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ERVING GOFFMAN

Footing

1

Consider a journalistically reported strip of interaction, a news bureau release of 1973 on presidential doings. The scene is the Oval Office, the participants an assemblage of government officers and newspaper reporters gathered in their professional capacities for a political ritual, the witnessing of the signing of a bill:

> WASHINGTON – (UPI) – President Nixon, a gentleman of the old school, teased a newspaper woman yesterday about wearing slacks to the White House and made it clear that he prefers dresses on women.
>
> After a bill-signing ceremony in the Oval Office, the President stood up from his desk and in a teasing voice said to UPI's Helen Thomas: "Helen, are you still wearing slacks? Do you prefer them actually? Every time I see girls in slacks it reminds me of China."
>
> Miss Thomas, somewhat abashed, told the President that Chinese women were moving toward Western dress.
>
> "This is not said in an uncomplimentary way, but slacks can do something for some people and some it can't." He hastened to add, "but I think you do very well. Turn around."
>
> As Nixon, Attorney General Elliott L. Richardson, FBI Director Clarence Kelley and other high-ranking law enforcement officials smiling, Miss Thomas did a pirouette for the President. She was wearing white pants, a navy blue jersey shirt, long white beads and navy blue patent leather shoes with red trim.
>
> Nixon asked Miss Thomas how her husband, Douglas Cornell, liked her wearing pants outfits.
>
> "He doesn't mind," she replied.
>
> "Do they cost less than gowns?"
>
> "No," said Miss Thomas.

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"Then change," commanded the President with a wide grin as other report
and cameramen roared with laughter. (*The Evening Bulletin* [Philadelphi
1973)

This incident points to the power of the President to force an i
dividual who is female from her occupational capacity into a sexu
domestic one during an occasion in which she (and the many wom
who could accord her the role of symbolic representative) mig
well be very concerned that she be given her full professional du
and that due only. And, of course, the incident points to a mome
in gender politics when a President might unthinkingly exert su
power. Behind this fact is something much more significant: t
contemporary social definition that women must always be rea
to receive comments on their 'appearance', the chief constrain
being that the remarks should be favorable, delivered by someo
with whom they are acquainted, and not interpretable as sarcas
Implied, structurally, is that a woman must ever be ready to chan
ground, or, rather, have the ground changed for her, by virtue
being subject to becoming momentarily an object of approvi
attention, not – or not merely – a participant in it.

The Nixon sally can also remind us of some other things. In o
society, whenever two acquainted individuals meet for busines
professional, or service dealings, a period of 'small talk' may w
initiate and terminate the transaction. This small talk will probab
invoke matters bearing on the overall relation of the participan
and on what each can take to be the perduring overall concerns
the others (health, family, etc.). During the business proper of t
encounter, the two participants will presumably be in a more s
mental relation ordered by functionally specific authority, wo
requirements, and the like. Contrariwise, a planning session amo
the military may begin and end with a formal acknowledgement
rank, and in between a shift into something closer to equalitari
decision-making. In either case, in shifting in and out of the busine
at hand, a change of tone is involved, and an alteration in the soc
capacities in which the persons present claim to be active.

Finally, it might be observed that when such change of ge
occurs among more than two persons, then a change commonl
occurs regarding who is addressed. In the Nixon scene, Ms. Thom
is singled out as a specific recipient the moment that 'unseriou
activity begins. (A change may also simultaneously occur in postur
here indeed very broadly with Mr. Nixon rising from his desk.)

The obvious candidate for illustrations of the Nixon shift com from what linguists generally call *code switching*, code here referring to language or dialect. The work of John Gumperz and his colleagues provides a central source. A crude example may be cited (Blom and Gumperz 1972:424):

> On one occasion, when we, as outsiders, stepped up to a group of locals engaged in conversation, our arrival caused a significant alteration in the casual posture of the group. Hands were removed from pockets and looks changed. Predictably, our remarks elicited a code switch marked simultaneously by a change in channel cues (i.e., sentence speed, rhythm, more hesitation pauses, etc.) and by a shift from (R) [a regional Norwegian dialect] to (B) [an official, standard form of Norwegian] grammar.

But of course, an outsider isn't essential; the switch can be employed among the ethnically homogeneous (Blom and Gumperz 1972:425):

> Likewise, when residents [in Hemnesberget, northern Norway] step up to a clerk's desk, greetings and inquiries about family affairs tend to be exchanged in the dialect, while the business part of the transaction is carried on in the standard.

Nor need one restrict oneself to the formal, adult world of government and business and its perfunctory service relationships; the schoolroom will do:

> ... teachers report that while formal lectures – where interruptions are not encouraged – are delivered in (B) [an official standard form of Norwegian], the speaker will shift to (R) [a regional Norwegian dialect] when they want to encourage open and free discussion among students. (Blom and Gumperz 1972:424)

By 1976, in unpublished work on a community where Slovene and German are in active coexistence, matters are getting more delicate for Gumperz. Scraps of dialogue are collected between mothers and daughters, sisters and sisters, and code shifting is found to be present in almost every corner of conversational life. And Gumperz makes a stab at identifying what these shifts mark and how they function (Gumperz 1976):

i. direct or reported speech
ii. selection of recipient
iii. interjections
iv. repetitions
v. personal directness or involvement

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vi. new and old information
vii. emphasis
viii. separation of topic and subject
ix. discourse type, e.g., lecture and discussion

More important for our purposes here, Gumperz and his co-workers now also begin to look at code switching-like behaviour that doesn't involve a code switch at all. Thus, from reconstituted notes on classroom observations the Gumperzes provide three sequential statements by a teacher to a group of first-graders, the statements printed in spaced-out form to mark the fact that three different stances were involved: the first a claim on the children's immediate behavior, the second a review, a 'preplay' of experiences to come, and the third a side remark to a particular child (Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz 1976:8-9):

1. Now listen everybody.
2. At ten o'clock we'll have assembly. We'll all go out together and go to the auditorium and sit in the first two rows. Mr. Dock, the principal, is going to speak to us. When he comes in, sit quietly and listen carefully.
3. Don't wiggle your legs. Pay attention to what I'm saying.

The point being that, without access to bodily orientation and tone of voice, it would be easy to run the three segments into a continuous text and miss the fact that significant shifts in alignment of speaker to hearers were occurring.

