'Race', Culture and the Right to the City
Centres, Peripheries, Margins
G. Millington
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

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

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For Anya, Edie and Isabel

Dedicated also to the memory of Robert Millington (1948–2011)

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1
Introduction: The Signs in the Street

In late October 2009 I visited the Lower East Side Tenement Museum in Orchard Street, Manhattan. The museum and its gift shop were packed and I only managed to get a ticket at the last moment when a group of people failed to show for their guided tour. The visit was fascinating and it was amazing to feel so close to the immigrant history of New York. It got me thinking, though, and I tried to make connections between times and places. It struck me – should someone or even *could* someone in the future open a museum dedicated to the experiences of the Kosovar–Albanian asylum seekers whom I had interviewed in bedsits and hostels in Southend-on-Sea, England, back in 2004? Will anybody dedicate a space emphasising the positive contributions they went on to make to British society? Will anyone painstakingly restore their equally humble dwellings? The answer, I suspect, will be no, yet why should this be the case? The answer is complex – we are comparing different nations, different locations (one a metropolis, the other a 'backwater'), and very different times. The city has changed and immigration contexts have altered. Somewhere in between 'race' has impinged upon our understanding of both.

Introduction

The scope of the book – beginning with the centralised, densely *peopled* city of the 19th century and ending in the 'edgier', more ambiguous 'non-places' on the periphery of the global city – is broad, and no doubt some will say too ambitious. However, to travel this journey through time and space feels like the best way of making sense of transformations in the relationship between 'race', culture and the metropolis. The spectacle of the 'zone in transition' or 'inner city' still holds sway in the

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public and academic imagination (think, for example, of the Lower East Side, Harlem, Notting Hill or Brixton), yet it can no longer be assumed that the centre of the city is the privileged site where quotidian struggles of a multi-ethnic, multiracial society are played out. The 19th-century metropolis once resembled something close to an encompassing *'city* in transition', a swarm of people trying to survive and in that process moving incessantly between dwellings. The city attracted people to its centre – people who remade the city and its form, continuously. In the 1920s the Chicago School brought to light a fundamental change in that the urban had been reduced to a 'function' of the city; it had become a *zone* in transition. The idea of an area of the city as a 'reception centre' was invented at this point, revealing a forgetfulness that this is *what cities were all along*. In today's global city where even the *zones* in transition are dwindling – their functionality lost to business, consumption or middle-class housing – we instead have tenement museums that, while suggesting continuity with the past, only really help us remember how cities used to be and, perhaps, how they still should or could be.

Centres, Peripheries, Margins attempts to connect and make sense of two stories – the story of the modern metropolis and the story of, for want of a better term, 'racial and ethnic relations'. There has been a tendency, more so in the UK than in the US, to focus on one at the expense of the other. In 'race' and ethnic studies especially there is often a lack of historical perspective, as this field (especially in its more administrative guises) is driven by the need to 'catch up' with the most recent developments – with the *latest* wave of immigrants, the latest exclusionary government policies and so on. Such work is mostly necessary. The approach taken in this book is different and comprises a geohistorical analysis of the sociological reality of the 'multicultural' city. This account aims to expose the 'roots and routes' (Urry 2000: 133) of 'race' and multiculture as they connect with the 'poetics and politics' (Hall 1997) of place. The novel focus of the book is the attention given to the relationship between centre and periphery and how this impacts upon Henri Lefebvre's notion of 'the right to the city'.

Geohistorical analysis must struggle with the interdependence of space, time and process, and 'to neglect one is to mis-specify the other two' (Sayer 2000: 122). The discussion offered here avoids the limitations of narrative and institutional history. Rather, it seeks – as with Lefebvre's interpretation of Karl Marx – to consider the development of humankind and the city in *all* aspects, especially at the level of practical activity. Cities are defined within *praxis*, through 'unity and scission, struggle and alliance' (Lefebvre 1972: 20). Studying the city

as a *totality* – a sum of human efforts – is, of course, challenging, yet to break up the social sciences into specialised compartments (sociology, geography, history) causes us to lose sight of what the city is. For Lefebvre the strength of Marx's understanding of totality is that it 'keeps multiplying and emphasising the contradictions between men and works, otherness and alienation, groups and classes, substructures and superstructures' (ibid.: 21). An approach that unifies the social sciences in the study of the city promises a great deal. It has dizzying effects for the scholar who must operate at a multi-scalar level and veer from the depths of despair found in the poverty and violence of the 'hyperghetto' (Wacquant 2008a) to transcendent moments when the impossible appeared possible, like the Paris Commune of 1871. The city always evades intellectual grasp, yet through trying to connect its raucous fragments and its past conflicts with those from the present – by reading the signs in the street – it is possible to sense the exhilarating 'Marxism with soul' that Marshall Berman (2009) once evoked.

This chapter begins by introducing the cities that are the basis for this study: London, New York and Paris. The following section outlines the theoretical framework that underpins the analysis. The first aspect concerns a theory of the city and the urban derived largely from Lefebvre's (1991) theory of the production of space and also his (1996) development of the notion of the 'right to the city'. The second aspect is an understanding of 'race' inspired by Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall and the race formation theory of Omi and Winant (1986). In drawing together 'race', the city and the urban, the final section begins to ask the critical questions that the book addresses.

Three cities, one metropolis

The book takes three cities as its focus: London, New York and Paris. These cities comprise arguably the three great Western metropolises; each at some point has laid claim to being the capital, or centre, of modernity (see Hall 1999). They were also chosen because of their shared current status as global cities (Sassen 2001), representative of the centralisation of capital and the corporate economy that has occurred in the global economy. This new form of centrality 'both as space and social form, [...] concentrates immense power, a power that rests on the capability for global control and the capability to produce superprofits' (Sassen 2006: 198). It is important to stress how global cities such as London, New York and Paris differ in many respects from provincial cities in their respective countries, which, if operating outside

the 'world market oriented sub-system', are likely to be experiencing a novel form of marginality and an increase in their *localness* (see Sassen 2001; Amen et al. 2006). The analysis presented here cannot be transposed onto provincial or smaller cities such as Manchester, Marseilles or Detroit, which require their own analysis (see, for example, Bell and Jayne 2006). Each of the cities that are the focus of this book promises to tell us something quite different about 'race' and culture. For example, whereas the importance of 'race' and racism to US cities cannot be exaggerated (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000: 9), the structuring or organising role played by 'race' is more ambiguous in European cities. At points in modern history when one city appears to have taken a different form in its structuring of 'difference' or assertion of white superiority it points to a future that is yet to be realised, or that will be realised via an alternative route in another city. Yet the book does not claim to be an exemplar of comparative urbanism (see Nijman 2007). Arguably more important than straight comparison, which runs the risk of producing overly descriptive work, is the development of a *composite* notion of the metropolis. This abstraction, based on *existing* cities, is developed through examining how 'race' and culture are interwoven as praxis and process within and between cities. Through acknowledging differences and similarities between London, New York and Paris, the ultimate aim is to offer a series of *general* observations on how 'race' and culture are integral to the development of the modern city and also how the metropolis is integral to processes of 'race' formation and the governance of difference.

This book is committed to both empirical labour and theoretical deliberation. The book is informed by two studies carried out by the author, one in Southend-on-Sea, Essex, England and another in La Courneuve, Paris, France. A third study, in the housing projects of Coney Island, New York City, was planned but did not make it to fruition in time. The book also makes use of a host of empirical studies that have been carried out in London, New York and Paris. In this sense, the book is emphatically grounded in research. A note should be made at this early point that the analysis contained here is not based upon quantitative data. This book prioritises qualitative sources and concentrates upon socio-cultural-historical processes rather than statistical measures.

The production of space and the formation of 'race'

The theoretical framework of the book utilises Henri Lefebvre's 'production of space' thesis, along with his insights into the relationship between

centres and peripheries. This is aligned to a Stuart Hall/ Gramscian emphasis on *historical* specificity in understanding 'race', 'race' formation and racism. These insights are combined in understanding the relationship between 'race', culture and the city. Whilst theoretical material is generally worn lightly – especially in the early 'historical' chapters – this framework informs everything that is written here.

The production of space

One of the reasons why capitalism has survived is because it has produced a space amenable to the ongoing accumulation of capital. In fact, it has shown great agility in doing this – capitalism now operates on a global basis and, in its current neoliberal form, demonstrates tendencies to what Harvey (2001a; 2005) calls 'flexible accumulation' – the exploitation of increasingly temporary labour markets both at 'home' and overseas. Despite appearances, the globe has not 'shrunk' in the last thirty years; rather, spatial relations (between producers, consumers and markets) have been recast in ways that maximise the potential for accumulation. Space has become the locus and medium of struggle – to be in the right place at the right time means more now than ever before. Some people – usually those already endowed with economic and cultural capital – successfully make it and are able to take advantage of the opportunities thus presented, while others appear to always miss out and are thus kept on the (global) outside. This is why Lefebvre (1991: 55) states that the class struggle is 'inscribed in space'. 'Racial' struggles, through their complex relationships with capitalism and class, deserve to be seen similarly.

Lefebvre (ibid.) presents a unified theory of space that combines an understanding of physical (material), mental and social space. Space, and therefore cities, resembles a totality, a 'thing' comprised of multiple layers of determination. Scholars are urged by Lefebvre not to treat spaces as absolutes and to think beyond the here-and-now of urban reality in order to comprehend how spaces came to be, how they were produced (and in whose or what interests). Yet, this is not a straightforward task, because 'it is never easy to get back from the object to the activity that produced and/ or created it [because] once the construction is completed, the scaffolding is taken down' (ibid.: 113).

Lefebvre implies production in a broad sense. Production is a material, mental and lived process; it produces not only 'things' but also *oeuvres* (or works). Lefebvre offers a spatialised reading of Marx's analysis of the fetishism of commodities. This rests on the recognition that commodities assume a strange 'thing like' character once they are exchanged at

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the marketplace. The fetishism of the commodity form masks the origin of its production, endowing it with a 'mystical' and 'mist-enveloped quality'. This idea is extended to space, arguing that its production can be likened to the production of any sort of commodity. In order to avoid spatial fetishism we therefore need to move beyond an understanding of 'things in space' to an understanding of the *production of space*. The 'race relations' paradigm of sociology tends to fall into this trap, as does migration studies by reifying 'race' or ethnic identity. In the perspective offered here 'race' and multiculture are not simply features of life 'in the city'; rather, *they are integral to its production*.

Lefebvre traces the production of space through the use of a 'triad' or 'three dimensional dialectic' (Schmid 2008), a heuristic device that identifies three facets of production. That there are three elements is critical to Lefebvre, who argues that 'relations with two elements boil down to oppositions, contrasts or antagonisms' (ibid.: 39). The problem is that simplistic systems 'can have neither materiality nor loose ends: it is a "perfect" system […]' (ibid.). Lefebvre's three 'levels of determination' rarely result in a perfect or coherent space. The spaces of the city instead exhibit intricate 'entanglements of power' (see Sharp et al. 2000), full of 'loose ends' and comprised of 'an amalgam of forces, practices, processes and relations' (ibid.: 20).

The first level is 'Spatial Practices' (or space as it is *perceived*). The notion of practice captures the moment of connectivity between objective and subjective states. Every space is already in place before the appearance in it of actors, and the pre-existence of space conditions the subject's presence, action and discourse. At the same time as practices presuppose space they also negate it. Spatial practices deliver everyday reality through the routes, networks and patterns of interaction that link places or sites set aside for home, work, consumption, leisure etc. Practices ensure societal cohesion and continuity, with each member of society deploying what Lefebvre calls a 'spatial competence'. While the 'performance' of spatial practices can give the appearance of order, this does not entail that spatial practice is rational; rather, 'the spatial practice of a society secretes that society's space; it propounds and presupposes it […] it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it' (ibid.: 38). Practice always involves 'overcoming' or 'going beyond'; it produces and reproduces space and 'is at once theoretical and practical, real and ideal, is determined by both past and present activity' (Lefebvre 1972: 5). Lefebvre (1991: 38) claims that '"modern" spatial practice might thus be defined – to take an extreme but significant case – by the daily life of a tenant in a government-subsidized high-rise housing project'.

The second and most dominant level in any mode of production is 'Representations of Space' (or space as it is *conceived*). This is space as conceptualised by professionals and technocrats such as planners, developers, architects, estate agents and others of a scientific bent. Invariably, ideology, power and knowledge are embedded in representations of space. Since representations of space are the space where *capital* exerts most influence, they exert more influence than other concepts within the triad. The potential for space to be conceived alternatively is subjugated by capitalist tendencies to conceive only of *abstract space*, in which the ultimate arbiter is value. Representations of space are tied most closely to the relations of production and to the order those relations impose. Lefebvre's emphasis on *abstract* has clear Marxist overtones: 'value, money (the universal measure of value), and exchange value (price) all, by hook or by crook set the tone of the structural conception of abstract space' (Merrifield 2002: 176). Lefebvre warns that 'left unchecked, a market and for-profit system always and everywhere flourishes through the abstract conceived realm' (1991: 90). Representations of space find 'objective expression' in monuments and buildings, for example factories, public housing projects, shopping malls and so on.

The final level in the triad is called 'Representational Space' (or space as it is *lived*). It is this experiential realm in which *conceived space* intervenes in capitalist societies, similarly to how Habermas (1987) explains the 'colonisation of the lifeworld' by system imperatives. Representational Space is the space of everyday experience and is often passively experienced in the sense that it is generally dreamt rather than 'thought about'. Yet lived space is the space of the imaginary and makes symbolic use of objects in space. This is why Lefebvre is adamant that we understand representational space to be 'alive' in the sense that it contains the potential to resist rules of consistency and cohesiveness and the capability to oppose the rationalistic conceptions of space purveyed by architects, planners and developers. Representational space is accessed through symbolic, artistic and aesthetic works that describe space as it is actually *lived*.

The perceived–conceived–lived triad loses force if it is treated as an abstract model (Lefebvre 1991: 40). It can tell us nothing in itself; rather, it should be used to make sense of concrete, historical urban forms, which is the intention here.

Centre and periphery

Advanced capitalism, in which space is conceived almost exclusively in abstract terms as exchange value, produces a particular kind of space; the

cities that are the focus of this book are, or rather have become, examples of this. Lefebvre (2003a: 210) argues that space produced in advanced capitalism demonstrates a specific logic that he terms: 'homogeneity-fragmentation-hierarchy'. This can be explained as follows. Abstract space (where exchange value is the sole arbiter) is an increasingly homogeneous space that implies the interchangeability of times/places based upon exchange values. Homogeneity occurs because abstract space is '[f]ormal and quantitative, it erases distinctions' (Lefebvre 1991: 49). Times and spaces become repetitive (e.g., work hours/ leisure hours; central business district/ entertainment district) and cities strangely begin to resemble one another. This uniformity rests upon a powerful centralisation that establishes distinct relations with the periphery. Centres are responsible for innovation and control and are the locus of power, while the periphery is subsumed under this regime.

Yet there is also a paradox in that, while urban space is homogeneous, it is also 'broken' and 'reduced to crumbs' (Lefebvre 2003a: 210). This is because space that can be bought and sold is fragmented into lots and parcels. Abstract space only becomes concrete by being embodied in practical use, in building activities and zoning procedures. Here, the state coordinates and attempts to impose some kind of spatial cohesion on the urban landscape. Thus, there is a vast bureaucracy associated with planning and land use regulations. Lefebvre argues that the fragmentation of space in this way produces 'ghettos, units [and] clusters [...] poorly linked with their surroundings [...]' (Lefebvre 2003a: 210). The state's role in fragmentation is to check the freedoms of both the market, by forbidding the emergence of an unfettered capitalist space, and civil society, by restricting the potential uses of space and controlling the forms of sociality that occur in such spaces.

In an open market, some spaces are valued more highly than others. This is why urban spaces in advanced capitalist societies are arranged within a hierarchy. For Lefebvre (2003b),

> Inequalities are a necessary outcome of the exchange of spaces [...] [p]laces are arranged unequally in relation to the centres which are themselves unequal [...] state action exacerbates this situation: spaces form extreme hierarchies, from the centres of domination to the peripheries that are impoverished but still all the more strongly controlled.

In advanced capitalism the value of places tends to be determined in their relation to the centre. Moreover, some centres on a global scale

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(such as London, New York and Paris) are valued more highly than others. Peripheries, on the other hand, tend to be devalued and sit at the bottom of hierarchies. In a re-centred system of global cities the national hinterlands are in danger of becoming 'nowhere' spaces, or alternatively, as Sassen (2006: 199) argues, devalued sectors of the urban economy are being drawn into fulfilling crucial functions for the centre. The relationship between centre and periphery is complex and historically contingent upon a range of factors. For example, Sennett (1994) explains how New Yorkers were once desperate to escape the city, with its cramped housing and poor pay, for the suburbs. Once transportation and the relocation of industry made this possible, that is exactly what they did during the 1950s – in droves. Yet, 'as the periphery took on an economic life of its own, part of the dream to escape thus began to fade. Poverty and low-wage jobs reappeared in the suburbs. As did crime and drugs' (ibid.: 364). The centre-periphery has since been re-imagined, as 'the children of those who left a generation ago have sought to return to the centre' (ibid.: 367) to escape the drudgery and frustration of a life on the periphery. Hierarchies mean that the fragments of urban space inevitably assume the form of a collection of ghettos: for the elite, for the bourgeoisie, for the intellectuals, for foreign workers, etc. These ghettos are not simply juxtaposed; they are hierarchised in a way that represents spatially the economic and social hierarchy, dominant sectors and subordinate sectors (Lefebvre 2003b: 95). The city may well appear highly diverse in terms of its visible human difference, yet a closer inspection always reveals 'the "residential" spaces of the elite, the bourgeoisie, and the middle classes are distinguished perfectly from those reserved for blue-collar and service workers' (Lefebvre 2003b: 95). As Bourdieu (1999: 120) states, there is no space in hierarchised society that is not itself hierarchised.

Centrality is important. Colonial domination was based around an exploitative relationship between centre and periphery, with the periphery providing energy, raw materials and surplus value and the centre organised around consumption and the concentration of power. For Lefebvre (1970), the right to the city is also the right to centrality. Moreover, 'there is no urbanity without a centre' (Lefebvre 1996: 2008). In the modern metropolis, the city is the centre of decision-making, consumption and finance. Yet it remains a place from which people are excluded, economically, socially and culturally (Lefebvre 1996: 169–70). Today we are witnessing a movement of workers to the edges of cities, which Lefebvre calls a shift from concentration to decentralisation. The separation of people from the urban is a consequence of a class

conflict inscribed in space. The peripheralisation of foreigners, factories, proletarian housing and 'new' universities is now a generalised tactic in the metropolis. Peripheral spaces have become 'heterotopia'; they are the *other* to the utopia of the urban centre and consequently reveal the order, or definition, of the centre.

Exclusion from the centre is evidence of the denial of the 'right to the city' – a 'superior right' concerned with *inhabiting* the city, rather than owning part of it or being allowed to work or contribute to decisions there (Lefebvre 1996: 173). Property and labour are mere abstractions of the *oeuvre* – the urban demands participation and appropriation. As Dikeç (2001: 1790) argues, the right to the city implies not only the participation of the citizen in social life but, more importantly, his or her participation in the political life, management and administration of the city. For Purcell, the usefulness of the 'right to the city' as a normative notion is that it represents an 'imaginative opening, […] a challenge to the current [urban] structure that points towards a new politics' (Purcell 2003: 565). The right to the city implies a renewed urban society and a renovated centrality based not upon a concentration of economic and political power but upon the regrouping of differences. The city as *oeuvre* contains the capacity to overcome divisions and restore totality. Appropriation must triumph over domination. For Kofman and Lebas (1996: 19), it is the 'ludic in its fullest sense of theatre, sport, games of all sorts, fairs, more than any other activity [that] restores the sense of *oeuvre* conferred by art and philosophy and prioritises'. The reclaiming of the urban centre (and of urbanity) is key to any revolutionary movement. Lefebvre describes the 1968 occupation of the elite Sorbonne by students from Nanterre, the university where he was teaching at the time, as 'a dialectical interaction between marginality and urban centrality' (Lefebvre 1969, cited in Elden 2004: 156). For just a brief time, Paris was restored: the occupation of the Latin Quarter brought the streets to life, ridding them of automobiles and making them once more an open *forum*. The city had been reclaimed Central streets were reinvigorated as meeting places where those normally kept apart – workers, businessmen, politicians, students – were able to congregate. The right to the city frees the *oeuvre* to overcome fragmentary divisions, to restore the totality. U-topie, as the search for a place that does not exist, plays a major role in Lefebvre's conception of the right to the city (Kofman and Lebas 1996: 21). Lefebvre is concerned with unlocking the 'possible impossible', a notion derived through the method of *transduction*. This involves developing a possible object (i.e., the city; the urban) from the problematic posed by information relating

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to reality (i.e., actual cities) (Lefebvre 1996: 151). In this way, *real* cities reveal the possibilities of what 'the city' could be; for Lefebvre *transduction* 'introduces rigour in invention and knowledge in utopia' (ibid.).

'Race' formation

'Race' is a social and political construct with no scientific basis in biology; there are no human races. 'Race' is an idea rather than a scientific (or social scientific) concept (see Carter 2000) and this is why it remains in inverted commas. Yet its deployment at various levels of society and in various forms (e.g., racism; racialisation; black identity politics) means that it remains a powerful structuring feature of society. While accepting the illegitimacy of 'race', sociologists are right to be concerned with how 'racial logics and racial frames of reference are articulated and deployed' (Donald and Rattansi 1992: 3). 'Race' thinking has effects: it causes inequality, injustice, violence, and personal and collective hurt. It is critical that scholars remain 'alive to the lingering power of specifically racialised forms of power and subordination' (Gilroy 1993: 32). With regards to Lefebvre's triad of spatial determinations, it is easy to see how racialised power can infiltrate each level. Black workers may choose to socialise together in the works canteen; estate agents may 'filter' non-white homebuyers into particular neighbourhoods; a city-based TV soap opera may 'imagine' Asian characters in a stereotypical fashion. The production of urban space is influenced at all levels by 'race'.

While 'race' is a critical focus of the book, this work aims to demonstrate 'a deeper commitment to a non-racial humanism that exhibits a primary concern with the forms of human dignity that race-thinking strips away' (Gilroy 2000: 17). This is achieved by picking from the ruins of the past signs that point towards an alternative non-'racial' metropolis. Yet it is not possible to think of a city 'beyond race' until the historical and present divisive influence of 'race' has been interrogated; a process that takes time. The non-racial city of the future can only be conceived, perceived and lived 'in response to the sufferings that raciology has wrought' (ibid.). Extending the right to the city to the many rather than the few is dependent upon such a process.

While the beneficiaries of racialised structures may not want to give up their privileges, preferring instead strategies of 'cultural tolerance' or 'cosmopolitan' openness (which entail they can never lose), those diverse groups who have been subordinated by race-thinking and racialised outcomes 'have for centuries employed the concepts and categories of their rulers, owners, and persecutors to resist the destiny that "race"

has allocated to them and to dissent from the lowly value it placed upon their lives' (ibid.). Oppressed groups have used 'race' to build traditions of politics, ethics, identity and culture. 'Race' may not be *real* but it has sometimes been all that oppressed groups have had to work with. The danger of 'whitewashing' 'race' from urban studies is that it marginalises traditions, which are often expressions of collective memory, from *official* histories of modernity (and the city). As Gilroy (ibid.: 13) argues, these 'vernacular cultures and the stubborn social movements that were built upon their strengths and tactics have contributed important moral and political resources to modern structures in pursuit of freedom, democracy and justice'. The public responses to tragedies such as the Paris massacre of 1961 and the murders of Stephen Lawrence and Jean Charles de Menezes in London are critical to the progress towards, rather than the anathema of, a *non*-racial city.

In terms of understanding what 'race' is and how it becomes a feature of social reality, this book concurs with Hall (2002b) in arguing against the 'economic tendency' which takes 'economic relations and structures to have an overwhelmingly determining effect [and] those social divisions which assume a distinctly racial or ethnic character can be attributed or explained principally with reference to economic structures and processes' (Hall 2002b: 39). However, it also argues along with Hall against a 'sociological' tendency that agrees 'on the autonomy, the nonreductiveness, of "race" and ethnicity as social features [with] their own specific effects, which cannot be explained away as mere surface forms of appearance of economic relations' (Hall 2002b: 40). The most satisfactory explanation – adhered to here – is that 'race' and racism are emergent but 'relatively autonomous' features of the social world. 'Race' is 'historically inserted' but also assumes an 'active structuring principle of the present organization of that society' (Hall 2002b: 60).

There is no essential or unitary 'black' subject just as there is no monolithic white identity. Hall (1991) argues that 'black' is a 'shifting signifier' that does not refer to a fixed object and is a category that is fought over in the relations of representation. One question that has been important in the UK is whether to categorise those from the Indian subcontinent as black; at times it has seemed appropriate and at other times – when ethnic or cultural differences have been deemed more important – not so (see Brah 1991; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Modood 1988). Black also has very different connotations in the US (Baker et al. 1996) and in France (Thomas 2007), yet this does not mean that a transatlantic black identity that connects experience in these locations with the Caribbean and Africa cannot be constructed if

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it is attentive to difference as well as commonalities (see Gilroy 1993). Similarly, being white is understood differently between nations and cultures, and there also exist hierarchies of whiteness (see Garner 2007). This is why there have been repeated calls for *contextual* accounts of racism, those that place 'race' within its distinct geohistorical milieu. Back and Solomos (2000: 20) argue that '[i]t is [...] important to understand why certain racialised subjectivities become a feature of social relations at particular points in time and in particular geographical spaces'. Moreover, racist discourse needs to be located within specific political, cultural, social and economic moments (Solomos and Back 1996: 27). Another important aspect of understanding the importance of history and space is that ideas about 'race' are often forged as composites of other processes, such as, for example, the building of cities. This explains why '[p]art of the complexity of analysing the historical impact of [race and] racism is that it is often intertwined with other social phenomena' (Bulmer and Solomos 1999: 13).

Racial formation is concerned with the enduring role that 'race' plays in terms of organising and shaping social inequalities. Racial formation theory as contrived by Omi and Winant (1994) explores how racial identities and meanings are 'decentred' complexes of social meanings that are changed over time within the context of political struggle. They define racial formation as 'the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed' (ibid.: 55). To this we should add that sociohistorical processes are spatialised too. This is why:

> 'Race'-making sits between historically complex demographic trajectories and historically spurious systems of categorisation. Temporalities and spatialities are consequently not just the context of these processes, they are instead a constitutive feature of them. (Keith 2005: 9)

The work of 'race' formation is carried out by 'racial projects' which connect what 'race' means with everyday forms of organisation that are based upon that meaning. As such, racial projects are always concretely framed and always contested and unstable. Society is suffused with racial projects, from the level of state politics to everyday experience; they are both large (such as the white city fantasy outlined later in this chapter) and small (for example, the recent gentrification of Brixton market and the Notting Hill Tabernacle, both reported in the London Evening Standard[1]), and yet people are – whether they realise it or

not – subjected to the will of these projects, such is the continued authority of 'racial' thinking. Omi and Winant (1994: 60) suggest we are all inserted into a racialised social structure. In relation to cities, 'race' thinking exerts an influence on all three levels of determination identified by Lefebvre (1991). We may prefer to imagine that cities are post-'race' or post-racist, but this cannot change how *they are or have been* perceived, conceived and lived. However much we would like the case to be otherwise, we cannot change this fact merely by wishing it away. The critical point is that it is not possible to reorganise social or urban structures without engaging either explicitly or implicitly in 'racial' signification. This is why the notion of 'colour blind', despite its avowed imperviousness to race, actually represents a deeply conservative racial project. It manipulates fears about the significance of 'race' in order to achieve political and economic gains. Gilroy (2000: 13) argues that 'the idea that action against racial hierarchies can proceed more effectively when it has been purged of any lingering respect for the idea of "race" is one of the most persuasive cards in this political and ethical suit.'

Ghassan Hage (1998) outlines the importance of the 'white nation' fantasy in shaping national responses to multiculture. Each city under scrutiny in this work – London, New York and Paris – labours more or less under the fantasy that it is fundamentally a *white* city, a belief that stems from the historical attachment of each city to imagined notions of nation and empire. During the modern age the white city fantasy has remained constant, although it has been configured and expressed in different ways, especially at its intersection with class, from Charles Booth's colour-coded poverty maps of 'darkest' London to the attacks on West Indians that precipitated the Notting Hill riots of 1958, to harassment by security staff of 'Muslim-looking' travellers at major city airports. The white city fantasy is continuously challenged in global cities that inevitably draw a huge diversity of people to their centres, yet it continues to exert a huge impact upon the rights to the city that are offered to non-white 'others'. The economic requirement for immigrant labour to make the city work (economically and socially) and the political and social requirement felt by government to *manage* and *restrict* immigrants' rights to the city is a contradiction yet to be resolved in the white city. A white city fantasy, shared by white racists *and* 'tolerant white multiculturalists' alike, conceives of the city as a space structured around white culture, 'where non-white "ethnics" are merely […] objects to be moved or removed according to […] will' (ibid.: 18). It is this belief that whites possess mastery over the city that is referred to as the white city fantasy. Evidence for this can be seen in policing, housing and

planning policy, as well as promotional literature for 'multicultural' events such as the London 2012 Olympics. The white city fantasy works at containing the active participation by non-white others in the production and reproduction of cities; they are only ever *half-resident*. Crucially, 'white multiculturalism [and cosmopolitanism] works to mystify, and to keep out of public discourse, other multicultural [or cosmopolitan] realities in which white people are not the overwhelming occupiers at the centres of [city] space' (ibid.: 19). Whiteness itself is obviously a complex issue, and Hage helpfully conceives of whiteness as an aspiration that is not 'governed by an either/or logic' (ibid.: 20). Rather, whiteness is accumulated (the experience of white ethnic groups in US or Australia is an example of this) and people can be seen as more or less white depending on a number of social attributes. Some groups may even, as Garner (2007) suggests, be considered 'borderline whites'.

The relationship between 'race' formation and capitalism varies between historical and geographical context. For example '[i]mperialism's creation of modern nation-states, capitalism's construction of an international economy, and the Enlightenment's articulation of a unified world culture [...] were all deeply racialised processes' (Winant 2001: 19). In discussing the relationship between slavery, capitalism and 'race', Winant argues, like Hall and Gilroy, that racial consciousness cannot be reduced to symptoms of economic processes. 'Race' played a formative role within this history and was one of the factors that overdetermined the enslavement of African peoples. The horrors of slavery were eased by the growing belief that the black 'race' was of lesser worth. Winant's argument is that this early phase of global integration required the lubricant of racial thinking. Bhattacharyya (2005) suggests, following Winant, that 'race' should be treated in a way that does not reduce its formation to a passing symptom in the underlying and determining story of capital. Rather, at particular geohistorical conjunctures capital formation has worked *in conjunction with* the ideologies of 'race'. In attempting to understand 'race' formation in an age where immigrant labour in Western cities is not limited to those who are black, Bhattacharyya (ibid.: 167) argues that the modern creation of the 'other' continues to do considerable 'racial' work in all sorts of social formations, and continues to sift human worth into relative and unequal values: indeed, 'it is this notion of unequal worth that sews together the global integration of modernity.' Our current phase of global integration, the kind that can be witnessed *in extremis* in London, New York and Paris, requires a supply of mobile labour from diverse origins (see Fainstein et al. 1992; Fainstein and Harloe 2003; Sassen 2001; 2006). The current contradiction, especially

for those on the right and centre left who (colour) blindly pursue policies of economic integration and deregulation, is that the movement of labour to global cities leads to nationally bounded debates around immigration control. There are exceptional levels of anxiety around immigration in the 'hubs' of advanced capitalism. Mobile labour continues to play a lubricating role in global capitalist expansion, yet the barriers against the movements of people are the most vigorously policed and receive the highest levels of political investment. For Bhattacharyya (ibid.: 170), this belief also serves to naturalise the concept of 'race', 'as if we all instinctively know the difference between them and us [...]'. Just because recent immigrants are not to be categorised along a continuum of blackness, this does not mean they are post-'race'. What has been occurring is that, just as in the 19th century, notions of whiteness are undergoing both fragmentation and hierarchisation with respect to the dynamic centre–periphery relation characteristic of the global city.

It is impossible to write about 'race' and the city without also telling a story about social class. While the 'race' narrative occupies the foreground in this book, 'race' intersects with class at almost every juncture. For example, whether the analysis is dealing with slum clearance (Chapter 2), suburbanisation (Chapter 3) or gentrification (Chapter 5), each process is structured along class as well as 'race' lines. In fact, whilst the class dimension to these processes is well known, perhaps the 'racial' facets are less so – often because the vital dimensions of 'race'-inspired ways of acting or thinking are hidden in 'metonymic elaborations' or racially coded signifiers (Solomos and Back 1996: 27). The analysis that follows offers very much a class-based narrative of urban change – it cannot really do otherwise – yet it chooses to point to and discuss at greatest length the distinct, relatively autonomous effects of 'race' thinking and acting – usually through untangling the web of coded signifiers that smother urban process and the practices of everyday metropolitan living. The danger, of course, which lurks within and between these pages, is that the analysis oversimplifies the class position of whites and blacks – for example, equating whites with an essentially middle-class, dominating habitus and blacks with a subordinate class position characterised by multiple forms of disadvantage. Such a failing would essentialise 'races' along economic and cultural lines, if not against biological criteria, whilst also reifying racial difference to the extent that being, say, black and middle-class may be assumed to be in some way a denial of an absolute and eternal division between 'races' (Gilroy 2000). It would also not do justice to the significance of apparently 'contradictory' 'race'/class positions such as the stigmatised white

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'underclass', whose heightened whiteness is seen as a mark of inferiority, such as 'white trash' in the US (see Hartigan 2005) or 'chavs' in the UK (see Hayward and Yar 2005), or the black middle class, a group that in relation to the urban has gained far more coverage in the US than in the UK (see, for example, Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Bowser 2007; Cashin 2007; Lacy 2007). Each of these 'awkward' class strata has to negotiate 'race' in a specific sense, battling internally and externally with preconceptions about their place in a 'natural' 'race'/class hierarchy (see Anthias 2001). For example, Lacy (2007: 1) writes how a black female civil servant, in discussing the black middle class, states: 'They're trying to be like the whites instead of *who they are*' (emphasis added), demonstrating the limits of class-based subjectivity when others identify you first and foremost as black. The impact of complex intersections of 'race' and class on the global city should not be underestimated. While *there are* historic and emerging blocs of urban dominance among predominantly white sections of the middle class and patterns of clear disadvantage suffered by working-class blacks or other immigrant non-whites in the most segregated Western cities, there are also highly novel intersections of class and 'race' (and also gender) in the global city that do not fit into a simple duality of dominance/subordination.

The underlying concern of the book with the 'right to the city' does, however, hint at the prospect that current global cities are not exhaustive of all the city can be. Put simply, 'race' need not have the fragmentary and alienating effect on the metropolis that is has or has had. There remains the prospect, glimpsed from time to time in actually existing cities, of genuinely more open urban centres where differences are regrouped and awareness of the *oeuvre* is restored, giving a reinvigorated sense of the possible impossible. The right to the city would not entail the end of racism or the death of class (who could forget their influence?) but it would allow such issues to constitute a public forum rather than reproducing their dominating effects, which have historically only benefited private interests. The right to the city is fundamentally an enabling right, 'to be defined and refined through political struggle' (Dikeç 2001: 1790).

'Race', culture and the right to the city

The city, for Lefebvre, is an *oeuvre*, closer to a work of art than a simple material product: 'the city has a history, it is the work of a history, that is, of clearly defined people and groups who accomplish this *oeuvre*, in historical conditions' (Lefebvre 1996: 101). The city is both action and

result. The urban, on the other hand, refers to a set of relations, a 'mode of existence of entities, spirits and souls, freed from attachments and inscriptions; a kind of imaginary transcendence' (ibid.: 103). The urban requires a practico-material base, otherwise it remains merely a set of possibilities. Urban life seeks incorporation and incarnation through the city. Cities can facilitate the urban or they can negate it. If cities do not permit the urban to flourish, the sense of possibilities that the urban represents may 'go into decline and disappear' (ibid.).

'Race' (as practice, organising principle or fantasy) has had destructive effects on the city. This is because it has often diminished urban life and negated the 'right to difference' that is part and parcel of the right to the city. The right to difference refers to the 'right not to be classified forcibly into categories which have been determined by the necessarily homogenizing powers' (Lefebvre 1976, cited in Dikeç 2001: 1790). This is not the same as the right to particularity; rather, it articulates the right to evade classification. 'Race' has corrupted the *oeuvre* at times like a cancer – the hugely popular HBO TV series *The Wire* showed this brilliantly in its depiction of post-industrial Baltimore. Rather than forgetting 'race', we need, more than ever, to detail what its negative effects are. The current rubric of planners as well as academics implies that 'multiculture', or at least a cosmopolitan diversity, should be fêted, whereas 'race' is bad news – it causes division, hurt and guilt, and only deepens resentment. Yet think about 'race' we must, if we are ever to leave 'race' behind and extend the right to the city to the many rather than the few.

We should not forget that at moments, especially when the hegemony of the white city fantasy has been challenged, 'racially' structured ways of thinking and acting have produced moments of spectacular urban modernism, the kind of modernism 'that is still happening, both in our streets and in our souls, and […] still has the imaginative power to help us make this world our own' (Berman 1984: 116). Two historical examples, the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and the birth of hip-hop from the ruins of the Bronx in the late 1970s, are considered in Chapter 8. 'Racial' ways of thinking and acting have, in these instances, been implicated in the *resurgence* of the urban against hostility and constraint.

Yet would these moments have been possible without the forum or stage provided by the city or without the urban? Even in the most unequal and troubled cities, urban living can appear from under the paving stones to offer surprises, paradoxes and contradictions that cause city governments and white supremacists to think again. Time and

again the city has played a critical role in terms of providing a fulcrum for challenges to 'racial' and racist ways of thinking and acting. Paul Gilroy (2005: 131) attempts to look also to the future and argues that the convivial metropolitan cultures of young people can still challenge the anxious, fearful and violent aspects of Britain's ugly post-colonial society. Multiculture and 'race', he argues, are sources of creativity that can help engender a conviviality marked by unruly, chaotic and antic interruptions. However, as Bonnett (2010: 12) points out, Gilroy's celebration of contemporary metropolitan culture remains conspicuously 'blank', as if, despite experience reassuring him that something- or indeed *somebody*- will eventually turn up, he does not quite believe it this time. The youthful culture that Gilroy celebrates contains perhaps a sense of regret and loss. His faith in contemporary metropolitan cultures is haunted by the ghost of the 'black rebel' who emerged from the inner cities of an earlier era (ibid.: 8). Gilroy's optimism is therefore only possible because of his nostalgia and an unwillingness perhaps to acknowledge 'the signs in the street' that are familiar to many urban scholars. Considering this from an urban perspective- as this book attempts to do- it is easy to understand why there is an emptiness or absence in Gilroy's analysis and, why his nostalgia for the convivial inner city of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s may indeed be justified. The urban transformations that lie unacknowledged in Gilroy's nostalgia is the loss and demise of the urban centre of cities. The questions remain – is the politically redemptive conviviality that Gilroy pins his hopes on possible *without the right to the city*? Does the loss of the *oeuvre* account for the void at the heart of Gilroy's celebration of youth? Without the city, perhaps we are destined to wallow in post-imperial melancholia while trapped in nowhere spaces such as devalued and drab suburbs, soon to be condemned housing estates or identikit gentrified districts. The deliberation of such questions promises to help us to understand how cities have been, how they could have been; what they are now, and how they could be in the future.

This chapter began by introducing the global cities of London, New York and Paris that form the basis of the analysis in subsequent chapters, whilst also pointing to the importance of studying the city as a totality (by taking a geohistorical approach) and the benefits of using a transductive rather than descriptive–comparative method. The chapter then outlined the theoretical framework used throughout the book, which takes the form of a theory of the city and urban, derived from Henri Lefebvre, and an understanding of 'race' as possessing 'relative autonomy' from social class. It is in this sense that the book examines

not only the class struggle inscribed in the spaces of the city but also the ongoing 'race' struggles. Finally, the notions of culture and conviviality were introduced in relation to the changing centre–periphery relation of the global city. It is suggested that convivial or expressive cultures that draw upon 'race' ideas or oppose racist ways of administering or acting are dependent upon both the urban and centrality, facets of the metropolis that have, in recent years, undergone a transformation.

Structure of the book

Part 1 comprises three historical chapters, which provide a context for the four contemporary analyses that follow in Part 2. Each of the three chapters in Part 1 covers a particular period: the first considers the 19th century 'public' city; the second considers the fragmentation of the modern city (1920 to the late 1960s); and the final historical chapter considers the antagonistic multicultural city of the 1970s and 1980s. Part 2 begins with a critique of the notion of cosmopolis by identifying three exclusionary forces that compromise even the most modest definitions of a public city. This lays the theoretical base for the next two chapters on the 'centre–periphery', the first of which considers immigration and unplanned cosmopolitanism in a declining seaside resort to the east of London and the second focuses on the 'state-space' of the Parisian banlieues. The final chapter, based upon case studies taken from New York City, attempts to combine the insights of previous chapters in outlining the notion of the 'outer-inner city'.

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Part I
I Can Feel the City Breathing

Every epoch not only dreams the next, but while dreaming impels it towards wakefulness. (Benjamin 1969: 172)

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2
Breathe In: The Public City

Introduction

The 19th-century metropolis was a public city. This is not implied in a normative sense or as a mark of nostalgia. Rather, the city was comprised fundamentally of *people*. This was the century when millions of workers and immigrants headed for the city to work, live and enjoy metropolitan freedoms. It was the presence, labour and creative practices of millions of ordinary people (some with extraordinary pasts) that made London, New York and Paris the great metropolises they became during this century. In response to this intense centripetal pressure, the 19th-century metropolis was characterised by implosion and concentration. Housing was for most city dwellers a continual problem – it was cramped, decrepit and expensive and always on the brink of being demolished as part of a public works or public sanitation programme. Work was plentiful, although in times of economic crisis casual pools of labour could be forced into starvation, destitution or imprisonment, such was the tyrannical rule of the free market. The urban cultures of the 19th-century, which sprang from the diverse publics who occupied the city, were vivid. For the most part the masses revelled in being at the heart of the city (and the centre of the empire). London, New York and Paris became urban palimpsests that have been rewritten many times over in the subsequent periods covered within this book. The same places appear again and again: 'an urban imaginary in its temporal reach may well put different things in one place: memories of what there was before, imagined alternatives to what there is' (Huyssen 2003: 7).

During the 19th-century the metropolis developed self-awareness; it became knowledgeable about itself and concerned with its own well-being. Mega-cities such as London, Paris and New York became the

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authors of their own narratives. The mapping of streets by their social character or the health of their population and the exploration of poverty-stricken neighbourhoods by writers such Friedrich Engels, Seebohm Rowntree and Jacob Riis are all aspects of the same *quest for truth* in discovering how the city was lived by its inhabitants and also how the city could be governed. The dominant interpretation of the new urban knowledges of the 19th-century was that the social life of great metropolises was essentially problematic, a plane of indetermination and an *incitement* to government.

This chapter follows a simple structure: 19th-century London is considered first and is followed by New York, then Paris. The discussion of each city focuses on the themes of immigration and 'race', centrality and public life and/or culture.

London

Throughout the 19th-century Britain was the pre-eminent 'industrial nation'. London was the world's largest city, with a population of just over 1 million in 1801, 2.6 million in 1851 and 6.5 million in 1901 (King 1990: 79). Yet London was not, strictly speaking, an industrial centre like other cities in England. During the course of the 19th-century, London's largest industries declined and were replaced by smaller commercial or 'finishing' enterprises that tended to employ small numbers of workers. London became a global centre of trade, finance and commerce; a site for head offices and specialised banking and insurance services (Stedman Jones 1970). Colonial expansion increased the amount of trade and jobs at London's ports, and this created vibrant riverside handling and processing industries. The city also profited from the monopolies created as a result of Imperial conquests in India, the Caribbean and the Pacific. London was a world city long before the term was invented. Anthony King (1990: 39) argues that 19th-century London had an 'external orientation', in that it was as much a product of external as of internal forces. The most obvious manifestation of London's trade with an emerging world system was the construction of the docks between 1799 and 1828. The size of the docks (in terms of space and the amount of vessels that could be handled), the range of commodities handled, and the origins and destinations of their shipping marked London as a point of convergence for an early form of global capitalism (ibid.: 73–4). The banking, financing and shipping offices of the City of London were a direct outcome of this trade.

The metropolis of the 19th and early 20th century was unbelievably crowded; it was a city thronging with people. Despite the hardship people faced when moving to the city, it seemed everybody wanted to be there. In addition to rural–urban migration, arrivals also hailed from Scotland, Ireland and Wales, and there also existed established 'foreign' communities of Jews, Huguenots and blacks. The main reason why people came to London was work and good wages, as much as fifty per cent higher than in the provinces (Porter 1994: 159). By the end of the century London had become a 'super-city' – 'driven by market forces it "just growed", without central command' (ibid.: 226). Indeed, as Sennett (1994: 321) explains, during this period of rapid growth London was unlike New York or Paris in that it lacked a central government structure.

The 19th century also saw a rapid concentration and steady expansion of the physical city. Builders' prospects remained bright as long as the population continued to rise and there were slums to be razed and cheap land on the periphery. London spread incoherently from its centre, relatively unhindered, resulting in a low-density city comprised of family houses and even detached villas rather than the stacked apartments or tenements that were common in New York and Paris. London was a city built on private capital, a colossus that '[i]n the century of Darwin [...] was likened to some natural phenomenon, evolving spontaneously' (Porter 1994: 252). The city was in constant flux: as new houses were built, older districts were devalued and became slums.

Rich and Poor

Although densely concentrated, London was a dual social world, comprised of the wealthy and the poor. Wealthy London congregated around the newer West End, originally built as a suburb of the City of London. The poor could be found in a north-eastern arc around the City and just south of the Thames in places such as Southwark, Lambeth and the Borough, districts that were seen as villainous, vice-ridden and filthy yet also wildly exoticised: '[t]he moneyed, the educated and the holy came from the West End, from the pulpits, to gaze, explore, deplore, reform, redeem' (ibid.: 370). The poor were described as degenerate yet also sentimentalised as 'cockneys' – famed for their astuteness and tolerance while mocked for their shallowness and love of the picaresque (ibid.: 369–370). The East End was akin to London's internal Orient – a 'dark continent' existing to the east of Aldgate. Images of colonial voyaging and the conquest of 'dark' regions were drawn upon to justify and narrate bourgeois incursions into working-class environments (Bonnett 1998: 319).

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The sheer amount of poor people concentrated in London was a spectacle in itself and attracted considerable fascination from provincial and overseas visitors. Like Paris, in the latter half of the 19th-century London began to invite the contemplation of the urban spectator, or *flanêur*. Such characters, usually male, viewed the city with a bourgeois detachment uncommon among more regular city dwellers. Sensory movement through the city merged with internal fantasy and desire. London's densely packed streets, alleys and courts offered freedom and imaginative delight. The city provided anonymity for the spectator and was compact enough that the metropolis could be brought under imaginative control. Walkowitz (2003: 303) quotes Henry James, who moved to London in 1876: 'I had complete liberty […] I used to take long walks in the rain. I took possession of London; I felt it to be the right place.' James also commented on the 'unlimited vagueness as to the line of division between centre and circumference' (ibid.). Late Victorian London was *all centre* – even the 'periphery' could be explored on foot. James aestheticised London into a panorama of movement, atmosphere, labyrinthine secrets and mysteries. His London is indicative of the privileged view of the modern bourgeois male, whose gaze simultaneously betokened both possession and distance (ibid.).

Housing London's Poor

The task of providing adequate housing for London's poor was a continual problem, and it was often philanthropists rather than government who acted upon this. According to Morris (2001: 527), a high-rent/low-wage equilibrium resulted in the subdivision and multiple occupancy of existing houses and the development of slums dominated by the private rented sector. There was considerable sympathy among elites and liberals for the 'respectable' working classes who were unable to afford satisfactory accommodation and were thus forced to live in close proximity to the 'semi-criminal' working class. Morris suggests that model dwelling companies such as Peabody Trust, Four Per Cent Industrial Dwellings Company and Improved Industrial Dwellings Company provided an effective response to the housing shortage, whilst also addressing the fear that the respectable working class would be contaminated. They provided working-class housing at rates cheaper than the private rented market and their homes were also of a far superior build to slums. Yet model dwellings could not be built quickly enough to house the poor in such a restless city.

Moving home was central to the Victorian metropolitan experience. It was commonplace for all classes to change houses as much as once a

year. While the poor moved to escape damp or poor repair, most moves were caused by demolitions of slums in the central districts. Residents from demolished homes were often displaced to 'suburban' districts that very quickly became slums themselves as pressure for housing became even more concentrated. This process of displacement meant that 'suburbs' such as Clerkenwell, St Luke's and Whitechapel were soon 'sucked into' the central city. Stedman Jones (1970: 159) goes as far as to suggest that 'in its arbitrary and unplanned way demolition and commercial development in the 19th Century must have involved greater displacement of population than the rebuilding of Paris under Haussmann.' Yet, whereas Haussmann was successful in pushing the poor to the periphery of Paris, London's poor clung stubbornly to the centre because that was where they had to be in order to find work (Stedman Jones 1970: 172). Street clearance was carried out under the premise that, with the removal of the worst housing, the threat of the 'dangerous classes' would also dissipate. Clearance also addressed the common belief that the poor, like rats, instinctually sought to wallow in filth (Allen 2008: 125). Yet demolition did not result in the desired dispersal but in a catastrophic rise in overcrowding; indeed, the most concentrated districts tended to be those areas adjacent to where demolition had taken place. The irony was that the demolition of slums played a critical role in the *perpetuation* of nearby slums (Allen 2008: 116; see also Wohl 1977).

It was not only jobs that kept the poor in central London. They also wished to take advantage of the plentiful and cheap food markets and second-hand stores located in central London. Central London had a feeling of community; it was the centre of

> a robust if elementary working class culture; each area was royally furnished with public houses, 'penny gaffs' and street stall amusements and in each area there were established centres of popular working class amusements like bird-singing competitions, rat-baiting, dog and pigeon fancying and boxing. (Stedman Jones 1970: 173)

Music hall was also part of working-class metropolitan culture. Halls were situated in the centre of the city in places like Oxford Street, Holborn and Leicester Square. The songs represented this centrality in titles such as 'The Lambeth Walk' or 'Let's All Go Down The Strand.' Numbers also reflected the immigrant experience with titles such as 'I Belong to Glasgow' or 'It's a Long Way to Tipperary' (see Bailey 1986). Poverty, a reliance on casual work and the emergence of a working-class

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metropolitan culture made London's poor cling desperately to their old haunts (Stedman Jones 1970: 191).

Immigration and 'Race' in Victorian London

London in the 19th century was a diverse place. Even the London-born 'cockney' generally had one or both parents born elsewhere, and it was extremely rare for Londoners to boast two London-born grandparents. The most likely place to find the London-born in the period 1851–81 was Bethnal Green, where between eighty and eighty-five per cent of residents were born in London (White 2007: 109). Yet the heritage of many of these cockneys derived from the silk-weaving French Huguenots who had arrived in London in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 1880s London's diversity was dominated by European nationalities. Of London's estimated 4.3 million inhabitants in 1887, the largest minority was the Irish (81,000). The only other substantial groups were German (22,000), French (8,000) and Polish (Jewish) (7,000); Swiss, Dutch and Italians numbered 3–4,000 each; Belgians, Austrians and Swedes about 1–2,000; and other nationalities had a few hundred or less (King 1990: 75).

Irish presence in London preceded the 19th century; indeed they were already the largest group of 'strangers' in the metropolis. Yet not all Irish in the city shared the same degree of 'foreign-ness'. The most skilled and wealthy merged invisibly into London society, but the Irish poor were infamous. The oldest, biggest, densest Irish district was the Rookery of St Giles (White 2007: 132). Even though only the fittest and wealthiest could muster the resources to pay for the crossing, once in London these immigrants became the poorest of London's many poor, with many eking out a living at the outer edges of the London economy (ibid.: 133). The Great Famine of 1846–49 radically altered the social character of London's Irish. Instead of single men, families who were significantly poorer than previous Irish immigrants arrived in London. There were several disputes between cockneys (some of whom had Irish origins) and London's 'new' Irish, with the main cause being competition at the lowest end of the labour market. Some established Irish were ashamed at the abject poverty of the famine migrants, whom they saw as a discredit to their own ancestry (ibid.: 136). The Irish were a visible presence in London's public life, and their critical mass meant that over time they were able to create their own cultural and political institutions in the city (see Holden Lees 1979: 19).

London was a centre for a diverse range of Europeans, many of whom were identified on the street by their 'peculiar' language or distinctive

accent. During the first half of the 19th century a 'foreigner' in London was simply a 'Frenchman', wherever he came from, despite the fact that migrants from Germany and Italy had been living in the city since the start of the century (White 2007: 140). A small German middle class of merchants, bankers, clerks and artisans was established in London by 1800. The most flamboyant Europeans were Italians. Italian boys sold images, artificial flowers, wax birds and ice cream; they played flutes, organs; they performed street shows with mice, monkeys and dancing bears. Overseas revolutions and the promise of work and a better life in London swelled immigrant numbers further, and by 1851 the city's foreign-born population stood at around 26,000. Soho was a cosmopolis by the century's end, famous for its French prostitutes and exiled politicos (ibid.: 144). The most exotic migrants could be found to the east, near the riverside. Here could be found the 'blacks', Chinamen and 'lascars' (a term applied to anyone appearing to hail from the Indian subcontinent). Most of these small populations had arrived as sailors, brought to London's ports as a result of imperial trade. Many only stayed a short while, yet some inevitably gravitated towards the whirlpool of London life.

