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TRANSFORMATION IN CULTURAL INDUSTRIES

CANDACE JONES
PATRICIA H. THORNTON
Editors

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TRANSFORMATION IN CULTURAL INDUSTRIES

INTRODUCTION

The cultural industries consist of those organizations that design, produce, and distribute products that appeal to aesthetic or expressive tastes more than to the utilitarian aspects of customer needs such as films, books, building designs, fashion, and music (Peterson & Berger, 1975, 1996; Hirsch, 1972, 2000; Lampel, Lant, & Shamsie, 2000). Less widely acknowledged, but as critical, cultural industries also create products that serve important symbolic functions such as capturing, refracting, and legitimating societal knowledge and values. For example, educational publishers influence what concepts and theories are promoted to students by the books they publish. Architects shape the sensibilities of interactions at work, home, and play by their choice of technologies, space design, and material resources. Music producers discover and promote vocal artists whose lyrics shape our understandings of age, gender, and ethnicity. Because of the societal impact of these symbolic functions, cultural industries have continued to interest both popular writers and sociologists alike.

However, to a large degree the cultural industries have been considered unique and out of the mainstream, not a subject for developing general theory, and therefore relatively understudied by scholars of organizations. We argue it is no longer the case that cultural industries are so unique – representing small markets and industries of little matter to research in the sociology of organizations. Cultural industries are now one of the fastest growing and most vital sectors in the US and global economies (United States Census Reports, 2000). This growth is fueled in a large part by the nature of the knowledge, creative, and symbolic assets of cultural industries. These assets are increasingly the key underlying drivers of innovation and competitiveness in both national and global economies (Florida, 2002).

In this volume we attempt to recognize that the functions of the symbolic, creative, and knowledge-based assets of cultural industries are also characteristic of the professional services industries as well, for example as design services, advertising, and even the more mundane services of auditing. Design services, one of the fastest growing areas in the US economy (United States Census Reports, 2000), employs symbolic, knowledge and creative assets to create desirable products for clients and consumers. Brand and product marketing has shifted from its primary focus on price and location to aesthetics, identity, and image management (Schmitt & Simonson, 1997). Even audit practices involve not only knowledge of standard accounting procedures, but more importantly the creative interpretation of complex tax codes, and the creation of symbols of public confidence in corporate practices. Yet few scholars have explored how cultural, professional services, and other industries illuminate one other.

While a large part of our research and knowledge in the field of sociology stems from the study of the decreasing returns industries based in the economic traditions of land, labor, financial capital, and the industrial corporation (Chandler, 1962; Arthur, 1996; Fligstein, 1990), the US Census data reveal that these industries in all likelihood will not be the key drivers of the economy in the future. Instead, increasingly, those industries driven by creative workers and the professions – with organizing principles based in knowledge and aesthetics – combined in novel ways with the institutional logics of the market and the corporation – will be the industries to shape the new views of organizations and our understandings of institutional and organizational change. To date, we have a few descriptive and conceptual pieces with initial explorations such as Hirsch's (1975) comparison of the record and pharmaceutical industries, Powell's (1990) discussion of the convergence of biotech, high tech, film, music, and book publishing as network organizations, and Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti (1997) examination of similarities among semiconductors, auto manufacturing, airplane outsourcing, and film for the application of network governance. We believe that scholarly work, however, has not yet cultivated insights from these cross connections to help us to understand institutional and organizational change. Indeed, in this volume our journey into the realm of cultural industries produces insights that would not be revealed in a Chandlerian (Chandler, 1962,1977) or Fligsteinian (Fligstein, 1990, 1996) world of organizations. By examining the ways in which participants of cultural industries organize and accomplish their goals, our attention is focused on fresh sociological insights and new challenges in the study of organizations.

Given these transformational changes, the manuscripts in this volume illustrate how the boundaries become blurred between cultural and other related industries that also rest upon the endeavors of creative workers. In particular, we see these blending processes in the chapters that examine cell phones, television critics, accounting, and architecture. These dynamic interactions in the commercial landscape between the cultural and professional service industries provide a richer context for the authors in this volume to examine changes in a specific market or industry, and also to advance more generally our knowledge of the latest theoretical and methodological tools sociologists have to offer in understanding the institutional transformation of organizations. We are delighted to present these studies to you.

Djelic and Ainamo (2005) explore the transpositions in institutional logics from the realm of aesthetic fashion to that of high technology in the context of the market for the emergent technology of cell phones. One of their findings points to the need for scope conditions on one of the key umbrella concepts of contemporary organization theory. Djelic and Ainamo show that the distinction between technical and institutional environments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Meyer, 1983), may well be in the era of market capitalism – a more mercurial one. They show for example how the transposition of a fashion logic into the high technology market for cell phones is at the same time utilitarian and cultural, albeit a product designed and marketed to customer expression. Moreover, the agents or institutional entrepreneurs responsible for blurring the boundaries of the aesthetic and the utilitarian are not always rational actors and pioneers with unique inventions (DiMaggio, 1988). Institutional entrepreneurs do not start from scratch but piece together and recombine cultural elements available in society in ways that often involve creative discovery as well as happenstance (Thornton, 2004). Worth's innovation of the modular dress, where component dress parts – sleeves, skirts, bodices, cuffs, trims, what have you – were rearranged in a myriad of permutations to maximize the product differentiation of the white dress for imperial ball occasions, is the telling metaphor. We see, not only in the origins of fashion logics themselves, but also in the track record of cell phone start-ups the potential for this hybridization of fashion and technology logics with varying consequences for strategic success in the product market.

Dowd, Liddle, and Blyler (2005) examine the interplay between production strategies and market concentration for the careers of creative workers. Market concentration has previously been found to limit the diversity of cultural products in the market (Mezias & Mezias, 2000). Dowd et al. assess how the product strategy of decentralization of musical performing acts mitigates the negative effects of concentration, with the effect of allowing for more diversity in cultural products as examined in a higher percentage of female acts. However, they also find that the density of female musical acts never exceeds more than 25% in contrast to their prior findings on African-American musical artists. Dowd et al. attribute this "glass ceiling" on female acts in the marketplace to the "inattention" of record label executives to female acts, reflecting society's gender bias. In short, although the consumer market may be receptive to increasing numbers of female acts, shown by the number of prior female acts that gained top song status on Billboards, there is a limit to this acceptance. This limit is demonstrated by the record companies not signing available female talent even though the success of prior women's acts should have paved a legitimizing path. Their important and timely research shows that unless production strategies are accompanied by a corollary change in societal level logics, change is unlikely to occur in cultural products available in the market.

Bielby, Moloney, and Ngo (2005) point out that there has been little attention to the scholarly study of the aesthetics of popular culture. They address this gap in the literature by examining the television critic's role in an increasingly market driven world in which there are great pressures to evaluate television in terms of "what will," rather than "what should" the audience be watching. As in the case of architecture in this volume (Thornton, Jones, and Kury), the Bielby et al. research highlights a case in which critics are situated in environments with conflicting constituencies that requires mediating between the dual demands for aesthetic and commercial evaluation. Using multidimensional scaling to generate descriptive mappings of meaning structures (Mohr, 1998), they show that, over time and during significant industry transformation, television critics attended to a remarkably consistent set of core evaluative criteria directed to these dual constituencies. As the authors point out there are structural changes in the environment that support critics' desire for greater legitimacy in the larger arena of professional critics that orient themselves to aesthetics. For example, this is evident in the development of professional organization, the emergence of academic television studies, an elevation of the position of television coverage in journalism, and more generally transformations in the structure of media industries. However, it remains to be seen how critics' simultaneous attention to popular aesthetics consistent with a professional logic will moderate the influences of the almighty market in the evaluation and production of television programs.

Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005), contribute to theory and methods of analysis of institutional and organizational change by integrating the work on institutional logics (Thornton, 2004) to understand how the content of culture influences organizational change with that on historical event sequencing (Sewell, 1996) to examine the causal events that transform the content of culture. They apply this dual perspective to examine three industries with histories of institutional and organizational transformation – accounting, architecture, and publishing – questioning in particular if there are countervailing effects from the institutional sectors of the state, the professions, the corporation, and the market. While analyses show distinct patterns of institutional and organizational change within each industry, they also reveal general models of institutional and organizational change that do not consistently support the conventional prediction for corporate and market rationalization. In particular, Thornton, Jones, and Kury focus on three mechanisms in their analyses – institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, and historical event sequencing. In sum, in contrast to the outcome of an *evolutionary* model of market rationalization in publishing, they illustrate how accounting has followed a *punctuated equilibrium* model in which managerial and market forces are periodically and increasingly stymied by the State. Architecture has followed a *cyclical* model in which a dialectic of conflicting institutional logics within the professions, between the aesthetics of architects and the efficiency of engineers, have prevented conflict resolution and linear transformations in the institutions and organizations of architecture.

Zuckerman (2005) examines whether a transformation of the film industry from hierarchy to market influenced actors' typecasting specialization or generalism. Prior research shows that the film industry went through a major transformation from hierarchy to market governance (Christopherson & Storper, 1989: Miller & Shamsie, 1996). Based on the fundamental differences between how market and hierarchies govern their productive assets, should we expect to see a difference in the outcome of cultural products? Zuckerman suggests that hierarchies and markets have internal countervailing forces for generalism and specialism that effectively negate one another. In the hierarchy period, studios had incentives to develop their actors as generalists because of their sunk costs in a semi-permanent staff. They were likely to use actors across a variety of roles rather than hire new actors. Studios, however, also had incentives to develop their actors into specialists with a clear persona that attracted audiences to films, made revenues more predictable and allowed them to recoup their costs of training and development for their stock of actors. In the market period, individual actors have greater control over their career assignments, thus they may turn down job opportunities that unduly constrict their skill development. Individuals, however, also experience forces for specialization such as the market's ability to match resources efficiently, which depends on a clear persona developed through experience in a role and genre. Zuckerman finds only modest differences between actor specialization in hierarchy and market periods. Thus, the governance of creative assets does not lead to significant differences in product diversity or typecasting in cultural industries. This raises the question of whether the dynamics of cultural industries, which are fundamentally driven by consumer demand, swamp differences between markets and hierarchies. An important question is whether the logic of consumerism, which underlies mass cultural products, trumps the governance dynamics of markets and hierarchies?

The chapters in this volume are distinguished by their theoretically integrative and mixed methods of analysis from ethnography to simulations to confirmatory modeling among others – that bring forth a multifaceted focus on the stories of creative individuals as well as the effects of markets and hierarchies in which creative workers operate. Combined, these chapters point toward new understandings of cultural products and industries, and institutional and organizational change processes.

The chapters bring to light examples of the blurring of the boundaries between the aesthetic and the utilitarian. The rise of mass customization stemming from new technologies and materials shifts our understanding of cultural products from serving primarily aesthetic or expressive, rather than utilitarian purposes, to one in which aesthetics, expressive, and utilitarian purposes are combined within a single cultural product. Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005) discuss how institutional logics in the architecture profession cycle between expressive (e.g., aesthetic) and utilitarian (e.g., efficiency). Increasingly, innovative architects such as Frank Ghery use new technological tools to bend, twist, and create buildings such as the Bilbao museum that are at the same time highly expressive and utilitarian. Djelic and Ainamo (2005) describe how Nokia adopted fashion logics that suffused their cell phones, a formerly utilitarian product, allowing consumers to use cell phones for both utilitarian and expressive purposes.

These studies call into question the generalization of classic sociological studies of institutional legitimacy and diffusion (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), and if institutional change and diffusion are a linear function of market rationalization. While the empirical evidence demonstrating the progression of corporate and market logics in a variety of contexts has been mounting (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000; Lounsbury, 2002), the studies in this volume show that institutional transformation does not necessarily occur in a linear process. The findings of Djelic and Ainamo (2005) shows, which institutional logics prevail – that is which logics drive isomorphism – is more a process of "oscillation," not the classic S curve, or linear process of market rationalization. The development of the cell phone was influenced also by the mercurial and happenstance logic of fashion rather than solely by the systematic and orderly advance of Moore's law[1] that drives all of high technology in which cell phone technology is embedded.

Similarly, Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005) demonstrate that in architecture, the logics of aesthetics versus efficiency, oscillated over time due to structural overlap and conflicts among rival but interdependent architect and engineer professionals. These cycles or oscillations opened up new building opportunities, and were triggered by shifts in the political landscape and technological innovations that increased space efficiency and the aesthetic use of new materials.

Moreover, their examination of accounting demonstrates a punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change in response to market crisis, where each crisis built upon and shifted the public's prior understandings (Sewell, 1996). With the first crisis, the public's distrust of market competition to monitor unscrupulous companies deepened. The public accounting profession was the first to step in to claim the privilege and responsibility to protect the public interest and assets. However, with each passing scandal in public accounting from Penn Central in 1970 to Enron in 2001 and now KPMG, this moral high ground has been increasingly eroded by the public perception that accounting firms are more likely to protect their own revenues rather than the public's assets. As the logics of the corporation and the market began to dominate those of the profession of accounting, the State usurped this progression and eroded professional power with tougher laws to protect the public's assets. State Attorney Generals, such as Elliott Spitzer of New York, continue to prosecute with much publicity the unscrupulous companies and accountants.

The chapters point to insights and opportunities for new research at the cross-section between societal sector analysis and theories of the middle range. For example, these chapters point to how the legitimacy of actors such as female vocal groups and television critics involves interplay of professional, corporate, and market forces. Bielby et al. (2005), Dowd et al. (2005), and Zuckerman (2005) address to some extent careers in cultural industries and how production strategies rather than governance shape the mix of cultural products and careers. Bielby et al. make the case that television critics' seemingly innate need for professional status in the eyes of the elite circle of aesthetically inclined critics cannot be stamped out by the almighty forces of market rationalization. Dowd, Liddle and Blyler (2005) show constraints on individuals' careers due to societal level understandings of gender. Zuckerman (2005) shows that even with organizational shifts in production strategies from integrated in a hierarchy to disaggregated in a market, that there is little difference in the diversity of cultural products, seen in actors career specialization under the two governance forms.

Similarly, Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005), as well as Djelic and Ainamo (2005) show how structural overlap provided institutional entrepreneurs with the opportunity to visualize and transpose institutional logics from one societal sector to another, igniting change in a variety of industries. These chapters extend and augment prior empirical research showing how institutional entrepreneurs import design or consumer logics to alter products and shift markets (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Jones, 2001). However, the scope conditions under which institutional entrepreneurs can take advantage of structural overlap to initiate institutional change are not well understood. Just how much of the discovery process is the happenstance of event sequencing versus the rational strategic behavior of entrepreneurs warrants further research.

The integrative use of theory and methods in these chapters brings to light the need to take stock of the accumulating research findings on cultural industries with regard to how they compare with extant organization theory. We encourage you in reading the chapters to think along these lines. For example, transaction cost theory argues that cost minimization is the driving force and logic for hierarchies, particularly those that serve large consumer markets (Williamson, 1985). However, Zuckerman (2005) points out limitations of transaction cost theory in that it does not necessarily matter whether it is the firm or the market that governs the typecasting of actor talent – the result is much the same for specialism. While population ecology theory argues that the effects of density are universal, instead we see examples in which density dependence propels legitimacy for some cultural products but not others, for example with African-American, but not female musical artists. In other chapters resource dependences are not simply altered by power, but instead by the institutional logics of the professions, the market, and the corporation that combined shape aesthetics in new ways (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). For example, the shift in architectural aesthetics from Beaux Arts to Bauhaus was shaped by the rise of engineers as an increasingly important profession during the 20th century in several Western industrialized countries. With this shift came an appreciation for material resources that were mass manufactured rather than hand crafted and traditional (Guillén, 1999). In institutional theory organizational actions as sign and symbol has been a vibrant line of research particularly with respect to understanding the sources of legitimacy and the mechanisms to buffer and loosely couple organizations in conflicting institutional environments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). We see applications and variants of this branch of institutional theory in widely divergent contexts such as in the realms of corporate executive practices (Zajac & Westphal, 1998, 2004), management of cultural organizations (Glynn, 2000), and entrepreneurial strategies (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). In this volume, Djelic and Ainamo (2005), with the case of cell phones, extends our understanding of how organizations located in highly cultural and technical environments transpose institutional logics to commercially use sign and symbol as the center piece for entrepreneurial opportunity and marketing strategy.

While these chapters bring renewed attention to classic studies of cultural industries, our hope is that these chapters motivate new scholars to take up the study of the cultural industries. By addressing a forgotten call to integrate cultural sociology and organizational theory (DiMaggio, 1977), we have chronicled new insights brought forth in these chapters. The question still remains, given the rising prominence of the creative class and its importance to future economic vitality, just how special and how mainstream are the research findings from the cultural industries and how do they change what we now take for granted in organizational sociology.

NOTES

1. Moore's law originated with Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel in 1965 with the observation that the area of transistors per square inch on computer chips had doubled every year since the chip was invented, increasing computing capacity fourfold every 4 years. (http://www.webopedia.com). These chips are the brains of computers, cell phones, car electronic systems, and a myriad of other products consumers use.

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AESTHETICS OF TELEVISION CRITICISM: MAPPING CRITICS' REVIEWS IN AN ERA OF INDUSTRY TRANSFORMATION☆

Denise D. Bielby, Molly Moloney and Bob Q. Ngo

ABSTRACT

Television critics play a central role in the interpretation of cultural forms, objects, and productions. In contrast to critics in elite art worlds, the role and status of television critics are less institutionalized and less well understood. One indicator of the degree and status of the institutionalization of critics' roles is the codification of evaluative criteria and critical practices. Our research examines whether critics in television draw upon a recognizable set of evaluation criteria, and if so, whether that repertoire of aesthetic concepts increasingly parallels criteria employed by critics in elite art worlds. Using multidimensional scaling to delineate television criticism over the last two decades, a period of considerable

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transformation in the industry, we find that television criticism attends to a core set of conventional criteria. These include appraisal of formal aesthetic elements, signaling increased attention to television as an art form, while retaining consideration of factors such as entertainment value that are of interest to audiences and business constituencies alike.

INTRODUCTION

Critics play a central role in the interpretation of cultural forms, objects, and productions. According to Griswold (1987), in serving their audiences critics comprehend and explain cultural objects in relation to larger, external systems of meaning. Comprehension takes into consideration the internal structure, patterns, and symbolic carrying capacities of cultural objects. In order to comprehend and explain, critics draw upon the intention or purpose of the artistic creation, taking into account the larger cultural context that shapes or constrains the reproduction of the object. In varying ways, critics' judgments are relevant to audiences as they make choices about and evaluate cultural objects.

The role of critics is institutionalized in elite art worlds (Becker, 1982; Long, 1986, 1987; Gans, 1974). In those realms, critical authority resides in designated experts to which all art world participants orient. In high art, audience members do not make autonomous personal judgments about the quality of an art form but instead are expected to defer to the expert judgment of cultural critics. Within critical public discourse, differences of opinion as well as consensus among art world participants are indicators of critics' status. Another indicator of their institutionalized position is the proliferation of formal training in criticism and interpretation offered by departments of art and film studies, among others, at institutions of higher education (Bordwell, 1989). Those programs not only affirm the role, function, and status of critics, they also define aesthetic criteria for critical analysis in elite art worlds.

In contrast to the accepted role and function of critics in elite art worlds, their status in non-elite art worlds is both less institutionalized and less well understood. To some scholars, critics are viewed as unnecessary in popular art worlds such as television, popular literature, or musicals because the experience of popular art forms is regarded as direct and unmediated by aesthetic valuation (Shrum, 1996). Indeed to those scholars, the very differentiation between elite and non-elite art worlds lies in the extent to which understanding of cultural objects is mediated by professional critics. While critical discourse is possible within popular culture, in their view it is the absence of the audience's deferral to critical authority that differentiates elite from non-elite art worlds. Consequently, there had until recently been little scholarly attention devoted to the aesthetics of popular culture, and particularly neglected has been the role of critics in shaping these aesthetic systems (Bielby & Bielby, 2004).

Since Becker's (1982) seminal work on art worlds, scholars have noted a tendency toward aesthetic codification as part of the development of elite art worlds generally, and developments pertaining to the television industry suggest a similar evolution may be underway. Aesthetics are systems through which attributions of value are made regarding cultural objects. Although aesthetic systems are integral to the operation of art worlds, sociological analysis has yet to fully engage how consideration of the aesthetic properties of the cultural product itself enters into judgments about the value of cultural objects.[1] Research on audience engagement of melodramatic narratives (Brooks, 1976; Gledhill, 1992), romance novels (Radway, 1984), soap operas (Harrington & Bielby, 1995), and popular music (Dowd, 1993; Frith, 1998) indicates consumers make discernments within these popular cultural forms, and increasingly, scholars have challenged the presumption that there is no aesthetic to popular art forms (Bielby & Bielby, 2004; Bird, 2003; Frith, 1998; Gans, 1974). Such developments underscore the importance of rethinking traditional distinctions between elite and popular culture (Peterson & Kern, 1996; Peterson, 2002; Han, 2003).

Early sociological research on mass media such as television, popular literature, film, and theater suggested that professional critics of these art forms serve as cultural mediators between cultural products and their audiences, not unlike critics in elite art worlds (Lang, 1958).[2] The research also found that critics in popular media operate within a complex system of cultural production, which is driven by overtly commercial considerations; often these critics must work hand-in-hand with those who oversee venues for display or distribution of products in order to create markets for those works, calling their professional objectivity into question. However, Becker's (1982) research on critics in elite art worlds revealed that they too are engaged, however obliquely, with market concerns. Because art critics provide audiences with reasoning that renders a product acceptable and worth appreciating and actively contribute to the process of bringing an audience to an artist's work, they are potentially no less involved in the commercial viability or success of a cultural product.

Our research is part of a larger project to examine the role, function, and status of critics and criticism in commercial popular art worlds. The objective of the analysis reported here is to ascertain the nature of television criticism and the extent to which evaluative criteria have become conventional. We do so by asking: (1) whether television critics draw on a recognizable set of evaluation criteria that orient to aesthetic considerations; (2) if so, whether that repertoire is oriented to "elite art" criteria; and, (3) whether and how these repertoires may be changing over time. Our interests are motivated by several considerations.

First, the proliferation of cable channels and networks over the last two decades represents one of the most significant shifts in the structure of the industry since the launch of commercial television in the late 1940s. This expansion has, in turn, encouraged more varied and perhaps more adventurous and artistically mature products, not unlike those produced during the so-called "Golden Age" of television in the 1950s. Since then, the medium has evolved from one concerned with a live, theatrical-world focus to filmed and videotaped programming of infinite variety. Television is now a ubiquitous form of popular entertainment domestically as well as globally, and although its presence is often publicly challenged, it is just as widely accepted by scholars and audiences alike as an important social force in everyday life (Gamson, 1998; Lembo, 2000; Grindstaff, 2002).

Second, research on the film industry has shown how efforts by its leaders, in collaboration with public intellectuals, transformed the cultural definition of film from a mass-oriented commercial one to a medium that may now also be regarded as an art form. That transformation occurred largely though the intellectualization of critical discourse (Baumann, 2001) and the emergence of the "scholarly critic" as a profession distinct from that of the journalistic film reviewer and critic. In a similar fashion, coverage of the television industry and review of its programs, which entered public cultural discourse through newspapers and other periodicals, receives more attention through analysis devoted to the medium as general news and as business, as well as arts and entertainment. In addition, television critics are understood to possess specialized knowledge, they have established a non-profit professional organization to advance professional autonomy and status, and "television studies" programs now exist in some universities (Newcomb, 1986; Spigel, 1998). In sum, a number of trends, including the increased "artiness" of television programs and legitimacy of television critics, suggest that the status of critics as knowledgeable experts to which participants in a non-elite art world like television orient is becoming institutionalized. If so, it should be evident in reviewers' critical appraisals of television programs, but it remains to be determined to what extent and how these developments are reflected in their work.

CRITICISM AND POPULAR CULTURE

Aesthetics and Popular Culture

In defining what popular culture encompasses, Mukerji and Schudson (1991) consider it to be "the beliefs and practices, and the objects through which they are organized, that are widely shared among a population" (p. 3). Thus, popular culture entails the study of the properties of a cultural form, medium, or product, such as musical styles, film narratives, or television programs, for the cultural significance they embody. Accessibility of a form is central to achieving its status as "popular." Scholars of cultural production usually conceptualize accessibility as how widely a cultural form is distributed (e.g., DiMaggio, 1977). In contrast, those who study reception among audiences emphasize their agency in creating access or generating novel meaning-making opportunities (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1992; Harrington & Bielby, 1995).

Although the prevailing definition of popular culture emphasizes that popular objects are "shared by entire communities" (Bennett, 1980, p. 3), surprisingly little sociological attention focuses on analysis of the properties or qualities of the popular culture objects that achieve this status of widespread knowledge or attention, or why those properties or qualities resonate broadly. Social critics and sociologists often presume that popular cultural products lack aesthetic quality and achieve popularity by striving for the lowest common denominator (see e.g., Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972 [1944]; Shrum, 1996). However, not all scholars subscribe to this view (Lang, 1957). Hall and Whannel (1964) concede that in order to achieve broad appeal the properties or qualities of popular cultural objects necessarily emphasize a sense of the familiar and of cultural knowledge widely shared. But to sustain popularity, those objects must also simultaneously incorporate sufficient novelty to perpetuate interest. In their words, popular art is understood to be "essentially a conventionalized art which restates in an intense form, values and attitudes already known; which reassures and reaffirms, but brings to this something of the surprise of art as well as the shock of recognition" (p. 66).

Among sociologists, Gans (1974) was the first to argue that aesthetic criteria apply not just to "high" art, but equally to popular art forms. In discussing aesthetic considerations in popular culture, he says:

> I use the term aesthetic broadly, referring not only to standards of beauty and taste but also to a variety of other emotional and intellectual values which people express or satisfy when they choose content from a culture, and I assume, of course, that people apply aesthetic standards in all taste cultures, not just high culture (p. 14).[3]

Increasingly, work by cultural sociologists on a variety of art worlds points to the validity of Gans' argument that aesthetic standards exist in popular art worlds and to the importance of those aesthetic standards to the organization of and practices within those art worlds (see, for example, Lachmann's (1988) analysis of graffiti artists, where taggers' notions of style influence innovation, Dowd's (1993) work on the contribution of musical attributes to cyclical diversity, and Rosenblum's (1978a, b) work on professional photographers, which demonstrates how variation in photographic styles underlies paths of distribution).

Sociological understanding of the emergence, transformation, and current meaning and cultural significance of television criticism requires the analysis of transformations in a number of different spheres – changes in the television industry broadly and in the structural location of television critics within this culture world, specifically, but also transformations in the form and substance of the objects of the critics' attention: the television programs, and the television medium's changing relationship to other popular and elite forms of culture. These spheres, then, provide the necessary social context in which we must situate our analysis of the primary cultural object produced by professional television critics, the television review. Before turning to analysis of the reviews themselves, then, we elaborate the institutional and social context in which they are embedded, beginning first with the structural location of the critics themselves.

Structural Location of Television Critics

Television critics occupy a complicated structural location. There are no specialized venues for critics to reach "connoisseurs" of the medium; instead, most reviewers of prime-time programming write for mass-circulation newspapers and magazines. The product they write about reaches an audience largely through advertiser-supported network television. Network programmers will choose to air a series only if it seems likely to deliver the large audiences with characteristics preferred by advertisers, and they will avoid series with controversial content or themes that are likely to alienate advertisers. Unlike critics in elite art worlds, there is little opportunity for television critics to write about "undiscovered" or promising new creators whose work is breaking new ground. Because of the economics of the industry, new ideas do not get produced until they have been evaluated by the business interests who screen out proposed series that appear not to be commercially viable.

However, the television industry is more fragmented today than in the early years, when the only way prime-time programming could reach an audience was through the three advertiser-supported networks. Public television has long been viewed as an industry segment less "tainted" by commercial considerations, and as a result a certain prestige has been attributed to the series it airs (including series that were considered mass entertainment when they originally aired in other countries). Subscriber-supported cable networks such as HBO and Showtime operate on a different business model that is not dependent on advertisers and audience demographics, and the series they air can be commercially successful without reaching a mass audience.

Television critics' access to a readership is constrained by the business interests of the companies that employ them, and their access (and the audience's) to the material they write about is constrained by the commercial interests of those who produce and broadcast the series they review. Over 40 years ago, Kurt Lang (1958) observed that the structural location of critics in relationship to audiences and business interests shapes the nature of criticism across a range of entertainment media. In the research reported here, we address how the complex business context of the television industry today affects critics' view of their role relative to their readership, the creative community, their employers, and the networks and advertisers, and how it is reflected in the criticism they write.

Television Critics' Status and Legitimacy

The complicated structural location of television critics is a significant factor in their ambiguous status as cultural authorities. One source of ambiguity is the social organization of the industry itself. Multiple constituents comprise the culture world of television[4] – industry executives and other decision-makers such as advertisers, the "creative" community, which includes writers, directors, and producers, among others, and last but not least, the audience. Because a ratings "hit" cannot be predicted in advance of airing, and not until many thousands of dollars have already been committed to producing a show, these constituencies co-orient to each other in strategic ways. On the one hand, audiences are looking for assurance when selecting entertainment that their investment of (increasingly scarce) leisure time will be rewarded. On the other, industry participants are most interested in critical assessments that predict the commercial viability of a program; these assessments are a primary kind of feedback upon which the industry relies to evaluate a program's potential performance in the ratings. Although critics' primary role is to evaluate programs for audiences for their potential entertainment value, those evaluations also provide critical feedback to members of the industry, for whom the commercial success of a program is all but impossible to predict. Critics are, to some extent, dependent upon business constituencies for access to advance screenings and to interviews with writers, producers, and actors. As in any cultural realm, providing critical and insightful analysis for audiences has the danger of alienating those upon whom the critics depend for access, and given the structure of the industry, the consequences for a critic's career may be considerable. Thus, the kind of criticism that gives a critic status among business constituencies may compromise her or his status among audience members, and vice versa.

Historical Evolution of Television Criticism

Focused newspaper coverage of television began when it was launched in the late 1940s, and reviewing became widespread in mass circulation dailies by the mid-1950s.[5] Between 1953 and 1955, newspaper space devoted to television rose 500 percent, according to an NBC survey (reported in Boddy, 1990, p. 191). According to Himmelstein (1981), by 1958 nearly 80 percent of US daily newspapers with a circulation over 50,000 had television editors. In its early years, television criticism was written primarily by journalists who were experienced at theater criticism. Until the late 1950s, most national programming originated live from New York, and the centerpiece of primetime was dramatic anthologies written by playwrights. Thus, evaluation of the early form of the new medium of television could be readily accommodated by drama critics already familiar with the aesthetics and practices of the stage.

The status of critics within this culture world may reflect change in the television industry, its products, and their relationship to other cultural spheres and media forms. By 1960, live dramas were no longer produced for television, the center for production had shifted to Hollywood, and the dominant form of programming had become the filmed series (referred to as the ''telefilm''). In place of live dramatic anthologies, the primetime television schedule filled with program genres that predominate to this day – hour-long dramas, situation comedies, and detective shows, among others. Not only did the shift to filmed programming represent a significant change in content and technology of production, it represented the emergence of the series concept that was organized according to a particular format. That format, now a well-established convention of television writing, is structured around the concept of the continuing character, with themes and plot ideas for the entire series established in the pilot episode (Boddy, 1990, p. 192). Although the shift in program production and format in the mid-1950s elicited discontent among television critics, which in turn elicited a hostile reaction toward the critics from network executives, the importance of television critics at the newspapers only increased, largely because the networks needed the newspapers as a venue for publishing and promoting their schedules (Spigel, 1998). A mutually beneficial relationship developed between the television and newspaper industries; the press depended on critics' access to the networks and local television stations for news, which in turn provided a steady stream of news for the papers.

Early research on television criticism found that reviews in daily mass circulation papers oriented differently to the audience when compared to reviews that appeared in more elite periodicals or even mass circulation outlets published on a weekly basis (Lang, 1958). According to this early work, reviews in mass readership outlets were largely framed in terms of "Will the viewer like the program?" rather than the more "public conscience" approach of elite publications, written from the perspective of "Should the viewer like a program?" (Lang, 1958, p. 15). Since the mid-1950s, general circulation newspapers have become the primary venue for access to information about television programs.

The nature and scope of the television critic's work has expanded considerably since the late 1940s. In television's earliest days, many newspapers marginalized coverage of the new medium because they saw it as a competitor for advertising revenue (Watson, 1985). Despite the expendable status of early television critics, many had experience in writing theater criticism for newspapers and were accustomed to the demands of writing on deadline and conforming to prescribed column length, among other journalistic constraints. Although the status of television critics has improved since then, and their importance is now widely recognized by newspapers, ;a newer set of job conditions have emerged to complicate the critic's ability to do their task effectively. Contemporary television critics describe the job as overwhelming, due in large measure to the sheer volume of television programming that needs to be reviewed. In addition, the scope of television reviewing now encompasses more than just the review of programs, it also includes coverage of industry news that affects what is broadcast. This added responsibility includes topics such as the Federal Communications Commission's oversight of the industry, broadcast legislation in Congress, developments in the business of the industry, celebrity interviews, and general news items (Watson, 1985, p. 68). Observing how the definition of the critic's role has expanded in scope since its early days, one reviewer stated at a 1985 symposium on television that, "it is now a legitimate news beat." Recognizing the additional demands placed upon reviewers, some newspapers (e.g., the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*) have expanded their staffs to allow for more complete coverage of the medium and the industry.

Despite critics' increased status and expanded staffs at key newspapers, the now dual role of television critic and television reporter that many television critics must carry places them in what appears be a more complicated relationship relative to the industry. As one critic put it, "…being a critic and a reporter puts a strain on you and your sources because they are never quite sure what hat you're wearing when you walk in the door" (Williams, quoted in Watson, 1985, p. 68). While early scholarship raised questions about critic's independence from the pressure of industry publicity (Lang, 1958), since then contemporary television critics have taken steps to distance themselves from it. In 1978, the Television Critics Association was established by television critics in an effort to professionalize their standing relative to the industry. This association, which meets during the television industry's semiannual preview of new programs, provides critics with a perspective on the industry they cover. An associated shift in coverage of the medium since its onset stems from the rise of the cult of the celebrity (Gamson, 1994). Although there has always been the opportunity, and pressure, to report on celebrities and other industry personalities, the expectation to incorporate softer news and gossip has increased since the launching of venues such as *Entertainment Tonight* in the 1980s or cable channel E! (Entertainment Television) in the 1990s, which are devoted to turning personal matters into public affairs. In short, the role of television critics has expanded in several ways. In addition to increased volume of programs to be reviewed, coverage of the television industry now includes two seemingly distinct categories, "hard news," which reports the business of the industry, and "soft news," which encompasses the culture of celebrity and gossip.

Elements of Popular Criticism

This issue of the structural location of television critics and the decisions they face regarding competing priorities and demands around which their criticism should be oriented or organized provides an important context for and represent potentially significant constraints upon the ultimate product of the critics, their reviews. But it is also important to look at the nature of the cultural objects themselves as providing a crucial social context for the shaping of these reviews; this requires attention to specificities of the aesthetics of the television medium and its relationship to other aesthetic systems, art worlds, and media cultures.

Critics evaluate cultural objects relative to aesthetic systems. Aesthetic criteria for classifying works of arts as "beautiful," "good," "not art," "bad," and other expressive categories are formulated by those expert with the art form and applied by critics and consumers to arrive at judgments of value or worth. An aesthetic criterion does not exist in a vacuum. To provide understanding, those criteria must relate to each other and to the cultural object itself within an overall system that establishes the kinds of relations that are possible (Prall, 1967 [1936], p. 41).

The formulaic, genre-bound nature of primetime television constrains the degree to which critics engage in aesthetic analysis of its artistic properties. Genre delineates the similarities and differences among cultural objects, and as one of the central organizing conventions of television production, it provides "standards for evaluating and appreciating cultural objects" (Crane, 1992, p. 112). Because of the industry's aversion to the risks that accompany innovation, and partly because of the audience's preference for familiarity when seeking popular entertainment, the television industry has recognized two basic genres of primetime entertainment programming – situation comedies and dramas – with reality shows increasingly treated as a separate, third genre (Bielby & Bielby, 1994). When reviewing programs, "the television critic is on the lookout for novelty, quality, controversy, the new and different (as, to a degree, is the Broadway playgoer or art gallery habitué)" (Littlejohn, 1976, p. 152). Occasionally, such elements do manifest themselves in the aesthetic properties of the narrative, cinematography, acting, or other artistic features of production, but not often. While the conventions of primetime television may constrain the degree to which critics make aesthetic judgments based on artistic criteria, social analysis and commentary is not the only alternative. As television studies scholar Horace Newcomb (1974) emphasizes, television is entertainment. Consequently, television critics can also approach the medium from what might be called a "popular aesthetic," a standard based on the degree to which a given production resonates affectively and achieves a level of emotional authenticity among viewers. The appreciation and evaluation of popular art forms like television is highly mediated, but by an aesthetic that is fully accessible to engaged audiences (see Bielby & Bielby, 2004).

Transformation in the Television Industry

The three major television networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, dominated the television industry from the 1950s. However, the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to the proliferation of cable television and the emergence of new broadcast networks such as Fox, UPN, and WB, which brought to an end the era of television controlled by the three corporations instrumental to its establishment. The emergence of these newer "weblets" was a key trigger in the shift from mass programming and broadcasting to niche-marketing and narrowcasting strategies through emphasis (initially) on urban and African American audiences, with programs such as *In Living Color* (1990), teen and youth audiences drawn by series that included *Twenty-One Jump Street* and *90210*, and more generally, the 18–34 demographic, who found appeal in shows like *Married with Children* and *The Simpsons*. While Fox, by the early 1990s, tried to move toward a broader mass/mainstream audience, its early programming strategies were copied by UPN and WB, which were launched in 1995. Coinciding with this transformation in the over-the-air segment of the television industry was the rise of the cable industry. By 1985, almost 50% of US homes had cable distribution and the network share of viewers dropped to 70% from a 1960s high of over 90%. By 2002, the cable industry's audience had increased to nearly 70% of the public, while the combined over-the-air network share had fallen to less than 40% of overall audiences. The mid- to late-1990s brought the expansion of original programming on basic pay-cable networks such as Lifetime, HGTV, and Discovery, and premium subscriber networks such as HBO (with series such as *The Larry Sanders Show, Sex and The City*, *The Sopranos,* and *Curb Your Enthusiasm*) and Showtime (*Beggars and Choosers* and *The L Word*).

This transformation in the industry was facilitated by the deregulation of television and radio, starting in 1980 with Reagan appointee Mark Fowler, chair of the Federal Communications Commission from 1981 to 1987. The FCC's steady loosening of regulations culminated in late 1995 with the elimination of the Financial Interest and Syndication (or "Fin-Syn") Rules and in 1996 with the passage of the Telecommunications Act. The Fin-Syn Rules, implemented in 1971, had been designed explicitly to intervene in the market in order to promote diversity and competition in the supply of primetime entertainment programming and to forestall the kind of vertical integration that dominated the film industry during the studio era (Matelski, 2002; Rosenbaum & Williams, 1990; see also Bielby & Bielby, 2003). The Telecommunications Act, which was the first major revision of telecommunications law in nearly 62 years, raised existing caps on ownership of broadcast stations and reduced prohibition against cross-ownership of cable and broadcast stations. The results of these series of deregulatory moves were massive media mergers in the 1980s and 1990s, including thousands of small ones, with the most prominent mergers being the 1985 acquisition of ABC by Capital Cities, the 1989 purchase of NBC/RCA by General Electric, the merger of Time Inc. with Warner, and Time/Warner Communications' subsequent acquisition in 1995 of Turner Broadcasting. That year also brought the subsequent merger of Disney with ABC, while Viacom merged with Paramount and CBS in 1999, and AOL with Time/Warner in 2000.

These shifts in the industry's regulatory environment, the first of real import since the early 1970s, mark the last two decades of television history as a period of significant structural transformation. The disaggregation of the mass audience into its constituent elements and the search for undeveloped ones alongside the rise of niche networks and specialized programming have opened up opportunities for television series that in some instances may be considered outright innovative and in others at least engaging unexplored terrain. We anticipate that these structural transformations are also consequential to the reception and appraisal of programs by television critics as well, which may be observed in the reviews they write of television series.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

We analyzed newspaper reviews of all US television series debuting in the fall seasons of 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000, an era in which the culture industry of television underwent a significant transformation in modes of transmission, industry consolidation, and regulatory environment (Hilmes, 2003). The effect of these industry developments that began in the early 1980s on viewing options and critics' evaluative system could take time, consequently we collected reviews at five year intervals to allow for lags in outcome. Most television shows premiere in the fall and the majority of television critics' reviews are of new, rather than returning, series, and while reviews of returning shows tend to be highly selective (reviewing just a few shows) reviewers tend to be more systematic in their coverage of new shows (reviewing the majority, if not all, of the new series). Thus we chose to focus particularly on new fall series reviews, which represent the most coherent subgroup of reviews. Articles were collected from the *Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, Seattle Times* (1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 seasons), and *USA Today* (1990, 1995, and 2000 seasons). These papers were selected to reflect a diverse range of publication sources. The *Los Angeles Times, New York Times, USA Today,* and *Washington Post* are all national or nationally prominent, with their reviewers read beyond the specific cities of publication (including through the syndication of their columns). The reviews at the *Boston Globe* and *Seattle Times* help round out this picture of television criticism, however, by introducing the reviews of critics more oriented toward specific, local markets.

The dataset consists of 540 reviews of television shows from 15 different writers in six different newspapers. While the *Boston Globe* and the *Los Angeles Times* made up a large portion of the sample (21.1% and 20.9%, respectively), each of the other individual papers made up at least 10% of the total sample. Fewer of the reviews were taken from 1985 (13.5%) than the other time periods, which ranged from 22% to 32%; however, in 1985 there were still only three national television networks and thus fewer new shows to review. For each review we recorded the author and source of the article, the subject of the review, the genre of the series (broadly categorized as drama, comedy, or non-fiction), whether or not the reviewer's evaluation of the television show was positive, negative, or mixed, and evaluative criteria pertaining to television as a medium and industry. The average length of a review was 334 words per review, with an average of seven different criteria used per review.[6]

Methods

One goal of our research is to identify the criteria and aesthetic qualities critics rely upon to pass judgment on series that are firmly grounded within specific genres and those that seem to transcend genres. Relying on descriptive techniques, we assess how they engage criteria such as innovation, novelty, or originality, usually attributed to valued objects from elite art worlds, and if they do, how they balance these considerations with those of highly conventionalized notions of format and formula. We are especially interested in how critics attempt to speak authoritatively about what is "good television" and "bad television" in contexts where there is no obvious base of critical expertise from which to draw. We also assess the extent to which the content of television criticism has become intellectualized as a result of critics' strategic efforts to elevate the prestige of the medium and their own claims to specialized knowledge, but we also look for indications of uses of a ''popular aesthetic'' in critics' evaluations of television shows. In short, we are interested both in mapping critics' aesthetic practices and evaluative patterns overall and charting how these may be changing over time. To that end, we rely upon the exploratory, inductive approach of multidimensional scaling to elaborate descriptively the structural interrelationship of aesthetic criteria utilized to appraise television series and the creative contribution of those involved in its production.

FINDINGS

Mapping Television Criticism: Descriptive Statistics

The reviewers slightly favored reviewing sitcoms (56.5%) over dramas (41.9%), with non-fiction/news programming filling out the rest of the sample (1.9%). In their subjective assessments of television series, critics overall were most likely to give a program an unfavorable evaluation. Specifically, nearly half of all shows (48.9%, $n = 264$) received a negative review. Only slightly more than one-third (38.5%, $n = 209$) received a positive assessment. However, almost 15% (14.8%, $n = 80$) of the shows reviewed were given a mixed appraisal from the reviewer. Analysis of variance was used to determine whether there were differences between time periods in the proportion of shows given favorable or unfavorable assessments. These tests yielded non-significant F-values, indicating there was no change over time in the percentage of positive and negative reviews (Table 1).

Our content analysis of the reviews examined the evaluative criteria used by television critics in their appraisals of series. With the aim of charting the deployment of high art and popular aesthetic criteria and other considerations in the critics' assessment of the shows, binary variables were created, measuring the presence or absence of review criteria. We examine the results of these descriptive statistics because before we can understand how television criticism may be changing its institutionalization, or its function within the culture world of television, it is necessary to get beyond surface impressions of television criticism and develop a systematic picture or mapping of what exactly television criticism is, what it looks like, what critics attend to, and how evaluative criteria are organized and deployed in producing this aesthetic system.

A first, basic question is: What cultural agents or producers do the critics focus on in their analysis? The production of a television series depends

Table 1. Characteristics of Sample of Newspaper Television Reviews, 1985–2000.

1. Frequencies and percentages of reviews by year published, newspaper, genre, and evaluation

	Frequency	Percent
Year published		
1985	73	13.5
1990	152	28.1
1995	195	36.1
2000	120	22.2
	$N = 540$	100.0
Newspaper		
Los Angeles Times	113	20.9
New York Times	55	10.2
USA Today	95	17.6
Washington Post	92	17.0
Boston Globe	114	21.1
Seattle Times	71	13.1
	$N = 540$	100.0
Genre		
Situation comedy	305	56.5
Drama	226	41.9
Non-fiction	9	1.7
	$N = 540$	100.0
Evaluation		
Negative	264	48.9
Positive	209	38.5
Mixed	80	14.8
	$N = 540$	100.0

2. Means and medians for word count and number of evaluative criteria used

	Mean	Median
Article word count	828.0	334.0
Review word count	780.0	297.0
Number of evaluative criteria	7.5	7.0

upon the project-based collaboration of numerous creative personnel, including writers (who are pivotal because they produce a script to provide the narrative and dialog), producers, actors, directors, musicians and skilled craft workers, and network executives who mediate conflict between commercial and creative interests (Bielby & Bielby, 1994, 2002, 1999). Moreover, the art world of television production relies upon creative knowledge, skill, and experience that is specific to the medium, and this art world yields a cultural product that is recognized as aesthetically distinct from film. Consequently, we were interested in the extent to which critics' appraisals attend to the expertise and reputation of a series' contributors, and to the quality of a series relative to others as the outcome of a particular collaboration. We looked for whether or not the evaluation attended to the role of (a) writers and writing; (b) the director or direction; (c) the acting or the cast; or (d) the creators/producers of the series. Over half of the reviews (56.9%) evaluated the quality of the writers or the writing of the show, while only 14.3% made the directing or director a part of the evaluation. Actors or acting was the most commonly used factor and were evaluated in a majority of the reviews (77%), and producers were a focus of evaluation 36.3% of the time. The dominance of evaluations of writing and acting – featured in a majority of the television reviews – is somewhat striking. Of all the evaluative criteria that were coded for, only one other – comparison to other television shows (68.1%) – is used in over half of the reviews. These, then, represent the core issues around which critics organize their reviews and their analyses of television shows overall. Television critics' attention to a show's writers and producers demonstrates a distinct departure from film criticism, which historically has drawn upon auteur theory for crediting or faulting directors for the artistic merit of a production. Our findings are consistent with the conventions of television production in which writers and producers, rather than directors, play the dominant role in the creative process (Cantor, 1971).

