Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8

G W F HEGEL

Translated with an Introduction by Robert R. Williams

LECTURES on the PHILOSOPHY of SPIRIT 1827–8

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

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1. WHY THESE LECTURES?

The Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827–8 is in many respects a 'new' Hegel text, first published in Germany in 1994. It is a transcription made by Johann Eduard Erdmann, a German philosopher who attended Hegel's lectures as a student in 1827. Not only is it a 'new' Hegel text, this lecture transcript illumines a less well-known, less well-understood area in Hegel's thought, one to which Hegel himself attached special importance. One puzzle in Hegel scholarship is that in spite of the renaissance of interest in his thought, and in spite of the importance Hegel himself attached to it, his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has received very little attention. There is an enormous secondary bibliography on Hegel's Phenomenology and Logic, as well as the Philosophy of Right, but very few studies of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Moreover, there is no scholarly consensus that this work is somehow 'insignificant' in comparison to the others. On the

- 1. Hegels Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes 1827/8, ed. Franz Hespe and Burkhard Tuschling (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1994). Hereafter cited as VPG 1827.
- 2. In English, see Murray Greene, Hegel on the Soul (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970); Willem deVries, Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel's Theory of Madness (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995); Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Heikki Ikäheimo, Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity: A Study of Hegel's Encyclopedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1830) (Jyväskylä, Finland: University of Jyväskylä, Publications in Philosophy, 2000); in German see Iring Fetscher, Hegels Lehre vom Menschen (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1970); Adrian Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog; 1987); Lothar Eley (ed.), Hegels Theorie der subjektiven Geistes (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990); Franz Hespe and Burkhant Tuschling (eds.), Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes, Spekulation und Erfahrung (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991); M. Wolff, Das Körper-Seele Problem: Kommentar zu Hegel (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992); and H. Schnädelbach, Hegels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften: Ein Kommentar (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000); Christolph Halbig, Objektives Denken: Erkenntnistheorie und 'Philosophy of Mind' in Hegels System (Frommann-Holzboog, 2002).

contrary, even a cursory examination of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* reveals that it contains material of interest to contemporary philosophy of mind and social science. So we are led to ask, why has the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* fared poorly in scholarly interest by comparison with other dimensions of Hegel's thought? The explanation is to be found in its relative unintelligibility. The reasons for this unintelligibility are not simply inherent in the work itself, but rather in factors surrounding its origins and reception, especially in the English-speaking world. In this section we focus on these factors and on the potential significance of these recently discovered lectures for the study and understanding of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. Those wishing for an account of the main themes of this work and the lectures may skip directly to section II.

The *Philosophy of Spirit* is the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817). Hegel planned to publish an expanded version of the first part, the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, in 1822 as a self-standing parallel volume to the *Philosophy of Right* (1821), which elaborates his philosophy of objective spirit. He began composing an introduction to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, 3 but for unknown reasons abandoned the project; instead, he brought out a revised and greatly expanded second edition of his *Encyclopedia* in 1827. Hegel delivered these lectures shortly after the publication of the 1827 edition.

Hegel's Encyclopedia was published in three editions: 1817, 1827, and 1830.⁴ Each of these editions is an outline of paragraphs from which Hegel lectured. Hegel's procedure was to elaborate and explain this outline in his lectures. This procedure is underscored by the full title of the 1827 edition which reads: 'Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in outline, for use in his lectures.' In a letter to Victor Cousin in July 1827, Hegel wrote '...this book is but a succession of theses, their development and clarification being reserved for the courses...'. In the preface to the 1827

^{3.} Published as Ein Fragment zur Philosophie des Geistes (1822-5) in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, ed. and trans. M. J. Petry, vol. I (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), 90-139.

^{4.} Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel, Theorie Werkausgabe (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), vols. 8–10. English translations of the 1830 edition: Hegel's Logic, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1873, 1975); Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). Hereafter cited as Enc. 1830 with paragraph number. There is a translation of the Encyclopedia 1817 edition by S. Taubeneck (New York: Continuum, 1990), hereafter Enc. 1817. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the 1830 edition. All translations are my own, although I have consulted (and often corrected) the Wallace translation.

^{5.} Hegel: The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christine Seiler (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 640, my italics.

edition, Hegel wrote that 'the pressure for abbreviation which an outline requires causes this second edition to have the same purpose as the first edition, namely, it is to serve as a *Vorlesebuch* that receives its *necessary elaboration and explanation through oral lectures*.' Thus in Hegel's view, the *Encyclopedia* is not a complete stand-alone publication like his *Logic* or *Phenomenology*, but rather a handbook or outline to assist his students in following his lectures. As an outline, the handbook compresses the material almost to the point of unintelligibility; the 'making sense' and explanation of the material was supposed to occur in the lectures. Taken by itself, the published *Encyclopedia* outline is virtually uninterpretable because the oral explanation Hegel deemed necessary for understanding the material is lacking.

Hegel's judgment on his Vorlesebuch has recently been echoed by J. N. Findlay and Herbert Schnädelbach. When Findlay helped to bring out reprints of the Encyclopedia in English, he argued for the inclusion and translation of supplementary materials (Zusätze) compiled from student notes and transcripts of Hegel's lectures. The reason for including the Zusätze, Findlay argued, is that 'Hegel's Encyclopedia was a condensed, arid compendium, put out as a foundation for detailed comment and explanation in lectures. Without such material as provided by the editorial Zusätze, the text of Hegel's Encyclopedia would be largely uninterpretable, a monumental inscription in Linear B.'8 More recently, Herbert Schnädelbach justifies his commentary on Hegel's Encyclopedia thus: 'This commentary is the attempt to make an unreadable book readable. It was not conceived primarily to be read, but for use in [Hegel's] lectures.'9 Beginning with Hegel himself, those familiar with Hegel's Encyclopedia recognize that its numbered paragraphs form an outline so condensed and compressed that they are virtually unintelligible apart from Hegel's lectures. Hegel intended to remedy this situation by publishing a complete Philosophy of Subjective

^{6.} Hegel, Werke, ed. Moldenhauer and Michel, Theorie Werkausgabe, 8:14. My italics.

^{7.} This judgment is not universally accepted. Adriaan Peperzak believes that the 'Haupttext' of the *Encyclopedia* is not only intelligible, but also contains a carefully thought-out argument exhibiting rational necessity. Peperzak locates the proper argumentation of the *Encyclopedia* not in the remarks and illustrations that Hegel added, but 'solely in the main text consisting of paragraphs internally connected to each other' (*Selbsterkenntniss des Absoluten*, 13). Hegel did not go this far. Although he is committed to defending the necessity of thought determinations and transitions, Hegel did not identify logical necessity with the sequence of the paragraphs of the *Encyclopedia*. Rather he characterized the *Encyclopedia* to Victor Cousin as 'but a *succession* of theses whose development and clarification is reserved for the courses' (see n. 7 above).

^{8.} J. N. Findlay, Foreword to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. Miller, p. vii.

^{9.} Schnädelbach, Hegels Enzyklopädie, 11.

Spirit that would, like the *Philosophy* of *Right*, combine the outline with the elaboration provided by the lectures; however this project was never realized.

After Hegel's death, his students who edited and published his collected works also confronted the intelligibility problem. Their solution was to fill in the abstract outline of the Encyclopedia handbook by drawing upon notes and transcripts of Hegel's lectures. Ludwig Boumann was assigned the task of editing and preparing the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Boumann sought to fill in the handbook outline by constructing supplemental notes and additions (Zusätze). For these additions he made use of several (as many as eight) different lecture manuscripts dating from between 1816 and 1830, most of which have been destroyed or lost. 10 Unfortunately, Boumann conflated materials from different years, ignoring and passing over their context in the development of Hegel's thought. In addition Boumann tells us that, owing to the often fragmentary nature of these materials, he had to work hard composing them so that they would not fall below the style and level of the paragraphs of the Vorlesebuch. Boumann engaged in further editorial interpretation by appending these Zusätze to the paragraphs of the 1830 edition, when in fact most of the lectures and the student transcripts were based on the 1817 edition of the Encyclopedia.

While Boumann unquestionably had the advantage of a living memory of a classroom performance to guide him, the disadvantage of Boumann's and other *Zusätze* is that they are editorial constructions and conflations of several transcripts of lectures from different auditors and different years. ¹¹ This conflation of materials does not follow modern editorial practice, which seeks to avoid interpretation of the texts and allows the reader to see for himself changes and/or developments in a writer's thought from one edition or lecture series to another. For these reasons Otto Pöggeler decided to exclude all the *Zusätze* from his edition of the 1830 edition of Hegel's *Encyclopedia*. ¹² Pöggeler and Nicolin produced a much shorter, 'pure' text, to wit, Hegel's original outline.

But what happens to the interpretation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* when the *Zusätze* are excluded? The reader is then confronted with a compressed outline that both Hegel and many scholars regard as

^{10.} Hegel published the *Philosophy of Spirit* as the first part of his *Encyclopedia* in 1817. In Berlin he lectured on the *Philosophy of Spirit* in 1820, 1822, 1825, 1827, and 1830.

^{11.} There are other problems as well: few of the Boumann Zusätze can be independently confirmed from existing Nachschriften of Hegel's lectures which have since been discovered. This does not mean that they are false, only that they cannot be checked and confirmed.

^{12.} G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), ed. Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1959).

nearly unreadable and uninterpretable. No wonder that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has been neglected, because the exclusion of the Zusätze actually occurred in the reception of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the English-speaking world. When William Wallace translated Hegel's Encyclopedia in the nineteenth century, he translated the Zusätze of the Encyclopedia Logic, but not those for the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit. For nearly one hundred years all that English readers had available to them was Hegel's handbook outline. The Boumann Zusätze were not translated into English until J. N. Findlay brought out a second English edition nearly 100 years later in 1971. The result? While there have been several fine studies in English of Hegel's so-called shorter logic (the Encyclopedia logic), there were almost no studies of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit until after the publication of Findlay's edition by Oxford University Press in 1975 and Michael Petry's three-volume edition Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in 1978. 13 This gap in scholarship suggests that Findlay was probably correct in his judgment that without the editorial Zusätze, the text of Hegel's Encyclopedia would be largely uninterpretable. Since 1971, when the Boumann Zusätze were first made available in English translation, at least two significant studies of Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit have appeared in English: Willem de Vries, Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity (1987) and Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel's Theory of Madness (1995). Both studies make use of the Zusätze. Berthold-Bond's study is almost entirely based on three of the Zusätze. In spite of their defects, the Boumann Zusätze have proven to be indispensable.

Until now, scholars interested in Hegel's philosophy of spirit have been confronted by two unattractive alternatives: either confine their examination to the largely uninterpretable handbook outline, or rely upon the Boumann Zusätze. However, thanks to a recent discovery, we now have a complete transcript of one of the lecture courses that Hegel offered on the Philosophy of Spirit. ¹⁴ This transcript allows us to see for the first time

^{13.} Petry's edition is based on the 1830 edition plus the Boumann Zusätze and the currently available transcripts of Hotho (1822), Kehler (1825), and Griesheim (1825).

^{14.} This is a transcript made by one of Hegel's students. It is not a text composed and published by Hegel himself. However, to exclude such transcripts from consideration would be to restrict Hegel scholarship to the *Phenomenology* (1807), the *Logic*, the *Encyclopedia* outline and the *Philosophy of Right*, and would exclude such materials as Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*, *Philosophy of Religion*, *History of Philosophy*, and *Philosophy of History*. These lectures have proven to be important, indispensible sources for the study of Hegel's thought that have both illumined and vastly supplemented the published works; these recently discovered *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit* 1827–8 should also count as an important and valuable supplement to Hegel's *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*.

an entire lecture course on the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. In these lectures Hegel introduced material that goes far beyond anything in the handbook outline or anything previously published. Further, this transcript originates not from different lectures presented at different times, but from one lecture series. This manuscript is not an editorially constructed text like Boumann's *Zusätze*, but a transcript of the entire course, made by a recognized philosopher. Unlike the Boumann *Zusätze*, these materials can be dated with certainty. These lectures are the first course on the *Philosophy of Spirit* that Hegel presented after substantially revising and expanding his handbook in its second (1827) edition in which the *Encyclopedia* achieved its mature, if penultimate, formulation. In these lectures Hegel does not simply repeat the presentation of the handbook, but presents a new introduction to the concept of spirit which differs from all previously published versions.

A word of clarification concerning the title and scope of these lectures. The title of Hegel's lecture course is simply Philosophy of Spirit. However, beginning with second (1827) edition of the Encyclopedia, Hegel systematically distinguished the philosophy of spirit into subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit. Erdmann did not observe these systematic divisions; his manuscript reads 'Hegel. Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit'. Erdmann probably replicated the announcement for Hegel's lectures. However, while the title of the lectures may appear to promise an introduction to the entire philosophy of spirit as a whole, their focus is principally on subjective spirit as Hegel explains: 'Here we consider only the finite spirit, but in it the essential substance is to be spirit. It has this in common with the infinite spirit, to be spirit.'15 It should be noted that the division of spirit into subjective, objective, and absolute does not mean that there are three separate entities. 16 Spirit is a self-organizing totality, and in the 1827 lectures the unifying theme which ties subjective, objective, and absolute spirit together is freedom. Only when spirit comes to be its own object is it free, actual spirit. Only then does the concept of right emerge, grounded in spirit itself. Thus subjective spirit furnishes the deduction of the concept of right presupposed by the Philosophy of Right. 17

^{15.} VPG 1827, 3; see below, p. 57.

^{16.} Iring Fetscher observes that 'every distinction and separation of the...abstract basic divisions of the doctrine of spirit [viz., subjective spirit v. objective spirit] have merely a provisional character, for in truth these elements exist only in and through each other. However, in order to comprehend their vital interpenetration, it is a necessary preliminary to distinguish them' (Hegels Lehre vom Menschen, 22).

^{17.} Subjective spirit grounds objective spirit by providing the concept of right wherein spirit becomes objective. See below, pp. 32–5.

2. HEGEL BETWEEN THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS

There is no consensus concerning the interpretation, much less significance, of Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*. Recently two books have appeared which offer divergent interpretations and estimates of it. ¹⁸ In part the divergence is over the significance of Aristotle and Kant for Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*. Alfredo Ferrarin maintains that Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit* is not only influenced by Aristotle, but that Hegel appropriates the structure of his Psychology and Anthropology from Aristotle's *De Anima*. ¹⁹ Consider what Hegel has to say about Aristotle:

The books of Aristotle concerning the soul with his treatises on its particular aspects and states are still the most outstanding or rather the only work of speculative interest on this subject. The essential purpose of a philosophy of spirit can only be to introduce again the concept into the knowledge of spirit, in order to open up and retrieve the meaning of those Aristotelian books.²⁰

It is rare to find in Hegel such unqualified praise for any philosopher. This seems to forge a connection between Aristotle and Hegel's philosophy of spirit. The philosophy of spirit is intended to be at least in part a retrieval of Aristotle's *De Anima*.

Such a retrieval is necessary because of what Hegel calls the 'deplorable condition' of psychology, which assumes or posits different faculties or powers of the mind which are taken as external to each other and functioning autonomously in isolation. So analyzed and understood, the only connection between these faculties, powers, and forces is an utterly external, coincidental 'also'. This abstractive approach, shared by rationalist and empirical psychologies, splinters and fragments spirit. Such fragmentation loses sight of spirit itself as a coherent living totality. Hegel complains that 'if the activities of spirit are treated as mere manifestations, forces, perhaps in terms stating their utility... for some other interest... there is no indication of the true final end of the whole business. Thom this perspective there is for Hegel no difference between empiricist psychology, rationalist

^{18.} Hermann Drüe, 'Hegels Philosophie des Geistes', in H. Schnädelbach (ed.), Hegels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften: Ein Kommentar (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000), 206–89; Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

^{19.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 252. 20. Enc. 1830, §378.

^{21.} Hegel includes empiricist and rationalist psychology or rational pneumatology in this criticism.

^{22.} VPG 1827, 9-10; see below, p. 63.

^{23.} Enc. 1830, §442A. I have modified the Wallace translation.

pneumatology, or Kant's critical philosophy. Any 'philosophy that pretends to investigate the forms of knowing abstractly, that is, which begins by separating its sources, understanding and sensibility, lacks precisely the fundamental trait of Hegel's retrieval of Aristotle: the unitary consideration of the various forms of living, sensing, knowing and willing as the stages in and through which the teleological process of living subjectivity articulates itself.'²⁴

The organizing principle of the philosophy of spirit is spirit itself. More precisely, spirit must be investigated from the perspective of its self-knowledge, for its self-knowledge—having itself for its own object constitutes its liberation from nature, namely its freedom. Spirit cannot be investigated externally or in investigations of separate faculties; all attempts to do so have had the unsatisfactory result, 'both for the spirit as such and for metaphysics and philosophy generally [that] all attempts to recognize the necessity of what is in and for itself have been abandoned, along with the effort to realize the concept and the truth.'25 The splintering and fragmentation of spirit into discrete faculties and powers contradicts spirit's unity; for the so-called faculties and powers are not actual in abstraction and isolation, but only as they constitute a self-organizing totality. Spirit must be understood as self-organizing and self-knowing. According to Hegel the 'true and final end of this whole business can only be the concept (of spirit) itself, and the activity of the concept can only have itself for its end, to suspend the form of immediacy or subjectivity and to reach and get hold of itself and to liberate itself to itself.'26

Consequently Hegel retrieves Aristotle because the latter helps in overcoming the abstract analytical separation of the various powers of spirit. Aristotle points to the importance of conceiving spirit as a self-conceiving unity, as a corrective to the abstractive understanding: 'The difficulty for the understanding consists in freeing itself from the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the faculties of the soul, between feeling and thinking spirit, and in coming to see that in human beings there is only one reason in feeling, thinking and willing.' According to Alfredo Ferrarin, Aristotle is important for Hegel 'because he understands the soul as an indivisible unity that lives, feels, remembers, thinks, wills, and in which the superior is implicitly present in the inferior, the *Nous* in the lowest functions. Hegel understands this as the negativity of subjectivity which idealizes its inferior

^{24.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 242.

^{25.} Enc. 1817, §367; cf. Enc. 1830, §444.

^{26.} Enc. 1830, §442A. I have modified the Wallace translation.

^{27.} Enc. 1830, §471A.

moments in its progression, so that the *Philosophy of Spirit* appropriates the structure of the *De Anima*, which progresses from the soul's immediate unity with nature to sensation, from the inwardization of experience to thinking and practical will.'²⁸

In contrast to Ferrarin, Hermann Drüe acknowledges that Hegel praises and is apparently indebted to Aristotle, but he denies that Hegel's philosophy of spirit actually follows De Anima. Drüe observes: 'Hegel praises Aristotle as the most important author of all time for psychology, especially the latter's De Anima. However, the powers and functions mentioned in Hegel's psychology are scarcely to be found at all in Aristotle. They belong rather to the funds of late scholastic and enlightenment psychology.'29 For Drüe, Hegel is more indebted to modern figures like Wolff and Kant who are not explicitly mentioned. Drüe acknowledges that Hegel praises Aristotle because the latter does not conceive the soul analogously to a thing, but rather understands it as the energeia or entelechy of the body. But Drüe maintains that the actual material of Hegel's psychology has 'very little in common with Aristotle. It stems chiefly out of the psychology of Christian Wolff, specifically out of his empirical rather than rational psychology which yielded little content. Wolff treated, among other matters, sensation, imagination, memory, understanding, anticipation, affect, will and freedom of choice. These unities were literally taken over by Hegel and grasped together with a finalizing grip as expressions of theoretical and practical spirit.'30

It is possible that Drüe and Ferrarin are both correct. Drüe is correct that the proximate basis of Hegel's reception of Aristotle lies in Kant, Wolff, and Leibniz. Certainly Leibniz's concept of the monad as an entelechy stands in the broad Neo-Aristotelian tradition. However, instead of following such figures as Kant and Wolff, it is rather the case that Hegel frequently criticizes them. Specifically Hegel criticizes Wolff's psychology for abstracting and hypostatizing the faculties, treating them as if they, and not spirit, were subjects.³¹ In contrast, Hegel demands that all the faculties be treated as activities and functions of spirit. It is against this background that Hegel's well-known criticism of Kant's critical philosophy for separating reason from sensibility can be appreciated.

^{28.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 252.

^{29.} Drüe, 'Hegel's philosophie des Geistes', 215. 30. Ibid., 282.

^{31.} See Franz Hespe, 'System und Funktion der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes', in Hespe and Tuschling (eds.), *Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes*, 517-21.

On the other hand, Hegel does not simply repeat Aristotle either. Hegel identifies 'Know yourself' as the basic imperative of spirit, and regards it as a condition of spirit's achieving its vocation. It is self-knowledge which unifies the various faculties, powers, and/or functions of spirit. On this issue Hegel acknowledges and praises Kant: 'one of Kant's great contributions to philosophy consists in his distinction between relative or *external*, and *internal* purposiveness. In the latter he has opened up the concept of life...'32 Unfortunately Kant compromised his own contribution when he interpreted teleology as a merely subjective maxim, and thus failed to examine 'the sole question to which philosophic interest demands an answer,' to wit, whether the principle is true.³³

Taking our cue from Hegel's praise of Kant, the gulf between Hegel and Aristotle may be appreciated by considering that Aristotle takes the soul to be a part of nature; thus the *De Anima* is part of natural philosophy.³⁴ Since the soul emerges in nature, it is treated as part of nature. Aristotle conceives the self-actualization of the human soul in terms of the scheme of potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). So conceived, this natural model implies that there is an essential human nature which prescribes an end to be realized (as an oak tree is the end prescribed by nature to an acorn). If so, then for Aristotle reason is not self-determining, but is rather more nearly instrumental, namely, it realizes a pre-determined end given by nature. To be sure, this model does not capture the whole of Aristotle's view of the soul or of freedom. In Nicomachean Ethics, for example, Aristotle holds that virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, 35 and this implies some conception of freedom. Nevertheless, even Ferrarin concedes that there is no equivalent to the modern conception of will or freedom in Aristotle.36

In contrast to Aristotle's apparently naturalistic doctrine of the soul, Hegel maintains that in the modern view of the human subject, the will, freedom, becomes its own object and its own end. It is for-itself; the subject is self-grounding and self-determining in a far more radical and fundamental sense than Aristotle and the ancients recognize. In Hegel's

^{32.} Hegel, Science of Logic trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 737. I have modified the translation.

^{33.} Ibid., 739.

^{34.} Aristotle, *De Anima* I, 403a25 ff. The only exception in Aristotle's psychology is the active *Nous*, which is capable of existing and functioning apart from the other natural psychic powers, including passive *Nous* (I, 413b25 ff.). Active *Nous* is not part of nature; it is separable, and thus studied not by physics but by first philosophy or metaphysics.

^{35.} Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1103a23-5.

^{36.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 330 ff.

view, Aristotle and the ancient Greeks conceived the human being 'as free within nature...as remaining confined within nature...advancing to pure thought only in philosophy but not in religion...being bogged down in what corresponds in thought to immediacy.'37 In contrast, modernity arises when the human being suspends immediacy and raises itself to a consciousness of absolute or infinite spirit, a raising up which begins in religion. This confrontation of human spirit with infinite spirit has two important consequences for understanding the modern subject: (1) The human spirit is, in comparison to infinite spirit, reduced to finitude, i.e., to limited, natural spirit. It becomes mortal finitude. (2) 'In another respect however it is through this very relation which comes into being with this comparison, that the human spirit has won a wholly free foundation within itself, and thus has given itself another relation to nature, namely, that of being independent of it.'38 The human being, although finite and mortal, is for itself, to wit, self-grounding and self-determining, its own object and end. On the one hand, the human being is not infinite or divine, but finite, part of nature; on the other hand, the human being is the image of God (imago dei). In its capacity of self-determination spirit is independent of nature.

For Hegel, spirit's capacity to be self-grounding and to be its own end have a logical priority over nature. While spirit does emerge out of nature as Aristotle contended, this emergence

must not be so conceived as though nature were the absolute immediate, the first, the original positing, and spirit only something posited by nature. Rather nature is posited by spirit, and spirit is the absolute first. Spirit existing in and for itself is not the mere result of nature, but in truth, spirit is its own result. It brings itself forth from presuppositions that it constructs for itself, from the logical idea and from external nature: spirit is the truth of both...The appearance that spirit is mediated through an other [nature] is thus suspended by spirit itself, because spirit has, so to speak, the sovereign ingratitude to suspend that through which it appears to be mediated, to mediate its mediator, to reduce its mediator to something that exists and endures only through spirit. In this way spirit makes itself completely independent. This implies that the transition from nature to spirit is not a transition to something utterly other, but only a process wherein spirit comes to itself out of its self-externality in nature. Just as little is the specific distinction between nature and spirit suspended, because spirit does not proceed out of nature in a natural way.³⁹

The priority of nature over spirit is suspended by spirit itself in its selfdevelopment. While Hegel expresses this suspension too negatively when he

^{37.} Hegel, Ein Fragment zur Philosophie des Geistes (1822-5), in M. J. Petry (ed.), Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, 93.

^{38.} Ibid. 39. Enc. 1830, §381 Zusatz. Italics mine.

says that nature 'has disappeared' in spirit, ⁴⁰ a closer reading reveals that it is only nature's immediacy and absolute priority that are suspended. Nature does not simply disappear, but continues on a higher level in spirit. ⁴¹

Nature continues to be the indispensable other of spirit. This is why Hegel considers Aristotle to be so important. Spirit begins in 'slumbering' subjection to nature; it must negate the immediacy of nature, and come to itself in and through a suspension of the externality and priority of nature. Spirit 'is absolute negativity, because in nature the concept has its complete but external objectivity, has suspended this its externalization, and in this suspension has become identical with itself. Spirit is this identity only as it returns to itself out of nature.'42 Hegel's retrieval of Aristotle is not a simple repetition. Although spirit emerges from nature, it does not emerge in a natural way, or by natural causality. Spirit is self-grounding and self-liberating. The point that needs to be kept in mind is that, given the sublation (Aufhebung) of nature in self-grounding spirit, the meaning of the terms Hegel appropriates from Aristotle such as energeia (Wirklichkeit, Tätigkeit, Aktuosität), dynamis (Möglichkeit, an sich), active and passive Nous, as well as the transition from possible to actual, self-actualization, and teleology itself, all undergo a corresponding transformation when they are removed from the context of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, and become employed in the philosophy of spirit. As self-grounding and free, spirit suspends its natural origins, opposes itself to nature and through such opposition comes to be for itself. Spirit may be conceived teleologically; however its telos is not predetermined by nature but rather is to be for itself, i.e., free.

3. DIVISIONS AND TOPICS IN PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

Hegel's introduction to the 1827 lectures follows none of the published handbook outlines. Spirit's free self-development is the central organizing

^{40.} Enc. 1830, §381.

^{41.} This becomes clear in Hegel's account of habit (*Gewohnheit*). See also Hespe: 'the overcoming of natural determinacies and the liberation from natural sentience, inclinations and feelings, does not mean...that nature and the natural sentience, inclinations and feelings disappear, but rather that the soul constitutes them as aspects of its own totality and subordinates them to this totality' ('System and function der philosophie des subjektiven Geistes', 503).

^{42.} Enc. 1830, §381.

principle of the lectures. Hegel's answer to the question 'What is Spirit?' is that 'spirit is this movement, this process, this activity of going out of nature and of liberating itself from nature.... The nature of spirit is to be this absolute liveliness, to be this process itself, namely, of proceeding out of its natural origins and natural immediacy, to abandon and suspend these conditions and thus to come to itself, to free itself. Spirit is only as it comes to itself, it exists only as it produces itself. Its actuality is only that it has made itself to be what it is.'43 Hegel elaborates this concept of spirit's freedom as its vocation or end, and makes spirit's self-development the theme and organizing principle of his 1827 lectures:

The vocation of spirit is to make itself be what it is in itself.... The absolute predisposition or substance of spirit is its freedom, and the vocation of its acting, the act of spirit, is to liberate itself. That spirit is free in itself, that its efficacy, its activity, is to liberate itself, and the history of its liberation—this is what our discipline is all about: It is our task to watch spirit achieving by itself its vocation, namely, freedom. Thereby both the content and the point of view are given from which we want to consider this discipline. We examine the series of stages through which spirit liberates itself, and the goal is that spirit becomes free, as free spirit. 44

The narrative tells the story of spirit's triumph over externality. The triumph over externality begins with the simplest organic life, proceeds to the opposition of spirit in the struggle for recognition, and culminates in the emergence of free spirit, to wit, spirit for itself (fürsichsein).

In the living organism, the material parts cease to be isolated bits of matter external to each other and instead become members of the self-organizing organic union and process. The organic union itself is not another part; it is immaterial, ideal, and it communicates itself to its members by organizing them and overcoming their mutual externality. The organism as such is a triumph over externality because it is a self-organizing, self-producing, living totality that pervades and is present in all its members. But it is not yet for itself. It is not yet the human soul, but the soul of nature (*Naturgeist*). Hegel speaks of soul as *Naturgeist*, spirit immersed in nature, as slumbering spirit. Spirit's immersion in nature is treated in the Anthropology. However, the decisive point is that the 'nature' of spirit is not to be mere nature, but rather to break with and oppose itself to nature. The Phenomenology corresponds to the first stage of liberation; it treats the emergence of the I in opposition to nature in the struggle for recognition and the development of a universal consciousness and social reason. Third,

^{43.} Kehler MSS. Petry (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, I. 6.

^{44.} VPG 1827, 7; see below, pp. 60-1.

the topic of the Psychology is spirit as having liberated itself, having come to be for itself and at home in its world. Accordingly, the basic divisions of the *Philosophy of Spirit* are as follows: (1) Spirit in its immediacy, as immersed in and dependent on nature: Anthropology. (2) Spirit emergent from and in opposition to nature: Phenomenology. The human being emerges from nature through the struggle for recognition and achieves an intersubjectively mediated universal consciousness or spirit. Spirit comes to be for itself only in and through the recognition of an other. Spirit is Hegel's corrective to the modern (Cartesian) conception of subjectivity. (3) Spirit for itself, the drive to suspend its apparent subjectivity: Psychology. Theoretical and Practical Spirit.⁴⁵

4. ANTHROPOLOGY: SLUMBERING SPIRIT

The material in the anthropology section was originally discussed under the general rubric of soul. The starting point is soul in general or soul of nature, but Hegel quickly narrows his focus to the human soul. The material treated here is much wider in scope than might be expected from the title 'anthropology'. Hegel ranges over cosmology, the solar system, to the earthly body, geography, geographic distinctions, to continents, to racial differences and physiognomy.⁴⁶

The *Naturgeist* is spirit not yet for itself, but rather immersed in nature, i.e., in subjection to and determination by natural influences. Hegel identifies the *Naturgeist* with the passive *Nous* of Aristotle. ⁴⁷ Slumbering spirit is the possibility of actual or free spirit. The range of topics he discusses under the rubric of spirit in nature includes embodiment, physiology, sentience, the influence of natural phenomena such as climate, weather, stars on human life, as well as sleeping and waking. Also included are race and gender, as well as illness, including dementia. As spirit gradually liberates itself from nature, natural conditions are supposed to have less influence and become more marginal. Spirit's process of liberation aims at transforming natural givens into its own posits, thereby not eliminating nature but transforming and pervading it.

^{45.} Düsing claims that the basic logical determinations of being (immediate abstract being), essence (relation, opposition) and concept (totality) underlie these divisions. See Klaus Düsing, 'Endliche und Absolute Subjektivität', in L. Eley (ed.), *Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990), 48–9.

^{46.} Hegel's perspective on geography and race is Eurocentric.

^{47.} VPG 1827, 27; see below, p. 77.

A. Animal Magnetism and Clairvoyance

Hegel criticizes the empiricist and rationalist psychologies of his day. Their abstract causal-mechanical analyses and their categories are inadequate to deal with the vitality and freedom of spirit. Equally important is Hegel's recognition of the significance of the empirical phenomenon of hypnotism (animal magnetism). This phenomenon cannot be explained within the dualistic and causal-mechanical schemes of psychology. Animal magnetism presents a direct, non-causally mediated influence between subjects. Thus it eludes the basic conceptual framework of empiricist psychology, pneumatology, etc. Hegel does not mean that animal magnetism cannot be explained at all; he is raising the question as to what counts as a suitable explanation while denying that causal-mechanical explanations are sufficient. Hegel does not believe that animal magnetism and hypnotism provide access to a superior epistemological position, much less reveal 'higher truths.' Rather such phenomena are evidence that spirit can fall below its level and regress into quasi-natural immediacy and dependence. 48 The phenomenon of hypnotism highlights the inadequacy of rationalist psychology and demonstrates the necessity of an alternative position such as his own. Hegel understands his own philosophical doctrine to be both connected with and capable of resolving these anomalous phenomena.⁴⁹

Although spirit is supposed to undergo a progressive development from lower to higher levels and thus liberate itself from nature, a dysteleological

48. This observation opens up the possibility for understanding madness as a regression.

^{49.} See deVries, Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity, 28. The following text from a fragment of the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel wrote in 1822-5 clarifies and supports this contention: 'But in the experience of animal magnetism it is in the region of external phenomena itself that the rational connection of causes and effects together with its conditions of spatio-temporal determinations, loses its sense and validity. And within the sensible existence itself and its conditions, the higher nature of spirit makes itself valid and becomes apparent. Later it will be shown that the phenomena of animal magnetism do not transcend the concept of spirit, do not transcend or elude its thinking and its reason, and that on the contrary, these phenomena belong to a state and stage of development in which spirit is sick, and is reduced to and sunk below the power of its true worth to a lower existence. Thus it is folly and a false hope to see in the phenomena of this animal magnetism an elevation of spirit and an opening of depths more profound than its thinking concept. Rather it is these phenomena in the field of experience itself which compel us to call upon the concept of spirit and which make it no longer permissible to remain with the conceptless comprehension of spirit according to ordinary psychology and the so-called natural process of things. The ideality of the sensible-rational distinction, in general the ideality of finite determinations manifest in these phenomena, is what gives them a kinship with philosophy. Ideality also has reconciling importance for history, in which, under the name of miracles, so many phenomena have been mishandled and rejected by the understanding, which assumes as its measure of truth the external connection of causes and effects, and the conditional character of sensible existence (Fragment on Philosophy of Spirit 1822-5, in Petry (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, I, 99, my translation).

regression to a lower level or stage of development is always possible. In short, spirit can become ill. Such regressions are possible because the lower levels/stages are present in the higher, but present as suspended (aufgehoben). In regressions such as dementia, this suspension breaks down, and the organism becomes divided against itself.

Such regression also occurs, Hegel believes, in animal magnetism and clairvoyance. These are discussed under the subdivision of 'dreaming soul'. Dreaming soul involves the concept of self-feeling in which the soul is a sentient totality but not yet in control of itself. It is a pre-conscious condition and some interpreters find in it a Hegelian version of the unconscious mind. Self-feeling is the beginning, but only the beginning, of the differentiation of spirit from nature. Spirit is not yet for itself, much less in control of itself; it is unstable and thus susceptible to control by other. This condition is present in animal magnetism and hypnotic suggestion. In hypnotism a person comes under the influence of and depends on another. This is unusual because it is a direct, unmediated psychic dependence. The puzzle is how this is possible. Causal explanations are inadequate.

In clairvoyance, feeling replaces the sense of sight: it is not the eye that sees, but the self-feeling (Selbstgefühl). But what is seen? Is clairvoyance or the hypnotic trance a revelation of some superior wisdom? Hegel denies that it is: the clairvoyant sees no further than himself or than the hypnotizer. Thus these phenomena do not constitute a 'higher condition' of insight, but rather a reduction of the human being to natural sentience. Hegel regards this 'sight' not as a superior insight, but as passivity, as weakness of spirit.

B. Dementia

Dementia or madness is also a disrupted or arrested self-feeling in which a human being regresses to a lower condition or state. Dementia is not just a mental problem, it is both spiritual and physical. Hegel considers dementia as an illness, namely a breakdown of organic function and process. The self-feeling does not develop normally into a shared, common lifeworld and rationality; rather it becomes a flight from the world. The self-feeling is projected as if it were objective, and displaces objective reality apprehension. Hence dementia is a deficit in world relation.⁵¹

50. See Berthold-Bond, Hegel's Theory of Madness.

^{51.} Hegel's account of dementia resembles aspects of his analysis of the beautiful soul in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, \$658 (trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)). Hegel's discussion of the beautiful soul portrays it as in flight from the world into subjectivity, while projecting an ideal fantasy world that it fancies as higher than the real world of action.

Hegel identifies three forms/stages of dementia: (1) imbecility, (2) folly, and (3) frenzy. Hegel observes that frenzy can be influenced by a sense of unjust treatment, of victimization, and he points out that it can turn into complete distrust of others and malice. Hegel's theory of dementia presupposes a fundamental ontology of human being that articulates universal structures, features, and possibilities that are shared by both the sane and the demented. Hegel agrees with Pinel that the demented are not subhuman beasts, but rather share a common humanity and rationality. Dementia thus lies on a continuum of universal human possibilities. It plays upon and distorts these fundamental capacities and possibilities.

In Hegel's view, this recognition has important implications for the treatment of dementia. Outside of their specific subjective folly, the demented are rational human beings who have a sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice, and the treatment of their dementia must address this sense. 52 So the treatment of dementia should begin not by attacking the subjective folly, but by seeking to engage the demented on the presupposition of their fundamental humanity. The goal of therapy is to re-engage the patient with the world and with others. One way to do this is to engage the patient in work. In this respect Hegel follows Pinel. However the point of such work is not external to the work itself, such as obtaining cheap slave labor, or training people to become docile laborers or an efficient, productive work force as Foucault has suggested. Rather Hegel believes that the therapeutic significance of work must reside in work itself, because work is an engagement with the world: 'The first point is that one seeks to occupy the demented outside of their dementia; through some other interest one seeks to engage them in work. To work means to become interested in a cause, to become interested in a cause outside of subjectivity.'53 If dementia involves a flight from the world into subjective self-feeling, working, i.e., interest and engagement in a cause, can break the solipsism of dementia by engaging a person with the world and with others.

Since dementia is in part a deficit in world-relation and projection of a fixed idea based in self-feeling, any treatment of dementia presupposes a relation of communication and trust between the demented and

The beautiful soul does not act, but substitutes its subjective fancies and ideals for action. But precisely because it is a flight from actuality and action, the freedom and autonomy of the beautiful soul are merely negative, without determinacy and without actuality. As Hegel notes, such abstract freedom may end in dementia. This observation may also refer to his friend the poet Hölderlin. See Berthold-Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness*.

^{52.} VPG 1827, 120; see below, p. 149.

^{53.} Ibid., 120; see below, p. 150.

their overseers and therapists. Trusting another human being is an act of self-transcendence that presupposes mutual recognition. Hegel maintains that trust is the beginning and origin of objectivity. ⁵⁴ However, Hegel also insists that the trust of the demented is something that must actually be earned by the therapist. Without this proviso, the relation of the therapist to the demented might be simply another form of master and slave.

Hegel observes that the demented can be easily deceived. This fact complicates treatment. On the one hand, it makes it more convenient and easy to dominate and control them. But such coercion and domination ultimately undermines therapy and may itself contribute to dementia insofar as dementia may result from harsh and unfair treatment. Hegel concedes that some deception may be necessary for reasons of health and safety. However, Hegel insists that even if it is justified, deception cannot be allowed to stand⁵⁵ for then the demented would never become aware of their folly. Such deception and resulting false consciousness would not only undermine the treatment, but also may produce dementia. So any deception must ultimately be revealed and overcome: no genuine cure of dementia can rest upon or result from deception or lies.

Finally, Hegel's account of habit shows an Aristotelian heritage formulated in terms of a modern understanding of subjective freedom. On the one hand, Hegel portrays habit as a break with nature; the formation of habit is a liberation from natural immediacy and inclinations because the self trains and disciplines itself. Habit is an acquired adroitness. But on the other hand, habit is an acquired capacity or structure of behavior. In reference to the will, it is a second nature, a kind of pre-reflective necessity. Habit is a structure of continuous willing that no longer needs to be willed. It is characterized by hardness, and is difficult to change or modify. I am this habit; habit is a second nature that I have created and cultivated. Thus, in habit, freedom has started to become a second nature.

5. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

The Phenomenology of the *Encyclopedia* differs from the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The latter was intended to be an introduction to Hegel's system, whereas the former is part of the system. The Phenomenology of the system is considerably abbreviated. It is no longer an archeology of knowledge from sense certainty to understanding, reason and spirit to

^{54.} Ibid., 120; see below, p. 150.

^{56.} Ibid., 125; see below, p. 154.

absolute knowing, but rather is confined to an exploration of one stage of spirit's development; specifically it focuses on consciousness as the sphere of difference and opposition.⁵⁷ It charts the emergence of the I, and the opposition between the I and its objects. The Phenomenology is supposed to show the development from the I in its immediacy, wherein it takes itself to be a bare, abstract, self-seeking particular, through the struggle for recognition and master/slave, to the I which through reciprocal recognition has become a universal consciousness, a 'We'. The 'We' in turn grounds reason and rationality. Consciousness is transformed from the abstract I = I, into self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is transformed through reciprocal recognition into an intersubjectively constituted universal consciousness. This development is propelled by difference or opposition. The gradual overcoming of opposition means that the subject discovers itself in its other.

While Aristotle understood the human soul to be part of and fundamentally continuous with nature (with the exception of the active *Nous* or intellect), the Phenomenology focuses on spirit's negativity: as consciousness, spirit is capable of opposing itself to nature, including its own life. Spirit's vocation is to liberate itself from nature. It does not serve a pre-given natural end; rather, it seeks freedom, and its task is to liberate itself, to become its own object. Spirit does not proceed from nature in a natural way, but rather must suspend its natural immediacy. This occurs in a struggle for recognition.

The struggle for recognition depicts the emergence of spirit from nature in two stages. The first is the life and death struggle; this struggle culminates in master/slave. Master/slave resolves the contradiction of the original encounter, but propounds a new contradiction, namely a relation based on coercion and domination. The overcoming of this second contradiction is the second stage; it occurs in mutual recognition. Spirit comes to be for itself in an intersubjectively mediated process. In the process of mutual recognition the I and its other mutually liberate themselves from their immediacy to a free, self-actualized togetherness. Now each 'I' is also a 'We'. Freedom and self-actualization are thus intersubjectively mediated. It is through such mediation that spirit has itself, to wit, its freedom, as its own end. This freedom is a universal freedom, a mediated autonomy which is both communal—involving a plurality of others—and rational—involving objectivity and equality in accordance with the concept of law.

^{57.} The 1817 Philosophy of Spirit distinguishes three stages in spirit's development: Soul, Consciousness, Spirit. These were later replaced in the second 1827 edition with the titles Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology respectively. The second stage—Consciousness—constitutes a sphere of opposition, which is overcome in spirit.

Mutual recognition grounds a socially constituted reason. Although this 'phenomenology of the system' is shorter than the 1807 *Phenomenology*, it remains important because here Hegel presents a positive account of mutual recognition as an affirmative self-knowledge in other.⁵⁸

Commentators have been perplexed by this dense section and disagree over its significance. For example, Adriaan Peperzak maintains that 'The entire sense of the "struggle for recognition" in the *Encyclopedia* phenomenology does not at all consist in a thematization of intersubjectivity (there is no talk of speaking, thinking, willing, acting, right and exchange), but only in a process through which the immediate or abstract self-consciousness must become an other for itself in order to be able to identify with itself.' ⁵⁹ The other of consciousness is consciousness itself as other, i.e., self-consciousness. This reading reduces Hegel's account of recognition to a monosubjectival theory and places Hegel in the Cartesian–Kantian philosophy of the subject. ⁶⁰

Hermann Drüe has a different interpretation. Contrary to Peperzak, he observes that for Hegel self-consciousness exists for itself only in and through another self-consciousness, and so requires intersubjective recognition. Thus according to Drüe, Hegel intends to show that universal consciousness and reason are intersubjectively mediated and constituted. However, Drüe believes that Hegel's account of self-consciousness is not intended as a description of the actual development of consciousness, but is rather a logical-conceptual construction, 'a historicising fiction of social constitution comparable to Freud's project in *Totem and Taboo*. Hegel's theory of self-consciousness is therefore one part a conceptual construction and one part an historical fiction.' The fiction is that the state of nature is to be understood as a struggle for recognition, a *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Against such a Hobbesian background, Drüe finds it implausible

^{58.} See Franz Hespe, 'System und Funktion der Philosophie der subjektiven Geistes', in Hespe and Tuschling (eds.), *Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes*, 509–10. As Hespe notes, Hegel identifies the philosophies of Kant and Fichte as dwelling in but failing to resolve the oppositions of consciousness which are constitutive of the phenomenology. Hegel's account in the phenomenology culminates in the constitution of a universal consciousness through reciprocal recognition that not only constitutes reason, but also reveals the Kantian and Fichtean philosophies of finitude to be versions of the false or spurious infinity.

^{59.} Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 40.

^{60.} This reading reduces affirmative self-knowledge in other constitutive of spirit to a self-identification in otherness. It is a one-sided reading that misses what is distinctive in Hegel's concept of spirit: its genesis in mutual recognition, and the intersubjective structure of ethical life

^{61.} Drüe, 'Hegels Philosophie des Geistes', in Schnädelbach (ed.), Hegels Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 260-61.

that master and slave culminates in mutual recognition and liberation. He dismisses this as purely conceptual construction, 'a classicist idyll'. 62

Finally, Franz Hespe, the co-editor of the 1827 lectures, has yet another view. He maintains that for Hegel self-consciousness is possible only in relation to an other, and adequately realized only in relation to another self-consciousness for Hegel is possible only in relation to another self-consciousness and thus only intersubjectively possible. This reference to intersubjective conditions of possibility of self-consciousness is not to be understood simply as an expression of empirical fact, [namely the fact of intersubjectivity,] but rather articulates what self-consciousness is according to its very concept.'63 Hespe cites the 1827 lectures in support of his interpretation: 'the material in which the I and freedom can be realized is only another self-consciousness. The latter is the reality, the objectivity, and the externality of the first.'64 The I comes to be for itself only through the mediation (recognition) of another.

The *Philosophy of Spirit* may be read, as Peperzak does, as a philosophy of the subject. On the other hand, Hegel's remarks, examples, and illustrations are clearly intersubjective. In the 1827 lectures Hegel asserts: '...in order for me to have self-consciousness, it is necessary to know myself in an other.' Only another subject can objectify the self and make it available to itself as an object; thus the other is a condition of being for self (*fürsichsein*). This is the point that Hespe makes when he asserts that for Hegel self-consciousness is already intersubjective in its concept. Peperzak's interpretation can be maintained only by ignoring Hespe's point, and by excluding much of what Hegel says in his remarks that amplify that point. Consider the following text:

There are two real, independent beings confronting each other.... They are both personally, absolutely independent, and nevertheless they are for each other. Thus I know that the other is an I, but in its appearance it confronts me like a thing, like something completely external to me. This is the highest contradiction—the most perfect indifference towards each other, and [yet] perfect unity and identity. The

^{62.} Ibid., 261.

^{63.} Hespe, 'System und Funktion des Philosophie des Subjektiven Geistes', in Hespe and Tuschling (eds.), *Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes*, 511. Italics mine. Iring Fetscher makes a similar point: the relevant objectification of consciousness in self-knowledge is not one that one can give oneself, but one that requires an other consciousness. The 'object' is another subject, for only another subject can objectify me and thus make me available to myself as a totality. See Fetscher, *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen*, 125.

^{64.} Ibid., German manuscript 155, VPG 1827, 170; see below, p. 190.

^{65.} VPG 1827, 144; see below, pp. 170, 193.

sublation of the contradiction—for it cannot remain a contradiction—is the process of recognition. ⁶⁶

Only an extremely narrow reading of the *Philosophy of Spirit* would suppress texts like this one. Hegel does not accept, but rather seeks to correct and transform the modern philosophy of the subject. Recognition is his anti-Cartesian, anti-Kantian corrective.

A. Reciprocal Recognition, Spirit, and the Concept of Right

It is well known that Hegel's account of the process of recognition develops it initially in terms of a life and death struggle (Hegel's account of the state of nature). Next comes master/slave as an unequal recognition that puts an end to the violence of the state of nature while institutionalizing coercion, domination, and inequality. The master is recognized by the slave, but does not recognize the slave; the slave recognizes the master, but is not recognized by the master. Thus master and slave are constituted by an asymmetrical, unequal recognition. This account is presented in one of the most famous passages in Hegel's 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Less well appreciated is Hegel's view that the coercion and inequalities of master/slave must be suspended and transcended; the unequal recognition founded on coercion is one-sided and constitutes an incomplete intersubjective mediation. This incomplete mediation means that master and slave are unfree, deficiently actual, a relationship that is unstable because of its inequality and asymmetry. This deficient, incomplete mediation must be overcome. Reciprocal recognition overcomes the asymmetry and inequality and completes the process of mediation that was short-circuited in the one-sided recognition of master/slave. Only through reciprocal recognition is an affirmative self-knowledge in other possible. Such affirmative self-knowledge can be accomplished only jointly and mutually, and this reciprocity constitutes the universal self-consciousness or spirit, the I that is a We. This point is developed in the *Phenomenology* of the system.

Hegel characterizes the universal consciousness as 'the affirmative knowledge of itself in another self...' that involves a 'real universality as mutuality when it knows itself recognized in a free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it as free.' In his remark, Hegel adds:

This universal reappearance of self-consciousness [affirmative self-knowledge in other], the concept, that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with

66. VPG 1827, 166-7; see below, p. 187.

67. Enc. 1830, §436.

itself, is the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality, of the family, of the fatherland, of the state, and also the form of all the virtues, love, friendship, bravery, honor and fame.⁶⁸

The universal consciousness constituted through reciprocal recognition is the universal structure inherent in the intersubjectivities and institutions of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Iring Fetscher emphasizes that this universal self-consciousness constituted through reciprocal recognition is for Hegel the existential genesis of reason and rationality:

Reciprocal recognition... is the *Urform*, the fundamental phenomenon, of the reason realizing itself in human experience. This universal consciousness is the fundamental form, the structure of both the social consciousness (*Gesellschaftsbewusstsein* or We consciousness) and of the individual consciousness that knows itself to be universally valid and rational. This universal consciousness constitutes the foundation, the substance of any essential spirituality (institution).... Consequently the universal self-consciousness is not only the human phenomenal form of the ontological principle, (Idea)—the idea is the true in and for itself, the absolute unity of concept and objectivity—but also the foundation and substance of ethical life.⁶⁹

Fetscher underscores the point that both the 'We' and the 'I' are grounded in reciprocal recognition; both constitute the universal consciousness. The universal consciousness is not a pre-recognitive, solitary recluse but the accomplishment of mutual recognition. Hegel maintains that all the institutions of ethical life, as well as all the virtues have this intersubjective-universal structure as their substantial basis; all are particular specifications of the universal consciousness.

Hegel illustrates what affirmative self-knowledge in other looks like with references to intersubjective phenomena such as love and friendship.

The process of consciousness that we are considering, is the realization of the concept. What is posited in the concept in its simplicity—the ideality of the other and the unity of the two—is the abstract. The reality is that each of these moments obtains a concrete meaning, that each of these moments itself is the concept as a whole. Thus in friendship the two sides constitute this whole. Each [is] I, and I in such a way that the I, since it is not merely an unyielding individual, but has suspended itself, has negated itself and has its conscious relation to itself in the self-consciousness of the other.⁷⁰

^{68.} Ibid. 69. Fetscher, Hegels Lehre vom Menschen, 120. Italics mine.

^{70.} VPG 1827, 144; see below, p. 170. Ferdinand Walter heard Hegel say: 'In friendship and love, I exist not simply for myself but am in an other and yet independent. Here therefore are two, so that both are no longer the abstract moment of the whole concept...'.

Later Hegel elaborated the intersubjective structure of mutual recognition inherent in love, friendship, and ethical life. Hegel not only agrees with but affirms Aristotle's view that all the virtues are relational and social.

In order for me to have self-consciousness it is necessary to know myself in an other. Thus insofar as I lose my self-consciousness in an other, I also know myself affirmatively in the other. Here the limit or restriction that previously was immanent in desire and self-seeking is concealed.

Self-consciousness thus reaches beyond itself; it continues in an other selfconsciousness so that there are no longer two self-seeking individuals opposed to each other, but rather a single self-consciousness, and thus it is a universal self-consciousness. Insofar as it is a particular it is separate from the other. These abstract determinations are present in much more concrete forms. The substance of this self-consciousness is the universality—of a self-knowledge that leaves behind self-seeking [particularity] and that continues itself in union with the other. This condition is found in love.... All the virtues have this foundation, as does love....Since the human being appears to lose himself, he cannot endure in his isolation but is in need of another consciousness. Thus he loses himself [in another]. But precisely [in] this condition of self-externality (Ausserlichkeit), of being beyond the limits of his individuality, he gains his substantial self-consciousness. This [condition of self-externality, of being beyond oneself] is the condition of being recognized. In an ethical totality such as a family or a state, all are recognized. Thus [in mutual recognition] the struggle for recognition has disappeared.71

These formulations strongly support Axel Honneth's contention, quite correct in my opinion, that the concept of love lies at the core of Hegel's theory of ethical life. ⁷²

The achievement of the intersubjective universal self-consciousness constitutes Hegel's deduction of the concept of right. It is well known that the *Philosophy of Right* does not provide the deduction or justification of the concept of right; rather it presupposes that deduction from elsewhere, namely subjective spirit.⁷³ But where in subjective spirit does this occur? Tuschling believes that the 1827 lectures are important because they provide the explicit grounding of the concept of right that is promised but in fact

^{71.} VPG 1827, 174; see below, p. 194. My italics.

^{72.} Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, trans. J. Anderson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 107.

^{73.} Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §2.

missing from the published handbook outline.⁷⁴ Consider the following remark from the lectures:

That spirit is free in itself, that its efficacy, its activity, is to liberate itself, and the history of its liberation—this is what our discipline is all about: It is our task to watch spirit achieving by itself its vocation, namely, freedom.... We examine the series of stages through which spirit liberates itself, and the goal is that spirit becomes free, as free spirit. With this liberation the science of objective spirit, i.e., the spirit that is objective to itself, begins, and with this liberation right and law begin.⁷⁵

In contrast, Allen Wood maintains that the concept of right is 'deduced' not in subjective spirit, but in objective spirit. ⁷⁶ Wood's view is incorrect. While right is discussed in objective spirit as co-extensive with the existence of freedom, this discussion presupposes that spirit is already on the objective level. As such it presupposes rather than delivers the requisite deduction of right. And it overlooks the crucial point, namely, the concept of right, which Hegel defines broadly as any determinate existence of freedom,⁷⁷ is co-extensive with whole domain of objective spirit. Right is not simply part of that domain; rather it grounds and co-constitutes that domain. As the 1827 lectures make clear, right is grounded in the transition from subjective to objective spirit, and this transition is effected in and mediated by mutual recognition. Recognition provides not only the self-actualization and liberation of spirit from nature, this self-actualization of spirit in mutual recognition also constitutes the grounding of both the concept of right and objective spirit. Hegel links the deduction of right with the liberation and self-actualization of spirit as universal consciousness and reason. The liberation of spirit is its mediated self-actualization in freedom where it has itself for its object, and constitutes itself as objective spirit.

^{74.} Burkhard Tuschling underscores the importance of this manuscript for the deduction of the concept of right from the concept of spirit: here alone is the deduction of right presupposed by the *Philosophy of Right* actually delivered. According to Tuschling, 'Right is spirit, objective spirit because freedom is the substance of spirit, both finite and infinite spirit.... The consolidation of subjective spirit within itself as the self-actualization of objective spirit, this synthetic conception of spirit with freedom, subjectivity and right, does not occur in his magnum opus [*Philosophy of Right*], nor in the first or second editions of the *Encyclopedia*, but occurs for the first time here in this lecture...' (VPG 1827, pp. xxix–xxxi).

^{75.} VPG 1827, 7; see below, p. 61.

^{76.} Philosophy of Right, §2, p. 392, n. 1. He refers to §§485-7 of the 1830 Encyclopedia. Wood wrote this before the discovery of the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit.

^{77.} Philosophy of Right, §29.

B. Recognition and Self-Actualization

Recognition is not only connected to the deduction of right, it also mediates the self-realization and self-actualization of freedom. In his analysis of recognition, Hegel shows that the self's relation to itself (fürsichsein) is mediated by its relation to other, by the other's recognition. Hence without recognition the individual self would be deficiently self-related and deficiently actual. The struggle for recognition shows that it is necessary to manifest one's freedom to others and thereby become actual in the world. A spirit that remains merely subjective may exist, but it lacks actuality; it achieves actuality only in becoming objective, and this means becoming and remaining self-related in relation to another in a process of mutual recognition. For Hegel, autonomy is a mediated autonomy.

The capacity of autonomy is an abstract possibility, but for that capacity to become actual, recognition is necessary. Apart from action, autonomy is merely abstract; but action involves relations to others and to the world. In the world freedom is not a given, nor is it merely reflective; it must be concretely risked and won in struggles for recognition, and in relation to others. For Hegel freedom is actual not in isolation but only in relation to and community with others. Hegel brings together the themes of freedom, self-actualization, and mutual recognition in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*:

As the foundation of our being we recognize only freedom. This determination is not transitory. All other determinations of our being are fleeting and variable. Only freedom remains constant as our fundamental characteristic. That I cannot be a slave is my innermost being, my nature, my category. Slavery contradicts my consciousness. This is the sense in which spirit's self-knowledge constitutes its very being, so that out of this self-knowledge the whole of its condition is exhausted.

More precisely, this connection of freedom and our nature implies that the universality of consciousness constitutes freedom. If I know myself as universal, I know myself as free.... But the free will as free is this: that its content is a universal. In this universal I am identical with myself. However, that others are identical and co-equal with me also hangs together with this identity. For the others are just as universal as I am. I am free only insofar as I posit the freedom of others and am recognized by others as free. Real freedom presupposes others who are free. Freedom is existent and actual only among many. In this there is implied the relation of a free being to other, free beings, and this implies the laws of right and of ethical life. The freedom of the will lies only in the conditions of the universal will.⁷⁸

^{78.} Hegel, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1940), 233-4. Italics mine.

In this passage, Hegel brings together the abstract formal universality of the transcendental subject, or I = I, with plurality and communal universality. The I = I identity is pre-recognitive, abstract, formal, and solitary. Hegel denies this abstraction is actual, insisting that the I = I hangs together with plurality; it is mediated through others who are co-equal in principle. Recognition underlies self-realization, right, and constitutes the intersubjective structure of ethical life. The I = I is actual only as spirit.

The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit grounds and establishes, but does not develop the content of objective spirit. That will be the task of the objective spirit section of the *Encyclopedia*, and its further elaboration in the *Philosophy of Right*. However at the conclusion of the Phenomenology, spirit has advanced to a new level. It is no longer soul or *Naturgeist*; it is no longer consciousness in opposition to nature, or in opposition to an other. Rather, spirit is now free or 'for itself'. Spirit is the recognition of the identity between the 'subjective reason' of consciousness and the 'objective reason' present in the world. So understood, spirit is not a worldless Cartesian *cogito* or a 'merely subjective' freedom, but rather a totality, a world structure. Spirit 'for itself' becomes the topic of Hegel's philosophical psychology.

6. PSYCHOLOGY: THEORETICAL SPIRIT

The Psychology is one of the more obscure parts of the *Encyclopedia*, chiefly because of its formal character. Nevertheless it contains important material, to wit, Hegel's interesting treatment of language, sign, and memory in the constitution of objectivity, and his important synthesis of Kant and Aristotle in practical spirit.

Some of the obscurity of the Psychology turns in part on the question of its place in the transition from subjective spirit to objective spirit. Is the Psychology already on the level of objective spirit? Or does it remain the final stage of subjective spirit? Actually it straddles both regions, and this straddling produces tension and confusion. The Phenomenology concluded with the universal consciousness constituted by reciprocal recognition, and with a social-universal reason confident that it would find rationality in the world. So it looks like the Psychology should start with a consciousness of totality. And it does.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the Psychology considers spirit as still finite and subjective. It begins with spirit as a totality that is implicitly both

79. Enc. 1830, §440.

subjective and objective. But while spirit is an implicit totality, it is also immediate. This immediacy must be overcome. Psychology will thematize that totality, and will gradually remove the form of immediacy with which knowing begins and which hinders the cognitive process.⁸⁰ Thus spirit will come to know the reason and rationality which it finds in its object to be identical with its own rationality.

As we have seen, Hegel is clear about what he finds objectionable in modern rationalist and empiricist psychology: (1) the tendency to reduce spirit to a mere collection or aggregate of different faculties; (2) these faculties are in turn considered in isolation from each other, and in isolation from the unity and activity of spirit; ⁸¹ (3) spirit is thus broken up, fragmented and dispersed. Such fragmentation diverts it from its supreme task and end, namely, knowledge and above all, self-knowledge; ⁸² (4) the *reductio ad absurdum* that psychology, construed as an empirical-anthropological discipline, has been declared the basis of metaphysics and philosophy; ⁸³ with the result (5) that for metaphysics and philosophy, all attempts to grasp the truth, to conceive the necessity of what exists in and for itself, have been abandoned. ⁸⁴

In opposition to such views, Hegel asserts that spirit must be understood as a unity, i.e., as an organic totality, and this is why he retrieves the Aristotelian program. What unifies spirit is its vocation to know the world and itself. This self-knowledge of spirit is not only the final end of the cognitive process, it is also the final end of psychology in Hegel's sense: 'This final end can only be the concept itself and can only have the activity of the concept for its aim, namely, to suspend the form of immediacy or subjectivity, to reach and grasp itself in order to liberate itself to itself. In this way the so-called faculties of spirit in their differentiation are to be considered only as stages of this liberation. This is the only rational way of studying spirit and its diverse activities.'85 Consequently while Hegel will speak of intuition, representation, memory, understanding and reason, he conceives these not as separate faculties but as moments or stages in cognitive process. Any separation between reason and sensibility, between feeling and reason, or between understanding and reason is ruled out. 'The difficulty for the understanding consists in freeing itself from the separation

^{80.} Ibid., §441 and Zusatz. 81. Ibid., §§445, 442.

^{82.} Ibid., §\$442, 445. 83. Ibid., \$444. 84. Ibid., \$444.

^{85.} *Ibid.*, §442. As he explains in the 1827 lectures, 'Reason is the activity of distinguishing itself from itself, of differentiating itself into a system of totality, into a plenitude where differences do not become [utterly] free but remain moments in the unity.' VPG 1827, 178–9; See below, p. 199.

that it has arbitrarily introduced between the faculties of feeling and a thinking spirit and coming to see that in the human being there is only one reason in feeling, willing and thinking.'86

A. Spirit for Itself: From the Found to the Posited

In the Philosophy of Spirit the higher levels have for their object the lower levels and stages that preceded them. Thus, in the Phenomenology, consciousness puts in play and places at risk the natural life that was the subject matter of the Anthropology. In this way consciousness demonstrates its transcendence of nature and natural instincts such as self-preservation. Similarly, the Psychology has for its object the preceding stage of the universal consciousness which has become spirit and reason; consciousness is only implicitly the identity of the I with its other, but spirit posits this identity explicitly for itself. Spirit knows itself (subjective reason) and its other (objective reason) to be the same rationality in principle. Hence the development of spirit will be twofold; it will proceed according to the rational determination that the content is both something existing independently in itself (objective reason) which is found or given, and spirit's own, posited by its freedom (subjective reason).⁸⁷ Rational determinations or categories are unities of thought and being. They exist as 'doubled: those of being (das Seiende), and those which are spirit's own (das Seinige); according to the former spirit finds something existent in itself; according to the latter spirit posits that something only as spirit's own.'88 Thus 'free spirit makes objectivity subjective and subjectivity objective. The determinations known by spirit are indeed immanent in the object, but at the same time they are posited by spirit.'89 Ferrarin comments: 'the psychology should not be read as a chronological or temporal development, nor as a transcendental regress from conditioned to condition, but as the movement from the found to the produced, from external necessity to freedom.'90

This account of the double movement of spirit from the found to the posited is spelled out further by Hegel in §445:

The intelligence finds itself determined; this is the appearance from which it proceeds in its immediacy. But as knowing, intelligence posits the found (das Gefundene) as its own. Its activity has to do with the empty form of finding reason, and its end is that its concept is for itself, that is, to be for itself reason, along with which the content is realized as rational. This activity is cognition (Erkennen). The formal knowing, which is only certainty, raises itself, because reason is concrete, to determinate and

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86. Enc. 1830, §471.
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^{89.} Ibid., §441 Zusatz.

^{87.} *Ibid.*, §443. 88. *Ibid.*, §443.

^{90.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 287. Italics mine.

conceptual knowing. The process of this development is itself rational, a specific necessary transition, determined by the concept, from one determination of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of spirit) into another. 91

Spirit finds itself determined, namely, by the given. But second, as knowing, intelligence posits the found or given as its own. Hence the found is compatible with freedom, because it is not *what* is found that must be negated and overcome, but only the formal *immediacy* with which it is given. The content that is found or given, is already rational in principle. The activity of spirit overcomes the immediacy with which the rationality in the object appears as something merely found, merely given. Spirit recognizes the rationality in the object as identical with its own rationality and thus posits the object as its own. This appropriation overcomes the initial appearance that the rational is something merely found or contingent.

In the condition of immediacy spirit is hindered from recognizing the rationality and determinacy of its object. Spirit must overcome its own immediacy and liberate itself from the inadequate forms in which the rationality of the object is concealed. These forms include 'the given' and 'the found,' 'contingency,' mere isolated particularity and externality; all these characterize the immediacy of knowing. The immanent rationality and necessity of the object emerge in a process which progressively strips away the externality and contingency of the inadequate forms of cognition. Insight into this immanent rationality in the object overcomes its strange, alien character. Hegel describes spirit as seeking and finding in the world a rationality that is congruent with its own rationality. Reason in the world and reason in spirit are one, i.e., are the same reason and rationality.

Hegel writes that 'intelligence posits the found (das Gefundene, das Seiende) as its own (das Seinige).' What does such positing mean? How does it relate to the found and the given? Does it mean to appropriate and understand the given, to make it one's own in cognition? Or does it mean to produce the given in a causal metaphysical sense? Alfredo Ferrarin provides one interpretation: it means that what appears to be given turns out to be produced:

^{91.} Enc. 1830, §445.

^{92.} The term 'posit' (setzen) is an operative term in German idealism. Because it is an operative term, it is rarely thematized and clarified. Subsequently it has received a wide range of interpretations ranging from a modest and benign mental-cognitive act of reflection or consideration of an object to a strong metaphysical sense of producing and creating its object, as in the case of an intuitive intellect. In the Psychology, Hegel is focusing on theoretical spirit, i.e., cognition, and for the most part uses 'posit' in a cognitive rather than strong metaphysical sense.

If the content, at first contingent and external, is then progressively transformed into intelligence's property, thus acquires a higher existence or ideal citizenship in the domain of spirit; and if it is made rational or is seen as spirit's production—then in this inwardization of the object intelligence at the same time recollects itself and relates itself to its products. It finally knows what is true for it as its own production. While the content is determined by the form it acquires, it is progressively reduced to the form that it has for intelligence; the more conceptual and comprehensive the form, the less is the content affected by difference, until the gap between form and content we started out with increasingly vanishes. The more the content is assimilated to its form, the less it is what it was as immediate and external. In the end there will be no more difference between the object and the subject, between what is found and what is produced, between thought determination and externality. 93

This statement is ambiguous in that it wavers between a strong metaphysical reading of positing as production, and a cognitive-epistemological reading in which positing means cognitive appropriation. ⁹⁴ Part of the difficulty lies with Ferrarin's claim that being (*das Sein*) as a *product* of spirit. This sounds too metaphysical and causal, especially in view of Hegel's rejection of metaphysical idealism of a Berkeleyan sort, because 'it is folly to deny the reality of matter.' ⁹⁵

On the other hand, Hegel would be critical of any 'myth of the given', i.e., any view that the given signifies an 'immaculate perception' 'untainted' by any concept. Such a view posits a separation between reason and sense in which reason and its conceptual schemes are imposed on, 'assimilate' and distort some 'pure' given. Ferrarin correctly notes that for both Hegel and Aristotle 'we perceive and think complex categorial relations.'96 Thus there are no bare particulars independent of and opposed to universals, there are only universals in particulars and particulars in universals. Perception is an implicit judgment.

If that is the case, then the 'found' (das Gefundene) is not merely external but also a cognitive form. According to Hegel the given is one of the poorest forms of cognition; it is inadequate because it posits a gap, between what is and what is thought, between being and thought. Ferrarin contends that in the cognitive process the object 'is progressively reduced to the form that it has for intelligence; the more conceptual and comprehensive the

^{93.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 288, my italics.

^{94.} Ferrarin's metaphysical reading is supported by the Boumann Zusatz to §442: 'the fact that the content or object is for our knowing something given, something coming to it from the outside, is only an illusory appearance and mind, by removing this appearance proves itself to be... absolute self-determining... the ideal existence that produces all reality from itself.'

^{95.} VPG 1827; see below, p. 69. 96. Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 297.

form, the less is the content affected by difference, until the gap between form and content we started out with increasingly vanishes. The more the content is assimilated to its form, the less it is what it was as immediate and external.'97 Thus Hegel's position is that 'intuition and concept are no longer forms given at the outset as separate, but rather form the two poles of givenness and constitution, of apparent passivity and activity, within the immanent motion of thought.'98 Some might interpret this movement from the found to the posited as an elimination of the given.⁹⁹ But if the process of cognition simply eliminated the found, it would be a road to nowhere. This objection is another version of the dualism between thought and being, reason and sense. It assumes that thought is merely subjective, a mere immanence that is incapable of comprehending what is. But this alleged elimination of the object of knowledge is belied by Hegel's remarks on attention. Attention properly understood is the very opposite of an idealist stance which, having nullified the object, postures as being above it all. Rather attention is an immersion in the object, a suspending of one's own interests and desires in order to allow the thing itself to generate its own categories and criteria. This makes sense only if the movement from the found to the posited—the attended to—is 'understood more exactly as the filling of oneself with a content that is both objective and subjective, or, in other words, that is not only for me, but also possesses a being of its own.'100 The point is not to eliminate the given content, but to be attentive to it, and appropriate it. Cognition is that appropriation. 101 As Hegel put the point in another context: 'What is represented ceases to be... something alien to the self's knowledge only when the subject has produced it, and therefore beholds the determination of the object as its own, and thus beholds itself in the object.'102

^{97.} Ibid., 288. 98. Ibid., 292.

^{99.} Cf. Ferrarin: 'the relation between givenness and subjective constitution is no longer one between two opposites. On the contrary, this relation shows itself as the transition from an apparent heteronomy to a self-determination of spirit discovering itself as notion or absolute reason, where self-knowledge appears as the foundation of the possibility of the knowledge of objectivity' (Hegel and Aristotle, 291).

^{100.} Enc. 1830, §448 Zusatz.

^{101.} For a similar account, cf. Stephen Crites's distinction between an experience-negating idealism and an experience-appropriating idealism (Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel's Thinking (Pennsylvania, PA: Penn State University Press, 1998), 265). Crites observes that Hegel's thought remains ambiguous, suspended between these two quite different alternatives, but argues that Hegel tends towards the experience-appropriating hermeneutical idealism.

^{102.} Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Miller, §684 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1952), 482.

B. Imagination, Sign, Memory

Imagination is not restricted to reproducing images and intuitions. It is also productive, i.e., capable of projecting new images and possibilities and going beyond the given. This is the sign-creating, name-bestowing imagination or Phantasie. Phantasie is not reproductive imagination (Einbildungskraft) which is dependent on intuition. Phantasie is capable of producing a new synthesis by itself independently of intuition. The superiority of spirit is manifest in the creation of signs and language. The sign is an image which has received from spirit a new soul, an independent representation constructed by productive imagination. This is most clearly seen in the name. The name is an externality that has no sense, and receives its significance only as a sign, produced by spirit. 103 Hegel's example is the name 'lion:' we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its image: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representation. We think in names. 104 The name replaces the found (das Gefundene); as posited by spirit the name inverts the initial relation so that an intuition (of a given) is no longer necessary. The intuition is thus suspended in the name. As Hegel observes, intuition, das Gefundene, when employed as a sign, has the essential determination of existing only as suspended (aufgehoben). 105 Once the name is understood, an intuition is no longer necessary; the form of the found (but not its meaning) has been displaced. The name is subjectivelyinwardly constituted, but it is also an externalization of spirit. Hegel maintains that the inwardizing or recollecting of the name is a self-externalization of intelligence. The name is both an externalization of intelligence and its recollection: The name gives existence to the content in intelligence and is the externality of intelligence to itself. 106 Thus the name suspends the found as intuition, and preserves it on a higher level as sign. Spirit is not only able to suspend and cancel the found, but also to preserve it and re-create it on a higher level of objectivity that is no longer dependent on the lower. We think in names, not in images. In this sense spirit is the condition of objectivity, but this assertion is an anticipation, not yet a conclusion. 107

Hegel takes a further step in the constitution of objectivity in his discussion of memory. He notes that 'to comprehend the position and meaning of memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of the most difficult points, and hitherto one quite unconsidered in the

^{103.} Enc. 1830, §459.

^{104.} Ibid., §462.

^{105.} Ibid., §459.

^{106.} Ibid., §462.

^{107.} Thus Ferrarin's claim that spirit's self-knowledge appears as the foundation of the possibility of the knowledge of objectivity (Hegel and Aristotle, 291) is correct.

theory of spirit.' ¹⁰⁸ Moreover, it is not just memory, but mechanical memory that most interests Hegel because he believes the latter is a crucial stage in the constitution of objectivity. ¹⁰⁹ It reveals how subjective inwardness must be leveled and prepared as pure abstract universal space, in order to become the space of objectivity. ¹¹⁰

Here is how Hegel explains memory in his published outline:

The supreme recollection of representation is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it posits itself as being, the universal space of names as such, i.e., meaningless words. The I, which is this abstract being, is, as subjectivity, the power over the different names, the empty tie which fixes the names in a series and keeps them in stable order. This is the power of abstract subjectivity, or mechanical memory. So far as the names merely exist (das Gefundene), and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity—memory. And, on account of the complete externality in which the members of such series of names stand to one another, and because intelligence is itself this externality, subjective though it may be, the intelligence is called mechanical memory. 111

The development and exercise of mechanical memory requires the self-divestment and self-externalization of intelligence. In mechanical memory spirit levels and constitutes itself as the abstract space of names, or as abstract subjectivity that is the connection between names and signs assembled in an arbitrary series. Hegel amplified his view of mechanical memory in a discussion of rote memorization in the 1827 lectures:

We call that mechanical, where a plurality of things stand in relation to each other, and are related, but in this relation remain at the same time external to each other. The intelligence is the power over the signs; as mechanical memory it is this center, this subject that holds the signs merely as signs, as words without meaning... These signs are meaningless. I can learn a series of names and numbers by heart, but so far

108. Enc. 1830, §464. For a discussion of this sweeping claim, cf. H. F. Fulda, 'Vom Gedächtnis zum Denken', in Hespe and Tuschling (eds.), Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes 321–60.

