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Foreword

The symbolic character of cultural phenomena is of greater interest today than at any other time in the history of anthropology. It is appropriate, therefore, that the seminar from which this volume developed explored meaning and its relationship to cultural symbols, theories of language, belief systems, thinking, the concept of culture, and the "native's point of view" and its manifestations in speech and social learning and kinship. As Keith Basso says in his thorough introduction, "the idea of meaning provides . . . an effective conceptual rallying point for much that is new and exciting in anthropology." These papers, written prior to the seminar and revised following exhaustive discussion, are unique in the intensity with which they approach this topic of critical current interest.

Beginning with Michael Silverstein's "pragmatic" model for speech analysis and the importance of recognizing a plurality of sign functions for the understanding of meaning, the book proceeds to consider from various perspectives the types of messages that can be and are relayed by a variety of behavioral acts and cultural symbols. Harold W. Scheffler argues for the merits of the distinctive feature model of lexical meaning, and, with it, critically evaluates David M. Schneider's work on American kinship. Basso, analyzing Western Apache metaphors, discusses the inadequacies of transformational grammars in their failure to explain the production and interpretation of figurative speech and presents his views on how the study of metaphors can provide a deeper appreciation of linguistic creativity.

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Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description[1]

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For Roman Jakobson

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will try to develop consequences of the statement that speech is meaningful social behavior. In itself, this statement is one of those set phrases of pidgin science that are used to ensure minimal trade relations in the contact community of linguists and social anthropologists. It gives us no analytic or descriptive power. What I wish to do here is demonstrate that we do, in fact, already have a full, subtle "language" with which to describe the elaborate meaning structures of speech behavior. It is a language that speaks of the "function" of signs, their modes of signification, distinguishing from among the types of sign functions *shifters* or *indexes*. The meaning of this functional sign mode always involves some aspect of the context in which the sign occurs. In making the nature of this involvement clearer, I hope to demonstrate that this "pragmatic" analysis of speech behavior—in the

tradition extending from Peirce to Jakobson—allows us to describe the real linkage of language to culture, and perhaps the most important aspect of the "meaning" of speech.

At one level, language has long served anthropologists as a kind of exemplar for the nature of things cultural. It seems to display these "cultural" properties with clarity in the tangible medium of articulate phonetic speech. Thus, and at another level, could the analytic lessons of linguistics be transferred analogically to other social behavior, giving a kind of structuralized anthropology, or, more remarkably, could the actual linguistic (especially lexicographic) structures of language be called culture. I will be developing the argument that this received point of view is essentially wrong. That aspect of language which has traditionally been analyzed by linguists, and has served as model, is just the part that is functionally unique among the phenomena of culture. Hence the structural characteristics of language in this traditional view cannot really serve as a model for other aspects of culture, nor can the method of analysis. Further, linguistic (or lexicographical) structures that emerge from the traditional grammatical analysis must of necessity bear a problematic, rather than isomorphic, relationship to the structure of culture.

LINGUISTIC AND OTHER COMMUNICATION

To say of social behavior that it is meaningful implies necessarily that it is communicative, that is, that the behavior is a complex of signs (sign vehicles) that signal, or stand for, something in some respect. Such behavioral signs are significant to some persons, participants in a communicative event, and such behavior is purposive, that is, goal oriented in the sense of accomplishing (or in failing to accomplish) certain ends of communication, for example, indicating one's social rank, reporting an occurrence, effecting a cure for a disease, and so forth. In general, then, we can say that people are constituted as a society with a certain *culture* to the extent that they share the same means of social communication.

Language as a system of communication has the same characteristics as the rest of culture. So in order to distinguish analytic subparts of culture, such as language, we have traditionally distinguished among

types of communicative events on the basis of the signaling medium. In the case of language, the signaling medium is articulate speech, and events can be isolated on this basis.

Speech Events

By such analysis, a *speech event*, endowed with an overt goal in a socially shared system of such purposive functions, consists of some sequence of speech behaviors in which some speaker or speakers signal to some hearer or hearers by means of a system of phonetic sign vehicles called speech messages or utterances. The utterances are organized into a system for the participants by virtue of their knowledge of a linguistic code, or grammar. The speech event takes place with the participants in given positions, or loci, and over a certain span of time. The roles of speaker and hearer may be taken by different individuals during the course of such an event. Many other characteristics of such speech events must also be taken into consideration, among them the other sociological aspects of the individuals in the roles of speaker and hearer, which are frequently salient in defining the event, the prior speech events (if any), the gestural or kinesic communication that invariably accompanies spoken language, the distinction between roles of hearer and audience, and so forth. A description of the speech event must minimally take into account these fundamental defining variables.

Speech events so defined, moreover, are cooccurrent with events based on distinct signaling media, and these together make up large-scale cultural routines. Descriptively, the simplest speech events would be those which themselves constituted the entire goal-directed social behavior. It is doubtful that such events exist. In our own culture, reading a scholarly paper can come close to being a speech event pure and simple, the purpose of which is expressible in terms of informative discourse among social categories of scholars. The possibility of distinct forms of symbolism that can be involved in these events is not at issue. I am dealing here only with the purposive nature of the speech event in a system of social action. The more embedded speech events are those which are part of such large-scale cultural enterprises as complex rituals including speech, song, dance, dress, etc., where the meaning of the speech behavior in the speech events is usually integrally linked to the

presence of these other signaling media. Analytically, the problem of trying to give the meanings of signals in such a situation is very complex.

Referential Speech Events

But the ultimate justification for the segmentation of speech from other signaling media lies in one of the purposive uses that seems to distinguish speech behavior from all other communicative events, the function of *pure reference*, or, in terms more culturally bound than philosophical, the function of description or "telling about." The referential function of speech can be characterized as communication by propositions—predications descriptive of states of affairs—subject to verification in some cases of objects and events, taken as representations of truth in others. Reference so characterized is a communicative event, and the utterances of referential discourse are made up of sign units in grammatical arrangements, the meaning of the whole being a descriptive or referring proposition. It is this referential function of speech, and its characteristic sign mode, the semantico-referential sign, that has formed the basis for linguistic theory and linguistic analysis in the Western tradition.

Referential Linguistic Categories

All linguistic analysis of the traditional sort proceeds on the basis of the contribution of elements of utterances to the referential or denotative value of the whole. And it is on this basis that the traditional segmentation, description, and definition of all *linguistic categories* is made. Our standard ideas about the significant segmentation of utterances all rest on sameness or difference of utterances in terms of referring or describing propositions, coded in speech. Plural vs. singular "number," for example, as a pure referential linguistic category, can be analyzed by the contribution of such markers to propositions describing more-than-one vs. not-more-than-one entity. In English, this is illustrated by *The boys run* vs. *The boy runs*, where noun suffixed with *-s* and unsuffixed verb signal the category of plural-number subject, and unsuffixed noun and verb suffixed with *-s* signal the category of singular-number subject. Thus we segment $-s]_N$ $-\emptyset]_V$: $-\emptyset]_N$ $-s]_V$. Durative or progressive vs. punctual "aspect" as a pure referential category contributes to propositions describing events as continuous or ongoing (where they are not necessarily so) vs. momentaneous or complete. In English, this is illustrated by *The boy was jumping* vs. *The boy jumped*, with segmentation $be(-ed)$ $-ing]_V$: $\emptyset$ $(-ed)]_V$, *be* + *ed* represented by *was*.

Any form of grammatical analysis in this referential mode, from Greco-Roman to transformational-generative, defines the signs, the categories, and their rules of combination and arrangement in this fashion. All of our analytic techniques and formal descriptive machinery have been designed for referential signs, which contribute to referential utterances in referential speech events. (We shall see below that certain among the referential categories cause difficulties with this whole approach.) When we speak of linguistic categories, we mean categories of this referential kind; hence one of the principal reasons social functions of speech have not been built into our analyses of language: the sign modes of most of what goes on in the majority of speech events are not referential.

Semantics and Linguistic Analysis

The study of the "meaning" of linguistic signs is usually called semantics. It is clear from the way I have characterized traditional linguistic investigation, however, that the actual object of study of semantics has been the referential meanings of utterances, of the words and categories and arrangements in terms of which we can analyze them. For the purposes of this chapter, the term will be restricted in this way, so that semantics is the study of pure referential meaning, embodied in propositions coded by speech. This property of speech, abstract reference or description, can be called its *semanticity*.

From an operational point of view, all grammatical analysis of the traditional sort depends on this semanticity. To be able to analyze linguistic categories, we must be able to give evidence about the semantic relations of parts of sentences. We must ultimately be able to say, in other words, whether or not a certain stretch of language is semantically equivalent, within the grammar, to some other stretch of language. By determining such equivalence relations, we can build up a notion of defining, or *glossing*, certain grammatical stretches of a

language in terms of others. But glossing is itself a referential speech event.

Metasemantics

Glossing speech events take language itself, in particular the semantics of language, as the referent, or object of description. These events use language to describe the semantics of language, and are thus *metasemantic* referential speech events. Such metasemantic speech events are the basis of all grammatical analysis and description, and hence of all semantic description as well. They are the basic activity of the traditional linguistics, which may be seen as the discovery of the glosses of a language, of the class of all possible metasemantic speech events in the language. Leonard Bloomfield's (1933) "fundamental postulate" is essentially one about the semantic and formal equivalence of certain sentences that underlie utterances within a speech community. Similarly, such semantic equivalence at the level of phrases and sentences has become the stock-in-trade of the transformational grammarian, who postulates a common "underlying" structure for semantically equivalent "surface" syntactic arrangements.

But it is interesting that metasemantic speech events are a natural occurrence in everyday speech, a culturally learned speech function. In our society, parents are constantly glossing words for children by using grammatically complex but semantically equivalent expressions, expressions that make the same contribution to reference of utterances as the glossed items.

