

C.G. JUNG'S THEORY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS:
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

By

WALTER AVORY SHELBURNE

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Walter Avory Shelburne

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Major Department: Philosophy

This study is an examination of Jung's idea of the collective unconscious being primarily concerned with the chief aspect of the collective unconscious, the concept of the archetype.

In the first half of the dissertation, an attempt is made to understand what Jung means by the archetypes. The exposition of the theory of archetypes begins with a look at the basic Jungian mental constructs, psyche and unconscious, and with a sketch of Jung's theory of mind. Then the various aspects of the idea of the archetype are discussed treating such topics as the ontological status of the archetype, the archetypes as a priori conditioners of experience, the symbolic nature of archetypes, the archetypes and the instincts, the origin of archetypes, the phenomenology of archetypes, personification of archetypes, the archetypes and synchronicity and changes in archetypes through time.

The exposition of the archetypal theory is undertaken with the aim in mind of showing how the idea of archetypes can be construed as a plausible scientific theory compatible with standard scientific

understanding. In the second half of the dissertation, we discuss problematic aspects of our reconstruction from the point of view of criticisms which have been brought against the theory. After a preliminary chapter in which criticisms of a general nature are discussed, we treat specific problematic aspects involved with understanding the archetypal theory as a plausible scientific one. The rationality of the archetypal theory is discussed in reply to the accusation that Jung's theory is mystical rather than scientific. In addition to the question of rationality, we treat the relationship between the practical and theoretical aspects of the theory in order to distinguish between a theoretical and therapeutic discourse about archetypes, with the latter discourse being concerned with personal meaningful interpretation of archetypal experience and hence often justifiably employing philosophical and religious terminology. Thus we attempt to show how the use of such terminology by Jung in discussions of archetypes does not count against the scientific nature of theoretical claims about archetypes.

In addition to attempting to show how the archetypal theory is a rational one and how its relationship to philosophy and religion does not count against it as a scientific theory, we also examine how the theory can be understood in the context of general criteria for scientific theories. In this regard we discuss the problem of falsification showing how the theory can not be interpreted as compatible with all observational states of affairs. We also discuss the explanations and predictions which can be expected from the theory. Finally the evidence for the theory is discussed.

The conclusion is reached that the archetypal theory can satisfy

general scientific criteria and also meet specific criticisms of it from the scientific point of view and that thus the scientific plausibility of the theory should be admitted.

INTRODUCTION

In this study we attempt a rational reconstruction of Jung's theory of archetypes with the goal in view of showing that this theory is a scientifically plausible one. In regard to this task, some preliminary questions need to be addressed. What is meant by a rational reconstruction? Why is the reconstruction undertaken from a scientific point of view and what is the purpose of showing that the archetypal theory is scientifically plausible?

So far as the first question is concerned, the idea of a rational reconstruction is to clarify the meaning and interrelationship of the basic concepts of a theory so that the theory can be shown to be consistent and to be a theory with a clearly specified meaning.

In Jung's style of theorizing, clarity and precision of basic concepts are much less important than fullness of meaning and phenomenologically accurate characterization of events. As a consequence many of Jung's ideas are as vague and ambiguous as they are fascinating and insightful. However, the purpose of a rational reconstruction as we understand it is not to oppose the spontaneity and richness of creativity with a simple desire for order and clarity. Rather the aim of a rational reconstruction is the transformation of the untidy richness of creativity into a more directly useable form. By attempting to clarify the meaning of the archetypal theory then, we hope to bring about a wider acknowledgement and study of

the theory so as eventually to contribute to its dissemination as a fruitful conceptual scheme.

However, our reconstruction from the scientific point of view needs some justification. For a survey of Jungian literature indicates on the whole a tendency to emphasize the therapeutic aspect of the theory and its immediate personal relevance rather than its employment in an attempt to gain scientific knowledge. But unless the scientific plausibility of the archetypal theory can be established on firm ground, the personal and therapeutic relevance of the theory will be undermined. In Jung's terminology, the dilemma of modern man is that he can no longer simply believe, he must know. The modern individual's desire for a comprehensive understanding of the world can thus not be satisfied by views which are incompatible with scientific understanding.

But if the author must confess that he is attracted to the archetypal theory from the standpoint of its personal existential relevance, it should not be concluded that the archetypal theory is seen only as a therapeutic tool. For in arguing for scientific plausibility, we have in mind a more ambitious goal of eventually showing how the theory can be used to gain theoretical understanding in a wide range of scientific disciplines. We believe that the theory is not only scientifically plausible, but that it should be accepted and employed as well. However, this more ambitious aim must await the outcome of our attempt to argue for scientific plausibility. For a rational reconstruction of the theory is necessary before its true scientific merit can be appreciated.

CHAPTER 1
JUNG'S MENTAL CONSTRUCTS

Psyche

Preliminary Remarks

In order to gain a full understanding of Jung's theory of archetypes, it is necessary to see his views on this matter within the context of his psychology as a whole. However, within the scope of this study of the archetypes, we can not attempt to trace the relationship between all of Jung's views and the archetypes. A principle omission in this regard is Jung's theory of individuation where he attempts to examine the role which the archetypes play in the development of personality.

But if we can not consider all of Jung's views which are related to the archetypal theory, it is essential to gain an understanding of his mental constructs. Thus, as a preliminary to discussing the archetypal theory itself, we will examine these constructs. Our approach in this regard will be to begin with the mental constructs of the widest application. We will consider first then the most general of the Jungian mentalistic terms, the psyche.

Psyche-Body Relation

Jung emphasizes that his notion of the psyche is not intended to be a precise notion in the sense that its limits are well defined. "I know that very many people have difficulties with the word 'psychological.'

To put these critics at ease, I should like to add that no one knows what 'psyche' is, and one knows just as little how far into nature 'psyche' extends."¹

Before attempting a definitive characterization of the psyche then, we will examine how the concept is used. For if the psyche is a vague notion, we have, nonetheless, little trouble for the most part with regard to deciding whether or not to apply it in specific cases.

Since by the psychic Jung has in mind something close in meaning to mental, one fruitful way to see how Jung uses this concept is to explore the intended relation between psyche and body.

In this regard then, it is clear that by psyche Jung does not mean to imply a Cartesian dualism in which the psyche would be a mental substance. For rather than a thing or a substance, the psyche is to be considered in terms of a system of energy relations. The term "libido" is used by Jung to designate the psychic energy. This energetic viewpoint seems to suggest a reductionist position in which the psyche understood as physical energy was seen as reducible to physico-chemical terms or else a vitalist position in which a special type of mind energy was postulated.

The possibility that Jung might be taking a reductive position is suggested by the fact that the purpose of the energetic standpoint is to enable the psychologist to understand psychological phenomena in such terms as entropy, conservation of energy and equilization of differences in an analogous way to the manner in which physical phenomena can be so understood. Thus Jung believes that the concept of libido "accomplishes for psychology the same advance that the concept of energy introduced into physics" (Vol. IV, p. 112).

In the absence of any methods of exact measurement of the energy, quantitative estimations can be reached through appeal to the system of psychological values, as the value intensity of psychological phenomena will be held to be a quantitative estimate of the amount of psychic energy involved (Vol. VIII, p. 9).

However, Jung makes clear that the analogy between physical energy and psychic energy cannot be taken in too literal a sense:

. . . in spite of the nonmeasurability of psychic processes, the perceptible changes effected by the psyche cannot possibly be understood except as a phenomenon of energy. This places the psychologist in a situation which is highly repugnant to the physicist: the psychologist also talks of energy although he has nothing measurable to manipulate, besides which the concept of energy is a strictly defined mathematical quantity which cannot be applied to anything psychic. . . . If psychology nevertheless insists on employing its own concept of energy for the purpose of expressing the activity . . . of the psyche, it is not of course being used as a mathematical formula, but only as its analogy (Vol. VIII, p. 233).

Jung's energetic standpoint is then obviously not an attempt to bring about a reduction of psychology to psychophysics. Jung insists on the autonomous position of psychology in relation to other sciences:

Since, unfortunately, we cannot prove scientifically that a relation of equivalence exists between physical and psychic energy, we have no alternative except either to drop the energetic viewpoint altogether, or else to postulate a special psychic energy--which would be entirely possible as a hypothetical operation. Psychology as much as physics may avail itself of the right to build its own concepts . . . (Vol. VIII, p. 15-16).

But this characterization of libido as a "special psychic energy" would seem to imply a vitalist position. This suspicion seems confirmed

when we read: "From a broader standpoint libido can be understood as vital energy in general, or as Bergson's élan vital" (Vol. IV, p. 248), and ". . . we would probably do best to regard the psychic process simply as a life-process. In this way we enlarge the narrower concept of psychic energy to a broader one of life-energy, which includes 'psychic energy' as a specific part" (Vol. VIII, p. 17).

However, Jung makes clear that "this broader standpoint" is a hypothetical and problematic one.² In order to maintain its functional autonomy, psychology must not conflate its concept of psychic energy with a possible biological concept of vital energy. "I have therefore suggested that, in view of the psychological use we intend to make of it, we call our hypothetical life-energy 'libido.' To this extent I have differentiated it from a concept of universal energy, so maintaining the right of biology and psychology to form their own concepts" (Vol. VIII, p. 17). There is also an explicit disclaimer of the concept of vitalism: "We shall not be disturbed if we are met with the cry of vitalism. We are as far removed from any belief in a specific life-force as from any other metaphysical assertion" (Vol. IV, p. 125).

We see then that in regard to the question of reductionism, Jung wants to avoid commitment to either reductionism or vitalism. Jung's stand on this issue can then best be characterized as de facto antireductionist. Rather than attempting to defend the a priori nonreduction of psychological phenomena to physics or chemistry, Jung holds to a de facto antireductionism. This nonreduction as a matter of fact is supportable by the available empirical evidence

and is strictly speaking neutral with respect to the issue of reduction in principle.

Jung's noncommittal stand on reductionism is characteristic of his psychology as a whole where he attempts to define his psychological constructs in ways which are as free as possible from philosophical controversy. However, this dislike for philosophy frequently leads to the situation of unclarity with regard to the full implications of Jung's views. This situation of ambiguity is well exemplified when we attempt to comprehend what sort of psyche-body relation Jung has in mind in constructing his psychology. For Jung's noncommittal views on reductionism fail to give us a definite clue as to his position on the mind-body problem.

However, in regard to this clue, there are indications that Jung holds to a nondualistic position in which the psyche is seen as necessarily dependent on the brain, with psyche entailing embodied psyche.

So far as our experience permits of any inference at all about the nature of the psyche, it shows the psychic process as a phenomenon dependent on the nervous system (Vol. VIII, p. 322, 1926).

. . . the human psyche lives in indissoluble union with the body (Vol. VIII, p. 114, 1936).

And just as the material of the body that is ready for life has need of the psyche in order to be capable of life, so the psyche presupposes the living body in order that its images may live (Vol. VIII, p. 326, 1926).

But Jung seems to call into question the view that the psyche is necessarily embodied, thus suggesting a dualistic position. In a 1934 essay we read such statements as the following:

. . . the psyche's attachment to the brain, i.e., its space-time limitation, is no longer as self-evident and incontrovertible as we have hitherto been led to believe (Vol. VIII, p. 413).

The hypothetical possibility that the psyche touches on a form of existence outside space and time presents a scientific question-mark that merits serious consideration for a long time to come (Vol. VIII, p. 414).

[At death] we may establish with reasonable certainty that an individual consciousness as it relates to ourselves has come to an end. But whether this means that the continuity of the psychic process is also interrupted remains doubtful, since the psyche's attachment to the brain can be confirmed with far less certitude today than it could fifty years ago. Psychology must first digest certain parapsychological facts, which it has hardly begun to do yet (Vol. VIII, p. 412).

One way to come to terms with this apparent radical shift in position is to attempt to distinguish an earlier necessary embodiment view from a later view when, in the last years of his life, Jung held to the belief in the existence of disembodied psyches. A consideration of the dates of the above quoted statements, however, casts doubt on the idea that Jung's position can be neatly divided into an earlier and later period.³ Although there certainly is a slow gradual shift away from the necessary embodiment view, the certitude with which Jung states that the psyche has a necessary connection with the body is never replaced with another position which Jung can state in an unhypothetical way and which can easily be integrated with the rest of his views.

Just as the parapsychological data have to an extent proved to be anomalies inexplicable in terms of present physical laws, so do the considerations concerning the related phenomena which caused Jung to doubt the psyche's necessary connection with the brain prove

to be anomalous with respect to his psychology as a whole.⁴ In order then to understand the place of these anomalous statements in relation to the totality of what Jung says about the psyche, the sort of distinction we must bear in mind is that between a well-worked out and fruitful concept, the notion of the psyche as embodied and dependent on the brain, versus tentative, hypothetical attempts to see how this view could be expanded, or perhaps revised, in order to take into account the full range of the parapsychological phenomena.

Although a full discussion of Jung's parapsychological reflections can not be attempted here, it would seem that the parapsychological data did not lead Jung to conclude that commitment to a position of dualism, in the sense that psyche and matter are radically different types of entities, was necessary. Rather, present in the latest as well as earlier writings is the view that psyche and body (matter) are different aspects of a common fundamental entity.

. . . it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing (Vol. VIII, p. 215, 1946).

This living being appears outwardly as the material body, but inwardly as a series of images of the vital activities taking place within it. They are two sides of the same coin, and we cannot rid ourselves of the doubt that perhaps this whole separation of mind and body may finally prove to be merely a device of reason for the purpose of conscious discrimination--an intellectually necessary separation of one and the same fact into two aspects, to which we then illegitimately attribute an independent existence (Vol. VIII, p. 326, 1926).

That even the psychic world, which is so extraordinarily different from the physical world, does not have its roots outside the one cosmos is evident from the undeniable fact that causal connections exist between the psyche and the body which point to their underlying unitary nature (Vol. XIV, p. 538, 1954).

If one is unwilling to postulate a pre-established harmony of physical and psychic events, then they can only be in a state of interaction. But the latter hypothesis requires a psyche that touches matter at some point, and, conversely, a matter with a latent psyche, a postulate not so very far removed from certain formulations of modern physics (Eddington, Jeans, and others). In this connection I would remind the reader of the existence of parapsychic phenomena . . . (Vol. VIII, p. 234, 1946).

In order to understand Jung's theory of mind, it would seem essential to understand two problematic aspects of Jung's views. On the one hand, we need to understand how Jung's essentially double aspect approach can be made compatible with acceptance of disembodied psyches. On the other hand, as exemplified in the last quotations, Jung appears to want to hold simultaneously to a double aspect theory and an interactionist view.⁵

Since we cannot attempt a full discussion of the relevant problems in the philosophy of mind which these problems raise, we will be content to point out that whereas the double aspect theory and interactionism can perhaps be shown to be compatible in principle, it is clear that the acceptance of disembodied psyches would at least greatly complicate such an endeavor. For if it can be shown that psyches can exist independently of bodies, then the essentially monistic double aspect view would be in great difficulty.

But if we have then good cause to try to construe Jung's views on the psyche-body relation independently of the statements about

disembodied psyches, we can nonetheless understand how Jung's views on this matter can seem at one moment to be dualistic, while in another instance he appears to hold to a monistic double aspect theory. For the psyche is to be studied from the standpoint of the empirical data as if it were a distinct entity from the body, although this phenomenological approach does not for Jung entail a substantial dualism. He can then say both that ". . . we have absolutely no means of dividing what is psychic from the biological process as such" (Vol. VIII, p. 16), and also that "so far, then, as our present knowledge goes, neuroses are to be influenced or cured by approaching them not from the proximal end, i.e., from the functioning of the glands, but from the distal end, i.e., from the psyche, just as if the psyche were itself a substance" (Vol. XI, p. 329).

The dualistic point of view is then assumed when we view the psyche as phenomena. When we stop to consider what the psyche is essentially and in its relation to the body, we see that the psyche is in all probability merely another aspect of the body.

Characterization of the Psyche


Keeping these considerations about the psyche-body relation in mind, we are now prepared to appreciate Jung's positive characterization of the psyche. Moreover, this characterization is to serve as a criterion of applicability of the term, defining the permissible range of its use and giving us at least a method in principle of discriminating the psychic from the nonpsychic. It is to be then a sort of operational definition. From the point of view of ontological considerations, we can not of course specify a psychic realm as distinct from and uncontaminated with a nonpsychic realm.

Heuristically though we can make such a specification in principle as this specification is to indicate the phenomenological difference between the psychic and nonpsychic.

Jung says then that "what I would call the psyche proper extends to all functions which can be brought under the influence of a will" (Vol. VIII, p. 183). Moreover, by will is understood a form of disposable energy (Vol. VIII, pages 182-183).

The sort of working model that emerges from this characterization then is a separation of the psyche and the truly psychological from the instincts and the only physiological in terms of the possibility of modification or flexibility in the otherwise rigid dynamisms of physiological compulsion.

An example of what is meant by the nonpsychic in terms of animal life is perhaps instructive. For in consideration of the insect world, there seem to be no exceptions to the rigid physiological determinism of behavior. An insect is essentially a physiological automaton. However, as we consider more complex forms of organisms with more centralized nervous systems, the hypothesis of the existence of at least a rudimentary form of consciousness becomes more probable. With the higher mammals the existence of psychological processes becomes evident. Thus Jung explicitly affirms the existence of psychic processes in dogs and domestic animals (Vol. VIII, pages 173 and 189). For Jung then the psyche is not restricted to man but only finds its greatest development there as the outcome of a continuous developmental sequence of gradual phylogenetic emergence.

In specifying the relationship between the instincts and the psyche then, the instincts are conceived to be ectopsychic in origin. 

Jung summarizes his argument on this point in the following way:

If we started with the hypothesis that the psyche is absolutely identical with the state of being alive, then we should have to accept the existence of a psychic function even in unicellular organisms. . . .

But if we look upon the appearance of the psyche as a relatively recent event in evolutionary history, and assume that the psychic function is a phenomenon accompanying a nervous system which in some way or other has become centralized, then it would be difficult to believe that the instincts were originally psychic in nature. And since the connection of the psyche with the brain is a more probable conjecture than the psychic nature of life in general, I regard the characteristic compulsiveness of instinct as an ectopsychic factor (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

In stating that instincts are ectopsychic, Jung does not of course wish to deny a psychological aspect to instinctual phenomena; and thus he wishes to make clear that the instincts can be considered from two points of view: as they appear in consciousness, their psychic impact, as it were, and as physiological stimuli.

Instinct as a ectopsychic factor would play the role of a stimulus merely, while instinct as a psychic phenomenon would be an assimilation of this stimulus to a pre-existent psychic pattern. A name is needed for this process. I should term it psychization. Thus, what we call instinct offhand would be a datum already psychized, but of ectopsychic origin (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

A further clarification of Jung's theoretical model of the psyche comes into play when this ambiguous interface region between the psychological and the physiological is explicitly considered. For the psychological phenomena associated with the disposable energy of the will are according to Jung's model merely the end of a continuum with the physiological at one end and the psychic at the other.

Moreover, in the middle of this continuum, Jung identifies psychoid functions which are quasi-psychic yet not merely physiological. Instincts are examples of these psychoid phenomena which though not psychic in the full sense of Jung's designation yet have psychological aspects. Jung states then that the term "psychoid" is "meant to distinguish a category of events from merely vitalistic phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other" (Vol. VIII, p. 177).

Since in order to be influenced by the disposable energy of the will a function or process must be capable of becoming conscious, the characteristic quality of those functions which are psychoid is their incapability of reaching full consciousness. The sense in which Jung sees the instincts as not capable of full consciousness is made clear in the following way:

We speak of "instinctive actions," meaning by that a mode of behaviour of which neither the motive nor the aim is fully conscious and which is prompted only by an obscure inner necessity. . . . Thus instinctive action is characterized by an unconsciousness of the psychological motive behind it, in contrast to the strictly conscious processes which are distinguished by the conscious continuity of their motives (Vol. VIII, p. 130).

Now the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of functions which can become fully conscious and hence capable of being influenced by the disposable energy of the will is not fully described by distinguishing between the psyche and the instincts. For Jung makes the point that there is another type of function which limits the will and which cannot be described as instinctual in the physiological sense. This function is called spiritual. Identical with the factors which Jung calls the archetypes, the spiritual function

is like instinct a psychoid function incapable of full consciousness.⁶

A full discussion of what Jung means by the spiritual will be given in Chapter 3. Here it will suffice to state that for Jung the compulsiveness associated with the nonpsychic realm is due not only to dynamisms of physiological origin, the instincts; but, in addition to this lower limit, the psyche has an upper limit where the psychic functions gradually fall under the influence of spiritual determinants. "Just as, in its lower reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic-material substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into a 'spiritual' form about which we know as little as we do about the functional basis of instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).

In terms of the continuum model then, there would appear to be psychoid processes on both sides of the psyche, and the psyche could be figuratively said to be surrounded by psychoid processes. But from a phylogenetic point of view, the question now arises why the spiritual function is said to be "higher" than the instinctual psychoid function, since the psyche appears to have developed out of the psychoid processes considered as a whole and thus to be "higher" than it in the sense of having developed later. The solution to this enigma seems to be that although the archetypal psychoid processes are probably present, at least in rudimentary form, throughout the animal kingdom, it is only with the development of the more advanced forms of consciousness that there is a clear separation between instinctual and spiritual psychoid functions. Moreover, it seems to be just this separation which brings about the phenomenon of consciousness so that "psychic processes seem to be balances of energy flowing between spirit and instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 207).

Now in this separation of spiritual and instinctual functions, the instinctual energies seem to be channelled by the spiritual forms. In a sense the spiritual function is then that which allows the energies of man to be employed in other than instinctual activities. This is the sense in which the spiritual function is higher than the instinctual. From the standpoint of phylogeny, however, the designation of "higher" is misleading since both types of psychoid processes are unconscious in relation to the later developing consciousness associated with the psyche. "Spirit and instinct are by nature autonomous and both limit in equal measure the applied field of the will" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).

Unconscious

Now it would seem that an understanding of the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of the will leads to the conclusion that the psyche is to be conceived as equivalent to consciousness or awareness in opposition to the psychoid functions, the distinguishing feature of which is their incapability of full consciousness and hence relative autonomy from the will (Vol. VIII, p. 184). However, it is only when we consider the attribution of an unconscious dimension to the psyche that a full characterization of what Jung intends by his psyche construct can be accomplished.

In order to resolve this apparent paradox of the existence of an unconscious psyche then, it is necessary to focus on the meaning Jung gives to the notion of the unconscious. He says that "since we perceive effects whose origin cannot be found in consciousness, we are compelled to allow hypothetical contents to the sphere of the non-conscious, which means presupposing that the origin of those effects

lies in the unconscious precisely because it is not conscious" (Vol. IV, p. 140). Thus ". . . everything in the personality that is not contained in the conscious should be found in the unconscious" (Vol. III, p. 204).

The unconscious understood in this negative way as the non-conscious is relatively unproblematic. Whatever is not immediately present in awareness is said to be unconscious. Memories, for example, can be said to be unconscious contents which can be brought into consciousness at will. Other unconscious contents such as repressed experiences or subliminal perceptions may also be brought into awareness, although a special effort or technique is needed. Since the latter are not as easily recoverable to awareness as the former, they are said to belong to a "deeper level" of the unconscious. The analogy of depth then amounts operationally to a function of energy. Contents with a certain critical energy stay in consciousness and lacking it become unconscious. When contents which are ordinarily unconscious become charged with energy, they intrude themselves into conscious awareness and produce a so-called "lowering of consciousness" with a consequent disruption of conscious intentionalities.

The boundary or dividing point then between conscious and unconscious is an energy threshold. However, this idea that conscious and unconscious are qualitatively separate should not be understood to mean that a sort of energy membrane sharply divides conscious from unconscious contents. For it rather the case that every psychic content is to some degree unconscious and that consequently the psyche is both conscious and unconscious at once.

Consequently there is a consciousness in which unconsciousness predominates, as well as a consciousness in which self-consciousness predominates. This paradox becomes immediately intelligible when we realize that there is no conscious content which can with absolute certainty be said to be totally conscious . . . (Vol. VIII, pages 187-188).

We must, however, accustom ourselves to the thought that conscious and unconscious have no clear demarcations, the one beginning where the other leaves off. It is rather the case that the psyche is a conscious-unconscious whole (Vol. VIII, p. 200).

It becomes clear then how the characterization of the psyche in terms of the will allows for an unconscious dimension to the psyche. For it is only the possibility of an influence by the will that is necessary to characterize the psychic as distinct from the psychoid. And although it is this possibility which is the distinguishing feature of the psyche, rather than being identical with consciousness, the psyche is better conceptualized as for the most part unconscious, with the conscious region being of comparatively narrow scope.

The idea of the unconscious then adds a dimension of depth to the notion of the psyche. In addition to those items of immediate awareness, there are other contents on the fringes of consciousness or just below the threshold of awareness. Jung catalogues these unconscious contents in the following way: ". . . lost memories, painful ideas that have been repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose), subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness" (Vol. VII, p. 66). ". . . Everything forgotten or repressed or otherwise subliminal that has

been acquired by the individual consciously or unconsciously" (Vol. XVII, p. 116).

Often these unconscious contents group together to form subliminal functional units which then become sort of "splinter psyches" or "fragmentary personalities" (Vol. VIII, p. 97). These focal points of unconscious psychic activity are designated as the complexes. They are groups of often highly emotionally charged feelings, thoughts and images which are associated together so that, for instance, an environmental stimulus which activates the complex results in the entirety of the associated psychic contents coming into play and affecting consciousness. This often leads to a response which is out of proportion to the initiating stimulus. For Jung the ego itself is merely a complex, "the complex of consciousness" (Vol. XIV, p. 357).

In so far as the meaning of the ego is psychologically nothing but a complex of imaginings held together and fixed by the coenesthetic impressions, [bodily feelings] . . . the complex of the ego may well be set parallel with and compared to the secondary autonomous complex (Vol. II, p. 601).

Collective Unconscious

With the description of these unconscious components to the psyche then, the concept of the psyche according to Jung's "definition" of it in terms of the will is complete. However, Jung goes on to describe the psychoid region of the unconscious which is designated as a collective unconscious in contrast to the region of the unconscious in relatively close association to consciousness which he calls the personal unconscious. "As to the no man's land which I have called the 'personal unconscious,' it is fairly easy to prove

that its contents correspond exactly to our definition of the psychic. But--as we define 'psychic'--is there a psychic unconscious that is not a 'fringe of consciousness' and not personal?" (Vol. VIII, p. 200).

The above quotation should make it clear that although according to Jung's specification of what the psyche means in the strict sense, it should be applied only to consciousness and the personal unconscious, Jung frequently uses the term to include the collective impersonal portions of the unconscious as well. Thus Jung often speaks of a collective psyche or of an impersonal, objective psyche. Further discussion on this point of how the collective unconscious can be said to be psychic on the one hand and not to fit into the definition of the psyche on the other must wait until further in the exposition. The crucial distinction involves discriminating between the psychic contents as they appear in consciousness and their postulated but unobserved determinants which are said to be psychoid rather than psychic.

There is then for Jung an impersonal and collective aspect to the unconscious in contrast to the personal unconscious described above. Moreover, this collective unconscious is said to constitute a deeper stratum of the unconscious than the personal. Whereas for the personal unconscious the "depth" of a content represents a corresponding lack of energy and hence a greater degree of nonassociation to the central focus of awareness, the collective unconscious is "deeper" in the additional sense of being the foundation of the "upper" layers. Consciousness and the personal unconscious then represent the individual and personal heterogeneity which develops through maturation from a common and universal homogeneity.

"Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the earth . . . (Vol. V, p. xxiv).

Jung then uses the term "collective" to mean the opposite of personal or individual. "I have chosen the term 'collective' because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals" (Vol. IX-A, pages 3-4).

Jung argues that since the body may be said to have certain universal features which form a common basis for the emergence of individual differences, it would then be reasonable to expect that the psyche, which is intimately related to the body, would also have common and universal features: ". . . Just as the human body shows a common anatomy over and above all racial differences, so, too, the human psyche possesses a common substratum transcending all differences in culture and consciousness" (Vol. XIII, p. 11). "For just as there is an objective human body and not merely a subjective and personal one, so also there is an objective psyche with its specific structures and activities . . ." (Vol. III, p. 267).

The idea of a collective unconscious thus understood as the common, universal element of the psyche would seem relatively unproblematic or perhaps even superfluous as a concept since no one would wish to deny that the psyche has foundations in the structure of the brain which are common to all men. However, the real import of Jung's theory of a collective unconscious is brought into clarity when Jung states that the contents of the collective unconscious are

in fact psychic contents which come into awareness but which are not the direct consequences of the individual's own personal experiences. ". . . In addition to memories from a long-distant conscious past, completely new thoughts and creative ideas can also present themselves from the unconscious--thoughts and ideas that have never been conscious before."⁷ The collective unconscious is then not only the structural element common to the psyches of all men; it is also the active source of original psychic contents.

Additional features of Jung's concept of the collective unconscious come to light when we learn that ". . . ego-consciousness seems to be dependent on two factors: firstly, on the conditions of the collective, i.e., the social, consciousness; and secondly, on the archetypes, or dominants, of the collective unconscious. The latter fall phenomenologically into two categories: instinctual and archetypal" (Vol. VIII, pages 217-218).

Thus both instincts as well as archetypes characterize the collective unconscious. Moreover, there is in addition a concept of collective consciousness which is to be distinguished from the collective unconscious. Jung states that by collective consciousness he has something similar in mind to Freud's idea of the superego (Vol. IX-A, page 3, note 2). Like the superego, the collective consciousness is partially conscious and partially unconscious. It consists of "generally accepted truths" (Vol. VIII, p. 218), i.e., of beliefs, values and ideals which are supposedly held in common by members of a community and which serve as a sort of common ideological basis or cultural idea for the community. The contemporary phenomenon of the so-called counter-culture would then represent

a process of development or change in the collective consciousness of our time.

The collective consciousness has its ultimate source in the collective unconscious. For through the influence of the collective unconscious on individuals, new ideals, ethical and religious systems, and basic scientific discoveries come into awareness for the first time. However, the symbolic quality of these images from the unconscious is eventually lost as the images and ideas are subjected to the interpretative powers of generations in order to assimilate them to the existing system of culture. Through this process the manifestation of the collective unconscious in one pioneer individual is gradually transformed into the cultural heritage and collective consciousness of the community. The result is then often the sort of transition that the religious insight of an individual undergoes in the change from the teachings of the individual in his lifetime to the formation of a doctrine of established belief by his later followers. It is the difference between an original religious experience and the dogma of an established church. Jung states then that ". . . we can hardly avoid the conclusion that between collective consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an almost unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended" (Vol. VIII, p. 218).

Jung makes the point that through the process of socialization and in attempting to adapt to the demands of society we tend to identify ourselves with the consequent roles which we must play in order to fit smoothly into the social order. This part of the personality Jung calls the persona. The word means mask and like a mask the

persona is the person that we pretend to be in order to have a well-defined niche in the community.

When we analyse the persona we strip off the mask, and discover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask of the collective psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be (Vol. VII, p. 158).

By "collective psyche" in this context it is clear that the collective consciousness is meant. However, there are other passages in which the term "collective psyche" means collective unconscious. For example:

It is therefore absolutely essential to make the sharpest possible demarcation between the personal and the impersonal attributes of the psyche. This is not to deny the sometimes very formidable existence of the contents of collective unconscious, but only to stress that, as contents of the collective psyche, they are opposed to and different from the individual psyche (Vol. VII, p. 94).

"Collective psyche" is then an ambiguous term leaving still to be specified the amount of unconsciousness that is implied. This formulation is sometimes preferable when speaking of the consciousness of a group, particularly when there is a strong group identity. For since the collective consciousness is grounded in the collective unconscious, there are then correspondences between the institutions of culture and the related archetypes. The effectiveness of the community leader, for example, is often a function of his capacity to fulfil the expectations brought about by the projection of the archetype of the hero or Old Wise Man upon him, and the guiding ideals of the community remain cohesive factors for the life of that community

only so long as they remain living symbols capable of constellating the appropriate archetypal configurations. The ambiguous "collective psyche" is then sometimes the best description of the Zeitgeist of a people, as it acknowledges the close relationship between the foundations of culture in the collective unconscious and the embodiments of those foundations in the accepted standards of collective life.

Moreover, Jung's use of the ambiguous "collective psyche" becomes easier to appreciate when it is made clear that for him the relationship of the personal psyche to the collective unconscious is closely analogous to the relationship of the individual to society. "Now, all that I have said here about the influence of society upon the individual is identically true of the influence of the collective unconscious upon the individual psyche" (Vol. VII, p. 154). Therefore the psychology of a community is not basically different from the psychology of an individual: ". . . The psyche of a people is only a somewhat more complex structure than the psyche of an individual" (Vol. X, p. 86).

Collective consciousness and the collective unconscious may then both be subsumed under collective psyche due to the close relationship between the two and the similar relationship of the individual to the collective aspect in each case. The individual has thus both an inner and an outer relationship to the collective as he must contend with society without and the collective unconscious within.

One point that should be made clear when use is made of the term "collective psyche" is that Jung does not mean to imply that a group consciousness exists in the sense of a psychic entity which

exists over and above the psyches of individuals. For the common aspects of the psyches of a group can be abstractly said to represent a group psyche without this having to mean that there is something psychic which persists independently of the individuals involved.

In so far as the similarities rather than the differences between collective consciousness and collective unconscious are emphasized as in "collective psyche," questions then arise concerning the existence of distinct kinds of group psyches. That is, to what extent is the idea of a collective unconscious meant to be truly transcultural and to what extent is there intended to be a different collective unconscious for each distinct community of men?

Evidence can be found in Jung's work to support either of the two possible positions suggested above. For example, we find: "The collective unconscious is simply the psychic expression of the identity of brain structure irrespective of all racial differences" (Vol. XIII, p. 11). But there are also statements such as the following:

No doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of psychic development, where it is still impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation essential differences are developed in the collective psyche as well (Vol. VII, p. 152, note 8).