I have illustrated through its changes what will be called *footing.*[1] In rough summary:

i. Participant's alignment, or set, or stance, or posture, or projected self is somehow at issue.

ii. The projection can be held across a strip of behaviour that is less long than a grammatical sentence, or longer, so sentence grammar won't help us all that much, although it seems clear that a cognitive unit of some kind is involved, minimally, perhaps, a phonemic clause. Prosodic, not syntactic, segments are implied.

iii. A continuum must be considered, from gross changes in stance to the most subtle shifts in tone that can be perceived.

iv. For speakers, code switching is usually involved, or at least the sound markers that linguists study: pitch, volume, rhythm, stress, tonal quality.

v. The bracketing of a 'higher level' phase or episode of interaction is commonly involved, the new footing having a liminal role, serving as a buffer between two more substantially sustained episodes.

A change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance. A change in our footing is another way of talking about a change in our frame for events. This paper is largely concerned with pointing out that participants over the course of their speaking constantly change their footing, these changes being a persistent feature of natural talk.

As suggested, change in footing is very commonly language-linked; if not that, then at least one can claim that the paralinguistic markers of language will figure. Sociolinguists, therefore, can be looked to for help in the study of footing, including the most subtle examples. And if they are to compete in this heretofore literary and psychological area, then presumably they must find a structural means of doing so. In this paper I want to make a pass at analyzing the structural underpinnings of changes in footing. The task will be approached by reexamining the primitive notions of speaker and hearer, and some of our unstated presuppositions about spoken interaction.

II

Traditional analysis of saying and what gets said seems tacitly committed to the following paradigm: Two and only two individuals are engaged together in it. During any moment in time, one will be speaking his own thoughts on a matter and expressing his own feelings, however circumspectly; the other listening. The full concern of the person speaking is given over to speaking and to its reception, the concern of the person listening to what is being said. The discourse, then, would be the main involvement of both of them. And, in effect, these two individuals are the only ones who know who is saying, who is listening, what is being said, or, indeed, that speaking is going on – all aspects of their doings being imperceivable by others, that is, *inaccessible.* Over the course of the interaction the roles of speaker and hearer will be interchanged in support of a statement-reply format, the acknowledged current-speaking right – the floor – passing back and forth. Finally, what is going on is said to be conversation or talk.

The two-person arrangement here described seems in fact to be fairly commonly found, and a good thing, too, being the one that informs the underlying imagery we have about face-to-face interaction. And it is an arrangement for which the term 'speaker' and 'hearer' fully and neatly apply – lay terms here being perfectly adequate for all technical needs. Thus, it is felt that without requiring a basic change in the terms of the analysis, any modification of conditions can be handled: additional participants can be added, the ensemble can be situated in the immediate presence of nonparticipants, and so forth.

It is my belief that the language students have drawn on for talking about speaking and hearing is not well adapted to its purpose. And I believe this is so both generally and for a consideration of something like footing. It is too gross to provide us with much of a beginning. It takes global folk categories (like speaker and hearer) for granted instead of decomposing them into smaller, analytically coherent elements.

For example, the terms 'speaker' and 'hearer' imply that sound alone is at issue, when, in fact, it is obvious that sight is organizationally very significant too, sometimes even touch. In the management of turn-taking, in the assessment of reception through visual back-channel cues, in the paralinguistic function of gesticulation, in the synchrony of gaze shift, in the provision of evidence of attention (as in the middle-distance look), in the assessment of engrossment through evidence of side-involvements and facial expression – in all of these ways it is apparent that sight is crucial, both for the speaker and for the hearer. For the effective conduct of talk, speaker and hearer had best be in a position to *watch* each other. The fact that telephoning can be practicable without the visual channel, and that written transcriptions of talk also seem effective, is not to be taken as a sign that, indeed, conveying words is the only thing that is crucial, but that reconstruction and transformation are very powerful processes.

III

The easiest improvement on the traditional paradigm for talk is to recognize that any given moment of it might always be part of *a* talk, namely, a substantive, naturally bounded stretch of interaction comprising all that relevantly goes on from the moment two (or more) individuals open such dealings between themselves and continuing until they finally close this activity out. The opening will typically be marked by the participants turning from their several disjointed orientations, moving together and bodily addressing one another; the closing by their departing in some physical way from the prior immediacy of copresence. Typically ritual brackets will also be found, such as greetings and farewells, these establishing and terminating open, official, joint engagement, that is, ratified participation in a *social encounter.* Correspondingly, throughout the course of the encounter the participants will be obliged to sustain involvement in what is being said and ensure that no long stretch occurs when no one (and not more than one) is taking the floor. Thus, at a given moment no talk may be occurring, and yet the participants will still be in a *state of talk.* Observe, once one assumes that an encounter will have features of its own – if only an initiation, a termination, and a period marked by neither – then it becomes plain that any cross-sectional perspective, any instantaneous slice, focussing on talking, not a talk, necessarily misses important features. Certain issues, such as the work done in summonings, the factor of topicality, the building up of an information state known to be common to the participants (with consequent 'filling in' of new participants), the role of 'preclosings', seem especially dependent on the question of the unit as a whole.

It is a crucial step to give credit to the autonomy of 'a talk' as a unit of activity in its own right, a domain *sui generis* for analysis. But, of course, only new questions are opened up. For although it is easy to select for study a stretch of talk that exhibits the properties of a nicely bounded social encounter (and even easier to assume that any selected occasion of talk derives from such a unit), there are apparently lots of moments of talk that cannot be so located. And there are lots of encounters so intertwined with other encounters as to weaken the claim of any of them to autonomy. So I think one must return to a cross-sectional analysis, to examining *moments* of talk, but now bearing in mind that any broad labeling of what one is looking at – such as 'conversation', 'talk', 'discourse' – is very premature. The question of substantive unit is one that will eventually have to be addressed, even though analysis may have to begin by blithely plucking out a moment's talk to talk about, and blithely using labels that might not apply to the whole course of a conversation.

IV

Turn first, then, to the notion of a hearer (or a recipient, or a listener). The process of auditing what a speaker says and following the gist of his remarks – hearing in the communication-system sense – is from the start to be distinguished from the social slot in which this activity usually occurs, namely, official status as a ratified participant in the encounter. For plainly, we might not be listening when indeed we have a ratified social place in the talk, and this in spite of normative expectations on the part of the speaker. Correspondingly, it is evident that when we are not an official participant in the encounter, we might still be following the talk closely, in one of two socially different ways: either we have purposely engineered this, resulting in *eavesdropping,* or the opportunity has unintentionally and inadvertently come about, as in *overhearing.* In brief, a ratified participant may not be listening, and someone listening may not be a ratified participant.

