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Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.
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Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered.
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Whether any event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence.
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Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
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Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause ofArminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.
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Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind.
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Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.
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Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity.
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Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.
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Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the Freedomof the Will.
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The evidence of Gods certain Foreknowledge of the volitions of moral Agents.
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God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity.
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Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty.
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