Inasmuch as there are differentiations corresponding to race, tribe, and even family, there is also a collective psyche limited to race, tribe, and family over and above the "universal" collective psyche (Vol. VII, p. 275).

The difficulty of understanding is again partly the result of the problematic interaction of form and content, of the difference between a common universal structure and its concrete embodiment in

ways which are characteristic of individual cultures. Moreover, the word "collective psyche" tends to obscure these differences which arise from the fact that the collective unconscious is an abstraction, a theoretically postulated commonality derived from the phenomena of concrete cultures in which the archetypes exist as actual symbols and images.

However, this line of explanation is only partially satisfactory in light of the totality of Jung's writings. It seems that notwithstanding the differences that come about when the common structure of the psyche is embodied in culturally characteristic ways, Jung means that the common structure itself is different with respect to the different ethnic and racial groups. His statements, for example, about the inapplicability of Indian yoga practises for the Western psyche (Vol. XI, p. 534) and the characteristic quality of Jewish psychology which might not be appropriate for non-Jewish peoples (Vol. VII, p. 152, note 8) seem to support this idea.

However, the concept of racial differences in the collective unconscious seems one of the least defensible of all Jung's ideas on the unconscious. For notwithstanding the lack of credibility in the notion that Jewish psychology or Indian yoga are inapplicable to someone with a Western Christian heritage, it would seem that the similarities of a universal structure of the psyche would greatly overshadow any racial differences that might exist in that structure, just as the bodies of persons of different races and ethnic groups seem to be of overwhelming similarity differing only in very minor ways.

There are, of course, marked differences in the collective

psyches of distinct human groups, if by this term is understood the culturally distinct ways in which the collective unconscious is developed and expressed. Much of what Jung says about the inherent psychic differences of people of various human groups can be understood in this way without the necessity of postulating significant racial or ethnic differences in the structure of the collective unconscious itself.

¹ C.G. Jung, Collected Works, Vols. I-XIX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. VIII, p. 409. Quotations are from the following editions: Vol. I, Psychiatric Studies, First Edition, 1957; Vol. II, Experimental Researches, 1973; Vol. III, The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease, 1960; Vol. IV, Freud and Psychoanalysis, 1961; Vol. V, Symbols of Transformation, First Edition, 1956; Vol. VI, Psychological Types, 1971; Vol. VII, Two Essays On Analytical Psychology, Second Edition, 1966; Vol. VIII, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, Second Edition, 1969; Vol. IX, Part I, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Second Edition, 1968 (hereafter cited as Vol. IX-A); Vol. IX, Part II, Ion, Second Edition, 1968 (hereafter cited as Vol. IX-B); Vol. X, Civilization in Transition, First Edition, 1964; Vol. XI, Psychology and Religion: West and East, Second Edition, 1969; Vol. XII, Psychology and Alchemy, Second Edition, 1968; Vol. XIII, 1968; Vol. XIV, Mysterium Coniunctionis, First Edition, 1963; Vol. XV, The Spirit in Man, Art, and Literature, 1966; Vol. XVI, The Practise of Psychotherapy, Second Edition, 1966; Vol. XVII, The Development of Personality, 1954; Vol. XVIII, Miscellany; Vol. XIX, Bibliography and Index. Hereafter cited by volume number.

² It is not in the passage where he speaks of Bergson that this is made clear but in the essay "On Psychic Energy," Vol. VIII, pages 3-66 where the implications of the libido theory with respect to the problem of the mind-body relation are discussed in detail. Unfortunately this seems to be characteristic of Jung's style. Misunderstandings are produced by a causal or parenthetical comment which then require many lengthy passages or even whole essays to correct.

³ In determining the chronology of Jung's writings the volume number of the collected works is not a reliable indicator. The collected works are grouped by subject matter, and while this serves as a rough guide to different periods of Jung's work, some of the early and middle writings appear in the last volumes.

4 We will consider anomalous facts with respect to a given theory to be ones which fail to be explained by the theory and which after a protracted period of such failure lead either to the ad hoc revision of the theory or to emergence of a new more comprehensive theory which will be able to encompass their explanation in a context which preserves previously explained data. The sense of anomaly is that used by T.H. Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

Statements about the disembodied psyche then have this anomalous relationship to Jung's established theory. This becomes evident when efforts are made to see how the statements can be made consistent with the established theory.

5 By dual aspect theory is meant the view that mental and physical are different aspects of some third entity which is itself neither mental nor physical. Interactionism is the view that mental events can cause physical events and vice versa.

6 Strictly speaking the archetypes are completely incapable of being made conscious in the sense that what appears in consciousness is never the archetype per se but only an archetypal image. This distinction between the archetype per se and the archetypal image will be fully discussed in Chapter 3.

7 C.G. Jung, editor, Man and His Symbols (New York: Dell, 1968), p. 25. Hereafter cited as Man and His Symbols.

CHAPTER 2
THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART I

Introduction

Preliminary Remarks

Our discussion of the notion of a collective unconscious serves as an introduction to the main concern of this study, the concept of the archetype. For in addition to the instincts, the collective unconscious is said to contain archetypes. It is the notion of archetypes then which gives Jung's collective unconscious its real substance, and it is the resolution of questions concerning the archetypes upon which the real point of a concept of a collective unconscious depends.

Many such questions inhabit the fringes of consciousness while reading about the archetypes: What really is an archetype? What sort of ontological status is it supposed to have? What is the relationship between the archetypes and the instincts? Where do the archetypes come from? What is the difference between the archetype in itself and as it appears in consciousness? What are the chief archetypes? What causes their appearance in consciousness?

These many questions about the archetype reflect the many aspects and perspectives from which the idea can be considered. In order to gain an insight into the unifying elements of these different perspectives on the archetypes, our exposition will proceed with a

conceptual overview followed by a detailed discussion of the different aspects of the concept. With this approach we hope to gain a unified understanding of the archetype which will make clear the reasons for the characteristic complexity of the idea.

Characterization of the Archetype

It will be remembered from the above discussion of the collective unconscious then, that the contents of this portion of the psyche were said to be objective and impersonal in the sense that the collective unconscious is the supposed source of original contents which appear in consciousness but which seem not to have been conscious before. For example, an individual has a dream, vision or fantasy composed of alien images to which he has no personal associations. Moreover, parallels to the phenomena's basic themes can then be found in materials drawn from comparative symbology which are unknown to the person previous to his experience of the archetypal event.

The following dream illustrates these characteristic archetypal qualities.

In my dream, I am at an amusement park with my wife and another couple. The first amusement we decide to see is a sort of "haunted house." To enter, we descend a flight of stairs into a cool, damp cellar, consisting of an empty main room. Looking into one room I see nothing. At this point a ghost-like figure appears. I recognize the "ghost" as a child dressed in a costume, and am friendly to it. The "ghost" then leaves. In the next room, I see a table. Upon the table is a small, incomplete child-like body. A large knife is hovering in the air over the table, and proceeds to dismember the body. Blood gushes out, spurting into the air in great streams. I think that this "show" is a little too much for an amusement for the general public, although I personally am not affected by the gore. The "body" then begins to carry on a normal conversation with me, while the blood continues to

spurt and gush over the table top. The show is then over, and the "body" disappears.¹

In this particular case, it is the archetypal motif of ritual dismemberment which is the most outstanding feature of the dream. The dreamer had no idea as to what this image might mean and was unfamiliar with the frequent occurrence of this theme in the literature of alchemy.

What Jung means by an archetype then is a disposition in the collective unconscious to produce such an image in consciousness as the one above. Moreover, Jung distinguishes between the actual image, which he calls the archetypal image, and the archetype per se, which as a disposition of the unconscious is unobservable in principle. However, the term "archetype" is used indiscriminately for both the archetypal manifestation and the archetypal disposition.

The archetypal image is a concrete instantiation of the hypothetical, unobservable archetypal disposition. Moreover, archetypal contents which emerge into awareness assume a form which is a reflection of the individual consciousness. The fact that archetypes appear in a personal form seems to be an instance of the tendency to structure awareness of unfamiliar phenomena so that they resemble familiar forms of experience.

The unconscious supplies as it were the archetypal form, which in itself is empty and irrepresentable. Consciousness immediately fills it with related or similar representational material so that it can be perceived. For this reason archetypal ideas are locally, temporally, and individually conditioned (Vol. XIII, p. 346).

In the case of the dismemberment dream, this assimilation of the archetypal motif into an individual context is illustrated when the

uncanny and alien ritual of dismemberment, concerning which the dreamer had no knowledge, was represented in the familiar setting of an amusement part.

Ontological Status of the Archetype

As a disposition the archetype has then the ontological status of a hypothetical construct. Like the electron, the archetype can be detected only through the effects which it produces, but, as with the electron, this unobservability is not held to make the archetype any less real than directly perceivable objects like chairs and door-knobs. Unlike the electron, however, the archetypes are unobservable in principle. Since the unconscious can only be known indirectly through its effect on consciousness, there is no possibility of a direct perception of these unconscious contents. Moreover, the archetypes per se, existing as dispositions, are only possibilities to form observable phenomena with the determinate form in which they appear being the result of the interaction between this disposition in the collective unconscious and the informing consciousness.

In basing the ontology of the archetypes on a position of scientific realism, Jung wants to carefully distinguish his unobservable theoretical entities from metaphysical concepts such as Plato's forms. The difference is that the archetypes are empirically derived and grounded. They are the product of Jung's therapeutic work in which he found it increasingly difficult to fit all of the phenomenological material into an explanatory framework which included only a personal unconscious. There exists then the possibility of falsification to the extent that the archetypal theory fails to provide adequate explanation for the observed phenomena. The relationship

between experience and the postulated concepts of metaphysics, on the other hand, is too vague to allow for the possibility of disconfirmation in principle.

Relationship of Archetypes and Instincts

Since the archetypes are not the product of an individual's personal experience, they must then be the result of inheritance. Rather than inherited experiences or inherited images, however, the archetypes are transmitted as the disposition to form images and ideas. There are close parallels here with the instincts, which rather than being inherited behaviors are instead inherited dispositions to produce certain behaviors when activated by the appropriate environmental releasing stimuli. With this similarity to the instincts in mind, Jung often refers to the archetypes as patterns of behavior.

. . . they prove to be typical attitudes, modes of action--thought-processes and impulses which must be regarded as constituting the instinctive behaviour typical of the human species. The term I chose for this, namely "archetype," therefore coincides with the biological concept of the "pattern of behaviour" (Vol. III, p. 261).

Just as the body develops evolutionarily conditioned modes of responding to external and internal stimuli, Jung hypothesizes the development of similar phylogenetic patterns for the psyche. The archetypes are then somewhat like psychic instincts. Moreover, since the body is not functionally a separate entity from the mind, these "mental instincts" are parallel psychic counterparts to the inherited modes of bodily response. ". . . There is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves . . ." (Vol. IX-A, p. 44).

The fact that archetypes can be understood as patterns of behavior emphasizes then their biological aspect and their continuity with naturalistically understood processes. With a widening of the traditional use of "patterns of behavior," this allows for the possibility of archetypes in animals. "There is nothing to prevent us from assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are grounded in the peculiarities of the living organism itself" (Vol. VII, p. 69).

Archetypes as A Priori Conditioning Factors

However, the archetypes can also be seen from the cognitive point of view as inherent categories of apprehension (Vol. VI, p. 376). This perspective then underlines their role as the structuring elements of the psyche and focuses on those aspects of the archetypes which seem least directly connected with instincts as ordinarily understood. It may then seem difficult to grasp how the archetypes can be at once both patterns of behavior and "a priori conditioning factors." However, man's characteristic pattern of behavior is to develop consciousness which can then act at variance with or in relative independence of the instincts understood as drives of the body. And, since for Jung, the mind and body are not really separate entities but merely different points of view, his shift from the archetypes as patterns of behavior to talk of archetypes as categories of the psyche can be seen as a plausible move rather than as a logical jump. "As a priori conditioning factors they represent a special, psychological instance of the biological 'pattern of behaviour'" (Vol. XI, p. 149, note 2).

Now in characterizing the archetypes as a priori conditioning

factors what Jung has in mind is similar to the idea of categories worked out by Kant. Moreover, it sometimes appears as if Jung is attempting to broaden Kant's concept so that in addition to necessary forms of cognition, the archetypes will also be categories of the imagination.² Specifically the archetypes are held to be forms of thought, perception and imagination (Vol. IX-A, p. 14). However, the comparison of the archetypes to the Kantian categories is only of limited usefulness. For the archetypes can be said to be necessary only in the biological sense of being part of our inheritance which will then necessarily influence us. They are not necessary in the sense that they could not have been other than they are. The archetypes are products of evolution and are thus subject to whatever contingent environmental forces made them an enduring part of the genotype. A hominoid on a different planet could then conceivably develop different archetypes.³

Moreover, Kant's categories were the necessary formal aspects to which any experience must conform whereas Jung's archetypes are the forms of only certain types of experience. Thus, the archetypes are more properly described as primordial images than as categories in Kant's sense. For the archetypes as "thought-forms" (Vol. VII, p. 66), i.e., dispositions to form certain typical images and thoughts come into consciousness only under unusual circumstances, rather than being the structuring aspect of experience in general. This is then what Jung has in mind when he states: "Only, in the case of our 'forms,' we are not dealing with categories of reason but with categories of the imagination" (Vol. XI, p. 518).

From the point of view of similarity with Kant, the archetypes can be seen to be universal, inborn and formal elements of the psyche

(Vol. IX-A, p. 44). Moreover, the individual and personal aspects of the psyche are held to develop from a universal substratum in the collective unconscious. From this perspective the ego is itself an archetype in the sense that it is prefigured as an a priori possibility in the collective unconscious of the individual before it emerges by a process of differentiation. All of the complexes, in fact, although they are predominantly manifestations of the personal unconscious, have a "nuclear element" (Vol. VIII, p. 12) which is an archetype.

. . . every complex, has or is a (fragmentary) personality. At any rate, this is how it looks from the purely observational standpoint. But when we go into the matter more deeply, we find that they are really archetypal formations (Vol. V, p. 255).

What this archetypal basis of complexes amounts to is that a complex which can be traced to events in the individual's personal history is often "magically" complicated because the personal situation has been assimilated to the archetypal one. For example, problems originating from the relationship with the parents are frequently the result of the fact that the individual has since childhood seen the parents as gods. The father is perceived as God the Father and the mother in terms of the Archetype of the Great Mother or Earth Mother. The troubled individual then can not successfully distinguish between parents as individuals and the archetypal projections in terms of which he has habitually perceived them.

For every typical human situation there is a corresponding archetype so that the experience of the individual in such a situation

invariably falls under the influence of an archetypal pattern. In this respect the description of the archetypes as "patterns of instinctual behaviour" seems amply justified.

However, the archetypal notion runs the risk of being over-generalized into triviality if the idea of the archetypes as formal a priori conditioning factors is taken as a guide for explaining all human behavior. For example, the archetypes can be seen as the phylogenetic forms to which ontogeny supplies the content. But, although this understanding of the archetypes is hypothetically plausible, it is misleading from an operational point of view. For although in principle all aspects of the personality are founded on the common structure of the collective unconscious out of which individuality emerges like an island out of the ocean, the archetypes can not be exclusively appealed to in order to form a comprehensive theory of behavior. This would be an incomplete and one-sided perspective ignoring the vitally important ontogenetic factors influencing individual development.

In the case of the complexes, for example, Jung identifies them with the personal unconscious. The archetypal nucleus is called upon as an explanatory principle only when the psychological situation seems incomprehensible from an exclusively personal point of view. That there is a common and universal structure to the psyche is then a true statement but not always an informative one for all distinct aspects of behavior.

Further Implications of Kantian Influence

On the basis of the discussion so far, it could be fairly

concluded that on the whole it is more accurate to understand the archetypes as patterns of behavior than to think of them in terms of Kant's theory of knowledge. This conclusion, however, would be too hastily arrived at as the full story of Kant's influence on Jung's idea of the archetypes has yet to be explained.

Jung's insistence on the label of empiricism to characterize his work, for example, is a consequence of his methodological ideal of staying within the bounds of possible experience. Moreover, in terms of Jung's thought, the concept of the psyche describes these bounds. There is no possibility of getting outside the psyche to determine how the psyche interprets the world, for all experience is most immediately and inescapably psychic experience. The psyche is the mediator of all experience, both from within and from without.

If a thinker comes up with a metaphysical scheme which he thinks grasps the essential nature of reality, Jung then cautions as to the need for a psychological critique. The claims of universal validity which the system maker has put forth transcend possible experience and are justified on the basis of an intuitive certainty. It is just at this point that Jung's theory of archetypes assumes a deflationary role by explaining the appeal of the metaphysical system on the basis of its conformity to the fundamental aspects of the thinker himself rather than to conformity of the system with the ultimate nature of reality.

When a speculative philosopher believes he has comprehended the world once and for all in his system, he is deceiving himself; he has merely comprehended himself and then naively projected that view upon the world (Vol. III, p. 185).

Archetypes and Scientific Theories

To complicate matters at this point is the fact that basic scientific insights are held to be founded on archetypes. For example, Robert Mayer's idea of the conservation of energy (Vol. VII, p. 67), the concept of the atom (Vol. IX-A, p. 57) and Kekule's discovery of the structure of the benzene ring (Man and His Symbols, pages 25-26) are all understood as illustrating the effect of archetypes.

. . . we speak of "atoms" today because we have heard, directly or indirectly, of the atomic theory of Democritus. But where did Democritus, or whoever first spoke of minimal constitutive elements, hear of atoms? This notion had its origin in archetypal ideas, that is, in primordial images which were never reflections of physical events but are spontaneous products of the psychic factor (Vol. IX-A, p. 57).

This archetypal basis of scientific theory is supported when it is shown that the ideas have been present in the history of civilization for many centuries. In Kekule's case the solution to his theoretical dilemma came during a state of relaxation when, dozing before his fireplace, he seemed to see snakelike atoms dancing in the fire. When one of the snakes formed a ring by grasping its own tail, the idea of the benzene ring was conceived in a flash of insight.⁴ This image of a snake (or dragon) biting its own tail is called the uroboros and dates from at least as early as the third century B.C. (Man and His Symbols, p. 26).

Naturally the role of the unconscious must always be seen in proper relation to the activity of consciousness in these cases. Had Kekule not already spent great amounts of time and energy consciously thinking about the problem of the structure of benzene, the situation

of an insightful archetypal constellation could not have occurred. Moreover, there was a great deal of effort necessary after the fireplace episode before the structure of benzene was finally worked out. Notwithstanding the well-documented and critical role of the unconscious then, it should not be thought that scientific theories exist preformed in the collective unconscious.

We might well imitate Kant at this point and ask how this apparent conformity between symbols from the collective unconscious and scientific theories is possible. Moreover, it needs to be made clear why scientific ideas derived from the archetypes are held to be genuine discoveries and advances, whereas similarly derived metaphysical ideas are restricted to a sphere of only subjective validity.

In the case of science then, the archetypal constellation sometimes proves to be instrumental in bringing about a progressive theoretical advance for science when the image from the unconscious is assimilated in terms of the already existing body of knowledge. Many other ideas from the same source are never put to scientific use because they do not happen to be compatible with the progress of science.

Thus with scientific theories, archetypes are sometimes an important influence within the context of discovery. Regardless of the origin of a scientific hypothesis, however, in order for it to become acceptable to the scientific community, it must be validated in terms of criteria of scientific methodology. These criteria of acceptability involve relating the theoretical terms of the hypothesis to observational statements in such a way as to constitute an empirically derived decision procedure which will indicate what observational

states of affairs will count for or against the hypothesis.

With metaphysical theories based on archetypal experience, on the other hand, the relationship between the theory and observations is not specified in such a way as to form the basis for an objective decision procedure which could be used to adjudicate conflicting metaphysical claims.

Moreover, the archetypal images are always the partial result of the individual traits of the embodying consciousness, with aspects of personal history and cultural background being always associated with their appearance. Thus the personal factor can not be eliminated in order to arrive at an objectively valid metaphysical statement. In addition to the inevitable contamination of the personal factor, the archetypes can be said to be unavoidably anthropomorphic. As the product of human evolution, they mirror man and are man. Although the archetypes represent man's relationship to the world, it is only from the historically conditioned human standpoint reflecting how the universe affects man.

There is for Jung, nonetheless, a possibility of evaluating the pragmatic value of the metaphysical ideas considered from the standpoint of their ability to further and enhance human existence. Thus very similar to Nietzsche, Jung would judge metaphysical ideas on their life-affirming quality, while maintaining that the final truth of the ideas in terms of which of them mirror best the ultimate structure of reality could not be decided.

In Jung's view we must be careful to distinguish subjective, psychological truth from objective truth about the external world. Thus, although it is an error to see the archetypes as objectively

true in the sense that they represent literal statements about objective states of affairs, yet the archetypes have a psychological validity and are psychologically true in the sense that it is possible to interpret them in a subjectively meaningful way. The validity of the archetypes in terms of applicability to the human situation must then be acknowledged even in absence of the possibility of a scientific validation of statements based on them. For example, the existence of a God can not be either proved or disproved scientifically; yet the existence of an internal God-image or its equivalent must be acknowledged as a psychologically real and effective event.

The gods cannot and must not die. I said just now that there seems to be something, a kind of superior power, in the human psyche, and that if this is not the idea of God, then it is the "belly." I wanted to express the fact that one or other basic instinct, or complex of ideas, will invariably concentrate upon itself the greatest sum of psychic energy and thus force the ego into its service (Vol. VII, p. 72).

The Symbolic Nature of the Archetypes

The way in which Jung characterizes the distinctive psychological validity of the archetypes is by emphasizing the symbolic nature of the archetypal images. The archetypes are said to be "symbolic formulas" (Vol. VI, p. 377).

The symbol for Jung is to be sharply distinguished from the semiotic function of signs. Signs are representations of known things. The trademark of a company, for example, simply represents the company itself. Symbols, on the other hand, can not be said to be logically equivalent to their referents. The symbol points beyond itself to an unknown.

Thus a word or an image is symbolic when it implies something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a wider "unconscious" aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. . . . As the mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason (Man and His Symbols, p. 4).

Symbols function as interconnecting links between the conscious and the collective unconscious, as they bring into consciousness in representable form the otherwise unknowable archetypes. The symbols mediate the experience of the archetypes and because of the unavoidable personal characteristics due to embodiment in an individual consciousness are products of both the collective unconscious and consciousness.

There is then in the symbol a synthesis of known and unknown and of real and unreal.

If it were only real, it would not be a symbol, for it would then be a real phenomenon and hence unsymbolic. . . . And if it were altogether unreal, it would be mere empty imagining, which, being related to nothing real, would not be a symbol either (Vol. VI, p. 111).

The symbol . . . unites the antithesis between real and unreal, because on the one hand it is a psychic reality (on account of its efficacy), while on the other it corresponds to no physical reality (Vol. VI, pages 128-129).

To a large extent then, what we add to the picture of the archetype by calling the archetypal images symbols is an emphasis on the living intensity of the archetypes as they are experienced. The archetypal images are not abstract intellectual concepts but symbols which are not transparent to reason and the intellect. Moreover, these symbols have a certain aura of fascination. They appeal not only to the intellect as puzzles for the understanding but to the

emotions as well. "They are as much feelings as thoughts . . . "
(Vol. VII, p. 66).

This characteristic quality of the symbol to evoke emotion is termed its numinosity, the numen being the specific energy of the archetypes.

With the description of the numinosity of the archetypes, the close relationship between archetypal images and religious motifs becomes evident. For Jung accepts Rudolf Otto's characterization of religious experience as a "careful and scrupulous observation of . . . the numinosum . . . " (Vol. XI, p. 7). "We might say, then, that the term 'religion' designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience of the numinosum" (Vol. XI, p. 8).

Although originating through individual experiences of the collective unconscious, religion is, strictly speaking, a phenomenon of collective consciousness. And since not all experiences of the archetypes result in their being assimilated in terms of a religious frame of reference, another wider designation is needed to characterize the effect of the numinous quality of archetypes. Thus the archetypes are said to be "spiritual" factors.

In a sense spiritual and archetypal are almost equivalent and interchangeable terms. For when we have understood the transpersonal nature of the archetypes,⁵ their aura of numinosity and their ability to generate images which serve as the foundations of culture, then we have made definite the meaning of the spiritual.

What keeps us from asserting this equivalence of meaning, however, is the instinctual perspective. For the archetypes are said to be

"patterns of instinctual behaviour" (Vol. IX-A, p. 44). And it is the instinctual aspect of man which seems to stand in sharpest contrast to what we wish to designate as spiritual.

However, Jung points to Christian prejudice as the origin of the apparent antithesis between spirit and nature.

. . . very remarkable opposition of spirit and nature. Even though spirit is regarded as essentially alive and enlivening, one cannot really feel nature as unspiritual and dead. We must therefore be dealing here with the (Christian) postulate of a spirit whose life is so vastly superior to the life of nature that in comparison with it the latter is no better than death (Vol. IX-A, p. 210).

A more in-depth perspective, then, reveals the paradoxical relation between spirit and instinct. For they seem to be similar processes of psychic energy which are distinguished by the application of this energy into diametrically contrasting modes.

Moreover, it is in the description of the relation between the spiritual and instinctual that Jung's psychological viewpoint is in sharpest contrast to that of Freud. For Jung does not conceive all psychic energy as being instinctual energy as does Freud. He uses the term for psychic energy, libido, in a way which does not imply its equivalence with instinctual energy. There is then for Jung no need of a concept of sublimation in which instinctual energy must be siphoned off for cultural purposes. Any diversion of the flow of libido from its natural instinctual channels in Jung's view leads only to neurotic maladjustment. However, there is more psychic energy available for the human being than is utilized by the natural instinctual processes. This excess psychic energy can then be used for other than instinctual purposes, and we might say that this excess

energy represents a degree of freedom for man to pursue cultural activities for their own sake. The symbolic images from the collective unconscious then serve as "transformers" of energy in the sense that the archetypes represent inherent patterns for this energy flow (Vol. V, p. 232).

Since the spiritual uses of psychic energy are the result of the influence of the archetypes which are themselves the product of evolution, it becomes evident that the development of the spirit in man is his characteristic pattern of behavior.

In reality of course the world-spurning passion of the "spirit" is just as natural as the marriage-flight of insects (Vol. V, p. 396).

The spiritual appears in the psyche also as an instinct, indeed as a real passion, a "consuming fire" It is not derived from any other instinct . . . but is a principle sui generis, a specific and necessary form of instinctual power (Vol. VIII, p. 58).

Archetypes and Instincts

In order to fully understand the meaning of the term "spiritual" then, a further clarification of the archetype-instinct relation is necessary. For we need to grasp how the spiritual is to be of the same type of stuff as the instincts and yet seemingly different from and even opposed to them.

A look at animals other than man helps to gain an insight into what Jung has in mind in this regard. For in the examples of patterns of behavior in animals, we see clearly the unity which in man becomes a tension of opposites between spirit and instinct.

A key word "pattern" is then the link which enables us to connect the behavior of animals with the archetypes and instincts in

man. For the instinctual behavior of animals is not to be understood as just a blind impulsion to action. Rather, for each instinctual act there is present a total pattern which includes a sort of image of the instinctual situation.

There are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as every instinct bears in itself the pattern of its situation. Always it fulfils an image, and the image has fixed qualities. The instinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfils the image of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and the little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of these conditions is lacking, the instinct does not function, because it cannot exist without its total pattern, without its image. Such an image is an a priori type. It is inborn in the ant prior to any activity, for there can be no activity at all unless an instinct of corresponding pattern initiates and makes it possible (Vol. VIII, p. 201).

The instinctual acts of animals then seem to be unified by a pattern which includes a sort of intuitive recognition of the goal of the instinctual acts as well as the physiological mechanisms which supply the necessary energy.

Of course, in the case of animals, our use of "image" must be metaphorical; but it is Jung's point that this regulating principle of the instinct, the factor which especially in the insects makes the operation of instinctual behavior amazingly precise and selective rather than haphazard, can be recognized.

The organizing factor of the instinct together with its specific energy make up a unified pattern of behavior for animals. In man, on the other hand, the representations of this formal factor of instinct can come into awareness as actual images. Thus, whereas in animals the archetypes and the instincts exist in a fused, undifferentiated state; in man, with the formation of consciousness, they

become separable and distinct.

In the human realm then the archetypes become the forms which regulate the instincts. Moreover, the archetypal images are said to represent the meaning of the instincts and to be "the unconscious images of the instincts themselves" (Vol. IX-A, p. 44). The archetypes thus act as guiding factors for the release of instinctual energy in appropriate ways characteristic of man as a species.

But what are these human instincts? Jung recognizes five types of instinctual factors for man: "hunger, sexuality, activity, reflection and creativity" (Vol. VIII, p. 118). He conceded that any attempt to enumerate the human instincts is at least a matter of controversy. The principle reason for this confusion as to what constitutes an instinct in man is the complication of the psychological factor. For the criterion of what to count as psychic is the ability of the functioning of the will to modify the otherwise automatic and compulsive instincts. It would seem evident then that the reason we can not decide on what to count as purely instinctual in man is due to the fact that instincts are always in part influenced by the psyche. Thus Jung says that the instincts per se are ectopsychic and serve the function only of a stimulus, whereas the determining factor for human behavior is always the result of an interaction between the ectopsychic instinct and the psychic situation of the moment (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

This mutual interaction between psyche and instinct in man has then the result of making the instinctual element ambiguous. For, on the one hand, all psychic processes seem to be founded on an instinctual base, whereas, on the other hand, psychic processes

also influence the working of the instincts. " . . . The instincts are a condition of psychic activity, while at the same time psychic processes seem to condition the instincts" (Vol. XI, p. 330).

Thus the twofold nature of instinct becomes most evident in human behavior where for each instinctual action we have to take into account both the aspect of "dynamism and compulsion" as well as that of "specific meaning and intention" (Vol. X, p. 287). For each instinctual action then we can pose the question as to its meaning.

The archetypal images are these psychic factors which provide the meaning for the instincts. They are the necessary forms of instinctual behavior for man. The sense of saying that something represents the meaning of an instinct for man is thus clarified by an understanding of this process of "psychization," the assimilation of the physiological stimulus to a preexistent psychic pattern (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

In the animals which have no psyche there is nevertheless present a unified pattern of behavior. The instinctual acts are the ways in which the animal realizes its inherent nature, its possibilities of becoming what it can be. The appropriate fulfilment of the instinctual nature of an animal is its way of realizing its meaning.

If we say then that the archetypes in man are the images of the instincts and represent their meaning, we are emphasizing this continuity with the lower animals. Man also has his characteristic patterns of behavior, and the archetypes act as the patterning factors for these human instincts. Will the fulfilment of the instincts

in man then also lead to an unfoldment of his inherent human nature?

The answer to this question must of course deal with the factor of the psyche. What is only dimly prefigured in animals becomes in man with the development of consciousness his particularly human way of being. For a human being to realize its nature then implies the development of consciousness.

This development is like an instinct in the sense that it comes into being conditioned by the archetypal patterns. However, its nature is to exist as a factor which can operate as a will and hence control and regulate the "other" instincts. The nature of consciousness contains then the possibility of being able to act against nature.

It is recognized that man living in the state of nature is in no sense merely "natural" like an animal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things whose meaning is not at all discoverable from the conditions of his natural environment. Their underlying meaning leads us in fact far away from all that is natural, obvious, and easily intelligible, and quite often contrasts most sharply with the natural instincts. We have only to think of all those gruesome rites and customs against which every natural feeling rises in revolt, or of all those beliefs and ideas which stand in insuperable contradiction to the evidence of the facts. All this drives us to the assumption that the spiritual principle (whatever that might be) asserts itself against the merely natural conditions with incredible strength. One can say that this too is "natural," and that both have their origin in one and the same "nature." I do not in the least doubt this origin, but must point out that this "natural" something consists of a conflict between two principles, to which you can give this or that name according to taste, and that this opposition is the expression, and perhaps also the basis, of the tension we call psychic energy (Vol. VIII, p. 52).

Thus the fact that archetypes seem to enter the human picture on two levels-- as patterns of instinctual behavior and as spiritual factors--is due to the fact that one of the innate human patterns, the tendency to develop consciousness, can act against the other lower drives and become a channel of psychic energy in its own right independently of the instincts. Therefore the archetypes seem to have two paradoxically opposite qualities: ". . . The archetype is partly a spiritual factor, and partly like a hidden meaning immanent in the instincts . . ." (Vol. VIII, 222). Only in man then is there this potential split between his natural tendencies and the realization of his human-most potentiality of being.

This split, which is the same as that between the conscious and unconscious, is a state of necessary tension since the development of awareness and the giving in to the unconsciousness of instinctual motivations tend to work against each other and to a large extent they are mutually exclusive activities. However, Jung's psychological viewpoint as a whole can be understood as the attempt to show how this necessary tension between conscious and unconscious and between spirit and instinct need not necessarily be a conflict. For the integrated personality is one which learns to live with a balance between these forces of tension rather than excluding one for the sake of the other.

But if we can reconcile ourselves to the mysterious truth that the spirit is the life of the body seen from within, and the body the outward manifestation of the life of the spirit--the two being really one--then we can understand why the striving to transcend the present level of consciousness through acceptance of the unconscious must give the body its due, and why recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philosophy that denies it in the name of the spirit (Vol. X, p. 94).

Notes

1 This dream was provided by a student and friend, George Clough.

2 The fact that Kant had a strong influence on the development of Jung's ideas is amply evidenced by the many explicit references to Kant scattered throughout Jung's works. Moreover, when Jung talks of the philosophers who had been important to his intellectual development, we again find him acknowledging the influence of Kant: "The philosophical influence that has prevailed in my education dates from Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Ed. v. Hartmann, and Nietzsche. These names at least characterize my main studies in philosophy." C.G. Jung, Letters, Vol. I 1906-1950, Vol. II 1950-1961, edited by Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), Letters, Vol. II, pages 500-501, letter to Joseph F. Rychlak dated 27 April 1959. Hereafter cited as Letters Vol. I or Vol. II.