Now consider that much of talk takes place in the visual and aural range of persons who are not ratified participants and whose access to the encounter, however minimal, is itself perceivable by the official participants. These adventitious participants are *bystanders.* Their presence should be considered the rule, not the exception. In some circumstances they can temporarily follow the talk, or catch bits and pieces of it, all without much effort or intent, becoming, thus, overhearers. In other circumstances they may surreptitiously exploit the accessibility they find they have, thus qualifying as eavesdroppers, here not dissimilar to those who secretly listen in on conversations electronically. Ordinarily, however, we bystanders politely disavail ourselves of these opportunities, practicing the situational ethic which obliges us to warn those who are, that they are, unknowingly accessible, obliging us also to enact a show of disinterest, and by disattending and withdrawing ecologically to minimize our actual access to the talk. (Much of the etiquette of bystanders can be generated from the basic understanding that they should act so as to maximally encourage the fiction that they aren't present; in brief, that the assumptions of the conversational paradigm are being realized.) But however polite, bystanders will still be able to glean some information; for example, 'who' (whether in categorical or biographical terms) is in an encounter with whom, which of the participants is speaker and which are listeners, what the general mood of the conversational circle is, and so forth. Observe, too, that in managing the accessibility of an encounter both its participants and its bystanders will rely heavily on sight, not sound, providing another reason why our initial two-party paradigm is inadequate. (Imagine a deaf person bystanding a conversation; would he not be able to glean considerable social information from what he could see?)

The hearing sustained by our paradigmatic listener turns out to be an ambiguous act in an additional sense. The ratified hearer in two-person talk is necessarily also the *addressed* one, that is, the one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over the speaking role. But obviously two-person encounters, however common, are not the only kind; three or more official participants are often found. In such cases it will often be feasible for the current speaker to address his remarks to the circle as a whole, encompassing all his hearers in his glance, according them something like equal status. But, more likely, the speaker will, at least during periods of his talk, address his remarks to one listener, so that among official hearers one must distinguish the addressed recipient from *unaddressed* ones. Observe again that this structurally important distinction between official recipients is often accomplished exclusively through visual cues, although vocatives are available for managing it through audible ones.

Once the dyadic limits of talk are breached, and one admits bystanders and/or more than one ratified recipient to the scene, then *subordinate communication* becomes a recognizable possibility, that is, talk that is manned, timed, and pitched to constitute a perceivedly limited interference to what might be called the *dominating communication* in its vicinity. Indeed, there are a great number of work settings where informal talk is subordinated to the task at hand, the accommodation being not to another conversation but to the exigencies of work in progress.

Those maintaining a subordinate communication relative to a dominant state of talk may make no effort to conceal that they are communicating in this selective way and apparently no pointed effort to conceal what it is they are communicating. Thus *byplay*: subordinated communication of a subset of ratified participants; *crossplay*: communication between ratified participants and bystanders across the boundaries of the dominant encounter; *sideplay*: respectfully hushed words exchanged entirely among bystanders.[2] Nature is a pedant; in our culture each of these three forms of apparently unchallenging communication is managed through gestural markers that are distinctive and well-standardized, and I assume that other gesture communities have their own sets of functional equivalents.

When an attempt *is* made to conceal subordinated communication, *collusion* occurs, whether within the boundaries of an encounter (collusive byplay) or across these boundaries (collusive crossplay) or entirely outside the encounter, as when two bystanders surreptitiously editorialize on what they are overhearing (collusive sideplay). Collusion is accomplished variously: by concealing the subordinate communication, by affecting that the words the excolluded can't hear are innocuous, or by using allusive words ostensibly meant for all participants, but whose additional meaning will be caught by only some.

Allied to collusion is *innuendo,* whereby a speaker, ostensibly directing words to an addressed recipient, overlays his remarks with a patent but deniable meaning, a meaning that has a target more so than a recipient, is typically disparaging of it, and is meant to be caught by the target, whether this be the addressed recipient or an unaddressed recipient, or even a bystander (Fisher 1976).

A further issue. In recommending earlier that a conversation could be subordinated to an instrumental task at hand, that is, fitted in when and where the task allowed, it was assumed that the participants could desist from their talk at any moment when the requirements of work gave reason, and presumably return to it when the current attention requirements of the task made this feasible. In these circumstances it is imaginable that the usual ritualization of encounters would be muted, and stretches of silence would occur of variable length which aren't nicely definable as either interludes between different encounters or pauses within an encounter. Under these conditions (and many others) an *open state of talk* can develop, participants having the right but not the obligation to initiate a little flurry of talk, then relapse back into silence, all this with no apparent ritual marking, as though adding but another interchange to a chronic conversation in progress. Here something must be addressed that is neither ratified participation nor bystanding, but a peculiar condition between.

Consider now that, in dealing with the notions of bystanders, a shift was tacitly made from the encounter as a point of reference to something somewhat wider, namely, the *social situation,* defining this as the full physical arena in which persons present are in sight and sound of one another. (These persons, in their aggregate, can be called a *gathering,* no implications of any kind being intended concerning the relationships in which they might severally stand to one another.) For it turns out that routinely it is relative to a gathering, not merely to an encounter, that the interactional facts will have to be considered. Plainly, for example, speakers will modify how they speak, if not what they say, by virtue of conducting their talk in visual and aural range of nonparticipants. Indeed, when reporting on having heard someone say something, we are likely to feel obliged to make clear whether we heard the words as a ratified participant to the talk of which they were a part or whether we overheard them as a bystander.[3]

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the structural significance of the social situation for talk (and, incidentally, of the limitation of the conventional model of talk) is to be found in our verbal behavior when we are by ourselves yet in the immediate presence of passing strangers. Proscriptive rules of communication oblige us to desist in use of speech and word-like, articulated sounds. But in fact there is a wide variety of circumstances in which we will audibly address statements to ourselves, blurt out imprecations, and utter 'response cries', such as oops, eek, and the like (Goffman 1978). These vocalizations can be shown to have a self-management function, providing evidence to everyone who can hear that our observable plight is not something that should be taken to define us. To that end the volume of the sounding will be adjusted, so that those in the social situation who can perceive our plight will also hear our comment on it. No doubt, then, that we seek some response from those who can hear us, but not a specific reply. No doubt the intent is to provide information to everyone in range, but without taking the conversational floor to do so. What is sought is not hearers but overhearers, albeit intended ones. Plainly, the substantive natural unit of which self-directed remarks and response cries are a part need not be a conversation, whatever else it might be.

