrialization Program allowed foreign firms to build assembly plants along the border and waived import fees on equipment and supplies as long as the final product was exported back to the United States. U.S. customs duties only applied to the value added to the manufactured product.

Although maquiladoras started as border plants, today *maquila* factories can be found throughout Mexico.

The *maquila* sector of the country's economy grew during the 1980s and experienced another boom after the passage of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT in 1994. Especially during times of economic decline in Mexico, the maquiladora sector has benefited from a relatively weak peso and from high levels of unemployment. Detractors of the program criticize the assembly plants for ignoring environmental and safety standards. Others claim that factory managers exploit Mexican workers, many of whom are young women with little education. Many factories require workers to be single and female, and many supervisors dismiss female workers who marry or become pregnant. In recent years, the maquiladora sector of Ciudad Juárez has attracted worldwide attention as hundreds of young female *maquila* workers have been kidnapped and killed.

Since 2001, maquiladora production in Mexico has been in a state of constant decline as many companies have shifted their operations to cheaper labor markets in China. Many experts question the future viability of the maquiladora industry.

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María Patricia Fernández-Kelly. *For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).

Mariátegui, José Carlos (b. 1894–d. 1930) *influential Peruvian intellectual* Born into a poor family in Moquegua, PERU, José Carlos Mariátegui received only a primary school education, yet went on to become one of Peru's and Latin America's leading essayists and political thinkers. At age 15, Mariátegui began working as a copy boy for the LIMA daily newspaper *La Prensa* and four years later became a reporter. In 1919, he was dispatched to Europe to report on WORLD WAR I. When he returned to Peru in 1923, Mariátegui brought with him a new sense of reality, an affinity for Marxism, and an Italian wife, Ana Chiappe, with whom he had four children.

In Lima, Mariátegui worked closely with VICTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE until the latter was deported in 1923 by President AUGUSTO B. LEGUÍA. This left Mariátegui to edit the magazine *Claridad*, which he used to espouse his Marxist ideas, devoting an entire issue to Lenin. Mariátegui's home became a center for avant-garde intellectuals, students, artists, and LABOR leaders. In 1926, he began to publish the journal *Amauta*, which served as a forum for the discussion of socialism, ART, and culture in Peru and Latin America. The Leguía administration viewed Mariátegui with trepidation, as it had Haya de la Torre, and had him interned in a MILI-

TARY hospital in 1927 and later placed him under house arrest.

Disenchanted with Haya de la Torre's AMERICAN POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE, Mariátegui left the organization in 1928 to found Peru's Socialist Party. It later became the Communist Party of Peru. That same year Mariátegui published *Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality*, a Marxist critique of Peru's oligarchic society (see LITERATURE). It was subsequently translated into several languages.

Mariátegui, who never recovered from leg injuries suffered as a child, had both his legs amputated in 1925 and died from complications of this on April 16, 1930.

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Harry Vanden. *National Marxism in Latin America: José Carlos Mariátegui's Thought and Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reiner, 1986).

Mariel boatlift (1980) Between April and September 1980, an estimated 125,000 Cubans left the island nation to find political asylum in the United States and other Latin American countries, particularly PERU. The incident began on April 1, when a group of Cubans crashed their way into the Peruvian embassy compound in HAVANA. Two Cuban policemen were killed in the process. Another 10,000 Cubans stormed the grounds the next day after an angry FIDEL CASTRO RUZ ordered the fence surrounding the compound to be torn down. Further inflamed, Castro then announced that all Cubans who wished to leave the island could do so. The announcement sent thousands of Cubans to government offices seeking exit visas but also prompted the Peruvian government to announce that it could absorb only 1,000 of those people and to turn the problem over to the United Nations. The long-term causes of the crisis lay in the abuse of civil and HUMAN RIGHTS by CUBA's dictatorial government, as well as poor economic conditions on the island. The immediate causes can be traced to the thousands of U.S. visitors to the island in 1979 and 1980, who brought with them television sets and other electronic gadgets, clothing, and stories of freedom and prosperity in the United States, all of which contradicted Cuban realities and propaganda. The visitors pumped an estimated \$100 million into the Cuban economy.

In his response, U.S. president Jimmy Carter quickly denounced Castro and Cuba's internal conditions and announced that Cubans would be welcome in the United States, while the Justice Department advised that any private U.S. effort to bring the Cubans stateside would be illegal. The contradictory statements did not stop

the exodus of thousands of Cubans, however, who made their way to the port of Mariel, where a variety of privately owned U.S. boats awaited to bring them to the United States. The mass exodus brought international criticism to Castro and his system. Over the summer of 1980, Castro sent signals of his willingness to settle the problem. In early September, presidential adviser Peter Tarnoff traveled to Havana, where he secured Castro's promise to close Mariel on September 26 and, at Carter's request, to restart talks aimed at easing tensions between the two countries. Although the exodus stopped, the meetings never materialized.

By the time Mariel closed, a total of 125,262 Cubans had traveled to the United States, including an estimated 5,000 criminals and infirm and mentally ill people and, as subsequently discovered, approximately 2,000 secret government agents. Much smaller numbers of émigrés went to Canada, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, Peru, Spain, and VENEZUELA. Despite the criticisms of President Carter, the incident indicated that Castro and no one else controlled Cuba's MIGRATION policy.

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Marta A. Ojito. *Finding Mañana: A Memoir of a Cuban Exile* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).

Martí, Agustín Farabundo (b. 1893–d. 1932) *communist rebel leader in El Salvador* The son of a moderate landowner in Teotepeque, EL SALVADOR, Agustín Farabundo Martí went on to the National University in San Salvador, where he enrolled in the School of Jurisprudence and Social Science. He soon lost interest in his studies and spent most of his time reading communist and anarchist literature in the university library. Martí also participated in several LABOR strikes in the capital. For provoking university professor Victoriano López Ayala into a duel, Martí was exiled to GUATEMALA. From 1920 to 1925, he lived among the K'iche' (Quiché) Maya and learned much about the plight of poor rural labor to the benefit of large landowners. He also worked as a day laborer in Guatemala and HONDURAS. He also visited MEXICO, where he found the workers still victimized by capitalists despite the promises of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. He left Mexico an admirer of Leon Trotsky, the exiled Soviet Marxist leader whom he met in Mexico, and for the remainder of his own life wore a lapel pin given him by the Russian.

In 1928, Martí returned to El Salvador, but President Alfonso Quiñonez (b. 1873–d. 1970) exiled him to NICARAGUA for attempting to organize and raise the

social consciousness of peasant workers. He met with Nicaraguan dissident AUGUSTO CESÁR SANDINO, who failed to convert Martí to the communist ideology.

In 1930, Martí again returned to El Salvador, where he helped establish the local Communist Party. By the time of the December 2, 1931, coup that brought General MAXIMILIANO HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ, who represented conservative elite landowners, to power, the party had made inroads into the rural labor force. Martí and his associates—Alfonso Luna, Miguel Mármol, and Mario Zapata—clandestinely organized coffee workers for a simultaneous uprising on January 22, 1932, in the western part of several provinces that bordered Lake Ilopango. The feeble attack was quickly crushed by the Salvadoran MILITARY, which learned of the plan four days earlier and arrested its leadership. All four rebels were found guilty of treason by a military court on January 25, and only Mármol escaped the February 1, 1932, firing squad by fleeing into exile. To ensure a government victory and to intimidate the coffee workers, Hernández Martínez directed the military to massacre the rebels (La Matanza). Exact figures are not known, but an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 peasants lost their lives, and the Pipal Indian culture was obliterated from El Salvador's western provinces because survivors abandoned their heritage for fear of reprisals. Martí's failed rebellion so frightened landowners that they became forever suspicious of the intention of labor organizers, always branding them as communists. Martí's death, however, did not extinguish his cause. It was taken up two generations later by the FARABUNDO MARTÍ NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, which prosecuted a civil war against the elitist El Salvadoran government in the 1980s (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS).

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Hector Lindo-Fuentes, et al. *Remembering a Massacre: The Insurrection of 1932* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007).

Menchú Tum, Rigoberta (b. 1959–) *K'iche' Maya activist and Nobel Peace Prize recipient* Born into a K'iche' (Quiché) peasant family, Rigoberta Menchú Tum spent much of her early childhood in GUATEMALA's northern highlands and during harvest season with her family working on Pacific Coast coffee plantations. The government's confiscation of Indian lands in Quiché Province in the 1970s prompted a violent response from local indigenous groups. Under the Guatemalan MILITARY's brutal suppression of that revolt and subsequent control of the region, Menchú's parents and brother lost their lives, between 1979 and 1981. Menchú recorded her experiences of these times in *I, Rigoberta Menchú* (1987). In 1992 she

was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of her activism, including her writing. Her account, however, was challenged by David Stoll in his *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans* (1999). The controversy led some to demand that Menchú's prize be recalled, but the Nobel committee refused to do so, explaining that the award recognized the totality of her work.

As a teenager, Menchú became involved in CATHOLIC CHURCH social reform activities and in 1979 joined the Committee of the Peasant Union (CUC). She taught herself Spanish and several of the other indigenous dialects spoken in Quiché Province in order to teach WOMEN there ways to resist suppression by the military. In 1980 and 1981, she was an activist in the Quiché and GUATEMALA CITY demonstrations calling for improvement in rural Native Americans' living and working conditions. Because of her activities, Menchú went into exile in MEXICO in 1981, returning on three occasions during the next decade to participate in various pro-indigenous movements. On each occasion, she returned to exile after receiving death threats.

In 1991, Menchú played a prominent role in preparing the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People. When military rule came to an end in Guatemala in 1992, she returned home to continue her work on behalf of indigenous peoples in Guatemala and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Because of their previous work in addressing violations of international human rights agreements and declarations, Menchú campaigned for Spanish courts to try Guatemalan political and military officials for HUMAN RIGHTS violations from 1960 to 1992. Finally, on December 23, 2006, Spain called for the extradition of seven Guatemalan political officials, including former military presidents Efraín Ríos Montt (b. 1926–) and Humberto Mejía Victores (b. 1930–), to stand trial on charges of genocide and torture; the Guatemalan government refused to extradite them. Menchú also joined forces with the Mexican pharmaceutical industry in a program entitled "Health for All," with the goal of offering low-cost generic medicines to indigenous people. On January 27, 2007, Menchú announced she would run for the Guatemalan presidency as the coalition candidate of the Winaq and Encounter for Guatemala parties. In the September 9, 2007 election, she finished seventh with just 103,316 popular votes.

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Menem, Carlos Saúl (b. 1930–) *president of Argentina* Carlos Saúl Menem was born to Syrian immigrants in the northern Argentine province of La Rioja. He was educated in local schools and as a youngster converted to Catholicism. While at university, Menem became active in politics, supporting President JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN. In 1955, at age 25, he was elected to Rioja's provincial legislature and subsequently, on three occasions (1973, 1983, and 1987), was elected governor of the province on the Peronist Party ticket. Following the MILITARY coup d'état that ousted President ISABEL MARTÍNEZ DE PERÓN, the military cracked down on all *peronista* leaders, including Menem, who served a three-year prison sentence. Following the failed 1982 MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR with Great Britain, the military fell from power and was replaced by a civilian government headed by President Raúl Alfonsín (b. 1927–) of the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, or UCR) party. For the next six years, ARGENTINA endured high inflation and unemployment that severely affected working-class Peronists. In 1989, against heavy odds, Menem secured the presidential nomination of the Peronist Party and impressively won the March 24 elections.

As president, Menem confronted a 150 percent monthly inflation rate; additionally, the government was \$4 billion in arrears in payments on external debts. Menem immediately imposed a strict austerity program. Having abandoned the principles of Peronism in favor of the neoliberal economic philosophy, in 1991, Menem found a like-minded colleague in Domingo Cavallo (b. 1946–), whom he appointed minister of the economy. They commenced the privatization of state-owned industries, including the national airlines, subway systems, and port facilities; the telephone and electric companies; and the coal and natural gas industries. Under Cavallo's "Convertibility Plan," the Argentine peso was placed on a par with the U.S. dollar. The influx of cash from the sale of state-owned industries and the confidence created by the "dollarization" of the ECONOMY reduced the national debt by nearly half by 1994, slashed inflation to a 4 percent annual rate, and initiated a period of economic recovery. Menem's administration also benefited from the establishment in 1991 of the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET, which sought to create a free TRADE area between Argentina, BRAZIL, PARAGUAY, and URUGUAY by 1995. The arrangement stimulated the Argentine economy by providing markets for the country's goods and commodities. On the downside, the Menem administration introduced austerity and privatization programs that contributed to layoffs in former government-owned industries. Workers demonstrated in an effort to regain their jobs and recapture the wages they had lost in the earlier inflation spiral. The government suppressed their demonstrations and strikes, often forcefully.

The opposition did not prevent Congress from amending the constitution in 1994 to permit second presidential terms. Menem capitalized on this and

declared himself a candidate in the May 1995 election, a contest he won with 50 percent of the vote. About the same time, the Argentine economy began to slow down. Unemployment increased as productivity decreased. Critics quickly blamed the Convertibility Plan, which prevented the Argentine peso from keeping pace with global price increases and led to the loss of markets and a decrease in direct foreign investment. Others pointed to Menem's abolishing of export taxes and the decrease in import duties, which failed to protect Argentine INDUSTRY from foreign competition and deprived the government of its main source of income. As a result, the Menem administration slashed government safety net programs, which further infuriated working-class Peronists. The international financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 aggravated the situation, but the full impact came with Argentina's economic collapse in 2000–02, after Menem had left the presidency (see ARGENTINA, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN).

Menem flirted with a third presidential term in 1999, but his increased unpopularity due to the country's economic woes caused him to abandon this thought. He ran for the presidency again in 2003 and finished second in the initial electoral round but withdrew from the runoff when he recognized he could not win the contest. NÉSTOR KIRCHNER then assumed the presidency by default.

Menem's public image was tarnished in other ways too. For example, in 1991, he had pardoned officers and terrorist leaders found guilty of HUMAN RIGHTS violations during the DIRTY WAR and ended further prosecutions. He also came under suspicion after a superficial investigation of the bombings of the Israeli embassy and the AMIA Jewish community center in BUENOS AIRES in 1992. After leaving office, Menem was charged with illegal arms sales to ECUADOR and Croatia in 1991 and 1996, respectively, and for reportedly having \$10 million in Swiss bank accounts. These allegations were never proven, but Menem spent two years in CHILE while the government in Buenos Aires attempted to extradite him to answer questions regarding corruption and embezzlement during his presidency. He returned to Argentina on December 22, 2004, after the Argentine Supreme Court ruled that the constitution does not permit extradition for the purpose of questioning only. In 2009, Menem still faced charges of embezzlement and for failing to declare illegal funds he holds outside Argentina.

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MERCOSUR See SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET.

Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) The Mexican Revolution was a bloody conflict that began as a revolt to overthrow the 34-year dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) and turned into a 10-year power struggle among revolutionary leaders. It was MEXICO's deadliest war and defined many aspects of the national character for the remainder of the 20th century.

The dictatorship of Díaz, known as the Porfiriato, began in 1876. For the next 34 years, positivist thinkers became Díaz's trusted advisers and encouraged policies to modernize the nation. Relying largely on foreign investment, the Mexican ECONOMY expanded through industrialization and modern agricultural techniques. The progress achieved during the Porfiriato, however, masked underlying inequalities. Large numbers of peasants and urban workers sank further into poverty while a few elite Mexicans and many foreign business owners became increasingly wealthy. Díaz maintained order by suppressing individual freedoms and curtailing political participation.

After more than three decades of dictatorial rule, several leaders emerged demanding reform. The FLORES MAGÓN BROTHERS (Ricardo, Enrique, and Jesús) began speaking out against the Díaz administration and were forced to flee to the United States. There, they published an activist newspaper and established the Mexican Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Mexicano, or PLM). The Flores Magón brothers advocated land and LABOR reform and demanded a more transparent political system. Though no longer in the country, the brothers' message reached many of the lower classes throughout Mexico. Díaz ruthlessly put down several strikes at factories and MINING facilities throughout the country. Then, in 1908, during an interview with U.S. journalist JAMES CREELMAN, Díaz announced that he would not run for office again in the 1910 presidential election. Believing that the political arena was finally opening, FRANCISCO MADERO announced his candidacy and began campaigning for president. Díaz, however, had Madero arrested, and the dictator won the presidency once again in highly fraudulent elections. Madero escaped to San Antonio, Texas, where he began plotting to overthrow Díaz.

In October 1910, Madero issued a general call to arms in an attempt to incite widespread revolt against Díaz. Madero's Plan de San Luis Potosí called for a violent uprising to return Mexico to democracy. On November 20, a rebellion led by FRANCISCO VILLA and PASCUAL OROZCO erupted in the state of Chihuahua. EMILIANO ZAPATA, a peasant leader who had already formed a resistance movement in the southern state of Morelos, also joined Madero's cause. Díaz was unable to put down the numerous revolts occurring simultaneously throughout the country and stepped down in May 1911. Madero became president in a special election held later that year.

Madero's presidency was plagued by instability from the beginning. Zapata, Orozco, and other local revo-

lutionaries throughout the country refused to disarm, demanding more immediate attention to various issues such as agrarian reform and labor laws. Madero also faced a constant threat of counterrevolution by supporters of the former dictator. In February 1913, a massive uprising in MEXICO CITY, led by Díaz's nephew FÉLIX DÍAZ and known as the Tragic Ten Days, ended with the ousting of Madero, who was later executed. VICTORIANO HUERTA became president, but his dictatorial tendencies angered many local leaders, who demanded a return to democracy as stipulated in the Constitution of 1857. Villa formed the Constitutionalist alliance with VENUSTIANO CARRANZA from the state of Coahuila and ÁLVARO OBERGÓN (1920–24) from the state of Sonora. The Constitutionlists led a massive uprising against Huerta for more than a year. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson denounced Huerta's dictatorship and sent a naval force to blockade Veracruz. In July 1914, Huerta resigned and fled into exile.

Huerta's departure left yet another power vacuum in a nation already beleaguered by war and political instability. Revolutionary leaders met at the CONVENTION OF AGUASCALIENTES to select a provisional president. When delegates selected Eulalio Gutiérrez (b. 1881–d. 1931), Carranza refused to acknowledge the convention's authority, and civil war erupted between Carranza and the Constitutionlists on one side and the Conventionists, led by Zapata and Villa, on the other. The alliance between Zapata and Villa soon broke down, and the nation was beset by a multisided civil war. In one of the most decisive confrontations, at the Battle of Celaya, Villa suffered a devastating defeat against Obregón's forces. A year later, Villa attacked a small town in New Mexico, provoking the U.S. government into sending an expeditionary force into northern Mexico.

By 1917, Carranza's forces had gained the upper hand, and Carranza had been recognized as "first chief." He convened a new convention in Querétaro, and delegates produced the CONSTITUTION OF 1917. The new governing document addressed nearly all of the reform issues that the various revolutionary factions had been demanding, but Carranza and subsequent presidents only selectively enforced them. Despite numerous unresolved issues, the fighting phase of the revolution came to an end by 1920. The implementation of revolutionary reforms continued to define Mexican politics and society for the remainder of the 20th century.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); MEXICO (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III); POSITIVISM (Vol. III).

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Mexico Mexico is a country of just under 800,000 square miles (2.07 million km²) that shares its northern border with the United States. It was colonized by the Spanish in the 16th century, and its population is made up of Europeans, NATIVE AMERICANS, Africans, and mestizos. Mexico was the main seat of Spanish authority in the Americas for more than 300 years, and many Spanish institutions left a pervasive legacy after the nation achieved independence in 1821. Conservative defenders of the CATHOLIC CHURCH and adherents to a strong centralized political system often clashed with Liberal leaders, and the nation witnessed infighting and instability through much of the 19th century. Although Mexico experienced a period of relative calm during the Porfiriato, many of the unresolved conflicts of the 19th century lingered. These culminated in the MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1910.

Much of Mexico's 20th-century history was defined by the revolution and its aftermath. The conflict started when FRANCISCO MADERO issued a call to arms in protest of the dictatorial political practices of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911). Díaz was ousted after only six months of fighting, and the revolution devolved into a struggle over how to replace the political, economic, and social system that had prevailed under the dictator. Some local revolutionary leaders, such as FRANCISCO VILLA, PASCUAL OROZCO, and EMILIANO ZAPATA, fought to improve the plight of the wider populace. Zapata advocated revolutionary reform based on significant changes in agrarian policy, while others pushed for sweeping reforms to benefit the growing LABOR sector and the urban poor. VENUSTIANO CARRANZA wanted only modest reform and a return to political stability. The revolution quickly became a power struggle, and the revolutionary factions descended into civil war. The disputes began to subside only after revolutionary leaders promulgated the CONSTITUTION OF 1917, which included provisions to satisfy nearly every faction's objectives.

While the ratification of the Constitution of 1917 did begin to curtail hostilities among competing revolutionary leaders, protests mounted as the Carranza administration only selectively implemented various social reform measures. Zapata, who refused to disarm

until his agrarian reform demands were met, was assassinated in 1919. The subsequent administration of ÁLVARO OBREGÓN (1920–24) implemented agrarian and labor reform more aggressively, but political infighting continued into the 1920s. PLUTARCO ELÍAS CALLES (1924–28) finally achieved relative political stability, but his anti-clerical policies created a backlash that culminated in the CRISTERO REBELLION from 1926 to 1929. Despite the violence, Calles oversaw the creation of the first of several POLITICAL PARTIES to emerge out of the revolution.

Even after his tenure as president had expired, Calles continued to dominate national politics behind the scenes by controlling a series of puppet presidents in an era known as the Maximato, from 1928 to 1934. Calles's control was finally broken during the presidency of LÁZARO CÁRDENAS (1934–40). Cárdenas became known as a man of the people and oversaw the most aggressive implementation of revolutionary reforms to date. He worked closely with labor groups to meet the needs of the working class and pushed through a series of land expropriations designed to help the rural peasantry return to an *ejido*-based land control system. Cárdenas also nationalized Mexico's railroad and oil industries, wresting control from foreign owners and placing it in the hands of the Mexican government (see PEMEX). In the early years of his presidency, Cárdenas made nationalism and social reform programs a priority. Those policies earned him a reputation as one of the most ardent defenders of the Mexican Revolution of all 20th-century presidents.

The end of Cárdenas's presidency coincided with the outbreak of World War II in Europe and a new approach to U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS. The war allowed the Mexican government to work closely with the United States, while still promoting a message of national unity. Wartime agreements between the two countries called for economic and technical assistance that allowed Mexican industrialists to develop new products and to modernize existing economic sectors. Mexico emerged from World War II with a growing middle class and a powerful industrial base that fueled economic growth in the coming decades. Between 1945 and 1972, Mexico's gross domestic product grew more than 6 percent per year on average. Economic observers watched in awe as the once-embattled Third World nation experienced more than two decades of nearly uninterrupted economic growth, with many dubbing this the "Mexican Miracle." Furthermore, WOMEN achieved nationwide suffrage in the 1950s, and by most outward measures, the nation seemed to be benefiting from the successes of the revolution.

Despite the perceived gains, however, signs of discontent were simmering under the surface. Political corruption ensured that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI)—the dominant revolutionary political party—controlled local and national politics. The party also used a complex system of cronyism to keep LABOR GROUPS in check. Those close to the party leadership grew wealthy through fraud and the

payment of bribes throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while millions languished in poverty. Discontentment with the status quo manifested in the 1968 STUDENT MOVEMENT, which emerged just as MEXICO CITY was set to host the summer Olympic Games. Hundreds of thousands of high school and university students went on strike and marched in peaceful demonstrations through the streets of the capital, demanding changes in government policy. On the night of October 2, security forces opened fire on a group of students who had gathered at the Plaza of Three Cultures in the middle-class neighborhood of Tlatelolco. Hundreds of unarmed young people were gunned down by government troops, and many more were arrested in the coming months. Although government officials attempted to blame foreign agitators for the incident, middle-class families began to question the so-called success of the revolution after 1968.

The Mexican Miracle came to an abrupt halt after 1972 as massive government spending projects reached a point where they were no longer sustainable. Official corruption and misspending, combined with massive borrowing by the administrations of LUIS ECHEVERRÍA (1970–76) and JOSÉ LÓPEZ PORTILLO (1976–82), left the Mexican government with a major economic crisis as the peso collapsed, inflation rose, and the TRADE deficit worsened. The discovery of large deposits of petroleum reserves off the coast of Tampico temporarily delayed the inevitable, but by 1982, Mexico's ECONOMY was in a tailspin. An International Monetary Fund bailout package forced the government to divest itself of all unnecessary spending. As a result, state-owned industries were privatized and social programs were cut according to the economic model of neoliberalism. The impact of these policies was devastating for Mexican society, and the 1980s became known as the "lost decade." Economic stagnation was made worse by the EARTHQUAKE OF 1985 that leveled much of Mexico City. The quake killed thousands and left many more homeless. As the national government found itself ill equipped to address the needs of victims, grassroots organizations stepped in to fill the void. Opposition parties, such as the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN), gained momentum. The conservative political party built up important bases of local support and began winning municipal elections. By 1989, PAN had won its first governorship, in Baja California.

A leftist opposition party was formed by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (b. 1934–)—son of the former President Cárdenas—who ran against the PRI candidate in the 1988 presidential election. CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI (1988–94) narrowly won that contest, but the defeated Cárdenas went on to become mayor of Mexico City and leader of a viable opposition party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD). After 1988, it became increasingly clear that the days of the PRI's monopoly on power were numbered. Salinas oversaw an impressive economic

turnaround during his six-year administration, but as he prepared to leave office, the 1994 presidential campaign was marred by political assassinations and charges of corruption. At the same time, the Zapatista Army for National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, or EZLN) rose in revolt in the southern state of Chiapas to oppose the recent passage of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT. Salinas's successor, ERNESTO ZEDILLO (1994–2000), inherited a devastating peso crisis, a guerrilla movement in the south, and investigations into the corrupt dealings of the Salinas family. The country's faith in the PRI was shattered, thus it was no surprise when PAN candidate VICENTE FOX (2000–06) became the first non-PRI president in 71 years.

On December 1, 2006, Felipe de Jesús Calderón (b. 1962–) replaced Fox in *Los Pinos*, the presidential residence in Mexico City. Calderón, the son of a PAN cofounder, is a devout Catholic and a neoliberal with regard to economic policies yet supports Mexican laws that permit abortion under certain conditions and favors the legalization and use of small quantities of drugs in the rehabilitation of addicts. He also supports the U.S. call for immigration reform but has not clearly stated his position. He has asked for U.S. military assistance in combating the ever-increasing violence brought about by drug traffickers and with the United States launched the Mérida Initiative, an undefined plan to combat crime and drug trafficking in Central America. He decreed a 10 percent pay cut for 546 top-level government employees and has asked the Mexican congress for legislation to also cut compensation for all government workers. As a neoliberal, he favors free trade and argues that competitive markets are the only way to successfully deal with economic problems. Still, he confronts Mexico's persistent problems of high unemployment, widespread poverty, and the need for educational, infrastructural, and medical modernization. With only a 0.58 percent margin of victory, Calderón will not have a commanding public voice with which to speak out on behalf of his programs until, possibly, 2012.

Debates over revolutionary ideals that had defined Mexico in the early decades of the 20th century had subsided by its end, though remnants of the revolution are still visible. IMMIGRATION, global commerce, and the DRUG TRADE have emerged as central national issues today, but the nation is still struggling over issues to do with land, labor, and poverty.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); MEXICO (Vols. I, III); NEW SPAIN, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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Mexico City Mexico City sits 7,350 feet (2,240 m) above sea level in MEXICO's central valley, surrounded by volcanic mountains. The Mexica, a group of Nahuatl Indians often referred to as the Aztecs, founded the city in 1325, in the middle of Lake Texcoco. The city of Tenochtitlán became the center of the Aztec civilization by the time Spanish conquistador Hernando Cortés arrived in 1519. Visual reminders of the Aztec culture are today found on the emblem of Mexico's national flag, the Templo Mayor located just off Mexico City's central plaza, and on the city's wide boulevards, which originally served as aqueducts.

Mexico City was the capital of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, whose administrative tentacles reached east into Florida and north from Texas to Washington State in modern-day United States, east to CUBA, south to COSTA RICA, and west to the Philippines. In 1824, three years after independence from Spain, the Federal District was established as the nation's capital, but its administrative relationship with the surrounding municipalities was often blurred. A 1993 constitutional amendment folded Mexico City and the Federal District into one entity. Today, Mexico City includes 58 municipalities of Mexico State and one in the state of Hidalgo and has a population of approximately 21 million people, making it the largest metropolitan area in the Western Hemisphere and the third largest in the world. Most of the population growth occurred after World War II. The city is also home to approximately half a million U.S. expatriates and uncounted numbers of expatriates from South and Central America, western Europe, and the Middle East.

In addition to being the seat of national government, Mexico City is the country's economic center, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of \$315 billion in 2005, making it the 8th richest urban center in the world. At present growth rates, it is predicted to become by 2015 the 30th largest ECONOMY in the world, with a GDP larger than that of Sweden and Switzerland. Its industrial sector accounts for 15.8 percent of the national GDP, and its service sector, for 25.3 percent. While its per capita GDP stands at \$22,696, the highest of all Latin American cities, approximately 25 percent of its residents live below the poverty line, compared to 36 percent of the country's total population. Because of the surrounding mountains,



Located on Mexico City's Zócalo (main square), the Metropolitan Cathedral was built between 1573 and 1813 and is the oldest and largest cathedral in Latin America. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

Mexico City is one of the world's most polluted cities. In an attempt to correct the problem, government programs have encouraged industries to relocate to suburbs outside the city and instituted limited car use within the city itself.

Mexico City is a cultural mecca with more than 160 museums, including the world famous Anthropological Museum, as well as art galleries and concert halls. Soviet and Communist dissident Leon Trotsky's fortress is located in the Coyoacán neighborhood. With approximately 265,000 students, the National Autonomous University of Mexico is Latin America's largest educational institution and in 2007 was named a United Nations World Heritage Site. Soccer, or *fútbol*, is the most popular sport, and the 105,000-seat Aztec Stadium is the site of competitions between Mexico's best teams. In the recent past, U.S. professional baseball, basketball, and football teams have penetrated the Mexico City market.

See also AZTECS (Vol. I); CORTÉS, HERNANDO (Vol. I); MEXICO CITY (Vols. I, II, III); TENOCHTITLÁN (Vol. I); UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO (Vol. II).

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migration The peopling of Latin America involved not only NATIVE AMERICANS, whose ancestors crossed the Bering Straits, but also Europeans, Africans, and, in smaller numbers, Asians. Because of the dominance and methodology of Spanish and to a lesser degree Portuguese colonization, a Hispanic/Iberian culture emerged. Characteristics of the indigenous lands and cultures remained and can still be found in the ART, LITERATURE, MUSIC, and dance of any given Latin American society.

With the development of Latin America's export-based economies from 1880 to 1930, an influx of Europeans, particularly from southern and central Europe, were attracted to the New World. For example, Spanish and Italian émigrés flocked to ARGENTINA, where they found employment in the beef, wheat, and wool-processing plants and TRANSPORTATION industries. In BRAZIL, eastern Europeans filled the LABOR void in the coffee industry. The German government encouraged outmigration as a means to indirectly find markets for its manufacturers. Germans could be found throughout Latin America but were most prevalent in Argentina, CHILE, COLOMBIA, and CENTRAL AMERICA, where many became successful businessmen and agriculturalists. Japanese migrants settled mostly in PERU and Brazil, and many of them also became successful entrepreneurs. The British

who settled in the New World during this period usually were associated with the export economies and therefore closely linked to the elites of their adopted country. Argentina is the most obvious example in this regard. Chinese and Indian workers usually came as indentured servants or contract laborers to work in the fields or build railroads. Almost all rejected repatriation at the end of their contracts and instead migrated to urban areas where they opened small textile shops, laundries, and restaurants. The impact of these migrants today is most evident in GUYANA and SURINAME on South America's northeast coast. By contrast, Mexico, with its large indigenous and mestizo population and lack of industrial base, drew very few foreigners. In all, some 21 million people, representing 30 different countries, came to Latin America from the time of colonization until 1970.

Outmigration initially affected the sugar-based Caribbean economies when slavery was outlawed in the early 19th century. While the freed blacks were often encouraged to relocate, few had the economic means to do so. Thus, many became contract laborers for short periods throughout the Caribbean. The most notable example is the 20,000 West Indians who performed the back-breaking labor in building the Panama Canal (see PANAMA CANAL, CONSTRUCTION OF). An estimated 121,000 Jamaicans worked in Cuban sugar fields during the *zafra*, or cane-cutting season. Under the terms of the U.S. War Manpower Act, during World War II, thousands of Caribbean workers were brought to the United States to help fill voids in defense-related industries. The most notable example was the BRACERO PROGRAM, under which Mexicans were brought to the United States to work on farms.

Latin American political crises prompted many members of the elite class to move outside their native country, at least until they felt it was safe to return. Cuban political history is replete with examples. More recently, the CUBAN REVOLUTION, the Latin American MILITARY governments during the 1970s and 1980s, the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s, the continuing Haitian collapse, and the Mexican economic and population crisis since the 1990s resulted in more migrants seeking permanent resident status in the United States. During the cold war atmosphere of the 1960s, Cubans were received with welcome arms but were mostly upper- and middle-class people with skills that permitted them to enter the workforce easily. When the skill set and skin color later changed, as it did during the 1980 MARIEL BOATLIFT and with the *BALSEROS* in the 1990s, Americans and Cubans residing in the United States alike protested the new migrants' arrival. The same points remain an undertone toward Haitian migrants, although the public debate focuses on whether they are political exiles who are eligible for admission or economic exiles, in which case they are not eligible for admission.

U.S. TRADE policy since the 1980s also contains provisions designed to discourage Latin American outmigration to the United States. While the 1984 CARIBBEAN BASIN

INITIATIVE had political overtones related to Central American conflicts at the time, it provided for job opportunities throughout the circum-Caribbean region. The 1994 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT envisioned job creation in MEXICO that would curtail illegal immigration to the United States (see IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES). For that reason alone, Florida Democratic senator Bob Graham and Republican representative Sam Gibbons proposed NAFTA's extension to the Caribbean. The governments of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and Central America, except COSTA RICA, readily viewed U.S. "807" assembly industries and investment provisions of the 2005 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT as means to spur employment, while U.S. authorities saw the programs as limiting migration of the unemployed to the United States.

See also MIGRATION (Vols. I, II, III).

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military Since the colonial period, the military has been an important component of national life across Latin America. Following independence and throughout the 19th century, the military defended national borders and maintained internal security. In the latter case, the military often served the personal interests of caudillos, charismatic figures who often became heads of state.

In 1859 and 1941, PERU and ECUADOR confronted each militarily before finally settling their boundary dispute in 1999. In the early 20th century, heads of state such as Venezuelan JUAN VICENTE GÓMEZ and Colombian LAUREANO GÓMEZ acted as caudillos and used the military to sustain their political power. In part, U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean region from 1900 to 1923 sought to dampen the role of the military in politics (see U.S. CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS, 1900-1934). The United States established apolitical national constabularies in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and NICARAGUA to serve the state's interests rather than those of the elite. These efforts failed. The constabularies became national guards used to serve the personal interests of dictators RAFAEL TRUJILLO, ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA, and ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE. Haitian dictator FRANÇOIS DUVALIER created the TONTON MACOUTES and Panamanian strongman MANUEL NORIEGA had the "Dobermans" to serve as personal protective forces that brutally repressed any political opposition.

Latin American governments continued to use the military for internal security. In ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and CHILE, troops were used in 1918 and 1919 to suppress LABOR MOVEMENTS allegedly run by anarchists,



A Chilean military musical band preparing for a ceremony in front of La Moneda, the presidential office, in Santiago de Chile (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

communists, or socialists that threatened the existing socioeconomic and political order (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA). These same three nations used the military in the mid- to late 20th century to brutally suppress labor leaders, journalists, academics, and anyone else suspected of being sympathetic to the CUBAN REVOLUTION. The elite feared that the impact of the Cuban Revolution would spread across the continent. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the Argentine generals conducted a DIRTY WAR (1975–83), the Brazilian military received international condemnation for its brutal torture of alleged communists and other dissenters, and Chilean strongman AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE was held responsible for thousands of “disappeared ones.”

Until World War II, Latin American governments obtained most of their arms from and arranged training through Europeans. Few U.S. citizens participated in the training, and when they did, it was via private contract. Thus, by the 1930s, European-style uniforms, armaments, marching formations, field tactics, and the like permeated Latin American militaries. In 1939 and 1940, the U.S. military surveyed the capabilities of its southern neighbors and found their militaries to be inadequately trained, poorly disciplined, and ill equipped to contribute to the hemisphere’s defense. After the outbreak WORLD WAR II in 1939, Latin Americans accepted U.S. offers of military assistance and training but showed greater interest in the former than the latter (see U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM). Although MEXICO sent a fighter

squadron to the Pacific theater, and Brazil sent ground troops to Italy, Latin America contributed little to the defense of the hemisphere during the war, and they received only 10 percent of the military assistance promised them under early wartime agreements.

As World War II drew to a close, the U.S. Army Command planned for a hemisphere-wide security plan under U.S. leadership and the uniform use of U.S. military equipment. Congress rebuffed the idea on the grounds that it would only perpetuate the presence of military dictators and, in so doing, further tarnish the U.S. image in Latin America. Only in 1952, after the cold war began, did Congress relent, fearing the spread of communism to Latin America. For the next 40 years, U.S. military largesse strengthened Latin American militaries with modern equipment and training. That training included counterinsurgency, civic-action, and interrogation programs to root out guerrilla groups, though the last faded into the background beginning in the late 1960s as Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon focused their attention on Vietnam. The military spigot remained open, and the equipment was used by Latin American military regimes to brutally suppress civil and HUMAN RIGHTS until the mid-1980s.

CUBA benefited from these policy parameters from the outbreak of World War II until early 1958, when the U.S. government ended military assistance to dictator FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR. When FIDEL CASTRO Ruz secured power in 1960, he sought outside assistance

to secure Cuba against an anticipated U.S. invasion. For reasons that had nothing to do with the defense of Cuba, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev placed Soviet missiles on the island. Castro learned the reality of Soviet *realpolitik* as the 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS unfolded, but this did not stop him from warning the Cuban people of a potential U.S. invasion (see BAY OF PIGS INVASION). The upshot of this was that the Cuban military remains the strongest institution in Cuban society today.

The impact of the Vietnam War on the U.S. populace and the impact of the United States's pro-British policy during the 1982 FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR on the Latin Americans, coupled with President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy, contributed to a significant slowdown of U.S. arms shipments to Latin America. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, established their own small arms industries. They and others purchased larger military equipment on the world's open market, particularly Mirage jet fighter planes from the French and modern field equipment from Israel.

During the 1980s, Latin America marched toward a "return to democracy." Military regimes gave way to elected governments. Many analysts insist that Latin American militaries are now a shell of their former selves. Others disagree, arguing that the military is lurking in the background, awaiting internal calamities that will require their attention. VENEZUELA may be an instructive case. Its president, HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS, came to office in 1998 as a populist determined to correct the ills of Venezuelan society. Since then, his increasingly assertive foreign policy has angered COLOMBIA and Ecuador, while his anti-U.S. rhetoric must await a new U.S. president's response. Externally, he has been generous with oil credits to Cuba and BOLIVIA and has negotiated oil contracts with China but has not adequately addressed domestic issues. By constitutional manipulation, he controls upper-rank military appointments so that the officer corps remains loyal to him. In the past, this same combination often resulted in a coup d'état.

In addition to Chávez, the leftward drift of Latin American politics potentially threatened U.S. interests, according to President George W. Bush. Beginning in 2004, he directed increased supplies to the Latin American military. Some analysts suggest the aim is regime change should domestic politics become tumultuous, rather than international hemispheric security. In 2009, new U.S. president Barack Obama promised a new direction in U.S. policy toward Latin America, but at this writing that policy has yet to take shape.

See also MILITARY (Vols. II, III).

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mining Mining lost its importance in the economies of BRAZIL, MEXICO, and PERU shortly after Latin America's independence in the early 19th century. A reduction in European demand for ores, along with the devastation wrecked during the wars of independence, resulted in the collapse of mining as a profitable economic pursuit. Not until the late 19th century did mining reemerge as an important economic activity in some countries. For example, guano (bird droppings) became an important Peruvian export commodity. Nitrates, followed by copper, became the mainstays of the Chilean ECONOMY. Other extracted minerals included bauxite, iron ore, manganese, and tin. Coal mining became an important part of the Colombian and Venezuelan export economies and were also somewhat significant in ARGENTINA, Brazil, and CHILE. Over time, oil and natural gas became important products in the economies of Argentina, Brazil, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, MEXICO, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, and Peru.

During the first quarter of the 20th century, foreign concessionaires dominated the exploitation of minerals in Latin America. States granted foreign companies the right to harvest minerals in return for a percentage of the money earned on the world market, ranging to about 20 percent. The concessionaire financed the exploitation of the minerals, the internal infrastructure to get the product to port, and its TRANSPORTATION to the world market. With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, the global demand for these commodities plummeted. This was a significant factor in the nationalization and expropriation of the mining industries in Latin America and the creation of state monopolies to control the exploitation of mineral wealth. State monopolies in the hydrocarbon industries drew most international attention, including the Bolivian and Mexican nationalization of oil companies on the eve of World War II. The non-petroleum industries did not escape state control; these included tin in BOLIVIA (COMIBOL), mineral ores in Peru (MineroPeru), and copper in Chile (Codelco).

State interference in the ECONOMY fizzled with Latin America's economic slowdown in the 1970s and the governments' acceptance in the 1980s of the neoliberal economic model, which encouraged the sale of state-owned enterprises to the private sector on the assumption that the latter would more efficiently manage mineral exploitation. Thus, every Latin American country offered



An explosion to clear the surface for the mining of copper ore at the Exotica Copper Mine in Chile, which is a subsidiary of the U.S.-owned Anaconda Copper Company (*Anaconda Company*)

mining concessions to domestic and industrial investors, although some continue to regulate the amount of foreign investment in any given mining venture.

CUBA and Chile were unique in the region. The United States TRADE embargo with Cuba beginning in 1960 prompted FIDEL CASTRO RUZ to order the nationalization of all U.S. industries on the island (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF). These included oil and sugar-refining operations and bauxite exploitation that were significant contributors to the Cuban economy. Due to international factors beyond Castro's control and his government's mismanagement of the economy, these industries eventually lost their importance in the overall Cuban economy. In Chile, President EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA "Chileanized" U.S.-owned copper companies in July 1966. The Chilean government now owned 51 percent of these companies and used a portion of its newfound profits to compensate the companies for the portions that were Chileanized. However, in 1971, new president and self-proclaimed Marxist SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSENS nationalized the companies without compensation for their lost investments. That changed again with military dictator AUGUSTO

PINOCHET UGARTE, who returned the companies to their former U.S. owners.

In the early 21st century, most Latin American economies are sufficiently diversified and are not dependent on mineral exports. VENEZUELA, with its oil, is an exception; as is Mexico, whose oil reserves have peaked and which is emphasizing other modes of industrial development. Nevertheless, mineral resources remain important commodities across the continent. Chile, for example, is home to the world's largest copper mine (Chuquicmata). Brazil's iron-ore reserves are sufficient to meet current demand for the next 530 years. With the exception of China's early 21st-century investments in Latin American oil reserves, U.S. and European investors are moving out of mineral exploitation in Latin America because of ever-increasing restrictions on foreign investors (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF).

See also MINING (Vols. I, II, III).

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Mitchell, James (b. 1931–) *prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines* Born on the island of Bequia in the Grenadines on May 15, 1931, James Mitchell was educated at the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO and the University of British Columbia. Mitchell entered politics in 1966, when he won a legislative seat as a candidate of the St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP). Mitchell subsequently declared himself an independent and forged a political alliance with the People's Political Party (PPP) in 1972. After defeating the SVLP in the 1972 elections, Mitchell served as prime minister of SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES until 1974. Mitchell founded the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1975. He was the opposition leader in Parliament until his party won the 1984 elections after Prime Minister R. MILTON CATO called for early elections. With 89 percent of the eligible voters participating in the election, Cato suffered a surprising defeat.

Mitchell came to power in 1984 on a platform calling for closer economic and political relations with his Caribbean neighbors. He was a strong supporter of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. Able to reinvigorate the ECONOMY during the 1980s, Mitchell's party was able to win all 15 seats in the 1989 parliamentary elections. During the 1990s, Mitchell encouraged economic diversification strategies. Special attention was devoted to developing the tourism INDUSTRY. In 1992, a \$55-million airport named after Mitchell opened on Bequia. One of the longest-serving prime ministers in Caribbean history, Mitchell voluntarily resigned on October 27, 2000. He was briefly succeeded by fellow party member Arnhim Eustace (b. 1944–), who served as prime minister only until the newly reformed SVLP, now known as the United Labor Party (ULP) and led by Ralph Gonsalves (b. 1946–), won the March 2001 elections by a landslide.

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MLN–T See NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

MNR See NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

Monterrey Designated the capital of the Nuevo León region of the Viceroyalty of New Spain in 1596, Monterrey remained an outpost throughout the colonial period and into the late 19th century following the country's independence from Spain in 1821. Today, 1.1 million people reside within the city's 320 square miles (892 km²), and another 2.7 million, in the 2,228-square-mile (5,770.5-km²) metropolitan area.

Monterrey's industrial growth began during the U.S. Civil War (1861–65) with the development of the cotton textile INDUSTRY. By the end of the 19th century, Monterrey had taken on new significance as a railroad hub that connected it with the United States, MEXICO CITY, and the Caribbean coast. The TRANSPORTATION system and the liberal economic policies of President Porfirio Díaz and Nuevo León governor Bernardo Reyes (b. 1850–d. 1913) contributed to the city's economic growth. The Garza-Sada family provided much of the economic leadership in the 20th century. The Cervezería Cuauhtémoc, which opened in 1899, evolved into a division of FEMSA (Coca-Cola Latin America) and today produces eight brands of beer for the national and international markets. In 1903, Monterrey became home to Latin America's first iron and steel plant, an industry that today accounts for about half of Mexico's steel production. Cemex, the world's third-largest cement producer, and Alfa, which processes petrochemicals and food and produces telecommunications equipment and auto parts, are among the other 15,000 plants that operate in metropolitan Monterrey.

In 2006, the Mercer Human Resource Consulting firm ranked Monterrey fifth in all of Latin America in terms of quality of life. The city's higher educational institutions include the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey and the Universidad Regiomontés. Like other Mexican cities, soccer, or *fútbol*, as it is known locally, dominates the athletic calendar. And starting in the 1960s, Monterrey became the center of *norteño* MUSIC, a regional trademark.

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Morales Ayma, Juan Evo (b. 1959–) *president of Bolivia* Juan Evo Morales Ayma won the December 18, 2005, Bolivian presidential election with 54 percent of the popular vote to become the country's first indigenous president. He is one of six children born into a family of Aymara Indian descent in the highlands of Orinoca, in Oruro, BOLIVIA. Poverty forced Morales to drop out of high school, though he went on to fulfill his mandatory MILITARY service. When the effects of the 1980 El Niño ravaged his native agricultural region, Morales joined his family in leaving Orinoca to participate in a government-sponsored agricultural project in the tropics of Cochabamba.



Evo Morales speaking to crowds below in the street, 2005 (AP Photo/Ismael Lizarasu)

Morales commenced his activities on behalf of coca growers and became head of his local union four years later. In 1988, he was elected general secretary of the Tropics Federation and in 1996 elected president of the Coordinating Committee of the Six Federations of the Tropics in Cochabamba State. Morales's rise to union leadership resulted from his strong criticism of the Bolivian government support for the U.S.-sponsored drug eradication program. Asserting that the coca leaf had been a staple in the life of Bolivian NATIVE AMERICANS dating to the precolonial period, he claimed its eradication would destroy their way of life. He charged that the United States should curtail the demand for refined coca at home and shut down the drug traffickers' operations, including money laundering (see DRUGS). His protestations fell on deaf ears. By 2005, legal coca growing had been reduced to some 29,000 acres (11,736 ha) of land in the Yungas Valley and Chaparé river region, and almost all cocaine refining operations had relocated to PERU and COLOMBIA. Substitute agricultural production failed to fill the financial void for the local coca farmers, and owing to the government's neoliberal economic policies and the lack of a diversified ECONOMY, the indigenous were left without employment opportunities.

Morales appealed to these displaced and unemployed rural indigenous in winning a seat to Congress in the 1997

elections and two years later became a founding member of the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS). His second-place finish in the June 30, 2002, presidential election made him a celebrity across South America. For the next three years, the Bolivian economy continued to spiral downward, and in response, workers demonstrated. The situation prompted President Carlos Mesa Gisbert (b. 1953–) to resign on June 6, 2005, and Congress to move up the scheduled 2007 elections to December 18, 2005. Morales campaigned on a pledge to nationalize the country's natural gas industries, restore coca production, require the teaching of indigenous languages in the schools, terminate the teaching of RELIGION in public schools, and convene a constitutional assembly to prepare a new document that better served the needs of the indigenous populace. His electoral victory and constant verbal assault on the United States and its capitalist system placed him in the same corner as VENEZUELA'S HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS and CUBA'S aging FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Since his inauguration, Morales has decreed a 50 percent increase in the minimum wage, nationalized the natural gas industry, and announced intentions to nationalize others but has backed off the pledges he made to improve EDUCATION.

Morales's emphasis on social policies that favored the indigenous and his use of executive prerogatives met

stiff resistance from state governors, particularly from the rich southern lowlands. Four departments—Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando—announced in December 2007 that they would seek more autonomy and self-government, a proposal declared unconstitutional by Bolivia's National Electoral Court. The autonomy movement received two severe setbacks. First, on August 10, 2008, Morales received 67 percent of the vote, affirming his rule and his programs. Second, a national referendum on January 26, 2009, approved a new constitution. The new document declares Bolivia a “unitary plurinational” and “secular” society, a clear reference to the indigenous population. The government was also granted the authority to limit private landholdings to 12,400 acres (5,000 ha). The increased government role in the economy will do little to assuage the concerns of the current economic elite.

See also BOLIVIA (Vols. I, II, III); COCA (Vols. I, II, III).

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Mora Valverde, Manuel (b. 1909–d. 1994) *labor and social activist and Costa Rican politician* Born into a working-class family, Manuel Mora Valverde experienced a childhood filled with the deprivations of COSTA RICA's lower socioeconomic groups, the most poignant being the death of two sisters because his family could not afford the necessary oxygen bags to sustain them. As a law student, he was exposed to some of his nation's most renowned intellectuals, such as Joaquín García Monge (b. 1881–d. 1958) and Carlos Luis Sáenz (b. 1899–d. 1983). Mora became a student activist on behalf of the poor and in 1929 became a leading organizer of the Workers and Peasants Bloc, a communist party that in 1943 changed its name to the People's Vanguard Party (PVP). Mora and his colleagues capitalized on the adverse impact of the Great Depression on LABOR to organize a union whose membership grew precipitously throughout the 1930s. Labor's influence became apparent in the 1940 presidential election and again in the 1942 congressional elections. The party reached its zenith during WORLD WAR II. Reportedly, Mora helped to author the 1943 labor code, and he supported the successful presidential candidacy of Teodoro Picado (b. 1900–d. 1960) in 1944 in return for Picado's promise to implement Mora's social program. Mora served two stints in the national congress, in 1934–48 and again in 1970–74.

Although Mora claimed that his social philosophy was based on Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, that called for social justice for the poor, political leaders from 1936 until 1974 charged Mora with being a communist and an agent of the Soviet Union. Following the

1948 civil war, JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER outlawed the party (see CIVIL WAR OF 1948, COSTA RICA). Nevertheless, many of the nation's leaders, particularly Figueres, presented social programs that closely paralleled that of Mora. U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica Nathaniel P. Davis noted the similarities during the 1948 civil war, prompting him to conclude that the Figueres-Mora feud was in the *personalismo* tradition of Costa Rican politics, a political conflict between individuals not political ideologies.

After leaving Congress in 1974, Mora remained a labor and social activist but garnered little political support as the National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Nacional, or PLN) had already implemented most of his proposals. He finally retired from politics in 1988. Just prior to his death on December 29, 1994, the Universidad de Costa Rica and the Universidad Estatal a Distancia presented him with honorary degrees and the national legislature bestowed on him the title Benemérito de la Patria (Hero of the Fatherland) for his contributions to Costa Rican society.

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Morínigo, Higinio (b. 1897–d. 1983) *president of Paraguay* Higinio Morínigo was born to middle-class parents in the town of Paraguari, some 40 miles (64.4 km) from Asunción, PARAGUAY. The family relocated to the capital city in 1906 and there, Morínigo Higinio entered the national MILITARY academy. He graduated from the school in 1922 as a second lieutenant. Thereafter, Morínigo rose steadily through the ranks. He served in the CHACO WAR (1932–35) with BOLIVIA, where he attained the rank of colonel and was placed in charge of the important garrison at Concepción. In 1938, Morínigo became the army's chief of staff; in 1939, interior minister; and in 1940, minister of war under President José Félix Estigarribia (b. 1888–d. 1940). When Estigarribia died in a plane crash on September 5, 1940, the army's high command recommended Morínigo complete the former's presidential term. Unopposed, Morínigo won the February 15, 1943, elections and remained in the presidential office until deposed by a coup d'état on June 3, 1948.

Despite declaring his country officially neutral and being courted by the United States, Morínigo sympathized with the Nazi cause during WORLD WAR II and permitted its agents to pass along information to their colleagues in ARGENTINA (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN

AMERICA). Only with an Allied victory in sight in February 1945 did Morínigo declare war on the Axis.

Following the war, Morínigo attempted to force out right-wing members of his administration and create a coalition government that included members of the Colorado Party and the Febrerista Revolutionary Party. Rather than pacify the country, Morínigo's conciliation effort led to bloody civil war. Morínigo defeated the rebels but only with the help of Colorado militias and troops brought in from Argentina. No longer an effective ruler, Morínigo resigned on June 3, 1948, and departed Paraguay for self-exile in Argentina.

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MRTA See TÚPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

Muñoz Marín, Luis (b. 1898–d. 1980) *writer and governor of Puerto Rico* Luis Muñoz Marín abandoned his career as a journalist and poet to enter Puerto Rican politics in 1938. He served as a four-term elected governor of the island. His achievements earned him the U.S. Medal of Freedom in 1962 and the title “Father of Modern Puerto Rico.”

The son of a newspaper publisher and resident commissioner of PUERTO RICO to the U.S. Congress, Luis Muñoz Rivera (b. 1858–d. 1916), and Amalia Marín Castilla, Muñoz Marín spent his early years traveling between Puerto Rico and the United States. Owing to his father's illness and subsequent death, Muñoz Marín was unable to complete his law studies at Georgetown University. He returned to Puerto Rico in 1916 and in 1919 married American feminist writer Muna Lee, with whom he had two children. The marriage ended in divorce in 1946, after which Muñoz Marín married his longtime mistress, Inés Mendoza.

Muñoz Marín entered Puerto Rican politics when he joined the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) in 1920. He advocated on behalf of LABOR for better wages and working conditions and greater job opportunities. Muñoz Marín also called for Puerto Rican independence from the United States. He left the Socialist Party for the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) in 1932 but remained an advocate for labor, particularly rural labor. Along with Liberal Party founder Antonio R. Barceló (b. 1868–d.

1938), Muñoz Marín was elected to the Puerto Rican Senate for the 1933–37 term. He changed POLITICAL PARTIES again in 1938 when he joined the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático), under whose banner he won a Senate seat in the 1940 and 1944 elections.

Muñoz Marín shared many of the reform ideas held by Rexford G. Tugwell (b. 1891–d. 1979), who became governor of Puerto Rico in 1942. As a result, basic reforms in land tenancy, natural resources, TRANSPORTATION, and EDUCATION were enacted. New accounting systems and oversight helped curb government corruption. The World War II era also stirred the beginnings of Puerto Rico's industrial development. These accomplishments contributed to Muñoz Marín's change of heart about independence; he now believed that Puerto Rico's future held greater promise if it secured U.S. assistance rather than attempt to go it alone. He recognized that the island lacked sufficient resources, and its people, the political experience for complete independence.

Muñoz Marín's legislative accomplishments contributed to his victory as the first elected governor of Puerto Rico in 1948. His first objective—to provide for greater Puerto Rican self-government—was accomplished in 1952 with a Puerto Rican constitution and the island becoming an associated free state, or commonwealth, of the United States. Under this arrangement, the islanders retained their U.S. citizenship and tax-exempt status. It also lifted the stigma of colonial status for the Puerto Rican people.

The roots of OPERATION BOOTSTRAP, which led to Puerto Rico's industrialization, can be found in the World War II era, when the Puerto Rican Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) was established to attract foreign INDUSTRY, the U.S. government invested in textile manufacturing, military installations were constructed across the island, and educational opportunities for Puerto Ricans were improved. The heyday of industrialization came in the 1950s and 1960s when U.S. and Puerto Rican tax incentives, grants, and cheaper labor costs brought U.S. companies to the island in the textile, pharmaceutical, and electronics industries and subsequently in heavy industry, such as oil refining and petrochemicals. For his efforts regarding Puerto Rico's relations with the United States, the island's industrialization, and his emphasis on the island's ARTS and culture, Puerto Ricans came to call Muñoz Marín the “Father of Modern Puerto Rico.”

Muñoz Marín decided not to seek another term as governor in 1964, preferring to turn over the office to his hand-chosen successor, Secretary of State Roberto Sánchez Vilella (b. 1913–d. 1997). Muñoz Marín continued to serve in the Senate until 1970, at which time he retired to private life. Owing to complications from heart disease, Muñoz Marín died at age 92 on April 30, 1980.

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muralists, Mexican Mexico's muralist movement emerged during the 1920s when Education Minister José Vasconcelos (b. 1882–d. 1959) commissioned some of the country's foremost artists to paint national history on public buildings. Diego Rivera (b. 1886–d. 1957), David Alfaro Siqueiros (b. 1896–d. 1974), and José Clemente Orozco (b. 1883–d. 1949) transformed the MEXICAN REVOLUTION into an artistic message; they became known as “*Los Tres Grandes*,” or the “Big Three,” of the muralist movement. Together, they defined Mexican ART for several decades and ensured that a specific version of national identity was proliferated in public spaces.

President ÁLVARO OBREGÓN appointed Vasconcelos education minister in 1922 and charged him with overseeing the dissemination of the government's revolutionary message throughout MEXICO. The work of a rising group of artists caught his eye. Rivera, Siqueiros, and Orozco had been trained during the violent phase of the Mexican Revolution and experimented with a variety of new painting techniques as an expression of revolutionary solidarity. They incorporated images of NATIVE AMERICANS and the working classes into their constructions of national identity, and their artistic style became part of a larger celebration of native cultures known as *indigenismo*.

Vasconcelos commissioned grand murals to be painted on the walls of government buildings in the early 1920s. Rivera became one of the most famous of the muralists. He completed projects at the National Preparatory School, the offices of the Ministry of Education, and the Agricultural School at Chapingo. Many of his murals depict indigenous people being exploited by powerful politicians and capitalists. His idealized portrayals of the peasantry reflect sympathy for their plight and clearly define revolutionary ideals. Rivera's work became internationally renowned, and he was commissioned for work in the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1929, Rivera married Frida Kahlo (b. 1907–d. 1954), a young artist and admirer who became a globally recognized artist in her own right. Rivera completed his most famous mural between 1934 and 1945 on the walls of the National Palace in MEXICO CITY. That work depicts the nation's history from pre-Columbian times through the Mexican Revolution.

Orozco and Siqueiros also painted public murals to express their revolutionary ideologies. The works

of Siqueiros and Rivera are featured on the sides of buildings on the campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, or UNAM). Orozco, who started his career as a cartoonist, is famous for his works in Guadalajara. Many of his murals are outwardly violent and grotesque, as he aimed to show the realities of the revolution and of life more generally.

Many of Mexico's famous muralists were heavily involved with communist politics. Rivera and Kahlo were well-known supporters of the Communist Party and helped secure asylum in Mexico for the exiled Soviet leader Leon Trotsky in 1937. Siqueiros was a self-proclaimed communist and was eventually arrested for his political activities in the 1960s. Orozco never claimed a close affiliation with communism, although many of his works were criticized as leftist propaganda.

Throughout the 20th century, the works of Mexico's muralists have been perceived as a nationalist project and an important component in the evolution of national identity.

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Musa, Said (b. 1944–) *prime minister of Belize* Born on March 19, 1944, in San Ignacio, British Honduras (later BELIZE), to Hamid and Aurora Musa, Said Musa is of Palestinian and Lebanese ancestry. He attended St. Andrew's Primary School in San Ignacio and high school at St. Michael's College in Belize City. Musa earned a doctorate in law at the University of Manchester in 1966. Musa returned to Belize in 1967 and went into private practice. He joined the People's United Party (PUP) in 1974 and was elected to the first Belizean National Assembly in 1979, where he served on the committee that wrote the Belizean constitution.

Musa was attorney general and minister of economic development during GEORGE PRICE's first term as prime minister (1981–84). During Price's second term (1989–93), Musa was minister of foreign affairs and education. He orchestrated negotiations with GUATEMALA that resulted in that country's recognition of Belize in 1991. When Price retired in 1996, Musa took over leadership of the PUP. He led the PUP to victory in the 1998 and 2003 parliamentary elections. During his tenure, Musa fostered significant economic growth, especially in the tourism INDUSTRY. His popularity suffered during his second term due to allegations of corruption. In 2008, he stepped down as party leader. On June 9, 2009, Belize's

chief justice, Abdullai Conteh, declared that because of insufficient evidence against Musa, he could not stand trial on corruption charges, a ruling that the director of public prosecution, Cheryl Lynn Branker-Taitt, promised to appeal. Musa's son Yasser (b. 1970–) heads the National Institute of Culture and History and serves as director of public relations for the PUP.

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music Latin America's Spanish colonizers attempted to repress the indigenous music of the time and replace it with their own religious themes and tempos, which eventually led to a proliferation of church choirs supported by the organ. During the 1600s, church music flourished in the Spanish New World, while in the mid-1700s, public theaters in many cities held performances of Spanish musicals. In the 19th century, the Italian opera made its way to Latin America and contributed to the development of a new genre that surfaced at the turn of the century: nationalism. A purely Latin American folk music took root until the next significant change in music occurred during the 1950s. Beginning with the rock and roll revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, Latin American music borrowed heavily from these genres.

In addition to borrowing from abroad, Latin America has produced musical styles that have had a lasting local and international influence. Indigenous folk music and instruments, such as the traditional Andean flute, or *quena*, remain popular, particularly in BOLIVIA and PERU, and performances are well received throughout the Southern Cone nations. MEXICO, the largest Spanish-speaking nation in the Western Hemisphere, has a long history of mixing Indian folk and Spanish music, as, for example, in the internationally renowned Ballet Folklórico de México. The so-called northern music, or *música norteña*, of borderland Mexico utilizes the accordion to play waltzes and polkas borrowed from the United States. Mexican influence is also found in Central American music, although Guatemala's national instrument, the marimba, which is most likely of African descent, sets its music apart. Cuban music probably has had the most influence internationally, particularly in the United States. Music from Cuba, the capital of cross-cultural relationships dating to colonial times, has a heavy African influence that first gained notoriety from 1880 to 1920. Thereafter, a steady stream of Cuban artists, such as Xavier Cugat (b. 1900–d. 1990), made their way to the United States and beyond.

South American artists also contributed to the international scene. The tango became a dance phenomenon across the globe during the 1930s, as did its

songs sung by Carlos Gardel (b. 1887–d. 1935) that described the plight of immigrant urban workers in ARGENTINA. Venezuelan Edmundo Ros (b. 1910–) was a bandleader of that era who gained fame and fortune in the United States and Great Britain. BRAZIL produced its own form of the tango in the late 19th century, but it was the samba, a nationalistic music-dance form developed in the early 20th century, which has had the most staying power. Artist Ary Barboso's (b. 1903–d. 1968) 1939 hit "Aquarela do Brasil" also became a hit in the United States on several occasions, under the title "Brazil." The samba derivative influenced by U.S. jazz, the bossa nova, received worldwide fame in the early 1960s, but of more long-lasting influence was Astrud Gilberto's (b. 1940–) "The Girl from Ipanema." Songs and music movements out of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and PUERTO RICO have also received international recognition. Music cross-fertilization is strong among many Latin American countries, such as Argentina and CHILE, and ECUADOR and Peru.

The Cuban Revolution produced *nueva canciones*, which reflect socially progressive themes and commentary influenced by the troubador tradition and singer-songwriter confessionalism. It ranges in presentation from individual acts such as those of Cuban Silvio Rodríguez (b. 1946–) to folk-style groups such as Inti Illimani from Chile.

Beyond Cuba, Caribbean music is a diverse grouping of musical genres. They are each syntheses of African, European, Indian, and native influences. Some of the styles to gain wide popularity outside the Caribbean include salsa, reggae, bomba, plena, and merengue.

In the 1960s and 1970s, New York City's Latino melting pot became home to the modern salsa and the merengue that blends rock, jazz, and Latin American and Puerto Rican musical traditions. Salsa soon gained wide acceptance in Europe. Reggae no longer is a Jamaican genre. Jamaican music and dancehall styles helped to create the Puerto Rican bomba and plena as well as hip-hop and rap in the United States and, more recently, in Latin America. The merengue was created by Níco Lora, a Dominican of Spanish descent, in the 1920s. In the Dominican Republic, it was promoted by Rafael Trujillo, the dictator from the 1930s through the early 1960s, and became the country's national music and dance style. Merengue's most popular song at the time, "Compadre Pedro Juan," by Luis Alberti, became an international hit. Angel Vilorio and his band, Conjunto Típico Cibaeño, made the merengue popular in the United States. Other Caribbean music that gained international notoriety includes the Trinidadian calypso and Antiguan soca. Visitors to Trinidad and Tobago are usually greeted at the pier or airport by a steel band. This band of musicians is dominated by a group of steel drummers, an instrument forged from a 55-gallon oilcan, hence the name steel drum. Its origins



A steel band, common throughout the Caribbean region, performs for tourists at the port in Bridgetown, Barbados. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

are traced to Trinidad and Tobago's early 19th-century Carnival percussion groups.

A unique cross-cultural form is Tejano music, a blend of country, rock, and rhythm and blues, born in southern Texas and made famous by latina singer Selena Quintanilla-Pérez (b. 1971–d. 1995), is performed in both Spanish and English, particularly in the United States and Mexico.

Other styles of popular music with a distinctively Latin style include Latin jazz, Argentine and Chilean

rock, and Cuban and Mexican hip-hop. Each is based upon the respective styles from the United States.

See also MUSIC (Vols. I, II, III).

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NAFTA See NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT.

National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional–Tupamaros; MLN-T) The National Liberation Movement (MLN-T), often called the Tupamaros, was a major Uruguayan guerrilla group between 1967 and 1972. It was one of several urban guerrilla groups that also afflicted ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and VENEZUELA during the same period. In the urban setting, guerrilla warfare was often indistinguishable from acts of terrorism. In most cases, including those in Latin America, urban guerrilla warfare failed and created or led to the further entrenchment of existing MILITARY dictatorships.

Founded in 1962 by a group of dissident Socialist Party members, the Tupamaros took their name from the 18th-century indigenous leader Túpac Amaru II. Its first leader and spokesman, Raúl Sendic (b. 1926–d. 1989), a law student and organizer of sugarcane workers, founded the group, which never presented a coherent philosophy. The MLN-T’s writings appeared to be nationalist, Marxist, and revolutionary. Rather than taking control of government itself, the MLN-T hoped to incite mass action against URUGUAY’S stagnant political structure.

Influenced by the Cuban model, the MLN-T initially did not directly challenge the government or its military, instead organizing itself into clandestine cells to steal food and other provisions from the rural elite for distribution to the urban poor and to kidnap prominent persons for ransom to fund their operations. In 1967, amid a string of well-publicized robberies and kidnappings, the MLN-T issued a letter through vari-

ous newspapers asserting that its goal was to awaken the public conscience and to change Uruguay’s political and economic structures. In response, President Jorge Pacheco (b. 1920–d. 1998) instituted a ruthless suppression program that from 1967 to 1972, escalated into the capture, torture, and killing of prominent individuals by both government forces and the MLN-T.

On August 10, 1970, the Tupamaros assassinated U.S. Agency for International Development public safety officer Dan Mitrione in retaliation for the U.S. training of the Uruguayan military in torture techniques. On January 8, 1971, they kidnapped and held captive for eight months British ambassador Geoffrey Jackson as leverage to ensure the fair participation of the left-leaning Frente Amplio (Broad Front) candidates, in the November 1971 elections. When more than 100 MLN-T members escaped from Punta Carretas prison on September 9, 1971, President Pacheco put the army in charge of all antiguerrilla activity. Newly elected president Juan María Bordaberry (b. 1928–) went further on April 14, 1972. He declared a “state of internal war,” suspended all civil liberties, and adopted a State Security Law that empowered the military to suppress the MLN-T, which it did by the year’s end. Those MLN-T members who survived the military suppression, which included death squads, went into exile. Until 1985, the military continued to administer the country through a junta established on June 27, 1973.

When democracy was restored in Uruguay in 1985, the MLN-T transitioned into a legal political party. It joined with other leftist forces to found the People’s Participation Movement (Movimiento de Participación Popular, or MPP) in 1989. In 1995, José Mujica (b. 1935–), a founding member of the MLN-T, was

elected to Congress. Subsequently, the MPP joined Frente Amplio's broader-based coalition of leftist political groups headed by former mayor of Montevideo and the current president of Uruguay Tabaré Vázquez (b. 1940–). The 2004 elections that brought Vázquez to the presidency also brought two old-time MLN-T members to Congress: Mujica and Nora Castro (b. 1947–).

See also TUPAC AMARU II (Vol. II).

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National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario; MNR) The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) is considered by many analysts to be the most important political party in BOLIVIA's 20th-century historical experience. Among its founders in 1941 were future presidents VICTOR PAZ ESTENSSORO (b. 1907–d. 2001) and Hernán Siles Zuazo (b. 1914–d. 1996). Since its beginnings as a leftist reform party, it appealed to the needs of the tin miners, Bolivia's largest LABOR sector. Over time, however, it drifted to the political right, and in the 1980s, the MNR leadership accepted the principles of neoliberalism. The MNR first came to political prominence in 1943 when it supported the regime of General Gualberto Villarroel (b. 1908–d. 1946) because of his reformist tendencies. Following his inauguration as president on April 15, 1952, Paz Estenssoro launched a social revolution based on the MNR's fascist principles, including the establishment in 1952 of a corporate state. The Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL) became the state agency that administered the nationalized tin mines and the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) became a semiautonomous umbrella for the labor unions. The government also implemented a land reform program, and universal suffrage was introduced.

Personal conflicts at the center of intraparty squabbles caused the MNR to split into several factions and led to the departure of JUAN LECHÍN OGUENDO and Siles to establish their own political parties: the National Revolutionary Movement of the Left (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda, or MNRI) and Revolutionary Party of the National Left (Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacional, or PRIN), respectively. In time, Siles's MNRI replaced Paz Estenssoro's MNR as labor's most effective political voice. When Paz Estenssoro assumed the presidency for

the fourth and last time in 1985, he had accepted the principles of neoliberalism.

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (b. 1939–) succeeded Paz Estenssoro as party leader and continued neoliberal economic policies during his 1993–97 presidential term. Thereafter, the party's percentage of the popular vote steadily declined. In the December 18, 2005, elections, its presidential candidate Michiaki Nagatani Morishita (b. 1960–) garnered only 6.5 of the popular vote, seven of 127 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and one of 27 seats in the Senate. In the 2005 election, Bolivia's electorate moved further to the left with the election of JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA as president.

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Native Americans The Native Americans are the indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere whose ancestors, most scholars believe, entered the Americas from Asia by way of the Bering Strait during the glacial period, which ended some 11,000 years ago. Because precise figures are lacking, the number of Native Americans in the Spanish New World during the colonial period is unknown. After a century of colonization, the best studies point to a 95 percent drop in the indigenous population in MEXICO, to 1.5 million in 1605, and a 50 percent drop in PERU to approximately 600,000 by 1620. Scholars attribute the sharp declines mainly to disease: The Europeans brought smallpox, measles, influenza, and various venereal diseases, among other illnesses, to the New World. The number of Latin American indigenous during the colonial period is blurred by the emergence of the mestizo, the offspring of a white and an Amerindian, and in BRAZIL, in particular, by the *mulacco*, or *zambo*, the offspring of an Amerindian and a black, and their descendants. In 1830, approximately 28 percent of independent Spanish America's population was of mixed blood, as was almost 18 percent of Brazil's population.

In the 150 years that followed Latin America's independence, the Native American population slowly recovered in size so that in the early 21st century, Native Americans account for approximately 11 percent of the region's total population, while mestizos account for nearly 15 percent. Because of discriminatory census policies, an accurate count of *mulaccos* is difficult to ascertain. Native Americans are spread across 15 Latin American countries but make up the majority only in BOLIVIA, where they account for 55 percent of the population. They are significant minority groups in other countries: GUATEMALA, 40 percent of the population; Peru, 37 percent; ECUADOR, 25 percent; and Mexico, 12



An 18-year-old Schmer Indian mother with her 18-month-old daughter in Ecuador (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

percent. The mestizo population is a majority in most countries: PARAGUAY, 95 percent; HONDURAS and EL SALVADOR, 90 percent; Mexico, 75 percent; PANAMA, 70 percent; NICARAGUA, 69 percent; Ecuador, 65 percent; and COLOMBIA, 58 percent. The most rural of the indigenous groups have done much to maintain their traditional culture, as publically expressed in their language, dress, RELIGION, and civil authority. Throughout the 20th century, indigenous groups have been largely neglected by their governments, as seen in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In Paraguay, government indifference toward Amerindians has resulted in the near obliteration of the Aché hunters and gatherers, while the devastation wrecked on the Brazilian Amazon has pushed Amazonia Indians deeper into the jungle's uncharted lands.

The plight of Native Americans contributed to the United Nations declaring in December 1994 the years 1995–2005 the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People. During that period, Latin America's indigenous exercised extensive political influence, which raised international awareness of their plight. Mexico saw the Zapatista uprising in 1994, and Ecuador's indigenous

took to the streets on several occasions to protest for socioeconomic and constitutional changes that would improve their quality of life and give them civil guarantees (see EZLN). Similar demonstrations in Bolivia resulted in the collapse of the Sánchez-Lozada government on October 17, 2003. The three-decade-old civil war in Guatemala was brought to an end on September 17, 1996, and the peace accords included an agreement on the identity and rights of indigenous peoples. With Latin America's transition to more democratic governments in the 1990s, indigenous groups became more politically active. Their voting strength vaulted Alejandro Toledo (b. 1946–) and JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA to the Peruvian and Bolivian presidencies, respectively.

Nevertheless, despite programs during the 1990s aimed at improving EDUCATION and health care among indigenous peoples, Amerindians remain behind other social sectors in educational achievement as measured by standardized testing and as health care recipients. Employment levels vary from country to country, but none present a marked improvement for indigenous workers or an increase in skilled laborers. The obstacles make it unlikely that the Latin American countries will achieve the United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 1990 poverty rate by 2015.

See also DISEASE (Vol. I); NATIVE AMERICANS (Vols. I, II, III).

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Nicaragua Nicaragua is the largest country in CENTRAL AMERICA and also its most sparsely populated. Sixty-nine percent of its 5.48 million people are mestizo. The volcanic central highlands are home to the majority of the population and are flanked by the narrow Pacific coastal plain and the more tropical and remote Caribbean coast. Service industries in commerce, construction, government, banking, TRANSPORTATION, and energy provide 58 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), while AGRICULTURE and INDUSTRY provide 22 percent and 21 percent, respectively. Nicaragua endures a wide disparity in the distribution of wealth and is the second poorest nation in Central America, after HONDURAS.

Following its discovery by Francisco Hernández de Córdoba in 1524, Nicaragua remained an outpost of Spain's New World empire. Following independence in 1821, Nicaragua joined the United Provinces of Central America, and after its collapse in 1839, a Liberal-Conservative struggle characterized the country's politics until 1893, when Liberal JOSÉ SANTOS ZELAYA became

president. Zelaya's Liberal policies opened Nicaragua to foreign investment, largely North American; encouraged coffee and banana production; and led to the construction of schools and improved infrastructure, in particular roads and port facilities. With time's passage, Zelaya became increasingly dictatorial, which intensified Conservative and Liberal opposition against him. Zelaya's subsequent tax policies raised the ire of both foreign residents and foreign investors. Zelaya's maneuvering for dominance of Central American political affairs and, after the United States began its canal project at Panama, his search for a Japanese or German partnership to construct a transisthmian canal through Nicaragua, led to increased U.S. interest in Nicaraguan affairs.

YEARS OF U.S. PRESENCE, 1909–1934

In 1909, when Conservative and dissident Liberal forces joined to oust Zelaya in a coup d'état during which two U.S. mercenaries lost their lives at the hands of government troops, the United States intervened, which began 24 years of U.S. involvement in Nicaraguan political affairs. During that time, U.S. Marines supervised elec-

tions, protected U.S. properties, and trained a national guard, ostensibly to replace the army and to be apolitical. In a policy described as "dollar diplomacy," U.S. banks paid off Nicaragua's foreign loans, and marines supervised Nicaraguan customhouses to ensure repayment, with government-owned infrastructure and buildings used as collateral. The U.S. presence further fueled the Liberal-Conservative struggle for power.

In an effort to bring political calm, in 1927, U.S. secretary of war Henry L. Stimson was dispatched to Nicaragua to mediate a settlement among the competing factions. The resultant Treaty of Tipitapa, signed on May 4, 1927, provided for U.S. supervision of the 1928 presidential elections, which were won by Liberal José María Moncada (b. 1870–d. 1945).

AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO was among those opposed to the Treaty of Tipitapa, and for the next four years, he used the agreement as a rallying point for his supporters to oust the United States from Nicaragua. Sandino, the illegitimate son of a wealthy landowner and a mestizo servant, left home at an early age to travel in Central America and Mexico, an experience that nurtured his



Members of the Sandino guerrilla forces in Nicaragua, circa 1927 (*Records of the U.S. Marine Corps*)

anti-American nationalism and awakened his social consciousness. On his return to Nicaragua in 1923, Sandino supported the Liberal cause in national politics but viewed the 1927 Tipitapa agreement as a sellout to U.S. interests. He refused to disarm his ragtag army and for the next four years led a guerrilla war against U.S. Marines. He inflicted heavy damage on U.S. properties, particularly mining and lumber enclaves. The war became unpopular in the United States and contributed to President Herbert Hoover's withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Nicaragua on January 1, 1933, as well as the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, announced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during his inaugural address on March 2, 1933. Immediately after the U.S. Marines withdrew on January 1, 1933, Liberal Juan Batista Sacasa (b. 1874–d. 1936) moved into the presidential office, while Sandino and his followers relocated to a sanctuary along the Cocos River.

THE SOMOZA DYNASTY

Sacasa attempted to reach an agreement with Sandino. Following a meeting between them at the presidential palace on February 21, 1934, Sandino was assassinated by National Guard officers at the direction of its chief, ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA. Somoza, who assisted the United States in its battle against Sandino, sought power for himself. He constantly confronted Sacasa until the latter's resignation on June 6, 1936. Somoza won the December 8, 1936, election by a remarkable 107,201 to 108 margin and took office on January 1, 1937. This marked the beginning of 19 years of personal rule and of a family dynasty that lasted until July 19, 1979. During his tenure, Somoza and his National Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Nacional, or PLN) controlled the national legislature through rigged elections and intimidation of the opposition. Somoza appointed family members and close associates to government posts and to direct private-sector operations. The Somozas expanded their control of the ECONOMY during WORLD WAR II, and by the time of Somoza García's assassination in 1956, the family owned the national railroad, national bank, port facilities, construction facilities, and countless acres of agricultural land. Somoza and his sons were staunchly pro-United States, and Somoza García used every opportunity he could to show his alleged closeness to President Roosevelt. During World War II, Somoza openly supported the Allied cause and followed the U.S. lead in controlling German influence in the country but would not accept U.S. training of National Guard troops to meet civilian needs. After the war, he was stridently anticommunist. Opposition to Somoza surfaced at the end of World War II and intensified until 1956, when he again sought to manipulate the constitution in order to extend his presidency. On September 21, 1956, poet Rigoberto López (b. 1935–d. 1956) fatally shot Somoza García, whose National Guard security forces quickly shot López. López's motivation is not fully understood.

REVOLUTION AND CONTINUED TURMOIL

Eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle (b. 1922–d. 1967) assumed the presidency and won it outright in the 1963 elections. During his term in office, he restored the constitutional ban on reelection and lifted many controls on society, including press censorship. René Schick Gutiérrez (b. 1904–d. 1966) succeeded Luis in 1963, and when he died in office three years later, Vice President Lorenzo Guerrero Gutiérrez (b. 1900–d. 1981) followed. In the wings was ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE (b. 1925–d. 1980), who assumed directorship of the National Guard on his father's death in 1956. The younger Somoza continued to use the National Guard to suppress the regime's opposition. Somoza won the February 8, 1967, presidential elections, at least according to the official count. Long-standing elite and middle-sector opposition to the Somoza dynasty, coupled with U.S. pressure for political change, became so intense that Somoza stepped aside on May 1, 1972, in favor of a three-man ruling junta until the 1974 elections. Somoza, however, retained control of the National Guard.

Somoza's removal from the presidency opened the door to broad-based opposition. PEDRO JOAQUÍN CHAMORRO CARDENAL used his newspaper *La Prensa* to blame the Somoza dynasty for the nation's poverty, poor health and educational facilities, and inadequate housing. Catholic archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo (b. 1926–) published a series of pastoral letters critical of the Somoza dynasty. A lesser-known opposition group at the time was the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN), a small communist-leaning organization. These disparate factions slowly crystallized following the December 23, 1972, devastating earthquake that destroyed Managua and killed an estimated 16,000 people. Somoza's response set in motion an ever-increasing confrontation against him. The National Guard did not keep order following the tragedy, instead itself engaging in the looting. Somoza used reconstruction aid to restore the elite sections of Managua but not the poorer districts of the city. His construction companies benefited handsomely. By late 1978, Somoza's National Guard had lost control of the countryside and important rural cities and towns. Somoza became increasingly isolated yet failed to compromise with the opposition groups despite the mediation efforts pursued by the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) and U.S. president Jimmy Carter. Somoza was further weakened in February 1979 when Carter cut off all U.S. military assistance to him. The Nicaraguan government collapsed on July 19, 1979, and Somoza fled the country, first to the United States and then to PARAGUAY, where he was assassinated on September 17, 1980. As the Somoza regime collapsed, the FSLN took control of the Nicaraguan government.