The most 'alien' group were the Jews, with their 'ghetto' situated at the eastern edge of the city. London Jewry was split between a middle class of bankers, merchants, stockbrokers, moneylenders, jewellers, importers and wholesale dealers and a lower class. There was also a divide between the longer-established Spanish and Portuguese Sephardic Jews and the synagogues of German, Russian and Polish Jews. In the second half of the 19th century, due to repressive measures taken against Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, huge numbers arrived in the East End where housing was cheapest. Overcrowding in the 1880s and 1890s was appalling in the densest Jewish areas such as Spitalfields as the numbers of Eastern Europeans rose. There were many complaints about Jews buying houses and renting them to immigrants who would overoccupy them. Some of the poorest and roughest Londoners were pushed out of accommodation as landlords 'spotted the gold to be gleaned from migrants who would of necessity pay a higher rent for less space' (White 2007: 155). There were also complaints that Jews did not use toilets properly and that they threw refuse into the street, which contributed to the image of the 'dirty Jew' (Garner 2007: 105). Competition for housing and sanitary concerns fuelled anti-Semitism, and Jews were taunted in the streets and ridiculed in the popular press. For Garner (2007: 104), the racialisation of Jews in 19th-century London revolved around four concerns: the threat to native male employment; physical concentration in housing; threats to health; and alien values. The far

right added fuel to latent hostility against Jews in the East End, which continued into the following century, culminating in the famous battle of Cable Street in 1936.

In the Victorian capital 'otherness' was usually understood in terms of nationality or social class. While it is possible to identify in retrospect what would nowadays be termed processes of racialisation, 'race' itself was in reality a catchword only for a select group of bourgeois Victorians who were concerned with events *outside* Britain. For example, the assumed superiority of the white 'race' was used to justify British intervention in Africa and continuing rule in India. A complacent belief in the 'natural' dominance of whites by aristocratic Britons was also used to criticise the 'racial experiments' occurring in the US during the time of reconstruction (Bolt 1971: ix). Non-whites were viewed as barbarians who lacked civility. Africa, the natural home of the Negro, was portrayed as an infantile place and, according to Bolt (ibid.: 27), only likely to progress to maturity with the aid of the superior white 'race'. It was common for history, or 'progress', to be viewed through such a racialised interpretation. As Hobsbawm (1987: 31–2) puts it:

> The conquering inhabitants of the first world concluded that vast ranges of humanity were biologically incapable of achieving what a minority of human beings with notionally white skins – or, more narrowly people of north European stock – had alone shown themselves to be capable of [...] Humanity was divided by 'race', an idea which penetrated the ideology of the period almost as deeply as 'progress' [...] Biology was called upon to explain inequality, particularly by those who felt themselves destined for superiority.

Although 'race' was understood as a feature of life in *other* places, occasionally bourgeois notions of 'race' did translate into an embryonic metropolitan racism. Green (1999: 206) describes how in September 1903 controversy was aroused when a publican in central London refused to serve refreshment to a member of the capital's black middle class. It was noted by a journalist in the *Daily News* how the 'Negro' in question was 'clearly an educated man' (cited in ibid.). Meanwhile, *The Westminster Gazette* referred to the matter under the headline 'A Colour Line in London? Publicans and "Nigger" Customers' (ibid.). They also noted how the gentleman in question was one of 'culture and refinement' and apparently well known in the US embassy. There was speculation as to whether the gentleman in question was actually W. E. B. Du Bois, who was visiting London at the time. Du Bois had

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previously held a high opinion of London's tolerance, yet a friend of Du Bois is quoted by the journalist as saying, 'yesterday was his first rude awakening to the fact that "a colour line existed here"' (cited in ibid.: 207).

The uneven application of 'white' identities among London's natives also needs to be considered. Bonnett (1998: 322) argues that the British working class was 'white' in colonial settings but *less than* or *other than* white in terms of Britain's own social hierarchy. The bourgeois construction of a 'hyper-whiteness' based upon characteristics such as tremendous energy and moral rectitude excluded most whites, especially those crowded into London's slums. The refusal of authentic whiteness to the working class operated in two main ways: first, by imaginatively aligning poor whites with non-whites and, second, by asserting that working-class whites were racially distinct from the middle and upper classes. The metaphors used to describe bourgeois contact with the working class were drawn directly from the colonial practice of exploration. Working-class areas of London were referred to as 'Darkest England' (a comment attributed to Charles Booth) and London's 'dark continent' (attributed to George Sims) (ibid.: 322–23). Regarding the 'racial' distinctiveness of the poor, Bonnett cites Henry Mayhew's exaggeration of white beggars' physical proximity to blacks. Most xenophobia was reserved for the Irish and there was 'an increased literalness, of interpretations of the catholic Irish as racially other to, and as darker in complexion to, other Britons, more especially the English' (ibid.: 324). Where applied, racial understanding was implicitly linked to the doctrine of natural selection, in terms of not only Charles Darwin's *Evolution of the Species* (1859) and *Descent of Man* (1871) but also Herbert Spencer's notion of 'survival of the fittest'. The mixing of London's casual labour with respectable artisans and labourers was the source of considerable middle-class anxiety that the respectable working class would become polluted by the 'residuum', in the process picking up a manner of criminal vices, including laziness and a dependence upon charity. The theory of degeneration held considerable weight. As Goldberg (1993: 200) explains, degeneration was, in the 19th century, central to discourses of collective identity and found expression across the biological and embryonic social sciences. It drew upon Darwin's theory of natural selection and used the 'pathology' of urban life to explain the existence of such an unfit population:

> Degeneracy […] is the mark of a pathological Other, an Other marked by and standing as the central sign of disorder. Stratified by race and class, the modern city becomes the testing ground of survival, of

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> racialized power and control: The paranoia of losing power assumes the image of becoming Other, to be avoided like the plague. (ibid.)

The worry was that the prevalence of slums would propagate a 'diseased and dangerous new "race" of the London poor' (Allen 2008: 126). Liberal elites argued with some urgency that the working class needed to be both 'saved' and co-opted.

Control and Resistance in Late Victorian London

Peter Hall (1999) argues that 19th-century London was a city organised around utilitarian – or Benthamite – principles. London was rightly celebrated for its liberty, but it was also a metropolis that operated as a laboratory for new disciplinary technologies. By the 1880s there was a full-blown social crisis due to cyclical depression, the decline of older industry and a chronic shortage of housing (Stedman Jones 1970: 281). With the emergence of socialism as a challenge to liberal ideology, the trepidation of London's elite intensified. There was real concern that the residuum in East London had grown large enough to engulf 'civilised' London. Visible signs of distress and agitation among London's respectable working class compounded this alarm. Serious rioting in central London during 1886 and 1887 led the elite to the conclusion that distress in the heart of London equated to distress in the empire. The guilt and sentimentality of the mid-century gave way to full-blown horror. According to Stedman Jones (ibid.), it was this sense of urgency that prompted Charles Booth's famous and exhaustive investigation of London's streets. During the 1880s he developed an elaborate classification of social classes, which he mapped onto a social geography of London. The end product of his endeavour was astounding – every street in London was classified according to its social grading.

Fear of the masses grew to such an extent towards the end of the century that more aggressive measures were suggested to deal with London's social crisis. Rev. Samuel Barnett and Alfred Marshall proposed a radical solution to disperse London's residuum to labour colonies located outside the city (Stedman Jones 1970: 303). Their belief was that removal of the degenerates would instil in them the virtues of hard work and moral decency whilst also 'saving' the respectable working class, who would remain in the city free from further contamination (Hall 2002: 91). Marshall was explicit about his goal – 'to rid London of its superfluous population' (cited in Allen 2008: 126). Charles Booth agreed with the colonization of the residuum, although he acknowledged that it would be difficult to induce or drive 'these people to accept a regulated life'

(cited in Hall 2002: 91). Another solution proposed by Lord Brabazon was that London's casual poor should be dispersed throughout the empire. As Samuel Smith put it, 'While the flower of the population emigrate, the residuum stays, corrupting and being corrupted, like the sewage of the metropolis which remained floating at the mouth of the Thames' (cited in Stedman Jones 1970: 309). Brabazon's idea was to use the 'wonderful safety valve we possess in our vast colonial empire' (cited in ibid.: 310). Containment would not only save London; it would also save the empire and the white English race from further degeneration (ibid.: 330).

New York City

In the 19th-century New York City became the greatest city of immigrants in the world, with 'half as many Italians as Naples, as many Germans as Hamburg, twice as many Irish as Dublin and two and a half times as many Jews as Warsaw' (Schlesinger 1933, cited in Hall 2002: 36). This is why Nancy Foner (2000: 36) writes that a 'picture of contemporary immigrant life is coloured by memories of tenement existence on Manhattan's Lower East Side and in the Little Italy's of a hundred years ago'. There is a great deal of nostalgia and mythologising of the old ethnic communities of New York and the sites where immigrants first struggled to realise the American dream. The determination and triumph of these groups is often emphasised at the expense of discourses of the 19th century which argued that the 'invasion from Europe' was making New York a squalid, corrupt, vicious and degenerate place – a seething mass of humanity to be escaped (Hall 2002: 360). Nineteenth-century New York was a compact and congested city. Yet, like London, Manhattan remained a 'readable' city, intelligible to its inhabitants and able to be traversed on foot.

Immigration, the Lower East Side and Tenement Life

Lower Manhattan was the population centre of the city. Queens was a place of fields, meadows and woods, a place to retreat from the hectic pace of city life (Hood 1993: 169). Brooklyn and the Bronx were also undeveloped and sparsely populated. Manhattan was not well linked to what would become the four other boroughs, which placed enormous centripetal pressure upon the city. Foner (2000: 38) notes that by 1910 a record 2.3 million people lived in Manhattan, 850,000 more than would live there in 1990. From the late 1840s torrents of Irish Catholic immigrants entered New York and brought with them the divisive element of religion (Barth 1980: 14). There was an increase in Manhattan's

heterogeneity when immigrants from southern and eastern Europe entered the US towards the end of the 19th century. Italians, Greeks, Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, Czechs, Poles and Russians contrasted vividly with their new surroundings as well as with each other (ibid.: 15). New York inspired visions of the free life, which accounted for the enormous attraction of the American modern city for the European poor who were fleeing hardship and oppressive regimes at home.

By the 1890s over half of the city's population lived in overcrowded tenement districts, most without hot running water or toilets. Half of the Lower East Side families slept three or four to a room, and a quarter shared with five or more (Howe 1976: 148). Tenements were built to maximise density within the constraints of New York's 25-by-100 foot lot dimension (Plunz 1990: 13). A tenement floor often contained eighteen rooms. Interior rooms had no ventilation unless airshafts were provided. Density was increased further by the practice of 'back-building' whereby rear yard areas between tenement blocks were filled in with additional housing. This produced countless fetid rookeries just like those found in London.

For new immigrants in New York there were no viable alternatives to the downtown tenement neighbourhoods, as it was a matter of survival to live close to warehouses, docks, factories and businesses to take advantage of employment opportunities. Slum housing placed the immigrant at the heart of the industrial and commercial city, even if the environs were dirty, unsafe and unhealthy (Kessner 1977: 136). The slums also allowed immigrants to settle near friends, relatives and compatriots who spoke the same language. In 1890 over half of New York's Italians lived in three 'Little Italys' (that had previously been Irish) situated south of 14th Street. In Little Italy people spoke in Italian, read Italian newspapers and put their savings in Italian banks. Storefronts bore Italian names and offered for sale imported Italian wines, pasta and olive oils. As in London, Italian religious festivals, or *festa*, brought noise, colour and procession to the streets. Other immigrant groups were also concentrated in particular districts of Manhattan. Three-quarters of the city's Jews congregated in tenements on the Lower East Side, south of 14th street and east of the Bowery. Foner (2000: 39) explains how

> Practically all Jewish immigrants who came to New York before 1900 initially found their way to the Lower East Side [...] the neighborhood was literally bursting at the seams. If at the turn of the century Manhattan was among the most congested urban places in the world, the single most crowded district was the Lower East Side.

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Manhattan's streets presented a constantly surging mass of humanity. Struck by the elementary vitality of New York's major thoroughfares in 1856, George Templeton Strong described 'an orgasm of locomotion' (cited in Barth 1980: 10). The city streets were contradictory and conflictual, a site for a 'moving panorama of human life'. Manhattan's urban scene presented innumerable varieties of figure, dress, air, gait, visage and expressions of countenance (ibid.). In New York the encounter with and negotiation of difference was a guaranteed feature of urban life.

By 1890 just over 35,000 blacks, a relatively small number in comparison with European immigrants, lived in New York (Rosenwaike 1972: 78). Jacob Riis's (1890, 1997) account of the 'color line' in 19th-century New York is revealing. He brings to attention in some detail how slum landlords created, maintained and extended racial divides between streets and neighbourhoods in Manhattan. Riis (ibid.: 112) suggests that blacks had little choice regarding where to settle in New York when they (usually) arrived from the American south, since they could only find rooms in the streets and buildings where landlords would let to them. Blacks were restricted to a neighbourhood popularly known as 'Africa' – a narrow section on the West Side comprised of the very worst housing in Manhattan. Rents were considerably higher here than for comparable accommodation in other areas of the city. In Riis's judgement, landlords played a despotic role, deliberately assigning 'to the defenceless Black the lowest level [of housing] for the purpose of robbing him' (ibid.). Prejudice was turned to profit. Landlords manipulated white fears and capitalised on the 'fact' (which they helped create) that 'white people will not live in the same house with colored tenants, or even in a house recently occupied by negroes' (ibid.: 115). For landlords, it was a case of 'once a colored house, always a colored house' (ibid.).

Riis's admiration for the resolve of the subjugated black in New York is accompanied strangely by a violent rejection of the possibility of blacks and whites mixing. His anxiety focuses on the blurred boundaries existing between white and black neighbourhoods:

> The borderland where the white and black races meet in common debauch, the aptly-named black-and-tan saloon […] has always been the worst of the desperately bad. Than this commingling of the utterly depraved of both sexes, white and black, on such ground, there can be no greater abomination. (ibid.: 119)

A 'black-and-tan dive' was the name given to the very lowest-ranking saloons in New York, where black and white people drank together. As

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Lewis Allen (1995: 152) explains, an interracial saloon was a notorious and scandalous idea at the time and denoted a very low establishment indeed.

Despite popular myth, New York did not represent the Promised Land for blacks during the 19th-century. Although they were no longer slaves, they were victims of racial discrimination and segregation and forced into separate transport, schools, theatres, hotels, restaurants, bars, hospitals and churches, in addition to the housing segregation described by Jacob Riis. Many northern whites accepted the abolition of slavery but continued to resist the notion that freedmen should enjoy equality of citizenship and live independently of white control (Fairclough 2001: 4). Blacks were also denied access to the industrial activity occurring in northern cities. During the 1850s, eighty-seven per cent of New York's blacks held menial jobs (Takaki 2000: 110). Regardless of skill, blacks were automatically located at the bottom of the occupational scale.

In the new 'racial sciences' that emerged during the 19th century blacks were understood to be close to savages and inferior in intelligence to whites. By the 1850s the inherent inequality of 'races' was accepted as scientific fact in America (Horsman 1981, cited in Garner 2007: 122). Yet Irish Catholics, who were ostensibly white, were conceived in similar terms as uncivilised and degenerate 'because within the proliferating racial hierarchies, Celts have been posited as a less-developed white 'race', particularly relative to the Anglo-Saxon' (Garner 2007: 122). Both Irish and black characters in 19th-century pictorial representations underwent a comparable process of simianisation (ibid.: 126). While Irish Catholics were not black, they certainly were not white either. The point of difference between Irish and Americans on which pro-Protestant American nativist discourse concentrated was religion and the tribalism, dogma and non-modernity of Catholicism (ibid.). Yet, ironically, the Irish in New York led the way, through the trade union movement, in intimidating white workers from sympathising with slaves and in expelling black workers – all under the pretext of safeguarding 'white men's work' (Ignatiev 1995, cited in Garner 2007: 125). The Irish, themselves excluded from hegemonic notions of Americanness, built alliances based upon notions of the gradual superiority/inferiority of 'race' in order to, *first*, make themselves white and, *second*, moving into the 20th century, make themselves American. The argument put forward by the Irish that they were basically a white 'race' as good as any other, and therefore better than all the non-white 'races', was key to their success. The Irish began the century as non-white and ended it as white (Garner 2007: 130).

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Breaking Out?

There was eventually movement out of the Lower East Side after 1900, as Jews and Italians ventured to Harlem, Brooklyn and the Bronx, where they created new ethnic colonies – areas we may now refer to as the 'inner city'. In 1910, a third of Jews and Italians lived in Brooklyn. Moves away from lower Manhattan followed the path identified by urban sociologists of the Chicago School, who suggested that settled immigrant groups eventually leave the central slums behind for a better standard of housing in neighbourhoods a little further out from the downtown district. However, Foner (ibid.) notes that many unsuccessful immigrants also left the lower Manhattan slums with the hope of improving their fortunes in another slum district. After 1900 many immigrants bypassed the downtown slums and headed straight for upper Manhattan or Brooklyn. New York's 'transitional zones' spread quickly beyond the downtown slums. Older ethnic communities in Manhattan were filled to capacity or were being destroyed in the first of the slum clearance projects. Many immigrants were also displaced by municipal improvements. For example, thousands of Jewish immigrants in the Lower East Side were displaced when hundreds of buildings were condemned to make way for the Williamsburg and Manhattan bridges. However, the bridges opened up uncharted, yet affordable, districts to move into. Italians moved into run-down tenement blocks in Brooklyn that had previously been occupied by Irish. The first Italian neighbourhoods in Brooklyn were close to the docks and waterfront in Red Hook and Williamsburg. In a similar pattern of succession, Jews replaced Germans in wards of Williamsburg. Jewish immigrants also started a new settlement in Brownsville, which was a quiet rural area in East Brooklyn. By 1905 50,000 Jews had moved to Brownsville, where the district comprised a bustling 'land of sweatshops and whirring sewing machines, of strange Russian baths, of innumerable dirty and tiny shops' (Kessner 1977, cited in Foner 2000: 42). By 1925 200,000 Jews lived in Brownsville; it was a completely Jewish world served by a thriving clothing and garment industry. Housing conditions up in Harlem or out in Brooklyn were often no better than back in Manhattan. Brownsville, in fact, was described as an even worse slum than the Lower East Side. Alfred Kazin (1946) (cited in Foner 2000: 46) recalls Brownsville as 'New York's rawest, remotest and cheapest ghetto'. In the mid 20th-century Brownsville would transform into an African American ghetto (see Pritchett 2002).

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Public Life and Protest

Luc Sante's (2003) *Low Life: Lures and Snares of Old New York* is a book about the city's 'adolescence and early adulthood' and is concerned with the 'vices and lures that the city proffered to the lower classes in the 19th Century, and the streets and alleys that were their theatre' (ibid.: ix). Here the colourful and sometimes murky public life of Manhattan between 1840 and 1920 is regaled in detail: from theatre to saloon culture, from prostitution to New York's bohemian underground. Much is made of how New York was incarnated by Manhattan: 'a finite space that cannot be expanded but only continually resurfaced and reconfigured[,] a wonderland of real estate speculation, a hot centre whose temperature cannot but increase as population increases and desirability remains several places ahead of capacity' (ibid.: x). Similarly, Rem Koolhaas (1979) spoke of Manhattan's unique 'culture of congestion' made possible by the accumulation of people and activities in such a confined space.

The pulse of urban life in 19th-century New York beat strongly but irregularly (Barth 1980: 18). The strength of the pulse was provided by the structures of work, and the irregularity of the city's rhythm was due to the manifold cultures congregating in the city:

> When there was time free from work, people took their leisure in the same unstructured way in which they struggled for their daily bread. Each chose activities that suited him or her best, as informally as they did everything else. They relaxed talking on streets or rooftops, drinking in bars or kitchens, and walking or playing in parks. No sequence of fixed traditional pageants, but rather the rhythm of work, shaped by the calendar of holidays. People celebrated their individualized feasts the way they fell, whenever opportunity offered itself. The structured course of metropolitan life primarily regulated by time clocks, streetcar schedules and factory whistles, ensured that they would have a multitude of responses to work and leisure. (ibid.: 19)

Barth's point is similar to Koolhaas's argument that the discipline of Manhattan's two-dimensional grid creates 'undreamt-of freedom for three dimensional anarchy [...] the city can be at the same time ordered and fluid' (cited in Berman 1982: 287). Over the years encounters between city cultures eroded old loyalties, and from the chaos emerged elements of a new diverse metropolitan culture (Barth 1980: 23). In other words, 'city people' slowly came to share a common frame of mind and set of behaviours. New Yorkers redefined culture not in

terms of heritage or high art but more in terms of the common adaptations made by struggling people. While Manhattan was undoubtedly a *peopled* city, it was comprised of a dazzlingly heterogeneous *range* of publics. New York's magnetism entailed that Manhattan lacked a singular culture, yet the city fostered surprising degrees of public sociability and association (Ryan 1997: 23).

Nineteenth-century Manhattan was a site of riotous public protest. Perhaps the most famous protest of all was the draft riots of July 1863. New Yorkers were resentful at the law approved by Congress to draft 300,000 men from New York to fight in the ongoing American civil war. What was seen as especially unfair was the $300 commutation fee that automatically excluded residents of the city's poorest tenements. The riots, lasting two days, were the largest civil insurrection in American history apart from the civil war itself (Foner 1988: 32). The targets of the rioters were shops, police station houses and the homes of government and police officials (Sante 2003: 350). Yet blacks were also convenient scapegoats to blame for the war, and it was held that their presence in the city made it harder to get jobs. Blacks were lynched in the street and others drowned in the rivers. Their homes and businesses were attacked and burned. Even the Colored Orphan Asylum on Fifth Avenue was looted and burned, and a little girl was killed. Around 2,000 rioters, including 200 blacks, were killed, along with a few hundred soldiers and a handful of police (ibid.: 353). Sante (ibid.: 351) surmises thus:

> Whether 'race', or even the draft, was the primary motive of the riot is another matter. The rage present was scattershot, directed variously at the government, the police, the powerful, the rich, as well as at the blacks – people as powerless as the rioters, but whom the mob may have thought better-favoured.

Despite the Draft Riots being a spectacular example of the very publicness of Manhattan at the time – the scale of such an event is inconceivable today – the protests remain an embarrassment to the city, which is why there are no public plaques, museums or anniversary celebrations to mark the most significant example of insurrection in a US city.

Paris

Walter Benjamin famously decried Paris, the capital of the 19th century, as a 'city of mirrors' where the city was remade as façade and spectacle – a place to look at and *be looked at*. Yet Paris – like London

and New York – also attracted millions of migrant workers, a story that often gets lost in comparison with the prevailing narratives of revolution and renovation that dominated the century. During the latter half of the 19th century, Paris displayed prescient tendencies towards greater administrative control and the centrifugal movement of the masses to the periphery. This strategy involved preserving the centre and west of the city and the solidification of working classes and immigrant districts on the periphery. As shall be seen, however, the masses did not relinquish their right to the city without a fight.

Immigration

Paris experienced a huge boom in immigration and internal migration during the 1850s (Harvey 2006: 181). Skilled workers quickly adapted to dynamic industrial conditions and there were many 'dirty jobs' to be done, not least in terms of contributing to the huge programme of public works that were being carried out in the city (ibid.). While foreign immigrants in the 19th century were initially semi-skilled workers, as the amount of migrants increased towards the end of the century, more and more arrivals were unskilled (Ogden 1989: 42). From the late 19th century, France turned increasingly towards immigrants to supply a significant part of the labour force and to compensate for the sluggish rate of population increase (ibid.: 38). In 1857 there were 381,000 foreigners in France and by 1881 there were more than 1 million. By 1931 there were 2.7 million (Ogden 1989: 39). Prior to World War I, most immigration into France was spontaneous and tended to consist of migrants from neighbouring countries (ibid.: 41). As Prost (1966: 534) explains, France in the 19th century was not a point of arrival for the masses of Europe seeking to escape hunger and poverty in the same way as the US was. Correspondingly, the most numerous immigrants in the 1896 census were Belgians and Italians, followed at considerable numerical distance by the Germans, Spanish and Swiss (Ogden 1989: 42). Whereas Italians tended to be located in Marseille in the South, a large number of Belgians, Germans and Swiss swelled the cosmopolitan population of Paris. In fact, in 1911, 6.7 per cent of Paris residents were foreign-born, hailing from fifteen different countries. This is in comparison to just three per cent in London (ibid.: 43). Green (1999) demonstrates how even small groups of immigrants made an impact upon the city. For example, around 35,000 Jews comprised a 'Pletzl' – or 'little place' – in the heart of the city in the Marais. The residential distribution of foreigners in the city reveals a broad division between the prosperous western *arrondissements* with high concentrations of British, Americans

and Swiss and the central, eastern and north-eastern working class districts, or *faubourgs*, where could be found large numbers of workers and artisans from Belgium, Germany and Switzerland.

The history of immigrants in Paris during the 19th century gets lost, first because of paucity in historical research, and second because of the social class narrative that dominated Paris from the mid to late 19th century. As Hargreaves (1995: 4) explains, the statistical lacunae generated by the French state reflect unwillingness at the highest level to officially recognise immigrants and their descendents as structurally identifiable groups within French society. This is why, Noiriel (1992) argues, there is very little awareness among the French public (in comparison with, say, the US) about the contribution of immigrants to the historical development of France. The lack of attention to 'race' and/ or ethnicity is largely the result of the rejection of 'origin': indeed, 'behind the haunting theme of equality is a violent rejection of all privilege (and all stigmatisation) based on origin' (ibid.: 69). The rejection of origin was intended, during the formation of the Republic, to increase the social value of the individual and to confine 'difference', and most especially religious difference, to the private sphere. From the Third Republic (1870–1940) onwards all questions regarding religion, language and so on were forbidden in the census. As such it is extremely difficult to undertake studies of distinct ethnic groups in Paris.

The working-class districts of Paris in the 19th century, where most foreign labourers lived, were known as *faubourgs*. These districts were situated on the periphery of the central city. The etymology of the word *faubourg* can be traced to the notion of a 'false city', or a *not-quite city*. According to Merriman (1999: 330), *faubourg* became a stigmatised label and came to convey the poverty, squalor and foreignness of the periphery. *Faubourgs* were associated with immorality and vice and 'increasingly became a space identified with people and activities largely unwanted by the centre' (ibid.: 332). *Faubourgs* were spoken about as if they were home to a sick, *other* 'race' (ibid.: 335). The perceived threat of the periphery was related to the very real threat of working-class unrest. This was so pervasive that even ordinary workers living in *faubourgs* could provoke bourgeois uncertainty and anxiety. For example, the prefect Chabrol lamented that the factories on the edge of the city were 'the cord that will strangle us one day' (cited in ibid.: 338). The Paris Commune of 1871 confirmed how fear of the *faubourgs* was not misplaced. Among the last barricades to fall at the end of the Paris Commune during Bloody Week, May 1871, were those in *Faubourg Belleville*.

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Immigrants were blamed for all of Paris's urban ills: 'Municipal and police reports describe the invasion of houses, blocks, streets and districts by immigrants, whose lifestyle, manners, clothing, speech, even smell proved intolerable to older inhabitants' (Hall 1999: 709). It was suggested by the bourgeoisie that immigrants failed to adjust to city life. In reality, the problem was similar to that of London or New York – migrants comprised a surplus pool of labour, and as such '100,000 Parisians did not know at noon how they would eat that evening' (ibid.: 710).

Haussmannisation

Whilst London and New York experienced a succession of minor implosions in their densely populated central districts due to public works and programmes of sanitisation, the reconstruction of Paris's medieval city between 1852 and 1870 was far more dramatic and systematic. As Hall (1999: 706) states, 'Haussmann made Paris, and Paris to this day is essentially the city he made.' Master planner Georges-Eugène Haussmann was appointed by Napoléon III in 1852 to 'modernise' Paris. His appointment was the culmination of a half-century of a vigorous public health movement in Paris (Shapiro 1985: 3). The plan was for Paris to assume the mantle of imperial Rome and become the head and heart of civilisation in Europe (Harvey 2006: 209). Haussmann was also appointed to control what Sennett (1994: 329) calls the threat of 'the motion of the masses'. His rebuilding ran until the end of the century and focused overwhelmingly on central Paris at the expense of the periphery.

Before Haussmann, Paris was awash with a sea of humanity. It remained in many ways a medieval city (Shapiro 1985: xiii). The oldest central districts showed a continual growth in density and the most crowded areas of Saint-Honoré and the Marchés had a density of just eight square metres per person (Hall 1999: 707). Paris was a knotted mesh of narrow streets, alleyways and markets where, according to Sennett (1994: 277), inequality was so prevalent as to be a 'sensory provocation'. There was inadequate water supply and sewers regularly overflowed in the streets. By the 1840s it was widely held that the city was uninhabitable; it was subterranean, dark, dank and muddy (Hall 1999: 709). There were no planning restrictions regarding the size of rooms, ventilation or sanitation (ibid.: 707). Paris was *une ville malade*, and the condition of the population was considered as grave a problem as the filth and congestion of the environment (Shapiro 1985: xiii). Like London, Paris was hit terribly by cholera. The 1832 epidemic took more lives and a greater proportion of the city population than it did in London, and, of course, the highest tolls

were in the poorest districts of the metropolis (Hall 1999: 708). While it may have been assumed that the city was neatly divided between rich and poor quarters, there were also districts that were surprisingly mixed, where there could be found 'crevices of poverty in the cracks between wealth' (Sennett 1994: 277). Rather than live in isolation, the city's poor circulated in the physical and spatial presence of inaccessible wealth. In some streets could be found the classically Parisian form of social mixing, with the bourgeoisie living immediately above the shop and the working classes crammed into the garret (Hall 1999: 710).

Haussmann's solution was to cut wide roads through the worst districts to the north and north-east of the city centre, comprised largely of working houses, craftworks and small factories. Working-class communities were destroyed and divided by new boulevards that flowed with traffic. The poorest districts were reduced to fragments. A highly symbolic example of Haussmannisation was the decimation of the *Île de la Cité*, the very heart of Paris, where 'Haussmann caused complete disaster' (Hazan 2010: 106). This was a labyrinthine place of crooked, narrow streets and tiny shacks. Hazan (ibid.) argues that the *Île de la Cité* was literally 'emptied out' by Haussmann for political and military reasons. During June 1848 there had been fighting in the *Cité* and the adjacent Latin Quarter. It was felt 'this centre of insurrection had to be eradicated' (ibid.). What Hazan (ibid.) refers to as the 'cradle of the capital' was replaced instead with barracks, a church, a hospital and a palace.

Lefebvre (1996) explains how Haussmann replaced winding but lively streets with long, wide boulevards, substituting 'sordid but animated "quartiers"' for bourgeois thoroughfares. The boulevards and open spaces of Haussmann's Paris were created not only for the wide vistas and for the opportunity for the bourgeoisie to display their finery, but also so that Paris could be combed with machine guns. These new 'voids' have a meaning – for Lefebvre (1996: 76) 'they cry out loud and clear the glory and the power of the State which plans them, the violence which could occur'. As Sennett (1994: 330) explains, the width of Haussmann's boulevards was finely calculated to deal with the movements of crowds in revolt. Street width permitted two army wagons to travel abreast, enabling the militia to fire into the working-class districts lying beyond the sides of the street wall.

Haussmann is viewed by David Harvey as 'the archangel of creative destruction', the master of reinvention through demolition. He had little concern for the heritage of the past; it simply got in the way (Hall 1999: 719). Walter Benjamin (1969) refers to him as an *artiste démolisseur* or 'artist in demolition'. Paris's vibrant urban democracy had threatened

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the privileges of the ruling class, and the purpose of Haussmann's instruction was to ensure this 'menace' would never be realised. This was largely, although not wholly successfully, achieved 'by expelling from the urban centre and the city itself the proletariat, by destroying "urbanity"' (Lefebvre 1996: 46). Haussmann's public works upset the notions of community and class solidarity that had existed before the Second Empire. He thought of the Parisian population as a 'floating agitated ocean' of immigrants and nomads that could not possibly amount to any kind of stable community (Harvey 2006: 234). After all, Paris was 'simply the national capital, "*centralization itself*"' (ibid.: emphasis added) and Haussmann treated it as such. Haussmann denied the possibility of one kind of community; he strove to impose a wider sense of affinity – to the glory of the Empire, to authority and the spectacle.

The Public City: Before and After Haussmann

Urban life in the pre-Haussmann years largely managed to escape social control by the authorities (Harvey 2006: 210–11). There were regular Sunday excursions from the centre of Paris to bars and dancehalls of Belleville that involved much ribaldry and promiscuous mixing, and even a blurring or temporary loss of class distinction. Indeed, it was this kind of integration that the socially controlled spectacles of the Second Empire sought to displace. There were also frequent insurrections in the poorest quarters, characterised by extraordinary bursts of violence (Hall 1999: 709). Lefebvre (1996: 75) suggests that between 1848 and the start of Haussmann's renovations the public life of Paris reached a great intensity involving 'the confrontation of differences, reciprocal knowledge and acknowledgement (including ideological and political confrontation), ways of living, "patterns" which co-exist in the city'. Lefebvre continues (ibid.), 'during the 19th Century, a democracy of peasant origins […] could have transformed itself into an urban democracy'. That a democratic metropolis was violently thwarted by Haussmann is why many judge the most radical effect of the renovations to be the transformation of 'active players into passive spectators' (Harvey 2006: 211).

Haussmann's new city transformed the urban life of Paris. Walter Benjamin (1969) is famous for demonstrating how the bourgeois *flanêur* found his apotheosis in Haussmann's boulevards, which, like monuments, were covered over with tarpaulins before they were unveiled to his public (ibid.: 171). As Hazan (2009: 316) explains, it was the distracted gaze of *flanêur*s that transformed the metropolis into theoretical object, an instrument of rupture with the forms of the past. For Harvey (2006: 216), the theatricality of the boulevards 'fused with the performative

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world inside the many theatres, cafes and other places of entertainment that sprang up along them to create spaces for the display of bourgeois affluence, conspicuous consumption and feminine fashion'. The boulevard became a symbol of Paris's fetishism of the commodity – a city in love with *façades*, a city in love *with itself*. In contrast, the 'rootless population of the great city', whom Haussmann confessed he hated (Benjamin 1969: 171), were driven to the fringes, or into even more cramped apartments in the awkward margins of the central city. Either way, they were alienated from what had once been *their city*. For Benjamin (ibid.), '[t]hey no longer felt at home in it. They began to become conscious of the inhuman character of the great city.'

Haussmann's renovations helped push Paris's famous café culture onto the pavements, where it became part of the theatricality of the boulevard. Cafés ceased to be intimate meeting places for conspiring political groups, and became, rather, tranquil places of leisure where middle and upper-class denizens could watch the passing crowd and enjoy the passing street scene. In 1808 police spies looking for dangerous political elements in Paris spent a great deal of time infiltrating cafés; in 1891 the police disbanded the bureau dedicated to café surveillance (Sennett 1994: 347). Paris's public realm was now populated with consumers and *flanêurs*. It no longer represented the political domain it had been before Haussmann. Harvey (2006: 222) offers an alternative view and suggests that the predominantly immigrant male working classes of Paris instead retreated from public life in the central city and filled the innumerable small eating and drinking establishments within their own peripheral neighbourhoods. For poorer workers who were forced to frequently change dwellings the local bar or café was a constant in their daily routine. Such spaces became dispersed social centres where working-class solidarities continued to be forged.

For Sennett (1986: 297), Baron Haussmann's renovations were based principally upon homogenisation, and in this sense they anticipated the urban planning profession and its obsession with order. Paris – however beautiful – represented the beginning of the 'single function', atomised vision of urban development, where each space in the city is designated a particular job.

The Paris Commune

The Commune of 1871 demonstrated that no plan is ever complete. The workers Haussmann had pushed to the periphery spectacularly returned to the centre to take back the city and the urbanity that had been stolen from them. As Merriman (1999: 341) explains, 'the

Commune has been described as the revenge of those expelled by Haussmannization.' Indeed, for Lefebvre (1996: 76), the crucial aspect of the Paris commune was 'the strength of the return toward the urban centre of workers pushed out into the outskirts and peripheries, their reconquest of the city [of] this *oeuvre* which had been torn from them'. It is difficult to convey the bitterness that many workers felt at being pushed out from their city. Haussmann's improvements prompted a rise in rents and forced poorer families towards the outer *arrondissements*. The population decreased in the centre and grew more concentrated in peripheral *faubourgs*. Alistair Horne (2007) explains that Haussmann produced a resentful apartheid, and in destroying central city slums he created infinitely more dangerous proletarian spaces, such as the *arrondissements* of Belleville and Menilmontant. Greater concentration of the poor, and two million immigrants living in Paris by 1870, actually made self-organisation and self-determination easier, as the commune demonstrated (Harvey 2006: 180). Belleville's diverse, yet highly localised and densely packed, community became the antithesis of Haussmann's preferred form of urban association; it was the impenetrable kind of community that the bourgeoisie had always feared, a place where 'the popular classes, with all their unruly passions and political resentments, held the upper hand' (ibid.: 236).

The commune was the result of a popular uprising against poverty, exclusion and the ongoing Prussian occupation of Paris. In fact, the demoralised French army eventually joined forces with protestors, prompting the evacuation of the city by the French government. The central committee of the National Guard, an armed working-class movement organised to defend the city from Prussian forces, became the new government of Paris, lasting between 28 March and 28 May 1871. The 'commune', as it became known, discarded the *tricolore* flag, replacing it with a socialist red flag. It also introduced a number of policies such as the separation of church and state (forbidding the teaching of religion in schools), the abolition of night work in bakeries and the right of employees to take over and run enterprises that had been deserted by their owners. Many districts implemented their own projects, such as providing school materials for free or establishing an orphanage. There were feminist-inspired policies to disregard the distinction between married women and concubines and between legitimate and illegitimate children. They also advocated the abolition of prostitution and the closure of official brothels (see Horne 2007). Ruggiero (2001) suggests that Haussmann's renovations were viewed by the communards as intrinsically part of a 'specific, unbearable organisation of life'

(ibid.: 128). As such, rather than seize the assets of the French National Bank, the Communards were more concerned with attacking symbols of Haussmann's city such as the Vendome column that celebrated Napoleon's military achievements. The Communards 'built barricades, makeshift monuments of opposition, quick, utilitarian and transient: an implicit rejection of the monumental city […]' (ibid.). The commune created instead an *acentred* space that could be explored and inhabited as if it were an unfinished project; a city that was 'open and free' (ibid.: 128).

The commune was an incredible moment in the history of Paris, indeed the history of the modern metropolis. It represented a moment when the 'possible impossible' was briefly realised. Eventually the French army returned to Paris and a fierce battle, know as Bloody Week, ensued. Each local *quartier* fought desperately for survival as troops from Versailles began a brutal repression.

Black Montmartre

In the 19th century human diversity in Paris tended to be imagined in terms of nations rather than 'races' (Thomas 2007: 25). Perhaps this is why there is difficulty in finding evidence, let alone accounts, of black communities in Paris before the start of the 20th century, although it is estimated that around 4,000 blacks lived in France at the time of the revolution (Peabody and Stovall 2003: 2). Of course, 'race' was just as important in justifying and extending the French imperial ambitions in Africa as it was to Britain and her Empire. This is why Stovall (1996: 16) surmises that 'for the average French man and woman, blacks meant Africa, where sensuous dark-skinned natives danced in the jungle or laboured under the benevolent tutelage of the French Empire.' However, by the end of the First World War, many French citizens had become accustomed to African American GIs, who felt that 'the French treated them with far more decency and respect than they had ever received from whites before' (ibid.: 16). Many African Americans actually settled permanently in Paris during the 1920s, where they nestled in a small community in Montmartre (ibid.: 34). As Stovall explains, for black Americans in Paris, Montmartre meant jazz, and, just like free-spirited white Parisians, African Americans were drawn to the nightclubs around Place Pigalle. Whereas for whites excursions to Montmartre 'represented voyages of exploration into a strange, exotic culture, to black people the jazz clubs symbolised home and community' (ibid.: 48). There were comparisons of the freedom and artistic creativity that blacks felt in Montmartre with Harlem, the famous African American neighbourhood back in New York.

In fact, in 1929 an American opened a nightclub in Montmartre called the Cotton Club in honour of the famous jazz club in Harlem (ibid.). Among the white avant-garde in Paris, a love for black culture (or 'Negrophilia' as Archer Straw (2000) calls it) became highly fashionable and a sign of being modern. The clash of black and white cultures in Paris during the 'jazz age' both 'reflected the European avant-garde artist's anarchic interests and challenged prevailing colonialist views' (ibid.: 9). The avant-garde provocatively adopted the racial complexities of Paris during the 1920s in order to challenge prevailing bourgeois values.

> For whites the negrophiliac relationship provided a space for rebellion against social norms. They naïvely considered blacks to be more vital, more passionate and more sexual. Their fantasies were about being different, even about being black. Living out these ideas involved "getting down" with black people. No social evening was complete without black musicians and dancers. (ibid.: 25)

In the high modernity of 1920s Paris, curiosity about 'race' and a fashion for urban spectatorship mixed with the legacy of rebellion to create a short-lived moment of frisson and conviviality in 'black Montmartre'.

Yet a comparison needs to be made at this point. During the war, the French government employed over half a million immigrant workers in its war industries and on farms. A proportion of these workers came from the empire, principally North Africa. While the French sympathised with how the African Americans were treated in the US by whites, the treatment of France's own colonial workers was remarkably similar in that they performed the worst jobs and received the lowest pay of any workers during the war. French-born workers resented their presence and there was much outrage at sexual relationships between non-white colonial workers and Frenchwomen (Stovall 1996: 20). As Stovall (ibid.: 23) explains, 'colonial workers [...] encountered a hostility that, while not usually as vicious as white American treatment of blacks, certainly called the idea of colour-blind France into question.' Colonial relations, premised upon socially constructed notions of superior/inferior 'race's, were critical in shaping concrete instances of racial formation and racism/s in late 19th- and early 20th-century France.

Conclusion

> The Victorian slum [...] was in many ways a horrific place; but it offered economic and social opportunities, lights and crowds. (Hall 2002: 93)

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This chapter has examined the public city of the 19th century and has focused on London, New York and Paris. The 19th-century metropolis was compact and concentrated, a consequence of the huge demand for housing as the populations of each city grew exponentially during this century. London, New York and Paris were truly *peopled* cities, characterised by a dazzling array of human diversity and motion; indeed, the masses became a spectacle along with the city they inhabited. The working classes have not occupied the city in a comparable manner since. Living conditions were frequently appalling and urban cultures, which were by turn joyful and prone to outbursts of anger and violence, reflected this.

In the 19th-century metropolis, where diverse nationalities mixed in close proximity to one another, 'race' was often conceived in terms of what we would today describe as degrees of whiteness. New immigrants such as Irish or Italians and also the very poor were conceived by the bourgeois elites in each city as a 'race apart', who carried with them the threat of contagion and degeneration. The influence of evolutionary thought meant that the boundaries between 'race' and class were ambiguous. There was a fear of mixing classes and 'races', even though social life was remarkably promiscuous by today's standards. With New York being the exception, 'race' (conceived in terms of non-white humans) did not overly concern city dwellers, although they would have been aware of 'racial' theories corresponding to the empire. Moreover, the non-white presence in London and Paris was small during the 19th century. It is more likely that the casual poor of the 'darkest' regions of the city represented the first 'racial' problem and authorities became mobilised to do something about it. Usually this took the form of clearing the worst slums, on the assumption that it was poor housing that nurtured this obstinate 'race'. In Paris, the transformation overseen by Haussmann was dramatic; yet it still did not rid the city of its 'racial' other – the poor. Despite the challenges of slum clearance and reconstruction, workers and immigrants did not give up their city without a fight. Towards the end of the century more radical solutions were proposed, such as the forced dispersal of the masses to labour colonies outside the city or even throughout the empire. The century saw the expansion of city knowledges, usually in relation to bourgeois crises of reproduction or law and order. The metropolis of the 19th century is not a city that one would attempt to reconstruct or emulate. Nevertheless, the urbanity of megacities such as London, New York and Paris – their magnetism, their sense of the possible and the forum they provided for both self-organisation and recognition – has, perhaps, aspects to be admired.

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3
Breathe Out: The Naked City

> Outer was projected as the locus of desire, the terminus of (upward) mobility; inner was painted as bleak, degenerate space, as the anarchic margin to be avoided. (Goldberg 1993: 188)

Introduction

Between approximately 1920 and 1960 the metropolis was shaped by a centrifugal force that dragged people and industry away from the congested central city. This tumultuous era was characterised by demolition, urban renewal, suburbanisation and ghettoisation. The public city was stripped bare during the 20th century as it underwent a rapid decentralisation and fragmentation:

> From the destruction of insalubrious and politically dangerous *quartiers* by Haussmann [...] to the dismemberment of individual blocks and buildings by urban renewal programs, the general trend towards spatial segmentation within the modern metropolis is unmistakable [...]. (Dimendberg 2004: 27)

During the first half of the 20th century the planning and governance of cities were inspired explicitly or implicitly by a utopian dream of the perfectly rationalised metropolis (Rose 2000: 95). There was a growing fascination with the idea of city as a place of transparency and perfect administration. Yet the city became an increasingly alienating environment. As Sennett (1994: 17) argues, the 'great geographic shift of people into fragmented spaces has a larger effect in weakening the sense of tactile reality and pacifying the body'. Inhabitants of cities

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were increasingly 'acted upon' by city planners. The public life of cities was supplanted by a dominance of the private sphere. The bewildering diversity of city publics that once comprised the *masses* or the *crowd* was gradually differentiated along class and 'race' lines. There was greater differentiation between men and women as segregated gender roles in the suburbs replaced the more egalitarian forms of urban living found in the city (see Davidoff and Hall 1983; Glucksmann 1990). This trend towards demarcation and segregation meant that it became difficult to conceive of the city as a 'whole'; rather it appeared to exist in a series of dislocated fragments.

The period outlined in this chapter saw the intensification of a number of significant trends in urban society. In order to understand these it is useful to refer to Dimendberg's (1997) distinction between 'early modernism' (1910–1930) and 'late modernism' (1930–1950). Early modernism began the process of *defamiliarising* the metropolis, a trend found in sociological texts by Simmel or Benjamin through to the avant-garde, expressionism, cubism and the proliferation of urban photography. Such works stressed the emerging fragmentation of the city and urban experience and for the first time began to ponder the *abstract* nature of urban space. Late modernism, on the other hand, is a truly centrifugal cityscape of highways, bridges, high-rise housing and sprawling suburbs. Late modernism reflects much more acutely the alienation caused by urban renewal and architectural monotony, by broadcast television and automobile travel. The late modernist city is a melancholy and distrustful place where nothing is ever quite what it seems. Dimendberg argues that Jules Dassin's film noir *Naked City* (1948) captures this tension between the 'residual American culture and urbanism of the 1920s and 1930s and its liquidation by the technological and social innovations [...] of the 1940s and 1950s' (ibid.: 3). *Naked City* combines nostalgia for the peopled central city combined with a fear of new alienating urban realities. In its naturalistic depiction of the sprawling ethnic tenement neighbourhoods of the Lower East Side as they undergo demolition and clearance, *Naked City* dwells upon the alternate urban futures these sites that belonged to the previous century once promised.

Discussion here is again focused on the cities of London, Paris and New York. However, rather than consider each city in turn, this chapter adopts a thematic approach. The chapter begins by considering how the concentric models of the city devised by sociologists at the University of Chicago have dominated our understanding of the city from this period. It then moves on to detail how the Great Migration transformed

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northern cities in the US, adding a 'racial' dynamic to the decomposition of the city. The discussion turns then to the theme of suburbanisation before considering the process of urban renewal, in two phases. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate how this era of dispersal and urban fragmentation in combination with the differentiation of 'race', class and gender 'identities' created a legacy that was critical in shaping the 'inner city' debates that followed in the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter 4).

The Spectre of the Chicago School

According to the Chicago School of Sociology, large industrial cities were the culmination of long evolutionary processes. Their work draws explicitly and implicitly upon Darwin's ideas about competition, succession and natural selection. Yet they also gained plenty of inspiration from the city they studied. Chicago grew rapidly in terms of both population and industrial significance between the 1860s and 1920s and provided a living laboratory for scholars to observe and record the processes through which a modern city is able to balance the absorption of new migrants while maintaining a sense of social cohesion. The problematic of the Chicago School, outlined in an exhaustive research agenda published in 1915 (see Park 1967), was essentially Durkheimian, for they aimed to demonstrate how an evolving and complex *modern* social formation such as the metropolis, characterised by enormous human diversity, did not descend into a state of anomie.

Burgess's (1967) model of urban form attempted to delineate basic patterns of social segregation in the modern city. His famous concentric zone diagram depicts an ideal type of city growth (ibid.: 50). In this model he identified that the urban life that had engulfed almost the whole of the 19th-century city had been reduced simply to a 'function', located in a run-down central district known as the 'zone in transition', a 'hobohemia' of rooming houses where accommodation is cheapest. After immigrants settle here there follows a process of 'expansion', which refers to the tendency of each zone to extend its area by the invasion of the next outer zone. In other words, people move outwards to successive zones away from the poorest zone, but only when they are able to afford to. This is what Burgess refers to as 'succession', a term associated with plant ecology. For Burgess, this process of invasion and succession inevitably leads to conflict because it is based upon the competition for urban space and scarce resources such as housing and jobs. Competition necessitates selection, thus giving form to *natural* economic and cultural groupings. This represents 'a process of distribution [...] which sifts and

sorts and relocates individuals and groups by residence and occupation' (Burgess 1967: 54). The fittest survive by participating in an evolving pattern of outward succession. Robert Park developed these insights into a theoretical project called 'human ecology' which views community as central to the biotic level of social life. He states: 'The city is […] a product of nature, and particularly of human nature' (Park 1967: 1). This is why Park talks of *natural areas* – culturally homogeneous spatial expressions of biotic forces.

The Chicago corpus is so influential because it identifies – and presents in iconic form – the fundamental dynamic of outward, or centrifugal, dispersion from the congested central city. The Chicago model hangs like a spectre over any analysis of the modern metropolis. Yet, despite capturing the zeitgeist, the Chicago approach has been subjected to criticism, the main point being that evolutionary theories of urban development such as those pioneered by the Chicago School examine everything but the essential problem (Merrifield 2002: 140), which for critical urbanists is the irrefutable reality that it is capital which shapes the city rather than Park's mysterious biotic force. As an adjunct to this, Chicago scholars have been condemned for failing to understand the liberal state's position in exacerbating or even alleviating the urban social problems caused by capitalism.

Drop Me Off in Harlem: the Great Migration

At the same time as the American city began to explode from its core due to urban renewal and suburbanisation, there was also centripetal movement into the central city. Between 1900 and 1940 blacks relocated from the American south to industrial northern cities such as New York, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore and Boston, a mass movement that has since been labelled the Great Migration. In the grim decades between 1890 and 1910 only around 200,000 blacks left the south, a figure that barely dented the south's black population of 10 million. Yet in 1915 the northward trickle began to swell, resembling a tide by the 1940s and 1950s (Fairclough 2001: 89). This radical incision by black America into the heart of the metropolis is correlated with the irresistible forces that were otherwise forcing the city outwards. Each movement necessitated and provided impetus for the other – blacks occupied the emptying immigrant districts of old and their presence provided a spur for remaining white ethnic populations to flee.

The option to move north and seek 'freedom' in the metropolis was made possible by the onset of World Wars in Europe and successive US

immigration laws in 1921 and 1924, which curtailed European immigration. The First World War created labour opportunities for blacks recently freed from slavery and inspired by patriotism (Fairclough 2001: 88). The maxim of 'work or fight' was also significant during the Second World War, when blacks took advantage of an acute labour shortage to fill positions in railroad construction, in steel mills and in packing-houses, foundries and automobile plants (ibid.). According to Cayton and Drake's (1946) *Black Metropolis*, most African Americans visualised the migration north 'as a step towards the economic emancipation of a people who had been tied to the southern soil […]' (ibid.: 60). Fairclough (2001: 90) argues that there was also a political dimension to the great migration: 'the accumulated oppression of decades – lynching, segregation, disfranchisement, inadequate schools, vagrancy laws […] insults, humiliation and danger – accounted for the eagerness with which blacks moved north'.