Finally, observe that if one starts with a particular individual in the act of speaking – a cross-sectional instantaneous view – one can describe the role or function of all the several members of the encompassing social gathering from this point of reference (whether they are ratified participants of the talk or not), couching the description in the concepts that have been reviewed. The relation of any one such member to this utterance can be called his *participation status* relative to it, and that of all the persons in the gathering the *participation framework* for that moment of speech. The same two terms can be employed when the point of reference is shifted from a given particular speaker to something wider: all the activity in the situation itself. The point of all this, of course, is that an utterance does not carve up the world beyond the speaker into precisely two parts, recipients and nonrecipients, but rather opens up an array of structurally differentiated possibilities, establishing the framework in which the speaker will be guiding his delivery.

V

I have argued that the notion of hearer or recipient is rather crude In so doing, however, I restricted myself to something akin ordinary conversation. But conversation is not the only context talk. Obviously talk can (in modern society) take the form of a pla form monologue, as in the case of political addresses, stand-u comedy routines, lectures, dramatic recitations, and poetry reading These entertainments involve long stretches of words coming from single speaker who has been given a relatively large set of listene and exclusive claim to the floor. Talk, after all, can occur at the tow podium, as well as the town pump.

And when talk comes from the podium, what does the hearing an audience, not a set of fellow conversationalists. Audiences hear i a way special to them. Perhaps in conjunction with the fact th audience members are further removed physically from the speak than a co-conversationalist might be, they have the right to exami the speaker directly, with an openness that might be offensive in co versation. And except for those very special circumstances when, f example, the audience can be told to rise and repeat the Lord Prayer, or to donate money to a cause, actions can only be reco mended for later consideration, not current execution. Indeed, a fundamentally, the role of the audience is to appreciate remar made, not to reply in any direct way. They are to conjure up what reply might be, but not utter it; 'back channel' response alone what is meant to be available to them. They give the floor but (e cept during the question period) rarely get it.

The term 'audience' is easily extended to those who hear tal over the radio or TV, but these hearers are different in obvio and important ways from those who are live witnesses to it. Li witnesses are coparticipants in a social occasion, responsive to the mutual stimulation that that provides; those who audit t talk by listening to their set can only vicariously join the station a dience. Further, much radio and TV talk is not addressed (as o dinary podium talk is) to a massed but visible grouping off the sta but to *imagined* recipients; in fact, broadcasters are under pressu to style their talk as though it were addressed to a single listene Often, then, broadcast talk involves a conversational mode of addre but, of course, merely a simulated one, the requisite recipients n being there in the flesh to evoke it. And so a broadcast talk may ha a 'live' audience and a broadcast audience, the speaker now styli his projection mainly for the one, now for the other, and only th music of language can lull us into thinking that the same kind of recipient entity is involved.

Still further multiplicities of meaning must be addressed. Podiums are often placed on a stage; this said, it becomes plain that podiums and their limpets are not the only things one finds there. Stage actors are found there, too, performing speeches to one another in character, all arranged so they can be listened in on by those who are off the stage. We resolutely use one word, 'audience', to refer to those who listen to a political speech and those who watch a play, but again the many ways in which these two kinds of hearers are in the same position shouldn't blind one to the very important ways in which their circumstances differ. A townspeaker's words are meant for his audience and are spoken to them; were a reply to be made, it would have to come from these listeners, and indeed, as suggested, signs of agreement and disagreement are often in order. It is presumably because there are so many persons in an audience that direct queries and replies must be omitted, or at least postponed to a time when the speech itself can be considered over. Should a member of the audience assay to reply in words to something that a speaker in mid-speech says, the latter can elect to answer and, if he knows what he's about, sustain the reality he is engaged in. But the words addressed by one character in a play to another (at least in modern Western dramaturgy) are eternally sealed off from the audience, belonging entirely to a self-enclosed, make-believe realm, although the actors who are performing these characters (and who in a way are also cut off from the dramatic action) might well appreciate signs of audience attentiveness.[4]

I have suggested that orators and actors provide a ready contrast to a conversation's speaker, the former having audiences, the latter fellow conversationalists. But it must be borne in mind that what goes on upon the platform is only incidentally – not analytically – talk. Singing can occur there (this being another way words can be uttered), and doings which don't centrally involve words at all, such as instrumental offerings, hat tricks, juggling, and all the other guileful acts that have done a turn in vaudeville. The various kinds of audiences are not, analytically speaking, a feature of speech events (to use Hymes' term) but of stage events.

And from here one can go on to still more difficult cases. There are, for example, church congregations of the revivalist type wherein an active interchange is sustained of calls and answers between minister and church-goers. And there are lots of social arrangements in which a single speaking slot is organizationally central, and yet neither a stage event with its audience, nor a conversation with it participants, is taking place; rather something binding is: cour trials, auctions, briefing sessions, and course lectures are examples Although these podium occasions of binding talk can often suppor participants who are fully in the audience role, they also neccessarily support another class of hearers, ones who are more committed by what is said and have more right to be heard than ordinarily occur in platform entertainments.

Whether one deals with podium events of the recreational, congregational, or binding kind, a participation framework specific to it will be found, and the array of these will be different from, and additional to, the one generic to conversation. The participatio framework paradigmatic of two-person talk doesn't tell us very much about participation frameworks as such.

VI

It is claimed that to appreciate how various as to kind hearers are first one must move from the notion of a conversational encounter to the social situation in which the encounter occurs, and then one must see that, instead of being part of a conversation, words can be part of a podium occasion where doings other than talk are often featured, words entering at the beginning and ending of phases of the program, to announce, welcome, and thank. But this might still incline one to hold that when words pass among a small number of persons, the prototypical unit to consider is nevertheless a conversation or a chat. However, this assumption must be questioned, too.

