Part I Studying Social Interaction from a CA Perspective

2 Everyone and No One to Turn to: Intellectual Roots and Contexts for Conversation Analysis

DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD
University of Wisconsin

1 Introduction

Conversation Analysis (CA) has established itself as a worldwide theoretical and empirical endeavor concerned with the social scientific understanding and analysis of interaction. The growth of this field over the decades from the first published papers by Harvey Sacks (1967a, b) and Emanuel Schegloff (1968) up to the present day can only be charted in exponential terms and is a remarkable accomplishment. What are the intellectual roots and contexts for this accomplishment? That is the question to which this chapter is addressed, and its title is meant to be a kind of pun on Sacks' concern with such categories as *everyone*, as well as the subtitle of Sacks' dissertation (and first publication), *The Search for Help: No One to Turn to*.[1] The pun is meant to suggest that Conversation Analysis reaches into an immense variety of traditions and does so because its founders turned to many different scholars and scholarly works (everyone) as the field of CA burgeoned. At the same time, CA represents nothing less than a revolution or paradigm shift in the social sciences. Consequently, for Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson and the other pioneers[2] who fashioned CA and its phenomena and approach from a dense underbrush of influences, there was *no one* in terms of predecessors or contemporaries to turn to (Sacks, 1992 Vol 2:549). Observe this exchange between Schegloff and an interviewer, Carlo Prevignano (Čmejrková & Prevignano, 2003):

> Interviewer: How did you come to the enterprise called Conversation Analysis?
> Schegloff: Well, I didn't really, because there was no such thing as "Conversation Analysis" to come to—at least not in the sense of what has developed over the last thirty-five years or so.

The Handbook of Conversation Analysis, First Edition. Edited by Jack Sidnell and Tanya Stivers.

To address the themes of everyone and no one to turn to, I draw heavily on Sacks' (1992) published lectures, Schegloff's (1992a, b) thoroughgoing reviews and introductions to them, and many additional writings by Schegloff about CA and the history of CA. I trace the intellectual roots and contexts of CA and attempt to show the new subject matter and underpinnings for inquiry it established. My purpose, in other words, is both to capture the traditions to which CA speaks and what it has uniquely bestowed to a variety of disciplines for scholarly inquiry into social interaction.

In a continuation of the interview quoted above, Schegloff comments that building on, extending, or even altering CA work depends on knowing the roots, the background, and the rationale for the enterprise. This chapter cannot explore in depth every source from which CA drew or to which it speaks, nor fully explore every branch of inquiry it has grown. Also, because Schegloff (1992a, b) has written extensively about Sacks,[3] but no one has developed a comparable full account of the background, depth and breadth in Schegloff's own work and thought, this chapter, with a focus on Sacks and the *Lectures on Conversation*, is by necessity somewhat one-sided. That is, a full scholarly treatment of the influences on Schegloff and the ways in which his work has shaped the field over the 35 years since Sacks' untimely death has yet to be written.[4] Certainly one of Schegloff's (e.g. 1968) crowning contributions, as Sacks himself wrote in a 1974 letter to Schegloff, was to instantiate and pave the way for working "quantitatively"—namely on masses of data or what have come to be called *collections*, rather than just single instances where Sacks' intention was "to isolate structure in particulars." That structure is to be found in the details of a single instance, even while the investigator works with collections of a phenomenon, is a hallmark of CA not usually found in endeavors concerned with talk and interaction.[5]

Similarly, a complete assessment of Gail Jefferson's contributions to early CA has as yet to be written, but it can be said that her invention of a system for detailed transcription is the very substrate upon which scholars in the CA field historically and to the present day have based and can generate observations and findings about what Sacks (1984a) himself famously termed *order at all points*.[6] The manifold CA reports and studies documenting robust conversational patterns and structures extant in the micro moments of talk and embodied social interaction would simply not be possible without the Jeffersonian system that, in combination with audio- and video-recordings, makes it possible to inspect hesitations, hitches, silences, overlaps, tokens, breaths, laughter, prosodic cues, and other accompaniments to what are considered the more usual components of speech production such as words or other turn content. Because of its technical acumen yet ready understandability for capturing elemental features of talk, Jefferson's transcription system has been massively influential for the CA tradition. That system, in conjunction with recordings, is indispensible in bringing to light just how there may be, as Jefferson (1985a, b, 2004b) has appreciated again and again in her research and in commentaries on transcription, orderliness in details (see Hepburn & Bolden, this volume). Quoting Sacks, Jefferson (1985a: 25) proposes including

those details that are, on first glance, seemingly "mundane, occasional, local, and the like."

This chapter will provide a broad, albeit brief, picture of the intellectual backgrounds and contexts to the variegated yet technical endeavor that CA has come to be. As I review its origins, we will see how CA crosses disciplinary boundaries, including at least Sociology, Anthropology, Philosophy and Linguistics. In the end, however, the sociological roots of CA must be said to predominate in the kind of field it is. This neither renders CA any less related or relevant to Anthropology, Linguistics, and the rest, nor does it mean to neglect the conversation analytic scholars in these other traditions and the core contributions they have made (as addressed in this volume). It does imply that there is a center to the variegation and it is deeply sociological.

My approach is to trace the roots and contexts of CA by examining the traditions to which it has addressed itself, viewing these traditions in the following order: in section (2) ethnomethodology, (3) Goffmanian sociology, (4) scholarship on Greek oral culture, (5) Linguistics, (6) Philosophy, and (7) ethnography, Anthropology, sociolinguistics. Other disciplines and subdisciplines could be explored—Communications (Beach, this volume), the history and philosophy of science, Freudian psychology, cultural analysis, and childhood studies to name a few, but considerations of length must prevail over comprehensiveness. The order of inquiry is for the most part neither a chronological one, nor an indication of any other priority such as the weight of influence a tradition represents, although the issue of weight will figure naturally in some of the discussions. So in following this list, I am not claiming to portray a developmental history of Conversation Analysis. Rather, I mean to appreciate a few of the strands that leave their traces on CA or to which the CA enterprise speaks because of contemporaneous development.

2 Ethnomethodology

In his introduction to Volume I of the *Lectures on Conversation*, after reciting facts about Sacks' education (BA Columbia College, 1955; LLB Yale, 1959) and the faculty members who may have interested him, Schegloff (1992a) almost immediately introduces Harold Garfinkel and ethnomethodology into the picture, suggesting that as a law student, Sacks was less concerned with being an attorney than with law as a social institution. Consequently, he turned to the work of the sociological theorist Talcott Parsons, then at Harvard, and by attending a seminar of Parsons' in Cambridge, there met Harold Garfinkel, who was on a sabbatical from UCLA in 1959 and revisiting his PhD alma mater.[7] In his law school studies, Sacks had already come upon something of the mystery behind how law actually works by noticing the way that legal reasoning ultimately depends on commonsense rather than on an internal logic of its own. Finding resonance in Garfinkel's ethnomethodological imagination, when Sacks went to Berkeley to study Sociology and, more particularly, labor law and industrial relations, he

maintained his relationship with Garfinkel and circulated the latter's manuscripts, including those that came to be published around that time (Garfinkel, 1959, 1960, 1963, 1964).