109. Burkhard Tuschling claims that Hegel works out a transcendental deduction of objectivity that eluded Kant and the other German idealists. See VPG 1827, introduction, p. xxxvi. Ferrarin also calls attention to the significance of memory and memorization, but not in a transcendental sense or context. Rather memory is an unperceived link between signs, the last stage of representation and the first stage of thought (*Hegel and Aristotle*, 299–301). Fulda is more critical of Hegel's discussion, focusing on the terms, details, and transitions of Hegel's argument, which he characterizes as 'difficult to penetrate, to see through' ('Vom Gedächtnis zum Denken', 359). Richard Winfield finds similar obscurities if not problems in Hegel's account. See Winfield, 'Identity, Difference and the Unity of Mind, Reflections on Hegel's Determination of Psyche, Consciousness and Intelligence', in Philip Grier (ed.), *Identity and Difference: Studies in Hegel's Logic and Politics* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007).

110. Enc. 1830, §464. 111. *Ibid.*, §463. Italics mine.

as this is mere rote memorization, there is no meaning and no significance in this for me. The intelligence is the space in which these determinations exist; the intelligence is what holds them together and which knows them in this vital connection. . . . If one knows [something] entirely by rote memorization, then one recites it in an entirely meaningless sound. Meaning interrupts the mere mechanism of memory. It appears miraculous that the spirit, this essential freedom at home with itself, relates to itself externally in its [own] inwardness in an entirely mechanical way. 112

Ferdinand Walter heard Hegel as follows:

With mechanical memory one knows something by rote memorization; one has no idea of what the words mean. The recitation of what is known by rote happens by itself automatically without accent. Children, when they are supposed to recite something by heart, have a sing-song school sound, and this is the correct tone for a recitation known by heart. If one recites with accent, this implies that one has a meaning, a significance, that one orders the particular determinations according to the nature of their connection—the accent depends on sense—if on the contrary one knows something purely by rote, then one speaks it in this entirely meaningless tone. What is recited by rote is spoken without meaning. To speak meaningfully is to speak with accent. The sense comes into the picture and breaks through the mere mechanical memory. Memory is the most wonderful power insofar as the intelligence, this inwardness, has this complete externality. 113

Hegel underscores that the rote memorization of meaningless, reference-less names and signs and holding them in an arbitrary but stable repeatable order is not easy, but requires rigorous discipline and training. This disciplining of mechanical memory is not only a divestment of meaning and sense, rote memorization is also torture:

The exercise of memory implies the levelling of the ground and preparation of the way to pure being. The compulsion of rote memorization is torture. Rote memorization is the torture of turning oneself into this abstraction and of consolidating oneself in this abstraction. In this abstraction will is the inner that is made into something mechanical in itself. This preparation of the soil of inwardness [is necessary] to constitute thinking as such in the form of intelligence.¹¹⁴

Rote memorization is an extreme abstraction from all meaning whereby spirit transforms itself into pure leveled, inner space, a mechanism for holding and ordering arbitrary, externally related names and signs in a purely arbitrary series. Mechanical memory replicates the self-discipline of

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112. VPG 1827, 220; see below, p. 233.
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^{113.} Ibid. see below, p. 234; Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, §195R.

^{114.} VPG 1827, 226; see below, p. 237 n. 32.

habit at the level of theoretical spirit. It prepares the soil of inwardness for abstract thinking and for the abstract objectivity of thought.

However, considered in and for itself, such self-externalization in memorization of meaningless names involves the loss of meaning and spirit's loss of itself. The self-externalization of spirit in memory is something like a death of meaning, or nihilism. The death of meaning in mechanical memory marks the extreme limit of spirit's self-externalization.

Yet it is in the death of meaning, spirit's 'dismemberment,' that spirit finds and discovers itself. Since the signs are without meaning and without reference, they are held together only by spirit, which is the tie that binds the signs together. This tie is not a naturally occurring series order, or a perception of something external; rather the tie itself is wholly external and as such without meaning. Mechanical memory is spirit constituting *itself* as a mechanism, in which it relates to itself externally. Spirit discovers itself as the connection or tie between the meaningless signs in abstract inner space. What does spirit discover when it thus finds itself? It finds that it is abstract inwardness (which Hegel likens to a pit) which is nevertheless completely self-external. This abstract inwardness that is self-external is the objective tie that binds meaningless names and signs together in arbitrary but stable order.

Whereas in intuition spirit has been so external as to pick up its facts ready-made and in representation it recollects this found in itself and makes it its own, now in mechanical memory, spirit makes itself external in itself, so that *its own* appears as something *found*. The one moment of thinking, objectivity, is here posited in intelligence itself as a quality of it. ¹¹⁵

Thus the given, the found, are thus constituted as the extreme self-externalization of spirit, on the boundary of the death of meaning in meaninglessness. Spirit makes itself external in itself, with the result that its own appears to it as something it merely finds.

This analysis of mechanical memory is Hegel's original, independent reconstruction and transformation of the reversal and inversion of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' in Kant's transcendental deduction. Mechanical memory shows that spirit is capable of constituting 'the found' (das Gefundene) with which the Psychology begins. Objectivity is thus a 'subjective' accomplishment, but not a self-legislating form-giving activity as Kant would have it. Rather, in mechanical memory spirit turns itself into a self-external mechanism. In this externality spirit appears to itself not only

as other, but as something it merely *finds*, namely, the leveled space and abstract, external tie that binds together meaningless signs. In mechanical memory, in rote memorization, spirit's own (*das Seinige*) is something spirit happens to find (*das Gefundenwerdendes*). This account of self-externalization recalls the preface of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in which Hegel describes spirit as tarrying with the negative and finding itself utter dismemberment. ¹¹⁶ Only when it is driven to this extreme of self-externality or 'dismemberment,' does spirit find itself and recognize itself. What is found is its own; what it finds is itself. Only as thus capable of recognizing itself in utter externality is spirit at home with itself (*bei sich*), the unity of subjectivity and objectivity.

C. Mechanical Memory and Transcendental Deduction

Burkhard Tuschling claims that in the 1827 lectures Hegel presents the most complete and explicit account of transcendental deduction in German idealism, an account that exceeds anything in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, or in Hegel's published writings. ¹¹⁷ According to Tuschling, Hegel's answer to the question how thought is objective is found in his account of mechanical memory. He cites the following passage:

For us or implicitly...the intelligence is reason.... That objectivity exists in the intelligence in general rests on the intuition that what is immediately given, I also posit in myself. The other side of this is that the intelligence posits itself as the objective... The place of memory in this is to be the moment in which the unity of the subject and the object is not only implicit in the intelligence, but is also posited in the intelligence; the intelligence is this externality. So the intelligence realizes that that which is inherent in it is also something external, [that] the objectivity is not something different from the intelligence, but is identical with it.... The absolute end of memory is that the intelligence be real, that the unity of subjectivity and objectivity come into existence. 118

Stephen Houlgate appears to agree with Tuschling's thesis that Hegel's account of mechanical memory is relevant to transcendental deduction. Houlgate maintains that what spirit discovers when it discovers itself in the self-externalization of mechanical memory is that it is 'the abstract activity of connecting as such, the abstract form of connection...abstract

^{116.} Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*: 'The life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself' (§32, Miller trans., 19). Death is the death of meaning.

^{117.} VPG 1827, introductions, p. xxxvi.

^{118.} VPG 1827, 221-2; see below, p. 235.

subjectivity...what Kant thought of as...[the] transcendental unity of apperception.'¹¹⁹ As Hegel puts it, the intelligence is the identity of subjective and objective, of thought and being.

It is also possible that this exploration of mechanical memory may constitute Hegel's appropriation and transformation of Aristotle's passive Nous. The passive intellect has no form of its own but is the possibility of becoming all forms, even to the point of 'comprehending' and holding meaningless signs together in its abstract inner space. What Hegel's analysis of mechanical memory opens up is the unity of active and passive Nous for spirit itself: spirit recognizes that it can endure the dismemberment of meaning because it is itself the tie that binds and holds even this dismemberment together. Here spirit discovers that being (das Sein) is its own (das Seinige), and that its own is [to wit, is objective, independent]. This exercise of memory prepares the way to the concept of being. Hegel explicitly identifies the prodigious effort of spirit in mechanical memory as the path to pure being—which is the opening category with which the Science of Logic begins. 120

However, Tuschling errs when he claims that Hegel retrieves Parmenides' conception of being as pure identity that excludes the nothing. Hegel does not simply retrieve Parmenides' abstract identity; his account of memory shows why. Hegel is closer to Heraclitos than to Parmenides. Hegel's path to the identity of thought and being goes through the door that Parmenides avoids and warns against, namely the way of spirit's self-externalization and 'dismemberment,' to wit, the way of non-being. The concept of being turns on confronting the death of meaning and the utter externality of thought to itself. The identity of subjectivity and objectivity, thought and being, which Hegel asserts, is constituted only when spirit in its utter self-externality and dismemberment of meaning finds and recognizes itself. This identity therefore should not be construed as the abstract identity of the understanding that shuns contradiction and dismemberment but rather as an identity of reason that requires negation, and 'is' only as a negation of negation.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance Hegel attaches to memory in his account of theoretical spirit and objectivity. The result of this analysis is

^{119.} Stephen Houlgate, 'Hegel, Derrida and Restricted Economy: The Case of Mechanical Memory,' *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 34/1 (January 1996): 79–93.

^{120.} VPG 1827, 228; see below, p. 239. The death of meaning and the reversal in which meaning is recovered in spirit's finding and reconnecting with itself is parallel to the indistinguishability of being from nothing, its vanishing into nothing, and the reversion from nothing to being in the *Logic*. The *Philosophy of Spirit* introduces a layer of possible meaninglessness as the background of the beginning of the Logic, which the Logic captures in the collapse of being and nothing into each other as the same empty featurelessness, absence of determination.

characterized by Hegel in the doctrine that intelligence is 'recognitive'. This is not the intersubjective sense of recognition (*Anerkennen*). Rather 'recognitive' here means that intelligence is identity of the subjective and objective. In other words, recognitive intelligence knows that 'what is thought is, and that what is only is [actual] insofar as it is thought.' Both the thought and the 'is' are dialectical.

7. PRACTICAL SPIRIT: THE SYNTHESIS OF KANT AND ARISTOTLE

If theoretical spirit has as its task translating the found being into cognition, i.e, cognitive appropriation, practical spirit has as its task translating a subjective end into externality and realizing this end in the world. That is, practical spirit aims at self-actualization through action. As many commentators have noted, in this section Hegel is attempting, on a high level of abstraction, a synthesis of Kant's and Aristotle's practical philosophies. 122 He is attempting to mediate between the ancients and the moderns. 123 Adriaan Peperzak contends that 'the Aristotelian roots of Hegel's doctrine of practical spirit are visible, but the way Hegel integrates them is mediated through their Kantian transformation. 124 Peperzak finds that Hegel remains too close to Kant; on the other hand, Alfredo Ferrarin focuses on Hegel's retrieval of Aristotle.

My thesis is that Hegel both agrees and disagrees with both Kant and Aristotle, and that he draws upon the strengths of each to correct the deficiencies he identifies in the other's position. Hegel praises Kant's concept of inner purposiveness, because it makes possible a retrieval of Aristotle's concept of life as entelechy. He agrees with Kant that self-determining freedom is the basis of ethics but he finds that Kant conceives freedom formally and that the categorical imperative reduces to the empty form of abstract universality and tautology. Hegel believes Kantian morality is unable to generate or justify any determinate ethical content and thus remains empty and formal. In contrast, Aristotle grasps the human being as a social and political animal, and understands human action as teleological. But Aristotleian teleology is more nearly external than internal because Aristotle

^{121.} Enc. 1830, §465.

^{122.} Drüe, Hegels Philosophie des Geistes, in Schnädelbach (ed.); Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle; Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten.

^{123.} Philosophy of Right, §§124, 185.

^{124.} Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 46.

conceives human being as part of nature and has a deficient concept of freedom and will. In what follows I want to show how Hegel's account of spirit's self-actualization might be plausibly interpreted as correcting Kant's formalism by means of Aristotle, and correcting Aristotle's deficient concept of freedom by means of Kant.

Hegel not only begins practical spirit with a quasi-Kantian formulation of autonomous will, he also appropriates Kant's distinction between *Wille*, or rational self-legislation, and *Willkür*, or the will as arbitrary, subjective, or agential freedom. ¹²⁵ The distinction of these senses of the will and their correlation forms the Kantian element of Hegel's theory of spirit's self-actualization. This starting point allows Hegel to transform and integrate Aristotelian elements into practical spirit on the basis of autonomous freedom.

The autonomy of the will implies spirit has broken with nature; the autonomous will does not follow ends prescribed from elsewhere, be it feeling, desire, inclination, or nature. Any externally prescribed end constitutes heteronomy of the will. The autonomous will is self-legislative: it determines and prescribes its own end. The end it prescribes for itself is freedom; the will has its freedom as its own object and end. However, Kant's account of autonomy suffers from two related defects: formalism, and the separation of reason from sensibility. In making universality and freedom from contradiction the supreme test of moral autonomy, Hegel believes Kant produces a purely formal concept of duty; in Hegel's view Kant cannot derive any determinate or specific content from the abstract form of pure law, or abstract universal. 126 Consequently, while Kant's ethics (morality) does nevertheless manage to provide duties which have some content, Hegel charges these are not derived from formal self-determining freedom but smuggled in. This shows the dependence of Kantian morality on ethical life (Sittlichkeit).

Second, Hegel criticizes Kant for separating reason from sensibility. As a result of this dualism, the moral subject is split into an internal master and slave, with reason subjugating or repressing sensibility, including the drives and inclinations. The separation of reason from sensibility violates Hegel's Aristotle-inspired fundamental principle that there is only one reason in

^{125.} Enc. 1830, §469. On the Wille/Willkür distinction, cf. Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 176–80; Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 7.

^{126.} Hegel, Natural Law, trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975); 75-6.

feeling, volition, and thought.¹²⁷ To be sure, Kant offers an important critique of hedonism and utilitarianism, eudaimonism, and Hegel accepts much of Kant's critique. But he does not want to follow Kant in declaring that the only good is the abstract good will. For in positing a separation between reason and sensibility, Kant reduces the feelings, emotions, drives, passions, etc., to heteronomy. In Hegel's view, the senses and passions appear to have only a negative connotation for Kant and play no affirmative role in ethics. Because that is the case, Kant has a deficient theory of ethical self-actualization.

Moreover, when Kant addresses the issue of the self-actualization of rational morality, it turns out that the infinite end that reason legislates for itself—the conformity of Willkür to Wille—cannot be achieved save through a process of infinite striving, or infinite deferral. Hence Kant finds it necessary to introduce the postulates of practical reason: freedom, immortality, and God, to buttress his account of morality, to ensure that 'ought implies can', i.e., that reason can attain its self-legislated end. More polemically, Hegel shows that the postulates are a nest of contradictions, dissembling, and bad faith. 128

In contrast, Aristotle has an affirmative, but limited and parochial theory of self-actualization through praxis. Hegel is attracted to Aristotle's view of action as teleological because it overcomes the duality between reason and sensibility, between spirit and nature. As Ferrarin notes, Hegel believes that the passions play an important role in Aristotle's theory of self-actualization. Hence they cannot be dismissed as merely negative as far as ethics are concerned. However, as Ferrarin also observes, for Aristotle the end that is to be realized in action is prescribed for human beings by human nature, not self-legislated by human reason. Reason accepts such naturally prescribed ends and is confined to an instrumental role in determining the means to the externally prescribed end. From Hegel's perspective, even though Aristotle's concept of life includes internal purposiveness, he nevertheless belongs to the ancient world, which has a deficient sense of and appreciation for subjective freedom and the will.

The complexity of Hegel's synthetic project can be stated in historicalepochal terms. According to Hegel, the Greeks, including Aristotle, apprehend spirit only as part of nature and as free within nature. They have not

^{127.} Enc. 1830, §471. 128. Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §§596-631.

^{129.} Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 332. However, he believes that Hegel misinterprets Aristotle on this point.

^{130.} Ibid., 334.

attained the concept of spirit itself.¹³¹ This epoch and its view of the world has been superseded by a higher standpoint. As we have seen, modernity arises when the human being raises itself to a consciousness of God or infinite spirit. In this relation to the actual infinite, human spirit is reduced to mortal finitude, but as *imago dei* it also gains a wholly free foundation in itself. As self-grounding, it gives itself another relation to nature, namely independence; thus spirit supersedes the Greek world-view. Modern spirit is constituted by both mortal finitude and infinitude, namely, its transcendence of nature, its capacity and right to determine its ends out of itself, or in Kant's term, its autonomy. ¹³² This concept of self-determining freedom corrects the parochialism and other defects in Aristotle's concept of freedom and will. This is the context or horizon within which Hegel appropriates and transforms Aristotelian teleology from a teleology of nature into a teleology of freedom, i.e., an inner purposiveness, wherein freedom becomes its own object and end.

Thus we can begin to see the outlines of Hegel's project in Practical Spirit: the reconciliation of Kant with Aristotle, in such a way that both Kant's formalism, his separation of reason from sensibility, and Aristotle's deficient concept of the will are overcome. According to Peperzak, Hegel conflates under the concept of spirit's self-actualization not only Aristotelian practice and production, but also Kantian hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The important point in this conflation is that spirit does not merely actualize ends prescribed to it by nature. Spirit is for itself; freedom is its own object and end, and capable of issuing its own imperatives.

Further, self-determination here includes the hypothetical and the categorical imperatives. Hegel treats these imperatives as different forms and

131. Cf. Hegel's following remark:

To the Greek the human was granted as his portion, that is, the free spirit, but the spirit had not yet apprehended its infinity. It is not the absolute, holy spirit that would be poured out over the Greek world and the knowledge of which the latter would come to possess. Rather the Greeks apprehended the human being as free within nature, so that the human being retains in nature the organ of his consciousness and thus remains confined to nature. To be sure the Greek advances to pure thought, but only in philosophy, not in religion; the latter is not able to free itself from the abstraction—being entangled with what corresponds in thought to immediacy—and thus does not come to the concept of spirit itself.

(Hegel, Fragment on Philosophy of Spirit 1822-5, in Petry (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, I, 93. Also found in Hegel, Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel, Theorie Werkausgabe (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), vol. 11, 527.

132. Cf. Philosophy of Right, §§124, 185.

133. Adrinan Peperzak, Praktische Philosophie (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991), 38, cited by Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 330.

stages of spirit's ethical self-actualization, starting with the will in its immediate particularity where it depends on a given and moving through the stages of the feeling of the pleasant and unpleasant, to drive, inclination, through eudaimonism, and finally to universal, rational self-determination. Thus Hegel appropriates Aristotle's naturalism, subjects it to Kant's critique of hedonism and eudaimonism, and transforms it into an account of necessary but inferior forms of inner purposiveness, which culminates in ethical self-realization. In these lower forms, the end is the satisfaction of feeling, of drive, of inclination, or the totality of pleasant feelings as in eudaimonism, but in none of them is freedom itself taken as the absolute end.

This critique of hedonism is by no means a rejection of it as essentially heteronomous. Rather Hegel corrects Kant by regarding feelings, and more importantly, the drives and passions, as precursors of rational self-determination, analogues (Vorforms) of the autonomous selfactualization. 134 Thus Kant's separation of reason from sensibility is overcome and his concept of autonomy and ethical subjectivity are enriched: the drives and passions are not heteronomous, but analogues of rational selfdetermination and dimensions of self-actualization. 135 Hegel agrees with Kant that practical reason or practical spirit is autonomous and determines its own ends. Hence it does not have to conform to a pre-given nature as Aristotle thought, but neither does spirit have to suppress or go against natural drives as Kant would seem to have it. 136 For Hegel reason is not only a faculty of thinking and legislating, it is also a drive towards self-actualization. Thus Hegel enriches Kant by drawing upon Aristotle's concept of drives as inferior but necessary forms and stages of inner purposiveness and self-determination. The self-actualization of reason in spirit does not stifle or repress the drives, but includes and sublates them. The drives are not essentially heteronomous, ¹³⁷ because reason itself is practical. Reason is not only formally self-determining as Kant asserted, but also, as Aristotle saw, has the character of a drive to seek satisfaction, fulfillment and self-realization in the world:

^{134.} Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 50.

^{135.} Cf. Enc. 1830, \$204R, where Hegel notes that need and drive are the readiest examples of inner purpose. Experienced as felt contradictions, they lead to the act of negating the negation (contradiction).

^{136.} Hegel paraphrases Schiller's jest at Kant's stern concept of duty as reason opposed to the inclinations: 'Do with abhorrence what morality enjoins.' (*Philosophy of Right*, §124).

^{137.} Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 48-51; Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 331-2.

The intelligence as such is still one-sided. Theory should be realized...the concept has this determination, that it suspends the one-sidedness of its subjectivity, gives itself the determination of being, immediacy and objectivity in general; thus it is end. ¹³⁸

Again:

The formal rationality of the drive means that the content of the drive does not remain merely subjective, but is made to be something immediate....the drive has the property of suspending the one-sided determination of subjectivity...' 139

Because spirit incorporates Kant's categorical imperative as a drive towards self-actualization, this transforms Kant's subjective idealism into a dynamic objective idealism in which 'the drive has the property of suspending the one-sided determination of subjectivity.' Spirit's end cannot remain merely subjective, because then it would remain unrealized, and spirit would not be actual. Rather spirit must suspend its subjectivism and become actual. This drive to self-actualization has a fundamentally ethical sense. According to Peperzak, Hegel's psychology is also a fundamental ethics, whose basic principle is 'Become what you [already implicitly] are! This principle comprehends and is valid for the entire philosophy of subjective spirit.' Thus Kant's formalism and separation of reason from sensibility are corrected by Aristotle's analysis of the drive (inner purposiveness), and Aristotle's conception of the natural teleology of the drives is reformulated on the basis of and as an expression of ethical self-realization.

Further, the abstract autonomy of Kant's pure will must also be overcome, and Aristotle helps Hegel to address this issue. Pure freedom is negative, the will of the void. As a corrective to pure freedom, Hegel maintains the will must become actual, and it can be actual only if it wills something. But to will something is to limit oneself. Thus Hegel argues that self-limitation is a necessary feature of self-actualization. Hegel develops this idea in the context of Aristotle's view that action is always particular. Hegel adds that the particularity of action requires self-limitation. Hegel cites Goethe's dictum that someone who wants to accomplish great things must know how to limit himself. Self-limitation is necessary for self-actualization, for someone who attempts to do everything really will accomplish

^{138.} VPG 1827, 239; see below, p. 248. 139. *Ibid.*, 254–5; see below, p. 258–9.

^{140.} Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 50. Fetscher makes a similar point about the identity of ethics and ontology in Hegel's philosophy of spirit (Hegels Lehre vom Menschen, 120).

nothing. 141 Self-realization requires self-limitation, and self-limitation, the placing of the self as a totality in a specific cause is or requires passion.

By itself passion is neither good nor evil. The form of passion expresses only that the subject has placed all his interests in some special determination and that this special interest claims his whole individuality. 142

Hegel cites Goethe on passion:

Nothing great can be accomplished without passion. When a human being wills something great—of whatever sort it may be—he must put his will into the cause (*Sache*) and subordinate every other cause to this one. Insofar as he places himself entirely in the cause it is his.¹⁴³

Passion is the drive of reason towards self-actualization. Only when spirit can become and remain self-related in relation to and union with the other, is spirit free and actual. This structure is also present in love.¹⁴⁴

Thus, for Hegel, Aristotle supplies what is lacking in Kant, namely the moment of self-limitation or determinacy, without which the will or the self cannot be actual. This moment of determinacy overcomes Kantian formalism and its reflective, subjective morality: The formal rationality of the drive and inclination consist only in their universal drive not to remain subjective, but to suspend subjectivity, to become realized through the activity of the subject itself. This drive towards self-actualization is not a pregiven natural drive or external teleology: Its authentic rationality cannot appear in the consideration of an external reflection which presupposes independent natural determinations and immediate drives, and thus lacks a principle and final end for these. It is an immanent reflection of spirit itself, to go beyond and transcend their

- 141. Enc. 1830, §80 Zusatz.
- 142. VPG 1827, 253; see below, p. 257 Enc. 1830, §474.

144. Enc. 1830, §§382-3. Cf. Hegel's account of love: 'The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right and that if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete... Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not isolated on my own, but gain my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent existence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me' (Philosophy of Right, §158 Zusatz).

145. Cf. Philosophy of Right, § 5-7. 146. Enc. 1830, § 474.

^{143.} See below, p. 258. Passion, the placing of the self as a totality in a specific determination or cause, is also linked to madness and tragedy. The collision between Antigone and Creon is tragic, because each fails to recognize the other as legitimate. The recognition that occurs in tragedy is a discovery, mediated by apparently blind and innocent suffering, that doing the right thing nevertheless implies erring and guilt. It is worth noting that non-recognition of other and a blind, single-minded commitment to a narrowly conceived (one-sided) cause or fixed idea are also features of madness.

particularity as well as their natural immediacy, and to give their contents a rationality and an objectivity wherein they exist as necessary ties of social relations, namely as rights and duties.' 147

A. The Formalism of the Psychology

Hegel corrects Kant's formalism by introducing a moment of determinate self-actualization; nevertheless Hegel's account remains formal. It is ironic that Hegel, the critic of Kantian formalism, perpetuates here an at least methodological formalism of his own. Hegel himself points this out: 'Its finitude consists in its formalism, that its abstract determinacy, its ownness—to be self-fulfilling and self-actualizing—is not identified with the developed and articulated reason.'148 In his Psychology, Hegel argues that spirit is selfactualizing, and that spirit's self-actualization constitutes spirit as objective. However, in the Psychology spirit is still considered methodologically as finite: this finitude renders the discussion of spirit's self-actualization formal. The Psychology provides no account of the determinate content of spirit's self-actualization. Hegel defers any account of the concrete content of selfactualization to objective spirit, saying 'Here [in the Psychology] we consider only the form; the content in its objective development is the . . . system of duties.' 149 'What concerns this content itself belongs in the examination of objective spirit.'150 Thus the question of the determinate content of spirit's self-actualization—the moment of the will's determinacy in social institutions, rights, and duties—is deferred to objective spirit. This deferral means that the Psychology considers spirit as finite and this methodological restriction gives freedom and self-actualization a formal look.

The Psychology appears to develop the transition to objective spirit, community, and social institutions out of the concept of the rational will. ¹⁵¹ What is missing from this development and discussion is Hegel's own phenomenological account of desire, and the genesis through reciprocal recognition of the universal consciousness, the I that is a We. Hegel's psychological account of self-actualization appears to abstract from his Phenomenology, and thus appears to present a methodologically individualistic account of the rational will. This makes it appear as if the will becomes plural only at the level of objective spirit. But why are the drives fundamentally social? This is presupposed, not explained or shown. In the Psychology this move to the social level is not apparent or made explicit;

^{147.} *Ibid*. 148. Enc. 1830, §469.

^{149.} VPG 1827, 248; see below, p. 254. 150. Ibid., 255; see below, p. 259.

^{151.} Peperzak, Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 58-9.

hence the Psychology appears to be formal, because what is missing is an account of self-actualization wherein spirit becomes determinately objective and social.

Peperzak offers a half-hearted defense of Hegel against the charge of formalism. He suggests that Hegel's is a benign and methodological formalism of procedure, rather than an empty formalism. ¹⁵² Subjective spirit is formal in that it abstracts from the larger totality of objective spirit and absolute spirit. If that is correct, the issue is whether Hegel can derive a concrete system of rights and duties of a universally valid morality from the necessary self-specification of the rational will. Peperzak answers this question tentatively in the affirmative.

The individual will which necessarily wills its freedom, is something that must be respected. (I pass over the question whether the respectability of an individual will can be conceived unless one can already conceive a plurality of individual wills, that is, whether the human plurality is according to the concept a prior or derivative concept.) The requirement that the individual will should be respected, is the external aspect of the freedom of the will. Right is nothing other than the ... existence of freedom. If this is the case, then Hegel can formulate the fundamental imperative approximately like Kant: be a person and respect others as persons. With this the normative foundation of a world consisting of individual persons or subjects of rights is given. All these persons should mutually recognize their rights. 153

Peperzak concludes: 'In case Hegel has in fact demonstrated the necessity of the institutions he describes, he can rightly assert that he has overcome formalism.' 154

Peperzak is correct that Hegel does not intend a merely formal concept of freedom. But his defense of Hegel in the above passage is faulty, since Peperzak brackets the question of human plurality. This means that his defense of Hegel against formalism exhibits and suffers from its own formalism. For when human plurality is bracketed, the result appears to be a merely abstract individual *fürsichsein* without context, determinacy and without any transition into its opposite—the many, plurality. How one gets from this formal, finite, and apparently individual *fürsichsein* to the necessity of social institutions and rights, is far from clear. As we have seen, Hegel not only believes that intersubjective recognition is a condition of both freedom and right, he declares—in the preceding Phenomenology of Spirit—that the universal consciousness which arises out of reciprocal

recognition constitutes the general formal structure of ethical substance, including the virtues and the institutions of ethical life. 155

Peperzak belatedly introduces the concept of intersubjective recognition that he previously denied to be part of Hegel's argument, ¹⁵⁶ but only in a comment on spirit that is already objective, i.e., existing on the objective social level. ¹⁵⁷ Thus, for Peperzak, recognition plays no role in constituting this already objective spirit or in the transition from subjective to objective spirit. Recognition is presented as logically derivative from an abstract Kantian argument about the will and respect for individual freedom. But this is implausible as Peperzak himself admits, when he concludes his discussion of Hegel's formalism with the observation that 'while Hegel tirelessly traces the connections between the practical life of individual and of collectivities and reconstructs these conceptually, it appears that in the end he has done the same thing that he reproaches Kant for doing,' ¹⁵⁸ namely, formalism.

B. Unresolved Issues: The Unity of the Philosophy of Spirit

From the phenomenological perspective, recognition and the corresponding human plurality are conditions of respect, and not derivative from it. This observation presupposes that the *Philosophy of Spirit* has some sort of unity, and that the Phenomenology is a necessary stage, not only in spirit's liberation, but also in the overall argument of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, and as such is presupposed by the Psychology. Yet this presupposition is supported only in a programmatic sense by Hegel's texts. The *Philosophy*

- 155. Enc. 1830, \$436 Anmerkung. Peperzak's decision to exclude not only the Boumann Zusätze but also Hegel's own remarks from the 'proper argument' of the Encyclopedia (Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 13) may be a factor contributing to the formalism of his account of that argument.
- 156. Peperzak writes: 'The entire sense of the struggle for recognition contained in the Phenomenology of the Encyclopedia lies not at all in a thematization of intersubjectivity, but only in a process through which the immediate or abstract self-consciousness must become other for itself in order to be able to identify itself with itself' (Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten, 40)
- 157. Ibid., 61. Peperzak is commenting on Enc. 1830, §488, which is part of objective spirit.
 - 158. Ibid., 65.
- 159. This presupposition of order and coherence may be questionable. Tuschling observes in his introduction (pp. x-xi) that Hegel's original announcement of his course was titled not 'Philosophy of Spirit', but simply 'Anthropology and Psychology'. In 1825, he added 'Philosophy of Spirit', but only as a subtitle. In 1829–30 he titled the course 'Psychology and Anthropology or Philosophy of Spirit.' It is interesting that the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' is conspicuous by its absence, and that the psychology precedes the anthropology. This suggests that the materials comprising 'the philosophy of spirit' were constructed and developed

of Spirit is divided into the Phenomenology that considers spirit at the level of consciousness, spirit in relation and opposition, and the Psychology that considers spirit for itself, as self-related. The Psychology turns out to be chiefly an inquiry into theoretical and practical spirit. The latter focuses on the will and, according to Hegel, this will exists on both an individual and a social level, parallel to the structure of Plato's *Republic*:

It is the immanent reflection of spirit itself to pass beyond their [drives and passions] particularity as beyond their natural immediacy and to give their content rationality and objectivity, in which they exist as necessary ties of social relations, rights and duties. This objectivation shows their content, their relation to each other, as well as their truth. And thus it was a true insight on Plato's part... when he showed that what justice is in and for itself can be exhibited only in the objective shape of justice, namely in the construction of the state as ethical life. ¹⁶¹

But unless the Psychology is already dealing with objective spirit this reference to Plato's *Republic* leaves the question of the transition from subjective to objective spirit unclarified. How does the drive towards self-actualization—that the rational end cannot remain subjective but must become actual and objective—clarify or articulate the transition from the individual to the social, from subjective to objective spirit? The Psychology offers no explanation. If this absence of explanation means that the Psychology presupposes that Spirit is already objective, then it would seem that the Psychology does not belong in subjective spirit but rather in objective

160. Enc. 1830, §385.

161. Enc. 1830, §474.

independently without any necessary order of linkage and dependence. The Phenomenology section was in the 1817 edition titled simply 'consciousness'. It was only in the second revised edition of the Encyclopedia in 1827 that Hegel arranged the material as we currently have it, the Philosophy of Spirit being divided into subjective, objective, and absolute spirit, and subjective spirit being subdivided into anthropology, phenomenology of spirit, and psychology. We do not know if in his 1829-30 lectures he followed the order of the announcement, in which the psychology preceded the anthropology, or the order of his handbook. However these philological-textual questions may be decided, it is also important to note that in his Science of Logic, Hegel outlined the idea of spirit in terms of a tripartite division of soul, consciousness, and spirit as such (Science of Logic, trans. Miller, 780-2). He indicates that anthropology, which includes spirit in its irrational manifestatations, deals with the soul as immersed in nature, and that the phenomenology of spirit is 'a science of spirit which stands midway between the science of natural spirit and spirit as such' (ibid., 781). Hegel also distinguishes divergent systematic orderings of the disciplines, which in part depend on whether the logic is taken as the first science or as the last (ibid., 782). Thus it would appear that while Hegel's course titles and nomenclature may be fluid, his basic conception of philosophy of spirit was already worked out as early as 1812-16, and it included the phenomenology as an intermediate discipline.

spirit. 162 Hegel's presentation is defective because it treats spirit as finite, yet spirit has already transcended the level of 'subjective' spirit when it achieved being-for-self (fürsichsein).

The basic issue is how Hegel's account of spirit's self-actualization hangs together. According to the Phenomenology spirit's self-actualization is located in the universal consciousness arising out of and mediated by intersubjective mutual recognition. This is an intersubjective-social account of self-actualization and of objective spirit. Spirit is Hegel's anti-formalist corrective to Cartesian and Kantian views of the modern subject. On the other hand, the Psychology account of self-actualization proceeds from an analysis of drives and passions as analogues of the rational will. The will must not remain merely subjective, but must suspend its subjectivity by the subject's own agency. Yet this 'subject' is only formally presented, together with references to Plato's Republic and its analogy between the soul and the state. This 'subject' that realizes itself objectively is not an abstract atomic individual or a particular arbitrary will. It is a universal will which sublates the drives into the universal end of happiness, and which surpasses such eudaimonism when it wills freedom as its absolute end; as universal will it gives itself duties and rights. But what is missing from this account is how this will which comes to be its own object and which wills freedom as its absolute end, is related to the universal consciousness of the Phenomenology—the I that is also a We. What is missing is an account of how the rational drive towards self-actualization which suspends its subjective forms of feelings, drive, and passions is related to the desire that tries to resolve the contradictions of the process of mutual recognition. Conversely, how is the process of mutual recognition also a development and self-actualization of the universal rational will? The Phenomenology account of mutual recognition with its resulting universal consciousness and social rationality, and the Psychology account of the self-actualizing will that becomes objective in morality and in the state, appear to run on parallel but separate tracks.

Franz Hespe suggests an important inner connection between the intersubjective universal consciousness and theoretical and practical spirit when he writes: 'Recognition therefore opens up for the first time a theoretical perspective on the liberation of spirit, namely, that I am capable of recognizing nature as determined by spirit, but I have this capacity not as a merely subjective self-consciousness, but only as universal

^{162.} This would also mean that subjective spirit consists of the anthropology and phenomenology, and that the transition from subjective to objective spirit is made at the conclusion of the phenomenology.

consciousness.' ¹⁶³ Hespe is right when he claims that for Hegel universal consciousness is intersubjectively constituted and the resulting critical rationality is not merely subjective, but an 'in the world' social rationality. Consequently for Hespe the Phenomenology of the system is not a mere superfluous afterthought sandwiched between the Anthropology and the Psychology. On the contrary,

The phenomenology has...an extraordinarily significant function in the architectonics of the philosophy of subjective spirit. It performs the important function of distinguishing between a subjective consciousness and an objective consciousness and thus grounds the reality of the outer world for consciousness. Otherwise consciousness would be merely a monadic individual which neither distinguished itself from the outer world nor possessed self-consciousness. The phenomenology grounds the necessity of the unity and identity of the 'I', namely the necessity of the self-consciousness as the final point of reckoning for all thinking, representing and the like, but through this demonstration of such [subjective] necessity, it also overcomes the standpoint of the merely individual subject and completes the transition from a merely individual reference to a universal reference of the subject to the outer world, whose thoughts are not mere personal idiosyncrasies but universal, communicable and capable of truth. ¹⁶⁴

Hegel's two accounts of spirit's self-realization as objective spirit—namely as intersubjective universal consciousness (reason) and as self-actualizing universal will-do not constitute a temporal sequence of stages of development. Nor are they incompatible; on the contrary, they rather seem to be complementary. Each exhibits different aspects and dimensions of the liberation of spirit from nature and the raising of consciousness from its particularity to its universality. The Phenomenology criticizes self-seeking desire and shows the constitution of the universal consciousness as spirit through reciprocal recognition. The Psychology shows the raising of spirit to the universal level of objective spirit in two steps: (1) as spirit's constitution of objectivity in the self-externalization of mechanical memory, and (2) as practical will which suspends its subjectivity by the subject's own agency and becomes a universal will whose content is subsequently specified in the institutions of objective spirit. Each in its own way makes the point that although spirit is subjective, it is never merely subjective but rather is always implicitly if not explicitly intersubjective, social, rational, and objective. However, Hegel did not bring all these themes together in a final comprehensive and systematic formulation within 'subjective spirit'. We are

^{163.} Hespe, 'System und Funktion des Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes', in Hespe and Tuschling (eds.), Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes, 514. 164. Ibid., 516.

left, not with the unified, coherent doctrine of spirit that Hegel called for and seemed to promise, but rather with a tripartite outline in which the Phenomenology account of mutual recognition and universal consciousness is inserted between the quasi-Aristotelian discussions of soul in the Anthropology, and the Aristotelian and Kantian analyses of theory and practice in the Psychology. Thus we are left with several questions. What is spirit? What unifies spirit? How do the anthropology, the phenomenology, and the psychology fit together and add up to a coherent philosophy of spirit? How does the phenomenology relate to the psychology, and how do both, taken together, clarify and constitute the 'transition' from subjective to objective spirit? These are questions that will need to be examined and sorted out by subsequent inquiry.

8. NOTES ON THE TEXT AND TRANSLATION

The German edition edited by Franz Hespe and Burkhard Tuschling contains a main text comprised by the Erdmann manuscript, and a supplementary text by Ferdinand Walter. The juxtaposition of these two texts is not sheer coincidence. Erdmann and Walter themselves were not complete strangers, but rather were relatives; Walter was Erdmann's maternal uncle, who was only four years older than Erdmann. By their own account, the two lived together in Berlin while attending Hegel's 1827 lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit. Much less is known about Walter than about Erdmann. 166

Erdmann recounts hearing Hegel lecture. Hegel neither dictated his lectures, nor delivered them in such a way that one could record them verbatim. Hegel brought several pages of notes with him to class; he searched and

^{165.} VPG 1827, 269.

^{166.} Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–92), German theologian and philosopher, was born at Wolmar in Livonia on 13 June 1805. He studied theology at Dorpat and afterwards studied both theology and philosophy at Berlin (1826–8), where he attended Hegel's lectures. From 1829 to 1832 he was a minister of religion in his native town. Afterwards he devoted himself to philosophy, and qualified in that subject at Berlin in 1834. In 1836 he was professor-extraordinary at Halle, became full professor in 1839, and died there on 12 June 1892. He published many treatises, including *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (2 vols., 1866), the third edition of which has been translated into English, Leib und Seele (1837), Grundriss der Psychologie (1840), Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik (1841), and Psychologische Briefe (1851). Ferdinand Walter, like Erdmann, was born in Livland. He became a pastor and later general superintendant of Livland; this information is taken from his son and biographer Julius Walter (1841–1922), a professor of philosophy in Königsburg.

shuffled through these in order to find the proper terms and expressions. Consequently Hegel's lecture style was laborious. The main ideas were brought forth by Hegel in pregnant keywords which made clear the general substantial sense and spirit of what he wanted to say, but those taking the notes also had to formulate the material themselves. Consequently in light of this joint activity in transcribing Hegel's lectures, Erdmann believed that it would be difficult to decide *how* Hegel thought (i.e., his thought process) concerning a specific point by relying simply on a transcription of his lectures. On the other hand Erdmann indicates that Hegel always strove to communicate *what* he thought to his students. Another auditor reported 'Hegel spoke with a clarity and popularity...nothing was dialectically developed merely to excite or impress his hearers.' 167

The process of transcribing and writing out the transcription of Hegel's lectures did not end in the lecture hall. Erdmann declares that his transcript was produced at home on the basis of his own notes. 168 Erdmann's text is not a verbatim transcription but a reconstruction; however it is a reconstruction based on a living memory of what Hegel said in the lecture. This living memory shows itself in Erdmann's own revisions and corrections as he recalls and re-thinks the material a second time. 169 In contrast to Erdmann, Walter's text is based not only on his notes, but also on the notes of other sources. Walter's text is more heterogeneous, whereas Erdmann's stems from one hand and one source. The German editors conclude that neither of the two manuscripts provide the exact words of Hegel, that both are the result of individually diverse transcriptions of the lectures and hermeneutical working out of the texts. Of course it is possible that they both got Hegel wrong, but when we compare their accounts against each other and against Hegel's Vorlesebuch outline, that they got Hegel wholly wrong seems unlikely. The substantial agreements in those passages in which Walter parallels Erdmann, show that while the transcriptions do not offer a literal protocol, they nevertheless reliably document the train of thought of the lectures. 170

The German editors Hespe and Tuschling claim that the Erdmann transcript is superior to the previously discovered transcripts of Hotho (1822), Griesheim (1825), and Kehler (1825), not only because it is more complete, but also because it exhibits a more consistent conceptual unity. In their

^{167.} *Ibid.*, 270–1 n. 11. 168. VPG 1827, 276.

^{169.} As an example of such self-correction, the German editors point to Erdmann's replacement of 'the infinite separation' (die unendliche Absonderung) with 'the infinite, absolute' (das Unendliche, Absolute) on p. 5 of the German edition (see below, p. 59, l. 1).

^{170.} VPG 1827, 279.

judgment its literary form is also superior to any of the others. ¹⁷¹ Moreover, it comes from an identifiable source whose reliability can be checked by comparing it with the Walter material. ¹⁷² It will give interpreters a third alternative to the 'pure' but almost unintelligible text of the handbook outline, and Boumann's readable, but questionable, editorial creations. It will permit readers to deal more intelligently with Hegel's handbook (*Vorlesebuch*) outline and more critically with the Boumann *Zusätze*. Finally, the 1827 lectures will allow Hegel's handbook outline to function for contemporary readers as it did for his students, namely, as the official outline and guide to the orally elaborated lecture materials.

As already noted, the German editors take the Erdmann transcript as the main text, and make use of Walter as a variant to the Erdmann. The English translation follows this practice, but relegates the Walter material to footnotes. It should be noted that in some cases Walter provides a variant reading for the Erdmann manuscript, and in some cases Walter provides additional material not found in Erdmann. The Walter material appears in footnotes which are identified by 'W'. In those cases where Walter provides a variant reading, the Erdmann text for which Walter is a variant reading is identified in the main text with the tilde character (\sim) placed at the beginning and the end of the text for which Walter offers variant material; thus $\sim \ldots \sim$. The note is identified as 'W reads'. In other cases Walter provides additional material not found in Erdmann. This material is identified as 'W adds' and no tildes are used in the main text.

The German edition is required to include all variant readings, no matter how trivial. Including all the variants would have produced a needlessly complicated English text. Consequently, not every variant reading in the German text has been translated, but only those which contained significant new material or made a substantial addition to the main text. In this sense

^{171.} See ibid., 279.

^{172.} Burkhard Tuschling claims that the Walter material both supplements the Erdmann, and provides a way of checking and establishing the reliability of the Erdmann transcript. But how can Walter both supplement the more complete Erdmann transcript while at the same time serving as a check on Erdmann's reliability? The Walter material supplements Erdmann in the sense that Walter provides some additional material not found in Erdmann. The Walter material provides a check for Erdmann in the sense that Walter frequently provides a parallel reading for Erdmann that can be used to check Erdmann's reliability. However, Tuschling also observes that the Walter material is more heterogeneous (multi-sourced) than the Erdmann, and that it is not as complete or extensive as the Erdmann transcript. Hence it cannot be used to check the entire Erdmann transcript, but only those passages for which the two present parallel versions. Since many of these passages are parallel both in wording and in their sense, Tuschling believes that the Erdmann transcript as a whole is reliable in capturing not Hegel's every word, but the spirit and sense of what Hegel said.

the translation is an abridgment and interpretation of the German original. But since many of the Walter additions are substantial and important, they have been translated.

Editorial footnotes, whether from the German editor Burkhard Tuschling, or from the translator, are identified thus: [Ed.]. The page numbers of the German edition are included in the text of the translation. They are preceded by a vertical line: |. Thus page 100 in the German edition is marked in the translation by |100. Tuschling's interpolations, which are often words or phrases written in the margin of the Erdmann manuscript, are marked thus <...>. The translator's interpolations, whether supplying a missing word or indicating German terms, are in brackets, thus [...].

Making Hegel speak English is not easy, and if Gadamer is correct about the extent to which Hegel's thought is embedded in the German language, probably nearly impossible. 173 Every translation remains an interpretation of, and not a replacement for, the original text. I have appended discussion of some translation issues in editor's notes in the text, and sometimes included key German terms in brackets [...]. Readers can also consult the translation glossary. I have drawn upon the glossaries of the Hegel Lectures translation series, as well as those of Harris *et al.* However, since the *Philosophy of Spirit* material differs from the *Logic* and from the other lectures, this translation's glossary necessarily contains some special terms of its own.

What to do about *aufheben*? As is well known, Hegel explains that it means both to cancel and to preserve on a higher level. Rather than following Stirling who coined the term 'sublate' and imposed on it the second sense of 'preserve' that Hegel claimed for 'aufheben,' I have accepted Suchting's proposal to translate 'aufheben' as 'suspend' rather than as sublate. In contrast to sublate, 'suspend' is felicitously ambiguous in Hegel's sense: it means 'to put out of operation,' and 'to hang from', i.e., to be lifted up and to depend on that from which one 'hangs'. ¹⁷⁴ While I cannot speak for the *Logic*, I can say that 'suspend' best conveys the sense of many passages in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, particularly those dealing with organism and organic process. If an organism fails to suspend the independence of its members, let alone their contradictions and conflicts, it fails to sustain itself as a vital living being, and becomes ill or perishes. If it does suspend those conflicts, the organism also surmounts them, and they are suspended from and are preserved in and depend on the organic totality as it in turn organizes

^{173.} H. G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. C. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 112.

^{174.} See Suchting's Minority Report in The Encyclopedia Logic, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

and reproduces itself in them. In any case the reader is referred to Hegel's own explanation of *aufheben* in the *Science of Logic*, ¹⁷⁵ and to the debate between Suchting and Harris in their translation of the *Encyclopedia Logic*.

Translating Hegel is a demanding task, especially without an official translation team. Fortunately several institutions and people assisted me. I should like to acknowledge research support from the University of Illinois at Chicago, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research, and a Summer Scholar grant from Hiram College. In addition, the German editors, Burkhard Tuschling and Franz Hespe, have offered support and encouragement in support of this translation. Thanks go to Burkhard Tuschling for a close scrutiny of portions of the translation, and to Franz Hespe for clarifying Hegel's discussion of the Phoenician alphabet. Thanks also go to Walter Jaeschke, director of the Hegel Archive in Bochum, for helpful discussions of this difficult text, and to Rolf-Peter Horstmann for helpful criticism of the translator's introduction. I wish to acknowledge the unflagging assistance of Claudia Fritsch, my research assistant, who reviewed the translation, caught many errors, and made interesting observations about how Hegel's lecture style is reflected in the transcript. Thanks go to Benjamin Steiner, a teaching assistant at Hiram College, for correcting the early draft of the Anthropology. Thanks go to George di Giovanni, for his helpful advice on rendering some 'impossible terms' like Seelenhaftigkeit. That too will be discussed in a translator's note. Thanks also go to Peter Hodgson who made valuable suggestions about translating Hegel and encouragement about improving the style of Erdmann's manuscript and Hegel's often repetitive lecturing. To that end I have shortened some long sentences and broken long passages up into shorter paragraphs that reflect discrete themes and topics. The remaining errors are my responsibility.

> Robert R. Williams Chicago, June 2006

175. Hegel, Science of Logic, 106 ff.

INTRODUCTION

I Our object is the philosophy of spirit or anthropology and psychology. Anthropology as such considers spirit in its natural life, when spirit is still immersed in nature, and appears as spirit in conflict and in relation to corporeity. Psychology has for its object spirit as it relates to and develops [freely] out of itself. The phenomenology of spirit, spirit as consciousness, stands between anthropology and psychology. In anthropology spirit is immersed in its natural corporeity; in psychology spirit constitutes itself in its freedom, i.e., free spirit. Between these two is the process wherein spirit

 in relation to nature. The second [stage] is spirit as consciousness, or spirit in its phenomena. Here we exist and know something, i.e., have an object externally, and at the same time we know ourselves. I am related to myself and at the same time relate myself to something other that is not I. I relate myself to an object that is related to itself. Thus we begin to consider spirit in general. It is a worthy object. Here we consider only the finite spirit, but in it the essential substance is to be spirit. It has this in common with the infinite spirit, to be spirit.

When we speak of the worthiness of the spirit, it can occur to us when we distinguish nature from spirit and oppose nature to spirit, [to ask] which is superior and which is the more worthy? In a true examination of spirit we find that spirit compares itself with nature, is essentially directed towards nature, and has its own nature together with nature in general as the objects of its activity. It has been often said as a general view that the works of human beings are considered to have less value than nature. I The human being is natural, but as human, he is supposed not to be merely natural, but also to be spiritual. [Yet] there is a widespread view that human effects and doings are so far inferior to natural events and to the entry of nature into

^{1. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §248A for a similar account of the relation between spirit and nature.

[human] arrangements and works that one can often find the natural called divine in contrast to the human. For example, floods and other natural disasters have been regarded as acts of God, as acts greater than humans are able to accomplish. [Moreover] art and other human products are supposed to be inferior to the works of nature. The process of nature is represented as something eternal, unchangeable, divine, while the human is represented as belonging to contingency and to arbitrary freedom, which deserves less to be appreciated than the natural. However, if we are supposed to determine the true relation [between spirit and nature], the reverse is the case. When the human being thinks for himself and explores the depth of his spirit, he knows that his freedom is something far superior to all the creations and products of nature. Through his freedom the human being knows that he is more sublime. The human being knows his freedom, his spirit, justly as something divine in a far higher sense than anything natural. When the human being is spiritual, and his spirit is free, so spirit and freedom are present in everything, even in what appears as the least. In everything human there is included the infinite stamp of spirit, [namely] freedom. If we bring the representation of God [to this stamp of spirit], it is clumsy and artless to desire to <see> God only on the side of nature, but not on the side of the human. God is essentially spirit² and if God is to be known, God must be known spiritually; God's acts are essentially spiritual acts.

If it is said that God thunders and is known in thundering,³ something higher than thunder is required for the human being conscious of his freedom and spirituality. God as spirit is not essentially revealed to him in such natural phenomena. From this perspective the object of spirit is to be regarded as something more worthy. This object may be regarded as most comprehensible and easiest to know. We ourselves are spirit, and I when we know spirit we are at home with ourselves. However, even if spirit appears to be the closest to us because no separation occurs, this does not mean that spirit is the first thing that presents itself for consideration. Finite spirit stands between two realms: one, the natural, is the corporal; the other, distinct from and opposed to nature is the infinite, the absolute. The finite spirit finds itself between the two. The human being is spirit, is spiritual in its relation to God, but finite in its connection with nature. God and nature are prior in the order of consideration to the human spirit. In the beginning of our lives we consider first external things, and then from these we rise from the finite to that which exists in and for itself. The human being is at first directed outwards, and outside of him there is both the finite

2. [Ed.] John 4: 24.

3. [Ed.] Job 37: 5.

and temporal, and the infinite, the absolute. It is later that the human being returns to himself and directs his consideration and interest towards himself.

In regard to the science of spirit, it should be noted that the command of the delphic Apollo was first given to the Greeks as their highest command: know yourself. This is not to be taken as one command among others, but as the command of the knowing God, in comparison with which everything else is only subordinate and dependent. This is also not to be understood as a command that the individual should know himself in his particular ends, inclinations, and weaknesses, rather it is the command of the knowing God, a general command that the human being should know his essence, i.e., the spirit. For spirit to have given this command to the Greeks, special conditions and modes of self-consciousness were required. and these conditions were first met by the Greeks. Peoples have developed their science in reference to some objects, but not to other objects. Thus the Greeks had no physics in our sense. If a people such as the Indians and the Chinese specialize in science, it goes without saying that this science will not have spirit for its object. In order for the science of spirit [Geisteswissenschaft] to have significance for a people, it is necessary that spirit itself have infinite value and importance for knowledge. It has such significance and importance only as free spirit I that is, when spirit has come to the consciousness of its own freedom. This consciousness [of freedom] began with the Greeks, for there it came to pass that spirit began to come to itself and know itself.5

Greek spirit proceeded from oriental exuberance. One characteristic of the latter is slavery towards absolute being. Here religion itself is despotism, with which political despotism is connected: on the one hand despotism, and on the other, subjection to the absolute being. Opposed to oriental exuberance and unrestricted arbitrariness is that condition wherein the human being has joy in himself. Such contentment he finds only in that freedom which is the measure and limit of ethical life. The task of knowing oneself is bound up with this consciousness. This consciousness of freedom bestows on the human being a universal interest in his inner life, but in his inner life he finds a wealth of interests and manifold contradictions between such interests, a chaotic wealth in which he is pulled first in one direction and then in another. In this plurality one is the truest and highest, to which the human being has subordinated the multiplicity of his desiring

^{4. [}Ed.] The inscription of the temple of Apollo at Delphi; it is repeated at the end of the lecture. For Hegel, self-knowledge (Selbsterkenntnis) is the central task of philosophy. See also Encyclopedia \$377 Addition, and Philosophy of Right \$343 Addition.

^{5. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §482A.

and willing. The [chief] interest is to isolate and identify this one, the true in the midst of these riches, the true determination among the many that stand in tension and contradiction. The matter is not yet settled merely by self-reference. Through the consciousness of its freedom spirit has become a riddle to itself insofar as self-contradictory determinations occur in a single [consciousness]. The solution to this riddle is the simple meaning wherein everything apparently contradictory makes sense, is explained, and is put in its proper place.

If it is asked, what is spirit? the proper sense of this question is what is essential in spirit, and this is equivalent to the question, what is the vocation⁶ [Bestimmung] of the human as such? Vocation expresses on the one hand a difference [between what is, and what is supposed to be], an end, a purpose that is supposed to be achieved. [That is,] what should the human being make of himself? What should he be? What should he bring forth in himself by his freedom? On the other hand, vocation means the origin, what the human being is in himself [an sich]. The human being is supposed to bring himself about, but he cannot make himself to be anything other, and can have no other end, except what he originally is in himself. What the human being is in himself is called his fundamental disposition or tendency. The nature of spirit is to bring forth what it is, to bring it to manifestation, to disclosure, to consciousness. | The vocation of spirit is to make itself be what it is in itself.—This is a tremendous distinction: what spirit is in itself, and what spirit is supposed to bring forth of itself. The content is one and the same; there is only a difference in form—that spirit makes itself become what it originally is. Every interest in the history of the world spirit turns on this distinction: to bring to consciousness what [the] in itself is, so that this inner potential also comes to be explicit and for itself. This absolute disposition is that to which everything else reduces, the origin. The absolute disposition or substance of spirit is its freedom, and the destiny of its action,

^{6. [}Ed.] The term Bestimmung has a variety of meanings, e.g., 'determination', 'definition', 'condition', and 'vocation'. When, as in this passage, it is taken in a practical sense, it means 'vocation' or 'destiny'. However, destiny is often associated with fate. German philosophical dictionaries refer to Fichte's Bestimmung des Menschen as an example, which is translated into English as 'The Vocation of Man'. Here vocation is not intended in the narrow sense of a special divine calling to a particular profession, but in a teleological-rational sense. This rational sense of vocation is explained in these passages, where Hegel links the human vocation to the command given to the Greeks by the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, namely, gnothi seauton, know yourself. Self-knowledge is both a condition and a result in Hegel's developmental anthropology. The human being has to discover and then become what it implicitly is. Hegel reinterprets this command to self-knowledge as the command of the knowing God. At the conclusion of this lecture course, Hegel returns to this theme of a divine call (Ruf) to self-knowledge as the supreme end of spirit.

INTRODUCTION

the act of spirit is to liberate itself. That spirit is free in itself, that its efficacy, its activity, is to liberate itself, and the history of its liberation— this is what our discipline is all about: It is our task to watch spirit achieving by itself its vocation and its destiny, namely, freedom. Thereby both the content and the point of view are given from which we want to consider this discipline. We examine the series of stages through which spirit liberates itself, and the goal is that spirit comes to be free, as free spirit. With this liberation the science of objective spirit, i.e., the spirit that is objective to itself, begins, and with this liberation right also begins.

Concerning the method of treating our object, we should recall the forms of self-knowledge and [empirical] human knowledge.7 In this empirical human knowledge [Menschenkenntnis] we have in mind the particularity of human beings only. <As for> self-knowledge that we are supposed to possess, we focus in particular on the deficiency of the inclinations. The human being should know with what weaknesses it is afflicted. Prudence [Besonnenheit] in behavior, etc., is important, but it cannot be the object of science. 'One should become acquainted with human beings in order to use them, in order to be on one's guard against them, and so forth.' All this refers to the particularity of human beings, a particularity that is either indifferent or untrue. The genuine element in the human being is its correspondence to the nature of its spirit. The former prudence leads easily to a surveillance of human beings, a type of treachery. This type of human knowledge is specially recommended as advantageous-[namely] to use human beings for one's [own] ends [and] to protect oneself from others. The empirical human knowledge I connected with psychology has been particularly invoked in pragmatic history.⁸ History has two dimensions. The first is the substantial element, the end, the content, and the second is that this content is set in motion by the subjective. Actualization is the relevant aspect, and the particularity etc., the individual, everything that is specially emphasized in pragmatic history, falls on this subjective side. In order to clarify a topic, to isolate its ground, [the pragmatic historians] went back to intentions. In this way great undertakings have been minimized, since they are explained by subjective satisfactions etc., although [subjective] particularity in fact played only a peripheral role in the acting subject. On the contrary, great undertakings cannot be derived from particularity. For

^{7. [}Ed.] See Encyclopedia §377 Addition. Here Hegel criticizes W. T. Krug, Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte, 1827 ff.

^{8. [}Ed.] For Hegel's criticism of pragmatic history writing, cf. Encyclopedia §§ 140A, 377A, 549A.

example, a great man is not a hero to his valet, although the valet 'can observe the great man when he is not [acting like] a hero, and therefore should know him the best'. This [kind of] knowledge of the human thereforefocuses [only] on the particular, not on the universal, on spirit.

Spirit then became the object of science, and there were at that time two sciences, empirical psychology and pneumatology. ¹⁰ Empirical psychology provides a knowledge of spirit as the latter is observed and researched. Pneumatology provided such determinations of spirit as for example, immateriality, on which the concept of immortality was based. However, with these determinations one still knows very little about spirit as concretely developed. To comprehend spirit concretely, it is necessary to turn to experience—since there is not much to be got from metaphysics—and to fetch concreteness there. In this way experience has to supplement the poverty of the metaphysical, *a priori* consideration of spirit, and in this way this psychology grounds itself in experience. It has been a common misunderstanding that philosophy devalues and reduces experience. But experience belongs to everything that human beings know; they must have inner and outer intuitions of objects, and they obtain these only through experience. Experience is essential and indispensable.

The next step is to think experience. Experience means more than mere sensible grasping or mere perception; it already includes a universality within itself. If something I is supposed to count as experience, there must be a law, something universal, and not merely a particular perception. This something must be raised by thinking to universality. Universality requires thinking. Individual observations are raised by thought to universality; only then do they count as experience. Whether what is present in perception is rightly comprehended depends on this universality, this category, so that experience is supposed to be universal.—It is a quite different matter if the empirical form of perception itself is supposed to be made the foundation of philosophy. Philosophy must contradict this. Insight into necessity and the comprehension of necessity are the task of philosophy, but experience signifies merely that something is. Philosophy [to be sure] must agree with what is actual. It considers what actually is, and what is

^{9. [}Ed.] A reference to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. A. V. Miller, 404. 10. [Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §§34, 378, 389.

^{11. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §§465 ff., where thinking is presented as not merely subjective, i.e., not merely as happening in the mind, but is to be understood in the sense of the Aristotelian–Leibnizian entelecheia, that is to say, both as an intellectual activity and an objective structure and process.

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must allow of being proved. But philosophy shows the necessity, and this knowledge of necessity experience does not attain.

In order to experience, one must be capable of thought and reason. Thus experience and empirical psychology on the one hand, and philosophy and conceptual thinking on the other, are not opposed to each other as is often falsely believed. Philosophy contradicts only the assumption that the fact that something is should be the final ground of its validity. One must also have insight into the necessity. The other aspect in which philosophy contradicts empiricism is that the latter is by no means without metaphysics. Experience contains general thought-determinations and everything depends on whether these empiricist thought-determinations are true. It is the [metaphysical] aspect of these empiricist thought-determinations to which philosophy is opposed.

In psychology representations of the will and imagination are introduced. These we can acquire without much education. Philosophy finds this doubled element deficient, namely, in regard to the category no necessity is demonstrated. It is said that the human being possesses imagination and so forth; 12 these faculties are set alongside each other. Different modes of action are discovered, and these are juxtaposed in such a way that their only connection is the 'also' [das Auch]. They are [thus related] like things in space, indifferent to each other, I each in its own place. The category of force [here] is defective, since it is imagined that this force has such-and-such modes of producing effects. Each of these forces is taken as independent, even when one says that spirit possesses them. They are not bound in a unity that constitutes them. When things are imagined thus, their unity is not evident. This is the defect in [the empiricist view of] the categories. The connecting 'also' always allows the independence of every activity and their mutual indifference. The soul appears as an external connection of all these diverse types of powers and activities. This is a defect in respect to form, and one has a [negative] feeling against this way of treating spirit and splitting it up, because we know that spirit is only a unity; this [analytical] splintering contradicts the self-consciousness that spirit is utterly one. In the philosophical mode of consideration, the concept, the concrete unity, must replace the category of the 'also', this abstract [external] connection. In this way the splintering of spirit is overcome and corrected. This deficient unity also becomes evident in another way; this unity also has another form. I am one, and all these activities are absolutely united in me. As the one, I

12. [Ed.] For Hegel's critique of empirical psychology, cf. Encyclopedia §\$135A, 259A, 379, 387A, 442, 445A, 471A.

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am not only a substrate, but a subject, so my end is also essentially only one, and my action is directed to one end. However, according to empiricist psychology, each of these powers [Kräfte] has a different end, and special ends are presupposed which these faculties serve. But since spirit is only one, it has only one end, and those many ends are subordinate to it. This subordination appears as a splintering. To be sure, some say 'activities' instead of powers, and this is some <improvement> but not much. For since these activities have entirely separate contents, they remain external and isolated from each other, and so the same deficiency remains.

Pneumatology or rational psychology also exhibits this [abstract] mode of consideration. Here the soul is not supposed to be considered according to its phenomena, but according to what it essentially is. Pneumatology is the metaphysical consideration of the soul according to entirely general definitions and determinations. Matter is regarded | as a composite manifold in itself, as an aggregate of many. In the [abstract] simple there is no determination of and by the other; the simple is not supposed to have other-being [Anderssein] in itself. If something is supposed to undergo alteration, the possibility of the alteration must reside in the thing itself. These metaphysical determinations are to be found in Plato's Phaedo. 13 These determinations are one-sided; [however] the true must be concrete. The [merely] abstract has no truth. In what is simple there is no determination by the other; in Phaedo Plato's concern was to assert the simplicity of the soul. But that which is simple has the determination to pass over [into its opposite]. Being-for-itself is a simplicity, but it also essentially has an intensive element, a degree. Kant objected that if the soul is qualitatively simple, it could nevertheless be quantitatively the opposite. 14 Consequently simplicity does not exclude intensity nor is it saved from it. The soul is consciousness, and if this is represented under the quality of intensity, it can be in a higher or lower degree. Complete weakness of consciousness does not suspend the simplicity of the soul. Pneumatology also treats the relation between soul and body. The soul is for itself, simple, while matter is the opposite, [namely] manifold. The soul has relation to matter, and relation presupposes something in common, a community or unity. But how can the simple be in unity with that which is complex and manifold?

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Does it not cease to be the simple when it is touched by matter? The disentanglement of this contradiction constitutes the difficulty. Pneumatology defines the soul according to what it is; however the soul is not a

^{13. [}Ed.] Plato, Phaedo 105b-107a.

^{14. [}Ed.] Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 414-15.

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being, rather it is essentially active, a manifold, and must be conceived as spirit. Abstractions like simplicity are insufficient to determine the richness and abundance of spirit, because spirit is more than something simple or a mere being. The concept of the soul includes both the simplicity of rational psychology, and the multiplicity, the rich content of empirical psychology. [Only] the two taken together amount to a full consideration. Each taken by itself is one-sided. The unity of both belongs to the idea, but not the abstract unity. Empirical psychology represents the soul as disintegrated, and what Aristotle has written about the soul is still to be recommended as the most philosophical. ¹⁵ Like everything else, Aristotle conceives the soul speculatively in its concept, and philosophy needs | to return to this manner of consideration.

12

Recently there have been many attempts¹⁶ to systematize the science of spirit, which contains a treasure of materials. In the beginning, the concept of spirit must be treated in a preliminary way and a division [of the subject] must be made. However we cannot follow the order of paragraphs, 17 because spirit is treated there as a unity in the context of the whole. A scientific treatment does not begin with spirit; rather spirit constitutes a form of existence of the idea. Of course, we begin with spirit, but this is not a proper first beginning because it depends on a presupposition: we take spirit first of all from representation. However, in the progress of science, spirit is a result in the sense that it is the truth of something that precedes it, namely, nature. Nature gathers itself and returns to the determinate form of the idea. If spirit is the truth of what precedes it, it is in fact prior to what precedes it, and the position that spirit is a result, is shown to be one-sided. There is a reversal from result to beginning, to starting point. That spirit and the idea are the truth will not be proven here, but will be taken as a premise. The point where this is to be proven is the connection with nature, that spirit is the truth of nature. The whole preceding discussion is a proof of this.

What is spirit? This we have to assume as a premise, and to appeal to the representation [of spirit]. What spirit is, the concept of spirit, can at first only be something entirely formal, because what spirit is is the concern of our entire <discipline>. This part can only contain the formal universal essence, the substance of spirit, and this is freedom. How this determination

^{15. [}Ed.] Hegel refers to Aristotle, De Anima: Encyclopedia §378.

^{16. [}Ed.] References to A. K. A.von Eschenmayer, Psychologie in drei Teilen as empirische, reine und angewandte (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1817, 1822), and H. Steffens, Anthropologie (Breslau, 1822).

^{17. [}Ed.] That is, the order of paragraphs of the Encyclopedia.

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[freedom] is connected to nature, we shall see afterwards. The essence of spirit is freedom; this assertion has its proof in the preceding and the entire discussion that follows will constitute the explanation and demonstration of this proposal.

The human being is spirit. What is the innermost, concentrated nature, the root of spirit? Freedom, I, thinking. I am spirit, the concrete, and when I take together all that appears to me, I say 'I' and only a human being can do that. The I is a completely simple representation, and is simple insofar as I can I abstract from everything, i.e., negate everything. When I say 'pure I' I have abstracted from all content. There is nothing particular or determinate therein. The pure I is this utterly simple universal that exists only through the activity of negating and abstracting. Since I have removed every particular from myself, I am absolutely only by myself, and with nothing other, as for example, I am when I intuit something. If I have an end, this end is always a determinate content in contrast to the universal that I am. The entirely colorless light 18 represents the I in nature, and the fact that I am only at home with myself and am not affected by or dependent on anything other—this is human freedom. Freedom consists in the fact that the human being can abstract from everything, even from life and from the entire encompassing world of consciousness. In representation I can abstract from everything, and even in actuality as such I can abstract from all inner existence. This latter fact of abstraction shows that all my ends and interests are external to me, insofar as they are different from me and from my I. This exclusive being-only-by-self is freedom, first of all, formal freedom.

~All determinations and activities proceed from freedom and are subordinate to freedom.~¹⁹ The human being can~bear infinite | anguish. This is the special prerogative of freedom, conceived as concrete freedom. Anguish is experienced only by the living being. Anguish is negative, and yet in this negation we preserve ourselves; this is a contradiction.²⁰ Self-feeling

^{18. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature §\$275-8. Colorless light is indeterminate, prior to, and without distinctions or differentiations. This is spirit in its slumber, not yet for itself as spirit.

^{19.} W reads: < All other determinations of the nature of spirit and its activities are only moments and modifications of freedom.>

^{20. [}Ed.] Cf. Science of Logic, trans. Miller, p. 770 (corrected) ... since it is the absolute identity in this disruption, the living being is for itself this disruption and has the feeling of this contradiction, which is anguish. Anguish is therefore the prerogative of living beings; because they are the existent concept, they are an actuality of infinite power such that they are within themselves the negative of themselves, their negativity is for them, and they maintain themselves in their otherness. It is said that contradiction is unthinkable; but the fact is that in the anguish of a living being contradiction is even an actual existence.'

is affirmative in the sense that, when it is negated, it does not disappearwhich is not the case in nature. [In spirit] contradiction as such comes to light. In injury, the negation of my self-feeling is itself still my selffeeling. What negates spirit is subordinate to spirit's affirmation, its unity with itself. This is the determination of freedom as such. Abstract freedom means that I am capable of suspending all content, all determinations in me. Concrete freedom means that in whatever determines, limits, or negates me. I nevertheless remain at home with myself [nur bei mir selbst bin] and annihilate the other[ness]. Freedom constitutes the essential determination of spirit, and we can say that freedom is the concept of spirit.~21 By 'concept' is understood first of all the simple determination that constitutes the distinctive characteristic of something. However, the philosophical concept is a simple determinacy that includes difference as suspended, so that the subject is rendered determinate, and incorporates the difference in such a way that in this difference it has returned to itself. ~The concept includes the difference, but the difference is at the same time transparent. I have many determinations that are incompatible with me, and in this difference I am nevertheless at home with myself, and have returned to myself. In this science we have to grasp the finite firmly in both its difference and its unity. \sim^{22}

Freedom is the concept itself that has come to existence. In every sensible intuition there is an external object; insofar as it is my representation, I am at home with myself, since I am together with this content. There is a difference, but I have negated it. Philosophy means that we consider

21. W reads: The human being can bear anguish—herein lies what belongs to the nature of freedom in its concrete [normative] determination. <Only the living [being] experiences anguish.> Anguish is something negative that is in us. (We have a defect and are discontent etc. = anguish = negative.) To endure anguish means that we preserve ourselves in spite of the negative that is in us. There is a contradiction in this. 'I am simple' <is> an affirmative, and 'I am hungry' a negative. If now the affirmative is negated, one means [falsely] that it disappears. In nature this is true, as for example, red is the negative of non-red, or light cannot endure its negation. In contrast, in the living and even more so in spiritual matters this is not so. If I am hungry, this is a negative, it contradicts my affirmative feeling of self, and nevertheless I feel this.—Self-negation is immanent in it, but subordinate to its affirmation, its unity.—The determination of formal <or abstract> freedom is that I am capable of suspending all determinations in me. The determination of concrete freedom is that I exist in my determination, that I annihilate it and persist by myself. This is the abstract concept of freedom that is the fundamental determination of our spirit.

22. W reads: a difference that is at the same no difference, immediately as a suspended difference. I am simple; I have determinations in me, that are other than me (intuitions, perceptions), that are unbearable also for another (pain, anguish); but nevertheless from this difference, I have returned to myself. It is only my intuition, and therefore it is no other, it is in me and is mine. In science we must, above all, grasp the finite firmly, know it< in its> difference and its unity.

everything in this medium of freedom *sub specie aeterni*.²³ ~The determination of freedom is also what we call ideality. A difference is posited but its independence is at the same time suspended. I comport myself idealistically; I look at something and it is independent over and against me, but this whole representation [of independence] is mine; I am the bearer of it, and the object's independence is ideal.

The fundamental determination of spirit is freedom; in freedom everything is posited as ideal. We allow this as valid, but we take up now another aspect, namely, nature, which stands in contrast and next to spirit. Here we place ourselves at a standpoint where we have to consider these two not as side by side, but rather as constitutive of the ideality of the external in its entire scope. This is the speculative standpoint, from which we likewise have to conceive spirit. \sim^{24} Spirit is to be regarded as higher than nature. But the speculative standpoint requires that ideality be considered as the truth of nature itself. It requires that the freedom of spirit is to be taken as the one and only, what is truly actual, not merely as something higher. Two points need to be made: (1) that this is the speculative standpoint, and (2) that we have to show | how we arrive at and demonstrate this standpoint. The latter is the transition from nature, which has the sense that nature is the eternal activity of turning itself into the ideal, of being eternally only what issues from spirit. Nature, which includes the concept as a law, is this: to be the process of bringing the concept to existence, and the existent concept is the concept in its freedom, namely spirit. This standpoint will be demonstrated by the connection with nature in the concept. The standpoint in terms of which I preserve myself in contrast to nature, will itself emerge from this singularity in the form of consciousness. We are at the speculative standpoint, and what is to be shown is the form in which the need for the speculative has manifested itself. The speculative in the proper sense grasps a unity of those differences that ordinary consciousness and the understanding keep entirely

^{23. [}Ed.] Spinoza, Ethics V: Prop. XXX; cf. also V: Prop. XXIX, II: Prop. XLIV Corollary 2.