The metasemantic property of language, the property that makes semantic analysis (and hence semantically based grammar) possible, is the one that is unique to language, and upon which rests the speech function of pure reference. It is what makes language unique among all the cultural codes for social communication. Anthropologists have long analyzed ritual, myth, or other media of social behavior as making symbolic statements about categories of social structure. But of what medium other than referential speech can we say that the behavioral signs can describe the meanings of the signs themselves? There are no naturally occurring "metamythic" events in the same way that there are metalinguistic ones, nor "metaritualistic" events with the same functional possibilities. It is in other functional properties of language,

which can be exploited in speech events, that the commonalty of language and many other cultural media lies.

Simultaneous Nonreferential Functions

Speech events that do not have referential functions accomplish socially constituted ends comparable to those of nonspeech events. For example, it is frequently through speech that we set social boundaries on an interaction, rather than through the physical separation of participants. To characterize such behavior abstractly, we note that we can choose the language in which we speak so as to preclude comprehension on the part of some individuals present; we can use a language all understand, but with pronominal markers that make the intended boundaries of participation clear; we can use phraseology only some can understand; we can spell out the written representations of words in the presence of those illiterate in some written language; and so forth. This purposive privacy function of the speech behavior is simultaneous with, but analytically distinct from, whatever referential function there is in the event for speaker and intended hearer(s), for only they participate in those roles in the referential communication.

One of the most interesting aspects of speech behavior, in fact, is this multifunctionality of what appear to be utterances in sequence, the traditionally recognized referential nature of some parts of utterances seeming to have intercalated many other functional elements simultaneously. From the point of view of the traditional semantico-referential linguistics, these other functional modes of language use seem to be "riding on" descriptive propositions. But this is a rather limited point of view. For it takes considerable analysis of the use of such speech itself to characterize what is going on in such cases as those given above. The only behavioral data are the speech signals themselves. To say, for example, that the speaker is using a different "language," just in the semantico-referential sense, presupposes a grammatical description of each of the distinct referential media, and hence presupposes the isolation of the referential function of speech in two distinct systems of semantic signals. So the functional analysis of a given use of speech behavior requires that we can contrast signs, all other things remaining the same. From the point of view of functional analysis, then, we must make sophisticated hypotheses of *isofunctionality*, or

comparability of function of the signaling media, before any structural description is justifiable.

Reference and "Performative" Speech

Just like reference, however, other uses of speech get some socially constituted "work" done; they accomplish or "perform" something, whether achieving privacy, as in the example above, or marking the social status of the participants, or making a command for someone to do something, or effecting a permanent change in social status, for example, marrying two people or knighting someone.

Much recent analysis has been focused on this performative aspect of language use, in what I have here termed purposive or functional speech events. Following upon the work of Austin, some have distinguished between "performative" aspects of speech and the "semantic" content (the term not rigorously circumscribed as it is here). Others, particularly the philosopher Searle (1969), have distinguished "speech acts" represented by utterances as distinct from their propositional content. (It is somewhat unfortunate, by the way, that "speech act" has been used as a term for the level of purposive functional speech events, since I will be using it in another sense below.)

All these approaches, in other words, start with a basically semantico-referential linguistic analysis from which the linguistic categories, the grammatical arrangements, etc., emerge in the traditional way. They tack onto this analysis a description of how these semantico-referential categories can be "used" performatively. This approach entirely misses the point that referential speech events are, a fortiori, speech events, endowed with the same kind of purposefulness as other speech events. Reference is one kind of linguistic performance among many. The linguistic categories that emerge from analysis of speech in the semantico-referential modes are not necessarily the same as those that emerge from other functional modes, and it is presumptuous to speak of arrangements of a basically propositional nature being "used" in other ways.

The physical signals of distinct functional modes of speech may be partially alike, since they seem to be superimposed in the same formal utterances, but the meanings, in this larger sense of functional cultural meanings, are different, and hence we have distinct signs. The priority of reference in establishing linguistic categories and structure rests

squarely on the manipulability of this mode by the metalinguistic property. But reference itself is just one, perhaps actually a minor one, among the "performative" or "speech act" functions of speech. We do not use basically "descriptive" linguistic structure to accomplish other communicative goals; description happens to be one of those goals, one that overlaps in formal structure of signals with other functional ends.

Abbreviatory Extensions

In certain cases, of course, the extension of descriptive referential language to other performative uses is patent. One such class of events is conversational abbreviations used as requests. A statement to another person in a room with an open window such as "I'm cold" or "It's cold in here" could lead to a discussion until the interlocutor is asked to close the window and does so. Or, more naturally for sophisticated persons in our society, we can abbreviate, the statement itself leading to the accomplishment of the action.

Several subtypes of statements require such experience and deduction based on full forms of linguistic sequences. But such seemingly descriptive utterances used as abbreviatory request events are very circumscribed and constitute a level of delicacy of manipulatory signaling highly susceptible to failure. In general, the point holds that descriptive reference is one among the speech functions, not the basis for all others.

Pragmatic Meanings of Linguistic Signs

The linguistic signs that underlie utterances, then, appear in speech that serves many socially constituted functions. The *meanings* of such signs, as they emerge from grammatical analysis, are traditionally described in terms of their contribution to referring propositional speech, of necessity a partial description. The problem set for us when we consider the actual broader uses of language is to describe the total meaning of constituent linguistic signs, only part of which is semantic in our narrowed terminology. We must begin with the facts of purposive utterances in speech events, and isolate their several functions. The linguistic signs have distinct kinds of meanings which depend on their contribution to the several kinds of functional speech events we can isolate.

We can see in this way that while some linguistic signs have semantic

meanings, contributing to reference, others have nonsemantic meanings, contributing to other distinct speech functions. In general, we can call the study of the meanings of linguistic signs relative to their communicative functions *pragmatics*, and these more broadly conceived meanings are then *pragmatic meanings*. Semantic meaning is, of course, in one sense a special form of pragmatic meaning, the mode of signification of signs that contributes to pure referential function. This fits exactly with the discovery that grammatical analysis of the traditional sort is equivalent to discovering the class of all possible metalinguistic or glossing referential speech events.

Pragmatic Categories

General pragmatic meaning of signs and more particular semantic meaning are largely superimposed in the formal signals of speech. In fact, there is a class of signs called *referential indexes*, to be characterized below, in which the two modes are linked in the same categories, segmentable and isolable simultaneously in at least two functional modes, one referential, one not. By examining only those categories that unite at least two functional modes in the same isolable speech fraction, for example an English deictic *this* or *that*, we might get the mistaken idea that the superimposition is always of discrete referential categories intercalated with otherwise functional ones. If speech consisted only of pure referential categories (which traditional linguistic theory postulates) and referential indexes, then all isolable segments would have semantic meanings, and some residual segments would have an additional pragmatic mode. This is false, as we shall see, since utterances include nonreferential and hence nonsemantic formal features.

It is thus possible to have entirely distinct analyses of the same overt speech material from different functional points of view. The linguistic signs that have various pragmatic meanings are only apparently represented at the "surface" of speech in continuous utterances. We may recall Victor Hugo's couplet, "Gal, amant de la Reine, alla (tour magnanime!) /Gallamment de l'arène à la Tour Magne à Nîmes." Analysis in general leads to this kind of superimposed structural heterogeneity, depending on the functional mode of the pragmatic meanings of utterances. Once we realize that distinct pragmatic meanings yield distinct analyses of utterances, we can sever our dependence on reference as the

controlling functional mode of speech, dictating our traditional segmentations and recognition of categories. We can then concentrate on the manifold social pragmatics that are common to language and every other form of socially constituted communication in society.

THE NATURE OF LINGUISTIC SIGNS

Having discussed the framework of function in terms of which all meaning is constituted, I shall turn now to an examination of the nature of the modes of signification of linguistic signs in utterances. By means of the analysis of propositional content in the referential mode, we will be able to see the limitations in principle of pure semantic grammatical approaches, and use the critical overlapping of functions in referring indexes to motivate a separation of three principal classes of sign modes. In particular, we can elaborate on the class of indexes, which appear to give the key to the pragmatic description of language.

Utterance and Sentence, Message and Code

For purposes of semantico-referential description, all *utterances*, or *messages*, in speech events are analyzed as instances of *sentences*. Such sentences are constructed from a finite repertoire of elements according to rules of arrangement, and express referential propositions. These constituents and the rules together constitute a *code* or *grammar* for the language. We separate here, then, the several individual instances or *tokens* occurring in actual speech from the semantico-grammatical *types* or elements of sentences in a language, which these instances are said to represent in speech.

In a given speech event, an utterance or message occurs in context. The traditional grammatical analysis of such utterances, however, depends upon the hypotheses of sameness and difference of segments of underlying sentences in the code, other tokens of which are manipulable in glossing speech events by the metalinguistic property of the medium. In other words, semantico-grammatical analysis can function only if sign tokens preserve their reference in all the speech events in which they occur, including the crucial glossing event or its equivalent. We explain this sameness of reference by postulating the underlying sign type, with a semantico-referential meaning. We must always be able to distinguish

sentence-bound, context-independent types from utterance-bound, contextualized tokens in this pure semantico-referential analysis of language. Where this property of speech signals is not found, the traditional form of grammatical analysis breaks down.

Propositional Analysis

Using the traditional grammatical approach, we can analyze any sentence the signs of which are purely referential, that is, where tokens in metalinguistic usage can be said to represent precisely the same underlying type. We can analyze as distinct sentence elements a great number of the nouns of a language, such as English *table, chair, man* (in several "senses"); a great number of verbs, such as *stand, run, eat;* and a number of apparent grammatical categories, such as 'number' and 'aspect', which I discussed above. So predications of timeless truths coded by sentences with such elements are readily analyzable as such, e.g., *Unicorns drink ambrosia.* (The verb here is "tenseless"; that is, does not refer to the present but to all time.)