In his autobiography Jung describes an interest in Kantian philosophy which was part of a "philosophical development" which "extended from my seventeenth year until well into the period of my medical studies." C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 70. Hereafter cited as Memories, Dreams, Reflections. The extent of that interest is revealed when Jung relates that while a medical student "the clinical semesters that followed kept me so busy that scarcely any time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was able to study Kant only on Sundays" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 101).

3 Jolande Jacobi, Complex/Archetype/Symbol in the Psychology of C.G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 52.

4 Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 16.

5 By the transpersonal nature of the archetype, we mean to refer to the fact that archetypal experience is not completely explainable by reference to the individual's past experience or development.

CHAPTER 3
THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART II

The Origin of the Archetypes

The next aspect of the archetypal theory which we must take up for discussion is the question of the origin of the archetypes: Where do the archetypes come from?

One way of approaching this problem is by considering the relationship between archetypes and mythological motifs. For since myths and fairytales are one of the most characteristic ways in which archetypes manifest themselves, if we can discover how myths originate, then perhaps this will shed light on the question of the origin of the archetypes.¹

Mythological motifs then are characteristic archetypal images so that the archetypes are sometimes designated as "mythologems" by Jung.

The mythological feature of archetypal manifestation can be seen to fit in with what was previously said about the archetypal images being symbols and having a religious or spiritual significance in that a myth is a phenomenon of collective consciousness. It is the end product of a conscious elaboration of the original unconscious content, which often includes the efforts of many generations of storytellers. In this way the numinous quality of the mythologem, the immediate impact of the living intensity of the unconscious

revelation, is lessened, and the genuine symbolic nature of the archetypes is expressed in a diminished degree. "The so-called religious statement is still numinous, a quality which the myth has already lost to a great extent" (Vol. XI, p. 301).

Since the religious expression of the archetypes can also suffer the same fate as myths and cease to become "living" symbols, it would seem that Jung's distinction between the religious and the mythological in terms of numinosity is not really adequate. In addition, there are examples from primitive cultures where the mythological and religious coincide. "A tribe's mythology is its living religion . . ." (Vol. IX-A, p. 154). When then does a religious statement cease to be religious and becomes mythological? Does Jung mean that when a religious dogma loses credibility it becomes a myth?

Moreover, there seems to be at least in ordinary usage an implied difference in content with the mythological involving more primitive types of thought and being more concerned with naturalistic phenomena than the religious. Religions then would seem to be more sophisticated types of mythologies.

At any rate, it is clear that Jung is not particularly concerned with establishing strict criteria of usage which would keep the terms distinct as is evidenced by the following:

. . . myths of a religious nature can be interpreted as a sort of mental therapy for the sufferings and anxieties of mankind in general . . .
(Man and His Symbols, p. 68).

I was driven to ask myself in all seriousness: "What is the myth you are living?" . . . So, in the most natural way, I took it upon myself to get to know "my" myth, and I regarded this as the task of tasks, for--so I told myself--how could I, when treating my patients, make due

allowance for the personal factor, for my personal equation, which is yet so necessary for a knowledge of the other person, if I was unconscious of it? I simply had to know what unconscious or preconscious myth was forming me, from what rhizome I sprang (Vol. V, pages xxiv-xxv).

In speaking about his personal myth as in the above, it is evident that myths are often used as vehicles of the most symbolic and numinous manifestations of the unconscious. Thus Jung's use of the term "myth" deviates somewhat from the ordinary usage. Sometimes he means myth to refer to the symbolic archetypal images themselves, and at other times he uses myth in the conventional way to indicate the cultural product as an aspect of the collective consciousness.

Thus both myths and religious (spiritual) statements² can be original symbolic expressions of the collective unconscious.

. . . esoteric teaching. This last is a typical means of expression for the transmission of collective contents originally derived from the unconscious.

Another well-known expression of the archetypes is myth and fairytale (Vol. IX-A, p. 5).

In attributing a positive function to myths even in the case of modern man, it is evident that Jung does not see myths as a sort of primitive inferior science, or simply as a crude form of prescientific explanation. This is because of the symbolic nature of myths. For if we understand that mythological statements are not really about the external world but are actually psychological statements, then we are less apt to criticize the myths for their variance with current scientific knowledge. Thus myths have a psychological validity and accurately depict the nature of the

human situation.

The inability of primitive and other unsophisticated peoples to distinguish between the psychological and the objective sense of truth frequently leads then to the phenomenon of projection in which an unconscious content is perceived as belonging to an object and being a property of the object. Through the agency of projection natural phenomena take on qualities stemming from the collective unconscious so that ". . . the whole of mythology could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective unconscious" (Vol. VIII, p. 152).

In spite of this confusion about inner and outer observed in mythological thinking, Jung asserts that mythology should not be understood as an attempt to formulate a type of scientific explanation.

There can be no doubt that science and philosophy have grown from this matrix, but that primitives think up such things merely from a need for explanation, as a sort of physical or astronomical theory, seems to me highly improbable (Vol. VIII, p. 153).

It would seem rather that the anthropomorphism seen in mythology, the projection of human qualities onto natural phenomena, is an attempt to grasp the meaning of nature in human terms. It is then the symbolic meaning of natural phenomena which captures the interest of the myth-makers. If we look at alchemy, for example, only as a sort of proto-chemistry, this can not explain how the interest in it continued in spite of the failure to produce the desired objective results over periods of hundreds of years.³ The alchemist is of course taken in to an extent by his own projections; but Jung points out that the hubris of assuming that our scientific

world view is thus superior to one founded on mythological projections is not justified, since if the unsophisticated mind anthropomorphizes the world, we have in the present era "mechanicomorphized"¹⁴ it with the result that the symbolic quality of our existence is impoverished. We must then avoid the mistake of trying to see mythology as an attempt at explanation in objective terms when its explanations are symbolic in nature. *

Now since the archetypal psyche expresses itself in the language of myth, it would seem as if the mythological interpretation of nature had been somehow imprinted on the psyche so that these archaic images reappear in modern man. We look then to a description of this process of how the mythological image arises in response to the physical process in order to gain what apparently is the essential clue to the question of the origin of the archetypes.

Keeping in mind the previous discussion of the nature of myths, it is clear that the relationship between the physical process and images of mythological motifs is not understood by Jung as being one of simple representation. When he says then that the archetypal image is not to be understood as an allegory of the physical process, he means that the objective content of representation is experienced symbolically and hence takes on psychic aspects due to projection.

It is not the world as we know it that speaks out of his unconscious, but the unknown world of the psyche, of which we know that it mirrors our empirical world only in part, and that, for the most part, it moulds this empirical world in accordance with its own psychic assumptions. The archetype does not proceed from physical facts, but describes how the psyche experiences the physical fact, and in so doing the psyche

often behaves so autocratically that it denies tangible reality or makes statements that fly in the face of it (Vol. IX-A, p. 154).

Thus original archetypal (mythological) images are postulated as being the resultant of an interaction between a physical process and the primitive psyche, with the physical process being interpreted in terms of a psychic fantasy content. Moreover, it is the subjective part, the fantasies which arise concomitant with the physical process, that are the formative elements for the mythological motif.

What we can safely say about mythical images is that the physical process imprinted itself on the psyche in this fantastic, distorted form and was preserved there, so that the unconscious still reproduces similar images today (Vol. VIII, p. 153).

It is not storms, not thunder and lightning, not rain and cloud that remain as images in the psyche, but the fantasies caused by the effects they arouse (Vol. VIII, pages 154-155).

Still to be explained, however, is the process of psychic imprinting through which an original mythological image becomes an enduring aspect of the collective unconscious, which can then produce images of similar form even to the present day. When we read Jung on this point, there seems to be an evident appeal to a theory involving inheritance of acquired characteristics. For although Jung is careful to make clear that it is the disposition to form images rather than the images themselves which are inherited, yet this inherited disposition is held to be a sort of condensation of the repeated experiences resulting from typical human situations.

These archetypes, whose innermost nature is inaccessible to experience, are the precipitate of the psychic functioning of the whole ancestral line; the accumulated experiences of organic life in general, a million times repeated, and condensed into types. In these

archetypes, therefore, all experiences are represented which have happened on this planet since primeval times (Vol. VI, p. 400).

The repetition of these typical human experiences leaves a sort of function trace in the psyche which then can act to produce analogous mythological images in succeeding generations. Thus the archetypes are described as "mnemic deposits."

From the scientific, causal standpoint the primordial image can be conceived as a mnemic deposit, an imprint or engram (Semon), which has arisen through the condensation of countless processes of a similar kind. In this respect it is a precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic form, of certain ever-recurring psychic experiences (Vol. VI, p. 443).

This reference to the influence of Richard Semon seems to clarify what Jung had in mind as a mechanism by which archetypes might be inherited. For the exposition of Semon's theory in his book The Mneme reveals a sort of theory of racial memory which tries to integrate the factors of memory, habit and inheritance under one theoretical principle and which appeals explicitly to the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.⁵ For example:

. . . the engraphic effects of stimulation are not restricted to the irritable substance of the individual, but that the offspring of that individual may manifest corresponding engraphic modifications.⁶

However, Jung's mention of Semon and use of his terminology does not constitute a complete endorsement of his theory. In particular, Jung is sensitive to the chicken and egg dilemma in relation to the question of the origin of the archetypes. For the archetypes can not only be seen as the product of past experiences but can also be seen as themselves conditioners of experience. Instead of seeking an

explanation of where the archetypes come from by saying that they are the result of the influence of physical processes on the psyche then, there is the alternative of conceiving the archetypes as part of the inherent nature of the psyche itself.

The fact that the sun or the moon or the meteorological processes appear, at the very least, in allegorized form points to an independent collaboration of the psyche, which in that case cannot be merely a product or stereotype of environmental conditions. From whence would it draw the capacity to adopt a standpoint outside sense perception? . . . In view of such questions Semon's naturalistic and causalistic engram theory no longer suffices. We are forced to assume that the given structure of the brain does not owe its peculiar nature merely to the influence of surrounding conditions, but also and just as much to the peculiar and autonomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a law inherent in life itself (Vol. VI, p. 444).

Jung in the course of his work abandoned Semon's theory of engrams and talk of mnemic deposits disappears from his later writings.⁷ Archetypes were then simply said to be part of the inherited brain structure, thus leaving the mechanism of hereditary transmission unspecified.

With Jung's retreat from the position that archetypes are "deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (Vol. VII, p. 69), we see that the simple correlations he had previously drawn relating physical processes to the formation of mythological images must also be reconsidered. What must then be revised in the theory of mythology is not the concept of projection and the vital role it plays in mythological thinking but the implication that myths were once original contents of consciousness, that they originate from the fantasizing of individual psyches. With the abandonment of the engram theory, Jung is no longer certain he can

reconstruct the process by which the objective physical process and the interpretive psyche interact to form myths. He seems, on the whole, in his later work (as exemplified in the quotations immediately below) to have come to the conclusion that mythological motifs are not amenable to a simple naturalistic explanation, as if they were caused by physical processes. Rather the subjective part of the process, the inherent laws of psychic apprehension, is now thought to be the essential determining factor.

Thus even the question of how archetypes (mythologems) originate is not seen by Jung as being a legitimate question since it implies the need for a special explanation of how the archetypes came to be in the psyche, whereas Jung now sees the archetypes as developing along with the psyche as part of its inherent pattern of functioning.

Empirically considered, however, the archetype did not ever come into existence as a phenomenon of organic life, but entered into the picture with life itself (Vol. XI, p. 149, note 2).

These images are "primordial" images in so far as they are peculiar to whole species, and if they ever "originated" their origin must have coincided at least with the beginning of the species. They are the "human quality" of the human being, the specifically human form his activities take. This specific form is hereditary and is already present in the germ-plasm (Vol. IX-A, p. 78).

The hope expressed earlier than that Jung's ideas on the way in which myths originate would prove to be the clue to solving the riddle of the origin of the archetypes proves to be unjustified, and we are left without a definitive answer to where the archetypes come from. Jung is naturally quite happy to abandon questions of ultimate origin to the sphere of metaphysics: "Whether this psychic

structure and its elements, the archetypes, ever 'originated' at all is a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable" (Vol. IX-A, p. 101; and " . . . it is impossible to say where the archetype comes from, because there is no Archimedean point outside the a priori conditions it represents" (Vol. IX-A, p. 69, note 27).⁸

But perhaps Jung should not be let off so easily. For rather than postulating that the archetypes are sort of an ultimate psychic fact for which no explanation in terms of more basic psychological theory is possible, it seems evident that, heuristically at least, we must seek an answer to the question of how it is that the psyche structures experiences in terms of the archetypes instead of other simpler modes. Perhaps, as Jung seems to think, the archetypes will eventually prove to be an ultimate mystery for human consciousness, but from the scientific point of view this can not be assumed.

Archetypal Image and Archetype Per Se

The claim that the archetypes are ultimately inaccessible must be further examined. For many difficult points in the articulation of Jung's theory of archetypes seem to hinge on distinguishing between the unreachable archetype per se and the archetypal image. The archetype per se was said to be not truly part of the psyche at all but rather psychoid and to be incapable of consciousness. As a consequence it was said to be unobservable in principle. The essential question in this regard would seem to be how such claims as the above can be justified from the empirical point of view.

But that nothing in principle would count as a direct observation of an archetype is a result of the total conceptual framework of the archetypal theory, which as a whole is grounded empirically. In this

respect it would seem not to differ significantly from other scientific theories. Moreover, if from the behaviorist point of view, the suggestion is made to do away with the hypothetical construct of the archetype per se and instead speak only of archetypal images, the reply is that this move would mean that a theory of archetypes is no longer possible. For there must be postulated an underlying common collective aspect to the psyches of individuals which will make the archetypal manifestations more than personalistic and idiosyncratic products. What counts as evidentially conclusive for the presence of archetypes then is just the appearance of contents which prove to constitute universal themes or motifs which can be recognized in contexts which transcend the individual's personal sphere of reference. Unless the archetypes are to be reduced to the merely personal then, there must be postulated an archetype per se which will be the transpersonal organizing principle for the personal and culturally determined archetypal manifestation.

It is better on the whole to think of the archetype per se as a principle or disposition rather than as an entity, i.e., something which can be clearly distinguished as an individual thing. Thus Jung says that the phenomenological material does not justify anything other than the postulation of principles which act to form distinct archetypal images, without it being possible to conclude anything definite about the nature of the archetype per se.

When one carefully considers this accumulation of data, it begins to seem probable that an archetype in its quiescent, unprojected state has no exactly determinable form but is in itself an indefinite structure which can assume definite forms only in projection (Vol. IX-A, p. 70).

Moreover, this uncertainty about the nature of the archetype *per se* extends even so far as to leave undetermined the number of archetypes and the point of differentiation between one archetype and another.

Empirically speaking, we are dealing all the time with "types," definite forms that can be named and distinguished. But as soon as you divest these types of the phenomenology presented by the case material, and try to examine them in relation to other archetypal forms, they branch out into such far-reaching ramifications in the history of symbols that one comes to the conclusion that the basic psychic elements are infinitely varied and ever changing, so as utterly to defy our powers of imagination (Vol. IX-A, p. 70).

Although he [the investigator] is forced, for epistemological reasons, to postulate an indefinite number of distinct and separate archetypes, yet he is constantly overcome by doubt as to how far they are really distinguishable from one another. They overlap to such a degree and have such a capacity for combination that all attempts to isolate them conceptually must appear hopeless (Vol. XI, p. 288).

In considering the problem of the nature of the archetype *per se*, Kant's influence on Jung's views must again be acknowledged. For Jung accepts the Kantian distinction between the thing-in-itself and that which appears. In these terms then the archetype *per se* is held to be inaccessible on analogy with Kant's noumenon, whereas the archetypal image is that which appears in the phenomenal realm.⁹

The existence of a transcendental reality is indeed evident in itself That the world inside and outside ourselves rests on a transcendental background is as certain as our own existence, but it is equally certain that the direct perception of the archetypal world inside us is just as doubtfully correct as that of the physical outside us (Vol. XIV, p. 551).

When I say "atom" I am talking of the model made of it; when I say "archetype" I am talking of ideas corresponding to it, but never of the thing-in-itself, which in both cases is a transcendental mystery. . . . One must therefore assume that the effective archetypal ideas, including our model of the archetype, rests on something actual even though unknowable, just as the model of the atom rests on certain unknowable qualities of matter (Letters, Vol. II, p. 54, letter to H. Haberlandt dated 23 April 1952).

However, it is unnecessary to follow Jung's Kantian way of construing the archetype per se. For rather than implicating the archetypal theory with a problematic phenomena/noumena distinction, we can interpret the archetype per se as an unobservable hypothetical construct. Thus, although Jung holds that the archetype per se is an ultimate mystery, the archetypal theory only requires that it be the unobservable and mostly unknown structuring principle responsible for the archetypal image.

In any case, our efforts to discover the nature of the archetype directly are frustrated since the archetypal image always reflects the personal history of the consciousness in which it is embodied. Thus when we attempt to abstract the archetype itself from its personal and cultural matrix, the result is that the distinctiveness of the archetype vanishes, and we can no longer say what it would be like in itself. But if the archetype is then essentially an "irrepresentable form," the question is how we are to distinguish collective archetypal manifestations from merely personal contents of consciousness. It would seem that there must be definite phenomenological differences between the archetypal images and other contents if we are to be justified in speaking of the existence of a collective unconscious containing archetypes. For in the absence of any common features which the individual archetypes manifest in

every person, we must have general criteria for recognizing what constitutes an archetypal content.

As previously mentioned in the example of an archetypal dream, archetypal images characteristically have an alien, impersonal character so that they do not appear to be contents which were once conscious and then forgotten or repressed. But this does not mean that the contents attributed to the collective unconscious contain images which the dreamer can not recognize at all. Rather it seems that the strange and alien contents amount to fantastic rearrangements of items of experience already known to the dreamer. If one dreams of God, for example, the image may be conveyed as that of the figure of Superman. The archetypal images are for the most part then something familiar appearing in an unfamiliar context. Thus mythological motifs may appear in dreams but with modern substitutes for the principle characters.

We have only to disregard the dependence of dream language on environment and substitute "eagle" for "aeroplane," "dragon" for "automobile" or "train," "snake-bite" for "injection," and so forth, in order to arrive at the more universal and more fundamental language of mythology (Vol. XI, 289).

It would be perhaps advantageous to distinguish the objective from the subjective aspects of the phenomenology of archetypes. Subjectively the archetypal appearance is characterized by its symbolic qualities. It has an aura of numinosity and seems to point beyond itself to an unknown. From the third person point of view, however, the symbolic nature of the archetype is less evident as we have to do only with a content of consciousness whose origin is unknown, so that what may appear objectively to be a symbol may upon closer examination prove to be a sign with a simple representational

explanation.

In order to verify the presence of an archetype then, both the views of introspection and extraspection are necessary.¹⁰ The symbolic nature of the person's experience and his for the most part absence of personal association to the material is taken into account along with the presence of the same theme or motif in material drawn from the history of symbols. The ability of these historical parallels to provide an explanation of the meaning of the otherwise unexplicable content is then the crucial factor justifying the employment of the archetypal hypothesis. When such a procedure provides the most plausible explanation for the presence of contents of consciousness, we can say that an archetype is present.

Rather than taking one particular image or dream in isolation, however, the determination of which contents are said to be archetypal is best arrived at with an examination of a series of dreams or other similar experiences. In this way the margin of error involved in any introspective evaluation is lessened. Then we are also able to see how the alleged archetype functions in more than one context. From the objective point of view, it is not so much how the supposed archetype appears as what it does and how it functions that is crucial for deciding about the presence of archetypes. This is especially so since the archetypes often appear as images which are themselves ordinary although the role they play in the dream as a whole is archetypal. For example, the images of actual persons known to the dreamer may function as archetypal images.¹¹

Although there is thus no definite objective criteria by which one can identify archetypal images out of the context of the function

they play in particular manifestations, Jung does give us an idea of the objective features which as a matter of fact are associated with the appearance of many archetypes.

An unfallible sign of collective images seems to be the appearance of the "cosmic" element, i.e., the images in the dream or fantasy are connected with cosmic qualities, such as temporal and spatial infinity, enormous speed and extension of movement, "astrological" associations, telluric, lunar, and solar analogies, changes in the proportions of the body, etc. The obvious occurrence of mythological and religious motifs in a dream also points to the activity of the collective unconscious. The collective element is very often announced by peculiar symptoms, as for example by dreams where the dreamer is flying through space like a comet, or feels that he is the earth, or the sun, or a star; or else is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. (Vol. VII, p. 160).

On the whole, the fantastic nature of the archetypal imagery often bears an alarming similarity to or even identity with the symptoms of schizophrenia. But the schizophrenic, although he has gained an access to the collective unconscious, has been figuratively speaking swallowed up by it, so that he has lost the ability to function as an ego and relate in a practical way to the objective world. In a sense he is unable to wake from his symbolic fantasies, so that they are more symptoms of psychic breakdown than they are luminous symbols which can be meaningfully integrated into the total pattern of his life.

The difference between archetypes and the dissociated products of schizophrenia is that the former are entities endowed with personality and charged with meaning, whereas the latter are only fragments with vestiges of meaning--in reality, they are products of disintegration (Vol. VIII, p. 122).

The phenomenology of the archetypal manifestation is often of immediate therapeutic relevance as the contents of the unconscious take on dark and menacing aspects when the point of view which they represent is not being acknowledged by the conscious mind.

The guise in which these figures appear depends on the attitude of the conscious mind: if it is negative toward the unconscious, the animals will be frightening; if positive, they appear as the "helpful animals" of fairytale and legend (Vol. V, p. 181).

In the form in which the archetypes appear is thus influenced by the attitude of the conscious mind, it would seem that the manifestation of the archetypes are not random and due to chance but that their appearance is conditioned by certain necessary circumstances in the individual. Moreover, an understanding of these conditions should shed light on the nature of the relationship between the collective and personal aspects of the psyche. For by calling the collective unconscious the impersonal and objective portion of the psyche, the integral part this aspect of the unconscious plays in the life of the individual is not given adequate consideration. In this regard we find then that the archetypes behave in an analogous fashion to other contents of the unconscious in the sense that their appearance functions in a compensatory fashion to consciousness. That is, the unconscious supplies contents which compensate the conscious attitude by representing features of the person's total situation which are overlooked, repressed or undervalued by the conscious personality. The appearance of the archetype then usually indicates the need for a collective compensation. What this means is that the true nature of the person's situation corresponds to a universal and typical human pattern,

so that what it is that is missing from the person's conscious attitude is an understanding of the broader human perspective which an appreciation of the basic patterns of human existence would give.

The archetypal structure of the unconscious corresponds to the average run of events. The changes that may befall a man are not infinitely variable; they are variations of certain typical occurrences which are limited in number. When therefore a distressful situation arises, the corresponding archetype will be constellated in the unconscious (Vol. V, p. 294).

One instructive example to make clearer the meaning of collective compensation can be drawn from Jung's work on the UFO phenomenon. After extensive research lasting a decade, Jung concluded that the UFO phenomenon represented a sort of modern myth in which the Archetype of the Self, an archetype expressing "order, deliverance, salvation and wholeness" (Vol. X, p. 328), was being projected into the heavens. Although unable to reach a definite conclusion about the physical reality of the reported objects, Jung makes a convincing case for the activation of the Self archetype as a compensation for the ominous world situation following World War II in which nuclear annihilation seemed possible at any moment.

We have here a golden opportunity of seeing how a legend is formed, and how in a difficult and dark time for humanity a miraculous tale grows up of an attempted intervention by extra-terrestrial "heavenly" powers . . . (Vol. X, pages 322-323).

The Archetype of the Self then functions to direct attention within to the possibility of the realization of an inner center of order and personal unity. With the world threatened with destruction, the Self can provide an inward source of meaning and unity.

Archetypal manifestations are thus the compensatory response of

the unconscious to typical human situations, with the response being a representation of an inherent pattern of human functioning. In this way the archetype supplies the insight of a universal perspective to what are universally experienced problems.¹² This enables the individual then to grasp the meaning of his situation in its more than personal aspect. If actual persons appear in archetypal guise in dreams, for example, we can see that the activation of some universal human pattern is complicating the personal interrelationship. If a known girl appears as the archetype of the anima then, she also represents a vehicle of symbolic projection.¹³

The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors

In our investigation of the conditions under which the archetypes come into consciousness, we have emphasized the similarity of behavior of archetypes to other contents of consciousness in that their appearance is the result of the overall compensatory influence of the unconscious. In this regard it must also be pointed out that the archetypes behave in a similar fashion to the complexes of the personal unconscious, i.e., they are autonomous factors. Thus, although archetypes as a rule arise in response to the needs of the individual, the end result of their activation may be that the archetype subjugates or even possesses the person.

The archetypes are then not only objects of consciousness but also subjects which can be described as having intentionalities which may oppose that of the ego personality.

They are spontaneous phenomena which are not subject to our will, and we are therefore justified in ascribing to them a certain autonomy. They are to be regarded not only as objects but as subjects with laws of their own. From the point of view

of consciousness, we can, of course, describe them as objects, and even explain them up to a point, in the same measure as we can describe and explain a living human being. But then we have to disregard their autonomy. If that is considered, we are compelled to treat them as subjects; in other words, we have to admit that they possess spontaneity and purposiveness, or a kind of consciousness and free will. We observe their behaviour and consider their statements. This dual standpoint, which we are forced to adopt towards every relatively independent organism, naturally has a dual result. On the one hand it tells me what I do to the object, and on the other hand what it does (possibly to me) (Vol. XI, p. 362).

In describing the archetypes as autonomous factors, Jung wants to hold to the distinction between the complexes as contents of the personal unconscious and the archetypes of a collective unconscious. For the word "complex" is used primarily to refer to the autonomous contents of personal origin, to those contents which develop ontogenetically. The archetype, on the other hand, is inherited and thus seems impersonal in the sense that it can not be explained in the terms of the person's own life history. Naturally, this clear separation between the personal and collective aspects of the unconscious is in reality always more or less an interrelation. For the complexes appear to have an archetypal nucleus and the archetypes are always manifested in images made up out of combinations drawn from the individual's store of experience. Nevertheless, it is still possible in practise to discriminate between those contents of consciousness which owe their origin primarily to the individual and his experience from those which are impersonal and which point beyond the individual.

The archetype behaves like a complex then in that it is a locus of thoughts, feelings and images which function in a unified way as

a sort of personality. Rather than indicating that the archetypes are actually entities outside man, however, the personification which the archetypal images manifest are typical of autonomous contents which exist in the unconscious without being integrated with the conscious personality. The less acknowledgement and understanding an unconscious element is accorded then, the more it tends to function independently of the conscious personality and even assume the characteristics of a personality itself. And since the archetypes are symbolic, numinous factors which do not originate from one's personal experience, the ability to integrate them into one's personality has definite limitations. They are, in fact, wider than the individual; they have a universal collective meaning which the individual can only participate in but can not hope to completely assimilate. There is often the real danger that the archetypes will even assimilate the ego personality. "It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the unconscious or an archetype to take complete possession of a man and to determine his fate down to the smallest detail" (Vol. XI, p. 409). Plausible examples of this phenomenon are to be seen in the lives of Christ and Hitler.

The archetypes seem to have a dual nature, being potentialities for both evil as well as good. Thus what to one person proves to be a healing experience giving meaning to life, may prove to another less stable consciousness to be a source of evil, disorientation or madness.

Among the most common archetypes which show a distinct personality are the shadow archetype and the anima and animus. The shadow is a representation of the personal unconscious as a whole and usually

embodies the compensating values to those held by the conscious personality. Thus the shadow often represents one's dark side, those aspects of oneself which exist but which one does not acknowledge or identify with. In dreams it may appear as a dark figure of an Arab or Negro of the same sex as the dreamer.¹⁴

The anima archetype appears in men and is his primordial image of woman. It represents the man's biological expectation of women but also is a symbol of a man's feminine possibilities, his counter-sexual tendencies. The experiences of one's mother and other actual women are a third contributing factor to the form of the archetype. The anima often appears in dreams as a strange or unknown woman. The animus archetype, the analogous image of the masculine which occurs in women, may appear as a series of strange men.¹⁵

The personification of the above archetypes is often of such a distinct character that dialogues of significant therapeutic value can be carried on between the ego and the shadow or anima/animus in the conscious state. This form of communication with the unconscious, popularized by the method of Gestalt Therapy, was enthusiastically recommended by Jung (Vol. VII, p. 201).

In addition to the archetypes mentioned above, there are many other archetypes which appear in personified form notably the Old Wise Man, the Great Mother, the Earth Mother, the Divine Child and the Archetype of the Self. However, any attempt to give an exhaustive list of the archetypes would be a largely futile exercise since the archetypes tend to combine with each other and interchange qualities making it difficult to decide where one archetype stops and another begins. For example, qualities of the shadow archetype may

be prominent in an archetypal image of the anima or animus.

One archetype may also appear in various distinct forms, thus raising the question whether four or five distinct archetypes should be said to be present or merely four or five forms of a single type. There would then seem to be no decision procedure for determining the exact boundaries of an individual archetype. For what is to count as a typical situation and thus indicate the presence of an archetype can not be decided a priori, so that for instance we can not determine on the basis of general considerations that there must be so many archetypes. And from the phenomenological point of view, the appearance of distinct types of archetypal images does not permit us to conclude anything definite about how many archetypes per se there may be. Therefore, it would seem evident that the complete cataloguing of the archetypes thereby determining their exact number is an irresolvable matter and an unreasonable expectation of the archetypal theory.

In addition to the personified forms mentioned above, there are many archetypes which do not appear in personal form. For example, the Archetype of the Self may be manifested as a stone, diamond, flower or as a four-sided figure. Animals, plants and natural objects such as the wind, a lake or a mountain may also figure into archetypal images. There is in fact no determinate condition regulating what form an archetype must assume. This is not to say, however, that there are not definite conditions an image must satisfy in order to count as archetypal. But these conditions depend more on the function of the image in the overall context of the manifestation than they do on the specific form.

With regard to the question of personification, a paradoxical situation seems to exist since Jung says that all autonomous contents of the unconscious are personified. "All autonomous psychic factors have the character of personality . . ." (Vol. X, p. 42). On the other hand, the archetypes, which presumably are all more or less capable of autonomous function in the unconscious, do not all appear in the form of persons. It would seem clear then that personification is being used in a general sense to mean ascription of traits of personality to an entity rather than implying that what is personified must appear as a distinct personality or in the form of a person.

Archetypes and Synchronicity

In our discussion of the phenomenology of the archetypes, dreams have been emphasized as a characteristic state of consciousness in which the archetypes come into awareness. Fantasies and visions are other altered states of consciousness in which archetypes frequently appear. But in addition to these modes of manifesting themselves, Jung states that the archetypes may also affect nonpsychic physical processes. This effect of the archetypes is described by Jung's theory of synchronicity. In synchronistic events then, there is a meaningful correspondence between a physical event and a psychic content with the possibility of a causal connection between the two having been ruled out. These events are the often recorded meaningful coincidences which seem to defy understanding in terms of either causality or chance.

An example Jung describes from his therapeutic work serves to illustrate these ideas.

A young woman I was treating had, at a critical moment, a dream in which she was given a golden scarab. While she was telling me this dream I sat with my back to the closed window. Suddenly I heard a noise behind me, like a gentle tapping. I turned round and saw a flying insect knocking against the window-pane from outside. I opened the window and caught the creature in the air as it flew in. It was the nearest analogy to a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes, a scarabaeid beetle, the common rose-chafer (*Cetonia aurata*), which contrary to its usual habits had evidently felt an urge to get into a dark room at this particular moment (Vol. VIII, p. 438).

There would seem to be no plausibility of attempting a causal explanation here, although chance seems a possible rational explanation. Other examples of synchronistic events, however, seem to eliminate the possibility of the meaningful coincidence being the result of the chance intersection of random events. The best illustration of synchronicity where chance is ruled out occurs in experiments attempting to verify the phenomenon of extrasensory perception, ESP. These tests using card guessing techniques are sometimes structured so that the subject tries to guess the sequence of a deck of cards before they are shuffled by a randomizing machine. As the subject is guessing the sequence of a future order of the cards, this of course also eliminates the possibility that the order of the cards can have a causal effect on the mental state of the subject. The overall results of this type of experiment revealed a probability of reproducing the same results by chance as 1:400,000 (Vol. VIII, p. 433). In another experiment one person guessed all twenty-five cards in the deck correctly after they had been shuffled, indicating a probability of 1:298,023,223,876,953,125 (Vol. VIII, p. 433).

In the ESP tests the meaningful coincidence is between a content of consciousness, the person's idea of what cards will appear, and the actual order of the cards. The archetypal theory comes into play then as Jung says that an archetype is manifesting itself synchronously in both a psychic content and a physical process. The term "synchronous" is used instead of simultaneous in the formulation of the synchronistic hypothesis to indicate that the meaningful coincidence between the psychic and physical events need not occur at exactly the same time. The physical event can be slightly before or after the psychic content.

In the ESP examples, it is the archetype of magical effect, the expectation that a miraculous event can occur, which seems to be at work.¹⁶ Evidence for this is the fact that the results of the experiments are positively correlated with the emotional state of the subject, so that an enthusiastic, hopeful subject can score well above chance probability at the beginning of the experiments; and then his score will move toward the chance probability as the novelty of the experiments lessen, or if he becomes bored or depressed (Vol. VIII, p. 434).

The archetypal influence is clearly seen in the first example given. The woman patient was at a crisis point in her analysis due to a too narrow rationalistic view which did not leave her sufficiently open to the possibility of change which could result from taking seriously the irrationally produced contents of the unconscious. The meaningful coincidence was then the turning point in this regard and produced the needed change in attitude allowing the analysis to progress to a successful conclusion. The scarab motif, moreover, is a

classic symbol of rebirth (Vol. VIII, p. 439) so that it would seem that the patient's situation of impasse had constellated the archetype of rebirth and renewal.

