

THE GENERATION OF POSTMEMORY

WRITING
AND
VISUAL
CULTURE
AFTER THE
HOLOCAUST

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Lorie Novak, *Postmemory*. Courtesy of Lorie Novak, www.lorienovak.com

INTRODUCTION

The guardianship of the Holocaust is being passed on to us. The second generation is the hinge generation in which received, transferred knowledge of events is being transmuted into history, or into myth. It is also the generation in which we can think about certain questions arising from the Shoah with a sense of living connection.

—Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*

The “hinge generation,” the “guardianship of the Holocaust,” the ways in which “received, transferred knowledge of events is being transmuted into history, or into myth”¹—these, indeed, have been my preoccupations for the past two and a half decades. I have been involved in a series of conversations about how that “sense of living connection” can be maintained and perpetuated even as the generation of survivors leaves our midst, and how, at the very same time, it is being eroded. For me, the conversations that have marked what Hoffman calls the “era of memory”² have had some of the intellectual excitement and the personal urgency, even some of the sense of community and commonality, of the feminist conversations of the late 1970s and 1980s. And they have been punctured, as well, by similar kinds of controversies, disagreements, and painful divisions. At stake is precisely the “guardianship” of a traumatic personal and generational past with which some of us have a “living connection,” and that past’s passing into history or myth. At stake is not only a personal/familial/generational sense of ownership and protectiveness, but an evolving ethical and theoretical discussion about the workings of trauma, memory,

and intergenerational acts of transfer.³ It is a discussion increasingly taking place in similar terms, regarding other massive historical catastrophes. These are often inflected by the Holocaust as touchstone or, increasingly, by the contestation of its exceptional status.

Urgently and passionately, those of us working on memory and transmission within and beyond the study of the Holocaust have argued about the ethics and the aesthetics of remembrance in the aftermath of catastrophe. How do we regard and recall what Susan Sontag has so powerfully described as the “pain of others?”⁴ What do we owe the victims? How can we best carry their stories forward, without appropriating them, without unduly calling attention to ourselves, and without, in turn, having our own stories displaced by them? How are we implicated in the aftermath of crimes we did not ourselves witness?

The multiplication of genocides and collective catastrophes at the end of the twentieth century and during the first decade of the twenty-first, and their cumulative effects, have made these questions ever more urgent. The bodily, psychic, and affective impact of trauma and its aftermath, the ways in which one trauma can recall, or reactivate, the effects of another, exceed the bounds of traditional historical archives and methodologies. Late in his career, for example, Raul Hilberg, after combing through miles of documents and writing his massive, 1,300-page book *The Destruction of the European Jews*—and, indeed, after dismissing oral history and testimony for their factual inaccuracies—deferred to storytelling and to poetry as skills historians need to learn if they are to be able to tell the difficult history of the destruction of the Jews of Europe.⁵ Hilberg is recalling a dichotomy between history and memory (for him, embodied by poetry and narrative) that has had a shaping effect on the field. But, nearly seventy years after Adorno’s contradictory injunctions about the barbarity of writing poetry after Auschwitz, poetry is now only one of many media of transmission.⁶ Numerous testimony projects and oral history archives, the important role of photography and performance, the ever-growing culture of memorials, and the new interactive museology reflect the need for aesthetic and institutional structures that broaden and enlarge the traditional historical archive with a “repertoire” of embodied knowledge that had previously been neglected by many traditional historians.⁷ For better or

worse, these various genres and institutions have been grouped under the umbrella term “memory.” But, as Andreas Huyssen has provocatively asked, “What good is the memory archive? How can it deliver what history alone no longer seems to be able to offer?”⁸

If “memory” as such a capacious analytic term and “memory studies” as a field of inquiry have grown exponentially in academic and popular importance in the last two and a half decades, both have, to a significant degree, been fueled by what has been considered the limit case of the Holocaust and by the work of (and about) what has come to be known as “the second generation,” or “the generation after.”⁹ “Second generation” writers and artists have been producing artworks, films, novels, and memoirs, or hybrid “postmemoirs” (as Leslie Morris has dubbed them), with titles like *After Such Knowledge*, *The War After*, *Second Hand Smoke*, *War Story*, *Lessons of Darkness*, *Losing the Dead*, *Dark Lullabies*, *Breaking the Silence*, *Fifty Years of Silence*, and *Daddy’s War*, as well as scholarly essays and collections like *Children of the Holocaust*, *Shaping Losses*, *Memorial Candles*, *In the Shadow of the Holocaust*, and so on.¹⁰ The particular relation to a parental past described, evoked, and analyzed in these works has come to be seen as a “syndrome” of belatedness or “post-ness” and has been variously termed “absent memory” (Ellen Fine), “inherited memory,” “belated memory,” “prosthetic memory” (Celia Lury, Alison Landsberg), “*mémoire trouée*” (Henri Raczymow), “*mémoire des cendres*” (Nadine Fresco), “vicarious witnessing” (Froma Zeitlin), “received history” (James Young), “haunting legacy” (Gabriele Schwab), and “postmemory.”¹¹ These terms reveal a number of controversial assumptions: that descendants of victim survivors as well as of perpetrators and of bystanders who witnessed massive traumatic events connect so deeply to the previous generation’s remembrances of the past that they identify that connection as a form of *memory*, and that, in certain extreme circumstances, memory *can* be transferred to those who were not actually there to live an event. At the same time, these members of what Eva Hoffman calls a “postgeneration” also acknowledge that their received memory is distinct from the recall of contemporary witnesses and participants.¹² Hence the insistence on “post” or “after” and the many qualifying adjectives and alternative formulations that try to define both a specifically inter- and

transgenerational act of transfer, and the resonant aftereffects of trauma. If this sounds like a contradiction, it is one, and I believe it is inherent to this phenomenon.

“Postmemory” is the term I came to on the basis of my own “autobiographical readings” of works by second-generation writers and visual artists.¹³ Like some of the writers named above, I felt the need for a term that would describe the *quality* of my own relationship to my parents’ daily stories of danger and survival during the Second World War in Romanian Cernăuți and the ways in which their accounts dominated my postwar childhood in Bucharest. As I was reading and viewing the work of second-generation writers and artists, and as I was talking to fellow children of survivors, I came to see that all of us share certain qualities and symptoms that make us a *postgeneration*.

Why could I recall particular moments from my parents’ wartime lives in great detail and have only very few specific memories of my own childhood, I began to wonder? Why could I describe the streets, residences, and schools of pre-World War I Czernowitz and interwar Cernăuți, where they grew up, the corner where they evaded deportation, the knock on the door in the middle of the night, the house in the ghetto where they waited for deportation waivers—all moments and sites that preceded my birth—when I had lost the textures, smells, and tastes of the urban and domestic spaces in Bucharest where I spent my own early life? It took a long time for me to recognize and to name these symptoms—the magnitude of my parents’ recollections and the ways in which I felt crowded out by them. These moments from their past were the stuff of dreams and nighttime fears for, as a child, it was at night, particularly, that I imagined myself into the lives they were passing down to me, no doubt without realizing it. My postmemories of the war were not visual; it was only much later, after leaving Romania and the censored history to which my age-mates and I were exposed there, that I saw images of what I had until then only conjured in my imagination. But neither were my postmemories unmediated. My parents’ stories and behaviors, and the way that they reached me, followed a set of conventions that were no doubt shaped by stories we had read and heard, conversations we had had, by fears and fantasies associated with persecution and danger.