We were interested in the degree of attention given to formal, aesthetic elements, and "production values" – such as camera, lighting, sounds, special effects, costumes, sound tracks, editing – in the critics' assessment of the shows. These evaluative criteria may correspond with an emphasis on the filmic qualities of television or on what has conventionally been associated with a "high(er) art" aesthetic. Reference to at least one of these formal elements can be found in 16.3% of the reviews. Films were explicit reference points in the critics' assessment 22.6% of the time (most commonly when television shows are remakes of films or feature actors or producers from the film industry). Other criteria that may be associated with a series' accomplishment of a creative aesthetic include evaluation of the show's subtlety or heavy-handedness (11.5%), its realism, credibility, or plausibility (19.8%), or its complexity or ambiguity (5%). When discussing aesthetic elements, approximately a tenth of the time (9.3%) critics included commentary on the constraints of the television medium to achieving quality on these dimensions.

Also important to us, though, were those dimensions that may be associated with a more "popular aesthetic" necessary to achieving television's goal of providing entertainment (Newcomb, 1974; Hall & Whannel, 1964). Humor or funniness was the most commonly used of the popular aesthetic factors we coded for – appearing nearly 40% (39.6%) of the time. Over a quarter of the reviews focused on richness of characters or character development (28.1%). The question of simply whether or not the show is fun or entertaining was a feature of evaluation in almost one-fifth of the reviews (17.6%) while the scariness or eeriness of a program is present in 5%, campiness even less, and analysis of the show's emotional authenticity in 12%. Lastly, a prediction of the audience's response to a program was an explicit factor in nearly one quarter of the articles (22.4%).

A question that interested us was how some of the distinct qualities of television programs as a cultural form shape the contours of aesthetic evaluation. One feature that sets televisual texts apart from many other cultural objects – such as a book, or a painting, or a film – is the ongoing, open-ended nature of the texts. Television's open-endedness is a consequence of the need to fill a viewing season, and formats such as the episodic series and the ongoing serial are conventions designed to sustain an audience from one installment to the next. Television formats, which are "the units in which television programs are constructed and their continuity through time," constrain the possibilities of narrative closure in storytelling formulas – the melodrama of a love story, for example (Swidler, Rapp, & Soysal, 1986, p. 325). Though open-endedness is most visible in television serials – in which the story continues from one installment to the next – even for television series composed of relatively autonomous episodes there is an open-endedness due to the fact that until the series is cancelled or concluded there is always the possibility for change and reevaluation. While for a film or a novel there is the possibility of a sequel, and certainly critics often situate evaluations of one text within the context of a creator's broader oeuvre, the boundaries of the text to be evaluated – a particular film, book, etc., – are fairly easy to establish. This may be less true for television series (though not for one-time programs or television movies, of course). Is the critic to evaluate an individual episode? Or, are they attempting to evaluate the longer-term trajectory of a series?

The reviews we examined correspond to new, debuting television series; in most cases the critics have only seen one or two episodes of a series at the time of their review. But does the fact that more episodes are forthcoming (unless the show is prematurely canceled) surface as a factor in their analysis, thus creating a type of evaluation not generally found in many other forms of artistic criticism? We found that slightly over a quarter (25.7%) of all reviews reflected this on-going nature of the television series as a factor in their evaluation. Close to one-fifth (19.4%) of the reviews couched their evaluations somewhat tentatively – due to the possibilities for the series to improve or decline in quality in future episodes. Only 5.7% of the reviews were explicitly prescriptive in making recommendations for improving shows (though most negative criticisms could be read as connected to indirect prescriptions).

Many of the dimensions of reviews we were particularly interested in are connected to the degree to which critics orient their evaluations around the organization of television genres and the assessment of programs as novel, clichéd, or derivative. Overall, genre provided an explicit reference point for evaluation in over a third of the reviews (37.4%), although it could be deployed in a number of ways. For instance, shows could be praised for transcending or escaping genre boundaries (9.6%) or for being firmly established within but quality representatives of a given genre (10.2%). Similarly the novelty or originality of a program was the focus of evaluation in 11.5% of reviews. In over a quarter (26.7%) of reviews evaluation focused on the presence or absence of television clichés or formula and another quarter discussed shows as specifically derivative of a particular earlier television series. Less than one-tenth (8.9%) of the reviews addressed a show's predictability.

Finally, we examined the use of social relevance or the "message" of a program as a factor of evaluation (16.5%), its offensiveness or tastelessness (13.3%), and frequency of references to "smart," "quality," "artistic" television (15.7%), or "mindless," "trashy," or "dumb" programming (12.4%). These appraisals pertain to a series' ability, as entertainment, to reflect prevailing social concerns – such as gender relations or conspiracy theories – through popular formulas (Swidler, Rapp, & Soysal, 1986; Newcomb, 1974). As anticipated, ratings predictions and inclusion of industry news were also featured, although not universally, indicating reviewers' attention to industry interests and not just aesthetic considerations. The importance of many of these factors becomes clearer when we move from the simple descriptive statistics of the criteria separately into looking at patterns of change over time and patterns of how the evaluative dimensions are associated with one another in reviews. In sum, while these descriptive statistics provide a rather general, rudimentary picture of the primary categories used in the reviews overall, they provide important details about the terrain of television criticism (Table 2).

Table 2. Frequencies of Evaluative Criteria, All Reviews (N = 540).

Evaluative Criteria	Frequency	Percent
Acting/Cast	416	77.0
Script/Writers/Writing	307	56.9
Production/Producers	196	36.3
Direction/Directors	77	14.3
Comparison to other television shows	368	68.1
Comparison to film	122	22.6
Plausibility/Realism/Credibility	107	19.8
Production values/Formal elements	88	16.3
Subtlety/Heavy handedness	62	11.5
Constraints of television medium	50	9.3
Complexity/Ambiguity	27	5.0
Funniness	214	39.6
Character development	152	28.1
Prediction of audience response	121	22.4
Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice	95	17.6
Emotional authenticity	65	12.0
Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	27	5.0
Campiness	21	3.9
On-goingness of show/Episodicity	139	25.7
Tentative/Speculative about future	105	19.4
Prescriptive about future	31	5.7
Genre comments	202	37.4
Clichéd/Formulaic	144	26.7
Derivative or rip off of another show	135	25.0
Novelty/Originality	62	11.5
Quality representative of genre	55	10.2
Transcending genre conventions	52	9.6
Predictability	48	8.9
Social relevance of show	89	16.5
Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart	85	15.7
Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless	72	13.3
Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb	67	12.4
Prediction of ratings	129	23.9
Use of news as part of review	95	17.6

Change in Use of Evaluative Criteria: Analysis of Variance

We were interested in determining how the aesthetic evaluations provided in the reviews have changed over time as well as how and whether they coalesce in different types of reviews. The way in which critics invoked these evaluative criteria over the period of our study varied for about half of the variables (22 out of 42) but few outright trends were detected using analysis of variance. Evaluation of directors/direction of a show and evaluation of a prediction of a show's ratings declined steadily between 1985 and 2000 (from 36% to 5%, and from 38% to 15%, respectively), while an evaluation of a show's funniness and comments on whether or not a show was offensive increased steadily over the time period (from 19% to 48%, and from 5% to 18%, respectively).

Several of the criteria, however, did exhibit sharp increases between 1995 and 2000. These included: discussion of whether or not a show was mindless; a show's emotional authenticity; the use of genre comments; reference to subtlety or character development; the episodic nature of shows; whether a show was entertaining; comparison to other television programs; and the use of news as part of the review. Also, the review word count and the number of criteria invoked per article showed an increase over time. Other criteria that showed variation over time, but not a consistent trend, were reference to producers/production and transcendence of genre. All of the other variables yielded non-significant *F*-values indicating no significant change over the time period (Table 3).

To better understand how critics employ evaluative criteria, variables were assigned to one of seven conceptual categories that reflect the substantive focus of television reviews as discussed earlier: cultural agents or producers; comparisons to film or television; popular aesthetic criteria; episodicity; genre-related comments; novelty; and boundaries of television quality. Two types of analysis of variance tests were conducted on the conceptual categories to assess shifts in their use over time. First, we tested for change in the use of any of the criteria within a given category. This procedure was conducted by creating a variable that measured for the presence of any of the criteria comprising a category within an individual review. Second, we tested for change in the intensity of use within individual reviews over time. This, too, was done by creating a variable that measured the total number of criteria from a conceptual category used within an individual review (Table 4).

Nearly all conceptual categories were found to differ significantly in both use and intensity from one time period to the next. The only categories that did not show significant change over time were the frequency of evaluations referencing cultural agents (i.e., producers, writers, directors, and actors) and the intensity of the use of popular aesthetic criteria. The finding of no significant change over time in deployment of these evaluative categories

Table 3. Analysis of Variance over Time by Selected Variables.

Variable	1985 ($N = 73$)	1990 ($N = 152$)	1995 ($N = 195$)	2000 ($N = 120$)	$F(df = 3)$
Article characteristics					
Article word count	939	725	898	774	8.946**
Review word count	323	315	262	492	36.391**
Number of evaluative criteria used	8	8	7	9	9.214**
Criteria					
Dramas	64%	33%	36%	49%	8.935**
Situation comedies	36%	61%	64%	50%	7.037**
Negative review	45%	45%	53%	49%	0.781
Positive review	38%	41%	36%	40%	0.265
Mixed review	16%	16%	12%	18%	0.785
Acting/Cast	75%	74%	78%	81%	0.715
Script/Writers/Writing	66%	43%	54%	73%	9.04 **
Direction/Directors	36%	15%	11%	5%	13.203**
Production/Producers	25%	40%	30%	49%	5.970**
Comparison to other television shows	71%	70%	57%	81%	6.828**
Comparison to film	23%	26%	20%	22%	0.675
Plausibility/Realism/Credible	18%	20%	19%	21%	0.102
Production values/Formal elements	19%	20%	13%	14%	1.323
Subtlety/Heavy handedness	15%	8%	7%	22%	6.710**
Constraints of TV medium	8%	12%	8%	8%	0.558
Complexity/Ambiguity	1%	3%	7%	6%	1.699
Funniness	19%	39%	43%	48%	5.765**
Character development	27%	26%	24%	38%	2.834*
Prediction of audience response	27%	20%	21%	24%	0.607
Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice	25%	20%	12%	20%	2.685*
Emotional authenticity	12%	13%	8%	18%	2.689*
Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	4%	3%	7%	4%	1.060
Campiness	5%	2%	5%	4%	0.760
On-goingness of show/Episodicity	29%	18%	22%	40%	6.578**
Tentative/Speculative about future	25%	15%	17%	25%	1.927
Prescriptive about future	5%	5%	4%	10%	1.928
Genre comments	36%	36%	32%	49%	3.339*
Clichéd/Formulaic	32%	32%	21%	27%	1.982
Derivative or rip off of another show	26%	32%	19%	26%	2.472
Novelty/Originality	14%	33%	16%	29%	6.497**
Quality representative of genre	7%	13%	9%	11%	0.955
Transcending genre conventions	5%	13%	5%	16%	4.314*
Predictability	14%	7%	9%	8%	0.881
Social relevance of show	15%	21%	15%	14%	1.081
Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart	18%	15%	11%	23%	2.460
Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless	5%	10%	16%	18%	2.986*
Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb	16%	90%	90%	19%	3.157*
Prediction of ratings	38%	24%	24%	15%	4.625*
Use of news as part of review	26%	16%	12%	24%	4.068*

*$p<0.05$
**$p<0.001$

Table 4. Conceptual Categories for Evaluative Criteria.

Conceptual Category	Evaluative Criteria
Cultural agents or producers	Acting/Cast, Script/Writers/Writing, Production/Producers, Direction/Directors
Comparisons to film or television	Comparison to other television shows, Comparison to film(s)
Popular aesthetic criteria	Funniness, Prediction of audience response, Fun/Entertaining, Emotional authenticity, Scary
Episodicity	Reference to ongoing nature of show, Tentativeness or speculative about show's future, Prescriptive about show's future
Genre-related comments	Genre comments, Quality representation of genre, Transcending genre conventions
Novelty	Clichéd/Formulaic, Novelty/Originality, Derivativeness, Predictability, Plausibility/Realism/Credibility
Boundaries of television quality	"Quality/Art," "Mindless/Dumb," Constraints of television medium

points to them as established conventions. Like the individual variables, most of the conceptual categories did not exhibit any linear trend up or down over time. The only category that manifested a steady trend was the use of popular aesthetic criteria, which increased steadily over the time period. While all of the other categories fluctuated over the period of our study, it is notable that all of them were higher in 2000 than in 1985 (Table 5).

Evaluative Criteria Used in Reviews

To further elaborate our mapping of the aesthetic systems of television reviews, we were interested in potential differences in how critics orient their comments about those programs they deem praiseworthy versus those they dismiss. To determine whether critics use different kinds of evaluative criteria when writing either a positive or a negative review, cross tabulations were conducted to assess their relationship to such appraisals. With nearly all the same variables associated with both types of reviews, we report results for positive reviews as the dependent variable.[7] Nearly two-thirds of

Table 5. Analysis of Variance over Time by Conceptual Category.

Conceptual Category		1985 ($N = 73$)	1990 ($N = 152$)	1995 ($N = 195$)	2000 ($N = 120$)	$F(df = 3)$
Cultural agents or producers	Use	88%	89%	91%	93%	0.688
	Intensity	2.00	1.70	1.70	2.10	4.419*
Comparisons to film or television	Use	75%	79%	66%	85%	5.412**
	Intensity	0.95	0.97	0.77	1.00	4.955*
Popular aesthetic criteria	Use	56%	64%	66%	76%	2.858*
	Intensity	0.88	0.95	0.91	1.10	2.066
Episodicity	Use	30%	19%	23%	41%	6.487**
	Intensity	0.59	0.39	0.43	0.75	4.576*
Genre-related comments	Use	36%	38%	33%	49%	2.941*
	Intensity	0.48	0.62	0.46	0.76	3.647*
Novelty	Use	51%	65%	47%	58%	4.134*
	Intensity	0.85	1.00	0.65	0.90	5.279**
Boundaries of television quality	Use	34%	30%	26%	44%	3.884*
	Intensity	0.42	0.36	0.29	0.50	3.581*

*$p < 0.05$
**$p < 0.001$

the 34 evaluative criteria were found to be associated with positive reviews (23 out of 34), and three were less likely to be. When the evaluative criteria are grouped into the seven conceptual categories described earlier, five of the seven were more likely to be associated with a positive review – cultural agents or producers, genre-related comments, episodicity, boundaries of television quality, and popular aesthetic criteria. By consistently applying more evaluative criteria more often in positive reviews critics seem to be providing a more elaborate and detailed analysis of those shows they most value or seek to promote – a practice that could be interpreted as contributing to a project of highlighting the strengths of television programming, thus contributing to an elevation of the status of the medium, and hence an elevation of the status of its critics as well (Table 6).

Analyzing the Repertoire of the Television Critic: Multidimensional Scaling Overall Cluster Analysis

To understand the practice of aesthetic judgment by television critics, we analyzed the ways in which discrete, separate evaluative criteria interrelate

Table 6. Cross Tabulations of Positive Reviews with Evaluative Criteria and Genre.

More likely to be associated with a positive review	Drama, Acting/Cast, Script/Writers/Writing, Production/Producers, Direction/Directors, Comparison to other TV shows, Comparison to film, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Production values/Formal elements, Constraints of television medium, Complexity/Ambiguity, Character development, Prediction of audience response, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Emotional authenticity, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Genre comments, Novelty/Originality, Quality representative of genre, Transcending genre conventions, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Prediction of ratings, Use of news as part of review
Less likely to be associated with a positive review	Situation comedy, Clichéd/Formulaic, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Tentative/Speculative about future
Equally as likely to be associated with a positive or non-positive review	Non-fiction, Derivative or rip off of another show, Subtlety/Heavy handedness, Funniness, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful, Campiness, Prescriptive about future, Predictability, Social relevance of show

to form coherent evaluative repertoires. In recent years cultural sociologists have increasingly utilized multidimensional scaling (MDS) to get at precisely this kind of project – to generate descriptive mappings of meaning structures by measuring the relations between the cultural elements that comprise these meaning structures (see, e.g., Mohr, 1998). Our use of this technique was to create a taxonomy that classified criteria into structurally equivalent blocks, each of which plays a role in the discourse of television critics. Thus, we employed this analytical approach to inductively generate a more systematic map of the television criticism landscape and how it has changed over time, with particular attention focused on the ways that the evaluative criteria and other characteristics of reviews may interrelate to form distinct repertoires of evaluative practices.

With over 40 different dimensions of evaluation to account for, multi-dimensional analysis guided the mapping of conceptual clusters of independent variables and insight into collapsing and analyzing how evaluative criteria are deployed by critics (see Bourgeois & Sutton, 2004, for more use of this method, in a different context). We proceeded in the following manner. First, a cluster analysis of critics' evaluative criteria was conducted to see which ones were more likely to be used with each other. An affiliation matrix was created with 39 of the attributes by transposing the data matrix, moving reviews to the columns and the variables to the rows. Using the Jaccard method, a distance matrix was derived that indicated how close any two of the attributes are in an N-dimensional space. The Jaccard method takes into account the co-occurrence of individual attributes to determine proximity. A higher proximity value represents a greater likelihood of criteria appearing in the same review. Using multidimensional scaling, the variables were then plotted into a five dimensional space. The Kruskal stress test yielded a value of 0.1 for the distance matrix, indicating a fairly good fit.

Only two clusters formed from the data when evaluated at 0.23, which is the average of all the distances between individual variables in the distance matrix. The first cluster consisted of the evaluation of writers/writing/script clustered with actors/acting, producers/production, and comparison to other television shows. The second cluster was composed of reference to the episodic nature of a television series clustered with critics being tentative about the future of a show. When the analysis was disaggregated into the years in which reviews were collected, a similar pattern occurred in each (when evaluated at the average distance of 0.23 for the respective distance matrix). In short, no more than two clusters were found in any year at this standard. The only notable difference across years was the addition of a third cluster in 1990 that contained genre comments and novelty.

Evaluation of clusters at the average distance between variables is, however, the strictest standard of evaluation of their existence. This standard was relaxed to allow for a more flexible interpretation of how the attributes clustered; the evaluation point ranged from 0.72 to 0.99.[8] At this standard, a core set of evaluative criteria clustered consistently over time for all of the reviews, accompanied by four to five peripheral clusters that varied in distance from the central cluster in different time periods. These isolated clusters may be indicative of idiosyncratic use of an attribute by a certain critic or the effect of a particular show that debuted that season. More important, however, is that the central cluster of attributes can be considered a repertoire of concepts consistently invoked by critics in their reviews. While there is slight variation over time, this central cluster remained remarkably consistent – despite the significant transformations in the structure and terrain of the television industry between 1985 and 2000. Attributes included in this cluster for all four of the time periods include: writers/writing, acting/cast, comparison to other television shows, prediction of audience response, genre comments, prediction of ratings, news, comparison to film, producer/production, the ongoing/episodic nature of a show, tentativeness/speculation about the future of a show, and funniness. The only notable deviation from this structure of attributes occurred in 2000, when a secondary cluster emerged that included several of the attributes associated with genre and a filmic or "higher art" aesthetic. This second cluster was composed of the following: direction/directors, complexity/ambiguity, production values/formal elements, constraints of the television medium, transcendence of genre conventions, and quality representative of genre. In short, while most of the evaluative criteria were accounted for in the central cluster or parsed out in more isolated clusters, genre and high art aesthetic concerns seem to have become a more central focus for critics in 2000.

This recent emergence of genre as a focus of critical appraisals is noteworthy. Television, like some other cultural forms, is a medium whose aesthetic elements are organized by genre, which in turn frames expectations in both the production and reception of television programs. Genres within television are readily recognizable, highly formulaic, and have changed very little over the past several decades, in contrast to film, where genre is arguably less important to prescribing narrative (Caughie, 1984, p. 115). As a result, television creators, critics, and audiences are knowledgeable about the defining characteristics of a thirty-minute sitcom, a one-hour drama, a reality show, or a daytime soap opera, and thus it would seem appropriate for reviews to attend to the attributes of a genre as an aspect of a show's appraisal. Moreover, primetime television schedules are organized to engage audiences and move them relatively seamlessly into the next scheduled program in order to retain the largest possible viewership from one hour to the next. Genre (or formula, see Newcomb, 1974) is central to the progression of evening entertainment "phases" that unfold sequentially and contribute to the "flow" of television (Williams, 1974). In short, the longstanding function of genre to the creation of new series and scheduling is increasingly acknowledged by critics in their evaluation of television.

In both analyses, the composition and persistence of the central cluster across the period of study reveals that critics share understandings of the conventions of television as a medium that are codified to a degree. These understandings, which were fully in place by 1985, are organized around a recognition of writers as the creative force that underlies a series and its narrative vision, the relevance of a show's predecessors – its canon – to its appraisal, and an assessment of its entertainment value, which is important to creating interest among viewers for a new series and, in turn, its possible future popularity. The last is of particular importance to those with a commercial interest in the industry. The emergence of a secondary cluster by 2000 that focused on genre and criteria connected to a high art, filmic aesthetic is noteworthy, given our interest in the existence and transformation of the aesthetics of television criticism (Table 7).

Cluster Analysis of Genre and Evaluative Criteria

To determine whether and how evaluative criteria aligned with genre, a second cluster analysis of evaluative criteria was conducted by dividing the dataset according to whether the show reviewed was a drama or situation comedy. The few non-fiction shows were omitted from this part of the analysis. A central cluster of core attributes emerged between 1985 and 2000 for each genre that was similar to the aggregated analysis presented above. However, there are some important differences in the content and timing of the emergence of a secondary cluster for each individual genre. For dramas, the secondary cluster appeared earlier, in 1995, than in the aggregate cluster analysis, which emerged in 2000. Similar to the aggregate analysis, the secondary cluster for dramas contained the same attributes: transcendence of genre, constraints of the medium, and being a representative of a genre. The other attributes located in this secondary cluster were direction/directors, complexity/ambiguity, and production values/formal elements – all of which can be associated with a more filmic and/or artistic aesthetic.[9]

One of the questions driving our interest in the practices of television critics has to do with their possibly changing status and legitimacy. The status of television critics is affected by the medium's assignment to a relatively low status on the cultural hierarchy. That is, the television critic for a newspaper or national magazine is likely to have lower status than those who write about film, theater, architecture, and art. And, as in any professional realm, television critics have a stake in improving their status and claims to legitimacy. So, we are interested in any evidence that television critics act strategically to improve their status through criticism that seeks to elevate television as an art form, as film critics have done, with some success, as documented in research by Baumann (2001).[10] While not at all conclusive, the emergence of this newer artistic/filmic aesthetic cluster in television critics' reviews is suggestive of a possible shift in the orientation to television dramas as art form.

Table 7. Cluster Analysis for all Reviews, by Year.

	Year 1985	1990	1995	2000
Central cluster	Acting/Cast, Character development, Comparison to film, Comparison to other television shows, Direction/Directors, Emotional authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Funniness, Genre comments, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production/Producers, Quality representative of genre, Script/Writers/Writing Tentative/Speculative about future of show, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to film, Comparison to other television shows, Derivative or rip off of another show, Direction/Directors, Funniness, Genre comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Plausibility/Realism/Credibility, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production/Producers, Production values/Formal elements, Quality representative of genre, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Social relevance of show, Tentative/Speculative about future of show, Transcending genre conventions, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character development, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to film, Comparison to other television shows, Complexity/Ambiguity, Constraints of TV medium, Derivative or rip off of another show, Direction/Directors, Emotional Authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing, Funniness, Genre comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Pleasant/Nice, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production values/Formal elements, Production/Producers, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Tentative/ Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character development, Comparison to film, Comparison to other television shows, Emotional Authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Funniness, Genre comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Pleasant/ Nice, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Prescriptive about future, Production/Producers, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Tentative/Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review

Table 7. (*Continued*)

	Year 1985	1990	1995	2000
Secondary cluster	Clichéd/Formulaic, Derivative or rip off of another show, Novelty/Originality, Predictability, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Social relevance of show	Character development, Emotional authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice	Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, Social relevance of show, Subtlety/Heavy handedness	Complexity/Ambiguity, Constraints of television medium, Direction/Directors, Production values/Formal elements, Quality representative of genre, Transcending genre conventions
Cluster 3	Prescriptive about future, Production values/Formal elements, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Complexity/Ambiguity, Constraints of television medium, Predictability, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Predictability, Prescriptive about future, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Campiness, Derivative or rip off of another show, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless
Cluster 4	Campiness, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless	Subtlety/Heavy handedness	Quality representative of genre, Transcending genre conventions	Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Social relevance of show, Subtlety/Heavy handedness
Cluster 5	Constraints of TV medium, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Subtlety/Heavy handedness	Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless	Campiness, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb	Clichéd/Formulaic, Predictability
Cluster 6	Complexity/Ambiguity, Transcending Genre Conventions	Prescriptive about future		Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful
Cluster 7		Campiness		
Distance evaluated at:	0.8151	0.8876	0.9795	0.9182
Number of dimensions:	5	5	5	5
Kruskal stress value:	0.1159	0.1072	0.1123	0.1022

For situation comedies, two principle clusters were present in each of the time periods. From 1985 to 1995, the secondary cluster always contained comments about the social relevance of a show in combination with a variety of other attributes. More so than in most other realms of art and culture, the discourse of the television critic engages social commentary as well as aesthetic analysis. When asked to define what the audience expects of them, one critic stated:

> I think that when people look to television critics they look for a means to get a handle on this experience, to be able to place it in some kind of context…to get a sense of what messages they're being delivered by what they're watching. The center of what you're doing (as a TV critic) is understanding what the more sophisticated of your audience understands about what's going on in the world and being able to recognize how that is reflected metaphorically.
>
> (Henry, quoted in Watson, 1985, p. 71)

In 1985, reviews of sitcoms revealed three major clusters of evaluative criteria. In addition to the central cluster, which contained many of the same attributes as the central cluster for the aggregated cluster analysis of all of the reviews and for the drama reviews, the second cluster also contained social relevance, comparison to films, character development, plausibility, and comments about the constraints of the TV medium. The third cluster contained production values, complexity, subtlety, prescriptions about the show's future, and scariness. For 1990 and 1995, this third cluster was incorporated into the central cluster. The second cluster organized itself somewhat differently in that in both 1990 and 1995, the second cluster contained social relevance, offensiveness, subtlety, and mindlessness. News, episodic evaluations, and prescriptions about the show's future were also included in the second cluster. In 2000, most of these attributes were incorporated into the central cluster. Also, a new second cluster emerged that contained many of the attributes related to genre. In addition, this cluster also encompassed some attributes that could be considered as relating to the artistic (or non-popular) aesthetic criteria, such as directors/direction, comparison to films, subtlety, and complexity. This shows that the critics' emerging artistic repertoire of evaluations is not limited to dramatic television, but includes comedic programs, which have traditionally been particularly culturally devalued.

At the same time, however, we do not see an abandonment of the more popular aesthetic criteria as privileged categories of analysis in the television reviews of situation comedies. Indeed, while there may be an emerging subgroup of critical practices around an artistic repertoire of evaluative criteria, in the side-by-side ANOVAs of the evaluative criteria discussed earlier, we found an upsurge in the deployment of popular aesthetic categories of analysis over time. Within television reviews – in the continuing core cluster we found overall and in the secondary emergent clusters in drama and situation comedy reviews – we find critics engaged in a balancing act, continually orienting to both popular and artistic aesthetic qualities. This could suggest the multiple constituencies and projects to which television critics must attend – on the one hand an interest in legitimizing the medium and their relation to it but on the other not wanting to alienate their core audience or to neglect the importance of the popular as a feature of television (Table 8 and 9).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Our research describes the patterns of aesthetic and evaluative practices of television critics. We examined the ways in which the distinctive features of the commercial, popular medium of television in an era of considerable industry transformation are consequential to critics' evaluation of debuting television series. Television critics occupy an overdetermined structural location within this industry, which necessarily complicates how they render critical judgment for their constituencies. Although television as a cultural product is generally assigned a relatively low cultural standing by scholars and non-scholars alike, analysis of television critics and criticism during the 1950s indicates that the then new medium possessed considerable potential as a form of artistically rooted entertainment and that aesthetic considerations were central to its evaluation. Subsequent inattention by cultural sociologists left unanswered fundamental questions about the aesthetic properties of television as a cultural form. Since then, of course, the medium has shifted from theatrical to film or film-like modes of production and has developed its own conventionalized formats and formulas, its creative origination has become more hierarchical, its means of distribution have evolved technologically in unforeseen ways, and its regulatory environment has swung from minimal bureaucratic oversight to relatively tight governmental control and back again to lesser federal regulation that facilitates market forces. In the midst of all this change relatively few cultural sociologists dedicated their attention to understanding television as a cultural product. Analysis of the work of television critics is one part of a larger project seeking to address this research lacunae.

Table 8. Cluster Analysis for Reviews of Dramas, by Year.

	Year 1985	1990	1995	2000
Central cluster	Acting/Cast, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to film, Comparison to other TV shows, Constraints of TV medium, Derivative or rip off of another show, Direction/Directors, Genre comments, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Prescriptive about future, Production values/Formal elements, Production/Producers, Script/Writers/Writing, Subtlety/Heavy handedness, Tentative/Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character Development, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to film, Comparison to other TV shows, Constraints of TV medium, Derivative or rip off of another show, Genre Comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Predictability, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production values/Formal elements, Production/Producers, Quality representative of genre, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Social relevance of show, Tentative/Speculative about future, Transcending genre conventions, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character development, Constraints of TV medium, Comparison to film, Comparison to other TV shows, Complexity/Ambiguity, Genre Comments, Predictability, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production values/Formal elements, Production/Producers, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Social relevance of show, Transcending genre conventions, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character Development, Comparison to film, Comparison to other TV shows, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Genre Comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Prediction of audience response, Prescriptive about future, Production/Producers, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Subtlety/Heavy handedness, Tentative/Speculative about future
Secondary cluster	Character Development, Complexity/Ambiguity, Emotional authenticity, Transcending genre conventions	Direction/Directors, Emotional Authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Funniness	Complexity/Ambiguity, Constraints of TV medium, Direction/Directors, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Prescriptive about future,	Constraints of TV medium, Direction/Directors, Production values/Formal elements, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart,

Table 8. *(Continued)*

	Year			
	1985	1990	1995	2000
			Production values/Formal elements, Quality representative of genre, Tentative/Speculative about future, Transcending genre conventions	Transcending genre conventions, Use of news as part of review
Cluster 3	Predictability, Novelty/Originality, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Social relevance of show	Complexity/Ambiguity Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless	Campiness, Derivative or rip off of another show, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless	Campiness, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, Social relevance of show
Cluster 4	Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Fun/Entertaining, Campiness	Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Prescriptive about future	Clichéd/Formulaic	Clichéd/Formulaic, Derivative or rip off of another show, Predictability
Cluster 5	Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, Funniness	Subtlety/Heavy handedness, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Emotional Authenticity, Funniness
Cluster 6	Quality representative of genre, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Campiness		Prediction of ratings
Cluster 7				Complexity/Ambiguity
Cluster 8				Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful
Distance evaluated at:	0.8151	0.9122	0.9124	0.9653
Number of dimensions:	5	5	5	5
Kruskal stress value:	0.1159	0.1146	0.1104	0.1116

Table 9. Cluster Analysis for Reviews of Sitcoms, by Year.

	Year 1985	1990	1995	2000
Central cluster	Acting/Cast, Comparison to other TV shows, Direction/Directors, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Funniness, Genre Comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production/Producers, Quality representative of genre, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Tentative/Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character Development, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to film, Comparison to other TV shows, Derivative or rip off of another show, Emotional Authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Funniness, Genre Comments, Novelty/Originality, Prediction of ratings, Production/Producers, Quality representative of genre, Script/Writers/Writing, Transcending genre conventions	Acting/Cast, Character Development, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to film, Comparison to other TV shows, Complexity/Ambiguity, Constraints of TV medium, Derivative or rip off of another show, Emotional authenticity, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Funniness, Genre comments, Novelty/Originality, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Prediction of ratings, Prescriptive about future, Production/Producers, Quality representative of genre, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Script/Writers/Writing, Tentative/Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review	Acting/Cast, Character Development, Clichéd/Formulaic, Comparison to other TV shows, Derivative or rip off of another show, Funniness, Genre comments, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Novelty/Originality, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, Prediction of audience response, Prediction of ratings, Production/Producers, Script/Writers/Writing, Social relevance of show, Tentative/Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review

Table 9. (*Continued*)

	Year 1985	1990	1995	2000
Secondary cluster	Character development, Comparison to film, Constraints of TV medium, Emotional authenticity, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Social relevance of show	Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, On-goingness of show/Episodicity, Prescriptive about future, Social relevance of show, Subtlety/Heavy handedness, Tentative/Speculative about future, Use of news as part of review	Campiness, Direction/Directors, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb, Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless, Prediction of audience response, Social relevance of show, Subtlety/Heavy handedness	Comparison to film, Complexity/Ambiguity, Constraints of TV medium, Direction/Directors, Fun/Entertaining/Amusing/Pleasant/Nice, Quality representative of genre, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Production values/Formal elements, Subtlety/Heavy handedness, Transcending genre conventions
Cluster 3	Complexity/Ambiguity, Prescriptive about future, Production values/Formal elements, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful, Subtlety/Heavy handedness	Direction/Directors, Production values/Formal elements, Quality/Art/Intelligent/Smart, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Transcending genre conventions	Emotional authenticity, Prescriptive about future, Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful

Cluster 4	Clichéd/Formulaic, Derivative or rip off of another show	Constraints of TV medium, Plausibility/Realism/Credible, Predictability	Predictability, Production values/Formal elements	Campiness, Predictability
Cluster 5	Campiness, Mindlessness/Trashy/Stupid/Dumb	Campiness, Complexity/Ambiguity	Scary/Eerie/Suspenseful	Plausibility/Realism/Credible
Cluster 6	Offensive/Decency/Vulgarity/Tasteless			
Cluster 7	Transcending genre conventions			
Distance evaluated at:	0.741	0.9146	0.9403	0.9443
Number of dimensions:	5	5	0	5
Kruskal stress value:	0.0795	0.1144	0.1221	0.1067

Our mapping of television criticism between 1985 and 2000 using the technique of multidimensional scaling reveals that television critics attended to a core set of evaluative criteria that are remarkably consistent during this period of considerable transformation in the industry. The attributes of series that commanded central and ongoing critical attention were a composite of production-related factors, assessments of entertainment value and related considerations of interest to viewers and the business community alike, and characteristics of the medium as a source of popular entertainment. Our expectation that television critics spoke to multiple constituencies was born out, as was the overall complexity of their charge, as indicated by their simultaneous attention to a popular aesthetic and factors predictive of commercial success (and thus of importance to business interests). Our interest in uncovering aesthetic elements of television criticism yielded intriguing new insights as well about the evolution of television as a medium. Of particular interest is the emergence in the last decade of the cluster of attributes that map critics' attention to genre and related attributes associated with a more filmic and/or artistic aesthetic. This shift toward more formal aesthetic elements signals a new focused attention to television as an art form in its own right that, interestingly, co-occurs with ongoing critical attention to the elements of a popular aesthetic that foregrounds entertainment value. We view this development as evidence of critics' more complicated role in non-elite art worlds, which comprises, at least in this medium, a balancing act between elevating television to an art form in its own right while not abandoning a popular aesthetic. Their co-occurrence in the secondary cluster associated with situation comedies is especially noteworthy, as it is a much derided genre. The difference in timing of the emergence of the genre cluster for dramas and situation comedies may reflect cyclical changes in the types of programming offered by the television networks, and suggests the importance of more sustained analysis along these lines.[11]

Our search for greater insight into the role and status of television critics and criticism is a direct outgrowth of the considerable transformation television has undergone as an industry and a medium. Whether the role and status of critics has improved because of changes in the television shows themselves or because of other, external pressures – including critics' desire for greater legitimacy, their development of a professional organization, the emergence of academic television studies, an elevation of the position of television coverage in journalism, and transformations in the structure of the media industries of which television is a part – cannot yet be fully known. Likewise, we cannot yet answer the question of how much influence, if any, the critics' reviews have on the development of programming itself. Only with further research that examines which shifts are driving change in critics' status and role, and whether, and the extent to which, those mechanisms are internal or external to criticism itself will we be able to disentangle cause and effect. Our findings are a necessary first step in that direction.

By minimizing the relevance of aesthetics as worthy of investigation, especially in popular art worlds, sociologists leave no role for critics and criticism in popular culture. "Bringing aesthetics back in" provides a foundation for developing a sociology of critics and criticism in popular culture. Such a field would need to provide an understanding of: (1) the structural location of critics in relation to audiences, and to creators/producers, distributors, and other business interests; (2) the status and legitimacy of critics as perceived by audiences and business constituencies; (3) how the medium's conventions and genres shape the interpretation and reception of the cultural object; and, (4) the relationship between criticism, social commentary, and a "popular aesthetic" in the realms of popular culture. The research reported here is a necessary first step in this undertaking by providing a clearer picture of what it is that critics in popular art worlds are actually doing in their reviews.

Our research allows us to develop more concrete ideas that can be tested with more elaborate inductive models and more explanatory analytical approaches. Future research should extend the analysis we began in this article by expanding the time frame of reviews analyzed (including earlier television criticism as well as continuing to update the research in light of the ever-changing nature of the television industry), broadening the scope of reviews analyzed by including additional newspapers as well as non-newspaper sources of television criticism, and further attending to differences between papers and reviewers in the emergence and transformation of the aesthetic system and evaluative repertoires of television criticism. In addition, further research that allows for more direct comparisons of the work of and relationship between television and other types of cultural criticism (e.g., art critics or film critics) will be necessary in order to more fully understand the nature and status of the role of television critics vis-à-vis critics operating in other culture worlds. We intend to see how this bears out in future explanatory analyses on more extensive datasets, since we are interested in the structure of television criticism as a profession more generally. We plan to examine the trends we found in finer detail in future investigations, and take guidance from remarks made by former *Los Angeles Times* television critic Brian Lowry (2003) while commenting on how the "possibilities" of television influence his practices as a critic: "Critics are prone to evaluate television based on how well the medium delivers upon – or falls short of – its noblest aspirations and potential."

NOTES

1. Sociological analysis of aesthetic systems has been largely limited to exploring how aesthetic conventions shape the social organization of cultural production, or how distinctions between types of art articulate with class differences or other social groupings (see Bielby & Bielby, 2004, for a fuller discussion).

2. Beyond this important early work on the role of critics within culture industries, little sociological research has been directed at this issue in the ensuing decades, particularly with regard to the television medium, a research lacuna that this article is intended to begin to fill.

3. In subsequent work, Gans (1992) observed that the conceptual distinction between elite and popular culture is due in large measure to a bias among scholars, primarily in the humanities, between "'our' intellectual-aesthetic culture and 'their' entertainment" (p. x). Gans writes: "Sociologists have been touched by this bias, and as a result they have not paid enough empirical attention to how highbrows entertain themselves or where lower-income groups get their intellectual-aesthetic culture. Nor have the similarities and differences between entertainment and intellectual-aesthetic experience, for all classes, been explored sufficiently."

4. For a discussion of the culture world of television see Bielby and Harrington (2004).

5. Two leading figures in television criticism whose careers began when television was launched were Jack Gould of the *New York Times*, who wrote between 1947 and 1972, and Dwight Newton of the *San Francisco Examiner*, whose coverage of the medium spanned the years 1949–1976. (*Source*: Gould information was retrieved on January 21, 2003 from the University of Texas Press website: http://www.utexas.edu/utpress/books/gouwat.html and the Newton information was retrieved on January 21, 2003 from the Broadcast Legends website: http://www.broadcastlegends.com/newton.html.

6. Some reviews were embedded in articles that evaluated more than one series or provided additional information such as program schedules, celebrity news, etc. In these instances, article word count, which refers to the total number of words when multiple shows were evaluated or other items of information were included, was also recorded.

7. Cross tabulations for negative reviews found that all criteria but plausibility and script/writing/writers were statistically significant.

8. There are several methods to determine the distance at which to evaluate clustering using multi-dimensional analysis. The skree test determines the level of evaluation by finding the distance at which several of the peripheral clusters that were composed of one or two variables joined a large central cluster. The clusters were then evaluated at the immediately smaller distance (see Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984).

9. The attribute of complexity, which appeared in the secondary cluster for drama in 1995, dropped out in 2000 and was replaced by "use of news."

10. Baumann (2001, p. 407) notes that the rising popularity of television in the 1950s was part of the rationale used by film critics and scholars to argue that their medium was a true art form, unlike the mass entertainment that appeared on television.

11. For example, there were five situation comedies in the 1985 season's top 10 series, six in 1990, five in 1995, and only two in 2000.

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THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AS CULTURAL INDUSTRY? THE TRANSPOSITION OF FASHION LOGICS INTO THE FIELD OF MOBILE TELEPHONY

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ABSTRACT

The term "fashion" triggers images of frivolous symbolic production with a particular impact on women, quite a world apart at first sight from high technology and mobile telephony that traditionally tend to be associated with science, rationality and masculinity. Surprisingly, we show in this paper that the field of mobile telephony has, for a number of years now, been impacted and significantly transformed by the transposition of fashion logics. We deconstruct the process of logic transposition, considering key moments and key actors, key modes and mechanisms. The comparison of multiple case studies within the mobile telephony industry also points to the limits of transposition and to varying degrees of hybridization and logic co-habitation. This process of logic transposition is, we argue, profoundly transforming the mobile telephony industry, bringing it closer, on many counts, to "cultural industries". In the end, we draw a

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number of theoretical conclusions on logic transposition as an important mechanism of institutional change.

INTRODUCTION

In its traditional acceptance, the term ''fashion'' triggers images of inconsequential swings in clothing styles, of frivolous symbolic worlds with a particular impact on women, driving prices and consumption patterns towards irrational levels. At first sight, such frivolous irrationality seems quite a world apart from high technology and mobile telephony, which on the contrary tend to be associated with ideas of science and rationality and suggest a masculine world. It is therefore surprising that the field of mobile telephony has, for a number of years now, shown signs of being impacted and significantly transformed by the transposition of fashion logics. Over the same period, the pre-existing scientific, rational and engineering logics originally associated with the telecom industry have been displaced in part and somewhat marginalized. They have not disappeared from the field but they have been pushed to the background – away from markets and clients – and they have to combine, to compose and mix with emergent fashion logics. Increasingly, the source of value creation in the telecom industry is seen to lie as much in symbolic production, mass customization and short commercial cycles – three key dimensions of what we call ''fashion logics'' – as in technological and engineering sophistication.

The transposition that is taking place can be assimilated to a double movement of de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization. The logics that go and come are highly structuring of the field; they set the rules of the game. With this process of transposition, the ''axial principles of organization and action'' (Thornton, 2004, p. 2) are profoundly being transformed within the telecom industry. The object of this paper is to try and understand how this double process – the transposition of logics external to a field and the concomitant displacement of previously dominant logics – could take place. The theoretical contribution is therefore to discussions around and about institutional change (Djelic & Quack, 2003; Thornton, 2004). Not only do we have to look at the mechanics of transposition but, building on an already rich tradition (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996), we suggest that transposition is likely to combine with situated ''translation'' and ''hybridization''; a process of transposition is bound to be at the very same time a process of multiple hybridizations. Questions of agency are also of particular interest – what type of "actorhood", if any, is behind institutional transposition? We start from the intuition that the understanding of "institutional entrepreneurship" that is currently dominant in the literature (Di Maggio, 1988; Sewell, 1992; Fligstein, 1997; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002) carries around a conception of "actorhood" that is too "rational" and "strategizing" and in a sense much too simple to fit with an institutional theoretical frame.

In the first part of the chapter, we start by defining what we mean by "fashion logics" – looking at fashion as a socio-psychological phenomenon. We then show how fashion logics first took on an industrial scope within the ladies' garment sector – symbolic production, mass customization and short cycles being three key dimensions there. From there, we turn to the story of transposition, starting with the experience of Nokia – a company in the field of mobile telephony that was a pioneer in that respect. During the 1990s, Nokia literally bumped, in a somewhat haphazard manner, into practices, mindsets and rules of the game external to its world. Before it even realized it, Nokia had become an active agent of the transposition of fashion logics into the field of mobile telephony. This dimension of the transposition story points to the limits of current frameworks that underscore the strategizing character of "institutional entrepreneurs" (Kleiner, 2003; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Selznick, 1957). Nokia was an accidental carrier of institutional logics long before it ever became a conscious "institutional entrepreneur". Strategizing came only later, when the process of transposition had already started and when fashion logics had already begun to make headway in the mobile telephony field.

In the next stage of the story, we focus on the more recent wider and broader diffusion of fashion logics within the mobile telephony field as a whole. The transposition and institutionalization of fashion logics within the mobile telephony field came together then with the progressive displacement of earlier logics. Yet, we also identify and document patterns of co-existence or even combination and hybridization. We focus more particularly on the spread of fashion logics towards three main types of actors in the field – mobile handset producers, network operators and customers.

Our methodological approach is structured around a multi-case discussion, where we juxtapose several historical narratives and learn from the systematic comparison but also from the aggregation of experiences of a few focal organizations. Our perspective on the more recent transposition stories into the mobile telephony industry is enriched through direct interviews with key actors for some of the cases we study. It also builds upon the regular follow up of important professional publications and websites.

In the discussion and conclusion, we try to assess the extent and impact of the changes brought about by this transposition of logics in the field of mobile telephony. We also suggest, on the basis of what is still sporadic and impressionistic evidence, that contagion or diffusion may be progressing further towards other spheres of the telecom industry – fixed telephony and internet activities, for example. The game in the telecom industry is increasingly a game of symbolic production and consumption. In that sense, we suggest that the nature of what is commonly referred to as the converging field of "information and communication technology" could be changing in a radical way. The transposition of fashion logics may be profoundly redefining the telecom industry – and potentially other industries affected by advances in (information) technology into cultural industries, at least in part.

The picture that emerges from this multi-stage and multi-layered transposition story is that of an incremental combination and aggregation of small steps, leading in time to a quite significant institutional transformation (see Djelic & Quack, 2003 for the concept of "stalactite change"). Radical change takes place, this story seems to suggest, through an incremental process. A succession of partial and sometimes minor "reforms" can lead in time to a "revolutionary" outcome. Agency is part of the story of change, we find, but in a complex way – both as itself a reflection and a tool of changing institutional logics and, at times, as a conscious, strategizing accelerator of a process already in the making. Thus, entrepreneurship seems in fact to precede conscious strategy and reflects accidental encounter as much as it does rational decision-making.

THE EMERGENCE OF FASHION AS A BUSINESS MODEL

Fashion is a modern phenomenon. Originally, it was associated with and revealed by the development in Western societies of the trend to produce garments outside the family and domestic sphere. The early expression of that phenomenon was limited in scale and scope – originally it concerned essentially women of royal blood or from the high aristocracy in a small number of Western countries. Progressively, though, the fashion phenomenon became more extensive and by the end of the 19th century it was turning into a business model for a dynamic and expanding women's garment industry.

Fashion as a Socio-Psychological Phenomenon

Among classical sociologists, Georg Simmel is one of the rare who took fashion seriously (Simmel, 1904). In all likelihood, the close association between fashion and the futile issue of women's clothing and adornment prevented many of Simmel's contemporaries and illustrious elders from recognizing the importance of fashion as a socio-psychological phenomenon.

According to Simmel, there was a direct relationship between the mechanism at work in fashion and the two basic principles shaping social life – conformity and differentiation. The interplay between the human need for belonging – and therefore for conformity – and the search for differentiation and individualization was at the roots of the fashion mechanism. In modern stratified societies, this interplay took place at the fault lines separating social groups and social strata. Yearning for status, subordinate groups conformed, trying to imitate the ways of superordinate groups. In reaction, superordinate groups came up with new fashions and markers in an attempt to reclaim status differentiation (Simmel, 1904). The dynamics of the game were therefore quite obvious and as fashions spread (or "trickled down") they lost their differentiating potential and gave way to new ones, in a self-perpetuating circle (cf. Bourdieu, 1984).

