4

The following paper was originally presented as the Katz-Newcomb Memorial Lecture, University of Michigan, 1976. It was designed to be spoken, and through its text and delivery to provide an actual instance—not merely a discussion—of some differences between talk and the printed word. Nevertheless, with a modest amount of editorial work, the original format could have been transformed. Reference, laconic and otherwise, to time, place, and occasion could have been omitted; footnotes could have been used to house appropriate bibliography, extended asides, and full identification of sources mentioned in passing; first-person references could have been recast; categoric pronouncements could have been qualified; and other features of the style and syntax appropriate to papers in print could have been imposed. Without this, readers might feel that they had been fobbed off—with a text meant for others and a writer who felt that rewriting was not worth the bother. However, I have refrained almost entirely from making such changes. My hope is that as it stands, this version will make certain framing issues clear by apparent inadvertence, again instantiating the difference between talk and print, this time from the other side, although much less vividly than might be accomplished by publishing an unedited, closely transcribed tape recording of the initial delivery, along with phrase-by-phrase parenthetical exegesis of gesticulation, timing, and elisions. (This latter would be useful, but requires a bit much by way of warrant for public self-dissection.) I venture this plea without confidence, because it provides the

obvious (albeit the only valid) excuse for obliging readers to suffer a text that has not been reworked for their mode of apprehending it. Of course, both this abuse of readers and what they can learn about framing from being thus abused are somewhat weakened by the fact that the original speaking was not extemporaneous talk, merely aloud reading from a typed text, and that all spontaneous elaborations added to the script on that occasion (and on others when the paper was reread) have been omitted—a standard practice in almost all conversions from talk to print. The punctuation signs employed are those designed for written grammar, being the same as those employed in the typed text from which the talk was read; however, the version of this order that appeared in sound arises from the original in unspecified ways—at least unspecified here. (For example, quotation marks that appear in the reading typescript appear also in the present text, but the reader is not informed as to how the words so marked were managed in the speaking, whether by prosodic markers, verbal transliteration ["quotes" . . . "unquote"], or/and finger gestures.) Moreover, here and there I have not foreborne to change a word or add a line (indeed, a paragraph or two) to the original, and these modifications are not identified as such. Finally, a prefatory statement has been added, namely, this one, along with the bibliographical references which allow me to acknowledge help from Hymes (1975) and Bauman (1975), all of which is solely part of the printed presentation. Thus, however much the original talk was in bad faith, this edited documentation of it is more so. (For a parallel discussion of the spoken lecture, and a parallel disclaimer regarding the written version, see Frake [1977].)

THE LECTURE

I

My topic and my arguments this afternoon are part of the substantive area I work in, the naturalistic study of human foregatherings and cominglings, that is, the forms and occasions of face-to-face interaction. The particular form in question incidentally provides scope for what I call "frame analysis." No other justifications are offered, but these are. Therefore, I hope you will reserve judgment and will not immediately assume that my selection of the lecture as a topic proves I am yet another self-appointed cut-up, optimistically attempting a podium shuck. I am not trying to wriggle out of my contract with you by using my situation at the podium to talk about something ready to hand, my situation at the podium. To do so would be to occupy a status for purposes other than fulfilling it. Of that sort of puerile opportunism we have had quite enough, whether from classroom practitioners of group dynamics, the left wing of ethnomethodology, or the John Cage school of performance rip-offs. (He who says he is tearing up his prepared address to talk to you extemporaneously about what it is like to address you or what it is like to write talks, or to formulate sentences in the first place, has torn up the wrong prepared address.) That I am transmitting my remarks through a lecture and not, say, in print or during a conversation, I take to be incidental. Indeed, a term like "paper"

in its relevant sense can refer equally to something that is printed and something that is delivered.

Surely nothing I can want to say about lectures can have the effect of questioning the opportunity they give to purposely impart a coherent chapter of information, including, in my own case, imparting something about lecturing. One necessary condition for the validity of my analysis is that I cannot avoid its application to this occasion of communicating it to you; another is that this applicability does not, in turn, undermine either the presentation or the arguments. He who lectures on speech error and its correction will inevitably make some of the very errors he analyzes, but such an unintended exhibition attests to the value of the analysis, however it reflects upon the speaking competence of the analyst. More still, he who lectures on discourse presuppositions will be utterly tongue-tied unless unself-consciously he makes as many as anyone else. He who lectures about prefaces and excuses might still be advised to begin his talk with an apologetic introduction. And he who lectures about lectures does not have a special excuse for lecturing badly; his description of delivery faults will be judged according to how well the description is organized and delivered; his failure to engross his listeners cannot be reframed retrospectively as an illustration of the interactional significance of such failure. Should he actually succeed in breaching lecturing's constraints, he becomes a performing speaker, not a speaker performing. (He who attempts such breaching, and succeeds, should have come to the occasion dressed in tights, carrying a lute. He who attempts such evasion and fails—as is likely—is just a plain schmuck, and it would be better had he not come to the occasion at all.) Which is not to say that other sorts of frame break might be as clearly doomed; for example, a reference at this point to the very questionable procedure of my employing "he" in the immediately preceding utterances, carefully mingling a sex-biased word for the indefinite nominal pronoun, and an unobjectionable anaphoric term for someone like myself.

However, it is apparent that lecturing on lectures is nonetheless a little special. To hold forth in an extended fashion on lecturing to persons while they have to sit through one, is to force them to serve double time—a cruel and unusual punishment. To

claim authority on lectures before an audience such as this one is to push forward into that zone where presumption shades into idiocy. Moreover, much as I argue that my avowals can, should, and must be firmly contained within the lecture format, something is likely to leak out. Indeed, I know that before this talk is over I will have turned more than once on my own immediately past behavior as an illustration of what is currently being said; for certainly I can inadvertently exhibit a thing better than I can consciously mock up a version for illustrative presentation. But there is a limit to how much of this sort of turning in one's tracks is allowable. Illustrations themselves raise questions. He who reports jokes, in a lecture on humor, has a right, and perhaps the obligation, to tell bad ones, for the punch line is properly to be found in the analysis, not in the story; he can allow data jokes to spark his presentation, but not to burn his thought down. Similarly, lecturing linguists can do a glottal stop or an alveolar flap as an illustration of it, and ornithologists a bird call, without particularly threatening the definition that it is lecturing that is going on. In a lecture on the grey-legged goose, slides of threat behavior are perfectly in order, words and slides being somehow equally insulated from the situation in which they are presented. In fact, medical lecturers can bring in the goose itself, providing it is a human one, and only the goose need be embarrassed. And yet, were the speaker to use the whole of his body to perform an illustration of grey-leg threat behavior—as I have seen Konrad Lorenz do—then something else begins to happen, something of the sort that only Lorenz can get away with doing, and he not without leaving a confirming residue in his reputation.

Trickier still: if an impropriety is enacted as an illustration of an impropriety, the enactment being, as it were, in quotes, how much extra insulation does that provide? In lectures on torture, speakers understandably hesitate to play tapes of actual occurrences; with how much less risk could I play such a tape as an illustration of what can't be played? Would that twice removal from actual events suffice to keep us all within the unkinetic world that lecturing is supposed to sustain? And finally, given that the situation *about* which a lecture deals is insulated in various ways from the situation *in* which the lecturing occurs, and is obliged to be insulated in this way, can an illustrated discussion

of this disjunctive condition be carried on without breaching the very line that is under scrutiny? And if all of the presentation which is to follow is a single, extended example of the vulnerability of the line between the process of referring and the subject matter that is referred to, and I so state it to be from the beginning, am I giving a lecture or a lecture-hall exhibition? And is it possible to raise that question directly without ceasing to lecture? In reporting in this way about the goose, don't I become one?

