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Friendship, Trust, and Political Order

A Critical Overview

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The Evil of Politics

The strong man is most powerful when he is alone. (Schiller, *Wilhem Tell*, I, 3)

It is appropriate to begin with the question: Does friendship count in modern politics? At first glance there are reasons for an answer in the negative, as the following reflection on the modern political discourse seems to suggest.

Politics and friendship rarely go together. As President Truman used to say, "If you want a friend in Washington get yourself a dog." German politicians subscribe to the following degree of comparison: enemy—deadly enemy—fellow party member *(Feind—Todfeind—Parteifreund)*.

At best the power game of politics might allow for friendships of utility. Political friends do not love each other in themselves, but only insofar as some benefit accrues to them from each other as Aristotle had already observed. Based on the notion of the quid pro quo, a blend of trust and distrust is required to complete a successful bargain. This friendship of utility shows in political logrolling and lasts as long as it promises common political gain. But if the chips are down and the power game turns into serious struggle for power, the friend of today might become the foe of tomorrow. "From this perspective, friendship can be seen to lead to an injustice akin to nepotism in public life, while political calculations can lead to betrayals in private life." This modern view of friendship, as Julian Haseldine indicates, brings forth an overriding concern with the "distorting, even corrupting, influence of the personal and internal on the political and external." Thus the institution of friendship is denied any ordering function in the political and social life of modern society.[1] "Friendship is supposed to be strictly private."[2] This position lends reason to the opinion that the world of power that is the modern state knows just a semblance of friendship among rulers and subjects, and that politics is built on the expectation that most people are to be distrusted. From the vantage point of the modern Hobbesian we cannot but face the "evil of politics":

> The ubiquity of the desire of power which, besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other evilness of purpose, constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action. . . . To the extent in which the essence and aim of politics is power over man, politics is evil. . . . For here the *animus dominandi* is not a mere admixture to prevailing aims of a different kind but the very essence of the intention, the very lifeblood of the action, the constitutive principle of politics as a distinct sphere of human action. . . . The evil that corrupts political action is the same evil that corrupts all action, but the corruption of political action is indeed the paradigm and prototype of all possible corruption.[3]

Under the particular conditions of the modern state the scope of this corruption has been broadened and its intensity strengthened. As the ultimate manifestation of power, the modern state expands the "cor-

ruption of the political sphere both qualitatively and quantitatively."[4] Morgenthau does not denounce political ethics but it is an ethics of doing evil in that "its last resort . . . is the endeavor to choose, since evil there must be, among several possible actions the one that is least evil."[5] If this choice is guided by political wisdom and moral courage man might reconcile his political nature with his moral destiny without, however, escaping the evil of politics.[6]

Morgenthau had dissociated himself from Carl Schmitt for moral and political reasons early in his German days. However, they enunciated the very same Weberian concept of state- and power-centered politics. The political defined in terms of the ultimate struggle for power is void of any ethically grounded political agency in society that rests on the notion of human fellowship, because it pits political collectivity against political collectivity in a life-and-death battle thus constituting the fundamental distinction between enemy and friend. In the last analysis the *animus dominandi* reveals itself in the antithesis of war, "whereby men could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings."[7] Schmitt does not distinguish between war in general and civil war. Civil war decides the future fate of a disintegrating political entity "and this is particularly valid for a constitutional state, despite all the constitutional ties to which the state is bound." So it should be noted that Schmitt denies the constitutional state's capacity for peaceful conflict resolution. Quoting from Lorenz von Stein, he states that as soon as the constitution is attacked, "the battle must then be waged outside the constitution and the law, hence decided by the power of arms."[8] The disjunction of enemy and friend emerges from combat in an existential sense in that it defines the substance of the political. But who is the friend with whom we are here concerned? It is the comrade in arms whom I have to trust because I rely on him as he relies on me for survival. The collective ethos of political community emerges from the combatant's experience.

Morgenthau left open the question of how community springs from the evil of politics in the modern state. Schmitt responds with the argument that all human beings are symbolically combatants and that any political community destined for political survival in the world of power must constitute itself as a fraternity in arms bound by the spirit of soldiery, and last but not least by the authority of the decisionmaking

power that is again, in an existential sense, in command of the fraternity. Schmitt thinks through what Weber worked into his discursive exegesis of the power- and domination-centered idea of politics. The political community possesses the coercive power over life and death of its members and their actions are ultimately dictated by the threat of physical force to the point where "the serious demand is made upon the individual to suffer death in the service of common interest. This imparts the political community its specific pathos and creates its enduring emotional foundations. Shared political destinies, i.e., above all the sharing of political life and death battles, bring about communities bound by shared memories which often have a deeper impact than the ties of merely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic community in that they are the ultimate constituent of 'national consciousness.'"[9] The crucial point is that this political fraternity of a human group welded together by the shared experience of war devalues the fraternal ethics of religion in that now politics creates the emotional basis of the coercive community that is the modern state.[10] This is reflected in the politics of modern mass democracy, which rests on the emotional bond between the charismatic leader and his mass following that puts its trust in the leader who in turn steers the masses by means of demagogic manipulation. From the fraternity in arms emerges the political order of plebiscitarian caesarism.

A final remark is in order: Schmitt denounces any anthropologically based vision of a common humanity of human beings that would allow for an ethically grounded political community guided by the mutual trust among citizens, including the rulers and the ruled. Neither Schmitt nor Weber can deal with what the classics and the modern neoclassics call "civil friendship." When they think in terms of communal traditions they have in mind the Christian idea of fraternity and its modern revolutionary varieties. To Weber the modern age is marked by the marginalization of ethics of Christian fraternity, and to Schmitt it has become a liberal deceit. Both, however, hold the Christian notion of a universal fraternity to be in principle apolitical in the face of modern politics. Their point of view is misleading insofar as it downplays the impact of historically metamorphosed Christian ideas of community on the diverse modes of political modernity.

