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**The Haunting of White Manhood: Poe, Fraternal  
Ritual, and Polygenesis**

**I**n a striking though seldom noted story published in 1845, Edgar Allan Poe offers a nuanced commentary on early efforts toward the scientific production of otherness. In “Some Words with a Mummy,” an unnamed narrator is summoned, just after retiring for the evening, to join his friend Dr. Ponnonner and a select company to dissect an Egyptian mummy on loan from the City Museum. The men begin at 11 P.M., and by 2 A.M. have only finished unwrapping the mummy and examining his three coffins (where they discover his name, Count Allamistakeo). Deciding to reconvene the next night, the men are preparing to retire when someone half-jokingly suggests applying electric jolts to the body. To their surprise, they resuscitate the mummy, who excoriates them for their incivility and their primitive scientific abilities.

Stunned by the mummy’s response, the group, which includes the famous Egyptologist George Gliddon, question him at length. In sweeps narrow and broad, the mummy tears down the modern men’s sense of cultural, political, scientific, and racial progress, suggesting that—far from advancing—the civilization and civic order they represent has degenerated from earlier ages. They think otherwise only because of their inferior ability in historiography, which follows directly from their inferiority in science, technology, and political organization. “In imminent danger,” as the narrator puts it, “of being discomfited,” the men are left grasping at straws—clothing fashion and humbug patent medicines—to “prove” the superiority of their world to Allamistakeo’s.<sup>1</sup> Happily, the mummy has not heard of “Ponnonner’s lozenges or Brandreth’s pills,” and thus the modern men

find cause for celebration: “Never was triumph more consummate; never was defeat borne with so ill a grace” (170). Indeed, the narrator avers, “I could not endure the spectacle of the poor Mummy’s mortification. I reached my hat, bowed stiffly to him, and took leave.” Once departed, though, the narrator reveals that contrary to the seeming triumph of his departure, he has been plunged into a kind of despair. He goes home and records his account of the evening, bitterly denouncing his wife and his family—and indeed the entire age—in what reads like a suicide note. The narrator reveals at the close his intention to be embalmed for 200 years: “The truth is, I am heartily sick of this life and of the nineteenth century in general. I am convinced that everything is going wrong. Besides, I am anxious to know who will be President in 2045” (170).

This story raises intriguing questions about the attitudes on “race” of an author whom we otherwise know to be committed to what Terry Whalen has recently characterized as an “average racism.” This story, featuring a prominent proponent of polygenesis (Gliddon) and one of its patent efforts to document “separate racial origins” (by proving that civilization arose from “white” and not “black” Egyptians), invokes the racist “science” of polygenesis only to leave its questions unresolved, if not actually refuted. I want to suggest, though, that Poe’s position on “race” is hard to account for in this story only if we understand “race” in its narrowest sense. If, that is, we read this story for evidence of Poe’s attitudes about blackness, we are left with the puzzle of the story’s ending, with the defeated narrator threatening a suicidal emulation of Allamistakeo. But by complicating our framework and examining this story as an interrogation not so much of the identity of blackness but of whiteness, and more particularly of white scientific-professional manhood, the story’s logic becomes clearer. “Some Words with a Mummy” lampoons a particular fraternal construction of white manhood as it diagrams the short circuiting of that construction’s affective structure.<sup>2</sup>

The story’s concern is with the rupture in an emerging form of U.S. manhood that stakes its privileged civic status not just through race but through gender, class, and political exclusions. U.S. democracy was abstracted as a fraternal, homogenous space. Its reassuring grant of equality, however, was always unsettled in practice, not only by the vicissitudes of citizens’ professional, political, and working interactions with other “white” men but also, and as insistently, by citizens’

daily encounters with democracy's "Others": "white" women, African Americans, Native Americans, and a growing underclass fed by poor immigrant Europeans. In John Brenkman's words, "the synthesis of civic equality and [white] masculinity is disturbed" constantly by the repeated claims of these other groups to civic entitlement, to democratic access.<sup>3</sup> These repeated, challenging encounters had become a symptom within the privileged spaces of civic fraternity by the mid-nineteenth century, a kind of haunting that Poe's story neatly delineates. Before returning to consider Poe's story in detail, I want to contextualize his fictional treatment by analyzing the symbolic negotiation of democratic haunting in actual instances, first in the rituals of nineteenth-century fraternal orders and then in the professional circulation of friendship engineered by Samuel George Morton, a key polygenesist and associate of George Gliddon. Read against these materials, Poe's elliptical story, rather than seeming an odd, antiprogressive science-fiction hoax, becomes important to our understanding of American culture as a diagnostic of the intersecting identities of white manhood, fraternity, and rational professionalism.

### **Fraternal Order**

The narrator's desire to be revived to see a future president suggests the importance of the fraternal imaginary in linking citizenship with the abstract identity of professional white manhood. The period just prior to Poe's story marks the concurrent emergence in the United States of "universal" white male suffrage, middle-class professionalism, and a reinvigorated fraternal movement. Indeed, this era of fraternal organization arguably represents an attempt to capture, locally and "in reality," the promised relief from managerial responsibilities for self and other as they were being assumed by middle-class professionals. Fraternalism structured a privileged space for select men while democratically appealing to the fraternal "sameness" of the white male citizen.

Freemasonry had been active in the American colonies since the early 1700s. The late 1700s saw an important development, when a new group composed largely of mechanics and militia men established itself as "Ancient" Freemasons, breaking with the Freemasons they termed "Moderns" and inducting "tens of thousands of members."<sup>4</sup> Soon infamous for their drinking and carousing habits, and

earning a more serious notoriety in the Morgan affair of 1826, the Freemasons suffered a strong and organized backlash throughout the 1830s.<sup>5</sup> By the late thirties and early forties, though, old orders were being revitalized and new ones were springing up. As Mark Carnes explains in his analysis of secret fraternal rituals in the nineteenth century, this new generation of orders diverged significantly from the tavern brotherhood of the early Freemasons.<sup>6</sup> Groups like the Odd Fellows placed a ban on alcohol at lodge activities and began revising initiation rituals. The Freemasons would shortly follow suit. Carnes notes that “from 1840 to 1860 American Masonry was entirely transformed,” so much so that their British counterparts denounced the revised rituals as “‘too long, too complicated, and too theatrical’” (28).

While it is hard to be sure now precisely what it was about these sober and obscure rituals that attracted millions of (mostly middle-class) white men,<sup>7</sup> it is clear that by midcentury the success of various orders—groups with such diverse orientations as labor, profession, temperance, and religion—rose and fell over the appeal of their rituals. Though many relied on religious imagery and rites, they tended to downplay explicitly Christian references in favor of a universalist emphasis. Theoretically inclusive and structured to initiate the member into ever higher levels of an all-male universal family, the ceremonies “promised to reveal ‘great mysteries,’ ‘impenetrable secrets’ or equally arcane forms of religious knowledge” (Carnes, 56).<sup>8</sup>

Beyond the raw silliness of men dressing up like Indians, Egyptian Pharaohs, and Knights on a regular basis, there are other reasons to ask why this mystic form of fraternalism attracted so many men from the middle classes.<sup>9</sup> One is the heavy and constant expense; in addition to dues, a member was constantly called on to contribute other monies. Each new level entailed more costuming, more equipment, another initiation fee. Oddly, too, the rituals became so long that they left little time for members to enjoy friendship or even casual association. For instance, like other increasingly successful orders, the revisionists in the Odd Fellows insisted on lengthy (as long as an hour), solemn, and elaborate rituals recited and enacted from memory—so much to the exclusion of fellowship that the Odd Fellows eventually split with their British brothers over their differing sense of purpose (Carnes, 27–28).