You will note that I have eased you into a discussion of the lecture by talking about the lecturer. Indeed, I will continue to do so. Balance could only come from what I won't provide, an analysis of the intricacies of audience behavior.

II

A lecture is an institutionalized extended holding of the floor in which one speaker imparts his views on a subject, these thoughts comprising what can be called his "text." The style is typically serious and slightly impersonal, the controlling intent being to generate calmly considered understanding, not mere entertainment, emotional impact, or immediate action. Constituent statements presumably take their warrant from their role in attesting to the truth, truth appearing as something to be cultivated and developed from a distance, coolly, as an end in itself.

A platform arrangement is often involved, underlining the fact that listeners are an "immediate audience." I mean a gathered set of individuals, typically seated, whose numbers can vary greatly without requiring the speaker (typically standing) to change his style, who have the right to hold the whole of the speaker's body in the focus of staring-at attention (as they would an entertainer), and who (initially, at least) have only the back channel through which to convey their response.

Those who present themselves before an audience are said to be "performers" and to provide a "performance"—in the peculiar, theatrical sense of the term. Thereby they tacitly claim those platform skills for lack of which an ordinary person thrust upon the stage would flounder hopelessly—an object to laugh at, be embarrassed for, and have massive impatience with. And they



tacitly accept judgment in these terms by those who themselves need never be exposed to such appraisal. The clear contrast is to everyday talk, for there, it is felt, no elevated role is being sought, no special competency is required, and surely only morbid shyness or some other unusual impediment could prevent one from delivering the grunts and eyebrow flashes that will often suffice. (Which is not to say that in conversational settings individuals

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Face-to-face undertakings of the focused kind, be they games, joint tasks, theater performances, or conversations, succeed or fail as interactions in the degree to which participants get caught up by and carried away into the special realm of being that can be generated by these engagements. So, too, lectures. However, unlike games and staged plays, lectures must not be frankly presented as if engrossment were the controlling intent. Indeed, lectures draw on a precarious ideal: certainly the listeners are to be carried away so that time slips by, but because of the speaker's subject matter, not his antics; the subject matter is meant to have its own enduring claims upon the listeners apart from the felicities or infelicities of the presentation. A lecture, then, purports to take the audience right past the auditorium, the occasion, and the speaker into the subject matter upon which the lecture comments. So your lecturer is meant to be a performer, but not merely a performer. Observe, I am not saying that audiences regularly do become involved in the speaker's subject matter, only that they handle whatever they do become involved in so as not to openly embarrass the understanding that it's the text they are involved in. In fact, there is truth in saying that audiences become involved in spite of the text, not because of it; they skip along, dipping in and out of following the lecturer's argument, waiting for the special effects which actually capture them, and topple them momentarily into what is being said—which special effects I need not specify but had better produce.

In the analysis of all occasions in which talk figures largely —what Hymes has called "speech events"—it is common to use

the term "speaker," as I will also. But in fact the term "speaker" is very troublesome. It can be shown to have variable and separable functions, and the word itself seems to demand that we use it because of these ambiguities, not in spite of them. In the case of a lecture, one person can be identified as the talking machine, the thing that sound comes out of, the "animator." Typically in lectures, that person is also seen as having "authored" the text, that is, as having formulated and scripted the statements that get made. And he is seen as the "principal," namely, someone who believes personally in what is being said and takes the position that is implied in the remarks. (Of course, the lecturer is likely to assume that right-thinking persons also will take the position he describes.)

I am suggesting that it is characteristic of lectures (in the sense of common to them and important for them) that animator, author, and principal are the same person. Also, it is characteristic that this three-sided functionary is assumed to have "authority" —intellectual, as opposed to institutional. By virtue of reputation or office, he is assumed to have knowledge and experience in textual matters, and of this considerably more than that possessed by the audience. And, as suggested, he does not have to fight to hold the floor—at least for a stipulated block of time—this monopoly being his, automatically, as part of the social arrangements. The floor is his, but, of course, attention may not be. As would also be true if instead of a lecturer at stage center we had a singer, a poet, a juggler, or some other trained seal.

Following the linguist Kenneth Pike, it can be said that lectures belong to that broad class of situational enterprises wherein a difference clearly occurs between game and spectacle, that is, between the business at hand and the custard of interaction in which the business is embedded. (The custard shows up most clearly as "preplay" and "postplay," that is, a squeeze of talk and bustle just before the occasioned proceedings start and just after they have finished.) The term "lecture" itself firmly obscures the matter, sometimes referring to a spoken text, sometimes to the embracing social event in which its delivery occurs—an ambiguity, also, of most terms for other stage activities.

The arrangement we have been looking at—the laminated affair of spectacle and game—itself will come in various formats:

as a one-shot event, or one of a series involving the same arrangements but different speakers, or one session of a course, the latter a sequence of lectures by the same speaker.

The spectacle, the environing social fuss in which a lecture is delivered, sometimes qualifies as a celebrative occasion. By "celebrative occasion" I mean a social affair that is looked forward to and back upon as a festivity of some kind whose business at hand, when any is discernible, is not the only reason for participation; rather import is intendedly given to social intercourse among the participants gathered under the auspices of honoring and commemorating something, if only their own social circle. Moreover, there is a tendency to phrase participation as involving one's total social personality, not merely a specialized segment. (The first and last night of a theatrical run according to this definition could be a celebrative occasion, but not likely the showings in between; a day at the office is not a special occasion, but the Christmas party hopefully is.) One-shot lectures "open to the public" involving a speaker otherwise inaccessible to the audience (and an audience otherwise inaccessible to him) are often embedded in a celebrative occasion, as are talks to private audiences in a serial format. Lectures that are part of a college course delivered by a local person tend to go unmarked in this particular way, except sometimes the opening and closing ones. Course lectures have another marginal feature: listeners can be made officially responsible for learning what is said—a condition that strikes deeply at the ritual character of performances. There note taking can occur, the lecturer accommodating in various ways to facilitate this, the note taker preferring to come away with a summary instead of an experience. (May I add, celebrative occasions seem to be a fundamental organizational form of our public life, yet hardly any study has been given to them as such.)

The recruitment of an audience through advertising, announcements to members, class scheduling, and the like; the selection and payment of the speaker; the provision of requisite housekeeping services—all these presuppose an organizational base which takes and is accorded responsibility, allowing one to speak of the "auspices" or sponsors of the lecture. A committee of some kind, a division of a university, a professional association, a government agency—any of these can serve. Characteris-

tically this sponsoring organization will have a life and a purpose extending beyond the mounting of the lecture itself. Insofar as the lecture is itself embedded in a celebrative occasion, the occasion will celebrate the auspices of the talk even as it celebrates the speaker and his topic. (A rock concert may have auspices whose life is restricted to the mounting of this one event, and the event itself may little celebrate its auspices—in this case its promoters—these persons hoping for rewards of a more palpable kind.) In celebrative occasions in which a lecture is to occur, transition from spectacle to game, from hoopla to business at hand, is routinely divided (as you have recently witnessed) into two parts, the first part enacted by a representative of the auspices introducing the speaker, and the second part by the speaker introducing his topic. Sometimes the introducer's part of the introduction is itself split in two, the introducer himself being introduced, as though the organizers felt that the contribution of this slot to their various concerns could best be used by inserting more than one candidate.