The semantics of the power-centered paradigm does not entail a conception of friendship and of its precondition, namely trust, as stated

above, nor does power-focused political science. A politician's mixing his friendships with his politics may be a probable moment of the power game, but not a determining element of political order. This also holds true for the concept of trust, which until recently was treated as a psychological or moral concept in European political discourse.[11] So runs the argument of Germany's leading sociologist:

> Trust has never been a topic of mainstream sociology. Neither classical authors nor modern sociologists use the term in a theoretical context. For this reason the elaboration of a theoretical context, one of the main sources of conceptual clarification, has been relatively neglected. Furthermore, empirical research—for example research about trust and distrust in politics—has rather relied on general and unspecified ideas, confusing problems of trust with positive and negative attitudes toward political leadership or political institutions, with alienation . . . , with hopes and worries, or with confidence.[12]

This might hold true so far as mainstream social science is concerned, but by and large this statement is off the mark because it neglects the great tradition of "political trusteeship" in Anglo-Saxon political thought and practice that made "trust" a key concept of political discourse in the English-speaking world in contrast to continental European political semantics. It speaks for itself that a recent German publication on *Vertrauen* refers to Hobbes of all people as the thinker who laid out in his *Leviathan* the basic model for dealing with the problem of trust.[13]

This observation points to the crucial point of this inquiry. The state-centered notion of power politics portrays the modern political world from the vantage point of the continental European experience. Its political paradigm of the modern state was not and could not be modeled on the civil polity of democratic constitutionalism that has become the hallmark of political order in the course of modern history. Anglo-Saxon political science emerged from a citizen-centered civil polity but succumbed to a degree to the paradigm of power politics in spite of the above mentioned fact that traditionally the semantic complex of "trust" is politically coded in English-speaking political cultures.

But there remains still the question to be answered whether the overall view of politics as outlined by the Weberian paradigm does not

in fact present us with an accurate portrayal of global politics in the modern age. It reflects indeed the pervading disorder of our age without, however, probing into the cause of the deplorable state of affairs that is characterized by the fundamental contradiction between longing for the good life in society and suffering under harsh domination. The explanatory force of the assumption that public order springs from power is limited or more precisely deficient in theoretical and empirical terms. Modern state building, whether revolutionary or not, involves in effect power and force, and the activities of fraternities in arms are instrumental in this enterprise. They provide the political nucleus of the emerging public order; but the fraternity in arms, once it is in power, creates systems of domination that lack stable foundations and fail to live up to the aspirations of their citizens in terms of life, liberty, and prosperity. The world abounds in miscarried state and nation building.

That is where the concepts of friendship and trust come into the picture when the question of political stability, and in particular of the stability of the constitutional regime, is raised by a theorist who argues from the unspoken premises of civic politics. Such a theorist is John Rawls. His *A Theory of Justice* introduces rather casually the notions of civic friendship and mutual trust as factors stabilizing a just scheme of cooperation in order to counter the Hobbesian recourse to sovereignty: "One may think of the Hobbesian sovereign as a mechanism added to a system of cooperation which would be unstable without it. . . . Now it is evident how relations of friendship and mutual trust, and the public knowledge of a common and normally effective sense of justice, bring about the same result. . . . Of course, some infractions will presumably occur, but when they do feelings of guilt arising from friendship and mutual trust and the sense of justice tend to restore the arrangement."[14] Neither here nor in the follow-up work *Political Liberalism* is the quasi self-evident notion of civic friendship closely inspected. In *Political Liberalism* it is tied to the "ideal of democratic citizens trying to conduct their political affairs on terms supported by public values that we might reasonably expect others to endorse. The ideal also expresses a willingness to listen to what others have to say and being ready to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in one's own view. This preserves the ties of civic friendship and is consis-

tent with the duties of civility. On some questions this may be the best we can do."[15] Rawls' "scheme," Gianfrancesco Zanetti comments, "entails a civic friendship, public values; respect for an existing reasonable pluralism is coupled with the need for *one* particular *ethos,* that of Rawlsian political liberalism." Rawls "exhibits a strong sense of political friendship, it is not surprising that a third of *A Theory of Justice* aims ultimately to develop a uniform consensus that will create (political) stability on the basis of a compound of justice and friendship distinctly reminiscent of Aristotle."[16] A close reading of Rawls, hailed as the high priest of modern liberal contractualism, uncovers a commitment to an idea of trust grounded in civic friendship operating as the binding force in political life and sustaining the ideal of democratic citizenship in constitutional regimes.

From the perspective of modern democratic constitutionalism as exemplified by Rawls, it is highly problematic exclusively to consider friendship in terms of the subjective, informal, and personal in private relations notwithstanding the fact that this view dominates modern discourse in general and power-centered politics in particular. At the present moment the "Western tradition of thought" that regarded the idea of friendship "the major principle in terms of which political theory and practice are described, explained and analysed" might indeed have "receded into the background" as Hutter and other students of the subject claim.[17] But "[the] problem which friendship presented to ancient thinkers, and which in turn seemed quite a natural starting point . . . to their medieval successors" seems not to be (as Haseldine assumes) so much of a different nature as far as the modern constitutional theoretician is concerned: "[H]ow does the institution of friendship form and regulate human society?"[18]

The Politics of Civility

> As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. (*Federalist* no. 55)

The *Federalist* refers here to the quintessence of constitutional government that was summarized in *Cato's Letters:* "What is government, but trust committed by all, or the most, to one or a few, who are to attend upon the affairs of all."[19] The message of the early modern constitutional revolutionaries is that any legitimate public order is built on trust. It is the starting point of an ongoing discourse on trust that is in some way a follow-up of the discourse on civic friendship that began in Greek—Roman antiquity and resurfaced in the citizen-centered political science of the democratic regime that, however, blended into and occasionally succumbed to the prevalent power-centered paradigm of politics. A basic outline of the current trust discourse is called for in order to show how it connects implicitly or explicitly with the grand theme of friendship and civility.