^{24.} W reads: Freedom = Ideality. The ideal is anything determinate and different in some way, but in such a way that the difference <its independence> is at the same time suspended. (I comport myself idealistically; I look at the house. The house is reality, independent of me. But the entire content of my representation is no longer independent; only I, the bearer of this content am independent.)

Since in spirit everything is posited as ideal <or since the fundamental determination of spirit is freedom> we allow it to count as valid. But the ordinary representation allows the spirit to be on one side, but nature next to it on the other side. That is not so here! Here we do not have freedom and reality (nature) next to each other, but we have to take freedom <or the ideality of the external> in its entire scope so that freedom is the all-encompassing. This is the speculative standpoint in which we likewise have to take up spirit.

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separate. Understanding has the characteristic of establishing and fixing the finite. Reason negates and suspends the finite. ~We have taken nature in the metaphysical, abstract sense as matter. ²⁵ Spirit and matter are different ~²⁶, a dualism, a difference that counts as something absolutely independent, ²⁷ but the unity of spirit is opposed to such dualism. This contradiction of reason's demand for unity can be dissolved in two ways:

- 1. when it is said²⁸ that matter is essential, while spirit is merely an appearance, form, or modification [of matter]. This is the standpoint of materialism which answers the speculative need to suspend the dualism of the understanding. This dualism is also | expressed linguistically as a dualism between God and world, between good and evil; such dualism constitutes a general difficulty. The human being who has not yet reached the level of reason allows [contradictions] to stand peaceably alongside each other. But if the need for reason arises, spirit presses towards unity. This unity is so conceived that matter is the true, while spirit is its product. If matter thus unites things, then spirit would come forth as fleeting and transitory. This standpoint of materialism is approximately that of naturalism—a mode of thought particularly favored in France. However, one should not thus misunderstand, but rather honor the demand for unity.
- 2. Spirit is self-sufficient, genuine, while nature is only an appearance of spirit, and not something in and for itself, not something truly real. Materialism is much preferable to this spiritualistic idealism, since its view is that matter is independent and spirit is dependent. ~Idealism has much against it, because one needs only to touch matter in order to experience resistance. It is folly to deny the reality of matter.~²⁹

Materialism satisfies the demand for unity, and human beings are easily inclined to abandon the reality of the spiritual in favor of the sensible. Our

- 25. [Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §389A.
- 26. W reads: The difference, which ensues from our discussion is spirit and matter (Nature in metaphysical abstraction).
- 27. W adds: Spirit on the one hand and matter on the other are independent.—In elementary thinking, where only understanding rules, this distinction counts and it originates < and to be sure this dualism comes to expression everywhere (good and evil, etc.) and constitutes the most difficulty. So long as human beings remain at the level of understanding, this dualism counts. But where the need of reason opens up, spirit presses on towards unity, to conceive the difference in a unity, in some sort of relationship.>
 - 28. [Ed.] Encyclopedia §389A. See also d' Holbach, Système de la nature (London, 1770).
- 29. W reads: This (idealism=) spiritualism has the disadvantage that the sensible exists in our consciousness as essentially real. <It> is <therefore> difficult to make people believe this view.

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ordinary consciousness holds fast to the sensible, and rightly. However, its standpoint is not the absolute standpoint. It is easy to believe that there is no other standpoint for considering things. Therefore, before we doubt that physical things are real, it can be that we doubt the self-sufficiency of the soul, and that lends support to materialism. Further, matter is taken to be lawful, and nature as a system where everything takes place according to laws. In reference to spirit, many experiences can be adduced to show that spirit is dependent, the result of nature, illness etc. The essentiality of matter is thus emphasized <against> | the dependence of spirit. The opposed view is that the spiritual alone is real. It is difficult to make this plausible. ~In Germany materialism has met with less acceptance.~30 For the Frenchman with his rationality, with his consistency, everything must be one; in Germany matter was independent, but so was spirit. If one regards spirit as the true power of the material, 31 this view has found acceptance. It is implied when we say that spirit is the only genuine reality in contrast to nature. It also occurs to us concerning spirit that when, (here we are thinking arbitrarily not of all but rather of only a few human beings, 32) we come to believe in the miraculous, that matter cannot withstand spiritual power. In order to avoid such a view—this wild dissolution of the orderly process of natural law³³— we remain either with ~materialism or with dead-end dualism~. 34 Miracles go together with religion; we can pass over this aspect of the question.

With animal magnetism [hypnotism] we discover that we cannot manage with the independence of either one side or the other. The affections of the spirit can kill a human being. In magnetism the spiritual appears as a power above natural laws; its phenomena contradict the order of nature. In natural entities a series of mediations constitutes the natural law—whatever is must have its cause—and this order is lacking in magnetism. In this case we are on the field of wonders. One struggles | against such experiences because they push one into the arms of superstition. These are the two opposed views wherein spiritualism has the disadvantage.

^{30.} W reads: In Germany materialism was less marketable than in France, and therein as well as in their constitutions, etc., the difference of these peoples expressed itself.

^{31.} W adds: so that the natural must be subordinate to the will of spirit.

^{32.} W reads: and if one does not assume this arbitrariness as befitting every spirit, so nevertheless [we think of it as befitting] a few,—.

^{33.} W reads: natural necessity.

^{34.} W reads: a connection of sovereign matter and sovereign spirit, this dualism.—Miracles

^{35. [}Ed.] Encyclopedia §379; cf. A. C. A. Eschenmayer, Psychologie in drei Teilen as empirische, reine und angewandte (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1817, 1822).

^{36.} W adds: kill, because an illness can disrupt and derange the spirit.

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In such phenomena we <also> find the need of our time, namely, to \sim comprehend the relation of spirit to matter \sim .³⁷ It has been said that we assert that the fundamental essence of spirit is freedom. This is freedom from and in the natural. Freedom must not be conceived as arbitrariness but as lawful freedom. — This relation of spirit is our chief object, and the fundamental relation of the concept is the first matter we have to consider.

Before this examination, I want to provide an overview of what we have to deal with. Our discipline shows the way of liberation. Spirit is free, but first it is merely implicitly free in itself. It has to bring forth what it is implicitly in itself.³⁸ This process is the content of our discipline: to liberate oneself, i.e., to liberate oneself from nature. This has a threefold dimension.

1. The relation of spirit to ~nature, or its unity with nature, how it is only in itself or for us, a unity that lies beyond consciousness~.³⁹ I have said 'unity'. But this is actually a poor, superficial expression that one can use as an abbreviation. In philosophy we have to do with the specific determinacy of unity, and without this determinacy unity is abstract and one-sided. Those who rely on such expressions revile philosophy. But what really counts is not unity in general, but how unity is determined. If one speaks [only] of unity, this is only half the story, and the matter becomes falsified.

2. The immediate unity of spirit (no longer as it is in itself). In its immediate unity spirit is yet only a natural being; this is natural unity.

3. The third dimension is that this relation is for spirit itself; it becomes for spirit and is produced by spirit. (The first [dimension] no longer belongs to the present discussion as such.)

The first [topic] is spirit as immersed in nature. Here spirit does not yet exist for itself, but exists as nature spirit [Naturgeist]. Nature spirit is soul. Even animals have souls. The animal is sensible, not as universal [but as a particular or] for itself. The human being as nature spirit is soul. This expression is acceptable. 40 The <earlier> metaphysics asked whether the

- 37. W reads: for all these phenomena are inconceivable from the standpoint of non-speculative thinking, the standpoint of ordinary consciousness.
 - 38. W reads: bring forth, spirit must free itself, freely spirit produces its world from itself.
- 39. W reads: Nature in itself or the unity of spirit and nature in itself,—a unity as it is only in itself or for us, a unity which is contrary to the laws of ordinary consciousness, and which enters our consciousness only through philosophical analysis.
- 40. [Ed.] From GW 12: 197: 'The name "soul" is otherwise used for particular finite spirit in general, and rational or empirical psychology is supposed to be equivalent to a doctrine of spirit. But the expression "soul" creates the impression that it is a "thing" like other things. One inquires concerning its locus, its spatial determinations from which its powers have effect. There is more: how this thing is immortal, subject to temporal conditions but removed from

soul is simple, designated the soul as a thing, and asked for its seat, by which was meant its spatial existence. ~Since the soul has been discussed in these terms, we are justified in using this expression for spirit, so far as it is merely existing [like a thing].~^{41} This is the first part: Anthropology. ~Even here a break between soul and its existence will arise. Spirit is still impeded, hemmed in by its corporeity. (In magnetic sleep spirit falls back into its entanglement in nature.)~^{42}

The second is the Phenomenology of Spirit. This break [with nature] advances to the point where the impediments of ensoulment [Seelen-haftigkeit]⁴³ are purged so that subjectivity comes to be for itself. Subjectivity becomes the 'I' and with | this emergence the second level begins, namely, ~the consideration of the standpoint of consciousness. This is the usual, ordinary standpoint. ~⁴⁴ In the first part [Anthropology] I am wholly in nature; in the second [Phenomenology of Spirit] I have opposed myself to nature. ⁴⁵ What I used to be now becomes my object. This is the standpoint of the appearance of spirit, the standpoint of relation, of contradiction, i.e., the posited existential contradiction. I am independent, as are external things, and nevertheless they have power over me, <and I over them> etc.

change.... The dark region in which spirit lives as a nature spirit in sympathy with nature must be relinquished to anthropology....' See *Encyclopedia* §321A, §34.

^{41.} W reads: The spatial is a material, if also always simple. Spirit as thing is indeed soul, as we also treat the animal soul as a thing. Therein we are justified to use the expression soul in this restricted sense for spirit, so far as spirit is existent.

^{42.} W reads: The madness of the human being, the condition of animal magnetism etc., belong here, – where spirit falls away from its lucidity and freedom into its raw natural condition [Natürlichkeit], its entanglement with nature. But here also begins the contradiction between the capacity to be ensouled [Seelenhaftigkeit] and matter, also <the> break between <the> soul and its being;—.

^{43. [}Ed.] Seelenhaftigkeit, which is here translated as ensoulment, characterizes a disposition towards subjectivity that is not yet subjectivity; it names Geist in the beginning of its break or rupture with nature, but still in a condition of being impeded by nature, as hemmed in by nature, prior to its emergence into contradiction and opposition. Hence Erdmann has Seelenhaftigkeit purging itself and widening the break with nature so that Seelenhaftigkeit is superseded by subjectivity which, as for itself, opposes itself to nature. In the preceding note, Walter has Seelenhaftigkeit as the beginning of the contradiction between soul and matter, the beginning of the break between the soul and its being. Hence I have translated it there as a capacity to be ensouled. When that capacity is realized, the result is ensoulment, which, regarded from a yet higher standpoint, is both more than nature and yet still impeded by nature. When this impediment and contradiction become explicit, Seelenhaftigkeit is superseded by consciousness [Bewusstsein]. When the contradiction constitutive of consciousness is suspended, then consciousness is superseded by spirit [Geist].

^{44.} W: This ego is free, but entirely abstract and essentially related to external objects.

^{45.} W adds: opposed as to an object that is external, as objective external nature.

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This is the standpoint of formal freedom, which is therefore freedom in its contradiction.

The third is spirit in itself, the object of Psychology, the spirit that relates only to itself, but is also determinate. It finds its determination in spirit, and its progress is to posit as its own this determination in which it finds itself and thus to determine itself out of itself (desire, will). With this we release the spirit which is now free for itself.

The first [stage] is therefore a relation of spirit to nature, where it is in itself, in concept, and this determines the way and manner in which we have to conceive it. What is to be conceived is spirit in general. The concept of spirit, stated abstractly, is that spirit is free, and freedom means that all determinations of spirit may be posited as something only ideal, as something that spirit negates so that spirit is the self-relating pure light. \sim This ideality of everything <other> is what freedom is. \sim ⁴⁶ In this abstract statement we have not yet considered whether what spirit negates is actually negated, or merely set aside, i.e., whether spirit is not a mere escape from the world. Here we are not concerned with this mode | of spirit, with the question whether the world is something that exists in and for itself. Rather the question concerns the truth of nature, namely the suspension⁴⁷ of the opposition [between nature and spirit];⁴⁸ it concerns the speculative consideration of the opposition. It could be historically demonstrated how, in what precedes the science of spirit, the orientation towards spirit is constituted. The philosophy of spirit is a special division of philosophy. It has a backward reference to the entire idea of divine life. The orientation of nature towards spirit is as follows:

The idea, what is in and for itself, is first of all the pure logical idea⁴⁹ in its clarity, but it determines itself to [become] nature.⁵⁰ God's eternal being that is at home with itself, decides to produce its content in nature. Nature is the absolute concept in its reality, but in such a way that this reality is determined as mutual externality [Aussereinander] and self-externality [Aussersichsein].⁵¹ ~The rationality of nature means that the concept is the soul of nature, and that this [external] realization is the untrue existence of

^{46.} W reads: (The ideal is something suspended, so that I do not relate myself to something independent, wherein I would not be free.).

^{47.} Wadds: If we consider this standpoint, everything that follows from it is the standpoint of consciousness. The question concerns the relation of spirit to nature in and for itself.

^{48.} W adds: but rather it is the question concerning the relation of this freedom to nature, whether freedom is independent and remains outside of its relation to nature.

^{49. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §§213-44.

^{50.} W adds: This is the creation of the world.

^{51. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §§247, 248, 248A.

the idea, the defection [Abfall] of the idea~,52 because the concept does not yet exist as it is in itself, at home with itself, but rather in the form of selfexternality. Abstractly stated, this form is what we call space and time (the tranquil mutual externality and the restless mutual externality). In space everything exists; \sim in time everything passes away \sim , 53 but does not fulfill its determination of negation. Time is the perennial re-awakening. ~ Nature therefore is the contradiction, ⁵⁴ | that which is <in> itself untrue and not adequate to the concept. Thus nature is this externality [Äusserlichkeit]. This is how the idea exists as nature and, as has already been said, in an untrue existence. The untruth lies in a non-correspondence between the concept and the reality.~55 Here it can be explained that spirit, in contrast, is the truth, for it is at home with itself: the other to which I relate myself is the same as what I am. I am the subjective and have objectivity. ~That is the I that distinguishes itself from me. But the object is identical with the first I. Here truth is found, because the subjective corresponds fully with the objective. Freedom—the ideality of everything other—is also truth. This truth exists first in spirit. Likewise nature is the untrue existence of the concept because the concept is the center that is immanent and because reality does not correspond to the concept, but is here material. \sim ⁵⁶ We can see without any qualifications that since nature is the untrue, the selfcontradictory, it cannot remain [mere nature]. Rather the concept in nature presses on to make⁵⁷ a true existence for itself. The concept is a center that

- 52. W reads: Nature is idea, reason (God has added reason to nature), nature is rational in itself, i.e., the concept is the soul of nature. But the concept actually is present in nature in a way that is inappropriate to the concept. Therefore nature is the realization of the untrue existence of the idea, or its defection;
- 53. W reads: everything passes away; the enduring existent disappears, but only so that it immediately produces itself again.
 - 54. [Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §248A.

- 55. W reads: This is characteristic of nature. The concept is subjective, by itself, but in reality thrown outside itself in the mode of mutual externality [Aussereinandersein].
- 56. W adds: When I am object to myself, I am for myself. Self-consciousness, for an other being, constitutes determinate existence in general. In the freedom of spirit (abstract freedom as an example, or pure self-consciousness), in this relation I have concepts. The subject is what I am; the object, the I that I distinguish from myself, the I as a 'something' of which I know. In this self-consciousness the object which I know is identical with the subject that does the knowing, with the first I. Here therefore is the truth: for here the subjective corresponds completely with the objective and vice versa.—My reality is none other than I. Freedom is the ideality of all other being, the truth (that reality, (existence) corresponds to the subjective, to the concept) is first attained in spirit, in self-consciousness. Therefore nature is the untrue existence of the concept; the idea. The concept is the center, the immanent. However, reality (existence) does not correspond to the idea, but nature remains the reality of the material, of mutual externality. This is the characteristic of nature in general.
 - 57. W adds: i.e., make its existence (reality) equal to itself, to make itself equal to itself.

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drives itself | to come to the surface, to ~supersede mutual externality~58. or conversely, nature returns into itself in order to attain its center. The process of the concept that suspends its untruth is the object of the philosophy of nature. It is ordered into stages of liberation of the concept [from nature]. For example, we know that all bodies are heavy, i.e., they strive towards a center. ⁵⁹ This seeking of the center means that everything seeks to achieve unity with itself. What they seek can be represented as a point. Matter, since it strives to suspend its mutual externality and to become wholly ideal, strives therefore to negate its reality, and that would occur if it arrived at its unity. This is the misfortune of matter: to strive eternally for a unity that it never attains. In contrast, spirit, in its freedom, attains its center wherein it comes to existence (for I am for myself, I am the whole universal and my object is also I). On the other hand, matter is mutual externality [Außereinander]. The concept in nature is just this: to overcome this mutual externality. The highest point to which nature attains in this overcoming is life, feeling. Sentience is an achievement that still falls within nature. 60 Life is not yet freedom, but in life there exists at the very least the highest shape in which the mutual externality is suspended. The living [being] is a single subject that in spite of its unity is still a plurality. These material members are mutually external to each other, but they have this in common: that for them their mutual externality is immediately ideal. Their ideality means that none of them is independent, but rather | the subject is the bearer of all the individual members. Because the individual members cease to be independent, life is the highest mode in which the unity of the concept exists in nature.

 \sim Mere parts become members [only] in living [organisms]. As sentient soul \sim^{61} the I is omnipresent in the body, and it exists only as a unity. ⁶² This omnipresence shows that the material mutual externality of nature

- 58. W reads: suspend and make itself identical with itself;
- 59. W adds: Bodies on the earth strive for the center of the earth, the planets strive for the center of the sun, even if they fail to reach the center soon, remain external.
- 60. W adds: Life stands immediately in closest proximity to spirit, <and> from life the concept makes the transition to spirit.—.
- 61. W adds: The concept is the inner. In living beings it begins to come into externality and into appearance. The body dissected, cut up in its parts which are laid alongside each other (as in osteology), decomposes and is no longer living. What in the inorganic sphere are called parts, are in the organic sphere called members; the latter exist only insofar as they are pervaded by a subjective unity of vitality.—In sentience this is the case in a more precise way, particuarly in view of the external determination of spatiality.—the I as sentient soul.
- 62. W adds: I am constantly conscious of this unity. When feeling the tip of my finger, I [also] feel [myself] there. There the feeling soul exists, the capacity of feeling, sensation. <In my consciousness I can distinguish myself from my feeling; but> so far as the animal only feels, the sensible soul is present, and present all over. And nevertheless it is only one.

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has no truth. The sentient soul does not believe in the mutual externality; it is idealistic and thus speculative. If the material externality were itself something for the sentient soul, then the soul would exist only in one place. It is 63 the subject, ~and matter is subordinate to it~.64 The judgment that matter is not the truth rests upon this ~ideality~.65 In the animal the concept comes to this power over matter; the animal is the highest mode of the concept in nature; the concept has superseded the mutual externality, and the ~substantial and material are only moments~.66 In the animal this subjectivity is still present in an immediate way; substantiality lacks the dimension | of being for itself [Fürsichseins]. The animal is this contradiction; the subjectivity is simple relation to itself that is concrete, and the process of the animal is to suspend this contradiction <so that> the substantial universal (the species) as such comes to existence. The species is thus ~the drive to destroy the individual existence~. 67 The species itself is that which is efficacious and which supersedes the immediate particularity of the animal, and the animal suspends the unvielding character of its particularity.⁶⁸ In this process the animal does not want to preserve itself as an individual, but in identity with an other. In this identity with other the contradiction is suspended. In nature, the species, this universality, does not come to an enduring existence, and falls back to a mere individual, something produced. The concept of spirit is precisely this: this unity of its universality with itself, a concrete unity that includes subjectivity in itself but which has equalized itself with itself through the negation of individuality. \sim This concrete universality \sim ⁶⁹ is what we have had as freedom.

§389 The soul is the general immateriality of nature, the simple ideal life of nature and in this simple being in itself the mutual externality [Außereinander] of nature is gathered together. Here we are not yet thinking of the individual soul, but of the soul in general, what has been called the soul of nature. This is⁷⁰ the determination that underlies the whole,

63. W adds: is omnipresent and one.

- 64. W reads: so that the material externality is suspended in it as ideal.
- 65. W adds: this representation of ideality, the to me on of the ancients.
- 66. Wadds: the animal is not yet spirit. It is rather the existing, phenomenal concept of the substantial. The material is only accident, a [subordinate] moment.
- 67. W adds: the drive, this negation in its universality, to destroy the immediate individual existence through the process of the species, the begetting, that suspends the immediate individuality of the animal. It has the feeling that it is not satisfied as a self-sufficient individual and gives up its independent individual existence. In begetting the species realizes itself.
 - 68. W adds: the individual is otherwise self-seeking.
 - 69. W reads: This substantiality is the concept of spirit,-..
 - 70. W adds: This universal soul, the general truth of nature, is.

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with which we begin, so that in all further determinations⁷¹ this universal substantiality—as we have⁷² earlier described it—remains omnipresent.

The soul is the first underlying mode of spirit. The soul is to be conceived as substance, the universal, as the self-enduring, such that all particularity does not step outside of this substantiality. ~The substantiality is a negative unity that negates the particular and renders it ideal~.⁷³

The soul therefore is slumbering spirit, or the passive *Nous* of Aristotle, ⁷⁴ which is everything according to possibility. ⁷⁵ Aristotle says: the concept is self-conceiving. There are two [dimensions]: *Nous* as the activity of thinking and *Nous* as the object thought. The *Nous* as object is the passive reason [*Nous pathetikos*]; passive reason is everything according to possibility (*dynamis*). This substantial unity is still only a possibility, not actuality.

 \sim That nature is thus a striving etc., must here be presupposed from the logic and philosophy of nature. \sim^{76} Here we seek only to show that the truth of materiality is its ideality.—We start from this ideality as a substantial basis.

The question concerning the immateriality of the soul has been of great interest. It follows from what has been said that the soul is not a material mutual externality, nor is it something immaterial in contrast to the material. The soul is immaterial only in the sense that the immaterial is the true, and the material is the untrue. The immateriality of the soul is therefore <not> asserted in opposition to matter, but only in the sense that | the soul alone is truly real and independent. The self-externality of nature has volatilized into universality.

71. W adds: the progressive determination and development (the individual soul belongs also to the further determination of the universal soul).

72. W adds: have—and that the progressive further determination does not fall outside of this one universal, substantial soul.—So this standpoint must be presented in advance as designating the transition from the natural to the sphere of spirit.

73. W adds: substantial unity;—so the absolute basis of all particularization and further specific determinations of spirit, that spirit has in its substantial unity all matter of its determination, and the substantial unity remains the all pervading, identical ideality.—(This substance is also at the same time to be grasped as subjectivity in itself. Subjectivity in general is negative unity, that negates and renders ideal the particular, subjective unity.)—.

74. [Ed.] Aristotle, De Anima 429a10-432a14. On Hegel's translation and interpretation of Aristotle, cf. Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge: University Press, 2000), 312-13.

75. W adds: but only according to possibility, actual only in activity, while it is thought.

76. W reads: The conviction that matter is only finite, that material reality is not genuine reality, [but] the apparent independence of matter and that only ideal truth exists (what here must be presupposed from logic and metaphysics) can be fully demonstrated only at the conclusion of the study.

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The question concerning the community of the soul with the body creates no difficulties here, because matter is nothing independent. \sim It is easy to lapse into an apparent chemical neutralization [of matter] but that is a subordinate category. \sim^{77} In fact this is not a community, but the soul is in and for itself contrasted with the corporal, so that it has no difficulty in the body. Only if both are taken as independent is the question a difficult one. It becomes difficult if this dualism is tacitly assumed.

We turn now to the determination of the universal foundation. This development is no stepping forth, but remains in a subjective unity in which all shapes are preserved. As a universal substance the soul progressively determines itself and this progressive determination is no mutual externality of figures; rather this universality determines itself to subject, to singularity, and all figures remain within this subjectivity. In nature these various levels manifest themselves as external enduring figures. Gravity as a totality is the solar system, the material mutual externality, and the transcendence of this mutual externality, [namely] a contraction into self (repulsion and attraction). <Here the idea exists as a mechanism.>79 The material idea determines itself further to become the physical. It becomes a special circle, another mode of existing. 80 The elements, etc. | remain subordinate to their substance, gravity, ~but form a special existence. The spheres of nature are developments of one and the same material idea, but the animal kingdom has its own individualities, etc., a series of systems that are external to each other and have particular existences as their actuality.~81 In spirit it is otherwise; spirit also perfects itself in such systems, but they do not fall apart into mutual externality, but remain enclosed in the one subject in a subjective unity. The difficulty relates to this.82 When we have to consider a particular level, this is not a particular figure. The heavenly bodies in their absolute mechanism isolate physical determinations into proper existences. 83 < When> spirit is considered concretely in its various

- 78. W adds: For then no community can occur.
- 79. W adds: This is the first level of development of self-determining matter.
- 80. W adds: We have the elements of water, air, fire, etc.
- 81. W reads: but appear in special individuality in contrast to what we call heavenly bodies. Every new sphere constitutes a system that manifests itself again as a special existence.—The physical individuality forms a realm of minerals, and from a realm of minerals to a realm of plants, and from a realm of plants to a realm of animals.
 - 82. [Ed.] Hegel adds §380.
 - 83. W adds: In spirit however its distinct levels have no such separate existence.

^{77.} W reads: The relation of soul to body; this unity must not be represented as a compound. Just as little should it be represented as a neutralization, from which it could easily occur to one that such a compounding of body with soul would be a chemical category. However, a chemical existence is not a genuine existence.

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levels and stages, we must already take further stages into consideration. When we consider feeling, ~we must also take into consideration religious and ethical feelings~. 84 These spheres are far removed from feeling as such. Further [considerations] will develop that point more fully. The awakening of the soul belongs to anthropology, but at the same time we know that [this] awakening is far more concrete; it includes consciousness. ~In these lower stages I we have to anticipate a content that does not occur on these lower levels as such. Thus in our presentation we have to separate levels and stages from each other. But when we want to consider them more concretely, we have to anticipate further stages. This anticipation is all the more necessary since spirit can become sick, it can decline into a lower condition. In this way the cultivated spirit can regress into a soul existence.~85 Thus in [discussing] these lower levels we have to anticipate what applies to the rational consciousness. In the development of the realm of souls, these levels and stages do not fall asunder. Second, we have to consider every form for itself. Third, when necessary we have to grasp such lower levels in a concrete way. Now we turn to our object, and the first discipline is anthropology.

84. W reads: we consider and know that ethical, legal, and religious feelings exist. But in order to know what these feelings are, we must already know what right, ethical life and God are.

85. W reads: So in our presentation we have to separate these levels purely from one another, and also at the same time (necessitated by the interest to consider them more concretely) we have to anticipate the knowledge of further levels. This is a further requirement because spirit can become ill, and is capable of declining from the level of its freedom into shapes of lower stages of development, e.g., the condition of animal magnetism and of madness. The cultivated spirit can sink to the level of [a merely] anthropological existence of the soul.

Anthropology has for its subject matter the soul in its uncultivated natural condition. In every such determination it is the case that soul in its natural condition is to be sure, a foundation, but it enters a further dialectic: The goal of the natural soul is liberation from this uncultivated natural condition; in freedom it becomes I, the free being at home with itself of spirit. I regard the soul as spirit in its \sim immediate existence; $^2 \sim$ it is not yet spirit as spirit. For it belongs to spirit to negate and render ideal its immediacy, its being, its immersion in nature, and to make these its own. It thus unites with itself through a suspension of its immediacy. | Insofar as something mediates itself with itself, the other by means of which it is mediated disappears, and with this the mediation itself disappears. We begin with the immediate, because the concrete is no longer the first or simple. Rather the concrete implies different determinations, whereby each is mediated by the other.³ This beginning is only a starting point, something imperfect, for spirit as such does not exist immediately. This beginning is the least true mode of spirit's existence. Also, immediacy itself is an abstraction, and determines itself essentially as something posited. (Parents are mediated through others equally as much as children, although we can consider them as immediate.) The determination of immediacy is one-sided. The other determination [of immediacy] is that this immediate soul itself is posited, that it is itself mediated. This positing [of the immediate] is the positing of spirit itself. This positing is presupposed, but spirit is itself the positing of this prius. It is spirit itself, which has itself as an other before itself. Consciousness finds itself confronting an other, and its further development

^{1.} W adds: or the nature-spirit, the immediate, subjective spirit,—the natural soul, soul in its natural condition.

^{2.} W adds: Its mediation is to mediate itself with itself. Mediation constitutes finitude, so far as something is mediated by another.

^{3.} W adds: The immediate is only simple. Therefore it is with the immediacy of spirit with which we must begin.

is to appropriate that other to itself. So we start with the immediate, but we also know that spirit as soul presupposes itself [as spirit]. It is a play of spirit⁴ whereby it comes to itself. The more precise division of anthropology involves first the naturally determinate soul as such. This conditionedness occurs beyond the level of consciousness; it is implanted in the naturally determinate soul prior to consciousness. This naturally determinate soul continues its development to subjectivity, to sentient soul. This is the first part [of the Anthropology]. The more precise divisions within this first part are first that this natural soul is determined as individuality | that is still immediate, not yet ~feeling, because in feeling self-relation includes a distinguishing of itself from itself.~5 The second is an alteration in this individual, and for this alteration it is essential that the individual develop in opposition to itself. These alterations are threefold: age of life, sexual relations, and awakening. These alterations are opposed to the natural state as sleep. The third of these alterations is the sentient soul, as identifying with itself, as subjectivity.

The second part of the Anthropology is the dreaming soul, the difference of the sentient soul from itself. The first element here is the sentient soul as totality relating to itself, a separation without any separation, or a separationless separation. The second element is that the sentient soul no longer senses itself in its universality, but is immersed in its particularity. This immersion in particularity is a pathological condition. The first state of separationless separation is animal magnetism [i.e., hypnotism] and the latter condition of immersion in particularity is dementia. ~The third is habit, custom, in which the soul subordinates corporeity entirely to itself, posits corporeity as ideal, and becomes a soul indifferent to its feeling.

The third element we have to examine is the sentient natural soul.⁶ Sentience has three moments: individuality, individuality in opposition to itself as an other, and third, the return out of otherness to itself. \sim ⁷ | In

4. W adds: of the absolute spirit with itself.

- 5. W reads: feeling (a relating of individuality to itself): for to it belongs a distinguishing of individuality from itself, in order to be able to be identical with itself.
- 6. [Ed.] Erdmann corrected his own account of the sequence here. His account of the first—the sentient natural soul—is incorrect, because this sentient natural soul would not be third in addition to the natural and dreaming soul, but only a subordinate section to the first, i.e., the natural soul. Walter has omitted the first section on natural soul and arranged this section correctly under the section titled 'sentient soul' [Empfindende Seele]. Walter's divisions as a whole are correct.
- 7. W adds: c) custom. That the feeling soul as subject subordinates its feeling and corporeity. 3.) Actuality of the soul—[the] structured and sentient soul, that as corporeity is actual in its immediate being. Soul that as subject is free in its corporeity so far as it is master, and reduces corporeity to a mere mode of its expression, to a mere sign of itself. (1) Sentient soul.

order for this relation of individuality to itself in sentience to come about, individuality must be two, and therefore individuality must distinguish itself from itself.

1. NATURAL SOUL

The first is immediate individuality, the natural soul in general (§§391-5),8 the natural determinacy of the soul. The individuality of the soul consists of three elements: the first is soul in its entirely general natural life as the natural determinacy of the soul. ⁹ Since these must appear in consciousness, they exist as natural changes of natural objects on the one hand, and on the other, they have their own existence separated from the soul, which is [nevertheless] the proper immanent determination of the soul. 10 The human being is thus the microcosm, i.e., the peculiar determinacies of the soul are present as external existents. The Leibnizian monad¹¹ should be recalled: every monad is in itself the entire universe. The monad is representing (its ideality), not with I consciousness, but representative in general. Each monad is [potentially] the universe as the seed is [potentially] the tree. They distinguish themselves simply through the fact that their representations are obscure or clear. 12 The totality is ideal; the monads represent it, but only darkly or clearly.—Another [element] is that in the soul these differences unfold themselves, become known and become conscious. Further, these determinations exist as an external nature. We speak most clearly about those determinations when we speak of them as if they were corporal

There are three elements in sentience: individuality, subjectivity that is only individuality (b) this individuality opposes itself as to an other.—the difference of individuality from itself, the otherbeing of individuality. (c) the return out of this other-being to itself; going together with itself. (Individuality has itself—individuality—for its object.—Feeling, self-referentiality, relation to itself.)

^{8. [}Ed.] Hegel refers to the numbered paragraphs in his 1827 Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit.

^{9.} W adds: These natural determinations are present in the existing soul and are of two types, ideality, and behind the ideality, free existence.

^{10.} W adds: to which the soul as such relates itself not as to something external; rather the soul in itself has these determinations as natural qualities.

^{11.} Wadds: (Every individual, every atom is a monad. Atom in the ancient sense is in itself utterly without determination. All determinations are only syntheses and aggregates of atoms. The atom in itself is the <entire> universe.) [Ed.] On the monad, cf. Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace \$\$2-4, 12; Monadology \$\$14, 19-30, 61-3.

^{12.} W adds: are clear consciousness. The soul as a monad is the totality of the universe.

determinations in nature. [Subjective] influence is excluded, because here the dependence of the soul on nature is presupposed. In nature these characteristics are entirely universal.

The soul's life participates in natural life, and here we recall the cosmic, sidereal life of humans. 13 The most universal determination of nature is the solar system in its movement; this is the life of gravity. 14 This life is the to be conceived in such a way that it only provides the abstract foundation which is the context in which psychic life individualizes itself. ~Here belong those astrological representations that posit a harmony between the outer and the inner.~15 In view of this relationship, one must grasp the determinate representation of the situation, that this life of free mechanics is determined only through relation of space to time. ~These condition the life that the material here lives. Gravity | developed in its various aspects gives space and time as its moments.~16 What are called the laws of heavenly movement depends simply on space and time and on their concepts and how they relate to their concepts. The earth is living, is individualizing; it is the concrete related to the abstract, the sun. The position of the earth is determined as a member of this [solar] system. It is not opposed to or in a different relation with the other members; it is individualized in this system. The earth is what it is as a member of this whole system. The positions of the planets have no relation to the soul, which is a higher individualization. These determinations of the planets must be conceived in this manner, and not as if they had a reflection in or relation to the soul. 17 When the earth is ready then the soul and the human being emerge, and this basic individuality is the final one. World history has been considered according to epochs of natural changes; it has been related to alterations of nature as these occur in the solar system. For example, [Dupuis] has traced all ideas of

^{13. [}Ed.] This terminology goes back to F. A. Mesmer and J. W. Ritter. Cf. Mesmer, De planetarum influxu in corpus humanum (Vienna, 1766). Cf. J. W. Ritter (ed.), Der Siderismus, vol. 1 (Tübingen, 1808); D. G. Kieser, Das siderische Baquet und der Siderismus, Neue Beobachtungen, Versuch und Erfahrungen über dieselben, in C. A. Eschenmayer, D. G. Kieser, and F. Nasse (eds.), Archiv für den thierischen Magnetismus, vol. 5 part 2 (Halle, 1819), 1–84.

^{14.} W adds: This life of gravity (movement and position of the heavenly body).

^{15.} W reads: representations and ideas that the position of heavenly bodies has a connection to the fate of nations and indviduals. This posits a harmony between external and internal so far as this harmony itself is determined by fate (the universal underlies this, but is conceived in a muddled way).

^{16.} W reads: The life that matter lives here is conditioned only by the relation of space and time—free mechanics, movement of matter.—matter, gravity, develop in vitality in movements, present themselves as movement,—and space and time are moments of movement.

^{17.} W adds: or that these alterations in history would have reference to changes in the whole system.

religion and cultus to determinations of nature. ¹⁸ He related the so-called displacement of day by night to changes in religion, and sought to compare the Egyptian reverence for bulls with Christian reverence for lambs. Rather it should be established that the earthly body, so far as it has a place in the system, stands in a peaceful connection with it. Determinations in the system are not changes in the earthly body, much less changes in spirit or in the soul. In earth, this body of individuality, there are alterations that manifest I themselves as differences in it, climate, etc. These alterations thus appear as such, they belong to the natural soul; differences of the seasons belong here. The soul co-lives with these, but only as established in paragraph §392, namely as dark and obscure moods.

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The soul has the character of universality in itself, which becomes indifferent to these natural determinations. ~Animals are entirely bound to natural determinations~¹⁹ and fail to rise above these natural alterations. Plants are tied to seasonal changes, as are animals. The nature of the human soul, i.e., the soul itself, also has these alterations within it, but in a subordinate way. These alterations consist partly only of moods, but the cultivated human being rises above these. External sensations such as cold effect alterations in our affairs. ~In any case, the human being has need of such changes. The less cultivated the human being is, the more these natural changes exercise power over him~.²⁰ In addition, periods of the day are also different, and in the case of some matters one cannot imagine doing them in the morning. The day belongs to the sphere of opposition and labor; evening is the time of return, while at midnight the spirit is inclined to be alone, reflective. Thus the Romans held their public meetings in the morning, while the English held theirs in the evening and at midnight.

One oft-noted natural alteration is the various phases of the moon.²¹ Earlier, people believed that there was a connection between the phases of the moon and psychic states. We must not call this an influence, because

^{18. [}Ed.] Charles Francois Dupuis, Origine de tous les cultes, ou religion universelle (Paris,

^{19.} W reads: the subordinate organizations (the vegetable and animal world) are entirely immersed in natural life and the course of their lives hang together with their conditions etc. They are chiefly grounded in this sympathy with nature,

^{20.} W reads: In different external changes we find ourselves differently disposed; the less cultivated a human being is, the more [affected he is by these changes].

^{21. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §361Å. The claim that phases of the moon exert influence upon psychic states was disputed by J. M. Cox, Practical Observations on Insanity, (1806, German translation 1811). In the unpublished lecture manuscript No. 154a, Hegel's notes run: 'Madness, Moon;—Pinel? denies this. Or Reil?' (J. C. Reil, Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode auf Geisteszerrütungen (Halle, 1803). Hegel made a few brief excerpts from the beginning of this book. Cf. Hegel, Berliner Schriften 692.

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there is I no talk here of an external relation, but rather of a coincidence. Many observations have been made about this. In particular, correlations have been asserted [to hold] between phases of the moon and mental illness. In particular cases paroxysms have been stronger in certain positions of the moon. That such phases of the moon can affect human disposition has been established. But it should be pointed out that the human organism, even as an animal, is more free from such influence [than the animal], and it is only when its energy is diminished²² that the human declines into uncultivated natural immediacy wherein the lunar influence shows itself more. In physical determinations there lies in part something that can devolve into superstition, a belief in a connection which cannot be allowed to count as lawful. That remedies help is founded on experience. Others find this not confirmed, but the first experiences are not set aside even if they are shown to be limited.

Connections of another type fall especially in the spiritual sphere. When the human being resolves on something, a question arises concerning the result and the connection between the result and the original resolve. Here superstition plays a part. The human being grasps its resolve according to the greater or lesser likelihood of success. For the ancients, the chief superstitions for assuring oneself were oracles, the entrails of animals and birds, etc.²³ When human beings take refuge in such things, in external circumstances, in order to reach decision, they do not yet possess the inner strength to decide for themselves. What happens most often in this regard is pure superstition, political fraud, etc. But there may also be a few beginnings therein, that indeed have some connection between the sign and the agent carrying out the decision. They have often busied themselves with observations of sacrifices | and food particularly in diverse circumstances. The outcome of a battle depended on personal courage; their bravery was different from the modern, which must be bravery as the discipline to rely on the whole. The courage of the individual as such is at the same time an embodiment, ~a determinate bodily condition, a mood which, although not yet an illness, can become depressed. This mood is connected with physical circumstances.~24 Insofar as bodily disposition was an essential element

^{22.} W adds: its freedom is diminished.

^{23. [}Ed.] Hegel's detailed discussions of ancient oracles and the significance of signs are found in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (GW 17.157-64; ET 2:183-8). Hegel relies on Etienne Clavier, Mémoire sur les oracles des anciens (Paris, 1818) (the book was in Hegel's library), and on Karl Philipp Moritz, Anthousa, oder Roms Alterthümer (Berlin, 1797), 350-3, for the examination of entrails.

^{24.} W reads: a bodily mood—as we already insinuate in ordinary life when we physically hint at the courage of a person, and say, 'he has heart'. There is no bravery that cannot through

[of bravery], it is connected with the fact that this bodily disposition was something in common with animals, and the release [Abspannung] of this disposition can be known according to the type of feeding or digestion. These can serve as signs for a determinate physical mood. Herein lies a type of connection not to be ignored. Union with nature²⁵ is precisely what constitutes the animal. In those who are closer to nature are found more such linkages with nature than in cultivated people who are more free. We can easily make night out of day.²⁶ These are the first, these determinations of nature.

The universal planetary life constitutes itself in various ways.²⁷ The first point | concerns the general position of the earth; the second is the differentiation of the general life of nature, which gives the particular natural spirits. The differentiation of our earthly body is familiar: the earth is divided into four continents, and a fifth [region] is the totality of scattered islands that manifest a great lack of development and culture. Much depends on these differences: the terrestrial differences are connected with different natural determinations of humans. We acknowledge that America forms another world in contrast to the old. The old world is divided into three parts, and this seems at first to be accidental. However this representation of these divisions may occur in humans, it is certain that the differentiations of the parts is also confirmed in the different spiritual sensitivities of their inhabitants. The geographic distribution is connected with races, differences that are in general extremely striking. It is assumed at present that there are four races. ²⁸ The first is the American in general, which although it contains a variety that differ from each other, nevertheless forms a contrast with the old world. In the latter the African character is very different. Then comes the Asiatic in contrast to the European character. ~The Mediterranean Sea connects these three parts of the earth. In this regard, North Africa belongs

a depressed mood at some point get cold feet. This is connected with physical conditions or the environment. So for example, when he is bogged down in a morass, the human being finds himself physically exhausted and not in a spiritual disposition for courage.

^{25.} W adds: which is often called the true condition and end of man,

^{26.} W reads: Because for us the moods do not have as much power as with the less educated.

^{27. [}Ed.] Reference is to Encyclopedia 1827 edition, §393: The universal planetary life of the natural spirit. (2) specifies itself in the concrete differences of the earth, and is divided into special natural spirits that, on the whole, express the nature of the geographic divisions of the world and constitute racial differences.

^{28. [}Ed.] On the distinction of four races, cf. Kant, Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen, Kant, Schriften II 432 ff.; J. F. Blumenbach, Einteilung des Menschengeschlechts in fünf Hauptrassen, in Beiträge zur Naturgeschichte, part 1 (Göttingen, 1806).

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much more to Europe than to Africa proper, from which the North is separated by desert. | Conversely, the Spanish have been called the Africans of Europe. North Africa has much more of a European character. It is similar with the Near East. As soon as one crosses the Indus, one finds a character vastly different from the European.²⁹ Here one first senses that one is in a different part of the world.

40

This difference manifests itself also in spiritual and temperamental differences of the human species. ~30 In view of the physical constitution of the earth, the next difference is the distinction between north and south. This is a more quantitative difference of cold and warm climates. As we know, the effects and influences of climate are extremely variable. 31 The north-south polarity must be distinguished from the east-west polarity. 32 ~The differences of the continents are formed out of both together. The differences of polarity are not merely apparent. ~33 The differences of races are therefore in part merely physiological; here belong differences of color. 34 The white color is to be regarded as inherently the most perfect, 35 not only out of custom, but this skin color is the result of the free activity

- 29. [Ed.] Cf. Mss Ackersdijck: G. W. F. Hegel, Dictat über Philosophie der Geschichte, 1830–1, p. 142: 'Elphinstone says when one goes from Asia Minor and the Turkish provinces to India, the contrast is extremely striking. In the former the European still believes himself at home; in reference to human passions, virtues, vices, all still have something human. But it is entirely otherwise in India, where everything emerges in sharpest contrast.' Hegel's source is Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Cabul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India (London, 1815).
- 30. W reads: Asia, Africa and Europe are again bound by the Mediterranean Sea, this great middle point of the vital ancient world, that so little separates these three regions, that (with greater justice than we can call the French Spaniards the African in Europe) one can reckon North Africa (which the Sahara, the vast dry desert, separates more from Southern Africa than the Mediterranean separates it from Europe) and Asia Minor (completely different from Asia beyond the Indus, but less different from Europe) as European, based upon great agreement in vegetation and geology as well as in the customs of these humans with those of Europe. This difference of races proves to be a difference of the spiritual, or at least psychological condition of the human species. Concerning this difference (variety of origins, etc.), it is connected partly with physiology, partly with spiritual disposition.
- 31. W adds: In warmer zones humans have different structures than in those where cold hinders external activity.
- 32. [Ed.] Cf. Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, Biologie oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur für Naturforscher und Ärzte, 6 vols. (Göttingen 1802–22), vol. 2, 443. See also Encyclopedia § 393.
- 33. W reads: East and West appear to be merely relative, since every point against one is an eastern, and against the other, a western, but this appears is merely an appearance as proven by closer examination, where East and West are found to be constituted by fixed differences.
- 34. W adds: Black predominates with Africans, Yellow with East-Asians, copper with Americans and White with Europeans.
- 35. [Ed.] This favorable singling out of the white skin color is found also in Goethe, Farbenlehre, vol. 1, §§672.

of blood, and the feelings that are connected with the movement of the blood can \sim present themselves through this skin. This creates the possibility that I with such blood movement the inner feelings can make a sign of their presence; the play of such feelings exhibits itself in the skin. The European skin is not exclusively white. \sim ³⁶

41

Further, to physiological differences belong differences of hair, the diverse shapes of the skull.³⁷ The difference in formation of the skull is not so easy to determine, because it is not so well established as is crystallization for example. ~A certain measurement assumed by Peter Camper 38 is determined through lines and angles. \sim^{39} The line which he determined, extends horizontally from the external ear channel to the root of the nose, and another line extends from there to the forehead. These two lines make an angle, and in the case of Greek statues this is almost always a right angle. In the case of animals, when one draws this angle, it is very pointed; with humans it is less pointed. In the case of Negroes the angle is more pointed than in Europeans. Blumenbach correctly remarks that many indeterminacies remain, and he acknowledges that one must consider the skull from above. This shows the protrusion of the teeth and the cheekbone. In the case of Negro skulls, for example, the cheekbone is very protruded. 40 The more precise detail is to be determined physiologically—the | characteristic is thus the sharper point of the Camper angles, then the protrusion of the teeth, jaw etc. These are the chief elements of the osteological structure.

42

What concerns us more precisely is how far these considerations coincide or are connected with the relation to spirit. The latter are not to be underestimated. Namely, when we represent the Camper angle as very pointed, we will recall an animal physiognomy, because this practical member, that

- 36. W reads: freely make visible, in these chief skin color (one can easily see anxiety, fear, shame, in this skin color); this color is not fixed, but there is a possibility that the play of emotions expresses itself therein and makes these into signs. Herein lies the basis for declaring the European skin color to be the most perfect. It is not however, purely white in the usual sense of this term. The European skin color is also blue, red, yellow, and to be sure yellow is the proper color of the skin as such, all colors play therein.
 - 37. [Ed.] J. F. Blumenbach, De generis humani varietate nativa (Göttingen, 1795).
- 38. [Ed.] Peter Camper, Dissertation sur les varietes naturelles qui characterisent la physionomie des hommes des divers climats et differens ages (Paris, 1791).
- 39. W reads: In determining measurements of the skull, Camper has assumed certain points, bound together through lines, and called attention to the angle formed by these lines,—first in order to determine beauty (as Greek works of art established the norm) insofar as it depends on the form of the skull.
- 40. W adds: from the oval of the skull.—Different forms of the skull itself (rounder, longer) are revealed in careful consideration, particularly where protrusion of the cheekbone is pronounced. In this way Blumenbach determined the skulls of the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Tungu etc. races.

is determined for the purpose of eating, protrudes. 41 In contrast, where the Camper angle approximates a right angle, the eyes are more prominent in approximation to the ideal, and still more of an angle makes the thinking forehead predominant relative to the organ that satisfies bodily needs. Another element is the protrusion of the cheekbone.⁴² This protrusion has the same connection, namely the muscles of chewing (that are attached below the cheekbone) show by this protrusion the pressure of need. Thus physiology has a spiritual significance. When racial differences are considered in such a way, they are not only external, but are essentially connected with the spiritual. As far as the more precise spiritual differences among races are concerned, America is a highly interesting continent, but only by virtue of the fact that Europeans have settled there. The ones who have drawn attention to themselves through the fact that they have made themselves independent⁴³ and have given themselves rational laws, are not the native Americans as such, but the Creoles. The authentic American race ~has I manifested itself as a mature, but also weak, culture of its type. \sim^{44} In the history of states, occupations of people are important, but in America there were no shepherds, no patriarchal way of life, and also no agrarian peoples. 45 Agriculture rests on the fact that people build their subsistence on certain basic plants. However, the agricultural way of life did not exist for the native Americans, nor did property ownership and law, because these are connected with the agriculture. The native Americans first became acquainted with horses and iron through the Europeans. They were not cultivated by contact with the Europeans but rather were destroyed.⁴⁶ The superior culture of the Europeans crushed those who were incapable of adjusting to it; when the native Americans came into contact with the European atmosphere, they were crushed by it, ~even where they were treated leniently.~47

- 41. W adds: the animal jaws and nose protrude more.
- 42. W adds: cheekbone, that is especially conspicuous in Mongols.
- 43. W adds: created human rights.
- 44. W reads: when it has become acquainted with the Europeans, has shown itself to be a mature culture of its type at a higher level of development, but nevertheless a species with weaker cultivation. The differences between them and the Europeans are wide-ranging, deriving from physical and moral conditions.
- 45. [Ed.] Cf. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 162-5; see also Rousseau, On the Origin of Inequality; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, book XVIII, ch. IX.
- 46. W adds: destroyed by this contact with a physically and intellectually more powerful culture.
- 47. W reads: and so in South America they are in the most miserable condition, slavery, and even in North America, where they were treated with greater justice and were less suppressed, they have declined into insignificance.—Even in modern times they have raised themselves to

In the old world we have Africans, Asians, and Europeans, whose characteristics differ both physiologically and mentally. The Africans retain a pure inwardness that never proceeds to development. The Africans are now as they have been for the last thousand years. They have never gone out of themselves, but always remain within themselves in a childlike manner. They have remained in the condition of [raw] particularity, of individuality, of desire, and have not developed the oppositions of the understanding, of [universal] law and particular instances. On the one hand they are gentle and meek, on the other they are frightfully cruel. They are accustomed to slavery, for freedom can exist only ~where the human being is conscious of himself as a universal end in itself, and reflectively knows himself as a thinking person. ~48 |

In the Asians the universal emerges. They have an objective God, an all-encompassing, all-dominating law, right and state. The universal emerges there, but with the qualification that the subjective is submerged in it, so that individuality is wiped out. This universal can be rational, but nevertheless the condition is an irrational, unfree one, because the element of morality is lacking, even though the determinations of the laws, etc., are rational. ⁴⁹ After European influence subjectivity ⁵⁰ emerges to be sure, but in such a way that ~it is merely a roaming in the universal without actual results. This is a comet-like condition—complete wild abandon in fantasy and absolute bondage in actuality. ~ ⁵¹

The Caucasian, European, Germanic race validates both the substantial⁵² and the subjective, ⁵³ the principles of morals and conscience. There concrete

the level of using horses, but never to the level of constitution etc., a condition that for us is alone respectable.

^{48.} W reads: Where the human being thinks: for the consciousness of freedom is the consciousness of a universality that exists in and for itself. Thus the African, who exists in his compact, solid singularity, never comes out of his singularity (desire) and never passes over into the universal life, and consequently, has no concept of right, law, state, science, and no concept of an objective God.

^{49.} Wadds: The power, endurance, and indolence of these realms attests this; where human beings are unfree in religion, they are also unfree in their form of governance, and in their laws, which are despotic.

^{50.} W reads: subjective freedom.

^{51.} W reads: the emergence of subjectivity in the universal is only a roaming in something universal; it is without result and does not amount to any genuine action. This character can be compared with a comet-like situation in physics; it is a freedom in imagination only, that is a roaming in fantasy, a fantastic, boundless exuberance coupled with an absolute bondage in actuality.

^{52.} W reads: Universal, true, substantial (in regard to religion God is the substantial truth in contrast to subjectivity),

^{53.} W reads: subjective freedom.

freedom exists, the harmony of freedom as [substantive] content and freedom as formal principle. |

These are the general differences according to which nature determines itself. These differences are constituted according to deeper spiritual conditions.⁵⁴ The latter do not belong here, but they must be anticipated in order to express the matter more concretely. The dispositions are entirely abstract,⁵⁵ but they develop and gain a concrete content as previously indicated.

These differences particularize themselves more and more. These further particularizations do not allow of being demonstrated according to the concept because many contingencies are also in play. As far as history reaches, such different folk characteristics exist. ~The ancient Gauls and the contemporary French character agree in these [characteristics].~⁵⁶ But in other nations these characteristics are more difficult to find. For example, when we consider Italy, which was dominated by Rome, individuality was subjected and subordinated to a single end. ~Today in Italy everything has disintegrated into isolated individual cities; this is the opposite condition of the rigid Roman unity.~⁵⁷ Meanwhile, if one considers the matter more closely, one cannot fail to appreciate that the former Roman unity | manifests itself in violence, and that the flight into disintegration had to emerge in opposition to the Roman unity [which was] so contrary to nature.

~As previously pointed out, we see different characteristics of peoples. In spite of the unity | of religion, education, and sciences, etc., this diversity of local spirits has emerged. Such particularizations continue in this way. For example, if we consider the Greeks, we find in them differences dependent on climate. The diversity of tribes has always maintained an importance. When the Greeks achieved the peak of their civilization, then we see the

54. W adds: (religious, ethical, etc.).

- 55. W adds: but they relate to the conditions of abstract laws, of universality and singularity;
- 56. W reads: as the Germans for example, and the Gauls have always asserted the same character.—(So the Gauls, although ravaged by many foreign peoples, made into a province by the Romans and preserved as such for centuries, and although they acquired another religion in Christianity, etc., nevertheless are in agreement with contemporary Frenchmen in respect to the general national character.
- 57. W reads: as it has completely disintegrated into a mass of individual cities and states and where many of these have become tied to larger states, the chief character of a multiplicity and separated states [emerges] and which still remains,—as the language is on the whole the same yet they have never desired to become a political totality—and they recognize this disintegration in total opposition to the inflexibility of Roman unity—so the Roman national character appears to be entirely opposite to the Italian.

Lacedemonians in the South. With them the solid substantial life of the state is predominant. In this substantial life individuality recedes. We can only wonder at the complete submergence of individuals in this universal interest. But it is not attractive or appealing to our own spirit because subjective freedom has no importance there. Family life, art, and science could not blossom in their culture as these did in Athens. In the case of the Thebans, we see subjectivity to be dominant, the friendship clubs of the youths. This subjectivity of the Thebans later declined into revelry and corruption. Between both of these extremes stand the Athenians, for whom patriotism, lawfulness, and ethics, and with these subjective freedom, all have received their due, and, as a result, art and science likewise. In a similar way the Ionian philosophy had nature as its principle; I the western Eleatic philosophy had abstract thought, and the Athenian philosophy in the middle had the concrete thought, namely, the Nous.

48

The particularizations are determined by the determinations of the concept. We have northern and southern Germany. The philosophies of subjectivity—Böhme, Kant, and Fichte—came from northern Germany. With cultivated persons these [regional] differences are dropped, because these people live according to general determinations. So much for the particularizations of the natural soul.~⁵⁸

58. W reads: We see the national characters of Europe within which the European universality stands in distinction from the Asian. Notwithstanding the common feature that the Germanic nationalities are the dominant ones in all these states, notwithstanding the unity in religion and culture, etc., notwithstanding all this, the differences of local spirits have managed to extricate themselves.—Such differences and particularizations proceed from a principle, and within particularizations this process continues. For example, when we considered the Greeks, we saw differences that are connected with climate. Greece was originally divided into many families. These family differences have always preserved an importance, but they prove to be something of further interest only for scholarly investigations. The Greeks, viewed in their highest cultural development, are the Athenians, the Lacedemonians, and Thebans, for these above all arouse our interest. (1) The Lacedemonians (doric) in the south. We regard them as exhibiting ethical life in its purity, the solid substantial life of the state, and subjective freedom is less important in view of this substantial unity. We can well wonder at the Lacedemonians owing to their virtue and eagerness to live solely for their country; but at the same time they do not inspire our hearts: for free individuality never emerges in them. Private property, beauty of family life etc., fall short—equally, fine arts and sciences have not blossomed in their culture as these did with the Athenians.—The other extreme to the Lacedemonians are (2) the Thebans (Boetians) more towards the north of Greece. With these we find subjectivity predominant, as in friendship organizations of youth, that bind themselves for life and death. Whereas the Lacedemonians were immersed in the substantial unity of the nation, the Thebans had free associations of the heart. The subjective life of the Thebans later passed over into orgies, and fell into corruption owing to a lack of a universal ethical interest.—(3) Between these two stand the Athenians, who allowed nation, law, ethics and subjective freedom both to have their rights equally. Therefore they also allowed subjective freedom to proceed freely in science and in art. \$395 The third is individuality, the soul becomes individually determined. Here multiplicity arises in which one individual closes itself against the others. Every individual is different from others, has a special talent and so it goes into infinite multiplicity. Differences that have been specially emphasized are those of temperaments. With greater cultivation these temperaments disappear gradually, so that today it cannot easily be said that someone has any particular temperament, for several temperaments may be united in a single individual; no one is the abstraction of one temperament. The difference of temperaments must be grounded on the determinations of the concept: on the one hand there is the thing itself [Sache], the end, and on the other there is subjective particularity. The difference of the temperaments can therefore only express the relation of these two. So we can say that the phlegmatic temperament is directed to the [substantial] thing itself, but with less activity of subjectivity. But once it has united with the substance itself, it can persist therein.

The sanguine temperament has the mobility and agility of I subjectivity, so that it grasps the thing itself more lightly, but can also more easily abandon it.

49

The melancholic and the choleric temperament are directed more towards their own subjectivity.

Particular individuality produces countless differences. Talent, genius is also such a difference. Art is not only the rational, it is also the spiritual made intuitive in a sensible way. There the natural aspect of the artist is

From another perspective we can see the same: The Ionian philosophy (against the East) had for its principle a natural—one can even say material—principle;—the Eleatic (against the West) philosophy had abstract thought (Pythagoras [Hegel apparently means Parmenides]), the Athenian (in the middle) had concrete thought, the Nous of Socrates. So the national character often particularizes itself within a given sphere, and these particularizations are oriented and determined in their differences by the determinations of the concept in general.—This is also the case in another respect, as in Greece. For example, Germany is divided into northern and southern sections.—In northern Germany there arose the philosophy of subjectivity (Jakob Böhme, Fichte, and Kant), in southern Germany in contrast:—Hegel does not say. To develop this [point] further would lead us too far astray. Cultivated men raise themselves above these [regional] differences, and it is difficult to recognize any national character in them, because the distinguishing feature of educated human beings consists in acting, existing, and being actual in accordance with universal modes of thought.

As already said, this is the sphere that concerns the particular determinations and specializations of the universal soul.

^{59. [}Ed.] Cf. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatische Hinsicht, Schriften VII, 286-91.

^{60.} W adds: Kant in his so-called Anthropology gives a thorough description of particular temperaments. But he presents only very external determinations that can occur more or less in other temperaments.

also an element in art. Talents are also different; genius refers more to totality, while talent refers more to a particular sphere and the difference of talents is manifest often in an entirely miraculous way. Many have a decisive talent for [mathematical] reckoning etc., idiosyncrasies. In families many such distinctive tendencies become distinctive characters as is manifest in aristocracies ~where circumstances also play a role. Character mixes with greater cultivation, i.e., conduct according to a universal norm.~61 These peculiarities do not affect what is essential in humans, namely, religion, reason, science, etc. The latter are not affected by temperaments or character. 62 Religion, reason, and science remain above special talent or genius. The former belong to a higher sphere than the special talents, and one cannot reproach nature for its injustice, for the essential point is that the human being is human, and ~all have the equal right to what makes a human being human.~63 These are I the natural determinations of the soul; they are the universal, particular, and finite determinations of individuality.

In §396 the natural changes are set forth. The soul is essentially individual.⁶⁴ Individuality is determinacy existing for itself, and the other determinations fall within this one individuality, while, for example, different national characteristics of people fall outside them. Here the differences are immanent in that one individuality through which they are bound together. The subject persists as one and the same throughout its phases of development. Even here we must also anticipate the knowledge of the concrete cultivated spirit. The difference is natural, but it comes to existence in a determinate mode in the spiritual, and we bring this mode with us here. ~One must here renounce such questions as 'If the physical condition is thus, how is the spiritual?' One must not separate the two so that the physical becomes the cause. ~⁶⁵ Rather in the soul the unity of the physical and the spiritual is present.

A closer look at these differences then shows the differences to be alterations in the individual, and in fact the individual is the totality of these changes. Since these alterations are different, they exclude each other,

62. W reads: These have universal validity for humans.

64. W reads: at first undetermined and then individual.

^{61.} W reads: Such special traits blend more in greater states of societies where families do not have such great privileges, etc.

^{63.} W reads: participation in religion, ethical life, etc., everyone has this, and it does not depend on talents.

^{65.} W reads: One must not regard the physical as foundation; the spiritual refers to the physical and can be known as ground and consequent, cause and effect.

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and belonging to an individual only if they can fall outside of each other temporally, i.e., are temporally successive. These alterations are as follows:

- (1) The periods of life, (2) the sex relation, in which the individual, who is himself an opposition, is opposed to other individuals, | and (3) the individual in himself is a judgment, so that individuality existing for itself differs from itself as mere existence. Therefore there are
 - (1) the totality of changes that follow each other successively.
 - (2) the difference or the individual as one-sided, and
 - (3) the totality, that is, the judgment, is the totality that opposes itself to itself; in this opposition it does not fall apart into two, but rather the opposition occurs in a single individual. The judgment then is the awakening of the soul.

§396 The first is the natural course of the periods of life, as a natural individual it is a totality, but as a natural individual it is also mortal. As an immediate singular of nature, it is contrasted with its universality, its species. It is this contradiction, and its life is precisely this conflict between these two extreme moments, a contradiction that is dissolved when the species prevails as substantial universality. However, the individual dies. The individual presents itself as this natural process. The human being is mortal by nature; it is a real possibility, i.e., necessity, that the human dies. The human being perishes of himself; he is himself the species and the species is nothing foreign to him. At the same time he exists immediately, and this is the contradiction in him. This process is the natural course of the stages of life. ~It is the privilege of organic nature to be mortal. The inorganic nature endures because it is subordinate, because it is abstract.~66

The extremes of life are childhood and old age. The latter dissolves into a second childhood, and its conceptual determinacy is totality without opposition. \sim In the child the contradiction between universality and particularity has not yet arisen. \sim^{67} We will give only the chief moments of the spiritual significance of this development. I The physiological does not belong here. In the child there is a unity without opposition, namely, innocence, a peaceful relation to oneself and to the world. The emergence of the child into the light is a mighty leap. Birth is a leap [saltus], not a merely gradual change; the physiological changes are not as significant. The child is still concealed in itself in a vegetative way, but soon after birth it

^{66.} W reads: In general the individual has this process. The organic does not. Mountains, stones, etc., endure and are abstract natures.

^{67.} W reads: The child is the spirit as still shrouded in itself.

^{68.} W adds: The child steps into the world out of a type of life lacking in individuality.

shows itself to be human. In youth there arises the contrast of the individual against the universal (it is supposed to be so and so, e.g., the ideal, the 'ought to be', etc.). In adulthood there is a contrast too, but totally different. In old age there is the peace of return, whereas the innocent peace of the child is supposed to be broken.

In childhood there are several periods to be distinguished. The child shows itself as human already in its organization as destined for manifold dexterities of life. \sim It announces itself not as needy, but as justified and unruly against the external world. It is justified in an entirely different way than an animal; in its cry it manifests an absolute certainty about its satisfaction. The first period of life has to do especially with sensible forms; in no other period of life does the human being learn so much. \sim 69

There is very much that is learned; e.g., those who, born blind, when they gain their sight, have no idea of distance, etc. The child acquires a great amount of content in this period. The next step is that the child passes over into the practical, [asserts] his worth against the outer world. This is evident in the development of the teeth, language, standing upright, and motion. The human being stands only because he wills to do so; if we do not will, if our will to stand disappears, we collapse. The teeth are organs directed outwards, thus they are presupposed also in the animal world as difference, for through them the animal asserts itself as a difference against the outer world. Through language we obtain our relation to humans as human.

The child concerns himself with the outer world, first of all in play, without seriousness or consequence. In play it is evident that children express their self-feeling and self-worth *vis-à-vis* the outer world by destroying their toys, etc. But later things become serious, and this seriousness consists in the fact that a rupture is introduced. Something alien is introduced into children, and they as human beings have the presentiment that such rupture is necessary. The alien and strange is the first lesson; reading and writing, abstract tones and signs are the elementary lessons, although in and by themselves [may be] entirely without spirit. This purely external

^{69.} W reads: The child announces itself along with its right to satisfaction in an imperious way when its needs arise, justified and raging against the outer world. His cry reveals his absolute certainty that he must be satisfied. This first childlike period has to do primarily with sentient forms; the development of sensible determinations and the learning of sensible differences—sensible determinations in general.

^{70. [}Ed.] That those born blind have no idea of distance was asserted by William Cheselden, 'An account of some observations made by a young gentlemen who was born blind', Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc., 35 (1728), 447. Kant also reflects this view, cf. Critique of Pure Reason A575 B603.

totality is what they must occupy themselves with. More precisely, this rupture has the sense that they preserve the idea that in the parents and other adults there is something entirely different than in the child. Here arises the consciousness of that alien element, that adults are other, and this alien element, as [already] actual, is something higher than the child. Parents are the will of children. This is respect, the first relation of the rupture. What the children do, they do according to authority, and this feeling that there is something superior in the adults is the very thing that brings up children. On the basis of this feeling they must be brought up. The pedagogues of play⁷¹ have lowered themselves to the level of children, as though childishness were their authentic measure. When children notice this lowering, they lose the presentiment of authority. Such children will easily treat everything with contempt, because in their earliest period they have developed no respect. Here also belongs the idea that one should not speak to children about God-although they already have a presentiment of something greater. Further, it has been said that one should cultivate the understanding of the children and this cultivation of the 'little understanding' has had impertinence as its result. The education of the child consists in his knowing how to learn from others and his acquiring the desire to become an adult. This desire | is what draws him towards adulthood. The way to the satisfaction of this desire is to appropriate everything external and make it one's own. This period of learning is childhood. Through this appropriation children begin to acquire objective value. As children they are always beloved, but through this acquired worth there arises another relation, namely the world of the school. ~The school is the mediating link between family and civil society. Here there is another evaluation of the youth, another way of counting than the way of the family. \sim^{72}

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The boy who has learned the breadth of everything appropriate for his age, passes into youth and adolescence. He knows religion, has general ideas of right and ethics, as well as external knowledge. If all of this has become his, he has achieved independence \sim and will and self-determination enter the picture. \sim^{73} As a youngster in theoretical relation, he now becomes self-reliant. The human being becomes free. In youth, the opposition emerges in a different way: \sim he has ends and drives; on the other hand, these ends and

^{71. [}Ed.] The reference is to the philanthropists Basedow, Salzmann, and Campe.

^{72.} W reads: In family the children are loved simply as they are. Other relations arise upon entry into the world of the school. Here they are valued for what they learn. They must learn to conduct themselves according to rules, to follow an external order. School life is the passage from the family into the world of civil society.

^{73.} W reads: will, self-determination, desire, drive, inclination, decision, to depend on oneself then arise. It is then that the human being is free.

drives have as their end the true, the essential, and so the drive filled with the true and the essential is designated as the ideal. But then the youth discovers that external world does not correspond to or agree with his ideal. \sim^{74} The youth | confronts the world with his general notions and ideals, and because his relation to the world is essential, he must get to know it. But he can participate only in a particular aspect of actuality, and prepares himself for a particular position. Now he prepares to apply what he has learned, and this is the transition to adulthood, which can often appear painful, since the world does not correspond to the ideal. This transition gives him an entirely different relation. The adolescent knew how to judge everything; he is more disinterested. But now in relation to the world there appears a restraint, a condition, a confinement to a particular purpose. This transition often shows itself physically as hypochondria, as a withdrawal into inwardness, as a disgust and repulsion in relations to externality.

The condition of the adult is that he has to do with a world that is already complete in and for itself. The world is a great power which he is unable to change, but wherein he can only seek a limited sphere to participate with his own activity.⁷⁵ The end that he attains is, on the one hand, the world's end, which goes on. On the other hand, the end he attains is a subjective end, for from the fact that he obtains a subjective totality, viz., the family, an objective totality, the state itself likewise proceeds. The adult has his worth through sharing in an undertaking in which the great totality, the work of the world, specifies and realizes itself. The objectification that he gives himself brings about a unity between his own interests and the universal. He becomes accustomed to this and passes over into old age.

The old person lives primarily in memories and without having any vital or powerful interest. The memory diminishes | because the old person is no longer interested in details, but only in the universal. Old age likes to moralize; \sim the loss of interests is the disappearance of life, which consists in the opposition between particular interests and the universal. \sim ⁷⁶ This

^{74.} W reads: In him there is present self-determination and knowledge of right in general etc., and this is his own, his inner possession. On the one hand there is purpose in general that arises, and on the other there is drive for the truth, etc., which is called the ideal. The period of youth corresponds to the ideal world. There we have the relation of the ideal, inner world to external reality. The external actuality does not correspond to the ideal, and the youth is not satisfied in his present state of desire for the ideal.

^{75.} W reads: The human being judges the world no longer according to his ideals, he finds it complete and has only restricted dealings with it.

^{76.} W reads: This loss of interest and custom is precisely the disappearance of vitality. Vitality consists in opposition, the human being was not satisfied in his ends. When his ends have been attained in satisfaction, or he (has) given them up in dissatisfaction,

contrast between interests and their satisfaction disappears. It has been replaced by unity and habit, the lack of vitality in which spirit goes to its death. These are the principles of the stages of life.

\$397 We proceed now to the species relation.⁷⁷ The first element was the totality of changes in the subject; the second is that these determinations become alterations, divisions, become determinations of the species itself, the tension of the species in an individuality. The species is particularized so that every side of an opposition is independent as an individual. In its individuality it is divided against the species, but in such a way that individuals [nevertheless] have the drive to posit the species. The animal element of the species process belongs in the reflection of life as such, therefore in the philosophy of nature. Individuals have the disposition to cancel their one-sidedness. This is the task of particularity through which the universal is posited. This is love in general, which has an animal aspect. Also in spiritual love this unity is posited, so that one has consciousness not in oneself, but in another. One is certain that the other [also] has his consciousness in the unity.

We now examine the species-sexual relation more closely. These are natural differences between individuals, but the human being is also conditioned by a difference of a spiritual sort. The difference is that one sex remains identical with itself and does not advance to the contrast between universal and particular, whereas the other produces the unity of universal and particular through its own activity. Man and woman. The one remains in this totality, while in the other there is disunion, rupture, and the unity is brought about later. This disunion is in the man. The man is the active one in general. I posit a determination in me in reference | to something present at hand, and my activity is to balance the elements contrasted, wherein these at first only subjective ends become objective. This disunion, desire, and need to overcome them, fall to the man. Need, the struggle against the outer world fall to the man. The end determines itself more closely as a universal in contrast to the particular. So strength, might, and power fall to the man, a universal that is willed, in contrast with which other individualities are related as merely singulars. To character belongs a universal end and perseverance to realize the end. The others also want that, but their activity is not identical with the universal, the essential end. The objective undertaking befits the man. To this belongs the higher universality,

^{77. [}Ed.] Hegel uses the term Geschlechtsverhältnis. The term Geschlecht can mean both species and sex. Although species relations include sexual relations, to translate Geschlechtsverhältnis here as sexual relation would be misleading because in English the latter connotation is too narrow.

the labor of spirit ~to know what is rational, and to realize the rational in the outer world. The conduct of the state is business of the man. This is the labor of spirit that brings the rational, I the universal end to consciousness.

Women are concerned more with the personal and the particular; they like to make intrigues in the state. Likewise the youth has a universal, but only a universal of the heart. In enthusiasm they want to realize the universal directly, instead of a rational apportionment. Sciences, the products of the universal, are thus not matters for women. Mathematics and especially philosophy are produced necessarily by men. To be sure, there have been women with great learning, but their learning has applied to positive objects of the understanding. In order to produce a great work of art, the idea must be comprehended and realized through labor. The great works of art are by men. \sim^{78} In order to make the universal one's end, to will the universal, the rupture [of universal and particular] is necessary, as is deep self-absorption and the activity of labor. It is a matter of bringing forth the unity of universal and particular. ~Woman | remains in this non-disrupted unity of the heart. The education of women never enters into the extreme of pain that drives one to production. The objective existence of women is attained therefore in the family. This is the other, the counterpart to the state. The family is an ethical institution, because a rational unity establishes its bond, and this unity is the rationality of this relationship. This is the ethical, and this ethical life is present in the family as a feeling, as immediate natural ethical life, or piety and love. In the state, law, right, objective duties dominate. In the family these originate in and proceed from love. The woman, even in her objective existence [family], remains in the form of subjectivity. The woman, since she does not advance to the reflection of the understanding,

78. W reads: To bring the higher universality to consciousness and to carry it out in actual existence. The conduct of the state is therefore the business of men. The end of the state is the rational will. But what the rationality of the will is, is known only through the labor of spirit that brings this at first only inward rationality to consciousness—essentially the conduct of the state, the universal end, is the business of men. Women are concerned more with the personal, not with the substantial matter itself. Where women come to power in a state, war results, the youth come to blows, where[as] the universal of the mind is supposed to be brought forth. In objective labor everyone will be assigned a part of the work and the individual must renounce himself and subordinate himself to the whole. Where youth together with women come to power, the state hastens towards its ruin. Just as affairs of state are not for women, neither are the sciences as universals of thought. These are necessarily and especially brought forth only by men. Women can also be essentially capable of essential scientific knowledge (In Italy for example there were women professors of right, i.e., a science that deals with the positive and the particular, a science of the understanding, not of reason) as well as the state; science and higher works of art do not pertain to women: for to these there belongs a universal idea, an idea represented in imagination and brought forth in labor. Greater works of art are therefore produced by men. Sophocles, Homer, Raphael, Mozart.-

is not inclined to such one-sidedness as is the man. For the woman what is right and proper is determined through feeling, and she is earlier cultivated and educated. Religiosity is stronger with women, and remains more in the form of feeling, while in men a religion goes on to the level of thought. Man is more world-oriented; the woman is inclined towards piety, the inner, and if the worldly sphere is of a mean common sort, the woman appears as the higher and the more privileged. Where there is no state, no community, then nothing remains for the man than the lower occupations such as are pursued in Italy. In the man there is disruption, and in the woman there is a plant-like unity of spirit. The woman rules the family, and her highest vocation is to be the mother of the family; whereas the man has still other objective vocations.~⁷⁹ So the natural difference is also a spiritual difference.