“Postmemory” describes the relationship that the “generation after” bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before—to experiences they “remember” only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to *seem* to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation. To grow up with overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s own life stories displaced, even evacuated, by our ancestors. It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that still defy narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened in the past, but their effects continue into the present. This is, I believe, the structure of postmemory and the process of its generation.

The “post” in “postmemory” signals more than a temporal delay and more than a location in an aftermath. It is not a concession simply to linear temporality or sequential logic. Think of the many different “posts” that continue to dominate our intellectual landscape. “Postmodernism” and “poststructuralism,” for example, inscribe both a critical distance and a profound interrelation with modernism and structuralism; “postcolonial” does not mean the end of the colonial but its troubling continuity, though, in contrast, “postfeminist” *has* been used to mark a sequel to feminism. We certainly are, still, in the era of “posts,” which—for better or worse—continue to proliferate: “posttraumatic,” of course, but also “postsecular,” “posthuman,” “postcolony,” “postracial.” Rosalind Morris has recently suggested that the “post” functions like a Post-it that adheres to the surface of texts and concepts, adding to them and thereby also transforming them in the form of a Derridean supplement.¹⁴ Post-its, of course, often hold afterthoughts that can easily become unglued and disconnected from their source. If a Post-it falls off, the post-concept must persist on its own, and in that precarious position it can also acquire its own independent qualities.

“Postmemory” shares the layering and belatedness of these other “posts,” aligning itself with the practices of citation and supplementarity that characterize them. Like the other “posts,” “postmemory” reflects

an uneasy oscillation between continuity and rupture. And yet postmemory is not a movement, method, or idea; I see it, rather, as a *structure* of inter- and transgenerational return of traumatic knowledge and embodied experience. It is a *consequence* of traumatic recall but (unlike posttraumatic stress disorder) at a generational remove.

I realize that my description of this structure of inter- and transgenerational transfer of trauma raises as many questions as it answers. Why insist on the term “memory” to describe these transactions? If postmemory is not limited to the intimate embodied space of the family, how, by what mechanisms, does it extend to more distant, adoptive witnesses or affiliative contemporaries? Why is postmemory particular to traumatic recall: cannot happy or otherwise transformative historical moments be transmitted across generations with the ambivalent intensity characterizing postmemory? What aesthetic and institutional structures, what tropes and technologies, best mediate the psychology of postmemory, the continuities and discontinuities between generations, the gaps in knowledge, the fears and terrors that ensue in the aftermath of trauma? And why have visual media, and photography in particular, come to play such an important role here?

This book addresses these and a number of related questions. It was written during the remarkable emergence and rapid evolution of Holocaust studies, and its chapters respond to urgent and immediate questions within this scholarly field, as well as related developments in visual culture and photography studies. But, as I came to Holocaust studies from feminist criticism and comparative literature, the book also gestures broadly and comparatively in the direction of the layered and intertwined transnational memorial landscape that marks the particular epoch of its genealogy from the mid-1980s through the first decade of the twenty-first century. In attempting to look back to the past in order to move forward toward the future, it asks how memory studies, and the work of postmemory, might constitute a platform of activist and interventionist cultural and political engagement, a form of repair and redress, inspired by feminism and other movements for social change.

BEGINNINGS

We’ve learned to be suspicious of origin stories, but somehow I know with unusual clarity that, for me, it began in 1986. Not personally, of course, but intellectually and professionally. The School of Criticism and Theory (SCT) had just come to Dartmouth College, where I was teaching, and its presence made for an intense academic summer, replete with lectures, seminars, and public events. It was a contentious time, as well, because the SCT, like the world of high theory in the U.S. academy, was still a male stronghold, and women, especially feminist theorists, were both clamoring for recognition and busy toppling and reimagining basic assumptions. In 1986 Elaine Showalter was one of the first women invited to teach at the SCT, and feminists on the Dartmouth faculty and in the School closed ranks around her to help ensure her success and the doors it would open for others.

Showalter’s presence and that of Geoffrey Hartman, the SCT’s director, helped initiate a transition in my work from feminist literary and psychoanalytic criticism to feminist Holocaust and memory studies. The occasion I remember with such lucidity was a public showing, in Dartmouth’s Loews’ Theater, of Claude Lanzmann’s monumental film *Shoah*, released in France the previous year. I had read about the film and was quite hesitant to go see it, not because of the stamina required by its two-part showing on two consecutive days (five hours on the first day and four and a half on the second), but because I had spent decades assiduously avoiding films about the Holocaust. Although I did not yet think of myself as a child of survivors (that term was not available to me), I could not bear to see any graphic representations of the events that had dominated my childhood nightmares. I had found myself totally unprepared at a showing of Alain Resnais’s *Night and Fog* as a college student, and, fifteen years later, I had not yet recovered from the shock of the evening in which I had literally become ill in the bathroom of the auditorium at Phillips Academy, where I was teaching summer school.¹⁵ Even by the late 1970s, I could not bear to look at more than half an episode of the television series *Holocaust*. And yet I knew that everyone would be talking about *Shoah* in Hanover and at Dartmouth, and I thus bravely decided to try watching it, though *Night and Fog* was still burned

into my eyelids. I sat right next to the door so as to be able to bolt if the images became too hard to look at. My husband, Leo, himself a child of Viennese Jewish refugees from the Nazis and born in Bolivia during the war, held my hand.

Something quite amazing and life-changing happened on that July afternoon, however: I did not leave the theater but became so fascinated with the very horrific details of persecution and extermination that I had systematically banished from my visual consciousness for many years as to watch the film in these two sittings, see it again many times, teach it and write about it, and spend the next decades thinking and writing about the subjects it opened up. Was it because Lanzmann eschews archival images and relies on oral testimonies that evoke the horror without showing it that I was able to sit through the film without leaving? Or was it his own curiosity, his mediating persona that engaged me so deeply as a viewer? When the film was over, I knew that something had shifted in my relationship to this horrific past. And not just for me: others in the audience were also profoundly affected; sensing this, Geoffrey Hartman organized a discussion about the film for SCT participants and members of the Dartmouth faculty. We gathered on a Friday afternoon in the elegant Wren Room in the English Department to talk about the film. I don't remember very much about the conversation, except that, at one point, looking at each other across the room, Elaine Showalter and I simultaneously exclaimed: "Where are the women in the film?" The question was quickly dismissed: attempting to detail the very process of extermination, the film focused on the Sonderkommando who were closest to it—those prisoners forced to clean the gas chambers, gather the victims' belongings, carry out the burning of the bodies—and only men were chosen for these horrific assignments. How could we even ask such a question, colleagues exclaimed; why would gender be relevant in a case where all Jews were targeted for extermination? But other men were interviewed besides the Sonderkommando, I whispered to Leo, who was sitting next to me, why were there so few women? Of the nine and a half hours of film, it seemed that only a tiny fraction had women's faces on screen. Why were women relegated to the role of translators and mediators? Why were they allowed to sing in the film and not to talk about their experiences as the men were invited to do?