While Carter appeared willing to work with the leftist FSLN, in 1981, incoming U.S. president Ronald Reagan did not. Reagan canceled the \$8 billion in reconstruction funds that Carter had promised, closed the U.S.

market to Nicaraguan exports, and engineered through the Central Intelligence Agency a clandestine war against the FSLN. The so-called Contra War eventually became public and ignited a national debate in the United States. Reagan and his supporters portrayed the war as a Soviet effort to extend its influence in Central America, while opponents viewed the FSLN victory as a culmination of the long struggle for social and economic injustice in Nicaragua. The U.S. Congress took the latter view and in 1986 terminated U.S. funding in support of the war. This prompted officials within the Reagan administration to make secret arrangements with foreign funding sources in an effort to sustain the contras. These illegal acts led to the eventual indictment of 19 individuals, including Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. President George H. W. Bush pardoned all of them.

During the 1980s, the Nicaraguan economy slowly collapsed, not solely because of Reagan's policies. The FSLN lacked experience in directing a national economy, which was evident in their mismanagement of the confiscated Somoza commercial properties. The FSLN antagonized cotton and tobacco producers by dictating production and controlling exports. Their failure to deliver on promises for housing, health, and educational improvements brought further discontent. The economic shortcomings, coupled with the postponement of elections, establishment of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and mass organizations meant only that the Nicaraguans traded one dictator for another.

The 1989 peace accords that ended the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS also paved the way for presidential elections on February 25, 1990, which resulted in the victory of the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora, or UNO) candidate VIOLETA BARRIOS DE CHAMORRO over FSLN leader DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA. Chamorro inherited a broken economy and demands for social justice, FSLN-led LABOR unions, and a national army led by FSLN general Humberto Ortega (b. 1951–). Over the next 17 years, peaceful and relatively fraud-free elections were held, followed by the peaceful transfer of presidential power. Each president confronted monumental postwar reconstruction problems, exacerbated by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, that included reconstruction of the national infrastructure, the procurement of international assistance to develop the economy, and the need to address massive social inequalities. The situation was exacerbated by the continued FSLN ownership of many of the Somoza and other properties that had been nationalized in the 1980s. Today, Nicaragua endures a nearly 50 percent combined unemployment and underemployment rate and a national debt that matches 82 percent of the GDP. The gross disparity of wealth further inhibits economic growth. The poorest 10 percent of the population receives only 1.2 percent of the gross national income (GNI), while the wealthiest 10 percent receive 45 percent of the GNI. When Daniel Ortega won the November 5, 2006, presidential elec-

tions with 38 percent of the vote, he did not receive a mandate to address these issues.

See also HERNÁNDEZ DE CÓRDOBA, FRANCISCO (Vol. I); NICARAGUA (Vols. I, II, III); UNITED PROVINCES OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Vol. III).

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Noriega Moreno, Manuel Antonio (b. 1934–) *de facto ruler of Panama* The illegitimate son of an accountant and his maid, Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno rose to be the *de facto* ruler of PANAMA. Adopted by a schoolteacher at the age of five, he attended the prestigious National Institute School in Panama City and then PERU'S MILITARY academy. Subsequently, he studied at the U.S. School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. In 1962, he was commissioned as a sublieutenant in Panama's National Guard; in October 1968, he supported the Guard's coup that ousted President ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID; and in 1969, he supported Colonel Omar Torrijos (b. 1929–d. 1981) in an attempted counter coup. As a reward for his services, Torrijos appointed Noriega chief of the National Guard's G-2 intelligence unit.

During the 1970s, Noriega directed the arrest and deportation of Panamanian businessmen opposed to Torrijos's dictatorial rule. During the same period, Noriega became involved in drug trafficking and also served as an "asset" for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in gathering information about CUBA. He proved to be a double agent. There is also some evidence that Noriega was linked to the plane crash that took Torrijos's life on July 31, 1981. Although he participated in the secret March 8, 1982, agreement among Guard officers to rotate the presidency among themselves in the 1980s, Noriega manipulated his own rise to power. He became the Guard's chief of staff in August 1983 and used that position to isolate the head of state, Colonel Rubén Darío Paredes (b. 1934–). By September 1983, clearly anyone seeking the presidency needed Noriega's approval. A month later, he had the National Legislature change the Guard's name to the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), which combined the Guard with the navy, air force, and police under his own leadership. In fraudulent elections

on May 6, 1984, Noriega placed Nicolás Andito Barletta (b. 1938–) in the presidency but forced him from office on October 11, 1984, over concern that Barletta would direct an honest investigation into the brutal killing of Noriega's civilian opponent Hugo Spadafora (b. 1940–d. 1985), which Noriega allegedly ordered.

Also in the 1980s, Noriega became a useful U.S. agent in supplying the Nicaraguan Contras, but at the same time he supplied the Nicaraguan Sandinista leader with U.S. intelligence information and the Salvadoran rebels with arms from Cuba (see *CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS*). By 1986, Noriega had expanded the PDF from 4,000 to 15,000 men, created two new combat battalions, and brought selected PDF officers into the government's policy-making bodies. Opposition to Noriega began to crystallize by the mid-1980s. While in June 1986, U.S. journalist Seymour Hersh revealed Noriega's involvement in activities including money laundering, *DRUGS* and arms trafficking, and working as a double agent, the elite and middle sectors challenged his regime's political repression and violation of *HUMAN RIGHTS*. PDF officers outside of Noriega's inner circle also decried his dictatorial rule and illegal activities. When the U.S. Congress curtailed its support for the wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Noriega no longer served U.S. interests. In an effort to depose Noriega, U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush cut economic and military assistance to the dictator. An August 1987 Gallup poll revealed that 75 percent of the people residing in Panama City and Colón wanted Noriega to resign, but he refused to go. Instead, he used the specially trained forces known as the "Dobermans" to brutalize those who came out in protest. He organized marginalized blacks and mestizos into the Coalition of Popular Organizations to hold counterdemonstrations, during which they placed responsibility for the country's plight on the United States and the Panamanian elite. While Noriega could count on support only from his inner circle of officers, the Panamanian people awaited the May 1989 elections.

In those elections, the eight-party progovernment Coalition for National Liberation (*Coalición para Liberación Nacional*, or *COLINA*) nominated Carlos Duque (b. 1938–) for president, and the Civil Opposition Democratic Alliance (*Alianza Democrática de Oposición Civil*, or *ADOC*) put forward Guillermo Endara (b. 1936–), an ally of former president Arias. Noriega became the centerpiece of a campaign plagued with violence, with Duque promising to keep Noriega on as PDF leader and Endara promising to fire him. The May 7 election was one of Latin America's most widely supervised. The *CATHOLIC CHURCH*'s exit polls reported that Endara held a three-to-one victory margin, but the Electoral Tribunal announced on May 8 that preliminary results indicated that Duque was ahead by six percentage points. Public outrage followed the board's May 10 declaration that Duque had won the election by a two-to-one margin. In the violence that followed, Endara and

his running mate, Guillermo "Billy" Ford (b. 1937–), were brutally beaten by Noriega's Dignity Battalions (paramilitary forces employed by Noriega to suppress his opponents), an event witnessed by millions on international television. In response, Noriega voided the elections, and the *ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES* subsequently failed to mediate a solution to the crisis. Finally, on August 31, 1989, Noriega named a former high school classmate, Francisco Rodríguez (b. 1938–), as provisional president with a promise to consider holding new elections six months hence.

As events unfolded in Panama, in Washington, D.C., President Bush planned a U.S. response. He now ordered the dispatch of a brigade-size force (about 3,000 men) to the Panama Canal Zone to augment troops already there and quietly instructed the Pentagon to design a plan of action within Panama. The aim of apprehending Noriega in Panama for trial in the United States was reinforced on June 21, 1989, when the Justice Department granted the U.S. president legal authority to order the abduction of a fugitive residing in a foreign country for violation of U.S. law. The first opportunity to seize Noriega came on October 1, 1989, when a group of dissident PDF officers, with U.S. encouragement, attempted a coup d'état. The Pentagon was not prepared to intervene, however, and the coup failed. Henceforth Noriega increasingly taunted President Bush, and PDF forces harassed U.S. troops on the canal zone's border, as well as U.S. citizens in Panama. At the same time, U.S. forces increased their readiness to enter Panama.

The breaking point came on December 16, 1989, when U.S. Marine lieutenant Robert Paz was fatally shot by PDF forces in Panama City and also in December, when U.S. Navy lieutenant Adam J. Curtis and his wife were detained by the PDF. The lieutenant was beaten and his wife sexually harassed. On December 17, President Bush ordered the implementation of Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama and Noriega's apprehension. U.S. troops landed in the canal zone on December 19, 1989, and entered Panama the following day. Although the worst of the fighting was over within 18 hours, the conflict lasted nearly a week because Noriega's Dignity Battalions refused to surrender. Noriega took refuge in the Panama City residence of the Papal Nuncio and finally surrendered to U.S. authorities on January 4, 1990. Endara, the reported victor in the 1989 elections, became president.

The U.S. Defense Department put the cost of the invasion at \$163 million, with 23 military and three civilian deaths and another 323 military personnel wounded. It also reported 314 Panamanian military deaths and 124 wounded, and subsequent investigations by human rights groups estimated that some 2,500 Panamanians lost their lives. Property damage was in the millions, with businesses and residences burned and looted. Hardest hit was El Chorillo section of Panama City, closest to the PDF's headquarters and home to the poorest Panamanians.

Noriega languished in a Miami jail until his trial began in September 1991. He was found guilty of drug trafficking on April 10, 1992, and on July 10 the same year was sentenced to 40 years in prison. At his sentencing, a defiant Noriega charged President Bush with illegally invading Panama and warned that the Panama Canal would not exist by January 1, 2000, the day Panama was scheduled to take control of the waterway. After serving 15 years in a Miami federal facility, Noriega was scheduled for parole on September 7, 2007. Noriega, who wishes to return to Panama, remains incarcerated while his lawyers fight a French extradition request to put him on trial for drug-trafficking charges.

See also ARIAS MADRID, ARNULFO (Vol. IV); PANAMA CANAL, CONSTRUCTION OF (Vol. IV); PANAMA CANAL TREATIES (Vol. IV).

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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1992) Signed on December 17, 1992, and ratified by the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. legislatures in 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect on January 1, 1994. At the time, NAFTA was the world's largest free TRADE ZONE, encompassing nearly 360 million people and a three-nation total gross national product (GNP) of \$6.5 trillion. Although modeled after the 1968 U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA's immediate origins can be traced to the Mexican financial crisis of the early 1980s. Successive presidents Miguel de la Madrid (b. 1934–) and CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI attempted to liberalize the Mexican ECONOMY by removing trade and investment restrictions put in place after the MEXICAN REVOLUTION from 1911 to 1917. Although Salinas de Gortari drastically reduced MEXICO's tariff barriers, loosened its investment laws, and sold off government-owned industries (except oil) during his administration from 1988 to 1994, the quality of life for the Mexican people did not appreciably improve. Hence, it was considered that the removal of all barriers would lead to further economic development. Although U.S. president George H. W. Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney



U.S. researchers arrive at the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, to discuss NAFTA's impact on the country's assembly industries. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

shared Salinas's vision for Mexico, each focused on their own national interests. For his part, Bush fretted over the potential effect that a Mexican economic downturn would have on the United States. Mulroney understood the need to protect Canada's access to the U.S. market and hoped Canada would benefit from free trade with Mexico.

The agreement provided for the elimination of tariffs on 9,000 categories of goods by 2009. Only goods produced in North America would be allowed to move freely across the three borders. Goods not containing North American content must be substantially transformed within the borders of one of the signatory partners to qualify for duty-free entry to another. The nationality of a manufacturing company does not matter. At the time, this meant that Japanese cars produced in Mexico could be shipped to the United States duty free. NAFTA also permits banking, telecommunications, information technology, and services ranging from insurance to trucking to conduct cross-border operations without discrimination. Provisions for the protection of intellectual property are included within the agreement. Bill Clinton's administration successfully negotiated two-side agreements on environmental and working conditions and wages in order to gain U.S. congressional passage of the NAFTA agreement.

NAFTA's accomplishments are a matter of conjecture and have become an emotional issue in the United States and Mexico. In the United States, NAFTA and Mexico receive blame for the outsourcing of U.S. jobs, but in the era of globalization the exact number of displaced workers due to NAFTA is hard to ascertain. Special sectors have been hard hit, among them growers of tomatoes and other table vegetables in south Florida,

who have lost U.S. market share to Mexican producers. In 2007, the U.S. trucking industry claimed that its survival was threatened by the admission of Mexican trucks into the United States, as they will carry goods more cheaply and avoid taxes for the maintenance of the highways they use.


The Mexicans also have their complaints. Small grain growers have lost out to the more efficient and larger U.S. and Canadian agro-industries. There have been significant population shifts from southern and central Mexico as workers seek employment in the assembly plants (MAQUILADORAS) along the U.S.-Mexican border. In the era of globalization, Mexico has also suffered from the relocation of assembly industries to the cheaper labor markets in Southeast Asia and China.

And while U.S. investment in Mexico has increased, its contribution to job growth has not kept pace with the growth of the Mexican LABOR market. The United States remains a safety valve for Mexico's poor and unemployed and contributes to the controversy in the United States over its immigration policies (see IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES).

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Obregón, Álvaro (b. 1880–d. 1928) *revolutionary leader and president of Mexico* Álvaro Obregón was one of the principal leaders of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION; he became president of MEXICO in 1920. He was known as an adroit MILITARY commander, and as a politician, he gained the support of workers and peasants. He was the first president to implement any meaningful social reform after the revolution.

Obregón was born on February 19, 1880, on an hacienda in the state of Sonora. He witnessed the outbreak of revolution in 1910 but refrained from joining the movement until after the assassination of FRANCISCO MADERO in 1913. At that time, he joined the Constitutionalist Army of VENUSTIANO CARRANZA and helped overthrow the dictator VICTORIANO HUERTA. Obregón remained loyal to Carranza as the country descended into civil war in 1914 and Carranza split with fellow revolutionaries FRANCISCO VILLA and EMILIANO ZAPATA. Obregón supported Carranza's conservative stance at the CONVENTION OF AGUASCALIENTES and in the deliberations for drafting the CONSTITUTION OF 1917. Nevertheless, when Obregón announced his plans to run for president in 1920, Carranza supported another candidate. Obregón and his political allies ADOLFO DE LA HUERTA and PLUTARCO ELÍAS CALLES then led a revolt to overthrow Carranza, and Obregón won the presidency.

Obregón served as president during a time of rebuilding after the Mexican Revolution. Unlike Carranza, who had not instituted the reforms called for in the Constitution of 1917, Obregón began implementing modest reforms. He supported LABOR GROUPS IN MEXICO and devoted national resources to improving EDUCATION. Obregón ran for president in 1928 after sitting out one term. He won the election but before he could take

office was assassinated by a supporter of the CRISTERO REBELLION on July 17, 1928.

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OECS See ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES.

Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA)

The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) was established by presidential executive order on July 30, 1941, to coordinate the cultural and commercial relations of the Western Hemisphere during World War II. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Nelson R. Rockefeller (b. 1908–d. 1979) as coordinator of the office, a position that reported directly to the president. The executive order directed Rockefeller to work with the State Department in planning and implementing various policies and programs in public relations, the ARTS, EDUCATION, cinema, and commercial activities that would advance the economies of the Western Hemispheric nations. From the start of its operations, the OCIAA found itself in a turf battle with the State Department, a situation intensified by Rockefeller's close relationship with Roosevelt.

Despite the interagency conflict, the OCIAA implemented several programs. Its public-relations programs, in reality, a pro-Allied propaganda campaign, included

editorial writing for Latin American newspapers, radio news programs that emphasized Allied successes, and an English-language program that emphasized anti-Nazi examples (see *WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA*). Walt Disney Films was enlisted to produce pro-Allied films geared for Latin American audiences. Educational exchanges for nurses and teachers were implemented. Local U.S. residents were formed into coordination committees to host U.S. art exhibits and visiting entertainers and to sponsor local athletic contests that often included participation by in-country U.S. military personnel. Medical clinics were established in urban centers, and traveling medical teams reached out to rural communities. The OCIAA also sponsored the development of nontraditional agricultural crops, such as abaca, rubber, and quinine in an effort to offset wartime economic losses. Measuring the effectiveness of the various programs proved elusive. The written and radio news propaganda programs reached the upper and middle sectors, while the cinema productions reached the urban and rural masses, but these groups did not communicate with one another. The economic programs did little to offset the wartime losses in the neediest countries, such as the Central American republics.

As the war neared its conclusion in late 1944 and into 1945, Rockefeller and several policy makers in Washington, D.C., advocated a continuation of the educational and technical help programs, particularly for the wider populace. The OCIAA's informational activities were transferred to the State Department by executive order on August 31, 1945, and the office itself was closed by a similar order on April 10, 1946.

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offshore banking Offshore banking is the cross-border exchange of funds and provision of services to nonresident individuals and corporate entities by banks in offshore financial centers (OFCs). These centers, often referred to as “tax havens,” are separated physically or by law from the major regulating units. The International Monetary Fund recognizes 16 offshore financial centers in the Caribbean region: Anguilla, Antigua, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, DOMINICA, GRENADA, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, PUERTO RICO, SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, and Turks and Caicos. In CENTRAL AMERICA, BELIZE, COSTA RICA, and PANAMA host such centers, as does URUGUAY in South America.

Offshore financial centers are jurisdictions that have large numbers of financial institutions engaged in business with nonresidents and typically have external assets and liabilities out of proportion to domestic financial indicators. For example, a 2002 report indicated some 13,000 persons worked in Panama's OFC and that these banks generated 11 percent of Panama's gross domestic product (GDP), with deposits of more than \$27 billion. In 2006, the Cayman Islands had 300 registered banks with \$500 billion in assets, but the Cayman's GDP was only \$2 billion.

Offshore banks are attractive to those wishing to protect assets, hide assets, or launder money gained from activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, or gambling. Offshore accounts benefit from a lack of local and home taxation and secrecy of accounts. In the early 21st century, the U.S. government assumed a more aggressive policy in pursuing persons and corporations with offshore accounts.

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Operation Bootstrap (Operación Manos a la Obra) To meet the widespread poverty and burgeoning population that characterized PUERTO RICO in the 1940s, government leaders designed a plan, popularly known as Operation Bootstrap (Operación Manos a la Obra), to industrialize the island's ECONOMY and reduce its dependence on the sugar industry. However, owing to wartime demands, the newly established (1942) government-owned Puerto Rican Development Company (PRIDCO) found few partners abroad. Puerto Rico's wartime industrial progress instead resulted from the needs of the U.S. MILITARY on the island, which led to the local manufacture of textiles, food processing, road construction, and the like. When the war came to an end in 1945 and PRIDCO lacked sufficient funding to pursue private capital on the island, the Puerto Rican government turned to a program of “industrialization by invitation.” The promise of low wages and rent subsidies, along with exemptions from local and federal taxes, made Puerto Rico an attractive place for subsidiaries of large U.S. corporations. These incentives were augmented in 1979 by Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, which permitted tax exemptions to the foreign subsidiary as well as on the profits repatriated to the U.S. parent company. By special legislation, the 42 manufacturing plants already established in Puerto Rico qualified for the program. In essence, goods manufactured in Puerto Rico had free access to the U.S. market.

Governor LUIS MUÑOZ MARÍN appointed University of Michigan-educated Teodoro Moscoso (b. 1910–d. 1992)

to direct Operation Bootstrap. According to some analysts, it is Moscoso, not Muñoz Marín, who deserves credit for the successes of Operation Bootstrap and for providing U.S. president John F. Kennedy with an ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS success story in the face of the popularity of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's CUBAN REVOLUTION in Latin America. Moscoso had no long-term strategy, simply the creation of well-paying jobs. The first wave of industries brought to Puerto Rico under Operation Bootstrap were labor intensive: Textiles, apparel, footwear, electronics, fishing tackle, and plastic goods made in Puerto Rico were shipped to the United States. In the 1960s, more capital-intensive industries arrived, including pharmaceuticals, oil-refining, petrochemicals, and high-tech industries. During the same period cutbacks in sugar production occurred because of LABOR lost to the industries and increased international competition. Today, sugar is of minimal importance to the Puerto Rican economy.

Initially, the new industries attracted unskilled rural labor, but the capital-intensive plants required more skilled labor. This change had several implications for Puerto Rico. At first, male laborers dominated the employment scene, but in the 1960s, the demand moved toward skilled workers, including WOMEN. By the mid-1960s, official unemployment figures showed an 11.7 percent unemployment rate, but it was much higher among males. And while emigration slowed to about 10,000 persons annually from a high of 61 percent in 1952, the number of returning Puerto Ricans is put at 200,000 annually. Because of an overall population increase during the same time period, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) reports that nearly 1 million Puerto Ricans are unemployed at the present time.

In the latter part of the 20th century, Puerto Rico faced economic challenges from outside its border. The 1983 CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE extended U.S. special trading privileges to other Caribbean nations, and the 1993 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT threatened the relocation of U.S. Caribbean-related industries to MEXICO. Finally, in 1996, the U.S. Congress repealed Section 936 of the tax code, thereby threatening Puerto Rico's competitive advantage. Thereafter, into the 21st century, Puerto Rican industries faced global competition. Operation Bootstrap collapsed, as did the mixed blessings it brought to the island.

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Operation Just Cause See NORIEGA MORENO, MANUEL ANTONIO; PANAMA.

Operation Power Pack (1965) Operation Power Pack was the code name for the U.S.-led MILITARY intervention of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC to protect U.S. hegemony after a group of civilian and military supporters of former Dominican president JUAN BOSCH launched a coup to restore the ex-president to power. Whereas the military intervention was initially a unilateral act on the part of the United States, within a few weeks the United States was able to obtain support from a majority of the members of the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS).

On April 24, 1965, a group of military officers led by Francisco Caamaño Deñó (b. 1932–d. 1973) staged a counter coup to return to power former Dominican president Juan Bosch, who had been overthrown in a military coup in 1963. Elements in the Dominican Republic supporting Bosch's return called themselves Constitutionalists. Those who continued to support the military-supported government of Donald Reid Cabral (b. 1923–d. 2006) called themselves Loyalists. While Bosch was still in exile in Puerto Rico, the Constitutionalists took control of the National Palace and immediately swore in Bosch's former vice president, José Molina Ureña, as the provisional president. Meanwhile, the Loyalists fortified their position in San Isidro, a military base located a few miles east of the capital. On April 28, the Loyalists formed a junta led by Colonel Pedro Benoit (b. 1921) to resist the Constitutionalists. As the death toll in the civil war mounted and it became increasingly apparent that Caamaño Deñó's Constitutionalists were taking control of the capital city of SANTO DOMINGO, U.S. ambassador W. Tapley Bennett and Colonel Benoit met at the U.S. embassy on April 24 to discuss the situation. Bennett informed the Lyndon B. Johnson administration that a communist takeover was eminent.

On April 28, 1965, President Johnson sent 1,700 U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic ostensibly simply to assist in the evacuation of American citizens. Within a month, the United States had deployed more than 23,000 troops in the country, and it quickly became apparent that the U.S. government was concerned about threats to U.S. hegemony in the region. The extent of communist influence over the Constitutionalists, however, was minimal at best. Although initially a unilateral U.S. military intervention, the OAS voted to support the intervention by a two-thirds majority on May 28. Six Latin American nations—BRAZIL, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, PARAGUAY, and COSTA RICA—joined the international peacekeeping force, which was officially known as the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Whereas less than three dozen IAPF troops lost their lives, more than 3,000 Dominicans, mostly civilians, died in the conflict.

U.S. intervention resulted in the return of democracy to the Dominican Republic. On September 3, 1965, the United States implemented a provisional government, led by Héctor García Godoy (b. 1921–d. 1970), thus paving the way for the resumption of civilian rule. Bosch was allowed to return from exile on September 25, 1965, exactly two years after being deposed in a military coup. On June 1, 1966, in OAS-supervised elections, Dominican voters were presented with two candidates: Bosch and JOAQUÍN BALAGUER. With 57 percent of the vote, Balaguer was the winner. U.S. vice president Hubert Humphrey represented the United States at Balaguer's inauguration on July 1, 1966. On September 21, 1966, the last U.S. troops left Dominican soil. In the postintervention period, the United States and the Dominican Republic enjoyed close diplomatic relations. In addition, the Dominican Republic has experienced democratic elections and the expansion of constitutional rule.

President Johnson used the Dominican Republic to further his containment policy abroad and gather support for “Great Society” legislation at home. Although Johnson's domestic agenda, especially the Great Society, was important to him, the containment of communism was even more so. By quashing a potential communist insurrection in the Dominican Republic, he hoped to demonstrate to the American people that COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA was contained in CUBA and that it was possible to contain it in Southeast Asia as well.

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Operation Uphold Democracy (1994) Operation Uphold Democracy was a U.S.-led plan to restore democracy in HAITI in 1994. Following the overthrow of democratically elected president JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE on September 30, 1991, in a military coup staged by Raoul Cédras (b. 1949–), the United States and other members of the international community became increasingly concerned about the failure of democracy in Haiti. In June 1993, the United Nations (UN) imposed an oil and arms embargo on the country, which forced the Haitian military to negotiate a settlement. On July 3, 1993, Aristide and Cédras signed the UN-sanctioned Governors Island Agreement, which called for Aristide's return to Haiti by October 30. The Haitian military, however, in defiance of the international community, reneged on the agreement, and the UN reimposed economic sanctions. The escalation of

HUMAN RIGHTS abuses in Haiti convinced the UN that more strenuous steps needed to be taken to restore democracy in Haiti.

On July 31, 1994, with strong encouragement from Bill Clinton's administration, the UN adopted Resolution 940, which authorized member states to use all necessary means to convince the Haitian military to restore constitutional rule in Haiti. The United States, taking the lead in forming a multinational force to carry out the UN mandate, began preparations for a military intervention, code-named Operation Restore Democracy, with the ultimate goal of fostering democratic government in Haiti and stemming the flow of illegal Haitian immigrants to the United States. Despite repeated promises from the military government to relinquish power, Cédras increased his authoritarian control over Haiti. The ECONOMY deteriorated, political repression increased, and tens of thousands of poor Haitians fled the country.

In August 1994, the United States began military planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. The Clinton administration, in fact, simultaneously planned for two possible scenarios: Operation Uphold Democracy, which entailed an intervention with the permission of the Haitian military, and Operation Restore Democracy, which entailed an intervention without the permission of the Haitian military. On September 18, as American forces were already on their way to Haiti, a negotiating team led by Jimmy Carter secured an agreement from Cédras calling for a peaceful transition to democracy and a permissive entry of American forces. The U.S.-led multinational force, composed of more than 20,000 American troops and more than 2,000 troops from other countries, was deployed peacefully. Cédras and several of his henchmen went into exile. Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994. After Aristide was restored to power, the international community provided financial and technological support to rehabilitate the political, economic, and social infrastructure in Haiti. On March 31, 1995, the United States transferred peacekeeping functions in Haiti to a UN peacekeeping force.

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Operation Urgent Fury (1983) Operation Urgent Fury was the code name for the U.S.-led MILITARY intervention of GRENADA to restore order and stability in the aftermath of a bloody internal power struggle of Grenada's New Jewel Movement (NJM), which resulted in the death of Prime Minister MAURICE BISHOP. The joint U.S.-Caribbean task force quickly restored order

and turned power over to a provisional civilian government before the end of 1983.

On October 18, 1983, the NJM, which had ruled Grenada since a military coup in 1979, imploded when Minister of Finance Bernard Coard (b. 1944–), who wanted to pursue a more pro-Soviet, anti-U.S. policy, overthrew Prime Minister Bishop with the support of the Grenadian army. Bishop and many of his closest associates were arrested, then executed the next day. On October 25, U.S. president Ronald Reagan unleashed Operation Urgent Fury, a coalition force with troops from BARBADOS, JAMAICA, DOMINICA, SAINT LUCIA, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES. Especially vocal in her support of the U.S.-led invasion was Prime Minister MARY EUGENIA CHARLES of Dominica. The invasion, which quickly defeated the fierce resistance offered by Grenadian and Cuban soldiers, was immensely popular in the United States, the English-speaking Caribbean, and Grenada. Grenadians celebrate October 25 as a national holiday, calling it Thanksgiving Day.

Between 1979 and 1983, the NJM, which aligned itself with the Soviet Union and CUBA, had begun a massive military buildup. The NJM had also begun construction of an international airport. Although ostensibly a move to foster increased tourism, Reagan and Charles were concerned that the airport, being built with Cuban assistance, would be used as a Soviet-Cuban airbase to support the spread of communism in the Caribbean. Following Coard's October 18 military coup, the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) petitioned the United States, Barbados, and Jamaica for assistance. U.S. officials cited the presence of American students at the St. George's Medical School as a justification for military intervention.

The military intervention began on October 25, 1983, at 5:00 A.M. More than 7,000 U.S. troops were supported by 300 troops from the English-speaking Caribbean. The invading forces encountered stiff resistance from more than 1,500 Grenadian and 700 Cuban combatants. U.S. forces suffered 19 fatalities. The Grenadians suffered 45 military and 24 civilian fatalities. Two dozen Cubans were also killed in battle. Unlike veterans of the Vietnam War, the American veterans of the Grenada invasion were welcomed home as heroes. Public and official opinion in the United Kingdom, Grenada's former colonial master, was critical of the military intervention. The British government was particularly annoyed that it had not been advised of the invasion. Regardless, Governor General Paul Scoon, the official representative of Queen Elizabeth II in Grenada, who had been placed under house arrest by forces loyal to Coard, supported the invasion. Following the successful invasion, Scoon organized an interim civilian government, restored the constitution, and laid plans for parliamentary elections in 1984. U.S. coalition forces had withdrawn from Grenada by the end of 1983.

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Organization of American States (OAS; Organización de los Estados Americanos; Organização dos Estados Americanos; OEA)

The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional organization that was established at the Ninth Pan-American Conference in BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA, March 30–May 2, 1948. It replaced the PAN-AMERICAN UNION, the world's oldest regional organization at the time. Some analysts see it as the fulfillment of the Bolivarian dream, or PAN-AMERICANISM. Originally having 21 members, the organization added 13 more over the years until 1994. The OAS mission is to promote hemispheric peace; prevent interstate difficulties and provide for peaceful solutions when they arise; provide for common action in case of aggression against member states; seek solutions to hemispheric political, juridical, and social problems; and promote cooperative action for Latin American development. The OAS attempts to achieve its objectives through seven subunits. The OAS also played a significant role in the establishment of the INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, which is funded by member states.

Before 1990, the cold war cast its long shadow over the OAS's operations as the United States, CUBA, and MEXICO held different visions of regional security. The United States dominated OAS political decisions, most obviously in the 1954 invasion of GUATEMALA, 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION, 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1965 invasion of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1983 invasion of GRENADA, and the political isolation of Chilean president SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS from 1971 to 1973 (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF).

After the cold war ended in 1991, the OAS passed resolutions against corruption, illegal DRUGS and arms trafficking, and violence against WOMEN. Its Resolution 1080 calling for a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss hemispheric action against any government that comes to power via a coup d'état or other illegal means has been used four times: in HAITI, in 1991; PERU, 1992; Guatemala, 1993; and PARAGUAY, 1996. The OAS has also supervised several Latin American elections for the purpose of certifying the fairness of the process.

In the social field, the OAS promotes educational programs throughout the hemisphere through the

Health Organization and the Institute for History and Geography. The OAS also has active institutes designed to assist the welfare of its target groups: women, children, and NATIVE AMERICANS.

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Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

(OECS) The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was established on June 18, 1981, by the Treaty of Basseterre; Basseterre is the capital city of SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS. Full membership is accorded to ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, SAINT LUCIA, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are associate members. On several occasions since 1990, the U.S. government has discouraged the request of the UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS from joining OECS. Saba, an island in the Netherlands Antilles and St. Martin attend meetings of the OECS Forum on Tourism while they work to gain full membership into the organization.

At the OECS 35th meeting in January 2002 in Anguilla, the seven regular members agreed to an economic union, but almost immediately suggestions were made to improve this agreement. A new agreement went into effect on January 1, 2007. Known as the OECS Economic Union, the agreement provides for the free circulation of goods and services and the free movement of LABOR and capital (through the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank) among its members, a common external tariff (CET), and a regional parliamentary assembly.

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Orozco, Pascual (b. 1882–d. 1915) *Mexican revolutionary leader* Pascual Orozco was a merchant from Chihuahua, MEXICO, who joined the revolutionary movement of FRANCISCO MADERO against Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) in 1910. He was instrumental in leading the forces of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION to victory in the decisive battle of Ciudad Juárez, which forced Díaz to resign and flee the country. Orozco initially supported the presidency of Madero, but when Madero failed to pursue social reforms quickly enough, the Chihuahuan MILITARY hero issued the Plan Orozquista. The 1912 plan denounced Madero as corrupt, demanded social

reform, and called for a general uprising against the government.

Orozco's rebellion posed a major challenge for the new president. Madero sent his trusted general, VICTORIANO HUERTA, to suppress the revolt, and Orozco was temporarily subdued. But, Orozco's rebellion was a symptom of larger problems, and isolated revolts against Madero continued to plague the country. In February 1913, the once-loyal Huerta led a coup that removed Madero from office. Orozco supported Huerta's dictatorship, hoping the general would stabilize the country enough to institute meaningful social reforms. Instead, Mexico descended even further into chaos as a Constitutionalist alliance between VENUSTIANO CARRANZA, ÁLVARO OBREGÓN, and FRANCISCO VILLA rebelled against Huerta. By January 1914, Orozco had fled to Texas. Huerta was forced to step down six months later. Orozco joined up with Huerta once again in the United States, and the two began planning another insurrection. They were eventually captured by U.S. authorities and placed under house arrest. Orozco escaped but was killed in 1915 while trying to avoid recapture. He represents many of the ambiguities and shifting alliances that characterized the Mexican Revolution.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III).

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Ortega Saavedra, Daniel (b. 1945–) *revolutionary leader and president of Nicaragua* Daniel Ortega Saavedra was born into a middle-class family in the rural town of La Libertad, NICARAGUA. His parents had fought with AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO in the 1920s and were arrested on various occasions by ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA in the 1940s. After the family moved to Managua, Ortega received a Catholic education, including at the Christian Brothers Pedagogic Institute, where he met future Sandinista colleague Jaime Wheelock. Ortega also briefly studied for the priesthood in EL SALVADOR under Bishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, who subsequently sympathized with the revolution of the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN).

Ortega commenced his political activism in the early 1960s with the recruitment of students for the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth League. He joined the FSLN in 1963 and soon became an organizer of urban groups. Ortega joined his colleagues in acts of violence against government officials and buildings. In 1967, his involvement with the assassination of a National Guard officer earned him an eight-year prison sentence. He was freed in December 1974 in a prisoner exchange program and a year later joined the Sandinista National Directorate. Ortega gained special recognition for his leadership role

in the Sandinistas' 1979 final offensive, which resulted in the ouster of ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE on July 19, 1979.

Ortega served on the Governing Junta for National Reconciliation that followed Somoza's ousting, but as the moderate members resigned over growing Sandinista power, Ortega further consolidated his hold over government. He stood as the FSLN's presidential candidate in 1984, an election he won with 67 percent of the vote. His administration was confronted with the U.S.-sponsored Contra War that took a heavy toll on the Nicaraguan economy, particularly from the destruction of infrastructure and agricultural fields (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS). The FSLN's reform programs in EDUCATION, health, and housing fell victim to the cost of defending the country against the Contras. The government's control of private-sector production created further scarcities. Together, these economic factors contributed to a 675 percent inflation rate by 1987. The appointment of his friends to government positions and their corrupt practices further eroded support for Ortega.

With the war's end in 1989, Ortega again stood for the presidency in the 1990 elections, only to lose

to VIOLETA BARRIOS DE CHAMORRO. He again failed in bids for the presidency in 1997 and 2001. During that period, the Nicaraguan economy worsened, as did social conditions. The government accepted the principles of neoliberalism, but its policies did not bring prosperity to the country or improve the quality of life for the poor. Furthermore, corruption and graft characterized each administration.

Against this backdrop, Ortega again sought the presidency in the 2007 election and won, but with only 38 percent of the popular vote. He appears to have rejected his Marxist background, yet finds himself linked to VENEZUELA'S HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS in blaming the United States for all that is wrong with Latin America. In addition to the need to end government corruption, Ortega must deal with a 50 percent unemployment rate, the need for rural development, and the strengthening of property rights.

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P

Panama Panama is the southernmost nation on the Central American isthmus and consists of 30,193 square miles (11,657.5 km²) of land, making it slightly smaller than the state of South Carolina. Its strategic location at the southern end of the Central American isthmus contributed to its independence in 1903 and the construction of a transisthmian canal through its territory (see PANAMA CANAL, CONSTRUCTION OF). Seventy percent of Panama's 3.2 million inhabitants are classified as mestizos, a mixture of Amerindian and European ancestry, followed by the descendants of Amerindians and West Indians, 14 percent; whites, 10 percent; and Amerindians, 6 percent.

In 1501, Rodrigo de Bastidas became the first European to set foot on Panama, and in 1513, Vasco Núñez de Balboa trekked across the land bridge that gave Panama its geographic importance. In 1524, King Charles I of Spain ordered a survey of the territory to investigate the possibility of building a canal, but it would be nearly 400 years before such a canal was constructed. Until the 1770s, Panama served as a center of Spanish commercial traffic in the New World, but TRADE liberalization policies introduced by the Bourbon rulers in Madrid led to the rapid decline in the country's importance.

Panama was initially governed by the Viceroyalty of Peru and from 1739 by the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Panama declared its independence on November 28, 1821, but remained part of the New Granada nation (Gran Colombia) until its breakup in 1830, after which it was incorporated into the government of COLOMBIA. As an outlying district of Colombia, Panama fell victim to the centralized government at BOGOTÁ throughout the 19th century. Resistance to Colombia's authority was seen in 50 riots and rebellions, five attempted secessions, and seven U.S. interventions under the terms of

the 1846 Bidlack-Mallanaro Treaty. Much of this conflict centered around the liberal-conservative conflict that characterized 19th-century Latin American politics, which erupted in Colombia's War of the Thousand Days from 1899 to 1902, setting the stage for Panamanian independence in 1903.

The War of the Thousand Days further distanced the Panamanians from Colombia. The former, particularly the commercial and internationally orientated elite, considered that the government in Bogotá wanted only to extract wealth from the province, not develop it economically. José Agustín Arango (b. 1841–d. 1909) and others affiliated with the Panama Railroad concluded that if Colombia failed to ratify the proposed Hay-Herrán Treaty, Panama would declare its independence. The Panamanians were further encouraged by reports that the United States might tacitly support their independence movement, which came at a time of increasing U.S. interest in a transisthmian canal. Phillipe Bunau-Varilla (b. 1859–d. 1940), representing the New French Panama Canal Company, entered the arena. Based on his conversations with U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay, Bunau-Varilla gave the Panamanians assurances of U.S. protection and recognition if they pursued independence. Bunau-Varilla also understood that his company could lose its canal rights if Panama became independent. These factors came together on November 3, 1903, when Panamanians did indeed declare their independence. With U.S. warships off both coasts of Panama, Colombia was denied the right to intervene. On November 6, the United States extended recognition to Panama. Meanwhile, Bunau-Varilla hurried to Washington, D.C., to meet with Hay and conclude a treaty bearing their names just prior to

the arrival of Panamanians Manuel Amador (b. 1869–d. 1952) and Federico Boyd (b. 1858–d. 1924). For a one-time payment of \$10 million and an annual subsidy of \$250,000, the United States guaranteed Panama's independence in return for the right to build a transisthmian canal through a 10-mile-wide zone of Panamanian territory and to act "as if it were sovereign" within that zone. Although disgruntled with the Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty, Amador and Boyd, and subsequently the Panamanian legislature, had little choice but to accept it. Otherwise, the canal and Panama's independence would be lost to Colombia. The 1903 treaty provided the framework that governed U.S.–Panamanian relations until the 1977 Carter–Torrijos Treaties (see PANAMA CANAL TREATIES). The 1903 treaty also became the focal point of Panama's fractured society.

CHALLENGE TO THE OLD ORDER, 1903–1930

Immediately after the November 3, 1903, revolt, three Conservatives—Arango, Boyd, and Tomás Arias (b. 1856–d. 1932)—formed a ruling junta, while a constituent assembly completed a governing document that provided for the selection of Amador as Panama's first president for a four-year term beginning on February 21, 1904. Reflecting the country's Spanish heritage, the constitution provided for a centralized government at the expense of provincial power. Article 136 sanctified potential U.S. intervention to maintain political order, which was also a proviso of the 1903 Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty. Many analysts and Panamanian Liberals at the time argued that the Conservatives had the provision incorporated into the constitution as a means of preserving their political power.

For a quarter-century following independence, Panamanian politics remained a contest between the Conservative and Liberal POLITICAL PARTIES. The Conservatives drew their support from the interior elite and high-ranking Panamanian employees of the Panama Railroad Company. The Liberals drew their support from a greater cross-section of society, which divided the party into several factions. One segment included white and mestizo cattlemen from around the port cities of Colón and Panama. A second faction consisted of the urban working class, which included mostly blacks and mulattoes. Belisario Porras (b. 1856–d. 1942) appealed to these groups. The immigrant businesspeople attracted to Panama first by the Panama Railroad and then by the canal made up the third Liberal Party faction, which was led by the Chiari family. Members of both parties shared a dislike of the black West Indian LABOR force and their descendants. The political diversity contributed to personalized politics, with each group seeking its own benefit in Panama's political arena and in the country's relationship with the United States regarding the canal.

Serving three presidential terms (1912–16, 1918–20, and 1920–24), Belisario Porras became Panama's most

dominant political figure during this period. He is credited with extending the railroad into Chiriquí Province as well as road construction into other parts of the interior to promote agricultural development, directing the construction of telephone and telegraph lines, and modernizing Panama City. He also established the country's first university and teacher's training college, as well as modern hospitals at Santo Tomás and Panama City. He appointed a committee to draft Panama's legal code, which went into effect on August 22, 1917. Despite these successes, Panama was beset with a multitude of internal problems. Porras's infrastructure projects were financed by \$18 million in U.S. loans and bonds. The North Americans invested another \$29 million in Panama's infrastructure, such as roadways and railways and electric and telephone systems. The United Fruit Company owned an estimated \$8 million in land for the cultivation of bananas for export, which brought little to the Panamanian ECONOMY. In addition, rural cattle farmers, urban labor, and middle-sector professionals and businesspeople failed to benefit from the Panama Canal operation. Their frustration turned into violent demonstrations against the proposed 1926 Kellogg–Alfaro canal treaty and the refusal by Panama's Congress to consider its adoption. These groups banded together on August 19, 1923, to form a secret society, ACCIÓN COMUNAL (AC), which opposed the policies and practices of the political elite. The West Indian labor force remained outside these circles. Discriminated against and kept from joining the Labor Federation of Panama, they established a protective subculture that included churches, schools, and fraternal and labor groups. On the eve of the Great Depression, the West Indians remained a group awaiting a political party or leader to appeal to it.

THE TRIUMPH OF PANAMANIAN NATIONALISM, 1931–1979

On January 2, 1931, members of AC engineered the ouster of President Florencio Arosmena (b. 1872–d. 1945) and paved the way for the presidency of Harmodio Arias (b. 1886–d. 1962), which began on June 5, 1932. The Arias administration opened Panama's political arena to the growing demands of the middle and laboring social sectors, which increasingly placed responsibility for their plight on the U.S.-owned and operated canal that dissected their country. Additionally, Arias's 1931 appointment of JOSÉ ANTONIO REMÓN CANTERA to lead the National Police resulted in the National Police becoming the final arbiter of politics from 1952 until 1989.

As president, Arias initiated a small rural land reform program, established a savings bank for the poor, established the University of Panama in 1935, and was responsible for the 1936 Hull–Alfaro Treaty that opened the canal zone to Panamanian businesspeople, increased job opportunities for Panamanian workers, and

terminated the U.S. right to intervene in Panamanian politics. He also instituted a policy of *bispanidad*, which emphasized Panama's Spanish past and required the use of the Spanish language in all official communication, as well as schools. Arias's newspaper, the *Panama-American*, became the mouthpiece for these programs. While Harmodio Arias's nationalistic programs frightened Panama's traditional elite, those of his brother ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID threatened other sectors. After taking office on October 1, 1940, Arnulfo directed the writing and implementation of a new constitution on January 2, 1941. It extended the president's term to six years and granted him new and extensive powers over the economy that could limit foreign investment in the country, hinted at the nationalization of foreign-owned properties, and established state control over the export of agricultural goods; it also furthered the cause of *bispanidad*. Arnulfo Arias also threatened West Indians with deportation. His program appealed only to urban day and skilled Panamanian workers in Colón and Panama City, who overwhelmingly supported his 1940 election. The elite, middle sector, and West Indians stood in opposition and found an ally in the United States, which had been antagonized by Arias's refusal to agree to defense site agreements on the eve of WORLD WAR II. These forces coalesced in October 1941 to prevent Arias from returning to the presidency following a visit to his mistress in CUBA. Arias's ouster did not suppress student, professional, and working-class nationalism. For the next eight years, the presidency became a game of musical chairs among Panama's elite families—the de la Guardia, Jiménez, Arosemena, Chanis, and Chiari—until Arias returned in 1949.

In the meantime, Remón transformed the National Police into the National Guard, a modern organization of approximately 2,000 men with both cavalry and motorized units. Taking advantage of the U.S. GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, he received technical advice from U.S. canal zone authorities, recruited like-minded officers, and implemented riot control training. By the mid-1940s, he was poised to act, and the opportunity came in 1951 following the death of President Daniel Chanis (b. 1892–d. 1951) and his replacement by Arnulfo Arias. Owing to an economic downturn following World War II, Arias inherited a tense environment that he exacerbated with graft and nepotism until his impeachment and ouster on May 9 of that year. Remón seized the moment. He resigned from the National Police to become the 1952 presidential candidate of the five-party National Patriotic Coalition (Coalición Nacional Patriótica, or CNP). Inaugurated on October 1, 1952, Remón instituted programs that emphasized industrial-agro businesses rather than the small farmer; attempted to redirect traditional commercial lines away from the canal; focused on improving health care and EDUCATION; and denied unions the right to strike. He completed a new treaty with the United States in 1955. The Eisenhower-Remón Treaty provided

Panamanian merchants with greater access to ship sales, increased the annual U.S. annuity to \$1.9 million, and expanded job opportunities for Panamanians working in the canal zone. In effect, Remón became a quasi-dictator similar to NICARAGUA'S ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA. This brought him opposition from the traditional elite, middle-sector business community, workers, and students. Remón's unexplained assassination on January 2, 1955, ended the CNP's role in national politics and resulted in the reemergence of traditional Conservative and Liberal leaders until a MILITARY coup on October 11, 1968. But, the return to traditional politics did not stem the rising tide of nationalism that found expression in the 1960, 1964, and 1968 riots that increasingly focused on U.S. responsibility, real or imagined, for Panamanians' socioeconomic plight.

The 1968 presidential election was a turning point in Panamanian political history. Whereas the elections until 1931 were contests among the elite, those after that date pitted the second generation of Panamanians against the old guard and among themselves. In 1968, a new group of reformers appeared, whose programs appealed to the poor at the expense of the oligarchs. Arias won his third presidential bid and took office on October 1, 1968, this time with the support of West Indian laborers. His efforts to consolidate power in his own hands and to control the National Guard led its upper-echelon officers to direct a coup d'état on October 11, 1968, after which Lieutenant Colonel OMAR EFRAÍN TORRIJOS HERRERA became head of state and, by Article 277 of the 1972 constitution, "Maximum Leader." Other provisions extended his term to six years, granted him the power to appoint most government officials, and replaced the National Assembly with an Assembly of Corregimientos, which effectively denied business and commercial elites influence over government policy. The National Guard, whose size grew to 8,000 men, became an instrument of repression. Torrijos ruled as a dictator whose programs to stimulate economic growth, provide land for the rural poor, and limit the power and influence of labor unions encouraged the opposition against him. Panama was also beset with other problems during Torrijos's tenure, including rapid urbanization and with it the growth of slums, the unequal distribution of wealth, and economic stagnation. In 1977, the Panamanians lost the anti-American issue with the completion of the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, which provided for ownership of the canal to be transferred to Panama on January 1, 2000, and withdrawal of other U.S. government operations from the canal zone, including the School of the Americas and the U.S. Army's Southern Command post.

For reasons never fully explained, in October 1978, 10 years after he came to power, Torrijos "returned to the barracks" so the nation could return to a democracy. The question of whether Torrijos intended to play a future role in national politics died with him in an unexplained plane crash on July 31, 1981. Politically, he left

Panama as fractured as before he took office. The elite wanted to restore its power and prestige, the middle sector sought democracy and greater economic opportunities, the poor wanted to improve their quality of life, and the National Guard looked to ensure its place in the nation's future.

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND AN EXPANDED CANAL

The vacuum created by Torrijos's death ignited a power struggle within the National Guard that led the officers to forge an agreement that provided for successive commanders in chief through 1991, but the jockeying for power continued until September 1983 when General MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA MORENO emerged as the man in charge. An illegitimate child, Noriega was abandoned by his father at an early age and subsequently raised by a Panama City schoolteacher, Luisa Sánchez. He had little interest in advancing his education beyond high school until an older half brother arranged for him to attend PERU's Chorillos Military Academy. After graduation in 1962, Noriega returned to Panama to join the National Guard, where he became an associate of Torrijos and eventually chief of the guard's intelligence unit. Noriega's reputation as a womanizer and his obsessive religiosity gained him more notoriety than his position of power within the Torrijos administration.

In October 1983, as commander in chief, Noriega persuaded the legislature to change the National Guard's name to the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), provide for the expansion of its membership, confirm Noriega's leadership over it, and place all Panamanian military forces—along with the police, traffic, and immigration departments—under the PDF's control. The law also permitted the PDF to close down the media and intern individuals for actions offensive to the government. The extent of Noriega's power became evident when he manipulated the presidential election of Nicolás Andito Barletta Vallarino (b. 1938–) over Arias on May 2, 1984. The margin of victory, 1,713 votes, was a number allegedly chosen by Yolanda Pulice, a friend of Noriega's who sat on the National Election Board. A "CHICAGO BOY," Barletta cut government spending, reduced protective tariffs, instituted a wage freeze, raised local taxes, and fired some 15,000 public employees. These policies struck hard at the middle and lower socioeconomic groups, which in turn staged demonstrations and turned to the media to offer criticisms of the government. In response, Noriega used the 1983 law to suppress the opposition, often ignoring civil and HUMAN RIGHTS. Distracted, the Panamanian people prepared for the May 1989 election. The progovernment, eight-party Coalition for National Liberation (Coalición de Liberación Nacional, or COLINA) nominated Carlos Duque (b. 1938–) for president; and the Civil Opposition Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática de Oposición Civilista, or ADOC), Guillermo Endara

(b. 1936–), but it was Noriega who became the election's focal point. The former promised to keep Noriega as head of the PDF, while the latter promised to fire him. Violence plagued the campaign and despite international supervision, including a team headed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, the May 7 election was fraudulent. Exit polls indicated that Endara was the victor, but the National Election Board, pushing aside Carter's public plea for honesty, declared in favor of Duque. During the public outrage that followed, Noriega's Dignity Battalions (a paramilitary force) brutally beat Endara and his running mate Guillermo Ford (b. 1936–), which was witnessed on international television. Noriega voided the elections, shunned mediation efforts by the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS), and finally, on August 31, 1989, named a high school classmate, Francisco Rodríguez (b. 1938–), as provisional president in September 1989.

Just as Noriega consolidated his hold on the Panamanian government in the mid-1980s, he ran afoul of the United States. Once an important conduit for arms and money for the Contras in the war against NICARAGUA'S SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN), he no longer served U.S. policies when the U.S. Congress cut off funds for the war in 1986. By that time, Panama had become a haven for hidden bank accounts of drug traffickers, and Noriega himself became involved in the illicit trade (see DRUGS). Secure in the thought that the United States feared an international backlash if he exposed his role in the Contra War and that any intervention would be viewed as a U.S. effort to void the 1977 canal treaties, Noriega increasingly chided the United States and President George H. W. Bush in particular. Bush, however, did not back down. He used the detention and harassment in Panama City of a U.S. naval officer and his wife by PDF forces to order the U.S. invasion of Panama on December 21, 1989. Operation Just Cause, as the invasion was named, led to the capture of Noriega and his deportation to Miami, Florida, where he was eventually found guilty of drug manufacturing and trafficking drugs into the United States and on July 10, 1992, was sentenced to 40 years in prison.

On December 29, 1989, Endara was declared president of Panama in accordance with the May 7 election results. He inherited a country in economic ruin, and despite nearly \$70 billion in economic assistance from the United States, economic recovery did not come until after 2004. Endara is credited with terminating the PDF and creating a civilian-controlled police force. But, his administration and that of his immediate successors, Ernesto Pérez Balladares (b. 1924–) in 1994 and Mireya Moscoso (b. 1946–), headed coalition governments that reflected the fractured nature of Panamanian society. Each administration was also plagued by graft and corruption. The son of Torrijos, Martín Torrijos (b. 1963–), won the May 2, 2004, presidential election, and with it, his Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido

Revolucionario Democrático, or PRD) won control of the national legislature. Torrijos has delivered on his campaign promise to end government corruption and has made its transactions more transparent.

Since the mid-1990s, the Panamanian economy has continued to grow steadily, reaching a high of 8.3 percent annual growth in 2006. Nearly 80 percent of the \$15 billion gross domestic product (GDP) is generated from finance, commercial endeavors (insurance, canal, and maritime services), telecommunications, and tourism. Industry and manufacturing account for only 14 percent of the GDP. Nevertheless, Panama has an 8.8 percent unemployment rate. The United States remains Panama's largest trading partner, and on December 16, 2006, the two countries completed a free TRADE agreement. The Panama legislature approved the agreement on July 11, 2007. However, the "fast track" authority that gave the U.S. president power to negotiate a free trade agreement that Congress can only vote yes or no on expired on July 1, 2007. Congress has yet to reapprove such presidential authority, and the treaty was never considered by Congress. On October 22, 2006, Panamanian voters approved a referendum to expand the Panama Canal with a third set of locks to accommodate modern cargo ships well into the future. Initial construction began on September 3, 2007, with a 2015 projected completion date. An estimated 7,000 to 9,000 workers will be employed on the project at the peak of its construction in 2009 and 2010.

See also BALBOA, VASCO NÚÑEZ DE (Vol. I); BASTIDAS, RODRIGO DE (Vol. I); BOURBON REFORMS (Vol. II); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); GRAN COLOMBIA (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); NEW GRANADA, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); PANAMA (Vols. I, II, III); PANAMA RAILROAD (Vol. III); PERU, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); TRANSISTHMIAN INTERESTS (Vol. III); WAR OF THE THOUSAND DAYS (Vol. III).

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Panama, flag riots in (January 9–12, 1964) On January 9, 1964, a group of Panamanian students marched to Balboa High School in the Panama Canal Zone where they raised PANAMA's flag. Although the high school was one of 15 zone locations designated by U.S. president John F. Kennedy at which the Panamanian flag could be flown, defiant residents of the zone had resisted. The confrontation led to four days of riots, 12 deaths, scores of injuries, and uncounted thousands of dollars of damage to U.S. properties in Panama. In the face of the crisis, Panamanian president Roberto Chiari (b. 1904–d. 1984) severed diplomatic relations with the United States. In turn, U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson suspended U.S. economic assistance to the republic and called to the zone all U.S. workers, including those in the Peace Corps.

The root of the trouble can be found in the 1955 Eisenhower-Remón Treaty, which provided for an equal display of each country's flags. In accordance with the treaty, on November 3, 1959, Panamanian students had unsuccessfully attempted to raise their national flag in the zone, as a sign of Panama's sovereignty over it. In the ensuing violence, U.S. properties in Panama were burned, and several demonstrators were injured. In 1961, newly elected Presidents Chiari and Kennedy recognized the need to address several canal-related issues, but Kennedy appeared to move too slowly for Panamanian nationalists. Following his designation of 15 zone locations where the Panamanian flag could be flown, a resident of the zone sued to prevent both flags from flying there. The incident fueled tensions on both sides. Subsequently, the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) investigated the incident and cleared the United States of alleged brutality.

Johnson, who ascended to the presidency on November 23, 1963, following the assassination of Kennedy, held the upper hand in the diplomatic maneuvering that followed the incident, since Panamanians were aware that the United States was considering other Central American locations for the construction of a canal. Additionally, as the stalemate continued, the Panamanian ECONOMY spiraled downward. President Chiari finally resumed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 3, 1964. Despite his strong stand, Johnson understood that the 1964 riots demonstrated the need to reassess the U.S. position. He understood the canal's vulnerability to sabotage and that the underdevelopment of Panama's economy and concomitant social ills fueled Panamanians' determination to end the sovereignty clauses contained in the 1903 treaty (see PANAMA CANAL TREATIES).

Talks for treaty revisions began in July 1964, and by September 1965, an understanding had been reached for new treaties. Although flawed, the proposed treaties advanced the Panamanian cause but soon were set aside by domestic politics in both countries. In Panama, frustration with elitist politics led to the short-lived



From January 9 to 12, 1964, Panamanians demonstrated in front of the Fence of Shame that separated the republic from the canal zone. The protesters demanded that the Panamanian flag be flown next to the U.S. flag in the zone. (*United States Information Agency*)

ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID administration in October 1968 and the emergence of strongman OMAR EFRAÍN TORRIJOS HERRERA. Johnson, meanwhile, fell victim to the public pressure against the war in Vietnam, which led to the 1968 presidential election of Richard M. Nixon, who came to office with no clearly defined Latin American policy.

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Panama Canal, construction of The construction of the Panama Canal dates to May 4, 1904, when U.S. Army Corps engineer Lieutenant Mark Books received the keys to storehouses and the hospital at Ancón, a township in central PANAMA formerly owned by the New French Canal Company, whose rights for canal construction had been acquired by the United States

under the 1903 Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty. The three main problems faced by the North Americans at the beginning of the Panama Canal project were sanitation, organization, and engineering. U.S. Army Corps Chief Sanitary Officer William C. Gorgas developed a comprehensive program of drainage, spraying, and trash cleanup and oversaw the construction of water and sewerage systems both in the construction zone and at the terminal cities of Panama and Colón. By 1907, Gorgas's programs had eliminated yellow fever and brought malaria under control in the region.

With these diseases under control, a LABOR force could be recruited and supporting infrastructure built. By 1913, nearly 45,000 workers were on the project's payroll, the majority coming from the West Indies (primarily BARBADOS, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Trinidad), with another 12,000 arriving from southern Europe (Spain, Italy, and Greece). Some 5,600 North Americans filled managerial, supervisory, and skilled-labor positions. Panama provided less than 1 percent of all workers. Within the canal zone, the United States constructed housing and eating facilities and a commissary to satisfy workers' personal needs. As specified in

the 1903 Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty, the United States brought all construction materials into the zone duty free.

In view of the failed French effort to build a sea-level canal (that is, one that includes only one level), the project's chief engineer, John F. Stevens, convinced U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt to build a lock canal (that is, a multilevel canal that includes “lock” sections to move ships up and down between levels). On June 27, 1906, the U.S. Congress concurred. Stevens, however, did not see the project to its completion. Personal conflicts with Roosevelt led to his resignation from the project on April 1, 1907. He was replaced by U.S. Army Corps engineer Lieutenant Colonel George W. Goethals.

The construction plan called first for damming the Chagres River to create an artificial lake, through which a sea-level channel would be dredged. The channel would flow from the newly constructed Caribbean harbor, adjacent to Colón, to the lake, known as Gatun Lake, where a set of locks would raise ships 85 feet. At the western end of the lake, another eight-mile-long (nearly 13 km) channel was dug through the Continental Divide to link with the Pedro Miguel and Miraflores Locks, where

ships would be lowered to a third dredged channel and harbor on the Pacific side of Panama. Design changes were made as work progressed. For example, at the U.S. Navy's request, locks were enlarged from 95 to 110 feet (from 29 to 33.5 m) and the channel in the Calebra Cut was widened from 200 to 300 feet (from 61 to 91.5 m) to accommodate larger vessels.

The magnitude of the canal project was without precedent at the time. The 1.5-mile-long (2.4-km) Gatun Lake was the largest artificial lake in the world, and the Culebra Cut, later named the Gailard Cut, was the largest excavation in history: Some 268.8 million cubic yards (205.5 million m³) of rock, shale, and dirt were excavated. The locks, with the largest gates ever swung, surpassed any others in the world and were operated by state-of-the-art electric generators and motors. When it opened to traffic on August 14, 1914, the Panama Canal stood as an extraordinary engineering accomplishment. Its total cost was nearly \$375 million, and some 5,600 lives were lost during its 10-year construction. The outbreak of WORLD WAR I on August 1, 1914, however, overshadowed its opening before a contingent of just 200 dignitaries, including Panamanian president Belisario



View of the Panama Canal locks (*Records of the Department of State*)

Porrás (b. 1856–d. 1942), U.S. secretary of war Lindley M. Garrison, and members of the diplomatic corps.

The Panama Canal served its commercial and military purposes well until the early 1960s, by which time cargo, container, cruise, and military vessels had grown precipitously in size. By the time of the 1964 flag riots in the Panama Canal Zone (see PANAMA, FLAG RIOTS IN), U.S. authorities had recognized that the canal would soon be outdated, but public debate of the issue was lost in the discussions that resulted in the 1977 Carter-Torrijos Treaties (see PANAMA CANAL TREATIES). Likewise, in the early 1990s, international discussion about a new canal faded over the issue of using nuclear power for excavation. Finally, on April 24, 2006, Panamanian president Martín Torrijos (b. 1963–) presented a plan for a third set of locks to parallel the site of the present canal. Seventy-eight percent of Panamanians approved of the plan in a national referendum on October 22, 2006. The internationally financed expansion project began on September 3, 2007, with an estimated 2015 completion date, and is expected to accommodate very large vessels well into the future.

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Panama Canal treaties Until the French diplomat and developer Ferdinand de Lesseps attempted to construct a transisthmian canal at PANAMA in 1879, the U.S. government envisioned an interoceanic waterway opened to world commerce and free of international intrigue. The de Lesseps project altered the U.S. policy from idealism to reality. As Europe roamed the globe in search of colonies in the late 19th century, the United States concerned itself with European presence near the canal and, as a result, pursued a policy that would secure the canal route for itself.

The canal also dictated U.S. relations with PANAMA. Always determined to ensure the safety of the canal's defense and operation, the United States consistently defended its sovereignty over the canal zone and hoped to placate the Panamanians with economic concessions. Toward that end, the U.S. government preferred to deal with Panamanian leaders who acquiesced to these objectives, not to others who had their own agendas. In the late 20th century, new realities led to a new U.S. policy that enabled the Panamanians to gain control of their most precious resource.

HAY–BUNAU VARILLA TREATY, 1903

By the late 1890s, the United States focused its attention on NICARAGUA as the most viable and cost-effective location for a transisthmian canal. In 1899 and again in 1901,

the Walker Commission, a group of engineers appointed by President William McKinley, recommended the Nicaraguan route at an estimated cost of \$189 million, compared to the \$144 million in estimated construction costs, plus an additional \$149 million for the rights at Panama being asked for by the New (French) Panama Canal Company, the successor to the de Lesseps project. Fearing the loss, the French company lowered its asking price to \$44 million and dispatched Phillipe Bunau-Varilla to Washington, D.C., to meet with Secretary of State John Hay and others. This came after the Walker Commission issued its third report in January 1902, this time favoring the Panama route. At the same time, the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan governments, in hopes of gaining larger rewards, delayed making any agreements with the United States for use of the San Juan River that straddled their common border. Also seeking greater financial reward, a year later the Colombian government refused to consider the proposed Hay-Herrán Treaty. The stalemate frustrated the Panamanians, who wanted independence from COLOMBIA; Bunau-Varilla, who sought compensation for his company's effort; and U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, who wanted to start the canal project before his anticipated 1904 presidential campaign. As a result of the intrigue that followed, Panama gained its independence on November 3, 1903, and U.S. recognition three days later.

Having maneuvered his own appointment as Panama's representative to the United States, Bunau-Varilla was in New York at the time of Panama's birth. At New York City's Waldorf-Astoria he met with Hay and accepted the U.S. drafted treaty that bears their names. When Panama's delegation arrived on November 18, 1903, they were presented with a *fait accompli*. Fearing that their new republic would revert to a province of Colombia, the Panamanians signed the treaty, and on December 2, 1903, the Panamanian legislature ratified the agreement. The U.S. Senate did the same on February 20, 1904. As a result, Panama got its independence, Bunau-Varilla his money, and Roosevelt his canal route.

According to the treaty, for a \$10 million one-time payment and a \$250,000 annual subsidy, Panama conveyed to the United States two sets of rights regarding the construction, operation, and protection of the canal. The first set of rights, allowing the United States to protect Panama from foreign and internal political instability, are found, respectively, in Articles 1 and 7. The second set of rights dealt with the canal zone and over time caused more lasting resentment in Panama. Article 2 granted the United States not only a 10-mile-wide (16-km) strip, but also other lands and waters outside the zone for the canal. Article 3 granted the United States all rights, authority, and powers within the zone as "if it were sovereign of the territory." Finally, Article 13 permitted the United States to import into the zone, duty free, all goods "necessary and convenient" for U.S. employees, workmen, laborers, and their families and "necessary" for the construction,

maintenance, and operation of the canal (see PANAMA CANAL, CONSTRUCTION OF). In other words, Panama retained residual sovereignty, but the United States gained effective ownership of the canal and its ancillary needs.

PROPOSED KELLOGG-ALFARO TREATY, 1926

During the canal's construction period, the U.S. authorities adopted a protective paternalism toward Panamanian politics, fearing that conflict between the Liberals and Conservatives would adversely affect the canal project. Apparently, the North Americans favored the Conservative elite over the Liberals who appealed to middle and lower sectors. To prevent political turmoil, U.S. officials and zone police supervised elections in 1906, 1908, 1912, and 1921. To legitimize their broad rights to maintain order within Panama, the United States pressured the Panamanians to incorporate Article 136 into their 1903 constitution. Armed with such police power, the United States disarmed Panama's so-called army and used zone police to quell disorders in Panama in 1918, 1921, and 1925. The zone police also attempted to control liquor sales and prostitution in the canal's terminal cities. Because Panama could not satisfy the needs of an estimated 17,000 workers during the construction period, U.S. authorities established commissary operations in the zone. Taking advantage of cheaper shipping rates and treaty privileges that exempted such goods from coming into the zone, the commissary operation militated against the development of the Panamanian economy. This was exacerbated by continued U.S. direct investment in the country. By 1920, U.S. businessmen invested an estimated \$10 million into the Panamanian economy. The most notable was Minor Keith's banana plantations in Boca del Toro Province that later became part of the United Fruit Company. Wages also became an irritant to the Panamanians. U.S. workers received a 25 percent wage differential over Panamanians performing the same tasks, and both groups were paid in gold. In contrast, Panamanian and West Indian laborers were paid in silver, which pitted the Panamanian against his elite brethren paid in gold and the black West Indians. The Panamanians argued that the United States had created a colony in their midst, and from the start, Panamanian leaders demanded limitations on U.S. privileges. By the 1920s, Panamanian nationalists emphasized that the 1903 treaty, hastily signed under duress, did not represent Panamanian interests. It should be replaced by a document that would permit Panama to realize the anticipated benefits from the canal.

With time's passage, new circumstances awakened U.S. canal zone governors to the vagueness of the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty. The development of radio, telegraphy, and aircraft brought about the need for new explicitness. But, U.S. officials refused to budge on their jurisdiction over the zone; they were determined only to define more clearly their rights.

Talks for treaty revisions began in March 1924. Because the negotiators started from opposite poles, the talks dragged on until July 26, 1926. The resultant proposed Kellogg-Alfaro Treaty provided for joint consultation regarding the control of radio, telegraphy, and aircraft and U.S. land use outside the zone, but it also made the United States the final arbiter of each case. Nothing was done to restrict the commissary operation or expand opportunities for Panamanian commercial interests and Panamanian LABOR (but not West Indian) in the zone. Only the Panamanian elite were satisfied with the promise of expanded job opportunities in the zone. When the treaty became public in Panama in December 1926, demonstrations, violence, and death threats against legislators who might approve the treaty followed. Finally, on January 26, 1927, Panama's National Assembly suspended consideration of the proposed treaties.

Although the U.S. State Department dismissed the treaty discussions as minor in character, the Panamanians did not. Merchants wanted measurable TRADE benefits; laborers, increased pay and job opportunities; and landowners, security against future expropriations. In contrast, Washington, influenced by improvements in technology, wanted more rights to defend the canal that further impinged on Panama's sovereignty.

HULL-ALFARO TREATY, 1936

The United States brushed off Panama's efforts to restart treaty negotiations in 1927 and 1928, and when talks resumed in 1934, a new environment prevailed. In Panama, a vibrant sense of nationalism followed the 1931 coup d'état engineered by ACCIÓN COMUNAL that brought Harmodio Arias (b. 1886–d. 1963) to the presidency. This nationalism was further fueled by the adverse impact of the Great Depression upon the republic. Canal traffic dropped precipitously by 1933, resulting in many job layoffs in the zone and otherwise brought commercial activities in the zone to a near halt. Simultaneously, the Panamanian economy also suffered and increasingly, the Panamanians placed responsibility at the U.S. doorstep.

During the same time period, the United States was moving away from its 30-year-old policy of intervention in the internal affairs of the circum-Caribbean nations. It culminated in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's announcement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY in his March 2, 1933, inaugural address. As a result, when President Arias visited Washington, D.C., in October 1933 he found a receptive Roosevelt. Panama found its concerns addressed in the joint communiqué issued at the end of their meetings, and they became the focal point for treaty revision negotiations that began in early 1934. The 110 sessions, some attended by Roosevelt, finally resulted in the Hull-Alfaro Treaty on March 2, 1936.

The Panamanians did not achieve all of their objectives but came away pleased with the abrogation of the U.S. protectorate over the republic as found in the 1903 document and the termination of U.S. eminent domain

over the terminal cities of Panama and Colón. The Panamanians gained a sense of sovereignty over the zone with the provisions for joint responsibility over future land acquisitions for canal purposes and control over radio stations. The restrictions placed upon commissary sales and the opportunity for Panamanian private businesses to enter the zone market gave the hope for increased prosperity for Panamanian merchants. In an accompanying note, Roosevelt promised equal job opportunities for Panamanian laborers in the zone, but nothing was mentioned about repatriation of the West Indians for which the president had indicated support in the 1933 joint communiqué. The adjustment of the annual annuity from \$250,000 to \$430,000 only reflected the devaluation of the U.S. dollar that Roosevelt introduced as an anti-depression measure. The Panamanian upper and middle sectors and labor organizations were pleased with the treaty, a fact that contributed to the treaty's quick ratification by the National Assembly on April 20, 1936.

U.S. Senate ratification of the Hull-Alfaro Treaty was delayed until 1939 because the War Department was reluctant to surrender control of radio communications and the ability to confiscate land for future canal operations, while the zone authorities resisted the equal opportunity labor provisions. Owing to pressure from Roosevelt and in anticipation of the forthcoming hemispheric conference of foreign ministers in Panama scheduled for September 1939, the Senate finally ratified the agreement, but only after preserving better-paying jobs for North Americans. The treaty went into effect on July 25, 1939.

DEFENSE SITES AGREEMENTS, WORLD WAR II

The outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 1939, brought new concerns to U.S. authorities regarding the defense of the Panama Canal (see *WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA*). The waterway was no longer immune to attack from existing army fortifications within the canal zone. Since World War I, military technology had changed appreciably, making real the canal's risk of attack by airplanes and submarines. To contend with the new danger, the U.S. War Department identified 71 sites within Panama needed for defense purposes over which it wanted complete control for 999 years. Whatever sense of cooperation existed in 1939 disappeared when ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID ascended to the presidency on October 11, 1940. Representing Panama's rising tide of nationalism, Arias indicated that he would permit the United States to have the defense sites for the duration of his presidential term, only after settling a host of other issues surrounding the canal's operation, including the repatriation of West Indian workers and their families. Arias's obstinacy contributed to his ouster on October 9, 1941, while on an unauthorized visit to CUBA to visit his mistress. New president Ricardo de la Guardia (b. 1898–d. 1969) acknowledged his country's obligation

to cooperate in wartime defense of the canal under the terms of the 1936 Hull-Alfaro Treaty.

On May 7, 1942, Panama agreed to the U.S. requests with the proviso that the sites would be returned to Panama within one year after a definitive treaty was signed ending World War II. By an accompanying executive agreement, the United States also granted Panama control over sanitation and Panama Railroad facilities in the republic and promised to build a bridge across the canal to connect the divided country. But, the United States refused to repatriate any West Indians.

The United States built 134 defense sites in Panama during the war and wanted to retain control over most of them after the war. President Enrique Jiménez (b. 1886–d. 1970) agreed to satisfy U.S. wishes, but opposition came from Panama's middle sector—students, technocrats, skilled workers, managers, professionals, and shopkeepers. Their demonstrations before Panama's National Assembly in December 1947 forced the legislature to reject the proposed extension of U.S. rights. By the end of 1948, the United States abandoned all but the sprawling Río Hato airbase in Panama.

EISENHOWER-REMÓN TREATY, 1955

The rising tide of Panamanian nationalism expressed in opposition to the World War II defense site agreements and their extension further intensified with the country's economic slowdown that followed the war. Panamanians came to blame the United States for all that was wrong within their country. To satiate Panamanian demands, in 1953, President JOSÉ ANTONIO REMÓN CANTERA appealed directly to U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower. To press his case, Remón orchestrated demonstrations in Panama City, a precedent-setting tactic to exert pressure on the United States. Eisenhower also appeared receptive, at least to Panamanian economic rights within the canal zone territory. Subsequent negotiations resulted in a new treaty signed on January 27, 1955. It increased Panama's annual annuity to \$1.9 million, further restricted commissary sales, contained a U.S. promise to equalize salaries, gave Panama the right to tax the salaries of its citizens working in the zone, returned to Panama all railroad properties and granted the republic control of sanitation facilities in Panama City and Colón, granted Panama the right to fly its flag within the zone, and included a U.S. commitment to pay for the construction of a transisthmian canal bridge to connect the dissected country. In return, the United States retained its rights to the Río Hato air base.

While the Panamanian legislature quickly approved the treaty, a wave of protest delayed U.S. Senate ratification until August 24, 1955. Owing to the increased annuity, shippers feared higher canal tolls, "Zonians" protested pay equalization and potential job losses to Panamanians, the MILITARY wanted assurance of continued defense rights, and a coterie of nationalists did not want anything to change from the 1903 treaty.

CARTER-TORRIJOS TREATIES, 1977

Rather than quell Panamanian nationalism, the Eisenhower-Remón Treaty appeared to encourage it, particularly among the elite and middle-sector groups who increasingly demanded Panamanian control over the canal. Encouraged by Egypt's 1956 takeover of the Suez Canal, VENEZUELA's arrangements for equal sharing of oil revenues, and FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's overthrow of Cuba's established order in 1959, Panamanians increased their demands for sovereignty over the canal zone. Protests and demonstrations began in 1956 and increased in intensity until the January 9, 1964, flag riots when Panamanian students marched into the zone to plant their flag at Balboa High School, one of 15 sites designated by President John F. Kennedy for the Panamanian flag to fly (see PANAMA, FLAG RIOTS IN). Defiant Zonians resisted. Four days of violence ensued, resulting in the death of two dozen persons and the destruction of thousands of dollars of U.S.-owned property in Panama. Diplomatic relations were temporarily severed. While most analysts understood that the United States held the upper hand in the crisis, President Lyndon B. Johnson recognized that the changing world conditions legitimized some of the Panamanian concerns. The canal could no longer be defended against modern military weaponry, and the ever-increasing size of cargo and naval ships could make the canal obsolete. Treaty negotiations began in July 1964 and dragged on until June 1967 when four tentative agreements were reached, including one abrogating the 1903 Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty but guaranteeing U.S. administrative and defense interests for another 100 years. Political events in both Panama and the United States stymied further progress. In Panama, OMAR EFRAÍN TORRIJOS HERRERA engineered a coup that ousted President Arias in October 1968. A month later, Richard M. Nixon captured the U.S. presidential elections but came to the White House without a clearly defined Latin American policy.

If Nixon put the canal issue on the proverbial back burner, Torrijos did not. He quickly internationalized the issue by lining up support for the Panamanian cause through COSTA RICA, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba. At the United Nations, where Panama held an elective seat on the Security Council, Torrijos convinced that body to hold a meeting in Panama City in March 1973. At that meeting, the Security Council approved a Peruvian-sponsored resolution that Panama receive full sovereignty over all of its territory. Only the United States voted against the resolution. Great Britain abstained. Following the council's approval of the resolution, Torrijos added insult to injury by warning that unless the United States moved swiftly to correct the injustice, Panamanian frustration would soon burst into open violence.

Other factors also influenced the Nixon administration to act. The Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict illustrated the strength of Third World

nationalism. If the Organization of Petroleum Exporting (OPEC) countries could reap the benefits of their major resource, by extension, so could Panama. Finally, the National Security Council (NSC) advised Nixon that the time had come to redefine the U.S. relationship with Panama. Negotiations began in 1974, but progress was hampered by the impact of the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation, a U.S. Senate resolution denouncing Panama's sovereignty over the zone, and Ronald Reagan's declarations during the 1976 Republican Party presidential primary campaign against any limitations on U.S. rights and sovereignty in the canal zone.

Jimmy Carter came to the White House in January 1977 determined to correct the image of U.S. hegemonic influence in Western Hemispheric affairs. To Carter, new Panama Canal treaties could serve as a harbinger of a new relationship between the United States and Latin America. What proved to be the final round of talks began in February 1977. An agreement was reached on August 11, 1977, and signed by Carter and Torrijos on September 7. The treaties satisfied Panama's long-standing demand for control of the zone. Panama's jurisdiction would begin three years after the treaties' ratification, and complete jurisdiction would be established on January 1, 2000. Although the Panamanians took over the commissary operation, North American jobs related to the canal's operation were protected. The United States also retained the right permanently to defend the canal. The toll system was restructured to provide Panama with another \$20 million in revenues, and Carter agreed that the United States would provide nearly \$350 million in economic and military assistance to Panama over 10 years.

Carter also insisted that before he would submit the treaty to the U.S. Senate for approval, the Panamanians would first have to ratify the agreements. Torrijos acted quickly. In an October 25, 1977, national plebiscite, two-thirds of the Panamanians voted in favor of the treaties. Only the West Indians and their descendants stood in opposition. If Panamanian nationalism demanded control of the canal, U.S. nationalism insisted upon its retention of control over the waterway. An August 1977 public opinion poll revealed that 77 percent of the North Americans did not want to give up the canal. U.S. opposition to the Carter-Torrijos Treaties focused on U.S. sovereignty over the zone as spelled out in the 1903 treaty, the character of the Panamanian government and volatility of its politics, and the canal's importance to U.S. defense and economic needs. Following acrimonious debate, the U.S. Senate finally ratified the treaty on September 26, 1979, and President Carter signed it the next day.

As the 1980s progressed, some analysts questioned whether the United States would carry through on its treaty commitments owing to the ever-increasing tense relations with Panamanian strongman MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA MORENO. The December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama to apprehend Noriega on DRUG charges only heightened that suspicion. As the date for transfer



Panamanian head of state Omar Torrijos (*right*) and U.S. president Jimmy Carter (*left*) sign treaties that provide for the transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama by 2000. (*Courtesy of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library*)

approached, Panama's middle and upper sectors questioned the wisdom of gaining control over the zone and the canal. Panamanian jobs and U.S. spending in the local economy would be lost, and the elite's privileged position would come into question. None of these concerns translated into action. On January 1, 2000, Panama took possession of its most valued resource, the canal.

See also KEITH, MINOR COOPER (Vol. III); PANAMA RAILROAD (Vol. III); TRANSISTHMIAN INTERESTS (Vol. II).

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
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Pan-American Highway The Pan-American Highway is a 16,000-mile (25,750-km) system of roadways stretching the hemisphere, from Alaska in the north southward to the tip of CHILE and then northeastward

to BUENOS AIRES, in ARGENTINA. Except for a 54-mile (87-km) gap at the Panamanian-Colombian border, the roadway fills a void that dates to colonial times, when Spanish TRADE policies provided for intra-American trade only via tightly controlled shipping routes. The highway passes through many diverse ecological zones, including dense jungles, high mountain passes, and deserts. Since the highway traverses many countries, it is far from uniform. Some stretches of the road are passable only during the dry season, and in many regions, driving is at times hazardous.

The concept of such a highway can be traced to the 1923 Fifth International Conference of American States meeting in SANTIAGO DE CHILE. Two years later, at Buenos Aires, the initial Pan-American Highway Conference concluded that construction of such a highway would contribute significantly to the economic, social, and political development of the American countries. Throughout the 1920s, the Highway Education Board, organized by the U.S. automobile industry and affiliated with the PAN-AMERICAN UNION, sponsored tours for Latin American engineers to study highways in the United States. As a result, the Sixth International Conference of American States, meeting in HAVANA in 1928, approved a "longitudinal road" across the continent. The following year, the U.S. Congress approved a \$50,000 study, followed by a \$1 million appropriation in 1934 to initiate construction of the road.