When discussing the Garfinkel manuscripts with others, Sacks "added the special directions of his own thinking" (Schegloff, 1992a: xv). Meanwhile he was also attending seminars in Los Angeles that Garfinkel had organized with Edward Rose of the University of Colorado. In 1963, Sacks moved to Los Angeles as an Acting Assistant Professor at UCLA, and worked with Garfinkel at UCLA and the Center for the Scientific Study of Suicide. Exactly how much Garfinkel's work influenced Sacks and the field of CA is difficult to establish, but we can observe that, in his paper on "On Sociological Description" (OSD), Sacks (1963: 1) remarks that the "stimulus" for his thoughts came from his meetings with Garfinkel and through reading his manuscripts. Various bits of OSD certainly align with ethnomethodological views of the time. These include (i) the critique of Sociology as drawing on a resource (language) that needs to be a topic for inquiry in its own right, (ii) the need for investigating the 'common-sense perspective' as embodied in a member's use of natural language rather than attempting to clarify, criticize or reconcile this use with the member's other activities, and (iii) appreciation for the 'etcetera' problem—the incompleteness of descriptions—as a site for sociological inquiry rather than as something to be solved through the application of social scientific methodologies (as by producing literal descriptions).

Beyond these critiques, Sacks and his then-student colleagues at Berkeley, David Sudnow as well as Schegloff (who were all part of the Center for the Study of Law and Society), were wrestling with what Garfinkel's "members' methods" could be as actual phenomena (Schegloff, 1999c: 9). Indeed, Schegloff (1963), in the same issue of the *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* in which Sacks' (1963) OSD article appears, published a paper on psychiatric theorizing, which credits Garfinkel as well as Sacks and Sudnow for discussion of the approach taken in the paper. That approach can be described as an analysis of the (ethno)methods by which, in their texts, psychiatrists depict the dialogic relationship constituting therapy between patient and psychiatrist. Schegloff's inquiry might have culminated in a sustained investigation of the insanity plea in law and psychiatry had his access to courtroom data not been hampered by a court administrator (see Čmejrková & Prevignano, 2003: 22). In a counterfactual way, we can only speculate on how CA might have developed differently (if at all), or how the field of Law and Society might have been transformed, had this roadblock not happened and also had Schegloff not landed a job in Ohio where he obtained tape recordings of phone calls to and from a police department complaint desk. It was with this opportunity and from this set of data that Schegloff (1968) developed the now indispensable strategy whereby conversation analysts, for gaining access to the most general level of regularity in conversation, operate with collections and with the deviant case or cases in a given collection (see Sidnell, this volume).[8] In terms of the ethnomethodological influence on CA, however, it can also be noted that Schegloff's (1968: 1077) early paper bears the stamp of Garfinkel's famous breaching experiments. When he discusses a "distribution rule" for telephone conversation to the

effect that "answerer speaks first," Schegloff begins his analysis by considering—rather extensively—". . . what might be involved in its violation." And, in doing so, he notes his indebtedness to Garfinkel.

The Sacksian lectures and writings reflect profound intellectual stirrings from Garfinkel, especially in the concern to eschew commonsense characterizations of conduct as part of the investigator's analysis in favor of analyzing the practices by which members come to produce such characterizations (Schegloff, 1992a: xli–xliii). However, Sacks' work is not reducible to ethnomethodology. For example, the OSD paper is concerned with what Sociology can or cannot claim about being a science, and that discussion anticipates what has become a central methodological concern for CA. That is, attention to practical reasoning and the methods of commonsense analysis for Sacks would eventually mean a subtle but radical analytical shift from direct examination of a given utterance in talk to the interpretation that a recipient makes of that utterance. In a lecture from Spring 1966, for instance, Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 285–7) observes that when the therapist Dan says, "Jim, this is Al, Ken, and Roger," it requires that the addressed participants attend the utterance in particular ways to know what to say subsequently. Ken and Roger, like Al, are being addressed under the auspices of the "this is" introduction rather than under a different action such as being summoned. Consequently, as a look at their responses shows, there is no need on their part for response to Dan, as there would be had the address terms been used in a summoning action. The lesson is one that conversation analysts now take as axiomatic. For an investigator to explicate an utterance as a social object or action, one paramount issue is how recipients deal with it, how they are the analysts of the talk in the first place.

In the consideration of conversational turns of talk, here—in the handling of what happens next—is a tool for examining "members' methods" that is both influenced by and a contribution to ethnomethodological inquiry. This reciprocal relation between ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis is manifest in many ways, another example being the joint concern with the ordinary, the mundane, the everyday social world (Schegloff, 1992b: xxiii), which in Sacks' (1984b) work receives exquisite articulation in a lecture that has been published under the title, "On Doing Being Ordinary." It suggests how the ordinariness of the world is an achievement of members' concerted practices rather than a feature that is inherent to social life.

3 Goffmanian Sociology

Discussing the ethnomethodological and CA focus on the ordinary, mundane, everyday world also necessitates a consideration of Erving Goffman and his relationship to CA. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz in 1983 characterized Goffman as "perhaps the most celebrated American Sociologist right now, and certainly the most ingenious." Such influence over the years has hardly diminished.[9] Goffman's rise occurred just after the 'golden age' of interdisciplinary Social Psychology, which had seen the greatly expanded use of surveys and statistical analysis, but

had only increased "the reliability of our observations rather than extend our powers of observation," as Sewell (1989: 13) put it. Goffman's success in drawing the attention of sociologists and others to the realm of face-to-face interaction was extremely timely and valuable.[10] As well, his nonpareil 'powers of observation' led him to develop concepts that influenced other social theories and inquiries, especially notions about impression management, stigma, involvement, territories of the self, remedial work, interaction ritual, role distance, and others. Goffman's (1964: 134–5) paper in a special issue of the *American Anthropologist* on the Ethnography of Communication (edited by John Gumperz and Dell Hymes) is typically eloquent and prescient in its statements about how, if written discourse is well understood, "the greasy parts of speech" are in need of attention by way of appreciating the "human and material setting" in which both talk and gesture occur. This setting is the "neglected situation," whose elements "constitute a reality *sui generis* . . . and warrant analysis in their own right, much like that accorded other basic forms of organization." In his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association about the importance, pervasiveness and independence of the *interaction order*, Goffman (1983) eloquently revisits and systematizes this earlier assertion.