Observe, the interests of the organizers will lie not only with the actual lecture delivery, but also with the photographic, taped, and textual record thereof, for such a record can serve organizational interests as much as or more than the talk itself. (The clear case here is the sort of charity ball that is held for a worthy organization, where commonly the costs of mounting the ball are barely offset by the monies gained from tickets, the real underlying purpose being to give newspapers a warrant for coverage.) Patently, to advertise a lecture is also to advertise its auspices; to obtain coverage of the lecture by the press has the same consequence. (Campus newspapers are interesting in this connection. They are ostensibly designed as independent, if not dissident, expressions of inmate opinion. But they appreciably function as vanity presses for administrations, providing coverage for what might otherwise, mercifully, go unrecorded.)

Here there is an obvious link between formal organizations and the "star system." Sponsoring organizations frequently judge themselves dependent on some degree of public support and approval, some recognition of their presence and their mission, even though their financial resources may have a more circumscribed base. A principal way of bringing the name of the spon-

sorship before the public is to advertise some commemorative event and to obtain press coverage of it. To make such an event significant to a wide public, it is apparently helpful to schedule one or more well-known names—personages—to make an appearance. This helps give members of the public who are far afield warrant for the journey in to witness the occasion. In a sense, then, an institution's advertising isn't done in response to the anticipated presence of a well-known figure; rather, a well-known figure is useful in order to have something present that warrants wide advertising. So one might also say that large halls aren't built to accommodate large audiences but rather to accommodate wide advertising. Of course, a speaker's prestige is relevant in another way: he lends his weight to the sponsoring organization and to its social occasions, on the assumption, apparently, that worthies only affiliate with what is worthy. For thus lending his name, the speaker receives publicity and an honorarium—rewards apart from a warm reception for his words and the opportunity to spread them. In all of this we see a glimmering of the links between social affairs and social structures, a glimpse of the politics of ceremony—and another way in which preeminence derives less from differential achievement than from the organizational needs of sponsors and their occasions.

There can be, then, between auspices and speaker a tacit, some would say unholy, alliance. And this alliance may be sustained at the expense of the lecture itself—the lecture as a means of transmitting knowledge. The speaker is encouraged to pitch his remarks down to fit the competence of a large audience—an audience large enough to warrant the celebration and cost that is involved. He is encouraged to fit his remarks into the stretch of time that such an audience might be ready to forebear, and to employ mannerisms which ensure audience involvement. And he is encouraged to accept all manner of rampant intrusion from interviewers, photographers, recording specialists, and the like—intrusions that often take place right in the middle of the heat of the occasion. (If at any moment you should get the notion that a speaker really is fully caught up in talking to you, take note of his capacity to treat photographers as though they weren't interrupting his talk. Such apparent obliviousness can, of course, come

from his involvement with you, as opposed to his commitment to publicity, but don't count on it.)

Finally it should be said that although a lecture can be the main business of the social occasion in which it is embedded—an arrangement that speakers presumably find ideal—other settings are common. In the United States, for example, there is the institution of the lunch speaker, and the understanding that a membership's regular get-togethers for a meal cannot be complete without a guest speaker; who, or on what topic, need not be a first consideration—anyone in the neighborhood who does talks for a fee will often do. (In many cases, of course, we might find it more natural to speak of such luncheon performances as giving a talk, not a lecture, the critical difference somehow involving the matter of systematic topic development.) And just as an occasion can make a convenience of a speaker, so a speaker can make a convenience of an occasion, as when a political figure graces a local gathering but his main concern is the transmission of his talk to media audiences.

III

What I have said so far about lectures is obvious and requires no special perspective; we move now to more intimate matters.

In our society we recognize three main modes of animating spoken words: *memorization, aloud reading* (such as I had been doing up to now), and *fresh talk.* In the case of fresh talk, the text is formulated by the animator from moment to moment, or at least from clause to clause. This conveys the impression that the formulation is responsive to the current situation in which the words are delivered, including the current content of the auditorium and of the speaker's head, and including, but not merely, what could have been envisaged and anticipated. Memorization is sometimes employed in lectures, but not admittedly. (Theatrical parts present a more complicated picture: they are delivered as though in fresh talk, and although everyone knows they are thoroughly memorized, this knowledge is to be held in abeyance, and fresh talk is to be made-believe.) In lectures, aloud reading is a frequent

mode of delivery. Fresh talk is perhaps the general ideal and (with the assistance of notes) quite common.

Memorization, aloud reading, and fresh talk are different production modes. Each presupposes its own special relation between speaker and listener, establishing the speaker on a characteristic "footing" in regard to the audience. Switches from one of the three forms to another, that is, "production shifts," imply for the speaker a change of footing, and, as will be seen, are a crucial part of lecturing. The critical point that will later be addressed is that a great number of lectures (because of my incompetence, not including this one) depend upon a fresh-talk illusion. Radio announcing, I might add, is even more deeply involved in maintaining this precarious effect.

It might be noted that fresh talk itself is something of an illusion of itself, never being as fresh as it seems. Apparently we construct our utterances out of phrase- and clause-length segments, each of which is in some sense formulated mentally and then recited. Whilst delivering one such segment one must be on the way to formulating the next mentally, and the segments must be patched together without exceeding acceptable limits for pauses, restarts, repetitions, redirections, and other linguistically detectable faults. Lecturers mark a natural turning point in the acquisition of fresh-talk competence when they feel they can come close to finishing a segment without knowing yet what in the world the next will be, and yet be confident of being able to come up with (and on time) something that is grammatically and thematically acceptable, and all this without making it evident that a production crisis has been going on. And they mark a natural turning point in fresh talking *or* aloud reading a lecture when they realize they can give thought to how they seem to be doing, where they stand in terms of finishing too soon or too late, and what they plan to do after the talk—without these backstage considerations becoming evident as their concern; for should such preoccupation become evident, the illusion that they are properly involved in communicating will be threatened.

Earlier I recommended that a lecture contains a text that could just as well be imparted through print or informal talk. This being the case, the content of a lecture is not to be understood as something distinctive to and characteristic of lecturing. At best

one is left with the special contingencies of delivering any particular text through the lecture medium. At best the interface, the bonding between text and situation of delivery. One is left with the form, the interactional encasement; the box, not the cake. And I believe there is no way to get at these interactional issues without directing full and sustained attention to the question of the speaker's handling of himself—a question that is easy to write about circumspectly but hard to lecture on without abusing one's podium position. I have a right to obtain and direct your attention to some relevant topic, including myself if I can manage to work that particular object into some topical event or opinion. I have the right, indeed the obligation, to back up this communicative process (whether what is said includes me as a protagonist or not) with all due manner of gesticulatory accompaniment and seemly jumping up and down. However, if, because of what I say, you focus your attention on this supportive animation; if, because of what I refer to, you attend the process through which I make references, then something is jeopardized that is structurally crucial in speech events: the partition between the inside and outside of words, between the realm of being sustained through the meaning of a discourse and the mechanics of discoursing. This partition, this membrane, this boundary, is the tickler; what happens to it largely determines the pleasure and displeasure that will be had in the occasion.

IV

Now consider footing and its changes. Differently put, consider the multiple senses in which the self of the speaker can appear, that is, the multiple self-implicatory projections discoverable in what is said and done at the podium.

At the apparent center will be the textual self, that is, the sense of the person that seems to stand behind the textual statements made and which incidentally gives these statements authority. Typically this is a self of relatively long standing, one the speaker was involved in long before the current occasion of talk. This is the self that others will cite as the author of various publications, recognize as the holder of various positions, and so

forth. As often the case in these matters, the speaker may use the term "I" or even "we" to refer to the capacity that is involved and the alignment to the audience that this particular self subtends, but this pronominal explicitness need not occur. Allied with this scholarly voice will sometimes be found a relevant historical-experiential one, the one that figures in a replay the speaker may provide of a strip of personal experience from his or her own past during which something of textual relevance occurred. (The lecture that a returning war correspondent or diplomat gives will be full of this sort of thing, as will lectures by elder academicians when they recount their personal dealings with historic personages of their field.) Observe, this textual self, presupposed by and projected through the transmission of either scholarship or historically relevant personal experience, can be displayed entirely through the printable aspects of words; it can appear in full form in a printed version of the lecture's text, an emanation from the text itself and not, say, from the way in which its oral delivery is managed on any occasion. Characteristically, it is this self that can still be projected even though the writer falls sick and a stand-in must deliver his address.