African Americans settled in racially coded, previously transitional, areas of cities that quickly became known locally as 'black belts', 'bronzevilles' or even 'niggertowns'. By the end of the 1920s, Chicago's South Side and New York's Harlem had the largest *concentrated* black populations of anywhere in the world. Many whites resented the presence of blacks in their metropolis. Racism in the metropolis tended to be less overt, concealed in bureaucratic procedure and in the brusque manners of neighbours (Griffin 1996: 5). Racial discrimination in employment was rife. Blacks were excluded from many industries and relegated to low-wage unskilled jobs. Labour unions forbade blacks from joining their ranks and were often exploited by employers to act as strike breakers (Fairclough 2001: 89). By the 1940s more industries opened to blacks; some factories even sent agents south to recruit blacks, promising to pay their train fares north (ibid.: 90). Once established in the city, blacks located 'safe spaces' away from the negative effects of racism; spaces ranging from 'parties, dance halls, pool halls, and barber shops to kitchens, churches, families and friendships' (Griffin 1996: 107).

At first African Americans took the place of whites departing from racially changing neighbourhoods. Often, as neighbourhoods 'become black', the expansion of the ghetto was halted by whites in adjacent areas standing firm (often resorting to violence) as there was nowhere left for them to 'flee' to. New arrivals were then accommodated in the ghetto by further subdividing housing. As population densities within the ghetto rose, black spatial isolation increased (Massey and Denton 1993: 43). Unlike white ethnic communities, African Americans experienced little

of the prosperity they expected, and very few blacks migrated from 'black areas' of the city. It seemed that the Chicago model of succession did not apply to African Americans, whose neighbourhoods appeared to coagulate. By 1940 the ghetto had become an enduring feature of the residential structure of black community life (ibid.: 49).

Drop Me Off at Tilbury...

Black immigration into London occurred during the 1950s and 1960s and did not, therefore, run contemporaneously with the Great Migration. In 1948 the *Empire Windrush* arrived at Tilbury Docks in the Thames, just east of London, carrying the first immigrants from the West Indies. As well as hoping to take advantage of the economic benefits on offer in the metropole (as opposed to the colony), West Indians embraced the adventure and educational gains of travel. West Indians chose mainly to settle in London after their arrival in the capital (Phillips and Phillips 1998). Yet, as Mullard (1973: 41) explains,

> Unaware of Britain's hostility towards immigrants, the first large group of West Indians who stepped off the Empire Windrush in June 1948 thought they were 'coming home' [...] [A]ll of them had been brought up to believe that England was the 'Mother Country'. [M]ost of the West Indians [...] expected to be welcomed in Britain and felt they had fulfilled their dreams.

The experience of West Indians in London was testing. Work was available, but was restricted to hard labour, unskilled or semi-skilled work, and was usually poorly paid. Caribbean workers were also the first to be laid off. Finding accommodation was more difficult than finding work, since many landlords explicitly stated they would not allow 'niggers' to rent their rooms. Generally it was the decrepit, vice-ridden and depopulating inner boroughs where blacks eventually found accommodation. Notting Hill, which at the beginning of the 1950s resembled 'a massive slum, full of multi-occupied houses, crawling with rats and rubbish' (ibid.: 107), became the 'headquarters' for the West Indian population in London. Notting Hill contained a stock of large well-built houses, originally built for London's wealthy middle classes. These had been allowed to dilapidate, and the vice trade that extended west from Soho landed the district a seedy reputation. Most houses were in multiple occupation, with single rooms rented to families, with only one kitchen and bathroom to share (ibid.: 108). Patterson (1965) explains that by the

1950s Brixton was similar to Notting Hill, having suffered from almost a century of social downgrading and material deterioration (ibid.: 49). Again a residential area for wealthy merchants had transformed into a twilight district of boarding and lodging houses, converted flats and single room lettings. More can be found on the African–Caribbean experience in London in Chapter 4.

Whilst the city was dispersing many of its inhabitants and spatially fragmenting, its central districts, deserted by whites, were being occupied by black migrants. This process of 'succession', followed by solidification in the form of black ghettos, is central to understanding the association of the inner city with 'race' that dominated the second half of the 20th-century.

Suburbanisation

In this section suburbanisation in London and New York is analysed. The 'suburbs' of Paris are considered – for good reasons – later in the chapter, in the section on mass housing. Suburbanisation is intrinsically linked to the city. As Bender (2002: 224) suggests, it is always helpful to think in metropolitan terms, rather than city and suburban terms. During the period in question suburbia represented both a solution and a problem for the city. In addition, the development of suburbs is argued to be crucial to the fragmentation of class, 'race' and gender identities that occurred in the 20th century.

In London suburbanisation occurred in class waves. The middle-class suburbs of the late 19th century, such as Deptford or Brixton, which are now considered part of London's 'inner city', were criticised by the right and left as evidence that the wealthy were deserting the poor, viewing it as a dereliction of their metropolitan duty. Suburbanisation began in earnest during the interwar years and coincided with the expansion of the middle class from a small group of upper middle-class professionals to a broader alignment that incorporated managers and technical, administrative and lower professional occupations as well as the self-employed (Butler and Watt 2007: 54). Residence in a middle-class suburb reduced some of the negative consequences of the experience of the modern metropolis, and because such houses were predominantly owner-occupied they initially precluded the less affluent masses. The suburbs were critical in shaping solidarity as well as divisions among the (emphatically white) middle classes.

Yet the working class were on the move also. In the early part of the 20th-century London developed a 'Corporation Suburbia' comprised of

council tenants (Clapson 2003: 4). During the interwar period municipal estates became a familiar part of the present urban landscape. The building of peripheral estates was an important strategy in order to calm stirrings of social unrest and the threat of bolshevism (ibid.: 57). Central London in the early 20th century was still comprised of dank back-to-backs where filth reigned and it was common for families of twelve or more to be crammed into single rooms. In order to bring relief, from 1900 the LCC (London County Council) was permitted to build estates on greenfield sites at the edge of the city and beyond. After World War I, Lloyd George famously announced that the British government were *obliged* to build 'habitats fit for the heroes who have won the war'. Migration from the central city to the early LCC estates was socially selective; only skilled artisans could afford LCC cottages, where rent was higher than in the centre of the city. Between 1919 and 1939 1.5 million houses were built in England by local authorities, many with subsidies from central government (Clapson 1998: 33). Some estates, such as Becontree on the border of London and Essex, were huge. Becontree remains the largest planned suburb of public housing in the world; by 1932 (the year of its completion) it housed 116,000 people (Hall 2002: 75). The suburban location of Becontree was not universally popular amongst people who had previously lived in the centre of a large city. The location especially inconvenienced women, who complained of poor transportation and insufficient shopping and leisure facilities. There was also a visible lack of street life in comparison with the congested, yet socially vibrant, slums (Hall 2002: 76). Power (1993: 182) explains how during the 1930s the face of London was changed completely 'by the clearance of the old inner areas and the construction of rings of council estates […]'. Large swathes of London's white working class had departed the city by the start of the Second World War.

Urban historians view the 1920s and 1930s as the classic era of English semi-detached suburbia (Clapson 1998: 34). The conceptual inspiration behind the early years of suburban growth was Ebenezer Howard's 'garden city' vision, which for many commentators also signalled the beginning of the town planning profession. Howard proposed the dispersal of sections of the congested urban population to 'garden cities', situated in the countryside, comprised of a small, self-contained and socially mixed community. However, while the utopian nature of Howard's vision and its progressive promise was an inspiration, it also served to increase dissatisfaction with *actually built* suburban developments, be they state-commissioned or speculative estates.

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In terms of London's privately owned suburbs, the development of the London Underground from 1863 was crucial. Hall (2002: 63) argues that the Tube triggered an explosion of speculative building around London. Effectively a whole new industry was created. Before World War I the majority of the population had rented their homes, but the expansion of the 'middle classes' and the availability of ninety-five per cent mortgages and low interest rates, in conjunction with abundant cheap suburban houses, produced a boom in home ownership (ibid.: 76). Suburban developments in Surrey catered for the so-called stockbroker belt, while north Kent and south Essex attracted working-class migrants. Mass production techniques in construction meant that the big building firms such as Laing and Wimpey could provide agreeable dwellings at affordable prices. Porter (ibid.) highlights the importance of low interest rates and cheap mortgage rates in sustaining the private housing boom on the fringes of London.

The upper and middle classes often sneered at the designs of houses in suburbia. In 1936 Frank Pick compared suburban development outside London to *a cancerous growth*. For Hall (2002: 83), the contempt shown for the new suburbs was akin to a terror of the democratisation of the countryside – 'a lower middle class and working class invasion of an area that had hitherto been the preserve of an aristocratic and upper middle class elite'.

Mass Suburbanisation and the 'Sufferin' City'

> When I first came, I cried for weeks, it was so lonely.
>
> (Mrs Sandeman, resident of 'Greenleigh', cited in Young and Willmott 1957: 122)

In 1944 the Greater London Plan, referred to since as the 'Abercrombie Plan', was published. The plan gave explicit recognition to the principle of dispersal as the solution to London's continued problems with overcrowding (Clapson 1998: 38). Abercrombie's design was for concentric rings of new development located beyond the city and its green belt. London's inner core would be saved by drastically reducing population density and by moving industry outwards. The plan was to displace (or 'evacuate') over one million London residents to 'new towns' or, as they became disparagingly known, 'overspill towns'. By 1950 eight new towns were mapped around Abercrombie's outer London ring: Basildon, Bracknell, Crawley, Harlow, Hatfield, Hemel Hempstead, Stevenage and Welwyn Garden City. The residential environment of new towns was low-density, consisting of semi-detached family homes for rent from

local authorities. The majority of their occupants were skilled and semi-skilled workers with young families. Clapson (1998: 49) explains that most migration from the city was voluntary. Very few slum residents opted to stay in the decrepit and war-damaged urban core, especially when offered a new house in a brave new dormitory town.

The post-war housing crisis accelerated the move towards owner occupation among the wealthier sections of the working class. The cheapest new housing was to be found in the Outer Metropolitan Region. By the late 1950s south Essex had more commuters than anywhere in the Home Counties. As Porter (ibid.) explains, 'Though south Essex lacks the charm of Cheam or Chertsey, post-war affluence meant working class people could afford their own homes and builders knocked up cheap estates in places like Thundersley, Billericay and Rayleigh, their owner-occupiers commuting in droves to the City.' The growth of the suburbs was an also an example of capital being used to generate consumption of goods such as cars, washing machines and television sets (Harvey 1973: 271). As Roy Porter (ibid.: 285) explains:

> Many factors […] had got the suburban ball rolling, and once started the centrifugal tendency would not stop, for it was propelled by the pressure of private capital seeking profitable outlets. It afforded new business opportunities – for landowners, railway and tram promoters, shareholders in utilities, land companies, speculative builders, property dealers, solicitors, house agents, shopkeepers and publicans. With abundant supplies of cheap land, labour and capital, suburban development became a bonanza, especially for the petty capitalists who dominated the building trade […]

Porter (ibid.: 421) goes on to suggest that population leakage was both a cause and a symptom of London's post-war economic troubles. Central London had been depopulating for some time, but by the 1950s even Greater London was thinning. Meanwhile, the Outer Metropolitan Area grew by almost a million in the 1950s and a further 650,000 in the 1960s (ibid.: 422). By the middle of the century London was unrecognisable as the city of fifty years before, with many of its street and market-centred communities destroyed by slum clearance, bomb damage, dispersal to new towns and owner occupation in the suburbs.

Post-war suburbanisation was critical in the construction of a 'new' or embourgeoised working class. The move out from the city engendered 'a privatised, as opposed to solidaristic civic culture, a reordering that undoubtedly facilitated the exacerbation of intra-class divisions'

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(Butler and Watt 2007: 55). A frequent complaint of suburban residents about their neighbours was that 'They're all Londoners [...] but they get highbrow when they get here. They're not so friendly [...] they are all wary of each other' (Mr Wild, cited in Young and Willmott 1957: 153). Suburban houses, with their superior facilities, certainly made residents feel they had moved upwards socially, that they had left the city and its poverty behind. Families retreated into their private worlds of home and motor car while accusing everybody else of being 'stand-offish'.

Suburbs in the US

The suburbs of North American cities similarly exploded after the Second World War, when millions of GIs returned home intent on starting new families only to be met with a severe housing shortage. Kenneth T. Jackson (1985: 190) claims that suburbanisation is a demographic phenomenon as important as the movement of eastern and southern Europeans to Ellis Island or the migration of American blacks to northern cities. Certainly the image of the suburb came to define American domestic life in the second half of the 20th century (Beauregard 2006: 6).

US suburbanisation was influenced by the ideas of mid-19th-century intellectuals, architects and planners (Knox 2008: 14). As in England, the common strand to visions of suburbia was an enduring anti-urban prejudice, a hangover from the previous century, and its high anxiety about social mixing and disorderly, unsanitary slums. American intellectuals and design professionals influenced by the genteel literary culture of the 'American Renaissance' advocated the benefits of a pastoral and picturesque 'middle landscape' between town and country. Also influential were the anti-urban writers and philosophers of the Transcendentalists, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. This group viewed cities as 'diseased, dangerous and even infernal' (ibid.). They drew upon the European Romantic's pastoral ideal that nature invigorated the spirit. As Knox (ibid.) states, 'By the mid-nineteenth century, Americans had come to think of their relationship with Nature and the Great Outdoors as something distinctively "American".' Key to this was the notion of the 'frontier experience' and the broadening of horizons seen as intrinsic to America's success. The virtue and good fortune of Americans could be explained by their access to bountiful, undefiled nature. Cities negated this essential relationship and were thus anti-American and reminiscent of the 'old world'. Yet, if suburbs represented the American connection with the land and nature, what alternative meaning does this necessarily confer upon those to whom the suburban

dream was not open? As shall be shown, American suburbia fulfilled an exclusively *white* fantasy.

Post-war suburbs in the US shared five characteristics (Jackson 1985: 238–45). First was peripheral location. By 1950 the national suburban growth rate was ten times that of central cities. Second was low density. Between 1946 and 1956, around ninety-seven per cent of all new single family dwellings were detached and surrounded by their own plots. America had the land, the money and the tradition for single-family home construction. Third was architectural similarity. Most large developers offered no more than six basic designs, which explains the monotony of many post-war suburbs. Fourth was the easy availability of a suburban home. Home ownership was no longer an indicator of wealth. High-income developments continued to be built after the war, but mass production techniques, government financing, high wages and low interest rates meant that for many of the city's white working classes it was cheaper to buy a brand new house in the suburbs than it was to reinvest in decrepit central city properties or to rent at market rate. Fifth, and for Jackson the most significant characteristic, was the economic and racial homogeneity of the post-war suburb: 'What was unusual [...] was not the presence of discrimination [...] but the thoroughness of the physical separation which [the suburbs] entailed' (ibid.: 241). For example, the Levitt organisation – builders of the famous Levittown developments – had a policy of refusing to sell to blacks for two decades after the war. Astonishingly, in 1960 not a single resident of Long Island's suburban icon Levittown, situated on a 4,000-acre site near the town of Hempstead, was black (ibid.; see also Gans 1967 for an analysis of New Jersey's Levittown).

The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) was key in prompting mass suburbanisation. Unlike the UK, the US government did not build suburban housing, yet through their policies they made sure that millions of homes were built. Federal influence stems from the adoption of the 1934 National Housing Act, which was designed to stimulate building and reduce unemployment without relying on government spending.[1] The FHA insured long-term mortgage loans made by private lenders for home construction and sale. They induced investment in residential mortgages by placing the weight of the US Treasury behind the contract. This spurred the housing market in a number of ways. First, FHA-secured loans required less sizeable deposits – ten per cent became common, as opposed to the thirty per cent needed to secure a deal in the 1920s. Second, the FHA extended repayment periods to twenty-five or even thirty years, making monthly repayments affordable. Third, because

FHA loans posed very little risk to the banker, interest rates fell by two or three percentage points. These changes substantially increased the amount of American families who could afford to purchase their own homes: '[T]he middle class suburban family with the new house and the long term, fixed rate, FHA-insured mortgage became a symbol, and perhaps a stereotype, of the American way of life' (Jackson 1985: 206). By the end of 1972, the FHA had helped nearly eleven million families to own houses in the suburbs (ibid.: 205).

The opportunity to buy a suburban house was not open to all. This was because the FHA programme discriminated against investment in the inner city. FHA insurance went almost exclusively to new residential developments on the peripheries of cities. According to Jackson (ibid.: 207), the most important reason for this was the 'unbiased professional estimate' that was a prerequisite for any loan guarantee. This mandatory judgement included a rating of the property itself, a rating of the borrower and, controversially, a rating of the neighbourhood. There were eight criteria that its underwriters considered in assessing the quality of a neighbourhood. Two categories carried more weight than others. These were 'economic stability' and 'protection from adverse influences'. For Jackson, both criteria were open to be interpreted in ways that were prejudicial against heterogeneous environments. Certainly, underwriters were taught that 'crowded neighbourhoods lessen desirability' and 'older properties in a neighbourhood have a tendency to accelerate the transition to lower class occupancy' (ibid.). The FHA was concerned that a neighbourhood would lose its investment value if rigid white–black separation were not maintained (ibid.: 208). The warning to underwriters was that: '"If a neighbourhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes"' (cited in ibid.). Inner-city areas across the US were marked as ineligible for loan guarantees – a process that became known as 'redlining'. Astonishingly, as late as 1966 the FHA did not have a mortgage on a single home in Camden or Paterson, New Jersey – both majority black declining industrial cities. Federal government effectively embraced the discriminatory attitudes of the marketplace and sponsored the decline of the inner city: 'The lasting damage done by national government was that it put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination and developed policies which had the result of the practical abandonment of large section of older industrial cities' (ibid.: 217). For Beauregard (2006: 8), this loss devastated the civic culture of America: 'their abandonment precipitated the loss of the

country's urbanity, its ability to make a common culture out of diversity. With it went the belief in a singular national character.'

While the suburbs remained prosperous, industrial cities underwent a terrible decline. As people fled the city, urban economies collapsed, with once robust manufacturing firms closing operations or moving to peripheral locations themselves. Huge job losses, poverty, racial tensions and physical decay grew into problems of overwhelming magnitude. City governments faced bankruptcy as taxpayers deserted in droves, yet, as city populations became poorer, demands for public services grew stronger. By the 1960s many African American inner-city neighbourhoods were so distressed that riots were commonplace (see Abu-Lughod 2007). The turnaround from the first half of the 20th century, when industrial cities had led America's growth, was remarkable. It had been assumed that these great cities would continue to prosper. Yet the reality was that

> [A]lmost half of the fifty largest cities – places like New York City, Philadelphia, Detroit, Michigan […] lost population between 1950 and 1970, with that number increasing in the 1970s. Cities such as Buffalo, New York; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Youngstown, Ohio; Gary, Indiana; Camden, New Jersey […] shed from one-third to one-half their residents. (Grodzins 1958: 1).

Suburbanisation sanctioned the formation of a new racial geography that starkly drew a contrast between black and white America. As inner cities become synonymous with 'race' – or rather blackness – the suburbs were an environment in which a new white American identity was forged (Avila 2004: 4). Middle-income workers and their families became immersed in the comforts of a thriving consumer economy centred on home ownership. As Bonnett (2002: 355) argues, the association of whiteness with consumerism provided a new phase in the racialisation of the (sub)urban whereby being white came to be connoted as a lifestyle, symbolically tied to the pleasures of a consumption-led identity and the values of freedom and choice. In this sense, 'white flight' entailed a renegotiation of racial and spatial identities whereby a new middle class comprised of diverse ethnic backgrounds came to discover themselves as *white*. The suburbs did not extinguish the traditions or values of diverse Euro-American cultures, but it privatised them, taking them away from the crowded spaces of, say, the Lower East Side in Manhattan and secluding them within detached, atomised

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spaces where they could practise the *fantasy* of suburban whiteness (Avila 2004: 14):

> White flight entailed an exchange of the heterosocial public world of the modern city, in which Jewish, Italian and Irish immigrants imparted distinct markings of their culture on the urban landscape, for the mass-produced, uniform, and what some critics decried as monotonous landscapes of the 1950s suburbs. (ibid.: 15)

Meanwhile, American cities became less identifiable with ethnic diversity and social mixing and increasingly evoked in reference to the presence and plight of a single 'race'. It seems heterogeneity could not find any home at all in the remade post-war American landscape. As the ghetto became embedded in the American *conscience collective* as a *black* space, whiteness gained strength as a normative social location. By spatially delimiting non-whiteness and symbolically ghettoising the meaning of *black,* whiteness became further deterritorialised. The suburbs were as *all American* as could possibly be imagined.

The descendents of those 'left behind' in the inner city would become those whom William Julius Wilson (1987) would later call 'the truly disadvantaged'. Kenneth B. Clark (1965), in a landmark study of Harlem, produced one of the earliest and most famous portraits of the 'dark ghetto', of which 'objective dimensions [...] are overcrowded and deteriorating housing, high infant mortality, crime and disease', and subjective dimensions include 'resentment, hostility, despair, apathy, self-depreciation, and its ironic companion, compensatory grandiose behaviour' (Clark 1965: 11). For Clark the ghetto of the 1950s and early 1960s was a place of ferment and paradox. Despite the ghetto's pervasive pathology, there also existed resilience, aspiration, vibrancy, cooperation and mutual concern (ibid.). Indeed, recent writers have characterised this socio-historical formation of the African American ghetto as a 'communal ghetto' (see Wacquant 1994), not least because it contained a full complement of social classes. Yet the forced segregation of the ghetto inscribed a sense of worthlessness and impotence on many, and the solutions adopted by blacks veered between persistence, through mutual encouragement and self-education, to passivity or even defiance (Clark 1965: 13). Clark points out how whites were at great pains to blind themselves to the conditions of the ghetto – their suburban fantasy did not permit 'turning back'. Yet blacks in the ghetto were not blind to life outside. The myths of suburban whiteness, with accompanying images of wealth and luxury, were accessed in the

ghetto through television and Hollywood (see also Nightingale 1993). The knowledge that others lived a better life brought 'a conglomerate of hostility, despair and hope' (Clark 1965: 12).

Urban Renewal and Mass Housing

The death knell of many historic slums in US cities was sounded when the Housing Act of 1949 provided federal funding for slum clearance and the building of huge public housing projects. This began as an intense phase of redevelopment that was still occurring as late as the 1980s. The process tended to work as follows. City governments identified and acquired 'decaying' areas and sold the properties to private developers, who would seek to build new ones. Because developers required their investment to be profitable, the homes they built usually catered for a higher income band than those they were displacing. Whilst many moved to another slum, slowly but surely people entered new public housing projects.

Hall (2002) explains why urban renewal was a huge failure. Up until March 1961 the programme of urban renewal in US cities destroyed four times as many housing units as had been built. Over one million people were evicted to substandard dwellings where they paid higher rents. The source of many problems was that urban renewal in the US was built upon an uneasy alliance of civic patriotism and private financial interests (stretching back to the Wagner Act of 1937 and the Housing Act of 1949). These acts effectively freed federal money to buy blighted property in residential areas, yet meant that funds needed for running costs would have to be met by rent. Initially, at least, this meant that new housing would exclude the poorest, a situation that remained the case up until the end of the 1940s when the barrier fell and welfare families began to enter the projects (ibid.: 248). A further problem was that urban renewal was kept politically separate from public housing. Often, when highly valued 'slum' land in metropolitan centres was acquired, commercial development was favoured and low-rent housing discouraged. Federal money was used to tear down slums in prime locations and the land was offered to private developers. Even the left and liberals were supportive of the public subsidies given to private developers, believing the working class had no 'special' place in the city centre and would be better off living elsewhere (ibid.: 250). The effect of urban renewal was to make the rich wealthier, while the poor often became more marginalized and segregated than when they had occupied so-called slums.

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It is important to explain the effects of urban renewal upon New York. Between 1920 and 1970 Robert Moses attained the status of New York's master builder, responsible for planning and constructing parkways, bridges, tunnels, expressways and public housing projects. Between 1949 and 1957 New York City spent $267 million on urban renewal, whereas all other US cities combined spent $133 million (ibid.: 249). Between the 1950s and 1960s the City levelled huge areas of Manhattan and the Bronx and built seventeen housing projects. Over 11,000 people – forty per cent of them black or Hispanic – were displaced, often with middle-income professionals taking their place (ibid.: 250). Indeed, it is stunning that 'the city that led the nation in racial decency would lead it in the final art of "Negro removal"' (Schwartz 1993: xv; see also Massey and Denton 1993).

Robert Moses drew up a huge programme of state-funded housing projects, almost all of which would be built on the site of or adjacent to existing slums – mainly on the Lower East Side and East Harlem, but also in Brooklyn near the navy yard and further out in Brooklyn at Brownsville. Two of the first public housing developments in New York City, the Harlem River Houses and Williamsburg Houses, were low-rise in design and built during the 1930s with New Deal money. Another project completed in the 1930s was Red Hook Houses in Brooklyn. The waterfront location of all three housing projects was chosen because the land was cheap – especially so in the outer boroughs. Savings were also augmented by the low-rise design of three or four stories and the low building coverage of the land. Gradually aesthetic, social and economic arguments began slowly shifting towards an acceptance of high-rise design, despite the conviction among many in housing administration that tall buildings were not healthy for children. Moses's first high-rise tower project was East River Houses, completed in 1941. As Plunz (ibid.: 243) explains, the site was a slum clearance area in East Harlem. Only six of its twenty-eight buildings were high-rise, yet even this modest number meant that savings of three per cent were made compared with the cost if all the apartments had been built to low-rise design. The decade-old prejudice against high-rise towers was finally reversed by the realities of economic cost (ibid.: 245). This set the precedent for the further redevelopment of East Harlem. By 1950 a second high-rise project had been completed. Eventually thirteen additional sites were developed. The result is that today one-third of East Harlem is covered with post-war subsidised housing, almost all designed to Moses's favoured 'tower in the park' image (ibid.). The 'tower in the park' was emblematic of the new era of racial and economic disparity (ibid.: 256), the main

reason being that high-rise buildings and the process through which housing was allocated tended to isolate 'differences' in New York City. For example, the insurance company projects of the 1940s, such as the iconic (and now highly sought after) Stuyvesant Town, were intended for the deserving or respectable sectors of the white working and lower middle classes. Robert Moses planned Stuyvesant Town during World War II and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company finally completed it in 1949. Eight blocks and 11,000 working-class tenants made way for 8,700 apartments. Blacks were barred from living in the complex, with MetLife's president, Frederick H. Ecker, making the uncompromising statement that 'Negroes and whites do not mix' (Bagli 2006). In response to accusations of racism regarding the barring of blacks from Stuyvesant Town, in 1944 MetLife announced Riverton – a project consisting of seven thirteen-storey towers in Harlem intended *only for black residents*. Harlem hated Riverton even before the builders arrived: 'they began hating it at about the time people began moving out of their condemned houses to make room for this additional proof of how thoroughly the white world despised them' (Plunz 1990: 257). As Schwarz (1993: 115) declares, Moses defined agglomerations of housing by 'race' as a matter of course. He would casually remark about his intentions for a 'Rockaway coloured project' (ibid.) and also spoke freely of a 'Bronx coloured project' (Hall 2002: 250).

Although economics usually took precedent in deciding the location and form of public housing, one should not underestimate the influence of 'race' thinking in how Robert Moses planned New York City during the mid-20th century. Robert Caro's famous biography, *The Power Broker* (1975), reveals in ugly detail Moses's thoughts on 'racial' mixing. For example, blacks were discouraged from using state parks because Moses felt them to be inherently dirty (ibid.: 318). They were also discouraged from using the best city beaches, such as Jones Beach, by a process called 'flagging', which entailed stationing the few African American lifeguards at the most distant and least developed beaches (ibid.: 319). The careful management of the city's swimming pools was another example of how Moses sought to discourage the mixing of white and 'colored' residents of the city (ibid.: 513). A pool intended to be used solely by the city's 'colored' (which for Moses was a category comprised of African Americans and Puerto Ricans) was built in Harlem, in Colonial Park, because he did not want 'colored' people mixing with whites in other pools. According to Caro, the pool where he was most concerned to discourage mixing was in Thomas Jefferson Park in East Harlem. This was a white middle-class district but the pool was

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close to 'Negro Harlem' and even closer to an expanding Puerto Rican community in Spanish Harlem. Moses discouraged local 'coloreds' from using the pool by employing only white lifeguards and attendants. He also took the further precaution of not heating the water because he was convinced that Negroes didn't like cold water:

> Whether it was the temperature or the flagging – or the glowering looks flung at Negroes by the Parks Department attendants and lifeguards – one could go to the pool on the hottest summer days, when the slums of Negro and Spanish Harlem a few blocks away sweltered in the heat, and see not a single non-Caucasian face. Negroes who lived only half a mile away, Puerto Ricans who lived *three blocks away,* would travel instead to Colonial Park, three miles away – even though many of them could not afford the bus fare for their families and had to walk all the way. (Caro 1975: 514).

Marshall Berman (1982) offers a personal view of urban renewal that points to how Moses's *modernism* destroyed modern forms of urbanism. The Bronx neighbourhood where he was raised made way for Moses's controversial Cross-Bronx Expressway. Berman surmises that his grief for the old neighbourhood is endemic to a particular brand of modernism that that destroys everything that most vital in the modern world (Berman 1982: 295). For example, he compares Moses's modernist resort Jones Beach State Park with Coney Island, which, Berman argues, is representative of a very different (and ultimately preferable) vision of American modernism. Jones Beach possesses an

> amazing clarity of space and form: absolutely flat, blindingly white expanses of sand, stretching forth to the horizon in a straight wide band, cut on one side by the clear, pure, endless blue of the sea and on the other by the boardwalk's sharp unbroken line of brown. (ibid.: 296)

Moses banished business and commerce from Jones Beach, revealing distaste for the 'vulgar' passions of the masses. At Jones Beach there is none of the paraphernalia found at Coney Island: 'no hotels, casinos, ferris wheels, roller coasters, parachute jumps, pinball machines, honky-tonks, loudspeakers, hot-dog stands, neon signs; no dirt, random noise or disarray' (ibid.: 296–97). Shortly after opening, Jones Beach stole Coney Island's middle-class constituency, leaving the older resort for New York City's working-class, poor and new immigrants.

The critical aspect is that the density, intensity, unruly noise and chaotic motion and the social mixing and 'seedy vitality' of Coney Island were absent *by design* from Moses's segregated Jones Beach. Whereas Koolhas (1979) saw Coney Island as the epitome of New York's 'culture of congestion', Jones Beach was the epitome for New York's new 'culture of segregation'. Jones Beach shares an affinity with Le Corbusier's brand of modernism, based upon a fantasy of cosmic geometry, serenity and unbroken perspectives (Berman 1982). Moses's deconstruction of New York represented a fundamental split between the modern spirit and its values of life, liberty and freedom for all and a *modernised* environment that tends to quash the aforementioned virtues: a disjuncture that remains to this day.

Les Grands Ensembles: from First to Second Ghetto

Rapid urbanisation in France did not begin until the end of the Second World War. At the end of the war less than half the population lived in cities, yet in the following decade a million French peasants left the countryside for the largest cities. This trend continued until the 1980s, by which time seventy-four per cent of the population resided in urban areas (Power 1993: 40). The main problems facing Paris in 1945 and the immediate years after were overcrowding and the existence of hundreds of thousands of makeshift cardboard and corrugated iron dwellings around the periphery. These improvised settlements were known as *bidonvilles*. Yet the majority of Paris's population lived in inadequate accommodation: in hotels or furnished rooms, in squats or makeshift shelters. The 1954 census found twenty-two per cent of the population living in acutely overcrowded conditions, and forty-two per cent still had no internal supply of running water (Harloe 1995: 321). Overcrowding was also intensified by immigration from overseas, which accelerated rapidly from 1946. In fact, there were over two million new immigrants by 1954 (Power 1993: 42). A decade later: 'The ending of the Algerian war in 1962 suddenly led to 1 million returning French settlers – *pieds noirs* – looking for jobs and housing' (ibid.). By the beginning of the 1960s there was an urgent need for fourteen million new housing units across France (ibid.: 44). This was the context for the construction of some of Europe's largest peripheral housing estates.

Unlike in the UK or the US, housing was a low political priority in the immediate post-war years, even though demand was enormous. It was not until 1953 that housing output began to rise significantly (Harloe 1995: 319). Funds for a new wave of industrialised and

standardised home building were gathered from a new employer's tax. Social housing associations, or *habitations à loyer modéré* (HLMs), along with other organisations linked to employers (CILs) began building homes for rent in earnest, trying to meet government-set targets of a quarter of a million per year. The government used their power to acquire land, often on the sites of *bidonvilles* or between existing 'suburban' towns, and made long-term favourable loans to HLMs based upon their ability to maximise the amount of units on each site (Power 1993: 46). The homes tended to be flats, which suited continental urban living, in which the *appartement* was already the accepted norm even for families (ibid.: 44). Individual landlords set rents for HLMs, although the state decreed maximum and minimum levels (Duclaud-Williams 1978: 129). Rents were differentiated according to the costs that HLMs had incurred during construction, as they were required to repay their borrowing to the government. Around a quarter of all HLM units can be found in the city, where large projects were constructed for, among others, the Simca, Renault and Peugeot workforces (Harloe 1995: 323). By the late 1950s it was clear that homes needed to be built at a faster rate, and in 1958 areas to the north and east of Paris were designated a '*Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité*' (ZUP), an 'area to be urbanised quickly'. Given the price of land, ZUPs were inevitably located around the periphery of the city. Between 1958 and 1965 over 400,000 new housing units were built. Technical ingenuity was allied with modern design to create the *grands ensembles*, a series of estates averaging around 5,000 units each, although some comprised more than 10,000.

HLM units were initially rented to better-off manual workers and white-collar workers (Harloe 1995: 324). It was rare to see low-income households housed in the new buildings; the poor were still to be found in overcrowded rooms in the city or in the *bidonvilles*. This led to a struggle throughout the 1950s between the HLMs and the state over the issue of allocations. The state argued that housing units were being allocated to households that did not need them – people whose incomes were high enough to enter the private sector. Moreover, the state argued that lower-income households and 'key workers' – those with greater need – were being excluded (ibid.: 326). In other words, the state argued that HLMs were not fulfilling the social purposes for which the movement had originally been created. HLMs were, however, reluctant to offer houses to the poorest tenants because of the inconvenience caused if they could not pay the rent. They also argued that they were prevented from taking such tenants because of the restrictive terms of the loans made to them by central government (Duclaud-Williams 1978: 131–32).

In 1958 maximum income limits were set by the state, although HLMs, who were free to set *minimum* income levels, raised these to a level that continued to exclude the poorest, a situation did not change until the late 1960s.

Designs for mass housing were inspired by Le Corbusier's pronouncement that houses were simply 'machines for living in' (*machines à vivre*). In the 1920s Le Corbusier argued for the adoption of high-rise as the fundamental building form of the modern city (Dunleavy 1981: 54). Yet many housing blocks in the *grands ensembles* did not have architects at all, so mechanised was their design and construction. There was a firm belief that the *grands ensembles* would offer their occupants an escape from the squalor, constriction and noise of the city and a life with plenty of open space, fresh air and recreational opportunities (Emms 1990: 66). Yet many were concerned about the inhuman design of *grands ensembles* from the outset, complaining about the monotony of the blocks and the impersonal reinforced concrete apartments. There were also complaints about the poor transport links with the city and a lack of social and commercial amenities (ibid.):

> Le Corbusier was a good architect but a terrible urbanist, who prevented us from thinking about the city as a place where different groups can meet, where they may be in conflict but also form alliances, and where they participate in a collective *oeuvre*. (Lefebvre 1996: 207)

By 1975 France had built enough dwellings to be in balance with the number of households. Yet these quantifiable housing 'successes' would cause huge social strains in the future.

The allocation of social rented homes to workers contributed to class fragmentation in France (Harloe 1995: 334). Wealthier residents of HLMs were coerced into owner-occupation in 1968 by government enforcement of the *sur-loyer*, an additional rent to be paid to HLMs by residents whose income was considered too high for the class of accommodation they occupied (Duclaud-Williams 1978: 139). By 1984 over half of French households owned their homes (Emms 1990: 62). Political pressure built during the 1950s and eventually led to minimal rents being charged for the poorest-quality homes (ironically often the most recently built units), meaning that low-income households became concentrated in the worst HLM units. During the 1960s unskilled and poorly paid workers from Portugal, Southern Italy, Spain and North Africa began entering low-quality estates, taking the place of residents who were moving

into the private sector (Power 1993). The 1970s marked a watershed for life on the *grands ensembles*, and they entered a period of disillusionment from which they are yet to emerge (Emms 1990: 68). The utopian belief of the 1960s that the *grands ensembles* embodied a pioneering New France was crushed. Social facilities such as schools, community halls, sports centres and transport arrived piecemeal if at all. The units were beset with problems as lifts and heating systems broke down. By 1973, the government acknowledged the inhuman scale of the housing blocks and placed a limit of 2,000 units on new housing projects (ibid.), a 'solution' that is evidence of the hegemony of abstract space. Social problems were also common. As those who could afford to leave did, unemployment and industrial restructuring meant that those left behind became marginalised and resentful: 'existing and new residents […] increasingly saw themselves as trapped on dumping grounds for the under-privileged' (ibid.).

In London after the Second World War the housing situation remained dire despite urban renewal and ongoing suburbanisation. Squatting, overcrowding and homelessness remained common in central districts. A coherent strategy to bring about a speedy and satisfactory resolution to the crisis was required. The turn was towards high-density development. New housing estates should be built and managed through local authorities, since they were already large landlords and the only bodies that could enforce compulsory purchase orders on negligent landlords (Power 1993: 187). Local authorities were equipped to deal with land acquisition, planning, slum designation, rehousing, redevelopment and building (ibid.). The renewed focus on the inner city occurred within the context of growing disillusionment with suburban sprawl. The central city needed saving, and this required a modernist planning solution. Dunleavy (1981: 1) argues that the scale of change in this period is underestimated. Most sociological accounts of slum clearance suggest that Londoners moved to suburban housing or to New Towns, yet between 1955 and 1975 the majority of the three million displaced were rehoused on mass housing estates in inner and core city areas.

Flats rather than houses became the order of the day for city councils, and the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a 'boom' in high-rise building (Dunleavy 1981: 51). Modernism became the official architecture of the welfare state:

> In 1956 a major new slum clearance and demolition programme was announced, fitting neatly with both the political commitment to rebuild and the post-war technocratic approach to 'machine living'

> [...] The maxim of Le Corbusier that 'Existing centres must come down. To save itself, every great city must rebuild its centre' was being followed. (Power 1993: 189)

The mass production of flats occurred mainly on slum clearance sites close to the city centre. Yet, as Power (ibid.: 195) points out, even though flats became the dominant housing unit for local authorities, the tower block accounted for only a small proportion of the total amount of new units. Their symbolic resonance far outweighed their actual presence on the urban landscape. Moreover, the fad for high-rise ended almost overnight in 1968 when a gas explosion at the twenty-two-storey Ronan Point in Newham, East London, caused the tower to partially collapse, killing four residents. Yet not all high-rise projects were a disaster, and some tower blocks designed by London County Council's Architects Department have been held as shining examples of modernist architecture. The Alton West estate in Roehampton, south-west London, built in 1959, has been heralded as the only genuine attempt to import Le Corbusier's famous *Unité d'Habitation* in Marseilles to London. Alton West's design opted against frivolous detailing, favouring instead the blanched-out look of Le Corbusier's designs. The buildings also balanced angular concrete frames on stout pillars. For Dunleavy (1981: 125), the view of the Roehampton estate became one of the most familiar and potent images of post-war British architecture.

Between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s 600,000 'slum' dwellings were demolished in London and a further million had fallen by 1976 (Power 1993: 190). Yet slum clearance did not clear the city of its dilapidated core. London's streets were plagued with blight; streets became semi-abandoned, vast areas of housing were damaged by either bombs or demolition companies, and communities understandably felt little attachment to homes that were either on the point of being wiped from the city or were yet to be built. In addition, landlords contested compulsory purchase orders on 'slum' properties, and schools, industry and business suffered terrible decline in designated clearance areas. Furthermore, local authorities suffered diminished income as income from rates fell.

There was an unhappy coincidence of inner-city blight with the arrival of immigrant workers from the West Indies and Indian subcontinent. Most immigrants were from ex-British colonies that comprised the New Commonwealth, and held British passports and full citizenship rights. Yet immigrants were often refused private rented accommodation or charged exorbitant rates for slum accommodation. They

were rarely eligible for council housing. As Ravetz (2001: 130) explains, significant amounts of slum dwellers could not be admitted to waiting lists, including single people, couples who were not married, married couples without children (excluding newlyweds), tenants in arrears and exceptionally large families who wished to stay together. Another almost universal requirement was that applicants must have lived and worked in a district for a specified amount of time, ranging from one to five years. This condition especially affected immigrants, who also found themselves excluded by other conditions. For instance, many new immigrants lived alone, many cohabited but were not married, and many arrived with large extended families. Overall, there was a great under-representation of ethnic minorities amongst council tenants through the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, immigrants tended to reside in blighted inner-city areas that were likely candidates for redevelopment. Many pooled resources to buy houses in rundown areas, usually from landlords desperate to escape rent control or compulsory purchase orders. Immigrants who did buy homes were subject to high interest rates from shady mortgage companies, since regular lenders had 'redlined' inner city areas (Power 1993: 191–92). One of the consequences was that clearance in black or immigrant areas was delayed (see Keith 1993 for an examination of Railton Road in Brixton). Local authorities were reluctant to offer council housing to immigrants, and without somewhere to rehouse existing residents nothing could be demolished. This led to a second level of blight whereby immigrant areas became overcrowded, as they were the only areas of the city where immigrants could access housing. There was widespread exploitation of immigrants by slum landlords, such as the infamous Peter Rachman, who owned properties in Notting Hill, where West Indians settled during the 1950s and 1960s. Blacks and Asians had no choice but to concentrate in redevelopment areas, yet because they were invariably excluded from the rehousing process this perpetuated the existence of slums.

There was a major change during the 1970s and 1980s, not only in the social composition of tenants of social rented housing but also in the social attitudes of wider society towards them. Rising unemployment, the growing incidence of family breakdowns and single-parent families, and the statutory Right to Buy (passed in Margaret Thatcher's 1980 Housing Act) led to the concentration of only the most deprived in council housing (Emms 1990: 40). Council tenants were commonly stereotyped as living in luxury at the expense of the taxpayer, as not being deserving of state assistance (ibid.). By the 1970s there was a concentration of eligible West Indians and Asians in hard-to-let estates,

which added a new strand to the existing complex of stigmatisation through which 'good', and 'bad' estates were distinguished (Dunleavy 1981: 354). Many whites were resentful as those they considered 'foreigners' were given local authority housing. State intervention in the post-war housing crisis provided huge numbers of homes, yet it also created forms of differentiation, inequality and stigma that would reverberate into the next century.

Although a great deal of public housing was built in the immediate post-war years in the US, during the 1950s there was only a minimal public housing programme, as Federal support was directed towards suburban home ownership. As private ownership became more attainable, public housing was used increasingly to house poor African Americans and other minority groups excluded from the market. As such, the concentration of poverty-level households in public housing intensified. Public housing became almost exclusively the preserve of the very poorest. In 1948, twenty-five per cent of public housing tenants had been 'over-income'; by 1957 this had fallen to just one per cent. Within the same period, the proportion of non-white tenants rose from thirty-seven per cent to forty-eight per cent (Harloe 1995: 274). Thabit (2003: 3) explains how public housing in East New York, Brooklyn, went from being eighty-five per cent white in the early 1960s to eighty-five per cent black and Puerto Rican by late 1966. In that year forty per cent of East New York's population were living in poverty. Thabit also reports how the city cut back on policing, cleaning and fire protection as the black population grew, which is why he states: 'make no mistake, ghettos are created by the apartheid policies of white society' (ibid.: 2). Yet, as Goldberg (1993: 197) explains, it was more common for housing projects to be interpreted in the US as the 'central mark of racially constituted urban pathology'.

The building of public housing in the US was briefly reinvigorated in the late 1960s when the 1968 Housing Act, passed by Congress under pressure from widespread urban riots and the assassination of Martin Luther King, set an ambitious target of building twenty-six million new units over the next ten years, six million of which were for low and moderate-income households (Harloe 1995: 278). Between 1967 and 1971 91,000 units were completed before the first Nixon administration withdrew support for the programme. Yet during the 1970s it was the plight of *existing* public housing that occupied political and public debate rather than the need for new housing. Certainly there was little public or political appetite to build more of what was seen as a growing problem (Harloe 1995: 278). The increasing concentration of

poor households with high rates of dependency upon welfare resulted in static rental income. As inflation rose and housing projects experienced growing dereliction, the annual federal contributions were no longer sufficient to meet public housing authorities' costs (ibid.: 279). Conditions deteriorated in many projects to such an extent that they were demolished. One of the most famous demolitions was the Pruitt-Igoe, a failed housing project in St Louis that stood for just eighteen years between 1954 and 1972. Some critics viewed the dynamiting of Pruitt-Igoe as the death of modernist architecture. The fact that the project suffered from extraordinary levels of segregation, poverty and crime meant that it also became emblematic of the perceived social failures of public housing in the US.

William Moore's (1969) account of life in a high-rise housing project in 'Midwest City' reveals a lot about the stigma and degradation of public housing in US cities – even by the late 1960s. He explains how a project is not somewhere in which tenants make a choice to live. Rather, the projects exist only for those who have no choice (Moore 1969: 37). The projects deteriorated so quickly and to such an extent that they became a *spectacle* of degradation:

> Most people don't just look; they stare. Blackmoor is one of the city's high-rise housing projects. Perhaps no other housing project is more of a caricature of inadequate living facilities than Blackmoor. It was built in the middle of one of the city's worst slums and is centrally located: ten minutes from downtown, ten miles from the suburbs, and ten decades from the mainstream. [...] Included in the area where Blackmoor is located are the sections of the city with the highest crime rate, the largest proportion of unemployed, the largest concentration of nonwhite residents, a predominance of absentee-owned rental units; in short it epitomises a ghetto with all its problems. (ibid.: 14)

The housing project is exposed as suffering the same problems as the slums it replaced. Both environments endured deteriorating physical structures, social and spatial isolation, a sense of impermanence and a reputation for dangerousness, a feature that intensifies isolation from the white city (and suburbs). Both environments are also characterised by a lack of services or facilities, quick evictions and ruthless bureaucratic management (ibid.: 36), the difference being that the landlord of public housing projects is the local housing authority.

Hirsch (1998: 254) describes the process of replacing black inner-city ghettos with high-rise public housing as a movement between 'first'

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and 'second' ghetto, a shift that implies a *worsening* of living conditions and *stricter* racial segregation. It also represents a crucial stage in the development of what Wacquant (2008a) calls the 'hyperghetto' – a feature of most large US cities by the 1990s. City officials employed slum clearance to preserve and extend the city's racial pattern in housing: 'with the emergence of redevelopment, renewal, and public housing [...] government took an active hand not merely in reinforcing prevailing patterns of segregation but also in lending them a permanence never seen before' (Hirsch 1998: 254). The distinction between first and second ghetto is a useful one, as clearly there are differences between the central city tenements where African Americans first settled during the Great Migration and the characterless, low-cost projects to which they were displaced. Although the term 'ghetto' cannot be used to describe comparable shifts from slums to mass housing in Paris or London because racial segregation there does not approach US levels, the notion that devalued urban environments were simply transferred between settings is a useful one. As a resident of William Moore's *Vertical Ghetto* explains, 'a project ain't nothing but a slum with the kitchen furnished [...]' (Moore 1969: 5).

Conclusion

Between 1920 and the 1960s the metropolis underwent a period of dramatic deconcentration and fragmentation, dispersing residents and industry towards the periphery and sorting and sifting city publics into clearly defined zones. The city and its suburbs came to resemble a relational, sometimes functional space – a *centre–periphery* if you will. Crucially, the city no longer resembled a whole or *totality* in the way that it had done a century earlier. The main vectors behind this centrifugal movement were suburbanisation and urban renewal. Yet during this same period class, gender and 'racial' identities became increasingly fragmented. As fractions of the white middle class were filtered into hierarchised suburbs and the white working class into public housing, Lefebvre (1996) suggests that 'urban consciousness' was stolen from the proletariat and the notion of *habitat* (simply to own a home) replaced the richer notion of to *inhabit*. The latter means to take part in the life of the city, whereas the former is an abstraction, reducing a home to its exchange value: '[i]solated from the city, the proletariat will end its sense of the *oeuvre*. Isolated from places of production [...] the proletariat will allow its creative capacity to diminish in its conscience' (ibid.: 77). For Lefebvre, owner-occupation was developed so

that the working class could cease operating as *producers* and be reduced simply to *consumers* of space. Despite the move out, it should not be forgotten that those who 'moved in' to the central city (immigrants from the Caribbean or the Indian subcontinent and migrants from the American South) into its most decrepit housing were to redefine the centre of the metropolis as 'inner city' in the coming decades. Whilst the backs of politicians, technocrats and the markets were turned, the centre of the 'white city' was wrestled from their possession, and, as shall be explored, many would later demonstrate considerable regret at this apparent act of remissness.

Lefebvre (1991) asserts that all residents of the city, even the least powerful, are involved practically (to greater or lesser degrees) in the production of space. Examples of the distinctive *spatial practices* of this period included an increasing introspection, a focus on private rather than public life, the emergence of commuting from the suburbs to work in the city as an idiosyncratic and highly modernist form of urban belonging (that even now has received very little academic attention) and the disconnecting experience of the city as a visage, viewed from a train or automobile and addressed towards the mind or eye rather than the body. *Representations of space* in this period became dominated by *abstract space* – by exchange rather than use value. The utilitarian designs of modernist architects or the consumer spaces of suburbia shared a concern with quantitative space. The effect of this was to segregate space, to parcel it off and to consequently differentiate – usually arbitrarily – between fragments of the metropolitan population. Examples of *representational spaces* of this period include utopian dreams of an orderly and rational metropolis in addition to the rather Arcadian fantasy of the suburbs. Increased segregation and fragmentation also gave rise to a more fervent imagination, or fascination with the habits, customs and *essence* of the 'racial' other.

4
Agonopolis: The Multicultural City

> In practice the urban core (an essential part of the image and the concept of the city) splits open and yet maintains itself: overrun, often deteriorated, sometimes rotting, the urban core does not disappear [...] And yet its reign seems to be ending. Unless it asserts itself again even more strongly as a centre of power. (Lefebvre 1996: 74)

Introduction

By the 1970s the metropolis resembled a fragmented, segregated and hierarchised assemblage of spaces rather than the 'whole' that urban explorers and social scientists of the 19th century had sought to comprehend and master. The physical legacy left by over fifty years of urban renewal and deconcentration, in London and New York at least, was a decrepit urban core of crumbling 19th century dwellings and recently built, but often unpopular, housing estates. As the suburbs enjoyed relative prosperity and stability, conditions in the city worsened. The period roughly between 1970 and the early 1990s was a period of almost perpetual crisis for the city, and much of the language used to describe the crisis was racially codified (see Keith 2002). As central cities and their *racially other* inhabitants were confined to the margins of economic, political and cultural life by racism and policies of neoliberalism, ironically the multicultural 'inner city' came to assume a symbolic centrality. Locations such as Brixton, Tottenham, Harlem or Bedford-Stuyvesant suddenly became ubiquitous in political debate and synonymous with racial conflict and lawlessness. Perversely, however, the latter years of the 1980s witnessed a boom in the financial districts of London, New York and Paris. Although many felt during the 1970s and 1980s that the city

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had been recklessly surrendered and colonised by 'racial' others, by the early 1990s the revanchist movement to reclaim the white city was well underway. The primary aim of this chapter is to complete the geohistorical analysis of 'race, culture and the metropolis' that began in Chapter 2, outlining the emergence of a multicultural city while also exploring why the 'inner city' became so symbolically central to the organic crisis that gripped the metropolis in the 1970s and 1980s. The secondary aim of the chapter is to highlight the growing schism between the multicultural city (as matter of fact) and multicultural*ism* as a strand of political thought or administrative strategy. It is suggested that this growing separation between the city and its specialist knowledges is an example of the intellectualist reduction of 'the [practical] "logic of things" into "things of logic"' (Bourdieu 1991: 36), whereby the fuzzy logic of the city, with its vernaculars, violence, fantasy and drama, is reduced simply to a political or ethical puzzle. This repression of the spatial – and the urban – misses the point that the spatial setting of multiculturalism is crucial to both its successes and its failures; indeed, a rediscovery of the urban is critical if this philosophy is to have any utility in the future.

The multicultural city that emerged in the 1970s was agonistic. Repression, resistance, conflict and conquest defined the era, and the mood remained politically charged throughout the 1980s. This is why the term *agonopolis* (agon being a Greek term for contestation) is advanced here to capture this fleeting moment in the history of the modern metropolis. *Agonopolis* captures also the public setting of contestation (the polis), whereby the inner cities acted as a stage for the 'playing out' of a range of national, imperial and global contradictions. *Agonopolis* also conveys antagonisms between the actually existing city and the language games (Lyotard 1979) contrived to bring about a sense of political *or* ethical clarity to the metropolis.