Just like Goffman's relation to Sociology generally, his connections to both ethnomethodology and CA are complicated ones (Rawls, 2003; Smith, 2003), and here I focus on just those involving CA. Although Goffman had originally chaired Sacks' dissertation committee (later withdrawing), references to and discussions of Goffman in the *Lectures on Conversation* (Sacks, 1992) are few and brief. Silverman (1998: 32), for example, points to remarks in the lectures that draw upon Goffmanian insights about "appearances" and the control of appearances in various circumstances. A backhanded appreciation can be found in an introductory lecture for a class in the fall of 1967, when Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 619) mentions that reading Goffman, and in particular, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), would be a helpful background for the students to understand his own enterprise. But Sacks goes on to state that Goffman's work, while making sociological hay from the details of ordinary daily life differently from usual forms of Sociology, is *only* background and not strictly related to his own investigations. Perhaps most connected to Goffman is Sacks' (1972b) "Notes on Police Assessment of Moral Character," written for a course offered by Goffman at Berkeley in the early 1960s, and examining how police infer moral character by way of an 'incongruity procedure' applied to 'normal appearances' that social actors present in public situations. The otherwise sparse mention of Goffman in the *Lectures* may reflect, as Wieder, Zimmerman and Raymond (2010: 135) put it, the strategy of taking, as the "primary harvest" from Goffman's texts for both CA and ethnomethodology, what can be "ransacked" in terms of its use for seeing the everyday world.

Goffman has opened many eyes in this regard. In some ways Schegloff's (1988c) contribution to an edited volume (Drew & Wootton, 1988) is more enlightening on the matter of Goffmanian influences on CA than are Sacks' lectures. Schegloff (1988c: 91) characterizes Goffman as a "progenitor" of the work, suggesting that as he and Sacks studied together with Goffman, they "appreciated his achieve-

ment and meant our own efforts to build on it in some respects, though not in others." In his interview with Čmejrková and Prevignano (2003: 25), Schegloff says, "Goffman made interaction a viable topic of inquiry." However, CA deals less with the notion of what Goffman called *ritual* constraints on interaction (and their psychological underpinnings, particularly concerns with maintaining *face*) and focuses more on *system* constraints, including structures of interaction such as turn-taking, the sequencing in adjacency pairs, and other organized aspects of talk-in-interaction. As well, the practices within CA of analyzing actual talk in detail, collections of sequences, and carefully drawing sociological accounts from participants' exhibited orientations, go against Goffman's tendency toward what Schegloff (1988c: 101) calls "analytic pointillism." Such pointillism includes adducing single instances, often invented, and providing astute interpretations and conceptual distinctions to summon a reader's sense of typical conduct rather than analyzing actual conduct in real, embodied courses of action.

Still, the Goffmanian influence lingers in CA, especially for theoretical understandings of the interaction order and from his later corpus of writings that began to focus on talk, when CA may have influenced his work as much as the reverse. Nascent in his early work (Goffman, 1963, 1967), concepts systematically developed in later work and associated with framing, footing and participation frameworks (Goffman, 1974, 1979, 1981b) have been absorbed across the CA spectrum whether investigators study ordinary interaction (C. Goodwin, 1984, 1988; M. H. Goodwin 1990a; Holt & Clift, 2007) or institutional settings such as medicine (Heritage & Maynard, 2006b; Maynard, 2003; West, 1984a; see also Gill & Roberts, this volume), news interviews (Clayman, 1988, 1992b; see also Clayman, this volume), survey interviews (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000: ch. 3), courts (Maynard, 1984: ch. 3; see also Komter, this volume) and other arenas. As Clayman (1992b: 165) writes:

> For Goffman participation in interaction is not a simple either/or affair in which one party speaks while another listens. There are varying forms and degrees of participation, and the roles of speaking and hearing can be broken down analytically into more specific interactional "footings."

Footings and degrees of participation are displayed not only through speaking practices but also in the embodied ways recipients align themselves or not with ongoing talk both during its production and in subsequent turns. For instance, by exhibiting stance through different concrete displays of footing, participants to a storytelling can show their appreciation of its components and an understanding of their roles within it (C. Goodwin, 1984), interviewers during news broadcasts can exhibit neutrality (Clayman, 1992b), and attorneys for the artful purposes of negotiation can fashion a bargaining position while showing some distance from it (Maynard, 2010). Finally, much as the bulk of CA is about 'system' constraints, there are CA works (e.g. Heath, 1988; Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Lerner, 1996a; Maynard & Zimmerman, 1984) that do draw upon Goffmanian notions about ritual constraints.

4 Scholarship in Greek Oral Culture

It is apparent that scholarship on early (pre-Socratic) Greek culture and its oral traditions (e.g. Havelock, 1963; Parry, 1971) was a touchstone for Sacks in several ways. In an oral culture, the poetic mode of expression infused daily life and talk, as it might mean bursting into verse "in order to admonish one's children, or dictate a letter, or tell a joke, [or] to give orders or draft directives" (Havelock, 1963: 134). Versifying is different from using operational or prosaic or literate (writing-based) language in speech, such as (respectively) defining the consequences of engaging in a prohibited act, writing a text message, offering laughter while making a point, or issuing a command. Although we may rarely versify in producing everyday social actions *per se*, CA, in its approach to talk-in-interaction, is open to exploring ways that modes of expression, other than literate, prosaic ones, affect the organization of conversation.

The issue of poetic expression raised by Havelock and others raises a methodological point. One of the distinctive marks of Conversation Analysis is *unmotivated inquiry*, an approach to the analysis of talk in which the investigator as much as possible puts aside or brackets assumptions about how a domain of human action does or could operate. Through repeated contact with recorded instances, the attempt is to appreciate phenomena that interaction itself presents. The institution of naturally occurring talk, even when existing in literate cultures, is nevertheless oral in nature and may have distinctive properties that—because of the literate cultures many of us occupy—are even more obscure to present day scientific imaginations than the inherent sluggishness of commonsense may bestow.[11] Simply put, familiarity with written language may suppress sensitivity to aspects of orality that nevertheless organize the institution of talk. That there may be such distinctive properties is the opposite of suggesting that oral cultures somehow lack features of talk documented in conversations from American or English or other literate cultures, a stance that Sidnell (2001) trenchantly critiques. Instead, the proposal is that theoretically erudite inquiry may entirely miss extant facets of skillfulness in everyday, talk-based oral productions.[12]

The literary environments comprising disciplinary reading and writing, which include vernacular formulations from commonsense, nurture and educate these imaginations by way of presuppositions in theory and method that can prespecify what is important to investigate and find in talk.[13] An example can be found in the extensive literature on gender differences in patterns of interruption in conversation,[14] where it is assumed that (a) we know what interruption is, and (b) we can, in *a priori* fashion, treat gender as a relevant category to explain possible patterns of interruption. While those assumptions seem merited on commonsense as well as theoretical grounds, Schegloff (2001) has challenged both assumptions, suggesting that conventional understandings of interruption need to be questioned in light of careful observation of actual contexts in which simultaneous talk occurs. Furthermore, systematic analysis of categories such as gender or other indications of high status or power in relation to talk needs to take into

account the orientations of participants. That is, researchers may be able to identify participants correctly by way of gender or other status categories, but participants themselves may be oriented, if they are oriented at all to category membership, to any of a myriad groups by which they potentially are identifiable. In the CA view, analysts need to discover participants' orientations rather than impose their own.