In canonical talk, the participants seem to share a focus of cognitive concern – a common subject matter – but less simply so a common focus of visual attention. The subject of attention is clear, the object of it less so. Listeners are obliged to avoid staring directly at the speaker too long lest they violate his territoriality, and yet they are encouraged to direct their visual attention so as to obtain gesticulatory cues to his meaning and provide him with evidence that he is being attended. It is as if they were to look into the speaker's words, which, after all, cannot be seen. It is as if they must look at the speaker, but not see him.[5]

But, of course, it is possible for a speaker to direct the visual attention of his hearers to some passing object – say, a car or a view – in which case for a moment there will be a sharp difference between speaker and both cognitive and visual attention. And the same is true when this focus of both kinds of attention is a person, as when two individuals talking to each other remark on a person whom they can see asleep or across the street. And so one must consider another possibility: when a patient shows a physician where something hurts, or a customer points to where a try-on shoe pinches, or a tailor demonstrates how the new jacket fits, the individual who is the object of attention is also a fully qualified participant. The rub – and now to be considered – is that in lots of these latter occasions a conversation is not really the context of the utterance; a physically elaborated, nonlinguistic undertaking is one in which nonlinguistic events may have the floor. (Indeed, if language is to be traced back to some primal scene, better it is traced back to the occasional need of a grunted signal to help coordinate action in what is already the shared world of a joint task than to a conversation in and through which a common subjective universe is generated.[6])

One standard nonlinguistic context for utterances is the perfunctory service contact, where a server and client come together momentarily in a coordinated transaction, often involving money on one side and goods or services on the other. Another involves those passing contacts between two strangers wherein the time is told, the salt is passed, or a narrow, crowded passageway is negotiated. Although a full-fledged ritual interchange is often found in these moments, physical transactions of some kind form the meaningful context and the relevant unit for analysis; the words spoken, whether by one participant or two, are an integral part of a mutually coordinated physical undertaking, not a talk. Ritual is so often truncated in these settings because it is nonconversational work that is being done. It is the execution of this work, not utterances, that will ordinarily be the chief concern of the participants. And it is when a hitch occurs in what would otherwise have been the routine interdigitation of their acts that a verbal interchange between them is most likely.

Or take the open state of talk that is commonly found in connection with an extended joint task, as when two mechanics, separately located around a car, exchange the words required to diagnose, repair, and check the repairing of an engine fault. An audio transcription of twenty minutes of such talk might be very little interpretable even if we know about cars; we would have to watch what was being done to the one in question. The tape would contain long stretches with no words, verbal directives answered only by mechanical sounds, and mechanical sounds answered by verbal responses. And rarely might the relevant context of one utterance be another utterance.

So, too, game encounters of the kind, say, that playing bridge provides, where some of the moves are made with cards, and some with voiced avowals which have been transformed into ideal performatives by the rules of the game.

And indeed, in the White House scene presented initially, the colloquy between Mr. Nixon and Ms. Thomas is not an embedded part of a wider conversation, but an embedded part of a ritualized political procedure, the ceremonial signing of a bill.

One clearly finds, then, that coordinated task activity – not conversation – is what lots of words are part of. Presumed common interest in effective pursuance of the activity at hand in accordance with some sort of overall plan for doing so is the contextual matrix which renders many utterances, especially brief ones, meaningful. And these are not unimportant words; it takes a linguist to overlook them.

It is apparent, then, that utterances can be an intimate, functionally integrated part of something that involves other words only in a peripheral and functionally optional way. A naturally bounded unit may be implied, but not one that could be called a speech event.

VII

Beginning with the conversational paradigm, I have tried to decompose the global notion of hearer or recipient, and I have incidentally argued that the notion of a conversational encounter does not particularly help in dealing with the context in which words are spoken; a social occasion involving a podium may be involved, or no speech event at all, and, in any case, the whole social situation, the whole surround, must always be considered. Provided, thus, has been a lengthy gloss on Hymes' admonition (1974:54): "The common dyadic model of speaker-hearer specifies sometimes too many, sometimes too few, sometimes the wrong participants."

It is necessary now to look at the remaining element of the conversational paradigm, the notion of *speaker.*

In canonical talk, one of the two participants moves his lips up and down to the accompaniment of his own facial (and sometimes bodily) gesticulations, and words can be heard issuing from the locus of his mouth. His is the sounding box in use, albeit in some actual cases he can share this physical function with a loudspeaker system or a telephone. In short, he is the talking machine, a body engaged in acoustic activity, or, if you will, an individual active in the role of utterance production. He is functioning as an *animator.* Animator and recipient are part of the same level and mode of analysis, two terms cut from the same cloth, not social roles in the full sense so much as functional nodes in a communication system.

But, of course, when one uses the term speaker, one very often beclouds the issue, having additional things in mind, this being one reason why *animator* cannot comfortably be termed a social role, merely an analytical one.

Sometimes one has in mind that there is an *author* of the words that are heard, that is, someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded.

Sometimes one has in mind that a *principal* (in the legalistic sense) is involved, that is, someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who has committed himself to what the words say. Note that one deals in this case not so much with a body or mind as with a person active in some particular social identity or role, some special capacity as a member of a group, office, category, relationship, association, or whatever, some socially based source of self-identification. Often this will mean that the individual speaks, explicitly or implicitly, in the name of 'we', not 'I' (but not for the reasons Queen Victoria or Nixon felt they had), the 'we' including more than the self (Spiegelberg 1973:129-56, Berreman 1969, Moerman 1968:153-69). And, of course, the same individual can rapidly alter the social role in which he is active, even though his capacity as animator and author remain constant – what in committee meetings is called 'changing hats'. This, indeed, is what occurs during a considerable amount of code shifting, as Gumperz has amply illustrated. Observe, in thus introducing the name or capacity in which he speaks, that the speaker goes some distance in establishing a corresponding reciprocal basis of identification for those to whom this stand-taking is addressed. To a degree, then, to select the capacity in which we are to be active is to select (or to attempt to select) the capacity in which the recipients of our action are present (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963:454-66). All of which work is consolidated by naming practices and, in many languages, through choice among available second-person pronouns.

The notions of animator, author, and principal, taken together, can be said to tell us about the *production format* of an utteranc

When one uses the term 'speaker', one often implies that th individual who animates is formulating his own text and stakin out his own position through it: animator, author, and princip are one. What could be more natural? So natural indeed that cannot avoid continuing to use the term 'speaker' in this sense, le alone the masculine pronoun as the unmarked singular form.

But, of course, the implied overlaying of roles has extensive institutionalized exceptions. Plainly, *reciting* a fully memorized tex or *reading aloud* from a prepared script allows us to animate word we had no hand in formulating and express opinions, beliefs, an sentiments we do not hold. We can openly speak *for* someone els and *in* someone else's words, as we do, say, in reading a depositio or providing a simultaneous translation of a speech – the latter a interesting example because so often the original speaker's words although ones this person commits himself to, are ones that someon else wrote for him. As will later be seen, the tricky problem is tha often when we do engage in *fresh talk*, that is, the extemporaneous ongoing formulation of a text under the exigency of immediat response to our current situation,[7] it is not true to say that w always speak our own words and ourself take the position to whic these words attest.

