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
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The Encyclopedia of Religion



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Abbreviations and Symbols Used in This Work

- abbr.** abbreviated; abbreviation
abr. abridged; abridgment
AD *anno Domini*, in the year of the (our) Lord
Afrik. Afrikaans
AH *anno Hegirae*, in the year of the Hijrah
Akk. Akkadian
Ala. Alabama
Alb. Albanian
Am. Amos
AM *ante meridiem*, before noon
amend. amended; amendment
annot. annotated; annotation
Ap. *Apocalypse*
Apn. *Apocryphon*
app. appendix
Arab. Arabic
'Arakh. 'Arakhin
Aram. Aramaic
Ariz. Arizona
Ark. Arkansas
Arm. Armenian
art. article (pl., arts.)
AS Anglo-Saxon
Asm. Mos. *Assumption of Moses*
Assyr. Assyrian
A.S.S.R. Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
Av. Avestan
'A.Z. 'Avodah zarah
b. born
Bab. Babylonian
Ban. Bantu
1 Bar. 1 Baruch
2 Bar. 2 Baruch
3 Bar. 3 Baruch
4 Bar. 4 Baruch
B.B. *Bava' batra'*
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
bc before Christ
BCE before the common era
B.D. Bachelor of Divinity
Beits. *Beitsah*
Bekh. *Bekhorot*
Beng. Bengali
Ber. *Berakhot*
Berb. Berber
Bik. *Bikkurim*
bk. book (pl., bks.)
B.M. *Bava' metsi'a'*
BP before the present
B.Q. *Bava' qamma'*
Bräh. *Brähmana*
Bret. Breton
B.T. Babylonian Talmud
Bulg. Bulgarian
Burm. Burmese
c. *circa*, about, approximately
Calif. California
Can. Canaanite
Catal. Catalan
CE of the common era
Celt. Celtic
cf. *confer*, compare
Chald. Chaldean
chap. chapter (pl., chaps.)
Chin. Chinese
C.H.M. Community of the Holy Myrrhbearers
1 Chr. 1 Chronicles
2 Chr. 2 Chronicles
Ch. Slav. Church Slavonic
cm centimeters
col. column (pl., cols.)
Col. *Colossians*
Colo. Colorado
comp. compiler (pl., comps.)
Conn. Connecticut
cont. continued
Copt. Coptic
1 Cor. 1 Corinthians
2 Cor. 2 Corinthians
corr. corrected
C.S.P. *Congregatio Sancti Pauli*, Congregation of Saint Paul (Paulists)
d. died
D Deuteronomic (source of the Pentateuch)
Dan. Danish
D.B. *Divinitatis Baccalaureus*, Bachelor of Divinity
D.C. District of Columbia
D.D. *Divinitatis Doctor*, Doctor of Divinity
Del. Delaware
Dem. *Dema'i*
dim. diminutive
diss. dissertation
Dn. *Daniel*
D.Phil. Doctor of Philosophy
Dt. *Deuteronomy*
Du. Dutch
E Elohist (source of the Pentateuch)
Eccl. *Ecclesiastes*
ed. editor (pl., eds.); edition; edited by
'Eduy. 'Eduyyot
e.g. *exempli gratia*, for example
Egyp. Egyptian
1 En. 1 Enoch
2 En. 2 Enoch
3 En. 3 Enoch
Eng. English
enl. enlarged
Eph. *Ephesians*
'Eruv. 'Eruvin
1 Esd. 1 Esdras
2 Esd. 2 Esdras
3 Esd. 3 Esdras
4 Esd. 4 Esdras
esp. especially
Est. Estonian
Est. *Esther*
et al. *et alii*, and others
etc. *et cetera*, and so forth
Eth. Ethiopic
EV English version
Ex. *Exodus*
exp. expanded
Ez. *Ezekiel*
Ezr. *Ezra*
2 Ezr. 2 Ezra
4 Ezr. 4 Ezra
f. feminine; and following (pl., ff.)
fasc. fascicle (pl., fascs.)
fig. figure (pl., figs.)
Finn. Finnish
fl. *floruit*, flourished
Fla. Florida
Fr. French
frag. fragment
ft. feet
Ga. Georgia
Gal. *Galatians*
Gaul. Gaulish
Ger. German
Git. *Gitin*
Gn. *Genesis*
Gr. Greek
Hag. *Hagigah*
Hal. *Hallah*
Hau. Hausa
Hb. *Habakkuk*
Heb. Hebrew
Heb. *Hebrews*
Hg. *Haggai*
Hitt. Hittite
Hor. *Horayot*
Hos. *Hosea*
Hul. *Hullin*
Hung. Hungarian
ibid. *ibidem*, in the same place (as the one immediately preceding)
Icel. Icelandic
i.e. *id est*, that is
IE Indo-European
Ill. Illinois
Ind. Indiana
intro. introduction
Ir. Gael. Irish Gaelic
Iran. Iranian
Is. *Isaiah*
Ital. Italian
J Yahvist (source of the Pentateuch)
Jas. *James*
Jav. Javanese
Jb. *Job*
Jdt. *Judith*
Jer. *Jeremiah*
Jgs. *Judges*
Jl. *Joel*
Jn. *John*
1 Jn. 1 John
2 Jn. 2 John
3 Jn. 3 John
Jon. *Jonah*
Jos. *Joshua*
Jpn. Japanese
JPS Jewish Publication Society translation (1985) of the Hebrew Bible
J.T. *Jerusalem Talmud*
Jub. *Jubilees*
Kans. Kansas
Kel. *Kelim*

