3:1 --
Spell-check and verification made against printed text using Wo rdPerfect spell checker
&nbs p; 'To pleasant songs my work was erstwhile given, and bright were all my labours then; but now in tears to sad refrains am I compelled to turn. Thus my maimed Muses guide my pen, and gloomy songs make no feigned tears bedew my face. Then could no fear so overcome to leave me companionless upon my way. They were the pride of my earlier bright-lived days: in my later gloomy days they are the comfort of my fate; for hastened by unhappiness has age come upon me without warning, and grie f hath set within me the old age of her gloom. White hairs are scattered untimely on my head, and the skin hangs loosely from my worn-out limbs.
'Happy is that death which thrusts not itself upon men in their pleasant years, yet comes to them at the oft-repeated cry of their sorrow. Sad is it how death turns away from the unhappy with so deaf an ear, and will not close, cruel, the eyes that weep. Ill is it to trust to
'Why, O my friends, did ye so often puff me up, telling me that I was fortunate? For he that is fallen low did never firmly stand.'
While I was pondering thus in silence, and using my pen to set down so tearful a complaint, there appeared sta nding over my head a woman's form, whose countenance was full of majesty, whose eyes shone as with fire and in power of insight surpassed the eyes of men, whose colour was full of life, whose strength was yet intact though she was so full of years th at none would ever think that she was subject to such age as ours. One could but doubt her varying stature, for at one moment she repressed it to the common measure of a man, at another she seemed to touch with her crown the very heavens: and when s he had raised higher her head, it pierced even the sky and baffled the sight of those who would look upon it. Her clothing was wrought of the finest thread by subtle workmanship brought to an indivisible piece. This had she woven with her own hands, as I afterwards did learn by her own shewing. Their beauty was somewhat dimmed by the dulness of long neglect, as is seen in the smoke-grimed masks of our ancestors. On the border below was inwoven the symbol II, on
When she saw that the Muses of poetry were present by my couch giving words to my lamenting, she was stirred a while; her eyes flashed fiercely, and said she, ' Who has suffered these seducing mummers to approach this sick man? Never do they support those i n sorrow by any healing remedies, but rather do ever foster the sorrow by poisonous sweets. These are they who stifle the fruit-bearing harvest of reason with the barren briars of the passions: they free not the minds of men from disease, but accusto m them thereto. I would think it less grievous if your allurements drew away from me some uninitiated man, as happens in the vulgar herd. In such an one my labours would be naught harmed, but this man has been nourished in the lore of Eleatics and A cademics; and to him have ye reached? Away with you, Sirens, seductive unto destruction! leave him to my Muses to be cared for and to be healed.'
Their band thus rated cast a saddened glance
3:1 -- and
are the first letters of
the Greek words denoting Practical and Theoretical, the two divisions of
philosophy.
'Ah me! how blunted grows the mind when sunk below the o'erwhelming flood! Its own true light no longer burns within, and it would break forth to outer dark nesses. How often care, when fanned by earthly winds, grows to a larger and unmeasured bane. This man has been free to the open heaven: his habit has it been to wander into the paths of the sky: his to watch the light of the bright sun, his to inqui re into the brightness of the chilly moon; he, like a conqueror, held fast bound in its order every star that makes its wandering circle, turning its peculiar course. Nay, more, deeply has he searched into the springs of nature, whence came the roari ng blasts that ruffle the ocean's bosom calm: what is the spirit that makes the firmament revolve; wherefore does the evening star sink into the western wave but to rise from the radiant East; what is the
'Now he lies there; extinct his reason's light, his neck in heavy chains thrust down, his countenance with grievous weight downcast; ah! the brute earth is all he can behold.
'But now,' said she,'is the time for the physician's art, rather than for complaining.' Then fixing her eyes wholly on me, she said, ' Are you the man who was nourished upon the milk of my learning, brought up with my food until you had won you r way to the power of a manly soul? Surely I had given you such weapons as would keep you safe, and your strength unconquered; if you had not thrown them away. Do you know me? Why do you keep silence? Are you dumb from shame or from dull amazement? I would it were from shame, but I see that amazement has overwhelmed you.'
When she saw that I was not only silent, but utter]y tongue-tied and dumb, she put her hand gently upon my breast, and said,' There is no danger: he is suffering from drowsiness, that disease which attacks so many minds which have been deceived. He has forgotten himself for a moment and will quickly remember, as
Then was dark night dispelled, the shadows fled away, and my ey es received returning power as before.'Twas just as when the heavenly bodies are enveloped by the west wind's rush, and the sky stands thick with watery clouds; the sun is hidden and the stars are not yet come into the sky, and night descending from above o'erspreads the earth: but if the north wind smites this scene, launched forth from the Thracian cave, it unlocks the imprisoned daylight; the sun shines forth, and thus sparkling Phoebus smites with his rays our wondering eyes.
&nbs p; In such a manner were the clouds of grief scattered. Then I drew breath again and engaged my mind in taking knowledge of my physician's countenance. So when I turned my eyes towards her and fixed my gaze upon her, I recognised my nurse, Philosophy, in whose chambers I had spent my life from earliest manhood. And I asked her,' Wherefore have you, mistress of all virtues, come down from heaven above to visit my lonely place of banishment? Is it that you, as well as I, may be harrie d, the victim of false charges? ' 'Should I,' said she,' desert you, my nursling?
'He who has calmly reconciled his life to fate, and set
proud death beneath his feet, can
8:1 -- Socrates was
executed by the Athenian state, B.C. 399.
8:2 --
Zeno of Elea was tortured by Nearchus, tyrant of Elea, about 440 B.C.
8:3 -- Canius was put to death by Caligula, c. A.D.
40.
8:4 -- Seneca was driven to commit suicide by
Nero, A.D. 66.
8:5 -- Soranus was condemned to
death by Nero, A.D. 66.
'Are such your experiences, and do they sink into your soul?' she asked.'Do you listen only as "the dull ass to the lyre "? Why do you weep? Wherefore flow your tears? " Speak, nor keep secret in thine heart." If you expect a physician to help you, you must lay bare your wound.' Then did I rally my spirit till it was strong again, and answered,' Does the savage bitterness of my fortune still need recounting? Does it not stand forth plainly enough of itself? Does not the very aspect of this place strike you? Is this the library which you had chosen
'Would you learn the sum of the charges against me? It was said that "I had desired the safety of the Senate." You would learn in what way. I was charged with "having hindered an informer from p roducing papers by which the Senate could be accused of treason." What think you, my mistress? Shall I deny it lest it shame you? Nay, I did desire the safety of the Senate, nor shall ever cease to desire it. Shall I confess it? Then there would hav e been no need to hinder an informer. Shall I call it a crime to have wished for the safety of that order? By its own decrees concerning myself it has established that this is a crime. Though want of foresight often deceives itself, it cannot alter t he merits of facts, and, in obedience to the Senate's command, I cannot think it right to hide the truth or to assent to falsehood.
'However, I leave it to your judgment and that of philosophers to decide how the justice of this may be; but I have committed to writing for history the true course of events, that posterity may not be ignorant thereof. I think it unnecessary to speak of the forged letters through which I am accused of " hoping for the freedom of Rome." The ir falsity would have been apparent if I had been free to question the evidence of the informers themselves, for their confessions have much force in all such business.
'But what avails it? No liberty is left to hope for. Wou ld there were any! I would answer in the words of Canius, who was accused
'And in this matter grief has not so blunted my powers that I should complain of wicked men making impious attacks upon virtue: but at this I do wonder, that they should hope to succeed. Evil de sires are, it may be, due to our natural failings, but that the conceptions of any wicked mind should prevail against innocence while God watches over us, seems to me unnatural. Wherefore not without cause has one of your own followers asked, " If Go d is, whence come evil things? If He is not, whence come good? "
'Again, let impious men, who thirst for the blood of the whole Senate and of all good citizens, be allowed to wish for the ruin of us too whom they recognise as champions of the Senate and all good citizens: but surely such as I have not deserved the same hatred from the members of the Senate too?
'Since you were always present to guide me in my words and
my deeds, I think you re member what happened at Verona. When King Theodoric,
desiring the common ruin of the Senate, was for extending to the whole order the
charge of treason laid against Albinus, you remember how I laboured to defend
the innocence of the order without any care for my own danger? You know that I
declare this truthfully and with no boasting praise of self.
14:1 -- The Emperor Caligula.
'Founder of the star-studded universe, resting on Thine eternal throne whence Thou turnest the swiftly rolling sky, and bindest the stars to keep Thy law; at Thy word the moon now shines brightly with ful l face, ever turned to her brother's light, and so she dims the lesser lights; or now she is herself obscured, for nearer to the sun her beams shew her pale horns alone. Cool rises the evening star at night's first drawing nigh: the same is the morn ing star who casts off the harness that she bore
While I grieved thus in long-drawn pratings, Phi losophy
looked on with a calm countenance, not one whit moved by my complaints Then said
she,' When I saw you in grief and in tears I knew thereby that you were unhappy
and in exile, but I knew not how distant was your exile until your speech
declare d it. But you have not been driven so far from your home; you have
wandered thence yourself: or if you would rather hold that you have been driven,
you have been driven by yourself rather than by any other. No other could have
done so to you. For if you recall your true native country, you know that it is
not under the rule of the many-headed people, as was Athens of old, but there is
one Lord, one King, who rejoices in the greater number of his subjects, not in
their banishment. To be guided b y his reins, to bow to his justice, is the
highest liberty. Know you not that sacred and ancient law of your own state by
which it is enacted that no man, who would establish a dwelling-place for
himself therein, may lawfully be put forth? For there is no fear that any man
should merit exile, if he be kept safe therein by its protecting walls. But any
man that may no longer wish to dwell there, does equally no longer deserve to be
there. Wherefore it is your looks rather than the aspect of this place which
disturb me.l It
19:1 -- Cp. Prose iv. of this book,p. 9.
'When the sign of the crab doth scorch the field, fraught with the sun's most grievous rays, the husbandman that has freely intrusted his seed to the fruitless furrow, is cheated by the faithless harve st-goddess; and he must turn him to the oak tree's fruit.
'When the field is scarred by the bleak north winds, wouldst thou seek the wood's dark carpet to gather violets? If thou wilt enjoy the grapes, wouldst thou seek with clutching hand to prune the vines in spring? 'Tis in autumn Bacchus brings his gifts. Thus God marks out the times and fits to them peculiar works: He has set out a course of change, and lets no confusion come. If aught betake itself to headlong way s, and leaves its sure design, ill will the outcome be thereto.
'First then,' she continued,' will you let me find out and make trial of the state of your mind by a few small questions, that so I may understand what should be the method of your treatment? '
'Ask,' said I,' what your judgment would have you ask, and I will answer you.'
Then said she,' Think you that this universe is guided only at random and by mere chan ce? or think you there is any rule of reason constituted in it? '
'No, never would I think it could be so, nor
'So is it,' she said,'and even so you cried just now, and only mourned that m ankind alone has no part in this divine guardianship: you were fixed in your belief that all other things are ruled by reason. Yet, how strange! how much I wonder how it is that you can be so sick though you are set in such a health-giving state of mind! But let us look deeper into it: I cannot but think there is something lacking. Since you are not in doubt that the universe is ruled by God, tell me by what method you think that government is guided? '
'I scarcely know the meaning of your question; much less can I answer it.'
'Was I wrong,' said she,' to think that something was lacking, that there was some opening in your armour, some way by which this distracting disease has crept into y our soul? But tell me, do you remember what is the aim and end of all things? what the object to which all nature tends? '
'I have heard indeed, but grief has blunted my memory.'
'But do you not some how know whence all things have their source? '
'Yes,' I said; ' that source is God.'
'Is it possible that you, who know the beginning of all things, should not know their end?
'How can I but remember that? '
'Can you then say what is a man? '
'Need you ask? I know that he is an animal, reasoning and mortal; that I know, and th at I confess myself to be.'
'Know you naught else that you are? ' asked Philosophy.
'Naught,' said I.
'Now,' said she,' I know the cause, or the chief cause, of your sickness. You have forgotten what you are. Now therefore I have found out to the full the manner of your sickness, and how to attempt the restoring of your health. You are overwhelmed by this forgetfulness of yourself: hence you have been thus sorrowing that you are exiled and robbed of all your possessions. You do not know the aim and end of all things; hence you think that if men are worthless and wicked, they are powerful and fortunate. You have forgotten by what methods the universe is guided; hence you think that the chances of good and bad fortune are tossed about with no ruling hand. These things may lead not to disease only, but even to death as well. But let us thank the Giver of all health, that your nature has not altogether left you. W e have yet the chief
'When the stars are hidden by black clouds, no light can they afford. When the boisterous south wind rolls along the sea and stirs the surge, the water, but n ow as clear as glass, bright as the fair sun's light, is dark, impenetrable to sight, with stirred and scattered sand. The stream, that wanders down the mountain's side, must often find a stumbling-block, a stone within its path torn from the hill's own rock. So too shalt thou: if thou wouldst see the truth in undimmed light, choose the straight road, the beaten path; away with passing joys! away with fear! put vain hopes to flight! and grant no place to grief! Where these distractions reign, t he mind is clouded o'er, the soul is bound in chains.'
THEN for a while she held her peace. But when her s ilence, so discreet, made my thoughts to cease from straying, she thus began to speak: 'If I have thoroughly learned the causes and the manner of your sickness, your former good fortune has so affected you that you are being consumed by longing for i t. The change of one of her this alone has overturned your peace of mind through your own imagination. I understand the varied disguises of that unnatural state. I know how Fortune is ever most friendly and alluring to those whom she strives to decei ve, until she overwhelms them with grief beyond bearing, by deserting them when least expected. If you recall her nature, her ways, or her deserts, you will see that you never had in her, nor have lost with her, aught that was lovely. Yet, I think, I shall not need great labour to recall this to your memory. For then too, when she was at your side with all her flattery, you were wont to reproach her in strong and manly terms; and to revile her with the opinions that you had gathered in worship of me with my favoured ones. But no sudden change of outward affairs can ever come without some upheaval in the mind. Thus has it followed
'What is it, mortal man, that has cast you down into grief and mourning? You have seen something unwonted, it would seem, something strange to you. But if you think that Fortune has changed towards you, you are wrong. These are ever her ways: this is her very nature. She has with you pr eserved her own constancy by her very change. She was ever changeable at the time when she smiled upon you, when she was mocking you with the allurements of false good fortune. You have discovered both the different faces of the blind goddess. To th e eyes of others she is veiled in part: to you she has made herself wholly known. If you find her welcome, make use of her ways, and so make no complaining. If she fills you with horror by her treachery, treat her with despite; thrust her away from you, for she tempts you to your ruin. For though she is the cause of this great trouble for you, she ought to have been the subject of
'As thus she turns her wheel of chance with haughty hand, and presses on like the surge of Euripus's tides, fortune now tramples fie rcely on a fearsome king, and now deceives no less a conquered man by raising from the ground his humbled face. She hears no wretch's cry, she heeds no tears, but wantonly she mocks the sorrow which her cruelty has made. This is her sport: thus she proves her power; if in the selfsame hour one man is raised to happiness, and cast down in despair,'tis thus she shews her might.
' Now would I argue with you by these few words which Fortune herself might use: and do you consider whether her demands are fair "Why, O man," she might say, " do you daily accuse me with your complainings? What injustice have I wrought upon you? Of what good things have I robbed you? Choose your judge whom you will, and before him strive with me for the right to hold your wealth and honours. If you can prove that any one of these does truly belong to any mortal man, readily will I grant that these you seek to regain were yours. When nature brought you forth from your mother's womb, I received you in my arms naked and bare of all things; I cherished you
">
30:1 -- The
proverbially rich and h appy king; defeated and condemned to death by Cyrus,
king of Media, in 546 B.C., but spared by him.
30:2 -- The last king of Macedonia, defeated at Pydna, 168.c.,
by L.Æmilius Paulus.
'If Fortune should thus defend herself to you,' said Philosophy,' you would have naught, I think, to utter on the other part. But if you have any just defence for your complaining, you must put it forward. We will grant you the opportunity of speaking.'
Then I answered,' Those arguments have a fair form and are clothed with all the sweetness of speech and of song. Whe n a man listens to them, they delight him; but only so long. The wretched have a deeper feeling of their misfortunes. Wherefore when these pleasing sounds fall no longer upon the ear, this deep- rooted misery again weighs down the spirit.'
&nb sp; 'It is so,' she said.' For these are not the remedies for your sickness, but in some sort are the applications for your grief which chafes against its cure. When the time comes, I will apply those which are to penetrate deeply. with Boethius
'While Fortune then favoured you, it seems you flaunted her, though she cher ished you as her own darling. You carried off a bounty which she had never granted to any citizen before. Will you then balance accounts with Fortune? This is the first time that she has looked upon you with a grudging eye. If you think of your happ y and unhappy circumstances both in number and in kind, you will not be able to say that you have not been fortunate until now. And if you think that you were not fortunate because these things have passed away which then seemed to bring happiness, t hese things too are passing away, which you now hold to be miserable, wherefore you cannot think that you are wretched now. Is this your first entrance upon the stage of life? Are you come here unprepared and a stranger to the scene? Think you that there is any certainty in the affairs of mankind, when you know that often one swift hour can utterly destroy a man? For though the chances of life may seldom be depended upon, yet the last day of a lifetime seems to be the end of Fortune's power, th ough it perhaps would stay. What, think you, should we therefore say; that you desert her by dying, or that she deserts you by leaving you? '
'When o'er the heaven Phoebus from his rose- red car begins to shed his light abroad, his flames oppress the paling stars and blunt their whitened rays. When the grove grows bright in spring with roses 'neath the west wind's warming breath, let but the cloudy gale once wildly blow, and their be auty is gone, the thorns alone remain. Often the sea is calmly glistening bright with all untroubled waves, but as often does the north wind stir them up, making the troubling tempest boil. If then the earth's own covering so seldom constant stays, if its changes are so great, shalt thou trust the brittle fortunes of mankind, have faith in fleeting good? For this is sure, and this is fixed by everlasting law, that naught which is brought to birth shall constant here abide.'
&n bsp;Then I answered her,' Cherisher of all the virtues, you tell me but the truth: I cannot deny my rapid successes and my prosperity. But it is such remembrances that torment me more than others. For of all suffering from Fortune, the unhappiest mis fortune is to have known a happy fortune.'
'But,' said Philosophy,' you are paying the him penalty for your mistaken expectations, and with this you cannot justly charge your life's circumstances. If you are affected by thi s empty name of Fortune's gift of happiness, you must listen while I recall how many and how great are your sources of happiness: and thus, if you have possessed that which is the most
'And may they continue to hold fast,' said I,'that is my prayer: while they are firm, we will reach the end of our voyage, however things may be. But you see how much my glory has departed.'
;And she answered,' We have made some progress, if you are not now weary entirely of your present lot. But I cannot bear this dallying so softly, so long as you complain that your happiness lacks aught, so long as you are full of sorrow and care. Whos e happiness is so firmly established that he has no quarrel from any side with his estate of life? For the condition of our welfare is a matter fraught with care: either its completeness never appears, or it never remains. One man's wealth is abundant , but his birth and breeding put him to shame. Another is famous for his noble birth, but would rather be unknown because he is hampered by his narrow means. A third is blessed with wealth and breeding, but bewails his life because he has no wife. Ano ther is happy in his marriage, but has no children, and saves his wealth only for an heir that is no son of his. Another is blessed with children, but weeps tears of sorrow for the misdeeds of son or daughter. So none is readily at peace with the lot h is fortune sends him. For in each case there is that which is unknown to him who has not experienced it, and which brings horror to him who has experienced it. Consider further, that the feelings of the most fortunate men are the most easily affected, wherefore, unless all
their desires are supplied, such men, being unused to all adversity, are cast down by every little care: so small are the troubles which can rob them of complete ha ppiness.
'How many are they, think you, who would think themselves raised to heaven if the smallest part of the remnants of your good fortune fell to them? This very place, which you call a place of exile, is home to those wh o live herein. Thus there is nothing wretched unless you think it to be so: and in like manner he who bears all with a calm mind finds his lot wholly blessed. Who is so happy but would wish to change his estate, if he yields to impatience of his lot? W ith how much bitterness is the sweetness of man's life mingled! For even though its enjoyment seem pleasant, yet it may not be surely kept from departing when it will. It is plain then how wretched is the happiness of mortal life which neither endures for ever with men of calm mind, nor ever wholly delights the care-ridden. Wherefore, then, O mortal men, seek ye that happiness without, which lies within yourselves? Ye are confounded by error and ignorance. I will shew you as shortly as I may, th e pole on which turns the highest happiness. Is there aught that you value more highly than your own self? You will answer that there is nothing. If then you are master of yourself, you will be in possession of that which you will never wish to lose, a nd which Fortune will never be able to take from you. Yet consider this further, that you may
'He that would build on a lasting resting-place; who would be firm to resist the blasts of the storming wind; who se eks, too, safety where he may contemn the surge and threatening of the sea; must leave the lofty mountain's top, and leave the thirsting sands. The hill is swept by all the might of the headstrong gale: the sands dissolve, and will not bear the load u pon them. Let him fly the danger in a lot which is pleasant rest unto the eye: let him be mindful to set his house surely upon the lowly rock. Then let the wind bellow, confounding wreckage in the sea, and thou wilt still be founded upon unmoving peace , wilt be blessed in the strength of thy defence: thy life will be spent in calmness, and thou mayest mock the raging passions of the air.
'But now,' she continued,' the first remedies of reasoning are reaching you more dee ply, and I think I should now use those that are somewhat stronger. If the gifts of Fortune fade not nor pass quickly away, even so, what is there in them which could ever be truly yours, or which would not lose its value when examined or thought upon?