In truth, however, the interesting and analytically relevant point about the lecture as a performance is not the textual stance that is projected in the course of the lecture's delivery, but the additional footings that can be managed at the same time, footings whose whole point is the contrast they provide to what the text itself might otherwise generate. I speak of distance-altering alignments, some quite briefly taken, which appear as a running counterpoint to the text, and of elaborative comments and gestures which do not appear in the substance of the text but in the mechanics of transmitting it on a particular occasion and in a particular setting.

First, there are overlayed "keyings." The published text of a serious paper can contain passages that are not intended to be interpreted "straight," but rather understood as sarcasm, irony, "words from another's mouth," and the like. However, this sort of self-removal from the literal content of what one says seems much more common in spoken papers, for there vocal cues can be employed to ensure that the boundaries and the character of the quotatively intended strip are marked off from the normally

intended stream. (Which is not to say that as of now these paralinguistic markers can be satisfactorily identified, let alone transcribed.) Thus, a competent lecturer will be able to read a remark with a twinkle in his voice, or stand off from an utterance by slightly raising his vocal eyebrows. Contrariwise, when he enters a particular passage he can collapse the distance he had been maintaining, and allow his voice to resonate with feeling, conviction, and even passion. In sensing that these vocally tinted lines could not be delivered this way in print, hearers sense they have preferential access to the mind of the author, that live listening provides the kind of contact that reading doesn't.

Second, consider text brackets. You will note that papers destined to be printed, not spoken, are likely to have some sort of introduction and closing. These bracketing phases will be presented in a slightly different voice from the one employed in the body of the text itself. But nothing elaborate by way of a shift in footing is likely—although such change *is* likely, I might add, in full-length books. In the case of *spoken* papers, however, text brackets are likely to involve some fancy footwork. The introduction, as is said, will attempt to put into perspective what is about to be discussed. The speaker lets us know what else he might have chosen to talk about but hasn't, and what reservations he places on what he is about to say, so that should we judge what follows as weak, limited, speculative, presumptuous, lugubrious, pedantic, or whatever, we can see that the speaker (he hopes) is not to be totally identified thereby; and in addition to the vaunted self implied in addressing a group at considerable length on a sober topic, he is to be seen as having an ordinary side —modest, unassuming, down-to-earth, ready to forego the pomp of presentation, appreciative that, after all, the textual self that is about to emerge is not the only one he wants to be known by, at least so far as the present company is concerned.

Closing comments have a similar flavor, this time bringing speaker back down from his horse, allowing him to fall back from his textual self into one that is intimately responsive to the current situation, concerned to show that the tack taken in the lecture is only one of the tacks he could have taken, and generally bringing him back to the audience as merely another member of it, a person just like ourselves. Comparatively speaking, a conclu-

sion is part way between the curtain call through which a stage actor finally appears outside of the character he has been portraying, and the coda (to use Labov's term) by which a storyteller throws up a bridge between the situation he was in as protagonist in the narrative, and his current situation as someone who stands before his listeners. As part of this down-gearing, the speaker may, of course, shift into the intimacies and informalities of question and answer, through which some members of the audience are allowed to come into direct conversational contact with him, symbolizing that in effect he and all members of the audience are now on changed terms. Responding to questions, after all, requires fresh talk. In other words, question answering requires a production shift from aloud reading to fresh talk, with the speaker often marking the shift by means of bracket rituals, such as lighting a cigarette, changing from a standing to a sitting position, drinking a glass of water, and so forth. As suggested, introductions and closings, that is, bracket expressions, occur at the interface between spectacle and game, in this case, occasion and lecture proper. Question period apart, prefatory and closing comments are likely to be delivered in fresh talk or a more serious simulation of this than the body of the lecture itself provides. And these comments are likely to contain direct reference to what is true only of this current social occasion and its current audience. Observe, when several speakers share the same platform, mini versions of opening and closing brackets can occur *during* a presentation, sometimes with the reengagement of a presiding figure, all this marking the transfer of the speaking role from one person to another.

So there are text brackets. Third, there are text-parenthetical remarks. Again, if one starts from a *printed* text—one meant to be read, not heard—one will find that the author exercises the right to introduce parenthetical statements, qualifying, elaborating, digressing, apologizing, hedging, editorializing, and the like. These passing changes in voice, these momentary changes in footing, may be marked in print through bracketings of some kind—parenthetical signs, dashes, etc. Or the heavy-handed device of footnotes may be employed. (So fully are footnotes institutionalized for this change in voice that someone other than the writer, namely, the editor or translator, can use footnotes, too, to com-

ment on the text in what is patently a voice totally different from the textual one.) Through all of these devices, the writer briefly changes footing relative to his text as a whole, coming to the reader in consequence from a slightly different angle. Observe, these elaborations ordinarily extend the "production base" for the reader, giving him more of a grounding in the writer's circumstances and opinions than the naked text might allow.

Turning from a printed text to a spoken one, aptly printable parenthetical remarks remain, but now much amplified by ones that are unlikely to appear in a printed version of the talk. (Admittedly advertisers sometimes employ the device of adding in the margins of a printed text remarks in print-script that are presumably to be taken as sprightly afterthoughts, and thus providing a keying of a communication not destined for print in the first place, a communication destined to be labored and cute.) In brief, during his talk, the speaker will almost inevitably interject remarks in passing to qualify, amplify, and editorialize on what the text itself carries, extending the parenthetical comments which would appear in a printed version. Although these remarks may be perfectly scholarly and contributed in a serious vein, they nonetheless introduce a somewhat changed alignment of speaker to hearer, a change in footing that in turn implies a facet of self different from the one theretofore projected. What results can only be partly captured through the nearest equivalents available in print, namely, parenthetical sentences and footnotes.

Text parenthetical remarks are of great interactional interest. On one hand, they are oriented to the text; on the other, they intimately fit the mood of the occasion and the special interest and identity of the particular audience. (Observe, unlike lectures, conversations appear to be scripted a phrase or clause at a time, allowing the speaker to build sensitivity to the immediately current circumstances through the very words selected to realize the main text itself.) Text-parenthetical remarks convey qualifying thoughts that the speaker appears to have arrived at just at the very moment. It is as if the speaker here functioned as a broker of his own statements, a mediator between text and audience, a resource capable of picking up on the nonverbally conveyed concerns of the listeners and responding to them in the light of the text and everything else known and experienced by the speaker.

More so even than bracketing comments, text-parenthetical ones had best be delivered in fresh talk, for by what other means could the speaker expect to respond to the trajectory of the *current* situation? Note that although only politicians and other desperadoes of the podium simulate fresh-talk replies to questions that they themselves have planted in the audience, a great number of speakers simulate fresh talk in conveying text-parenthetical remarks. The speaker will have reviewed some of these remarks beforehand and may even have inscribed them in his reading copy in note form as a reminder of the footing to be employed in delivering them. In all of this, observe, lectures are like stories or jokes: a teller can (and is encouraged to) throw himself into his telling as if this telling were occurring for the first and only time. The only constraint is that no one in the audience should have already heard his performance. And, in fact, every communication fosters a little of this "first and only" illusion.