A necessary condition for the emergence and existence of the fashion phenomenon in Simmel's analysis was the very possibility within a particular society to interact and imitate across social fault lines. In pre-modern societies, traditions, customs and a strict separation of groups and their lifestyles were the mechanisms balancing the need for conformity and the need for differentiation. In a sense, traditions and customs in static and rigid pre-modern societies and fashion in more fluid and open societies could be seen as functional equivalents. Fashion "introduces order in a potentially anarchic and moving present…even though it be passing uniformity and order. It performs in a moving society a function which custom performed in a settled society" (Blumer, 1969, p. 289). The sociological context for the development and expansion of the fashion mechanism is the progressive democratization, opening up and modernization of a society – associated with fluidity, principled equality, relative massification, rationalization and standardization. The expansion of fashion is the sign of a deep transformation – change displaces stability and permanence as the key structuring axis of a society. Fashion comes together with the questioning of "stable orders", sacred "stability" and "absolute truths". In the words of Simmel, one of the reasons why "in these latter days fashion exercises such a powerful influence on our consciousness is the circumstance that the great, permanent, unquestionable convictions are continuously losing strength as a consequence of which the transitory and vacillating elements of life acquire more room for the display of their activity'' (Simmel, 1904).

Hence, Simmel understood that, as a socio-psychological mechanism, fashion went well beyond the sphere of women's adornment. He found an explanation to the fact that women were originally particularly concerned by the phenomenon in the ''psychological characteristic of most women'', which ''consists in the lack of differentiation, in a greater similarity among the different members of her sex'' (Simmel, 1904). If one replaces ''psychological characteristic'' by ''socio-cultural context'', the argument becomes interesting. Men had many other opportunities to differentiate themselves and set themselves apart in early modern society. For women, external appearance was the valve through which ''their craving for some measure of conspicuousness and individual prominence found vent when its satisfaction was denied in other fields'' (Simmel, 1904). Fashion, in other words, is an ideal answer to an individual craving for prominence and singularity in a socio-structural context that does not provide her or him with that.

Let us imagine a society where the desire for differentiation remained strong while fluidity, principled equality and hence massification and similarity were progressing – all marks of what some have called post-modern or post-industrial societies (Bell, 1999; Lyotard, 1979). In all likelihood, the phenomenon of fashion would increase in scope within such a society, spreading well beyond the arena of women's adornment. It would also probably change, not in nature but in form of expression. A post-modern society is symbolically more accurately represented by a flexible network rather than by a rigid hierarchy (Castells, 2000). Instead of a stable and unique, objective, reality, the world becomes a kaleidoscope of visions and perspectives, worldviews and images, ''tribes'' and social groups (Lyotard, 1979). In that context, taste or prestige would not anymore be defined only by superordinate groups or classes and social elite. Fashion leaders or fashion makers could be found everywhere and influences would be multi-directional (Baumgarten, 1975; Polegato & Wall, 1980). The reduction of physical as well as mental distances coming together with a post-modern society would mean that inspirations and aspirations would become multilateral rather than purely hierarchical and that the number of options and possible paths would increase quite significantly for any particular individual and group in their quest for differentiation and/or conformity. Most actors in the field of cultural production agreed by the 1980s that there were no longer any clear hierarchical taste and fashion flows (Kaiser, Nagasawa,

& Hutton, 1991). Tastes and fashions diffused horizontally within and across groups (King, 1963) or they could even diffuse upwards (Field, 1970; Blumberg, 1974) rather than downwards. The expansion of fashion was coupled with the progress of democratization.

The Invention of the Business Model: Worth and the Women's Garment Industry

Such an understanding of fashion as a psycho-sociological phenomenon closely associated with democratization can help explain both why fashion logics remained so marginal until the mid-19th century and why they have progressed so rapidly and widely since. The transformation of fashion from an essentially latent socio-psychological phenomenon into a business model took place during the 19th century in the women's garment industry in Paris. Ironically, a key actor behind that transformation was an Englishman, the *Couturier* Charles Frederick Worth. Worth bumped into the fashion mechanism, progressively had the intuition of its power and went on to appropriate it, and turned fashion into what proved to be a very successful business model. Worth's competitors rapidly imitated and replicated that business model, which became in the process a blueprint for an entire industry in the making.

Charles Frederick Worth was born in 1825 and, from an early age, worked in London as a shop assistant. Attracted by the glitters of Paris, he crossed the channel in 1845 with nearly no money in his pocket and absolutely no knowledge of French. Needless to say, the first years were fraught with difficulties. In 1847, he finally managed to secure a job as a selling clerk at Gagelin, a luxury mercer in Paris. Gagelin sold mostly fabrics but also a few cashmere shawls, ready-made mantels and various other accessories of ladies' wear. It was somewhat by chance that Charles Frederick Worth bumped into his own destiny. At Gagelin, the shawls and mantels that were sold along with drapes and fabrics were presented to clients in "real-life settings", on the shoulders of a small number of "live models". Worth worked more particularly with one of the models, Marie Augustine Vernet, who would soon become his wife. With the idea of creating a neutral background that would not distract from the display of shawls and mantels, Worth made a few dresses for Marie that were white and of extreme simplicity. This did not have, however, the expected impact and the clients in fact soon were noticing only the dresses, asking for the same. This episode really launched Charles Frederick Worth's career as a dressmaker and in

1858 he set up Worth and Boberg, his own *maison* or house, together with a Swedish associate. Ten years later, Worth had imposed his own name, *Maison Worth*, transforming it into a ''seal of excellence'' for his products and his company and turning these into benchmarks for other players in the women's garment industry (Marly, 1990).

All through her life, Marie served as the main ''communication post'' for her husband's new creations. The world was watching Marie Worth and a ''change in her attire could produce a change overnight in the whole French Imperial court'' and by extension in time in Europe's noble classes and America's new bourgeoisie or upper-middle classes (Marly, 1990). Worth had bumped into the fashion mechanism and he had rapidly understood its power. He realized the important role that ''fashion or trend setters'' could play. Hence he soon had the idea to forge a close association with an opinion leader, a woman of society. But he needed a woman who would be a risk taker and who would not be afraid of regularly breaking off conventions. He found that opinion leader and opinion maker in the person of Princess von Metternich, the wife of the Austrian Ambassador to Paris. This woman was very interested in dress and she had absolutely no inhibitions about wearing anything that might be considered too daring by others. In fact, the Princess took a positive delight in being reckless and sensational. Charles Frederick Worth approached her by offering her two evening dresses at a ridiculously low price. She liked the dresses, she wore them at Court, and soon all the women at Court would talk only about that. For many years after that, Princess von Metternich played, together with Marie Worth, the role of *avant garde* fashion-setter in the fashion cycle run and managed by Charles Frederick Worth.

Charles Frederick Worth is often dubbed the ''father of *Haute Couture*'' (Marly, 1990). In fact, though, *Haute Couture*, as such, was born only much later. *Haute Couture* emerged around 1910 from a split within the high-end women's garment industry. This split was triggered by the political desire of a small group of firms to protect and exploit their status and position in the field in a context of increasing competition. *Haute Couture* was invented as a differentiating mechanism in an industry that was growing rapidly (Grumbach, 1993). Only then did the stereotypes that we tend to associate with *Haute Couture* or luxury fashion, at least in the French model (Djelic & Ainamo, 1999) start to crystallize – that luxury fashion is an art or a craft, the expression of a unique artistic talent (and not an industry); that it is highly labour intensive, produces highest quality goods and more or less unique pieces; that it is by nature small scale and elitist; and that it cannot be directly associated with marketing techniques. In fact and quite in contrast to these stereotypes, if one looks at the adventure of Charles Frederick Worth in its unique historical context, the picture that emerges is surprisingly different.

We do find a discourse and other forms of political pronouncements where Worth clearly did associate what he was doing with the field of art. But this discourse appeared in reality to be quite decoupled from other political acts and choices that pointed in quite different directions – towards large-scale and mass customization, rationalization and time management, the creation of a perpetual circle of needs where there had been none before, the democratization of fashion, an internationalization of the client base and what we could call today "aggressive brand management". The historical integration of the fashion mechanism into a business model, as pioneered by Charles Frederick Worth, had, we argue, three main dimensions – symbolic production, short cycles and mass customization.

Symbolic Production, Short Cycles, and Mass Customization

Charles Frederick Worth defined himself as an artist and he construed himself as elevating dress making to a higher plane. He positioned his work as part of aesthetics. He was not only – and far from it – producing functional artifacts; he was also creating symbolic worlds and that in fact was what gave unique value to his dresses and garments. In the process, Worth was constructing the women's garment industry as a cultural industry.

There were two main sources of inspiration for Worth. One was history and the past, as reflected in art. From the moment he arrived in Paris, he spent a lot of time in museums, he leafed through albums of drawings, and hunted through collections. Another source of inspiration was the contemporary world around him – and in a sense this was even more revolutionary. "It was seeing acrobats in sleeve jackets that inspired him to create jackets; it was Empress Eugénie's interest in the Scottish side of the family together with Victoria's fondness for Balmoral which led him to use tartan sashes and trimmings on dresses. It was the French conquest of Algeria that led Worth to use the burnous as a wrap" (Marly, 1990). Ideas for creations and fashions could come from anywhere. They could even come from below, as when the victory of Garibaldi in Italy inspired Worth to propose red shirts and pill-box hats – the latter soon becoming all the rage.

Following his whims and inspiration, the artistic infatuation of the moment or more mundane and contemporary developments, Worth created perpetual movement, with a direct and rapid impact on what women were wearing. He regularly came up with new and differentiating features – he brought crinoline back, then shortened the skirts, replaced bonnets by hats, got rid of shawls and wraps and in 1868 he abolished crinolines altogether. A small number of opinion makers – among whom his wife – took the early risks. Then, this generally triggered a frenetic search for conformity among noble and bourgeois women within France, but soon also internationally. After each successful wave of conformity came a new episode of differentiation; and the cycles were run and monitored by the "master", Charles Frederick Worth.

Through his intuition of the role of "fashion-setters" and his use of this mechanism with his wife and the Princess von Metternich, Worth managed to create, early on, an association between the symbolic worlds he was building and the highest nobility. A Worth dress made a statement. It was a status symbol, a slightly open door unto a world of refinement and privilege. The Worth business model took off – and this is not so much of a surprise – during the Second Empire in France, in the second half of the 19th century. In France, this was a period of industrialization, wealth creation and rise of the bourgeoisie, with the associated progress, undeniably of a certain form of democratization. The *parvenus* of the Second Empire were looking for all possible ways to associate themselves with a world of nobility and privilege, boosting in the process the business of Maison Worth. The expansion also went beyond national borders. In Europe, one key element of context was the *zeitgeist* of nationalism and a widespread process of nation building in Italy, Germany and elsewhere, with which came here again some degree of democratization and the desire of local *elites* for symbols and signs of status. But most revealing, probably, was the expansion of Maison Worth into American territories. By the 1890s, a key element in Worth's client base were the wives and daughters of the American Robber Barons, from meatpackers to bankers. The privilege of wealth was beginning to oust aristocratic prestige and dominance, pointing towards the mass and democratic society that would come of age during the 20th century. Both in Europe and the Americas, Worth was undeniably a harbinger of that evolution if not a contributing mechanism. Worth was selling much more than dresses. He was selling dreams, status, and a sense of association with desirable worlds. And because of that he could charge extremely high prices. In 1869, the average yearly dress allowance of the French bourgeois woman, supposed to cover all her dress needs for a year, would be at most £200 when an evening gown at Worth would cost about £100. Nevertheless, Worth had to deal with an exploding demand!

By any standards of the time, *Maison Worth* was very large. The average Parisian dressmaker employed then a maximum of 40 seamstresses. Worth started with 20 in 1858, but by 1870 he had about 1,200 seamstresses working for him. Worth ran in fact what was, "behind the golden façade a factory where 1,200 pairs of hands turned out parts which Worth fitted together. He would have scorned the word factory himself but, in scale and operations, that was what it amounted to" (Marly, 1990). In the spirit of the dawning industrial age, Worth embraced advances in industrial technology to satisfy the large demand for his dresses. Contemporary improvements in loom technologies made it possible to produce fabrics, drapes and materials on a wider scale and to significantly increase productivity. The sewing machine had also been a major revolution without which one cannot understand Worth's adventure. These technological inventions were not new. However, they had seen some 30 years of improvement and experiment. The glory, the glamour and artistic pronouncements associated with the name of Worth relied in fact strongly upon industrialization. Worth and luxury fashion were the products of an industrializing and industrial age!

At the same time, Worth had to work with or rather around a number of societal constraints. The Second Empire in France was a period of intense social activity and numerous social happenings. At the Imperial Court only, there were four main balls a season. About 2,500 women attended each Imperial ball. Two important constraints were that all women at Court evening events had to dress in white and that a woman could not wear the same dress twice. Even if Worth did only half of the dresses, this still meant that Maison Worth would have to create 1,000 dresses four times a season, all in whites and without any single one of them being exactly the same as the other. In practice, this was achieved by designing variations around central themes or core elements – Worth called them 'declinations' and if we look at it, the process is quite in line in fact with what we would call today modularity or "mass customization" (Pine, Victor, & Boynton, 1993). For each category of dress piece – e.g. body, sleeves, skirt – there were a small number of standardized variants that were mass produced but assembled under the supervision of Worth, each time in unique ways (Marly, 1990). These pieces were put together on the sewing machine, which made the long seams and the trimmings. The finishing and the embroideries were done by hand. What also added to the singularity and customization of each dress was the unique combination in each case of ribbons, feathers, flowers and decorations.

In light of our contemporary understanding of "cultural industries" as "industries where products serve not only an instrumental but also a symbolic purpose" (Hirsch, 1972), we can see why and how the imprint of Charles Frederick Worth was so significant. Worth had managed to turn fashion into a business model, combining symbolic management and modern industrial methods and heralding in the process the advent of "cultural industries". During the 20th century, the idea of using symbolic production as the basis for a business model then progressively made its way into other spheres, primarily those associated with arts and creation. The first cultural industries to emerge in the process were the film and music industry, through a combination of the commercial exploitation of symbolic production and increasingly fast cycles (Jones, 2001). Gradually, those "fashion logics" have come to reshape and transform significantly other spheres of cultural production, such as publishing or the art and museum worlds (Thornton, 2004; Ballé & Poulot, 2004). More recently, the fashion business model has started to make inroads well beyond what could be seen as the traditional boundaries of cultural industries. And our interest, in this paper, is to tell the story of such a transposition of logic in the mobile telephony industry. The story starts with Nokia and what, in large part, was a chance encounter with fashion. Progressively, Nokia would seize upon fashion as a conscious strategy, transposing its logics into the world of mobile telephony.

NOKIA AND FASHION: FROM ENCOUNTER TO STRATEGY

In 1977, Kari Kairamo became President of the Nokia Corporation, then a major Finnish conglomerate with a particular presence in forestry and rubber works but also some activity in electronics. Two dimensions in the personal biography of Kari Kairamo help understand the way in which he steered the corporation. The first dimension is that Kari Kairamo was clearly a member of the Finnish elite. A second dimension is that he "discovered America" – at a time when this was still quite rare in Finland – and that this experience marked his life and his personal vision.

The father of Kari Kairamo had also been the President of Nokia and his grandfather had been the founder of a major Finnish bank. Kari Kairamo was trained as an engineer and from an early age, he attracted attention as a "born leader" – he had the social, intellectual and economic capital that could allow him to make a mark in his native country. In 1964, he had crossed the Atlantic to sell Finnish paper machines. He was soon fascinated by the capacity of the United States to create wealth by reconciling technology and a marketing perspective where multiple needs and perspectives were taken into consideration. Such a model stood in exciting contrast to the

Finnish model where societal consensus and uniformity were the rules of the game. He brought this model with him into Nokia when he became its President (Saari, 2000).

Kari Kairamo and the Vision of an "Information Society"

"Progress and flexibility" was Kairamo's favourite slogan. Since 1960, Nokia had had an electronics division that produced "public-radio" networks and mobile telephones for closed-off communities such as the military or the police, where access was highly restricted. After Kairamo took over, Nokia started cooperating with Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian partners to study the possibility of extending those technologies to business, government and even, eventually, to regular citizens. Kairamo was deeply convinced that, just as the structuring frame of the industrial society had been transportation, communication would be the core infrastructure of the future "information society" (Nokia, 2000a). Nokia's role, in that context, should be not merely to follow that development but to be an active agent of it. Thus Nokia, under Kairamo's leadership, set itself the strategic objective to foster the emergence of the "information society" by extending the reach of new technologies to society at large – by bringing together, in other words, the citizen and the latest technologies (Nokia, 2000b; Ainamo & Pantzar, 2000).

Early on, Kairamo identified mobile communication through telephone as potentially a key driver of that strategic project. A professional industrial designer, with a vast experience of product architecture and user interface design in several industries, was put in charge of "dreaming the future" (cf. Pulkkinen, 1997). Nokia's engineers provided him with a stack of components and Nokia's management with a simple brief – adopt a "users' perspective". This called in fact for a solution that would make telephony and data networks user-friendly and accessible, including to those citizens who were novice with complex technologies. The results were mobile phone handsets that were launched in 1981 on the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) network. In comparison to competing products, Nokia phones were indeed relatively user-friendly (Pulkkinen, 1997). Still, the number of users remained quite low due to prohibitively high prices reflecting the cost of those new technologies. The first adopters were industrial leaders and aspiring entrepreneurs in Finland, Sweden and Norway. In that early period, the mere fact of possessing a mobile telephone was in itself a powerful factor of differentiation (Pantzar, 2003). A mobile telephone was soon as much a symbol of status as a technological artifact – and it was not so different in that from a Worth's dress. Ownership of a mobile phone in itself brought you into a special group – a "new class" associated with success, wealth, modernity and dynamism.

After this first success, Kari Kairamo turned to the internationalization challenge. The management team wanted to confirm the transformation of Nokia from a predominantly national firm into a large international diversified firm. Hence, they orchestrated a wave of acquisitions – targeting particularly the German television and computer sectors. The plan had been to finance extremely high research and development costs in mobile phones with profits from television activities. But the move into television proved to be a drastic failure and precious cash reserves were wasted on that venture. Furthermore, there were still major obstacles out there to a strategy that wanted to bring advanced technologies of communication closer to the average citizen on a transnational level. Nokia had to deal, in particular, with the great diversity of technological standards in the telephone industry. Overworking himself in this situation, Timo H.A. Koski, Kari Kairamo's right-hand man, died of a stroke in 1988. Depressed by the realization of an imminent crisis, Kari Kairamo committed suicide the same year.

Kairamo and Koski had grown Nokia Corporation ten-fold in size and transformed the previously strong but sleepy business-to-business firm into a dynamic – but fragile – corporation and consumer brand. Nokia Corporation now had to fight for survival. A new management team began to sell businesses and divisions one by one: first rubber, forest industries, and cable industries, then computers and televisions. Mobile telephony was seen as a promising but risky sector and a young, dynamic manager – Jorma Ollila – was put in charge of the mobile phone business. The process was difficult but the mobile phone division was moving towards the structuring of the world's first commercial GSM (Global System for Mobile Telephones standard) digital network for cellular phones. On that, Nokia worked together with Finnish telecom operators. In 1991, the Finnish Prime Minister made the first call ever placed on a commercial GSM network, on a Nokia phone. The turnaround of the mobile telephony division sufficiently impressed the Nokia board that in 1992 they made Ollila the CEO. Jorma Ollila announced the new strategic orientation – Nokia was to become a "focused" and "telecom" company. All other activities would have to go and the divesting process started in the late 1980s was pushed along. Nokia would also have a "customer benefit" orientation and this would mean new emphasis on marketing management and turning Nokia into a global brand (Vanjoki, 2002a).

Discovering Fashion and Turning it into a Strategic Advantage

In line with the US textbook model of cross-subsidization, Nokia moved to treat mature technologies and markets as cash cows to fund inroads into new markets as well as new technological developments. Nokia exploited old applications to move faster and more flexibly into the exploration of new exciting technological possibilities and their applications. It black-boxed or standardized what was old and everyday in order to develop economies of scale, to grow volume and to increase profits. New product launches were made to fit with sediments and irreversibilities of earlier design choices and technological progress. This approach soon had concrete and positive results. The GSM standard developed quickly and the construction of mobile networks followed along. Sales to the business sector took off. Within the Nordic countries, phone sales to non-business consumers also progressed at surprisingly swift pace. Nokia had thus survived as an independent business entity. Not only that, it had even managed to prosper, thanks essentially to a combination of three developments – focus through restructuring, returns from the rapid progress of the GSM standard for mobile telephony and well-timed foreign financing that bridged the gap in between.

In 1994, Nokia launched the 2100 series GSM phones. The series rapidly became an instant classic and a symbol of the brand. Nokia had to cope with an exploding demand and turned for that to state-of-the-art enterprise-wide resource planning (ERP). The company perfected its product platforms in the process, following here what was being done in the automobile industry (Vanjoki, 2002; Miettinen, 2004). Nokia went fast and the company managed to implement ERP virtually overnight across its various businesses and geographical locations (Koivukoski, 2002; Kulkki & Kosonen, 2001). The new digital mobile phones ran on software that could be adapted to suit particular market conditions. The digital technology hence created significant flexibility and Nokia could offer its various business and individual consumers a bounded diversity of phone concepts. In other words, it could offer them a degree of mass customization (Pine et al., 1993).

As it was enlarging its customer base, Nokia turned to market studies to test the reactions of its new customers. The first market and product studies revealed, somewhat to the surprise of Nokia managers, that users saw the Nokia brand as "feminine", in particular in comparison to rival brands in the same industry (Vanjoki, 2002). Thorough analysis of those findings revealed that many customers perceived "masculine" technological features as complex obstacles that generated considerable confusion and constituted a barrier to adoption and use. The relative user friendliness of

Nokia phones thus meant, in reality, a de-emphasis and relative neutralization of technology that proved to be very much appreciated by the average customer, whether man or woman. Those average customers did not want to look at phones and other devices as technological artifacts. They wanted direct access to communication, fun and entertainment (Pantzar, 2003). This "transparency" or partial disappearance of technology was at the source of the "feminine" perception associated with the Nokia brand.

Nokia managers could have been worrying at the apparent discrepancy between this "feminine" image and their strategic vision of building an "information society". Instead, they reacted opportunistically. Without giving up on the vision of an "information society", they seized upon the identity of the brand as really perceived by the market. They commissioned studies to see how this brand image could be turned into a strategic advantage. They rapidly understood that making the best of this particular positioning meant that Nokia should become a broker, neutralizing technology and turning it into a means of self-expression (Nokia, 2000a). Soon, Nokia was introducing styling and fashion into its handsets. The 2110 phone, launched in 1995, made it possible for consumers to "personalize" their mobile phones with accessories, such as removable and exchangeable colour "skins". This phone was featured broadly in newspapers, magazines and on TV, with media coverage reifying it as a cultural artifact, and therefore adding a unique aura to Nokia products and to the Nokia brand.

From that point on, Nokia communicated and described openly how it encouraged its designers to propose new concepts that fitted this new orientation and to keep proposing them again and again until the concepts were dealt with adequately in one or the other of the producer's divisions (Kosonen, 2001). The Head of the Design team at Nokia, Franck Nuovo, called for designers within Nokia to internalize norms of autonomous interaction with lead users as their guiding principle rather than to expect direct supervision, control or result measurement from superiors (Nuovo, 2000). It was precisely at this time that consumers swarmed into the GSM and other mobile telephony networks across Europe. Nokia phones were soon representing the ultimate in contemporary "fashion items" with consumers competing for who had the most recent and the most expensive phone. In 1996 and 1997, many new subscribers joined in the "second" generation network both inside and outside the Nordic countries, and over that period Nokia gained a critical lead over Ericsson and Motorola.

Even though Nokia, just like Charles Frederick Worth in earlier times and in a different industry, had discovered somewhat by chance the potential of its phones as cultural and symbolic artifacts and as fashion items, it did not take long for Nokia managers to appropriate the fashion logic. In an interesting twist to its strategy of fostering an egalitarian "information society", Nokia identified different categories of consumers, with varying attitudes towards technology. A differentiation was made, in particular, between "lead users" and "followers". "Lead users" were technologically sophisticated consumers who could understand complex technological features. They would persist in their attempt at using new applications, in spite of initial difficulties or frustration. These consumers had the capacity to "read" and interpret new technologies. They had acquired this capacity through experience and familiarity with technological artifacts and models developed earlier. They were thus "leading the way", and clearing the path as it were, showing others how to incorporate the "new" and technological innovations into everyday life (Ainamo & Pantzar, 2000). The parallels there with Worth's "fashion" or "trend setters" are quite unmistakable. Nokia actively developed a close relationship with those "lead users", letting them engage in autonomous "interaction" with product designers to identify and explore new directions for product and business development. At the same time, Nokia also focused upon the "followers" – upon the mass-market customers who brought in most of the sales volume – and this was led by Nokia's marketing management, rather than by designers' teams.

The stage was thus set for the fashion mechanism to come into play. At surprisingly swift pace, the ownership and display of "regular" second generation digital phones became quite insufficient to signal differentiation. Possession of a mobile phone could not anymore be in itself a status symbol. Prices were falling and penetration rates of mobile telephony were soaring up in many countries. In Finland, by December 1998, nearly 60% of the population had a mobile phone. That same year, the penetration rate was already over 20% in Italy, Portugal or the UK, and rising quite fast. Mobile phones were on the verge of becoming products of mass consumption around Europe. In that context, to keep providing customers with superior and always renewed experiences, Nokia launched ever more diverse ranges of mobile phones. Product life cycles got ever shorter and Nokia interacted ever more intensely with consumers to sustain sales momentum for "regular" and in some way stylized GSM phones, as well as to create market-pull for a new "third" generation of phones that was then being launched. Nokia developed a roadmap with "time slots" for the introduction of new technologies and products, pre-programmed for years in advance. Rather than stopping analysis at the level of technological feasibility studies and sales statistics, Nokia used "contextual design"; that is, its design teams placed Nokia's prototypes, products, consumers and themselves in unique laboratory settings. There was friction-free user–producer interaction with end users to collect, analyze and interpret their experiences and stories. Special ad hoc teams of designers were empowered to interact using radical new design methods with innovative consumers and users worldwide. Like musicians in a jazz quartet, these teams improvised, but within given limits. Nokia was not pushing a proprietary set of modular technology or other solutions to the market. The teams were encouraged to be sensitive to all consumer feedback, while nevertheless staying within the limits set by market analyses and tests.

Nokia ever more openly exploited the growing interest in phones as symbolic accessories and fashion items rather than as purely instrumental devices for voice and data transmission and reception. In 1999, Nokia launched its Nokia 8210 during the Paris Fashion Week at the 30th anniversary celebration of Kenzo design: "Nokia enters the Kenzo world of fashion… Nokia as the world's leading design house for mobile communication" (Nokia, 2000b). In 2000, Nokia spun off a firm called Vertú, a venture specializing in fully customized mobile phones for the *nouveaux riches*, with Frank Nuovo, Nokia's chief designer, being also Vertú's chief designer. This venture was explicitly geared for the elite market. Nokia's marketing compared Vertú to jewellery, rather than to technology. The phones would cost between €5,000 and €24,000, depending upon how many jewels were embedded in the "jewellery-like" phone. There was an emphasis on developing the Vertú brand and structuring an "exclusive" distribution channel. Much publicized "cosmopolitan" donners of the Vertú phone included the singer Madonna and the movie actress Gwyneth Paltrow – both also well-known as global "fashion setters". The marketing team at Vertú made a point of the scenario that half of its customers ought to live in a country not corresponding to their nationality. "Vertú will never become a mass-market brand" (Talouselämä, 2003; Litchfield, 2003). However, in hindsight, Vertú was launched at what turned out to be the beginning of the end of a period of economic boom. In the changed context that followed, the Vertú concept failed to generate the sales figures that had been targeted and Vertú was spun back in by 2004 (Litchfield, 2003). Nokia, it seems, was in reality "dedicated to the mass market" (Miettinen, 2004). Marketing analyses showed that, for the mass market, personalization meant an "open-source" combination of Nokia's technologies, styling propositions and contents offers (Vanjoki, 2002).

FASHION AND CONTAGION: THE IMPACT ON MOBILE TELEPHONY

On its way to fostering an "information society", Nokia had in the 1970s and 1980s made a choice in terms of strategic positioning, where diffusion of technology and technological development appeared to be at the core of the business model. The market, though, had soon been feeding back a double message. First, mobile phones were not mere technological artifacts. They also had an important symbolic dimension. Ownership of a mobile phone was in itself a status symbol in the early period. Later on, the fashion mechanism as we have described it above, was fully at work and the "new new things" (Lewis, 2001) were repeatedly associated with differentiation in a powerful but unstable way. Cycles, for these "new new things" – technological developments, increasingly combined with design innovations – were becoming shorter and shorter. Second, it soon became quite clear that the vast majority of consumers aspired to "user friendliness"; that is a "transparency" of technology, where technology was pushed into the background and should not interfere with the communication experience.

While initially driven by a vision of the "information society" where all citizens should have direct and equal access to the benefits of new technologies, Nokia encountered and gradually learned to exploit the very same logics that C. F. Worth had pioneered. Nokia had bumped into fashion. "Lead users" gained status from an early appropriation of technological and stylistic developments. The symbolic world thus created and attracted other users, which brought in the need for industrialization and mass customization – and the parallel here again with what happened to *Maison Worth* is quite striking. The appropriation of the new technologies by mass users created in turn the need for alternative means of differentiation among "lead users". This translated into a self-reenforcing cycle, with ever shorter product life cycles. Thus, the three key dimensions associated with fashion logics – symbolic production, mass customization and short commercial cycles – were in place.

Nokia seized upon the possibilities of the fashion mechanism, translating it in what could appear at first sight as an unlikely field for that mechanism – the field of mobile telephony. Progressively, but undeniably, the transfer of the fashion logic came to have an impact beyond Nokia – on other handset producers, through capillarity and imitation, but also on network operators and more generally on the mobile phone industry as a whole. The progressive sophistication and individualization of the customer and her needs came together with both the necessity for mass customization and its limits.

From Innovation to Institution: Fashion Impacts Other Handset Producers

While Nokia was discovering and instrumentalizing fashion on the European market during the second half of the 1990s, parallel developments were taking place in the Asian market. The pioneer there was the Japanese telecom service provider DoCoMo. Similarly to Nokia on the Western market in the business of the phone handsets of mobile telephony, DoCoMo was in a dominant position on the Japanese market in the provision of mobile telephony services. Similarly to Nokia's being a player in not only handsets but also netword design and building, DoCoMo was also player in several businesses at once; that is, DoCoMo was both operating digital networks and providing services to end customers. This service provision, importantly, included the marketing, sales and delivery of mobile handsets. With the spread of the PDC (Personal Digital Cellular) standard for digital networks in Japan – in parallel to the GSM in Europe – DoCoMo was soon realizing – similarly and in parallel to Nokia on the Western Market—that mobile phones were emerging as something more than purely technological devices for instrumental purposes. There was a huge market demand in Japan too, waiting to express itself, for mobile phones as means of self-expression, symbolic and cultural artifacts. In a growing and democratizing market, where mobile phone penetration was progressing swiftly, a search for differentiation and self-expression emerged. Earlier models of consumption and use were constantly first challenged and then renewed, in particular by Japanese teenagers. And mobile phones soon became fashion items.

DoCoMo was as much the undisputed leader on the Japanese market as Nokia was on European and American markets. Both companies benefited from their positions as first movers with superior access to knowledge and data on the market. And soon, both Nokia and DoCoMo became exemplary symbols of the power of fashion in the future of mobile telephony. Their success meant that they soon became benchmarks and imitation led to the spread of the fashion logic among mobile handset producers.

In the West, following the successful models of Nokia and DoCoMo, Motorola or Ericsson were among the first to jump on the bandwagon of fashion. Motorola rehauled its product portfolios in mobile phones in the late 1990s according to what it called "lifestyle" categories. Ericsson, traditionally strong in the construction of telecom networks, teamed up with the Japanese Sony, who had had a string of "hits" in launching new products in and around consumer electronics. Challenger firms and new entrants such as the Asian handset producers, Samsung, LG and TCL made fashion their business model starting in the early 2000s and have explored that path ever since.

During the same period, the German company Siemens went quite far towards the systematic articulation and instrumentalization of fashion logics. In 2003, it launched the Xelibri line that "invents the fashion accessory phone category". Xelibri products were presented as "fashion accessories that make phone calls". Siemens marketed those phones as fashion items, with two collections per year, one in the spring and one in the fall. For its Xelibri phones, Siemens targeted unlikely diffusion channels in the world of mobile telephony – such as department stores or fashion retailers. This move by Siemens was radical and extreme; in that Siemens had built its reputation on technical and technological prowess. Siemens was a German electrical engineering giant that had branched out into communication and telephony. It was famous until the early 2000s for a good mix in its mobile handset division between technological sophistication, on the one hand, and price, on the other (Kaufmann, 2003). In the "old model", phones had been technological artifacts and as such closely associated with the German engineering spirit and tradition so characteristic of Siemens. In contrast, Xelibri revealed a profound transformation of logics – in the world ahead, phones were going to be essentially about self-expression, symbolic representation and aesthetic emotions. Siemens managers talked about "changing the world" – and what they meant essentially was a profound transformation of rules of the game in that industry.

Naturally, although Siemens was feeling like a pioneer, the story of Nokia (and we could add DoCoMo) shows that Xelibri was not so much a radical reinvention of mobile telephony as one step further towards the institutionalization of a fashion logic that had had an impact for some years already in that industry. The trigger behind Siemens's bold move was a combination of two market features. First, Western mobile phone markets were moving quickly towards saturation – everybody would soon have a mobile phone. Second, Siemens had had trouble imposing itself on those saturated markets. Siemens was a challenger on a nearly saturated market with a market share of 8% during the early 2000s and with that market share Siemens appeared to have reached a cap. The literature tells us that in such a situation, bold moves and risk taking make sense and might in fact be the only way to break out of the status quo (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Stearns & Allan, 1996; Jones, 2001). While the transposition of fashion logics into mobile telephony owed a lot until then to chance encounters and smart but intuitive reactions to opportunities, George Appling, project leader for Xelibri, was about to strategically push the transposition to an extreme. He was about to don the mantel of the rational and strategic "institutional entrepreneur".

Before he had accepted this challenge, Appling had been working for Siemens as a consultant for McKinsey, a company that had also consulted with Nokia and Vertù. Appling had been a specialist, at McKinsey, of the telecoms industry and naturally he was well aware of the trends and evolutions within that industry. He had noticed, in particular, that the fashion logic had already made significant inroads in the industry and, undeniably, Nokia's experience with fashion inspired him (Kaufmann, 2003). Appling also knew that those inroads, although real, were not yet recognized or acknowledged as such by the majority of actors in the organizational field. His bet was that the rational and systematic appropriation and exploitation of the fashion logic and its explicit transposition as a business model in the field of mobile telephony could be a value-creating proposition for Siemens. It could represent for that company a new kind of differentiation strategy, with potentially an interesting and positive impact on sales figures and market share.

To build up his team, Appling brought in new recruits with a background in fashion or design. The explicit strategy was to create and sell "fashion accessories that make phone calls". Aesthetic emotion and the symbolic representations associated with design and branding were thus key. Technology had to be there but it should be no more than a transparent medium. Its place was in the background, as a mere facilitator of the communication and symbolic experience. Appling considered brand building, symbolic production and marketing as key core competences, to be kept in-house, while all the rest, the entire physical side of the business, could be outsourced (Kaufmann, 2003). The optimal approach to brand building was clearly a concern. Rapidly, it was decided that classical advertising strategies would not be satisfactory. A fashion adviser explained to Appling that "in the fashion industry, brands are not imposed on the consumer; they are found". This fashion consultant went on, suggesting that "if you want to build a brand that stands on solid ground, you will need to use a more grassroots type of approach. You need people with influence in the fashion industry to believe in your brand and to spread your name by word of mouth. Their lifestyle will then be copied by other people" (Kaufmann, 2003). Charles Frederick Worth would probably not have disagreed!

Transforming phones into fashion accessories opened the door on a mass scale to the possibility of ownership of a phone on an almost disposable basis. If that was indeed going to happen, design not only had to be radically different; it also had to be constantly renewed. The Xelibri team timed product launches according to the rhythms of the fashion industry, with two collections per year articulated around overarching themes. Price positioning was upscale but not outrageous as had been the case with Vertù – Xelibri phones hovered between €200 and €400. Each model was designed to be sold for 1 year only. While cycles indeed were short, volumes were to be large. To minimize the risks associated with this strategy, Appling seized upon what had been another intuition of Charles Frederick Worth many years before in a very different industry – modularity and mass customization. The idea was to build every Xelibri model around the same core technology or platform with a different configuration of modules. If a model did not sell, chips and parts could be used for another, thus reducing waste and limiting costs.

Siemens, however, ran into the limits of pushing fashion logics to their extreme. In that, the experience appears to share similarities with that of Vertú. The venture as a whole proved extremely costly and sales did not materialize on the expected scale. One must admit that the ambitions of having two collections per year and four new models each time were quite bold. By the end of 2003 already, Siemens was selling Xelibri phones in discount supermarkets and on the German Amazon website at significantly reduced prices. At the same time, the company was taking writedowns for unsold inventory. As a consequence, Siemens announced in May 2004 that it was dropping Xelibri operations. Interestingly, at the very same time, Siemens confirmed that it would nonetheless continue to target the fashion segment – but that it would do so principally under the Siemens brand (Dow Jones, 2004).

One could read the Xelibri story as a story of failure or one could read it, as we think it should probably be done, as a story showing in fact a fair degree of institutionalization of fashion logics within the mobile phone industry by then. As it turns out, Siemens phones had themselves evolved significantly in the recent period, with respect in particular to design. The Siemens SL55, a phone that slides open, "had featured recently in many fashion shows", according to a Siemens' spokesman. Dropping the Xelibri brand could simply mean that Siemens management had now recognized that the fashion potential was already in the Siemens phones and that the costly launch of a separate brand was not anymore necessary.

Interestingly, while Siemens was giving up the Xelibri brand, the Korean handset producer Samsung was systematizing and rationalizing its inscription in a fashion business model. In October 2004, Samsung announced together with the fashion magazine *Vogue* a co-marketing partnership. Samsung and *Vogue* were to combine their engineering, design and marketing clout to create a "couture" category of mobile phones under the Samsung brand (Rheingold, 2004).

The Fashion Logic Spills Over: Orange and Network Operators

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, mobile handset manufacturers thus began, one after the other and across the board, to appropriate symbolic production, short cycles and mass customization; hence, progressively appropriating fashion logics. Things moved along also among network developers and operators, interestingly in a quite disconnected manner, at least at the beginning. Mobile phone penetration was approaching saturation in Western markets; price competition was increasing among network operators and service providers. It became clear that growth would there also depend on finding and exploiting new strategies. Orange plc, an outsider that entered the British market as late as 1994, showed the way. Orange found itself then in a situation quite similar to that of Siemens as we have described it above. Disrupting a stable market situation where Orange was a latecomer would require taking risks. This is what Orange did by bringing symbolic production and fashion into network operations. In that, Orange was a pioneer.

Orange plc was born in the United Kingdom in 1994 as an internal start-up venture nurtured by Hutchinson Whampoa, one of Asia's biggest conglomerates. The Canadian Hans Snook was the leading man in that project. Orange entered the scene as the fourth British mobile operator on a rather dull market, behind Cellnet (associated with British Telecom), Vodafone and a recent entrant called One2One. Orange was a challenger – and a weak one at that. In that context, taking risks was probably the best bet. Hence, from the start, Orange chose a bold strategy. Snook and his team positioned Orange as "more than just another mobile phone company". They defined Orange as a "promise deliverer". The vision of the future, the Orange "promise" was that of a world where tiny wireless phones would be able to carry out all kinds of necessary transactions for the customer. The service would not be just a handset but the customer's ticket to a convenient, wire-free world that would provide all her communications. Orange would become a "life-management system" and thus Orange would "change the world". The customer should be able, in the process, to liberate herself from logistical constraints, geographical boundaries as well as from the tyranny of technology. The time and energy that was thus saved could be used for essential processes, such as "self-creation and recreation" and "enhanced and unmediated communication between people".

The key in the Orange promise, hence, was not technology but service and adaptation to the needs of the customers. In the Orange vision, mobile phones would become gateways for all manners of media and business transactions. In time, Orange should as a consequence become a mobile-internet access provider and a content developer or, at least, a mediator and a broker bringing together various content providers. In the words of Hans Snook, "Our competitors were only interested in technology and handsets. We took in consideration the needs and dreams of the client". Snook communicated that, as a "life-management system", Orange would, in the near future, offer its customers a vast and rapidly adapting menu of standardized options, contents and transaction opportunities, from which a customer could pick and choose according to her needs and dreams. The idea was modularity – and in a sense again mass customization combined with short cycles. Orange had to be always slightly ahead of the trends, in a constant and dynamic quest for evolving needs. The key was to feel and intuit where customers were headed next and to make that step not only possible but also desirable. The vast – but limited number of options made it possible to combine standardized units, hence reasonable costs, with a feeling for the customer of a unique and fully personalized experience.

Orange defined itself as the customer champion. Ultimately, the business promise was about "creating a better world", not in any general or messianic sense but simply for each and every customer out there. From early on, Hans Snook and his team worked together with Wolff Olins – a London and New York-based design brand consultancy – as well as with WCRS – the ad agency – to adjust the brand to the business promise, and vice versa. Orange ad campaigns never featured a phone. Campaigns were there, it seems, to illustrate and reflect the brand – which itself was an expression of the culture of the firm and of its values. Both expressed in a symbolic manner freedom, innovation, fun, simplicity and an optimistic – "orange" – vision of the future… . "A Bright Future" was the Orange mantra. Quite rapidly in the mid-1990s the Orange ads became something of a phenomenon and Orange handsets became the fashion accessories of the moment in Britain. To set itself apart from its rivals and competitors, Orange sponsored cultural events such as the Orange Prize for Fiction that soon became prestigious. Orange kept the buzz going with the launch of the "O" magazine and the purchase of Ananova Ltd, an interactive web site of Ananova, the green-eyed, green-haired cyber girl who became known by many as the world's first digital newscaster.

The promise that came with the Orange brand resonated with aspirations in large parts of the British population. The marketing around this promise turned into brand development – without doubt the most significant strategic activity in and for Orange. Orange made itself into the fastest growing operator in Britain, taking over One2One, and soon taking third place in the

British mobile operator market. Already in the first year from 1994 to 1995, Orange's sales exploded. Sales tripled in 1996 when owners floated Orange on the stock exchange. Affiliates sprung up in Austria, Belgium and Switzerland. Hutchinson licensed the Orange name for networks in Australia, Hong Kong and Israel. Altogether, the Orange brand appeared to resonate wherever it was brought in. France Telecom acquired Orange in 2000 and in the process Orange became one of the leading European-wide network operators.

Incumbent network operators on the British market reacted with some delay but after a while they ended up jumping on the bandwagon. Vodafone, for example, started to focus on brand promotion in the early 2000s. "Brand is a very big issue for [Vodafone]… . When you think about fast food, you think of McDonald's. When you think about a soft drink, you think of Coke…[when you think of] mobile product and services…go to Vodafone" (Financial Times, 2003). The intent was to increase Vodafone's purchasing power with manufacturers of mobile handsets in order to orchestrate their actions so that they would serve Vodafone's brand strategy. Vodafone worked with Asian manufacturers, willing to compromise on their own product identity and to work towards an identifiable Vodafone "look and feel". Vodafone was determined to move towards a more centralized and coordinated product development, marketing, branding and sales across different territories. The corporate size of Vodafone and its geographic scope meant that when Vodafone moved it could create a wave in the world of network operators; it could, in fact, potentially steer the course of the field as a whole.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The transposition of fashion logics in the field of mobile telephony has undeniably made considerable progress in recent years. In an industry where technological sophistication and price traditionally were two dominant mechanisms in the competitive game, the fashion business model quite clearly and rapidly imposed itself. In the process, it significantly transformed the nature both of rules of the game and of the industry.

The Impact of the Transposition of Logics on the Mobile Telephony Industry

Every year, all actors that play a role in the field of mobile telephony gather for the annual GSM World Congress in Cannes until 2005 and in Barcelona after that. This Congress is the annual high point for the organizational field – a big "mass" where trends are discovered, celebrated and institutionalized. In 2004, for the first time, fashion was given prime of place during that Congress. A "fashion show" was organized as a keynote moment to celebrate, in the words of the organizers, the "convergence between technology and self-expression". The rationale for organizing such an event was that "more than just a technology, mobile communication has become a dynamic catalyst for combining Fashion, Function and Fun" (GSM World Congress, 2004, 2005). This, clearly, was a sign that fashion logics had not only made inroads in the field of mobile telephony but had also imposed themselves as structuring frame and business model for that industry. The fashion show was featuring "hot new mobile, wearables, garment gizmos, jazzed up jewellery and electronically energized fashion accessories" (ibid).

The introduction of fashion logics in the mobile telephony industry has thus clearly had an impact on the competitive make-up and identity of that industry. Among handset producers, in particular, the competitive fight has undeniably become more intense and it has increasingly hinged upon the capacity to play the fashion game. The difficulty is not only to make fashion but also to stay in fashion (Les Echos, 2004). In that respect, the dynamics of competition have clearly heightened with the introduction of fashion logics. It is interesting to go back, in this context, to the case of Nokia's breakthrough in the mid-1990s. Originally a challenger, Nokia made significant inroads by realizing and then exploiting the potential of fashion logics in the mobile telephony industry. Using fashion logics as a source of competitive advantage, Nokia managed to grab market share in the process and impose itself as a dominant market player. However, by opening the transposition of logics path, Nokia also unleashed in retrospect dynamics of competition that would come, in time, to play against itself. Competitors were quick to jump on the bandwagon, and the progressive institutionalization of fashion logics in the mobile telephony industry made it all the easier for challengers to impose themselves. Fashion, after all, was about renewal and what is more, constant renewal. By 2004, Nokia had been taken up at its own game, in a sense. In April of that year, the stock value of the Korean company Samsung was higher than that of Nokia (Les Echos, 2004). This reflected the fact that design at Nokia had tended to rigidify and become more static in recent years. It was not reactive enough to consumer demand – in spite of the strategy of "interaction" described above. On the other hand, challengers – both old (Sony-Ericsson or Motorola) or new (Samsung or the Chinese companies TCL and LG) – were on their toes, offering constant design innovation and apparently in closer synergy with market evolutions and changing consumer demand. This does not mean, however, that Nokia cannot come back strongly – as in fact recent signs seem to show (Les Echos, 2004; Libération, 2004). It does show, nevertheless, that an organizational field where fashion logics play a role is bound to be particularly fluid and dynamic.