And how did the absence of women shape the story told in this remarkable document? These questions remained both with Leo and with me.

Nine months later, in April 1987, *Shoah* was shown on public television over several nights; on one night, PBS aired an interview with the director. Leo and I watched the entire film again, fascinated by its choices. We were still trying to understand the absence of women: how could the film be so brilliant and also so blind? That question soon receded, when, shortly afterward, at a family event, we found ourselves in an entirely new set of conversations. Suddenly Leo's aunt Frieda, her friends Lore and Kuba, and other friends of theirs—all Holocaust survivors—surrounded us in a corner of Frieda's living room and began talking about the camps. Although we had tried to engage Frieda and some of her friends on previous occasions, they had never wanted to say more than a few words about their wartime past. It turned out that they had all watched *Shoah* on television, but it was not the film that they wished to discuss with us; it was their own acts of survival, the deaths of their parents, siblings, and first spouses, the pain, anger and melancholy they had suppressed for too many years. *Shoah* authorized their acts of witness, we quickly understood; it made them feel that they had a story to tell and listeners who might be willing to acknowledge and receive it from them. On that afternoon, we became those listeners, though we did not yet understand the responsibilities that came with this role.

I could not yet imagine teaching *Shoah* (the length alone seemed utterly forbidding), but that same year I had begun to teach another work about Holocaust memory, Art Spiegelman's *Maus*, which had been published the previous year. I was not teaching it in a course on the Holocaust—that would come later—but I thought it the perfect work to use in an introductory comparative literature course and in my first-year seminars. In fact, I soon found myself teaching *Maus* every year, no matter what I was teaching. Spiegelman's foregrounding of the structures of mediation and representation was enormously useful pedagogically. But there was something else that drew me in as well: Artie's persona, the son who did not live through the war but whose life, whose very self, was shaped by it. I identified with him profoundly, without fully realizing what that meant. In class, I was focusing on

aesthetic and narratological questions of representation, and I was also interested in discussing the gender issues in *Maus*, the way it was structured as a transaction between men who were mourning the wife and mother who had committed suicide, whose diaries had been burned and whose voice would never be heard.

By 1987 my fascination with *Shoah* and *Maus* came together in plans for an interdisciplinary team-taught summer course, "After Such Knowledge: Culture and Ideology in Twentieth-Century Europe," with a long section on the Second World War and the Holocaust. As we were preparing the class, along with co-instructors Michael Ermarth and Brenda Silver, I attended my first Holocaust conference, "Writing and the Holocaust," held at SUNY Albany in April 1987, organized by Berel Lang and published as a book with the same title the following year. The conference provided a rich introduction to the debates in the field and to its most distinguished scholars and writers. Bringing historians, writers, and cultural critics together encouraged productive if sometimes acrimonious disagreements about fact and representation, as exemplified by Raul Hilberg's unexpected deference to literature and storytelling mentioned earlier. Five years before the historic conference on "Probing the Limits of Representation" that Saul Friedlander organized at U.C. Irvine and that featured now legendary debates between Hayden White and Carlo Ginsburg about White's notion of the "emplotment" of history and the "problem of truth," "Writing and the Holocaust" introduced the ideas of "the memory of history" and of "fiction as truth"—ideas that remain controversial to this day.¹⁶

Although a number of the speakers at the Albany conference were women, gender did not figure as a category of analysis, and no one raised it as a question—surprising for me, as I had been attending feminist conferences for more than a decade. Even more surprising was the curt dismissal I received when I enthusiastically attempted to compliment Cynthia Ozick after she read, "The Shawl," her crushing and brilliant story about a mother whose baby is brutally murdered by an SS guard before her eyes, to a rapt audience.¹⁷ I was in the process of finishing a book on mothers and daughters in which I argued that, in feminism and in psychoanalysis, the mother's voice is rarely heard, but that the daughter tends to speak for her.

"Your story means so much to me," I started to say when I met Ozick in the bathroom. "Especially since I am writing a book on mothers and daughters in literature."

"Oh, that's not what the story is about at all," she replied and turned away. I had read about Ozick's reluctance to be thought of as a "woman writer," and yet in Ozick's *Rosa* I found something I had been searching for in my work on *The Mother/Daughter Plot*—a way to represent the subjectivity of the mother, not mediated by the daughter's narrative as in the novels of Colette or Virginia Woolf, for example, but the subjectivity of the mother herself, the unspeakable mother who cannot protect her child, who cannot keep her alive, but who, devastatingly, survives her brutal murder. What did Ozick's disavowal mean? Why was it so troubling to think *women* and *the Holocaust* in the same frame?

Ozick's reading brought me back to another transformative event that had occurred in 1986, compounding these discoveries and drawing me, irrevocably, to the subject of memory and transmission: Toni Morrison's visit to Dartmouth and her public reading of the first chapter of *Beloved* a full year before the novel's publication. When I heard Morrison read Sethe's powerful voice and articulate the story of the traumatized mother and her bodily remembrance, I knew I could not finish my book until I had read the novel in its entirety. I began and ended *The Mother/Daughter Plot* with Sethe, but Ozick's story somehow became part of another narrative and a different, future, project for me. Indeed, I had not yet been able to find the interface between the feminist questions I was asking about female and maternal subjectivity and the work on memory and the Holocaust toward which I would begin to turn, more deeply, in the 1990s. Morrison's novel was the hinge: it made women both the carriers and the narrators of historical persecution. It dramatized the haunting, transgenerational reach of trauma, and it showed me that latency need not mean forgetting or oblivion. Generations after slavery, Morrison was able to convey its impacts and effects more powerfully than contemporary accounts. How is trauma transmitted across generations, I began to wonder? How is it remembered by those who did not live it or know it in their own bodies? This is the story of Denver in the novel, as it is the story of Spiegelman's Artie. In some ways, I began to acknowledge, it is my story as well.

I had just begun to conceive some of these questions when Dartmouth College announced a new initiative funded by the Mellon Foundation: the opportunity to gather an interdisciplinary group of scholars from Dartmouth and beyond to pursue work around a common topic in the context of a term-long humanities institute. With several colleagues, I participated in a series of meetings that resulted in an institute in the spring of 1990 on “Gender and War: Roles and Representations.” We invited Klaus Theweleit to be our resident senior fellow because he had done some of the most interesting work on masculinity and war that we had read: aware of how easily the notion of gender can be conflated with women, we wanted to ensure that the topic of the institute would indeed be “gender and war” rather than “women and war.” Theweleit’s presence, and that of the other fellows and guest lecturers, created an intense and supportive atmosphere in which to look at the gendered structures not only of war, but of what we then understood as “representation.” It gave Leo and me the time and the context to work on Lanzmann’s *Shoah*, one of the most challenging works we had ever encountered. Watching the film again, discussing it with colleagues in the institute, and going to hear Claude Lanzmann speak at Yale propelled the first collaborative publication project we undertook, our essay “Gendered Translations: Claude Lanzmann’s *Shoah*.”¹⁸ In *Shoah*, we argued, women are not simply absent: they tend to function as translators and as mediators carrying the story and its affective fabric, but not generating it themselves. A few Polish witnesses and one German informant do provide some important testimony, but Jewish women in the film merely cry or sing; they are haunting voices in the rubble of the Warsaw ghetto, rather than key witnesses to the workings of extermination or to suffering and survival. Indeed, it is their silence and visual absence that enables the act of witness from “inside” the spaces of death that characterizes the film and allows a horrific past to erupt and invade the present. This analysis of *Shoah* was, for each of us, our first foray into the study of the Holocaust and its memory and our first essay on a visual work. It inspired a set of preoccupations that would engage both of us, in and across our respective disciplines—history and literary and cultural studies—for the next decades.