Perhaps intensifying imperatives for male self-discipline led men

to make sacrifices of time and money in order to gain purchase on a “pure” space of formal masculine affiliation. There does seem to be a strong correlation between the rise of Male Purity movements and fraternal men’s desires for intensified ritualism; Carnes notes that the midcentury “infusion” of newly prosperous professionals and tradesmen into the orders “coincided with new demands for sobriety and self-restraint and with the rise of emotionally intense rituals” (24).<sup>10</sup> The more nineteenth-century culture emphasized the importance of men disciplining their bodily flows, insisting that they practice sexual abstinence, dietary regimentation, and temperance in order to conserve energy for proper (business) pursuits, the more necessary—repeatedly and formally necessary—it became to consolidate an ideal form of properly channeled manhood. Or, to approach this point from a slightly different angle, if, as Mary Douglas has argued, rituals work to contain fears of social formlessness, we can see how strong imperatives for men’s self-control, for maintaining bodily and identity boundaries (“individualism”), responded to the massive social and economic changes accumulating at midcentury.<sup>11</sup> Fraternal ritual offered men a formally and emotionally focused time during which they could experience themselves as part of a controlled male body.

The various rituals—of Freemasons, Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias, the Fraternal Order of Red Men, and others—structured spaces in which men could feel symbolically reconstituted within the abstract and pure body of brotherhood. These rituals emphasized the degraded nature of the initiate’s worldly self and of the world outside the fraternity.<sup>12</sup> Elaborating a symbolic death and rebirth, initiations exterminated a debased, sinful, unmanly, and dirtied self. In a Scottish Rite ceremony, the candidate began wearing a spotless uniform, only to have each item replaced with “more common clothing.” Eventually, the ceremony’s official would declare that “‘these marks of indignity are not sufficiently humiliating’” and would cover the initiate “with a black cloth sprinkled with ashes” (Carnes, 51). Ceremonies described death in lurid details featuring dismemberment and putrefaction. Humiliation seems to have been central to the ceremonies. Carnes observes, “as if skeletons, skulls, bloody daggers, executioners’ devices and funereal accouterments were not enough, ritualists frequently employed other mechanisms to unnerve the initiate” (54). With the candidate sufficiently soaked in his own shame and embarrassment, the ritual proceeded to rescue or rebirth the candidate into

a new family, his all-male secret brotherhood. The rituals, according to Carnes, “affirmed that, though woman gave birth to man’s body, initiation gave birth to his soul, surrounding him with brothers who would lavish on him the ‘utmost affection and kindness’” (120).

Fraternal structures were not, however, egalitarian. An adult man’s symbolic humiliation in fraternal initiations reminded him to identify with vertically structured male power: the rituals established and maintained a hierarchy among members, teaching initiates that the grant of “manhood” and lodge-family membership depended on their earning approval from lodge patriarchs. As Mary Ann Clawson explains, the hierarchy expressed within rituals and in the succession of degrees, “upheld a version of a social mobility available to all industrious men.”<sup>13</sup> But more than a structural analogue to the work world, ritually instituted fraternal hierarchy worked affectively to install in “brothers” a desire for the “intimate inequality” that Julie Ellison has argued increasingly represented the emotional organization of male homosocial culture by midcentury.<sup>14</sup> Thus, while Carnes concludes that the rituals contain symbols and metaphors that help men “effectively confront” the difficult conflicts of the “outside world” (144), I am suggesting somewhat differently that fraternal rituals mirrored, distilled, and provided a kind of narcotic for the conflicts men faced outside the lodges. In other words, ritualism seems to have provided men not so much the equipment to “confront” the disparities of the world outside (if we take “confront” in the sense of engaging critically) as a standpoint that naturalized the emotional dissonances they experienced because of political and economic imbalances “outside” the lodge.

Let me elaborate briefly. Fraternal rituals allowed groups of men to act in unison, as a single, coherent body. This body exemplified the purpose and order they had been taught to long for—by emergent capitalism and its deacons, the temperance campaigns and male purity movement—and it was precisely their formalized, emotionally intense, affectively gratifying subordination to group leadership that allowed fraternal orders to function in a way that satisfied these needs.<sup>15</sup> Brotherhood was grounded—as Christopher Newfield so precisely phrases it—in “rewarding subjection.”<sup>16</sup> The pleasures men experienced as part of a hierarchicalized, rigidly ordered fraternal “body” worked forcefully to naturalize the hierarchical entitlements white men enjoyed outside the lodge, as citizens/representatives of

democracy. At the same time, the lodges' hierarchies worked powerfully to rationalize the uneven distribution of wealth, the gains and losses, the pleasures and humiliations, that the men themselves experienced in economic competition.<sup>17</sup>

Above all (for my analysis, at least), fraternal brotherhood provided a paradigm of internally ordered, hierarchically managed "*sameness*." It is in such symbolic spaces that we can begin to discern the cultural emergence of homophobia. As Newfield trenchantly observes, "[h]omophobia's sexual regime takes its modern structure by miming the shape of a national imperative"—representative democracy as it was symbolically expressed in vertically ordered relations among white men.<sup>18</sup> Increasingly, as scholars like Newfield, Ellison, and Michael Moon have argued, "homosexuality" was conceptualized as a kind of radical equality, a mob-equivalent, a de-individualizing sameness, a danger to democratic order that threatened to emerge from the ranks of the citizens.<sup>19</sup> The "rewarding subjection" of fraternal brotherhood, with its imperative for stratified sameness, mirrored and arguably intensified emerging middle-class (national) phobias about unmanaged sameness—the haunting specter of a mob united by their desire for equalizing social change.

In a chapter describing the counterintuitive way the highest levels of the various orders tended to culminate in ceremonies that emphasized not combative manliness but peaceful homecoming, a reconciliation of man's "masculine passions" with his "feminine identifications," Carnes questions the role of secrecy: "if all men could benefit from the truth of the rituals, why were they concealed at all?" He concludes that the secrecy of these orders points toward the men's deep concerns about the "gender bifurcations of Victorian society"—their sense that they were forbidden to "express nurturing and paternal emotions" (149). I would insist, differently from Carnes, that lodge secrecy was symptomatic of members' simultaneous desires for and fear of the radical impulses represented by "Fraternity," its specific promise of a *universal* Good. In their rituals, they learned to love their "Others," but only in the most denatured, evacuated form—the symbolic pure mother, the symbolic noble Red Man, the symbolic mystic "primitive." In such ritualized contact, they exercised their sense that they stood, like Poe's narrator, for the "hopes of humanity," for the Good of the Whole. But these symbolic encounters kept the men who participated in them away from their homes with real women

and real children; they kept the men who joined occupied in homogenous racial and class company and mostly homogenous ethnic and religious company. These rituals did work to redress men's rightful sense that they were being deprived of something in the world outside the lodge. But I would say that rituals were like an opiate, allowing men to experience the "traumatic pleasure" of their social power<sup>20</sup> as their own "innocent" victimization, as their exclusion rather than their exclusiveness.<sup>21</sup> Thus, as victims, men turned to mystic rituals to regain a sense of social "wholeness"—a structure that reinforced existing power imbalances rather than encouraging social change in the form of democratic expansion.<sup>22</sup> They could not access a sense of wholeness, however, without invoking their (many) Others. As I will argue in the next section, democracy's excluded Other(s) becomes a melancholy revenant at the heart of the white fraternal imaginary, a haunting we can see even outside the space of fraternal ritual, in practices of professional affiliation and male friendship.

