

THE SECRET TEAM: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World by L. Fletcher Prouty. 496 Pages. Prentice-Hall. 1973. \$8.95.

CIA: The Myth and the Madness by Patrick J. McGarvey. 240 Pages. Saturday Review Press. 1972. \$6.95.

These two books are additions to the fast-growing library devoted to criticism and exposés of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Colonel Prouty claims to have been the official "Focal Point Officer" for first the Air Force and then the Department of Defense for contacts with the CIA on all matters pertaining to the military support of special operations—clandestine activities. He contends that there is a group of men, that he terms "the Secret Team," which:

... consists of security-cleared individuals . . . who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data, when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities. . . .

Although Colonel Prouty does state that membership of the Secret Team varies with the problem, he treats it as an organizational entity. At the heart of the Secret Team, he claims, is the CIA and National Security Council. The discussion of the activities of the Secret Team is a fascinating mélange of descriptions of dering-do activities, gross errors in fact and unsupported assertions.

He asserts that General Maxwell Taylor and General William Rosson owe their first loyalty to the CIA. He further asserts that General Taylor was appointed Special Advisor to President John F. Kennedy through

the machinations of Allen Dulles to further the interests of the Secret Team in combating communism.

Despite the many faults of this rambling and incredible book, the author does raise two cogent points. He does focus on the danger of combining the functions of intelligence collection and analysis and the conduct of clandestine operations in one organization. And he raises an even more important point of the danger of clandestine actions precipitated as a reaction to intelligence rather than in deliberate support of a national foreign policy plan.

Mr. McGarvey was an intelligence analyst for 14 years, the last few years with the CIA. He contends, based on his experiences, that the CIA is grossly inefficient, beset with bureaucratic headaches, deluged with paperwork and that a great gap exists between policymaking and reality.

Focusing on the *Pueblo* disaster, the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the 1968 Tet offensive, he tells stories to illustrate his point that the various intelligence agencies duplicate each other's efforts, and often compete against each other and refuse to share information.

Simply stated, he contends the intelligence community has grown so large and uncontrolled that it is on the verge of collapse because of bureaucratic chaos. His solution is for the taxpayers to raise their voices and demand remedial action from the President and the Congress.

Despite their many flaws, these two books raise important questions that need to be addressed. For this reason, they should be of particular interest to those who are concerned with the role of intelligence at the national level.

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P-McGarvey, Patrick J.
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AND THE MADNESS