The Multicultural City: the *Logic of Things*

This section will focus predominantly on London. It will outline how London became 'multicultural', concentrating on post-war immigration and how these changes were conceptualised by sociologists. In the late 1940s and 1950s Britain's labour shortage meant that it could not provide workers for unpopular manual or menial jobs (Fryer 1984: 374). At first employers attempted to lure European workers, but eventually turned their attention to the 'black Commonwealth'. The first set of immigrant workers from the West Indies arrived in London in 1948 on the *Empire Windrush* and more arrived throughout the 1950s. New

arrivals found work fairly easy to come by, and this remained the case until the beginning of the 1970s. In some industries the demand for labour was so great that members of a 'reserve army' of black workers were actively recruited in their home countries. For example, in 1956 London Transport even began recruiting staff in Barbados (Fryer 1984: 373). Despite high demand for their labour, blacks were often victims of racism and discrimination in the workplace. Moreover, many immigrants were ignorant of trade unions, pay scales, average hours and working conditions and were easily exploited at first. Most newcomers settled for a lower job status than they had enjoyed in the West Indies. Yet they did not accept this passively. Sivanandan (1982) records a series of strikes by black and Asian workers during the 1960s and 1970s that failed to elicit solidarity from the Trade Union movement and went largely unreported by the white press.

While work was plentiful in the 1950s, there was little choice in accommodation. Mullard (1973: 42) explains that a black man [sic] in London had no choice but to pay extortionate rents: 'He did not qualify for a council house, he could not afford to buy a house; and because of discrimination he could not rent accomodation at reasonable rates in the "respectable" areas [...]'. Occasionally blacks or Asians would club together to buy a house which they would then let to other immigrants. Profits would then go towards buying a second house, and so on until all the original investors in the first house had a house of their own (ibid.). Estate agents encouraged blacks to buy property in 'black areas', which tended to be slum areas that were being deserted by previous inhabitants. Whilst in London these processes of exclusion did not create ghettos to compare with those in New York, they did make London a racially divided metropolis.

In her study of West Indians in Brixton, Sheila Patterson (1965) expressed concern that immigrants were becoming too comfortable living within the 'colonies' she saw developing in the city – that they were becoming too much of a 'home from home' (ibid.: 382). Patterson agonised over how West Indians would ever integrate, assimilate or come to share mainstream 'British' values while they remained in the inner city. Here Patterson echoed the Chicago School whilst also demonstrating a very British anti-urban bias, equating integration (and success) with a move from the inner city to the suburbs. Only upon leaving the city could West Indians become accepted and permanent members of British society. However, Rex and Moore (1967) challenged the notion that inhabitants of a 'zone of transition' *chose* to live a segregated life in the city and argued instead that the crucial issue was that their attempts

to move to the suburbs were continuously thwarted by racism in the housing market.

The experience of many West Indian immigrants, schooled in a colonial education system to revere the 'motherland', was one of shock, disappointment and disillusionment (Fryer 1984: 374). Prejudice against black people was widespread; they were viewed as uncivilised, backward people inherently inferior to Europeans. Other myths included the fear that black men had stronger sexual urges than white men. There was also much resistance among many whites to any form of mixing with blacks. Also, as Fryer (ibid.: 375) observes, 'To the prejudiced and ignorant majority it seemed "strange and out-of-place" merely to see black people in the centres of large industrial cities.' Verbal and even physical abuse was common. From the 1970s 'second generation' immigrants found themselves under almost continual attack by racists and the police; between 1976 and 1981 thirty-one black people in Britain were been murdered in attacks (ibid.: 395). In almost every case the police denied there could have been a racist motive.

The number of immigrants in London from the Indian subcontinent also grew rapidly between 1950 and the mid-1960s, although it was not until the 1960s that numbers matched or exceeded migration from the Caribbean (Smith 1989: 25). The South Asian population was (and remains) concentrated in the cities where labour was most required – London, the industrial Midlands and the textile towns either side of the Pennines (see Anwar 1979). A more detailed picture shows that Caribbean, Indian and Bangladeshi populations tended to be concentrated in London and Birmingham, while the Pakistani population had a stronger northern bias towards Manchester, Bradford and the Pennine mill towns (Peach 1998: 1663). Subsequent population growth amongst South Asians has come from family reunification, the arrival of British passport-holders of South Asian origin from newly independent colonies in East Africa, and the emergence of a burgeoning British-born 'second generation' (Ballard 1994: 6).

South Asian families favoured buying cheap houses in 'slum' areas of the city where properties could be bought cash-down – for as little as a few hundred pounds (ibid.: 17). They regarded tenancy, even if the landlord was the Local Authority, as humiliating. Peach (1998: 1,667), however, explains how during the 1950s and 1960s over forty per cent of South Asian immigrants lived in rented accommodation, predominantly in the private sector because they could not gain access to council housing. Almost half of Indian and Pakistani households were in owner-occupation, compared with around a quarter of Caribbean

households. By 1991, things were quite different, with around eighty per cent of Indian and Pakistani households in owner-occupied properties compared with sixty-three per cent of all households. However, again there is much variety in the South Asian experience, as Bangladeshi-headed households (along with Caribbeans) showed double the national dependence on social housing.

The South Asian presence in post-war London not only contributed further to the making of the metropolis as a visibly *multiracial* society; their presence is crucial to the imagining of London as a poly-ethnic, *multicultural* city. As Ballard (1994: 1) explains, 'inspired as they are by cultural, religious and linguistic traditions, the new minorities have significantly expanded the range of diversities covered by British lifestyles.' Indeed, while South Asians may have been considered *racially* other by their white 'hosts' in London (black and at the same time *not* black), it is their commitment to religious, linguistic and cultural traditions that is intrinsic to their *being*. For this reason, South Asians have assumed an ambiguous and/or contested position in black politics. While most South Asians willingly identify themselves as 'Indians', 'Pakistanis' or 'Bangladeshis', it would be a mistake to assume that those so identified share any great commonality, or interact in such ways that they might be considered a 'community' (ibid.: 8). Stratification among South Asians is complicated by caste, kinship and marriage endogamy (see Werbner 1990). The Asian presence in greater London was and remains incredibly diverse – even if the majority of the white population viewed them simply as Asians, or, worse, 'Pakis'.

Whilst racial minorities were becoming increasingly visible in London during the 1950s, it was also during this period that the defence of a *white* identity was born. Alistair Bonnett (2000) suggests that whiteness became available to the working class during the post-war establishment of welfarism and the formation of an imperialist 'national community' (ibid.: 39). The use of a *white* identity by the working class in Britain was precipitated by the increase in immigration. This was interpreted as a threat to the 'rights' that working-class Britons had gained from the establishment of a one-nation welfare state. Whiteness was transformed from a bourgeois identity connoting extraordinariness towards a more populist identity that aggressively asserts both superiority *and* ordinariness. It was during this post-war period that belief in the biological superiority of races was by common agreement supplanted by a 'cultural racism' concerned with preserving a national 'way of life' and the articulation and assertion of a white national identity (see Barker 1981 and Hage 1998). Race, nation and culture create effective (and affective)

chains of association, and this is why it is perhaps misguided to exaggerate the divide between old biological racism/s and newer cultural racism/s (Rattansi 2007: 99).

Crisis and Consent: the Inner City and 'Race'

> Railton Road in Brixton, All Saints Road in Notting Hill [...] These are at the centre of areas where crime is at its worst, where drug dealing is intolerably overt, and where the racial ingredient is at its most potent. (Kenneth Newman, ex-Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, cited in Keith 1993: 122)

It was during the long-running crisis of British capitalism in the 1970s and early 1980s that London's inner city became branded in the public consciousness as a 'racial' problem. The inner city effectively became a spectacle – a freezing of time, space and social relations. This section outlines the dimensions of the crisis and how its representation in the form of the 'inner city' condensed understandings of immigration, blackness and criminality. This leads into a discussion of urban riots that arguably denote the high (or low) point of the *agonopolis*. One consequence of the re-categorisation of the central city as 'inner city' as a remainder or a barrier to market progress or social cohesion is that policy emphasis overwhelmingly was concerned with remedying the problems of the 'inner city' (see Lawless 1988; Robson 1988; Lewis 1992). As the financial might of the City diminished during the 1970s the symbolic power of the deprived and conflict-ridden inner city grew exponentially – providing vast resources of symbolic, political and cultural capital for those able to exploit its riches.

Scholars at Birmingham's famous *Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies* (CCCS) used Gramsci's notion of 'organic crisis' to describe the conditions that gripped England in the 1970s and 1980s. An organic crisis is a crisis of the *whole* system, in which contradictions in the economic infrastructure have repercussions through the superstructures (Forgacs 1999: 427). As such, the crisis identified by Solomos et al. (1982: 11) is argued to be the result of the combined effect of economic, political, ideological and cultural processes. An organic crisis is also a crisis of consent, or hegemony, in that it impels the ruling bloc of society to fight in order to maintain their authority and legitimacy.

For Solomos et al. (1982), the most critical element of the organic crisis concerned the shift to a post-industrial economy, the subsequent reorganisation of labour and the eventual marginalisation of black work-

ers. The state's response to mass youth unemployment was to portray economic realities as having social or moral roots (ibid.: 19). A rapid concentration of political power in the executive led to a directed focus of public attention on the 'enemy within' and the threat they posed to law and order (ibid.: 20; see also Hall S. et al. 1978). It was within this context that 'race' and the areas of the city that blacks inhabited were presented as problems, the axis of which was law and order. The crisis of law and order was produced by doubts regarding the 'permissiveness' and countercultural trends of the 1960s and two decades of industrial, national and colonial decline. IRA terrorism and the perceived economic and social threat posed by trade union militants were also sources of concern. It was in this context that policing came to symbolise a crisis of legitimacy for the bourgeois public realm as a whole. Battle lines were drawn between British society and its enemies; between who *was British* and *who was not*. Fears converged around the idea of a threatening black presence in the city whose 'alien culture' constituted an assault upon patriotism, the family and traditional morality. 'Race' was used by the state in order both to *explain* the crisis and to *justify* their exertion and extension of repressive social control (Solomos et al. 1982: 27; see also Hall S. et al. 1978). Black youth suffered from increasingly aggressive policing as concerns about 'race' and crime were projected onto their problematic presence in the city. Powerful images connected blacks with particular areas of the city (such as Brixton) and with specific kinds of crime (such as mugging or drugs); the imagery of American ghettoes was also transposed onto the British scene, with Brixton and Notting Hill compared to the streets of Harlem or Watts (Solomos 2003: 127).

One element of the crisis not given due attention by the CCCS is the urban. The first half of the 20th century witnessed a great deal of optimism regarding the city and urban planning (see Chapter 3). For example, the Keynesian welfare state was utilised in an attempt to eradicate poverty and to find ways of integrating and managing sections of the community that had previously been excluded (Cochrane 2007: 24). There was also hope that urban blight was a 'residual' matter and that 'escalators' such as suburbanisation or social housing would eventually restore order. Yet by the 1970s there were doubts about the effectiveness of these escalators, especially as those left behind in the city began to look more like *permanent* features of the city rather than the latest transient group waiting their turn (Graham and Clarke 1996: 168). The ability of government to respond to these problems was compromised by the fiscal crisis, brought about by global recession and changing central government spending priorities (see Cochrane 1993). The crisis of progress

in planning related especially to high-rise public housing, whose populations were disaffected and rightly complained about the physical and social environment to which they had been displaced. A common criticism was the lack of community and the decline in the kind of informal social controls that could be found on the street (Graham and Clarke 1996: 169; see also Newman 1973; Coleman 1990).

'Race' Riots: Brixton and elsewhere

The 1980s witnessed a number of spectacular riots in London that burned 'race' and the inner city into the public consciousness. In representational terms 'race', the inner city and criminality became inseparable: 'the moment in which crime and legality begin to dominate discussion of the "race" problem is thus also the moment when "black youth" become a new problem category, conceived in the combination of youth and "race"' (Gilroy 1987: 106). Inner-city riots became understood as a form of pathological contagion associated with black communities, a contamination that threatened to spread like an epidemic from the sites where disorder erupted (Keith 1993: 5). London was felt to be under threat.

In his analysis of the 1981 Brixton riots, Unsworth (1981: 65) suggests that the condition of London's inner cities bore a physical testimony to Britain's economic decay, with 'the imposing facades of the great commercial institutions at the heart of the Victorian city staring out over landscapes devastated by social, economic and environmental abandonment' (ibid.: 70). The inner cities bore the brunt of deindustrialisation, leaving unskilled populations without work – a disadvantage multiplied by racism in the employment market. As deindustrialisation accelerated, social distress increased, racial tension mounted, policing became more concentrated and state intervention was usurped by a reliance on market forces (ibid.: 71). The object of the rioters' fury was the police. As Keith (1993: 5) explains, the police have featured prominently in many of the most horrific moments of British racism. In Brixton, the Metropolitan Police had instigated *Operation Swamp*, aimed at reducing street crime and involving the heavy use of the so-called 'sus' law, which allowed police to stop and search individuals on the basis of 'suspicion' of unlawful behaviour. The 'riots were not sudden explosions of violence within normally peaceful and harmonious communities but a cluster of upsurges that punctuated the chronic tension and routine aggression that had become commonplace' (Unsworth 1981: 71).

The Brixton riots left a legacy, not least an official inquiry (see Scarman 1981; Benyon 1984). The realisation that violence of such ferocity had occurred not only on the British mainland, but at the *very heart of the capital*, administered a profound shock to the political system:

> Media images of masked looters and rioters in guerrilla battledress, or rioters tilting lengths of scaffolding at the walls of riot shields [...] or of stolen milks floats weaving around the streets, [...] of children hurling fragments of pavement at blood-spattered policemen confirmed the worst fears of the scourges of liberalism and multiracialism. (Unsworth 1981: 75)

Further riots took place in Brixton during the spring and summer of 1985. Yet the most notorious inner-city riot of 1985, during which PC Keith Blakelock was murdered, occurred on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, North London. It was not only the final remaining 'transitional zones' of the city that were under duress but also the mass housing estates of the 1960s. Broadwater Farm had been built in 1966 by Haringey Council and contained over 1,000 flats, many of which were contained in two eighteen-story tower blocks. The riot was triggered by the death of Cynthia Jarrett, a black woman who, her daughter claimed, was pushed to the ground by police officers during a routine search of her home. At the beginning of the 1980s the now disbanded and infamous Special Patrol Group, organised by the Metropolitan Police to target areas of serious crime, were used as reinforcement on the estate, causing deep resentment among many black residents (Power 1993: 203).

The trouble at the heart of the metropolis, so close to parliament and the City of London, signalled a turning point; the city would never be the same again. Yet the direction the city turned was not the way that most envisaged at the time.

The Underclass and the Unheavenly City

Whilst there was some sympathy, even within government, with the plight of those 'left behind' in the inner city and the harassment they suffered at the hands of 'racially' insensitive police (see Scarman 1981), the dominant view was that those living in the inner city only had themselves to blame for their predicament. This strand of thought began in America during the 1970s, and by the 1980s it had also assumed a prominent place in British political discourse. In *The Unheavenly City* (1970), Edward C. Banfield, mentor to leading conservative scholars such as

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James Q. Wilson, argued that 'inner city' problems can be explained by the behavioural patterns and culture of those who live there. 'Race' was not a factor; problems arose because the lower class were 'present oriented' and acted on impulse rather than planning for the future. During the 1980s Charles Murray evoked the term 'underclass' in constructing an argument that builds upon this work. The underclass is not defined simply by poverty but by 'poverty plus', in the sense that it is a group that not only lacks material resources but is socially, culturally and politically deficient (Butler and Watt 2007: 91). Murray (1984) goes further than Banfield and explicitly links the growth of the underclass to the rise of the welfare state. Welfare encourages the development of an underclass locked into a dependency culture. The consequence is that the underclass suffers from chronic social immobility and in some instances occupies a disadvantaged position for the duration of whole lives and across generations (Roberts 1997: 42). Yet there *is* a 'racial' aspect to underclass logic. Cochrane (2007: 70) explains how the underclass debate has also been used to raise concerns about the parenting practices of minority ethnic groups, specifically Caribbean Africans in the UK and African Americans in the US (see Moynihan 1973; Murray 1990). Indeed, Murray argues that 'illegitimacy produces an underclass for one compelling practical reason having nothing to do with morality or the sanctity of marriage. Namely: communities need families. Communities need fathers' (1990: 6). Many have viewed this as a guarded assault on the culture and family structures of blacks on either side of the Atlantic. The critical issue, however, is that inner-city or ghetto dwellers are blamed for their own predicament.

Writers who emphasise structural constraints rather than individual or familial morality have also identified the existence of an underclass (or, in the UK, the 'socially excluded' – see Byrne 1999) although their policy recommendations involve more, rather than less, welfare intervention. William Julius Wilson (1987) argues that ghettos in the old industrial cities of the US have been created by deindustrialisation: spatially, they represent the consequences of what happens 'when work disappears'. Deindustrialisation had devastating effects for blacks who lived in cities and worked in blue-collar jobs. As auto plants, steel mills and factories in major cities of the North and Midwest shut down or relocated during the 1970s and 1980s, many men were left without work. As Sugrue (2005: 3) explains,

> Scenes of devastation and poverty are disturbingly familiar to anyone who has travelled through the streets of America's Rust Belt [...] cities that formed the backbone of American industrial might a

half-century ago. The urban crisis is jarringly visible in the shattered storefronts and fire-scarred apartments of Chicago's South and West sides; the rubble-strewn lots of New York's Brownsville, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and South Bronx.

Ten cities in the North and Midwest accounted for three-quarters of the rise in ghetto poverty during the 1970s. New York City alone accounted for one-third of the rise, and if New York and Chicago are combined this accounted for half the total increase (Wilson 1992: 643). Although Wilson (1987) identifies many of the same 'symptoms' as Murray, underclass behaviours such as crime, marital breakdown and babies born outside of marriage are argued to spring instead from the decline in jobs. As such the underclass has material rather than cultural causes. The 'ghetto poor', as Wilson (1996) eventually preferred to refer to the underclass, were further isolated as the anti-discrimination and positive action programmes of the 1960s and subsequent improvements in education, job and housing opportunities encouraged the expansion, and suburbanisation, of an African American middle class (see Wiese 2004). The desertion of the ghetto by the middle classes meant that there were no black teachers, social workers or business people for children to aspire to.

Wacquant (2002: 48) takes the argument further and argues that ghettoes in North American cities provided an abundant source of cheap labour whilst also 'keeping black bodies at a safe distance, to the material and symbolic benefits of white society'. According to Wacquant, the move from urban-centred industry and manufacturing towards a service-oriented suburban economy in conjunction with a new immigrant workforce made possible a shift in the way that black inner-city populations are managed. Welfare programmes have been replaced by punitive measures of containment.

Brixton en France?

Violent incidents involving youth of immigrant origin and the police have occurred in French *banlieues* since 1978 (Daoud 1993; Rey 1999). Yet, during the 'hot summer' of 1981, the *banlieues* of Paris and Lyon experienced several episodes of unrest that engrained in public consciousness the association of peripheral areas of cities with a feeling of insecurity and a fear of immigration (Hargreaves 1996: 607). As de Laforcade (2006: 221) argues, the 1980s 'is remembered today as the beginning of the era of heightened polarization on the issue of immigrants and the place of their progeny in French society'. The 1981 riots

have since assumed an iconic status, a symbol of the inadequacies of social housing *and* the problematic position of immigrants in France (Belbahri 1984). As Dikeç (2007: 42) explains, the 'race' riots occurring on the other side of the channel in Brixton were almost a ghost haunting the French Republic.

The *grands ensembles* built during the 1960s contributed to the eradication of *bidonvilles* or shantytowns, and, whilst they improved living conditions for many, their peripheral location meant they were disconnected from city centres and suffered from a lack of adequate transportation, shops and cultural amenities (Dikeç 2007: 38). The *banlieues* performed many functions of the inner city, yet their residents were rarely viewed, or indeed perceived themselves, as city dwellers. Like the mass-produced housing estates built in London or New York during the same period, many buildings suffered from rapid physical degradation. When the middle class moved out of French social housing estates (HLMs) during the 1970s they were replaced by socio-economically disadvantaged populations and immigrants. Many *cités* (housing estates) were affected by job losses in industry and manufacturing during the 1970s, placing immigrants in a vulnerable position. As Abelmayak Sayad notes (1979), to be an 'immigrant worker' in France was to be a nomad or a person in transit; a temporary guest with a singular function – to work. Losing employment and becoming sedentary in a land where you were not viewed as indigenous was perceived as a *transgression* and imbued with a suspicion of criminality.

The 'immigrant problem' first emerged during the Algerian war of decolonisation (1954–62), when the makeshift *bidonvilles* on the peripheries of cities where North African workers lived were picked out by neo-Nazis and the colonialist paramilitary *Organisation de l'armée secrete* (OAS) for *ratonnades* or 'rat hunts' of suspected Algerian nationalists (de Laforcade 2006: 219). In October 1961 the police prefect of Paris, former Nazi collaborator Maurice Papon, ordered a curfew on Algerian French citizens, which was the catalyst for large demonstrations in the centre of Paris, culminating in the massacre by the police of several hundred Algerians, their bodies tossed into the Seine. Later in the decade, following the widespread revolts of 1968, there was a wave of expulsions of perceived agitators, mainly of North African origin (ibid.). In 1974, in response to rising unemployment and concerns over the assimilation of immigrants, the government announced that from then on only workers from the European Community would be admitted, thereby halting the flow of unskilled labour from North Africa, although family reunifications did keep the overall foreign population growing (Brubaker

1992). It was clear that 'immigration was framed as a "problem" concerning post-colonial migrants only' (de Laforcade 2006: 219).

In the early 1980s the second generation of North African origin ('*les Beurs*'[1]) became increasingly active in anti-racist movements (Lamont et al. 2002: 392). These were years of intense mobilisation on behalf of the rights of immigrants and their families, during which the meaning of French national identity and the status of citizens with roots in former colonial territories were placed under scrutiny (de Laforcade 2006: 221). As Sayad (1979) explains, children born in France to immigrant parents were trapped in an ambivalent status, between 'ethnicised' foreigners and 'non-ethnicised' nationals. It was impossible to shake the label of 'children of immigrant' or 'second-generation', especially if the racialisation of their identity marked them physically and socially as 'outsiders' (de Laforcade 2006: 223). Young French-born citizens with North African ancestry began to organise around their ethnic identity and arranged a series of high profile anti-racist marches in 1983, 1984 and 1985 (the famous '*marches des beurs*'). As Bleich (2004: 174) explains, it appeared as if the pendulum had swung towards an 'American' model of ethnic identification and 'race'-or-ethnicity-conscious identity politics. New youth mobilisations against racism followed: in 1984 *S.O.S. Racisme* and in 1985 *France Plus*. The former defended the 'right to difference' and introduced themes of multiculturalism to the political mainstream. Yet the multiculturalist Left who popularised the concept of '*Blacks, Blancs, Beurs*' ('Blacks, whites and Arabs') were criticised by some for being apolitical, largely because they enlisted the support of a wide range of minorities as well as members of the political mainstream: 'in doing so, it showed itself to be an anti-racist movement operating in a […] 'race'-neutral paradigm' (ibid.: 174). Indeed, Malek Boutih, the president of *S.O.S. Racisme* (1999–2003), revealed his group's conservative stance when he used the term 'barbarians' to describe rioting youth and also offered strong opposition to the suggestion of affirmative action (Blandin 2009). The latter group, *France Plus*, defended the assimilationist model of French republicanism while lobbying for greater French-Maghrebi representation in major political parties (de Laforcade 2006: 223).

In the face of widespread xenophobia centring upon the immigrant/*banlieues* linkage and the rise of the *Front Nationale* during the 1980s, the Socialist Party officially renounced multiculturalism as a political strategy, preferring traditional Republican 'blindness' to differences of ethnicity or 'race' over strategies of political recognition (see also Bleich 2004). Indeed, the discursive restrictions placed upon the cultural and ethnic claims of minorities have arguably become tighter still since the

1980s. This orthodoxy is defended by the French against the 'multicultural' model associated with the United States or Great Britain, where particularistic identities are preserved and where separate communities are understood to comprise a multicultural nation state. As such, France sought to replace debates around racism with concern over *integration*. Blame for recurring urban disturbances and racist attacks was directed at immigrants and their concentration in *banlieues* was simply seen as evidence of their reluctance or inability to assimilate (de Laforcade 2006: 222). Incessant debates about nationality concentrated on the 'original sin' of Maghrebi youths and accentuated the burden of proof placed on them to attain full equality in the republic (ibid.). Since the late 1980s 'multiculturalism' and related terms such as 'difference' or 'ethnic minority' have been interpreted as signalling the breakdown of French society into entrenched ethnic and/or racial segregation. The French republican model assumes integration as a process by which individuals subordinate their particularistic origins and accept membership in a nation state defined by shared reference to universalistic values.

Some in government were willing to take the problems of the *banlieues* seriously. Dikeç (2007: 48–56) explains how policy responded to France's pressing 'urban question' by eschewing the advice of state technocrats who had for so long dominated the field and instead began listening to communities, social movements and people 'working on the ground'. There was an acknowledgement that immigrants and their descendents represented 'particularly disadvantaged' sections of the population. It was proposed also that the centre and periphery of the city be considered together, as part of the same problem. It was even proclaimed that the *grands ensembles* were not ghettoes but *bona fide* neighbourhoods of the city. The Dubedout Report of 1983 was also critical of the 'ghetto images' diffused by media, especially when covering riots, immigration or social problems. Overall, the conviction was that France's crisis was not merely economic; it was also important to recognise the plight of minorities living in degraded social housing. However, during the late 1980s and 1990s impetus was lost, first in relation to rising anti-immigrant sentiment and second because urban policy became more concerned with financing renovation projects and the policing of *banlieues* to prevent further revolts (Dikeç 2007: 66).

Crisis, Culture and the Re-centring of the City

This section focuses on New York, although it also has relevance for London and Paris. It begins detailing the twist of fate which saw a

resurgence of the white city fantasy and once again demonstrated how capital, when it chooses, is the dominant force in how the city is conceived. The 'fight back' begins here. The fiscal crisis of the 1970s was critical to how New York's inner-city neighbourhoods and housing projects (not necessarily mutually exclusive) gained a reputation for lawlessness (see Tabb 1984), yet it is also important to understand how the appropriation of urban culture emerging from the ruins of the crisis unwittingly helped provide a 'magical solution' for the city's survival.

David Harvey's (2005) analysis of New York's fiscal crisis provides the framework for this analysis, a solid base from which to diverge. Capitalist restructuring and deindustrialisation eroded the economic base of New York, and suburbanisation had left much of the inner city impoverished. One of the most spectacular consequences of this shift was the social unrest that first occurred during the 1960s (ibid.: 45). Exposure to police brutality and poverty, plus impatience over progress in civil rights and opposition to the Vietnam War, converged to form an explosive mix of discontent (Abu-Lughod 2007: 23). New York was one of the first cities to experience ghetto revolts in the 1960s, and the Harlem/Bedford-Stuyvesant riot of 1964 served as a precursor to revolts in many other cities throughout the US (ibid.: 24). The plight of the predominantly African American inner cities was temporarily eased by the expansion of public employment and welfare provision (Harvey 2005: 45). Yet, when President Nixon withdrew federal aid, jobs once again disappeared and more people were forced to claim welfare, the gap between revenues and outlays in the New York City budget increased. Initially financial institutions were prepared to bridge the gap, but by 1975 a powerful cabal of investment bankers refused to roll over the debt and pushed the city into technical bankruptcy (ibid.). The 'bail-out' eventually agreed between the city and the banks amounted for Harvey (ibid.) 'to a coup by the financial institutions against the democratically elected government of New York City […]'. With the city on its knees, the banks created new institutions, such as the Financial Control Board, to assume control of the city budget. Bondholders were paid off first, and whatever was left paid for essential public services. Municipal unions were required to invest their pension funds in city bonds, which meant that workers became tied to the fortunes of the city – unions either moderated their demands or faced the prospect of losing their pension funds through city bankruptcy. As Harvey (ibid.) explains, 'the effect was to curb the aspirations of the city's powerful municipal unions, to implement wage freezes and cutbacks in public

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employment and social provision (education, public health, transport services) […]'. This 'fiscal compromise' amounted to a regressive redistribution of income, wealth and power (Zevin 1977). New York was 'saved' by satisfying the investment bankers and diminishing the standard of living of most New Yorkers (Harvey 2005: 46).

Similar processes were also occurring in London and Paris. The 1986 'big bang', which deregulated London's financial markets, catapulted the city into one of the world's foremost global financial centres. As Hall (1999: 903) explains,

> The new City, the City of hysterical men in coloured blazers on the trading floors, the City of Essex men and women who had made themselves millionaires in their twenties, was the core of the new service economy, the symbol of the enterprise culture that [Thatcher] was injecting into Britain.

This coincided with iconic developments such as the London's Docklands (see Foster 1997; Hall 1999). Similarly, the early 1980s saw the expansion of the purpose-built *La Défense* financial centre in West Paris. These iconic developments helped signal that the centre of the city had been 'reclaimed', or in Paris's case re-fortified.

The investment bankers who issued the bonds did not walk away from New York City. Rather, they seized the opportunity to restructure the metropolis in ways that suited their own agenda. Of most importance was the creation of a 'good business climate', which involved using public resources to provide subsidies and tax incentives for enterprise. In addition, the city's elite institutions were mobilised to sell the image of the city as a cultural centre and a tourist destination, even inventing the now famous brand/logo: 'I Heart NY.' An important part of the re-centring of the city involved the opening up of the cultural field to all manner of diverse cosmopolitan currents: 'The narcissistic exploration of self, sexuality, and identity became the leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture' (ibid.: 47).

Even New York subway graffiti was incorporated within the hegemony of resurgence. Graffiti, once seen as a visible symptom of New York's terminal decline, lost its vitality and subcultural meaning as 'pieces' by approved writers began to go on sale in Manhattan galleries, where they were devoured by city cognoscenti as examples of a wild 'folk art', as evidence of the city's vibrant street cultures (Cresswell 1996; Austin 2001). The irony was that graffiti writers from the forgotten corners of Brooklyn, the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island had always

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seen 'themselves as embodying an (illegal) urban beautification and education programme for a fading city bent on denying its own magnificent cultural dynamics and destroying its own "local colour", both figuratively and literally' (Austin 2001: 4). Corporate marketers even copied the style of graffiti and the wider hip-hop subculture in their own campaigns to offer a simulacrum of 'authentic NYC', what Alvelos (2004) calls the creation of a city of semiotic confusion. Harvey's interpretation is that post-crisis restructuring amounted to the neoliberalisation of culture, the moment when 'Delirious New York' (to use Rem Koolhaas's phrase) erased all memory of *democratic* New York (Harvey 2005: 47), a feature emblematic of the more general shift towards entrepreneurialism in urban governance (see Harvey 2001).

Whilst some benefited enormously from the restructuring that arose from the ruins of crisis, and visible signs of 'recovery', such as the gentrification, were celebrated, working-class and ethnic-immigrant New York 'was thrust back into the shadows, to be ravaged by racism and a crack cocaine epidemic' (ibid.: 47–8). For example, John Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells (1991: 3) explain how

> New York contestably remains a capital for capital, resplendent with luxury consumption and high society [...] But New York also symbolises urban decay, the scourges of crack, AIDS and homelessness and the rise of a new underclass. Wall Street may make New York one of the nerve centres of the global capitalist system, but this dominant position has a dark side in the ghettos and barrios where growing populations of poor people live.

As Harvey explains (ibid.: 48), New York Mayor Rudolf Giuliani claimed worldwide fame by taking revenge on behalf of an increasingly affluent Manhattan that was becoming increasingly intolerant of the effects of such devastation on its doorstep. As Neil Smith (1998: 1) claims, Giuliani led a vendetta against the most oppressed groups in the city, those who had benefited, or would stand to benefit, from liberal urban policy – the 'welfare mothers', immigrants and gays, blacks, homeless and so on. For Smith 'they are excoriated for having stolen New York from a white middle class that sees the city as its birth right' (ibid.).

In addition to, and perhaps because of, the sense of resentment felt by many residents of the multicultural *agonopolis*, there were many examples of cultural hybridity and conviviality composed from the meeting and mixing of diverse cultures in the city. This 'mood' resulted in cultural practices that reconfigured the 'racial' stigma of the inner

city. For example Paul Gilroy (1987) explains how the loose, pluralistic and diverse affiliation between London's reggae sound system scene and an emerging London hip-hop scene (which originated in the Bronx) articulated the new sense/s of belonging forged by second-generation blacks (and whites) in the inner city. A new voice was found as London's reggae DJs and toasters fell under the influence of rap and their rhymes began to reflect the post-1981 situation (ibid.: 259). Indeed, 1981 prompted a host of recordings that marked the beginning of a new style of reggae immediately definable as a British, or even a *London*, product. One characteristic of the London sound was how toasters switched between different speech idioms. For instance, the reggae DJ 'Culture Smiley' (later renamed Smiley Culture) based in Deptford, South London had a hit in 1984 with a song called 'Cockney Translation', which juxtaposed cockney rhyming slang (the argot of the white working class) with London's black patois. For Gilroy both languages connoted supposedly fixed positions of class and 'race'. The crucial aspect for Gilroy was

> [h]ow London's urban blacks were constantly in motion between the identities these languages symbolize and consolidate. The implicit joke beneath the surface of the record was that though many of London's working class blacks were cockney by birth and experience [...] their 'race' denied them access to the social category established by the language real (i.e., white) cockneys spoke. (Gilroy 1987: 262)

'Cockney Translation' initiated a new response to the contradictions of being British and black, political categories usually presented as mutually exclusive (ibid.). The song articulates an 'oppositional core' of a black culture no longer based in a defensive rejection of Englishness – a reaction – but in a redefinition of black and white urban cultures as mutually intelligible. The two languages are presented as equivalents 'facing each other across the desperate terrain of the inner city' (ibid.: 262), thereby disrupting the racial hierarchy in which they are usually arranged and redefined as a class culture (Gilroy 1993: 34) capable of providing a significant opposition to common-sense racism (ibid.: 35). Interestingly, Gilroy refutes the notion that such expressive cultures may be postmodern, displaying depthlessness, a weakening of historicity or the waning of affect (ibid.: 42). Rather, he suggests that these cultural forms represent complete 'hermeneutical gestures' that use 'the new technological means at their disposal not to flee from depth but to revel in it, not to abjure public history but to proclaim it!' (ibid.)

The collisions between white and black working-class cultures in the metropolis were often more prosaic, revealing evidence of what Les Back (1996) calls the 'metropolitan paradox' whereby the places where racism are most rife tend also to be the places where the mixing between 'racial' and ethnic groups is most pronounced. Back (ibid.) conducted ethnographic research in two council estates in South London – one predominantly white and the other ethnically diverse. In the first community the dominant 'semantic system' (or way of talking about 'race') centred on how white people on the estate felt they were being 'forced out' by an influx of racial and ethnic minority groups. In the second community, the dominant semantic system expressed a harmonious, inclusive sense of place. Racism was acknowledged to exist but viewed as absent and/or irrelevant to life on *their* estate. Back also found evidence of hybrid ethnicities that involved white youths expressing a desire to be black. Their understanding of 'being black' did not refer to skin colour but rather to the seductive potential of the black youth cultures and styles (e.g., hip-hop) they identified with: '[t]hese mixed cultural forms offer young whites a sense of "difference" that provides an alternative to the public meanings associated with whiteness and Englishness' (Back 1996: 249). As Solomos and Back (1996: 137) summarize, 'new ethnicities not only challenge what it means to be black [and white] but they also call into question the dominant coding of what it means to be British'. New ethnicities weaken racial divisions and recognise that everyone speaks from a particular place, from a particular history and experience – that everyone is ethnically located but not contained by their ethnicity (Baker et al. 1996, cited in Davis 2004: 183). Urban life – based upon use rather than exchange value, and more importantly the co-presence of strangers at the centre of the metropolis – facilitates the formation of expressive or syncretic cultures, which paradoxically and historically have helped provide solutions for periodic economic crises of the city. When all else fails, the city sells itself.

The urban narrative of the 1970s and 1980s metropolis is dominated by the symbolic weight of the distressed, black inner city. It was in this period that 'race', the 'inner city' and criminality became entwined in meaning. Yet, whilst the dominant discourse suggested that the inner city constituted a problem, and moreover a 'racial' problem, there was a great deal of cultural and political creativity emerging from the antagonisms and conflicts that were fought during this period, many of which mobilised, or rather articulated, a black or minority urban experience. Although the urban infrastructure was crumbling, minority groups and the poor occupied and defended their right to the city. A casual

admission in Lord Rogers's Urban Task Force report (which outlined a policy agenda for British cities in the mid-1990s) that '*we* lost ownership of our towns and cities' (1999, cited in Lees 2003: 64–5, original emphasis) reveals just how the establishment viewed a period in which its white city fantasy suffered its strongest challenge yet.

Multiculturalism: Things of Logic

As Peter Caws (1994, cited in Goldberg 1994: 1) emphasises, multiculturalism stands for a wide range of social articulations, ideas and practices that the '*-ism*' reduces to a formal singularity. The complex bundle of practices and knowledge that comprise multiculturalism contributed to the production of the *agonopolis* as a contested, politically charged space; multiculturalism offered, and continues to offer, a valuable defence of the presence of racial or ethnic minorities in the Western metropolis. Yet it is suggested here that a greater understanding of the urban would have helped reunite multiculturalism with its lost object – *the city*. In the process, many of the more intractable philosophical problems posited by multiculturalism might have been avoided. Multiculturalism emerged from the realisation that the melting pot *doesn't melt* and that ethnic and racial divisions get reproduced from generation to generation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 158). Multiculturalism antagonistically constructs society both as a homogeneous majority and as a series of smaller unmeltable minorities with their own essentially different communities and cultures that deserve to be understood, tolerated and left alone (ibid.). As Rose (2000: 95) argues, such visions are inevitably 'quickened by a sense of crisis, of the nefarious activities and mobile associations with urbanised territories that elude knowledge and escape regulation'. The multicultural discourse in all its varieties is viewed here as a 'representation of space' (Lefebvre 1991) that seeks to impose a sense of clarity (and in some cases order) upon a dislocated yet raucous urban landscape. As Phil Cohen argues, multiculturalism is an attempt to imagine the city as a rational, ordered and visible *whole*, yet 'this imagination is, of course, haunted by the fear that the elements will prove too combustible to be contained […] that the melting pot will become a boiling cauldron' (Cohen 2000: 319).

Multiculturalism is conceived differently in different national contexts. The French, for example, reject the promises of multiculturalism. In the US, McLaren (1994: 53) outlines the differences between conservative multiculturalism (for example, Schlesinger 1992), liberal multiculturalism and left-liberal multiculturalism (Scott 1992) before

advancing his own radical notion of a 'critical and resistance multiculturalism'. In the UK, whilst multiculturalism achieved some degree of establishment in the political order, it is contested not only by the conservative right, in defence of the purity and cultural integrity of the nation, but also by liberals who claim that the 'cult of ethnicity' and the privileging of difference threaten the universalism of the liberal state, which is premised upon personal autonomy, individual liberty and formal equality. Multiculturalism is a threat because it potentially legitimates 'group rights' (Hall, S. 2002a: 211). During the 1980s, radical politics in the UK saw a polarisation of two fundamentally opposed movements – multiculturalism and anti-racism (Rattansi 1992: 24); both are briefly outlined below.

Multiculturalism is/was a broadly liberal programme, whilst the radical left claimed the position of anti-racism. Multiculturalism argues that the most pressing issue is how to create tolerance for mainly black minorities and their cultures in a white nation. Intolerance is viewed fundamentally as a matter of attitude. In other words, it is prejudice or ignorance that prevents us from living together happily. The overarching aim of multiculturalism is to create a harmonious and democratic cultural pluralism. Parekh (2006) defends the virtues of multicultural society. He argues that single cultures become richer when they enjoy access to others; they may still be judged against one another, because this is part of the process of enrichment, yet no culture should be rendered wholly worthless and all cultures deserve respect. The key aspect is that,

> [S]ince every culture is inherently limited, a dialogue between them is mutually beneficial [and] possible only if each culture accepts others as equal conversational partners, who need to be taken seriously as sources of new ideas and to whom it owes the duty of explaining itself. (ibid.: 338)

However, dialogue between cultures only realises its objectives if 'participants enjoy a broad equality of self-confidence, economic and political power and access to public space' (ibid.). Parekh argues that the relative social stability and cultural richness of most Western societies is a result of the fact that they are not based on a single political doctrine or world view. The difference that is respected in multiculturalist societies gives way also to a broader culture, a sense of both difference and similarity. Belonging is therefore a two-way process – immigrants cannot belong to a society unless it is prepared to welcome them, and the

society cannot make them part of it unless they want to belong (Parekh 2008: 87). Multiculturalism represents the fairest way of thinking and acting upon the *fact* of multicultural societies. Such a perspective is positive about the benefits of cultural diversity for all cultures in society and places an emphasis on enrichment, learning, growth and reflection.

Tariq Modood's (2007) understanding of multiculturalism is based more upon a politics of recognition, in particular the attributing of *negative difference* to 'racial' or ethnic minorities within predominantly white societies (ibid.: 37). For Modood (ibid.: 6), difference in Western societies is typically marked by racist ideologies that portray the places that immigrant groups originate as historically inferior to the countries in which they have settled. For Modood (ibid.: 38–9), the fractious co-presences that are characteristic of Western cities often have historical roots in relationships of domination–subordination that owe their existence to previous colonial empires. As such, post-immigrant groups are usually marked as second-class citizens. Compounding this identity enforced from the outside, yet no less important, are the senses of identity that groups perceived in negative terms have of themselves. The sense of the collective that is produced in relation to a position of subordination forms the basis for political action.

Multiculturalism, therefore, represents not an ideal state but an arena of struggle in which difference is not washed away or melted down but recognised and transformed into *positive difference*. An example of this kind of mobilisation is how African Americans, by self-identifying as 'black', turned a derogatory term into a social movement, at the same time reclaiming their heritage and creating a political category. Here the black movement redefined the meaning of racial identity and consequently of 'race' itself in American society (Omi and Winant 1994: 99; see pp. 95–112 for a full account). In this way subordinate groups do not only take charge of their positive self-definition but also get to define the ways in which they have been inferiorised, and through which mode/s of oppression: 'the group speaks for itself, not just in terms of its positivity but also about its pain' (Modood 2007: 41). Multiculturalism is characterised here by the challenging, dismantling and remaking of public identities; multiculturalism should not be subservient to a broader national or societal culture.

Anti-racists argue that multiculturalism is too concerned with culture, which inevitably leads to a skin-deep celebration of diversity – what they famously call the 'saris, samosas and steel-bands syndrome' (Donald and Rattansi 1992: 2). The argument is that, by focusing only on culture, multiculturalism fails to address hierarchies of power existing among

the different centres of cultural authority (ibid.). As Bannerji (2000: 147) argues in response to Charles Taylor's (1994) clarion call for a 'politics of recognition' based upon affirmation of ethnic particularity: '[i]t is not a plea for recognition that "they" put forward, but rather a struggle to end exploitation and injustice'. For anti-racists it is not individual beliefs and prejudices about 'race' that are the main problem, but structures of power and the institutions and social practices that produce 'racial' oppression and discriminatory outcomes (ibid.: 3). It is discrimination in fields such as education, employment and housing that is the basis of inequality. For anti-racists, racism or xenophobia is rooted in broader economic, political and social structures; it is an expression and concealment of wider contradictions. Sivanandan, a key figure on the anti-racist left, argues that multiculturalism in its celebration of difference is responsible for blunting the 'race' and class struggle. Multiculturalism's exaggerated focus on ethnicity, identity and cultural heritage encourages minorities not only to divide along class lines but also to fight among themselves for local resources:

> Ethnicity was a tool to blunt the edge of black struggle, return 'black' to its constituent parts of Afro-Caribbean, Asian, African, Irish – and also, at the same time, allow the nascent black bourgeoisie, petit-bourgeoisie really, to move up in the system. Ethnicity de-linked black struggle – separating the West Indian from the Asian, the working class black from the middle class black. (Sivanandan 1983: 4)

The problem is that multiculturalism personalises racism by suggesting efforts should be directed at changing the attitudes of individuals or groups. As Bonnett (2010: 8) suggests, for the anti-racist left racialised minorities, and in particular young black men, became a repository of revolutionary hope; they were viewed as the new, energetic agents of both race and class resistance. This belief, whether justified or not, contributes to how the *agonopolis* is looked back on, perhaps even reminisced about, today.

Perhaps no-one has done more in terms of projecting a philosophical vision of multiculturalism onto the city than Iris Marion Young, who develops an ideal of *city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference* (Young 1990: 226). For Young it is only the urban that can allow multiculturalism to flourish; cities encourage recognition, respect and cultural enrichment. Whilst Young remains an idealist, she does state that 'radical politics must begin from historical givens and conceive [...] change not as the negation of the given but rather as making

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something good from many elements of the given' (2002: 436). The basis or starting point for multiculturalism must come, therefore, from the imperfect *agonopolis*. The city is a site of social, spatial and aesthetic inexhaustibility where, simply as a matter of course, we experience the pleasures, rather than anxieties, of the unfamiliar. The virtues that Young associates with city life are based upon the tantalising glimpses that emerge even within the most troubled *agonopolis*. The first virtue is 'social differentiation without exclusion' (ibid.: 238). Here, the city provides privacy and space for social group differences (whether concerned with 'race', ethnicity, politics or sexuality) to flourish without being ascribed negative characteristics:

> In the good city one crosses from one distinct neighbourhood to another without knowing precisely where one ended and the other began. In the normative ideal of the city, borders are open and undecidable. (Young 1990: 239)

The key point is that self-segregation is fine as long as borders remain permeable. The second virtue of city life is 'variety', and here Young draws upon Jane Jacobs (1961) *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. What attracts people to cities is the pleasure and excitement provided by the diversity of activities they support. This promise rests upon multifunctional spaces such as streets, parks and neighbourhoods that people want to occupy, participate in and look after. The third virtue is 'eroticism', and here she endorses the pleasures of being drawn out of one's routine to encounter the 'strange, novel or exciting' (Young 1990: 239). The ideal city is an erotic adventure because it holds the possibility that, through attraction and fascination for the other, we will lose our sense of self. Fourth and finally, cities provide 'publicity' in that they possess public spaces where people can interact or simply look at each other without having to come together in a 'community of "shared final ends"' (ibid.: 240). For Young, it is crucial that the diversity of the city is not managed or cajoled into a governmental project.

Young (1990: 227) identifies three barriers to the realisation of her urban ideal. First is the centralised corporate and bureaucratic domination of cities, the re-centring of the city and its loss of urbanity. Second is the decision-making structure in municipalities and their hidden mechanisms of redistribution – the kind of issues that the anti-racists point to. Third is segregation and exclusion, both within cities and between cities and suburbs. This aspect points to the historical development and fragmentation of cities (see Chapter 3). Together these barriers reduce the

vitality of cities through the separating of functions, thereby rendering contemporary city life more alienating, lonely and oppressive than it need be. Rather, cities can and should weave activities, interests, actions and actors together in such a way that 'the bigger picture' becomes apparent and accessible to all (ibid.: 245), or, in Lefebvre's (1996) terms, residents become reacquainted with the *oeuvre*. Young's city would be simultaneously whole and differentiated; fleeting moments in the life of the great metropolises tell us that this potential *can* be realised. Crucially, Iris Marion Young defends and advances a notion of multicultural urbanism; she views the city as integral to the realisation of multicultural politics. In doing this she integrates political philosophy and a radical imagination into *spatial practice*. When theory is exhausted, the urban – a 'thing' with its own logic – takes over.

Conclusion

The *agonopolis* endured only for a long decade. This contested, politicised and racialised city emerged out of the fragmented and centrifugal space of the post-war, in which the white middle classes had fled to the suburbs, leaving the heart of the city in the hands of the poor and minority 'racial' and ethnic groups. Arguably, the 1970s and early 1980s resembled a transitional phase, and its notorious yet convivial 'inner city' was the expression of a fractured, contradictory, *fraudulent* space where everything was not as it seemed; it was but a brief spatio-temporal disjuncture – the moment before order was restored, margins were widened and the white city fantasy revived. In France, of course, things were the other way around, yet exactly as the state planned and as they remain to this day. Yet what was common in London, New York and Paris was a sense of crisis, which, although it had its roots in economics, was largely articulated in 'racial' and cultural terms. In response came a defence of the multicultural city in the non-urbanised form of multicultural*ism*, a liberal political philosophy that eventually became a practical strategy for managing diverse cities and societies. While debates around recognition and identity preoccupied the left, sometimes unnecessarily so (see Hobsbawm 1996), elites and financial institutions were busy reclaiming and remaking the city in *their* own image, even adopting aspects of tolerant multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism as their own. One thing was clear – they would never surrender the centre of the city so easily again. By the 1990s London, New York and Paris were confident and denationalised 'global cities' – the command centres of the new globalised economy.

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Part II
Empty Prosperity

What then is excluded is not simply a category of persons and the sentiments and capacities these categories point to, but important knowledge about what city life could be. (Simone 2009: 827)

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5
Cosmopolis? Ain't No Love in the Heart of the City

> Two or three years ago I saw the headline, 'The Bowery Lives Again', and I knew at once my favourite Bowery life sign, the punk rock club CBGB, was doomed. CBGB's was one of New York's freest voices in the city's most desperate days. […] It had come proudly through the crash; but could it survive the boom? (Berman 2007: 36)

Introduction

London and New York (and to a lesser extent Paris) have undergone radical economic, social and political restructuring since the 1980s (see Castells 1991; Fainstein et al. 1992; 2003; Sassen 2001; 2006). During this period London and New York emerged from their respective crises (see Tabb 1984; Thornley 1992) as strident global cities, successfully reversing the trends of population and employment loss that had predicated their respective declines in the 1970s (Fainstein and Harloe 2003: 157). Yet these cities are also undergoing centrifugal transformations that up until now have passed relatively without comment. In many senses they are emulating what Paris accomplished in the 1960s. Whilst it is too dramatic to say that we are the metropolis turning 'inside out', it is possible to identify a recent trend of dispersal linked to the restitution of centrality that occurred during the second half of the 1980s. The old urban centres have decomposed and been replaced by centres of decision-making (Lefebvre 1996: 81). City centres have also become sites of privilege premised on the 'make-believe of the joy of living' and the ideology of consumption as happiness (ibid.: 84). Remade centres concentrate the means of power, repression and persuasion, conditions that come together 'for a refined exploitation of

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people as producers, consumers of products, consumers of space' (ibid.: 85). Global elites and the middle classes have apparently rediscovered city living, and the predominantly, but not exclusively, white middle classes have 'remade the inner city' in their own image (see Butler with Robson 2003). This has contributed to the growing inhospitality of the city for minority 'racial' and ethnic groups, the poor and homeless, with the consequence of gradually pushing the urban life of cities in fragments to the periphery. Yet, perhaps in order to compensate for the demise of the urban, notions such as cosmopolitanism and cosmopolis have gained favour within both the academy and city governments and political 'think tanks'. These ideas imagine a metropolis that is now post-'race', a city beyond conflict where difference exists to be enjoyed; they reflect 'a privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures' (Zizek 2006: 171).

In this chapter, the first of Part 2, the structural transformations associated with the rise of global cities are considered first. Following this, the notions of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolis are interrogated in both their philosophical form and their 'soft' application to the urban environment. The latter is especially important in bestowing upon the central city a 'global feel'. The main body of the chapter outlines three intertwined centrifugal spatial practices – dispersal, gentrification and securitisation – that may be viewed as 'product producers' (Lefebvre 1991: 36) of the radically re-centred global city. Individually and collectively, these exclusionary practices negate all possibilities that cosmopolis could be realised.

Dual Cities and Quartered Cities

The defining characteristic of a global city is the polarisation of occupational and wealth structures (Sassen 2001). This dynamic is the reason why many prefer to describe the global city as a 'dual city'. The polarisation that has occurred in the last thirty years has been caused by the expansion of highly paid professional jobs, such as accountants, lawyers and merchant bankers; and, conversely, low-paid service jobs such as cleaners, security guards and waiting staff. Immigrants, especially female, arrive from a wide range of less developed countries to fill low-wage positions and may even work informally or in unregulated sectors with almost no protection at all (see Kwong 1997; Sassen 2001; 2003; McDowell et al. 2009). The dual city thesis rests upon the idea that there exist in the metropolis two separate economies (formal

and informal) and increasingly segregated neighbourhoods and social systems (Fainstein and Harloe 2003: 161).

Mollenkopf and Castells (1991) chart the transformation of New York into a dualised global city. After the fiscal crisis of 1975, the city could no longer rely on an industrial base and transformed into a post-industrial financial and service-based economy, a shift that mirrored the globalisation of capital. Berman (2007: 17) contrasts two decisions from the late 1970s that indicate how New York changed in pace with global capitalism. First was the closure of the Brooklyn Naval Yard, the city's largest industrial facility, which employed 100,000 people at its peak, and the second was the reorganisation of investments around the enormous speculative real-estate enterprise of the World Trade Center. These changes were accompanied by a dramatic dissolution of New York's blue-collar working class, with immigrants providing the 'casual labour' needed to fill the few remaining manufacturing jobs. Although the city has become more ethnically diverse, it has become increasingly polarised and segregated, with the main contrast between a cohesive core of professionals in the advanced corporate services and a disorganised periphery fragmented by 'race', ethnicity and the spaces they occupy (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991: 402–03).