### **Sanctum Sanctorum**

Mary Ann Clawson has commented on the widespread influence of Masonic-style fraternalism in nineteenth-century culture: it "served as an organizational model for trade unions, agricultural societies, nativist organizations, and political movements of every conceivable ideological stripe, as well as for literally hundreds of social organizations."<sup>23</sup> Observing that the model extends even further, to "professional societies and business partnerships, combinations, and trusts," Mark Kann notes that "efforts to strengthen male bonds were especially refined among middle-class professionals who participated in occupations and associations that claimed to reunite masculine virtues and commercial interests."<sup>24</sup> Most recently, E. Anthony Rotundo has noted that "[h]istorians who have studied the structure and habits of the middle-class workplace have always approached it as a product of economic rationality, class interest, or professional imperatives. We also need to understand it as the product of its own masculinity."<sup>25</sup> Locating professional boundaries both geographically and associationally, professional men moved work spaces away from the home and sought to define themselves as a group in terms of narrowing, specialized criteria. In structures that evoke the "work" of fraternity ritual, professional domains developed courses of study and certifi-



cation rituals that determined a candidate's eligibility for entry into his chosen career.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the anxieties that Rotundo highlights as characterizing a young white man's choice of and entry into a career sound much like those that Carnes describes for fraternal initiates, writ large.<sup>27</sup>

Our culturally guided conception of men in the nineteenth-century workplace tends to envisage them as isolated actors; we might, for instance, conceptualize Samuel George Morton's work analyzing his massive collection of crania (known as the "American Golgotha") as the lonely but dedicated work of the scientific lab. But Rotundo reminds us that "male work and sociability mixed promiscuously"<sup>28</sup>—for Morton as for other scientists—in local university settings (Morton was Professor of Anatomy at the Pennsylvania Medical College), in professional organizations that held regular meetings (like the Academy of Natural Sciences), and at formal and informal professional and socializing networks like dinner gatherings and parties. Professional culture was a multi-layered *male* culture in which men spent time in the company of other white men not just during the day but during the evenings and on weekends as well. Men distinguished themselves in all these subcultures, as Rotundo explains, through professional expertise, personal discipline, and successful competitiveness.<sup>29</sup> A man's ability to compete, though, was always conditioned by his ability to affiliate successfully in cooperative networks of fellow professionals.

Morton provides us with a particularly rich example of a figure who consolidated professional respect and cultural authority through a carefully built system of formal and informal relations with other men. First, he cultivated an enormous web of correspondents who supplied him with crania (he obtained none on his own). As Morton's manuscript collection at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania indicates, he was a thoroughgoing networker. These are uniformly warm correspondences, mainly with men who seem to value their affiliation with the cordial, attentive, and generous Philadelphia scientist. His files are littered with letters from one- and two-time correspondents the world over writing to thank Morton for his kind letter, copies of his most recent work, and casts of crania, and to offer further information on the location and disposition of the crania they sent in response to his queries. These range from scientists of international repute to casual scientists, from Ohio and Kentucky, Massachusetts and New

York, Dublin and Lima, and virtually all stops between. As William Stanton informs us, casual scientists on the frontiers in particular

recognized Morton's pre-eminence in the study of crania and were proud to contribute to his famous cabinet. In this manner, Morton was able to gather at the Academy of Natural Sciences the largest collection of crania in the world. . . . That army surgeons stationed at remote western outposts and explorers of the world's deserts took the trouble, often at great hazard to themselves (for some tribes had strong taboos against the desecration of the dead [!]), spoke eloquently of the wide reputation that Morton's collection had acquired.<sup>30</sup>

Morton used this network to construct a veritable army of researchers who wrote with additional support for arguments he was working on—including offers of supporting quotations and logical analogies. In this way, Morton's craniological research and racial arguments became a corporate project with a reach both national and international. Corresponding and supplying Morton with materials for his scientific researches offered men an imagined affiliation with Morton and the science that he represented and lent them some of the growing cultural prestige of science as a profession. We might also imagine that for frontier correspondents association with Morton and his progressivist/rationalist/categorical scientific project conditioned their attitude toward local native peoples whom they encountered.

In Philadelphia Morton made himself the center of another important social network for men of science and ideas. As Stanton notes, Morton made a custom of holding “‘weekly soirées’ to which he invited friends and ‘strangers distinguished in the various departments of learning and philosophy.’”<sup>31</sup> In a practice registered by other men as a professional service,<sup>32</sup> Morton engineered a social space that offered a mannerly reprieve from the pressures of daily work, a private retreat where a select company could build acquaintance, exchange information, and experience an emotionally charged professional confirmation before an audience of important friends and distinguished visitors.<sup>33</sup>

The most important of these professional and social networks for Morton was an inner circle of friends, Josiah Nott (1804–1873), George Gliddon (1809–1857), and Ephraim Squier (1821–1888), his core group of fellow combatants in the battle over polygenesis. Morton had so-

licited a correspondence with Gliddon in 1837, two years before the publication of *Crania Americana*, hoping that the U.S. Vice-Consul to Cairo would be able to supply him with samples of Egyptian crania. As William Stanton notes, Morton's friendship with Gliddon "was of great value, for he was able now to verify his growing suspicion of the great antiquity of the races through his own researches."<sup>34</sup> Morton indicated his debt to Gliddon by dedicating *Crania Aegyptiaca* (1844) to him. Nott, whom Morton first contacted in 1844, served as point man. Aggressive and argumentative, he engineered attacks in the name of polygenesis on the authority of natural theology. Nott's work on hybridity predated and paved the way, in inflammatory and colorful fashion, for Morton's more cautiously worded, carefully built, and scientifically validated arguments. Squier, who introduced himself to Morton in a fund-raising tour for his mound-excavation project in Ohio, was like the younger brother in the group. Stanton observes that the crania Squier supplied to Morton were pivotal in cementing Morton's arguments that racial differences were "aboriginal."<sup>35</sup> When Squier found his first whole crania, the sketches he sent immediately to Morton were answered by an enthusiastic letter from Morton declaring it the "perfect type" of its "race" (thus steering Squier's own interpretation of it).<sup>36</sup> The group offered steady support (and Gliddon his usual advance promotion) as Squier dealt with the Smithsonian Board of Regents in the production of his book (written with his excavation partner, Edwin H. Davis), *Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley* (1848). In their correspondence, these men shared scientific materials, arguments, and even a group vocabulary—coined by Gliddon and Nott in particular—including terms like "niggerology" for polygenesis, "moundology" for Squier's work excavating Indian mounds, and "parson-skinning" for successful shots against natural theologians.<sup>37</sup>

As a group of men with diverse talents and interests, they adeptly generated a widespread cultural and scientific interest in polygenesis. Their consolidation as a group, though, is by no means exceptional in the history of modern science. Robert V. Bruce observes that "the development of American scientific institutions in the nineteenth century cannot be fully understood without looking at a small group of men known . . . as the Florentine Academy, [or] the Lazzaroni."<sup>38</sup> This was a group of roughly a half-dozen scientific men living in Washington, Philadelphia, and Boston in the mid-1800s who were instrumental

in “organizing, raising support for, and guiding scientific institutions” (217). It is a group that has long been legendary as a scientific “cabal,” though their actual influence has been widely contested.<sup>39</sup> Bruce identifies them as “a natural phenomenon in the development of organized science”:

So natural does such a pattern of association seem, in fact, that sociologists have generalized it for twentieth-century scientists. Small, close-knit, informal groups form, they say, quite consciously about an acknowledged leader, who usually serves as a model for at least the younger members. Such groups tend to generate “tribal folklore,” with mock ceremonies. Held together best by the belief that they are advancing a radical new view in science, they may go beyond scientific objectivity in pushing it. And the impression they give of arrogance and exclusiveness often sets outsiders against them.<sup>40</sup>

While Morton and his colleagues, Nott, Gliddon, Squier, and eventually the Swiss scientist Louis Agassiz,<sup>41</sup> were never to wield the financial clout of the Lazzaroni, in many other respects their group functioned similarly. The five men were all variously in correspondence by 1848, sharing sources, promoting each others’ works, and collaborating on publications. Morton was central to cementing alliances between these four men and many others less centrally involved.

A host of productive interrelations link the public arena of professional science and this private discursive domain. Morton’s network, as the correspondence of its members frequently affirms, is most prominently a space that ameliorates the competitive abrasions the men suffer in making their controversial, scientific arguments. Their correspondence also reveals a great tenderness for one another structured around their mutual admiration for Morton. In this aspect, the group is a haven where they can feel an almost familial support, where they can worry, for instance, over the illnesses of fathers and sons. It is a site where the professional, objective pursuits of the group interpenetrate with emotional, subjective ones.