'Are riches valuable for their own nature, or on account of your and other men's natures? Which is the more valuable, the gold itself or the power of the stored up-money? Surely wealth shines more brightly when spent than whe n put away in masses. Avarice ever brings hatred, while generous spending brings honour.
&nb sp;'Think again of precious stones: does their gleam attract your eyes? But any excellence they have is their own brilliance, and belongs not to men: wherefore I am amazed that men so strongly admire them. What manner of thing can that be which has no mind to influence, which has no structure of parts, and yet can justly seem to a living, reasoning mind to be beautiful? Though they be works of their creator, and by their own beauty and adornment have a certain low beauty, yet are they in rank lowe r than your own excellence, and have in no wise deserved your admiration.
'Does the beauty of landscape delight you? '
'Surely, for it is a beautiful part of a beautiful creation: and in like manner w e rejoice at times in the appearance of a calm sea, and we admire the sky, the stars, the sun, and the moon.
'Does any one of these,' said she,' concern you? Dare you boast yourself of the spl endid beauty of any one of such things? Are you yourself adorned by the flowers of spring? Is it your richness that swells the fruits of autumn? Why are you carried away by empty rejoicing. Why do you embrace as your own the good things which are outs ide yourself? Fortune will never make yours what Nature has made to belong to other things. The fruits of the earth should doubtless serve as nourishment for living beings, but if you would satisfy your need as fully as Nature needs, you need not the a bundance of Fortune. Nature is content with very little, and if you seek to thrust upon her more than is enough, then what you cast in will become either unpleasing or even harmful
'Again, you think that you appear beautiful i n many kinds of clothing. But if their form is pleasant to the eyes, I would admire the nature of the material or the skill of the maker. Or are you made happy by a long line of attendants? Surely if they are vicious, they are but . a burden to the h ouse, and full of injury to their master himself; while if they are honest, how can the honesty of others be counted among your possessions?
'Out of all these possessions, then, which you reckon as your wealth, not one can re ally be shown to be your own. For if they have no beauty for you to acquire, what have they for which you should grieve if you lose them, or in keeping which you should rejoice? And if
Is ther e then no good which belongs to you and is implanted within you, that you seek your good things elsewhere, in things without you and separate from you? Have things taken such a turn that the animal, whose reason gives it a claim to divinity, cannot s eem beautiful to itself except by the possession of. lifeless trappings? Other classes of things are satisfied by their intrinsic possessions; but men, though made like God in understanding, seek to find among the lowest things adornment for their h igher nature: and you do not understand that you do a great wrong thereby to your Creator. He intended that the human race should be above all other earthly beings; yet you thrust down your honourable place below the lowest.
For if every good thing is allowed to be more valuable than that to which it belongs, surely you are putting yourselves lower than them in your estimation, since you think precious the most worthless of things; a nd this is indeed a just result. Since, then, this is the condition of human nature, that it surpasses other classes only when it realises what is in itself; as soon as it ceases to know itself, it must be reduced to a lower rank than the beasts. To ot her animals ignorance of themselves is natural; in men it is a fault. How plainly and how widely do you err by thinking that anything can be adorned by ornaments that belong to others! Surely that cannot be. For if anything becomes brilliant by additi ons thereto, the praise for the brilliance belongs to the additions. But the subject remains in its own vileness, though hidden and covered by these externals.
'Again, I say that naught can be a good thing which does
harm to its possessor. Am I wrong? "No," you will say. Yet many a time do riches
harm their possessors, since all base men, who are therefore the most covetous,
think that they themselves alone are worthy to possess all gold and precious
stones. You therefore, who now go in fear of the cudgel and sword of the robber,
could laugh in his face if you had entered upon this path with empty pockets.
'O happy was that early age of men, contented with their
trusted and unfailing fields, nor ruined by the wealth that enervates. Easily
was the acorn got that used to satisfy their longwhile fast. They knew not
Bacchus' gifts, nor h oney mixed therewith. They knew not how to tinge with
Tyre's purple dyes the sheen of China's silks. Their sleep kept health on rush
and grass; the stream gave them to drink as it flowed by: the lofty pine to them
gave shade. Not one of them yet clave the ocean's depths, nor, carrying stores
of merchandise, had visited new shores. Then was not heard the battle's trump,
nor had blood made red with bitter hate the bristling swords of war. For why
should any madness urge to take up first their arms up on an enemy such ones as
knew no sight of cruel wounds nor knew rewards that could be reaped in blood?
Would that our times could but return to those old ways! but love of gain and
greed of holding burn more fiercely far than &’Etna's fires. Ah! who w as
the wretch who first unearthed the mass of hidden gold, the gems that only
longed to lie unfound? For full of danger was the prize he found. 'What am I to say of power and of the with the careless
happiness of the man who meets highwayman with no purse and empty pockets.
'But what is the power which you seek and esteem so highly?
O creatures of the earth, can you not think over whom you are set? If you saw in
a community of mice, one mouse asserting his rights and his power over the
others, with what mirth you would greet the sight! Yet if you consider the body,
what can you find weaker than humanity? Cannot a tiny gna t by its bite, or by
creeping into the inmost parts, kill that body? How can any exercise right upon
any other except upon the body alone, or that which is below the body, whereby I
mean the fortunes? Can you ever impose any law upon a free spirit? Can you eyer
disturb the peculiar restfulness which is the property of a mind that hangs
together
'Further, if there were any intrinsic good in the nature of
honours and powers themselves, they could never crowd upon the basest men. For
opposites will not be bound together. Nature refus es to allow contraries to be
linked to each other. Wherefore, while it is un- doubted that for the most part
offices of honour are enjoyed by bad men, it is also manifest that those things
are not by nature good, which 'We have heard what ruin Nero wrought when Rome was burnt
and senators were slain. We know how savagely he did to death his brother,l
how he was stained by the spilling of his own mother's blood, and how he looked
upon her cold body and yet no tear fell upon his cheek: yet could this man be
judge of the morals that were dead. Nay, he was ruler of the peoples whom the
sun looks upon from the time he rises in the east until he hides his rays
beneath the waves, and those whom the chilling northern Wain o'errules, and
those whom the southern gale burns with its dry blast, as it heats the burning
sands. Say, could great power chasten Nero's maddened rage? Ah! heavy fate, how
often is the sword of high injustice given where is already most poisonous
cruelty!' Then I said,' You know that the vain-glory of this world
has had but little influence over me; but I have desired the m eans of so
managing affairs that virtue might not grow aged in silence.' 'Yes,' said she,' but there is one thing which can attract
minds, which, though by nature excelling, yet are not led by perfection to the
furthest bound s of virtue; and that thing is the love of fame and reputation
for deserving well of one's country. Think then thus upon it, and see that it is
but a slight Further, the manners and customs of different races are so
little in agreement , that what is make his name known, because he takes
pleasure in a glorious fame. So each man shall be content if his fame travels
throughout his own countrymen, and the immortality of his name shall be bounded
by the limits of one nation. But how ma ny men, the most famous of their times,
are wiped out by oblivion because no man has written of them! 1 And yet what
advantage is there in much that is written? For with their authors these
writings are overwhelmed in the length and dimness of age. Yet when you think
upon your fame in future ages, you seem to think that you are prolonging it to
immortality. But if you think upon the unending length of eternity, what
enjoyment do you find in the long endurance of Boethius is thinking of Horace,
Od es iv. 9. Ere Agamemnon saw the light, There lived brave men: but tearless
all Enfolded in eternal night, For lack of sacred minstrels, fall. (Mr..
Gladstone's translation.)
'The mind that rushes headlong in its search for fame,
thinking that is its highest good, should look upon the spreading regions of the
air, and then upon the bounded tracts that are this world: then will shame enter
it; that, though fame grow, yet can it never fill so small a circle. Proud men!
why will ye try in vain to free your necks from the yoke mortality has set
thereon? Though fame may be wide scattered and find its way through distant
lands, and set the tongues there talking; though a splendid house may draw
brilliance fr om famous names and tales; yet death regards not any glory,
howsoever great. Alike he overwhelms the lowly and the lofty head, and levels
high with low. 'Where are Fabricius's1
bones, that h onourable man? What now is Brutus?2
or 'But,' she said,' do not think that I would urge implacable
war upon Fortune. There are times when her decept ion of men has certain merits:
I mean when she discovers herself, unveils her face, and proclaims her ways.
Perhaps you do not yet understand what I would say. It is a strange thing that I
am trying to say, and for that reason I can scarcely explain myself in words. I
think that ill fortune is of greater advantage to men than good fortune. Good
fortune is ever lying when she seems to favour by an appearance of happiness.
Ill fortune is ever true when by her changes she shews herself inconstant. T he
one deceives; the other edifies. The one by a deceitful appearance of good
things enchains the 'And do you think that this should be reckoned among the
least benefits of this rough, unkind, and terrible ill fortune, that she has
discovered to you the minds of your faithful friends? Fortune has distinguished
for you your sure and your doubtful friends; her departure has taken away her
friends and left you yours. At what price could you have bought this benefit if
you had been untouched and, as you thought, fortunate? Cease then to seek the
wealth you have lost. You have found your friends, and they are the most
precious of all riches. 'Through Love1
the universe with constancy makes changes all without discord: earth's elements,
though contrary, abide in treaty bound: Phoebus in his golden car leads up the
glowin g day; his sister rules the night that Hesperus brought: the greedy sea confines its waves in
bounds, lest the earth's borders be changed by its beating on them: all these
are firmly bound by Love, which rules both earth and sea, and has it s empire in
the heavens too. If Love should slacken this its hold, all mutual love would
change to war; and these would strive to undo the scheme which now their
glorious movements carry out with trust and with accord. By Love are peoples too
kept bou nd together by a treaty which they may not break. Love binds with pure
affection the sacred tie of wedlock, and speaks its bidding to all trusty
friends. O happy race of mortals, if your hearts are ruled as is the universe,
by Love!1' When she finished her lay, its soothing tones left me
spellbound with my ears alert in my eagerness to listen. So a while afterwards I
said, 'Greatest comforter of weary minds, how have you cheered me with your deep
thoughts and sweet singing too! No more shall I doubt my power to meet the blows
of Fortune. So far am I from terror at the remedies which you did lately tell me
were sharper, that I am longing to hear them, and eagerly I beg you for them.'
Then said she,'I knew it when you laid hold upon my words
in silent attention, and I was waiting for that frame of mind in you, or more
truly, I brought it about in you. They that remain are indeed bitter to the
tongue, but sweet to the inner man. But as you say you are eager to hear, how
ardently you would be burning, if you knew whither I am attempting to lead you!
' Whither is that? ' I asked. 'To the true happiness, of which your soul too dreams; but
your sight is taken up in imaginary views thereof, so that you cannot look upon
itself.' Then said I,' I pray you shew me what that truly is, and
quickly.' 'I will do so,' she said,' fo r your sake willingly. But
first I will try to picture in words and give you the form of the cause, which
is already better known to you, that so, when that picture is perfect and you
turn your eyes to the other side, you may recognise the form of tru e happiness.
'When a man would sow in virgin soil, first he clears away
the bushes, cuts the brambles and the ferns, that the corn-goddess may go forth
laden with her new fruit. The honey, that the bee has toiled to give us, is
sweeter when the mouth has tasted bitter things. The stars shine with more
pleasing grace when a storm has ceased to roar and pour down rain. After the
morning star has dispersed the shades of night, the day in all its beauty drives
its rosy chario t forth. So thou hast looked upon false happiness first; now
draw thy neck from under her yoke: so shall true happiness now come into thy
soul.' She lowered her eyes for a little while as though searching
the innermost rece sses of her mind; and then she continued: -- ' The trouble of
the many and various aims of mortal men bring them much care, and herein they go
forward by different paths but strive to reach one end, which is happiness. And
that good is that, to which i f any man attain, he
'Some men believe that the highest good is to lack nothing,
and so they are at pains to possess abundant riches. Others consider th e true
good to be that which is most worthy of admiration, and so they strive to attain
to places of honour, and to be held by their fellow- citizens in honour thereby.
Some determine that the highest good lies in the highest power;and so they
either d esire to reign themselves, or try to cleave to those who do reign.
Others think that renown is the greatest good, and they therefore hasten to make
a famous name by the arts of peace or of war. But more than all measure the
fruit of good by pleasure a nd enjoyment, and these think that the happiest man
is abandoned to pleasure. 'Further, there are those who confuse the aims and the
causes of these good things: as those who desire riches for the sake of power or
of pleasure , or those who seek power for the sake of money or celebrity. In
these, then, and
'Again, it is plain that the good things of the body must
be accounted to those false causes which we have mentioned; for bodily strength
and stature seem to make men more able and strong; beauty and swiftness seem to
gi ve renown; health seems to give pleasure. By all these happiness alone is
plainly desired. For each man holds that to be the highest good, which he seeks
before all others. But we have defined the highest good to be happiness.
Wherefore what each man desires above all others, he holds to be a state of
happiness. 'Wherefore you have each of these placed before you as the
form of human happiness: wealth, honours, power, glory, and pleasure. Epicurus1
considered these forms alone, and accordingly determined upon pleasure
as the highest good, because all the others seemed but 'But to return to the aims of men: their minds seem to seek
to regain the highest good, and their memories seem to dull their powers. It is
as though a drunken man were seek ing his home, but could not remember the way
thither. Can those people be altogether wrong whose aim it is to lack nothing?
No, there is nothing which can make happiness so perfect as an abundant
possession of good things, needing naught that belongs to others, but in all
ways sufficing for itself. Surely those others too are not mistaken who think
that what is best is also most worthy of reverence and respect. It cannot be any
cheap or base thing, to attain which almost all men aim and strive. And is power
not to be accounted a good thing? Surely it is: can that be a weak thing or
forceless, which is allowed in all cases to excel? Is renown of no value ? We
cannot surrender this; that whatever is most excellent, has also great renown.
It is ha rdly worth saying that happiness has no torturing cares or gloom, and
is not subject to grief and trouble; for even in small things, the aim is to
find that which it is a delight to have and to enjoy. These, then, are the
desires of men: they long for riches, places of honour, kingdoms, glory, and
pleasure;and they long for them because they think that thereby they will find
satisfaction, veneration, power, renown, and happiness. It is the good then
which men seek by their different desires;
and it is easy to shew how great a force nature has put
therein, since in spite of such varying and discordant opinions, they are all
agreed in the goal they seek, that of the highest good. 'I would to pliant strings set forth a song of how almighty
Nature turns her guiding reins, telling with what laws her providence keeps safe
this boundless universe, binding and tying each and all with cords that never
shall be loosed. The lions of Carthage, though they bear the gorgeous bonds and
trappings of captivity, and eat the food that is given them by hand, and though
they fear their harsh master with his lash they know so well; yet if once blood
has touched their b ristling jaws, their old, their latent wills return; with
deep roaring they remember their old selves; they loose their bands and free
their necks, and their tamer is the first torn by their cruel teeth, and his
blood is poured out by their rage and wrath. 'If the bird who sings so lustily upon the high tree-top,
be caught and caged, men may minister to him with dainty care, may give him cups
of liquid honey and feed him with all gentleness on plenteous food; yet if he fl
y to the roof of his cage and see the shady trees he loves, he spurns with his
foot the food they have put before him; the woods are all his sorrow calls for,
for the woods he sings with his sweet tones. 'The bough which has b een downward thrust by force of
strength to bend its top to
'Phoebus sinks into the western waves, but by his unknown
track he turns his car once more to his rising in the east. 'All things must find their own peculiar course again, and
each rejoices in his own return. Not one can keep the order handed down to it,
unless i n some way it unites its rising to its end, and so makes firm,
immutable, its own encircling course. 'And you too, creatures of the earth, do dream of your
first state, though with a dim idea. With whatsoever thinking it may b e, you
look to that goal of happiness, though never so obscure your thoughts: thither,
to true happiness, your natural course does guide you, and from the same your
various errors lead you. For I would have you consider whether men can reach the
end they have resolved upon, namely happiness, by these ways by which they think
to attain thereto. If money and places of honour and such-like do bring anything
of that sort to a man who seems to lack no good thing, then let us acknowledge
with them th at men do become happy by the possession of these things. But if
they cannot perform their promises, and there is still lack of further good
things, surely it is plain that a false appearance of happiness is there
discovered. You, therefore, who had lately abundant riches, shall first answer
me. With all that great wealth, was your mind never
'Yes,' I said; ' I cann ot remember that my mind was ever
free from some such care.' Was it not because something was lacking, which you missed,
or because something was present to you which you did not like to have? ' 'Yes ,' I answered. 'You desired, then, the presence of the one, and the
absence of the other? ' 'I acknowledge it.' 'Then,' said she,'such a man lacks what he desires.' &n bsp; 'He does.' 'But while a man lacks anything, can he possibly satisfy
himself? ' 'No,' said I. 'Then, while you were bountifully supplied with wealth, you
felt that you did not satisfy yourself? ' 'I did indeed.' 'Then,' said she,'wealth cannot prevent a man from lacking
or make him satisfied. And this is what it apparently professed to do. And this
point to o I feel is most important: money has in itself, by its own nature,
nothing which can prevent its being carried off from those, who possess it,
against their will.' 'It has not,' I said. 'No, you canno t deny that any stronger man may any day
snatch it from them. For how come about the quarrels of the law-courts ? Is it
not because people try to regain money that
'Then,' said she,' a man will need to seek from the outside
help to guard his own money.' 'That cannot be denied,' I said. 'And a man will not need that unless he possesses money
which he can lose.' 'Undoubtedly he will not.' 'Then the argument turns round the other way,' she said.'
The riches which were thought to make a man all-sufficient for himself , do
really put him in need of other people's help. Then how can need be separated
from wealth? Do the rich never feel hunger nor thirst? Do the limbs of moneyed
men never feel the cold of winter? You will say, " Yes, but the rich have the
wherewithal to satisfy hunger and thirst, and drive away cold." But though
riches may thus console wants, they cannot entirely take them away. For, though
these ever crying wants, these continual requests, are satisfied, yet there must
exist that which is to be satisfied. I need not say that nature is satisfied
with little, greed is never satisfied. Wherefore, I ask you, if wealth cannot
remove want, and even creates its own wants, what reason is there that you
should think it affords satisfaction to a man? ' Though the rich man with greed heap up from ever-flowing
streams the wealth that cannot satisfy, though he deck himself with pearls from
the Red Sea's shore, and plough
'But,' I urged,' places of honour make the man, to whom
they fa ll, honoured and venerated.' 'Ah! ' she answered,' have those offices their force in
truth that they may instil virtues into the minds of those that hold them, and
drive out vices therefrom? And yet we are too well accustome d to see them
making wickedness conspicuous rather than avoiding it. Wherefore we are
displeased to see such places often falling to the most wicked of men, so that
Catullus called Nonius "a diseased growth,"1
though he sat in the highest chair of office. Do you see how great a disgrace
high honours can add to evil men? Their unworthiness is less conspicuous if they
are not made famous by honours. Could you yourself have been induced by any
dangers to think of be ing a colleague with Decoratus, 2
when you saw that he had the mind of an unscrupulous buffoon, and a base
informer? We cannot consider men worthy of veneration on account of their high
places, when we hold them to b e unworthy of those 'Now I would hav e you consider the matter thus, that you
may recognise that true veneration cannot be won through these shadowy honours.
If a man who had filled the office of consul many times in Rome, came by chance
into a country of barbarians, would his high posi tion make him venerated by the
barbarians? Yet if this were a natural quality in such dignities, they would
never lose their effective function in any land, just as fire is never aught but
hot in all countries. But since they do not receive this qualit y of veneration
from any force peculiar to themselves, but only from a connexion in the
untrustworthy opinions of men, they become as nothing as soon as they are among
those who do not consider these dignities as such.
'But that is only in the case of foreign peoples. Among the
very peoples where they had their beginnings, do these dignities last for ever?
Consider how great was the power in Rome of old of the office of Præfect: now i
t is an empty name and a heavy burden upon the income of any man of Senator's
rank.'The præfect then, who was commissioner of the corn-market, was held to be
a great man. Now there is no office more despised. For, as I said before, that
which has no intrinsic beauty, sometimes receives a certain glory, sometimes
loses it, according to the opinion of those who are concerned with it. If then
high offices cannot make men venerated, if furthermore they grow vile by the
infection of bad men, if ch anges of time can end their glory, and, lastly, if
they are held cheaply in the estimation of whole peoples, I ask you, so far from
affording true beauty to men, what beauty have they in themselves which men can
desire? 'Thoug h Nero decked himself proudly with purple of Tyre
and snow-white gems, none the less that man of rage and luxury lived ever hated
of all. Yet would that evil man at times give his dishonoured offices to men who
were revered. Who then could count men b lessed, who to such a villain owed
their high estate? 'Can kingdoms and intimacies with kings make people
powerful? " Certainly," some The may answer, " in so far as their happiness is
lasting." But antiquity and our times too are
' Yet these all would willingly live without fear, but they
cannot, and yet they boast of their power. Think you a man is powerful when you
see that he longs for that which he cannot bring to pass? Do you reckon a man
powerful who walks abroad with digni ty and attended by servants? A man who
strikes fear into his subjects, yet fears them more himself? Damocles, what it
was to be a tyrant, by setting him in his own seat at a sumptuous banquet,'but
hung a sword above him by a hair.