There is an irony here. There are moments in a lecture when the speaker seems most alive to the ambience of the occasion and is particularly ready with wit and extemporaneous response to show how fully he has mobilized his spirit and mind for the moment at hand. Yet these inspired moments will often be ones to most suspect. For during them the speaker is quite likely to be delivering something he memorized some time ago, having happened upon an utterance that fits so well that he cannot resist reusing it in that particular slot whenever he gives the talk in question. Or take as a heavy-handed example the parenthetically interjected anecdote. It is told in a manner to imply that its telling was not planned, but that the story has now become so apropos that the speaker can't forebear recounting it even at the cost of a minor digression. At this moment of obvious relevance it is rarely appreciated that anecdotes are specialized for aptness. As with pat comebacks, standard excuses, and other universal joints of discourse, relevance is to be found not so much in the situation as in the intrinsic organization of the anecdote itself. The little narratives we allow ourselves to interject in a current talk we are likely to have interjected in other talks, too, let alone other presentations of the current one.

May I digress for a moment? Parenthetical elaboration is found in all communication, albeit with differing roles across

differing forms. During conversation, a raconteur, lodged in the telling of a story, is likely to kibitz his own telling, breaking narrative frame throughout to interject initially overlooked detail, or provide background whose relevance is only now evident, or warn hearers that a climactic event is imminent. Between songs, pop singers in recital commonly switch into direct address, providing out-of-frame comments as a bridge between offerings, presenting themselves in their "own" name instead of characters in sung dramas. Indeed, they are sometimes so concerned about the figure that they cut while not singing that they develop a stand-up comic's routine in order to linger on the bridges. Giving readings of one's own poetry provides a different sort of case. As with singing, parenthetical transitions from one unit to the next are more or less required by virtue of the segmented character of the offering, but poets must allow themselves less room for what they project during these transitions. Poetry is itself an exploration of the elaborations and asides that the poet can manage in regard to some stated theme; compressed in the text itself there should be allusions to most of what a live commentator might parenthetically elect to say, and preferably this should be rendered to sound spontaneous. To cut a figure talking about a poem is to have failed to cut that figure in the poem.

To return. Bracketing and parenthetical remarks, along with keyings imposed on the ongoing text, seem to bear more than the text does on the situation *in* which the lecture is given, as opposed to the situation *about* which the lecture is given. These remarks can, incidentally, also draw on the biography of experience of the speaker-author in a way that depends upon *this* particular speaker being present, not just *a* particular speaker. And here, of course, is the reason why the printed version of a spoken text is unlikely to contain the introductory and textual asides that enlivened the spoken presentation; what is engagingly relevant for a physically present audience is not likely to be so snugly suitable for a readership. It is not so much that an immediately present audience and a readership are differently circumstanced —although they are—but that a speaker can directly perceive the circumstances of his recipients and a writer cannot. Topical and local matters that a speaker can cite and otherwise respond to are precisely what cannot be addressed in print. And, of course, it is

just through such response that the social occasion can be made palpable.

Consider now some words speakers use to describe audiences, words which also happen to be much like those employed by any other type of platform performer. An audience sensed by the speaker to be "unresponsive," an audience that does not pick up on the talker's little gems and doesn't back-channel a chuckle or offer some other sign of appreciation, will tend to freeze him to his script. An audience that is "good" or "warm," that is, one that is audibly quick on the uptake, showing a ready, approving responsiveness, a willingness to take his innuendoes and sarcasms as he intended them to be taken, is likely to induce the speaker to extend each response-evoking phrase or phrasing: he will continue along for a moment extemporaneously where gestured feedback from the audience suggests he has touched home —a playing-by-ear that Albert Lord tells us singers of epic poetry also manage. (If an audience is to be warm, it may have to be "warmed up," a process that is consciously engineered in variety programs, but ordinarily given little thought in lecturing.) Again, note, fresh-talk elaborations that are themselves a response to audience response can little find a place in the printed version of the talk; for where could the writer find the response to trigger these remarks?

One can become aware of the situational work of overlayed keyings, text bracketing, and parenthetical utterances by examining the disphoric effects which result when circumstances require someone other than its author to read the author's talk. Such pinch-hitting can be studded with as many "I's" and other self-references as a normally delivered talk. It can even follow the text in employing a style that is for speaking, not reading. And yet what it can't do is provide the usual kind of keying, bracketing, and parenthetical elaboration. A nonauthorial speaker, that is, someone filling in, can preface his reading with an account of why he is doing it, avow at the beginning that the "I" of the text is obviously not himself (but that he will use it anyway), and even during the reading, break frame and parenthetically add a comment of his own, as does an editor of printed text in an editor's footnote. But to speak a passage with irony or passion would be confusing. Whose irony? Whose passion? To employ

parenthetical expressions introduces the same dilemma; for fresh-talk asides can here only encode the thoughts of a second author. And the stand-in who stands off from a particular passage must appreciate that he will be seen as having too easy a shot. In any case, all of these changes in footing cut too deep; they project the self of the animator all right, but this time not the author of the text, thereby widening a split that is just the one that successful lecturing heals. Such an arrangement, then, strikes at the ritual elements of the presentation. (Understandably this tack is principally found in professional meetings where a session may provide reports on the work of three to five authors who are not eminent, so that the failure of one or two to appear in person does not much reduce the ritual density of the occasion.)

Three places for alternate footings have been mentioned: keyed passages, text brackets, and parenthetical remarks. Finally consider—at the cost of a lengthy digression—a fourth location, this one connected with the management of performance contingencies.

Every transmission of signals through a channel is necessarily subject to "noise," namely, transmissions that aren't part of the intended signal and reduce its clarity. In telephonic communication, this interference will involve sound; in TV, by easy extension of the term, sound and sight. (I suppose those who read braille can also suffer noise by touch.)

To those who watch TV it is abundantly clear that a disturbance to reception can come from radically different sources: from the studio's transmission; from malfunction in one's own set; from neighborhood electronic effects, such as spark-coil transmissions; and so on. There are, of course, quite practical reasons why source discrimination should be made; indeed, when a station is at fault it may employ a special visual or sound signal to so inform audiences. Now look at the telephone. In ordinary telephonic communication, the fit of the earpiece to the ear is such that a concern for noise at that interface in the system is unnecessary; at worst, one need only cover the other ear. With TV (and speaker phones) it becomes evident that considerable noise can enter the communication system between the point of signal output and the receiver, as when one tries to listen to a car radio over the noise of an uninsulated engine, or tries to tape

radio programs "on air." It is also evident that speaker and hearer can fail to effectively communicate over the phone for physical reasons internal to either, as when the one has laryngitis or the other is hard of hearing. By extending the term "noise," all such constraints on transmission can also be included for consideration.

I elaborate these obvious points to warrant the following formulation: that when communication occurs, noise will also; that a communication system can be seen as a layered composite structure—electronic, physical, biological, and so forth; and that effective communication is vulnerable to noise sources from different layerings in the structure of the system that sustains it.

The next point to note is that the recipients in every communication system develop tolerance for a range of noise, in the sense that they can disattend such sound with little distraction. Recipients doing so, senders can afford to follow their lead. In addition, both recipients and senders deal with some noise by affecting unconcern, treating it as if it were not present even though they are distracted by it. Further, whether a particular source of noise is distracting or not, participants in the communication system can elect to engage in physical actions calculated to improve reception.

To complete the picture it need only be said that senders have another course of action open to them. Whether or not they make a physical effort to improve transmission, they can directly mention the disturbance and their remedial action (if any), employing parenthetical remarks to do so. These remarks necessarily break frame, for instead of transmitting the anticipated text, the sender transmits comments about the transmission. Senders have various motives for such actions. They may not wish the disruption to stand without introducing an account or apology for what has happened to communication, the hope presumably being that they then won't be judged by these failures. Or they may feel that to maintain the appearances of disattendance is itself too distracting for everyone concerned, and that open reference to the difficulty will release hearers from having to fake unconcern. Or they may feel compelled to forestall other interpretations of the disturbance.