And yet I still did not think of myself as a Holocaust scholar, but, following on *The Mother/Daughter Plot*, I had begun to work on family photographs and family narratives as media of memory and loss. I was working with the theories of Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin, and Victor Burgin, on writers like Marguerite Duras and Jamaica Kincaid, and on artists like Edward Steichen, Cindy Sherman, Lorie Novak, and Sally Mann when, in 1991, Art Spiegelman’s *Maus II* appeared. In the midst of the drawings of mice and cats there were two photographs of people, one of his lost brother, Richieu, on the dedication page, the other of his father, Vladek, at the end. With the photograph of his mother, Anja, and himself as a young boy in the first volume, Spiegelman had allowed photography to reconstitute his nuclear family, a family destroyed by the Holocaust and its traumatic aftereffects. An analysis of the use of photographs in the graphic pages of *Maus* became the first chapter of my book on family photographs, *Family Frames*, and the inspiration for the idea of postmemory.

Even as I was continuing work on the familial look and gaze, and on the autoportrait and the maternal look, I found that I could not evoke the power that family photos hold in our imagination without writing personally, about my own pictures and the power they hold for me. And, for me, I realized, that power is intimately bound up with my family’s displacement and exile, and with the familial and collective losses that were provoked by the Second World War in Europe. *Family Frames* could easily have morphed into two books, and at times I felt that the compelling issues raised by the memory of the Holocaust (not just in *Maus*, but also in the memorial writing and visual installations of Eva Hoffman, Christian Boltanski, Shimon Attie, and the newly opened United States Holocaust Memorial Museum) threatened to overshadow and overtake the critical and theoretical concerns related to family photography with which I had begun the project. I was writing out of a very particular location and a subject position I had never before seen as my own, that of the daughter of survivors—not camp survivors, to be sure, but survivors of persecution, ghettoization, and displacement. I was writing as someone who had inherited the legacy of a distant and incomprehensible past that I was only just beginning to be ready to study and to try to understand from a larger historical and generational

perspective. Family photos became my own media of postmemory and helped me define the notion, though not yet refine or focus on it closely. That focus would follow in two subsequent projects, *Ghosts of Home* and *The Generation of Postmemory*, both in response to images and stories that captured me and drew me in for years to come.

Indeed, the book that Leo Spitzer and I coauthored on the afterlife of my family's city of origin in Jewish memory was, in essence, a work both of and about postmemory. *Ghosts of Home* emerged from the "return" trip Leo and I were able to take to present-day Ukrainian Chernivtsi with my parents, a trip that finally allowed me to anchor my postmemories in a specific time and place. It emerged from the urgency we felt to tell a little-known story of my family's largely assimilated cosmopolitan Eastern European Jewish culture that was destroyed and displaced but that persisted in the memory and the identity of its survivors and their children. While working on *Ghosts of Home* together—traveling to Chernivtsi on several occasions, as well as to Romania, Western Europe, and Israel and throughout the United States to collect oral histories from survivors, including family and friends—we had a great many opportunities to reflect more theoretically and critically on the workings of memory and intergenerational transmission. Not all of those reflections had a place in a book written on a closely focused theme and for a more general audience. Our analyses of the methodologies mobilized by this postmemorial work, and our thinking about the archives and objects we were using to write this history, found their way into conference papers and invited lectures and into the two collaboratively written essays included here. My own essays on memory, visuality, and gender were certainly inspired by this personal postmemory work, but they also emerged from the theoretical discussions in the evolving field of cultural memory; from my teaching, and co-teaching with Leo, of courses on Holocaust, memory, and testimony; and, strangely, from my obsessive reading and viewing of images and testimonies of the camp experiences that my parents were fortunate to evade. After decades of avoiding them, I now found I had to look and to try to understand.

Admittedly, the discussions that inspired and inflected this work—in my collaboration with Leo, in the classroom, at conferences, and on the pages of journals, edited volumes, and special issues—were not just

scholarly or professional: many of them were intensely personal. It turned out that throughout the late 1980s, the 1990s, and the early 2000s, many of my feminist colleagues and friends had also turned to the study of memory and trauma; they had come to the field out of both their individual histories and their political commitments. At breakfasts and lunches, and over coffee or drinks at various conferences and on the campuses where I was presenting this work, I came to learn of the family histories, some quite traumatic, of colleagues I had known for years, but in different contexts. We began to talk about what it means to be children of Holocaust survivors, members of the "second generation," and, later also, as Leo had experienced, the "1.5 generation" of child survivors. Did we share similar experiences? Was it a syndrome? Was it different for children of camp survivors, or for children of those who had survived in hiding, by fleeing east to the Soviet Union or west to the Americas, with false papers or with special waivers, as my parents did? Was it different for those whose parents talked readily about their experiences and those whose parents were silent? What was our stake in their story, what were our motivations, what was the source of our urgency? Why now? Were we appropriating their stories, overidentifying, perhaps—and this always in a whisper—envious of the drama of their lives that our lives could never match? Were we making a career out of their suffering? And what about other traumatic histories—slavery, dictatorships, war, political terror, apartheid? Among my fellow travelers on these journeys, I found a number of feminist scholars known for their work on women writers and artists and for their theoretical work on sex and gender, on power and social difference. Like me, they had begun to explore personal histories either indirectly, or more explicitly in their critical and theoretical work on trauma and transmission. But, although for all of us working on different sites of trauma and different historical contexts, this work on memory was intensely personal and urgent, it was not necessarily autobiographical or familial.

Thinking back, I now see that along with other feminist colleagues, I turned to the study of memory out of the conviction that, like feminist art, writing, and scholarship, it offered a means to uncover and to restore experiences and life stories that might otherwise remain absent from the historical archive. As a form of counter-history, "memory" offered a

means to account for the power structures animating forgetting, oblivion, and erasure and thus to engage in acts of repair and redress. It promised to propose forms of justice outside of the hegemonic structures of the strictly juridical, and to engage in advocacy and activism on behalf of individuals and groups whose lives and whose stories have not yet been thought. At the same time, feminism and other movements for social change also offer important directions for the study and work on memory. They make activism integral to scholarship. They open a space for the consideration of affect, embodiment, privacy, and intimacy as concerns of history, and they shift our attention to the minute events of daily life. They are sensitive to the particular vulnerabilities of lives caught up in historical catastrophe, and the differential effects trauma can have on different historical subjects. It is important, also, to note that they bring critical attention to the agents and the technologies of cultural memory, particularly to its genealogies and the traditional oedipal familial structures where these often take shape. They scrutinize and refuse the sentimentality attached to the figure of the lost child that often mediates traumatic stories, enjoining us to queer that figure and to engage in alternative patterns of affiliation beyond the familial, forming alternate attachments across lines of difference.