'Need I speak of intimacies with kings when kingship itself
is shewn to be full of weakness? Not only when ki ngs' powers fall are their
friends laid low, but often even when their powers are intact. Nero compelled
his friend and tutor, Seneca,l to
choose how he would die. Papinianus,2
for a long whi le a powerful courtier, was handed over to the soldiers' swords
by the Emperor Antoninus. Yet each of these was willing to surrender all his
power. Seneca even tried to give up all his wealth to Nero, and to seek
retirement. But the very weight of thei r wealth and power dragged them down to
ruin, and neither could do what he wished. 'What then is that power, whose possessors fear it? in
desiring to possess which, you are not safe, and from which you cannot escape,
even tho ugh you try to lay it down? What help are friends, made not by virtue
but by fortune? The friend gained by good fortune becomes an enemy in
ill-fortune. And what plague can more effectually injure than an intimate enemy?
'Th e man who would true power gain, must needs subdue his
own wild thoughts: never 'How deceitful is fame often, and how base a thing it is!
Justly did the tragic poet cry out,1
"O Fame, Fame, how many lives of men Of naught hast thou puffed up! " For m any
men have got a great name from the false opinions of the crowd.-And what could
be baser than such a thing? For those who are falsely praised, must blush to
hear their praises. And if they are justly won by merits, what can they add to
the pleasure of a wise man's conscience? For he measures his happiness not by
popular talk, but by the truth of his conscience. If it attracts a man to make
his name widely known, he must equally think it a shame if it be not made known.
But I have already said th at there must be yet more lands into which the renown
of a single man can never come; wherefore it follows that the man, whom you
think famous, will seem to have no such fame in the next quarter of the earth.
'Popular favour s eems to me to be unworthy even of mention
under this head, for it comes not by any judgment, and is never constant.
& nbsp; 'Again, who can but see how empty a name, and how
futile, is noble birth? For if its glory is due to renown, it belongs not to the
man. For the glory of noble birth seems to be praise for the merits of a man's
forefathers. But if praise cre ates the renown, it is the renowned who are
praised. Wherefore, if you have no renown of your own, that of others cannot
glorify you. But if there is any good in noble birth, I conceive it to be this,
and this alone, that the highborn seem to be bound in honour not to show any
degeneracy from their fathers' virtue. 'From like beginning rise all men on earth, for there is
one Father of all things; one is the guide of everything.'Tis He who gave the
sun his rays, and horn s unto the moon.'Tis He who set mankind on earth, and in
the heavens the stars. He put within our bodies spirits which were born in
heaven. And thus a highborn race has He set forth in man. Why do ye men rail on
your forefathers? If ye look to your be ginning and your author, which is God,
is any man degenerate or base but he who by his own vices cherishes base things
and leaves that beginning which was his? 'And now what am I to say of the pleasures of the body? The
desi res of the flesh are full of cares, their fulfilment is full of remorse.
What terrible diseases, what unbearable griefs,
'All pleasures have this way: those who enjoy them they
drive on with stings. Pleasure, like the winged bee, scatters its honey sweet,
then flies away, and with a clinging sting it strikes the hearts it touches.
'There is then no doubt that these roads to happiness are
no roads, and they cannot lead any man to any end whither they profess to take
him. I would shew you shortly with 'Ah! how wretched are they whom ignorance leads astray by
her crooked path! Ye seek not gold upon green trees, nor gather precious stones
from vines, nor set your nets on mountain tops to catch the fishes for your
feast, nor hunt the Umbrian sea in search of goats. Man knows the depths of the
sea themselves, hidden though they be beneath its waves; he knows which wate r
best yields him pearls, and which the scarlet dye. But in their blindness men
are content, and know not where lies hid the good which they desire. They sink
in earthly things, and there they seek that which has soared 'So far,' she continued,' we have been content to set forth
the form of false happiness. If you clearly understand that, my next duty is to
shew what is true happiness.' & nbsp; 'I do see,' said I,'that wealth cannot satisfy, that
power comes not to kingdoms, nor veneration to high offices; that true renown
cannot accompany ambition, nor true enjoyment wait upon the pleasures of the
body.' ; 'Have you grasped the reasons why it is so? ' she asked.
'I seem to look at them as through a narrow chink, but I
would learn more clearly from you.' 'The reason is to hand,' said she; 'human error takes that
which is simple and by nature impossible to divide, tries to divide it, and
turns its truth and perfection into falsity and imperfection. Tell me, do you
think that anything which lacks nothing, can be without power? ' 'Of course not.' 'You are right; for if anything has any weakness in any
part, it must lack the help of something else.' 'That is so,' I said.
&n bsp; 'Then perfect satisfaction and power have the same
nature? ' 'Yes, it seems so.' 'And do you think such a thing contemptible, or the
opposite, worthy of all veneration? ' 'There can be no doubt that it is worthy.' 'Then let us add veneration to that satisfaction and power,
and so consider these three as one.' 'Yes, we must add it if we wish to proclaim the truth.'
'Do you then think that this whole is dull and of no
reputation, or renowned with all glory? For consider it thus: we have granted
that it lacks nothing, that it has all power and is worthy of all veneration; it
must not therefore lack the glory which it cannot supply for itself, and thereby
seem to be in any direction contemptible.' 'No,' I said,'I must allow that it has glory too.' 'Therefore we must rank this glory equally with the other
three.' 'Yes, we must.' 'Then that which lacks nothing from outside itself, which
is all-powerful by its own might, which has renown and veneration, must surely
be allowe d to be most happy too?' 'I cannot imagine from what quarter unhappiness would creep
into such a thing, wherefore we must grant that it is full of happiness if the
other qualities remain existent.' 'T hen it follows further, that though perfect
'They cannot.' 'This then,' said she,'is a simple, single thing by
nature, only divided by the mistakes of base humanity; and while men try to gain
a part of that which has no parts, they fail both to obtain a fraction, which
cannot exist, and the whole too a fter which they do not strive.' 'Tell me how they fail thus,' I said. 'One seeks riches by fleeing from poverty, and takes no
thought of power,' she answered, 'and so he prefers to be base and unknown, and
even deprives himself of natural pleasures lest he should part with the riches
which he has gathered. Thus not even that satisfaction reaches the man who loses
all power, who is stabbed by sorrow, lowered by his meanness, hidden by his lack
of fame. Another seeks power only: he scatters his wealth, he despises pleasures
and honours which have no power, and sets no value upon glory. You see how many
things such an one lacks. Sometimes he goes without necessaries even, sometimes
he feels th e bite and torture of care; and as he cannot rid himself of these,
he loses the power too which he sought above all things. The same argument may
be applied to offices, glory, and pleasure. For since each one of these is the
same as each other, any m an who seeks one without the others, gains not even
that one which he desires.'
'What then? ' I asked. 'If any man desires to obtain all together, he will be
seeki ng the sum of happiness. But will he ever find that in these things which
we have shewn cannot supply what they promise?' 'No. 'Then happiness is not to be sought for among these things
which are separately believed to suppl y each thing so sought.' 'Nothing could be more plainly true,' I said. 'Then you have before you the form of false happiness, and
its causes; now turn your attention in the opposite direction, and you will
quickly see the true happiness which I have promised to shew you.' 'But surely this is clear even to the blindest, and you
shewed it before when you were trying to make clear the causes of false
happiness. For if I mist ake not, true and perfect happiness is that which makes
a man truly satisfied, powerful, venerated, renowned, and happy. And (for I
would have you see that I have looked deeply into the matter) I realise without
doubt that that which can truly yield any one of these, since they are all one,
is perfect happiness. 'Ah! my son,' said she,' I do see that you are blessed in
this opinion, but I would have you add one thing.' 'What is that? ' I asked. 'Do you think that there is anything among mortals, and in
our perishable lives, which could yield such a state? '
'I do not think that there is, and I think th at you have
shewn this beyond the need of further proof.' 'These then seem to yield to mortals certain appearances of
the true good, or some such imperfections; but they cannot give true and perfect
good.' ; 'No.' 'Since, then, you have seen what is true happiness, and
what are the false imitations thereof, it now remains that you should learn
whence this true happiness may be sought.' 'For that,' said I,' I have been impatiently waiting.' 'But divine help must be sought in small things as well as
great (as my pupil Plato says in his Timoe;us);1
so what, think you, must we d o to deserve to find the place of that highest
good? ' 'Call,' I said,' upon the Father of all, for if we do not
do so, no undertaking would be rightly or duly begun.' 'You are right,' said she; and t hus she cried aloud: -- 2
'Thou who dost rule the universe with 'Grant then, O Father, that this mind of ours may rise to
Thy throne of majesty; gra nt us to reach that fount of good. Grant that we may
so find light that we may set on Thee unblinded eyes; cast Thou therefrom the
heavy clouds of this material world. Shine forth upon us in Thine own true
glory. Thou art the bright and peaceful res t of all Thy children that worship
Thee. To see Thee clearly is the limit of our aim. Thou art our beginning, our
progress, our guide, our way, our end. 'Since then you have seen the form both of the imperfect
and the perf ect good, I think I should now shew you where lies this perfection
of happiness. In this I think our first inquiry must be whether any good of this
kind can exist in the very nature of a subject; for we must not let any vain
form of thought make us miss the truth of this matter. But there can be no
denial of its existence, that it is as the very source of all good. For if
anything is said to be imperfect, it is held to be so by some loss of its
perfection. Wherefore if in any kind of thing a pa rticular seems imperfect,
there must also be a perfect specimen in the same kind. For if you take away the
perfection,
'Yes,' said I,' that is quite surely proved to be true.'
'Now consider,' she continued,' whe re it lies. The
universally accepted notion of men proves that God, the fountain-head of all
things, is good. For nothing can be thought of better than God, and surely He,
than whom there is nothing better, must without doubt be good. Now reason she ws
us that God is so good, that we are convinced that in Him lies also the perfect
good. For if it is not so, He cannot be the fountain-head; for there must then
be something more excellent, possessing that perfect good, which appears to be
of older origin than God: for it has been proved that all perfections are of
earlier origin than the imperfect specimens of the same: wherefore, unless we
are to prolong the series to infinity, we must allow that the highest Deity must
be full of the highest , the perfect good. But as we have laid down that true
happiness is perfect 'Yes, I accept that; it cannot be in any way contradicted.'
'But,' she said,' I beg you, be sure that you accept with a
sur e conscience and determination this fact, that we have said that the highest
Deity is filled with the highest good.' 'How should I think of it? ' I asked. 'You must not think of God, the Father of all , whom we
hold to be filled with the highest good, as having received this good into
Himself from without, nor that He has it by nature in such a manner that you
might consider Him, its possessor, and the happiness possessed, as having
different esse ntial existences. For if you think that good has been received
from without, that which gave it must be more excellent than that which received
it; but we have most rightly stated that He is the most excellent of all things.
And if you think that it is in Him by His nature, but different in kind, then,
while we speak of God as the fountain-head of all things, who could imagine by
whom these different kinds can have been united? Lastly, that which is different
from anything cannot be the thing f rom which it differs. So anything which is
by its nature different from the highest good, cannot be the highest good. And
this we must not think of God, than whom there is nothing more excellent, as we
have agreed. Nothing in this world can have a n ature which is better than
'Most tr uly,' I said. 'You agree that the highest good is happiness? ' 'Yes.' 'Then you must allow that God is absolute happiness? 'I cannot deny what you put forward before, and I see that
this follows necessarily from those propositions.' 'Look then,' she said,'whether it is proved more strongly
by this too: there cannot be two highest goods which are different. For where
two g ood things are different, the one cannot be the other; wherefore neither
can be the perfect good, while each is lacking to the other. And that which is
not perfect cannot be the highest, plainly. Therefore if two things are highest
good, they cannot be different. Further, we have proved to ourselves that both
happiness and God are each the highest good. Therefore the highest Deity must be
identical with the highest happiness.' 'No conclusion,' I said,' could be truer in fact, or more
surely proved by reason, or more worthy of our God.' 'Besides this let me give you corollary, as geometricians
do, when they wish to add a point drawn from the propositions they have proved.
Since men become ha ppy by
; 'This corollary,' I said,' or whatever you call it, is
indeed beautiful and very precious.' 'Yes, but nothing can be more beautiful than this too which
reason would have us add to what we have agreed upon.' &nbs p; 'What is that? ' I asked. 'Happiness seems to include many things: do all these join
it together as into a whole which is happiness, as though each thing were a
different part thereof, or is any one of them a go od which fulfils the essence
of happiness, and do the others merely bear relations to this one .? ' 'I would have you make this plain by the enunciation of
these particulars.' 'Do we not,' she asked,' hold that happiness is a good
thing? ' 'Yes,' I answered,' the highest good.' 'But you may apply this quality of happiness to them all.
For the perfect satisfaction is the same, and the highest power , and
veneration, and renown, and pleasure; these are all held to be happiness.
'What then? ' I asked. 'Are all these things, satisfaction, power, and the others,
as it were, members of the body, happiness, or do they all bear their relation
to the good, as members to a head? ' 'I understand what you propose to examine, but I am waiting
eagerly to hear what you will lay down.' &n bsp; 'I would have you take the following explanation,' she
said.' If these were all members of the one body, happiness, they would differ
individually. For this is the nature of particulars, to make up one body of
different parts. But all these have been shewn to be one and the same. Therefore
they are not as members; and further, this happiness will then appear to be
joined together into a whole body out of one member, which is impossible.' 'That is quite ce rtain,' said I,' but I would hear what is
to come.' 'It is plain that the others have some relation to the
good. It is for that reason, namely because it is held to be good, that this
satisfaction is sought, and power likewis e, and the others too; we may suppose
the same of veneration, renown, and pleasure. The good then is the cause of the
desire for all of these, and their consummation also. Such a thing as has in
itself no real or even pretended good, cannot ever be sought. On the other hand,
such things as are not by nature good, but seem to be so, are sought as though
they were truly good. Wherefore we may justly believe that
'I cannot see how any one can think otherwise.' 'But we have shewn that God and true happiness are one and
the same.' 'Yes.' 'Therefore,' said she,'we may safely conclude that the
essence of God also lies in the absolute good and nowhere else. 'Come hither all who are the prey of passions, bound by
their ruthless chains; those deceiving passions which blunt the minds of men.
Here shall you find rest from your labours; here a haven lying in tranquil
peace; this shall be a resting-place open to receive within itself all the
miserable on earth. Not
&nb sp; 'I cannot but agree with that,' I said,' for it all
stands woven together by the strongest proofs.' Then she said,'At what would you
value this, namely if you could find out what is the absolute good? ' 'I wou ld reckon it,' I said,'at an infinite value, if I
could find out God too, who is the good.' 'And that too I will make plain by most true reasoning, if
you will allow to stand the conclusions we have just now arrived at.' 'They shall stand good.' 'Have I not shewn,' she asked,' that those upon the things
which most men seek are for this reason not perfect goods, because they differ
between the highest themselves; they are lacking to one another, and so cannot
afford full, absolute good? But 'That has been proved beyond all doubt.' 'Then such things as differ among themselves are not goods,
but they become so when they begin to be a single unity. Is it not then the ca
se these become goods by the attainment of unity? ' 'Yes,' I said,' it seems so.' 'But I think you allow that every good is good by
participation in good? ' 'Yes, I do.' 'Then by reason of this likeness both unity and good must
be allowed to be the same thing; for such things as have by nature the same
operation, have the same essence.' 'Undeniably.' &n bsp;'Do you realise that everything remains existent so
long as it keeps its unity, but perishes in dissolution as soon as it loses its
unity? ' 'How so? ' I asked. 'In the case of animals,' she said, ' so long as mind and
body remain united, you have what you call an animal. But as soon as this unity
is dissolved by the separation of the two, the animal perishes and can plainly
be no longer called an animal. In the case of the body, too,
'Yes, I see the same when I think of other cases.' 'Is there anything,' she then asked,' which, in so far as
it acts by nature, ever loses its desire for self-preservation, and would
voluntarily seek to come to death and corruption? ' 'No,' I said; ' while I think of animals which have
volition in their nature, I can find in them no desire to throw away their
determination to remain as they are, or to hasten to perish of their own accord,
so long as there are no external forces compelling them t hereto. Every animal
labours for its preservation, shunning death and extinction. But about trees and
plants, I have great doubts as to what I should agree to in their case, and in
all inanimate objects.' 'But in this case t oo,' she said,'you have no reason to be
in doubt, when you see how trees and plants grow in places which suit them, and
where, so far as nature is able to prevent it, they cannot quickly wither and
perish. For some grow in plains, others on mountain s; some are nourished by
marshes,
'We are not now discussing t he voluntary movements of a
reasoning mind, but the natural instinct. For instance, we unwittingly digest
the food we have eaten, and unconsciously breathe in sleep. Not even in animals
does this love of self-preservation come from mental wishes, but from elementary
nature. For often the will, under stress of external causes, embraces the idea
of death, from which nature revolts in horror.1
And, on the other hand, the will sometimes restrains what nature alwa ys
desires, namely the operation of begetting, by which alone the continuance of
mortal things becomes enduring. Thus far, then, this love of self- preservation
arises not from the reasoning animal s intention, but from natural instinct.
Providence h as given to its creatures this the greatest cause of permanent
existence, the instinctive desire to remain existent so far as possible.
Wherefore you have no reason to doubt that all things, which exist, seek a
permanent existence by nature, and simi larly avoid extinction.' 'Yes,' I said,'I confess that I see now beyond all doubt
what appeared to me just now uncertain.' 'But,' she continued,'that which seeks to continue its
existence, aims at un ity; for take 'That is true.' 'Then all things desire unity,' she said, and I agreed.
'But we have shewn unity to be identical with the good? '
'Yes,' said I. 'Then all things desire the good; and that you may define
as being the absolute good which is desired by all.' 'Nothing could be more truthfully reasoned. For either
everything is brought back to nothing, and all will flow on at random with no
guiding head; or if there is any universal aim, it will be the sum of all good.'
'Great is my rejoicing, m y son,' said she, 'for you have
set firmly in your mind the mark of the central truth. And hereby is made plain
to you that which you a short time ago said that you knew not.' 'What was that? ' 'What was the final aim of all things,' she said,' for that
is plainly what is desired by all: since we have agreed that that is the good,
we must confess that the good is the end of all things. 'If any man makes search for trut h with all his
penetration, and would be led astray by no deceiving paths, let him turn upon
himself the light of an inward gaze, let him bend by force the long-drawn
wanderings of his thoughts into
'If,' said she,' you look back upon what we that have
agreed upon earlier, you will also soon recall what you just now said you knew
not.' 'What is that? ' I asked. 'The guidance by which the universe is directed.' 'Yes, I remember confessing my ignorance, and though I
think I foresee the answer you will offer, I am eager to hear you explain it
more fully.' < /p>
'This world,' she said,' you thought a little while ago
must without doubt be guided by God.' 'And I think so now,' I said,'and will never think there is
any doubt thereof; and I will shortly explain b y what reasoning I arrive at
that point. This universe would never have been suitably put together into one
form from such various and opposite parts, unless there were some One who joined
such different parts together; and when joined, the very vari ety of their
natures, so discordant among themselves, would break their harmony and tear them
asunder unless the One held together what it wove into one whole. Such a fixed
order of nature could not continue its course, could not develop motions tak ing
such various directions in place, time, operation, space, and attributes, unless
there were One who, being immutable, had the disposal of these various changes.
And this cause of their remaining fixed and their moving, I call God, according
to th e name familiar to all.' Then said she,' Since these are your feelings, I think
there is but little trouble left me before you may revisit your home with
happiness in your grasp. But let us look into the matter we
'We have.' 'Wherefore He needs no external aid in governing the
universe, or, if He had any such need, He would not have this complete
sufficiency.' 'That of necessity follows,' I said. 'Then He arranges all thi ngs by Himself.' Without doubt He
does.' 'And God has been shewn to be the absolute good.' 'Yes, I remember.' 'Then He arranges all things by good, if He arranges them
by Him self, whom we have agreed to be the absolute good. And so this is the
tiller and rudder by which the ship of the universe is kept sure and
unbreakable.' 'I feel that most strongly,' I said; 'and I foresaw that
you would say s o before, though I had a slight uncertainty.' 'I believe you,' she said,' for now you bring your eyes
more watchfully to scan the truth. But what I am going to say is no less plain
to the sight.' 'Wh at is that; ' 'Since we may reasonably be sure that God steers all things
by the helm of goodness, and, as I have shewn you, all things have a natural
instinct to hasten towards the good, can there be any doubt that they are guided
according to
'That is so,' I s aid,'and the government would not seem
happy if it was a yoke upon discontented necks, and not the salvation of the
submissive.' 'Then nothing need oppose God's way for its own nature's
preservation.' &nbs p;'No.' 'But if it try to oppose Him, will it ever have any success
at all against One whom we have justly allowed to be supremely powerful in
matters of happiness? ' 'Certainly not.' &n bsp; 'Then there is nothing which could have the will or
the power to resist the highest good? ' I think not.' 'Then it is the highest good which is guiding with strength
and disposing with gentleness? ' & nbsp; Then said I,'How great pleasure these things give me!
not only those which have been proved by the strongest arguments, but still more
the words in which you prove them, which make me ashamed that my folly has
bragged so loudly.' & nbsp; 'You have heard in mythology how the giants attacked
heaven. It was this kindly strength which overthrew them too, as was their
desert. But would you care to put these
'As you hold best,' I said. 'Nobody would care to doubt that God is all-powerful? '
'At any rate, no san e man would doubt it.' 'Being, then, all-powerful, nothing is beyond His power? '
'Nothing.' 'Can, then, God do evil? ' 'No.' &nbs p;'Then evil is nothing, since it is beyond His power,
and nothing is beyond His power? ' 'Are you playing with me,' I asked,' weaving arguments as a
labyrinth out of which I shall find no way? You may enter a labyrinth by th e
way by which you may come forth: come now forth by the way you have gone in: or
are you folding your reason in some wondrous circle of divine simplicity? A
little while ago you started from happiness, and said that happiness was the
highest good; a nd you shewed how that rested in the highest Deity. And you
reasoned that God too was the highest good, and the fullest happiness; and you
allowed, as though granting a slight gift, that none could be happy except such
as were similarly divine. Agai n, you said that the essence of God and of
happiness was identical with the very form of good; and that that alone was good
which was sought by all nature. And you argued, too, that God guided this
universe by the helm of
Then she answered,' I was not mocking you. We have worked
out the greatest of all matters by the grace of God, to whom we prayed. For the
form of the divine essence is such that it is not dif fused without, nor
receives aught into itself from without. But as Parmenides says of it, " It is a
mass well rounded upon all sides."1
But if you examine it with reasoning, sought for not externally but by lying w
ithin the sphere of the very thing we are handling, you will not wonder at what
you have learnt on Plato's authority,2
that our language must be akin to the subjects of which we speak. 'H appy the man who could reach the crystal fount of good:
happy he who could shake off THUS gently sang the Lady Philosophy with dignified mien
and grave countenance; and when she ceased, I, who had not thoroughly forgotten
the grief with in me, interrupted her as she was about to speak further.' Herald
of true light,' I said,'right clear have been the outpourings of your speech
till now, seeming inspired as one contemplates them, and invincible through your
reasonings. And though th rough grief for the injustices I suffer, I had
forgotten them, yet you have not spoken of They what I knew not at all before.