Return now to the particular communication system under

consideration—the lecture. It is apparent that the noise associated with lecturing can involve sound or sight, and that its source may be variably located, say in the outside environment surrounding the auditorium, or the interior shell itself, or the audience, or the podium. This latter location is particularly important because noise coming from the podium area will be much more difficult to ignore than noise coming from places where the audience is not obliged to pinpoint its attention.

As a source of potential noise, the podium itself is a many-layered thing. One source we owe to the fact that lecturers come equipped with bodies, and bodies can easily introduce visual and audio effects unconnected with the speech stream, and these may be distracting. A speaker must breathe, fidget a little, scratch occasionally, and may feel cause to cough, brush back his hair, straighten her skirt, sniffle, take a drink of water, finger her pearls, clean his glasses, burp, shift from one foot to another, sway, manneristically button and unbutton a jacket, turn the pages and square them off, and so forth—not to mention tripping over the carpet or appearing not to be entirely zipped up. Observe that these bodily faults can equally plague full-fledged entertainers such as singers, mentalists, and comedians.

Another structural source of noise can be located even closer to the source of transmission: those minor peculiarities of human sound equipment that affect speech production across the board —for example, lisps, harelips, laryngitis, affected speech, "thick accent," a stiff neck, denture whistles, and so forth. One can think here of equipment faults, the human, not the electronic kind. These faults are to be compared to what an improperly tuned instrument brings to a recital, what a wall-eyed person brings to two-person conversation, what misalignment of type brings to the communication occurring on the printed page, what bad lighting brings to the showing of slides, and, of course, to what a malfunctioning microphone brings to any podium.

Human sound-equipment faults as a class have not been much studied systematically, but a closely related source of trouble has: encoding faults bearing differentially on elements of the speech flow itself. Speaking inevitably contains what can be linguistically defined as faults: pauses (filled and otherwise), restarts, redirections, repetitions, mispronunciations, unintended

double meanings, word searches, lost lines, and so forth. What will obtrude as a fault varies markedly according to which of the speech forms is involved—fresh, memorized, or read.

During lectures, some equipment and encoding faults are inevitable; they imply that a living body is behind the communication and, correspondingly, a self in terms of which the speaker is present and active, although not relevantly so. A place is made for this self. It is okay to self-correct a word one has begun to mispronounce. It is okay to clear one's throat or even take a drink of water, providing that these side-involvements are performed in speech-segment junctures—except, uniquely, this one, this being the only juncture when so minor a deflection would not be that, but some overcute theatricality, of merit only as a frame-analytical illustration of how to go wrong in performances. In sum, such attention as these various maneuvers get either from speaker or hearer is meant to be dissociated from the main concern. The proper place of this self is a very limited one.

You will note that what is here defined as equipment and encoding noise is meant to be disattended and usually is. Occasionally, however, disturbances from these sources do occur, both visual and aural, which the audience cannot easily ignore, the less so for obligatorily trying to do so. More to the point, there will be noise that the speaker correctly or incorrectly *feels* the audience cannot easily disattend, or shouldn't be allowed to. (This latter occurs, for example, when the speaker misstates a fact that would get by were he not to correct matters.) In response, the speaker may be inclined to briefly introduce accounts, excuses, and apologies. These remedial remarks will have an obvious parenthetical character, something split off from the mainstream of official textual communication yet comprehended nonetheless. One has, then, not merely a disattended stream of events, but sometimes a dissociated stream of verbal communication, too. And this stream of communication, just like the equipment and encoding faults to which it is a response, implies a self, one indeed that has claims upon the audience even if this means minor overridings of other selves that are being projected at the time. After all, an animator not only has a right to cough, but under certain circumstances, to extend the interruption by excusing himself. Indeed, someone serving as a substitute reader (or a language translator)

can make precisely the same sort of mistakes, and project the same self in the process of apologizing for them.

Plainly, then, speakers are necessarily in a structural position to betray their obligation to transmit their texts; they can choose instead to intrude comments on the contingencies of transmitting it. Observe that comments on such difficulties, as well as remedial remarks consequent on failing to avoid them, are likely to entail use of the pronouns "I" and "me," but one must be very careful to see that now these terms refer to an individual in his capacity as animator, not the individual in his capacity as author of a prepared text. The fact that the same pronouns are employed, and that indeed they ordinarily refer to the same person makes it very easy to neglect critical differences. When a speaker says, "Excuse me" or, "Let me try that once more" or, "There, I think that will stop the feedback," the author of these remarks is an individual in his capacity as animator, and not an individual in his text-authorial capacity. The person hasn't changed, but his footing certainly has, no less than would be the case were a substitute reader to make a mistake and apologize for it.

I have suggested that when a speaker senses that equipment or encoding troubles have occurred, he may intrude a comment about the difficulty and about any effort to physically correct matters he may undertake. The minor change in footing that ensues as the speaker ceases to transmit his text and instead transmits open reference to his plight as an animator will often be quite acceptable, characteristically attended in a dissociated way. But there are format-specific limits. It is a structurally significant fact of friendly conversations that they are set up to allow for a vast amount of this reflexive frame breaking, and, contrariwise, a crucial condition of prime-time broadcasting to allow for extremely little. Lecturing falls somewhere between. Interestingly, speakers can be optimistic here. Sensing that time is running short, a speaker may change voice and let the hearers in on the fact that the pages he is now turning over are ones he has now decided to summarize in fresh talk or even skip, projecting the rather touching plea that he be given credit for what he *could* have imparted. Finding a page out of order in the script, he may hunt for the right one while candidly describing that this is what he is doing. Reaching for the book he planned to quote from, he may

assay a little quip, confiding that he hopes he brought the right one. I believe that once the show has seriously begun, these efforts to frankly project oneself exclusively in one's capacity as an animator are not likely to come off—at least not as frequently as speakers believe. Nonetheless the liberty is often taken.

V

We can now try to put the pieces together. As suggested, from one perspective a lecture is a means through which an author can impart a text to recipients and (from this point of view) is very much like what occurs when any other method of imparting is employed, such as conversational talk or the printed page. The relevant differences among the available methods would presumably have to do with cost, distribution, and the like, that is, constraints on access to the message. But if this imparting were the main point about lecturing, we might only have the university course kind, and even there the matter is in doubt; other means of transmission would probably displace it. Audiences in fact attend because a lecture is more than text transmission; indeed, as suggested, they may feel that listening to text transmission is the price they have to pay for listening to the transmitter. They attend—in part—because of something that is infused into the speaking on the occasion of the text's transmission, an infusion that ties the text into the occasion. Plainly, noise here is a very limited notion. For what is noise from the perspective of the text as such can be the music of the interaction—the very source of the auditors' satisfaction in the occasion, the very difference between reading a lecture at home and attending one. Let me review two aspects of this attendance.

First, there is the issue of access. In any printed work, the writer exposes himself in various ways. Through writing style, biographical detail, intellectual assumptions, mode of publication, and so forth, information about the writer becomes available to readers. Indeed, a book is likely to contain a brie biographical sketch of the author and even a picture on th dust jacket. What readers here learn about the author, they ca cross-reference to what, if anything, they had already know

about him. Thus, in making himself accessible, and in facilitating their familiarity with him, the writer encourages readers to form something like a one-way social relationship to him.