For Conversation Analysis, there is a lesson from the studies of oral culture that applies broadly and to the gender-and-speech literature as an example.[15] That lesson is to approach talk and interaction in a fashion that is absent of (commonsensically- or theoretically-derived) presupposition, to the degree that it is possible, and recognizing that no inquiry is completely freestanding. Not every CA study does this of course, and Clayman and Gill (2004: 596–7) suggest that inquiry can start *either* with an unmotivated "noticing," or with a "vernacular action" that is provoking inquiry. However, Sacks' originating lectures are notorious for inquiries that derive from freely seeing what the data present, as when, citing scholars of Greek oral culture, and Havelock in particular, he (Sacks, 1992 Vol 1: 104–10) probes the phenomenon of proverbial usage in talk, suggesting not only that social scientists routinely find such statements to be incomplete and inconsistent, and therefore needing correction, but that, concomitantly, investigators have not much dealt with "actual occasions of their use." When the investigator does examine actual occasions, proverbs turn out to be correct in and for those contexts. An extended treatment of the matter of proverbial correctness can be found in Sacks' (1975) article that has a proverb as its title—"Everyone Has to Lie"—in which he argues that the truth of this statement derives from the organization of conversation, including the selection of identifications, the action (such as complaining) that an utterance constitutes, knowledge about the sequential implications of different utterance forms, and so on. This principle generalizes: the organization of conversation provides for the understandability and precision of any formulation—prosaic *or* poetic—that inhabits the talk between participants.

Also related to the theme of oral communication and its intrinsic properties is Sacks' analysis of the occurrence of proverbial expressions upon completion of a story (Sacks, 1978). This location is where speakers propose upshots and recipients display their understandings of the story. Such upshots and displays are often done with proverbial expressions. Moreover, in a pattern suggesting that poetic traditions are still relevant in our literature cultures, these expressions regularly have unrecognized pun-like relationships with elements of the story. These puns often go unattended because their recognition depends on a grasp of their *literal* meaning, whereas proverbial expressions at story completion points are deployed and usually understood for their *figurative* meanings.

Three CA offshoots are related to oral culture and properties inhering within it. One is similar to the studies of proverbs and consists of work on the *poetics* of talk—sound patterns, puns, rhymes, 'suppressions' of problematic or delicate terms that subsequently surface, and the like (Jefferson, 1996; Schegloff, 2003b, 2003c, 2005c). A second offshoot is concerned with such phenomena as irony (Clift, 1999), wherein utterances take on meanings opposite from their literal forms, and

idiomatic expression (Drew & Holt, 1988, 1998; Silverman, 1997: 138–9), when utterances are figurative and formulaic. A third offshoot related to oral culture draws from further work by Sacks (1978) on storytelling. As in Greek poetry, it can be appreciated that stories do not convey concepts like those endemic to literate culture and logic so much as they transmit concrete lessons "through the way the story is told" (Havelock, 1978: 192). Sacks' (1992 Vol 2: 470–94) "detoxifying" treatment of a dirty joke is in this vein, showing just what and how the information the joke contains derives from the embedded dramatic form, a form that has specific resonance for the 12-year-old girls who were its original transmitters but not for the 17-year-old boys who hear it from the brother of one of the girls. In Sacks' astute analysis, the dramatic form is one that is developed by way of its temporal and sequential organization. Jefferson (1978) picks up the latter theme in her influential study of how stories are both sequentially occasioned and sequentially implicative.

Overall, it can be said that when conversation analysts have dealt with phenomena related to poetics, irony, idioms, proverbs and storytelling, they are in a domain of inquiry partly opened through the influence on CA of writers about oral cultures who draw attention to the nonliterate forms of organization in speech that, besides being of historic, cultural, linguistic and scientific interest in their own right, can indelibly mark structures of everyday talk in contemporary societies.

5 Philosophy

In the concern for language in use, CA would have a natural affinity for ordinary language philosophy, including that of Austin, Ryle, Hart, Searle, Strawson, and others, but particularly that of the later Wittgenstein. Rather than ordinary language philosophy influencing CA, however, it is more accurate to say that CA developed *in parallel* with such philosophy—or at least that of Searle for example (Schegloff, 1992a: xxiv). This parallelism raises two questions: in what ways are ordinary language philosophy and CA alike, and in what ways are they different?

5.1 Similarities

Arising in an era that Hacking calls the 'heyday of sentences' when the linguistic turn in Philosophy brought scholarly attention to how language operates in the context of human activity, it should be no surprise that there is a parallelism between CA and ordinary language philosophy. In a sense, CA is dealing with how it is possible to 'do things with words' (Austin, 1962) and with 'speech acts' (Searle, 1969),[16] and thus decries, as do these theorists, long-held views in the philosophy of language that utterances or statements of any kind are to be seen as descriptions capable of relating to the world through ostensive demonstration. A second similarity is the recognition that a sentence or utterance can have an

assortment of meanings, or perform a variety of different speech acts. Searle's (1969: 7071) classic example is a wife reporting to her husband at a party, "It's really quite late":

> That utterance may be at one level a statement of fact; to her interlocutor, who has just remarked on how early it was, it may be (and be intended as) an objection; to her husband it may be (and be intended as) a suggestion or even a request ("Let's go home") as well as a warning ("You'll feel rotten in the morning if we don't").

In ethnomethodological terms (deriving from Bar-Hillel and others), utterances are indexical and related to the time, place and other aspects of context for their understandability.

A third similarity is that both speech act theorists and CA are interested in the variety of actions done through speech or talk. Austin (1962: 150) suggests that there are on the order of a thousand or so actions, while Wittgenstein (1953: para. 23) proposes that there are "innumerable" activities in which language plays a part, including but by no means limited to "ordering, describing, reporting, speculating, presenting results, telling a story, being ironic, requesting, asking, criticizing, apologizing, censuring, approving, welcoming, objecting, guessing, joking, greeting." Conversation analysts (Schegloff, 2007b: 7) might list "asking, answering, disagreeing, offering, contesting, requesting, teasing, finessing, complying, performing, noticing, promising . . . inviting, announcing, telling, complaining, agreeing, and so forth."