A bridge along El Salvador's section of the Pan-American Highway constructed during World War II (Office of Inter-American Affairs, Photography and Research)

World War II served as a catalyst for further development of the highway, especially through MEXICO and CENTRAL AMERICA to PANAMA in order to meet the defense needs of the Panama Canal in light of the German submarine threat in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). In 1941, the U.S. Congress appropriated \$20 million for this portion of the project and another \$12 million in 1943. Substantial progress was made through Central America, but owing to the declining German threat and the inability of the Central American countries to meet their financial obligations for construction, this portion of the road remained incomplete at the war's end.

In the 1950s, supporters of the highway convinced the U.S. Congress that the highway and its accompanying economic and social development would serve as a deterrent to communist penetration of Latin America (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA). As a result, for the next decade, the U.S. Congress regularly approved monies to meet the U.S. contributions required for the completion of specific sections of the highway. The highway was finally opened in 1963, except for the Darien Gap, a stretch between northern COLOMBIA and southern Panama. The highway contributed to the development of the tourist industry, particularly in Mexico and Central America. It also has facilitated the transportation of goods between the Andean countries of ECUADOR, PERU, and Chile.

The Darien Gap received new attention in the 1990s with the anticipated FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS. For economic reasons, the Colombians appeared more anxious than the Panamanians to complete this section of the road through harsh mountainous and jungle territory. Opponents of the project include those who want to save the rain forest, contain the spread of tropical diseases, protect the livelihood of NATIVE AMERICANS along the route, prevent foot and mouth disease from entering North America, and create a buffer for anti-drug trafficking from Colombia. Interest in the highway waned after construction began on a third set of locks for the Panama Canal in 2004.

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Pan-Americanism Pan Americanism is an elusive term that implies some kind of Western Hemispheric solidarity in relation to social, economic, cultural, and political issues. The term first appeared in the New York City press on the eve of the 1888–89 Inter-American Conference that convened in Washington, D.C., but the origins of hemispheric unity can be traced to the interests and activities of Liberator Simón Bolívar of South America. Bolívar envisioned the unification of former Spanish colonies to resist possible European intervention in the newly independent region. Bolívar's plan did not include BRAZIL because of its Portuguese heritage or the United States because he feared it would dominate hemispheric affairs.

The Pan-American movement, as it became known, can be divided into five time periods. The first period, or Old Pan-Americanism, ran from 1826 to 1889, a time when Spanish Americans concerned themselves with imagined and real European interventions. For example, the 1826 Panama Congress dealt with Spain's potential reclamation of its former New World colonies, and the 1864 conclave at LIMA, PERU, focused on Spanish, British, and French encroachments in the Caribbean and west coast of South America. The Latin American mistrust of the United States intensified with the latter's mid-century expansion, which cost MEXICO one-third of its territory, and alleged plots to incorporate CUBA and CENTRAL AMERICA and purchase the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. The 1847–48 Lima Conference and the 1856 Washington meeting focused on U.S. expansion.

The WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE (1865–70) and the WAR OF THE PACIFIC (1879–84) intensified Latin American

nationalism and provided an opening for the United States to assume the leadership role of the Pan-American movement. Secretary of State James G. Blaine initiated the “New Pan-Americanism” by convening the first International Conference of American States in Washington, D.C., in 1888. Owing to the Latin American’s mistrust of the United States and its economic links with Europe, Blaine’s hope for a continental customs union failed to materialize. Over the next 45 years, five international conferences were held: in MEXICO CITY (1901–02), RIO DE JANEIRO (1906), BUENOS AIRES (1910), SANTIAGO DE CHILE (1923), and HAVANA (1928). These shared common characteristics: The United States dominated the agenda of each meeting and focused attention on economic and cultural issues, rather than political problems such as U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean region, as the Latin Americans wished. The undercurrent of U.S. hegemony was one of many factors that led to the U.S. announcement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY at the 1933 MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, meeting of American states, which marked the end of the Pan-American movement. According to the new policy, the United States promised henceforth not to interfere in the internal political affairs of Latin American nations.

This third period of Pan-Americanism lasted through the late 1960s and was characterized by a reduction of hemispheric tensions and a spirit of solidarity that focused on cooperation during World War II and the early cold war years and efforts toward Latin America’s economic development. The establishment of the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES in 1948 was the high water mark of this time period, while the breakdown in the hemisphere’s cooperative spirit began in 1954 with the U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF GUATEMALA, when not all Latin American governments shared the U.S. view that JACOBO GUZMÁN ARBENZ was a communist. The rift was complete by 1973. Although many Latin Americans shared the U.S. disdain for the CUBAN REVOLUTION of 1956–61, they equally disliked Washington’s unilateral actions during the 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, and U.S. policies that contributed to the overthrow of Chilean president SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS in 1973, all of which led to a new era of Pan-Americanism.

Since 1973, the Latin Americans have demonstrated a great degree of independence in the effort to satisfy their own interests. Although the Latin American governments accepted the neoliberal economic model espoused by the United States in the 1980s, they also resisted U.S. advances toward economic unity such as the proposed FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS. Yet, Latin American regional pacts, such as the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET and the ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, and international agreements and individual linkages such as Brazil, CHILE, and ECUADOR with the People’s Republic of China further weakened the Pan-American ideal in the early 21st century (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF).

See also BOLÍVAR, SIMÓN (Vol. II); PANAMA CONGRESS (Vol. III); U.S.-MEXICAN WAR (Vol. III); WAR OF THE PACIFIC (Vol. III); WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE (Vol. III).

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Pan-American Union The establishment of the International Union of American Republics (Pan-American Union) on April 14, 1890, was the most notable achievement of the Conference of American States that convened in Washington, D.C., from October 2, 1889 to April 14, 1890. In fact, April 14 came to be known as Pan-American Day. In turn, the Pan American Union created the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics to be supervised by the U.S. secretary of state in Washington. The bureau collected and distributed commercial information among the Latin American republics and the United States. Over time, it expanded its activities and its staff to do this work. The Pan-American Union became the organization’s official name at the 1910 Buenos Aires conference.

Although the delegates did not set dates for future meetings, they left Washington with a clear understanding that they would convene again. Nothing happened until 1899, when U.S. president William McKinley called for another meeting. This prompted the Commercial Bureau to issue invitations and set the agenda for the union’s second meeting in MEXICO CITY, held from October 22, 1901, to January 22, 1902. Except during the two world wars, meetings thereafter were convened every four or five years, in various Latin American capitals: RIO DE JANEIRO, 1906; BUENOS AIRES, 1910; SANTIAGO DE CHILE, 1923; HAVANA, 1928; MONTEVIDEO, 1933; LIMA, 1938; BOGOTÁ, 1948; and CARACAS, 1954.

The issues that recurred most prominently at these meetings included arbitration, hemispheric peace, TRADE, the forcible collection of debts, U.S. dominance of the organization, intervention by one state in the affairs of others and, in the 1920s, arms control. Accomplishments, however, were more modest. Resolutions, conventions, and treaties were often debated, but major solutions were rarely reached or ratified. One exception was the 1923 Gondra Treaty, which was designed to create machinery for the peaceful settlement of American disputes. U.S. secretary of state Charles Evans Hughes prevented the passage of one of its resolutions, however, declaring that no state had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another. In so doing, Hughes made the Gondra Treaty useless. U.S. policy changed in 1933 with the pronouncement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, under which the United States promised no longer to interfere in the

internal affairs of Latin American states. As the world drifted into World War II, U.S. concerns with hemispheric solidarity and prosecuting the war preempted Pan-American activities (see **WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA**). The accomplishments of the foreign ministers' meetings during the war accounted for the sense of Pan-Americanism that characterized the agency from 1938 until the founding of the **ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES** in 1948.

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Panday, Basdeo (b. 1933–) *prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago* Born on May 25, 1933, in Princes Town, Trinidad, Basdeo Panday was the son of first-generation Indo-Trinidadian parents. He went to London in 1957, where he studied law at Lincoln's Inn, economics at London University, and drama at the London School of Dramatic Arts. Panday returned to **TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** in 1965 to practice law, work with **LABOR** unions, and pursue a political career. By 1973, he was the leader of the All Trinidad Sugar and General Workers' Trade Union.

In 1976, Panday was one of the cofounders of the United Labour Front (ULF), which won 10 of the 36 parliamentary seats in the 1976 elections. In 1981, the ULF allied itself with the Democratic Action Congress (DAC), led by A. N. R. ROBINSON, and the Tapia House Movement (THM), led by Lloyd Best (b. 1934–d. 2007), to form the National Alliance. In the 1981 elections, the ULF won eight seats, and the DAC won two seats. In 1986, the National Alliance joined the Organization for National Reconstruction to create the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), which defeated the People's National Movement (PNM) in the 1986 elections. This was the first time since 1956 that the PNM had not been the majority party.

Panday's ally, Robinson, became prime minister. In 1988, however, Panday had a disagreement with Robinson and left the NAR to form the United National Congress (UNC). In November 1995, Prime Minister PATRICK MANNING called early elections. The PNM and UNC both won 17 seats, and the NAR won two seats. The NAR allied with the UNC, which allowed Panday to become the first Indo-Trinidadian prime minister. In the 2001 elections, the PNM and the UNC both won 18 seats. Robinson, serving as president, appointed Manning prime minister, despite the fact that Panday was the sitting prime minister. In 2005, Panday was arrested on corruption charges. His 2006 conviction, however, was overturned in the Court of Appeals in 2007. Panday continues to lead the Indo-Trinidadian-dominated UNC.

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Paraguay Paraguay is home to approximately 6.5 million people, 95 percent of whom are of mixed Spanish and Amerindian descent (mestizo). Nearly the size of California, at 157,047 square miles (406,752 km²), Paraguay is bordered on the northwest by **BOLIVIA**, on the northeast and east by **BRAZIL**, and on the southeast by **ARGENTINA**. The Paraná River, which forms Paraguay's border with Brazil, flows southward to the Río de la Plata, which provides Paraguay with its only land-based access to the Atlantic Ocean. Paraguay has two distinctive geographic features: grassy plains and tropical forests characterize the eastern sector, while the Chaco region in the western and northern sectors turns to desert as it approaches the Bolivian border.

Guaraní Indians dominated the region when Spanish conquistador Juan de Salazar (d. 1566) founded the city of Asunción on August 15, 1537. Several Jesuit missions dotted the interior landscape, but Paraguay remained a backwater of the Spanish Empire because of its location and lack of resources. Paraguay declared its independence on May 14, 1811, after which three dictators dominated the political scene—José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, Carlos Antonio López, and his son Francisco Solano López—setting a pattern of authoritarian government that lasted until 1989. Paraguay also endured long-term consequences from the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–70), which pitted it against combined Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan forces. Paraguay lost an estimated 18 percent of its prewar male population in the war, as well as some 17,500 square miles (45,325 km²) of its economically valuable territory in the Misiones region to Argentina. Most of its **INDUSTRY**, located mainly in Asunción, was destroyed. From 1870 until 1904, a string of Conservative presidents administered the country. During the same time period, Paraguay experienced an influx of Europeans. Additionally, the **ECONOMY** recovered in line with increased external demand for yerba maté, tannin, and quebracho. Still, Paraguay remained an economically and politically underdeveloped country at the start of the 20th century.

COLORADOS V. LIBERALS: POLITICS OF THE STATE

Although two political parties, the Colorados and the Liberals, dominated the Paraguayan political arena, their ideologies differed little, and each was highly factionalized. In 1904, a group of Liberal exiles supported by

Argentine businessmen and the Argentine navy seized power, but this did not bring political stability. Indeed, 21 different governments administered the country from independence until 1940. While the Liberals dominated Asunción, they did nothing to prevent a small group of Conservative *hacendados* (hacienda owners) from gaining control of the countryside. A small, but vociferous middle sector made up of intellectuals, students, and white-collar and skilled workers emerged in the 1920s to protest Paraguay's corrupt political system. In 1928, the intellectuals formed the National Independent League to press their demand for a "new democracy." With the adverse impact of the Great Depression on Paraguay in the early 1930s, the middle sector added a call for reform in working conditions, public services, and EDUCATION to their agenda. The movement reached a momentary high-water mark in October 1931 when government troops fired on student demonstrators in front of the Government Palace. The ingredients for political and social upheaval were present, despite the fact that peasants, Paraguay's largest sector, remained outside the country's political dynamics, focusing instead on their own survival as workers on the large haciendas, day laborers, or squatters who had settled on unclaimed or unused lands. Instead, the CHACO WAR (1932–35) postponed the upheaval.

Bolivia had long claimed sovereignty over the Chaco, believing that the territory would be of economic value and the construction of a port on the Paraguay River in the northeastern corner of the disputed region would provide it with an access route to the sea, which had been lost in the War of the Pacific (1879–83). The Chaco conflict began on June 15, 1932, when Bolivian and Paraguayan troops clashed at Lake Pitiantuta. For two years, the Paraguayans defeated the Bolivian army in a series of battles at small forts throughout the Chaco but in so doing overextended their lines. With both sides exhausted and drained of men, money, and arms, the combatants agreed to a cease-fire on June 12, 1935. Not until June 21, 1938, did a peace treaty bring the war to a formal end. While the Paraguayans gained control of the disputed territory, the Chaco War illustrated the fragility of their government.

After the 1935 truce, thousands of Paraguayan soldiers returned home dismayed by the Liberals' ineptitude in preparing for, prosecuting, and supporting the war. They also resented the government's refusal to pay pensions to disabled war veterans, while providing MILITARY generals with monthly pensions of 1,500 gold coins. Finally, on February 17, 1936, supported by members of the dissident middle sector, they marched on the Government Palace to force President Eusebio Ayala's (b. 1875–d. 1942) resignation that same day and the installation of General RAFAEL FRANCO. The Paraguayans enthusiastically greeted the arrival of the Febrerista Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Febrerista, or PRF). Other than the distribution of more than 495,000 acres (200,319 ha) of land to 10,000 peasant

families, the Febreristas did not bring a clearly defined philosophy with them. Franco's cabinet represented almost every political ideology found in Paraguay. The government's fragility became evident on August 13, 1937, when the military ousted Franco after he ordered a retreat from some captured Chaco territories. General José Félix Estigarribia (b. 1880–d. 1940), a Chaco War hero, took office. He began a land reform program aimed at providing every Paraguayan family with a small plot of land, balanced the budget, increased the capital of the national bank, instituted municipal reforms, and laid the plans for national highways and public works projects. A new constitution in 1940 enhanced presidential powers and empowered the national government to deal directly with social and economic development issues. If there were to be a new Paraguay, the possibility came to a sudden end on September 5, 1940, however, when Estigarribia died in a plane crash. He was succeeded by War Minister HIGINIO MORÍNIGO.

THE DICTATORS: MORÍNIGO AND STROESSNER

Morínigo inherited the dictatorial powers set down in Estigarribia's constitution and used them to ban the Febreristas and the Liberals and to clamp down on free speech and individual liberties. With the support of a group of young military officers, Morínigo was able to stave off a number of plots to oust him from office until June 3, 1948. Morínigo's pro-Axis stance throughout World War II brought him both criticism and rewards from the United States (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). The United States attempted to lure him to the Allied cause with a multitude of economic assistance dollars, and in June 1943, he became the first Paraguayan president to visit the United States. Although Morínigo severed diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers in February 1942, he permitted German agents to live in the country and to pass information on to their superiors in Argentina, with whom Morínigo maintained a close relationship. Only when victory appeared in sight in February 1945 did he declare war on the Axis. Under pressure at home and from the United States, Morínigo relaxed restrictions on the political opposition and allowed political exiles to return home, but he gave no indication that he intended to step down from the presidency. In March 1947, Morínigo, with the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel ALFREDO STROESSNER, stymied a coup attempt led by Franco and his Febrerista, Liberal, and Communist followers. As a result, only the Colorado Party remained in the political arena, but it quickly split into factions, a hardline group headed by publisher Natalicio González (b. 1897–d. 1966) and the moderate *democráticos* led by Federico Chávez (b. 1881?–d. 1978). González ran unopposed in the May 15, 1948, presidential election, but his presidency was short-lived. Again the military, including Stroessner, intervened by forcing him to leave the country on December 30,

1948. Nine months later, on September 10, 1949, the military allowed Chávez into the presidential palace. Despite a reputation as a Democrat, three weeks into his term, Chávez declared a state of siege. Throughout the political infighting, Morínigo's political influence drastically declined. When Chávez declared a state of siege, Morínigo agreed to leave Paraguay and permanently reside in exile in Buenos Aires.

Two decades of political and social unrest that included depression, war, and civil conflicts had left Paraguay's economy shattered. Both the gross national product (GNP) and per-capita income had dropped drastically, while inflation and a black market characterized the national consumer economy. In early 1954, former Central Bank director Epifanio Méndez Fleitas (b. 1917–d. 1985) joined with Stroessner, now a general and commander in chief of the army, against Chávez. When the latter attempted to dismiss a Stroessner-appointed military officer, the general removed Chávez from office and moved himself into the presidential palace on August 15, 1954. Stroessner immediately declared a state of siege and continued to do so, except for a brief period in 1959, every three months for the interior of the country until 1970 and until 1987 for Asunción. He exiled González and Méndez Fleitas. Stroessner implemented an austerity program and denied workers pay increases. At the

same time, Argentina cancelled a TRADE agreement with Paraguay, and the Colorado Party declined to support Stroessner, giving him every appearance of an isolated leader. Nevertheless, he won a national plebiscite in 1958. This was followed by a guerrilla war against him, allegedly aided by Cuban dictator FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Stroessner gave the military a free hand to suppress the guerrilla insurgency, which led to a terrorist campaign against all the regime's opponents. Because of his strong anticommunist stance, Stroessner received U.S. military and economic assistance during the 1960s and 1970s. The former was used for internal security, while the latter enabled Stroessner to modernize the country's infrastructure. Stroessner also benefited from Brazil's granting Paraguay duty-free access at its Atlantic Coast ports and from the construction of the Itaipú Dam on the Paraná River between the two countries. When opened in 1982, it was the world's largest hydroelectric dam, and because of its own underdevelopment, Paraguay became a net exporter of electric power to Brazil and then Argentina.

RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

By the 1980s, Stroessner faced several opposition groups. The landed elites wanted to return to political power, high-ranking military officers began to jockey among themselves as possible successors to Stroessner, lower-



Paraguay's Government Palace building in Asunción (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

ranking military officers chafed under limitations on promotions and access to graft and corruption opportunities, while peasants and laborers became openly discontent with their continued lack of economic opportunity. Externally, the United States drastically cut back on its military and economic assistance, and Argentina and Brazil, which had jettisoned their military regimes in the early 1980s, pressured Paraguay to do the same. The catalyst to change came in 1987, when the Stroessner faction in the Colorado Party openly anticipated that Stroessner's son, Gustavo (b. 1945–), would become Paraguay's next president. Finally, on February 2, 1989, General Andrés Rodríguez (b. 1923–d. 1997) ousted the Stroessners and their Colorado supporters from power. The Stroessners quickly departed for Brazil.

Rodríguez, linked by marriage to the Stroessner family, became president in 1989, but rather than consolidate his power, he oversaw the rewriting of electoral laws and a new constitution that paved the way for the presidential election of Colorado candidate JUAN CARLOS WASMOSY on May 15, 1993, Paraguay's first civilian president in 40 years. But, political stability did not come quickly. In April 1996, the United States initiated a regional response to prevent General Lino Oviedo (b. 1943–) from ousting Wasmosy. Colorado Party candidates captured the next two presidential elections: Raúl Cubas Grau (b. 1943–) in 1998 and ÓSCAR NICANOR DUARTE FRUTOS (b. 1956–) in April 2003. Although Duarte has made progress in addressing corruption during the Cubas regime and the economy appears to have registered gains in 2006 and 2007, on a per-capita basis, real income appears to have stagnated at 1980 levels. Although Paraguay boasts of a market economy, it has a large informal sector, which makes it impossible to obtain accurate economic data. This sector is engaged in the re-export of goods to the neighboring countries of Argentina and Brazil, as well as thousands of microenterprises and urban street vendors. In addition, a large percentage of the population derives its living from agricultural activities, mostly on the subsistence level.

See also ASUNCIÓN (Vol. II); COLORADO PARTY, PARAGUAY (Vol. III); FRANCIA, JOSÉ GASPAR RODRÍGUEZ DE (Vol. III); GUARANÍ (Vols. I, II); LÓPEZ, CARLOS ANTONIO (Vol. III); PARAGUAY (Vols. I, II, III); SOLANO LÓPEZ, FRANCISCO (Vol. III); WAR OF THE PACIFIC (Vol. III); WAR OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE (Vol. III).

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Patterson, Percival (b. 1935–) *prime minister of Jamaica* Born on April 10, 1935, in Westmoreland, JAMAICA, Percival Patterson earned a B.A. in English from the University of the West Indies in 1958. He subsequently studied at the London School of Economics and was admitted to the Jamaican bar in 1963. A member of the People's National Party (PNP), Patterson entered politics in 1969 after winning a seat representing Western Kingston in a special by-election. During MICHAEL MANLEY's first term as prime minister during the 1970s, Patterson served as minister of tourism. In 1981, as BELIZE prepared for independence, Patterson served as an adviser to the Belizeans and helped them draft their constitution. When Manley returned to power in 1989, Patterson was appointed deputy prime minister.

Citing health reasons, Manley retired in 1992 and was succeeded by Patterson, Jamaica's first black prime minister. Patterson remained in office until 2006, making him the longest continuously serving prime minister in Jamaican history. Patterson revised banking practices, reorganized the taxation system, and implemented numerous incentives in the tourism industry. Significantly, his pragmatic stance on political and economic issues greatly diminished the political violence between Jamaica's two main parties. In 1994, Patterson announced that Jamaica would not recognize the internationally installed government of Gérard Latortue (b. 1934–) in HAITI after the resignation of JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE. Following Aristide's exile from Haiti, Patterson allowed the former Haitian leader to reside temporarily in Jamaica. In February 2006, when Patterson announced his impending retirement, Portia Simpson-Miller (b. 1945–), the vice president of the PNP since 1978, became the party's leader and was sworn in as prime minister on March 30, 2006.

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Paz Estenssoro, Víctor (b. 1907–d. 2001) *president of Bolivia* Born into a landowning family in the Tarija, a department in southern BOLIVIA, Víctor Paz Estenssoro

graduated from high school in 1922 and went on to earn a law degree from the national university in La Paz. He held several government positions until conscripted into the army during the CHACO WAR (1932–35). In 1941, Paz Estenssoro cofounded the NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MNR).

Disillusioned by Bolivia's failure in the Chaco War, Paz Estenssoro became part of the "Chaco Generation" group of middle-sector people who called for an end to elitist control of government and for social reform for NATIVE AMERICANS. His interest in the rights of the indigenous led to his appointment in the Ministry of Housing during the brief presidency (1937–38) of DAVID TORO RUILOVA and to his election to the 1938 constitutional convention that authored a document granting the government the right to intervene in the national ECONOMY and to address social problems.

Paz Estenssoro came to the national forefront in 1941 when he joined with others to form the MNR. A year later, he gained greater notoriety when before Congress he condemned the MILITARY for the December 22–23 slaughter of an estimated 400 miners and their families in the city of Catavi as they demonstrated for higher pay from the Patiño Mining Company (see MINING). Subsequently, Paz Estenssoro and the MNR joined with lower-ranking officers—colonels and lieutenant colonels—who advocated for their greater participation in government. The alliance resulted in the presidential installation on December 20, 1943, of Colonel Gualberto Villarroel (b. 1908–d. 1946), who appointed Paz Estenssoro as minister of finance. Although Paz Estenssoro supported the framework of import-substitution-industrialization, the U.S. State Department saw him as a fascist who had to go. Under U.S. pressure, Paz Estenssoro resigned on July 7, 1946, two weeks before Villarroel fell from power. He went into exile in ARGENTINA, where he witnessed much of the JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN era.

When the military annulled the May 15, 1951, elections and denied Paz Estenssoro the presidency, the MNR organized its miners, who stormed out of the mountains and into La Paz. In 1952, after a three-day bloody confrontation with the military, from April 13 to April 15, the army capitulated, permitting Paz Estenssoro to assume the presidency on April 15, 1952. Under Paz Estenssoro's leadership, the government restructured the military, nationalized the tin INDUSTRY, instituted a land distribution program, and extended suffrage to all Bolivians. Constitutionally ineligible to immediately succeed himself, Paz Estenssoro waited until 1960 to run for the presidency again and was reelected. During this administration, differences between him and Vice President JUAN LECHÍN OQUENDO fractured the party, resulting in the latter's expulsion from it in 1964. Paz Estenssoro amended the constitution to enable him to be reelected on May 31, 1964, but was overthrown by his vice president and air force general René Barrientos (b. 1919–d. 1969) on November 4, 1964. Over the next two decades,

Paz Estenssoro moved in and out of Bolivia, returning in 1979 and 1980 to make unsuccessful presidential bids.

Former dictator HUGO BANZER SUÁREZ defeated Paz Estenssoro in the June 29, 1985, presidential contest, but neither received the 50 percent threshold required for victory. Thus, the National Congress had the final authority and chose Paz Estenssoro. When Paz Estenssoro took office on August 6, 1985, he was committed to neoliberal economic principles to deal with an economy plagued by staggering inflation. In application, this meant a government austerity program that included firing 30,000 miners, repressing LABOR unions, and privatizing government-owned industries. Despite these measures, Bolivia remained South America's poorest nation when Paz Estenssoro retired from politics at the end his term on August 6, 1989. He died of a circulatory ailment at age 93 on June 7, 2001.

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Pelé (Edson Arantes do Nascimento) (b. 1940–) *Brazilian soccer player* Pelé is the nickname given to Edson Arantes do Nascimento, who was born into poverty in the town of Três Corações but spent his childhood and early teenage years in Bauru, SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL. Taught soccer by his father, João Ramos do Nascimento (Dondinho), himself a soccer star, Pelé played street soccer, where he earned his nickname (see SPORTS). One year after joining the Santos Football Club in 1956, Pelé earned a starting position at the age of 16. He would go on to play 1,363 games and score 1,280 goals. He played on the Brazilian national team that won World Cup championships in 1958, 1962, and 1970. He retired from Brazilian soccer in 1972 but three years later joined the New York Cosmos of the North American Soccer League (NASL). Pelé led the Cosmos to the NASL championship in 1977, the same year that the league folded. Known more for his flamboyant style and pleasant personality rather than his fundamental skills, Pelé became an ambassador of international soccer. The International Olympic Committee named him athlete of the century in 1999.

Twice married, Pelé is the father of five children. Following his soccer career, Pelé labored in public relations, journalism, film, and music. He also authored two novels. Although critics denounced his failure to criticize Brazil's MILITARY regime, Pelé epitomized the culture and optimism of most Brazilians.

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PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos) PEMEX is Mexico's state-owned oil company. It is one of the nation's largest companies and is in charge of all oil exploration, extraction, refining, processing, and marketing in MEXICO. PEMEX has been a major part of the Mexican ECONOMY throughout the 20th century. It accounts for a large portion of government income and a significant percentage of export revenue.

PEMEX was created in 1938 by President LÁZARO CÁRDENAS when Mexico expropriated foreign-owned oil operations and nationalized the industry. National control of the country's natural resources had been one of the objectives of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION, and government authority to nationalize major industries had been outlined in the CONSTITUTION OF 1917. Cárdenas's expropriation of the petroleum INDUSTRY elicited strong feelings of nationalism in Mexico, but it also angered foreign oil companies, which launched a boycott against Mexican oil. U.S. and European companies protested Mexico's initial settlement offers, and a standoff ensued until the late months of 1941. The exigencies of World War II contributed to the resolution to the conflict (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA).

Since its inception, PEMEX has dominated the Mexican economy. From the 1950s to the 1970s, it served as a hallmark of the Mexican economic policy of import-substitution industrialization, under which the government nationalized major industries. These policies ended with the economic crises of the 1980s, and many major industries were privatized, but the government has retained control of PEMEX. The company has helped Mexico become one of largest petroleum-producing countries in the world. PEMEX remains an important source of government income and a symbol of ardent Mexican nationalism.

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Pérez, Carlos Andrés (b. 1922–) *president of Venezuela* Born in the Andean village of Rubio, VENEZUELA, Carlos Andrés Pérez was influenced by the policies of dictator JUAN VICENTE GÓMEZ, which led him down the path of political populism to work on behalf of LABOR in his home region and then to the Venezuelan Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, or AD) party. As a teenager, Pérez became active in the party and served as personal secretary to RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO during his first presidency from October 18, 1945, until his ouster by the MILITARY on February 17, 1948. Pérez fled into exile in COSTA RICA, where he

and Betancourt authored antimilitary works. Pérez also spent time in CUBA and PANAMA and occasionally made clandestine trips into Venezuela. Pérez later became a champion of Third World causes and proposed that it unite in its dealings with the industrialized world. He returned to Venezuela following the overthrow of dictator MARCOS PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ on January 23, 1958, to become Betancourt's minister of finance.

Nominated as the AD's presidential candidate, Pérez campaigned in almost every Venezuelan village before winning the December 9, 1973, elections with 48 percent of the popular vote. His first presidency (1974–79) was best known for the government's nationalization of the petroleum and iron ore industries. "CAP," as Pérez was popularly known at the time, used the newfound oil revenues to initiate state-sponsored welfare programs. When Pérez commenced his second presidential term on February 2, 1989, he immediately confronted a precipitous drop in global oil prices. He accepted International Monetary Fund assistance that required a government austerity program. The loss of oil revenues and the austerity measures contributed to his growing unpopularity and an increasing number of protests against his administration. Finally, after two failed coup attempts, on February 4, 1992, Lieutenant Colonel HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS engineered Pérez's ouster. After being sentenced to a two-year prison term for corruption, Pérez left Venezuela, first for the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and then to Miami, Florida, where he currently resides.

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Pérez Jiménez, Marcos (b. 1914–d. 2001) *president of Venezuela* Born in the Michelena municipality of Táchira District, in VENEZUELA, Marcos Pérez Jiménez received his education in local schools before entering Venezuela's MILITARY academy in 1931, from which he graduated in 1934 at the top of his class. He subsequently studied at PERU's military college.

In 1943, Pérez Jiménez organized the Patriotic Military Union (Unión Patriótica Militar, or UPM) that stood in opposition to President Isaiás Medina (b. 1897–d. 1953) and led to Pérez Jiménez's arrest on October 18, 1945. His arrest instigated the military overthrow of Medina and installation of RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO in the presidential palace. Betancourt quickly dispatched an infuriated Pérez Jiménez on a lengthy diplomatic tour abroad. Pérez Jiménez returned

to Venezuela three years later to organize another military coup, ousting President Rómulo Gallegos (b. 1884–d. 1968) on November 24, 1948, and ending three years of civilian rule. Pérez Jiménez served as a member of the junta until December 2, 1952, when it overthrew the caretaker government of Germán Suárez Flamerich and named Pérez Jiménez president. He remained in office until removed by another military coup on January 23, 1958.

Pérez Jiménez's administration was noted for its abuse of civil and political rights, as well as corruption and fraud. On the positive side, Pérez Jiménez undertook an extensive infrastructure program including the construction of roads and bridges, government buildings, public housing, and the glittery Humboldt Hotel overlooking CARACAS. After being ousted from office in 1958, Pérez Jiménez went into exile in the United States until his extradition home in 1963 to face charges that he grafted for himself \$200 million in government funds during his presidency. Pérez Jiménez remained in prison during his five-year trial. After being found guilty of the charges, the government released him from prison. Pérez Jiménez returned to Spain, residing in Alcobendas until his death on September 20, 2001, at the age of 87.

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Permanent Treaty of 1934 The Permanent Treaty of 1934 went into effect on June 9, 1934, following its ratification by the U.S. and Cuban Senates. It replaced the 1903 Permanent Treaty (see PLATT AMENDMENT). The treaty resulted from converging influences within CUBA and the United States. During the 1920s, Cuban student groups emerged as the most vocal nationalist group criticizing U.S. presence in the country. The climax came in September 1933 with the so-called Sergeant's Revolt, which brought RAMÓN GRAU SAN MARTÍN to the presidency. When he unilaterally abrogated the Platt Amendment, Grau's assertion momentarily satisfied Cuban nationalists but did not meet the requirements of the 1903 treaty that legalized the Platt Amendment between the two countries. The 1903 treaty required a negotiated termination of the agreement.

During the same time period, the United States was moving away from its interventionist policies in the Caribbean region toward a noninterventionist stance, as found in the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY of President Franklin

D. Roosevelt. For Cuba, this meant negotiations that led to the Permanent Treaty of 1934. While terminating the 1903 agreement, the 1934 treaty certified that all acts of the U.S. military government in Cuba from 1898 to 1902 had been ratified by the Cuban government and that they would remain in effect permanently. Additionally, the United States maintained its lease rights to Guantánamo Naval Base and that the lease could be terminated only by mutual agreement.

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Perón, Isabel Martínez de (María Estela Martínez de Perón) (b. 1931–)

president of Argentina The third wife of Argentine president JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN, Isabel Martínez de Perón served as vice president during his 1973–74 presidency and succeeded him as president following his death on July 1, 1974. Born María Estela Martínez to a lower-middle-class family in La Rioja, ARGENTINA, Isabel, as she was called, pursued a career as a cabaret dancer. She met her future husband in PANAMA while he was in exile. She went with him to Spain in 1960, where they married. They returned to Argentina in 1973, and Martínez de Perón stood as his running mate in the presidential election. She came to the presidency without political experience or the charisma of MARÍA EVA DUARTE DE PERÓN, Perón's second wife. Martínez de Perón inherited a country plagued by a fledgling guerrilla war, rising oil prices, LABOR unions pressing for significant wage increases, and a fractured Peronist Party. She fell under the influence of right-wing Peronist José López Rega (b. 1916–d. 1989), who convinced her to purge the cabinet of moderate ministers and crack down on labor unions. The confrontation between government and labor resulted in strikes, demonstrations, and the assassination of the regime's political and intellectual opponents and labor leaders. The ECONOMY careened out of control, with a drastic drop in exports and an inflation rate of 335 percent in 1975. Given the chaotic conditions, the military deposed Isabel Perón on March 4, 1976, replaced her with General Jorge Rafael Videla (b. 1925–), and launched a vicious campaign known as the DIRTY WAR against all leftists, real or imagined. Perón retired to Spain, where she maintained close ties with the family of one-time Spanish strongman Francisco Franco. On January 12, 2007, the 75-year-old Perón was arrested

in Spain on an Argentine warrant for her alleged role in the political assassinations during her brief presidency. She was released from prison and placed under house arrest pending further judicial actions in Argentina and Spain.

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Perón, Juan Domingo (b. 1895–d. 1974) *president of Argentina* Considered the mastermind of a coup d'état in June 1943 that toppled civilian president Ramón Castillo (b. 1879–d. 1944), Juan Domingo Perón became ARGENTINA'S most dominant political figure in the 20th century. He served as president in 1946–55 and again in 1973–74. His influence remains present today.

Although his parents later married, Perón was born on October 8, 1895, the illegitimate son of Mario Tomás Perón, a farmer, and Juana Sosa Toledo, reportedly a mestizo, in Lobos, Buenos Aires Province. Following his graduation in 1913 as a second lieutenant from the national MILITARY academy, Perón moved slowly through the ranks, earning distinction as an instructor of noncommissioned officers and being appointed in 1926 to Argentina's Superior War School. Following his graduation in 1929, Perón was assigned to the General Staff Headquarters, where he became involved in 1930 in General José F. Uriburu's (b. 1868–d. 1932) plan to overthrow President Hipólito Yrigoyen (b. 1892–d. 1943). At the last moment, Perón switched his allegiance to another plotter, General José Augustín P. Justo (b. 1876–d. 1948), a move that proved costly because Uriburu acted first. For his misjudgment, Perón spent two years on the Bolivian frontier until Justo finally pushed Uriburu out in 1932. Perón benefited from the change with subsequent assignments at the Superior War School and in Argentina's embassies in CHILE and in Italy. The latter assignment enabled Perón to observe Benito Mussolini's fascist state, which confirmed his own political and economic thoughts. Returning to Argentina in 1941, Perón joined commercial and agricultural isolationist groups that benefited financially from the conflict and who labored to keep Argentina out of WORLD WAR II. With colleagues in the Group of United Officers (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, or GOU), Perón engineered the overthrow of President Ramón Castillo on June 4, 1943.

Perón had himself appointed head of the LABOR department in the new government, a position he used to launch his political career. He granted labor many rights, but most important, he encouraged and then settled strikes on the worker's behalf. He also supported labor's nationalism that challenged oligarchic rule and British and U.S. presence in the Argentine ECONOMY. Concerned with his growing popularity and political ambitions, the

military officers forced Perón into exile in October 1945, but it lasted only eight days because of massive demonstrations on his behalf. A year later, Perón was elected Argentina's president.

Perón moved quickly to implement his campaign promises for economic independence, national sovereignty, and social justice. He established a corporate state by which the agriculturalists, industrialists, and laborers were organized into separate units supervised by the state. The government paid the *estancieros*, or ranchers, a fixed below-market price for their beef, wheat, and wool and then sold the products globally at market prices through the Institute for the Promotion of Trade (Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio, or IAPI), a state-owned trading monopoly created in 1947. Perón used the profits for his other projects. To achieve economic independence he encouraged the development of new industries through government subsidies and loans and protective tariffs and by nationalizing foreign-owned infrastructure, such as electricity, railroads, docks, and warehouses. Perón used some of the profits from the IAPI to pay the British, French, and North American owners for their losses. He also paid off Argentina's foreign debt. Perón's policies provided the workers with increased wages, health benefits, paid vacations, and improved working conditions. His wife, MARÍA



This 1950 photo shows Juan and Eva Perón of Argentina. (AP Photo)

EVA DUARTE DE PERÓN, herself a product of Argentina's poorer classes, provided significant assistance to her husband through her own social foundation that, in part, had been well financed by forced pledges of funds from society's elite sectors. The *descamisados*, or "shirtless ones," as the workers were called, vaulted Perón to reelection in 1951, following the amendment of the 1853 constitution permitting consecutive presidential terms.

Not pleased with the loss of profits, the *estancieros* boycotted the administration by withholding production of their primary products, meaning that Perón had less to offer the world market, a market where demand and prices had also declined as the European and other economies recovered from war. Within Argentina, the upper and middle sectors increasingly protested Perón's appeal to urban labor, whose increasingly violent demonstrations appeared to threaten Argentina's stability. The threat became a reality in 1955 when Perón legalized divorce and proposed to end the CATHOLIC CHURCH'S involvement in public EDUCATION. These acts resulted in Perón's excommunication and public criticism of him by the church's higher clergy. In turn, mobs of Peronists demonstrated against the church's leadership and took the torch to many historic churches in BUENOS AIRES. The conservative military officers forced Perón's resignation on September 15, 1955, and sent him into exile, first to PARAGUAY and then to Spain, where he remained until 1973.

During Perón's 18-year absence, the Peronists—by then the largest singular group of voters in urban areas—showed their political strength either by boycotting elections or electing their own leaders to congressional or provincial office. In this same time period, the Peronists suffered significantly from the government-imposed economic austerity measures. Understandably, they welcomed Perón's return to Argentina and to the presidency in 1973. Perón, however, knew that the Argentine economy could not sustain the worker's demands, but before he could earn their wrath for doing nothing on their behalf, Perón died of heart disease on July 1, 1974.

Peronism did not pass with the president's death. The Peronist party remained the country's most potent political group, but its leadership fell victim to the military's DIRTY WAR during the late 1970s. Following Argentina's return to democracy, the Peronists overwhelmingly supported CARLOS SAÚL MENEM'S bid for the presidency in 1994 and again in 1999. Despite labor's support, Menem's neoliberal policies continued the practice of selling state-owned industries, mostly to foreign companies, whose downsizing increased unemployment. Menem also pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar, a move that drained the country's financial reserves and contributed to the economic meltdown that beset Argentina in 2000 (see ARGENTINA, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN). Following a period of political and economic instability, President NÉSTOR KIRCHNER used support from the International Monetary Fund to stabilize the economy and restore eco-

nomie growth, but he has yet to deal with labor's demand for improved wages and job security.

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Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita) (b. 1919–d. 1952) *influential and popular First Lady of Argentina* María Eva Duarte de Perón, popularly known as Evita, was the illegitimate daughter of Juan Duarte and Juana Ibargurén. She became the second wife of Argentine president JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN and First Lady of ARGENTINA. Raised and schooled in the town of Junín, some 150 miles from BUENOS AIRES, Evita moved to the capital city at age 15 to seek a career in theater and film, but fame and fortune in those endeavors eluded her. Her breakthrough came in 1942 when she signed a long-term radio contract for the popular radio program *Great Women in History*, which gave her a vast public audience. A year later, with others she founded the LABOR union known as the Argentine Radio Syndicate, a position that gave her entry into Argentine politics.

Evita met Perón during a fund-raising event for earthquake victims in San Juan, Argentina. Shortly thereafter the two lived together, which shocked many Argentines at the time and impeded Perón's political ambitions. Evita used her radio program to extol Perón's virtues. His growing influence over and popularity among the Argentine working class alarmed many of his colleagues within the ruling military junta and led to his arrest on October 9, 1945. For the next six days, crowds estimated as high 350,000 demonstrated in front of the presidential residence in Buenos Aires, demanding his release. Evita's role in this affair is not clear. On one side, she is portrayed as organizing and stirring people to protest, while on the other side, she reportedly did little more than press for a writ of habeas corpus. Perón was released on October 17, and on October 21, the two were married.

Perón resigned his MILITARY position in order to be constitutionally eligible to seek the presidency in 1946. Evita played an important role in his campaign, often

traveling with him outside Buenos Aires. She also used her radio program to promote Perón as a populist who would address the problems of the *descamisados* (shirtless ones), as the workers were known. Perón won the February 24, 1946, presidential election. As she had during the campaign, Evita sat in strategy sessions with the president and his advisers, which infuriated the elite. She is known to have played a crucial role in policy making during Perón's first administration.

Evita's popularity grew following the establishment of the Eva Perón Foundation, which served the poor. Government funds were augmented by monies reluctantly donated by the Argentine elite to build schools and medical clinics in poorer communities across Argentina. Once constructed, the government assumed operational expenses. The foundation also paid medical and utility bills for the poor and distributed food and clothing to them. As a result, Evita developed a strong following, particularly among women. Her popularity at home did not transcend the Atlantic Ocean in 1947 when she visited Europe as a stand-in for her husband. Only in Spain, where she met dictator Francisco Franco, did she receive a warm reception. Visits to Rome and Paris were more subdued, and in Germany and Switzerland, she faced protests. Evita canceled a scheduled visit to Great Britain after the British government denied her request to stay at Buckingham Palace.

In the political arena, Evita established the women's branch of the Peronist Party, which numbered nearly 500,000 persons by 1951, the same year that Congress rewrote the 1853 constitution to permit Perón to seek another six-year term and granted women the right to vote. But the Peróns' desire to have Evita serve as Juan's vice-presidential running mate in the 1952 presidential election was too much for the military officer corps and the Argentine elite. Without a vice-presidential running mate, Perón won the October 27, 1952, elections with 67 percent of the popular vote and was the overwhelming choice among female participants.

By mid-1951, Evita's declining health became apparent. A victim of cervical cancer, operations, and chemotherapy, which was new at the time, could not save her life. She died on July 26, 1952. Countless thousands lined the route of her funeral procession. For two years, Evita's embalmed body remained in her office at the General Confederation of Workers headquarters. Before the completion of the crypt and monument that was to serve as her final resting place, the military ousted President Perón on September 19, 1955, and clandestinely dispatched Evita's body to a secret burial site in Milan, Italy, where it remained for 16 years. It was exhumed in 1971 and sent to Spain, where the exiled Perón kept it in his home. Following his death in 1974, his third wife, ISABEL MARTÍNEZ DE PERÓN, brought Evita's body to Argentina for burial in BUENOS AIRES's most prestigious Recoleta neighborhood cemetery. Her legacy lives on through numerous books, documentaries, films, and the continu-

ing world tour of Tim Rice and Andrew Lloyd Webber's musical production *Evita*.

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Peru Peru is located on the Pacific coast of South America, bordered on the north by ECUADOR and COLOMBIA, the east by BRAZIL, the southeast by BOLIVIA, and the south by CHILE. Totaling 496,225 square miles (191,593.5 km²), Peru is South America's third-largest country and approximately three times the size of the U.S. state of California. Peru has three identifiable geographic regions: the western and coastal plains, the central rugged Andean mountains, and the eastern lowlands with tropical forests that are part of the Amazon Basin. Forty-five percent of Peru's 28.8 million inhabitants are NATIVE AMERICANS, mostly Quechua and Aymara; 37 percent are mestizo; 15 percent are European; and 3 percent are African, Japanese, Chinese, and other groups. From 1940 to 2005, a steady flow of rural-to-urban MIGRATION contributed to the growth of cities so that in 2005, 74.6 percent of the total population lived in urban centers. Peru has 21 cities with more than 100,000 people.

Although there is evidence of human presence in Peru dating to 11,000 B.C.E., organized societies appeared around 3000 B.C.E. At the time of Francisco Pizarro's arrival in 1532, the Incas were the dominant group and, in fact, were the largest indigenous society in pre-Columbian America, with an empire stretching from northern Ecuador to central Chile. Spanish conquistadores completed the Incas' capitulation by 1533 and in 1542 established the Viceroyalty of Peru, from which the Spanish initially governed all of South America. For the next 200 years, the Spanish used forced Amerindian LABOR to work Peru's vast silver and gold mines. Although Peruvian independence was declared on July 18, 1821, it was not until the Spanish lost the Battle of Junín on August 6, 1824, and the Battle of Ayacucho on December 9 the same year that Peru became free for all practical purposes. Spain finally recognized Peru's independence in 1879. Key features of 19th-century Peru included the Liberal-Conservative political conflict, the exploitation of guano by foreigners, and the loss of the Tarapaca and Arica Provinces to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879–83).

THE OLD ORDER UNDER DURESS

After the War of the Pacific, new coastal elites emerged through the production and exportation of cotton and sugar, and the MINING of lead, zinc, iron, and copper.

Peruvians dominated the agricultural elite, while foreign, mostly U.S., companies dominated the mining sector. The Peruvian elites coalesced into the Civilista Party, which dominated the country's presidency through World War I. Although property qualifications and literacy tests served to limit the electorate, the Civilistas also resorted to fraud to ensure that their candidates won elections. The economic changes contributed to new social patterns. While coastal peasants continued to work the agricultural estates, additional Amerindian laborers were brought in from the Andean sierra as *enganchados*, or workers indebted by cash advances. The mining INDUSTRY attracted rural labor and contributed to the establishment of urban communities. Neither labor group, however, shared in the distribution of wealth. The system contributed to a growing social consciousness, which surfaced in 1919 at the end of World War I.

The urbanization of Peru also gave rise to a nascent labor movement, as seen in the labor strikes of 1910 and 1911. The strikes only intensified with the loss of overseas markets that accompanied the war in 1914 (see WORLD WAR I AND LATIN AMERICA). The ideals of the Mexican and Russian Revolutions prompted new schools of intellectual thought. *Indigenismo* caught the attention of many artists and writers who wished to celebrate the glories of the indigenous past. The movement also brought to the forefront the marginalized Amerindian and mestizo middle sector and laboring groups. In 1918 and 1919, university students joined the protest against the status quo, and all found solace in a new group of reformers headed by VÍCTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE and JOSÉ CARLOS MARIÁTEGUI. In 1919, the Regional Peruvian Labor Federation (Federación Obrera Regional Peruana, or FORP) and socialist and workers' parties were established. Considered moderate in its tone, FORP unsuccessfully sought industrywide and nationwide collective bargaining, while the two POLITICAL PARTIES were Marxist in their orientation and, therefore, an anathema to the elites.

The immediate political beneficiary of these changes was former president AUGUSTO B. LEGUÍA, who returned from abroad to win the May 1919 presidential election. Sensing that the elite would oust him from office, Leguía acted first. On July 4, 1919, he engineered a coup d'état against President José Pardo (b. 1864–d. 1947) and set in motion an 11-year period of dictatorial rule known as the Ocenio. Leguía legitimized his position through a new constitution in 1920. The constitution gave the central government authority over the ECONOMY, including the power to set prices, impose taxes, and manage labor-management relations. Leguía suppressed the indigenous, labor, and student movements and purged Congress of opposition, exiling many members. Leguía also had the constitution amended so he could run for the presidency again in 1924 and 1929. He pursued an export-based economic policy and opened the door to foreign investment on favorable terms, but neither provided sufficient

tax revenues to pay for his extensive infrastructure program. In addition, Peru's reliance on the importation of consumer and industrial goods resulted in an unfavorable balance of TRADE.

Leguía was not without opposition. Two of his most significant critics who had a long-term influence on Peruvian society and politics were Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre. A Marxist, in 1928, Mariátegui founded the Peruvian Socialist Party (later the Peruvian Communist Party, or PCP). He accepted the class conflict view of history that saw revolution as the only way to correct inequitable socioeconomic systems. Mariátegui believed the long history of Peru's peasant rebellion could be melded into a Marxist movement. In 1924, Haya de la Torre organized the AMERICAN POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE (APRA), which he envisioned as a continent-wide, anti-imperialist alliance that would incorporate the middle class, peasants, and workers to create a new society. With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, Leguía's popularity dwindled to an all-time low, prompting the MILITARY to oust him from office on August 25, 1930.

For two generations after Leguía's ouster, the military and the landed elite supported each other as actors on the political right, confronting the forces on the left, particularly APRA and the PCP. The 1930s were dominated by General Óscar R. Benavides (b. 1876–d. 1945), who benefited from increased exports of cotton, lead, zinc, and petroleum after 1933, which restored economic growth and resulted in a doubling of trade by 1936. In 1934, he commenced the state-directed development of petroleum. He used a significant portion of the associated government tax receipts for public works and social projects, including the construction of roads and working-class housing and setting up a compulsory social security system. Benavides's economic development policies were modified by his two successors, Manuel Prado (b. 1889–d. 1967) and José L. Bustamante (b. 1894–d. 1989), by strengthening the government's role in the economy and reducing the country's reliance on exports. In the midst of post-World War II food shortages and inflation, Bustamante approved a contract in 1946 giving the International Petroleum Company (IPC) permission to search for oil in the Sechura Desert (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). While the sugar barons seethed at the government's trade restrictions, the oil concession to the Canadian subsidiary of Standard Oil initiated a nationalist chorus of protest.

The coastal elite turned to the military for redress, and on October 29, 1948, General Manuel A. Odría (b. 1897–d. 1974) ousted President Bustamante. Odría's pro-planter policies included the return to an export-based economy, the lifting of trade restrictions, and the encouragement of foreign investments in oil and mining. Odría sought U.S. advice on currency stabilization. Odría also reached out to the coastal urban workers and extended suffrage to WOMEN in 1955. For these actions,

some analysts have compared Odría to Argentina's JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN. Odría, however, turned on his critics, particularly the *apristas*. To escape deportation, Haya de la Torre took refuge in the Colombian embassy, where he remained for five years. Regime dissenters found their civil rights violated.

The Odría-oligarchy alliance came under increasing attack in the 1956 presidential election and reached its climax in the June 10, 1962, contest when APRA's Haya de la Torre captured the largest number of popular votes but only 33 percent of the total vote. Believing that Congress might favor Haya de la Torre, the military dismissed Congress and established a ruling junta until a new election was held on June 9, 1963. This was won by Acción Popular candidate FERNANDO BELAÚNDE TERRY with support from the Partido Democrático Cristiano (PDC), which represented the rural poor. The military-oligarchy belief that Belaúnde Terry would not change the existing socioeconomic order quickly dissipated. Although he attempted to form a national consensus among all sectors, his focus on the needs of workers and peasants, increasing the state's role in the economy and social services, and call for land reform only fostered opposition from the elite and military officers. While Congress emasculated his land reform program, the proposal itself inspired some 300,000 peasants in 1966 to rise up and seize land. Belaúnde Terry sent the military into the countryside to suppress the peasant movement with bombs and napalm. The military action left some 8,000 dead, another 19,000 homeless, countless wounded, and about 34,600 acres (14,000 ha) of land destroyed. Belaúnde Terry's standing fell further in 1967 when the public became aware of the government's claims settlement with IPC. The agreement failed to settle the government's claim to back taxes. It also left the government in control of the depleted La Brea-Pariñas oil fields while granting IPC access to new fields in the Amazon and allowing it to purchase government-produced crude oil at fixed low prices. Similar to the 1946 contract, this agreement resulted in a national protest. The proposed land reform and the IPC contract coupled with the nation's downward economic slide led to the military's again seizing the presidential palace, on October 3, 1968.

CHALLENGE FROM THE POLITICAL LEFT

General Juan Velasco Alvarado (b. 1910–d. 1977) led the junta that replaced Belaúnde Terry. Instead of seeing itself as a caretaker government, the junta declared its intention to bring far-reaching changes to Peru. The group of military officers that accompanied Velasco to power did not represent the Peruvian elite but rather came from middle- and lower-class mestizo and "*cholo*" (Amerindian) backgrounds from provincial areas. Velasco himself was a *cholo*. These officers had a genuine sympathy with the plight of the long-oppressed peasantry. Resembling the concept of a corporate state, the government took control of each of the nation's economic sectors. Among

Velasco's first measures was the expropriation of the large coastal sugar haciendas for distribution to peasant cooperatives through a government agency, the Agricultural Society for Social Interest (SAIS). By 1979, nearly 27.2 million acres (11 million ha) of agro-grazing land had been distributed in this manner.

The government instituted an "industrial community" law that required all manufacturing enterprises employing more than six workers to allow these employees to acquire 50 percent of the operation and have representatives sit on the company's board of directors. By 1974, 3,500 such communities with more than 200,000 members controlled 13 percent of the total shares in their firms. The government also reduced the amount of foreign investment in the country. At the time of Velasco's government takeover, 242 firms controlled 44 percent of Peru's industrial production. To stem the tide of future investment, the government's regulation board prohibited the foreign purchase of viable local firms and restricted foreign involvement in certain industrial sectors. The government also nationalized IPC and established Petro Perú to operate the oil industry. The government took over other foreign-owned operations in banking and mining, most of which were U.S. firms.

The blighted squatter settlements in Peru's urban centers stood as the most significant social challenge to the Velasco regime. LIMA alone had an estimated 750,000 such residents in 1970. Lacking such basic infrastructure as clean water, sewerage facilities, and electricity, these settlements served as a potential source of disease, crime, and exploitation by political activists. The government organized them into "young towns" (*pueblos jóvenes*), granted land titles, and implemented infrastructure programs. The National System for Support of Social Mobilization (SINAMOS) served as the integrating institution for peasants and urban workers. This medium of supervision enabled the government to keep abreast of the pulse of the downtrodden and attempt to meet their needs, arbitrate their disputes, and hopefully contribute to political stability.

Velasco was not without opposition. The local elite and their allies within the military, the U.S. firms whose Peruvian operations were nationalized, and the middle sector whose civil rights had been trampled upon by the military stood in protest. Rural and urban workers, feeling more secure under the Velasco administration, increased their demands for better wages and working and living conditions. In 1975 alone, there were 779 work stoppages.

Owing to a circulatory problem, Velasco resigned on August 30, 1975, and was replaced immediately by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (b. 1921–). Amid a slowing economy and worker protest, in 1976 Bermúdez accepted an International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance package and announced Plan Túpac Amaru to deal with the situation. In addition to the IMF-imposed government austerity program, Bermúdez

set about dismantling the Velasco reform program. This included a return to direct foreign investment, privatization, and economic decentralization.

In the aftermath of military rule and the adverse impact of economic policies on the people, Peruvian politics moved to the left during the 1980s, first under Belaúnde Terry, who returned to the presidency from 1980 to 1984, and then under APRA candidate ALAN GARCÍA PÉREZ from 1985 to 1990. Belaúnde Terry's implementation of neoliberal economic programs and acceptance of an IMF financial bailout ran afoul of the Latin American debt crisis triggered by MEXICO's default on its international loans in 1982, followed by a global recession. García attempted to address the economic adversity through a stimulus package that reduced interest rates, froze prices, and devalued the currency. After a brief boom, the crisis worsened, and García announced a government default on its international debt. As a result of its economic failure, analysts describe the 1980s as Peru's "lost decade." Amid Peru's doldrums, a self-professed antiestablishment champion of the people, not affiliated with any political party but supported by an ad-hoc organization, Cambio 90 (Change 90), ALBERTO KENYA FUJIMORI won the June 11, 1990, elections.

When he took office on July 28, 1990, Fujimori inherited a country wracked by hyperinflation: 7,482 percent in 1990 and a -7 percent annual gross domestic product (GDP) rate. Fujimori also confronted two ruthless guerrilla movements that had surfaced and grown during the 1980s: the SHINING PATH and the TÚPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA). While both groups operated in the rural highlands, MRTA also took its violence to urban centers, particularly Lima. Fujimori addressed the country's problems in a fashion similar to that of CHILE's AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE. He introduced neoliberal reforms and a government austerity program that had reduced inflation to an annual rate of 139 percent by 1992 and advanced the annual GDP to 6.7 percent in 1995. He also privatized several state-owned companies, removed barriers to foreign investment, and generally improved public finances. The military was set loose to effectively crush the Shining Path and MRTA, despite the latter's 127-day seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima, which began in April 1997. The military also silenced civilian opposition without recourse for its civil and HUMAN RIGHTS violations. Fujimori ordered censorship of the press and directed the weakening of labor unions. With the opposition significantly weakened, he captured the April 9, 1995, presidential election. One analyst asserted that Fujimori had effectively established an "illiberal democracy," that is, despite free elections, political and human rights are ignored. Although constitutionally questionable, Fujimori captured a third presidential term in 2000 when his opponent, Alejandro Toledo (b. 1946–) of the Possible Peru party, withdrew from the race on May 24 that year. His term, however, was short lived. Amid cries of corruption and continued

civil and human rights violations, Fujimori resigned from office on November 22, 2000, while "visiting" Japan. In November 6, 2005, he fled to Chile. On September 25, 2007, the Chilean Supreme Court ordered his extradition to Peru to stand trial on charges of government corruption and human rights violations.

Peru's economic conditions improved measurably under Presidents Toledo, who took office on July 28, 2001, and García, who was returned to the presidency in the June 4, 2006, election with 52.4 percent of the popular vote. The GDP steadily improved from an annual rate of 4.9 percent in 2002 to 8 percent in 2008, while inflation was down to a 2 percent annual rate in 2007. Construction, mining, textiles, and agricultural exports brought about general economic expansion, while political stability encouraged foreign investment. Peru concluded the Trade Promotion Agreement with the United States on April 19, 2006, that provided greater access to the Peruvian market for U.S. agricultural goods, while permitting Peru greater flexibility on its tariff policies. Following legislative ratification in both countries, the agreement went into effect on December 14, 2007. Despite the progress, however, an estimated 44 percent of Peruvians live below the poverty level. In an effort to address that problem, President García intends to pursue the economic development program in Peru's southern and central highlands, home to the majority of indigenous people, whom the government has historically neglected.

See also CIVILISTA PARTY (Vol. III); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); INCAS (Vol. I); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); PERU (Vols. I, II, III); PERU, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); PIZARRO, FRANCISCO (Vol. I); QUECHUA (Vol. I); WAR OF THE PACIFIC (Vol. III).

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Pindling, Lynden (b. 1930–d. 2000) *premier and prime minister of the Bahamas* Born on March 22, 1930, to middle-class black parents in Nassau, the BAHAMAS, Lynden Pindling graduated from Government High School in Nassau in 1946. For two years, he worked as a clerk in the Post Office Savings Bank. In 1948, he went to London to study law at the University of London, where he graduated in 1952. Pindling returned to the Bahamas in 1953 to help establish the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). Dissatisfied with white minority rule, the PLP sought to achieve a greater political voice for the black population.

In 1967, Pindling defeated ROLAND SYMONETTE'S United Bahamian Front (UBF), a political party dominated by white political and economic interests. While both the PLP and the UBF won 18 seats in the House of Assembly, one of the independent representatives chose to sit with the PLP, enabling Pindling to form a government. Pindling led the nation to independence in 1973, becoming the first prime minister of the Bahamas. Pindling encouraged tourism, developed the local infrastructure, and initiated numerous social welfare services. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1983.

Despite allegations of abuse of state-owned companies, nepotism, and involvement in international drug trafficking during the 1980s, Pindling was able to maintain control of the government in free elections. In 1992, although Pindling retained his South Andros seat in the House of Assembly, his party was defeated by the Free National Movement (FNM), a socially liberal and economically conservative political party formed in 1971 by conservative dissidents from the PLP and members of the UBF. Pindling retired from politics and leadership of the PLP in 1997 and died of prostate cancer on August 25, 2000. The Nassau International Airport was renamed in his honor in 2006. Pindling has also been honored by having his portrait depicted on the Bahamian \$1 bill.

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Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto (b. 1915–d. 2006) *dictator of Chile* Born into a middle-class family in Valparaíso, CHILE, Pinochet entered Chile's Army Academy at age 17 in 1933 and graduated in 1938. On January 30, 1943, he married Lucía Hiriart, with whom he had five children. Pinochet rose through the ranks of the army, in 1971 becoming division general and commandant of the garrison in SANTIAGO DE CHILE, considered the most prestigious and influential MILITARY assignment. A year later, he was appointed chief of staff of the army and in 1973 commander in chief. Pinochet

was part of the military triumvirate that ousted President SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS on September 11, 1973, and the governing junta that replaced him.

Pinochet had had a distinguished military career. He undertook assignments throughout Chile and was a member of the Chilean military mission to the United States. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, he held teaching positions at Chile's Military School and War Academy and at ECUADOR'S War Academy. He was considered a specialist in geopolitics and military geography. His 1968 book, *Geopolítica*, went through seven editions. During his military career, Pinochet, a staunch constitutionalist, became frustrated with the stagnation in Chilean politics and its drift to the left. The turbulence that accompanied President Allende's 1970–73 administration convinced Pinochet that the country was spiraling into anarchy. He was not alone in this belief. On August 22, 1973, the Chamber of Deputies approved a resolution asserting that Chilean democracy had broken down and called for Allende's ouster, by military force if necessary. Allende, who was maneuvering for his own survival, appointed Pinochet commander in chief of the army the following day. If he had reasoned that Pinochet and the military would remain loyal to him, he was wrong. Over the next few weeks, Pinochet and his fellow chiefs of staff Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro (b. 1915–d. 1996) and air force commander Gustavo Leigh Guzmán (b. 1920–d. 1999), plotted Allende's ouster, which occurred on September 11, 1973. Two controversies emerged from the coup itself: While Pinochet asserted his leadership role in the affair, critics questioned his claim; and, despite the evidence, including a 1990 autopsy, Allende supporters asserted that the military had killed the president, as opposed to the generally accepted version that Allende had committed suicide in the presidential office.

Within a year of the coup, Pinochet had become the chairman of the ruling junta. On June 27, 1974, he proclaimed himself "Supreme Chief of the Nation" but on December 17, 1974, changed his title to "President," a title he held for the next 16 years until stepping down on March 11, 1990. Pinochet further consolidated his power in 1980 when 67 percent of voters approved a new constitution, which replaced the 1925 document and strengthened the presidency at the expense of the legislature.

Pinochet's regime was highly repressive. Not only were Congress and POLITICAL PARTIES disbanded, the administration did not tolerate any opposition. LABOR unions were silenced, the media controlled, and a state of siege imposed. While accurate numbers are difficult to ascertain, HUMAN RIGHTS organizations place the number of people killed by the regime at 3,000, another 30,000 jailed and tortured, and an estimated 30,000 who went into mostly self-imposed exile. The regime reached outside Chile to assassinate former members of the Allende administration, including General Carlos Prats (b. 1915–d. 1974) on September 30, 1974 in BUENOS



Augusto Pinochet (*left*) is named commander in chief of the Chilean army in 1973 by President Salvador Allende (*right*). (AP Photo/Enrique Aracena)

AIRES, ARGENTINA. Prats had preceded Pinochet as commander in chief of the army under Allende. A former Allende confidant, Orlando Letelier (b. 1932–d. 1976), fell victim to a car bombing in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976. The government’s repressive measures, however, did not prevent the armed branch of the outlawed Communist Party, the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (Frente Patriótica Manuel Rodríguez, or FPMR), from attempting to assassinate Pinochet on September 7, 1976, or from smuggling a wide array of arms into the country in 1986.

The government’s economic policies during the Pinochet years were directed by the “CHICAGO BOYS,” a group of Chilean economists who had studied at the University of Chicago under economists Milton Friedman and Albert Harberger. They applied neoliberal economic principles to Chile, which resulted in the sale of government-owned enterprises and drastic cuts in government spending and opened Chile to unrestricted foreign investment and unhindered profit repatriation. The policies were accompanied by a harsh austerity program imposed by the International Monetary Fund. From 1973 to 1976, Chile endured a deep recession, followed by six years of economic recovery often referred to as an “economic miracle.” Critics assert, however, that this miracle was little more than a recovery to pre-1973 levels. A global recession in 1982 adversely affected the Chilean economy, prompting Pinochet to appoint new

advisers, who implemented further neoliberal economic reforms. By 1988, the economy had advanced to pre-1982 levels, but critics quickly pointed out that wages lagged far behind price increases and that the purchasing power of the Chilean currency had declined drastically. Still, at the macroeconomic level, the Chilean economy was far more robust than that of most of its Latin American neighbors by 1988.

With a picture of prosperity and political opposition and other groups suppressed, Pinochet approached the 1988 election with confidence. As required under the 1980 constitution, the plebiscite would determine if the Chilean people wished to continue the Pinochet regime for another decade. In a simple “yes” or “no” vote, 55 percent of Chileans voted to send Pinochet into retirement on October 5, 1988. To the surprise of many analysts at the time, Pinochet accepted the result and handed the presidential sash over to Patricio Alwyn (b. 1918–) on March 11, 1990. Alwyn and his presidential successors into the 21st century came from Concertación, a coalition of 17 political parties representing mainly the middle class.

Pinochet did not leave the political scene, however. In accordance with the 1980 constitution, he became a senator for life and retained his position as commander in chief of the armed forces until 1998. Over the next 17 years, Concertación kept Pinochet’s economic policies in place, but in 2007, newly elected president Michelle Bachelet (b. 1951–) called for greater government involvement in addressing the nation’s socioeconomic ills.

In October 1998, while in London for medical treatment, Pinochet was arrested on a Spanish warrant on charges of human rights violations against Spanish citizens living in Chile during his regime. While Pinochet lived under house arrest, diplomatic discussions led to his return to Chile in March 2004 on humanitarian grounds. Over the next two years, the Chilean court system wavered on a decision to indict Pinochet on human rights crimes during his administration. Finally, on November 25, 2006, he was indicted, arrested, and confined to his home for his role in the arrest and subsequent killing by firing squad of two Allende bodyguards: Wagner Salinas (b. 1943–d. 1973) and Francisco Lara (b. 1951–d. 1973). Three days earlier, on November 22, a Chilean court indicted Pinochet on income-tax evasion using secret bank accounts abroad. In so doing, the Chilean courts linked Pinochet’s dealings to those of his wife, four of his children, and two advisers who had been indicted on similar charges a year earlier.

To mark his 91st birthday on November 25, 2006, which was also the date of his second indictment, Pinochet delivered a radio address to the nation in which he accepted responsibility for all that had occurred during his administration but explained that his motive had been to avoid the nation’s disintegration. He died on December 10, 2006, in Santiago.

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Platt Amendment (1901) The Platt Amendment was tacked on to the 1901 U.S. Army Appropriations Bill and appended to the 1902 Cuban constitution and the Permanent Treaty of 1903 between the United States and CUBA. Named after its sponsor, Republican senator Orville H. Platt of Connecticut, the amendment resulted from U.S. policy makers' consensus that the Cuban people were incapable of self-government, as evidenced in the emergence of Cuba's lower classes from 1898 to 1902. The Platt Amendment also reflected larger U.S.–Caribbean policy at the time, which sought to keep Europeans out of the region in order to protect the Panama Canal (see U.S. CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS, 1900–1934). The amendment became a focal point of Cuban nationalism until its termination in 1934.

From its inception, three of the amendment's provisos irritated Cubans because they directly affected Cuban sovereignty. The Platt Amendment granted the United States the right to intervene in Cuba to protect it from a foreign power or to maintain public order. It also prohibited the Cuban government from entering into a treaty with any foreign power that threatened Cuban independence and from granting control over any portion of the island to a foreign power. Cuba, furthermore, could not assume a foreign debt without sufficient reserves to pay the debt. The 1898 Treaty of Paris opened the door to future U.S. territorial aggrandizement in Cuba by granting the U.S. government the right to acquire any land necessary for naval and coaling facilities anywhere in Cuba. At the time, U.S. naval authorities focused their attention on the Isle of Pines and what eventually would become Guantánamo Bay, but the State Department did not want to rile Cuban nationalism any further. While the Cubans would fret over these infringements of its sovereignty, they did not object to the Platt Amendment's requirement that its government ratify all acts of the U.S. MILITARY government during its occupation from 1898 to 1902 nor to the United States continuing the construction of sanitation facilities throughout the island.

The set of provisos allowing the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs caused the most difficulty over the following 30 years. Once the U.S. Navy determined that the Isle of Pines was unsuitable for a naval base or coaling station, the United States assigned it to Cuba.

Reluctantly, the Cubans accepted the U.S. GUANTÁNAMO NAVAL BASE in 1903, and it has remained a contentious issue ever since.

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political parties At the beginning of the 20th century, two types of government dominated Latin America's political arena: personal dictatorships and those controlled by the elite. Both shared common characteristics, including the advocacy and support of export-based economies, limited political participation by the middle and lower socioeconomic sectors, and the need for an orderly society that was free of protest. The origins of Latin American political parties can be traced to the region's independence in the 1810s and 1820s, when each nation's political leadership divided itself into two camps, conservative and liberal, whose differences lay in the Spanish colonial system. The conservatives believed in continuing the practices of a strong central government and the privileges of the CATHOLIC CHURCH. They also had little interest in pursuing international commerce. The liberals held distinctly opposite positions on each issue. They argued for decentralized government, stripping the church of its privileged position in society, and looked favorably on entering the global markets. However, both shared the belief that the lower classes should not enter the political arena because of their size, color, illiteracy, and the cost of fulfilling their demands. For approximately 50 years after independence, conservatives controlled national governments, but by the 1880s, liberals had moved to the forefront.

As the 20th century progressed, conservatives and liberals benefited from export-based economies and wished to continue their privileged economic, social, and political positions at the expense of the lower socioeconomic groups. They were, however, willing to permit the entry of the middle class into the political arena. The elite's attitude helps explain, for example, the formation of CHILE's Democratic Party in 1887 and ARGENTINA's Radical Civic Union in 1891. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia intensified the elite and middle sector's disdain for urban and rural LABOR, contributed to the use of force to suppress labor strikes and deport labor leaders from Argentina and Chile in 1918 and 1919, and led to legislation that provided for government control over workers.

The Great Depression that gripped the world in the 1930s brought significant changes to the Latin America's political landscape. The populace and the MILITARY came to mistrust the “professional politicians”



The Justicialista Party office in the San Telmo section of Buenos Aires, Argentina. The party appeals to urban workers in the tradition of former president Juan D. Perón. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

who had dominated the scene since 1900 and who were blamed for the depression. New political parties emerged, including the Communist and Socialist Parties. So, too, did political populists, such as BRAZIL'S GETÚLIO DORNELLES VARGAS and Argentina's JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN. Both catered to and drew support from urban labor, the largest single voting bloc in each country, and became populist heroes. In Chile, the Christian Democratic Party understood that the dichotomy between the traditional elite and left-wing groups could lead to destruction of the political system.

Communism threatened to destroy the elite's privileged economic, social, and political position, as well as its military and religious props, and replace them with a dictatorial and closed party, as in the Soviet Union (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA). This fear led Latin America's elite to label any person or group that challenged the existing order as "communist." Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, Communist Parties or their leading representatives became victims of government repression. In Brazil, the Communist Party was outlawed, and in EL SALVADOR, its leader, AGUSTÍN FARABUNDO MARTÍ, was killed. President Vargas in Brazil

and President Perón in Argentina appealed to urban labor for political support and in so doing claimed they had saved their countries from communism. The Communist Parties in COSTA RICA, Chile, and CUBA were founded in the 1930s and survived the anticommunist crusade. Subsequently, each became influential in national politics. Some individuals sought only to rectify socioeconomic disparities and were socialists rather than communists. JOSÉ BATLLE Y ORDÓÑEZ, twice president of URUGUAY between 1903 and 1915, is an example. Portions of his social safety net remained in effect in the early 20th century.

The MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1910–20) produced a constitution in 1917 that bore similarities to the Soviet document of the same year. The Mexican government's control of the nation's economic policies in the 1920s and 1930s and its practice of "democratic centralism," which effectively closed the political arena to other actors, earned MEXICO the communist label in some quarters. Until the 2000 election of President VICENTE FOX, Mexico remained a one-party state; that party was the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI).

As the cold war took hold after World War II, the debate over communist influence in reform efforts intensified. Nicaraguan dictator ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA quickly labeled his country's Socialist Party as communist. In 1948, Costa Rican JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER led a rebellious army in a 44-day civil war to save the country from communism, although the U.S. ambassador in San José, Nathaniel P. Davis, saw little difference between Figueres's philosophy and that of Communist Party leader MANUEL MORA VALVERDE. GUATEMALA proved more vexing. Presidents JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO and JACOBO GUZMÁN ARBENZ were labeled communists by the local elite, newspapers, and spokesmen for the Catholic Church for their policies on behalf of urban and rural labor. There were indeed members of Guatemala's Communist Party in government positions, but whether they had links to the Soviet Union was unknown. The question led State Department analysts to caution that U.S. policy makers must distinguish between communism and legitimate nationalism when deciding foreign policy. Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration decided that international communism had arrived in Guatemala and ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to direct the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in July 1954 (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). Guatemala's old order was reestablished, but the nation soon embarked on a 40-year civil war to overthrow it.

FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's CUBAN REVOLUTION of 1956–61 ignited a similar debate, and Castro's links to the Soviet Union by mid-1961 sealed his fate (see SOVIET UNION AND CUBA). He was considered part of the international communist community. At the height of the cold war, communism was to be prevented from spreading throughout Latin America. The perceived need to contain communist expansion guided U.S. policy on its invasion of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC in 1965, Chile in 1973, GRENADA in 1983, and in the CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS of the 1980s. In Latin America, the fear of communism contributed to the emergence of military governments for the next generation. These authoritarian regimes suppressed political parties, censored the press, denied civil rights and violated HUMAN RIGHTS, all in the name of saving their nations from communism. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are often most cited as the worst examples of military rule.

Starting in the early 1980s, with the Latin American economies stagnating and the region's collective international debt standing at \$213 billion, military regimes crumbled. In the subsequent "return to democracy," a plethora of new political parties appeared to challenge the traditional elites. Notable among the new leaders were Argentina's CARLOS SAÚL MENEM and Brazil's LUIZ INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA, whose appeals to labor vaulted them to the presidential palaces in Buenos Aires and Brasília in 1989 and 2002, respectively. On the opposite end of the political scale, Fox of Mexico's conservative National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or

PAN) won the 2000 presidential election, replacing the PRI in Los Piños for the first time in 70 years. Despite their political differences, each accepted the neoliberal economic model that had been in vogue across Latin America since the 1980s. While neoliberalism brought badly needed structural reforms and opened local economies to globalization, the quality of life for the majority of Latin Americans did not improve. This helps to explain the political victories of Venezuelan HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS in 1998 and Bolivian JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA in 2005. Their election and the civic protests against government economic policies may suggest that Latin America is on the verge of another political shift in the early 21st century.

See also CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III).

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Price, George (b. 1919–) *prime minister of Belize*
Born on January 15, 1919, in Belize City, George Price attended high school at St. John's College in Belize City. A Roman Catholic, Price briefly attended a seminary, has never married, and has no children. He won a seat on the town board of Belize City in 1947. On September 29, 1950, Price cofounded the People's United Party (PUP). Eventually elected the leader of the PUP in 1956, he led a nonviolent independence movement against British colonialism in British Honduras. Throughout his career, Price, although cognizant of BELIZE's identity as both a Central American and a Caribbean nation, has emphasized closer ties with Central American nations.

In 1954, the British government offered Belizeans the first step toward autonomy, calling for elections to choose seats on a nine-member legislative council. Price won one of the eight seats won by the PUP, which campaigned on a platform opposed to a WEST INDIES FEDERATION. Price claimed that the British plan would destroy Belize's ECONOMY. Price's opponents frequently accused him of collusion with GUATEMALA, which has made claims against Belizean territory since the 1850s. Nevertheless, by 1956, Price was the undisputed leader of the PUP. Following the devastation wreaked on Belize City by Hurricane Hattie in October 1961, Price called for the establishment of an inland capital at Belmopan, which became a reality later in the 1960s. On January 1,

1963, Belize achieved internal self-government, while the British continued to control foreign affairs and national defense. As the leader of the majority party, Price, who served as premier, presided over the gradual transformation from an economy based on forestry to one based on sugar. Whereas Price sought immediate independence, the main opposition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP), preferred to delay this until Guatemalan claims to Belizean territory were completely resolved.

From 1975 to 1980, the United Nations General Assembly affirmed the sovereignty of Belize and called on the British and Guatemalans to reach a compromise and grant Belize independence by the end of 1981. In January 1981, Price returned from a series of talks in London with a proposal, known as the Heads of Agreement, to appease Guatemalan territorial claims. One of the possible points of concession was to grant the Guatemalans free access to the Caribbean, a proposition that set off a wave of unrest in Belize. Without achieving a peaceful settlement with Guatemala and facing unrest in Belize, on September 21, 1981, the British granted Belize independence, and Price became the first prime minister. The British promised to defend Belize against possible Guatemalan attempts to forcibly acquire Belizean territory. Price's party lost to the UDP in 1984 but was returned to power in 1989. Price remained in power until 1993, when the UDP regained power. Price turned over leadership of the PUP to SAID MUSA on November 10, 1996. In 2000, the Belizean government awarded Price the First Order of National Hero, the country's highest honor.

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Puerto Rico Puerto Rico is a 3,508-square-mile (1,355-km²) Caribbean island that lies approximately 1,000 miles (1,609 km) south-southeast of Miami, Florida. Its territory includes VIEQUES ISLAND and Culebra, Mona, Desecheo, and Caja de Muertos Islands, but only the first two are inhabited. Puerto Rico is the easternmost and smallest island in the Greater Antilles chain, but with the Mona Passage to its immediate west and the Virgin Passage separating Culebra Island from the eastern tip of St. Thomas Island, it strides the two most important northern access routes to the circum-Caribbean region.

Puerto Rico is home to some 3.9 million people in a self-governing commonwealth in association with the United States. When Christopher Columbus arrived on November 19, 1493, the Taino Indians inhabited the island but were soon decimated by European diseases and

the harsh LABOR conditions to which they were subjected. African slave laborers were brought in to replace the NATIVE AMERICANS. Lacking natural wealth and with few inhabitants, Puerto Rico became an economic outpost in the Spanish Empire. When Spanish America achieved its independence in the early 19th century, Puerto Rico and CUBA remained as the last remnants of Spain's New World empire. Poverty and political repression led to an uprising in Puerto Rico in 1868. Although it was quickly suppressed, it ignited an independence movement that culminated in 1897, when Spain granted Puerto Rico a charter of autonomy that gave the islanders home rule within the Spanish Empire. The charter went into effect in 1898 but was short lived. Puerto Rico's strategic position brought a North American expeditionary force to the island in July 1898, during the War of 1898. Anticipating the construction of an interoceanic canal somewhere on the Central American isthmus, the U.S. Navy understood that Puerto Rico would play an important role in securing that future waterway. The 1898 Treaty of Paris that ended the war also granted Puerto Rico to the United States.

A U.S. MILITARY government administered Puerto Rico for two years until Congress approved the FORAKER ACT in 1900, which provided for U.S. administrative authority over the island through U.S. presidential-appointed officials, from governor to judges. A locally elected Chamber of Deputies provided the nearly 950,000 Puerto Ricans with a local government, but the U.S. Congress could invalidate any of its legislation. The 1917 JONES ACT granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship and provided for the election of a Senate to complete the bicameral legislature. Later that same year, Puerto Rican males became eligible for U.S. military service.

Puerto Ricans fared poorly under the first two generations of U.S. tutelage. Until Governor Rexford Tugwell arrived on the island in 1940, U.S. administrators tended to take a superior attitude toward Puerto Ricans and displayed indifference to their history and culture. The teaching of English, beginning in primary school, and the establishment of the University of Puerto Rico in 1904 became the administrators' most visible means of "Americanizing" the locals. Puerto Rico's ECONOMY did not change during the same period. It remained agriculturally based and dependent primarily on sugar and coffee that had to compete in the world market, unlike Cuban sugar, which enjoyed special market access to the United States. The population, however, doubled by 1930 to 1.8 million people, and nearly 80 percent of them lived in rural areas where land ownership was dominated by a few creoles and three large foreign-owned sugar corporations. In the depression-battered era of the 1930s, the Puerto Rican political leadership encouraged these people to migrate to the United States in hopes of finding employment; this began a trend that continued until the end of the 20th century (see MIGRATION).



Sugar baron inspecting his cane. Sugar was a major agricultural product in several circum-Caribbean nations, including Puerto Rico. (*Library of Congress*)

Puerto Ricans began debating their relationship with the United States immediately after the island became a U.S. territory in 1900. That year, the Federalist Party was founded to campaign for U.S. statehood; meanwhile, the Unionist Party of Puerto Rico, founded in 1904, fought against the “colonial” government established by the Foraker Act but did not advocate total independence from the United States. That call came in 1912 with the formation of the Independence Party. Lacking broad-based popular appeal, each of these movements was short lived. That changed in the 1930s, when a greater number of educated Puerto Ricans could not find employment in the depressed economy and better understood the island’s political relationship with the United States. Two political parties set the framework of the debate. The Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista*), founded in 1922 and led by Pedro Albizu Campos (b. 1891–d. 1965), advocated complete independence, and in 1938, LUIS MUÑOZ MARÍN (b. 1898–d. 1980) established the Popular Democratic Party (*Partido Popular Democrático*) to advocate reform within the system. Albizu resorted to violence to achieve his objective, and this netted him a long-term sentence in an Atlanta prison. Muñoz Marín’s less aggressive style, on the other hand, found a sympathetic ear in

Tugwell, appointed governor of Puerto Rico in 1941 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Tugwell and Muñoz Marín understood the need for economic and government reform. World War II prompted diversification in AGRICULTURE, which lessened the island’s dependence on sugar production and helped trigger industrialization in Puerto Rico (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). Tugwell improved the civil service and established less corrupt and more efficient government accounting procedures. During Tugwell’s governorship, the question of Puerto Rican–U.S. relations became more tense, however.