In the case of live lecturing, all these sources of accessibility (or their equivalent) are present, plus a large number of others. This is especially clear when a speaker is known to his audience through his writings or other activities. Whatever view they may have had of him, this view will be modified when they can see him in the flesh and watch and listen to him handle the transmission of his text over the course of its delivery. Furthermore, however candid and revealing a speaker's written text may be, he can easily render its spoken delivery much more so (or less not so); for vocal keyings and parenthetical admissions not in the text can be added throughout. And all of this opening up and exposing of the self will mean accessibility *only* to the members of the listening audience, a much more exclusive claim than ordinarily can be made by a readership.

To the degree that the speaker is a significant figure in some relevant world or other, to that degree this access has a ritual character, in the Durkheimian, not ethological, sense of affording supplicants preferential contact with an entity held to be of value. May I add that in thus gaining access to an authority, the audience also gains ritual access to the subject matter over which the speaker has command. (Substantive access is quite another matter.) And indeed, this sort of access is the basis of the talk-circuit business. Individuals who come to the attention of the media public because of their association with something in the news can make themselves available in person through a lecture tour. Here authority is not a prerequisite, or the thoughtful development of an academic topic, only association. The subject matter of these talks is exactly and as fully diverse as are the fleeting directions of public attention, the various speakers sharing only the agents and bureaus that arrange their appearances. It is thus that a very heterogeneous band of the famed and ill-famed serve to vivify what is or has recently been noteworthy, each celebrity touching audiences with what he or she has been touched by, each selling association.

So there is the issue of access. (I have mercifully omitted consideration of its final form, the little sociable gathering held

by the sponsors for select members of the audience after the talk to "meet" the speaker.) Second, there is the matter of celebrative occasion. The difference between the text as such and the verbal delivery of the text not only supports a sense of preferential access to the speaker, but also gives weight to the uniqueness, the here and now, once only character of the occasion in which the delivery takes place. In thus committing himself to the particular occasion at hand, in thus mobilizing his resources to pay it mind, the speaker is conferring himself on those who are participants.

It might now be worth reviewing and detailing how a printed text that is available to any competent reader can be transformed into a talk that is responsive to the local situation in which it is delivered. Consider, then, some "contextualizing" devices.

First, there is the tacit assumption, an assumption carefully preserved, that what the audience hears was formulated just for them and for this current occasion. A crude token here is the topical reference through which the speaker shows that at least one of his sentences belongs entirely to the particular setting in which the current delivery is taking place. (This is a device of traveling performers which probably antedates even Bob Hope's camp visits.) Introductions, it turns out, are especially likely to be seeded with these topicality tokens.

But there are less obvious devices for producing the effect of responsiveness. When a lecture is given in fresh talk or a simulation of fresh talk, then responsiveness to the current scene seems apparent. And so another kind of tokenism becomes possible. As suggested, bracketing comments and parenthetical remarks delivered in fresh talk can be used to give a coloration of freshness to the whole script. (Where these remarks are not actually in fresh talk, fresh talk can easily be simulated out of memorized bits, simply because only short strips are necessary.)

Another simulation method, standard in aloud reading, is to scan a small chunk and then address the audience with one's eyes while reciting what has just been scanned.

Then there is the effect of "hypersmooth" delivery. As suggested, conversational talk is full of minor hitches—hesitations, repetitions, restarts—that are rarely oriented to as such by speaker or hearers; these little disruptions are simply passed by. On the other hand, it is just such minor hitches that are notice-

able when they occur in aloud reading, crudely reminding us that it is aloud reading that is going on. Paradoxically, then, by managing to read aloud without these routine blemishes, we can give the impression that something more than merely aloud reading is occurring, something closer to fresh talk. (Hyperfluency, I might add, is crucial in the illusion of fresh talk that broadcasters achieve.)

Finally, consider the effect of "high style," even if issuing from a patently read address. Elegance of language—turns of phrase, metaphor, parallel structures, aphoristic formulations—can be taken as evidence not only of the speaker's intelligence (which presumably is worth gaining access to), but also of his giving his mind and ability over to the job he is now performing. Indeed, one could argue that "expressive" writing is precisely that which allows a consumer of the text to feel that its producer has lent himself fully to this particular occasion of communication.

Underlying all these devices for localizing or indexicalizing a text is the style or register of spoken discourse itself. What makes for "good" writing is systematically different from what makes for "good" speaking, and the degree to which the lecturer uses the normative spoken form marks the degree to which it will appear he has delivered himself to a speaking event. Some of the differences between written prose and spoken prose are these:

1. In general, writers can use editors' instructions, style sheets of journals, and college writing manuals as a guide for what will and won't be ambiguous, as though the reader, as well as the writer, had an obligation to apply these standards. Readers accept the responsibility of rereading a passage to catch its sense, and seem to be ready to tolerate the difficult more than the "grammatically incorrect." And, of course, readers can reread a passage, whereas hearers can't rehear an utterance—except from a tape. Also, spelling helps to disambiguate what in speech would be homonymous. The reader is further helped by punctuation marks having fixed sets of meanings; most of these marks, observe, have only very rough, ambiguous equivalents in sound. In consequence, a sentence whose head is far away from its feet is much easier to use effectively in print than in speech. In brief, for talk, clauses may have to be changed into sentences. But in compensation, contraction and deletion are favored, as are "left displacement" forms and deictic terms.

2. Print conventions for laying out a text provide for coherence in ways unavailable to oral delivery. Talk has no obvious paragraph markers or section headings. In printed texts, footnotes allow a sharp break in thematic development and can thus accommodate acknowledgments, scholarly elaboration, and parallelisms. (For example, it would be hard for me here, in the speaking that I am doing, to bring in the fact that spoken prose in turn differs very considerably from what occurs in natural conversation, and to cite the source, David Abercrombie's "Studies in Phonetics and Linguistics," but this would be easy and apt as a footnote in the printed form.)
3. Ordinarily, liberties that can be taken with an audience can't be taken with a readership. A speaker correctly senses that there are colloquialisms, irreverences, and the like he can use with his current audience that he would censor in a printed text. In talk, he is likely to feel that he can exaggerate, be dogmatic, say things that obviously aren't quite fully true, and omit documentation. He can employ figures of speech he might feel uncomfortable about in print. For he can rely on people he can see getting the spirit of his remarks, not merely the literal words that carry them. He can also use sarcasm, *sotto voce* asides, and other crude devices which cast him and his audience in some sort of collusion against absent figures, sometimes with the effect of "getting a laugh" (and he can further milk the audience when he gets one) —something that print cannot quite get from a reader. And a speaker can interrupt his own sentence almost anywhere, and with the help of an audible change in voice, interject something that is flagrantly irrelevant.

I need only add that in preparing a text for oral delivery, an author can make an effort to write in spoken prose; indeed he had better. Speakers do sometimes read a chapter from a book or a paper that is ready to be sent to the printer, but they don't keep audiences awake when doing so—at least in contemporary platform performances. Your effective speaker is someone who has written his reading text in the spoken register; he has tied himself in advance to his upcoming audience with a typewritter ribbon.

To write a text in spoken prose and to read it "expertly" is, then, to foster the feeling that something like fresh talk is occurring. But, of course, with illusion goes vulnerability. The prosodic shaping a fresh talker gives to a phrase, clause, or brief sentence is closely guided by his knowing the general drift, if not thematic development, of the argument to follow. So although he may

botch a word, or lose one, he remains pointed in the right direction. The worst that can happen is that he can be stopped short momentarily for want of a usable word or because of having lost the point of his own current remark. In aloud reading, however, the speaker tends to commit himself to a particular syntactical interpretation (and therefore prosodic punctuation) of his current phrase by reference mainly to the immediately visible, upcoming line of his text. The sense that informs a fuller portion of his script—the sense that must inevitably emerge—does not much serve the speaker as a check upon what he is currently saying. A simple mistake in perceiving a word or a punctuation mark can therefore send the speaker off on a radically misconstrued aloud reading of his upcoming text. The eventual, and necessary, correction of that reading will expose the speaker as having all along faked the appearance of being in touch with the thoughts his utterances were conveying. As all of you know, this can be a little embarrassing.