§398 The third element in this differentiation of individuality is the judgment or division [*Urteil*] in the individual itself—the awakening of the soul, etc.

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Individuality as being for itself confronts its own natural life in such a way that its first state is a confrontation with an opposite condition. It is

79. W reads: The woman is the other side. She remains in the non-dirempted unity of spirit and the heart. The education and socialization of women never exhibits the extremes of universality and particularity that in men produces the extreme of pain that goads them to production. The woman attains her objective existence in the family. The family is the other of the state. It is ethical life, rational unity, that constitutes family ties. The family unity is constituted by members of different sexes. This unity is the rationality of this relationship. This rationality is ethical. At the same time ethical rationality is present in the family in the form of feeling—called piety by ancient families. This piety is the highest form of women's ethical life. Here love rules.—In the state, law and right prevail. Duties in families proceed from love, not abstract duties but proceeding from love and inclinations. In her development into objective existence, woman remains in the form of subjectivity. In her being woman exhibits a development, but this occurs in a beautiful inner peace, concord, and stability. The woman is not subject to the one-sided extremes that man is. Through feeling she senses what is fitting and proper. The man must gain his education through impropriety, opinions of every sort, and through one-sidedness.—Religiosity is stronger in the woman, but remains more in devout feeling in her, whereas the man comes to religion more in thought and reflection.

These are the basic determinations of the differences between men and women. To the man belongs the mundane; to the woman belongs the idea. When the mundane is not of much worth, women appear to have great value and preference. When a state is weakened in its ends and comes to focus only on particular details, then women stand in high regard. So in Italy men are inferior, have to look after the affairs of the house; women have to purify themselves and go to church. There is no alternative for the men where there is no state or [public] common life.

The matters of the understanding are the domain of men, who thus experience alienation, whereas women enjoy plant-like unity and harmony. In the family the sexual relation attains its spiritual and ethical significance and determination. The woman rules in the family and her highest vocation is to be mother of a family. In contrast, the man is not satisfied in the family, but has his vocation in the state, in business and the sciences, etc.

here posited that the individual for itself sheds its natural life and opposes its natural life as a condition to itself, so that this its being for self is also only a natural condition. It is a single individual in which both states or conditions exist. The individual thus detaches its natural life from itself, but in such a way that is not yet free or for itself. The next step is \sim that it determines itself as feeling \sim . 80 This shedding [of the natural] is to be distinguished from the preceding \sim conditions that come to pass in the individual, so that we judge that these are only changes in the individual. \sim 81 These present conditions are to be sure 'in' the individual, but in such a way that the one condition, waking, itself is a judgment [disruption] that opposes its beingfor-itself to natural life. Further the waking state is to be distinguished from the sexual relation, in that the latter is a drive [Trieb], a desire, in relation to the species. But here wakefulness is to have, in peaceful contrast, one's natural life as a state or condition.

As previously noted, the first was immediate individuality, the naturally determined individuality. Second are the determinations and conditions that belong to being-for-oneself, which are (a) natural individuality and (b) its otherness [Anderssein], the tension of this individuality against itself in drive, and essentially in the sex drive. Here is the condition of being posited in opposition to oneself, the difference, disruption that is the drive itself. Herein the individual has no peaceful enduring existence in itself. For existence in self has as its condition the tension of the individual against the others, namely, disruption and the negation of disruption, i.e., I the satisfaction of the drive. The state of being divided [drive] is itself negated and suspended. The natural individual, which was divided against itself, is now identical with itself, but as posited individuality, individuality as such and for itself. These are the abstract determinations on which depends the task of conceiving the difference in its essence.

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Individuality existing for itself is contrasted to individuality in itself; initially these are only contrasted, and this relation is the facade of alteration. Individuality existing for itself and individuality in itself are one individual, in which this judgment [disruption], this difference, exists, and the relation of the two is the façade of alteration. The entire anthropology is concerned with determining this relation further. In this way there are alterations between the states that we designate as waking and sleep.

^{80.} W reads: that one is free to determine oneself to self-feeling [Selbstgefühl], to feeling as such [Empfindung as solcher].

^{81.} Wreads: relation of the periods of life and sex. The stage or period of life is transitional, so that we judge it not to be the judgment of the individual in itself.

Our determination was that the individual existing for itself has excluded natural life from itself (the in-itself, the implicit being of individuality); it is in a state of opposition to slumbering natural life. Since these are natural conditions, they are bound to the form of externality and naturalness, i.e., to day and night. One can at will change day into night. Animals also alternate between these, but only in part, for the majority of animals sleep only at night. The bird of prey is immersed in desire, and in desire it has no theoretical relation to the external world. For the theoretical point of view the world is an enduring reality, valid in itself, and to theory it is a matter of indifference whether the world exists. In contrast, desire is hostile towards the endurance of the outer world; it negates the world and makes it null. For desire therefore the manifestation of an external world is not a matter of indifference or of a peaceful 'ought to be'. Rather its nightly predatory behavior stands in close connection with this phenomenon of the world.

Wakefulness is the being-for-itself of the individual that is at the same time directed outwards. This relation is directed to an existent, no longer the internal disruption of the individual within itself, and his peaceful [relation] $vis-\grave{a}-vis$ the other. Therefore there is a relation posited in wakefulness: quiescent relation to self, and relation to the outer world, which should be allowed to be as existent; wakefulness has excluded its slumbering natural life, the external in general. \sim The waking individual | existing for itself has divided itself, has excluded its being-in-itself from itself, and relates itself to itself. Precisely this divided being is the individual itself. \sim 82

Bichat in *Sur la vie et la mort*, has called attention to the physiological distinction.⁸³ He calls these two sides the organic life and the animal life.

- 1. The organic life is the life of the simple relation of the individual to himself, the reproductive process, that also in irritability again belongs to
- 82. W reads: physiologically the difference, the judgment should be recalled; the individual has divided itself, excluded its being in itself (its natural life) from itself and relates itself to it. The individual in itself is precisely this condition of [internal] division.
- 83. [Ed.] Marie François Xavier Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (Paris, 1800), 7 ff.; in German: Tübingen, 1802, ch. 1, §1. Hegel touches upon this in §355 and §389 Zusatz. Bichat distinguished between an animal and an organic system. To the former he assigned the system of sensibility and irritability, and to the latter, the reproductive system. This terminology is drawn from A. v. Haller, Von der empfindlichen und reizbaren Teilen des menschlichen Körpers (published in Latin, 1753). Through this distinction of sensibility and irritability he derived a distinguishing characteristic of the organic that was valid for a long time. Schelling rejected the separation of these systems as well as the assumption of a proper organic lawfulness opposed to natural principles. Sensibility, irritability, and reproduction can be deduced as characteristics of the organic that in turn can be derived from natural principles. Hegel also criticized the distinction of sensibility, irritability, and reproduction as discrete systems of organism.

reproduction; circulation of the blood continues in waking as well as in sleep. Only this organic life is connected with the external world through breathing and respiration. The life directed outward is the relation to the air. This root of life remains also in sleep. When this system ceases to be living, the human being is dead.

2. The system of animality varies between active and passive. Within this animal system there are the subsystems of irritability and sensibility. In this animal system they come into their efficacy. To this belong the senses and muscle movement. Theoretically sensibility resides in the organs of sense, irritability is practically directed towards the world. In sleep the animal life ceases to be active; to this extent sleep and death are brothers. ⁸⁴ The organs that are directed outwards fall under the judgment of duality and doubling and are therefore themselves doubled. The organs belonging to organic life are only individual and irregular. The former organs are inwardly double, and since there is no basis for variation, they are symmetrical. Eyes and ears are doubled. The outer directedness of the human figure is essentially the object of art, the spiritual expression in form and gesture.

Concerning the further distinction between sleep and waking, it has usually been determined abstractly, i.e., there is sleep and there is waking. When we consider human sleep and waking, I insofar as these states must be apprehended concretely, one wishes to take the distinction according to concrete conditions, namely, that in sleep there also exist representations. Here one doesn't want the abstract distinction between sleeping and waking, but so far as in both states the more concrete, wider activity of spirit occurs, one wants [to examine] the form of this representation. Thus this distinction is made into a vexing question. 85

The images that we have in sleep are dreams. People have wondered whether the soul is active in sleep. Spirit, soul, is essentially activity, not a thing, not an abstract, self-relating, reflective, quiescent dead being; rather spirit is eternal movement. To be at home with self constitutes the dimension of rest, but this is a being with self that is at the same time a coming to self. (It is not worth the effort to retain or remember dreams, and one must not allow oneself to relate one's dreams to others.) One has images in waking and in dreams I also know of external objects. Dreaming is also consciousness, concerning oneself with images. This involves vexing

^{84. [}Ed.] Cf. Lessing, Werke, VI. 83 f.; 405; Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, book 8; Schiller, Kabale und Liebe, V, 1; C. A. Kluge, Versuch einer Darstellung des animalischen Magnetismus (Berlin, 1811).

^{85. [}Ed.] The reference is to the question that Napoleon posed at the University of Padua. Cf. Encyclopedia §398.

questions. The common elements are the images. In this concrete consideration, it is supposed to be explained how the images of sleep differ from the images of waking. The general difference is that in waking I am confronted with the outer world, and this being-for-myself includes in its concrete significance that I am subject together with the totality of all determinations. In sleep I am not for myself; I am powerless, so that what I otherwise hold together in my subjectivity, now falls apart. In falling asleep both images and their interconnections disappear. The circumspect waking consciousness has power over the entire complex of images. In the dream state one allows everything to run through one's mind without connection, without purpose, and without understanding. Jean Paul had a technique to put children and himself to sleep: he invented a silly story full of nonsense and pretended that this was a real story.⁸⁶ This dissolution, this absence of connection where all connection is merely external, and this suppression of the power of consciousness over the images in an interconnected complex—all this is what produces sleep. Vertigo, dizziness, a swimming of the head, is akin to this. Vertigo originates when one moves rapidly, for then such a mass of images passes before the eyes I so that we cannot bring them all together and comprehend them. In vertigo on a high tower, the eye is not accustomed to comprehend what is distant, or to comprehend distance as a relation. It is vertigo when one is in sleep. If one is sleeping, one stands in vertigo, and is about to fall. One has lost the consciousness of the center point, the center of gravity, when the will, the ground on which one stands, is weakened.

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Here originates indifference against all particular images that follow each other without order or connection; and this aspect must be noted. Monotony in the senses, which constitutes boredom, is what puts one to sleep. This dissolution wherein the unity of the soul absolves itself from multiplicity is *in abstracto* the character of the image as it exists in sleep.

The superficial consideration is that in both conditions we have images, that the difference between waking and sleep refers to the form of being-for-self, and the totality of the being-for-self is to be considered more closely. I, together with all this existence, am the centerpoint, and everything that I have before me is an objective complex that is rationally ordered. What appears to me I order in this objective complex. This entire interconnected nexus is concretely present in me in a veiled way. I am the whole connection, and this connection is the measure of the phenomena. Now I am sitting here. The 'now' is a result of preceding conditions, this place exists likewise

^{86. [}Ed.] Jean Paul, 'The Art of Bringing on Sleep', in Sämtliche Werke (München, 1976), vol. 6, 238-50. Hegel became acquainted with Jean Paul while at Heidelberg.

in connection I with my concrete condition. ~I do not have the 'now' entirely present before me, but I am the unity that is present—so I relate myself to myself in waking. When something entirely unexpected appears to me, which does not fit into that complex, I can ask, am I awake or am I dreaming? When by and by I learn to comprehend this nexus, then I regard it [even the unexpected] as actual. This concrete consciousness is not developed, but is nevertheless implicitly present in me in a concealed way. It is the measure of my subsuming something as actual. In dreaming this nexus is not present. In dream I do not relate to myself as the concrete center. In dreams everything is ordered without reference to this concrete centerpoint that constitutes actuality, the rationality of my representing, the most concentrated point of the nexus, that in turn constitutes objectivity.~87 It can still be added that even in dreams there is a correlation with ~the actual. But dreams occur without an actual objective association. Sensations and feelings can also be the content of dreams; images in the evening that continue in dreams, but dreams can also produce a sensation in the body. It

I have sensations in sleep, but it is the fantasy that accounts for these, not the reflective, waking understanding. The imagination makes an image out of these feelings, and so feeling is the occasion for a specific dream.⁸⁹ In sleep the human being can have a feeling of an illness

depends on how one explains this sensation—I feel hardness and then say,

there is something hard.~88

87. W reads: I do not have everything present in my consciousness, or in its development, but I am the present feeling, the unity of the complex. If in waking something suddenly comes to me outside of this coherence, so I ask myself whether I am awake or dreaming. This fact, that something occurs to me, of which I know not how it has come into connection with my existence—and now I learn to have insight into the nexus. I consider it as actual if it appears in connection with the rest—the concrete consciousness of the nexus is present to me in a concealed way, and this presence, this totality, is the criterion by which I measure everything that occurs to me. This is the waking consciousness.

In dreams I do not relate to myself as this concrete center; here everything is in flux and confusion without any concrete center and without any actuality.—This is therefore the true difference, this diverse constitution of representation, the rationality of representation in waking is the concentratedness of the nexus in me. This coherence constitutes objectivity.

88. W reads: connection of feeling with what is actual. Dreams go on and on forever without understanding. Feeling can also be the occasion of determinate content of the dream. If something has interested us in the evening, it can continue in a dream; but it can also produce special feelings in the body. It depends on how these feelings are explained. Feeling is immediate. I explain the feeling of [my] finger when I say, there is something hard through the fact that I feel it.

89. W adds: especially in the morning, when one has the most lively dreams because then the soul opens itself again to external impression.—So dreams often have such external occasions beyond the fact that the spirit during the day has had particularly interesting pastimes.—Eating.

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that afterwards is followed by an actual illness. ~The system is already actually | pathologically affected, but in the waking condition, normal undertakings and the like keep it from being felt. In waking such a feeling is objectively explained, i.e., in reference to its context. We will speak more precisely about this complex, concentrated objective context.

67

In the remark [to §398] there is mention of the refreshment that sleep grants. It is noted how it is necessary to refresh oneself through sleep. Resting, as merely doing nothing, cannot be a refreshment, for rest in the sense of doing nothing is rather relaxation. The refreshment of sleep consists in the fact that in waking I am for myself in contrast and opposition to the outer world. There are two foci here; waking is distinguished from simple natural life and the simple substantiality. Sleep is this covering of oneself in oneself. In waking I divide myself from myself. In sleep I withdraw, I sink within myself but not because I place myself in opposition to my universality, but because I immerse myself in substantiality, which is the power of the individual. Occupation with particulars belongs to the category of being—quantity, because power has a measure—this direction towards the outer is opposed to submergence in universality.

We pass on now to sentience (*Empfindung*). It is the third element beside (1) the natural qualities that are different for us, not for the individual, and (2) the alterations in the subject itself as it differs from itself. The third is the return, the remaining identical with self in disruption and alteration. Being-identical-with-self is the first category. The second is alteration, a being-different in oneself. The third is a being-different, but different in relation to oneself. This [moment of return] is sentience as such. 90

Sleeping and waking are alternating states forming an infinite progression. ⁹¹ They cannot derive from each other; this progression means that they do not exist in their truth, i.e., in their unity. They have only a negative relation. ⁹² Truth is the genuine infinity in contrast to the aforementioned

^{90. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia \$381 Zusatz: 'Sentience [Empfindung] is the omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate every impression and influence to the one whole which in the animal begins to come to be for itself.'

^{91. [}Ed.] Hegel speaks of an infinite progression, but here progress is also regress: the perpetual transcending of a limit that constantly re-establishes or reinscribes the limit and so constitutes only a negative relation. Hegel does not use the term 'infinite regress,' but the 'bad' or 'spurious infinite'.

^{92.} W reads: so that prophecies often have essential grounds. The sick person is already pathologically affected; waking does not allow the pathology to emerge unhindered, whereas this can happen in sleep where there is no tension of wakefulness.—So dreams also have connections with actual feelings and conditions. We will speak more about this totality that exists in self-feeling, this totality of the entire feeling that is present in self-feeling, when we examine the diremption of feeling. It is essential to have a definite account of what objectivity

bad infinite. The true infinity (object of logic) contrasts with the bad infinity and is frequently confused with the latter. The true infinity means that when there is a transition from one to the other, this one, when it transitions into the other, in this other only comes to itself. The cause exists in the effect, and first in its effect becomes what it is. [Similarly] the genuine determination of waking is to be at home with oneself in being-other than oneself (sleep). The particular soul thus finds the determination of its sleeping nature. This determination exists in being; I am determined thus; it is a determination in me and this determination is to be sleeping, natural. But the individual soul, in opposition to its being-for-self, posits what the other is as identical with itself; ~it posits the other as ideal in itself, | and in this [ideal] otherness it remains simply at home with itself. Being awake, as being-for-self, is the exclusion of the uncultivated natural immediacy; this is its abstract determination. The concrete determination of being awake is that this other

is. (There is posited a complex, a nexus of determination, which I am.) In remark (§398 end) sleep is the reinforcement of this activity, not as the simple negative of rest from activity, but as a return out of the world of determinations, of distraction(s), and out of the process of stabilization, namely, the singularities in the universal mode of subjectivity which is the substance of those determinations and therefore the absolute power over them. Sleep is the reinvigoration of feeling and of spirit, and of the entire concrete consciousness. One rests. Rest, understood as a merely doing nothing, cannot reinvigorate. Rest is rather, so far as it is absence of activity, relaxation,—but the reinvigoration of sleep consists in the fact that I immerse myself in the universal essence of subjectivity from which I am separated in waking. I for myself and opposed to the activity, and thus opposed to the external world—I can say there are two foci in human beings. Everything is directed outwards and is distinguished in its simple natural life. Activity contains duality, separation,—sleep is the fulfillment of self. In waking I isolate myself from my substantiality. I am opposed to myself in a special way in isolation from myself as species, universal being. In sleep I also have this separation. Then I go within myself, not in order to be for myself against this universal. I abandon myself and immerse myself in my substantiality. As [Alkgonosis] could not be overcome by Hercules so long as he touched his mother earth and could draw life from her, so in sleep we always return into substantial life, which is the true might and power over singularity. The direction outwards belongs to the category of determinate magnitude. This outer directedness suspends itself and sinks into the entire universal that is the power. We immerse ourselves in the unity which we give ourselves in sleep. Sentience. Sentience is the third of the natural qualities. The first two (1) the natural determination of the soul in general. The natural determination is different only for us, not for the individual. (2) The alterations in the individual. The individual in himself is distinguished from himself. Now (3) return, the logical third. In the disunion, the determination nevertheless to be identical with oneself. This is the category of what is called natural quality. (1) Being, (2) internal difference and the third category is now difference in self that suspends itself.—Sentience as such. Sleep and wake are not mere alterations (of periods of life) but alternating conditions. These are the exchange of two determinations that are inseparable. Their connection, inseparability, is their union. This is a progress into infinity. Sleep and waking, sleep and waking, etc., cause, that itself is effect, and has another as its cause that in turn is effect, etc. The boring exchange between one and the same.

that is opposed to me is essentially related to me; that the other, the natural being, is for me, or that I am determined in being awake means that this other is no other, but rather in this other I have returned to myself. Such is being awake, sentience.

Feeling is the being for self of the individual soul, so that it is at the same time dissolved in its universality. \sim^{93} There is no great distinction to be made between sentience [*Empfindung*] and feeling [*Gefühl*]. ⁹⁴ Sentience

93. W reads: it negates the other being, posits it as ideal, and posits it in itself. In this condition of being-other, it remains itself. We have spoken about waking consciousness and understanding etc. This touches upon concrete content. But waking (taken in complete abstractness) is a being for self that is distinguished from natural life. Up till now we have remained with this abstract representation. The concrete is that I am for myself, and an other exists in contrast to me, but this other is related to me. Therefore, concretely being awake is that I am for myself in a determinate way, that the other is for me, that I am determined in my wakeful state—that I simply have returned into myself and this is feeling. Feeling is the being-for-self of the simple soul in its determinacy. The nature of the universal is determined and this means it is posited as ideal in being-for-self.

94. W adds: Feeling. [Gefühl] Feeling of revenge [Rachegefühl], feeling of justice [Gefühl des Rechts], etc. Feeling [Empfindung] Feeling of revenge [Empfindung der Rache], feeling of justice etc. Moral feeling [moralisches Gefühl] and moral feeling [moralische Empfindung]. [Ed.]: Hegel's point in these repetitious phrases seems to be to show that at the level of ordinary language, the terms Empfindung and Gefühl are equivalent and interchangeable in German. At the level of philosophical theories of knowledge, etc., some have formulated a technical distinction between these. For example, the term Empfindung was used to translate the English term 'sensation' (Locke) into German. This usage suggests that Empfindung/'sensation' has an object or stimulus that evokes it, produces it, etc. Empfindung/'sensation' depends on a given. Hegel himself notes in Enc. 1830, \$402 a similar distinction. Empfindung is the transient impression or effect an object produces in us. For this reason it is essentially linked with passivity of the subject and connected to an external given. In contrast, Gefühl may not have any identifiable object or stimulus ready at hand, and is thus more related to the subject's unity and activity, including mood, emotion, etc., in contrast to sensations (Empfindungen) and impressions (Eindrücken). In Enc. 1830, §407, Hegel uses the term Selbstgefühl in this sense, but not Selbstempfindung, which suggests some sort of distinction. Willem deVries (Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), ch. 5) claims that Hegel did not develop any clear distinction between sensation (Empfindung) and feeling (Gefühl) until the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia. There, feeling (Gefühl) is a higher-order term than sensation (Empfindung); feeling represents a deeper, fuller sense of the self as a totality. Thus deVries contends that 'since all feelings (Empfindungen) are its own, in every feeling (Empfindung) the soul is feeling (fühlen) itself, is self-feeling (Selbstgefühl)'. (ibid., 76). In this usage Selbstgefühl is virtually equivalent to sentience, which Petry and I both use to translate Empfindung. But sentience need not imply a passive relation to a given object. However, Hoffmeister notes that unlike Empfindung, Gefühl is capable of supporting contrasts or polarities, e.g., between pleasure and pain, between the pleasant and unpleasant (J. Hoffmeister, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955), 244). Feeling (Gefühl) denotes a middle level between the level of sensation(s) (Empfindung), where the soul is immersed in and bound by a given, whether natural or substantial, and the level of consciousness where the soul attains liberation and freedom from nature. Empfindung designates 'something [merely] particular, contingent, one-sidedly subjective' (Enc. 1830, §400 Z). Because it is chiefly passive, Empfindung denotes dependence on and immersion in nature.

[Empfindung] expresses the same [sense] more from the subjective side, while feeling [Gefühl] expresses this sense in its determinacy according to its content. \sim Feeling = a finding in self [Insichfinden] that has the mode of immediacy, but is at the same time in itself. \sim 95 The form of simplicity is to be considered more closely. Dullness contrasts with clear presence of

Gefühl in contrast designates the union or unification of the Empfindungen or sensations. In this usage it is equivalent to sentience (Empfindung) as a general capacity. However, Gefühl may go on to become Selbstgefühl, and this implies a contrast between the self and what is not-self or nature. Thus self-feeling as such is the beginning of the liberation from or transcendence of nature. Gefühl names this middle ground between sensation and consciousness; it is the beginning, but only the beginning, of the separation/liberation of the soul from its raw natural substantiality, and the achievement of a subjective, in contrast to an objective, sense or 'consciousness' of itself as a totality (Enc. 1830, §402 Zusatz). Selbstgefühl thus denotes the beginning of self-activity and self-presencing. Gefühl comes to be the term designating this deeper conception of self as totality underlying polar contrasts; feeling is a pre-cognitive organization and unification of sensations that is crucial to Hegel's account of madness. There he employs it in his account of the dysfunctional projection of merely inner, subjective fantasies as objective. Such projections involve a skewed, distorted sense of objectivity, which includes an arrested development, or a retrogression of the subject to a condition of unfreedom. Since Gefühl supports polarities, it is the precondition of the distinction between subjective and objective. However, the latter distinction is not yet explicit either at the level of Empfindung (Enc. 1830, §§400 Z, 402 Z) or at the level of Gefühl (Enc. 1830, §402 Z, 118-19). The distinction between subject and object is made explicit only at the level of consciousness. Consciousness represents a liberation of the psychic life from nature and reflects free self-determination. Consciousness is the subject of part two of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, namely, the Phenomenology of Spirit. However, it should be noted that deVries's neat, systematic distinction between Empfindung and Gefühl is not consistently followed by Hegel even in the 1830 Encyclopedia. For example, in §381 Zusatz, Hegel writes, 'Feeling is the omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate every impression and influence to the one whole which in the animal begins to come to be for itself.' If deVries were correct, the term we would expect Hegel to use here for feeling would be Gefühl, but instead Hegel uses Empfindung. Admittedly this is a Zusatz from Boumann; it could have come from any of Hegel's lectures between 1817 and 1830, and probably reflects Hegel's pre-1830 view. In our 1827 text, Hegel challenges any neat and sharp terminological distinction between Empfindung and Gefühl. Hegel flatly asserts that linguistically there is no great distinction between Empfindung and Gefühl. While he may have revised this view somewhat by 1830, his interchangeable usage of the terms is the nemesis of any translator, and requires any translation to be an act of interpretation. It should also be noted that matters are not much clearer linguistically in English. The English equivalents of the German terms Empfindung and Gefühl namely, 'sentience', 'sensation' and 'feeling' are nearly, if not completely interchangeable according to their definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary. I have decided not to standardize the later distinction between Empfindung and Gefühl in the translation, because that would impose a greater clarity than the text supports, and more importantly, greater clarity than the 1827 Hegel possesses.

95. W reads: feeling [Gefühl] for beauty. Feeling [Empfindung] also determined, but more according to its not being itself.—The deficiency of feeling, sensitivity, sensibility (direction depending on the form of feeling). Feeling, the finding of something in self, finding oneself in oneself. The main point is the simplicity of being-in-self in the determinacy.

mind. The latter requires ~specificity so that everything in its determinacy stands before consciousness.~96 All determinacy therein is still immediate, but this immediacy is ideal, taken back into itself and canceled. This return is still the immediate simple mode of return. Feeling thus belongs to the most particularized uniqueness of the subject. | What is in my heart⁹⁷ etc., that I have immediately; it is the immediate mode of my being, the soul existing in itself in its simplicity. Everything exists in feeling; I am subject, as such I exist in a specific way in some determinacy. So far as my determinateness is a being, this determinacy is feeling. When I speak of something objective or about general principles, then that is something universal that is there for everyone. It is for others; it is the element I have in common with others. Reasons, principles are also held in common, but this is not a dimension of feeling, rather the latter means that I am there according to my immediate singularity. The content that belongs to me, pertains to the natural idiosyncrasy or feeling. 98 To be sure, feeling, although a return to self, is a return to self that is still immediate. So everything exists in feeling. It is in my heart, the complex of feeling; ~it is in me as this singular. Principles must be in the heart, which means they belong to my being~99 so that I am inseparable from this content. If I merely know about it, then it is not identical with my very being and immediacy. I must be it. This inseparability is necessary. We have this inseparability also in our images. We distinguish principles from our feeling. The judge, we say, has no feeling. ~There is a great cause I that must be striven for; character restrains feeling. There we oppose the universal to feeling, and the universal is far greater than every particular. The judge who in this respect seems without feeling can always have a feeling for his duty, and this is greater than his singularity. \sim^{100}

More precisely, the following distinction must be noted: (1) According to its form, feeling does not possess the distinction between subjective and objective. ~With every sensation I double the content. The determination

^{96.} W reads: Development of the grounds, etc., comparison of a content with the universal,—this development is not found in feeling [Empfinding].

^{97.} W reads: feelings. 98. W adds: the standpoint of immediate singularity.

^{99.} W reads: So I determine myself as [the] universal of feeling.—It is not sufficient, so it has been said, that principles, religion, etc., be only in one's head; they must also be in one's heart, in one's feeling.

^{100.} W reads: a man who has to accomplish great ends, the principle, the universal, must lay aside his feelings. The greater purpose is that for which one must act. Character, understanding, reason, keep feeling under control. The judge can be without feeling;—and yet as an individual, a father of a family, etc., he can have feeling. That a man acts rightly is much greater than all those particularities. The feeling of his right, his duty, is higher than other feelings, and is not a feeling of his own particularity and subjectivity.

'hardness' is entirely simple. But I double it. First I say 'hardness' in my finger; and then I say the object itself is hard. \sim^{101} This doubling is not yet present in feeling as such. Afterwards we say that this feeling comes from this or that. But the feeling as such is the unity of my being and this impression. (2) But in feeling the content is still undeveloped and exists in an indefinite way. One must be aware of this, because it has been asserted that the truth exists only in feeling. Then it would not be necessary to remind ourselves that the foregoing is a false idea, namely that some content is justified simply because it is felt in the heart. People have never debased themselves as much as in this idea. The first reason is that anyone who, when confronted with different opinions, appeals to his own feeling [Gefühl], must be left alone. That's the end of the discussion, because he has fled the common world that others share and which constitutes the human sphere. 103

The further point is that feeling is a determinate, restricted, singular. From this, we know that feeling [Empfindung] is capable of having any possible content, [and] that this content can be good or evil. Feeling \sim has no criterion in itself \sim^{104} because it is the feeling of a human being. Whatever is universal, that is for the human being the measure of something. Hot feeling is merely singular and can contain in itself either good or evil. \sim The universal has its basis in thought; this can also be felt; it is mine and so my immediate feeling, but it derives from spirit. In the animal, whatever it needs, whatever is good for it, exists in the mode of feeling, as instinct. But the human being has no instinct. Its instinct is reason. Thinking here is not at all to be understood as philosophical thinking. Thought in the pure element of thinking—it would be folly to demand this here. One knows a basic principle and it derives from spirit. \sim^{106} The good can be present in feeling,

101. W reads: when we have a feeling, consciousness or intuition enters. As consciousness of it, I double the simple feeling; hardness exists both as an object and as my subjective feeling.

^{102. [}Ed.] The polemic is directed against Jacob Fries (Handbuch der praktische Philosophie (Heidelberg: Mohr & Winter, 1818)), F. H. Jacobi (David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus (Breslau: G. Loewe, 1787)) and Schleiermacher (Der christliche Glaube (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1821)).

^{103.} W adds: Rational men constitute something rationally through reasons, i.e., through something that is present also for another in his understanding. In feeling [Gefühl] I take refuge in my particularity that excludes others.

^{104.} W reads: has no criterion in itself of what is true and right, etc.

^{105.} W reads: of that which constitutes right, etc.

^{106.} W adds: Religion has its origin in spirit, in thought. God should be revered as spirit. The ethical is a universal, rational aspect of willing that has its source and origin in thought. What has its origin in spirit can also be sensed and felt, and become mine. But it comes to feeling from spirit. An animal holds itself to feeling and instinct. Its vitality includes the criterion for what is good and not good for it. But the human being does not have instinct;

but the only criterion of good is rationality. The true must have the form of universality. Concerning experience, it is known that animals do not have religion. However, it is through thought that feeling becomes human. I That there can be bad feelings 107 and bad hearts is an entirely trivial experience. \sim It is a consummated religious feeling with the Egyptians that an ox is God. This feeling is prattle, learned prattle; in actuality nowhere is it allowed to count as valid. The judge investigates the objective aspects of a matter, \sim^{108} the context, the necessity, the circumstances. This is what is objective; this is the rationality in the activity of judging.

The worship of Apis has been felt [to be appropriate] but nevertheless this is a feeling which degrades human beings. 109 ~Whether a feeling is appropriate depends on its content. A cultivated, purified feeling has a purified content, and this content is the rational, thought. The pious feeling originates when what is brought before the representation, the insight, is of a truthful sort.~110 The content must be correct in itself; if the content is correct, then the feeling will be correct. Since this content is mine, and since I am identical with it in my immediacy, I feel it. ~It has been said that we should just hold fast to the point that every people has its religion in feeling, and that we should leave aside entirely the content of religion. This is a special individual point of view | which philosophy has to consider when feeling is made the criterion.~111

it has reason instead, and reason must be universal in form. Reason and thought are not yet philosophical thought or knowledge in the element of pure spirit. Humans know that stealing is a vice, but they do not know this through philosophy. This knowledge comes from spirit and we know it, are conscious of it, without recourse to philosophical thinking.

^{107.} W reads: there can be good as well as bad feelings.

^{108.} W adds: That an ox or an ape is God is a fully religious feeling, but it is only a feeling, and nevertheless is degrading in spirit—there is only a prattle about this feeling. In actuality it is talk about nothing. Nowhere would the actual truth be decided on the basis of feeling. A judge does not act according to feelings, but investigates the objective aspect of a matter.

^{109. [}Ed.] On the cult of Apis, cf. Charles Francois Dupuis, Origine de tous les cultes, ou religion universelle (Paris, 1793).

^{110.} W reads: One must know how to give an account of what special reasons there are for this language of feelings. Feeling is only a form whose content can be true or false.

^{111.} W reads: Whoever says that religious feeling is that on which everything depends, shows only that he is satisfied with custom. He wants to hold fast to custom without reflecting further on the content of the custom. We are content and want to stand pat simply because this content is ours. This standpoint makes one impatient with reflective consideration. In general, religion is that to which we hold ourselves in feeling [Gefühl]. Here philosophy has only to defend the view insofar as it is asserted as a philosophical standpoint, that feeling is the criterion of truth. Concerning this matter the points on which it depends have already been mentioned.

As has been shown, feeling [das Gefühl] is only a form for any content whatsoever. This form must now be considered more carefully. It has been noted that in feeling the distinction between subject and object is not yet present; this distinction belongs to consciousness. 112 But in feeling there is immediately present the distinction between immediate being and beingin-itself. Feeling is this concrete whole and we can hold on to these two moments of feeling itself. Feeling must determine itself. ~If we consider these two moments, the immediate determinacy and being-in-itself, we can immediately consider this as the special content, that its content is immediate determinacy as such, or that the other aspect, being-in-itself, is the content of feeling. The latter aspect is the true determination of the form. If we make the immediate determination as such the content, then we have outer sensations [Empfindungen] and, in case of the other content [being-in-itself], inner sensations.~113 Therefore in this paragraph (§401) when this being-for-self [Fürsichsein] or being-in-itself [Insichsein] is taken concretely as absorbed in itself, it is I, and the immediate determination is thus corporeity. Feeling is thus first of all feeling of corporeity. Feeling remembers...¹¹⁴

It is further to be noted that I external sensations [*Empfindungen*]¹¹⁵ are recalled and made inward. This is the first point. The second is that the sensations which originate in spirit must become embodied in order to be felt or sensed.

The first to be considered are the external sensations [Empfindungen]. In general these are familiar as bodily determinations. It is not only a determinacy, but also a feeling [Gefühl], a sensation [Empfindung], so that we find it in us. The immediate sensation is a sensation of a being, external sensation. Further it is to be noted that there is a circle of these sensations. We know these well as the five senses. ¹¹⁶ It is of interest to consider in what way these five senses constitute a totality; the concept is its determining element; the soul which the concept constitutes should be comprehended. We call sense here a mode of external sensation [Empfindung]. We shall briefly sketch the concept of sense. How does nature come to five senses? It

^{112.} W adds: Consciousness. We also have therefore no objectivity in feeling [Empfind-ung].

^{113.} W reads: If we accept this distinction we have two types of feelings—(1) outer, where the content is immediate determination; and (2) inner feeling, where the content is the determination of the subject existing in itself.

^{114. [}Ed.] Hegel refers to \$401 of the 1827 edition of his Encyclopedia. 'Feeling is recalled through the fact that it is made inward in the being-for-self of the soul.'

^{115.} W reads: determinations, external sense impressions

^{116.} W adds: seeing, tasting, feeling, etc., touch.

often comes only to four. 117 Three always serves as a basis, but it depends on whether one of these can be explicated.

~The first is the immediate. But the immediate is concretely only so, that the concrete determinations are not yet connected to the points of unity. According to its content the matter itself is all there, but not yet explicitly connected.

The second is the difference. The two elements no longer fall outside each other in such an immediate way, but are related. \sim^{118}

The third is the unity of the first two. Where this is fully developed there are five senses. The first element contains two, the second likewise two. Spirit comes essentially to three. Nature often to four.

According to this scheme we have first the senses of simple ideality: sight and hearing. Second are the senses of difference: smell and taste. Third the sense of totality, namely feeling [Gefühl]. Since these senses are at the same time sensations [Empfindungen], and we have to do with them, feeling as such determines itself in progressing outwards from itself. The first is the abstract feeling; the last must be its ~return [to itself], essentially self-feeling [Selbstgefühl].~119 Therefore the last sense is exclusively called feeling [Fühlen]. In hearing and seeing we do not sense ourselves, but in smelling and tasting such self-sensing begins. In feeling as such the return to self is completed. When I feel an object, I feel it offering resistance to me.

~First [we have] sensibility in general, without return to self. The progression is to the sensation of corporeity and from there to return to self, i.e., self-feeling.~120 The physiological aspect does not concern us here. The first [sense] is seeing. When we see, we see an object; we do not sense the eye. The content is immediately projected outwards. We well know when we reflect on this, that our corporeity is determined in a certain way. But in healthy conditions we do not perceive the eye in seeing. (It is otherwise with the sense of taste) The content is projected on to the world for us; what we see is that [kind of] being which is in space. | The sense of space

^{117.} W adds: as spirit comes to three.

^{118.} W reads: Three is the immediate in general. The immediate is concrete. The concrete content is not yet in its unity and is external to itself. The first is the eye, but not yet connected to a point of unity, not yet returned to identity. The second is the determination of the difference, where two fall outside each other as relative and related.

^{119.} W reads: return of feeling to itself in its subjectivity, self-sensing, self-feeling.

^{120.} W reads: During the phase of sensibility in general I feel both the object and myself against it.—Sense of self-feeling therefore—This is the more precise determination of the progress in the determination of this external feeling. (1) Feeling in general. (2) Feeling of corporeity. (3) Self-feeling or sensing of corporeity as a corporeity existing for itself in contrast to others.—

is not abstract space, but materialistic spatiality, so to speak, that the content is for us and manifests itself to us. This space that manifests itself physically is light. Light is an immaterial matter; it has no weight, is not composed of parts, and is this indivisible connection, this inseparable unity. Light is the pure manifesting of the object for us. The sense of sight is thus completely theoretical. The objects are for us, i.e, independent; we do not perceive our eyes. Seeing is therefore a feeling of abstract being and so remains external. Is sight we have only a surface before us, the abstract. We learn to judge the three dimensions as well as spatial distance only through habit. This manifestation is spiritually simple, immediate, without mediation. \sim 124

The other ideal sense is hearing. If sight is the sense of physical spatiality, hearing is the sense of physical (non-abstract) time. To be sure we see alterations, movements, but there time is only a moment in reference to space. Hearing is time become physical, so to speak. 125 What we call hearing is the vibration of the bodies in themselves. The body vibrates, and this vibration more precisely means that every part is displaced, exists in the place of others and is immediately again displaced by the others that assert themselves. Where there is one spatial-physical point, I immediately there is another. This is the vibration of the body. This [account] is not allowed to count as valid: wherever a point exists there could be no other. Some take refuge [from the difficulty] in the pores. But the pores [of matter] are a mere fiction, nothing empirical. These are a matter projected by the understanding, ~which helps itself thus.~126 This vibration is the suspension of the mechanism of the body and its restoration. This inflow and outflow is what we hear. ~If the vibration continues, the real suspension of cohesion occurs, warming and melting. 127 What we distinguish as material points or parts are posited as temporal; i.e., it is, and because it is, it is not. \sim^{128}

- 121. [Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §§275 f.
- 122. W reads: Light is matter, but it is equally immaterial. It does not consist in parts, or out of particular independents. It is the indivisible, a (gathering) unity.
- 123. W reads: In sight we are immersed in the object without reflexion on ourselves. The immaterial manifestation of what lies before us.
- 124. W reads: (the dimension, distance etc. belong to reflection), sight is a spiritual manifestation, simple, unmediated relation. Sense of ideality.
 - 125. [Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §§298A, 300 f.
 - 126. W reads: which has completely made it up.
 - 127. [Ed.] On the transition from sound vibration to heat, cf. Encyclopedia §§302 ff.
- 128. W reads: through resonance there is a transition to complete negation of cohesion. What we can view as material points are continually external and temporally posited. It is, and because it is, it is not. The unity of being and not-being. When I say 'now' the 'now' is no longer. This is time. The material, in vibrating, is thus temporally posited.

Time is the inseparability of the 'is' and the 'is-not'. So, in sound, the disappearance of the material is posited. This is the inwardness of the body that manifests itself, this subjectivity and negativity. This is what we hear. In hearing we do not have a feeling of the 'is' but only a feeling of the becoming, the material process of becoming, of pure physical self-alteration. It is, however, an ideal sense, because it is only this pure process of the becoming of the mechanical that is equally external to us and immediately inseparable from us.

There is no feeling of our corporeity present in hearing. Since this concerns the relation of space and time, it is likewise an ideal meaning. This is the first pair of senses, namely, ideal senses.

The second are those senses in opposition. Where the transition is made to reality, the practical begins. Our corporeity begins to be felt, and our feeling begins. In smell we sense the volatilization of the body, its real annihilation, or real resumption into a simple mode. I The body passes over into this simple mode, which is gas. This non-apparent consumption of the body—its volatilization—is what we sense in smell. There is therefore an existent, but one in transition to annihilation, its dissolution.

Taste is closely connected with the foregoing. In this case it is we who accomplish the consumption. It is our activity that is present in the matter and at the same time our self-feeling. In smell we already begin to perceive our organs, and in taste this perception increases. ~(In Swabian 'to smell' is equivalent to 'to taste'). In these perceptions we sense ourselves. ~129 These are the senses of difference—that being is simultaneously related to its other, and consequently to its annihilation. The element of water corresponds to the [sense of] taste. This neutral [element] individualized presents a concrete neutrality, and these are salts in general.

The third sense is feeling [Gefühl]. ¹³⁰ In this we find being [as] offering us resistance, i.e., an independent existence against us, as we are independent for ourselves. [Here we find our corporeity again]; both sides are determined as existing for itself. In sight, the content is the existent; in feeling the content determines itself as existing for itself. It offers resistance. Weight belongs to these different modes of being-for-self, as does a tendency for matter to strive after the center. According to this ideality it is weight. The type of resistance is to be further distinguished, also heat belongs here, i.e., the dissolution of cohesion.

^{129.} W reads: In Swabian one does not distinguish smelling and tasting.—Our activity is directed towards being and senses itself therein.

^{130.} W reads: feeling, sense of touch.

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This is the totality of sensations that we call external and which belong to the senses. It can still be noted that the feeling of a sense has a certain measure (a quantitative determination as existent). Quantity and measure are categories of immediate being. They proceed from I being to beingfor-self. In their [independent] being-for-self, we, the feeling ones, are for ourselves. Both fall asunder and only then there emerges the distinction of objectivity. In seeing there is only an immediate relation; we are engrossed in the object and have only one feeling. In feeling the perceiver is determined as existing for himself, and here arises a ~relation.~¹³¹ Here a comparison, a relation between both arises. This relation includes what we call the pleasant and the unpleasant, an agreement of the existent with our being-for-self. We are determined as being for ourselves, but as such we have an inwardness full of content, and our inwardness can be appropriate or inappropriate to the content. The pleasant and repulsive arise here; this is at first a very superficial comparison. ~It can also be more fundamental so that this agreement can be further determined. For example, there can be a harmful pleasure.~132 Animals know this through instinct. But with humans instincts are entirely subordinate. We depend more on understanding than on instinct. Also the instinct of animals is not infallible. This pleasantness expresses an entirely superficial agreement of the external determination with our inner determination. A further agreement can also be mentioned. The symbolic aspect | ~of feeling, namely, that an outer figure is present and a universal meaning, a universal character, is connected with it.~133 Sensible immediate feelings have in themselves a character that is common with inner inclinations and feelings, and are thus symbolic.

Colors are especially symbolic, because colors have objectivity, are existents. 134 ~It belongs to the symbol that it has existence and a character with traits distinct from its existence. In mourning one chooses a definite color, black or white. This absence of difference counts as a symbol of negativity, so white corresponds to innocence. Pure red has always been the queen of colors.

^{131.} Wadds: dual relation: (1) the external senses (2) that an independent being has arisen, as well as an exclusion of other independent beings.

^{132.} W reads: there can be something pleasant to our feeling that is harmful to our health. But both can be bound together, e.g., narcotic addicting colors in odor, appearance, and (yet) harmful to health.

^{133.} W reads: In symbol there is an external form and signification, i.e., a certain attribute, determination, and general character that is connected with external structure (eagle the symbol of strength).

^{134. [}Ed.] Cf. Goethe, Farbenlehre, Part 1, §\$915 ff., in Goethe's Werke 13, 520 f.; Kant, Critique of Judgement \$59.

Symbolism implies that something has an essential determination that agrees with an inner determination. The two relate symbolically in that one and the same determination is contained in things that are different. Why a particular color is the symbol of an inner determination is very difficult to say, only because this is an utterly external determination of feeling, and the other [determination] is | entirely inner. Light is white provided that it is visible. 135 In the case of innocence we represent to ourselves an undivided heart. What purple is in itself, depends on theory. Why purple is a royal color-for this one must know the nature of color. According to Newton, purple is not different from other colors. Red is an intermixture of two darkenings (blue and yellow), a balance that then intensifies to subjectivity, individuality and within such intensity, to power and strength. 136 On account of this nature, red stands out. With blue something bright shines through the darkness. Conversely, yellow is the darkening of a light through dimming. For this reason blue is mild, also cold, because darkness is the base, the substantial element. \sim^{137}

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135. [Ed.] According to Goethe's theory, colors originate through an interplay of light and darkness; Cf. Farbenlehre, Part 1, Einleitung, Goethe's Werke 13, 326. According to this theory, white originates as a pure darkening of the transparent (§§175, 494 ff.); following this, according to Hegel's interpretation light attains existence for us or becomes visible (Encyclopedia §317A). In contrast, Newton's view was that the white of sunlight is a synthesis of the basic colors in a mixture (Opticks, book 1, part 2, prop. V. theor. IV, Opera quae exstant omnia (London, 1770–85)).

136. [Ed.] According to Goethe, blue originates in darkness, yellow in light. On the correlation of the colors yellow and blue with inner emotional states (warm and cold respectively), cf. Goethe, *op cit.* \$\$764–71; 778–85.

137. W reads: Smells are not easily taken as symbols in contrast to colors. One speaks of cheerful and serious colors. For example, in mourning one chooses traditional colors that are symbolic. Black designates absence of distinctions; white symbolizes innocence. It has been felt that white simply is (not Newton). In contrast, red is the royal color. It is difficult to say why a color is a symbol of an inner disposition, because feeling is opposite to external determination, the other is the inner. White is the simple. Pure light is, taken externally, a pigment of all representations etc., a visible mode of light. Innocence, purity, is a heart without any inner discord.

Rose red, a serene, cheerful color, symbolizes love. Why is red a royal color? One must understand the nature of red. Red is an intermixture of two modes of dimming (blue and yellow in opposition).—(The white that is non-opaque becomes through its seven dimmings the dark, the mysterious. If the bright in its seven dimmings predominates it becomes light grey, where darkness predominates it becomes dark grey.)—A balance adjusts both dimmings to individuality, to subjectivity. The powerful, the strong, the individual among colors.—This is the individual nature of this color, hence it is the symbol of the noble and powerful. Blue is mild and cold. Blue has a dark, gloomy base, where light shines through. Where light color is the base, and dark transparent medium dulls it, the result is a yellow. The heavens are thus blue; it is entirely night-black. Atmosphere offers no resistance. Night, the absence of light in the heavens, becomes blue through a lighter medium of atmosphere.

Tones are also symbolical. There is a tone that without any melody can by itself be bright and cheerful. It includes determinacy in another way through the relation of tones, melodies, harmony. 138, 139 The objective element of these relations are numbers: the tone, the vibration of coherence, are determined according to the number of vibrations. Harmony is something symbolic, corresponding to our feeling. 140 One considers harmony so noble, that numbers should hardly constitute its objective ground. But the nature of feeling is to have the manifold and concrete as simple determinations. Sensation, the form of simplicity, reduces what is concrete in itself to a simple determination. So a sense of vision such as ~blue, is an entirely | simple determination and nevertheless a relation of light and dark—sensation reduces it to the form of simplicity. It is then only a blending.~141 It is similar with tones; ~determinate tones have a numerical relation, and if this is a specific ratio, we hear it as entirely simple. \sim^{142} One must have this simplification in mind when we compare the content of something sensed in perceptual relation to the same content in its objective condition.

The other dimension is inner sensation [innere Empfindung]. Sensation essentially includes the moment of natural immediacy; the inner sensation is thus embodied. This embodiment is now to be considered. In the remark there is talk of a psychic physiology, which demonstrates the form of embodiment through which it becomes sensation. We have feelings

- 138. W adds: [can] be [cheerful and] please the mind. It still includes in another mode determination in itself, so through the difference of tone, through different tones that have a certain relation, harmony and disharmony are determined.
- 139. [Ed.] This doctrine goes back to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans; it was further developed by Descartes, Compendium Musicae (1650). In the Encyclopedia Hegel refers to Giuseppe Tartini, Trattato de musica second la vera scienza dell'armonia (Padua, 1754), and to Ernst Florens Friedrich Chladni, Die Akustik (Leipzig, 1802). Hegel presents a more detailed account of his theory of harmony in his Lectures on Aesthetics.
- 140. W adds: It strikes us particularly with tones that harmony and melody have numerical relations as their objective ground
- 141. W reads: Blue is a relation,—so it appears simple. This completely simple determination 'blue' is thus: a spatial relation of clear and dark, where the dark constitutes the foundation and the clear functions as a medium through which we see the dark and the gloomy. This relation is what we sense; but in sensing this is reduced to the form of simplicity, 'blue'.—Red permeates the balance. Green is the simple mixture of blue and yellow.
- 142. W reads: More tones together have a determinate numerical relation. If these are of a simple nature, 2 or 3, the tone is harmonious to the ear. The third, fourth, and fifth are simple harmonies, although objectively considered they are a relation of numbers of a determinate frequency of vibrations in a certain period of time.
- 143. [Ed.] In the addition to Encyclopedia §401 Hegel refers the idea of the embodiment of feelings and sensations to M. F. X. Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (Paris, 1800).

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[Empfindungen] of hate and love, etc. These determinations constitute the content. One could demand a system of inner feelings. But the content of inner feelings is derived from spirit. Right, ethical life, and love are spiritual. Envy and hate derive from the representation. 144 The systematic content of feelings is a spiritual system. In pursuing this further, the same point will prove true of inclinations, 145 namely that the content is the authentic element and is to be considered in objective spirit. Here we bracket this content. The other point is that this content, in order to be perceived, must be embodied. In sensation we have still to do with immediate corporeity. Insofar as something is sensed, it must be corporalized. A psychic physiology would be the system of embodiment of this inner content. Such embodiment occurs in anger, shame, laughter and crying. Other modes of embodiments are to be distinguished from such immediate embodiments. Gestures, countenance, are also embodiments of inner feelings. Gesture is a sign that expresses the beginning of an activity. The embodiment that we have here is wholly immediate. It is not conscious or arbitrary. It has its seat chiefly in what can be called viscera and the lymphatic system. Earlier we noted the distinction between animal and organic life. Here the psychic physiology would have to state the psychic significance of the organs, e.g., the liver. Anger is the outbreak of my self-feeling or mood in response to injury. 146 ~ Envy is the wish~147 that the superior be brought down (Nemesis). In anger humans become red, for the breast, the heart, is the center of irritability, and the latter is driven outward, a being-directed externally. With anger and courage the heart and especially the blood are brought into motion, wherein these inner feelings embody themselves.

~Anger is bound up with the gushing of gall and with the appearance | of blood in the extremities. Shame is also an anger, an involuntary displeasure about appearing in a certain way. In contrast, with anxiety there is a withdrawal of blood from the extremities. Terror makes the hair gray. The standing of the hair on end also embodies terror. ~ 148 Then there are crying

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^{144.} W adds: which I make for myself of an individual

^{145.} W adds: the feeling of right, etc., is, according to its content, to be considered in right, in the doctrine of right.

^{146.} W adds: but more of an imagined injury that another has preference

^{147.} W reads: envy, the nemesis of the ancients, the will

^{148.} W reads: Anger, courage, the heart that brings the blood into movement wherein these inner feelings are embodied. Anger embodies itself in the blood that rises into the face. Gall is, physiologically speaking, the anger that has gushed forth from the liver, and drives the blood into the extremities. Shame is the emergence of the blood in the face and breast; also a beginning of anger in displeasure with oneself. One is ashamed of actions and of an utterly false suspicion. Shame is a displeasure at appearing before others in such a light. Conversely, one associates fear with the withdrawal of blood from the extremities, cold sweats, chattering

and laughing. Physiology does not have much to say about these. There are expressions in which both underlie the awareness of a contradiction. In crying it is I, my vital feeling, which is injured, and I feel its negativity—that is the experienced contradiction.

~Loss of a person belonging to my totality.~149 It is rightly said that tears make this easier. Such an event is a crisis where the inner determination becomes feeling and expresses itself to the point of tears. The connection is difficult to give. Tears are one mode of appearance, more mucous is excreted in the nose; the pain becomes water as it were. This embodiment is found especially in the viscera, and to these also belong the glandular system; there is some connection between these. Tears make matters easier because the sensibility finds this expression, and the oppression of the breast ceases. If pain is inwardly concentrated so that it cannot come to tears, it becomes still stronger and can produce illness and death. But through tears the pain is turned outwards and relieved. This agrees with the professional mourners of the ancients; the expression of sympathy was a great hardship, but this repetition | of the loss brought it to external representation and this repetition is already a lightening of the suffering. The expression of a pain in a poem for example, is an easing of suffering. 150 Laughter is the other to crying. It has many gradations from raw laughter to laughing with tears in the eyes—and the difference of the emotional disposition is evident in these modifications. Laughter can go to the point of tears just as people often cry for joy. As one wants to take in air in crying, the opposite is true in laughing. Laughter is also occasioned by contradiction. An action is laughable when it brings about the opposite of what is intended. 151 The object in this case need not be inwardly interesting, but must be more external. Laughter is more external than is crying. It is connected with language; it is a noise that

of the teeth (a symptom of both cold and of fever). In the face of fear and terror, the hair grows grey. There is a withdrawal of life from the extremities. This happened for example to Marie Antoinette. The standing of the hair on end in cases of fright and of wonder, etc., are particular modes of embodiment of inner conditions.

^{149.} W reads: with inner pain, loss of persons who belong to my totality, my personal life and feeling

^{150.} W adds: Goethe for example, in difficult and distressing situations sought to make a novel or poem out of them and thus sought to express himself outwardly and remove the distress from his heart. [Ed.] In the supplement to Encyclopedia \$401 and in the Kehler Nachschrift (Philosophie des Geistes nach Hegel ed. H. von Kehler, Summer 1825, repr. in Petry, Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 2), Hegel says concerning Goethe that many times he relieved his suffering through a poem.

^{151.} W adds: Fools, according to Aristophanes, have great intentions for the state, but bring about the opposite.

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is not articulated and thus it spoils itself. The physiological investigation of laughter is not easy, nor is the investigation of moans and groans and the like.

This is the embodiment of the inner determination that must posit itself corporally in order to be sentient. Mere corporeity is not sentience; sentience must remember itself and the merely inner must find embodiment.

We have considered sentience [Empfindung]. Sensations are manifold. Sensing is something singular. Sensations and feelings are singular, ~transitory, are alterations of | immediacy. This knowledge means that the soul is a sentient totality. The soul is the subject of sentience, it is sentient totality, the totality of sentience. This is the dreaming soul.

2. THE DREAMING SOUL

\$403 The consideration of the soul has been confined to its sentience, but this sentience is the soul in its totality. ~Next we must note the further development and the end. This is that the sentient totality take possession of itself and assert its power over itself.~153 As sentience, the soul is totality, but an as yet contingent totality, 154 not yet for itself. The standpoint towards which this totality is directed is [that of] consciousness. 155 The soul is still only the plaything [Spielball] of alterations. These develop in it as in the monad, or one may take these as coming from outside; in brief, I am a contingent realization of these given alterations. ~The end of the subject is that it become purely and simply for itself,~156 distinct from and master over what fills it. The end is that the subject take possession of the richness of its totality. That we are something, and that something is in us, does not imply that these are in our possession. For example, in illness | humans

^{152.} W reads: transitory determinations, alterations posited in their substantiality in the being-for-self of the soul that is identical with that substantiality. But the truth of the singular and the transitory is the universal. This manifold of sentience taken together as a totality, is the subject of the soul. The sentient soul is the totality of sentience reflected into itself, the sense of the total substantiality which it is in itself.—So we have to consider the soul now as totality of sentience.

^{153.} W reads: (1) subject of sentience, totality of sentience,—simple ideality, subjectivity of sentience. (2) The goal is that the individual posit itself as this sentient subjectivity, take possession of itself, become the power over itself, become for itself the power over itself.

^{154.} W adds: But it is not yet master of itself, a totality

^{155.} W adds: sentient totality, the totality that I am; physical monad,—where this and that posits itself in me, I am still identical with these my determinations.

^{156.} W adds: It has to do with freedom, that this sentient subject becomes free,

suddenly speak foreign languages that they have long forgotten. That we are capable of this means that we must bring it [the foreign language] out of this pit that we are, and we must bring it before consciousness, before our imagination. The human being is a sentient totality, but not yet the power over this totality. In order to achieve this self-mastery, the soul begins to distinguish itself, to determine itself, and its end is to become an 'I'. When we have forgotten something, we are divided: the one which we are in ourselves; the other, the consciousness, the power over us. Thus there is a division, and the progress of the totality consists precisely in this act of self-division. The sentient totality is at first only one. Thus we come into the sphere of doubling of personality, namely the existent person in itself, and the free subject. Cf. Remark.

The soul posits difference in itself. That from which it distinguishes itself is at first not object. Rather the soul judges and divides itself; it is subject, and the soul's object is its own substance, its complete content, so that the soul is its own object. This is the sentient soul. As such it is determining so that the soul in itself distinguishes itself from itself. This chapter of the anthropology is the most difficult because it is the most obscure.

It should be noted that we have to examine the stages of this determination [of internal self-division] in their immediate significance, and then we note that these stages can also be conditions of the | self-possessed, free conscious spirit. \sim In these conditions the free self-conscious spirit is ill, \sim^{158} it regresses to the level of the sentient soul. The first of these illnesses is somnambulism, and the second is the condition of dementia.

A. Sentience

§405 The first mode of determination of the totality is the passive totality of individuality. The sentient totality is at first immediate; it appears not to be determined. But this constitutes its weakness. \sim This absence of determination in fact means that the sentient totality is in the determination of immediacy. \sim ¹⁵⁹ This is the logical determination, and is concretely

- 157. W adds: every individual is a world of determinations over whose unity we have power; and when we forget, we no longer have power.
- 158. W reads: as states of the free conscious spirit, they are its illnesses. Herein therefore fall the illnesses of the soul.
- 159. W reads: freedom of spirit is to be for itself; in contrast, sentient totality is, through this lack of determination, in its highest determination, [namely] in the determination of immediacy, of raw naturalness

represented by the term 'genius'. ¹⁶⁰ Every man is his own genius. The genius is distinguished from the person by the fact that the person is conscious of his genius, i.e., his entire consciousless totality in the mode of feeling can warn him. ~So we can say: the soul is the genius of the human~. ¹⁶¹

This totality that the soul is, exists as sentience. This totality is passive. Passivity is its determination. The essential point is that in this sentient totality \sim all determinations \sim^{162} are included and concealed. The two chief types that belong here are:

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The first is the child in the mother's womb. The child is human, but only potentially. The child is not at all independent, but is like a member of the mother. The mother pervades the child psychically; I the child is a moment of its mother. ~The child has no true independence;~163 it is, so to speak, only an attribute of its mother. This is an immediate relation, the mother is a sentient totality and the child is only a moment in her. The physical dispositions of parents are thus communicated to the child. This communication occurs in this sphere of sentient totality in an entirely immediate way. More essential than their physiological connection is the unity of [their] vitality. This substantial unity is the basic relation, or rather the absence of relation, the immediate (this unity is what we seek to clarify). Specific qualities of the mother exist also in the child. For example, birthmarks [Muttermäler], which one denies without justification. With this denial is connected a denial of the foundation of empirical science. To be sure, there are many tall tales concerning birthmarks, but also confirmed experiences that demonstrate the connection. Children have been born with broken arms. 164 Frights of the mother have produced lasting dispositions in the children. The influence that the anger of the wet nurse has on the child is already an influence mediated through the movement of the bile. The child in the mother's womb, which is determined by an emotion of the mother, is immediately affected. The mother is here the genius of the child, the sentient selfhood, in which the child is concealed merely as a moment.

^{160.} W adds: genius, which is sensation without consciousness.

^{161.} W reads: so we can call this form of the soul, sentient totality, the genius of the human being.

^{162.} W reads: everything that belongs to the being of the individual.

^{163.} W reads: Its independence has no truth or actuality in respect to its vitality, nor any meaning with respect to its vocation of becoming spirit.

^{164.} W adds: when the mother has violently injured her arm. Frights of the mother have produced enduring dispositions in the child. The child at the mother's breast will be injured through the anger of the mother. There is a communication through the embodiment of anger in the milk.

The sentience of the mother embodies itself in the child in an immediate way ¹⁶⁵ (Dr Sachs). ¹⁶⁶

Another example of this is that humans die of a powerful fright and of joy. Hypochondria also belongs here. Distress becomes embodied, and becomes a chronic illness, a universal, enduring mood of corporeity. In these effects we have to establish the sentient totality, how the child in the mother's womb is [related to her] ~as accident to a substance; how the mother is the genius, this sentient totality outside the [child's] consciousness. The individual remains this sentient totality in the inseparability of its content from its corporeity, and yet he remains outside the determinations of his own consciousness. If pain enters this unity, the individual can be overwhelmed by the disproportion between what happens to him and what he otherwise is. This disproportion is then also an element in the sentient totality and the latter can be destroyed.~167 The cultivated spirit that has arisen above this genius and corporeity, consists in subjugating the corporeity (as we shall see in habit). Where this is not the case, and the human being remains more on the level of sentient totality, what has been said [about the rupture of totality] is the result. Suicide is something other; it is also a disproportion in consciousness that through the mediation of the will becomes dangerous to corporeity. 168 The complete disproportionality of this I contradiction has its effect, not directly, but through the decision not to live any longer.

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165. W adds: There is an example of two albino children. An elder brother of the albino children, who was a physician, relates the following story. His father was a clergyman in Steiermark, where one day an expectant mother went into a darkened barn. Outside there was snow and bright sunshine; she stepped from this bright light into the dark stall. There was a crack in this barn through which sunlight shone and concentrated as a point of light in a corner. In this corner sat a hare, and this ray of sunlight fell upon its eye. She saw only the shining eye of the hare. She stepped from the dazzling sunlight into the darkness, and her eyes fell in the darkness upon the shining eye of the hare. When the son was born, he was albino, and his sister was also.

166. [Ed.] Georg Tobias and Ludwig Sachs, Historia Naturalis duorum Leucaetheiopum auctoris ipsius et sororis eius (Sulzbach, 1812).

167. W adds: as a child in the mother's womb is an accident of the mother, and is pervaded through and through, so can such a content appear in its sentient totality, in this genius. (The genius is open to consciousness, open to imagination, genius is also consciousness, but often remains sentient totality; the indivisibility of its content and corporeity—open at the same time for other determinations). So it can be that this content cannot be endured by this consciousness, and it is disproportional to the sense of this consciousness, that this individual is overpowered through the disproportionality between what it is and what enters it. This disproportionality rends and destroys the sentient totality.

168. W adds: Cato the younger. Absolute contradiction. Roman republic ingrained in his character, and what was, was no longer a republic. He could not endure this contradiction.

Here in contrast, this disproportionality in consciousness does not pass over through mediation to a disproportion in corporeity, but is rather carried out immediately into corporeity.

This sentient totality is existent, and so falls under the category of being, also the category of quantity. The genius has a measure, and when its measure is exceeded, it perishes.

The third are the manifestations of the power of genius over its corporeity. There belongs here a kind of miracle that humans are healed through faith. For any type of illness it is possible that faith will not help. But in many cases [it does], namely, when nerves are paralyzed and contracted, the vegetative life is still present, but the fluidity of vitality has been interrupted and broken. There are examples—not at all rare—of lame people healed by the fire of faith, by magic, or through mere words. Many such miracle cures belong here. When the age becomes more rational, so these [cures] that once were efficacious become no longer effective. With educated people there is no longer such an intense certainty. But where there is such certainty, the concentrated feeling is the substantial force against the particular circumstances—i.e., the interruption or loss of function. In this gathering the whole vitality is concentrated, and the accidental can put up no resistance to this totality.

In §406 we speak about another topic, namely this sentient totality as a condition of illness. The main issue is the point of view that has to be established. The human being is the sentient totality, | and the latter is [...]¹⁶⁹ wherein the totality of what the human being is is contained. We have to compare the other, how the human being exists as conscious. The human being is this totality; as a conscious, self-possessed human being its actuality is present for it as an external world, to which it relates itself. The second point is that this totality itself is unfolded as external. In this unfolding everything stands in a rational connection, and in a manner familiar to the human being. In consciousness reflective self-control is the chief determination, so that I relate myself to everything in a mediated way.

What belongs to my actuality is only what in the external world is for me. It exists outwardly; on the other side I exist inwardly. \sim The relation of children to parents is external, but this relation is also the inner actuality of the children. \sim^{170}

^{169. [}Ed.] gap in original text.

^{170.} W reads: the children exist for the parents, the children exist in the parental affections and belong to their actuality. The children's love for their parents is also the inner actuality of the children and not external.

If the human being falls below conscious, rational life into mere sentience, he becomes ill. ¹⁷¹ His consciousness, his being turned towards the world, can become obstructed and a paralysis can arise. This can be a mere weakness of his subjectivity, the power of his subjective self-feeling. ¹⁷² The subject's self-feeling can be weaker; however the I hindrance of corporeity can also be more specific. This hindrance arises in the nervous life in general, and particularly in the visage of a face whose eyes have become entranced. When a person is blind, he knows that he cannot see, but he has no consciousness of defect. In this diseased condition the human being is in a rational dream—he is still outwardly directed, but in such a way that an obstruction has arisen.

The main phenomena must now be considered. The chief condition is 173 somnambulism. There is also a natural somnambulism. ¹⁷⁴ This condition appears in pregnancy, in the development of a young woman, and a few hours prior to death, etc. The previously mentioned obstruction in consciousness in the outwardly directed activity becomes a retrogression into the life of feeling. There one relates to the objective content as to something belonging to one's genius, one's feeling. One knows of it in an immediate way. Here belong the phenomena in which sight is fully obstructed, [as if] the eye had become frozen. Seeing is negated, and yet the common feeling can be present and effective. The human being is not sentient only through his eyesight. It may happen that the common feeling specifies itself to a sight without eyes. In this condition a person can have the feeling as though he had seen with his fingers, particularly when objects are placed on the chest cavity over his heart. It is feeling as such that assumes this form of sight, so that the organ of the eye is not necessary. In the same way, we do not have a special eye for blue and [another] for yellow; feeling in general collects itself, specifically as sight. There are several examples of this. Feeling specifies itself | to sight, and the organ of this species, the eye, is omitted. A center of cerebration is paralyzed. It has been said that it is wholly paralyzed and the ganglia system is substituted for it. This is credible;

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^{171.} W adds: the human being is the totality of his character. What he is, that is he. What he is as consciousness he directs towards the external, so that this content is to him the external world. He stands in mediation with this content. This content is the mediated world.

^{172.} W adds: self-feeling. In the power of his self-conscious self-feeling, he projects the content outwards, and relates to it as to an external world.

^{173.} W adds: is the condition of animal magnetism and.

^{174.} W adds: somnambulism. Sleepwalking also belongs here. Cataleptic condition, St Vitus dance also have similarities with it.

 \sim since cerebration outwards is paralyzed, spirit is immersed in itself in hypochondria. \sim^{175}

Witches have used magic potions or have smeared themselves with salves. These have been mostly of *Hyoseyamus niger* or *Digitalis*. Jean Baptiste Helmont conducted such an experiment on himself.¹⁷⁶ With a diet of *Aconitum napellus* it appeared to him as though his images were in the vicinity of his stomach, and far keener than usual. The raising of the images has been connected with feelings of delight.

A second phenomenon goes so far that one does not actually know its full scope, namely, a knowing of one's actuality insofar as it is not present as external world, but insofar as it is the content of genius, a merely inward knowing of what in waking one could know only through mediation.

When the human being stands opposed to the outer world, it is not only void of content, but the content of the world is the human being's own inner content. ~Family ties~177 constitute my actuality, and it is possible that if ~such a [family] bond, that exists as a single person, were torn from me, I would perish.~178 This bond is a reality in me; if one is thus torn away, if a family member dies, a branch of my life also dies and my actuality itself can be lost. It is not unusual that in such a loss the individual loses his own actuality, but the latter loss of actuality also occurs in a different way. The family tie constitutes my actuality. There can be people who, when in the external situation some change occurs, know about this in their own inwardness, their genius. So we have now to consider what exists in the form of presentiments. A man of forceful, sound self-feeling is bound to the usual condition of knowing. ~But there are several examples in which, removed at a distance, a subject suffered a loss, nevertheless experienced an immediate sensation of that loss, believing that he had heard a noise or some such thing.~180 As already pointed out, the root problem is how to conceive this.

^{175.} W reads: Brain activity is directed outwards. The plexis solaris, etc., ganglia of the lower body, have been called the brains of the lower body. And when the brain activity is paralyzed, the organism is sunk within itself, as it were, in hypochondria.

^{176. [}Ed.] Jean Baptiste van Helmont, Demens Idea, Ortus medicinae, Opera Omnia (Frankfurt, 1682), 262-72.

^{177.} W reads: Love, friendship, family.

^{178.} W reads: [if] this world (so far as my life as a whole stands in this union) dies, my whole inner actuality likewise perishes with it.

^{179.} W adds: there is an absolute connection between the two, [which constitute] one and the same reality.

^{180.} W reads: A kinsman can be distant from me. But his existence belongs to my actuality. There are examples in which kinfolk have died, and this death is immediately felt in the subject, who suffers loss and has immediate awareness of such loss. In other cases an individual believes

The genius is not bound to the mediations of ordinary reflective consciousness. Connected with this is the fact that sensations of objects can be present in the body, objects of which one otherwise can have awareness and knowledge only in a completely different way. A neurasthenic person can thus have sensations, when the reflective person must go through many mediations. Neurasthenics are people who have a feeling for whether they are over water or metal concealed in the ground. When they are walking over ground where there is water or metal, they feel in their body sickness, nausea and the like. (Campetti) 182

~This weakness is an obstruction of the connection with the external world. This weakness manifests itself in sensitivity | towards all sorts of things.~183 A further condition of such a weakness is that individuals have lacked independence to such an extent that they existed merely in a state of co-feeling with others. The sound individual is independent being-for-itself;184 the sensations of the soul are present in him as an individual. But in this weakness the feelings, the states of another are in the individual and in such an immediate way that the individual's own genius is not independent. ~Kluge's History of Magnetism contains several examples. These presentiments are very remarkable, and often one does not know what to make of them. Presentiments of illness are possible through the fact that illness does not suddenly arise but requires time in order to develop. So the genius is already capable of having a feeling of illness.~185

he has heard a noise. This hearing is clearly nothing external, but rather something in the subject. The facts cannot be denied.

^{181.} W adds: This is connected with the divining rod.

^{182. [}Ed.] Francesco Campetti, as reported by J. W. Ritter, Der Siderismus, vol. 1 (Tübingen, 1808). See also M. J. Petry, Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, vol. II, 260 ff.

^{183.} W reads: The general weakness of the organs is bound up with sensitivity to the outer world. When a human being is sick, his connection with the outer world is disrupted, and this is connected with eating and drinking; but he remains sensitive to air and warmth etc. The examples of the former feeling for the presence of water etc. were related to this type of weakness. Campetti brought by Ritter to Munich (Siderism), and found concealed ore. Servant of the lord of Salis.

^{184.} W reads: for itself, and its connection, its dedication etc., to others is present in it, but at the same time there is yet an independent existence; there are sensations that proceed from it as individual;

^{185.} W reads: Kluges' History of Magnetism is a useful book, in which the many symptoms of animal magnetism are gathered together in an arid but rational manner. Here is one: A doctor sympathized with his sister to such an extent that he fell into disquiet as soon as she became ill etc. Premonitions prior in time to one's own illnesses or the illnesses of another, with those with whom one stands in such exaggerated sympathy, are possible through the fact that in an individual an illness does not suddenly arise, where therefore the genius (the feeling of an individual in and of himself) already has a feeling of the illness, which the waking reflective

The further phenomena are those of animal magnetism. This name derives from the fact that in the first information about the phenomenon, metal, more precisely, magnets, were used. Mesmer first called attention to these phenomena. He began to use magnets. \sim Only later was it recalled that many earlier sorts of phenomena are connected with this one. \sim 186 In his first public appearances, | Mesmer had to endure a difficult history, and this affected him. He himself described an outrageous incident with Demoiselle Paradis. 188 Today magnetism has become discredited, and with justification, owing to its fraud and abuse. But this does not discredit the phenomena that had been noted. In clairvoyant persons there nevertheless occur many deceptions, and often they are spurred into actions of fraud and abuse by their vanity.