- Ker.** *Keritot*
Ket. *Ketubbot*
1 Kgs. *1 Kings*
2 Kgs. *2 Kings*
Khois. Khoisan
Kil. *Kil'ayim*
km kilometers
Kor. Korean
Ky. Kentucky
l. line (pl., ll.)
La. Louisiana
Lam. *Lamentations*
Lat. Latin
Latv. Latvian
L. en Th. Licencié
 en Théologie, Licentiate
 in Theology
L. ès L. Licencié ès Lettres,
 Licentiate in Literature
Let. Jer. *Letter of Jeremiah*
lit. literally
Lith. Lithuanian
Lk. *Luke*
LL Late Latin
LL.D. Legum Doctor,
 Doctor of Laws
Lv. *Leviticus*
m meters
m. masculine
M.A. Master of Arts
Ma'as. *Ma'asevot*
Ma'as. Sh. *Ma'aser sheni*
Mak. *Makkot*
Makh. *Makshirin*
Mal. *Malachi*
Mar. Marathi
Mass. Massachusetts
1 Mc. *1 Maccabees*
2 Mc. *2 Maccabees*
3 Mc. *3 Maccabees*
4 Mc. *4 Maccabees*
Md. Maryland
M.D. *Medicinae Doctor*,
 Doctor of Medicine
ME Middle English
Meg. *Megillah*
Me'il. *Me'ilah*
Men. *Menahot*
MHG Middle High German
mi. miles
Mi. *Micah*
Mich. Michigan
Mid. *Middot*
Minn. Minnesota
Miq. *Miqva'ot*
MIran. Middle Iranian
Miss. Mississippi
Mk. *Mark*
Mo. Missouri
Mo'ed Q. *Mo'ed qatan*
Mont. Montana
MPers. Middle Persian
MS. *manuscriptum*,
 manuscript (pl., MSS)
Mt. *Matthew*
MT Masoretic text
n. note
Na. *Nahum*
Nah. Nahuatl
Naz. *Nazir*
N.B. *nota bene*, take careful
 note
N.C. North Carolina
n.d. no date
N.Dak. North Dakota
NEB New English Bible
Nebr. Nebraska
Ned. *Nedarim*
Neg. *Nega'im*
Neh. *Nehemiah*
Nev. Nevada
N.H. New Hampshire
Nid. *Niddah*
N.J. New Jersey
Nm. *Numbers*
N.Mex. New Mexico
no. number (pl., nos.)
Nor. Norwegian
n.p. no place
n.s. new series
N.Y. New York
Ob. *Obadiah*
O.Cist. Ordo
 Cisterciencium, Order of
 Cîteaux (Cistercians)
OCS Old Church Slavonic
OE Old English
O.F.M. Ordo Fratrum
 Minorum, Order of Friars
 Minor (Franciscans)
OFR. Old French
Ohal. *Ohalot*
OHG Old High German
OlR. Old Irish
OIran. Old Iranian
Okla. Oklahoma
ON Old Norse
O.P. Ordo Praedicatorum,
 Order of Preachers
 (Dominicans)
OPers. Old Persian
op. cit. *opere citato*, in the
 work cited
OPrus. Old Prussian
Oreg. Oregon
'Orl. *'Orlah*
O.S.B. Ordo Sancti
 Benedicti, Order of Saint
 Benedict (Benedictines)
p. page (pl., pp.)
P Priestly (source of the
 Pentateuch)
Pa. Pennsylvania
Pahl. Pahlavi
Par. *Parah*
para. paragraph (pl., paras.)
Pers. Persian
Pes. *Pesahim*
Ph.D. *Philosophiae Doctor*,
 Doctor of Philosophy
Phil. *Philippians*
Phlm. *Philemon*
Phoen. Phoenician
pl. plural; plate (pl., pls.)
PM *post meridiem*, after
 noon
Pol. Polish
pop. population
Port. Portuguese
Prv. *Proverbs*
Ps. *Psalms*
Ps. 151 *Psalm 151*
Ps. Sol. *Psalms of Solomon*
pt. part (pl., pts.)
1 Pt. *1 Peter*
2 Pt. *2 Peter*
Pth. Parthian
Q hypothetical source of the
 synoptic Gospels
Qid. *Qiddushin*
Qin. *Qinnim*
r. reigned; ruled
Rab. *Rabbah*
rev. revised
R. ha-Sh. *Ro'sh ha-shanah*
R.I. Rhode Island
Rom. Romanian
Rom. *Romans*
R.S.C.J. Societas
 Sacratissimi Cordis Jesu,
 Religious of the Sacred
 Heart
RSV Revised Standard
 Version of the Bible
Ru. *Ruth*
Rus. Russian
Rv. *Revelation*
Rv. Ezr. *Revelation of Ezra*
San. *Sanhedrin*
S.C. South Carolina
Scot. Gael. Scottish Gaelic
S.Dak. South Dakota
sec. section (pl., secs.)
Sem. Semitic
ser. series
sg. singular
Sg. *Song of Songs*
Sg. of 3 *Prayer of Azariah*
and the Song of the Three
Young Men
Shab. *Shabbat*
Shav. *Shavu'ot*
Sheq. *Sheqalim*
Sib. Or. *Sibylline Oracles*
Sindh. Sindhi
Sinh. Sinhala
Sir. *Ben Sira*
S.J. Societas Jesu, Society
 of Jesus (Jesuits)
Skt. Sanskrit
1 Sm. *1 Samuel*
2 Sm. *2 Samuel*
Sogd. Sogdian
Soṭ *Soṭah*
sp. species (pl., spp.)
Span. Spanish
sq. square
S.S.R. Soviet Socialist
 Republic
st. stanza (pl., ss.)
S.T.M. *Sacrae Theologiae*
 Magister, Master of Sacred
 Theology
Suk. *Sukkah*
Sum. Sumerian
supp. supplement;
 supplementary
Sus. *Susanna*
s.v. *sub verbo*, under the
 word (pl., s.v.v.)
Swed. Swedish
Syr. Syriac
Syr. Men. *Syriac Menander*
Ta'an. *Ta'anit*
Tam. Tamil
Tam. *Tamid*
Tb. *Tobit*
T.D. *Taishō shinshū*
daizōkyō, edited by
 Takakusu Junjirō et al.
 (Tokyo, 1922–1934)
Tem. *Temurah*
Tenn. Tennessee
Ter. *Terumot*
TeV. Y. *Ṭevul yom*
Tex. Texas
Th.D. *Theologicae Doctor*,
 Doctor of Theology
1 Thes. *1 Thessalonians*
2 Thes. *2 Thessalonians*
Thrac. Thracian
Ti. *Titus*
Tib. Tibetan
1 Tm. *1 Timothy*
2 Tm. *2 Timothy*
T. of 12 *Testaments of the*
Twelve Patriarchs
Toh. *Ṭohorot*
Tong. Tongan
trans. translator,
 translators; translated by;
 translation
Turk. Turkish
Ukr. Ukrainian
Upan. *Upanisad*
U.S. United States
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet
 Socialist Republics
Uqts. *Uqtsin*
v. verse (pl., vv.)
Va. Virginia
var. variant; variation
Viet. Vietnamese
viz. *videlicet*, namely
vol. volume (pl., vols.)
Vt. Vermont
Wash. Washington
Wel. Welsh
Wis. Wisconsin
Wis. *Wisdom of Solomon*
W.Va. West Virginia
Wyo. Wyoming
Yad. *Yadayim*
Yev. *Yevamot*
Yi. Yiddish
Yor. Yoruba
Zav. *Zavim*
Zec. *Zechariah*
Zep. *Zephaniah*
Zev. *Zevahim*
 * hypothetical
 ? uncertain; possibly;
 perhaps
 ° degrees
 + plus
 – minus
 = equals; is equivalent to
 × by; multiplied by
 → yields

S

(CONTINUED)



SPELLS belong to the general context of magical thought. They consist of words or sets of words that issue a command that is efficacious merely because it has been pronounced. Spells represent one of the many techniques used to control nature and the evils arising in a given society. They are found universally and are probably as old as language itself, having been in existence since the Lower Paleolithic.

The basis of the power of spells is the primitive idea that nothing exists without a name and that to know the names of things is to possess them. [See Names and Naming.] Thus, to give orders with the appropriate words is to ensure success, made even more certain when the speaker is a witch, shaman, holy man, or anyone else whose profession it is to deal with mystery.

Stated in other terms, spells are all-powerful spoken formulas, words, or phrases of power. They are definitive: once uttered, the desired chain of events is set irrevocably in motion. Each word, once enunciated, has a magical value and weight that none can control.

The order given in the spell, addressed to deities, spirits, or the forces of nature, can be creative, destructive, protective, or medicinal; it can demand triumph over an enemy, or the attainment of impossible powers or things. It can be used to break spells, cast spells, or obtain love.

Conditions of Spells. According to magical thought, only prayers can be spoken by anyone at any time and remain effective. [See Prayer.] Spells, by contrast, and other such magical activities, have many prerequisites. Spells in particular must be pronounced by a person who is initiated into the mysteries or endowed with supernatural powers, and who is sexually, dietetically, and socially pure. The person casting the spell must know with precision the words he will pronounce, the time when they must be uttered, the cardinal point toward which he will face, what he will stand or sit on, how his person must be arranged, the clothing, colors, ornaments, and objects he will use, the number of times

he must repeat the words, and the psychological attitude and manners he must assume. Everything must be precise. As a part of religious and magical activities, spells sometimes require musical backgrounds, specially prepared settings, appropriate instruments, prudent timing, and attention to taboos that might be violated, such as sex, the lack of initiation, or impurity.

Spells can serve either collective ends, such as victory in battle, the banishing of plagues and epidemics, or the bringing of rain, or they can serve personal ends, such as the attainment of love, health, power, wealth, virility, fertility, finding out who has stolen something, or causing harm to an enemy. The former collective spells require a complex ceremony and initiates. The latter, usually carried out on a popular level, generally need only to be repeated continually or for a magical number of times.

As a general rule, spells accompany the preparation of potions, amulets, weapons, magical paraphernalia, scepters, and objects of sorcery. They are recited over sick people, addressed to the natural elements one wants to control, or murmured softly and continuously. Rarely are they repeated by large groups of people, although this does happen occasionally.

Powerful Sounds and Words. Many scholars have concentrated on the study of the word as a symbol. [See Language.] These scholars include linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, educators, psychiatrists, and occultists. Many of these researchers are inclined to give an onomatopoeic value to sounds: for example, /m/ and /n/ are related to the mother because of the sound made during breastfeeding; /g/ is related to water, because that is how it sounds when swallowed; and /a/ is an imperative for calling attention. Since ancient times, philosophers such as Plato (in his dialogue *Cratylus*) have remarked on how words somehow take on the form of the things they name.

Nevertheless, a serious analysis gives us very few sounds or words that have the same value in all cul-

tures. Greater universality can be found, perhaps, in the language of gestures: assenting by moving the head up and down, negating by moving it from right to left, beckoning with the arm and hand, pointing things out with the index finger or the eyes and brows, or threatening by raising a fist. [See Postures and Gestures.]

In Qabalah, the interest in a knowledge of sounds, written letters, and words was intensified. Each sign was given a magical value that had a religious meaning and a numerical relationship. For example, the Hebrew letter *alef* became the symbol of mankind and the abstract principle of material objects; it is the trinity in unity and its numerical value is 1 (Scholem, 1974). Freemasonry also produced speculations in this field, but it assigned many meanings to the same letter. The letter *A* became an emblem of the first of the three faculties of divinity—creative power—in addition to being the abbreviation for the word *architect* (Powells, 1982). This association of the word with creation is found among many peoples of the world.

The history of religions has given us several words or short phrases that have been believed to be particularly powerful. The gnostics of North Africa, for instance, made an abundant use of talismans and incantations. Two words in particular have survived to our day: *abraxas* and *abracadabra*. The word *abraxas* represents the supreme deity and his supreme power. Numerically ($a = 1, b = 2, r = 100, a = 1, x = 60, a = 1, s = 200$) it adds up to 365, or the number of days in the solar year, the cycle of divine action. The word was carved into stone as a talisman and pronounced as a protective device. The word *abracadabra*, derived from the Aramaic phrase “Avreiq ‘ad havra’ ” (“Hurl thunderbolts to [unto? at?] darkness”), was used to invoke the aid of the supreme spirits. Inscribed as an inverted triangle, with one less letter on each successive line, it was considered a powerful talisman.