But this one thing is the chief cause of my grief, namely that, when there
exists a good governor of the world, evils should exist at all, or, existing,
should go unpunished. I would have you think how strange is this fact alone. But
there is an even stranger attached thereto: ill-doing reigns and flourishes,
while virtue not only lacks its reward, but is even trampled un derfoot by
wicked doers, and pays the penalties instead of crime. Who can wonder and
complain enough that such things should happen under the rule of One who, while
all-knowing and all-powerful, wills good alone? ' Then she answered: ' Yes, it would be most terrible,
monstrous, and infinitely amazing if
'Yea, airy wings are mine to scale the heights of heaven;
when these the min d has donned, swiftly she loathes and spurns this earth. She
soars above the sphere of this vast atmosphere, sees the clouds behind her far;
she passes high above the topmost fires which seethe above the feverish turmoil
of the air,1 until she rises 'Wondrous,' I cried; 'what vast things do you promise! and
I doubt not that you can fulfil them. I onl y beg that you will not hold me back
with delays, now that you have excited me thus far.' 'First, then, you must learn that power is never lacking to
the good, while the wicked are devoid of all strength. The proofs of these two
statements hang upon each other. For good and bad are opposites, and therefore,
if it is allowed that good is powerful, the weakness
'It is allowed that there are two things upon which depend
the entire operation of human actions: they are will and power. For if the will
be wanting, a man does not even attempt that which he has no desire to perform;
if the power be wanting, the will is exercised in vain. Wherefo re, if you see a
man wish for that which he will in no wise gain, you cannot doubt that he lacks
the power to attain that which he wishes.' 'That is plain beyond doubt.' 'And if you see a man gain tha t which he wishes, can you
doubt that he has the power? ' 'No.' 'But wherein a man has power, he is strong; wherein he has
not power, he must be counted weak? ' 'Yes.' 'Yes,' said I,' I remembe r that that too was proved.' 'Do you remember that happiness is the absolute good, and
that the good is desired of all, when in that manner happiness is sought? '
&nbs p;'I need not recall that,' I said,'since it is present
fixedly in my memory.' 'Then all men, good and bad alike, seek to arrive at the
good by no different instincts? ' 'Yes, that follows necessarily. ' 'But it is certain that the good become so by the
attainment of good? ' 'Yes.' 'Then the good attain that which they wish? ' 'Yes,' said I,' it seem s so.' 'But if evil men attain the good they seek, they cannot be
evil? ' 'No.' 'Since, then, both classes seek the good, which the good
attain, but the evil attain not, it is plain that the good are powerful, while
the evil are weak? ' 'If any doubt that, he cannot judge by the nature of the
world, nor by the sequence of arguments.' Again she said,' If there are two pers ons before whom the
same object is put by natural instinct, and one person carries his object
through, working by his natural functions, but the other cannot put his natural
instinct into practice, but using some function unsuitable to nature he can
imitate the successful person, but not fulfil his original purpose, in this
case, which of the two do you decide to be the more capable? ' 'I think I guess what you mean, but I would hear more
explicitly.' ; 'You will not, I think, deny that the motion of walking
is a natural one to mankind? '
'No, I will not.' 'And is not that the natural function of the feet ? ' 'Yes.' 'If, then, one man walks, being able to advance upon his
feet, while another, who lacks the natural function of feet, uses his hands and
so tries to walk, which of these two may justly be held the more capable? ' 'Weave me other riddles I ' I exclaimed, ' for can any one
doubt that a man who enjoys his natural functions, is more capable than one who
is incapable in that respect? ' 'But in the case of the highest good,' she said,' it is
equally the purpose set before good and bad men; good men seek it by the natural
functions of virtue, while bad men seek to attain the same through their
cupidity, which is not a natural function fo r the attainment of good. Think you
not so? ' 'I do indeed,' said I; ' this is plain, as also is the
deduction which follows. For it must be, from what I have already allowed, that
the good are powerful, the wicked weak.'
'Your anticipation is right; and as doctors are wont to
hope, it shews a lively nature now fit to withstand disease. But I see that you
are very ready in understanding, and I will multiply my arguments one upon
another. See how great is the weakness of these wicked men who cannot even
attain that to which their natural instinct leads them, nay, almost drives them.
And further, how if they are deprived of this
'That is quite plain.' 'I would have yo u understand what is this strength of
power. We have a little while ago laid down that nothing is more powerful than
the highest good? ' 'Yes,' I said. 'But the highest good can do no evil? ' 'No.' 'Is there any one who thinks that men are all-powerful? '
'No one,' I said,'unless he be mad.' 'And yet those same men can do evil.' Would to heaven th ey
could not! ' I cried. ' Then a powerful man is capable only of all
'Kings you may see sitting aloft upon their thrones,
gleaming with purple, hedged about with g rim guarding weapons, threatening with
'Do you see then in what a slough crimes are invo]ved, and
with what glory honesty shines forth? It is plain from this that reward is never
lacking to good de eds, nor punishment to crime. We may justly say that the
reward of every act which is performed is the object for which it is performed.
For instance, on the racecourse the crown for which the runner strives is his
reward. But we have shewn that hap piness is the identical good for the sake of
which all actions are performed. Therefore the absolute good is the reward put
before all human actions. But good men cannot be deprived of this. And further,
a man who lacks good cannot justly be describe d as a good man; wherefore we may
say that good habits pever miss their rewards. Let the wicked rage never so
wildly, the wise man's crown shall never fail nor wither. And the
'Then, from the other point of view of the good, see what a
punishment ever goes with the wicked. You have learnt a little while past that
all that e xists is one, and that the good itself is one; it follows therefrom
that all that exists must appear to be good. In this way, therefore, all that
falls away from the good, ceases also to exist, wherefore evil men cease to be
what they were. The form of their human bodies still proves that they have been
men; wherefore they must have lost their human nature when they turned to
evil-doing. But as goodness alone can lead men forward beyond their humanity, so
evil of necessity will thrust down be low the honourable estate of humanity
those whom it casts down from their first position. The result is that you
cannot hold him to be a man who has been, so to say, transformed by his vices.
If a violent man and a robber burns with greed of other me n's possessions, you
say he is like a wolf. Another fierce man is always working his restless tongue
at lawsuits, and you will compare him to a hound. Does another delight to spring
upon men from ambushes with hidden guile? He is as a fox. Does one man roar and
not restrain
'The east wind wafted the sails which carried on the
wandering ships of Ithaca's king to the island where dwelt the fair goddess
Circe, the sun's own daughter. There for her new guests she mingled cups
bewitched by charms. Her hand, well skilled in use of herbs, changed these
guests to different forms. One bears the face of a bo ar; another grows like to
an African lion with fangs and claws; this one becomes as a wolf, and when he
thinks to weep, he howls; that one is an Indian tiger, though he walks all
harmless round about the dwelling-place. The leader alone, Ulysses, tho ugh
beset by so many dangers, was saved from the goddess's bane by the pity of the
winged god, Mercury. But the sailors had drunk of her cups, and now had turned
from food of corn to husks and acorns, food of swine. Naught is left the same,
speech a nd form are gone; only the mind remains
'How weak was that hand, how powerless those magic herbs
which could change the limbs but not the he art! Within lies the strength of
men, hidden in deep security. Stronger are those dread poisons which can drag a
man out of himself, which work their way within: they hurt not the body, but on
the mind their rage inflicts a grievous wound.'1 Then I answered: 'I confess that I think it is justly said
that vicious men keep only the outward bodily form of their humanity, and, in
the attributes of their souls, are changed to beasts. Bu t I would never have
allowed them willingly the power to rage in the ruin of good men through their
fierce and wicked intentions.' 'They have not that power,' said she,' as I will shew you
at a convenient time. But if this v ery power, which you believe is allowed to
them, were taken from them, the punishment of vicious men would be to a great
extent lightened. For, though some may scarcely believe it, evil men must be
more unhappy when they carry out their ill desires t han when they cannot fulfil
them. For if it is pitiable to have wished bad things, it is more pitiable to
have had the power to perform them, without which power the performance of this
pitiable will would never have effect. Thus, when you 'Yes,' said I,' I agree; but I do wish from my heart that
they may speedily be rid of one of these misfortunes, being deprived of this
power of doing evil.' 'They will be rid of it,' she said,'more speedily even
than you wish perhaps, and sooner than they think they will be rid thereof.
There is in the short course of life naught which is so long coming that an
immortal mind can think it has long t o wait for it. Many a time are their high
hopes and great plans for evil-doing cut short by a sudden and unlooked- for
end. This indeed it is that sets a limit to their misery. For if wickedness
makes a man miserable, the longer he is wicked, the more miserable must he be;
and I should hold them most miserable of all, if not even death at last put an
end to their evil-doing. If we have reached true conclusions concerning the
unhappiness of depravity, the misery, which is said to be eternal, can have no
limit.' 'That is a strange conclusion and hard to accept. But I see
that it is suited too well by what we have agreed upon earlier.' 'You are right,' she said; ' but when one finds it hard to
agree with a conclusion, one ought in fairness to point out some fault in the
argument which has preceded, or shew that
'What is that? ' I a sked. 'That wicked men are happier when they pay the penalty for
their wickedness than when they receive no penalty at the hands of justice.1
I am not going to urge what may occur to any one, namely, that depraved habits
are corrected by penalties, and drawn towards the right by fear of punishment,
and that an example is hereby given to others to avoid all that deserves blame.
But I think that the wicked who are not punished are in a nother way the more
unhappy, without regard to the corrective quality of punishment, nor its value
as an example.' 'And what way is there other than these?' 'We have allowed, have we not,' she said, 'that the good
are happy, but the bad are miserable . 'Yes.' 'Then if any good be added to the misery of any evil man,
is he not happier than the man whose miserable state is purely and simply misera
ble without any good at all mingled therewith?' 'I suppose so.' 'What if some furthe r evil beyond those by which a man,
who lacked all good things, were made miserable, were added to his miseries?
Should not he be reckoned far more unhappy than the man whose misfortune was
lightened by a share in some good? ' &nb sp;'Of course it is so.' 'Therefore,' she said,' the wicked when punished have
something good added to their lot, to wit, their punishment, which is good by
reason of its quality of justice; and they also, when unpunished, ha ve
something of further evil, their very impunity, which you have allowed to be an
evil, by reason of its injustice.' 'I cannot deny that,' said I. 'Then the wicked are far more unhappy when they are
unjustly unpunished, than when they are justly punished. It is plain that it is
just that the wicked should be punished, and unfair that they should escape
punishment.' 'No one will gainsay you.' 'But no one will deny this either, that all which is just
is good; and on the other part, all that is unjust is evil.' Then I said: 'The arguments which we have accepted bring us
to that conclusion. But tell me, do you leave no p unishment of the soul to
follow after the death of the body?' 'Yes,' she answered,' heavy punishments, of which some, I
think, are effected by bitter penalties, others by a cleansing mercy.1
But 'When I hear your arguments, I feel sure that they are true
as possible. But if I turn to human opinions, I ask what man would not think
them not only incredible, but even unthinkable? ' 'Yes,' she said,' for men cannot raise to the transparent
light of truth their eyes which have been accustomed to darkness. They are like
those birds whose sight is clear at night, but blinded by daylight. So long as
they look not
'I would hear those strong reasons,' I said. 'You do not deny that every wicked man deserves punishment?
' 'No.' 'It is plain for many reasons that the wicke d are unhappy?
' 'Yes.' 'Then you doubt not that those who are worthy of punishmen
t are miserable? ' 'No, I agree.' 'If then you were sitting as a judge, upon which would you
consider punishment should fall -- the man who did the injury, or the man who
suffered it? ' 'I have no hesitation in saying that I would make amends
to the sufferer at the expense of the doer of the injustice.' 'Then the doer of the injustice would seem to you more
miserable than the sufferer? ' & nbsp; 'That follows.' 'Then from this,' said she,' and other causes which rest
upon the same foundation, it is plain that, since baseness makes men more
miserable by its own nature, the misery is brought not to the sufferer of an
injustice, but to the doer thereof. But the speakers in law- courts take the
opposite course: they try to excite the pity of the judges for those who have
suffered any heavy or bitter wrong; but more justly their pity would be due to t
hose who have committed the wrong. These guilty men ought to be brought, by
accusers kindly rather than angry, to justice, as patients to a doctor, that
their disease of crime may be checked by punishment. Under such an arrangement
the occupation of advocates for defence would either come to a complete stand-
still, or if it seemed more to the advantage of mankind, it might turn to the
work of prosecution.
'To what good end do men their passions raise, even to drag
from fate their deaths by their own hands? If ye seek death, she is surely nigh
of her own will; and her winged horses she will not delay. Serpents and lions,
bears, tigers and boars, all seek your lives with their fangs, yet do ye seek
them with swords? Is it because your manners are so wide in variance that men ra
ise up unjust battles and savage wars, and seek to perish by each other's darts?
Such is no just reason for this cruelty.
Then said I,' I see how happiness and misery lie
inseparably in the deserts of good and bad men. But I am sure that there is some
good and some bad in the general fortune of men. For no wise man eve n would
wish to be exiled, impoverished, and disgraced rather than full of wealth,
power, veneration, and strength, and flourishing securely in his own city. The
operation of wisdom is shewn in this way more nobly and clearly, when the
happiness of rulers is in a manner transmitted to the people who come into
contact with their rule; and especially when prisons, bonds, and other penalties
of the law become the lot of the evil citizens for whom they were designed. I am
struck with great wonder w hy these dues are interchanged; why punishments for
crimes fall upon the good, while the bad citizens seize the rewards of virtue;
and I long to learn from you what reason can be put forward for such unjust
confusion. I should wonder less if I could believe that everything was the
confusion of accident and chance. But now the thought of God's guidance
increases my amazement; He often grants happiness to good men and bitterness to
the bad, and then, on the other hand, sends hardships to the good and grants the
desires of the wicked. Can we lay our hands on any cause? If not, what can make
'It is no wonder,' she answered,' if one who kno ws not the
order and reasons of nature, should think it is all at random and confused. But
doubt not, though you know not the cause of such a great matter of the world's
government, doubt not, I say, that all is rightly done, because a good Governor
rules the universe. 'If any man knows not that the star Arcturus1
has his course nearest the topmost pole how shall he not be amazed that Bo”tes
so slowly takes his wain and is so late t o dip his brightness in the ocean, and
yet so swiftly turns to rise again? The law of heaven on high will but bewilder
him. When the full moon grows dim to its horns, darkened by the shadow of dull
night, when Phoebe thus lays bare all the varying b ands of the stars, which she
had hidden by the power of her shining face: then are the nations stirred by the
errors of the vulgar, and beat without ceasing brazen cymbals.2No
man is surprised when the blasts of t he wind beat a shore with roaring waves,
nor when a solid mass of frozen snow is melted by Then said she, smiling,' Your question calls me to the
greatest of all these matters, and a full answer thereto is well-nigh
impossible. For this is its kind: if one doubt be cut away, innumerable others
arise, as the Hydra's heads; and there can be no limit unless a man restrains
them by the most quick fire of the mind. For herein lie the questions of the
directness of Providence, the course of Fate, chances which cannot be foreseen,
knowledge, div ine predestination, and freedom of judgment. You can judge for
yourself the weight of these questions. But since it is a part of your treatment
to know some of these, I will attempt to make some advantage therefrom, though
we are penned in by our na rrow space of time. But
'As you will,' said I. Then, as th ough beginning afresh,
she spake thus: 'The engendering of all things, the whole advance of all
changing natures, and every motion and progress in the world, draw their causes,
their order, and their forms from the allotment of the unchanging mind of God,
which lays manifold restrictions on all action from the calm fortress of its own
directness Such restrictions are called Providence when they can be seen to lie
in the very simplicity of divine understanding; but they were called Fate in old
times when they were viewed with reference to the objects which they moved or
arranged. It will easily be understood that these two are very different if the
mind examines the force of each. For Providence is the very divine reason which
arranges all things, and rests with the supreme disposer of all; while Fate is
that ordering which is a part of all changeable things, and by means of which
Providence binds all things together in their own order. Providence embraces all
things equally, however different they may be, even however infinite: when they
are assigned to their own places, forms, and times, Fate sets them in an orderly
motion; so that this development of the temporal order, unified in the
intelligence of the mind of God, is Providence.
&n bsp;'But you will ask, " What more unjust confusion could
exist than that good men should sometimes enjoy prosperity, sometimes suffer
adversity, and that the bad too should sometimes receive what they desire,
sometimes what they hate? " Are then men possessed of such infallible minds that
they, whom they consider honest or dishonest, must necessarily be what they are
held to be? No, in these matters human judgment is at variance with itself, and
those who are held by some to be worthy of rewa rd, are by others held worthy of
punishment. But let us grant that a man could discern between good and bad
characters. Can
'But I see that now you are weighed down by the burden of
the question, and wearied by the length of our reasoning, and waiting for the
gentleness of song. Take then your draught, be refreshed thereby and advance
further the stronger. 'If thou wouldst diligently behold with unsullied mind the
laws of the God of thunde r upon high, look to the highest point of heaven
above. There, by a fair and equal compact, do the stars keep their ancient
peace. The sun is hurried on by its whirl of fire, but impedes not the moon's
cool orb. The Bear turns its rushing course aro und the highest pole of the
universe, and dips not in the western depths, 'Do you see now,' she continued,'what follows upon all that
we have said? ' 'What is it?' I asked. &nb sp; 'That all fortune is plainly good,' she answered. 'How can that be? ' said I. 'Consider this,' she said: 'all fortune, whether pleasant
or difficult, is due to this cause; it is for the sake of rewarding the good or
exercising their virtue, and of punishing and correcting bad men: therefore it
is plain that all this fortune which is allowed to be just or expedient, must be
good.' 'Yes,' I said,'that is a true arg ument, and when I think
of the Providence or Fate about which you have taught me, the conclusion rests
upon strong foundations. But if it please you, let us count it among those
conclusions which you a little while ago set down as inconceivable.' < /p>
'Why?' she asked. 'Because it is a commonplace saying among men -- indeed an
especially frequent one -- that some people have bad fortune.' 'Would you then hav e us approach more nearly the common
converation of men, lest we should seem to withdraw too far from human ways?'
'If you will,' I said.