Surveying the phenomena of political order and political decay in the global world, Samuel Huntington points out that "the degree of community in a complex society . . . depends upon the strength and scope of its political institutions. The institutions are the behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest."[20] "A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires." Its politics is a "Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces."[21] "A government with a low level of institutionalization is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government." It "lacks authority, fails to perform its function and is immoral in the same sense in which a corrupt judge, a cowardly soldier, or an ignorant teacher is immoral." Thus, political institutions entail structural as well as moral dimensions. The morality of the institutional makeup requires trust, which in turn "involves predictability; and predictability requires regularized and institutionalized pattern of behavior."[22] There is a dialectical interplay between political culture and public institutions that Huntington explains by referring to Bertrand de Jouvenel: community means "the institutionalization of trust" and the "essential function of public authorities" is "to increase the mutual trust prevailing at the heart of the social whole." The "climate of mutual trustfulness" that is conducive to the pursuit of the common good depends even in modern complex societies on a modicum of "social friendship."[23] "Social friendship is strengthened when all are aware of one and the same framework of loyalties—a framework built of the

most complex materials, with as many small rituals as large symbols. The construction of this framework is effected by life in common, it derives from lessons and experiences which all have shared alike"; it denotes the "culture of the people."[24]

Societies that lack stable and strong political institutions are, according to Huntington, "also deficient in mutual trust among their citizens, in national and public loyalties, and in organization skills and capacity." In other words social friendship is missing. These political cultures are "marked by suspicion, jealousy, and latent or actual hostility toward everyone who is not a member of the family, the village, or perhaps the tribe."[25] In sum: stable and effective political institutions depend on mutual trust among the citizens and the cultural force of social friendship generates this trust. Adam Seligman generalizes this sociopolitical function of trust albeit without explicating the specific nature of the trust-generating quality of human relations: "The existence of trust is an essential component of all enduring social relationships. . . . Power, dominance, and coercion, in this reading, become a temporary solution to the problem of order and the organisation of the division of labour therein, but they will not in themselves provide the basis for the maintenance of said order over time."[26]

The foregoing considerations of trust derive from a broad range of empirical studies of the subject. Practitioners of empirical trust research distinguish between "social trust" and "political trust." The first refers to the interpersonal dimension of social life. It entails the "expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community."[27] The latter connotes "trust in government or other social institutions." "Trust in other people is logically quite different from trust in institutions and political authorities,"[28] but "[a]cross individuals, across countries, and across the time, social and political trust are, in fact, correlated, but social scientists are very far from agreeing why."[29] The answer to this question would require a reflection on the moral constitution of human being that allows for the mutual recognition of trustworthiness because "[t]rustworthiness, not simply trust, is the key ingredient."[30] However, such an anthropological reflection moves beyond the theoretical horizon of normal social science. In the following, the subject of this rough outline will be explored in depth.

The sociohistorical context of trust must be clarified in order to understand the meaning of the ongoing trust discourse stretching from undertheorized empiricism to overtheorized system building à la Luhmann. There are three interrelated aspects to be considered.

First, it is foremost the self-understanding of the American republic that preserved the idea of public or political trust as the self-evident constituent of public order. That all rulership is political trusteeship was an unquestioned and generally shared conviction as evidenced by public discourse from the founding era onward. All power is fiduciary power granted by the citizens to their representatives. "The institution of delegate power" remarks *Federalist* no. 76, "implies that there is a portion of virtue and honour among mankind which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence."[31] This quasi Lockean legacy (to be discussed presently) shaped the American concept of political legitimacy in a way that distinguished it from the state-centered paradigm of politics

Second, as the *Federalist* asserted, entrusting officeholders with power involves the assumption of a mutual trust that places officeholder and citizen under a reciprocal moral obligation. This raised the issue of trust in general terms: Does the democratic order depend on the presence of trust among the citizenry? "If one cannot trust other people generally, one can certainly not trust those under the temptation of and with the powers that come with public office. Trust in elected officials is seen to be only as a more specific instance of trust in mankind."[32] Trust, however defined and measured, is considered to be an indicator of the strength or weakness of the civic culture in the United States and elsewhere. The link between political trust and the legitimacy of government is thus reinforced. From this point of view, trust—social and political—turns into the moral foundation of democratic political order. Political trust articulates the belief "that the government is operating according to one's own normative expectations of how government should function. The concept is closely related to the notion of legitimacy, a statement that government institutions and authorities are morally and legally valid and widely accepted." The democratic order rests on political trust; "when that trust is undermined, the whole system of government is threatened."[33] Since, however, political trust is contingent on trust among people, it is social trust that is at stake: "[P]eople who trust others are all-around good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are

both more trusting and more trustworthy. Conversely, the civically disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and feel less constrained to be honest themselves."[34]

Third, the political, intellectual, and scholarly debate of trust sprung from American political experience and, as a consequence, the American republic was considered the paradigmatic case of a "culture of trust," at least as far as the concensus school of American social science was concerned.[35] And it referred with good reason to the specific "associative characteristics," the persistence of which in American history has been pointed out by American and foreign observers since Tocqueville.[36] The associational trust Tocqueville found in America resurfaces in modern trust discourses in two different modes: (1) conceptually, in that trust was recognized as a crucial ingredient of community formation in political culture sustaining regime stability, and (2) in terms of rich empirical research in that the development of survey research methodology in the 1930s made trust research into a scientific instrument for the measurement of the levels of trust and distrust present among citizens. Trust scientifically measured became an indicator of political stability and societal well being and trust research mutated into a collective self-analysis of the body politic in times of political crises because decline of trust meant in this view that "[t]he heritage of trust that has been the basis of our stable democracy is eroding."[37] The more trust research seems to uncover symptoms of trust decreasing the more trust discourse turns into a crisis discourse: a jeremiad about the "strange disappearance of civic America." Americans are bowling alone: "At century's end, a generation with a trust quotient of nearly eighty percent was being rapidly replaced by one with a trust quotient barely half that. The inevitable result is a steadily declining social trust, even though each individual cohort is almost as trusting as it ever was."[38] Be that as it may.

The crucial point is that trust research and trust discourse are contingent on principles of political order that in themselves are never elucidated in spite of the fact that American political science has universalized the assumptions underlying trust research and has made the trust–distrust disjunction a functional determinant of political culture in general as demonstrated by Huntington. Almond and Verba, the godfathers of modern comparative politics, inform us that trust signifies the "sense of community" of political culture: "Political cultures

are built either upon the fundamental faith that it is possible to trust and work with fellowmen or upon the expectation that most people are distrusted. . . . Each political culture differs according to its pattern of trust and distrust, its definitions of who are probably the safe people and who are their most likely enemy, and its expectations about whether public institutions or private individuals are more worthy of trust."[39] Verba and Almond pioneered this new approach of survey research based on comparative study of democratic political culture that started with the civic culture project in the late 1950s. They integrated the trust complex into their paradigm of political culture that was widely accepted by international social and political science.[40] Only since then has trust research been carried on in non-American democratic polities. There it is still marked by the vexing problem that it clashes with Weberian politics where political trusteeship and the modalities of trust never figure prominently.