Jung postulates that an archetypal ordering principle is at work in these instances of synchronicity bringing about a situation in which an outer event and a psychic content are expressions of the same meaning. The archetypes in these cases seem to be localized as much in matter and in the environment as they are in the psyches of individuals.

The psychoid archetype has a tendency to behave as though it were not localized in one person but were active in the whole environment (Vol. X, pages 451-452).

. . . the archetypes are not found exclusively in the psychic sphere, but can occur just as much in circumstances that are not psychic (equivalence of an outward physical process with a psychic one) (Vol. VIII, p. 515).

In using the designation "psychoid" for the archetypes, it seems that Jung wanted to imply that the archetypes could be manifested in nonpsychic ways, specifically influencing matter. This use of "psychoid" does not have the same implications as when the instincts are said to be psychoid.¹⁷ In the case of the instincts, the psychoid label describes a sort of interface region between the psyche and the physiological processes. ". . . term 'psychoid' . . . meant to distinguish a category of events from merely vitalistic phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other" (Vol. VIII, p. 177). But the archetype "with its psychoid nature, forms the bridge to matter in general" (Vol. VIII, p. 216). The psychoid archetype therefore seems to be "quasi-psychic" in the special

sense that it may be independent of the body.

Synchronicity postulates a meaning which is a priori in relation to human consciousness and apparently exists outside man. . . . the possibility that synchronicity is not only a psychophysical phenomenon but might also occur without the participation of the human psyche . . . (Vol. VIII, pages 501-502, note 71).

It may well be a prejudice to restrict the psyche to being "inside the body" (Vol. XIV, p. 300).

The phenomena which Jung describes in his theory of synchronicity undoubtedly exist and his efforts to take account of these events in his overall theory of the psyche seems a worthwhile and needed endeavor. However, as we have previously stated, the notion that there can be a psyche independent of a body and archetypes which persist outside of man is a postulate which can not be unproblematically integrated in a consistent way with Jung's theory of archetypes as a whole. Perhaps the ESP phenomena and the other events associated with synchronicity will eventually lead to a new scientific model of the universe. But as this major revolution in the basic theories of science has yet to come about, the best plan for trying to gain a coherent understanding of the idea of the archetype is, as we have previously argued, to parenthesize the postulation of archetypes existing outside man and to regard this idea as one possible theoretical extension of the archetypal notion which has yet to be successfully integrated into the overall theory.

Moreover, the interpretational approach we have used in trying to grasp the meaning of Jung's archetypes has not had to assume that archetypes exist outside of man. The overall success of this approach in making the archetypes comprehensible is perhaps a matter to be

left to the judgment of the reader. However, in taking into account the full panorama of Jung's utterances on the archetypes, it has been necessary only twice to mention this possibility as a way of understanding the archetypal theory.

So far as the assertion that the archetypes have a psychoid characteristic is considered then, this may perhaps best be rendered to mean that the archetypes manifest themselves in a psychic way but seem to be more than psychic or not only psychic. What this quality may eventually prove to be would seem part of the puzzle of the nature of the archetype per se. But this way of conceiving the psychoid characteristic of the archetypes need not imply that they exist outside of or independently of man.

In any event, the concept of the archetype is not logically tied to the notion of synchronicity. Although synchronicity may well require something like an archetypal hypothesis to make it intelligible, the reverse is certainly not the case.¹⁸

Archetypes and Temporality

One final topic which must be taken up before our exposition of the archetypal theory is complete is the aspect of the changes in archetypes through time. Two distinct questions seem to be involved. In the first place, are there emergent archetypes, that is, do new archetypes come into being in response to the changing situation of man? Secondly, how can we account for the changes that archetypes manifest through time as, for example, the changes that the God archetype undergoes when the Jehovah of the Old Testament is experienced as the Christian Trinity and Devil?

It seems evident that an answer to our first question must hinge on our idea of the origin of the archetypes. As will be remembered, it was concluded in this regard that the archetypes are inherited in a similar fashion to other biological structures. If we take changes in archetypes as being strictly analogous to the way that the body changes through evolution, we would expect that the chance of new archetypes coming into being through the evolutionary process constitutes a very low probability. For the evolutionary process works in an accumulatory fashion in the sense that the origins of new structures occurs, as a rule, as an addition to the pattern of the existing genotype. Highly evolved creatures then tend to be more complex organisms. Moreover, as a structure becomes highly evolved, there is less probability of major changes occurring in it since the chance that single mutations in the genotype will lead to an improvement in the overall structure compatible with the rest of the existing genotype is very small. We would not expect then the appearance of human beings with new basic structures for the body, a third eye or an extra limb. These occurrences would be monstrosities rather than improvements to be passed on to the next generation. Analogously, the origin of new archetypes through evolution would seem unlikely, especially in the light of the basic structuring function that the archetypes are held to play in the psyche. The archetypes are the phylogenetically old aspects of the psyche and hence those parts least liable to be changed to the overall benefit of the organism.

A contemporary man is thus genetically very similar to what man was like ten thousand years ago, and no radical changes in the overall

pattern of inherited human behavior are to be expected, at least not for the next few millenia. Moreover, what would a new typical human situation be like corresponding to which a new archetype could arise? It would seem clear that any changes in the basic human situation would only be variations of situations which have existed cotermporously with the emergence of man as a species.

If from phylogenetic considerations we then reject the practical possibility of the formation of new archetypes through the evolutionary process, the observed changes in archetypal manifestation through time must be explained from the ontogenetic viewpoint, as the result of cultural and individual development. The changes in archetypal manifestation do not thereby indicate a change in the archetype itself. By comparison we might consider the human brain which genetically is basically the same structure as it was thousands of years ago at the dawn of civilization. Modern man's degree of consciousness and his overall conception of reality is, however, far different today than it was then, as we see reflected in the development of culture. The crucial importance of the ontogenetic influence in giving shape and content to the archetypal disposition must then not be underestimated, as the basic patterning influence of the archetype itself can take on a seemingly limitless variety of forms.

Although there can be no new archetypes, there can be new symbols and new myths. The UFO phenomenon is a particularly instructive example in this regard.

It is characteristic of our time that the archetype, in contrast to its previous manifestations, should now take the form of an object, a technological construction, in order to avoid the odiousness of mythological personification (Vol. X, p. 328).

It is then the interaction between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche that accounts for the changes in archetypes across time. For with the development of consciousness through the agency of culture, the archetypal images undergo a gradual transformation. This is, moreover, what would be expected if the archetypes are to function as compensatory agents for the conscious attitude.

1. As will become apparent as we proceed, this hope will not be fulfilled. It is only in Jung's earlier writing that he attempts to explain how archetypes originate through ideas about the origins of myths. However, due to the fact that Jung's views on this matter become implicated with ideas about the inheritance of acquired characteristics, this earlier view merits full discussion.

2. In the above we have not distinguished the spiritual from the religious, as in the previous discussion of the spiritual when the latter term referred to the archetypal manifestation and "religious" to the product of collective consciousness. Jung does not always use these terms in a consistent way, although from the context it is usually clear whether he is referring to the individual or the collective manifestation.

3. However, it is easy to fall into the opposite error of seeing alchemy solely as a philosophico-religious enterprise and thus fail to appreciate the important role which alchemical work has played in the history of chemistry. Jung, in his work with the psychological significance of alchemical symbols, is particularly open to this criticism that he has overemphasized the psychological aspect of alchemy while failing to give due credit to the naturalistic and practical aspects of the art.

4. The term "mechanicomorphize" is taken from Joseph F. Rychlak, A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 57. "It is also possible to take the opposite approach [to anthropomorphism] and assign non-human characteristics to human organisms. Some psychologists feel that the behaviorist does this when he 'mechanicomorphizes' man"

5. Richard Semon, The Mneme (New York: MacMillan, 1921), p. 11.

6. Ibid., p. 12.

7 This transition apparently occurred sometime between 1925 and 1935.

8 It is evident that by saying in effect that the question of the origin of the archetypes is not a useful one to ask, Jung is attempting to avoid the stigma of the doctrine of inheritance of acquired characteristics. For from the Lamarckian point of view, it makes sense to ask how the archetypes come to be in the psyche and to postulate possible environmental causative conditions. With his withdrawal from implicit support of the Lamarckian position, Jung sees no point to raising the question. However, asking about the origin of archetypes need not imply a Lamarckian answer. One might legitimately wish to know whether archetypes have a natural, biological origin or nonnatural origin as result of intervention by spiritual agencies. Jung speculates about the possibility of the latter alternative in the following:

The question is nothing less than this: Does the psychic in general--the soul or spirit or the unconscious--originate in us, or is the psyche, in the early stages of conscious evolution, actually outside us in the form of arbitrary powers with intentions of their own, and does it gradually take its place within us in the course of psychic development? . . . This whole idea strikes us as dangerously paradoxical, but, at bottom, it is not altogether inconceivable (Vol. X, pages 69-70).

9 The application of the Kantian phenomena/noumena distinction to the problem of archetype per se versus archetypal image is not unproblematic. For the appeal to the archetype per se as the principle responsible for the archetypal image would seem to imply the attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself, i.e., that the latter was real and had certain effects. Thus, if we take the archetype per se as strictly analogous to the thing-in-itself, we end up attributing properties to that which from Kant's viewpoint we are not supposed to be able to attribute anything at all. See Edward Casey's article "Towards An Archetypal Imagination" in Spring, 1974, p. 29).

10 We are using the word "extraspection" in the sense ascribed to it by Joseph F. Rychlak in A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory, page 27: "If a theorist takes an extraspective perspective or frame of reference, he defines his abstractions from his vantage point as observer, regardless of the point of view of the object of study."

11 In this portion of a dream of Jung's, for example, the shadow archetype appears as "Dr. Y. and his son." Moreover, the image of Jung's father also plays an archetypal role in the dream. In contrast to the relationship Jung had with his real father, this symbolic father acts as a guide to the mysteries of the unconscious.

It started with my paying a visit to my long-deceased father. He was living in the country-- I did not know where. I saw a house in the style of the eighteenth century, very roomy, with several rather large outbuildings. . . . My father guarded these as custodian.

He was, as I soon discovered, not only the custodian but also a distinguished scholar in his own right--which he had never been in his lifetime. I met him in his study, and, oddly enough, Dr. Y.--who was about my age-- and his son, both psychiatrists, were also present. I do not know whether I had asked a question or whether my father wanted to explain something of his own accord, but in any case he fetched a big Bible down from a shelf, a heavy folio volume like the Merian Bible in my library. The Bible my father held was bound in shiny fishskin. He opened it at the Old Testament--I guessed that he turned to the Pentateuch--and began interpreting a certain passage. He did this so swiftly and so learnedly that I could not follow him. I noted only that what he said betrayed a vast amount of variegated knowledge, the significance of which I dimly apprehended but could not properly judge or grasp. I saw that Dr. Y. understood nothing at all, and his son began to laugh. They thought that my father was going off the deep end and what he said was simply senile prattle. . . .

The two psychiatrists represented a limited medical point of view which, of course, also infects me as a physician. They represent my shadow--first and second editions of the shadow, father and son (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, pages 217-218).

12 In talking in this way about the insight of a universal perspective, there is a temptation to speak in terms of the "wisdom" of the unconscious. In regard to collective compensation then, we must be careful to avoid the misunderstanding that this type of language implies that the unconscious is a sort of higher consciousness which purposively guides the personality to its destination. For the sort of "guidance" which the unconscious provides is that which results from the workings of a natural process which itself has no end in view. Jung makes this point in a discussion concerning compensation by the unconscious.

Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to suppose that in such cases the unconscious is working to a deliberate and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain definite ends. I have found nothing to support this assumption. The driving force, so far as it is

possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in essence only an urge towards self-realization. If it were a matter of some general teleological plan, then all individuals who enjoy a surplus of unconsciousness would necessarily be driven towards higher consciousness by an irresistible urge (Vol. VII, p. 184).

13 The anima is in part man's inner image of woman. See page 75 for further characterization of the anima archetype.

14 This generalization is primarily based on the dream material of Caucasians. Do the shadows of Negroes and other racial groups then appear as figures with white skin? To my knowledge this question has not been resolved through empirical studies.

15 Although the content of all the archetypes is conditioned by the individual's personal experience, the shadow and the anima/animus differ from the other archetypes in the fact that their content is more directly relatable to the person's personal situation than the other archetypes. In terms of the analogy of depth then, these archetypes occupy a position intermediate between consciousness and the personal unconscious and the other aspects of the collective unconsciousness.

16 See Ira Progoff, Jung, Synchronicity, and Human Destiny (New York: Delta, 1973), p. 106.

Since causation has been ruled out, the question might well be raised how the "influence" of the archetype can then be made intelligible. It would seem that some sort of lawlike ordering principle must be postulated not involving a cause and effect relationship between the objective event and the correlated internal state of expectancy. Making clear how the archetype is supposed to function as this ordering principle is one of the major conceptual ambiguities which must be resolved in order to make synchronicity into a viable explanatory hypothesis.

17 Compare use of psychoid as discussed on page 13.

18 Since the position taken here is that a rational reconstruction of the archetypal theory is not committed to the task of a rational reconstruction of synchronicity, we will not attempt a critical assessment of synchronicity in this study. In order to carry out that task, several crucial questions would have to be considered. In addition to the problem of making archetypal "influence" intelligible, additional clarification is needed as how the crucial distinction between coincidence and meaningful coincidence can be made operationally sound. Questions can also be raised as to the validity of Rhine's statistical procedures and results. See C.F.M. Hansel's ESP (New York: Scribner, 1966).

CHAPTER 4
CRITICISMS OF THE ARCHETYPAL THEORY: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Preliminary Remarks

The exposition of Jung's concept of the archetype having now been completed, it is the objective of the second half of this study to consider criticisms of the theory. To an extent we have anticipated this task in the first half. For in order to rationally reconstruct Jung's concept of the archetype, it has proved necessary on occasion to distinguish between essential aspects of the idea and other aspects which although linked by Jung on occasion with discussion of archetypes would, if explored in terms of their full implications, lead to a situation of either obvious inconsistency or hopeless obscurity and confusion concerning what is meant to be implied by the concept of an archetype.

As the chief case in point, we have interpreted the archetypes naturalistically in the sense that it was assumed that they occur as a natural phenomenon of man rather than as subsistent entities with an ontological locus outside of man. Closely related to this naturalistic stance on the origin and ontological nature of the archetype was the position taken asserting the psyche's necessary dependence on the brain. In addition, in terms of our project of reconstruction, it was found necessary to emphasize the logical independence of the idea of archetypes from the hypothesis of synchronicity. The assumption of an extrapsychic locus for the archetype which was entailed by

synchronicity, a locus "in matter," was considered to be an unnecessary complication to an already cumbersome theory and to be, moreover, an addition which is incompatible with other aspects of the archetypal theory as we have reconstructed it.

One could, of course, postulate archetypal entities which are responsible for the phenomena of synchronicity and which subsist independently of man without having to assume that they were therefore supernatural agencies. This supernatural agency hypothesis is then only one of several conceivable types of nonnaturalistic interpretations.¹ However, this assumption of extraspsychic subsistence, even if it need not invoke the supernatural, still has the effect of making the archetypes into occult entities, that is, entities which have very little in common with man as he is understood in terms of standard scientific knowledge.²

In addition to the questions related to the naturalistic interpretation of the archetypes, we have also previously discussed the influence of Kantian epistemology on Jung's archetypes (pages 35 and 38). This topic will be further treated in the third section of this chapter.

The question of evolution theory and its possible consequences for the plausibility of the archetypal concept, foreshadowed on page 59 will be examined further in the last section of Chapter 7.

The last of Jung's views previously critiqued concerns the question of racial differences (page 26). Following World War II, Jung appears to have retreated from the implications for racial differences which he drew from the idea of the collective unconscious. The claim that different racial groups have a distinctly different collective unconscious is at any rate not emphasized by Jung in his writings

after World War II, although the quotes in support of such a view presented on page 26, from Vol. VII, were not retracted by Jung in the "thorough revision" to which he subjected the book in the fifth edition in 1942 (Vol. VII, p. 7).³

With objections from the scientific perspective and evaluation of the archetypal concept as a scientific theory having been reserved for later discussion (Chapters 5,6,7), what remaining criticisms must then be considered? This question is rendered problematic by the vast panorama of different types of critical attacks which have been directed against Jung's views. The project of presenting conclusive counter-arguments against each individual dissenting author could conceivably engage one's efforts for several years. But such a volume and variety of critical literature is not itself a reliable indication of the inherent weakness of Jung's conceptions nor even of the result of his violation of beliefs and presuppositions of vested professional interest so much as it is an indication of the obscurity of his method of presentation, which in its magnificent rhetorical style manages through its all-encompassing, cosmic scope to have something to offend, confound or confuse just about everyone. There is also, of course, a very large and rapidly growing literature from Jungian enthusiasts. But as the work of even the most immediate Jungian disciples (individuals such as Aniele Jaffe, Jolande Jacobi and Michael Fordham) offer supposedly authoritative accounts of Jung's views which differ widely in interpretational approach and emphasis at crucial points,⁴ one begins to wonder if perhaps there is in fact a problem in that through a combination of intuitive overdetermination⁵ and lack of precision in formulating and limiting his basic constructs, Jung has tried to explain

too much by his archetypal theory through the use of conceptual categories which are simply too vague and too sweeping in scope.

Jung's work certainly offers ample justification for this type of comment, but rather than being the result of laziness or lack of attention, such openness and indeterminateness in regard to his theoretical constructs was rather the product of a conscious methodology. In Chapter 6 we will have occasion to examine this methodology and consider in what measure it is adequate for the tasks which it purports to accomplish. The point to be made here, however, in regard to criticisms of Jung is that the ambiguity and openness to different possible interpretations characteristic of Jung's formulations gives the unsympathetic critic an abundance of possible avenues of attack. Jung is particularly vulnerable when passages are criticized out of their proper context or without regard to what is said in other writings. For it is frequently necessary to read Jung's explanation of a theoretical point in several different writings in order to gain a complete understanding of what he is saying in light of the overall development of his ideas. Jung thus offers more than the usual difficulties for the reader, and as a consequence a significant amount of Jungian criticism is grounded in misunderstanding of Jung's basic ideas.⁶

We will be content here with two examples of this type of criticism. Rather than being instances of simple errors, they are more aptly described as "a mixture of distortion and misunderstanding, which is obviously motivated by ill will."⁷

The first sample comes from the pen of Philip Rieff. In the passage below this unfortunately influential critic slides from a discussion of

the role of fantasy in mediating the experience of the archetypes to two subsequent passages on the same page where it is apparent that he is equating "illusion" and "archetype." Although Rieff may feel that the archetypes are illusions, it should not be supposed, as he implies, that this in any way approximates Jung's meaning of the term. It would seem that Rieff wants the reader to think that because archetypal images can be produced through a type of fantasy activity (Jung calls it active imagination) archetypes are then merely "forms of fantasy"⁸ in the sense of being a system of illusions.

What exactly is this "creative impulse" which Jung sets up as the highest activity of man? On first glance, one would think it is merely a new term for art; but actually Jung implies something much more general, public as well as private. What Jung means by fantasy is, in a word: illusion. . . . More than ever before, then, both the high culture and the individual sense of well-being depended, for their very existence, on erotic illusions. If old illusions no longer functioned satisfactorily, then they must be replaced by "something new." Jung dedicated his life to the production of something new in the way of saving illusions. . . .

Jung despised the fundamental "unspirituality" implied by Freud's suspicious treatment of the dynamics of the unconscious. Just there, in the unconscious, are those superior illusions that would compensate mankind for the barren interdicts of Christianity and the almost equally barren interdicts of psychoanalysis.⁹

Our second sample of misconceived criticism comes from Edward Glover, whose book Freud Or Jung is the fortunately as yet unsurpassed nadir of anti-Jungian literature. The following statements reveal that he fails to appreciate even so basic an idea as the importance of the unconscious in Jung's psychology. Glover is apparently unaware of the distinction Jung draws between collective consciousness and the collective unconscious and thus deduces the

absurdity that Jung is actually proposing a brand of conscious psychology.

Now in so far as Jung is convinced of the overwhelming importance of the Collective Unconscious (and it must be remembered that although he appears to be sincerely convinced of this, he also adduces considerations which if correct would reduce its importance to the level of purely conscious forces and factors) Indeed it is hard for any Freudian who takes the trouble to immerse his mind in Jungian psychology to avoid the horrid suspicion that Jung is nothing more or less than a pre-Freudian who having at first let himself be carried in the stream of Freudian thought has ever since striven to make his peace with conscious psychology.

But by thus dismissing from further discussion extant criticisms based on misunderstandings of what Jung's archetypal theory implies, we must not then also exclude certain systematically biased critiques. These criticisms are based not so much on a misunderstanding of what Jung says as on the failure to see how Jung's archetypes can be made comprehensible within the scope of a particular conceptual framework for understanding human experience.¹¹ Consequently these criticisms recur as a type or species of criticism which adherents of a given intellectual persuasion typically raise against Jung in regard to the archetypes. (The examples to be discussed below are from psychoanalysis and Judeo-Christian theology.)

What is at stake then in the consideration of such systematic critiques is the intelligibility of the archetypal hypothesis from the perspective of a given image of man. Criticism from such a point of view could readily be understood as having begged the questions at issue. However, this consideration is not a sufficient reason to disregard the criticisms discussed below. For in addition

to helping us understand the point of two common types of criticism, we must consider whether the phenomena for which the archetypes purport to provide an explanatory framework can not be accounted for in less cumbersome ways. Perhaps from the perspective of these other images of man, archetypes can be shown to be no longer necessary. At any rate, a discussion of such criticism will better enable us in gaining a critical viewpoint on Jung's image of man.¹²

Psychoanalytic Criticism

If we consider then the characteristic criticism of Freudians to the archetype concept, this is usually a claim to the effect that all unconscious contents can be accounted for in terms of an individual's personal history without the need for an hypothesis of a collective unconscious. According to this line of argument, the latter should then be eliminated in favor of a more parsimonious explanation couched in individual developmental terms. As a case in point Glover argues as follows:

. . . but at the very least we must examine the embryonic stages of individual development to see whether they could not account satisfactorily for those mental contents that led Jung to develop his theory of the collective or racial unconscious.¹³

. . . many Jungian archetypes are capable of adequate explanation in terms of purely individual thought but also that so long as we have not fully explored the early forms of individual thinking, the validity and universality of the collective archetype is under strong suspicion.¹⁴

A second representative instance of Freudian systematic criticism is taken from Nandor Fodor's Freud, Jung and Occultism. In the passage cited below he gives examples of dreams which from the Jungian point of view would provide good paradigm cases of archetypal images.

He concludes that these images can be adequately understood in terms of Freudian personal psychology without the need for a concept of a collective unconscious of archetypes.

The chief point of interest, however, is whether the concept of the Old Wise Man and the archetype of transformation make any novel contribution to the interpretation of the dream. They do not. Unconscious guidance and sublimation cover the situation just as well. The spiritual element is a beautiful unconscious fantasy. The Jungian contribution is only verbal--but it is stimulating and appeals to the imagination.¹⁵

Was then the Carpenter of his dream an archetype of the Self or just a personification of the integrating drive? It makes no difference whichever way you look at it.¹⁶

[Archetype of the] Shadow or neurosis. It makes no difference. The meaning is the same. The Jungian approach yields nothing that the Freudian does not imply.¹⁷

In considering the force of this type of objection, it is important to note that what is at issue is not the existence of the phenomena for which the archetypal theory is to provide an explanatory framework so much as how these phenomena are to be interpreted. The British psychoanalyst Anthony Storr admits for example that: "It is not difficult to prove the existence of an inner world of highly irrational images . . . ,"¹⁸ and "the existence of the mythological substratum to human experience is recognized by analysts of entirely different theoretical orientations, [i.e., different from Jung] though they would use another nomenclature."¹⁹

Although Fodor and Glover argue that Freud's psychology can account for the images alleged to be archetypal without need for any theoretical adjustment of basic Freudian theory, another school

of psychoanalytical thought has developed a concept of "internal objects" to account for the type of phenomena at issue. This neo-Freudian school is composed of followers of Melanie Klein. According to the Kleinian view then, the images which Jung would call archetypes are the result of a process of introjection in which items of experience in the child's immediate environment such as the mother's breast are internalized and become incorporated into the child's ego as internal objects.

In the passage cited below, we see an example of how this explanatory device of introjection of internal objects attempts to account for the allegedly archetypal images within the context of an essentially Freudian psychology which explains unconscious images in terms of individual development.

In reality parents and child possess limited power or goodness and badness, wisdom and foolishness. The child's phantasy makes gods and demons and all those unearthly creatures of them which folklore and mythology, religious legends and artistic creation present to us in sublimated, and the imagination of the insane in more unsublimated, form. Moreover, the child places his self-created figures inside his own body and treats them as live entities alien to himself and beyond his control."²⁰

The proper Jungian reply to this line of criticism will appeal to evidence that the images said to be archetypal have collective features which rule out an interpretation solely in terms of individual development. The reasoning in support of the collective nature of such features will consist of a demonstration of the correspondence of the images with symbols in the history of culture which are unknown to the individual previous to his experience of the images. Thus the spontaneous appearance of the same symbols in

cultures widely separated in space and time will be seen as necessitating a concept of the collective unconscious.

The soundness of such reasoning is naturally open to question in various ways. In the case of the individual who experiences allegedly archetypal images, how is the absence of previous cultural influence established, for example? Moreover, would not a theory of cultural diffusion better account for the appearance of the same symbols in different cultures?

However, the sort of systematic attack on the archetypal theory with which we are concerned here is not so much interested in directly impugning the evidence for a collective unconscious as it is to try to show how its own interpretative framework makes the allegedly archetypal phenomena intelligible without the need for a concept of a collective unconscious. We will then reserve an examination of the evidence given in support of the collective unconscious for a later chapter. For it is our task in the present section to indicate the manner in which the Freudians and Kleinians see the Jungian interpretation of the phenomena at issue as not merely false or unsupported by the evidence given but as violating basic assumptions they appear to hold about the nature of man.

The sort of assumption on which the tension between the Jungian and Freudian images of man seems to turn involves the issue of description of human experience in terms of "spiritual" predicates. As will perhaps be remembered from previous discussion (page 45), we were unable to grasp what Jung means by the spiritual until we had contrasted the spiritual and the instinctual. The spiritual was that which allows the energies of man to be employed in other than

instinctual activities. The emphasis of the Jungian image of man is thus on the existence of a source of creative symbolic activity which may manifest itself in artistic, religious and even scientific ways, but which can not be understood merely as an outgrowth of instinctuality interpreted in a narrow, physiological sense.

By contrast, what might be characterized as a Freudian image of man seeks to explain all aspects of human activity in terms of the development of the individual's instinctuality. Thus the attempt is made to give the so-called spiritual aspects of man a reductive biological interpretation. Since it is difficult to see how creative symbolic activity relates directly to the biological needs of the individual, from this perspective it is then easy to believe that the symbolic manifestations must be either infantile phenomena or delusions. Thus Storr states:

As will be perceived, I am putting forward suggestions as to possible myths which can be variously regarded either as paranoid delusions or as religious beliefs. . . . I think that Kleinians and Freudians would argue that religious beliefs are as unnecessary as delusions, provided a man has sufficiently rewarding interpersonal relationships.²¹

Psychoanalysts consider that the inner world and its images are infantile phenomena, admittedly powerful determinants of a man's idea of the external world, and therefore of his behavior, but actually a hindrance in adaptation to reality. The mythological level of the psyche is, in this view, a misconstruction which ought to be outgrown or overcome if a person is to be properly orientated toward people in an adult way, and toward the external world as it actually is.²²

This way of understanding as instinctual perversities that which from the Jungian perspective constitutes man's human-most potentialities for being seems to lead to an incomplete and nondescriptive image of the human situation. The suspicion that there has been an effort to

explain away a vitally important aspect of experience through a biological reductionism is reinforced by the often emotionally worded attacks on Jung. If the archetypes were really only infantile phenomena or delusions, then one wonders if they would elicit such emotional counterattacks. As a case in point (Glover states that ". . . he [Jung] proceeds to invest human ideas and images with an atmosphere politely described as mysticism, but which the less polite observer would call an atmosphere of religiosity."²³

With such differing ways of looking at the human condition as that represented in the writings of Freud and Jung, we can not attempt here to provide conclusive arguments in favor of Jung's views versus those of Freud. Such a task would carry us beyond the purpose of this study. In so far as what we say here about Jung and his theory of archetypes proves to be intelligible and to offer a genuine gain in understanding the human situation, this may perhaps count against a Freudian perspective if a comparison with Freud's ideas fails to provide an equally satisfactory explanation. But beyond what we have said about the archetypes, no effort will be made to conclusively validate the importance of a spiritual dimension to experience. Such a question can not be resolved only through argumentation but must be settled as the course of time proves the relative merits of the Freudian or Jungian images of man.²⁴

In any case, it seems evident that the claim that the archetypal theory must be rejected on grounds of parsimony can not be upheld. For although it is readily admitted that Jung's archetypal theory is a more cumbersome theoretical device than Freudian explanation in terms of individual development, in contrast to Freud, Jung's idea of

archetypes reflects the characteristic quality of the phenomena it seeks to explain. To charge Jung with violation of parsimony is thus beside the point until another theory can provide a simpler explanation while at the same time being able to adequately characterize the phenomena.

Jung's view has an obvious advantage over Freud in that in dispensing with the idea that dreams and other unconscious products are systematically distorted by the unconscious, Jung can have his theoretical explanations of the images in close agreement with the phenomenological content. The actual content of the images must then for Jung be taken seriously, not as mere disguises for sexuality.

A passage from Fodor serves to illustrate this point. He once had a dream involving a coal mine and under the influence of having read Jung attempted a Jungian type of explanation in terms of the archetype of transformation.²⁵ His interpretation along these lines proceeds in part:

Coal preeminently stands for transformation--of vegetable life (and imprisoned sunshine) into stone. Moreover, coal is something valuable; it is called black diamond, not quite without reason, as both coal and diamond are made of carbon. . . . Treasure is undoubtedly referred to and, if it is in the mine or if it is to be mined, it has been mined from the unconscious.²⁶

Then in an attempt to discount the importance of this interpretation he remarks: "It is interesting to note that, under the influence of Jung, I completely ignored the obvious uterine element in the coal mine" ²⁷ The interpretation of the coal mine as uterus does not have much phenomenological plausibility; that is, we fail to see on what grounds the interpretations of the coal mine as representing a uterus can be adequately defended. If a coal mine is a uterus, then

any enclosed space could on basis of this reasoning be a uterus and any elongated object a penis.

By comparison with the Freudian interpretation, the Kleinian theoretical model can take the phenomenology of the images successfully into account. However, its explanatory device of the introjection of internal objects lacks credibility. The internal objects thesis seems to be, moreover, a sort of ad hoc addition to the Freudian theory, an attempt to save at any cost the perspective of explanation in terms of individual development.

Perhaps someday a theory will succeed in accounting for what Jung calls archetypes without the necessity of a concept of collective unconscious and yet without explaining away the phenomena. However, there is no good reason to believe that the Freudian or Kleinian approach is in fact such an account.

Theological Criticism

The second type of systematic criticism we will discuss comes from the theological point of view. Rather than opposing the archetypal theory with an alternative psychological interpretation of events as was the case with the Freudian and Kleinian approaches, the theologians are concerned with the issue of psychologism. They object to Jung's theory of archetypes then since, in their understanding, Jung's theory attempts an illegitimate psychological reduction of the transcendental concerns of religion. In regard to the psychological interpretation of religious assertions, Father Josef Goldbrunner thus remarks that: "In the language of science this thinking of Jung's must be called psychologism, the levelling down

of supra-psychic realities to the level of purely psychic reality."²⁸

It is then not so much the theory of the archetype itself to which the theologians object, as it is Jung's use of the theory to understand and explain religious experience in a psychological way which attempts to be metaphysically neutral with respect to such issues as the existence of God.

The Jewish theologian Martin Buber voices this type of criticism of Jung. He feels that Jung's psychological treatment of God in terms of a God archetype has the effect of making God into an entity which has reality only within the psyche. Thus he accuses Jung of overstepping the legitimate scientific bounds of psychology and indulging in a type of psychologically based theology.

In short, although the new psychology protests that it is "no world-view but a science," it no longer contents itself with the role of an interpreter of religion. It proclaims the new religion, the only one which can still be true, the religion of pure psychic immanence.²⁹

Jung does not exercise such a restraint when he explains that God cannot exist independent of men. For, once again, if this is a statement about an archetype called God, then the emphatic assurance that it is a psychic factor is certainly unnecessary (What else could it be?) But if it is a statement about some extra-psychical Being which corresponds to this psychic factor, namely the statement that no such Being exists, then we have here, instead of the indicated restraint, an illicit overstepping of boundaries.³⁰

The validity of Buber's criticism must be evaluated in the face of what Jung has to say about God. Jung distinguishes God-as-he-is-experienced, the psychic God-image or God archetype, from a possible God entity transcending possible psychic experience to which the God-image could correspond. In terms of his scientific methodological

ideal of avoiding undecidable metaphysical claims, Jung's assertions about God are then to be restricted to psychological statements about the God-image.

Psychologically, however, God is the name for a complex of ideas grouped round a powerful feeling; the feeling-tone is what really gives the complex its characteristic efficacy . . . (Vol. V, p. 85).

The idea of God is an absolutely necessary psychological function of an irrational nature, which has nothing whatever to do with the question of God's existence. The human intellect can never answer this question, still less give any proof of God. Moreover such proof is superfluous, for the idea of an all-powerful divine Being is present everywhere, unconsciously if not consciously, because it is an archetype. There is in the psyche some superior power, and if it is not consciously a god, it is the "belly" at least, in St. Paul's words. . . . Our intellect has long known that we can form no proper idea of God, much less picture to ourselves in what manner he really exists, if at all. The existence of God is once and for all an unanswerable question (Vol. VII, p. 71).