The spread and institutionalization of fashion logics in the mobile telephony industry is certainly real, as we have tried to show in this paper. It has, on the whole, meant a combination of symbolic production, short cycles and mass customization. At the same time, through the juxtaposition of different cases, we document that the appropriation and expression of fashion logics can vary significantly from case to case. The appropriation by Vodafone, for example, has been significantly different from the appropriation – at the other extreme – by Vertú or Xelibri. In the latter two cases, Vertú and Xelibri, the referent has clearly been high or luxury fashion. Vertú positioned itself in parallel to *Haute Couture*, while Xelibri was closer to luxury fashion – with a high but more affordable price range and a mass customization strategy rather than a unique "work of art" approach (Djelic & Ainamo, 1999). For Vodafone, Orange or even Nokia, on the other hand, the referent has rather been mass fashion. In the cases of Vertú and Xelibri, furthermore, the objective with the transposition of fashion logics was quite extreme – ultimately, the idea was to displace entirely the pre-existing technological logic. Phones as technological devices were to disappear and be displaced by the concept of phones as objects of adornment and self-expression. In the other cases we have talked about, displacement was less extreme – leaving room for the hybridization of technological and fashion logics.

From where we stand now, and without prejudging too much of future evolutions in the medium to long term, it seems that the second type of transposition – the less extreme one or the hybrid one – has been the most successful. It does seem that customers still consider their phone a phone – that is, a tool for communication – to which they want to add a measure of self-expression. The jump to considering phones purely as accessories or merely as means of adornment for purposes of stylistic or symbolic self-expression has not (yet?) been taken fully. For now at least, the transposition of fashion logics into the field of mobile telephony has not meant a full displacement of the previously dominant technological logic but rather a hybridization of technological and fashion logics. In parallel, fashion logics have spread in mobile telephony in different forms and, in that industry, strategies of mass fashion have tended to be more profitable than strategies of high fashion, here again at least until now.

Mobile Telephony as Cultural Industry?

This latter finding should be related to a general trend that has been transforming the garment and accessories industries as a whole (Horowitz, 1975; Crane, 1997; Djelic & Ainamo, 1999). At the high end of that industry, *Haute Couture*, in its craft and "unique work of art" understanding, has progressively receded over the past 15 years or so (Economist, 2004). The model of "luxury ready-to-wear", implying a significant degree of mass customization, has imposed itself instead. At the very same time, the garment and accessories industries have been swamped by mass fashion brands – that use the trilogy of symbolic production, mass customization and short cycles. Those mass brands have taken over the sophisticated tools of branding in manners often quite similar to what was happening in "luxury ready-to-wear". At the same time, luxury brands have increasingly turned towards mass strategies in production and distribution. As a consequence, the gap between mass and luxury fashion has in general been significantly reduced. To illustrate that, some have made direct comparisons between the Spanish mass brand Zara and the Italian luxury ready-to-wear Gucci (Economist, 2004).

As pioneered by Worth, the fashion business model had revealed an important tension. On the one hand, symbolic production in that period had an "elite" dimension. The world Worth had been creating made reference to royal history, high arts and to aristocratic ways of life. At the very same time, C.F. Worth was a pioneer, in the garment industry, for seizing upon the opportunities created both by industrialization and an expanding *bourgeoisie*. The fashion business model, in the 19th century and C.F. Worth sense of the term, was thus oscillating between elite and mass logics. One could argue, in fact, that both the *Haute Couture* and mass fashion or branding lay, as potentials, in the business model pioneered by C.F. Worth. In the garment industry, *Haute Couture* had its heyday and period of dominance during the first half of the 20th century (Grumbach, 1993). Ever since the 1950s, the story of that industry has been one where *Haute Couture* has progressively been losing steam and significance, while luxury fashion has been exploding and being increasingly relayed by mass fashion or branding – both displaying parallel features and mechanics (Crane, 1997; Djelic & Ainamo, 1999; Economist, 2004).

Starting in the mid-1990s, the transposition of fashion logics to the mobile telephony industry corresponded to a period when, in the garments industry, fashion increasingly had a mass dimension, including within the luxury segment. It is therefore not so surprising that a venture such as Vertú, which positioned itself with *Haute Couture* as a referent, was not a big success.

Fashion in mobile telephony essentially means symbolic production with a mass dimension and within an industrial logic – hence the importance of mass customization that we have underscored. The transposition of that particular understanding of fashion logics into the mobile telephony industry means that this industry is moving closer to becoming a "cultural industry", where "products are tailored for consumption by masses…manufactured more or less according to plan" (Adorno, 1975).

Changing Rules of the Game and the Transposition of Logics: Some Conclusions

The stories we have told amount, altogether, to a significant transformation of the rules of the game within the mobile telephony industry. As a consequence, what we have shown and said above is pertinent in part to the debates on and around institutional change – where institutions are understood to be the structural and normative rules of the game in a particular field or sphere of action or interaction (Djelic & Quack, 2003). We document in this paper what can be characterized as a relatively successful transposition of logics. From the empirical material presented here, we draw a set of theoretical hypotheses on the nature, mechanics and limits of institutional change or change in rules of the game. A number of those hypotheses resonate with recent findings (Djelic & Quack, 2003; Thornton, 2004). They ought nevertheless to be tested further in different empirical settings.

Conditions and Actors of Change

The stories told above undeniably show the role and importance of organizational or individual initiatives and drives in the process of changing or transforming logics (Di Maggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Garud et al., 2002). A few men at Nokia, Orange or Xelibri had in time a significant impact on the mobile telephony industry as a whole. Our evidence tends to confirm that innovation and the readiness to break the rules are generally associated with a challenger position (see also Leblebici et al., 1991; Jones, 2001; Ainamo, 2005) and/or with a situation of internal crisis (see also Djelic, 1998) – and may even be more probable when there is a combination of both. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis relative to the conditions in which change and innovation is more likely to emerge:

> **Hypothesis 1.** A combination of challenger position and internal crisis will make readiness to break the rules and thus innovation more likely.

Our evidence also seems to suggest that early innovators may differ quite significantly from later adopters. In particular, and in partial contrast to what can be found in the flourishing literature on institutional entrepreneurship, we propose that the concept of "institutional entrepreneur" may fit better in fact late adopters than early innovators. Our cases show that, at the beginning of the transposition process, chance and partly "blind" or intuitive, reaction played an extremely important role. There was no strategizing at that stage and hence, one could argue, little "institutional entrepreneurship", at least in the sense in which that concept is generally used in the literature (Di Maggio, 1988; Sewell, 1992; Fligstein, 1997; Garud et al., 2002). The transposition of logics has been an important mechanism for institutional change in our stories. Yet, this transposition has not been, at least in its early stages, the reflection of a purposeful and conscious move by strategic entrepreneurs.

Rather, what we find in the story of the transposition of fashion logics to the mobile telephony industry is that pioneers and innovators were those who were able to feel, in a very intuitive manner, evolutions in their environment and to let themselves in a certain sense be manipulated by those evolutions. We probably need to invent a label, different from the "institutional entrepreneur" label, to refer to those pioneers. A rational and systematic strategy of transposition was only to be found later with, as it were, the next generation of initiatives. Innovators or pioneers spark new logics by muddling through, while institutional entrepreneurs diffuse logic by conscious strategy and manipulation.[1] As a consequence, we propose the following hypotheses, bearing on actors of change:

Hypothesis 2a. Early pioneers and innovators may be moved more by a combination of intuition and chance than by a rational strategy of transposition and innovation.

Hypothesis 2b. Late adopters will be more likely than pioneers and innovators to adopt a rational and systematic strategy of transposition and innovation.

The Pace of Institutional Change

The empirical material presented in this paper tends to show that the transposition of fashion logics into the field of mobile telephony has been quite progressive. We outline, in fact, a process with several stages and layers – some being closely connected, others less. There is no radicality in the process we document – one logic, one day; another one, the next (for extensive discussions of punctuated equilibria models of change see Quack &

Djelic, 2005; Djelic & Quack, 2005). Rather, we show that each step, each stage needed and built upon the previous one in an incremental manner. There was, in fact, a multiplicity of impact points through which fashion logics progressed, at different moments, towards the mobile telephony industry. In the end, though, the transformation that took place with respect to the rules of the game in the industry was quite significant. The transposition of logics was an incremental and cumulative process but with a consequential impact (see also Djelic & Quack, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Ainamo & Tienari, 2002).

In the early period, the first signs of a transposition of logics emerged in a rather disconnected and nevertheless parallel manner at Nokia, DoComo or Orange. A second stage opened when direct competitors of those lead actors started imitating them – thus spreading fashion logics more broadly within the mobile telephony field. The story then became a rather classic one of diffusion (Rogers, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) – implying both direct imitation and indirect mediation through professional consultants and the relay of the press.

Finally, a third stage – still very much in the making – is one of field level consolidation and institutionalization of fashion logics. What used to be maverick practices, reflecting structuring logics foreign to the field, are progressively legitimated, as fashion logics spread and transform the rules of the game in the field as a whole. The fashion show at the 2004 GSM World Congress was, for example, a symbolic sign that the industry was entering this third stage.

From those conclusions, we draw another hypothesis, this time on the pace of institutional change:

> **Hypothesis 3.** One path to institutional change is through the progressive aggregation of multiple and sometimes minor changes in organizational practices and in the behaviours of actors in a given field.

The Limits of Transposition

The transposition of fashion logics in the field of mobile telephony came, we find, in two types. Analytically, we can separate between "cut and paste" attempts at transposition (i.e. Vertú and Xelibri) and initiatives leading instead to a degree of hybridization with the previously dominant technological logic (i.e. Nokia and Orange). On the whole, the "cut and paste" attempts tended to be associated with a conscious and highly rationalized strategy. On the other hand, the hybridization stories reflected more of a step-by-step, intuitive and bricolage-like path threading.

Interestingly, we also find that the "cut and paste" attempts, those that purported to stay closer to fashion logics as found in the garment industry, proved on the whole quite unsuccessful – if not outright failures. From where we stand, we would tend to argue that transposition with hybridization has been in fact more stable and longer lasting. Transposition with hybridization, in the case of mobile telephony at least, meant that the pre-existing technological logic was not entirely displaced but that it accommodated and became associated with fashion logics, and was transformed in the process.

On the limits of transposition, we thus propose the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a. A "cut and paste" transposition of logics, albeit enticing, may be less stable than a transposition with hybridization.

Hypothesis 4b. "Cut and paste" transposition may be particularly complex and unstable during the early stages of the transposition process, when the existing dominant logic still appears strong.

The transposition process we describe, although quite advanced, is nevertheless still in the making. Hence, we admit the limits of those conclusions and wonder, in particular, how valid they will remain in the longer term. Hybridization could be an intermediary stage in the process of transposition and fashion logics could come to impose themselves in a "purer" form once, for example, consumers become progressively accustomed to treating their phones as fashion and self-expression accessories. This could mean, as a consequence, that the "failure" of Vertu or Xelibri would be all relative. Both, in fact, could then be seen in retrospect as pioneers and innovators well ahead of their time – and in fact misunderstood for that reason.

NOTES

1. This formulation was suggested to us by the editors.

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CHARTING GENDER: THE SUCCESS OF FEMALE ACTS IN THE U.S. MAINSTREAM RECORDING MARKET, 1940–1990

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ABSTRACT

Research on creative workers speaks to the relative lack of job opportunities available, the role that changing production logics play in shaping such opportunities, and gender disparities in success. Tracking 22,561 hits found on Billboard's mainstream charts, we examine various factors that may spur or hamper the success of female recording acts. We find that the expanding logic of decentralized production eliminates the negative effect of concentration on the success of female acts and that the presence of successful female acts in one period bodes well for subsequent female acts, until a glass ceiling of sorts is reached.

INTRODUCTION

Research that addresses creative workers (e.g., authors, musicians) in media industries reveals a number of patterns, of which we mention a few. First,

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relatively few individuals enjoy success in terms of employment and/or contracts with media firms, as the pool of potential workers frequently exceeds the actual number of positions available (see Menger, 1999), and fewer still enjoy success in terms of career longevity. Of the 1,048 fiction authors that published their first book in the U.S. during 1940, 1955, or 1970 – more than half never published a second book, and only eight published 50 or more books (Ekelund & Börjesson, 2002). Of the 1,078 directors of films released in the U.S. from 1965 to 1980 – more than half never directed a second film, and only six directed ten or more films (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987). Second, a range of factors – which are not reducible to the individual worker – exacerbates such disparities in success, including assumptions regarding the capabilities of women. In nascent media industries, for instance, women achieved prominence in certain types of creative work – by comprising a sizable number of novelists in the early 1800s, by editing the groundbreaking *Ladies Home Journal* in the late 1800s, and by constituting a notable portion of screenwriters for silent films in the early 1900s. However, as these industries prospered and as business operations were formalized, women were often relegated to limited tasks that were now deemed suitable for feminine sensibilities (e.g., writing "women's films") while the creative work that they formerly pursued was largely re-defined as the purview of men – and would be so defined for decades to come (Bielby & Bielby, 1996; Damon-Moore & Kaestle, 1991; Tuchman, 1989).

Finally, changing production logics in media industries shape how such success unfolds for creative workers. By a contested process, for example, the early film industry went from a logic of exploiting technology – such as gaining competitive advantage via patents and releasing films that merely showed the novelty of the medium (e.g., short snippets of physical activity) – to a logic of exploiting content, whereby films with extended narrative plots, multiple camera angles, and close-ups became common. With this shift in logics, actors went from being nameless participants to "stars" around which films were constructed and marketed. Consequently, career opportunities changed markedly for film actors, including the amount of money that they earned (Jones, 2001; Kerr, 1990).

We add to this research on creative workers by examining longitudinally the success of female performing acts in the U.S. mainstream recording market. In doing so, we also speak to a growing literature in the social sciences and humanities that addresses the opportunities that women face in music. Historically, women have encountered barriers that men did not, ranging from differentially distributed resources to gender stereotypes (e.g., Bayton, 1998; Macleod, 1993). For example, the association of masculinity with both musical genius and the playing of certain musical instruments placed women at a relative disadvantage by casting them as interlopers in composition and performance (e.g., DeNora, 1995, 2002; Walser, 1993). Despite these historical barriers, however, a strand of scholarship shows that women persisted in music-making, though not in as visible a fashion as their male counterparts (e.g., Citron, 1993; Rohlfing, 1996; Tucker, 2000). Moreover, another strand of research shows that women musicians have made recent inroads – enjoying expanded opportunities, for example, as instrumentalists in orchestras and rock bands (e.g., Allmendinger & Hackman, 1995; Clawson, 1999). This paper, then, highlights factors that account for changing opportunities of female musicians in a specific setting – with a critical factor being a shift in production logics.

This paper proceeds in several broad sections. It begins by describing the context of our study. It next turns to factors that could account for the aggregate success of female acts in this market. Drawing on scholarship that ranges from organizational sociology to social movement theory, we glean hypotheses regarding *general* factors at work in media markets (e.g., shifting production logics) and we control for the impact of specific *historical* factors (e.g., the flourishing of the women's movement). By attending to this range of factors, we take seriously the point made by Keith Negus (1999): the recording industry obviously produces culture in the music that it offers, yet its production is also shaped by the cultural environment in which it is located.

The final section of the paper empirically tests our hypotheses. We track the 22,561 recordings found on *Billboard's* mainstream charts from 1940 to 1990, documenting the quarterly number of these hits by female performing acts. We then use Poisson regression to assess which factors significantly predict such success by female acts across this 50-year span. Beyond contributing to the literature on creative workers and complementing interdisciplinary scholarship on women and music-making, the present results build on a companion study addressing the success of African-American performers in the mainstream market (Dowd & Blyler, 2002).

WOMEN AND THE MAINSTREAM RECORDING MARKET

The mainstream is the oldest and largest market in the U.S. recording industry, encompassing a variety of musical styles and performer types over its many years of existence (Dowd, 2003); the collective success of women performers in this market, while sometimes impressive, has often been limited, if not sporadic, when compared to that of male performing acts. In the early 1900s, the songs of Tin Pan Alley composers (e.g., Irving Berlin, George Gershwin) dominated the mainstream market (Garofalo, 1997; Pessen, 1985). This stylistic dominance continued into the 1940s, when big bands and their vocalists (both male and female) included such songs in their repertoires. Women typically did not appear as instrumentalists with big bands (Tucker, 2000), serving instead as "canaries" who were "beautifully coiffed and made up, costumed in an elegant gown" (Hoke, 1991, p. 259). However, this elaborate physical presentation did not extend to musical arrangements; as DeVeaux (1988) suggests in one account, female singers provided the basic melody as male instrumentalists created complex arrangements and improvisations.

A number of changes occurred in the mainstream market from the 1940s onward. The ongoing success of "crooners" (e.g., Frank Sinatra) and the emergence of "cowboys" (e.g., Gene Autry) further legitimized male vocalists, thus encroaching on one of the few musical roles in which women potentially achieved prominence (Dickerson, 1998; see McCracken, 1999). Still, female vocalists who were once associated with big bands sometimes retained their popularity into the 1950s, long after the popularity of these bands had waned. Though not always enjoying mainstream success to the extent of their male counterparts who had likewise originated with big bands (e.g., Bing Crosby, Perry Como), the now-solo vocalists included such prominent performers as Doris Day, Ella Fitzgerald, Peggy Lee, Kay Starr, and Margaret Whitting (see Garofalo, 1997; Hamm, 1979). These women were soon joined in the mainstream by a new cohort of female vocalists, including soloists (e.g., Teresa Brewer, Connie Francis, Brenda Lee) and "sister" groups (e.g., DeCastro Sisters, Lennon Sisters, McGuire Sisters) (Gaar, 1992). From the mid-1950s onward, however, the explosion of rock music in the mainstream market arguably hampered the success of female vocalists, as this genre was (and still is) largely defined as the domain of men (see Clawson, 1993; Walser, 1993). Against that backdrop, the 1960s saw the rise of a particular type of "girl group" that stressed tight vocal harmonies and choreographed appearance (Cyrus, 2003). Hirshey (2001, p. 50) explains that in the wake of "congressional payola scandals and parental backlash" that accompanied the rise of rock music, the recording industry responded "…tinkered with a formula for mass-market success: fewer moving parts on stage, lots of well-crafted hooks and cute, carbonated lyrics." The Shirelles demonstrated the formula's success in 1961, topping the mainstream charts and paving the way for such girl groups as the Chiffons, Dixie Cups, and

Shangri-Las (Bradby, 1990; Gaar, 1992). The ultimate demise of the this girl group phenomenon is sometimes attributed to the British Invasion, when music with a strictly vocal emphasis was unable to compete with the electric guitars of groups like The Beatles (Bayton, 1998).

Shifting stylistic tendencies continued through the end of the century, occasionally benefiting women performers. The folk revival of the 1960s created opportunities for some female performers, such as Joan Baez, Odetta, Judy Collins, and Joni Mitchell. However, even major festivals of the time (e.g., Monterey, Woodstock) presented fairly few women on their stages (Hirshey, 2001). In this male dominated scene, women were more frequently cast as backup singers or groupies (Dickerson, 1998). While the diffusion of R&B music into the mainstream market in the 1960s obviously benefited men performers (e.g. Stevie Wonder, Marvin Gaye), it also fostered the success of such women as The Supremes, Diana Ross, Aretha Franklin, and Dionne Warwick (see Dowd, 2003; Gaar, 1992; Ward, 1998). The feminist movement of the 1970s allowed women to see their participation in historically male endeavors – including music – as a political statement (Bayton, 1998). Nevertheless, all-women rock bands (e.g., Fanny, ISIS, and Birtha) enjoyed little to no mainstream success when encroaching on this decidedly masculine genre (Skinner, 2004). Instead, mainstream success mostly flowed to those female vocalists working on the edges of rock, such as the country-tinged work of Anne Murray, Olivia Newton-John, Helen Reddy, and Linda Ronstadt and the R&B influenced work of the Pointer Sisters and, on occasion, Sheena Easton (Gaar, 1992). As the 1970s gave way to the 1980s, the "glamour queens" of disco (Hirshey, 2001) recalled the "canaries" of the big band era (Hoke, 1991), while the emergence of punk and new wave music actively subverted gender norms and sometimes allowed women easier entry to music-making (Bayton, 1998; Clawson, 1999; Leblanc, 1999). The 1980s witnessed a brief revival of girl-groups – with this variant including female vocalists *and* instrumentalists (e.g., The Go-Go's, The Bangles) who achieved mainstream success (Hirshey, 2001). As the old century gave way to the new, divas with vocal dexterity benefited from the continued presence of R&B in the mainstream (e.g., Mariah Carey, Christina Aguillera), as did female rappers who also achieved mainstream success (e.g., Queen Latifah; see Emerson, 2002; Keyes, 2002).

Despite the periodic successes of female performers in the mainstream market, women have historically faced challenges in the industry. Production roles and other decision-making positions have been disproportionately filled by men (Bayton, 1998; Dickerson, 1998; Gaar, 1992; Parsons, 1988), leading to concerns about sexism. Women performers have been frequently construed as “novelty acts” (Bayton, 1998). This narrow definition leads to the clumping of disparate groups together and, in turn, affects the abilities of female performers to disseminate their music. For example,

> Ask a contemporary female performer about getting radio airplay and you'll hear the same story. “I can't put you into the rotation this week,” says the DJ in Anytown. “I've already added Alanis, Tori, Sarah, or *anyotherwoman*, so I can't add another.” The assumption behind this absurd argument is that women all occupy the same space in music, so why would you need two? The flawed logic doesn't end there. Not only does it restrict the number of women getting on radio playlists, but it's also why concert promoters feel that two women on the same touring bill is strictly *verboten* (Childerhose, 1998, p. 18).

Considering this obstacle-ridden environment leads us to question what factors are at work when women do overcome barriers and achieve success. The mainstream market thus provides an ideal setting in which to explore the intersection of gender and career at the aggregate level.

GENERAL FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR MAINSTREAM SUCCESS OF FEMALE ACTS

In this section, we mostly draw upon organizational sociology to detail general factors that longitudinally shape the mainstream success of female acts. While organizational sociology has not typically focused on women musicians, we show how it pertains to female acts in the aggregate. The general hypotheses that we derive thus complement the scholarship beyond organizational sociology that admirably documents the barriers (and opportunities) that have confronted specific female acts at particular points in time.

Concentration

When addressing the careers of creative workers, a common starting point is the impact of dominant firms. This starting point is conceptually reasonable. Proponents of the new institutionalism in organizational sociology (Scott, 1995) theorize that firms which dominate a given market also shape the manner in which the entire market operates (e.g., Fligstein, 1996). Media scholars similarly argue that dominant firms usually define the business environment that confronts both creative workers (e.g., Farrell, 1994; Peterson & Anand, 2002) and small firms (e.g., Lee, 1995; Miller, 1999). However, institutionalists and media scholars also point to the potentially tenuous position of dominant firms (e.g., Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991;

Powell, 1991). Various "shocks" to the market – including new competitors, new technologies, and/or new governmental regulations – can undermine the dominance of particular firms and create opportunities for other firms to attain dominance; when the latter occurs, the market now operates in a fashion dictated by newly dominant firms. This starting point is also empirically reasonable. Creative workers affiliated with dominant firms often enjoy more opportunities than those at small firms (e.g., Bielby & Bielby, 1999; Janssen, 1998), and the ascendance of newly dominant firms can expand opportunities for some creative workers (Dowd, 2003; Jones, 2001).

A noteworthy literature brings together these conceptual and empirical issues by examining the impact of "concentration" – the extent to which a few firms dominate a given market – on a variety of outcomes, including the careers of creative workers (e.g., Bielby & Bielby, 2003; Mezias & Mezias, 2000; Neiva, 1996). The seminal work of Peterson and Berger (1972, 1975) offers an important example, especially their examination of the rupture that occurred around 1955 when rock'n'roll and rhythm and blues (R&B) swept into the mainstream market. Note first the historical significance of this rupture. In its wake, once-dominant record firms ("majors") did not hold sway over the mainstream market; instead, a flood of small firms ("independents") enjoyed considerable success. Hence, RCA, Columbia, Decca, and Capitol saw their combined market share plummet as Atlantic, Chess, Dot and a host of other independents posed competitive challenges. Likewise, performing acts associated with the majors (e.g., Doris Day) lost their once-sizable advantage over those acts associated with independents (e.g., Gogi Grant). However, after grappling with this rupture for several years, the old-guard (e.g., RCA) and ascendant (e.g., Warner Bros.) majors eventually re-established dominance through a number of strategies, such as signing performers away from independents (e.g., Dion and the Belmonts) and signing unknown acts adept at rock music (e.g., The Beach Boys). From their vantage in the 1970s, Peterson and Berger (1975) expected that retrenched majors would eventually offer a limited variety of music and performers – especially when compared to the variety found in the mid-1950s.

The explanation that Peterson and Berger (1975) offer regarding this rupture stresses both "concentration" and "diversity" – with the latter referring to much variability among the market's firms (e.g., a large number of new recording firms), personnel (e.g., a sizable number of new acts), and content (e.g., an expansive range of lyrical themes). They argue that concentration and diversity are inversely related, with long periods of high concentration and low diversity occasionally ruptured by short periods of low concentration and high diversity. On the one hand, their argument draws on scholarship in industrial organization economics and media studies which notes that dominant firms tend toward conservatism and away from innovation because of constraints associated with large size (e.g., the red-tape of bureaucracy) and because they lack a credible challenge from competitors and, hence, can ignore consumer demand without fear of reprisal. This provides the basis for the inverse relationship that Peterson and Berger posit. On the other hand, they draw on scholarship in sociology concerning the cyclical nature of cultural production and on the history of the mainstream recording market. Based on such materials, they emphasize the confluence of factors that gave independents access to an audience whose demand was not met by the majors around 1955. For example, the propagation of specialist radio targeting teen tastes and the growing influence of disk jockeys helped independents prosper in a dramatic but short-lived fashion. This provides the basis for the longitudinal pattern that Peterson and Berger posit, wherein the mid-1950s and, to a lesser extent, the 1960s witnessed the flourishing of diversity.

Although Peterson and Berger (1975) do not explicitly consider the gender of performers, we suggest that the relative success of female acts is another appropriate indicator of diversity. Given the historical barriers that women have faced in the mainstream market, a burgeoning of female acts would indicate heightened diversity because of, at the very least, a greater heterogeneity among performers. Furthermore, Barbara Bradby (1990) argues that the rise of female acts in the 1960s can also heighten diversity with regards to content. Contrasting the "girl groups" of the 1960s with male rock bands, she makes the case that the relation between primary vocalists and background vocalists – as well as the organization and delivery of lyrics – was markedly different for these female acts. At a time when industry concentration had not returned to its highest levels (Peterson & Berger, 1975), groups like the Chiffons, Martha & the Vandells, Ronnettes, and Shirelles were expanding the range of content found among hit songs – doing so while based at independents rather than majors (Gillett, 1983). Brady (1990, p. 34) writes, "The equation of small with progressive and big with conservative can be easily overlaid with a gender analysis." If Peterson and Berger's (1975) argument holds, and if the success of female acts is an adequate measure of diversity – as Bradby's (1990) work suggests – then we should expect the following:

Hypothesis 1. Concentration has a negative effect on the success of female acts.

Production Logics

While some emphasize "concentration" in their consideration of firms that dominate a given market, a growing number of scholars emphasize the production logics by which firms operate – that is, "the cognitive maps, the belief systems carried by participants…guide and give meaning to their activities…" (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000, p. 20). In doing so, they problematize the treatment of firms found in some institutional and media scholarship, wherein the conservative nature of dominant firms is taken as given. In contrast, these scholars argue that the nature of firms *varies* rather than remains uniform; dominant firms may pursue drastically different logics in one period versus another. Patricia Thornton's (2001, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) work on higher education publishing provides a telling example. Prior to the mid-1970s, dominant firms in this US industry embraced an editorial logic that stressed, among other things, the prestige of the publishing house, the reputation of its editors, and the nurturing of authors. Under this logic, competition for resources had little or no bearing on the publishers' rate of executive turnover, their merger activity, and their adoption of the multidivisional form (MDF). From the mid-1970s onward, however, dominant firms in the industry embraced a market logic that stressed, among other things, return on investments, sophisticated marketing, and profitability. In the wake of this logic, resource competition has great bearing on executive succession, mergers, and MDF adoption. The "nature" of these dominant firms changed markedly as one logic gave way to another.

One line of argument within this growing literature is particularly relevant for this paper: the impact of concentration on various market outcomes – including the careers of media workers – is not uniform but, instead, is *contingent* upon logics of production (see Dobbin & Dowd, 2000; Dowd, 2003). A group of researchers demonstrates such contingent effects in the mainstream recording market. When assessing the applicability of Peterson and Berger's arguments for the 1970s and beyond, they find that diversity (e.g., number of new acts and firms, musical complexity) need not decline in the face of rising concentration (e.g., Burnett, 1992b; Dowd, 1992; Frith, 1988; Hellman, 1983). Lopes (1992) and Dowd (2004) reconcile these arguments with that of Peterson and Berger (1975) in the following manner: In the era described by Peterson and Berger (1975), dominant firms embraced a logic of centralized production; the majors relied on an extensive bureaucracy for production of recordings and simultaneously sought to quash the success of independents. High concentration levels resulted when majors succeeded and led to reduced diversity in the mainstream market. In a later era, however, dominant firms embraced a logic of decentralized production; the majors dismantled once-sizable bureaucracies by turning to freelance producers, establishing a host of subsidiary labels[1] and pursuing contractual alliances with numerous independents. The successful pursuit of this logic led to high concentration but not to low diversity. Indeed, diversity could now thrive amidst high concentration as majors seek to coopt an expanding range of performers and genres via this decentralization.

Recent work documents the diffusion of decentralized production in the mainstream market (Dowd, 2000, 2003, 2004; Dowd & Blyler, 2002). In the early 1940s, the era of centralized production was in full bloom and concentration was relatively high. Three majors (Columbia, Decca, and RCA Victor) accounted for all mainstream hits and 99% of all recorded music, and they faced few competitors. As the 1940s and early 1950s unfolded, however, a swarm of competitors entered the mainstream market. Capitol Records, for example, rose to the ranks of the majors by exploiting an innovative strategy at the time – providing radio DJs with free recordings for broadcast – while two others (with formidable parent companies) attained major status, MGM and Mercury. The new majors were joined by hundreds of independents – with many of the latter dealing in musical styles that lay beyond the purview of the majors (e.g., rock'n'roll, R&B). As the dominance of the majors declined, each took steps to address the emergent genres (and demand) that their centralized approach had mostly ignored. By 1955, each major had established subsidiary labels to target particular genres and/or audiences, thereby expanding and bolstering their range of music while decentralizing their respective organizations.

Decentralized production grew more pronounced in the years that followed – with each major presiding over a growing web of subsidiary labels and inter-firm alliances. Warner Brothers, for instance, began the 1960s with one label, but by the early 1990s, its operations spanned some 90 labels. In the latter period, it acquired Tommy Boy Records, a specialist in rap and dance music; its new subsidiary label, in turn, entered into a joint-venture with Stepson Records and contracted to distribute Ill Records and Living Large Records – thereby extending Warner's reach into rap and dance music. It made similar moves with alternative rock: its Atlantic subsidiary label distributed Interscope Records and entered joint-ventures with two other specialists, Mammoth and Matador (Davies, 1993; Hilburn & Philips, 1992; McAdams, 1992; Nathan, 1992). Because of this new logic, then, the majors are less conservative in their approach than they once were. The relative lack of bureaucracy – as well as freelance producers – helps limit the routinization of music-making found in the earlier era, while the web of labels and alliances help the majors pursue and coopt new musics and performers. While high levels of concentration are not necessarily desirable, their effects are more benign under the logic of decentralized, rather than centralized, production.

Decentralized production has implications for women musicians in the mainstream market. If the relative success of female acts is an indicator of diversity, then female acts will likely benefit from decentralized production, as have other indicators of diversity. For example, in an era where concentration increased dramatically – decentralized production facilitates a growing range of musical genres in various recording markets (Burnett, 1992a; Lopes, 1992; see also Hesmondhalgh, 1998) and heightens musical dissimilarity in the mainstream (Dowd, 2000). The expansion of decentralized production also spurs the number of new performing acts and recording firms entering the mainstream market, with high levels of decentralized production completely eliminating the negative impact of concentration (Dowd, 2004). Most notably, amidst rising concentration, the expansion of decentralized production also fosters the relative success of another group that has historically faced barriers in the mainstream market: African-American performers (Dowd & Blyler, 2002). It would not be surprising if women performers likewise enjoyed greater success as decentralized production expands. Some scholarship already hints at this pattern, noting that women performers from once-marginal genres have enjoyed mainstream success during an era when majors absorb such genres via their web of labels and alliances (see Clawson, 1999; Lont, 1992; Keyes, 2002). Gottlieb and Wald (1994, pp. 251–252) observe

> In the case of the bands, Hole, Babes in Toyland and L7…major-label contracts carry with them certain undeniable perks – like an audience of more than a few thousand people and enough money to concentrate exclusively on the production of new music…the signing of the three most recognizable 'angry women bands' to major labels may signal mainstream commercial acceptance of a new role for women in rock and, most optimistically, the beginnings of a new role for women.

If the argument regarding production logics holds, and if the success of female acts is an appropriate indicator of diversity, then the following should occur:

Hypothesis 2. The negative effect of concentration on the success of female acts is reduced by the expansion of decentralized production.

Legitimacy

Some approach the careers of creative workers by emphasizing the uncertainty entailed in the production of aesthetic goods (e.g., music, motion pictures) rather than the dominance of particular firms. Given that aesthetic goods do not typically address utilitarian needs, demand for them can be extremely difficult to predict (Hirsch, 1972, 2000). Many firms respond to this uncertainty by selecting creative workers who have attained success in the past (e.g., Bielby & Bielby, 1994; Faulkner, 1983) and workers who, in some fashion, resemble those who previously attained success (e.g., Baker & Faulkner, 1991; Grazian, 2003). Such a response allows firms to legitimate their actions (Bielby & Bielby, 1994).[2] That is, whether or not these creative workers will again succeed when given opportunities, firms can defend their selections by pointing to the track records of said personnel (see Jones, 2002). Nevertheless, some creative personnel can unexpectedly attain success, thereby altering which individuals and types will be selected and legitimated in the future (see Phillips & Owens, 2004; Watkins, 1998).

This approach to creative careers resonates with much organizational theory. Its portrayal of selection routines harks back to notions of bounded rationality: firm managers make decisions based on limited information searches rather than on gathering all possible information; they rely especially on information that has served them well in the past and do so until it proves ineffective (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963). The widespread use of these selection routines calls to mind institutional theory: firms in uncertain markets imitate the routines of their successful competitors, with extensive imitation giving way to taken-for-granted ways of operating; firms collectively rely on these institutionalized routines until an arguably "better" alternative comes along – as when new and unexpected successes undermine extant routines (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Finally, its treatment of legitimacy evokes an emphasis found in organizational ecology: legitimacy is not a dichotomous outcome, where it is either present or absent, but an outcome that rises and falls along a continuum (e.g., Dobbin & Dowd, 1997). Put another way, some "track records" are more legitimate than others.

The ecological emphasis on the waxing and waning of legitimacy is particularly useful for our purposes. Consider first the general argument. Ecologists describe a curvilinear pattern for the total number ("density") of market actors, whether these actors be firms or creative workers (e.g., Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Haveman, 2004). As a new type of actor emerges and increases in number, their growth is enabled by a market that is flush with relevant resources. Their initial growth thus denotes increasing legitimacy, as producers and consumers deem these actors to be acceptable (see also Scott, 1995). However, continuing growth can prove problematic. Once density reaches relatively high levels, the once-flush supply of resources is now divided among a large number of actors. As a result, relatively high density denotes competition rather than legitimacy.

Now consider the implications of the density argument. On the one hand, it nicely captures claims that the initial success of a few female acts paves the way for subsequent female acts by legitimating the market (and aesthetic) viability of women performers (e.g., Clawson, 1999; Gaar, 1992; Keyes, 2002; Lont, 1992). Accordingly, the impressive success of Jo Stafford, Patti Page, and the Andrews Sisters in the mainstream market of the 1940s and early 1950s (Hamm, 1979) should bode well for the subsequent success of female acts. On the other hand, the density argument also addresses the possible "glass ceiling" that women performers face because of stereotypes and biases that shape the selection process (e.g., Bayton, 1998; Parsons, 1988; Rohlfing, 1996). It suggests, in particular, that only a limited number of female acts can enjoy success in the mainstream market; when the total number crosses a certain threshold, a high number actually dampens subsequent opportunities for the mainstream success of female acts. This might explain, then, why the collective success of female acts in the 1940s and early 1950s (e.g., Stafford, Page) was later followed by the dearth of success described by Garofalo (1997, p. 14), "While some women were able to achieve a certain status as vocalists in the decades preceding the emergence of rock' n' roll…status could be achieved, disappeared rapidly with the advent of rock' n' roll. Indeed, rock 'n' roll actually reduced the presence of women in popular music." If the density argument holds for women performers, then we expect the following:

Hypothesis 3. The total number of female acts (density) has a curvilinear relationship with the subsequent success of female acts.

Legitimacy may flow from the most recent successes of creative workers rather than from the entire span of their careers (i.e., density). At the level of individual creative workers, for instance, Bielby and Bielby (1999) find that the latest success has more bearing on subsequent opportunities than does past success. Put another way, legitimacy has an "expiration date" of sorts in the selection process, as the track record of a creative worker is "only as good as [his/her] most recent hit" (Bielby & Bielby, 1999, p. 80). At the aggregate level of creative workers, organizational ecology provides an example of how to approach such short term legitimation (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997; Singh & Lumsden, 1990). Ecologists find that when a market is conducive to a particular type of actor (e.g., a new firm), then a rising number of these actors in one period will encourage comparable numbers in the subsequent period because eager producers and consumers provide a hospitable market for such actors. However, there are limits to this positive contagion: an excessively high number of actors in one time period may take resources away from subsequent actors, as producers and consumers are now sated with such actors. While comparable to the density argument, this contagion argument is nevertheless distinctive in its ability to capture the brief flurry of a particular type of actor in the market-place – a flurry that fades as quickly as it emerges.

Taking our cue from organizational ecology, we posit how short-term legitimation may unfold in the mainstream market. When recording industry personnel witness the current popularity of female performers, they may be willing to support and feature them in the immediate future. However, if personnel in the recording industry are not particularly enamored with female acts, which some scholarship suggests, then a high number of successful acts may have a backlash affect – leading to reduced efforts and, hence, lowered success for female acts in the future. Such short-term legitimation may underlie the faddishness described earlier in the paper, where particular types of female acts enjoy but a short bout of success, as was the case with the girl groups of the 1960s and the disco glamour queens of the 1970s. That is, the faddishness may stem from a contagion associated with the number of female acts rather than the ebb and flow of particular genres. This is comparable to Gillian Gaar's (1992, p. xiii) lament about a general pattern that transcends genre:

> When given the opportunity, women performers have proved again and again that they can sell records, but doubts about the ability of women artists to make records that people will actually want to buy remain – even today, managers relate that they still have trouble finding a record deal with companies who continue to claim "But we already have a girl singer."

If the legitimation that success offers is brief, then we expect the following to hold at the aggregate level:

Hypothesis 4. The previous success of female acts will have a curvilinear effect on the subsequent success of female acts.

HISTORICAL FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR MAINSTREAM SUCCESS OF FEMALE ACTS

The previous section details general factors that likely shape the careers of creative workers in a wide range of markets. However, existing scholarship also suggests that unique factors can operate within a specific market, shaping the careers of particular types of creative workers. In a previous study, for example, we find that the success of African-American performers in the mainstream market was hampered by *de facto* segregation of both the musician's union and radio airplay (Dowd & Blyler, 2002). While women musicians have not been hampered by such segregation, the literature does suggest other historical factors that may hinder or promote their mainstream success. We now turn to these for devising control variables.

Wartime Shortages

Several shortages that arose during World War II challenged the music business and, in turn, may have held implications for female acts. Specifically, these shortages may have augmented the mainstream success of women performers. First, WWII created a general labor shortage in the U.S., as a massive number of men relocated due to wartime efforts abroad. This resulted in new work roles for women in manufacturing and electrical industries (Milkman, 1987), yet it also created new opportunities for women musicians, especially those female jazz and swing bands that had received little attention in the 1930s. "As the draft and enlistment whittled away at the ranks of men's bands, women's bands profited from the range of jobs available to them" (Tucker, 2000, p. 48). Perhaps a similar dynamic played out in the mainstream recording market. Second, WWII also witnessed a particular type of labor shortage – a strike among the majority of instrumentalists (but *not* vocalists) in the U.S. and Canada. Concerned about the loss of performance opportunities to technology (e.g., prerecorded music used by movie houses and radio stations), the American Federation of Musicians imposed a ban on commercial recording until record companies agreed to pay into the union's unemployment fund (Anderson, 2004). This ban lasted from 1942 to 1944 and opened the door for new mainstream acts that filled the gap created by absent AFM members (Dowd, 2004). It could very well be the case that women (e.g., vocalists) were well represented among these new acts. Finally, a shortage of manufacturing materials (e.g., the shellac used in record discs) limited the number of recordings released by the industry. Just as the dearth of recordings directed increased attention to a once-marginalized group – R&B performers (Dowd, 2003) – this dearth may have also directed attention to female acts in the mainstream market.

Then again, these shortages may have hampered the mainstream success of female acts. While employment opportunities did expand for women musicians in the hinterlands, the established big bands (e.g., Benny Goodman, Glenn Miller, Tommy Dorsey, Kay Kyser) continued to dominate the most prestigious concert venues in urban centers, as well as the mainstream recording market (DeVeaux, 1997; Hamm, 1979; Millard, 1995). Regarding the recording ban, instrumentalists in women's bands were likewise members of the musician's union and, hence, constrained in their studio efforts. In fact, few of these women's bands would ever make a recording (Tucker, 2000). Meanwhile, notable vocalists who emerged during the ban were male – Frank Sinatra (formerly the vocalist for Tommy Dorsey) and the Mills Brothers (Garofalo, 1997; Hamm, 1979). In the face of labor and material shortages, the dominant recording companies (a) focused their efforts on the most commercially successful of their acts (e.g., Glenn Miller) at the expense of moderately successful acts (e.g., Duke Ellington), (b) re-issued past records, and (c) issued a backlog of previously unreleased records (Anderson, 2004; DeVeaux, 1988). Such shortages, then, could have worked against a flurry of female acts in the mainstream. Rather than privilege either the positive or negative effects of wartime shortages, we control for either possibility in our analysis.

Industry Recession

Some research suggests that, not only do female acts enjoy less success than their male counterparts, they are also less likely to enjoy success when the recording industry faces economic instability (Anderson, Hesbacher, Etzkorn, & Denisoff, 1980; Hesbacher & Anderson, 1980; Hesbacher, Clasby, Clasby, & Berger, 1977). As explained by Lisa Lewis (1990, p. 69), "Poor economic conditions threatened to curb for the foreseeable future the music industry's awards of new contracts to 'risky' musicians. This translated into dim prospects for female musicians."

During the time frame of our study, the recording industry underwent a period of considerable economic instability – an industry recession that lasted from 1979 to 1982. This recession represented a significant downturn, as production levels and sales had risen somewhat steadily since World War II and had peaked in the late1970s. In 1978, the industry produced more than 700 million recordings and generated more than 4 billion dollars in sales. The boom then turned to bust. Total sales of recordings declined by 11%, dropping from \$4.1 billion in 1978 to \$3.6 in 1979. This recession continued until the end of 1982, when the massive sales of Michael Jackson's *Thriller* revitalized the industry (Frith, 1988; Garofalo, 1997; RIAA, n.d.).

We have already found that this recession dampened the mainstream success of Black performers, as hard times eroded their promotion and support by recording firms (Dowd & Blyler, 2002). We now control for the possibility that a similar dampening occurred for female acts.

Impact of MTV

The emergence of Music Television ("MTV") in 1981 represented a major development for the mainstream market, as well as for the broader music business in the U.S. and abroad (Banks, 1997; Regev, 1997). Although variants of music videos had been around for decades (Goodwin, 1992), MTV's arrival meant that the use of videos for promotion became commonplace in the mainstream market. To be sure, record companies did not immediately embrace MTV, but they did so when it became apparent that MTV provided an ideal medium for launching new performing acts (especially compared to radio) and for stimulating album sales (Banks 1996; Garofalo, 1997). Jack Banks (1997, p. 293) describes the growing acceptance of videos as follows:

> Record label reliance on music video grew so extensive that video clips became considered a necessity for an artist to achieve success in the pop market. While only twenty three of the top 100 hit singles listed in Billboard's "Hot 100" chart had accompanying videos in May 1981, the number of singles with videos increased to eighty-two in May 1986, and rose even further to ninety-seven of the top 100 hits by December 1989.

Many scholars have focused on the gendered nature of music videos (e.g., Walser, 1993), with particular emphasis given to depictions of women (e.g., Banks, 1997; Emerson, 2002; Pegley, 2000). While acknowledging the extent to which music videos objectify women, some also emphasize the benefits that videos have afforded certain female acts. "Whereas the rock era celebrated male superstars…the rise in popularity of female performers in the post rock era coincided with the emergence of MTV as a format for integrating feminine based icons with visual and aural performances" (Katovich & Makowski, 1999, p. 141). Sometimes conforming to stereotypical portrayals – and sometimes subverting them – Madonna, Pat Benatar, Cyndi Lauper, and Janet Jackson used their respective music videos to attain mainstream success (see Banks, 1997; Gottlieb & Wald, 1994; Lewis, 1990; Whiteley, 2000). We control for MTV's impact to see if an increasing reliance on videos benefited women performers in general, rather than just a select few.

Women's Movement

Recent music scholarship examines how social movements provide a seedbed from which artists and their critique-laden content[3] can spring, as well as a receptive – if not readymade – audience. This work considers, for example, how particular movements may have fostered the commercial and/or critical success of hillbilly (Roscigno, Dahaner, & Summers-Effler, 2002), folk (Eyerman & Barretta, 1996; Skinner, 2006), and rap musicians (Keyes, 2002; Watkins, 2001). Given the focus and time frame of our study, a consideration of the role played by the women's movement is eminently reasonable.

The women's movement that blossomed during the 1960s and 1970s is commonly acknowledged as a turning point for women in the United States. Increased activity in the quest for equal rights, heightened visibility of women's issues, and the spread of consciousness-raising groups began transforming society on multiple levels. The organization building that accompanied and enabled this movement was especially impressive (see Liddle, 2004; Whittier, 1997). For example, Debra Minkoff (1995) documents more than 400 organizations in operation between 1955 and 1985 that were devoted to women's issues – including women's organizations focused on advocacy (e.g., National Association of Women) and culture (e.g., Women Make Movies). She finds a marked increase in the total number (density) of women's organizations beginning in 1969. For example, while the annual increase in the density of women's organizations ranged from 0 to 3 organizations between 1955 and 1968, their density increased by 11 organizations in 1969. In subsequent years, through 1980, the annual increase ranged from 10 to 36. Such organization-building reflects how the women's movement inspired an impressive mobilization of resources and broad support for a variety of women's activities.

Music was one area in which the women's movement prompted activity, especially during the 1970s. Frustrated by a male-dominated recording industry and performance venues that were not often receptive to female acts, women began creating alternative opportunities for themselves (Lont, 1992; Morris, 1999; Skinner, 2004). "Women-identified" music featured feminist- or lesbian-focused lyrics combined with popular music idioms (Petersen, 1989). Women trained themselves and one another in sound recording and concert production (Hogan & Hudson, 1998; Morris, 1999; Sandstrom, 2000). In 1973, the first festival devoted to women's music took place at Sacramento State University (Morris, 1999), presaging such sizable gatherings as the annual Michigan's Womyn Festival (Dowd, Liddle, & Nelson, 2004). A collective of women formed Olivia Records in 1973 and two years later released the first long-playing album that was produced completely by women. By 1979, there were enough distributors to warrant the formation of WILD – the Women's Independent Label Distribution Network (Petersen, 1989). These activities were vital in creating women's audiences and demonstrating the viability of the women's market (Baxandall & Gordon, 2000; Hogan & Hudson, 1998; Post, 1997). Indeed, a number of women who later received mainstream recognition – including Melissa Etheridge and Tracy Chapman – began their careers on the women's music festival circuit (Lont, 1992; Morris, 1999).