The political culture approach still begs the question as to the nature of this community building "fundamental faith" that is held to be the warrant of political stability. It is obviously considered the most important sociomoral resource a civil polity possesses and it is supposed to shape social life whose main features are those "networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objects."[41] This sociocultural complex that permeates political culture was recently defined as "social capital." In fact it fits Jouvenal's concept of "social friendship." Neither Putnam nor the Straussian Fukuyama nor any other author resorts to the semantic of friendship, in spite of the fact that at least Putnam has an inkling of the anthropological moment involved: "Social capital is closely related to what some have called 'civic virtue.' The difference is that 'social capital' calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a dense network of social relations."[42] Indeed it is—and this network of social relations theoretically analyzed denotes civic or political friendship. As an aside, it should be mentioned that trust analysts never refer to the Rawlsian notion of civic friendship. Social capital is a "value free" descriptive term that nevertheless treads over normatively loaded issues, and in the latter sense it points to the anthropological ground of civic morality and its formative force of community creation. But even the most theoretical attempts at conceptionalization of trust fail to come to grips with this

problem.[43] It remains to be stated that mainstream political science in spite of its devotion to trust research has neither developed a conceptual apparatus nor a theoretical frame for analysis of the principles of order as expressed in the historical vision of a civil polity that was to evolve into the Western form of political order. American normative political science runs into difficulties in this respect because it is fixated on the symbols of self-interpretation couched in scientific language with a claim to universality. It is rarely aware of the distinction between theory and civil theology, settling for a more reflective self-interpretation instead of theoretical and historical discourse.

The Politics of Tradition: The Lockean Hypothesis

> Since then those, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Society, cannot but be supposed to have some Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another. (John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government* §107)

The critical discussion of political culture research as it was outlined above evokes some historical observations and comments that provide the subject of the following reflection. First of all, civic culture, the key concept of this approach, tacitly presupposes the citizen-centered communitarian notion of the political. It originated in the ancient citizen-polis, was interpreted and explicated in terms of a discursive paradigm of order by the philosophers, and received into Western Christian culture to be reinterpreted, revised, and adapted to the cultural exigencies of their time. In the form of a Christian neoclassical blend, this paradigm of politics informed the *idée directrice* of an emerging public order committed to the republican principle of self-government of free citizens. The principle of civic self-government that is explicitly emphasised in all modern democratic theory and empirical political culture research only makes sense on the condition of the rational and spiritual nature of the citizen-man, which is the source of ordering spirit among cooperating citizens evoking community. This vision of civil politics originated in the seventeenth-century crisis of postreformatory civil wars in response to the ascendancy of the continental

monarcho-confessional state and it brought forth the constitutional state in the late-eighteenth-century Atlantic revolutions.

The Greek polis found its reflexive exegesis in Plato and Aristotle, Rome in Cicero, the Christian republic in Thomas, and the monarchical state in Bodin. For the constitutional state we are at a loss in this respect. We might refer to Harrington, Locke, the Federalist, or Tocqueville—even Kant—Kant for theoretical illumination, but none is *the* philosopher of the constitutional state who discursively separates theory from symbolic self-interpretation that is civil theology. Notwithstanding this caveat all these thinkers have expounded to a degree the principles of order that ground civil politics. John Locke is certainly not the spiritual godfather of Western liberalism—a misreading of his part in the history of the modern political mind that owes much to American self-interpretation and its impact on the social sciences at large. But in one respect Locke is important in that he contributes to our understanding of the principles underlying the notions of trust and friendship in a civil polity.

In his study of American political culture, Donald J. Devine contends that "a consensual political culture has existed in the United States, essentially unchanged in its entire history. It roots are in the republican principles of Locke and were reinforced and adapted to American circumstances by Madison and the other 'founding fathers' of the constitution."[44] Devine's inquiry reflects the "liberal tradition" thesis that had been proposed by Louis Hartz in the 1950s.[45] "The political culture of the United States is conceived as being composed basically of Lockean values, which can be called the liberal tradition."[46] This "Locke hypothesis" guides his analysis of American culture. In the meantime, American historiography has come to disregard this *nihil praeter* Locke approach to American intellectual history in favor of the "republican synthesis." It refers to a republican paradigm of order that blends neoclassical civic humanism with the radical Protestant republican biblicism and fits Locke into the overall republican interpretive frame of analysis sketched out in the foregoing paragraph.[47] The "Lockean hypothesis" works if limited to the issue at hand, as pointed out as far as the modern trust discourse is concerned.

In the following I confine myself to what I think are the key concepts in a theoretical analysis of friendship, trust, and the civic polity.

Whatever we think of Locke philosophically, he discussed the fundamental question "What is the bond of human society?" in a way that

proved to be historically effective in that it became constitutive for the institutional and symbolic form of the civic polity. His "trust-discourse" is motivated by the classical idea that a commonwealth is established for peace, security, and "common friendship."[48] His arguments may be guided by tradition and informed by the constitutional debates of seventeenth-century England and by widely held tenets of the neoclassical republicanism, but he formulates a concept of common friendship whose centerpiece is the idea of trust, which is the foundational morality of political order. Locke's conception of political trusteeship builds first of all on the analogical legal figure of trust developed in the constitutional conflicts since the early 1600s: "We . . . find two main forms, with some minor varieties: first, the idea that the king, or the executive, is a trustee for the people governed, and second, that the members of parliament are trustees of the electorate."[49] Thus, the concept of political trusteeship had become an established mode of thought by the middle of the seventeenth century and it "reached Locke in a well-developed form, and . . . he did no more than receive and apply it."[50] This is correct as far as Locke considers all legitimate power fiduciary power entrusted to the legislative to act for certain ends. But the doctrine of political trusteeship as presented in *The Second Treatise of Government* involves the well-known conclusion that the power reverts to the people whenever the legislative acts are contrary to the trust reposed in the members of society. In legitimate civil societies ruler and ruled are morally bound by mutual trustworthiness—the root of all political agency—and society in itself is conceived as an enterprise of cooperative agency operating on the assumption that "[t]rust is both the corollary and the safeguard of natural political virtue."[51]