Recently, at a panel on memory studies in New York, a historian skeptical of the field's rapid growth and widening reach outlined what he saw as its genealogy and named its "founding fathers"—Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, and Michel Foucault.¹⁹ Although these theorists are certainly foundational, this was neither my genealogy nor that of other feminists in the audience. Had one of us been asked to tell an origin story, we exclaimed during the coffee break, we would have named Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein; Virginia Woolf, Marcel Proust, and Toni Morrison; Hannah Arendt, Shoshana Felman, and Cathy Caruth. We would have gone back to the early days of feminist scholarship, especially to women's history and its search for a "usable past," and we would have discussed the political valences that, for us, inflected the field.

And yet, although feminist/queer scholarship and memory studies have shared a number of central preoccupations and political commitments, the two fields have developed along parallel and mostly nonintersecting tracts over the last two and a half decades. In our 2002 coedited

issue of *Signs*, titled "Gender and Cultural Memory," Valerie Smith and I argued that "to date there have been very few sustained efforts to theorize in such general and comparative terms about memory from the perspective of feminism," and we viewed our issue as an opportunity for an overdue "interdisciplinary and international dialogue between feminist theories and theories of cultural memory."²⁰ That dialogue happened in the issue and has been evolving elsewhere, but I would maintain that it has not yet resulted in a developed theoretical elaboration on memory and gender or on a sustained effort to theorize memory from feminist and queer perspectives. As some of the following chapters will show, and as my evocation of that 1986 discussion about *Shoah* at the SCT suggests, this effort is particularly fraught when it comes to catastrophic historical events like the Holocaust. Most of the chapters comprising this book were written in the attempt to offer some suggestions about the terms such a broader theorization might take.

If gender and sexuality have entered Holocaust studies in the last twenty years, they have primarily been used to create a lens through which we can understand the particularities found in women's testimonies and memoirs, and to shape a platform that has enabled those stories to emerge and be heard in a context in which masculine and heteronormative stories had for the most part dominated. My own interest in this book joins a different set of feminist approaches that explore the rhetoric and the politics of memory and transmission, in some of the ways suggested by the analysis of *Shoah*.²¹ As Claire Kahane has put it: "If hysteria put gender at the very center of subjectivity, trauma, in its attention to the assault on the ego and the disintegration of the subject, seems to cast gender aside as irrelevant. . . . Does feminist theory of the past several decades make a difference in my reading of Holocaust narratives? . . . Could—and should—the Holocaust even be considered within the context of gender?"²² In response, my broader aim in this volume is to suggest a reframing of the discussion of gender in Holocaust studies. On the one hand, I want to avoid what I see as an unfortunate and all too common opposition between erasing difference and exaggerating it to the point of celebrating the skills and qualities of women over those of men. On the other hand, I would like to think beyond "relevance" or "appropriateness" as analytic categories. Indeed, the

analyses in the book's chapters find that gender, as sexual difference, can fulfill a number of functions in the work of memory. It can serve as a figure that can mediate the ways in which certain images and certain narratives have been able to circulate in the culture of the postgeneration. In traumatic histories, gender can be invisible or hypervisible; it can make trauma unbearable or it can serve as a fetish that helps to shield us from its effects. It can offer a position through which memory can be transmitted within the family and beyond it, distinguishing mother-daughter transmission from that of fathers and daughters or fathers and sons, for example. It can offer a lens through which to read the domestic and the public scenes of memorial acts. And even when gender seems to be erased or invisible, feminist and queer readings can nevertheless illuminate not just what stories are told or forgotten, or what images are seen or suppressed, but how those stories are told and how those images are constructed. In its awareness of power as a central factor in the construction of the archive, moreover, feminist analysis can shift the frames of intelligibility so as to allow new experiences to emerge, experiences that have heretofore remained unspoken, or even unthought.

THE TASKS OF MEMORY

Most of this book's chapters were written during a period when anxieties about the death of the generation of survivors and the responsibilities they were transferring to their descendants were at a peak. This is also the period when Holocaust studies developed as a field. Although I use the Holocaust as example and historical frame of reference in these chapters, I am also sensitive to the fact that at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century—after the brutal dictatorships in Latin America; after Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur; during the aftermath, globally, of the events of September 11, 2001; and in the midst of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict—the Holocaust can no longer serve simply as a conceptual limit case in the discussion of historical trauma, memory, and forgetting. Certainly, my analysis is in dialogue with numerous other contexts of traumatic transfer that can be understood as postmemory. In fact, the process of intergenerational transmission has

become an important explanatory vehicle and object of study in sites such as American slavery; the Vietnam War; the Dirty War in Argentina and other dictatorships in Latin America; South African apartheid; Soviet, East European, and Chinese communist terror; the Armenian, the Cambodian, and the Rwandan genocides: the Japanese internment camps in the United States; the stolen generations in aboriginal Australia; the Indian partition; and others. It is precisely this kind of resonance I was hoping for in developing the idea of postmemory throughout my writing on this subject, and, in the book's last section, I explicitly engage in such connective and intersecting analyses that I have come to see as absolutely necessary if we are to move forward in the field.

Although I am drawn to the challenge of comparative approaches to memory studies, I have also experienced the risks of such frameworks and the ways in which comparison can slip into problematic equation and distressing competition over suffering. At a conference on testimony focusing on the Holocaust and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission held in the late 1990s, for example, it soon became obvious that different emphases and goals were driving the memory work of the different survivor communities. On the one hand, historians and psychoanalysts engaged in Holocaust survivor testimony stressed the unspeakability and incommensurability of trauma and the long reach of its symptoms. Ethically and politically, also, it seemed important to them to “keep the wounds open” so as to warn against forgetting and oblivion, to underscore the injunction “Never again.” On the other hand, justices, commissioners, and scholars of the TRC articulated a very different discourse of truth-telling, reconciliation, forgiveness, and reparation, a pragmatic process to serve a “democratic future” within a space in which former victims and former perpetrators needed to coexist. These different approaches, based on divergent histories, are difficult to articulate in neutral terms, and the conference did, at certain moments, acquire an unfortunate and unproductive competitive tone. I saw how easy it is for comparative frameworks to become unfairly weighted toward certain cultural strategies of working through a traumatic past at the expense of others.²³

Some of the same debates that have inflected comparative approaches to memory, however, have thrown a dark shadow within Holocaust

studies as well. Here also different subject positions compete over authority and authenticity. Virulent critiques of the work on the second generation, including my own, have been based on an assumption that children of survivors want to equate their suffering with that of their parents, appropriating it for their own identity purposes. According to Gary Weissman, second-generation writers and scholars suffer from “fantasies of witnessing,” and he contests the very notion of a “post-Holocaust generation.”²⁴ Ruth Franklin, in *The New Republic* and in her recent book *A Thousand Darknests*, attributes to us baser motives still: “driven by ambition or envy or narcissism, a number of the children of survivors—commonly referred to as ‘the second generation’—have constructed elaborate literary fictions that serve to elevate their own childhood traumas above and even beyond the sufferings of their parents.”²⁵ Some volumes on the second generation do, in fact, open themselves to such critique. Even the title of Melvin Bukiet’s anthology *Nothing Makes You Free* hints at the appropriation of suffering, underscored by the exclusively biological definition of second generation that Bukiet applies in his selection of writers to include. Names and appellations are important: we are not, I would maintain, “second-generation survivors” or “second-generation witnesses,” as Alan L. Berger has written in his *Children of Job*.²⁶ Many scholars working on the post-generation have tried to find the delicate balance between identification and distance, and they do so, most successfully, by discovering and analyzing the complex and multiply mediated aesthetic strategies of second-generation artists and writers from different historical contexts, such as the ones who have inspired the chapters of this book.²⁷