This example has a plural noun-phrase subject and a transitive predicate with verb and mass object noun, and it codes the universal proposition that all unicorns drink ambrosia. We might represent this proposition, in a kind of rough-and-ready way, without logical quantification, as 'drink(unicorns, ambrosia)', showing that 'drink' is a "transitive" predicate of two places that makes a claim about an "agent" (represented by the subject in grammatical construction) and a "patient" (represented by the object). For each of the sign types that make up the constituents of the sentence, we can gloss another token of the form with a paraphrase—*A unicorn is . . . , Ambrosia is . . . , To drink is to . . .*—under hypotheses about the grammatical categories they represent. (It would require a treatise in grammatical analysis to give the heuristics of discovery. Language in the semantico-referential mode being a loose system, much of the analysis must be completed to justify a particular hypothesis.) For the residual grammatical categories, such as [mass] : [count] nouns, and subject-of-verb-representing-agent, object-of-verb-representing-patient, we can show the proportionality of meanings under transformational manipulation, as our (post-)Saussurean principles demand.

Referential Indexes in Propositional Speech

However, the situation becomes more complex for propositional analysis of sentences that include referential indexes, such as signs for 'tense'. I specified above that the verb *drink* in the example was "tenseless." But consider on the other hand an utterance such as that represented by the common example *The boy hit the ball.* By a similar sort of grammatical analysis, we can say that a sentence of English is represented here with agent and patient and transitive verb. The noun phrases *the boy* and *the ball* are both "definite" (a term the analysis of which I do not wish to take up here). But when such an utterance is made with "past tense" verb token, how are we to give the meaning (and hence analyze) the underlying categorial types?

Clearly, the form *hit* is to be segmented as $hit]_V$ + Past (: $hit]_V$ + Present : : $walk]_V$ + Past : $walk]_V$ + Present). Under such an analysis, we can gloss the stem *hit* and give its "senses" as grammatically complex paraphrases. But what of the morphological segment Past that we wish to attribute to the sentence underlying the utterance? While it is perfectly feasible to segment such a category as a residual of the grammatical analysis, as we can see in the proportion just above, to give a semantico-referential meaning in terms of glossing is impossible; and yet there is clearly a contribution to reference not explicable by grammatical arrangement. The category of past tense, in other words, is not represented in utterances by pure referential sign tokens, and hence a strict semantico-referential analysis is powerless to describe this obvious category of language. (That this fact has not hindered the description of languages merely attests the truth that the natives' theories do not always tell us what the natives are really doing, nor do they prevent obvious solutions that are strictly out of theoretical bounds.)

Indexical Presupposition of Reference

In order to describe the meaning of this kind of category, we have to make certain observations about the class of tokens of "tense" in utterances. These contribute to propositions by describing the time of an event; that is, the whole proposition makes some claim to be verifiable for a particular time. In this sense such sign tokens are referential. But

more specifically, the past tense tokens refer to a time t_r that is assertedly prior to the time t_{sp} at which the utterance containing them is spoken. In other words, temporal categories, and past tense in particular, compare the time for which the proposition of a referential speech event is asserting something with the time of the referential speech event itself. So the referential meaning of any categorial type 'tense' to which we want to assign the several tokens depends upon a comparison of the time referred to with the time of utterance in each speech event incorporating the token.

The proper utterance or interpretation of each token of the past tense category, then, presupposes the knowledge of the time at which the speech event takes place. A tense category takes the time of the speech event as the fixed point of comparison in referring to another time, t_r. It assumes cognitive "existence" of t_{sp}, just as t_{sp} demands cognitive "existence" only when such a tense category, or its equivalent occurs.

Double-Mode Linguistic Categories

This kind of referential index has also been called a *shifter*, because the reference "shifts" regularly, depending on the factors of the speech situation. It is very interesting that these presupposing, referential indexes, or shifters, are what Jakobson (1957) calls "duplex signs," operating at the levels of code and message simultaneously. The segmentation of sentences in the semantico-referential mode leads to the recognition of this semantic residue, unanalyzable by the methods depending on the metalinguistic property, but constituting a distinct kind of superimposed linguistic type that fits tongue-in-groove with pure semantic categories. Such categories as tense unite in a single segmentable sign vehicle a referential or quasi-semantic meaning and an indexical or pragmatic one. The referential value of a shifter, moreover, depends on the presupposition of its pragmatic value.

All languages incorporate these duplex signs, referential indexes. They are pervasive categories, which anchor, as it were, the semantico-referential mode of signs, those which represent pure propositional capabilities of language, in the actual speech event of reference, by making the propositional reference dependent on the suitable indexing of the speech situation. Not only is tense such a duplex category, but also *status*, which, following Whorf, indicates the truth value for the

speaker in a referential event of the proposition encoded by the semantico-grammatical elements; *deixis*, which indicates the spatio-temporal relations of some presupposed referent in the speech event to speaker, hearer, or other referent; and so forth. A very large part of the Whorfian oeuvre (1956), in fact, can now be seen as a first attempt to draw out the Boasian implications of how pure referential (semantic) categories and duplex (referential-indexical) ones combine differently from language to language to accomplish ultimately isofunctional referential speech events. What one language accomplishes in utterances with a single referential index (for example, tense), another accomplishes with a combination of semantic category plus referential index (for example, aspect + status). Whorf himself lacked the theoretical terminology with which to make this clear, and his writings have had the sad fate of being misrepresented in the "popular" anthropological literature for a generation, under the guise of some vague "relativity" taken literally, rather than as the metaphorical idiom of the then-beginning atomic age.

Rules of Use

A consideration of such duplex signs brings up the question of how the indexical mode of such segmentable elements of utterances is to be described, that is, to be given a systematic account in terms of sign types and meanings. We have seen that the particularly indexical aspect of the meaning of such shifters involves a presupposition of the "existence" of, or cognitive focus on, some specific value in the domain of variables of the speech situation. On the one hand, the referential contribution of a shifter depends on the specific value of one or more of the variables being realized; on the other hand, the specific value being realized during some specific utterance permits the category to occur as a shifter of that specific sort.

We can summarize these converse properties of implication between contextual variable and indexical token by a general function we can call a *rule of use* or *rule of indexicality*. We can say that a rule of use is a general constraint on the class of actual shifter tokens occurring in the class of actual speech contexts. In this sense, the specifically indexical aspect of a shifter token can be said to represent some indexical type, that is, some underlying general sign that stands in the same relation to its tokens—permitting us to analyze them as "the same"—as the usual

sort of general semantico-referential sign. It is clear that the senses in which we have sign types in these two modes are quite different, a fact not always easy to grasp, for the one depends on rules of use for definition of the type, the other on the metalinguistic operations of glossing speech events or the equivalent.

Formal Description of Indexicality

A rule of use is a general function that describes the relationship between speech context, given as a set of variables, some of which must have specific values, and some portion of the utterance, some message fraction. Recalling the minimal description of the speech event given at the outset, we can say that speaker x speaks to hearer y about referent z, using message fraction θ_n (message itself θ), analyzable in terms of semantico-referential grammar G, at time t, in spatial configuration $l_x,l_y,(l_z)$—the referent need not be present independent of its creation by the speech event itself—plus other factors. Some of the variables will be present in a description as such, while for others we will have to specify particular values in order to characterize the appropriate use of the shifter.

Thus, for English past 'tense', where we refer in the speech event to a time before the time of the utterance, we can describe the indexical aspect of this shifter by the schema:

$$sp(x,y,t_r<t_{sp},\{\text{-}ed\},G_E,t_{sp},l,\ldots)\rightarrow \text{Past tense}$$

where t_r is the specific value of the referent z, and t_{sp} is the specific value of the time of utterance. For assertive 'status', where the speaker asserts the truth of the proposition being uttered, in English we use a heavily stressed inflected verb, such as auxiliary or modal, in the general case. We can describe this by:

$$sp(x,y,T(f(z_1,\ldots,z_n)),[A\acute{u}\check{x}],G_E,t,l,\ldots)\rightarrow \text{Assertive}$$

where the proposition $f(z_1,\ldots,z_n)$ may take several arguments and T(f) is the truth-value indicator.

Such rules of use for shifters are necessary to describe their indexical mode of meaning, much as rules of a grammar G are necessary to describe their semantico-referential meaning. In these cases, where two modes are united in the same category, we have a fortunate illustrative case. But in both modes of a shifter, the description can proceed only by defining sign types for occurring tokens. In the referential mode, this is accomplished through traditional referentially based linguistic analysis, which leaves shifters as residuals. In the indexical mode, it is accomplished through the constitution of general rules of use.

Peirce's Trichotomy of Signs

These two modes of signification combined in the classical shifter illustrate 2 of the 3 elementary sign types given by one semiotic analysis of C. S. Peirce (1932). Altogether, he presented three trichotomies of signs, each one classified on a distinct basis. The first was based on the nature of the sign vehicle, the second on the nature of the entity signaled, and the third, the most important, on the nature of the relationship between entity signaled and signaling entity, that is, on the nature of the meaning that is communicated. (Of the 27 logically possible sign types, only 10 occur, though I will not develop this Peircean deduction here.)

The three sign types, each characterized by its own type of meaning for the users, are icon, index, and symbol. *Icons* are those signs where the perceivable properties of the sign vehicle itself have isomorphism to (up to identity with) those of the entity signaled. That is, the entities are "likenesses" in some sense. *Indexes* are those signs where the occurrence of a sign vehicle token bears a connection of understood spatio-temporal contiguity to the occurrence of the entity signaled. That is, the presence of some entity is perceived to be signaled in the context of communication incorporating the sign vehicle. *Symbols* are the residual class of signs, where neither physical similarity nor contextual contiguity hold between sign vehicle and entity signaled. They form the class of "arbitrary" signs traditionally spoken of as the fundamental kind of linguistic entity. Sign vehicle and entity signaled are related through the bond of a semantico-referential meaning in the sense elaborated earlier.

Every linguistic sign token is an icon of the linguistic sign type, and in this sense every linguistic sign trivially incorporates an iconic mode. Further, every symbol token is an index of the symbol type, since its use in context depends upon cognitive "existence" of that part of the semantico-referential grammar which explains its referential value. In

this sense, as Peirce noted, there is exemplified the progressive relationship of inclusion of the three sign modes.