The Jews, a people rich in esoteric and magical lore, were the inventors of Qabalah, which includes one of the most important techniques for the numerological analysis of words and letters, intended to reveal their esoteric meaning. Four words in particular deserve mention. *Adonai*, which means “supreme lord,” was spoken as an infallible invocation of aid. *Haleluyah*, translated as “hymn to the lord,” also served as an invocation. *Amen* was a term that gave a full and definitive meaning to whatever was expressed. It was understood as “So be it,” but with the magical sense that things could not be otherwise. Some think it was derived from invocations to Amun. *Golem* referred to the basic substance from which God created man. When deprived of a soul, it could be used to create evil beings, who could be controlled only by pronouncing the true and secret name of God.

Within Islam, three phrases are believed by some to have a magical power. The phrase “*Lā ilāha illā Allāh*” (“There is no god but God”) has been used to perform miracles (Idries Shah, 1968). The phrase “*Allāh akbar*” (“God is great”) serves as a basis for white magic, and the words “*Ism al-a‘ẓam*” are used to subjugate or subdue evil spirits.

Among Christians, the names *Christ* and *Jesus* serve to stave off evil. Roman Catholics may seek triple insurance by naming all three members of the holy family: “Jesus, Mary, and Joseph.”

For Tibetan Buddhists, the phrase “*Oṃ maṇi padme hūm*” contains many occult meanings. It is believed that the first word, *oṃ*, emanates from the cosmic vibration essential to creation. [See *Oṃ*.] Some scholars maintain that it is equivalent to the *Amin* of the Muslims and the *Amen* of the Jews. It is the basic name of the creator god. The complete phrase expresses a desire to be pure and to be part of the universal spirit.

Spells in the History of Religions. Since ancient times people have uttered and written words, phrases, and formulas that they have believed to have some magic power or irresistible influence. Spells to ward off what is evil or undesirable and to bring about what is good or desirable are known in many cultures.

Egypt. The basic esoteric activity of the ancient Egyptians was preparation for life after death. For this purpose they developed high levels of art, magic, and religion. The preparation of a scarab, carved from semi-precious stone to replace the heart of the deceased, required that the artisan recite the following spell: “I am Thoth, the inventor and founder of medicine and letters; come to me, thou who art under the earth, rise up to me, great spirit.” This spell was to be uttered without fail on a set number of days after the new moon (Idries Shah, 1968). Many similar spells are known to have been used, usually with apotropaic intent. In addition, the Egyptian *Book of Going Forth by Day* records spells that were to be used for each moment after a person’s death.

Mesopotamia. The earliest Mesopotamian cultures have left very few records of their magico-religious thought. Later Assyro-Babylonian translations make it seem that one of the most crucial concerns of these peoples was the evil eye, the evil that surrounds men on all sides and affects them especially in the form of the envy of enemies. One spell against the evil eye went as follows:

Let the finger point to the evil desires,
the word of ill omen.

Evil is the eye, the enemy eye,
eye of woman, eye of man,
eye of a rival, anyone’s eye.

Eye, you have nailed yourself to the door

and have made the doorsill tremble.
 You have penetrated the house. . . .
 Destroy that eye! Drive out that eye!
 Cast it off! Block its path!
 Break the eye like an earthen bowl!
 (Garcia Font, 1963)

The old spells used in Assyrian medicine had something of a mythical nature. Take, for instance, this spell for toothache:

After Anu made the heavens, the heavens made the earth, the earth made the rivers, the rivers made the canals, the canals made the swamps, and the swamps, in turn, made the Worm. The Worm, crying, approached Shamash, and he approached Ea, spilling tears: "What will you give me to eat and what will you give me to destroy?" "I will give you dried figs and apricots." "Of what use are they to me? Put me between your teeth and let me live in your gums, so that I can destroy the blood of the teeth and gnaw at the marrow of the gums. . . ." "Since you have spoken thus, O Worm, let Ea crush you with his powerful fist." (Hocart, 1975)

This was repeated until the pain disappeared.

Greece. The Greeks imagined their gods as having human form and character, and they occasionally ordered them to help the needy by means of magical formulas, as in the following spell addressed to Hekate:

Come, infernal, earthly and heavenly one . . . goddess of the crossroads, bearer of light, queen of the night, enemy of the sun, friend and companion of the darkness; you who are happy with the barking of dogs and bloodshed, and who wander in the darkness, near the tombs, thirsty for blood, the terror of mortals, Gorgon, Mormon, moon of a thousand forms, accept my sacrifice. (Caro Baroja, 1964)

Medieval Europe. In Europe, the practitioners of witchcraft developed multiple spells for defense against enemies, always preceded by the name of God and the archangels. We also find terrible spells that try to control enemies. In the anonymous medieval work *Clavicula Salomonis* (Small Key of Salomo), one reads: "Man or woman! Young man or old! Whoever might be the evil person trying to harm me, either directly or indirectly, bodily or spiritually . . . MALEDICTUS ETERNAM EST, by the holy names of Adonai, Elohim, and Semaforas. Amen." After reciting this spell, a candle was extinguished as a sign of the finality of the curse.

Sudan. The Sudan covers a territory between Egypt and Ethiopia, where the magic of Egyptian antiquity and the later Muslims is mixed with primitive animistic magic. Popular sorcerers and magicians abound, openly offering their services. Frequently they exalt their own powers, which they obtain through their spells. For example, when a hunter hires one to obtain luck at hunting, the magician says: "I am a magician, all powerful in spells. What I say comes true. I say, 'Give victory to

so and so.' He will have victory in all things." Afterward, the magician goes about filled with the desire that events might occur that will instill the hunter and the warrior with luck. This is accompanied by whistle-like sounds and by facing toward different cardinal points, whistling three times in each direction while holding a receptacle of water. The Sudanese believe that spells are more powerful when pronounced over running water.

The Sudanese also have spells to give power to certain leaves that are used in the preparation of medicines. The spells are recited over the leaves a specific number of times in order to bring about the desired effect.

To obtain the love of the opposite sex, the magician draws a magic circle within which he prepares a potion of herbs and feathers. In order to give the potion the necessary potency, he repeats the following spell: "I am a magician, O Pot, you contain the medicines of love, the spell of love, of passion. My heart throbs like the drum, my blood boils like water." This is repeated three times, and afterward another spell is intoned: "Bring my desire to me, my name is so-and-so, and my desire is the one whom I love." This spell requires solemnity and precision. To make it more effective, one has to open and close one's eyes four times, slowly, while saying it.

Such spells are not taught to laymen, only to initiates. To be able to pronounce them one has to undertake a series of purifications, such as abstaining from food and sex for forty to sixty days (Idries Shah, 1968).

India. The sheer number of spells used in the sacred books of India is noteworthy in itself. The *Atharvaveda* in particular is full of them. Here I shall mention only one, dedicated to obtaining a man's love: "By the power and laws of Varuna, I invoke the burning force of love, in thee, for thee. The desire, the potent love-spirit which all the gods have created in the waters, this I invoke, this I employ, to secure thee for me" (Idries Shah, 1968).

China. One result of China's use of ideograms is that its magic produces mostly written talismans, although spells abound, greatly influenced by their historical past. A spell written on the blade of a sword could make it invincible: "I wield the large sword of Heaven to cut down specters in their five shapes; one stroke of this divine blade disperses a myriad of these beings" (Idries Shah, 1968).

Mesoamerica. As in most cultures, magic in pre-Conquest Mexico was highly specialized, permitted only to initiates. The spells themselves prove this, since their language was comprehensible only to occultists of the time; for example, a spell for alleviating intestinal pain—very common in tropical countries—was re-

corded in the seventeenth century by Jacinto de la Serna:

Ea, white serpent, yellow serpent, observe that you are damaging the coffer . . . the tendons of meat. . . . But the white eagle already goes ahead, but it is not my intention to harm or destroy you, I want only to stop the harm you cause by withdrawing . . . by stopping your powerful hands and feet. But should you rebel and disobey, I will call to my aid the pledged spirit Huactzin and also call the black chichimeco, who is also hungry and thirsty, and who rips out his intestines, to follow you. I will also call my sister, the one with the skirt of jade, who soils and disorders stones and trees, and in whose company will go the pledged leopard, who will go and make noise in the place of the precious stones and treasures: the skeletal green leopard will also accompany her. (de la Serna, [1656] 1953)

The serpents mentioned at the beginning are the intestinal maladies (intestinal worms, pinworms, tapeworms, etc.) that harm the stomach and intestines. They are threatened with the eagle, which represents the needle used to pierce the stomach for bloodletting. They are also threatened with the spirit of medicinal plants and liquids.