A final similarity is that a concern with actions done through speech or talk raises a seemingly simple problem: how are investigators to know what the action force of an utterance is? It is untenable that the performative aspect of an utterance is somehow built into its form, for the reason stated above—the 'same' utterance can perform a variety of acts. Put differently, the *form* of a sentence or utterance can even be misleading about its status as an activity. For example, Levinson (1983: 275) mentions imperatives, which, despite their grammatical structure as commands or requests, rarely appear as such in natural conversation. Rather, they occur "in recipes and instructions, offers (Have another drink), welcomings (Come in), wishes (Have a good time), curses and swearings (Shut up), and so on . . . " That is, the linguistic form is subordinated to social action and interaction (Ochs, Schegloff & Thompson, 1996). As Levinson (1983: 274) nicely formulates the problem of knowing the illocutionary force of an utterance, it is one of mapping speech acts onto utterances as they occur in actual contexts.

5.2 Differences

Although philosophers such as Austin and Searle disavow notions of demonstrative correspondence between words and things, they do figure there can be a correspondence between words and actions by way of intentions and rules that are essentially cognitive in nature. Recognizing that a sentence can have an assortment of meanings or perform a variety of different speech acts, speech act theorists

link a given or 'same' utterance to specific actions by way of what Austin (1962: 15–24) calls *felicity conditions*, or the set of circumstances that allow for the successful completion of a performative. Thus, for an act of promising to be effective, Austin (1962: 21–2) suggests that the promisor must intend to promise, have been heard by someone, and be understood as promising. Searle (1969, 1975) provides a sophisticated system of rules whereby the 'direct' or 'indirect' action a given sentence is intended to initiate can be consummated. For example, rules or conventions, according to Searle (1969: 57–61) specify how an uttered promise is produced, what the preparatory conditions are (e.g. that the promise stipulates an act for someone that would not occur in the normal course of events), that the speaker intends to do the act as an obligation, and that the hearer recognizes the utterance as it was meant. These rules can be related to what Grice (1975) has called *conversational implicature*, a set of maxims that underlie and provide for the cooperative use of language (Levinson, 1983: 241).

With its ethnomethodological roots, CA contests this intentionalist and cognitive thesis by its attention to practices. And this aligns CA more to Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy and 'meaning is use' dictum rather than speech act theory. It is not that CA represents an attempt to carry out a Wittgensteinian approach to language-in-use, however. Rather CA is compatible with such an approach because it developed its own phenomena and ways of accounting for such phenomena through looking closely at what people say and when, in the course of their activities together, they say it. In fact, neither the rule-based perspective nor Wittgenstein's famous 'language-game' approach to the mapping problem deal with actual spoken utterances, whereas from the outset of his fortuitous preoccupation with talk, Sacks "begins by offering particular utterances in a particular context" (Schegloff, 1992a: xxv). As well, where speech act theorists begin with classes or categories of action, such as the ones (describing, asking, agreeing, etc.) in the lists above, CA starts with talk itself and asks what some singular piece of talk could be doing (Schegloff, 2007b: 8) according to the participants' orientations rather than the theorists' postulated felicity conditions, maxims or implicatures.

For CA, attending to participants' orientations means dealing with an utterance in its explicit sequential and interactional environment through analysis of actual cases, one-by-one, rather than exploring disembodied, hypothesized exemplary sentences. CA also recognizes that most utterances have no overt indication of what they are doing (such as through having an attached name or by their grammatical form), and may even disguise what they are doing so as to provide for a certain kind of invisibility or potential deniability. For example, in one by now well-known example, Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 10) discusses how a staff member on an emergency psychiatric hotline can request a caller's name tacitly rather than overtly by *offering* his own name ("This is Mr. Smith, may I help you?"). In many calls with such introductions, the caller will respond by offering his/her name in return: "Yes, this is Mr. Brown." However, there is a "skip move" device whereby a caller can ask for repair by stating that he cannot hear. After the repair, the relevant next utterance on the caller's part is an acknowledgment rather than self-introduction. The skip move can be a way of refusing to self-identify *without*

being seen to be engaged in refusal. CA's attention to actual *practices* and *methods* for the assembly of utterances and turns as actions in overall courses of action captures phenomena that cannot be imagined or hypothesized, contests the cognitive approach of Austin and Searle in ordinary language philosophy, and takes a more empirical approach to language usage than does Wittgenstein.[17]

6 Linguistics

One of the earliest and indeed surprising influences on CA is the transformational grammar of Noam Chomsky.[18] It happens that Sacks attended Chomsky's lectures while at Harvard (Schegloff, 1992a: xiii), and, whether or not the lectures as opposed to his written work were the source, Chomsky's influence is seen in Sacks' investigation of membership categorization devices. Participants' use of such devices provides for the reproducibility of descriptions, such as "I have no one to turn to" (Sacks, 1972a), and the sense of small stories that a child might assemble, such as "the baby cried, the mommy picked it up" (Sacks, 1972c).[19] At a more basic level, Sacks pursues a related vein from structural linguistics having to do with how, on the basis of a very limited exposure to a society's speech patterns and a relatively small number of personnel, individuals acquire the competence to deal, eventually, with a wide variety of situations and many other people. That is, society's neophytes are early on able to deal with multifarious 'anybodies' and to produce an infinite assortment of syntactically complex sentences. The answer, from a Chomskyian perspective, has to do with abstract properties of mind, 'deep structures' of grammar whose transformation can result in the variation found in surface-level syntax. However, instead of pursing a rationalist investigation into the properties of mind, CA is concerned with actual produced organization as exhibited in social, publicly interpretable methods and behaviors. In the Chomskyian view, however, CA is dealing not with competence but rather with performance, which is beyond the domain of Linguistics.

Even if the CA focus can be characterized as different from the linguistic one, the question about learning to perform raises an issue about the generic organization of talk. When neophytes acquire and generate actual practices in interaction, these practices have provenance for other situations and circumstances. For instance, Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 76–7), whose interests in children and children's cultures are another early stream in CA (Schegloff, 1992a: xvi), suggests that children learn a "prototype" account for legitimating an activity that they want to do (see Kidwell, this volume, on children). Generically, the account as a device is along the lines of saying, *An adult with authority told me it was 'okay'*. Children are known to obtain one parent's permission for doing something by citing the other parent's prior assent. Adults can use the device for other circumstances, as when calling a help line, and accounting for the call with "My brother suggested that I call you" (Sacks, 1992 Vol 1: 76). The prototype, in other words, is transferrable in its use to other places and times. And this insight underscores a methodological point. Conversation analysts can investigate a relatively small portion of the culture, as

exhibited, perhaps, in seconds or minutes and discover order and organization as assembled through actual practices for doing social actions (Sacks, 1984a). Predictably, those practices will, in context-sensitive ways, inhabit other settings where participants are engaging in similar social actions. And this prediction is derived not from theorizing about the nature of brains or minds or cognition. Nor is it derived from a sampling plan in a statistical sense. Rather, it is an observation about what can be demonstrated *in* interactional data *about* interaction, which is that participants have abstract understandings and knowledge concerning the social environments in which they operate (Sacks, 1992 Vol 1: 104–12; Schegloff, 1992b: xx).