The women's movement could have at least two effects on the mainstream market. On the one hand, its flowering in the 1970s could have fostered the success of female acts in the mainstream, as music business personnel and/or audiences grew increasingly receptive to female acts. This would parallel the situation of African-American performers, where the civil rights movement accompanied a rise in the success of Black acts in the mainstream market (e.g., Dowd, 2003; Dowd & Blyler, 2002). On the other hand, the women's movement in the 1970s could have led to limited success for female acts – as the alternative market for women's music siphoned off potential artists and listeners from the mainstream market. We allow for either effect by controlling the flourishing of the women's movement in our analysis.

DATA AND METHODS

In an ideal world, researchers would have complete data on the economic performance of all firms in a given market, as well as the products offered by all firms. This ideal world, however, typically does not exist for researchers investigating U.S. media markets (see Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The privately owned firms that populate these markets are not legally required to divulge such data (and most do not). Publicly owned firms typically provide only the most basic of data, as when multinational corporations detail the overall performance of their respective firms rather than the performance of specific media divisions within the firms. Moreover, there are no systematic data for U.S. sales of particular recordings across the time frame of our study. Facing this less than ideal world of data, we follow the lead of previous researchers (e.g., Lopes, 1992; Peterson & Berger, 1975) and rely on the popularity charts of *Billboard* to construct a dataset. By summarizing weekly sales and airplay of recordings, the charts of this industry trade paper detail *which* firms and acts enjoyed mainstream success (i.e., hit recordings) in a given week. Working from that information, we can longitudinally gauge the dominance of particular recording firms ("concentration") and careers of performing acts ("density"), as well as examine our dependent variable – the number of female acts that succeed in a particular period. Given the larger project in which this paper is situated (Dowd, 2000, 2004; Dowd & Blyler 2002), we similarly track the weekly *Billboard* charts from 1940 to 1990.

While some have drawn on *Billboard* charts that address the most popular *albums* (e.g., Lopes, 1992), we instead draw on the mainstream charts that address the most popular *songs* ("singles"). We do this because the singles charts span the entire time frame of our study, whereas the album charts did not begin until the mid-1950s. From 1940 to 1957, *Billboard* supplied separate singles charts based respectively on retail sales, radio play, and jukebox play. We tracked performers and firms in all three of these weekly charts. From 1958 to 1990, *Billboard* provided weekly *Hot 100* charts, which were based on a combination of sales and radio play. We used these to track all performers and firms listed in each of the weekly 100 spots. All the charts we used report how successful an individual song is relative to others; in fact, the charts report *only* such rankings (e.g., Number 3 on the charts versus Number 99) rather than actual sales or radio play. Thus, the 22,561 hits that we track from 1940 to 1990 share a consistent metric.

Our reliance on *Billboard* charts entails more than convenience. Its charts offer key information by which recording industry personnel apprehend their various markets – including the mainstream market (Anand & Peterson, 2000). In fact, widespread acceptance of a particular market – be it the R&B market in the 1940s or the world music market in the 1990s – is symbolized by the establishment of its own chart in *Billboard* (Dowd, 2003; Taylor, 1997). Consequently, when we use hit singles to assess success within the mainstream market, we are drawing on a measure that industry personnel likewise use when evaluating the success and careers of performing acts.

Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is the quarterly number of hit recordings performed by female acts. To construct this variable, we examined the performers listed on each of the hit singles in the mainstream market. For hits by a single individual (e.g., Ella Fitzgerald), we coded the performer as "female" if the individual is a woman (as is the case for Fitzgerald). However, for hits that feature acts with multiple individuals (e.g., Peter, Paul, and Mary) or feature a combination of acts (e.g., Ella Fitzgerald and the Ink Spots), we coded them as “female” only if *all* the performers are women. Hence, recordings by “Peter, Paul, and Mary” and “Ella Fitzgerald and the Ink Spots” were not coded as “female.” We use this coding approach so as to highlight when female performers have success independent of males. We employed a variety of sources to ascertain the gender composition of performing acts, including album covers, reference books (e.g., Hardy & Laing, 1991; Whitburn, 1994), and music websites (e.g., http://www.allmusic.com; http://www.ubl.com). Fortunately, we were able to identify the gender composition of performing acts in all but 33 of the nearly 23,000 hits in our dataset. We did not include these 33 cases in our analysis.

Fig. 1 shows that the quarterly number of hits by female acts is quite low in the early 1940s, at its height in both the mid-1950s and 1960s, and is moderate in subsequent years. Fig. 2 reveals that female acts never account for more than 40% of all hits in a given quarter; in fact, they typically account for a small minority of hit recordings – averaging 16% per quarter. Given the relative lack of variation in the quarterly percentage of female acts, we focus our attention on the quarterly numbers in Fig. 1.

Independent Variables

Concentration

We rely on the Herfindahl index to measure market concentration. This index simultaneously assesses the total number of firms and their respective



Fig. 1. Quarterly Number of Mainstream Hits by Female Acts.



Fig. 2. Quarterly Percentage of Hits by Female Acts.

market shares via the following formula:

$$\text{Herfindahl Index} = \Sigma(Si)^2(i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, n) \tag{1}$$

where S represents the percentage share of individual firm i and n is the number of firms in the market. The Herfindahl index (when divided by 10) ranges between 0 and 1,000, with "0" indicating perfect competition and "1,000" indicating perfect monopoly (Dobbin & Dowd, 2000).

We use the Herfindahl index to gauge the quarterly share of hit singles enjoyed by each firm. We credited a firm with a hit when it owned or distributed the label on which the hit was released, thereby replicating previous research (Lopes, 1992) and capturing the growing alliances among recording firms (Peterson &; Berger, 1996). We attributed a hit's firm on a case-by-case basis and, as a result, recognized the numerous changes in ownership and distribution arrangements that occurred over the 50-year time frame. We relied on a number of firm and industry sources when identifying ownership and distribution, including weekly issues of *Billboard*, annual issues of *Billboard's Buyer's Guide*, annual editions of *Moody's Industrial Manual*, annual corporate reports, and various editions of *The Recording Industry Sourcebook* and *The Yellow Pages of Rock*. We also relied on the work of other scholars who have documented ownership and distribution, including Gart (1989), Gillett (1983), and Sanjek and Sanjek (1991). Fig. 3 shows that concentration is at its highest in 1940, when Columbia, Decca, and RCA completely dominated the market. Concentration declines throughout the 1940s and 1950s, rebounds in the early 1960s, and increases almost steadily thereafter.



Fig. 3. Concentration in the Mainstream Recording Market.



Fig. 4. Decentralized Production in the Mainstream Recording Market.

Decentralized Production

We measure decentralized production by noting the quarterly number of *labels* that enjoyed hits relative to the number of recording *firms* that did so, thereby following the example of Lopes (1992). We constructed this ratio by relying on the same sources used for constructing the concentration variable (see above). Fig. 4 shows the last vestiges of an earlier era of decentralized production in the early 1940s (Dowd, 2004, p. 1418). By the mid-1940s, decentralized production is all but nonexistent, with the number of labels and firms nearly equal in some time periods, dropping to a ratio of 1.07. A slight increase in decentralization occurs in the 1950 and a sizable increase occurs in the 1960s. This upward trajectory continues for much of the remaining time period.

Density of Female Acts

We created this variable in two steps. First, we constructed a life history for *each* female act that enjoyed mainstream success, detailing when it secured its first and last mainstream hit singles and, if applicable, when it garnered hits in between. Some female acts could have experienced their first hit before 1940 (left truncation) while others could have had their last hit after 1990 (right truncation). We addressed left truncation by using Whitburn (1986) to see if each act enjoyed mainstream success prior to 1940; 11 of the acts did so. We addressed right truncation by tracking the *Billboard* charts through 1995; 55 acts had mainstream hits after 1990. Second, we aggregated the number of female acts that were in existence at the beginning of each quarter. From 1940 to 1965, the density of female acts rises steadily from 11 acts to its peak of 64 acts. Thereafter, the quarterly density hovers between 44 and 63 (see Fig. 5). Ecologists model the curvilinear impact of density by using the polynomial, $X - X^2$, which we do as well. The first term captures the positive impact of legitimacy and the squared term captures the negative impact of competition (Hannan & Carroll, 1992).

All Hits and #1 Hits by Female Acts in Previous Quarter

We use two measures to address Hypothesis 4. First, we use the previous number of all mainstream hit singles by female acts – which is simply a lagged version of our dependent variable (see Fig. 1). It may be the case, however, that only the most prominent success by female acts matters for their subsequent success. We gauge such "prominence" by examining those hits that achieve #1 status on the weekly charts and, by definition, rank the highest in terms of popularity (e.g., sales, radio airplay). The quarterly



Fig. 5. Density of Female Acts in the Mainstream Market, 1940–1990.

number of #1 hits by female acts ranges from 0 to 5, with "0" being the mode and "1.8" being the mean. We use a polynomial, $X - X^2$, to assess the curvilinear impact of both measures (see *Hypothesis 4*).

Wartime Shortages, Industry Recession, and Proliferation of the Feminist Organizations

We rely on dummy variables to tap several factors, with "1" indicating the occurrence of each factor and "0" denoting its absence. Two dummy variables represent historical developments that span a delimited time, with wartime shortages coded as "1" from 1942 to 1945 and the industry recession coded as "1" from 1979 to 1982.

The remaining variable draws on data compiled by Debra Minkoff (1995) and graciously shared with us. Her dataset documents the annual number of women's organizations that are founded, disbanded, and operative in the U.S. from 1955 to 1985, with additional data extending from 1986 to 1988. Given that her data span only a portion of our time frame, and are annual rather than quarterly, we rely on a dummy variable that assesses the height of mobilization in the women's movement – when 20 or more organizations are founded in a given year. As a result, this dummy variable is coded as "1" from 1970 to 1980. Given that such heightened mobilization did not likely occur before 1955 (the starting year for Minkoff's project) and that the emergence of the Women's Music movement occurred in the 1970s, we believe that this dummy variable, while rudimentary, nevertheless encapsulates the flourishing of the women's movement at the aggregate level.

Impact of MTV

We inspect MTV's impact via the quarterly percentage of all hit singles for which there is a music video, as listed in weekly *Billboard* charts. This measure depicts the increasing reliance on videos for promotion (see Banks, 1997), thereby showing the impact of MTV. The quarterly percentage of singles with accompanying videos is nonexistent before the 1980s, reaches 50% by 1985, and nears 80% by 1990.

Methods

We use Poisson and negative binomial regression to model the quarterly number of mainstream hits by female acts. Researchers use Poisson regression to model event counts (i.e., outcomes that can only take the value of an integer); however, this form of regression depends on the assumption that the conditional variance and mean of the number of events are equal,

$$\mathrm{Var}(Y_t) = E(Y_t) \tag{2}$$

In cases where the conditional variance exceeds the mean, overdispersion can lead to underestimated standard errors and, in turn, erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis. The quadratic parameterization of negative binomial regression corrects this problem with the specification,

$$\mathrm{Var}(Y_t) = E(Y_t) + \alpha E^2(Y_t) \tag{3}$$

Barron (1992). We can assess overdispersion with a *t*-test of the hypothesis that the overdispersion parameter, α, in Eq (3) differs significantly from zero (Barron, 1992, p. 211).

Barron (1992, p. 193) writes, "Autocorrelation is the norm rather than the exception" in longitudinal data such as ours. One way that some address this, he notes, is to include a lagged count of the dependent variable as an independent variable – when such a lag is theoretically and substantively motivated. Given our Hypothesis 4, we take this approach in our paper and use the previous number of mainstream hits by female acts to predict the current number. Barron 1992

We used LIMDEP to derive Poisson and negative binomial models via maximum likelihood estimation. Several points of interpretation are important for the regression models that follow (Berry & Feldman, 1985; Long, 1997). First, the fit of a given model is given by comparing the log-likelihoods of nested models by using the following formula:

$$(-2) * [(\text{log-likelihood of Model A}) - (\text{log-likelihood of Model B})] \tag{4}$$

This yields a likelihood-ratio χ^2 by which to gauge the improvement in fit, with the degrees of freedom corresponding to the number of variables unique to Model B.

Second, Hypothesis 2 poses a statistical interaction, where decentralized production offsets the negative impact of concentration. We thus rely on a multiplicative term (Concentration*Decentralized Production) because it is an acceptable way for modeling interactions (Friedrich, 1982). In doing so, however, we are examining the *combined* effects of concentration and decentralized production rather than their isolated effects. Consequently, we are interested in how the effect of concentration changes from, say, the lowest value of decentralized production (1.07) to its mid-point (2.69) and highest values (3.64; see Fig. 4). We do so via the following formula, with the bold portion showing a particular value of decentralized production, 1.07

(Friedrich, 1982):

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 Conc + b_2 Decent\text{Pr}od + b_3 Conc * Decent\text{Pr}od + e$$
$$Y = b_0 + b_1 Conc + b_2(1.07) + b_3(1.07)Conc + e$$
$$Y = [b_0 + (b_2 * 1.07)] + [b_1 + (b_3 * 1.07)]Conc + e \quad (5)$$

As it is necessary to examine the combination of coefficients (i.e., $b_1 + b_3$) in a statistical interaction, it is also necessary to calculate the standard error for this combination. We use the following formula, with the bold portion showing a particular value of decentralized production, 1.07 (Friedrich, 1982):

$$\textit{standard error}_{(b_1+b_3)} = \left(\text{var}(b_1) + [(1.07)^2 * \text{var}(b_3)] + [2 * (1.07) * \text{cov}(b_1, b_3)]\right)^{1/2} \quad (6)$$

To see the impact of concentration at other levels of decentralized production (e.g., 2.69, 3.64) and derive the appropriate standard errors, we respectively insert those values into formulae (5) and (6).

Third, the impact of variables on our outcome of interest is given by the following formula:

$$100 * [\exp(\text{coefficient}) - 1]. \quad (7)$$

This demonstrates the effect that a one-unit change in a variable has on the expected number of hits by women in the following quarter. Finally, when faced with a curvilinear relationship (b X-b_5 X^2), we can calculate the tipping point at which the positive effect becomes negative via the following formula:

$$b_4/(-2b_5) \quad (8)$$

RESULTS

Before turning to the regression analysis, we first offer descriptive results that illustrate the challenges that women performers face in attaining career success and longevity. From 1940 to 1990, 784 female acts appeared on the singles charts in the mainstream market. Of these, 352 had only one hit single, 37 had 30 or more hits, and only 5 secured 55 or more hit singles. Most female acts thus have a brief stint in the mainstream market. In fact, the density of female acts in any given quarter ranges from 11 to 64 (see Fig. 5). For a point of comparison, the density of *all* performing acts (regardless of their gender composition) ranges from 94 to 430 over the same time period (Dowd, 2004). Table 1 lists the female acts that arguably enjoy the most success and longevity during this time frame. These superstars, as Fig. 2 would suggest, collectively account for a small minority of mainstream hits, with their shares dropping across the decades, from 6.8% to 2%. However, these superstars also comprise a declining percentage of mainstream hits by female acts, from 52.8% to 11.5%. Finally, the challenges seem particularly daunting when considering the most prominent success in the mainstream singles charts. Ninety-nine female acts accounted for just 179 of the 1,007 #1 hits from 1940 to 1990, with male and mixed-gender acts accounting for the remainder. Of these 99 acts, 67 had but a single #1 hit, and only 5 acts had five or more #1 hits (The Supremes, Diana Ross, Whitney Houston, Madonna, and Janet Jackson).

Table 2 contains the models by which we test our hypotheses regarding female performers in the mainstream market. The number of cases analyzed ($N = 201$) refers to the annual quarters for which we have complete data (Oct.–Dec. 1940 to Oct–Dec. 1990). In negative binomial regressions not reported here, we found the overdispersion parameter, $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$, to be insignificant in Models 1, 3, and 4 (see Formula [3] in the methods section). As a result, we report Poisson regression estimates for these models in Table 2, as overdispersion is not an issue for them. Regarding Model 2, though negative binomial regression is warranted, we report Poisson estimates for purposes of symmetry and because the substantive results remain the same for both Poisson and negative binomial estimates. All the models in Table 2 offer a significant improvement in fit over the null model lacking any explanatory variables, with the latter having a log-likelihood of -904.25 (see formula [4] in the methods section). However, Model 2 is the least impressive in this regard, as it offers but a modest improvement when compared to the other models.

Model 1 addresses the hypotheses that lie at the core of our paper and, consequently, illuminates general factors at work in the mainstream market. First, this model adjudicates between Hypotheses 1 and 2, with the coefficients for the interactions coming from formula [5] and the standard errors coming from formula [6]. If concentration is what drives the quarterly number of hits by female acts (i.e., diversity), then its negative effect will not be mitigated by the extent of decentralized production (*Hypothesis 1*). However, if production logics condition the impact of concentration on diversity, then we should see the negative effect of concentration decline or disappear as the logic of decentralized production expands in the mainstream market (Hypothesis *2*).

Table 1. Top Five Female Acts with Hit Singles in the Mainstream Recording Market, by Decade and by Half-Century.

Time Period	Name of Act and Number of Hit Singles	Hits of the Top Five Acts Combined as a Percentage of Hits by	
		All female Acts	All mainstream acts
1940–1949	Dinah Shore (44) The Andrews Sisters (34) Jo Stafford (32) Margaret Whiting (17) Peggy Lee (15)	52.8	6.8
1950–1959	Patti Page (58) Kay Starr (30) Doris Day (28) Jo Stafford (28) Teresa Brewer (27)	24.5	4.7
1960–1969	Brenda Lee (47) Connie Francis (43) Dionne Warwick (32) Aretha Franklin (31) The Supremes (28)	16.4	2.6
1970–1979	Aretha Franklin (26) Linda Ronstadt (22) Olivia Newton-John (21) Helen Reddy (20) Anne Murray (19)	14.6	2.0
1980–1990	Madonna (23) The Pointer Sisters (19) Sheena Easton (17) Pat Benatar (16) Diana Ross (16)	11.5	2.0
1940–1990	Patti Page (79) Aretha Franklin (68) Dinah Shore (62) Jo Stafford (60) Connie Francis (55)	9.0	1.4

Table 2. Poisson Regression Estimates for the Quarterly Number of Hit Songs by Female Acts in the Mainstream Recording Market, 1940–1990.

Variables	Model			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	1.611** (0.399)	2.940** (0.021)	1.700** (0.403)	1.605** (0.399)
Concentration, when Decentralized Production = 1.07	$-0.054e^{-02}$ ($0.086e^{-02}$)		$-0.039e^{-02}$ ($0.086e^{-02}$)	$-0.046e^{-02}$ ($0.085e^{-02}$)
Decentralized Production = 2.69	$0.150e^{-02}$** ($0.065\ e^{-02}$)		$0.165e^{-02}$** ($0.064e^{-02}$)	$0.160e^{-02}$** ($0.064e^{-02}$)
Decentralized Production = 3.68	$0.275e^{-02}$** ($0.010e^{-02}$)		$0.290e^{-02}$** ($0.010e^{-02}$)	$0.287e^{-02}$** ($0.010e^{-02}$)
Density of female acts	0.061** (0.014)		0.056** (0.014)	0.061** (0.014)
Density of female acts squared	$-0.500e^{-03}$** ($0.142e^{-03}$)		$-0.442e^{-03}$** ($0.146e^{-03}$)	$-0.493e^{-03}$** ($0.142e^{-03}$)
#1 Hits by female acts in previous quarter	0.019** (0.017)			
All hits by female acts in previous quarter	0.019** (0.003)		0.019** (0.003)	0.019** (0.003)
Wartime shortages (dummy)		−1.209## (0.115)	−0.194 (0.134)	
Industry recession (dummy)		−0.077 (0.064)		
Impact of MTV		0.001 (0.001)		
Proliferation of women's organizations (dummy)		−0.023 (0.042)		
Log-likelihood	−582.67	−818.39	−582.22	−583.30

Note: Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors are shown in parentheses; $N = 201$.
*$p < 0.05$
#$p < 0.05$
**$p < 0.01$ (two-tailed tests)
##$p < 0.01$ (one-tailed tests)

The results in Model 1 clearly support Hypothesis 2. When decentralized production is at its lowest (1.07) – as was the case in the mid-1940s – concentration has a negative and insignificant effect on the quarterly number of hits by female acts. However, when decentralized production reaches its mid-point value (2.69) – as was the case in the early 1970s – concentration now has a significantly positive effect. Each one-unit increase in concentration raises the subsequent number of these hits by 0.15%, as calculated by entering the coefficient into formula [7] of the methods section: 100*[exp(0.**150e$^{-\mathbf{02}}$**) – 1]. Put another way, each ten-unit, increase in concentration subsequently prompts a 15% increase in hits by female acts. As decentralization approaches its peak value (3.68) – as it did in the early 1980s – the positive effect of concentration likewise grows more pronounced: each one-unit increase in concentration spurs the subsequent number of such hits by 0.28% (see formula [7]). Thus, an increasing reliance on decentralized production mitigates the impact of concentration. A comparison of Figs. 1, 3, and 4 clarifies this. While portions of the 1940s and 1980s share comparable ranges of concentration (Fig. 3), those in the 1940s are marked by less decentralized production than the latter (Fig. 4). The success of female acts is more pronounced in the latter portion (Fig. 1), when decentralized production expands.

Model 1 also addresses key concerns regarding legitimacy. First, it shows the declining positive effect posed in Hypothesis 3. The significant effect of the density measure (0.061) indicates that a rising number of successful female acts in existence paves the way for more hits by women, as a growing number of such acts legitimates women in the realm of performance and, in turn, furthers opportunities. However, the negative and significant effect of the density squared measure (-0.500e^{-03}) shows that the positive effect grows less pronounced as density rises and eventually reaches a point where relatively high density reduces opportunities for success in subsequent periods, as many acts now compete for limited resources and opportunities in a crowded market. Using formula [8] in the methods section, we find that the tipping point occurs when density reaches 61 female acts. To make this intuitive, we refer the reader to Fig. 2, as it shows the rather low ceiling that female acts encounter relative to male and mixed-gender acts. Second, Model 1 shows that a flurry of hits by female acts opens the door, so to speak, for such hits in the following quarter. This legitimating effect refers to *any* mainstream hit (as indicated by the significance of all previous hits by female acts) and is not limited to the most prominent hits (as indicated by the insignificance of #1 hits by female acts). Each additional hit by female acts in one quarter translates into a 1.9% increase in the subsequent number of such hits (see formula [7]). Furthermore, regression analyses not reported in Table 2 show that the impact of all previous hits by female acts is not curvilinear (Hyp*othesis 4*). That is, while the measure for all previous hits is significant in Model 1, the squared term of this measure is insignificant. This is noteworthy because there is apparently no tipping point for the previous number of hits by female acts, as there is for the density of female acts.[4]

Models 2 and 3 allow an inspection of historical factors that some invoke when discussing female acts. Model 2 shows minimal effects for these historical factors. While MTV apparently promotes hits by female acts, its positive effect is insignificant. We thus find no evidence that MTV benefited female acts in general. Similarly, the negative effects of the industry recession and the proliferation of women's organizations are also insignificant. In results not reported here, we find that none of these three variables attains significance in bivariate models; hence, we are not surprised by their lack of predictive power in Model 2. Only wartime shortages have a significant effect. Rather than benefiting from the potential gaps that resulted from the AFM recording ban and the like, the WWII era proved a difficult time for female acts – reducing their number of hits by 70% (see formula [7]). However, Model 3 shows that the sizable effect of wartime shortages disappears in the presence of the other significant variables. During the wartime years, for example, the density of female acts declines from 14 to 11 acts active in the mainstream market – while decentralized production drops to its lowest levels. These general factors capture the difficulties of WWII better than a dummy variable.

Both Models 3 and 4 show the robustness of the effects associated with decentralized production and legitimacy, with Model 4 showing their impact when insignificant predictors are removed from consideration. The effects found in Model 4 are parallel those found in Model 1. Decentralized production continues to mitigate the effect of concentration on the quarterly number of hits by women. The latter's insignificant and negative effect – when decentralized production equals 1.07 – becomes significant and increasingly positive as decentralized production expands, with each one-unit increase in concentration spurring the number of such hits by anywhere from 0.16% (when decentralization is at 2.69) to 0.29% (when decentralization reaches 3.68). The significance of the density variables continues to reveal a "glass ceiling" of sorts; the effect of density grows less positive and eventually becomes negative when density reaches 62 female acts. Each one-unit increase in the previous numbers of all mainstream hits by women contributes to a 1.9% rise in the current number of such hits. These results, then, offer strong support for the arguments associated with Hypotheses 2 and 3 and moderate support for the argument associated with Hypothesis 4.

In results not reported here, we explored the robustness of the findings by considering alternatives that could likewise shape the number of new acts. First, we considered that the passage of time could affect the number of mainstream hits by female acts. For instance, such hits could be more plentiful in a mature rather than a nascent market. To assess this possibility, we added a time trend variable to Model 4. The trend variable is insignificant and does not alter the results of either model. Second, we considered that a heightened number of hits by female acts merely results from an increasing number of hits – as when the turnover of hits on the *Hot 100* charts is quite rapid, with many new hits entering each week. To gauge this possibility, we added a variable to Model 4 that tracked the number of all hit recordings found in the previous quarter. This variable is insignificant and does not change the results of the model. Finally, we added to Model 4 a variable representing the percentage of women in the U.S. labor force. Given that this variable significantly predicts both the founding of women's organizations and feminist protests (Minkoff, 1997), we use it to tap a broader shift in demand, with the expansion of roles for women translating into a broader appeal of female acts. This variable likewise proves insignificant and does not alter the results of Model 4. These explorations therefore demonstrate that the above results are not artifacts of a secular trend, chart turnover, or a broader shift in demand.

CONCLUSIONS

Two observations made by Keith Negus – an influential sociologist of music – provide a convenient way to frame our findings. The first one is as follows: "The artists signed by record companies and the repertoire prioritized for recording and release are not in any straightforward way a reflection of the talent that is available" (Negus, 1999, p. 32). This observation squares with much scholarship addressing, in general, the careers of creative workers (e.g., Menger, 1999) and, in particular, the careers of women musicians. Indeed, the latter compellingly documents how female acts (especially instrumentalists) have been historically overlooked and/or underpromoted by record companies (e.g., Bayton, 1998; Gaar, 1992; Tucker, 2000). Our results show the implications of such inattention. On the one hand, we find that consumers are actually receptive to the female talent that is available in the mainstream market: increased retail sales and heightened radio airplay (i.e., hit singles) for *any* female act bode well for *all* female acts in the near future. Regardless of the genre of music involved, then, mainstream success is contagious for women performers at the aggregate level. There are limits to this contagion, however, as the quarterly number of hits by female acts only accounts for 25% or more of mainstream hits in just 16 of the 201 quarters found in our study. On the other hand, we find that the number of female acts in the mainstream market is relatively small and is constrained by a glass ceiling of sorts. During the time frame of our study, the active number of female acts (density) never accounts for more than 25% of *all* active mainstream performers, as male acts or mixed-gender acts account for the vast majority. Furthermore, as the active number of female acts approaches the low 60s, the mainstream success for all women performers is subsequently dampened because too many now compete for the limited resources at their disposal. This stands in stark contrasts to other types of performers, as neither new performers nor African-American performers encounter a glass ceiling in the mainstream market (Dowd, 2004; Dowd & Blyler, 2002). Thus, while the commercial viability of female acts is legitimated by their short-term successes and long-term careers (density), the limits of such legitimacy suggest that record firms have yet to heed fully the available talent among women performers. Such inattention is especially apparent in light of the Women's Music movement, wherein female musicians, entrepreneurs, and consumers created a relatively self-contained market as an alternative to the mainstream market (Lont, 1992; Skinner, 2004).

Negus (1999, p. 35) also observes that "…absorption of independent labels has been a feature of the music business throughout the twentieth century and has become increasingly institutionalized through a series of joint ventures, production, licensing, marketing and distribution deals which have led to the blurring of 'indie'/'major' organizational distinctions and belief systems." Beyond documenting the expansion of such decentralized production from 1940 to 1990 – where each major came to preside over an expanding web of labels, some of which it owns and some of which are owned by indies – we also show how this decentralization combines with concentration to shape the careers of women musicians. When decentralized production is at its lowest level, which was true in the early 1940s, concentration has a negative but insignificant effect on the mainstream success of female acts. When decentralized production is at moderate levels, which was the case in the early 1970s, concentration now has a positive and significant effect on such mainstream success. When decentralized production is at its highest level, which occurred in the mid-1980s, then the positive effect of concentration is at its highest level for female acts. As decentralized production grows more extensive, we argue, dominant firms become more adept at using independents as both ''barometers'' of and ''farm teams'' for emergent genres and performers. Besides blurring the distinction between major and indie, as Negus notes, this decentralization also offsets the negative effect of concentration and, in turn, promotes increased diversity in the mainstream market – as indicated by growing musical dissimilarity among #1 hit songs (Dowd, 2000), heightened success among African-American performers (Dowd & Blyler, 2002), an increasing number of new performers and new record firms (Dowd, 2004) and, as shown here, a growing number of hits by female acts.

While our findings detail general factors at work in the mainstream market – and factors that obtain across the stylistic shifts occurring in this market – they do not reveal the impact of any historical factors. That is, the following fail to obtain significance in the presence of variables representing legitimacy (e.g., density) and decentralized production: the shortages of labor and materials associated with World War II, the flourishing of the women's movement in the 1970s, the recording industry recession of the late 1970s, and the growing impact of MTV on mainstream production. These non-findings are particularly intriguing given results of past studies. The success of African-American performers, for example, was both hindered by the industry recession and the initial rise of MTV (Dowd & Blyler, 2002), and a shortage of musicians during WWII spurred the number of new performers entering the mainstream market (Dowd, 2004). We suspect that the relatively small presence that female acts have in the mainstream market may be the reason that general factors alone account for the success, as various barriers that have arisen and/or fallen for some types of performers may remain somewhat constant for women performers. We concede that extending the time frame of our study may reveal the import of historical factors, as Parsons (1988), Clawson (1999), and others suggest that a shift is underway, whereby women performers now have more opportunities for success than in the past. Indeed, we would not be surprised if this is the case, especially when the online distribution of music can take decentralized production to a whole new level via peer to peer networks (see Lee & Peterson, 2004; McCourt & Burkhart, 2003). Of course, that remains an empirical question, as the general factors detailed above may still be all that is needed when accounting for the mainstream success of women performers.

Other empirical questions remain as well. For example, we believe that the interplay between production logics and concentration matters for the careers of creative workers in other settings. The over-the-air network television sector in the U.S. (e.g., ABC, CBS) has grown more concentrated and centralized in the wake of regulatory changes. Bielby and Bielby (2003) show how this results in programming that is less diverse in terms of the number of suppliers. Perhaps, the combination of low decentralization and high concentration also hampers the careers of those writing such programs – including women screenwriters (see Bielby & Bielby, 1996). Radio broadcasting in the U.S. has also experienced regulatory changes in recent years, growing more concentrated yet not necessarily more centralized in its production (Ahlkvist & Faulkner, 2002; Lee, 2004); moreover, some evidence suggests a blurring between the actions of major and indie stations (Rossman, 2004). This seems an ideal setting for investigating the impact of production logics on the careers of various creative workers – including, once again, women musicians. We also believe that the next step of this project is to shift focus from the collective success of female or African-American acts to the career trajectories of *each* mainstream act, so as to highlight the intersection of race and gender rather than treat them as analytically distinct. In doing so, this project will further elucidate, on the one hand, the linkages between legitimacy, production logics, and selection routines and, on the other, the charting of race and gender in the mainstream market.

NOTES

1. "Label" refers to the organizational identity and/or ' prominently displayed on each recording (see Peterson and Berger, 1975). At their most basic, "labels" are used by companies to target a particular audience and/or genre (see Sutton, 2000); at their most elaborated, labels represent distinct divisions within (or affiliated with) a given recording company (see Lee, 1995; Negus, 1999). During the 1940s and early 1950s, when centralized production reigned, the majors mostly relied on a few labels (sometimes even one) for popular music – such as Decca and its Decca label. From the mid-1950s onward, when decentralized production grew pronounced, majors increasingly relied on a range of labels, as when Decca emphasized its Decca, Coral, and Brunswick labels.

2. "Legitimacy" is a concept with an extensive history in social psychology and organizational sociology (see Johnson, 2004; Scott, 1995). Our usage of it is informed by Suchman's (1995, p. 574) definition: "…a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions."

3. Stamatov (2002) persuasively argues that individuals and social movements can perceive a critique in musical content that is arguably neutral in its politics.

4. We entertained the possibility that the critical success of female acts has an independent and positive effect on their subsequent commercial success (e.g., the number of mainstream hits). While no measures of critical success span our entire

time frame (see Schmutz, 2004), we did utilize a crude measure that sums the annual number of female acts that received the top Grammy awards – those for Record of the Year (est. 1959), Album of the Year (est. 1959), and Best New Artist (est. 1961). This measure fails to attain significance in either Model 1 or in a model where it is the sole predictor.

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INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONS: TRANSFORMATION IN ACCOUNTING, ARCHITECTURE, AND PUBLISHING

Patricia H. Thornton, Candace Jones and Kenneth Kury

ABSTRACT

We contribute to the literature on institutional and organizational change by integrating two related areas of study: the theory and methods of analysis informed by the research on institutional logics and historical-event sequencing. Institutional logics provide the theory to understand how the content of culture influences organizational change; historical-event sequencing reveals the underlying patterns of cultural transformation. We apply this dual perspective to the cases of institutional stability and change in organizational governance in three industries: accounting, architecture, and higher-education publishing. Research on governance has focused on changes in organizational design between markets,

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hierarchies, and networks. Missing from this research is an understanding of how institutions at the wider societal level motivate organizations to adopt one of these governance forms over another. We examine how the governance of firms in these industries has been influenced by the institutional logics of the professions, the market, the state, and the corporation by focusing on three mechanisms – institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, and historical-event sequencing. Overall, our findings reveal how accounting was influenced by state regulation producing a punctuated equilibrium model, architecture by professional duality producing a cyclical model, and publishing by market rationalization producing an evolutionary model of institutional change in organizational governance.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars of institutional analysis are producing vibrant branches of research in institutional theory and historical comparative sociology (Scott, 2001). For example, research has examined the consequences of a change in institutional logics for organizational decision-making (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), and how the sequencing of historical events transforms institutional logics and organizations (Sewell, 1996). While these developing lines of research call for multiple approaches, they emphasize one aspect of institutional change and stability to the exclusion of another, focusing on either the consequences of a shift in the cultural content of institutional logics or on how the content of culture itself changed.

We address this gap by developing a theory and method of analysis combining the approaches informed by the research on institutional logics and historical-event sequencing. We apply this dual perspective to examine institutional stability and change in organizational governance – our dependent variable – in three industries: accounting, architecture, and higher-education publishing. Research on organizational governance has focused on understanding changes in organizational design between markets, hierarchies, and networks. Missing from this research is an understanding of how institutional logics at the wider societal level motivate organizations to adopt one of these governance forms over another. We explore the connection between organizational governance and broader interpretative schemes, which in theory reveal the values and beliefs underlying intentions, aspirations, and purposes that shape the organizing principles and strategy of action for organizations (Greenwood & Hinnings, 1993). We examine how the governance of firms in our three focal industries has been influenced in varying ways by the logics of the professions, the market, the state, and the corporation, focusing on both the consequences of change in institutional logics and on how the logics themselves change. We analyze how change happens by focusing on three mechanisms: institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, and historical-event sequencing. We also speculate more broadly by comparing the three industries with respect to how the institutional logics of different societal sectors drive various change patterns.

Following the review by Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997), we define organizational governance as the mechanisms that firms use to coordinate economic activity. Research on governance has been largely at the intra- and inter-organizational levels – working to understand organizational strategy and structure by applying the ideal types – markets, hierarchies, and networks (Williamson, 1975, 1991; Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990). These ideal types are distinguished by different normative bases for coordinating economic activity – for markets, it is competitive self-interest in contractual property rights; for hierarchies, the power and authority relationships of employment; and for networks, the cooperative complementarities among firms in skills and assets (Powell, 1990). However, to our knowledge there is no research that clarifies the sources of these normative bases operating in markets and organizations, and how these sources are influenced by societal-level cultural institutions. We empirically explore this analytical problem in a historical comparison of three industries.

Our approach is motivated by four concerns with current theory and empirical research on institutional and organizational change. First, organizational structures appear to be patterned in ways that cannot be fully explained by organizational field dynamics (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 243). Consistent with theory (Strang & Meyer, 1994), empirical research shows that the institutionalization of practice innovations in organizational fields and markets require legitimation from wider cultures (Davis & Greve, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Second, while institutional entrepreneurs may be agents of institutional change (DiMaggio, 1988), the source of their entrepreneurial ideas and how these ideas are associated with institutional change remains unclear. Third, the strategic use of persuasive language, or what is termed the reframing of vocabularies and rhetoric, is argued to explain change in institutional logics (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). However, the origins of the metaphors that enable competing rhetoric to displace current rhetoric often stem from outside the substantive cases under analysis. Last, although there is empirical evidence of institutional change as an evolutionary process driven by the linear rationalization of market capitalism, in all likelihood there must be other empirical patterns eluding the observations of social scientists.

Linking the new research on institutional logics and event sequencing provides an opportunity to further explore these concerns and gain insights to advance our ability to understand competing theories of institutional change and organizational governance. First, we define the theory and methods of institutional logics and historical-event sequencing. Second, we develop historical case histories for accounting, architecture, and publishing. Third, we apply our dual perspective to analyze the institutional change in organizational governance in the three industries. We conclude with synthetic comments on patterns of institutional and organizational change in organizational governance across the three industries and propositions for future research.

INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND HISTORICAL EVENTS

Institutional logics is a theory and method of analysis for understanding the influences of societal-level culture on the cognition and behavior of individual and organizational actors (DiMaggio, 1997). The cultural content of logics is represented in taxonomies of institutions organized by societal sectors. Western societies are composed of six societal sectors – the market, the corporation, the professions, the family, the religions, and the state. Each sector is defined by distinct and often conflicting cultural symbols and material practices that comprise its organizing principles. These organizing principles spell out the vocabularies of motive, the logics of action, and the senses of self for sector participants (Friedland & Alford, 1991). They reveal the deeply held and often unexamined assumptions by which reasoning takes place. The institutional logics of each societal sector shape an interpretation and view of archetypical organization structures and governance mechanisms used to coordinate economic activity as a part of a broader range of sector institutions. Table A.1 in the appendix presents the ideal type societal-level institutional logics for each of the six sectors derived from Weber (1922/1978). The elements of the sector logic (rows) represent theoretical predictions for institutional and organizational arrangements within the influence of that particular sector. When individual actors and organizations are influenced by the logics of multiple sectors (columns), they have the opportunity to create hybrid institutions.

We suggest that change or hybridization occurs through at least three mechanisms – institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap (Thornton, 2004), and event sequencing (Sewell, 1996). Institutional entrepreneurs and structural overlap provide the opportunity and means for recombination of cognitive schema and cultural models, which are then amplified by others in the sequencing of historical events.

Institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988) are individual and organizational actors, who create opportunities for innovation and institutional and organizational change by exploiting cultural discontinuities. Similar to entrepreneurs who create opportunities by recognizing and exploiting economic and political discontinuities (Timmons, 1999), institutional entrepreneurs create opportunities by recognizing cultural discontinuities across multiple societal sectors, in Friedland and Alford's parlance, they live across societal sectors. Similar to entrepreneurs who discover opportunities based on their perceptions shaped by prior experience (Shane, 2000), institutional entrepreneurs also instigate change by discovering ways to innovate through structural overlap, thus blurring their primary roles and activities by moving from one societal sector to another.

We further suggest that the institutional entrepreneur is aware of the modularity of cultural elements within a sector and experiments with how they can be decomposed and recombined in hybrid ways. This creative rearrangement of sector parts has the effect of economizing on the processes of discovery, theorization, and institutionalization of novel practices (Swidler, 1986; Strang & Meyer, 1994). Sewell (1992, p. 17) argued, for example, that institutional entrepreneurs have the cognitive capacity to carry and transpose a wide range of incompatible schematic elements to a variety of circumstances outside the context in which they were initially learned, presenting new solutions to old problems.[1]

Structural overlap is when individual roles and organizational structures and functions that were previously distinct are forced into association (Thornton, 2004). Mergers and acquisitions are an example of structural overlap when organizational actors from divergent cultures are forced into association, triggering a change in institutional logics guiding the firm. When accounting firms incorporated management consultants into their organizations, this structural overlap shifted the focus of attention from overseeing the accuracy of client's books to using exposure to accounting ledgers to identify consulting opportunities. Similarly, this was at the heart of the contestation around the attempts to create multidisciplinary partnerships with the acquisitions between accounting and law firms (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).

The sequencing of historical events are theorized as the occurrences that dislocate, rearticulate, and transform structures (Sewell, 1996, p. 844). By structures, Sewell refers to changes in cultural schemas, shifts of resources, and the emergence of new sources of power. Because structures are often overlapping, any rupture has the potential of cascading into multiple structural changes, particularly when the events are characterized by heightened emotion, collective creativity, and ritual. The accumulation of events can result in a path-dependent process in which shifts in the symbolic interpretation of events are locked in place by simultaneous shifts in resources. Such sequencing produces more events that reinforce or erode the dominance of the incumbent logic. To use Sewell's examples, the cultural transformation of the French revolution was a significant event of new vocabulary, for example, Bastille, revolution, people, liberty, despotism, and so on – words that took on heightened emotion and new authoritative meanings that taken together reshaped politics. Cultural transformations were both stimulated and locked into place by simultaneous shifts in both resources (e.g., the transfer of control of guns and ammunition from the royal forces to the Paris militia) and in modes of power (e.g., the formation of the new Paris militia) (Sewell, 1996, pp. 861–862).

In the context of accounting, Edwin Waterhouse with his Quaker background exemplifies an institutional entrepreneur who drew on the logics of both the religions and the professions in promulgating the necessity of the auditing function in businesses (Jones, 1995). Indeed, Waterhouse's hybrid logics spurred the use of "Quaker ethics" as the basis for the fiduciary logic used by other accounting firms seeking to increase their legitimacy in the auditing function. Moreover, the historical sequencing of events around the aftermath of the South Seas speculative bubble in England further consolidated Waterhouse's following to the fiduciary logic.

A more recent example stemming from the Arthur Anderson scandal illustrates how the institutional logics of the professions, are transposed to another sector, the corporation. Dugan (2002) noted,

> Mr. Rider says that after Ernst & Young set sales goals for partners and put them through sales training in 1995, he spent one-third of his time on "practice development." "I sold professional services." Once, he says, a client barked at him: "Are you my auditor or a salesperson?"

In architecture, the sequencing of historical events, for example, the invention of the elevator, transformed aesthetic understandings of architecture. Jordy (1986) noted a change in logics with the rise of the Commercial school, which catered to real estate developers who wished to reduce building costs and economically use space to maximize their return on investment. The Chicago Commercial school was exemplified by Louis Sullivan's slogan *form follows* function and characterized by simplicity in ornamentation, an emphasis on economical use of land through height that was made possible by the elevator and a focus on blending interior and exterior space such as reduced wall size and more windows. Frank Lloyd Wright, Sullivan's employee–apprentice, amended and extended Sullivan's aesthetic orientation with his motto – *form and function are felt as one*. Wright transported this new aesthetic of simplicity and space from the Commercial school into residential (e.g., Robie Residence (1909), Falling Water (1934)) and institutional (e.g., Unity Temple (1906), Taliesin (1911)) buildings.

In sum, institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, and historical-event sequencing are the motors of institutional and organizational change. Historical sequencing of events provides the temporal framework to understand how structural overlap provides access to different institutional logics and how institutional entrepreneurs who perceived analogies and discontinuities in institutional logics turn them into actions that maintain stability or initiate change.

DATA AND METHODS

Methods of Analysis

The use of institutional logics requires the development of formal typologies. Typologies are composed of two parts: (a) the description of ideal types and (b) the set of assertions that relate the ideal types to the dependent variable (Doty & Glick, 1994). The development of ideal types is a method for the multidimensional classification of phenomena that are not restricted by the events of the selected cases and the characteristics of the organizations in the sample. As theoretical models, the ideal types offer hypotheses that can be tested by examining the similarities and dissimilarities between the institutional logics' ideal types and the independent and dependent variables presented in the cases.

Table A.1 abbreviates the key concepts and theories of the ideal types for each of the six societal-level sectors.[2] We developed industry specific instantiations of these societal-level institutional logics from our empirical data on accounting, architecture, and publishing. The external validation of the industry-level logics is supported by their degree of fit with the broader societal-level sector institutional logics derived from Weber (1922/1978), represented in Table A.1

Data Sources

We relied on historical and contemporary directories, books, articles, and news releases. The first author conducted 30 interviews with higher-education publishers, key investment bankers who specialize in publishing, and the staff of the Association of American Publishers. The second author conducted 38 structured in-depth interviews with architects, engineers, their clients, and the staff at the American Institute of Architects (AIA). While the third author conducted several informal interviews, his main data contribution stemmed from his prior experience as a certified public accountant (CPA) and as an employee of a large accounting firm. Based on this experience, he was able to share ethnographic experiences and interpretations of our historical data. We used these data sources to develop the ideal types presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 and to associate them with the historical periods they dominated.

Case Selection

We selected cases based on the 2000 United States Census, which identified industries with knowledge-based assets as the fastest growing sectors of the economy – accounting, management consulting, architecture, financial services, and entertainment (e.g., film, publishing, and music). From these census categories, we selected accounting, architecture, and publishing because they represent the diversity of industries with knowledge based assets.

CASE INSTANTIATIONS

Accounting

The rise of public accounting as a profession began in the mid-1800s (Jones, 1995). Accounting has transformed from the *fiduciary logic* designed to protect the public interest from market opportunism at the onset of the industrial revolution in Victorian England to the present situation in which accounting is dominated by a *corporate logic* seeking profit maximization itself in the context of the Big Four firms (Price, Waterhouse, Coopers; KPMG; Ernst & Young; Deloitte & Touche) in a global business world (Zeff, 2003b). In the wake of repeated corporate scandals, self-regulation by the profession and corporate governance has been increasingly supplanted by state regulation and oversight.

According to the *fiduciary logic*, accounting firms' identity is that of a profession similar to educators, priests, lawyers, and physicians with responsibilities to the broader community (Jones, 1995). Logics of the professions dictate that accountants focus their attention on verifying the legitimacy of client's financial statements. In the late 1890s, the legitimacy of accountants to perform this role was a consequence of their reputation, standardization, and conservatism in an otherwise unscrupulous and unstandardized business environment. Their mission is to build the legitimacy of the public corporation and the prestige of the partnership. The authority of the profession is solidified through professional associations supported by government regulation (Dennis, 2000; Zeff, 2003a) and a strategy of standardizing audit procedures, accounting practices, and report presentation to authenticate client's financial statements (Jones, 1995; Zeff, 2003a). Governance of the accounting firm and adherence to professional values is maintained by restricting partnership/ownership to fellow CPAs (Zeff, 2003b).