That Morton served as the “heart” of the group is clear in Nott’s letter to Squier on the news of Morton’s death in 1851:

I recd. a letter today from Gliddon giving me the melancholy news of Morton’s death—I am really overwhelmed by this affliction and have not the spirit to write—He was our leader and I look around in

vain for one to supply his place—all men of science knew his talent and learning and I need say nothing to you of his virtues—human nature can be no better than he was.<sup>42</sup>

Nott and Gliddon memorialized Morton's importance, professional and personal, in their 1854 compendium of arguments for polygenesis, *Types of Mankind*, which begins with Henry S. Patterson's "Memoir of the Life and Scientific Labors of Samuel George Morton." Patterson opens with a testimony to Morton's ability to inspire fraternal devotion:

[A]lways there was this peculiarity to be noticed, that wherever a man had known Morton personally at all, he mourned not so much for the untimely extinction of an intellectual light, as for the loss of a beloved personal friend. Certainly the man who inspired others with this feeling, could himself have no cold or empty heart. . . . Quiet and unobtrusive in manners, and fond of the retirement of the study, it was only in the privacy of the domestic circle that he could be rightly known; and those that were privileged to approach nearest the *Sanctum Sanctorum* of his happy home, could best see the full beauty of his character. That sacred veil cannot be raised to the public eye but beneath its folds is preserved the pure memory of one who illustrated every relation of life with a new grace that was all his own, and who, in departing, has left behind him an impression on all hearts.<sup>43</sup>

In her recent analysis of Emerson's *Conduct of Life*, Julie Ellison argues that "sentimental or domestic configurations in men's texts are not necessarily, or not only moments in which men are 'feminized.' . . . They are also specific to masculine culture."<sup>44</sup> I want to draw upon Ellison's insight in considering the ways Morton's social networking structured reassuring and empowering experiences of affiliation for scientific professionals and casual scientists not just in Philadelphia but all over the nation. His genial habits provided circulatory paths for scientific theories, materials, and fellow feeling that led, in treasured moments of professional intimacy, to his study and his *heart*. In this sentimental space men could enjoy the "overflow" of "gentle affections." In this space they could presumably hope, like Morton, to be "rightly known."

A careful reading of this passage suggests that the fellowship men enjoyed within Morton's *Sanctum Sanctorum* depended structurally

and symbolically on excluded Others. The confluence of metaphors of difference, figured by race and gender, circulate in this passage in numerous ways. We can see how Morton's scientific reputation, which Patterson describes as a "white radiance," offers access to a scientific brotherhood both sexually purified and racially dominant. The womblike metaphors of that "domestic" space relocate procreative power from the kitchen (or parlor) to the study, the home/heart of the masculine scientific enterprise. The scientific identity formation Patterson memorializes in Morton suggestively manages to evacuate actual femaleness while absorbing its domestic functions. Morton's study, seen from this vantage, operates as an emotionally charged, intellectually reproductive space that is pointedly, in David Noble's phrase, a "world without women."<sup>45</sup> It culminates the professional arrogation of power and knowledge to science in the private regions of male affiliation.

Patterson eulogizes Morton in a language that appeals to interiority, to a private wholeness revealed in select companies of men. Refusing to describe for the curious masses this space in which Morton displayed the "full beauty of his character," Patterson keeps Morton protected, in an area symbolically cordoned off from the "public." His observance here provides suggestive confirmation of Gillian Brown's arguments about the domestic construction of nineteenth-century individualism. According to Brown, "[i]n the midst of change the domestic sphere provided an always identifiable place and refuge for the individual: it signified the private domain of individuality apart from the marketplace."<sup>46</sup> Morton's *Sanctum Sanctorum* thus promises a privileged access to an individualizing and pure world protected from abrasive encounters with "otherness"—from, for instance, the black waiters that so upset Agassiz in his Philadelphia hotel,<sup>47</sup> from women who were challenging the rights, spaces, and habits of manhood, from the frictions, the woundings professional men experienced among other white men in scholarly and marketplace competitions.

But its value depends precisely on the space culturally associated with women—the domestic circle and its sentimental symbol, the heart—to demarcate the highest and most intimate form of professional men's association. Like fraternal orders' highest degrees, Morton's privileged space of friendship returned professional men to a feminine domain. In this sense, Patterson's paean to Morton and his *Sanctum Sanctorum* evokes the "hermaphroditic figure of the father"

that Eric Cheyfitz has outlined in *The Trans-Parent*. In this study Cheyfitz situates an analysis of Emerson's gendered language practices through a reading of Tocqueville's delineation of reconfigured father/son relations in the post-Revolutionary era:

Tocqueville characterizes this new, or natural, relation as more "intimate" and "sweeter," or "softer" . . . than its aristocratic counterpart. It is a relation marked by "tenderness" and "affection." When contrasted to the relationship between a father and his sons in an aristocracy, the relationship between a father and his sons in a democracy, as Tocqueville describes it, appears as a maternal one. It would seem then, that the democratic father at whom we are looking, if we are to see him as natural, must appear before us clothed, at least partially, in one of the figures of nature, that of the mother, or Woman.<sup>48</sup>

In this sense, Cheyfitz suggests, post-Revolutionary manhood comes to be, in Tocqueville's depiction and Emerson's handling, haunted by its relation to the "not me": "At the moment she appears as a figure of repose, a figure of that natural place of repose, the home, woman also appears as an ironic figure, representing the contradictions within the word *freedom* that threaten to bring revolution."<sup>49</sup>

It is in just this way that I want to pressure Patterson's evocation of the "sacred veil" that "cannot be raised," the "folds" that shield Morton from "the public eye." This veil implies a suggestive range of metaphors for an explicitly feminized purity—Morton as muse, as vestal virgin, as bride—threatened with symbolic penetration by a male (public) gaze. But this is a bride (or virgin or muse) who is *dead* (this is the occasion of Patterson's "Memoir," after all). In this figure Patterson conveys the haunting of the "not me" that plagues and challenges the fraternal imaginary. It is a haunting that betrays the instability of white masculinity's self-sameness, its declaration of independence, its constitutional authority to stand for the Good. This is a "haunting" that works spatially and symbolically. The culture of middle-class manhood, having claimed a sphere apart, compulsively returns to the domestic space, attempting to recreate it in the inner circle of lodge rituals or through the physical occupation of domestic spaces emptied of actual women. In the evocation of women (and Indians, Egyptians, and primitives), these brotherly practices signal the extent to which the foreclosed domestic space of *democratic* human

connectedness—foreclosed by men’s identification with civic, representative power—haunts the fraternal imaginary of white manhood.

I would urge, then, that we think about the way Patterson’s eulogy memorializes a kind of white male melancholy that registers the multiple foreclosures of human exchange that structure white brotherhood in U.S. culture. This is a melancholy that simultaneously symptomatizes a longing for human interconnection *and* an identification with the power that demands its renunciation. It is precisely this melancholy that returns me to Poe’s distressed narrator in “Some Words with a Mummy.”

### Allamistakeo

In light of my analysis of Morton’s *Sanctum Sanctorum*, we cannot overlook the site of the unwrapping of the mummy—not a laboratory or an office but Ponnonner’s dining room; the mummy is laid out on the dining table late at night. The secretive hour and the select company place the event in science’s domestic space, an exclusive domain-within-a-domain where professional men congregate by invitation only to gain access to special knowledge (presumably acquiring professional and cultural advantage thereby). Ratification of their precedence comes through the “Other,” its historical authorization abstractly expressed through their ritual, professional “recognitions” of the mute “facts” of the mummified Egyptian’s bodily difference (thicker skull, primitive stature, alien features).

Given that this science depends on the silence of the mummy, it should not surprise us that when this mummy speaks, it speaks to refute, indeed to devastate, the anticipated pleasures of science’s rational vantage. This story, which has a great deal of fun spinning out what science’s “Other” might say if given an opportunity to respond, demonstrates above all Poe’s attention to the converging popular and scientific appeals of Egyptology. Gliddon, a widely recognized public figure, was pivotal both in cultivating public, museum interest in the “wonders” of ancient Egypt and in promulgating its research value for racial science. As Thomas Gossett notes, Gliddon was “one-half serious student and one-half P. T. Barnum.”<sup>50</sup> Born in England in 1809, Gliddon spent his childhood in places like Malta and Alexandria, Egypt. After his schooling in England, he worked as his father’s agent in Greece, Syria, and Cairo. In 1832 he was appointed U.S. Vice-Consul



in Cairo, whence he cultivated a large “expertise” in Egyptology. In the 1840s Gliddon traveled to the U.S. with a collection of Egyptian materials and began a lecture tour with exhibits.