Icons

I do not deal here extensively with iconism in language, since, interesting though the subject be, it is largely peripheral to our concern with the cultural contextualization of language. At the formal level of single units, however, all languages are seen to contain *onomatopoeias*, which duplicate the thing signaled in the physical medium of sound. Thus, *bzzz*, to a speaker of English, is an onomatopoeia that means 'noise that sounds like the sign vehicle', used particularly to describe bees' flight, high-speed saws cutting through wood, and so forth. It is usually assimilated as a lexical item to the phonemic pattern of the language. Since monosyllables in English require a vowel, it is written out as *buzz*, pronounced [bʌ́z(:)] or [bəz:]. This assimilation is frequently found for onomatopoeias, giving a remarkable variety to those in different languages said to represent the same noise. But this should not obscure the fact that, to the users, the iconic mode of meaning is the one that gives the sign significance in speech.

There are many kinds of icons in languages, ranging from *replicas* and *images*, where the physical properties of signal and thing signaled are indistinguishable or totally alike, through *diagrams*, where the perceived parts are structurally isomorphic. Many diagrams are speech-internal. Universal laws of sequencing of morphemes, for example, are frequently direct or inverse diagrams of syntactic units, and so forth.

Symbols

In the symbolic mode of sign mechanism, language is most "language-like" in the traditional sense. From the negative characterization of no necessary physical or contextual connection between sign vehicle token and entity signaled, the symbolic mode of communication depends entirely on an abstract connection, motivated through semantico-grammatical sign types and their rules of combination. This kind of pure reference forms the closed system of classical discussions of language semantics. The referential value of sign tokens in any given event depends only upon the general propositional contributions of the sign

types in certain arrangements that underlie the tokens. This propositional value of the signs in terms of equivalence relations can be analyzed by metasemantic manipulation. Such symbols, then, are what we described in the section above on propositional analysis.

Symbols vs. Shifters

It is to be observed that the symbolic mode of signs is one mechanism for achieving reference in actual referential speech events. The implementation of the symbols by tokens depends on—presupposes—the knowledge of the grammar G in a pure referential event. In contrast, the shifters, referential indexes, are a mechanism in which there is no abstract system of propositional equivalence relations, but only the rules of use which specify the relationship of actual referent of the sign token to the other variables of the context, among them the sign vehicle. The referential value of a shifter is constituted by the speech event itself; shifters may presuppose any variables of the speech event, including the semantically based grammar G (for example, anaphoric "switch reference"). So we must distinguish between semantically constituted symbols, the abstract propositional values of which are implemented in actual referential events, and the shifters, or referential indexes, the propositional values of which are linked to the unfolding of the speech event itself. These are two distinct types that merge in the apparent structure of utterances but are analytically separable.

Indexes

We have seen indexical reference exemplified in shifters. But it remains to observe that *indexicality*, the property of sign vehicle signaling contextual "existence" of an entity, is itself a sign mode independent of the other two. In the duplex categories illustrated above, the referential value depended upon the indexical value. Of course, then, it is possible to conceive of indexical signs of language which do not overlap with referential categories, that is, do not contribute to achieving reference. Such *nonreferential indexes*, or "pure" indexes, are features of speech which, independent of any referential speech events that may be occurring, signal some particular value of one or more contextual variables.

From the point of view of pragmatic analysis, we have to recognize such nonreferential indexical contributions of speech behavior, regardless of the dominant speech event occurring. These various indexical elements of language go into constituting distinct speech events. They are functionally discrete, but behaviorally they potentially overlap with referential speech in multifunctional utterances, as we noted above. Pure indexical features of utterances are describable with rules of use, just as are referential indexes. But the rules of use do not specify a referent independent of those created by other elements of the utterance, for these indexes are not referential. The "meaning" of these indexes is purely pragmatic and does not intersect with semantico-referential meaning exemplified in symbols.

Nonreferential Indexes

Such indexes as do not contribute to the referential speech event signal the structure of the speech context. Some of the most interesting of these indexes, certainly for the social anthropologist, are those that index features of the personae of the speech event. For example, *sex indexes* for some languages are formally systematic categories or other obvious features. In the Muskogean languages of the southeastern United States, such as Koasati (Haas 1944), there was a suffix *-s* (or its etymological equivalent) that appeared (with characteristic phonological alternations in shapes) on the inflected verb forms of every nonquotative utterance spoken by a socially female individual. In direct quotation, as we might expect, the sex of the original speaker is indexically preserved. It is important to see that the referential value of the utterance, and of the verb especially, is exactly the same, whether or not the form has the suffix. The suffix makes no referential contribution, but rather its presence or absence provides the categorial information about the sociological sex of the speaker. Not only "first person" forms of verbs, in utterances referring to speaker, but verb forms of all "persons" take this suffix, and the referential content of the speech in both suffix-bearing and suffixless forms is unaffected.

A more complex case is reported by Sapir (1929) for Yana, a language of California, in which there is one form of all major words in utterances spoken by sociological male to sociological male, and another form for all other combinations. The two forms are typically related by

the operation of phonological changes in the one form and not in the other. And these pairs of related forms can function referentially in exactly the same way; the only difference in utterances containing them is in the pragmatic suitability for certain classes of speaker and hearer. These essentially morphological and phonological mechanisms of sex indexing must be functionally abstracted from utterances and described by rules of use, for example, Koasati sp(♀ (x),y,z,V]+*s*,G$_K$,t,l, . . .); I will take up the characterization of the Yana case further below, in discussing rule mechanisms.

Exactly the same sort of nonreferential indexical mode is found in *deference indexes*, where speech signals inequalities of status, rank, age, sex, and the like. For example, we may take those of Jaγanese, reported by Geertz (1960) and more lucidly by Uhlenbeck (1970) and Horne (1967; 1973), where one of the modes of contrast is between a vocabulary set and certain grammatical restrictions (the variety called krɔmɔ) used basically by lower-to-higher or high-to-high on these scales, while other, "unmarked" vocabulary items and all constructions (ŋɔkɔ) are used in the opposite cases. It is interesting that most vocabulary items and virtually all constructions do not have these alternate forms, yet the power of the alternation was apparently very great in traditional Javanese society. Here again, the propositional content of the utterances with corresponding krɔmɔ/ŋɔkɔ vocabulary is just the same, while the deference they index between speaker and hearer differs. The rules of use based on the parameters for deference are always of the form sp(H(x),L(y), . . .), sp(L(x),H(y), . . .) and so on.

These deference indexes frequently and especially intersect with the referential indexes called "first and second person pronouns" in the standard literature, giving, as for example in Thai and Burmese (Cooke 1970), upwards of a score of sets of segmentable "pronouns" for use as referential personal index plus pure deference index combined into one apparent surface category. In many languages (see Brown and Gilman 1960), functionally analogous marking of social deference in pronominal indexes is accomplished by skewing otherwise referential categories of 'person' and 'number'. These special effects, *pragmatic metaphors* (to be dealt with below), are to be distinguished from a distinct indexical expression of social deference with unique formal signals.

A distinct nonreferential bifurcation of lexical items into complementary indexical sets was widespread in Australian Aboriginal speech

communities. As described by Dixon (1971; 1972) for Dyirbal, a language of the Cairns Rain Forest in Northern Queensland, there is an "everyday" set of lexical items, and a "mother-in-law" set, which had to be used by a speaker only in the presence of his classificatory mother-in-law or equivalent affine. In other words, the mother-in-law vocabulary, totally distinct from the everyday one, indexes the specified affinal relation between speaker (x) and some "audience"—not the socially defined addressee (y)—in the speech situation. As such, the switch in vocabulary serves as an *affinal taboo index* in the speech situation, maintaining and creating sociological distance.

It is interesting that the grammatical structure in the traditional sense remains exactly the same in these two kinds of situations. What changes is the entire set of nongrammatical lexical items. Moreover, since the ratio of everyday to mother-in-law vocabulary is approximately 4:1, the strictly semantic content of propositions coded in everyday vocabulary will require more elaborate grammatical constructions and many more lexical items to code in mother-in-law vocabulary. Semantic content was apparently severely reduced in actual communication. Further, the glossing possibilities back and forth, under the same grammar, can be exploited, as was done by Dixon, to justify semantic description. But the principle of this being a pure indexical device, independent of the semantico-referential content, makes the general form of the rule of use $sp([\imath x][Af(x,y')],y,z,\{L_2\},\ldots)$, where $Af(x,y')$ expresses the relationship between speaker and "audience" and $L_2(:L_1)$ represents the disjunct set of lexical items.

So there is a distinction between referential indexes, such as tense, and nonreferential ones, such as the disjunct sets of forms to code sociological relations of personae in the speech situation. Some phenomena, however, appear to be interesting borderline cases between shifters and pure indexes. In Javanese, where the basic distinction of vocabulary into krɔmɔ and ŋɔkɔ sets is a pure deference index, there is another, less pervasive distinction between a set of lexical forms (krɔmɔ iŋgyel) showing deference of speaker to some exalted human referent. This set of forms, coded in stems having to do with parts of the body, personal activities, and so forth, occurs in both krɔmɔ and ŋɔkɔ styles. It constitutes an independent axis of lexical choice, but one which intersects with the speaker-hearer deference when the hearer is also the

focused referent (that is, $sp(x,y,y,\ldots)$). Since the lexical alternants have the same basic propositional value in krɔmɔ iŋgyel or plain styles, under strict semantic analysis we should want to describe this speaker-referent deference switch as a pure indexical one. But especially in the case of speaking about the addressee, where the reference is perforce of an indexical sort, the two systems krɔmɔ : ŋɔkɔ, krɔmɔ iŋgyel : [plain] seem to merge. The actual facts of any given instance probably rest ultimately on the distinction between indexically presupposed and indexically created referent, another axis of classification.

Indexical Presupposition

In all cases of indexes, we have constructed indexical sign types by rules of use. These rules of use state the relationship of mutually implied existence of sign vehicle token and certain aspects of the context of discourse. For all of the shifters we examined in the section on referential indexes, we could furthermore say that the aspect of the speech situation was *presupposed* by the sign token. That is, a given shifter token is uninterpretable referentially without the knowledge of some aspect of the situation.