During the 1980s and 1990s London experienced the best and worst of times: 'inner London […] was simultaneously host to the richest area in the European Union whilst containing the nation's top three deprived boroughs' (Butler with Robson 2003: 13; see also Hall 1999: 888–89). In describing the redevelopment of London's Docklands, Hall (2002: 398) explains how between 1981 and 1990 Docklands lost just over 20,000 jobs but gained 41,000 new ones, around half transferred from the City and half genuinely new. Yet 'the lost jobs were very different from the new ones: port jobs disappeared, manufacturing stayed almost static, while the big gains were in advanced services, above all banking and finance […] and very few jobs […] went to local people' (ibid.). Hamnett (2003), however, offers a critique of Sassen's polarisation thesis and argues that there is no evidence of polarisation between low-skilled and high-skilled service jobs; rather, only the professional and managerial occupations have grown, resulting in an overall upgrading or professionalisation of London's workforce. Sassen's theory may apply to New York, but for Hamnett it is less applicable to London, where polarisation takes a different form, between the expanded middle class of professionals (see also Fainstein and Harloe 2003) and long-term unemployed, retirees and discouraged workers who exist effectively outside the labour force. For Hall (2009: 25), London is characterised, in apparent paradox,

by both high unemployment and high immigration. Although Sassen and Hamnett disagree over the exact form that social polarisation takes, their respective analyses concur that London and New York are subject to profound processes of widening income and wealth inequalities. As Fainstein and Harloe (2003: 163) conclude,

> We can identify [in both cities] a close link between economic change and intensified poverty and deprivation, alongside soaring incomes for limited sectors of the population and a more ambiguous combination of costs and benefits for many more.

The key to understanding the distinct spatiality of the global city is to recognise how urban space in such arenas has become increasingly *homogenised*, to the extent that London's traditional arrangement of polycentric 'villages' (see Gyford 1999) has been smoothed over and that gentrified or abandoned districts in London and New York are now almost transferable between cities; *fragmented*, in that space is increasingly split into smaller and smaller parcels to be bought and sold; and also *hierarchised*, in that global cities are home paradoxically to both the most prestigious and the most stigmatised addresses in the Western world. Often the value ascribed to places marks the relation of spaces to the centre, to sites of accumulated economic, symbolic and cultural capital (see Bourdieu 1999 on 'the profits of localization'). The city may appear highly diverse in terms of its cosmopolitan aesthetic, yet a closer inspection reveals 'the "residential" spaces of the elite, the bourgeoisie, and the middle classes are distinguished perfectly from those reserved for blue-collar and service workers' (Lefebvre 2003: 95).

Peter Marcuse (1989; 2003; see also Marcuse and Van Kempen 2000) has led the way in untangling the complex spatial dynamics of the dual city. In particular, he argues that the dual city has become increasingly zoned – or quartered. While the zoning of economic and industrial activity has long been a feature of the modern metropolis, residential zoning by class, 'race', ethnicity and lifestyle is more troubling (Marcuse 2003: 271). These zones are comprised, first, of insulated *luxury* residences for the extremely wealthy. In relation to inhabitants of such residences: 'if they reside in the city, it is a world insulated from contact with nonmembers of [their] class […] If the city no longer offers profit or pleasure, they can abandon it' (Marcuse 2003: 273). The second kind of residential quarter is the *gentrified* city inhabited by professionals, managers, academics and so on. For Marcuse, the frustrated 'pseudo-creativity' of these middle-class residents 'leads to a quest for

other satisfactions found in consumption, in specific forms of culture, in "urbanity" devoid of its historical content' (ibid.: 273). Gentrified zones of the city are often chosen for their historical resonance. As such they are often older middle-class areas of the city or historical working-class or immigrant districts. The third residential city identified by Marcuse is the *suburban* city occupied by better-paid blue and white-collar employees seeking 'stability, security and the comfortable world of consumption' (2003: 273).

The remaining two residential zones provide homes to more precarious populations of the metropolis. The *tenement* city refers to what remains of the old zones in transition and provides rented housing to low-paid workers or those with irregular employment, few benefits, little job security and no chance of advancement (ibid.: 274). These areas of the city are continuously under threat since they are often targeted for 'higher uses' such as urban renewal or gentrification. The final residential zone is the *abandoned* city of the very poor – the underclass in the US or the 'socially excluded' in the UK. The spatial concentration of the poor is reinforced by the ghettoisation of public housing and its increasing use as accommodation of 'last resort' (Marcuse 2003: 274). Many people from previous immigrant 'invasions' remain firmly in place in the public housing 'compounds' of deteriorating inner cities. Particularly useful in charting the *solidification* of non-gentrified inner cities or public housing projects is Wacquant's (1994) account of how communal ghettos of the 1960s have deteriorated to resemble 'hyper-ghettos' characterised by *advanced marginality*, a terminal predicament arising from economic insecurity, a disconnection from macroeconomic trends (i.e., no boom or bust, simply bust), territorial fixation, stigmatisation and social fragmentation (Wacquant 2008a). Critically, these are not areas that new immigrants move into. Even in areas of New York such as Harlem or the Bronx, where there remains an abundance of public housing, there are long waiting lists comprised exclusively of native-born citizens (Foner 2000: 51). Whilst this residential zone remains a significant presence, it is slowly shrinking as public housing is either sold to private or quasi-public owners (see Watt 2009a, b on housing stock transfers) or demolished for regeneration.

Cosmopolis: Everything is Fair when You're Living in the City

It seems strange that cosmopolitan political theory should rise to prominence at the same time as urban scholars are systematically destroying

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the notion that cities like London, New York and Paris are becoming more equitable and fairer places. Cosmopolitanism is primarily advanced in the post-9/11 political climate because it is perceived to offer a remedy for the perceived weaknesses 'of twenty-first century multiculturalism' (Sandercock 2006: 39), referring to how multiculturalism supposedly encourages undesirable forms of nationalist, ethnic and religious solidarity. Cosmopolis is used as a trope for bringing questions of a cosmopolitan political order to a lower, more manageable level of abstraction; as Isin (2002: 212) explains, the city has the advantage intellectually because it exists as both a virtual and an actual space. For Featherstone (2002:1), cities feature so much in cosmopolitan theory because they have long been the sites where people, commodities, ideas and cultures mix. In this section cosmopolitan theory will be analysed first before focusing on how 'soft' forms of cosmopolitanism has influenced the governance of global city spaces.

Contemporary thinking about the cosmopolitan derives mainly from the Kantian tradition, which extends a notion of *polis* (order or administration) across the globe (*cosmos*). For Kant, a peaceful cosmopolitan order rests upon individuals acting as world citizens in order to cancel out the egoistic ambitions of individual states. This has much appeal in a highly globalised world where national forms of citizenship have been undermined. Cosmopolitan democracy seeks instead to develop a planetary humanism. Appiah (2006: xiii) suggests that there are two strands that intertwine in the notion of cosmopolitanism. The first is the idea that we have obligations to others that stretch beyond 'kith or kind' or the formal ties of shared national citizenship. The second is that we take seriously the value of 'different people' and take an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. Held (1995) and Beck (1998) argue that only through the establishment of new democratic institutions and the nurturing of a global civic society can a world currently at the mercy of a foraging neoliberal market and unhinged national responses to 'permanent crises' be rescued. A cosmopolitan political community is based upon converging citizenships whereby individuals are connected into local, national, regional and global forms of governance. Cosmopolitanism understands that since the most serious global issues affect us all it is collective responses that are required. Ulrich Beck (2002: 27) even diagnoses a *cosmopolitical crisis* in which 'people all over the world are reflecting on a shared collective future, which contradicts a nation-based memory of the past.' For Beck, we are witnessing the disintegration of traditional solidarities and entering a global social milieu where there is no *other*. Perhaps this is why Stuart

Hall (2002: 27) understands cosmopolitanism as a decentred, anti-essentialist form of liberal universalism. As Calhoun (2002: 533) neatly surmises, cosmopolitanism forgoes modest forms of social solidarity and instead entails 'the allegiance of each to all at the scale of humanity'. To be a cosmopolitan is no longer simply to feel oneself a citizen *of the world* but also to be a citizen *for the world* (Archibugi 2000: 4).

So what is a cosmopolis? According to Dharwadker (2001: 5), 'the idea of the cosmopolis is older than the idea of nation.' The collapse of classical Greece entailed the small, enclosed world of the *polis* giving way to the expanded horizons of *cosmopolis*. The cosmopolite is also a figure of antiquity. Antiquity, a deracinated individual takes inspiration from the wandering stoics who, rather than belong to any place in particular, sought to be citizens of the world. In this sense the cosmopolite is a deracinated individual occupying a terrain that is at once both worldly and *placeless*. Cosmopolis is an *ideal* that the world becomes one's *polis* or that one's *polis* is constituted by the world.

In a series of influential articles and books, Leonie Sandercock formulates a contemporary vision of cosmopolis. Diverse cities are to be celebrated rather than feared, and so she asks 'how can "we" (all of us) in all our differences, be at home in the increasingly multicultural and multiethnic cities of the twenty-first century?' (Sandercock 2003: 37). For Sandercock our urban arenas resemble 'mongrel cities' where diversity and heterogeneity are now the norm. The right to the city, for Sandercock, is not material, but is primarily a right of *recognition* – on political, social and cultural levels. Sandercock (ibid.: 98) advocates 'a new imagination that conceives of the city as a space of travelling cultures and peoples with varying degrees [...] of attachment', a multicultural carnival where people 'immerse themselves in their own cultures whilst respecting those of their neighbours, collectively forging new hybrid identities and spaces' (ibid.: 208). This involves dissolving multiculturalism and identity politics. Preferable are dialogues 'on matters of common destiny, a recognition of intertwined fates' (Sandercock 1998: 125). A peaceful coexistence can only be achieved by embracing the democracy that arises from the 'vibrant clash between empowered publics' (ibid.: 86). The main obstacle to cosmopolis for Sandercock is those sections of the working class who fear change and who especially fear the *other*. This often results in violence against 'those who are different, not seen as belonging, "not my people"' (ibid.: 4).

Engin Isin (2002) has also been influential in terms of linking cosmopolitan social theory with the urban, focusing in particular on how the cosmopolis is an arena where new forms of citizenship are created.

Modern cities are the realm of the homeless, gays and immigrants, each 'categories of alterity' who disturb established histories of citizenship. Yet the ability of marginalised social groups to articulate a language of citizenship and claim rights comes up against a professional, 'organising' discourse that constitutes them as objects of nuisance or dirt to be 'cleansed' from the *polis*. Drawing upon Holston's (1995) work on the spaces of 'insurgent citizenship', Isin views the cosmopolis as a political space where altern social groups, empowered simply by their *presence* in the city, are able to negotiate, nay *demand*, citizenship rights: 'in their everyday struggles, every marginalized, stigmatised, and dominated social group is invited, interpellated, incited and cajoled into [constituting] themselves as active citizens under terms and conditions they may not have articulated' (Isin 2002: 272). Isin clearly believes in the urban as an emancipatory form of dwelling and sociality, but this belief is, of course, contingent upon a city that is accessible to all, an open forum where their presence may be felt.

Whilst cosmopolis remains a utopia for many, broad notions of the 'cosmopolitan' have been used, often in an insouciant manner, to introduce intellectual order, political accountability and market competitiveness into the dynamic spaces of global cities (see, for example, Florida 2003; 2005). In Binnie et al.'s (2006) terms, cosmopolis serves as an 'operationalising notion' in contemporary forms of urban governance. Governments are increasingly convinced that cultural diversity is the ingredient that makes our cities vibrant and attractive. Demos, an influential centre-left policy think tank in the UK, states that 'diversity is vital because it is through combining and colliding new and old that innovation and adaptation occurs. The more open a city is to new people, new ideas and new ways of living, the greater its creative metabolism will be' (Demos 2003, cited in Binnie et al. 2006). A 'cosmopolitan veneer' is essential to the promotion of city spaces as attractive places to invest, work, live and enjoy leisure time.

The desire to promote cities as cosmopolitan has resulted in an aesthetic of 'openness' and cultural mixing that consists more of signs promoting cultural dialogue than policies designed to remove the actual barriers to integration and participation in public life. For Calhoun (2002) this attenuated cosmopolitanism remains a superficial model of citizenship, one that is just as likely to exclude as to include. Haylett (2006: 198), for example, argues that cosmopolitanism reinforces the shame and inadequacies of the working class who are unable to access the resources required to become cosmopolitan. In a particularly pithy passage, Calhoun (2002: 98) argues that participation in a cosmopolitan

civil society appears to require 'too much travel, too many dinners out at ethnic restaurants, too much volunteering with *Médicins sans frontières*'. In reality, commercial capitalism and political liberalism tend to tame diversity. He argues: 'the difference between a willingness to enter situations truly without parallel and a willingness to experience diversity as packaged for consumer tastes is noteworthy. There is a tendency [in the city] for a soft cosmopolitanism to emerge' (Calhoun 2002: 104). Román-Velázquez (2009: 113–15), for example, explains how the future of Latin American-owned retail activity in the previously neglected Elephant and Castle Shopping Centre in London has been jeopardised by plans to demolish the centre and provide an upscale retail space with green recreational areas for families. It is unlikely that the homely and functional Latin American enterprises of the original centre will be invited to take up units in the new development (or whether they could afford them), yet one can predict the chain coffee shops and restaurants, each displaying signs of 'banal globalism' (Szerszynski and Urry 2002), that will be present. Dávila (2004) offers a similar examination of the effects of gentrification in Manhattan's Spanish Harlem. Cosmopolitanism can too easily become a project attuned to the class ethos of elite groups, adopted by and supportive of neoliberal, homogenising visions of global capitalism. Perhaps, as Harvey (2000: 559) argues, pleas for new forms of cosmopolitan democracy have as much to do with making the world safe for capitalism and market freedoms as they have to do with any other conception of the good life. The notion of cosmopolis presents a simulacrum of a post-class, post-'race' city 'at ease with itself – post-conflictual, socially integrated and harmonious' (Coleman 2004: 233).

That city government's attempt to *possess* or *harness* the diversity and vitality of their vibrant multicultural streets in order to gain competitive market advantage presents a dilemma. For Richard Sennett (2002), the city is the site where the dialectic between alterity and bureaucratic rationalisation is played out. Our experience of diversity takes place in cities geared towards 'an ever-greater bureaucratic rigidification and solidification of capitalist enterprise' (ibid.: 42). The city 'crowd' is increasingly managed on a principle of *non*-interaction: '[c]rowds become mono-functional, levels of violence go down, non-interaction becomes a guarantor of public order; so the way to manage the constant churning over of populations is to have less contact' (ibid.: 47). There is a separation of consumers and non-consumers, professionals and the unemployed. The city becomes more segregated along class, 'race' and ethnic divisions. This results in a 'separation of the virtuous and vicious [into] a clear spatialization of danger into safe zones and risk zones'

(Rose 2000: 102). Attempts to possess and promote diversity are vulnerable to an anti-cosmopolitan realpolitik that narrows rather than expands the social field (Bridge 2006).

A City Sickness

> Outside colonizes inside; unable to afford spiralling rents, the inner are turned out, homeless onto the street [...] As the social margins are (re)colonized or cut loose, the peripheral is symbolically wiped away. (Goldberg 1993: 189)

Three broadly conceived exclusionary spatial practices are compromising the realisation of cosmopolis in global cities such as London, New York and Paris. These are *dispersal*, *gentrification* and *securitisation*. The crux is that the central city is becoming less inhabitable for immigrants, black and minority ethnic groups and the poor. Each exclusionary practice can be seen as both a consequence of and a contributor to the recentring of the city that began in the late 1980s and has ramped up considerably post-2000. Critically, these practices not only limit the social field in the centre of cities but also transform the ethnoscapes of the urban periphery (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). The analysis that follows draws some strength from Beck (2002), who argues that nationalism, liberalised markets and 'democratic authoritarianism' pose considerable obstacles to the realisation of planetary humanism; they are in fact the 'enemies' of cosmopolitan society. While the first two enemies are fairly self-explanatory, the latter refers to how neoliberal states compensate for their loss of democratic power by increasingly resorting to authoritarian means (Beck 2002: 41). Nationalism, liberalised markets and democratic authoritarianism occupy a conspicuous role in the three exclusionary practices outlined below.

Dispersal

The treatment of asylum seekers and refugees became a major political issue during the 1990s. Bauman (2007: 43) explains how 'asylum-seekers have replaced the evil-eyed witches [...], the malignant spooks and hobgoblins of former urban legends'. McGhee (2005) even coins a new term – 'asylophobia' – to account for populist fears. European states have introduced mechanisms designed to deter asylum seekers from gaining entry, and, if they do make it, to prevent them from clustering in capital cities. For Schuster (2004), the primary mechanisms of exclusion are dispersal, detention and deportation. Each has formed an

occasional part of European migration regimes throughout the twentieth century in response to particular crises, yet 'by the end of the twentieth century [...] deportation, detention and most recently dispersal became "normalised", "essential" instruments in the ongoing attempt to control or manage immigration in European states' (ibid.: 1).

The dispersal of asylum seekers from metropolitan centres is justified by reference to the idea of 'burden sharing' (Robinson 2003: 23). This rests upon two premises. First, since the arrival of refugees is a national problem, no locality should be expected to bear a disproportionate share of the 'costs'. Here lies the assumption that concentrations of asylum seekers create a social burden that cannot be compensated through monetary flows alone. This burden could include housing shortages and pressures on local schools and health services (Boswell 2001: 3). The second justification is for the right of the 'indigenous' population to live in communities where their identity is not challenged. Asylum seekers are understood to generate community tension and even racist violence. The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) was set up in 1999 with the aim of dispersing asylum seekers away from London.[1] One of the specific problems of the late 1990s was the way in which asylum seekers tended to congregate in particular areas of London. Within the context of a rapidly gentrifying London and a diminishing stock of social housing (see Watt 2009a; 2009b), the problem for local authorities was locating reasonably priced accommodation that would fall below the government's grant cap of £240 a week for families and £140 a week for single adults (Robinson 2003: 9). Unsurprisingly, asylum-seekers are often sent to areas of lower-cost housing outside the capital, to places suffering from deprivation, geographical isolation, high unemployment and high crime. Effectively the dispersal programme introduced in 1999 means that all new asylum seekers are obliged to settle outside London. Asylum seekers are only offered financial support on the condition they leave the city: 'whilst dispersal was thus not compulsory for all, it was mandatory for those who were unable to support themselves' (Robinson 2003: 123).

Concerns have been raised as to the suitability of the designated dispersal areas to cope with new immigrants, especially in terms of high unemployment in these areas and the likelihood of asylum seekers encountering hostility from a deprived 'host' community (Phillimore and Goodson 2006: 1,717). Asylum-seekers have been concentrated in some of the very poorest wards in Britain. The key issue is that immigrants moving into such areas are likely to become permanently marginalised (ibid.: 1,719). A further problem is that asylum seekers are prevented from working legally until they attain refugee status, a process

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that can take years. Therefore, by the time the 'right to remain' has been given refugees may already find themselves marginalised within the labour market, suffering from the kinds of exclusion experienced by the 'long-term unemployed' (ibid.: 1,721). For Schuster (2004: 3), dispersal is exclusionary because it takes away the freedom of asylum seekers to choose where they settle and destroys kinship and community networks crucial to early stages of settlement.

It is not only dispersal that is used to control the movement and settlement of asylum seekers. Most European countries now use detention in order to facilitate the process of removal. Detention is defended on the grounds that deportation without some form of detention would be impossible. Yet not all those detained are subject to removal; they include those who *may* be subject to removal and hence also those who *may not* (Schuster 2004: 9). Those held in detention centres are also at different stages of the asylum process, including those who are waiting for appeals to be heard and those who have only just arrived (ibid.: 10). Moreover, the majority held in detention centres are eventually released. In England there are ten detention centres, mostly situated around the M25 motorway that circles London. Centres tend to be run by private security firms, such as DSL (formerly Group 4), on behalf of the government. The conditions of detention centres and behaviour of staff have been criticised by the United Kingdom Inspector of Prisons. In 2002 the Yarl's Wood detention centre in Bedfordshire was burned down by detainees following a protest triggered by the physical treatment of a fifty-five-year-old woman by staff. In February 2010 twenty detainees at the centre went on hunger strike, protesting against their indefinite detention and the racial and physical abuse they suffered at the hands of staff. For Burnett and Chebe (2010: 100–01), 'the human misery which the UK detention estate embodies cannot be overstated'. They bring attention to the plan to use detainees as a labour force under the rubric that work helps instil order; those seeking asylum will effectively be forced to accept exploitative working practices (ibid.: 101). Welch and Schuster (2005) suggest that the rush to imprison, to adopt the gravest act the state can perform against people, is evidence of a 'culture of control' (Garland 2001) spreading from the US and Britain to continental Europe. They argue: 'the detention of asylum seekers combines the "prison works" mentality with the emotional valence of the asylum issue' (ibid.: 334), which can be seen as part of an 'emerging *criminology of the other* in which […] asylum seekers […] are characterized as menacing strangers who threaten not only individual safety but also the entire social order' (ibid., original emphasis). Anxiety about asylum

seekers and immigration more generally in a post 9/11 scenario reproduces a state of permanent crisis in which the reliance upon authoritarian measures and racist stereotypes becomes commonplace.

In the US most immigration issues have been transferred to the Department for Homeland Security (DHS). The government's crackdown on undocumented immigrants, foreigns and asylum seekers is part of a post-9/11 response to terrorist threats and has resulted in a number of civil and human rights infractions. A programme initiated by the DHS in 2003 named *Liberty Shield* required the detention of asylum seekers from thirty-three countries where al Qaeda was known to operate. Under a later directive illegal immigrants, including asylum seekers, could be held indefinitely if their cases presented national security concerns. Meanwhile, although France places the strictest limits on the length of time a person may be held in detention, conditions in France's twenty-three detention centres are among the worst, with terrible overcrowding and a lack of adequate sanitation or food. There have also been hundreds of documented acts of violence perpetrated by the border police against asylum seekers, especially in the notorious detention centre at Roissy Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris where ninety-five per cent of asylum seekers are held (Welch and Schuster 2005: 340).

It is uncommon to view dispersal zones and detention centres as part of the city; rather, they are viewed as comprising a great 'elsewhere' that exists beyond the cosmopolitan gaze. The assertion here is that in their relation to the administered, consumption-centred central city these zones of containment and exclusion should be understood as very much integral to the metropolis. They are *of* the city even if they are not located within it. As Marc Augé (1995) writes in relation to his definition of 'non places':

> this paradox has to be explained: it seems the social game is being played elsewhere than in the forward posts of contemporaneity [...] The non-place is the opposite of utopia: it exists, and it does not contain any organic society. (ibid.: 111–12).

Dispersal zones and detention centres are the new non-places of the global city. They are evidence that the game is being played elsewhere; they are the very opposite of cosmopolis.

Gentrification

As a field of urban analysis, gentrification has come to encompass a range of processes associated with the globalisation of capital and neoliberal

governance, ranging from the upscaling of already gentrified neighbourhoods – 'super-gentrification' (Lees 2003a; Lees et al. 2008) – to social housing stock transfers (Watt 2009a; 2009b), from state-led gentrification (Florida 2003; 2005; Wyly and Hammel 2005; Porter and Barber 2006) to 'new build' gentrification (Davidson and Lees 2005). Gentrification is a watchword for the loss of racial, ethnic and class diversity in what were once vibrant inner-city neighbourhoods. Gentrification is the coincidence of four processes (Savage et al. 2003): one, the displacement of one group of residents with a concentration of new residents of a higher social status; two, the transformation of the built environment in terms of exhibiting distinctive aesthetic features and evidence of the emergence of new local services; three, the gathering together of persons with a shared culture, lifestyle and consumer preferences; and four, the economic reordering of property values. Gentrification is ordinarily understood as a distinctive feature of post-industrial or post-Fordist cities, where shifts in industrial base and employment structures have attracted wealthier workers back into the central city. Critically, this process reverses the centrifugal movements of the post-war period: '[T]hroughout North America and Western Europe, new residential patterns in many old cities appeared to contradict the long-term decline of their inner core' (Zukin 1987: 130). In a move that has been described as 'the death of urban planning', central government and local authorities increasingly look upon gentrification as a tool with which to initiate the 'renaissance' of rundown urban areas. Indeed, Lees's suspicion is that current policy strategies for urban regeneration amount to little more than a 'gentrifiers' charter' (2003: 61). This analysis shall begin with an examination of gentrification in Paris, before moving on to look at material, cultural and 'racial' explanations for gentrification and finally considering the effects of gentrification.

Gentrification in Paris has centred on the Marais in central Paris, the so-called 'intellectual quarters' of the Left Bank, and the former working-class *faubourgs* such as Belleville to the north-east of the city. The Marais, comprised of impressive 16th- and 17th-century mansions, declined socially throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and attracted an East European Jewish population (Carpenter and Lees 1995: 290). Gentrification began there in the 1970s, accelerated in the 1980s and appeared to stabilise during the 1990s. Reinvestment in the Marais began when property developers, commercial companies and private individuals took an interest shortly after property values hit rock bottom in the mid-1970s. By the mid-1990s, the Marais assembled an eclectic mix of the old and new as high-class fashion outlets moved into

former *boulangeries*, retaining the authentic shop fronts. During the late 2000s, there was dismay that the gentrification of Rue des Rosiers, the heart of the old Jewish community in Marais, had now totally transformed a once-thriving community of independent Jewish shops into 'an identikit line-up of middle-range international fashion chains' (Chrisafis 2008). Meanwhile, in the historic Left Bank districts of Saint-Germain-des-Prés and Odéon, 'at the café tables where Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir once held court, the talk is of property prices and holidays in the Maldives [...] you could easily be in South Kensington – a posh and soulless inner-city enclave for the super-rich' (Hussey 2007). Gentrification tends, in this way, to homogenise rather than differentiate space. Working-class Paris to the north-east of the city has also gentrified, with the marginal, the poor and immigrants steadily replaced by '*bobos*' ('bohemian bourgeois' – intellectuals, artists, designers, journalists, etc.) who, as Hazan (2010: xi–ii) explains, 'cultivate their superficial nonconformism and benign antiracism in these quarters, while driving up rents with the help of property speculators'. Streets that were dilapidated in the 1990s, such as Rue Myrha and Rue Doudeauville, have also been renovated, leading to the expulsion of their vulnerable African population (ibid.). Yet Hazan is not entirely pessimistic, and argues that working-class Paris is resisting rather better than people suspect:

> [T]he Chinese at Belleville, the Arabs at the Goutte d'Or, backed by well-established Algerian traders who own their freeholds, the Turks at the market of the Porte saint-Denis, the Africans of the Dejean market [...], the Sri Lankans and Pakistanis on the Faubourg Saint-Denis near La Chapelle - all these welcoming enclaves are holding their own, and even gaining ground here and there. (ibid.: xii)

Hazan reminds us that solidarity and common action always contain the potential to fight off speculators and, while this may not necessarily bring gentrification to a halt, it can at least be stalled.

Gentrification is often explained by a theory of 'rent gap' (see Smith 1996). This describes a situation whereby, for economic reasons, urban areas become ripe for redevelopment. In declining areas – usually residential urban centres – the rent obtainable from letting a property often falls due to the deterioration of properties in the area. Landlords allow properties to deteriorate further because they see no prospect of returns for the costs of maintenance. At a certain point it becomes profitable to change the use of the land. The land then becomes attractive to

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middle-class tenants or house-buyers or becomes cheap enough for contractors to erect new homes at a profit. For Carpenter and Lees (1995: 287), disinvestment and reinvestment are critical to understanding the gentrification process. Borrowing from Harvey's (1982) famous formulation, an over-accumulation of the capital in the 'primary circuit' of the production process prompts a switch to the 'secondary circuit' of the built environment. Smith (1979) applies this idea to gentrification: cyclical patterns of disinvestment and reinvestment in the built environment determine the supply of gentrifiable housing. Carpenter and Lees (2005: 287) also point to the existence of a 'value gap' whereby, due to depressed rent levels, landlords sell properties to individual owner-occupiers, thus encouraging gentrification through a change in tenure and a shift upwards in terms of residential profile.

Rent or value gap theories do not explain the cultural factors that drive educated, professional middle classes back into the city centre. Here also lies the distinction between geographical and sociological approaches to gentrification (see also Butler with Robson 2003). The first wave of middle-class gentrifiers – or 'pioneers' – tend to be risk-oblivious bohemians. They spend time renovating decrepit properties and their artistic and/or cultural activities give an area a 'cool' cachet. House prices in the area rise; this what is referred to as the 'sweat equity' derived by pioneers. This group is followed into the area typically by university-educated professional couples and households. Consumption patterns are integral to maintaining the middle-class identity of the gentrified neighbourhood. Indicators in the urban landscape such as coffee shops, delicatessens and florists signify the existence, arrival and dominance of the middle class. Butler and Robson emphasise how the middle classes have been active in the remaking of inner London; they have tirelessly sought out spaces they can remake in their own image. Inner London has become an expression of the aspirations and values of the various socio-economic subgroups of the middle class (ibid.: 12).

The 'look' or the aesthetics of gentrification is also important (Krase 2005: 187). Even before census figures reveal changes in tenancy or socio-economic composition of a neighbourhood, there are qualitative factors that show the 'scene' is changing, most especially the upscaling of homes and storefronts. Krase draws upon Bourdieu's (1984) distinction between the taste of 'necessity' and the taste of 'luxury'. Gentrification involves 'a movement from a space dominated by expressions of the taste of necessity to those of a taste of luxury' (ibid.: 187). This is why 'frontier' neighbourhoods that still have a residual working-class aesthetic are described as 'rough around the edges': 'in order for the

upscaling of the neighbourhood to be successful, however, such roughness and related apparent danger must be tamed' (ibid.: 188). Gentrifiers strive to achieve distinction within the context of middle-class consumption patterns, yet they conform enough to an overall style for the semiotics of gentrification to be read by comparable social groups between cities. Indeed, one result of the homogenisation of urban space in advanced capitalism (see Lefebvre 2003) is that gentrified districts in London, New York and Paris are almost transferable between cities.

The gentrification aesthetic is conditioned by the availability and affordability of older buildings (Zukin 1987). Gentrifiers are usually associated with the appropriation of Victorian style (Jager 1986), which is not simply an expression of taste but can also be explained by the fact that it was the industrial bourgeoisie of the 19th century who bequeathed such a major proportion of buildings in the central city. Gentrifiers have also developed a taste for abandoned manufacturing lofts that they convert to residential use (Zukin 1982). Either way, historic preservation of the city is important in the affirmation of distinction. The gentrifier's quest for a historic district to move into involves a cultural oscillation between the prosaic realities of the contemporary inner city and an imaginative reconstruction of an area's past (Zukin 1987: 135). Imagining a Victorian past is evidence of a refracted nostalgia for a period when profits gained from the overseas British Empire allowed an educated white middle class to gain a secure footing in the metropolis. Non-consciously, and sometimes even consciously, white middle-class gentrifiers view Victorian properties and their distinctive style as their rightful inheritance. For Jager (1986), gentrifiers moving into areas often feel they are 'buying into' history and, in so doing, constructing a historical purity. For example Abu-Lughod (1994) has written extensively about the gentrification of the Lower East Side of Manhattan, 'an area that since the second half of the nineteenth century has played an important role in immigrant absorption in the city, that occupies a special place in the imagination and lore of New York and indeed of America […]' (ibid.: 4). In London, gentrification accelerated dramatically in the 1990s in Brixton, which now enjoys the status of 'an internationally renowned, cosmopolitan lifestyle centre' (Butler with Robson 2003: 56) based upon its public persona of 'funky multiculturalism'. Brixton is now infused with a self-conscious appropriation of the neighbourhood's radical past; it resembles a space of 'boutique multiculture' (Keith 2005: 181). While the symbolic capital of historic neighbourhoods remains a powerful attraction for gentrifiers, new owners renovate properties by stripping away, gutting and sandblasting

any traces of actual life. For Jager (1986), this also represents an attempt to symbolically dislodge the stigma that many inner-city properties acquired in the post-war era of urban decline. The working-class and immigrant past of many properties is obliterated by the middle-class affectation and aestheticisation of Victoriana. Yet the gentrification aesthetic is not a static phenomenon; its boundaries are continuously tested 'in the acquisition of modern goods on one side and the identification of historical symbols on the other' (Bridge 2001: 214).

The image most people have of gentrifiers is of white yuppies moving into low-income neighbourhoods with dense concentrations of ethnic minorities (Lees et al. 2008: 108), yet gentrification research has been reluctant to press too hard on issues of 'race', preferring to concentrate on the class dynamic. That most gentrifiers are white is viewed almost as a matter of coincidence. Powell and Spencer (2003) reject the possibility that 'residual' poor and minority ethnic residents benefit from gentrification in their neighbourhoods. They suggest that any account of gentrification must take whiteness and white privilege into account. They argue that 'being white contributes to and draws benefits from the privileges and entitlements associated with the white face of gentrification' (ibid.: 439). In this sense, gentrification is a product of the defence of white privilege, of a 'white right' to the city. For Neil Smith (1996), gentrification is an integral strategy for middle and ruling-class whites to seek revenge against people they perceive as having 'stolen' the city from them. For Atkinson and Bridge (2005), gentrification resembles 'a new urban colonialism'. A key feature of this contemporary form of colonialism is how the expansion of capital is premised on the exploitation of differences in economic development. Contemporary gentrification also resembles colonialism as a cultural force in that it privileges whiteness, and its distinct class-based aesthetic reasserts the white Anglo appropriation of urban space and urban history. As such, the white middle classes view themselves as saviours of the city:

> Those who come to occupy prestigious central city locations frequently have the characteristics of a colonial elite. They often live in exclusive residential enclaves and are supported by a domestic and local service class. Gentrifiers are employed in [...] 'new class' occupations, and are marked out by their cosmopolitanism. (ibid.: 3)

As Goldberg (1993: 201) explains, gentrification represents the reversal of the degeneration associated with the immigrant-tainted inner city or slum district: 'if degeneration is the *dark*, regressive side of progress,

then "regeneration" is the reformation – the spiritual and physical renewal – but only of those *by nature fit for it*' (emphasis added). Despite the gentrifiers' avowed desire for a cosmopolitan milieu, evidence has shown that in reality they tend only to mix with 'their own'. Butler (2005: 185) has referred to social relations between gentrifiers and residual communities as *tectonic*, moving 'across each other in ways that do not apparently involve much interaction'. However, despite the validity of all of the above, it should not be forgotten that the middle-class 'pioneers' who have first made inroads into sought-after and historic black areas of the city, such as Harlem in New York, have themselves been black (see Taylor 1992; 2002; Jackson 2001). In these areas, the class battle over the neighbourhood has played out along similar lines to other gentrifying districts.

Most accounts of gentrification stress how gentrifiers are liberal and open to and tolerant of diversity. Yet how tolerance is a white fantasy (Hage 1998) has not been explored within the context of gentrification. For Hage, tolerance, although viewed as a morally 'good' value or practice, is structurally similar to more 'evil' or racist versions of nationalism. Hage interrogates the so-called 'innocence' of tolerant multicultural or cosmopolitan narratives and argues these are based upon an assumption or fantasy that the nation (or the city) *belongs* to their narrator. The 'tolerance' and 'openness' of gentrifiers presuppose control over what is tolerated. Consequently, tolerated 'others' such as the working-class or minority groups are imagined to exist within the tolerator's sphere of influence; they are merely guests in this space. Tolerance, as expressed through gentrification's avowed openness to difference, disguises and reproduces a relationship of power. The cosmopolitan habitus displayed by white middle-class gentrifiers is a form of symbolic violence in which their domination is presented as a form of egalitarianism (ibid.: 87). Tolerance is an empowered practice, every bit the product of a 'white city' fantasy.

Residential displacement is one of the primary dangers cited by those concerned with the exclusionary effects of market and state-assisted gentrification. Residents may be displaced as a result of either 'housing demolition, ownership conversion of rental units, increased housing costs (rent, taxes), landlord harassment [or] and evictions' (Newman and Wyly 2006: 1). For Zukin (1987), one of the most severe blows against the existing population in a gentrifying area is the removal of low-price rental housing: single-room occupancy hotels or bedsits. This kind of accommodation forms the beating heart of inner-city transitional zones. Yet, in a study of gentrifying neighbourhoods in New York

City, Freeman and Braconi (2004) claim to find very little evidence of lower-income residents being displaced. Rather, they claim that gentrification results in a low residential turnover. As neighbourhoods gentrify, they improve in ways that are appreciated as much by their disadvantaged residents as by their new, more affluent ones; because gentrification tends to improve retail and public services, delivers safer streets and improved job opportunities, and upgrades the physical environment, disadvantaged households have less reason to change residences in search of a better living environment (ibid.). Freeman and Braconi argue that public housing and rent stabilisation or control in gentrifying areas guards against displacement. Yet Newman and Wyly's (2006) quantitative analysis indicates that displacement affects six to ten per cent of all rental moves within New York City each year. They suggest:

> [f]or all displaced renters who find new accommodations in the city, and who are not forced to double-up, our research suggests that they are looking further afield in the outer boroughs to find affordable arrangements. As gentrification swept with renewed intensity across Manhattan through the 1990s, renters forced to seek homes elsewhere moved farther into Brooklyn and increasingly into Queens and the Bronx. (ibid.: 3)

According to their interviews in gentrified neighbourhoods, many potential displacees spoke about leaving the city and moving to upstate New York, to New Jersey or out to Long Island. Residents in gentrifying black neighbourhoods in Fort Greene, Brooklyn and Harlem reported a reverse migration, as many residents considered returning to the American South. Displacement is difficult to quantify. Atkinson (2000) has likened measuring displacement to 'measuring the invisible'. Moreover, it is by no means clear whether the displaced necessarily recognise themselves as victims of gentrification; they may well offer alternative reasons for their move. There is also the issue of exclusionary displacement, whereby individuals and households are unable to access inner-city property because it is already gentrified (Marcuse 1985).

Exactly where the displaced go is a key concern of this book. Recently Paul Watt has charted the continued suburbanisation of white working-class Londoners moving outwards to Essex. He argues, 'what thus far remains unclear is how far such suburbanisation is due to gentrification-induced displacement [...]'. He continues, '[t]his debate is furthermore complicated because of the confounding influence of "white flight"' (Watt 2008a: 208; 2008b; 2008c). There are similar problems with measuring

white flight as there are with ascertaining levels of displacement due to gentrification. Many moves out from London are explained using reasons such as better schools and cleaner air rather than a dislike of immigrants. Scepticism that white flight is the sole cause of moves from the city is supported by recent evidence showing that black and minority ethnic groups *are also* moving to the suburbs and satellite towns, mainly in attempts to find somewhere affordable to live. Watt (ibid.) reports the comments of one resident on a suburban estate in Essex who claims that 'my friend is selling up and moving […] and in two months the only people she's had to look at it are black Africans from London' (Watt 2008: 17). To some degree this echoes black suburbanisation from major US cities (see, for example, Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Wiese 2004).

Socio-economic and political restructuring in the last quarter-century has led to distinctive urban geographies that have challenged traditional rural–suburban–urban divisions. There has been much talk, for instance, of *edge cities*, *edgeless cities* and *exurbia* (Garreau 1991; Eiesland 2000; Teaford 2006). Each epithet describes a facet of the post-suburban megacity. The rescaling of socio-economic processes and state practices in the era of global cities has led to the rise of sub-national institutions, policies and territories. This mobilisation is manifest in direct interventions by the state to construct new city-regions such as Thames Gateway, the largest regeneration project in Europe, designed to ensure the effectiveness and competitiveness of London as a global city. The Gateway stretches from London's easterly boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Lewisham along the river and coast to Southend in Essex and Sittingbourne in Kent. Plans for new city-regions draw some inspiration from Gottmann's (1961) idea of *Megalopolis*, referring to the continuous stretch of urban and suburban areas along the Bos–Wash (Boston to Washington) north-eastern seaboard of the US.

The preposterous cost of living in London, driven by gentrification, has meant that debates regarding the provision of affordable housing for 'key workers' such as police, teachers, fire fighters and hospital staff have dominated the vision of Thames Gateway (Keith 2008). As Buck et al. (2002: 243) explain, the problem in London is that the high demand for professional and managerial workers drives up housing costs and supply constraints exacerbate this effect. Low-income households must either pay high rents or seek social housing, which itself has shrunk due to sales or worsened to become the most marginalised housing in the capital. In order to alleviate the crisis, Thames Gateway aims to build 110,000 'affordable homes' on brownfield sites and marshland on the periphery of the city by 2016. As Keith (ibid.: 59) explains, the

housing crisis is one of social reproduction: 'the city struggles to provide the supply of labour needed to support the civil institutions and the public sector' (see also Imrie et al. 2009). In this sense, those who work to *make the city work* but claim very little in the way of economic benefits are forced away from the city. They cannot afford to inhabit the city their labour helps produce. Phelps et al. (2006) posit two possible outcomes of this kind of place-making. The first is that plans will create 'nowhere places' where the state has simply imposed 'spaces on places' (Scott 1988). The second, more positive outcome is that state restructuring galvanises social, economic and cultural processes to create new meaningful places in the way that industrial cities emerged over a century ago; global city regions will, in other words, be comprised of multiple centres.

Securitisation and Fear of the Other

> The universal consequence of the crusade to secure the city is the destruction of any truly democratic urban space. The American city is systematically turned inward. (Davis 1990: 155)

Whereas much of the urban cosmopolitan literature promotes the image of the city as a celebration of difference, alternative images contemporaneously depict the city as an unruly, unsettling and disorderly place. The paradox is that, while difference is beguiling and can attract investment in a city, 'difference is [also] seen as overwhelming and dangerous, to be excluded or segregated where possible' (Bannister and Fyfe 2001: 807). Securitisation has become an even more pressing issue for cities in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. Measures introduced to counter the terrorist threat include physical barriers restricting access, advanced surveillance techniques and zero-tolerance policing. There has also been a rise in the prevalence of vigorously defended 'public plazas' such as the redeveloped Battery Park City in Lower Manhattan (see Smithsimon 2008). As Davis (1990) intimates, the city has retreated into itself. Yet, while those who 'belong' become introspective, others must turn to face the outside. The current obsession with security is making the global city a hostile place for black and minority ethnic groups, as well as other marginalised groups, such as the homeless, to reside. In outlining the third and final centrifugal spatial practice this section will first consider the paradoxical role played by (multi)culture in urban regeneration before examining policing policy in New York City and the preponderance of racial profiling in the apprehension of suspects.

Cities increasingly use culture as an economic base, yet the unruliness of culture also requires policing, otherwise it threatens to disrupt rather than add vibrancy to what is primary a business environment. Zukin (1995: 11) talks of the growing importance of the symbolic economy of cities where culture is intertwined with capital and identity in the city's production system (ibid.: 12). In order to capitalise on urban cultures, this requires a degree of privatising and militarising public space, since the power of culture to revitalise is compromised by an aesthetic of fear (ibid.: 11). Urban regeneration, even when it builds upon a city's existing cosmopolitan character or 'creative buzz', must also make places *feel* safe by removing 'social pollutants', those individuals and groups 'whose co-presence may threaten the perceived and aesthetic quality of urban space' (Raco 2003: 1,869). Regeneration has critically been referred to as the 'domestication of public space' as it calms fears associated with social mixing. A crucial element in ensuring the success of regenerated spaces is their actual and perceived levels of security, and this is where economic competition and security agendas merge (Coaffee 2003: 7). Lees (2003: 630) comments that 'the rhetoric of urban renaissance yearns for heterogeneity, but in practice harmony and stability are often emphasised over other forms of urban experience.' Some social groups are viewed as less desirable than others, in particular the homeless, teenagers, 'aggressive' beggars and the 'wrong' kind of ethnic minorities. These groups are policed using situational measures such as CCTV, curfews and by-laws, with the intention of reducing opportunities for disorder to occur. An example of this 'technological' form of policing is the anti-sleeping bench, an attempt to 'design out' the homeless from consumption spaces or financial centres. Rogers and Coaffee (2005) suggest that youth are often marginalised from practices of urban renaissance by attempts to ban or displace specific youth-related activities such as skateboarding or simply 'hanging out'. Mitchell (2003) produces an impassioned analysis of what he calls 'the war against homeless people' being fought in the name of competitiveness. This, for Mitchell, is conducted primarily through legislation preventing the homeless from using public spaces in the city: 'we are creating a world in which a whole class of people cannot be – simply because they have no place to be' (Mitchell 2003: 171). The paradox is that the multiculture and urbanity feted by strategies of urban renaissance are negated as they are crushed by dominant representations of the city primarily as a place to consume and/or do business.

Policing techniques have responded to the post-crisis requirement that cities must sanitise their central business, consumption and

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entertainment districts. The most prominent example of this is the so-called zero-tolerance policy deployed by ex-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in New York City (but primarily Manhattan) from the mid-1990s. This strategy is based upon the principle that, by clamping down on minor street offences and incivilities, more serious offences will also be curtailed (Carrabine et al. 2004: 276). This results in aggressive policing of incivilities such as public drinking, graffiti, drug dealing and public urination and the targeting (arrest and moving on) of marginal populations such as beggars, prostitutes, jaywalkers, pickpockets, 'squeegee merchants', homeless, obstructive street traders, entertainers and so on. Zero tolerance signals that the police have the capacity and motivation to tackle behaviours that make a city look and feel unsafe (McLoughlin 2006a: 466; 2006b: 131). Giuliani won international acclaim as zero tolerance was interpreted as the decisive factor in 'reclaiming' the main thoroughfares and parks of New York City.[2] As Mary Dejevsky writes in *The Independent* (21 March 2002),

> [A]ny recent visitor will attest, the streets of New York City now feel not only livelier, but safer than they did 10 years ago. They are cleaner and neater, too. The exodus to the suburbs has been reversed, and people are moving back into town. New York – is once again becoming somewhere not only to work, but to live.

The city feels safer for those who feel at home in the revanchist city (Smith 1996), but for recipients of zero tolerance it is an unforgiving place. For the *others* who are the recipients of zero-tolerance policies the city becomes a whole lot more hostile. Zero tolerance promoted aggression among police officers and encouraged discriminatory policing that resulted in the harassment of marginalised, usually minority ethnic groups already over-represented in the criminal justice system. For example, there were public protests against the torture of Abner Louima, a Haitian security guard arrested by officers from the 70th precinct in Brooklyn in August 1997. There was also the Bronx murder of West African unarmed street vendor Amadou Diallo in February 1999 by the NYPD's Street Crimes Unit. Four plain-clothes officers fired forty-one rounds into the twenty-three-year-old Guinean's body. All four officers were acquitted at trial. After a challenge from civil rights activists, New York City faced the possibility that it might have to pay around $50 million in compensation to as many as 50,000 people who had been illegally subjected to routine strip searches after being arrested for 'quality of life' offences (*The Times*, 11 January 2001, cited in Carrabine et al.

2004: 276). Greene (1999) has pointed to how any reductions in crime that may be attributed to zero tolerance have come at a severe cost to public trust in the police and city authorities, especially among minority communities.

Many have been outraged at what they perceive to be the influence of racial profiling in the injustices attributed to zero tolerance. Racial profiling refers to police intervention on the basis of 'race' or ethnicity rather than the actual behaviour of an individual. Prior to 9/11 the debate about racial profiling in the US concentrated on the disproportionate stopping of African American and Hispanic motorists by law enforcement officers and perceived harassment as a result of zero-tolerance street policing practices (Harris 2002). Since 9/11 the debate has tended to focus on the policing and surveillance of Muslim communities. However, it would appear that, since the 'war on terror' began in the aftermath of 9/11, the public are far more supportive of the use of racial profiling. Indeed in September 2003 the *New York Times* reports that the majority of Americans polled were willing to sanction more intensive security screening checks, closer surveillance and 'threat profiling' for those of Middle Eastern appearance (cited in McLaughlin 2006b: 334).

The heightened climate of fear in the city and the public acceptance of zero tolerance, racial profiling and 'shoot to kill' procedures in the name of 'public' safety have had catastrophic consequences in London, not least the murder of Brazilian-born resident of London Jean Charles de Menezes, shot dead by police at Stockwell underground station in 22 July 2005 (22/7), wrongly suspected of being a suicide bomber (see Pugliese 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2007). There were also the 2006 'anti-terror' raids on a flat in Forest Gate, East London, where police shot an innocent Muslim man. Weber (2006) points to how, despite white residents and city workers being quick to proclaim 'they were not afraid' following the 7/7 London bombings in a well-publicised web campaign (werenotafraid.com), many non-whites felt *very afraid* – not so much of further terrorist attacks but of the 'anti-terrorism terrorism' (Young 2008) waged against them. Weber (ibid.) explains how a Muslim woman called Samera posted a picture of herself on the aforementioned website wearing a niqab above the caption 'We are Afraid!' Samera posts, 'This pic is to highlight my concern as an INNOCENT Muslim and to raise awareness about the increase in racial hate and crime because of the atrocity in London last week' (ibid.: 700). Vaughan-Williams (2007: 185) writes of an 'auto-immune crisis'. Through a preoccupation with security, cities are destroying their own forms of protection – they are obliterating civic life. This is a distinctly new form of 'urbicide' (Berman 1984).

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The three broad exclusionary spatial practices identified here – dispersal, gentrification and securitisation – are indicative of a 'city sickness' that is gripping the metropolis and reducing its inhabitability for swathes of the population, most especially asylum seekers, immigrants, minority ethnic or 'racial' groups, the homeless and the poor. The chief symptoms of this sickness include pacified central districts dominated by the symbolic economy of cities and exclusionary and punitive outposts such as dispersal zones and detention centres that are situated on or beyond the periphery. The city is not yet turning 'inside out', but these exclusionary practices jeopardise even the most modest definitions of a public city, let alone a cosmopolis.

Conclusion

> Insofar as utopian thought seeks to create a closed, homogeneous, all absorbing political cosmos, it is antithetical to the dynamism, heterogeneity and openness of modern life – modern life as both it is and as we should like it to be. (Berman 1970: 319)

Prospects for an emancipatory cosmopolis comprised of spaces that encourage 'encounters between people of different classes, "race"s, ages, religions, ideologies, cultures and stances towards life' (Berman 1986: 484) are seriously compromised by the city sickness detailed above. Yet, while cosmopolitan theorists would undoubtedly wish to distance themselves from the 'soft cosmopolitanism' and 'hard exclusion' outlined here, the utopian visions of cosmopolitanism may actually be part of the problem. It remains to be seen just *how possible* it is to envisage cosmopolis without undermining the features that make it attractive in the first place.

The universal gaze of cosmopolitanism exemplifies the bourgeois desire to reduce and eliminate all spatial and temporal barriers in the quest for a *sublime* moment of revelation (Harvey 2001: 73). The work of Louis Marin on the limits of utopia is useful here. Marin (1992) argues that the totalising vision offered by the observation deck at the top of the Sears tower in Chicago (the highest tower in the world) is a symbol of the American utopian drive, the will to create a homogeneous world in the image of its own homeland. It is suggested here that the utopics of cosmopolis act as a metaphorical 'London Eye' casting a commanding gaze that encompasses the whole city. The elevated cosmopolitan eye masters all that is before it – erasing division and conflict and mastering the complexity of the metropolis. The notion of cosmopolis

homogenises and assimilates the miscellany of the city into a totality. Perhaps this is why Stuart Hall (2002a: 27) argues that cosmopolitan theory is fundamentally 'assimilationist' in its thrust. Here is a drive towards a homogenised city, a city both with and without difference, a city unbound through a 'natural, "spontaneous" assimilation' (Marin 1992: 403). The frontiers that arise as a consequence of the eye's centrality act as a constraint, a closing of the utopian imagination. Yet without limits, without a frontier beyond which there is somewhere and somebody *other*, there would be no cosmopolis. Where exactly *is* this privileged viewpoint that fascinates the imagination with its sublime effects? The cosmopolitan 'view from nowhere' is, despite the universalistic veil, definitely a view from *somewhere*. It is constitutive of the process of re-centring; although cosmopolitan liberals observe and communicate from *the centre*, they fail to recognise the social conditions of their own discourse (Calhoun 2003: 532). Another difficulty with the overly 'scholastic point of view' (Bourdieu 1990) created by cosmopolitanism is that the social conditions required to transform the plan into reality are obscured. Utopian urban futures usually founder because such dreams are based upon 'absent causes' or 'absent totalities' (Holston 1995: 160–62). This is the utopian paradox – unless the social conditions of the plan can be 'made visible', the plan will always remain in paralysis, completely 'disconnected from the conditions that generate a desire for it' (ibid.: 165). One can also detect evidence of what Garland (2001) calls the 'denial and acting out' common to neoliberal forms of governance. This is based on the disregard or *denial* of evidence – in this case that beyond the cosmopolis lie dispersal zones, detention centres, devalued suburbs; moreover, there is a denial that within the cosmopolis can be found discriminatory policing and a struggle over the future of working-class neighbourhoods. Acting out results in 'soft' cosmopolitan practices at a policy, planning and commercial level that attempt to convince all of us that the city is fair and equitable and that we share a common, rather than divided, destiny.

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6
Bedsit-land: Southend-on-Sea and London

> I saw Southend and thought this is my home. Anyway people are tired of foreigners in London. (Mat, car washer and asylum-seeker, late teens)

Introduction

What kinds of spaces exist beyond the cosmopolis? Marin's (1992) answer is that these spaces are neutral – they close the utopian vision and open up a new space. It is these 'open' spaces – in particular, the badlands and marshlands of Essex – that are the focus of this chapter. Southend-on-Sea in Essex, a once popular seaside resort, is home to an increasingly diverse ethnoscape (Appadurai 1996). This once popular seaside resort is now home to a diverse population. It is tempting to view the 'unplanned cosmopolitanism' (Hall 2004) occurring in the town as offering a counter-hegemony to the 'soft' and *very much* planned cosmopolitan spaces of the capital. Alternatively, the changing ethnoscape of Southend could be understood as another transparent example of the wonders of 'transnational urbanism' (Smith 2001: 5). Yet this would be to mislead and perhaps to romanticise. In categorising the coming together in incongruity of marginal people and marginal places, it feels more justified to appeal to Foucault's (1986) notion of *heterotopia*. These are spaces that form on the horizon of utopia – *real* places that invert, personify or lay bare the totality of the utopian vision. For Foucault, heterotopias reveal the order of 'normal' space.