Other critiques focus on the ways in which Holocaust memory, along with the paradigm of trauma that has developed around it, has functioned as a readily available and appropriable victim identity position and screen memory in the United States, occluding other, more proximate histories of violence.²⁸ The challenge may be how to account for contiguous or intersecting histories without allowing them to occlude or erase each other, how to turn competitive or appropriative memory into more capacious transnational memory work. Such an expansion does not in any sense aim to diminish or relativize the experiences and suffering of European Holocaust survivors. On the contrary, its goal

would be to incorporate these memories into an enlarged global arena, making room for additional, local, regional, national, and transnational memories. The notion of “connective histories” that I use in this book aims to think divergent histories alongside and in connection with each other. A number of recent “connective” transnational projects have, to my mind, responded to this challenge and have begun to chart a future direction in both Holocaust and memory studies. Among these, I would single out Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznajder’s *The Holocaust and Memory in a Global Age*, Michael Rothberg’s *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*, Andreas Huyssen’s careful and critical formulation of palimpsestic and interwoven histories that result in related memorial aesthetics across vast cultural divides, and Gabriele Schwab’s personal and theoretical reflections on “haunting legacies” emerging from the intertwined histories of victims and perpetrators, the Holocaust and colonialism. Levy and Sznajder propose that the European memory of the Holocaust can itself have a broader effect by “facilitat[ing] the formation of transnational memory cultures, which in turn, have the potential to become the cultural foundation for global human rights politics.”²⁹ In a different approach, Rothberg’s notion of “multidirectional memory” calls attention to a series of imbrications between memory of the Holocaust and postwar movements of decolonization and civil rights. And Gabriele Schwab adds, “It is not so much that our memories go in or come from many directions but rather that they are always already composites of dynamically interrelated and conflicted histories.”³⁰

I believe it is indeed now time for such a “multidirectional” or “connective” approach with different starting and reference points and different models, suggesting paradigms and strategies for working through and, yes, also, without forgetting, for moving beyond a traumatic past. I hope that the notion of postmemory can provide a useful framework for such connective approaches. As the next chapters will show, I am interested in exploring affiliative structures of memory beyond the familial, and I see this connective memory work as another form of affiliation across lines of difference.

In addition, media theorist Andrew Hoskins has recently used the notion of connective memory in relation to the “connective turn”

memory has taken in the digital age. Along with José van Dijck, he argues that in the digital, memory is neither *collective* nor *re-collective*, but, instead *connective*—structured by digital networks, and constituted “through the flux of contacts between people and digital technologies and media.”³¹ Memory, they argue, is constituted not only through individuals and through social institutions, but also through technological media. Tracing a history of the second half of the twentieth century through the first decade of the twenty-first that moves from analog to digital media of memory, this book features memory’s connectivity in both these senses.

The first part of the book, “Familial Postmemories and Beyond,” focuses on the workings of familial memory, on its problematics and its limits. The first chapter examines some of the fundamental assumptions behind the idea of postmemory. It defines the workings of intergenerational transmission and scrutinizes them from a feminist perspective. In responding to three key questions—why memory? why family? why photography? it clarifies an important distinction I develop and carry through the volume between “familial” and “affiliative” postmemory. Two enormously influential texts, Art Spiegelman’s *Maus* and W. G. Sebald’s *Austerlitz*, reveal how the work of postmemory falls back on familiar, and unexamined, cultural images that facilitate its generation by tapping into what Aby Warburg saw as a broad cultural “storehouse of pre-established expressive forms”—in this case the images of the lost mother and the lost child. Read together, these two texts map the chronology of the works discussed in the book, from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s.

The second chapter, co-authored with Leo Spitzer, “What’s Wrong with This Picture?,” begins with a mysterious picture from my parents’ family album and looks at it in relation to other archival images from a painful past that are reframed in second-generation fiction and artwork. We argue that, rather than giving information about that past, archival images function as “points of memory” that tell us more about our own needs and desires, our own fantasies and fears, than about the past to which they supposedly bear witness. The notion of small “points of memory,” inspired by Roland Barthes’s *punctum*, connects productively to feminist preoccupations with the subjective, the daily, the intimate

and embodied, the affective. The third chapter, “Marked by Memory,” asks how the sense memory of trauma—represented by the mark on the skin—can be transferred across generations. It studies this question particularly through the identification and bodily connection between mother and daughter, but it also examines cross-identifications and interconnections—between the memories of the Holocaust and slavery and between African American and Jewish memory cultures, and between a male artist and his female subjects. It defines “postmemory” in contrast to Toni Morrison’s “rememory,” moving from the familial and embodied workings of rememory to the mediated structures of postmemory.

In the book’s second part, “Affiliation, Gender, and Generation,” I move more explicitly from familial to affiliative structures of transmission. Chapter 4, “Surviving Images,” asks why images become iconic and which ones, and it argues that repetition actually produces rather than screens trauma in the viewer. By invoking the most dehumanizing and impersonal of iconic images—the gate of Auschwitz and the bulldozer burying corpses, for example—it shows, like the following two chapters, that gender can modulate intolerable images and acts of dehumanization, and that acts of witness are fundamentally gendered. Chapter 5, “Nazi Photographs in Post-Holocaust Art,” asks how artists of the postgeneration can use perpetrator images structured by a genocidal Nazi gaze to memorialize victims. This chapter examines tropes of feminization and infantilization that neutralize these images and enable them to be reframed in the art of the postgeneration. Chapter 6, “Projected Memory,” wonders why images of children—and which images of children—have so easily become iconic and looks at the ways in which the identification with the endangered child can promote affiliative postmemory. In the co-authored chapter 7, “Testimonial Objects,” Leo Spitzer and I read two books produced in concentration camps as “testimonial objects.” We ask, particularly, what it means to read for gender in a context of hunger, threat, destruction, and dehumanization in which gender easily disappears from view. In imagining the camp community that produced these books, the analysis moves beyond familial structures to other forms of attachments and alternative structures of transmission.