VI

Now let me take another try at saying what it is that a speaker brings to the podium. Of course, there is his text. But whatever the intrinsic merit of the text, this would be available to readers of a printed version—as would the reputation of its author. What a lecturer brings to hearers in addition to all this is added access to himself and a commitment to the particular occasion at hand. He exposes himself to the audience. He addresses the occasion. In both ways he gives himself up to the situation. And this ritual work is done under cover of conveying his text. No one need feel that ritual has become an end in itself. As the manifest content of a dream allows a latent meaning to be tolerated, so the transmission of a text allows for the ritual of performance.

Through evident scholarship and fluent delivery the speaker-author demonstrates that such claims to authority as his office, reputation, and auspices imply are warranted. Thus a link is provided between institutional status, reputation, and the occasion at hand. Given warranted claims, parenthetical embroidery provides an example to the audience of how such authority can

be worn lightly. The distance that status can exact is here relaxed; the respect that authority can demand is unobtrusively declined. Indeed, the speaker-author shows that although he has external claim to an elevated view of himself, and some currently demonstrated warrant for the claim, he chooses instead to be unimpressed by his own quality. He elects to present himself as just another member of the gathering that is present, someone no different from you or me. He thus provides not only vicarious access to himself but also a model of how to handle oneself in the matter of one's own claims to position (as well as how to cope with performance contingencies). In many ways, this modeling may be the most important thing a speaker does—aligning him, I might say, with TV personalities who provide the same sort of model, but for a wider public. (I only wish such authority existed in the field of face-to-face interaction, and that I had it to handle unassumingly. What I can treat modestly and offhandedly, alas, might not even merit that.)

So the person who delivers a talk can meld himself into the occasion by how, as a speaker, he extemporaneously (or apparently extemporaneously) embellishes his text, using his text as a basis for a situationally sensitive rendition, mingling the living and the read. And in consequence of the way he handles himself, he can render his subject matter something that his listeners feel they can handle. (Which is not to say that he need use anything more broad than donnish vocal qualifiers to gently remove himself from occasional passages.)

But a deeper understanding is to be drawn, an understanding that speaks to the ultimate claims that society makes upon a person who performs. What the audience will sense in an esteemed speaker as intelligence, wit, and charm, what the audience will impute to him as his own internally encompassed character —all this turns out to be generated through what he does to effectively put himself at the disposal of an occasion and hence its participants, opening himself up to it and to them, counting the rest of himself as something to be subordinated for the purpose. If, then, a speaker would encourage the imputation to himself of sterling attributes, he would be advised to display in the way he stands off from his topic and from its textual self that he has rendered both up to the audience. The animator invites the

audience to take up this alignment to the text, too — an invitation carried in the intimate and comradely way in which he talks about his material. And lo and behold, this posture to his text is one that members of his audience find they can readily take up, for it gives credit to the world of the text, while showing that people like them are fully equal to the task of appreciation and are not themselves depreciated thereby. And surely this stance to the text is respectful enough, for the speaker himself has modeled it. He who delivers a talk, then, is obliged to be his own go-between, splitting off a self-as-animator who can speak with the voice of the audience although the audience itself is allowed only a rudimentary one. (Indeed, it turns out that the only thing some members of the audience may actually comprehend—let alone take an interest in—is this attitude that has been struck up on their behalf in regard to what is being delivered.) And, to repeat, it isn't merely that the speaker's side-comments are designed for the current context; the self that would utter such comments must be designed for the context, too.

It is here that we can begin to learn about a basic feature of all face-to-face interactions, namely, how the wider world of structures and positions is bled into these occasions. The predetermined text (and its implied authorial self) that the speaker brings to a podium is somewhat like other external matters that present themselves to a local situation: the age, sex, and socioeconomic status that a conversationalist brings to a sociable encounter; the academic and associational credentials that a professional brings to an interview with clients; the corporative organization that a deputy brings to the bargaining table. In all these cases, a translation problem exists. Externally grounded properties whose shape and form have nothing to do with face-to-face interaction must be identified and mapped with such ingredients as are available to and in local settings. The external must be melded to the internal, coupled in some way, if only to be systematically disattended. And just as diplomatic protocol is a transformation function for mapping official position into celebrative occasions, and just as everyday civility is a formula for giving recognition to age, sex, and office in passing social contacts, so, in a deeper way, an author's speaking personality maps his text and his status into a speaking engagement. Observe, no

one can better provide a situationally usable construing of the individual than that individual himself. For if liberties must be taken with him, or with what he is identified with, he alone can cause no offense in taking them. If the shoe is to pinch, it is the wearer himself who had best ease it on.

So the individual who has prepared a lecture trumps up an audience-usable self to do the speaking. He performs this self-construing at the podium. Indeed, he can model this self-management for interaction in general. Of course, as any platform performer might remind you, although he is obliged to put out in this way for his audience, he doesn't have to put out for any particular member of it—as he might in personal communication—although, admittedly, at the little reception held in his honor after the talk he will find it more difficult to avoid these person-to-person involvement penalties. And in exchange for this comic song and dance, this stage-limited performance of approachability, this illusion of personal access—in exchange for this, he gets honor, attention, applause, and a fee. For which I thank you.

But that, ladies and gentlemen, is not the end of it. Some there are who would press a final argument.

A text allows a speaker a cover for the rituals of performance. Fair enough. But his shenanigans could be said to produce a reward for him and for the audience that is greater than the ones so far described. For the performance leads the audience and the speaker to treat lecturing, and what is lectured about, as serious, real matters, not less so even when the talk is covertly designed hopefully to be amusing.

The lecturer and the audience join in affirming a single proposition. They join in affirming that organized talking can reflect, express, delineate, portray—if not come to grips with—the real world, and that, finally, there is a real, structured, somewhat unitary world out there to comprehend. (After all, that's what distinguishes lectures from stints at the podium openly designed as entertainments.) And here, surely, we have the lecturer's real contract. Whatever his substantive domain, whatever his school of thought, and whatever his inclination to piety or impiety, he signs the same agreement and he serves the same cause: to protect us from the wind, to stand up and seriously project the assump-

tion that through lecturing, a meaningful picture of some part of the world can be conveyed, and that the talker can have access to a picture worth conveying.

It is in this sense that every lecturer, merely by presuming to lecture before an audience, is a functionary of the cognitive establishment, actively supporting the same position: I repeat, that there is structure to the world, that this structure can be perceived and reported, and therefore, that speaking before an audience and listening to a speaker are reasonable things to be doing, and incidentally, of course, that the auspices of the occasion had warrant for making the whole thing possible. Even when the speaker is tacitly claiming that only *his* academic discipline, *his* methodology, or *his* access to the data can produce a valid picture, the tacit claim behind this tacit claim is that valid pictures are possible.

No doubt some public speakers have broken from the fold, but these, of course, cease to have the opportunity to lecture—although presumably other kinds of podium work might become available to them. Those who remain to speak must claim some kind of intellectual authority in speaking; and however valid or invalid their claim to a specialized authority, their speaking presupposes and supports the notion of intellectual authority in general: that through the statements of a lecturer we can be informed about the world. Give some thought to the possibility that this shared presupposition is only that, and that after a speech, the speaker and the audience rightfully return to the flickering, cross-purposed, messy irresolution of their unknowable circumstances.

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