Southend-on-Sea is situated thirty-five miles east of London at the mouth of the River Thames and has a population of approximately 160,000. Its zenith as a seaside resort for working-class Londoners ran from the turn of the last century and reached a peak in the 1930s. O'Brien (1934: 60)

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describes the packed dance floor of the Pier Pavilion, a common scene during the resort's golden era: 'See them swaying together […] deluded by the idea that they are out of London, and yet contentedly aware that they both are and are not.' Southend resembled a 'home from home', a place of elective belonging for the Londoner who 'wants safety in danger, danger in safety. He wants to be fooled into thinking that he is a snail, and has brought his dear London with him on his back' (ibid.: 45). In this respect, Southend has always been *of the city*, but not *in the city*; it has historically performed a function of one kind or another for the city. Since this pinnacle the town has suffered mixed fortunes and has struggled to reinvent itself. Its niche as a playground for the industrial working class has been irrevocably lost. Where once London crammed the seafront and hotels with tourists, the capital now appears to send only its 'internal Orient'. As Sassen (2006: 199) argues, devalued sectors of the urban economy are now fulfilling crucial functions for the centre.

The relatively obscure location of Southend is somewhat emblematic of the changing contours of 'race' relations in the UK as outlined in Vertovec (2007), where cultural diversity in each city can be viewed as 'a specific, context-dependent multicultural *problematique*' (Joppke and Lukes 1999: 16). The town is also symbolic of how provincial English towns, devalued suburbs and deserted seaside resorts are becoming increasingly multi-ethnic in character. The qualitative data presented here are the result of a community study conducted in Southend-on-Sea between 2003 and 2006.[1] Almost forty in-depth qualitative interviews (with residents, asylum seekers and local officials) were conducted with a purposive sample. This chapter proceeds by charting the history of Southend in four phases before closely examining how the central part of the town known as bedsit-land came to perform the function of a 'transplanted' zone in transition for nearby London. The discussion then follows Gilroy's (2005) reflection upon post-colonial Britain and considers how heterotopic spaces of diversity such as Southend are typified by both melancholia and conviviality, although the former is more pronounced due a lack of centrality and a sense of remoteness. This chapter is the first in a series of three that examines contemporary examples of the relations between 'race', multiculture and the centre–periphery.

A Relic of Modernity? A Geohistory in Four Phases

1750–1850

Until the latter half of the 18th century South End was a hamlet of nineteen fishermen's houses situated towards the 'south end' of the

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Saxon village Prittlewell. The hamlet grew slowly in response to the burgeoning trend among London's gentry for sea bathing (Pollitt 1957: 2). Two hotels were built on a prime cliff-top site overlooking the Thames Estuary to capitalise on this fashion. To distinguish this new resort from the fishing hamlet, the term 'New South End' came into being, with the original hamlet becoming 'Old South End'. There was fierce competition between the two sites for patronage of visitors, with the inns of the lower town apparently offering 'viands and wine not at all inferior […] and on much more reasonable terms' (cited in Pollitt 1957: 23). Royalty and several titled individuals visited the resort during this formative period, and over time the boundaries between the old and new towns blurred. Southend was still small enough in 1848 for *Punch* to joke about the sleepiness of the resort, saying that it was 'well worth seeing – with a microscope' (cited in O'Brien 1934: 42). The critical point, which will remain so throughout, is that the resort of Southend would not have developed at all without patronage from London.

1850–1950

The railway reached Southend in 1856, opening up large-scale investment and settlement (Pewsey 1993: 59). Trains cut journey times from London to an hour and a half and provided cheap access to the coast for those who had not been able to afford a carriage or steamer ride. A select resort for the fashionable and wealthy was transformed overnight into a Londoners' playground. Southend adjusted quickly and began to cater for the leisure tastes of working-class metropolitans. It developed an aesthetic that was innocent and unselfconscious. The development of Southend mirrored how Coney Island became an informal space for working-class Manhattan and Brooklynites (see Kasson 1978). Southend was considered a modern place and, as O'Brien (1934: 48) claimed, 'Southend is twentieth century […]. It has set its face to the future'. Southend was set-aside as a 'non-work' space in the geography of the working class. This resonates with how Lefebvre (1991: 58) describes the transformation of the Mediterranean coast into a leisure-oriented space for industrialised Europe. Southend acquired during this period a specific role in the social division of labour in the capital: 'the Londoner who wants a day off, but also wants to be happy, and wants them both cheaply, has learnt to seek them in Southend' (O'Brien 1934: 45). Like other British seaside resorts, Southend-on-Sea was popularly constructed in the collective conscience as a 'place on the margin' (see Shields 1991), a site for liminal cultural pursuits such as sea bathing, singing, dancing, copious drinking and 'dirty weekends'. The town also attracted a restless ethnoscape of working-class Londoners, seasonal work-

ers, gipsies, Eastern European Jews, Italian organ grinders and exiles from London who had moved to the suburbs. In 1938, visitors to Southend-on-Sea totalled 4,945,000 – a figure exceeded only by Blackpool (Pewsey 1993: 53). The population of Southend also grew at an astonishing rate during this period: from 2,462 in 1851 to 12,380 by 1891 (Pewsey 1993: 59); and from 28,857 in 1901 to 120,093 in 1931 (cited in Everitt 1980: 7–9).

It worth pausing to consider exactly what these population increases 'amount to' in a sociological sense. The notion of a 'cockney diaspora' is often implied in a semi-ironic fashion and its use by academics has been limited (Fawbert 2005; Carrabine 2006; Cohen 2006a; Watt et al. 2010). This social group – whether they comprise a *bona fide* diaspora or not – is comprised of working-class Londoners from the East End and City of London who at various points during the 20th century moved out of what were mainly slum or bomb-damaged dwellings and settled in places such as Southend. They retained connections with the city, often by commuting daily and by staying in close contact with relatives still living in the city by car, speedy commuter lines and the telephone. Londoners in Essex continued to feel at home by forming close relationships with fellow Londoners in their new environs; indeed, whole suburban or exurban streets were filled with people originating from the same communities in London. Thus a distinct identity based upon both presence and absence was formed, especially in the post-war years. The culture of the City and East End was uprooted and re-imagined as pie and mash and seafood stalls opened in Dagenham, Romford and Basildon and at 'the end of the line' in Southend-on-Sea. On weekends, many would travel back into the city in to watch football matches at West Ham, Arsenal or Spurs (Fawbert 2005). In terms of accent, over time the 'cockney guttural [has] soften[ed] to an Essex burr' (Cohen and Rustin 2008: 299) to form a hybrid accent now referred to as 'Estuary English'. Yet less affluent white residents in peripheral locations such as Southend are habitually racialised as being too white; they are effectively viewed as outside, beyond or beneath the nation, in other words the exact opposite of the cosmopolitan, metropolitan middle classes (Haylett 2001). The 'cockney diaspora' and the places they have settled are abject, unmodern (ibid.: 365).

1950–2000

Tourism initially boomed after World War II, but visitors were in steady decline by 1950. The 'proletarian invasions' of the early 20th century drove away the middle classes, who were being lured by package holidays to Spain. Even day-trippers from London, many of whom now owned

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cars, looked further afield for outings. Southend's proximity to London became a nuisance rather than a locational advantage. The town's administrators began the search for a new identity. As Harvey (1996) notes, describing the vagaries of place formation under capitalism:

> Old places […] have to be devalued, destroyed and redeveloped while new places are created. The cathedral city becomes a heritage centre, the mining community becomes a ghost town, the old industrial centre is deindustrialized, speculative boom towns or gentrified neighbourhoods arise on the frontier of capitalist development or out of the ashes of deindustrialized communities. (Harvey 1996: 296)

But what future for a fading seaside resort? Consultants told Southend's councillors that the town had to get rid of its 'kiss-me-quick image' if it was to attract white-collar business and reinvent itself as a centre of commerce (King and Furbank 1992: 92). Despite attempts of varying success to attract investment, Southend struggled to shake off its brash modernity, the kind Marshall Berman (1982) celebrates in Coney Island. After 1950 hundreds of hotels, guesthouses and premises fell into disuse and were eventually subdivided into flats and bedsits. Developers butchered Southend-on-Sea's central district of guesthouses, town houses and terraces during the housing boom of the 1980s, and over 1,000 flat conversions were completed in just two years between 1986 and 1988. This was accompanied by a rise in the amount of legal and illegal HMOs (Houses in Multiple Occupation):

> At the same time as the property boom was going on, the bed and breakfast places started to find that if tourism had slipped and they weren't letting their places, they could get just as much money by DSS [Department for Social Security] letting […] So we realised that a lot of our bed and breakfasts weren't bed and breakfasts anymore – they were DSS places and HMOs. They were catering for a need in the town. And there was definitely a need because there's very little social housing in this town. (Planner, SBC)

By the 1990s Southend possessed an abundance of cheap accommodation. Landlords profited in the first instance (in the growing absence of social housing) from residents claiming housing benefits, many of whom were rehoused in Southend by London boroughs. Indeed, since 1996 London Boroughs have been permitted to disperse homeless people under their jurisdiction to local authorities where cheap and vacant

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housing stock is more plentiful (Sales 2002). Second, during the late 1990s many hostels, HMOs and bedsits found a purpose providing temporary homes for asylum seekers, the majority of whom were Kosovar Albanians and Roma from Poland and the Czech Republic.

Asylum seekers and refugees arrived in Southend via two main routes, both of which are connected to dispersal policies from London. First, nearby local authorities used private rented accommodation in Southend to house asylum seekers under their own jurisdiction. This has been popular with London boroughs, since average rent is considerably cheaper in Southend than in even the most outlying boroughs of the capital.[2] Second, due to the large number of settled asylum seekers and the provision of specialist social services in the town, the interim regulations of 2000 (introduced because many designated dispersal areas were insufficiently prepared) declared that recent arrivals could be dispersed from London to Southend. Asylum seekers are not permitted to work, but many work 'cash-in-hand' as car washers, interpreters, drivers, 'odd-job' men and chefs in the informal economy. Initially asylum seekers and those dispersed from London boroughs had little choice in coming to Southend, but since then immigration appears to have developed a momentum of its own.

2000–present

Since 2000 asylum seekers and refugees have continued to arrive in Southend from African countries such as Zimbabwe, Somalia, Congo, Angola and Togo. There has also been a steady movement into the town by black and minority ethnic groups from London attracted by cheaper rents or offered accommodation in the town by the London boroughs where they were previously housed. This centrifugal movement out of London is only likely to increase further since the Coalition government elected in 2010 has proposed caps on housing benefit, meaning that thousands of families living in the private rented sector in London will be forced to leave the capital and find accommodation elsewhere in the south-east (Hanley 2010; Wintour 2010). In addition, the resort, like other easterly towns such as Boston, Peterborough and Thetford, now has a sizeable Portuguese population. A walk along the popular thoroughfare of Hamlet Court Road in the Westcliff region of the town reveals Filipino, Polish, Thai, Japanese, Indian, Pakistani, Moroccan, Portuguese, Slovak and Greek restaurants as well as three Chinese restaurants, a Jewish bagel bar, a Madeiran café and a Portuguese café/ delicatessen. There are also two weave hairdressers and an African shop/ travel agent. The central region of the town is now home to an

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increasingly diverse ethnoscape. Yet Central Southend contains some of the poorest wards in the east of England and the nation as a whole (Roberts et al. 2004). In fact, five of Southend's central *super output areas* fall within the most deprived ten per cent in England. The most deprived area ranks ninety-third in the country as a whole, one of the most deprived areas outside the major conurbations of London, the west Midlands and the north-west. The deprived picture in the centre of town stands in stark contrast to its prosperous commuter suburbs, elongating along train lines to London, where many super output areas fall within the *least* deprived twenty per cent in England. In fact, Southend-on-Sea is 'one of the most unequal parts of the country in terms of deprivation' (Local Futures 2009).

Alongside other locations in South Essex such as Grays, Basildon and Canvey Island, the iconic seaside resort of Southend-on-Sea has been incorporated within the Thames Gateway, the largest regeneration project in Europe, designed to ensure the effectiveness and competitiveness of London as a global city. Building upon Southend's cultural history as the 'lungs of London' (Schama 1996: 5), Thames Gateway aims to reinstall Southend as a 'thriving cultural hub' and a centre of excellence for leisure and the arts. This strategy emphasises how the 'vibrant [...] cosmopolitan atmosphere' of the town should 'play a key role in the regeneration and renaissance of Southend' (University of Essex 2005). The mobilisation of culture as a means to transform redundant, but once prosperous, areas is a well-established practice within urban policy (see Cochrane 2003). From the securing of 'objective two' funding through to the new vision of Southend as cultural hub, it is clear that the town is learning to utilise the market advantages of cultural diversity. Through marketing ethnic diversity as a locational strength, technocrats have been able to positively spin and claim credit for the *unplanned* cosmopolitanism that has occurred in its most deprived spaces. Yet, the project should not be judged a success too quickly. Sharon Zukin's (1995: 273–74) warning that cultural strategies represent 'a worst case scenario' of regeneration 'when a city has few cards to play' appears prescient (see Millington 2008 for a detailed assessment of Southend's regeneration).

Bedsit-land or mini-Bosnia

> Turn off the High Street. Do not be afraid of the ugly rows of lodging houses you will find. To the West they are grandish and ugly, to the East mean and ugly. (O'Brien 1934: 50)

This section will outline the productive origins of the district in Southend to which asylum seekers, immigrants and homeless have generally moved. The conditions that existed to make the presence of asylum seekers in Southend-on-Sea a possibility reveal a great deal about the reception they receive. The legacy of the rapid expansion of the town at the turn of the last century is a deprived central region known locally as 'bedsit-land'. Rather than a nightmarish vision of graffiti-ed tower blocks and deserted precincts, bedsit-land is closer in kind to a Chicago-style zone-in-transition, a hobohemia of subdivided town houses and terraces. Officially, Bedsit-land or mini-Bosnia spans the best part of one electoral ward – Milton – and creeps into three others – Victoria, Westborough and Kursaal. According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation (2000), which highlights the 4,000 most deprived wards in England and Wales, Milton is ranked eighty-first. Using the alternative Underprivileged Area Scale of Deprivation, Milton is identified as the poorest ward in Southend, Essex and the south-east (excluding London). With an urban population of 9,000, Milton contains higher than average numbers of flats/maisonettes, single-person households, rented tenures, unfit properties, unemployment, people of non-white British origin and residents born outside the UK (all figures 2001 Census). Such characteristics are similar to those that may be found in traditional 'inner-city' districts.

Bedsit-land cannot be chronicled through objective measures only. In the following excerpt, a resident describes her friend's flat, situated in a particularly dense region of bedsit-land:

> It's very, very overcrowded. There's these big Victorian houses that have got twelve bedsits in them. It's horrendous because some of them were beautiful family homes but they've literally had rooms sliced in half and they've put a sink in and you've got two bedsits. I've got a friend who lives in a little basement flat and she's got nothing of her own because they've crammed so many people in, put fences up to mark boundaries which is rotten especially if you've got kiddies, I mean where are they supposed to play? (Kat, garage attendant, 30s)

The impact upon quality of life caused by cramped and overcrowded conditions is clearly apparent. Living is constricted by the fragmented space created by partition walls, divisions and subdivisions. Kat reveals how there is no space for children to play; a paradox in an area where *so much* 'space' has been produced by the subdivision of existing properties. A seventeen-year-old asylum seeker who spent his first few months

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in Southend living in one of the many hostels in bedsit-land describes his experience:

> There were different people in the hostel, from different countries. Lots of people came to visit, making lots of noise. Some were drunk. Some of them in the room were drug-users and I just wanted to move. I just didn't like it but it was out of my hands. If I could I would have moved [...] but the local government [a London borough] supported me. I didn't choose that – they sent me. (Mat, car washer and asylum seeker, late teens)

Mat conveys the insecurity that is part and parcel of everyday life in the hostel. Although asylum seekers are the *object* of fear for many in the town, they are often the most vulnerable residents. That Mat's predicament was 'out of his hands', as he had been sent to live in Southend by a London Borough, reveals just how residents of bedsit-land can become 'trapped in space' (Harvey 1973).

Urban space produced in advanced capitalism has three specific characteristics that Lefebvre (2003a: 210) calls 'homogeneity–fragmentation–hierarchy'. This can be explained as follows. Abstract space (where value is the sole arbiter) contains a paradox – it creates an increasingly homogeneous space but also fragments space into lots and parcels. This process necessarily differentiates space to produce both valorised spaces such as 'super-gentrified' Barnsbury in Islington, central London (Lees 2003a; Lees et al. 2008) and devalued spaces such as bedsit-land in Southend-on-Sea – relegated neighbourhoods 'designed' for immigrants, the homeless and other 'residues' of advanced capitalism. Yet these spaces also homogenise, fragment and hierarchise – the process does not stop. For example, racial, ethnic or class differences become heightened, causing communities to be wracked with conflict and tension and a narcissism of minor differences. The notion of homogeneity–fragmentation–hierarchy is used to explain the *production* of bedsit-land and its subsequent racialisation as 'mini-Bosnia'.

The Production of Bedsit-land (1) Homogeneity–Fragmentation

The *laissez-faire* planning regulations of the 1980s provided the mainspring for the subdivision of the decaying Victorian and Edwardian properties in the once-prosperous central region of Southend. This moment of creative destruction owes much to the political and economic conditions of the time, where '[u]nder Thatcherism the language of politics [...] shifted from "public good" to "individual choice" and "entrepreneurial

flair"' (Thornley 1991: 2). In terms of planning regulations, Circular 22/80 (DoE 1980 cited in ibid.) advised a 'loosening up' of the planning system with the aim of creating the conditions through which housing demand could be met. The circular also promotes the view that planners should withdraw from aesthetic control and not attempt to influence the layout, density and size of rooms in new residential developments (Thornley 1991: 147–48). A later white paper entitled 'Lifting the Burden' (DoE 1985 cited in ibid.) was intended to deregulate urban planning and prevent state intervention that undermined the legitimacy of market processes and individual freedoms, although it fails to acknowledge community interest as an objective (Thornley 1991: 135). The traditional purpose of planning – the protection of public interest – weakened as the liberal political economy of the 1980s supplanted this with the enhancement of private interest.

Eager developers and landlords plundered devalued property in central Southend during the boom of the mid to late 1980s. In fact, 'in excess of 5000 flats [were] created from accommodation no longer suited to current requirements' (Southend-on-Sea Borough Council 1994: 53). A planner in the council takes up the story:

> In Southend, in that central area, you've got the larger, villa-type houses built during a prosperous time, it was the Victorian/ Edwardian age, and they're huge. You get to the 1980s, and you've got a big property boom going on, it was just ripe for sub-division. So, you even get sub-divisions of flat conversions and it went through the roof. Prices just went up and up and up and the more you could sell, the more money you made. And property was moving really quickly […] so if you bought a big house for £70,000 even the house itself would have been £110,000 before you turned it round. You turn it into two flats and you've got, like £220,000. The market drove that and there was a lot of money to be made. (Planner, SBC)

Subdivisions created an abundance of 'new' accommodation that landlords appropriated and made profit from renting to marginalised groups – initially housing benefit claimants and later asylum seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants. Market opportunities were also increased by the relatively low amount of social housing available in the town. Below, a landlord describes how he buys properties in devalued areas for the purpose of letting to housing benefit claimants. There is no endeavour to improve the property or the surrounding area. Properties are allowed to deteriorate because maintenance requires further investment. After a quick slap of paint they are sold on at a price

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that, while low for the south-east of England, exceeds the landlord's initial investment:

> It's full of lowlifes but as an investor I can go to York Road and buy cheap flats. I was buying them for seventy, eighty grand and renting them out for £300, £325, £350 a month. I'm buying five times income and I'm making money. I don't mind what shit I put up with as long they can sign a form and I can get the cheque paid to me, I'm happy. As long as the council keeps the cheques coming I don't go round there, the place deteriorates, they don't give a fuck so I don't give a fuck. When it becomes empty I'll do it up and I'll sell it [...] I've sold my bedsits, I had them eight or nine years, I bought them for forty grand and sold them for ninety-five [...] Someone else buys the bedsits and it carries on the same scale. They've bought what they think is cheap, I've had my profit and the road remains the same. (Landlord)

If there are beneficiaries of this space there are also those who have to live in it because they have few other places to go. People condemned by the market to live in this fragmented and relegated environment often fail to recognise themselves. The local newspaper story below hints at this alienation, suggesting that *life itself* is opposed by bedsit-land.

> Landlords of a house in which a refugee last week tried to commit suicide today admitted facilities were not ideal. Depressed Iranian 'KMM' doused himself in petrol and threatened to set himself alight in a house in Burdett Avenue, Westcliff, which he shares with 19 other asylum seekers [...] They share washing and toilet facilities and must take it in turns to use the kitchen because it is too small. (*Southend Evening Echo* 1 February 2000)

The story carries the view that it is the *lack of space*, rather than the concealed productive forces of space, that is the source of KMM's misery. The house where KMM lives is simply viewed as too small to cope with twenty asylum seekers. Of course this is true, yet the problem is not one that can be solved simply by improving 'facilities'. In this way, urban space appears benign or transparent, as far removed from politics and power as one could imagine. Yet this example is actually evidence of a class struggle and vicious racism inscribed in space. Simone, below, also explains how human life is opposed by the abstract nature of space in the homogeneous yet fragmented spaces of bedsit-land:

> That's why I haven't got children because I wouldn't bring them up in this. And we decided that a long time actually because you could see it getting worse. I mean it's terrible now. (Simone, call centre worker, 30s)

The following comment by Valentina, a young asylum seeker from Kosovo, also illustrates the 'transparent' quality of space:

> We lived in a two-bedroom flat in London Road when I first came here. We lived there and it was three children, my cousin, my mum and dad and then there was another baby on the way. We were living seven people in a two-bedroom flat. All of us had to sleep in the same room. The kitchen was so tiny. It was so small, especially in the summer when it was boiling hot. We couldn't live there anymore. (Valentina, student and asylum seeker, late teens)

When we treat space as an absolute we think about it only in and of itself. Eventually residents are unable to cast a critical eye towards it, or more importantly think beyond space. Cramped conditions *do* cause discomfort, but the structural conditions of this overwhelming immediacy always tend to be placed beyond the realm of vision. The capacity of people to recognise the productive origins of space is, of course, undermined by the discomfort engendered by the space itself. It is in this sense that space is far more ideological than may be imagined. Bourdieu (1999: 126) argues:

> Space is one of the sites where power is asserted and exercised, and, no doubt in its subtlest form, as symbolic violence that goes unperceived as violence. Architectural spaces address mute injunctions directly to the body and, just as surely as court etiquette, obtain from it the reverence and respect born of distance, or better yet, from being far away, at a respectful distance. Their very invisibility [...] undoubtedly makes these the most important components of the symbolic order of power and the totally real affects of symbolic power.

It is in this way that 'space becomes the medium through which particular settlements of ethics, material interest and value are made to appear normal or inevitable' (Keith 2005: 22).

The Production of Bedsit-land (2) Hierarchy: 'Mini-Bosnia'

> That part of Westcliff used to be the old Jewish quarter years ago. I guess they've become more prosperous and they've moved into other areas of Southend. (Lynn, designer, 50s)

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> They call it mini-Bosnia or something round here in some parts, it's all the ethnic minority and Kosovans. You don't even hear English. (Richard, self-employed electrician, 30s)

Hierarchies are the necessary outcome of the exchange of spaces. Moreover, state action exacerbates this situation: 'spaces form extreme hierarchies, from the centres of domination to the peripheries that are impoverished [...]' (Lefebvre 2003a: 94). The second decisive moment in the production of bedsit-land is a connotative switch from bedsit-land to 'mini-Bosnia', a reference to the presence of central and eastern Europeans and a clear example of how racisms become normalised in space (Goldberg 1993: 185). Curiously, the central region of Southend has a half-remembered history of racialisation. Walton (2000: 160) details how some of the strongest Jewish communities in Britain consolidated and grew in seaside settings, including Southend. He reports a resident in the 1930s bemoaning that Westcliff has become a 'Little Palestine', occupied by a plethora of Jews 'driving around in their flashy cars, stuffing themselves in the best hotels' (ibid.). The reproduction of Little Palestine as mini-Bosnia is an example of what Phil Cohen (2006b) calls the 'urban uncanny' where 'the living and the dead, the animate and inanimate become strangely confused.' The material relics of Little Palestine, existing now as subdivided flats and bedsits, continue to haunt through the guise of mini-Bosnia. Spatialised (and racialised) epithets such as Little Palestine and mini-Bosnia give credence to Cross and Keith (1993: 9) view that '"race" is a privileged metaphor through which the confused text of the city is rendered comprehensible.' Lefebvre (1991: 56) describes a 'spatial economy' that valorises relationships between people and places and produces 'connotative discourses' concerning particular areas. The 'connotative switch' from bedsit-land to mini-Bosnia is evidence of this. At the heart of this switch is the conviction of some residents of bedsit-land that the deterioration of the area is caused by incoming immigrants.

> I would have said it started getting worse over the last three or four years, I reckon – when you started to get some of these immigrants people. We seem to get a lot. Years ago you didn't have it. (Paul, warehouse assistant, 30s)

The re-imagining of bedsit-land as mini-Bosnia also reflects an understanding that a 'tipping point' has been reached. Asylum seekers are thought of as 'bad spirits' – the ushers of decline, disorder and loss.

They are a metaphor for the violence perpetrated by abstract space and they assume all its destructive powers. The feeling that the town has been 'invaded' creates a hostile atmosphere:

> There was an elderly lady – a Romany – she's got two or three granddaughters. Anyway, they were walking together and a couple of people attacked them and were shouting 'fucking gipsies!' (Kari, waitress and refugee, 30s)

Kari's story demonstrates how people – like all material objects – are redolent with symbolism. The geohistorically positioned bodies of 'asylum seekers' or 'Kosovans' in bedsit-land come to represent 'symbols of absolute cultural and moral difference' (Alexander and Knowles 2005: 10).

The state and local politicians rarely challenge the misrecognition that asylum seekers are to blame for the demise of the central town. For example, following the attack on two asylum seekers in their own homes, then MP Sir Teddy Taylor publicly stated:

> This was a horrifying crime which I'm afraid is something which is rather typical. The joy of living in Southend used to be the particularly good community race relations […] The public has got the feeling now that things have got out of control and there are a number of incidents like this which I have raised with the Home Office […] We have got to have a system for dealing with asylum seekers and make sure they are brought into communal areas and dealt with speedily. (*Southend Evening Echo* 12 January 2000)

Taylor insinuates that the racist attack is justified in part because the asylum-seeker 'problem' has 'got out of control'. It resonates with how the 1950s Notting Hill riots were blamed on West Indian immigrants, even though the disorder consisted of whites attacking blacks. For Taylor, the attack is regrettable but the real problem is the presence of asylum seekers in a town *like Southend*. Taylor's solution is not to fight prejudice or to improve living conditions but rather to urge government to instigate a new system for 'dealing with' asylum seekers speedily. Despite being victims of a brutal attack, immigrants are guilty simply for *being* somewhere they do not belong.

There is little reason to doubt the view that Southend may have been a more pleasant place to live in the past. What can be questioned, however, is the assumption that the deterioration of the area is caused

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by immigrants. This is fundamentally a misrecognition, because, as Lefebvre (1991: 57) correctly points out, 'every space is already in place before the appearance in it of actors; the pre-existence of space conditions the subject's presence, action and discourse.' Simply put, the productive forces of the space that exists to make the presence of immigrants in Westcliff a possibility are concealed beyond everyday practical consciousness, within the *naturalness* of space. Residents understandably apportion blame for the deterioration of the area to the most noticeable *effect* of these productive forces – immigrants.

Hierarchies develop within relegated spaces; in fact, the need to symbolically dominate the 'other' becomes all the more pressing. Asylum seekers and refugees in mini-Bosnia are endowed with a mythic status, and their everyday activities appear magical or enchanted:

> And they're in and out the houses all the time you know. (Paul, warehouse assistant, 30s)
>
> Even though they're probably perfectly innocent and just chatting why are they standing on street corners all the time? Why are they standing on the road? The other thing is that they are drinking as well. You think, well, how do they fund that? Because if you get £37 per week from the Government for your dole money, that probably only covers your food bill. How can they afford to go out drinking? (Craig, unemployed, 30s)

These examples highlight the curiosity that asylum seekers arouse, linking with Knowles's (2005: 91) assertion that 'race' formation occurs, amongst other ways, through 'the ways in which people operate, move through, and in the terms on which they occupy, and use space'. Certainly, the behaviour of asylum seekers is a source of fascination for many, who suggest even their most mundane activities are part of a great conspiratorial plan to exploit Britain's welfare system (Bonnett 2000; Millington 2010). There is also an element of what Edward Said calls a 'discipline of detail' whereby the everyday practice of asylum seekers and refugees is subject to scrutiny, study and judgement. In the narratives and stories that established residents tell about asylum seekers they are cast in various roles as thieves, vandals, drunks, diseased, dirty, drug addicts, muggers, child abusers, flashers, rapists and killers of domestic animals (Millington 2010). The already subjugated position of established residents in the deprived central town is compromised further by the arrival of asylum seekers, with whom they share an equivalent social and spatial position. The requirement to symbolically dominate asylum seekers arises

as objective differences between the two groups diminish. Signs of distinction between established and outsiders are thin on the ground as they are forced to share the same streets, shops, schools and doctors' surgeries. In the absence of objective differences, stories about asylum seekers attempt to pinpoint a 'racial' essence through particularistic references to the smell, appearance, language and modes of association of asylum seekers:

> You can smell the drugs as you walk past them, it's got a very strange smell, you know, it's not just cigarettes. (Laura, garage attendant, 20s)
>
> They are slightly tanned and, as I say, they have nearly all got leather jackets. Half of them talk their own language so you don't know what they're saying. (Paul, warehouse assistant, 30s)

These examples, as asides to longer stories, are symptomatic of this discipline of detail whereby every minute aspect of the activities and being of asylum seekers testifies to their essential otherness.

Hierarchies develop as a result of the fragmentation of spaces and identities in combination with the heightened awareness of difference that spatial fragmentation engenders. Existing spaces such as bedsit-land are racialised when a visible minority moves in to the area; it is transformed from bedsit-land into mini-Bosnia. The neighbourhood then becomes further removed from spaces of the city characterised by their normality, sameness and whiteness (see Shields 1991; hooks 1992). If bedsit-land was already a degraded space, then its renaming as 'mini-Bosnia' signifies an intensification of this place-stigma.

The Production of Bedsit-land (3) Everyday Life

Everyday life embraces both the production and the reproduction of space. If the mechanism of homogeneity–fragmentation–hierarchy is concerned primarily with *production* (i.e., it produces the space/s of bedsit-land and mini-Bosnia), then spatial practice is critical to the reproduction of this space. Without practice (people *doing* things), the mechanism of homogeneity–fragmentation–hierarchy would remain a meaningless abstraction. Lefebvre (1991: 337) suggests that when *conceived* (objective) and *lived* (subjective) space is fused through social practice then space rejoins material production. This section is concerned with how the overdevelopment and subdivision of the central town (*homogeneity–fragmentation*) and the misrecognition and subsequent stigmatisation of this space as mini-Bosnia (*hierarchy*) fuse to produce distinctive spatial practices that complete the material reproduction of

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bedsit-land as 'mini-Bosnia': a racialised 'outer–inner city' (a concept outlined thoroughly in Chapter 8) of London.

Spatial practice engenders what Lefebvre (1991) calls 'archi-textures', the *fuzzy perceptions* of space produced by virtue of continuous activity in a particular neighbourhood.

> There's one part where the pavement is thick with grease. Over the years it's gone black and dirty. (Rita, retired, 70s)
>
> That's a sofa and this is just a pile of rubbish. Well over this side there's a carrier bag with a jumper in it, just strewn; a Yellow Pages, dumped; a box with a pizza in it with one triangle eaten, I mean there's going to be rats there soon enough. I hate it. (Kat, garage attendant, 30s)

These examples demonstrate that spatial practice is intrinsically related to perception, of how space *feels*. The first example points to the sedimentation of spatial practice – '…over the years'. Both capture a sense of disgust with the environs of bedsit-land and a fear of infection or contagion. The filth and dirt that will inevitably bring rats threatens the boundaries of personal space, engendering a 'fear of dissolution [and] the fear of […] social dissolution' (Sibley 1995: 24). Certainly these perceptions, forged through routine activity, elicit an emotional response: '…I hate it.'

The symbolic representation of asylum seekers as dangerous or predatory causes people to walk along routes that reduce the likelihood of coming face to face with an asylum seeker:

> I'm not saying they're going to do us any harm, but you just don't feel safe. You won't walk past them, I'd rather come up the street and go around another road than go through the town and walk past them if there's a few together. I haven't personally been attacked by anybody but I don't want to give them a chance. (Diane, newspaper distributor, 60s)
>
> They recognise us from the hostel. I've seen people going around maybe in the longer way – going somewhere just not to cross the road opposite where we live. I have seen that, believe me. (Mat, car washer and asylum seeker, late teens)

The result is a spatiality of suspicion – a proto-community that avoids integrating with itself. These kinds of spatial practices are integral to the material reproduction of bedsit-land as mini-Bosnia.

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In bedsit-land *antagonistic* rhythms of practice are a source of anxiety for many residents. This contributes to its symbolic representation as an 'area you don't go happily' (Lana, insurance clerk, 50s). Fractious time–space paths disrupt a sense of predictability about the world:

> And they just go. Come back – go. Come back – go. Whether it's the same people all the time I don't know. They always go at nighttime and it's normally on a Sunday evening about 9 o'clock and then they come back in the week. Whether it's the same lot come back I don't know. That I don't know. (Peter, retired, 80s)

> Is my dad working? No. Is my mum working? No. Every single day we're just stuck home. Even my dad, he just goes out with his friend. There's nothing to do. What can you do when you're unemployed? My mum is unemployed. My dad is unemployed. Only taking us kids up and down the school to collect us and take us there. (Valentina, student and asylum seeker, late teens)

The trust-inducing 'silence' of rhythmical unity is not a feature of these examples. It is not that rhythms do not exist; it is that they do not cohere. This is a jarring experience and can be fraught with existential anxiety. The 'brackets' that form a protective cocoon to push out events that threaten bodily or psychological integrity are removed. This is what makes anxiety, suspicion and fear a regular feature of bedsit-land; it is a disorientating space. Fear and a lack of trust in 'the everyday' are projected onto those who are mistakenly viewed as architects of this arrhythmia – asylum seekers and refugees.

These examples of spatial practice complete the reproduction of bedsit-land as the racialised space of mini-Bosnia. The practices of everyday life considered in this section are the *product of* bedsit-land and the *producer of* mini-Bosnia. Such practices are 'product producers': activities that propound and presuppose space (Lefebvre 1991: 36). All these everyday practices – from noticing how grimy pavements are to choosing to walk 'the long way home' – contribute to bedsit-land's brooding, claustrophobic atmosphere.

Melancholia or Convivial Culture?

Having established how bedsit-land is produced and lived as an outer–inner city space, there are also a number of wider questions that need to be considered. These follow Paul Gilroy's (2005) concerns with melancholia and conviviality. Gilroy (ibid.: 113) argues that Britain's

politics of 'race' is dominated by a combination of post-imperial melancholia and a renewed interest in 'race' talk. White Britain, he argues, is struggling with the legacy of various migrations and the impact of second-generation 'native' citizens who have unsettled and displaced national identity and a surety in a sense of Englishness. Britain's racial imagination, obsessed with reliving the national drama of the Second World War,

> has helped to keep the anti-Nazi war at the centre of the nation's sense of itself, to turn postcolonial settlers back into immigrants long after immigration had been stopped, and to saturate recent talk of refugees and asylum seekers with telltale traces of racial discourse […].' (ibid.)

This melancholia, evident in recourse to racial discourse, is the morbid core of England and Englishness in remorseless decline. Yet there also exists a spontaneous tolerance and openness evident 'in the underworld of Britain's convivial cultures', even if this has not yet developed into a political model of change or adaptation (ibid.: 144). For Gilroy, exposure to otherness is always risky, but it promises the advancement of a convivial post-colonial urban of chaotic pleasures (ibid.: 167). It is shown below how melancholia and conviviality take highly local forms in addition to occupying a national stage.

Melancholia

> Southend […]has decided to be a place of pleasure and a home from home – a tolerant, unquestioning mistress who takes her lover as, and for as long as, she finds him. (O'Brien 1934: 48)

Southend-on-Sea is consumed by a melancholia obsessed with picking over the details of the resort's faded grandeur. This melancholic disposition is very much directed at the specificities of place, focusing on once proud buildings and monuments in the town. Asylum seekers, themselves a degraded population, are viewed as contributing further to the humiliation of the town (Millington 2005). Southend's melancholia stems, then, from its loss of a clearly defined role in the capitalist division of labour and its declining patronage by Londoners as a resort, a site of easy leisure. This reality is *publicly* repressed in the ongoing 'competition with other places for highly mobile capital' (Harvey 1996: 298) but is evident in repeated calls from residents to 'bulldoze' the golden mile of amusements and replace them with conference centres or luxury flats. This are parallels here to what Cohen (2005) calls an

Anglo-gothic imagination that imaginatively racialises decaying urban spaces. The gothic imagination thrives on

> […] Half-destroyed structures, often ancient, or mediaeval (and more recently modern) buildings which have either fallen into decay or disrepair […] These buildings contain secret chambers, subterranean passages, trapdoors, underground vaults, putrefying corpses, all of which have an important narrative function in evoking a past which has been forgotten or ignored […] and returns as a threatening or disruptive force. (Cohen 2005)

Buildings and structures that symbolise Southend's heyday attract an unhealthy amount of attention in residents' speech about asylum seekers. Most attention of all is reserved for the Palace Hotel, a grand building that dominates the cliff-top region of Southend's seafront. The Palace was built during a period of great prosperity for the town, and its immensity assertively emblemised Southend's confidence, ambition and modernity. The town and hotel have since suffered mixed fortunes. Pewsey (1993: 38) even suggests, '[t]he vicissitudes of this building over the years have been a metaphor for the uncertain direction of Southend's own future.' Self-assured projections of success at the beginning of the 20th century have never been realised. After tourism floundered, the Palace Hotel was used sporadically in the 1990s and early 2000s by various local authorities and London Boroughs to house those with chronic housing need. The hotel gained the reputation of a 'troubled landmark'. A councillor describes the hotel in the local press as a 'monstrous carbuncle', claiming that '[w]e cannot in all honesty claim to have made real progress towards the full regeneration of Southend while the hotel remains in its present decrepit state […] the Palace Hotel has suffered from nearly 50 years of dormancy and decay.' He goes on to state, 'It is an eyesore, entirely unsuited to its present use accommodating homeless families' (*Southend Evening Echo*: 16 May 2003). Displaying a more vivid imagination, other articles reveal how '[t]enants have told "nightmare" stories of how a man lay dead inside his room for four days and a child found a syringe coated in heroin' (Southend Evening Echo: 4 October 2001). Southend's residents also share this fascination for decay and vicarious revelation:

> My Mum actually used to have to visit the Palace Hotel. She had to go in there as part of her job in mental health […] Some of the people in there! [gasps] She said there was this one woman and she could

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> just *see* all the fleas on her. It makes you want to gag. (Rachel, Shop assistant, 30s)
>
> The chap next door, he was in the Palace Hotel with his two little children but he just walked out of there because of the asylum seekers, there were so many of them in there that he didn't feel safe [...] But he was telling me how bad it was down there. He was just frightened to come out of his room. He would lock the door and stay in there all night. They wouldn't do anything because they were all out in the corridors drinking – drugs as well, of course. (Diane, newspaper distributor, 60s)

As Rachel's and Diane's stories reveal, the Palace became synonymous with the presence of asylum seekers. Yet residents and the local press do not deal with the association of asylum seekers with the Palace Hotel as a matter of fact. Rather, their accounts reveal a fixation with the hotel and the unspeakable things that are imagined to happen inside its ailing walls. Established residents of the town appear to gain a sense of satisfaction from these embellishments.

Norbert Elias (1976) explains how once-powerful nations often possess a 'we-ideal' based upon an idealised image of greatness which can linger on for many years as a model to emulate, even when there is little realistic hope of being able to do so. One way that the charisma of the declining nation is kept alive is through the presence of buildings that seemingly confirm the greatness of the past. Yet Elias believes that any discrepancy between the imagined and *actual* condition of the nation leads not only to the destruction of threatening others but *also* to the destruction of the *self*. Self-destruction and the enjoyment derived from it are essential components of the condition of melancholia. The melancholic is utterly self-absorbed yet 'represents his ego to us as worthless [...] and morally despicable, he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished' (Freud 1995: 585). The melancholic also revels in 'self-exposure'; s/he develops a trait of 'insistent communicativeness' bent on diminution of self-regard. The discrepancy between Southend's 'we-ideal' – represented by the Palace Hotel – and the town's demise induces a collective state of melancholia:

> It's sad. It's sad. It's sad to think a lovely building like that has ended up housing asylum seekers. (Peter, retired, 80s)

A photograph taken with a disposable camera by a young male asylum seeker from Kosovo (Mat) also points towards melancholic aspects

of multicultural life outside the metropolis (Figure 1). When he was interviewed about the photograph, it was revealed that the boat symbolised being stranded, run aground, feeling lonely and out of place. Indeed, it was common for asylum seekers and refugees who were interviewed to vacillate between feeling at home in Southend and feeling lost, dispossessed and highly anxious.

Yet it is not only immigrants who may identify with this evocative photograph. Established residents also share a sense of being run aground, of being left 'high and dry'. They feel that the city they or their parents escaped has followed them out. They believe they have been *dumped upon*; not only has quality of life in Southend declined, the suburban dream turned sour, but also the reputation of *their Southend* is diminished. A common refrain is 'It's getting like London round here.' The only solution for some is to escape Southend and resettle in an imagined 'purified space' (Sibley 1995) that retains the whiteness that Southend once possessed (and London before that):

> A mate of mine has just sold up because you could see that happening and he hates blacks, Kosovans and anything else with a passion, and he's moving to Wakering.(Terry, plasterer, 50s)
>
> We left London to get away from all that and now it's following us out. (Roy, retired, 80s)

Figure 1 'Run Aground'
Source: Gareth Millington

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Residents talked of moving to Suffolk, Norfolk, Canada or Spain, all imagined white spaces where there are 'no foreigners'. Where Southend may have once represented the 'end of the line' – the furthest east one could escape from London – there is a strong sense among ex-Londoners now trapped in bedsit-land that the city they left behind has finally caught up with them.

Conviviality

> I was walking through Westcliff a few evenings ago and I saw I group of them [asylum seekers or immigrants] outside one of the hotels on the corner, just standing around. I thought, 'this is a bit different, what the fuck are they doing?' It turns out they are listening to the radio. About six of them, crowding round a little transistor radio! (Andy, hospital porter, 20s)

While Southend has a melancholic disposition, there are also signs that recent immigrants are introducing a sense of urgency and vitality that the town has missed. Asylum seekers and refugees who have arrived in Southend via London report that Southend is less crowded, less anonymous and offers a slower pace of life:

> It is easier in a town like Southend to feel part of society. Many people will tell you that it's easier in London because you don't feel a foreigner. But I feel more like a foreigner in London because I'm aware that around me is 90% foreigners. For me personally it's easier outside of London. London is so hectic for me on my own. I'm happier out of the city, as far as I can get from the city I think. (Kari, waitress and refugee, 20s)

> I feel myself here, I am someone not just no-one. I have lived in big cities like New York – I slept on the subway – and London, but this is where my home is, this is where my life is now. When I arrived here people treated me as special. They gave me so many things. (Predrag, chef and refugee, 40s)

The above revelations are counter-intuitive in the sense that it is often assumed that immigrants crave the anonymity granted as a matter of course in the metropolis. Yet in Southend difference remains just that; it is not assimilated, celebrated or ignored. The outsider identity of immigrants can be a resource to draw upon in establishing convivial relations with established residents. It need not be an isolating factor

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or a stigma. Yet it is not only newcomers who reassess identity and belonging:

> It's much more multicultural now and I like it. It's like the place has become important again […] It's like this is Southend and it is a home for these people whether we like it or not. It is home for us all. (Ruth, unemployed, 30s)

Multiculture and/or diversity offers a way back into the world for a devalued location such as Southend. New immigrants network the town into transnational flows – they bring visible signs of globalisation to Southend. Some residents are proud that Southend is changing because it makes the town feel modern again.

Tim Cresswell (1996) examines how ideas about things having 'a place' or being 'in place' reveal the workings of sociocultural and political power. The city is taken for granted as the home of diversity. In contrast, the suburbs or edge urban environments are viewed as staid, monocultural and backward, home to conservative rather than cosmopolitan whites. In a global age, the suburbs are a place from which you must escape to experience the real freedoms of the city. The presence of asylum seekers in Southend upsets this stability. As Cresswell (1996: 9) suggests, 'transgression serves to foreground the mapping of ideology onto space, and thus the margins can tell us something about "normality".' He cites the work of the black British photographer Ingrid Pollard, who uses her own body as a form of transgression in 'white' landscapes such as the Lake District or the British seaside: 'when she enters the Lake District, the meaning of the landscape is brought into question' (ibid.: 167; see also Gilroy 1993). The sense of liberation gained from spatial transgressions can be detected in Mat's second photograph (Figure 2). Here he looks up at a statue of Queen Victoria, situated in a historical preserved conservation district of Southend's seafront on the cliffs.

The coming together by happenstance of an eighteen-year-old youth from Kosovo, Southend seafront and a statue of Queen Victoria pointing across the estuary in this photograph is a potent example of spatial transgression. Like the photographer, the statue is also in exile, the town council having forcibly moved Queen Victoria in 1969 from a site on Southend's rowdy seafront to this more respectable area on the cliffs in a conservation area where it would no longer 'clash' with the deteriorating environment.

Figure 2 'In Exile'
Source: Gareth Millington

Conclusion

Southend-on-Sea is emblematic of the new terrain of 'race' relations in London. The central region of the town now operates as an outer–inner city of London. The relationship between Southend and London is historic; the centre–periphery dynamic is long-standing, although this has changed in accordance with the transformation of London. From the days when London filled Southend's 'golden mile' of beaches and amusements with rowdy working-class day-trippers to today when London Boroughs utilise the plentiful subdivided housing units in the central town to house their surplus populations, the subservience of Southend in this power-geometry has remained. Multicultural life in Southend may appear to be post-'race' in the sense that relations are not divided along the black–white lines that were common in the *agonopolis*. However, it is clear that asylum seekers are racialised in that they are seen to possess essential characteristics. What is the future for multicultural Southend? Racism and melancholia exist alongside the conviviality that immigrants have brought to the town, and to which many established residents have responded enthusiastically. These interactions and unlikely conjunctures have pointed towards strategies of cultural regeneration that local government has sought to exploit in the rebranding of the resort (see Millington 2008). The future also depends upon whether Southend can regain a sense of centrality or whether it remains a place of exile. The question remains as whether the town will be recognized as a multicultural and/or urban centre in its own right.

7
State-space: La Courneuve and Paris

(with David Garbin)

> I don't really feel Parisian … Courneuvian? Yes … The *mentalité* is different. When we go to Paris, they look at us in a different way… they think: 'they are not from here'… They are not like us. They live in Paris, we are living in La Courneuve. It's very different… (Slimane, 17)

Introduction

The peripheralisation of poverty in Paris began with Haussmann's renovations in the 19th century and came to a head with the construction of mass housing (the *grands ensembles*) on the northern and eastern peripheries of the city in the 1960s. The latter arguably represents the purest example of how a metropolis can be re-centred, with the preservation and pacification of a historic centre and business district and the expulsion to the periphery of the working class and immigrants who are denied the right to the city and right to use of the centre (Lefebvre 1996: 34). For Hazan (2010: xiii), contemporary exclusion from the city is very much in line with the history of Paris, in which, ever since the great confinement of 1657 that locked up the poor, deviant and mad in the Hôpital Général, 'the combined action of town planners, property speculators and police has never stopped pressing the poor, the "dangerous classes" from the centre of the city.' Paris has led the way in establishing a centre–periphery relation that appears a perfection of the practices of exclusion that are now common in London and New York.

The term 'state-space' is used here in the sense outlined by Brenner et al. (2003: 6) to refer to the historical territory and place-specific ways in which the state and its institutions are strategically mobilised to organise and regulate the social and economic relations of advanced capitalist

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society. This definition builds upon Lefebvre's (1991: 9) argument that 'each state claims to produce a space wherein something is accomplished – a space, even, where something is brought to perfection […]'. Yet even where social relations can be territorialised or homogenised in space, as is the intention with the *grands ensembles* of the *banlieues*, established grids of state-spatial regulation are frequently unsettled, particularly under conditions of socio-economic instability or systematic crisis (Brenner et al. 2003: 10).

After a brief geohistory of La Courneuve, Paris, the stigma that is attendant to the state-space of the *banlieues* is scrutinised. The aim then is to uncover how residents negotiate, live with or resist this stigma. Finally, the 'post-colonial' is considered as a useful metaphor to help make sense of resistance to the symbolic ignominy of the exclusion of colonial 'immigrants' from the city. It is suggested that the post-colonial helps make sense of the present by establishing continuities with the past. This chapter draws on qualitative data collected in La Courneuve during 2008, where twenty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with ordinary *Courneuviens*, youth workers, community activists, artists and council officials.[1]

Geohistories

From the second half of the 19th century until the end of the Second World War the town of La Courneuve, situated to the north-east of the city, was a mix of industry and agriculture, with factories lying side by side with bean plantations. During the 1960s, when Paris could no longer meet the demands of a rapidly rising population, La Courneuve, like many other north-eastern suburbs of the city, was designated a '*zone à urbaniser en priorité*' (ZUP), an area to be urbanised quickly. In fact, the housing crisis in Paris was so acute that during the 1950s much of the surrounding area resembled a shanty town (or '*bidonville*'). These makeshift dwellings were built mainly by Portuguese, Italian, and later Spanish and Algerian immigrants who had arrived in numbers in Paris to swell the post-war urban workforce. Unsurprisingly, native residents and politicians viewed *bidonvilles* as a blight on the city. The camps were associated with 'dangerous and dirty immigrants' and in parliamentary debates the terms *bidonville* and 'foreigners' were used interchangeably. As de Barros (2004: 67) explains, while officially complainants 'insisted on the fact that the shantytown was a danger to them and to their children, in private they complained about the "Arabs" themselves'.

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The chronic housing shortage in Paris was worsened by the arrival of around one million *pieds noirs* (returning French settlers) after the end of the Algerian war in 1962. At the beginning of the 1960s there was a desperate need for fourteen million new housing units (Power 1993: 44). In response, industrial building techniques that maximised size, speed and density for minimum cost were developed so that large, dense housing projects could be built on the peripheries of the largest cities – often on the sites of existing *bidonvilles*. Designs were utilitarian and inspired by Le Corbusier's pronouncement that houses were mere 'machines for living in' (*machines à vivre*). This prescriptive view fitted with the tradition of the paternalistic and hygienist French state. This belief in the *urban solution* encouraged the mechanised construction of repetitive and monotonous estates (or *cités*) that almost made architectural input redundant. The emergent hegemony of an automobile-centred model of *aménagement du territoire* was also one of the main vectors behind the spatial ex-centring of these new housing projects and their initial poor connectivity with the urban cores in terms of public transport (Body-Gendrot and de Wenden, 2007). The largest of these housing projects became known as the *grands ensembles* and included the *Quatre Mille* (or simply *Les 4000*) built in La Courneuve.

> When we got to *Les 4000*, there was a shopping centre, a cinema, it was very modern. It was called 'une ville moderne' in the 1960s. There were 4,000 dwellings. At that time there were the 'pieds noirs', French, even Spanish, but also relocated people from Paris who were living in the old working class areas of Paris. They relocated them. But the majority was the 'pieds noirs' at that time. It changed little by little, other people came. It is an urban history. A very rich history since the 1960s… (René, 60)

The *Quatre Mille* comprised a mix of high-rise towers and low-rise apartment blocks as well as football and basketball courts, a shopping precinct and cultural centre. The *cité* is divided into north (*nord*) and south (*sud*) regions. David Wright (2009: 48), an African American who moved to La Courneuve during the 1980s, takes up the story:

> In the sixties, France considered [the *Quatre Mille*] a site of social progress. The government constructed high-rise projects […] to house the people displaced by the Algerian and other colonial wars who lived in shanty towns near the industrial centre […] in 1968–70 the town boasted more jobs than residents. Hardly a decade later the

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> jobs began to disappear [...] Significant portions of the native white population [...] left and the high-rise projects became increasingly brown and black, and increasingly poor. La Courneuve became one of the poorest townships in France, home to 38,000 people of 80 nationalities and 26 religions, more sects than in any other French municipality. The deteriorating *Quatre Mille* high-rises dominated the landscape, calling to mind the bland concrete and metal poverty of Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes more than Left Bank café culture.