In his early *Essays on the Law of Nature* Locke denounces the Hobbesian law of nature that men are in a state of war: "So all society is abolished 'et societas vinculum fides.'"[52] The term "fides" means trust as well as faith, and in this sense it refers back to medieval political thought and practice: fides defines the feudal relationship between lord and subject as well as the religious relationship between God and the Christian believer. Either relationship involves mutual trust. Locke's anthropology and Socinian theology is dubious, but we are concerned with the politicoreligious part of it. The virtue of fides is the virtue of keeping one's promises: "Trustworthiness, the capacity to commit oneself to fulfilling the legitimate expectations of others, is both the constitutive virtue of, and the key causal precondition for the existence of any society. It is

what makes human society possible. . . . The duty to be trustworthy is primary because moral conventions and positive laws depend on it."[53] Trust springs from human beings' natural sociability, but it is safeguarded by the comprehensive order of the divine laid down in the *lex naturae.* Human trust and trust in God are intrinsically joined together in the sense of the biblical tradition. Human trust is premised by trust in God: "Those are not at all tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bond of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all."[54] In an addendum to the final draft of his 1667 *Essay on Toleration* Locke explains "that the belief of a Deity is not to be reckoned amongst purely speculative opinions for it [represents] the foundation of all morality, and that which influences the whole life and actions of man, without which a man is to be counted no other than one of the most dangerous sort of wild beasts and so incapable of all society."[55] "To be rationally and consistently trustworthy, for Locke the human being must fear the wrath of God."[56] Common friendship is guaranteed by the reverence for and fear of God. They alone lastingly ingrain the true principles of the law of nature, the foundation of morality in the heart of people.

To Locke the *obligatio moralis* is contingent on the sensual apperception of the well-ordered universe, the contemplation of which leads the mind by its discursive faculty that is reasoning to acknowledge God as the creator of everything and the author of the *lex naturalis:* "Hence it appears clearly that, with sense-perception showing the way, reason can lead us to the knowledge of a law-maker or of some superior power to which we are necessarily subject"—insofar God "has a just and inevitable command over us."[57] Once the nature of this command is more closely inspected it is clear that this God is not the God of the philosophers, not the God of the Deists, but a kind of Christian God as revealed in Locke's *The Reasonableness of Christianity.* The labors of reasoning produced only an inconsistent modicum of morality. The law of nature in its entirety gave Jesus Christ the authority of God in the Gospels: "Where was there any such code, that mankind might have recourse to, as their unerring code, before our Saviour's time. . . . We have from him a full and sufficient rule for our direction, and conformable to reason."[58] Locke extracted from the Gospels a Christian

core doctrine, similar to the radical Protestant biblicism that expounded a primordial Christianity: the acceptance of Christ as the Messiah, the belief in the one God, and genuine repentance and the submission to the law of Christ. "In his last major work . . . Locke sets out a clear and simple account of how for an English Christian in 1695 trust may be more confidently and securely disposed."[59]

But there is more to this ethics of belief. This reading of the Gospels authorized Locke's religiopolitics. Since the coming of Christ, God's command, the law of nature, is known to be the fundament of morality and this commits one to the reverence of God. Genuine "religion" combines piety and peacefulness, and the salvation of the soul is beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate, which is to tolerate all religions believing in God and animated by the fraternity among human beings. This includes all Christian denominations that agree on the minimal dogma as laid down in the Gospels, and Muslims, Jews, and pagans so far as they do not deliver themselves to the protection and service of another prince as Catholics to the pope of Rome and Muslims to the mufti of Constantinople. Nobody who confesses to the belief in God should be excluded from civil rights of the commonwealth on account of his religion.[60] This political conception of public morality anchored in monotheism is a nonconformist Protestant version of the Roman concept of *religio* that had been reanimated and reformulated by neoclassic humanism albeit without raising the matter of trust in any particular way. Religion in the sense of reverence for the divine emancipated the spiritual dimension of politics from doctrinal Christian orthodoxy and delegitimized the political power of the church. Locke dissociated the public sphere from the church-dominated spiritual sphere, but he committed the whole society to political monotheism. This ordering faith of the commonweal was separated from the saving faiths of the warring denominations. This concept of a more or less nondenominational Protestant public religion unfolded its full efficacy in revolutionary republicanism to become the religiopolitical framework of the American republic. All American founders and in particular the early presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson subscribed to this ordering faith, making it the civil religion of the republic.

From the trust discourse of Lockean politics emerges the unique Anglo-Saxon conception of government of political trusteeship. Only

in English thought were the legal concepts of trust and trusteeship transferred into the political sphere. The Weberian semantics of domination does not admit a concept of government in terms of trusteeship, nor is there a people that exerts this fiduciary power in terms of self-rule on the admittedly precarious basis of common friendship. The Lockean espousal of an order grounded in trust represented a paradigm of the political less fixated on the reason of state as Dunn explained: For Locke "the political primacy of *fides* is certainly not a matter of the priority of private rights over public utility. What divided him on this score from . . . exponents of the claims of state authority . . . was not any lack of sensitivity to the *rationes status*. . . . Rather, it was a more disabused and less alienated conception of the state. For him the state was only an organizational system through which some human beings are enabled to act on behalf of (or against) others."[61] This conclusion oversimplifies the matter in that Locke, like his neoclassical contemporaries, expounds the idea of a civic community unified by public virtue and committed to a "Higher Law" "promulgated by the Deity." Implied in Locke's conception of community was the notion of civism that animates cooperative civic agency and that Locke himself, on account of his specific theological individualism, was unable to articulate. It was the concept of reason, in that Locke differed from the neoclassic paradigm that was to absorb his politics of trust in turn.

The crucial point of this theological epistemology is that it eclipses reason as the constituent of humanity in terms of the ordering center of humans' personal existence in society. This has to be viewed in connection with the further observation that Locke did not develop a notion of citizenship. The alleged father of modern liberalism speaks of the "citizen" neither in his political tracts nor in his draft of the constitution for Carolina. All political and intellectual factions of this era envisioned the "free man" to be the pivot of civil politics, but it fell upon the neoclassic followers of Harrington to elevate the "free man" to "citizen" in the civic humanist tradition. "[T]he difference between *civis* and *servus* is irreconcilable; and no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a commonwealth; for he is not in his own power, cannot have a part in the government of others."[62] This credo of republicanism inspired by the Greco-Roman legacy, however, affirmed the essential rationality of human nature and made it the *condicio sine qua non* of the citizen's po-

litical agency. This premise provided Locke's trust discourse with a more specific political rationale: "common friendship" reveals itself as "civic friendship" based on the common sense of rational human beings. The trust discourse justified the right of revolution and legitimized regime change, but Locke "is not at all explicit about what actually happens when people find themselves at liberty to entrust new hands with the government."[63] It was the republican legacy of 1649 that filled this lacuna with the republican paradigm of civic self-government grounded on the principles of reason and common sense. Moreover, it was easily entwined with the Lockean concept of political monotheism and the privatization of church establishment. Setting aside the complex history of emergent Anglo-American republicanism, and at the risk of simplifying the story, the following brief comment might suffice in order to indicate how the moment of political rationality came to play a crucial role in the revolutionary trust discourse of the founding era of the American republic.