If this methodological point about the generic quality of conversational practices has a generative grammarian backdrop, Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 622) nevertheless can be trenchant—"either polemical, or additive"—when dealing directly with formal Linguistics, because the latter field has been preoccupied with utterances in isolation from one another or without reference to the social environment. Chomsky's (1965) attempt to discover transcendent cognitive structures or a universal grammar that provides for competence, after all, is an effort that goes back to de Saussure and other linguistically-oriented inquiries seeking foundations (*langue*) for language that are independent of and invariant to social contexts in which 'performance' occurs (*parole*). In contrast, by examining the details of naturally occurring talk, Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, and colleagues set in motion the fundamental consideration of how participants construct social actions not by reference to an abstract cognitive competence but by forming utterances in very local social contexts created through contiguous turns of talk and multimodal facets that affect the design of those turns. This is an interactional competence, and the devices that define it are malleable in and through their real time organizing. Although actual utterances could be seen as violating the rules of an idealized grammar, their shaping as parts of turns embedded in interaction is exactly how they can accomplish the myriad of social actions that they do. An example from Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 641) is about a conversation between a psychiatrist in training and his supervisor about the trainee's handling of a patient who committed suicide.

> The meeting is roughly hostile in more or less subtle ways, and at one point the supervisor asks "Well why did you take this case?" There's some juggling around about that. The young psychiatrist answers eventually with this sentence: "I thought I could help him, with supervision."

In a prescriptive grammatical sense—that is, if the utterance were parsed as "I thought I could help him with supervision"—the young psychiatrist's utterance could mean that he was helping the patient by way of supervision, whereas "with supervision" at the end of a turn in talk and in its larger sequential context is at least a mild (if unintended) rebuke of the supervisor to whom it is directed, suggesting that if the neophyte had had "supervision," perhaps the case outcome would have been better.[20]

Conversation analysts, and Sacks in particular, may have formed ideas about the generic nature of practices in interaction by playing off of Chomsky's model of transformational grammar. Although CA was not concerned with 'language' *per se* when the investigations of talk began, the field inevitably developed in relationship with the older discipline of Linguistics. The contribution to Linguistics is that morphology and syntax, instead of being an autonomous entity, is in many aspects determined by the place of an utterance in a sequential environment (on grammar, see Mazeland, this volume). As research developed, CA has both influenced and been influenced by Linguistics (see Fox, et al., this volume), and the contemporary view is that grammar and social interaction are interconnected and together provide for organizational aspects of interaction. Grammar, rather than being something formally inert and static, only defining of 'competence' and not 'performance' as Chomsky defines these opposites, and emanating from transformations whereby deep structures of language are mapped onto surface structures of particular sentences, can be approached as a living resource, deployed in and not separable from the moment-by-moment developing contingencies of language in use. In speaking, a participant forms actions through linguistic and other structures always fitted to what has gone before, what a recipient is doing in the moment, and what can be anticipated from a recipient upon completion of a current turn.

7 Ethnography, Anthropology, Sociolinguistics

Just as CA developed on something like a parallel track with ordinary language philosophy, it also coincided with an increasing preoccupation among anthropologists with language use, a preoccupation of which Sacks (1992a,b) and Schegloff (1968) were well aware (see Clemente, this volume on CA and Anthropology). The background here is the wider area of ethnography—both sociological and anthropological—with Sacks, for instance, being steeped in these literatures (Schegloff, 1992a: xliv–xlv, fn. 30). About sociological ethnography, Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 27) remarks that it is ". . . the only work worth criticizing in sociology; where criticizing is giving some dignity to something." His affection for ethnography had to do with its concern for the "this and that" of everyday life, while his disaffection arose from the fact that ethnographers tended not to show the data upon which they based their reports from the field.

It was not just sociological ethnography for which Sacks had an affection, but also that of the anthropological sort, as in both his praise of Evans-Pritchard for studies of the Azande that reveal their notions about disease (1992 Vol 1: 34–5), and his criticism of the same author for making assertions about the centrality of cattle to Nuer conversations but not showing "how that's so" (389–90). Given his own longstanding concern to provide analyses that capture the reproducibility of utterances as actions in their contexts both for the participants who produce and hear them, and for scholarly audiences who hear or read a research report, there was a necessity in CA for using recordings and showing transcripts by which

audience members could "re-do the observations." This reproducibility, a methodological resource for inquiry, is one reason that, in publishing their research, conversation analysts insist upon including detailed transcripts and now, especially as in Schegloff's homepage listing of publications with accompanying, downloadable digital audio and video files, also making the original recorded interactions available (when possible).

Ethnography, much as it works to capture the concreteness of everyday life experience, traditionally has neither investigated interaction nor provided records thereof in its reports from the field, and this includes studies where language may be of central concern. As with his treatment of Evans-Pritchard, Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 624–32) also shows appreciation as well as dissatisfaction for the anthropologist Ethel Albert, for her descriptions of speaker sequencing among the Burundi according to a system of social rankings. The trouble is that the descriptions are lacking in specifications of how exactly this system works in practice. The extensive critique of Albert serves as a jumping off point for the work that resulted in the now-famous paper on turn-taking in conversation. So it might be said that both sociological and anthropological traditional ethnography influenced CA in a bivalent way—supplying reports from the field about interaction that were deeply fascinating and yet having gaps in such reportage that CA could fill by consideration of actual instances.

Additionally, in the lecture in which Sacks (1992 Vol 1: 27) comments on sociological ethnography, he also recommends "the modern anthropologists," and by this he meant those who were associated with John Gumperz and Dell Hymes in developing the *ethnography of speaking*. Because this field—related to but not entirely the same as sociolinguistics—developed co-extensively with CA, it is worth exploring, if only in summary fashion. Anthropological linguistics, as Duranti (1997a: 13–14) notes, is intimately related to sociolinguistics, although the two areas have different origins and different trajectories (see also Clemente, this volume). Here I will treat them apiece to make two points concerning the intellectual heritage and environment of CA.