What Jung says above about God seems relatively unproblematic. However, Jung frequently uses his God-image construct in ways which imply that it has the same meaning as the ordinary traditional religious usage of "God."

"Absolute" means "cut off," "detached." To assert that God is absolute amounts to placing him outside all connection with mankind. Man cannot affect him, or he man. Such a God would be of no consequence at all. . . . this urge to regard God as "absolute" derives solely from the fear that God might become "psychological." This would naturally be dangerous. An absolute God, on the other hand, does not concern us in the least, whereas a "psychological" God would be real (Vol. VII, p. 235, note 6).

Yet Jung is not agnostic and affirms his personal view that there is something to which the psychological God-image corresponds.

This is certainly not to say that what we call the unconscious is identical with God or is set up in his place. It is simply the medium from which religious experience seems to flow (Vol. X, p. 293).

For me "God" is on the one hand a mystery that cannot be unveiled

On the other hand "God" is a verbal image, a predicate or mythologem founded on archetypal premises . . . (Letters, Vol. II, pages 254-255, letter to Pastor Jakob Amstutz dated 23 May 1955).

From these different perspectives from which Jung talks about "God" we can begin to understand why his views attract theological criticism. For Jung believes that he can restrict himself to the "facts" of religious experience and that without committing himself to any metaphysical assertions arrive at certain valid empirical statements about God-as-he-is-experienced. But since these assertions will be based on a cross-cultural comparison of religious symbology, they may come into conflict with the dogma of a specific religion where the archetypally based religious experiences have undergone a prolonged period of interpretation.

Thus Jung says that the doctrine of the privatio boni and its implication: "Omne bonum a Deo, omne malus ab homine" is not supportable by existing archetypal evidence.

. . . I have felt compelled to contest the validity of the privatio boni so far as the empirical realm is concerned. . . .

Criticism can be applied only to psychic phenomena, i.e., to ideas and concepts, and not to metaphysical entities. These can only be confronted with other metaphysical entities. Hence my criticism is valid only within the empirical realm. . . . It seems to me, however, that the existing empirical material, at least so far as I am acquainted with it, permits of no definite conclusion as to the archetypal background of the privatio boni. Subject to

correction, I would say that clear-cut moral distinctions are the most recent acquisitions of civilized man (Vol. XI, pages 305-306).

For the most part, however, Jung feels that his empirical formulations leave the door open for at least theoretical compatibility with metaphysical religious statements based on faith. Since these metaphysical statements such as the assertion that a God exists who transcends the psyche are supported by faith rather than by experiences, they can not be either empirically validated or disproved. For even the numinous experience of the God archetype reveals only that a certain psychically conditioned factor exists.

Thus Jung's reply to theological criticism is that he is making empirical statements about the God archetype rather than uttering metaphysical truths. He is not talking theologically but scientifically.

You evidently did not know that epistemologically I take my stand on Kant, which means that an assertion doesn't posit its object. So when I say "God" I am speaking exclusively of assertions that don't posit their object. About God himself I have asserted nothing, because according to my premise nothing whatever can be asserted about God himself. All such assertions refer to the psychology of the God-image. Their validity is therefore never metaphysical but only psychological. All my assertions, reflections, discoveries, etc. have not the remotest connection with theology but are, as I have said, only statements about psychological facts (Letters, Vol. I, p. 294, letter to Josef Goldbrunner dated 8 February 1941).

In spite of all Jung's protests of innocence, the theologians have nonetheless good reason to be upset with Jung's archetypal treatment of religion. It is not that Jung has explained away religion by reducing it to psychology--his psychological treatment

maintains the authentic existence of numinous experience which transcends reference to the personal ego to an indeterminable extent. Rather the difficulty is that the Jungian image of man with its archetypal understanding of the spirit is in real conflict with a traditional religious viewpoint based on faith.

Thus although Jung is attempting to approach religious concerns from a strictly empirical point of view and is not advocating that his views be interpreted in a religious way, it is hard to avoid perceiving the manifest incompatibility with a traditional religious viewpoint. For if one holds Jung's theory of archetypes to be true, then traditional religious understanding can only claim to be a relative and limited interpretation.

In a letter Jung once admitted this point:

If the Christian truth is not supreme and solely valid, then it believes it has lost it raison d'être and, if I may express my humble opinion, it would have lost it. It would instantly have to turn into a sort of philosophical syncretism. I think that this is a most serious point (Letters, Vol. I, pages 269-270, letter to W.E. Hocking dated 5 May 1939).

Jung's claim then is that all experience which could count as supporting a religious understanding, since it must be a psychic experience, falls within the domain of his theory. The religious interpretation of this experience is thus always open to question and to possible psychological critique.

. . . I approach these problems in a way that has often been charged with "psychologism." If "psychology" were meant, I should indeed be flattered, for my aim as a psychologist is to dismiss without mercy the metaphysical claims of all esoteric teachings. . . . Let the convinced Christian believe, by all means, for that is the duty he has taken upon himself; but whoever is not a

Christian has forfeited the charisma of faith. (Perhaps he was cursed from birth with not being able to believe, but merely to know.) . . . One cannot grasp anything metaphysically, one can only do so psychologically. Therefore I strip things of their metaphysical wrappings in order to make them objects of psychology (Vol. XIII, p. 49).

The fact that I am content with what can be experienced psychically, and reject the metaphysical, does not amount, as any intelligent person can see, to a gesture of scepticism or agnosticism aimed at faith and trust in higher powers, but means approximately the same as what Kant meant when he called the thing-in-itself a "merely negative borderline concept." Every statement about the transcendental is to be avoided because it is only a laughable presumption on the part of a human mind unconscious of its limitations. Therefore, when God or the Tao is named an impulse of the soul, or a psychic state, something has been said about the knowable only, but nothing about the unknowable, about which nothing can be determined (Vol. XIII, p. 54).

Such a position, although technically leaving open a loophole for religious faith, has the practical effect of destroying any ground for belief in the extrapsychological truth of such faith, i.e., a truth that would be more than just valid relative to a particular psychology. Unless one is motivated by an arbitrary will to believe, the choice of one religious interpretation of archetypal experience over another or over an atheistic interpretation must be on the basis of pragmatic reasoning, i.e., one finds it helpful and congenial to one's personality.

Moreover, there is some real question to what extent Jung is successful in maintaining his discourse about religious concerns on a solely empirical psychological level. The appropriation of the emotionally loaded word "God" to mean the psychological God-image opens him up to the criticism that he is indulging in theological

discourse. In his Jung, Gods, and Modern Man, Moreno complains then that "Jung, the philosopher-psychologist, interprets man's ideas of God within the framework of his own ideas of God."³¹ Works such as Answer to Job leave the impression that what is being expressed is more a personal religious testament than an objective psychological discussion.

The claim that Jung's theory of archetypes constitutes a psychologicistic treatment of religion is then justified in the sense that his theory offers a psychological framework for understanding with which a traditional religious framework can be made compatible only by assuming the subservient role of an undecidable metaphysical interpretation based on the archetypal "facts."

The question remains, however, to what extent this "psychologism" is the basis for a valid criticism of the archetypal theory. For the fact that psychologism can be established does not necessarily mean that something is wrong with the theory. It would seem clear that psychologism is an objection only to a misuse or misapplication of the archetypal theory rather than to the theory itself. If, for example, the claim is made that the psychological perspective is the only valid way to understand a religious, philosophical or aesthetic work or event, then there exists the manifest possibility of an illegitimate reductionism. Freud's psychologicistic understanding of religion and art in terms of sublimation of sexuality seems an example of this pernicious "nothing but"³² psychologicistic application of a theory.

But surely there is a legitimate psychological element in religion, art and philosophy which can be discussed without the implication that these disciplines are nothing but confused psychology.

Jung's application of the archetypal theory beyond psychology to these other areas is for the most part sensitive to this problem. But of course examples can be found where Jung is guilty of failing to appreciate a work in its own terms because of his awareness of the psychological element. He seems to arbitrarily dismiss the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger in this manner:

. . . Hegel, who in my very incompetent opinion is not even a proper philosopher but a misfired psychologist. His impossible language, which he shares with his blood-brother Heidegger, denotes that his philosophy is a highly rationalized and lavishly decorated confession of his unconscious (Letters, Vol. I, p. 501, letter to Joseph F. Rychlak dated 27 April 1959).

Moreover, it can be readily seen how it is Jung's Kantian strategy which brings him into direct conflict with the theologians. Jung will give a psychological treatment of the phenomena and leave the theologians and metaphysicians with the impossible task of talking about noumena. But we need not follow Jung on this point; the archetypal theory can be made intelligible without the need for a Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. In this way much of the theological criticism loses its force. For there is no longer the necessity for the misleading emphasis on the merely phenomenal nature of the God-image we experience.³³

But on the other hand, with the abandonment of this Kantian distinction, the question about the locus of the archetypes reappears. Are archetypes only psychic entities or is the psyche merely one place in which they manifest themselves.³⁴

Our argument for an understanding of the archetypal theory in terms of the former alternative, which we have construed as a naturalistic interpretation, can now be shown to have the advantage of

helping to separate the scientific aims of such a theory from unnecessary metaphysical and theological complications. For Jung was perhaps misguided in believing that Kant's doctrines would preserve the scientific character of his theory and prevent metaphysical and theological discourse in its name. It is not clear that Kant succeeded in preventing the claims of science and religion from becoming competing systems of explanation, and, in any case, Jung in fact fails to strictly adhere to Kant and sometimes indulges in discourse which is of dubious scientific justification (Answer to Job). Nonetheless, it is in the spirit of Jung's theory to try to interpret it in such a way that the scientific import of the theory is not hopelessly implicated with nonscientific discourse.

1 An example of a nonnaturalistic account not involving supernatural agencies could be drawn from the work of Carlos Castaneda. In Journey to Ixtlan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), for example, he purports to describe entities called allies which have intentionality and which "reside" in natural locations such as springs. Such an entity, if it existed, would not be a supernatural agency since it is partly on the basis of such entities that the workings of nature are described and understood, according to the world view of sorcery which Castaneda describes. On the other hand, trying to interpret the archetypes as allies would not be a naturalistic interpretation either since it involves appeal to a radically nonstandard understanding of natural processes. Our usage of the term "naturalistic" then involves at least prima facie compatibility with standard (i.e., scientifically enlightened, common sense) understandings of nature.

2 As the interpretation of Jung's archetypes as supernatural agencies is not attributed to any particular author in the following, it should be mentioned that this line of interpretation of Jung is one which is very popular with university students and others who are eager to embrace doctrines which from their point of view represent sensationalistic alternatives to a scientific world view.

3 Jung's social and political views have been the subject of widespread misunderstanding due in no small measure to Jung's notorious ineptness in public affairs. In order not to add to such

misunderstandings, it should be made clear that in no sense does Jung's life or work offer any evidence that he was a bigot or advocated racial supremacy. Our critical statements on this matter are intended merely to argue that in fact the concept of the collective unconscious is not relevant to arguments concerning racial differences. For an unbiased account of Jung's social-political views and his unfortunate adventures in public affairs see Aniela Jaffe's From the Life and Work of C.G. Jung (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

4 A comparison of discussion of the concept of the archetype in Aniela Jaffe's book The Myth of Meaning (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), Jolande Jacobi's The Psychology of C.G. Jung (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), and Michael Fordham's The Objective Psyche (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) offer what at first sight seem to be incompatible accounts. Fordham looks at the archetypes from a scientific perspective, while Jaffe emphasizes the role of archetypes in mediating authentic religious, mystic and paranormal experiences. Jacobi, on the other hand, by literalizing Jung's often metaphorical language through the use of simplistic and misleading diagrams, creates her own unique account of what is involved in Jung's model of the psyche.

However, this is not to say that these books grossly misrepresent Jung's views. Together with a reading of the Collected Works, they help in gaining a fuller appreciation of the many facets of Jung's ideas. But individuals who each read one of these books without reading Jung in the original would in all probability end up with widely differing ideas of what Jung means by the archetypes. An interesting passage from the Letters, although not mentioning names, must be quoted as relevant here: "There have been so many pupils of mine who have fabricated every sort of rubbish from what they took over from me" (Letters, Vol. I, p. 518, letter to Jurg Fierz dated 13 January 1949).

5 Jung's analytical inclinations and abilities at times fail to keep pace with the flood of insights and ideas from the unconscious. His expositions frequently become so involved with lengthy examples and parenthetical elaborations that the main thread of discussion is lost. Vol. V of the Collected Works, Symbols of Transformation, is a good example of this overdetermination of content at the expense of form.

"Overdetermination" is a word introduced by Freud to mean the fusing together of different elements in the unconscious to produce single images with compound meanings. See Jung, Vol. III, pages 62-63.

6 We do not mean to imply here that the secondary work should be ignored in an effort to understand Jung. In the course of exposition of Jung's work, instructive and thought-provoking errors are sometimes made. A case in point occurs in Moreno's Jung, Gods and Modern Man (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970) where in the course of a discussion of the relationship between

archetypes and myths he reaches the following conclusion: In spite of Jung's explanation, the relation of myth and archetypes is not yet clear. It is the myth which forms the archetype, and at the same time, it is the archetype which produces mythical ideas. Is it a vicious cycle? Not likely, because for Jung, the subjective fantasies of myths are the causes of archetypes. [Italics mine.] But once the archetype is formed, it is endowed with a kind of readiness to arouse the same mythical ideas which were the cause of its formation, a familiar psychological process. Habits and dispositions are formed in the same way; repetition of acts forms the habit, but once the habit exists it is inclined to produce the very acts that were the cause of its existence (Moreno, p. 19).

By thus clearly spelling out one possible interpretation of what Jung intends as the relationship between archetype and myth, we are directed to its implausibility as an account of Jung's view in regard to its consistency with his writings on the subject as a whole.

7 Gerhard Adler, letter to the editor, Horizon, 19 (1949), p. 454.

8 See Philip Rieff, Triumph of the Therapeutic (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 41, where this terminology is used.

9 Philip Rieff, "C.G. Jung's Confession: Psychology as a Language of Faith," Encounter, 22 (1964), p. 49.

10 Edward Glover, "Freud or Jung," Horizon, 18 (1948), p. 243.

11 As might be expected, what we have called criticisms based on misunderstanding could also conceivably be fitted into this second category of systematically biased critiques. Although it is not clear what ideological motives Rieff may have, Glover is obviously a Freudian defending the faith. But as many of Glover's criticisms can not be understood solely in terms of a Freudian interpretation of the psychological phenomena, they have no value for determining whether an alternative hypothesis can account for the objects of Jungian theoretical interest. Thus some but not all of Glover's objections to Jung's ideas can be relegated to the first category.

But it should be made clear that our categorization of criticisms is not intended to be a definitive guide for identifying incompetent critiques. It is rather intended as an explanation of why some extant criticisms are discussed and others passed over in silence.

12 One could conceivably criticize Jung's archetypal hypothesis from other standpoints than those mentioned here. One could well image a behaviorist critique, for example. However, an examination of such a critique would not shed much light on archetypal theory.

A more fruitful discussion would be one drawn from the standpoint of an existentialist critique. Although the phenomenologists and existentialists do not for the most part address themselves to Jung's concept of the collective unconscious, it might well be thought that their attempt to frame their ideas without appeal to a concept of an unconscious would constitute a strong implicit repudiation of Jung's viewpoint. But such thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Medard Boss, although they claim to describe human experience without the need for an unconscious, have in actuality smuggled it back into their views with functionally equivalent concepts. For example, in Heidegger's work the concepts of "horizon" plus "thrownness" seem to be functionally equivalent to what Jung means by the unconscious.

13 Edward Glover, Freud or Jung (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1950), p. 35.

14 Ibid., p. 38.

15 Nandor Fodor, Freud, Jung, and Occultism (New York: University Books, 1971), p. 177.

16 Ibid., p. 180.

17 Ibid., p. 182.

18 Anthony Storr, C.G. Jung (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), p. 38.

19 Ibid., p. 37.

20 Paula Heimann, "Some Notes on the Psycho-analytic Concept of Introjected Objects," British Journal of Medical Psychology, 22 (1949), p. 14.

21 Storr, p. 39.

22 Ibid., p. 68.

23 Glover, "Freud or Jung, Applied Jungian Psychology," Horizon 19 (1949), 225.

24 To avoid misunderstanding it must be made clear that in saying that the question of the value of a spiritual dimension to experience can not be resolved only through argumentation, the point being made is not that the importance of such a dimension cannot be argued for at all, but that the final justification of an image of man based upon the belief in the value of such a dimension will be how well it enables us to understand and effectively deal with the human situation in the long run. In comparing the relative merits of Freudian and Jungian images of man then, we do not at this time in history have sufficient perspective on what sort of consequences follow from these ways of looking at man in order to be able to state that the worth of one view has proved to be clearly superior to that of the other.

25 " . . . archetypes of transformation. They are not personalities, but are typical situations, places, ways and means, that symbolize the kind of transformation in question" (Vol. IX-A, p. 38).

26 Fodor, p. 176.

27 Ibid., p. 177.

28 Josef Goldbrunner, Individuation (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 172.

29 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pages 83-84.

30 Ibid., pages 135-136.

31 Moreno, p. 111.

32 The editors of Jung's Letters, Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffe, give the following explanation of this commonly used expression of Jung's:

A term frequently used by Jung to denote the common habit of explaining something unknown by reducing it to something apparently known and thereby devaluing it. It is borrowed from William James, Pragmatism (1907), p. 16: "that is higher is explained by what is lower and treated for ever as a case of 'nothing but'--nothing but something else of a quite inferior sort" (Letters, Vol. I, p. 142, note 1).

33 From the Kantian point of view, it might be objected that a Kantian interpretation of the archetypes is still possible even if we do not identify the archetype per se with the thing-in-itself. For it is possible to think of both the archetypal image and the archetype per se as part of the phenomenal realm and as distinct from the noumenal archetypal referent. In keeping with the intent of Jung's line of reasoning on this matter, we could then state that what is said about the God archetype does not necessarily implicate us with claims about God as noumena.

34 Compare James Hillman's "Why Archetypal Psychology," Spring (1970), p. 216, where he opts for the latter alternative.

CHAPTER 5
JUNG AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART I

The Relevance of the Question

In the previous chapter in the course of considering various types of criticism of Jung's idea of archetypes, we discussed the problem of psychologism: the claim that Jung was illegitimately reducing religion and metaphysics to psychology. In the present chapter we must consider the opposite problem: the claim that Jung is making psychology into religion and metaphysics. From this fact that Jung is attacked both from the theological and metaphysical perspective as well as from the scientific point of view, one might be tempted to conclude that Jung has hopelessly confused the traditional distinctions between these areas of inquiry and produced a type of discipline which fails to be either good philosophy, religion, or good science.

But as we have urged in the previous chapter that Jung's theory should not be implicated with theological and metaphysical claims, so in the present and subsequent chapters we must consider the scientific status of the archetypes. This question is the most crucial one for our naturalistic reconstruction of the archetypal theory. For if we are to establish successfully that there is a continuity between ordinary natural phenomena and the phenomena of archetypes, then we must show how the archetype construct can be compatible in

principle with a scientific understanding. If on the other hand, it can be shown that Jung appeals to a framework of understanding of a radically different nature with different principles of explanation from what constitutes at least a minimally acceptable scientific standard, then in light of the scientific claims Jung makes for his archetypes,¹ we would have to conclude that the idea of archetypes is not only nonscientific but perniciously pseudoscientific, deceptively claiming the authority of scientific method.

But we do not mean to imply that for any of Jung's ideas to be meaningful, they must be shown to be genuinely scientific. Certainly such works as Answer to Job are meaningful and insightful though most probably not science. Jung was too complete an individual to have been only a scientist, and his writings often reflect his extrascientific views and interests. But the fact that Jung at times exceeds the legitimate boundaries of scientific inquiry as in Job is all the more reason to assess the scientific status of the archetype. For the many facets of Jung's personality--philosopher, therapist, "speculating heretic" (Vol. XI, p. 307), scientist--invite the unsympathetic and shortsighted critic to dismiss Jung's views *carte blanche* as hopelessly unscientific or "mystic." And since we understand our task in this study to be, at least in part, an attempt to show why the archetypes merit serious scientific study and consideration, we must then address ourselves to the questions centering around the putative scientific status of archetypes.

The Charge of Mysticism

The first problem to be tackled in treating the various questions related to the scientific validity of archetypes is the issue of

mysticism. For if Jung's views are mystical then certainly they can not be scientific. To simply dismiss Jung's writings as mystical is, of course, an extremely unfair and prejudicial attitude to take toward his work. However, the uncertain relationship between mysticism and Jung's views gives the critic a chance to impugn Jung's ideas by intimating that they constitute a mystical rather than a scientific body of statements. Thus in an article entitled "The Mystical and Scientific Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Theories of Freud, Adler and Jung," Edward Burchard states:

But it is only in Jung [in contrast to Freud and Adler] that we find a conscious and deliberate repudiation of rationality and empirical science and a lush proliferation of concepts which are indistinguishable in form and intention from those of Christian and Oriental religious mystics.²

Though not actually using the pejorative label "mysticism," Rieff criticizes Jung in a similar vein stating that Jung's views are based on revelation rather than scientific method.

There is no arguing with revelation. Jung's was a personal language of faith, revelatory, and therefore beyond danger of being invalidated by argument or contrary experience. . . .

Against the democracy of the scientific intellect, he represents the aristocracy of emotional profundity.³

Because it offers no criteria of validity, other than the therapeutic experience of conviction, Jungian theory amounts at once to a private religion and an anti-science.⁴

It would seem that in relation to the question of mysticism, there exists a confusion of various issues. For it is unclear exactly what the charge of mysticism amounts to or what the word "mysticism" is supposed to signify other than "unscientific."⁵ Moreover, the accusation that Jung is a mystic would seem to be the most polemical and

extreme form of criticism of various sorts that Jung is unscientific. But whereas some critics such as Rieff refrain from using the loaded word "mysticism," the substance of their criticism seems to amount to the similar claim to that of calling Jung a mystic in that they allege that Jung is involved in paradigmatically unscientific endeavors. The mildly worded statement below by Friedman and Goldstein seems to be of this nature:

Jungian psychology, with its emphasis on the archaic and its tendency to passive preoccupation with symbolic content, stands in strong contrast to the rationalism and determinism characteristic of Western thought in general and modern science in particular.

In order to untangle the confusion of issues centering around the allegedly unscientific nature of Jung's work then, we will employ the strategy of considering various plausible reasons which, in light of a knowledge of Jung's work, would lead one to question its genuine scientific status. Rather than further discussing extant criticisms then, we will proceed with a consideration of scientifically problematic aspects of Jung's work.⁷

Mysticism Characterized

W.T. Stace in his Mysticism and Philosophy argues that genuinely mystical experience can be divided into two basic types. A so-called extroverted mystical experience is to be distinguished from an introverted one. In the extroverted experience there is a ". . . unifying vision, expressed abstractly by the formula 'All is One.' The One is . . . perceived through . . . the multiplicity of objects."⁸ Thus the extroverted mystic perceives a oneness of all things which is distinguishable from the individual things themselves. The introverted

mystic on the other hand experiences a oneness in a consciousness otherwise devoid of all ideational content. "The Unitary Consciousness, from which all the multiplicity of sensuous or conceptual or other empirical content has been excluded, so that there remains only a void and empty unity."⁹

In addition to the experience of oneness, Stace lists other characteristics shared by both types of mysticism: "Sense of objectivity or reality; feeling of blessedness, joy, happiness, satisfaction, etc.; feeling that what is apprehended is holy, or sacred or divine; paradoxicality; alleged by mystics to be ineffable" ¹⁰

Is Jung a Mystic?

Now if we characterize someone as a mystic, we could mean that this person adheres to mystical beliefs. However, it would seem that a plausible case could be made for the claim that a true mystic must come by his mysticism first hand, i.e., that he must be a person who has himself had mystical experience. But as in any case we will consider later the influence of mystical writings on Jung's views, we must pause here to consider whether there is any evidence that Jung had personal mystical experiences.

In this regard we discover that although Jung in his autobiography reports several instances of paranormal psychic experiences and in one case an out-of-body experience, plus many visions and instances of hearing voices or conversing with spirits,¹¹ there do not seem to have been any genuine cases of mystical experience. Moreover, in deciding about the nature of Jung's altered states of consciousness, it is important to note that the visions and voices which

Jung describes do not qualify as genuine mystical states. Stace points out that visions and voices are not really mystical phenomena.

Not only is this the opinion of most competent scholars, but it has also been the opinion which the great mystics themselves have generally held.¹²

The main point is that the most typical as well as the most important type of mystical experience is nonsensuous, whereas visions and voices have the character of sensuous imagery. The introvertive kind of mystical states are, according to all the accounts we have of them, entirely devoid of all imagery.¹³

On the basis of the negative evidence then, we might feel justified in concluding that Jung had no genuine mystical experiences. For in view of the disclosure of the types of unusual experiences which Jung does reveal in his autobiography, it would be reasonable to expect a description of a mystical state had there been one to report.

Moreover, at least in regard to the introverted mystical state, there is also the fact that Jung argues against its possibility, i.e., in terms of the first characteristic, he says the experience of a oneness in a consciousness devoid of all thought, imagery and sensation is impossible.

"As long as *Sunyata*¹⁴ is cognized by a subject it remains object." But when the subject enters *Sunyata* and becomes identical with it, the subject itself is *Sunyata*, namely void. And when the void is really void, there is not even a cognizing subject in it. The subject has vanished and there cannot be a consciousness of this fact, because there is nothing left any more. There can also be no memory of it, because there was nothing. . . .

I want to know what there is to be known, but I don't want to make assumptions about things of which I know that one cannot know them. Thus it is absolutely impossible to know what I would experience when that "I" which could experience didn't exist any more. One calls this a contradictio in adjecto. To

experience Sunyata is therefore an impossible experience by definition, as I explained above, and it is also impossible to experience consciousness in a field of which I know nothing (Letters, Vol. I, p. 263, letter to W.Y. Evans-Wentz dated 9 February 1939).

It would seem that Jung's comment that the introvert mystical experience is "impossible by definition" needs qualification. For although we can argue with the mystic about the meaning of his experience and how it should be construed, we are less open to question that he had an experience. Thus Jung is opposed to one of the ways in which mystics most commonly characterize their experience, the characterization of it as a oneness in a consciousness devoid of all multiplicity. For in terms of Jung's own framework of understanding, what happens in the mystical experience is that there is a lowering of the threshold of consciousness which allows an experience of the unconscious.

It is psychologically correct to say that "At-onement" is attained by withdrawal from the world of consciousness. In the stratosphere of the unconscious there are no more thunderstorms, because nothing is differentiated enough to produce tensions and conflicts (Vol. XI, pages 498-499).

Now if consciousness is emptied as far as possible of its contents, they will fall into a state of unconsciousness, at least for the time being. In Zen, this displacement usually results from the energy being withdrawn from conscious contents and transferred either to the conception of "emptiness" or to the Koan. As both of these must be static, the succession of images is abolished and with it the energy which maintains the kinetics of consciousness. The energy thus saved goes over to the unconscious and reinforces its natural charge to bursting point (Vol. XI, p. 551).

Since Jung understands the mystical experience as analogous to other more familiar types of experience of the unconscious (e.g.

dreams or visions), he then wants to say that the feeling that the bounds of the ego have been dissolved and that the experient has become merged with the oneness he experiences can not be what it seems to be. For since all experience of the unconscious is possible only through its relation to the ego, the mystical experience must also involve the ego.¹⁵

If the Indians would call sublime psychic experience "psyche" or something equivalent to it, I would agree with them, but to call it consciousness cannot be substantiated by any evidence. If the highest psychic condition is Sunyata, then it cannot be consciousness, because consciousness is by definition the relation between the subject and a representation. One is conscious of something. As long as you are conscious of Sunyata it is not Sunyata, because there is still a subject that is conscious of something (Letters, Vol. I, pages 249-250, letter to W.Y. Evans-Wentz dated 8 December 1938).

As Jung understands the mystical experience then, it involves only a relativizing of the ego perspective of consciousness rather than a complete elimination of it.

In addition, Jung's standpoint also amounts to a denial of the mystic's claim that his experience is of something outside himself, that it is of something objectively real. It is not a direct experience of the essence of reality that the mystic enjoys but only an insight into the unknown depths of himself. Of course from the psychological point of view, Jung is trying to restrict himself to the phenomena and avoid metaphysical assertions. However, the force of Jung's objections to the mystic's way of construing his experience as seen in the above quotations seems to be the argument that the psychological interpretation of mysticism in terms analogous to other more common experiences of the unconscious is at least consistent with

psychological common sense, whereas the mystic's characterization of it is not.

We can conclude then that not only is Jung not a mystic by virtue of personal experience but that, in addition, his treatment of mystical experience is a psychologistic one expressed in terms which conflict with the mystic's own way of construing the experience. It might then seem difficult to understand Jung's mystic reputation except on the basis of an unjustified prejudice. The fact is, however, that although Jung disputes some of the claims the mystic makes for his experience on psychological grounds, he nonetheless considers the mystic experience as having considerable value and significance.

This is not really surprising since Jung understands mysticism as an experience of the unconscious. Consequently the value of the mystical experience is due to the positive effects of the expansion of consciousness which a direct insight into the unconscious makes possible. The experience affords an opportunity to realize the limitations of the perspective of ego consciousness and thus helps to bring about the process of individuation, the goal of which is an integration of the conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality.

The occurrence of satori¹⁶ is interpreted and formulated as a break-through, by a consciousness limited by the ego-form, into the non-ego-like self (Vol. XI, p. 543).

So far as Western mysticism is concerned, its texts are full of instructions as to how man can and must release himself from the "I-ness" of his consciousness, so that through knowledge of his own nature he may rise above it and attain the inner (godlike) man (Vol. XI, p. 545).

Satori corresponds in the Christian sphere to an experience of religious transformation (Vol. XI, p. 547).

In relation to the question of the charge that Jung is a mystic then, although we can ascertain with reasonable certainty that Jung had no personal mystic experiences and outline the essential differences between his way of interpreting the experience versus the mystic framework of understanding, there is still some ambiguity about whether Jung ascribed to any mystical beliefs. For despite the differences between the way in which mystical experience was characterized and what Jung says about the experience of the archetypes, there is nonetheless some degree of overlap. For example, what we have said about the numinosity of archetypal experience (Chapter 2) agrees well with the mystic characteristic of "feeling that what is apprehended is holy, or sacred or divine."

Concerning the mystical quality of "alleged ineffability," it is difficult to make comparisons. For it is not clear what sense it makes to talk about degrees or kinds of ineffability. In any case, the mystical ineffability is related to the quality of paradoxicality in that paradoxical descriptions which violate basic laws of logic seem appropriate for its description. This way of talking about the mystic experience is then another way of stating the inability of language and logic to adequately express the inexpressible.

The language which he finds himself compelled to use is, when at its best, the literal truth about his experience, but it is contradictory. This is the root of his feeling of embarrassment with language.'

But even though Jung does not follow the mystic in an explicit appeal to the transcendental domain of the ineffable, it might well

be argued that there is, nonetheless, some similarity between the description of a mystical experience as ineffable and the ascription of numinosity to characterize archetypal experience. The point needs to be made, then, that although presumably all allegedly ineffable experience would be numinous, i.e., charged with a great deal of emotional energy, Jung does not claim the numinous experience of archetypes is ineffable. In this regard we need to examine what Jung says about the paradoxical and also consider to what degree the indeterminate nature of symbols, i.e., the fact that they refer beyond themselves to an indeterminable extent, constitutes a kind of ineffability. (See the section entitled *Can There Be a Science of Archetypes?*) But we will have occasion to examine these questions in a later section. For the present, it is sufficient to remark that there is a certain family resemblance between mysticism in the strict sense and some of the things Jung says about the archetypes. However, there seems to be no point in talking in terms of a weak or loose definition of mysticism, for the claim that Jung is quasi-mystical must, in any case, be examined on the basis of the individual reasons for such a contention and to the understanding of the several relevant questions involved, the quasi-mystical label contributes nothing. Moreover, since Jung does not understand the archetypes from a mystical point of view but rather understands mysticism in terms of the collective unconscious, the remaining crucial question to be resolved is thus not whether Jung is a mystic in any marginal sense, but whether what he is doing with the archetypal theory is paradigmatically unscientific, i.e., opposed in principle to the scientific attitude.

Jung's Attitude Toward Science

Introduction

Postponing for the present the questions relating to rationality which we left unresolved in the last section, we turn now to the issue of Jung's attitude toward science. The relevant issue in this regard is the extent to which Jung's empiricism is nonscientific in attitude, that is, the degree to which Jung holds views incompatible with an attitude necessary for science.

The objection could well be raised at this point that this question is an ad hominem type of consideration. For regardless of what beliefs an investigator holds concerning the nature of the scientific endeavor, the issue of whether his theories constitute good science must in any case be resolved in terms of what the theories can do in relation to acceptable scientific standards.

In Jung's particular case, however, there are good reasons for looking into the question of his scientific attitudes and beliefs. (The problem of acceptable scientific standards is the subject of a future chapter.) One reason is that we need to understand the relationship Jung sees between the idea of archetypes and the domain of science. Is archetypology, the systematic study of archetypes, to be understood as one branch of science, or is science merely one manifestation of archetypes?¹⁸ In the latter case, the question of validity of archetypal theory could not be decided solely in terms of scientific validity. We need then to understand how Jung interprets science in relation to his archetypes.

A second reason for investigating Jung's scientific attitudes is to get clear about the empiricistic claims he makes for his theory.

In other words, on what grounds does Jung claim that the study of archetypes is scientific. This question is particularly crucial in view of the fact that the demarcation between Jung's allegedly scientific statements and his extrascientific statements is at times very difficult to make. It is, of course, a separate question whether Jung does what he claims to be doing, but it is nonetheless relevant to the question of scientific validity to see whether what he says he is trying to do with the archetypes will in principle qualify as scientific. (This question will be examined in the section on methodology.)