The salient point is, in brief, that Locke's highly individualistic political ontology was cleansed from the subjectivist implications of his anthropology by the Scottish philosophy of common sense that became an intellectual force in late-eighteenth-century America. It supplied the Lockean idea of common friendship with a philosophical grounding of the kind that objectifies ontologically the civil-theological precepts of the Lockean idea of political community. Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense restates the rationality of human nature and, consequently, of the citizen as the prudent man of common understanding that activates his moral sense. It enables him to make right judgements on private and public affairs. Common sense is the symbolic expression of the bond of community in that the common sense of the individual coincides with the *sensus communis* of interacting people. It is the constituent of the common world of human agency. Therefore, it is to be distinguished from the discursive faculty of reasoning (Locke's definition of "reason"), because it denotes that degree of reason that is necessary "to our being subjects of law and government . . . it is this reason, and this only that makes a man capable of managing his own affairs and answerable for conduct toward others; this is called common sense, because it is common sense to all men with whom we transact business or call to account for their conduct."[64] It installs a regularity of human conduct that inspires confidence in the action of fellowmen: "If we had no

confidence in our fellow-men that they will act such a part in such circumstances, it would be impossible to live in society with them. For that which makes men capable of living in society, and uniting in a political body under government, is, that their actions will always be regulated, in a great measure, by common principles of human nature."[65]

Reason allows for judging of things self-evident and apprehending first principles of order. Common sense in this understanding "coincides with reason in its whole extent" and is an "inward light or sense . . . given by heaven to different persons in different degrees" and it is "this degree that entitles them to the denomination of rational creatures."[66] The public world of common sense emerges from reason as the source of order—it is the order articulated in common friendship among citizens. It rests on "public spirit, that is an affection to any community to which we belong. . . . Without it, society could not subsist." If this affection of belonging is dominated by private concerns, public spirit is weak; but when it is "under the direction of virtue and reason, it is the very image of God in the soul."[67] Needless to say, Reid, like many of his intellectual confreres in the late eighteenth century, insists on the nation's duty to "honour God by stated acts of devotion and piety," "rational piety being the most powerful motive to virtue."[68] And he even proffers with reference to Locke the idea that a state may be well governed without an established religion, as in the case of Pennsylvania.

The concept of common sense is central to this understanding of the modern version of friendship in the civic polity because "it is the habit of judgement and conduct of a man formed by ratio" as Eric Voegelin indicates. But contrary to Voegelin's assertion, Reid was aware of the fact that "common sense is a civilizational habit that presupposes noetic experience." He would agree with Voegelin that the citizen of common sense need not himself possess "differentiated knowledge of noesis. The civilized *homo politicus* need not be a philosopher, but he must have common sense."[69]

The civic culture of civil polity, I conclude, presupposes political friendship and political friendship rests on the community of existentially formed *homines politici.* This Anglo-Saxon view of government has been so instilled into the political mind of the moderns that it has become a self-evident doctrine of democratic civil theology without, however, any interest paid to the underlying political ontology. How-

ever, as Eric Voegelin indicates, "A theory that insists on discussing politics in terms of Anglo-Saxon democracy can not deal adequately even with the Western national states, and not at all with the political organization, e.g., of Asiatic civilizations. It will, therefore, be . . . a problem of political philosophy to separate the essential from the historically contingent and to break with the habit of treating the institutions of a particular nation state at a particular time as if they truly manifested the nature of man."[70]

Such a systematic and reflexive account of the essentials of the political friendship discourse as distinguished from the modalities of its historical form is not an easy task for several reasons. First, it is inextricably bound up in the doctrine, thought, and institutional practice of Anglo-Saxon democracy, and its understanding of political trusteeship. In this regard it is a product of experiences engendered by historical situations, and effectively interpreted in terms of sets of symbols that were, as pointed out, an ideational amalgam coming to fruition in the modern constitutional state. Second, to reflect theoretically on the essence of this complex of ideas, sentiments, and behavioral attitudes requires penetrating to the formative principles and the underlying experiences at the root of the political friendship discourse in order to make sense of its modern modalities. This reflexive that is the philosophical approach to this discourse entails necessarily a recurrence to its ancient beginnings of a political reading of friendship and trust, because it emerged from a philosophical reading of citizen politics that set the ground base of the discourse that continues to resound in the modern era.

The Reflexive Politics of Friendship: Ancient and Modern

> Friendship is so eminent a republican virtue. (Hannah Arendt, *Denktagebuch*, I, 12)

Hannah Arendt's lifelong theoretical endeavours aim at a reconceptualization of citizen-related politics that would bring this classical idea of civic community to fruition in modern political discourse. This she accomplishes by reanimating the concept of friendship as the key to understanding the authentic meaning of the political. In contrast to the

power-centered notion of politics, her reconstruction of the political realm reasserts the dignity of the political that in terms of the "practical truth of politics" is a politics of friendship. Arendt's theorizing on politics is set to retrieve anamnetically the spirit of civil politics and to instil a modicum of civility into the apolitical manner of modern political life.[71] This entails an Aristotelian meditation of kind. She refers to Aristotle's explanation that "community is not made out of equals, but on the contrary of people who are different and unequal." The community comes into being through equalizing in economic and political terms. The political noneconomic equalization is friendship. The equalization in friendship, Arendt argues, means that the friends become "partners in a common world—that they together constitute a community." And she brings to the fore the crucial point of her analysis: the political element in friendship is that in truthful dialogue each friend can understand the truth inherent in the other's opinion.