The professional integrity of the fiduciary logic was initially influenced by the audit practices of Price Waterhouse and its partner Edwin Waterhouse, with his Quaker background and sense of integrity (Jones, 1995). Following this Quaker ethos, early professional associations worked to establish rules of conduct such as a ban on self-promotion (Zeff, 2003a). "In the historical case of the 'gentleman's Profession' of accounting, sales people were once unheard of and thought to be antithetical to preserving the mission and authority of the profession as the conscience of capitalism" (Dugan, 2002). Regulators recognizing the importance of reputation and expertise to profession building supported the development of audit procedures and accounting standards (Zeff, 2003a). In 1924, the Board of Tax Appeals certified that lawyers and CPAs were the only professionals qualified to practice before the board (Dennis, 2000).

In contrast, according to the *corporate logic*, accountants' identities are grounded in the belief that accounting is an industry in which attention should be focused on selling services and generating profits (Zeff, 2003b). Accountants' legitimacy is derived from the size of the firm and the scope of services offered (Previts, 1985). Moreover, their mission is to remedy the problem of seasonal stability (Previts, 1985) and to build the status of the firm through growth (Jones, 1995). Managing partners, management committees, and government regulation (Zeff, 2003b) are the authorities guiding this mission according to two strategies: (a) growth through mergers and acquisitions (Jones, 1995; Dennis, 2000) and (b) increasing differentiation on client services (Zeff, 2003b).

The accounting firm governed by a corporate logic resembles the private corporation with majority ownership concentrated in the hands of CPAs.

The corporate logic was vividly portrayed in the 1980 address given by Wm. R. Gregory, outgoing chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Public Oversight Board,

> It seems that the effects of the phenomenal growth in the profession and competitive pressures have created in some CPAs attitudes that are intensely commercial and nearly devoid of the high-principled conduct that we have come to expect of a true professional. It is sad that we seem to have become a breed of highly skilled technicians and businessmen, but have subordinated courtesy, mutual respect, self-restraint, and fairness for a quest for firm growth and a preoccupation with the bottom line. (quoted in Zeff, 2003b, p. 267)

Under this logic, firms began negotiating accounting treatments with their clients rather than dictating the standards, all to serve clients and protect their revenue base (Zeff, 2003b). In 1979, the chairman and chief executive of Arthur Anderson was forced into early retirement for suggesting that the company be split into two companies, audit and consulting. (Zeff, 2003b). Table 1 summarizes these ideal-type attributes as the fiduciary and corporate institutional *logics*.

The transformation of accounting in the United States from the fiduciary logic to the corporate logic, and a failure of both, which led to increasing state regulation has been driven, to a significant extent, by the historical sequencing of market and corporate scandals. We examine the transformation of these institutional logics and highlight the institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, and historical events that promoted this transformation in logics. The American public-accounting profession arose against the backdrop of an unregulated, unscrupulous business environment seen in the numerous bankruptcies associated with the South Seas speculative bubble (Jones, 1995). While England's Parliament pursued state regulation in the form of an audit requirement as early as 1856, the American public-accounting profession pursued professional control guided by a *fiduciary logic* to protect the public against unscrupulous investor behavior.

The Big Four accounting firms' formations can be traced back to Victorian London (Previts, 1985) and institutional entrepreneurs: Edwin Waterhouse (Jones, 1995), Arthur Young, and John B. Niven from Britain and Arthur Andersen, Charles Waldo Haskins, and Elijah Watt Sells in America (Zeff, 2003a) – all having founded firms and associations, and acting to institutionalize the profession with the fiduciary logic. For example, Edwin Waterhouse, in the name of the firm Price Waterhouse, entered the business-advisory practice of auditing in 1866. Waterhouse, a member of

Table 1. Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in Public Accounting.

Characteristic	Fiduciary Logic	Corporate Logic
Economic system	Personal capitalism	Managerial capitalism
Sources of identity	Accounting as a profession	Accounting as an industry
Sources of legitimacy	Reputation of CPAs Standardization and conservatism	Scale and scope of firm
Sources of authority	Professional association Government regulation	Management committee Managing partners Government regulation
Basis of mission	Build legitimacy of public corporation Build prestige of partnership	Build seasonal stability of firm Build status position of firm through growth
Basis of attention	Selling legitimacy	Selling services Generating profits
Basis of strategy	Standardize and authenticate client financial statements	Growth through mergers and acquisitions Differentiate on client service
Logic of investment	Build legitimacy of profession	Build wealth and career of partners
Governance mechanism	CPA partnership CPA ownership	Private corporation Majority CPA ownership
Institutional entrepreneurs	British: Waterhouse, Young, Niven American: Haskels, Sells, Andersen	Big Eight accounting firms
Event sequencing	1896–1921 State CPA legislation; 1933 & 1934 Securities acts 1938 SEC accounting series release no. 4	World War II 1965–1975 Consolidation to Big Eight Corporate merger wave 1970s–1980s FTC ruling on open competition 1980s–1990s Consolidation to Big Five 2001 Enron collapse 2001 Andersen bankruptcy
Structural overlap	Intentional reduction of overlap CPA – lawyers in tax practice	CPA – consulting CPA – lawyers in tax practice

the Society of Friends, conceptually framed auditing from the standpoint of ethics and hence set the tone for the fledgling profession. As railways expanded, their audit shareholders adopted the practice of an outside accounting adviser to legitimize the companies' accounting statements. The practice spread to banking and financial institutions, further solidifying the professional practice of audits (Jones, 1995). While at this time the insolvency business made-up the majority of revenues of accounting firms, the practice of audits continued to gain in popularity, and Price Waterhouse saw the opportunity to develop its nascent firm around this new market (Jones, 1995). As innovators and institutional entrepreneurs in the audit business, Price Waterhouse drew on their Quaker ethos to help shape the accounting profession – with honesty, ethical behavior, independence, and objectivity as the corner stones.

This fiduciary logic was institutionalized through the professionalization of public accounting from the late 1800s through 1930s. In 1887, 31 accountants formed the American Association of Public Accountants (AAPA). Although this organization lacked any statutory power and was limited in its influence (Dennis, 2000), it eventually evolved into the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which has had power and influence over the profession since the middle of the 20th century. In 1896, the New York state legislature passed the first CPA accreditation law (Dennis, 2000) paving the way for other states to follow and establishing the present system in accounting of certification by each state rather than by a federal body. In 1902, the Industrial Commission called for annual audits of trusts (Dennis, 2000), which due to the lack of auditing and reporting standards, had little impact on practice but did set the precedent to give CPAs the jurisdictional claim over professional auditing services. In 1905, accountants gained a collective voice, when the Illinois national association took over publication of the *Auditor*, rechristening it the *Journal of Accountancy* (Dennis, 2000) and providing CPAs with a trade magazine to discuss the profession and its future direction, In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment to the US Constitution ratified a levy of federal income tax, providing another service venue for accountants. By 1921 all 48 states had passed CPA legislation, in essence creating a legal franchise (Previts, 1985) and in 1924, the profession's role in tax work was solidified when the Board of Tax Appeals certified that lawyers and CPAs were the only professionals qualified to practice before the board (Dennis, 2000). Thus CPAs benefited from another legal franchise. Professional control of accounting was justified by a fiduciary logic and legally established within the American market by the mid-1920s.

The market crash of 1929 tested the professional control and public's trust of public accounts. With the crash came a public outcry over the breach of public trust and a greater reliance on public accounting to protect the public interest in the marketplace. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, written in response to the 1929 collapse, changed the foundations of American business by requiring an audit by an independent public or certified accountant (Dennis, 2000), further solidifying a legal franchise to the public accounting profession. Professional self-rule received further support in 1938 when the SEC issued SEC accounting series release no. 4, recognizing the standards used by private-sector accountants. In essence, the SEC delegated its standard setting authority to the national association, now named the American Institute of Accountants (Dennis, 2000).

After World War II, accounting began to drift away from the fiduciary logic and move toward a corporate logic, driven by a focus on the selling of services and the government's reconceptualization of public accounting firms as corporations rather than protectors of the public trust. We see this shift toward a focus on services in Donald Perry, a Cooper & Lybrand partner, essay in *Accounting Review*, April 1944:

> Prior to the war the average accounting practice was largely composed of audit work and preparation of tax returns sweetened on occasion by nonrecurring system engagements or cases dealing with new financing. The scope of services rendered by accountants has been considerably extended in war time.
>
> (Previts, 1985, p. 73)

The new focus of selling services solved another problem for the accounting profession, slack resources. In 1945, Paul Grady (Andersen partner 1923–1942, executive assistant to the office of the Secretary of Navy, 1942–1943; Price Waterhouse partner, 1944–1960) wrote:

> The curse of public accounting in the past has been the tremendous stress and strain on all personnel during the first quarter of the year, accompanied by the large numbers of temporary workers ... the basic causes of the old peak season are still with us and they must be conquered as a condition precedent to satisfactory progress by the profession.
>
> (Previts, 1985, p. 89)

From such addresses, it became increasingly clear that consulting engagements were not only a solution to the seasonal instability of the business because such engagements could be scheduled in times other than the peak season of the first quarter (Previts, 1985), but also now included in the very definition of the profession itself.

Shortly after this address, the profession started to focus in earnest on how to sell services. For example, in 1953, the AICPA started its first committee on management services to encourage smaller firms into the practice that the big boys, acting as institutional entrepreneurs, had already begun. For instance, Touche Ross had already been testing the waters since 1947 (Previts, 1985). The AICPA published information on advisory services in 1953 and 1957, outlining the scope of services and the ins and outs of the practice. In 1954, the AICPA stated that advisory services were becoming "the third dimension of accounting" (Previts, 1985).

Once more a market scandal punctuated the American accounting profession. The accounting profession this time both reasserted its importance and significantly decoupled itself from its protector role. In 1970, Penn Central Railroad went bankrupt (Dennis, 2000). The controversy regarding financial reporting and auditing came to light and the AICPA moved into action to maintain its legitimacy. The result, in 1973, was the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a board independent of the AICPA. Members of the board are or have been either CPAs or financial officers of corporations, ensuring an understanding of accounting. However, to maintain the appearance of independence, members must resign their positions during their term on the board. Thus, audit standards continued to remain in the hands of the AICPA and also became decoupled from the profession by the creation of an "independent" FASB board, supposedly distinct from the profession and its guardian role.

This decoupling process perhaps reflects a shift in the conceptual tone of the accounting profession from ethical institutional entrepreneurs like Edwin Waterhouse and Arthur Anderson to the influential role of The Big Eight accounting firms, who focused on service and reflected the market rationalization of their services. The Big Eight accounting firms resulted not only from mergers of accounting firms, but more importantly from the mergers of their corporate clients. Corporations began acquiring smaller companies as well as bringing subsidiaries closer in house, when this occurred, audits were conducted by the parent company's auditor. For example, Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) began auditing English Ford Motor Co. and its subsidiary in 1911 and continued until 1960 when the parent company, Ford, took it over and transferred the audit to its accountants, Coopers & Lybrand (Jones, 1995). In other instances, mid-size firms who were auditing smaller companies were absorbed into the Big Eight when their clients merged with corporations.

> Price Waterhouse was, therefore, active in the movement which led to the polarization of the profession. In order to serve existing audit clients adequately and compete effectively with its major competitors it was forced to merge with medium-sized practices in various locations. This process, repeated elsewhere, was responsible for the virtual disappearance of the medium-sized accountancy firm.
>
> (Jones, 1995, p. 276)

With the consolidation of the industry, accounting firms began to look more and more like the companies they were auditing.

The consolidation of public accounting and the shift from fiduciary to corporate logics is reflected in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions that forced the profession to alter its code of conduct to allow for competitive bidding, direct and uninvited solicitation of clients, and to allow commissions from non-attest clients during the 1970s and 1980s (Zeff, 2003a). The FTC actions treated accounting firms as it would a corporation attempting to increase the saliency of the corporate logic within the profession. "Competition among firms came to be signified more in the idiom of commerce – the aggressive pursuit of profit – thus, creating conflicts with the previous organizing conception of professional values" (Zeff, 2003a, p. 202). This competition among accounting firms had the effect of driving down auditing prices (Zeff, 2003a). As a result income targets were set by upper management, underperforming partners were replaced, and non-CPA partners were increasingly included in management (Zeff, 2003b). These competitive pressures were central forces in consolidating the Big Eight to the Big Five. Soon accounting firms began to offer partner incentive packages similar to those offered by their clients, clients increased the pressure on auditors to "negotiate" accounting stances in response to their own incentive packages, and consulting services were seen as reducing the independence of the audit firm (Zeff, 2003b). The structural overlap of these previously distinct functions that had been adamantly restricted under the fiduciary logic was now not only embraced under the corporate logic, but was increasingly propelled by the marriage of accounting and consulting services to clients.

Market scandals once again punctuated the accounting profession and dominated the public discourse. In 2001 and 2002, Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Global Crossing are just a few of the high-profile corporate scandals grounded in accounting malfeasance to rock the investment world that have been complicated by this structural overlap of auditing and consulting. The Big Five accounting firms have been reduced to the Big Four with the bankruptcy of the Anderson accounting firm in the wake of the Enron collapse. Self-rule of the accounting profession is viewed with skepticism. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a private non-profit corporation charged with protecting investors and ensuring that the financial statements are audited with high standards of quality, independence, and ethics. This independent board will replace the AICPA's Audit Standards Board as the entity responsible for setting audit standards, and will foster further moves away from a reliance on the fiduciary logic as a governance mechanism for accounting. In 2005, the US government publicly accused KPMG, one of the remaining Big Four accounting firms, with selling tax shelters it knew were unacceptable to the Internal Revenue Service, depriving the public of tax income while generating $124 million in fees for the firm. Ironically, the government is reluctant to indict KPMG for fear that there will not be enough large accounting firms to audit America's large corporations (Nocera, 2005).

Throughout the history of the accounting profession, transformation has been predicated, externally, by financial scandal and followed by regulation. Auditing began in England in response to insolvencies (Jones, 1995). The market crash of 1929 led to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as the early development of standardized accounting principles. Penn Central's bankruptcy predicated the move to the FASB as an independent authority of financial reporting. The FTC expanded the structural overlap and competitiveness of the profession by forcing the AICPA to liberalize its professional standards (Zeff, 2003b). And finally, Enron sparked the transformation to an independent board (the PCAOB) to oversee audit procedures (Dennis, 2000). These external incidents have all contributed to move the profession from a fiduciary logic to a corporate logic, which is increasingly regulated by the state.

Internal to the profession, efficiencies and growth have fueled change. World War II exposed the profession to additional markets and services, opening the opportunity to utilize slack resources through the reduction of the seasonality of work processes (Previts, 1985). The widespread growth and consolidation of accounting firms fostered the need for alternative control structures and organization within the firm (Zeff, 2003b). In response to competitive pressures brought on by the liberalization of professional standards and structural overlap, accounting firms created incentive pay packages and escalated non-CPA ownership as a means to motivate and retain productive personnel (Zeff, 2003b). In essence, the accounting firm had transformed from a professional firm to a corporation. The American accounting firms led this transformation from fiduciary to corporate logic with their emphasis on selling services. For example, Canadian accounting firms experienced this transformation much later during the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002).

Ironically, accounting originally became a profession and adopted the fiduciary logic because of the failure of the market to protect the public investor from unscrupulous firms. However, market rationalization by accounting firms and public scandals leading to increasing regulation by the state highlight how the accounting profession in embracing a corporate logic abandoned its original mission to uphold the fiduciary professional logic. In this process, large public accounting firms became accused of accomplices of unscrupulous behavior. This shift in logics was seen as the cause of accounting malfeasance – the inability of the accounting firms to proctor the oversight of corporate ledgers – resulted in greater state regulation.

Architecture

The origin of the architectural profession dates to Vitruvius, a 1st century Roman writer, who described an architect as one who "combined firmness and utility with beauty" (Boyer & Mitgang, 1996), providing the seeds for multiple interpretations of architecture as beauty, utility, and safety. The American architectural profession has focused on beauty with designers as the ideal professional (Brain, 1989; Cuff, 1995; Fisher, 2000), whereas a concern for safety and utility is most oft associated with engineering ideals and has been used by architects who were also trained as engineers (e.g., Guillén, 1999; Woods, 1999). Thus, the American architectural profession is comprised of a pair of often-competing logics: an artistic concern for the beauty of the built environment, emphasizing design skills, and a concern for safety and utility of buildings, emphasizing technology. These logics combined with corporate and market logics to create two hybrid logics, an *aesthetic logic* and an *efficiency logic*. Although the AIA and scholars of the architectural profession (e.g., Blau, 1984; Brain, 1989; Cuff, 1995, Gutman, 1988) recognize only the aesthetic logic, scholars who discuss critical American buildings (cf. see Jordy, 1986 and Pierson's, 1978 series on American buildings) reveal the key role of architect–engineer and how the architectural profession has been oscillating between these two logics for over a century.

The logic of aesthetics marries the profession's artistic concerns with the marketplace. According to this logic, the identity of the architect is that of the artist–entrepreneur, who as a solo practitioner uses the design skills of his or her small boutique firm to enhance the beauty of the built environment. Their legitimacy stems from their reputations as artists and the visibility of their buildings within communities and throughout history. For example, the first "celebrity" architect was H. H. Richardson, who helped to establish architecture as an American profession in the 1850s (Woods, 1999, p. 110). Authority resides in the artist–entrepreneur in their *atelier* – an apprenticeship and mentoring system that teaches and focuses attention on design. The aesthetic logic also exerts control on practices through university programs, registration exams, and design competitions. Their mission is to build their firm's prestige and reputation, primarily through design competitions juried by fellow professionals. Because buildings are a very expensive art form, architects' strategy depends on connections with prestigious and wealthy patrons and, more recently, public agencies for commissions (Gutman, 1988; Larson, 1993). Attention is focused not only on design in resolving building problems, but also on business skills in establishing the practice (Blau, 1984; Blau & McKinley, 1979; Draper, 1977; Mintzberg, Otis, Shamsie, & Waters, 1988; Jones & Lichtenstien, 2000). This hybridized mix of profession and market logics stems from a lack of state and federal funding for arts and buildings during the formative early years of the profession and the nation. Thus, American architects relied more on the marketplace than their European counterparts. As Woods (1999, p. 168) points out, "French, German and Italian architects aspired to public positions, state appointments that on the Continent conferred honor and authority... . British architects...although independent practitioners...shared the upper-class aversion to 'trade'." For American artist–entrepreneurs, the central challenge is "to somehow stand apart from commercial pressures but still compete within the market" (Woods, 1999, p. 31).

One of our interviewees described the aesthetic logic with "We love architecture and we do it out of a love for the profession. I like to start out with a blank sheet of paper and a year later have a building that is a great building or start out with an old run down historic building and a year or year and a half later end up with something wonderful... . Leaving the world with good architecture is a value of ours." This aesthetic logic is the ideal that dominates the profession, both historically (Brain, 1989; Draper, 1977; Blau & McKinley, 1979; Woods, 1999) and more recently. A comprehensive survey of over 35,000 students in 103 accredited architectural programs during 1994–1995 by the Carnegie Institute showed the top two priorities for students entering architecture: 44% wanted to use their creative abilities and 39% wanted to improve the quality of the built environment (Boyer & Mitgang, 1996).

In contrast, the logic of efficiency marries the profession's safety and utility concerns with the corporation. Within this logic, an architect is often a managing partner in a large architectural–engineering (A–E) firm whose identity is based on their ability to resolve technological challenges and enhance the utility of a clients' buildings. Their legitimacy derives from using science and technology to resolve building problems, generally in regard to efficient and economical usage. They tend to practice in large multidisciplinary, and increasingly global firms and are organized by specialization. Authority and governance is hierarchically based—a principle in charge oversees the work of many staff and project architects, engineers, and other specialists. The mission for architect–engineers is to gain building commissions for large corporate clients, which provides technological challenges and also supports the staff of their large, multidisciplinary firms. Their attention is focused on technology and how new innovations can enhance a building's safety and utility and create more efficient and economical construction processes.

The logic of efficiency was articulated by William Le Baron Jenney in an 1889 lecture to young architects:

> Engineering is the science of building well and economically, and architecture is the application of art to engineering… . The practical is at the bottom of the whole, and underlies all that makes claim to architecture. The plan and the entire construction…is purely practical science, leaving but a small and superficial area for the application of art.
>
> (quoted in Jordy, 1986, p. 40)

Although the efficiency logic represents only 2% of architectural firms (e.g., firms that have more than 100 employees), these firms have historically cornered a larger portion of billings in the building market (Blau, 1984; Boyer & Mitgang, 1996; Boyle, 1977) and continue to do so (AIA, 2003).

Although the efficiency logic is acknowledged neither by AIA rhetoric nor scholars of the architectural profession, these two hybrid logics have long coexisted in dialectic tension and represent a partitioning of the building market in the United States. The small boutique firms make up almost two-thirds of all architectural firms and are more likely to garner design awards. In contrast, the less numerous but larger multidisciplinary firms (e.g., only 2% of firms have 100+ employees) corner the larger share of building revenues (AIA, 2003). The remaining almost one-third of architectural firms involve solo practitioners; they plod along, making a living but unlikely to either garner design awards or build the corporate offices and facilities that generate large building revenues. Thus, two distinct and viable niches – design awards or volume dollar sales – coexist in the architectural profession. Table 2 presents the ideal type attributes of the aesthetic and efficiency institutional logics.

In the United States, the profession of architecture has cycled between the aesthetic and efficiency logics as seen in the dominant building styles: Beaux-Arts, Commercial school, Art Nouveau/Arts and Crafts, Modernism, Postmodernism, and the current confusion. These cycles between the aesthetic and efficiency logics within the architectural profession reflect the historic rivalry between architects and engineers based on a guiding logic of design aesthetics versus technology. These cycles in dominant styles and

Table 2. Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in Architecture.

Characteristic	Aesthetic Logic	Efficiency Logic
Economic system	Personal capitalism	Managerial capitalism
Sources of identity	Architect as artist–entrepreneur	Architect as engineer–manager
Sources of legitimacy	Reputation of architect Aesthetics of design	Scale and scope of firm Efficiency and economics of design
Sources of authority	Design prowess	Managing partner or supervisor
Basis of mission	Build personal reputation Build prestige of firm	Build multidisciplinary firm Build market position of firm
Basis of attention	Resolve design problems and entrepreneurial challenges	Resolve technological and organizational challenges
Basis of strategy	Increase prestige of patron or government sponsor Win design competitions	Increase number of corporate clients and engagement frequency Increase markets for services
Logic of investment	Build wealth and prestige of entrepreneurs	Build wealth of partners
Governance mechanism	Entrepreneurial firm (atelier) Profession	Partnership ownership Private global multidisciplinary corporation
Institutional entrepreneurs	H. H. Richardson, R. M. Hunt, R. R. Ware, Robert Venturi	Louis Sullivan, Wm Le Baron Jenney, Walter Gropius, Mies Van der Rohe
Event sequencing	1857 Founding of architecture profession 1893 Chicago Fair reinforces aesthetic of Beaux art tradition 1967 Postmodernism treatise rejects aesthetic of minimalism	Increased immigration and industrialization 1871 Chicago fire provides commercial building opportunities World War I provides building opportunities and implementation of new aesthetic, which rejects history World War II immigration of modernist architects to US
Structural overlap	Professions – architects, engineers, and contractors Clients – government and wealthy individuals as patrons	Professions – architects, engineers, and contractors Clients – real estate speculators and corporations

partitioning of the building market are sparked by the structural overlap among architects, engineers, contractors, builders, and other specialists who vie for control of building projects. This competition hybridizes the logics seen throughout architectural history such as those of the artist–entrepreneur and the architect–engineer. Because buildings are expensive, a focus on one type of client – government, wealthy patron, or large corporation – shifts architects from focusing on buildings as statements of beauty to buildings as investment tools. It is enlightening to review the historical sequence of events and the institutional entrepreneurs who triggered cycles in these hybrid logics.

Beaux-Arts, which emphasized the traditional and historical foundations of beauty, was revealed through design competitions (Draper, 1977). This aesthetic logic was imported from France and institutionalized into to the US by several institutional entrepreneurs: R. M. Hunt, H. H. Richardson, William Robert Ware, and the architectural partners McKim, Mead, and White. R. M. Hunt and H. H. Richardson were trained in Paris at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts and founded the American Institute of Architects in 1857. H. H. Richardson was one of the most influential and prolific American architects of the 19th century, whose influence is seen in the "Richardsonian" style based on Romanesque traditions (Burden, 2002). The Beaux-Arts approach was institutionalized into architectural education by William Robert Ware, who hired Beaux-Arts faculty when he founded both MIT's (1868) and Columbia's (1871) architectural programs (Woods, 1999). Finally, the Beaux-Arts approach was institutionalized into architectural practice by the firm of McKim, Mead, and White, which was one of largest architectural firms but also emphasized design. The firm's partners trained apprentices in an atelier style (mentoring and oversight of apprentices by a master). Over 500 architects who were trained by McKim, Mead, and White founded their own architectural practice (Woods, 1999, p. 146).

The hybrid logic of the architect–engineer and the market niche of Commercial architecture arose when increased immigration and industrialization put pressure on land use in major cities. The Commercial school is most associated with Chicago, where an 1871 fire razed 61,000 (or one-third) of the city's dwellings (Jordy, 1986) and allowed Chicago to dramatically revise its building landscape. In addition, its population doubled and its real estate value went up over 600% between 1880 and 1890, "from $130,000 per quarter acre to $900,000" (Dupré, 1996). Such institutional entrepreneurs as Louis Sullivan and William Le Baron Jenney of the Commercial school were engineers who had become architects, allowing them to solve the technological challenges of tall buildings. The first true skyscraper, which used a metal framework rather than walls to support the building, was the Home Insurance building by William Le Baron Jenney in 1895. Another institutional entrepreneur, Burnham, an architect–engineer in a leading Chicago firm at the turn of the 19th century, stated: ''you can't do big things unless you have big organization'' (Boyle, 1977, p. 315). For example, a large commercial project in the late 1800s required between 3,500 and 5,500 drawings and copies, all of which were done by draftsmen (Woods, 1999, p. 121). Financed by the Brooks brothers, real estate speculators from Boston, the Chicago Commercial school promulgated the purpose of buildings as an investment tool. The Commercial school minimized building ornamentation because it was costly. The public did not react favorably to this new style. Architect–Engineer William Le Baron Jenney's Leiter store in 1879 was criticized by neighboring landlords who protested against its ''meanness of appearance'' (Jordy, 1986, p. 13). These negative reactions signified Americans' concern about the onslaught of industrialization and technology and a desire by many to reaffirm traditional and historical conceptions of buildings and beauty.

The Chicago Fair of 1893 reflected these social strains and reactions against industrialization and commercialization. During the Fair, the buildings that reaffirmed the Beaux-Arts ideals of ornamentation and classical style were popular and influential (Brain, 1989). In addition, the Arts and Crafts movement, which started in Britain and moved to the US in the late 1800s and early 1900s, called for a return to handcrafted furniture, textiles, houses, and other objects, rejecting mass-produced items (Clark, 1972; Cumming & Kaplan, 1991). Thus, we see at the end of the 1800s, a conflict between the aesthetic and efficiency logics, reflecting the social transitions of the era. As Brady (2000) noted ''The underlying issue was whether creativity or technology should be the stronger design determinant.'' The aesthetic logic reacted against industrialization, valorized classical aesthetic, and historical traditions, and saw the practitioner as an artist–entrepreneur. In contrast, the efficiency logic drew upon such new technologies as metal frames and elevators to solve building problems of urbanization, cultivated a new aesthetic of ''modernism'' based on new materials and mass-produced products, and required large, multidisciplinary practices of architects, engineers, and contractors to design and erect tall, complex buildings.

In the US, Frank Lloyd Wright was an institutional entrepreneur who transposed the modern aesthetic from commercial buildings for corporate clients in urban centers to residences for wealthy patrons in suburban areas. In 1887, Wright began working for Louis Sullivan, one of the premier institutional entrepreneurs of the Chicago Commercial school (Blake, 1996;

Jordy, 1986). By 1902, Wright had his own practice and designed residential homes and churches in a modernist aesthetic. The modern aesthetic was characterized by minimal ornamentation and a refusal to imitate historical traditions, embraced new technologies and materials, and heralded a ''democratic'' architecture. The modernist esthetic of structural minimalism is captured by Mies van der Rohe's famous dictum: *less is more*. Between 1925 and 1928, modernism was an international movement; European architects, dismayed by the ravages of World War I, rejected historical precedence and looked to technology to transform society (Larson, 1993). The modernist aesthetic, however, did not become a dominant style in American architecture until the 1930s, when European modernist architects – trained in countries with high rates of engineers in their populations (Guillén, 1999) – fled Hitler and accepted positions in key US educational institutions. For example, Mies van der Rohe fled to the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1939 and Walter Gropius to Harvard's Graduate School of Design, heading the school from 1937 to 1953. Modernism, which began with a focus on technology, engineering, and commercial buildings, was transformed from an efficiency to an aesthetic logic through the house designs of Frank Lloyd Wright and Walter Gropius.

Postmodernism arose in reaction against the unintended consequences of modernism. For example, Wright's ideals of individual houses spread outside the city created urban sprawl and Mies van der Rohe's ''rational cities'' created ''monotonous, curtain-walled office parks along beltways and elsewhere'' (Blake, 1996, p. viii). As Blake (1996, p. ix) noted: these modern masters scaled cities and the built environment to the automobile rather than the pedestrian, removing the ''human scale'' that attracted people to cities. Postmodernism also arose in reaction against the cooptation of modernist architects by large corporate clients and against sterile landscapes described as white, glass boxes. Robert Venturi, who taught at the University of Pennsylvania, published his treatise against modernism in 1967, heralding the postmodern movement. Venturi was famous for his dictum, ''Less is a bore!'' in playful opposition to Mies van der Rohe. Scholars vary in their perceptions of when postmodernism began and declined, ranging from 1965–1988 (Larson, 1993) to 1970–1995 (Blake, 1996). Postmodernists drew upon ideals similar to those of Beaux-Arts – ornamentation and historical traditions – but differed with the use of multiple styles in one building. Ironically, postmodernism initially rejected architects' reliance on corporate clients but became influential only after large multidisciplinary firms such as Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill used postmodernist aesthetics to build corporate offices.

Since 1996, architecture has been in a "state of crisis." Leading scholars and Deans of architectural schools argue that postmodernism is the culprit because postmodernists rejected both pure historical art traditions, seen in revival movements, and technology as their basis for legitimacy and a means for developing a dominant aesthetic. This wholesale rejection left the profession without clear legitimating claims against competitors such as contractors, engineers, and project managers (Boyer & Mitgang, 1996; Fisher, 2000). Since the mid-1980s, architecture is increasingly dominated by design–build, organized by contractors who hire architects and focus on cost reductions through streamlining the construction process. Design–Build integrates the design and construction phases, placing them both under the control of the contractor. One of our architects explained, "You have to design to a budget instead of to the need… . And you design differently." Design–Build values and rewards the shortest construction time, which saves the investor money. The rise of a logic of efficiency during the mid- to late 1980s corresponds roughly with a shift to the right in the US seen in the election of Reagan from 1981 to 1989, which emphasizes market forces and reduced spending on social goods such as public buildings. In addition, industry consolidation reduced the number of corporate clients and correspondingly the variety of potential approaches to buildings, reinforcing the primacy of efficiency over the aesthetic logic.

Architecture in the US has been guided by the logics of the profession hybridized in two variants: profession-market seen in an aesthetic logic and profession-corporate seen in an efficiency logic. In the early years, architects were forced to operate within the market since little government support was provided. As a professional, the architect enhanced the beauty of the built environment with their design skills. As an entrepreneur, the architect competed in the building market. This founding hybrid logic is still seen in boutique design firms and the large number of solo practitioners and small firms that populate the profession. An alternative hybrid logic, profession-corporation, arose with industrialization and was made possible by new technologies such as metal frames and elevators. Architects were also engineers, and they created new kinds of buildings – skyscrapers – that used space economically. These new buildings required large architectural firms due to the need for many draftsmen and specialists. These firms arose in response to the corporate demand for buildings and continue to capture this important and profitable niche (Blau, 1984; AIA, 2003). Thus, architecture in the US has specialized niches with two distinct hybrid logics: the artist–entrepreneur who runs a small, boutique design firm guided by the logics of the profession and the market, and the managing partner who runs a large, multidisciplinary practice guided by the logics of the profession and the corporation. The ideals underlying these logics – design versus technology – are reflected in the cycles of aesthetic versus efficiency logics that have permeated and driven the practice of architecture.

Publishing

The origin of the publishing industry dates back to the distribution of bibles shortly after the invention of the printing press in the 15th century. Since then publishing has segmented into specific markets – religious, trade, school, higher education, professional, and children's books. With the rise of compulsory education in the early 1900s, large hierarchical school textbook companies developed. As educational institutions continued to develop, the higher-education market increased in size and stability relative to other publishing markets. As a result, publishers who had previously specialized in other markets such as trade and schoolbooks began to diversify into the higher-education market in search of more predictable revenues.

Since the 1950s, the higher-education publishing marketplace has changed from a culture of independent domestic publishers organized according to relational network structures (Coser, Kadushin, & Powell, 1982; Powell, 1990) to one currently exemplified by international corporate hierarchies (Epstein, 2001; Dreazen, Ip, & Kulish, 2002). The acquisition of many independent, old-line publishing houses by major corporate and foreign buyers has galvanized a new business culture (Tebbel, 1987; Greco, 1997). We examine the economic conditions in the marketplace and the management culture of the late 1950s and trace their development as the seeds of institutional change, progressing through the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. Historian John Tebbel (1981) called this transformation the great change from the gentleman publisher, focused on establishing personal imprints and author–editor relationships, to the corporate manager, focused on building market channels and the market position of the firm.

The historical sources and publishers in the interviews characterized higher-education publishing in the 1950s and 1960s as dominated by small houses that were privately owned by families and individuals who engaged in publishing as a lifestyle and a profession. The dominant authority was the founder–editor, whose legitimacy stemmed from their personal reputation in the field, their position in the organizational hierarchy, their relational networks with authors, and the stature of their books (Coser et al., 1982). The founder–editor's expertise was embodied in the individual person, and because of the uncertainty in the precise ingredients of a best seller, these leaders were accorded professional status (Hirsch, 1972).

During this era, publishers viewed their mission as building the prestige and the sales of their publishing houses. To do so, they focused their attention on strategies of organic growth, hiring and developing editors with the best reputations to build personal imprints, develop new titles, refine backlists of existing titles, and nurture relationships with authors (Asser, 1989). Editors were rewarded for their success with prestige in publisher and academic circles and in some cases by the establishment of their own personal imprints. Personal imprint publishing is an organizational form that recognizes the importance of personal and relational networks in developing new authors and manuscripts. It emphasizes the editor's professional autonomy and freedom from the influences of management and hierarchy (Powell, 1985). Governance was by family ownership and independent publishers' participation in trade associations (Chandler, 1992). Both of these practices emphasize committing capital to one's firm as a logic of investment (not necessarily seeking the highest market return on the capital). Table 3 summarizes the first set of ideal-type attributes as the *editorial logic*.

The editorial logic during this time was exemplified by comments from the executive in charge of strategic planning for a major higher-education publisher.

> In the 1960s, publishing was a different world. Most of the companies were small and private. Nobody talked about profits; sales, yes, but not profits… . Nobody cared that much about making a lot of money. You went into publishing because you liked books and authors… . A lot of the publishing companies in those days were still run by the grand old men of publishing. I used to see Mr. Knopf come in every day with his white hair and his cane and walk into his dark blue velvet office with a great mahogany desk. These were truly devoted editors, who were really into literature… . And so, this world was really not about business, you went into publishing because you liked authors and books.

The historical research and publishers in the interviews described a change that occurred in the identity and organization of publishers during the 1970s: a shift from the view of publishing as a profession to that of publishing as a business. With the change to publishing as a business, the dominant form of leadership and authority became the CEO, whose legitimacy stemmed from the firm's market position and performance rank, the corporate parent firm, and public shareholders. The mission was to build the competitive position of the firm and increase profit margins. To do so, executives changed their focus of attention to counteracting problems of

Table 3. Ideal Types of Institutional Logics in Higher-Education Publishing.

Characteristic	Editorial Logic	Market Logic
Economic system	Personal capitalism	Market capitalism
Sources of identity	Publishing as a profession	Publishing as a business
Sources of legitimacy	Personal reputation Education value	Market position of firm Share value
Sources of authority	Founder–Editor Personal networks Private ownership	CEO Corporate hierarchy Public ownership
Basis of mission	Build prestige of house Increase sales	Build competitive position of corporation Increase profits
Basis of attention	Author–Editor networks	Resource competition
Basis of strategy	Organic growth Build personal imprints	Acquisition growth Build market channels
Logic of investment	Capital committed to firm	Capital committed to market return
Governance mechanism	Family ownership Trade association	Market for corporate control
Institutional entrepreneurs	Prentice-Hall Richard Prentice Ettinger	Thomson Michael Brown
Event sequencing	Increased public funding to education Increased college enrollments Wall St. announces good investment	Founding of boutique investment bankers Founding of publishing finance newsletters
Structural overlap	1950–1960s Prentice-Hall internal corporate ventures and spin-offs 1960s Acquisitions wave	1980s Acquisitions wave

resource competition using strategies such as acquisition growth and building market channels. This attention to *marketing* books is in sharp contrast with the older editorial logic. Under that logic good books sold themselves by favorable word of mouth (Powell, 1985, p. 10), so there was little point in investing in marketing a good book. Tebbel (1996) reinforced this point by noting that in the 1960s modern marketing methods were rare in publishing, but most publishers were emphasizing the most advanced marketing techniques by the early 1980s. The logic of investment is to commit capital to its highest market return; hence the emphasis on marketing techniques and financial models. Table 3 summarizes this second set of ideal-type attributes as the *market logic*.

The market logic during this time was exemplified by one veteran publisher.

> If you take it back to the 1960s, I remember seeing some things that were odd by publishing standards at the time… . The conglomerate phenomenon was one. It was not only the big companies outside the industry buying publishers, but there were some internal examples… . What sticks in my mind was the guy who put together InText. Buying up all those little companies to make one big important company. We real publishers looked at this and wondered – why was he doing this? This didn't fit publishing as we knew it… . All of a sudden what were really editors were now managers. The outside conglomerates gave up and divested… . They couldn't understand the business…that we don't break even until nine months into the year… . But the conglomerate acquisitions gave publishers a first glance at finance skills and a new business – investment banking… . Maybe that is why we now (1991) have a market for publishing companies.

We now shift our focus from the content to the transformation of institutional logics. With growth in the college and university market, publishers needed new sources of expansion capital beyond those provided by retained earnings and the limited debt financing available to family-owned publishers. The increased state and federal support in the 1950s and 1960s were important policy events, resulting in a building boom for colleges and universities and a growing market for publishers (Coser et al., 1982). The growth of these institutional structures more easily identified the customer, the college professor (Powell, 1985), and also made use of college-supported bookstores to reduce distribution costs, in total making revenue sources more predictable. While these conditions were solutions to key problems plaguing publishing, the problem of expansion capital remained. As the historical events reveal, the problem of expansion capital was remedied by the creativity of institutional entrepreneurs.

The best-known institutional entrepreneur is the cofounder of Prentice Hall (PH), Richard Prentice Ettinger, a New York University professor of corporate finance who successfully self-published his first book in finance. More than any other publisher, Ettinger and PH brought the practices of financial, editorial, and marketing entrepreneurship to the craft of publishing and in so doing created a standardized and multiplicative model of organization (Tebbel, 1981).

Rather than relying on external bankers, PH diversified and used its cash-rich subscription-services businesses, such as its loose-leaf tax services, financial services, and incorporation services of the New York Institute of Finance, to fund a major investment in book publishing in the 1950s. Tebbel, the publishing historian, described how PH emerged as more individual and independent than other publishers. In comparison to a few competitors, most notably McGraw-Hill, PH had an unusual profit-sharing plan, a paternalistic attitude toward its employees, and organized and operated its business along the more or less standard corporate lines that characterize non-book businesses (Tebbel, 1981, pp. 247–248). These founding principles motivated expansion by both organic and acquisition growth. By 1962, PH had become the largest publisher of college books in the world with 22 divisions and subsidiaries (Tebbel, 1981, p. 250). Moreover, PH had spun off more companies that successfully established themselves as players in the industry than any other publisher. How did such institutional change take place?

One former president of PH stated,

> When John Powers was president of PH in the 1960s he admired the job ''Tex'' Thornton was doing in building the conglomerate Litton Industries. Powers was enamored of the idea of separate and independent profit centers and transposed this corporate logic to PH to motivate entrepreneurial publishing. (Interviews with the former CEO of an international higher-education publisher 1991, 1999)

Another former president added, ''PH also was the first college publisher to formally train its editors and sales reps to sell and think about markets. Until then, college travelers were old fashioned bards and anachronistic public relations arms carrying gossip from one professor to another. When Paul Andrews became head of the college division, he really pushed the concept of selling – it changed the industry'' (Interviews with a former president and CEO of a major higher-education publisher 1994, 1999).

The PH sales training programs were the seed garden for the editorial talent needed to propel newly founded and acquired divisions. Even executives in competing companies proudly stated that they were initially trained by the PH method, including past presidents of Addison-Wesley and Holt, Rinehart & Winston (Interview with a former executive of a major higher-education publisher and director of a university press 1991). And while competing companies such as Macmillan and Harper worried about employee unions, PH motivated its employees through an innovative combination of public-stock offerings and employee profit-sharing arrangements. As Ettinger envisioned, founders and rejuvenators were paired to stimulate ''group management'' and break down the traditional model of management by a dominant individual editor characteristic of 19th century publishing. First-generation editors initially trained at PH went on to train publishers who founded second-generation companies such as Brooks/Cole and Prindle, Weber & Schmidt.

These sibling companies were not only related by common sales and editorial training experiences, they were also linked by sophisticated financing and employee incentive policies. For example, when Wadsworth and Merrill were spun off from PH in 1964, PH shareholders received a share of Wadsworth and Merrill stock for every 10 shares of PH stock they owned. This was a dividend to PH stockholders in recognition of reduced earnings from funding the start-up and acquisition costs of Wadsworth and Merrill. Moreover, the employee profit-sharing plans were partially invested in the stock of these companies, thus linking owners, managers, workers, and other stockholders of the PH family of companies.

While the institutional entrepreneurs of PH transposed a combination of institutional logics from the family, the market, and the corporate societal sectors and set in motion a cultural transformation of the publishing business, at its core PH remained true to an editorial logic. It built its business solely among publishers who knew better than any 19th century publisher the value of book contracts that are made successful by the richness of author–editor networks. However, as the PH model spread through its family genealogy of companies, a sequence of historical events and conditions aligned to erode the dominance of the editorial logic.

Demand for textbooks continued to increase in the 1960s, fueled not only by state and federal funding, but also by continued demographic expansion of post-war baby boomers (Brint & Karabel, 1991). This led Wall Street analysts to tout higher-education publishing as a growth industry to Fortune 500 firms in the US, making publishing firms attractive targets for acquisition (Coser et al., 1982, p. 25). While Richard Prentice Ettinger was the pioneer in bringing corporate finance to the PH family of companies, this corporate- and market-finance model was becoming established with the acquisition of many traditional publishers as a part of the general conglomerate acquisition wave of the late 1960s.

However, the mid-1970s began to witness a decline in the rate of increase in college enrollments and new entrants. Additionally, non-traditional competitors who specialized in course packs and the efficient computerized distribution of used books began to enter the market (Baker & Hileman, 1987; Bernstein Research, 1994). With the lower revenues brought on by these changes, smaller publishers needed new sources of capital (Smith, 1995) and larger publishers were beginning to supplement organic-growth strategies with acquisitions. Family publishers faced the choices of going public to obtain access to public-capital markets or securing corporate capital by being acquired.

Publishing companies that sought acquisition became divisions and subsidiaries of corporate parent firms. Parent corporations imposed new performance expectations for yearly increases in profits and market share. This in turn refocused publishers' logics of investment on market processes. One publisher stated,

> Instead of being able to manage your business for the value of future cash flow, you had to manage it for yearly profits transferred to the parent company… . Every year had to be better than the previous year. The only way to get bigger rapidly is to go outside and acquire others. Then you set up a new kind of industry competitiveness, which is: I want to buy this other company because if I don't our competitors will get it. So executives' attention shifts from publishing to what it is we can buy.

Publishers explained that acquisitions could increase market share and short-term profits more quickly than organic growth. They provide an instant increase to the sales line that can be structured to have immediate, positive results on the bottom-line profit, thus achieving year-end executive bonuses and the goals of the corporate parent. One executive in charge of strategic planning for a large New York publisher stated,

> There was this idea that in order to be competitive, you had to be big and do megadeals. That way you would be large enough to buy market share. So, when people started doing deals, other people felt they had to.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, other trends and events led to further institutional change, including new sources of buy-out capital from Europe (Graham, 1994; Levin, 1996), institutional entrepreneurs founding newsletters emphasizing corporate finance and strategy, and boutique-investment banking firms specialized to publishing. A review of the *Literary Marketplace* (*LMP*) from 1940 to 1996 shows that foreign-owned higher-education publishers did not have a presence in the American marketplace until the 1980s. Beginning in 1946, just after World War II, "agents" of foreign publishers were listed in the *LMP*. By the mid-1970s, the international presence in US publishing began to shift in kind, from the presence of foreign agents (individuals) to foreign ownership and global offices (organizations). However, the attractiveness of the American marketplace with its huge college and university system and single-language market presented irresistible commercial opportunities with no parallel anywhere else in the world. As a result, foreign publishers with US offices began to surface in the *LMP* for the first time in 1978.

In 1969 and 1974, two newsletters were founded, *Educational Marketer* and *BP Report on the Business of Book Publishing*. Both were influential newsletters targeted at the executive suite and a different kind of publishing. Rather than the typical *Publishers Weekly* features about new books, authors, and imprints, these newsletters focused on reporting competitive position, ranking publishers by their control of market share, and providing information on increasing market share through acquisitions. *Acquiring parent, target company,* and *deal price* were terms used for the first time in the publishing trade literature. Zucker (1983, p. 33) and Hirsch (1986) argued that language is one of the most basic indices of cultural centrality. The linguistic framing in these newsletters imprinted new finance and marketing concepts on publishing executives' minds.

However, the efforts of foreign publishers to found divisions organically in the US market were not successful. Therefore in 1978, the European conglomerate publishers decided to acquire American publishing firms to establish a beachhead for further investment to come in the 1980s and 1990s. Michael Brown, a young accountant with Thomson in the UK, was perhaps the most notable institutional entrepreneur, making the first move on the acquisition of Wadsworth – a company originally founded by PH – and its prodigy Brooks/Cole; Prindle, Weber & Schmidt; Duxbury; and others. Throughout the 1980s, Thomson continued its campaign with the acquisitions of Southwestern, Delmar, and Boyd & Fraser, among others. Maxwell (British) acquired Macmillan, Murdock (Australian) acquired Harper & Row, Pearson Longman (British) acquired Addison-Wesley, and Von Holtzbrink (German) acquired Freeman, Worth, and St. Martins Press. Paramount eventually acquired the venerable PH in 1985, and Paramount itself was acquired in a tumultuous battle between QVC Network and Viacom in 1994. Viacom subsequently divested PH and its remodeled sibling Allyn & Bacon to Pearson Longman in 1998.