'Do you not think that that, which i s advantageous, is
good?' 'Yes.' 'And that fortune, which exercises or corrects, is
advantageous? ' 'I agree,' said I. 'Then it is good, is it not? ' 'It must be so.' 'This is the fortune of those who are either firmly set in
virtue and struggling against their difficulties, or of those who would leave
their vices and take the path of virtue? ' < /p>
'That is true,' I said. 'But what of that pleasant fortune which is granted as a
reward to good men? Do most people perceive that it is bad? No; but, as is true,
they esteem it the best. And what of th e last kind of fortune, which is hard
and which restrains bad men by just punishment? Is that commonly held to be
good? ' 'No,' said I,' it is held to be the most miserable of all
that can be imagined.' &nb sp;'Beware lest in following the common conception, we
come to some truly inconceivable conclusion.' 'What do you mean? ' 'From what we have allowed,' she said,' it results that the
fortune of those w ho are in possession of virtue, or are gaining it, or
advancing therein, is entirely good, whatever it be, while for those who remain
in wickedness, their fortune is the worst.' 'That is true, but who would dare confess it? '
'For this reason a wise man should never complain, whenever
he is brought into strife with fortune; just as a brave man cannot properly be
disgusted whenever the noise of battle is heard, since for both of them their
very difficulty is their opportunity, for the brave man of increasing his glory,
for the wise man of confirming and strengthening his wisdom. From this is virtue
itself so named,1
bec ause it is so supported by its strength that it is not overcome by
adversity. And you who were set in the advance of virtue have not come to this
pass of being dissipated by delights, or enervated by pleasure; but you fight
too bitterly against all fortune. Keep the middle path of strength and virtue,
lest you be overwhelmed by misfortune or corrupted by pleasant fortune. All that
falls short or goes too far ahead, has contempt for happiness, and gains not the
reward for labour done. It rests i n your own hands what shall be the nature of
the fortune which you choose to form for yourself. For all fortune which seems
difficult, either exercises virtue, or corrects or punishes vice. 'The avenging son of Atreus strov e for full ten years
before he expiated in the fall of Phrygian Troy the wrong done to his brother's
marriage. The same Agamemnon must needs throw off his father's nature, and
himself, an unwilling priest, thrust his knife into his unhappy 'Go forth then bravely whither leads the lofty path of high
example. Why do ye sluggards turn your backs? When the earth is overcome, the
stars are yours. HERE she made an end and was for turning the course of her
speaking to the handling and explaining of other subjects. Then said I: 'Your
encouragement is right and most worthy in truth of your name and weight. But I
am learning by experience what you just now said of Providence; that the
question is bound up in others. I would ask you whether you think that Chance
exists at all, and what you think it is?' Then she answered: ' I am eager to fulfil my promised debt,
and to shew yo u the path by which you may seek your home. But these things,
though all-expedient for knowledge, are none the less rather apart from our
path, and we must be careful lest you become wearied by our turnings aside, and
so be not strong enough to comp lete the straight journey.' 'Have no fear at all thereof,' said I.'It will be restful
to know these things in which I have so great a pleasure; and when every view of
your reasoning has stood firm with unshaken credit, so let there be no doubt of
what shall follow.' 'I will do your pleasure,' she made answer, and thus she
began to speak:
'If chance is defined as an outcome of random i nfluence,
produced by no sequence of causes, I am sure that there is no such thing as
chance, and I consider that it is but an empty word, beyond shewing the meaning
of the matter which we have in hand. For what place can be left for anything
happeni ng at random, so long as God controls everything in order? It is a true
saying that nothing can come out of nothing. None of the old philosophers has
denied that, though they did not apply it to the effective principle, but to the
matter operated up on -- that is to say, to nature; and this was the foundation
upon which they built all their reasoning. If anything arises from no causes, it
will appear to have risen out of nothing. But if this is impossible, then chance
also cannot be anything of that sort, which is stated in the definition which we
mentioned.' 'Then is there nothing which can be justly called chance,
nor anything "by chance"? ' I asked.' Or is there anything which common people
know not, but which t hose words do suit? ' 'My philosopher, Aristotle, defined it in his
Physics1
shortly and well-nigh truly.' 'How? ' I asked. 'Whene ver anything is done with one intention, but
something else, other than was intended, results from certain causes, that is
called chance: as, for instance, if a man digs 'In the land where the Parthian, as he turns in flight,
shoots his arrows int o the pursuer's breast, from the rocks of the crag of
Ach‘menia, the Tigris and Euphrates flow from out one source, but quickly with
divided streams are separate. If they should come together and again be joined
in a single course, all, that 'I have listened to y ou,' I said,' and agree that it is as
you say. But in this close sequence of causes, is there any freedom for our
judgment or does this chain of fate bind the very feelings of our minds too?'
'There is free will,' she answered .'Nor could there be any
reasoning nature without freedom of judgment. For any being that can use its
reason by nature, has a power of judgment by which it can without further aid
decide each point, and so distinguish between objects to be desired a nd objects
to be shunned. Each therefore seeks what it deems desirable, and flies from what
it considers should be shunned. Wherefore all who have reason have also freedom
of desiring and refusing in themselves. But I do not lay down that this is eq
ual in all beings. Heavenly and divine beings have with them a judgment of great
insight, an imperturbable will, and a power which can effect their desires. But
human
'Homer with his honeyed lips sang of the bright sun's clear
light; yet the sun cannot burst with his feeble rays the bowels of the earth or
the depths of the sea. Not so with the Creator of this great sphere. No masses
of earth can block His vision as He looks over all. Night's cloudy darkness
cannot resist Him. With one glance of His intelligence He sees all that has
been, that is, and that is to come. Then said I,' Again am I plunged in yet more doubt and
difficulty.' 'What are they,' she asked,'though I h ave already my idea
of what your trouble consists? 'There seems to me,' I said,' to be such incompatibility
between the existence of God's universal foreknowledge and that of any freedom
of judgment. For if God foresees all t hings and cannot in anything be mistaken,
that, which His Providence sees will happen, must result. Wherefore if it knows
beforehand not only men's deeds but even their designs and wishes, there will be
no freedom of judgment For there can neither b e any deed done, nor wish formed,
except such as the infallible Providence of God has foreseen. For if matters
could ever so be turned that they resulted otherwise than was foreseen of
Providence, this foreknowledge would cease to be sure. But, rathe r than
knowledge, it is opinion which is uncertain; and that, I deem, is not applicable
to God. And, further, I cannot approve of an argument by which some men think
that they can cut this knot; for they say that a result does not come 'Yet how absurd it is that we should say that the result of
temporal affairs is the c ause of eternal foreknowledge! And to think that God
foresees future events because they are about to happen, is nothing else than to
hold events of past time to be the cause of that highest Providence. Besides,
just as, when I know a present fact, that fact must be so; so also when I know
of something that will happen, that must come to pass. Thus it follows that the
fulfilment of a foreknown event must be inevitable. 'Lastly, if any one believes that any matter is ot herwise
than the fact is, he not only has not knowledge, but his opinion is false also,
and that is very far from the truth of knowledge Wherefore, if any future event
is such that its fulfilment is not sure or necessary, how can it possibly be
known beforehand that it will occur? For just as absolute knowledge has no taint
of falsity, so also that which is conceived by knowledge cannot be otherwise
than as it is conceived. That is the reason why knowledge cannot lie, because
each matter must be just as knowledge knows that it is. What then How can God
know beforehand these uncertain future events? For if He thinks inevitable the
'What cause of discord is it breaks the & nbsp; Then said she,' This is the old plaint concerning
Providence which was so strongly urged Philosophy by Cicero when treating of
Divination,1
and you yourself have often and at length questioned the same subject. But so
far, none of you have explained it with enough diligence or certainty. The cause
of this obscurity is that the working of human reason cannot approach the
directness of divine foreknowledge. If this could be understood at all, there w
ould be no doubt left. And this especially will I try to make plain, if I can
first explain your difficulties. 'Tell me why you think abortive the reasoning of those who
solve the question thus; they argue that foreknowledge cannot be held to be a
cause for the necessity of future results, and therefore free will is not in any
way shackled by foreknowledge.2
Whence do you draw your proof of the necessity of future results if not from
the fact that such things as are known beforehand cannot but come to pass? If,
then (as you yourself admitted just now), foreknowledge brings no necessity to
bear upon future events, how is it that the voluntary results of such events are
bound to find a fixe d end? Now for the sake of the argument, that you may turn
your attention to what follows, let us state that there is no foreknowledge at
all. Then are the events which are decided by free will, bound by any necessity,
so far as this goes? 'But you will say that there is no doubt of this too,
whether there can be any foreknowledge of things which have not results bounden
by necessity. For they do seem to lack harmony : and you think that if they are
foreseen, the necessity follows; if there is no necessity, then they cannot be
foreseen; nothing can be perceived certainly by knowledge, unless it be certain.
But if things have uncertainty of result, but are foresee n as though certain,
this is plainly the obscurity of opinion, and not the truth of knowledge. For
you believe that to think aught other than it is, is the opposite of true
knowledge. The cause of this error is that every man believes that all the su
bjects, that he knows, are known by their own force or
'Do you see then, how in knowledge of all things, the
subject uses its own standar d of capability, and not those of the objects
known? And this is but reasonable, for every judgment formed is an act of the
person who judges, and therefore each man must of necessity perform
'With regard to feeling the effects of bodies, natures
which are brought into contact from without may affect the organs of the senses,
and the body's passive affection may precede the active energy of the spirit,
and call forth to itself the activity of the mind; if then, when the effec ts of
bodies are felt, the mind is not marked in any way by its passive reception
thereof, but declares that reception subject to the body of its own force, how
much less do those subjects, which are free from all affections of bodies,
follow externa l objects in their perceptions, and how much more do they make
clear the way for the action of their mind? By this argument many different
manners of understanding have fallen to widely different natures of things. For
the senses are incapable of an y knowledge but their own, and they alone fall to
those living beings which are incapable of motion, as are sea shell-fish, and
other low forms of life which live by clinging to rocks; while imagination is
granted to animals with the power of motion, who seem to be affected by some
desire to seek or avoid certain things.
'Let us therefore raise ourselves, if so be that we can, to
that height of the loftiest intelligence. For there reason will see what it
cannot of itself perceive, and that is to know how even such things as have
uncertain results are perceived definitely and for certain by foreknowledge; and
such foreknowledge will not be mere opinion, but rather the single and direct
form of the highest knowledge unlimited by any finite bounds. 'In what different shapes do living beings move upon the
earth! Some make flat their bodies, sweeping through the dust and usin g their
strength to make therein a furrow without break; some flit here and there upon
light wings
'Since then all that is known is apprehended, as we just
now shewed, not according to its nature but according to the nature of the
knower, let us examine, so far as we lawfully may, the character of the divine
nature, so that we may be able to learn what its knowledge is. 'The common opinion, according to all men living, is that
God is eternal. Let us therefore consider what is eternity. For eternity will, I
think, make clear to us at the same time the divine nature and knowledge. '
Eternity is the simultaneous and complete poss ession of infinite life. This
will appear more clearly if we compare it with temporal
'And further, God should not be regarded as older than His
creations by any period of time, but rather by the peculiar property of His own
single nature. For the infinite changing of temporal things tries to imitate the
ever simultaneously present immutability of His life: it cannot succeed in
imitating or equailing this, but sinks from immutability into change, and falls
from the single directness of the present into an infinite space of future and
past. And since this temporal state cannot possess its life completely and
simultaneously, but it does in the same manner exist for ever without ceasing,
it therefore seems to try in some degree to rival that which it cannot fulfil or
represent, for it binds itself to some sort of present time out of this small
and fleeting moment; but inasmuch as this temporal present bears a certain
appearance of that abiding present, it somehow makes
'Since then all ju dgment apprehends the subjects of its
thought according to its own nature, and God has a condition of ever-present
eternity, His knowledge, which passes over every change of time, embracing
infinite lengths of past and future, views in its own direct comprehension
everything as though it were taking place in the present. If you would weigh the
foreknowledge by which God distinguishes all things, you will more rightly hold
it to be a knowledge of a never-failing constancy in the present, than a
foreknowledge of the future. Whence Providence is more rightly to be understood
as a looking forth than a looking forward, because it is set far from low
matters and looks forth upon all things as from a lofty mountain-top above all.
Why then do you demand that all things occur by necessity, if divine light rests
upon them, while men do not render necessary such things as they can see?
Because you can see things of the present, does your sight therefore put upon
them any necessity?
'"What then," you may ask, " is the d ifference
The present translation of 'THE CONSOLATION OF
PHILOSOPHY' is the work of Mr. W. V. COOPER, B.A., King's College,
Cambridge, who has thus carried on the tradition of English renderings of
Boethius's famous work, the list of translators beginning with the illustrious
name of Alfred the Great. The recent Mi llenary, celebrated at
Winchester, has perhaps justified the issue of this first of twentieth-century
versions. The Frontispiece, taken from an Elzevir Sallust printed in 1634, has
been cbosen by way of illustrating both the fortune of the author an d his
famous idea of the changeableness of Fortune's Wheel. BOETHIUS'S first wife was Elpis, daughter of Festus. The
following epitaph has been handed down as that of Elpis, and has been said by
some to have been written by Boethius himself: -- THE incompatibility of the sufferings of good men, the
impunity and success of bad men, with the government of the world by a good God,
has been a subject of thought alllong men ever since religion and abstract
questions have occupie d the thoughts of mankind. The poetical books of the
Bible are full of it, particularly, of course the book of Job, which is a
dramatic poem entirely devoted to the subject. The New Testament contains much
teaching on the same question. Among the Gree ks the tragedians and later
philosophers delighted in working out its problems. But from the sixth to the
seventeenth centuries of our era the De Consolatione of Boethius, in its
original Latin and in many translations, was in the hands of alm ost all the
educated people of the world. The author's personal history was well known. He
was a man whose fortunes had risen to the highest pitch possible under the Roman
Empire; who had himself experienced the utter collapse of those fortunes, and w
as known to have sustained himself through imprisonment and even to torture and
an unjust death by the thoughts which he left to mankind in this book. It is a work which appealed to Pagan and Christian alike.
There is no Chri stian doctrine relied upon throughout the work, but there is
also nothing which could be in conflict with Christianity. Even the
personification of Philosophy, though after the form of a pagan goddess, is
precisely like the 'Wisdom' of Solomon in the Apocrypha; and the same habit of
thought led the Jews to personify the 'Word' of God, and use it as identical
with God Himself; and the same led to that identifying of the ' Word with
Christ, which we find in the first chapter of St. John's Gospel.
For though some have held that the Christianity of Boethius
was foisted upon him, with his canonisation as St. Severinus, after his death by
those who thought he must have been too good a man to have been a heathen, and
tho ugh the authenticity of his theological works also has therefore been
doubted, yet we may now be almost certain that he was a Christian, and an
orthodox Christian, for if it is true that he wrote those works, he combated
Arianism during his life, and during his imprisonment he was engaged upon a
treatise on the Unity of the Trinity, as well as upon this work. Here perhaps
lies an explanation of what must seem strange to us at first sight, namely, that
a Christian should apparently look to Philoso phy rather than to his religion
for comfort in persecution and support at the approach of death. But it is to be
feared that in his day, and in the society in which he moved, Christianity meant
to many who professed it little more than a sllbject for rivalry and argument
among sects and for the combating of heresies. With many of the contemporaries
of Boethius, therefore, a new book of comfort sought for in Christian doctrine
would not have had much influence, and there seems to be no reason uhy people of
our own day, even those who draw the greatest help from their religion, should
not enjoy the additional comfort which solaced an honest and pious thinker in a
time of apparently intolerable and incredible misfortune. &nbs p;The wide learning of Boethius may be partly shewn by a
list of some of his writings, which included original works and translations in
many branches of study. For instance, he translated into Latin a great number of
Aristotle's works on different su bjects, such as those on Rhetoric, Logic, the
Categories, etc. He translated three books of Euclid, and wrote other
mathematical works. He translated and wrote books upon Music and Mechanics, and
one upon Astronomy. His theological
But his Consolation is the work upon which his fame
rests. The veneration in which this book was held in the middle ages and onward
is abu ndantly shewn by the numerous translations made of it. It was very early
rendered into German, and later on translated into the French of the day by
Jehan de Meun and others in later times; into Greek by Maximus Planudes, into
Italian and Spanish. In England translations have appeared at intervals during
the last thousand years. For just that space of time has passed since that noble
educator of his people, Alfred the Creat, translated it with Asser's help,
thinking, it would seem, that this work was most worthy of his people's reading
of all books after the Bible. But his version does not give us a very true
knowledge either of Boethius or his Consolation. It is of the greatest
value to the student of Alfred, because there are many i ndisputablygenuine
sayings and opinions of that wise man. There are wise thoughts upon kingly duty
and many definitely Christian maxims. These were outside the theme of Boethius,
though wise themselves and deeply interesting as Alfred's own work. Furt
hermore, the more abstruse parts are wholly omitted, probably as being of little
use for King Alfred's subjects. In later times that most versatile scholar, Queen
Elizabeth translated it. Chaucer, Sir Thomas More, and Leslie , Bishop of Ross,
the adviser of Mary, Queen of Scots, wrote imitations of it. Robert of Lincoln
(Grossetˆte) commented upon it. In the sixteenth century appeared Colville's
very fine translation. Translations in verse appeared in the seventeenth cent
ury by Harry Coningsby and Lord Preston; others followed in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Its influence is to be found perhaps even in the oldest
English poetry of pre-Conquest times; it is certainly very marked in Chaucer,
Gower, Spenser, and many another later poet. And in Italy, Dante makes St.
Thomas Aquinas point out the spirit of Boethius in Paradise with these words: --
Paradiso, x. 121 ff (Wright's translation.) A few words on Theodoric may conclude this note. Theodoric was born A.D. 455, educated at Constantinople as
a hostage of the Emperor Leo, and succeeded his father as King of the Ostrogoths
in 475. His
Page 44
surpassing blessing of mortal wealth! As soon as you
have acquired it, your cares begin!
Page 45
honours of office, which you raise to heaven because you
know not true honoured power? What fires belched forth from &’Etna's flames,
what overwhelming flood could deal such ruin as these when they fall into the
hands of evil men? I am sure you remember how your forefathers wished to do away
with the consular power, which had been the very foundation of liberty, because
of the overbearing pride of the cons uls, just as your ancestors had too in
earlier times expunged from the state the name of king on account of the same
pride. But if, as rarely happens, places of honour are granted to honest men,
what else is delightful in them but the honesty they prac tise thereby?
Wherefore honour comes not to virtue from holding office, but comes to office
from virtues there practised.
Page 46
upon the firm basis of its reason? When a certain tyrant
thought that by tortures he would compel a free manl
to betray the conspirators in a plot against his life, the philosopher bit
through his tongue and spat it out in the tyrant's face. Thus were the tortures,
which the tyrant intended to have cruel results, turned by the philosoph er into
subjects of high courage. Is there aught that one man can do to another, which
he may not suffer from another in his turn? We have heard how Busiris, who used
to kill strangers, was killed by Hercules when he came to Egypt. Regulus,2 who had cast into chains many a Carthaginian
captive, soon yielded himself a prisoner to their chains. Do you think that
power to be any power, whose possessor cannot ensure his own escape from
suffering at another's hands what he inflicts upon some other?
46:1 -- This story is
told of Anaxagoras and Nicocreon, king of Cyprus, c. B.C. 323.
46:2 -- Regulus was the Roman general in Sicily in the first
Punic War, taken prisoner in 255 B.C., and put to death in 250.
Page 47
allow themselves to cling to evil men. And this indeed
may worthily be held of all the gifts of fortune which come with the greatest
success to the most unscrupulous. And in this matter we must also think on thi s
fact, that no one doubts a man to be brave in whom he has found by examination
that bravery is implanted: and whoever has the quality of swiftness is plainly
swift. So also music makes men musical, medicine makes men physicians, oratory
makes men orators. The nature of each quality acts as is peculiar to itself: it
is not confused with the results of contrary qualities, but goes so far as to
drive out those qualities which are opposed to it. Wealth cannot quench the
insatiable thirst of avari ce: nor can power ever make master of himself the man
whom vicious passions hold fast in un- breakable chains. Honours, when joined to
dishonest men, so far from making them honour- able, betray them rather, and
show them to be dishonourable. Why is t his so? It is because you rejoice to
call things by false ¤ames which belong not to them their names are
refuted by the reality of their qualities: wherefore neither riches, nor that
kind of power, nor these honours, can justly so be called. Las tly, we may come
to the same conclusion concerning all the aspects of Fortune: nothing is to be
sought in her, and it is plain she has no innate good, for she is not always
joined with good men, nor does she make good those with whom she is joined.'
Page 48
48:1 -- Britannicus, son of Nero's
father, the Emperor Claudi us, put to death A.D. 55.
Page 49
thing of no weight. As you have learnt from astronomers'
shewing, the whole circumference of the earth is but as a point compared with
the size of the heavens. That is, if you compar e the earth with the circle of
the universe, it must be reckoned as of no size at all. And of this tiny portion
of the universe there is but a fourth part, as you have learnt from the
demonstration of Ptolemæus,l
which is inhabited by living beings known to us. If from this fourth part you
imagine subtracted all that is covered by sea and marsh, and all the vast
regions of thirsty desert, you will find but the narrowest space left for human
habitation. And do you thi nk of setting forth your fame and publishing your
name in this space, which is but as a point within another point so closely
circumscribed? And what size or magnificence can fame have which is shut in by
such close and narrow bounds? Further, this na rrow enclosure of habitation is
peopled by many races of men which differ in language, in customs, and in their
whole scheme of living;and owing to difficulty of travelling, differences of
speech, and rareness of any intercourse, the fame of cities can not reach them,
much less the fame of men. Has not Cicero written somewhere that in his time the
fame of Rome had not reached the mountains of the Caucasus, though the Republic
was already well grown and
49:1 -- A mathe matician,
astronomer, and geographer of Alexandria. Fl. 140-160 A.D. Boethius translated
one of his works.
Page 50
striking awe among the Parthians and other nations in
those parts? Do you see then how narrow and clos ely bounded must be that fame
which you wish to extend more widely? Can the fame of a Roman ever reach parts
to which the name of Rome cannot come?
Page 51
your name? For though one moment be ars but the least
proportion to ten thousand years, yet there is a definite ratio, because both
are limited spaces of time. But even ten thousand years, or the greatest number
you will, cannot even be compared with eternity. For there will always be r atio
between finite things, but between the finite and the infinite there can never
be any comparison. Wherefore, however long drawn out may be the life of your
fame, it is not even small, but it is absolutely nothing when compared with
eternity. You k now not how to act rightly except for the breezes of popular
opinion and for the sake of empty rumours; thus the excellence of conscience and
of virtue is left behind, and you seek rewards from the tattle of other men.
Listen to the witty manner in wh ich one played once upon the shallowness of
this pride. A certain man once bitterly attacked another who had taken to
himself falsely the name of philosopher, not for the purpose of true virtue, but
for pride of fame; he added to his attack that he wou ld know soon whether he
was a philosopher, when he saw whether the other bore with meekness and patience
the insults he heaped upon him. The other showed patience for a while and took
the insults as though he scoffed at them, until he said, " Do you n ow see that
I am a philosopher? " " I should have, had you kept silence," said the other
stingingly. But we are speaking of great men: and I ask, what do they gain from
fame, though they seek
Page 52
glory by virtue? what have they after the body is
dissolved at death? For if men die utterly, as our reason forbids us to believe,
there is no glory left to them at all, since they whose it is said to be, do not
exist. If, on the other hand, the mind is still conscious and working when it is
freed from its earthly prison, it seeks heaven in its freedom and surely spurns
all earthly traffic: it enjoys heaven and rejoices in its release from the of
this world.