A particularly clear case of such presupposition is the operation of deictics, in English, for example, *this* and *that* in the singular. When we use a token of the full noun phrase *this table* or *that table* (with stressed full vowel in both words), pointing out thereby some particular object, the referent of the token of *table* must be identifiable, must "exist" cognitively, for the deictic itself to be interpretable. The proper use of the token of the deictic presupposes the physical existence of an actual object which can properly be referred to by *table*, or it presupposes a prior segment of referential discourse which has specified such a referent. Otherwise the use of the deictic token is inappropriate; it is uninterpretable and confusing. (There is a related noun phrase incorporating reduced-vowel "deictic" form, with reduced stress and distinct intonation pattern, used for nondeictic definite reference, no presupposition of referent being involved, and no prior discourse necessary.) If we use the wrong deictic for the referent, or use the deictic with the wrong lexical noun (one that does not properly describe an object in correct position for the deictic), again confusion results, or correction

by the interlocutor: "Oh, you mean that other table!" or "This is not a table, it's a chair!"

The use of the deictic, then, is maximally presupposing, in that the contextual conditions are required in some appropriate configuration for proper indexical reference with a deictic token. The general pattern of all the shifters is similar. Some aspect of the context spelled out in the rule of use is fixed and presupposed, in order for the referential contribution to be made. And in this sense, reference itself is once more seen to be an act of creation, of changing the contextual basis for further speech events. Recall that one of the ways in which the presupposition of the deictic can be satisfied is to have referred to the entity in question.

Indexical Creativity

But there is a general *creative* or *performative* aspect to the use of pure indexical tokens of certain kinds, which can be said not so much to change the context, as to make explicit and overt the parameters of structure of the ongoing events. By the very use of an indexical token, which derives its indexical value from the rules of use setting up the indexical types, we have brought into sharp cognitive relief part of the context of speech. In some cases, the occurrence of the speech signal is the only overt sign of the contextual parameter, verifiable, perhaps, by other, cooccurring behaviors in other media, but nevertheless the most salient index of the specific value. Under these circumstances, the indexical token in speech performs its greatest apparent work, seeming to be the very medium through which the relevant aspect of the context is made to "exist." Certainly, the English indexical pronouns *I/we* and *you* (vs. *he/she/it/they*) perform this creative function in bounding off the personae of the speech event itself; in those languages, such as Chinook (Columbia River, North America) with 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' pronominal indexes, the boundary function becomes even more finely drawn. Social indexes such as deference vocabularies and constructions, mentioned above, are examples of maximally creative or performative devices, which, by their very use, make the social parameters of speaker and hearer explicit. Adherence to the norms specified by rules of use reinforces the perceived social relations of speaker and

hearer; violations constitute a powerful rebuff or insult, or go into the creation of irony and humor.

Classification of Index Types/Tokens

Indexical tokens range on a sliding scale of creativity or performative value from the extreme of presupposition displayed by deictics to the extreme of creativity displayed by subtle social indexes. The particular placement of any given indexical token depends to a great extent on the factors of the individual context of its use: how many events are simultaneously occurring; how many independent media are signaling the factors of the context; what prior events have taken place; how many cooccurrent indexes of a given functional sort are occurring in speech. As we have seen, the different kinds of indexical types have inherent ranges on the functional scale of presupposition. Underlying all these specific usages, however, are the rules of use, *norms* as it were, for the relationship of mutual existence between contextual variables and speech signals.

The referential vs. nonreferential nature of indexes, a measure of the independence of indexes from the semantico-referential mode of communication, is one axis of classification, of indexical types. The presuppositional vs. creative nature of indexes, a measure of the independence of indexes from every other signaling medium and mode in speech events, is another axis of classification, of indexical tokens. Because the two classifications interact, borderline cases exist. The speaker-referent deference vocabulary of Javanese, for example, seems to be used referentially or nonreferentially in a way that depends upon the presuppositional or performative nature of the given token in context. This discourse reference, the actual unfolding referential speech event, is once more seen to be distinct from abstract (semantic) propositional reference, implemented in discourse. The former type, characteristic of referential indexes and described with rules of use, responds to such indexical properties as presupposition/performance, while the latter, based on semantico-grammatical analysis, does not.

A kind of four-cell array is thus generated by these *functional characteristics* of indexes, in which we can place the examples discussed, and provide for further examples:



Referential, presupposing indexes contribute to propositional description in discourse, but only by taking as a starting point the value of some contextual variable, as for the computation of time reference in tense categories. Nonreferential presupposing indexes reflect in speech the existence of some specific values of contextual variables, such as the presence of affine audience in mother-in-law lexical items. Referential, relatively performative indexes contribute to propositional description in discourse, and in addition function as the signal for the existence of speech-event features, as in the choice of pronominals, which assign the event roles of speaker, hearer, audience, and referent to certain individuals in the maximal case. Finally, nonreferential, relatively performative indexes serve as independent speech signals establishing the parameters of the interaction themselves, as in deference forms, which in effect establish overtly the social relations of the individuals in the roles of speaker and hearer, speaker and audience, or speaker and referent.

Functional Aggregation in Indexical Forms

The Thai example cited above in which social deference indexes are united with pronominal referential indexes points up the fact that even indexical categories can be pragmatically multifunctional. On the one hand, the pronominals have discourse-referential values that contribute

to description, and on the other hand, they have nonreferential values that structure the factors of the speech situation. The first indexical aspect contributes to the propositional mode of speech, while the second constitutes part of the social mode of marking equality or inequality. By analysis of the surface categories of speech, we might segment the pronominals as semantico-grammatical residuals, and then attempt to specify the pragmatic meaning of the forms. But inasmuch as two modes are united here in one surface category, it would take considerably more analysis to see that two distinct rules of use are involved, based on two distinct functions of the forms. At a functional level, then, there are *two* indexes which happen to be represented by the same surface indexical category, one a shifter, one not. This functional and hence analytic distinctness of the two modes must always be the starting point for the isolation of the pragmatic categories in language, and must rest ultimately on a sensitive analysis of the speech-event function of utterances, a task which is essentially social anthropological.

Referential Analogy in Discourse

The situation is even more interesting in the case of pragmatic metaphors connected with pronominal shifters referring to the hearer (sp(x,y,y, . . .)), a phenomenon found in many languages. Instead of distinct forms indexing the quality of speaker-hearer social relations, the "second person" pronouns incorporate skewing of otherwise semantic categories (see Benveniste 1950; 1956). To analyze these data, we have to distinguish two kinds of extension or analogy of referential categories in discourse.

The so-called pronouns frequently seem to incorporate categories of 'person' and 'number', so that we tend to speak of "first and second person singular and plural" for pronominal forms. "Third person" pronouns can be true substitutes, *anaphoric devices* that obviate the need for repetition of a full, lexically complex referring noun phrase (thus, *The man sat down. He . . .*). In the referential mode, they act as *negative indexes* in never indexing speaker or hearer participants in speech events. But "first and second person" forms are referential indexes, the contribution to discourse reference of which comes about by functionally distinct rules of use; such forms have no anaphoric properties.

When we use a "third person" pronoun, the singular or plural number is derived by the rules of anaphora from the semantic 'number' specification of the noun phrase it replaces. In this pure semantic mode, plural 'number' signals more-than-one of whatever entity is referred to by the lexical stems of the noun in question. But some occurrences of plural number category derive secondarily only at the level of discourse reference by a kind of summing up of individual semantically established entities (thus, English, *Jack and Jill went up a hill. They* . . .). It is at this second level of reference that the first and second person pronominal indexes get their apparent "singular" and "plural" forms. For English 'we' ≠ 'I' + 'I'; the form *we* is an index that refers to and presupposes a speaker and at least one other individual in the referential speech event, sp(x,y,x&w,*we*, G_E,t,l, . . .). Similarly, second person plural refers to and indexes hearer and at least one other persona, for example, Russian sp(x,y,y&v,*vy*,G_R,t,l, . . .). Only by the summation of the individual referents in discourse, which are referentially indexed by such pronominals, does their 'singular' or 'plural' referential value emerge.

With this analysis of the distinction between anaphoric and nonanaphoric pronominal indexes ("person"), and of semantically based (cardinal "number") vs. discourse-based (summed "number") reference to quantity, it is possible to see the nature of the skewings in so-called "honorific second person pronouns."

Pragmatic Metaphors of Grammatical Categories

For some languages, Russian for example, or French, we can index the same kind of speaker-hearer deference that is indicated elsewhere by vocabulary switch (see Friedrich 1966; Ervin-Tripp 1971), when addressing a single addressee, by using the "second person plural" (*vy*, *vous*) rather than the "singular" (*ty*, *tu*). In other words, the semantic cardinal number category, in its summed discourse use, either refers to plural addressees or refers to a single addressee, concomitantly indexing the deference of speaker to hearer. In some languages, for example Italian, the deferential second person index uses what is otherwise the "third singular (feminine)" pronominal form for combined referential indexing and social indexing. In other words, third singular feminine

anaphoric, or nonpersonal pronoun, either replaces a third singular feminine semantic noun or refers to and indexes a singular addressee while indexing deference of speaker to hearer. Some languages, such as German and Worora (Northern Kimberley, Western Australia), switch both person (2 → 3) and number (sg. → pl.) to express this deference. In those languages with a 'dual' number category, more highly marked than 'plural', deference is indicated along the axis of number by switch to dual-number addressee index. This occurs, for example, in Yokuts of south central California (Newman 1944) and Nyangumata of northern West Australia (O'Grady 1964). (Curiously, in both these languages, the deference must be accorded to a genealogically specified persona, mother-in-law and equivalent in the first, mother's brother and equivalent in the second.)