In addition, a new breed of investment banker emerged, specializing in publishing and evangelizing the market logic. John Suhler cofounded Veronis Suhler in 1981 and Joe Berkery founded Berkery Noyes in 1983. These institutional entrepreneurs were originally publishers – Suhler with CRM and CBS publishing and Berkery with former positions with Baker and Taylor and McGraw-Hill, and as president of a publishing division of Litton Industries – giving them the ability to speak the language on both sides of the street. They served as coaches, interpreters, and go-betweens to publishing executives, teaching them the ways of Wall Street. These institutional entrepreneurs suggested that during the first acquisition wave in the late 1960s, *deal makers* came from Wall Street, not from publishing, and the acquiring firms were located in industries outside of publishing.

One investment banker said,

> One of the things that will come out in your interviews is that most publishers in the 1960s didn't know what mergers and acquisitions were, much less the word investment banking.

However, in the market period, as one CEO stated, "Investment bankers are now wired into the process." The activities of these in-house investment bankers further legitimatized acquisition growth as a strategy to accomplish a firm's mission of building competitive position. Investment bankers now conduct training for publishers in how to ''stay ahead of the game'' using acquisitions as a business strategy (Fulcrum Information Services, 1998, p. 2). This training strengthens publisher's relations with the financial community and erodes publishers' networks to the academic community.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Accounting Narrative Sequence

In accounting, goal conflict occurred when firms attempted to use corporate logics to dampen the seasonality of audit revenues by ''selling'' an expanded set of product offerings to their clients, thus becoming increasingly reliant on the satisfaction of their clients. This shift in accountants' attention from professional to corporate logics was further institutionalized during the US merger wave of the 1960s and 1970s, which created structural overlap through growth strategies of consolidation among accounting firms. Accounting firms that chose not to grow suffered the consequences; as their clients grew, they were less able to serve the growing clients' needs and who then looked elsewhere for services. Hence, the smaller firms lost access to recurring, indeed increasing, sources of revenue (Han, 1994, p. 656). Thus, if an accounting firm wanted to keep its client base, it grew along with its clients, which were publicly held firms driven by corporate logics of capitalism. A change to a corporate logic in accounting firms empowered the influences of management and disempowered those of the profession. In sum, the relational aspects of accounting changed – from relations in the profession to relations with clients – displacing the original source of professional legitimacy – the fiduciary duty to verify shareholders' investments in public corporations.

Scandals created public crises resulting in incremental changes in the fiduciary logic that were increasingly punctuated by regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of World War II, scandals such as Penn Central challenged the legitimacy of the fiduciary logic, creating avenues for an alternative view of accounting as a business, not a profession. The increasing consolidation of accounting firms continued to shift attention away from the original organizing principles of the profession and increasingly on strategies that were client centered. This shift resulted in accountants' temptation to ''bend the books'' to appeal to clients' pressures for positive stock-market performance. Continuing scandals such as Enron and WorldCom ushered in increasing regulatory oversight by the State, further eroding the governing power of the accounting profession. The evolutionary trend of growing with one's clients and fellow subsidiaries of the parent firm was interrupted by state intervention to protect the public good – culminating in the disempowerment of professional means of governance. The state intervened through regulatory oversight (PCAOB), reducing the role and importance of the profession in oversight of corporate financial affairs.

Overall, the shifts in institutional logics followed the pattern of moving from dominant influences of the market to the professions to the corporation to the state depending on what governance mechanisms were perceived by public opinion to be a failure in protecting the interests of corporate investors. This implies that:

H1. Industries with higher public policy implications and higher displacement of professional control by that of the corporation are more likely to lose professional and corporate jurisdiction to the state and are more likely to exhibit a punctuated equilibrium pattern of institutional change in organization governance.

Architecture Narrative Sequence

In architecture, the dialectic tension between the logics of the architect as artist–entrepreneur and architect as engineer–manager created niches for both small networks of boutique firms and large multidisciplinary firms. The triggers for the development of these hybrid niches include increased immigration to cities, which increased demand for large housing and office complexes and increased land prices. Thus, real estate developers and corporations sought to use space efficiently. New technologies such as elevators and steel frames allowed architects to erect large buildings, which used land efficiently and provided economic returns to developers and corporate clients. The backlash against urban sprawl and the decimation of historic city neighborhoods to erect corporate buildings triggered the rise of postmodernism and the shift back to an aesthetic logic. For the case of architecture, the higher degree of professionalization compared to accounting and publishing sheds light on why architecture exhibited a cyclical pattern of institutional change in which the dialectic between architecture as art and architecture as engineering remains unresolved. The profession led architects to play a key role in defining building standards and codes, much like the earlier era of accounting. This facilitated their control over public policy. Although there has been structural overlap, the institutional entrepreneurs – Ware, Richardson, Sullivan, Wright, and Venturi – have always come from within the architectural profession. In addition, the hybrid logics contain an element of the professions – either architectural or engineering. Overall, the shifts in institutional logics followed the pattern of cycling between the hybrid logics of artist–entrepreneur and engineer–manager. This implies that:

> **H2.** Industries that actively co-opt public policy implications under professional control, with lower displacement of professional control by that of the corporation and the market, and with conflicting factions of the profession, are more likely to exhibit a cyclical pattern of institutional change in organizational governance.

Publishing Narrative Sequence

In publishing, the higher-education marketplace changed from a culture of independent domestic publishers in the 1950s, organized around personal imprints and author–editor relational networks, to one currently exemplified by international corporate hierarchies and corporate managers focused on building market channels and the market position of the firm. The rising market demand of the 1960s could no longer be met by an economic system of retained earnings under family capitalism. Searching for new sources of capital in a risky business, in which assets are difficult to value, made corporate capital the most attractive option. R. P. Ettinger, both professor of finance and cofounder of PH was the institutional entrepreneur who introduced corporate finance and corporate restructuring to 19th century publishing. Subsequently, the structural overlap brought about by acquisition of many independent, old-line publishing houses during the two great merger waves, by US corporations in the 1960s and foreign buyers in the 1980s galvanized a new business culture. During the heyday of the editorial logic, Ettinger's dual background in the logics of both finance and publishing allowed him to visualize new hybrid combinations of strategies that created the entrepreneurial editor who in novel ways remodeled traditional and founded independent and internal corporate publishing ventures. Structural overlap also occurred later, albeit, not at the role level, but at the company level, with the consolidating acquisitions in the 1980s with the market logic in full swing. When personal capitalism and the editorial logic were dominant, attention was focused on the markets for books that were created from relational networks. When market capitalism was dominant, attention was focused on the markets for companies that were created from hierarchies in which managers used the firm to increase financial returns. For the case of publishing, the evolutionary process of market rationalization was largely uninterrupted by the influences of the state, the family, and the professions. Overall, the shifts in institutional logics followed the pattern of family to the quasi-professions to the corporation to the market. This implies that:

H3. Industries with lower public policy implications, but with lower degrees of professionalization and higher displacement of professional control by that of the market, are more likely to exhibit an evolutionary pattern of institutional change in organizational governance.

Synthesis

Table 4 compares the mechanisms for institutional and organizational stability and change across the three industries, summarizing several dimensions to distinguish the different patterns of change: changes in mission, governance forms, triggers, shifts in institutional logics, theoretical models, meta-theoretical models, statistical models, and historical-event sequencing.

Examining the mechanisms of institutional change in organizational governance – institutional entrepreneurs, structural overlap, and historical-event sequencing – brings to light larger questions on the underlying metatheory to explain institutional stability and change. Our broad-brush analyses suggest that accounting followed a punctuated equilibrium model (Schumpeter, 1942), architecture a cyclical model (Peterson & Berger, 1975), and publishing an evolutionary model of change (Weber, 1922/1978).[3] However, below we briefly discuss countervailing observations and caveats to our broad-brush categorizations.

With respect to a punctuated equilibrium model, recent events in accounting argue for a resurgence of governance by the professions and of network organizational forms. The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will disaggregate the functions of auditing and accounting from those of consulting, eliminating the distribution channel for consulting firms, making scale, the "source of legitimacy" under a corporate logic, no longer possible. Hence, we may observe a reversal of the growth of hierarchy in the accounting industry. For example, one could argue that (a) the increasing complexity of client problems will lead to increased demand for specialization of knowledge and customization of product, (b) the loss of distribution channels for entry into clients will reduce the function of scale and the vertical integration of the required number of specialists, (c) the anticipated increase in competition will

Table 4. Mechanisms of Institutional and Organizational Change and Stability.

Dimension	Accounting	Architecture	Publishing
Mission conflicts	Audit as fiduciary responsibility versus audit as case finding for consulting services	Building as enhancing beauty of society versus building as efficient resolution of problems	Books as sources of imprint status versus books as sources of corporate profit
Governance forms	Profession to state Peer review by CPA to regulation by state	Profession-market and profession-corporation Peer review by design competition versus management by multidisciplinary firm	Family-profession to corporation-market Peer review by status of house to shareholder review by market position of firm
Triggers	Changes in demand for investment venues, periodic scandals	Societal trends of industrialization, urbanization, immigration, technology, urban sprawl, and urban "renewal"	Changes in demand for books and sources of expansion capital
Changes in dominant institutional logics	Market → Professions → Corporation → State	Professions-market ← → Professions-corporation	Family → Professions → Corporation → Market
Theoretical model	State regulation	Professional duality	Market rationalization
Meta-theoretical model	Punctuated equilibrium	Telelogical dialectic	Evolution
Statistical model	Step function	Cyclical	Linear
Event sequencing	Market crash 1929 → SEC; Penn central bankruptcy → FASB; Enron → PCAOB	AIA founded 1859 on Beaux-Arts aesthetic → Commercial school efficiency arises from Chicago fire 1871 and technological inventions → classical aesthetics in Chicago Fair 1893 → Modern efficiency with WWI → Postmodern aesthetic → Current crisis	Publishing Federal-State funds → universities; Post war baby boomers → college; Wall street analysts-expansion capital needs → 1960s merger wave; Industry financial newsletters-European buy-out capital → 1980s merger wave

reduce profitability and the market power of the incumbents. These arguments suggest the rise of resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985) and hence the need for multiform alliances and the resurgence of network forms of organization associated with governance by the professions.

With respect to a cyclical model, there is evidence in publishing of the classic industrial organization market cycle. While the publishing case focused on the period of the transition from an editorial to a market logic, it is also true that in the mid-1800s there were smaller school textbook firms that were consolidated into the large hierarchical American book company by the early part of the 20th century – illustrating a resource partitioning or earlier cyclical model of smaller companies, later hierarchical concentration, and again new firm foundings (Carroll, 1985).

With respect to an evolutionary model, there is evidence in accounting and architecture that one way firms addressed seasonal instability due to the cyclical natures of the tax season and building was to rationalize scale by obtaining clients, such as the McDonalds restaurant chain, who were themselves in the evolutionary process of national and international corporate expansion. Similarly, diversification by trade publishers into the higher-education market was seen by some as a way to hedge the risks of signing a best-selling manuscript and hence to stabilize profit margins. Thus, the desire for survival and reduced uncertainty, seen in seeking to stabilize revenues, lead all of these industries to displace or hybridize their original mission and hence to some extent their governance forms. While architecture has continued to develop corporate hierarchies, it is the case that large firms have existed since the turn of the century and to this day still do not dominate the markets for architectural services in actual number of firms.

We have examined three mechanisms of institutional change in organizations. Institutional entrepreneurs introduce institutional change and mediate the influences of structural overlap and historical events when they transpose the organizing principles of different societal sectors. Thus, a shift in institutional logics is more likely to occur when institutional entrepreneurs and structural overlap expose the discontinuities in the meaning and opportunities of institutional logics of different societal sectors. These discontinuities are amplified by the sequencing of historical events when institutional entrepreneurs pick up and use these discontinuities to frame their actions and alter cognitive perceptions in the process. More research is needed to understand the micro-processes of how these three meso-level mechanisms work. For example, how the three mechanisms may affect the probabilities of variation, selection, and retention of cognitive schema or memes in theories of the origin of institutions (Weeks & Galunic, 2005).

Institutional stability and change in organizational governance is a topic of increasing scrutiny and economic and sociological importance in the global economy. We have extended the analysis of institutional change in organizations by integrating the work on institutional logics and historical-event sequencing to develop a theory and method of analysis to study organizational governance. We applied this dual perspective to examine how societal-level culture affects the governance and strategic behavior of organizations in three distinct industries. The role of societal-level culture has typically been associated with explaining institutional stability, not change (Swidler, 1986). The spread of market capitalism has typically been associated with linear and evolutionary models of institutional change. Our comparative findings across three industries show that this is not necessarily the case. While institutional logics provide the theory to understand the content of culture and the consequences for the governance of organizations, historical sequencing of events reveals the metatheory underlying the pattern of cultural transformation.

NOTES

1. However, the elements of culture that are transposed to new contexts by any entrepreneur have different probabilities of traction depending on the strength of their metaphoric association with natural and symbolic analogies (Douglas, 1986) and their ability to compete for the scarce resource of human attention (Weeks & Galunic, 2005).

2. The concepts within columns are descriptive of the six societal sectors; combined they specify theories of organization and action for each sector. For example, for the religion sector, we draw on Weber's theories of authority because legal–rational aligns with Protestant Reformation, traditional aligns with Catholic, and charismatic authority aligns with current evangelical (Nelson, 1993).

3. It is difficult to precisely know the underlying metatheory without information on the starting point (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). The cases of accounting and architecture began in the mid-1800s, the beginning of professionalism in these industries. The study of publishing started with the 1950s even though publishing's origins are found in the medieval craft of printing.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1. Institutional Logics of Societal Sectors.

Key Characteristics	Markets	Corporations	Professions	States	Families	Religions
Economic system	Investor capitalism	Managerial capitalism	Personal capitalism	Welfare capitalism	Personal capitalism	Occidental capitalism
Theories	Agency	Managerial	Neo-institutional	Resource dependence	Power-elite	Authority
Natural effect of symbolic analogy	Market as transaction	Hierarchy as corporation	Profession as relational network	State as redistribution mechanism	Family as firm	Temple as bank
Sources of identity	Faceless	Bureaucratic roles quantity of production	Personal reputation quality of innovation	Social class political ideology	Family reputation Father–Son relations	Occupational and vocational association with deities
Sources of legitimacy	Share price	Market position of firm	Personal expertise	Democratic participation	Unconditional loyalty	Importance of magic in economy
Sources of authority	Shareholder activism	Board of directors management	Professional association	Bureaucratic domination political parties	Patriarchal domination	Personal charisma of prophet power and status of priesthood

Basis of norms	Self interest	Employment in firm	Membership in guild	Citizenship in nation	Membership in household	Membership in congregation
Basis of attention	Status position in market	Status position in industry	Status position in network	Status position of interest group	Communism of household	Relation of individual to supernatural forces
Basis of strategy	Increase efficiency of transactions	Increase size and diversification of firm	Increase personal reputation and quality of craft	Increase community good	Increase family honor, security and solidarity	Increase magical symbolism of natural events
Learning mechanisms	Competition prices	Competition training and routines subunit of firm	Cooperation apprenticing relational network	Popular opinion leadership	Sponsorship	Analogy and parable formulae of prayer routinization of preaching
Informal control mechanisms	Industry analysts	Organization culture	Celebrity professional	Backroom politics	Family politics	Worship of calling
Formal control mechanisms	Enforcement of regulation	Board and management authority	Internal and external peer review	Enforcement of legislation	Rules of inheritance and succession	Rationalization of usury and norms of taboos
Forms of ownership	Public	Public	Private	Public	Private	Private
Organization form	Marketplace	M-Form organization	Network organization	Legal bureaucracy	Family partnership	Religious congregation office hierarchy

Table A.1. *(Continued)*

Key Characteristics	Markets	Corporations	Professions	States	Families	Religions
Logic of exchange	Immediate best bargain	Personal career advancement	Indebtedness and reciprocity	Political power	Family power	As sign of God's grace
Logic of investment	Capital committed to capital markets	Capital committed to the corporation	Capital committed to nexus of relationships	Capital committed to public policy	Capital committed to household	Capital committed to enterprise of salvation

TYPECASTING AND GENERALISM IN FIRM AND MARKET: GENRE-BASED CAREER CONCENTRATION IN THE FEATURE FILM INDUSTRY, 1933–1995

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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to bridge and contribute to three related lines of inquiry: the effect of economic organization on cultural diversity; the origins of career specialism; and the contrast between market and firm as alternative modes of governance. In particular, I use the natural experiment engendered by the transformation of Hollywood from the firm-based studio system to the contemporary market system to test the claim that typecasting-driven restrictions on generalist identities in an internal labor market are comparable in their significance to those found in the external labor market (Faulkner, 1983; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & von Rittmann, 2003). Results support this claim and thereby suggest that incentives for experimentation by employers in internal labor markets

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counterbalance the greater control over work assignments enjoyed by independent contractors in the external labor market.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Market Limits on Generalist Identities

One of the abiding themes in research on cultural industries concerns the manner by which economic organization influences the range of cultural forms produced. For example, there appears to be a marked tendency for (increasing) economies of scale in production or distribution to cause an industry to be dominated by large firms that produce for the "single mass market" (Peterson & Berger, 1975, p. 159) or "market center" (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000, p. 719) and eschew more specialized tastes. Cultural innovation in such industries depends on the entry of small, innovative firms who target emerging niches. In Peterson and Berger's model, exogenous shocks to the industry (e.g., the switch in the radio industry to specialized formats in the late 1950s Peterson & Berger, 1975, pp. 164–165) provide such an opportunity; in Carroll's resource portioning theory (Carroll, 1985; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Péli & Noteboom, 1999), such opportunities arise endogenously as the largest firms actively withdraw from small niches that they cannot serve as efficiently as the market center. The challenges faced by large firms may include technical or logistical hurdles in producing or distributing a wide range of products. An additional set of challenges stems from the potential confusion that firms face when they attempt to assume multiple, potentially contradictory, *identities* in the marketplace. This challenge is responsible for the common solution whereby "majors" absorb "independent" firms and then present them as sub-brands or "labels," each with its own identity (e.g., Lopes, 1992; Peterson & Berger, 1996; Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). In other contexts, even this solution may not work as consumers devalue independents simply because they are owned by majors (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Swaminathan, 2001).

Research on typecasting in the labor market reinforces the lesson that even when economic organization affords significant cultural diversity, limits may be placed on the *variety of identities* that a given actor may successfully assume (see also Phillips & Owens, 2004; Polos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002; Ruef, 2000; Zuckerman, 1999, 2000). Consider, in particular, the typecasting rule of thumb described by Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, and von Rittmann (2003, p. 1027; cf., Faulkner, 1983): ''one screens out candidates that have experience in one area when they apply to jobs in [others].'' Zuckerman et al., (2003) argue that this rule of thumb will be particularly salient when job candidates' skills are hard to evaluate and when credentials and other signals do not provide strong indicators of a candidate's talents. Under such circumstances, employers (or such market intermediaries as headhunters or talent agents) tend to rely heavily on past experience – i.e., priority is given to candidates who have done (a significant amount of) work of the type that is demanded. Moreover, insofar as different employment categories reflect distinct skills and/or distinct training schedules, it is reasonable for employers (or the market intermediaries who act on their behalf) to assume that, as a first approximation, experience in one category implies a lack of suitability in other categories. Thus, to use the familiar example raised by Zuckerman et al., (2003), it is a standard assumption in the sociological labor market that job candidates whose research has been strictly qualitative in the past are not viable candidates for jobs that require teaching quantitative courses (and vice versa).

As long as candidates' skills are highly specialized (e.g., it is impossible to be skilled in more than one category of work), the described typecasting process does not restrict career opportunities and career identities – i.e., the sets of jobs for which a candidate is regarded as competent and incompetent by employers and other key audiences – will be highly specialized too. Restrictions on career identities apply in situations where at least some candidates have the potential to work in multiple categories of work. The challenge is to gain recognition as being competent in each of those areas – i.e., to assume the identity of a generalist. This is a difficult challenge because, insofar as the quality of work is hard to evaluate, a would-be generalist (''jack of all trades''), who *chooses* to work in a wide variety of job categories will closely resemble the candidates who is unskilled in any of the categories (''master of none'') and therefore is *compelled* to move from job-type to job-type as a result of failure. Thus, the typecasting process implies that those who have (or have the potential to develop) generalist skills face significant difficulty in gaining recognition for such skills; indeed, they face the threat of being confused with the unskilled, thus becoming ''non-entities'' in the sense of not being recognized as fit for *any* job, and having a weak attachment to the labor market (Zuckerman et al., 2003). And this implies that labor markets where quality is difficult to evaluate limit the emergence of generalist identities such that we observe fewer generalists than we would if skills were readily evaluated.

1.2. Perhaps Limits are Even Higher in Firms

Thus, research on typecasting suggests that processes that are basic to labor markets (but are more salient in those that meet the described scope conditions) limit the development of generalist identities because candidates who try to assume such identities are potentially confused with those who have no skills at all. Yet it is reasonable to ask whether this curtailment of generalism is really so significant. Even if typecasting processes in the labor market restrict generalism, it could still be the case that these processes support *more* generalism than do alternative systems for matching workers with jobs. Put differently, while an important baseline for assessing the implications of typecasting in the labor market is the amount of generalism that would be observed if skills could be readily evaluated, another key baseline is the amount of generalism that would be observed under alternative institutional arrangements. Consider, in this regard, how these processes are affected by the mode of governance – i.e., whether the careers in question occur largely through the (external labor) market or the (internal labor market of the) firm. And imagine if we were to find that, for the same kind of work, career identities are significantly more specialized when workers are independent contractors in an external labor market than when they are employees in an internal labor market. Such a finding would suggest that the restrictions on generalism imposed by typecasting in the external labor market above pale in comparison to the restrictions that are observed in (cultural and other) industries where workers tend to be long-term employees of firms.

The primary objective of this article is to conduct such a comparison by analyzing how the aggregate level of generalism in the careers of Hollywood feature film actors[1] varies as the industry was transformed from one in which actors were typically employees under long-term contract to one in which actors are independent contractors. This comparison of firm vs. market is useful not only because it affords a very different ''employment system'' (in the sense of a set of practices and institutions for allocating workers to jobs and setting the terms and length of their tenure in those positions; see e.g., Cappelli, 1999; Jacoby, 2005; Kalleberg & Lincoln, 1988; Kochan, McKersie, & Katz, 1994; Osterman, 1995), against which to evaluate the claim that typecasting in the (external) labor market limits generalist identities, but also because it allows us to make progress on a key but largely unexamined issue in research on comparative economic organization: how firms and markets compare in their efficiency as mechanisms for allocating resources. The large economics literature on the theory of the firm has traditionally assumed that markets and firms (''hierarchies'' [Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996]) are different and even fundamentally opposed systems. For instance, Hayek's (1945) influential defense of capitalism articulated the view that free-floating prices facilitate the aggregation and transmission of dispersed information about supply and demand, thereby allowing for a more efficient allocation of effort that can be obtained in a system run by a central planner. And Coase (1937) expressed a similar view in his original formulation of the problem of the theory of the firm, when he described firms as ''islands of conscious power'' (p. 388) that are more apt to ''waste resources'' (p. 395) than markets, which are more efficient at ''plac[ing] the factors of production where their value is greatest (pp. 394–395).''

Such a view of the contrast between firm and market seems to imply that there will be less restriction on the emergence of generalist identities in external labor markets. After all, the challenge that occasions typecasting – i.e., matching candidates with the jobs for which their skills are most appropriate – is precisely the type of difficult resource-allocation problem that markets should presumably be best-placed to solve. And, while typecasting restricts the emergence of generalism in comparison to the level of generalism that could theoretically exist, it is equally true that this process does not support systematic *mismatches* between workers' skills and the jobs they perform. While mismatches in competitive labor markets certainly occur and are sometimes sustained long after they are apparent (e.g., through nepotism), they are unsustainable for the most part. Thus, the constraints imposed by typecasting are quite specific: they restrict the set of matches for those workers who could potentially succeed in many different types of work. In the aggregate, these constraints produce systems that have less generalism than would be observed if skills were more transparent and employers did not have to resort to typecasting. But, if it is indeed the case that firms are generally less efficient resource-allocation mechanisms than markets, generalist identities may be even less likely to emerge in careers that are governed by an internal labor market than in those governed by an external labor market.

Yet there is at least one reason to doubt this implication: little or no empirical research has been conducted that demonstrates the superiority of the market as a mechanism for allocating resources and, in particular, for uncovering (generalist) skills. Following Coase, the literature on the theory of the firm (as developed by Williamson and others; see Freeland, 2001; Gibbons, 2004, for review) generally approaches the conundrum of the firm not by questioning the assumption that firms are less efficient, but by focusing on when the costs of transacting through the market outweigh the efficiency gains it affords. Only recently has research begun to emerge that examines how firms and markets compare in their functioning and in the outcomes they produce. And this research generally suggests that firms and markets feature processes that are more similar than had been assumed (e.g., Bidwell, 2005a, b; Eccles & White, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1990; but see Mullainathan & Scharfstein, 2001).

Of course, there are many cases in which firms and markets function quite differently. Indeed, both the present analysis and a companion paper, which analyzes the degree of repeat collaboration in different eras of the US feature-film industry (Zuckerman, 2005), examine a context in which the system of governance in a firm-based system was indeed very different from the market-based system that replaced it. Yet it is not apparent how different are the *outcomes* produced by the two systems. That is, at least for a certain range of outcomes, firms and markets may feature very different processes that lead to approximately the same place. Accordingly, I argue below that, when we consider how the situation of the employer and candidate/employee changes as a result of a shift in the employment system from internal to external labor market, and especially when we consider the transformation of Hollywood, there is little reason to expect significant change in generalism despite massive change in the nature of the employment system. That is, I contend that the restrictions on generalism imposed by typecasting in the external labor market are comparable in their significance to those imposed by typecasting in internal labor markets.

This study thus joins a small but growing body of research that shifts attention from firm boundary (“make vs. buy”) decisions to direct analysis of how firms and markets compare in their functioning and outcomes (e.g., Bidwell, 2005a, b; Mullainathan & Scharfstein, 2001). One reason why there has been so little empirical research in this vein is that the data requirements for such an analysis are formidable. In particular, we need such a comparison on cases where the same activities are performed alternatively and independently in two systems of governance. For the specific question analyzed here, we need data on career lines for an entire industry over long periods of time across settings for which the only thing that varies is the organization of the industry, from one based on internal labor markets to one based on the external labor market (or vice versa). The transformation of the feature film industry over the course of the twentieth century thus represents an unusually good – if hardly ideal, for reasons I highlight below – opportunity to shed light on the issues raised above.

In the next section, I provide a theoretical discussion of two primary differences between internal and external labor markets that seem likely to affect the degree to which they encourage or discourage the emergence of generalist identities. In the following sections, I review the key differences between the Hollywood studio system and the contemporary system and, then, how casting was conducted in the two systems. I then turn to the analytic framework used to compare the level of specialization in the two systems and present the results of the comparison. The final section concludes.

2. POSSIBILITIES FOR GENERALISM IN FIRM (STUDIO) VS. MARKET

2.1. Independent-Contractor Control vs. Employer Experimentation

Beyond the general presumption (bias?) that markets should be more efficient at solving difficult resource-allocation problems,[2] existing theory does not provide a clear, general prediction as to whether career specialization should be greater in internal or in external labor markets. In order to lay the foundations for such theory, I begin by making three assumptions: (a) that the distribution of underlying ability – and, in particular, the potential for generalism – is the same regardless of the nature of the employment system; (b) that all workers desire to work in all the job categories for which they have (or have the potential to develop) suitable skills; and (c) that employers use the typecasting rule of thumb, as described above (Zuckerman et al., 2003).

Once these assumptions are made, there appear to be two factors that affect the degree to which generalist identities can develop and which seem to vary based on the employment system in place: (a) the degree of control that workers enjoy over their work assignments; and (b) the degree to which employers are willing to experiment with "off-casting" – i.e., by trying out someone who has been typecast in category i in job category j. Some combination of these factors is necessary for a would-be generalist to assume a generalist identity. Since workers with generalist potential want to be generalists, factor (a) looms large: do workers have enough control over their work assignments to obtain work in a new category despite having specialized in another one? And if, employers control work assignments, factor (b) becomes important: is there some reason that employers might want to experiment with off-casting? I argue that a review of how these factors vary between internal and external labor markets suggest that while increased worker control over job assignments in external labor markets increases the opportunities for generalism, this is counterbalanced by a decrease in employer incentives to experiment with off-casting.

2.1.1. Independent Contractor Control

Let us first consider factor (a). One of the key differences between firm and market-based employment systems is that, whereas an independent contractor always has the right to refuse a job offer and hold out for offers that are more appealing (perhaps in categories that facilitate a broadening of her career identity), this is less true for employees, who generally accept a wide range of work assignments within a broad "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938). Indeed, control over assignments is one of the main attractions of being an independent contractor (e.g., Jones & DeFillippi, 1996; Kunda, Barley, & Evans, 2002). And, while employees in internal labor markets sometimes do have considerable control over their work assignments (and can typically quit and take another job if the assignments are unappealing), we will see that this was typically not the case under the Hollywood studio system. It would thus seem to follow that the would-be generalist is less able to escape the specialist tag and become a generalist in an internal labor market, especially one that resembles the studio system.

In forming this expectation, however, it is important to recognize that even if a worker has the ability to turn down job assignments that reinforce a specialist identity, this does not mean that he will succeed in obtaining offers in other categories. After all, if the worker has already been typecast in a given specialty, this implies (by assumption) that employers will tend not to consider him for other categories.[3] Furthermore, note that independent contractors may strategically *choose* to specialize, at least at the outset of their careers, even when they: (a) have the freedom to refuse jobs they do not want; (b) have generalist potential; and (c) dream of becoming regarded as Renaissance men. Such a choice is a predictable response to the lesson that working in many categories carries the risk of being regarded as unskilled (Zuckerman et al., 2003). Of course, such a choice to specialize reinforces the typecasting process and implies that independent contractors' greater ability to turn down jobs may not be sufficient to produce more generalism.

Thus, another ingredient is necessary to translate the ability to turn down unwanted jobs into a method for overcoming a typecast identity. In particular, the independent contractor must *sacrifice* short-term opportunities (and the associated income from) the jobs that are in her existing specialty and to seek out opportunities that are less attractive or remunerative in the short term, but which develop and signal her skills for and commitment to new categories. Such sacrifices are familiar as the costs of entry into any new career and may involve paying for additional training, doing an unpaid internship, or taking an entry-level job of some sort. As one contemporary casting director suggests (Zuckerman et al., 2003, p. 1041; italics added):

> If all [actors] are being offered is the same parts over and over again, then it's time to turn them down and maybe take a role in a smaller picture. *It's their career, they have to take control.*

Echoing this sentiment, a contemporary actor describes successful strategies for avoiding typecasting involves "managing your own career [by] thinking beyond the current project."[4] Thus, while the control over job assignments enjoyed by an independent contractor scarcely allows her to obtain any job offer she wants, it does afford the opportunity to accept short-term sacrifices, and the risks that are associated with them (after all, she may not succeed in the new category) that are necessary for overcoming the typecasting rule of thumb, at least in the long term. Thus, *insofar as gaining recognition for generalist skills requires workers to have both the desire and ability to solicit assignments that are unattractive in the short term, and insofar as workers do not have this ability in internal labor markets, we should see less generalism in internal labor markets.*

2.1.2. Employer Experimentation

Yet, a consideration of factor (b) suggests a countervailing force that is basic to internal labor markets. To see this, observe first that in an external labor market where, at the extreme employers hire independent contractors for short-term assignments, the employer has little or no incentive to overcome a typecast or engage in "off-casting." As explained by a contemporary casting director (Zuckerman et al., 2003, p. 1041):

> … no movie wants to be the test ground that an actor/actress uses to learn skills.
>
> If I were a business exec in charge of movie investment, I would want to minimize my risks and hire people who could play the roles perfectly.

Why indeed would one ever try an apparent square peg in a round hole when round pegs are available?

One reason might be that one has already purchased square pegs and cannot return them to the store. In this situation, it may be worthwhile to see if the square pegs can be made to fit the round holes before spending additional money to buy some round ones. That is, a key difference between an internal labor market and an external labor market is that employers in the former system make relatively long-term commitments to – i.e., they sink fixed costs in – a given staff and that, conditional on having this staff under contract, they often have a strong interest in using it to the fullest.[5] On the margin, such an employer has an incentive to experiment with staff members in roles for which they are seemingly inappropriate before he spends extra money to hire new employees or contractors. For instance, while a department chair would prefer to have quantitative sociologists teach quantitative methods, she may ask a qualitative sociologist to teach such a class if there are no quantitative sociologists on staff who are available, and if the qualitative sociologist is not otherwise occupied. By contrast, no such preference exists if there is no such thing as a department and staffing is conducted on a position-by-position basis through a spot market. And, the experimentation results from such a preference may, sometimes unintentionally, lead to the development of more generalism. Thus, *insofar as employers seek to obtain maximum utilization of their staffs, this creates a stimulus to engage in experimentation such that we should see more generalism in a system governed by internal labor markets.*

2.1.3. The Argument

To recall, the primary objective of this article is to assess whether the limitations on generalist identities imposed by typecasting in the external labor market are significant when compared with the limitations imposed by the internal labor market. The foregoing discussion suggests that there is no theoretical basis for expecting a substantial difference. In particular, I argue that a shift from an employment system based on internal labor markets to one based on external labor markets involves a shift from one potential support for generalist identities – i.e., the freedom enjoyed by the independent contractor to reject unwanted job assignments – to another – i.e., the desire by employers to utilize their staffs to capacity. An ideal test of this argument would involve a direct examination of the postulated processes in an effort to see how they contribute to the degree of generalism observed. This ideal cannot be realized with available data. Instead, I aim to illuminate these issues by assessing whether the degree of generalism in feature-film careers changes as the US film industry is transformed from a series of internal labor markets to a single external labor market. Before doing so, I first review the relevant history and, in particular, discuss how casting was conducted in the two eras.

3. THE STUDIO SYSTEM VS. CONTEMPORARY HOLLYWOOD

The contemporary US (''Hollywood') feature film industry is well known as a market in which little work is conducted within the boundary of a single firm. Under what is variously known as the ''package-unit,'' ''independent production'' (Staiger, 1985), ''flexible specialization'' (Christopherson, 1996; Christopherson & Storper, 1989), or ''short-term project'' (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987) system, the pre-production, production, and post-production stages of feature film creation are collaboratively produced by a set of independent contractors. Indeed, while independent production companies sometimes produce multiple films over a series of years, many firms are created to produce a single film and then cease to exist. And those production companies that do produce a series of films typically have almost no employees beyond the administrative staff. Rather, the producer secures capital (perhaps from the studio that also will be the distributor) and uses that capital to purchase rights to a screenplay; the services of the ''talent'' (i.e., director, actors); and the various craft personnel and their equipment (e.g., special-effects specialists; make-up artists); and rights to shoot the film in the desired location. Under this system, films are produced by independent producers, who raise financing for the film and contract through the open market to obtain the creative talent. Essentially, the studio plays one main role (distributor) and will often play two additional roles (financier, provider of production space/equipment). Producers are almost always independent companies, though sometimes with multi-picture deals with a studio. And, actors are independent contractors who navigate their ''boundaryless career'' (Arthur & Rousseau, 1996) across short-term projects with the help of talent agents and managers (see Jones & DeFillippi, 1996, for review).

The contemporary system stands in strong contrast to the ''studio system'' that dominated the US film industry from the 1920s to about 1950. The key points of contrast lie in the range of activities that was conducted in-house at the studios and the manner by which these activities were administered by studio management. One such activity was exhibition: prior to the *Paramount* antitrust decision of 1948 that outlawed such vertical integration (as well as anticompetitive bundling practices in selling to unaffiliated theaters), the major studios owned large theater chains and were often described as existing to support such chains. Another key contrast between the two periods is that, ''rather than an individual company containing the source of the labor and the materials, the entire industry became the pool for these (Staiger, 1985, p. 330).'' During the studio era, the myriad activities involved in pre-production, production, and postproduction stages were largely conducted by studio employees within permanent offices and divisions rather than by independent contractors, as is the rule today.

While the antitrust actions of the 1940s had a large impact on the industry, they seem to have been only partially responsible for the demise of the studio system. As Caves (2000, p. 94) points out, the British film industry underwent a similar transformation in the same period despite the fact that no antitrust actions were taken against British studios. Thus, the key event in the demise of the studio system seems to have been the substantial drop in the demand for feature films that began in 1947–1948 with a reduction in available leisure time and a change in post-war adult tastes (Carey, 1981, pp. 272–273). This drop in demand was then reinforced by the rapid diffusion of television, which essentially replaced the low-budget 'B' pictures (which the studios could no longer bundle with their 'A' pictures in their sales to theaters). And the most far-reaching effect of these changes was the move to reduce fixed costs by eliminating studio staffs (e.g., Carey, 1981; Caves, 2000; John, Ravid, & Sunder, 2003; Schatz, 1988; Weinstein, 1998). As Harmetz (1984, pp. 116) vividly relates:

> Like frantic fisherman afraid that the fish they had hooked would swamp the boat, the studios cut loose their contract lists. The result was that in 1952 Clark Gable finished off his MGM salary at $7200 a week for the standard forty weeks. Ten years later, Elizabeth Taylor was paid $1 million for *Cleopatra*.

Thus, the events that are most responsible for the demise of the studio system appear to have indirectly (by creating an incentive to eliminate fixed costs) led to the transformation of the actor from employee to independent contractor.

What had been the nature of this employment relationship? The standard 7-year contract granted to "contract players" in the studio's "stock company" who were being groomed for possible stardom required an actor to remain with the studio for the duration of the contract. The primary attraction to the actor, especially for young performers during the Great Depression, was the prospect of job security coupled with a steady rise in income:[6]

> Assuming the artist did nothing to trigger the escape ("morals") clause [of the standard contract], he or she was guaranteed forty weeks of employment at a fixed salary. If the option was renewed each year, the artist enjoyed an escalating salary. The escalating salary offered more security than they had previously known. That factor, combined with the fact that all studios firmly controlled their artists, was enough to convince these artists to sign away their rights (Reddersen, 1983, p. 20).

One right "signed away" by these "indentured employees" (Klaprat, 1985, p. 351) was the right to work with another studio if she so chose. While the studio had the option to terminate the contract after each year, the actor enjoyed no such option. In addition, the actor worked under a fixed salary and typically lost the ability to decide on the projects on which she would work.

These contractual constraints are evident in cases of stars who bridled under their restrictions. A well-known example is the case of James ("Jimmy") Cagney, who battled Warner Bros. throughout the 1930s to renegotiate his contracts (see Warren, 1983; McDonald, 2000, pp. 65–69). These disputes, which involved two walk-outs and a lawsuit that was decided in Cagney's favor, revolved around several related issues: (a) a failure to raise his salary despite verbal assurances that it would be increased if his films were successful; (b) overwork (six films in 1934 despite the fact that his [renegotiated] contract stipulated no more than four films per year); (c) requirements that Cagney make personal appearances on behalf of the studio; and (d) restrictive casting, whereby Cagney was given "tough guy" roles almost exclusively even though he wished to broaden his roles to include other dramatic parts and musicals. Cagney's willingness to take on the studio and his relative success in doing so were exceptions to the general rule and reflected his growing star power. Perhaps the strongest weapon by which the studio could gain the compliance of its contract personnel was the contractual clause that allowed them to suspend an actor without pay for insubordination and then to add the suspension time to the end of the contract. A second method of control was the "loan-out," whereby an actor's services were rented to another studio (who typically paid the actor's salary plus an average of 75%; McDonald, 2000, p. 63) without the actor's consent. While such loan-outs were sometimes agreeable to the actor, they were also used as "the Hollywood equivalent of Siberia (*ibid.*)" when the project for which the loan-out was made was not expected to succeed (Harmetz, 1984, p. 115).

Note that while actors (and directors and producers [see Zuckerman, 2005]) enjoyed relatively less control over their work under the studio system, and there was frequent conflict as a result, this does not mean that the system's constraints were always resented. Indeed, a common attitude seems to have been one that of: the employee as the mid-twentieth century organization man (Whyte, 1956), who displays loyalty to an organization and accepts a broad array of assignments within a broad "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938) because he regards the management as playing the legitimate role of coordinating the various specialized tasks necessary to further a collective effort with which he identifies. The director Frank Capra, who took a pay cut to leave MGM for Columbia and there by gain greater autonomy and the right to write and produce, described the "the directors at MGM (as) 'the crème-da-la-crème' (but also) "organization men, as anonymous as Vice Presidents at General Motors (quoted in Harmetz, 1984, p. 138)." As explained by John Lee Mahin, an MGM screenwriter, "Whatever we were working on was an MGM picture, and we all wanted MGM pictures to be the best (*ibid.*: 12)." William Ludwig, another MGM screenwriter expressed similar sentiment when he related that "There was a sense of pride at [MGM], a sense of community. There were five major studios … and you supported your own (*ibid*)." Evidence for such loyalty comes also from cases like that of the actress Norma Shearer, who reportedly was offered $200,000 from a rival studio, but signed with MGM for $150,000 because she "never wanted to desert the company that had made her a star (Carey, 1981, p. 230)." While it is hard to know how widespread such loyalty to the studio was, it clearly had significant currency and it created a link between the personnel and the studios that has no parallel today.

A related feature of the studio system that bound actors to the studios for many years was the significant investments in human capital that the studios typically made in the actors that they had under contract. Indeed, young actors were often recruited not for their present ability or appearance, but because they were seen as having raw potential that could be groomed for potential stardom by the studio's in-house drama coaches, dentists, hair stylists, costume designers, plastic surgeons, fitness trainers, etc. As Klaprat (1985, p. 351) writes, "Stars were created, not discovered." Harmetz (1984, p. 107) elaborates:

> In signing Judy Garland, MGM had bought an extraordinary voice unfortunately attached to a mediocre body and a badly flawed face. In the next seven years, the voice would be trained, the teeth capped, the nose restructured, the thick waist held in by corsets, and the body reshaped as well as possible by diet and massage. In greater or lesser measure, the same thing happened to everyone the studio put under contract. If nothing had to be done to improve Lana Turner's breasts, there was certainly enough to be done by the studio's hairdressers and dramatic coaches.

Such actor-specific investments were typical of the "star system" whereby "budding star and studio would benefit together from the studio's strong incentive to invest. In promot(ing) the actor's career (during the period of the long-term contract). In the meantime, the star received a low-risk and rising income, while the studio assumed (and pooled) the uncertainties associated with star potential. When the actor's career flourished…the star ceded (temporary) rents to the studio…(Caves, 2000, p. 89; cf., McDonald, 2000)." Thus, the studio and actor were mutually bound not just by the studio's greater power in enforcing the terms of a restrictive contract, but by certain attractions that the contract held, at least to novice actors.

4. CASTING AND TYPECASTING IN THE TWO SYSTEMS

4.1. Factor (a): Employee Control Over Assignments

In the contemporary system, casting directors are key players in contemporary casting decisions on the employers' side (see Zuckerman et al., 2003, pp. 1037–1042; see also Kungus, 1988) and talent agents (or managers) typically represent the actors in what may be described as a "brokerage system of administration" (DiMaggio, 1977). The casting director, who is either an employee of a production company or an independent contractor, is generally charged by the film's director with finding actors to fill the roles in a film. Casting directors inform talent agents of openings and the agents suggest clients that they think are good matches with the available parts. The talent agent's role in this process seems to exacerbate the tendency to use the typecasting rule of thumb. Even if a casting director may be open to "off-casting," talent agents often typecast their clientele because such openness is rare and hard to predict.

Yet, while the contemporary system restricts opportunities for broadening an actor's career and breeds alienation as a result, it seems plausible that these effects were far stronger in the studio system. As discussed above, a key difference is that actors have more control over their careers in the contemporary system, and thus should be able to escape a restrictive career identity than an actor who has little choice but to do the projects that are given to him by his employer. Indeed, contemporary casting directors often believe that actors are responsible if they are rigidly typecast because they could break out of the typecast if they try hard enough (by turning down typed roles, getting additional training, or working in theater see Zuckerman et al., 2003).

But, while the contemporary actor may theoretically have the ability to control her career by refusing parts and taking on assignments that are less rewarding in the short term, such control was largely in the hands of studio management during the studio system. The case of Jimmy Cagney at Warner Bros. recounted above is just one of the many instances in which the studio's desire to develop a consistent screen brand or "persona" that could draw moviegoers to its "star-genre" combinations (Schatz, 1988) conflicted with a star's desire to expand his or her range. The following argument (Behlmer, 1985, pp. 229–233) between Warner Bros. head Jack Warner and Humphrey Bogart is similarly revealing. The dispute between Bogart and Warner took place in 1944 and concerned Bogart's reluctance to star in the film *Conflict*

(1945), in which Bogart returned to play a gangster after having had break-out success as a sympathetic, romantic lead in *Maltese Falcon* (1941) and *Casablanca* (1942):[7]

> Bogart: Nothing you can say will convince me it is a good picture, or is in good shape, or for me. I consider you a personal friend of mine and do not think you will do all the things you say you will…
>
> Warner: You must remember, Humphrey. It is not Jack Warner that is asking you to do this picture. You are doing this for the company, and the same thing would happen in the steel business…
>
> Bogart: Allow me the privilege of making a decision. I work for Warner Bros. and am willing to die for Warner Bros. When you asked me to appear at the [Hollywood] Bowl on Easter Sunday at 4 a.m., and dance in a musical comedy, I did so. I will do anything, but I cannot do this picture.
>
> Warner: Don't make the mistake that some people have made.
>
> Bogart: What are you doing, threatening me?
>
> Warner: No, I am not threatening you, but if you don't want to play ball I will have think along certain terms contractualwise (sic). We will suspend you and not put you in *Passage to Marseille*…
>
> Warner: This is a potent business, that is why people respect the motion picture industry, and I know you are making an awful error.
>
> Bogart: What are you doing, frightening me?

Other "Warners" stars who battled the studio over casting assignments included Claude Rains (Behlmer, 1985, p. 82), George Raft (*ibid.*: 116); Edward G. Robinson, and Bette Davis. As Schatz (1988, p. 139) comments:

> Like Robinson and Cagney, [Bette] Davis was ruthlessly typecast: this ensured her market value but steadily restricted her screen persona. Not only did Warners resist "off-casting" its emerging stars,[8] but Jack Warner also resisted loaning them out, since work for other companies upset Warners' schedule and threatened to dilute the screen personality being refined at Warners… . The stars resented this policy…but in the long run there was little any star could do, since in those years the standard industry practice was to tack on the suspended time to the end of a player's contract… (p. 139).

And while Warners was perhaps the most aggressive in enforcing their contractual right to determine a star's casting, other studios followed similar practices. Indeed, typecasting was perhaps even more restrictive at MGM where disputes over typecasting included Greta Garbo's demand for "no more bad women" (Carey, 1981, p. 104); or Joan Crawford's desire to stop starring in "glamour-girl vehicles in which she invariably played either a bored socialite or a shopgirl with upward mobility on her mind'' (Carey, 1981, p. 237). More generally, Harmetz (1984, p. 103) notes that:

> MGM's stars were not used indiscriminately. Scripts were written for them; books were rewritten for them. Their parts were as carefully tailored as their clothes – and with much the same purpose: to exaggerate strong points, to disguise flaws… Once the actor was a star, the clay was considered permanently fired. Although there were subtle changes (due to aging), there were very few experiments.

Thus, actors had considerably less control over how they were cast under the studio system and it would thus seem to follow that, especially given the studio's desire to have stars with consistent marketable personae, that the range of career identities was even more restricted under the studio system than under the contemporary system. And if such restrictions applied to stars, it stands to reason that they were at least as binding on less prominent actors since they had even less leverage with their employers.