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A main phenomenon is falling into trance, although such sleep is not yet a proof that the magnetic cure is effective. ¹⁸⁹ If the condition presents itself in developed form, the person must fall into a trance. But this trance resembles the condition of sleepwalkers. In the latter case the sense of sight

human being does not feel. [Ed.] Carl Alexander Ferdinand Kluge, Versuch einer Darstellung des animalischen Magnetismus (Berlin, 1811).

^{186.} W reads: (this still today occurs with magnets with the sick. In the magnetic state there is generally strong sensitivity to metal.) Animal, because magnets are applied to the animal organism. Mesmer began his cures in the 1760s, and afterwards it was recalled that there were earlier cures in healing through the laying on of the hands, etc.

^{187. [}Ed.] Mesmer reported this incident with his patient Paradis in his Mémoire sur la découverte du magnétisme animal (Genéve, 1779), 41 ff.; German translation: Abhandlung über die Entdeckung des thierischen Magnetismus (Karlsruhe, 1781), 31 ff. Mesmer had Mademoiselle Paradis in his care at a sanatorium, where he attempted to cure her blindness, but in spite of initial success, he saw the long-term recovery threatened by the fact that the patient's father, out of ill will, forbade him from treating the slowly recovering patient in his home. The relapses of the patient were according to Mesmer the consequence of the interference of her father, who accused Mesmer of not succeeding in his cure, an allegation against which Mesmer had to defend himself.

^{188.} W adds: Paradis, who was blind from the age of 5 with amaurosis so that the eyes bulged out and moved convulsively:—suffered from many obstructions. Stark treated her vigorously for 10 years in vain. Mesmer restored her vision before thousands of witnesses. Incongruities as a result of this: The crudity of the father (who feared that the girl would lose her pension from the empress. And the mother who shoved the girl into the wall striking her head so that convulsions etc., followed and the girl again became blind. So that was in Vienna. Mesmer then went to Paris where he lectured about his method to an entire society. This society has broadened the inquiry and information concerning this condition further than Mesmer, who behaved inappropriately in many respects (he wanted to have a hospital in a grand style that would have cost several million pounds). Above all these men have made known and developed further this method of treatment.

^{189.} W adds: an individual can be treated a month long without [inducing] sleep and not without effect.

is paralyzed. However, they are aware of their surroundings, and so they quite correctly relate themselves towards the outer world. The residual feeling replaces sight and particularizes itself to this specific function that we designate as sight. 190 There is much in this sleepwalking that is entirely correct, but also much | deception and so misfortune often occurs. But the sleepwalker does much that is correct. The magnetic somnambulists are not dreaming ~such that there is an accidental connection of images;~191 rather they know of themselves what they are, but as feeling beings they know this through their genius. This knowledge is a theoretical knowing of the feeling genius in itself. They know of their genius, the actual human being. but this actual human being is isolated, without rational relation to the outer world. 192 By being so immersed in their emotional life, it follows that human beings are not spiritually or mentally independent, but depend on others, as an accident is related to a substance, as a child in its mother's womb. 193 They are such that they do not belong to themselves but exist in the power of an other. These are the two determinations that are connected here. More closely considered, it is known that one person is placed in such a condition by an other. There are also cases where this condition arises in a natural way. 194 The usual case is that people are put into such a condition through manipulation.

The human being in this condition exists only as feeling life [Gefühlsleben] which on the one hand is psychic, but on the other hand is identical with corporeity. Grasped in and affected through its 'psychic corporeity', the person can be brought under the power of another.

The subject to be magnetized is manipulated by using one's hands. This manipulation is not indecent. No touching is necessary. This manipulation is the initial stage; the influence is physiologically difficult to determine. The production of heat or electricity are not appropriate categories. The chest cavity over the heart is very important. If the person is very sentient he

^{190.} W adds: sometimes night walkers hear [others] speaking, sometimes not; they hear music, sometimes correctly, sometimes not; they reply to questions, but often produce confusions. Mixtures of correctness and incorrectness. Vision is paralyzed.

^{191.} W reads: they sleep also. There is in their representations not an accidental connection, that would exist without understanding as in dreams.

^{192.} W adds: without the alertness of the senses and without waking relations to this its actuality as a surrounding world external to him.

^{193. [}Ed.] Cf. Friedrich Hufeland, Über Sympathie (Weimar, 1811), 108f.: 'There is in organic nature only one relation in which sympathy, in analogy with animal magnetism, expresses the highest degree of dependence of one individual on another, namely, that which we perceive in the indivisible connection of the unborn infant with the mother...'

^{194.} Wadds: conditions of illness, especially with women in the years of their development; women in pregnancy.

needs less manipulation, merely moving the hands can often induce sleep, and stronger manipulations often produce convulsions. A French school has refused manipulation altogether, ¹⁹⁵ claiming that it is merely a matter of will and belief. ¹⁹⁶ The person must be manipulated from the head down and with serious intent. Manipulations from below to above can also introduce convulsions. It may also turn out that nothing happens—no effects, no trance, no second sight or clairvoyance. The one being magnetized may feel warmth in the parts over which the magnetizing hand moves. The effect is an enhancement that can include the sex drive.

Finally the trance is induced, and if the person is only receptive, this receptivity does not at all depend on their will, but is something completely involuntary. This trance can be the whole effect and it can complete the healing by and for itself. ¹⁹⁷ The patient becomes accustomed to the period of the trance. The main effect is the trance itself. In this trance-sleep, the human being is restored to its substantial unity with itself. ¹⁹⁸ In this trance clairvoyance can also be produced. This has created a sensation. Magnetism is one of those things that one must see in order to believe. It often happens that enlightened people who have witnessed magnetism still do not believe it.

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Clairvoyance is immersion in inwardness. Mesmer did not yet know this. One of his students discovered it by accident. Usually clairvoyance arises after being magnetized on several days, and then the patients begin not to speak, but only to answer. To be sure, they answer only the magnetizer or someone with whom they are in rapport. The material element stands out, and rapport can be produced through metal, but silk in contrast is isolating [fails to produce rapport]. The question is, what do they see in this clairvoyance? ¹⁹⁹ Its sphere is [restricted to] this individuality in general. They are this actual individual and only this; the sphere of clairvoyance extends no further. It is absurd to believe that this is a higher condition

^{195. [}Ed.] Cf. Kluge, Versuch einer Darstellung des animalischen Magnetismus (Berlin, 1811), §47.

^{196.} W adds: This school transfixed the patient with the eyes only and said, croyez et reveillez (believe and awaken).

^{197.} W adds: The person must be put in this state at the same time on other days. If that is not done in the same time period, the person feels restless, in grief and anxiety; this can progress to convulsions.

^{198.} W adds: is led back to the [substantial] unity of the all-pervading life process.

^{199.} W reads: What they see in themselves is what they know only from themselves, and (2) they know what is going on in the mind of the magnetizer—the sphere of that which they see in themselves is

in which higher revelations can occur.²⁰⁰ The trance is a depression of the human, not its elevation or enhancement. The human being becomes conscious of the truth only in the activity of thinking. Religious people who are inwardly noble and compassionate indeed speak freely and can utter deep and remarkable things, but this does not transcend or exceed their individuality. Plato expressed the correct view of the matter. Divination²⁰¹ ($\mu \alpha \nu \tau \epsilon \iota \alpha$) counted for the ancients as something divine. The genius of Socrates is the same. He found himself often in such a condition, and his genius belonged to this condition. What his genius revealed to him is no special wisdom, but particular things that concerned only himself or his friends. Deleuze, a doctor in France,²⁰² maintains that in clairvoyance knowledge is oriented to the knowledge of the waking state. One possesses | no science except the one that is acquired by study. ~Plato says concerning divination~203 that with it the irrational element becomes to a certain extent capable of partaking in truth: if God had created the liver and given it the power of divination, this would be a sufficient proof that no sensible, level-headed person would be capable of partaking of a divine feeling except in sleep and with a demented understanding.²⁰⁴

Plato was aware that divination is something inferior that pertains to the non-rational soul. The main point is that they [clairvoyants] name their illnesses, especially chronic nervous disorders that are not yet fully developed. 205 Also, rheumatism, toothaches, yield to magnetism. Remarkably, it seems to have an effect on the maladies of menstruation. The somnambulists especially know how to specify these disorders and it is easy to admit that they discover deficiencies. They describe these conditions, but in an entirely ordinary manner, not in the manner of one who understands anatomy. Then they indicate the remedy for their disease. Cautious doctors have not only allowed themselves to accept these remedies, but have also prescribed cures and asked their patients whether they approve them. The remedy stands

^{200. [}Ed.] Hufeland, Über Sympathie, 'The words of somnambulists are not prophecies of oracles.... One should not regard somnambulists as infallible or inspired beings that could be used for experiencing supernatural and concealed matters' (47).

^{201.} W reads: prophet (like Pythia).

^{202. [}Ed.] J. P. F. Deleuze, Histoire critique du magnétisme animal, 2 vols. (Paris, 1813–19).

^{203.} W reads: Plato expressed it thus: (Ancients believed in prophecy, not only of the oracles, but of every human that could find himself in such a condition, and they believed also in the prophecy of the demented and those in sleep).

^{204. [}Ed.] Plato, Timaeus, 71-2.

^{205. [}Ed.] Cf. Kluge, Versuch einer Darstellung des animalischen Magnetismus, §§137 ff. and §§343 ff.

in a necessary connection with the disease, and it is easy to admit²⁰⁶ that they can have a feeling of the appropriateness [of the cure]. With the giving of treatment another issue arises. These treatments can be extremely varied according to different countries and methods of curing. The main point is that the somnambulist on the one side expresses his own feelings, but on the other side, he knows what is in the imagination of the doctor. The means of cure are for the most part determined by the method of therapy of the doctor, and often by what they see the doctor prescribe, but also [they include] home remedies, etc. | In particular the somnambulists state how long the illness will last, also how long they will sleep; nevertheless they often deceive themselves in these matters.

Clairvoyants also know about distant objects.²⁰⁷ The individual is actual, and to his actuality belongs everything that concerns him. Since clairvoyants know their actuality, and their actuality is this concentration of feeling, ~they know of all this in an immediate way~. 208 This is particularly true of blood friends.²⁰⁹ The sphere of actuality extends also to persons that interest one, belong to one's environment, but extends further to such objects that belong to one's circle and of which one can therefore know in one's emotional life. Such stories can be found in the works of Johannes von Müller, Briefe, 6 vols. 210 Here belongs the phenomenon of 'second sight' of the Scottish, which should be compared with Kieser's Journal.²¹¹ Also the prophet Müller of Heidelberg can be mentioned. 212 Afterwards he became discredited by numerous questions and the like. The occasion of his capability is noteworthy. At the death of his father he threw himself on top of his father, and with the most inner fervor prayed to God. The father was awakened, and this highest effort, this positing of the soul outside of itself, had fixed this predominantly emotional life [Gefühlsleben] in him.

The somnambulists also have this capacity but mischief is often done with it. One form is still to be mentioned. Clairvoyants very often speak of

^{206.} W adds: Gmelin in Heilbronn and Wienold in Bremen.

^{207. [}Ed.] Cf. Kluge, op. cit., §§159 ff.

^{208.} W reads: so they know of this without the mediation through which one otherwise knows of such objects existing outside of oneself. They know in an immediate way.

^{209.} W adds: the same blood. Family is an ethical, but also a natural unity. Actuality of the one is substantially included in the substantial actuality of the other.

^{210. [}Ed.] Johannes von Müller, Sämtliche Werke, Part 6, ed. J. G. Müller (Tübingen, 1811), 428 ff.

^{211. [}Ed.] D. G. Kieser, Das zweite Gesicht der Einwohner der westlichen Inseln Schottlands, in Archiv für tierischen Magnetismus, vol. VI, issue 3 (1820).

^{212. [}Ed.] Hegel learned about Müller in a letter from Carové; cf. Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, vol. II (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1981), No. 379.

a protective spirit of a deceased or revered friend.²¹³ Generally the mood of the clairvoyant is serious, ethical, often very religious. The body must fight through the crisis | of its disorder. This struggle is often united with a struggle of good and evil. Thus often the person enters into the innermost core of his morality and fights the battle through. And the experience is that often the patient returns to himself out of this crisis more calm, milder and better.

10

The other issue is the connection between the magnetizer and the one magnetized.²¹⁴ The latter is no independent individual; in his emotional life he is in the power of another. This is a condition of weaker personality, of unfreedom. The magnetized one is in rapport with the magnetizer; he hears only him. To be touched by others can affect the patient very unpleasantly to the point of paralysis. They not only hear only the magnetizer, but sense him even at a distance. He can be hours away and nevertheless can induce a trance in them through imagination and orientation of the will. It is possible that they sense him in the same way as the above examples have shown. ~The patients have a sense, a feeling, of the states, illnesses of the doctor.~215 It is also peculiar that in waking they know nothing of what they have heard while in a clairvoyant state. The reverse is also true. Further, they feel the disorders of others with whom they have been placed in rapport. ~This feeling of the illnesses of others is something remarkable, and is carried still further: they are placed in rapport with pieces of clothing and the like. 216 The so-called 'baquet' belongs here, partly because many magnetized are placed in rapport, partly because they are brought into connection with a box etc. | Puységur²¹⁷ magnetized a tree like that.²¹⁸ Mesmer especially established rapport with the sick.

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Further, they often have a sense of the ideas of the doctor. The clair-voyant's knowledge of many objects consists in reading off the ideas of the doctor, as it were. It is thus that they read and express the ideas of

^{213. [}Ed.] Eschenmayer gives examples of visions of such tutelary spirits in his *Psychologie in drei Terlen* as empirical, pure, and applied, §283.

^{214.} W adds: insofar as a person is in this state, he is in a relationship like that of a child to its mother in its mother's womb.

^{215.} W reads: They sense also the (depression) illness of the magnetizer. If he is in a bad mood, so are they.

^{216.} W adds: Count Puysegur. He consulted a somnambulist about his epilepsy, and the latter also became epileptic. Clairvoyant people have been placed in rapport with the clothing of a woman, and she determined their illnesses.

^{217. [}Ed.] A. M. J. C. Puységur, Mémoires pur servir à l'histoire et l'établissiment du magnétisme animal (Paris, 1820).

^{218.} W adds: from its limbs strings lowered and from this throngs of people were healed.

others.²¹⁹ It must also be pointed out that clairvoyants do not always see well: sometimes they see keenly, but often not at all.

In such a condition the human being is a feeling totality [die fühlende Totalität]. Everything that happens in an unconscious way belongs in this sphere. One's genius is one's inner fate for which one cannot give an account. The genius often allows one to feel very different conditions for which one can offer no explanation. A difference arises between this feeling individuality and the self-conscious individuality. This difference falls within my entire actuality, and I can know of this in a way that contradicts my self-conscious individuality.

Also, deceptions are often found in the sphere of possibility of this condition. The individual has insight into himself in an immediate way, but it is difficult to distinguish what I he sees in himself and what he sees in the magnetizer and expresses of the latter.²²⁰ A second source of deceptions is that the somnambulent subject has his impartiality disturbed. As already noted, it is usually the rule that the somnambulent subject is milder, more ethical. ~But similarly, in a psychical respect there can arise a struggle between the subject and his better self. The condition thus often manifests an elevation, enhancement.~221 Nevertheless the somnambulent subject can become muddled in his purity, can become vain; his desires can become whims. None of this transcends the [face] value that it has. All sorts of whims can, if they are realized, validate the idea that all of these whims are fulfilled in this [fantasy]. As with madness, various precautions need to be taken here, so that other people are not bothered by arbitrariness and their treatment impaired. It often happens that they find pleasure when they know things that cannot be known in a rational manner and are admired. They do not always see clearly, so it is often necessary that one must request that they look carefully. Through such

^{219.} W adds: he asked about a female friend, and she said where does the friend live?, and how and what? How can you see anything in this way? When I look at such a house, when I am asked about it, I was led there by a ray of light that proceeds from the questioner, through this I am united with the questioner. This ray of light with him brings me to the place mentioned in the discourse. My own attention and yours contributes much. Without attention I see only superficially. If another asks, he must ask with seriousness and have trust, otherwise I become confused.

^{220.} W adds: Many astonishing things in many phenomena thus fall away.

^{221.} W reads: It is his best part that arises as feeling in him. Physical illness is merely the struggle of the health of the body against disease. Without health there would be only death. Health, the harmonious condition, must exist as the basic condition. The same is true of the psychological dimension. Also here the better self must win a struggle against the evil disposition. Therefore there is an elevation and enhancement of the ethical-religious disposition.

instigation the power of vision is increased, but it can also easily be overstimulated and in addition, vanity can bring them to express what they have not actually seen, and so that they even fall into trickery. The mere overstimulation in one direction has the disadvantage that the cure is delayed. They take to brooding; the isolation of feeling becomes I weaker in the transition to recovery; thus, the stimulus delays and retards the cure.

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The knowledge of this condition has been exhausted. Something new is not to be expected. We turn now to something different. We have to forget the concrete and \sim consider the form of our object as sentient individuality in general [Gefühlsindividualität überhaupt]. From this general form of sentient individuality, another form of sentient individuality is to be distinguished, namely, self-feeling [Selbstgefühl], which means that the individual feels himself entirely in this abstraction of the self.

B. Self-Feeling

§407 We see individuality as sentient of itself. It is essentially self and this self becomes the object of feeling. I The individuality is being-for-itself, and this point [of unity] becomes the content. This is self-feeling [Selbstgefühl]. Here we have to consider two dimensions; first, the self-feeling as such. The individual senses himself, and to this feeling belongs the exclusion of particularity. He takes the feeling back into himself. The determinacy is an ideal. It is a determination from which the feeling subject frees himself precisely because he feels it. In this liberation he is not impeded by the determination, but exists in himself. He posits the content of the determination as negative, as abstracted from himself.~224

- 222. W adds: When the healing begins, the separation of the emotional life from the rational conscious life is gradually reduced, the isolation becomes weaker, and the capacity to see clairvoyantly is also diminished. When in the process of recovery the vision is constantly overstimulated, the cure is delayed.
 - 223. W adds: so there is nothing new in Kieser's Journal.
- 224. W reads: The form [of self-feeling] is the total individuality as feeling. The feeling is something felt, and this is the entire individuality. The entire individuality is sentient individuality. Sentient individuality in general, that is the standpoint. Thus we distinguish B. Sentient individuality [Gefühlsindividualität] as self-feeling [Selbstgefühl] or that the individual feels itself, to feel the self. To sense and to sense something. Sentience, determinacy [Bestimmtheit] in general, recalls the outer etc. Individual as sensing itself.—Individual is as individual essentially a self, and this self is again essentially the content that is sensed. Individual as being-for-itself. It is for itself. The being itself = subjectivity in general; this point of unity of the individual must become [the] content.—The second is therefore self-feeling. Self-feeling as such: the individual

This form of self-feeling can also shift and change into disorder. Since the already self-conscious individual is considered here, it can happen that he, the concrete human being, comes to a standstill \sim in the one form of feeling, and he remains in self-feeling in opposition to his rational actuality. \sim^{225} This condition is dementia.

Self-feeling is the sentient individuality sensing its being-for-itself. In the determinate feeling it reflects itself out of the particularity into itself. This reflection into self is the proof of one's self-worth and self-assurance. When the self is actual these particularities are ideal [and fluid].²²⁶

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Here is to be noted an element of selfhood that is added to and qualifies sentience [Empfindung]. This element has the narrower specification | that will be retained in our exposition. This now becomes the content that is posited in us as being. Pieces of information are finitudes, this content remains in us, we preserve it when it is posited in us as being. As self-feeling, we are identical with our corporeity. The former qualitative content can be in us only so far as we are the self-feeling of this qualitative being.²²⁷ In old age one does not remember so well as in youth. The body has become weaker. With greater power of self-feeling, such content is inscribed in us in the bronze table of our self-feeling and we retain it. This corporeity is to be taken as universal, not as an isolated point or as an organ of the soul. This is the moment in self-feeling that remembers the determinations inscribed in our being, that become our possession, and are made fast against disappearance through the fact that they now belong to our being. This being belongs to us only in the condition of feeling. This preservation in memory, the fact that it belongs to the corporeity of our being, appears in many ways.

feels itself. This form in general is that it feels itself, to which belongs that it feels itself by excluding the particularity, or that it has returned to itself and is at home with itself.—The determination, particularity, is something suspended, something from which the feeling subject at the same time frees itself in its feeling—and so it turns back to itself and feels itself. Its self is the abstract point of unity of individuality. The fact that this point is a self constitutes the abstraction.

^{225.} W reads: in which one form of self-feeling, which is a special determination, does not become master but withdraws into itself; in [this] self-feeling an opposition remains to the reasonable, rational actuality.

^{226.} W adds: (not to feel itself, not be at one with oneself). This determinate content is not excluded but preserved, posited in the being of the soul. We are ourselves as returning to ourselves in a given determination.

^{227.} W adds: Such come to us so far as we ourselves are beings—as we ourselves have abstract spirituality. Feelings etc. pass on and die out of the stream of universality.

In illness something emerges that is not under the power of our conscious actuality.²²⁸ This [unconscious] dimension, which is preserved in memory, can be erased by a blow, etc. Conversely, illnesses can again evoke many things that are outside our [conscious] power, and that otherwise could not be called forth again at will. What is thus in our [unconscious] being we cannot know. One forgets what one learns. Afterwards this is posited in one's being and can be awakened again under special conditions. The connections with corporeity reveal such examples, but as previously noted. one must not imagine the being of the soul has material extension. This self-feeling is therefore the return of the self into itself and has the determination of being the theoretical aspect, [while] the practical dimension is the feeling that arises from the satisfaction of what we want. According to this practical aspect, the determination begins from within, opens itself up in us and through it the I contradiction is posited in us. We and this determination. But at the same time it is affected with negation, namely, it has not yet returned to us. The next is that in self-feeling itself there is division, a determination against the totality of self-feeling itself. Such desire is a disunion in us. This disunion also exists as an embodiment, a corporeity. In passion I am outside myself, that is, my entire totality sinks into a one-sided particularity, although this particularity is my own. I have fallen into a state of restrictedness [Beschränkheit]. This disunion [of passion] is also corporeity, a corporeity divided against itself. In satisfaction, my self-separation and restrictedness are overcome, 229 and this overcoming is both mental and physical. In satisfaction I make myself healthy physically just as much as I come to myself spiritually. This is the self feeling as such: in it I restore my totality. I am divided; I am totality and I am particularity, and the satiated self-feeling has returned to itself out of this particularity. This is self-feeling: I obtain the totality through overcoming the particularity. I make that particularity ideal, and I am at home with myself [qua totality].

The disorder of this dimension of self-feeling is dementia. Dementia is a condition that affects the self-feeling [totality], it is an illness of the self-feeling. Insofar as it is a division [Urteil], it is the being-for-self of the soul in opposition to its particularity. Dementia is illness of spirit, but it is also a physical illness and this inseparability [of the physical and the spiritual] is precisely its characteristic. If dementia were simply spiritual, it would

^{228. [}Ed.] Here Hegel hints at an unconscious mind, which has both theoretical and practical dimensions, namely, wish-fulfillments. This is possibly the first nineteenth century theory of the unconscious. See Berthold-Bond, Hegel's Theory of Madness, for a discussion of Hegel's anticipation of Freud.

^{229.} W adds: and falls away; I return to my totality.

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be | folly and banality.²³⁰ It is difficult to determine its boundaries. One can easily pass into folly owing to trivial interests. Dementia belongs to the division [Urteil] of self-feeling; more precisely, division, disruption, is precisely what this illness does, namely, the human being does not move beyond this disunion. [In dementia] one's particular inclination is not controlled by the totality of self-feeling. The self-possessed human being arranges every particular feeling in a totality. Something particular goes through the head. Since he has his self-feeling in his totality, and since he possesses the feeling of his actuality, he arranges his self-feeling in that totality. The human being possesses a capacity for self-esteem. This self-esteem oscillates between meekness in which one values oneself too little, and arrogance into which it can just as easily pass. Self-esteem is thus conceived in this oscillating condition, without the human being possessing the right measure or balance in every instant. A person can possess more determinate inclinations such as actual pride, but there too he will control their expression in some way. He knows how it goes and how it stands in the world, and he will keep these inclinations to himself. A human being can be completely perverse and yet outwardly bearable. His rational consciousness restrains such inclinations, always lives in this composure, and keeps them hidden in itself. This is his totality, his consciousness of his actuality. He has a feeling of this actuality.

Now it can happen that the human being becomes ill, not only that he has the same imaginary ideas and keeps them to himself, but also that these pretensions that he has now themselves acquire a fixed corporeity. Earlier we have spoken of embodiment, corporeity. ~Dementia also has an embodiment, a corporeity; it belongs to | this individual, and thus has an existent [somatic] aspect. In a self-possessed consciousness this particular being [somatic aspect] is taken back into self; the somatic aspect is overcome. ~231 But disorder arises when this particular becomes fixed in an existent, somatic way. A somatic illness as such means that an organ or system acquires an activity which hinders the processes of the entire organism.

^{230.} W adds: banality = (humans who are immersed in the particularities of interests, of the body, can never raise themselves out of this immersion to the level of spirit, and cannot understand spiritual interests because they are not their own, can easily appear [to be] truly in the condition of folly).—

^{231.} W reads: that the human being has desires, etc., is not only spiritual, but belongs to the self as this [particular] self, and so it has an existent dimension. Since now it has an existent side, in a healthy soul this existence is taken back into the universal health.—satisfaction is this, to make oneself healthy at the same time, not only to attain one's will in general, but also to acquire one's corporeity.

 \sim Likewise in self-feeling a blockage [Knoten] can arise \sim^{232} against which the totality of self-feeling can do nothing because this blockage has become somatic.

The totality of self-possessed [rational]²³³ consciousness is disrupted and \sim a passion or disposition becomes fixed against the objective coherent

232. W reads: so it is still possible in general self-feeling, because it has a somatic aspect, that a disorder arises, and this blockage in the corporeity of self-feeling is also a blockage in the totality of representation,

233. W reads: self-possessed, at home with itself, rational [beisichseienden verständigen]. [Ed.] In this Walter note, Hegel plays upon German terms such as beisichseienden, besonnen, which means bei + sinnen, and verständigen. These word-plays and cross references are impossible to reproduce literally. This Walter note makes some important terminological connections: Hegel's favorite expression bei sich in anderen zu sein, being at home with self in another, articulates the self as a complex dialectical totality in which the vital unity pervades all its dimensions, determinations, and members. Hegel maintains that just as a condition of disease presupposes a prior concept of organic health, so dementia can only be understood on the presupposition of a common human nature in a condition of health and wholeness, that is at once self-possessed (besonnen) and beisichseiende, being at home with self in one's determinations. The self-possessed person is not free from contrasts, oscillations, and anxieties of self-esteem mentioned previously, but manages to hold them more or less together in some sort of equilibrium, which the German term besonnen, bei + sinnen, expresses. In English we say that such a person is 'in his right mind', exhibits 'presence of mind', is 'level-headed', is self-possessed, i.e., not 'prone to extremes' or to 'going off the deep end', i.e., 'sensible'. Note that here 'sensible' [bei+ sinnen] is not opposed to reason or the rational (as in epistemological discussions), but is equivalent to it, i.e., 'sensible' means 'reasonable', and reasonable means 'self-possessed'. These meanings Hegel expresses by the terms Besonnenheit, besonnen, which are German renderings of Sophrosyne, which is one of virtues in Plato's Republic, usually translated as temperance or moderation. Dementia presents itself in symptoms that reveal that the equilibrium of the self implicit in the above expressions is disrupted, deranged, demented, i.e., the demented are no longer self-possessed, i.e., are said to be 'not in their right mind', are said 'not to exhibit presence of mind,' are 'not level-headed', 'go off the deep end', and 'are not sensible or rational'. The disruption in their Selbstgefühl or subjective totality, in turn hinders the acknowledgment of a common world or objective totality. Because the demented are inwardly disrupted and divided against themselves, they are unable to experience fully, and not only project their Selbstgefühl on the life-world, but confuse it with the life-world. Doubtless it will occur to the reader that many otherwise normal people, especially scientists, politicians, theologians, psychologists and philosophers, are sometimes said 'not to be in their right mind.' Hegel himself refers to the 'splendid absent-mindedness of Archimedes' and to madness in the English courts below. Michel Foucault generalizes this point concerning the continuum between madness and sanity as human possibilities when he cites Pascal in the preface to Madness and Civilization: 'Men are so necessarily mad that not to be mad would be another form of madness.' While Foucault thus quotes Pascal against the Cartesian separation of reason from madness, the quotation in fact articulates the central point in Hegel's appropriation and philosophical grounding of Pinel's reforming approach to dementia that acknowledges the rationality and humanity of the demented. Hegel conceives human being as a self-organizing totality. Only such a self-organizing totality is capable of both health and disease, both sanity and dementia. A stone does not have these capabilities or possibilities. Foucault fails to include or examine Hegel's treatment of totality.~²³⁴ Clairvoyance is distinct from dementia. In clairvoyance the entire actuality is in inwardness; the waking consciousness is only different in form from that totality in its inwardness. In dementia the self-feeling is divided in respect to its content; self-feeling exists in one-sided opposition to its totality. The distinction can also mean that the self-feeling is an empty daydream and does not come to the point of action—a lack of interest in and | a deficit in reaction to the external world or apathy. The totality of rational consciousness does not direct the activity [which becomes] a disquieted movement. This is absent-mindedness and twaddle—the complete indifference to action therefore, or also action, but with shallowness and vanity of self-feeling.

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This is the chief determination, that this condition is equally mental and physical, that corporeity is an essential moment. Whether the physical or the mental constitutes the beginning is difficult to say, or impossible to determine.²³⁵ Often one finds nothing abnormal in the anatomy of demented people; in other cases many abnormalities are present. Often one finds arthritic or gouty nodes. In such cases the entire abstract corporeity is in play, therefore often nerve disorders. Bodily illness is often present in the depressed nervous system, in the lymphatic system and skeleton. But often illness is not noticeable in the merely vegetative system. Two points must be noted: (1) the forms of dementia and (2) the treatment of dementia.

As for the various forms of dementia, this condition is infinitely varied, but the common feature is that a particularity becomes fixed and is not subjected to the totality of reasonable, sensible consciousness. The form of a fixed idea is contingent, accidental, and often has no connection with what originates the dementia. ²³⁶

human being and dementia in his survey in *Madness and Civilization*. Foucault avoids the ontology that the continuity thesis of reason and madness he here invokes presupposes. Instead Foucault's view is that madness is an extrinsic labelling, a social construction. In rejecting the medical model of disease, ignoring ontology, and restricting his account of madness to extrinsic labelling, Foucault can give no plausible account of what it is in the human being that oppression violates or that of which dementia is a derangement and distortion. See Berthold-Bond, *Hegel's Theory of Madness*, 2, but especially ch. 8, 177–216.

^{234.} *W reads*: the subject throws itself into some inclination or other and clings to a false representation of this inclination, opposing it to the objective coherence of his actuality,—this solidification is at the same time essentially something existent, corporal.

^{235.} W adds: for even to madness belongs the vulnerability of the body to illness. This disposition is present in abstract self-feeling as such, so far as self-feeling is a universal corporeity.

^{236.} W adds: When the predominant feeling is one of pride, there are an infinite series of notions that the demented possess. cf. Mah, X, Fr II, God. If hypochondria is predominant:—anxiety, considering oneself as spiritually stricken by a fear of hens. If the feeling of corporal

The various types of dementia include imbecility, folly and madness proper, or frenzy.²³⁷ Imbecility in general. Under this belongs imbecility as such. It is very often the final form of dementia. It is the merely vegetative existence without interest. This condition is wretched and incurable. To this belongs cretinism, that appears to be bound to a particular locality (Herr von Buch says that wherever there are cretins there are no hailstorms).²³⁸ With cretinism there is often connected goiter, contorted members, stupid facial expressions, inarticulate sounds etc. There are other examples of this most extreme dullness. There are many gradations. Pinel has written the best book about dementia, and Reil's Natural Philosophical Formalism is not better in any respect.²³⁹ The best is found in Pinel. The psychic method in particular was founded by Pinel. This method was first given stimulus in Germany by Langermann. 240 Pinel includes the more interesting examples. He relates the case of a 28-year-old imbecilic young woman.²⁴¹ Her dementia was derived from a terror her mother suffered during a pregnancy. The young woman did not move, speak, appeared to be nearly without feeling or desire. Every morning she manifested seizures of wild rage, although afterwards she manifested feelings of remorse.

The first [type of dementia] is thus imbecility as such. It has been assumed that one fourth of the population of asylums are imbeciles. ²⁴² There is also a type of imbecility that is a kind of catalepsy. Also a transitory imbecility, a complete inability | to be affected, utter inactivity. An Englishman in this condition was cured by confronting him with an opposite image. To this general form there also belongs a dispersed absent-mindedness that is often the beginning of dementia. (There is also a splendid absent-mindedness

burdens dominates: [there is] a hay wagon with four horses in the stomach. If feeling is located in the feet: feet of glass. These particular forms are more or less indifferent and have no connection with the immediate occasion of dementia.

^{237.} W adds: The general condition is spitefulness and malevolence, but also one of misfortune.

^{238. [}Ed.] Christoph Leopold von Buch, 1774-1853, geologist and paleontologist.

^{239. [}Ed.] Philippe Pinel (1745-1826), Philosophische-medizinische Abhandlung über Geisteverriungen oder Manie (Vienna, 1801). ET A Treatise on Insanity (New York: Hafner, 1962). J. Christoph Reil, Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Geisteszerrütungen (Halle, 1803).

^{240. [}Ed.] Johann Gottfried Langermann (1768–1832); from 1805 on he was director of a psychiatric institution at Bayreuth.

^{241. [}Ed.] Pinel, op. cit., 321 ff.

^{242.} W adds: In good institutions those considered incurable are separated. The imbeciles in particular belong to this group.

that accompanies deep meditation, and perceives nothing outside itself—Archimedes.) The absent-mindedness that becomes dementia is an immersion in oneself, an inattentiveness towards the external environment. This daydreaming often becomes dementia. Twaddle, gibberish, are the opposites of absent-minded distraction and imbecility.

Twaddle is this outer-directedness, a being driven towards external activity without any context or connection, without this activity being under the control of the self.²⁴³ There are several levels of twaddle, and the boundaries are difficult to determine because the patient often still is capable of conducting his affairs.

The second form is dementia or folly proper, distraction with a special content. This is an error, an imaginary idea that contradicts the actuality of the subject, a self-feeling that is arrested in one respect, ~and this fixed aspect contradicts its actuality. The ethical human being is master over the evil genius that the dementia releases, and that posits such a passion in a fixed manner.~244 The imaginary notions | correspond to this fixed passion and inclination. They are errors concerning one's own worth, etc., but are posited by this special feeling that has become fixed. The forms of these notions are contingent.²⁴⁵ In particular the passions that occur here are arrogance and vanity. These become fixed, and since they are not subordinate to the understanding, the result is dementia. The passion of love that is bound up with physical illness and weakness, is often a source of dementia. Dreams of blessedness are often nothing other than a reaction against a loss or misfortune, or because some persons are not allowed to have what they desire. But since they are unable to shrug off this loss from their inner reality, these dreams contradict them and their actual

^{243.} W adds: as having self-feeling in concrete ends and purposes. The most striking image of chaos has been: all [the patient's] ideas and speech are incoherent, etc. His outbursts are confined to childish outbreaks because he cannot summon himself to anger. Thus, drivel at the highest level. [Ed.] If the patient were self-present and self-controlled instead of in a condition of self-division that, according to Hegel, constitutes dementia, then there would be self-feeling in his concrete ends.

^{244.} W reads: so that this special self-feeling has no proper place in the totality. Folly is bound up with the alertness of a demented, irrational consciousness. In human hearts there are the beginnings of all evil passions. The rational, ethical person is the one who restrains and locks up the evil genius. But the main point is that the ethical person is master over the evil disposition and allows it no room. In the condition of folly this evil genius is released, set free. Such inclination and passion isolates itself; such evil disposition so far as it is not mastered by totality is dementia.

^{245.} W adds: of infinite variety and arbitrariness, hundreds and thousands of high-minded vanities and no two representations are alike.

circumstances. 246 Then come the ideas, the contingent fantasies. Misfortune has very often placed humans in the condition of dementia; during the French Revolution many became demented. Even good fortune can make humans demented. For one calls that good fortune, if everything happens as one wishes it, and where this happens from youth on, it can lead to dementia. ~Therefore fantasy often presents itself as a substitute for failed hopes~. 247 There are also demented persons | with severe depression and ~complete despair, who have only a feeling of negativity~248 and who live in continual anxiety and fear. They appear to be surrounded by enemies who do them harm. Religious fanaticism is also a frequent source of dementia (it is said that these make up one fourth to one fifth of all those in asylums). 249 Images of the torments of hell have put many in the asylum. 250 Arrogant pride frequently assumes a religious form and becomes the intention to reform the world. Another form is hypochondria (melancholy), a sinking within oneself with the idea that one has no worth, and likewise a disbelief in the love and the honesty of people. It is a sense of one's negativity, of one's own powerlessness that is often mixed up with religious negativity and so manifests itself [as fatalism]. 251 Further, there is a disbelief in the results one could accomplish through one's own action. Melancholy is [often] bound up with inaction, and often bound up with a suicidal drive²⁵² such that the will cannot resist this tendency, and that, if one does not commit the deed, it is only because one is prevented from doing so by others.

246. W adds: and since the idea remains thus fixed against their actuality, the representation develops that they are in actuality what they would not be, and have what they did not demand.

247. W reads: A person who has always had his own way from youth falls easily into a rage over a resistance or a contradiction. It can later happen that since he believes himself to be infringed upon everywhere, that he falls into folly. Bad education! The follies, fantasies that the person has before him are frequently a substitute supplied by the imagination for a loss in actuality. And they appear as unfortunate only so far as what they project in imagination is not granted or obeyed.

248. W reads: loss and misfortune, which throw humans back into disconsolateness, only into the one feeling of misfortune, the negativity.

249. [Ed.] Cf. Pinel, Philosophische-medizinische Abhandlung über Geisteverriungen oder Manie, 78-81.

250. W adds: Often out of religious madness they commit acts of murder in order to save the other soul, or in order to be executed, or in order to gain time during trial to prepare themselves for death.

251. W adds: which the religious representation often connects with being destined to eternal damnation.

252. W reads: the suicidal drive can be present, since the human being is fully conscious, and since he has in himself a self-negating drive in a certain way,

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The third form of dementia is madness, mania, or frenzy. This is partly an enduring condition and partly a symptom of dementia. It can result from physical causes. I ~Wild rage is a symptom of many forms of dementia and appears only in brief periods.~253 Here we note the relations of the demented to others. They are often malicious and special attention must be directed to this circumstance during the treatment. This disposition to harm others can become a literal bloodthirstiness, which can be connected with a love for the individual whom they feel compelled to murder along with an abhorrence of such actions and a consciousness of their injustice. The malice of the demented that can advance to frenzy often comes from the fact that they feel themselves injured and mistreated, so that their rebellious outrage increases to utter malice, a condition in which it is difficult to win their trust again. It is to be noted that apart from the seizures, the demented are capable of speaking coherently and correctly. A judgment about their convalescence can be made only after a long observation. Apart from their dementia they have feelings that are entirely moral. Pinel says that every day in the asylum one can see affecting scenes.²⁵⁴ In English courts there occurs another form of dementia—an impotence of the spirit, which is not yet dementia, and which often occurs in the administration of property. It can be attributed to twaddle. 255

The other main aspect of this topic is the cure, healing. First of all it is purely physical and medicinal in nature. | ~Illnesses must be treated in a purely medical fashion.~²⁵⁶ In modern times water baths have been applied, sudden immersion in water. In particular cases it can do good, but in others it can produce apoplexy. Cutting the hair has also helped. Dementia seems often to have a definite course, and certain quick cures fall mainly in the final stages where madness has been implicitly overcome. ~Imbecility proceeds to become folly and through

^{253.} W reads: disorder, where fits of rage sometimes follow periodically. After a mad dog's bite. Fit of rage, violent activity, injuries of others. This rage is for many mere folly, a symptom, not perennial, appearing only occasionally, partly as physical diseased condition, partly as occasioned in particular by inner feelings.

^{254. [}Ed.] Pinel, op. cit., 17: 'With the exception of novels, nowhere have I found such devoted married couples, tender loving fathers, esteemed and high-minded patriots than in the madhouses when the people are in their sane and quiet periods. Here every day any sensitive person can see some touching scenes.'

^{255.} W adds: distraction, in which the individual does what is inappropriate to his condition.

^{256.} W reads: specific illnesses, gout, etc., must be improved in the ordinary medical way (bloodletting, purgations etc. for head affection, abdominal aches and pains. In Spring and Fall Heslarn had the entire madhouse purged. [Ed.] Pinel, op. cit., 289 ff.

folly passes over to reason. The reverse order is the more dangerous one. \sim^{257}

Many means are employed that are not capable of restraining the illness as such, but rather only restrain the mad frenzies:²⁵⁸ straitjackets and swing.²⁵⁹ However, the main aspect of the therapy is psychic healing. Previously the treatment of the illness had been entrusted to the brutality of barbaric men who see only evil in the outbreak of dementia and treat it accordingly. In modern times people have begun to take the mind into consideration and to make people sound through a healing of the mind.²⁶⁰ This presupposes that the demented are still human beings and are rational. Further, one must not be insulted by a demented person. ~This presupposition is the same | as the idea that every illness presupposes health, and this idea becomes the focal point of the treatment. It presupposes that the demented person still knows what right and wrong are, and that he possesses complete soundness and accountability outside of the specific sphere of his folly itself. Here we can abstract from his folly and turn ourselves to the rest [of the human being]. ~²⁶¹ Since his folly is not directly included in the rest of

257. W reads: Folly often begins with dullness and apathy, imbecility, madness and then transitions to folly proper (fools are more curable than imbeciles) and from there a cure is more possible. But if the process goes from folly to rage to imbecility, then it is a more dangerous way.—

258. [Ed.] These methods are described in Josef Mason Cox, Practical Observation on Insanity (London, 1806), 137 ff. Hegel has more to say about Cox's methods of treatment in the 1825 Lectures; cf. Philosophie des Geistes, Petry, op cit., vol. II, 380-1.

259. W adds: Swing often produces dizziness and relieves the fool of the series of his crazy ideas and thus produces calm.

260. [Ed.] Here is a passage where the English term 'mind' is appropriate as a translation of Geist. Following Pinel the mode of treatment Hegel endorses proceeds on the recognition that madness is not a loss of humanity or reduction to mere bestiality and the subhuman, but rather is a spiritual illness. Hegel's term is Verrucktheit which contains as its root meaning 'displacement'. Displacement suggests Hegel's fundamental concept of dementia as the self which has become divided against itself into two centers, the conscious and the unconscious. The unconscious is not subject to direct rational control. Verrucktheit, the displacement of the self into two centers, is related to Wahnsinn literally, a delusional 'sense', i.e., the demented are capable of making sense, but a sense which is delusional. Hegel's Verrucktheit is best translated as 'dementia' because the latter term presupposes the concept of mind (mens), even as it suggests its disunion, derangement, and impairment. This also reveals how 'mind' is misconceived when it is thought of as a 'thing'; 'thinghood' conceals the crucial point here, namely the displacement and disunion the mind undergoes in dementia, when it both is and is not itself, and lives both sides of the contradiction in its self-feeling.

261. W reads: Just as when one treats a body medically one presupposes that it still possesses health (i.e., possesses vital powers) and therefore hopes to cure it, so also in the case of the demented one presupposes that they still possess reason, that they have a sense of the right and wrong that have happened to them and that they have committed; that they are fully responsible outside the sphere of their particular folly in the wide field of the remainder of their behavior and conduct. With this treatment one lets the demented be in their folly and

his humanity, he is accounted as having a consciousness of right and of injustice. It is from this latter perspective that one must consider and seek to influence him, and one must comport oneself towards him with justice and good will.²⁶² In this way one must impart to the demented respect for their supervisors.

The issue of treatment, therapy, is a very interesting topic. The first point is that one seeks to occupy the demented outside of their dementia; through some other interest one seeks to engage them in work.²⁶³ To work means to become interested in a cause, to become interested in a cause outside of subjectivity [outside the subjective folly]. This work, although mechanical at first, serves then to promote movement, vitality, and health.²⁶⁴

This method of extrication from dementia requires especially that a person become distanced from his accustomed world. His accustomed world is part of his disordered self-feeling, which has made this world up and derives support from it. The novelty of the objects interrupts this support for the unimpeded course of the insane ideas. A further condition is that their trust must be earned. This trust is already implicit in this distancing from the accustomed world of the disordered self-feeling; trust is the beginning of an objectivity since by this trust one awakens an interest in an other. This trust is especially necessary for those who were driven to dementia through harsh treatment. Even with these it is possible to awaken confidence and trust, because they are human. A further point is that it is often necessary to induce in the demented a consciousness of a superior power by means of attention, respect, and fear in its various gradations. This is necessary to break their illusion and produce respect for something greater than their particular subjectivity. Very often ceremonial authority is used in order to show that their opinion, their will, I is not something objective. An additional psychological element in this regard is the awakening of fear, namely, the representation or threat of violence itself does violence to them

does not directly contradict it. Direct contradiction of their folly has no effect at all, and is itself a contradiction. Instead one turns to the rest of their behavior and conduct.

^{262.} W adds: Pinel has made the greatest contribution to this method of treatment.

^{263. [}Ed.] Pinel, op. cit., 239: 'It is the time-tested, universally valid result of experience that in all public asylums, as well as in prisons and hospitals, the most certain and perhaps only method of preserving the health, good order and good customs is the strict observance of a law of a mechanical occupation.' It should be noted that Hegel interprets work differently, namely as a form of self-transcendence and legitimate engagement with the world and others, in short, as self-actualization. For Hegel work has the significance of liberation, as his account of the slave in the master/slave relation attests.

^{264.} W adds: A madhouse in Naples is interesting owing to the arrangements made in this respect.

so that they are led to do violence to themselves. Frequently arousing fear is necessary to prevent other, worse things [from happening]. Often the demented don't want to eat. It is necessary to arouse fear in them so that they force themselves inwardly to eat.

A chief effect of fear is thus this self-domination which one also finds in the demented. This violence of images, for example, is also applied in such cases where the disorder is of a more epileptic kind~ as in the well-known narrative of Boerhaave.~²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, violence or its threat must always be legitimate, and the structure of punishment must be preserved, so that the demented person knows that he has done something improper.²⁶⁶ A further point to be emphasized is that the demented can be deceived very easily. This fact permits a means of controlling them, but it must be carefully and discriminately applied, since they are very mistrustful. Such deceptions are often very important, presumably where delay brings danger. But this also requires presence of mind and good will on the part of the overseer.

Very often the demented can be deceived when one enters their fantasy in such a way as to suspend their disorder. The disorder can be momentarily suspended, but in order to become fully sound they must [themselves] know that their illness was folly, otherwise the therapy is only half concluded and relapse is possible. \sim But this deception must not remain behind in the recovery [like a bitter aftertaste], \sim ²⁶⁷ lest their treatment appear [negatively] to them I as it appeared during their dementia, so that no hate and no rebellion remain behind.

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It is said that one can cure dementia by entering into its fantasy because then it is easy to bring the demented person into a contradiction with his dementia. Often the dementia recedes because the contradiction catches the demented person's attention.²⁶⁸

265. W adds: The infection in such evils can occur in fools and weak persons through vision, through the imagination. So Boerhaave threatened to have infected young women pinched with glowing pincers, and the attacks ceased. Reil narrates that an entire cloister of young women considered themselves to be cats. They were cured by the threat that the first who acted thus would be whipped by soldiers. [Ed.] Hermann Boerhaave (1668–1738), founder of clinical medical practice and research, taught at the University of Leiden. He collected and systematized the medical knowledge that had accumulated up to his time. Hegel read Boerhaave as early as 1794; Hegel also refers to Boerhaave in the transcripts of Kehler and Griesheim in Philosophy of Spirit, ed. Petry, vol. 2, 378.

266. W adds: The repeated struggle between the automatic fits of rage and fear [of punishment] gradually grows stronger, and the symptoms of madness subside.

267. W reads: The mere remembrance of an unjust treatment can produce a regression.

268. W adds: Nevertheless the contradiction must always astonish. Thus a powerful joke has often put folly right. 'How can you be the Holy Spirit?' 'Because I am!'

One can appeal to the demented person in feelings and in his affective life, and bring him to actions that contradict his fancy.²⁶⁹ In such cases the cure proceeds entirely from the mental side, as in other cases it proceeds from the physical. As a rule, both approaches must be united; one of them can predominate and in cases such as those mentioned above, the physical aspect can precede the mental. But the cure can equally proceed from the mental and with this the physical is also set right.²⁷⁰

These are the points of view that occur in this condition, and it is difficult to judge whether the condition is incurable, whether it is cured, and even whether dementia is actually present.

We proceed further in the course of our discipline. We recall its standpoint. This was the feeling individuality, the individuality that is a totality and a unity, the self-feeling in relation | to its determinations. We have considered the self-feeling as genius, as it was not yet in control of itself, and thus what is to be done so that it rules. Then second, self-feeling as such, but in relation to its specifics, so that its individual determinations are reduced to moments and become posited as ideal in the totality: the self-feeling exists for itself in them. ~In passion the human being is immersed in a particularity, and so is not at home with itself.~²⁷¹ This self-feeling comes to itself by making its particulars ideal. This process of idealization has the sense that the determinations are posited in self-feeling, in this pit, but as suspended. Illness means that a particular determination becomes fixed for the concrete self, with the result that it is not idealized or subordinated to the simple totality of the whole.

Therefore feeling totality.

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The second is self-feeling with the negation of singularity. It is self-determining, but in such a way that its singularity is negated.

The third is element is the self-feeling as self-fulfilling, so that it determines itself, but at the same time transcends the determination and is indifferent to it.

^{269.} W adds: (One who believed himself to be dead was brought to a grave, street youths derided him on the way, and he sprang from the casket to do battle with them.—Haller and the glass leg).

^{270.} W adds: A disease must always have passed through a crisis before the physical evil can be considered overcome. But then an entirely small psychic stimulus (a friendly look, etc.) can often complete the healing process, particularly when the evil lay in the fool.

^{271.} W reads: In passion the human being has self-feeling; however it is immersed in a particularity and so not present to [for] itself.

C. Habit

The third is the present fulfillment of the self-feeling, the totality as that which presents itself in the particular feelings so that the totality in selffeeling is at the same time indifferent to these particulars. This level is what we call habit. Individuality has determinations, I sensations, feelings; these are at first particular. In these I am immersed in a content; I do not keep or preserve myself as universal in these sensings. In contrast, in habit it is posited that these satisfactions are directly subordinate to the universal that at the same time transcends them, and that preserves itself in its simple self-relation. We represent this abstract concept through the idea of habit. Habit is there not only as a particular, momentary satisfaction; rather I am this habit. It is my universal mode of being—what I am is the totality of my habits. I can do nothing else, I am this. In my individual feelings, I make it so one time, and another time not so. Then I do not say, 'I am so,' \sim but I am so in \sim^{272} a general feeling that belongs to my self as such, as a simple self-relating unity. Such habit is something posited by me. Through this self-positing, habits are distinguished from natural qualities to which I have contributed nothing.²⁷³ Sleep and waking occur in me without my agency. Habit is also one such universal quality or mode, that is manifest in all particulars, but it is posited by me and made my own. Habit is a quality I have posited in myself as simple totality. The second [point] is that habit is a universal mode of my own doing; the particular [action] is subsumed under it. It becomes universal since I appropriate it to myself. This feeling that has been appropriated by me is posited in the simplicity of my self, and as thus having become simple, it is the universal in the form of simplicity. It is a posited universality. It is a universality of reflection, i.e., generality, | a universality, since it includes many particulars in itself, a universal related to the many (the higher universality, the species, is not a universal of reflection, ~it is rather simple relation to itself)~.274 Here the universality is brought forth, produced, and proceeds out of particular cases. This [process] contains the determination that what is supposed to become habit for us, is a repetition of feeling. Habit is acquired through repetition so that the individual is appropriated to a universality. Thus it is

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^{272.} W reads: but I distinguish the particular feeling from me, as universal feeling.

^{273.} W adds: for example, that I am a European.

^{274.} W reads: for the universality of thinking is simple self-relation, without reflection on the many. Here on the contrary the universality is brought forth; it proceeds from individual cases and raises itself accordingly. Therein lies the determination that what is supposed to become habitual for us must be a repetition of feelings and activities.

a universality arising out of many individual cases that are repeated. This is the determination of habit in contrast to natural determinations. Habit resembles a natural quality, but it has been posited. So in one of its aspects habit resembles natural qualities. But habit also has an aspect that is related to the will as such, and from this perspective it appears as a necessity in relation to freedom. According to the first perspective in reference to the natural determinations and particular feelings, habit is a liberation. But in reference to the will, habit is a necessity. The expression 'another nature' [second nature] is entirely correct: on the one hand, habit is an 'other' than nature, and so it is a liberation [from nature]; it is a second nature in contrast to immediate, uncultivated nature. On the other hand, habit is [a second, cultivated] nature, it is a being—I am thus—this is my habit. This latter quality preserves this aspect of natural immediacy in itself.

When we consider habit in its special forms, it is said that self-consciousness is no longer empty being-for-self; it rather makes itself objective. It is the inherent determinate being of the soul that is determined by its own activity. In this determinacy, the being [of the determination] is its own. \sim Habit is the subject and being is the predicate \sim^{277} , | and both have their stability [Halt] in habit so that the subject is no longer dominated by drives.

There are two more explicit aspects of habit; it involves first a hardening [of the disposition] and second an adroitness and dexterity. We have seen that affection belongs to feeling. We distinguish affection as follows: it is the inner made outer, the inner determination made into a corporal one. The mode of immediacy, the inner determination embodies itself, and both belong to feeling. Feeling is the process of uniting inner and outer. Habit means that this unity becomes itself inwardly posited, becomes posited in the self, so that the self takes possession of its feeling. Only insofar as it has taken possession of its feeling is it at home with itself, simply relating to itself. The first unity, namely, feeling, is always a particular, a now, but now this particularity is suspended.

What is called a hardening of the disposition generally occurs when what is in feeling is [also] at home with itself, and is not simply immersed in feeling, but remains free in feeling. For example, thinking for us has become habitual; thinking, the pure being at home with self, also must belong to the self. Thinking exhausts (the body), and what is called mental exhaustion is

^{275.} W adds: liberation from the particularity of the drive.

^{276. [}Ed.] Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §151.

^{277.} W reads: So the self is the universally pervasive soul in its feeling and in its life for itself, both subject and predicate.

only this embodied feeling. Habit means that one does not become tired so soon; the fatigue is postponed and deferred. Practice produces this, for it is implicit in practice that corporeity is no longer independent, but rather the unity of the body and inwardness which is my own, is relaxed and subjected to the independence of being.

Thus the moment of corporeity is posited in me and thereby loses its externality and materiality. I To this aspect belongs the habit of satisfaction of needs. Here my corporeity, my existence, is made to correspond with how my existence is supposed to be, [namely] with the drive. This satisfaction is an enjoyment, a feeling. Habit consists in the fact that in this satisfaction I remain at home with myself. In habit the satisfaction belongs to myself. The satisfaction of desire is a deadening of desire, and it includes the liberation from desire, being satiated. But habit means that we are satiated with being satiated and are indifferent to achieving satisfaction itself.

Satisfaction merely helps against an expression of the drive. Habit implies that the satisfaction is already mine, something that has become part of my self-feeling, and is then a new enjoyment of what I already possess and is familiar to me. Habit is essentially a reproduction of enjoyment out of myself as this enjoyment is a feeling. This feeling is something that I already possess and is nothing new to me. I have interest only as long as I am in an opposition, so long as I do not possess what my drive demands.²⁷⁹ In habit it is not merely the drive that is satisfied, but I already possess this satisfaction in such a way that I am not simply immersed in it when getting a new satisfaction. In contrast, I transcend it, I relate to this satisfaction as to something I already possess, and so I am related therein only to myself. I am present, not in this limitation, but rather my 'I' is at home with itself, this determination is something I have appropriated. There has been much talk about the liberation of the drive, and generally one can regard that as something superior (for in concrete cases the non-satisfaction is indeed very important). |

 \sim Since he can liberate himself from the drives without their being satisfied, the human being can come into an [internal] struggle. The drives are necessary, [they are] the system of determinations of vitality. \sim ²⁸⁰ Vitality is

278. W adds: drive. Satisfaction gives me enjoyment. Drive is a volition to which my determinate being at first fails to correspond; corporeity as not adequate to its needs.

279. W adds: Interest has the difference and contrast in itself; it includes activity: subjectivity wants to free itself from itself, wants to become objective.

280. W reads: The liberation is achieved only through the non-satisfaction of the drives. Thereby the human being falls into a great struggle with himself.—But the drives are at first natural needs, necessary conditions of our living organism. Our self-feeling, according to its vitality, is a system of conditions that constitute the natural needs.

essentially a process and first becomes actual when it is satisfied. The natural drives are essential. However it is just as essential to free oneself from them. This liberation consists not in the particular satisfaction, but rather in this \sim satisfaction of being self-related. \sim^{281} Since I possess the satisfaction, the satisfaction only reproduces my possession, and only in it do I return to myself. In this particular feeling [of satisfaction], I am only my own self-feeling, and thus transcend the limitation and am at home with myself. Thus habit includes the cardinal point that one is liberated from what one is accustomed to. (One eats and drinks and yet one is not present in the matter itself.)

Hardening is directed against the need itself, against the need without its satisfaction. But this hardening is also a habit, i.e., that I maintain myself in my self-feeling against this negation present in me. Hardness means a firm holding oneself together, so that I do not become disunited in myself, but rather my self-feeling preserves itself in its identity, which to be sure has negations present in it, but excludes them from itself. One does not think about these negations but rather about something else that is stronger, namely, the holding together, the coherence, of one's self-feeling.²⁸²

Hardness consists therefore in not giving into disunion, cleavage, but holding to the abstraction of the self and persevering in oneself. The other aspect of habit is adroitness. Adroitness refers to activities that are the embodiment of an inner determination. Adroitness consists in the fact that such embodiments, such doings, are appropriated by me, so that every new doing is only something reproduced, something repeated. I reproduce and repeat the activity that is already my own. These activities, embodiments, have their deeper ground, as we have seen, in the fact that sensible separation is something ideal, ²⁸³ and offers no resistance. I embody it directly; this power essentially belongs to me, and it is supposed to be also for me and must be appropriated by me, posited in me so that, when I again intend this activity I do not need to accomplish it with any special will or attention. It belongs to me and thus becomes a possibility for me, and the activity becomes a capacity or resource. If I do it again it becomes a reproduction and I am fully in control over it. This appropriation of my corporeity is something that extends quite far. That a human being stands upright has

^{281.} W reads: satisfaction, not the satisfaction of momentary aspect of the drives, but of them as drives,—in their satisfaction to be at the same time independent of them, to be free from them, to relate to oneself and to be only at home with oneself.

^{282.} W adds: of self-feeling.—Feeling remains—only it does not appear.—The defeated element allows itself to sink into negation and disunion. Death can often be a matter of indifference to the person immersed in this negation and disunion, which creates despair.

^{283.} W adds: has no truth in spirit.

become a habit acquired through his own will. It is a continuous will that I stand, but I no longer need to will standing as such, because it has become an enduring determination of my self-feeling. I have posited this embodiment in my self-feeling and every repetition is only a reproducing. The series of movements are simplified in my self-feeling and the adroitness in execution is completely immediate in spite of the great series of mediations (e.g., playing according to notes). The self is the simple bond of all these mediations. The will pushes as it were, only on the self-feeling, and in the latter the embodiment is executed without any express willing being necessary. This is the nature | of habit and its special determinations. Habit indeed can include particular content, but it is one of the most difficult topics.

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What one does out of habit, one does without thought, mechanically. Habitual action proceeds independently of our conscious will like a necessity. This doing belongs to being, the being of my [trained] self. Habit is the greatest power in the individual; it is the individual himself—I as necessity. But habit is also a liberation, as noted previously. Adroitness no longer requires attention in the exercise of particular activities. Habit means I am already prepared; I have the capacity and am master over it. That is the nature of habit, and the human being is ready, so far as he is habituated, [to be] what he is. It only then that there is the quiet enjoyment of being.

Youth is the period of interests that are supposed to be attained but are not yet attained. The old man is finished; he possesses everything peacefully as habit. The human being perishes of the habit of living. Sweet habit \sim of existence, says Egmont of life, \sim^{284} but [sweetness of habit] is also a peaceful death. The conduct of life becomes simpler, with less opposition and conflict, but the vitality of life consists precisely in this conflict. To the extent that life gradually coincides more and more with habit and custom, it also disappears because its intensity disappears and lifeless living arises.

That is the sphere of habit. We speak about animals and ascribe habits to them, or rather adroitnesses. Animals are trained to do some things, and this training consists in an affection of some sort being produced in them and connected with this activity. The animal is capable of this sort of connection because it is a self. The simplicity of the animal is the bond between feeling and activity in it. But it does not make this connection apart from its instincts. Ordinarily the stimulation of the connection occurs by means of a feeling coming from without, namely the training. This

training can go pretty far in approaching the miraculous, even the human sphere. ²⁸⁵ Their clever stunts occur not through signals of their owners, of that one can easily convince oneself. If one speaks a word to such an animal, it must be able to distinguish the wounds, i.e., spell the word. That [training] can take several years, but whether difficult or easy, it is the same operation.

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3. THE ACTUAL SOUL

The actual soul is the third to the natural soul and the dreaming or sentient soul. Natural soul is the totality existing as external nature for our consciousness and developed as being in itself, [or implicit being]. This natural soul was the first. The second is the sentient soul, the natural soul as existing for itself, as self in general. This develops itself and makes itself exist as sentient soul, and actively seeks self-realization. This includes doubled determinations. First of all, feeling already includes the immediate determinateness, [namely] affection. This affection must be recalled, posited as feeling, and conversely, the inwardness determined in it is the immediate affection. The other aspect is that the inward determination becomes embodied. So we have the unity of the inner and the outer: sentience. The sentient totality is what we have generally called genius. The second element in this respect was that this totality develops itself into self-feeling. This means that it makes itself manifest as an existent feeling, the genius expresses itself, negates its restrictedness and becomes a self. Reproduction was a further fact. This point is essential. There is a negation of immediacy and a reproduction of the unity of the inner and the outer. These connections themselves have to be connected, namely unified by the self so that in its feelings and embodiments it is now related to itself. In feeling it is also for itself, but these first feelings, as imperfect, can be compared with a chemical process. So the actualized soul is also the unity of the inner and the outer, but this is said only superficially. Nature is also | such a unity [of inner and outer]. Such determinations are one-sided and superficial; they lack more precise definition. This unity is itself only an external one, a restriction of the self that is inherently universal. These unities are themselves to be posited as inner, and this is what we regard habit to be. The soul in respect to its actuality is in itself precisely this ideality of all the multiplicities that exist

^{285.} W adds: When written and spoken words are presented to animals, they assemble these out of an alphabet and also out of dissimilar letters. Further, there are dogs that can calculate.

in externality or in nature in general. In the concept this mutual externality has no truth. This ideality is the soul, the difference inherent in externality is not independent. This ideality, this basic concept is posited in the actuality of the soul; the [independent] being-for-self of the soul has here come to existence. Consequently habit is reduced to possibility. Previously it stood higher as containing independent differences, but now it is simply posited, and since I will it, it is also brought about. The whole series of activities acquires a completely simple determination. There is no longer any mutual externality, but everything is posited in the simplicity of my inwardness as it is according to the concept. This is the process of the speculative concept. It is the actual soul as the indwelling totality of custom.

So the soul is subject existing for itself; it is substance whose corporeity is no longer due to being, rather corporeity is only a moment in the soul. The soul existing for itself is this ideality which has pervaded corporeity and immediacy; corporeity is now posited as a moment in the soul. This [corporal] externality is only a sign of the soul, only represents the soul. The soul is actual as this kind of identity of inner and outer. Embodiment or corporeity is thus only the soul's work of art and constitutes the shape of the soul in which it feels itself. It is actual, effective, and something other than mere existence (what is rational is actual and vice versa²⁸⁶). A bad soul has existence, but no actuality. The bad soul is not an expression or the image of the idea; it does not reveal the inner as substance of the soul. It does not represent the idea but something other, the non-idea, the appearance on its way towards truth. What is actual is the soul existing for itself, the soul that has transformed its corporeity into an ideal moment and is the dominant power therein. I The actual soul has no other externality than the one that mirrors its own inwardness. The soul is the effective ability and capacity in the process of mirroring. Thus the soul has its very self in its externality, not simply a condition of its being [passively] affected. The soul is at home with itself [in its externality], and has attained to a unity of itself with ideality. This is the ideality of the soul, what it is according to its concept, and [in] this ideality the soul is at home with itself. The actual soul is the self that has come to rest in itself. In this actual soul immediacy is manifest as something natural, but [the natural is only] an expression of the soul.

The actual soul is the individual become stable and constant in itself, the accomplished genius that has objective existence and is simply present as such; but where this presence is only an expression of the soul. It is the soul

286. W adds: cf. the Philosophy of Right: only the rational is actual. Actuality is here to be distinguished from existence. [Ed.] Philosophy of Right, Preface, trans. Nisbet, 20.

in this quiescent shape that is revealed only in this externality. It has human expression, pathognomic and physiognomic expression, the human being as a total individual, but in such a way that its humanity can be seen in this totality. This is how the human being distinguishes itself from the animal. Much effort has been expended in determining this distinction. Some have sought the difference in anatomy, but the human organism is not essentially different from the animal (the human has earlobes). 287 Here one has the dark suspicion that the essential determination has not yet been found. It has also been said that the animal has the os intermaxillare [intermaxillary bonel. ~Goethe found this also in humans.~288 The truth in all this is that indeed in humans the feeding organs [Freßorgane] are more recessed. These anatomical differences are not striking. What constitutes the human is what the soul places in the body, for example, the upright posture is the primary gesture of the human being.²⁸⁹ The human being gives to itself its orientation in space, and this orientation is a matter of its willing. This willing to stand becomes habit, but the habit always depends on the will to stand.

The human hand, the absolute tool, is entirely different from the animal paw.²⁹⁰ The hand is the element wherein one essentially recognizes | the human. The human activity reveals itself corporally in the hand. Gestures [of the hand] can be distinguished from idle, dormant expressions. They are expressions by movement, and through gesture the soul expresses some sort of affection, reflection. Gesture is different from the embodiment of feeling. The embodiment of feeling is supposed to be a sign; the bodily element is here only a sign whereby I represent myself. For example, the expression of anger is an immediate anthropological embodiment. But gestures as such are something different. They are symbolic; they reveal an action, but this [action] is not yet complete. Rather the soul only presents what sort of action it intends to commit. Gesture is a restricted action. But the animal

^{287. [}Ed.] According to Blumenbach the human being distinguishes itself from the animal in respect to its earlobes. De generis humani varietate nativa (Göttingen, 1795), §12.

^{288.} W reads: (bones in the upper lip).—In accordance with his great sense, Goethe did not waste time on nebulous concepts; he has investigated this condition, compared it, and found that these bones also are present in humans. He discovered this at a churchyard in Geneva. [Ed.] Goethe, Morphologie, Werke 13, 184–6. Others, including P. Camper, S. T. Sömmering, and J. F. Blumenbach disputed this, claiming that humans differ from other vertebrates by lacking an independent intermaxillary bone. See also Goethe, Berliner Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1830, 52 f.; Goethe, Werke 13, 219–50.

^{289. [}Ed.] The upright position as distinctively human was asserted by Blumenbach, op. cit., §17, and J. G. Herder, Ideen zur philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Sämtliche Werke, 12 (Riga and Leipzig, 1784–91), 110–14.

^{290. [}Ed.] Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, 432a1f; Herder, Ideen, Sämtliche Werke 13, 137.

passes immediately into action. The symbolism of gesture lies in a similarity to action—e.g., a threatening position. Many such gestures are not so easy to figure out, but we understand them immediately, for example, affirming and negating with [movements of] the head. Laughter is a human element that is modified in a variety of ways. The 'long face' separates people; but it is soon over, past. Throwing one's hands up in the air means something that goes beyond me; shaking hands, etc.²⁹¹ There is a great multiplicity [of gestures] and the connection with what each signifies is not always easy to say, particularly where finer organs dominate the discourse of gestures.

More education and less use of gestures go together. The Italians have many antics. Gestures refer especially to face and posture. The educated person has speech, the absolute gesture. The ancients used to have masks in theater. With us much importance is placed on the so-called play of facial expressions. The calm expression in the face and posture is cultivated. Eye and mouth, particularly the mouth, is the seat of facial gestures. The mouth dominates the lower half of the face. Orientals cover the lower half of the face with beards; with us one can view the varied outlooks and musculature. The self-driven spirit has an elaborately composed lower half of the face. The statues of the ancients have been praised because they were naked, but only ten percent were naked. Their modesty covered this nakedness because it was not the expression | of spirit. Consequently the human being covers itself and is ashamed of the purely animal in a beautiful way. Neither posture nor spiritual expression are lost with clothing; on the contrary, both gain much from clothing.

Every human being has, either by nature or by education, a physiognomic instinct, and his judgment falls accordingly. This can be more or less correct, and any incorrectness can fall to the faculty of judgment or to the physiognomy as such. The pathognomy refers more to the expression in the movement of passion. Physiognomy considers the calm expression insofar as it relates particularly to the intellectual. Lavater raised the issue and sought to make stable determinations. ²⁹² Consciously or unconsciously everyone lets himself be led by the human figure, and one's first judgment, which belongs to particularity, falls accordingly. One can look at a physiognomy that all the passions have engraved on a human being, but its truth is confined to the universal, whether a spirit has worked, whether its inclinations were vital or indolent. It has been said that humans in death revert to the physiognomy

^{291. [}Ed.] Similar examples can be found in Kant's Anthropologie, Schriften, VII, 301.

^{292. [}Ed.] Johann Casper Lavater, Von der Physiognomik (Leipzig, 1772); Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beforderung der Menschenkenntniß und Menschenliebe, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1775-8).

of childhood. This means: the human physiognomy is animated by spirit, directed by the indwelling activity of character so far as the latter has formed itself for life. The human being makes itself known through its action. The deeds make manifest what the person is. The person is his deeds. There is nothing else in him except his deeds; what he is he shows in his deeds. Physiognomy belongs to the external in general, to the corporal. The human being, spirit, is essentially for itself in its body, but also against its body. 'The inner and the outer correspond to each other' is an abstract proposition. The inner is character. The 'outer' of character is not the human figure, but rather its actions.

With figure anthropology concludes. The totality is that the soul relates to its immediacy, corporeity, that the soul is sentient. This determination has its immediacy; in its determinations it is at home with itself. Further, the soul makes its feeling ideal, so that the soul, the simple—in relating itself to the immediate as something ideally posited, negated, | superseded—relates only to itself. Anthropology considers the soul, spirit in its immediacy and the movement of spirit, the end of which is that this simple [soul] relates to the immediate in its affections so that they are transformed into the simple itself. (The soul is implicitly the concept, the universal simple self-relating.) The soul relates to the affections as to a simplification, no longer as immediate, but as a suspended simplification.

Anthropology considers the immediate natural determination, corporeity, according to the phenomena mentioned. We have not had to do with the corporal as material, because in the sphere of spirit matter has lost its truth. We dealt with the simple determinations of the soul that are simple, immediate, but not material. Only in the figure do we come to something that has existence for an other, for something external, and thus that is itself external. The soul is present in the immediate so that it reveals itself therein. This yields the determination that the soul expresses itself and this expression is to be comprehended as something in itself external that falls into the determinacy of materiality in general. The totality as figure is this simplicity with itself in immediacy. This immediacy exists as suspended; it does not represent itself, but is a sign. The soul is indifferent in regard to this immediacy because it has been rendered ideal. Thus the moment of immediacy does not disappear but is posited as indifferent. Through the fact that the soul is posited as indifferent to its immediacy, the moment of immediacy is self-posited as an external existence. In figure, the soul has external existence; it is the soul that appears so that it is indifferent to its eternality. For the sake of indifference the soul is external existence.

The unfree man has slaves and makes slaves of others. The man who is inherently free lets the others be free. The soul that is inherently free lets the immediate be free as external. The soul is indifferent (relating to itself), relating itself to an other, but this other is ideally posited. The soul is posited as relating to itself in this indifference. The point of the transition is the simple determination that the soul relates to itself through the negation of its immediacy in it, that the soul lis not merely a being, an affirmative relation, but rather that the soul is relation to self through negation and rendering the immediate ideal. It is therefore negative relation to itself (it is infinite), it is the self-relating, simple negativity. Through the fact that the soul is negative relation to itself, it is exclusive. The external towards which it is indifferent is not something to which the soul simply relates indifferently, but something that is excluded by the soul and is put in opposition to it. The external occurs as idealized. The soul is the being-for-self of the universal, the universal that is for the universal.

The other determination of the immediate is that it is posited as external. Insofar as it has made itself free through the suspension of the immediate, it lets its immediacy go free out of itself, but as infinite negativity so that it excludes the immediate, it is not simply indifferent to it. The soul exists as the subject of the concept that is for itself, that possesses itself in determinate existence. In what is for the concept, the concept possesses its determinate existence. The universal that is for the universal, is—I. The I excludes the external from itself, and this excluded externality in its totality is the world, the totality of the natural soul. The natural soul in itself—the universum. The natural soul represented as external is nature, the world. Here is the awakening of the soul to consciousness. Here we give up the name 'soul' and have not yet to do with spirit, but with the I, abstract spirit. Soul, I, spirit. Animals also have souls but not consciousness. Existing freedom begins with consciousness. With consciousness there is the I and the world that stands over there confronting me, of which I say that I find it before me—the act of creation considered from this perspective. The concept is what has been explicated here. The explication is the withdrawal of the soul into its simplicity through the suspension of its immediacy, as we have seen. We know that our process thus far is one-sided. The I proceeds out of the natural soul; the I is the truth of the natural soul. The result is always this, that the I is the true. But the natural soul is the merely untrue existence that suspends itself in order to come to its truth. The higher [view] is that it is spirit that resolves itself on the one side to the I, and on the other, to 137

nature.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

I The transition from necessity to freedom has this sense, that the natural has been reduced to freedom as its truth. With consciousness we don't need to consider the necessary idea, but what we know directly from consciousness itself. In consciousness we have first of all: I. What do we mean by I? This meaning must agree with what is determined according to the concept. This is the one necessary determination, and the question arises whether the term I is rightly ascribed to this level.