A final consideration. Just as we can listen to a conversatio without being ratified hearers (or be ratified to listen but fail to do so), so as ratified listeners – participants who don't now have th floor – we can briefly interject our words and feelings into th temporal interstices within or between interchanges sustained by other participants (Goffman 1976:275-76). Moreover, once others tacitly have given us the promise of floor time to recount a tale or to develop an argument, we may tolerate or even invite kibitzing knowing that there is a good chance that we can listen for a moment without ceasing to be the speaker, just as others can interrupt for a moment without ceasing to be listeners.

VIII

Given an utterance as a starting point of inquiry, I have recommended that our commonsense notions of hearer and speaker are crude, the first potentially concealing a complex differentiation of participation statuses, and the second complex questions of production format.

The delineation of participation framework and production format provides a structural basis for analyzing changes in footing. At least it does for the changes in footing described at the beginning of this paper. But the view that results systematically simplifies the bearing of participation frameworks and production formats on the structure of utterances. Sturdy, sober, sociological matters are engaged, but the freewheeling, self-referential character of speech receives no place. The essential fancifulness of talk is missed. And for these fluidities linguistics, not sociology, provides the lead. It is these matters that open up the possibility of finding some structural basis for even the subtlest shifts in footing.

A beginning can be made by examining the way statements are constructed, especially in regard to 'embedding', a tricky matter made more so by how easy it is to confuse it with an analytically quite different idea, the notion of multiple social roles already considered in connection with 'principal'.

You hear an individual grunt out an unadorned, naked utterance, hedged and parenthesized with no qualifier or pronoun, such as:

a directive: Shut the window.
an interrogative: Why here?
a declarative: The rain has started.
a commissive: The job will be done by three o'clock.

Commonly the words are heard as representing in some direct way the *current* desire, belief, or intention of whoever animates the utterance. The current self of the person who animates seems inevitably involved in some way – what might be called the 'addressing self' – and one is close to the expressive communication we think of as the kind an animal could manage through the small vocabulary of sound-gestures available to it. Observe that when such utterances are heard they are still heard as coming from an individual who not only animates the words but is active in a *paticular* social capacity, the words taking their authority from this capacity.

Many, if not most, utterances, however, are not constructed in this fashion. Rather as speaker, we represent ourselves through the offices of a personal pronoun, typically 'I', and it is thus a *figure* – a figure in a statement – that serves as the agent, a protagonist in a *described* scene, someone, after all, who belongs to the world that is spoken about, not the world in which the speaking occurs. And once this format is employed, an astonishing flexibility is created.

For one thing, hedges and qualifiers introduced in the form of performative modal verbs ('I wish', 'think', 'could', 'hope', etc become possible, introducing some distance between the figure an our avowal. Indeed, a double distance is produced, for presumabl some part of us unconditionally stands behind our condition utterance, else we would have to say something like 'I think that think ... '. Thus, when we slip on a word and elect to further in terrupt the flow by interjecting a remedial statement such a 'Whoops, I got that wrong, ... ' or 'I meant to say ... ', we ar projecting ourselves as animators into the talk, but this is a figure nonetheless, and not the actual animator; it is merely a figure tha comes closer than most to the individual who animates its present tion. And, of course, a point about these apologies for breaks i fluency is that they themselves can be animated fluently, exhibitin a property markedly different from the one they refer to, remindin one that howsoever we feel obliged to describe ourselves, we nee not include in this description the capacity and propensity to projec such descriptions. (Indeed, we cannot entirely do so.) When we say 'I can't seem to talk clearly today', *that* statement can be very clearly said. When we say, 'I'm speechless!' we aren't. (And if we tried to be cute and say, 'I'm speechless – but apparently not enough to prevent myself from saying that', our description would embody the cuteness but not refer to it.) In Mead's terms, a 'me' that tries to incorporate its 'I' requires another 'I' to do so.

Secondly, as Hockett recommends, unrestricted displacement in time and place becomes possible (Hockett 1963:11), the reference now becoming to what we did, wanted, thought, etc., at some distant time and place, when, incidentally, we were active in a social capacity we may currently no longer enjoy and an identity we no longer claim. It is perfectly true that when we say:

I said shut the window

we can mean almost exactly what we would have meant had we uttered the unadorned version as a repetition of the prior command:

Shut the window.

But if we happen to be recounting a tale of something that happened many years ago, when we were a person we consider we no longer are, then the 'I' in 'I said shut the window' is linked to us – the person present – merely through biographical continuity, something that much or little can be made of, and nothing more immediate than that. In which case, two animators can be said to be involved: the one who is physically animating the sounds that are heard, and an embedded animator, a figure in a statement who is present only in a world that is being told about, not in the world in which the current telling takes place. Following the same argument, one can see that by using second or third person in place of first person we can tell of something someone *else* said, someone present or absent, someone human or mythical. We can embed an entirely different speaker in our utterance. For it is as easy to cite what someone else said as to cite oneself. Indeed, when queried as to precisely what someone said, we can reply quotatively:

> Shut the window

and, although quite unadorned, this statement will be understood as something someone other than we, the current and actual animator, said. Presumably 'He (or 'she') said' is implied but not necessarily stated.[8]

Once embedding is admitted as a possibility, then it is an easy step to see that multiple embeddings will be possible, as in the following:

> To the best of my recollection,
> (i) I think that
> (ii) I said
> (iii) I once lived that sort of life.

where (i) reflects something that is currently true of the individual who animates (the 'addressing self'), (ii) an embedded animator who is an earlier incarnation of the present speaker, and (iii) is a doubly embedded figure, namely, a still earlier incarnation of an earlier incarnation.[9]

Although linguists have provided us with very useful treatments of direct and indirect quotation, they have been less helpful in the question of how else, as animators, we can convey words that are not our own. For example, if someone repeatedly tells us to shut the window, we can finally respond by repeating his words in a strident pitch, enacting a satirical version of his utterance ('sayforing'). In a similar way we can mock an accent or dialect, projecting a stereotyped figure more in the manner that stage actors do than in the manner that mere quotation provides. So, too, without much warning, we can interrupt our own words with an adage or saying, the understanding being that fresh talk has momentarily ceased and an anonymous authority wider and different from ourselves is bei suddenly invoked (Laberge and Sankoff 1979, esp. Section III). these playful projections are to be thought of in terms of embe dings, then stage acting and recitation must be thought of as forms embedded action, too. Interestingly, it seems very much the case th in socializing infants linguistically, in introducing them to words an utterances, we from the very beginning teach them to use talk this self-dissociated, fanciful way.[10]

It should be clear, then, that the significance of productio format cannot be dealt with unless one faces up to the embeddin function of much talk. For obviously, when we shift from sayin something ourselves to reporting what someone else said, we a changing our footing. And so, too, when we shift from reporting o current feelings, the feelings of the 'addressing self', to the feelin we once had but no longer espouse, a change of footing will resul (Indeed, a code switch is sometimes used as a mark of this shift).