Some U.S. political leaders took up the *independentista* cause. In 1943, Maryland Democratic senator Millard E. Tydings introduced a bill calling for Puerto Rican independence. The bill stalled in Congress, but this did not prevent President Harry S. Truman from appointing Jesús T. Piñero (b. 1897–d. 1952) as the first native-born governor of Puerto Rico. A year later, in 1947, Truman signed the Elective Governor’s Act, which allowed Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor. In 1948, Muñoz Marín became Puerto Rico’s first elected governor, a position in which he would be reelected for the next 16 years. Amid these U.S. actions, the Puerto Rican Independence Party (*Partido Independentista*

Puertorriqueño, or PIP) was founded in 1946, and on November 1, 1950, Puerto Rican nationalists attempted to assassinate President Truman.

The U.S.–Puerto Rican relationship changed again in 1950, when the U.S. Congress approved Public Law 600, which required Puerto Ricans to choose between either continuing the status quo or creating a commonwealth model after the British pattern. In a three-step process, Puerto Ricans elected a constituent assembly, approved the document it composed, and selected Muñoz Marín as governor, who declared the Associated Free State of Puerto Rico on July 25, 1952. As a result, Puerto Rico has authority over all its internal matters, while the U.S. federal government controls its international affairs, as well as citizenship, the postal system, radio and television communications, and commerce. While Puerto Ricans do not pay U.S. federal income tax, local levies are on a par with those in the United States. Puerto Ricans do participate in the U.S. Social Security system. In response to this action, in 1973, the United Nations General Assembly declared that Puerto Rico was no longer a territory of the United States but resolved that Puerto Rico had the right to become independent. The issue of Puerto Rico's connection to the United States continues to simmer, and the choice remains between continuing as a commonwealth or becoming a state within the United States. In a 1998 referendum, as well as in the 2004 governorship election, votes were split almost evenly—48 percent—between the pro-statehood New Progressive Party (Partido Nuevo Progresista, or PNP) and the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrático, or PPD), while splintered *independentista* groups gained less than 3 percent of the popular vote. The issue was at the forefront of the November 4, 2008, governorship election won by the PNP candidate Luis Fortuño (b. 1960–) by an 11 percent margin over PPD incumbent Aníbal Acevedo Vilá (b. 1962–). While the PNP is committed to becoming the 51st state of the United States, such a status remains controversial in Puerto Rico.

As Puerto Rico's political relationship with the United States evolved, so, too, did its economy. In 1942,

the Puerto Rican government commenced an industrial growth program, “Manos a la Obra,” or OPERATION BOOTSTRAP as it is known in English. Using local tax and U.S. tax incentives, along with grants and the promise of cheaper labor, the Puerto Rican landscape changed appreciably starting in the 1950s. Manufacturing accounted for 40 percent of the island's gross national product and employed 170,000 workers in 1992, compared to 24,000 in 1953, and the number of factories multiplied from 83 to more than 2,000 during the period. Despite these apparent successes, the Puerto Rican economy endures a 24 percent unemployment rate and a drain of skilled and technical workers to the United States. In fact, since the start of World War II, an estimated 2 million Puerto Ricans have left for the United States, and today, more Puerto Ricans live in New York City than in San Juan, the capital of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, in 1996, the United States voted to phase in Section 936 of the U.S. tax code, which serves as an enticement for U.S. industries to relocate their assembly operations to Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, as globalization continues, goods are being produced elsewhere at cheaper costs than can be had in Puerto Rico. As the new century begins, Puerto Rico confronts the age-old problem of achieving both political independence and economic prosperity.

See also PUERTO RICO (Vols. I, II, III); TAINO (Vol. I); WAR OF 1898 (Vol. III).

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R

Radio and TV Martí Radio Martí is a shortwave radio station sponsored by the U.S. government that has broadcast into CUBA since 1985 under the charter for the Voice of America. TV Martí was added in 1990. In September 1981, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12323, which established the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, and in 1983, Congress appropriated funding for the project. Radio Martí broadcasts soap operas, news, and popular music, while TV Martí sends poor-quality transmissions of news, documentaries, soap operas, and movies.

Today, Salvador Lew serves as director for both Radio and TV Martí, with an approximate \$25 billion budget for 120 employees, with operating stations in Marathon Key, Florida; Greenville, North Carolina; and Delano, California.

Technically, the Voice of America was responsible for the programming, but in reality, this was undertaken by the Office of Cuban Broadcasting, directed by Jorge Mas Canosa, head of the Miami-based CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL FOUNDATION from 1981 until his death in 1997, an open advocate of the ouster of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ and a supporter of President Reagan's policies toward Cuba. This connection led to charges that propaganda and not news is being sent to Cuba by Radio and TV Martí. The Cuban government jams both signals but has not been able to cut off all transmissions or shut down the stations.

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rapprochement, U.S. and Cuban On five occasions between 1963 and 1984, high-level secret talks were held between U.S. presidential emissaries and FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's representatives on improving relations between the two countries.

The first came in the fall of 1963 when delegates from each met to discuss a possible secret meeting in CUBA that might include Castro. The Cuban suggestion came at a time when Castro had been burned by the Soviets in their not coming to his rescue during the 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, Moscow's lack of support for spreading revolution throughout Latin America, and his need for spare parts for U.S.-made machinery in Cuba (see SOVIET UNION AND CUBA). U.S. president John F. Kennedy accepted his advisers' suggestion that French journalist Jean Daniel be dispatched to Cuba for secret talks. Daniel's trip was scheduled for November 22, 1963, but the meetings were canceled after the president's assassination the following day. New president Lyndon B. Johnson did not pursue the matter or two other offers put forward by Castro in a July 6, 1964, *New York Times* interview and in his speech marking the fifth anniversary of the CUBAN REVOLUTION, on July 26, 1964. Johnson was more interested in expelling Cuba from the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES and having the organization help tighten the U.S. embargo on trade with the island (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF).

The third initiative came in June 1974 from Henry A. Kissinger, secretary of state and national security advisor to President Richard M. Nixon. Kissinger was motivated by the U.S. congressional opposition to continuing the U.S. embargo on Cuba, the fact that many European and Latin American nations had opened TRADE relations with Cuba, and that improved relations fit into the larger administration policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China. For the next 18 months, several secret meetings were held in HAVANA, New York, and Washington, D.C., between Kissinger's and Castro's advisers. Although the embargo issue dominated the conversation, a wide range of topics were discussed, including HUMAN RIGHTS and compensation for U.S. properties in Cuba that had been nationalized. The United States abruptly ended the discussions in February 1976, allegedly because of Cuban support for Puerto Rican independence and because it sent troops to participate in the civil war in Angola.

Jimmy Carter came to the White House in January 1977 with a greater interest in Latin America than his two predecessors and desirous of improving relations with Cuba. While calibrated steps were taken on both sides, including the establishment of "interests sections" in each nation's capital, the U.S. embargo and the presence of Cuban troops in Africa remained stumbling blocks to significant progress. In early 1978, Castro signaled his willingness to seek further accommodation. The first set of private talks began in May 1978 and led to the release and deportation of 2,500 political prisoners in Cuba to the United States that November. Several meetings were held throughout 1980 in Havana and Cuernavaca, MEXICO, but nothing of significance materialized from these. U.S. policy makers stiffened their position because of Castro's support of MAURICE BISHOP in GRENADA and the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT in NICARAGUA and the continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

The final rapprochement proffer came in 1981 from Castro. Although not known publicly at the time, Soviet economic support of Cuba was beginning to weaken. Castro also understood that in President Ronald Reagan he faced an ardent anticommunist who would be pleased to topple the Cuban regime. Reagan set as a precondition for reaching any understanding that Cuba sever its relationship with the Soviet Union, which was something no one expected in 1981. Given this, the discussions were meaningless when Secretary of State Alexander Haig met with Cuban vice president Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (b. 1913–d. 1997) in MEXICO CITY in November 1981 and Special Ambassador Vernon Walters with Castro in Havana in March 1982. Castro made one more appeal in December 1984, but this was rejected by Reagan.

Cuban-U.S. relations were at their lowest ebb in nearly a generation when Reagan left office in 1989 and remained so through the mid-1990s as the U.S. Congress tightened the trade embargo. Despite President Bill

Clinton's efforts to ease tensions just prior to leaving office, President George W. Bush quickly changed paths by tightening the trade embargo and expanding the list of requirements for Cuba to meet in order to normalize diplomatic relations.

In spring 2009, recently elected U.S. president Barack Obama made several public declarations supportive of a new stance in U.S. relations with Cuba. In April, he lifted the travel restrictions on Cuban-Americans visiting families in Cuba and the limitations of their remittances to the island. While the Cuban government did not respond with public gestures, reportedly Obama envoys traveled to Cuba on three occasions in July and August 2009 to explore further openings and reductions in tensions between the two nations.

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Rastafarianism Rastafarianism is a religious movement that emerged in JAMAICA during the Great Depression among the lower-class black population. The followers of the RELIGION contend that former Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie I was the biblical messiah promised in the Old Testament of the Bible.

Rastafarianism developed as a spiritual system to boost morale and counteract the negative impact of political, economic, and social marginalization among economically and socially disadvantaged blacks during the 1930s. It came into being at roughly the same time that blacks in HAITI were emphasizing *noirisme* (Negritude) and blacks in the United States were participating in the Harlem Renaissance. As Haile Selassie was the only African monarch of an independent black African state during the 1930s, Jamaicans, cognizant that the Ethiopian emperor's lineage traced back to biblical characters King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, came to view him as part of the Holy Trinity. The name of the religion is derived from the Ethiopian emperor's pre-coronation name, Ras Tafari Makonnen. Rastafarianism gradually spread throughout Jamaica and eventually the rest of the world. The popularity of Rastafarianism increased during the 1970s and 1980s through REGGAE, as many of the musicians were Rastafarians who incorporated the religion's themes into their lyrics. It is estimated that about 10 percent of the Jamaican population is Rastafarian and that there are more than 1 million Rastafarians around the world.

Emphasizing the importance of human dignity and self-worth, Rastafarians seek release from the psychological and physical legacy of slavery and Western imperialism. They extol the superiority of African culture and civilization in an effort to achieve freedom and self-respect. Since Rastafarianism is not a centralized religion, followers are encouraged to question authority

and societal norms in their individual quest for freedom. Developed at a time of intense racism and political domination of blacks, Rastafarians view society as corrupt and inherently unjust. In an attempt to counteract the negativity of society, Rastafarians seek to become one with nature. To accomplish this, they allow their hair to grow into dreadlocks; smoke marijuana, which they call ganja; and eat a restrictive (ital) diet based on the dietary laws found in Leviticus and Deuteronomy.

In 1966, Emperor Haile Selassie visited Jamaica and was greeted at the international airport in Kingston by 200,000 marijuana-smoking Rastafarians. In the crowd were reggae singer Bob Marley and his wife, Rita. After meeting the Ethiopian emperor, Rita Marley converted to Rastafarianism, claiming to have seen the stigmata on Haile Selassie's hands as he waved to the crowd of followers. Although the Ethiopian emperor died in 1975 under house arrest after being overthrown by a Marxist revolution, Rastafarians hold that he will call the day of judgment when righteous black people will return to Africa to live in peace and harmony. Haile Selassie, it should be noted, told his followers not to immigrate to Africa until they had first liberated the black people of Jamaica, a philosophy known as liberation before repatriation.

On April 23, 1978, at the height of political violence in Jamaica, reggae stars appeared at the One Love Peace Concert in Kingston. Peter Tosh demanded the legalization of marijuana. Bob Marley appeared on stage with politicians MICHAEL MANLEY and EDWARD SEAGA in an attempt to restore harmony in Jamaican society. The commercialization of reggae has helped to transform Rastafarianism from an outcast cult into a mainstream belief system.

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reciprocity treaty, U.S.-Cuban (1903) The U.S.-Cuban reciprocity treaty went into effect on December 16, 1903. It provided a 20 percent tariff reduction on Cuban goods entering the United States and reduced Cuban tariffs on imported U.S. goods from 40 to 20 percent. The United States had long been the primary market for Cuban sugar and tobacco, a fact that had wide ramifications for the Cuban economy and politics. During the U.S. Army's occupation of CUBA from 1898 to 1902, General Leonard Wood understood this relationship and thought the best way to encourage an economically independent Cuba was through a TRADE reciprocity agreement. Wood reasoned that continued economic prosperity would support the need for stable government on the island. He found a sympathetic ear in President William McKinley and his successor Theodore

Roosevelt. Congress appeared recalcitrant, owing to the influence of U.S. sugarcane and sugar beet growers. On the other hand, U.S. manufacturers and commercial interests strongly supported the bill.

Once implemented, Cuban sugar growers expanded production and refining capacities on the island and gained extensive profits through their privileged access to the U.S. market. The lowered tariffs on U.S. imports, largely manufactured items, however, effectively discriminated against the importation of similar goods from elsewhere. The global depression that began in 1929 and lasted through the 1930s increased political pressure from U.S. sugar beet and cane growers and resulted in U.S. legislation in 1937 that assigned quotas to foreign sugar-producing nations. Cuba received a 28.6 percent annual allotment of U.S. sugar imports, an amount temporarily suspended with the outbreak of World War II in 1939. The quotas were reestablished after World War II in legislation in 1948 and 1952, which also granted Cuba 98.64 percent of any deficiencies in the quotas assigned to other nations. Critics argued that over the long haul, Cuba's privileged access to the United States made the Cubans dependent on the United States and prevented its industrial development.

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reggae Reggae is a MUSIC style developed in JAMAICA during the 1960s and 1970s. RASTAFARIANISM has influenced many popular reggae artists who have incorporated the themes of faith, social injustice, poverty, and social conditions into their lyrics.

Although the term *reggae* is frequently used to describe all styles of Jamaican music, it refers primarily to a genre of music developed by poor blacks in Trenchtown, the largest ghetto in Kingston, Jamaica. Jamaican musicians, many of whom were influenced by Rastafarianism, blended traditional Jamaican folk music with American rhythm and blues during the 1960s. Reggae is characterized by a rhythmic style noted for regular chops on the off-beat, usually accented on the second and fourth note in each bar. The term *reggae* was first used by the Maytals, a Jamaican group that incorporated the word in their song "Do the Reggay" (1968), which was written by Frederick Nathaniel "Toots" Hibbert (b. 1945-). Prior to 1968, the term *reggay* referred to a dance style in Jamaica, but the connection of the word with the music lent its name to the new music genre.

Reggae became popular internationally during the 1970s as artists such as Bob Marley (b. 1945-d. 1981), an advocate of Rastafarianism, incorporated themes

emphasizing social justice and oppression into his music. Marley, who is regarded by many as a prophet of Rastafarianism, is best known for his reggae songs, which include the hits “No Woman, No Cry,” “Could You Be Loved,” “Jamming,” “Redemption Song,” and “One Love.” Marley, who suffered racial prejudice in his youth, used his music to proclaim his social rights activism. Marley’s popularity facilitated the appeal of Rastafarianism worldwide.

Lyrics, melodies, and rhythms from reggae songs have been used to energize political campaigns in Jamaica. Both of Jamaica’s main POLITICAL PARTIES, the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP), have used reggae themes in their political campaigns and the music genre for their own political goals to win voters. As a result, the two parties share relatively even percentages of the votes among Jamaica’s black population. Reggae, therefore, promotes political and social cohesiveness through religion. Whereas the majority of Jamaica’s people are not Rastafarian, the biblical messages of faith, salvation, and social justice are popular with Jamaica’s Christian population.

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
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religion Today, some 90 percent of Latin America’s population has been baptized Catholic, the highest percentage of any region in the world. Still, there are differences among the faithful. While some cling to the CATHOLIC CHURCH’s conservative traditions, others have accepted more modern values, as seen in the socioeconomic and political struggles that date to independence and in the conflict over the church’s role in the upheavals from the 1960s through the 1980s. During this generation, pressure for social change became violent. With few exceptions, such as EL SALVADOR’s archbishop Óscar Romero (b. 1915–d. 1980), the church’s hierarchy, older and more conservative, preferred to remain outside the conflict. Clergy more closely linked to the daily lives of their parishioners espoused liberation theology, a call for church activism in pressuring the state to address the needs of the poor.

Latin American Catholicism, furthermore, was influenced by the region’s indigenous peoples and by the African slaves brought to the New World. Although the Spanish and Portuguese forced these people to convert to Catholicism, their native rituals may be blended into Catholic religious services, particularly in the smaller and remote towns and villages in the Andes Mountains, CENTRAL AMERICA, and BRAZIL.

Although Protestantism arrived in the New World with missionaries in the 1840s and 1850s, it was not



A bust of Pope John Paul II commemorating his 1998 visit to Santiago de Cuba. Despite Protestant inroads, Catholicism remains the predominant religion in Latin America. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

until the late 19th and early 20th century that Protestant churches born in the Reformation were established. Anglicans, Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians were among the new immigrants from Europe, particularly Germany, England, and Scotland. Throughout most of the 20th century, these groups tended to vote for liberal and radical POLITICAL PARTIES that opposed the Catholic Church. Similar to the Catholic Church, after WORLD WAR II, the membership of the Protestant Church split into two main groups, traditionalists and those who supported socioeconomic and political reform. Since the 1960s, Protestants who supported change drifted more toward centrist and left-of-center political parties, which resulted in more indigenous Latin Americans joining their churches.

Protestant churches benefited from the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965, which focused on the need for socioeconomic reforms and led to liberation theology. Scholars also argue that other factors during the same period led many lower socioeconomic groups to the Protestant churches. These factors included increased violence in rural areas, which in turn led to urban MIGRATION; the breakdown of traditional peasant community life;

increased civil strife; and increased unemployment. Since the 1960s, evangelical faiths, particularly Pentecostals, have accounted for the most significant growth of Protestantism in Latin America. Countries that saw the greatest increase in the number of Protestants during the 1990s were ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, CHILE, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, El Salvador, HAITI, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, and VENEZUELA.

While Latin America's Jewish population is relatively small, there are large communities in Argentina, Brazil, and MEXICO. Jewish migration can be traced to colonial Brazil, but the number of Jews increased markedly with their emigration from Europe between 1880 and 1920 and when fleeing persecution before and after World War II. Most Jews in Latin America are secularized and do not regularly participate in religious activities, except important holidays such as Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur.

Santería is the Spanish name given to the religious practices African slaves brought to Cuba in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Variants are found in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Lesser Antilles islands. Today, Westerners refer to these practices as Vodou. Vodou is a mixture of African traditions that references Catholic saints. Some Caribbean migrants to the United States have brought Santería with them.

See also RELIGION (Vols. I, II, III); SANTERÍA (Vol. III); SYNCRETISM (Vol. I); VODOU (Vol. III).

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Remón Cantera, José Antonio (b. 1908–d. 1955) *president of Panama* Born into a prominent Panamanian family, José Antonio Remón Cantera graduated third in his class from MEXICO's military academy in 1931. As the only Panamanian with formal MILITARY academy training, he returned home to be appointed captain of the National Police force. President Harmodio Arias (b. 1886–d. 1962) directed him to lead the police independent of U.S. supervision and to protect his presidency. Throughout the 1930s, Remón received technical advice from the U.S. Panama Canal Zone police but did not have to fear its interference owing to U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt's GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY. After 1940, Remón imprinted his own style on the force by recruiting like-minded officers, establishing cavalry and motorized units, and implementing riot-control training. Although never numbering more than 2,000 men, by the mid-1940s, PANAMA's police force was poised to become the arbiter of national politics.

In the violence-marred 1948 presidential election, Remón's force prevented the National Assembly from ousting the sitting president Enrique Jiménez (b. 1886–d. 1970). President Daniel Chanis (b. 1890–d. 1961) was ousted by the police in July 1949 when he attempted to fire Remón, and in November 1949, the force permitted ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID to become president after promising not to interfere with the force. Following Arias's impeachment in May 1951, Remón permitted Alcibíades Arosemena (b. 1883–d. 1958) to assume the presidency, but Remón dictated appointments and government policy. Remón seized the moment in the political turmoil that followed. He resigned his police position to run for the presidency in the 1952 election as the candidate of the National Patriotic Coalition (Coalición Patriótica Nacional, or CPN). His promises to change the direction of national politics, along with the campaigning of his wife, Cecilia, overcame his reputation for torture, graft, and corruption to win office with 64 percent of the vote.

As president, Remón sought to please a broad spectrum of society. His policies favored agro-industrial enterprises at the expense of small farmers and sought to reduce Panama's economic dependence on the canal. A redefined tax code sought to cut the government's deficit and at the same time address the health care and educational needs of all Panamanians. Remón also prevented LABOR unions from striking, ordered the arrest of radicals and communists, and imposed "voluntary" censorship on the press. He converted the police into the National Guard and accepted increased U.S. military assistance for the guard. These changes led to charges that his regime bore similarities to that of Nicaraguan dictator ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA.

Remón addressed Panamanian nationalism with a revised canal treaty in 1955 that increased the annual annuity to \$1.9 million, further restricted the U.S. commissary operation in the zone, promised better job opportunities and equalized pay for Panamanians in the zone, and provided for the flying of the Panamanian flag in the zone (see PANAMA CANAL TREATIES). Other than the increased annuity and commissary restrictions, other treaty provisions were slow in coming and led to violent protests and demonstrations before the decade was out. Remón did not live to see any of this. He was assassinated on January 2, 1955. While the reasons behind the assassination have never been adequately explained, his death ended the CPN's stronghold on national politics.

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Reyes, Rafael (b. 1849–d. 1921) *president of Colombia* Rafael Reyes was a native of Boyacá, COLOMBIA. As a

young man, along with his brother, Reyes explored the Upper Amazon River and later the Putumayo River regions. Reyes earned a fortune during Colombia's quinine boom of the 1870s and a decade later became a leader in the Conservative Party, which led to his appointment as a general of the Colombian army. Reyes's opposition to extremist elements of the Conservative Party prompted him to leave the country during the War of the Thousand Days (1899–1902). He visited the United States in 1904 in a failed effort to gain redress for Colombia's loss of PANAMA. The adverse impact of the War of the Thousand Days and Panama's independence caused the Conservative and Liberal Parties to temporarily reconcile their differences. Reyes took the presidential sash on August 7, 1904, and set in motion a relatively peaceful 26-year period of political reconciliation, but not without intraparty squabbling.

Intolerant of criticism, Reyes strengthened executive power at the expense of the legislature. He dismissed Congress and replaced it with the National Assembly consisting of representatives appointed by governors he himself had appointed. He then ruled with an iron fist, which proved useful in the implementation of protectionist economic policies that were also in vogue elsewhere in Latin America at this time, and stood in conflict with traditional Conservative principles. Reyes encouraged industrial development, which in turn contributed to the growth of cities. He also expanded the agro-export coffee industry. Reyes is credited with stabilizing Colombia's monetary system. The nation returned to the international gold standard, and its international credit standing improved. At home, Reyes implemented an infrastructure development program that included the construction of roads, schools, and government buildings.

Traditional Conservatives were only one source of the political opposition to Reyes. He also drew the Liberals' ire because of their secondary role in his administration. The leadership of both parties opposed his plan to modernize the national army, which included the conscription of soldiers and linking promotion to ability rather than family connection. While Reyes considered that this reform would end the ruling elite's use of the institution to serve its own needs, some politicians charged that it would end civilian control of the MILITARY. Conservatives and Liberals also rejected Reyes's efforts to force the ratification of the 1909 THOMSON-URRUTIA TREATY, which provided for Colombia's recognition of and establishment of diplomatic relations with Panama. Colombian nationalism prevailed, and the treaty was rejected. Reyes recognized the tidal wave of opposition to him and resigned on July 27, 1909. He secretly boarded a ship bound for Europe.

See also CONSERVATIVE PARTY, COLOMBIA (Vol. III); LIBERAL PARTY, COLOMBIA (Vol. III); WAR OF THE THOUSAND DAYS (Vol. III).

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Richards, Viv (Isaac Vivian Alexander Richards)

(b. 1952–) *cricket player from Antigua and Barbuda* Born on March 7, 1952, in St. John's, Antigua, Isaac Vivian Alexander Richards, better known as Viv Richards, is called the “master blaster” by cricket enthusiasts. Richards made his test debut for the West Indies team against India in Bangalore in 1974. As a batsman, Richards was known for his attacking style, and his overall skill and personality made him the most popular cricketer in ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA. The West Indies team won the first Cricket World Cup, held in London in 1975. According to Richards, it was the most memorable moment in his career. The team went on to win the second Cricket World Cup in 1979. Richards was honored with the Man of the Match Award for his performance in the 1979 games. This award is given to the player deemed to have played the biggest part in his team's victory. Richards retired from the West Indies team in 1991 and was knighted in 1999.

Richards was named one of the five greatest cricketers of the 20th century by a panel of 100 expert judges appointed by the *Wisden Cricketers' Almanack* in 2000. This honor brought great pride to the people of Antigua and Barbuda and reinvigorated the sport of cricket in the Caribbean. In 2006, Antigua and Barbuda, with a \$60 million grant from China, began construction of the Sir Vivian Richards Stadium in North Sound, Antigua and Barbuda. Located about 20 minutes north of the capital of St. John's, the stadium was built for use in the 2007 Cricket World Cup hosted by the West Indies. Although designed to seat 10,000, temporary seats were added to double the seating capacity during that event.

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Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro is the capital of the state of Rio de Janeiro. From 1763 to 1822, it served as the capital of the Portuguese colony and thereafter, until 1960, as the capital of independent BRAZIL. In 1960, the Brazilian capital was relocated to the city of Brasília, nearly 800 miles (1,287.5 km) inland, in a government effort to stem the tide of urban growth along the coast and develop the nation's interior.

During its colonial period, Brazil received minimal attention from Portugal because most of the empire's

wealth was drawn from Asia. Nevertheless, Rio was an important port in the colony and endured many raids from pirates, as well as a brief French occupation. Until the 20th century, the city remained confined to what is now the downtown business district. Today, it is divided into four districts, including the downtown and the north, south, and west zones. The downtown, or El Centro, remains the heart of Rio de Janeiro's business and commercial enterprises. It is also home to many former government buildings that date to the 19th century, the National Historical Museum and the National Art Museum, and the Municipal Theater. The south zone includes the famous Atlantic coast beaches, Sugarloaf Mountain, the Corcovado, and Tijuca Forest, the world's second-largest urban forest. The north zone includes the Maracanã Stadium, which can hold nearly 200,000 people. The sprawling west zone includes the city's industrial area.

Rio de Janeiro also serves as an important commercial and financial center and a shipping port. The range of industrial pursuits includes chemicals and petrochemicals, clothing and other textiles, metal products, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals, and processed foods. Despite a nearly \$11,000 per-capita annual income, Rio de Janeiro has some of Latin America's worst urban slums, or favelas, which are often without sewer and sanitary water systems and experience severe mudslides during heavy rains. An underground rail system is limited in its ability to move people around, and most residents rely on public buses for TRANSPORTATION.

In addition to its famous Atlantic beachfront, Rio de Janeiro is known for its annual CARNIVAL, which marks the beginning of the Catholic season of Lent, 40 days before Easter. Rio de Janeiro, particularly during Carnival, is known for lively MUSIC such as the samba (a music and dance form that dates to the 19th-century *choros* [poor black] communities and is based in Afro-Brazilian religious prayer music) and the currently popular funk carioca, a dance music whose lyrics depict the plight of the poor.

See also RIO DE JANEIRO (Vols. II, III).

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Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) (1947) The Rio Pact, officially known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was agreed to at the 1947 Inter-American Conference held in RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL, from August 15 to September 2. The Rio Pact clarified interpretative issues that had arisen from the 1945 ACT OF CHAPULTEPEC. The former provided for the peaceful settlement of hemispheric disputes before any appeal could be made to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the first such pronouncement relating to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allowed for the establishment of regional alliances.

More significantly, the Rio Pact declared that “an armed attack by any State against an American State” shall be considered as an attack against all the American states.” While a treaty safeguard provided that no individual state could be forced into action by others, the delegates could not agree on a definition of an “act of aggression” or exactly how the hemispheric nations would respond to any such act.

The treaty was a response to the growing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that had led to the onset of the cold war by 1947. At the time, the Soviets controlled Eastern Europe, Communists were advancing their cause in Greece and Turkey, and Mao Zedong's forces appeared on the verge of victory in China. From the U.S. perspective, the primary need was to contain communist expansion, potentially by MILITARY expansion. For the moment, the Rio Pact fulfilled that need in the Western Hemisphere.

For the United States, the Rio Pact meant the abandonment of its historic policy precepts not to become involved in permanent or entangling alliances. At the time, some analysts argued that the Rio treaty “multilateralized” the Monroe Doctrine by making it hemispheric policy. For the Latin Americans, the treaty deterred external aggression and served as a potential constraint on the United States because under it, a two-thirds majority was required to intervene collectively in another signatory state.

As pointed out by Nelson A. Rockefeller, State Department officials, and many Latin American political leaders, the United States had yet to address the socio-economic needs of Latin America that contributed to its becoming a breeding ground for the growth of communism (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA). Those needs would be addressed later in the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS.

The Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Pact appeared to become empty promises in 1954, when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency engineered the overthrow of Guatemalan president JACOBO GUZMÁN ARBENZ for his alleged communist policies (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORS INVASION OF).

See also MONROE DOCTRINE (Vol. III).

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Robinson, A. N. R. (b. 1926–) *prime minister and president of Trinidad and Tobago* Born on December 16, 1926, in Calder Hall, Tobago, Arthur Napoleon Raymond Robinson earned an M.A. in politics and economics from London University in 1955. After

returning to TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, he was a founding member of the People's National Movement (PNM). Robinson served as the parliamentary representative for Tobago in the Parliament of the WEST INDIES FEDERATION from 1958 to 1962. Disagreeing with the political style of ERIC WILLIAMS, Robinson left the PNM in 1970. He established the Democratic Action Congress (DAC) in 1971, which was only successful in winning the two seats from Tobago in the 1976 and 1981 parliamentary elections. In 1981, Robinson joined forces with the United Labour Front (ULF), led by BASDEO PANDAY, and the Tapia House Movement (THM), led by Lloyd Best (b. 1934–d. 2007), to form the National Alliance, which subsequently joined the Organization for National Reconstruction (ONR) in 1983 to create a multiethnic party called the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR).

In 1986, the NAR defeated the PNM by winning 33 of the 36 seats in the assembly. Robinson became the third prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago. In 1987, the government, led by Robinson, selected NOOR HASSANALI to be the second president of Trinidad and Tobago. The multiethnic NAR, however, began to crumble in 1988 when the Indo-Trinidadian component, led by Panday, left to form the United National Congress (UNC). In 1990, during a coup attempt led by the Jamaat al Muslimeen, Robinson was shot in the leg, and most of his cabinet was held hostage for five days. In 1991, the PNM, led by PATRICK MANNING, one of the three PNM representatives to retain his seat in 1986, won the elections, and Manning became prime minister. In 1995, Manning called early elections. The PNM and UNC both won 17 seats, and the NAR won two seats. Robinson gave the two NAR seats to Panday, who became prime minister. Panday rewarded Robinson by selecting him to be the third president in 1997. Following the 2001 elections, in which the PNM and the UNC both won 18 seats, Robinson appointed Manning prime minister, despite the fact that Panday, the sitting prime minister, had appointed Robinson president. Manning's government selected George Maxwell Richards (b. 1931–) to serve as Trinidad and Tobago's fourth president when Robinson's term expired in 2003.

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Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo (b. 1900–d. 1975) *president of Colombia* Born in Tunja in COLOMBIA's Boyacá Department, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was educated in

local schools before attending the military academy in BOGOTÁ, from which he graduated in 1920. Shortly after being promoted to lieutenant in 1924, Rojas Pinilla made a career change. He spent three years studying civil engineering in the United States and after his return to Colombia in 1927 became involved in infrastructure construction projects, particularly road building.

Rojas Pinilla returned to the MILITARY in 1932, where his engineering skills were utilized. In 1943, the Colombian government sent him to the United States to secure military and construction materials under the terms of the lend-lease program. Upon his return to Colombia, Rojas Pinilla was appointed assistant director of the School of War in 1944, director of civil aeronautics in 1945, and promoted to the rank of colonel in 1946. For his role in suppressing the riots that followed the assassination of JORGE ELIÉCER GAITÁN on April 9, 1948, he was promoted to the rank of general. In 1952, Rojas Pinilla became commander of Colombia's armed forces. Despite his own conservative political leanings, on June 13, 1953, he engineered the removal of Conservative president General LAUREANO GÓMEZ in a bloodless coup d'état. Within a year of seizing power, Rojas Pinilla was faced with an economic downturn, which contributed both to increased violence and opposition to him. The military removed him from office on May 10, 1957, after which he remained a critic of the bipartisan National Front that alternated the presidency between Conservatives and Liberals. Subsequently, with his daughter María Eugenia Rojas de Morena (b. 1932–), he organized the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular, or ANAPO). He stood as its candidate in the April 17, 1970, presidential election, which he lost to Misael Pastrana Borrero (b. 1923–d. 1997).

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Romero Barceló, Carlos Antonio (b. 1932–) *governor of Puerto Rico and resident commissioner to the United States* The grandson of politician Antonio R. Barceló (b. 1868–d. 1938), Carlos Antonio Romero Barceló became an advocate of Puerto Rican statehood. A graduate of Yale University, he earned his law degree from the University of Puerto Rico in 1976 and began practicing law on the island a year later. He was linked to the 1978 murder of a young proindependence advocate at the hands of police. After several investigations, four police officers were found guilty of murder, and no links to Romero Barceló were found. Nevertheless, the incident became a continuing issue in his political career, which began in 1967 when he joined the New Progressive Party.

During his two terms as governor of Puerto Rico (1977–85), Romero Barceló emphasized the develop-

ment of tourism as an alternative to the nearly defunct sugar industry and stagnant industrialization process of OPERATION BOOTSTRAP. In 1986, Romero Barceló filled, by appointment, a vacant Senate seat, a position he held until elected resident commissioner in 1992. In Washington, D.C., he continually worked for a statehood referendum, even after its rejection by Puerto Rican

voters in 1993 and 1998. On returning to Puerto Rico from Washington in 2003, Romero Barceló retired from electoral politics.

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Saint Christopher and Nevis (Saint Kitts and Nevis) Part of the Leeward Islands, the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis, commonly referred to as St. Kitts (an old-fashioned abbreviation for Christopher) and Nevis, achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1983.

The islands of St. Christopher and Nevis occupy 101 square miles (261.5 km²) of territory and are separated by a narrow strait about two miles (3 km) wide. Roughly 43,000 people currently live in St. Christopher and Nevis, most of whom are descended from African slaves. St. Christopher, the larger of the two islands and the location of the capital, Basseterre, is an oval-shaped island with a small peninsula at its southeastern end. Nevis, which lies to the south of St. Christopher, is cone shaped. St. Christopher and Nevis was a founding member of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES. St. Christopher, named for Christopher Columbus, was the first English colony in the Caribbean. During the colonial period, to simplify administrative tasks, the British attached the somewhat distant Anguilla to the colony of St. Christopher and Nevis (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH). In 1958, the three-island group of St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla entered the WEST INDIES FEDERATION, which was dismantled in 1962. In 1967, the British government granted St. Christopher–Nevis–Anguilla local autonomy. Anguilla immediately opted out of the association, eventually becoming part of the BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES. St. Christopher and Nevis became independent on September 19, 1983.

St. Christopher and Nevis is a parliamentary democracy based on the British model. The head of state, Queen Elizabeth II, is represented by a governor general, who is appointed by the British government. Since the governor

general's power is primarily advisory and ceremonial, real power is vested in the prime minister, who is usually the leader of the majority party in the National Assembly. The National Assembly is composed of directly elected representatives and senators appointed by the governor general. The uniqueness of the 1983 constitution derives from the provisions for the local autonomy of Nevis and the establishment of the separate Nevis Island Assembly. The island of Nevis, therefore, elects representatives both to the National Assembly and to its own Nevis Island Assembly. The Nevis Island Assembly may amend or revoke legislation passed by the National Assembly. At the time of independence, Nevis was also granted the right of secession. Secession from the nation requires a two-thirds vote in the Nevis Island Assembly and the approval of two-thirds of the voters in an island-wide referendum.

The Labour Party, organized by ROBERT BRADSHAW in 1940, dominated the political scene until 1979. By 1979, political opposition to the Labour Party had coalesced into two party groupings: the People's Action Movement (PAM) on St. Christopher, which supported economic diversification away from sugar and toward tourism, increased domestic food production, and increased autonomy for Nevis; and the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) on Nevis. PAM and NRP, which had formed a coalition led by KENNEDY SIMMONDS, came to power in 1979. The PAM-NRP coalition cleared the way for the independence of St. Christopher and Nevis as a two-island federation. The Labour Party, led by DENZIL DOUGLAS, returned to power in 1995.

In the mid-1980s, the government envisioned the economic future of St. Christopher and Nevis as dependent on tourism, light manufacturing, and a scaled-

down sugar industry. To create a workforce to manage the country's tourist industry, the government invested heavily in the economic and social infrastructure of the nation. Although the potential seemed great, the economy did not keep pace with the rapidly expanding population. As a result, 20 percent of the population has been left in search of employment. Remittances to family members at home became a substantial portion of the national ECONOMY.

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Saint Lucia Located in the center of the Windward Islands, Saint Lucia lies between Martinique to the north and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES to the south. Named in honor of St. Lucy, the patron saint of blindness, the island achieved independence from the United Kingdom in 1979.

The pear-shaped island of St. Lucia is 239 square miles (619 km²) of territory populated by 161,000 people, the majority of whom are descended from African slaves. The island is dominated by high peaks and rain forests in the interior and has a coastline of sandy beaches. St. Lucia is also known for its natural deepwater harbors. Castries, the capital and largest city, is located on the northwest coast and has an excellent natural harbor. St. Lucia was a founding member of the ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES in 1983.

Because of the strategic value of the island's natural harbors, control of St. Lucia changed hands 14 times during the 18th and 19th centuries. The British eventually gained ultimate control in 1814. Although English is the official language and is spoken by 80 percent of the population, the cultural footprint of the early French presence on the island is still evident. Many St. Lucians, especially those in rural areas, speak a French patois. In addition, more than 90 percent of the people are Roman Catholics.

St. Lucia was a member of the WEST INDIES FEDERATION from 1958 to 1962. In 1967, the British government, which continued to control foreign affairs and national defense, granted St. Lucia local autonomy. St. Lucia became independent on February 22, 1979. St. Lucia is a parliamentary democracy based on the British model. The head of state, Queen Elizabeth II, is represented by a governor general who is appointed by the British government. Since the governor general's power

is primarily advisory and ceremonial, real power is vested in the prime minister, who is usually the leader of the majority party in the House of Assembly. The bicameral legislature in St. Lucia consists of the House of Assembly, whose 17 members are elected for five-year terms, and a Senate, whose 11 members are appointed by the governor after consultation with political, economic, and religious figures. Politics have been dominated by competition between the United Workers Party (UWP) and the St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP). JOHN COMPTON, leader of the UWP, was premier of St. Lucia from 1964 until independence in 1979, when he became prime minister. Shortly after independence, the SLP took control of the House of Assembly. Compton returned to power in 1982 and remained the prime minister until his resignation in 1996. He was succeeded by VAUGHAN LEWIS. The SLP won an overwhelming majority in the House of Assembly in 1997, and KENNY ANTHONY became the prime minister. Octogenarian Compton returned to power in 2006.

During the 1960s, the ECONOMY was transformed from a sugar-based one to one dedicated to banana production. This transformation initially improved the economic situation of small farmers because banana crops could be cultivated on small plots. During the 1990s, however, as the Europeans implemented more restrictive TRADE policies, St. Lucia, faced with declining revenues from banana exports, began to implement a long-term economic development program based on a diversified economy. Although AGRICULTURE is still an important component of the national economy, St. Lucia has made significant gains in developing the manufacturing sector and attracting a greater portion of the West Indies' tourist trade. St. Lucia's manufacturing sector is the most diverse in the eastern Caribbean.

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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Part of the Windward Islands, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines achieved independence from the United Kingdom on October 27, 1979. A federation of 32 islands, St. Vincent and the Grenadines lies between SAINT LUCIA to the north and GRENADA to the south. St. Vincent occupies

the majority of the nation's 150 square miles (388.5 km²) of territory. The Grenadines, a collection of islands to the south of St. Vincent, make up the remaining territory. Kingston, the capital, is located on St. Vincent. The majority of the nation's 120,000 inhabitants are descended from African slaves.

Initially a French colony, the British acquired permanent control of islands in 1783. The British encouraged the immigration of Portuguese and East Indians during the 19th century. In 1958, the British placed St. Vincent and the Grenadines in the WEST INDIES FEDERATION, which was dissolved in 1962 after JAMAICA and TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO withdrew. In 1967, the British government granted St. Vincent and the Grenadines local autonomy but continued to control foreign affairs and national defense. St. Vincent and the Grenadines became independent on October 27, 1979, the last of the Windward Islands to gain independence from the United Kingdom.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines is a parliamentary democracy. The head of state, Queen Elizabeth II, is represented by a governor general who is appointed by the British government. The governor general's power, however, is primarily advisory and ceremonial. Real power is vested in the prime minister who is usually the leader of the majority party in the House of Assembly, which consists of directly elected representatives and senators appointed by the governor general. Until recently, politics have been dominated by the St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP) and the New Democratic Party (NDP). SVLP prime minister R. MILTON CATO led the nation to independence and held power until 1984. Militant Rastafarians led by Lennox Charles seized Union Island (one of the Grenadines) in 1979. Cato requested military assistance from BARBADOS, which sent detachments of the Barbados Defense Force to capture the insurgents and restore order. NDP prime minister JAMES MITCHELL held power from 1984 until he voluntarily resigned in 2000. In 2001, a revised SVLP, now called the United Labour Party (ULP), defeated the NDP and took power under Ralph Gonsalves (b. 1945–), who has joined Venezuelan president HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS'S Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas.

The nation's ECONOMY is heavily dependent on AGRICULTURE. Bananas account for more than 50 percent of exports. In April 1979, the eruption of La Soufriere volcano caused extensive agricultural damage. Hurricanes have also devastated banana plantations. Dependence on a single-crop, export-led economy has also made the nation's economy vulnerable to external economic forces. Particularly ominous for the people of St. Vincent and the Grenadines is the European Union's plan to end preferential access to its markets by 2008. The government, therefore, encouraged the development of the tourist industry. During the 1990s, tourism replaced banana exports as the chief source of foreign exchange. The Grenadines have become especially popular with yachtsmen. New cruise ship berths helped increase the

number of tourists to more than 200,000 annually by 2000. Nevertheless, the negative impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the tourist industry and a high birthrate have caused thousands of people to emigrate.

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
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Lesley Suttly. *St. Vincent and the Grenadines* (London: Macmillan Caribbean, 2002).

Salinas de Gortari, Carlos (b. 1948–) *president of Mexico* Carlos Salinas de Gortari was an economist and president of MEXICO in the late years of the 20th century. His presidential administration began with the promise of economic and social progress but was marred by corruption and economic crisis.

Salinas was born into a prominent family in MEXICO CITY on April 3, 1948. He was educated at the



A 1993 photo of Mexico's president Carlos Salinas (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) and earned a Ph.D. at Harvard University. Salinas served in the cabinet of President Miguel de la Madrid (b. 1934–) during the disastrous recession of the 1980s and became the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) presidential candidate in 1988. In that election, Salinas faced strong opposition from Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (b. 1934–), son of former president LÁZARO CÁRDENAS. His narrow victory elicited accusations of fraud among Cárdenas supporters, and later investigations uncovered a number of electoral irregularities.

As president, Salinas implemented an economic plan known as the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad, which encouraged local grassroots control of government aid programs. Arguing that the MEXICAN REVOLUTION had already succeeded, Salinas ended the agricultural protections granted to *ejido* communities under the CONSTITUTION OF 1917. The move provoked intense debate, but the president argued that revolutionary agrarian policies were no longer effective. Salinas also helped devise the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT with the United States and Canada. The treaty went into effect during his last year in office and incited a major rebellion by the Zapatista National Liberation Front, a revolutionary movement in the state of Chiapas (see EZLN).

While Salinas's policies created short-term economic growth for Mexico, he is remembered for the economic crisis that occurred after he left office. Irresponsible monetary and fiscal policies implemented throughout 1994 forced Salinas's successor, ERNESTO ZEDILLO, to devalue the nation's currency.

Salinas de Gortari fled the country after leaving the presidency. His brother, Raúl, was arrested on suspicion of fraud and conspiracy, and his brother Enrique was killed in 2004.

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Carlos Salinas de Gortari. *Mexico: The Policy and Politics of Modernization* (Barcelona, Spain: Plaza & Janés, 2002).

Sam, Vilbrun Guillaume (b. 1859–d. 1915) *president of Haiti* Born on March 4, 1859, in Ouanaminthe, HAITI, Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was the son of former Haitian president Tirésias Augustin Simon Sam (b. 1835–d. 1916), who ruled Haiti from 1896 to 1902. Prior to 1915, Sam served as a congressional representative, a senator, a minister of defense, and a minister of finance. On March 4, 1915, Sam succeeded Joseph Davilmar Théodore (b. 1847–d. 1917), who had become

president in November 1914 after overthrowing Oreste Zamor (b. 1861–d. 1915) with the help of cacao farmers in the north. Théodore's inability to pay the cacao farmers (known as Cacos) led to the Cacos Rebellion, led by Rosalvo Bobo (b. 1873–d. 1929), and Théodore's resignation in favor of Sam.

Faced with rebellion, Sam, a black man who distrusted the mulatto elite and German investors, advocated closer economic and political ties with the United States. Bobo, a mulatto medical doctor, however, was critical of Sam's efforts to expand political and economic ties with the United States. On July 27, 1915, after Bobo's forces attacked the National Palace, Sam ordered the execution of 167 political prisoners, including Zamor. The result was a national uprising that sent Sam fleeing to the French embassy for safety. At 10:30 A.M. the next morning, an angry mob invaded the embassy and captured Sam, who was hiding in a bathroom. The mob publicly dismembered the president in front of the French embassy and scattered his remains throughout Port-au-Prince.

News of the gruesome events reached U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, who feared that the pro-German Bobo might become the next president. On July 28, 1915, Wilson ordered U.S. Marines to militarily occupy Haiti, who sent Bobo into exile in JAMAICA. Sam was succeeded by Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave (b. 1863–d. 1926), the first in a series of puppet presidents.

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Sandiford, Erskine (b. 1937–) *prime minister of Barbados* Born on March 24, 1937, in BARBADOS, Erskine Sandiford earned a B.A. in English from the University of the West Indies and a master's degree in economics and social studies from the University of Manchester. A member of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), Sandiford was appointed to the Senate in the Barbadian Parliament in 1967. He resigned his seat in 1971 to run for a seat in the House of Assembly. Prime Minister ERROL BARROW appointed Sandiford to serve first as minister of education and then as minister of health and welfare. In the 1976 parliamentary elections, although the DLP lost control of the House of Assembly, Sandiford managed to hold his seat by a margin of 12 votes. From 1976 to 1986, Sandiford served as a deputy parliamentary opposition leader.

After the DLP defeated the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) in 1986, Barrow, who once again was prime minister, appointed Sandiford deputy prime minister. After

Barrow died suddenly on June 1, 1987, Sandiford became prime minister. Sandiford led the DLP to victory in the 1991 parliamentary elections. His technocratic style, however, alienated many DLP members of Parliament. In 1994, after several members of the DLP opposed a motion proposed by Sandiford, the prime minister called for early elections. The BLP, led by OWEN ARTHUR, defeated the DLP, and Arthur became prime minister. David Thompson (b. 1961–) succeeded Sandiford as leader of the DLP, but Sandiford remained in the House of Assembly until 1999, when he retired to teach economics at Barbados Community College.

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Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN; Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional) Founded by a group of Nicaraguan university students in 1961, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, or FSLN, dedicated itself to the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty and to the expulsion of U.S. influence in the country. The FSLN's philosophy drew on the nationalism of its namesake AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO, as well as the Marxism-Leninism and Christian humanism embedded in liberation theology. Impressed by the success of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ in CUBA, the FSLN prosecuted a guerrilla conflict, albeit unsuccessful, against the Somoza government throughout the 1960s. In the early 1970s, on Castro's advice, the FSLN shifted its strategy to emphasize military strikes against isolated National Guard outposts. This strategy frustrated the Guard, whose response became increasingly brutal, which, in turn, only turned the population further against the Somoza regime. As the opposition to ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE crystallized after the devastating 1972 earthquake that destroyed Managua, the FSLN was NICARAGUA's only armed group. Following the 1978 assassination of journalist PEDRO JOAQUÍN CHAMORRO CARDENAL, SOMOZA's support rapidly slipped away. He appeared totally isolated in June 1979, when the FSLN launched its final offensive.

Politically, the FSLN split into three factions in the early 1970s. One faction dated to 1967, when it adopted the "prolonged popular war" (*guerra popular prolongada*) as its strategy. It called for the building of a grassroots organization among the peasants in northern Nicaragua, while urban supporters would raise money to sustain the effort. Because Somoza's suppressive measures were directed at urban youth, rather than the rural villages, in 1975, Jaime Wheelock formed the "proletarian tendency," which changed the emphasis to urban guerrilla warfare. Shortly thereafter, a third faction, the "third way," or *terceristas*, surfaced within the FSLN. Led by DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA and his brother Humberto

(b. 1951–), the *terceristas* reached out for alliances with other opposition groups, including the Nicaraguan elite. In October 1977, the *terceristas* formed an alliance with the "Group of Twelve," which represented Nicaragua's professional and business community. In San José, COSTA RICA, they formed a government in exile. The political strategy did not deter the *terceristas* from playing the lead role in either the 1978 summer offensive or the final offensive in June 1979 that forced Somoza to leave the country on July 19, 1979.

After Somoza's ouster, the FSLN set up a five-man junta that represented Nicaragua's different factions, but as the Sandinistas moved to consolidate their own power, the five resigned from the junta. VIOLETA BARRIOS DE CHAMORRO was the first. Many of the FSLN's actions reminded observers of Castro's efforts in Cuba 20 years previous: the organization of rural and urban workers into FSLN LABOR groups, defense committees in urban neighborhoods, and postponement of elections until 1984. Land distribution programs and the control of production in the private sector smacked of communism. The suspicions were confirmed by the FSLN leaders' visit to Moscow in 1981 and the presence of Cuban doctors, teachers, and agricultural and industrial advisers. As the U.S.-backed Contra War in Nicaragua intensified during the 1980s, so, too, did Cuban military assistance to the Sandinistas (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS).

While the FSLN's socioeconomic policies may have failed on their own merits, their rapid decline was brought about by the policies of U.S. president Ronald Reagan, who saw the Sandinistas as part of the Soviet Union's vision to communize the world (see SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICA). Reagan refused to appropriate the \$8 billion reconstruction aid package initiated by his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, directed the INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK not to extend credit to Nicaragua, and embargoed U.S. TRADE with the country. Most important, he ordered the prosecution of the Contra War to topple the FSLN government: The Central Intelligence Agency organized discontented Nicaraguans and trained them in HONDURAS to conduct warfare inside Nicaragua. The war took a heavy toll on Nicaragua's infrastructure and by 1985 caused the FSLN government to spend 67 percent of the national budget on defense against the Contras. Combined with the failure of the FSLN's economic policies, Nicaragua was an economic failure, which contributed to its acceptance of the 1989 Arias Peace Plan, which brought the war to an end.

The peace plan also paved the way for elections on February 25, 1990. FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega lost to Violeta Chamorro. He would lose again in 1997 and 2001 but finally captured the presidency in 2007. Over the same time span, the FSLN remained the largest single opposition party in the national legislature, and FSLN labor unions continued to pressure for improvement in the quality of life for the Nicaraguan poor, society's largest sector.

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Sandino, Augusto César (b. 1895–d. 1934) *guerrilla leader in Nicaragua* Augusto César Sandino was born in Niquinohomo, NICARAGUA, the illegitimate son of businessman Gregorio Sandino and coffee picker Margarita Calderón. Sandino went on to lead a guerrilla army against U.S. forces in Nicaragua from 1927 to 1933 and to become a national hero whom the revolutionary leaders of the 1980s named themselves after.

Sandino had a difficult childhood. He was forced to abandon formal schooling in 1910 to work in his father's general store. In 1916, he left Nicaragua for COSTA RICA, where he worked as a mechanic for three years before returning home to pursue his own grain business. After killing a man, Sandino again left Nicaragua. He first went to La Ceiba, HONDURAS, where he worked for the Vacarro Brothers Fruit Company and then on to Tampico, MEXICO, where he was employed by the Southern Pennsylvania Oil Company. During his stay in Tampico, Sandino was influenced by the social justice and anti-American aspects of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. When Sandino answered his father's call to return to Niquinohomo in 1926, he brought with him a determination to correct the injustices that beset Nicaragua.

When Liberal general José María Moncada (b. 1894–d. 1946) accepted U.S. secretary of war Henry L. Stimson's mediated Treaty of Tipitapa on May 24, 1927, that ended his war against the ruling Conservatives, Sandino slipped off to San Rafael del Norte to take up his two-pronged cause: fighting against General Moncada, who represented the tradition of corrupt Nicaraguan politics, and driving the North Americans from his country. For six years, the war waxed and waned. U.S. Marines and Nicaraguan government troops chased the wily Sandino and his band of fighters, which never numbered more than 1,000 men. Sandino's forces wracked U.S.-owned commercial properties. In the eyes of U.S. Marines, Sandino shifted from being a "bandit" to a "guerrilla." Just as the war became unpopular in Nicaragua, the United States grew weary of its commitment. In the broader context, U.S. policy makers became frustrated with the failure of their interventionist policies in the Caribbean region since 1900 (see U.S. CARIBBEAN INTER-



Nicaraguan guerrilla leader Augusto César Sandino (center) with Mexican José Paredes (left) and Salvadoran Agustín F. Martínez (right), in El Salvador, June 1925 (*Records of the U.S. Marine Corps*)

VENTIONS, 1900–1943). By 1930, U.S. president Herbert Hoover faced vociferous opposition at home and abroad regarding the U.S. troops stationed in Nicaragua, as well as a stalemate on the battlefield. On February 13, 1931, Hoover announced that U.S. troops would be withdrawn after the November 1932 election; that withdrawal was completed on January 2, 1933. The withdrawal also led to a February 2, 1933, peace agreement between newly elected Liberal president Juan B. Sacasa (b. 1874–d. 1946) and Sandino. It provided for an immediate cease-fire, amnesty for Sandino's forces, and a tract of land in the Coco River region for a cooperative farm.

The end of the United States's "special relationship" with Nicaragua also opened the door for ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA to rise to power. Both Sacasa and Sandino had reason to fear Somoza. He brought the two together for meetings in the presidential palace on February 18 and 21, 1934, at which they agreed to disband the Somoza-led National Guard. Fearing for his own future, earlier in the day of February 21, Somoza and his officers had agreed to take joint responsibility for Sandino's death, which they plotted. That evening, as Sandino left the presidential residence, a group of National Guardsmen seized him and took him to an open field near Managua's airport, where he was executed by firing squad. At the time, Somoza was attending a poetry reading at the National Theater. Sandino's legacy reached new heights in the 1970s when the SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT declared that it was fighting to rid Nicaragua of the corrupt Somoza dynasty and U.S. support of it.

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Sanguinetti, Julio María (b. 1936–) *president of Uruguay* Born in MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, into a middle-class family of Italian descent, Julio María Sanguinetti was educated in local schools before earning his law degree from the University of Montevideo in 1961. Two years later, he was elected to the national parliament on the Colorado Party ticket and was reelected in 1966 and 1971. Until his appointment by President Jorge Pacheco (b. 1920–d. 1978) as minister for industry and commerce, Sanguinetti served as a member of the Uruguayan delegation to the 1964 Geneva meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and as President Pacheco's adviser on the affairs of the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS). He was serving as minister of education and culture under President Juan María Bordaberry (b. 1928–) in 1972, when he resigned in protest over the growing influence of the MILITARY in government. In 1976, the military government prohibited him from further political activity.

In 1983 and 1984, Sanguinetti served as general secretary of the Colorado Party during the negotiations of the Pact of the Naval Club, which paved the way for the November 25, 1984, elections in which Sanguinetti captured the presidency. Allegedly, the pact defined the military's parameters for permitting the country to return to its traditional democracy, requirements that included civilian promises not to punish the officer corps for HUMAN RIGHTS violations. Some observers contended that the pact also guaranteed Sanguinetti's electoral victory.

Sanguinetti inherited a country traumatized by 11 years of brutal military rule. He immediately released all political prisoners and reestablished full constitutional rights for all. But, the military's refusal to participate in any civilian trials for human rights abuses during the 1973–84 period eventually led to a 1989 government amnesty for all military officers. The law sharply divided the nation and cost Sanguinetti popular support. Through his foreign affairs minister, Enrique Iglesias (b. 1931–), Sanguinetti pursued an activist TRADE policy that spurred the ECONOMY in 1986 and 1987, but thereafter, it slowed markedly until the end of his first presidential term in 1989.

Sanguinetti, who could not immediately succeed himself by constitutional provision, could seek a second term at a later date. This he did on November 27, 1994, when he won the presidential election with only 24.7 percent of the popular vote, which forced him to form a coalition government with several other political parties. Over extensive popular protest, Sanguinetti directed through the legislature a social security reform law that reduced

government subsidies to retirees. He also oversaw constitutional changes that strengthened the executive and reformed the election process to restrict one presidential candidate per party and a runoff election should no one candidate receive an overall majority of the vote in the initial election. Sanguinetti's administration benefited from expanded trade relations, particularly among its MERCOSUR partners and with the United States (see SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET). Domestically, this resulted in job creation and higher wages and attracted direct foreign investment. Sanguinetti handed over the presidency to his colleague Jorge Batlle (b. 1947–) on March 1, 2000, just before BRAZIL's currency devaluation and the Argentine economic collapse (see ARGENTINA, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN).

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
Santiago de Chile Santiago de Chile is located approximately at the midpoint of CHILE's 2,485-mile (4,000-km) length and 70 miles (113 km) inland from the Pacific Ocean port of Valparaiso. Metropolitan Santiago consists of 27 municipalities that are home to 5.6 million people, approximately one-third of Chile's total population. Santiago is the seat of the national government, although the legislature convenes in Valparaiso.

Founded on February 12, 1541, by Spanish conquistador Pedro de Valdivia, Santiago was the most distant city from Spain in its New World empire and remained an outpost after independence until the 1880s. The Church of San Francisco, completed in 1628, and the presidential offices at La Moneda, built in 1764, serve as reminders of Santiago's colonial past. The city took on new importance as a commercial and financial center with the development and expansion of the nitrate INDUSTRY and subsequently copper exports. In the period after World War II, Chile's industrial development centered in Santiago and the surrounding Central Valley, which led to further population growth in the city.

Chile moved away from its dependence on copper exports under the regime of General AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE, from 1973 to 1988. Today its well-diversified ECONOMY includes many international firms, such as Billiton, Coca-Cola, Ford, Intel, JP Morgan, Nestlé, and Unilever. Santiago's industrial base accounts for 45 percent of the national gross domestic product.

Chile's Central Valley is a rich fertile plain that historically produced food for export that today, thanks to refrigeration and modern shipping, reaches the United States and China. Many food-processing plants are located in metropolitan Santiago.

Santiago also is a rich cultural center. Twenty-nine institutions of higher learning are located in the city,



Aerial view of Santiago de Chile, with the Andes in the background (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

including the prestigious Catholic and national universities. In addition to La Moneda and the Church of San Francisco, 12 museums are located in the capital, including one of pre-Columbian art, archaeology, as well as the National Historical Museum.

See also SANTIAGO DE CHILE (Vols. II, III); VALDIVIA, PEDRO DE (Vol. I).

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Santo Domingo Santo Domingo, capital city of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, is the oldest continuously inhabited European settlement in the Americas. Officially founded on August 4, 1496, by Bartholomew Columbus, brother of Christopher Columbus, Santo Domingo is located on the Caribbean Sea at the mouth of the Ozama River. Today, an estimated 2.7 million people live in Santo Domingo's metropolitan area, which includes the National District, the seat of the national government.

Santo Domingo served as Spain's first New World capital and was the launching area for Spanish con-

quistadores such as Vasco Núñez Balboa and Hernando Cortés. Many of its historic buildings are found today in the city's colonial district, including Santa María la Menor, the New World's first Catholic cathedral; Ozama Fortress, the oldest fort in the Americas; the Royal Palace; and the New World's first monastery and convent. Santo Domingo entered a state of decline after English privateer Francis Drake invaded the city in 1586. By a series of treaties in 1665, the city came under French control. From 1801 until 1844, the French, Haitians, and Spanish took turns administering the city. Finally, in 1844, the Dominican Republic gained its independence from HAITI.

In the 20th century, Santo Domingo was the epicenter of the country's political domination by U.S. Marines from 1916 to 1924, the dictatorship of RAFAEL TRUJILLO from 1930 to 1961, and JOAQUÍN BALAGUER's 22-year rule between 1960 and 1996. Trujillo oversaw the city's reconstruction following the 1930 earthquake and renamed it Ciudad Trujillo, a name that lasted until his death in 1961.

Today, Santo Domingo is a city of broad avenues and modern buildings and is home to many international businesses. Outside the city center, campuslike environments house nearly 500 U.S. "807" assembly plants in textiles, clothing, electronics, footwear, and leather goods

for reshipment to the United States. In addition to its port, which connects the Dominican Republic with the Caribbean and the rest of the world, the international airport at Santo Domingo brings businesspeople and tourists from Europe, Asia, and Africa. Three main highways and a domestic air service link the capital with the remainder of the country. Though the city has an excellent international telecommunications system, an inadequate electric system is a major drawback to commercial development.

In addition to the old Spanish sector, Santo Domingo has many museums and historic sites, including the Christopher Columbus Lighthouse, built in 1992 to house the assumed remains of the explorer. Eighteen institutions of higher education are located throughout the city. Santo Domingo has many wealthy neighborhoods with plush arcades and modern shopping centers. In contrast, the residents of the city's northernmost reaches are among the poorest in Santo Domingo.

See also COLUMBUS, CHRISTOPHER (Vol. I); SANTO DOMINGO (Vols. II, III).

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São Paulo São Paulo, BRAZIL, is situated some 30 miles (48 km) west of the port city of Santos on a high plateau that is part of the Brazilian Highlands. Founded by a group of Jesuit priests in 1554, São Paulo remained an impoverished outpost during the Portuguese colonial period. In the 19th century, São Paulo experienced rapid growth first through the expansion of the tea industry and by the end of the century through coffee production for export to international markets. With a decline in the demand for coffee and the impact of the two world wars, São Paulo's elite invested their wealth in industrial development into the late 20th century, at which time financial and ancillary services emerged as the primary economic activity.

São Paulo's economic development saw a concomitant rise in population. The city grew from a rural town of a few thousand people during the Portuguese colonial period to 25,000 in the mid-19th century. Twentieth-century industrialization brought with it a large influx of Europeans, particularly Italians, as well as Middle Easterners and Japanese, who found employment in the city's 11,500 industrial plants. By the middle of the 20th century, São Paulo had nearly 2 million residents. The rapid growth continued thereafter so that in 2007, the 588-square-mile (1,523-km²) city had some 10.9 million inhabitants, or 19.9 million including the 3,108-square-mile (8,050-km²) metropolitan area. At present, São Paulo is the most populous city in Brazil, South America, and the Southern Hemisphere.

Industrial growth also spawned a middle class, but the *paulista* elites remained in political and financial control of the city. Beginning in the 1920s, LABOR organized into unions, which became a potent political force after World War II.

São Paulo has a diverse cultural makeup that finds expression in restaurants, LITERATURE, MUSIC, and the arts. Many cultural historians trace Brazil's first theater to São Paulo, and today, the tradition is found in several theatrical venues. The city has its own Drama Art School. Its Historic Museum has rare book and original document collections that cover the colonial period. The city is also home to eight universities.

See also SÃO PAULO (Vols. II, III).

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Seaga, Edward (b. 1930–) *prime minister of Jamaica* Born on May 28, 1930, in Boston, Massachusetts, to Jamaican parents of Scottish and Lebanese descent, Edward Seaga and his family returned to JAMAICA when he was still an infant. Seaga attended primary and secondary school in Kingston and graduated from Harvard University with a B.A. in social sciences in 1952. A member of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), he won election to Parliament in 1962 representing Western Kingston, a seat which he held for more than 40 years. Seaga served as minister of development and welfare for ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE and minister of finance for Hugh Shearer (b. 1923–d. 2004) until the JLP lost power in the 1972 elections. In 1974, he became the leader of the JLP. Seaga's party lost the 1976 elections, which were plagued by political violence, to the People's National Party (PNP), led by MICHAEL MANLEY.

In 1980, campaigning on a platform of reestablishing close relations with the United States, Seaga's party won 51 of the 60 seats in the House of Representatives. Seaga established an amicable relationship with U.S. president Ronald Reagan. He supported Reagan's CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE and OPERATION URGENT FURY, the U.S.-led invasion of GRENADA designed to overthrow the New Jewel Movement. Seaga broke diplomatic relations with CUBA and lowered the taxes on U.S. mineral companies operating in Jamaica. The Jamaican ECONOMY, however, did not improve during the 1980s, and Seaga lost support at home. Manley won the 1980 elections and returned to power. Seaga continued to lead the political opposition until 2005, when he retired from politics to accept a position as senior research fellow at the University of the West Indies. His retirement marked the end of Jamaica's first generation of political leaders. Seaga was succeeded as leader of the JLP by Bruce Golding (b. 1947–), who became prime minister in 2007.

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Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) The Shining Path was founded by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso (b. 1934–) in 1968 at the San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University in Ayacucho as a splinter group of PERU's Communist Party. Many of its disciples were students of Guzmán in San Cristóbal's College of Education and returned to their native villages to further espouse Guzmán's philosophy. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Shining Path remained within the Ayacucho District, one of Peru's most poverty-stricken regions.

The Shining Path's stated objective is to destroy traditional Peru and replace it with a "people's republic" based on an alliance between the workers and peasants. Its ideology—"Gonzalo Thought"—draws from the doctrines of Mao Zedong and Peruvian Marxist JOSÉ CARLOS MARIÁTEGUI. From Mao, the Shining Path advocates a protracted "people's war," initially to gain control of the countryside, then moving into the cities. From Mariátegui, it accepts the idea that only a revolution can destroy Peru's semifeudal society.

On the eve of Peru's first democratic election on May 17, 1980, the Shining Path began its armed struggle for revolution with an attack on an obscure polling place in Ayacucho. Thereafter, the movement spread throughout the Upper Huellaga Valley and into LIMA. In the process, its members brutally tortured and executed local political officials, as well as supervisors of community farms and opposition spokesmen, real or imagined. Torture and rape became common tactics to force peasants into compliance. Political representatives, community organizers, and social workers in Lima's "young towns" (slums) became the target of the Shining Path's wrath. In addition, Lima's infrastructure came under attack, particularly electric relay stations. The Peruvian government's first reaction was to arm the peasants so they could resist encroachments but in 1985 gave the army carte blanche to suppress the movement. The army proved to be as brutal as the Shining Path. In all, an estimated 69,000 people died or disappeared as a result of the terrorist and MILITARY violence.

With the capture of Guzmán on September 12, 1992, and his subsequent call for an end to the armed struggle, the 1995 arrests of other Shining Path leaders, and President ALBERTO KENYA FUJIMORI's amnesty plan that netted an estimated 6,000 Shining Path members, the movement seemed to wither away. However, from 2001 to 2006, several isolated attacks on government buildings, roads, and infrastructure projects, along with some kidnappings, indicate that the Shining Path remains active.

In the meantime, legal maneuvering delayed Guzmán's trial until 2006. On October 13 of that year, a Peruvian court convicted him of terrorism and sentenced him to life in prison.

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Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da See LULA DA SILVA, LUIZ INÁCIO.

Simmonds, Kennedy (b. 1936–) *prime minister of St. Christopher and Nevis* Born on April 12, 1936, in Basseterre, the capital of SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, Kennedy Simmonds earned a medical degree at the University of the West Indies in 1962. After his internship in JAMAICA, he set up private practice in Anguilla. In 1965, he was one of the founding members of the People's Action Movement (PAM), which was formed as an opposition party to the Labour Party led by ROBERT BRADSHAW. From 1966 to 1969, he pursued postgraduate studies, first in the BAHAMAS and then in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 1969, he returned to St. Christopher and Nevis to resume his practice. Simmonds was elected leader of PAM in 1976.

In a special bi-election in January 1979, Simmonds won the seat made vacant by Bradshaw's death in 1978. He was the first person in decades to be elected to a political position in St. Christopher and Nevis and not a member of the Labour Party. Taking advantage of confusion in the leadership of the Labour Party following Bradshaw's death, Simmonds allied PAM with the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) and won the 1980 elections. The change in government reduced the drive for secession in Nevis. Simmonds served as premier from 1980 to 1983, when the United Kingdom granted St. Christopher and Nevis independence.

One of Simmonds's first acts as prime minister was to support the October 1983 U.S. intervention in GRENADA. St. Christopher and Nevis dispatched a small force of police to participate in the pacification of Grenada. The growth of the offshore finance industry during the 1980s, although economically beneficial for the nation, increased money laundering and led to rampant allegations of corruption in the government (see OFFSHORE BANKING). Allegations that government officials were involved in drug smuggling led to the Labour Party's victory in 1995.

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Sinarquistas Sinarquistas were members of the National Synarchist Union (Unión Nacional Sinarquista, or UNS), which formed in MEXICO in 1937 as an ultranationalist, pro-Catholic, and anticommunist organization. Sinarquista founder José Antonio Urquiza (b. 1904–d. 1938) criticized the social policies of President LÁZARO CÁRDENAS as leftist and anticlerical.

Urquiza and his followers advocated the tenets of Christian democracy espoused in Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* encyclical. For that reason, Sinarquistas were condemned by the Mexican government and U.S. intelligence agents as fascists. One high-ranking member of the Sinarquistas, Hellmuth Oskar Schreiter, was found to be a Nazi agent. The Sinarquistas sympathized with many of the political philosophies championed by Francisco Franco's Falange in Spain. They also denounced PAN-AMERICANISM as a U.S. attempt to dominate the other countries of the Americas. The Sinarquistas were most active in the states of Guanajuato and Sinaloa but aimed to spread the movement across Mexico. The organization published a weekly newspaper called *El Sinarquista* to promote its nationalist agenda. The movement eventually expanded into the U.S. Southwest as anti-Mexican racism in the 1940s created a receptive audience for Sinarquistas's pro-Mexico message.

In the early years of WORLD WAR II, nongovernmental leftist groups in Mexico led the charge in trying to discredit the Sinarquistas. By 1942, however, Mexico had formally joined the war and more organized government action helped silence the Sinarquistas. In the last half of the 20th century, Sinarquistas have made several attempts to establish a political party but have failed to obtain official recognition.

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Soccer War (1969) The Soccer War was a four-day conflict from July 14 to 18, 1969, between EL SALVADOR and HONDURAS. The immediate cause of the war was the riots that erupted at the Tegucigalpa soccer stadium where the two national teams were to compete for a place in the international soccer tournament the World Cup. The historic origins of the conflict date to the 1920s, however, when Salvadoran peasants migrated to Honduras because

land was not available to them in El Salvador. The new immigrants settled along the countries' common border. With time's passage, their numbers increased through continued MIGRATION and procreation of those already living in Honduras. The new groups moved to the unoccupied Honduran interior. The Salvadorans remained on these lands, in some cases for two generations, and made no attempt to obtain clear title to the land or apply for Honduran citizenship. Two factors in the 1960s exacerbated the problem. Honduras, already the region's poorest and most underdeveloped country, received little, if any, benefit from the CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM) that was established in 1960. In fact, Honduras found itself with an ever-increasing TRADE deficit to the more industrious El Salvador.

Nationalism on both sides intensified in 1969 when Honduran president Oswaldo López Arellano's (b. 1921–) land distribution program conflicted with the holdings of the Salvadoran migrants and their descendants, who were being forced to return home. The Salvadoran elite resisted their forced return because they would increase the pressure on already scarce lands in El Salvador.

The rioting in Tegucigalpa prompted the Salvadoran government to send troops into Honduras, ostensibly to end the outflow of people. The troops rapidly advanced to Nueva Ocotepeque and Santa Rosa de Copán, leaving the impression that they intended to attack the capital, Tegucigalpa. Caught off guard by the ground assault, the Hondurans used their superior airpower to rout the Salvadorans. The ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES negotiated a cease-fire that went into effect on July 20, 1969, but it was not until October 30, 1980, that U.S. president Jimmy Carter orchestrated an agreement that sent the dispute to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. In 1992, the court awarded the disputed territory to Honduras, but not until 1999 did El Salvador accept the decision.

The cost of the war was high. An estimated 2,000 people, most of them Hondurans, were killed. Estimates range from 60,000 to 130,000 peasants who returned to El Salvador, where their presence complicated an already tenuous land tenure system that contributed to Salvadoran civil war a decade later (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS). The CACM fell into disarray, only to be revived with the changing global ECONOMY in the 1990s.

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Société Haïtienne–Américaine pour le Développement Agricole (SHADA; Haitian–American Society for Agricultural Development) The Société Haïtienne–Américaine pour le Développement Agricole

(SHADA) was an American corporation dedicated to the production of rubber in HAITI during World War II. It was created on August 15, 1941, to encourage the production of raw materials in Haiti, especially those materials considered vital to the MILITARY that could conceivably be denied to the United States if the Japanese militarily conquered European and U.S. colonies in Southeast Asia. Most troublesome to U.S. government officials was the potential loss of access to natural rubber supplies in British Malaysia and Dutch Indonesia, which represented more than 95 percent of the world's natural rubber production. Notwithstanding American efforts to develop synthetic rubber, the U.S. government energetically sought to develop alternative rubber sources in more than a dozen Latin American nations (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA).

Haitian president ÉLIE LESCOT who supported the United States during World War II, encouraged SHADA activities in Haiti. Technically, the Haitian government was the owner of SHADA, which was funded with a \$5-million loan from the Export-Import Bank. To secure the loan, however, the company's stock was turned over to the Export-Import Bank as collateral. The manager and all principal officers of SHADA were Americans. More than 40,000 Haitian peasants had their farms expropriated to provide the needed land for rubber and sisal plantations. By 1943, more than 90,000 Haitians were employed by SHADA. Synthetic materials to produce rope, however, eventually negated the need for Haitian sisal. Over 32,000 acres of land in Haiti were planted with *Cryptostegia* vines and *Hevea* trees imported from the Philippines. Harvesting latex from the *Cryptostegia* vines, however, proved difficult and unproductive. In addition, the displacement of peasants from their farms caused food shortages in Haiti. In 1944, the U.S. government, citing the success of the synthetic rubber program in the United States and the dismal performance of the *Cryptostegia* rubber plantations in Haiti, canceled SHADA's *Cryptostegia* rubber program. In 1945, the U.S. government also canceled the contract for rubber from the *Hevea* trees. Lescot's association with the failed economic venture contributed to his overthrow in 1946. The government of Dumarsais Estimé (b. 1900–d. 1953) nationalized SHADA's holdings and began the process of returning land to peasants and encouraging them to plant coffee.

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soldaderas *Soldaderas* were WOMEN soldiers and camp followers in MEXICO during the revolution of

1910. The armies of nearly all factions of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION had female participants, but the number of women and the types of duties they performed varied.

Soldaderas were often the wives, sisters, and other female relatives of male soldiers, and they accompanied their men for a variety of reasons. Many *soldaderas* had lost their homes and main income providers as local villages were destroyed and the men went off to fight. Others followed their men into battle to provide basic services that were not supplied by rebel militias or by the national army. Women cooked and cleaned for the soldiers and provided basic nursing care to the wounded. *Soldaderas* were also female companions to the soldiers, and often entire families accompanied revolutionary armies. Women gave birth and raised small children in the camps. When a male companion died in battle, the *soldadera* often attached herself to another. In some armies, *soldaderas* even fought alongside the men. Some women held officer ranks, and there are numerous accounts of *soldaderas* performing brave feats and leading armies to victory on the battlefield. Although life in the camps was difficult, many *soldaderas* found their new roles to be liberating and welcomed the opportunity to contribute to the revolution.

After the fighting subsided, many women were forced to return to their former lifestyle, their services on the battlefield having produced few immediate changes in gender roles. Nevertheless, the emerging feminist movement in Mexico frequently pointed to the contributions made by *soldaderas* to argue for women's rights and equality.

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Somoza Debayle, Anastasio (Tachito) (b. 1925–d. 1980) *dictator of Nicaragua* Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle rose to power through the MILITARY to serve as president and dictator of NICARAGUA. The second son of ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA and Salvadora Debayle, the younger Anastasio was educated at St. Leo's Preparatory School in Florida and La Salle Military Academy on Long Island prior to his graduation from West Point in 1946. After returning home, President Somoza appointed his son head of the National Guard, the regime's military prop. Until his father's death in 1956, the younger Somoza directed the Guard in the suppression of the numerous minor rebellions against the elder Somoza.

Following the assassination of the elder Somoza in 1956, Tachito's brother Luis Somoza Debayle



Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza Debayle (*center*) with his wife, Hope Portocarrer, and Nelson A. Rockefeller during a reception at the U.S. Embassy Residence in Managua, Nicaragua, on May 16, 1964 (*Courtesy of the Rockefeller Archive Center*)

(b. 1922–d. 1967) served as Nicaragua's president until 1963. During that time, the brothers were at loggerheads. Luis was a reformer, who lifted the existing state of siege and wanted free and unfettered elections as a step toward a more democratic nation. Tachito wanted to retain the family's political dominance. Despite their conflict, the Somoza brothers continued to appoint family and friends to key government posts. On February 8, 1967, two months before Luis's fatal heart attack, Anastasio won the presidential election. His four-year term was characterized by further graft, corruption, and nepotism, which further intensified the opposition. In addition to the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties that opposed the Somoza dynasty, factions within Somoza's ruling Independent Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Independiente, or PLI) sought his resignation. Outside the political circles, CATHOLIC CHURCH officials and the fledgling middle class also sought social and political change. The nascent Marxist-leaning SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN) conducted guerrilla attacks on National Guard outposts in the countryside. The weight of opposition against him prompted Somoza to manipulate an agreement in 1971 that required him to step down from the presidency in favor of a three-man ruling junta until the 1974 presidential elections, when he would again stand as a candidate.

Nicaragua's political dynamic significantly changed following an earthquake on December 23, 1972, that devastated Managua and killed an estimated 10,000 people. Somoza, his colleagues, and the National Guard allegedly took for their own purposes much of the international relief aid that poured into Nicaragua. Indeed, the poorer sections of Managua were never rebuilt. The opposition stiffened its resistance. The traditional elite

rallied behind the owner of *La Prensa*, PEDRO JOAQUÍN CHAMORRO CARDENAL. Small businesspeople formed the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense, or MDN), while individual and more disparate middle-sector groups operated alone. All clamored for Somoza's resignation. In the countryside, the FSLN continued its assault on government, and particularly National Guard, outposts. The opposition intensified following Chamorro's assassination on January 10, 1978; it was widely assumed that Somoza had engineered the shooting. Chamorro's death also brought together the Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio Opositor, or FAO), which represented the various opposition groups and the United People's Movement (Movimiento Pueblo Unido, or MPU), an organization that included students, as well as communist and socialist elements. Somoza, however, refused to seriously negotiate with these groups in the spring and summer of 1978.

Somoza's weakness, however, was registered on August 22, 1978, when members of an FSLN faction, led by Edén Pastora (b. 1937–), seized the National Palace and 2,000 of its occupants. Somoza eventually caved into their demands for the release of 60 FSLN prisoners and their safe conduct out of Nicaragua to PANAMA and VENEZUELA. Somoza agreed to have his government disseminate an FSLN declaration of charges against the dictator and pay a \$500,000 ransom. Despite this embarrassment and continued FSLN victories in the countryside, Somoza refused U.S.- and UN-initiated mediation efforts in the fall of 1978. Somoza's recalcitrance and continued HUMAN RIGHTS violations prompted President Jimmy Carter to terminate all U.S. military assistance to the Nicaraguan dictator. Although he would continue to purchase arms on the world market, particularly from Israel, Somoza otherwise stood completely isolated when the FSLN began its offensive in June 1979. New U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzulo, made one last mediation attempt, but this time, the FSLN, with victory in sight, determined that peace negotiations were useless. Somoza finally succumbed on July 17 and two days later flew out of the country for Miami, Florida, leaving behind an economically devastated country.

Because an extradition treaty existed between the United States and Nicaragua, arrangements were made for Somoza to go to PARAGUAY, where he lived under the protective shield of dictator ALFREDO STROESSNER. Despite tightly controlled borders and society, two assassins made their way into the country to kill Somoza on September 17, 1980, while he was driving his car in Asunción. Responsibility for the killing remains elusive. Initially, an Argentine guerrilla group claimed responsibility for Somoza's killing, but subsequently, the FSLN made a similar claim, and finally, a former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operative asserted that FIDEL CASTRO Ruz designed the plot.

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Somoza García, Anastasio (Tacho) (b. 1896–d. 1956) *dictator of Nicaragua* Technically the 35th and 39th president of NICARAGUA, Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza García ruled over the nation as a dictator for 20 years. The son of a successful San Marcos Province coffee grower, Somoza was educated in local schools before earning his degree from the Pierce School of Business Administration in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, an experience that enabled him to become fluent in English. In Philadelphia, Somoza met his future wife, Salvadora Debayle (b. 1925–d. 1980), who provided him entry into Nicaragua’s prominent social circles. They had two sons, Luis and ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE.