52:2 -- L. Juni us Brutus, who led the Romans to expel the last
of the kings, and was elected the first consul, B.C. 509.
Page 53
unbending Cato?1
Their fame survives in this: it has no more than a few slight letters shewing
forth an empty name. We see their noble names engraved, and only know thereby
that they are brought to naught. Ye lie then all unknown, and fame can give no
knowledge of you. But if you think that life can be prolonged by t he breath of
mortal fame, yet when the slow time robs you of this too, then there awaits you
but a second death.
53:1 -- Probably Cato Major, the
great censor, B.C. 184, the rigid champion of the stern old Roman morals; or
possibly Ca to Minor, who committed suicide at Utica after the battle of
Thapsus, B.C. 46, because he considered that Cæsar's victory was fatal to the
Republic and the liberty of Rome.
Page 54
minds of those who enjoy them: the other frees them by a
knowledge that happiness is so fragile. You see, then, that the one is blown
about by winds, is ever moving and ever ignorant of its own self ; the other is
sober, ever prepared and ever made provident by the undergoing of i ts very
adversities. Lastly, good fortune draws men from the straight path of true good
by her fawning: ill fortune draws most men to the true good, and holds them back
by her curved staff.
54:1
-- Boethius in this passage is probably thinking of Empedocles's doctrine of
Love which unites, and Strife which divides, the two primal forces in the
universe.
< tt>Page 55
55:1 -- C p. Bk. I. Prose
iv, p. 10.
Page 56
Book 3
BOOK III
Page 57
Page 58
can desire nothing further. It is that highest of all
good things, and it embraces in itself all good things: if any good is lacking,
it cannot be the highest good, since then there is left outside it something
which can be desired. Wherefore happiness is a state which is made perfect by
the union of all good things. This end all men seek to reach, as I said, though
by different paths. For there is implanted by nature in the minds of men a
desire for the true good; but error leads them astray towards false goods by
wrong paths.
Page 59
other things like to them, lies the aim of men's actions
and prayers, such as renown and popularity, which seem to afford some fame, or
wife and children, which are sought for the pleasure they give. On the other
hand, the good of friends, which is the most honourable and holy of all, lies
not in Fortune's but in Virtue's realm. All others are adopted for the sake of
power or enjoy ment.
59:1 -- Epicurus (B.C. 342-270) was the famous founder of the
Epicurean school of p hilosophy. His school had a large following of Romans
under the Empire. His own teaching was of a higher nature than might be supposed
from this bare statement that he thought 'pleasure was the highest good.'
Page 60
to join with it in bringing enjoyment to the mind.
Page 61
Page 62
earth, so soon as the pressing hand is gone, looks up
again straight to the sky above.
Page 63
perturbed by torturing care arising from some sense of
injustice? '
Page 64
has been by force or by fraud taken from them? ' ' Yes,'
I answered.
Page 65
his fertile fi eld with oxen by the score, yet gnawing
care will never in his lifetime leave him, and at his death his wealth will not
go with him, but leave him faithlessly.'
65:1 -- Probably Boethius makes a mistake in his interpretation
of Catullus (Carm. 52), as Nonius's surname was very likely ' Struma ' (which
also means a wen); in which case Catullus cannot at most have intended more to
be understood than a play upon the man's true name.
65:2 -- Decoratus was a minion of Theodoric.
Page 66
high places. But if you see a man endowed with wisdo m,
you cannot but consider him worthy of veneration, or at least of the wisdom with
which he is endowed. For such a man has the worth peculiar to virtue, which it
transmits directly to those in whom it is found. But since honours from the
vulgar crowd cannot create merit, it is plain that they have not the peculiar
beauty of this worth. And here is a particular point to be noticed: if men are
the more worthless as they are despised by more people, high position makes them
all the worse because it cannot make venerable those whom it shews to so many
people to be contemptible. And this brings its penalty with it: wicked people
bring a like quality into their positions, and stain them with their infection.
Page 67
Page 68
full of examples of the contrary; examples of men whose
happiness as kings has been exchanged for disaster. What wonderful power, which
is found to be powerless even for its own preservation! But if this kingly power
is really a source of happiness, surely then, if it fail in any way, it lessens
the happiness it brings, and equally causes unhappiness. However widely human
empires may extend, there must be still more nations left, over whom each king d
oes not reign. And so, in whatever direction this power ceases to make happy,
thereby comes in powerlessness, which makes men unhappy; thus therefore there
must be a greater part of unhappiness in every king's estate. That tyrant 1 had
learnt well the dangers of his lot, who likened the fear which goes with
kingship to the terror inspired by a sword ever hanging overhead. What then is
such a power, which cannot drive away the bite of cares, nor escape the stings
of fear?
Page 69
A man who must be at the mercy of those that serve him,
in order that he may seem to have power?
69:1 -- Seneca, the
philosopher and wise counsellor of Nero, was by him compelled to commit suicide,
A.D. 65.
69:2 -- Papinianus, the greatest lawyer
of his time, was put to death by the Emperor Antoninus Caracalla, A.D. 212.
Page 70
must he let his passions triumph and yoke his neck by
their fou l bonds. For though the earth, as far as India's shore, tremble before
the laws you give, though Thule bow to your service on earth's farthest bounds,
yet if thou canst not drive away black cares, if thou canst not put to flight
complaints, then is no true power thine.
70:1 -- Euriped, Andromache,.319-320.
Page 71
Page 72
truly the fruits of sin, do they bring upon the bodies
of those who enjoy them! I know not wha t pleasure their impulse affords, but
any who cares to recall his indulgences of his passions, will know that the
results of such pleasures are indeed gloomy. If any can shew that those results
are blest with happiness, then may the beasts of the field be justly called
blessed, for all their aims are urged toward the satisfying of their bodies'
wants. The pleasures of wife and children may be most honourable; but nature
makes it all too plain that some have found torment in their children. How bitt
er is any such kind of suffering, I need not tell you now, for you have never
known it, nor have any such anxiety now. Yet in this matter I would hold with my
philosopher Euripides,l
that he who has no children is happy in his misfortune.
72:1 -- Referring
to lines in the Andromache (419-420), where Euripides says: 'The man who
complains that he has no children suffers less than he who has them, and is
blest in his misfortune.'
Page 73
what great evils they are bound up. Would you heap up
money? You will need to tear it from its owner. Would you seem brilliant by the
glory of great honours? You must kneel before their dispenser, and in your
desire to surpass other men in honour, you must debase yourself by setting asid
e all pride. Do you long for power? You will be subject to the wiles of all over
whom you have power, you will be at the mercy of many dangers. You seek fame?
You will be drawn to and fro among rough paths, and lose all freedom from care.
Would you sp end a life of pleasure? Who would not despise and cast off such
servitude to so vile and brittle a thing as your body? How petty are all the
aims of those who put before themselves the pleasures of the body, how uncertain
is the possession of such? In bodily size will you ever surpass the elephant? In
strength will you ever lead the bull, or in speed the tiger? Look upon the
expanse of heaven, the strength with which it stands, the rapidity with which it
moves, and cease for a while to wonder at ba se things. This heaven is not more
wonderful for those things than for the design which guides it. How sweeping is
the brightness of outward form, how swift its movement, yet more fleeting than
the passing of the flowers of spring. But if, as Aristotl e says, many could use
the eyes of lynxes to see through that which meets the eye, then if they saw
into the organs within, would not that body,
Page 74
though it had the most fair outside of Alcibiades,1
seem most vile within? Wherefore it is not your own nature, but the weakness of
the eyes of them that see you, which makes you seem beautiful. But consider how
in excess you desire the pleasures of the body, when you know that hows oever
you admire it, it can be reduced to nothing by a three-days' fever. To put all
these points then in a word: these things cannot grant the good which they
promise; they are not made perfect by the union of all good things in them; they
do not le ad to happiness as a path thither; they do not make men blessed.2
74:1 -- Alcibiad:s was the most handsome and brilliantly
fascinating of all the public men of Athens in her most brilliant period.
74:2 -- Compare Philosophy's first words about
the highest good, p. 58.
Page 75
above the star-lit heavens. What can I call down upon
them worthy of their stubborn folly? They go about in search of wealth and
honours; and only when they have by labours vast stored up deception for
themselves, do they at last know what is their true good.
Page 76
Page 77
satisfaction, power, glory, veneration, and happiness
differ in name, they cannot differ at all in essence?'
Page 78
Page 79
79:1 -- Plato, Timoe;us, 27 C. (ch. v.) -- ' All those
who have even the least share of moderatio n, on undertaking any enterprise,
small or great, always call upon God at the beginning.
79:2 -- This hymn is replete with the highest development of
Plato's theory of ideas, as expressed in the Timoe;us, and his theory of
the ideal good being the moving spirit of the material world. Compare also the
speculative portion of Virgil, Æneid, vi.
Page 80
everlasting law, founder of earth and heaven alike, who
hast bidden time stand forth from out Eternity, for ever firm Thyself, yet
giving movement unto all. No causes were without Thee which could thence impel
Thee to create this mass of changing matter, but within Thyself exists the very
idea of perfect good, which grudges naught, for of what can it have envy? Thou
makest all things follow that high pattern. In perfect beauty Thou movest in Thy
mind a world of beauty, making all in a like image, and bidding the perfect
whole to complete its perfect functions. All the first principles of nature Thou
dost bind together by perfect orders as of numbers, so that they may be balanced
each with its opposite: cold with heat, and dry with moist together; thus fire
may not fly upward too swiftly because too purely, nor may the weight of the
solid earth drag it down and overwhelm it. Thou dost make the soul as a third
between mind and material bodies: to these the soul gives life and movement, for
Thou dost spread it abroad among the members of the universe, now working in
accord. Thus is the soul divided as it takes its course, making two circles, as
though a binding thread around the world. Thereafter it returns unto itself and
passes around the lower earthly mind; and in like manner it giv es motion to the
heavens to turn their course. Thou it is who dost carry forward with like
inspiration these souls and lower lives. Thou dost fill these weak vessels
Page 81
with lofty souls, and send them abroad throughou t the
heavens and earth, and by Thy kindly law dost turn them again to Thyself and
bring them to seek, as fire doth, to rise to Thee again.
Page 82
it is impossible even to imagine whence could come the
so-called imperfect specimen. For nature do es not start from degenerate or
imperfect specimens, but starting from the perfect and ideal, it degenerates to
these lower and weaker forms. If then, as we have shewn above, there is an
uncertain and imperfect happiness to be found in the good, then there must
doubtless be also a sure and perfect happiness therein.'1
82:1 -- This reasoning hangs
upon Plato's theory of ideas and so is the opposite of the theory of evolution.
Page 83
good, it must be that true happiness is situated in His
Divinity.'
Page 84
its origin, wherefore I would conclude that that which
is the origin of all things, according to the truest reasoning, is by its
essence the highest good.'
Page 85
acquiring happiness, and happiness is identical with
divinity, it is plain that they become happy by acquiring divinity. But just as
men become just by acquiring the quality of justice, and wise by wisdo m, so by
the same reasoning, by acquiring divinity they become divine. Every happy man
then is divine. But while nothing prevents as many men as possible from being
divine, God is so by His nature, men become so by participation.'
Page 86
Page 87
their good quality is the cause of the desire f or them,
the very hinge on which they turn, and their consummation. The really important
object of a desire, is that for the sake of which anything is sought, as a
means. For instance, if a man wishes to ride for the sake of his health, he does
not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect, namely health. As,
therefore, each of these things is desired for the sake of the good, the
absolute good is the aim, rather than themselves. But we have agreed that the
other things are desired for the sake of happiness, wherefore in this case too,
it is happiness alone which is the object of the desire. Wherefore it is plain
that the essence of the good and of happiness is one and the same.'
Page 88
all the wealth of Tagus's golden sands, nor Hermus's
gleaming strand,1 nor Indus, nigh earth's hottest zone, mingling its emeralds
and pearls, can bring light to the eyes of any soul, but rather plunge the soul
more blindly in their shade. In her deepest caverns does earth rear all that
pleases the eye and excites the mind. The glory by which the heavens move and
have their being, has nought to do with the darknesses which bring ruin to the
soul. Whosoever can look on this true light will scarce allow the sun's rays to
be clear.'
88:1 -- The modern
Sarabat, in Asia Minor, formerly auriferous.
Page 89
when they are gathered together, as it were , into one
form and one operation, so that complete satisfaction, power, veneration,
renown, and pleasure are all the same, then they become the true good. Unless
they are all one and the same, they have no claim to be reckoned among the true
object s of men's desires.'
Page 90
so long as it remains in a single form by the union of
its members, the human figure is presented. But if the division or separation of
the body's parts drags that union asunder, it at once ceases to be what it was.
In thi s way one may go through every subject, and it will be quite evident that
each thing exists individually, so long as it is one, but perishes so soon as it
ceases to be one.'
Page 91
others cling to rocks; some are fertilised by otherwise
barren sands, and would wither away if one tried to transplant them to better
soil. Nature grants to each what suits it, and works against their perishing
while they can possibly remain alive. I need hardly remind you that all plants
seem to have their mouths buried in the earth, and so they suck up nourishment
by their roots and diffuse their strength through their pith and bark: the pith
being the softest part is always hidden away at the heart and covered,
protected, as it were, by the strength of the wood; while outside, the bark, as
being the defender who endures the best, is opposed to the unkindness of the we
ather. Again, how great is nature's care, that they should all propagate
themselves by the reproduction of their seed; they all, as is so well known, are
like regular machines not merely for lasting a time, but for reproducing
themselves for ever, a nd that by their own kinds. Things too which are supposed
to be inanimate, surely do all seek after their own by a like process. For why
is flame carried upward by its lightness, while solid things are carried down by
their weight, unless it be that these positions and movements are suitable to
each? Further, each thing preserves what is suitable to itself, and what is
harmful, it destroys. Hard things, such as stones, cohere with the utmost
tenacity of their parts, and resist easy dissolution; while liquids, water, and
air, yield easily to division, but quickly slip back to mingle their parts
Page 92
which have been cut asunder. And fire cannot be cut at
all.
92:1 -- Boethius
is possibly thinking here of passages in Plato's Republic, Bk. iv.
(439-441) where Socrates points out the frequent opposition of reason and
instinct.
Page 93
this away, and none will have any chance of continued
existence.'
Page 94
one circle; l et him tell surely to his soul, that he
has, thrust away within the treasures of his mind, all that he labours to
acquire without. Then shall that truth, which now was hid in error's darkening
cloud, shine forth more clear than Phoebus's self. For th e body, though it
brings material mass which breeds forgetfulness, has never driven forth all
light from the mind. The seed of truth does surely cling within, and can be
roused as a spark by the fanning of philosophy. For if it is not so, how do ye
men make answers true of your own instinct when teachers question you? Is it not
that the quick spark of truth lies buried in the heart's low depths? And if the
Muse of Plato sends through those depths the voice of truth, each man has not
forgotten a nd is but reminding himself of what he learns.'1
When she made an end, I said,'I agree very strongly with Plato; for this is the
second time that you have reminded me of these thoughts. The first time I had
lost them through the material influence of the body; the second, when
overwhelmed by this weight of trouble.'
94:1
-- Plato's doctrine of remembrance is chiefly treated of in his Phæ;do
and Meno.
Page 95
have set before ourselves. Have we not shewn that
complete satisfaction exists in true happiness, and we have agreed that God is
happiness itself, have we not? '
Page 97
their own will: and that of their own accord they turn
to the will of the supreme disposer, as though agreeing with, and obedient to,
the helmsman? '
Page 98
arguments at variance? For pe rhaps from such a
friction, some fair spark of truth may leap forth.'
Page 99
goodness; and that all creatures with free will obeyed
this guidance, and that there was no such thing as natural evil; and all these
things you developed by no help from without, but by homely and internal proofs,
each gaining its credence from that which went before it.'
99:1 -- This is a verse
from the poems in which Parmenides embodied his philosophy: this was the
doctrine of the unity which must have been in Boethius's mind above. Parmenides,
the founder of the Eleatic school (495 B.C.) was perhaps, considering his early
date, the greatest and most original of Greek philosophers. Boethius probably
did not make a clear distinction between the philo sopher's own poems and the
views expressed in Plato's Parmenides.
99:2 --
Plato in the Timoeus says,' The language must also be akin to the subjects of
which its words are the interpreters' -- -(29 B.).
Page 100
the chains of matter and of earth. The singer of Thrace
in olden time lamented his dead wife: by his tearful strains he made the trees
to follow him, and bound the flowing streams to stay: for him the hind would fea
rlessly go side by side with fiercest lions, and the hare would look upon the
hound, nor be afraid, for he was gentle under the song's sway. But when the
hotter flame burnt up his inmost soul, even the strains, which had subdued all
other things, co uld not soothe their own lord's mind. Complaining of the hard
hearts of the gods above, he dared approach the realms below. There he tuned his
songs to soothing tones, and sang the lays he had drawn from his mother's1<
/a> fount of excellence. His unrestrained grief did give him power, his love
redoubled his grief's power: his mourning moved the depths of hell. With
gentlest prayers he prayed to the lords of the shades for grace. The
three-headed porter2 was taken captive with amazement at his fresh songs.
The avenging goddesses,3
who haunt with fear the guilty, poured out sad tears. Ixion's4
wheel no longer swi ftly turned. Tantalus,5
so long abandoned unto thirst, could
100:1 --
Orpheus's mother was the Muse Calliope, mistress of the Castalian fount.
100:2 -- The dog Cerberus.
100:3 -- The Furies.
100:4 -- Ixion for his crimes was bound upon a rolling wheel
100:5 -- Tantalus for h is crimes was condemned
to perpetual hunger and thirst though surrounded by fruits and water which ever
eluded his grasp.
Page 101
then despise the flowing stream. The vulture, satisfied
by his strains, tore not awhil e at Tityos's1
heart. At last the lord of the shades2
in pity cried: "We are conquered; take your bride with you, bought by your song;
but one condition binds our gift: till s he has left these dark abodes, turn not
your eyes upon her." Who shall set a law to lovers? Love is a greater law unto
itself. Alack! at the very bounds of darkness Orpheus looked upon his Eurydice;
looked, and lost her, and was lost himself.
< p> 'To you too this tale refers; you, who seek
to lead your thoughts to the light above. For whosoever is overcome of desire,
and turns his gaze upon the darkness 'neath the earth, he, while he looks on
hell, loses the prize he carri ed off.'
101:1 -- Tityos for his crimes was for ever
fastened to the ground while a vulture devoured his entrails.
101:2 -- Pluto.
Page 102
Book 4
BOOK IV
Page 103
it were as you think. It would be as though in a
well-ordered house of a good master, the vilest vessels were cared for while the
p recious were left defiled. But it is not so. If our former conclusions are
unshaken, God Himself, of whose government we speak, will teach you that the
good are always powerful, the evil are always the lowest and weakest; vice never
goes unpunished; virtue never goes without its own reward; happiness comes to
the good, misfortune to the wicked: and when your complaints are set at rest,
many such things would most firmly strengthen you in this opinion. You have seen
now from my teaching the form of true happiness; you know now its place: let us
go quickly through all that must be lightly passed over, and let me shew you the
road which shall lead you to your home. I will give wings to your mind, by which
it shall raise itself aloft: so shal l disquiet be driven away, and you may
return safe to your home by my guidance, by the path I shall shew you, even by
myself carrying you thither.
103:1 -- This
and some of the following lines allude to some of the theories of the early
Physicists.
Page 104
to the stars' own home, and joins her path unto the
sun's; or accompanies on her path the cold and ancient Saturn, maybe as the
shining warrior Mars; or she may take her course through the circle of every
star that decks the night. And when she has had her fill of journeying, then m
ay she leave the sky and tread the outer plane of the swift moving air, as
mistress of the awful light. Here holds the King of kings His sway, and guides
the reins of the universe, and Himself unmoved He drives His winged chariot, the
bright disposer of the world. And if this path brings thee again hither, the
path that now thy memory seeks to recall, I tell thee, thou shalt say, " This is
my home, hence was I derived, here shall I stay my course." But if thou choose
to look back upon the earth ly night behind thee, thou shalt see as exiles from
light the tyrants whose grimness made wretched peoples so to fear.'
Page 105
of evil is manifest: if the weakness and uncertainty of
evil is made plai n, the strength and sureness of good is proved. To gain more
full credit for my opinion, I will go on to make my argument sure by first the
one, then the other of the two paths, side by side.
Page 106
Page 107
Page 108
great, this almost invincible , aid of a natural
instinct to follow? Think what a powerlessness possesses these men. They are no
light objects which they seek; they seek no objects in sport, objects which it
is impossible that they should achieve. They fail in the very highest o f all
things, the crown of all, and in this they find none of the success for which
they labour day and night in wretchedness. But herein the strength of good men
is conspicuous. If a man could advance on foot till he arrived at an utmost
point beyon d which there was no path for further advance, you would think him
most capable of walking: equally so, if a man grasps the very end and aim of his
search, you must think him most capable. Wherefore also the contrary is true;
that evil men are simila rly deprived of all strength. For why do they leave
virtue and follow after vice? Is it from ignorance of good? Surely not, for what
is weaker or less compelling than the blindness of ignorance? Do they know what
they ought to follow, and are they t hrown from the straight road by passions?
Then they must be weak too in self-control if they cannot struggle with their
evil passions. But they lose thus not only power, but existence all together.