First, sociolinguistics was dealing with the already-mentioned tradition of structural linguistics and its overwhelming tendency to view linguistic structure as extant outside time and place and hence not subject to social influence. Sociolinguists, following scholars such as Firth (1935), Malinowski (1923), and others, were utterly dissatisfied with such a view. Indeed, as Duranti (1997a: 216–17) writes, Malinowski came early to the idea that spoken language is pragmatic and performative—in essence a site of social actions—and this idea came to influence anthropological, socio- and pragmatic linguistics. Accordingly, when Hymes (1974: 2–3) developed his influential notion of the ethnography of speaking, he declared that the frame of reference for the social scientific investigation of language could not be linguistic forms in themselves, and must instead take the community context into account. Interestingly, Labov (1972c: xiii) resisted the term *sociolinguistics* because he could not conceive of a linguistic theory or method that did not incorporate a social component. The social component would include cultural values, social institutions, community history and ecology, and so on

(Hymes, 1974: 3). In any case, CA's implicit and explicit critiques of Linguistics and speech act theory are cognate with the sociolinguist appraisal of those same fields.

A second point about sociolinguistic studies represents a difference between that work and CA and serves to emphasize a distinctive feature of CA. Sociolinguistics—whether by virtue of dialect *surveys* or by way of *interpretive* work—has traditionally been concerned with variation, where the focus is on indigenous forms of speech in social networks and communities, including those structured by social class and ethnicity (Gumperz, 1972: 12). CA, by contrast, involves a concern with universality, and studies about what may vary among speech communities have to do with how syntax and grammar of particular languages or styles are adapted to practices involved in taking turns and developing actions through specific but cross-linguistic ways of organizing conversational sequences (Schegloff, 2006a; Sidnell, 2007a). As Schegloff (1986: 147) has put it, ". . . underlying that which varies, we can often find themes of interactional organization to which participants are oriented whatever their milieu." In second language acquisition (Firth & Wagner, 1997, 2007; Mori, 2007) and other applied domains, for example, it is often the generic practices and the 'themes' to which they are addressed that are crucial for learning and thereby for competence. In other words, the CA sensibility that Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 699) developed by focusing on the sequential "facts" of conversation, "rather than on particular outcomes in particular settings" enables the analysis of patterns that go beyond particular situations and circumstances. Of course, primary concepts in CA research are also those of context-freeness and context-sensitivity. The practices of talk and social interaction in one sense are generic and universal, but they also are deployed in ways that exhibit "recipient design" (Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974: 727), showing an orientation to particular others and circumstances including languages, language capacities, and identities of co-participants. These identities may include the membership categories to which they belong and that can be active or inactive according to a developing course of action and interaction.

8 Conclusions

Ethnomethodology, Goffmanian sociology, scholarship on oral cultures, Philosophy, Linguistics, ethnography, Anthropology and sociolinguistics are only some of the traditions that provided intellectual roots or contexts for the development of conversation analytic studies. In the Garfinkel and Goffman cases, these scholars, in crucially different but profound ways, opened the sociological doors through which the founders of CA could, directly and with repeated inspection, discover and elucidate orderly phenomena evident in the domains of actual talk and social interaction. Familiarity with distinctive features of oral cultures enables appreciation of modes of organization in talk—doing proverbs, telling stories, accomplishing irony, and other features of speech—that may best be discovered by way of

unmotivated inquiry. CA, with its focus on actual practices and by its methods of discovery, involves the study of language as it is lived.

Once language comes to be studied as a lived phenomenon, whereby units of speech known as indexical expressions achieve objectivity through practices, and investigators examine these practices as participants deploy them interaction, it means abandoning propositional or ideal approaches to language. Such abandonment is something CA shares with ordinary language philosophy, but CA crucially eschews the rule-based approach of speech act theory and is agnostic about cognitive maxims, intentions and other psychological features that are said to explain the meaning of utterances. Rather, the focus is on participants' observable attributions and displays as these occur through visible, hearable ways in everyday talk.

Although formal Linguistics provides a rudimentary model for conceptualizing the generics of conversational practices, it is limited. The preoccupation with abstract and transcendent forms means a diminished comprehension of language as it is lived through bodily enactments, such as the "lungs, larynx, tongue, and teeth" (Havelock, 1963: 148) as they are involved in speech, and other movements in gesture, gaze and posture. Traditional units of grammar—syntax, morphology, semantics—are not fixtures to which talk is configured and instead are part of a repertoire of practices in use whereby participants assemble actions through turns and sequences providing for mutual understanding.

Finally, but not exhaustively, CA scholars share ethnographic concerns with situated worlds of social life, with an insistence on making those worlds accessible to direct observation by others in the scientific community. In that sense, CA, with its focus on talk-in-interaction is doing a kind of ethnography of communication with the decisive twist of looking not in the first place for what is different among speech communities and instead for what may be generic for the participants in the interaction-based practices by which they assemble their social worlds. By drawing from these intellectual areas, in many cases operating in parallel on similar ground, and by addressing these areas in terms meant to expand the understanding of human behavior and action, CA is its own enterprise. It directs attention to the concreteness of talk, its embedding in context (especially of the sequential kind), the orderliness that participants produce and to which they demonstrate their orientations, the overt practices and displays of understanding embedded therein. CA ultimately analyzes our commonsense knowledge, our detailed ways of doing things together, and this means that it captures actually produced structures that inhabit ordinary human experience and social actions.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore ways in which CA, for the social, behavioral and communication sciences, is something like a new "paradigm" (Kuhn, 1970)—a term that has been the subject of considerable controversy. In many ways, however, relative to its forerunners and contemporaries, and however much it turned to them for insight or purposes of critique, CA has utterly changed the landscape of "normal science" in social and behavioral inquiry in a way that revolutionizes the presuppositions, facts, concepts and analyses for inquiry into the domain of everyday talk and interaction. In changing that landscape, there were deeply important intellectual predecessors and parallel inquir-

ies, but there was no one or no thing fully to turn to for the field's originators to fashion what Conversation Analysis could be. Appreciation of their revolutionary accomplishment, in fact, can get clouded because, as Schegloff (1992 Vol 1: xviii) puts it, a vision of the early work is "readily assimilated" to what CA is now. It is better to grasp the originality of that early work, as well as the innovations introduced in its subsequent development, as momentous feats of disciplined imagination and relentlessly forged analytical acumen aiming to be answerable to the pristine and primordial orderliness in social interaction in its detail.

NOTES

I am very grateful to Steve Clayman, Ceci Ford, Virginia Gill, Christian Heath, Junko Mori and the editors of this volume, Jack Sidnell and Tanya Stivers, for (in all cases) extremely helpful comments on previous versions of this chapter.

1 That dissertation (Sacks, 1967a) and a publication from it were about the methods whereby callers to a Suicide Prevention Center could come to the conclusion that they have no one to turn to (even though, paradoxically, they are doing just that when they produce the report to a counselor at a suicide prevention center).