Somoza did not distinguish himself until 1926, when he joined the Liberal rebellion in support of Juan Bautista Sacasa’s (b. 1874–d. 1946) claim to the presidency. Sacasa was his wife’s uncle. Somoza’s English-language skills, rather than his military prowess, saw him serve as interpreter for U.S. secretary of war Henry L. Stimson, who brokered an end to the dispute leading to the presidency of the Liberal Party leader José María Moncada (b. 1870–d. 1945) from 1929 to 1933. Somoza held several positions in the Moncada administration, including governor of León and foreign minister. He also accepted an appointment to the U.S.-created National Guard, where his English-language skills again served him well between the supervising U.S. Marines and the Spanish-speaking Nicaraguan troops. By the time of the U.S. military withdrawal from Nicaragua in 1933, Somoza had become the Guard’s commander.

Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Somoza set out to gain political control of Nicaragua. He first eliminated guerrilla leader, AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO, who was popular among the poor. On the evening of February 21, 1934, at Somoza’s instruction, a group from the National Guard seized Sandino as he left the presidential residence and took him to an isolated spot, where he was assassinated. Next, Somoza confronted President Sacasa (1933–36) at every opportunity until the latter’s resignation on June 6, 1936. Somoza went on to win the December 6, 1936, presidential election by a 107,201 to 108 popular vote count, according to Nicaraguan officials. Owing to its GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, the United States rejected the political opposition’s calls for intervention. Somoza then consolidated his hold on the country. FAMILY and close friends received high-level government appointments. The National Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Nacional, or PLN) was revived to become his personal political

tool and the dominant party in the unicameral legislature through rigged elections. Somoza used constitutional manipulation to extend his presidency to 1947, but by the end of World War II, the opposition groups pressured sufficiently for change. Spurred on by the pro-U.S. propaganda that circulated during the war, the opposition forced Somoza to renounce his 1947 presidential bid. Still, Somoza retained enough power to place two relatives in the presidency. The elderly Leonardo Argüello (b. 1875–d. 1947) took office on May 1, 1947. When he sought to gain control over the National Guard, Somoza replaced him in May 26, with Víctor Ramón Reyes y Reyes (b. 1873–d. 1950), who retained the office for three years. In 1950, Somoza returned to the presidential palace through rigged elections, but not before reaching an agreement with the Conservative Party that it receive one-third of the National Assembly and an equal amount of cabinet appointments.

During Somoza’s dictatorship, he and his family gained control of the national ECONOMY. At first they used government revenues to purchase commercial outlets, then capitalized on the nationalization of German-owned properties during WORLD WAR II to expand their holdings. Their control spread across banking, railroads, the national airline, ports, warehouses, construction, and the



Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza García (*bottom, center*) with his army officers in 1943 (*U.S. Army Signals Corps*)

media. To ensure the National Guard's continued support, Somoza permitted it to share in some of these operations, along with gambling activities, prostitution, and the sale of liquor. At the time of Somoza's death in 1956, the family's wealth was estimated to be \$140–\$160 million.

Somoza also cultivated friendship with the United States. He supported U.S. policies during World War II and the anticommunist fight during the cold war. Such deliberate cultivation, along with the U.S. failure to distance itself from Somoza, led many to assert that the United States approved of the dictatorship. Others point out that because Nicaragua lay on the extreme fringe of World War II and the cold war, Washington policy makers had other priorities.

On the evening of September 21, 1956, Somoza was in León to accept his party's nomination for another presidential term when a young poet, Rigoberto López Pérez (b. 1935–d. 1956), assassinated him. U.S. ambassador Thomas E. Whelan, with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's approval, had Somoza flown to a U.S. military hospital in the Panama Canal Zone, where he died September 29.

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Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR; Mercado Común del Sur) The Southern Cone Common Market was established by the Treaty of Asunción on March 26, 1991. It pledged the countries of ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PARAGUAY, and URUGUAY to eliminate tariffs among themselves by December 31, 1995, establish a common external tariff (CET) for third parties outside MERCOSUR, and adopt harmonious economic policies in relation to LABOR, intellectual property rights, TRADE policies, and technical matters. The member states did not meet the 1995 treaty deadline, but discussions continue to present.

Should MERCOSUR fully integrate, it would become the largest trading bloc in Latin America, with nearly 270 million residents who account for 55 percent of Latin America's gross domestic product (GDP), 55 percent of its industrial trade, and 35 percent of all trade. By 2008, BOLIVIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, and PERU, had become associate members of MERCOSUR.

From the start, MERCOSUR was beset with differences between the parties. The treaty did not resolve the long-standing nationalistic rivalries between Argentina and Brazil, with each claiming leadership in Southern

Cone affairs. Both countries had implemented the neoliberal economic model, which had led to more engagement in the global market than with neighbors Paraguay and Uruguay. Paraguay, the weakest and the poorest of the MERCOSUR nations, hoped to cut a niche within the market and in trade with neighboring countries. Uruguay faced the greatest challenge in privatizing its state and para-statal (semiprivate) operations. Progress has been slow in reaching the goals of the Asunción treaty, except for establishment of a CET. The harmonization of labor laws exemplifies the problem. Argentine workers are paid comparatively well, and Argentine workers historically have enjoyed greater job security. In contrast, workers in Paraguay are among the most poorly paid in the hemisphere. Argentine workers fear that harmonization of labor laws will lead to lower wages, while Paraguayan workers aspire to the Argentine level. Additionally, intellectual property rights are poorly protected within MERCOSUR, and this, in turn, contributes to problems in negotiations with external groups, particularly the United States and the European Union (EU).

The implementation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT on January 1, 1994, was seen by most analysts as the first step toward the FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA), a hemisphere-wide trade partnership, although most Latin Americans view the FTAA as another tool of U.S. hegemony. Of the MERCOSUR partners, Brazil spoke out most loudly against it and vowed to organize all Latin American nations into an economic bloc before dealing with the United States in relation to an FTAA. Simultaneously, the EU was casting about for trading partners. MERCOSUR served that purpose and also provided an opportunity for the EU to strengthen its economic relations with the United States. Discussions began in 1998 but became ensnared over the EU's agricultural policies and MERCOSUR's protection of Latin American textile industries (see EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN AMERICA).

Other factors contributed to a slowdown of the intra-MERCOSUR discussions toward common economic policies and Latin America's relationship with the EU. The administration of George W. Bush brought a change in U.S. policy regarding an FTAA. Instead of a hemispheric trade partnership, the Bush administration sought regional or individual free trade agreements, such as the 2005 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT and the 2006 treaty with Colombia that the U.S. Congress has yet to consider. The expansion of the EU into eastern and central Europe contributed to its temporary loss of interest in pursuing trade relations with the MERCOSUR countries. These voids sent those countries to seek trade partnerships outside the hemisphere. China and South Korea have been the most receptive (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF). Events within the Southern Hemisphere also affected MERCOSUR. The devaluation of the Brazilian real on January 13, 1999,



Columbia University in Asunción, Paraguay, hosts a conference on the 10-year benefits and detriments of the Southern Cone trading bloc MERCOSUR. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

and the 2000–01 Argentine financial crisis adversely affected intra-MERCOSUR trade. Political changes in Bolivia and VENEZUELA that brought left-leaning men to power were also significant. On May 1, 2007, Bolivian president JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA announced that the MERCOSUR countries would no longer receive privileged pricing for the purchase of natural gas. Despite the myriad of issues, MERCOSUR discussions regarding trade, tariff, and labor issues continue. In 2008, the EU rekindled its interest in a trading relationship with MERCOSUR.

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Soviet Union and Cuba Soviet foreign policy regarding the spread of COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA had been predicated on the U.S.-proclaimed Monroe

Doctrine, which stated that the Western Hemisphere was off limits to foreign penetration. The Soviets, therefore, gave vocal and strategic support to local Communist Parties throughout Latin America but did not support violent revolutions, including that of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ during his march to power in CUBA from 1956 to 1959. Once Castro took office in 1959, the Soviets remained hesitant to support Castro and provide him with economic assistance, unsure of Castro's intentions or of the U.S. response to him.

The first Soviet effort at assistance came on February 4, 1960, during a visit by Soviet first deputy premier Anastas Mikoyan to HAVANA, ostensibly to open a Soviet TRADE fair in the city. While Mikoyan performed the public function, he also signed a trade agreement that provided Cuba with a 12-year \$100 million credit line at 2.5 percent interest to purchase Soviet commodities and technical assistance for the construction of plants and factories and ensured the Soviet Union 5 million tons of Cuban sugar for the next five years. The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration did nothing more than assert that the treaty violated the Monroe Doctrine, a protest that fell on deaf ears in Havana and Moscow.

Nevertheless, throughout spring and into early summer 1960, the rhetoric from Havana and Washington intensified. When U.S. president Eisenhower directed U.S. companies not to refine Soviet crude oil on June 29, 1960, Castro responded by nationalizing those companies and went on to threaten the nationalization of other U.S. companies should Congress pass and Eisenhower implement legislation to place an embargo on the importation of Cuban sugar. Congress approved the measure, and Eisenhower implemented the embargo on July 6, 1960 (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF). Two days later, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would purchase the remainder of the 1960 quota of Cuban sugar. Khrushchev also declared that the Soviets would defend Cuba against outside aggressors. An emboldened Castro completed the nationalization of U.S. properties by October 31, 1960, an act that contributed to the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States on January 3, 1961, just before Eisenhower left office.

Eisenhower's failure to respond to Castro's aggressiveness and President John F. Kennedy's failure to openly support the BAY OF PIGS INVASION in April 1961 were among the factors that convinced Khrushchev to persuade the Soviet MILITARY leadership to place medium-range intercontinental missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev's decision was not for Cuban defense but to counter the presence of U.S. missiles in Western Europe aimed at the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Kennedy settled the crisis without consulting Castro (see CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS). An embarrassed Castro became infuriated during his state visit to Moscow in April 1963 and was advised by the Soviets to return the Cuban ECONOMY to its reliance on sugar, something Castro had come to power determined to end. While the Soviets retreated from Cuban affairs for the remainder of the decade, Castro attempted to diversify the economy. He failed to do so and again turned to the Soviet Union. As a prerequisite for Soviet assistance in 1970, Castro pledged to implement Soviet-designed five-year economic plans and otherwise accept Soviet economic advice.

The Vietnam War had a broad impact on U.S. policy toward Castro and opened the door to renewed Soviet interest in Cuba. In August 1970, U.S. intelligence reported that the Soviets were constructing a submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba. While President Richard M. Nixon wanted to solve the problem quietly, his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, did not. The latter wished to chastise the Soviets and went on to act independently of the president to demand that they tear down the base. In the diplomatic exchanges between Kissinger and the Kremlin, the Soviets capitalized on Kissinger's statement that the United States would not bring down the Castro regime by military force, a much broader statement than in the 1962 "Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding," which declared that the United States would not invade Cuba.

Kissinger's statement became part of the Soviet's final statement on October 22, 1970, that brought the crisis to an end. Despite continued U.S. protests, the Soviets completed the base, and over the next four years, some 12 Soviet submarines visited it.

The 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding was revisited eight years later, when another U.S. president had been weakened by events beyond his control, enabling the Soviets to again probe U.S. interests in Cuba. President Jimmy Carter confronted inflation at home, rising anti-Americanism in Latin America, an insolvable Middle East crisis, and Muslim fundamentalism in Iran. The Soviets tested U.S. resolve in the summer of 1978, when U.S. intelligence indicated that the Soviets had provided the Cuban Air Force with a squadron of MIG-23 jet fighter planes. Although the Soviets had long assisted in the modernization of the Cuban military, not until the reported presence of the MIGs did any of that aid violate the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev accord, which prohibited the introduction of offensive weapons to Cuba. The MIGs were capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Following a series of meetings in Moscow and Washington, D.C., the crisis was settled with a Soviet pledge that there were no MIG-23s in Cuba. Carter appeared satisfied.

The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding made no mention of stationing military troops in Cuba; nevertheless, the Soviet troop presence increased precipitously, to about 5,000 men, in July 1979. When Senator Frank Church threatened to scuttle the Senate's consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) agreement, President Carter quietly went about settling the crisis. In October 1979, Carter secured a Soviet pledge not to use any of its troops stationed in Cuba against the United States.

Cuba and the Soviet Union, which had never been close, began to drift further apart in the mid-1980s when Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev informed Castro that the Soviet Union could no longer prop up the Cuban economy. The Cubans would now be expected to pay for the goods and services they received from the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuban economic ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states came to a near standstill, as the Cuban government lacked the hard currency to pay for imports. As a result, Castro declared a "special period" in which the Cubans endured greater economic hardship while he cast about for new trading partners.

See also MONROE DOCTRINE (Vol. III).

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Soviet Union and Latin America Although relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America were a dominant feature of the cold war (1960–90), contact between the two regions can be traced to famous writers from czarist Russia who visited BRAZIL. By the end of the 19th century, only ARGENTINA (1885), URUGUAY (1887), and MEXICO (1890) had established official diplomatic relations with the Russian government. While Russian immigrants had scattered to many parts of Latin America, they had taken up residence mainly in Argentina and Brazil. Marxist thought was widespread in the early 20th century, particularly among LABOR leaders. Mexican Communist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano (b. 1894–d. 1968), for example, was instrumental in the writing of the Mexican socialist-leaning CONSTITUTION OF 1917. Communism's ultimate objective, as expressed in the goals of the Communist International (COMINTERN), directly contradicted the capitalist model. The COMINTERN was a Soviet-sponsored international organization established at a Moscow meeting from March 2 to 6, 1919, to replace the world's bourgeoisie with a Soviet-style system. In Latin America, this opposition to capitalism led to the violent suppression of alleged communist labor unions and the deportation of their leaders, as seen in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1919 and 1920 (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA).

After WORLD WAR I and throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, only Mexico and Uruguay had appointed diplomats to the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Communist groups were elsewhere looked upon with disdain, as evidenced by the criticism of Mexico's 1917 constitution and the U.S. hunt for AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO in NICARAGUA and AGUSTÍN FARABUNDO MARTÍ in EL SALVADOR. Despite government opposition, however, by the end of the 1920s, Communist-led LABOR unions and POLITICAL PARTIES could be found in almost every Latin American country. In 1929, these groups formed the Latin American Trade Union Confederation (Confederación Sindical Latinoamericana, CSLA). In their campaigns against capitalism, Communist labor unions pursued themes such as foreign domination of the local economies and the exploitation of workers by the ruling classes. While these concepts were put forward in COMINTERN's propaganda, they also reflected some of Latin America's socioeconomic and political realities.

Communist groups met varied fates during the 1930s. In some cases, such as in Brazil and El Salvador, communist political parties were driven underground, while in COSTA RICA, MANUEL MORA VALVERDE'S Communist Party continued to grow and became an influential player

in the country's 1940 and 1944 presidential elections. CHILE'S Communist Party also became significant, particularly after allying itself with the Radical and Socialist Parties to form the Popular Front, which had become a significant political player by 1946. During World War II, the Cuban labor movement benefited from its leader Blas Roca's (b. 1898–d. 1937) support of President FULGENCIO BATISTA Y ZALDÍVAR. During the war, Latin America's Communist Parties mirrored Soviet foreign policy: They supported Soviet neutrality at the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939, until the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. From that point until the Allied cross-channel invasion on June 6, 1944, they portrayed the Soviet Army as the lone effective force in combating Nazism; and after that date, they fully supported the Allied cause against the Axis partnership (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). In deference to the Allied cause, Stalin disbanded COMINTERN on May 15, 1943, and encouraged the Communist Parties henceforth to capitalize on local issues and cooperate with other political groups to gain popular support for election to political positions in order to legitimize their government roles.

As the cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union began to simmer following World War II, the debate around nationalism and communism in Latin America sharpened. As the war drew to a close in 1945, calls for corrections in Latin America's political system and its socioeconomic disparities found various expressions. For example, Argentina's JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN asserted in 1946 that his prolabor programs had prevented Communists from controlling the country's largest voting bloc, but this fell on deaf ears among Argentina's traditional elite and U.S. policy makers. That same year, U.S. ambassador to GUATEMALA Edwin Kyle fell out of step with local landowners when he favorably compared President JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO'S social security, rent control, and minimum wage laws to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal programs. In 1948, the U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica did not see any significant difference between the policies of political rivals JOSÉ FIGUERES FERRER of the National Liberation Party and Communist Mora. On the eve of the 1954 U.S.-sponsored invasion of Guatemala, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland cautioned policy makers to distinguish between communism and legitimate nationalist movements to correct historic socioeconomic and political ills that plagued Latin American countries. Holland's advice was ignored, and the U.S. invasion restored Guatemala's old order (see GUATEMALA, U.S.-SPONSORED INVASION OF). While there was very little to connect the Soviet Union to any of these movements, the postwar experiences of U.S. foreign service officers colored their perception of events. The 1947 State Department reforms included rotation in assignments so that Europeanists and Asianists would serve a term in Latin America or on the department's

Latin American desk. To these officers, Latin American welfare programs, social security, wage laws, and land distribution paralleled similar programs in Communist Eastern Europe and China and only confirmed a U.S. National Security Council conclusion in September 1950 that the Soviets were seeking to control the world.

The CUBAN REVOLUTION of 1956–61 best illustrates the nationalist-communist argument. Because he railed against CUBA's socioeconomic ills and its corrupt political system, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ drew broad support from the lower and middle socioeconomic sectors in his successful drive to oust Batista from power on December 31, 1958. Over the next two years, Castro moved quickly to consolidate power in his own hands, and his confrontation with the United States resulted in the nationalization of U.S.-owned industries in Cuba and, subsequently, a U.S. economic embargo (see CUBA, U.S. TRADE EMBARGO OF). Throughout the period, Cuban elites and former *batistianos* labeled Castro a communist, but U.S. policy makers remained unsure, with some describing him rather as a dictatorial nationalist. Nevertheless, as Cuba and the Soviet Union drew closer together economically in 1961 and the Soviets placed intermediate range ballistic missiles on the island in the summer of 1962, U.S. analysts placed Castro within the Soviet orbit (see SOVIET UNION AND CUBA). This was an incorrect assessment, as Castro, frustrated by Soviet policy during the October 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, attempted to maintain his independence from the superpowers. Only after the collapse of the Cuban ECONOMY in 1970 did Castro accept, as a precondition for Soviet assistance, to implement the Soviet economic model and political system in Cuba. From then until the late 1980s, the Soviets spent an average of \$2 billion annually to sustain the Cuban economy for geopolitical reasons regarding its relations with the United States. The governments in Havana and Moscow actually mistrusted each other.

Castro's Cuba prompted the MILITARY in other Latin American countries to suppress Communist and other leftist organizations over the next generation and the United States to increase its military assistance to meet the same objective. The United States also intervened when it anticipated a communist victory. For example, on April 14, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent 42,000 troops into the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC to prevent an alleged communist, JUAN BOSCH, from taking political power, and on October 25, 1983, President Ronald R. Reagan sent 7,000 troops to GRENADA to prevent a "communist takeover" of that island. In the first instance, there was no Soviet presence, and in the second, Eastern European and Cuban military personnel were present to assist with the construction of a modern air facility. Reagan also oversaw the Contra War in Nicaragua and supported the established order in El Salvador in the 1980s to prevent a communist takeover of those

countries (see CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS). Although the Soviets supplied the Nicaraguan SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT with token military support, Moscow made it clear that it could not afford to support another "Cuba" in the Western Hemisphere. In addition to military action, the United States used economic measures to isolate the legally elected Chilean government of Marxist SALVADOR ALLENDE GOSSENS from 1970 until his overthrow on September 11, 1973. U.S. policies forced Allende to seek and gain assistance from Soviet bloc countries and China, actions that in turn produced allegations of increased Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere.

In the 1990s, Latin America moved away from military governments toward a more free and open society that provided a greater opportunity for Communist Parties to reemerge. However, until the end of the 20th century, their impact was minimal, owing to the disintegration of the Eastern European bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. With the failure of the neoliberal economic model to improve the quality of life for the Latin American poor, in the early 21st century, voters turned "left" to bring leaders such as HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS to the presidency in VENEZUELA, JUAN EVO MORALES AYMA in Bolivia, and DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA in Nicaragua. Some U.S. analysts viewed these elections as a resurgence of communism in Latin America rather than as local nationalist cries for improved socioeconomic conditions.

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Spencer, Baldwin (b. 1948–) *prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda* Born on October 8, 1948, in Green Bay, ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, to working-class parents, Baldwin Spencer is a TRADE unionist by profession. As the leader of the United National Democratic Party (UNDP), he won and continues to hold a seat representing St. John's Rural West in the 1989 parliamentary elections. In 1992, he formed the United Progressive Party (UPP), a coalition party made up of the UNDP, the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), and the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), to challenge the Antigua Labour Party (ALP) led by VERE CORNWALL BIRD.

In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the UPP captured 12 of the 17 seats in the House of Representatives, thus ending the Bird family's control of politics in Antigua and Barbuda. Since his election, Spencer has tried to expand the economic infrastructure of the nation, especially the tourism industry. American billionaire Allen Stanford, the largest landholder and employer in Antigua and Barbuda, has invested millions of dollars in the nation. In 2006, Stanford created and funded the Stanford 20/20 cricket tournament in Antigua. Both Spencer and Stanford are avid cricket aficionados, and cricket is the most popular sport in Antigua and Barbuda (see SPORTS AND RECREATION). In early 2007, however, Spencer and Stanford began a verbal war in local newspapers. Spencer was angered that Stanford continued to consult ALP politicians about development strategies, and Stanford was miffed at the criticism.

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sports and recreation Sports in Latin America are as diverse as its people and geography. By the 20th century, the ball games and other sports of the indigenous peoples had disappeared from popular view. The equestrian sports played on the Argentine Pampas harked back to the colonial period but were engaged in mainly by the elite. Instead, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the games of the North Atlantic world were taking root as businessmen, skilled laborers and managers, missionaries, teachers, and military personnel traveled and settled across Latin America. While soccer, or *fútbol*, is of European origin, the game bears some resemblance to the ball games of the Mesoamerican indigenous population. Soccer is the most popular sport in Latin America today. Latin American countries have won nine World Cup titles, as well as many hemisphere-wide contests.

North American sports are also played in Latin America. Baseball arrived in CUBA with merchants and seamen in the late 19th century. From there, it spread throughout the circum-Caribbean region, becoming very popular also in PUERTO RICO, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA, NICARAGUA, and MEXICO. After Jackie Robinson's debut with the Brooklyn Dodgers tore down the color barrier in U.S. professional baseball in 1947, players from Latin America began to grace the U.S. Major League Baseball rosters; they now count among the game's most successful players. Boxing also captured the imagination of many Latin Americans, particularly in countries with large minority populations. Auto racing attracted many of South America's elite. More recently, basketball has enjoyed widespread appeal in Latin America, with



Registration call for little league soccer, in Montevideo, Uruguay. Fútbol is Latin America's most popular sport. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

teams having successfully challenged the United States in the Pan-American Games, the Olympics, and other international contests.

Amateur athletics quickly gave way to club and factory sports teams and leagues, which helped break down Latin America's color and ethnic barriers. By the 1920s, industrial leagues had brought together the best players in any given plant no matter their origin, as seen in PERU. Skilled Yucatecan Mayan Indians still dominate local baseball rosters. These professional players are better paid and perform less-taxing tasks on the job, at least for the duration of their playing careers. The same is true of Latin American club sports, where players are subsidized by various private-sector businesses. The International Olympic Committee had recognized this reality by 1992, when it allowed professional athletes to participate in the Olympic games as part of national teams.

As had occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries during the cold war, Cuba has established government-supported training facilities, with children attending from a young age to train for international competition. That model was followed by other Western Hemisphere nations, including the United States, but through a combination of public- and public-private-sector funding.

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Stroessner, Alfredo (b. 1912–d. 2006) *dictator of Paraguay* The son of a German immigrant and Paraguayan woman, Alfredo Stroessner grew up in a well-to-do family in Encarnación, PARAGUAY. In 1929, at the age of 17, Stroessner entered the Paraguayan MILITARY academy. His studies were interrupted in 1932 upon the outbreak of the CHACO WAR with BOLIVIA. Recognized for his bravery in the 1932 battle of Boquerón, Stroessner rose to the rank of first lieutenant and had control of an artillery unit by the war's end in 1935. Stroessner was among a group of younger officers sent to BRAZIL in 1940 for additional military training, after which he continued to rise in the military. For remaining loyal to President HIGINIO MORÍNIGO during the 1943 abortive coup d'état, Stroessner was sent to the Superior War School. After graduation in 1946, he was assigned to the army's General Staff Headquarters. On Morínigo's instructions, Stroessner directed his artillery to destroy Asunción's shipyards in order to thwart an attempted coup by naval officers in 1947. Stroessner emerged from the conflict as one of a handful of officers in the reorganized and purged Paraguayan army and by 1951 was its commander in chief. From that position on May 15, 1954, he directed the ouster of President Federico Chávez (b. 1882–d. 1978) and assumed the presidency himself three months later. Subsequently, Stroessner was reelected president in eight consecutive rigged contests (1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988).

Initially, Stroessner's political power rested on his military reputation gained during the Chaco War. To strengthen his position as president, he purged dissident officers from the military and Colorado politicians from government and the party. Stroessner also tightened his control over the Colorado Party by letting its many conflicting factions battle one another. Stroessner controlled the party through appointed officials and spies. Through an intricate network of ancillary organizations, he manipulated control over businesspeople, professionals, students, workers, WOMEN, and peasants. Opponents of the regime, real and imagined, were jailed and tortured, assassinated, or exiled. A detailed record of these atrocities was uncovered with the discovery of the "Archive of Terror" in 1992.

Stroessner's economic policies favored the elite, particularly in AGRICULTURE, and foreign investors. Loyal Colorado Party members and other loyalists benefited from road construction and other public works projects, many of which were financed by U.S. foreign aid programs during the 1960s and 1970s. Some 10,000 soldiers received 50 acres (20 ha) of land each on leaving the military, a program that helped expand agricultural production. Stroessner's greatest economic triumph was the completion of the Itaipú Hydroelectric Dam in 1982, which provided his cronies the opportunity to profit from its construction and subsequently from the sale of electricity to neighboring countries, particularly Brazil.

Stroessner's strong anticommunist stand at the height of the cold war brought him U.S. friendship and economic assistance. That changed during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, especially with Carter's emphasis on HUMAN RIGHTS. The changed global situation caused deep cuts in U.S. assistance to Paraguay, which continued during the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, who called for democracy in Paraguay. Changes in U.S. assistance programs coincided in the 1980s with a slowing in the Paraguayan ECONOMY, as well as rising inflation and unemployment, the increasingly restive middle and upper classes anxious for participation in politics, and a split in the military over who should succeed Stroessner. The restlessness climaxed on the evening of February 2, 1989, when General Andrés Rodríguez (b. 1929–d. 1997) forced Stroessner to relinquish power. Stroessner and his son Gustavo (b. 1945–) fled to Brazil, thus ending a 35-year dictatorship. Only FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's hold over CUBA has lasted longer. Both Stroessners refrained from future political action, splitting time between their homes in Brasília and a ranch outside Belo Horizonte. Despite an extradition treaty between Brazil and Paraguay, no effort was made to return Stroessner to Paraguay to stand trial for his crimes against the Paraguayan people. He died of heart failure on August 16, 2006.

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student movement in Mexico In the 1960s, a resistance movement led by students and other young people began to grow in MEXICO. University and preparatory school students—many of them from the middle and upper classes—began to challenge the government on issues relating to democracy and social justice. The student movement gained momentum in the summer of 1968 when the government sent in the Granaderos—a special mounted riot-police force—to break up demonstrations. Clashes between the Granaderos and students became more frequent, and the movement grew as more young people joined in protest.

Just weeks before MEXICO CITY was set to host the summer Olympic games, students called for a massive strike and took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations. Mexico was the first Latin American nation and the first developing country to host the Olympics, and the government insisted that the games would take place in a peaceful and efficient manner. Negotiations failed

to bring an end to the student strike, and the number of marchers grew into the thousands. On the evening of October 2, 1968, following a day of speeches and peaceful protests, student demonstrators gathered in the Plaza of Three Cultures in the middle-class Tlatelolco neighborhood. By nightfall, the plaza had been surrounded by paramilitary units and other security forces. In the ensuing chaos, police opened fire and killed hundreds of unarmed protesters, although official government accounts claimed only a few dozen casualties.

In the aftermath of the confrontation at Tlatelolco, government forces arrested hundreds of suspected student leaders and blamed communist agitators for the confrontation. The Olympic games proceeded uninterrupted, but in the coming weeks, many middle-class families began to see the true authoritarian nature of the government as young people were arrested and many disappeared altogether. It also became clear that the government had engaged in a coverup, and many citizens lost confidence in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI). Decades later, the administration of President VICENTE FOX (2000–06) declassified government documents related to the Tlatelolco incident, and the Mexican judicial system attempted to bring charges against the government leaders suspected of ordering the attack. Among those investigated was former president LUIS ECHEVERRÍA, who was serving as minister of the interior in 1968.

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Suriname Formerly known as Netherlands Guiana or Dutch Guiana, Suriname achieved independence from the Netherlands on November 25, 1975. Suriname is the smallest sovereign state in South America. Occupying 63,251 square miles (163,819 km²) of territory, it lies between French Guiana to the east and GUYANA to the west. Its northern border is the Atlantic Ocean, and its southern border is shared with BRAZIL. The southernmost part of its border with French Guiana is still disputed. Almost 90 percent of Suriname's 450,000 people live along the 230-mile-long (370-km) coastline, with the great majority living in Paramaribo, the nation's capital. Almost 350,000 Surinamese people live in the Netherlands. Suriname's population is made up of several distinct ethnic groups. East Indians, descendants of 19th-century contract workers from India, constitute 38 percent of the population. Creoles—mulatto and black descendants of African slaves—account for 32 percent of the population. Javanese, descendants of 20th-century contract workers from the Dutch East Indies, make up about 15 percent of the population,

while Maroons, descendants of escaped African slaves, are about 10 percent of the total. This ethnic diversity is replicated in Suriname's linguistic and religious composition. Although Dutch is the official language, Sranan Tongo, a creole language with English, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and African components, is the lingua franca. Sarnami Hindustani is spoken by the descendants of British contract workers. Christianity is dominant among Creoles and Maroons, while most of the Sarnami Hindustani speakers are Hindu. The Javanese are primarily Muslim.

In 1667, the Dutch received Suriname from England in exchange for their colony of New Netherland (present-day mid-Atlantic U.S. states). Dutch farmers initiated a land reclamation policy that entailed draining swamps and lagoons, as well as building dikes and canals, which made the land habitable and suitable for AGRICULTURE. After the Napoleonic Wars, the entire region of Guiana (Guayana, in Spanish), as it was then called, was divided into English, Dutch, and French zones. Following the emancipation of slaves in Suriname in 1863, the Dutch people brought Indonesian workers to the colony. In 1954, Dutch Guiana became a self-governing component of the Netherlands responsible for its own internal affairs. The Dutch, however, continued to control foreign policy and national defense. In 1975, the Dutch granted independence to Suriname. Johan Ferrier (b. 1910–), Suriname's governor since 1968, became the nation's first president. HENCK ARRON, the leader of the Suriname National Party (SNP), was the nation's first prime minister. When Suriname became independent, its large Asian population feared that it would lose political and economic privileges to the even larger African population. As a result, about 140,000 people immediately left to the Netherlands. At the time of independence, the Dutch government guaranteed the new Surinamese government \$100 million per year for 10 years to help the new nation develop its ECONOMY. As aluminum production declined during the first decade of independence, the Dutch annual stipend became the basis of economic stability in Suriname. Regardless, virtually none of the Dutch aid was used to develop the nation's infrastructure.

On August 13, 1980, DÉSI BOUTERSE led a MILITARY coup that overthrew the civilian government. The general population welcomed the coup, hoping that the military would end government corruption and improve the standard of living. Bouterse, however, banned opposition parties and brutally suppressed dissent. In 1982, following a series of grizzly political murders, the Dutch and U.S. governments suspended all economic aid to Suriname. Bouterse responded by greatly expanding the size of the military and experimented with the idea of forming an alliance with CUBA. Realizing the risks involved in this plan, especially in the aftermath of the 1983 U.S.-sponsored invasion of GRENADA, Bouterse quickly disengaged from his foreign policy initiatives with Cuba. In an attempt to regain the desperately needed Dutch

economic aid, Bouterse tried to construct a veneer of democracy. He lifted the ban on opposition POLITICAL PARTIES and began work on revising the constitution. In 1986, Ronnie Brunswijk (b. 1962–), representing 50,000 Maroons living in the interior who were angered by Bouterse's attempts to resettle them in urban areas, launched a civil war. U.S. and Dutch government officials condemned Bouterse's harsh tactics to combat the rebels but stopped short of imposing further sanctions.

Although the civil war continued, Bouterse allowed elections to be held in 1987. An anti-Bouterse coalition called the Front for Democracy and Development won 40 of the 51 seats in the National Assembly. The Netherlands and the United States resumed economic aid the following year. President Ramsewak Shankar's (b. 1937–) initiative to end the civil war by pardoning the revolutionaries angered Bouterse, who overthrew the civilian government on December 24, 1990. Following the so-called telephone coup, Bouterse installed a military-backed government led by Johann Kraag (b. 1913–d. 1996). In 1990, after large quantities of cocaine began to arrive in the Netherlands, an investigation revealed that Bouterse was involved in the export of Colombian cocaine (see DRUGS). Once again, the Dutch suspended their massive aid infusions, which precipitated another economic crisis and increased the internal opposition to Bouterse, who resigned from office on December 24, 1990. Democratic elections held on May 25, 1991, were won by RONALD VENETIAAN's New Front coalition. Although Venetiaan was able to end diplomatically the civil war in 1992, the economy deteriorated due to a slump in international aluminum prices. Venetiaan won the 1996 elections by a slight majority but did not have the necessary two-thirds vote required to be president. Jules Wijdenbosch (b. 1941–), a member of Bouterse's National Democratic Party (NDP), was able to form a coalition government and be elected president. Wijdenbosch created the new position of councillor of state for Bouterse. In late 1997, Bouterse was tried in absentia in a Dutch court for drug smuggling and was found guilty. Regardless, Surinamese law prohibits Bouterse's extradition because he is a former head of state.

By the end of the 1990s, the Dutch had again resumed aid payments, albeit at the diminished amount of \$65 million per year. Widespread strikes over economic difficulties broke out in 1999, forcing Wijdenbosch to call for early elections. Wijdenbosch's coalition collapsed, and Venetiaan returned to power in 2000. Venetiaan initiated an austerity program, raised taxes, and attempted to limit government spending. Regardless, Suriname remains dependent on aluminum exports, which provide more than 90 percent of the government's tax revenues.

Notwithstanding the nationalistic rhetoric employed by all politicians since independence, the bauxite INDUSTRY is still controlled by a subsidiary of the Australian company Alcoa. Rice remains the chief agricultural crop and food staple. Venetiaan was reelected to office in 2005. His austerity programs, supported by low-interest loans from the United States and the Netherlands, have improved the national economy.

See also SURINAME (Vols. II, III).

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Symonette, Roland (b. 1898–d. 1980) *premier of the Bahamas* Born on December 16, 1898, in the small town of Current on the island of Eleuthera in the BAHAMAS, Roland Symonette was the son of a Methodist minister. Although he only had six years of formal education, Symonette was a major figure in Bahamian politics for more than 50 years. During the 1920s, when Prohibition was in effect in the United States, Symonette accumulated wealth smuggling rum to the Florida coast. He invested his money in real estate and became a billionaire. He won a seat representing Shirlea in the House of Assembly in 1924 and held the seat until his retirement in 1967.

In 1958, Symonette helped establish the United Bahamian Party (UBP). He served as chief minister from 1955 to 1964. Symonette was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1959. When the Bahamas achieved internal self-government in 1964, he became premier. Symonette resigned his seat in Parliament shortly before the 1967 elections, which were won by LYNDEN PINDLING's Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). He died at his home in Nassau on March 13, 1980. Symonette has been honored by having his portrait depicted on the Bahamian \$50 bill. His son Brent (b. 1954–), a member of the Free National Movement (FNM) and one of the few white members of Parliament, has been foreign minister since 2007.

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Taiwan relations with Latin America On July 23, 2008, Taiwan president Ma Ying Jeou announced his intention to visit PARAGUAY and the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC after visiting the United States. The trip had nothing to do with economics or the vital interests of the approximately 10,000 descendants of Chinese who reside in Paraguay or the 50,000 in the Dominican Republic. Rather, it was designed to shore up diplomatic relations between the governments in ASUNCIÓN and SANTO DOMINGO and in Taipei. Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and the Central American states (COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, and PANAMA) have a solid regional commitment to Taiwan's status as a state separate from the People's Republic of China.

For several years following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Latin American states followed the U.S. lead in recognizing the Kuomintang government in Taipei as the legitimate government of all China. That began to change in October 1971 after the United Nations (UN) recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate Chinese government and China replaced Taiwan on the UN Security Council and in the UN General Assembly. Taiwan's position was further weakened after U.S. president Richard M. Nixon visited Beijing in 1973. MEXICO quickly altered its position, and other South American nations soon followed. In 1980, COLOMBIA was the last Latin American nation to drop its recognition of the Kuomintang government as the legitimate Chinese government. At present, 12 Latin American nations recognize the legitimacy of the Taipei government: BELIZE, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, HAITI, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, SAINT CHRISTOPHER

AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, and SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES.

From the 1970s until the end of the 20th century, Taiwan paid for this support through generous aid programs, particularly those that brought technical and medical assistance after natural disasters in CENTRAL AMERICA. In return for its assistance, the seven Central American states support Taiwanese views in the international community, and Taipei does the same for Central America. Panama is unique in its Taiwanese relations, as it permits the Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Whampoa Company to operate its Pacific coast port and entry to the Panama Canal and on August 21, 2003, completed a free TRADE agreement with Taiwan.

Since 2001, the increasing democratization of Taiwan has led to questions about its commitment to Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay. Additionally, more transparent accountability in Taipei has resulted in decreased financial assistance to these countries over the past eight years. These trends in Taiwan, along with China's aggressive economic policies in Latin America since 2000, prompted the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Central American republics to rethink their relations with Taiwan and contributed to their completing the 2005 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT with the United States (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF).

Taiwan is not anxious to lose the recognition and support of these Latin American nations, however, since they account for one-fourth of the total of countries that extend recognition to it. Its status is made more tenuous by cuts in its foreign aid program and by China's rising interest in Latin America.

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Terra, Gabriel (b. 1872–d. 1942) *president of Uruguay*
Born into a wealthy MONTEVIDEO family, Gabriel Terra earned his degree from the University of Uruguay in 1895 in law and jurisprudence, with a specialization in fiscal and financial matters. Shortly afterward, Terra entered politics as a member of the Colorado Party and soon became a self-professed disciple of its leader, JOSÉ BATLLE Y ORDÓÑEZ. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1905, Terra served there until 1925. During that same period, Terra served as URUGUAY's representative to the 1916 Pan-American Commercial and Financial Conference in Washington, D.C., and in 1918, he headed the Uruguayan delegation to the International Financial High Commission in Paris.

In 1925, Terra was elected to a six-year term on the National Council of Administration, the collegial executive created by the 1918 constitution. This nine-member body shared the executive power with the president of the republic, who was elected for a four-year term. In 1930, Terra resigned from the council to run for the presidency. His bid was successful, and he took office on March 1, 1931. By this time, Terra had moved ideologically to the right; he had become frustrated with the collegial administrative structure that made it difficult for the government to deal with the adverse impact of the global depression, which severely damaged Uruguay's export-based ECONOMY. Terra joined forces with Nationalist (Blanco) Party leader Luis Alberto de Herrera (b. 1873–d. 1959) to engineer a nonviolent coup d'état on March 13, 1933. Terra presided over the new regime, which drafted a new constitution effective in 1934. Under the terms of this document, Terra was elected to a four-year term, from 1934 to 1938. The Congress remained in the hands of procoup supporters from both the Colorado and Blanco Parties, while Terra used his newfound executive powers to banish from politics independent *blancos* and the *batllistas* of the Colorado Party.

As president, however, Terra could do nothing to correct the impact of the depression. No government policy could regain the lost global markets, particularly in Europe, for Uruguayan beef and grain. The tariff-protected manufacturing sector continued to operate, albeit at a slower rate, but it could not grow owing to a loss in consumers' purchasing power. At the same time, the government wage rolls continued to grow. The outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939, paved the way for Uruguayan economic recovery. In 1938, Terra turned over the reins of government to president-elect and brother-in-law Alberto Baldomir (b. 1884–d. 1948).

Until his death in 1942, Terra spent his time quietly in Montevideo, writing books on economics.

See also BLANCO PARTY (Vol. III); COLORADO PARTY, URUGUAY (Vol. III).

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Thomson-Urrutia Treaty (1914) On April 6, 1914, the U.S. ambassador to COLOMBIA, Thaddeus A. Thomson, and Colombia's foreign minister, Francisco José Urrutia (b. 1870–d. 1950), signed a treaty bearing their names that provided Colombia with \$25 million, free use of the Panama Canal, and a U.S. apology for its role in the "separation" of PANAMA from Colombia in 1903.

The treaty had its origins in Panama's independence in 1903 and the United States's support of the Panamanian rebels and speedy recognition of the new government. An effort to soothe Colombian feelings was found in the 1909 proposed Root-Cortés Agreement, but Colombia's lingering anti-U.S. sentiment prevented its congress from approving the agreement.

President Woodrow Wilson and his first secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, were more sympathetic to the Colombian discontent and for this reason instructed Thomson to negotiate an agreement. The outbreak of WORLD WAR I on August 1, 1914, forced delays in the process, however, as the canal's defense, security of Caribbean oil fields, and concern about the Germans residing in countries throughout the circum-Caribbean region took precedence (see WORLD WAR I AND LATIN AMERICA). Following the German surrender on November 11, 1919, President Wilson asked the Senate to ratify the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty. The Senate refused to do so, largely because supporters of former president Theodore R. Roosevelt saw the treaty as a criticism of Roosevelt and his policies.

Relations improved between Colombia and the United States in the years immediately following World War I. Colombia welcomed U.S. private investment and its own expanded access to the U.S. market. U.S. global policy also changed, particularly toward Latin America, with which the United States sought more friendly relations. The memory of Roosevelt also waned. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on October 20, 1921, and the Colombian Senate gave its approval on December 22, 1921.

See also PANAMANIAN INDEPENDENCE (Vol. III).

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Tonton Macoutes (Milice de Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale; MVSN; National Security Volunteer Militia) The *Milice de Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale* was a militia created by FRANÇOIS DUVALIER in 1959 to impose compliance with the Haitian dictator's demands. Its members were commonly referred to as "Tonton Macoutes," a reference to a character from Haitian folklore. At Christmas, good children who obeyed their parents were visited by Tonton Noël (Uncle Christmas) and received gifts and treats. Bad children who disobeyed their parents were kidnapped by Tonton Macoute (Uncle Knapsack), who placed them in a large burlap sack and took them away to an undisclosed location. Since Haitian parents frequently used intimidation, threats, and physical punishment to control their children, the specter of the Tonton Macoute—essentially the equivalent of a bogeyman in American culture—was a source of physical and psychological terror.

Duvalier, who came to power as a populist in HAITI's 1957 presidential elections, created the Tonton Macoutes after a 1958 military coup attempt. Recruited from the poorest, most uneducated rural black families, the Tonton Macoutes, who eventually numbered more than 25,000, were a powerful tool of physical and psychological intimidation. The brutal measures taken by the Tonton Macoutes to enforce loyalty to Duvalier were overlooked by the government. Led by Luckner Cambronne (b. 1929–d. 2006) until 1972, the Tonton Macoutes dressed in paramilitary garb reminiscent of the Blackshirts, another voluntary militia, organized by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in 1919. The Tonton Macoutes were famous for wearing dark sunglasses, even at night. Although the Tonton Macoutes carried pistols, they preferred to use machetes to inflict bodily harm, which was reminiscent of the terror unleashed on Haitian peasants in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC in 1937.

The Tonton Macoutes, who committed thousands of atrocities during the Duvalier dictatorship, cultivated an image of being Vodou demons. Victims were publicly displayed as a warning to other Haitians that noncompliance with Duvalier's wishes would not be tolerated. The power of the Tonton Macoutes eventually rivaled that of the Haitian National Guard and served as a countervailing force to protect the Duvalier FAMILY from the threat of a military coup for three decades. By 1986, the violence and corruption of the Duvalier regime led to a massive uprising that ended the Duvalier dictatorship. The MILITARY government disbanded the Tonton Macoutes, many members of which fled Haiti to escape reprisals from an angered population. In the aftermath of the Duvalier dictatorship, more than 100 Tonton Macoutes were placed inside tires coated with gasoline and set on fire. This act—known as *Père Lebrun* (a popular tire retailer in Port-au-Prince) in Haiti—is commonly referred to as *necklacing* in English.

See also VODOU (Vol. III).

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Toro Ruilova, David (b. 1898–d. 1977) *president of Bolivia* A native of Sucre, BOLIVIA, David Ruilova Toro pursued a military career from an early age and during the CHACO WAR (1932–35) became army chief of staff. The war resulted in the loss of Bolivian territory to PARAGUAY and contributed to the emergence of a group of middle-sector professionals who became known as the "Chaco generation." They questioned the elite political leadership that had ruled Bolivia since its independence in 1825, as well as the military officer corps for its failed wartime policies and practices. The Chaco generation also appealed for an improved quality of life for Bolivia's NATIVE AMERICANS.

To ward off a civilian political attack on the military, Toro and his military colleague Germán Busch (b. 1904–d. 1938) led a group of younger officers to oust President José Luis Tejada (b. 1882–d. 1938) on May 17, 1936. Influenced by European fascist concepts, Toro set out to establish a corporate state in which the government controlled a society organized according to socioeconomic functions. Under his "military socialism," Toro also attempted to provide economic and social reforms for Bolivia's long-neglected indigenous groups. Toro directed the nationalization of Standard Oil Company operations without compensation. This not only satisfied Bolivians' desire to control their own natural resources but was seen as revenge for the company having sold oil to Paraguay via ARGENTINA during the Chaco War. Toro appealed to the Bolivian populace by establishing a LABOR ministry and labor unions, or syndicates, which everyone was encouraged to join. He called for a constitutional convention that would prepare a new framework of state that legalized new political parties and guaranteed social equality.

Because Toro made no effort to strip the country's tin MINING triumvirate of its wealth or political influence, Busch led another group of officers against Toro, who was unseated on July 13, 1937. For the next two years, Toro remained moderately active in Bolivian politics before retiring to SANTIAGO DE CHILE, where he died on July 25, 1977. Toro's legacy to Bolivia was the initiation of a social consciousness that reached its high-water mark in the 1952 revolution.

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Torrijos Herrera, Omar Efraín (b. 1929–d. 1981) *de facto leader of Panama* Born in Veraguas Province,

PANAMA, Omar Efraín Torrijos Herrera was educated first at local schools and later at EL SALVADOR'S Military Academy, at which he was commissioned as a second lieutenant. He later studied at the U.S. Army's School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone. Torrijos joined the Panamanian army in 1952 and reached the rank of second lieutenant in 1966.

Torrijos joined Major Boris Martínez to oust President ARNULFO ARIAS MADRID on October 11, 1968. A year later, Torrijos won a power struggle with Martínez and promoted himself to brigadier general. Torrijos immediately set out to consolidate his power, persecuting political opposition and student and LABOR leaders. After a controlled legislative election in 1972 that was devoid of opposition candidates, Torrijos directed the writing of a new constitution that made him absolute head of government for a six-year term. He also restructured the Panamanian army into the National Guard and eventually approved all officer assignments, including that of Lieutenant Colonel MANUEL ANTONIO NORIEGA MORENO as head of the guard's G-2 intelligence unit. Understanding that instituting social programs was a means to political security, Torrijos established the National School for Political Training (ESCANAP) to educate National Guard officers in a wide range of political and social issues, after which they also participated in government policy making.

Immediately after coming to power in 1969, Torrijos reached out to the urban and rural lower classes. He established the National Confederation of Panamanian Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajador Panameños, or CNTP), which brought into the political arena those groups traditionally associated with the canal zone and with rural agro-export-oriented industries. For rural peasants, he established cooperatives (*asentamientos*) whereby the government purchased and then sold to them the properties of tax delinquents. With the redistribution of approximately 1.235 million acres (500,000 ha) of land by 1977, some 12,532 families benefited from the program. After 1974, the Panamanian ECONOMY slowed, prompting a new MIGRATION of the rural poor to the canal's terminal cities, Colón and Panama City. Torrijos attempted to meet their needs through public housing programs and by providing basic services such as electricity and potable water. Nevertheless, he failed to reduce the disparity in wealth. In 1977, the wealthiest 10 percent of Panamanians received 45 percent of the national income, while the poorest 20 percent received just 2.3 percent.

Torrijos's most important accomplishments were the 1977 PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, which provided for the transfer of the canal's ownership from the United States to Panama by December 31, 1999. Two-thirds of Panamanians approved of the treaties in a yes or no plebiscite in October 1977, with only West Indian laborers voting in mass against them. The West Indians stood to lose their only protection against Panamanian racially

motivated discrimination if the United States withdrew from Panama. The acceptance of the Panama Canal treaties also deprived Panamanians of the opportunity to blame the United States for all their ills and brought into focus Torrijos's continued repression, dictatorial government, and inability to improve a stagnant economy.

Torrijos's popularity had dramatically declined by the mid-1970s, prompting him to announce in October 1978 that he would relinquish his role as "Maximum Leader" and "return to the barracks." He appointed Aristides Royo (b. 1940–), a young reformist, as president, and conservative banker Ricardo del la Espriella (b. 1934–) as vice president. At the same time, Torrijos announced that the country would return to democracy with elections for the National Assembly in 1980 and general elections in 1984.

After Torrijos stepped down in 1978, he became increasingly dispirited and withdrawn, distancing himself from both government and National Guard affairs. Whatever his intentions, they came to an abrupt end on July 31, 1981, when his plane crashed into a mountain in western Panama. While the crash may really have been an accident, every Panamanian seemed to have a theory. They attributed Torrijos's death to Noriega, the communists, the conservative elite, and even the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Torrijos changed the face of Panamanian politics. His socioeconomic and political programs reached out to those who had been abused by the oligarchs, the canal laborers and workers of the agro-export industry. His social programs made the government the nation's largest employer but depended on government borrowing. By 1977, Panama had the highest per-capita debt in the Western Hemisphere. Torrijos also turned the National Guard into a social institution that carried out civic action and service delivery programs and gave it a stake in the political arena. But, an undetermined number of its officer corps became involved in illegal activities, including arms and DRUG smuggling, prostitution, liquor distribution, and money laundering. In the end, Torrijos intensified the competition among Panama's political actors: the elite, the middle sector, the poor, and the National Guard.

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trade Patterns of trade in Latin America have paralyzed the region's industrial development. European and U.S. industrialization created demand for Latin America's primary products, which fueled its export-


based economies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Hemispheric trade patterns fell into place: Primary products were exported from Latin America to the Northern Hemisphere, and manufactured goods were imported from it.

ARGENTINA and URUGUAY exported mainly beef, wool, and grains; BRAZIL, rubber and sugar; CHILE, nitrates and copper; PERU, guano and metal ores; CUBA, sugar; CENTRAL AMERICA, bananas and coffee; and MEXICO, agricultural and MINING products. In turn, these countries imported European and U.S. manufactured goods, including textiles, electronic devices, furniture, machinery, and pharmaceuticals. As manufactured goods always cost more than raw materials, Latin America was in debt to the United States and western European nations on the eve of the Great Depression in 1929. Latin American political leaders failed to recognize that U.S. and European protective tariffs not only made Latin American nations dependent on their manufactured goods but mitigated against the diversification of Latin American economies. Exports of beef, wool, hides, and other agricultural products to the United States were further restricted by U.S. tariffs.

Contrary to popular perception, the United States, not Great Britain, was Latin America's major trading partner on the eve of the depression. The United States imported 29 percent of Latin American exports by 1929, while Britain imported 20 percent; Germany, 12 percent; and France, 8 percent. Additionally, the

United States was the main importer of primary goods from 13 countries: BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, Cuba, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, MEXICO, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, VENEZUELA, and the U.S. territory of PUERTO RICO. Great Britain served as the primary market for goods from Argentina, BOLIVIA, Chile, and Peru. HAITI's primary market was France. Britain was the chief supplier of goods to seven countries, but the total value of its exports matched that of the United States.

The Great Depression stymied international trade, with each country pursuing its own trade policies. The United States sought trade reciprocity treaties with individual countries. Only the newly minted dictators in the circum-Caribbean region signed on, with the intent more of legalizing their governments than gaining trade benefits. For the next two generations, the larger Latin American nations turned to import-substitution policies as a means of diversifying and industrializing their economies (see ECONOMY). Under this model, they produced mainly for their domestic markets. Brazil and Mexico capitalized on U.S. WORLD WAR II economic assistance to initiate industrialization. To do so, they had to borrow foreign capital to purchase machinery and technical know-how; they also instituted tariffs to protect their fledgling industries against foreign competition. By the late 1970s, however, import substitution began to crumble. The small domestic markets had stagnated, while other regions had begun to export competing



With the process of globalization that began in the 1980s, Latin America's Southern Cone nations have expanded commerce with Asia. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

primary products. Africa and Asia exported tropical fruits and food products, for example, and Australian and Canadian beef and wheat cut into traditional Latin American markets in Europe. Additionally, U.S. tariffs and quota systems militated against its importation of Latin American manufactures and agricultural produce. Latin American trade suffered further after 1971 with the collapse of the 1947 Bretton Woods system, which meant that the United States could no longer support the convertibility of dollars into gold at a fixed price. As a result, the major industrialized nations began to float their currencies, which made it difficult for Latin American nations to sustain trade-weighted exchange rates. Furthermore, in 1973 and 1978, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) restricted oil production, which reduced the global supply and quadrupled the price of petroleum. Except for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, the other Latin American nations lacked oil self-sufficiency, a factor that contributed to higher domestic energy costs and an increase in trade deficits as the cost of imported oil rose. Finally, while Latin America's post-World War II military dictators kept workers' wages down, these remained a much larger part of the total cost of production than they did in Southeast Asian nations. By 1980, the Latin American share of the global market had declined markedly. The problem was magnified by the region's trade imbalance with the industrial world and its sizable debts to the international banking community.

Not all Latin American economies suffered, however. PARAGUAY's primary export, yerba maté, enjoyed a special place in the Argentine market, and otherwise, that country's underdeveloped economy meant it did not fully participate in the global economy. Uruguay's socialized economy depended more on trade with its neighbors Argentina and Brazil than elsewhere, thus it, too, was somewhat insulated from global economic conditions. Cuba, historically dependent on the export of sugar, refused U.S. assistance to diversify its economy after World War II and saw its share of the global sugar market dwindle as other traditional sources of the product, such as Southeast Asia, returned to the market. Central American and Caribbean nations that depended on the export of bananas and coffee likewise suffered. Those countries with petroleum reserves fared better; Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, in particular, benefited from rising petroleum prices due to OPEC's policies.

In 1976, the United States implemented the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) already in place in Western Europe. GSP's promise for duty-free access to industrialized markets for nontraditional exports brought little progress to Latin America until the United States modified its tariff code to permit the importation of goods. Originally designed to aid U.S. multinational corporations, it gave rise to Mexico's MAQUILADORA industries along the U.S. border and the so-called 807 industries in the Dominican Republic and

Central America that assembled U.S.-made goods for return to the United States.

The failure of various trade policies to generate employment and improve national economies significantly contributed to the LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1980s. The world was moving toward the neoliberal economic model, of which trade liberalization was a fundamental tenet, and Latin American nations joined the march. From the 1980s, the region's governments eliminated protective tariffs and other trade restrictions and opened their doors to foreign investment. Additionally, the Western Hemisphere followed the European example in moving toward free trade agreements. First, the 1994 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT aimed for an open market between the United States, Mexico, and Canada by 2005. Although that goal was not achieved, much has been done to integrate the three markets. Next, U.S. president George H. W. Bush pursued a FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) that would combine the hemispheric nations into an economic union, as originally envisioned in 1889 by Secretary of State James G. Blaine. While President William J. Clinton pursued the same objective, in 2004, President George W. Bush abandoned it. He was motivated in part by Latin American resistance, led by Brazil, to an FTAA that would serve primarily U.S. interests. Thereafter, until 2008, Bush completed free trade agreements with Chile in 2003, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC and CENTRAL AMERICA in 2005 (DR-CAFTA), and Colombia, Panama, and Peru in 2007 (see DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT). However, the U.S. Congress has only approved the Chilean, Peruvian, and DR-CAFTA agreements; it has yet to consider the Colombian and Panamanian agreements. Latin American governments also have acted independently. Discussions for a trade agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR that began in 1999, restarted in 2007, following a three-year hiatus. The Central American countries reached a trade agreement with Mexico in 2006 that permits the duty-free transit of Central American goods across Mexico to the U.S. market. Potentially more significant was China's arrival in the Western Hemisphere beginning in 2001 (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF). China has concluded trade agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru and has concessions from Ecuador and Venezuela to access their remote oil fields.

See also TRADE (Vols. I, II, III).

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Viviani Ventura-Díaz, et al. *Trade Reforms and Trade Patterns in Latin America* (Santiago, Chile: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 1999).

transportation While footpaths connected much of the Aztec, Maya, and Inca Empires and the Spanish and Portuguese constructed coastal port facilities to serve their commercial purposes, highways and railroads connecting the interior towns of Latin American countries, along with modern port and aviation facilities, are a phenomenon of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The construction of highways, railroads, and port facilities is associated with the development of export-based economies, which required bringing products from a country's interior to oceanic ports for their shipment to Europe and the United States. Because Latin American governments lacked the funds to undertake such projects themselves, foreigners did much of this work. British firms, for example, constructed railroads and port facilities for the transportation of Argentine beef, grains, and wool to the world market. French companies did most of the work associated with the exportation of Brazilian sugar. U.S. entrepreneurs such as Henry Meiggs, Minor Cooper Keith, and James J. Hill and the United Fruit Company built railroad networks in BOLIVIA, CHILE, MEXICO, PERU, CENTRAL AMERICA, and CUBA. Railroads and port facilities were constructed at Arica, Valparaíso, Tampico, Callao, Puntarenas, Puerto Barrios, and HAVANA. American, British, and French businessmen often pursued their projects with monies borrowed by Latin American governments from European bankers. Because those governments then needed to repay these loans, they realized little profit from the new infrastructure. In one of the worst examples, by 1910, the Honduran government was approximately \$100 million in debt to British financiers but had yet to see a mile of railroad track. Foreign-owned railroads became the targets of nationalistic governments in the mid-20th century, such as in ARGENTINA under JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN and in Cuba under FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. A lack of funding for the development and maintenance of efficient highway systems contributed to a dramatic decline in railroad traffic after World War II. Some railroads, such as the San José–Limón line in COSTA RICA and the BUENOS AIRES–Patagonia service in Argentina, are no longer fully usable.

In the 1920s, Mexico became the first Latin American country to construct a planned system of highways. Some 14,000 miles (22,531 km) of roadway were completed by 1950 and 115,000 miles (185,075 km) by 1975. Tolls partly pay for the maintenance of the roads, which reach into all regions of the country. The pursuit of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) economic model, particularly after World War II, prompted Latin American governments to construct highways into the outlying suburbs of major cities and then into the interior to harvest raw materials and market products (see

ECONOMY). The relocation of manufacturing plants inland was an effort to relieve the strain of population growth on coastal urban centers. At the local level, workers were moved by public busing systems from home to work. This is best illustrated today in the industrial campuses that house the “807” industries in SANTO DOMINGO, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, and near Puerto Cabezas, HONDURAS. The relocation efforts did not prevent urban sprawl or congestion in Latin America's large cities, however. Like their North American counterparts, Latin Americans fell in love with the automobile, thus today's urban centers are congested with traffic.

While the vision of an intercontinental highway connecting the Northern and Southern Hemispheres in the Americas was first envisioned in 1925, progress on the road itself did not come about until World War II (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). The threat of the German U-boats operating in the Caribbean Sea prompted the need for an alternative supply route to the Panama Canal Zone. The United States largely financed the wartime construction of the PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY from the U.S.-Mexican border to the Panama Canal Zone. The project employed thousands of Mexican and Central American workers who were displaced by the loss of their traditional jobs in the agricultural sectors. After, the threat of German U-boats ended in early 1943 and the wartime Allies focused their efforts first upon the European and then the Asian war theaters, work on the Pan-American Highway slowed and in some cases stopped altogether. Plans for the highway's completion altered after World War II. Rather than a unitary highway, by 1955, the Pan-American Highway reached into Chile as a collection of interconnecting national roads.

In the early 20th century, aviation was the sport of Latin America's wealthy elite. Then, in 1911, Mexican president Porfirio Díaz hired two French pilots to fly reconnaissance missions over revolutionary strongholds. Starting in the 1920s, Latin American governments developed military air forces for self-protection, and from Argentina to Honduras governments purchased antiquated U.S. and European planes for training pilots, flying reconnaissance trips, and mapping missions. During World War II, Central American air forces contributed to the fight against German U-boats in the Caribbean. During the cold war, Latin American pilots received U.S. training, but the availability of military aircraft was subject to the mood of the U.S. Congress. In the 1970s, for example, congressional and presidential concerns over HUMAN RIGHTS violations in Latin America made the acquisition of U.S. aircraft difficult. In these circumstances, the Latin Americans turned to Western Europe, particularly France, to purchase military planes. Since 1970, the Cuban Air Force has consisted of Soviet-built aircraft.

Latin American commercial airlines developed in the 1920s and 1930s. National airlines such as COLOMBIA'S Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transporte Aéreo



The former Honduran national airline TAN, now part of the TACA Group, typifies the common means of intra-regional transportation in Latin America. (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

(SCADTA) connected not only with other capital cities but with the nation's interior. EL SALVADOR's Transportes Aéreos Centroamericanos (TACA) performed a similar function in Central America.

Beginning in 1927, Pan American World Airways, with extensive government support, monopolized U.S.–Latin American air routes until the end of World War II, when new companies entered the market. After World War II, Latin American government-controlled airlines became commonplace and enabled the airlines to fly further afield, to Europe and the United States.

At the beginning of the 21st century Latin America has an adequate transportation system connecting internal regions with the national capitals, as well as the global marketplace.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); KEITH, MINOR COOPER (Vol. III); TRANSPORTATION (Vols. I, II, III).

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Trinidad and Tobago The most industrialized of the former British colonies in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago achieved independence from the United Kingdom on August 31, 1962 (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH).

Outside the hurricane belt, Trinidad and Tobago, which encompasses 1,979 square miles (5,125.5 km²) of territory, consists of two main islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and 21 small islets. The nation's capital and third-largest city, Port of Spain, is located on Trinidad, which accounts for about 95 percent of the country's territory and population. Trinidad and Tobago is located northeast of VENEZUELA, southwest of BARBADOS, and south of GRENADA. Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians, each representing about 40 percent of the nation's 1.3 million people, are the two largest ethnic groups in Trinidad and Tobago. Whereas English is currently the nation's official language, place-names on Trinidad are equally of Amerindian, Spanish, and English origin, reflecting the nation's colonial experience. On Tobago, most place-names have their origin in English.

Christopher Columbus first encountered Trinidad and Tobago in 1492. Trinidad is named for the Holy Trinity, and Tobago is named after tobacco. Initially the islands were Spanish colonies, but the British consolidated their control over Trinidad and Tobago during the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 19th century. During the 1830s, following the abolition of slavery, the British began massive importation of Indian laborers. The United Kingdom combined the two islands and several small islands into a single colony during the 1880s. The British ruled Trinidad and Tobago as a CROWN COLONY without any local representation until 1925, when the British established a legislative council for the islanders. Voting rights, however, were severely limited by income and property requirements. It was not until 1946 that the British implemented universal adult suffrage.

Whereas sugar dominated the ECONOMY from the 16th to the 19th century, by the end of the 19th century, cacao was the principal agricultural crop. During the 1930s, the Great Depression and crop diseases contributed to the displacement of cacao production. Since the 1930s, the petroleum INDUSTRY has dominated the economy of Trinidad and Tobago, which has had a strong impact on the nation's political stability. In 1937, LABOR riots in the oil fields led by Tubal Uriah "Buzz" Butler (b. 1897–d. 1977) caused political and economic pandemonium in Trinidad and Tobago. Butler, who left the Trinidad Labour Party in 1936 to establish the British Empire Citizens' and Workers' Home Rule Party, was imprisoned until early 1939. Fearful of losing access to Trinidadian petroleum, however, the British reimprisoned Butler at the outbreak of World War II. Concurrently, the British also leased the naval base at Chaguaramas to the United States, which the United States occupied until 1963.

Following his release from prison after the war, Butler reorganized his Home Rule Party. The party won three of the nine available parliamentary seats in the 1946 elections. It also won seven of the 18 available seats in the 1950 elections. British officials, however, fearful of Butler's radicalism, asked ALBERT GOMES to form a coalition government. Gomes, the founder of the Party of Political Progress Groups, which eventually merged with the People's Democratic Party and the Trinidad Labour Party to form the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), the main opposition party between 1957 and 1971, became the first chief minister. In 1956, the People's National Movement (PNM), led by ERIC WILLIAMS, won the parliamentary elections, and Williams became chief minister and subsequently premier in 1959, when the United Kingdom granted Trinidad and Tobago greater self-autonomy. Trinidad and Tobago joined the short-lived WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958. Initially, West Indian leaders selected Chaguaramas as the site of the new federation's capital. By 1962, however, JAMAICA began to view the West Indies Federation as an inhibitor to independence. After Jamaica withdrew from the federa-

tion in 1962, Trinidad and Tobago, unwilling to support the financial burden that membership entailed, also left, which signaled the end of the federation. Within weeks, the British granted Trinidad and Tobago independence, on August 31, 1962. Williams became the nation's first prime minister and held office until his death in 1981.

Following independence, Queen Elizabeth II was the titular head of state, while the leader of the majority party was the prime minister. In 1976, however, Trinidad and Tobago became a republic, and Ellis Clarke (b. 1917–), the last governor general, was elected president, largely a symbolic position, by the Parliament. Williams supported greater economic integration in the Caribbean. In 1967, Trinidad and Tobago became the first commonwealth nation to join the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS). In 1973, several Caribbean nations signed the Treaty of Chaguaramas in Trinidad and Tobago, establishing the CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET. Whereas Williams maintained diplomatic relations with CUBA, he consistently pointed out the superiority of the capitalist system over the socialist one. During the 1970s, the international oil crisis benefited the nation's economy. After Williams died in office in 1981, the PNM, led by George Chambers (b. 1928–d. 1997), continued to rule until 1986 when the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), a multiethnic coalition party, won 33 of the 36 seats in the assembly.

A. N. R. ROBINSON was prime minister from 1986 to 1991. In 1987, the Parliament selected NOOR HASSANALI to be the second president of Trinidad and Tobago. The first Indo-Trinidadian to be president of the nation, Hassanali was also the first Muslim head of state in the Americas. The multiethnic NAR, however, began to crumble in 1988 when the Indo-Trinidadian component, led by BASDEO PANDAY, left to form the United National Congress (UNC). In 1991, the PNM, led by PATRICK MANNING, one of the three PNM representatives to retain his seat in 1986, won the elections, and Manning became prime minister. In November 1995, Manning called early elections. The PNM and UNC both won 17 seats, and the NAR won two seats. The NAR allied with the UNC, which allowed Panday to become the first Indo-Trinidadian prime minister. In 1997, the Parliament chose Robinson as the third president.

In the 2001 elections, the PNM and the UNC both won 18 seats. Robinson, serving as president, appointed Manning prime minister, despite the fact that Panday was the sitting prime minister and the UNC had won the popular vote. In 2003, the Parliament selected George Maxwell Richards (b. 1931–) to serve as Trinidad and Tobago's fourth president. Richards is the first head of state of Amerindian ethnicity in the English Caribbean. Regardless of which party holds the majority in Parliament, both the PNM and the UNC support free market economic policies and increased foreign investment. Virtually all state-owned industries and corporations have been privatized. The main difference between

the two principal political parties is the ethnic affiliation of their members. Nevertheless, the economy, especially the petrochemical industry, remains strong and provides a high standard of living for the people of Trinidad and Tobago.

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Trujillo, Rafael (Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina)

(b. 1891–d. 1961) *dictator of the Dominican Republic* Born on October 24, 1891, to José Trujillo Valdez and Julia Molina Chevalier in San Cristóbal, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Rafael Trujillo, a light-skinned mulatto, had a relatively uneventful childhood. His nine siblings—Rosa María Julieta, Virgilio, José “Petán” Arismendy, Amable “Pipi” Romero, Aníbal Julio, Nieves Luisa, Pedro Vetilio, Ofelia Japonesa, and Héctor “Negro” Bienvenido—would all eventually benefit from the Trujillo dictatorship. Trujillo was employed as a guard at the American-owned Boca Chica sugar mill at the beginning of the first U.S. intervention of the Dominican Republic (1916–24). In an attempt to restore order and stability, the United States disarmed the Dominican population and ordered the creation of a supposedly apolitical National Guard in 1917. While many of his fellow countrymen were protesting against the U.S. occupation, Trujillo, armed with a letter of recommendation from his American boss at the Boca Chica sugar mill, applied for a position in the new National Guard. His request was accepted in December 1918, and he was made a second lieutenant in the Guard in January 1919. Because of his friendly attitude toward U.S. MILITARY personnel and his ability to speak English, Trujillo rapidly rose in rank, being promoted to captain in 1922. Trujillo was promoted to major immediately prior to the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1924. Dominican president Horacio Vásquez (b. 1860–d. 1936) placed Trujillo in charge of the National Guard and promoted him to brigadier general in 1927.

By early 1930, Vásquez’s hold on power had been weakened by personal illness, the debilitating impact of the Great Depression, and his unconstitutional

attempt to remain in power for a second term. With the approval of U.S. officials in SANTO DOMINGO, a civilian-military movement led by Rafael Estrella (b. 1889–d. 1935) and Trujillo overthrew Vásquez’s government in February 1930. Although he initially stated that he had no desire to assume the presidency, Trujillo became president in May 1930. All political opposition was eliminated through bribes, intimidation, torture, and murder. Trujillo established vast intelligence networks throughout the country that spied on the Dominican people as well as each other. One of his most brutal and efficient agencies was the Military Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Militar, or SIM). SIM employed a particularly brutal form of torture, known as the “pulpo” (octopus), involving electrodes connecting sensitive body parts to a leather skull cap. Trujillo’s hold on power was reinforced when Hurricane Zenon hit Santo Domingo on September 3, 1930. He was able to claim that he had protected his people from a natural disaster by rebuilding the city.

Trujillo quickly established a cult of personality in the Dominican Republic. He surrounded himself with intellectuals such as JOAQUÍN BALAGUER to give his regime legitimacy and appeal. Scholars wrote books glorifying Trujillo’s rule. Thousands of monuments were erected in Trujillo’s honor to fuel his megalomania. In 1936, the name of the capital city was changed from Santo Domingo to Ciudad Trujillo. Dominican citizens who did not display images of Trujillo in their home were brutalized. The CATHOLIC CHURCH, one of Trujillo’s staunchest allies, ordered that homage be paid to the dictator during mass. To solidify his relationship with the United States, Trujillo proclaimed himself a staunch anti-Nazi and protector of U.S. economic investment in the Dominican Republic. In 1941, he paid off the Dominican foreign debt. His friends and FAMILY members were rewarded with lucrative economic concessions. Trujillo came to personally own half of the Dominican ECONOMY, including almost 70 percent of the sugar industry. Although he was only officially president from 1930 to 1938 and again from 1942 to 1952, he exercised absolute power during the interim periods by appointing puppet presidents.

Trujillo was preoccupied with eliminating the African footprint in his nation and reinforcing the Hispanic cultural identity. Fearful of the influence of neighboring HAITI, a nation with strong African cultural roots, Trujillo encouraged the immigration of white people to the Dominican Republic. As a result, DOMINICAN-HAITIAN RELATIONS were acrimonious. During the 1930s, Trujillo facilitated the immigration of European Jewish refugees and displaced people from the Spanish civil war. The Jewish settlers became the base of a Jewish community in Sosúa. In 1937, using the excuse that they were criminals, Trujillo orchestrated the death of more than 15,000 Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. The butchering of Haitians with machetes is vividly recounted in Edwidge Danticat’s fictional *The Farming*



In 1930, at age 39, Rafael Trujillo was general commander of the Dominican Republic's National Guard. (*Records of the U.S. Marine Corps*)

of *Bones*. Regardless, the U.S. government continued to support Trujillo.

Trujillo's hold on power began to unravel during the second half of the 1950s. He hosted an international fair in 1955 at the cost of more than \$30 million, which placed a serious strain on the Dominican economy. In 1956, Trujillo ordered the death of his outspoken critic Jesús Galíndez (b. 1915–d. 1956), a refugee from the Spanish Civil War. SIM agents kidnapped Galíndez, who had recently completed a dissertation at Columbia University outlining the atrocities of the Trujillo dictatorship, from the streets of New York City and flew him to the Dominican Republic, where he was tortured and killed. Gerald Lester Murphy, the American pilot who flew the doomed Galíndez to Ciudad Trujillo, became vocal about Trujillo's activities, and he, too, was eliminated. To quell U.S. accusations that he had a part in Murphy's death, Trujillo developed an elaborate ruse that claimed that a Dominican pilot killed Murphy because of an illicit homosexual love affair. U.S. policy makers, Murphy's girlfriend, and the Dominican pilot's wife were unconvinced. In the aftermath of FIDEL CASTRO RUZ's CUBAN REVOLUTION of 1956–61, U.S. policy makers believed that authoritarian dictators such as Trujillo threatened U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. The U.S. government found it difficult to convince democratically

elected Latin American presidents to support a plan of action against a Cuban dictator while the United States supported an authoritarian dictator in the Dominican Republic. On June 24, 1960, Trujillo authorized an assassination attempt on Venezuelan president RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO, also an outspoken critic of the Trujillo regime. Although unsuccessful, the event led the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic. Significantly, the United States blocked Trujillo's access to the profits from the lucrative U.S. sugar quota. On November 25, 1960, Trujillo orchestrated the death of Minerva, María Teresa, and Patria Mirabal, three sisters of the elite who had also criticized his regime. The sisters, who became known as "the Butterflies" (their code name among the opposition was "Las Mariposas") became a symbol of opposition to the Trujillo regime.

On the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo, on the way to visit one of his mistresses, was assassinated by a group of members of the Dominican elite made up of former accomplices and victims of his dictatorship. Although the United States had no active role in the assassination, it did provide the weapons used to kill Trujillo and give its approval. Following the dictator's death, his son RAMFIS TRUJILLO unsuccessfully attempted to continue the Trujillo dictatorship. Ramfis and the rest of the Trujillo family fled into exile in November 1961. Following the exodus of the Trujillo family, Trujillo's remains were sent to Paris, only to be transferred to Madrid in 1970. Notwithstanding Trujillo's brutal and corrupt regime, thousands of Dominicans still pine for the order and stability of his dictatorship.

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Trujillo, Ramfis (Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Martínez)

(b. 1929–d. 1969) ruler of the Dominican Republic Born on June 5, 1929, to RAFAEL TRUJILLO and his mistress María Martínez, Ramfis Trujillo was the dictator's eldest son. Although Ramfis's paternity was called into question, Trujillo acknowledged Ramfis as his legitimate son. Rumors assert that the disappearance of Martínez's husband, who denied paternity of Ramfis, was orchestrated

by Trujillo. The bond between Trujillo and Ramfis, nicknamed after a character in Verdi's opera *Aida*, was strengthened when Trujillo made Martínez his third wife in 1936. Indulged by his father, Ramfis had a pampered childhood. He played with real pistols and was made a colonel in the Dominican army at the age of four. In the early 1950s, Ramfis married his first wife, Octavia Ricart, who bore him six children: María Altagracia, Aida, Mercedes, María Angélica, Ramses, and Rafaelito.

In 1957, his father sent him to study at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Trujillo was a poor student and spent most of his time with his friend Porfirio Rubirosa (b. 1909–d. 1965) in Hollywood carousing with starlets such as Kim Novak, Zsa Zsa Gabor, and Joan Collins. Trujillo gave his actress girlfriends lavish gifts. In early 1958, the U.S. Army denied Trujillo a diploma, which humiliated and angered his father. In November 1958, Trujillo returned to the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC to continue his debauched lifestyle. He divorced his wife, participated in the rape of Dominican women, and ordered the murders of several enemies and critics. Becoming an embarrassment to his father, who hoped to groom Trujillo to succeed him in power, in 1959, the dictator sent Trujillo to a sanatorium in Belgium. After spending several months in the sanatorium, Trujillo established residence in a mansion in Paris and married Lita Milán.

On May 31, 1961, Trujillo learned that his father had been assassinated the previous night. Trujillo, his younger brother Radhamés, and Rubirosa immediately returned to the Dominican Republic aboard a chartered Air France plane. Trujillo immediately took control of the Dominican army and set about searching for his father's assassins. JOAQUÍN BALAGUER, who was attempting to distance himself from the atrocities of the Trujillo dictatorship and move the nation along the path toward democracy, continued to handle the day-to-day operations of the Dominican government. Internal and external opposition to the continuation of the Trujillo regime was intense. In November 1961, Trujillo, after executing all but two of the surviving assassins of his father, fled the country and settled in France before moving to Spain in 1962, where he was welcomed by Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. While living in Spain, Trujillo continued his playboy lifestyle. On December 17, 1969, while on the way to the airport in Madrid in a Jaguar driven by the duchess of Albuquerque, the car crashed into a tree. On December 28, 1969, he died in a Madrid hospital of pneumonia. Trujillo was buried in Madrid.

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Tugwell, Rexford G. See MUÑOZ MARÍN, LUIS; OPERATION BOOTSTRAP; PUERTO RICO.

Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru; MRTA)

The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) was a communist guerrilla movement in PERU between 1980 and 1997. Founded in 1980, it was led by Víctor Polay Campos (b. 1951–) and Néstor Cerpa Cartolini (b. 1953–d. 1997), known as Comrades Rolando and Evaristo, respectively. The MRTA took its name from Túpac Amaru II, an 18th-century rebel leader who claimed Inca ancestry. Its goal was to establish a communist state and eliminate all imperialistic elements in the country, including the Peruvian elite and U.S. business interests.

At the height of its strength in the mid-1980s, it counted close to 1,000 members. Unlike Peru's other noted guerrilla organization, the SHINING PATH, the MRTA did not focus on the killing of civilians. Rather, it attempted to demonstrate its strength through kidnappings for ransom and the destruction of infrastructure facilities. The MRTA drew U.S. attention following the November 30, 1995, arrest of MIT student Lori Berenson (b. 1969–) for collaborating with the MRTA. Originally sentenced to life imprisonment, Berenson's sentence was reduced to 20 years' incarceration. Among the MRTA's most noted acts was the seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residence in LIMA in December 1996 and holding 72 hostages there for four months. The crisis ended on April 22, 1997, when President ALBERTO KENYA FUJIMORI ordered a military assault on the residence, during which all but one hostage was freed and all 14 MRTA militants were killed.

Infighting among MRTA's leadership continually weakened the organization. The Fujimori government's efforts resulted in Polay's capture and imprisonment in 1992 and Cerpa's death in 1997. The MRTA subsequently self-destructed, although a few of its members remained active into the 21st century.

See also TÚPAC AMARU II (Vol. II).

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Tupamaros See NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

U

Ubico y Castañeda, Jorge (b. 1878–d. 1946) *president of Guatemala* Born in GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA, Jorge Ubico y Castañeda was the son of Marta Lainfiesta de Ubico and Arturo Ubico Urrucla, a wealthy landowner and prominent politician in the administration of Justo Rufino Barrios (b. 1835–d. 1885), Jorge’s godfather. After finishing his schooling in the United States, Ubico entered the Guatemalan Military Academy in 1894. He joined the Guatemalan army in 1897 and enjoyed a distinguished career, which included outstanding service in a war with EL SALVADOR in 1907, promotion to colonel at the age of 28, the governorship of two states, serving as minister of war from 1921 to 1923, and promotion to division general, the highest rank in the Guatemalan army, in 1922.

In the political turmoil brought about by the impact of the Great Depression on Guatemala in 1930 and 1931, Ubico emerged as the sole candidate in the February 14, 1931, presidential elections. He quickly consolidated his power by appointing loyal military officers to government positions; silencing political opposition through intimidation, incarceration, and exile; and censoring the press. The National Legislature rubber-stamped his programs and proposals and approved his manipulation of the constitution to extend his presidency. Despite the government’s limited income during the depression, Ubico maintained fiscal control through tight budgets. He improved global market access for Guatemala’s primary export, coffee, and refused to incur debt through foreign loans.

Ubico undertook the modernization of Guatemala City, directing the construction of a presidential palace, the national legislative building, post and telegraph offices, a sports stadium and park facilities, water and

sewerage systems, and the paving of streets. The process was extended into rural towns and villages. A network of mostly gravel roads reached into Guatemala’s most



Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, Guatemalan president and general of the army from 1931 to 1944 (Courtesy of the American States Library)

remote areas. Ubico accomplished this modernization through the exploitation of LABOR.

The outbreak of the European war on September 1, 1939, caused the loss of European and subsequently U.S. markets for Guatemalan coffee and bananas. Despite the 1940 International Coffee Agreement, U.S. wartime subsidies, and programs in quinine and rubber production, Guatemala's ECONOMY worsened. Throughout World War II, Ubico enthusiastically supported the Allied cause, readily implemented U.S. directives to deport both suspected and real Nazis, and placed restrictions on those German nationals and descendants who remained in the country. At the United States's request, Ubico placed German-owned properties, businesses, and financial accounts under government control. Guatemalans, already chafing under Ubico's dictatorship, now blamed him, not the loss of global markets, for the country's adverse economic conditions and railed also against his embracing of U.S. directives against German residents (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA).