Modern-day spells. With the development of experimental science, one would expect magic and religion to decline. In fact all three remain active, although magic has certainly yielded ground. (Magic tends to gain ground in times of crisis.) We find both ancient and modern spells disguised in the folk tales recorded by the brothers Grimm, such as the traditional "Magic wand, by the powers you possess, I command you to make me [rich, invisible, etc.]."

Mexico provides an interesting example of the survival of ancient spells. In pre-Conquest Mexico, death was believed to be a change of life, and it was thought that the god of the underworld, Mictlantecuhtli, was a disembodied, skeletal being with whom those who died natural deaths were united in burial. After the Spanish conquest, the figure was assimilated, ending up as a being who lends aid when the request is made in the appropriate fashion. Thus today, at the entrance to thousands of churches throughout Mexico, one can buy prayers and spells "To Most Holy Death." The most common of these tries to obtain the love of some indifferent person and says: "Death, beloved of my heart, do not separate me from your protection; do not leave him a quiet moment, bother him every instant, frighten him, worry him so that he will always think of me." This is repeated as often as possible, with the interjection of Catholic prayers.

The new mythology is even felt in the kitchen. For example, when there is some fear the the cooking will not turn out well, the following spell is recited: "Saint

Theresa, you who found God in the stew, help my stew not to be [salty, burned, overcooked, etc.]." It must be admitted, however, that this and many other spells are usually said out of habit, not from a certainty that the words, through their intrinsic power, will bring the desired results. Nevertheless, a belief in the power of spells can still be found among marginal groups even today, as it has been found in the past.

[See also *Incantations and Magic*.]

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BEATRIZ BARBA DE PIÑA CHÁN

Translated from Spanish by Erica Meltzer

SPENCER, HERBERT (1820–1903), English philosopher. Born in Derby, England, Herbert Spencer became the most influential exponent of social evolutionism. Educated largely in an atmosphere of religious dissent (and especially influenced by Quakers and Unitarians of the Derby Philosophical Society), Spencer combined a practical bent (for railway engineering, inventions, etc.) with a constant search for scientific principles. He became assistant editor at *The Economist* in London in 1848. After an early essay (1852) on the "development hypothesis" (concerning the laws of progress), he settled on evolution as the basic principle governing all change in the universe and began propagating a theory of evolution even before Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* appeared in 1859.

The core of Spencer's literary output was published in several volumes under the general title *A System of*

Synthetic Philosophy; this huge endeavor was left unfinished at Spencer's death. Its bearing on religion was at least fourfold. First, the prefatory volume, called *First Principles* (1862), contains the earliest philosophic exposition of the position known as agnosticism. Proceeding beyond the fideism of William Hamilton and Henry Mansel, both of whom maintained that the existence of God was a matter of faith rather than certain knowledge, Spencer argued that the force behind the cosmic process of evolution was unknown and unknowable. Second, this work and his books *The Principles of Biology* (1864–1867) and *The Principles of Psychology* (1855–1870) defended evolution as a universal natural process of development from simple and homogenous to more complex and differentiated forms of life over millions of years. Thus Spencer became embroiled with Darwin, T. H. Huxley, and others in the debate with those who held to a literal interpretation of *Genesis* or who denied the simian ancestry of human beings. Spencer also used the evolution debate as a forum to attack the idea of established religion.

Social evolutionism was the third and most important of his system's implications for religious questions. In *The Principles of Sociology* (1876–1896), he presented a barely qualified unilineal account of religious evolution and also fleshed out the first "sociology of religion" (at least in English). Spencer thought that the origins of religion lay in the worship of ghosts or ancestors; he extrapolated this view from the balance of evidence found among "primitives," or what he had no hesitation in describing as "the lowest races of mankind." Although primitive religions had, according to Spencer, barely evolved, he believed that marks of progress could be found in the religions of the greater civilizations, and he tended to plot Greco-Roman and Hindu polytheisms, the "cruder" monotheisms of Jews and Muslims, and the relative refinements of Catholicism and Protestantism on an ascending scale, envisaging his own agnostic, scientific position as the pinnacle in the history of religious consciousness. Apart from suggesting that history reflected progress toward more mature insights and institutional complexity, Spencer outlined the kinds of religious activity worth investigation. He isolated ceremonial institutions, for example—a category in which he placed laws of intercourse, habits and customs, mutilations, and funeral rites, as well as ecclesiastical institutions.

Finally, his system also carried ethical implications. In *The Principles of Ethics* (1879–1893), and in various social essays (especially those in his book *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*, 1861), he was seen as a liberal and an "individualist" who opposed punitive childrearing, narrow biblicist morality, and state legis-

lation that interferes in private affairs or with the entrepreneurial spirit.

Spencer's book sales were poor during his lifetime, and he eked out a frugal existence as a London bachelor until he was taken in by two elderly women in his old age. Through the later popularization of his ideas, however, his influence was immense, especially in the United States. His work and that of E. B. Tylor were crucial in conditioning the widespread preoccupation in English-speaking scholarship with the evolution of religion. Always ready for a lively interchange with other scholars and literati, Spencer struck up close intellectual friendships with George Eliot and her companion Henry Lewes and debated with Max Müller about mythology and the origins of religion. Spencer combined cautious distinctions and vitriolic attacks in an attempt to dissociate himself from Comtism and the views propounded by Frederick Harrison, an English disciple of Auguste Comte.

Spencer's written approach to religion suffered from a certain dilettantism: his knowledge of foreign languages was limited, and his educational background provided him no basis for the in-depth study of any single historical religion. He barely traveled outside Great Britain, although his encyclopedic tendencies, as well as his ability to collect data through travelers' accounts and mission reports from all over the world, made him a precursor to the armchair scholarship associated with James G. Frazer and *The Golden Bough*.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the liveliest popularizer of Spencer's ideas was W. H. Hudson, and his most cogent critic in matters of religious sociology was Émile Durkheim. His impact has waned with the decline of social evolutionism, but his influence on cosmological theory (that of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, for instance) and on evolution-oriented educational philosophy, especially that of John Dewey, has been more durable.

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History (London, 1975) on placing Spener in the history of the field of comparative religion; and my "Radical Conservatism in Herbert Spencer's Educational Thought," *British Journal of Educational Studies* (1969): 267–280, on religious and philosophical assumptions underlying Spencer's views on education.

GARRY W. TROMPF

SPENER, PHILIPP JAKOB (1635–1705), the most widely recognized representative of early Pietism. Spener was born in Rappoltsweiler, Alsace, on 13 January 1635. He grew up in a Lutheran home in which the prevailing religious atmosphere was heavily influenced by Johann Arndt's *True Christianity*, the widely beloved devotional guide of seventeenth-century Lutheranism. Thus Spener was naturally predisposed toward Arndtian piety. Being an omnivorous reader, even at a tender age, he acquainted himself early with Puritan works that had been translated into German, as well as with those coming out of the reform party within Lutheranism, the avowed aim of which was the furtherance of religious devotion and ethical sensitivity within the Lutheran churches.

After he had completed the necessary preliminary studies, Spener matriculated at the University of Strasbourg in 1651. His student life manifested what was considered, by the prevailing standards of the day, an unusually ascetic tendency, insofar as he abstained from excessive drinking, revelry, and generally rude behavior. The dominant intellectual influence upon him during his university days was exerted by his theology professor, Johann Konrad Dannhauer (1603–1666), who, among other things, deepened Spener's lifelong interest in the teachings of Martin Luther. Upon completion of his studies, Spener spent some years in travel. That he did so largely in Reformed territories seems to say something about his appreciation of the piety found in various Reformed circles. During his itinerary he visited Basel, where he studied Hebrew under Johann Buxtorf (1599–1664). At Geneva the fiery French representative of Reformed Pietism, Jean de Labadie (1610–1674), impressed Spener so much that in 1667 he published a translation of one of Labadie's edificatory tracts. During an extended visit to Tübingen he set in motion various impulses toward the development of Swabian Pietism. Upon his return to Strasbourg (1663) he worked for his doctoral degree, taught and preached, and married Susanne Ehrhardt. They had eleven children.

Spener was called to a succession of pastorates, beginning with his appointment in 1666 to the position of senior pastor at Frankfurt am Main, where his emphasis on the catechization of children and on confirmation be-

gan to evoke critical reactions. So did his introduction of private meetings among the laity for the purpose of promoting a life of personal piety. Here, too, began his correspondence with highly placed people, which gradually helped to make him the most influential pastor in Germany during his time. Then, weary of the controversies that his activities and writings had provoked, Spener accepted a call to Dresden, in Saxony, where in 1686 he became chaplain of Elector Johann Georg III. However, the elector's lack of sympathy for Spener's concerns prompted him to move to Berlin in 1691. As rector of the Church of Saint Nicholas, as a member of the Lutheran consistory, and as inspector of churches he was now at the zenith of his effectiveness. Enjoying the confidence of the ruling house of Prussia and of a large segment of the German nobility, he was instrumental in opening up many pastorates throughout Germany to the appointment of pastors with Pietist leanings. Spener died on 5 February 1705, having expressed the wish that he be buried in a white coffin, a symbol of his hope that the church on earth might expect better times.