2 Lerner's (2004b) edited volume, *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation*, not only has chapters by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson but also from Jo Ann Goldberg, Gene Lerner, Anita Pomerantz and Alene Terasaki.

3 See also Silverman's (1998) introduction to Sacks' works, and Chapter 2: "An Intellectual Biography" in particular. Also see Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008: Introduction and Chapter 1).

4 Sacks and Schegloff shared many long and intense discussions from their days as graduate students together at the University of California, Berkeley in the early 1960s (also with David Sudnow). Then, they were co-residential in the Los Angeles area in 1963–4 when a pivotal "long talking walk" generated Sacks' mention of a "'wild' possibility" regarding the organization in talk at a heretofore unappreciated level (see the "This is Mr. Smith, may I help you" example below in this chapter's section on Philosophy). They stayed in close contact by mail and periodic visits when Schegloff lived across country from Los Angeles during 1964–72, after which both were in Southern California and could collaborate locally (and also with Jefferson) up to Sacks' death in 1975. For accounts of this period and their dialog, see Schegloff (1992a: xii–xx), and also Čmejrková and Prevignano (2003: 18–20) wherein Schegloff briefly describes his own intellectual background. See also the volume edited by Prevignano and Čmejrková (2003) and particularly the introductory chapter by Heritage (2003b).

5 Beyond the contribution in terms of analyzing collections rather than single instances, Schegloff often includes mini-tutorials about how to form collections and isolate interactional phenomena in his research papers. An exemplary instance among many such mini-tutorials can be found in Schegloff's (1996a) methodological discussion preceding the analysis in a paper on "confirming allusions."

6 As Lerner (2004c: 3) puts it, Jefferson's transcription system ". . . is the internationally recognized 'gold standard' for transcribing the interactionally relevant features of talk-in-interaction."

7 Garfinkel was a student of and obtained his PhD under Parsons at Harvard in 1952.

8 On this point about collections and using "masses of data," see Lerner (2004c: 1–2, fn. 1): "In my view, without this move it would have been nearly impossible for others to develop the kind of insight into human conduct that Sacks was so able to extract from single cases."

9 Geertz is quoted in Burns (1992: 3). A more current comment on Goffman's preeminence is to be found in Jacobsen's (2010: 4) introduction to *The Contemporary Goffman*: ". . . Goffman is still very much alive and kicking and vibrant in contemporary sociology. His books seem to hold that rare

quality of standing the test of time and his work therefore deserves listing among the true classics of the discipline."

10 When social psychology was not survey-based, as Kendon (1990b: 24) has observed, it had a "highly experimental and artificial character . . . using pre-established category systems." In contrast, anthropologists, linguists, information theorists (cyberneticists) and clinical psychiatrists working on the "Natural History of an Interview" were developing approaches in Palo Alto, California in the 1950s and 1960s that came to be called *context analysis* (Scheflen, 1963). This analysis used filmed interactions, incorporating kinesic and paralinguistic analysis. Goffman's work both informed and was informed by these approaches (Kendon, 1990b). For a social history of the individuals and the project, see Leeds-Hurwitz (1987), and for other discussions, see C. Goodwin and Duranti (1992: 22–5) and Heritage (2002b: 910–11), the latter stressing the contribution of the Palo Alto group in using recordings of naturally occurring interactions. On embodiment, see Heath and Luff, this volume.

11 Garfinkel (1967b: 38) refers to the "sluggish imagination" and attributes the phrase to Herbert Spiegelberg. Hibbitts (1992: 875) has written about the transition from oral to written culture in western societies:

> In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the immediate European progenitors of our culture turned increasingly to writing to help preserve information and customary lore that had been primarily perpetuated and celebrated in sound, gesture, touch, smell, and taste. Once this corpus was inscribed, and thus removed from its original multisensory context, it slowly but indubitably became the creature of the medium that claimed to sustain it. Writing encouraged subtle alterations in the style and sometimes even the substance of age-old traditions and tales. From the sixteenth century, as the printing press stimulated the universalization of literacy, writing's social and intellectual grip on Western societies became so strong that more traditional channels of communication lost a crucial measure of their surviving legitimacy.

Such transitions were well underway, per the scholars mentioned above, in pre-Socratic Greece but probably were accelerated and spread more widely by the processes that Hibbitts discusses.

12 This is a statement about studies of talk-in-interaction, not the considerable literature on folklore and public speech events and performances (e.g. Bauman, 1986).

13 In a remark applicable to discourse inquiries of various kinds, Havelock (1978: 337) asks, "To what extent have the observer's own literate habits encouraged a remodeling of what is said into forms which may help to suggest structure?" Compare Schegloff (1997d: 183): "Discourse is too often made subservient to contexts not of its participants' making, but of its analysts' insistence."

14 The classic and often-cited piece is West (1979). For critical reviews, see Schegloff (1987b: 214–18) and James and Clarke (1993).

15 The literature on gender and speech is large and it is not possible to do justice either to the research in this domain or the main issues. For exemplary summaries as well as research that does provide important insights about gender and speech patterns, see Speer and Stokoe (2011), Ford (2008), Kitzinger (2007), and Ochs (1992), among others. "In summary," Ford (2008: 13) writes, "since the inception of modern feminist language studies, there has been a move away from cataloguing gender differences in language use based on understandings of gender as fixed and binary. Indeed, early attempts at correlating language form with sex of speaker often led researchers to perpetuate stereotyped views of women and men. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, research findings were contradictory and inconsistent."

16 See Levinson (this volume) for discussion of Searle's (1976) systemizing of Austin (1970b), and for how the topic of linguistic action not only came to occupy Philosophy and Sociology but also ". . . Linguistics, Psychology of Language, Developmental Psychology (Bruner, Bates), and Artificial Intelligence or Natural Language Processing."

17 And in some cases, as Schegloff (1992e: 125–6) observes, it can be said that domains of inquiry formerly belonging to Philosophy are passing to empirical disciplines including Sociology and

Conversation Analysis. As an example: Heritage's (1984a) detailed analysis of the particle *Oh* ends with a reference to Wittgenstein's (1974) suggestion that the use of *Oh* is not comparable to the complicated calculus involved in the deployment of other words. As Heritage (1984a: 337) puts it, and as his analysis of the particle demonstrates: "Wittgenstein's judgment would appear to be premature . . . ".

18 As Schegloff (1992a: xxi) writes about the "less expectable . . . echo of generativist grammar" in Sacks' early work, "studies of discourse and conversation are often set in contrast to transformational grammar."

19 This early work by Sacks has inspired a strain of ethnomethodological studies also related to CA and focusing on *membership categorization analysis* (e.g. Hester & Eglin, 1997).

20 See Ford, Fox and Thompson (2002) on turn increments.