Public opposition to Ubico surfaced in 1942, as the emerging "generation of rising expectations," consisting mainly of middle-class people, protested what they saw as an illegal extension of his presidency. In the spring of 1944, discussion of another extension prompted a greater public outcry. Ubico's removal of the dean of the medical school brought University of San Marcos students and faculty into the streets in protest. They were soon joined by shopkeepers, journalists, lawyers, and medical professionals. Younger and lower-ranking officers within the military who had little opportunity for promotion used the occasion to direct a coup d'état and ousted Ubico from power on July 1, 1944. He fled first to El Salvador and then to New Orleans, where he died on June 14, 1946.

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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was completed on December 10, 1982, after nine years of negotiations. It went into force on November 16, 1994, when GUYANA became the final signatory to the treaty. The treaty contains a wide set of guidelines for the use of internal waters: It establishes rules for archipelagic states to define their waterways, sets territorial water limits at 12 miles (19 km), and per-

mits coastal states to set laws on the use of their waters, ranging from mineral exploitation to fishing rights and scientific research. The convention extends the boundary for another 12 miles for the control of illegal TRADE, smuggling, and immigration by the coastal state and allows that state another 200 miles (322 km) as its exclusive economic zone, in which it can mine nonliving material in the subsoil of the continental shelf.

A crisis over Latin American territorial waters can be traced to the 1950s when CHILE, ECUADOR, and PERU each claimed legal control over territorial waters extending some 200 miles into the Pacific Ocean. There were also conflicting claims among a number of Caribbean states, whose coastal waters often overlapped. These situations resulted in a compromise on the 12-mile territorial limits, with a 200-mile extension of exclusive economic zones.

By February 2009, 155 nations had signed the Law of the Sea Convention, including all but six Latin American nations (COLOMBIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Ecuador, EL SALVADOR, Peru, and VENEZUELA).

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United States Agency for International Development (USAID) The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established in 1962 as an independent federal agency directed by the secretary of state to administer the U.S. government's bilateral aid programs. USAID shapes its programs in accordance with the foreign policy of each presidential administration.

Regarding Latin America, for the first 10 years of its existence, USAID administered the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS \$20-billion program to strengthen capitalism, provide for economic development and an improved quality of life, and expand the institution of democracy. Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon lost interest in the program because of their different philosophies in the battle against communism and their focus on the Vietnam War. That war made the U.S. Congress more assertive in terms of foreign affairs, however. In 1973, it mandated that foreign assistance focus more on the basic needs of the world's poorest people than on economic development, and in 1979, it created the position of agency director to supervise USAID, in place of the secretary of state.

The influence of the Christian Right on USAID policy became evident in 1973 when North Carolina Republican senator Jesse R. Helms engineered an amendment to the agency's funding bill that denied the use of U.S. funds for abortions. In 1984, President Ronald R. Reagan expanded the edict by banning all U.S. assistance to international agencies that provided abortion counseling or advocated

or provided abortions. The ban on USAID family-planning assistance adversely impacted governments and agencies across Latin America that endeavored to limit population growth among the poor. Although President William J. Clinton rescinded the ban in 1993, President George W. Bush reinstated it in 2001.

In response to the wave of democratization in the 1980s, President George H. W. Bush emphasized funding projects to enhance civil society, including EDUCATION programs, preventing voter fraud, expanding voting rights, and reforming judicial and criminal justice systems. Presidents Clinton and the younger Bush vigorously pursued these programs, and Latin American countries have benefited accordingly. The total amount of U.S. development assistance to Latin America since USAID's founding has decreased drastically, however, dropping from \$5.1 billion in 1962 to approximately \$2 billion in 2005.

In 2008, Congress approved \$400 million for military assistance to Mexico and \$65 million for Central America, but disbursement of the funds to Mexico has been held up owing to Congressional objections to charges of human rights violations. On September 29, 2009, the State Department issued its human rights report that indicated a lessening of government human rights abuses in Mexico. However, engaged in fierce debate over health care reform legislation, Congress has yet to consider lifting the block on aid disbursement.

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United States Virgin Islands The United States Virgin Islands are located in the Caribbean Sea, approximately 1,100 miles (1,770 km) southeast of Florida and approximately 50 miles (80.5 km) east of PUERTO RICO. Some 100 islands and islets make up the U.S. Virgin Islands, but only four are of significance: Saint Croix, St. Thomas, St. John, and Water Island. An estimated 112,000 people reside in this organized and unincorporated territory administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior's Office of Insular Affairs. The islands' combined area is approximately 133 square miles (344.5 km²), about twice the size of Washington, D.C.

On his second voyage to the Western Hemisphere, in 1493, Christopher Columbus discovered and named the islands, but over time, they were occupied by several European powers, including Spain, Britain, the

Netherlands, France, and Denmark. The Danish West India Company settled on St. Thomas in 1672 and on St. John in 1694 and in 1733 purchased St. Croix from France. They became royal Danish colonies in 1754. African slave labor sustained the sugar-based ECONOMY until its demise in the early 19th century, which helped lead to the abolition of slavery in 1848.

Twice in the late 19th century, the Danes attempted but failed to sell the islands to the United States. At the time, the U.S. Congress was not in an expansionary mood, but that changed in 1914 with World War I and the opening of the Panama Canal (see WORLD WAR I AND LATIN AMERICA). The islands became strategically important to the United States because of their location along the Anegada Passage, one of three main connectors between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. The governments in Washington, D.C., and Copenhagen understood that should Germany occupy Denmark during the war, the islands would fall under German jurisdiction and potentially serve as a submarine base to threaten U.S. interests in the Caribbean region. A deal was struck. For \$25 million, the United States purchased all but Water Island, which it did in 1944 for \$10,000.

Although Virgin Islanders are citizens of the United States, the U.S. Constitution prevents them from participating in U.S. presidential elections. The islanders elect their own governor to a four-year term, and he or she is eligible for immediate one-term reelection. John de Jongh (b. 1957–) won the November 2006 contest and took office on January 1, 2007. The 15-seat Senate constitutes the unicameral legislature. Its laws are subject to approval by the U.S. Congress. The governor appoints judges for 10-year terms to the islands' Supreme Court, but its decisions can be reviewed by the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands. The islanders also elect a representative to the U.S. Congress; he or she can sit on committees but cannot vote on legislative matters. The islanders show little interest in altering their current relationship with the United States.

Despite the constant threat of storms, tourism is the islands' major INDUSTRY, accounting for 80 percent of the gross domestic product and employment. Approximately 2.6 million visitors arrive each year, mostly by cruise ship at the main port of Charlotte Amalie on St. Thomas. HOVENSA, a joint venture between Amerada Hess and Petróleos de Venezuela, operates a modern oil-refining plant on St. Croix that processes 495,000 barrels of crude oil a day. With only 5.71 percent of its land arable, AGRICULTURE is limited, and foodstuffs must be imported. Financial and businesses services make up a small component of the ECONOMY.

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Uribe Vélez, Álvaro (1962–) *president of Colombia* A professional politician from Medellín, COLOMBIA, who earned a law degree from the University of Antioquia in 1977 and completed postgraduate studies in administration and management at Harvard University, Álvaro Uribe Vélez served as mayor of Medellín and senator from and governor of Antioquia state before winning the presidential election on August 7, 2002, with 52 percent of the popular vote. Uribe was reelected for a second term on May 26, 2006, with 67 percent of the popular vote. On January 13, 2009, President George W. Bush presented Uribe with the Medal of Freedom, the highest U.S. award for civilians.

As president, Uribe's greatest challenge was to confront the twin issues of drug trafficking and guerrilla insurgency. The United States provided the Colombian government with more than \$3 billion in military assistance to arrest both elements. By middle of his second presidential term, the Colombian government claimed substantial progress on both counts; all crime was down by 50 percent since Uribe began his presidency in 2002. Despite, the dramatic rescue on July 3, 2008, of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three Americans held captive by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for six years that highlighted the war on Colombian terror, critics assert that Uribe has been less successful and that both the narco-traffickers and guerrillas receive support from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez as part of his anti-U.S. stance.

An advocate of the neo-liberal economic model, Uribe pursued a privatization and tax program that netted the government nearly \$800 million, which he used for housing, medical, and educational programs for poor urban dwellers. Uribe also signed commercial agreements with Argentina and Bolivia, but the free-trade agreement signed with the United States on November 22, 2006, still languishes in Congress.

Uribe's second term endured allegations of corruption against him and his supporters and charges that Uribe's past is tarnished by links to the Medellín drug cartel.

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
Uruguay After SURINAME, Uruguay is the second smallest nation in South America. Totalling approximately 68,000 square miles (176,119 km²), Uruguay is slightly smaller than the state of Oklahoma. Uruguay is bordered on the northeast by BRAZIL, the southwest by ARGENTINA, and on the southeast by the Atlantic

Ocean. Its capital, Montevideo, is home to 1.4 million people, nearly half of the country's population. The rolling hills that characterize the countryside are similar to Argentina's Pampas and prompted the development of cattle and sheep farming, as well as the cultivation of grains, in the 19th century. Industrialization came in the mid-20th century and is largely confined to Montevideo and its environs.

Founded by the Spanish in 1726, Montevideo first served as a strategic outpost of its empire. By the time of Latin America's independence movements in the early 19th century, the city had developed into a major seaport. Originally claimed by Argentina, Uruguay was annexed by Brazil in 1821, only to declare its independence in 1825, which was secured by a British-sponsored treaty in 1828. Agricultural pursuits quickly took root, but given the nation's space limitations, by the late 19th century, the countryside could no longer support the growing population. Montevideo became the safety valve for the excess rural populace. Two political parties emerged, the liberal Colorado Party and the conservative Blanco Party. They both represented the nation's rural elite and, as elsewhere in Latin America at the time, mirrored the liberal-conservative ideological conflict.

In the early 20th century, President JOSÉ BATLLE Y ORDÓÑEZ benefited from the profits of the export-based ECONOMY to introduce political structural changes, social welfare programs, and state-sponsored economic enterprises. Uruguay's 1919 constitution contained the framework of these programs. The global depression that began in 1929, however, adversely affected Uruguay's economy, and this, in turn, contributed to a new constitution in 1934 and the 1933–38 dictatorship of GABRIEL TERRA. Batlle's social welfare system, nonetheless, remained intact. During World War II and the immediate postwar period, the global demand for Uruguay's primary agricultural products was rekindled and stimulated government-supported import-substitution industrialization, as well as the government's purchase of British-owned railroads and public utilities that dated to the 19th century. In the process, the government bureaucracy and social welfare system expanded. In the mid-1950s, the global demand for Uruguay's agricultural products dropped precipitously as Europe recovered from the war and new sources (notably Australia and Canada) of beef and grain entered the marketplace. At the same time, the limited domestic market contributed to the stagnation of ISI, a situation exacerbated by LABOR's demands for lofty pay increases to keep pace with inflation. A new constitution in 1951 replaced the president with a nine-member ruling National Council, which crippled political decision making. Bailouts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1967 and 1973 momentarily brought fiscal relief to the government, but the IMF's concomitant austerity measures adversely affected the quality of life of Uruguayan people.

Given the country's political situation, left-wing parties could register no more than 9 percent of the vote



A typical upper-class home in an affluent section of Montevideo, Uruguay (Thomas M. Leonard Collection)

in national elections, but the debate outside the political arena came to the forefront in 1964 with the unification of industrial workers into the National Assembly of Workers (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores, or CNT). While the CNT prompted the traditional political parties—the *blancos* and *colorados*—to compete for labor's support, a new movement surfaced. A challenge to the nation came from the NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN-T), or Tupamaros, an urban guerrilla group founded in 1963. It burst onto the national scene in the early 1970s. Shortly after President Juan María Bordaberry's (b. 1926–) inauguration on March 1, 1972, the MLN-T launched a wave of terrorist attacks on the government in hopes of stirring a popular uprising that would lead to the establishment of a Marxist state. The uprising did not occur. In fact, the MLN-T practice of kidnapping for ransom and maiming of individuals and its lack of a coherent philosophy militated against their garnering popular support. By 1979, the guerrilla threat to Uruguayan society markedly declined, but the MILITARY did not relinquish power until 1984, when it permitted the presidential election of *colorado* JULIO MARÍA SANGUINETTI on November 25. Sanguinetti served two presidential terms: 1985–90 and 1995–2000.

He and President Luis Alberto Lacalle (b. 1944–), who served from 1991 to 1995, implemented neoliberal economic reforms such as lowering tariffs, encouraging foreign direct investment, controlling deficit spending, reducing inflation, and cutting the size of the government workforce. Nevertheless, the government continued to play a prominent role in the economy by continuing its role in water, electric and telephone services, insurance, banking, petroleum refining, airlines, and railways.

In 1992, Uruguay joined with Argentina, Brazil, and PARAGUAY to establish the SOUTHERN CONE COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR) and in 1996 became home to its secretariat. The increased TRADE with its MERCOSUR partners contributed to Uruguay's 5 percent annual growth rate through the late 1990s. Still, the United States remained Uruguay's major trading partner. Argentina's financial crisis in 2001–02 slowed that commerce and prompted the Argentinean withdrawal of U.S. dollars deposited in Uruguayan banks (see ARGENTINA, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IN). The international demand for Uruguay's agricultural goods prompted an economic recovery that led to 5 percent annual growth rates during the last two years of the decade.

By the end of the 20th century, the Blancos and Colorados gave way in popularity to the Frente Amplio, a coalition of left-of-center parties that can be traced to 1971. Although the party long governed Montevideo, it did not move into national prominence until the October 1, 2004, presidential elections, when its candidate Tabaré Vázquez (b. 1940–) easily captured the presidency with 50.5 percent of the popular vote. Frente Amplio also gained control of the national legislature. Vázquez immediately made good on campaign promises to reopen investigations of HUMAN RIGHTS violations by the military during the 1970s and early 1980s. Vázquez also finds himself engaged in a dispute with Argentina over Uruguay's construction of a wood pulp mill on the Uruguay River, which it shares with Argentina. The latter is seeking to terminate the project because of the potential adverse affect of the mill on the environments of both countries.

At his administration's midpoint, Vázquez benefited from an annual economic growth rate of 7 percent and a per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) of more than \$5,800. Sixty percent of Uruguay's GDP is generated by the service industries; the industrial sector accounts for 22 percent; and AGRICULTURE, only 9 percent, a drastic change from the agro-export economy at the start of the 20th century.

See also BANDA ORIENTAL (Vols. II, III); BLANCO PARTY (Vol. III); COLORADO PARTY, URUGUAY (Vol. III); URUGUAY (Vols. I, III).

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U.S. Caribbean interventions, 1900–1934

During the first three decades of the 20th century, the United States intervened in the internal affairs of circum-Caribbean nations on 17 occasions. U.S. policy makers were motivated mainly by the need to secure the Panama Canal from foreign threats and the belief that the region's inhabitants were not yet able to administer their nations wisely, owing to the legacies of Spanish colonial rule. U.S. policies in the Caribbean contributed to Latin Americans' charge of "Yankee imperialism."

In 1898, as the United States moved toward war with Spain over CUBA, the crescendo for a U.S.-owned and -operated transisthmian canal intensified, and each influenced the other regarding U.S. Caribbean policy. Policy makers in Washington and U.S. diplomats in the circum-

Caribbean region considered that regional political leaders were inept when it came to administering government and managing financial affairs, with both factors causing political instability and inviting foreign interventions. These points were driven home by the British-German-Italian blockade of the Venezuelan coast in 1902–03. Those nations succeeded in their effort to force President Cipriano Castro to renegotiate his government debt to European banks. To keep European gunboats out of the Caribbean, the United States took preemptive action. For example, to secure Cuba from foreign intervention, it insisted on the attachment of the PLATT AMENDMENT to the 1902 Cuban constitution as a precondition for the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from the island and granting Cuba its independence. The Platt Amendment prevented the Cuban government from granting any foreign government territorial rights on the island and from undertaking excessive foreign debt and allowed the United States to intervene on the island to maintain political stability. Similar provisions were found in the 1903 Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty, which granted Panama its independence. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt provided for a broader policy application on December 4, 1904, when he announced that any "chronic wrongdoing" in the Western Hemisphere gave the United States the right to intervene in a nation's internal affairs.

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was first applied to the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, when in 1905, it could not meet its debt obligations to European bankers. An agreement, finally ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1907, provided for U.S. Marines to supervise the Dominican customhouses, distributing 45 percent of import duties for local government operations and 55 percent to meet the country's international debt repayments (see U.S. CUSTOMS RECEIVERSHIP). President William Howard Taft and his secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, pursued a similar policy, known as "dollar diplomacy," whereby private U.S. banks paid off a nation's debts to foreign and domestic investors and U.S. Marines occupied that nation's customhouses to distribute operating funds to the local government and ensure repayment to U.S. banks. This was the essence of the Knox-Castillo Convention with NICARAGUA and the Knox-Paredes Agreement with HONDURAS, both signed in 1911. Two years later, the United States stood by as the British threatened gunboat diplomacy to force Guatemalan strongman MANUEL ESTRADA CABRERA to resume international debt repayments.

Roosevelt also used the Platt Amendment to dispatch marines and ENOCH CROWDER to Cuba to prevent President Tomás Estrada Palma (b. 1884–d. 1960) from remaining in office in 1906. Crowder remained until 1909 to write new electoral laws for Cuba. While these were deemed the most progressive in Latin America at the time, they did not bring the conflict between political conservatives and liberals to an end. In 1911 and 1916, U.S. troops again returned to the island to ensure

political order and did not leave until 1933. President Woodrow Wilson sent troops into HAITI in 1914 and to the Dominican Republic in 1916, where they remained until 1934 in an effort to ensure political stability. The United States attempted to foster democracy in the Central American republics (COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, Honduras, and Nicaragua) through treaty agreements in 1907 and 1923. Each was an attempt to define a revolutionary government and deny it the rights accorded a legitimate government, including recognition. The agreements did not prevent internal turmoil, however, as seen in the Honduran civil conflicts during the 1920s, and the emergence of revolutionaries such as Nicaragua's AUGUSTO CÉSAR SANDINO.

To further secure the circum-Caribbean region from international threats, in 1916, the United States completed the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty with Nicaragua, which gave it the right to construct a transisthmian canal route through that country and to purchase the Danish West Indies to secure the Anegada Passage, which connects the Caribbean Sea with the Atlantic Ocean.

Following World War I, several factors converged that resulted in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1933 pronouncement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, which momentarily marked an end to U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of circum-Caribbean nations. First, the European threat to the Panama Canal dissipated after the war. Furthermore, State Department officials had lost interest in bringing democracy to the region. For example, Central American desk officer Stokeley W. Morgan argued that because revolutions were a way of life throughout the Caribbean, the United States could not alter the region's political culture. Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark concluded in his 1928 study of the Monroe Doctrine that the Roosevelt Corollary was an inappropriate extension of the doctrine itself. As secretary of commerce from 1921 to 1928, Herbert Hoover offered an economic reason for policy change. He argued that the Latin American charge of Yankee imperialism contributed to the larger and richer countries in South America not purchasing U.S. goods. These factors converged in 1933, so that President-elect Roosevelt announced in his inaugural address on March 4 that the United States would henceforth follow a good neighbor policy. It became official U.S. policy when Secretary of State Cordell Hull announced it at the Seventh Pan-American Conference meeting in Montevideo, URUGUAY, from December 3 to 26, 1933.

See also CASTRO, CIPRIANO (Vol. III); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); MONROE DOCTRINE (Vol. III); PANAMANIAN INDEPENDENCE (Vol. III); TRANSISTHMIAN INTERESTS (Vol. III); WAR OF 1898 (Vol. III).

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U.S. Customs receivership (1905–1940) In an effort to protect U.S. economic interests and preclude the possibility of European intervention to collect debts, the U.S. government took control of the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC's finances in 1905. Dominican and American government officials entered into a customs receivership whereby U.S. officials would collect customs revenue, regulate Dominican finances, provide funds to the Dominican government, and service Dominican foreign debt.

During the last quarter of the 19th century, President Ulises Heureaux contracted extensive foreign loans to develop the economy and infrastructure of the Dominican Republic. The financial chaos and political turmoil following Heureaux's 1899 assassination coincided with a period in which the United States began to exert greater influence in the Caribbean region (see U.S. CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS, 1900–1934). On January 5, 1905, as the Dominican Republic plunged into deeper financial and political chaos, U.S. secretary of state John Hay, fearful that European creditors would intervene in the Dominican Republic to collect unpaid claims, announced that the newly unveiled Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine would be applied to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican government accepted a U.S.-implemented customs receivership that took control of Dominican customhouses and collected Dominican export and import taxes. In April 1905, the *modus vivendi*, whereby the United States allocated 55 percent of the collected revenue to pay Dominican foreign debt and 45 percent to the Dominican government, went into effect. At the same time, the United States attempted to persuade the Dominican government to carry out various fiscal and political reforms. Dominican elites wantonly facilitated the extension of U.S. hegemony for their own self-interest.

After the arrangement was ratified by the U.S. Congress on June 22, 1907, the United States proclaimed the U.S.-Dominican Convention of 1907. With the approval of the Dominican government, the United States reduced and consolidated the Dominican foreign debt with the collaboration of the Guarantee Trust Company of New York. The plan included a \$20-million loan by the bank to pay legitimate claims against the Dominican government, thus making the United States the Dominican Republic's only foreign creditor. In August 1916, after Dominican president Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal (b.

1859–d. 1935) refused to grant the United States greater control over the Dominican economy, the U.S. government suspended the Dominican government's access to funds collected by the customs receivership. The result was economic and political pandemonium. Citing the inability of the Dominicans to control their nation, the United States militarily intervened in November 1916. A U.S. military government attempted to implement fundamental changes in the nation's political, economic, and social life in the hope of creating a stable neighbor that would safeguard U.S. strategic and economic interests. The marines disarmed the Dominican population and created the theoretically apolitical National Guard, which eventually became the power base of dictator RAFAEL TRUJILLO.

In 1922, U.S. secretary of state Charles Evans Hughes and former Dominican minister of finance Francisco J. Peynado (b. 1867–d. 1933) announced the Hughes-Peynado Plan, which paved the way for presidential elections in the Dominican Republic and the withdrawal of U.S. Marines. In 1924, after the Dominicans ratified the Dominican-American Agreement, which guaranteed U.S. Customs receivership until the foreign debt was paid to American banks, the marines left. In 1931, as the Great Depression ravaged the Dominican economy, Trujillo, who had come to power in 1930, secured U.S. permission to suspend the payment of the principal on the Dominican foreign debt, although he continued to make interest payments. Because of the new international environment brought about by World War II, Trujillo was able to negotiate the 1940 U.S.-Dominican Convention, which abolished the customs receivership. U.S. financial officials would remain in the Dominican Republic but only in an advisory capacity. In 1947, Trujillo paid off the remaining Dominican foreign debt. For Trujillo, this was a historic event because it constituted U.S. recognition of Dominican financial independence.

See also HEUREAUX, ULISES (Vol. III); MONROE DOCTRINE (Vol. III).

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U.S. direct investment in Latin America At the beginning of the 20th century, Europeans—led by British, German, and French entrepreneurs, shipping magnates, bankers, and commercial houses—dominated the foreign investment sector in Latin American economies. Nevertheless, European businesspeople on the ground in Latin America cautioned their home offices

and governments that their U.S. counterparts were making rapid inroads into the market. While U.S. trade with Latin America can be traced to the colonial period, little materialized after Latin America completed its independence in 1826 until the late 19th century, when two developments enabled the United States to advance its commercial interests in the region.

In the 1880s, Liberals occupied Latin America's presidential palaces. Determined to accelerate their respective nation's involvement in the global market, they implemented the free trade ideology of the time, which enabled foreigners to invest in local economies with relative ease. During the same period, the industrial revolution took hold in the United States, and U.S. entrepreneurs began to look abroad for raw materials and new markets and places to invest. The vision of Latin American Liberals and U.S. entrepreneurs melded. Under these conditions, the Kennecott, Braden, and Anaconda Companies came to control copper mining in Chile; Sinclair and Standard Oil of California dominated the oil industries in Mexico and Venezuela; the United Fruit Company controlled the banana and transportation businesses in Central American countries and elsewhere in the circum-Caribbean region; and the Guggenheim, Hearst, and Morgan interests dominated Mexico's mining, cattle, and banking industries, respectively. There was much truth to the observation "Poor Mexico; so far from God, so close to the United States." Equally poignant was Leland Jencks's 1928 book title, *Our Cuban Colony*. By the mid-1920s, Cuba stood as the most obvious example of U.S. direct foreign investment. U.S. investments in the country rose from \$50 million in 1895 to \$205 million in 1928 and encompassed most aspects of the Cuban economy: agriculture, land development, banking, shipping, railroads, and public utilities.

The Great Depression that began in 1929 set in motion a decade of global economic stagnation, during which direct foreign investment in Latin America was virtually nonexistent. Industrial nations took to solving their own economic woes rather than seek cooperative solutions to the problem. For example, the U.S. trade reciprocity agreements of the 1930s were designed to spur U.S. industries, not those of Latin America. Nevertheless, because of the reduction in Latin America's imports at the time, the treaties were of little benefit to the United States.

World War II brought mixed economic returns to Latin America (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). Argentina sustained its exports of beef and wheat to the Allies, as the war choked off European food sources. Chile and particularly the U.S. copper companies there earned enormous profits because copper was used in the manufacture of shell casings. Cuba became the Allies' primary source of raw sugar, and hence, U.S.-owned refineries, transportation companies, and ancillary businesses benefited. U.S. oil companies operating in Ecuador and Venezuela profited from the wartime demand for

petroleum. On the opposite end of the scale, the coffee and bananas produced by U.S. companies in Central American and Caribbean countries virtually ceased operations. In the middle of these extremes, BRAZIL and Mexico were able to begin their industrial development due to the largesse of the U.S. government.

Owing to growing concern about communism in Europe and Asia immediately after World War II, U.S. investments in Latin America grew slowly until the 1960s, when the threat of communism in Western Hemisphere brought a new and heightened interest in that region (see COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA). Initially, capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive industries developed in Latin America, where governments were still operating under the rules of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) economic model.

As Latin American governments moved away from the ISI model in the late 1970s and in the 1980s accepted the neoliberal concept of free markets, U.S. business attitudes also changed. Corporate leaders now saw Latin America as a vast consumer market waiting to be tapped. U.S. firms opened operations across Latin America, and in effect, Latin American workers produced “American” goods for local consumption; the increased local consumption of these goods led to increased job security. For example, the “Big Three” U.S. automakers—Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors—built plants in Argentina and Brazil, as did Motorola, the electronics maker. Significant attention was given to the “927” industries in PUERTO RICO, the “807” industries elsewhere in the Caribbean and Central America, and Mexico’s MAQUILADORAS, which permitted the manufacture of clothing, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and other products by U.S.-based companies for resale in the United States. But, given less attention was the fact that these products could be shipped elsewhere in Latin America. U.S. retailers soon followed. Sears Roebuck long operated its department stores in major Latin American cities, but as the cities modernized in the 1980s, which included the construction of U.S.-style malls, specialty retailers entered the consumer market. The “Big Boxes”—for example, Wal-Mart and Home Depot—soon followed.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, new factors affected U.S. investment in Latin America. Mexican economic growth slowed dramatically owing to a provision in the CONSTITUTION OF 1917 that limited direct investment in any single business to 49 percent of the operation. This was a response to the legacy of Spanish colonialism and to President Porfirio Díaz’s Liberal economic policies from the 1880s to 1911, which permitted 100 percent foreign ownership of any singular economic pursuit in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, finance, transportation, and communications. However, in the 1980s neither wealthy Mexicans nor the national government had sufficient funds to invest the required 51 percent in any company. President CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI therefore persuaded the Mexican legislature

Total U.S. Direct Investment in Latin America

YEAR	DOLLARS (MILLIONS)
1897	0.3
1914	1.2
1960	8.3
1970	14.7
1980	38.8
1990	70.7
2000	233.1
2006	322.2

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investments Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), p. 27.

to abolish the requirement, which contributed to the growth of maquiladoras along the U.S. border. Salinas also saw the need for a more open market with the United States. This led to the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA), which went into effect in 1994. U.S. direct investment quickly followed, as did an uprising in the south of Mexico (see EZLN).

The U.S. vision to expand NAFTA into the FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) fizzled at the beginning of the 21st century. Latin Americans became increasingly concerned about U.S. dominance of such an arrangement, prompting individual governments to reach out to European and Asian nations, including China, instead (see CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF). U.S. businesses now faced increased global investment competition in Latin America. Additionally, at the beginning of the new century, the structural reforms demanded by the neoliberal economic model (see ECONOMY) had been implemented, but the benefits of free trade had not reached the wider populace. The frustration at this found expression in the contemporary leftward drift of Latin American politics. The impact of this political change on direct foreign investment in Latin America remains to be seen.

See also DÍAZ PORFIRIO (Vol. III).

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U.S.-Mexican relations U.S.-Mexican relations in the 20th century shifted from concerns over U.S. intervention during and after the MEXICAN REVOLUTION to issues of commerce, the DRUG TRADE IN MEXICO, and IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES. As the diplomatic debates have evolved, the geographic proximity of the United States and MEXICO has produced both resentment and the need for cooperation.

When the Mexican Revolution broke out in 1910, U.S. leaders watched with alarm and concern. American economic interests had grown substantially in Mexico during the Porfiriato, and revolutionary violence threatened landholdings and businesses owned by U.S. citizens. Furthermore, instability in Mexico became a security concern as World War I erupted in Europe (see WORLD WAR I AND LATIN AMERICA). U.S. diplomats attempted to influence the course of the revolution by acting as mediators and by urging Washington to become involved. One of most controversial examples came in 1913, when U.S. ambassador Henry Lane Wilson helped to broker a deal that led to the overthrow of FRANCISCO MADERO and the rise of dictator VICTORIANO HUERTA. As the revolution dragged on, the United States became more interventionist. In 1914, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson authorized a blockade of the port of Veracruz after a minor altercation between U.S. and Mexican soldiers. Two years later, he appointed General John J. Pershing to lead a punitive expedition against FRANCISCO VILLA after the revolutionary leader led a raid on Columbus, New Mexico. In both instances, the presence of U.S. troops on Mexican soil created strong nationalist feelings and resentment toward the United States.

Revolutionary reform in Mexico in the coming decades continued to concern U.S. economists. In the 1920s, issues of land ownership, debt, and oil rights were initially addressed in the Bucareli Agreement, but economic nationalism continued to grow in Mexico. In 1938, President LÁZARO CÁRDENAS nationalized the petroleum INDUSTRY, setting the stage for government-sponsored import-substitution industrialization policies in later decades. Mexican leaders secured government ownership of important economic sectors and imposed TRADE barriers to protect national industries. Government involvement in the ECONOMY combined with aggressive spending in social programs to create a financial crisis in the 1970s that was addressed in the short term by foreign borrowing. Since the 1980s, Mexico has experienced several debt and currency crises, often involving U.S. banks and investors. The most recent, in 1994, coincided with the passage of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT between Mexico, the United States, and Canada, and a U.S.-funded bailout package helped the Mexican economy recover.

Since 1990, other diplomatic issues have dominated the relationship between the two countries. As the U.S. government waged its war on DRUGS in South America in the 1980s, the production of illicit substances shifted

to Mexico. Drug-related violence and corruption have become increasing prevalent throughout the country, especially in border regions. Illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States has also dominated the foreign relations of the two countries in recent decades. It is estimated that as many as 10 to 20 million undocumented Mexican immigrants reside in the United States, working mainly in low-wage service, manufacturing, and agricultural jobs. Changing immigration policy has become a topic of intense political debate in the United States and often dominates diplomatic discussions between the two countries.

See also PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

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U.S. military assistance programs Twentieth-century U.S. interest in Latin American MILITARY affairs began shortly after World War I. It paralleled the U.S. effort at global disarmament, as seen in Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover's various formulas to determine the size of national armies based on national needs. Hoover's proposals did not find a receptive global audience, even at the 1922–23 Central American conference held in Washington, D.C. (see CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFERENCES OF 1907 AND 1923). While the five Central American republics (COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, and NICARAGUA) accepted the U.S. plan to limit the size of their land armies, they did nothing to implement the agreements. Two circum-Caribbean countries, Nicaragua and the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, accepted the U.S. recommendations to create a national constabulary, or national guard. The goal was to create a force that would serve the nation's interest, not those of its dictator. This did not occur, however. The National Guardsmen supported ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA and his son ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE in Nicaragua and RAFAEL TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic, just as armies supported military dictators elsewhere in the Caribbean.

During the 1920s, the U.S. proposal to limit the total tonnage of capital ships also had little impact in Latin America. Where navies existed, they were small, and their equipment was antiquated. Thus, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and CHILE accepted the U.S. offer of naval ships after World War I. The purchases enhanced those country's hemispheric and global prestige.

During the interwar generation, from 1920 to 1939, the U.S. Congress continually cut back on appropriations. As a result, the U.S. military was underfunded, and the State Department did not approve all sales of U.S. military equipment to foreign powers. As in the case of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, U.S. officers could not train foreign troops unless they first resigned from the U.S. military service. That rarely occurred. U.S. policy meant that the Latin Americans remained dependent on European equipment and training officers. In effect, Latin American militaries possessed a variety of outdated European equipment that was often in need of repair, while field training varied according to the practices of the contracted countries, usually French, German, Italian, or Spanish. This fact became apparent to U.S. military planners from August to October 1940, during their assessment visits to Latin America countries. Latin America was not in a position to offer military assistance in World War II (see *WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA*).

That war did not appreciably alter the situation. Neutral nations Argentina and Chile did not accept U.S. military missions. Some political leaders, such as those in Central America, did not want their officers coming into close contact with their U.S. counterparts out of fear that they might become self-serving. Brazil and MEXICO stood as exceptions among Latin American nations, sending troops to the Asian and Pacific battlefronts. Latin American governments also were disappointed with the U.S. wartime lend-lease program. Each presented the U.S. government with vast shopping lists to modernize their militaries. The Joint Army-Navy Board lowered the final allocations and indicated that shipments could not begin until 1943 because of demands in the European and Asian theaters.

After World War II, the U.S. military planned to unify the hemispheric command structure, training methods, and equipment. The plan fell on deaf ears in the State Department and U.S. Congress, each of which argued that such assistance would do little more than sustain Latin American dictators. That changed in 1952, by which time the cold war had become a global contest. U.S. military assistance now began to flow to Latin America, initially to help secure ports and other *TRANSPORTATION* facilities. The *CUBAN REVOLUTION* of 1956–61 prompted new U.S. policies. President John F. Kennedy introduced the *ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS* to help resolve the socioeconomic conditions that could result in revolutions. To prevent the growth of guerrilla movements, the military turned to counterinsurgency, including training local military in combating and interrogating guerrillas. The methodology became brutal, resulting in heavy criticism of the program and the United States, but this did not prevent President Lyndon B. Johnson from increasing military assistance to Latin America in the hope of suppressing the guerrilla movements. President Richard M. Nixon, who had little interest in Latin America, continued the high levels of military sales.

Two new trends that converged in the 1970s affected U.S. military sales abroad. The U.S. Congress completed legislation that granted the president authority to cut military assistance to governments in violation of civil and *HUMAN RIGHTS*. Jimmy Carter came to the presidency in 1977 with a commitment to human rights and used that legislation to terminate military sales to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala. In February 1979, he added Nicaragua to the list, which contributed significantly to the downfall of Nicaraguan strongman Somoza Debayle in July 1979. Ronald Reagan reversed course on assuming the presidency in 1981. U.S. arms became available to all Latin American nations provided they maintained internal order against potential “communist” threats (see *CENTRAL AMERICAN WARS*). At the same time, the Guatemalan military government resisted overt U.S. assistance, instead taking arms purportedly to fight against drug trafficking in the country. Providing military assistance to Latin American nations became a hallmark of the Reagan and George H. W. Bush presidencies. U.S. funds and equipment, such as helicopters, were used in the U.S. war on drugs and the effort to eliminate them at the source.

In the 1990s, several factors contributed to another change in military sales to Latin America. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the cold war, which in turn led to a reduction in U.S. military assistance programs. Latin America’s return to democratic governments reduced the military’s presence in politics and helped lower the demand for foreign military hardware and training. Additionally, President William J. Clinton emphasized solving the U.S. drug problems at home rather than abroad and sought to limit the entry of *DRUGS* into the country by tightening border control. Clinton’s plan had failed to curtail U.S. drug use by the end of his administration. Indeed, drug use had increased, which prompted Clinton to push through Congress in 2000 a \$1.3-billion assistance package to battle drugs in *COLOMBIA*, *ECUADOR*, *Aruba*, and *Curaçao*. The preponderance of the package was for military assistance, including airport construction and improvement in Ecuador, Aruba, and Curaçao. Sixty-five percent of the funding went to Colombia, where guerrilla groups worked with drug-growing peasants and narcotraffickers. The U.S. drug war left indelible marks on Latin America. By 2000, the pursuit of drug growers, processors, and traffickers had enhanced the power of the military, which expanded its influence in government, particularly in *BOLIVIA*, *Colombia*, and *PERU*.

Upon taking office in January 2001, President George W. Bush continued the emphasis on combating narcotraffickers and guerrilla groups, particularly in Colombia. U.S. assistance to Latin American governments combating internal drug traffickers continued through May 2008, when Bush asked Congress for \$500 million in military assistance to aid Mexico in its battle against drug trafficking. Bush traveled down a new path

on October 2, 2005, when he lifted a three-year ban on 21 Latin American countries from receiving U.S. military aid and training to nations that refused to exempt U.S. soldiers from war crimes trials. The ban had little impact on the Latin Americans' purchase of military supplies in the international market, including arms. Just how the policy change impacted on U.S. military sales is difficult to determine because precise figures for military hardware sales to Latin America after 2003 under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs are difficult to ascertain, but from 2005 to 2008, an estimated 3,321 Latin American soldiers received training in the United States in a wide range of antiguerrilla tactics, including counterintelligence and helicopter repair. This aid has been directed at the military in countries with large indigenous movements that publicly oppose economic neoliberalism, including Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and PARAGUAY. While most Latin American analysts see these movements as a response to local economic conditions, Bush did not. Critics also note that these activities have increased the Pentagon's influence in foreign policy decision making.

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U.S. trade reciprocity agreements (1930s) In the 1930s, a series of bilateral TRADE agreements between the United States and Latin American countries were signed. By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt took the presidential oath of office on March 4, 1933, U.S. trade with Latin America had declined drastically; since 1929, exports had fallen by 78 percent in value and imports by 68 percent. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff exacerbated the problem by raising the tariffs on imports. Other governments were equally nationalistic during

the Great Depression, initiating currency restrictions, import quotas, barter agreements, and higher tariffs. In 1934, U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull gained support from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle and Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace to seek trade reciprocity agreements with Latin American nations with the aim of boosting the post-depression ECONOMY in the United States. At the Seventh International Meeting of American States from December 3 to 26, 1933, in Montevideo, Uruguay, Hull secured a resolution calling for trade liberalization policies, including the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements. At home, in June 1934, Congress granted the State Department authority to negotiate such treaties, while the president could raise or lower tariff duties by 50 percent and move goods onto and off the duty-free list.

Latin America fitted neatly into the plan because it did not have a competitive industrial sector, nor did its major exports (flaxseed, cane sugar, cacao, castor beans, bananas, crude rubber, manganese, bauxite, and platinum) compete with U.S. commodities. In addition, the majority of Latin American exports to the United States were already admitted under the terms of the most-favored-nation status. By comparison, the United States could be the chief supplier of manufactured goods to Latin America. In sum, the former had the dominant negotiating position. Latin America's larger countries, such as ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, and CHILE, whose economies were more oriented toward Europe, shied away from negotiating trade reciprocity agreements with the United States. At the other extreme were the circum-Caribbean countries, whose primary exports of bananas, cane sugar, tobacco, and tropical fruits had already entered the United States under most-favored-nation status and whose underdeveloped economies did not generate sufficient wealth to purchase significant quantities of U.S. manufactures.

One indirect result of the treaties was to legitimize the status of regional dictators, including GUATEMALA'S JORGE UBICO Y CASTAÑEDA, NICARAGUA'S ANASTASIO SOMOZA GARCÍA, and COLOMBIA'S LAUREANO GÓMEZ. Thus, while the reciprocal trade treaties did not contribute very much to the revitalization of U.S. INDUSTRY, they did serve the personal purposes of Latin American dictators.

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Vargas, Getúlio Dornelles (b. 1882–d. 1954) *president and dictator of Brazil* Born into a prominent family with good political connections, in São Borja in the southern border state of Rio Grande do Sul, Getúlio Dornelles Vargas became one of BRAZIL's most influential politicians. On completing his education in local schools, he followed in his father's footsteps and joined the MILITARY but resigned in 1907 to study law in Pôrto Alegre. Three years after his graduation, in 1911, he was elected to the state's legislature, which was under the complete control of Governor Borges de Medeiros (b. 1863–d. 1961). As Vargas learned in 1912, not even the slightest criticism was tolerated. For so doing, he was barred from reelection for five years and would be readmitted only after he had demonstrated sincere contrition and sworn allegiance to the state's political boss. Vargas gained national prominence during the 1920s as a congressman and head of the delegation from Rio Grande do Sul. In 1926, President Washington Luís Pereira de Sousa (b. 1869–d. 1957) appointed him finance minister. Two years later, Vargas bested incumbent Medeiros in Rio Grande do Sul's gubernatorial election.

Vargas sought the presidency in 1930 as the candidate for the Liberal Alliance, a coalition that the Republican Party and other dissidents had formed to oppose to the traditional elite. Vargas also gained support from the *tenentes* (army lieutenants) and their civilian followers, who clamored for political and social change. Vargas's support base lay in the urban areas but was ultimately insufficient to outmaneuver the rural elite. Júlio Prestes (b. 1882–d. 1946) won the election on March 1, 1930. Although Vargas appeared to accept his fate, he quietly authorized his supporters to plan a revolution. It came

on October 3, 1930, and within three weeks, the rebels controlled most of the coastal states. Outgoing president Luís capitulated, and on November 3, Vargas became head of a provisional government for an unspecified time and without limitation on his authority.

Vargas moved quickly to consolidate his power by suspending the 1891 constitution, dismissing the judiciary and the National Congress, and replacing elected state governors with intervenors answerable only to him. A new military command structure ensured that officers remained loyal to the defense and navy ministers appointed by Vargas. To garner popular support, Vargas created the Ministries of Education and Labor, though in reality the government lacked the financial resources to address educational and LABOR-related issues. In effect, Vargas emerged as Brazil's undisputed dictator.

Vargas attempted to address the devastating impact of the Great Depression on Brazil's agro-export-based ECONOMY by cutting domestic taxes and import duties and lowering import quotas. Even so, as an economic nationalist, he favored protective tariffs to secure home-grown industries.

Vargas's political high-handedness and the continuing depression caused opposition to him to emerge, which found expression in a three-month-period of protest known as the Constitutional Revolution of 1932. As it fizzled, Vargas took steps to ensure his own position. On July 16, 1934, a new constitution was promulgated, and on July 17, 1934, Vargas was selected by the constituent assembly to be the first president under the new document. Constitutionally ineligible to seek reelection in 1938, Vargas and his colleagues manufactured a communist threat that led to the pronouncement of yet another constitution on November 10, 1937.

Known as *ESTADO NOVO* (New State), the government under the new constitution was a dictatorship. Congress and the judiciary were disbanded, civil rights were suspended, the state took control of the media, and the military was authorized to suppress all subversion. Rather than stand aside in the scheduled 1943 presidential election as promised, Vargas used World War II to justify his declaration of a state of siege and thus remain in power. As the war drew to an end in 1945, the public, stirred on by the Allies' democratic ideals, demanded that Vargas leave office. Concerned that Vargas might be quietly maneuvering to stay on, in October 1945, a group of army officers recently returned from the Italian battlefront deposed Vargas and installed a provisional government. Vargas, however, did not disappear. He was elected to the Senate in the December 1945 elections.

Despite his dictatorial rule and the fascist ideology of *Estado Novo*, Vargas was decidedly pro-Allies during World War II (see *WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA*). Brazil entered the war on August 22, 1942, and in 1944, a Brazilian expeditionary force fought with the Allies in the Italian campaign. Vargas also benefited from U.S. wartime assistance, using U.S. funds to construct the nation's first steel plant, a base for future industrialization. He also laid the foundations of a corporate state by establishing national control over the automotive and hydroelectric power industries. The 1943 labor code permitted the establishment of unions under government auspices.

Vargas returned to the presidency on January 31, 1951, following a successful campaign as the candidate of the Brazilian Worker's Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*, or PTB). However, he inherited a more democratic Brazil, as illustrated by the divided Congress. He also inherited an economy ravaged by inflation. From the start of his administration, Brazil's traditional rural elite and conservative military officer corps distrusted him. To satisfy his labor support base, Vargas declared a 100 percent pay increase for blue-collar workers on May 1, 1954. This set opposition to him in motion, and he was eventually charged with graft, corruption, and undefined criminal activities. Under these circumstances, the military demanded his resignation. Vargas answered by committing suicide on August 24, 1954, leaving a legacy that included initiating Brazil's industrialization and rights for urban labor.

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Velasco Ibarra, José María (b. 1893–d. 1979) *president of Ecuador* Born into a middle-class family in Quito, ECUADOR, José María Velasco Ibarra received his early education in the capital city, then undertook postdoctoral studies at the Sorbonne in Paris, France. He held several jobs after his return home in 1920, including as the editorial writer *Labriolle* for Quito's leading newspaper. He used his column to attack Ecuador's elitist government and corrupt politicians and called for the implementation of democracy. Velasco Ibarra was elected to the National Congress in 1932 and a year later became president of the Chamber of Deputies. After Congress voted to depose Liberal Party president Juan de Dios Martínez Mera (b. 1875–d. 1955) for participating in alleged electoral fraud, Velasco Ibarra became Ecuador's president on September 1, 1934. His term lasted only 11 months. When the Conservative Party blocked his legislative program, Velasco Ibarra attempted to rule as a dictator, and the MILITARY removed him from office on August 21, 1935. Political turmoil characterized Ecuadorean politics for the remainder of the decade.

Liberal Carlos Alberto Arroyo (b. 1893–d. 1969) won the fraudulent 1940 presidential elections but became increasingly unpopular because of government repression and the ceding of land to PERU in the 1942 border dispute settlement. A bloody revolt on May 28, 1944, forced his resignation and three days later led to Velasco Ibarra's appointment as president. Initially, Velasco Ibarra drew support from a number of political parties, save his own Liberals. His most important accomplishment was the convening of a constitutional convention in 1946, which ratified Velasco Ibarra's tenure in office until 1950. He did not complete his term, however. A military coup on August 23, 1947, ousted Velasco Ibarra, who again left the country. Velasco Ibarra returned to win the presidency in 1952 and, this time, he completed his full term.

Constitutionally ineligible to succeed himself in 1956, Velasco Ibarra waited until the May 20, 1960, presidential election to seek another term in office. When he began to show signs of support for FIDEL CASTRO RUZ'S CUBAN REVOLUTION and at the same time proposed tax increases on the elite, the traditional Conservative and Liberal Parties turned to the military to oust Velasco Ibarra on November 7, 1961. Velasco Ibarra was again inaugurated president on September 1, 1968, for the fifth and final time. After he disbanded Congress on July 22, 1970, and replaced the 1967 constitution with that of 1946, he engaged in a power struggle with the military that resulted in his ouster from office on February 15, 1972.

Velasco Ibarra's charismatic style and effectiveness as an orator captured the imagination of Ecuador's poor, whose problems he appeared to understand. Nevertheless, he lacked the support of key political actors, who were needed to sustain his presidencies. After his final removal from office, Velasco Ibarra moved to ARGENTINA, where

he resided until March 1979, when he returned to Quito to bury his wife. Two weeks later on March 30, 1979, at age 86, he died of pulmonary disease.

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Venetiaan, Ronald (b. 1936–) *president of Suriname* Born on June 18, 1936, in Paramaribo, SURINAME, Ronald Venetiaan earned a doctorate in mathematics from the University of Leiden, in the Netherlands, in 1964. He returned to Suriname after graduation and taught mathematics at the University Preparatory and Teacher Training College. In 1973, Prime Minister HENCK ARRON appointed Venetiaan minister of education. Venetiaan returned to teaching following the 1980 MILITARY coup led by DÉSI BOUTERSE that overthrew the civilian government. In 1987, he was elected chairman of the advisory board of the Suriname National Party (NPS). Following the return to civilian government in 1988, Venetiaan was renamed minister of education. Notwithstanding the 1990 military coup, Venetiaan remained minister of education until 1991.

Venetiaan, the leader of the New Front coalition (which included the NPS), won the democratic elections held on May 25, 1991. He promptly replaced Bouterse, who had become the commander in chief of the armed forces. Venetiaan also ended six years of civil war that had been unleashed by disgruntled Maroons in 1986. Although Venetiaan won the 1996 elections by a slight majority, he did not have the necessary two-thirds vote required to be president. Jules Wijdenbosch (b. 1941–), representing Bouterse's National Democratic Party (NDP), was able to form a coalition government and be elected. Widespread strikes over economic difficulties broke out in 1999, forcing Wijdenbosch to call for early elections. Wijdenbosch's coalition collapsed, and Venetiaan returned to power in 2000. Venetiaan's fiscal austerity and currency reform programs have restored economic stability.

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Venezuela Venezuela is located on the northeastern coast of South America bordered by the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean; to its west lies COLOMBIA, and to its south, GUYANA and BRAZIL. Venezuela totals 352,143 square miles (912,046 km²), including 11 federally controlled island groups with a total of 72 individual islands. Venezuela's terrain is marked by the Andean highlands and Maracaibo lowlands in the northwest, the Guiana Highlands in the southeast, and the central plains. Venezuela is approximately twice the size of California and with slightly more than 26 million inhabitants is the sixth most populous country in Latin America. Eighty-five percent of the people reside in urban areas in Venezuela's northern sector. The population is a combination of European, indigenous, and African heritage. While the country is noted as one of the world's major oil producers, it is also rich in natural gas, coal, iron ore, bauxite, and other minerals and produces hydroelectric power.

On August 1, 1498, during his third voyage to the New World, Christopher Columbus became the first European to set foot on South American territory, near the mouth of the Orinoco River. Because it did not appear to possess mineral ores or the large Amerindian civilizations that attracted the Spanish to other parts of the New World, much of what is Venezuela today remained unexplored by Spanish conquistadores. Over time, CARACAS became a center of the cacao TRADE, but little more. Only in 1777 did Venezuela become a captaincy general, and in 1786 it was named an *audiencia* within the Viceroyalty of New Granada. As elsewhere in Latin America, Venezuela gained its independence from Spain only slowly. The process began on April 19, 1810, when the *cabildo* (town council) at Caracas refused to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as ruler of the Spanish Empire, then declared independence from Spain on July 5, 1811, and was completed at the Battle of Carabobo on June 24, 1821. For the next nine years, Venezuela was part of the Gran Colombian nation that also included Colombia and ECUADOR. A rebellion led by José Antonio Páez resulted in Venezuela's leaving the confederation on January 13, 1830, with Páez serving as the first president of the new nation for 16 years, after which the Liberal-Conservative struggle that characterized all Latin American countries in the 19th century resulted in a series of caudillo (political strongman) administrators.

As the 20th century began, General Cipriano Castro occupied the presidential palace. His nine years of despotic and brutal rule are best known for provoking foreign interventions. By 1902, Venezuela had accumulated significant debt with European banks, particularly in Britain and Germany. Castro refused to arbitrate the dispute, and the United States acquiesced, hence in December 1902, the two European powers dispatched gunboats to blockade the Venezuelan coast for two months before Castro capitulated and agreed to arbitration. The International Court at the Hague arbitrated a final settlement in 1904.

THE GÓMEZ YEARS, 1908–1935

On December 19, 1908, General JUAN VICENTE GÓMEZ ousted Castro when he was in Europe for medical treatment. Gómez, often described as Venezuela's last caudillo, governed the country for 27 years until his overthrow in 1935. The MILITARY was his major support, while a compliant legislature wrote six new constitutions to extend his tenure. If political opponents did not go into exile, they found themselves incarcerated under intolerable conditions and subject to brutal torture that often resulted in death. Gómez's methods earned him the title "Tyrant of the Andes."

Because Gómez viewed Venezuelans as a primitive mixed-raced people, as opposed to "pure" people, he believed that the country's economic development could be completed only by foreigners with their superior technological and management skills, who needed a stable political environment in which to work. Initially, Gómez benefited from the high global demand for coffee, but beginning in 1918, increased oil production provided the state with unprecedented wealth that enabled Gómez to pay off Venezuela's foreign debt and institute a public works program. Because the oil INDUSTRY is capital intensive, rather than labor intensive, it did little for the Venezuelan LABOR movement but did contribute to the nation's urbanization and to the growth of the middle class. Through corruption and skimming from its income, Gómez and his closest advisers benefited most from the oil industry. In the 1920s, agricultural productivity declined and, coupled with the influx of oil money, led to high inflation, which adversely affected middle- and lower-income groups. Real wages and purchasing power declined.

Public protests against Gómez began in 1928 and continued until his death seven years later. The most significant demonstrations occurred on April 11–15, 1928, when university students took to the streets in Caracas, only to be repressed by the military. Student leaders such as future presidents RÓMULO ERNESTO BETANCOURT BELLO, Raúl Leoni (b. 1905–d. 1972), and Rafael Caldera Rodríguez (b. 1916–) escaped into exile, while hundreds of others were arrested and jailed, and countless were killed and injured. Gómez's dictatorship finally came to an end with his death on December 17, 1935. Although Venezuela would again experience dictatorial rule, most analysts agree that Gómez's death marked the end to *caudillismo* and the beginning of Venezuela's slow transition to democratic rule.

Gómez's two immediate successors, Generals Eleazar López Contreras (b. 1883–d. 1973) and Isaías Medina Angarita (b. 1897–d. 1953), governed through a tumultuous decade. As might be expected after a long period of dictatorial rule, several new POLITICAL PARTIES emerged, mostly on the left, such as the National Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Nacional, or PDN) and the Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, or AD) party. Greater freedom of expression resulted in labor

demands for wage increases and the establishment of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which exerted influence over government economic development policies.

With regards to potential oil wealth, President Medina adopted the "50/50" principle, meaning that oil company profits could not exceed the amount of monies going to the state. This principle found expression in the 1943 Hydrocarbons Act, which placed a tax on the income the oil companies earned from their downstream operations, such as gasoline refining, fertilizer production, printing ink, and, subsequently, plastics. In return, the oil companies received full concession rights to extract all oil possible for a 40-year period. The act was the first step in the process of nationalizing Venezuela's oil industry.

Sources of discontent existed. Within the military, a group of younger officers dissatisfied with the lack of professionalism and the cronyism among the upper ranks formed a secret lodge, the Patriotic Military Union (Unión Patriótica Militar, or UPM) that, in turn, formed an alliance with the AD to oust Medina from the presidency on October 18, 1946, and pave the way for the presidency of AD leader Betancourt Bello. Still, democracy had not been secured. Beginning with Betancourt, over the next 14 years, Venezuela had seven presidents, including the brutal dictator MARCOS PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, who held power from December 2, 1952, to January 25, 1958. Benefiting from ever-increasing petroleum monies, Pérez Jiménez undertook large construction projects that mostly stood as monuments to himself, such as luxurious hotels and an imitation of New York City's Rockefeller Center, while government expenditures on EDUCATION and health care stagnated. Government corruption was so rampant that when Pérez Jiménez left office in 1958, he reportedly took with him an estimated \$250 million. Two caretaker governments followed, until elections were held on December 2, 1958, and Betancourt was returned to the presidency.

DEMOCRATIC VENEZUELA, 1958–1998

In retrospect, historians mark the Betancourt administration as Venezuela's turning point from military-elite leadership to a more representative democratic government with a peaceful transfer of power between elected civilian presidents. Nevertheless, the facade of democracy did not cover over the plight of the larger Venezuelan population.

Under Betancourt's tutelage the AD factions agreed to cooperate rather than fight with each other as they had in the past, and to be more flexible in their approach to politics. AD reached out to the Social Christian Party (COPEI) in signing the Pact of Punta Fijo on October 31, 1958, under which the two parties agreed to share cabinet positions and the control of state institutions regardless of who won the elections, an agreement that effectively shut other parties out of Venezuela's political

arena. Benefiting from oil profits, the two parties satisfied the needs of their major constituencies at the expense of the poor and marginalized communities represented by smaller political parties. Over time, the system became corrupt as AD and COPEI attempted to hold on to power.

The military was the first beneficiary of the new system. Most important at the time was the amnesty granted to all military personnel who could be charged with crimes committed during the many years of previous military dictatorship. The military also received immediate pay increases, better housing, and modern equipment, benefits that continued over time and that kept the military from intervening in political affairs. The CATHOLIC CHURCH, which had vehemently opposed the Pérez dictatorship, was able to expand its influence during the Betancourt and succeeding administrations.

AD and COPEI also agreed to an economic development plan. Private property rights were protected, and compensation would be provided for any expropriated for agrarian reform purposes. Local industries received tax benefits to protect themselves from foreign competition and financial assistance through the newly created state agency, the Venezuelan Development Corporation. Labor unions gained the right to collectively bargain for wage increases and other benefits. Again, owing to its oil wealth, the state invested heavily in food programs, housing, and health care. Finally, a new constitution in 1961 enhanced presidential powers at the expense of the national legislature. Clearly, Betancourt had set out to institutionalize Venezuela's newfound democracy, or as one analyst put it, "to institutionalize a prolonged truce." Until 1989, Betancourt's successors continued and expanded the reform programs.

Venezuela's economic growth and social programs were predicated upon profits from petroleum exports. In 1960, the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (CVP) was established to oversee that industry. That same year, Venezuela became a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a nascent cartel that would dominate the global oil market and greatly influence the price for crude oil during the 1970s and 1980s. The Arab-Israeli war of 1971 and OPEC's manipulation of production and price increases triggered a steep increase in Venezuela's oil profits, which enabled the government to continue its development and social programs.

On December 9, 1973, CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ won the presidential election with 48.8 percent of the popular vote. Together, AD and COPEI gained control of the national legislature. With this mandate, Pérez set course on an aggressive economic policy that enabled the Venezuelan government to nationalize, with compensation, U.S. firms mining iron ore in the Guiana Highlands and 14 foreign-owned oil operations. In 1976, the oil industry became the province of the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (PDVSA), a government agency.

The increased wealth enabled Pérez to expand the country's industrialization process. Wage increases were decreed for labor, and the public employment rolls doubled during the Pérez administration. Subsidized price controls encouraged the excessive purchase of foreign-made consumer goods, ranging from televisions to automobiles, from clothing to foodstuffs. In the process of economic expansion, government corruption became more prevalent. The economic downside of the spending spree was increased inflation and government debt and an unfavorable balance of TRADE. For Venezuela, the oil boom of the 1970s became the oil crisis of the 1980s as the global price for oil collapsed. Three successive presidents, including Pérez, who returned to office on February 2, 1989, failed to improve the situation.

THE HUGO CHÁVEZ ERA

Opposition to the AD-COPEI 1958 Pact of Punta Fijo arose immediately after its signing. Protest groups and fringe political parties played on the plight of the poor. Most notable during the 1960s and 1970s were guerrilla organizations that received support from FIDEL CASTRO Ruz in CUBA. In addition to the government's aggressive military policy against guerrillas, ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA's death in 1967 contributed to Castro's reassessment of his support for revolutionary movements in Latin America. Whatever the reasons, Venezuela's guerrilla movements subsided after 1967. In their place, new leftist political groups and parties emerged in the 1970s, such as the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS), Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, or MIR), and the People's Electoral Movement (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, or MEP), which drew their support from the poor and marginalized sectors that did not benefit from the oil prosperity.

When Pérez returned to the presidency at the beginning of 1989, he initiated a neoliberal economic austerity program that included a reduction in government-subsidy programs for basic goods and services; it had the largest impact on the poor. The military suppressed the demonstrations that followed, a move that only further infuriated the populace. Pérez survived two coup attempts in 1992, including one by an unknown military officer, HUGO RAFAEL CHÁVEZ FRÍAS, who received a two-year prison sentence for his action. Pérez, however, did not survive the pressure that stemmed from the corruption charges against him. He resigned the presidency on May 21, 1993. Two interim presidents followed until the general election of December 9, 1993, that sent Caldera back into the president's office, but he was unable to cope with the magnitude of the problem. By 1998, nearly 75 percent of Venezuelan people lived in poverty.

As the candidate of the newly founded Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento V [Quinta] República, or MVR), Chávez was elected Venezuelan president on December 9, 1998, with promises to break with the past through a new

constitution, which Venezuelans approved on December 8, 1999. The new document promised agrarian reform, health care, education, housing, and a social security program for all. It also provided for the direct election of a president by a plurality of vote, with all people having suffrage. Chávez won the presidential election on July 30, 2000, with MVR and MAS support. The two parties also gained control of the unicameral legislature.

Opposition to Chávez was immediate and intensified until April 11–13, 2002, when mass demonstrations in Caracas led to a coup attempt and his temporary resignation until a group of loyal military officers put down the rebellion and restored him to the presidency. The persistent opposition resulted in a national work stoppage from December 2, 2002, until February 17, 2003. The political turmoil continued with a national petition calling for a referendum on Chávez's recall; it was held on August 15, 2004. Again, Chávez survived and went on to win a second presidential election on December 3, 2006. His effort to tighten his grip over government by amending the 1999 constitution to provide for greater executive authority at the expense of the legislature and the courts failed in a national referendum on November 29, 2007.

The reasons for Chávez's unpopularity are many. The traditional elite and middle sector scoff at his power grab, at the expense of democracy as Venezuelans know it. His promises to reach out to the poor have gone largely unmet. Venezuela remains a country of significant wealth disparity, with nearly 70 percent of the population unemployed or underemployed. Chávez has squandered the nation's oil wealth on modern military equipment and foreign policy gifts for other underdeveloped countries in the hemisphere, such as Cuba and BOLIVIA. And his debunking of the United States and effort to thwart U.S. presence in Latin America has met with mixed reactions at best.

See also CASTRO, CIPRIANO (Vol. III); CAUDILLO (Vol. III); CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); GRAN COLOMBIA (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); NEW GRANADA, VICEROYALTY OF (Vol. II); PÁEZ, JOSÉ ANTONIO (Vol. III); VENEZUELA (Vols. I, II, III).

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Vieques Island Vieques Island is a 63-square-mile (163-km²) island municipality that lies 10 miles (16 km) northwest of PUERTO RICO in the Caribbean Sea. It gained international notoriety in the early 21st century as a bomb-training site for the U.S. Navy. This sparsely populated island was home to ancient NATIVE AMERICANS between 3000 B.C.E. and 2000 B.C.E. and had an estimated population of 9,000 in 2000. Christopher Columbus claimed the island for the Spanish, but Vieques remained a lawless outpost, home to pirates and outlaws throughout most of its colonial history. The island was formally annexed to Puerto Rico in 1854. In the latter part of the 19th century, black Caribs, mostly from St. Thomas, Nevis, St. Christopher, and St. Croix, migrated to the island, and today, their descendants play an important role in the island's ECONOMY and society.

The United States acquired the island, along with Puerto Rico, in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War. During World War II, the U.S. Navy purchased about two-thirds of Vieques as an extension of Roosevelt Roads Naval Station on Puerto Rico (see WORLD WAR II AND LATIN AMERICA). After the war, the U.S. Navy continually used its portion of the island for military exercises and a firing range for bombs, missiles, and other weapons. With the approach of the 21st century, Puerto Rican protests intensified against the continued use of the island as a bombing range, but not until the killing of Vieques native David Sanes (b. 1954–d. 1999) on April 19, 1999, did the protests draw international attention and that of U.S. politicians. The navy withdrew from Vieques in 2003 and from Roosevelt Roads a year later. Both closings contributed to unemployment on the main island and on Vieques. Today, the former naval property is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

See also VIEQUES ISLAND (Vol. III); WAR OF 1898.

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Villa, Francisco (Pancho Villa; José Doroteo Arango Arámbula) (b. 1878–d. 1923) *Mexican revolutionary leader* Francisco (Pancho) Villa was one of the most colorful and disputed personalities of the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. Considered by many to be nothing more than a bandit, to others he was a heroic defender of the poor and exploited.

Villa was born José Doroteo Arango Arámbula on an hacienda in the state of Durango in 1878. Stories

say that as a teenager he attacked a landlord who had raped his sister. He fled the hacienda, changed his name to Francisco Villa (*Pancho* is the diminutive of *Francisco*), and lived as a bandit for more than a decade. In 1910, he joined the revolutionary movement initiated by FRANCISCO MADERO and played a prominent role in the Battle of Ciudad Juárez, which ultimately forced the dictator Porfirio Díaz into exile.

Villa remained a loyal supporter of Madero, who was elected president in 1911. After Madero was removed from office and executed by VICTORIANO HUERTA, Villa joined the Constitutionalist alliance with VENUSTIANO CARRANZA and helped lead a nationwide uprising against the Huerta dictatorship from 1913 to 1914. During that time, Villa used the U.S. media to gain recognition and support in the United States. The Mutual Film Corporation sent a camera crew to film footage of Villa's revolution and produced the feature-length film *The Life of General Villa*. After deposing Huerta, a rift developed between Villa and Carranza, and the two fought each other in a bloody

civil war for several years. In 1916, Villa led a raid into Columbus, New Mexico, killing dozens of U.S. citizens. In retaliation, the U.S. government sent General John J. Pershing on an expedition to capture Villa. Pershing's expedition was unsuccessful, Villa's forces were already faltering. The battle-worn leader went into retirement on a large hacienda in Chihuahua in 1920.

Even in retirement, Villa was considered a threat to the national leadership. The revolutionary leader was assassinated in Parral, Chihuahua, on July 23, 1923.

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III).

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Violencia, La See COLOMBIA.



Wasmosy, Juan Carlos (b. 1938–) *president of Paraguay* Born and educated in Asunción, PARAGUAY, Juan Carlos Wasmosy was trained as a civil engineer. While serving as the head of the Paraguayan consortium that built the Itaipú Hydroelectric Dam between 1973 and 1984, Wasmosy amassed significant wealth. As the handpicked successor to Colorado president Andrés Rodríguez, Wasmosy won the May 9, 1992, presidential election. Wasmosy's popularity quickly dwindled when he appointed to government posts longtime supporters of dictator ALFREDO STROESSNER and did not continue the Rodríguez reform programs. Wasmosy survived an attempted military coup d'état in 1996, directed by General Lino Oviedo (b. 1943–), thanks to the diplomatic maneuvering of U.S. president William J. Clinton. Four years after leaving office in 2002, Wasmosy was convicted of defrauding the Paraguayan government and sentenced to a four-year jail term.

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West Indies Federation (WIF) (1958–1962) The West Indies Federation (WIF) was a short-lived alliance of several British colonies into a single political unit that would eventually become independent of Great Britain. Britain's Colonial Office had a long history of proposing various schemes to unify some or all of the Caribbean islands into a collective unit, but these all ran afoul of local opposition (see CARIBBEAN, BRITISH). Established on January 3, 1958, the WIF brought together 14 major

Caribbean islands, plus 220 uninhabited minor islands, islets, and cays. Spread out over 7,800 square miles (20,202 km²) the major islands included ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, the BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, Cayman Islands, DOMINICA, GRENADA, JAMAICA, Montserrat, SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

A governor general was appointed to represent Queen Elizabeth II, and a government was set up at Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, under a prime minister, the first being Grantley H. Adams (b. 1898–d. 1971) of Barbados. In consultation with the state governors, the governor general appointed a 19-member Senate, while the House of Representatives had 45 elected members.

From the start, the federation was beset with disension. Despite the Caribbean-wide call for independence, not all member states approved the WIF charter, including the two most populous states, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The central government could not function smoothly, given the insular interests of its membership. Antifederation movements in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago doomed the enterprise to failure. As these two larger and more prosperous members moved toward their independence from Britain, the West Indies Federation disintegrated and officially dissolved with the British Parliament's passage of the West Indies Act on May 31, 1962. The experience left the Caribbean leaders with the recognition that economic unity was a necessary first step to political unity (see CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET; CARIBBEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION).

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West Indian labor force See PANAMA; PANAMA CANAL, CONSTRUCTION OF.

Williams, Eric (b. 1911–d. 1981) *prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago* Born on September 25, 1911, in Port of Spain, Trinidad, Eric Williams was the son of a Trinidadian postal employee. He earned a Ph.D. in history from Oxford University in 1938 after completing his doctoral dissertation, “The Economic Aspect of the West Indian Slave Trade and Slavery.” Williams accepted a tenure-track position at Howard University in 1939, becoming a full professor in 1947. He worked for the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, an organization created to examine political and economic developments in the postwar Caribbean, in Washington, D.C., from 1948 to 1955. Williams returned to TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO to establish his own political party, the People’s National Movement (PNM), in 1956. His party served as the political vehicle for Afro-Trinidadians, who had previously lacked significant political organization.

In 1956, the PNM won the parliamentary elections, and Williams became chief minister and subsequently premier in 1959 when the United Kingdom granted Trinidad and Tobago greater self-autonomy. Trinidad and Tobago joined the short-lived WEST INDIES FEDERATION in 1958. The two largest entities in the 10-nation federation of English-speaking territories in the Caribbean were JAMAICA and Trinidad and Tobago. Williams and his Jamaican counterpart, however, had vastly different ideas about how the federation should function. Williams wanted a strong federal government with representation based on financial contribution to the federation. Jamaica, however, preferred a weak federal government and representation based on population. In September 1961, Jamaica left the federation. Williams, unwilling to remain in the federation and become financially responsible for the eight small, poor islands that made up the rest of the federation’s membership, and convinced that the federation would delay independence, subsequently removed Trinidad and Tobago from the federation. In the December 1961 parliamentary elections, the PNM won 57 percent of the popular vote and 20 of the 30 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

The United Kingdom granted Trinidad and Tobago independence on August 31, 1962, and Williams became the nation’s first prime minister. Following independence, Queen Elizabeth II was the titular head of state, while the leader of the majority party was the prime minister. In

1976, however, Trinidad and Tobago became a republic, and Ellis Clarke (b. 1917–), the last governor general, was elected president, largely a symbolic position, by the parliament. Williams supported greater economic integration in the Caribbean. In 1967, Trinidad and Tobago became the first commonwealth nation to join the ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS). Although Williams maintained diplomatic relations with CUBA, he consistently pointed out the superiority of the capitalist system over the socialist one. During the 1970s, the international oil crisis benefited the nation’s ECONOMY. After Williams died in office on March 29, 1981, the PNM, led by George Chambers (b. 1928–d. 1997), continued to rule until 1986. Williams, a prolific writer and scholar, published dozens of books, articles, and essays during his lifetime.

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women At the dawn of the 21st century, the majority of Latin American women reside in urban, not rural, areas. On average, they have two to three more years of schooling than men do. Their lives have become more secular thanks to global communications and greater autonomy and mobility. Still, the cultural stereotype persists of a devout Catholic, subject to male dominance and tied to home, FAMILY, and menial tasks. Reality belies that stereotype.

In the 19th century, elite women such as Peruvian Clorinda Matto de Turner and Argentine Mariquita Sánchez (b. 1786–d. 1868) engaged in literary discussion and became the center of the *bellas artes* (fine arts). Their efforts set the stage for early 20th-century writers, such as Brazilian Patrícia Galvão (Pagu) (b. 1910–d. 1962), who defied acceptable norms and spoke out in defense of workers’ rights. Women gradually entered the public arena. Until World War II, they had won the right to vote in only five countries—BRAZIL, CUBA, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, and URUGUAY—and this tended to be for political reasons rather than a desire for gender equality. In the post–World War II period, MARÍA EVA DUARTE DE PERÓN symbolized both the triumph and the hope of women everywhere. She rose from an obscure background to become the first lady of ARGENTINA, with her own political ambitions, before her death at age 33. Starting in 1942, women’s right to vote spread across

Latin America until 1961, when PARAGUAY became the last state to institute woman suffrage. Since then, women have entered the local, regional, and national political arenas. In 1986, Rose Marie Karpinsky became the first female president of COSTA RICA's legislative assembly. In the early 21st century, Michelle Bachelet (b. 1951–) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (b. 1953–) serve as the presidents of CHILE and Argentina, respectively. Other women received notoriety for supporting revolutionary agendas, such as Peruvian Magda Portal (b. 1901–d. 1989), a founder of the AMERICAN POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE, and Cecilia Sánchez (b. 1920–d. 1980), confidante of Cuba's revolutionary leader, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Women also came to the forefront in mass urban protests over food shortages, inflation, and civil and HUMAN RIGHTS violations. For example, in Argentina women pressed for government accountability for the more than 10,000 estimated “disappeared ones” during the DIRTY WAR. In contrast, in countries with large indigenous populations, such as GUATEMALA, ECUADOR, and BOLIVIA, women's roles and lifestyles remain closer to the traditional image, although there are prominent exceptions, such as RIGOBERTA MENCHÚ TUM, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition for her work in rights for NATIVE AMERICANS.

Until the Liberal movement gripped Latin America in the late 19th century, women's EDUCATION remained the domain of CATHOLIC CHURCH institutions. The Liberals' implementation of public education broadened and strengthened the movement to educate both men and women from all social sectors. Educational reforms were most successful in societies with more homogenous populations, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, and least successful in mixed or nonwhite societies, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, and MEXICO. Not until after World War II, and particularly after the CUBAN REVOLUTION of 1956–61 and the ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, did the desire for female education take hold in Latin America. While literacy campaigns for the poor received the most public attention, the door opened for women to train in professions including architecture, computer science, engineering, medicine, and business management. Despite educational advances, Latin American women continue to earn less and advance more slowly in the workplace than men do, and the globalization of the ECONOMY has made these differences more apparent. Women dominate employment in the various low-wage assembly industries along the Mexico-U.S. border and in the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, BELIZE, COSTA RICA, Guatemala, and HONDURAS (see MAQUILADORA). The fast-growing tourist INDUSTRY employs women as hotel clerks, tourist guides, cooks, maids, and waitresses. Women also work in cash-paying LABOR such as picking and packaging agricultural products for shipping abroad. Public awareness of these discrepancies, along with the plight of the poor, are the focal points of contemporary women's movements in Latin America.

See also MATTO DE TURNER, CLORINDA (Vol. III); WOMEN (Vols. I, II, III).

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World Trade Organization (WTO) The 124 governments represented at the final session of the Uruguay Round of international TRADE discussions in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994, agreed to establish the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the year's end. The WTO came into existence on January 1, 1995, with the power to establish permanent trading commitments and rules of trade and to settle disputes among its members. The organization dates to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) established on January 1, 1948, as a stopgap measure en route to the establishment of an international trade organization. Fifty countries had agreed to the charter of the International Trade Organization by 1950, but the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the agreement. The world's economic order had changed significantly by the 1980s. Europe and Japan had recovered from World War II and were now major players in international commerce. Former colonies in Africa and Asia had become independent and sources of natural resources and cheap labor. Latin American economies were no longer controlled by the state, and governments there were more democratic. The nations of the world also accepted the neoliberal economic model that called for the tearing down of trade and commercial barriers. The WTO set out to level the playing field for international trade, and to tackle other issues that affected commerce, such as agricultural subsidies, environmental controls, LABOR costs, and intellectual property rights.

Initially, the Latin American nations, like the European Union (EU), saw the WTO in part as a tool to limit U.S. dominance of Western Hemispheric trade through the proposed FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA). By 2000, however, the WTO had failed to force a reduction in U.S. subsidies for the U.S. agricultural sector and protective tariffs for selected industries that would make Latin American food stuffs and manufactures more competitive in the United States. Negotiations are further complicated by the fact that the Latin American governments have minimal interest in protecting intellectual property rights and the harmonization of labor wages, fringe benefits, and laws that protect workers. These issues became apparent at the 1999 WTO meeting

in Seattle, Washington, from November 29 to December 3, 1999, and the FTAA conclave in Miami, Florida, on November 20–21, 2003. Beginning in March 2005, the United States abandoned its hopes for an FTAA agreement and set about signing free trade agreements with CENTRAL AMERICA and the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMINICAN REPUBLIC–CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, or DR-CAFTA), the Andean Pact member nations (ANDEAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS) COLOMBIA and PERU. By 2008, only the DR-CAFTA was in operation, while the impact that it and the other hemispheric free trade agreements will have on the WTO and FTAA remains uncertain.

Latin American governments have turned to the WTO in relation to individual commodities. For example, on June 26, 2008, the WTO ruled against the EU's discriminatory tariff on bananas from nine Latin American nations: BRAZIL, Colombia, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, and VENEZUELA. In January 2005, the EU imposed a quota system on the importation of bananas that favored former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In January 2008, the EU replaced the quota system with a tariff (230 euros per ton) on such imports, which the nine Latin American countries felt was discriminatory. The WTO has yet to rule on a protest from Brazil, Thailand, and Australia against a February 2005 EU decision to increase tariffs on sugar imports.

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World War I and Latin America Europe's plunge into war in August 1914 at first had little impact on Latin America, where the conflict was viewed as a non-American affair. For the next two and a half years, until April 1917, Latin American nations discussed proposals to ensure their neutrality and to resolve economic problems created by the war but failed to implement any program. They also did nothing to prepare for their possible entry into the war or toward hemispheric defense of the continent.

The German declaration to continue unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, did little to promote hemispheric solidarity, despite government professions to the contrary. Following the U.S. declaration of war against Germany on April 4, 1917, eight Latin American republics eventually did the same; these were BRAZIL, CUBA, COSTA RICA, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, and PANAMA. With the exception of Brazil, these countries were in the strategic circum-

Caribbean region and had been victims of U.S. occupations and/or political and financial pressures. Two—Cuba and Panama—owed their independence to the United States. Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua unsuccessfully appealed to Washington for greater economic assistance due to loss of the European market share. Because of political turmoil, the United States had occupied Haiti since 1915, but Secretary of State Robert Lansing concerned himself more with the German presence in the country, which had links to the Haitian elite. Costa Rica acted on March 23, 1919, to be eligible for entry into the League of Nations, but the declaration did not end the U.S. nonrecognition of the Federico Tinoco (b. 1868–d. 1931) government.

BOLIVIA, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, PERU, and URUGUAY severed diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, but their declarations of “friendly neutrality” toward the United States incurred risks equal to those assumed by the nonactive belligerents. EL SALVADOR declared itself neutral in the conflict, but “friendly neutral” toward the United States. In both instances, “friendly neutrality” meant that U.S. naval and merchant ships could frequent, without harm or limitation, Ecuadorean and Salvadoran ports. Other neutral countries included ARGENTINA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, MEXICO, PARAGUAY, and VENEZUELA.

In 1917, Argentine president Hipólito Yrigoyen (b. 1852–d. 1933) issued two calls for a conference on continental solidarity, but without a U.S. presence. The conference never materialized, thus the Argentine effort to assume hemispheric leadership failed.

The economic impact of the war varied from country to country. The Central American nations whose primary coffee market was Germany suffered from the Allied blockade of the German coast. But, those with primary products that the Allies could readily consume did well: Argentina, with wheat and beef; Chile with copper and nitrates; and Cuba with sugar. None of the Latin American countries militarily participated in the conflict, although Brazil helped guard the Latin American Atlantic coast from German submarine attacks.

In November 1920, when the League of Nations convened in Geneva, Switzerland, all the Latin American republics were present except the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Ecuador. At the time, the Dominican Republic was still occupied by U.S. Marines, meaning that its independence was “suspended.” Mexican absence was due to the U.S. refusal to extend recognition to the new “revolutionary” Mexican government. Ecuador's government failed to ratify the league covenant until 1934, at which time it joined the League of Nations. The Latin Americans were motivated by their idealism and the international prestige that league membership brought with it. They also saw the league as a vehicle to prevent what was termed “external aggression.” This could refer to border conflicts, foreign attacks, and U.S. intervention in the region's internal affairs (see U.S.

CARIBBEAN INTERVENTIONS, 1900–1934). The United States did not join the League of Nations, however, which led the Latin Americans to lose interest. Their participation in the League of Nations was almost nonexistent by 1925.

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World War II and Latin America The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, sent the world into war. By January 1942, eight Latin American nations had joined the United States in declaring war on Germany, Italy, and Japan. These were COSTA RICA, CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HONDURAS, and PANAMA. The remainder, save ARGENTINA and CHILE, severed relations with the Axis Powers. MEXICO and BRAZIL declared war in May and August 1942, respectively, followed by BOLIVIA and COLOMBIA in 1943. Chile, concerned about the defense of its coastline, severed relations in 1943, followed by Argentina a year later, when outcome of the war seemed clear. Chile and Argentina declared war on the Axis Powers in 1945, likely more concerned with meeting admission requirements to the newly formed United Nations (UN) than in support of the Allies.

Following the 1933 U.S. announcement of the GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY, Latin Americans were more concerned with U.S. reaffirmation of that policy than with the war clouds forming in Europe. This was evident at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace meeting in BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, on December 1–23, 1936, and the Eighth International Conference American States that convened in LIMA, PERU, on December 9–27, 1938. Only after the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and the capitulation of France and the Low Countries to the Germans in early summer 1940 were the Latin Americans stirred to action, and in both instances, they accepted U.S. leadership. In response to the German invasion of Poland, the hemisphere's foreign ministers convened in Panama from September 3 to October 3, 1939, where they declared a safety belt around the Americas south of Canada, extending some 300 to 1,000 miles (483–1,609 km) into the Atlantic Ocean, and warned the belligerents to refrain from warlike action in the region. At HAVANA in July 1940, the foreign ministers asserted that British, Dutch, and French possessions would be administered by the American republics to prevent them from falling into “unfriendly hands,” a clear reference to Germany.

This was a bankrupt declaration, however, because of the American republics' inability to enforce it militarily.

Beginning in 1936, the U.S. War and Navy Departments had begun to plan for hemispheric defense in the event of a European war. This planning included meetings with MILITARY staff from each Latin American republic in 1940. U.S. generals and commanders concluded that their neighbors' militaries and navies could offer little, if any, assistance. Thus, in “Rainbow 5,” the U.S. plan for hemispheric defense, a line was drawn from the hump of Brazil on the Atlantic Ocean coast northwest to ECUADOR's southern border to protect the Panama Canal and Venezuelan oil supplies. From the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific, across the northern coasts of Colombia and VENEZUELA, throughout CENTRAL AMERICA, and on several Caribbean islands north to CUBA, a vast network of airfields was built to secure the canal, its shipping lanes, and the oil. The army's air effort, coupled with the navy's antisubmarine activities, had eliminated the German U-boat threat in the Caribbean by the end of 1942.