Archetypology as Mythos¹⁹

In regard to the question of how Jung sees the archetypes in relation to science as a whole, it may well seem that we have posed an artificial question in asking whether the study of archetypes is to be considered as a branch of science rather than science being subsumed under archetypology. And to a certain extent this question does pose a false dichotomy. For Jung both defends the scientific nature of the archetype, its compatibility with a contemporary scientific understanding, while also stating that science is one modern instance of the attempt to integrate the essentially mythological archetypes into acceptable cultural forms.

Psychology, as one of the many expressions of psychic life, operates with ideas which in their turn are derived from archetypal structures and thus generate a somewhat more abstract kind of myth. Psychology therefore translates the archaic speech of myth into a modern mythologem--not yet, of course, recognized as such--which constitutes one element of the myth "science" (Vol. IX-A, p. 179).

Edward Edinger expresses this same point in a succinct manner:

Of course, to function properly, the mythological container must be acceptable to the conscious personality, including the critical intellect. . . . Jung considers his own psychological theories as an attempt to provide a new mythology or vessel for the archetypes which will be acceptable to the modern scientific mind.²¹

But the understanding of science as a modern enactment of a myth is a speculative rather than a scientific statement. This attitude toward the logos is, then, necessarily part of the mythos. And thus we can see why expressing mythos and logos as an either/or is misleading (the study of archetypes as science versus science as a type of archetypal phenomenon). For of course the logos must not attempt to usurp the function of the mythos, whereas the mythos while always assuming a broader perspective than the logos must not confuse itself with the logos.

However, the point of framing the question about archetypology versus science is that the confusion of the mythological with the scientific is just the sort of problem that Jung is confronted with and just the sort of error he is accused of making. For Jung purports to study scientifically about myths and to do so phenomenologically, i.e., taking into account the phenomena in their totality. And in this regard there always exists the temptation and the danger of losing the critical point of view about archetypes and instead proclaiming a new metaphysical doctrine of truth. To avoid this problem and thus to succeed in keeping the scientific statements about archetypes distinct from metaphysical interpretations of archetypal events, Jung clings to the ideal of empiricism.²²

This is not to say that Jung is uninterested in possible metaphysical implications of archetypes. Naturally he has his personal

metaphysical views and from the clinical point of view, he encourages the individual to develop a functional philosophy of life based in part on the individual's experience of the archetypes. But Jung attempts to distinguish the scientific level of discourse about archetypes from the level of personal metaphysical interpretation. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that Jung always succeeds in sharply distinguishing these levels of discourse--all too often he takes the distinction for granted, thus leading to many confusions--the point to be made is that Jung sees the distinction as a necessary one if there is to be a science rather than just a philosophy or metaphysics of archetypes.

When Jung says as above that psychology is part of the modern myth, this is then a statement on the personal level of discourse, i.e., part of how Jung the individual understands the metaphysical significance of archetypes. But the fact that Jung is motivated to value scientific endeavor from the point of view of his personal metaphysical perspective should not lead us to conclude that Jung is merely paying lip service to science or attempting to pawn off his ideas by coating them with a scientific veneer. For in working with an ideal of empiricism, he is attempting to gain a critical knowledge of the archetypes, one which can withstand the rigorous demands of scientific knowledge.²³

Science and the Individual

Thus Jung understands his work in part as an attempt to gain a scientific understanding of archetypes. But even though Jung sees himself as a scientist, this is not to say that in aspiring to empiricism Jung views science as the only valid path to knowledge or

truth. For Jung's aim is always to provide a legitimate scientific treatment of the irrational phenomena of the unconscious while at the same time maintaining a position as metaphysically neutral as possible which will allow the metaphysical and the mythological their own domain of validity. As we saw in Chapter 4, Jung as a matter of fact is unable to carry completely through this essentially Kantian program and at times gets involved in psychologistic reasoning incompatible with the claims of religion and metaphysics. But, although in this regard, Jung's attempt to rely upon a phenomena/noumena distinction is open to criticism, it seems nonetheless clear that what Jung is striving for is a separation of scientific and metaphysical-religious types of discourse about archetypes as far as this is possible.

This separation, moreover, does not entail for Jung the supremacy of either type of discourse but only its validity within the limits of its own sphere of application. Thus we find some cases where Jung defends the practical and therapeutic value of a metaphysical-religious outlook against an attempt to eliminate it entirely in favor of a world view dominated by the findings of science and other places where Jung defends the necessity of a metaphysically neutral approach for science.

No science will ever replace myth, and a myth cannot be made out of any science. For it is not that "God" is a myth, but that myth is the revelation of a divine life in man. It is not we who invent myth, rather it speaks to us as a Word of God (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 340).

There is, however, a strong empirical reason why we should cultivate thoughts that can never be proved. It is that they are known to be useful. Man positively needs general ideas and convictions

that will give meaning to his life and enable him to find a place for himself in the universe (Man and His Symbols, p. 76).

My subjective attitude is that I hold every religious position in high esteem but draw an inexorable dividing line between the content of belief and the requirements of science (Letters, Vol. I, p. 125, letter to Paul Maag dated 12 June 1933).

As a scientist I have to guard against believing that I am in possession of a final truth (Letters, Vol. I, p. 346, letter to H. Irmingier dated 22 September 1944).

As our exposition of Jung's views of science has progressed up to this point, it may seem relatively unproblematic. For to summarize what we have said thus far in this regard: Jung sees his own work as part of the contemporary attempt to develop a scientific understanding of the world which is not, however, to be understood as a substitute for the religious and metaphysical needs of man. If this were the full story of Jung's scientific attitude, it would be cause for little further comment. Such views on the nature and limits of science might well be shared by many contemporary scientists. However, the problem is that Jung is doing science about the metaphysical and religious needs of man, and not entirely in an objective detached manner either. For Jung not only studies religion and metaphysics, he advocates them.

This close interrelation between the scientific level of discourse and the level of personal meaningful interpretation is in part a direct result of Jung's therapeutic involvements. Jung, then, is sensitive to the practical-therapeutic as well as the strictly theoretical scientific aspects of his work. In order to make Jung's views on the nature of science intelligible then, we need to understand the basis for the particular tensions we find in Jung's writings

between what he sees as theoretical scientific knowledge on the one hand versus personal therapeutically relevant understanding on the other.

On this account what is necessary is to show how on the one hand when one goes from the scientific perspective of theoretical knowledge about archetypes to the therapeutic perspective, one in effect makes a move not only from theoretical to practical knowledge but also from the scientific to the religious and philosophical. On the other hand we need to determine to what extent Jung understands the tension between the two levels of discourse about archetypes as due to an incommensurability between theory and practice, between scientific versus therapeutic aims, and to what extent Jung is trying to argue for an idiographic versus nomothetic type of distinction within the realm of theoretical knowledge itself.²⁴

Now if we address ourselves to what Jung sees as an incommensurability in principle between his scientific theory and the practical work of therapy, it is not at all clear why this sort of incommensurable relationship must exist. For after all, it would seem that scientific knowledge about psychological matters would prove in the long run to be therapeutic. We can easily imagine paradigm cases of "unscientific" therapy such as a witchdoctor treating a case of hysteria by trying to cast out the demon responsible. Even if the witchdoctor succeeds and produces a cure, our scientific mentality assumes that suggestion or some such mechanism must be at work for which there exists a scientific explanation which if known would prove eventually to be therapeutically valuable. From the scientific point of view then, we assume that there are discoverable principles

at work in human psychology which if we knew them would greatly decrease the gap between our theoretical knowledge and what can be accomplished in terms of practical applications to therapy. From this point of view, it is simply the immaturity of science which leads to an incommensurability between theory and practise.

But this is not the sort of incommensurability between theory and practise that Jung principally has in mind. For parenthesizing for the moment idiographic considerations in terms of applicability of a theoretical knowledge for understanding the individual, it must be emphasized that Jung sees theoretical scientific knowledge as necessary but never sufficient for accomplishing the work of psychotherapy. For it is characteristic of Jung's view of therapy that it is necessary for the therapist to enable the patient to reorganize his philosophical and religious viewpoint. Therefore, for Jung it is not that science is rejected in doing therapy but that objective scientific knowledge about psychology must be complemented with a subjectively meaningful reorientation of world view.²⁵

The intellect is the sovereign of the scientific realm. But it is another matter when science steps over into the realm of its practical application. The intellect, which was formerly king, is now merely a minister--a scientifically, refined instrument it is true, but still only a tool; no longer an end in itself, but merely a precondition (Vol. VI, p. 57).

. . . sooner or later it was bound to become clear that one cannot treat the psyche without touching on man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and deepest issues, any more than one can treat the sick body without regard to the totality of its functions . . . (Vol. XVI, p. 76).

I can hardly draw a veil over the fact that we psychotherapists ought really to be philosophers or philosophic doctors--or rather that we already are

so. . . . We could also call it religion in statu nascendi, for in the vast confusion that reigns at the roots of life there is no line of division between philosophy and religion (Vol. XVI, p. 79).

The most healing, and psychologically the most necessary, experiences are a "treasure hard to attain," and its acquisition demands something out of the common from the common man.

As we know, this something out of the common proves, in practical work with the patient, to be an invasion by archetypal contents (Vol. XVI, p. 82).

The statement that Jung sees scientific knowledge and psychotherapy as incommensurable irrespective of the state of the completeness of scientific knowledge amounts then to a reiteration of the previous claim that Jung believes that science can not serve as a substitute for the religious and metaphysical needs of man in terms of which the Jungian therapy is primarily oriented.

When Jung talks about what he calls psychological truth then, he is emphasizing this subjective aspect of the therapeutic process for which the term scientific is not appropriate precisely because of the philosophical and/or religious nature of the questions involved. Psychological truth is that which as a matter of fact proves to be meaningful to the individual.

Considered from the standpoint of realism, the symbol is not of course an external truth, but it is psychologically true

Psychological truth by no means excludes metaphysical truth . . . (Vol. V, p. 231).

Is there, as a matter of fact, any better truth about the ultimate things than the one that helps you to live (Vol. XI, p. 105).

When an idea is so old and so generally believed, it must be true in some way, by which I mean that it is psychologically true (Vol. V, p. 7).

In his Ego and Archetype, Edward Edinger furnishes an illuminating

example of essentially what Jung has in mind by emphasizing the subjective nature of psychological truth.

These are abstract, objective meanings conveyed by signs. However, there is another kind of meaning, namely subjective, living meaning which does not refer to abstract knowledge but rather to a psychological state which can affirm life. It is this sense of the word we use when we describe a deeply moving experience as something meaningful. . . . It is the failure to separate these two different usages of the word "meaning" which leads one to ask the unanswerable question, "What is the meaning of life?" The question cannot be answered in this form because it confuses objective, abstract meaning with subjective, living meaning. If we rephrase the question to make it more subjective and ask, "What is the meaning of my life," it then begins to have the possibility of an answer. . . .

"Who am I?" The latter question is clearly a subjective one. An adequate answer can come only from within. Thus we can say: Meaning is found in subjectivity.²⁶

This example from Edinger amply shows the subjective and essentially philosophical emphasis in Jungian therapy. But this subjective therapeutic emphasis should not mislead us into overlooking the possibility of a valid scientific level of understanding. Jung, for example, does attack the question of the meaning of life in general. His answer in terms of a theory of individuation purports to be an objectively valid account of the psychology of the various aspects leading to a fulfilment of the personality and self-realization.

We must be careful to distinguish then between the subjective psychologically true statements and scientifically valid statements about psychological truth. Whereas in the first case we have what is found by the individual to be subjectively meaningful, in the second case we have generalized statements concerning what has as a matter of fact been found to be meaningful.

When psychology speaks, for instance, of the motif of the virgin birth, it is only concerned with the fact that there is such an idea, but it is not concerned with the question whether such an idea is true or false in any other sense. The idea is psychologically true inasmuch as it exists (Vol. XI, p. 6).

But whereas from the scientific theoretical point of view, psychological truth is the object of study; in the actual therapeutic situation, we are no longer on a meta-level of psychological truth, so to speak, but on the object-level working directly with the patient's "myth," i.e., his life-outlook. Moreover, it is just when the scientist-therapist moves from the objective scientific level of discourse about the unconscious to the level of personal psychological truth that Jung emphasizes the importance of taking what prove to be essentially idiographic considerations into account. In the practical therapeutic situation, we must, in Jung's view, be prepared to set aside our theoretical psychological knowledge to a large extent so that we can gain an understanding of the individual who may deviate from the scientific ideal case to a greater or lesser degree.

Theories in psychology are the very devil. It is true that we need certain points of view for their orienting and heuristic value; but they should always be regarded as mere auxiliary concepts that can be laid aside at any time (Vol. XVII, p. 7).

He [the therapist] should remember that the patient is there to be treated and not to verify a theory. For that matter, there is no single theory in the whole field of practical psychology that cannot on occasion prove basically wrong (Vol. XVI, p. 115).

Thus Jung likes to emphasize that science is nomothetic in nature being concerned with the lawlike behavior of classes of particulars, whereas in therapy it is just the idiographic particularities of the

individual which need to be understood. Instead of a nomothetic/ideographic terminology, Jung talks in terms of knowledge versus understanding.

Every theory of complex psychic processes presupposes a uniform human psychology, just as scientific theories in general presuppose that nature is fundamentally one and the same (Vol. VI, p. 490).

Hence it is not the universal and the regular that characterize the individual, but rather the unique.
 . . . At the same time man, as member of a species, can and must be described as a statistical unit; otherwise nothing general could be said about him.
 . . . This results in a universally valid anthropology or psychology, as the case may be, with an abstract picture of man as a average unit from which all individual features have been removed. But it is precisely these features which are of paramount importance for understanding man. . . . I can only approach the task of understanding with a free and open mind, whereas knowledge of man, or insight into human character presupposes all sorts of knowledge about mankind in general (Vol. X, p. 250).

And if the psychologist happens to be a doctor who wants not only to classify his patient scientifically but also to understand him as a human being, he is threatened with a conflict of duties between the two diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive attitudes of knowledge on the one hand and understanding on the other. This conflict cannot be solved by an either/or but only by a kind of two-way thinking: doing one thing while not losing sight of the other.

In view of the fact that, in principle, the positive advantages of knowledge work specifically to the disadvantage of understanding, the judgment resulting therefrom is likely to be something of a paradox. Judged scientifically, the individual is nothing but a unit which repeats itself ad infinitum and could just as well be designated with a letter of the alphabet. For understanding, on the other hand, it is just the unique individual human being who, when stripped of all those conformities and regularities so dear to the heart of the scientist, is the supreme and only real object of investigation (Vol. X, p. 251).

Thus, we can see how Jung emphasizes the different aims of science

and of therapy on two accounts. As already discussed, Jung understands theoretical psychology and his type of therapy as finally leading to different types of understanding: theoretical psychology to objective scientific knowledge and therapy to subjectively meaningful self-knowledge. On the other hand when Jung contrasts knowledge and understanding, this emphasizes what he sees as the limitations of a general scientific knowledge in its application to the particular individual.

But whereas if therapy eventually leads to a subjectively meaningful "psychological truth," we can readily agree that the therapist is involved in an enterprise with the individual patient for which the term scientific is not entirely appropriate; it is less clear that the mere particularity of the individual makes his understanding something beyond the range of science. In his discussion of knowledge and understanding, Jung seems to overlook the possibility of any idiographic scientific methods²⁷ and seems on the whole to understand science in too narrow a way as only a study of universals.

In fairness to Jung, however, the essential point of the distinction between knowledge and understanding is to avoid the therapeutic attitude of seeing the patient only as a scientific problem. Moreover, the validity of this point would seem to hold independently of the question of nomothetic versus idiographic scientific methods. For Jung's "understanding" is not so much a question of seeing to what degree the individual's behavior conforms to lawlike scientific expectations or is idiosyncratic but rather of establishing the right therapeutic relationship with the patient.

But at any rate, it is evident that what Jung is saying about

the incommensurability between the theoretical and practical aspects of psychology can often seem to be simply the adoption of an anti-scientific attitude as in this example:

Yet this is still "psychology" although no longer science; it is psychology in the wider meaning of the word, a psychological activity of a creative nature, in which creative fantasy is given prior place (Vol. VI, p. 57).²⁸

Jung is open here to the criticism of giving the false impression of holding to a dichotomous division between theoretical and practical psychology, whereas, in reality, there is in fact a close interdependence and interrelation between the two aspects of his psychology. For the distinctive aspects of Jung's therapy are a direct product of his theoretical understanding (compare Jung's emphasis on the practical religious and metaphysical needs of man with Freud's); and, on the other hand, Jung's psychological system is to a large extent the end result of his experiences in working with patients.

We can conclude then that there is a real basis for distinguishing a scientific level of discourse about archetypes from a level of personal meaningful interpretation. However, we must be aware of the danger of understanding this distinction between the two levels of discourse as a dichotomy between theoretical and practical knowledge about archetypes implying that what is learned in theory does not have real application to the practical therapeutic needs of the individual, that therapy goes on completely independently of theoretical knowledge. On the other hand, to abandon the distinction altogether is tantamount to giving up the scientific perspective of objectivity without which the study of archetypes can easily degenerate into pseudoscience with metaphysical and religious overtones.

Notes

- 1 An example of these claims is the following:
 Nobody has ever shown me in how far my method has not been scientific. One was satisfied with shouting "unscientific." Under these circumstances I do make the claim of being "scientific" because I do exactly what you describe as the "scientific method." I observe, I classify, I establish relations and sequences between the observed data, and I even show the possibility of prediction (Letters, Vol. II, p. 567, letter to E.A. Bennet dated 23 June 1960).
- 2 Edward Burchard, "Mystical and Scientific Aspects of the Psychoanalytic Theories of Freud, Adler, and Jung," American Journal of Psychotherapy, 14 (1960), p. 306.
- 3 Rieff, "C.G. Jung's Confession: Psychology as a Language of Faith," Encounter, 22 (1964), p. 47.
- 4 Rieff, Triumph of the Therapeutic, p. 114.
- 5 [Mystical] "The denotation of this neologism in the polemical literature of the social sciences, where it is employed as a term of abuse, is obscure. It seems to mean, roughly, "unscientific." Joseph Campbell, "Bios and Mythos," in Psychoanalysis and Culture, edited by George G. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger (New York: International Universities Press, 1951), p. 331.
- 6 Paul Friedman and Jacob Goldstein, "Some Comments on the Psychology of C.G. Jung," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 33 (1964), p. 196.
- 7 Someone might well object at this point that in regard to the scientific nature of the archetypes, the question of whether Jung himself is mystical is not relevant. For if we can show how the archetypal theory is scientifically viable, then the question whether Jung is himself mystical will not matter. However, the importance of the problem of mysticism is that questions of the rationality of the archetypal theory are brought into focus through a discussion of this issue. Our strategy is thus to work towards a clarification of the problem of rationality by first discussing the question of Jung's mysticism. The investigation of the latter question is then a way to see what is at stake in the issue of rationality by first discussing the limiting case of arationality, i.e., mysticism.

However, the examination of the question of Jung's mysticism is more important than just as a device to introduce the problem of the rationality of the archetypal theory. For if Jung is attempting a justification of archetypal theory from the point of view of mystical insight, then the scientific significance of the archetypal theory would be undermined, and we would have little reason to take seriously the question of its scientific significance. See also page 127 where there is a continuation of this line of reasoning attempting to show the relevance of discussion of Jung's scientific views to the question of the scientific status of the archetypal theory.

8 W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1960), p. 79.

9 Ibid., p. 110.

10 Ibid., p. 79.

11 For out-of-body experience see Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 289. For examples of some paranormal psychic experiences see Memories, Dreams, Reflections, pages 137 and 155. Jung tells of conversing with a ghostly guru on page 183. For visions see pages 179 and 289. An instance of hearing voices is related on page 191 of the autobiography.

12 Stace, p. 47.

13 Ibid., p. 49.

14 Sunyata, the Void, is the term used in Mahayana Buddhism for the introverted mystical state. See Stace, page 107.

15 This feeling of loss of individuality and being merged with the One which occurs during mystical experience would be a consequence of the experience of an empty consciousness, if it were possible. For a consciousness devoid of multiplicity could not distinguish subject and object. See Stace, page 111.

16 Satori is the experience of enlightenment in Zen Buddhism. It can be considered a paradigm type of mystical state.

17 Stace, pages 304-305.

18 To avoid possible misunderstanding, it should be made clear at the outset of this discussion that it is the former rather than the latter statement that we are trying to show is Jung's actual view. The dialectical nature of the discussion here is designed to bring to light what is at stake in the difference between the two alternatives.

I take the term "archetypology" from Edward Casey's article "Toward an Archetypal Imagination," Spring 1974, p. 14. Casey refers to the work of Gilbert Durand: "In other words, Durand's general

archetypology is a genuine archetypal topography, a mapping of the primary topoi of the imaginal realm." Casey references Durand's "Exploration of the Imaginal," in Spring, 1971, p. 91.

Jung does not use the term "archetypology," but it seems to be appropriately descriptive of the work of some writers who approach the archetypes from a philosophical as opposed to a scientific point of view. Casey's article is, moreover, a good example of the archetypology as mythos perspective as discussed under the next heading.

19

In using the terms "mythos" and "logos" below, we do not mean to refer to the work of any particular philosopher who may have used them. The distinction can easily be attacked by citing examples which are not easily classified as either mythos or logos. However, in our use of this distinction, we are presuming only that there exists a discernable difference in degree between what passes for the ideal of exact knowledge, the logos, and metaphysical speculations of the widest scope, the mythos.

20

Wolfgang Giegrich in an illuminating article criticizes Erich Neumann's Origin of the History of Consciousness (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955) for confusing science and mythology and doing speculative mythology while giving the appearance of an empirical study. Nonetheless, he appreciates Neumann's work on its own terms. In the following passage, similar to Jung's view, he expresses the thought that there is a sense in which the logos is grounded in the mythos since logos can always be interpreted as an expression of the mythos.

Something (some "factor") obviously keeps us from the truly psychological orientation and makes our thinking unpsychological by making us wish for, or even need, empirical verification, scientific truth, and systematizations. This "factor" is our containment in the Great Mother/Hero-myth, whose nature it is to create the (mythic!) fantasy of the possibility of heorically breaking out of myth, into "fact," "truth," "science" (Wolfgang Giegrich, "Ontogeny=Phylogeny?" Spring, 1974, p. 118).

21

Edward Edinger, "The Collective Unconscious as Manifested in Psychosis," American Journal of Psychotherapy, 9 (1955), p. 625.

22

In order that the reader not think that we have been persecuting a stray man in the foregoing discussion, it must be pointed out that some writers who take their inspiration essentially from Jung's work have not attempted to follow Jung in his empirical, scientific approach to the archetypes. For example, in the following passage Naomi Goldenberg characterizes the work of what she calls a third generation of Jungians who go beyond strict adherence to Jung's views and develop their own approach to the archetypes. In this regard James Hillman is the dominant figure.

Imaginal life becomes primary while natural science and biology become working areas of

imaginal life. This leads to an "imaginal reduction" aimed at showing the fantasies behind scientific or scholarly empiricism. "Facts" and "empirical" proof are no longer invoked to validate psyche or psychology. Scientific terms are by no means the ultimate stopping places. . . .

"All ways of speaking of archetypes are translations from one metaphor to another. Even a sober operational definition in the language of science or logic is no less metaphorical than an image which presents the archetypes as root ideas, psychic organs, figures of myth, typical styles of existence, or dominant fantasies that govern consciousness" (Quoted from James Hillman, Revisioning Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. vii.) (Naomi Goldenberg, "Archetypal Theory After Jung," Spring, 1975, p. 213).

Such an approach has the disadvantage of making knowledge of archetypes incommensurable with standard scientific knowledge in the sense that what is said about archetypes is then out of reach of scientific criticism altogether. Even though it may be true that even our most well-established scientific knowledge rests on an irrational basis and is the end result of the working out of a myth, it is nonetheless unwise to give up the ideal of rationality as embodied in the methods of science. This seems in my view to be particularly relevant in regard to archetypes. For the ever present danger of being overwhelmed by the numinosity of the archetypes necessitates a critical attitude. This is in accord with Jung's view of the importance of maintaining a balance between conscious and unconscious. The rational approach of the conscious attitude must listen to and heed the irrational forces in the unconscious, but without losing its own particular autonomy.

It is not my intention to denigrate the work of Hillman and others who do not appear to be interested in the question of scientific validity. I do not wish to maintain that the scientific interpretation of the archetypes is the only worthwhile or valid approach but rather am trying to show why the scientific perspective must not be discarded or abandoned.

23 Adequate substantiation for this claim will be presented in the section on methodology in the next chapter.

24 We are using these terms in the sense in which Rychlak characterizes them:

Nomothetic study essentially presumes that a theoretical abstraction can be made which has general applicability for several members of a given class (i.e. distribution). Idiographic study, on the other hand, emphasizes the uniqueness of personality manifestation (Rychlak, p. 24).

Thus there are two distinct issues involved in discussing the basis for the tension between a scientific level of discourse about archetypes versus a personal therapeutic level. The issue of an incommensurability in principle between theory and practise and the issue of nomothetic versus idiographic methods for understanding the individual. As will become clear, Jung does not really distinguish between these two questions but equates nomothetic with the therapeutic and extrascientific. We intent to show how Jung's distinction between the two levels of discourse is defensible on the basis of the first issue. With respect to the second issue, we do not intend to fully explore the question of the relative merits of nomothetic versus idiographic methods for studying the individual. However, it can be reasonably maintained that an idiographic scientific study is possible outside the context of therapy. Thus, although what Jung says about the value of an idiographic approach to the individual makes sense within the therapeutic context, Jung fails to point out how the idiographic approach does not have to be identified with the aims of practical psychology but can also be defended as a legitimate scientific method in its own right.

25 It must be made clear at this point that the Jungian therapist does not advocate that the patient adopt any specific metaphysical or religious point of view.

26 Edward F. Edinger, Ego and Archetype (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 108.

27 What we have in mind by idiographic scientific method is the sort of study recommended by Gordon Allport who suggests, for example, that the psychologist learn from biography and literature the merit of such things as the in-depth study of individual cases of personality. Personality and Social Encounter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 12.

It seems that in this regard we have a discrepancy between what Jung says and what he actually does. For the in-depth study of individual cases is in fact characteristic of his work. The massive volume Symbols of Transformation (Vol. V) is primarily an extended commentary centered around the material of one schizophrenic individual. (The person was not a patient of Jung.)

28 This passage is quoted somewhat out of context. The remainder of the context is supplied by the quotation on page 134 which begins "The intellect is the sovereign of"

CHAPTER 6
JUNG AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART II

Can There Be A Science of Archetypes?

Other questions relating to Jung's views on science must wait until the section on methodology where we will examine Jung's reasons for claiming that his work on archetypes is scientific. In regard to what we just discussed in the last chapter, it would seem that we have not yet fully resolved the question posed at the beginning of that chapter, the question of whether Jung holds views incompatible with an attitude necessary for science. So far as this question is concerned, our strategy has been to argue for a distinction between two levels of discourse: one appropriate for scientific statements about archetypes and one appropriate for statements on a personal, subjective level of meaning involving in many cases metaphysical and/or religious interpretations of archetypal experience. The distinction then is essentially one between the facts of archetypal experience versus the attitude one takes towards these facts, what we should do about them.

It was pointed out, moreover, that the frequent shifts in Jung's work between the levels of discourse, which Jung understands in terms of theoretical versus practical knowledge, is due to his professional involvement on both levels as scientist and therapist. Thus sometimes he talks about his scientific views, and at other times he gives us practical, therapeutic advice or relates his personal, subjective understanding of the metaphysical and religious implications of the

archetypes.

However, the critic will perhaps wish to point out that Jung can not be so easily saved from scientific criticism. For even if we can distinguish a scientific level of discourse from a level of personally meaningful interpretation, questions can still be raised concerning the justification of what is advocated for therapy. For we wish our theoretical knowledge to rule out some therapeutic practices as unscientific even if we admit that scientific knowledge is not itself sufficient for therapeutic success as determined by the individual's gain in self-knowledge and self-realization.

However, our distinction between the levels of discourse is not intended to have the result of immediately resolving the questions of scientific validity of Jung's views on the archetypes. Rather the lengthy discussion on this matter is intended to clear the way for a proper consideration of this problem by showing how arguments from the scientific point of view need not be concerned with everything Jung says about the archetypes. Specifically, the question of the scientific validity of the archetypal theory is not prejudiced by what Jung says about what attitude we should take towards archetypes.¹ Only when we have come to an understanding of the strange mixture of statements in Jung's work by means of the distinction between the levels of discourse, then, can we genuinely appreciate the possibility that Jung's repeated pleas to be understood as an empiricist must be given careful consideration.

There still remain ample grounds for withholding the sanction of a scientific label to Jung's theory of archetypes which we have yet to consider. But keeping what has been said about Jung's views on the

nature of science in mind, hopefully we can now examine these remaining questions with some insight into the reasons for Jung's unscientific reputation. (A summary of our conclusions as to the extent to which this reputation is deserved will appear in the next chapter along with our conclusions concerning attitudes necessary for science.)

We proceed now to redeem a promise made on an earlier page to consider questions of rationality in relation to the archetypal theory. For recalling the context of the discussion in that section, we were considering the question of whether Jung was a mystic. Although we concluded that Jung did not qualify as a mystic either on the grounds of experience or because he held mystical beliefs, this conclusion was reached on the basis of a rather exact characterization of mysticism. We have still to consider whether Jung is advocating views resembling or analogous to mysticism. These questions have to do with the rationality of the archetypal theory. We understand the problem of whether Jung's views are analogous to mystical views as equivalent then to the problem of whether the archetypal theory is scientific in the loose sense of satisfying requirements of rationality. Only when we have worked our way to a clear view of this question will we be in position to properly assess the problem of whether Jung holds views incompatible with an attitude necessary for science. In addition, the extent to which Jung's therapy is justifiable on grounds of rationality is at stake. For if Jung's theoretical views can be shown to be irrational, then we could hardly expect the therapeutic attitude based on such theoretical views to be justified.²

This question of requirements of rationality comes to focus in light of the apparent similarity between the qualities of ineffability

and paradoxicality which are said to characterize mystical experience and what Jung says about the paradoxical nature of archetypal experience and its symbolic character which "is never precisely defined or fully explained" (Man and His Symbols, p. 4). However, parenthesizing the problematic of this similarity for the time being (it will be discussed at the end of this section), we can arrive at this same question of requirements of rationality from other considerations. For in light of the apparent difficulty in maintaining an objective, theoretical level of discourse about archetypes, evidenced by the fact of the mixture of theoretical statements about archetypes and statements of an interpretational character concerning how we should relate to archetypal experience that we find in Jung's writings, we might well ask: Is a science of archetypes possible at all? Perhaps in light of the tremendous emotion-evoking quality of numinosity characteristic of the subject matter, the effort to defend the study of archetypes as genuinely scientific is an idealistic fantasy. One of Jung's followers, Gerhard Adler, seems to be of this opinion as expressed in the following passage:

Jung himself fought against the reproach of being a philosopher or metaphysician or even a mystic. He fought against this criticism because he felt that he had elevated his approach to the status of true science; but perhaps, also, he was still caught in the idealisation of the scientist's image, represented by natural science, so rampant in the first half of the century. There are vast philosophical, metaphysical, and even mystical aspects and implications in Jung's scientific research and results 3

Even Jung himself had moments of skepticism and doubt concerning whether irrational phenomena like archetypes were proper subject matter for science.

Indeed, I am persuaded that, in view of the tremendous irrationality and individuality of dreams, it may be altogether outside the bounds of possibility to construct a popular theory. Why should we believe that everything without exception is a fit subject for science? . . . It might be better to look upon dreams as being more in the nature of works of art instead of mere observational data for the scientist (Vol. XVII, pages 163-164).

Of course, scientific is a characteristic of a method of study rather than a subject matter per se. But in this regard we would naturally expect that some subjects lend themselves more easily to the methods of science than do others. Certainly psychology is one of the most difficult subject matters to study in a rigorous scientific way. Moreover, within psychology itself Jung's interests can be easily identified as subjects which are at least at the very frontier of scientific endeavor, subjects which have either just begun to attract scientific attention or else have been given no previous scientific consideration at all. Such subjects as astrology, alchemy, UFO's, I Ching, and ESP are among Jung's professional interests in addition to investigations into the delusional systems of the insane and the world-wide literature of mysticism, mythology, and religions of all sorts. We might even chance a sweeping generalization and say that Jung's chief area of investigation was the irrational in all of its multiform manifestations. Although such a generalization perhaps stands in need of some qualification, it is easy to see how as an approximate truth this fact of Jung's professional interest in the occult and the irrational could lead to the conclusion that there is a similarity between the subject matter and its investigator. Jung addresses this problem in the following passage:

If you call me an occultist because I am seriously investigating religious, mythological, folkloristic and philosophical fantasies in modern individuals and ancient texts, then you are bound to diagnose Freud as a sexual pervert since he is doing likewise with sexual fantasies, and the psychologically inclined criminologist must needs be a gaol-bird. . . . It is not my responsibility that alchemy is occult and mystical, and I am just as guilty of the mystical delusions of the insane or the peculiar creeds of mankind (Letters, Vol. II, p. 186, letter to Calvin S. Hall dated 6 October 1954).

Although this sort of identification between a subject matter and its investigator is easily exposed as an error if taken as a necessary or universal type of relationship, it nonetheless contains an element of truth with respect to some individuals. For we wonder if there is not, as a matter of fact, some relationship between Freud's professional preoccupation with sex and his own sexual problems, between his theory of the Oedipus complex and the facts of his own family history. As an analogous case, Jung had an abundance of first hand experiences with the irrational which was the source for at least part of the motivation for his researches as he confesses below:

I was particularly satisfied with the fact that you clearly understand that I am not a mystic but an empiricist. It is true however that a vivid interest in religion and religious truth has guided my research (Letters, Vol. I, p. 237, letter to Norbert Drewitt dated 25 September 1937).

