of
"monopoly" and "closed market" and "arbitrary price control." This book
does not plead the case one way or the other, since it seeks to be
entirely objective.
The
opponents of the Diamond Corporation and Diamond Trading Company
(overwhelmingly consisting of people outside the diamond business)
protest that London (by that they mean De Beers, the Diamond
Corporation, and the Trading Company) has stifled competition, has
inflated the value of the diamond beyond all common logic, and has
deliberately curtailed production to prevent a plethora of stones with
a resultant drop in value.
Diamond men do not deny those things. But they ask questions such as these:
Did
Cecil Rhodes and Sir Ernest Oppenheimer and the Diamond Corporation
establish the diamond as the most precious material object in the
world? Or was it not regarded as such in the days of Pliny the Younger
and of Tavernier the Traveler?
What
would the thousands upon thousands of men and women—some rich, but many
so poor that they could only purchase one on a long installment
basis—think if suddenly there were to be a flood of these gems upon the
world, wiping out values?
Every
time there have been new great diamond finds— in the Congo, in Brazil,
and, yes, even in South Africa—a depression in values has threatened.
But for the strong, controlling head of one unit, of this entity called
"London," such a depression would have persisted. That is why it is
important to look into the story of the Lichtenburg and Namaqualand
diamond rushes.
For
many years geologists had made what seemed rash predictions about the
possibility of rich diamond deposits in the Western Transvaal. For
thousands of years the great
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