The I is the universal, the simple: it distinguishes and also suspends the distinction, and has only the universal, the simple itself for its object. The I is wholly pure and empty, perfectly simple self-identity, entirely without determinations. (Universality is not a common element present in many, for that is only the universal of reflection. Rather we have to do with this abstract self-identity [Sichselbstgleichheit].) I am the universal, but when I say 'I', I have myself as object. I am this movement in myself, being-forself. I relate to myself, universal to universal. There is a complete absence of difference, and yet there is a difference. It is a difference that is no longer a difference, namely a suspended difference. Thus we have correctly designated the determination to which we have come as 'I'. The I and that to which the I relates itself is also 'I'. But more closely considered, there is posited in the I a different determination. On the one hand I am entirely universal, on the other hand, when I say 'I', I mean absolutely only this I to the exclusion of all others. The I is the universal in an infinite singularity. The I is the simple [universal], but at the same time the I is the absolute singular. Thus there is difference present within it.

The understanding holds that universality and individuality are opposed. However the I is the absolute example that the two are posited as identical and united in a single determination. The infinite is the universal. The I is infinite and at the same time it is this finite point. The differences are dissolved, even the highest ones. This return to self, wherein the simple relates

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to the simple, I has thereby come about. The result includes the following: that the return to self has become simple by negation of immediacy and of the differences that emerged in [the self's] simple immediacy. This activity of the simple originated from the negation of the immediacy—self-seeking [Selbstischkeit], the condition of self-seeking. This implies the negation of the immediate; the immediate is something other than the simple. The soul in its natural condition is not true, and thus it must posit itself as it is in itself. The soul is immediate. This is the most tremendous contradiction; the soul suspends this contradiction. The soul is the negation of negation, that is, the absolute negativity, or what we call particularity, which is not an immediate sensible individual, but the single individual that is subject, and that we have in being-for-self [Fürsichsein]. The relation of the universal to the universal, of the simple to the simple includes the negation of negation.

This contradiction is not a disadvantage for the concept. [On the contrary] all speculative concepts contain contradiction in themselves, the developed negation, the difference that is brought into relation. Everything is a contradiction, but a contradiction that has been resolved. I am the whole, pure, simple, and universal, and at the same time I am immediately the opposite, an individual, a 'this'. I am the resolution of this contradiction. The simple abstract identity of the understanding is death. The vitality of spirit, the concept, is the eternal resolution of the contradiction that produces itself eternally in this resolution in order to become resolved again. The universal that has come to its existence in freedom is the universal in the form of universality. The I has the universal for its object, the universal is for an other and so has determinate existence [Dasein]. The determination through which it posits its existence is itself universal, since the universal in its determinacy is itself universal, the simple in the form of the simple. This appears to be a simple abstraction that is everywhere and anywhere. It does not appear to be so important. It appears that with the I—the simple root of our self-consciousness—nothing of importance is expressed.

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In nature we find plenty of universals-space, time, the process of becoming self-identical, becoming as a universal, so for example, blue is a universal— I but none of these [yet] exist in the form of universality. Universals [in nature] do not exist for themselves. Universal space cannot be presented. Only in the I does space come to that existence in which it has the form of universality. Likewise, the animal exists only as this isolated individual. It is not evident to the animal that its species, its substantial universality—namely being an animal—is itself this universality. There is blue; there are animals etc., but the form of their existence is only that

of isolated particular facts, not the form of universality itself. Animals are capable of feeling each other, but they exist only as individuals for each other. Insofar as the animal—one such universal—comes to existence, it comes to [such an] existence [qua universal] in us, in the I. The superiority of the I lies in the fact that the universal exists for the universal. The I is the infinite simple for itself, however otherwise one may wish to express this.

Consciousness includes this I, but the I is related to an object in general. The I is this difference in itself, this repulsion that relates this universal to the universal. In general the I relates to itself as the universal to the singular, the infinite to the finite, so that these [contrasts] are one simple unity.

The relation of infinity to finitude appears to be entirely different than the relation of universality to particularity, but this particularity is itself the entirely abstract finitude, or singularity. Because it is entirely abstract singularity, it is also the entirely universal particularity, the infinite finitude. The finite explicates itself, for I am finite in many aspects. This is the explication of my singularity, but as singularity the explication is itself wholly universal. Everyone is a 'this'. Singularity, subjectivity, is itself this absolute negativity. Negation of negation, the return of universality to itself, [is] the self-equalizing of universality with itself, which makes the determinacy in which it exists into an indeterminate universal. Singularity is self-relation as negation of negation,—this is a negative relation, a relation of negation but [of] a negation directed at itself. The one [i.e., qua universal] relates itself to the other [i.e., qua singular], and both are the same. This negation is therefore relation to itself and thus itself universality. Thus singularity is itself [a] self-relation and therefore equivalent to universality; theirs is a | difference that, as soon as it exists, cancels itself. The I is the existent concept, otherwise it never exists; as I it exists as free concept. All things are concept, but only implicitly; they do not exist as concept, as free concept. The concept exists in nature in the mode of externality. This reality is in space, in this wood, but this is not the concept that exists freely by itself. Such is the misfortune of nature, that the concept is not at home with itself in freedom, but has fallen into externality. In consciousness we have the I and relation to an object. We call this consciousness in general. The I is exclusive; this relation of the simple to itself which we had in the self of the figure, is exclusion. The I is the self-relating negativity, being-for-itself. This negativity is negative towards itself; negativity is relation to itself; thus it repels itself from itself, and thus there is posited the exclusion of itself as the negation of itself. Thus there is an other. The I relates itself to itself, but in such a way that this relation has the determination of an other, that is, an object that stands over against it.

What we find is the immediate. The I in its immediacy includes everything we have treated as the soul in the Anthropology. The I is for itself, is free, through the fact that it excludes this immediacy from itself. The freedom of spirit means that it knows, it has this totality in itself, it acquires this totality, makes it its own possession; it means that it is its own representations, thoughts, determinations. But at first the I is the abstract; the I is the act of excluding, and takes what it excludes as the negative of itself. This is consciousness; an other is and has the significance of being something discovered [Vorgefundsein]. This determinate being is independent, it is excluded from me, and I relate myself to the existent. Its content is the determinations that belong to sense in general. Red, which we consider only in sensible form, I is a determination of the soul. But that the red is something red, is the objectivity of consciousness. ~The higher stage, since it has the preceding stage as its object, is here the determinacy of the soul, the negative of the I, the not-I.~1 This totality—soul—is the content of the consciousness of the I, and the I is at the same time the relation to this object. It is for me. As consciousness I have determinate existence (Dasein); I have determinate existence, that is, I exist for an other, and the other exists for me. The being of spirit is the soul; it is something for me.²

The phenomenology is the appearing spirit, spirit in its determinate existence; it must be apprehended in its contradictions, and thus this [contradictory] determinate existence is only appearing spirit. I am free, and as absolutely free I am existing only through myself and not through any other. The other side of this contradiction is that I have an object opposed to me, my other, the excluded that [nevertheless] exists, and I relate myself to this object, this negation of myself. But relation means identity, [which is] community in the poorest form. This object is my determination; it exists in me as my representation, if this expression may be used here. It is ideal; I am the subject, and this object does not belong to itself, but to me. It exists in me. This is the contradiction in a doubled way: (a) The object exists, but as object here it is not independent, but essentially related to me. In consciousness it has no other sense. Whether it is otherwise still something [more] belongs to spirit. (b) These opposing determinations are in me, I am

^{1.} W adds: What the I has for its object is the soul; the lower level always becomes object for the higher. The object is the negative of the I; therefore, according to Fichte, it is the not-I (non-moi).

^{2.} W adds: something for the same; so it is consciousness. This means §414, that consciousness is the standpoint of the posited contradiction. Therefore I have called this part the phenomenology of spirit.

^{3.} W adds: ideal, not independent.

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this free [being]⁴ and exist in relation to the negation of myself, thus I am outside of I myself.⁵ The object is and is not mine. I stand in relation to myself, and, because I stand in relation to myself, I do not stand in relation to myself. Thus spirit is divided against itself, not reconciled to itself. The appearing spirit is the posited contradiction, the posited relation.

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Every relation is constituted by two independent [beings], and each of the sides has meaning only in its relation. The cause is a cause only when it does not remain by itself in relation only to itself, but refers to its negative, the effect. The consciousness which philosophy gives us, is that such relations where we have nothing bad, are nevertheless contradictory in themselves. Thus here I am free, relating [only] to myself, but in the very fact that I am independent, I am independent as a conscious [being] and this means that I do not relate myself to myself. The soul is this immediacy, where the contradiction is not [yet] posited. The second [moment] is always the positing of the contradiction, the difference in relation. The aim is to solve the problem of ~consciousness~.6 This is spirit, the resolved contradiction, the contradiction as reconciled. Thus the way to reconciliation, wherein the I frees itself from this its relation to its other, from its unfreedom. is determined thus: the object undergoes an alteration, and the alteration appears to take place first in the object. (§415) This object alters itself so that it determines itself to become an I. This is the transition of consciousness to self-consciousness: I am related to an object, the negative of myself, but this object is itself I.7 There the contradiction is canceled, at least on one side: the I relates itself to a negation of itself, but this negation is itself I. Self-consciousness is then itself still abstract; as self-consciousness it is still affected with the difference.

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Third, the I determines itself as universal self-consciousness. First it was I, being in general, abstract being. Second, [it is] I, an abstract self-consciousness, that has an I that is likewise independent, for its object. I have myself in this object, but at the same time as personal, as negation of myself, and this negativity is only a moment. I have therein an affirmative relation as an I. Insofar as it is my negative relation, there are individuals, but insofar as the truth of my self-consciousness is determined as universal, I am in the third place: reason, a knowing of all content, knowing that it is mine, mine at the same time as this particular I, and knowing further that the particularity of my self disappears. I do not exist as this particular I, but

^{4.} W adds: free, in that everything is only ideal.

^{5.} W adds: to me, I am not free.

^{6.} W reads: of the contradiction [of consciousness].

^{7.} W adds: so I am self-consciousness [Ed.] Self-consciousness is mediated by an other. Self and other are equiprimordial. See below n. 12.

as universal I. Self-consciousness as inherently universal is reason. It is both the realization of the I and the superseding of its one-sided determination as relating to a being that is the negation of itself. In the process this one-sidedness is suspended. This abstraction negates itself, negates this negation. But this is also the realization of the concept.

The I = I as such for itself, that is, this freedom, this identity with itself in the ideality of its other being such that the other exists only as suspended; thus it is at home with itself. We have in the I simple ideality, the ideality of other-being, and the identity of these two. This is the concept of the I. The process of consciousness that we are considering is the realization of the concept. What is posited in the concept in its simplicity-the ideality of the other and the unity of the two-is the abstract. The reality is that each of these moments obtains a concrete meaning, that each of these moments itself is the concept as a whole. ~Thus in friendship the two sides | constitute this whole.~8 Each [is] I, and I in such a way that the I, since it is not merely an unvielding individual but suspends and supersedes itself, has negated itself and has its conscious relation to itself in the selfconsciousness of the other. Each is therefore the whole, each is the entire concept of the I.9 This is the realized self-consciousness, here all moments are the entire I. The totality of this totality is such that the relation of these two Is to each other is itself I. I am consciousness as the consciousness of the identity, the unity of these two. This reality of the concept is the aim that the I, the concept, constitutes itself as idea. 10 This universal selfconsciousness or reason, is the idea, the concept, that relates itself to its reality. This concept is the idea itself, and the whole is the unity of concept and reality, such that this distinction is suspended. The I determines itself (§415). The form of this determination appears as a change of the object. I am consciousness; the way my consciousness is determined depends on the object I have. I am a rational consciousness insofar as I know of something rational. Insofar as I have myself for my object, I am self-consciousness. The determination of the I, whether it is self-consciousness, appears in the object. The manner and way in which consciousness is determined falls in the object.

^{8.} W reads: In friendship and love, I exist not simply for myself but am in an other and yet independent. Here therefore are two, so that both are no longer the abstract moment of the whole concept,

^{9.} Wadds: Each is an I, and each is [also its] relation to the other I. This is manifest in feeling, love, and friendship. This constitutes the reality of the I.

^{10.} W adds: makes, reason. The realized concept itself is the idea. The I is supposed to become universal self-consciousness, reason.

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If the object remained the same, I would remain a consciousness determined in just one way. If the truth of the world were merely sensible, I would remain a sensible consciousness. However, the truth of the world is that the sensible has an inner, its substance, the law, the universal; the species is the truth of sensible being. The object has different determinations, but these do not exist [haphazardly] next to each other. Rather the differentiation of these determinations is a necessary one. There is an essential connection between these determinations such that | the object alters itself in its essential connection with its determinations and proceeds from its immediate (untrue) determinations to its true ones.

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Consciousness itself shows how the object is determined. The latter alters its determinations and this alteration is a necessary progress, a necessary change, a dialectical movement. The sensible alters itself, and the necessity of this alteration is called dialectic. Since the object necessarily alters itself and has the dialectical movement in itself, ~consciousness likewise alters, and thus the dialectic is [self-]moving~11, because the forms of consciousness fall into the object. The progression is such that the I becomes real in its object, and has itself in its object (reality of the concept), and thus is I--idea.

The aim of spirit as consciousness is to make its appearance identical to its essence, and to raise its self-certainty to truth. The self-certainty constitutive of consciousness in general [merges] with the reflection that something is in our immediate consciousness. I know something, have seen something, whether this content be an inner object or an external one. Consciousness is a knowing of something in general, and certainty means that it is in my consciousness, that this content is connected to me. I see this, and it is certain for me that it is. Consciousness means that I relate myself to an object, and this relation is likewise the certainty that I am so related to the object, because it is posited in unity with me, is identical with me. I know the object with as much certainty as I know myself. 12 This is self-certainty. This certainty is to be raised to truth. What is known thus is not yet true. This is the difference between concept and reality. Consciousness in its concept, namely I, is the concept itself in its free but yet abstract existence. Truth is the idea, that reality corresponds to, is adequate to, is identical with its concept, or that what is in the concept also exists. The object is the concept; the closest realization of the concept is self-consciousness, namely, that the I has itself for its object, the higher | truth, or reason. When we know such

^{11.} W reads: also consciousness according to its determinacy is this dialectical movement.

^{12.} W adds: This is the immediate unity of the object with my I.

things in life, as e.g., the light burns, so we also know that such 'truths' are indifferent to spirit, and do not deserve the name of truth.

The existence that spirit has in consciousness is first finite, and finitude is formal. 'Formal' means that only the concept is at first existent to my consciousness. A thing, or a something, is not yet the concept. Thus what I know in my consciousness is only something, a thing, not yet the concept. Objectivity insofar as it is my own and I know it, is a determination of my consciousness. But it is still only abstractly mine; ~I do not yet have the concept of it~.13

The defect of consciousness is that my object is a negation of me, that it has, so to speak, too much objectivity. In self-consciousness the object is the I itself, and here there is too little objectivity. In self-consciousness, the content is entirely mine, but the difference is not yet present and identity is predominant. Both elements belong to the truth: the unity of consciousness (self-consciousness) wherein the concept is I, and the difference of consciousness. The third is the principle of spirit, the freedom of spirit, intuition of itself, reason. In every object as it is, reason has itself and at the same time knows that it is object, that the object exists. ~The process of consciousness is set forth in the phenomenology of spirit.~15

Here we consider only the relation that we call consciousness. Beyond this there is nothing but the logical determination, the determination of the abstract I. Since spirit goes beyond this relation of consciousness and becomes spirit, its determinations become an entirely different type. Right, ethical life belong to further determinations of spirit; but also in these [determinate shapes] spirit is conscious. ¹⁶ Consciousness is everywhere, but it is only a form of spirit, one that is subordinate to higher determinations. Ethical life is the content, the law of willing reason. My spirit is this rational will, and when I personally act unethically, and am punished by the law, I am punished by my own law. I know of this ethical substance, because it is mine. I know that it is, and that it exists in and for itself. ¹⁷ The character of the spiritual is that it has the determination of being at once subjective—I, mine—and also objective—it is. In the relation constitutive of

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^{13.} W reads: The further content of the thing is not yet the concept; I do not yet have the concept, do not yet have myself as concrete consciousness, but only the abstraction that the thing is my object.

^{14.} W adds: The I must be both I and object.

^{15.} W reads: There are three levels that we have to pass through briefly. In the Phenomenology I have given a complete account of this process of consciousness.

^{16.} W adds: But consciousness is a form of spirit in itself, there spirit is consciousness.

^{17.} W adds: without my contribution, eternal in and for itself.

consciousness, the law is negatively opposed to me. \sim In ethical life this contradiction, characteristic of consciousness, is suspended, \sim^{18} but it also falls in this higher sphere that I know this suspension of the contradiction. ¹⁹ In phenomenology we treat not only consciousness, but also the further content of spirit, so far as it falls into consciousness. ²⁰

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1. CONSCIOUSNESS AS SUCH

First we have to consider consciousness as such. The concept is the whole, the universal, and the latter reduces itself to be only one of two sides, constitutes itself an abstraction, as only a particular. In general terms consciousness is (1) immediate sensible consciousness, (2) perceptual consciousness, (3) rational consciousness.

Consciousness is the universal, but still completely abstract; [it is] the universal in its merely simple, immediate relation to itself. The concrete universal is self-mediating through particularity into individuality and singularity. The abstract universality is immediate; thus consciousness is immediate, sensible consciousness. This immediate consciousness has its object immediately before itself as an existing object, as a thing, as particular object that exists on its own. We call immediate consciousness the immediate knowing of an object. I am immediately related to this object. It is identical in me, its content is posited in me. Consciousness includes only the determination that the object is the negative of myself. Consciousness is this [negative] judgment. I, the subject, am this abstraction, consequently the object is also abstract and particular, is reflected into itself, it exists. That is, the object does not exist only in relation to me, but exists on

- 18. W reads: The further content of spirit is distinguished by the fact that the contradiction present at the level of consciousness is dissolved, for example, in ethical life.
- 19. W adds: But all this content occurs also in the form of consciousness.—coercion, ethical life come into my consciousness; I have then to appropriate these, to posit them in my determinate existence.
- 20. [Ed.] The Encyclopedia Phenomenology has a different significance and function than the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. Hegel calls attention to this difference in Encyclopedia §25. The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was the introduction and first part of the system, and began with the most elementary and simple shapes of consciousness and proceeded to show how these developed into philosophical science. In the Encyclopedia, the phenomenology is already part of the system, and so loses its introductory function. As part of the system it is guided by Hegel's conviction that questions concerning concrete cognition in all the spheres of life 'are reducible to simple thought-determinations, which only get their appropriate treatment in the logic.'

its own. It is not merely for an other, it is for itself, an individual. The object has no other determination than that it is. Individuality is the same as what I am, namely, subjectivity but as the negative of my [subjectivity]. The sensible consciousness is the richest of all. With all these senses we are open [to the world]; in every moment we have an entire great picture before us. But these riches contrast with the poverty of the determinations constitutive of [sensible] consciousness. This wealth is nothing more than that the soul, when it becomes I, excludes itself from itself. The soul includes the totality of all determinations | that belong to sensible soul. This content is excluded, we have expelled the entire content of sentience. The I is this pure free [being] and has separated the content from itself. The I is exclusive, and what it excludes is its immediate natural existence, its soul and the determinations of this natural immediacy.

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The Kantian critique has grasped spirit as consciousness. It has to do only with \sim phenomena, \sim^{21} not with the philosophy of spirit. It deals only with the examination of the appearing spirit. Kant thus begins with the view that in our consciousness we have two elements, the one belonging to sensation, (subjective) and the other which is objective—the distinction between phenomena and noumena.²² My sensation (for example of hardness), is subjective affection, but the beginning of liberation occurs when, having expelled the content of sensation, I express it: 'This is hard, something hard.' The one content of these riches belongs to the soul, while the second is a determination²³ of a different kind. To the latter belong determinations such as being, individuality, cause, and effect. These determinations are objective. The wealth of sensible consciousness is a wealth of sensation, but it is the poorest in thought-determinations because the I in its immediate consciousness is still abstract. Ordinary consciousness does not know that the object has the determinations it possesses as noumenon, only through and in relation to me. Ordinary consciousness does not know that the I is the determining [basis]. The object of ordinary consciousness is not consciousness itself, i.e., the relation of the I to the object, but only the object as such.

The first level is consciousness in general which includes the immediate consciousness. There I relate myself to being, I know of being, I am the knowing that is, and this knowing is still immersed in an external or internal | determination of sense. The object is an immediate being. In its first determination it is not yet the whole, but only the simple immediate,

^{21.} W reads: determinations of the phenomenology.

^{22. [}Ed.] Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason B294-315.

^{23.} W adds: determinations of pure abstraction.

only one side of consciousness. The whole is consciousness, the I in relation to the object. More closely considered, the object is a being, a thing, a particular.²⁴ The object contains the determination that it is something that exists for itself, is internally reflected; the being as reflected into itself is something, a thing, or an individual. Thus what stands over against us is this entire knot of logically different determinations.²⁵ It is something that exists for itself, thing and individual.²⁶ All other wealth [of content] belongs partly to our further determinations of thought, and partly to the multiplicity of sense.

What we have to consider here is this fundamental determination and the further progression. ~We have to run through briefly the progression of this category.~²⁷ The object is a singular. In our intuition this singular means a 'here' and 'now'. 28 Sensible objects are such that they exist for us through our senses. What determinations do such objects have? The determination of the sensible is in general immediate singularity.²⁹ The forms of this singularity are space and time; ~the object [Objekt, Gegenstand] is here I to be taken only as something external to the I. But the object is also external to itself. The most immediate determination of the object is that it is. \sim^{30} This freedom of the object to be for itself, to be in itself this totality, it gains for the first time only when it is ~related to spirit. Space is the selfexternality of the object in itself. \sim ³¹ That which exists in time is external to itself, but not at rest or quiescent. Rather its being is essentially connected with the determination of not-being.³² This form of the sensible belongs more narrowly to intuition. What is present in the world, exists, but it is not something enduring. Rather it undergoes change and becomes other. The thing has many attributes; being other in itself thus appears as its attribute.

- 24. W adds: but independent, outside of me.
- 25. W adds: In logic we have to keep these forms distinct; here we do not.
- 26. W adds: This is the first understanding of the objective, that it exists;
- 27. W reads: concerning this we can be brief: (the progression of these categories, etc., belongs to the logic as such).
 - 28. [Ed.] See Encyclopedia §418A. 29. W adds: plurality.
- 30. W reads: These belong to intuition (where they occur).—With now and here, the given is to be taken as external to consciousness. The object exists, that is the next determination. If the given [object] is assumed to be present in space and time, it is taken as an object which is in itself external.
- 31. W reads: related to spirit, raises itself to a higher freedom of spirit in itself.—Here it is now something external in itself because space is a being external to itself, the externality of the object in itself, so that there is an infinite multiplicity posited here and every aspect thereof is posited as independent.—
- 32. W adds: not-being. Being begins through not-being the other, and this being is bound equally to the determination of the not-being. For example, this moment exists only through the past of what preceded it.—

The thing is this simple self-existent, different from the differences that we call attributes. The immediate particular (not as subject) has its difference in itself. This difference, attributes, content are the sensible matter that belongs to sensation, the content of sensation that is posited in this form. Sensations are nothing other than the relation of sensible matter to the I.

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The determinations of sense are now posited in the I itself.³³ The I thus liberates itself from its immediacy, from its sense-predicates.³⁴ In sensible consciousness we have already | transcended the sensible, for when we say that we have a thing before us, a something [etwas], these are thought determinations, qualities of the something that one can bring before one's eyes, but not the something itself. For the animal there is no something, no thing, no particulars.³⁵ The sense determination is for me, i.e., I do this to the sensible, by positing my determinations in it, the determinations of the abstract I. Reflection, which transcends the immediate, is at the same time the content of that which we have before us. We are reflected, and the object of consciousness is likewise reflected in its breadth. This is no longer immediacy, but relation, mediation. The sensible determinacy is posited, not for itself, but as belonging to the thing, as gaining hold by means of the thing, i.e., as having the thing as its bearer. The thing is thus not immediate, but mediated by the I, in the sense that I relate myself to it.

The first determination is being, entity, something. But an entity [exists] as relation, because it exists through an other, and because we have mediation and relation. Consequently, the sensible determinations do not exist for themselves but by means of an other, and have their subject in the thing. So we have before us mediation and relation, no longer the immediate wherein there are two aspects; the one is the essential, and the other has its being only by means of the other. The latter belongs to sensation. Consciousness, since it has the preceding situation as its object, is here called perception. Consciousness has altered itself. The question is, whether the result of this alteration means perception. Perception means this: to exert oneself in examining an object, to take from it its truth, and not merely to know it [passively] as a sensible immediate.

§\$420-1 In perception we proceed from experience, for if one wants to have the object in consciousness as | it actually is, one must not remain

^{33.} W adds: things exist; these have attributes, there is a sensible matter, and it is subordinate to thought;

^{34.} W adds: The soul, as it has determined itself to I, has posited matter as suspended, as having no validity for the I. So it appears in the explication of the sensible.—In the relation, the predicates come to be attributes in the thing; the thing is independent. Thus the object of consciousness is determined in this necessary way.

^{35.} W adds: for these are determinations of thought.

with the immediacy of consciousness but rather take the objects as they are mediated and reflected into themselves. The object as internally reflected (1) contains different determinations which (2) stand in relation to each other. Then the immediacy has disappeared, for since they stand in relation, the one needs the other; the one determination is reflection into itself, the other is a reflection into another. The thing is for itself, reflected into itself, but the attribute is a distinguishing feature or determinacy that has its inner reflection in another. For example, color is reflected not into itself, but in an other, [namely] the thing mediated by the thing, and the thing is independent.

The content of perception is in this way a connection of determinations of immediacy,³⁶ [namely] sensation, and thought-determinations. [It is] something, and the type and manner of the relations of these determinations. We know that something is determined thus and so.

Kantian philosophy has as its object especially the activity of the I in consciousness, not what spirit is in and for itself. Of all the determinations [of the object] only the categories remain to consciousness. These determinations are supposed to belong to thought, to the I. Thus Kant's philosophy is called idealism, particularly in opposition to the Lockean philosophy. Here misunderstandings are prevalent. For example, 'I posit the object, thus whatever I have before me depends on my will.' This is the usual misunderstanding of idealism, which everyone rightly regards as folly. The things themselves in and of themselves find themselves just as we find them, and thus we are unfree in this matter. The one aspect of the object belongs to sensation, and is in this respect subjective, but only in the sense that determinations of sense in general are subjective. They are in us, but since we exist only as soul, so the determinations are immediate; we are so, and the thing is so, and not made so by us. The forms of subjectivity and objectivity have nothing to do with this. In sensation we are generally determined | so, and this is the aspect of our specific determination. That we are determined in an immediate way is the aspect of externality in relation to our freedom, the field of external necessity and unfreedom. Here there is no positing by us.

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The other aspect is that of the category, according to which the object is a noumenon, i.e., a system of thought-determinations. These are relations of thought; consequently they concern us because we are thinking. We refer ourselves to the object, and this is the relation of the object to us: i.e., that which is not our own is [nonetheless] in us and thus determined through

36. [Ed.] There are no additions or variants from Ferdinand Walter between pp. 154–216 of the German edition. The reason is that Walter was unable to attend the lectures because he was called away from Berlin.

us. We are active in these determinations, because they are ours. However, they are not arbitrary but belong to the necessity of thought. This necessity is the objective necessity as Kant also designates it.³⁷ It is objective in itself, without any contrast to the subjective. To find the noumenon requires that we are the determining activity, otherwise it is not possible to find it. This necessary activity is usually confused with arbitrary positing. [But] the positing is an objective one. This insight is very important, an insight that Kant opposed to Lockean philosophy and to the so-called ideology according to which in thought, just as in sensation, we are supposed to be only externally affected.³⁸

Therefore this is the relation for Kant. His philosophy groups these thought-determinations under the category of universality and necessity, and designates both of these the objective, while that which belongs to sensation is called the subjective. This is correct; the contingent and accidental are subjective. Universality is primarily identity with self. But this is not the case in sensation. Necessity is rather a judgment, a difference included in universality, namely, the essential inseparability of differences. Thus crime and punishment are inseparably connected, space and time are inseparable. Necessity does not reside in sense perception; in the latter there is posited only a connection of before and after, and this [temporal sequence] is completely different from necessity. Universality and necessity first exist on the first level of consciousness.

That with which we have to do at present is the level of perception. Through perception we make experiences. Perception is the combination of sensible determinations with thought-determinations, i.e., experience in general. Perception is not yet experience. Here we demand I that there should be a perception that is also universal, and this experience should have necessity. In experience both determinations should always show themselves as connected. And precisely this constitutes experience. It is essential to have this insight, that experience is not reducible to having sensations. For example, a narrative of particular sense perceptions is never physics. To physics belongs universality. If the sciences of empirical experience want to be only perceptual, they do themselves an injustice, for on mere seeing and

^{37. [}Ed.] Hegel refers to Kant's transcendental deduction, Critique of Pure Reason B 138, \$\$17-18.

^{38. [}Ed.] Ideology is the designation for a tendency of philosophical psychology, namely, the sensualistic philosophy connected with Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-80). See Condillac's Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines (Paris: Editions Alive, 1998), 1777. ET. Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, trans. Hans Aarsleff (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also Treatise on the Sensations (Manchester: Clinamen, 2000).

hearing no science can be constructed. Science means to have thought above and beyond sensible particulars.

The domain of philosophy begins wherever thought is present. The fact that thought is present in all empirical sciences authorizes and justifies the existence of philosophy. The dispute is only whether this or that thinking that is used is also correct. To determine whether this is so, philosophy must investigate thought-determinations. If the sciences speak of causes, simplicity etc., philosophy critiques this usage. The entire distinction between philosophy and science turns on the application of categories. The naturalistic use of the categories must be strictly and directly upheld, but the empirical sciences contain more metaphysics than they believe. So much for the general nature of perception.

includes the transition from perception to understanding. Perception is the combination of the sensible and spiritual, of particular and universal, in general a mixture. This mixture consists of heterogeneous elements, and contradictions emerge between these categories themselves, contradictions of which the empirical sciences in their naiveté have no consciousness. The development of these contradictions in the categories belongs to logic. Here the contradiction is that we say (1) things are singulars, objects, and (2) the thing has attributes. These many attributes are the manifold aspects of the thing, that is nevertheless one. But the attributes are not independent, only the thing itself is. Thus the attributes or qualities become accidents. Nevertheless these are found only within sensible perception, not in the I thing itself. But what is found in sense perception is supposed to constitute the ground of experience and to be the substance of the thing. The attributes must therefore be expressed as fixed, and thus they receive the distinction of being matters, particular stuff. All attributes thus become fixed. This is a [further] contradiction, because now the attributes are the enduring element and not the thing. Perception, since it contains both sensible perception and thought-determinations, shows itself to have internal contrasts and contradictions—thing, multiplicity, difference. Attributes, which are distinct from the simple unity of the thing, are taken by themselves as different, independent, and thus signify matter.

The question becomes how this multiplicity relates to unity, how the one relates to the other (for therein lies the unity). Unity remains entirely superficial, it includes manifold determinations. Philosophy in its entirety is nothing but the exhibition and clarification of different types of unity. One must know that matters are nothing [except] what one derives from perception. To be sure, in perception I have brightness, cold, heat, etc., but

I don't have light or heat as something independent before me, but only the heat of a particular body. That heat is something self-subsistent I cannot experience. Plainly I encounter it only in a complex of others. These matters are determinations prepared through thinking, which representation considers in isolation. It is said in physics that such assumptions are necessary otherwise no explanation is possible. But this is an inner assumption of reflection. Take for example, the perception of gold. Where one matter is, another cannot be, so the heating stuff is inserted into the pores. But this matter is again porous, so electrical elements are inserted into it.³⁹ Since these elements are bound up with each other, the unity need not exist, because where one matter exists, the other cannot be. But pores are merely thought-constructs; they are reflections that do not actually exist. This is the contradiction. The immediate consequence is that this sensible thing, when reflection is applied to it, is expressed as something that is not in itself—as appearance. The | immediate result is that the object of perception is selfcontradictory, self-canceling, not self-subsistent, but only appearance.

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But we cannot give up the [idea of] self-subsistent determinacy. I have a being in opposition to me; I make myself objective, I posit it as out there. This is a thought that presupposes itself as the negative of itself, the not-I. This appearance is not the true, but nevertheless the true exists. The true is different from the appearance, but nevertheless it is. Here we have the following doubling: (1) this matter as non-being, as appearance; (2) the matter as being, which is different from the immediate sensible. This true is called the inner [nature] of the thing, and the other in contrast is called appearance. This amounts to a third determination (1) consciousness, (2) the interweaving of reflection in this sensible matter, (3) the separation of the inner from this matter.

This consciousness is what is usually called the understanding. The inner is called the simple quiescent substance, but it is essentially connected with this appearance. The process was that the logical content separated itself from the determination of appearance. The result is the inner. Insofar as it is result, this inner of the thing is a determinate content. The inner occurs especially in the form of force and law. The appearance is essentially a manifold, but it is reflected into the inner, an internal difference. This internal contradiction is a stabilized contradiction; it is a necessary connection, or a law. But this law does not reside on the surface of phenomena; rather it takes great effort to discover this law. These laws are present in phenomena, and phenomena must contradict them. They have at first a simple existence

39. [Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature §296A.

as law; these laws are not behind the appearance, but rather direct the appearance. Nothing can happen in the appearance that is not in the law. Perception contains the contradiction; the law is the first contradiction. The two determinations are inseparable from each other. This inseparability of differences constitutes necessity. I Such a law is found in magnetism: where there is a north pole, there is also a south pole. The being of the one is the being of the other; the one is immediately connected with the other. Thus the being of the north pole is equally its non-being, or the being of the south pole; the being of positive electricity is equally its non-being, the being of negative electricity. The law or essence that would not be in the appearance would not be a law or essence at all. What presents itself in appearance is the law; phenomena are manifestations of the law. Sensible existence is nothing but the self-externalization of the law.

Thus has the object of consciousness determined itself; it is the logical advance of necessity. The logical development is from abstract immediacy to necessity; in this way the object determines itself. The object is rational, a determination and movement of its determinacy. The law is a particular one, and has another contrasting law as its condition. Thus we seek to comprehend the phenomenal world as a realm, a systematization, and so [to comprehend it by means] of laws. This is the third level. From this we make the transition in §423 to the concept of self-consciousness in itself, or for us, namely, that consciousness is essentially self-consciousness. When we consider what we have in lawful necessity, we have found two differences inseparably connected. The unity of these differences is not abstract or empty, but a determinate unity. Determinacy is difference. The concept as such is the unity of differences. Contradiction is thus included in this unity, but it is a suspended contradiction. This unity is entirely different from the previous unity of the multiplicity. Here there is a unity that consists only in immediate difference, which in its determination is this difference differing [from] itself, and is only this disunion, in which the difference both is and yet is suspended, so that the result is just this inseparability itself. Difference is suspended in unity, and the unity [is a unity] of differences that require unity.

If we consider the previous standpoint, consciousness depended only on the I and an other, the negation of the I. Now we discover that the inner difference, i.e., the true | difference, is no difference. The understanding is hard pressed to fathom that the difference is nothing independent. It is well to say that positive electricity refers to negative, but experience always presents the inseparability of the two. Rightly understood, experience shows what the concept is. There is also a level of the reflection of the difference as such; this shows itself also in space—where differences [exist] alongside each other. But

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also here [difference] comes to this form of true existence. Consciousness persists in the belief that both the I and the object are independent. But now it is implicit in the determination of the objective, of the object, and implicit in the determination of consciousness, that the difference [between these] is no difference; thus the difference between consciousness and object has disappeared.

Since consciousness remains and is the I as this active excluding, it still has an object, but this object is determined otherwise, namely as immediately identical with the I. To be sure, the object is an other, but in such a way that its difference is no difference. For us this form—the difference that is no difference—is the truth. It occurs as a particular mode of consciousness among others (if we can call these modes). This is self-consciousness, that I distinguish myself from myself, I have an object, an other, but it is immediately taken back that this is other. The object of which I know is not different from that which knows itself.

2. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

§424 The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness. In humans this occurs in an empirically graded way. Children speak of themselves often in the third person. 40 When they conceive themselves as 'I' this is an important level [of development]. When Fichte's son said 'I' for the first time, he set in motion a great celebration. Thought as thinking activity is 'I'. It is immediately implied that the 'I' is for itself. In each object we distinguish the substance. Attribute is not a suitable expression for this. 'The body is heavy.' This is its substantial nature. With the designation 'attribute' we envision something murkier. Likewise with self-consciousness: this relation to self is I freedom. Self-consciousness is the [abstraction]⁴¹ of freedom in humans.

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I have consciousness; in self-consciousness I am no longer related to an other. I can withdraw my I from all objects and make myself object. The substance of self-consciousness is freedom, I = I. I know myself; this is a tautology; no determinacy, no distinguishing feature, is posited. This substance is still completely abstract, and this freedom is also abstract. I am

^{40. [}Ed.] That children often speak in the third person was noted by Kant, Anthropology, Schriften VII, 127.

^{41. [}Ed.] Gap in the original; completed according to W: Self-consciousness is abstract freedom in humans.

not content to be only I, human actuality has to transcend and go beyond this [abstract] substance to realize it. The difference of consciousness is not satisfied in this [abstract] substance. There must also be a difference. The absence of difference in substance is its abstraction and deficiency. The more precise elaboration of how the difference is posited constitutes the further explication of the levels of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is at first only identity. How can the world proceed from this determination [of abstract identity]? The task of philosophy is to proceed from something certain, and if anything is certain, it is selfcertainty. How the I = I determines itself negatively would be a logical determination from which we are exempted by our procedure. We come to selfconsciousness through the negation of consciousness. Self-consciousness is this abstraction, or freedom, but this is a completely formal freedom, because freedom, as much as it expresses itself as being absolute and unconditioned, nevertheless comes to be through and out of consciousness. Freedom [as unconditioned] nevertheless comes to be through an other, which is its condition. All abstraction is an abstraction from something, and this something is itself necessary for the abstraction. The abstraction cannot be without that from which it is abstracted. This is the idea that is concrete in itself, wherein the 'something' is already included in this universal. The idea includes this something, this distinguishing feature, in its relation to itself. The distinguishing feature of the something is no longer opposed to it. In what has been pointed out the one-sidedness of the standpoint is included: I = I. The I = I, since | it is abstract, is a form, a distinguishing feature, a limit; consequently it is not freedom. Freedom is not something limited. Therefore we have to assume the self-consciousness in relation to the consciousness. Self-consciousness thus exists as the contradiction between itself as free-

dom and itself as consciousness. It is not yet free, for it relates to an object and is dependent [on it]. Self-consciousness is itself the consciousness of this contradiction of its consciousness. Self-consciousness is free in itself, and at the same time consciousness. It is entangled in this contradiction. Self-consciousness is conscious of the contradiction of its consciousness. Further, self-consciousness is the certainty of itself in contrast to consciousness. We see that consciousness means to cancel and suspend itself, to turn back into self-consciousness. Consciousness is not merely for self-consciousness; rather in the concept of self-consciousness there also is the fact that what self-consciousness relates itself to (its consciousness), is a negative aspect. Thus there is still only the appearance of the contradiction, and the move-

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ment of self-consciousness is to suspend this contradiction, as was also the case in the process of development of consciousness. More precisely, the

development of self-consciousness has this significance: to be the suspension of the appearance of a contradiction. More closely considered, self-consciousness is the drive to become what it implicitly is, to posit itself as that of which it is already certain.

Consciousness is relation to an object. Self-consciousness—in desire we relate ourselves to an object, this is the aspect of consciousness, but at the same time, desire is not a theoretical, peaceful, consciousness of an object: rather it is the conviction that what for consciousness is an existent is at the same time implicitly a nullity in itself. Consciousness is the drive to suspend this appearance of its relation to an other, and to posit this other in identity with itself, to know itself as that in relation to which this object is no longer an other, but is suspended in self-consciousness and united with it. The drive is an inner unrest; I am certain of myself, but in this certainty | there is at the same time a negative lack, and needs. This deficiency exists both in me and at the same time as an object external to me. This negation is a contradiction to my self-consciousness. I have the conviction of my freedom, of my infinite being at home with myself. This is the truth, my relation to myself. In this way it is certain that this object which remains external to me is no longer something independent, no longer a being over and against me. I have the certainty of the truth of my identity with myself in contrast to the appearance that I am dependent. Thus I realize my truth. I suspend the difference that is present in my consciousness and satisfy myself in myself. This is self-consciousness as we have it in our representation. Self-consciousness is essentially a process initiated by the contradiction of consciousness that is bedeviled with a negation, with an other. This is the realization of selfconsciousness. Self-consciousness as such is an empty freedom. Through this process it gives itself content, coincides with itself, gives itself objectivity and makes itself actual. Self-consciousness proves its freedom in relation to its consciousness, and this is at the same time realization, since it gives itself an objectivity that is identical with subjectivity. Self-consciousness realizes the formalism of its freedom, the I = I, appropriates the implicit objectivity, and makes the latter its own. Such is the process and drive of self-consciousness to realize itself and suspend the disunion constitutive of consciousness. The drive is the certainty of its infinite identity with itself and the certainty of the disunion constitutive of consciousness, against which self-consciousness brings about its truth, [namely] to be identical with itself. As we saw, the existent shows itself not to be different; this difference is what consciousness knows. There is an object, but this object is something null in itself. Consciousness has only itself in its object; it knows that the determination of the object is only to be for it.

Self-consciousness has three forms (1) desire, (2) relation of mastery and servitude, (3) the determination of self-consciousness as universal. First, an object exists immediately for I the self-consciousness; self-consciousness is an individual, and is confronted by an object in general. The second moment is that the object is also a self-consciousness. There are two self-consciousnesses, both free, and free in relation to each other, but in such a way that they have not yet recognized each other, and so each in its own existence does not yet know the other as itself. The third moment is that the [mutual] recognition is brought about. Each in its personality is for itself, but at the same time in its conduct shows that the other counts likewise as a free self-consciousness.

The concept of self-consciousness is at first immediate. The universality of the concept exists at first in the form of immediacy. The universality of the concept is itself only form-thus it is immediate. It is self-consciousness in its particularity and immediacy. It is desire, because it is this contradiction between itself as infinite certainty of itself, and itself as consciousness that is mediated in and by something other. I am free, self-consciousness in relation to my consciousness. Consequently this negation, which appears as an external object, is annulled. The lack in me appears as an external object. The latter is only something that is not an end in itself and has no absolute independence. The object has thus proven itself to be without independence in self-consciousness. This is the standpoint of desire. In desire there is drive, and drive still appears in the form of consciousness as object. We appropriate this to ourselves so that it does not exist any more and no longer is for itself. The object is posited together with us, but not in a chemical fashion. We are the enduring, abiding, self-preserving element. But the object is not preserved. Here the third is the first. Acid in salt is no longer present, no longer has the quality of being acid, but here [in selfconsciousness] the one is the free self that preserves itself, that remains in its identity with itself. The other loses its independence, it must subject itself and coincide with us.

This is what occurs even in animal desire; the animal has the feeling that it can become master over external things. It does not believe in the being and independence of external things, rather it believes that they have their being relative to it. The concept of the thing is that it is something to be used, negated, worn out. Things exist; this is in consciousness, but even animals have the feeling that these things are not absolutely independent beings. Desire proceeds from this conviction, namely that things are null in themselves. If I believed I that things have as strong and independent a being as I have in my self-feeling, it would be folly to apply myself to things.

\$427 The object can offer no resistance to this activity; I am self, I am free, and this is something entirely different than the being of external things. The progressive determination of consciousness is that the object reduces itself to appearance and to an inner in which consciousness finds itself. This is the negative nature of things. This concept, which was our concept, exists in desire. Things are implicitly such as to make themselves into [mere] appearance. Now I fulfill in them what their own judgment is. This negative self-referential negativity is freedom. This determination of the things is what they are in themselves, their end, their concept, their truth. Thus external things receive what is due them. Desire is the first and lowest level of self-consciousness (I am restricted therein; I cannot consume the sun).

The movement, the process of immediate self-consciousness. Through the suspension of the external object, self-consciousness is at home with itself, related to itself. It has posited consciousness as identical with itself through the suspension of the immediacy of the object. The product of this process is that the subject has preserved itself, the object is suspended, as is the one-sidedness of the subject that was its defect. Self-consciousness has preserved itself. Preservation means its bringing itself forth by means of the suspension of negation. It has preserved itself only as particular, and thus it reverts to the determination that we previously saw, [namely] desire. This determination of being an individual self-consciousness is desire. Desire, considered in this relation to object and from the perspective of the object, is the negation of the object, the negation of a selfless, null, mere appearance. This being of the object counts in the concept only as appearance. There remains nothing of the object, it is consumed. Desire is in relation to the object self-seeking and destructive; it goes only after the preservation of itself as a singular. I

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But there is a further transition. I, the self-consciousness, coincides with itself and thus is for itself an actual self-consciousness. For us this certainty was first of all. With this certainty self-consciousness is concerned with the object. Now this certainty of the unity of itself and the objectivity, exists for itself as a determinate [certainty], not only as the objectivity constitutive of abstract certainty. [However] in A = A, the difference does not receive its due, [for] the difference, as soon as it is supposed to be posited, has disappeared. The self-consciousness is for itself a unity that is also objective. The objectivity is posited in self-consciousness for self-consciousness. It is for itself [...]⁴² and since now the determination of consciousness enters, the

object is posited henceforth also as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is satisfied; it is for itself this unity of subjectivity and objectivity. In this determination it is two consciousnesses. The difference, that which is distinguished from it, is an object. But the foundation, the fundamental determination of this level is that the object is identical with the subject. It is identity, but no longer abstract identity like A = A. Insofar as self-consciousness is consciousness, there is an object [ein Gegenstand] something that stands over against it, an object [ein Objekt]. But the object now has the determination of being identical with and inseparable from the subject, of being united with it, objectivity connected with subjectivity. The object is now determined so that it is another object that is likewise a being that is opposed to an other—the form of consciousness. This object has so determined itself that it is in itself subjective, i.e., a self-consciousness.

The self is satisfied and free in this objectivity. Peace is established. It excludes its own concept, its own distinguishing feature, from itself, and therefore relates itself to a free object (§429). In this free object the I has itself for its object, and this I is at the same time a free subject, a person.

On this second level of self-consciousness I have myself affirmatively in the object. On the [previous] level of desire, the determination of the object is negative against me, an other to me. Now the determination of the content is [another] freedom, I, so I have myself | affirmatively therein. The concept of self-consciousness is now realized. There are two real, independent beings confronting each other. I have the [other] I as object. This infinite selfrelation that is the I, is my object. However, this perfect undifferentiatability [Ununterscheidbarkeit] is equally the most perfect difference. The I is an existent, another self and person. It is universal, and yet exclusive, negative, self-relating. It is a personal being, but the being of personality is the hardest. The I is impenetrable, to which no resistance is equal. In this identity, this undifferentiatability, both are nevertheless absolutely distinguished from each other. They are both personally, absolutely independent, and nevertheless they are for each other. Thus I know that the other is an I, but in its appearance it confronts me like a thing, like something completely external to me. This is the highest contradiction—the most perfect indifference towards each other, and [yet] perfect unity and identity. The suspension of the contradiction—for it cannot remain a contradiction is the process of recognition.

§430 I am for myself, and the other is also free, an I. I know this, this is certain, but I do not yet know the other I as free, and do not recognize the other's freedom. To recognize something is to know it in its determinacy and development—that as concrete it is free (in itself). But such knowing

requires that the other manifest his freedom in a concrete way, that his freedom be developed and made explicit. This development of concrete freedom, wherein freedom first becomes actual, is being for myself through the negation of immediacy. Mediation occurs through self-relation, that I suspend my immediate being and exist for myself through the negation of immediacy. If I am to recognize the other as free, I must have before me the other in his development and process, which is freedom itself. Then I allow the other to count as free, I express myself thus: 'that is free'. But the other is equally an I, and nothing counts more for me than it does for the other. Recognition is therefore two-sided, mutual. Mutual recognition is the realization and suspension of the contradiction that the other [appears] to be opposed to me as an immediate being, and that I likewise appear to the other as immediate. Therein I appear as something sensible, as a thing, and not as free.

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This contradiction is suspended through the negation of immediacy. I Through this negation of immediacy there arises a distinction of my freedom from my life, from the particularity that constitutes my self, from the immersion in the sensible, and from self-seeking. Since two Is are related here, the I is implicitly the universal. This universality is different from my immediate particularity and life wherein all these peculiarities and corporeities are comprehended. This universality that I have is supposed to suspend this contradiction, which as particularity is absorbed in desire through the negation of its immediacy. This is the general determination.

A self-consciousness is for another self-consciousness (universality), and each is immersed in corporeity and is sensuous. Through such immersion in particularity they are distinguished from each other. The mediation is a process of the relation of two self-consciousnesses that exist for each other as immediate, and that do not yet recognize each other.

\$431 This relation of two self-consciousnesses is a struggle. I know myself immediately in an other, [but] I cannot know myself immediately as myself so far as the other is a body immersed in its desires and has a will and interests different from my own. I am directed towards the suspension of this immediacy different from me. My immediacy is connected with me; I am immersed in it, I hold on to my immediacy and am directly bound to it. Insofar as I am directed towards an immediacy, I am directed towards the immediacy of the other. But in recognition I proceed through the negation of my immediacy, I must also be recognized. This process must be mutual. In immediacy I am directed towards the suspension of my immediacy, not directly, but indirectly, through going after the death of the other. But at the same time I place my own life in jeopardy. I cannot will to give up my

own life because it is my life, my body. Rather the negation of immediacy is something alien, an other opposed to me, and a process of being compelled.

I coerce, but it is equally the case that coercion is directed against me. This coercion must likewise be voluntary, that is, I must voluntarily place my life in danger. My self-consciousness and self-certainty, my freedom—and the fact that my life is here distinguished from these I provides proof of my freedom—become thus uncertain, just as I make the life of the other likewise uncertain. But since I know myself to be free, the uncertainty of my life is posited in me. If both mutually annihilate each other, recognition would not come about, [although] the dead person gains freedom [in the sense] that whoever falls in battle, dies as a free man. But this would only show that both were indifferent to life. The superiority of freedom over life would be realized, but the basic condition on which recognition depends would be lost.

§433 gives one solution, which is the proximate resolution of this contradiction. The free will is supposed to demonstrate in its determinate existence that it is a free will, so that it can be recognized as such. The freedom of the will is to be demonstrated, and the distinguishing feature of this demonstration is the placing of one's immediate existence in danger. The negation, placing oneself in danger, carried out to the end, is death. However, life, wherein freedom is supposed to show and prove itself, is also entitled to recognition. Freedom is supposed to have a determinate existence, that is, freedom is supposed to be recognized. But for recognition life itself is required; the one element is just as essential as the other. The mediation in which these determinations receive their due, is given in §433. One of those engaged in struggle prefers life to death, and gives up his attempt to prove himself as free will and to be free for himself in his consciousness. The other self-consciousness holds on to its freedom, to its free self-consciousness, and is recognized by the other, who is subdued. Thus we have the state of being recognized of a person who has placed his life in danger and shown himself to be indifferent to his own life, his own immediacy. He is recognized as free by the other. The other is the one in which the other determination—the preservation of life—is affirmative, and is posited not in a negative way, but rather, as an essential moment. In this relation both moments are posited, but in such a way that they are divided between the two self-consciousnesses, so that the totality does not exist on each side. This constitutes the relationship of mastery and slavery.

This is the external manner in which states have arisen. The one customary way that is originally at the same time natural is [through] the family, namely, the patriarchal mode of living together. Although the [patriarchal]

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family is a moral person, it is nonetheless simply one person against the others, for whether it is one person | or a particular self-consciousness is a matter of indifference. The original element is that they come into community, and the first way in which they arrive at community is through force. We have acquired our insights from the states; we ourselves would prefer to unite in an alternative way.) All states have originated in force, and this subjugation, domination, whose course we have seen, is thoroughly necessary, legitimate, and just. This struggle must take place because the self-consciousness must be for another self-consciousness, and the individual must come into relation to another. This has been called a social drive, 44 but in fact it is reason, the unity of self-consciousness.

The fundamental point is that this unity must be realized, and it can be realized only in the self-consciousness of other individuals. The material in which the I, freedom, can be realized, can only be another selfconsciousness. The latter self-consciousness is the reality, objectivity, and the externality of the I and its freedom. Self-consciousnesses, when they come to themselves, are free, but only implicitly. If they are to preserve this freedom in their relations, and count as free, they must both have demonstrated their freedom: they must present their freedom as actual and concrete through this struggle, and they must prove their indifference and preparedness to sacrifice their capability, their immediacy, existence. This is the state of nature. Insofar as self-consciousnesses confront each other as immediate, force is what counts. In principle, in themselves they are free, but they relate to each other only externally because they are not yet recognized. Their relation is such that they are merely immediate particulars confronting each other, alien in their existence, and force arises when the implicit necessity comes to me as something alien. Inwardly they are free, but they are not yet free in their relationship.

The origin of states is nothing historical: to history belongs education and cultivation, which first occur in the progressive development of states.

^{43. [}Ed.] The claim that all states historically developed through force is found in nearly all modern philosophies of right. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, Bk III; John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, Second Treatise §103; Kant, Appendix of Explanatory Remarks on the Metaphysical Foundations of Right, Schriften VI, 370-2.

^{44. [}Ed.] For social drive, cf. Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Prolegomena §§6, 8 (ET: The Law of War and Peace (Birmingham, AL: Gryphon, 1984)); Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Lib. II, Cap. III, §15, in dependence on Cicero, DeLegibus I, Kap. 5. [Pufendorf, ET: Of the Law of Nature and Nations, ed. Leonard Lichfieldand Basil Kennett (Oxford: Printed by L. Lichfield for A. and J. Churchil, R. Sare, R. Bonwicke, W. Freeman, T. Goodwyn (and 7 others in London), 1710). Cicero, ET: The Republic; and The Laws, trans. N. Rudd, J. G. F Powell, and others (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)]. Hobbes strenuously disputed this thesis, De cive. I.2.

But as far as the origin of extant states is concerned, we discover that the origin includes a patriarchal element, and the other element that belongs to it is force. The immediate self-consciousness is self-seeking in its desire, and desire is directed towards its immediate particularity. Under such conditions struggle is justified. Reason demands that reciprocal recognition be the result. But violent struggle constitutes only the phenomenal⁴⁵ | origin of the state, not its substantial principle. On the contrary, whatever pushes the state towards the establishment of force and arbitrariness gradually makes itself superfluous through the development of reason. We must distinguish between the apparent beginning [of the state] and its genuine originating principle. We find the relation of mastery and slavery in the patriarchal condition. In earlier times those who were subjugated became the slaves of others. There is a [kind of] community posited here-the master has only property and the slave has none. The slave is not even his own owner. The slave is not his own, not free for himself; he has subordinated his freedom to his life and has no will of his own. He has recognized the will of the other, and is a thing for the other, and so belongs to the other-this is a community based on needs and their satisfaction.

This is not a universality that would be recognized in and for itself, [namely a community based on] right or justice, but [merely] a community [based on ownership]. The slave is a means, and indirectly for the preservation of such means slaves must be cared for; and thus the slave becomes a relative end. An interest to form objects arises which provides the possibility of satisfying desire. Concern to preserve this activity is what holds master and slave together. The slave's end is his own self-preservation, he has preferred life [to freedom]. The slave's direct end is an indirect end for the master. The feature of this community is that only one will is present, namely, the subjugation of the slave to the will of the master. This sort of community is an external universality. Concern for many needs introduces the understanding of having the possibility of satisfying the needs [via the slave]. This possibility [also] rests upon objects that produce general satisfaction, not just for the present, but for an extended period of time, thus land, agriculture, and the like. This is the manner in which universality intrudes into the sphere of needs, desire, of individual will, for the universal is the substance of the I.

The master has his self-consciousness and his recognition in others, such that he has certainty; he is known as free subject. However, the intuition of this freedom in an other is still incomplete [because] it is a one-sided

recognition. The master is known by the other as free, as independent will, but he is known only by a self-consciousness in a formal sense, I not one that is a free or independent will in itself. Thus only a formal recognition is attained, but this is not a substantial recognition by an independent free consciousness as free self-consciousness [as such].

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The slave suspends his inner immediacy, which consists of desire and of self-seeking; these are concerned only with his immediate particularity. With this suspension, the slave makes the transition to the universal selfconsciousness. The essential element of this transition falls on the side of the slave. Desire and the satisfaction of desire comprehend the whole of life, but desire has yet another dimension, namely it exists at the same time as will. The will as a desiring will is only sensuous, particular and selfseeking. The bravery of the master, the freedom that he demonstrates, is only a demonstration at the level of the natural immediacy of desire, since the master puts his life at stake. However the master does not negate desire in its inner dimension, nor does he negate self-seeking or the particularity of the will. The suspension of the self-seeking particularity of the will occurs in the slave, who fears the master. This fear has an inner dimension: it is the consciousness of powerlessness, the dependence of my external particular existence. [Such powerlessness extends to] everything that belongs to natural desire and the dependent dimension of the human being. All this can be taken from me; my life itself can be taken from me. When I will this dimension and am immersed in it, I become conscious that it does not belong to my independent side, that there is nothing fixed or stable in it, but rather it can be made independent against me. This consciousness of negativity is freedom, and the fear of the lord as higher is the beginning of wisdom.⁴⁶ Thus the particular will toils in service of the master. It can endure all possible deprivations, but this strength relates only to the transitoriness of immediate individuality. In service the immediate will of desire and of satisfaction toils, i.e., the will purifies itself. This is what the slave has endured.

Through obedience one learns to command. This means to acquire power over the contingency of one's desires, and the | true command consists in what is just and rational—in such rational and just commands one receives obedience from others. [In this obedience] there is a negation of inner self-seeking, and with this negation of particularity the will emerges as a universal.

The self-seeking will of the slave is thus checked and restrained. This restraint appears at first as something effected by an [alien] power, as obedience to an alien will. The restraint of the self-seeking will is obedience. States have started with despotism, tyranny, but this initial period is followed by a time where force makes itself superfluous. After Solon had given his laws, Pisistratos set himself up as a tyrant, but without overturning Solon's laws. Precisely because the Athenians under him had to obey these laws they became accustomed to them. Obedience is thus at first negative, but then it becomes something affirmative. The affirmative [element] is self-knowledge. That which is now known is something immediate and habitual; it no longer has the determination of being desire or self-seeking. Rather it is a selfknowledge in which the immediacy of desire has been worked off. It is a self-knowledge in which the condition of sensuous individuality or selfseeking is negated. In this higher self-knowledge there is a correspondence with the concept, namely the I = I. In the realization of self-consciousness, the other I has done away with its self-seeking. Thus the other is there not as a mere particular, but as a universal free [being]. On the one hand the subjugation of the will appears to be unfreedom. However this is the unfreedom of a subject that is itself implicitly unfree, and conscious of its unfreedom. True freedom does not mean that the arbitrary will is let loose or allowed free rein. The will in the determination of universality is now the other will, which self-consciousness obeys. The self-consciousness obeys another will, but this will is a free will liberated from particularity. Through obedience, the negation of the particular self-seeking will, the will achieves the determination of being a universal will. The self-consciousness now knows itself no longer as a particular and has the determination of universality immanent in it. To educate an individual means nothing other than to cultivate him through obedience, I so that he no longer obeys any external will. A child still has the arbitrary will of self-seeking particularity; in obedience this self-seeking is checked and restrained. Beyond self-seeking there is the universal lawful will. Through obedience the particular will becomes this universal will.

acquire sufficient power and ability to be free themselves. Then they know that they are inherently free. This is the determination to which we have come. This determination is again present as consciousness, that is, that another self-consciousness is object, but in such a way that I am free in the

Likewise, peoples must first pass through a great oppression until they

consciousness of the freedom of my self-consciousness, so that I obtain and preserve my freedom in the other self-consciousness. Thus in order for me to have self-consciousness, it is necessary to know myself in an other. I lose my

self-consciousness in an other, but I also know myself affirmatively precisely in the other. Here the limit or restriction that previously was immanent in desire and self-seeking is canceled.

Self-consciousness thus reaches beyond itself; it continues in an other self-consciousness so that there are no longer two self-seeking individuals opposed to each other; rather there is a single self-consciousness, and thus it is a universal self-consciousness. Insofar as it is a particular it is separate from the other. These abstract determinations are present in much more concrete forms. The substance of this self-consciousness is the universality of a self-knowledge that leaves behind self-seeking [particularity] and that continues itself in union with the other. This condition is found in love. I exclude all others, and precisely because I am this singularity, I am no longer a self-seeking I but a free self-consciousness that knows itself in an other, and since I know this, I know myself to be identical with myself.

All the virtues have this foundation, as does love. Goethe says, if obedience is in the heart, love will not be far away, ⁴⁷ which means that if the limits of exclusive self-seeking particularity are suspended, then self-consciousness [exists] in the determination of universality and as an individual is free. Obedience is the negative determination directed against self-seeking. Since the human being appears to lose himself, I he cannot endure in his isolation but is in need of another consciousness. Thus he loses himself [in another]. But precisely in this condition of self-externality [Aussersichsein], of being outside himself, he gains his substantial self-consciousness.

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This [condition of self-externality, of being beyond oneself] is the condition of being recognized. In an ethical totality such as a family or a state, all are recognized. Thus the struggle for recognition has disappeared. In the family, the child that is weak and without desert is nevertheless recognized. In society all citizens are recognized and count as free. The freedom of every individual exists only insofar as he is recognized as free by the others, and the others have in him the consciousness of their own legitimacy, [that they count for him]. In a rightful situation, every person counts, because he allows everyone else to count as free. I am free insofar as the others are free, and I let them count as free just as they let me count as free. In love and friendship this [counting] is more at the emotional level, but in civil society I count as an abstract person without regard to my subjective peculiarities.

This is the realization of consciousness as self-consciousness, and then the realization of immediate self-consciousness as universal consciousness,

^{47. [}Ed.] A literal citation from Goethe, Der Gott und die Bajadere, Werke, I, 274, ll. 40-1. ET: Goethe's Collected Works (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

namely, that I as I absolutely exist as free, not according to my self-seeking, but according to my universal nature. My knowledge of my universality is realized, since I know the other as free, not only in the comparison my self-consciousness has in others, but in the other I know myself, and in the other I have my self-consciousness concretely. This is the self-consciousness that is objective, the universality existing in and for itself. There is a mediation, but one that has suspended what was [previously] one-sided in the mediation. For the other self-consciousness is no longer other; I know myself therein by means of the other, and this mediation is suspended, for in the other I know myself.

3. REASON

The definition of reason is as follows: [to be] subject, but [without being merely subjective]. Reason is subject in such a way that it has an object [Gegenstand], but this object is the I itself. | This object [Gegenstand] is an other, an object [Objekt], but this object [Objekt] is the universal that includes all determinations in itself. Consequently in all this content I have myself and am free therein. The object is universal and as such it includes the content of my self-consciousness, the subject. I am the certainty of the subject in its development within itself, such that this development of itself is objective, and that these determinations are determinations of my being. The things are just as my thoughts are. I do not have this certainty as a particular self-seeking subject, but as a subject that has raised itself to universality in itself. Spirit is nothing other than reason under the form of knowing. Spirit has objects, but knows with certainty that these objects allow of being known. The being that things have is not true; but I can penetrate their surface. When I recognize and know them, they are my determinations, and my determinations and my thoughts are immediately objective. This is the certainty possessed by spirit, when it sets out to know things.

The spirit is first soul, then I. The final determination is that the subject is not only this particular subject, but the unity of both particularities—the subject and the object, or spirit. The I or the subject is thus determined as universal; the object is universal in itself, and this is its truth. Spirit knows this object does not merely exist but is rational. This relation has two aspects that coincide: I relate myself to the object, which is determined as object in contrast to the subject, for the object is different from its other. The substantial universality of reason has the determination of being this unity, such that in the relation of the subject to the object, the particularity

of the subject in opposition to the object falls away. Thus the subject is free in the object. The object has the same content that the subject has. This is the freedom of spirit in general. The object is determined, and the subject, consciousness also has a particular content. According to its content, particularity is opposed [to consciousness]. But since self-consciousness determines itself to universality, it is thinking in general. Since the I has also raised itself to the form of universality by negating its particularity and self-seeking, its content is likewise of a | universal nature. This universality of the nature of the object and of spirit means that universality is the concept, that its content includes immanent self-determination, which [in turn] includes reason and self-consciousness. This means that the content includes difference, that the content is in itself different, yet in this difference the diverse elements are utterly interconnected and inseparable. The rationality of the content as such means that the particularities previously subject and object, now particularities in general—are at the same time no longer [merely isolated particulars] and that the differences are equally identical. The content [still] includes particularization, but in such a way that the difference of particularization is only a suspended difference. The rationality of spirit is certain of finding its content in the world, of having nothing alien or impenetrable before it. Spirit says to the world: you are reason of my reason. 48 It knows that it encounters nothing in the world besides its reason, its universality, that its content is the object. From this perspective, [the certainty of] spirit is the relation of freedom [towards the world]; it is the certainty that the content of the world is likewise implicitly rational. The will determines itself; it gives itself a content, and this content is the determinacy of reason. Spirit determines itself, this is the content of the rational, and with that the content is itself also rational. The rationality of the content means that the content is the concept and that its aspects are only moments within a coherent whole, a system; that they are moments of a system means necessity. The content is, to be sure, determinate, but its determinacy is posited of through a diremption of the unity.

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Spirit is soul, consciousness, and the fact that spirit is these, exists as spirit for spirit, so that in all differences spirit preserves itself in the object. This confidence is rooted in its consciousness of its universal rationality. Spirit is the knowing of the totality, which is equally subjective and objective in it. Such differences belong only to the appearing spirit that has not yet triumphed over this object about which consciousness is confused. As rational, spirit is originally and essentially reconciled in itself.

48. [Ed.] A paraphrase of Genesis 2: 23.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

The I is soul, and as such it is feeling. Since I am feeling, I am also consciousness and make this object objective, but as spirit I regard this object as a moment of the totality, I of the entire nexus which is reason, and reason is my very nature. With spirit we do not begin with an immediate affection; we do not have an abstract external object, nor do we begin with self-consciousness, the abstract I = I. [Rather] spirit is the evolution of reason, and this [evolving] rationality is what spirit is. Or rather, since reason appears as something out there [in the world], spirit is the consciousness that this world is rational, that spirit finds in the world its own thought-determinations and the system of its thought. It is with this confidence and certainty of [the world's] rationality that spirit begins.

PSYCHOLOGY

Spirit is essentially infinite in that it has suspended the opposition. It no longer has a limit in its object because it knows the object as rational. But spirit is also finite, insofar as spirit, as consciousness, does not grasp what it implicitly is, namely its reason. It has not yet made its reason into its object, does not yet realize that the world is rational, and has not developed reason as its object in its totality. The finitude of spirit consists in the nonequality between what it is in itself and what it is for itself, or what it is [implicitly as] consciousness, and what it is explicitly as [its own] object. Reason is the substance of what becomes the material, the content of its knowledge. Reason is the difference: The one [aspect of reason] is that reason exists in the form of being. Reason is eternally at rest in itself, absolute truth, peaceful, unclouded clarity. The other [aspect of reason] is the [act of] differentiation itself, and the being of this difference, this activity, is knowing. By knowing we understand the pure form, the pure activity wherein knowing and its content are distinguished. Herein lies the finitude of spirit.

[However] the infinite form of reason is that both elements are implicitly identical. Reason is the activity of distinguishing itself in itself, of differentiating itself into a system of totality, to | a plenitude where differences do not become [utterly] free but remain moments in the unity. The differentiation is in the substance, but the leading [of difference] back to unity and preserving it in unity is the form; this self-relating form is knowing. This is the particularity that in spirit is totality. Spirit in its difference is the absolute, highest difference, the difference in the pure form that relates itself to itself. But spirit likewise eternally suspends this difference.

We first grasp spirit as immediate; what is true, is true only insofar as it returns to itself, and in bringing itself forth, spirit becomes for itself [returns to itself]. It is negation, self-determination, self-differencing, and the negation of this negation; this is the affirmation that has been brought

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forth as affirmation. Thus spirit must oppose itself to itself as soul; the final [phase] is the true wherein spirit first exists—to distinguish itself from itself, to differentiate itself as soul—spirit is true only as this process of distinguishing itself from itself, opposing itself, and positing reason as its own. Spirit is first of all immediate spirit with an opposition constituted thus: knowing posits the rational in opposition to itself; the rational is 'out there'. The aim of spirit is to posit this rational 'out there' as its own. It has the faith that this [external] reason is its reason. Its doing is to posit this reason initially distinguished from it, as its own [als das Seinige], so that the rational is what it brings forth opposite itself as its own. Here lies the distinction between theoretical spirit and practical spirit.

When spirit begins, it is not yet reason conscious of itself. It is not cognition in the beginning; it is true spirit only in the end. In its beginning spirit possesses only the faith [that the world confronting it is rational]; it has reason confronting it, and regards truth as something yet different and separate from it. Thus arise's the theoretical spirit; it has a world opposite itself, but it approaches the world with the faith that the world is rational. Spirit is a drive that includes determination and content in itself. This content is reason, but reason has not yet taken shape for spirit and is still not yet posited as identical with spirit. An ignorant human being is [still capable of] knowing; he knows and yet in himself knows nothing. He is a contradiction, and yet because he is a unity he has the drive to suspend this contradiction. An ignorant human being is theoretical | spirit that wants to become acquainted with reason, and to the extent that he becomes acquainted with reason, he possesses it.

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Spirit is objective reason, reason in and for itself. Now it is reason as consciousness, knowing, but the opposition has disappeared. Reason that knows [itself] is spirit. Knowing is the infinite form. Spirit is intelligence as knowing. The movement of spirit is thus: it posits its concept as identical with itself to make knowing substantial, to fill itself with reason, or conversely, to make a determinate existence into something known, something that has determinate existence and exists as reason. Reason, which is spirit in and for itself, and of which spirit is conscious in its existence, is the concept. Its [self-] knowledge constitutes the actuality of reason existing in and for itself. This is the highest mode of existence, the absolute form, the pure relation—infinite relation to self, the being-for-self of the universal, or the relation of the universal to itself. The reality of reason is knowledge. The laws, the ethical in and for itself, are reason that realizes ethical life and exists in the citizens. The latter are the matter—the material—in which reason gives itself existence. Citizens exist truly only when they

fill themselves with the substantial. The law is inert without the subject in which it achieves actuality. The intelligence is the infinite form in which reason gives itself existence and through which certainty becomes truth.

§442 The progress of spirit is development. Development is different from alteration or change. In change something disappears; an other is posited in its place, and both elements are opposed to each other. In contrast, spirit develops itself, and in this development nothing alien enters. Thought involves a change of representation, but this is merely a superficial, external way of regarding the matter. Spirit develops itself; thus its particularity, limitation, and determinacy change, but spirit itself does not change when it advances, but preserves itself in the process. Spirit is the activity of producing, and what it posits is its own. When we consider spirit as knowing, then knowing in itself is identical with reason. In its progress spirit produces only itself in order to become objective for itself, in order to know, and | what it knows is its reason. This bringing forth of spirit is not the doing of the particular subject, as if reason were a matter of its arbitrary will or its talent; rather the idea of the arbitrary will must disappear.

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This development is a bringing forth of what is in itself necessary. It is reason itself that undergoes development. Spirit has the certainty of reason, but this certainty is at first implicit; it must become worked out and explicit. What positing and producing are, appears likewise as an act of taking in, so that spirit is filled out in its development, so that the development—[the positing, the producing and the taking in]—is explicit for spirit itself. This is the first form—namely, that it is filled—that this comes about. But we are already beyond the opposition of something standing over and against us as a being. The two determinations are one and the same: spirit has the certainty of reason, and does not need to overcome either of the finitudes with which it begins. The finitude [of knowing] means that spirit is only implicit, that it possesses only the certainty but not yet the truth of rationality. This rationality is implicitly its own rationality. What is implicit is the inner, and the activity is to make it external, to set forth the development, so that spirit knows this implicit inner, and so that it is object for spirit itself.

The implicit is the inner, and becomes posited for spirit itself. Being-in-itself [Ansichsein] also has in itself the form of immediacy: what is implicit appears as something external. Therefore this rationality is the inner, but this is supplemented [supplient] by the opposite one-sidedness, namely that reason is something given, something present in existence. If we start with the determination of knowing, this is the other side, namely that the development of spirit appears thus: spirit is something found, discovered, [Gefundenes], transformed into being [das Seiende]. Spirit is a

being, an existent, but not as in consciousness; it is an existent with the certainty that actual being [das Seiende] is not a being [ein Sein], but rather has the determination that it is rational. Being can be filled with any possible content, because it is abstract. When it is so filled, it is concrete, reason itself. This is the sense of this development and the form that this advance takes.

What happens is only a translation, the formal transition into manifestation, that reason exists for me, such that I know about it, that I know that it is, and the human being has the faith that reason is actual. I When he recognizes reason's presence he obtains truth. He has nothing else to do but to appropriate this recognition as his own, and thus he comes into possession of a truth that is existent.

What is the end, the aim of this production? The knowledge of rationality, that reason becomes known. Therein lies the universal end of spirit to be free, because it knows the objective world as its own, and thus spirit relates not to something alien but to its own [das Seinige]. The world stands over and against spirit. At first the world is alien to spirit. The highest end of spirit is to be at home with itself. Spirit wants to know the world, to know that it has pervaded the world. According to this end, we have to consider the activity of spirit, the moments of this process of liberation. This activity is process, development, mediation. We consider these activities of spirit only as moments and stages of this end. This determination gives the activities of spirit entirely different conditions. We know that we have understanding, imagination and the like. What is the end of memory? It is useful to preserve knowledge and experiences (remark to §442). This usefulness need not be denied; the use of this capacity is essential to us. But we have to consider spirit first of all for itself and indeed as intelligence; further interests will arise in the consideration of objective spirit.

We have to consider spirit as intelligence in general, spirit as spirit. Here the capacities and faculties are not to be regarded as if they were present externally or in isolation, but rather essentially as determinations of this end: that spirit becomes rational knowing, or that reason as it is in itself becomes explicit knowing. Thus the faculties are to be considered as moments of this process [of cognition]. Philosophy is concerned to become acquainted with what is familiar; so here the faculties are to be considered according to the stated end. First we speak of intuition [Anschauung], then of representation [Vorstellung] insofar as it is directed at intuition; then we speak of the imagination [Einbildungskraft] as it is directed to the representing activity. The latter is altered by spirit. Next we speak of memory [Gedächtnis], where this is directed to the representation | of images.