A prolific writer, Spener published many hundreds of letters; sermons; edificatory and catechetical tracts; works on genealogy, history, and heraldry; and writings of a polemical nature. The most famous of his literary productions was his *Pia desideria*, which appeared as a preface to Arndt's *Postil* in 1675 and later was published separately at various times. In it he proposed his program for the moral and spiritual reform of individuals, church, and society, which he followed throughout his life.

The major emphases of Spener's works are typical of Pietism, namely, natural man's lost estate, the necessity of his religious renewal, the possibility of his conscious experience of God's regenerating and sustaining presence, the desirability of continued spiritual nourishment through worship and appropriate literature, the holy life expressed in love for God and man, the need for religious fellowship of like-minded people, and the hope of being able to reform the church for the purpose of reshaping a sinful world. Spener was opposed chiefly because of his often expressed vision of a better future for the church, which implied that the church was in need of renewal; for his insistence on religious instruction and on a way of life calculated to be a protest against the moral laxity of the day, which in the eyes of his opponents marked him as a zealot; and for instituting private meetings (*collegia pietatis*), which were seen as having the potential to fragment the church.

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Toward the end of his life Spener published some of his writings in his *Theologische Bedencken*, 4 vols. in 2 (Halle, 1700–1702), to which Karl Hildebrand von Canstein posthumously

added *Letzte theologische Bedencken*, 3 vols. (Halle, 1711). Since then many of Spener's works have been published singly, and a long series of unsuccessful attempts have been made to bring out a complete edition of his writings. Toward the end of the century Paul Grünberg, the noted Spener scholar, edited a modernized version of Spener's *Hauptschriften* (Gotha, 1889). The Historical Commission for the Study of Pietism (Kommission zur Erforschung des Pietismus) has begun publication of a multivolume edition of *Philipp Jakob Spener Schriften*, edited by Erich Beyreuther (Hildesheim, 1979–). Spener's best-known work, his *Pia desideria*, has been translated into very readable English and supplied with an introduction by Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia, 1964).

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F. ERNEST STOEFFLER

SPINOZA, BARUKH (1632–1677, known as Bento in Portuguese, Benedictus in Latin); Jewish rational naturalist of Marrano descent, author of a rigorously monistic interpretation of reality expressed through an interlocking chain of propositions demonstrated in the geometrical manner. Spinoza's relentless drive for the naked truth was of singular intensity, and his scientific assessment of traditional Jewish thought thoroughly uncompromising. His aim was to contemplate things as they really are rather than as we would like them to be. Anthropocentrism is peremptorily and unceremoniously banished from his philosophical purview. Yet in spite of his unadorned style, considerable controversy still envelops the interpretation of the very foundations of his thought.

Life and Works. On 27 July 1656 Bento de Spinoza was excommunicated by the *ma'amad* (ruling board) of the Amsterdam Jewish community into which he had been born. His father, Mikael, had been born in Vidigere (modern-day Figueira), Portugal, and was the business partner of the Portuguese merchant Abraham de Spinoza of Nantes, alias Emanuel Rodrigues Spinoza. Bento (the son of Mikael's second wife, Hanna Debora, who died when the child was scarcely six) was never trained to be a rabbi (as previously thought) and was never a full-time pupil of Sha'ul Levi Morteira, senior instructor in Talmud-Torah Ets Hayyim, although he may have attended an adult group known as Yeshivat Keter Torah that was led by Morteira. He apparently

left school at age thirteen or fourteen to work in his father's business. From 1654, the year of Mikael's death, to 1656, the firm Bento y Gabriel de Spinoza was managed by Bento and his younger brother Gabriel. In March 1656, several months before his excommunication, Spinoza, perhaps in anticipation of it, realizing that the excommunication would mean the end of a merchant's career and that he would therefore be unable to settle his father's estate which was burdened by debts, dispossessed himself of the estate.

The manuscript of the ban, written in Portuguese, the language of all the documents of the Amsterdam Jewish community, is still preserved in the municipal archives of Amsterdam but contains no signatures. Other contemporary documents suggest that young Spinoza's heretical views, which led to his excommunication, were inseminated especially by Juan (Daniyye'l) de Prado, who, excommunicated in 1658, was also a member of Morteira's Keter Torah circle and had attacked biblical anthropomorphism, poked fun at the idea of Jewish chosenness, and asserted that the world was eternal and that the immutable laws of nature constituted the only form of divine providence. We also learn from a report of Tomas Solano y Robles to the Inquisition of 8 August 1659 that Prado and Spinoza were excommunicated because they thought the Law (Torah) untrue, that souls die with the body, and that there is no God except philosophically speaking.

Spinoza's early years after the ban were spent at Rijnsburg with Collegiant thinkers, some of whom he had already met in his merchant days in the Amsterdam Exchange. His first philosophical essay, the *Korte verhandeling van God de mensch en des zelfs welstand* (Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being), discovered about 1860 and of which we possess two Dutch versions of an original not meant for publication, was apparently completed about 1660. The *Short Treatise*, in which we are still witness to the birth pangs of Spinoza's system, has a strong pantheistic-mystical coloring, and its language is still clearly theological. Spinoza's *De intellectus emendatione* (Correction of the Intellect), meant as an introduction to the *Short Treatise* and dealing with method, was written shortly after the latter (though not published until after his death).

Discontented with the Collegiant ethics of mystic withdrawal, Spinoza moved in April 1663 to Voorburg, near The Hague. Before leaving, however, he visited his old friends in Amsterdam, whereupon Jarig Jelles and Lodewijk Meyer prevailed upon him to expand his Euclidean exposition of Descartes's *Principia philosophiae* and allow its publication together with his *Cogitata metaphysica* (Metaphysical Thoughts). This was the only book of Spinoza's to appear in his lifetime under his own name. In 1670, after his move to The Hague, his

Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was published anonymously under a false imprint in Amsterdam. A few months thereafter, the Reformed Church Council of Amsterdam pronounced its condemnation of the book, and a series of lesser councils and consistories swiftly followed the example. In July 1674 the Court of Holland condemned the *Tractatus* and prohibited its printing, distribution, and sale. The need for caution was underlined by the trial of Adrian Koerbagh, in which the prosecutor questioned him about his relations with Spinoza and attempted to obtain from him a confession that his book contained Spinoza's teachings. Koerbagh was condemned to ten years in prison but died in jail from torture in 1669. Spinoza's *Tractatus*, which quickly ran through five editions and was finally banned in 1674, was a philosophical statement of the Republican party and was published under the protection of the Dutch statesman Johan de Witt, who awarded Spinoza an annual pension of two hundred florins.

In 1672 came the French invasion of Holland and the murder of de Witt, events that cast a dark shadow on Spinoza's last years. In February 1673 he received an invitation from the elector palatine Karl Ludwig to accept a professorship at Heidelberg. Spinoza refused it for "mere love of quietness," and because of his misgivings about a statement in the invitation concerning the prince's confidence that Spinoza would not misuse his freedom in philosophical teaching to disturb the public religion.

Late in the summer of 1675, Spinoza completed his *magnum opus*, the *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* (Ethics), and went to Amsterdam to arrange for its publication, but there, as he wrote to Henry Oldenburg, "while I was negotiating, a rumor gained currency that I had in the press a book concerning God, wherein I endeavored to show there is no God" (*Letter 68*, September 1675). He therefore decided to put off the publication.

His last major work, the *Tractatus Politicus*, written in 1676–1677, abandoned the theological idiom employed in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* and offered instead a straightforward analysis of aristocracy, monarchy, and democracy in an attempt to demonstrate how a stable government could be ensured. This work was unfortunately interrupted by Spinoza's death on 21 February 1677. Another late work that remained incomplete was his Latin *Compendium of Hebrew Grammar*, which he "undertook at the request of certain of his friends who were diligently studying the Sacred Tongue." Spinoza was buried in the New Church on the Spuy, and his *Opera posthuma*, edited by Jelles, Meyer, and Georg Hermann Schuller, appeared in November 1677 with only the initials B. D. S.

Biblical Critique. Spinoza's excommunication left a psychological scar that explains much of his subsequent

bitterness toward his own people and their traditions. Although his pioneering biblical critique is frequently illuminating (his view that Moses did not write the Pentateuch was already openly expressed by Isaac La Peyrère, whose work *Prae-Adamitae* Spinoza possessed), much of his writing in the *Tractatus* is marred by a one-sidedness that distorts his judgment.