As Stanton notes, Gliddon’s timing was perfect: “P. T. Barnum and Peale’s Museum had popularized Egyptian relics, and during the thirties and forties the Egyptian influence became apparent in American architecture. . . . [W]ell-to-do Americans began to include Egypt as part of the Grand Tour.”<sup>51</sup> Growing fascination with Egypt was intimately bound up with discourses of national, class, and racial progress.<sup>52</sup> Drawing on Walter Benjamin, who has commented on the ways nineteenth-century industrial capitalism employed contrasting images of the “archaic” in order to consolidate the experiential “newness” of commodities, Anne McClintock delineates how the growing cultural fixation

with origins, with genesis narratives, with archaeology, skulls, skeletons and fossils—the imperial bric-a-brac of the archaic—was replete with the fetishistic compulsion to collect and exhibit that shaped the *musée imaginaire* of middle-class empiricism. The museum . . . became the exemplary institution for embodying the Victorian narratives of progress. In the museum of the archaic, the anatomy of the middle-class took visible shape.<sup>53</sup>

Ancient Egyptian artifacts offered a fascinated American public a way to conceptualize U.S. culture in the contrastive terms of progress, a way to experience the U.S. social body as historically, nationally, and racially exceptional.

Gliddon may have been the first to lecture publicly in the United States on Egyptology.<sup>54</sup> His role in spectacularizing remnants of the ancient civilization was complemented by his work at turning the attention of scientists toward ancient Egypt’s pivotal importance. As Gliddon showed, Egyptology was critical not only to achieving science’s definitive break with biblical interpretation by pushing human chronology back beyond theological consensus but also to emerging theories of separate racial origins. In 1843, when Gliddon gave his Lowell Institute Lectures in Boston, he provided timely publicity and indeed stood as the public focal point for a nexus of arguments coming out of the scientific community that were tending toward claiming separate racial origins. Morton’s *Crania Americana* (1839) had ges-

tured toward but not committed to a theory of polygenesis. In 1843 the rebarbative Josiah Nott published his essay "The Mulatto, a Hybrid," which was to touch off waves of scientific speculation and controversy through its arguments that mulattos, though more intelligent than their black progenitors, were more sickly and less fertile, tending ultimately toward infertility and thereby documenting the claim he would later make (in his *Two Lectures*, 1844) that blacks and whites were separate species.<sup>55</sup>

Gliddon seemingly nerved Morton to make that claim explicitly as well. Providing the embalmed Egyptian heads Morton would use in arguments before the American Philosophical Society in the spring of 1843 to demonstrate that differences in internal crania capacity between ancient Caucasian and ancient Negroid skulls correlated significantly with contemporary differences, Gliddon also urged Morton to dispute theological arguments about chronology.<sup>56</sup> Taking up Gliddon's challenge, Morton began, within the year, publicly arguing in anatomy lectures for the doctrine of polygenesis, an argument he obliquely forwarded in the 1844 publication of his *Crania Aegyptiaca*. However unwilling he might have been at that point to argue explicitly in print for polygenesis, his conclusions, on the basis of his cranial measurements as well as his examination of ancient paintings, that "the valley of the Nile, both in Egypt and in Nubia, was originally peopled by a branch of the Caucasian race," that "Negroes were numerous in Egypt, but their social position in ancient times was the same that it now is, that of servants and slaves," and that "[t]he physical and organic characters which distinguish the several races of men, are as old as the oldest records of our species" provided ample fodder for Gliddon's more aggressive public proclamations.<sup>57</sup>

Because of widespread attention to archaeological remains in Egypt, the achievements of that ancient civilization and suggestions that ancient Egyptians were "black" had become an important obstacle to those who argued for the permanent inferiority of the black "race." As Young writes, evidence that ancient Egypt was the product of a "black" or even "mixed" culture had to be decisively refuted: "for the polygenesisists, it had to have been a white civilization."<sup>58</sup> Recognizing this earlier than most, Gliddon—a bit like Ponnonner in the story—gathered a likely circle of friends, offering them various kinds of encouragement in the form of a steady stream of "raw" materials, public support for their professional reputations, his constant (if some-

what manic) friendship and correspondence, and his own sympathetic arguments and encouragement for their (similarly oriented) work.

Eric Lott has commented on the “revealing continuity” between discourses of sciences (biology, geology, anthropology) and museum culture’s fascination with racial difference and antiquities.<sup>59</sup> But Robert Young argues that Gliddon participated with Nott and Morton in *engineering* that continuity: “The significance of their work was the way they brought the scientific and the cultural together in order to promulgate an indistinguishably scientific and cultural theory of race. Biology and Egyptology thus constituted *together* the basis of the new ‘scientific’ racial theory.”<sup>60</sup>

Poe’s story both highlights that symbiotic connection and exposes the cultural logic of this “science,” its social desire. The story, which begins with the removal of a mummy from the sensationalist public space of the museum to the objective, private space of a scientific gathering, not only stages the spectacle of a revived mummy discrediting modern science,<sup>61</sup> but also foregrounds the character of science’s social investment through its depiction of men entirely unprepared to countenance evidence that contradicts their presumptions about their privileged place in history, their privileged relation to knowledge and progress. The unwrapping is a fraternal ceremony of professional white manhood: a brotherly rehearsal of sameness and coherence in the ritualistic unveiling of otherness.

But the symbolically hollowed mummy turns literal revenant, and his return severely interrupts the privileged invocation of white manhood. From the first moment that the mummy comes to life, it speaks as the haunt of professional manhood, chiding Gliddon and the character “Silk Buckingham” for their disrespectful treatment of his body and his feelings:

I really did anticipate more gentlemanly conduct from *you*. What am I to think of your standing quietly by and seeing me thus unhandsofely used? What am I to suppose by your permitting Tom, Dick and Harry to strip me of my coffins, and my clothes, in this wretchedly cold climate? In what light (to come to the point) am I to regard your aiding and abetting that miserable little villain, Doctor Ponnonner, in pulling me by the nose? (159, emphasis in original)

As the mummy’s first comments indicate, this science works only by keeping otherness on display, exempting the body and culture of

the scientist from uncontrolled comparison. Once the mummy can speak, he can challenge the terms of the comparison: the result in Poe's story is at once humorous for the reader and embarrassing—even devastating—for the scientific narrator and his compatriots.

Gliddon responds to the mummy's charges in the depersonalized language of modern science. According to the narrator:

Mr. Gliddon's discourse turned chiefly upon the vast benefits accruing to science from the unrolling and disemboweling of mummies; apologizing, upon this score, for any disturbance that might have been occasioned *him*, in particular, the individual Mummy called Allamistakeo; and concluding with a mere hint, (for it could scarcely be considered more) that, as these little matters were now explained, it might be as well to proceed with the investigation intended. (161, emphasis in original)

The mummy refuses that devivifying hint, jumps down from the table, and, shaking hands with each member of the scientific party, installs himself as their speaking equal rather than their mute object. The men are thus forced to divert from their monologic investigation to a more dialogic interrogation.

The mummy reveals in short order that these scientists have incorrect understandings of ancient Egyptian life spans (anywhere from five hundred to one thousand years), chronology (the mummy had been entombed over five thousand years, not the two to three thousand the scientists had guessed), embalming practices, and religion. Far more significantly, Allamistakeo details the absolute unreliability of historical transmission, recounting how ancient Egyptian historians would have themselves embalmed alive and then resuscitated a couple centuries later so that they could rectify the always mistaken interpretations of their historical accounts. Indeed, the scientific moderns standing before him seem to offer support for the Egyptian method, since their understanding of ancient Egypt, when compared to the mummy's account, is as "totally and radically wrong" as the ancient Egyptian historical lessons to which the mummy refers (165).