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What is present in representation is transformed by memory. Memory is the transformation of representation. We consider all these activities not as they proceed outwardly, influencing this or that, but as moments directed towards each other, such that the development of spirit passes over from one activity to another, and so that an as yet unfree immediate activity is raised to a higher level of freedom. This is the sense of this advance, the end according to which we consider these activities. If we speak of spirit's powers we think of something isolated, by itself—the electrical power is completely different than the magnetic. But spirit is no [external] aggregate or collection. If we say activity, this is more correct, but the activities can be isolated again and held apart. Then they will not be considered from the perspective that the doing of spirit is a system of its own doing. In fact they exist only as moments in this system. This is the point of view from which we consider spirit.

In the beginning spirit does not yet know that truth is its own. This is the theoretical spirit, but only in its beginning. With this beginning is immediately connected the process of making the abstract its own, of working up what it has received so that it becomes rational, and finally that it becomes concept. This content does not come into consideration, but rather the fact that it becomes conceived.

The practical spirit is the suspension of the other one-sidedness. Spirit that has advanced to the concept, is free. It is a free intelligence that is for itself, that has itself in the concept. Thus spirit is will. Will is for itself and by itself, i.e., the content and determinations are its own from the beginning. Spirit removes from them the one-sidedness of being [merely] its own determinations, and spirit's doing is to give its determinations objectivity.

§443 Only then does it exist as free will and objective spirit. Since spirit is that which gives itself objectivity, considered formally, this means that the determinations lose their one-sidedness as spirit's own, I but also their status of being merely accidental determinations is equally superseded. Thus spirit achieves a form in which it is genuine spirit. This is the fundamental determination of objective spirit, even though for the present we remain at the level of subjective spirit.

\$444 Theoretical and practical spirit are not distinguished as passive and active. This distinction is a formal one. Theoretical spirit appears as passive, but it is also immediately active. Its activity is to cancel this form of immediacy and make these determinations its own. Practical spirit is also passive; it knows its determinations as its own, but these are at first contingent, this and that drive. Subjective spirit remains indifferent to its

content and to this extent is formal. It starts with being. The content ascribed to this determination is not important [since] it is given [to spirit]. Only the objective spirit gains the content as genuine. As we will see later, the form becomes itself the content. Here theoretical spirit has the aim of comprehending the content, and practical spirit has the aim of coming to a rational content. These are the counter-currents, so to speak: the one is that what spirit knows is rational, and the other is that spirit gives its knowing immediacy and objectivity in general.

1. THEORETICAL SPIRIT

The first is the theoretical spirit. The intelligence finds itself determined, but this is only an appearance and not merely for us, but for intelligence itself. The world is inherently rational. I have to appropriate this rational element for myself and thus come into the possession of truth. First, it appears merely as an acceptance or taking in [of a given], but in order that this content be rational, the intelligence must work on and process the given [das Gefundene]; the intelligence must be active. The immediate intuition that one has of the world must be processed, it must be produced to rationality [zur Vernünftigkeit produziert werden]. The intelligence is thus a drive, it is active and wants to satisfy the drive; | it wants to cancel the contradiction between the content that is in it only as a certainty, and the fullness of rationality. It knows that truth exists in the world and has to be discovered. This is its vocation, and what it discovers is rational. Insofar as this rationality is its possession, its thoughts are rational, not merely subjective. They actually exist just as they are its possession. (The intelligence knows that the world is inherently, implicitly rational, that its concept is to be rational.) It is only an appearance that rationality is at first something existing 'out there' and is not the intelligence's own rationality. This appearance is to be worked off [in the process of cognition].

The intelligence has a drive. There is a vocation in the intelligence which wants to realize itself. The human being has the drive to know, to understand. The intelligence is immediately the act of willing, and [what it wills is] that rationality be for it and be its possession. Knowledge is the infinite form, certainty. This form of knowledge needs to be filled, and it has the drive to become filled, to become totality, rationality. Conversely, this knowledge should be realized. The reality of reason consists in being rational knowledge.

As a rule we distinguish understanding and the heart; this distinction is an abstraction of the empirical understanding. When one appeals to experience, one is correct. For example there is a legal intelligence without heart, and a heart without cultivated intelligence. The empirical world and empirical individuality are caught in this difference. These are one-sided existences. Their ability to be is conceded, but it is another question whether this ability is the true. The truth is that there is no authentic higher cultivated intelligence without good will, and likewise no cultivated heart without intelligence. The human being does not act out of instinct, he is good because he wills what is universal. Universal determinations of freedom are not subjective fancies. The universal must be known and this is possible only for thought. Consciousness and knowing are present in the poorest action. The drive to recognize reason is a drive towards both rationality and good will.

The stages of the movement of theoretical spirit are

- (1) Intuition, spirit in immediate determination, again as feeling. Feeling is subjective, and intuition is the relinquishment | of subjectivity. Spirit makes the existent subjective, but this is not abstract subjectivity; rather it is itself rational and objective. Intuition is the immediate relation of spirit in its immediate determination; this is essentially a relation of spirit.
- (2) Representation in which the content of intuition is made subjective and inward, so that spirit simultaneously possesses and expresses this content. At this level we have the inwardness of the content, which is still conditioned by an intuition, such that the latter is necessary to remind me to subsume the immediate under my subjective representation. The other [element] is the reproductive representation, the imagination. Spirit connects the images, brings them under its determinations, gives them an inner soul, so that the content of this representation no longer has the concrete in the immediacy of intuition, but rather the content belongs to spirit.

This is the consummation of the distinctive feature of representation, [to be] a totality of representations that is itself only subjective. This [consummation] requires that these representations be expressed and manifested by spirit. The word is this unity. Sign and language belong here.

(3) The third element is memory. Spirit makes this relative unity into an absolute unity in itself, into an abstract unity; it immediately subjects this word, this intuition, to itself so that the meaning itself becomes the thing [Sache]. In memory the subject in itself makes itself into a thing, into an object of itself. Thus the subject in itself is objective, the substantial thing. This is the transition to thinking. Memory and thought are related already

in language. What brings forth memory is the principle of thinking, which has to become rational.

A. Intuition

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\$446 The first point is that spirit is again in the mode of immediacy, such that this immediacy is at the same time its own. As soul, spirit is naturally determined, and in consciousness it exists in relation to this determination. In feeling as spirit, spirit is likewise immediately determined; it finds itself therein. Spirit is aware that feeling is only immediate determination, and that this immediate determination is a lack, a defect. Spirit is a being at home with self; as such it is immediately subjective. However, the fact that it is immediately subjective is for spirit a defect. Self-feeling is the highest point of the soul's [development], but now spirit exists in the mode of feeling, and it is explicit for spirit that this immediate determinacy is only immediate, is only subjective. The spirit is feeling, is self-feeling, but a further determination is that it is this for itself, that it separates itself from feeling, which is for spirit a limit, one-sided, something defective. So far as self-feeling is for spirit subjective, spirit has a drive to take this restriction, this defect and to make it objective in general. In consciousness we began with an object, with an immediate determination of an objective; at our [present] standpoint the first determination is the immediate condition of the subjective. The I is self-relation and in the I the determination exists as object. Here we are in spirit; here spirit is as spirit only self-relating, existing abstractly in itself, therefore this restrictedness is something subjective for spirit. Spirit begins with the subjective restriction. This is the beginning, the form of feeling in general. In feeling, everything exists, everything that becomes representation, concept, etc. 'O man, out of thine own passions and feelings thou hast created thy gods.' The entire matter [Stoff] is here, but it does not yet possess the proper form. The infinite form is knowledge, and knowledge in its truth is rational knowledge. This content which spirit possesses in itself belongs in principle to reason and has reason as its root. But it does not yet have rational form. Herein lies the possibility that the content of the heart may also be evil or bad. It becomes evil through the

^{1. [}Ed.] Cf. Aesthetics: 'For man does not... carry in himself only one god as his "pathos"; the human emotional life is great and wide; to a true man many gods belong; and he shuts up in his heart all the powers which are dispersed in the circle of the gods; the whole of Olympus is assembled in his breast. In this sense someone in antiquity said: "O man, out of thine own passions thou hast created the gods." (Aesthetics, vol. I, 236-7). The difference is that the Aesthetics circumscribes this view by confining it to ancient Greek culture, whereas the Philosophy of Spirit seems to assert it without such restriction.

restriction, through some sort of one-sidedness that it establishes. In feeling there exists all the content of spirit, but in such a way that this content belongs to the nature of spirit itself; spirit is its own | matter. Ordinarily one assumes that the matter is something externally given.

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It is customary to say that there is more in feeling than there is in thought. All contingencies exist in feeling; everything externally sensible belongs to natural immediacy, corporeity, to the immediate determination of spirit in which spirit does not yet exist in its genuine way. But this 'more' that feeling has is the temporal, finite, and the bad. So far as feeling contains the true, it has the genuine content [of truth] only through reason. Feeling has been purified from contingencies by rational determination and reduced to what is truthful in it. Spirit is feeling and it finds itself in these determinations. It is of the highest importance that I in myself, I as this particular, find that this truth is for me also as immediately existing with me, as being in unity with me.

When we anticipate that spirit is in itself rational, full of knowledge, cultivated, its feeling has a cultivated content, its feeling is cultivated. In feeling there immediately appears what the human being owes to, and has acquired through, experience and reflection. So far one is entirely correct. The human being who in his feeling has the entire totality before him, and who sees rightly in his intuition, is to be called thoughtful [sinniger]. There is a rationality in feeling. But this felt rationality must be lifted up to consciousness through education and reflection-although it does not need to be educated to philosophical consciousness. There is no more thoughtful human being than Goethe in whom the idea of reason is the animating and ruling power; this is present in his immediate consciousness, but he has acquired it through education and reflection. A thoughtful human being will conduct himself sensitively in his feeling, and will make correct distinctions that others fail to make. Delicacy of feeling and sense are acts of distinguishing that require attention. Only a cultivated spirit has a cultivated feeling. All cultivation, including the highest education of spirit through knowledge, experience, and science is present in the subject, and also in feeling. Feeling for itself as such, where the content, the matter, is still only in feeling and has not gone through the further processing of spirit, I remains on the level of the category of immediate being. The content is restricted, limited. Reflection is what first determines the sense. For this sense, [reflection determines that] feeling is in one respect essential, and in another, unessential.

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There has been much talk about the inexpressibility of feeling, of what exists only in the subjective mode of feeling. Language has for its content

only the universal, the true, the concrete. What language cannot conceive is the trifling, the bad, the merely subjective, the abstract 'mine'. What is true in feeling is the rational, and what is rational can be expressed. Spirit, the intelligence as feeling, finds itself determined. Since its immediate determination is present to it, it immediately transcends this determinacy and likewise is immediately directed towards this immediate determination. This directedness is the simple identical direction of spirit to this determinacy. It is a recollection; the spirit, in this immediacy determination that is feeling, that exists as free, simple, infinite relation to itself, has withdrawn into itself against this finitude, limitation. Spirit is within itself; this means for us a recollection, a being-in-self, a being-in-self of spirit. In feeling spirit makes itself inward and relates to itself. This determination we call attention in general, the formal self-determination of the intelligence. The first abstract determination of the object in consciousness is being, this identity that is the I: this is what being means, its attention, its recollection, its original, entirely simple, identical direction to its determination [on the part of the I]. This direction is abstract, a simple direction of the intelligence towards itself and its immediate determinacy, a direction towards this identical that is at the same time attention. This inwardness, and its directedness to restricting itself to what is in it, to restricting itself to the present, to what stands before it—all this requires a cultivated intelligence. Then one allows the thing itself on which everything depends, to be itself. The intelligence has this intensity in itself. The imperturbable intelligence which is present in what is before it—this is the substantial relation, to hold to the thing itself—is opposed to having deviations [Heraussein] from the thing, is opposed to subjective whims and fancies.

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The direction to the determination is the self-determination of the l intelligence, as yet abstract and formal, to restrain others and to concern itself with the present and the determinate. This determinacy is what intuition contains in itself. This intuition has a doubling in itself, namely, the determination that in sensation we had as content [Stoff], and the various modes of this determination, constitute the differentiation of the inner sense and the outer sense. As immediate determination this content is present in its entire explication as nature. Insofar as spirit itself is soul in a natural way, the senses are in it, and this totality constitutes the determination. We have already considered the senses in their system.

Paragraph §449 discusses what essentially pertains to this determination, namely, intuition. Attention is the remembrance of and direction towards the immediate, this self-determination. Since it orients itself towards this self-determination, it distinguishes this immediate determination from itself.

In feeling this distinction as such is not present. In feeling, the I and its determinacy do not fall asunder. They are distinguished only in recollection, a turning within that is at the same time a differentiation. This distinguishing is the negative, being-other, no longer as in consciousness but the abstract other-being in itself, the external in itself (more precisely space and time). Intuition is the going into self of the intelligence, orienting oneself towards this determination and also separating from this determination, projecting it in space and time outside of its inwardness. In consciousness we had the diremption into I and object. In consciousness, the object had only the abstract determination of being. Spirit is there only as appearing; consciousness is only relative; the reference of consciousness to the object is only relation, relativity. For this reason the object is only determined as being and for consciousness; more precisely as particular object, as plurality and multiplicity. Indeed this belongs to the concept, but it depends on how the unity of this [particular] unity and this particular multiplicity is determined. In consciousness, this generally exists only in an entirely general, relative way, [as] a particular content and manifold determination of objectivity | at first in immediate consciousness. In intuition the being of the object is not only a relative one, the object is not only object. The intelligence as intuiting opposes itself to the object, so that the object is in itself an other. The intelligence is reason, the certainty of reason. What exists for the intelligence is immediately rational—in and for itself, not merely determined as relative (in consciousness the content exists only as opposed to me and relative to me). Now the intelligence posits the content as totality in itself, and removes from it this relativity, so that the content itself is this totality.

In intuition the following are to be distinguished. (1) Real content, determination of the sensed as such, sensible matter [Materiatur], stuff [Stoff]—these may also come from the spiritual. This stuff is at first this given. In the intuition it contains only the general determination to be implicitly rational. There is only the faith, the presentiment, that it is rational, totality. This is only an abstract rationality, not yet posited as rational. (2) From this real the ideal is to be distinguished, space and time. The real appears to have priority over the ideal, the content as such over the form: space and time. We distinguish both of these in the intuition: the manifold content, and the content in space and time. That the distinction between real and ideal totality exists, is due to the fact that the intelligence, as intuition, acts initially as abstract immediate. Since that is the case, the rationality that occurs in this determination is itself still the spatial and temporal abstract; it is in itself only the yet abstract and therefore formal totality. Since the

genuine totality is always present, the formal totality is also present, but only initially as the belief that it is rational, totality in itself.

The content of the intuition is at first a felt content, a content in its contingency; only it is supposed to be implicitly rational. But the intelligence is active in this felt content as well as determining for this determinacy. In this determinacy, what is for the intelligence is also present in its determining so that it has shaped this content, and this formation is spatial and temporal. This formation is still abstract; a formal | production of rationality because rationality is the first. This formation we call (outer or inner) intuition, namely, to have such content before one, [a content] that is no longer opposed to consciousness but is supposed to be totality. In this formation there is the belief that this content is totality, which, processed by the intelligence, at the same time includes an ideal aspect, time and space. This is the form and this form is the activity of the intelligence. Sight, the ideal sense, is the transition into this ideality itself—and intuition derives from seeing. This content is an external one, not only in relation to me; rather it is posited as external in itself. The intelligence is free, and its content is also posited as free and with it as totality.

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We have to consider more closely what falls to intelligence—space and time. Recently it has been said that one must possess the philosophical intuition that understands the intelligence as a totality. What one demands of the intuition that contrasts with reflexion and with the understanding is the following: In [studying] living beings I must have some intuition of life; in history I must have an intuition, an image of time and occurrence [event]. In intuition one has before one the view that the totality is included in intuition, that the intuition is [of] totality. The truth in this view is this: the sound, healthy spirit has the whole before it, whereas the understanding, in the vanity of its point of view, isolates and emphasizes only particular aspects. In contrast to such particulars one calls the whole an intuition, since one has the whole before one. The whole, the certainty of the whole, must always rule. The consideration of a single individual can acquaint one with the dimensions in a natural object; similarly, in skills a whole series of particulars are correct and completely necessary, but all of this must be related to the whole, because one has the sense of this whole, this totality. We call those examinations spiritless, which, when considering works of poetry, grapple only with these isolated particulars. One must feel all particular beauties and characteristics, and one cannot feel these in intuition if one has no knowledge of these, but these particular characteristics must be grasped together in a single image, the whole. Knowledge becomes spiritually significant insofar as spirit is present, so far as intuition

governs I the knowledge of these particularities so that they are subject to this totality.

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Poetic philosophical intuition occurs when all particulars constitute a whole, so that the substantial element rules and subordinates the particularities to itself. This sense of totality, this holding fast to an object in general, [in order] to have the certainty of an object in its totality—this has been rightly upheld against the merely critical analytical dismemberment. A sense is called healthy, sound, so far as it possesses the ability to distinguish particularities while holding fast to the substantial and only subordinating all particulars to the whole. In general intuition includes this totality. If this totality, so far as it is the totality of the content, is not yet developed, it belongs only to the sense of intuition. The other [point] is that this content. the external, which is external not only relative to the intelligence, but in itself, is equally totality. It is ideal and thus formal because it derives from intelligence. So it is posited as space and time. The intelligence expels this content; this content is for the intelligence that which is external to itself, and not only external to intelligence. What exists in space exists in juxtaposition, what exists in time exists in a before and after series, or, if simultaneous, differs spatially. Both are utterly discrete. Externality is still an abstract difference, not an objective difference. All heres and nows are like one another, the difference derives from me. The now is; thus it is the immovable, the always now of the present. There are infinitely many units, absolute separateness, but just for that reason they constitute merely a single identity. The absolute opposites, the abstractly opposed elements are thus united in an entirely immediate way. The here has no abyss around it, it is connected with others and constitutes an identity, an undifferentiability. There are points, but it is equally the case that since there are points, there are none. This point of time excludes all others, and precisely because it is exclusive, it is not exclusive, and coincides with all others. I can posit everywhere a limit, and equally there is no limit. There are differences, but differences that make no breaks and cause no interruptions between themselves.

This is the activity of the intelligence, to bestow the totality of the concept on this content. The nature of the concept, the abstract rationality, is immediately communicated by the intelligence; these are, in their determinacy, posited as external. The two moments of | discreteness and continuity exist in inseparable unity in space and time; discreteness passes over into continuity and vice versa. Here we have an example of the concept in which one-sidedness is overcome. Space and time are different from each other; these are two different forms of the concept. This derives from the fact

that the concept in its externality is external to itself, and thus exists in a doubled way. The entire concept is posited under its own determinacies. But the specific forms of the determinations in which it is posited, fall apart as different. Space is the concept in the form of rest, the abstract identity of continuity. The totality of discreteness and continuity is posited under the form of one determination, namely, continuity. To be spatial and to endure spatially are, in respect to the sensible object, the same. The spatial is a determination of the identical self-relation and continuity. Moreover, time will come into the picture; time is the same unity in the form of negation, discreteness, the negative being of one against the other. In time the whole is posited under the determination of negation. It is exclusive, but in such a way that it is the negation of its other. The being of time is such that it immediately passes over into the negative. The present is being and the being of an other. Being, as negatively posited, is the past, and the negation itself is existing. Under the form as existing, time is the present, but under this existent form, it has the determination to become negated, i.e., future. The present is the simple union of being and nothing. One can only say of the present: it is, for what is past exists no more, and what is future does not yet exist. Space and time are the forms of the sensible, forms of intuition. They are

not the real [element] in intuition, i.e. determinations of feeling; rather space and time are the intelligence as form. They are the sensible externality that is at the same time non-sensible, i.e. they are ideal forms and do not belong to determinations of feeling as such. This is the activity of the intelligence,

attention to self, the act of distinguishing that posits this content | outside itself in order to make itself free. This is the first form of the liberation, that it separates the content from itself. But equally, as the intelligence projects this content externally, it remains in itself. This is the other element. In intuition we are immersed in the content, and this immersion consists in

intuition we are immersed in the content, and this immersion consists in the intelligence being outside of itself in its externality. This immersion, immediate union with the matter, is what one calls intuition in general. This means to allow the object to hold sway, to find oneself in the objective development of the object, to allow the object to present itself as nothing other but what it is. The inspiration of the poet is this immersion; the activity of productive imagination [*Phantasie*] is effective in this matter.

The intelligence, as intuiting, is this immediate unity with its content, and being filled with its content. But the intelligence is the form of consciousness; in this form the intelligence distinguishes [the content] from itself and is immersed for itself in the content so that this content is for the

intelligence.

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The other aspect is that the intelligence is the act of knowing. Intelligence as the form of infinite reflection into itself, remembers itself in this material. The intelligence awakens to itself in this material, and since the intelligence recollects itself in this material, the content is posited as its own. This is representation, namely, out of intuition to be simultaneously recollected in oneself. According to this determination intelligence is representation.

B. Representation

§451 The intelligence that posits intuition as its own, so that intuition, this content, is for it as its own, is representation in general. Representation is the mean (middle) between the immediacy of knowing, between thought finding itself immediately determined, and its freedom. It is the synthesis of both. The content of the representation is given, it is something immediately found [Vorgefundenes]. But considered according to its form the content belongs to the (intelligence). The intelligence, posited as such, is immediately infected with universality. In representation there is a sensible, immediate givenness, and the element of freedom, namely, that this content is my representation. This representation belongs to me; I have it in possession and am active in order to have this representation. However I have not made this content. The content possesses an element of 1 immediacy, givenness, of not being posited through my freedom. This element is the outwardly or inwardly objective. Even if it were also in the nature of my spirit, it would still be something given, not yet produced by my freedom, not yet posited by my freedom.

Representation is different from intuition and feeling. But it is also essentially different from concept and thought. It is essential to make this distinction in speculative philosophy. Most philosophizing means to make appropriately good and suitable substantial assertions; but to comprehend (Begreifen) and prove such assertions is another matter. In whatever is spoken of according to representation, the content is always a given. One reasons about God, right, ethical life and the like, but it nevertheless can be the case that these matters are discussed only in the mode of representation. These determinations about God are likewise in me, and I comport myself according to these representations; I bring them together and go further. But the foundations on which everything is based are presupposed and are represented. I have a representation of something; this means that I do not yet know the object in its specificity. Definition requires that I state the species, the universal, and also state the determinacy, the essential determination. In so doing, I have gone beyond the form of representation to

the determinations of the concept. These conceptual determinations belong to the free process of thought determining itself, [whereas] in representation there is always the moment of givenness. In representation there is a foundation that is present to me; this representation of God has been imparted to me, it appeals to my conscience, but it is always a representation insofar as it is for me in my thought something presupposed, something given.

The following distinction occurs in reference to such representations: [the 'that' and the 'what']. God is such and such—which is entirely in accord with the representation that God exists—and only subsequently is the question addressed what God is. This distinction implies that I do not possess the representation of God. I contradict what I know, and instead produce a definition in order to know what this is. The representation is not enough. On the contrary, the representation is I the criterion and rule for what I now represent to myself in the predicate, what I represent to myself as God. Representation [is] for me an internal or external given. Everything enters into my representation as a convolute, a non-structured totality. There it has the character of authority, [simply] because it is. We have now to consider the representation more closely.

Representation is the content that was present in intuition, as mine, as it was in me. Thus it exists in the other form of one-sidedness, it is a subjective relation. In intuition I was immersed in immediate being, now I am in the disjunction that this content is mine. The representation is mine and has a determinate content, and to the latter belongs relativity and difference in general. We have to consider the representation in relation to its other, the intuition that is its immediacy. The first relation is the immediate relation of a representation to outer intuition. This is in a narrower sense a remembering; something appears before me, and I know that I have already seen it.

Second, representation is posited as relation in itself. It is my representation, and as [mine] it must be posited by me. This is the inner processing of the representation by me. The representation thus processed by me, is posited as a relation and more precisely, as totality. This is the reproductive imagination [Einbildungskraft]. I bring the representations into a relation that I put into them. This latter relation is the product of the productive imagination [Phantasie].²

2. [Ed.] The term 'imagination' has two opposed meanings. On the one hand, it is a subjective power to reproduce, arrange, and combine images. This is reproductive imagination, which remains dependent on givens for the materials it reproduces and arranges. On the other hand, imagination is also productive, the power to create and form images independent of any given, to project what is factually unthinkable, to create and explore possibilities; in this sense imagination is the highest creative power of the mind. It is a transcendental power that both creates and re-orders images. Where English has only a single ambiguous, equivocal term,

This representation as relation in itself, must also be brought to intuition; it must be expressed, formal immediacy must be given to this representation of mine. But this intuition is an essence given by me; it is not immediate as something that has been discovered. This is the sign, the root of language. In the word, I give my representation the capacity to be intuited. This form of immediacy is a unity of a representation and an immediacy, an intuition that I have produced.

The third is that I make this intuition itself, the totality of my | representation and the intuition I have produced, into something inner. This is memory; in myself I give myself this objectivity. In word and speech, the meaning, the representation, and the intuition, the objectivity, are completely separated. [But] in memory these become one. The intelligence, in the determination that its determination is at the same time both the content and the thing itself, is the transition to thinking; moreover, the objective, that which exists in and for itself, is equally the determination of the intelligence, and vice versa. Thinking is the subjective—I am free, but thought is also the thing itself. That the concept is also the thing itself—this must be posited and brought forth in the existing intelligence itself. Thought that conforms to the necessity of the thing is objective [thought]. That this [necessary] concept is also realized in the existing intelligence is the further development. The difficult and only interesting point is the self-reproduction of the intelligence in the concept of thinking.

(1) Recollection (2) Imagination (3) Memory. Each is in itself relation, the totality of the concept. The intelligence, as positing intuition inwardly, posits the content of feeling in itself, in its own space and time, and so the content [of feeling] becomes an image. Image = when the given, which is in the form of immediacy, has a sensible content. The representation of God, right, etc., is not an image. However, God represented in human form is an image, a sensible intuition.

Every stage of spirit is a special individual form and every stage contributes to the concreteness of spirit. If one wants to speak of the concrete more determinately, one anticipates a form that is not yet produced but when it is produced, also appears in this form. We have representations of God, of the sensible, although the latter is not a content that is produced in this sequence.

German has two terms Einbildungskraft and Phantasie. The reproductive imagination noted above corresponds to Hegel's term reproduktive Einbildungskraft. In contrast, Hegel uses Phantasie to designate the productive imagination (produktive Einbildungskraft). I have translated Einbildungskraft as imagination. See further discussion below, p. 222.

The image exists in a time and place, but when this intuition exists as an image, it is taken [abstractly] out of the space and time in which it was, and now exists in my space and my time. The intelligence is at home with itself in the intuition. The content belongs to intelligence as its own, so the image belongs to intelligence, posited in its own space and time. I can represent this image in any time. It is past, but I can represent it as now. The content occurred in a place, but now it exists in my space. The intelligence makes the perishable I imperishable, it makes a mummy out of the past and preserves it. This event is, in the intelligence, imperishable, preserved in the time of the intelligence. The content that was posited in universal time becomes enduring thereby; what Mnemosyne³ does not record is lost. The image, torn from its space and time, is made abstract; its space and time are its content and connection with other things. The image is determinate, stands in multiple connections and is relative. When something is made into an image, it is torn out of all these conditions, out of the great system of the world in which it has its position as a member of this network and is considered by itself. It is supported [no longer by its context but] by itself.

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At the same time it no longer possesses the complete determinacy or the uniqueness determined by all points [of context] that are possessed by the intuition. Since the content is posited in me, this is a darkening, an effacing of particular details, for the intelligence is the universal that emphasizes the content over the infinitely plural singularities and determinacies. The content is distinguished in us from the time posited in the intelligence. In general we know about time, space, and about the filling of time and space. This separation of the image in itself, the separation of the content from time—this can be in me completely without content. Then one says that one is bored. Boredom is the consciousness of time when that which fills the time fails to interest us, when one has the consciousness of this empty time.

As subject, I am also corporeity, and to the latter belongs changes and alterations. Life is not a peaceful duration, but rather a not remaining [the same] that is in itself change and process. I am naturally in time and have feeling, consciousness and intuition of this time. If I know merely of this abstract change and process, I know of abstract time—for time always passes away—the consciousness of time is present for me, and this does not itself pass away. If on the contrary, I am earnestly engaged in something, I know about the content and its own succession, not about abstract succession. Therefore the judgment whether time is long or short is in remembrance opposed to the judgment about time in intuition. A day

^{3. [}Ed.] Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 191d.

in which I have been occupied with many important matters and passed through many interests, appears in recollection to be much longer because it is a rich portrait of the content. The time that has become long to me, | is in recollection quite brief, and a day utterly without interest is in recollection equivalent to nought. In my representation I have an objective spatial ground. When this is empty, then I am bored. Time and space are a drive in me; they want to be filled. The intelligence knows that time and space are only abstract, and when they are empty abstractions the intelligence is not satisfied; it wants a content, a filling. Image means that the intuition is mine. The intelligence is the active time of the image. The intelligence allows the image to pass, to disappear, or it can preserve the image. Attention is time itself for the content of the intelligence. But the intelligence is the 'in itself' of its particularities; it is the universal space. Since these belong to intelligence and the intelligence is the enduring universal, these its particularities and images likewise endure, and become fixed. The intelligence is the concrete universal, the universal that is particularized. The particular, posited in this universal, belongs to the universal and endures along with it. The retention of images is connected with conditions of disorder. This was the side of being [the ontological aspect of the image].

The intelligence is also existent; this is its natural aspect. Since the intelligence has its images in itself, they are contained in it equally as existents. This is the anthropological dimension [of the image]. This enduring, preserving, and reproducing are now determined differently than in the anthropology. Recollection proper includes the inwardizing of the image in the intelligence, not the disappearance from, but the complete immersion of the image in the intelligence and its connection with an intuition that belongs to me. The image buried in the pit of my consciousness is the universal image in contrast to the immediate image, the intuition as such. The immediate image is restricted to a particular time and place; in contrast, the image that belongs to me has acquired the determination of the universal. My bringing both together is the subsumption of a particular image under the same content, insofar as it is universal, a judgment, I apply my image now to the present. Then I say, 'I have seen it.' This means that what is past in the intelligence, I is now present. 'Have' signifies here what 'having' really means, namely to possess. I have it as something seen; it is something that has happened and I possess it.

Intuition is already my own; in it I am already inward. In immediate intuition, I am outside myself, occupied with something that is not characterized as the universal. In it I am in myself; it is inward to me. The cultivated human being finds nothing new; it is only a recollection, a point of view

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that he already knows and possesses; it has only been connected with a new relation. The intuition is for me already something inner. Conversely, my inner representation acquires a determination through this intuition, namely that my inner representation agrees with this intuition, or that my representation is proven in this immediate intuition. This external intuition is already mine, and my inner representation agrees with the intuition. This agreement is called truth. If my representation is constituted like the intuition, my representation is correct. In recollection I confirm my representation; it is not merely subjective, but has the same content that the intuition does. My representation is thus posited as true, is confirmed. This implies that for the inner representation the intuition itself has become superfluous because I possess already in my representation what the intuition can give me. I have all that I need in the representation. The intuition is to this extent dispensable as far as the intelligence is concerned. The cultivated human being possesses enough in the verified representation, and is no longer curious like children who need to see everything once again. The representation is now posited as separate, distinguishable from intuition. The intuition now falls away. The intelligence abandons the intuition. In recollection as such the representation is still conditioned by the intuition. The representation must preserve the determination that it is the unity of itself with intuition. Since the representation thus includes the determination of the intuition in itself, namely, the external, the immediate, the given, the intelligence possesses in itself the condition of externality. The immediate is in me, but as something that can be freely brought before me again and expressed without an external intuition being necessary. | But one forgets something again if one has not confirmed one's inner representation through an intuition. That the representation is in me something external, immediate, this is a determination that is now supplied by the representation itself. One can for the first time repeat the intuition as it were. This is attention.

Thus the representation is posited with the determination that it is capable of being expressed, and this ability is the reproductive imagination.

The intelligence active in the image and in possession of the image, is imagination [Einbildungskraft]. There are three determinations in the imagination: (1) The reproduction of images. (2) This connection is a connection posited by imagination; it transforms the content that is first given to it into a proper idea or representation; this is productive imagination in general. (3) Productive imagination gives the content the capacity to be intuited. It posits the completion of the process as intuitable, and transforms imagination into a sign-inventing intelligence.

(1) The intelligence active in this possession is reproductive imagination that calls forth these images out of its inwardness. The intelligence is the power over these images, an independent calling them forth by its own power, without being occasioned by external intuition. That is, the occasion is for us merely an occasion; through this occasion another content is called forth independently. The material is the image, but (2) the intelligence holds these images together, it is the unity, the subject, the connection, the relation, that wherein these manifold images have their subsistence, it is their bond. Its evocation is a binding one, it becomes objective as the connecting element in this evocation. An object, image, intuition, is something concrete. It is present, it is one, it relates to itself and through its self-relation it has individuality. The stone, like the living, is an individual, a concrete subject. However since this content belongs to the intelligence, the subjectivity of the image is canceled, the organizing point is no longer objective, but the intelligence is the subject of this content, the content is borne by the subject; the particular soul of this content is killed, and the intelligence becomes its soul. This implies that the subject is the supporting foundation and binding tie of this content. Through this, I the representation (image) reproduced by the intelligence becomes objective to the intelligence, and so the intelligence knows of the object it has reproduced.

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This process of determining and the relation of determinations of intuition has been called the association of ideas. Ideas are not associated; consequently these modes of relation are not laws, although much has been claimed concerning laws of association of ideas. A situation in which there are so many laws, and I am at liberty to do thus or so, does not deserve the name of law. The modes of relations which the intelligence applies are of multiple types. The next mode of relation is that that which is contiguous in space or which follows successively in time is reproduced by me. If something has no objective connection except a merely temporal one, the other does not fail or lack in reproduction. This is an act of association according to which the imagination focuses more on how this content is already bound together. The intelligence relates here passively as it were. But outside of this type of connection there are many others. The categories (universal

4. [Ed.] Cf. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 2, ch. 33, §\$5 ff.; Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, vol. 1, book 1. In Germany the doctrine of the association of ideas was spread by Michale Hissman, Geschichte von der Lehre der Association der Ideen (Göttingen, 1770); C. G. Bardili, Ueber die Gesetze der Ideenassociation (Tübingen, 1796). The laws of the association of ideas were thoroughly treated in the manuscript of the lecture of Flatt (cf. GW 1, 588 f.); in this manuscript there was a debate with Hissmann (589). Hegel did not take up the concept in his manuscript, but the concept itself was treated under the rubric 'the reawakening of ideas treated according to laws' (GW 1, 175, 1 ff.).

determinations) enter as further determinations, for example, similarity and dissimilarity. We can attend to this or that aspect of the content, we take a point of view, and a similar case comes to mind, or we pass over from this case to ground, cause, and condition. These are entirely different relations than those that exist merely according to the connection of intuition; the former differ from the connection as it is produced in the intuition. These modes of associations and relations are arbitrarily determined according to contingent, accidental ends. It is the passions, sensations, interests that determine and shape the connection of representations.

The mental mood [Gemütsstimmung] is especially a determining factor in the way representations are brought together. A serious man attends to the causes, reasons, results. [But] humans differ especially in the way that they bring representations together. A bright, cheerful mind will easily know how to gain something cheerful from everything; whereas a dark, gloomy mind, when it considers things, will be attentive to defects. I Mental mood also plays a role in wittiness and jokes, where something is connected to a prior given idea that is quite heterogeneous in content and appears to be far removed from it. The calembours [pun] also belongs here; it is a completely different idea or sense that is connected through similarity of sound or of the word. A clever wit brings what is remote, but essentially and inherently connected, into relation; if the connection is superficial, so is the wit. The facility with which the pun comes to mind, the suddenness with which it strikes one, are ways human beings are especially different; this is a very wide field of differences which are entirely accidental and contingent. Passions, deeper interests are essential elements in this connection. A person who is consumed by a passion finds only references to his passion everywhere and in everything. This is the association of ideas in general.

More precisely, what is to be noted concerning this association is that one idea is bound to another by a condition that constitutes the connection, a common bond, between them. The connection is their unity, universality as such. In the case of concrete objects it is possible to make a transition to countless others; a concrete object (the image) has a mass of aspects from which a transition to other aspects is possible. What concerns us here is only the bond, the connection between the objects. In this connection the intelligence singles out, emphasizes, and lays hold of one particular aspect. The intelligence is attentive to the images that are present before it, but since it is the subject of this content, the content itself is no longer internally connected; rather, the intelligence itself holds it together, and can equally allow it to fall apart. The intelligence can pull apart the concrete image, and since it thus dissolves the concrete images, it has particular determinations before

itself, and so one particular representation is singled out for emphasis, which the intelligence makes into the connection with another representation. This attention to one determination is abstraction, or the method of forming universal representations. This universal, since we called it the associating link, appears first as the connecting element, the universal common to both [representations]. The formation of abstract ideas is immediately connected with this act of association. | The dissolution and destruction of the image of intuition, and the attention of the intelligence to isolated particulars, are immediately connected with this abstracting activity of association.

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The intelligence isolates, singles out a particular; it abstracts. This act of isolation constitutes abstraction. The isolated factor, (e.g., the yellow of the gold) is posited as self-relating. The yellow of the gold is tied to a specific gravity. The intelligence singles out this vellow that in fact is tied to and bound up with other features; consequently this singling out isolates the yellow, and constitutes it as [abstractly] self-relating (the yellow is only as yellow). The determination thus becomes universal, an abstract representation. The content is taken from the given, but the form is a process of analysis, the determination is isolated (the concrete unity is suspended), self-related, and with this, made abstract. What gets connected are therefore abstract representations in general. Thus abstraction and association go together. There is a subsumption of many representations under one that appears as the tie between the others. The subsumption is an activity of judgment that proceeds from the universal and posits the particular in the universal. This is the imagination, and this reproduction is essentially a connecting, associating imagination [Einbildungskraft]. In this connecting and associating imagination there are [acts of] abstraction and subsumption. The act of subsumption is merely a superficial connection; the content appears as the same, it is merely brought into a different connection. The determination that I single out is its own; that through which it is connected is the proper determination of the content. The substantial [act of] connection is productive imagination, which can be symbolizing, allegorizing, or poetic. The intelligence as productive imagination is the power over this stuff, this material, the storehouse of representations and images. This possession the intelligence can use according to its own proper determination and through this material it can make its own representations knowable, impressionable.

The formation of representation as such in and from images. Representation is the general name for the fact that the object is mine, in my possession, and that I am the subject of the object. Image is also a representation but the | representation is an abstract content, a content in the form of

universality. Image in contrast is the concrete external reality—if image and representation are supposed to be distinguished. What sort of relation do these two have to each other—the singling out of particular images in contrast to the totality of the image? The determination is: the image is an externality in contrast to the specific feature of the intelligence; with this, the image is the non-essential in contrast to the construct of the intelligence. The construct produced by the intelligence and belonging to it is the substantial element in contrast to the particularities of the image, and this given manifold is only material that can be used by the intelligence. This is the relation of the substantial product of the intelligence to the matter itself. It is the activity of intelligence that cancels this differentiation, posits it as identical, and gives to its abstract inner peculiar content this externality and presentation that befits the image. Thus the imagination [Einbildungskraft] is productive imagination, a free connecting of representations, a presentation that connects the image to the explication of its proper sense—its proper sense is the universal—as processed representation.

The essential element is whatever constitutes the true and proper content, for whose expression and explication the intelligence employs images. It is driven to make it imaginable through the application of the given material. We have two elements, the proper construct of the intelligence or the universal, and the given, the particular, the image. The former is the inner, substantial, the essential, and the latter is the sense. There is a dual content: (1) the significance, the sense, the substantial and essential; (2) what has no sense for itself, what should only give the significance, and is used only for the explication of the significance, namely the symbolizing imagination. The intelligence forms and shapes the given material—reproductive imagination. The intelligence imagines its own peculiar characteristic in this at first merely given material; in these images it obtains its inwardness. Thus intelligence is productive imagination [produktive Einbildungskraft]. The preceding was the reproductive imagination, the evocation of images out of myself. The productive [imagination] images the universal; the pictorialfigurative [imagination] receives from the intelligence | a soul, the significance; the sense, the image for itself no longer counts.

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Symbol is an image, the content of an intuition, but it no longer has a simple, natural sense; rather it has a second sense. The one is the immediate sense of intuition, the second is the [symbolic] sense. In the symbol as such, the intuition as such according to its proper essential content, is the same as what the meaning, the sense is. The symbol is the following: the intelligence singles out the essential, the substantial; this universal needs an intuition to represent itself. Symbolizing belongs to poetic productive imagination and

art generally. Speaking is already essentially a symbolizing action. The eagle for example is a symbol of strength. The soul of this intuition is strength; the eagle is merely an example [Beispiel], a by-play [Beiherspielendes]. (This expression is connected to the disposition of the German language towards thinking. The concrete image counts as a by-play on what it is about, namely the [abstract] universal sense.) The immediate intuition is used only as material. The intuition is merely the housing for the psychic sense, the inner. In Aesop's Fables⁵ there is an intuition of nature, a story to the effect that the raven or the fox does something according to its [natural] instinct or manner that can occur [only] contingently according to the circumstances of the animal. For example, the eagle carries coal to its nest. Therein a universal is projected, a universal meaning (the ravens cry out when they see something—on this point the well—known fable depends). Such natural phenomena, nature stories, that can occur contingently, are, in Aesop's Fables, taken in such a universal sense—not as in modern fables.

Allegory is as it were a detailed, complex symbol; it is prosaic. A general representation, e.g., justice, and its explication, is contrived by various and sundry attributes and symbols. On the whole allegory is somewhat prosaic. Attributes are attached to personality in an external way; there is no authentic individualization, no poetry. Poetic imagination is an inner meaning. Spirit, when pressed to explain itself, uses sensible material, its images, in order to make these known, since this material is by nature something external.

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§457 The intelligence comes thus to this internal completion, to recollection, in which it has its own peculiar meaning and it is the drive to express this meaning. The first stage is an expression that is something formed by productive imagination. But the intelligence goes farther in the unfolding and explicating of its inwardness. The intelligence is implicitly reason; it is the drive of reason (the unity of the subjective and the objective). Thus it is the drive of recollection to posit the objective as subjective. It exists as the activity that makes itself rational and for which reason itself is supposed to be, so it is the drive of recollection to posit the immediate, external, and given as inner. In the universal representation it has, as it were, completed on this level the inwardizing, the recollection of the external. The universal representation is the highest way of forming the given.

Just as the intelligence is the drive of recollection, it is also the drive of externalization [Entäusserung] that posits the inner as an outer; the

^{5. [}Ed.] Hegel means the fable of the Fox and the Eagle, and the Fox and the Raven. Hegel owned Aesop's Fables in the edition of Joachim Cammerarius (Leipzig, 1544).

intelligence integrates its subjectivity through the objectivity. This externalization is a forming of imagination, expression through images, but at this level its inner is not yet posited as the complete totality of inwardness and externality. This requires that the externalization sharpen this fantasy image to the immediacy of existence of the intuition, in the mode and form of something immediately present at hand. This is the intelligence as productive imagination, which proceeds to these formulas to give this inwardness existence, so that its constructs have the form of immediate existence.

Here we have come to signs, which are connected with language, the intelligence as self-expression. This sign-making productive imagination can be called *Mnemosyne*, the productive memory. One uses memory in ordinary life for the recollection of signs. Since they are intuitions, the signs have to be made inner, just as much as the first immediate intuition. Memory as such is the inner appropriation of signs in connection with their significance. *Mnemosyne* is the mother of the Muses. Memory is the production of images and signs, the recollection of signs. The drive of intelligence, to make intuitable what it has shaped in itself, is here still formal objectivity, externality in general. The higher objectivity is found in thought and concept. Here we have a unity of the I inner image and of the external image that has now become intuitable. The one is the meaning, the sense of the sign, that which is represented; the other is that which represents. The sign is itself a determinate mode of intuition, a determinate representation; the other is the essential representation.

The sign is an intuition: of a sound, a tone, a color. This is something external, sensible, and is arbitrarily connected by the intelligence with a representation. The blue cockade according to its nature has nothing to do with Bavaria. The sign as a sign is no symbol. The sign is an external means posited by the intelligence. The intelligence uses an external immediate [means]: so far as it uses such means, the latter is a thing that the intelligence comes upon and that it uses, or it activates its corporeity to posit something intuitable. The representation is the essential, and the external is used as material. The sign can itself be spatial or temporal and can have both forms of externality.

\$459 The sign whose externality is time, namely, sound and language, is the sign that is much more appropriate to intelligence. This externality does not possess a being; it exists essentially as suspended and has its soul in the representation. This negation is also actually existent, namely the sound disappears. The sound is determinate, articulated, contingent as a whole, arbitrary. This determinate sound represents something, has a signification, and this is its representation.

Immediate things acquire a second existence in and through language. Language is also a determinate existence of the content. The thing acquires this existence from me—the name. [Language—giving things a name] is the rebirth of the content out of the intelligence. Through language the content gains a higher existence, created by the conscious intelligence. The other [natural] existence is for it not irrational, but a non-mental existence. The human being gives names to things; these are taken up by the intelligence into the realm of representation and are there guaranteed [by the intelligence]. The content has an existence for the representing intelligence; this is its origin, the rationality and foundation of language.

The details concerning the formation of particular languages can be treated | as a science of how the special characteristics in the language originated. The material of language, the lexical basic stuff, is the object to be considered. The objects, which are acoustic in nature, are imitated in language; a similar sound is evoked. This has been called the pictorial element of language, the direct relation to the natural. This elementary natural [element] has no specific advantage. The other elements can be designated, the gesture of the sound is the determining, particularizing [element]. The intelligence as determined in itself, since it is also corporal, embodies these determinations, sounds in general, and when these are articulated, they can signify gestures. There are letters for the lip, teeth, and tongue.

A further merely spiritual means of inventing names is symbolizing, namely that expressions of a sensible content are used as symbols for the mental. The form of language is the main point; this includes what belongs to mind, representation, and thought in expressions of ideas and relations between ideas. Declination, conjugation, syntax [grammatical] combinations: connecting and binding all these elements together is the rational, and a cultivated language proves its cultivation and rationality on this basis. The more excellent a language is, the more cultivated it is in representations and expressions for the mental and spiritual. This constitutes the logic of language. The more cultivated a language is, the more regularity there is in it,⁶ and the more freely the understanding deals with the merely material. It is pedantic not to use 'mouth,' 'breast', and similar words in the plural.

With written language [we have] signs in space. This writing can be twofold, an alphabetic writing or a hieroglyphic writing. First is spoken language, gestures formed through sound. Then there is a need to make

^{6. [}Ed.] Cf. Encyclopedia §459, where Hegel refers to Wilhelm von Humboldt's Essay on the Dual (Ueber den Dualis I. 10, 11, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. VI, 4-30) in support of his view of the increasing uniformity of language.

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the sound an enduring one; this is the written language in spatial figures. Alphabetical writing characterizes the sounds; the sound is a sign of an idea [Vorstellung]. The sign of this sign is the letter; thus the sign for the sound is further removed from the idea itself. In contrast, hieroglyphic writing designates the idea more closely. It seems to be advantageous to designate the idea | as such. Hieroglyphic signs are of great convenience and on this account we also make use of them, e.g., +, -, =, that designate not only a sound, but also a certain determination. When it has been demonstrated that letters originated out of painting,⁷ these letters in their abbreviated form [e.g., +, -, =] are made hieroglyphic anew, as it were. Also inner objects, relations of ideas themselves, are hieroglyphically presented, and this proceeds to symbolizing. Ciphers are hieroglyphs; with these spatial determination continues further, whether a cipher has another behind it or not. Merely through these different positions in space unity is signified; for example, here belong also the signs for metals and apothecaries. But this is a restricted use. Spoken language is the first, and if one wants to determine its [specific signs], it is natural that written language has reference only to the basic spoken language. It is a great advantage for spoken language to be written; it gains in determinacy and purity. Language can be analyzed into a very few sounds, individual articulations, shaping of the mouth. This is an abstraction, an attention of the highest importance. Through this abstraction tremendous simplification is produced; the entire multiplicity [of sounds and vowels] is reduced to around twenty, and the sounds that we produce in language can be reduced to nearly as few. To be sure there are modifications, for example, the E and the A. On the whole, the sounds of a language reduce to a smaller number. Also there are peculiar signs for whose sounds our signs are insufficient. Written language becomes simple and more cultivated through such measures. Understanding and abstraction belong to the intelligence. Animals also have many voices that we cannot characterize, e.g., the crowing of the rooster.

Reading and writing are by themselves immediately educative. Children become obliged to direct their attention to the sounds in isolation, and to note the particular sign for each sound, and to record the different abstract moments themselves.

The Chinese have a hieroglyphic written language and a vocal spoken language. I The vocal language, because it has no direct relation to the written language, is very little cultivated. Our cultivated language as a

^{7. [}Ed.] Cf. J. Hug, Die Erfindung der Buchstabenschrift (Ulm, 1801), who expressed the view that alphabetical letters may be transformations of an older picture-writing or hieroglyphics.

spoken language, makes all distinctions by various articulation of words. To be sure, for truly different significations a sound is often used where what is meant must result from the context, but on the whole difference is posited in the objective [elements] of particularizing and articulating. In Chinese, the difference falls not merely on the sound, but occurs in a manner difficult for Europeans, namely through loud shouting. This is the imperfection that clings to a spoken language when it is not formed through a letter alphabet. If there is a hieroglyphic writing, then it is the case that one must learn two languages.

The system of our spoken language is ready-made. We are familiar with this system of language. If it is written, the spoken language is reduced to very few signs, and all lexical elements of spoken language are merely elements in the alphabetic language, merely combinations of these simple elements. The easy transition from spoken language to alphabetic language, is extremely difficult for hieroglyphic writing. The consequence is that peoples who have hieroglyphic language remain behind others. In Egypt hieroglyphic writing was restricted to the priests; in China it is restricted to officials. The more simple spoken language comprises only a few objects. In contrast we have the means to become familiar with the whole wealth of thought of a people.

A principal circumstance that has been cited as an advantage of hieroglyphics, which also caught Leibniz's attention, 8 is that nations can come more easily into relation. The words of nations with different languages are themselves different; each makes its own peculiar spoken language, every people cultivates the communal element in a distinctive way. Nations are naturally concerned above all to designate spoken language through writing.

Experience shows that when a nation had a hieroglyphic language and came into contact with another, the latter did not learn the former hieroglyphics, but rather | made it into a written language. In Macartney's travels to China⁹ it is reported that in Canton, where Europeans wanted to come together with the Chinese, the latter turned to alphabetic writing. There the

^{8. [}Ed.] Leibniz, Opera Omnia, Nunc primum collecta, in Classes distributa, praefationibus & indicibus exorntata, studio Ludovici Dutens, in Sex Tomos distributa (Geneva, 1768), vol. 5, 7–10; Lettres de Mr. G. G. Leibniz à M. M. Remond de Montmort. Lettre I. D'une Langue universelle. Cf. also Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, ed. V. C. J. Gerhardt (Berlin, 1875 ff.) vol. 7, 185–9; vol. 3, 605–8.

^{9. [}Ed.] A journey of an English legation to the emperor of China in 1792-3: Reise der englischen Gesandschaft an den Kaiser von China, in den Jahre 1792-3. Aus den Papieren des Grafen von Macartney, aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Johann Christian Hüttner, vol. 2 (Zurich, 1799), 636 ff.

Chinese use the signs of their vocal language in such a way that the words begin with the signs with which the hieroglyphic writing characterized the object. This process was initiated by the Chinese, and this can be considered generally as a transition from hieroglyphic to alphabetic writing. It was similar with the Phoenicians. The symbol 'gimel' is the hieroglyph for *kamel* [camel]. ¹⁰ Since the hieroglyph begins with G, it designated the letter G. The same circumstance occurred in China.

In the case of the [ancient] Egyptians, it is difficult to decipher the hieroglyphic alphabet, because their vocal language is not known to us. Translations from hieroglyphics to Greek have been discovered. 11 Then Young 12 discovered that the nomina propria [proper name] must be expressed on the other side [of the Rosetta Stone], and that the hieroglyphic signs here signify a sound. He discovered: 'Ptolemy', 'Berenice', 'Cleopatra'. The 'l' occurred in Ptolemy and in Cleopatra. Now one reads several hundred names. The proper names are usually inscribed in an elongated quadrangle or oval. Through a knowledge of Coptic, the common language of the Egyptians, whose mother tongue is Old Egyptian, we have come much further because we have become acquainted with the spoken words. But we have not yet been able to decipher the authentic hieroglyphic written language. However, it is an advance to find that the hieroglyphs themselves are used for the signs of sounds. These phonetic hieroglyphs have been deciphered and read. It is possible that many sounds can begin with the same hieroglyphs because many words begin with the same letter; one finds six or eight signs for a single sound.

- 10. [Ed.] The Erdmann manuscript contains a crude drawing of what appears to be the Phoenician hieroglyph 'gimel'. In correspondence with the translator, Franz Hespe, the German co-editor, observes that 'gimel' means 'camel' in the Phoenician system. Thus, while the hieroglyph as written by Erdmann is difficult to decipher, the above passage contains Hespe's latest and best conjecture, which corrects a misprint in the German edition that resembles a Gothic 's'. Hegel was working with C. F. C. de Volney, L'Alfabet Europeen appliqué aux Langues Asiatiques (Paris, 1818). He became aware of the book through a discussion in the Edinburgh Review, no. 62 (March, 1819), article 6, 369-75.
- 11. [Ed.] A reference to the discovery of the Rosetta Stone in 1799, that refers to a decree of a priest of Memphis to the honor of the Ptolemies, and that was expressed in two alphabetical languages and three pictographical languages.
- 12. [Ed.] Thomas Young (1773–1829), an English physician, physicist, and Egyptologist, who, together with Jean-François Champollion of France, deciphered the Rosetta Stone. The hieroglyphic text on the Rosetta Stone contains six identical cartouches (oval figures enclosing hieroglyphs). Young deciphered the cartouche as the name of Ptolemy and proved a longheld assumption that the cartouches found in other inscriptions were the names of royalty. By examining the direction in which the bird and animal characters faced, Young also discovered the way in which hieroglyphic signs were to be read. The work of Champollion and Young established the foundation for translating all Egyptian hieroglyphic texts.

Memory. Here we mention an element in the relation of the type of sign to its retention, memory as such. But before this, a further word: When we have proficiency in reading, we have the sense immediately in the letters. We do I not recollect the sound, but with the letters we are immediately reminded of the content itself, so that alphabetic writing is for us an expression in space, not of the sound, but of the content; therefore it becomes so to speak hieroglyphic for us through the long custom of reading. This production, which is called a word, is an immediate product, a particular and something transitory, an ideal expression, but it is only an expression, not yet what we call a name. All words are names of something, but names are expressly words so far as they remain tied to a specific representation. The specific representation has its existence only in this specific mode of expression. The word is particular and transitory, and the next action of the intelligence is that this word become an enduring [sense]. It is one and the same representation that the intelligence presents. It is only one representation, and therefore the mode of expression and of existence must be one and the same. The intelligence does this, since it is recollection of this externality. The intelligence has a representation and has an intuition of it. This connection the intelligence makes its own, posits it inwardly, and thus makes the mode of expression universal for this representation, so that the word is only a sign for this specific representation. This is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and the intelligence has to make it its own, to know it. The unity thus becomes the content of the intelligence and an enduring, universal connection. This does not imply an agreement, as though humans had a discussion and agreed that they wanted to use this expression for that idea. That would be arbitrary, and in order for such a discussion to occur, language would have to be already in existence. That language is gradually formed and developed is self-evident. But this does not concern the inner necessity in the advance of the intelligence itself. Great nations can have one and the same language for their foundation. In America there is a far greater quantity of languages than in the old world; every little tribe has its own language and manages arbitrarily with it. There it is considered high treason under a new regime even to retain the same name for an idea that was used under the previous regime.

I The intelligence connects its intuition with its representation, verifies its representation in this intuition, and appropriates this connection as its own. Since it thus appropriates this connection, the indifference of the two towards each other is suspended. Thus the connection has the character of universality and is an enduring, universal connection. This is memory.

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Memory. Memory retains the names, [to wit] that the intuition belongs to this word, and that this word belongs to one and the same representation. The intelligence has to recall this intuition that is produced and posited by it, just as it has to recall the immediate intuition. This is the name-retaining memory. The significance of the name is the representation, and the representation is essential to the word and to existence. That is the name, and this name is the substantive matter itself as it has validity in the realm of ideas. This mode of the relation of the human is a mental one; its representations are supposed to have determinate existence relative to each other, because it exists for other intelligences. The realm of the intellectual world has this theoretical existence in the mode of names and their connections. The name is the determinate existence of the representation; the name is how this substantial matter exists, not in an immediate sensible way, but in the realm of the intelligence. The names are thus the existence of the representation, and the reproductive memory possesses in the name the matter itself without image or intuition.

First the object is preserved in the intelligence as image. Like the object, the image has an immediate sensible quality. The name is a second mode [of existence] of the sensible as it has been produced by the intelligence. The name is the determinate existence of the content so that we do not need the image at all; we do not need to bring the image of the content before us. Caesar is long dead, but as a name he has been preserved. Cicero speaks about Mnemonik, in ad. Herenn, Lib. III. 13 This matter was investigated approximately twenty-five years ago; it was also investigated in the Middle Ages. Mnemonics is nothing but the skill of transforming names into images, a reversion of memory to imagination. The name is the superior as I a determinate existence that is produced by the intelligence. The distinction between hieroglyphs and alphabetical writing consists in the fact that the latter is thought in names, not in images. One establishes a picture in imagination, a series of images; to this series is connected whatever I am supposed to learn by heart. I have to transform it into images that are connected in an established order. The sequence of these images must always be the same. Cicero calls this tableau of images Loci. One such mnemonics-artist had twenty-five such images which were alphabetically ordered, five vowels in succession, and for each he had five names, the second vowel of each of which was equally of the same series: Aaron, Aeneas, Abimelech, Apollo, arbustum. First he has images before him. Then he must learn something by heart: The first is Aaron; then Aaron must be

^{13. [}Ed.] Hegel refers to Pseudo-Cicero, Rhetorica ad Haerennium, book III, chs. 17-24.

fitted out with attributes, for example, that he reminds one of an admiral. This becomes something thoroughly absurd. He goes through it a couple of times so that he remembers how it is connected. The second, this decorative outfitting, Cicero calls the imagination, but he does not say anything about its connection with the tableau.

The second is the reproductive memory, a reproduction of the name as a representation, so that the latter is identical with the meaning. That word we call a sign; it is identical with its content. This is an identity of subjectivity and objectivity within the intelligence itself. Here there is an objectivity produced by intelligence in which there is a stuff, a matterthe word comes from the activity of intelligence—but while the word is an expression of the activity there is at the same time an indifference of this matter to the meaning, to the representation. The name still retains the contingency of the content. On the one hand it is identical when I reproduce the name; I have the content, the sense, but it is an identity encumbered by this distinction | of the indifference of the material towards the meaning. Therefore it does not yet contain the genuine objectivity of the content. The name appears here as a contingency in contrast to the significance and the sense. It is as if the name has lost its connection with its origin, the intuition, since it has been produced as intuition. As name, this origin has disappeared. It is further reflection, further consideration that again discloses what is elementary in this connection. But the name is in language a more or less dry sign. In this sphere contingency acquires a great realm of free play. ~The contingency of the composition of sounds belong here \sim^{14}

Where the name has lost its vitality and has become a non-vital sign, arbitrariness arises. In reflection one seeks a rational connection between word and sense. Name—a representational sign that has no connection with representation, e.g., the name Schmidt. In regard to this level, it is easy to note that the name is something universal. The name expresses a representation and thus something universal. Blue, red are sensible contents, but, taken by themselves they are posited abstractly as something universal in the form of universality. When an individual is supposed to be designated, it so happens that on the whole names are made that proceed from the universal: Müller, etc. A number of names of rivers and mountains are not proper names. For example, a people calls its river simply 'the river'. 15

^{14.} W reads: The contingency of the connection of words, sounds enters here, which merely have this connection in the sense, not in the origin of gesture and articulation.

^{15.} W adds: So with mountains and the like. Scheideck (mountain pass). These proper names are first of all something universal, and thus reveal themselves as not proper names. Thus

The name for itself, so far as it has become a proper name, has no closer connection I to the thing itself. Recently it has been demanded that the name have such a connection to the thing that the name should be a definition; the name of the species should be used with a specific determination. Instead of vitriol one says that the metallic is the basis and, bound to the acid, something neutral is formed. This drive to discover such a nomenclature comes from the fact that one has forgotten what a name is. The name is precisely this, that this sign has no relation to the content. Sulphuric copper is a definition, not a name. ¹⁶

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The reproductive memory means that in the name the intelligence has the content immediately, and in the content of the intelligence the external mode of existence is prior. We think essentially in words, names, for thinking is a knowing; to me, who thinks, this content that I think is present; it has objectivity, externality for me.¹⁷ I do not now know of all other content. This mode of externality that it has for me means that the content has a name. This mode of externality is the highest type of inwardness of intuition. Names are not images and yet we have the entire content while we have the name before us. 18 It has often been said that the correct, true thinking is without words. 19 For example, Mesmer in his memoirs concerning magnetism reports that ~he nearly went mad in his attempt to think without words~. ²⁰ | However, knowledge means that I have the word before me and proceed mindfully in words. Herder has many declamations to the effect that philosophizing is a making and combining of words. By doing this one thinks that one has the thing itself while one proceeds through words, and that this movement through words is only an illusion in which we believe we have the thing itself before us. Cf. Herder's Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit, and his Metacritique, where he attacks the

names of families deriving from classes designating something universal, that become proper names—and so become meaningless. He is called Laplace, because he was no official place, Müller, because he was not a miller.

^{16.} W adds: The name is precisely what is fixed and meaningless, and is supposed to be exactly this because this sign has no relation to the content.

^{17.} W adds: [it] is not in this pit, in which infinitely many things lie. The content is taken out of this inner pit, I know of it.

^{18.} W adds: Without words one cannot think.

^{19.} W adds: But it lies in the thing itself that thinking is knowing, and the manner and mode of having before oneself the object of knowing lies in words.—

^{20.} W reads: He attempted to imagine himself in the pure power of inwardness, and attempted to think without words. He continued it nearly to the point of madness. [Ed.] Franz Anton Mesmer, Precis Historique faits relatifs au Magnetisme Animal (London, 1781), 22-3.

Kantian philosophy in this way.²¹ Names are conditions of thought itself: thinking is consciousness, and so must have an objective [reality] in itself. The content that we possess with the name is what we call the sense (we do not need the image) of which we are conscious, and which we have entirely before us.

The third is memory as such. The I, the intelligence, is in general this unity, and in its manifold it is the unifying element, that which relates the many to each other. These many names, representations, are a dispersed manifold. Their truth, as the truth of every multiplicity, is that they are posited under a subject as belonging to a concrete whole in which this many are only one aspect, so that the many are combined into something concrete. As in the case of imagination the intelligence produced concrete representations that are unified so that they constitute only moments of the subject, so here the intelligence is the unifying element for the many representations along with their names. A sentence is a complex of words; it is only one meaning, but we interpret its sense in this complex of words. Since the intelligence has such a complex of representations that are connected to their names, it is memory as such. The intelligence is the tie that binds the representations to these names, as well as the tie that binds the names as such.

This is mechanical memory. We call that mechanical, wherein a plurality of things stand in relation to each other, and are related, but in this relation remain at the same time external to each other. The intelligence is the power over the signs; as mechanical memory it is this center, I this subject that holds the signs merely as signs, as words without meaning, as, for example, a unity like a house of stones. The connection of stones with the house is not at all determined by the nature of the stones [themselves], and so their connection is a mechanical one.²² If the end, the soul, no longer lives, then every member ceases to be a member—something it can be only in relation to the vital center.²³

These signs are meaningless. I can learn a series of names and numbers by heart, but so far as this is mere rote memorization, there is no meaning and no significance in it for me. The intelligence is the space in which these determinations exist; the intelligence is what holds them together and knows

^{21. [}Ed.] Herder, Ideen, Sämtliche Werke, 13, 358–9; Eine Metakritik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Zweiter Teil: Vernunft und Sprache, Sämtliche Werke, 21, 191 ff.

^{22.} W adds: The unity of the spiritual and living is of an entirely different sort. In this case the members are not merely parts. The member, taken outside of relation to and with the other members is nothing, no longer a member, something dead.

^{23.} W adds: the memory is mechanical as preserving a relation of signs.

them in this vital connection. \sim The anantapodoton²⁴ in recitation signifies a meaning, a sense that acts specifically according to the nature of the context. If one knows it entirely by rote memorization, then one recites it in an entirely meaningless sound. Meaning interrupts the mere mechanism of memory. \sim^{25} It appears miraculous that the spirit, | this essential freedom at home with itself, relates to itself externally in its [own] inwardness in an entirely mechanical way. This condition is of the greatest importance in relation to thought. In our German language this relation also expresses a deep and meaningful ascent to thought.

Reason is the unity of subject and object. Such one-sidednesses as 'only subject' or 'only object' are not true. The truth is rather that the subject, the inwardly subjective activity of thought, this inwardness, this being at home with self of the intelligence in itself, is the most objective. As reason the intelligence approaches the world in order to posit that which is at first external to it subjectively; spirit believes itself to be capable of knowing the world. Spirit has a presentiment that it is in itself identical with the objectivity in its truth, i.e., in its universality. Previously the process of intelligence was to posit the immediate, the external as its own, but the converse direction is equally true. With that this unity is fully realized. The other aspect is that the intelligence posits itself as objective, as the external in itself, [so that] in its highest inwardness it is mechanical, related to itself as this space in which stands a series of signs that are merely juxtaposed or entirely meaningless.²⁶ Therein the transition to thought is expressed.²⁷ The process of the intelligence is that it is implicitly the unity of subject and object, that this unity is for it, that it knows this unity, that in this inwardness it is in itself the absolute opposite, the objective, the objective

- 24. [Ed.] In propositions with two membered conjunctions, an error in the proposition introduced by the second conjunction.
- 25. W reads: With mechanical memory one knows something by rote memorization; one has no idea of what the words mean. The recitation of what is known by rote happens by itself automatically without accent. Children, when they are supposed to recite something by heart, have a sing-song school sound, and this is the correct tone for a recitation known by heart. If one recites with accent, this implies that one has a meaning, a significance, that one orders the particular determinations according to the nature of their connection—the accent depends on sense—if on the contrary one knows something purely by rote, then one speaks it in this entirely meaningless tone. What is recited by rote is spoken without meaning. To speak meaningfully is to speak with accent. The sense comes into the picture and breaks through the mere mechanical memory. Memory is the most wonderful power insofar as the intelligence, this inwardness, has this complete externality.
- 26. W adds: the fact that intelligence makes itself into such a mechanism includes the determination of externality of spirit in itself.
- 27. W adds: This moment of memory is something that has been previously completely misunderstood.—Intelligence is reason.

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wholly in the sense of externality. I For us, or in itself—it is not yet posited there in the object, but is still the inner—the intelligence is reason. But what is implicit or in itself cannot remain hidden; everything must enter existence, and precisely here is the place where the intelligence is the knowing of this objectivity in itself. That the objectivity is in the intelligence as such, is contained in the intuition, that what is immediately given I also posit in myself. The other side of this is that the intelligence posits itself as the objective, and thus intelligence exists in memory in a mechanical fashion, but at the same time it is the power of this mechanical mode, of this mechanical connection, of this senselessness itself. The place of memory in this is to be the moment in which the unity of the subject and the object is not only implicit in the intelligence, but is also posited in the intelligence itself, to wit, that the intelligence is this externality. So the intelligence realizes that that which is in it is also something external, that the objectivity is not something different from the intelligence, but is identical with it.

Usefulness means something exists for a definite end, and the higher, the more excellent something is, the more universal and substantial it is, so that all particular ends receive their support from it. The end is multifaceted and in a certain sense it is true that right and ethical life are ends. But the absolute end of memory is that intelligence be real, that the unity of subjectivity and objectivity comes to be. Memory is also debased as though the imagination were more excellent, but the word, the name, is a far greater mode of existence than the image. The word is something²⁸ that is created by the intelligence, a representation made external in a [certain] way; the externality is created by the intelligence itself. ~In memory | one can place everything next to everything else~²⁹; for memory is just this universal abstract power that holds everything together. In memory the intelligence has given itself objectivity, and it is thus abstract externality, this abstract space. With this the intelligence has given itself the determination which is thought, an inwardness that in itself is externality.

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C. Thought

These are the moments that pertain to thought, but there is a further determination to be added, which falls within our consideration, namely that this determination is present in memory. The intelligence has become an

^{28.} W adds: a second existence.

^{29.} W reads: Words are therefore higher than intuition, than image, and so memory according to its content, and as activity, and this pure space (in which one can place everything next to each other as in space).

inwardness which is utter externality as such; the intelligence is absolutely in itself externality. The further relation, determination, is consequently the suspension of the opposition that exists between immediacy, externality, and inwardness; it is not merely an opposition between immediacy, givenness, and inwardness, being at home with self, but at the same time a difference between particularity and universality. The intelligence is the simple, pure being at home with self of the universality; that which is opposite to intelligence, as opposite to the universal, being in general, has the determination of singularity, of multiplicity, of the particular. This opposition has suspended itself, and through this suspension the intelligence is essentially determined as thought. The intelligence [is both] the simple being at home with self and the externality; this is the opposition; but since the intelligence in itself is this sensible mode of externality, the difference [of the externality] from intelligence, [as well as the difference of] the universal from particularity, has fallen away. ~So far as the general difference | is still present, this difference is in general the particular. Since this difference has suspended itself, the intelligence is a concrete universal that has posited the singular and particular in the universal itself. The intelligence, as the unity of both, is the overgrasping³⁰ of the other, the unity of the previously different.

So posited, intelligence is the universal. Previously the universal itself was not yet a genuine universal but in fact itself merely a particular in opposition to other particulars. When the intelligence is [the overgrasping of the other] the inwardness that is in itself this externality, then intelligence is the unity of the two, the true universality. Thought contains this determination, that what I think is the thing itself; and what this means, what the truth of the matter is, must be determined in reflection and contemplation. The thing itself first comes to be for me through thinking, and only when the thing is thought, *noumen*, is it the thing itself. Everything else is only

30. [Ed.] I follow H. S. Harris in translating uebergreifen as overgrasp, rather than overreach. Uebergreifen expresses the positive result of the Aufhebung. The concept that results from speculative comprehension reaches back and overgrasps the preceding opposition of opposing moments, transforming them and preserving them on a higher level, a third term. Harris tracks this metaphor of overgrasping to Zeno and the Stoics. Zeno used the five fingers to represent the differing 'apprehensions of the five senses; then, closing his fist, he called that gesture 'comprehensive sensation'. To express the comprehensive power of thought, he grasped the closed fist with his other hand, i.e., overgrasped it. Hegel retrieved Zeno's metaphor of overgrasping. It has nothing to do with 'overreach' or its negative connotations. See Harris's comments, 'Translating Hegel's Logic' in G. W. F. Hegel: The Encyclopedia Logic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), xxvi. The above passage, which concludes with Hegel's use of overgrasp to express the comprehensive unity of inwardness and externality, universal and particular, illustrates the point.

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existence, opinion, nothing objective; only in thinking does the thing acquire its objectivity; thinking is therefore the objective. \sim ³¹

Youth has a good memory because it does not yet relate to itself reflectively. The images are still lively, the retention of objects is stronger in youth, but with maturity the universal becomes powerful. Wise maxims and experiences are [now] the interest, and for this reason one no longer retains the particular [as vividly]. The human being dies of this universality, this self-coincidence, this ceasing of difference.

Immediate existence, intention, feeling have been recalled; the intelligence determines them as its own. The other is just as essential, the fact that the intelligence relinquishes its subjective determination, that its own determination is likewise not subjectively posited, but exists generally in the mode of immediacy. With this the difference [Differenz] which was present in representation is suspended. In representation the external, the given and the certainty of belonging to the intelligence are different. In thought it has been realized that the external is the intelligence's own. Through this realization, unity and truth have come into being. What is, ~is only so far as it is thought, and what thought thinks is the thing [Sache] itself. Thought is also empirical. The exercise of memory implies that inwardness is leveled into pure space. Intelligence makes itself into an abstraction within itself, through which this inwardness, for the sake of abstraction, is made into a mechanism. Inwardness is made into a thing-like reality. This inwardness means that the intelligence exists as thinking. ~32

31. W reads: For the difference in general is only suspended through this [the fact that intelligence is both, inwardness and externality]—and so the intelligence is the concrete universal, not merely the abstract universal that still has the particular over and against it. Therein the intelligence has posited itself immediately as the universal,—and with this, thinking. The intelligence is the unity of the two, the overgrasping of the other; since it is this, it is the universal, for the universal is precisely this overgrasping: for a universal that stands in opposition to a particular, is itself only a particular.—The intelligence is thus the unity of subject and object and is the genuine universal—thus the intelligence is determined as thinking.—

The meaning of thinking is: that which I think, is the thing itself, and I first attain this thing itself in its truth (when I reflect on it) through thinking—and insofar as I have thought objectivity in general, so far is objective thought the thing itself. Everything attains its objectivity only in thinking, and thinking is therefore the objective.

32. W reads: is that truth [is] thought. The thought is the object thought. What is thought is, and is, insofar as it is thought. Conditions of thinking. The human being empirically runs through the various levels: sensation, intuition, etc., memory. The exercise of memory implies the leveling of the ground and preparation of the way to pure being. The compulsion of rote memorization is torture. Rote memorization is the torture of turning oneself into this abstraction and of consolidating oneself in this abstraction. In this abstraction will is the inner that is made into something mechanical in itself. This preparation of the soil of inwardness [is necessary] to constitute thinking as such in the form of intelligence.

The thinking of intelligence is for itself, a having of thoughts [Gedanken habend]. Here thought does not exist as immediate activity. The intelligence wants to think; it exists as the drive to think, so that thinking is its end. Thinking as an activity, but not as the end of intelligence, is pure mental activity in general. This is the view that one acquires through the knowledge of spirit, that intelligence relates to itself thoughtfully, and is the activity of thinking. The intelligence in part makes the immediate, the external, into its own, and with this determines it to universality. Intuition becomes image, cut out of the infinite context with which intuition is connected, and allows determinations of intuition only in an indefinite, purely general way. There the intelligence is active as thinking in general; it is active as judging, so far as it employs its distinguishing feature | of being presentation, of being reality. The act of intelligence is the word. Here [in judgment] it is reversed, namely to determine the universal to singularity. This is a raising of the immediate to the universal, and a setting out of the universal to make it an externality. Here judgment is implicitly the syllogism. The judgment determines the universal as particular, dividing it again; and to undertake the division again is to judge. The intelligence as action is thinking. The various modes of the activity are in thought, but here the intelligence has to think the drive, the end, so that it is determined for itself as thinking. The absolute inner end of intelligence is to exist as thinking. The end is the concept; the concept should be realized and come to existence, and this very concept has been realized in the intelligence. Insofar as it is for itself as the act of thinking, the intelligence is conscious of its own vocation and end.