Final points. As suggested, when as speaker we project ourselves a current and locally active capacity, then our coparticipants in th encounter are the ones who will have their selves partly determine correspondingly. But in the case of a replay of a past event, the se we select for ourself can only 'altercast' the other figures *in th* *story*, leaving the hearers of the replay undetermined in that regar *They* are cast into recipients of a bit of narrative, and this will b much the same sort of self whomsoever we people our narrativ with, and in whatsoever capacity they are there active. The status 'narrator' and 'story listener', which would seem to be of sma significance in terms of the overall social structure, turn out, then to be of considerable importance in conversation, for they provid a footing to which a very wide range of speakers and hearers ca briefly shift.[11] (Admittedly, if a listener is also a character in th story he is listening to, as in the millions of mild recriminations communicated between intimates, then he is likely to have more than mere listener's concern with the tale.)

Storytelling, of course, requires the teller to embed in his ow utterances the utterances and actions of the story's characters. An a full-scale story requires that the speaker remove himself for th telling's duration from the alignment he would maintain in ordinar conversational give and take, and for this period of narration maintain another footing, that of a narrator whose extended pauses an utterance completions are not to be understood as signals that h is now ready to give up the floor. But these changes in footing ar by no means the only kind that occur during storytelling. For durin the telling of a tale (as Livia Polanyi has nicely shown [1977]), the teller is likely to break narrative frame at strategic junctures: to recap for new listeners, to provide (in the raconteur's version of direct address) encouragement to listeners to wait for the punch line or gratuitous characterizations of various protagonists in the tale, or to backtrack a correction for any felt failure to sustain narrative requirements such as contextual detail, proper temporal sequencing, dramatic build-up, and so forth.[12]

IX

It was recommended that one can get at the structural basis of footing by breaking up the primitive notions of hearer and speaker into more differentiated parts, namely, participation framework and production format. Then it was suggested that this picture must itself be complicated by the concept of embedding and an understanding of the reflexivity that seems to be an essential feature of the production process in speaking, the layering effect. But this complication itself cannot be clearly seen unless one appreciates another aspect of embedding, one that linguistic analysis hasn't much prepared us for, namely, the sense in which participation frameworks are subject to transformation. For it turns out that, in the ethological sense, we quite routinely ritualize participation frameworks; that is, we self-consciously transplant the participation arrangement that is natural in one social situation into an interactional environment in which it isn't. In linguistic terms, we not only embed utterances, we embed interaction arrangements.

Illustrations are easy to find. Collusion, for example. This arrangement may not itself be common, but common, surely, is apparently unserious collusion broadly played out with winks and elbow nudges in the obviously open presence of the excolluded. Innuendo is also a common candidate for playful transformation, the target of the slight meant to understand that a form is being used unseriously – a practice sometimes employed to convey an opinion that could not safely be conveyed through actual innuendo, let alone direct statement. The shielding of the mouth with the hand, already a ritualized way of marking a byplay during large meetings, is brought into small conversational circles to mark a communication as having the character of an aside but here with no one to be excluded from it. (I have seen an elderly woman in a quiet street talking about neighborhood business to the man next door and then, in termination of the encounter, split her mouth with the five stiff fingers o her right hand and out of one side remark on how his geranium were growing, the use of this gesture, apparently, marking he appreciation that to play her inquiry straight would be directly t invoke a shared interest and competency, not a particularly masc line one, and hence a likeness her neighbor might be disinclined t be made to face.) Or witness the way in which the physical distanc focusing tone, and loving endearments appropriate within the priva of a courtship encounter can be performed by us in fun to an unsui able candidate as a set piece to set into the focus of attention o wider convivial circle. Or, in the same sort of circle, how we can re pond to what a speaker says to an addressed recipient as though w were bystanders engaged in irreverent, collusive sideplay instead o ratified co-participants. I think there is no doubt that a considerab amount of natural conversation is laminated in the manner the illustrations suggest; in any case, conversation is certainly vulnerab to such lamination. And each increase or decrease in layering – eac movement closer to or further from the literal – carries with it change in footing.

Once it is seen that a participation framework can be parenthe sized and set into an alien environment, it should be evident that a the participation frameworks earlier described as occuring outsid of conversation – that is, arrangements involving an audience or n official recipient at all – are themselves candidates for this reframin process; they, too, can be reset into conversational talk. And, o course, with each such embedding a change of footing occurs. Th private, ruminative self-talk we may employ among strangers when our circumstances suddenly require explaining, we can playfully restage in conversation, not so much projecting the words, but projecting a dumbfounded person projecting the words. So, too, on such occasions, we can momentarily affect a podium speech register, or provide a theatrical version (burlesque, melodramatic) of an aside. All of which, of course, provides extra warrant – indeed, perhaps, the main warrant – for differentiating various participation frameworks in the first place.

It is true, then, that the frameworks in which words are spoken pass far beyond ordinary conversation; but it is just as true that these frameworks are brought back into conversation, acted out in a setting which they initially transcended. What nature divides, talk frivolously embeds, insets, and intermingles. As dramatists can put any world on their stage, so we can enact any participation framework and production format in our conversation.

X

I have dealt till now with *changes* in footing as though the individual were involved merely in switching from one stance or alignment to another. But this image is itself too mechanical and too easy. It is insufficiently responsive to the way embedding and ritualization work. For often it seems that when we change voice – whether to speak for another aspect of ourselves or for someone else, or to lighten our discourse with a darted enactment of some alien interaction arrangement – we are not so much terminating the prior alignment as holding it in abeyance with the understanding that it will almost immediately be re-engaged. So, too, when we give up the floor in a conversation, thereby taking up the footing of a recipient (addressed or otherwise), we can be warranted in expecting to re-enter the speaker role in the same footing from which we left it. As suggested, this is clearly the case when a narrator allows hearers to 'chip in', but such perceivedly temporary holding up of a stance is also to be found when storytelling isn't featured. So it must be allowed that we can hold the same footing across several of our turns at talk. And within one alignment, another can be fully enclosed. In truth, in talk it seems routine that, while firmly standing on two feet, we jump up and down on another.