Spinoza characterizes his new method of investigating scripture as an empirical approach that accepts the biblical text as a natural datum. Since prophecy claims to surpass human understanding, Spinoza must somehow take it at its word. For the sake of the masses, who cannot be reached by reason alone, Spinoza is willing to grant that prophecy is possible. There may be, he says, laws of imagination that are unknown to us, and the prophets, who received their revelations from God by means of the imagination, could thus perceive much that is beyond the boundary of the intellect. Although Moses is the chief of the prophets, his eminence consisted only in his receiving his prophecies through a real voice rather than an imaginary one. In other respects, however, Moses' imagination was not especially distinguished, for he was not sufficiently aware of God's omniscience, and he perceived the Decalogue not as a record of eternal truths but as the ordinances of a legislator.

In contrast to Moses, Spinoza set up the figure of Christ. If Moses spoke with God face to face, Christ communed with him mind to mind. No one except Christ received the revelations of God without the aid of the imagination, so that he possessed a mind far superior to those of his fellow men. Moreover, because Christ was sent to teach not only the Jews but the whole human race, it was not enough that his mind be attuned only to the Jews; it was attuned to ideas universal and true. If he ever proclaimed any revelations as laws, he did so because of the ignorance of the people. To those who were allowed to understand the mysteries of heaven, he taught his doctrines as eternal truths.

To Spinoza, the biblical doctrine of the chosenness of the Hebrews implies on their part a childish or malicious joy in their exclusive possession of the revelation of the Bible. The doctrine is to be explained by the fact that Moses was constrained to appeal to the childish understanding of the people. In truth, he claims, the Hebrew nation was not chosen by God for its wisdom—it was not distinguished by intellect or virtue—but for its social organization. Spinoza explains the extraordinary fact of Jewish survival by the universal hatred that Jews drew upon themselves.

From *Jeremiah* 9:23, Spinoza deduces that the Jews were no longer bound to practice their ceremonial law after the destruction of their state. The Pharisees continued these practices more to oppose the Christians

than to please God. (Spinoza's view of the Pharisees is consistently derogatory. He attributes to them economic motives in their quarrel with the Sadducees and goes so far as to say that Pontius Pilate had made concession to the passion of the Pharisees in consenting to the crucifixion of Christ, whom he knew to be innocent. Maimonides' interpretation of scripture Spinoza dismisses as harmful, useless, and absurd.) Moreover, on the basis of *Ezekiel* 20:25, Spinoza finds the explanation of the frequent falling away of the Hebrews from the Law, which finally led to the destruction of their state, in the fact that God was so angry with them that he gave them laws whose object was not their safety but his vengeance.

To motivate the common man to practice justice and charity, certain doctrines concerning God and man, says Spinoza, are indispensable. These, too, are a product of the prophetic imagination, but they will necessarily be understood philosophically by those who can do so. This universal scriptural religion is distinguished both from philosophical religion, which is a product of reason and is independent of any historical narrative, and from the vulgar religion of the masses, which is a product of the superstitious imagination and is practiced through fear alone; it consists of seven dogmas. The first four concern God and his attributes of existence, unity, omnipresence, and power and will. The other three deal with man's religious acts, and seem to derive from a Christian context: man's worship of God, his salvation, and his repentance. Each of the seven dogmas can be understood either imaginatively, in which case they would all be false, though useful, or philosophically, in which case they would all be true. Presumably, the average man's score would be a mixed one.

Thought. Spinoza begins and ends with God. He is convinced that upon reflective analysis we become immediately aware that we have an idea of "substance," or that which is in itself and is conceived through itself. Since substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another, and since if two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other, it is evident that all the entities of which we have experience, including ourselves, must, since they all have extension in common, constitute one substance. Although man is also characterized by thought, which has nothing in common with extension, since he is aware of his own extension, these two attributes cannot denote two substances but must be instead two parallel manifestations of one and the same substance. Spinoza thus insists that we have a clear and distinct idea of substance or God, having at least two parallel attributes. (In *Ethics* 1.11 he defines God as consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which ex-

presses eternal and infinite essence, but some scholars believe that Spinoza is here using the term "infinite" as a synonym for "all," and that what he means to say in this proposition is that God exists in every possible basic way. Although he elsewhere hints that there may be more than two attributes, he stops short of saying that there are. Even more controversial is the question whether the attributes are to be understood as subjective or objective.) Although this conception of substance is ultimately derived from empirical observation, it is not dependent on any particular observation as such but follows from the analysis of our ideas and is therefore a product of the power of the mind to think ideas and analyze their logical structure. It is in this sense that our knowledge of substance, or God, is *a priori*, deriving essentially from an analysis of a given true definition contained within our minds. Knowledge of this kind Spinoza designates as intuitive; he ranks it as the highest form of knowledge we have, above deductive reasoning, which is mediated by the syllogistic process, and imagination, which is based either on hearsay or random experience. For Spinoza, the only adequate or clear and distinct ideas we possess are related to God, simple ideas, and common notions, or axioms, and what is deduced from them. Knowledge derived from syllogistic reasoning, which yields universal knowledge, and intuitive knowledge, which represents the power of the mind itself, on which syllogistic reasoning ultimately rests, are necessarily true.

God is eternally in a state of self-modification, producing an infinite series of modes, which are manifested under either of his attributes. Under the attribute of extension, there is the immediate infinite mode, motion and rest, and under thought, the absolutely infinite intellect, or the idea of God. Finally come the finite modes, or particular things. Substance with its attributes is called *natura naturans*, the creative or active divine power, whereas the entire modal system, the system of what is created, is called *natura naturata*. Spinoza's God is thus not identical with the natural world as such but only with the creative ground that encompasses it.

While others consider human actions and appetites as virtues and vices to be bewailed or mocked, Spinoza considers them natural facts to be studied and understood. Vice is impotence, whereas virtue is power. We act when anything is done of which we are the adequate cause; we suffer when anything is done of which we are only the partial cause. The first law of nature (as the Stoics had already noted) is the impulse, or effort (*conatus*), by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being. We do not desire anything because we think it good, but we adjudge a thing good because we desire it. Desire is activity conducive to self-preservation;

pleasure marks its increase, pain its decrease. Spinoza offers a pioneering psychological analysis of the ways through which the human imagination acts and discusses in some detail the various laws of what he calls the association and imitation of the emotions.

Those emotions, which are related to the mind insofar as it acts and of which man is the adequate cause, are called by Spinoza active emotions. Of these there are only two: desire, or the effort of self-preservation in accordance with the dictates of reason, and pleasure, or the enjoyment experienced from the mind's contemplation of itself whenever it conceives an adequate or true idea. In the conflict of emotions (as Plato had already indicated in the *Timaeus*), weaker emotions are removed by stronger ones. Knowledge of good and evil can be a determining factor only insofar as it is considered an emotion, that is, a consciousness of pleasure and pain. Inasmuch as happiness consists in a man's preservation of his own being and he acts virtuously when he effects his self-preservation in accordance with his full powers, he must seek to maximize his power to act, which means removing his passive emotions to the greatest possible extent and substituting for them active emotions.

Spinoza suggests various remedies for the passive emotions, described by him (as already by the Stoics) as mental diseases. Since a passive emotion is a confused idea, the first remedy is to remove confusion and transform it into a clear and distinct idea. Another remedy is to realize that nothing happens except through the necessity of an infinite causal series. We should also endeavor to expel the many ghosts that haunt our minds by contemplating the common properties of things. Indeed, the emotions themselves may become an object of contemplation. The sovereign remedy, however, is the love of God. The mind has the capacity to cause all affections of the body to be related to the idea of God, that is, to know them by intuitive knowledge. Spinoza endeavors to demonstrate the immortality of the human mind (stripped of sensation, memory, and imagination) but insists that even during our lifetime we can experience the state of immortality that he describes as union with, or love for, God and calls blessedness. The intellectual love of God, which arises from intuitive knowledge, is eternal and is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself.

Influence on Later Thought. Alone among the major philosophers, Spinoza founded no school. Although his work did not fall into complete oblivion for the first hundred years after his death (during which time his name was connected principally with the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*), only toward the end of the eighteenth century did it begin to arouse enthusiasm among men of letters. In 1778, Herder equated Spinoza with

John himself as the apostle of love, and in 1780 Lessing declared to Friedrich Jacobi that "there is no other philosophy than that of Spinoza." Moses Mendelssohn, although a follower of Christian Wolff, who directed a formidable critique against Spinoza, hailed Spinoza as early as 1775 as a martyr for the furthering of human knowledge. As a result of the publication of Mendelssohn's *Morgenstunden* in 1785, in which he sought to attribute to Lessing a purified form of pantheism, Jacobi countered with a work called *Über die Lehre des Spinoza* (On the Teaching of Spinoza, 1785), in which he branded Spinozism as atheism and the Jewish Qabbalah as a confused Spinozism. Goethe, on the other hand, eagerly devoured Spinoza's *Ethics*, finding its spirit "deeper and purer than his own." Salomon Maimon, the first to call Spinoza's system "acosmic," spoke admiringly in his autobiography of the profundity of Spinoza's philosophy, and his first book, *Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie* (An Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, 1790), was an attempt to unite Kantian philosophy with Spinozism. According to Hegel, there was "either Spinozism or no philosophy," and Schelling wrote that "no one can hope to progress to the true and complete in philosophy without having at least once in his life sunk himself in the abyss of Spinozism."