Initially *Les 4000* and other *grands ensembles* were viewed as triumphs. From the beautifully preserved centre of Paris it may have been easy to find cause for celebration. The city was ordered and everything and everyone appeared 'in place'. Yet those who lived in mass housing on the newly built periphery soon spoke of the problems of exclusion and dislocation. As Lefebvre (1996: 207) argues, 'Le Corbusier was a good architect but a catastrophic urbanist [...]'. Much of Jean-Luc Godard's (1966) film *Two or Three Things I Know About Her* is filmed in the alienating environs of the *Quatre Mille* and tells the story of a housewife who, in order to supplement her family's meagre income, has to prostitute herself in the centre of Paris for one night a week. Godard provides an early critique of mass architecture, rationalised planning and the dual alienation of work and participation in the burgeoning consumer society. It also provides a metaphor for the distinctive centre–periphery relationship that has characterised Paris since the 1960s.

By the 1970s and 1980s employment on the periphery of Paris began to disappear. Significant portions of the white population left, and *Les 4000* became increasingly brown, black and poor. Between 1975 and 1982, La Courneuve lost eleven per cent of its population. The decline of the *Quatre Mille* continued and there were riots in 1981 involving young people and the police. The mid to late 1980s also saw an increase in anti-immigrant feeling among the Right, especially among the followers of Le Pen, the leading voice of *le Front National* (the notion of *immigré* being almost exclusively associated with Arab–Muslim–*Maghrébin* communities). During this period almost eighty per cent of violent acts officially classed as racist and more than ninety per cent of racist murders were committed against Maghrebis (Hargreaves and McKinney 1998). However as Braziel (2008: 145) explains, concomitant with the rise of anti-Arab sentiment and anti-immigrant legislation, the second-generation children of Maghrebi migrants entered a period of artistic and political awakening known as 'Le Mouvement beur'.

Loïc Wacquant, who began ethnographic research in *Les 4000* in the 1990s, brings attention to what has become a beleaguered multi-ethnic, post-colonial population who interpret their entrapment in the *cité* as an insult. Notions of progress and modernity are forgotten as Wacquant records how residents 'have a vivid awareness of being "exiled" to a degraded space that collectively disqualifies them [...] (1996: 239). Moreover, there is resentment that La Courneuve is used 'as a dumping ground for its problem populations and in particular for relieving itself of lower class households displaced by the urban renewal of the eastern boroughs of the capital' (Wacquant 2008a: 167). Since the 1950s and 1960s when the *grands ensembles* were built, they have gradually been reduced from communal, human places to 'indifferent "spaces" of mere survival and relentless contest' (ibid.: 241). In placing conditions in the *Quatre Mille* in historical context, Wacquant (ibid.) presents a theory of 'advanced marginality', a *fin-de-siècle* regime of urban marginalisation that is neither residual nor cyclical nor transitional. The two dimensions of this marginality are socio-spatial relegation and exclusionary closure. Each will be dealt with in turn. In relation to socio-spatial relegation, *banlieues* are relegated spaces occupied by relegated people. The social oppositions objectified in physical space are reproduced in thought and language, as categories of perception (Bourdieu 1999: 125). For example, districts in central Paris such as the *Marais* are understood to be safe, white spaces whilst sites such as La Courneuve provoke abject feelings of disgust or fear. This connotation disguises the arbitrariness of positions in social space. Exclusionary closure is implied in a Weberian sense, whereby a dominant collective restricts its adversary's access to opportunities and resources in order to exclude them from the competition. In other words, a whole section of a population is physically and symbolically contained, thereby producing the 'effect' of an ordered, harmonious and homogeneous central Paris. This symbolic containment involves drawing upon characteristics such as 'race', language and place of domicile or social background. For Wacquant (2008a: 3), closure is primarily 'the product of a class logic, in part redoubled by ethnoracial [post-colonial] origin and in part attenuated by state action'. Dikeç (2007) and Rey (1999) have argued, however, that fear of the *banlieues* is associated primarily with immigration. For Wacquant (2008b: 15), the warehousing of the poor and/or black in the *banlieues* is embedded in a neoliberal policy choice aimed at the social and penal regulation of *all* marginal categories. Either way, the state space of the banlieues is an example of what Dikeç (2001) calls the 'injustice of spatiality', the fact that 'spatial dynamics not only aggravate but actually produce injustice

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through the stabilization of social inequalities and problems, becoming a major reproducer of them' (ibid.: 1,798). Social space is granted permanence in urban space (ibid.: 1,793), not just in concrete forms such as housing but also in the symbolic stigma and/or prestige that give rise to further injustice and ignominy.

Territorial Stigma

In Paris there is a terrible stigma imposed upon those who live on the poor peripheries of the city: a shame that far exceeds that which may be found on the peripheries of London or New York. To dwell 'in a Red Belt[2] low income complex means to be confined to a branded space, to a blemished setting experienced as a "trap"' (Wacquant 2008a: 171). The result of this stigma 'is a profound "image deficit" that is present in all interaction. Symbolic defamation also 'intensifies the experience of finitude: it chains one to a place' (Bourdieu 1999: 127). Similarly, Lapeyronnie (2008) argues that for residents negative images of their *banlieue* are perceived to be both the source *and* the consequence of urban segregation. The colonised of the *banlieues* experience estrangement from the wider social world as the dominant norms of values of society permanently invalidate their own reality (ibid.: 17). Even when young people from La Courneuve travel into the centre of Paris, when they leave behind the monotonous grey concrete of the *cité*, they are easily recognised as *jeunes de banlieue* and attract a mixture of fear, contempt and fascination.

> Yes, we go often to Paris, it's fine there. But when they see a 'troupeau' [gang], they are scared… it's normal … people from Paris, young and adults. They know we are coming from the *banlieue*… (Soufrane,[3] 15)

> But when the kids are looking for a job in Paris, and they say they are from La Courneuve, they don't get anything… There is discrimination towards the *banlieue*... That's for sure! My daughter is a secretary – she applied for jobs in Paris – she got rejected many times… (Sonia, 53)

Even the central Paris underground shopping complex of *Les Halles*, where many banlieue youth congregate,[4] is renowned as the least attractive of all Paris's recent regeneration projects; guidebooks portray it as a place that sells cheap leather jackets, where visitors are warned to watch their bags and wallets. Spaces in the central city, exemplified by the case of *Les Halles*, are viewed as vulnerable to 'contamination' from the periphery.

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The *Cité des 4000* is perhaps the most stigmatised Parisian *banlieue*. As Morris, 50, states, '*Les 4000* is a symbol throughout France … *Les 4000* represents an image about the worst of the Banlieue'. Its derogated status in the French *imaginaire* was reinforced by (then Interior Minister) Nicolas Sarkozy's visit to the estate on 20 June 2005. The previous day an 11-year-old boy, Sidi-Ahmed Hammache, had been killed as he washed his father's car outside the *Quatre Mille Sud*, caught by a stray bullet 'intended for two Tunisians who forbade their sister's romance with an African' (Wright 2009: 50). During his visit, Sarkozy vowed to clean out the housing projects, removing their 'rabble' or '*racaille*' ('scum'). Sarkozy was becoming famous at that time for his anti-crime/anti-immigrant stance, and the visit was a clear attempt to project this image more forcefully in the run-up to the presidential elections. Whilst popular with some sections of the public,[5] Sarkozy's words confirmed the suspicions of beleaguered residents that the authorities viewed them merely as dirt. Sarkozy's comments and the political capital gained from media coverage of his 'tough cop' performance compounded the stigma that La Courneuve already carried. Indeed, to show how fierce and unrelenting the stigma became following Sarkozy's visit, in May 2009 the Mayor of La Courneuve lodged a formal complaint of '*discrimination territoriale*'. It was the first time the national agency for anti-discrimination and equality had received a 'collective' complaint from a city council.

The stigma of living in La Courneuve is all-encompassing and engenders a mistrustful disposition, so that grievances are found in the unlikeliest of circumstances. For Mouna (see below), even her daily experience of the RER, the suburban train linking Paris to its (rich or poor) *banlieues*, reflects the ways in which *Courneuviens* feel they are treated by the city and the state, in all its guises:

> They don't even give us the time to get off the RER: 'Aubervilliers-La Courneuve, come on, get out! Get out!' [allez, dégagez!] They treat us like dogs and all this because we live in La Courneuve. But when the RER stops at La Plaine de France, the next stop, it goes slowly – you'll also find station managers; there is a clear difference! They do that because they don't like us! (Mouna, 54)

There is a temporal aspect to Mouna's sense of victimisation, a sense that this example is indicative of an *ongoing* process of denigration across a variety of bureaucratic fields controlled by the state. Lapeyronnie (2008: 251–52) writes about the omnipresence of the state in terms of

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the rules and regulations of the *cité*. He argues that residents deploy tactics in order to negotiate the intricacies of social control and coercion, from the council estate agency (*agence HLM*) to social services and the justice system. Certainly the state (from the Interior Minister down to the police and national train services) is viewed as playing a critical role in producing and reproducing the negative representations of space that shame residents and the *banlieue* space.

As Lapeyronnie (2008) shows in his seminal analysis of the *banlieue* experience, there exists a considerable tension between internal self-perception of *banlieue* residents and external representations. In the eyes of many *Courneuviens*, the media shoulder a great deal of responsibility for the territorial stigmatisation of the *banlieues* and the *Quatre Mille* in particular.

> There is a gap [fossé]... They [the media] are prejudiced against La Seine St Denis and La Courneuve... There is a difference between the way people live and the way it is portrayed in the media... There is a discrepancy [décalage]. (Cyril, 35)
>
> The area where we are 'Les 4000-Sud' has a bad reputation, image... But this image doesn't correspond to the reality... Radio, TV, papers, they always speak badly of La Courneuve, especially about Les 4000 sud... Unfortunately when an image has been stuck to you [image collée], to get rid of it, it takes time... (Arboncana, 62)

When Arboncana, retired teacher and chairman of Malian community group, reflects on a discussion with a journalist from the leading national newspaper *Le Monde*, he stresses the discrepancy between what is told and what is reported:

> They [the media] have all stigmatised La Courneuve. We had a journalist from *Le Monde*, she wrote really bad things about La Courneuve. We had a discussion with her and I also arranged for several young people of La Courneuve to be present. All that we had talked with her during an hour and a half, she didn't write anything about it, because it didn't fit with what she wanted, it was horrible. Generally speaking the media are so biased about what is happening in La Courneuve. They are contributing to the bad image of La Courneuve. (Arboncana, 62)

The (re)production of a limited type of images and messages is seen not in terms of a *mediation* of a lived, experienced reality but as a reified

version of reality. Lapeyronnie (2008) argues that the media stigma represents a heavy weight for residents of the *banlieue*, even suggesting that the dominance of the stigma separates them from the meaning of their own behaviour. In other words, they begin to understand themselves within the categories imposed by the media.

The symbolic violence inflicted by the stigma legitimates the use of actual violence against youthful residents of *Les 4000*. The widely used term '*banlieue* youth' ('*jeunes de banlieue*') is a racialised category that implies the perceived threat posed by working-class youths of immigrant origin. Of course these young people are overwhelmingly *French* in the sense they were born in France, but most are of Franco-Maghrebi descent with parents from Algeria, or, to a lesser extent, Morocco and Tunisia. Some have parents from Senegal, Congo, Cameroon or Caribbean islands such as Martinique and Guadeloupe (Braziel 2008: 136). In response to the supposed threat of *les immigrés*, the police create a daily climate of tension and humiliation (or *hagra*) for this unassimilated, disenfranchised and racially targeted minority (Mucchielli and Le Goaziou 2006). Many interviewees, and not only young people, described the negative consequences of such encounters with the police:

> They stop and search us for nothing. We walk on the street, they know us, they know everything about us, and they stop and search us [ils nous contrôlent] … for nothing, it's really to piss us off, [pour nous faire chier] All the time, all the time, they search us … They know us, they know our names … But we don't have a good relationship with them (Slimane, 17)
>
> The policemen would come to us and insult us, for nothing … Every time they stop and search us [un contrôle] … like 'go back to your country', things like that. (Soufrane, 15)
>
> The police are dogs … I don't like them … I don't like them … All the time, all the time, they search us … They know us, they know our names … (Slimane, 17)

The actions of the police exacerbate the humiliation already experienced by *banlieue* youth in other areas of life, such as education and the labour market. The extension from symbolic to physical violence is made possible by the imposition of the former. Dikeç (2007: 160) discusses in detail the role of the police in provoking humiliation and resentment, stating: 'there is ample evidence of police discrimination and violence, notably towards *banlieue* youth.' Dikeç cites a variety of reports that

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demonstrate how deliberate police provocation is a regular feature of life for youth in the *banlieue*. There is also evidence of the effective impunity of law enforcement officers in cases of shootings, deaths in custody or torture and ill treatment. Underlying, and indeed supporting, the police control of *Les 4000* is the denotation in French public policy that the *banlieues* constitute 'objects of intervention' (ibid.: 21).

While humiliation is part and parcel of daily life in the *cité*, arguably the shame is worse when police harass youths in public spaces *outside* the *cité*, especially in the centre of Paris. Lapeyronnie (2008) recounts the story of a youth accosted by the police for hanging out in the city just as one of his schoolteachers happened to be passing. The boy asked, 'what kind of person must my teacher think I am to be stopped by the police?' This demonstrates how the stigma of the territory adorns the body, and, even when you leave the environs of the *cite*, age, style, speech and ethnicity/race identify you as belonging to the *banlieue* rather than the city. In this way, when young people of North or sub-Saharan African origin enter Paris they are likely to be judged as out of place and therefore legitimate objects of police/state intervention. This is why we have seen that many *Courneuviens* do not feel Parisian, or perhaps even French. Indeed, at a soccer match between France and Algeria in 2002 held at the Stade de France (situated close to La Courneuve), North African youths from the *banlieues* opted to support Algeria, partly in recognition of their origins and partly as a matter of their disaffiliation with the Republic. In the process they roundly booed the Marseillaise and even invaded the pitch. Political discourse following this demonstration challenged North African youth to choose Algeria *or* France, an imposition that denied their cultural hybridity, the prospect that they may belong to or feel affinity with more than one nation.

Space is used perniciously in the case of the *banlieues* to impose systems of meaning upon lower social classes and non-white citizens. This is why the *Quatre Mille* occupies a unique place in the French *imaginaire*. Like the iconic inner cities of New York and London, the *cité des 4000* is a spectacle, which explains why media, journalists, artists, politicians (and sociologists) flock there. Whilst the stigma of the *Quatre Mille* restricts access to opportunities for those who live there, the paradox is that its extreme marginalisation enriches the *cité* with symbolic, cultural and political capital (see Garbin and Millington 2011) that those already sufficiently endowed with capital and legitimated within particular fields can extract to further enhance their own social position. In the interlocking representation of space conveyed by these agents, *Les 4000* remains a *state-space*, a perfectly

homogenised territory where the stigma is 'the single most protrusive feature of the lived experience of those entrapped in these sulfurous zones' (Wacquant 2008a: 169).

Escape Attempts

> Belonging to the *quartier* – it's more in the mind… (Stephen, 25)

The most striking aspect of interviews with residents of La Courneuve is their sense of injustice at the stigma they bear. Residents do not accept this imposition with passivity. They are active in 'carrying' the stigma whilst simultaneously challenging or wrestling with its effects. The forces of oppression that combine to produce the *banlieues* as a relegated space are not endowed with the same 'naturalising effect' that veils the production of space in, say, the inner city or outer–inner city. Arguably, where the peripheralisation project feels most natural is in the centre of Paris, which still manages to give the impression of being a living, breathing city even if its urban heart has been removed and relocated to a position external to the body. Paris projects an image of centrality, even though in reality its previously urban core is now 'museumfied' (Lefebvre 1996: 209). Many living in the *banlieues* accurately recognise the causes of their exclusion from Paris and their wider stigmatisation in French society. It is held here that the domination of urban space – even in an unambiguous state-space like the *Cité des 4000* – is the vexed outcome of (unequal and ongoing) struggles within a myriad of urban-related social fields (e.g., architectural design, resource allocation, policing, community politics, etc.). Domination is never the direct and simple action exercised by a set of agents – 'a dominant class' – invested with powers of coercion. Rather, it is the indirect effect of a complex set of actions engendered within the network of intersecting constraints. Residents are skilled at recognising how the symbolic domination they are subject to is imposed. They identify a diverse range of 'guilty' agents – politicians, the media, the police, the city, state bureaucracies and even other residents – who they understand to be responsible for the arbitrary classifications imposed upon them and the unjust treatment they receive as a consequence.

Whilst Wacquant accurately captures an important facet of the development of the *banlieues* as an exclusionary and closed space functional for neoliberal times, he does not satisfactorily account for the variety of methods deployed by residents in order to 'win space' – be that mental,

social or physical space – from the oppressive overdetermined environs of the *cite*.[6] The aim of this section is to demonstrate how it is at the level of the everyday, in ordinary spatial practice, where symbolic domination is reproduced and contested. Foucault's (1979) argument that *wherever there is power, there is also resistance* is crucial, although the term 'resistance' is perhaps too encumbered with political (i.e., *organised* political) overtones. Cohen and Taylor's (1992) conceptualisation of 'escape attempts' better conveys the balancing act of celebrating projects of resistance whilst also exposing their fragility. Escape attempts range from subtle psychic manoeuvres, to full-scale riots, to a utopian imagination. What escape attempts share is a desire to 'puncture' the given social reality – to ignore, subvert or resist the world as it is presented. Escape attempts are phenomenological solutions to oppressive everyday life, which is why they seek to evade or embrace a 'La Courneuve state of mind' – whichever promises most relief.

The city is never univocal (De Certeau 1984). Discursive struggles over representation are as fiercely fought and just as fundamental to the activities of place construction as bricks and mortar (Harvey 1996: 322). Residents do not unquestioningly accept the denigration of their *cité*; they construct their own oppositional representational spaces. That is not to say they are happy with their exclusion from the city and their living conditions; rather, they seek to extricate themselves, however temporarily, from what they *recognise* as the unfair and illegitimate symbolic violence imposed upon them. Narratives concerning positive aspects of everyday life in La Courneuve comprise a representational space where ordinary *Courneuviens* and local activists tactically engage with dominant visions of the *banlieues*. Micheline (see below) speaks eloquently of the 'fight' and the need for community organisation in order to project an affirmative place-image. Claude explains how residents in the *'le 93'* have organised to counter negative representations of the *banlieues*, while Farida gives a sense of the labour required to reverse the stigma:

> In my everyday life I fight to stop these images, stereotypes, I am fed up! I would like the good things of La Courneuve to be heard… I am Courneuvian! I like my *cité*. (Micheline, 47)
>
> There is a difference between the way people live and the way it is portrayed in the media. I think some Seine St Denis' residents are getting organised to create their own press agency to report what is really happening… (Claude, 35)
>
> Yes people have clichés about *Courneuviens* but we also have to construct our own image… (Farida, 32)

Despite recurrent representations of the *banlieues* as isolated and static spaces (dumpsters or containers), many residents are keen to underline the spatial positioning of La Courneuve in the geography of Greater Paris in terms of greater social inclusiveness. For example, Mme Hamouche, 77, 'flips' the notion that La Courneuve is a static container and provocatively suggests that La Courneuve is dynamic and cosmopolitan compared with Paris, which is staid. She argues that 'Paris is too quiet. There is no mixing.' She continues in this vein, contradicting the hegemonic centre–periphery relation: '[W]e are like a family in the *banlieues*… Paris is isolated (*isolé*).' Here she draws a contrast between the togetherness of the *banlieues* and the remoteness, perhaps even coldness, of the city. Certainly, Paris remains a distant presence in the accounts of residents of La Courneuve. Rarely do they convey a sense that they *inhabit* the city. Paris may not be far, and it may only take ten minutes to travel to the city by train, but the dominant theme can be summed up in the words of Sophie, 42: 'I don't think people here feel Parisian … In their head Paris is very far … They don't really know Paris …' and Marcelle, 47, who states 'I don't live in Paris… I like Paris, but do I live there? No.'

Yet belonging to the *cité* rather than the city is not necessarily a problem. Mouna asserts that, 'despite everything', many residents actually like La Courneuve and, in spite of what anybody else thinks, that is all that matters: 'I feel Courneuvian, it's the most important identity for me. We like La Courneuve despite all the attacks against us, despite the stigma, despite everything…' (Mouna, 54). Mouna's *Courneuvien* identity is located in the shadows; it is something only residents can *know*; a performance only they can *inhabit*. In de Certeau's (1984) terms, this is an exercise in the art of 'making do': taking the predisposition of the world and making it over, converting it to the purposes of ordinary people. This identity remains illegible to the media and politicians. Rather, it is reminiscent of what Lukács (1970, cited in Lovell 1980: 71) calls 'the inner poetry of life':

> I like La Courneuve, people are nice, despite what the media says. There is diversity; it's pleasant. There are 80 different communities here, different nationalities, it's very rich. (Samadia, 53)
>
> I like La Courneuve, despite the delinquency, the bad image. I like the *'interculturalité'* the cultural *'mixité'*. You can travel without moving. I haven't travelled much but I could talk about Mali, Senegal like if I had lived there! I could talk about India and Algeria, like if I was going there often. That's because I interact with so many different people here. (Farida, 32)

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> I like it here, it's ok. It's a *quartier* where there is everything, the mix [*mélange*] is good [*bien dosé*]. There is not one community that is more represented than another one. We have Portuguese, mixed couples, a lot of mixed couples, Franco-*Antillais*, Franco-Algerian, African families, it's all ok. (Anna, 25)

Residents do not 'reverse' the racialisation and/or ethnicisation of their collective relegation but instead take comfort in a 'quiet' cosmopolitanism, a representational imagining of a Courneuvian identity embedded in a place that contains '80 different communities', where one 'travels without moving'. These observations are supported by Avery (1987: 21–2), who finds in *Les 4000* 'a lot of mutual respect and solidarity in the daily life of the *cité*'. In addition, Lepoutre (1997, 2001: 80) claims that in La Courneuve 'friendships cross cultural barriers quite easily.' Everyday experience of cultural *mixité* in La Courneuve is viewed positively insofar as the heterogeneity and fluidity of the community are juxtaposed with the homogenising effect of the stigma. This is an expression of the 'right to difference' (rather than particularity), referring to the 'right not to be classified forcibly into categories which have been determined by the necessarily homogenising powers' (Lefebvre 1976, cited in Dikeç 2001: 1,790):

> I am everything at once [*tout en meme temps*]! There's not one identity more important … Everything is together – as long as you respect me… (Said, 15)

This is especially relevant in the hegemonic and rigid context of the French Republican nationhood, which tends to mute and gloss over the politics of difference and the multicultural/intercultural dimensions of contemporary post-colonial French society (Amiraux and Simon 2006; Gondola 2009; Murray 2006).

Residents like Mouna, Samadia, Farida, Anna and Said are never completely victims of closure since the internal diversity of the *cité* offers plenty of escape 'routes'. Through their everyday sociability they produce what Homi Bhabha (1990) calls a hybrid 'third space' that allows the emergence of new cultural forms as well as new structures of authority (ibid.: 211). This supports the view that, even when it appears we are trapped in space, 'we can never ever be purely "local" beings' (Harvey 1996: 353).

Escape attempts are not limited to the representational realm. Spontaneous *practical* interventions such as riots also provide relief from

the symbolic violence. The 2005 riots are a case in point. In a nearby *cité* at Clichy-sous-Bois on 27 October 2005, two Maghreb youths aged 15 and 17 died by electrocution after running into an electric transformer whilst attempting to evade police arrest. There was much debate as to whether the police were pursuing the fleeing teenagers. Rioting followed that night and for a further night. There was also a silent march in honour of the victims which drew around 500 people from Clichy and surrounding *banlieues* (Braziel 2008: 136). Political tension intensified when Sarkozy, then Interior Minister, described protestors as *racailles* (or scum). By 4 November, arson and violence had erupted in *banlieues* not only in Paris but across the country. Curfews and a state of emergency remained in effect until 15 November.

Rioting in *Les 4000* was less pronounced in comparison with neighbouring *cités* at Clichy-sous-Bois, Stains or Sarcelles. In fact, there were no reports of disturbances in La Courneuve until 'day three' of the rioting (Mucchielli and Le Goaziou 2006). The reason given by residents for the lack of activity in the early stages was not a lack of anger on the part of the young people but the huge police presence that had already congregated in the *cité* in anticipation of rioting:

> There was a climate of tension, but more because of seeing all the police vans, CRS vans [riot police]. Helicopters were also watching. I think that was more threatening [*angoissant*] than what was really happening. Of course, cars were burning, but I was in a state of war. I was stressed, with all the helicopters, the police. It was too much. I have experienced more what was *around* the riots, than the riots themselves. (Micheline, 49)

> I think that a big reason for the 'inactivity'" was the incredible overdose of CRS [riot police] in the area for at least a week. The local youth told me that they [the police] were constantly provoking them and that the few things that did happen were simply out of anger at the behaviour of the police. I think this is because the state knows the potential for things to end in a blood bath here and this caused them to put a huge emphasis on keeping things down as much as possible. (Marc, 50)

The 'nesting' of emergency riot police squads inside sensitive zones of the urban periphery has been documented elsewhere (Wacquant, 2008b: 22). As the accounts above demonstrate, residents reported that, whilst they did not witness widespread youth revolt, they did experience the invasion and occupation of La Courneuve by the CRS. They describe

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this incursion by the state as a frightening episode that exceeded usual levels of insecurity on the estate.

Perhaps this explains the inter-generational understanding and support among residents for the belated disorder that did occur in the *Cité des 4000*. As Claudia explains (below), the actions of young rioters were born out of respect for themselves and their *cité,* a love for life even. She also explains how the riots should be understood almost as a 'cry and demand' (Lefebvre 1996: 158) for the right to the city:

> Young people are the symptom, not the cause. The cause is that people are sleeping and they are not active. They don't love life [*aimer la vie*]. Loving life is asking yourself: how can I improve things in my *banlieue*? What am I doing here? (Claudia, 50)

Lapeyronnie (2008) argues that the rioters' modes of action suggested an oscillation 'between the moral affirmation of their right to exist, their right to live, and the use of destructive but rational violence from which they hope to gain entry to or acknowledgment from the system' (ibid.: 43). In this sense, rioters set about the task of claiming a new space of inhabitability by destroying the existing space that denied them this right.

Much has also been said and written about how the riots were criticised for popularising 'violence without political objective'. Some sections of the mainstream press, 'media intellectuals' and the right-wing government predictably discussed the 'nihilist' nature of the violence and called for the restoration of the 'authority of the state', whilst also pointing to familiar problem of 'integration' (Mauger 2006). Balibar (2007: 52) suggests that media coverage of the violence transformed real, endemic violence into a spectacle, thereby making *invisible* its everydayness. Yet, the Invisible Committee (IC) (2009) suggest, *what was distinctive* about the events of 2005 is that the youth involved in riots did not answer to anyone (their elders, political organisations or associations). Furthermore, their actions cannot easily be 'read' and therefore defy political appropriation; the 'wordless destruction' of the riots inscribes a *denial of the political*:

> These assailants no longer listen to anybody, neither to their Big Brothers and Big Sisters, nor to the community organizations charged with overseeing the return to normal. No 'SOS Racism' could sink its cancerous roots into this event [...] This whole series of nocturnal vandalisms and anonymous attacks, this wordless destruction,

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> has widened the breach between politics and the political. No one can deny the obvious: this was an assault that made no demands, a threat without a message, and it had nothing to do with 'politics'. […] Like lost children we trashed the prized trinkets of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris at the end of the Bloody Week[7] […].' (IC 2009: 24–5)

Some residents, however, have more prosaic concerns, for instance with how the riots will only serve to increase the stigma of La Courneuve and reinforce its closure as a state-space. They complain about how the public presumes that there was more rioting in La Courneuve than there was in reality. They are also angered that the media used La Courneuve as a base for their news reports, despite the fact that rioting was more pronounced elsewhere. Moreover, they pointed to the irony that many post-riot news documentaries visited *Les 4000* ahead of more 'active' *cités*.

> We don't want to deal with the media anymore. TF1[8] contacted a community group during the riots, asking them to put them in touch with young people who would then set fire to a car, so that they could film it! It was appalling… (Isi, 30)

It is hard to envisage a scale through which the relative achievements or merits of 'escape attempts' can be measured. Ferrell (2001: 177), for example, understandably views *all* forms of praxis and 'resistance' as flawed because they are necessarily caught within a web of contradictions, not least the unintended effect of reproducing injustices of spatiality (Dikeç 2001). However, the narratives of individuals living in La Courneuve are diagnostic of extraordinary forces and mechanisms of exclusion, homogenisation and closure.

Enjoy the Silence: the *Banlieues* and a Post-colonial 'Past Present'

> And is not this work of spontaneous recollection […]? For here the day unravels what the night has woven. (Benjamin 1973: 204)

In allying the place stigma and physical exclusion of the banlieues to anxieties about immigration and integration, it is apparent that, even in a French state that refuses to employ the term race or ethnicity when addressing societal problems, processes of racialisation *are* occurring

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and a whole section of the French public is being 'racially' essentialised. This represents the negative impact of 'race' thinking on the city in terms of how it is used to divide and exclude. Yet an alternative process of race formation – an evocation of 'the post-colonial' – is being used to challenge the injustices still faced by Maghrebi populations in France, not least the reproduction of racial marginalisation in the spaces of the Republic. On the face of it, as Goldberg (1993: 187) puts it, it seems uncontroversial to claim that the roots of racialised Western metropolis can be traced to the end of the colonial era. In this sense, history, or rather memory, is being added to socio-spatial forms of resistance such as discursive or violent struggles. The traumas of decolonisation are crucial to understanding contemporary France, not least the social and spatial isolation of the *banlieues* from the city (Hargreaves and McKinney 1998: 18). In their public representation and everyday dealing with the majority population, Maghrebis cannot escape the 'generally unstated and often unconscious but nonetheless potent legacy of the colonial era, which continues to colour majority perceptions of minority groups' (ibid.). This perception elides national and ethnic differences and constructs barriers based upon ideas of racial inferiority inherited from over a century of colonisation: 'Anyone with a physical appearance suggesting Maghrebi origins is apt to be seen as an "Arab" and to be taken for an Algerian' (ibid.). However, to focus only on Maghrebis is to ignore the potentially differentiated post-colonial racialisation that affects sub-Saharan Africans, a group who undoubtedly experience their peripheral position in France in a specifically racialised way. As White (2007: 375) states,

> We merely have to recall Frantz Fanon's classic 'Look! A Negro!' moment for an indication that phenotype has relevance in the French context […] Quite clearly there are black French who are not only fighting for full citizenship but doing so in the painful context of anti-black racism.

The *banlieues* of major French cities have been associated with the so-called 'immigrant problem' for decades. This problem concerns the 'perceived threat posed to the fabric of "cohésion nationale" by working class youths of immigrant origin' (de Laforcade 2006: 218) and is intimately linked to the recent turn to 'law and order' policies by politicians and the French public. To understand the gravity and significance of highly politicised anti-immigrant hysteria, Laforcade (2006: 218) insists that, contrary to the 'forgetfulness' of the Republican ideal,

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it is vital to acknowledge the roots of anti-immigrant sentiment in post-war French history. Laforcade's argument is that the 'issue' of immigration in France can be traced back to the Algerian war of decolonisation, when the *bidonvilles* where North African workers lived were routinely targeted by 'ratonnades' or 'rat hunts' carried out by neo-Nazis and the colonialist paramilitary organisation *OAS*. These attacks were provoked by fear that the uncharted zones of the city had become a haven for pro-independence revolutionaries. The maltreatment of Algerians in France was such that in 1974 Algeria suspended all emigration to France; more than 50 Algerians had fallen victim to a wave of homicides indiscriminately targeting Arab and anti-racist organisations. For Rioux (1990) and Stora (1991), memories of the Algerian War and the years that followed are repressed yet omnipresent. The absence of an explicitly post-colonial discourse in France is partly a reflection of lingering 'neocolonial' reflexes (Hargreaves and McKinney 1998: 18).

There has been a conspicuous silence on the similarities between the treatment by French authorities of Algerians (or other citizens with Maghrebi origin) both in North Africa and on home soil. There is reluctance to draw comparisons between the Algerian war and the stigma and harassment imposed upon North African youth in the exclusionary and dislocated *banlieues*. The apparent (and ironic?) inversion of the Kasbah of Algiers in modern-day Paris passes without comment. An example of this reluctance can be found below:

> There is some *continuity* between the experience of being an immigrant in modern day France and being a civilian in previously colonised Algeria. However, any suggestions of *equivalence* are based purely upon intuition. The equivalence in experience cannot be objectified by research and thus remains a political issue rather than a scientific fact. (Bertrand 2006: 126, emphasis added)

Here, Bertrand argues that, although there are undoubtedly continuities between the experience of being an immigrant in France and a civilian in colonised Algeria, we cannot speak of any true equivalence because this cannot be objectified in research. Similarities are down simply to *intuition*. It is difficult to understand exactly what Bertrand would agree to as an objective measure of equivalence between past and present; it is difficult to think of a statistical measure that could be used. While he is correct to be wary of lazy comparisons that serve political (as opposed to sociological) purposes, his caution demonstrates the reluctance of the French academy to 'ethnicise' social problems.

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The discourse of the Republic continues to regulate and discipline the ideas, identities and claims of minorities in France (see Blatt 1997).

Bertrand is arguing primarily against writers such as Achille Mbembe, who have dared suggest the existence of a *post-colony* in France and abroad. Mbembe (2001) argues that there is a clear correlation between state racism at home and French neocolonial policy in the African countries that remain dependents of the former empire. He argues that France's homeland 'post-colony' is comprised by the exclusion, stigma and policing of the *banlieues*, which are, of course, populated by the descendents of the formerly colonised. The post-colony, as located in the *banlieues*, is a remnant of a French colonial tradition whose administrative habits have never been eradicated. Lapeyronnie (2008: 17) also sees striking continuities between the colonial and post-colonial in relation to urban France. Whilst he accepts that the *banlieues* are not conquered lands, nor are they occupied by armies or exploited for their natural resources, he does suggest that:

> Neo-colonial power relations thus feed the social isolation of the ghetto and provide it with meaning. Isolation becomes part of a normative order that inserts immigration into a continuity of colonial relations, irrespective of the 'independence' of the countries they migrate from.

It is the meaning that neocolonial power relations provide to the *banlieues* that is important here. The past can be used to make sense of, and form opposition to, the present. In a similar vein, Balibar (2007: 56) writes of how the post-colony *haunts* the contemporary French situation.

The post-colonial will not go away, despite the silences of the Republic. In some ways this is because it serves as a useful metaphor to make sense of contemporary struggles for the right to the city. In 2005 a new organisation, *Les indigènes de la République*, the 'Natives of the Republic', called for the 'decolonisation of the Republic' and organised public protests and meetings in Paris to denounce the 'neocolonial management' of the *banlieues*, and to expose 'post-colonial' forms of authority, power and legitimisation. Like Mbembe, they sought to establish parallels by connecting power relations through a specific colonial–post-colonial time/space. The Natives of the Republic stress the existence of 'two Republics', a 'dreamed' and a 'real' Republic. For them, the sole historical and ideological function of the dreamed Republic is to conceal the real Republic of repression and oppression. They advance the notion of the 'past-present', meaning that you cannot even 'think' the present

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without interrogating the past. Attempts to tie past and present together have occurred at a local level. In October 2005 the communist mayor of La Courneuve inaugurated the renaming of a street in memory of the massacre at the Pont Saint-Michel, from where the Police threw bodies of Algerians into the Seine during a peaceful demonstration of around 40,000 people on 17 October 1961. The demonstration took place to challenge a curfew directed specifically at the *travailleurs algériens*, the 'Algerian workers', itself part of a wider strategy to curtail the anti-colonial activities of the FLN (The Algerian Liberation Front) in the French capital. The renaming of the street was the result of campaigning on behalf of, among others, AFRICA – a local organisation based in *Les 4000*. It is arguably part of a progressive shift in the wider politics of post-colonial memory. It should also be understood as a modest rewriting of urban history, a reminder that those denied the right to the city may yet still lay claim to Paris.

History marks the relation of a community to its past. It serves the function of guaranteeing the stability of the past and its 'past-ness' (Huyssen 2003: 1). In France, the Republic *is* history and those excluded from the Republic effectively have no history. This is because, as Trouillot (1995) explains, 'any historical narrative is a particular bundle of silences, the result of a unique process [...] these silences crisscross or accumulate over time to produce a unique mixture'. The silences or absences that fail to address the post-colony are central to the re-production of the Republican *imaginaire*. The narrative of the Republic is defined by its collective forgetfulness and inexhaustible capacity to turn over the darkest pages of its history. Acts of resistance, on the other hand, work through memory. Whereas history is a linear narrative – an authorised story – memory is dispersed, incomplete, half-remembered. As Gilloch (1996) explains, memory shapes and is shaped by the urban setting; lost times are like overlooked places. In this sense the landscape of the *Cité des 4000* offers fragments of an as yet unwritten history, of past and present 'racial' and spatial injustices. Memories concealed within the living rooms, bedrooms, walkways and open spaces of the *cité* are like flotsam and jetsam, an endless supply of disconnected moments yet to comprise a *history*. Abrasive urban encounters leave scars on the unconscious, imprints of what has been forgotten, yet not forgotten; hidden, but not lost. Memories of a colonial past are carried within the post-colonial actions of those who live with, evade or rage against the territorial stigma imposed upon *Les 4000*. An acknowledgement of *this past* and *this present* is vital in granting the right to the city to Parisians and Courneuviens alike.

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Conclusion

The Parisian *banlieues* are spatially peripheral but symbolically central in a way that the peripheries of London and New York are not (yet). In this sense, that the *banlieues*, and especially *Les 4000*, are 'instrumentally constitutive of the shared imaginary repertoires of the dominant culture' (Stallybrass and White 1986, cited in Shields 1991: 5), these spaces are reminiscent of other iconic inner cities such as Brixton or Harlem. Their symbolic centrality is arguably a result of their status as uncompromising and unambiguous examples of purified state-space, spaces that lack the 'fraudulent' or 'mystical' qualities of more contradictory spaces. This chapter has detailed the geohistory of La Courneuve, in particular the *Quatre Mille* mass housing project built during the 1960s to solve Paris's post-war housing crisis. There followed an account of how the estate and its residents carry a stigma enforced upon them by politicians and the media, in conjunction with the wider public. The critical point is that *Courneuviens* are not passive recipients of an unjust stigma; rather, they actively resist its constraining effects in a number of ways, ranging from the representational to the everyday to the overtly violent. There are two points to emphasise at the close of this chapter. *First*, the multicultural urbanism that exists in La Courneuve provides a source of strength for some residents. The social mixing common in *Les 4000* is juxtaposed against what is perceived as the social sterility of Paris – residents even reject the city for its lack of urbanity. There are attempts here, through the everyday practice of a truly cosmopolitan community, to produce, in a clandestine manner, *Les 4000* as an urban centre in its own right. *Second*, there is the growing importance of the 'post-colonial' as a narrative equipped to grasp the past-present disquiet of 'racial' and symbolic exclusion in the *banlieues*. 'Race' thinking and acting have compromised urban life in Paris but are also being used, reflexively, to illuminate a path towards a more coherent, just city that is connected with and thereby *freer from* its troubling past.

8

The 'Outer-inner City': 'Race', Conviviality and the Centre-Periphery

> We didn't get our forty acres and a mule, but we did get you CC. (Parliament, *Chocolate City*)

Introduction

Since the mid-to-late 1980s London and New York, and to a lesser extent Paris, have become global cities or 'command points' in the world economy, concentrating headquarters of the international financial system alongside producer and consumer services (Fainstein and Harloe 2003: 159), and are connected more to one another than to their national hinterlands (Sassen 2001). There has also been a sharpening of inequality within these cities and also between these cities and provincial cities and regions in their respective countries (Sassen 2006: 7–8; for London specifically see Buck et al. 2002). Yet it is surprising how little scrutiny has been devoted to the impact on the hinterlands, especially in relation to *sociological, cultural and political* effects (see Fishman 1987; Scott 1988; Phelps and Parsons 2003 for spatial and economic analyses). As global cities continue to concentrate market activity, consumption, financial and legal services and operate as informational nodes whilst requiring low-wage labour to service the activities and lifestyles of new professional elites, it has become more imperative than ever for new immigrants to access the city. Yet the 'transitional zones' that were once a feature of the central metropolis are shrinking or disappearing, or have become closed to newcomers. For example, Zukin (1987) argues that one of the most severe blows against existing populations in gentrifying areas is the removal of low-price rental housing: single-room occupancy hotels where residents pay by the night or week. Moreover, as Waldinger (1987: 3) suggests, old ghetto areas rarely provide accommodation for

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new immigrants, because of their accelerated abandonment on the one hand and their gentrification on the other. The inner city has undergone a functional decline and a structural transformation. What is left of the inner cities, often in the form of 'second ghetto' public housing, represents merely the margins or dividing lines between gentrified neighbourhoods, self-consciously 'cosmopolitan' consumption and entertainment zones (which often incorporate new media workplaces) and financial centres. For example, as Butler and Hamnett (2009: 52) state, it is no exaggeration to say that housing estates are now the only exception to an almost wholly gentrified inner London.

The functional decline and structural transformation of the inner city has contributed to a crisis of reproduction for the metropolis. As Sassen (2006: 199) argues, devalued sectors of the urban economy are now fulfilling crucial functions for the centre. Consequently, locations on the periphery suffering from disinvestment are being drawn into a new functional relationship and are emerging as unlikely meeting points for new immigrants seeking access to the city and also as places of dwelling for groups – often old immigrants – priced out of the city. These dislocated and often fractious sites comprise 'outer–inner cities' – spaces that perform some of the functions of the 20th century inner city whilst displaying distinctive features of their own. They are relational, diasporic spaces that serve almost as metropolitan *fractals* – pieces of the city that in microcosm contain the whole, or at least the missing *urban* element (Body-Gendrot 2000: 21).

Yet this analysis is not only attentive to the functional transformations of city space. It also focuses on 'race' and conviviality, in particular how these aspects combine to produce 'expressive cultures' (Gilroy 1987) that are also determined in some sense by the centrality or peripheral urban location of their enunciation. For example, the lyrics that open this chapter from Parliament's (1975) track 'Chocolate City' speak from a position of centrality. They reference how, although African Americans were not given the forty acres a mule they were promised when freed from slavery, they did eventually come to 'own' several US cities, in the sense that after decades of the Great Migration many cities in the north became majority black cities or, as the song states, 'chocolate cities'. Of course, many of the cities listed in the song, such as Newark and Gary, in the post-industrial era of global city dominance no longer comprise centres, but rather the new peripheries decimated by deindustrialisation, disinvestment and population loss.

This chapter is based upon an analysis of New York City. It considers first the inner city, especially the cultural and political importance of

two of New York's iconic inner cities, Harlem and the Bronx. The analysis then moves on to a reminder about why and how the inner city had been compromised since the mid-1980s. In terms of this examination, the key point is that inner cities no longer offer a reception centre for new immigrants. After a more general exposition of changing trends of migration and settlement in New York, the chapter introduces a case study of Latino immigrants in Long Island who live in a series of fragmented spaces across the Island. Together, it is argued, they comprise *a city without a city*. Finally, the concept of outer–inner city is advanced in an attempt to capture the continuities and discontinuities between the inner city and its contemporary incarnation.

The Inner City

The 'inner city' remains, on both sides of the Atlantic, a powerful signifier. The geographical location and the social connotations of the term are intimately linked to notions of 'race', especially blackness. Les Back (1998) explains how the inner city has 'long been constituted as the key symbolic location for representing racialised criminality, pathologies of black and minority family life and the centre of "corrosive alien cultures"'. Moreover, the symbolism of the term 'inner city' implicitly refers to racialised images of danger, violence and depravity that can be contrasted with the ideals of calm, safety and security attributed to non-urban or suburban spaces (Forman 2002: 43). The paradox is that here, at the very centre of the metropolis, can be found the peripheral and marginal. The (late) modern metropolitan figure is the migrant (rather than the *flaneur*): 'she and he are the active formulators of metropolitan aesthetics and life styles, reinventing the languages and appropriating the streets of the master' (Chambers 1994:23). The term 'inner city', when mobilised in particular contexts, implies a naturalising of social relations, that blacks *belong* in the city whereas whites feel at home in the suburbs. For example, Lord Scarman's report after the 1981 Brixton riots caricatured the West Indian community as 'people of the street' (cited in Keith 2005: 183). Sociological representations of the 'code of the street' among African Americans can have a similar, though unintended, effect (see Anderson 1999). The spectacle of the inner city suggests its 'freezing' in time; it effectively becomes 'a phenomenon without causes, without development and without a history' (Rodrigues 1981: 19).

The 'inner city' evoked in this chapter elides what some scholars may distinguish as two periods. The first reflects the core urban spaces into

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which African Americans first migrated, commonly referred to as the 'black belts' of cities (see Chapter 3). The second refers to a later period when these 'zones in transition' were solidifying to become ghettoes, suffering from increased segregation and isolation, a lack of work and an intensifying symbolic stigma (see Chapters 3 and 4). Used here, the 'inner city' is an abstraction constructed using concrete examples of spatial practice in New York. The symbolic dimensions of this space are often too easily separated from the material spaces that are its referents. As a 'floating signifier' the 'inner city' does a lot of work; indeed, Duncan and Ley (1993: 6) argue that 'the black ghetto' is largely a cultural fiction, a pernicious white mythology about *black culture*. Some of that symbolic work will be pointed to here, as it has been in previous chapters. Yet the material and spatial constitution of what is referred to as the 'inner city' – not least, the visible presence of non-white residents at the heart of the 'white city' – is viewed as being of critical importance, the historical consequences of the production of a kind of urban space becoming rarer in today's global city.

Harlem and the Harlem Renaissance

> Gillis set down his tan-cardboard extension-case and wiped his black, shining brow. Then slowly, spreadingly, he grinned at what he saw: Negroes at every turn; up and down Lenox Avenue, up and down 135th Street; big, lanky Negroes, short, squat Negroes; black ones, brown ones, yellow ones; men standing idle in the curb, women, bundle-laden [...] That was the point. In Harlem black was white. Rudolph Fisher, *The City of Refuge*[1]

Harlem, situated at the uptown tip of Manhattan, is the most famous African American neighbourhood in New York. Indeed, one could go as far as to argue that the figurative space of Harlem represents the quintessential black urban community (Jackson 2001: 17). Harlem is very much a spectacle; it condenses understandings of 'race' and the city, creating a 'hermetically sealed off social sphere easily vanquishing other potential trajectories of difference' (ibid.: 18). The physical result of a period of over-speculation in the early 20th century, Harlem was built with white middle-class Manhattanites in mind; it was conceived very much as part of the 'white city'. The problem was that realtors could not attract enough whites to upper Manhattan and so feverishly began selling and renting at higher prices to blacks (ibid.: 25; see also Osofsky 1966). Jackson explains that the neighbourhood very quickly 'blackened' (ibid.: 19) as residents from African American enclaves

across Manhattan gravitated to the new housing and were joined there by thousands of African American migrants from the South.

What is noticeable when reading early accounts of African American experience in New York is the centrality of their presence in the metropolis. Despite the struggles endured, blacks were claiming their 'right to the city' with some style. There was an intuitive sense that *the possible* was finally being achieved (what Lefebvre calls the 'possible impossible'). See, for example, James Weldon Johnson's (1925: 301) imagination of what could be achieved for and by black people in Harlem:

> I believe that the Negro's advantages and opportunities are greater in Harlem than in any other place in the country, and that Harlem will become the intellectual, the cultural and the financial centre for Negroes of the United States, and will exert a vital influence upon all Negro peoples.

The Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s was the moment when this neighbourhood of Manhattan gained its greatest notoriety and its reputation 'as a city within the city'. The migration from the hated South to the greatest city in the nation, and the settlement of blacks in an excellently located district, appeared to augur a new day for African Americans (Rampersad 1997):

> Lenox Avenue was [...] Harlem's Bowery, shaky from its subway station and lined with pool halls and dives, with a few restaurants and theatres farther north. But Seventh Avenue was Black Broadway, sleek and spacious[,] thriving and well groomed and active all day, and from five in the afternoon until after midnight it was brilliant and glamorous and exciting as well. Numbers-racket runners, Hindu fakirs, and soapbox orators clung to its corners, with prostitutes, blind musicians, lovers, bolito kings, dancing children, poets, pimps, preachers, and families in between [...]. (Kellner 1984: xviii)

African Americans in Harlem responded to their surroundings with a new confidence in themselves and their abilities. Black intellectual life was already flourishing through the ongoing work of W E B Du Bois and the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) and the National Urban League. This consciousness was reflected in Harlem-based magazines and newspapers, as well as on the stage and in nightclubs. Literature, music and other arts also began to flourish. The poets, writers and thinkers integral to the Harlem

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Renaissance were the key contributors to Alain Locke's famous collection 'The New Negro' (the definitive text for many scholars and critics of the Harlem Renaissance). Locke himself was 'a decidedly learned and urbane black cosmopolitan' (Jackson 2001: 27), who proclaimed: 'In Harlem, Negro life is seizing upon its first chances for group expression and self-determination. It is – or promises to be – a 'race' capital. Harlem I grant you, isn't typical – but it is significant, it is prophetic' (Locke 1925, 1997: 7). He continues, 'Harlem, as we shall see, is the centre of both these movements; she is the home of the Negro's "Zionism". The pulse of the Negro world has begun to beat in Harlem' (ibid.: 14). Harlem also became the centre of black musical expression and innovation. Harlem revolutionized jazz by creating a distinctly New York style called bebop, which emerged from after-hours Harlem clubs where the likes of Dizzy Gillespie, Charlie Parker and Thelonious Monk were regular performers (Jackson 2001: 27). Produced in a climate 'of constant innovation and friendly but spirited competition, [bebop] took the nation and ultimately the world by storm in the decade after the war' (Stovall 1996: 30). Harlem provided the space within which the 'New Negro' movement could flourish. Yet Harlem was also a base from which to think about and draw comparisons and connections between other places. It was a true urban explosion.

Yet the Harlem Renaissance was in many respects a conservative movement that shunned the more radical ideas of the time, such as Marcus Garvey's separatist message. Indeed, 'his [Garvey's] organization, with its colourful processions and controversial claims and promises as well as its roots in the working poor was clearly seen as inherently disreputable and a force to be ignored, if not disdained' (Rampersad 1984: xx). As black poet Robert Hayden observed, the Harlem Renaissance was more 'aesthetic and philosophical than political', its main thrust 'integrationist' rather than 'separatist'. Its ultimate aim was not to radicalise but to awaken black Americans to their own value in society (Kellner 1984: xxi). Many theatre productions, musicals and songs associated with black Harlem were performed with a 'white gaze' or 'white ear' in mind. Many song titles would nowadays be considered racist, drawing upon crude stereotypes of black people. Many songs lacked originality and were derivative of downtown show tunes (Kellner 1984: xix). The more subtle arts of the blues and spiritual songs were often performed to small black-only audiences. The fanciest nightclubs in Harlem featured black entertainers but did not admit black clients (Stovall 1996: 30). Indeed, underlying the vibrancy and faddism that made Harlem so exotic for daring white Manhattanites, the conviction remained that

New York was still a white city and that the most pressing task for blacks was to ingratiate themselves within this order by integrating as best they could. Through a display of black sensitivity, intelligence and artistic versatility, it was believed by prominent figures in the Renaissance that whites would come to a new understanding of the humanity of African Americans (Rampersad 1997: xvi). While tempered in its ambition, the Harlem Renaissance undoubtedly succeeded in laying the foundations for all subsequent depictions in poetry, fiction, drama and music of the African American urban experience. Despite its sometime conservative ethos, the movement also indicated the drawing power provided by a central city stage. This centrality meant that the nation and beyond became aware of what was going on in Harlem; Harlem became the epitome of racial potentiality, the capital of Black America (Jackson 2001: 19). The Harlem Renaissance was an often sophisticated and elegant protest against the continued subjugation of black Americans in the white metropolis. Crucially, it gave a brief glimpse of what the city could be, the conviviality and expressive cultures that it could produce. Perhaps this is why Harlem is also seen in retrospect as the embodiment of squandered opportunity (ibid.).

The influence of the Harlem Renaissance spread far and wide. Whilst many of its core activities centred upon just a few blocks, its message and vitality reached way beyond the neighbourhood or city. In Paris during the 1920s there was considerable interest in African American culture, especially what they viewed its 'primitivism'. Whilst this attitude was a product of racist stereotypes of the time, it also resulted from envy for the urbanity and modernism of African Americans. As Stovall (1996: 31) explains,

> [T]he dreadful, mechanical slaughter of the war sharply increased this fascination, for African culture seemed to embody a lush, naïve sensuality and spirituality that cold, rational Europeans had lost. […] In Paris black was not just beautiful, but creative, mysterious, seductive, and soulful.

Parisians were already obsessed with American culture, and jazz dominated the nightclubs and dancehalls of the city. The impact of American culture was such that '[j]azz attracted both the Parisian intellectual interested in black subjectivity and the Parisian shopgirl bent on dancing the night away' (ibid.). While racism in the US experienced an upsurge after the war, France was viewed as racially tolerant, so much so that Du Bois staged the 1919 Pan-African Congress in Paris.