For those who abandon the common end of all who exis t, must equally cease to
exist. And this may seem strange, that we should say that evil men, though the
majority of mankind, do not exist at all; but it is so. For while I do not deny
that evil men are evil, I do deny that they " are,"
in the sense of absolute existence. You may say, for
instance, that a corpse is a dead man, but you cannot call it a man. In a like
manner, though I grant that wicked men are bad, I cannot allow that they are men
at all, as regards absolute being. A thing exists which keeps its proper place
and preserves its nature; but when anything falls away from its nature, its
existence too ceases, for that lies in its nature. You will say, " Evil men are
capable of evil ": and t hat I would not deny. But this very power of theirs
comes not from strength, but from weakness. They are capable of evil; but this
evil would have no efficacy if it could have stayed under the operation of good
men. And this very power of ill shews t he more plainly that their power is
naught. For if, as we have agreed, evil is nothing, then, since they are only
capable of evil, they are capable of nothing '
Page 110
good; but even those who are capable of evil, are not
capable of all: so it is plain that those who are capable of evil, are capable
of less. F urther, we have shewn that all power is to be counted among objects
of desire, and all objects of desire have their relation to the good, as to the
coping-stone of their nature. But the power of committing crime has no possible
relation to the good. Therefore it is not an object of desire. Yet, as we said,
all power is to be desired. Therefore the power of doing evil is no power at
all. For all these reasons the power of good men and the weakness of evil men is
apparent. So Plato's opinion1 is plain
that " the wise alone are able to do what they desire, but unscrupulous men can
only labour at what they like, they cannot fulfil their real desires." They do
what they like so long as they think that they wi ll gain through their
pleasures the good which they desire; but they do not gain it, since nothing
evil ever reaches happiness.
110:1 -- From Plato's Gorgias (466).
Boethius in this and several other passages in this book has the Gorgias in
mind; for Plato there discusses the strength and happiness of good men, and the
impotence and unhappiness of bad men. Socrates is also there represented as
proving that the unjust man is happier punished than unpunished, as Boethius
does below.
Page 111
fierce glances, and their hearts heaving with passion.
If any man take from these proud ones their outward covering of empty honour, he
will see within, will see that these great ones bear secret chains. For the
heart of one is thus filled by lust with the poisons of g reed, or seething rage
lifts up its waves and lashes his mind therewith: or gloomy grief holds them
weary captives, or by slippery hopes they are tortured. So when you see one head
thus labouring beneath so many tyrants, you know he cannot do as he would, for
by hard task- masters is the master himself oppressed.
Page 112
wickedness of bad men can never take aw ay from good
men the glory which belongs to them. Whereas if a good man rejoiced in a glory
which he received from outside, then could another, or even he, may be, who
granted it, carry it away. But since honesty grants to every good man its own
rew ards, he will only lack his reward when he ceases to be good. And lastly,
since every reward is sought for the reason that it is held to be good, who
shall say that the man, who possesses goodness, does not receive his reward? And
what reward is thi s? Surely the fairest and greatest of all. Remember that
corollary1
which I emphasised when speaking to you a little while ago; and reason thus
therefrom. While happiness is the absolute good, it is plain that all good men
become good by virtue of the very fact that they are good. But we agreed that
happy men are as gods. Therefore this is the reward of the good, which no time
can wear out, no power can lessen, no wickedness can darken; they become divine.
I n this case, then, no wise man can doubt of the inevitable punishment of the
wicked as well. For good and evil are so set, differing from each other just as
reward and punishment are in opposition to each other: hence the rewards, which
we see fall t o the good, must correspond precisely to the punishments of the
evil on the other side. As, therefore, honesty is itself the reward of the
honest, so wickedness is itself the punishment
112:1 -- P.84.
Page 113
of the wicked. Now whosoever suffers punishment, doubts
not that he is suffering an evil: if, then, they are ready so to judge of
themselves, can they think that they do not receive punishment, considering that
they are not on ly affected but thoroughly permeated by wickedness, the worst of
all evils?
Page 114
his rage? He would be reckoned as having the heart of a
lion. Does another flee and tremble in terror where there is no cause of fear?
He would be held to be as deer. If another is dull a nd lazy, does he not live
the life of an ass? One whose aims are inconstant and ever changed at his whims,
is in no wise different from the birds. If another is in a slough of foul and
filthy lusts, he is kept down by the lusts of an unclean swine. T hus then a man
who loses his goodness, ceases to be a man, and since he cannot change his
condition for that of a god, he turns into a beast.
Page 115
unchanged, to bewail their unnatural sufferings.
115:1 -- Cf. St. Matthew x. 28.
Page 116
see men with the will and the power to commit a crime,
and you see them perform it, they must be the victims of a threefold misfortune,
since ea ch of those three things brings its own misery.
Page 117
the sequence of statements is not so joined together as
to effectively lead to the conclusion ; otherwise, if the premises are granted,
it is not just to cavil at the inference. This too, which I am about to say, may
not seem less strange, but it follows equally from what has been taken as fact.'
117:1 --
Plato, Gorgias, 472 and ff.
Page 118
118:1 -- It must not be supposed from the words
' cleansing mercy ' (purgatoria clementia) that Boethius held the same
views as were held by the Church later concerning purgatory, and as are now
taught by the Roman Catholic Church. It is true that St. Augustine had in 407
A.D. hinted at the existence of such a state, but it was not dogmatically
inculcated till 604, in the Papacy of Gregory the Great.
Page 119
it i s not my intention to discuss these now. My object
has been to bring you to know that the power of evil men, which seems to you so
unworthy, is in truth nothing; and that you may see that those wicked men, of
whose impunity you complained, do never m iss the reward of their ill-doing; and
that you may learn that their passion, which you prayed might soon be cut short,
is not long-enduring, and that the longer it lasts, the more unhappiness it
brings, and that it would be most unhappy if it endure d for ever. Further, I
have tried to shew you that the wicked are more to be pitied if they escape with
unjust impunity, than if they are punished by just retribution. And it follows
upon this fact that they will be undergoing heavier penalties when they are
thought to be unpunished.'
Page 120
upon the true course of nature, but upon their own
feelings, they think that the freedom of passion and the impunity of crime are
happy things. Think upon the sacred ordinances of eternal law. If your mind is
fashioned after better things, there is no need of a judge to award a prize; you
have added yourself to the number of the more excellent. If your mind sinks to
worse things, seek no avenger from without: you have thrust yourself downward to
lower things. It is as though you were looking at the squalid earth and the
heavens in turn; then take away all that is about you; and by the power of
sight, you will seem to be in the midst now of mud, now of stars. But mankind
looks not to such things. What then shall we do? Shall we join ourselves to
those whom we have shewn to be as beasts? If a man lost utterly his sight, and
even forgot that he had ever seen, so that he thought he lacked naught of human
perfection, should we think that such a blind one can see as we do? Most people
would not even allow another point, which rests no less firmly upon strong
reasons, namely, that those who do an injury are more unhappy than those who
suffer one.'1
120:1 Plato, Gorgias, 474 and ff.
Page 121
Page 122
And if the wicked too themselves might by some device
look on virtue left behind them, and if they could see that they would lay aside
the squalor of vice by the pain of punishment, and that they would gain the
compensation of achieving virtue again, they would no longer hold it punishment,
but would r efuse the aid of advocates for their defence, and would intrust
themselves unreservedly to their accusers and their judges. In this way there
would be no place left for hatred among wise men. For who but the most foolish
would hate good men? And the re is no cause to hate bad men. Vice is as a
disease of the mind, just as feebleness shews ill-health in the body. As, then,
we should never think that those, who are sick in the body, deserve hatred, so
are those, whose minds are oppressed by a fie rcer disease than feebleness,
namely wickedness, much more worthy of pity than of persecution.
Page 123
Wouldst thou apportion merit to merit fitly? Then love
good men as is their due, and for the evil shew your pity.'
124-1 -- Arcturu:, the star in Boötes nearest to the Bear,
used to be thought the nearest star to our pole. Boöoute s was also known as the
Arctophylax, or Bearward, and so also as the driver of the Wain.
124:2 -- The old superstition was that an eclipse meant the
withdrawal of the moon, and that by a noise of beaten brass, etc ., she could be
saved.
Page 125
the warmth of Phoebus's rays; for herein the causes are
ready at hand to be understood. But in those other matters the causes are
hidden, and so do trouble all men's hearts, for time d oes not grant them to
advance with experience in such things as seldom recur: the common herd is ever
amazed at all that is extraordinary. But let the cloudy errors of ignorance
depart, and straightway these shall seem no longer marvellous.'
< p> 'That is true,' I said; 'but it is your kind
office to unravel the causes of hidden matters, and explain reasons now veiled
in darkness; wherefore I beg of you, put forth your decree and expound all to
me, since this wonder most d eeply stirs my mind.'
Page 126
if you enjoy the delights of song, you must wait a
while for that pleasure, while I weave together for you the chain of reasons.'
Page 127
The working of this unified development in time is
called Fate. These are different, but the one hangs upon the other. For this
order, which is ruled by Fate, emanates from the directness of Providence. Just
as when a craftsman perceives in his mind the form of the object he would make,
he sets his working power in motion, and brings through the order of time that
which he had seen directly and ready present to his mind. So by Providence does
God dispose all that is to be done, each thing by itself and unchangeably; while
these same things which Providence has arranged are worked out by Fate in many
ways and in time. Whether, therefore, Fate works by the aid of the di vine
spirits which serve Providence, or whether it works by the aid of the soul, or
of all nature, or the motions of the stars in heaven, or the powers of angels,
or the manifold skill of other spirits, whether the course of Fate is bound
together by any or all of these, one thing is certain, namely that Providence is
the one unchangeable direct power which gives form to all things which are to
come to pass, while Fate is the changing bond, the temporal order of those
things which are arranged to come to pass by the direct disposition of God.
Wherefore everything which is subject to Fate is also subject to Providence, to
which Fate is itself subject. But there are things which, though beneath
Providence, are above the course of Fate. Those things are they which are
immovably set nearest the
Page 128
primary divinity, and are there beyond the course of
the movement of Fate. As in the case of spheres moving round the same axis, that
which is nearest the cent re approaches most nearly the simple motion of the
centre, and is itself, as it were, an axis around which turn those which are set
outside it. That sphere which is outside all turns through a greater circuit,
and fulfils a longer course in proporti on as it is farther from the central
axis; and if it be joined or connect itself with that centre, it is drawn into
the direct motion thereof, and no longer strays or strives to turn away. In like
manner, that which goes farther from the primary inte lligence, is bound the
more by the ties of Fate, and the nearer it approaches the axis of all, the more
free it is from Fate. But that which clings without movement to the firm
intellect above, surpasses altogether the bond of Fate. As, therefore, r
easoning is to understanding; as that which becomes is to that which is; as time
is to eternity; as the circumference is to the centre: so is the changing course
of Fate to the immovable directness of Providence. That course of Fate moves the
heavens and the stars, moderates the first principles in their turns, and alters
their forms by balanced interchangings. The same course renews all things that
are born and wither away by like advances of ofFspring and seed. It constrains,
too, the actions and fortunes of men by an unbreakable chain of causes: and
these causes must be unchangeable, as they
Page 129
proceed from the beginnings of an unchanging
Providence. Thus is the world governed for the best if a directn ess, which
rests in the intelligence of God, puts forth an order of causes which may not
swerve. This order restrains by its own unchangeableness changeable things,
which might otherwise run hither and thither at random. Wherefore in disposing
the u niverse this limitation directs all for good, though to you who are not
strong enough to comprehend the whole order, all seems confusion and disorder.
Naught is there that comes to pass for the sake of evil, or due to wicked men,
of whom it has been abundantly shewn that they seek the good, but misleading
error turns them from the right course; for never does the true order, which
comes forth from the centre of the highest good, turn any man aside from the
right beginning.
Page 130
he therefore know the inmost feelings of the soul, as a
doctor can learn a body's temperatur e? For it is no less a wonder to the
ignorant why sweet things suit one sound body, while bitter things suit another;
or why some sick people are aided by gentle draughts, others by sharp and bitter
ones. But a doctor does not wonder at such things, for he knows the ways and
constitutions of health and sickness. And what is the health of the soul but
virtue? and what the sickness, but vice? And who is the preserver of the good
and banisher of the evil, who but God, the guardian and healer of m inds? God
looks forth from the high watch- tower of His Providence, He sees what suits
each man, and applies to him that which suits him. Hence then comes that
conspicuous cause of wonder in the order of Fate, when a wise man does that
which amazes th e ignorant. For, to glance at the depth of God's works with so
few words as human reason is capable of comprehending, I say that what you think
to be most fair and most conducive to justice's preservation, that appears
different to an all-seeing Pro vidence. Has not our fellow-philosopher Lucan
told us how " the conquering cause did please the gods, but the conquered,
Cato?"1
What then surprises you when done on this
130:1 --
L ucan, Pharsalia, i. 128. This famous line refers to the final triumph
of Cæ;‘sar at Thapsus, B.C. 46, when Cato considered that the Republican cause
was finally doomed and he committed suicide at Utica rather than survive it.
Page 131
earth, is the true-guided order of things; it is your
opinion which is perverted and confused. But if there is any one whose life is
so good that divine and human estimates of him agree, yet he must be uncertain
in the strength of his mind; if any adversity befall him, it may always be that
he will cease to preserve his innocence, by which he found that he could not
preserve his good fortune. Thus then a wise dispensation spares a man who might
be made worse b y adversity, lest he should suffer when it is not good for him
to be oppressed. Another may be perfected in all virtues, wholly conscientious,
and very near to God: Providence holds that it is not right such an one should
receive any adversity, so th at it allows him to be troubled not even by bodily
diseases. As a better man1
than I has said, " The powers of virtues build up the body of a good man." It
often happens that the duty of a supreme authority is as signed to good men for
the purpose of pruning the insolent growth of wickedness. To some, Providence
grants a mingled store of good and bad, according to the nature of their minds.
Some she treats bitterly, lest they grow too exuberant with long
131:1 -- The author is supposed to be Hermes Trismegistus, who
wrote in the third century after Christ. The word 'powers' was used by many
Neo-Platonic philosophers for those beings in the scale of nature, with which
they filled the chasm between God and man. But Boethius does not seem to intend
the word to have that definite meaning here.
Page 132
continued good fortune; others she allows to be
harassed by hardships that the virtue s of their minds should be strengthened by
the habit and exercise of patience. Some have too great a fear of sufferings
which they can bear; others have too great contempt for those which they cannot
bear: these she leads on by troubles to make tria l of themselves. Some have
brought a name to be honoured for all time at the price of a glorious death.
Some by shewing themselves undefeated by punishment, have left a proof to others
that virtue may be invincible by evil. What doubt can there be of how rightly
such things are disposed, and that they are for the good of those whom we see
them befall? The other point too arises from like causes, that sometimes
sorrows, sometimes the fulfilment of their desires, falls to the wicked. As
concerns the sorrows, no one is surprised, because all agree that they deserve
ill. Their punishments serve both to deter others from crime by fear, and also
to amend the lives of those who undergo them; their happiness, on the other
hand, serves as a proof to good men of how they should regard good fortune of
this nature, which they see often attends upon the dishonest. And another thing
seems to me to be well arranged: the nature of a man may be so headstrong and
rough that lack of wealth may stir hi m to crime more readily than restrain him;
for the disease of such an one Providence prescribes a remedy of stores of
patrimony: he may see
Page 133
that his conscience is befouled by sin, he may take
account with himself of his fortune, and will perhaps fear lest the loss of this
property, of which he enjoys the use, may bring unhappiness. Wherefore he will
change his ways, and leave off from ill-doing so long as he fears the loss of
his fortune. Again, good fortun e, unworthily improved, has flung some into
ruin. To some the right of punishing is committed that they may use it for the
exercise and trial of the good, and the punishment of evil men. And just as
there is no league between good and bad men, so als o the bad cannot either
agree among themselves: nay, with their vices tearing their own consciences
asunder, they cannot agree with themselves, and do often perform acts which,
when done, they perceive that they should not have done. Wherefore high
Providence has thus often shewn her strange wonder, namely, that bad men should
make other bad men good. For some find themselves suffering injustice at the
hands of evil men, and, burning with hatred of those who have injured them, they
have return ed to cultivate the fruits of virtue, because their aim is to be
unlike those whom they hate. To divine power, and to that alone, are evil things
good, when it uses them suitably so as to draw good results therefrom. For a
definite order embraces all things, so that even when some subject leaves the
true place assigned to it in the order, it returns to an order, though another,
it may be, lest aught
Page 134
in the realm of Providence be left to random chance.
But "ha rd is it for me to set forth all these matters as a god,"1
nor is it right for a man to try to comprehend with his mind all the means of
divine working, or to explain them in words. Let it be enough that we have seen
that God, the Creator of all nature, directs and disposes all things for good.
And while He urges all, that He has made manifest, to keep His own likeness, He
drives out by the course of Fate all evil from the bounds of His state.
Wherefore if y ou look to the disposition of Providence, you will reckon naught
as bad of all the evils which are held to abound upon earth.
134:1
-- Homer, Iliad, xii. 176.
Page 135
and though it sees the other constellations sink, it
never seeks to quench its flames in the ocean stream. In just divisions of time
does the evening star foretell the coming of the late shadows, and, as Lucifer,
brings back again the warming light of day. Thus does the interchanging bond of
love bring roun d their neverfailing courses; and strife is for ever an exile
from the starry realms. This unity rules by fair limits the elements, so that
wet yields to dry, its opposite, and it faithfully joins cold to heat. Floating
fire rises up on high, and mat ter by its weight sinks down. From these same
causes in warm spring the flowering season breathes its scents; then the hot
summer dries the grain; then with its burden of fruits comes autumn again, and
winter's falling rain gives moisture. This ming ling of seasons nourishes and
brings forth all on earth that has the breath of life; and again snatches them
away and hides them, whelming in death all that has arisen. Meanwhile the
Creator sits on high, rules all and guides, king and Lord, fount an d source of
all, Law itself and wise judge of justice. He restrains all that stirs nature to
motion, holds it back, and makes firm all that would stray. If He were not to
recall them to their true paths, and set them again upon the circles of their
courses, they would be torn from their source and so would perish. This is the
common bond of love; all seek thus to be restrained by the limit of the good. In
no other manner can they endure if this bond of
Page 136
love b e not turned round again, and if the causes,
which He has set, return not again.
Page 137
Page 138
138:1 -- The Latin word 'virtus' means by its derivation,
manly strength.
Page 139
daughter's throat, and buy the winds at the cost of
blood, when he sought to fill the sails of the fleet of G reece. The King of
Ithaca wept sore for his lost comrades whom the savage Polyphemus swallowed into
his huge maw as he lay in his vast cave; but, when mad for his blinded eye, he
paid back with rejoicings for the sad tears he had drawn. Hercules bec ame
famous through hard labours. He tamed the haughty Centaurs, and from the fierce
lion of Nemea took his spoil. With his sure arrows he smote the birds of
Stymphalus; and from the watchful dragon took the apples of the Hesperides,
filling his hand with their precious gold; and Cerberus he dragged along with
threefold chain. The story tells how he conquered the fierce Diomede and set
before his savage mares their master as their food. The Hydra's poison perished
in his fire. He took the horn a nd so disgraced the brow of the river Achelous,
who hid below his bank his head ashamed. On the sands of Libya he laid Antæ;‘us
lw; Cacus he slew to sate Evander's wrath. The bristling boar of Erymanthus
flecked with his own foam the shoulders which were to bear the height of heaven;
for in his last labour he bore with unbending neck the heavens, and so won again
his place in heaven, the reward of his last work.
Page 140
Book 5
BOOK V
Page 141
141:1 -- Aristotle, Physics, ii. 3.
Page 142
the ground for the sake of cultivating it, and finds a
heap of buried gold. Such a thing is believed to have happened by chance, but it
does not come from nothing, for it has its own causes, whose unforeseen an d
unexpected coincidence seem to have brought about a chance. For if the
cultivator did not dig the ground, if the owner had not buried his money, the
gold would not have been found. These are the causes of the chance piece of good
fortune, which co mes about from the causes which meet it, and move along with
it, not from the intention of the actor. For neither the burier nor the tiller
intended that the gold should be found; but, as I said, it was a coincidence,
and it happened that the one dug up what the other buried. We may therefore
define chance as an unexpected result from the coincidence of certain causes in
matters where there was another purpose. The order of the universe, advancing
with its inevitable sequences, brings about thi s coincidence of causes. This
order itself emanates from its source, which is Providence, and disposes all
things in their proper time and place.
the two streams bear
along, would flow in one together. Boats would meet boats, and trees meet trees
torn up by the currents, and the mingled waters would together entwine their
streams by chance; but their sloping beds restrain these chances vague, and the
downward order of the falling torrent guides their courses. Thus does chance,
which seems to rush onward without rein, bear the bit, and take its way by
rule.'
Page 144
spirits must be more free when they keep themsel ves
safe in the contemplation of the mind of God; but less free when they sink into
bodies, and less still when they are bound by their earthly members. The last
stage is mere slavery, when the spirit is given over to vices and has fallen
away from the possession of its reason. For when the mind turns its eyes from
the light of truth on high to lower darkness, soon they are dimmed by the clouds
of ignorance, and become turbid through ruinous passions; by yielding to these
passions and consenti ng to them, men increase the slavery which they have
brought upon themselves, and their true liberty is lost in captivity. But God,
looking upon all out of the infinite, perceives the views of Providence, and
disposes each as its destiny has already fated for it according to its merits:
"He looketh over all and heareth all."1
144:1 -- A
phrase from Homer (Iliad, iii. 277, and Odyssey, xi. 1O9), where
it is said of the sun.