While several of the essays in the first two parts touch on sites beyond the immediate context of the Holocaust, the essays in the third part, "Connective Histories," engage in more explicitly comparative memory work. Chapter 8, "Objects of Return," explores the role that objects (photographs, here read for their material qualities, domestic interiors, household objects, items of clothing) play in stories of return to a lost home. I develop further the idea of the "testimonial object" that shows how we inherit not only stories and images from the past, but also our bodily and affective relationship to the object world we inhabit. Here again, the familial and gendered image of the lost child returns as a powerful figure of extreme dispossession in the context of the familial ruptures caused by war, genocide, and expulsion. In focusing on Jewish and Palestinian stories of return, this chapter performs a connective approach to memory work. The book ends with a ninth chapter, "Postmemory's Archival Turn," that examines the archives of postmemory, here specifically the album and its digital afterlife on the World Wide Web. It asks what happens to the materiality of images when they circulate on the Web by looking at two postmemorial albums, drawn from the different historical and political circumstances of Polish Jews and Kurds. Collected in the aftermath of historical catastrophe and destruction, they attempt to reconstruct the traces of lost communities on the basis of images and artifacts. Looking specifically at women collectors, the chapter reaches beyond family and historical specificity to explore transnational aesthetic structures after the Holocaust and in the digital age.

I like to think of these capacious, nonessentialist approaches to memory as practices of "reparative reading" in the terms that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has so usefully inspired.³² Unlike "paranoid reading," which is "anticipatory," "monopolistic," demystifying, and confident of exposing a "true knowledge," "reparative reading" offers alternative ways of knowing. In the terms of postmemory, it might offer possibilities of knowing that are, in Sedgwick's terms, "contingent," "additive," and "accretive," "mutable." Such a reparative approach to memory would be open to connective approaches and affiliations—thinking different historical experiences in relation to one another to see what vantage points they might share or offer each other for confronting the past

without allowing its tragic dimensions to overwhelm our imagination in the present and the future.

The techniques of projection and superimposition Lorie Novak uses in her evocative *Postmemory*—the cover image of this book—bring some of these layered contradictions to the surface. Incongruously, two hands hold a photo album in a luminous forest setting, announcing the many hands, and the many different protective acts of holding memory, that we will see in the images populating this book. The album is open and features two photos: on the left, a young family, parents and a little boy, arms embracing, all looking intently toward the right of the camera lens. The summer dress and short sleeve shirts, the bright light, indicate a summer day in freedom. On the facing page a woman in a light suit stands alone in front of a large open wooden door. Both these images are taken outdoors, though the second leaves an opening to a dark domestic interior, invisible to our eyes. Photo corners are used to affix the images to the album's elegant paper. It's an ordinary family photo album, created in seemingly ordinary circumstances, but here it is placed into the decidedly extraordinary setting of these woods. And, uncannily, several children's and young women's faces escape from the album: there are no photo corners to hold them in. One smiling girl hangs over the right page, a boy over the left; others float eerily among the trees. These images hover over the album, exceed its boundaries, co-existing with one another but, unintegrated, they do not cohere.

The landscape of *Postmemory* is peopled by faces from the past, by images in and out of the family album, by photos of victims and of survivors. Images originating in Vienna, La Paz, New York, and Izieu, France, from private and public albums and archives are superimposed on trees in upstate New York, near the artist's home. Memory is mediated, cultural, but it has also escaped through the open doorway in the photograph to haunt the natural landscapes of the present. The ghosts have become part of our landscape, reconfiguring the domestic as well as the public spaces of the postgeneration. Despite these invasions, however, the woods themselves continue to replenish in the bright sunshine, the trees persist in reaching upward, indifferent witnesses to the layered connective histories projected onto them.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, xv.
2. *Ibid.*, 203.
3. On the notion of generation, see esp. Sigrid Weigel, "'Generation' as a Symbolic Form," and Susan Rubin Suleiman, "The 1.5 Generation."
4. Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*.
5. "Roundtable Discussion," in Berel Lang, *Writing and the Holocaust*, 273.
6. Theodor W. Adorno, *Prisms*, 34.
7. Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*.
8. Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts*, 6. For a critical take on the current surfeit of memory, see esp. Huyssen, *Present Pasts*, and Régine Robin, *La Mémoire saturée*.
9. Arlene Stein dates the "second generation movement" back to a 1975 conversation among a small group of children of survivors published in *Response* magazine and reprinted in Lucy Y. Steinitz and David M. Szonyi, eds., *Living After the Holocaust*. It was also in 1975 that psychotherapists Eva Fogelman and Bella Savran organized the first support group of children of Holocaust survivors in the United States. (Arlene Stein, "Feminism, Therapeutic Culture, and the Holocaust in the United States.") By 1979 Helen Epstein had already published her influential *Children of the Holocaust*.

10. Epstein, *Children of the Holocaust*; Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*; Leslie Morris, "Postmemory, Postmemoir"; Anne Karpf, *The War After*; Thane Rosenbaum, *Second Hand Smoke*; Mikael Levin, *War Story*; Christian Boltanski, *Lessons of Darkness*; Lisa Appignanesi, *Losing the Dead*; Irene Lilienheim Angelico, dir., *Dark Lullabies*, 1985; Edward Mason, dir., *Breaking the Silence*, 1984; Tatana Kellner, *B 11226: Fifty Years of Silence* (artist book) and *71125: Fifty Years of Silence* (artist book); Irene Kacandes, *Daddy's War*; Julia Epstein and Lorie Hope Lefkowitz, eds., *Shaping Losses*; Dina Wardi, *Memorial Candles*; Aaron Hass, *In the Shadow of the Holocaust*.
11. Ellen Fine, "The Absent Memory"; Nadine Fresco, "Remembering the Unknown"; Henri Raczymow, "Memory Shot Through with Holes"; Froma Zeitlin, "The Vicarious Witness"; James Young, "Toward a Received History of the Holocaust"; Celia Lury, *Prosthetic Culture*; Alison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory*; Gabriele Schwab, *Haunting Legacies*.
12. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 187.
13. On autobiographical reading, see Susan Rubin Suleiman, "War Memories." In her *Trespassing Through Shadows*, art historian Andrea Liss uses the term "postmemories" in a more circumscribed way to describe the effects that some of the most difficult Holocaust photographs have had on what she terms the "post-Auschwitz generation."
14. Rosalind Morris, "Post-it to the Future: After Lyotard," paper presented at "The Politics of 'Post,'" in the Keywords Interdisciplinary Conversation Series at the Center for the Critical Analysis of Social Difference, Columbia University, April 21, 2011.
15. The childhood or adolescent encounter with images of horror, and *Night and Fog* in particular, haunt many of us in the second generation. See, for example, the account of Gabriele Schwab in *Haunting Legacies*, 11; see also my discussion of Alice Kaplan in chap. 4 and Mitzi Goldman in chap. 6.
16. Saul Friedlander, ed., *Probing the Limits of Representation*.
17. Cynthia Ozick, *The Shawl*.
18. Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer, "Gendered Translations."
19. Interestingly, Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz's ambitious collection, *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, also names a number of male figures (Nora, Proust, Bergson, Halbwachs, Freud, Kracauer, Benjamin, Adorno, and Deleuze) as foundational to modern conceptions of memory. Most of these figures are Jews, a fact that the editors mentioned to me in conversation but on which they do not comment in their introduction.
20. Marianne Hirsch and Valerie Smith, "Feminism and Cultural Memory," 4, 5. In her sociological work with children of Holocaust survivors, Arlene Stein connects the "second-generation movement" to feminism and the therapeutic culture of the 1980s. Sensitive to critiques of the embrace of victimhood that