What unites all of these seemingly isofunctional usages is the unidirectionality, in every case, of switch from "second person pronoun" to "third," from expected "singular number" to "plural" (or "dual"), or both concomitantly. There is a kind of metaphor based on the discourse-referential value of the categories, it would seem. In the one case, it is shift out of the realm of second person address, where an individual is indexed in the speech situation face-to-face, to the realm of anaphora, where an already established entity is understood as the referent of the substitute. This makes the addressee larger than life by taking away the individual personhood implied by the face-to-face address. In the second case, it is a shift out of the realm of the singular, where an individual is referred to, and into the realm of nonsingular, where, as it were, the summed number of individuals referred to is greater than one. This makes the addressee count for more than one social individual; to his persona accrues the social weight of many, as compared with the speaker. (The "royal 'we'" does the inverse, we should note.)

Such universals in expression, examples of isofunctional indexing with seeming metaphorical plays upon semantic categories, are an important demonstration of the interplay between the semantic mode of language and the pragmatic constitution of social categories through speech. The semantically based analysis of categories, even with "fudges" to permit incorporation of the analytic residue of shifters, does not capture these generalizations. The perspective must be one that frees us from de-

pendence on semantic categories, or even referential ones, as the defining segmentation of speech requiring analysis.

Functional and Formal Analogues

In each of these cases, I have been claiming a kind of functional comparability of the parallel formations. Rules of use are norms between the contextual variables and some formal feature of the message. To be *functionally analogous*, then, indexes must be described by rules of use that specify analogous contexts under analogous speech events. (Obviously, the utterance fractions in different languages can hardly be expected to be alike.) When indexes seem to be accomplishing analogous socially constituted tasks, we can speak of cross-linguistic comparability. So the claim of functional analogy from a heuristic point of view makes hypotheses about the social parameters of speech events. From a theoretical point of view it depends upon the results of social anthropology for a framework of description of social categories, for the structural significance of the pattern of indexical speech norms in the given society. Universals of functional signification thus are the necessary means for creating a real science of language pragmatics—that is, for establishing the ethnography of speech—just as within the semantic mode, universal hypotheses about phonetics and reference are the necessary empirical correlates of semantico-grammatical analysis.

On the other hand, *formally analogous* indexicals depend upon cross-systemic specification of equivalence of message fractions. In the case of the pragmatic metaphors illustrated above, there is formal comparability in the expression of deference through the pronominal categories themselves, which can be isolated in the referential mode in every one of the languages in question. (Note how the formal analysis in one mode depends on isofunctionality in others, as was mentioned above.) The languages all use formally similar categorial substitutions, definable in the semantico-referential mode, to index deferential address. From a formal point of view, then, we seek some way of characterizing as structurally analogous the message fractions serving as indexes. But any such structural specification depends upon analysis of forms, which itself rests on finding some isofunctional basis for comparison. Ultimately, then, cross-linguistic formal analogy and functional analogy are, like phonetic and

referential frameworks in the semantic mode, linked as hypotheses that serve to justify a particular analysis.

Formal Distinctions Signaling Functional Ones

The parallel formal-functional analogy of all the pragmatic metaphors for speaker-hearer deference is an exceptional case. Ordinarily, given some social parameters constituted on nonspeech grounds and indexed in some language, we might want to ask whether or not these are indexed in some other language and, if so, how. The sex indexes of several American Indian languages mentioned above are somewhat diverse functionally, but all formally overlap in apparent phonological changes at the ends of words, in particular of inflected verbs. The Thai pronominal system for first and second persons—independent words that index in complex ways the various inequalities resulting in deference—includes among the grounds of deference distinction of sociological sex. So the several American Indian systems seem to isolate the social variable of sex, indexing it with a unique formal set of changes. (The ethnographic record establishes the great salience of the distinction, at least in the societies speaking Muskogean languages, but its cultural position has not been established.) The Thai (and other Southeast Asian) systems assimilate the social variable of sex to the functional characterization of inequality more generally, making a pointed ethnographic statement on equivalences of stratification. It is always necessary, as this example demonstrates, to take the functional perspective in terms of rules of use to be able to see in what way such pragmatic items fit into systematic sociological patterns, of which linguistic ones are a major part.

Formal Characterization of Indexes

From the formal point of view, the sign vehicles that function in an indexical mode are extremely varied. As we noted when dealing with the privacy function of language, switch of semantico-referential grammar can itself serve as an index. We have seen vocabulary, affixes, phonological rules, and syncretistic pronominal categories serving indexical functions within utterances. Indexical devices such as anaphoric pronouns, mentioned above, which maintain discourse reference in certain surface struc-

tural configurations, are formally defined only over at least two noun phrases, frequently found in distinct semantico-referential sentences. Intonation patterns and stress shifts are further kinds of features that are characteristically indexes, though I have not dealt with them directly by example. And syntactic constructions, such as the distinction between "active" and "passive" forms of utterances, or the English "performative" construction *I* [V] *you* [X], are virtually always pragmatic units, formally isolable on functional grounds. In other words, the range of possible formal elements that can serve as speech indexes, according to our traditional semantico-grammatical understanding, includes the entire range of language-level indexing, discourse-sequence level, sentence level, word and affix level, and phonological alternations that can be characterized by rules, including intonation and other nonsegmental gradient devices.

The description of all these occurring pragmatic formal features of speech presents a vast problem for our traditional ideas of what a grammar (G) is. From the point of view of a semantico-referential grammar, it would appear that every pragmatic index is a kind of "structural idiom," where the constructions cannot be analyzed according to semantico-referential combinatory regularities. This would make by far the greater bulk of a description of speech into a list of such "idioms." The undesirability of such an alternative is manifest, given the kinds of regularities of pragmatic function exemplified above.

So some attempt to patch up traditional grammar cannot serve as a principled description of the pragmatics of language—a fact that most contemporary linguistic theorists have not yet appreciated. For the characterization of pragmatics as dependent on semantico-referential analysis—the "performative" approach discussed above—becomes totally hopeless once we consider that only a portion of the indexicals in speech are shifters, with connection to the semantically based grammar in the speech function of reference. The remainder of the indexes are just functionally independent of reference as such.

The question, then, becomes one of how to represent speech as the apparently continuous formal medium it is, while at the same time preserving the pragmatic distinction among (1) the pure referential function or semantic aspect of meaning, from which semantico-referential systems derive their analyzability, and on which one facet of referential speech acts rests; (2) the shifter function, or indexical-referential

aspect of meaning, constituted by rules of use at the level of discourse reference; and (3) the pure indexical functions, serving other functional modes independent of reference, for which nonreferential rules of use are constituted. In (2) we have a point of overlap between (1) and (3)—hence their duplex nature. But a formal descriptive "pragmatic grammar" must integrate semantics, valid as a specialized mode, into an inclusive system.

PRAGMATICS AND CULTURAL DESCRIPTION

I have analytically separated functional modes of speech behavior, further showing the modes of meaning so constituted in linguistic signs. I want now to characterize briefly the integration of these modes in a systematic pragmatics of language, indicating how this purports to be a more adequate descriptive paradigm for speech and other communicative behavior. This will lead naturally to a consideration of the relationship of such pragmatic description to broader ethnographic or "cultural" description.

Functional Alternatives in Rules of Use

Rules of use for both shifters and other, nonreferential indexes show the existential relationship of contextual variables to some overt utterance fraction. The rules of use for shifters specify the referent (z) as well, consonant with the fact that such categories contribute to referential speech events. It would seem that formally, the third variable (corresponding to z) in nonreferential rules of use should be the functionally determined kind of entity which is being indexed, for example some sociological domain, such as kinship, sex, rank; some spatial configuration, such as the "proxemic" configuration of persons in the speech event; and so forth. In other words, not only referential speech events, but all other types as well have rules of use that specify the functional domain over which the particular pragmatic mode of meaning is being realized. So not only do we specify rules of use for $sp(x,y,z^r, \dots)$ where z^r is "referent," but also $sp(x,y,z^f, \dots)$ where z^f is a variable of functions more generally, defined by the range of speech events.

Under such a generalization, the "rules of use" we specify for shifters, the "duplex" categories, must be further analyzed into what are indeed

two elementary functional modes. One such functional mode is referential, with variable z^r specified; another functional mode is nonreferential, with some variable z^f to be specified, such as z^t "temporal parameter," z^p "privacy-boundary," and so forth. In shifters, an elementary referential function and a distinct elementary indexical function are united in the same surface speech category, but if we examine them carefully, we can see that the referent z^r is frequently of a different domain from the indexed z^f. Deictics, as we saw, presuppose the referent from previous discourse, for example, as well as the speaker or hearer location, and refer to the locus of the presupposed referent relative to that of speaker or hearer.

The Constitution of Speech Acts

We can call each one of these elementary functionally specific rules of use a *speech act*. We can note that such norms for pragmatic meaning relations depend upon the functional specification of speech at the level of speech events, for it is at this higher level of analysis that one can recognize various pragmatic modes, the socially constituted "tasks" which speech behavior accomplishes or "performs." Reference is one such pragmatic mode, and referential speech acts are of two kinds, which explain the nature of the referring utterance fraction. On the one hand, the shifters motivate elementary referential rules of use, where referent is specified with respect to some speech-event variable(s). On the other hand, the semantico-referential entities motivate rules of use which merely specify *variable* z^r and presuppose (index) the grammar G; that is, the referential value is determined by the semantico-grammatical rules implemented in a functionally referential speech event, no further specification being required. Other pragmatic modes define distinct kinds of speech acts, many of which, as we have seen, overlap in precisely the same, multifunctional surface indexes. For example Thai "pronouns" represent in utterances a bimodal shifter of personal referent, as well as a social index of deference. The widespread pragmatic metaphors for deference use otherwise referential categories in multiple functions expressing equality/inequality.