Associated with the military defense of the canal and oil was the U.S. concern with Axis, and particularly German, espionage, intelligence gathering, and propaganda capabilities throughout the hemisphere. The United States instituted a wide-ranging plan to rid



Members of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force prepare to embark for combat in Italy during World War II. (U.S. Army Signal Corps)

the hemisphere of Axis influence and, with the exception of Argentina and Chile, Latin American governments cooperated. Residents of German, Japanese, and Italian extraction who were considered dangerous were deported to their homelands or sent to the United States for internment. Others were placed under house arrest, while their mail was censored, monetary transactions controlled, and movements restricted. Approximately 8,500 Axis nationals and their descendants had been deported by the time the program was halted in October 1943. Many lost their homes and businesses. The United States conducted a mass propaganda program throughout the hemisphere through the OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS (OIAA). OIAA employed Walt Disney Studios to make films specifically for Latin American audiences. These films touted the superiority of democracy and capitalism over fascism and militarism. They also espoused the war's goals of democracy, civil rights, and freedom from hunger, all of which hit a nerve in Latin America. Indeed, recent studies have suggested that the U.S. propaganda helped lead to the popular challenge to Latin America's elitist and military rule at the end of the war.

The outbreak of the European war in 1939 disrupted Latin America's historic ties to the European marketplace. The United States undertook several programs to help alleviate the problem, but not all countries benefited, and among those that did, the assistance was not equal. For example, because the Allies had lost access to sugar from Southeast Asia and eastern Europe, the United States purchased the entire Cuban sugar crop each year during the war. The loss of access to natural rubber latex from Southeast Asia benefited Brazil in the same way. Likewise, the Allied need for copper for shell casings brought added income to Chile. Argentina continued to sell its beef to Great Britain. At the war's end in 1945, all these Latin American countries had favorable TRADE balances, particularly with the United States. But, the primary products of Central American and Caribbean countries—coffee, tobacco, bananas, and tropical fruits—were not wartime necessities. The economies of those countries therefore slipped backward. Brazil and Mexico benefited from U.S. largesse. Both became manufacturers of U.S. wartime needs, from uniforms to jeeps. Each also used the U.S. assistance to further their industrial development.

Conventional wisdom holds that the United States has long sustained Latin American militaries. With the exception of the National Guards established in the Dominican Republic and NICARAGUA, this assertion was not correct through 1952. On the eve of World War II, the United States found the Latin American militaries to be woefully inadequate and laden with antiquated and broken European equipment. U.S. wartime military missions to Latin America faced difficult challenges. Dictators were mistrusting, believing that the U.S. training of their militaries might lead those militaries to seek political power for themselves rather than support the regime. Costa Rica's democratic governments directed the U.S. military personnel not to wear their uniforms in public. Although the Latin American governments presented the United States with massive shopping lists under the lend-lease program, U.S. Army and Navy administrators scaled these back significantly. Under the program, Latin America received just \$480 million, or 10 percent of the budgeted amount, in military supplies, and delivery did not begin in earnest until 1943. In the meantime, the Caribbean was secured from German U-boats, and the needs for the planned 1944 cross-channel invasion took precedence, as did preparations for the invasion of Japan. Although the U.S. Army put in place plans for postwar hemisphere defense in 1945, its request for the supplies to do this was rejected by the State Department and Congress. Not until 1952 did U.S. military assistance begin to flow to Latin America.

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WTO See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.



Yáñez Decree See CHILE.

Zapata, Emiliano (b. 1879–d. 1919) *Mexican revolutionary leader* Emiliano Zapata was an agrarian worker who became the leader of the rebel army from Morelos and surrounding southern states during the MEXICAN REVOLUTION. He fought for agrarian reform and became a symbol of peasants' rights in MEXICO.

Zapata was born on August 8, 1879, in Anenecuilco in the state of Morelos. He held many jobs, including working as a muleteer, horse trainer, and a part-time sharecropper on a local hacienda. He also owned some land. He was elected to represent other peasants on the village council and began to speak out against the injustices, including land policies, of the Porfiriato. As neighboring haciendas expropriated *ejido* (communal) lands from indigenous communities, Zapata led local protests and minor uprisings in defense of the peasantry. When FRANCISCO MADERO issued his call to arms in 1910 to bring down the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, Zapata organized a local fighting force and joined the insurrection. Rebellions erupted throughout the country, forcing Díaz into exile in May 1911.

Zapata initially supported Madero as the latter became president with the promise of democratic and social reforms. Zapata hoped Madero would address peasant demands for a return of expropriated *ejido* lands but quickly withdrew his support when he became convinced that this would never happen under Madero. Zapata instead, once again, called his army to revolt under the Plan de Ayala, which set out his goals, agrarian reform being the most prominent. In subsequent years, Zapata's army rebelled against the dictatorship of

VICTORIANO HUERTA and against the Constitutionalist Army of VENUSTIANO CARRANZA during a protracted civil war. Throughout the revolution, Zapata continued his struggle in defense of peasants' rights and agrarian reform.

The CONSTITUTION OF 1917 finally addressed many of the land tenure issues that the Zapatistas had been demanding, but President Carranza refused to implement the most aggressive reforms, and Zapata continued to defy the central government. On April 19, 1919, Zapata was assassinated in an ambush orchestrated by one of Carranza's generals. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation that formed in Chiapas in 1994 to oppose agrarian and other injustices that were part of the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) took its name from Emiliano Zapata (see EZLN).

See also DÍAZ, PORFIRIO (Vol. III); *EJIDO* (Vol. III); PORFIRIATO (Vol. III).

Further reading:

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John Womack. *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970).

Zapatista Army of National Liberation See EZLN.

Zedillo, Ernesto (b. 1951–) *president of Mexico* Ernesto Zedillo was an economist and president of MEXICO in the 1990s. He inherited a major economic

crisis from his predecessor, CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI, and devoted his six-year administration to putting the nation on a path toward recovery. He is credited with overseeing sweeping political reforms that opened the electoral process and allowed an opposition party to win the presidency for the first time in 2000.

Zedillo was born on December 27, 1951. He studied economics and earned a Ph.D. from Yale University. He held several advisory positions in the government in the 1980s and became the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) presidential candidate in 1994 after the assassination of candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio (b. 1950–d. 1994). In the weeks following his inauguration in December, Zedillo was forced to devalue the Mexican peso as a result of poor fiscal and monetary policies implemented over the previous year. The economic fallout caused by the devaluation combined with accusations of corruption against the previous administration and created widespread dissatisfaction in the country. Zedillo's administration oversaw investigations of the Salinas family and conducted negotiations with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, a rebel group Ejército in Chiapas (see EZLN).

Zedillo effected a major transformation in Mexico's democratic process by reforming the Federal Election Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral, or IFE). He also ended the "*dedazo*"—the practice of an outgoing president naming the next PRI candidate (and de facto successor)—by instituting a system of primary elections. Zedillo's political reforms allowed opposition POLITICAL PARTIES to challenge the PRI, and the party that had dominated the Mexican presidency since 1929 was voted out of office for the first time in 2000. Since leaving the presidency, Zedillo has held numerous posts at the United Nations. He also teaches economics at Yale University.

Further reading:

Julia Preston. *Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2004).

Susan Kaufman Purcell. *Mexico under Zedillo* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1998).

Zelaya, José Santos (b. 1853–d. 1915) *president of Nicaragua* The son of a wealthy Managua planter, José Santos Zelaya was educated at the Instituto de Oriente in Granada, NICARAGUA, and then, at age 16, sent to France for further studies. There, he became imbued with the positivist philosophers Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. Zelaya returned home in 1872, at age 19, and immediately became involved in politics. He vaulted to the Nicaraguan presidency in 1893 following a series of Liberal-instigated revolts.

Zelaya brought liberal philosophy to the presidency. He directed the writing of Nicaragua's 1893 constitution, which provided for the separation of church and

state, prohibited convents and monasteries, decentralized government by giving greater powers to municipal governments, mandated state-directed EDUCATION, and abolished the death penalty. Still, Zelaya ruled as a dictator. At times, he censored the press and imprisoned his political opponents. He succeeded himself through rigged elections.

Like other Latin American Liberals of the time, Zelaya promoted the development of the agro-export industries: bananas, coffee, cotton, timber, and gold. He also supported and used government monies to finance infrastructure development but did not permit foreigners to dominate the construction and ownership thereof. He also granted special privileges to outsiders who built commercial houses that supported the development, including hardware stores, food-processing businesses, and the like (see ECONOMY).

Zelaya gained notoriety in foreign affairs by forcing the British to accept the 1860 Treaty of Managua, which gave Nicaragua control over the Mosquito Coast and by settling Nicaragua's boundary disputes with HONDURAS and COSTA RICA. He supported the unsuccessful effort to bring about a union of Nicaragua, EL SALVADOR, and Honduras in 1895. His dream of reuniting CENTRAL AMERICA under his leadership during the first decade of the 20th century contributed to his downfall.

The San Juan River that borders Nicaragua and Costa Rica long had been the preferred site for the construction of a transisthmian canal, and during the first two years of the 20th century, the United States attempted to persuade Zelaya to make the appropriate concessions. Zelaya refused because it meant granting the United States sovereignty over Nicaraguan territory. He also wanted greater compensation for the use of Nicaraguan territory for the canal. His recalcitrance was among the factors that led the United States to PANAMA in 1903.

After 1903, the United States viewed Zelaya's profession of Central American leadership with a jaundiced eye, an attitude that only emboldened Zelaya. At the same time, internal discontent with the Zelaya dictatorship intensified, leading to a rebellion in Bluefields in 1909. The assassination of two U.S. mercenaries that same year by members of Zelaya's army gave the United States reason to intervene. Zelaya fled the country, and the United States installed a Liberal, Dr. José Madriz (b. 1867–d. 1911), as president. The U.S. intervention did not stop the Liberals and Conservatives from continuing their battles, which in turn caused the United States to maintain its presence in Nicaragua until 1933.

See also CONSERVATISM (Vol. III); LIBERALISM (Vol. III); MOSQUITO COAST (Vol. III); POSITIVISM (Vol. III); TRANSISTHMIAN INTERESTS (Vol. III).

Further reading:

Charles Stansifer. "José Santos Zelaya: A New Look at Nicaragua's Liberal Dictator." *Review/Revista Interamericana* 7, no. 3 (October 1977): 468–485.

APPENDIX

PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENTS

Several themes permeate Latin America's 20th-century historical experience. These are grouped below into four sections addressing some of the key elements of Latin America's path to the present. The documents found in the first section, "The Search for Political and Financial Stability," represent the U.S. effort to bring political modernity to the circum-Caribbean region. The documents under "Latin America Limits U.S. Imperialism" elucidate the Latin American response to U.S. interference in the region's internal affairs. After World War II, there emerged across Latin America efforts to correct the economic, social, and political injustices that had long marred the region. While these movements could be described as legitimate nationalist efforts to correct Latin America's historical record, in the larger cold war context, they were often considered to be communist. The documents under "Nationalism or Communism?" illustrate that intellectual conflict. Under "Latin America's New Political Paradigm" are documents that address the impact of a generation of political and economic change as Latin America enters the 21st century.

The Search for Political and Financial Stability

During the first generation of the 20th century, U.S. policy towards Latin America focused on the Caribbean, in large part due to the political instability and financial mismanagement that characterized the history of each nation in the region, and which potentially invited

European intervention. Because any political instability might spill over into Panama and a European presence in the Caribbean might present a threat to the operations of the Panama Canal, the U.S. State Department initiated policies designed to bring political and financial stability to the region, and hence deter European intrusions, which were viewed in Washington, D.C., as violations of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine under which the United States declared itself the protector of the Western Hemisphere.

Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921 (Excerpt)

Dana G. Munro (b. 1892–d. 1990) spent two years in Central America before joining the State Department in 1920, where he assisted with the formulation of policy toward the region. His view of the Caribbean people was similar to that of others responsible for U.S. policy in Latin America at the time.

Munro's description is based on his view of the region's political immaturity, economic underdevelopment, and social stagnation. The elite families assumed the right to govern at the expense of the impoverished and largely illiterate masses. Yet, this elite lacked the skills to administrate fairly or wisely. As a result, there was no effective civil society, nor was there government fiscal responsibility. Political conflict was one consequence of this system, and the threat of violence crossing national borders and into Panama threatened the U.S. operation of the Panama Canal. Thus, the U.S. pursuit of democratic government and fiscal responsibility was not only a crusade to improve quality of life for the people of the circum-Caribbean region but also to secure the Panama Canal.

To understand the problems that faced President Theodore Roosevelt and his successors, one must know something about conditions in the Caribbean states in the first years of the cen-

ture. In 1900, few of the Central American and West Indian republics had achieved the relative stability and economic prosperity that many of their South American neighbors were beginning to enjoy. They were small countries with scanty resources. Estimates of their populations are unreliable, but Guatemala, the most populous, was thought to have somewhat less than 1.6 million inhabitants in 1900. Cuba had about the same number. None of the others, except perhaps Haiti, had so many as 1 million, and Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama had considerably less than half a million. There had been some material progress in the quarter century before 1900, when foreigners had begun to invest in a small way in railroads and mines and plantations, but in general, the Caribbean area was one of the most backward parts of the Western Hemisphere.



The chief cause of backwardness was the continual internal strife that had discouraged economic activities of all sorts. Inherited political traditions, combined with the poverty and ignorance of the masses of the people, made it difficult to attain stable government under the republican constitutions adopted at the time of independence. In colonial times, the inhabitants had been ruled autocratically by officials sent from Europe and had had no opportunity to participate in governmental affairs. After independence, it had been difficult for them to operate unfamiliar institutions borrowed from people who had had centuries of experience in self government.

In most of the Caribbean republics, political affairs were dominated by a relatively few families who owned most of the large farms and cattle ranches. The members of this upper class, with their servants and dependents, lived a rather simple life in the towns and larger villages, without many of the amenities that their descendants enjoy today. Usually they left the actual management of their properties to overseers. Since their estates rarely produced large incomes, even in years when crops and cattle were not destroyed by revolutionary armies, few of them were wealthy. Many of the men practiced law or medicine, but these professions were overcrowded and usually unremunerative.

The upper class was avidly interested in politics because government employment did offer opportunities for profit as well as the prestige of holding office. As the only educated people in the community, and the only group that understood something of the complexities of public affairs, the members of the principal families held most of the positions in the government even when military leaders from other social groups occupied the presidency. In such a community, personal and family ties and private enmities played an important role in political life. Where the number of educated people was so small, a native leader or an unusually able foreign diplomat, or a small group that knew what it wanted, could have an extraordinary influence.

There was practically no middle class between the aristocracy and the illiterate and poverty-stricken masses. The great majority of the people were peasants, of Indian or Negro

descent in some countries and of mixed blood in others. Most of these lived in small villages where the only contact with the outside world was in many cases by a journey of several days on foot or horseback over bad trails, and where, more likely than not, there was neither a school nor a priest. Their houses were dirt-floored, one- or two-room shacks, with little or no furniture. Some of them worked for a few cents a day on the farms and ranches of the upper class; others planted *milpas*—small clearings in the forest where a patch of corn could be grown for a few years before the land was exhausted. In Guatemala and a few other sections of Central America, the majority of the peasants were full-blooded Indians, who were practically slaves under a peonage system. Elsewhere the peasants were frequently oppressed and exploited by landowners and officials. The Indians and the Negro peasants in Haiti, showed no interest in politics, but this was less true of the people of mixed blood in such countries as Nicaragua, Honduras, and Santo Domingo. There, the country people were often enthusiastic adherents of one of the parties that contended for power, and the monotony and poverty of their daily lives made them the more responsive to appeals to take up arms when the leaders appealed to them.

The political parties, though they might call themselves “conservatives” and “liberals,” rarely represented any great differences over questions of policy. The Church, except perhaps in Guatemala, never had the wealth and power that made its relation to the government an issue in several of the larger Latin American countries, and there was rarely any clear-cut cleavage on other political or social problems. The groups that contended for control of the government were usually factions that supported a popular leader and they were often called by the leader’s name. A politician’s importance depended on the number of adherents who were ready if necessary to take up arms to support him, and this was true whether he was a white aristocrat, popular among his fellow townsmen or among the people of the region where he had his estates, or an illiterate soldier who had attained an ascendancy over his equally ignorant companions. When the leader’s influence was particularly strong in one city or province it was reinforced by the traditional local rivalries that were one of the chief causes of civil strife.

Conflicts between rival leaders were normally settled by the use of force. Constitutional forms were preserved by holding elections at the end of each presidential term or after a successful revolution, but the party in power always won. The inexperience of the voters and the lack of any tradition of self-government made it easy for the group in power to control the electoral process, and leaders who seized power by force could see no reason to permit their opposition to oust them simply by obtaining a majority of the voters. Often the opposition party did not even contest the election, and, when it did, intimidation and fraud assured its defeat.

A political group could keep control of the administration only so long as it could prevent the opposition from waging a successful civil war, or from inducing a part of the army to stage a *golpe de cuartel*, or military mutiny. Sometimes, to maintain an appearance of constitutional government, the presidency was passed from hand to hand among a group of leaders. More

often, perhaps, the principal chief of the dominant group had himself reelected from term to term, or kept control by giving the presidency to a henchman who was little more than a figurehead. In either case, the man who controlled the army ruled the country, deciding who was to sit in Congress and giving orders to the courts in any case where political considerations were involved. If a leader were sufficiently ambitious and ruthless, he could maintain a despotic control over the country and its people for a long period.

If the president was a ruler of the more brutal type, he had his chief opponents shot or driven into exile, and he systematically persecuted their followers. Even if he wished to rule in a more civilized way he could not usually afford to permit any overt political activity or any freedom of the press. He knew that political opposition could only have revolution as its goal, and that toleration of public criticism would be regarded as a sign of weakness which could cost him support of politicians and army officers who wanted above all to be on the winning side.

At the first sign of overt resistance, the principal members of the opposition party would be imprisoned or exiled. Even when there was no immediate threat of civil war, the lot of the opposition leaders was not a happy one. Lawyers who belonged to the wrong party found it difficult to get fair decisions from the courts, and planters were likely to have their workers seized for service in the army. The result was that the party out of power had to revolt in order to escape an intolerable situation, and it too often resorted to savage reprisals when it came into power. The cruelties practiced on political enemies engendered factional hatreds which were passed on from father to son and which helped to keep the revolutionary spirit alive.

Starting a revolution was a simple matter. In such small countries, a few hundred men were a formidable force. If the leaders did not have rifles that had been hidden since the last civil war, they could usually obtain them from foreign merchants willing to gamble on their success, or from the government of a neighboring country. Both in Central America and in *Española* [Hispaniola], the governments continually interfered in one another's affairs in this way, partly because each ruler felt that he himself would be safer if a president indebted to him was in power in a nearby state. Frequently local commanders within the country could be induced by bribery or promises of preferment to join the revolutionary movement. An uprising might achieve important successes before the government could interfere because there were no roads for the rapid transport of troops. It was not necessary for the insurgents to be well trained or well equipped because the government had no well trained or equipped troops with which to oppose it.

The standing armies, made up of barefooted soldiers, recruited usually against their will from the most ignorant strata of the population and officered by men who had little or no professional training, were rarely formidable forces. Nevertheless, with revolution an ever-present possibility, the military establishment was the most important branch of the government. There were garrisons through-out the country, in

each important town and village, and in the rural districts the *comandante* [commander], though he might command only six or eight soldiers, was a petty despot, charged with police as well as military duties. In larger political subdivisions, civil and military jurisdiction was also combined in one official, so that the whole country was in fact under military rule. The army almost always consumed by far the largest part of the public revenue. All officers, from the Minister of War to the local *comandante*, expected to supplement their salaries by graft in the buying of supplies or by collecting money for the pay of non-existent soldiers, and important generals often demanded and received outright grants from the treasury as the price of continued loyalty. Even the most powerful dictators had to submit to this sort of blackmail because they could not hope to remain in office without military support.

Heavy military expenditures, and the graft that pervaded all other departments of the administration, usually kept the governments poor, even at times when internal disorders did not curtail their revenues. It was not unusual for civilian employees to go unpaid for months at a time, and frequently there was not even money to pay the soldiers. Very rarely were funds available for schools or road building. Much of the money which the governments should have received was lost through smuggling and corruption in the customhouses, which were the principal source of revenue.

Source: Dana G. Munro. *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921*, 7–12 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

Platt Amendment, 1901 (Excerpts)

Events in Cuba that followed the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, illustrated the worst of the prevalent views among U.S. foreign policy makers at the time that the circum-Caribbean region was politically immature, economically underdeveloped, and socially stagnant. Spanish administrators departed the island leaving behind the Cuban creole elite to govern, but the Spanish colonial structure deprived them of any meaningful experience. Below the elite was a mass of mostly illiterate Afro-Cubans who had been tied to the sugar and tobacco industries and who also lacked any political or fiscal experience. In addition, Spain left Cuba with \$400 million in international debt obligations and an empty treasury. The seeds for political upheaval and foreign intervention had been planted.

U.S. policy makers faced few choices thanks to the Teller Amendment to the Joint Congressional Resolution on April 19, 1898, which was equivalent to a declaration of war on Spain to free Cuba. The Teller Amendment prevented the United States from annexing Cuba. Policy makers confronted a serious dilemma: Cuba was potentially volatile, but the United States was unable to annex or to permanently occupy the island.

Senator Orville Platt (b. 1827–d. 1905), a Republican from Connecticut, resolved this dilemma with his proposal attached to the 1901 Army Appropriations Bill. Approved by

Congress on March 4, 1901, the Platt Amendment, as it became known, granted the United States intervention rights in case of Cuban political chaos or fiscal irresponsibility. As a precondition for the termination of U.S. military occupation and for Cuba's independence, the Cubans reluctantly amended their constitution in 1902 to include the Platt Amendment. Between 1906 and 1921, the United States used the Platt Amendment to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs on four occasions.



I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with an foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorized or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of [Cuba].

II. . . . [Cuba] shall not assume or contract any public debt, the pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government is inadequate.

III. . . . [Cuba] consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV. . . . That all Acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquire there under shall be maintained and protected. . . .

VII. . . . To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

Source: C. I. Bevans, comp. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949*, Vol. 8, 1,116–1,117 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

Isthmian Canal Convention (Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty), November 18, 1903 (Excerpts)

Philippe Bunau-Varilla (b. 1859–d. 1940), a French citizen who represented French canal interests, played a unique role in the independence of Panama in 1903. Just prior to the war, he

labored in the United States to raise money and troops for the independence movement and reportedly persuaded President Theodore Roosevelt to prevent Colombian troops from suppressing the movement. Following Panama's independence on November 3, 1903, Bunau-Varilla became the republic's representative to the United States, and on November 18, 1903, in New York City's Waldorf Astoria Hotel, he signed the Isthmian Canal Convention, better known as the Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty, granting Panama its independence and the United States the rights to construct and defend the canal. Drafted by U.S. secretary of state John Hay, the treaty was presented to the Panamanian commissioners when they arrived in New York on November 24.

In addition to granting rights to the United States “as if it were sovereign” within the zone, the Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty, like the Platt Amendment with Cuba, restricted Panama's foreign policy and international debt liability and also granted the United States the right to intervene in Panama's internal affairs should it threaten to disrupt the canal's operation. At first, the Panamanian elite sought only to chip away at U.S. rights within the zone, but after World War II, the rising tide of Panamanian nationalism called for the termination of the 1903 treaty, which was finally accomplished with the Carter-Torrijos Treaties, signed in 1977.



. . . Article I. The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama.

Article II. . . . Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of . . . [a] canal . . .

Article III. . . . Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone . . . and auxiliary lands and waters described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by . . . Panama of any sovereign rights, power or authority. . . .

Article VII. . . . The same right and authority are granted to the United States for the maintenance of public order in the cities of Panama and Colon and the territories and harbors adjacent there to in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order. . . .

Article X. . . . Panama agrees that there shall not be imposed any taxes, national, municipal, departmental, or of any other class, upon the canal, the railways and auxiliary works, tugs or other vessels employed in the service of the canal, storehouses, workshops, offices, quarters for laborers, factories of all kinds, warehouses, wharves, machinery and other works, property and effects appertaining to the canal or railroad and auxiliary

works, or their officers or employees, situated within the cities of Panama and Colon, and that there shall not be imposed contributions or charges of a personal character of any kind upon officers, employees, laborers, and other individuals in the service of the canal and railroad and auxiliary works. . . .

Article XIII. The United States may import at any time into the [canal] zone and auxiliary lands, free of custom duties, imposts, taxes or other charges, and without any restrictions any and all vessels, dredges, engines, cars, machinery, tools, explosives, materials, supplies and other articles necessary and convenient in the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the canal and auxiliary works, and all provisions, medicines, clothing supplies and other things necessary and convenient for the officers, employees, workmen and laborers in the service and employ of the United States and for their families. . . .

Article XXIII. If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed forces for the safety and protection of the canal, or the ships that make use of the same, or the railways and auxiliary works, the United States shall have the right, at all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for these purposes. . . .

Source: Treaty Series, no. 431 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938).

Theodore Roosevelt, Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, December 6, 1904 (Excerpt)

In addition to Cuba and Panama, political and, particularly, fiscal irresponsibility throughout the Caribbean invited European gunboats to force loan payments. The 1902–03 Anglo-German-Italian blockade of Venezuelan ports illustrates the point. Although the International Court at The Hague settled the debt problem in 1904, the lingering German naval ships alarmed U.S. policy makers when, in that same year, political chaos in the Dominican Republic made it impossible for the government to meet its international debt obligations.

Building upon policy precedents found in the 1901 Platt Amendment and the 1903 Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty, President Theodore Roosevelt (b. 1858–d. 1919) proclaimed during his annual message to Congress a “Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” as the justification statement for U.S. interventions throughout the circum-Caribbean region. According to Roosevelt’s declaration, the United States could execute preemptive interventions in order to keep European gunboats from encroaching upon the Caribbean and potentially threatening the Panama Canal. During the next generation, analysts pointed to the “Roosevelt Corollary” to justify U.S. intervention in several circum-Caribbean republics.



. . . It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards to other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean would show the progress in just and able civilization which with the aid of the Platt amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all question of interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or willingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it. . . .

Source: James R. Richardson. *Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. 16, 6,293–6,294 (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1917).

Treaty Respecting Finance, Economic Development and Tranquility of Haiti, September 16, 1915 (Excerpts)

Since its independence from France in 1791, Haiti continuously experienced violent political instability and fiscal mismanagement. More presidents fell victim to the bullet than the ballot box. The situation reached a high-water mark in 1915 when President Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (b. ?–d. 1915) was dragged from his hiding place in the French legation by a mob that literally tore him limb from limb for having directed the execution of 160 political prisoners. French and German

troops were already in the country to defend their citizens, but now, the United States feared that these nation's presence would somehow effect operations of the Panama Canal. In July 1915, U.S. Marines were dispatched to the island to ensure tranquillity and to force the Haitian regime to accept a treaty that granted more interventionist rights to the United States than the Platt Amendment did in Cuba and the Hay–Bunau Varilla Treaty did in Panama. Additionally, the 1915 treaty with Haiti is similar to the financial agreements signed with the Dominican Republic in 1905 and Honduras in 1910 and, as in these instances, only served to heighten criticism of the United States.



Article I. . . . The United States will . . . aid the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis.

Article II. . . . The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination of the President of the United States, a General Receiver and such aides and employees as may be necessary, who shall collect receive and apply all customs duties on imports, and exports accruing at the several custom houses and ports of entry in the Republic of Haiti.

The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination of the President of the United States a Financial Advisor . . . attached to the Ministry of Finance . . . to devise an adequate system of public accounting, aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the expenses, inquire into the validity of the debts of the Republic, enlighten both Governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues and make such other recommendations to the Minister of Finance as may be deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti. . . .

Article V. All sums collected and received by the General Receiver shall be applied first, to the payment of the General Receiver, his assistants and employees and expenses of the Receivership . . . second, to the interest and sinking fund of the public debt of the Republic of Haiti; and third to the maintenance of the constabulary referred to in Article X, and then the remainder to the Haitian Government for the purposes of current expenses. . . .

Article VIII. . . . Haiti shall not increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the President of the United States, and shall not contract any debt or assume any financial obligations unless the ordinary revenues of the Republic [are] available for such purposes. . . .

Article IX. . . . Haiti will not without previous agreement with the President of the United States modify the customs duties in a manner to reduce the revenues there from . . .

Article X. . . . Haiti obligates itself, for the preservation of domestic peace, the security of individual rights, and full observance of the provisions of this treaty, to create . . . an efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed of native Haitians . . . and organized and officered by Americans. . . .

Article XI. . . . Haiti agrees not to surrender any of [its] territory . . . by sale, lease or otherwise, or jurisdiction of such territory to a foreign power, nor enter into a treaty or contract with a foreign power or powers that will impair or tend to impart the independence of Haiti.

Source: William M. Malloy, comp. *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers*, Vol. 3, 2,673–2,678 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).

General Treaty of Peace and Amity February 7, 1923 (Excerpts)

With the exception of Costa Rica, political turmoil characterized the Central American republics of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua after their independence from Spain in 1823. In these nations, the political arena remained closed to all but the landed elite while the military served to ensure their continuance in power. Rivalries between political parties that often erupted into so-called revolutions were more a rivalry among the elitist families. On many occasions, political rivals or those ousted from power would assemble across their national border to organize and implement another “revolution.” With Panama’s independence and the construction of the transisthmian canal, U.S. policy makers feared that the Central American political turmoil would spill over into Panama and thereby threaten the canal’s operation and security.

In an effort to bring political tranquillity to Central America, the United States hosted a conference from December 10, 1922, until February 7, 1923. At it, the Central American representatives agreed to the nonrecognition of governments that came to power illegally and to limit the size of their military to that needed only for national defense, not to serve the interests of the ruling clique. The treaty proved ineffective, as the United States quickly found itself involved in Honduran and Nicaraguan politics. The Central Americans, except those in power in 1923, gave only lip service to the treaty. By consensus, the signatories, including the United States, voided the agreement in 1935.



GENERAL TREATY OF PEACE AND AMITY FEBRUARY 7, 1923

Article II. . . . to contribute to strengthening their stability . . . [the Republics of Central America] . . . declare that every act, disposition or measure which alters the constitutional

organization in any of them is to be deemed a menace to the peace of said republics, whether it proceed from any public power or from the private citizens.

Consequently, the governments of the contracting parties will not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five republics through a coup d'etat or a revolution against a recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country. And even in such a case they obligate themselves not to acknowledge the recognition if any of the persons elected as President, Vice-President or Chief of State designate should fall under any of the following heads:

- (1) If he should be the leader or one of the leaders of a coup d'etat or revolution, or through blood relationship or marriage, be an ascendant or descendant or brother of such leader or leaders.
- (2) If he should have been a Secretary of State or should have held some high military command during the accomplishment of the coup d'etat, the revolution or while the election was being carried on, or if he should have held this office or command within the six months preceding the coup d'etat, revolution or the election.

Furthermore, in no case shall recognition be accorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution of his country as eligible. To election as President, Vice-President or Chief of State designate . . .

Article IV. In case of a civil war no government of Central America shall intervene in favor of or against the government of the country where the conflict takes place.

Article V. The contracting parties obligate themselves to maintain in their respective Constitutions the principle of non-reelection to the office of President and Vice-President of the Republic; and those of the contracting parties whose Constitutions permit such reelection, obligate themselves to introduce a constitutional reform to this effect in their next legislative session after the ratification of the present treaty.

ARMS LIMITATION CONVENTION FEBRUARY 7, 1923

Article I. . . . Having taken into consideration their population, area, extent of frontiers and various other factors of military importance, agree that for five years that . . . shall not maintain an army and national guard in excess of the number hereinafter provided, except in case of war or an impending invasion by another state.

Guatemala	5,200
El Salvador	4,200
Costa Rica	2,500
El Salvador	2,500
Nicaragua	2,500

General officers of a lower rank of the standing army, who are necessary in accordance with the regulation of each country, are

not included in this article, nor are those of the national guard. The police force is also not included.

Article II. . . . The first duty of the Central American armies is to preserve the public order, each of the contracting countries agrees to establish a national guard to cooperate with the army to maintain order in the various districts of the country and frontiers, and shall immediately consider the best means for establishing it. With this end in view, the Central American states shall take into consideration the use of instructors, in order to take advantage of in this manner, of experience acquired in other countries in organizing such corps.

In no case shall the combined force of the army and the national guard exceed the maximum number in the preceding article. . . .

Article III. The contracting parties agree not to export or permit the exportation of arms or munitions or any other kind of military stores from one Central American country to another.

Source: United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Conference on Central American Affairs, Washington, D.C., Appendix, Treaties and Conventions, 284–288.

Latin America Limits U.S. Imperialism

Given Latin America's historical experience, a deep distrust of foreigners permeated its society. The colonial experience was replete with Spanish exploitation. During the immediate postindependence period, internal political debate about opening the continent to foreign trade was rooted in the colonial experience. By the 1860s, however, the debate changed from one about whether to have foreign connections to one about how to control them. When the North Americans arrived in Latin America during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they did not leave a good impression, as explained by John T. Reid.

The Latin Americans also sought legal recourse to control the intervenor beginning with the work of Carlos Calvo in 1866, followed by efforts by people such as Luis M. Drago in 1902 and Manuel E. Gondra in 1923. Although their efforts failed to curb foreign intervention, they serve as examples of the rising tide of Latin American nationalism against U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean region during the early 20th century.

In the post-World War I period, U.S. policy also underwent change, culminating in the good neighbor policy in 1933, by which the United States pledged itself not to intervene in the internal affairs of the Latin American nations.

John T. Reid, Spanish American Images of the United States, 1790–1960 (Excerpt)

Early 20th-century Latin American writers were highly critical of U.S. efforts to impose its political and financial institutions on their nations, as demonstrated in University of Florida professor John T. Reid's The View from the South (1977). Imperialism, not moral crusading, characterized these efforts: Private U.S. entrepreneurs, corporations, and officials at the highest levels of government were guilty of exploiting their weaker and less sophisticated Latin American neighbors. U.S. capitalists sought only profit at the expense of the Latin American people. U.S. government officials imposed their will at inter-American conferences. Although some Latin American intellectuals in the late 1930s separated the American people from government policies, the seeds of distrust had been planted, the fruits of which carried over into the post-World War II period.



The dominant attitude of many if not most Spanish American intellectuals toward the United States as a nation for a good part of this century has been that of an alarmed and resentful opponent of what was universally called imperialism. In the first years political imperialism was the primary target. The fear that the Colossus of the North was plotting to absorb the weaker Spanish speaking republics into its expanding empire became a conviction among a number of very articulate critics of the United States, filtering down in the form of slogans from them to sizeable segments of the population. Later, economic and cultural domination became the dreaded spectres.

[T]he anxiety about North American expansionism dates back to the Independence period and that it grew in intensity during the nineteenth century. The Spanish American War ignited a conflagration, fueled by the acquisition by the United States of Spanish-speaking territory and growing psychological tensions within Spanish America. While the fear of political absorption has diminished, some form of opposition to northern imperialism has been a fairly constant note to this day in opinion about the United States.

There is no need to recount here the details of the events that aroused widespread and vehement opposition to America's foreign policy with regard to Latin America since it has been told often by competent authorities.¹ [Just] recall the occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the Platt Amendment to Cuba's constitution, the American role in the birth of the Republic of Panama, interference in the events of the Mexican Revolution, and the frequent interventions, armed and otherwise, in the affairs of several Caribbean republics, we have the basic framework on which was built the movement of opposition to political imperialism.

[No attempt will be made here] to present a comprehensive listing of the dozens of books and articles that appeared in the early years of the century attacking the actions and policy

of the United States. An exhaustive accumulation of examples would not be especially illuminating except as an illustration of the scope of the campaign, since, for the most part, they were cut from a single pattern.²

The broadsides aimed at *yanqui* imperialism by Jose Vargas Vila and Rufino Blanco-Fombona are probably the most devastating of the collection, and a brief survey of their invective will give a useful idea of the extremes of the campaign. Vargas Vila, a Colombian novelist, compressed most of his *anti-yanqui* venom into an impassioned prose-poem called *Ante 105 bárbaros*. Its pages are studded with epithets of opprobrium: North Americans were "the barbarians of the North," "the drunken mobs," "a voracious, unfriendly, disdainful race," "a band of adventurers." Their policy toward Latin America was "the doctrine of plundering, robbery, and conquest." American conduct in the Philippines was "a wave of fire and blood," and the Panama affair was nothing but "insolent, tricky piracy." In summary, wrote Vargas Vila, "A great nation becomes a burly bandit, cutting the throats of weak nations. Washington's ghost becomes a pirate. And the banner of liberty becomes an immense shroud cast over the heads of those peoples." While British imperialism, he declared, was at least a civilizing force, the North American brand was simply brutalizing and destructive, "the sport of savages . . . the madness of prosperity."³

Rufino Blanco-Fombona, a Venezuelan litterateur of substantial and continental reputation, was equally outspoken in numerous publications. When he heard that President McKinley had been assassinated, he felt that justice had been done. The dead leader, he wrote, had fostered North American imperialistic ambitions, and "his hangman's fingers" had marked out Hispanic America for northern greed. "May his wounded flesh taste lead" was his requiem, "may the man who unleashed tragedy in the Philippines, in Cuba, and on the sea know what tragedy means."⁴

Manuel Ugarte, an Argentine essayist and perhaps the most persistent and dedicated of the literary foes of imperialism, devoted a good part of his life to proclaiming the dangers which threatened on the northern horizon. More temperate in his expression than Vargas Vila or Blanco-Fombona, he was probably the most influential of the anti-imperialist guild in spreading indignation against the expansionist course of the United States. He propagated the idea, which became almost a cliché, that there was a North American master plan for dominating its southern neighbors, a skillfully coordinated conspiracy involving Wall Street and the Department of State, plotted with diabolical shrewdness.⁵

Other writers, such as Carlos Pereyra and Jose Vasconcelos of Mexico, were especially brilliant among anti-imperialistic luminaries; in fact almost everybody who pretended to literary prominence from 1900 to 1925 felt the urge or the obligation to condemn and warn against the expansionist designs of the Colossus of the North.⁶ Even poets from time to time forsook their fine-spun theories and Parisian bohémias to lend their talents to the verbal offensive against *yanqui* imperialism.

The poem "A Roosevelt," by Ruben Darío, the best known representative of the new *modernista* movement in poetry, was a particularly memorable poetic reflection of concern in the face

of the northern menace. University students are said to have learned it by heart. Published in 1904, this poem expressed in vivid terms the common fear not only of political engulfment by the United States, but also and more pointedly of the annihilation of the cultural personality and even the language of Spanish America.

Addressing Theodore Roosevelt as the personification of American imperialism, Darío said, “You are the United States—you are the future invader—of that ingenuous America which has Indian blood—which still prays to Christ and still speaks Spanish.” Describing Roosevelt as haughty, able, energetic and self-confident, the poet glorified his own America, which “lives on light, fire, perfume, love” and prophesied that the “free cubs of the Spanish lion” will never be conquered.⁷ Although Darío also occasionally criticized the United States in his journalistic articles,⁸ he was neither a consistent nor a convinced anti-imperialist. In fact, shortly after the publication of “A Roosevelt,” he composed “Salutación al Aguila,” which was a somewhat banal hymn to Pan American friendship and cooperation. Darío had gone to Rio de Janeiro as Nicaraguan delegate to the Third Pan American Conference, and there, possibly under the influence of Elihu Root’s personal charm and the cheery brotherhood of champagne, he wrote this rather friendly tribute to the United States, a poem that angered Blanco Fombona, a less fickle opponent of the imperial eagle.⁹ Darío’s last important poem, “Pax,” was a plea for the union of all American republics—“The Star-Spangled banner with the [Argentine] blue and white.”¹⁰

José Santos Chocano, a Peruvian poet often described as a literary Yankeephobe, also held a somewhat ambiguous attitude toward North American power. In his “La epopeya del Pacifico” he wrote lines that became well known in Spanish America: “The United States, like a bronze pillory, tortures the foot of America against a nail. . . . Let us distrust the man with the blue eyes when he tries to snatch us from the warmth of our hearth—and beguiles us with a gift of buffalo skins-nailed down with disks of sounding metal.” But then the poet granted that hard work is the only way to enjoy a lost Eden, implying that Spanish America should imitate the industrious virtues of the blond-haired Saxons. While the Panama Canal will be built by Negro labor, not by white northerners, it will surely be a boon to Spanish America, Chocano concluded.¹¹ There is evidence that Chocano’s ideal was the harmonization of the exuberant Latin imagination with the persevering energy of the North.¹²

The defeat of Spain in 1898, considered by many as a blow aimed at the Latin or Hispanic “race,” and the landing of marines in Central America and the Caribbean republics stirred up a swarm of protests in verse which were more significant as polemic than as poetry.¹³ Poems written later by the Cuban Nicolas Guillen and the Chilean Pablo Neruda, in which the United States came under heavy fire, were in an entirely different category. Because of the universally recognized poetic genius of the authors (Neruda is regarded by some as Latin America’s greatest bard), their denunciations of American imperialism, following the Communist line pretty closely, have in all probability carried a good deal of weight. Neruda’s series

of intricate poetic criticisms of Anaconda Copper, Standard Oil, and United Fruit is impressive verse, even though its basic theme is well within the established pattern; the poems have likely had influence, particularly among Chilean and other Spanish American young people.¹⁴

One of the most remarkable literary manifestations of the fear and detestation of *yanqui* imperialism was a series of novels attacking North American economic and political penetration. The first of these, *El problema*, by the Guatemalan Máximo Soto-Hall, was published in 1899, and they have continued to appear steadily ever since.

With a few exceptions, such as César Vallejo’s *Tungsteno* and one or two novels of Miguel Angel Asturias, this fictional offensive is of slight literary quality. The plots are melodramatic and the characters are usually caricatures. Like our western novels and like folk-tales, they are compounded of a group of familiar motifs or elements that occur with remarkable regularity. A few of the earlier novels, such as those of Soto-Hall and the Costa Rican Carlos Gagini, deal with the dreaded possibility of political and cultural absorption by the United States. Most, however, are concerned with the penetration of North American companies into Spanish America for oil, mining, or fruit. It is not unexpected that a large number of works are the product of Central American pens and that the villain is the United Fruit Company. Some of the recurring elements in most of these stories are the cold, heartless *yanqui* businessman or manager, often disdainfully conscious of race, the hateful, servile native overseer or foreman, the seduction of a native maiden by these lustful bullies, the collusion with national politicians to steal the nation’s economic birthright, the “cultural” invasion by the *yanquis* with their whiskey, aspirin, victrolas, strange language, and immorality, and, above all, the cruel and pitiless exploitation of the national worker.

The authors of some of these novels were Communists (e.g., Carlos Luis Fallas) and they naturally used the party’s stereotypes as their building blocks. Nearly all of them, party members or not, followed a generally uniform pattern; a number of these novels, in addition to their main anti-imperialist theme, included plentiful material illustrative of local folklore and customs, particularly those of Miguel Angel Asturias. The tendency may be one facet of the intense nationalism which inspired these novels.¹⁵

Historians and other North Americans concerned with inter-American relations are often so astonished, shocked, or conscience stricken when they realize the extent and effectiveness of the anti-imperialist sentiment embodied in the writers we have discussed that they fail to heed several very noteworthy although secondary aspects of this literature. It will be worthwhile to review briefly these aspects.

Almost without exception, in the tirades against *yanqui* imperialism, the attack was directed not particularly at the people of the United States, but rather against the government of the Colossus of the North in unholy alliance with the greedy interests of Wall Street. In their broadsides some of the more rabid crusaders, such as Vargas Vila, pilloried our whole civiliza-

tion and its people, but a good many of the critics specifically absolved the ordinary North American citizen of responsibility.

Carlos Pereyra, a Mexican historian and one of the most implacable foes of imperialism, explained that the American people have been deceived by politicians with regard to the true and dastardly intent of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁶ In one of the most explicit anti-imperialist novels of Central America, Máximo Soto Hall's *La sombra de la Casa Blanca*, the White House and Wall Street are as usual bracketed as vicious flaws in North American life. But, the novelist continued, "as for the people, I am never weary of repeating that they are fine. The clean seed brought by the 'Mayflower' has been borne by the four winds throughout this vast continent and has flowered and borne fruit. When the scalpel cuts out the flaws, this will really be a marvelous nation."¹⁷

The Argentine poet Leopoldo Lugones wrote in 1938, "In the United States there is a breed of ignorant, brutal politicians and they are the proponents of the famous 'big stick.' But there is another more numerous and better kind of individual for whom inter-American harmony is no vain clap-trap." Benjamin Subercaseaux, a Chilean writer, believed that the people of the United States are the best intentioned in the world, but that their rulers do wrong to Latin America.¹⁸ A contemporary Argentine castigator of imperialism denounced American bankers, politicians, and monopolies in the old-fashioned way, but declared that imperialistic ventures find no favor or support among the common people of the United States and arouse active opposition from a distinguished academic group.¹⁹

Related to this belief that the villains of imperialism are the politicians and bankers, and not the man-in-the-street, is the curious fact that many of the most ardent opponents of *yanqui* highhandedness in the Caribbean draw a clear line of demarcation between the alleged imperialism of the United States and the civilization and national characteristics of that country. A few, like Blanco-Fombona, simply damned our whole culture with all its ways and works. But more frequently one finds unqualified censure of imperialism alongside frank admiration for certain aspects of the *yanqui* character and its culture. Darío, while making Theodore Roosevelt the symbol of the dangers of North American expansionism, also expressed a scarcely veiled esteem for his energy, culture, pride, and capability—all presumably representative qualities of his country.²⁰ Ugarte, the arch-enemy of the United States' Latin American policy, did not equivocate in expressing his high regard for the virtues and cultural advance of the United States. Francisco García Calderón (Peru), after making the customary charge against North American perfidy in dealing with Latin America, proceeded to describe North American society with equanimity, giving full credit to its praiseworthy aspects.²¹

A particularly clear example of the tendency to separate the government from the American people is provided by Colombian attitudes following the Panamanian revolt and Theodore Roosevelt's arbitrary action with regard to the canal. Colombian opinion at the time and subsequently showed continued respect for United States contributions to republican progress and generally placed the blame for Colombia's grievances on Theodore Roosevelt and his cohorts. Their treachery,

many maintained, did not represent the desires of the American people.²²

Some of the *apristas*, passionately defiant of economic imperialism, found much excellence in the North American way of life. For example, in Luis Alberto Sánchez' voluminous survey of the United States as he knew it, there is a chapter which could pass as a typical pamphlet attacking Manifest Destiny and Dollar Diplomacy. But the bulk of this Peruvian *aprista's* book contains a fairly objective and mostly favorable account of life and culture in the United States.²³ A most striking illustration is the lengthy book about the United States by Colombian educator Jesús Arango. It is divided into two parts. The first 115 pages are a sober examination of American civilization, with clear emphasis on its laudable features. The remainder is a forthright condemnation of the imperialistic monster.

A third important aspect of the clamor about North American imperialism is the fact that attacks on the iniquity of the United States have almost invariably been accompanied by severe castigation of their fellow citizens and especially of their rulers by the Spanish American writers themselves. In the writings of men like Ugarte, the blame for intervention in the political life of Latin American countries by the United States is assigned as much to the governing classes in the south as to the northern meddler. According to Ugarte's thesis, to disparage and hate the United States leads nowhere; the Spanish Americans' energy must be directed to united and patriotic efforts to make their own countries strong. In the midst of his diatribes against the "modern Carthaginians" (North Americans), Vargas Vila in like manner took time out to excoriate Spanish American politicians as blind, lazy, and submissive.²⁴

Gabriela Mistral, a Chilean poetess of continental fame, expressed in vigorous terms a typical attitude: "Hatred of the *yanqui*? He is conquering us, overwhelming us, through our own fault, because of our torrid languor, our Indian fatalism. . . . Let us hate that in ourselves which renders us vulnerable to his spike of steel and gold, his will and his wealth."²⁵

In fact, part of the reaction against *yanqui* misbehavior was really a distressing re-examination on the part of Spanish American *pensadores* of their own human condition, a search for their true roots and for a definition of their national identities. The anti-imperialist campaign was only one phase of a broader attempt to find their correct way through the labyrinth of modern values.

To a certain extent, the fear of the *yanqui* peril was related to that widespread tempest, primarily European in origin, in which racial superiority or inferiority were earnestly debated as if they were realities. The ideas of Gobineau, Chamberlain, et al. were, as we have seen, not unknown to certain Spanish American intellectuals who sometimes associated their quarrel with the Colossus of the North with the facile, deterministic theories of the racists. Thus the quarrel became a battle in a hypothetical and transcendental war between the Anglo-Saxon or Nordic race and the Latin race (whatever those terms may mean). A few were pessimistic about the outcome, but others, sounded the clarion call for Latin unity against the racial enemy, sometimes dreaming of an ideal coalition of France,

Spain and Latin America; more frequently, as has been noted, they advocated a union of the Latin American republics. Both Vargas Vila and Blanco-Fombona though they discerned collusion among Great Britain, the United States, and Germany to subdue the Latin race.²⁶ Vasconcelos was also at time obsessed with the now antiquated social ideology of race struggle and customarily located his early *anti-yanqui* oratory in that context. In view of the complexity of racial mixture in Latin America, conversion of the anti-imperialist crusade into a clear cut confrontation of Nordics and Latins naturally caused some confusion in the minds of the more realistic crusaders.

NOTES

- Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, presents the essential facts, although his tendency to justify the actions of the United States is obvious.
- Yankeephobia of the anti-imperialist kind is thoroughly examined in Rippy, "Literary Yankeephobia in Hispanic America," and in his "Pan Hispanic Propaganda in Hispanic America." See also Mary Chapman, "Yankeephobia."
- Vargas Vila, *Bárbaros*, pp. 149, 159, and passim.
- Blanco-Fombona, *La lámpara de Aladino*, p. 402; see also his *La evolución política y social de Hispanoamérica*, and his essay on Sarmiento in *Grandes escritores de América* (Madrid, 1917).
- Ugarte, "La nueva Roma," in Englekirk et al., *Anthology of Spanish American Literature*, pp. 656–57. Four books by Ugarte are important landmarks in the anti-imperialist campaign: *El porvenir de la América latina* (1910); *Mi campaña hispanoamericana* (1922); *El destino de un continente* (1923); and *La patria grande* (1924).
- For a fairly complete bibliography of anti-imperialist writings, see Rippy's introduction to Ugarte's *Destiny of a Continent*, pp. 293–96. Particularly significant works were Pereyra, *El mito de Monroe* (1914), Arturo Capdevila, *América: nuestras naciones ante los Estados Unidos* (1926), Alfredo Palacios, *Nuestra América y el imperialismo yanqui* (1915), and Vasconcelos, *Bolivarismo y Monroísmo* (1935).
- Darío, in Englekirk et al., pp. 426–27. Fear of cultural imperialism has been a frequent theme in other commentators; see, for example, Ernesto Mario Barreda, poet and novelist, *Nosotros*, 2a época, 1:52–57.
- E.g., *La caravana pasa*, pp. 240–49, and "Edgar Allan Poe," in *Los raros*, in *Obras completas*.
- See Fred P. Ellison, "Ruben Darío and Brazil"; Luis Alberto Sánchez said that Darío's opposition to imperialism was purely "decorative" and that he lacked "social sensitivity" (*Balance y liquidación del 900*, p. 49).
- Darío, *Poesía: libros poéticos completos*, pp. 479–84.
- Chocano, in Englekirk et al., pp. 468–69.
- See Chocano's poem "El canto del porvenir" and Estuardo Nuñez, "El poeta Chocano en Nueva York."
- See selections by Calix to Oyuela (Argentina), Luis Andrés Zuñiga (Honduras), and Santiago Argüello (Nicaragua) in Alberto Cabrales, *Política de Estados Unidos y poesía de Hispanoamérica*.
- Neruda, *Obras completas* (Buenos Aires, 1956), pp. 423–27; Guillén, *West Indies, Ltd.* (Havana, 1934).
- See Eneida Avila, "Las compañías bananeras en la novelística centroamericana." This comprehensive study attempts to collate conditions as described in the novels with present-day realities as revealed in a large number of field interviews with personnel of the United Fruit Company. The results indicate little correspondence between the fictional presentations and the actual situations. For a brief survey of *anti-yanqui* fiction, see Luis Alberto Sánchez, *Proceso y contenido de la novela hispanoamericana* (Madrid, 1953), pp. 531–34; Harold Urist, "Portrait of the Yanqui"; and Ansón C. Piper, "El yanqui en las novelas de Rómulo Gallegos." (Gallegos, a distinguished novelist and statesman, portrayed admirable *yanquis* as well as villains.)
- Pereyra, p. 22.
- Quoted in Avila, "Las compañías," no. 57, p. 118.
- Lugones, "La América Latina," p. 67; Subercaseaux, *Retorno de U.S.A.*, p. 180. Future references to Subercaseaux are in the text.
- Ramón Oliveres, *El imperialismo yanqui en América*, p. 50. Other commentators of the caliber of Alfonso Reyes and Luis Alberto Sánchez exempt the American people from imperialistic guilt. See Beals and Humphrey, *No Frontiers*, p. 94, for the belief of Mexican students in the innocence of the common man.
- Darío, "A Roosevelt," in Englekirk et al., pp. 426–27. Darío later admired Roosevelt even more fully when he learned that the president honored poets (ibid., p. 427). See José Balseiro, "Ruben Darío and the United States," p. 76.
- Ugarte, *The Destiny of a Continent*, pp. 169, 285; García Calderón, *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress*, pp. 298–306.
- Joseph L. Arbená, "The Image of an American Imperialist: Colombian Views of Theodore Roosevelt."
- Sánchez, *Un sudamericano en Norteamérica*, chap. 2 and passim.
- Ugarte, in Englekirk et al., p. 661; Vargas Vila, passim; see also Enrique José Varona, "imperialismo yankee en Cuba."
- Mistral, in *Inter-America* (1922), 6:21.
- Vargas Vila, p. 99; Blanco-Fombona, *La americanización del mundo*, p. 24.

Source: John T. Reid. *Spanish American Images of the United States, 1790–1960*, 153–162 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1977). Reprinted with permission of the University Press of Florida.

Carlos Calvo, Calvo Doctrine (Initial Draft), 1868

The 1860s represented a turning point in Latin America's global relationships. Thanks to the replacement of sailing vessels with steam engines, European businesses came in search of markets and raw materials, and in 1862, the French led a combined military mission to Mexico to force the collection of debts. Only the U.S. Civil War caused momentary pause in American expansionary interests.

Argentine scholar Carlos Calvo (b. 1824–d. 1906) viewed these events, and particularly the French intervention in Mexico, as precursors to the future. He wanted to devise a legal means that would prevent foreign corporations from persuading their home governments to interfere in Latin America's internal affairs over unpaid debts and other legal matters. As a result, the Calvo Clause, written into contracts of foreign businesses operating in Latin America, required the foreigners to accept the jurisdiction of local courts and to surrender the right to appeal for diplomatic protection from their home government. The Calvo Doctrine, which contained similar limitations, was to be written into economic agreements between governments, such as the United States and Mexico, but the United States resisted such efforts. The Latin Americans con-

tinued to push for limitations on diplomatic protection (in other words, interventions) well into the 20th century.



According to strict international law, the recovery of debts and pursuit of private claims does not justify *de plano* intervention of governments, and since European states invariably follow the rule in their reciprocal relations, there is no reason why they should not also impose it upon themselves in their relations of other nations of the new world.

It is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the same right to protection as nationals, but they ought lay claim to a protection more extended. If they suffer any wrong, they ought to count on the government of the country prosecuting the delinquents, and not claim from the state to which the authors of the violence belong any pecuniary indemnity.

The rule that in one case it has been adopted to impose on American states is that foreigners merit more regard and privilege, more marked and extended than those accorded even to the nations of the country where they reside.

Source: Edwin M. Borchard. *The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad*, 793 (New York: Banks Law Publishing, 1915).

Luis M. Drago, Drago Doctrine, December 29, 1902 (Excerpts)

In 1902, the alarmed Argentine foreign minister Luis M. Drago (b. 1859–d. 1921) appealed to U.S. secretary of state John Hay to use the Monroe Doctrine as a tool to prevent the use of European gunboats to force debt collection in Latin America. At the time, British and German ships had blockaded the Venezuelan coast for such purposes. Drago argued that the use of force violated a nation's sovereignty and that sovereignty was a fundamental concept of international law. Furthermore, Drago proclaimed that the Monroe Doctrine declared against European occupation of Latin American territory, and accordingly, the British-German presence in Venezuela violated the doctrine. Drago sought U.S. support for his position.

Although Hay failed to support Drago and President Theodore Roosevelt arranged for the settlement of the European-Venezuelan debt dispute, the Drago Doctrine became widely recognized as the first protest against the use of force by an industrialized nation to collect debts in a developing and weaker nation.



... [T]he origin of the (British-Venezuelan) disagreement is, in part, the damages suffered by subjects of the claimant (Britain) during revolutions and wars that have recently occurred within the borders of [Venezuela] ... and in part also the fact that certain payments on the external debt of the nation have not been met at the proper time. ...

Among the fundamental principles of public international law ... is that all states, whatever be the force at their disposal, are entities in law, perfectly equal one to another, and mutually entitled by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect.

... [T]he payment of (debt) in its entirety can and must be made by the nation without diminution of its inherent rights as a sovereign entity, but the summary and immediate collection at a given moment, by means of force, would occasion nothing less than the ruin of the weakest nations, and the absorption of their governments, together with all the functions inherent in them. ...

This is in no wise a defense for bad faith, disorder, and deliberate and voluntary insolvency. It is intended merely to preserve the dignity of the public international entity which may not thus be dragged into war. ... The fact that collection cannot be accomplished by means of violence does not ... render valueless the acknowledgment of the public debt, the definite obligation of paying it. The Argentineans acknowledge that Venezuela's failure to pay its international obligations resulted in the capture of its fleet, the bombardment of one of its ports, and the establishment of a rigorous blockade along its shores. If such proceedings were to be definitely adopted they would establish a precedent dangerous to the security and the peace of the nations of this part of America. The collection of loans by military means implies territorial occupation to make them effective, and territorial occupation signifies the suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed. ...

Such a situation seems obviously at variance with the principles many times proclaimed by the nations of America, and particularly with the Monroe Doctrine, sustained and defended with so much zeal on all occasions by the United States, a doctrine to which the Argentine Republic has heretofore solemnly adhered. ...

The only principle which the Argentine Republic maintains and which it would, with great satisfaction, see adopted ... by a nation that enjoys such great authority and prestige as does the United States, is the principle ... that there can be no territorial expansion in America on the part of Europe, nor any oppression of the peoples of this continent, because an unfortunate financial situation may compel some one of them to the fulfillment of its promises. In a word ... public debt can not occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power.

Source: U.S. Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903*, 1–5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904).

Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States (Gondra Treaty), May 3, 1923 (Excerpts)

The agenda of the Fifth International Conference of American States held in Santiago, Chile, in 1923 illustrated Latin America's discontent with U.S. interventions in their internal

affairs. Although the U.S. delegation sidestepped most discussions about political issues, it could not ignore the proposal of former Paraguayan president and head of the Paraguayan conference delegation Manuel E. Gondra (b. 1871–d. 1927). He proposed a continental treaty to establish commissions of inquiry that would examine disputes between nations. In effect, the Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts provided for these commissions to conduct a year-long examination of an interstate problem, and while so doing, neither disputant would prepare for war. Hopefully, this “cooling-off” period would pave the way for a diplomatic solution to interstate problems. The Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts proved ineffective, but its concept eventually became a basic tenet of the inter-American security system in limiting external influences in Latin America.



Article I. All controversies which for any cause whatsoever may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties and which it has been impossible to settle through diplomatic channels, or to submit to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties, shall be submitted for investigation and report to a Commission to a Commission to be established. . . . [The parties] undertake, in case of disputes, not to begin mobilization or concentration of troops on the frontier of the other Party, nor to engage in any hostile acts or preparations for hostilities, from the time steps are taken to convene the Commission until the said Commission has rendered its report or until the expiration of the time provided for. . . .

Article II. The controversies referred to in Article I shall be submitted to the Commission of inquiry whenever it has been impossible to settle them through diplomatic negotiations or procedure or by submission to arbitration, or in cases in which the circumstances of fact render all negotiation impossible and there is imminent danger of an armed conflict between the Parties. Any one of the Governments directly interested in the investigation of the facts giving rise to the controversy may apply for the convocation of the Commission of Inquiry and to this end shall be necessary only to communicate officially this decision to the other party and to one of the Permanent Commissions. . . .

Article V. . . . The Commission shall furnish the render its report within one year from the date of its inauguration . . . [and] it may be extended six months beyond the period established, provided the Parties to the controversy are in agreement. . . .

Article VII. Once the report is in possession of the Governments parties to the dispute, six months time will be available for renewed negotiations in order to bring about a settlement of the difficulty in view of the findings of [the] report; and if during this new term they should be unable to reach a friendly arrangement, the Parties in dispute shall recover entire liberty

of action to proceed as their interests may dictate in the question dealt with in the investigation. . . .

Source: U.S. Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923*, Vol. 1, 30–34 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938).

J. Reuben Clark, Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, December 17, 1928 (Excerpts)

As the Latin American protest against U.S. intervention in its internal affairs intensified during the 1920s, U.S. policy also slowly changed. The threat of European intervention greatly diminished after World War I, the State Department’s Latin American Division recognized its inability to impose democracy upon the circum-Caribbean states, the U.S. business community asserted that the interventionist policy negated economic opportunities, and, in the late 1920s, body bags carrying marines home from the chase after Nicaragua’s rebel leader Augusto César Sandino caused increasing public protest against intervention.

Shortly after assuming the presidency in March 1929, Herbert Hoover directed Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark (b. 1871–d. 1961) to undertake a study of the Monroe Doctrine and the accompanying “Roosevelt Corollary” that provided the cover for U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean region after 1904. As indicated in the excerpt below, Clark concluded that the corollary had no relationship to the original intention of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine.



. . . It is of first importance to have in mind that Monroe’s declaration in its terms, relates solely to the relationships between European states, . . . the Western Hemisphere, and the Latin American Governments, which on December 2, 1823 declared and maintained their independence which we had acknowledged. . . .

[T]he declaration does not apply to purely inter-American relations. Nor does the declaration purport to lay down any principles that are to govern the interrelationship of the states of the Western Hemisphere as among themselves. The (Monroe) Doctrine states a case of United States *vs.* Europe, not of the United States *vs.* Latin America.

Such arrangements as the United States has made, for example, with Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua, are not within the Doctrine as announced by Monroe. They may be accounted for as an expression of national policy, which like the Doctrine itself, originates in the necessities of in the necessities of security or self preservation of national policy . . . and outlined in what is known as the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine (1904) in connection with the Dominican debt protocol of 1904; but such arrangements are not covered by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.

Should it become necessary to apply a sanction for a violation of the Doctrine as declared by Monroe, that sanction would run against the European power offending the policy, and not against the Latin American country which was the object of the European aggression, unless a conspiracy existed between the European and American states involved.

In the normal case, the Latin American state against which aggression was aimed by a European power, would be the beneficiary of the Doctrine not its victim. This has been the history of its application. The Doctrine makes the United States a guarantor, in effect, of the independence of Latin American states, though without the obligations of a guarantor of those states, for the United States itself determines by its sovereign will when, where, and concerning what aggression it will invoke the Doctrine, and by what measures, if any, it will apply a sanction. In none of these things has any other state any voice whatever.

... [T]he Monroe Doctrine ... has no relation in its terms to an aggression by any other state than a European state, yet the principle 'self preservation' which underlies the doctrine ... would apply to any non-American state in whatever quarter of the globe it lay, or even to an American state, if the aggression of such state against other Latin American states were "dangerous to our peace and safety," or were a "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States," or were "endangering our peace and happiness;" that is, if such aggressions challenged our existence.

Source: J. Reuben Clark. *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine*, December 17, 1928, xix–xx (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930).

**Cordell Hull, Statement by the U.S.
Secretary of State, Seventh International
Conference of American States,
December 15, 1933 (Excerpt)**

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt (b. 1882–d. 1945) promised to be a "good neighbor" in world affairs. Nine months later, in December, at the opening session of the Seventh International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay, Secretary of State Cordell Hull (b. 1871–d. 1956) extended Roosevelt's proclamation by promising that his country would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of Latin American nations. It was the culmination of Latin American demands for U.S. policy changes during the 1920s and the U.S. self-examination of its policy that culminated in J. Reuben Clark's Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine. The United States committed itself to the good neighbor policy in the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States and the Protocol to Non-Intervention, signed at the conference's conclusion on December 23, 1933.

Ironically, shortly before the conference, Roosevelt's special envoy to Cuba, Sumner Welles (b. 1892–d. 1961), encouraged Cuban army sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar (b. 1901–d. 1973) to overthrow the government of President Ramón Grau San Martín (b. 1889–d. 1969), a proposal reiterated in January 1934 by his replacement, Jefferson Caffrey (b. 1896–d. 1974). Batista acted on January 14, 1934. Elsewhere in the circum-Caribbean region during the 1930s, the United States did not interfere in the rise to power or the political maneuverings to remain in power of dictators Jorge Ubico y Castañeda (b. 1878–d. 1946) in Guatemala, Maximiliano Hernández Martínez (b. 1882–d. 1946) in El Salvador, Tiburcio Carías Andino (b. 1876–d. 1969) in Honduras, Anastasio Somoza García (b. 1896–d. 1956) in Nicaragua, and Rafael Trujillo (b. 1891–d. 1961) in the Dominican Republic.



The United States comes to the Montevideo Conference "because we share in common the things that are vital to the entire material, moral and spiritual welfare of the people of this hemisphere and because the satisfactory development of civilization itself In this Western World depends on cooperative efforts by all the Americas ... we stand ready to carry on in the spirit of that application of the Golden Rule by which we mean the true good will of the true good neighbor. ... We have a belt of sanity on this part of the globe. We are as one as to the objective we seek. We agree that it is a forward-looking enterprise which brings us here, and we must make it a forward-moving enterprise. ...

In its own forward-looking policy the administration in Washington has pledged itself ... to the policy of the good neighbor. As President Roosevelt has defined the good neighbor, he 'resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.' We must think, we must speak, we must act this part."

I am safe in the statement that each of the American nations whole-heartedly supports this doctrine—that every nation alike earnestly favors the absolute independence, the unimpaired sovereignty, the perfect equality of each nation, large or small, as they similarly oppose aggression in every sense of the word.

... [M]y country is steadily carrying [this new policy] into effect ... the extent and nature of which should be familiar to each of the nations here represented. My Government is doing its utmost, with due regard to commitments made in the past, to end with all possible speed engagement which have been set up by previous circumstances. ... The people of my country strongly feel that the so-called right of conquest must forever be banished from this hemisphere, and most of all they shun and reject that so-called right for themselves.

Source: U.S. Department of State. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States—Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941*, 196–198 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943).

Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933 (Excerpts) Additional Protocol Relating to Non-Intervention, December 23, 1936 (Excerpts)

This convention and protocol formed the legal basis of the good neighbor policy as articulated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The principles of national sovereignty and equality were reaffirmed and the right of intervention in the internal affairs, of each state, denied. At the next two inter-American conferences—in Buenos Aires in 1936 and in Lima in 1936—the Latin American delegations were more interested in the reaffirmation of the nonintervention principle than any discussion of the rising European and Asia war clouds. Only with the outbreak of the European war in September 1939 and the fall of France in June 1940 did the Latin Americans turn to a discussion of hemispheric security.



Convention on Rights and Duties of States

Article III. The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.

Article IV. States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law. . . .

Article VI. The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable. . . .

Article VIII. No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

Article IX. The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all its inhabitants. Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals. . . .

Article XI. The signatories agree not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other mea-

asures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.

Additional Protocol Relating to Non-Intervention

. . . Article I. The . . . parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal affairs of any other of the parties.

The violation of the provision of this Article shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment.

Article II. It is agreed that every question of concerning the interpretation of the . . . [protocol] which . . . has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the procedure of conciliation provided for in the agreements in force, or to arbitration or to judicial settlement.

Source: C. I. Bevans, ed. *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States, 1776–1949*, Vol. 3, 338–342, 343–346 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949).

Nationalism or Communism?

Long-standing socioeconomic problems emerged as the most important issue in post-World War II Latin American history. As explained by Peruvian writer and philosopher José Carlos Mariátegui (b. 1894–d. 1930), poor farmworkers—usually Amerindians, mestizos, and their dependents—had been long exploited by the landowners. Arduous workdays under miserable conditions for nearly subsistence wages and without legal protection in turn contributed to poor housing, education, and health care for the rural workers. Urban workers fared no better. Since the beginning of the 20th century, these workers had been at the mercy of producers, unprotected by law. Governments regularly repressed labor strikes and demonstrations and charged the strike leaders with being anarchists, socialists, and communists. Argentine populist and president Juan D. Perón (b. 1855–d. 1974) drew support from urban workers, popularly known as descamisados (shirtless ones). Below, Perón spells out what he believes to be legitimate workers' rights.

Mexico was the first Latin American nation to address both issues. Its 1917 constitution detailed the rights of urban labor, which many analysts assert reflect the ideas of Mexican Marxist labor leader Vicente Toledano (b. 1894–d. 1968). The same document granted the Mexican federal government control over all land and natural resources, including the redistribution of property and exploitation of natural resources. Collectively, these three documents illustrate the growing assault on Latin America's traditional socioeconomic order in

which the elites, including foreigners, profited at labor's expense. From this perspective, Mariátegui, Perón, and the Mexican Constitution of 1917 are expressions of Peruvian, Argentine, and Mexican nationalism, respectively.

As the cold war took root in the years immediately after World War II, these legitimate nationalist demands became ensnared in the free world's struggle against communism. This conflict of ideas played out in Guatemala from 1945 to 1954, where Presidents Juan José Arévalo (b. 1904–d. 1990) and Jacobo Arbenz (b. 1913–d. 1971) initiated reforms that increasingly attacked the elite's privileged position. The uncertainty regarding Arévalo's and Arbenz's philosophy is discussed in this section. The same confusion is found in regard to Fidel Castro (b. 1926–). In pleading his own defense case at his trial for the July 26, 1953, attack on the Moncada Barracks, Castro calls for the need to correct the inequities of Cuba's past. In his 1959 meeting with Castro, U.S. vice president Richard M. Nixon (b. 1913–d. 1994) could not determine if the Cuban leader was a communist or not. Eighteen years later, during a television interview with British newscaster David Frost (b. 1939–) on April 1, 1977, Nixon was very more sure of himself when he reflected upon the administration of self-professed Chilean Marxist Salvador Allende. While the Frost interview focuses on the larger policy context, Laura, a 24-year-old "leftist," describes her work with the urban poor at the local level, in Santiago de Chile. Laura's struggles are in marked contrast to Nixon's concerns, as are the programs of Grenadian prime minister Maurice Bishop and U.S. president Ronald Reagan.

Mexican Constitution of 1917, February 5, 1917 (Excerpts)

Mexico was the first Latin American nation to address the plight of rural and urban labor as described below by José Carlos Mariátegui and Juan D. Perón. Mexican history is replete with the exploitation of the lower classes. During the Spanish colonial period, Amerindians, mestizos, and their descendants labored on large landed estates and in the mining industry for the benefit of the Spanish government. The practice continued following Mexican independence in 1821, when a local elite emerged to dominate the agricultural and mining sectors. Foreign investors, mostly North Americans, arrived late in the 19th century and soon played the most prominent roles in the export of agricultural produce, mining, railroad construction and operation, and banking.

The Mexican Revolution (1910–20) was an attack on Mexico's socioeconomic and political inequities. Its 1917 constitution, excerpted below, detailed the rights of urban labor, which many analysts assert reflect the ideas of Mexican Marxist labor leader Vicente Toledano (b. 1894–d. 1968).

The same document granted the Mexican federal government control over all land and natural resources, including the redistribution of property and exploitation of natural resources, a clear strike against large landowners and foreign investors.



Article 27. Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property.

Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public use and subject to payment of indemnity.

The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth. With this end in view, necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large landed estates; to develop small landed holdings in operation; [and] to create new agricultural centers.

In the Nation is vested the direct ownership of all natural resources.

[T]he Nation is inalienable and imprescriptible, and the exploitation, use, or appropriation of the resources concerned, by private persons or by companies organized according to Mexican laws, may not be undertaken except through concessions granted by the Federal Executive, in accordance with rules and conditions established by law.

It is exclusively a function of the general Nation to conduct, transform, distribute, and supply electric power which is to be used for public service. No concessions for this purpose will be granted to private persons and the Nation will make use of the property and natural resources which are required for these ends.

Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters. The State may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property acquired to the Nation.

Religious institutions known as churches, regardless of creed, may in no case acquire, hold, or administer real property or hold mortgages thereon; such property shall revert to the Nation, any person whosoever being authorized to denounce any property so held. Presumptive evidence shall be sufficient to declare the denunciation well founded. Places of public worship are the property of the Nation. Bishoprics, rectories, seminaries, asylums, and schools belonging to religious orders, convents, or

any other buildings built or intended for the administration, propagation, or teaching of a religious creed shall at once become the property of the Nation by inherent right, to be used exclusively for the public services of the Federal or State Governments.

Article 123. Workers, day laborers, domestic servants, artisans and in a general way to all labor contracts:

The maximum duration of work for one day shall be eight hours.

The maximum duration of nightwork shall be seven hours.

The use of labor of minors under fourteen years of age is prohibited. . . .

For every six days of work a worker must have at least one day of rest.

During the three months prior to childbirth, women shall not perform physical labor that requires excessive material effort. In the month following childbirth they shall necessarily enjoy the benefit of rest and shall receive their full wages and retain their employment and the rights acquired under their labor contract. . . .

The general minimum wage must be sufficient to satisfy the normal material, social, and cultural needs of the head of a family and to provide for the compulsory education of his children. The occupational minimum wage shall be fixed by also taking into consideration the conditions of different industrial and commercial activities.

Farm workers shall be entitled to a minimum wage adequate to their needs.

Equal wages shall be paid for equal work, regardless of sex or nationality.

Wages must necessarily be paid in money of legal tender and cannot be paid in goods, promissory notes, or any other token intended as a substitute for money.

In any agricultural, industrial, or mining enterprise or in any other kind of work, employers shall be obliged to furnish workmen comfortable and hygienic living quarters for which they may collect rent that shall not exceed one half percent monthly of the assessed valuation of the property. They also must establish schools, hospitals, and any other services necessary to the community. If the enterprise is situated within a town and employs more than one hundred workers, it shall be responsible for the first of the above obligations.

Employers shall be responsible for labor accidents and for occupational diseases of workers, contracted because of or in the performance of their work or occupation; therefore, employers shall pay the corresponding indemnification whether death or only temporary or permanent incapacity to work has resulted, in accordance with what the law prescribes. This responsibility shall exist even if the employer contracts for the work through an intermediary.

An employer shall be required to observe, in the installation of his establishments, the legal regulations on hygiene and health, and to adopt adequate measures

for the prevention of accidents in the use of machines, instruments, and materials of labor, as well as to organize the same in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible guarantee for the health and safety of workers as is compatible with the nature of the work, under the penalties established by law in this respect.

Both employers and workers shall have the right to organize for the defense of their respective interests, by forming unions, professional associations, etc.

Strikes shall be legal when they have as their purpose the attaining of an equilibrium among the various factors of production, by harmonizing the rights of labor with those of capital.

An employer who dismisses a worker without justifiable cause or because he has entered an association or union, or for having taken part in a lawful strike, shall be required, at the election of the worker, either to fulfill the contract or to indemnify him to the amount of three months' wages. The law shall specify those cases in which the employer may be exempted from the obligation of fulfilling the contract by payment of an indemnity. He shall also have the obligation to indemnify a worker to the amount of three months' wages, if the worker leaves his employment due to lack of honesty on the part of the employer or because of ill treatment from him, either to himself or to his wife, parents, children, or brothers and sisters. An employer may not relieve himself of this responsibility when the ill treatment is attributable to his subordinates or members of his family acting with his consent or tolerance.

Enforcement of the labor laws belongs to the authorities of the States, in their respective jurisdictions, but it is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities in matters relating to the textile, electrical, motion picture, rubber, sugar, mining, petrochemical, metallurgical, and steel industries, including the exploitation of basic minerals, their processing and smelting, as well as the production of iron and steel in all their forms and alloys and rolled products, hydrocarbons, cement, railroads, and enterprises that are administered directly or in decentralized form by the federal Government.

Source: Thomas M. Leonard's excerpt and translation from *Constitución política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, 5–7, 42–46 (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1968).

José Carlos Mariátegui, "Peru's Agrarian Economy in the 1920s," 1928 (Excerpts)

Peruvian essayist and political thinker José Carlos Mariátegui (b. 1894–d. 1930) best describes the plight of the poor farmworkers, usually Amerindians, mestizos, and their dependants. Born into poverty, Mariátegui received only a primary education in Peru. Subsequently, he spent four years in Europe (1919–23), where he fell under the influence of Marxism. Upon his return to Peru, he became an outstanding leftist

personality and a prolific writer. One essay from his most prestigious work, Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality (1928; reprint, 1971), is excerpted below.



Peru, despite its expanded mining industry, remains an agricultural country. The great majority of the population is rural, with the Indian, who is usually and by tradition a farmer making up four-fifths of the population. . . . Mining employs . . . a small number of workers, 48,592 in 1926. . . . sugar cane haciendas alone employed 22,367 men and 1,173 women . . . sugar haciendas used 40,557 laborers and rice haciendas 11,332 laborers. . . .

The landowning class has not been transformed into a capitalist middle class, ally of the national economy. Mining companies and transportation are in the hands of foreign capital. The *latifundistas* (landowners) have been satisfied to serve as the latter's intermediaries in the production of sugar and cotton. This economic system has kept agriculture as a semi-feudal organization that constitutes the heaviest burden on the country's development.

The survival of feudalism on the coast is reflected in the stagnation and poverty of urban life. There are few towns and cities on the coast and village as such hardly exists except for the occasional cluster of plots that still adorns the countryside in the midst of a feudalized agrarian structure.

In Europe, the village is descended from the fief. On the Peruvian coast, the village does not exist because the fief is still preserved virtually intact. The hacienda with its more or less classic manor house and usually wretched workers' compound [*rancheria*], and the sugar mill with its outbuildings are the typical rural community. The lack of villages and scarcity of towns prolongs the desert into the cultivated and fertile land of the valley.

Cities, according to the laws of economic geography, are formed regularly in the valleys where roads intersect. The rich and broad valleys of the Peruvian coast, which head the statistics of the national production, have not yet produced a city. At their crossroads or railway stations may be found scattered towns—torpid, malaria-ridden and feeble, lacking either rural health or urban attire. And in some cases, as in the Chicama Valley, the latifundium has begun to suffocate the city. Capitalist enterprise, more than the castle or the feudal domain, opposed the prerogatives of the city by competing for its business and robbing it of its function. . . .

. . . The countryside, however secluded, needed the town. It had, above all, surplus cotton or sugar cane for distant markets. Assured of the transport of these products it has little interest in relations with its surroundings. Food crops, when not completely eliminated by the cultivation of cotton or sugar cane, are raised only for consumption on the hacienda. In many valleys, the town receives nothing from and possess nothing in the countryside. Therefore, it lives in poverty from a few urban trades, from the men it sends to work at the hacienda, and from its wearisome employment as a way station for the many thousands of tons of agricultural products that pass through it

annually. The rare stretch of farmland supporting an independent and industrious community is a oasis in succession of fiefs that, defaced by machinery and rails, have lost the stamp of a noble tradition.

In many cases, the hacienda completely closes its doors to outside trade: only its company stores are allowed to supply its workers. On the one hand, this practice indicates that the peasant is treated as a thing and not as a person; on the other hand, it prevents the town from fulfilling the role that would maintain it and guarantee its development within the rural economy of the valleys. The hacienda, by taking over the trade and transport as well as land and dependent industries, deprives the town of a livelihood and condemns it to a sordid and meager existence.

The industries and commerce of cities are subject to supervision, regulation, municipal taxes. Community life and services are sustained by their activity. The latifundium, however, escapes these rules and levies. It can compete unfairly with urban industry and commerce and is in a position to ruin them.

The favorite legal argument for large estates is that they are essential to the creation of great production centers. Modern agriculture, it is claimed, requires expensive machinery, huge investments, and expert management. Small prosperities cannot meet these needs. Exports of sugar and cotton safeguard Peru's balance of payments.

But the crops, machinery and exports of the *latifundistas* boast of are from being their own achievement. Production of cotton and sugar has flourished thanks to the stimulus of credits obtained for that purpose and on the basis of cheap labor. The financial organization of the crops, which depend for development and profit on the world market, is not the result of either the foresight or the cooperation of landowners. The latifundium simply has adapted itself to outside incentive. Foreign capital, in its perennial search for land, labor and markets, has financed and directed the work of landowners by lending them money secured by the latter's products and properties. Many mortgaged estates already are being directly administered by foreign exporting firms.

The country's landowning aristocracy has most clearly shown its incompetence in the department of La Libertad where it owned large valley haciendas. Many years of capitalist development brought the following results: the concentration of the sugar industry in the region of two huge sugar mills, *Cartavio* and *Casa Grande*, both foreign owned; the absorption of domestic business by these two enterprises, especially the second, which also monopolized import trade; and the commercial decline of the city of Trujillo and the bankruptcy of most of its import firms.

The old landowners of La Libertad, with their production and feudal customs, have not been able to resist the expansion of foreign capital enterprise with its scientific methods, discipline, and determination. In general, all this has been lacking in local landholders, some of whom could have accomplished as much as the German industrialists if they had had the same entrepreneurial temperament.

The *criollo* [creole] landowner is handicapped by his Spanish heritage and education, which keeps him from clearly

perceiving and understanding all that distinguishes capitalism from feudalism. The moral, political, and psychological elements of capitalism apparently have not found a favorable climate here. The capitalist, or rather the *criollo* landowner, believes in income before production. The love adventure, the drive to create, and the organizing ability that characterize the authentic capitalist are almost unknown in Peru.