- characterizes some second-generation writing, Stein and many of the second-generation feminists she interviews see their memory work as pedagogical, compensatory, reparative, and activist. (Arlene Stein, "Feminism, Therapeutic Culture, and the Holocaust in the United States.")
21. For feminist approaches to the Holocaust focusing on women and on more general issues of gender and memory and representation, see, among others, Judith Tydor Baumel, *Double Jeopardy*; Elizabeth Baer and Myrna Goldenberg, eds., *Experience and Expression*; Julia Epstein and Lori Hope Lefkowitz, eds., *Shaping Losses*; Claire Kahane, "Dark Mirrors"; Lillian Kremer, *Women's Holocaust Writing*; Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman, eds., *Women in the Holocaust* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Joan Ringelheim, "The Unethical and the Unspeakable" and "Thoughts About Women and the Holocaust"; and Carol Rittner and John Roth, *Different Voices*. This extensive work has not yet reversed the dominance of male writers and masculine narratives about the Holocaust; see, for example, Ruth Franklin's *A Thousand Darknesses*, which discusses the work of ten classic male writers ranging from Borowski to Schlink. For queer approaches to memory studies, see esp. Ann Cvetkovich, *An Archive of Feelings*; David L. Eng, *The Feeling of Kinship*; and Judith Halberstam, "Like a Pelican in the Wilderness" (book in progress).
22. Claire Kahane, "Dark Mirrors," 162.
23. For an analysis of TRC testimony and its aftereffects, inspired by scholarly work on Holocaust memory, see Heidi Peta Grunebaum, *Memorializing the Past*.
24. Gary Weissman, *Fantasies of Witnessing*.
25. Ruth Franklin, "Identity Theft."
26. Melvin Jules Bukiet, *Nothing Makes You Free*; Alan L. Berger, *Children of Job*.
27. Among others, I would name Eva Hoffman, Ellen Fine, Nadine Fresco, Erin McGlothlin, Efraim Sicher, Froma Zeitlin, James Young, Brett Kaplan, Emily Miller Budick, Sara Horowitz, Pascale Bos, Irene Kacandes, Annelies Schulte Norholt, Arlene Stein, and Gabriele Schwab, as well as psychoanalytic work by Dan Bar-On, Yael Danieli, Nannette Auerhahn and Dori Laub, Martin S. Bergmann and Milton E. Jucovy, Eva Fogelman, and Dina Wardi.
28. See, among others, Amy Hungerford, *The Holocaust of Texts*; Ruth Leys, *Trauma*; Walter Benn Michaels, "'You who never was there.'" Related critiques of victim culture are equally prevalent in feminist work, of course. See, for example, Martha Minow, "Surviving Victim Talk," *UCLA Law Review* 40 (1992-93): 1411-45; Lauren Berlant, *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Wendy Brown, "Resisting Left Melancholy," *Boundary 2*, 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 19-27.

29. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, 4. See Andreas Huyssen, "Transnationale Verwertungen von Holocaust und Kolonialismus." See also the connective work of Naomi Mandel, *Against the Unspeakable*.
30. Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*; Schwab, *Haunting Legacies*, 30. Recent historical work also places the Holocaust within the context of other related histories. See esp. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands*. On the dangers and risks of exclusivist approaches to Holocaust memory, see Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer, "Holocaust Studies/Memory Studies." Carol A. Kidron's analysis of second-generation support groups in Israel, including her argument that these groups perform the functions and follow the practices of traditional liturgical memory work to preserve a uniquely Jewish memory, goes very much against the grain of the more broadly affiliative, connective, and secular approach to postmemory I attempt in this book. See Carol A. Kidron, "In Pursuit of Jewish Paradigms of Memory," and a series of responses to Kidron in *Dapim* (2010).
31. Andrew Hoskins, "7/7 and Connective Memory," 272. See also Andrew Hoskins, "Digital Network Memory;" J. Van Dijck, "Flickr and the Culture of Connectivity."
32. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling*.

1. THE GENERATION OF POSTMEMORY

1. Art Spiegelman, *The First Maus* (1972), first published in *Funny Animals*, reprinted in Art Spiegelman, *Meta Maus*, 105.
2. Art Spiegelman, *Maus I: A Survivor's Tale: My Father Bleeds History*.
3. Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*. Gary Weissman objects specifically to the "memory" in my formulation of postmemory, arguing that "no degree of power or monumentality can transform one person's lived memories into another's." (*Fantasies of Witnessing*, 17.) Both Weissman and Ernst van Alphen refer back to Helen Epstein's 1979 *Children of the Holocaust* to locate the beginnings of the current use of the notion of "memory" in the late 1980s and 1990s: in contrast, they indicate, Epstein had described the "children of the Holocaust" as "possessed by a *history* they had never lived," and she did not use the term "second generation," which, van Alphen observes, implies too close a continuity between generations that are, precisely, *separated* by the trauma of the Holocaust. Epstein spoke of the "sons and daughters of survivors." Objecting to the term "memory" from a semiotic perspective, van Alphen firmly asserts that trauma cannot be transmitted between generations: "The normal trajectory of memory is fundamentally indexical," he argues. "There is continuity between the event and its memory

And this continuity has an unambiguous direction: the event is the beginning, the memory is the result. . . . In the case of the children of survivors, the indexical relationship that defines memory has never existed. Their relationship to the past events is based on fundamentally different semiotic principles." (*Art in Mind*, 485, 486.)

4. Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 6, 9.
5. *Ibid.*, 126.
6. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*.
7. Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis*. Assmann uses the term "kulturelles Gedächtnis" ("cultural memory") to refer to "Kultur"—an institutionalized hegemonic archival memory. In contrast, the Anglo-American meaning of "cultural memory" refers to the social memory of a specific group or subculture.
8. Aleida Assmann, "Re-framing Memory."
9. *Ibid.*, 36.
10. *Ibid.*, 40.
11. *Ibid.*, 39.
12. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 193. When I referred to myself as a "child of survivors" in my writings on memory and postmemory, for example, it never occurred to me that my readers would assume, as Gary Weissman has done, that they were Auschwitz survivors. (Weissman, *Fantasies of Witnessing*, 16, 17.)
13. For a series of distinctions between familial and nonfamilial aspects of postmemory and for a strictly literal interpretation of the second generation, see Pascale Bos, "Positionality and Postmemory in Scholarship on the Holocaust." In *Haunting Legacies*, Gabriele Schwab relies on Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok's suggestive notion of the crypt to explain the intergenerational transmission of trauma from a psychoanalytic perspective. I have always seen the crypt as an inherently familial structure of transfer, but Schwab usefully defines "collective, communal and national crypts" that ensue from historical traumas. (*Haunting Legacies*; see esp. chap. 2.)
14. On the familial gaze, see Marianne Hirsch, *Family Frames*.
15. Geoffrey H. Hartman, *The Longest Shadow*, 9; Ross Chambers, *Untimely Interventions*, 199ff.
16. See chap. 6 for a theorization of nonappropriative identification based on Kaja Silverman's distinction between idiopathic and heteropathic identification.
17. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*, 187 (emphasis added).
18. It is useful, in this regard, to recall Edward Said's distinction between vertical *filiation* and horizontal *affiliation*, a structure that acknowledges the breaks in authorial transmission that challenge authority and direct transfer. (Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic*.) While Said sees a linear