Speech acts are the elementary indexical formulae for specifying the pragmatic meaning or *function*$_2$ of speech signs. They operate within the framework of *purposive function*$_1$ of socially constituted behavior

already discussed above. We can speak of the "referential function$_2$" of actual signs in the sense of the contribution they make to achieving a valid instance of function$_1$ of describing. Similarly, we can speak of the "socially seriating function$_2$" of actual signs in the sense of the contribution they make to the function$_1$ of defining hierarchies within social categories. Speech is multifunctional$_1$ in the sense that it can simultaneously be used to constitute distinct kinds of events. Speech is multifunctional$_2$ in the sense that apparent elements of surface form actually incorporate meanings of several distinct indexical types. This accords with our traditional notions of *grammatical function*, an instance of function$_2$, always ultimately specified in terms of the contribution of elements to the semantico-referential system.

The analysis of speech acts is thus a generalization of the analysis of semantico-referential systems, providing for meaning relations and language uses distinct from those of the traditionally analyzed sort. In a mathematical analogy, it is the more general structure of which the previously explored type turns out to be a special case. More particularly, the speech acts for semantico-referential signs function$_1$ exclusively in referential speech events—abbreviatory extensions and such aside—and are vacuously specified, with the exception of presupposing the grammar G.

The "Grammar" of Speech Acts

Such a characterization permits us to see at least the nature of a more inclusive kind of "grammar," which includes the traditional sort as a component. If grammar G, as in our present understanding, is a finite, recursive set of rules which relate semantico-referential representations to utterance types (or "sentences" in "surface form"), we can recall from the first part of this paper that the meanings within G are defined in terms of the function$_1$ of pure reference, and the sentences are segmentable into constituents on this basis. In pure referential sentences, the surface elements so functioning$_1$ form a continuous sequence.

To construct a *grammar* (G′) *of speech acts*, the analogous generalization is a set of rules which relate pragmatic meanings—functions$_2$ specified by functionally$_1$ indexed variables—to the "surface form" of utterances. Utterances are, we have several times remarked, continuous in nature. The great bulk of such utterances, moreover, give the appear-

ance of formal integration in terms of phrase, word, and affix structure, especially for referential segments, the shifters and semantic elements. This would seem to indicate that the traditional grammatical rules (G) must be incorporated into pragmatics (G′), that is, that at least some speech acts consist of rules showing the contextual dependence of traditional grammatical rules for generating surface forms.

This is further confirmed by two pragmatic examples I have already mentioned. One is the switch of semantico-referential language, which can serve as an index. Here the whole set of rules of the traditional sort is a function of—indexes—the grammatical competence of speaker, hearer, and audience. So obviously our pragmatic description should show the selection of rules G^L, not just an infinite set of messages $\{\theta^L_i\}$, as a function of contextual variables. The second case is the Yana male vs. female indexing. Here phonological rules, which show the regularities of shape in pairs of forms for the majority of words in the language, characterize the context-sensitive indexing, rather than any affixation or other segmental material. We would want to characterize the indexing here as the dependence of the implementation of certain phonological rules upon the variables of speaker-hearer sociological sex. Any phonological indexes of this sort, such as those marking geographical *dialect* of the speaker, or class-affiliated *variety*, must be similarly treated.

So a grammar of speech acts G′ consists of rules of use that map the variables of speech events into rules generating utterances. With this characterization, we have moved from the heuristic device of directly relating contextual variables to "surface" utterance fractions—detailing, in other words, the definition of an index—to constructing a pragmatic system that explains the relation between apparent structural continuity of surface form and its multifunctional$_{1,2}$ nature. For any given utterance fraction, there may be many speech acts which motivate its presence in a speech event, that is, any utterance fraction may be a constituent of pragmatic structures in several modes, or a constituent in some mode and not a constituent in others. Reference, in particular, the function$_1$ which has heretofore motivated all our ideas about utterance constituency, motivates only one such pragmatic structure, at the core of which are essentially rules of use selecting G. The shifters require distinct functional$_2$ rules of G′, though they function$_1$ also in referential events.

Multifunctionality and Pragmatic Strategy

There is a structure to a pragmatic grammar so constituted, the details of which are now only partially clear. Speech acts are ordered, for example, a reflection of *pragmatic markedness relations* among functional$_2$ meanings of utterance fractions. For example, there is a hierarchical relation among all the kinds of sociological variables leading to deference indexes, which can be formally described by intrinsic ordering of the speech acts characterizing their use (see Ervin-Tripp 1971 for flow-chart characterization). And further, there are markedness relations of speech-event function$_1$ of utterance fractions, so that features of utterances contribute normally to some functional$_1$ mode, less appropriately, though possibly, to others. Pragmatic metaphors mentioned above are a case in point, basically semantic categories being extended, as it were, filling out "holes" in the pragmatic structure.

The multifunctionality of apparent utterances means that there is a kind of pragmatic indeterminacy of utterances taken out of context, and the possibility for strategic uses of language in the context of speech events. Out of context, we can only have recourse to the referential mode in determining the meaning of utterances, which, with certain exceptions for shifters, is essentially "context-free." Additionally, and especially in context where indexes are relatively creative or performative, there can be pragmatic indeterminacy in utterances that can be manipulated by the individuals in an interaction. This leads to such phenomena as *pragmatic contradiction*, or "double-bind" behaviors, which play upon two or more communicative media signaling contradictory indexical meanings to the receiver of the concurrent messages, or upon contradictory highly presupposing indexes within the same medium. Similarly, there is *residual semanticity*, the semantico-referential meaning which a speaker can claim after the fact for potentially highly pragmatically charged speech. Thus the characteristic speaker's denial of speech offensive to the hearer takes the form of "All I said was . . . " with a semantico-referential paraphrase or repetition of the referential content of the original utterance. A speaker can create a social persona for himself, playing upon the hearer's perspective of *imputed indexicality*, where the speaker has characteristics attributed to him on the basis of the rules of use for certain utterance fractions. Thus the phenomenon underlying the plot of *My Fair Lady*. Finally, *diplo-*

matic nonindexicality, on the analogy of diplomatic nonrecognition in foreign policy, allows the hearer to respond to speech as though it constituted a semantico-referential event, all the while understanding completely the distinct function$_2$ of the indexes which overlap in surface form.

Pragmatic contradiction and imputed indexicality are alike in depending on the unavoidably high functional$_2$ potential of utterances. Residual semanticity and diplomatic nonindexicality are alike in depending on the universal metasemantic awareness of people, whereby the semantico-referential function$_1$ of speech is the officially or overtly recognized one, the one to which actors may retreat with full social approval. (This point was made several times by Sapir.) But all of these *pragmatic strategies*, manipulation of pragmatic function$_2$ in actual behavior, depend in the last analysis upon the shared understanding of norms for indexical elements in speech acts. Obviously, some individuals are better at these pragmatic strategies than others, just as some individuals have a more explicit and accurate conception of the pragmatics of their own language. I wonder whether the two skills are related.

Metapragmatics

If strategy requires purposive manipulation of pragmatic rules, then it may also require an overt conceptualization of speech events and constituent speech acts. Such characterization of the pragmatic structure of language is *metapragmatics*, much as the characterization of semantico-grammatical structure is metasemantics. The distinction between these two realms is vast, however. While language as a pure referential medium serves as its own metalanguage in metasemantic referential speech events, there can be no metapragmatic speech events in which use of speech in a given functional mode explicates the pragmatic structure of that very functional mode. The metapragmatic characterization of speech must constitute a referential event, in which pragmatic norms are the objects of description. So obviously the extent to which a language has semantic lexical items which accurately refer to the indexed variables, to the constituents of speech, and to purposive function is one measure of the limits of metapragmatic discussion by a speaker of that language.

Limits to Metapragmatic Awareness

But more importantly, it would appear that the nature of the indexical elements themselves, along formal-functional$_1$ dimensions, limits metapragmatic awareness of language users. Indexes were characterized as segmental vs. nonsegmental, that is affix, word, phrase vs. some other feature of utterances; as referential vs. nonreferential, that is, shifter vs. nonshifter index; and as relatively presupposing vs. relatively creative or performative. It is very easy to obtain accurate pragmatic information in the form of metapragmatic referential speech for segmental, referential, relatively presupposing indexes. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a native speaker aware of nonsegmental, nonreferential, relatively creative formal features, which have no metapragmatic reality for him. Indexes of the first type, which are susceptible of accurate conscious characterization, are, of course, closest in their formal-functional$_1$ properties to semantico-referential segments, for which metasemantic manipulation is possible. Notice once again that metasemantic speech events (see above) are thus a special, equational sort of metapragmatic event. The extent to which signs have properties akin to those of strictly segmental, semantico-referential ones, in fact, is obviously a measure of the ease with which we can get accurate metapragmatic characterizations of them from native speakers. Investigation of the triply distinct formal-functional$_1$ elements of speech, on the other hand, requires interpretative observation in a functional$_1$ framework.

I think that every fieldworker has had such experiences, where a careful sorting out of kinds of pragmatic effects ultimately just cannot rely on the metapragmatic testimony of native participants. (That so-called generative semanticists insist on the validity of their own "intuitions" about pragmatics in *Gedankenforschungen* simply attests to the unfortunate naïveté and narrowness of most contemporary linguists on matters of speech observation and of systematic pragmatic theory.) In the course of investigating Wasco-Wishram (Chinookan), for example, I attempted to systematize with informants the diminutive-augmentative consonantisms which are ubiquitous in speech acts of endearment/repulsion felt by speakers toward referent, without referential contribution. They form a pragmatic metaphor on the more "physical" speaker estimation of size relative to a standard—the classic syncategorematic

problem of small elephants and the like. These effects are entirely phonological, most consonants participating in pairs (or *n*-tuples) which alternate by phonological rules regardless of their position in lexical items. A lexical item thus appears in overt form with two or more sets of consonants, for example, the nominal adjectives for size, the paradigm elaborated example, *i- -qbaiλ* (super-augmentative), *i- -g(ʷ)aiλ* (augmentative), *i- -kʷaic* (quasi-diminutive), *i- -k'ʷaic'* (diminutive), *i- -k'ʷɛit'θ* (super-diminutive). Upon request for repetition of a lexical item with such effects that had occurred in discourse, informants invariably gave a lexically normal form—the pragmatically "unmarked" form. So requesting a repetition of *i-ǰa-muqbal* 'her belly [which I think is huge and repulsive, by the way]', one gets *i-ča-muqʷal*. "But you just said '*-muqbal*' didn't you; that means great big one, no?" "No, it's *ičamuqʷal*." . . . "Well, how do you say 'her great big belly'?" "*Iaga*iλ *ičamuqʷal* ['It's large, her belly']." Notice that the last question is interpreted as a request for an interlinguistic metasemantic equation, the pragmatic marker of rules for augmentative consonantism being beyond studied manipulation.