Appreciation for Spinoza in England was due especially to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who wrote in about 1810 that only two systems of philosophy were possible, that of Spinoza and that of Kant. In a letter of 1881, Friedrich Nietzsche expressed his astonishment at the kinship between Spinoza's position on morality and his own, although elsewhere he is severely critical of Spinoza. Martin Buber (1878–1965) found much inspiration in Spinoza, seeing in him the highest philosophical exemplification of Judaism's unique quest for unity, but he criticized the Spinozistic attempt to depersonalize God.

In the 1850s, Samuel David Luzzatto stirred up a literary polemic concerning Spinoza after having been aroused by the first laudatory biography of Spinoza in Hebrew (1846), written by the poet Me'ir Letteris; by the essays (1850–1854) of Senior Sachs, a student of Schelling, in which he links together Shelomoh ibn Gabirol, Avraham ibn 'Ezra', the qabbalists, and Spinoza; and by Shelomoh Rubin's *Moreh nevukhim he-ḥadash* (1857), which contains a positive account of Spinoza's thought. Luzzatto attacked Spinoza's emphasis on the primacy of the intellect over the feelings of the heart and his denial of free will and final causes, and called unjustified his attack on the Pharisees and on the Mosaic authorship of all of the Pentateuch. Nahman Krochmal's son, Avraham, wrote an apologetic work, *Eben ha-ro'shah* (1871), in which he defended Spinoza, whom he reverently called Rabenu [Our Master] Ba-

ruk. A virulent attack against Spinoza, as impassioned as that by Luzzatto, was later mounted by Hermann Cohen in his "Spinoza über Staat und Religion, Judentum und Christentum" (1905; reprinted in Cohen's *Jüdische Schriften*, Berlin, 1924, 3.290–372).

Spinoza has been regarded as the founder of scientific psychology, and his influence has been seen in the James-Lange theory of the emotions and in some of the central concepts of Freud (See David Bidney, *The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza*; reprint, N.Y., 1962). He has also received an enormous amount of attention in the Soviet Union. Spinoza's concept of nature as self-caused, infinite, and eternal was first singled out for comment by Friedrich Engels in his *Dialectics of Nature*. From the Soviet viewpoint, Spinoza's materialism is unfortunately wrapped in a theological garb, but his consistent application of the scientific method is seen as overshadowing "the historically transient and class-bounded in his philosophy" (G. L. Kline, *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*, London, 1952, p. 33, 42).

In America, Spinoza was held in very high regard among the transcendentalists of the nineteenth century. Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841–1935) read and reread Spinoza's *Ethics*, and his famous formulation that freedom of thought reached a limit only when it posed a "clear and present danger" appears to have been made under Spinoza's influence. Moreover, Spinoza had special appeal for the young American Jewish intellectuals who were children of the first wave of immigrants from eastern Europe. Morris Raphael Cohen (1880–1947) had as a youthful Marxist valued Spinoza the cosmopolitan who had rejected Judaism, and Horace M. Kallen's *The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy* (New York, 1918) was described by Lewis Feuer as being "embedded in a Spinozist matrix." Some of the greatest Jewish scientists and philosophers in modern times, such as Albert Einstein, Samuel Alexander, and Henri Bergson, also felt a deep affinity with Spinoza. (See Lewis S. Feuer, "Spinoza's Thought and Modern Perplexities: Its American Career," in *Spinoza: A Tercentenary Perspective*, ed. Barry S. Kogan [Cincinnati, n.d.], 36–79.)

[For further discussion of Spinoza's place in the history of Jewish thought, see Jewish Thought and Philosophy, article on Premodern Philosophy.]

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SPIRIT. For discussion of the difference between spirit and soul, see Soul, especially articles on Greek and Hellenistic Concepts and Christian Concept. For discussion of Christian beliefs about the Holy Spirit, see God, arti-

cles on God in the New Testament and God in Postbiblical Christianity; see also Trinity.

SPIRITISM. *See* Necromancy; *see also* Afro-Brazilian Cults and Kardecism.

SPIRIT POSSESSION may be broadly defined as any altered or unusual state of consciousness and allied behavior that is indigenously understood in terms of the influence of an alien spirit, demon, or deity. The possessed act as though another personality—a spirit or soul—has entered their body and taken control. Dramatic changes in their physiognomy, voice, and manner usually occur. Their behavior often is grotesque and blasphemous. Justinus Kerner, a nineteenth-century German physician and disciple of the philosopher Friedrich Schelling, describes a demonically possessed woman in his native Swabia:

In this state the eyes were tightly shut, the face grimacing, often excessively and horribly changed, the voice repugnant, full of shrill cries, deep groans, coarse words; the speech expressing the joy of inflicting hurt or cursing God and the universe, addressing terrible threats now to the doctor, now to the patient herself. . . . The most dreadful thing was the way in which she raged when she had to submit to be touched or rubbed down during the fits; she defended herself with her hands, threatening all those who approached, insulting and abusing them in the vilest terms; her body bent backward like a bow was flung out of the chair and writhed upon the ground, then lay there stretched out full length, stiff and cold, assuming the very experience of death.

(quoted in Oesterreich, 1930, p. 22)

Some of the possessed, those who suffer what the German scholar Traugott K. Oesterreich has called a somnambulistic form of possession, remember nothing of their possession. Others experience a more "lucid" form and remember it. In this case the possessed become passive spectators of an "internal" drama. Often they are said to be inhabited simultaneously or sequentially by several spirits, and their behavior varies according to the different possessing spirits. Although possession is sometimes considered desirable, as in spirit mediumship, more often, at least initially, it is considered undesirable, an affliction requiring a cure. Cures, or exorcisms, may be simple affairs involving only the exorcist and his patient, or they may be elaborate, highly theatrical performances involving the patient's whole community. [*See* Exorcism.]

In one form or another, spirit possession occurs over most of the world. The anthropologist Erika Bourguignon found that in a sample of 488 societies 74 percent

believe in spirit possession. The highest incidence is found in Pacific cultures and the lowest in North and South American Indian cultures. Belief in possession is widespread among peoples of Eurasia, Africa, and the circum-Mediterranean region and among descendants of Africans in the Americas. It occurs more frequently in agricultural societies than in hunting and gathering ones, and women seem to be possessed more often than men. However, altered states of consciousness, such as trance, are not always interpreted as spirit possession. In Bourguignon's 488 societies, 437 societies (90 percent) have one or more institutionalized forms of altered states of consciousness, but only 251 of these (52 percent of the total) understand them in terms of spirit possession.

Scholars have attempted to classify possession phenomena in many ways. Some have based their classification on the moral evaluation of the spirit. The French scholar Henri Jeanmarie argues that exorcism aims at the permanent expulsion of the possessing spirit in societies that regard the spirit as essentially evil, whereas exorcism in societies that regard the spirit as morally neutral aims at the transformation of the "malign" spirit into a "benign" one. Other scholars have looked to the cultural evaluation of the possession state itself. In *Ecstatic Religion* (1971) the anthropologist I. M. Lewis distinguishes between central and peripheral spirit possession. The former are highly valued by at least a segment of society and support the society's moral, political, and religious assumptions. In these cases possession is considered desirable, and the spirits are generally thought to be sympathetic. Peripheral possession does not support, at least directly, the moral, political, and religious order. In these cases possession is considered undesirable and requires some form of cure, and the spirits are thought to be malign. Still other scholars, such as Oesterreich, have sought the basis for classification in the phenomenology of the experience. Oesterreich divides possession into involuntary or spontaneous possession and voluntary or artificial possession.

Oesterreich's distinction plays an implicit role in many other classification systems. For example, in *Ti-kopia Ritual and Belief* (1967, p. 296), the anthropologist Raymond Firth distinguishes "spirit possession," "spirit mediumship," and "shamanism" on the basis of the host's control of the spirit. According to Firth, spirit possession refers to "phenomena of abnormal behavior which are interpreted by other members of the society as evidence that a spirit is controlling the person's actions and probably inhabiting his body." Spirit mediumship involves the "use of such behavior by members of the society as a means of communication with what

they understand to be entities in the spirit world." The medium's behavior must be fairly regular and intelligible. Firth applies the term *shamanism* "to those phenomena where a person, either a spirit medium or not, is regarded as controlling spirits, exercising his mastery over them in socially recognized ways." In the case of spirit mediumship and shamanism, at least after the initial possession, the state of possession is often deliberately induced by inhalation of incense or mephitic fumes (as at the Delphic oracle in ancient Greece), by ingestion of drugs (as in North Africa and the Middle East) or emotionally laden substances (such as the blood of a sacrificial victim in parts of India), or by mechanical means (such as drumming, dancing, hyperventilation, or the incantation of repetitive prayers).