This exposition of thinking, namely that it gives itself as thinking, has been set forth in the previous account. Thinking, the posited thought; thinking is posited, it is for the intelligence that thinking is no longer an immediate activity, is no longer merely implicit, thus it is the inner concept. The intelligence no longer exists in the form of immediacy, immediate activity—there it is intuition, feeling, representation. The one-sidedness of being and the one-sidedness of subjectivity have been suspended. Thus thought is posited for the intelligence not merely as one-sided, but as its essence. The intelligence has thus attained its concept, that this is its vocation; it now wills to think. It wills that its intuitions, representations become thoughts. Another point: the intelligence has the drive to know, to have representations that are valid and true.

~That the intelligence knows this as thought, that it transforms its experience into thought, means here that the intelligence transforms the given into something | free. The process of the intelligence is then explicit for the intelligence, that it is and that it does this. The intelligence wills

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to think, and what it is, is its end. It has the following representation of thinking: that the thought is the thing itself; that what is thought exists, and that what is exists only as thought. In order to know what the heart of a matter is, I must reflect. That is an ancient prejudice of which humans are convinced. In order to know the thing itself, reflection is necessary, the most rigorous reflection. This is the meaning of the assertion that the true is the unity of thought and being.

First, thinking is formal, abstract universality and abstract reflection. Such thought is not yet | the thing itself. Being is this utter abstraction; it is so far as the subject thinks and raises itself to this pure void or emptiness. There one represents being as an existent thing; everything exists in this sense, but this is not the thing itself or as such, rather it is nothing substantial. What is true, the truth, the eternal, exists only for thought. Conceptual thought is thinking in its totality, its total specificity and determinateness. But even when I take being and thought in the correct sense, this is expressed as the 'unity of being and thought', as though they were not [also] different. But thought divides itself, distinguishes itself, and only when thought proceeds out of this process of distinguishing itself [from itself] and of coinciding with itself, is it true thinking. The true sense that thought is the reality itself, is something altogether ancient, and not eccentric, paradoxical or crazy. ³³ Reason does not concern itself with imaginings or with representations; rather reason is the developing consciousness of true being. ³⁴ The

33. [Ed.] Cf Encyclopedia §465 Zusatz: 'Those who have no comprehension of philosophy are astonished and become speechless when they hear the proposition that thought is being. Nevertheless, the presupposition of the unity of thought and being underlies all our actions...But it is a good idea to distinguish between only being thinkers and knowing ourselves as thinkers. We are the former always and in all circumstances; but the latter happens completely only when we have risen to pure thinking. Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or representation, is capable of grasping the truth of things, and that the assertion of Epicurus that the true is what is sensed and felt, must be explained as a complete perversion of the nature of spirit.'

34. W reads: to transform the immediate and individual into thought. The intelligence wills to think; the concept is the end, intelligence wills to fulfill its vocation—which is that the intelligence has the image of thought that thought is the thing itself, and that that which is, is thought. This is the eternal prejudice of humans, that what occurs in my intuition, etc.—in order to know what is present there, the truth, I must reflect. This is the prejudice of which human beings are convinced. But what the thing itself really is, that one does not have at one's fingertips, as the thing itself. It has this sense when one now says, the true is the unity [of being] and thinking. But thought and being are poor expressions! People believe that thinking means representation. But even as thought in general, this representation remains at first formal. Now the representation can be entirely other than the thing itself. Similarly, a formal thinking, ratiocination, does not need to be the substantial thing itself. Being is utter abstraction. Being is not sensible, it is purely abstract. The same is true of pure thinking: since the subject thinks it goes forward and advances into this reason. But it does so as utterly abstract being.—One

intelligence, as thought which has come to itself, is free, at home with itself. This objectivity, which was first determined as externality, is intelligence in itself. But this inwardness and objectivity have determined themselves reciprocally in relation to each other such that they have suspended their one-sidedness, particularity, and finitude. Thus thought is determined as the one that is the unity of the two and [as such] is the universal.

Everything that is untrue in the world consists in the fact that the objectivity does not correspond to the concept. A bad man can exist, but what exists in the world does not correspond to its concept, and this non-coincidence is its finitude. But what is true in the man's existence consists in the agreement of his reality with his vocation [Bestimmung].

The intelligence is now active as thought; it wills to have thoughts; it does knowingly what we have previously seen, namely it reconstructs intuitions, representations into thoughts, ~and if it has the very idea of something, intelligence is convinced that it is right, that it possesses the thing itself. \sim ³⁵ The thing itself must exist essentially as being for the human [being], as something known explicitly in | words. This is the action of the intelligence. that what it knows in itself it knows in words, that it expresses itself and thus determines itself. The intelligence exists now as thinking; it wills to have thoughts. What constitutes the content of thought appears initially as something given, as that from which intelligence derived. Intelligence looks back at its activity, the intuition, but this is not yet the correct doing. So far as there is a stuff, a matter, set before thought, which thought works on, we say that thought is applied to this material, i.e., the particular is subject to rules and laws. Thought as applying itself to this stuff that appears external to it is what we call thinking knowledge—when thought as such transforms a matter into thoughts. But we have to consider thinking, not as applying itself to externals, but rather as thinking in its own form, in general as

also imagines that being is an existent thing. A thing is an accidental, contingent existence without concept—This everything is, but not everything is genuine and substantial.—Thus being exists in thought—but in thought it is no longer such [a] contingent, conceptless being.—One then says 'is'; this 'is' is supposed to be the substantial. But the substantial exists only for thought, not however, for formal abstract thought, but for conceptual thought, for thought in its totality.—Even if one takes thinking in the sense of reason, concept, as the thing itself, and as the substantial, it is not yet correct to say 'the unity of thought and being'. For unity implies that the difference of the two is suspended. Only when thought coincides with itself in a syllogism is it the essence, the concrete thought. This self-coincidence is other than a mere unity or abstraction. Therefore 'the thing itself is the unity of thought and being'. [This assertion] is entirely something ancient and universal.

^{35.} W: the substantial thing itself and being. In opinion being is on the one hand something accidental. The substantial is the opposite.

self-explicating, self-determining, self-specifying, positing the particularity, judging and coinciding with itself. But thoughtful knowledge first involves the application of thought and its form to its existent matter. So the process of knowledge is as follows: we begin with intuition and perception, we make this perception into something universal, and we transform the particular, the singular, into the universal.

We call this procedure the analytical method of induction: by means of the particular we seek the [universal] thought. In induction we omit from the individual what is not common, the special features through which it distinguishes itself from others, and hold fast to the universal. The common element is only the universal of reflection; we bring the various elements together under the point of view that this is the same in all; however, this does not concern this object itself. ~The human being remains what he is, whether he is large or small, or whether another exists or not. \sim ³⁶ But the higher universality is the species, the inner nature that essentially constitutes the nature of an object. A tree that ceases to be a plant: | one no longer knows what that is. ~The universal is nothing other than what is contained in the object. The universal is only in the subject, and the question has arisen whether the genera are in nature or only in the subject. \sim^{37} The universal has the advantage for the subject in that it is easier to retain; the plurality is here reduced to a unity. But the end of the retention, the act of collecting for the subject, this subjective end, is something only relative. ~The universal is the true element in the object.~38 'To give distinguishing features in a definition,' it is said, 'is necessary only for a subject.' But the distinctive feature that differentiates one type of species from another type, must be the essential feature that is the root of the other determinations. In the external world where determinations are indifferent—namely in inorganic nature, the determinations are external to each other. ~In the case of the specific gravity of a metal one well notes that there is an essential determination. So: the human being is rational. The | distinguishing feature is that human being is thinking, and from this capacity for thought follow all others

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^{36.} W reads: The house and the tree remain a house and tree, whether they are similar to another or not.

^{37.} W reads: The end of the intelligence therefore is to raise matter to the form of universality. On the one hand subjective, the intelligence makes something universal out of this; on the other hand, the universal is only the objective dimension of this object, that in the object which is the thing itself. [Universal] determinations stand out in an object, but in such a way that they are essentially for the subject. Linneus in his Systema Planetarum contended that genera are to be regarded as natural.

^{38.} W reads: the universal is for itself also objective. The species in the object is itself the true.

of which the human being is capable. Religion and science etc., follow from this single capacity, namely thought. Thought proceeds to find the universal, the species, the law. This is the analytical method. \sim^{39} The reverse is the synthetic method. This begins with the definition (the universal) 40 and proceeds to special features. Here one allows as it were the special features to be added, and accepts them from without. One can also begin analytically by analyzing the universal; the determinations that are contained within the universal are then expounded. The first analysis is an abstraction, where one proceeds from particulars. One omits what is peculiar and special in order to obtain the universal. If one analyzes the universal, one distinguishes determinations such that one does not omit these; rather they count because they belong to the universal.

\$467 ~In thought spirit is at home with itself, and its essence is | thought. Thought develops itself, analyzes itself; it is the concrete, this absolute negativity that develops through the suspension of subjectivity and objectivity.
Thus it is the self-determining | activity. The immediate, which we have treated as affirmative, and the subject, are both one-sided and abstract. The result is the negation of the objective and the subjective. The result is in itself the infinite.

Thought as this activity is self-differentiating, the positing of that which thought implicitly is, and the third [step] is drawn back to the first unity which is what the difference implicitly is. This is the concept [of the process of] thinking itself. There are three determinations which we distinguish as understanding, judging, and syllogism. The first two modes of thought are one-sided; these are first, immediacy, second, the difference. The two together constitute understanding (the third is reason). I Understanding applies itself to a content insofar as this form is first the form of universality. But this universal is abstract and not developed. The understanding establishes and holds fast to some determination for itself. It has been called the concept, but not in the speculative sense. Indeed one must possess

^{39.} W reads: But this is the gravity in external corporeity, where the determinations appear external to each other. For example, a metal has a specific gravity. Indeed one deals with this specific gravity prior to color or crystallization. Specific gravity is an impressive feature that does not show that it is a determination of a higher condition than the others. This higher must be shown by the essential determination that the others are only [dependent] consequences or effects of it.—The human being is rational. The character of reason is thought, from which results everything else that constitutes the human. This is a determination that is not to be regarded merely as an external convenience, but rather the innermost essence, so that it is the universal essence of the object in itself. Thus the universal species, laws, etc., must be discovered: we call this the analytical method, namely from the particular to discover the universal.

^{40.} W reads: in right, what right is, in geometry, what the point is, etc. This is the universal.

understanding; one must establish the object in its determinacy. A human being must also have a definite end and pursue it. Thus the human being possesses character.

The other element is judgment [Urteil]. When we consider judgment in relation to knowledge it is called explaining, conceiving, i.e., [placing] something in its connection with others. In nature one demonstrates the power, the universal of which this or that is the expression. One subsumes a particular case under a [general] law. The dependence of one particular on another particular is then called comprehension. This explanation is an act of judgment. There are particular cases, and their relation to the universal or the species must become known. By judgment we mean something not only subjective, but also objective; for example, we mean that the tree in itself is thus differentiated. It is this [particular] tree, and has a species immanent in it, i.e., that it is a plant.

In finitude judgment is [objectively present]; the finite is judged [condemned (verurteilt)] because in it species and individual, soul and body are separable. The soul is the species, the body a singular individuality. If I know how to specify the substantial nature of an object, this is completely different than if I know only its individual attributes. In this knowledge one advances to a conclusion, but not properly to a rational conclusion. The existing object is the particular, the type. This type undergoes qualification and particularization through the fact that it distinguishes itself from its species. The rational syllogism would be that this particular is grounded in the universal of the species, that the particular is posited by the species itself. As a particular it is grounded in the species, and is only an appearance, an image of the species. The planets move about the sun; this law is their universal nature; the particular would be the particular planet. The one is this far, and the other is that far distant. This distance must yet be determined from the general law of motion. This would be the rational syllogism [Vernunftschluß]. The particular would be litself the revelation of the law, of the universal. Thought is thus initially in the form of its universality. Judgment is the differentiation of the universal into its particularities, and the third is the uniting of the particular with the universal, the gathering together of the particulars in the universal. This is the concept in general; the judgment and conclusion are nothing other than this explication of the concept. In the syllogism the concept exists as the developed concept, the universal and self-identical that determines itself and preserves itself in its determinations. In this way it is rational. Everything is in itself a syllogism, and the true existence of the syllogism is found in the life-principle, in spirit.

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Intuition and understanding are judgment. To remain self-identical in this particular, to preserve self and be self-coincident in the conclusion—this is spirit. The concept is first in the form of universality, and if thinking remains in this universality, it is the formal understanding.~⁴¹ Thought

41. W reads: Thinking is the free universality; there the spirit is at home with itself (reason is with thoughts and thought is its essence). Reason develops itself and thought develops itself, analyzes itself. Reason is this: to be concrete within itself. This absolute negativity—activity of negating and affirmation, which is eternally in itself the result of negation. What we at first have treated as affirmative, the subject against the object: both of these are one-sided, both particulars, negation.—The immediate, the subject and the object, are negated by the activity of the intelligence, and so the intelligence is the active unity in itself, thinking. As this activity in itself, thought is self-differentiating. This negation as negation, as simple self-relation—the positing of the difference; (3) to posit itself as what it is, as what the difference is,—to ascribe this self-referential negative process as due to the unity, this is the concept of thinking. These are the three determinations that we distinguish as understanding, judgment, and syllogism. At first understanding and then reason. The first two one-sided modes of thought (form of universality, self-relation, and second, the form of difference and negation) are united in the third, reason. This distinction between understanding and reason [is] important.

So far as the content of the understanding is at first the form of universality, this is the abstract universal of the understanding. Understanding seeks to hold fast to a determination for itself. It relates this determination to itself in the form of universality. This is the non-speculative form of the concept. Understanding means to determine [something]. One must have the understanding: one must conceive in a determinate way. In action one must have understanding, have character, remain true to an end.

The understanding in general. How the understanding is also in the concept, it determines first of all for itself. The other to the understanding is the judgment. Judgment also means explanation, comprehension. To comprehend something means to understand it in its context. 'I don't understand it, explain it to me', that is, show me its context and connection, the power of the universal of which this particular is the expression. To comprehend the orbit of the planets, one explains these from the perspective of the [universal] power, and then one comprehends it. That through which one comprehends something is the law, power, universal determination, or one explains an occurrence through its causes or motive. The condition has for its cause another finite condition. There one also says [it is] explanation.

The general dependence of particulars on one another—to see the particular in its necessity. This is judgment. One has here particular cases and recognizes their relation to a law. Explanation in general is judgment. By judgment we generally understand that this is nothing merely subjective. When I speak of a tree, [saying] there is a plant; this is a judgment. But this judgment is not only in me. The tree is in itself this judgment. It is this tree, but it is also at the same time a plant and a species. When a tree is cut down, the plant remains. The tree is no longer a tree, it is merely wood, but the [tree's species] and plant do not burn. In finitude these [determinations] are separable.—Soul and body are separable. They are the judgment, and thus a judgment that they are sentenced [condemned (verurteilt)].—In this knowledge there is an advance to judgment; this means that the object is considered according to its power, law, and universal features.

In ordinary life we distinguish type from judgment. 'The painting is colorful' is a judgment; it has by itself no power of judgment.—The judgment counts as something formal, but more precisely it is the nature of the predicate that is determinative for thought. 'Gold is yellow', 'gold has a specific gravity'. The second judgment is equally determinative for thought. That which thought focuses on [is] the universal particularity of this object, in which the other particular has its basis. From judgment we pass on to conclusions, inferences that are formal,

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however is essentially differentiation, determination, judgment, negativity. The intelligence in itself is exactly like this: it differentiates itself within itself. In addition to its implicit internal differentiation, the intelligence intuits and feels, it divides itself in this universality to be feeling and intuiting. We proceeded from an immediacy that is not the true original, but is likewise something posited, and the judgment means that intelligence exists as being, finds itself self-determined. The intelligence is feeling, intuiting, the connection, the copula is the identity of both; it is feeling and intuiting. This identity is not yet posited in judgment; it is an implicit identity; it is the syllogism. That the differentiation is at the same time one and the same is included in the copula 'is'. But it is not yet posited as identity. The two sides of judgment do not yet constitute the fulfillment of the 'is', the identity. The concrete identity is first posited and realized in the syllogism. This concrete identity is such that in the case of the intelligence—which after the judgment [differentiation] exists in a condition of particularity, intuiting and representing—this particularity is posited as the I itself, as its proper being, the action of the intelligence. We observed this process: that the intelligence assimilates its feelings, intuitions, representations, | posits them as identical with itself, so that it is at home with itself in this particularity,

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but not properly rational syllogisms. These are not such that in them the objective existence in the species coincides with itself. The existent is object, is the particular; object is a type. This type befits the particular. What one knows of this object is a judgment. Rational syllogism would be: that the particular is grounded in the species in a universal way. That the species advances to particularization, but in this particularization the species coincides with itself. Movement of the sensible body. Planets move themselves around the sun. Essentially planets are these movements. The specific planets: (a) thus far distant, (b) thus far distant etc. This specificity of the instances [is] that they develop and become out of this universal context, out of the laws of their movement. The particular would be posited, not as something [accidental] added to the universal context and law, but rather as revealing and manifesting these. This would be the rational syllogism.

This is the rational concept, and judgment and conclusion are only the explication of the concept.—The concept implies that it is concrete, the universal identical to itself, that determines itself so that in this determination it preserves itself—and this is the rational.—

Just as everything is an implicit judgment, so everything in the rational concept is a syllogism. The things are syllogisms in themselves. The freedom of the spirit is this: to be identical with itself in particulars, or in intuition, therein to preserve itself, therein to be coincident with itself. This is the existing spirit, in which other things are only implicit.

Abstractly considered, thought is this self-referential activity, thought is the form of universality.

^{2.} Judgment = differentiation, in the form of its particularity

the integration of the particular. The particular is gathered into the universality, so that
the particularity shows itself as posited in the universal, as only the particularity of the
universal.

this particular determination. Thus it does not exist in an immediate identity with itself, it does not exist in immediate freedom, but is free only in that it has opened itself to difference and has suspended this difference, positing it in identity with itself. This is the [process of] mediation through which it is this concrete affirmative being for self. This is the syllogism.

The intelligence as thinking, is concrete thinking, and as such it is concept. Then it is reason in general. The syllogism is the activity of the rational in general. In ordinary life one designates as rational that which is in and for itself, something firm; a self-standing essential end, an end existing in and for itself, that which expresses an essential end. When something is firm and secure, it is so because it is not abstract, one-sided, but something that stands the test. Since it coincides with itself, it is not finite but infinite.

~What relates itself to another, a particular, is finite. But when the particular is overcome, it is not something whose relation to itself is defined as otherness. Reason is the process of self-mediation, judgment [differentiation], of distinguishing itself from itself, determining itself, and through the negation of this difference has joined and integrated with itself, has posited itself as identical.

The formal syllogism means that something has combined with an other. In the rational syllogism there is a negative element which is not present in the ordinary syllogism of the understanding, namely, that it posits its modification as its own, so that it remains at home with itself in its modification, and thus has joined and integrated with itself in its modification. This is thinking as concrete, the concept, reason. Syllogism and concept are the same. The concept implicitly includes the syllogism, and the syllogism is the developed concept. This is thought as reason, and the latter is immediate will. \sim^{42}

§468 The end of the intelligence is to posit the immediate and the given as something mediated by the intelligence, as its own, and thereby to be at home with itself, infinitely reflected in itself. The intelligence is the universal

42. W reads: The intelligence or the subject which has overcome the modification, etc., and made it its own, does not relate to these modifications as if they were an other-being of itself. Rationality = infinity. Returned into self; what is rational has mediated itself with itself; it has differentiated itself and through negation of its determination it has joined together with itself. This is the authentic syllogism. In the formal syllogism the subject joins with an other (a particularity). There one says of the subject: it is also this other. There it remains finite, bound to its end. In the rational syllogism there is a negation that does not occur in the syllogism of the understanding. The rational syllogism suspends this its modification, posits it as its own, is at home with itself, and [in this negation of negation] has joined together with itself. This is thought as concrete. Thought as concrete is the concept, is reason and the syllogism is the concept. This is thought as reason. This constitutes an immediate transition to the will, as immediate will. §468 Transition to will, that thought exists as free concept.

that specifies itself, and is at home [in its determinacy] and thus is free. As reason, thought is free, and the will is free. Rational thought and will have freedom in common, but the will is yet wider in scope. The will is to realize this freedom, which the intelligence is in itself, so that the content, the determinations that are the intelligence's own, are to be posited in the form of immediacy as not the intelligence's own. Theoretical and practical spirit, intelligence and will, both are one-sided. The intelligence begins, it finds itself, and its activity is to make this immediate into its own posit, so that it does not remain external, but becomes its own activity, its own self-determination. The intelligence posits the immediate as its own, and it has completed this process, so that its posits have the determination of being objective in general.

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2. PRACTICAL SPIRIT

\$469 Practical spirit brings its determinations into existence so that there is a world present at hand. Practical spirit is concrete thinking that coincides with itself, passes over into the determination of the immediate, with an end.

This determination of immediacy, from which intelligence has liberated itself and now unfolds itself in its pure ether, has been attained; it is at the same time an immediate passing over into immediacy. The intelligence that has digested the world, has, by means of negation of the existing determinations, coincided with itself, and is free. This result is a return to simple unity with self and therewith a return to being. The intelligence has determined itself as immediate, or to individuality. In the concept there are three determinations, universal, particular, individual. The individual means that the universal appears as existing by means of particularity as it initially is, and that the universal, through the negation of particularity, coincides with itself through this medius terminus. So the universal is first subject or individuality. Through particularity, the difference, and the negation of particularity, the universal is determined as equality with itself, as an affirmation that is a negation of negation. The universal, determined as negation of negation, is specified as individuality, as subject. ~As syllogism the intelligence passes over into thought through assimilation and negation, into the determination of immediacy, individuality. | Thinking activity [as freel is therefore in itself an individual subject, an actual individual.~43

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43. W reads: The intelligence therefore proceeds as syllogism in thought, to the universal, the intelligence assimilates all particulars to the universal. Through this assimilation and

The determination of immediacy that the intelligence has overcome, nevertheless comes in where intelligence has overcome it and in this way is included in intelligence. But the intelligence has another relation to immediacy; it comes into this immediacy as end, and is active as end. The will means nothing else but the end that is active. End and reason are immediately connected; what is rational is an end. For the intelligence, rationality resides primarily in theory. But the intelligence as such is still one-sided. Theory should be realized; it is supposed to acquire and preserve the determination of immediacy, of being. Thus the concept has this determination: it suspends the one-sidedness of its subjectivity and gives itself the determination of being, of immediacy and of objectivity in general; thus it is end. ~The concept of end has been badly handled.~44 The intelligence is a syllogism in itself. But at the same time intelligence posits this syllogism, which it implicitly is, as existing. Thus reason is end. The idea, the true, the unity of the concept and reality, the concept that realizes itself, is the end that in reality coincides with itself, so that that by means of which the end coincides with itself is immediate being, existence in general. This immediate existence is posited through the concept, so that the concept has itself therein, this is its objectivity, the reality is in accordance with the concept—this is the idea. The concept, end, is the fundamental condition in everything, and where the concept exists in a higher, freer way in the mode of unity, it exists as natural vitality or as spirituality. The living [being] is subject, and as subject it is the concept of itself. This is its soul, its simple vitality, and as subject it realizes itself. ~It is active, and its activity is to realize itself. | Its realization is its self-preservation by means of the negation of its needs, of its external condition, its inorganic nature; through this negation it coincides with itself, thereby preserving itself. Its self-preservation signifies that the end, by means of its activity, coincides with itself. This living process produces nothing new; it only preserves itself. The determinations of the intelligence in pure, true thought are objective; these constitute the thing itself. What in the intuition and sensation is external to thought is appearance, i.e., not the essential. \sim^{45}

negation of particulars, the intelligence is individuality posited in the determination of immediacy. This is the transition from free thinking, that liberates thought. Through this [liberation] thinking is a particular subject, a particular individuality.—This is the dialectical transition, the difficult, the entire speculative.

^{44.} W reads: In recent times the concept of end has been badly handled, [because] no one knew what to make of it.

^{45.} W reads: It is active in self-realization, and its realization is activity that preserves itself by means of the negation of the external organic nature, which it assimilates and through this

Practical spirit also makes its determinations objective for itself, so that its determinations are not only implicitly objective but are objective as posited by spirit through its activity. As intelligence begins with the faith that it can understand the world, and that it will find its reason in the world, so practical reason is certain that it is capable of giving the determinations an immediate existence and putting them into effect. It has been shown how the determination of immediacy that is for us lies in free intelligence. We must distinguish this [immediacy] from what is explicit for free intelligence itself. It is only implicit insofar as intelligence has passed over to immediacy. According to one side, it finds itself thus. But since intelligence is free and has coincided with itself, it is to be distinguished from its immediacy. It is implicitly the immediacy and is distinguished from this immediacy as free [intelligence], and consequently the immediacy is other for it. So it is this, it suspends this difference of immediacy from itself, and it produces immediacy through its activity, so that immediacy is something posited by it, but at the same time it possesses the mode of immediacy. Since it is implicitly | immediacy, it is thus end.

To posit this immediacy, so that it is brought forth through intelligence, constitutes practical spirit. Practical spirit first becomes actual spirit, so far as actual spirit is actual in an immediate way. Here finitude arises for it. ~The intelligence, as coinciding with itself, is free therein, but with this immediacy through which it is actual, it enters into finitude. There intelligence exists in a restricted condition, dependent. The singularity relates itself to freedom, so it is at first opposed to freedom. But freedom now has this determination in itself, namely that all determinations are its own. Therefore in this immediacy freedom is supposed to have itself. So far this immediacy is posited and brought forth by spirit—an existence that for itself is only appearance, and has only freedom for its soul, its substance.~\frac{46}{2} Practical spirit has the 'ought to be' [Sollen] of its freedom in contrast to

assimilation it preserves itself. The living [being] preserves itself, that is, in its activity the end coincides with [the living being] itself. We have said that in thought, the intelligence knows that the determinations are objective. What the intelligence thinks is the substantial thing itself, the objective. The other aspects [manifest] in intuition, feeling, etc., are transitory. The determinations of thought are the substantial thing, the objective.

^{46.} W reads: So having arrived at immediacy it is at the same time without freedom. This is separated from immediacy; immediacy—so determined—means that it is posited by the intelligence. Being, which exists through the intelligence, is to be brought forth by the intelligence. Intelligence has begun with a presupposition, a self-discovery, a feeling. The practical spirit is as follows: it is free, but at the same time exists in immediacy, but this immediacy is only posited by spirit. Spirit is free in this immediacy, and in this immediacy spirit knows itself. This is mediated, not immediate, and yet it is at the same time immediate,

immediacy; the existent condition is one posited by freedom and is the end. The higher imperative is the 'ought' of the concept in itself: freedom wills to construct and implement a content; the content is contingent, | [it] has not yet acquired any more precise determination or formation.

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The higher imperative is that the universality and rationality in that which is willed by intelligence be realized. This is the inner 'ought' of the idea. The next imperative is that freedom bring about and realize its determinations, give them the mode of immediacy so that the immediate is something posited by freedom. The intelligence has the faith it can attain the immediate, it appropriates the existent, and thus directs itself according to appearance towards the given. The existent appears as the rule for the correct method of the intelligence so that it comes to truth and exists in truth. But since the intelligence is this appropriation, the appropriation is essentially a transformation of the given. \sim Here the standpoint is reversed. \sim ⁴⁷ The proper determinations of the intelligence that it posits from itself are its end, they count for it as its end so that they are the essential in contrast to the immediate [given] that it finds, and in the corresponding immediacy [produced by intelligence] they are made as the intelligence wills. Here are the proper determinations of the intelligence in its knowledge, which the intelligence puts into effect. The inner element in this execution, what is inherently carried out, is that the determinations are raised to universal determinations existing in themselves; the will [of the intelligence] becomes rational in regard to the content; what intelligence wills is rational. This is the standpoint of practical spirit. There are three points to be considered:

(1) The intelligence as will determines itself in itself; this content, which is essential, substantial, and is supposed to be realized, is the way immediacy is to be preserved. I The practical spirit is in itself again this immediacy, but such that this immediacy has practical spirit's proper form; as in the

simple relation to self that has only the mode of immediacy that is nothing true in and for itself.—The practical spirit therefore, as implicitly free, is not satisfied by this implicit freedom. This freedom is the concept in itself. The determinations are ideal. But they are not supposed to be only ideal but also immediate. The moment of immediacy proceeds to the form of particularity. This particularity refers to freedom and is thus at first opposed to freedom. But freedom possesses every determination as its own: thus even immediacy is something brought forth by freedom.—Freedom has itself therein—and that is only insofar as the immediacy is posited through spirit. The soul has only the free spirit for its substance.—This is the determination of the will.

^{47.} W reads: This standpoint is the opposite. Here it is no longer the case that the given and the immediate are the essential, such that the intelligence has to conform to them.

intelligence so it is with the form that intelligence wills, and so intelligence is practical feeling.

- (2) This content is realized, carried out. Feeling becomes drive. What is initially present in feeling becomes proper end; the intelligence is satisfied. In this realization these drives and determinations come into collision with each other. They come into the difference when they are put into effect against the existence that each lacks and that is supposed to be given by intelligence. In this difference which is immediately and formally overcome. the will can put itself into effect in the existence that is only an empty covering for it. The higher collision is that the drives come into opposition to the actual, not as external [actuality], but rather as the [actuality] of the subject itself. The realization [of the drive] means that the subject comes to enjoyment and satisfaction; that what is at first only an inner determinacy is posited as existing, and to be sure as existing through the subject. This is the proper actuality of the subject: within this unity of the subject that unites all the streams of the drives in itself, these opposing drives come into collision with each other. If the drives existed simply as particulars for themselves, they could be realized, but they come into collision because they exist in a subject. These collisions dissolve when the drives are united under a single end that is the universal. Within this sphere the end is
- (3) Happiness, the satisfaction of the drives, but in such a way that an undisturbed, pure satisfaction results, and the single satisfaction | of the subject in these many particular [satisfactions] is happiness. The union of the drives is universal. The higher universality, the substance of spirit itself is freedom, spirit's concrete, immanent universality. However, instead of this universality that still has the drive for its content, freedom becomes its own end. This is the universal absolute end, constituting the transition to objective spirit that forms the limit of this inquiry.

§471 The first is the *practical feeling*. Spirit is free in itself, but is at first still entirely formal, the [process of] self-determining and self-division. These are determinations of its inwardness in general. Since they are in and for spirit, they are first of all the practical feeling. Spirit is individual as subject, and this individual is a concrete subject that determines itself; spirit analyzes its concrete being, posits the determinations that are immanent therein and they are at first only immanent. These determinations are immediate, they exist as such in this subject. Consequently they are felt, but they also belong to the essence of the subject itself, arising out of the essence of the subject itself and not merely externally found; they are rather grounded in the proper nature of the subject—practical feeling.

These are inner feelings in general. The human being has a feeling of right. 48 These feelings are still within it as a simple subject, and the content is felt as the content of feeling in itself. This is not the same situation as intuition, where spirit finds itself as an existent, rather these determinations of feeling are spirit's own modifications. This is the first way that the determinations are in themselves, which we call the nature of the will. It is said that God has planted these in the heart. The heart is the human being himself, and these determinations are not external; rather this determinate content is my own from the ground up. These are determinations; therefore there l is a specific content.

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The question is, what sort are these feelings? What is their system? For they must constitute a totality together. It has been said that the human being should follow the heart, not the understanding; the latter is one-sided, hard, etc. This statement is just as correct as it is false. A heart that is pure and correctly ordered in its feelings (for the heart must be educated to do this), feels instinctively, so it appears, what is right in an immediate way. Since I myself am just, I do what I find in my heart. The understanding divides the several aspects from each other and holds fast to a particular case; since every aspect is isolated [from the rest], each counts as valid in and for itself, and the understanding can give this or that aspect priority as the essential. There the heart can have great superiority, but feeling can also be determined in a one-sided way, and can be bad. The heart is the totality of determinations of practical feelings. It can be asked, What are these special feelings? What is their system, what relation do they have to each other, which order and priority, what are essential and what are nonessential? All of these questions are about the content and determinations of the feelings. This is the content of the heart, and everything depends on which content, which determination, this feeling has. This content exists in a particular subject, heart, and in this ~confusion and chaos it exists in this subjective unity with itself.~49 In order for this content to be the truth, the intrinsically true shape, it is necessary that it emerge from this mixture⁵⁰ and become known in its objectivity, and that its objectivity be a determination of the will. This form of objectivity is what we generally call right, duty.

The same content that is feeling then exists as drive; these determinations which we have in us are also posited in my existence as an immediacy attained by me and in me. We have the same content in morality as virtue,

^{48.} W adds: of right, wrong, hate, shame and religious feelings. All of these feelings are certain in content and determination.

^{49.} W reads confusion, not yet a system. Feeling is subjective unity and content in chaos.

^{50.} W reads: subjective form.

in the proper ethical I actuality as the right and duty of the individual in the state. What right is must also be a duty and vice versa. Duty and right in the ethical sphere are not something one-sided but one and the same. A person who has no rights also has no duties, like the slave. Feelings, provided that they are of \sim a truthful sort, are the same as what virtues and duties are. As the latter, feelings exist in their genuine style and objectivity. \sim^{51} These feelings form a system of determinations, the objective determinations of freedom, the system of ethical life. Actualized, these are life in the state. 52

If one asks about the content of the feelings, this content, when it is explicated, means nothing other than what in a totally objective determination the duties are, [namely] essential determinations and relations. But in the form of feeling they exist in the form of an individual subjective particularity. Duty and right appear as something cold from the perspective of feeling; people prefer feeling and prefer to keep themselves in the sphere of feelings. The heart can indeed constitute a totality against the onesided understanding, but it is equally one-sided [in its own way]. Whether a content is essential, or right, cannot be decided within the sphere of feeling.⁵³ Everything willed, in general everything in us must be present in the mode of feeling, i.e. in my proper, immediate subjectivity, and must belong to me in this way. I But feeling does not exclude having a specific consciousness of what my feeling is and what it is supposed to be. Nor does it exclude that my will is firmly determined and resolved as an insightful will that has insight ~into right~54. There is more in the heart than the objective [elements of right and duty], namely, a particular subjectivity that wants to be comforted and satisfied. However, right and duty require an indifference towards oneself. What is true in these determinations can be determined only from the thinking intelligence. The human being must act with consciousness; and that this content should be true requires that it be grasped in the form of universality, for only thus is it a purified content, a content purified by thought and reflection. ~ The heart is good by nature; 246

^{51.} W reads: true order. The form of feeling is the poorest and worst form of this content. This content must be known in its true form.

^{52.} W adds: The practical feelings belong to the conditions of the nature of spirit, and are manifest as our conditions that are present in us, that are our interests.

^{53.} W adds: In the remark it is said that it is foolish to believe that in the transition from feeling to right and duty, the content is diminished or loses its excellent character. This transition brings feeling to truth for the first time.—[To say] that one has the feeling of right etc. is entirely correct.

^{54.} W reads: concerning the nature of what right and reason are. What is merely in feeling [is contingent], can be so and so. It is more than suspect to hold on to heart and feeling instead of holding on to rationality in thought.

i.e. the willing human being is implicitly good; however, so far as the heart is only natural, it exists in its I natural state and is evil. The heart is supposed to develop to the form of universality and systematic totality, i.e., to the idea. \sim^{55} Here we consider only the form; the content in its objective development is the organization, the system of duties.

§473 Practical feeling contains an 'ought to be'; that is, a certain determination in me is my self-determination. From the perspective of inner self-determination, it emerges that inner determinations have my existence as their correlate. This establishes a comparison between this inner determination and my immediate state or condition. This feeling, so far as it is part of my existence, compares itself with the condition immanent in me, the 'ought to be', the essential. The external condition is supposed to correspond to what ought to be. When both agree, I feel this agreement and I say, 'It is pleasant.' ~This is an entirely superficial agreement between my singularity and a determination in me in general. But where higher objective points of view are concerned, we cannot leave the matter with the relation between the pleasant and the unpleasant.~56 The content, in order to be of a true and objective sort, must emerge in another form and be transformed into another shape so that it has the form of a duty, the ethical. In the examination of the form of ethical life, much still remains undetermined, and is more or less left to subjectivity. This accidental aspect has and retains its place in feeling. ~Outside of this sphere that corresponds to the good, I there is also a dimension of the not-ethical. What is opposed to the will as genuinely free is the sphere of the particular. \sim^{57} Evil occurs when the human being attaches itself to a particularity in such a way that this particularity is opposed to the ethical. This evil is at home in feeling,

^{55.} W reads: The human heart is evil by nature; therein dwell evil thoughts says the Bible; [on the other hand] the heart is good. Both are correct. The heart, the spirit that wills, is implicitly good. There reason is implicit. But that which is only implicit amounts to nothing; it must be for itself, <the> rational element therein must be known. But the heart in the state of nature has not yet attained rationality; it is the evil nature of spirit, i.e., implicit spirit; a natural state where reason has not yet achieved its truthfulness and integral totality. There the heart exists in the natural state and is evil. The will should be thoughtful. The content, when thought, acquires the character of universality etc., its true condition. [In contrast] the [merely factual] determinacy of practical feeling as such constitutes its [limitation].

^{56.} W: pleasant—and its opposite, the unpleasant. The former means pleasure and enjoyment; the latter means pain etc. In reference to something significant to say it is 'pleasant' is superficial because the pleasant itself is superficial.—[Conversely] in the face of great danger we do not say 'unpleasant'. The insipidity of the word soon becomes apparent.—The entire consideration of the subjective is thus properly concluded.

^{57.} W reads: Moreover, [there is] also an aspect of unethical life, [namely] evil. Evil is opposed to the ethical, i.e., opposed to the rational will. The particular, on the other hand, is opposed to the genuinely free will.

and retains the form of feeling. Benevolence refers to legal and ethical duties towards others, but it refers more to what is left to the contingency and arbitrariness of the individual. Laws, determinations cannot be prescribed for this sphere.

In the case of friendship, the relation of one individual to another, it is left entirely up to me which individual I wish to be interested in. This concerns the particularity of my character and my being. These are contingent, and friendship itself is something contingent, ~for no acquaintance with a rational mind will deprive me of his advice.~58 Why is friendship not among the virtues prescribed by Christ? Christ had a circle of friends about him, but this was not what is called a friendship of the heart, but rather a similar orientation of interest towards an objective, true, divine matter.⁵⁹ ~With the Greeks we find a few exemplary friendships which, precisely because they are rare, are so outstanding.~60 Pleiades is not bound to Orestes through objective interests, but rather has made interest in Orestes' person and personality his end. 61 | Sympathy, compassion, gratitude refer to such [friendship] relations that cannot be settled by ethical determinations, but they generally relate to the ethical so that they include an interest in the welfare of others, but in such a way that the type and extent of the interest remains more a matter dependent on special circumstances and occasions. 62 In all these matters, particularity enters to a greater or lesser extent, according to which things are left to contingency, particularity, and arbitrariness.

Further, feelings of a nasty sort have a content that not only does not belong to ethical life, but is opposed to it. These are the feelings peculiar to this sphere. \sim An unjust content is one that belongs to my person in its particularity that is in opposition to my universal rational person. This constitutes the evil heart, and the latter is peculiar to me, in contrast to the objectivity of the will. \sim ⁶³ If one could look into the human heart it

- 58. W reads: Cultivated rational humans respect each other and share an objective interest that they communicate to each other. Or it is a particular interest (need, advice etc.). Thus I can turn to an acquaintance of honest character who will help me without being a special friend.
 - 59. W adds: the true friendship.
- 60. W reads: With the Greeks we find outstanding friendships: Orestes and Pleiades, etc. but these friendships are counted as something rare, and as rare, they are exceptional
- 61. W adds: which means that an end that does not concern or affect the duty of ethical relations among humans but is part of this [interpersonal] side [of friendship], and is more particular. This is left to feeling and remains in feeling.
- 62. W adds: That I am sympathetic, helpful, warm-hearted, requires the time and resources to take care of such matters.
- 63. W reads: and where the content, the determination of these feelings cannot occur in any further objective determination of what is right and true in the heart and feeling. Feelings of the

would be entirely other than it appears. But when the human being is ethical and just, the ethical and the just have the upper hand in him. Indeed there can also be feelings in him that express the satisfaction of his universality in relation to the universal. The demented manifest feelings of arrogance, vanity. Then one says that this passion has made them demented. But these passions are universal in humans; however, it is only self-possessed persons who control them, suppress them. In part this means that they do not allow these passions to arise in them, do not allow them to determine their will. In part they control the passions so that they do not become evident externally. Reflection and especially comparison lead to such feelings. ~Envy, anger, jealousy are | such feelings. Envy demands equality. When abstract understanding holds to the view that all persons are equal, this is essentially envy, *phthonos*, Nemesis, to whom the ancients ascribed the idea that it makes everything the same (equal).~⁶⁴

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The second are the drives. The pleasant and the unpleasant already constitute a judgment, a comparison of the condition in which I immediately exist with the determination that is inner, an 'ought to be'. The drive is also an inner, a sense of a determination accompanied by a feeling of the nonconformity of my existence to the inner demand. The non-conformity is bound up with a defect, a lack, and the drive is the demand that this negative of the positive side of my nature be suspended. The non-conformity is necessary insofar as I am a spiritual and living nature. What I am is supposed to be something brought about by me. Spirit must know what it is, and it knows this only when it has posited itself as such. In this 'ought to be' that spirit is for itself, it is implied that feeling passes over to drive, so that the will is for itself. Accordingly, the conformity of the inner determination and the immediate existence should be posited by the will—drive, inclination, passion. Passion is also drive, but is so designated when the totality of the individual is put into this particular, and the latter is made into the whole. The individual suffers there because such a content is merely a particular,

personality that contradict the objective will are unethical. Every individual is struck by such pulsations of subjective determinations that oppose the universal. But these pulsations are temporary.

^{64.} W reads: Feelings of the spirit, revenge, jealousy, envy etc. are feelings that count for our (affairs) and against the perception of the others. For example, envy is such a feeling based on reflection. Envy is the desire or demand for abstract equality. The ancient Nemesis was a nemesis because it sought to make everything noble into something base and to reduce everything to an abstract equality. Envy is the demand of the understanding that feels itself repressed because another appears to be higher or better. This is the general point of view concerning feelings.

and through this the whole suffers violence because the particular does not conform to it. I The expression pathos has a comprehensive meaning: some particular content becomes for the individual the whole, the great undertaking itself. This content can be entirely ethical. By passion we understand the unethical, which is a general overdoing that is not present in pathos.

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§475 Passions and inclinations are equivalent with respect to their content. Their content is the same as that of the practical feelings, namely, to be satisfied; it is only that the drive turns this into the determinacy of its existence and satisfies itself therein. The drive is a lack; what is lacking to me does not depend on the content as such. Rather it lies more in my selfdetermination and ~this subjective determination is supposed to become objective.~65 Passions and inclinations have the rational determinations of spirit for their content. ~The living being is already rational, and spirit is so much more rational.~66 These determinations are supposed to be not only natural determinations [but also spiritual]. Further, I can preserve determinations in me that are wholly objective rational determinations of the will; on the other hand, drives and inclinations still belong to the particular subjective will. Insofar as the content is still drive, it is not yet purified and has not yet obtained rational determination. For itself, passion is neither good nor evil. The form of passion expresses only that the subject has placed all his interests in some special determination and that this special interest claims his whole individuality.

\$476 ~This cause, for example, the state, or [on the other hand] the piety of Antigone [namely the family], insofar as it is her cause, is her interest. We also understand | interest to be something wrong and self-seeking.~⁶⁷

- 65. W reads: and the demand is that the drive be transformed from the form of subjective self-determination into the form of an objective self-determination—Feelings that are connected with the unpleasant become drives.
- 66. W reads: The original self-determination is rational. Determinations of the heart are generally universal determinations of spirit, rationality;
- 67. W reads: Then a passion is a pathos. If the content is entirely identical with individuality, then it is pathos, and if it is identical with ethical content it is the highest pathos. The pathetic element in tragedy. Orestes, who had to carry out justice for the death of his father, and become the murderer of his mother. This justice that only he had to carry out, is his pathos (not a passion). Or Antigone, who as the sister had to provide the final rites of honor for her brother and bury him against the passion of the ruler. This love of brother (what the brother is in the eyes of the state does not concern Antigone) in which she places her entire individuality, is her pathos.—Creon has to carry out what is the interest of the state—that the traitor to the state should not receive an honorable burial—Creon acts out of the interest of the state. This is his pathos to which he sacrifices the happiness of his son, [and] his son's relation to Antigone.—We have no other the unsuitable word except term 'passion' to express the fact that a human being places his entire interest, fate, condition, in a special circumstance and particularity.

When its motive is only a particular satisfaction, use, or enjoyment, an action has no moral worth. But when it is said that one should act without interest, that is an abstract requirement. I can never act without interest. If a human being does something, this must be his affair, it must belong to his own will, ~even if it is the purest cause. So far the cause is his interest (for the good). The cause, taken abstractly, is the content; so far as it is supposed to become actual, it must occur through the activity of the individuals and so far they are present in the cause \sim^{68} —interest mea causa.

Insofar as a cause is mine, there is interest in it, and it is a misunderstanding if it is said that one should act without interest. Rather it depends on whether it is a true interest or a bad one. Nothing great can be accomplished without passion. When a human being wills something great—of whatever sort it may be—he must put his will into the cause, and subordinate every other cause to this one. Insofar as he places himself entirely in the cause it is his cause. This is his interest and he acts out of passion. ⁶⁹

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In respect to the more precise content of the drives and inclinations, what has been said about feeling is also true. The formal rationality of the drive means that the content of the drive does not remain merely subjective, but is made to be something immediate in me and that I make my determinate existence conform to the content of the drive. When I attain what I have willed, I have enjoyment. The known, which is determined as true, is brought about, and I am satisfied—both the cause and I are satisfied. It would be folly if a human being were supposed to receive no satisfaction, no enjoyment from what he accomplishes. I have made my existence conform to the inner determination, my drive. In life the human being has to see to it that he enjoys himself, that he brings forth a true end and takes pleasure in what he has done. How others take this is an external contingency. This [self-satisfaction] is a higher satisfaction than satisfying others, where one takes it one way and another takes it another

In drives and passions the cause lies in my interest. For Creon the cause is the state, for Antigone [family] piety is her cause and interest. Interest expresses pathos better than passion; however it has at the same time the defect of making it appear as though the cause were mere narrow self-interest or untrue.

^{68.} W reads: The cause must belong to his will, the cause must be his interest. Thus the determination of the content is always present. The cause as such does not bring itself about. The cause is an idea, a substantial end. The activity of individuality is necessary for this end to be realized. In order for individuality to be active, the cause must be present, it must be somebody's cause and somebody's interest.

^{69.} W adds: In history nothing is more vulgar or absurd than to reproach great men that they have acted out of passion. Without passion they cannot act.—To sacrifice other things and to make a cause one's own, means to realize a cause with passion.

way. One must have the insight oneself, that one does the right thing. Drives, enjoyment belong only to a form that can have a rational content or a bad content. But these are determinations that are present in the most ethical and most juridical content. What concerns this content itself belongs in the examination of objective spirit.

One aspect of the drive is to objectify itself, to suspend subjectivity and inwardness and give itself a determinate existence. I The drive aims at enjoyment. This aspect of the drive, that the drive has the property of suspending the one-sided determination of subjectivity, concerns us here only for the sake of the general determination. In the realization of the drive still other determinations occur than in this determination of immediate existence, in which the drive is supposed to be realized, splitting itself into subjectivity in itself and the objective world. But this is the standpoint of consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness is conditioned by the external world, the material that is used as a means and in which the drive is satisfied. This aspect belongs to the sphere of consciousness as such. The self-feeling that consciousness attains its end in this feeling, belongs indeed to our standpoint, but this is only the formal aspect of the drive in general, to wit that in all that I accomplish, I can satisfy myself and enjoy myself.

More narrowly considered, the point is that the drives have a content, and so they are particulars in contrast to each other. Where this particularity comes from has already been discussed, namely that these are determinations of thinking, willing spirit. The drives here are only a transitory special content and this is what proceeds to its satisfaction. The drive as such does not intuit but proceeds to its satisfaction; the drive is blind, therefore like passion. If the drive is blind, the intelligence is not blind; it is the subject to which the drives belong. The drives in their indeterminate multiplicity belong to the simple subjectivity of the will, belong to one subject, and this is here determined as thinking. It has the form of universality in itself and under this form it relates to the particular drives. So it appears as the will in general. The drives and their content have the form of particularity for this subject, and the universal drive of the individual—to satisfy itself—is not only to satisfy the drive, but to satisfy the subject itself in the drive. This is the difference between self-enjoyment as universal, and self-enjoyment as this particular. In animals drives are blind. The subject as intelligence thus stands | above his drives, and wills his own satisfaction. But his satisfactions in these particularities can contradict each other.

§477 The will, because it is thinking, has the content of the drive before it and the specification that here occurs with the realization of the drive. The same drive can be realized in manifold ways, and likewise, among the

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drives that are particular, one or the other can be satisfied. The intelligence is reflective will in general; the will is thus arbitrary as choosing. To consider will and thought as separated is irrational. Insofar as the will is will, thought is present therein. If it is not abstract pure thought but relates to particularity, it is nevertheless a reflective will. Choosing presupposes the will as universal before which stand the particular drives. Thus the will is the possibility of abandoning itself to one drive or another. The choosing will has not yet decided, i.e., it has not yet put itself into one of these particulars and adopted it for its own; it has not yet coincided with itself as a whole subject. In contrast, that the will has resolved means that the will has taken up this particular and excluded the others. Since the will declares one [drive] as being essential to it, it coincides with itself in this particular, or it makes this type of particular its end, and gives itself this content as the content of its subjectivity.

The unifying of inwardness and externality constitutes actuality. The will is actual only when it makes one such particular its own, only when it so determines itself. The will that has not resolved itself is only a possible will. The decision and resolve constitute its actuality. ~This is an important matter, I since the human being uses the drives as an excuse, but this does not clear him of responsibility or guilt, for this drive is a particular, and in order for it to be satisfied, he must first make it his own. He can satisfy the drive or not; for he stands above it as universal. If the human being I commits an action and one says that the drives have seduced him and led him astray, this ignores his freedom. The particular was his own only because he has made it his. This is the standpoint of ancient tragedy. Individuals are taken to be guilty and they assume responsibility for their action. The human being has willed the act, and is guilty, or else he must acknowledge himself to be an animal and then be treated like one. This standpoint is not yet the will free in and for itself, for what the human being has to do with here is only a particular content, not an absolute content such as right, duty. The intelligent will can only will itself, its innermost being, and its being, the being of the human being, is freedom. The true free will is that will that wills nothing but freedom. The arbitrary will as such does not yet have as its end freedom itself; rather the content of arbitrary will is at first the drives, and it can choose among the drives. Merely giving up the drives is simple negation; but the particular drives are affirmative. The intelligence restrains the particular drives; it is the higher, the negation of the particular, [so] the particular is not its sole content.

§477 Since the arbitrary will takes as its end the universality of the drive and its satisfaction in opposition to the restricted particularity of the

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drive, it becomes the drive towards | [the third element of practical spirit], happiness, the proper judgment, the will as intelligence against the particularity of the drive. For the intelligence the allness [Allheit] of the drive results from its particularity. The particular has the universal as its truth; the will passes over to a satisfaction that has the character of universality and this end stands above the satisfaction of the particular drive. Here we are at the standpoint of eudaimonism. \sim^{70} Prior to Kant the principle of eudaimonism was dominant in ethics, as it had been the principle of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, although in the latter it was eudaimonism with a higher end. Happiness is something ancient. In no theory of morals or

70. W reads: There the will is in a state of conclusion. The other is that the will unites the other, the external side of objectivity, with itself.—That is choice, that the will [is] a particular only when the will resolves itself to be a particular, when the will posits the particular as its own. This is an important matter, so far as humans take drives as excuses. This does not get rid of guilt. The human being is intelligent and as a thoughtful being could equally well have not chosen or concluded as he did.—The human being is not without guilt. It is a higher honor for the person when he considers himself as guilty than when he considers himself innocent. To be innocent, not to have committed evil, is out of the question. In an action that he commits, if the human being says he is innocent, he declares himself to be not in possession of his freedom. To be guilty of something means that what drove him, what provoked him, all this had relation to him only in the particular, and that he had willed what he had done, that the guilt was his only because he had made it his. For this reason in ancient tragedy there is a higher standpoint which takes individuals to be guilty, and not this commiseration with being led into temptation so that guilt is not to be imputed. That guilt can be imputed is the height of intelligence.

§477 This standpoint of the reflective will is still arbitrary, not yet the will in and for itself, because this will has to do only with the particular content of the drive, not yet with the absolute content, the content of duty as such. Arbitrary will is distinguished from free will in that arbitrary will deals with a particular content, not absolute; whereas the free will has to do with absolute content. It can only will itself, and its essence is freedom. The genuine free will wills nothing but the explication of duty, right, ethical life as the objectivation of freedom. Arbitrary will has only the drive for its content, so that it may choose, but since it rejects this drive, all other content is [for it] only another drive or another way of satisfying a drive. Mere giving up is negation, but affirmation requires an affirmative content. Here there is no affirmative content other than the particular. Arbitrary will is free abstractly. Its content is a finite particular. The reflective will is then comparative, restraining against the particular content. The universal in relation of the subject to itself, as universal in the subject.—There stands no other content than a particular content. On this point the transition turns itself into the end, which is happiness. [Ed. Break in manuscript]...makes its end the universality of satisfaction, so it is the drive for happiness

In the drive judgment is present, of the subject against the object. The proper judgment is the will as the will of intelligence against particularity and for intelligence. This results from the particularity of the universal.—Pure logical transition that the particular has its truth in the universal, and in its dialectic passes over to the determination of the universal. This transition is necessary, passes over to a satisfaction that has the character of universality, and this end stands above the particular drives. This end, with which enjoyment is universal, is what we call happiness, eudaimonia. Here we are at the standpoint of the eudaimonistic will, that happiness is the end.—

justice is it given as the end or final determination. Nevertheless it is always an interesting standpoint and is necessary in the progress and development of spirit. This standpoint is also found in Solon's time.⁷¹ The history of Croesus is familiar; Croesus had a need to be happy. Solon replied to him, not from a higher standpoint, but completely accepted Croesus' position. He answered within this framework, and did not place himself above it.⁷² He replied: The happiness of the individual requires his entire life. This is Solon's standpoint; the truth in it is the totality of satisfaction. With Plato and Aristotle *eudaimonia* is the highest, namely, that it goes well for the *daimon* of the person, that the human being in its totality is well, that the whole of the human being in itself is satisfied. The concern is precisely for this whole, this end, that is supposed to be satisfied.

§479 Desire is restrained; the drive is taught to consider the other, the whole prior to considering its own desire. [The universal point of view] has come between the decision of desire as the restraining negative. | In happiness the universal satisfaction is the end, but this is indeterminate; and the satisfaction, if it wills to be actual enjoyment, is dependent on a particular, singular content.

\$480 There is a contradiction in the fact that the actualization of a satisfaction is found only in a particularity; and in contrast to universality, the particularity is not something satisfying precisely because it is a particularity. Consequently satisfaction disappears again if it is sought or is found in a particular way. It is a contradiction to find satisfaction in a particularity when for the will only a universal satisfaction counts. The will finds its satisfaction in something, and immediately transcends this something. This contradiction displays itself as a progression into infinity. This standpoint of the dissatisfactions that are found in the satisfaction is what we repeatedly experience and find portrayed. There is a circle of German and French writings from a certain period whose content and end is 'wisdom for living'. There it is portrayed in the style of a novel or a story that the individual sees satisfaction only in this social position in this or that way. Then the experiences are portrayed. Klinger⁷³ made a series of such stories which attest from great life-experience the transitoriness of such satisfaction and the bitter harshness of self-sacrifice connected with

^{71. [}Ed.] Cf. Herodotus, Histories, I, 30–3. See also Hegel's handwritten notice to §21 of the Philosophy of Right, MM 7.73.

^{72.} Wadds: one can praise no one for being happy until after his death, that is, until one can determine whether the entire course of his life was happy and whether the death itself was not unhappy. He cites many who died an easy, quick, and uncomplicated death so that even in their final moments they experienced no contrary unpleasant feeling.

^{73. [}Ed.] Friedrich Maximilian Klinger (1752-1831).

these satisfactions. The result is the so-called 'wisdom for living': one has to find satisfaction for oneself only in peace, quiet, and solitariness of life. Anything else will not make one happy. The satisfaction is an enjoyment; but the fact that this is not genuinely satisfying proceeds not from an assurance but from experience, and this experience must be my very own. That fame and honor are not satisfying proceeds from experience and must be felt. But feeling is entirely subjective. The experience of others is lost to the individual so far as it is not had by the individual himself, and if one has had such experience, then it is too late to orient oneself according to the experience of others. A circle of writings—essentially French—revolves around these images, I [namely] one can be happy only through deception; there comes a time when the illusion disappears, and what one regarded as real and affirmative is determined as a deception. These reveal a burned-out reflection, vacuity of spirit, a longing for deception in order to be happy, and, because one has experienced that even this view is a deception, one shrinks back [from it]. Happiness requires the satisfaction that is universal. but it is at the same time a universal that is yet rooted in particulars and has no other content but the particular. Here the arbitrary will dominates: 'To me that is no enjoyment, others may make of it what they wish.' Happiness has a determination in itself, [namely] that of having no fixed determinacy. This [principle] is above and beyond universality and reflection. In this sense Plato treats pleasure, this standpoint of satisfaction, by bringing pleasure under the determination of the boundless [apeiron]. 74 Since pleasure is boundless, Plato shows that it could not be an end, and he rejects this [teleological] standpoint as a nullity.

What we have before us is the will, this universal, but one that is essentially said to have a determination, a content, in itself. This determination, the immediacy of the drive, is a content not suitable for the category, the form of the universal. The particular content is at the same time suspended as a particular; it is negated through the universality that is the end. Thus a determination results that is negated. In the negation, the universal determination remains a determination, particularity in its universality. But the determination that allows and includes the determination in itself, and at the same time is this universal determination, is *freedom*. The will that as arbitrary will is implicitly free has for its content the proper determination of the intelligence, of the [rational] will. In this result the will has come to the point of having freedom, that is, having itself, for its substantial content. Freedom thus comes to the point of | having itself for its end. Thus freedom

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is the idea, the concept of spirit that for its reality no longer has immediacy, drive, a possession in itself, but rather has freedom itself, its own being, its own concept. What is to be brought forth by freedom should be posited by freedom. This is the objective, the substantial matter; the substance of spirit is freedom.

Subjective freedom is formal, as the freedom of the subject. But the freedom that is object exists in its universality; its end is supposed to be universal. In happiness there was only the universality of reflection. There the universal is not yet this determination in itself. The universality that was only sought after in happiness, was only an 'ought to be,' cannot be attained, because it is not the true universal in and for itself. Only in the latter does spirit attain to its true idea, where the concept is identical with its reality and identical for itself. ~Everything is implicitly idea~75, that is, [exists] in our reflective consideration, but there [in happiness] reality is not being-for-itself or concept; for this reason nature is not free. But reality now corresponds to its concept for spirit; however, it corresponds to the concept only insofar as it is the concept itself. Everything else is merely forms of external realization. That its concept (the end of spirit) is its reality, constitutes objective spirit.

The formal freedom that may or may not make the rational its concept is arbitrary freedom. Arbitrary freedom has not yet found its purpose, has not yet discovered that it can only have itself for its end. Objective spirit means that the concept has only its I freedom for its object, has only freedom for its substantial end; this then is rationality. The concept of spirit is the thing in question, it is the rational that is in and for itself, the substantial. Since spirit wills nothing but freedom and has no other end than its freedom, ~the state is only the mirror image of spirit's freedom, wherein it has its freedom as actual, as a world before itself. \sim^{76} This is the concept with which we began, the universality that is at home with itself, returned out of the externality of nature, that has overcome the externality of nature and has come to itself. A science can have no other conclusion than that to which the concept has led so far, and has been realized; the result is that the subjective has disappeared and the concept thinks itself and has itself as its object, content, and purpose. In this conclusion we have arrived at the beginning: the conclusion is the coincidence of spirit with itself. The natural spirit has arrived at its concept in this way. The faculties of spirit can be

^{75.} W reads: process of formation in nature is also idea,

^{76.} W reads: so in addition spirit is to be recognized according to this determination, and it must be recognizable, that what it does (legally, ethically, etc., as spirit)—is nothing other than to bring forth a world that is a reflection of its freedom.

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considered as serving this or that. Intuition, recollection have an immediate satisfaction in themselves, but the vocation that these faculties have is none other than to bring spirit to itself, to recognize the immediate affection of the world as its own, with the result that its own being is universality in general, the concreteness of the end.

- (l) The natural spirit, spirit implicit in its concept; it exists immediately in a natural way.
- (2) Spirit's abstract being-for-self is consciousness, here it is also rational self-consciousness, but here also reason is for spirit only as something existent.
- (3) Spirit is the eternal, true, concept of itself. \sim The most important aspect is that spirit know itself: *gnothi seauton*. | This is the call that was issued to the Greeks. \sim ⁷⁷ Spirit has only to know what it is. The purpose of these lectures has been to contribute to this knowledge.

77. W reads: spirit in this way is the most worthwhile of all.

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. It has served as a guide, not an inflexible rule. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first, while terms following a semicolon may be suitable in certain contexts. 'Cf.' indicates related but distinguished German terms, which generally are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings.

Abhärtung hardening Absicht intention

allgemein universal, general; common

Allgemeine the universal Allgemeinheit universality

andere other, else (cf. Veränderung)

Andere (das) the other Andere (ein) another Anderssein otherness

Anerkanntsein (fact of) being recognized, recognized status recognize, acknowledge (cf. 'erkennen')

Anerkennen recognize, act of recognition

Anerkennung recognition

Anlage disposition, tendency

Anschauung intuition

an sich in itself, implicit (cf. 'in sich')

Ansich, das the in-itself
Ansichsein being-in-itself
an und für sich in and for itself
Arbeit labor, work

aufheben suspend, supersede, sublate, transform,
Aufhebung suspension, sublation, supersession

Aufmerksamkeit attention

aussereinander mutually external
Aussereinander (das) mutual externality

äusserlich external Äusserlichkeit externality

äussern utter, externalize (cf. 'entäussern',

'veräussern')

Aussersichsein self-externality

Äusserung utterance, externalization

(cf. 'Entäusserung', 'Veräusserung')

Bedeutung significance, meaning
Bedürfnis(se) need, needs (cf. 'Not')
Befriedigung satisfaction, contentment

Begierde desire begreifen to conceive Begriff concept

bei sich with self, present to self, at home

Benutzung use, employment

Berechtigung justification, entitlement, authority

Beschränktheit restrictedness Besitz possession(s)

besonder particular (cf. 'einzeln', 'partikulär')

Besonderheit particularity (cf. 'Einzelheit')

besonnen self-possessed, level-headed, reasonable

Besonnenheit self-possession, composure,

reasonableness, level-headededness,

presence of mind

bestehen to subsist, consist

Bestehen subsisting

bestimmen to determine, define bestimmt determinate, definite

Bestimmtheit determinateness, determinacy,

distinguishing feature

Bestimmung determination, vocation, destination,

definition, condition

Betätigung activity, exercise betrachten regard, consider

bewähren validate

beweisen prove

Bewusstsein consciousness

Beziehung relation, connection, reference

(cf. 'Verhältnis')

Bild image

bildlich imaginative, figurative

Bildung education, cultivation, formation, training,

culture

Blödsinn imbecility

Boden soil, ground, territory
Bürger citizen, burgher
bürgerlich civil, civic

darstellen to present, portray

Darstellung presentation, portrayal, exposition

(cf. 'Vorstellung')

Dasein (determinate) existence (cf. 'Existenz', 'Sein')

Denken thinking, thought

Depression depression

Differenz difference (cf. 'Unterschied')

Diremption disunion, rupture, division, diremption

Ehre honor, dignity (cf. 'Würde')
Eigenschaft property, feature, attribute

eigentlich proper

Eigentum ownership, property (cf. 'Vermögen')

Eigentumlichkeit peculiarity

Einbildungskraft imagination (cf. 'Phantasie')

einfach simple

Einzelheit individuality, singularity

(cf. 'Individualität')

einzeln single, individual
Einzelne (single) individual
Element (cf. 'Moment')

empfinden n. sentience, sentient, v. to feel, to sense

Empfindung sentience, sensation, feeling (cf.

'Gefuhl')

entäussern to alienate, divest, externalize

(cf. 'äussern', 'veräussern')

Entäusserung alienation, divestment, externalization

Entfremdung estrangement Entschliessen resolve, decide

Entwicklung development

Entzweiung rupture, disunion, cleavage, division

ergeben follow from, result from

erheben raise, elevate

errinern (sich) recollect, remember
Erinnerung recollection, reminiscence

erkennen to recognize, to know (cf. 'anerkennen',

'kennen')

Erkennen, Erkenntnis cognition, recognition, knowledge

(cf. 'Wissen')

erscheinen to appear (cf. 'scheinen')
Erscheinung appearance, phenomenon

etwas something

Erziehung education, upbringing Existenz existence (cf. 'Dasein')

existieren to exist; to become really existent (cf. 'sein')

Faselei twaddle, gibberish
Forderung requirement, demand
formell (merely) formal

Fortbestimmung process of further determination advance, progression, course

Fortschreiten advance, advancing

Freiheit freedom fremd alien fühlen feel, feeling

für sich for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit

Fürsichsein being-for-itself

Gang course, path, procedure

Gattung species, genus

gebildet educated, cultivated, refined Gebot precept, commandment

Gedächtnis memory Gedanke thought

Gedankenbestimmung determination of thought,

thought-determination

gedankenlos thoughtless Gedankenlosigkeit thoughtlessness

Gefühl feeling (cf. 'Selbstgefühl', 'Empfindung')

Gegensatz antithesis, opposition, contrast

Gegenstand object

Gegenstände (pl.) objects, affairs, matters

gegenständlich objective
Gehalt content, import
Geist spirit, mind
Gemeinde community
gemeinsam common

Gemeinsame the communal, community
Gemeinschaft community (cf. 'Gesellschaft')
Gemüt emotion, disposition; soul, heart

(cf. 'Gesinnung')

Gemütlichkeit congeniality
Genesung recovery
gerecht just

Gerechtigkeit justice (cf. 'Recht')
Geschäft business, occupation
Geschichklichkeit adroitness, skill

Gesellschaft society (cf. 'Gemeinschaft')

Gesetz law (cf. 'Recht')

gesetzlich legal

gesetztsein posited, positedness Gesinnung disposition (cf. 'Gemüt')

Gesundheit health

Gestalt shape, figure, form configuration, formation

Gewalt force, power, violence (cf. 'Kraft',

'Macht')

Gewalttätigkeit violence

Gewerbe trade, business, industry

Gewissen conscience

Gewohnheit habit, practice, custom (cf. 'Sitte')

Gleichheit equality
Gliederung articulation
Glück fortune (good)
Glückseligkeit happiness
Grund, Gründe ground, reasons
Grundsatz principle, maxim

gültig valid Gültigkeit validity

Gute good handeln to act

Handlung action, act, transaction (cf. 'Tätigkeit')

Heilung treatment, therapy, cure

herabsetzen reduce

herauskommen come forth, result

heraussetzen set forth

hervorbringen bring forth, produce Hochmut pride, high-mindedness

Hohlheit shallowness, vanity, emptiness

Hypchondrie hypochondria

Ich (the) I

Ideal, Idealität the ideal, ideality

Idee idea

ideell (merely) ideal

Individualität individuality (cf. 'Einzelheit')

Inner, das the inner, the inward

innerlich inward Innerlichkeit inwardness

in sich within itself, into self, internal

(cf. 'an sich')

Insichsein being-within-self

intellektuell intellectual
Intelligenz intelligence
Interesse interest

kennen to know (cf. 'erkennen', 'wissen')

Körper body

körperliche corporal, physical, somatic, bodily Kraft force, strength (cf. 'Gewalt', 'Macht')

Krankheit illness, disorder

Kur cure

Lebendigkeit vitality, life-principle, organism

Leiblichkeit corporeity

leiblich corporal, physical, somatic

Leidenschaft passion

Lehre doctrine, teaching, theory
Macht power (cf. 'Gewalt', 'Kraft')

Mangel defect mannigfaltig manifold

Masstab criterion
Material material
Materie matter
Melancholie melancholy

Mensch(en) human being(s), humans
Menschheit humanity, humankind
Mittel means, commodity

Moment moment, element (cf. 'Element')

moral moral (cf. 'sittlich')

Moralität morality (cf. 'Sittlichkeit')

Narrheit folly, foolishness

Nachdenken thinking over, reflection

Nacheinander succession
näher more precisely
Nation nation (cf. 'Volk')

Naturgeist nature spirit, spirit in nature

Natürlichkeit uncultivated natural condition, natural

immediacy

Naturrecht natural right, natural law Naturzustand state (or condition) of nature nebeneinander side by side, juxtaposed

Neigung inclination

Nichtigkeit nullity, nothingness

Not need, necessity, want (cf. 'Bedürfnis')

Objekt object
Objektivität objectivity

Ohnmacht powerlessness, impotence

partikulär private, particular (cf. 'besonder')

Phänomen phenomenon

Phantasie productive imagination

Plattheit banality

raisonnieren argue abstractly

real real Real the real

Realität reality (cf. 'Wirklichkeit')

Recht right, law, justice reell (merely) real Reflexion reflection empire, realm

Reichtum wealth

Sache the thing itself, cause, substantial, subject

matter,

Schein; Scheinen semblance, show; seeming

scheiden divide, separate

scheinen to seem (cf. 'erscheinen')

schlecht bad, wicked schlechthinnig utter, simple Schlechtigkeit wickedness schliessen conclude, decide

Schluss syllogism

Schmerz anguish, sorrow, pain

Schuld responsibility, obligation, guilt

Seelenhaftigkeit ensoulment

seiend (part., adj.) having being, subsisting

Seiende, das being, what is

sein (verb) to be; to exist, to occur (cf.

'existieren')

Sein (noun) being (cf. 'Wesen')

selbständig self-sufficient, self-subsistent,

independent

Selbständigkeit independence, self-sufficiency Selbstgefühl self-feeling (cf. 'Gefühl')

Seligkeit blessedness, bliss

setzen to posit

Sinn sense, meaning

sinnlich sensible
Sinnlichkeit sensibility
Sitte custom, ethics
sittlich ethical (cf. 'moral')

Sittlichkeit ethical life, ethics (cf. 'Moralität')

Sollen obligation, 'ought'

Staat state

Stoff stuff, material

Subjekt subject Talent talent

Tapferkeit valor, bravery, courage

Tat act, deed

Tätigkeit activity (cf. 'Handlung', 'Wirksamkeit')

Tatsache fact

TäuschungdeceptionTeilpartteilbardivisibleteilendivideTeilungdivisionTollheitmadnessTorheitfolly

Träumerei daydreaming
Trennung separation, division
Trieb drive, instinct
Übergang transition
übergehen pass over
übergreifen overgrasp

übergreifen overgrasp überhaupt generally, on the whole; altogether, after

all, in fact, etc.

Übung exercise

unangemessen inadequate, incongruous

unendlich infinite
Unendlichkeit infinity
Ungerechtigkeit injustice
Unglück misfortune
Unmittelbarkeit immediacy

Unrecht wrong, wrongdoing, violation of right,

injustice

unselbständig not independent, dependent unterscheiden distinguish, differentiate

Unterschied difference, distinction, differentiation

Ununterscheidbarkeit undifferentiatability

unveräusserlich inalienable
Urteil judgment
urteilen judge, divide
Veränderung alteration, change
Veranstaltung arrangement

Verantwortung accountability, responsibility veräussern to alienate (goods or property)

(cf. 'entäussern')

Veräusserung alienation (of goods or

property)

verbinden link, bind, connect

vereinzeln isolate

Verhalten conduct, attitude
Verhältnis relationship, relation
Verhältnisse (pl.) conditions, circumstances

verkehrt inverted

verknüpfen connect, combine, link

Verlauf course, journey

Vermögen faculty vermitteln to mediate

Vermittlung mediation, means

Vernunft reason
vernünftig rational
Verrucktheit dementia
Verschiedenheit diversity

verschwinden disappear, vanish

Versicherung assurance Verstand understanding

Volk people, nation (cf. 'Nation')
Volksgeist folk spirit, national spirit

Voraussetzung presupposition
Vorgefunden the found, the given
vorhanden present, at hand, extant

vorhanden sein to be present, to be at hand, to exist

(cf. 'sein')

vorstellen to represent; to imagine, to envisage

Vorstellung representation, image, idea
Vorurteil prejudice, assumption
Wahnsinn madness, insanity

wahr true

wahrhaft(ig) true, genuine, authentic

Wahrheit truth

Weltgeist world spirit
Wert value, worth

Wesen essence, essential being, being (cf. 'Sein')

Widerschein reflection

Wiedererkennen recognize (reflective)

Wille will

Willkür arbitrariness, caprice, arbitrary will,

free will, free choice

willkürlich arbitrary, capricious
Wirken efficacy, effective action

wirklich actual

Wirklichkeit actuality (cf. 'Realität')

Wirksamkeit activity, agency, efficacy (cf. 'Tätigkeit')

Wirkung effect

wissen to know (cf. 'kennen')

Wissen knowledge, knowing (cf. 'Erkennen')
Wissenschaft (philosophical) science, scientific

knowledge

Wohl welfare

Wollen volition, willing
Würde dignity (cf. 'Ehre')

Wut rage
Wutanfall fit of rage
Zeitgeist spirit of the age

Zerstreutheit absent mindedness, distraction

Ziel aim, end Zufall chance

Zufälligkeit contingency, chance

Zufriedenheit satisfaction

Zusammenfassung comprehensive whole

zusammengehen go together

Zusammenhang connection, nexus, continuum, complex

Zustand condition, state, situation
Zweck purpose, end; goal, aim
zweckmässig purposive, purposeful

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