4.2. Factor (b): Employer Interest in Experimentation

Yet, the desire for stars with consistent images was not the only factor that influenced studio casting decisions. As discussed above, another important consideration was the need to ensure that all of the studio's actors worked the maximum amount of time specified in their contracts (typically 40 weeks). The studio stock company in a given year represented a cost was fixed in that it did not vary with the number of films produced and was largely sunk in that it could not be redeployed for other uses (with the exception of loan-outs to other studios). Having sunk such costs in an actor, the studio faced no additional costs in using her for a given part, but would have to pay extra to hire a new actor or to borrow one from a different studio. As Reddersen (1983, p. 30) points out:

> …the primary disadvantage of the stock company was the need to keep its members working. An actor laid off in excess of the time limit in the contract (12 weeks) had to be paid. The more he worked, the greater the cost-efficiency per film.

Accordingly, the studio casting director's job (see also Friedman, 1937; Kungus, 1988) was not only to fill roles specified by the producer (in the first instance, from the studio stock company rather than from free lancers on the open market) but to keep track of who was working when so as to minimize the lay-off periods (Reddersen, 1983, pp. 151–159). And this desire to get maximum use of the studio's staff potentially conflicted with the desire to maintain consistency in an actor's image. Thus, according to Caves (2000, p. 89), ''the studio also had to juggle its personnel under contract… , to keep them fully occupied…(such that) a studio might find (the) objective (of building an actor's career) overridden by the goal of keeping its contract players busy.''

In this regard, it is interesting to note how Humphrey Bogart initially broke out of his typecast as a gangster. According to Reddersen (1983, p. 30), this transformation of his career identity derived from Warner Bros.' tendency to ''put their whole contract list in every picture whether they fit or not'' (MGM casting director Leonard Murphy, quoted in Harmetz, 1984, pp. 121–122) so as to get maximum utilization of their staff. This tendency led Warner Bros. to its original discovery that Bogart would be successful as a ''shitheel heavy,'' but it also led him to be cast in *Maltese Falcon* after George Raft turned it down, and thereby to the discovery that he might be successful as a romantic lead.

The desire to utilize the studio stock company to the fullest seems to have been stronger at Warner Bros. than at MGM, which was unique in following a high-quality/high-cost strategy under the model developed by Irving Thalberg. However, even at MGM, it appears that there was extensive experimentation at the beginning of an actor's career. Indeed, while MGM stars may have been considered ''permanently fired,'' a ''potential star was clay for the molding (Harmetz, 1984, p. 103).'' Recall that actors were hired into the stock company less for their skills at the time of hire (as is the case in the contemporary system), but for what they might *become* as a result of the (unrecoverable, specific) investments that the studio made in the actors' appearance and skills. Having sunk such costs, it made sense for MGM and other studios to experiment with their contract list in a variety of roles until they found the roles for which they were most successful. Harmetz (*ibid.*) gives a sense of this experimentation at MGM and how it related to the studio's casting more generally:

> Robert Taylor was given a singing role in *Broadway Melody* of 1936 in the hope that he might make a leading man for musicals. Taylor's voice made that experiment a failure, but Eleanor Powell's success as a dancer in the same film allowed the studio to shift Joan Crawford to exclusively dramatic roles. Powell could take over all those dancing ladies previously reserved by necessity for Crawford.

Klaprat (1985) describes a similar process whereby after failure with Warners' initial screen personality for Bette Davis – the blonde bombshell, an experiment during a loan-out to RKO led her to be typecast as a (brunette) man-slaying vamp.

In sum, the two factors identified above as varying between internal and external labor markets and providing countervailing supports for generalism seem quite salient in the shift from the studio system and the contemporary system. On the one hand, actors employed by the studios had much less control over how they were cast. Coupled with the studios' desire to develop consistent screen personalities, this would seem to suggest that career identities should be much more specialized under the studio system. And yet, we have seen a reason to think that, while the contemporary system does not permit "movies to be testing grounds" for actors to experiment with innovative casting, the inherent logic of having a semi-permanent staff sometimes stimulated such experimentation under the studio system. In certain cases, such experimentation resulted from a deliberate attempt to groom in-house talent, and find the types of roles for which they were best suited; in other cases, it occurred as an unintended by-product of the desire to keep contract personnel fully utilized. Regardless of the degree of intent, such experimentation represented a support for generalist career identities that does not have a parallel in the contemporary system. Thus, a review of casting practices in the studio system and the contemporary system supports my argument that the radically different employment systems characteristic of internal and external labor markets provide roughly the same amount of support for the emergence of generalist career identities. I now proceed to validate this argument.

5. ANALYSIS

As in Zuckerman (2005), I examine whether the decline over time in the strength of the attachment between studios and actors is associated with a corresponding decline in the degree of specialization in acting careers. Given the argument presented above, we can expect to see substantial decline in the strength of attachment between studios and actors (as actors shift from being long-term employees to being independent contractors), but little change in the degree to which actors specialize by work category. I first describe the analytic framework used to measure the attachment between studios and actors, which constitutes the "independent variable," and then I discuss the measurement of specialization, which constitutes the "dependent variable."

5.1. Independent Variable: Timing the Decline of the Studio System

There are two seemingly straightforward options for measuring the decline of the studio system, but which are unfortunately not available. The first option would be to rely on a date when the era of the studio system ended, and the contemporary period began. But such approach is problematic for two reasons. First, the shift between the two systems seems to have been more gradual than the common depiction of an abrupt change around 1950. For instance, while the *Paramount* decision mandated the divestiture of the studios' theater operations in 1948, the studios' initial responses varied. At one extreme, Warner Bros. moved quickly to comply with the mandate and also engaged in a series of substantial downsizing moves. Yet, MGM took the opposite tack. Indeed, after studio chief L.B. Mayer was replaced by Dore Schary in 1951, Schary returned MGM to the central producer system that had previously been abandoned for the somewhat more decentralized unit producer system. It was not until suffering major losses in the early 1950s that MGM "began in earnest" "to phase out its contract personnel," and MGM was separated from the Loews theater chain (Schatz, 1988, p. 462). Moreover, some contract personnel remained on studio staffs into the 1960s. Moreover, just as vestiges of the studio system remained for years after 1950s, various trends before 1950s foreshadowed the system's demise. These trends include a change in the tax code and corresponding increase in free lancing; a November 1940 consent decree that limited anticompetitive bundling practices (Schatz, 1988, p. 298); and Olivia de Havilland's successful 1943 lawsuit against Warner Bros., which invalidated the contractual provision allowing studios to add suspension time to the end of contracts.

The foregoing considerations suggest that one should not rely on a specific year by which to mark the boundary between the two systems. Rather, it seems preferable to analyze empirically the extent to which actors in a given period were employees or independent contractors and to use the periodization that emerges from the data. The main difficulty with such an approach, however, is that data on who was a studio employee and for what length of time (as well as the nature of their contract) are not available, except for a few cases.

Thus as a proxy, I analyze the extent to which actors work repeatedly on films distributed by the same studios. The data for this analysis and those that follow data are from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB) (http://www.imdb.com), which maintains highly comprehensive information on virtually every feature film ever produced. I restrict attention to English language, non-pornographic, feature-length films.

To clarify the procedure, I discuss how it was computed for the first 3-year period under analysis – 1933 through 1935 or the "1935 period."[9] In the first column of Table 1, I display the distribution of the number of films in which an actor was credited with a part during this period. The second column gives the mean concentration score for the tendency for an actor to work with a small number of studios. For the purpose of this analysis, a

Table 1. Distribution and Significance of Actors Work with the Same Studios, All English-Language Releases, 1933–1935.

		Observed		Additional Random Simulation	
I	II	III	IV	V	VI
N of films in which acted	Frequency	$\overline{fhas}$	Mean % of iterations where $fhas(r)_a < fhas_a$	$\overline{fhas}$	Mean % of iterations where $fhas(r)_a < fhas_a$
1	1,860	0.000	0.00	0.000	0.00
2	688	0.089	19.8	0.031	6.1
3	412	0.129	34.1	0.034	13.3
4	308	0.135	46.4	0.045	21.2
5	229	0.157	53.8	0.051	34.6
6	173	0.140	59.8	0.048	39.2
7	153	0.136	62.3	0.052	42.0
8	111	0.190	67.0	0.063	50.8
9	97	0.152	69.4	0.049	41.9
10	110	0.177	74.2	0.063	54.0
11	76	0.207	78.2	0.057	47.7
12	67	0.192	78.1	0.058	49.4
13	67	0.207	80.6	0.056	47.3
14	54	0.158	77.7	0.063	51.9
15	47	0.156	83.2	0.062	50.1
16–20	171	0.158	79.5	0.059	47.6
21+	182	0.146	83.4	0.064	52.1
All actors	4,805	*Mean* = 0.084	*Mean* = 31.21	*Mean* = 0.028	*Mean* = 17.87
Actors with 1+ films	2,945	*Mean* = 0.137	*Mean* = *50.92*	*Mean* = *0.046*	*Mean* = *29.16*

studio is the film's distributor (of which there is sometimes more than one). During the era of the studio system, the distributor was often the film's producer as well. This concentration score is computed in two steps. First, I calculate a Herfindahl score for an actor's tendency to work with a small set of studios (cf. Zuckerman et al., 2003):

$$has_a = \sum_{s}^{S} \frac{w_{as}^2}{N_a} \tag{1}$$

where a indexes actors, s indexes studios, w_{as} is the number of films in which a for which s was the distributor, and N_a is the total number of films in which a acted. Note that, if an actor never works twice for the same studio, then has_a will equal the reciprocal of N_a.[10] Thus, an indicator of the extent to which actors tend to concentrate their work with particular studios is

$$fhas_a = has_a - \frac{1}{N_a} \tag{2}$$

As displayed in the second column, the mean concentration score is 0.084 for all actors and 0.137 for those actors who appeared in more than one film – i.e., those actors who could potentially have significantly high concentration of work with a small number of studios. But, how significant is this level of concentration? Even in a system with random assignments of actors to studios, we would expect some actors to display high levels of attachment to particular studios. The question then is whether and to what extent the observed distribution of *fhas* reflects a level of concentration that exceeds that which would be expected through random chance. To analyze this question, I use a simulation procedure that: (a) fixes the number of screen credits earned by each actor and the number of films, and screen roles per film, distributed by a given director in each of the 3 years; (b) constructs 1,000 samples in which the assignment of actor to screen role is random within each of those years (see Zuckerman et al., 2003; cf., Ellison & Glaeser, 1997); (c) recalculates $fhas_a$ on such random collaboration patterns for the 3-year period, denoted as $fhas(r)_a$; and then compares the distribution of $fhas_a$ with $fhas(r)_a$.

In Fig. 1, I display the distribution of mean $fhas(r)_a$ or $\overline{fhas\,(r)}$ for the 1,000 simulations. As we can see, the observed $\overline{fhas}$ of 0.084 was more than three times greater than the mean of the simulated means or $\mu_{\overline{fhas\,(r)}}$, which was 0.027, and nearly three times greater than the maximum of the simulated means, which was 0.030. Since the distribution of the simulated means approximates a normal distribution, the significance of the difference between the observed concentration score and that found in the simulated data may be expressed through the following Z-score:

$$Zas = \frac{\overline{fhas} - \mu_{\overline{fhas\,(r)}}}{\sigma_{\overline{fhas\,(r)}}}$$

This test statistic uses the standard deviation in the simulated data as a baseline against which to compare the deviation between the observed concentration score and the mean from the random simulations. For the 1933–1935 period, $Zas = 67.15$. That is, the observed tendency for actors to



Fig. 1. Distribution of Mean Concentration from 1,000 Random Simulations; Full Sample, 1935 Period.

repeatedly work for the same studios exceeds the level expected due to random chance by a factor of more than fifty.

In addition to expressing the deviation from random work with the same studios at the aggregate level, it is also useful to examine this from the level of the individual actor. Thus, in the third column of Table 1, I indicate the tendency for the observed level of concentration, $fhas_a$, to be matched by the level of concentration achieved in the 1,000 simulations $fhas(r)_a$. We see that, on average, the observed level of concentration is greater than 20% of the simulations for those actors who were in two films. This 'low' level of excess concentration is unsurprising: such actors work either with one or two studios (except in rare cases where a film is co-released by multiple studios) and even random data will produce many cases in which actors work twice with the same studio. Thus, in column four, I present results from one additional random simulation, which is then compared with the first 1,000 random simulations. We see that the mean concentration score is now much lower, both among those who acted in two films and more generally, and yet 6% of the simulations are still not matched in the other 1,000 random simulations. At the same time, this 6% is much lower than the 20% achieved by the observed data. And as the number of movies in which an actor had a credited role increases, the proportion of the 1,000 simulations that reaches the level of the additional random simulation is about 50% (which indicates that the additional simulation represents the middle of the distribution from Fig. 1), but is about 80% for the observed data, as indicated in column three.

Contrast these results with those presented in Table 2, which parallels Table 1, but reflects the same analysis conducted on the 1995 period. Note that one key difference between these two differences is that, under the studio system, actors (and directors and producers; see Zuckerman, 2005) worked in many more films than they do today. Indeed, the vast majority of actors today appear in a single credited role in their entire feature-film careers (Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Zuckerman et al., 2003). This seems to reflect the fluidity of the boundaries to the contemporary feature-film labor market, which is a sharp departure from an era in which actors tended to

Table 2. Distribution and Significance of Actors Work with the Same Studios, All English-Language Releases, 1993–1995.

		Observed		Additional Random Simulation	
I	II	III	IV	V	VI
N of films in which acted	Frequency	$\overline{fhas}$	Mean % of iterations where $fhas(r)_a < fhas_a$	$\overline{fhas}$	Mean % of iterations where $fhas(r)_a < fhas_a$
1	15,833	0.000	0.00	0.000	0.00
2	3,214	0.028	6.37	0.011	2.2
3	1,373	0.041	14.37	0.023	7.3
4	660	0.048	23.8	0.030	14.0
5	318	0.061	34.49	0.041	23.0
6	195	0.061	38.7	0.048	32.0
7	120	0.051	41.2	0.056	38.4
8	43	0.076	49.3	0.055	38.4
9	51	0.096	53.9	0.048	43.6
10	26	0.048	35.8	0.053	43.4
11+	29	0.066	47.3	0.047	43.2
All actors	21,912	*Mean* = 0.010	*Mean* = 3.95	*Mean* = 0.006	*Mean* = 2.32
Actors with 1+ films	6,029	*Mean* = 0.038	*Mean* = *14.35*	*Mean* = 0.020	*Mean* = 8.42

either be employees under multi-film contracts or to be outside the market. And it is clear that even fully employed actors in the contemporary system tend to work on many fewer films than did their predecessors in the studio system.

The results in Table 2 also suggest that, while there is still a tendency to work repeatedly with the same studios, this tendency has diminished considerably over time. This is particularly evident for those actors who appeared in more than five films, who have only a slightly higher average level of concentration than is generated by the random data. Overall, the mean of the mean concentration scores for the 1,000 simulations $\mu_{\overline{fhas\,(r)}}$ was 0.0057, which was just over half the observed $\overline{fhas}$ of 0.1033, and $Z_{as} = 16.17$. So while, there remains a significant tendency for actors to concentrate their work with particular studios (perhaps because of relationships with directors or producers (Zuckerman, 2005) or because of their agents' relationships with particular studios), the attachment between actor and studio observed in the 1995 period is several times weaker than in the 1935 period.

In Fig. 2, I display results from the application of this procedure to the 13 3-year periods that end each of the half-decades beginning in 1935 (by which time 100% of the feature films were talking pictures) and ending in 1995. Three trend lines are presented: all English-language screen roles; all screen roles in major releases;[11] and all screen roles for top-billing actors. The second and third trend lines are particularly useful for comparing the studio era with the contemporary system because there has been little change either in the set of firms that constitute the major studios (essentially, the replacement of RKO with Disney/Buena Vista) or in the market they target (at least within the US), but their role in the labor market for actors has changed radically.

Several patterns in this figure deserve note. First, there is clear evidence of a fraying of the bond between actor and studio that is reflected in the contrast between the 1935 and 1995 periods. In general, the Z-score measures peak in the 1940 period and then fall steadily until a trough in the 1985 period when a slight reversal occurs, especially in the larger market. Note, however, that it is hard to find evidence of a particularly sharp drop around 1950. Rather, this period appears to have been the middle of a long-run decline. In fact, the greatest average percentage period-to-period drops in these trend lines occurred between the 1970 and 1975 periods, when the mean percentage reduction in the Z-scores was 53%.

It is useful to compare these trends in the size of the market. As indicated in Fig. 3, there was a 2/3 decline in the number of films released in the 1935 period through the 1965 period, and then a 137% rise from the 1975 period



Fig. 2. Z-Scores for Concentration of Actors with Particular Studios, 1935–1995 Periods.

through the 1995 period (which largely reflects the rise of video and cable as additional "exhibition windows" and the expansion of independent films; see Zuckerman & Kim, 2003). The size of the major market saw a somewhat longer decline (79% from the 1935 period through the 1975 period) and a more modest increase more recently (70% increase from the 1975 period through the 1995 period). These trends in the size of the market do not seem to correspond with the trends in the *Z*-scores. In particular, note that: (a) there were large increases in the *Z*-scores from 1935 to 1940 despite the fact that the market contracted over the same interval; (b) the *Z*-scores continued to decline after 1965 despite the fact that the market had bottomed-out by this period; and (c) the rise in the *Z*-scores in the more recent periods is not commensurate with the rise in the size of the market. Indeed, while the number of films released in 1995 was only slightly smaller than it was in 1940, the Z-scores for 1995 were substantially below those for 1940,



Fig. 3. Number of English-Language Films Released, 1935–1995 Periods.

which appears to represent the height of the studio system. Similarly, while roughly the same number of films was released through major studios in the 1960 and 1995 periods, the Z-scores for major releases were substantially higher in the former period, even though the studio system was by then beyond its twilight years.

5.2. Dependent Variable: Genre Specialization

The previous analysis provides us with our independent variable – i.e., the Z-scores for actors' concentration of work with particular studios in a given period. The question before us is whether actors' concentration of work within particular types of acting roles changed across these periods in a manner that can be explained by the decline in the Z-scores for studio concentration.

To address this question, I follow Zuckerman et al. (2003) by analyzing specialization with respect to feature film labor-market categories. In particular, specialism is measured as a function of the tendency for actors to work in films that were in a small set of genres. The genre assignments in IMDB are based on information supplied by film enthusiasts who collectively compile the data on IMDB. Up to five of the seventeen genres listed in Tables 3(a) and (b) are assigned to a given film. The first table gives the

Table 3. Share of Screen Credits.

	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	Average
(a) In all feature films														
Action (%)	2.0	3.3	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.3	3.1	7.4	14.0	9.9	15.3	17.2	22.3	8.1
Adventure (%)	3.4	5.9	4.1	5.0	12.0	6.6	6.1	5.0	5.2	5.3	7.5	5.2	5.2	5.9
Children (%)	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.5	1.1	1.4	1.9	1.5	1.8	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.8	1.1
Comedy (%)	23.0	21.0	24.7	21.0	20.1	21.2	35.5	31.1	22.9	32.5	36.7	36.7	31.3	27.5
Crime (%)	5.7	7.8	4.9	8.2	10.3	10.7	5.3	7.3	14.7	3.9	4.9	6.0	5.2	7.3
Documentary (%)	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.5	2.1	0.7
Drama (%)	32.8	26.5	21.3	23.9	27.2	32.3	27.0	34.8	32.1	35.7	32.1	34.3	41.0	30.9
Fantasy (%)	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.7	1.5	2.4	1.0	2.1	2.8	2.2	1.7	1.2
Film-noir (%)	0.1	0.4	2.0	8.9	4.1	1.5	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.4
Horror (%)	1.0	0.9	2.4	0.3	1.1	6.5	8.5	5.5	12.5	9.8	8.8	11.2	6.1	5.7
Musical (%)	9.2	6.6	15.5	5.0	7.4	3.9	5.5	3.9	4.9	5.0	2.2	1.8	0.6	5.5
Mystery (%)	6.4	7.4	7.3	3.3	2.7	2.5	3.0	1.7	4.0	1.8	2.6	2.2	2.8	3.7
Romance (%)	8.4	5.7	3.8	4.5	5.5	3.4	2.3	2.9	2.6	4.5	8.4	6.8	9.7	5.3
Science Fiction (%)	0.9	1.1	0.2	0.8	4.7	7.1	4.6	4.9	4.7	8.3	8.7	7.1	6.2	4.6
Thriller (%)	1.8	1.8	3.2	2.4	4.0	4.5	5.7	6.3	10.4	8.2	8.7	13.0	18.5	6.8
Western (%)	12.1	17.7	13.2	19.1	17.0	12.9	8.4	9.9	5.0	3.1	0.5	1.2	1.8	9.4
War (%)	0.7	1.9	9.0	1.4	5.7	10.1	7.3	6.7	0.6	3.6	2.7	2.6	1.8	4.2
Total (%)	108	109	115	107	126	129	126	133	138	136	144	150	158	
Total roles	25,045	27,830	22,277	23,307	15,245	12,695	10,928	13,692	12,665	20,194	24,357	38,370	61,108	

(b) In all major releases

Action (%)	1.4	3.3	1.7	2.4	3.2	2.7	3.1	6.5	11.8	8.5	16.7	19.7	21.6	7.9
Adventure (%)	2.2	6.1	4.1	4.7	15.2	8.0	5.6	4.9	4.4	6.6	8.8	6.8	7.7	6.6
Children (%)	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2	1.4	2.3	2.1	3.4	1.0	1.9	0.5	3.3	1.3
Comedy (%)	27.5	23.6	30.1	25.3	19.7	20.0	36.8	31.1	24.8	42.9	44.5	45.9	43.3	32.0
Crime (%)	5.1	8.2	5.3	6.8	6.4	7.1	3.8	6.4	13.7	2.9	3.7	7.1	5.4	6.3
Documentary (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.2
Drama (%)	37.1	32.1	22.4	25.0	28.4	34.9	27.3	40.2	34.2	35.1	33.7	35.7	42.8	33.0
Fantasy %	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.9	0.6	2.1	1.8	3.7	3.2	3.8	2.7	1.6
Film-noir (%)	0.1	0.6	3.0	12.8	4.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.8
Horror (%)	0.8	0.9	2.4	0.1	1.2	4.1	6.4	2.0	9.1	3.7	5.0	6.6	3.0	3.5
Musical (%)	10.1	7.5	19.5	6.8	11.6	5.8	5.6	5.9	9.4	7.0	1.9	1.0	0.5	7.1
Mystery (%)	5.9	8.2	7.0	2.3	1.5	2.1	4.2	2.9	5.8	2.4	2.9	2.5	3.5	3.9
Romance (%)	10.0	6.9	4.4	5.1	6.4	4.9	3.5	3.8	4.0	6.3	11.5	10.3	15.5	7.1
Science Fiction (%)	0.7	1.1	0.1	0.7	3.4	4.9	1.7	4.3	4.6	8.2	9.7	5.0	5.7	3.9
Thriller (%)	1.9	1.4	2.7	2.2	3.9	3.7	6.3	5.9	12.3	7.3	9.1	13.2	14.8	6.5
Western (%)	8.6	12.2	6.0	14.9	18.1	14.6	9.4	11.2	6.5	4.4	1.0	1.7	2.4	8.5
War (%)	0.6	1.6	10.0	1.5	6.4	10.1	9.6	6.7	0.0	3.4	3.4	3.1	2.3	4.5
Total (%)	113	114	119	111	130	128	126	136	147	144	157	163	175	
Total roles	14,476	16,218	13,391	11,820	7,946	6,378	5,116	6,045	5,115	8,406	11,549	12,446	22,497	

allocation of screen credits by genre for the full sample, while the second table shows the same distribution for the sub sample that consists of major releases only. Note that while the size of certain genres (e.g., Comedy, Romance, and Drama) has been relatively constant through time, there have been substantial shifts over time in certain genres, particularly those that are characteristic of the cinema as distinct from other performing arts (e.g., substantial decline in Western and Musical; substantial increase in Action, Science Fiction, and Thriller). Also note that there has been a steady rise in the number of genres assigned to a film, as indicated in the rise in the total percent of a film allocated to different genres. This increase could reflect an increase in the dramatic complexity of films or it could just reflect a recency effect, whereby contemporary enthusiasts see today's films as more complex than those of the past. In either case, these changes complicate the present attempt to compare genre specialization in acting careers over time. In particular, it could be that the classificatory coherence of films (cf., DiMaggio, 1987; Zuckerman, 2004; Zuckerman & Rao, 2004), or at least the coherence of the genre classifications made by IMDB contributors, has decreased over time such that our baseline expectation for how much specialization we should expect has declined as well. We will return to this issue below.

Even if we bracket the issues that hinder a historical comparison, and treat the periods as having comparable expectations for specialism and generalism, the value of this analysis is limited by two key assumptions that underlie the procedure developed by Zuckerman et al. (2003). The first is that the genre assignments in the IMDB are reasonably accurate indicators of the genre assignments in use by the market participants. The second assumption is that genres, as categories in the product market for films, are also salient as categories in the labor market for films. The latter assumption is clearly a crude one in that there are many acting roles that appear in multiple genres. For instance, while we might not expect to see a Jimmy Cagney gangster role in a film assigned to the Children, Fantasy, or Science Fiction genres, one could imagine such a role in most of the other genres, though there are certain genres in which we would expect such a role to be more prevalent (e.g., Crime rather than Musical). The need to make each of these assumptions undoubtedly introduces noise into our analysis. At the same time, comfort with these assumptions may be derived from the fact that significant specialization in the IMDB genre categories is observed, as demonstrated by Zuckerman et al. (2003, pp. 1044–1048).

This procedure calculates the degree to which actors tend to concentrate their work in a given genre using the following steps. First, for actor *a* in film

f in year y, a binary variable is calculated that indicates whether the film was assigned to the genre:

$D_{afy} = 1$, if one of the genres assigned to film f is the genre under consideration

$D_{afy} = 0$, otherwise

The total number of credits received by the actor in that genre over the 3-year period is thus:

$$g_a = \sum_{y}^{3} \sum_{f}^{F} D_{ify}$$

Next, a Herfindahl score is generated over the 3 years:

$$H_g = \sum_i \left(\frac{g_i}{G}\right)^2$$

where G is the total number of credits in movies that were assigned to that genre over the 3-year period. And finally, 1,000 simulations are generated in which actors are randomly matched to films in a given year and measures of g_i and H_g are computed for each simulation. As before, this facilitates a comparison of the observed level of concentration with that found in the simulated data, with the following Z-score:

$$Z_g = \frac{H_g - \mu_{H(\bar{r})_g}}{\sigma H(\bar{r})_g}$$

In Table 4a (full sample) and Table 4b (major releases), I present the results of this analysis conducted on the eleven largest genres over this historical time frame during those periods in which there were enough data to calculate results, first for the full sample and then for the major sub sample.[12] There are several patterns in these results that command attention. First, and most importantly, the main source of variation within each table is not across time but across genre. Thus in the full sample, the mean Z-score ranges from a low of 2.88 (Romance) to a high of 34.25 (Western) across genres, and from 4.73 (1985) to 15.15 (1945) across time periods. As discussed by Zuckerman et al. (2003, pp. 1046–1048), one of the more interesting contrasts between genres is between Comedy and Drama, which are the two largest genres in every period. While Drama was the basis for significant specialization in some (early) periods, its mean Z-scores for both the full sample (3.24) and the major sub sample (1.85) are substantially lower than that for Comedy (13.10, 7.88), which seems to reflect the fact that Drama is essentially a catch-all or residual category, while Comedy has

Table 4. *Z*-Scores for Concentration.

	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	Mean
(a) In specific genres														
Action	8.43	2.16	16.04	7.37	−0.04	3.43	5.91	2.75	11.84	6.59	8.55	19.47	27.90	9.26
Adventure	13.63	12.09	11.06	10.41	10.26	4.16	3.60	0.21	3.84	10.64	6.99	3.35	5.48	13.63
Comedy	10.36	13.55	10.85	13.05	14.17	19.91	20.35	11.42	8.14	11.67	12.07	11.63	13.16	13.10
Crime	5.16	5.93	7.86	3.72	5.28	2.19	2.96	2.90	8.34	1.45	1.96	4.75	7.10	4.59
Drama	11.00	12.31	−0.69	−0.56	1.74	3.22	1.40	0.12	3.92	5.81	2.20	6.05	−4.37	3.24
Horror	6.83	5.79	15.25	−0.74	1.54	5.70	10.05	14.81	6.92	4.66	1.16	11.44	7.76	7.01
Musical	5.19	5.26	12.38	7.84	10.07	1.73	3.42	0.87	−1.71	1.23				4.63
Romance	3.55	7.51	−0.45	4.14	2.90	2.84	5.28	−1.32	−0.37	1.26	4.30	1.69	6.09	2.88
Science fiction					4.76	4.01	−0.53	2.89	0.45	4.11	4.35	3.02	12.30	3.93
Thriller	3.69	1.70	3.46	−0.02	2.07	1.25	5.39	1.44	3.00	3.82	0.96	8.52	15.28	3.89
Western	63.06	72.49	75.73	65.68	40.63	24.67	15.93	22.28	9.74	8.80		2.71	9.27	34.25
Mean	13.09	13.88	15.15	11.09	8.49	6.65	6.71	5.31	4.92	5.46	4.73	7.26	10.00	8.67
Mean (Excl. western)	7.54	7.37	8.42	5.02	5.28	4.84	5.78	3.61	4.44	5.12	4.73	7.77	10.08	6.15
Weighted avg.	15.45	21.02	16.17	16.72	13.22	9.93	10.96	7.28	7.80	8.64	7.99	12.91	14.00	15.45
Weighted avg. (Excl. western)	8.32	10.38	10.47	9.36	6.78	4.87	6.22	3.07	3.52	4.22	3.11	3.14	3.94	8.32

(b) In specific genres for major studios

Action	0.97	0.72	3.91	2.41	−0.83	2.72	−0.7	1.77	6.07	6.58	5.07	8.05	11.41	3.70
Adventure	1.53	9.21	4.48	8.66	7.89	2.48	2.92	0.13	0.42	9.58	6.21	−0.36	3.63	4.37
Comedy	8.67	9.20	11.84	8.15	4.52	9.83	11.90	4.74	6.5	9.39	6.31	4.75	6.65	7.88
Crime	1.61	5.77	11.41	2.26	−1.52	0.6	1.18	2.54	4.18	1.78	−0.1	1.55	2.79	2.62
Drama	6.66	4.46	3.41	2.51	3.05	2.21	1.34	0.09	3.41	−1.35	−1.34	1.27	−1.66	1.85
Horror	3.46	5.09	15.18	−0.13	1.91	9.67	5.58	4.07	3.05	1.00	0.90	0.33	−1.56	3.73
Musical	4.13	5.86	14.27	7.19	7.05	1.96	3.54	0.54	−2.76	0.28				4.21
Romance	1.2	5.31	−1.49	0.44	2.39	2.19	4.5	−1.48	0.36	0.84	2.53	0.33	3.27	1.57
Science fiction					1.55	0.77	0.51	3.85	1.06	4.25	2.64	1.43	0.24	1.81
Thriller	2.6	−2.07	1.47	−2.19	1.01	3.04	4.68	−0.13	0.37	0.95	1.33	2.26	4.89	1.40
Western	36.24	42.03	33.68	33.25	22.41	10.84	9.23	15.5	8.28	6.65	.	2.93	5.41	18.87
Mean	6.71	8.56	9.82	6.26	4.49	4.21	4.06	2.87	2.81	3.63	2.62	2.25	3.51	4.75
Mean (Excl. western)	3.43	4.84	7.16	3.26	2.70	3.55	3.55	1.61	2.27	3.33	2.62	2.18	3.30	3.37
Weighted avg.	8.70	10.6	10.34	8.74	7.97	5.40	6.81	3.75	4.75	5.61	4.46	4.78	6.39	8.7
Weighted avg. (Excl. western)	8.32	10.38	10.47	9.36	6.78	4.87	6.22	3.07	3.52	4.22	3.11	3.14	3.94	8.32

more clearly delimited boundaries. Another genre that stands out is Western, which recorded by far the most significant Z-scores over this time frame; it peaked in the 1940s with the highest recorded Z-scores (75.73 in the 1945 period in the full sample; 42.03 in the 1940 period in the major sub sample), and it continued to be the basis for significant specialization even in recent periods, when it amounted for a small fraction of screen credits.

5.3. Linking Independent and Dependent Variables

The results in Tables 5(a) and (b) reinforce the interpretation that differences between genres, which have been relatively stable across time, account for a substantial proportion of the variation in the Z-scores. The first column in each table is an ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) of Z_g on dummies (equivalent to an ANOVA) for each of the genres except Western, which serves as the reference category. The second column is a weighted least-squares (WLS) regression, where genres are weighted based on the proportion of total screen credits they represent in a given year. And we see that these between-genre differences account for almost half of the variance in the first model, both for the full sample ($R^2 = 0.478$ in column 1 of Table 5a) and the major sub sample ($R^2 = 0.482$ in column 1 of Table 5b) and for 60% or more of the variance ($R^2 = 0.674$ in the full market and $R^2 = 0.598$ in the major sub sample) when the genres are weighted by size. Thus, *most of the variation in observed career specialization can be explained by genre-specific factors that do not change over time despite radical transformation in the way the industry was governed and the employment systems in which actors worked.*

Yet while, the main pattern in the data appears to indicate little change, the demise of the studio system could still have had *some* impact on the degree of specialization observed. Thus, we see in models 3 and 4 of both tables, that the introduction of the Z-score measuring the degree of concentration in actor's work with specific studios in a given period, adds significant explanatory power. In particular, an increase (decrease) of one Z-score unit in aggregate attachment to particular studios (*Zas*) leads to a modest though significant 0.09 increase (decrease) in the amount of genre-based specialization observed. This pattern can be observed in Tables 4(a) and (b), as we see that the mean deviation from the genre-specific means declines from being positive and peaking around 1945 and to being negative throughout most of the period after the decline of the studio system. Thus, while this association pales in comparison to the stability in

Table 5. Multiple Regression of *Z*-Scores for Genre-Based Specialization.

	All Eleven Genres				Excluding Western	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
	OLS	WLS[a]	OLS	WLS[a]	OLS	WLS[a]
Genre dummies[b]	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
(a) Full sample, 1935–1995						
Action	−24.99 (3.73)	−33.63 (3.75)	−24.77 (3.54)	−30.38 (3.64)	5.37 (1.75)	7.74 (2.27)
Adventure	−26.88 (3.73)	−40.04 (4.11)	−26.67 (3.54)	−38.30 (3.91)	3.47 (1.75)	0.91[c] (2.46)
Comedy	−21.15 (3.73)	−34.28 (2.96)	−20.93 (3.54)	−32.24 (2.84)	9.21 (1.75)	6.76 (1.87)
Crime	−29.66 (3.73)	−42.53 (3.86)	−29.45 (3.54)	−40.83 (3.67)	0.70[c] (1.75)	−1.59[c] (2.33)
Drama	−31.01 (3.73)	−44.21 (2.92)	−30.79 (3.54)	−42.21 (2.80)	−0.65[c] (1.75)	−3.18[c] (1.85)
Horror	−27.23 (3.73)	−39.73 (4.14)	−27.02 (3.54)	−36.33 (4.01)	3.12[c] (1.75)	1.68[c] (2.47)
Musical	−29.62 (3.73)	−41.21 (4.29)	−30.11 (3.79)	−41.31 (4.06)	0.59[c] (1.88)	−0.75[c] (2.60)
Romance	−31.37 (3.73)	−43.98 (4.25)	−31.16 (3.54)	−42.38 (4.04)	−1.01[c] (1.75)	−3.06[c] (2.54)
Science Fiction	−30.32 (4.11)	−43.24 (4.54)	−28.26 (3.93)	−39.66 (4.39)	0.42[c] (1.95)	−1.78[c] (2.68)
Thriller	−30.36 (3.73)	−41.32 (3.94)	−30.14 (3.54)	−38.24 (3.80)		
Studio Z-score (*Zas*) $\times 10^{-1}$			0.97 (0.25)	0.98 (0.25)	0.20[c] (0.13)	0.27[c] (0.15)
Constant	34.25 (2.69)	47.41 (2.56)	30.15 (2.77)	41.91 (2.91)	3.09 (1.35)	5.43 (1.71)
N	134	134	134	134	122	122
R^2	0.478	0.674	0.534	0.711	0.357	0.488

(b) Major subsamples, 1935–1995

Action	−15.16	−15.95	−15.02	−14.02	2.30[c]	4.36
	(2.07)	(2.09)	(1.90)	(1.87)	(1.21)	(1.36)
Adventure	−14.50	−17.32	−14.36	−16.48	2.97	2.29[c]
	(2.07)	(2.20)	(1.90)	(1.94)	(1.21)	(1.43)
Comedy	−10.99	−14.46	−10.85	−13.48	6.48	5.25
	(2.07)	(1.64)	(1.90)	(1.45)	(1.21)	(1.11)
Crime	−16.25	−19.39	−16.11	−18.80	1.22[c]	0.07[c]
	(2.07)	(2.23)	(1.90)	(1.96)	(1.21)	(1.44)
Drama	−17.02	−20.55	−16.88	−19.72	0.45[c]	−0.94[c]
	(2.07)	(1.63)	(1.90)	(1.44)	(1.21)	(1.11)
Horror	−15.14	−18.66	−15.00	−16.93	2.33[c]	1.53[c]
	(2.07)	(2.69)	(1.90)	(2.39)	(1.21)	(1.71)
Musical	−14.66	−16.59	−15.04	−17.07	2.57[c]	2.17[c]
	(2.21)	(2.17)	(2.03)	(1.91)	(1.30)	(1.43)
Romance	−17.30	−20.42	−17.16	−19.58	0.17[c]	−0.81[c]
	(2.07)	(2.15)	(1.90)	(1.90)	(1.21)	(1.40)
Science	−17.06	−20.15	−15.66	−18.01	0.98[c]	0.30[c]
Fiction	(2.28)	(2.65)	(2.11)	(2.35)	1.35	(1.68)
Thriller	−17.47	−20.24	−17.33	-18.43		
	(2.07)	(2.21)	(1.90)	(1.96)		
Studio Z-score (Zas) $\times 10^{-1}$			0.81	0.88	0.37	0.57
			(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Constant	18.87	22.26	16.62	19.35	0.45	1.32
	(1.49)	(1.46)	(1.44)	(1.37)	(0.90)	(1.02)
N	134	134	134	134	122	122
R^2	0.482	0.598	0.567	0.691	0.337	0.568

[a]In the WLS models, a genre is weighted by the proportion of all genre assignments it represents in a given year.
[b]Western is the reference category in the models 1–4; Thriller is the reference category in models 5 and 6.
[c]Not significant at the $p < .05$ level.

the genre-specific effects, there does seem to be a general reduction in genre-based specialization and this trend seems to be associated with the decline of the studio system to a modest though significant extent.

Does this association reflect causation? One reason to be skeptical is that so much of the decline in genre-based specialization was due to the decline of the Western genre, and this decline seems more due to changing tastes than it does to the demise of the studio system. Thus, we see in Table 4a that, once Western is excluded, there is no longer any identifiable trend in the mean deviations from the genre mean. Similarly, results from models 5 and 6 of Table 4a indicate that the effect of studio concentration declines to insignificance once the Western genre is excluded. Results from the same analyses of the major sub sample (Tables 4b and 5b) also show a similar reduction in the significance of studio-concentration but the association is still significant. In particular, an increase of one Z-score unit in the tendency for actors to work with particular studios is associated with a rise of as much as 0.06 (WLS model) in genre-based specialization. *Thus, there appears to be a significant yet small association between aggregate studio attachment and aggregate genre specialization in the major sector.*[13]

6. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have sought to bring together three lines of inquiry: (a) on how variation in economic organization shapes cultural variety; (b) on how typecasting limits specialism in (external) labor markets; and (c) on how firms and markets compare in their functioning and outcomes. I do not pretend to have tied these disconnected strands of research into a neat bow, but hope at least to have provided guidance for future research that will conduct efforts at integration. First, the theoretical discussion directs us to two mechanisms, each characteristic of one of the two employment systems and each providing a distinctive support for the emergence of generalist identities. In particular, the increased control that independent contractors enjoy over the work assignments, and the potential therein for cultivating opportunities for recognition as a generalist, is counterbalanced by the incentive to experiment with specialists in new jobs that is experienced by an employer who has made a relatively long-term (and non re-deployable) commitment to a staff. While there is no reason to think that these factors are equally powerful in helping to overcome typecasting, it is equally true that there is no reason to expect one to dominate. Thus, I have argued that the restrictions on generalist identities due to typecasting in the external labor market (see Zuckerman et al., 2003) are comparable in their significance to the restrictions imposed in internal labor markets.

This article provided a first empirical analysis of this issue by examining the extent to which the transformation of a cultural industry from one that is composed largely of a set of internal labor markets to a single external labor market affects the aggregate level of specialism. The replacement of the Hollywood studio system with the contemporary system represents an unusually good context for such an analysis, though this case has significant limitations as well-in particular, the change in the genre distribution of films and, possibly, how those genres relate to the labor-market categories in use in casting decisions hinders confidence that we can compare the two eras as an apples-to-apples comparison. In addition, while we have seen from histories of Hollywood that the two factors varied across the two systems in the manner expected, the available data do not allow us to conduct a systematic examination of these processes and how they affect opportunities for generalism.

That being said, we can have some confidence in two basic lessons from the analysis. First and foremost, it seems evident that the fundamental transformation of the industry, which is reflected in a weakening of the bond between actor and studio, did not occasion a similarly fundamental decline in the degree of career specialization. As reviewed above, the strongest basis for predicting such a decline and a rise in generalist identities was the fact that contemporary actors enjoy a degree of control over the jobs their forebears did not. Today's actors are never in a situation where they must take a particular job and indeed, cases that parallel that of Humphrey Bogart or Jimmy Cagney described above simply do not and cannot occur in today's system.[14] And the fact that actors now have refusal rights on the jobs they take could be taken to imply that limitations on generalism would have been much stronger during the studio system, especially given the studios' strategy of presenting filmgoers with predictable, consistent personae from film to film.

Yet, the analysis presented above indicates that the decline in specialization was quite modest and that the degree to which actors tended to specialize in a given genre was quite stable over time and in the face of the transformation of the industry. Insofar as typecasting implies an "inefficient" undersupply of generalism (i.e, workers who could be productive in a wide array of job categories are restricted to one), one might suppose that generalist careers would be more common in the contemporary system because the market is superior to firms at facilitating the allocation of resources to their most efficient uses. But the results presented are consistent with a view that *the mechanisms for allocating resources in firms are sometimes as efficient as those operative in markets even when those mechanisms are fundamentally different*.[15] The key factor in this regard is the sinking of costs in a semi-permanent staff creates a stimulus for experimentation in an internal labor market that has no parallel in an external labor market. Indeed, beyond the film industry, it is useful to consider firms that have management-training programs that groom generalist managerial skills by placing them in a variety of industries and/or regions. Such programs create career lines (e.g., a General Electric manager might work in such varied industries as plastics; industrial diamonds; appliances; medical devices; and broadcasting at various points in his career) that are vanishingly rare in the external labor market, where hiring is typically governed by a typecasting process according to which employers (or the executive recruiters who represent them) look first for candidates who have worked in the industry in question.

A direct test of the salience of such a stimulus for generalism must await data that are better suited for such an analysis. At the very least, however, the modest decline in specialization despite an evident increase in actors' formal control over how they are cast suggests that such a mechanism may be quite important. Thus, the current trend toward careers that cross firm boundaries (e.g., Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Kunda et al., 2002) will not necessarily foster careers that are more apt to cross labor market boundaries (cf., Jones & deFillippi, 1996, p. 93).

NOTES

1. Here and in the rest of the paper, I use the term ''actor'' to refer both to male actors and female actresses.
2. This presumption seems more commonly held by economists than sociologists. Yet even sociologists tend not to argue the opposite – i.e., that managed systems are more efficient than unmanaged ones.
3. In some cases, a worker may have enough market power or financial resources to choose the jobs she wants. For the most part, the typecasting process, applied either to independent contractors as well as employees, implies that the actor with a specialist identity will have difficulty breaking out.
4. Interview conducted on November 14, 2000 with an Oscar winning actor, as part of the research described in Zuckerman et al. (2003).
5. There appears to be a widespread misconception among social scientists that sunk costs should *never* affect decisions and that such effects always reflect an irrational ''sunk cost fallacy'' or ''escalation of commitment'' (see e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner, 1992). In fact, this (widespread) bias is for the decision-maker to

focus on the sunk costs *directly* and let that affect his decision. However, insofar as the sinking of costs changes the costs of future courses of action (which should be the only concern of a rational, forward-looking actor), it is quite rational for sunk costs to affect resource allocation decisions *indirectly*. For example (Saloner, Shepard, & Podolny, 2001, p. 229), conditional on having built railroad tracks, the price a railroad company will require to operate its trains is much lower than it would be if the tracks could be redeployed for other purposes. Similarly, having obligated itself to pay a faculty member for a year, a department faces no additional cost in using that faculty member for a given class, but will incur additional cost if it hires an adjunct to do so. Of course, there may be instances in which a department chair irrationally focuses on sunk costs directly in that they use the faculty member on staff even when the lower cost in using him would have been outweighed by the benefit of using an adjunct that is better suited for the class. Yet, it is not necessary to assume such irrationality in order to assert that the sinking of costs in a staff creates an incentive for using staff members over contractors.

6. For instance, Judy Garland's initial contract with MGM paid \$100 per week for the 1st year, an increase of \$100 each year through year 5, and then an increase to \$750 per week for year 6 and \$1000 per week for year 7 (Harmetz, 1984, p. 104). In fact, the contract was rewritten after the 5th year to pay Garland \$2000 per week for the next 3 years. Such renegotiations near the end of an actor's contract reflect attempts to gain access to the rent stream generated by the actor for a longer period of time, albeit with a lower share of that stream.

7. Bogart eventually acquiesced and starred in *Conflict*, which was relatively unsuccessful.

8. See Klaprat (1985) for a slightly different view on the offcasting of Bette Davis by Warner Bros.

9. While the studio system began roughly 10 years earlier, I confine analysis to the periods that include only talking pictures.

10. For instance, if an actor works for 10 different studios, has_a will equal $10 \times (0.1 \times 0.1) = 0.1$.

11. I define the following as major studios: Buena Vista [Disney], Columbia, MGM, Paramount, RKO; Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, or Warner Bros. High-billing actors are those who were listed first through fifth in billing order on any of their films from the 3-year period (see Zuckerman et al., 2003).

12. Results for the top five in billing order were substantially the same.

13. As noted before, a similar result was found when analysis was restricted to the top-billing actors. I have also conducted a separate analysis of genre-based concentration that follows the same procedure described above for concentration of work with particular studios (and with directors and producers, see Zuckerman, 2005). This analysis shows a decline in genre-based specialization that is of the same magnitude as that shown in the analyses in Tables 5(a) and (b) that include the Western genre.

14. It is noteworthy that both Cagney and Bogart formed independent production companies after their contracts with Warners were up and, while both focused on broadening their career identities, they both failed in this regard (see Reddersen, 1983, pp. 115-130; Warren, 1983, pp. 158-170)

15. As reviewed above, one of the themes in emerging research comparing firms–markets is that they function in ways that are more similar than is commonly

supposed (see Bidwell, 2005a, b). In the current case, it seems clear that firms and markets operate quite differently but the *outcomes* due to these processes are substantially the same.

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