More than his friend as a person, one friend understands how and in what specific articulateness the common world appears to the other, who as a person is forever unequal or different. This understanding is "the political insight par excellence." This understanding and action inspired by it brought about without the help of the statesman would mean for "each citizen to be articulate enough to show his opinion in its truthfulness and therefore to understand his fellow citizen."[72] Republican friendship binds together the citizens of good judgment communicating their mutual judgments on the basis of truthfulness. This common understanding of friendship allows for leadership in politics but not for domination. The virtue of judgment is prudence, the virtue of the mature citizen (the Aristotelian *phronimos*). The commonality of prudence articulated in civic interlocution and interaction brings forth the common sense of political society. This Arendtian approach to civic culture illuminates to a degree the notion of the model citizen and the modality of community conducive to civic self-government in terms of friendship that is the unspoken prerequisite of all democratic political theory. Arendt recognizes the significance of the prudent citizen's capacity for judging for the common realm of political interaction but she does not raise the question whether it requires some existential quality inherent in judging that makes its persuasiveness into an active force of order among the people.

To Arendt the truly political realm is constituted by the plurality of human beings whose quality of being citizens blunts the temptation for domination on the part of the despot, be it even the philosopher. Arendt's Heidegger-induced anti-Platonism causes her to underestimate the theoretical relevance of Plato's reflexive critique of "normal" polis politics. He follows Thucydides in analyzing the destructive impact of power politics on a citizen-community—not constrained by a communal spirit:

> Where offices of rule are open to contest, the victors in the contest monopolize power in the polis so completely that they offer not the smallest share in office to the vanquished party or their descendants; and each party keeps a watchful eye on the other, lest any one should come into office, and in revenge for the former troubles, cause a rising against them. Such *politeiai* we, of course, deny to be *politeiai,* just as we deny that laws are true laws unless they are enacted of in the interest of the commonweal *(koinon)* of the polis. But where the laws are enacted in the interest of a few, we speak of *stasioteiai* rather than of *politeiai.*[73]

Also, "a polis ought to be free and wise and in friendship with itself, and . . . a lawgiver should legislate with a view to this."[74] Plato's radical antidote to a *stasioteia* riddled by brutal interest and power politics was a *politeia* where there is observed the old Pythagorean maxim that "friends have all things really in common" meaning that there is "a community of wives, children, and chattel as well as all other private things *(idia).*"[75] We no longer have such a succinct terminology at our disposal as suggested by the *stasioteia–politeia* disjunction in order to distinguish a civil society based on trust and consensus from that one derailed into pure interest and power politics. The problem itself has been a vexing one in civil polities ever since, and Locke's trust discourse is just one case in point.

To Aristotle as well as to Arendt, and—as should be noted—to the "constitutional" tradition at large, the Platonic price was much too high since with the *stasioteia* the citizen polis altogether would have to go: "It is clear from this consideration that it is not an outcome of nature for the polis to be a unity in the manner in which certain persons

say that it is, and that what has been said to be the greatest good in the *poleis* really destroys *poleis.*"[76] "For in one way the Polis as its unification proceeds will cease to be a Polis, and in another way, though it continues a Polis, yet by coming near to ceasing to be one it will be a worse Polis, just as if one turned a harmony *(symphonia)* into a unison *(homphonia).*"[77] For the polis is by nature a plurality of persons, and it consists of persons differing in kind.[78] Against Plato's friendship of a guardian class engineered by a community of wives, children, and property, his student Aristotle opts for a friendship of civic integration: "We think that friendship is the greatest blessing of the Polis, because it is the best safeguard against lapsing into *stasioteia (stasiazein).*"[79] "Friendship." Aristotle asserts, "appears to be the bond of the Polis,"[80] and a *politeia* of free citizens requires "that all citizens shall be equal and shall be good, so that they all rule in turn and all have an equal share in power; and therefore the friendship between them is also one of equality." "For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there can be no friendship between them either, any more there can be no justice."[81] This is "political friendship" the substance of societal concord *(homonoia).* "Therefore *homonoia* exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one."[82] In passing it should be noted that this conceptualization sums up the Philosopher's analysis of polis politics. Neither the historians nor the orators speak of *philia* as a political concept in the Aristotelian sense. When friendship and friends were mentioned, they referred to personal relations among associative ties based on family, regional, and cultic networks and their working together or against each other in the political process.[83]

Arendt's concept of republican friendship builds on Aristotle's political friendship and she follows Aristotle in that not the rule of the philosopher, but friendship among citizens is the proper response to the crisis of democratic order. The Arendtian conception of republican friendship unfolds its theoretical potential only on the condition of including the constituent element of human rationality, because according to Aristotle friendship among citizens reflects the modality of "primary friendship" among good human beings that is a loving meeting of rational spirits united in mutual trust *(pistis).* Primary friendship is the epitome of friendship that is "the ultimate substance of all human

relations, the bond of feeling, varying in color, intensity, and stability according to the things which are felt to create the community in the concrete case." Primary friendship figures as the source of order in human relations "in so far as a perfect community will be achieved between men who have the order of the nous in common."[84] Political agency in the citizen polis rests on political friendship that is *homonoia* or like-mindedness in that it requires citizens to be of one mind or spirit in regard to subordinating their interests, plans, and actions to the common weal: political friendship determines whether concord or discord rules in society. The concord—discord disjunction corresponds to the trust—distrust junction of political culture research. The first, however, brings the problem of the substance of order into the picture, the second does not.

Arendt's anti-Platonism lets her repudiate Plato's anthropological principle that God is the measure of all human things by emphasizing Aristotle's statement that the measure for everybody is virtue and the good man: "The standard is what men are themselves," she claims, "when they act and not something which is external like the laws or superhuman like the ideas."[85] But the political truth attained by prudence is the truth of the good life that provides the measure of a well-ordered political life. According to Aristotle we arrive at it by induction that is the living experience of the good man who practices the life of reason: "Not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine."[86] This seems to fly in the face of the modern's humanistic belief. It might well be that this is the reason for Arendt's eclipsing this existential that defines the essence of the citizen's humanity. The Arendtian conception of political friendship has Aristotelian implications that must be explicated in order to confront it with so-called modern conceptions of community. Both are deficient in that they avoid acknowledging the anthropological premises of the Western idea of civic community as mentioned above, notwithstanding the historical fact that the modern constitutional form of public order, its institutions and symbolic form, derives from a paradigm of order that made human nature the base of self-government. So it may come much to the surprise of the practitioner of political science that this notion of human nature's spirituality became the centerpiece of the emerging citizen-centered vision of a civic polity in early modernity in

that it accounted for the legitimacy of republican self-government, as demonstrated by a close reading of Locke's trust discourse and of Reid's common sense philosophy.