Metapragmatic Lexical Items

A certain amount of reference to pragmatics at the level of speech events (purposive function$_1$) is accomplished in every language of which I am aware by quotation framing verbs, the equivalents of English phrases such as *he said (to him), he told (it) to him, he asked (of him), he ordered him,* and so forth. It is remarkable how many languages have only constructions expressing the first few of these, which serve to name the entire, undifferentiated set of speech events. Framed by such verbs, which describe certain speech events, and the inflections of which describe the participants, we find reported speech, the messages purportedly used. There is a whole range of devices for reporting speech events, from exact quotation through indirect quotation through pseudo-quotation, paraphrase, and descriptive reference, the subtleties of which I cannot explore here.

Additionally, languages incorporate lexical items which in certain constructions refer to, that is, name, the speech event of which a token forms an utterance fraction. I have already adumbrated their description above (see *Reference and "Performative Speech,"* pp. 18–19

above). In English, for example, these items fit into the schema *I/we* [V] *you* [X], where the verb V is inflected for present, nonprogressive (punctual) tense-aspect. They actually name the socially constituted speech event of which they form an utterance fraction: *christen, dub, sentence,* and so forth, particularly socially salient routines which are primarily linguistic events behaviorally. They are referential, creative (or performative) indexes which are most important to ethnographic description, since they individualize certain ongoing functions$_1$ of speech as they are happening. They constitute a message about the function$_1$ of the medium, functionally$_2$ a pragmatic act. The cross-cultural investigation of these *metapragmatic shifters* is a very urgent and important anthropological desideratum.

Lexical Items in General

The metapragmatic content of certain lexical items brings up the complementary question of the pragmatic content of lexical items. As I have discussed above, metasemantic events that equate meanings of segmental, semantico-referential forms of language are the basis for grammatical analysis, and vice versa. Obviously, in the semantico-referential mode alone, the ideal language would consist of elementary referring grammatical categories and their rules of hierarchical combination. But, as many linguists, particularly Bloomfield (1933) and Chafe more recently (e.g., 1970) have seen, lexical items—the elements that enter into metasemantic equations—form a kind of irreducible set of "idioms" or "basic irregularities," the existence of which is really inexplicable on the basis of semantico-grammatical theory. True lexical items have that unpredictable quality of specialization or extension or multiple senses in their referential functions$_1$ which makes them what they are, referential primes of some sort.

But it is precisely at the level of pragmatics that the coding of seemingly arbitrary chunks of referential "reality" becomes clear. For *lexical items are* abbreviations for *semantic complexes* made up of semantico-referential primes in grammatical constructions (Weinreich 1966; Silverstein 1972 and refs. there), *together with* all of the *indexical modalities* of meaning that make the functional$_1$ result unexpected. In other words, traditional semantico-grammatical analysis can never hope to specify meanings for lexical items finer than the grammatical

structure of implicit referential categories allows, for every lexical item includes a pragmatic residue—an indexical component motivated only at the level of speech acts, actual discourse reference being only one such mode. (Certain kinds of lexical content in the discourse-reference mode have been characterized by linguists as ad hoc "selectional" restrictions on the cooccurrence of lexical items.)

So such lexical items as so-called kinship terms or personal names in any society can hardly be characterized by a "semantic" analysis. It is the pragmatic component that makes them lexical items to begin with; it is the pragmatic functions$_2$ that make them anthropologically important, as Schneider, among others, have never ceased pointing out (see Schneider 1965; 1968; and chapter 8 in this volume). Further, so-called folk taxonomies of nominal lexical items, again "semantically" analyzed by a procedure of ostensive reference, essentially ripped from the context of speech, give us no cultural insight. For the whole pragmatic problem of why these lexical abbreviations form a cultural domain, rather than some other collection, why these lexical items occur at all, rather than some other semantic combinations, remains entirely to be explored. The so-called ethnoscientific structure of these vocabulary items turns out to be, from the point of view of a functional linguistics, a restatement of the fact that these semantico-referential abbreviations, rather than others, in fact occur.

Pragmatic Structure and Cultural Function

The linkage between the pragmatic grammar subsuming the traditional sort and the rest of "culture" is through the two types of function of speech. On the one hand, the cultural function$_1$ of speech comes from its goal-directed nature, which is to accomplish some kind of communicational work. Frequently, as we have seen, there are explicit lexical items which are shifters referring to such functions$_1$ in overtly recognized speech events. But these labels are not necessary for certain social functions$_1$ to be recognized. On the other hand, the cultural function$_2$ is the whole meaning structure described by the speech acts of a pragmatic grammar. As I have mentioned, all but a part of this function$_2$ is not susceptible, in general, to consciousness and accurate testimony by native participants, much as rules of semantico-grammatical systems are not. But these speech elements, which represent recurrences of behavior, have such indexical modes of meaning as presuppose and create the very categories of society which form the parameters of the speech event.

It is unreasonable, then, to take naïve native participant testimony, metabehavioral interpretation, as anything more than an *ethnosociology* which partially (and problematically) overlaps with a true *functional$_{1,2}$ sociology* in terms of a pragmatic grammar based on indexical meaning. For the investigation of the latter must proceed with all the difficulties of interpretative hypotheses that are at once descriptive and comparative (see *Functional and Formal Analogues*, above pp. 40–41, and Goodenough 1970). And the interesting result is to see the ways in which societies use specifically linguistic means to constitute and maintain certain social categories, one society merging some of those given by comparative perspective, another society keeping them distinct. With a strictly linguistic focus, the pragmatic structures of speech give insight into the use of the same apparent "surface" material in distinct functional modes. And we can study the universal constraints on this rich patterning. From a broader anthropological perspective, the pragmatic system of speech *is* part of culture—in fact, perhaps the most significant part of culture—and a part the structure and function$_{1,2}$ of which is probably the real model for the rest of culture, when the term is a construct for the meaning system of socialized behavior.

Cultural Meaning

Language is the systematic construct to explain the meaningfulness of speech behavior. We have seen that iconic, indexical, and uniquely symbolic modes of meaningfulness accrue to speech behavior. Thus any notion of language has to be inclusive enough to comprise these distinct modes, in particular, as I have stressed and elaborated, the indexical modes that link speech to the wider system of social life. The investigation here has claimed for language the uniqueness of a real symbolic mode, as that term can be justifiably used for pure semantic signs. I have linked this property to the possibility of the traditional semantico-grammatical analysis in terms of metasemantics, and have found the other linguistic modes to be categorically distinct. The pragmatic aspect

of language, for example, that which is constituted by its indexical mode, can similarly depend upon metapragmatic uses of speech itself in only very limited areas. Otherwise it depends upon sensitive observation and comparative illumination of functional$_{1,2}$ speech acts and speech events for the indexical mode to be understood.

If language is unique in having a true symbolic mode, then obviously other cultural media must be more akin to the combined iconic and indexical modes of meaningfulness. In general, then, we can conclude that "cultural meaning" of behavior is so limited, except for speech, and see a *cultural description* as a massive, multiply pragmatic description of how the social categories of groups of people are constituted in a criss-crossing, frequently contradictory, ambiguous, and confusing set of pragmatic meanings of many kinds of behavior.

If there can be such apparent vagueness about pragmatic meaning, then one might be tempted to see in actual behavior the only level of integration, of orderliness, in culture. But for the social anthropologist, as for the linguist, regularities of pragmatic form and function$_2$ will ultimately define the orderliness and integration of such meaning systems. We need invoke "symbolism" for a certain modality of speech alone; the vast residue of language is culture, and culture is pragmatic.

Shake Well Before Using (L'envoi)

We must be careful how we use terms like "sign," "symbol," "semantic," "meaning," "function," and other lexical items referring to entities of semiotic theory. I have tried to be consistent in usage in this chapter, which necessitated, for example, using subscripts on certain terms. This intended careful semantico-referential function$_1$ of usage must be the sole criterion of judgment of the argument here that culture is, with the exception of a small part of language, but a congeries of iconic-indexical systems of meaningfulness of behavior.

Usage of the same terms by others should be similarly scrutinized for actual referential content, which may differ considerably in terms of the underlying theory. We must not be carried away by the rhetorical —that is, pragmatic—force of scientific argumentation, wherein, contradictorily enough, lies its sole power as natural communication, this chapter, alas, being another token of the type.

NOTE

1. This study replaces a longer one of the same title discussed at the School of American Research seminar "Meaning in Cultural Anthropology." That work was a draft for the opening sections of a larger work in progress on the anthropology of language. This work, narrowed in focus, refashions some of that, incorporating material from four lectures given during 1974 since the conference: "Pragmatic Functional Analogues in Language," University of New Mexico, March 25; "Metasemantics and Metapragmatics, Implications for Cognitive Research," University of Chicago, May 8; "The Meaning of Pragmatics and the Pragmatics of Meaning," University of Chicago, May 27, and Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, September 18. For comments on the draft chapters, I would especially like to thank Carol Feldman, Paul Friedrich, and Norman McQuown, in addition to the participants at the School of American Research seminar. For particularly useful discussion of points raised in the lectures, aiding my attempts at clarification, I am indebted to Philip Bock, Carol Feldman, Marshall Sahlins, David Schneider, Milton Singer, James Talvitie, Anthony Forge, Roger Keesing, and Anna Wierzbicka. The final draft has been completed under the less-than-ideal conditions of fieldwork, and I beg the reader's indulgence of my bibliographic laxity. The galley proofs benefited from a careful reading of the manuscript graciously communicated by Rodney Huddleston.