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By 1932 the Great Depression had set in and Harlem was too hungry to care much about the 'New Negro': 'With banks failing, religious faith at a low ebb, schools offering no help for employment training, lynching reborn, and only the NAACP still speaking out in protest, Afro-Americans were destined to suffer' (Kellner 1984: xiii). The flowering of African American intellectual, artistic and political life in Harlem was followed by a sustained period of disinvestment, deindustrialisation and depopulation, which created the impoverished 'dark ghetto' captured by Kenneth Clark (see Clark 1960). Harlem became a byword for black urban marginality and crime and was the 'natural' setting in the 1960s for Chester Himes's *noir* crime novels and in the 1970s for violent blaxploitation films such as *Cotton Comes to Harlem* (Ossie Davies, 1970) and *Shaft* (Gordon Parks, 1971). In the late 1960s and early 1970s Harlem become synonymous with the Black Power movement when Malcolm X, the minister of a Nation of Islam mosque in Harlem, became the premier voice of Black politics in the US (Jackson 2001: 27–8). Harlem developed an uncanny ability to provide the central forum for the articulation of a diverse range of 'moments' or transitions in African American and black history.

Boogie Down Production of Space: Hip-Hop and the South Bronx

If the Harlem Renaissance belonged to the first half of the 20th century, the moment when the 'public city' was beginning to disassemble to become the 'naked city', a further cultural flowering fifty years later belongs to the troubled *agonopolis*. Perhaps the most important cultural product to emerge from the inner city in the last thirty years is hip-hop. This is a further example of the conviviality and political potency derived from the presence of a multicultural and multi-'racial' component within the inner city. The story of hip-hop's rise from New York City's South Bronx is a familiar tale, but deserves repeating here. Hip-hop did not spring forth magically; rather, it emerged from an economically and socially limiting context as a means of negotiating this immediate environment (Forman 2002: 41). As E P Thompson reminds us, culture is always a response to a shared set of constraints, or, as Brooklyn rapper Mos Def puts it in his track 'Umi Says': 'I ain't no perfect man, I'm tryna do the best I can with what it is I have…' Those involved in hip-hop in its earliest stages, through DJing, MCing, breakdancing and writing graffiti,[2] sought with meagre resources to make their mark on a city hell-bent on ignoring them. The city, encompassing both the physical environment and the symbolic notion of the 'hood, is central to the discussion of 'race', space and hip-hop. In the

mid-1970s, when hip-hop surfaced, no place was held up more consistently as a symbol of America's pitiful urban condition than the Bronx, particularly its southernmost section: 'images of burned out buildings [...] dominated the media' (George 1998: 10). The South Bronx was a mythical wasteland that served as a nightmarish contradiction of suburban tranquillity and Manhattan affluence. Tom Wolfe's novel *Bonfire of the Vanities* caricatured white New York's worst fear – getting lost in the Bronx. Hollywood even capitalised on the 'South Bronx as hell' image in a number of exploitative films, *The Warriors* (Walter Hill, 1979) and *Fort Apache: The Bronx* (Daniel Petrie, 1981). The dominant image of the Bronx was of poverty, disease, violence, and danger, 'all coded as black' (Forman 2002: 40).

Yet, while the physical Bronx may have resembled ruins, it was far from a *cultural* wasteland:

> Behind the decay and neglect the place was a cauldron of vibrant and quite visionary creativity born of its racial mix and relative isolation. It was within its boundaries that the expressions we associate with hip-hop – graffiti art, break dancing, MCing and mixing – all have roots. (George 1998: 10)

Hip-hop sprang from the South Bronx, an ill-defined neighbourhood of the mind rather than the map, in the mid-1970s during spontaneous block parties and jams in public parks. In its formative years it truly did resemble a street culture, with its composite elements of graffiti, Emm-Ceeing, DJing and graffiti practised in the public spaces of the city.

The music, which is the element that eventually came to define the hip-hop subculture more than any other, was created on the turntables of innovative DJs such as Kool Herc, Afrika Bambaataa and Grandmaster Flash, all residents of the 'boogie down' Bronx. Through 'mixing' old soul, funk and disco records, often repeating just their drum breaks to create a whole new track, these pioneering DJs 'staked out a loud, scratchy, in-you-face aesthetic that, to this day, still informs the culture [...]' (ibid.: xi). Kool Herc employed a friend, Coke La Rock, as his 'master of ceremonies' – someone to 'hype' his live mixes. Several of La Rock's motivating slogans, such as 'ya rock and ya don't stop' and 'to the beat y'all' became hip-hop staples still heard today (ibid.: 17). In many respects La Rock was the first hip-hop rapper. Afrika Bambaataa was famous for providing the 'scholarship' of hip-hop as a result of his prodigious record collection and musical knowledge. He added lots of new breaks and brought a wider range of music, including previously

obscure European elements such as Kraftwerk, into the hip-hop canon. Grandmaster Flash was a showman, mixing records while entertaining crowds with his prodigious skills in 'scratching', which involved manipulating vinyl with hands while a record was playing. Flash also had an on-and-off relationship with a group of young MCs known as the Furious Five (ibid.: 19). Indeed, it was Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five who, in 1982, had hip-hop's first great rap hit with 'The Message', which would later be regarded as a breakthrough for the whole genre. As Marshall Berman (2007: 28) explains, while the spirit of early raps was bawdy and shallow, 'The Message' was heavy, dark and deep:

> Myriad horrors are packed into two minutes: aggressive rats, aggressive junkies, nice girls turned into addicts and whores; kids, burned out before the age of ten, who want to grow up to be drug dealers, because they are the only people they know who command respect [...]. (ibid.: 28)

Berman (ibid.) asks so *what is the message* of this track? His answer is that social disintegration and existential desperation can be sources of life and creative energy. Those growing up in poverty and ghetto isolation may have suffered great losses, but they did not lose themselves; rather than destroying the imagination, their suffering had created idealism and an amazing sense of urgency. Despite the ignominy that came from growing up in the ruins of the Bronx, the first hip-hop generation were making a claim on a city that, during the fiscal crisis of the mid-to-late 1970s, would rather they did not exist at all (see Austin 2001). Hip-hop announced its presence in the city, or rather *of the city*, through a variety of media – sound, word, image and motion. It was impossible to ignore, and, as Marshall Berman explained to the *New York Times* (4 July 1999), hip-hop was 'a great burst of creativity emerged from the Bronx's ruins, and it deserves remembrance and celebration'.

For Rose (1994), the city was much more than a backdrop to hip-hop's formative years; rather, it shaped the cultural terrain, access to space, materials and education for hip-hop's earliest innovators. Hip-hop artists since the outset veered between realistic portrayals of their neighbourhood and a more knowing exploitation of the semiotic value of the Bronx or other ghettos and their cultural resonance within the public imagination. There is some debate regarding whether hip-hop can be viewed as an African American musical form (see, among others, Gilroy 1987; Szwed 1999; Perry 2005). As George (1998: xiii) suggests, hip-hop

chronicles a generation coming of age at a moment of extreme racial confusion. Although civil rights had won many gains, *de facto* segregation was increasing and economic marginality for the black working class was intensifying. In the Bronx there was also the important and often overlooked Puerto Rican influence, a result of the fact that a large Puerto Rican population lived among blacks in the same Bronx neighbourhoods. As Flores (1994: 91) argues,

> The beginnings of rap are connective not so much because they link black traditions and Puerto Rican traditions, but because they mark off one more step in a long and intricate black-and Puerto Rican tradition of popular culture, based primarily in the long standing black- and Puerto Rican neighbourhoods of New York City.

In this way, hip-hop was not only a way of negotiating and reconfiguring a potentially alienating urban condition; it was also a democratic means with which to articulate complex, fluid and knowingly *racialised* identities as well as respond to white racism/s. The inner city provided the context from which this was possible; it supplied the materials as well as a stage or forum upon which the distinctive spatial practices of hip-hop could flourish and achieve recognition and, ultimately, worldwide acclaim.

As hip-hop developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s it also chronicled the increasing marginalisation of New York's ghetto spaces. Hip-hop from the mid-1990s onwards is more likely to depict the brutal, aggressive and sexually violent streets of the deteriorating and ever more alienated projects, a shift in emphasis that perhaps reflects Wacquant's (2008a) suggestion that the communal ghettos of the past have become hyperghettos characterized by fear, violence and mutual hatred. Compare Grandmaster Flash's (1982) 'The Message' with Mobb Deep's (1995) bleak 'Survival of the Fittest'. Both describe life on the harsh streets of New York's housing projects, yet the latter portrays a world now completely devoid of urbanity:

> My skin is thick, cause I be up in the mix of action If I'm not at home, puffin' and relaxin' New York got a nigga depressed So I wear a slug-proof underneath my Guess God bless my soul, before I put my foot down and begin to stroll And to the drama I built, and all unfinished beef You will soon be killed, put us together It's like mixin' vodka and milk I'm goin' out blastin'; takin' my enemies with me and if not, they scarred, so they will never forget me

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The Harlem Renaissance and hip-hop, although emerging from quite different inner-city contexts, are both examples of convivial urban cultures. They are both products of creativity emanating from the antagonistic milieu of the inner city (both imagined and real). Both movements, whilst concerned at least initially with specific neighbourhoods – Harlem and the South Bronx – were not local in their reach. They simultaneously remade and reached way beyond the inner city. The Harlem Renaissance and hip-hop both became globally regarded cultures (see, for example, Jackson 2001 and Chang 2005). As Gilroy (2005) argues, movements such as these also allowed 'blackness' to signify vitality rather than abjection – in this way both movements were crucial in offering a form of resistance to the master narrative provided by American racism. Despite their flaws, the spatial practices associated with Harlem Renaissance and hip-hop – poems, novels, songs, art and dance – enriched the metropolis; they are glimpses of what the right to the city may entail. Moreover, they are crucial urban elements of *what makes cities*.

Hard Times in a White City: Centre and Margins

Global cities such as London and New York have undergone radical economic, social and political restructuring since the 1990s (see Castells 1991; Fainstein and Harloe 2003; Sassen 2001; 2006). One aspect of the social restructuring of global cities is the gradual diminishment of their traditional 'zones in transition' that once functioned as entry points for new immigrants. It is proposed that the functional demise of the inner city is attributed to the three broad and interconnected centrifugal processes outlined in Chapter 5: *dispersal*, *gentrification* and *securitisation*. Each process is, of course, attendant to the ascendance of global cities and should also be viewed as integral to a revanchist 'racial project' (see Omi and Winant 1986) to reclaim the white city (see Smith 1996). There is not the space here to revisit each of three processes in full, but, in brief, *dispersal* clears the city of economically and socially 'burdensome' asylum seekers, immigrants or homeless; *gentrification* is the result of, among other things, the changing occupational structures of global cities, especially the increase in the number of highly-paid upper middle-class professionals. Gentrification makes the city unaffordable for poorer city residents, forcing them to the periphery while also preventing would-be city dwellers from entering. *Securitisation* reflects the post-9/11 atmosphere of suspicion that surrounds global cities, especially those with high-profile financial districts that are perceived to be high-risk

terrorist targets. This results in an increasingly hostile and dangerous atmosphere for non-white or 'borderline white' minorities.

There follows a short examination of how gentrification has impacted upon Harlem, which is followed by a discussion of what remains of the 'old' inner city – what Marcuse (2003: 274) refers to as the *abandoned* city of the very poor, comprised of housing of 'last resort'. In this analysis, these spaces are referred to as the *margins*.

In the mid-1980s Schaffer and Smith (1986) surprised many by pointing to the fact that Harlem was a candidate for gentrification. While there were a few white 'pioneers' involved in the 'rehabilitation' of Harlem, the majority were black. Taylor (1992) studied black gentrifiers in Harlem between 1987 and 1992. She finds that black gentrifiers were drawn to Harlem because of its historical significance and political resonance within the black community. For Taylor, black gentrification involved a strategy of cultural survival 'rooted in the search for the positive meaning and support that the black community might provide' (ibid.: 109). As such, gentrifiers were keen to participate in the rituals that defined daily life in the neighbourhood (ibid.: 102); they did not want to change it completely. Harlem allowed middle-class blacks to construct a black identity away from the white city world of business and finance, where many worked and felt excluded. Settling in Harlem also involved confronting a 'dilemma of difference' because their class positions and lifestyle identified them as distinct from other blacks in Harlem. In fact, their middle-class status made them outsiders in Harlem, where they assumed the position almost of a gentry. In their renovated brownstones in the tree-lined streets of Hamilton Heights, they lived a world away from impoverished areas elsewhere in Harlem. Many of the gentrifiers that Taylor (2002) interviewed report the existence of class conflict and resentment: 'We have more money and better jobs than most of the people who live on our block […] they think we are very strange' (ibid.: 91).

The gentrification of Harlem led to some proclaiming a 'Second Harlem Renaissance' (Lees et al. 2008: 111). Yet the practices of gentrifying pioneers who had respect for the neighbourhood's past started a trend that eventually bore all the hallmarks of advanced gentrification. For Lees et al. (ibid.), the black middle class paved the way for the wealthier white middle class that followed. However, the gentrification of Harlem is not a *fait accompli*, because a considerable amount of low-cost rental housing exists alongside expensive privately owned homes purchased with a mortgage. Reinvestment in Harlem is not complete, and the neighbourhood remains polarised, with a poverty rate four times the US national average (ibid.: 181). However, as the *New York*

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Times (6 January 2010) reports, blacks no longer comprise the majority of the population of greater Harlem, making up just four in ten residents. The black population is smaller than at any time since the 1920s despite the population of central Harlem growing more during the 2000s than in any decade since the 1940s. The article reports that, in 2008, twenty-two per cent of white households in Harlem had moved to their present homes within the previous year; in comparison, this was the case for only seven per cent of black households.

The Margins

The inner city cannot be wholly confined to the past. Many people from previous immigrant 'invasions' remain firmly in place in the ghettos and public housing of diminishing and deteriorating inner cities. The presence of these groups often gives the impression that the global city remains a diverse, multicultural or multi-racial space. Useful in charting the *solidification* of the remaining non-gentrified inner cities or public housing projects is Wacquant's account of how the communal ghettos of the 1960s have deteriorated to resemble 'hyperghettos'. Wacquant (2008a) argues that those who live in the most deprived, dangerous and stigmatised districts of the city now suffer from *advanced marginality*, a condition arising from economic insecurity, a disconnection from macroeconomic trends (i.e., no boom or bust, simply bust), territorial fixation and stigmatisation, as well as social fragmentation. Critically, these are rarely areas that new immigrants move into. Even in areas such as Harlem or the Bronx, where there is an abundance of public housing, there are long waiting lists comprised exclusively of native-born citizens (Foner 2000: 51). The inner cities still exist, yet their conditions and functionality have changed considerably.

For Wacquant, changes to the structure of the ghetto have nothing to do with a fictitious underclass that can be blamed for their worsening predicament. For Wacquant (2008a: 233),

> [T]he communal ghetto of the immediate post-war era, compact, sharply bounded, and comprising a full complement of black classes […] has been replaced by what we may call the hyperghetto […] whose spatial configuration, institutional and demographic make-up, structural position and function in urban society are quite novel.

Initially the ghetto was primarily an institution of racial exclusion whereby African Americans were forced to live in a perpetual and almost

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complete state of segregation. In addition, they lived a separate institutional life, being recipients of differing public services and having different political representation from white residents of the city. Since the end of the 20th century, the ghetto has experienced an intensity of collapse, encapsulating physical degradation, rampant insecurity and violence, and degrees of economic and social hardship comparable to the worst years of the Great Depression (ibid.). The ghetto has also changed in terms of social composition, as middle-class blacks have left for segregated suburbs. Depopulation has meant that those who remain are the very poorest. For this group, for whom the absence of legitimate paid work is almost a certainty, survival is ensured from day to day by hustling and making money in the informal economy of drugs (ibid.) and 'off the books' trade of other goods and services (see Venkatesh 2002; 2006).

In New York, the decline of the city's public housing projects has been referred to as a 'civic emergency' (Lamport 2007). Frey's (1994) account of young African American basketball players in the housing projects of Coney Island, New York City illustrates the transformation of the 'inner city':

> There was a time, of course, when Coney Island [...] was home to three world-renowned amusement parks, and its streets were lined with three-storey homes, filled to the eaves with Jewish, Irish, and Italian families who proclaimed Coney Island the most welcoming place in America for a newly arrived immigrant. (ibid.: 3)

Frey goes on to detail the decline of the resort and the demolition of old homes and their replacement in the 1950s and 1960s with a twenty-block stretch of public housing projects, built to house African Americans. For Frey (ibid.: 3–4), the use of public housing to isolate impoverished tenants from the heart of their cities succeeded in Coney Island even more efficiently because of the resort's utter remoteness:

> On this peninsula, at the Southern tip of Brooklyn, there are almost no stores, no trees, no police; nothing, in fact, but block after block of gray-cement projects – hulking, prison-like and jutting straight into the sea. Most summer nights [...] an amorphous unease settles over Coney Island, as apartments become stifling and the streets fall prey to the gangs and drug-dealers [...] Officially Coney Island is part of the endless phantasmagoria that is New York City. But on a night

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> like this, as the dealers set up their drug marts in the streets and alleyways, and the sound of sirens and gunfire keep pace with the darkening sky, it feels like the end of the world. (ibid.)

While public housing is categorised here as the margins, this is not an attack upon public housing *per se*. There is no doubt that in New York public housing, along with Section 8 rent subsidies, is the only mechanism preserving the diversity of 'races', ethnic minorities and classes in a city where high rents are forcing low-income residents out.

The Outer–Inner City: a 'City Without a City'

> The challenge is how to bridge the inner city, or the squatters at the urban perimeter, with the centre. (Sassen 2006: 196)

This section completes the journey from Harlem, a city *within* the city, to new immigrant entry points outside the city that may be described as cities *without* cities. First, however, it is necessary to link spatial shifts to changes in immigration patterns. Following Hollinger (1995), Vertovec (2007: 1,025) suggests that immigration has undergone a transformative 'diversification of diversity' not just in terms of bringing more ethnicities and countries of origin but also with respect to where, how and with whom people live. Additionally, it is not enough to see diversity only in terms of ethnicity; rather, diversity includes differential immigration statuses, divergent labour market experiences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns of spatial distribution and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents. The interplay of these factors is what Vertovec (ibid.: 1,025) terms *super-diversity*. Recent immigration has transformed the social construction of 'race' and ethnicity in New York City (Foner 2007). The significant groups responsible for the greater diversification of New York are foreign-born West Indians and arrivals from former Soviet Union countries. An arresting feature of New York's three million-strong immigrant population is its extraordinary diversity; not even four countries of origin can be said to dominate (ibid.: 1,002). In 2000 the top three groups – Dominicans, Chinese and Jamaicans – made up just under thirty per cent of all the foreign-born. No other foreign country accounted for more than five per cent. While there is much hybridity in terms of relationships between new immigrants and native minority groups, there is less mixing between these groups and native whites (ibid.: 1,010), indicating the social distance and sense of superiority predicated upon the white city fantasy.

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In terms of settlement, suburbs not far from New York City have become home to 'increasing numbers of low-income, aged, and racial minority households' (Foner 2000: 56). Immigrants have also been moving into less affluent and run-down suburbs and satellite cities outside New York City's borders. As such, 'the old central cities in New Jersey not far from Manhattan – Jersey City, Passaic, Newark, Elizabeth, and Paterson – as well as older suburbs with a central-city character, like Union City and West New York, now have enormous numbers of immigrants'[3] (ibid.). It is the 'quadruple promise' of work (however flexible or low-paid), cheap housing, access to the city and privacy/security that 'pulls' marginalised groups from the city to the outer–inner city.

Long Island

Long Island is fixed in the mind as a quintessential white American suburb yet it is now the site of a number of fragmented outer–inner cities that house a diverse range of Latino immigrants, most illegal, who hope to find regular employment and access to the American dream. Long Island today resembles a sea of white middle-class suburban communities dotted by 'a smattering of "minority pockets"' (Mahler 1995: 192) that together provide homes for over 300,000 Latino immigrants. In fact, the growth of suburban Hispanic residents in New York now exceeds that of urban Hispanics (Garland 2009: 39). New immigrants are bypassing the city and moving directly to the suburbs: 'America's shift to a service economy meant that there were plenty of restaurant and retail jobs in the outer-rings of metropolitan areas. Many jobs occupied by Latinos are located in New York City but the high wages earned in Manhattan by many of Long Island's wealthier residents creates a vigorous local economy based around building the homes and servicing the lifestyles of the rich. The mini-mansions in the newly sprouting exurbs – the suburbs of the suburbs – need roofing, pruning and vacuuming' (ibid.). Immigrants to Long Island in the 1990s entered a bifurcated New York labour market divided between high-paid jobs in financial services and 'low-wage, dead-end jobs that few natives would take […] because they had better opportunities available to them, or because the low wages fell short of the cost of living' (Mahler 1995: 108). A dynamic economy and a tight labour market (Garland 2009: 39) created the 'pull' conditions that encouraged immigrants to settle in Long Island. Many Latino immigrants are day labourers, earning as little as $60 for a twelve-hour day. Employers are frequently unscrupulous, promising a certain amount and paying less or nothing at the end of the day (ibid.: 140). Immigrants from Central and South America fleeing dire circumstances

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at home are welcomed in Long Island as a low-wage workforce but not accepted as local residents (Dolgon 2005: 148).

If Latino workers entered a very restricted sector of the local economy, taking jobs that promised few prospects for advancement, they were also concentrated into marginal neighbourhoods populated almost exclusively by members of poor minority groups (Mahler 1995: 106). For example, Hempstead, situated in Nassau County in the heart of Long Island, had since the 1980s been comprised almost entirely of African Americans. In the early 20th century Hempstead was a magnet for New Yorkers, 'a promised land where families seeking an escape from the gritty, jostling and sometimes violent city could settle among like-minded people' (Garland 2009: 33). Hempstead was one of New York's earliest suburbs and was, like other suburbs, nearly all white (ibid.: 39). In the 1950s and 1960s it was difficult to imagine that the suburbs could ever enter decline, yet, as Garland (ibid.: 37) explains, suburbs are not exempt from the rules of real estate and social status. Hempstead was usurped by the building of nearby Garden City and other more prestigious suburbs to the east of the Island, which drew away some of Hempstead's wealthier residents. There was also the gradual in-movement of upwardly mobile African Americans from New York into Hempstead, and 'as minorities moved in, white families moved out' (ibid.: 38). By the 1980s Hempstead's population was almost entirely black (ibid.). Shopping malls elsewhere on Long Island destroyed local business, leaving stores in Hempstead vacant. The crack epidemic also reached African American suburbs. Hempstead became what Paul Watt (2007) calls a 'spoiled suburb'. Garland (2009: 39) details one of her respondents claiming that by the late 1980s Hempstead resembled pictures of the South Bronx he had seen on TV news. It was in the late 1980s that Latino day labourers from El Salvador and Honduras appeared on the suburban scene in Long Island, and they settled almost exclusively in declining blue-collar towns such as Hempstead (ibid.: 141). Hempstead now serves as a hub for the Latino population in Long Island.

Newly arrived immigrants in Long Island encounter one of the most expensive and restricted housing markets in the country. However, even the most expensive areas of Long Island, such as the Hamptons in the east end, are home to some Latino immigrants. As Dolgon (2005) explains, the Hamptons is increasingly a primary residence for some of Manhattan's ascendant 'ultra-rich' who made their fortunes in the 1990s stock-market boom. Consequently, 'the burgeoning economy of wealthy homeowners in the Hamptons has created a huge labour demand in construction and landscaping, as well as retail' (ibid.: 120). As such, businesses in the Hamptons rely on immigrants and often bus them

in daily from places like Hempstead, Riverhead, Freeport, Wyanduch and Brookhaven. The lack of affordable housing in the Hamptons has not stopped immigrant workers from sleeping in nearby trailer parks, hotels, group housing or even local woods (ibid.: 149). Residents of the Hamptons have responded by campaigning to have immigrant homes demolished; indeed, a cul-de-sac of six houses shared by a dozen Latino families in Southampton was condemned. As Dolgon (ibid.) explains,

> While there is ongoing pressure to provide adequate housing for the burgeoning Latino population, few communities want to risk the profits of upscale real estate development by legitimizing low-income housing or a visible, relatively poor immigrant community.

Mahler (1995) outlines in greater detail how Latino immigrants in Long Island manage to find accommodation. She explains that suburban areas attract immigrants in small part because of the safety and aesthetics of the suburbs and in large part because jobs have been created in these areas (ibid.: 14). Immigrants are willing to leave areas of the globe where housing is cheap and abundant for areas such as Long Island that, while living costs are high, offer employment. Housing consists primarily of single-family homes, with less than twenty per cent available for rent. Even if homes were available to rent, immigrants do not earn enough to afford an apartment or even a room. However, Mahler unravels the existence of a housing rental market existing parallel to the mainstream market, which she calls the 'encargada' system (ibid.: 189). Immigrants minimise their housing expenditure by living in overcrowded, substandard housing in the least expensive neighbourhoods in Long Island (ibid.: 191). They do this in the following ways. In the first instance, slum landlords bought the cheapest housing in Long Island during the 1980s and have subsequently subdivided the space and rented to immigrants. In the second instance, once spaces have been let to immigrants, the immigrants themselves sublet space to other immigrants (ibid.: 198). In the third instance, the encargada system relies on subletting the hundred thousand or so illegal apartments that have been carved out of single-family homes through the conversion of basements and attics (ibid.: 189). Living conditions for those trapped in the encargada system are frequently appalling, and it is worth citing Mahler at some length to illustrate this point:

> I walked into Yanira Palacias's apartment and almost fell through the exposed floorboard. As roaches skitted along the floor, I noticed that

> the ceiling had collapsed over the hallway and there was a persistent drip from the bathroom. Yanira, an undocumented immigrant from El Salvador, took me inside to show me the non-functional shower. Water dripped from the ceiling and had smeared wet plaster all over the shower floor. Yanira had asked me to come by when she heard I worked with lawyers. She was being evicted – purportedly because she had two small children there, including an infant suckling at her breast. (ibid.: 199)

Immigrants in the fragmented outer–inner cities of Long Island are isolated from what they perceive to be 'the real America' of both the suburbs and the city. New York is glimpsed only at work or from the confines of public transport (ibid.: 190).

The film documentary *Farmingville* (Sandoval and Tambini 2004) shows the vicious hostility that has been directed at Latino labourers in Long Island. It is argued by white residents of Farmingville, another blue-collar suburb, that 'illegals' are destroying the community. Residents, unaware or uninterested in how the economy operates in global city-regions, simply ask 'why Farmingville?' They cannot understand why 1,500 Mexican day labourers have set up base in their small suburban town of just 15,000 residents. While residents interviewed in the film resist the accusation that they are racist, stating they simply care about the illegal status of day labourers and the future of America, the treatment of Mexican workers in the town suggests otherwise. Rumours circulating in the town cast Latinos as peeping toms, rapists and criminals. Garland (2009: 113) reports how after 9/11 Latinos were accused by residents of Hempstead as representing a terror threat. In Farmingville it is argued that day labourers are driving down local wages. Latinos have been attacked, their homes sprayed with gunfire, and some have had faeces-filled tortillas posted through the letterbox. Two men were convicted of 'race' hate crime in Farmingville after luring two Mexican workers to a disused warehouse before attacking them with knives. One of those convicted was tattooed in neo-Nazi and race hate symbols. Residents also disrupt the hiring of workers by taking pictures of those doing the hiring. The film does not contradict the notion that hostile white residents in the devalued suburbs of Long Island are somehow backward, un-modern or un-cosmopolitan; if not quite 'white trash', they are not too far removed from this despised status. In response to racism, pro-immigration groups have supported Mexican self-help groups in campaigning against the hate, claiming that Long Island has no room for racism and that the issue of migrant day labourers is the

biggest 'race' issue locally since the civil rights movement. Although in the outer–inner city social divisions are rarely based around black–white relations, these spaces are by no means post-'race' or representative of a renewed post-ethnic America (see Hollinger 1995).

In terms of public life amongst new immigrants, the dispersal of Latinos across Long Island, in conjunction with their diverse nationalities, long working hours and illegal status, means that street life rarely extends beyond the daily attempt to pick up work. However, as Dolgon (2005) demonstrates, it is soccer, and in particular organised soccer leagues, that provides a focus for both Latino men and women. Leagues have now been running since the late 1980s and are fought between teams such as Team Mexico, Team Ecuador and Team Costa Rica. Weekend matches are well attended and accompanied by parties, barbecues and dancing: 'the referees speak Spanish, the crowd speaks Spanish, and the sound of Latin music and [...] the smells of Spanish foods fill the air' (ibid. 152). Yet even this release from the stresses of everyday life as an immigrant in the suburbs are under threat, as white residents make racially coded complaints that sports fields designated for baseball or American football should not be used for soccer since it cuts up the grass, or they complain about the presence of 'undocumented labourers' and the noise from the post-match socialising.

In terms of political life, for undocumented workers this is concentrated around the struggle for fair pay, reasonable hours, and safe and respectful working conditions. Gordon's (2005) book *Suburban Sweatshops* details the campaigns of the Workplace Project, which attempted to organise workers in Long Island and led to hundreds of workers' complaints against employers who had not paid or had underpaid workers or had been negligent in their care (ibid.: 8). The project also collected previously unavailable data about the working conditions that migrants faced. The Workplace Project brings to light the struggles of immigrants who manage to eke out a living as casual labourers in Long Island.

Latino immigrants living in pockets and fragments across Long Island practise city living without a city of their own to live in. The hardships of immigrant life, and the ingenuity used in confronting the struggle for existence, are in many ways similar to the endurances of previous waves of immigrants to New York. The difference, of course, is that these latest immigrants are denied the right to the city; their daily toil will not contribute to the production of New York City in the way that European and African American migrants were able to shape the city and its cultural life.

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The Outer–Inner City

The outer–inner city is an ideal–typical urban formation (see Table 1) that proposes to capture cross-cutting transformations in immigration, settlement patterns, racial politics and the post-industrial global city. Critically, the outer–inner city is produced via a series of dis/continuities with the inner city of the mid-20th century. The most fundamental aspect of the transformation concerns how new sites of immigrant settlement perform functions of the old inner city. That this is now the case is symptomatic of the radical disconnection that exists between the global city and those who *work to make the city work*. The outer–inner city is very much *of the city*, even if it is not *in the city*. It is an alienated space, a product of the denial of the right to the city to new immigrants. Critically, the outer–inner city should not simply be read as the outcome simply of the benign 'spread' of multiculture from city to suburb or as evidence of continued black or brown suburbanisation.

Table 1 The inner city and outer-inner city

Inner City (1950–)	**Outer–inner city (2000–)**
Entry point to the city – cheapest housing	Entry point to the city – cheapest housing
Devaluation, i.e., poorest-quality housing, 'racial' stigma (blacks)	Devaluation, i.e., loss of purpose, 'racial' stigma ('Superdiverse' *others* and poor whites)
Zone in Transition; 'Black Belt'	Dispersal zones; *fractals*; detention centres
Tenements, boarding houses, public housing	'Spoiled' suburbs, basements, bedsits, encargada, *la jungle*
Segregation	Displacement and dispersal
Industrial labour; high unemployment	Flexible labour; informal economy
Centrality; high visibility; recognition	Peripheral; imperceptible; dislocation
Conviviality	Melancholia
Radical black politics; identity politics	Far right politics; Majoritarianism
Law and order; 'black crime'	Immigration; deportation Hate crime
'Racial' tension: whites, blacks, the police	'Xenoracial' tension: non-cosmopolitan whites and superdiverse immigrants (e.g., 'Kosovans'; Latinos)

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In outlining an ideal typical outer–inner city, it feels justified to appeal to Foucault's (1986) notion of *heterotopia* – real places that reveal the order of 'normal' space.

The ideal–typical outer–inner city outlined above is constructed from the analysis of the peripheries of London (Chapter 6) and New York (this chapter). Both types of inner city coexist, although the former is in decline, both in terms of its function as entry point to the city and in terms of its worsening physical and social conditions. The outer–inner city, on the other hand, is in the ascendancy in global city regions. The analysis below will briefly consider each category in Figure 1.

The outer–inner city provides an entry point into the city, although the disconnection between the central city and its new transitional zones often makes any notion of 'entry' negligible. Both the inner city and the outer–inner city began as devalued locations that lost prestige or purpose and thereby have moved towards the bottom of an urban hierarchy. They both suffer from a racialised territorial stigma, although the latter is notable because the wrong kind of whiteness is also invoked as a mark of shame. The milieu that typifies the outer–inner city is more diverse than the inner city, ranging from sublet suburban houses to bedsits in rooming districts. Moreover, there is no reason why a list of likely surroundings cannot include the Afghans escaping deportation from France who famously lived in a makeshift camp in woods near Calais known locally as 'la jungle'. There may also be grounds to include the detention centres, where the state seems to be mimicking the actions of the market in preventing immigrants from accessing the city. In this way, outer–inner cities may not look like cities at all.

While the inner city is segregated mainly between black and white districts (considerably more so in the US than in the UK), residents of the outer–inner city tend to live in a more diverse environment, which perhaps engenders a heightened sense of difference. The settlements of the outer–inner city are also more dispersed and fragmented, which prevents the kinds of immigrant concentrations (and, *ergo*, political potency) traditionally characteristic of inner cities. The outer–inner city provides access to work – albeit low-paid, temporary or informal labour rather than the industrial or manufacturing work that, before deindustrialisation left the inner city impoverished, was once accessed through settlement in the central city. Those who work on the periphery are often servicing the lifestyles of wealthy residents who work in the global city, usually in the financial sector. The outer–inner city is a site of exploitation (see Gordon 2005 on suburban sweatshops in Long Island), and the lack of visibility, surveillance and labour organisation

on the periphery means that these aspects are potentially intensified. Indeed, symbolic marginality is a key feature of the outer–inner city. Unlike the inner city, where immigrant populations inhabit the heart of the city and were (and continue to be) the subject of moral panic and political storm, the outer–inner city remains dislocated and imperceptible, offering elites little in the way of political or symbolic capital. As such, it receives little attention.

The centrality of the inner city and its symbolic resources provide a forum, or stage, where convivial, oppositional or antic cultures could, despite considerable hardship, flourish. Whilst it is an exaggeration to suggest that conviviality is entirely absent from the outer–inner cities, their peripheral location does not encourage the sense of urgency or possibility that is found in the convivial cultures (such as the Harlem Renaissance or hip-hop) that emerged from an inner-city environment. Rather, the outer–inner cities tend to be consumed by melancholia, a feeling of decline, loss, disconnection and resentment that is related to their distance from the centre. However, it should not be forgotten that the expressive cultures that articulate the inner-city experience are merely *glimpses* of what the right to the city might look like, as opposed to evidence that this right had been extended and was being enjoyed by all living in the centre of the metropolis. On the contrary – there was (and is) plenty wrong with the inner city, and this analysis is not foolish enough to attempt to contradict the wealth of academic evidence, amply covered in this book, that details this.

When the outer–inner city occasionally attracts media or political attention, it is usually to point to the deficiencies of racist whites or to the perceived terrorist threat lurking in the concealed recesses of the far-metropolis. The centrality and vibrant conviviality of the inner cities were breeding grounds for radical black and identity politics, whilst the outer–inner cities, by repute if not in reality, constitute unmappable 'badlands' fostering right-wing extremism and majoritarianism (a right-wing doctrine that rails against political correctness – see Pathak 2008). Both types of inner city are criminalised. In the former the law and order discourse was dominant, foregrounding 'race' riots and so-called 'black crimes' such as mugging. In the latter the discourse rounds on immigration control and the hate crimes of whites.

Like the inner city, the outer–inner city is a site of 'racial' conflict. Indeed, in what remains of the inner city, and in the metropolis itself, racism remains endemic, even when it exists in coded rather than overt forms. Hostility in outer–inner cities often resembles what Sivanandan (2001) calls xeno-racism, in which antagonistic relations are not

colour-coded. This is, of course, a result of the more diverse immigration the outer–inner cities have experienced in comparison to the post-war immigration that shaped the inner city. On the periphery it is often 'not-quite-white' (Garner 2007) groups such as 'Kosovans' or Latinos who become symbols of racial otherness. The symbolic centrality of the inner city entailed that racism and discrimination became a political priority in the latter half of the 20th century. The lack of political capital in the outer–inner city, the imperceptibility of these sites from the centres of decision-making, suggests that racism here will not receive comparable scrutiny. In fact, the displacement of racial conflict away from the cosmopolitan central city makes it easier for the global city to be imagined as post-'race', free of conflict and at ease with itself.

Certainly, more work needs to be done in order to understand the dynamics and characteristics of emerging outer–inner cities. The analysis offered here is very much a work in progress. It should also not be forgotten that an ideal type is unlikely to describe any concrete example in its entirety; rather, it is a description of a possible entity to be used in critical comparison with existing cases.

Conclusion

> We need Harlem. Poor people deserve Harlem. […] Harlem belongs to us, to folks who are just regular […] Harlem is a place where you can not be ashamed and just feel proud. (Damon, cited in Jackson 2001: 38).

The inner city was (and indeed remains, albeit in a nostalgic fashion) an iconic site of immigrant settlement, racial and identity politics, and conviviality. Two examples of cultural flourishing from black communities in New York – the Harlem Renaissance and the birth of hip-hop – are testament to this. Each movement had an impact way beyond its local inner-city origins. Whilst the inner city was a *produced space* like any other, it was also immensely *productive* in terms of articulating through a variety of creative cultural practices the contradictions of modern urban experience. Yet major cities such as New York have since undergone a process of reinvestment and re-centring whereby they have become axes of business, finance and decision-making (Lefebvre 1996: 206) rather than centres of urban life. Even the historic immigrant or 'racial' districts of cities have become a 'consumption product' (ibid.: 73): tourists visit the Tenement Museum on the Lower East Side and buy souvenirs; to live in Harlem today is *to own* a piece of black history. In the fiercely

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competitive and hierarchised global cities of the 21st century, the functionality of the inner city as entry point to the metropolis has been compromised. Three factors are argued to be responsible, each of which exerts a centrifugal force rendering the central city increasingly uninhabitable for poor, immigrant and minority groups. These factors are *dispersal*, *gentrification* and *securitisation*. The outward force exerted by these factors, in conjunction with the devaluation of some peripheral regions (often existing amidst considerable wealth, such as Hempstead in Long Island) and the availability of low-paid service sector employment on the periphery, results in the emergence of outer–inner cities such as those found among the crevices in Long Island: sites that resemble the 'old' inner city in terms of functionality. Yet outer–inner cities differ in many key respects. They are radically disconnected from the city they serve and are also more diverse in relation to milieu, the ethnic/racial identities and the legal status of the immigrants who live there. They also provide a distinct context for antagonisms that go beyond the black/white nexus that tends to characterise inner-city struggles. Experience of outer–inner city life is more fragmented than the 'wholeness' that was part of the inner-city experience.

All of this has important consequences, and this book argues that centrality matters, especially in terms of its social, political and cultural effects. As Damon intimates in the quote that opens this conclusion, although black folk in Harlem may not have had much and were disadvantaged in many ways because of their 'race', *at least they had Harlem*. Harlem (and indeed the Bronx) was much more than simply a neighbourhood; it was a space and a stake in a much larger forum – the metropolis – and that alone permitted recognition, participation and, most importantly, the making of urban history. These districts gained a globally recognised symbolic resonance because of the amazing things that concentrated groups of ordinary people were able to achieve whilst living there – spatial practices that are testament to the promise of multicultural urbanism. Today's racialised minorities do not share this historic right to the city – they do not have a Harlem, and in the case of many Latino day labourers in Long Island they do not have any place at all. The city is diminished because of the exclusion of these groups – what they may bring to the city, a sense of new possibilities, is lost.

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9
Epilogue

There is no urbanity without a centre. (Lefebvre 1996: 208)

Our story began in 19th-century London and reached its conclusion in 21st century Long Island, New York. The geohistorical transformations that occurred in between have been charted, at times extensively and no doubt too sketchily at others, during the course of this book. Whilst this analysis attempts to shed light on the 'race' aspects of the story of the metropolis and its centre–periphery, inevitably some facets – most notably gender – have been underplayed. Whereas London in the 19th century was teeming with people concentrated into a dense metropolis, Long Island in the 21st century is comprised of fragmented, isolated outer–inner cities that presently lack any kind of *polis*. They apparently have no way of achieving concentration or becoming an urban centre in their own right – although such a possibility should, of course, never be precluded. It is, therefore, inevitable that this book ends on a melancholy note, since the analysis necessarily closes on fairly unambiguous examples of loss and/or absence – the loss or diminishment of the urban within what are now called global cities. The ramifications of this loss go beyond indulgent self-absorption, however, for the decline of multicultural urbanism, the denial of the right to the city and the continued negative impact of racism on the contemporary cityscape are of wide-ranging and pressing sociological and political significance. In these final pages a brief summary of the work is provided before a final few words of comparison are offered on London, New York and Paris. To close, some comments and further questions on the issues of 'race', culture and the right to the city are offered.

The public city of the 19th century was shaped not only by external factors but also by the diverse groups who lived there. The metropolis

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was modern and progressive; it offered something beyond solitude, something beyond community. The city was a dazzling, bewildering and imperfect human product and its inhabitants were part of its production; they were (by today's standards at least) authentically connected with what Lefebvre refers to as the *oeuvre*. Yet, as Berman (1982: 15) explains, everything that is modern is vulnerable to destruction:

> To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world – and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are.

The public city was soon stripped bare as two quite distinct visions of 20th-century modernism took hold, in the shape of urban renewal and suburbanisation. As use value of the city became supplanted by exchange value, the city and its inhabitants also became fragmented and hierarchised:

> Social space [...] assumes the form of a collection of ghettos: for the elite, for the bourgeoisie, for the intellectuals, for foreign workers, etc. These ghettos are not simply juxtaposed; they are hierarchized in a way that represents spatially the economic and social hierarchy. (Lefebvre 2003b: 95)

Here the plot takes a dramatic turn. The disorderly aspects of the urban should have ceased at this juncture; at least, that was the intention of city authorities and planners. While whites departed the inner city for the suburbs or for 'respectable' social housing, black immigrants took their place. This 'racial' incursion into the heart of the white metropolis hurried a 'second run' of multicultural – or multi-'racial' – urbanism, as African Americans in New York and Afro-Caribbeans in London, as well as North Africans in the Parisian *banlieues*, articulated, through expressive cultures such as music and art as well as more traditional political avenues (see Krase and LaCerra 1991), their responses to white racism and 'racial' stigma. Of course, this all happened during a period of severe economic decline for cities on both sides of the Atlantic, and the inner city was a politically agonistic and explosive place. It was certainly no utopia. The crisis of the city was commonly expressed in 'racial' language and the inner city became renowned as a 'black' space, an incongruity and an incitement in what had for so long been taken for granted as a *white city*. Here was the context for

the reclaiming and subsequent re-centring of the city by elites and the middle classes during the late 1980s and 1990s. Yet, as Smith (1998: 16) argues, '[r]evanchism was neither a politically nor socially necessary outcome of economic crisis and restructuring.' Alternative urban futures could have emerged from this crisis, not least the advancement of multicultural urbanism and encouragement of the conviviality and political engagement that was a feature of the troubled *agonopolis*. As the city was swept from under their feet by processes of dispersal, gentrification and securitisation, those defending and advocating multiculturalism, and later cosmopolitanism, lost touch with the 'natural' object of their analysis – the city. Urban living became abstracted to a philosophical puzzle when it should have been made real through social practice.

London, New York and Paris are the concrete cities upon which an understanding of the metropolis is constructed. In its contemporary form each of the cities exhibits tendencies towards less inhabitability for the poor, minority ethnic and 'racial' groups and new immigrants. Depending upon the city, these groups may find themselves excluded by forced dispersal, prohibitively high costs of housing or a feeling that they do not belong in the gentrified, security-conscious central city – or perhaps a combination of all three. They may settle on the periphery of the city because of cheaper housing, the greater availability of work or the belief that they will be safer (from racism, aggressive police, immigration control) and more at home (amongst people like themselves) in spaces that lie beyond the cosmopolis.

Paris provides a continual point of comparison to the broadly comparable pattern of development demonstrated by London and New York. Paris simultaneously appears 'ahead of the game' as well as occasionally 'lagging behind'. This is because the centre–periphery of Paris is primarily a *state-space* – an attempt at total control and purification through urban planning. This is achieved by preserving the centre whilst imposing an undifferentiated homogeneity and stigma upon the diverse residents of the periphery. Of course, this is exactly how Haussmann had envisaged Paris in the 19th century. The *banlieues* were outer–inner cities when central London and New York still offered affordable entry points to the city. Within this context, the *banlieues* resembled a perfected form of exclusion from the central city that the market could never emulate. Yet it should not be forgotten that the African American ghettos in public housing projects in New York – in peripheral locations such as Brownsville and East New York in Brooklyn – where racism, the state and market collide are comparable to the *banlieues* in

levels of deprivation and exclusion (see Pritchett 2002; Thabit 2003; Wacquant 2008a). It is just that they *are not all there is*. As locations such as Southend-on-Sea and Long Island have become alternative 'entry points' to the global city in fragmented spaces produced more by the vagaries of the production of space in advanced capitalism than the state, the *banlieues* appear almost quaint in their 20th-century modernism, their 'perfection'. Yet in their concentration of difference (a difference that is officially denied) the *banlieues* are ironically encouraging of urban living, of expressive cultures and conviviality. They offer an oppositional space, a symbolic counterpoint to the 'museumfied' central city, that the outer–inner cities of London and New York do not, at least not yet. Unlike the outer–inner cities, the *banlieues* are anything but anonymous – they retain a symbolic and political centrality comparable with the inner city.

The metropolis is by no means post-'race'. The revanchism that accompanied the re-centring of the city in the 1980s and 1990s means that the white city fantasy, 'where non-white "ethnics" are merely […] objects to be moved or removed according to […] will' (Hage 1998: 18), is more relevant than ever. All difference in the city is now imagined to be under the sphere of influence of the more-or-less white elites who finance, control and administer the city. This confidence is also expressed in an entitled brand of 'tolerant' multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism, of which a critical aspect is a disempowering rhetoric that claims 'race' is no longer relevant to our understanding of the city or our deracinated selves. Yet, arguably, the city is differentiated more now by 'racially' structured ways of thinking and acting than it was previously. The influence of 'race' remains insidious. For instance, in addition to a white city fantasy that persists – albeit with a new cosmopolitan veneer – there remains the increasingly pathological margins comprised of 'last-resort' public housing, the Asian enclaves and the scattered presence of 'borderline white' minorities such as asylum seekers, migrant workers from the EU, Latino day-labourers and Muslims. Moreover, while whiteness in the form of the white city fantasy 'speaks from' a privileged position of invisibility, there also exists a hyper-visible whiteness referring to the degraded status of poor, non-cosmopolitan and usually suburban whites. These whites are blamed for any 'residual' racism that exists in backward spaces beyond the rarefied atmosphere of the cosmopolis (see Millington 2010). In the white city, whiteness is not a guarantee of preferential treatment (McDowell 2005). We would do well *not to forget* 'race', because it continues to structure processes of

inclusion and exclusion and shape the centre, periphery and margins of the city.

Whereas the iconic black inner cities of the 20th century provided a central forum where radical (and indeed conservative) politics and expressive cultures battled against historical white racism and attempted to take ownership of what it meant to be black in a white city, it appears that the new subjugated 'races' of the periphery will not be granted access to an equivalent forum. The outer–inner cities, in their fragmented and dispersed form, do not yet provide a stage for *recognition*. A likely consequence of this denial of the right to the city, the right to the *oeuvre* and the right to difference is that the experience, imagination and labour of groups like asylum seekers and Latino labourers may not contribute to the production of the future metropolis; unlike previous waves of immigrants and working classes, their presence may not be felt. Surely, like those 20th century immigrants who settled in the city and are now commemorated in tenement museums and 'walking tours' of their historic neighbourhoods, the new 'racial' and ethnic minorities are just as deserving of a place and a stake in the metropolis? Of course, but it is not as simple as that. A modest home in Manhattan, Paris or central London would not, on its own, emancipate subjugated minorities from discrimination or exploitation, and it never did in the past. Yet it is the wider notion of what cities are, or could be, that remains critical. If cities lose their urban function (urbanity reduced to zone as identified by the Chicago sociologists) and no longer provide a forum for recognition, an *oeuvre* to participate in and a position of centrality to speak from, then do they cease to be cities at all and become simply monuments?

Any attempt to resuscitate the ghosts of the past in order to provide a contrast with the present is likely to be labelled nostalgic. Yet, nostalgia is perhaps a necessary burden, a shared and inevitable emotion in the modern era of rapid and often enforced change (Bonnett 2010: 15). Nostalgia as a realm of acknowledgement, experience and exploration need not be precluded from a radical imagination. It may just be worth placing trust in an 'openness to themes of yearning and loss' (ibid: 3). Such an openness fully accepts 'there cannot be a going back (towards the traditional city)' (Lefebvre 1996: 148), yet neither can there be 'a headlong flight, towards a colossal and shapeless agglomeration' (ibid). This is why, for Lefebvre, the right to the city is 'like a cry and a demand [that] slowly meanders through the surprising detours of nostalgia and tourism, the return to the heart of the traditional city, and the call of

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existent or recently developed centralities' (ibid: 150). It is only through thinking about past urban spaces in a *transductive* manner, by comparing them with today's urban centres, that the future city can be perceived, conceived and lived. Nobody would wish to return to the maelstrom of the 19th-century public city or the hostile *agonopolis* of the 1970s and 1980s, yet these spaces – and others – offer glimpses of the urban and of the city that indicate not only lost opportunities but also future possibilities.

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Notes

1 Introduction: The Signs in the Street

1. Brixton market article in *London Evening Standard*, 19 November 2010. Notting Hill Tabernacle article in same newspaper Thursday 9 June 2011

3 Breathe Out: The Naked City

1. There was also the creation of a Veterans Administration (VA) programme after the war to help the sixteen million returning service people purchase a home. The FHA and VA are part of a single effort to improve rates of home construction, sale and ownership across the US – a project that continued up until the late 1960s (ibid: 204).

4 *Agonopolis*: The Multicultural City

1. During the 1970s, young Maghrebis in Parisian *banlieues* began calling themselves *Beurs*. This *verlan* (backslang) expression was formed by inverting the syllables of the word *Arabe*. As Hargreaves and McKinney (1998: 20) explain, 'As a neologism, Beur had many advantages. It lacked the pejorative connotations associated with *Arabe* and enabled its users to speak to themselves without having to choose between one of the ready-made national or quasi-national identities [...] proferred to them [...]'.

5 *Cosmopolis*? Ain't No Love in the Heart of the City

1. There has actually been a concern with preventing concentrations of immigrants in London since the mid-1960s, when a government circular advocated bussing African Caribbean children to schools in parts of the city where 'immigrant' numbers were smaller. There have since been dispersal programmes from London for Polish, Ugandan Asian, Chilean, Vietnamese, Bosnian and Kosovan refugees.
2. Critics of zero tolerance pointed to the fact that crime rates were falling in New York City before the policy was introduced and also that American cities, such as San Diego, that did not adopt zero tolerance also experienced comparable reductions in crime (Body-Gendrot 2000). McLaughlin (2006a: 467) puts the decrease in crime down to the waning of the crack epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s. There were also broader demographic changes, such as lower numbers of young men.

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6 *Bedsit-land*: Southend-on-Sea and London

1. ESRC award number R42200154335.
2. For example, the average monthly rent for a one-bedroom flat in Barking, one of London's most easterly boroughs, is £937.00. In Westcliff-on-Sea the average monthly rate for a similar property is £540.00. (Prices obtained from RRPI (Residential Rental Price Index) at http://www.rentright.co.uk/essex/barking/1_rrpi.aspx (accessed 7 April 2010)).

7 *State-space*: La Courneuve and Paris

1. Aurélien Gampiot-Mokoko carried out the majority of interviews. The research project was funded by a British Academy small grant (SG-49636).
2. Towns governed or formerly governed by communist councils.
3. All the names have been changed to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees.
4. The RER train line that connects the north-eastern *banlieues* with Paris concludes at *Les Halles*.
5. Balibar (2007: 50) suggests that Sarkozy's political strategy made appeals to the sentiments of poor whites.
6. Wacquant (2008a: 183) points to three 'strategies of social distinction and withdrawal'. These are 'mutual avoidance', 'the reconstitution and elaboration of "infra-differences"' and 'the diversion of public opprobrium onto scapegoats such as notorious "problem families" and foreigners, or drug dealers and single mothers'. In the fieldwork that forms the basis for this paper, evidence to support the first and third strategies was thin, although there was some evidence to support the second. The problem lies with the fact that Wacquant's strategies are all based upon misrecognition of, or compliance with, the stigma imposed upon residents, *by residents*. This was not as common as Wacquant suggests.
7. The battle that finally crushed the Paris Commune of 1871.
8. TF1 is the most important privately owned right-wing TV channel in France.

8. The 'Outer-inner City': 'Race', Conviviality and the Centre-Periphery

1. This story appeared in *The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance*, published in 1925 and edited by Alain Locke.
2. These are commonly referred to as the 'four elements' of hip-hop.
3. The last two districts have foreign-born populations of fifty-five per cent and sixty per cent respectively.

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