Most devastatingly, Allamistakeo ridicules these men's attempt to date the Creation. Though Ponnonner presents this as a topic of "universal interest," the mummy ridicules it as a provincial, laughable speculation:

During my time I never knew any one to entertain so singular a fancy as that the universe (or this world, if you will have it so) ever had a beginning at all. I remember, once, and once only, hearing something remotely hinted, by a man of many speculations, concerning the origin of *the human race*; and by this individual the very word *Adam* (or Red Earth) which you make use of, was employed. He employed it, however, in a generical sense, with reference to the spontaneous germination from rank soil . . . of five vast hordes of men, simultaneously upspringing in five distinct and nearly equal divisions of the globe. (166, emphasis in original)

Allamistakeo's glancing (and indeed, trivializing) reference to the theories of "a man of many speculations" triggers an association that gives life back to the scientists. Seemingly nerved by the mummy's allusion to Egyptology's pet theory, the separate origins of the "five races," and responding to the gestures of "one or two" of the men who "touched our foreheads with a very significant air," Buckingham goes on the offensive. Imputing the amazing knowledge demonstrated by the mummy simply to "the long duration of human life in your time," Buckingham trots out a favorite craniological "fact" as his *coup de grace*: "I presume therefore that we are to attribute the marked inferiority of the old Egyptians in all particulars of science, when compared with the moderns, and more especially, with the Yankees, altogether to the superior solidity of the Egyptian skull" (166).

The associative link that Buckingham makes, from the mention of five races to the craniological studies that "document" their separate origins, leads him to the suggestion that ancient Egyptian skulls evidence a "primitive" thickness. This chain of association highlights the contradictory demands Egyptology placed on the mute(d) body of the mummy. This science simultaneously seeks a "white" Egyptian body to serve as a classical exemplar of white/"Yankee" civilization and a primitive Egyptian body to serve as an anthropological Other to modern science. For his part, Allamistakeo refuses to be baited by an essentialist argument correlating bodily differences with intellectual and cultural ones; instead, professing not to understand Buckingham, he requests more information about the "particulars of science." On that (relative, argumentative) ground, the Yankee moderns cannot prevail, though they bring out all the ammunition, from phrenology, astronomy, and architecture to modern transportation, Transcenden-

talism, and democracy. (Regarding the last, Allamistakeo recalls experiments in democracy during his age: "For a while they succeeded remarkably well; only their habit of bragging was prodigious.")<sup>62</sup> Allamistakeo's refusal to engage as either classical exemplar or anthropological Other reveals the limited conceptual basis of both impulses, their hierarchical and teleological orientation. The mummy takes a direct swipe at the latter: "As for Progress," Allamistakeo opines, "it was at one time quite a nuisance, but it never progressed" (169).

The extent to which these scientists were counting on the mummy's (mute) corporeality to validate their manly-scientific incorporation under such signs as modernity, whiteness, and above all progressive rationality is underscored in the narrator's emotional unraveling after leaving the gathering. We can best comprehend the narrator's evidently troubled response by reading it as the story's index to the emotional short-circuiting of self-making scientific white manhood. As Poe's story reveals, this identity depends on the excavated Other, here not just the excavated body of the mummy but also the evacuated domestic space.

The tale of the mummy's interview is framed by the narrator's attempt to demarcate his relation to the domestic. He introduces the story by recounting his evening at home before being summoned by Ponnonner. He narrates his desire to eat a "light" supper and retire in order to recover from a demanding evening the night before. In what looks suspiciously like a series of jabs at Ben Franklin, Poe's narrator inadvertently reveals himself in advertising his self-discipline. Though he is "exceedingly fond of Welsh rabbit," he sagely opines that "[m]ore than a pound at once . . . may not at all times be advisable" (154). This ideal of moderation is quickly followed by the narrator's defensive rationalizing of his own lack of self-discipline:

Still, there can be no material objection to two. And between two and three, there is merely a single unit of difference. I ventured, perhaps, upon four. My wife will have it five—but, clearly, she has confounded two very distinct affairs. The abstract number five, I am willing to admit; but, concretely, it has reference to bottles of Brown Stout, without which, by way of condiment, Welsh rabbit is to be eschewed (154).

Attributing any "miscalculation" about the meal to his wife, the narrator concludes his account of "a frugal meal" and retires to bed "with

the aid of a capital conscience.” Despite his “wretched head-ache” and firm conviction that the “wiser thing” is to sleep through “till noon the next day,” the narrator is more than happy to answer Ponnonner’s summons: “I leaped out of bed in an ecstasy, overthrowing all in my way; dressed myself with a rapidity truly marvellous [*sic*]; and set off, at the top of my speed, for the Doctor’s” (154–55).

The narrator’s eager retreat from the compromised domestic space associated with his wife—whom he labels a “shrew” at the close of the story—to the all-male enclave of his scientific friends models (spatially and affectively) the trajectory of the narrator’s plan at the end of the story at the same time that it reveals the inadequacy of the “separate spheres” for consolidating a secure sense of identity for white middle-class men. The story’s opening associatively connects the narrator’s self-loathing over his lack of self-discipline to his *domestic* space, emblemized by the allegedly argumentative, miscalculating wife. The particular appeal of Ponnonner’s invitation to examine the mummy is that it allows the narrator to escape the space where his Other can “talk back” for one where it can’t. This safer space is one of antiseptically ritualized sameness, where the scientific rehearsal of the “corporeality and disincorporation” of the Other promises to restabilize the narrator’s interrupted sense of self.<sup>63</sup>

Unfortunately, the plan doesn’t work, and when it doesn’t—when science’s carefully engineered space is interrupted by the revenant Other—the narrator pathetically retools his original strategy. Now, the abjected and rejected domestic space expands to include not just the shrewish wife and his family but his entire milieu: “The truth is, I am heartily sick of this life and of the nineteenth century in general. I am convinced that everything is going wrong” (170). Projecting his own sense of self-division onto his wife has not proved an adequate defense against the onslaught of the mummy; what disappoints him about his own self-control, about the limitations of what he stands for, he now projects outward onto the world around him. He will transcend the haunting that has spoiled “everything” by using the mummy’s technique, escaping to an idealized fraternal space, with the “President in 2045” (170).

Thus Poe’s story diagrams the affective rupture of white manhood as a haunting of democratic fraternal identity. In the story the mummy literalizes this rupture, this haunting. But the narrator himself enacts the pattern of emotional response that is key to understanding the

tale's more serious cultural diagnosis. His desire for redemptive confirmation in the fraternal sighting of a future president is revealed as a literal dead-end; the narrator's final resort is to occupy the excavated, deadened space of his Other. "Some Words with a Mummy" unwraps that Other to reveal at its ghostly center the melancholic, emotional hollowness of self-making scientific white manhood.

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### Notes

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- 1 Edgar Allan Poe, "Some Words with a Mummy," in *The Science Fiction of Edgar Allan Poe*, ed. Harold Beaver (New York: Penguin, 1976), 169. Subsequent page references to this work are to this edition and are cited parenthetically.
- 2 This is by no means to say that the story gives evidence of lampooning white manhood in general, but rather that it takes aim at a *particular construction* of white male identity, participating thereby in a broader ideological construction of white manhood in the early nation, under the rubric of competition.
- 3 John Brenkman, *Straight, Male, Modern: A Cultural Critique of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 241.
- 4 Mark Carnes, *Secret Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1989), 23; subsequent references to this work are cited parenthetically.
- 5 Falling on hard times, William Morgan, a stonemason, threatened to, and then actually did publish a book that advertised itself as an insider's exposé of secret Masonic rituals. Local Masons tried to buy him off; failing there, they threatened him and his publishers. On the night of 12 September 1826, Morgan was abducted and was never again seen. For historical treatments of the Morgan affair and the anti-Masonic movement more generally, see William Preston Vaughn's *The Anti-Masonic Party in the United States, 1826-1843* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1983); Lynn Dumenil's *Freemasonry and American Culture, 1880-1930* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), 5-7; and Ronald Formisano and Kathleen Smith Kutolowski's "Anti-Masonry and Masonry: The Genesis of a Protest, 1826-1827," *American Quarterly* 29 (summer 1977): 139-65.