This statement necessitates further comment. Arendt's paradigm of republican friendship provides the modern friendship discourse with a near-Aristotelian theoretical grounding but she misses the "religious" moment involved. If we compare her vision of friendship to the civil theological thinking on friendship, this drawback becomes obvious. This idea of civic friendship was religiously connoted insofar it fed on a trans-denominational nonconformist version of Christian communalism. The community under God that is the national commonwealth blends the political notion of civic friendship with the Gospel's postulate of fraternity. Thus was the Christian vision of like-mindedness in Christ's body transferred to the body politic in the course of the "spiritual closure of the national cosmion."[87] From the outset this whole complex of ideas represented a politicocultural provincialism whose claim to universal validity was evoked by the new revolutionary regimes of Western constitutional democracy. In this respect the Christian ethic of fraternity was not marginalized as Weber claimed but metamorphosed in modernity. Weber is only correct in his analysis where he is concerned with another modern outgrowth of Christian fraternity: the eschatologically loaded project of a fraternity of revolutionary comrades in arms recreating the political world in their own image. "The relationship between Christian and pagan reflections on *philia/amicitia* is a complex one" in antiquity and even more so in the Middle Ages.[88] The presence of friendship in discourse and variegated modes of social practice in the Latin West is beyond the scope of this inquiry.[89] But an understanding of the revolutionary evocation of fraternity in modernity is contingent on its backdrop in terms of the evocation of the spiritual community of Christ. It was eschatologically coded insofar as it allowed for friendship with God (being denied by the pagans) to be perfected in a world to come:

> The very last, and perhaps most defining, novelty of the Christian theories of friendship—defining because all other elements lead up to it—was the inherent link forged between friendship and the life of heaven. . . . Aelred of Rievaulx brought his *De Amicitia Spirituali* to

> a close with the following words . . . : The sting of death, which now afflicts us and makes us grieve for one another, will be destroyed. And then, in complete security, we shall rejoice for the everlasting existence of the Highest Good, when this friendship to which on earth we admit but view, will be extended to all, and by all will be extended to God, since God will be all in all.[90]

Once the Christian paradigm of a sacred history was transformed into a speculation on the meaning of the intramundane historical processes leading up to a terrestrial paradise, the promise of true fraternity was relegated to an open horizon of human perfection: a *democratie à venir* is the imagined place where the quest for true friendship comes to rest, as Jacques Derrida argues in his *Politiques de l'amitie.* Derrida's meandering speculation on the politics of friendship sets the counterpoint to Arendt's republican friendship and "deconstructs" the civil theological tradition in general. From his vantage point the political discourse on trust and friendship in past and present is under the spell of a political world marked by the Schmittian friend—enemy disjunction. The deconstructivist hermeneutics revolves around an apocryphal saying of Aristotle: "He who has friends can have no (true) friend" or "O friends, there is no friend."[91] Derrida operates with an erudite sleight of hand. He follows Plato and Aristotle in their philosophical understanding of primary friendship and hyperbolizes it in a twofold way: all modes of friendship are exclusive and therefore "politically" connoted (family, gender, nation) and the telos of friendship par excellence, universal and freed from any social fetters, is unattainable either because the pursuit of friendship is infinite or because the nature of friendship in itself is incomprehensible.[92] Thus, whenever people befriend each other they miss the all-inclusive universality of a true human intercourse—at least for the "political" time being. This reading destroys the ontological underpinnings of any politics of trust and friendship as well as it neglects the empirical reality of civil politics. This done, there is only one question left: "Is it possible . . . to think and to live the bittersweet rigor of friendship, the law of friendship with the experience of a certain inhumanity, in the absolute separation, on this or that side of the commerce between gods and men? And which politics could one still base on this friendship which exceeds the

measurement of the man without becoming a theologeme?"[93] Neither man nor god is the measure: Who is left but Derrida? His imagined point of reference is a parousia: the "*democratie à venir.*" It appertains to the time of promise, and it remains in all future times "in coming": "Is it possible to open with the 'coming' of a certain democracy that is no longer an insult, which has the friendship with which we try to think beyond the homofraternel and phallogocentric scheme?"[94] In the last analysis Derrida acts the French Jacobin turned prophet, passing judgment on the lapsed people of democratic common sense.

The Western discourse on trust and friendship is a theoretical and practical discourse on the human condition of political order and as such it is an inherent element of Western self-understanding from its origins in the Greco-Roman world onward. But the semantics of friendship connotes foremost the highly personal moment of the face-to-face encounter of individuals and defines the optimal mode of human intercourse. In this respect it is correct to say: "The language, ideas, and lived experience of friendship are common place in human society,"[95] because this personal friendship is a transcultural phenomenon that can be studied in terms of equivalent modes of expression. The crucial point is, however, the "political" understanding friendship: it refers to the public sphere of common meanings sustaining a common reference world that signifies common purpose, action, and aspiration of the members of society. They live together by virtue of the binding force of trust. Its social efficacy results from a public ethics of trust. It links the personal habitus of trusting and trustworthiness to an image of human personality that serves as the ordering principle of society. It envisions the existentially engaged participation in the life of community on account of the common reason present in all citizens that signifies the theomorphy of human being's humanity. This linking of friendship to the public order was dependent on the citizen politics of Western antiquity, and following suit the evocation of the spiritual Christian community. From a theoretical point of view the political symbolism of trust and friendship entails a paradigm of order emerging from a specific mode of Western experience. The symbolism welds the historical contingent to the essential inherent in the political form of order: the constitutional state. This became obvious in the course of the global spread of this political model: the outward institutional form

founders on the lack of community-creating substance because no ordering experience has materialized and become socially effective in the process of societal and political "Westernization."

In effect, any theoretical reflection on political friendship is in principle limited insofar as it is bound up with the Western form of order. The theoretical quest for the essential involves the study of symbolic and structural equivalent modes of evoking a political unit, a "cosmion of order" (Voegelin), into existence by acts of imagination in accordance with an ordering idea of human existence in society in intercivilizational perspective. The reflexive politics of friendship is in this respect a case study of human nature's potential for creatively ordering its existence in societal form.

Notes

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6. Ibid., 18.

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8. Ibid., 47.

9. Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, ed. Johannes Winkelmann (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1956), 658. My translation.

10. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), 548–49.

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23. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 123.

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25. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 28.

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27. Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 26.

28. Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 137.

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34. Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 137.

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37. Robert N. Bellah et al., *The Good Society* (New York: Knopf, 1991), 3.

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43. For example, Fukuyama, *Trust;* Seligman, *The Problem of Trust.*

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