When we consider then the fact of Jung's interest in the irrational in regard to the question of the possibility in principle of a science of archetypes, we can conclude on the one hand that the irrationality of a subject matter should not disqualify it as legitimate subject matter for scientific study, since a scientific statement about the irrational need not itself be an irrational statement. But, on the other hand, we must acknowledge certain practical problems for

scientific study which arise due to the irrational nature of archetypes. In this regard a major practical problem seems to be the difficulty of maintaining a suitable scientific attitude of objectivity and detachment. This is reflected in the problem of the two levels of discourse as we saw how Jung frequently shifts from an objective scientific level of discourse to a subjective, personal level or therapeutic level. This problem is also exemplified in the very close relationship that exists between Jung's life and work. For it seems to be the case that archetypal experience does not produce only objective scientific knowledge but also a personal involvement. One does not only assimilate the archetypes to one's scientific understanding, but in a sense one's overall outlook becomes modified by the archetypes. One not only gains a scientific concept of the irrational, there is, at least in the ideal case, a coming to terms with the irrational forces inside oneself.

From the therapeutic perspective then Jung can be seen to advocate the necessity for direct involvement with the irrational forces experienced in the unconscious. Particularly in regard to this perspective, we need to determine the theoretical justification for what Jung says about the irrational. Thus we need to know whether what Jung says about the irrational can itself be justified by rational means. In this respect it is essential to understand what theoretical claims Jung is trying to defend in relation to the irrational. In particular we need to know what Jung understands by this term.

We find then that Jung closely associates the irrational with unconscious processes, whereas for him rationality is a correlate of consciousness.

No matter how beautiful and perfect man may believe his reason to be, he can always be certain that it is only one of the possible mental functions, and covers only that one side of the phenomenal world which corresponds to it. But the irrational, that which is not agreeable to reason, rings it about on all sides. And the irrational is likewise a psychological function--in a word, it is the collective unconscious; whereas the rational is essentially tied to the conscious mind (Vol. VII, p. 71).

To a large extent, then, the statements which Jung makes about the limits of reason and the intellect for comprehending the totality of experience can be seen to be the result of his view that consciousness has a necessarily incomplete comprehension of the totality of the unconscious.

There are several related reasons that Jung gives for the limitations of consciousness to fully comprehend the unconscious. The first has to do with the fact that knowledge of the unconscious necessarily is the product of its interaction with consciousness. Since consciousness always mediates the experience of the unconscious, Jung argues that there is a sense in which we never know the unconscious itself but only as it interacts with the more or less interferring medium of consciousness.

Between the conscious and unconscious there is a kind of "uncertainty relationship," because the observer is inseparable from the observed and always disturbs it by the act of observation (Vol. IX-B, p. 226).

In the concluding chapter of Man and His Symbols, M.L. von Franz elaborates this same argument.

Each new content that comes up from the unconscious is altered in its basic nature by being partly integrated into the conscious mind of the observer. Even dream contents (if noticed at all) are in that way semi-conscious. And each enlargement of the observer's consciousness caused by dream interpretation has again an immeasurable repercussion and influence on the unconscious.¹¹

As we have previously remarked on other occasions, Jung likes to think about the archetype per se in terms of Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself. Thus, he frequently makes the move from asserting that there exists an uncertainty relationship between conscious and unconscious to the statement that the ultimate nature of the archetype per se is unknowable in principle as a thing-in-itself.

In Mysterium Coniunctionis my psychology was at last given its place in reality and established upon its historical foundations. . . . The moment I touched bottom, I reached the bounds of scientific understanding, the transcendental, the nature of the archetype per se, concerning which no further scientific statements can be made (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 221).

A third reason for asserting the limitations of consciousness to completely comprehend the unconscious is derived from the consideration that, as a matter of fact, consciousness is limited and finite in potential capacity, whereas the unconscious, although not infinite, contains a much larger relative store of content. Since consciousness is only possible through a restriction of attention, this narrower scope of consciousness means then that consciousness cannot be aware of all aspects of the unconscious. Although this line of reasoning strictly shows that consciousness is limited only at any one time to what it can be aware of, it is Jung's claim that the overall potential capacity for consciousness is limited, and that thus our attempts to make our actions and endeavors completely articulate and transparent to consciousness will always fail, and the unconscious in all its manifestations can never be completely assimilated to a conscious awareness.

. . . even the most matter-of-fact contents of consciousness have a penumbra of uncertainty about

them. Even the most carefully defined philosophical or mathematical concept, which we are sure does not contain more than we have put into it, is nevertheless more than we assume (Man and His Symbols, p. 29).

Since we do not know everything, practically every experience, fact, or object contains something unknown. Hence, if we speak of the totality of an experience, the word "totality" can refer only to the conscious part of it (Vol. XI, p. 41).

The fact that the unconscious is never completely assimilated to consciousness means then that for Jung human existence always consists to a large extent of essentially irrational aspects and that consciousness and rationality are always circumscribed by the irrational and unconscious.⁵

. . . the rational is counterbalanced by the irrational, and what is planned and purposed by what is (Vol. IX-A, p. 94).

That is, I do not believe that reason can be the supreme law of human behaviour, if only because experience shows that in decisive moments behaviour is precisely not guided by reason but rather by overpowering unconscious impulses (Letters, Vol. I, p. 402, letter to Pastor H. Wegmann dated 12 December 1945).

We have on the contrary good grounds for supposing that . . . [life and fate] are irrational, or rather that in the last resort they are grounded beyond human reason (Vol. VII, p. 49).

But from the fact that Jung holds that human existence and reason do not mirror each other perfectly can we then conclude that at least certain aspects of experience lie beyond the grasp of reason altogether? Jung apparently thinks that this in fact is the case. For he says that "there is a certain incommensurability between the mystery of existence and human understanding" (Vol. XII, p. 212).

Of course, it is just the archetypes of the collective unconscious

that Jung has in mind as regards this "mystery."

In these words Freud was expressing his conviction that the unconscious still harboured many things that might lend themselves to "occult" interpretation, as is in fact the case. These "archaic vestiges" or archetypal forms grounded on the instincts and giving expression to them, have a numinous quality that sometimes arouses fear. They are ineradicable for they represent the ultimate foundations of the psyche itself. They cannot be grasped intellectually, and when one has destroyed one manifestation of them, they reappear in altered form (*Italics mine*) (Vol. X, p. 272).

In order to understand Jung's position on the irrational then, we need to get clear about precisely what he means by "incommensurability" and "cannot be grasped intellectually." Although it may seem that in this regard what Jung says about the archetypes is very similar to mystical utterances, there is one sense in which what he means is very mundane. For in pointing to an incommensurability between archetypal experience and the understanding, part of what Jung wants to emphasize is the particular quality of the lived experience of archetypes which is not adequately captured by concepts.

However, many experiences of an emotional nature have in common with archetypes this feature of relative ineffability, i.e., the feature of the relative inadequacy of concepts to express their lived quality. The particular emotive quality of a beautiful sunset, for example, is best expressed by a poem or a painting rather than by a concept. Because of the numinosity of the archetypes then, a concept of archetypes does not adequately convey their essential nature as experienced.

However, considerations about the relationship between the experience of archetypes and the formulation of a theoretical understanding

are not particularly crucial in regard to the question of the rationality of archetypal theory. For Jung does not maintain that an intuitive knowledge of archetypes based on their immediate experience is the only sort of understanding of them possible. Rather he maintains on the whole that intuition is not sufficient for intellectual knowledge.

The safe basis of real intellectual knowledge and moral understanding gets lost if one is content with the vague satisfaction of having understood by "hunch." One can explain and know only if one has reduced intuitions to an exact knowledge of facts and their logical connections (Man and His Symbols, p. 82).

On the other hand Jung frequently points out the inadequacy of an intellectual understanding as a substitute for the experience of confronting the unconscious and the archetypes in a therapeutic context.

It is precisely our experiences in psychology which demonstrate as plainly as could be wished that the intellectual "grasp" of a psychological fact produces no more than a concept of it, and that a concept is no more than a name, a flatus vocis (Vol. IX-B, p. 32).

We can understand then that from the therapeutic perspective it is just the emotive qualities of archetypes and the particular problems of value and purpose in relation to the individual's life as brought into focus by archetypal experience that are of utmost importance. Thus much of what Jung has to say against reason must be understood in a therapeutic context. In this respect it is a misuse of reason rather than reason itself which is the object of vilification.

. . . a relativation of rationalism is needed, but not an abandonment of reason, for the reasonable thing for us is to turn to the inner man and his vital needs (Letters, Vol. II, p. 286, letter to Eugen Bohler dated 8 January 1956).

The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that on the one hand we must defend the sanity and logic of the human mind, and on the other hand we have to accept and to welcome the existence of illogical and irrational factors transcending our comprehension (Letters, Vol. II, p. 53, letter to Father Victor White dated 9 April 1952).

It would seem evident then that if all Jung has in mind by his "cannot be grasped by the intellect" is to emphasize the practical therapeutic aspects of working with the archetypes on an experiential level that the question of rationality need not be considered as a serious problem. However, in addition to the practical problems of assimilating archetypes into one's experience on a personal basis, Jung apparently feels that the archetypes also pose particular problems for theoretical understanding. This point is well exemplified in regard to the symbolic manifestations of archetypes.

To the scientific mind, such phenomena as symbolic ideas are a nuisance because they cannot be formulated in a way that is satisfactory to intellect and logic (Man and His Symbols, p. 80).

It symbol has a wider "unconscious" aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. Nor can one hope to define or explain it. As the mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason (Man and His Symbols, p. 4).

This metaphorical way of talking about what lies beyond the grasp of reason can be made clearer as well as more plausible if instead of talking about what can not be grasped or understood, we say that archetypal experience can not be completely rationalized. That is, the archetypal phenomena have a sort of cognitive autonomy which eludes attempts to completely reduce it to an unambiguous rational formulation. An example using the familiar phenomena of dreams helps clarify

this point.

When we try to rationally understand a dream then, we attempt an interpretation which translates the pictographic images of the dream into words. We encounter difficulties, however, because the dream images frequently fail to conform to rational expectations of order and logic. Moreover, even with the most in-depth interpretation, we somehow feel that something is lost in the transition from the dream images to words. In addition to the emotive content which is difficult to convey in words, it seems that the dream has its own way of cognitive expression which an interpretation does not completely capture. The dream images then represent a certain gestalt of meaning which often resists translation into a linear sequence of ideas.

Moreover, when we say that a dream or other manifestation of the unconscious can not be rationalized, what we previously discussed in terms of the inability of consciousness to completely assimilate the unconscious must be borne in mind. Excepting Jung's appeal to the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself then, the arguments we mentioned there are additional reasons in support of this view.

Our way of talking in terms of the inability of the unconscious to be completely rationalized might seem to amount to the claim that a complete conscious reduction of unconscious experiences is unadvisable. And the objection could be raised at this point that if this is what our claim amounts to, then it is not so much relevant to the question of theoretical knowledge as to the problem of how best to deal with unconscious experience in a therapeutically beneficial way. From

the theoretical perspective, it would seem that it is just our task to try to make unconscious experience intelligible, i.e., to rationalize it.

However, in spite of Jung's unfortunate way of expressing himself in terms of what lies beyond the grasp of reason, what he has in mind does apply to the theoretical knowledge of archetypes. (And, of course, it also has practical therapeutic implications.) For it is his contention that we must make our theoretical statements about the archetypes reflect the actual nature of the phenomena. What we need to avoid in the problem of rationalizing the unconscious then is the reading in of more order and logic than is really there. If we think of dreams in terms of their being only informational static or noise in the brain, for example, an explanation satisfactory to the rational need to account for such disturbing phenomena in a theoretically elegant way, we not only fail to benefit from them in a practical way, but we also miss the distinguishing feature of the phenomena itself, the fact that its cognitive content constitutes a meaningful message which can be shown to compensate the conscious attitude. Thus Jung wants to argue that a conscious reduction of unconscious experiences is inadvisable not only in terms of the practical situation of the individual dreamer but also from the standpoint of scientific methodology.

The problematic of the rational reduction of unconscious processes must also be kept in mind when we try to understand Jung's attitude toward the paradoxical. In regard to the paradoxical then, we often find Jung associating the paradoxical and the metaphysical. For he says that metaphysical assertions can only be adequately formulated

in an antinomial way.

Every metaphysical judgment is necessarily antinomial, since it transcends experience and must therefore be complemented by its counterposition (Letters, Vol. II, p. 254, letter Pastor Jakob Amstutz dated 23 May 1955).

Thus, when we state a metaphysical truth in a paradoxical way, we express what Jung sees as its quality of unknowability.

Paradox is a characteristic of the Gnostic writings. It does more justice to the unknowable than clarity can do, for uniformity of meaning robs the mystery of its darkness and sets it up as something that is known (Vol. XI, p. 275).

Paradox is a characteristic of all transcendental situations because it alone gives adequate expression to their indescribable nature (Vol. IX-B, p. 70).

This use of paradoxical then links the paradoxical with a metaphysical way of interpreting archetypal experience. In this regard there is a real similarity with the way in which mystical experience is commonly interpreted. But irrespective of Jung's Kantian views on the appropriateness of an antinomial expression for the metaphysical, it seems that there is no problem with rationality here since to say that archetypal experience is frequently described in paradoxical terms is itself not a paradoxical statement.

However, Jung also means not only that the ascription of paradoxical qualities to archetypal experience applies to the interpretation of the experience in metaphysical terms but also that it applies to a metaphysically neutral description. But in the latter regard when we say that archetypal experience is paradoxical, this amounts to a restatement of the considerations about the problem of rational reduction of archetypal experience. For rather than as assertion that the experience cannot be described except by contradictory predicates,

this weak sense of paradoxical implies only that you can not pin down the experience and make it unambiguous; i.e., it is open to different interpretations. This use of paradoxical is then not an assertion that the experience transcends logic altogether (the mystical sense of paradoxical), but only that it is very ambiguous. For example, the frequent archetypal symbol of the snake combines both negative and positive qualities. "Hence it is an excellent symbol for the two aspects of the unconscious: its cold and ruthless instinctuality, and its Sophia quality or natural wisdom, which is embodied in the archetypes" (Vol. XIII, p. 333).

Moreover, this ambiguity of the manifestations of the unconscious reflects for Jung the tension between the conscious and the unconscious attitudes. The symbols from the unconscious change their form then in response to the conscious attitude (see page 70). The symbols are a reflection of this dynamic relationship between conscious and unconscious and thus often represent a synthesis of opposites.

And since the symbol derives as much from the conscious as from the unconscious, it is able to unite them both, reconciling their conceptual polarity through its form and their emotional polarity through its numinosity (Vol. IX-B, p. 180).

What can we say then about the rationality of Jung's treatment of the archetypes? In the first place it is obvious that Jung's sage statements about the unknowable are not satisfactory; i.e., we want to know on what grounds he can talk meaningfully of what is unknowable. This sort of talk seems to imply a transhuman perspective from which the relationship between our ways of knowing and the world can be determined. However, as has been pointed out on other occasions, there is no necessity to follow Jung's Kantian line in order to

rationally reconstruct the archetypal theory. And when we no longer think of the archetype per se as a thing-in-itself, many of Jung's least rational sounding statements need no longer concern us.

But if we disregard Jung's Kantian views on the unknowable, what Jung says about the irrational seems to be both reasonable and defensible on empirical grounds. If there is a genuine similarity here between mysticism and Jung's views, it is that both concur in the discovery of genuine irrational aspects of experience. However, whereas the mystic says that we have to accept this irrational given and abandon efforts to understand it rationally, it is always Jung's position that we must try to assimilate the irrational with our rational understanding as best we can. And although Jung's view that the rationality of consciousness as a matter of fact cannot completely assimilate and rationalize the unconscious may seem at first sight to be the very repudiation of the methodology of science, it is Jung's claim that far from deserting science his phenomenological method of approach to the archetypes provides the key for a valid objective understanding of them. We need to examine this phenomenological method then in order to see whether it in fact qualifies as a valid and adequate scientific methodology.

Jung's Methodology

In discussing the topic of Jung's methodology, it is important to understand what substantive issues are at stake. In the first place then, we are attempting to get clear about the grounds for Jung's claim that his study of archetypes is a scientific enterprise. This question, moreover, must be considered in the context of the discussion of the last section where the problem of the rationality

of the archetypal theory was taken up. There it was emphasized that although scientific statements about the irrational need not themselves be irrational, there are nonetheless special problems involved in studying archetypes which from the theoretical perspective we described by talking of the difficulty of accomplishing a rational reduction of archetypal experience, i.e., the need to allow for a certain inherent ambiguity in the phenomena in order to characterize them properly. We need then to discover what actual consequences for the study of archetypes these considerations of the problem of the rational reduction produce.

If we inquire how Jung understands what he is doing, we discover then that he asserts that his psychological views fall within the domain of natural science, although science with certain special limitations. "Analytical psychology is fundamentally a natural science, but it is subject far more than any other science to the personal bias of the observer" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 200).

The problem of subjectivity enters into psychology then at the theoretical level. Jung likes to emphasize that this is due to the fact that in psychology we have no extrapsychological point of view from which to view the phenomena since all observations are themselves psychological processes. ". . . in contrast to any other scientific theory, the object of psychological explanation is consubstantial with the subject: one psychological process has to explain another" (Vol. VI, p. 494).

Moreover, this difficulty with objectivity is, as previously discussed, especially relevant with regard to the observation of

unconscious processes. " . . . this uncontrollable reactive effect of the observing subject on the unconscious limits the objective character of the latter's reality and lends it at the same time a certain subjectivity" (Vol. VIII, p. 229, note 130).

For Jung this dilemma of subjectivity in psychology necessitates the toleration of a plurality of viewpoints. We must realize, then, that a psychological theory mirrors the psychology of its formulator. "The assumption that only one psychology exists or only one fundamental psychological principle is an intolerable tyranny, a pseudo-scientific prejudice of the common man" (Vol. VI, p. 41).

This point of the plurality of theories in psychology is developed in the context of Jung's theory of types.⁶ He sometimes argues, therefore, that the necessity of considering a plurality of theories must be taken to the extent of admitting one "true" theory for each type.

I believe that other equally "true" explanations of the psychic process can still be put forward, just as many in fact as there are types (Vol. VI, p. 493).

For, besides his own theory, he would have to regard seven other theories of the same process as equally true, or, if that is saying too much, at least grant a second theory a value equal to his own (Vol. VI, pages 490-491).

I am quite convinced that a natural process which is very largely independent of human psychology, and can therefore be viewed only as an object, can have but one true explanation. But I am equally convinced that the explanation of a complex psychic process which cannot be objectively registered by any apparatus must necessarily be only the one which that subjective process itself produces (Vol. VI, p. 491).

In addition to the problem of the typological bias of an investigator making a truth claim in psychology, Jung also states that we must be prepared to see these truth claims as relative rather than

absolute since due to the polaristic nature of the psyche (conscious and unconscious attitudes do not coincide), we must be prepared to admit the reverse of our claim as also valid.

Because psychology basically depends upon balanced opposites, no judgment can be considered to be final in which its reversibility has not been taken into account (Man and His Symbols, p. 47).

. . . we must observe the rule that a psychological proposition can only lay claim to significance if the obverse of its meaning can also be accepted as true (Vol. XVI, p. 115).

Now if the above considerations are the sorts of things Jung has in mind as a way of remedying the special problems with subjectivity in psychology, we might well wonder if the solutions are not as problematic as the difficulties for which they are to be remedies. However, Jung's statements about the relativity of truth in psychology and the necessity for admitting the validity of a plurality of theories remain more or less theoretical methodological ideals for Jung rather than actual practises he observes.

In any case these sorts of considerations are actually more relevant to problems of practical applications of theoretical reasoning in therapy than they are problems of theory itself. For example, in doing therapy Jung emphasizes that the therapist must never put the desire for theoretical confirmation of his pet theory above the need to understand the patient as an individual. Moreover, it is just in therapy that the potential conflict of personalities as a result of differing personality types is most keenly relevant. Then, the need to consider questions from the standpoint of both the conscious and unconscious attitudes comes to focus most clearly in regard to the working out of the individual's personal problems.

To generalize, as Jung sometimes does on these points, from what is useful in therapy to what is necessary for a theoretical psychological understanding in general is at best a questionable move. It is always open to us, however, to accept the psychological facts of subjectivity that Jung points to without drawing the same conclusions for theoretical understanding in psychology. That is, we can admit that there is a real problem with subjectivity without having to concede that truth claims in psychology can only be considered valid relative to individual personalities.⁷

But we may consider the question of subjectivity in psychology as a generalization of the problem of the rational reduction of archetypal experience. In regard to questions of methodology then, if we can satisfactorily determine the allegedly scientific method by which Jung studies archetypes, we need then not be unduly concerned if some of the things that Jung says about psychological methodology in general seem to be problematic.

We discover, then, that Jung recommends a phenomenological technique for the scientific study of archetypes. Here it is essential to understand what he means by phenomenology. The term connotes for him a theoretically unbiased observation of phenomena. It is clear, moreover, that the Freudian technique of dream interpretation (see page 101) is the sort of unphenomenological theory-biased construal of unconscious phenomena to which Jung is opposed.

Nevertheless, it cannot be maintained that the phenomenological point of view has made much headway. Theory still plays far too great a role, instead of being included in phenomenology as it should. Even Freud, whose empirical attitude is beyond doubt, coupled his theory as a sine qua non with his method, as if psychic

phenomena had to be viewed in a certain light in order to mean something (Vol. IX-A, p. 54).

Here the interpretation must guard against making use of any other viewpoints than those manifestly given by the content itself. If someone dreams of a lion, the correct interpretation can only lie in the direction of the lion . . . (Vol. XVII, p. 88).

What this phenomenological method entails for Jung becomes more evident in the following where in response to a challenge that his study of archetypes is not grounded on a scientific method, Jung states what is his understanding of that method.

I can entirely subscribe to your statement
 "Its (the scientific method's) tool is the objective observation of phenomena. Then comes the classification of the phenomena and lastly the deriving of mutual relations and sequences between the observed data, thereby making it possible to predict future occurrences, which, in turn, must be tested by observation and experiment," if, I must add, the experiment is possible . . . (Letters, Vol. II, p. 567, letter to E.A. Bennet dated 23 June 1960).

As may be expected, Jung's method of studying the archetypes does not employ an experimental technique.

Every science is descriptive at the point where it can no longer proceed experimentally, without on that account ceasing to be scientific (Vol. IX-A, p. 55).

Analytical psychology differs from experimental psychology in that it does not attempt to isolate individual functions (sense functions, emotional phenomena, thought-processes, etc.) and then subject them to experimental conditions for purposes of investigation. It is far more concerned with the total manifestation of the psyche as a natural phenomenon--a highly complex structure . . . (Vol. XVII, pages 91-92).

Jung justifies his nonexperimental method of study by pointing out that as a medical psychologist he has to investigate the phenomena as they appear in his patients without being able to institute

controls and manipulate variables. In Maslow's terms Jung's psychology is problem-centered rather than method-centered.⁸

. . . academic psychology . . . prefers to avoid complex situations by asking ever simpler questions, which it can do with impunity. It has full freedom in the choice of questions it will put to Nature.

Medical psychology, on the other hand, is very far from being in this more or less enviable position. Here the object puts the question and not the experimenter. The analyst is confronted with facts which are not of his choosing and which he probably never would choose if he were a free agent (Vol. X, p. 272).

The difference between this and all earlier psychologies is that analytical psychology does not hesitate to tackle even the most difficult and complicated processes. Another difference lies in our method of procedure. . . . Our laboratory is the world. Our tests are concerned with the actual, day-to-day happenings of human life, and the test-subjects are our patients, relatives, friends, and, last but not least, ourselves (Vol. XVII, p. 92).

But if it is clear that the primary context of discovery for the archetypes is the clinical situation, it must not then be concluded that this is also the only context of validation. For when Jung uses the term phenomenological for his method of study, this should not be understood to mean that it is entirely dependent upon introspective techniques. The other term "empirical" that Jung employs for his method of study is then in some respects more descriptive.

Jung thus emphasizes the necessity of supplementing the findings derived from work with patients by examining the manifestations of archetypes in a cross-cultural context. For when the same sorts of phenomena as appear in the clinical situation can be seen as exemplified in the art, literature, mythology and religion of many different cultures, this gives the archetypes an extraclinical and publically

observable dimension. Jung then likes to compare his method of study of archetypes to that of comparative anatomy. "My scientific methodology is nothing out of the ordinary, it proceeds exactly like comparative anatomy, only it describes and compares psychic figures" (Letters, Vol. I, p. 360, letter to Pastor Max Frischknecht dated 7 April 1945).

The psychologist must depend therefore in the highest degree upon historical and literary parallels if he wishes to exclude at least the crudest errors in judgment (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 200).

Symbolism has today assumed the proportions of a science and can no longer make do with more or less fanciful sexual interpretations. Elsewhere I have attempted to put symbolism on the only possible scientific foundation, namely that of comparative research (Vol. VII, p. 106).

In our discussion of Jung's scientific methodology, one chief question remains to be explored. This question has to do with what Jung sees as the appropriate method of characterizing archetypes. For if we understand that the phenomenological method tries to produce an accurate description of the archetypal phenomena which is as theoretically unbiased as possible, it seems evident Jung takes this to imply that his descriptions of the archetypes must mirror the phenomena described in the sense that they are themselves ambiguous descriptions.

I don't know whether I ought to be glad that my desperate attempts to do justice to the reality of the psyche are accounted "ingenious ambiguity". At least it acknowledges my efforts to reflect, as best I can, the "ingenious ambiguity" of the psyche. . . . The language I speak must be ambiguous, must have two meanings, in order to do justice to the dual aspect of our psychic nature. I strive quite consciously and

deliberately for ambiguity of expression, because it is superior to unequivocalness and reflects the nature of life (Letters, Vol. II, pages 69-70, letter to R.J. Zwi Werblowsky dated 17 June 1952).

We must, however, distinguish here between two senses of ambiguous description. On the one hand, there are empirically accurate descriptions of ambiguity, and on the other hand, there are ambiguous descriptions of ambiguous phenomena.

But if Jung is all too often guilty of the latter type of ambiguity, this should not prejudice our attitude toward the genuine problem posed by the rational reduction. For irrespective of Jung's individual style of description of archetypes, a plausible case can still be made for the necessity of having our descriptions of the archetypes take into account their inherent ambiguity.

¹ In distinguishing between the facts of archetypes versus the attitude one takes toward them, this has the effect of distinguishing the theoretical claims from therapeutic considerations on the one hand and from philosophical interpretations of archetypal experience on the other. Thus, it is misleading to say that in separating facts from attitudes in terms of the two levels of discourse we have in effect separated scientific from extrascientific claims about archetypes. For what Jung says about how to deal with archetypes from the therapeutic point of view is open to scientific critique and needs scientific justification. Often, however, Jung can be seen to generalize from therapeutic experience and to relate his views on what is beneficial for man in general. In this way a great deal of philosophy does in fact appear in Jung's writings. In spite of Jung's avowed dislike for the label of philosopher, it is thus still very evident that he is the son of a preacher.

The distinguishing between the two levels of discourse as a distinction between scientific statements about archetypes versus personal meaningful interpretation is of course Jung's distinction. It should be apparent that we have changed the meaning of the distinction slightly so that it now distinguishes facts of archetypal experience from attitudes one takes towards the experience. But attitudes can mean one's own attitude, the personal meaningful interpretation, or it can refer to what attitude is recommended from a therapeutic point of view. As a therapist Jung is naturally qualified to recommend appropriate attitudes. But when he does so, there

is then the tendency to get involved with philosophical statements.

When we argue for a separate consideration then of what Jung says about the facts of archetypal experience versus what attitudes he advocates we take toward them, this hopefully will pave the way for an objective consideration of the archetypes irrespective of our attitude toward Jung's philosophizing.

Moreover, by means of the distinction between the two levels of discourse, we also save ourselves from having to specify the relationship between the effectiveness of therapy and the truth of a theoretical viewpoint. This is not to say that they are not intimately related, but only that it is very difficult to determine what causes success or failure in therapy.

2 Of course, it is possible that Jung's theory could be impeccably scientific while his therapeutic viewpoint was open to obvious criticisms. For a sound psychological theory does not automatically lead to an effective therapeutic technique. Although in the context of this study we can not enter further into discussion of Jung's ideas on therapy, it is our view that Jungian therapy on the whole proves to be practically effective as well as theoretically sound.

3 Gerhard Adler, "Analytical Psychology and the Principle of Complementarity," in The Analytic Process: Aims, Analysis, Training, edited by Joseph B. Wheelwright (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), p. 120.

4 M. L. von Franz, "Conclusion: Science and the Unconscious," in Man and His Symbols, edited by C.G. Jung (New York: Dell, 1964), pages 382-383.

5 The point of the inability of the conscious mind to completely assimilate the unconscious will be considered later in this section where we will say that the unconscious can not be completely rationalized. That discussion will be a continuation of the sort of reasoning presented here. We defer presentation of that discussion for the sake of preserving the continuity of our argument.

6 Jung's typology works with two attitude types called extrovert and introvert which indicate the overall orientation of the individual with regard to objective or subject processes respectively. There are also four function types: intuition, thinking, feeling and sensation. Together with the attitude types this yields then eight basic types of personality: an extroverted intuitive, thinking, feeling and sensing type and an introverted intuitive, thinking, feeling, and sensing type.

7 In fairness to Jung it must be pointed out Jung is usually sensitive to a distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge as outlined in the section on science and the individual. However, as exemplified in the passages cited here, Jung sometimes is guilty of not distinguishing between the practical requirements for applying a theory in therapy and requirements for the acceptance of a theoretical claim.

8 " . . . many psychologists who choose to work as best they can with important problems (problem-centering) rather than restricting themselves to doing only that which they can do elegantly with the techniques already available (method-centering)." Abraham H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 16.

CHAPTER 7
THE STUDY OF ARCHETYPES AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE

Introduction

In the previous two chapters we have considered the question of whether Jung holds views incompatible with those necessary for science and also looked at the basis upon which he claims that his study of archetypes is scientific. From these discussions what can be concluded concerning Jung's scientific views?

In the first instance, it must be remarked that Jung's writings do not conform to any expectations we may have had concerning what constitutes ideal scientific writing. Moreover, this is due principally to the fact that the works are not uniformly scientific in character. In this regard we have suggested that by separating the theoretical claims Jung makes for the archetypes from statements where Jung discusses attitudes toward archetypal experience, we could examine the question of scientific status independently of both what Jung says about the archetypes from a therapeutic perspective and from philosophical and religious implications which also appear in Jung's work. But if such a distinction is successful in isolating the question of scientific status, this is not to say that we have then purified the theory or arrived at its meaningful core, as if to imply that Jung should have done this himself at the very beginning. Such an attitude only confuses the logic of reconstruction and the

process of discovery. For if we admit that the extrascientific aspects of Jung's personality in fact dominate his writings as a whole, this is not in the end to the disadvantage of scientific knowledge. For it is only through the wholeness of Jung's personality that we have such a theory which we can then examine in terms of scientific criteria, that is to say, it is only through Jung's interest in and involvement with the irrational aspects of experience, both as an individual and a therapist.

In regard to Jung's scientific views then, our arguments so far have endeavored to show that Jung did in fact attempt to construct a theory compatible with scientific understanding. Considering the highly irrational nature of the phenomena which are the objects of such a theory, success in such an enterprise would most certainly entitle Jung to be regarded as a truly great scientific pioneer and investigator.

But did Jung in fact succeed in formulating a theory which can be construed as a genuine scientific one? Instead of attempting to discuss necessary and sufficient criteria of what is scientific in general, our approach to this question has been to examine possible reasons on the basis of which the scientific label could be withheld from Jung's theory. Rather than attempting to show that Jung's theory is scientific because of its similarity to paradigmatic models of science such as physics and chemistry, we have attempted to establish that Jung's theory is not unscientific. This sort of approach allows for a liberal understanding of what constitutes a scientific theory. For rather than establishing a priori standards of what science must be, we instead examine the putative scientific theory in regard to what it can in fact

accomplish toward a rigorous understanding of its subject matter.

But the sort of considerations we have discussed in regard to showing that Jung's theory is not unscientific do not suffice to establish the scientific status of the theory. For if we have successfully shown, for example, that the theory can be understood as a rational theory and that religious and philosophical utterances often associated with it are not a necessary part of the theory itself, these are, for the most part, special problems of the archetypal theory. The resolution of these problems is then necessary but not sufficient to show that the archetypal theory is not unscientific. There are other considerations which must be examined before the scientific critic will rest content. For we still need to discuss the problem of falsifiability. In addition we need to show what sorts of predictions the theory can make and what explanations result from it.

With the examination of these remaining questions, the basis upon which we will advocate scientific status for the archetypal theory will not be so liberal a basis as to admit other disciplines such as astrology and numerology from which we would wish to withhold the scientific label. For these questions still to be discussed are the sorts of questions which any discipline must be capable of answering in a satisfactory way if it is to be included in the domain of science.

Falsifiability

A preliminary topic which must be discussed in confronting the issue of falsifiability is the problem of specifying the basis on which we claim that an archetype is present. The question at stake here is brought into focus by the difficulties encountered by the

non-Jungian in determining what observational states of affairs count as evidence for the presence of an archetype.

The existence and working of the Jungian archetypes seems more difficult to demonstrate operationally: one can define objectively particular stimulus features or combinations of these, and can say whether or not they are present; but the Jungian archetypes have no clearly defined essential features by which their presence may be unequivocally established, and so many specific features are included as possible manifestations of one or another archetype that it is always possible to claim one is present.

Moreover, Jungians themselves, sometimes make statements which seem to indicate that they see archetypes in everything. The following statement from Jacobi thus indicates an attitude insensitive to the problem of falsifiability:

And since all psychic life is absolutely grounded in archetypes, and since we can speak not only of archetypes, but equally well of archetypal situations, experiences, actions, feelings, insights, etc., any hidebound limitation of the concept would only detract from its richness of meaning and implication.²

In order then to show that claims involving archetypes can not be made compatible with all possible observational states of affairs, we must clearly indicate the observational basis for presence of archetypes.