- 6 In this section of my analysis, I have relied heavily on Carnes's important study—the only comparative study of fraternal ritualism—to characterize predominant features of mid- to late-century fraternalism. His major conclusion explicates how fraternal ritualism worked to ease boys from a female-role-identified childhood environment into a male-role-identified environment in fraternal orders that would help them deal better with the world outside: “By emphasizing a surrogate father’s benevolence and love, the ritual made it easier to identify with the male role; and by accepting the initiate into the family of patriarchs, the ritual made it possible to approach manhood with greater self-assurance”(123). These stresses came about because of the pressures of separate spheres combined with the forces of moral reform:

The implicit meanings of the symbols suggest that many men were deeply troubled by the gender bifurcations of Victorian society, which deprived them of a religious experience with which they could identify and of a family environment in which they could freely express nurturing and paternal emotions. . . . By affirming that men possessed traits socially defined as female, the symbols conveyed a message expressed nowhere else in Victorian America.

These ideas and emotions could not be stated publicly. If men had acknowledged that the orders were an alternative form of religion, of family, and of social organization, the forces that had crushed Masonry in the 1820s might have again besieged the fraternal movement. (149)

While there is much to admire about Carnes's analysis, I find that his sympathies with the members obstruct a more pointed analysis. It's hard to imagine, if even one in eight men were members of fraternal orders by the end of the 1800s, and if lodges were overwhelmingly composed from the middle classes, that these same men weren't also in powerful social and even reform positions. It is also difficult to understand why, if men needed simply to be able to acknowledge that they were “like” women—emotional, vulnerable—their rituals featured the symbolic repudiation of women. Carnes's conclusions simplify his analysis, allowing an important aspect of fraternal orders' social function to drop from sight: the way in which fraternities upheld the very uneven social, affective, and economic structures that their lodge rituals “mystically” redressed.

- 7 Carnes asserts that from midcentury on, membership was overwhelmingly middle class. Mary Ann Clawson, in *Constructing Brotherhood: Class, Gender and Fraternalism* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989), argues otherwise, insisting that “large numbers of American working-class men participated in fraternal orders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But this did not lead to the consolidation of working class solidarity” (89). In Clawson's view, Masonic-style fraternalism “exerted a special appeal to anyone seeking to establish or reaffirm

a symbolic relationship to the figure of the producer-proprietor" (14). Given that "class" has never been a particularly clear term, Carnes's and Clawson's difference may be in part one of definition: another student of fraternity, Nancy Maclean, uses the category *petit-bourgeois*, or lower-middle class to limn the gray zone between working and middle class. See her chapter "Men in the Middle: The Class Composition of the Klan," in *Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), 52-74. What is at least clear is that after midcentury, the initiation fees and the multiplication of "levels" of membership increasingly entailed heavy costs that fewer and fewer among the working classes could afford; see Dumenil, 13-17.

- 8 Commentators other than Carnes take the racial homogeneity of fraternalism more seriously into account. Dumenil notes that "Masons insisted that their order was committed to the principle of *universality*, which they defined as the association of good men without regard to religion, nationality, or class . . . [but] the fraternity was in fact, predominantly a white, native, Protestant, middle-class organization" (9). She goes on to note that "despite its insistence on the equality of men, . . . in practice the order excluded non-whites" (9-10). For a study of the African American Masons, see Loretta J. Williams, *Black Freemasonry and Middle-Class Realities* (Columbia: Univ. Of Missouri Press, 1980). Clawson observes that fraternal egalitarianism was

made possible by the exclusion of women, blacks, and ethnic minorities from the relevant social universe, a universe whose boundaries fraternal institutions helped to demarcate and guard. American fraternalism thus heightened the already great social and cultural distinctiveness of those white male workers who were also the most highly skilled and privileged segment of the wage-earning work force. (110)

- 9 By the end of the century, estimates of membership in the United States ranged from one in eight to one in five men (Carnes, 1).
- 10 Clawson notes that "the mobilization against drinking was paralleled by a new and narrower definition of the limits of fraternal obligation." Her observation seems to fit with my argument that as the fraternal man constricted and channeled his own bodily flows, he was less inclined to "open up" on behalf of others. Indeed, as Clawson continues, "The Independent Order of Odd Fellows continued to maintain, throughout the century, that the obligation of reciprocal relief was one of the order's defining characteristics, but its mode of practice tended to transform fraternal aid from a right (and a rite) to a kind of charity that would be afforded only to the deserving" (121): charity thus became a disciplinary practice, responding only to those who evidenced proper forms of self-discipline.

- 11 Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966; reprint, New York: Routledge, 1991).
- 12 Dumenil describes how “Masonry ritual forms . . . accented the sacred-profane demarcation between Masonry and the rest of the world” (39).
- 13 Clawson, 176.
- 14 In her study of Emerson’s *Conduct of Life* and other male conduct manuals (“The Gender of Transparency: Masculinity and the Conduct of Life,” *American Literary History* 4 [winter 1992]: 584–606), Ellison describes how Emerson increasingly delineates male friendships as “engagements that are simultaneously tender and hierarchical, affectionate and interested” (584–85).
- 15 In *Threshold of the Visible World* (New York: Routledge, 1996), Kaja Silverman provides a suggestive critique of Lacan’s assumption that “unity” or “wholeness” develops into a psychic ideal out of childhood sensations of “organic disturbance and discord.” Comments Silverman: “It seems to me the reverse is actually true: it is the cultural premium placed on the notion of a coherent bodily ego which results in such a dystopic apprehension of corporeal multiplicity” (21). Drawing on the work of Henri Wallon and Paul Schilder, Silverman points out that subjects are constantly experiencing bodily “disintegration” in nonthreatening ways (e.g., hair, fingernails)—in ways that are actually experienced as “beneficent”—as the “precondition for change” (21). She underlines Schilder’s suggestive point that “wholeness” does not in fact signify “psychic health” (22; see also 20–22 *passim*).
- 16 Christopher Newfield, *The Emerson Effect: Individualism and Submission in America* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), 125.
- 17 Clawson observes, similarly, that definitions of “the lodge as a cross-class institution that bound men together, regardless of who they were, enabled the fraternal order to legitimate the operation of the market by denying its consequences for social life” (176).
- 18 Newfield, 94.
- 19 Mark Kann writes, “In time, the medical profession established a new litmus test for masculinity in studies . . . [that suggested] effeminate males were infected by sexual inversion and political subversion” (*On the Man Question: Gender and Civic Virtue in America* [Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1991], 203).
- 20 Juliet Flower MacCannell, drawing on Rousseau, has recently outlined this as the Good of the Whole, haunted by its own partiality; see “The Post-Colonial Unconscious, or The White Man’s Thing,” *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 1 (spring 1996): 27–41.
- 21 This calls to mind Robert Bly and the Men’s Movement today, where, as Lynda Boose observes, “as ‘Iron John’ and Bly’s newly masculinized ‘wild man’ are celebrated in a reaffirmed hierarchy, the meaning of patri-

archy for women goes totally ignored” (“Techno-Muscularity and the ‘Boy Eternal’: From Quagmire to Gulf,” in *Cultures of U.S. Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease [Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1993], 587). Of the contemporary manifestation of the “white male as victim” plot in current cinema, Liam Kennedy observes that this crisis in white manhood

is not a terminal one, or even . . . historically new—traumas of male crisis/resolution have a significant dialectical presence in narratives of American identity. More to the point, I believe this crisis has in many ways been recognized and successfully managed by white males; the very rhetoric of crisis is one that has been franchised and mobilised by those incarnating it. Only one of the most obvious examples of this crisis management is the white male appropriation of “victim status.” (“Alien Nation: White Male Paranoia and Imperial Culture in the United States,” *Journal of American Studies* 30 [April 1996]: 90)

- 22 My arguments here about nineteenth-century fraternal rituals correlate strikingly with sociologist Michael Schwalbe’s analysis of the practices of the contemporary mythopoetic men’s movement; see especially his concluding chapter, “A Critical Appreciation,” in *Unlocking the Iron Cage: The Men’s Movement, Gender Politics, and American Culture* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).
- 23 Clawson, 5.
- 24 Kann, 230, 231.
- 25 E. Anthony Rotundo, *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 196.
- 26 Burton J. Bledstein, in his study of “the culture of professionalization,” comments on the way the authority of the professionals drew on the combined mystique of esoteric ritual and the cultural authority of science:

The jurisdictional claim of [professional] authority derived from a special power over worldly experience, a command over the profundities of a discipline. . . . Hence, the culture of professionalism required amateurs to “trust” in the integrity of trained persons, to respect the moral authority of those whose claim to power lay in the sphere of the sacred and the charismatic. Professionals controlled the magic circle of scientific knowledge which only the few, specialized by training and indoctrination, were privileged to enter, but which all, in the name of nature’s universality, were obligated to appreciate. (*The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1976], 90)

- 27 See Rotundo, “Work and Identity,” *passim*, and Carnes, e.g. 17–21 and *passim*.
- 28 Rotundo, 197.