XI

To end, let us return to the Nixon scene that formed the introduction to this paper. When Helen Thomas pirouetted for the President, she was parenthesizing within her journalistic stance another stance, that of a woman receiving comments on her appearance. No doubt the forces at work are sexism and presidents, but the forces can work in this particular way because of our general capacity to embed the fleeting enactment of one role in the more extended performance of another.

When Helen Thomas pirouetted for the President, she was employing a form of behaviour indigenous to the environment of the ballet, a form that has come, by conventional reframing, to be a feature of female modeling in fashion shows, and she was enacting it – of all places – in a news conference. No one present apparently found this transplantation odd. *That* is how experience is laminated.

The news report of this conference itself does not tell us, but from what is known about Nixon as a performer, a guess would be that he switched from the high ritual of signing a bill to the josh of Ms. Thomas not merely as a bracketing device, a signal that t substantive phase of the ceremony was over, but to show he wa person of spirit and humanity. And I surmise that, although h audience dutifully laughed loudly, they may have seen his gestu as forced, wooden, and artificial, separating him from them by behavioral veil of design and self-consciousness. All of that wou have to be understood to gain any close sense of what Nixon w projecting, of his alignment to those present, of his footing. And believe linguistics provides us with the cues and markers throug which such footings become manifest, helping us to find our way t a structural basis for analyzing them.

NOTES

[1] An initial statement appears in *Frame Analysis* (Goffman 1974:496-559

[2] Bystanders show something of the same respect when they inhibit their ow encounter-formation when theirs would have to compete for sound space wi the accessible encounter in progress.

Note: left unconsidered here are the other arrangements possible betwee two quite differently manned encounters when these occur within access of ea other, the chief possibility being mutual modulation so as to appear to equitab allocate available sound space.

[3] Suggested by Joel Sherzer.

[4] Maintaining a rigid line between characters and audience is by no means, o course, the only way to organize dramatic productions, Burmese tradition theatre providing one example (Becker 1971), our own burlesqued melodram almost another.

[5] Overlayed on this general pattern is a very wide range of practices bearin on the management of interaction. Frequency, duration, and occasion of mutua and unilateral gaze can mark initiation and termination of turn at talk, physic distance, emphasis, intimacy, gender, and so forth. And, of course, a change i footing. See, for example, Argyle and Dean (1965:289-304).

[6] A useful review of the arguments may be found in Hewes 1973:5-24.

[7] David Abercrombie (1965:2) divides what I here call fresh talk into conversation, involving a rapid exchange of speaker-hearer roles, and monologue which involves extended one-person exercises featuring a vaunted style tha approaches the formality of a written form.

[8] Some generative semanticists have argued that *any* unadorned utterance, implies a higher performative verb and a pronoun, e.g., 'I say', 'aver', 'demand', etc., the implication being that all statements are made by figures mentioned or implied, not by living individuals. See, for example, Ross 1970.

[9] It would be easy to think that 'I' had special properties uniquely bridging between the scene in which the talking occurs and the scene about which there is talking, for it refers both to a figure in a statement and to the currently present, live individual who is animating the statement. But that is not quite

so. Second person pronouns are equally two-faced, referring to figures in statements and currently present, live individuals engaged in hearing what a speaker is saying about them. Moreover, both types of pronoun routinely appear embedded as part of quoted statements:

> She said, 'I insist you shut the window.'

in which case the individual who had served as a live, currently present animator has herself become a figure in a higher order statement. The bridging power of 'I' remains, but what is bridged is an embedded speaker to the figure it describes. The scene in which speaking and hearing is currently and actually occurring does not appear except through implicature: the implication that everyone listening will know who is referred to by 'she'.

[10] In play with a child, a parent tries to ease the child into talk. Using 'we' or 'I' or 'baby' or a term of endearment or the child's name, and a lisping sort of baby talk, the parent makes it apparent that it is the child that is being talked *for*, not to. In addition, there are sure to be play-beings easy to hand – dolls, teddy bears, and now toy robots – and these the parent will speak for, too. So even as the child learns to speak, it learns to speak for, learns to speak in the name of figures that will never be, or at least aren't yet, the self. George Herbert Mead notwithstanding, the child does not merely learn to refer to itself through a name for itself that others had first chosen; it learns just as early to embed the statements and mannerisms of a zoo-full of beings in its own verbal behavior. It can be argued that it is just this format that will allow the child in later years to describe its own past actions which it no longer feels are characteristic, just as this format will allow the child to use 'I' as part of a statement that is quoted as something someone else said. (One might say that Mead had the wrong term: the child does not acquire a 'generalized other' so much as a capacity to embed 'particularized others' – which others, taken together, form a heterogeneous, accidental collection, a teething ring for utterances and not a ball team.) It strikes me, then, that although a parent's baby talk (and the talk the child first learns) may involve some sort of simplification of syntax and lexicon, its laminative features are anything but childlike. Nor do I think parents should be told about this.

A treatment of this issue in another culture is provided by Schieffelin (forthcoming).

[11] One example: A few years ago British Broadcasting did an hour-length TV documentary on backstage at the Royal Household. The show purported to display the Queen in her full domestic round, including shopping and picnicking with the Family. Somehow the producers and stars of the program managed to get through the whole show without displaying much that could be deemed inadvertent, revealing, unstaged, or unselfconscious, in part, no doubt, because much of Royal life is probably managed this way even in the absence of cameras. But one exception did shine through. The Queen and other members of the Family occasionally reverted to telling family stories or personal experiences to their interlocutor. The stories no doubt were carefully selected (as all stories must be), but in the telling of them the Royal personages could not but momentarily slip into the unregal stance of storyteller, allowing their hearers the momentary (relative) intimacy of story listeners. What could be conceived

of as 'humanity' is thus practically inescapable. For there is a democracy impl in narration; the lowest rank in that activity is not very low by society's sta ards – the right and obligation to listen to a story from a person to whom need not be in a position to tell one.

[12] Interestingly, the texts that folklorists and sociolinguists provide of every stories often systematically omit the narrative frame breaks that very lik occurred throughout the actual tellings. Here the student of stories has t fully accepted the teller's injunction that the shift in footing required to int duce a correction or some other out of frame comment be omitted from official record. Often omitted, too, is any appreciation of the frequency w which hearers change footing and inject in passing their own contributio the tale (Goodwin 1978, especially Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Part 5).

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