A clue to how we can go about meeting this difficulty is provided by reflections on the problem of individuation of archetypes. This is the problem of how to tell one archetype from another. This problem is one manifestation of what we have called the problem of the rational reduction. For it seems that the archetypal phenomena do not readily lend themselves to classification into unambiguous types.

These unconscious nuclei are the archetypes and they can, up to a point, be classified and enumerated through special images--the mythologems--but they have a tendency to, as it were, dissolve into each other so that they seem at one time to be numerous and at others to be a single entity.³

When we speak of a problem of rational reduction, this is to indicate that the ambiguity is inherent to the phenomena rather than being a result of the inadequacy of the classificational criteria. In this regard it is helpful to consider the analogous problem of individuating species or other biological groups such as phyla. When we consider then on what basis it is decided that in this instance you have two species whereas in another instance only one, we do not expect from our taxonomist a definite decision procedure which can be applied in all problematic cases. Rather the classification of species turns in the end not so much on a priori criteria of species as on the reasonable judgment of the professional taxonomist, subject to its acceptance by the professional taxonomic community.

The point of this analogy is to indicate that when dealing with naturally occurring complex phenomena precise operational definitions can not be expected in regard to the classification of the basic entities. Thus there are no simple answers to the question of where to draw the line between one archetype and another. But although it is unreasonable to expect a definitive decision procedure for distinguishing archetypes, nonetheless discriminations can be carried out by the experienced Jungian practitioner, although on analogy with biological speciation this will not eliminate the element of conventionality and thus professional controversy concerning the specification of specific archetypes.⁴

If we consider then the more general problem of the recognition of archetypes in regard to the difficulty of the non-Jungian in deciding what to call an archetype, the sort of answer we give is one couched in terms of lack of experience with the theory.

To understand the peculiar phenomena of the archetype one needs a lot of practical experience, f.i. the numinous quality, so indispensable to the recognition of an archetype, is an indefinable imponderable like the expression of the human eye, which is indubitable yet indescribable (Letters, Vol. II, p. 490, letter to Stephen I. Abrams dated 5 March 1959).

But of course the claim that difficulties with the empirical interpretation of the theory are due to lack of knowledge of the theory or lack of experience in applying it in specific cases can easily be construed as a possible defense against all criticism of the theory. For to say that only the person experienced with application of the theory really knows whether or not it applies in any specific case seems to work against the possibility of there being criticisms of the theory from standpoints which do not already assume it.

In order to understand Jung, it has been said, one must experience his findings at first hand--his work must be "at least partially lived through and validated existentially, before it can be thoroughly grasped on a conscious level" [Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p. ix.] From the academic side, by contrast, comes the argument that a considerable amount of direct contact is likely to diminish objectivity. This, of course, is the old dilemma often set forth for depth psychology in general--either one remains outside and therefore insufficiently acquainted with the facts, or one moves inside and is cured of the desire to criticize.⁵

However, although the practical difficulties with knowing how to apply the theory do seem in fact to lead to a situation in which

only experts in the theory can determine how it applies in a specific case, this does not have the consequence of making the theory unfalsifiable or immune from the possibility of criticism. In order to demonstrate this point, it will be necessary to recapitulate the observational grounds for asserting the presence of archetypes.

Recalling the discussion of this topic from Chapter 3, it was stated that the chief difficulty in establishing the presence of archetypes was the fact that although the archetype was postulated to be part of the collective unconscious, the form of its manifestation in the individual always reflected the cultural and personal experiences of the individual. The problem of identifying the presence of archetypes then is one of distinguishing the personal and collective contents. Moreover, what was distinctive of the collective, archetypal contents was, on the one hand, their symbolic and nuministic qualities, and, on the other hand, their alien character, i.e., the fact that they appear in consciousness without the individual being able to account for them solely on the basis of his previous, personal experience. But these are introspective and subjective features and if the claim that there are archetypes just rested on these types of claims, the critic would be justified in pointing out the difficulties of establishing validation of introspective reports. This difficulty would be accentuated by the fact that the reports are usually made by patients in Jungian therapy. However, in addition to the subjective introspective reports of archetypal experience, Jung points to the presence of the same motifs in the mythology, religion, art and literature of widely divergent cultures. A knowledge of cross-cultural symbology is then brought

to bear on the symbolic manifestations in the individual. The claim is that these cultural parallels help to explain the meaning and implications of particular symbolic manifestations in the individual in ways which can not be satisfactorily accounted for solely by appeal to the person's individual development or previous experiences. An example of how this method is used to elucidate the meaning of symbols by appeal to cultural parallels helps clarify this point.

I can remember many cases of people who have consulted me because they were baffled by their own dreams or by their children's. They were at a complete loss to understand the terms of the dreams. The reason was that the dreams contained images that they could not relate to anything that they could remember or would have passed on to their children. . . .

I vividly recall the case of a professor who had had a sudden vision and thought he was insane. He came to see me in a state of complete panic. I simply took a 400-year-old book from the shelf and showed him an old woodcut depicting his very vision. "There's no reason for you to believe that you're insane," I said to him. "They knew about your vision 400 years ago." Hereupon he sat down entirely deflated, but once more normal (Man and His Symbols, p. 58).

It should be evident then where the difficulty is encountered in knowing how to apply the theory. For if the non-Jungian has access to the same data as the Jungian practitioner, he could easily be shown that the nuministic symbolic images with cross-cultural parallels existed and that in this sense there were archetypes; but he would be at a loss to say which archetypes he had been shown or what was their full meaning. In order to deal with the later problems and employ the theory in a meaningful way, it is thus necessary to gain a working knowledge of cross-cultural symbologies. This will entail, for example, a knowledge of the motifs of world-wide mythologies and

religions. From the standpoint of its empirical basis then, it is easy to understand why the archetypal theory is frequently not given much serious consideration. For the archetypal skeptic frequently lacks either extensive experience with unconscious phenomena or else is unacquainted with the sort of cross-cultural parallels which Jungians claim as validation for the theory.

But although confirmation of the archetypal theory would entail a great deal of erudition, the validational basis of the theory, the cross-cultural parallels, are nonetheless part of the public domain. Moreover, these de facto considerations concerning the practical difficulty of gaining a working knowledge of the employment of the theory do not mean that the validity of the theory can not be evaluated by the non-Jungian. For although to understand how the theory works in a practical way involves specialized knowledge, the theory claims certain states of affairs which can be checked independently of a detailed knowledge of the manifestations of individual archetypes.

For example, the theory claims that archetypal manifestations can be demonstrated in all races and civilizations of men without exception. What then will count as showing that archetypes are not present in a group of men? In this regard the ideal test case would be a tribe which has not had previous cultural contact with other human groups. This is to guard against the possibility of the group having taken over symbols through contact with other cultures. To gather evidence against the archetypal theory, we have to show that the group has no indigenous religious or mythological symbols. This would in effect involve showing that the group had no indigenous religious or mythological beliefs.

Other consequences which follow from the archetypal theory include the postulation of biological parallels to the archetypes in lower organisms. For since the archetypes are assumed to arise through the course of evolution, they must be prefigured in the other animals. Moreover, due to the close relationship which is postulated between the archetypes and the instincts, this is an especially critical point since we would expect whatever instinctual aspects there are in man to have homologies in the animal kingdom. (See page 47.) If the efforts of the ethological school of animal behavior to demonstrate the existence of innate patterns of behavior can be shown to be misguided, this will count against the archetypal theory. Thus in order to make the archetypal theory viable, it must be shown that either ethology or some similar type of theory is valid.

A third consequence which follows from the archetypal theory is the assertion that archetypes will be manifested in altered states of consciousness.⁶ Although this seems to be a very vague claim, what it rules out is the situation where archetypes appear only in patients undergoing Jungian therapy or in individuals who have read Jung. In this regard experimental results can be brought to bear for or against the theory. If experimental techniques designed to produce altered states of consciousness uniformly do not produce any sort of subject reports which describe phenomena similar to the Jungian description of archetypal experience, then this will be damning evidence against the theory. Moreover, it must be emphasized here that the reports of subjects can not be uniformly interpreted as archetypal. Electrical stimulation of the brains of epileptics, for example, tend to produce dream-like states, but they are easily

identified by the subjects as being for the most part memories of previous experiences.⁷

These three examples indicate what sort of evidence would count against the theory, and thus what sorts of states of affairs are incompatible with it.⁸

Explanation

Although we can not enter here into all aspects of the question of archetypal explanation,⁹ one principle problem with explanation in the archetypal theory is that it does not seem possible in principle to predict when an archetype will be manifested nor what its appearance will be like except within broad outlines.

As has been stressed in this book, there are no laws governing the specific form in which an archetype might appear. There are only "tendencies" . . . that, again, enable us to say only that such-and-such is likely to happen in certain psychological situations.¹⁰

However, it is not reasonable to expect laws depicting the relationship between the archetype per se and the archetypal image. For the questions of when an archetype appears and what its manifestation will be like are answered in terms of the interaction between the innate archetype per se and the environment. The archetypal image is then always a product of these two factors interacting with each other in a dynamic way.

This often leads to a state of affairs in which we explain a situation by appeal to the archetypal theory which we could not have predicted. For example, Jung attempted to explain the phenomenon of National Socialism on the basis of the activation of specific archetypes in the German people.¹¹ However, previous to the rise of Hitler

and shortly thereafter Jung was uncertain of what outcome would ensue from the possession of the German people by these archetypes.

In regard to explanation then, the archetypal theory is more like evolution theory than Newtonian mechanics. For prediction on the basis of the principles of evolution, such as the prediction that the fittest populations of organisms will survive, is always subject to environmental circumstances which are subject to unforeseeable changes. For example, what species survives might be due as a matter of fact to some environmental accident, such as location relative to the eruption of a volcano, which has no relation to the organisms' adaptation to the environment.¹² Thus the course of evolution can not be predicted with certainty, although this does not mean that the theory of evolution is not explanatory.

In the archetypal theory on the other hand, what is unforeseeable that prohibits reliable prediction of the outcome of behavior of individuals or groups due to the activation of archetypes is exactly how a new archetypal manifestation will interrelate with the existing cultural matrix. For example, we can explain the appeal of the cult of Guru Maharaj Ji, a teenage Indian who is celebrated as the messiah by the Divine Light Mission in the United States, on the basis of the projection of the Archetype of the Divine Child.¹³ When we attempt to determine why this particular archetype is manifested in this particular form at this particular time in history, the answers we give in terms of the loss of numinosity of the traditional religious symbols and the consequent appeal of symbolic forms from a non-Western culture which are different enough to seem new and alive, yet similar enough to the old symbols to be easily assimilated to the

existing culture. However, due to the uniqueness and complexity of the factors which are involved in any particular time in history, this explanation of the appearance of a new manifestation of the Archetype of the Divine Child is not sufficient for us to make law-like generalizations from which we could then expect exact predictions.

If we consider the situation in the individual rather than talking from a cultural perspective, the uncertainty which prohibits our knowing exactly when an archetype will appear and what its manifestation will be like is again due to the indeterminacy of the relationship between the innate archetype per se and environment. For the appearance of archetypes is conditioned by one's overall knowledge and experience.¹⁴

Moreover, whereas from the cultural perspective the difficulty with predicting archetypal manifestations is primarily due to the complexity and uniqueness of the relevant factors (here archetypal theory shares the same problems with historical explanation and prediction), with regard to the individual there is the additional factor of an ethical issue. For in order to be able to separate the variables at work in determining how environment conditions the appearance of archetypes in the individual, we would need to perform an isolation experiment on a human being lasting several years.¹⁵

In addition to the ethical problems with the isolation experiment, another reason which complicates the problems with determining the appearance and manifestation of archetypes is the effect of the conscious attitude. For the degree to which the individual works with the archetypes and attempts to understand their relationship to

his personality effects how and when they appear to the individual. Moreover, it is evident that Jung's work in attempting to trace this relationship between the phenomenology of archetypes and the development of personality as encompassed by his theory of individuation is very much pioneer work and that much additional study on this matter still needs to be done.

With regard to explanation and prediction with the archetypal theory then, we must conclude that two principle factors prohibit the theory from being able to accomplish feats of explanation and prediction similar to those of the physical sciences. On the one hand, it is evident that the archetypal theory is an immature theory in the sense that its full empirical implications have yet to be worked out. Moreover, in many respects the theoretical foundations of the theory are still far from adequate.¹⁶ To mention one example, the relationship which Jung has in mind between archetypes and instincts needs to be more precisely specified. It has been one of the goals of this study to attempt to make some progress in the direction of clarifying foundational questions, but it must be confessed that a great deal of further work in this direction needs to be done before we could expect its acceptance and widescale employment in such obviously applicable areas as anthropology.

But, on the other hand, if we admit that the theory is an immature theory, this is not to say that the theory is not scientifically viable or that its methods are inadequate for what they attempt to accomplish. For the complex nature of the subject matter imposes certain definite limitations on what we could expect from even a foundationally impeccable archetypal theory whose empirical implications

had been thoroughly worked out. Especially with regard to explanation and prediction then, we can hardly expect perfect knowledge in principle from an archetypal theory.

Evidence

The archetypal image is postulated to be the end result of the interaction between the innate archetype per se and the environment. But from the discussion in the last section we saw that the archetypal theory does not attempt to specify precisely how these two factors interrelate to produce the archetypal image. Thus, in the absence of any archetypal laws specifying how these two factors interact to produce the archetypal images, the question arises how the innateness of the archetype per se is to be established. For if we are not in fact able to separate these two factors through some type of isolation experiment, it might well seem that the claim that the archetypes are innate rather than acquired as a result of experiences in individual development would be on very weak ground. Moreover, if we cannot substantiate the innate nature of the archetype per se, then the theory as a whole will lack a credible basis.

In this regard it is instructive to consider in general the sort of evidence Jung gives in support of his theory. In particular we need to examine how he attempts to establish that the archetypal images are due to innate factors.

Jung argues then that the archetypal images are due to innate factors primarily on the basis of paradigm cases in which it can be reasonably ascertained that the persons involved had had no previous exposure to the sort of motifs that appear in the dreams or visions.

Although we cannot from an ethical point of view isolate the human subject from the possibility of cultural influences, in some actual cases it is nevertheless possible to determine that the subject could not have learned of the motifs. Naturally in most cases of alleged archetypal manifestation, this degree of control will not be possible. For when the individual reports that he can not trace a specific image to something he has acquired through learning, he may be either lying or mistaken. In the latter case the possibility of cryptomnesia must always be kept in mind, i.e., the possibility that the person has forgotten what he had previously learned which now appears as an alien content of consciousness without apparent connection with antecedent experience, when in fact this connection has been simply forgotten. A third complicating factor is the element of suggestion, where instead of the images being spontaneously produced their appearance is due to the suggestive influence of the investigator.

Moreover, in order to establish that the content of the dream or vision is an archetype, in addition to establishing that it has not been acquired through previous experience, we must also show that it has cultural parallels. However, in this regard the sort of correlation that we need to establish between spontaneous products without previous experiential antecedents and similar manifestations in cultural symbology is not one between images but rather one between motifs. By emphasizing the similarity between motifs rather than symbols per se, we rule out the possibility that the similarity between symbols is due to chance or is a similarity with no significance. For in order to establish that a symbol is a manifestation of an archetypal motif, rather than simply comparing the similarity of

isolated symbols, we must examine how the symbols function in relation to their context.

It does not, of course, suffice simply to connect a dream about a snake with the mythological occurrence of snakes, for who is to guarantee that the functional meaning of the snake in the dream is the same as in the mythological setting? In order to draw a valid parallel, it is necessary to know the functional meaning of the individual symbol, and then to find out whether the apparently parallel mythological symbol has a similar context and therefore the same functional meaning (Vol. IX-A, p. 50).

Thus, if we can show that a given content is not due to previous learning and has the required cultural parallels, this is the sort of evidence that Jung gives in support of his theory of archetypes. Moreover, it is evident here that it is the first factor, the demonstration that the spontaneous content has not been learned, that will be the most difficult aspect of the task of evidentially substantiating the archetypes.

A paradigm case to which Jung refers most often in the latter regard involves the vision of a schizophrenic patient which Jung noted in 1906.

One day I found the patient standing at the window, wagging his head and blinking into the sun. He told me to do the same, for then I would see something very interesting. When I asked him what he saw, he was astonished that I could see nothing, and said: "Surely you see the sun's penis-- when I move my head to and fro, it moves too, and that is where the wind comes from" (Vol. IX-A, pages 50-51).

Jung, who at that time was not well acquainted with the literature of mythology, did not know what to make of the vision. However, four years later in a text describing a rite of Mithras he discovered an account which depicted the same motif.

"Draw breath from the rays, draw in three times as strongly as you can and you will feel yourself raised up and walking towards the height, and you will seem to be in the middle of the aerial region. . . . The path of the visible gods will appear through the disc of the sun, who is God my father. Likewise the so-called tube, the origin of the ministering wind. For you will see hanging down from the disc of the sun something that looks like a tube. And towards the regions westward it is as though there were an infinite east wind. But if the other wind should prevail towards the regions of the east, you will in like manner see the vision vering in that direction" (quoted Albrecht Dieterich, Eine Mithrasliturgie, Leipzig, 1903, p. 6) (Vol. IX-A, p. 51).

The possibility of the patient having previously learned of this archetypal motif, "the idea of a wind-tube connected with God or the sun" (Vol. IX-A, p. 52), is largely nullified by the fact that the passage which Jung cites as a parallel was only published in 1903 which was after the patient had been committed. Moreover, other incidences of this rare motif as depicted in medieval paintings were not in the local gallery in Zurich where the patient had lived his whole life (Vol. IX-A, p. 52).

Another example cited by Jung in Man and His Symbols involves archetypal dream motifs reported by a ten-year-old girl.

"The evil animal," a snakelike monster with many horns, kills and devours all other animals. But God comes from the four corners, being in fact four separate gods, and gives rebirth to all the dead animals.

A small mouse is penetrated by worms, snakes, fishes, and human beings. Thus the mouse becomes human. This portrays the four stages of the origin of mankind.

A drop of water is seen, as it appears when looked at through a microscope. The girl sees that the drop is full of tree branches. This portrays the origin of the world (Man and His Symbols, p. 59).

The first citation contains the motif of divine restitution, Apokatastasis, as well as the motif of a divine quaternity. The second and third citations illustrate the cosmogonic myth depicting the origin of the world and man (Man and His Symbols, pages 60-61).

The problem with this sort of evidence is that it has the character of a selected demonstration of a limited number of individual cases. Moreover, it is never possible with absolute certainty to rule out the possibility of deception and/or cryptomnesia, and Jung's word is just about all the basis we have for judging the reliability of his subjects and determining their lack of previous exposure to symbols from cultural sources.

But within the context of his method of investigation, which is phenomenological rather than experimental, it is difficult to see how we could go beyond the sort of evidence Jung presents. With this type of approach, the best we could manage would seem to be a larger collection of similar paradigm cases. In regard to numbers of cases, Jung often says that he could easily multiply his examples but hesitates to do so since each case requires lengthy discussion in order to make clear the context out of which the symbols are taken for comparison.

Establishing such facts not only requires lengthy and wearisome researches, but is also an ungrateful subject for demonstration. As the symbols must not be torn out of their context, one has to launch forth into exhaustive descriptions, personal as well as symbolical, and this is practically impossible in the framework of a lecture (Vol. IX-A, p. 50).

In order to make clear what is meant by an archetypal motif then, rather than giving a summary of its essential features, the best approach is to give examples of the motif within its various contexts

of manifestation. This is illustrated when we try to give a list of archetypes. For without actual examples of how these archetypes function in a given context, such a list produces only a very superficial understanding of what an archetypal motif consists. Moreover, in any case archetypal motifs are not easily divided into unambiguous discrete types. These sorts of considerations then are reasons why Jung adheres to a descriptive, phenomenological method of investigation which yields evidence of an essentially nonquantitative nature.

However, the archetypal theory would rest on a very suspect empirical basis if the only evidence we had for the theory is the sorts of cases just discussed, which for the most part arise out of the context of therapeutic work done by Jungians. In order for the theory to be credible at all, it must be shown to have consequences which are manifested outside of the Jungian therapeutic context.

In this regard we can appeal to the commonality of symbolic motifs in cultures throughout the world widely separated in space and time. However, although this type of evidence is of an extraclinical and publicly observable nature, it has definite limitations so far as constituting compelling evidence for the archetypal theory is concerned. For it is even more difficult to establish the spontaneous origin of symbolic motifs in cultures than it is in individuals, since the history of and influences on the former are more uncertain than for an individual. Moreover, appeal to cross-cultural similarities will not have much probative strength independently of the ability to demonstrate the emergence of these same archetypal motifs in individuals.

Although we might expect that, irrespective of the difficulty of substantiating the spontaneous origin of symbolic motifs in various

cultures, anthropological evidence would nonetheless prove to be very helpful in establishing the credibility of the theory, this expectation is for the most part not fulfilled. For due to the difficult nature of the theory in its practical application, anthropologists tend either to accept the theory and to interpret their data from a Jungian perspective, or else reject the theory from an unknowledgeable standpoint. In the latter case, it is difficult to determine the degree to which their findings support the theory, since for the most part they are not sensitive to what constitutes an archetype and are unaware of the diverse phenomenology of the various archetypal motifs.¹⁷

Due to the difficulties of evaluating the evidence for the archetypal theory independently of a Jungian framework of understanding, in the last chapter we suggested that reports from experiments designed to induce altered states of consciousness be studied in order to see whether anything similar to descriptions of archetypal motifs was reported. If none were reported, then this would be strong evidence against the theory. On the other hand, however, the claim that there are such similar descriptions which constitute confirming evidence for the archetypal theory is rendered problematic by the fact that many of the investigators are influenced by Jung's work and thus readily assume his theoretical viewpoint in interpreting their data. Moreover, in many of the studies involving drugs, the element of suggestion was a relevant variable not controlled. (Both of these considerations apply to the Masters and Houston study discussed below.)

But it is clear that this sort of research offers the promise of a solution to the problem of extending the validation basis of the

theory beyond the sort of evidence to which Jung originally appealed. For if no additional support for the theory is forthcoming besides the sort of data for which it was originally designed to explain, then we would have to conclude that the theory is on weak grounds.

We will thus proceed to discuss one example of such evidence from altered states of consciousness research.¹⁸ This research as reported by R. E. L. Masters and Jean Houston in Varieties of Psychedelic Experience involves work with the chemical substances LSD-25 and peyote and covers a period of more than fifteen years. A total of 206 subjects were given the drugs.¹⁹

The investigators reported that the perception of the guides in the experiment was frequently distorted in such a way that they were apparently seen as archetypal figures.

In a fairly common distortion the guide may be perceived by the subject as one or more of a variety of archetypal figures. For example, a female guide may be seen as a goddess, as a priestess, or as the personification of wisdom or truth or beauty. Descriptions of some of these "archetypal" perceptions have included seeing the guide's features as "glowing with a luminous pallor" and her gestures as being "cosmic," yet "classical."²⁰

Moreover, in the course of the experiments, mythological and religious symbolic imagery was frequently encountered.

In the psychedelic drug-state mythologies abound. The guide often may feel that he is bearing witness to a multi-layered complex of mythological systems as they arise out of their latency in the mind of the subject.²¹

The most frequently recurring mythic themes were summarized as follows:

Myths of the Child-Hero, Myths of Creation, Myths of the Eternal Return (Cycles of Nature), Myths of Paradise and the Fall, Hero Myths, Goddess Myths,

Myths of Incest and Parricide (Oedipus, Electra, etc.), Myths of Polarity (Light and Darkness, Order and Chaos), Myths of the Androgyne (Male-Female Synthesis), Myths of the Sacred Quest, Prometheus-Faust Myths (Myths of the Trickster).²²

Religious images of some kind were reported in ninety-six percent of the 206 subjects. These included images of religious figures: Christ, Buddha, saints, godly figures, William Blake-type figures (fifty-eight percent); devils and demons (forty-nine percent); and angels (seven percent).²³

Despite the factors of the influence of Jung's work and the problem of suggestion, these results seem to constitute convincing evidence for the archetypal theory.

Archetypes and Evolution Theory

In considering the scientific status of the archetypal theory, it has been our concern to demonstrate that the theory is compatible in principle with a contemporary scientific understanding, i.e., that the theory can be construed as a viable scientific one. In this regard, it is essential to establish that the theory is not logically tied to an evolutionary theory which has been repudiated by modern biologists, namely, one involving appeal to the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

As we saw in Chapter 3 (page 60), there was one point in Jung's career where he postulated that the archetypes were inherited by means of such a mechanism and that archetypes were the deposits of repeated experiences (Vol. VII, p. 69). However, Jung retracted this view and thereafter did not attempt to explain the evolutionary mechanism by which archetypes become part of the innate structure of the psyche

except to say that the archetypes were inherited as part of the structure of the brain and hence evolved as man evolved (Vol. XI, p. 149, note 2 and Vol. IX-A, p. 78).

It is clear how the latter position can be construed as in principle compatible with Darwinian mechanisms of evolutionary change. However, although we can see how this sort of origin of archetypes through evolution is possible in principle, we might still question whether the inheritance of such dispositions to produce symbolic images is plausible from the standpoint of modern evolutionary theory. In other words, is there any reasoning from the biological point of view which can support the hypothesis that such dispositions are in fact inherited?

Now although we do not know what sort of genetic mechanisms might be responsible for the inheritance of such dispositions, this aspect of ignorance does not count against the archetypal theory since the genetic mechanisms which are responsible for many aspects of the human being are as yet, to say the least, imperfectly understood. However, if it can be shown how a structure enables a man to be better adapted to the environment in such a manner as to produce relatively more progeny than another man lacking the structure, then it is reasonable to suppose from the standpoint of modern evolutionary theory that whatever genes are responsible for the structure will tend to increase in the overall population of the species. Showing that dispositions to produce symbolic images have probably been inherited is then reducible to the problem of showing the basis in terms of which it is reasonable to believe that these dispositions did in fact confer a selective advantage on those humans or predecessors of humans who

happened to have the necessary genes to produce them.

In this regard we point to the fact that man is not a solitary species but evolved as a social animal. Thus, it is not difficult to see how the survival of man as a species has been enhanced by mechanisms which facilitate social cooperation such as the development of a shared culture. Moreover, it is easy to understand how the religious or mythological heritage of a human society gives it unity and stability and how "the integration of a social group, its cohesion, is maintained by the direction of certain sentiments toward a symbolic center."²⁴

If we admit that religious and mythological symbolic systems have survival value in that they enhance social cooperation within the human community, the likelihood that dispositions which tend to produce symbolic manifestations will be selected for in the course of evolution would seem to very great. From the standpoint of modern evolutionary theory, we can conclude from these considerations that the inheritance of archetypes is something which is very likely to have occurred.²⁵

Notes

- 1 J.I. Fisher, "The Sociopsychological Analysis of Folktales," Current Anthropology, 4 (1963), p. 256.
- 2 Jacobi, Complex, Archetype, Symbol, p. 59.
- 3 Michael Fordham, New Developments in Analytical Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 57.
- 4 An aspect of disanalogy with biological speciation in the problem of individuating archetypes is that whereas it is reasonable to expect that biological species delineate distinct entities, namely populations of similar organisms capable of interbreeding with each other, archetypes are better thought of as processes rather than as distinct entities. Ira Progoff suggests then that ". . . in the final analysis it is incorrect to speak of archetypes as nouns, if we are implying by that each has a specific and individual existence." Ira Progoff, Jung, Synchronicity, and Human Destiny, p. 156.
- 5 Avis Dry, The Psychology of Jung: A Critical Interpretation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961), p. xiii.
- 6 By experiments with altered states of consciousness, we have in mind such things as dream research, work with hypnosis, experiments with psychedelic drugs, sensory deprivation experiments, and work with electrical stimulation of the brain.
We do not mean to imply here that archetypes can only be manifested in altered states of consciousness. Presumably the archetypes influence consciousness in all its states. However, analogously to other aspects of the unconscious, the archetypes are most noticeable when consciousness is interfered with in some way as under the influence of drugs or if there is a relaxation of conscious attention as in hypnosis or dreams.
- 7 See C.W. Sem-Jacobsen, Depth-Electrographic Stimulation of the Human Brain and Behavior (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1968).
- 8 But this is not to say, of course, that there are no possible ad hoc modifications which could save the theory from contrary evidence in these cases. For in addition to the fact that we must not underestimate the ingenuity of theorists, theories are not in any case simply overthrown by single incidences of contrary evidence. However, in the cases cited, it is very difficult to see what sort of ad hoc modifications could be invoked which

would not involve a radical revision of the theory itself.

9 The chief issue not discussed is that of purposive explanation. Particularly from the therapeutic point of view, the essential questions concerning archetypes do not involve attempts to explain or predict behavior by means of them so much as the endeavor to use the archetypal manifestations as a way to help the individual work toward a new perspective on his overall life-situation and life plan.

10 M. I. von Franz, "Conclusion: Science and the Unconscious," in Man and His Symbols, p. 383.

11 See Jung, Vol. X, Part III for a detailed discussion on this question.

12 Michael Scriven, "Evolution and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory," in Man and Nature, edited by Ronald Hanson (New York: Dell, 1971), pages 213-221.

13 See Jung, "The Psychology of the Child Archetype," in Vol. IX-A. The sort of motif at work here is roughly the same as that which involves the story of the Christ child, i.e., miraculous origins followed by heroic childhood deeds.

14 This then is one reason why persons who have had experience with Jung's work dream Jungian dreams. The theoretical knowledge of Jung is thus one additional aspect of one's overall understanding in terms of which the appearance of the archetypal manifestations are conditioned.

There are people who can read my books and never have a dream of anything reminiscent of my writings, but it is true that if you understand what you have read, you get a frame of mind or a problematic outlook which you did not have before, and that, of course, influences your dreams (Letters, Vol. II, p. 137, letter to a young Greek girl dated 14 October 1954).

15 The sort of experimental problems we have in mind with regard to an isolation experiment would be similar to those encountered in ethological studies designed to investigate innate behavior patterns. (See Konrad Lorenz, Evolution and Modification of Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935).) With regard to archetypes two separate questions are at stake. On the one hand, we would want to know whether archetypal images were manifested at all under conditions of isolation, and, on the other hand, we could investigate the relationship between selected environmental stimuli such as television or a particular literature and archetypal appearance.

16 Jung is the first to admit that his work is of a pioneer nature and thus often without adequate theoretical foundations. However, as you have rightly seen, I have landed myself in enormous difficulties by framing general formulations which are intended to explain the

whole field of human experience. I had to keep to experiences that were directly accessible to me and compare them with data drawn from the whole history of the mind. This gives rise to some degree of inexactitude which makes my efforts appear provisional. It is perfectly clear to me that everything I do is pioneer work which has still to be followed by a real laying of foundations, but there are gratifying signs that others are beginning to make forays into this territory (Letters, Vol. I, p. 231, letter to Rudolf Panwitz dated 27 March 1937).

17

It might seem that these considerations indicate that one must assume the archetypal theory in order to be able to see what counts as data in favor of it. However, this difficulty of appraising the evidence for the archetypal theory from a non-Jungian perspective exemplifies the close interrelationship that exists between theory and evidence. That is to say, the theory determines which data are relevant as evidence and what is relevant as evidence from one theoretical perspective is irrelevant from another. The fact that Jung employs a phenomenological method of investigation does not of course mean that he does not select what is relevant for description from essentially theoretical considerations.

18

Within the scope of this study, we cannot hope to examine all relevant evidence. Moreover, in light of the lengthy discussion often necessary to make clear what is meant by the claim that an archetype has been experienced, we thought it better to discuss one example in detail rather than simply mentioning several. Other sources of evidence involving work with altered states of consciousness which we will not discuss include the works of such authors as the following: Carlos Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan, John Lilly, The Center of the Cyclone (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), and Ann Faraday, Dream Power (New York: Berkeley Publishing Corp., 1972).

19

R. E. L. Masters and Jean Houston, The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience (New York: Dell, 1966), p. 5.

20

Ibid., p. 92.

21

Ibid., p. 224.

22

Ibid., pages 224-225.

23

Ibid., p. 265.

24

Bernard G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago: Adline Publishing Co., 1966), p. 314.

25

Of course, the archetypal theory is not the only possible explanation of how religious and mythological symbolic systems come into

being. When the point about the survival value of religions and mythologies is admitted, this only entails the inheritance of dispositions to produce symbolic images rather than the full archetypal theory. One might wish to argue, for example, that all that was necessary for such systems to come into being is language and imagination. However, it would seem that the archetypal theory with its hypothesis of the innate archetypes offers a theory of dispositions to produce images which goes a long way toward explaining the culturally universal similarity and emotional appeal of religious and mythological motifs, whereas this additional explanatory import is lacking with other ideas of how symbolic ideas might have originated.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Walter Avery Shelburne was born March 26, 1946 in Bristol, Virginia. He attended the local high school, graduating in 1964. From 1964 until 1968 he was a student at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. In 1968 he received the Bachelor of Science degree in Biology. Plans to attend the Graduate School of the University of Florida were interrupted by the military draft. The author saw service in Vietnam from February, 1969 until April, 1970. Upon release from the Army in May, 1970, the author came to Gainesville, Florida where he started graduate school in Entomology in June, 1970. In September of that year, the author transferred from the College of Agriculture to the College of Arts and Sciences and began graduate work in philosophy. The Master of Arts degree in Philosophy was awarded in March, 1973. The author is not married.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Marilyn Zweig
Marilyn Zweig, Chairman
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Thomas P. Auxter
Thomas P. Auxter
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


Richard P. Haynes
Richard P. Haynes
Associate Professor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Thomas W. Simon
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Franz R. Epting
Associate Professor of Psychology

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June, 1976

Dean, Graduate School