- 29 See Rotundo, 194–205.
- 30 William Stanton, *The Leopard's Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America, 1815–1859* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960), 28.
- 31 Stanton, 27.
- 32 For instance, by Charles Meigs in his “Memoir” of Morton read before the Academy of Natural Sciences; see “A Memoir of Samuel George Morton, M.D.,” (Philadelphia: T. K. and P. G. Collins, 1851), 43.
- 33 Rotundo notes that dinner and evening parties were increasingly an important form of business entertainment in the nineteenth century: “In this convivial atmosphere, men made new business contacts and entered discussions that might lead to significant transactions” (199).
- 34 Stanton, 50.
- 35 Stanton, 82–88.
- 36 See Morton’s letter to Squier, 10 April 1847, Squier Papers, Library of Congress.
- 37 Morton, as far as I can tell, never used this language, though it is a constant feature of the letters Nott and Gliddon sent to him. Mark Beach notes a similar phenomenon in the midcentury scientific group known as the American Lazzaroni: “Many of their letters to one another speak as much of tender oysters and foolproof home brew as they do of science. Most of them delighted in calling one another by pet names” (“Was There a Scientific Lazzaroni?” in *Nineteenth-Century American Science: A Reappraisal* [Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1972], 119).
- 38 Robert V. Bruce, *The Launching of Modern American Science, 1846–1876* (New York: Knopf, 1987), 217.
- 39 For instance, Beach contests the idea that members of the U.S. scientific Lazzaroni ever concertedly or even consciously forwarded a scientific agenda: “they were nine men who were conscious of having some special relationship to one another for social purposes only” (131–32).
- 40 See Bruce, 218, 219. In their study of twentieth-century “Networks of Informal Communication Among Scientifically Productive Scientists,” Belver C. Griffith and A. James Miller distinguish between “low and background levels of communication networking” (Morton’s wide correspondence, for example), “loose communication networks among active scientists” (for instance, men who might count on running into each other at Morton’s soirées), and “highly coherent groups within science” (Morton’s circle or the Lazzaroni). Griffith and Miller characterize the latter thus:

[E]ach of these several groups [in their study] seemed convinced that it was achieving the overthrow of some major position within its discipline. . . . In this process, none of the groups continuously observed the attitude of disinterested objectivity that is commonly regarded as a norm of science; two groups even ventured actively into profes-

sional politics to obtain or protect appointments and research support. ("Networks of Informal Communication Among Scientifically Productive Scientists," in *Communication Among Scientists and Engineers*, ed. Carnot E. Nelson and Donald K. Pollock [Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington, 1970], 139)

- 41 Agassiz, originally a proponent of monogenesis, changed his mind after a visit to Philadelphia spent largely in the company of Morton at the Academy of Natural Sciences. Between examining Morton's crania collection under his tutelage and encountering "real" blacks at the dining room of his hotel, Agassiz soon changed his mind and became a prominent supporter of the theory of polygenesis; see Stanton, 100–3.
- 42 Squier Papers, 29 May 1851.
- 43 Henry S. Patterson, M.D., "Memoir of the Life and Scientific Labors of Samuel George Morton," in *Types of Mankind* (1854; reprint, Miami: Mnemosyne, 1969), xix–xx.
- 44 Ellison, 601.
- 45 David Noble, *A World Without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of Western Science* (New York: Knopf, 1992).
- 46 Gillian Brown, *Domestic Individualism: Imagining the Self in Nineteenth-Century America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 3.
- 47 Agassiz recorded the encounter in what Gould characterizes as a "remarkably candid" 1846 letter to his mother:

It was in Philadelphia that I first found myself in prolonged contact with negroes; all the domestics of my hotel were men of color. I can scarcely express to you the painful impression that I received, especially since the feeling they inspired in me is contrary to all our ideas about the confraternity of the human type and the unique origin of our species. But truth before all. Nevertheless, I experienced pity at the sight of this degraded and degenerate race, and their lot inspired compassion in me in thinking they really are men. Nonetheless, it is impossible for me to repress the feeling that they are not of the same blood as us. In seeing their black faces with their thick lips and grimacing teeth, the wool on their head, their bent knees, their elongated hands, their large curved nails, and especially the livid color of the palm of their hands, I could not take my eyes off their face in order to tell them to stay far away. (Quoted in Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* [New York: Norton, 1981]: 44–45)

The passage continues in (abjecting) detail. It is a passage so rich in contradiction that it begs analysis. This experience would be the basis on which Agassiz would lend his support to Morton and Nott's arguments about "natural repugnance."

- 48 Eric Cheyfitz, *The Trans-Parent: Sexual Politics in the Language of Emerson* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), 129.
- 49 Cheyfitz, 138, emphasis in original.
- 50 Thomas Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (New York: Schocken, 1963), 64.
- 51 Stanton, 47.
- 52 For an engaging reading of the cultural politics underwriting the United States' most recent Egyptian fascination, see Melani McAlister's "'The Common Heritage of Mankind': Race, Nation and Masculinity in the King Tut Exhibit," *Representations* 54 (spring 1986): 80–103.
- 53 Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 40.
- 54 See Stanton, 207 n. 2, for sources offering evidence on this possibility.
- 55 On Nott, his essay, and his arguments on behalf of polygenesis, see Stanton (66–68 and passim); Reginald Horsman, *Josiah Nott of Mobile: Southerner, Physician and Racial Theorist* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1987), 81–103; and Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 126–33.
- 56 See Stanton, 50.
- 57 Quoted in John Campbell, *Negro-Mania* (1851; reprint, Miami: Mnemosyne, 1969), 426.
- 58 Young, 128.
- 59 Eric Lott, *Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 77.
- 60 Young, 124, emphasis in original.
- 61 As Scott Trafton recalled to my attention, this spectacular surprise in Poe's story foreshadows the sensational scandal of Gliddon's 1850 Boston lectures, which he advertised with the promise of unwrapping one of two female mummies, the daughters of Egyptian priests. Stanton describes the climax thus:

Night after night the "enlightened assemblage" sat in awed silence as Gliddon removed the shroud. At last he withdrew the final remnants and the ancient relic was revealed to the audience. It was the body of a man. . . . A sharp burst of uproarious laughter broke strangely from some two thousand well-bred Boston throats and echoed resoundingly in the local press. Attempting to explain the fiasco, Gliddon sent a serialized five-and-one-half column letter to the editor of the Boston *Transcript* to show it was all due to the illegibility of the inscription on the mummy case. (146–47)

Trafton, who is completing a manuscript entitled "Egyptland: The Cultural Politics of Egyptomania, 1800–1900," provides a more careful analysis of this event in his important and much-needed reexamination of the socio-political contexts of Egyptology.

- 62 Neither this story nor my reading of it should be taken to represent Poe's attitude toward science. As John Limon's far more detailed treatment concludes, Poe's attitude toward science throughout his career is "duplicitous always (where Poe seems to be antiscience, he is less antiscience than where he seems to be proscience)" (*The Place of Fiction in the Time of Science: A Disciplinary History of American Writing* [New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990], 96); see chapter 3, "Poe's Methodology," passim.
- 63 I borrow the phrase from Denise Albanese, *New Science, New World* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1996), 5.