Capitalist concentration has been preceded by a stage of free competition. Great modern property does not arise, therefore, from great feudal property, as the creole landowner probably imagines; all to the contrary, it could only emerge after great feudal property had been broken up and dissolved. Capitalism is an urban phenomenon, it has the spirit of the industrial, manufacturing and mercantile town. Therefore, one of its first acts was the liberation of land and the destruction of the fief. The development of the city had to be sustained by the free activity of the peasant.

In Peru, the meaning of republican emancipation has been violated by entrusting the creation of a capitalist economy to the spirit of the fief—in the anthesis and negation of the spirit of the town.

Source: José Carlos Mariátegui. *Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality*, translated by Marjory Urquidí, 16–21 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971).

Juan D. Perón, "On Labor, 1943–1947," 1948 (Excerpts)

From 1943 until his death in 1974, Juan D. Perón (b. 1895–d. 1974) exercised significant influence over Argentina's urban labor, or the descamisados (shirtless ones), whom he organized into powerful trade unions and then consolidated into the 2-million-strong General Labor Confederation (Confederación General de Trabajadores, or CGT). The CGT, in turn, was the backbone of the Peronist Party, today known as the Justicialista Party. His influence over labor can be measured by its electoral support for Perón's successful presidential candidacies in 1946, 1951, and 1973. Even during Perón's exile from 1955 to 1973, the Peronists worked to undermine every presidential administration.

Urban labor, long the largest single bloc of people in Argentine society, were exploited by native and foreign (largely British) companies. Until Perón, labor was denied the right to form unions, which, in turn, led to poor wages, working conditions, and human dignity. As indicated in the excerpt below, Perón argued that urban labor was entitled to an improvement in its quality of life.



... "[W]hen both factors, capital and labour, under the tutelage of the State act and develop harmoniously, the symbols of social peace will watch over the vigorous progress of the Nation. . . . Both the representatives of capital and labour should conform

to more Christian principles and have due respect for one another". . . .

"Employers, labourers and the State constitute the elements of every social problem. The and no others are the ones to solve it. . . . Unity of purpose and comprehension among those three elements should be the basic principle of the struggle against the real enemies of society, represented by bad policy, alien ideologies, whatever they may be, false apostles who get into trade-unions to thrive by deceiving and betraying labourers, and the hidden powers of disturbance in international policy."

... "Up to now [in Argentina], manufacturers, traders and all those who employ human labour have had extraordinary advantages with respect to the labourers. . . . The employer is a man who has . . . very often met dishonest men who had to decide as judges . . . bribed them." . . . The worker, on the other hand, "never had money to buy what he needed, and consequently the results of his law-suits always favoured the employer." . . .

On the other hand, Perón continued, "The labourers themselves and their authentic leaders should be the ones most interested in maintaining discipline in labour, as without it, productive work is impossible. Discipline is not authoritative-ness; but a feeling of personal responsibility. . . . he must work with a will to do all he can as well as possible, fully convinced that a decrease in the normal output is wrong, for it is not detrimental to the employer's interests but to society itself and the labourers who intentionally reduce their output. . . . To prevent labourers who have received the necessary and logical social justice from demanding more than their due, the first remedy is the organization of those labourers . . . with responsible, logical and rational organizations, under a good management, they will not ask for anything unfair." . . .

"Work is the indispensable means of satisfying the spiritual and material necessities of the individual and of the community, it is the cause of all the conquests of civilization and the basis of general prosperity; therefore the right to work should be protected by society, by giving it the dignity it deserves and by providing those who need it with occupation." . . .

"The State acting as a judge must legally assert the terms, obligations, rights and guarantees for all who work. Nobody will be left to the free and untrammelled contrivances of those who contract or pay for work and in this way we shall have suppressed the principal cause of disunion, disorder and abuse." . . .

Perón concluded that because of labor's importance to society, the Argentine government had the responsibility to insure that labor:

1. "make possible and guarantee the worker a moral and material retribution to satisfy his vital needs and to compensate the result obtained and the effort made." . . .
2. supply "the means which enable every individual to have an equal chance to exercise the right to learn and perfect his knowledge." . . .
3. have "the right to exact fair and proper [working] conditions for the development of their activities and oblige

society to . . . institute and regulate these conditions are strictly observed.” . . .

4. “not lack the adequate requirements of hygiene and security, that they should not exact excessively heavy effort and should enable the individual to recover his energy through repose.” . . .
5. the right . . . “to well-being, the minimum expression of which is made concrete in the possibility of possessing an adequate dwelling place, adequate food, of satisfying without too heavy toil his and his family’s necessities in such a form that he can work with satisfaction, rest free of worry and enjoy spiritual and material freedom.” . . .
6. “to be protected in cases of decrease, suspension or loss of his power to work, brings about the obligation of society to take unilaterally into its charge the corresponding grants or to promote régimes of mutual obligation destined one and all to cover or to supplement the insufficiencies of certain periods of life or those which result from bad luck arising from possible dangers.” . . .
7. must have his family protected “since it is here that his most elevated affectionate feelings have their origin and all we do for his well-being must be stimulated and favoured by the community.” . . .
8. has the zeal for economic improvement “society must support and favour the initiatives of those who aspire to such an end and to stimulate the formation and utilization of capital in so far as it constitutes an active element for the production and contribution to general prosperity.” . . .
9. “The right to group together freely and to participate in other Legal activities which promote the defence of professional Interests constitute an essential right of the workers that Society must respect and protect.”

Source: Juan Domingo Perón. *Perón Expounds His Doctrine*, 180–184, 202–205 (1948. Reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1973).

**Thomas M. Leonard,
“Communism or Nationalism?”
1990 (Excerpts)**

Guatemala’s socioeconomic and political experience paralleled that of Mexico: Spanish exploitation during the colonial period and the dominance of a landed elite following independence from Spain in 1821. The elite produced the military officers who secured the socioeconomic and political structures, often governing itself. One such ruler was President and General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda (b. 1878–d. 1946) who ruled over Guatemala from 1933 until 1944 when he was forced to resign. The following president, Juan José Arévalo (b. 1904–d. 1990), was an idealistic university professor who brought about only minimal social changes but at a cost to the landowning elite. His successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (b. 1913–d. 1971), went further. Not only did he promise government control of foreign investments in Guatemala but introduced a

land reform program that confiscated idle acreage for distribution to the rural poor.

The Guatemalan elite asserted that Arévalo was leading the country down the road to communism, a view not shared by U.S. policy makers through 1950. Rather, these policy makers argued that Arévalo’s social programs were legitimate responses to long-standing inequities. With the hardening of the cold war lines—the Soviets in Eastern Europe, its saber rattling against the European Recovery Program, and the Communist takeover of China in 1949—along with a younger diplomatic corps that witnessed these global experiences, found themselves in agreement with the Guatemalan elite regarding Arbenz: He was a communist who had to be replaced. The essay below illustrates the changing U.S. attitude during the early cold war years that subsequently culminated in the CIA-sponsored and -directed overthrow of Arbenz in 1954.



[The overthrow of President and General Jorge Ubico in July 1944,] “effectively moved the political scale leftward, [but] the extent of nationalistic fervor could not be immediately” determined.

The articulate middle sector played a significant role in vaulting [Juan José] Arévalo into the presidential palace in February 1945, but it did not anticipate that his “Spiritual Socialism” would appeal to Guatemala’s impoverished masses. Arévalo’s “Spiritual Socialism” promised a new order for Guatemala without the dominant presence of foreign capital and the implementation of a “square deal” for the common man, promises that appealed to 80% of the Guatemalans. In application, “Spiritual Socialism” meant rent and housing legislation to control rents and provide appropriate maintenance on the rented properties; a social security program similar to that in the United States; a labor code to set minimum wages, hours and permit the organization of labor unions; and a proposed income tax to provide government revenues. Such legislation was designed to improve the quality of life for the downtrodden masses at the expense of the wealthy. Furthermore, the administration’s \$100 million in expenditures through 1947 frightened many who were used to pre-war national budgets of \$10 million. When Arévalo directed a revision of the Electoral Code, several newly formed conservative political parties found themselves ineligible for the 1948 congressional elections, a situation that only exacerbated the tense political climate. . . .

. . . These programs did not appeal to the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties who wanted to maintain their own privileged position, nor did they appeal to the middle sector which was concerned only with its own participation in the political process. Not interested in social reform, both elite and the middle sector viewed Arévalo’s appeal to the masses as a threat to their own positions. They quickly labeled Arévalo and his followers as “communists.”

As the 1948 congressional elections approached, Arévalo’s opponents increasingly injected the communist issue into the campaign. The Guatemala Democratic League was founded.

Comprised largely of businessmen, it charged Arévalo with using the plight of the poor to camouflage for his communist intentions. Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano warned Catholics not to vote for communist candidates in the congressional elections without suffering church condemnation. Subsequently, the Social Democratic and Constitutional parties, both representing the elite, withdrew from the race in light of Arévalo's communist leanings. . . . The opposition to Arévalo was so intense, that he survived a reported twenty one coup attempts during his presidential tenure. . . .

In 1950, the intelligence units of State, Army, Navy and Air Force concurred with a CIA report that described Arévalo's policies as "strongly nationalistic and influenced by modern socialistic ideas" favoring the interests of the impotent laboring groups, but that they were not communistic. . . . A year later [1951], the State Department concluded that . . . [Arévalo's] "government cannot be said to be communist or controlled by communists."

In contrast United States officials presented evidence of communist growth in Guatemala. As early as 1945, the FBI described the rhetoric used by labor leaders José Manuel Fortuny and Alfredo Pellecer as communist inspired. Both wrote and spoke against "foreign capitalism" and "foreign monopoly capitalists," which the FBI interpreted to mean United States private business interests. Subsequently, a number of known communists held important government posts, . . . [including] the government's Traveling Cultural Mission, charged with stamping out Indian illiteracy in the countryside also injected "a shot of communism" into the curriculum. Also during Arévalo's administration, leading Latin American communists visited Guatemala. . . . The communist presence led Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden to conclude that they had a secret agreement with Arévalo which permitted their participation in government and labor. In fact, Braden charged that Arévalo was not a spiritual crusader, but rather was "an agent of Stalin." . . .

A 1948 embassy staff report was even more damning and in many respects, reflected the opinions of the Guatemalan elite. The staff found that an estimated 200 communists, linked to Moscow indirectly through Mexico City and Paris, had secured influential government and labor positions and, that they engineered the abandonment of the 1944 revolutionary goals in favor of the Marxist dialectic. The communist rhetoric was described as an "attempted advance toward dictatorship of the proletariat" and if fully enforced, the labor code "would facilitate the communist objective of state and worker control of industry." Furthermore, the embassy staff described the rent law as a form of confiscatory taxation and the social security program as an unfair burden to industry. In his analysis of this report CPA [Central America and Panama Division] political advisor Robert E. Wilson concluded that when considered alone, Arévalo's reform programs did not constitute a communist threat, but when coupled with the "unmistakable proofs" of communism [which Wilson did not identify], there was cause for concern about Guatemala's political future. Two years later [1950], the CPA staff was convinced that communism had gained more strength in Guatemala than in any other Central American country and, when given Arévalo's known sympathy toward communists, Guatemala had become "a potential danger spot for

the furtherance of international communism in Latin America." In 1950 and 1951 both the CIA and State Department reflected the critical analysis of the Arévalo administration. Each agency concluded that neither Arévalo nor his "Spiritual Socialism" were communist, but that many individual communists had penetrated government and labor circles. However, policy makers failed to determine if the communist growth was by design or because Arévalo was ignorant to the danger. "Perhaps," it was "a mixture of both," the State Department noted, but in either case, the original revolutionary aims became distorted through their confusion with communist jingoism in the domestic and international fields causing Arévalo to lose his original support base. To American policymakers, Arévalo lost sight of his democratic and social justice objectives and adopted the dictums of communist economic, social and political change. . . .

Guatemala's 1950 presidential election came off as scheduled and won by another alleged leftist, Jacobo Arbenz. . . . Throughout the campaign, United States officials failed to reach a consensus regarding Arbenz's social and economic philosophies. Ambassador [Richard C.] Patterson's initial double talk characterized what followed. On the one hand, the ambassador was "inclined to share" a widely held local opinion that Arbenz was an opportunist who was "using labor and if elected will turn on the extremists." On the other hand Patterson continued, "the possibility [that] he shares extremist ideological views may not be discounted." On several subsequent occasions during the campaign embassy officials were impressed with the moderate tone of Arbenz's speeches. In April 1950, Embassy Secretary Milton K. Wells noted that Arbenz "spoke with dignity, with less demagogic allusion to the spectra of alleged foreign influences" exploiting the country.

In contrast to his moderate statements, Arbenz gave several indications of being an extreme leftist. In his initial campaign speech, Arbenz asserted that the electorate had a clear choice between those who defended the goals of the 1944 revolution, and "those old systems which for more than a century have tried to destroy the other social sectors by controlling the national wealth and persecuting the population." In May 1950, Arbenz struck out at UFCO (United Fruit Company) and the Guatemalan landowners when he charged that foreign companies and "creole reactionaries" corrupted the nation's economy and sacrificed its independence. His promises to improve the quality of Indian life at the cost of the "reactionary landlords" sounded like communist rhetoric to the embassy staff. From another perspective Embassy Secretary John W. Fisher concluded that when Arbenz spoke out against communism, he did so only for campaign purposes because he avoided direct answers regarding his position on communism. Two months before the election, Wells reported that the business community accepted the inevitability of an Arbenz victory and that they made "wishful talk of a trend away from the left" once he moved into the presidential palace. In January 1951, following the election, CPA desk officer William Tapley Bennett suggested that the *Arévalista* parties were purging themselves of moderate elements in order to more favorably position themselves of moderate elements in order to more favorably position themselves with Arbenz.

Given the conflicting reports from Guatemala and analysis of them in the State Department, what did United States officials anticipate once Arbenz took office? As early as July 1950, the CIA expected his administration to be more in accordance with traditional Central American practice, in which graft, privilege and arbitrary repression was more prevalent; that he would subvert the army and labor leaders who opposed him; and that he would grant favors to private business groups and welcome United States investment. The agency also anticipated that Arbenz would use labor as a personal political tool to make himself the indispensable arbiter between business, the army and other factions. Embassy secretary Wells shared that optimism in March 1951 when he cabled home that Arbenz, in his inaugural address, called for national unity, not class conflict. Wells also believed that the cabinet was significantly more moderate than its predecessor and, that the extremist members—Galich and MacDonald—would not hold their posts for long because of moderate pressures.

Given the field reports the State Department officers concluded that Arbenz was a political opportunist who could mold events to ensure this continuance in power. Although officials failed to reach a consensus on the nature of his political philosophy, they agreed that “he will steer a more nearly middle course than Arévalo” and given the fact that he controlled the army he could suppress the communists “if he so desires.”

Source: Thomas M. Leonard. “Communism or Nationalism? The Truman Administration and Guatemala, 1945–1952.” *Journal of Third World Studies* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 176–180, 183–185.

Fidel Castro Ruz, “History Will Absolve Me,” September 27, 1953 (Excerpts)

Fidel Castro Ruz (b. 1926–), born into a middle-class farming family in eastern Cuba, became one of the 20th century’s most famous revolutionary leaders. He railed against the socio-economic inequities and closed political system that characterized Cuban history since its independence from Spain in 1898. In 1952, after receiving a law degree from the University of Havana, Castro set about to organize a guerrilla army that on July 26, 1953, attacked the Cuban army barracks at Moncada, in Santiago de Cuba. All but 11 of Castro’s estimated 186-man attack force were killed in the assault. Castro was jailed but quickly brought to trial in September 1953. As a lawyer, Castro defended himself in a lengthy essay, “History Will Absolve Me,” subsequently published under the same title. In the portion excerpted below, Castro calls for the need to correct the inequities of Cuba’s past.

Castro was found guilty of his role in the attack upon Moncada but served only 11 months of his 15-year sentence. Forced to leave the country, Castro went to Mexico where he organized a small expeditionary force that returned to Cuba on December 2, 1956, and ended with Castro’s triumphant march into Havana on January 7, 1959.



A revolutionary government with the support of the people and the respect of the nation, once it cleans out all venal and corrupt officeholders, would proceed immediately to industrialize the country, mobilizing all inactive capital (currently over 1,500 million dollars) through the National Bank and the Bank for Industrial and Agricultural Development, submitting that giant task to the study, organization, planning, and final realization by technicians and men of absolute capability, free from political meddling.

A revolutionary government, after making the 100,000 small farmers owners of the land for which they now pay rent, would proceed to end the land problem once and for all. This would be done first by establishing, as the Constitution orders, a limit to the amount of land a person may own for each type of agricultural undertaking, acquiring any excess by expropriation; by recovering the lands usurped from the state; by improving the swamplands; by setting aside zones for tree nurseries and reforestation. Second, it would be done by distributing the rest of the land available among rural families, preferably to those large in number; by promoting cooperatives of farmers for the common use of costly farm equipment, cold storage, and technical-professional guidance in the cultivation of crops and the breeding of livestock. Finally, it would be done by making available all resources, equipment, protection, and know-how to the farmers.

A revolutionary government would solve the problem of housing by lowering rent 50 percent, by giving tax exemption to houses inhabited by their owners; by tripling the taxes on houses built to rent; by substituting the ghastly one-room flats with modern multistory buildings; and by financing housing projects all over the island on a scale never before seen, which would be based on the criterion that if in the rural area the ideal is for each family to own its parcel of land, then in the city the ideal is for each family to own its house or apartment. There are enough bricks and more than enough manpower to build a decent house for each Cuban family. But if we continue waiting for the miracle of the golden calf, a thousand years will pass and the problem will still be the same. On the other hand, the possibility of extending electrical power to the farthest corner of the Republic is today better than ever before because today nuclear energy applied to that branch of industry, lowering production costs, is already a reality.

With these three initiatives and reforms, the problem of unemployment would disappear dramatically, and sanitation service and the struggle against disease and sickness would be a much easier task.

Finally, a revolutionary government would proceed to undertake the complete reform of the educational system, placing it at the same level as the foregoing projects, in order to prepare adequately the future generations who will live in a happier fatherland.

Source: Fidel Castro. *History Will Absolve Me*, 41–42 (New York: Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 1961).

**Richard M. Nixon, Memorandum:
"Meeting with Fidel Castro,"
April 19, 1959 (Excerpts)**

On April 15, 1959, three months after his triumphant march into Havana, Fidel Castro (b. 1926) arrived in Washington, D.C., to begin an 11-day tour of the eastern United States and Canada. In his public appearances, Castro spoke of remaining neutral in the cold war, declared that free elections would be held within four years, encouraged additional foreign investments in Cuba, and warned that while there would not be confiscation of private industry, there would be "legal expropriation" of uncultivated or poorly cultivated land for distribution to the rural poor.

On April 19, Castro met for two hours with Vice President Richard M. Nixon (b. 1913–d. 1994) because President Dwight D. Eisenhower (b. 1890–d. 1964) refused to meet with the Cuban revolutionary leader. Conveniently, Eisenhower was in Augusta, Georgia, for a golf engagement. Following the meeting, Nixon could not determine if Castro was a communist and concluded that given Castro's current position of power and popular support, there was little that the United States could do except steer him in the right direction.



Richard Nixon initiated the conversation by suggesting "that while I understood that some reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to have elections . . . I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that four years would be the maximum amount of time that would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections were scheduled." He [Castro] went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holding elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did not want elections because the elections in the past had produced bad government."

He used the same argument in justifying the executions of war criminals and his overruling the acquittal of Batista's aviators . . . [and in fact] "it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people whatever it might appear to be at a particular time" . . . [Regarding his trip to the United States], "his interest was 'not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion.'"

"It was almost his slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion—the voice of the mob—rather than his naïve attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary principles of economics which concerned me the most in evaluating what kind of leader he might eventually turn out to be . . . [Yes], the Cuban people were completely disillusioned as far as elections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date and thereby restore the faith of the people in democratic processes.

Otherwise the inevitable result would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so gallantly. I used the same arguments with regard to freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge and jury, and other issues that came up during our conversation. In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the people. . . .

. . . "He was incredibly naïve with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when Communists overplayed their hand and 'my people put them in their place.' He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that Communists tried to come to power . . . I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I felt I made very little impression, if any."

. . . I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he did this he would have a workload which would be so great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion that his primary concern was with developing programs for economic progress." . . .

Castro further argued that it "would be are better if the money that you [the United States] give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment . . . I found little here that I could disagree with . . . but "I pointed out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise . . . Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.

I tried tactfully to suggest to Castro that Munoz Marin had done a remarkable job in Puerto Rico in attracting private capital and in generally raising the standard of living of his people and that Castro might well send one of his top economic advisors to Puerto Rico to have a conference with Munoz Marin. He took a very dim view of this suggestion, pointing out that the Cuban people were "very nationalistic" and would look with suspicion on any programs initiated in what they would consider to be a "colony of the United States." . . .

"He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased." . . .

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude on the part of the American press and the American people. . . . “every place I go you seem to be afraid—afraid of Communism, afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little more rice and the market for your rice will be reduced—afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell enough abroad as they have previously. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa—you should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship.” . . .

. . . “His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the Cuban people.” . . .

“My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere, he is either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline—my guess is the former and I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.” . . .

. . . “we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.”

Source: Papers of Mike Mansfield, University of Montana Library, Missoula, Montana. Richard M. Nixon to Mike Mansfield, April 25, 1959, ser. 22, Leadership Files, Container 44, Folder 12.

New Havana, an Organized Poor Community in Santiago de Chile (1970–73), 1977 (Excerpts)

The 1970 election of self-proclaimed Marxist Salvador Allende (b. 1908–d. 1973) as president of Chile brought forth the formation of several nongovernmental groups to work with the urban poor. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, or MIR), for example, was active in New Havana (Nueva la Habana), a poor section of Santiago de Chile. One of MIR’s active members was 24-year-old Laura (b. 1946–), who below describes the thrust of some of the organization’s activities. Her story is instructive for understanding the plight of Santiago’s urban destitute within a city of relative wealth and a country often cited for its progressive government.



During the Popular Unity [PU] period I was politically active in New Havana, a Santiago *campamento* organized mainly by the MIR. The *campamentos* are poor housing areas on the fringes

of the major cities. They consist mainly of one-room shacks with very little sanitation, running water or electricity. They’re distinct from the *poblaciones*, or traditional shantytowns, in being somewhat organized. This is usually on a political basis dating from the land occupations which first brought them into being.

Their roots thus lie in the housing shortage common to most South American cities. It’s widely assumed that most people in them are unemployed immigrants from the country, but this is only part of the story. In New Havana many people were regular workers, though typically with unstable jobs, in construction for instance. The point is that the living conditions in these areas aren’t unusual—they’re shared by much of the working class, not just the under-employed or unemployed. . . .

. . . [L]ed by the MIR, and involving about eight thousand people, combined to demand a new place to live. The Christian Democrats, eager for votes, gave them some land called “La Florida”, on the outskirts of Santiago. They promptly renamed it “New Havana.” Its development was vital to us. We were still a clandestine organization centered in the universities. New Havana was one of our first mass fronts. . . .

It was probably the cultural front which attracted most participation. . . .

The comrades set up a nursery school where working mothers could leave their children. They lobbied the educational department for the materials for a new school, which they then built, and refurbished buses for extra classrooms. A parent-teacher group was set up to discuss the way the schools were run, and children were represented. They produced some striking new ideas. Especially they challenged the assumption that classroom education was more important than experience. This debate with the teachers was a long one, but finally the classes did get a much more practical orientation. The children went on outings to the nearby foothills of the Andes for botany and biology classes. For mathematics they visited their parents’ work-places to count the machines and learn about angles—and this taught them to respect what their parents were doing, in itself a minor revolution. . . .

We also launched a literacy programme using the methods of Paulo Freire. Politically, it was an ideal time for Freire’s combination of teaching people to read and write and also look critically at their environment. There were lengthy discussions about what were the most interesting and important words to learn, words like “government,” for instance. The illiteracy rate was very high, and the classes were organized by *manzana* [block]. Very few people took part at first. This was partly because the classes were being held in the school, in the evenings. The adults were ashamed to be going to their own children’s classrooms. So we transferred the classes to the *manzanas*. Far more people then took part. By the time the coup put an end to all this, illiteracy in New Havana was virtually a thing of the past.

We also organized leisure activities, song competitions and a youth theatre. This was especially successful. It performed in other *campamentos* and industrial cordons. Its biggest success was *The Story of the Land Occupation* based on local people’s

experiences. The children remembered these vividly and devised most of the play themselves. Even the smallest of them would say: “Well, this is what I was doing then,” and that’s basically how it developed. The six to ten age group presented it on the second anniversary of the formation of New Havana. . . .

. . . Alcoholism was common in New Havana, as elsewhere in Chile. With generations of repression behind them, workers drink heavily as a way of escaping from their problems. This was a major concern of the health front. First, [we] lobbied the National Health Service to sponsor a local health organization—the government was supposed to send its own nurses and doctors, but they hardly ever came. In the end we got permission for this, with a representative of each *manzana* receiving training from the Health Service in nursing and first aid etc. The comrade in charge of the health front had a more intensive course, which even trained her for emergency operations. We also got a clinic, an ambulance and regular visits from a doctor. All this was the product of the health front’s pressure on the Health Service, especially by women comrades.

Many women were also strongly committed to combating alcoholism. . . . Our first step was to eliminate the dozens of small, illicit bars where most of this heavy drinking took place, at extortionate prices. The assembly succeeded in doing this. Just one survived—one stubborn character set up his bar at the very entrance to the *campamento*, with the wine right there in the window. Our long-term solution was to increase alcoholics’ involvement in the life of the *campamento*. We’d encourage them to come home early, for instance, and join in their *manzana* assembly. By these means, and by professional medical treatment, some eighty or so comrades were cured of varying degrees of alcoholism.

This had a visible effect on the everyday life of the *campamento*. You could now go out at three or four in the morning, with little danger of being molested. I often had to, and never had problems. Outside New Havana it was immediately different—any woman out late in a shantytown was likely to run into trouble with drinkers. But in New Havana, no. You were safe. . . .

. . . The New Havana people were known as “the delinquents” to the rightwingers. . . . they were just too used to assuming that shantytown dwellers would always be humble. One confrontation showed especially the difference which grassroots pressure could make. The local mayor was very right-wing, and always harassing the *campamento*. Sometimes, he would cut off electricity, at other times the water supply, and often the rubbish wasn’t cleared. The carts were supposed to come every two days, but once they were missing for a week. It was summer, the stench and flies everywhere. The *manzanas* brought this up in the assembly, which produced a plan of action. Two large trucks were filled with rubbish, and we hoisted the *campamento*’s flags on them. Off we went, with a New Havana security command in front and half the *campamento* following, to the municipal offices. When officials refused to open the gates, we drove the trucks through them. Everyone took a hand in dumping the rubbish in the mayor’s

office. From then on the rubbish trucks were sent to New Havana daily. . . .

In New Havana, small shopkeepers controlled distribution. Most of them were extortionists, although they did provide some employment. Within the *campamento* there were roughly a hundred and fifty of them. People’s purchasing on a small scale—the only one they could afford—increased the scope for profiteering.

The official means of regulating supplies and prices were the JAPs [People’s Committees], promoted mainly by the Communist Party. In New Havana we tried instead for an understanding with the shopkeepers. They agreed to buy from official sources and also to sell at official prices. This would leave them a reasonable profit and prevent hoarding and black marketing. Like the JAPs this had little success, and for much the same reason: the penalties were weak and hard to enforce. Congress rejected Allende’s proposals for strengthening them, and the judiciary hardly applied them, because it was also controlled by the right. So what penalty could the people impose, either with or without the JAPs. In highly organized *campamentos* like New Havana, offending shopkeepers could be expelled. But this was only a local solution, as they then set up in other areas where people were more easily exploited. The assembly was always discussing this problem. It reflected the PU’s weak control in this case of the distributive system, which it was reluctant to really challenge for fear of a right-wing reaction. Our local problems were those of Chile as a whole, of the PU’s limited power and programme.

By early 1973, with the shortage caused by the lorry-owners’ strike, the shopkeepers were holding people to ransom. Despite our efforts to be patient, most of them kept up their old ways. Our only solution was to force them to close. And so instead we relied on a “people’s store” (*Almacén Popular*). This was set up with contributions from the *manzanas*, while the State gave us credit for a stock of supplies. By selling at official prices, this acquired a virtual monopoly of non-perishable goods. This confined the shopkeepers to perishables, which made hoarding and speculation harder. The store belonged to the *campamento* and was managed by the directorate. As it extended its operations and put the small shopkeepers out of business, they were given first choice of becoming its salaried employees. This provided some conciliation, kept them in work and put their expertise to good use.

. . . [W]e kept living standards in the *campamento* rising. For instance the houses, which were wooden and prefabricated, began with bare floors. By the end of three years almost all the floors were covered. Also most families began with only one bed between them, but by 1973 they managed to buy separate ones, and blankets. There was even a communal television in most *manzanas*. . . .

New Havana paid for its reputation. The military and the bourgeoisie had a special hatred for the people there because they were known not just for their words, but for their actions. Whenever they said they were going to take action, they really went ahead and took it. The almost legendary status this gave them was treated as a crime, deserving a specially brutal repression.

Source: Colin Henfrey and Bernardo Sorj, eds. *Chilean Voices: Activists Describe Their Experiences of the Popular Unity Period*, 130–140 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977).

David Frost, Conversation with Richard M. Nixon: Communism in Chile, April 1, 1977 (Excerpts)

In contrast to Laura's story above is former president Richard M. Nixon's view of the Salvador Allende (b. 1908–d. 1973) administration in Chile. An ardent anticommunist, Nixon focuses on Allende's nationalization of foreign industries, largely United States based and the example it might set for other Latin American countries to follow. Nixon's perception of Chile fits neatly into that of a traditional cold warrior who saw the world as free or communist and the United States as the leading defender of the free world.

Recent scholarship goes further than Nixon does in this interview regarding the U.S. role in the ouster of Allende on September 11, 1973. Nixon asserts only that U.S. officials did discuss the possible overthrow of Allende prior to his inauguration but once in office backed away. Subsequently, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency pursued policies that disrupted the Chilean internal economy and resulted in demonstrations against Allende that prompted the Chilean military to act alone.



Frost: One of the most controversial aspects of your foreign policy, namely Chile. And there were the Chilean elections in September 1970 and after those elections of September the fourth popular traditions suggested that [Salvador] Allende the Marxist would be elected as president in a joint session [of the Chilean congress] on October twenty fourth. And in a meeting with CIA director, Richard Helms, on September fifteenth 1970, you did direct him, didn't you to take such steps as were necessary to prevent Allende from coming to power?

Nixon: Yes, there was such a meeting . . . we did not discuss the specific steps, the only steps that were discussed . . . was the use of economic measures that might be effective. And in listing whatever political groups were to be involved . . . in preventing Allende from coming to power, enlisting of course the major military leaders. Because, of course, the military had great influence in Chile, on a political situation. A military coup was not was contemplated and of course it did not take place.

Frost: No, but a coup was one of the things that Mr. Helms could have felt was certainly not ruled out?

Nixon: . . . What I anticipated was that . . . it might be possible under the circumstances Allende had not gotten . . . a majority of the popular vote, that the other two parties should get together and . . . with proper press support, and . . . support from the military that they would be able,

through a coup, if you want to use that term, to prevent him from coming to power.

Frost: But never the less, you wanted to prevent him [Allende] from coming to power.

Nixon: Yes. . . .

Nixon: Let me say . . . let's get our priorities as far as morality into proper perspective here. . . . What we're really talking about is the real world . . . not the world as I know you want and as I want it. Different as our backgrounds are . . . we would prefer a world in the great Anglo-American tradition in which . . . we have freedom of expression . . . in which there are not covert activities, there are no fears, no repression . . . or if there is, that, when it is punished, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, it isn't that kind of a world. We live in a world where at the present time the greatest threat to free nation is not from Communist nations, potential aggressor nations, marching over borders, it is not from Communist nations with huge nuclear armaments launching a nuclear strike, but the threat to free nations through Communist nations, potentially aggressive Communist nations like the Soviet Union, like Cuba, for example, like Chile if Allende had stayed in power. Burrowing under a border rather than over a border . . . and supporting, and supporting the Communist Party.

Frost: What did you have in mind in Chile when you said that you wanted the CIA or you wanted America to make the economy scream?

Nixon: Well, . . . Chile, of course, is interested in . . . obtaining loans . . . from international organizations where we have a vote. . . . and I indicated that . . . that wherever we had a vote . . . where Chile was involved that . . . unless there were strong considerations on the other side that we would vote against them. . . since they expropriated property. . . .

Frost: [Interrupts Nixon] He had done that on September fifteenth [Chilean election day].

Nixon: . . . but I knew that was coming . . . all you had to do was to read his campaign speeches. Let us . . . when we talk about Allende that his history went back, we knew him in 1964 when both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations spent a total of over four million dollars to keep him from coming to power. . . .

. . . Because they knew that he was a Marxist and they knew what he would do to Chile and the effect that would have on the countries neighboring on Latin America. But in his campaign in early 1970, he said . . . with Cuba in the Caribbean and with Chile on the southern cone, we—he meant Castro and Allende—will make the revolution in Latin America. Now we had fair warning of that, now, why was Chile, even though it is a small country in terms of population, it has common borders with Argentina . . . it can have influence in Bolivia . . . it can have an influence in Brazil . . . it can have one also in Peru . . . and all of those countries had significant problems and all of them were concerned about the possibility of a beachhead of communism in Chile that would export in the Western

Hemisphere, Cuba, that is exporting revolution and didn't want another one—Chile—doing it.

Frost: . . . [Allende] turned out to be a Marxist. . . . he worked within the system for three decades. He never attempted to introduce political pressure. That only came later. . . . he continued to work within the system to the extent where it was predicted he would lose the next election.

Nixon: Well, as a matter of fact. Let's well . . . Allende played it very clever, but he . . . played it as a Chilean would rather than as a Cuban would. The Chileans being . . . frankly less volatile than the Cubans, I would say, but on the other hand . . . there wasn't any question about his turning all the screws that he possibly could . . . in the direction of making Chile a Marxist state. There wasn't any question but that he was cooperating with Castro. There wasn't any question that Chile was being used by some of Castro's agents as a base to export terrorism into Argentina, to Bolivia, to Brazil. We knew all of that. . . .

Frost: In fact what they have now with [General Augusto] Pinochet is a right-wing dictatorship. . . . what they had with Allende was a left-wing, or Marxist, democracy. . . . it was never a dictatorship.

Nixon: . . . I don't agree with your assertion whatsoever. . . . It was . . . you said it was not . . . a dictatorship . . . and my point is Allende was a very subtle and a very clever man. But he was . . . it was not a dictatorship in . . . the sense that Castro's Cuba is a dictatorship . . . it was not a dictatorship in that sense certainly. On the other hand, as far as the situation in Chile was concerned, he was engaging in dictatorial actions, which eventually would have allowed him to impose a dictatorship. That was his goal. . . .

. . . what we really had here in Chile, I think it was graphically described to me, even though you and many of our audience may disagree with what we did in Chile . . . and disagree with my defense of it . . . but I have to state what I believe, and that's what we're here for in this program. . . . Because here is what was involved in Chile. . . . I remember months before he [Allende] might run again . . . an Italian businessman came to call on me in the Oval Office and said "If Allende should win the election in Chile and then you have Castro in Cuba, what you will in effect have in Latin America is a red sandwich. And eventually it will all become red." And that's what we confronted. . . .

Source: Sir David Frost, with Bob Zelnick. *Frost/Nixon: Behind the Scenes of the Nixon Interviews*, 276–287 (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

Maurice Bishop, "On the Second Anniversary of the Grenada Revolution" March 13, 1981 (Excerpt)

On March 13, 1979, the New Jewel Movement, headed by Maurice Bishop (b. 1944–d. 1983), seized control of the government of Grenada, a 133-square-mile nation state in the Windward Islands. Bishop introduced educational and health reforms and proposed to make the island more economi-

cally diverse and productive. He also proposed the construction of an airstrip capable of handling large passenger airplanes. Politically, however, Bishop increasingly consolidated power into his own hands, a move that fractured his political party, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). The political struggle climaxed on October 19, 1983, when Bishop and several of his close associates were executed and replaced by the Revolutionary Military Council, headed by another leftist, Bernard Coard (b. 1944–). For many Grenadians and for the Ronald Reagan administration, Bishop's government-directed economy and his close association with Cuba and Nicaragua, indicated his moving into the communist camp and justified his removal from power.



The approach of the revolution is . . . to make a conscious attempt to transform the economy that we have inherited, to seek to break our dependence on outside forces, to lay the basis for planned and progressive development. For this reason dreams and mysticism and lack of information and lack of statistics are replaced now by a Ministry of Planning that functions as a ministry of serious and committed technocrats who understand the importance of building that mechanism in order to achieve the necessary economic transformation. That is also why, sisters and brothers, we have decided and have laid great stress on the need for us to ensure that the productive sector in our country begins to pay for itself in a serious way; that was the reason for declaring 1980 the Year of Education and Production, that is the reason for declaring this year, 1981, the Year of Agriculture and Agro-Industries. That is why in agriculture we have spent so much time and are making sure that more seeds, that more plants, that more fertilizer, that more extension services, that new crops, that agricultural equipment, that new markets are sought after, so that the farmers in our country will be able to receive a better price for what they are producing. That is also why in the areas of agro-industry we have moved to establish the coffee-processing plant out in Telescope, have moved to establish the agro-industrial plant down in True Blue, that now produces juices, that now produces different condiments. That is also why a new Ministry of Fisheries and Agro-Industry under Comrade Kenrick Radix has been created so as to ensure that even more time and more attention is given to pushing production in this year 1981. That is also why, sisters and brothers, in the area of tourism the Hotel Training School has been established; additional plans have been created in the state sector; more tours from abroad have been organized to bring more and more guests to Grenada. More promotion is being undertaken and discussions are going ahead at full speed to see about the immediate construction of new hotels to add to the size of our existing plant. That is also why in the area of fisheries we have now moved to establish the first fish and fish-products processing plant out in True Blue; that is why for the first time in our country today it is now possible to eat entirely locally produced and locally salted salt-fish. That is why we have been moving to get hold of more fishing boats and better fishing boats and to train our fishermen in more modern techniques of catching the fish, and thereafter in processing what

they have caught; all of this is aimed at ensuring that the productive sector in fact develops. Further, we believe too, comrades, that progress can continue to be made notwithstanding the difficulties in a situation where we continue to struggle as a people for the new international economic order, continue to struggle for better prices for what we produce, continue to look for new markets for what we produce, continue to struggle to have science and technology transferred to the poorer developing countries around the world. We believe too that in order to keep that progress moving that it can be done through developing closer relations among countries that are themselves developing—to continue to develop what is called South to South cooperation to ensure that we talk to each other and look to find ways of helping each other.

That is why one of the most important aspects of our relationship with revolutionary Cuba is the area of economic cooperation and assistance. That is why, as part of this dialogue between developing countries, revolutionary Cuba has been able to come to our assistance, to help us to construct an international airport, to lend us their doctors, to lend us their internationalist workers, to lend us their fishermen, to help us with universities scholarships. Revolutionary Cuba can undertake that kind of assignment because they understand themselves from their own history the meaning of true internationalism. That is one of the things that reaction understands about the relationship between Grenada and Cuba—they understand that this relationship means that the economic development of our country will be pushed even further. And they understand, too, that that means that this will help us to break our dependence on their market and their economies, and that is why they are also so concerned to break those links and bonds of friendship between our two countries. But today again we say what we have always said—that the solidarity, the friendship, the depth of feelings, the unity, the cooperation, the anti-imperialist militancy that keeps us together can never, ever be broken: these bonds between free Grenada and revolutionary Cuba.

As part of this South to South cooperation, comrades, we have also developed very great working relations with another country in this region—the country of Venezuela—and with that country we have in fact been able to develop some good bilateral programs that have sought to advance the cause of friendship between our two countries. We have also been able to develop that kind of relation with the government and people of Nicaragua. That might sound like a strange statement, that Nicaragua—a country like our own, a country at this stage in a period of national reconstruction—it might sound strange that areas of cooperation on the economic front are possible. But I must tell you, comrades, that we in free Grenada, as a contribution to the cause of the Nicaraguan literacy campaign, sent two of our own Grenadian teachers on an internationalist assignment to help the people of Nicaragua to learn to read and to write. Even more importantly, but again showing what is possible between developing countries themselves even when they are also just struggling and starting off, I must tell you that only last week the government of Nicaragua sent us a gift that has been of tremendous importance—a gift that has meant that the militia comrades on duty today are able to have new

uniforms, which came as a gift from the Sandinistas and the junta of Nicaragua.

In that area too, of South to South cooperation and dialogue, we have developed excellent working relations and excellent cooperation with the governments and people of several countries in the Middle East. From the government of Iraq, we have received tremendous financial assistance both by way of gifts and soft loans, and our government and people place on record our appreciation of this internationalist support. Similarly, we have received tremendous assistance from the government and people of Algeria, and I ask the representative of that government to convey our fraternal appreciation. Such assistance has also come from the government and people of Libya and the government and people of Syria. In Africa likewise, among developing countries on that continent, we have received significant assistance from the governments of Tanzania and Kenya, and that again is an example of what can be done if we try to help each other.

Source: Maurice Bishop. *Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution, 1979–1983*, 133–135 (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1983).

Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Events in Grenada,” October 27, 1983 (Excerpts)

On the morning of October 25, 1983, the United States landed 1,200 troops on the island of Grenada, allegedly to rescue an estimated 1,000 U.S. students at St. George’s Medical School. The total number of U.S. troops climbed to nearly 7,000 before the crisis ended in December 1983. President Ronald Reagan (b. 1911–d. 2004) viewed both heads of government—Maurice Bishop and his replacement, Bernard Coard—as communists with close links to Cuba and Nicaragua. Reagan speculated that Bishop’s proposal for an extended airstrip to serve tourist airplanes was, in reality, a cover for anticipated Soviet military aircraft that would then be positioned to threaten the Panama Canal and U.S. oil interests in Venezuela. To emphasize the communist threat, Reagan used a map of the Caribbean to illustrate that communists already controlled Cuba and Nicaragua and that if Grenada fell under communist control the circum-Caribbean region would be threatened by the Soviet military.



... Grenada, ... [an] island only twice the size of the District of Columbia, with a total population of about 110,000 people, [along with] a half dozen other Caribbean islands here were, until recently, British colonies. They’re now independent states and members of the British Commonwealth. While they respect each other’s independence, they also feel a kinship with each other and think of themselves as one people.

In 1979 trouble came to Grenada. Maurice Bishop, a protégé of Fidel Castro, staged a military coup and overthrew

the government which had been elected under the constitution left to the people by the British. He sought the help of Cuba in building an airport, which he claimed was for tourist trade, but which looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet-built long-range bombers.

The six sovereign countries and one remaining colony are joined together in what they call the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The six became increasingly alarmed as Bishop built an army greater than all of theirs combined. Obviously, it was not purely for defense.

In this last year or so, Prime Minister Bishop gave indications that he might like better relations with the United States. He even made a trip to our country and met with senior officials of the White House and the State Department. Whether he was serious or not, we'll never know. On October 12th, a small group in his militia seized him and put him under arrest. They were, if anything, more radical and more devoted to Castro's Cuba than he had been.

Several days later, a crowd of citizens appeared before Bishop's home, freed him, and escorted him toward the headquarters of the military council. They were fired upon. A number, including some children, were killed, and Bishop was seized. He and several members of his cabinet were subsequently executed, and a 24-hour shoot-to-kill curfew was put in effect. Grenada was without a government, its only authority exercised by a self-proclaimed band of military men.

There were then about 1,000 of our citizens on Grenada, 800 of them students in St. George's University Medical School. Concerned that they'd be harmed or held as hostages, I ordered a flotilla of ships, then on its way to Lebanon with marines, part of our regular rotation program, to circle south on a course that would put them somewhere in the vicinity of Grenada in case there should be a need to evacuate our people.

Last weekend, I was awakened in the early morning hours and told that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, had sent an urgent request that we join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada. They were proposing this action under the terms of a treaty, a mutual assistance pact that existed among them.

These small, peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don't have armies at all, and the others have very limited forces. The legitimacy of their request, plus my own concern for our citizens, dictated my decision. I believe our government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens, if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.

We knew we had little time and that complete secrecy was vital to ensure both the safety of the young men who would undertake this mission and the Americans they were about to rescue. The Joint Chiefs worked around the clock to come up with a plan. They had little intelligence information about conditions on the island. We had to assume that several hundred Cubans working on the airport could be military reserves. Well, as it turned out, the number was much larger, and they were a military force. Six hundred

of them have been taken prisoner, and we have discovered a complete base with weapons and communications equipment, which makes it clear a Cuban occupation of the island had been planned.

Two hours ago we released the first photos from Grenada. They included pictures of a warehouse of military equipment—one of three we've uncovered so far. This warehouse contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists. Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well, it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time.

The events in . . . Grenada . . . [show that] Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence, [and also] provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control over Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island. At the moment of our landing, we communicated with the Governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union and told them we would offer shelter and security to their people on Grenada. Regrettably, Castro ordered his men to fight to the death, and some did. The others will be sent to their homelands.

You know, there was a time when our national security was based on a standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coasts, and, of course, a navy to keep the sea lanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well-being. The world has changed. Today, our national security can be threatened in faraway places. It's up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them.

Source: Ronald Reagan. "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada." October 27, 1983. Available online (<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm>). Accessed June 18, 2009.

Latin America's New Political Paradigm

At the beginning of the 21st century, the political scales in Latin America moved to the left, as new political leaders appeared as populists aiming to address the socio-economic needs of the larger populace. These changes began in the 1980s, when a generation of military dictatorships came to an end and the region saw a return to democracy and the implementation of neoliberal, or free market, economics. By the mid-1990s, democratic elections were held in most Latin American nations, and neoliberal structural reforms were in place. Still, nearly 50 percent of Latin Americans remained mired in poverty as the region moved into the new century.

**Thomas M. Leonard, "Neo-Liberalism
and Latin America's Political Left,"
2006 (excerpts)**

"Latin America Taking Left Turn," a Washington Times headline proclaimed on March 10, 2005. Following a spate of Latin American presidential elections, in late December 2005, London's Daily Telegraph asserted "Latinos Lean Left." An Inter-Press News release on January 4, 2006 read "Morales, Chavez and Castro Begin a New Left Axis." The September 2006 edition of the The Latin American Monitor: Central America reported that Daniel Ortega, leader of Nicaragua's Marxist leaning Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), appears to be the odds on favorite to win that country's presidency in November's elections. And as Mexico approached its July 2006 election, Enrique Krauze, author of Mexico: A Biography of Power, speculated about the country continuing its ride towards democracy and capitalism or reverting to the continual socio-economic crisis that characterized Mexico's past.¹ . . .

Beginning in the early 1980s Latin America "returned to democracy," a phrase that meant the replacement of military with civilian governments.² The new political leaders also adopted the "Neo-Liberal" economic model, sometimes identified as the "Washington Consensus." Eventually, the consequences of the two—democracy and neo-liberalism—would clash. . . .

"Neo-Liberalism" called for the implementation of several measures, including disciplined fiscal policy, moderate interest rates, trade liberalization, openness to direct foreign investment, privatization of state owned enterprises, deregulation, legal security for intellectual property rights, tax reform and the of redirection of public expenditures towards education, health and infrastructure investment. To some, it was simply supply side economics. In other words, Latin America needed to open its doors to foreign investment, encourage domestic investment by lowering taxes on the upper class, strip away protections from domestic industries and protect the new investments from legal challenges. Effectively, "Neo-Liberalism" promised expanded economic activity, which in turn would produce increased government revenues that could be spent on roads to reach the ports and education and health care, two of the most important concerns held by the masses of people across Latin America.³ Many analysts drew parallels between twentieth century "Neo-Liberalism" and late nineteenth century "Liberalism." Both opened the door to foreign investment and the exportation of primary products, but "Neo-Liberalism" came at a time when democratic governments permitted the participation of the lower socio-economic groups participation in the political arena.

Assessments of "Neo-Liberalism" appeared a decade into the program. At best, they were mixed. The macro instability caused by the debt crisis of the 1980s was corrected. Markets were opened to the world and tariff barriers reduced from a continent wide average of 41.6 percent to 13.7 percent. Also,

structural reforms in banking and commerce made it easier for Latin America to participate in the global market that led to a significant amount of foreign direct investment in the region. The Latin American governments also carried out a substantial proportion of the total amount of global privatization during the 1980s. The changes in economic policies, however, did not "trickle down" to the masses of people. While there was economic recovery, annual growth rates did not match the 5–6% rates of the 1960s and 1970s. This translated into limited job growth. Although unemployment rates were lower by the end of the 1980s, they did not continue into the 1990s, in part due to the increase in population across Latin America. In 1996 eight of every 100 Latin Americans willing to work had no job. In fact, when Vicente Fox assumed Mexico's presidency, he faced the improbable task of creating one million jobs per year over the six years of his presidential term to meet the needs of 16 year olds entering the labor market. Nor did the number of people living in poverty decline from approximately 150 million poverty stricken people in 1980, as Latin America remained the region of the world with the widest disparities in income distribution.⁴

In the late 1990s, Latin America began its "left" turn with the election of Hugo Chavez to the Venezuelan presidency in 1998. At mid-point in the first decade of the twenty-first century analysts have identified other heads of state or potential heads of state to accompany Chavez in the left turn: Argentina's Nestor Kirchner (2003), Bolivia's Evo Morales (2006), Brazil's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003), Chile's Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet (2005), Costa Rica's Oscar Arias (2006), Peru's Alan García (2006), and Uruguay's Tabare Vazquez (2005). The list potentially could have expanded with the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador to the Mexican presidency in July 2006. It is expected to expand In November 2006 with the election of former FSLN leader Daniel Ortega to the Nicaraguan presidency.⁵ . . .

As Latin America [continued to turn] politically left in the early twenty first century, in 2002 the Strategy Research Corporation (SRC) surveyed the region regarding marketing possibilities for U.S. companies. . . . [SRC's research] may help to explain Latin America's "left turn." It indicated that the Latin American nations share several facts of life: the great majority of the people residing in each nation are concerned about the health of the national economy as reflected in the high unemployment rate and the number of people living in poverty. Owing to unemployment and widespread disparities in income distribution, as measured by the percentage of people below national poverty levels, there exists an inability to consume. This may help explain the high crime rates, which usually accompany recessionary times. Clearly, [SRC's] survey indicates a loss of confidence in the existing regimes, a clear indication that one could anticipate a forthcoming political change.⁶

As candidates for their respective presidencies, the politicians mentioned above—Chávez, Kirchner, Morales, Lula, Lagos, Bachelet, Vazquez, Obrador and Ortega—campaigned on promises to correct these social disparities within their own borders by promising greater government activism.⁷ . . .

This cursory summary of Latin America's recent neo-liberal and democratic experiences begs the question: Has the Neo-Liberal economic model run its course? While the model brought positive structural change to the region, the benefits have not reached down to the masses. But then, the same can be said about the various economic models that preceded it. The end of each economic model was made possible by major events, economic and otherwise, and that the new development models were adopted in response to the failures of the past. The Great Depression brought the Export Based Economies to their end; Fidel Castro's revolution helped to bring down Import Substitution Industrialization and the 1980s Debt Crisis significantly contributed to the end of military rule.⁸

With the adoption of the "Neo-Liberal" economic model in the 1980s, analysts also pointed out that Latin America "returned to democracy." While we can argue whether the term is a valid description of Latin America's previous political arena, for sure, the "return to democracy" meant the re-entry into the political arena the multitude of political parties that dotted Latin America's period of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) from roughly 1930 to 1960. These political parties drew support from the masses of the people—those Latin Americans that comprise the largest singular element of electoral power, the lower-socio economic groups. When the promises of the "Neo Liberal" economic model failed to deliver, the people across Latin America turned to politicians not necessarily associated with it. Thus, the movement "left." In effect, the leftward movement of Latin American politics illustrates the application of a Latin American political axiom: the farther down the social pyramid a politician goes to draw his political support, the farther left he goes on the political scale. These factors suggest that unlike the termination of previous models, "Neo-Liberalism" may be voted out of existence, or at least fine-tuned.

Source: Excerpted from a paper presented at an international conference on Latin America sponsored by the *Consejo Coreano para América Latina y el Caribe* (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean) in Seoul, South Korea, September 25–26, 2006.

NOTES

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Gary Payne, "Venezuela's Chávez as Everyman" March 29, 2004 (Excerpts)

Elected president of Venezuela on December 9, 1998, Hugo Chávez (b. 1954–) promised to break with the country's past of elitist rule and to correct the nation's vast socioeconomic problems. He directed the writing of a new constitution in 1999 that promised agrarian reform, health care, education, housing, and a social security program for all Venezuelans. It also provided for the direct election of a president by a plurality of vote, with all people having suffrage. Chávez won the presidential election on July 30, 2000, and his supporting political parties gained control of the national legislature. Opposition to Chávez began immediately thereafter and continued to intensify and reached a high-water mark on November 29, 2007, when a national referendum rejected his proposals to amend the 1999 constitution that would have further centralized government control in the presidential palace.

Shortly after Chávez's presidential inauguration on January 10, 2002, Central Lakes College (Minnesota) professor Gary Payne (b. 1953–) traveled to Venezuela and filed the following report that differed from those by Chávez's critics.



He looks like he could be the driver of the most decrepit taxi on the streets of Caracas. He could be a street sweeper, a waiter, a shoe shiner. The tiny upper and middle classes of Venezuela think he is uncivilized. But to the three-quarters of *Venezuelanos* [Venezuelans] living in poverty, he is a mirror image of themselves. He is Everyman.

When he addresses the nation on the popular Sunday broadcast, "Hello Mr. President," *bis* somewhat darker skinned crowds gather in Plaza Bolívar to listen to him carry on over government-installed television screens and radio speakers. For five hours. He answers questions from everyday citizens in an engaging conversational tone, without notes, without hesitation, but with an air of calm informality that sets him apart from the pretentiousness of his competition.

And then, without any warning, albeit at regular intervals in the broadcast, he will bathe his detractors—the richest and most powerful people in the history of the world—with a shower of insults that confirm his peculiar position in global politics. For Hugo Chávez is not merely the President of this poor majority, but the long-stifled expression of its collective historical frustration and the embodiment of its hopes. Hopes that would have seemed terribly naive only a few years ago.

Some would say that those hopes are still naive. Like many populist-left leaders before him, Chávez has become an abso-

lutely intolerable barrier to business as usual in this hemisphere. Venezuela's oligarchs and free marketers everywhere both hate and fear him, for nothing succeeds like success. And if his administration is allowed to succeed in South America, a new cadre of followers might rise across the continent, threatening historical privilege and economic privatization like never before.

Not even Cuba poses such a threat, for as an island nation, it has been more easily isolated. What Fidel Castro has accomplished may be miraculous considering the challenges he has faced—attacks, embargoes, harassment, covert destabilization efforts—but Cuba's potential for democracy was subverted by this history. Fidel seems to have recognized this himself, having reportedly told his friend Hugo that he has an historic opportunity in front of him, and he should not waste it.

For by contrast, Venezuela is a vast territory, and Hugo Chávez was twice elected by overwhelming majorities in this oldest democracy on the continent. By all accounts, the nation's energy resources are legendary. Chávez is raising the cost of oil royalties paid by Exxon-Mobil, Conoco-Phillips, and supporting OPEC production limits instead of over pumping as his predecessors have done. This income could be diverted from its customary path to the pockets of the oligarchy and distant stockholders. It could build a modern egalitarian society.

The untold story in Venezuela is that this new society is sprouting legs and moving off the drawing board. Chávez has not yet turned the tide on poverty—not by any means—but he has set the stage for a fundamental shift in economic and educational opportunity. He banned school entrance registration fees for students which previously served as a barrier to much of the child population. "Bolivarian" schools have opened in poor neighborhoods, often maintained and run by parents and volunteers, but supported by the government. Literacy is increasing rapidly as millions of new students have entered school.

Chávez's "Inside the Barrio" health plan is setting up clinics in the poorest communities, often staffed by respected Cuban doctors and nurses who are on loan to a society that in return provides cheap oil to the island nation. Some of the better new Venezuelan students, previously unable to even dream of college, have found themselves enrolled in Cuban medical schools.

His land reform legislation limits individual ownership to 5,000 hectares (12,350 acres), and allows idle land to be redistributed to peasant cooperatives, which will likely lead to much greater fairness in a nation where 2% of the people own 60% of the territory.

The Venezuelan oligarchy and various international entities connected to Venezuela's natural resource food chain have taken notice, and are coordinating actions to bring Chávez down. Their task is formidable, because of his popularity and elected status. But they maintain several overwhelming advantages.

Most useful is information control. Almost all of the private television and radio stations and all but one of the major newspapers in the country are owned and operated by those who loathe the Chávez administration. The feeds that go to the mainstream international media come almost exclusively from

these sources, and the hype and spin against Chávez is spectacular, even by today's cynical standards.

The International Monetary Fund has indicated that it supports a transitional government and was reported by Caracas' right-wing *El Nacional* to be willing to bankroll those who would replace Chávez. The National Endowment for Democracy, long used as a cover for the CIA projects, brought several opposition leaders to Washington for consultations in the months preceding the attempted coup in 2002. *Fedecarmaras*, an unnatural alliance of upper-middle class trade unionists and business owners that called for a strike two days before the coup attempt in order to promote the impression of chaos, is waiting backstage. Coke, along with Venezuelan-owned Polar breweries, recently provided bus service for members of the opposition, and/or help with blockades during both violent and non-violent protests by the opposition. . . .

. . . What remains to be seen is whether a steady diet of it can exhaust the will of Chávez supporters or lead Chavez himself into making a serious mistake with the military forces at his disposal.

In the old English passion play, Everyman asks Death to give him more time. Death complies, although Everyman eventually must succumb, taking only his good deeds with him to the afterlife. Chávez is asking for more time. But in the Venezuelan version of the play, his good deeds may never be fully implemented. And Death, in some form, may be forced upon him prematurely.

Source: Gary Payne, "Venezuela's Chávez as Everyman." Available online (Venquelanalysis.com). Accessed March 29, 2004.

Andres Martinez,
"They Can't Believe They're Still in Cuba,"
April 30, 2006

In contrast to the ebb and flow of international history since the end of World War II, Cuba remains Latin America's constant reminder of a period that passed into history. The island appears to remain in a time warp that predates the Castro revolution, which began in 1959 when Fidel Castro Ruz seized power. Foreign visitors to the Caribbean island are awed by the modern hotel resorts that pepper Veradero Beach on Cuba's north coast and that stand in sharp contrast to the poverty, dilapidated buildings, lack of consumer goods, and massive unemployment in Havana. In 2006, Los Angeles Times writer and editorial page editor Andres Martinez found the Cuban people resigned to their contemporary status, confident that fate will improve their quality of life, but not knowing when or how it will come.



It doesn't take long to figure Cuba out. The whole island is a stage putting on a rather austere production of Samuel Beckett's "Waiting for Godot." What's hard to figure out, as in the play, is exactly what Cubans are waiting forever they don't know.

But that sense of waiting, of a suspended reality, is as palpable in Havana as is the sticky humidity that corrodes the vintage American cars and the colonial Spanish buildings. Cubans have been waiting, and waiting, for years—whether it was for the revolution to fulfill its promise or to run its course as a result of the Soviet collapse. Neither has happened, so Cubans are left to await, with a mixture of resignation and grudging respect, the death of Fidel Castro, who has been in power 47 years and turns 80 in August.

But even that begs the "what are we waiting for?" question, because no one quite knows what will happen the day after.

Certainly the day after cannot just be about Raul Castro, my host in Havana. The dictator's younger brother runs the Cuban military, which in turn runs the tourism industry, making Raul concierge in chief to the hordes of German, British, Spanish and Canadian tourists who flock to Cuba in part to spite Uncle Sam.

In a recent interview with a French journalist, Fidel seemed to dismiss his brother's future relevance when he pointed out that Raul is only four years younger than he is and that another generation would have to take over at some point. There are a number of other players vying to succeed Fidel—Vice President Carlos Lage Davila; Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque and Raul Alarcon, president of the National Assembly—but assessing their relative chances and merits feels like a trivial pursuit best left to those who can name the last leader of East Germany.

The real question in Cuba is whether the system, in all its kitschy, anachronistic glory, can survive the only leader it has known, the *comandante* [commander] who rode into Havana from the Sierra Maestra 47 to serve as impish nemesis to 10 U.S. presidents (and counting). That's highly unlikely, and Fidel seems to know it.

His harsh crackdown of recent years—rounding up dissidents and reversing timid steps toward a market economy—is driven by his desire to ensure that Cuba's socialism outlasts him. But the man who famously declared that "history will absolve me" when tried by his predecessor half a century ago must know that history will catch up with this island.

"We are more *fidelistas* than socialists," says Lizardo Gomez, a veterinary student at San Jose University, located on the outskirts of Havana. Gomez is an earnest believer in the principles of the revolution, but he concedes that Cuba is unlikely to be a socialist nation in five to 10 years. He thinks Fidel's successors will be able to muddle through for a year or two, but after that, who knows?

He says all this in the back seat of my rental car on the way to the city of Cienfuegos—the throngs of hitchhikers such as Gomez and the obligation to pick them up are among the charms of revolutionary solidarity.

Castro likes to bask in his "Bolivarian" partnership with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and he points to the rise of Bolivia's Evo Morales and Brazil's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva to suggest hemispheric trends are going his way. But it's self-delusional for him to ignore the fact that these and other Latin American leftists were elected, and that their cities remain teeming bastions of private consumerism, while in Cuba you'd

better not lose your rationing card if you want that bar of soap you are entitled to every three months.

Cuba's nightly newscast loves to show fellow Latin Americans rallying against free-trade agreements with the U.S. The goal, once again, is to reinforce the notion that events are going Cuba's way, but the message is mixed.

"If only we could protest spontaneously like that here," says Eliezer, a bookseller in Havana, echoing a common refrain among Russians exposed quarter of a century ago to scenes of anti-nuclear protests in Western Europe. "The trouble with this country," he goes on to say, presumably ignoring the thousands of compatriots who brave the Straits of Florida each year, "is that no one is willing to die for freedom."

Eliezer sells some risqué material in his bookshop, but he says the way to stay out of trouble is to not get air-conditioning (a bourgeois comfort that might raise suspicions), stay off the Internet and never learn English. That's quite a survival guide.

Over in Havana's Miramar district, Natalia Bolivar, a prominent intellectual, says: "This is a mystery island where we all manage to get by fine, thank you, despite such absurdly insufficient rations like a monthly pound of chicken. We all are scamming something, paying a high price to live in the land we love." Her survival guide: surround yourself with art, music and other forms of escapism.

A collective incredulity that dulls the imagination is afflicting the island nation's 11 million inhabitants, akin to the "I-can't-believe I'm-still-here" exasperation Bill Murray's character felt in the movie "Groundhog Day." Cuba's news radio station is called Radio Reloj, featuring a clock's jarring second hand ticking between its propagandistic vignettes, as if to convince the audience that time is actually passing.

Most people seem to know that they are living in a Stalinist theme park—albeit a somewhat whimsical Caribbean version in which the customs agents who grill you wear fishnet stockings and irrepressible salsa tunes still waft. But Cubans no longer dare speculate how they will transition back into the real world.

Church officials worry that much violence, of the spontaneous score-settling variety, is in store. Diplomats speculate about possible "precipitating events," beyond the obvious one of Fidel's passing. A botched hurricane response, ala Katrina? Too many blackouts during this "year of the energy revolution"? You never know. What became the tragedy of China's Tiananmen Square was triggered by the death of an ousted reformer, and protests tied to a visit by Mikhail Gorbachev in the fall of 1989 helped bury East Germany.

The U.S. embargo against Cuba has long provided Castro a convenient, all-purpose scapegoat. Yet compared to a previous visit 14 years ago, I am struck by the extent to which the drama unfolding here, or yet to unfold, is no longer about us.

Yes, most Cubans I met are bitter that Washington wants to make their lives more difficult, but on the whole they don't hold the United States responsible for their hardship.

Even Castro is downplaying the siege theme these days. He must be torn between wanting to gloat that he has stared down the empire and not giving up his scapegoat entirely. In one of his trademark marathon speeches last November, commemo-

rating the 60th anniversary of his admission to the University of Havana—hey, any excuse will do—Castro said Cuba would never become a colony again: "This country can self-destruct; this revolution can destroy itself, but they can never destroy us; we can destroy ourselves, and it would be our fault."

THE REGIME is busy rooting out corruption and what it calls "ideological vulnerability," meaning it doesn't want to be seduced by the types of economic reforms that China's communist leaders have wholeheartedly endorsed. Castro's Chinese comrades are wagering that large doses of economic freedom will keep people so content that the Communist Party will be able to retain its monopoly on political power. Castro worries that once you cede too much autonomy to the private marketplace, your political monopoly is doomed.

Private businesses, and there were never many in Cuba, are being shut down, and Castro no longer allows U.S. dollars to circulate. Angel, a former fisherman who works as a government inspector of neighborhood *bodegas* [warehouses] that distribute the subsidized rations, acknowledges his country is a mess. "How are people supposed to live on a half-pound of beef a month?" he asks, pointing to his rationing card. He thinks it's unconscionable that the regime won't allow people to open up their own stores if they want.

As we sit in his cramped apartment, he shows off his pirated CD collection and offers me a Beck's beer that he obtained because in his position people like doing him *favorcitos* [little favors].

The regime's propaganda has become more muted in recent years, at least judging by the public billboards around Havana. Posters that once boasted that "we owe everything" to the revolution are now deemed perilously double-edged. So most billboards now bash the U.S. for jailing Cubans accused of spying, and for supposedly giving safe haven to Luis Posada Carriles, an anti-Castro militant who stands accused of a 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner and who is being held on immigration charges in Texas, pending a resolution of his deportation proceedings.

Cuba's more uplifting propaganda is about Castro's foreign policy, which is all about turning the country into another Doctors Without Borders. Some 25,000 Cuban doctors are on missions overseas, and not a day seems to go by without more needy, grateful patients being flown in for treatment.

That may win some hearts and minds elsewhere, but Castro's impulse to dispatch doctors around the globe is creating a backlash at home. "It's all very admirable," says Angel, "but we are a poor nation that cannot afford this at a time when medicines are scarce here."

The United States, for its part, must come up with a new strategy to win over hearts and minds in Cuba as it prepares to engage Castro's successors. Even if the administration refuses to lift the ill-advised embargo, it should find a way to convince ordinary Cubans that their fellow baseball-playing nation—an older sibling, by virtue of culture and history—does not mean them harm. Creating a widely trumpeted, multibillion-dollar transition investment fund to aid Cuba once it has a democratic government would be a good start.

In the meantime, Cubans continue to wait. No experience is more emblematic of life in Havana these days than standing in line to enter the iconic Coppelia ice cream parlor in the Vedado district, a flying-saucer-like structure in the middle of a park. Uniformed guards manage the lines that converge on it from six directions. My first attempt to enter was thwarted by a cop plucking me out of the line and insisting that I go to an adjacent hard-currency ice cream stand, where there was no wait. But the next night the confusion of a tropical storm helped me gain entrance into the high temple of Cuban ice cream.

As luck would have it, I shared a table with two soldiers, Mario and Ramon, on leave and clearly mortified to be sharing

a table with a foreigner. A waitress hurriedly dispensed bowls of an orangy-vanilla ice cream—no choice here—covered in chocolate sauce.

My tablemates each downed three of the bowls, and chided me for having only one after waiting in line for so long. “It’s OK, it was worth it,” I say truthfully, not because the ice cream was any good, but because I hadn’t known what awaited me inside.

I hope most Cubans find their wait worthwhile too.

Source: Andres Martinez. “They Can’t Believe They’re Still in Cuba,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 2006, p. 20.

❖ GLOSSARY ❖

- Amerindian** an American Indian
- anarchist** political activist, usually from the urban laboring classes, who opposes all forms of organized government
- anarcho-syndicalism** political and social ideology that advocates replacing central governments with worker-controlled communities with the aim of eradicating economic and social inequalities
- audiencia** literally, “court”; in Spanish colonial times, it also functioned as a regional administrative unit.
- ayllu** pre-Columbian term now used as a synonym for self-governing Andean highland peasant communities, whether villages, kinship groups, or labor organizations based on agricultural production
- balance of payments** summary of the monetary value of all economic transactions—goods, services, investment income, credits, loans, and other financial matters—between one country and the rest of the world
- barriada** shantytown located in and around major Latin American cities
- cabildo** an autonomous town council in colonial Spanish America; the lowest administrative unit in the colonial structure. Depending on usage, the term also applies to the building where the council met.
- capital good** machinery or tool used in the production of other goods
- capital intensive** of a productive process, employing a greater amount of technology and machinery than manual labor
- captaincy general** a geographic division within a Viceroyalty of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires. Administered by a military captain general or a governor, often times held by the same person
- Carabiniero** member of the Chilean national police
- caudillo** political strongman or dictator who governed through the force of his personality with the support of the military. Caudillos existed at the local, regional or national level.
- central** a sugar-refining complex associated with the modernization of the sugar industry through linking factories and estates for greater efficiency
- cholo** in Bolivia or Peru, a Hispanicized term for an Amerindian who dresses, acts, and works like a mestizo or white person in an urbanized setting.
- Christian-based community** group consisting mainly of Christian laypeople who advocate to improve the quality of life of the poor
- científico** adviser to Mexican president Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911) and others who accepted the positivist philosophy as the means to economic modernization
- common external tariff (CET)** common import duty placed on goods and commodities by a group of nations that wish to protect their domestic economic activities
- common market** form of economic integration among several nations that coordinate their agricultural, industrial, and economic and social policies, including a common external tariff
- constituent assembly** body of elected delegates commissioned to draft a new constitution and, in some cases, elect a new president. Traditionally, the assembly reverts to the national congress once its work is completed.
- Contra** member of counterrevolutionary U.S.-supported forces that sought to oust the Sandinistas from political power in Nicaragua during the 1980s
- coronelismo** Brazilian term similar to the Spanish *caudillismo*. A system under which an influential political boss controlled townspeople and peasants but also assumed responsibility for their well-being
- corporate state** political system attributed to Italian leader Benito Mussolini under which various constituencies—business community, middle sector, military, and rural and urban labor—are organized into units that theoretically provide input into government policy and in return receive government patronage. In reality, government control of each unit’s leadership often belies the theory.

coup d'état the overthrow of the sitting government, usually by military means

creole (criollo) person born to Spanish parents who resided in the New World; over time, the term came to include their descendants

Cristero a Catholic who took part in a rebellion against the secularization of Mexican society in the 1920s

debt peonage credit system that permits landowners to make cash advances to peasants, who then must work for the landowner to pay off the debt

decentralization devolution of centralized government responsibilities to state and local governments

desaparecidos, los “the disappeared,” referring to those who were arrested or kidnapped and later died or were killed, from the 1960s to the 1980s, as a result of military and paramilitary actions designed to eliminate leftists, real or imagined, who threatened the established order

dollar diplomacy early 20th-century U.S. policy applied to nations in the circum-Caribbean region. It permitted U.S. banks to pay a nation's European debts in return for U.S. supervision of customhouses to ensure repayment to the U.S. banks.

dollarization replacement of national currency with the U.S. dollar, as occurred in Argentina and El Salvador in the 1990s

807 industries an informal reference to that section of the U.S. tax code that permits U.S. industries to ship materials abroad for assembly or manufacture and be returned as completed goods, exempt or partially exempt from import duties. The program is designed to create employment and contribute to the economic development of underdeveloped countries, particularly in the Caribbean Basin region and Central America.

ejido system that provides for Amerindian or peasant collective or community ownership of a large tract of land, which can be subdivided into individual farming units or plots for schools, houses, and urban zones

embargo government policy that prohibits the trade in goods, services, and financial instruments with another nation or nations

enganchado in Peru, a person caught in debt peonage

estancia mainly in Argentina, a large cattle and/or sheep ranch

estanciero owner of a large pastoral estate in Argentina

European Currency Unit (ECU) unit of monetary accounts used by the European Union. Its value fluctuates with other world currencies.

expatriate an individual who voluntarily lives outside his or her native country for an extended period

expropriation government seizure and control of foreign-owned properties or businesses, with or without compensation

extreme poverty the World Bank benchmark for defining extreme poverty is when a family earns \$1.25 per day, and \$2.50 per day for moderate poverty.

fazenda large landed estate in Brazil

fazendeiro owner of large landed estate in Brazil

finca plot of variable size that is productive beyond a subsistence level

fiscal austerity usually required by the International Monetary Fund as a prerequisite for assistance, it entails cutting government expenditure and reducing government subsidies, increasing taxes, and privatizing state-owned economic entities.

flight capital outflow of money into more secure banking or investment institutions abroad because the home nation is facing high inflation or possible currency devaluation

foco theory of guerrilla warfare popularized during the Cuban Revolution from 1956 to 1959. It postulates that a small group of revolutionaries can carry out a revolution at the same time as they create conditions to gain popular support for the revolution.

foreign direct investment (FDI) investment in a foreign company or foreign joint venture. The investment is usually made in cash but can also be in plants, equipment, or know-how that constitutes at least 10 percent of the voting stock in the foreign entity

foreign exchange rate the value of one nation's currency in relation to that of another nation

foreign exchange reserves the holding of gold or foreign currencies by a government or its financial institutions

free trade area a zone in which a group of nations eliminates all trade restrictions among themselves, but each participating nation maintains its own trade policy and separate tariff rates with other nations of the world

frutera mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, a large fruit company, usually producing bananas

Garifuna ethnic group that descended from the Caribs of the eastern Caribbean islands and Africans who escaped slavery. Many of these people migrated to the coastal regions of southern Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The term also refers to the language of these people.

gaucho cowboy who worked the pastoral lands in Argentina and Uruguay. The Brazilian term is *faucho*.

golden age time period from the late 1880s until 1930 when Latin America's primary products were in demand on the global market, which contributed to domestic prosperity, at least for the elite

gross domestic product (GDP) total value of goods and services produced by the domestic economy of a nation within a year

gross national product (GNP) total market value of all goods and services produced by a national economy during a year. It consists of the gross domestic product (GDP), the income received from abroad from both individuals and corporations, minus payments abroad for goods and services.

Guardia Nacional National Guard established, often with the encouragement of the United States, in the 1920s and 1930s throughout the circum-Caribbean region to serve the interests of the state rather than the personal interests of a national dictator; in application, however, the Guardia Nacional often served the political leaders

guerrilla movements from the 1960s to the 1980s, several Latin American countries saw the rise of guerrilla movements that sought to destroy the existing order and replace it with a socialist or Marxist model. Usually active in the countryside, guerrillas waged violent and brutal battles against the government military.

gusano in Spanish, *gusano* means “worm” but used after 1959 by the Cuban leaders to describe an exile.

hacendado owner of a large agricultural estate

hacienda a large agricultural estate

Hispanic of or having to do with the culture and countries formerly ruled by Spain

huaso in Chile, a cowboy

indigenismo the 20th-century movement to restore the historical prominence and culture of Amerindians

indigenous people descendants of the Native American populations encountered by the Spanish and Portuguese in the late 1400s and 1500s

informal economic sector the underground economic activities outside government regulation and taxation that include street vendors in urban areas and coca growers in rural areas

infrastructure works designed to promote economic development, such as bridges and roads, communication systems, dams, electrical systems, and water and sewerage facilities

inquilino in Chile, tenant farmer

junta governing committee that usually comes to power via a coup d'état or revolution

Kennedy Amendment 1974 U.S. legislation that prohibited all U.S. security assistance to Chile because of its military's repression of political opposition; the prohibition was expanded in the 1976 Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act to all countries that violated human rights.

ladino in the Spanish colonies, a Native American or individual of mixed heritage who adopted Spanish culture. With time's passage, it came to include all individuals who rejected indigenous culture and heritage.

land reform the division of large tracts of land into smaller plots for underprivileged rural workers. It is usually accomplished through government seizure of land, with or without compensation.

latifundio a system under which large landed estates are held as private properties that are usually farmed as

plantations by tenant sharecroppers or as traditional haciendas

llanero a person who resides in the southern plains and prairies of Venezuela and Colombia

llanos the plains and prairies of southern Venezuela and Colombia

machismo the cult of male dominance

maquiladora assembly plant—usually located along the U.S.-Mexican border—that manufactures goods for export using low-cost Mexican labor and taking advantage of duty-free tax laws

mariachi street band, common to Mexico and parts of Central America, that usually performs traditional songs; in the 19th and early 20th century members usually played stringed instruments, but beginning in the 1920s wind instruments were incorporated

maroons depending on its usage, the term originally referred to runaway slaves or runaway slave communities in Brazil. Following the end of slavery in 1889, the term referred to blacks or black villagers living in remote areas.

Mesoamerica literally, “middle America.” Anthropologically, the term applies to the region from Central Mexico to northern Honduras that included advanced civilizations prior to the arrival of Europeans.

mestizo originally the offspring of a Spaniard and a Native American. Over time, the term came to include their descendants and, in many cases, nonwhite persons who spoke Spanish and observed Hispanic culture.

minifundio small parcels of land worked by peasants for subsistence living

monteneros Bolivian and Peruvian guerrilla groups

most-favored-nation (MFN) status a trade status granted by one nation to another that provides the receiving nation with the lowest existing tariff on the exporting nation's goods

mulatto a person whose parentage and/or ancestry includes both African and white blood

multinational corporation (MNC) or transnational corporation (TNC) a large corporation usually headquartered in an industrialized nation, while its production processes are located in several different countries. MNCs are the primary source of foreign direct investment in many developing countries.

nationalization process by which a national government takes control, with or without compensation, of foreign- and/or native-owned enterprises operating within its borders

New World North and South America, including the Caribbean

927 industries an informal reference to that section of the U.S. tax code that permits U.S. industries to ship materials abroad for assembly or manufacture and be returned as completed goods, exempt or partially

exempt from import duties. The law was used successfully after World War II in the industrialization of Puerto Rico.

Oncenio the administration of Peruvian president Augusto P. Leguía

pampas the plains found in Argentina, Uruguay, and southern Brazil on which cattle grazing is the predominant economic pursuit

parastatal partly owned by the government. The board of directors of a parastatal entity is appointed by the head of state to manage it in accordance with government policies.

parceiro in Brazil, tenant farmer

pardo another word for mulatto, the offspring of a black and white union. Over time, it came to include the descendants of combinations of European, Indian, and African bloodlines.

patria one's homeland

peón controversial term for a person tied to agriculture; a peasant or peon

personalismo a political figure whose popularity is determined by his/her personality rather than political ideology

plebiscite a referendum whereby the electorate votes either for or against a government proposal

"popular" sector the working class and underemployed and unemployed citizens

populism political movement usually led by a charismatic individual that calls for the reduction or elimination of social and economic injustices

Porfiriato period from 1876 to 1911 when Porfirio Díaz ruled Mexico

porteño resident of Argentina's port city of Buenos Aires

praetorian state system under which the armed forces act as a corporate body to maintain control over government or actively intervene in the political arena to select or change a governments

primary product raw material or natural resource that is essential to the productive process, such as agricultural products, metals, and minerals

privatization the sale of government- or partly government-owned (parastatal) properties to private domestic or foreign investors

profit repatriation remittance of profits from a subsidiary operation in a foreign country to the parent company, usually in the industrialized world

protectionism economic policies concerning tariffs and other taxes, and import quotas designed to protect and promote domestic industrial development

pueblo joven literally "young town." In Peru, *pueblos jóvenes* are the shantytowns that developed in the 1960s in urban centers.

ranchero in Mexico, a small-scale farmer or rancher

soldadera woman camp follower and often a participant in the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920)

stagflation economic situation in which a high inflation rate is coupled with negligible economic growth

sustainable development implementation of development policies to meet both contemporary needs and a society's future requirements

syndicalist radical labor unionist who, like anarchists, seeks the destruction of government

tenente Brazilian military officers and their followers who battled against the central government from 1932 to 1938

value added tax (VAT) incremental tax applied to the value added at each stage of the processing of a raw material or production and distribution of a commodity. The VAT is an indirect form of taxation, and its impact on the consumer is the same as a sales tax.

zambo child of a union between a black and an Amerindian
Zapatista either a follower of Mexican revolutionary leader Emiliano Zapata, who violently protested against the Mexican government's failure to initiate agrarian reform, or a member of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation that emerged in southern Mexico during the 1990s to demand social justice and indigenous rights and a rejection of neoliberalism

❖ SUGGESTED READINGS ❖ FOR THIS VOLUME

There is a vast field of Latin American historical literature, as evidenced by the suggested readings appended to the entries throughout this encyclopedia, and it is constantly being updated. This select bibliography is designed to assist readers in framing the larger context of Latin American history and to guide them into more specialized studies. The Web Sites section leads readers to current economic and social information from the Inter-American and World Banks, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. State Department's Background Notes provide constantly updated statements on internal conditions and U.S. policy toward a particular nation. Atlases and Other Geographic Sources augment the cursory overviews provided by these agencies.

The Historical Studies section approaches the broad context of Latin American history and the place each nation has within it. Readers who wish to delve into the historical experience of any given Latin American country should refer to the Library of Congress Area Handbooks (under Web Sites), which provide excellent historical overviews of a nation's political, economic, and social and cultural structures. The handbooks' overviews are supplemented by the national and regional histories listed in the Country and Regional Studies section. The Specialized Reference Works more fully present the role of individuals, provide explanations of themes, and offer more detail on events and other subjects in the Latin American historical experience than are usually found in general surveys.

The Topical Studies section introduces some of the most recent and salient works on subjects germane to Latin America's 20th-century experience. The works listed under Latin America and the World introduce readers to works detailing Latin America's increasing place in global affairs.

Those who wish to identify other works, including journal articles, are encouraged to refer to the *Handbook of Latin American Studies* listed under Web Sites. This

publication, also available in hardback copy through the University of Texas Press, provides brief explanations for the most important works published each year in all areas of Latin American studies.

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