Page 145
He alone ca n see all things, so truly He may be called
the Sun.' 1
145:1 -- This sentence, besides referring to the application
of Homer's words used above, contains also a play on words in the Latin, which
can only be clumsily reproduced in English by some such words as ' The sole
power which c an see all is justly to be called the solar.'
Page 146
to pass for the reason that Providence has foreseen it,
but the opposite rather, namely, that because it is about to come to pass,
therefore it cannot be hidden fr om God's Providence. In that way it seems to me
that the argument must resolve itself into an argument on the other side. For in
that case it is not necessary that that should happen which is foreseen, but
that that which is about to happen should be foreseen; as though, indeed, our
doubt was whether God's foreknowledge is the certain cause of future events, or
the certainty of future events is the cause of Providence. But let our aim be to
prove that, whatever be the shape which this series of causes takes, the
fulfilment of God's foreknowledge is necessary, even if this knowledge may not
seem to induce the necessity for the occurrence of future events. For instance,
if a man sits down, it must be that the opinion, which conjectures that he is
sitting, is true; but conversely, if the opinion concerning the man is true
because he is sitting, he must be sitting down. There is therefore necessity in
both cases: the man must be sitting, and the opinion must be true. But he does
not sit because the opinion is true, but rather the opinion is true because his
sitting down has preceded it. Thus, though the cause of the truth of the opinion
proceeds from the other fact, yet there is a common necessity on both parts. In
like manner we mu st reason of Providence and future events. For even though
they are foreseen because they are about
Page 147
to happen, yet they do not happen because they are
foreseen. None the less it is necessary that either what is about to happen
should be foreseen of God, or that what has been foreseen should happen; and
this alone is enough to destroy all free will.
Page 148
fulfilment of such things as may possibly not result,
He is wrong; and that we may not believe, nor even utter, rightly. But if He
perceives that they will result as they are in such a manner that He only knows
that they may or may not occur, equally, how is this foreknowledge, this which
knows nothing for sure, nothing ab solutely? How is such a fore- knowledge
different from the absurd prophecy which Horace puts in the mouth of Tiresias: "
Whatever I shall say, will either come to pass, or it will not "?1
How, too, would God's Pro vidence be better than man's opinion, if, as men do,
He only sees to be uncertain such things as have an uncertain result? But if
there can be no uncertainty with God, the most sure source of all things, then
the fulfilment of all that He has surely foreknown, is certain. Thus we are led
to see that there is no freedom for the intentions or actions of men; for the
mind of God, foreseeing all things without error or deception, binds all
together and controls their results. And when we have once allowed this, it is
plain how complete is the fall of all human actions in consequence. In vain are
rewards or punishments set before good or bad, for there is no free or voluntary
action of the mind to deserve them and what we just now determined was
most fair, will prove to be most unfair of all, namely to punish the dishonest
or reward the honest, since their own will does not put them in the way of
148:1 -- Horace, Staires, II. v. 59.
Page 149
honesty or dishonesty, but the unfailing necessity of
development constrains them. Wherefore neither virtues nor vices are anything,
but there is rather an indiscriminate confusion of all deserts. And nothing
could be mor e vicious than this; since the whole order of all comes from
Providence, and nothing is left to human intention, it follows that our crimes,
as well as our good deeds, must all be held due to the author of all good. Hence
it is unreasonable to hope for or pray against aught. For what could any man
hope for or pray against, if an undeviating chain links together all that we can
desire? Thus will the only understanding between God and man, the right of
prayer, be taken away. We suppose that at th e price of our deservedly humbling
ourselves before Him we may win a right to the inestimable reward of His divine
grace: this is the only manner in which men can seem to deal with God, so to
speak, and by virtue of prayer to join ourselves to that inaccessible light,
before it is granted to us; but if we allow the inevitability of the future, and
believe that we have no power, what means shall we have to join ourselves to the
Lord of all, or how can we cling to Him? Wherefore, as you sang but a little
while ago,1
the human race must be cut off from its source and ever fall away.
149:1 -- Supra, Book IV. Met. vi. p. 135.
Page 150
bonds of agreement here? What heavenly power has set
such strife between two truths? Thus, though apart each brings no doubt, yet can
they not be linked together. Comes there no d iscord between these truths? Stand
they for ever sure by one another? Yes,'tis the mind, o'erwhelmed by the body's
blindness, which cannot see by the light of that dimmed brightness the finest
threads that bind the truth. But wherefore burns the spir it with so strong
desire to learn the hidden signs of truth? Knows it the very object of its
careful search? Then why seeks it to learn anew what it already knows? If it
knows it not, why searches it in blindness? For who would desire aught unwittin
g? Or who could seek after that which is unknown? How should he find it, or
recognise its form when found, if he knows it not? And when the mind of man
perceived the mind of God, did it then know the whole and parts alike? Now is
the mind buried in the cloudy darkness of the body, yet has not altogether
forgotten its own self, and keeps the whole though it has lost the parts.
Whosoever, therefore, seeks the truth, is not wholly in ignorance, nor yet has
knowledge wholly; for he knows not all, y et is not ignorant of all. He takes
thought for the whole which he keeps in memory, handling again what he saw on
high, so that he may add to that which he has kept, that which he has
forgotten.'
Page 151
151:1 -- Cicero, De
Divinatione, II.
151:2 -- Referring to
Boethius's words in Prose iii. of this book, p.145.
Page 152
Of course not. Secondly, le t us state that
foreknowledge exists, but brings no necessity to bear upon events; then, I
think, the same free will will be left, intact and absolute. " But," you will
say, " though foreknowledge is no necessity for a result in the future, yet it
is a sign that it will necessarily come to pass." Thus, therefore, even if there
had been no foreknowledge, it would be plain that future results were under
necessity; for every sign can only shew what it is that it points out; it does
not bring it to pass. Wherefore we must first prove that nothing happens but of
necessity, in order that it may be plain that foreknowledge is a sign of this
necessity. Otherwise, if there is no necessity, then foreknowledge will not be a
sign of that which does no t exist. Now it is allowed that proof rests upon firm
reasoning, not upon signs or external arguments; it must be deduced from
suitable and binding causes. How can it possibly be that things, which are
foreseen as about to happen, should not occur? That would be as though we were
to believe that events would not occur which Providence foreknows as about to
occur, and as though we did not rather think this, that though they occur, yet
they have had no necessity in their own natures which brought them about. We can
see many actions developing before our eyes; just as chariot drivers see the
development of their actions as they control and guide their chariots, and many
other things likewise. Does any necessity compel any of those things
Page 153
to occur as they do? Of course not. All art, craft, and
intention would be in vain, if everything took place by compulsion. Therefore,
if things have no necessity for coming to pass when they do, they cannot have
any necessity to be about to come to pass before they do. Wherefore there are
things whose results are entirely free from necessity. For I think not that
there is any man who will say this, that things, which are done in the present,
were not about to be done in the past, before they are done. Thus these
foreknown events have their free results. Just as foreknowledge of present
things brings no necessity to bear upon them as they come to pass, so also
foreknowledge of future things brings no neces sity to bear upon things which
are to come.
Page 154
nature alone, which are known; but it is quite the
opposite. For every subject, that is known, is comprehended not according to its
own force, but rather ac cording to the nature of those who know it. Let me make
this plain to you by a brief example: the roundness of a body may be known in
one way by sight, in another way by touch. Sight can take in the whole body at
once from a distance by judging its r adii, while touch clings, as it were, to
the outside of the sphere, and from close at hand perceives through the material
parts the roundness of the body as it passes over the actual circumference. A
man himself is differently comprehended by the se nses, by imagination, by
reason, and by intelligence. For the senses distinguish the form as set in the
matter operated upon by the form; imagination distinguishes the appearance alone
without the matter. Reason goes even further than imagination; by a general and
universal contemplation it investigates the actual kind which is represented in
individual specimens. Higher still is the view of the intelligence, which
reaches above the sphere of the universal, and with the unsullied eye of the min
d gazes upon that very form of the kind in its absolute simplicity. Herein the
chief point for our consideration is this: the higher power of understanding
includes the lower, but the lower never rises to the higher. For the senses are
capable of und erstanding naught but the matter; imagination cannot look upon
universal or natural kinds; reason cannot comprehend
Page 155
the absolute form; whereas the intelligence seems to
look down from above and comprehend the fo rm, and distinguishes all that lie
below, but in such a way that it grasps the very form which could not be known
to any other than itself. For it perceives and knows the general kind, as does
reason; the appearance, as does the imagination; and the matter, as do the
senses, but with one grasp of the mind it looks upon all with a clear conception
of the whole. And reason too, as it views general kinds, does not make use of
the imagination nor the senses, but yet does perceive the objects both of the
imagination and of the senses. It is reason which thus defines a general kind
according to its conception: Man, for instance, is an animal, biped and
reasoning. This is a general notion of a natural kind, but no man denies that
the subject can be approached by the imagination and by the senses, just because
reason investigates it by a reasonable conception and not by the imagination or
senses. Likewise, though imagination takes its beginning of seeing and forming
appearances from the sense s, yet without their aid it surveys each subject by
an imaginative faculty of distinguishing, not by the distinguishing faculty of
the senses.
Page 156
his own action from his own capability and not the
capability of any other. 'In days of old the Porch at Athens1
gave us men, seeing dimly as in old age, who could believe that the feelings of
the senses and the imagination were bu t impressions on the mind from bodies
without them, just as the old custom was to impress with swift-running pens
letters upon the surface of a waxen tablet which bore no marks before. But if
the mind with its own force can bring forth naught by its own exertions; if it
does but lie passive and subject to the marks of other bodies; if it reflects,
as does, forsooth, a mirror, the vain reflections of other things; whence
thrives there in the soul an all-seeing power of knowledge? What is the for ce
that sees the single parts, or which distinguishes the facts it knows? What is
the force that gathers up the parts it has distinguished, that takes its course
in order due, now rises to mingle with the things on high, and now sinks down
among the things below, and then to itself brings back itself, and, so
examining, refutes the false with truth? This is a cause of greater power, of
more effective force by far than that which only receives the impressions of
material bodies. Yet does the pas sive reception come first, rousing and
stirring
156:1 -- Zeno, of Citium (342-270 B.C),
the founder of the Stoic school, taught in the Stoa Poekile, whence the name of
the school. The following lines refer to their do ctrine of presentations and
impressions.
Page 157
all the strength of the mind in the living body When
the eyes are smitten with a light, or the ears are struck with a voice's sound,
then is the spirit's energy arou sed, and, thus moved, calls upon like forms,
such as it holds within itself, fits them to signs without and mingles the forms
of its imagination with those which it has stored within.
Page 158
But reason belongs to the human race alone, just as the
true intelligence is God's alone. Wherefore that manner of knowledge is better
than others, for it can comprehend of its own nature not only the subject
peculiar to itself, but also the subjects of the other kinds of knowledge.
Suppose that the senses and imagination thus oppose reasoning, saying, " The
universal natural kinds, whi ch reason believes that it can perceive, are
nothing; for what is comprehensible to the senses and the imagina- tion cannot
be universal: therefore either the judgment of reason is true, and that which
can be perceived by the senses is nothing or, s ince reason knows well
that there are many subjects comprehensible to the senses and imagina- tion, the
conception of reason is vain, for it holds to be universal what is an individual
matter comprehensible to the senses." To this reason might answer , that " it
sees from a general point of view what is comprehensible to the senses and the
imagination, but they cannot aspire to a knowledge of universals, since their
manner of knowledge cannot go further than material or bodily appearances; and i
n the matter of knowledge it is better to trust to the stronger and more nearly
perfcct judgment." If such a trial of argument occurred, should not we, who have
within us the force of reasoning as well as the powers of the senses and
imagination, app rove of the cause of reason rather than that of the others? It
is in like manner that human reason thinks that
Page 159
the divine intelligence cannot perceive the things of
the future except as it conceives them itself. For you argue thus: " If there
are events which do not appear to have sure or necessary results, their results
cannot be known for certain beforehand: therefore there can be no foreknowledge
of these events; for if we believe that there is any forek nowledge thereof,
there can exist nothing but such as is brought forth of necessity." If therefore
we, who have our share in possession of reason, could go further and possess the
judgment of the mind of God, we should then think it most just that h uman
reason should yield itself to the mind of God, just as we have determined that
the senses and imagination ought to yield to reason.
Page 160
which beat the breeze, and they float through vast
tracks of air in their easy flight. 'Tis others' wont to plant their footsteps
on the ground, and pass with their paces over green fields or under trees.
Though all these thou seest move in different shapes, yet all have their faces
downward along the ground, and this doth draw downward and dull their senses.
Alone of all, the human race lifts up its head on high, and stands in easy
balance with the body upright, and so looks down to spurn the earth. If thou art
not too earthly by an evil folly, this pose is as a lesson. Thy glance is
upward, and thou dos t carry high thy head, and thus thy search is heavenward:
then lead thy soul too upward, lest while the body is higher raised, the mind
sink lower to the earth.
Page 161
things. All that lives under the conditions of time
moves through the present from the past to the future; there is nothing set in
time which can at one moment grasp the whole space of its lifetime. It cannot
yet comprehend to-morrow; yesterday it has already lost. And in this life of
to-day your life is no more than a changing, passing moment. And as Aristotle1 said of the universe, so it is of all that is subject
to time; though it never began to be, nor will ever cease, and its life is co-
extensive with the infinity of time, yet it is not such as can be held to be
eternal. For th ough it apprehends and grasps a space of infinite lifetime, it
does not embrace the whole simultaneously; it has not yet experienced the
future. What we should rightly call eternal is that which grasps and possesses
wholly and simultaneously the ful ness of unending life, which acks naught of
the future, and has lost naught of the fleeting past; and such an existence must
be ever present in itself to control and aid itself, and also must keep present
with itself the infinity of changing time. Th erefore, people who hear that
Plato thought that this universe had no beginning of time and will have no end,
are not right in thinking that in this way the created world is co-eternal with
its creator2
161:1 -- Aristotle, De Cæ;elo, 1.
161:2 -- Boethius speaks of people who 'hear
that Plato thought, etc.,' because this was the teaching of some of Plato's
successors at the Aca demy. Plato himself thought otherwise, as may be seen in
the Timæ;us, e.g. ch. xi. 38 B., 'Time then has come into being along
with the universe, that being generated together, together they may be
dissolved, should a dissolution of them ever come to pass; and it was made after
the pattern of the eternal nature that it might be as like to it as possible.
For the pattern is existent for all eternity, but the copy has been, and is, and
shall be, throughout all time continually.' (Mr. A rcher Hind's translation.)
Page 162
For to pass through unending life, the attribute which
Plato ascribes to the universe is one thing; but it is another thing to grasp
simultaneously the whole of unending life in the present; this is plainly a
peculiar property of the mind of God.
Page 163
those, to whom it comes, seem to be in truth what they
imitate. But since this imitation could not be abiding, the unending march of
time has swept it away, and thus we find that it has bound together, as it
passes, a chain of life, which it could not by abiding embrace in its fulness.
And thus if we would apply proper epithets to those subjects, we can say,
following Plato, that God is eternal, but the universe is continual.
Page 164
Surely not. If one may not unworthily compare this
present time with the divine, just as you can see things in this your temporal
present, so God sees all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this divine
foreknowledge do es not change the nature or individual qualitiesofthings: it
sees things present in its understanding just as they will result some time in
the future. It makes no confusion in its distinctions, and with one view of itS
mind it discerns all that shal l come to pass whether of necessity or not. For
instance, when you see at the same time a man walking on the earth and the sun
rising in the heavens, you see each sight simultaneously, yet you distinguish
between them, and decide that one is moving voluntarily, the other of necessity.
In like manner the perception of God looks down upon all things without
disturbing at all their nature, though they are present to Him but future under
the conditions of time. Wherefore this foreknowledge is not o pinion but
knowledge resting upon truth, since He knows that a future event is, though He
knows too that it will not occur of necessity. If you answer here that what God
sees about to happen, cannot but happen, and that what cannot but happen is bou
nd by necessity, you fasten me down to the word necessity, I will grant that we
have a matter of most firm truth, but it is one to which scarce any man can
approach unless he be a contemplator of the divine. For I shall answer that such
a thing
Page 165
will occur of necessity, when it is viewed from the
point of divine knowledge; but when it is examined in its own nature, it seems
perfectly free and unrestrained. For there are two kinds of necessities; one is
simple: for instance, a necessary fact, "all men are mortal "; the other is
conditional; for instance, if you know that a man is walking, he must be
walking: for what each man knows cannot be otherwise than it is known to be; but
the conditional one is by n o means followed by this simple and direct
necessity; for there is no necessity to compel a voluntary walker to proceed,
though it is necessary that, if he walks, he should be proceeding. In the same
way, if Providence sees an event in its present, that thing must be, though it
has no necessity of its own nature. And God looks in His present upon those
future things which come to pass through free will. Therefore if these things be
looked at from the point of view of God's insight, they come t o pass of
necessity under the condition of divine knowledge; if, on the other hand, they
are viewed by themselves, they do not lose the perfect freedom of their nature.
Without doubt, then, all things that God foreknows do come to pass, but some of
t hem proceed from free will; and though they result by coming into existence,
yet they do not lose their own nature, because before they came to pass they
could also not have come to pass.
Page 166
in their not being bound by necessity, since they
result under all circumstances as by necessity, on account of the condition of
divine knowledge? " This is the difference, as I just now put forward: t ake the
sun rising and a man walking; while these operations are occurring, they cannot
but occur: but the one was bound to occur before it did; the other was not so
bound. What God has in His present, does exist without doubt; but of such things
som e follow by necessity, others by their authors' wills. Wherefore I was
justified in saying that if these things be regarded from the view of divine
knowledge, they are necessary, but if they are viewed by themselves, they are
perfectly free from all ties of necessity: just as when you refer all, that is
clear to the senses, to the reason, it becomes general truth, but it remains
particular if regarded by itself. " But," you will say, " if it is in my power
to change a purpose of mine, I will di sregard Providence, since I may change
what Providence foresees." To which I answer, " You can change your purpose, but
since the truth of Providence knows in its present that you can do so, and
whether you do so, and in what direction you may chang e it, therefore you
cannot escape that divine foreknowledge: just as you cannot avoid the glance of
a present eye, though you may by your free will turn yourself to all kinds of
different actions." "What?" you will say, " can I by my own action chang e
Page 167
divine knowledge, so that if I choose now one thing,
now another, Providence too will seem to change its knowledge?" No; divine
insight precedes all future things, turning them back and recalling them to the
pr esent time of its own peculiar knowledge. It does not change, as you may
think, between this and that alternation of foreknowledge. It is constant in
preceding and embracing by one glance all your changes. And God does not receive
this ever-present grasp of all things and vision of the present at the
occurrence of future events, but from His own peculiar directness. Whence also
is that difficulty solved which you laid down a little while ago, that it was
not worthy to say that our future events were the cause of God's knowledge. For
this power of knowledge, ever in the present and embracing all things in its
perception, does itself constrain all things, and owes naught to following
events from which it has received naught. Thus, therefore , mortal men have
their freedom of judgment intact. And since their wills are freed from all
binding necessity, laws do not set rewards or punishments unjustly. God is ever
the constant foreknowing overseer, and the ever-present eternity of His sight
moves in harmony with the future nature of our actions, as it dispenses rewards
to the good, and punishments to the bad. Hopes are not vainly put in God, nor
prayers in vain offered: if these are right, they cannot but be answered. Turn
therefore from vice: ensue virtue: raise your soul to
upright hopes: send up on high your prayers from this earth. If you would be
honest, great is the necessity enjoined upon your goodness, since all you do is
done before the eyes of an all-seeing Judge.'
Page 169
A Note on the Translation
I. G.
December 19, 1901.
Page 170
APPENDIX
(See Book 1l., Prose iii. p. 32)
Hope1
was my name, and Sicily my home,
Where I was
nursed, until I came from thence
An exile for the love I bore my
lord:
Apart from him my time was full of tears,
Heavy the day, laden with
care the night,
(But with him all was joy and peace and love) 2
And now, my pilgrim's journey o'er, I rest
Within this sacred place, and
witness bear
Before the throne of the Eternal Judge on
high.
170:1 -- Elpis is a Greek word meaning
hope
170:2 -- This line is lost from the
original Latin.
Page 171
EDITORIAL NOTE
Page 172
So, if there is nothing distinctly or dogmatically
Christian in the work, there is also nothing which can be condemned as pagan, in
spite of the strong influence of pagan philosophy, with which Boethius was
intimate .
Page 173
works included treatises against the Nestorians and
Arians.
Page 174
'Now if thy mental eye conducted be
From light
to light as I resound their fame,
The eighth well worth attention thou wilt
see.
Within it dwells, all excellence beholding,
The soul who pointed out
the world's dark ways,
To all who listen, its deceits unfolding.
Beneath
in Cieldauro lies the frame
Whence it was driven; from woe and exile
to
This fair abode of peace and bliss it came.'
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
A.D.
Page 175
youth was spent chiefl y in war. He attacked his ally,
the Emperor Zeno, in 487. To save Constantinople, Zeno gave him leave to expel
Odoacer from Italy. Practically the whole Gothic nation migrated with
Theodoric's army to Italy, where Odoacer was thrice defeated. He cons ented to
allow Theodoric to reign jointly with him, but he was conveniently assassinated
very soon afterwards, and Theodoric ruled till he died in 526, leaving the
country certainly in a better state than that in which he found it, having ruled
with m oderation on the whole, and choosing good ministers such as Boethius. But
in his last years he became influenced by unscrupulous men, informers, barbarian
Ostrogoths, who oppressed the Italians, and the most bitter Arian sectaries, by
each of which c lasses Boethius was hated as an honest and powerful minister, a
protector of the oppressed Italians and as an orthodox Christian.
W. V. C.