All these classifications impose on the reality of spirit possession a conceptual rigidity that distorts the essential fluidity of the phenomena. Often the host moves in and out of all of Firth's three states—if not in one séance then in the course of his relationship with the spirit. The anthropologist Esther Pressel found that in the Afro-American cults of Brazil initial possessions tended to be involuntary and subsequent ones voluntary as the host gained control of his or her spirit. One Moroccan woman with whom I worked suffered periodic possessions in which she was very much the victim of her possessing spirit (*jinni*). At times, however, she was able to gain some control over the spirit and convey its messages to those about her. It was rumored, though I never witnessed this, that she would sometimes force her possessing spirit to perform nefarious deeds for her and her secret clientele.

Too rigid a definition of spirit possession precludes recognition of its power as an authentic and believable metaphor for other conditions not usually associated by the Western observer with altered states of consciousness or with trance. For example, possession metaphors were used in Morocco to describe extreme rage, sexual excitement, love, prolonged erections, morbid depressions, and on occasion those conditions in which the subject did not want to accept the consequences of his or her own desires. In the West, possession metaphors also occur—for love, extreme anger, depersonalization, multiple personality, autonomous behavior—in short, for any experience in which the subject feels "beside himself." Such metaphors may be a residue of an earlier belief in spirit possession.

The discussion in the remainder of this entry will be restricted to spirit possession as defined by Firth. Exorcisms will be divided into the permanent and the transformational. Permanent exorcisms aim at the complete expulsion of the possessing spirit; the patient is liberated from all spirit influence. Transformational exor-

cisms strive to change the nature of the spirit from malign to benign; as a result the relationship between spirit and host also changes. In transformational exorcisms, the patient is usually incorporated into a cult that sponsors periodic ritual occasions when the patient can again experience possession and reaffirm his relationship with his possessing spirit.

Altered States of Consciousness. An altered state of consciousness refers to any mental state subjectively recognized or objectively observed as a significant deviation from "normal" waking consciousness. Sleep, dreaming, hypnosis, brainwashing, mental absorption, meditation, and various mystical experiences are all altered states of consciousness. These states are characterized by disturbances in concentration, attention, judgment, and memory; by archaic modes of thought; by perceptual distortions, including those of space, time, and body; by an increased evaluation of subjective experiences, a sense of the ineffable, feelings of rejuvenation, loss of a sense of control, and hypersuggestibility. [See *Consciousness, States of.*]

The altered state of consciousness most frequently associated with spirit possession is trance (Lat., *trans*, "across," and *ire*, "to go"; cf. OFr., *transir*, "to pass from life to death"), defined as "a condition of dissociation, characterized by the lack of voluntary movement and frequently by automatism in act and thought, illustrated by hypnotic and mediumistic conditions" (*Penguin Dictionary of Psychology*, Harmondsworth, 1971, p. 38). The subject experiences a detachment from the structured frames of reference that support his usual interpretation and understanding of the world about him. He is, as the Balinese say, "away," quite literally dissociated (Lat., *de*, "from," and *socius*, "companion"), removed from companionship and from society.

Ritual trance, the trance of possession, is induced by various physiological, psychological, and pharmacological means. The most common techniques involve sensory bombardment (an increase in exteroceptive stimulation), sensory deprivation (a decrease in exteroceptive stimulation), or an alternation between the two. Techniques of bombardment include singing, chanting, drumming, clapping, monotonous dancing, inhaling incense and other fumes, and experiencing the repetitive play of light and darkness. Techniques of deprivation include ideational and perceptual restrictions, blindfolding, and isolation. Fasting and other dietary restrictions, hypo- and hyperventilation (during incantations, for example), and ingestion of drugs (tobacco, cannabis, and various psychedelic substances) may also be used. Psychosocial factors—group excitement, heightened expectations, theatricality, costumes and masks, a gener-

ally permissive atmosphere, and the presence of strong behavioral models—all facilitate trance.

Although trance is considered the hallmark of possession, it is important to recognize that "possession" has been used to describe nontrance states and that the experience of possession is neither continuous nor unchanging. The possessed person moves in and out of dissociation. There are some moments of ordinary lucidity, other moments when consciousness appears to have surrendered to the possessing spirit, and still other moments of complete unconsciousness. Frequently there is a "doubling of consciousness" (*Verdoppelungserlebnis*), whereby one of the two (or more) consciousnesses looks on passively at what is happening and is quite capable of remembering what Oesterreich has called "the terrible spectacle" of possession. At other times consciousness is submerged, and the actor loses all awareness and memory of the spectacle; recall of the trance experience is confused, dreamlike, and often stereotypic. The possessed person makes frequent use of mythic plots and symbols when recounting the experience, although his tales are not as elaborate as those of the shaman describing, for example, his voyage to the netherworld.

The Possession Idiom. The interpretation of dissociation, ritual trance, and other altered states of consciousness as spirit possession is a cultural construct that varies with the belief system prevalent in a culture. Although the relationship between spirit and host has been described in many different ways, most indigenous descriptions suggest the spirit's entrance, intrusion, or incorporation into the host. The relationship is one of container to contained. Usually, in any single culture a wide variety of metaphorical expressions are employed. The spirit is said to mount the host (who is likened to a horse or some other beast of burden), to enter, to take possession of, to have a proprietary interest in, to haunt, to inhabit, to besiege, to be a guest of, to strike or slap, to seduce, to marry, or to have sexual relations with the host. In part, this variety reflects changes in the spirit-host relationship, a relationship that should not be regarded as static, well-defined, and permanent but rather as dynamic, ill-defined, and transitory.

Although it is often of analytic significance to distinguish between the psychobiological condition of the possessed (the trance state) and the cultural construct ("spirit possession"), it should be recognized that the construct itself affects the structure and evaluation of the psychobiological condition. The construct articulates the experience, separating it from the flow of experience and giving it meaning. The experience itself instantiates the interpretive schema. The process involves the subjectification of the "external" elements, the symbols, of the spirit idiom.

It is important to stress the belief in the existence of the spirits on the part of the possessed and those about him if we are to grasp adequately the spirits' articulatory function. The spirit idiom provides a means of self-articulation that may well radically differ from the self-articulation of the Westerner. Much of what the Westerner "locates" within the individual may be "located" outside the individual in those societies in which the spirit idiom is current. [See *Demons*, article on Psychological Perspectives.] This movement inward is perhaps seen on a literary level in the gradual internalization of the "double" in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European and American literature.

Spirits, as exterior to the individual, are not projections in the psychoanalytic sense of the word. For the psychoanalyst, projection is the subject's attribution to another of feelings and desires he refuses to recognize in himself. Projection occurs only after introjection. The movement is centrifugal, from inner to outer. If "external" spirits represent as "outside" what the Westerner would regard as within him, then, strictly speaking, there can be no projection, for there is nothing within to project. The movement here is centripetal, from outer to inner.

A construction of human experience so radically different from that of the Westerner is difficult to convey; nonetheless, it has been suggested by many scholars who have worked with the spirit-possessed. The anthropologist Godfrey Lienhardt, for example, refers in his study of the Dinka, a Nilotic people, to "Powers" (spirits) as extrapolations or images that are the active counterpart of the passive element in Dinka experience. Since the Dinka have no conception of mind as a mediator between self and world, the images—the powers or spirits—mediate between self and world:

Without these Powers or images or an alternative to them there would be for the Dinka no differentiation between the experience of the self and of the world which acts upon it. Suffering, for example, would be merely "lived" or endured. With the imaging of the grounds of suffering in a particular Power, the Dinka can grasp its nature intellectually in a way which satisfies them, and thus to some extent transcend and dominate it in this act of knowledge. With this knowledge, this separation of a subject and an object in experience, there arises for them also the possibility of creating a form of experience they desire and of freeing themselves symbolically from what they must otherwise passively endure.

(Lienhardt, 1961, p. 170)

Of utmost significance in both projection and articulation through "external" spirits is the status accorded the vehicle within the individual's culture. A Western paranoid who believes himself pursued by secret agents responds to dominant cultural images, just as does an

African who believes himself hounded by ancestral spirits. Both give expression to feelings of persecution and suffer the consequences of that expression. In the first instance, the secret agents are not generally thought to exist by anyone other than the paranoid himself. In the second instance, the ancestral spirits are generally recognized by others. The consequences of this difference are immense. The haunted person does not necessarily suffer the same social isolation, loneliness, derision, and feelings of abandonment as does the paranoid. He enters a new symbolic order. He learns the language of the spirits and of possession and submits to its grammar. He is afforded the possibility of therapeutic intervention.

I am not suggesting that the idiom of spirit possession is more conducive to cure than the "psychological" idiom of the modern Western world. Both have their successes and failures. In societies with spirit possession some individuals articulate their experiences in terms of spirits in purely idiosyncratic ways and hence do not respond to indigenous therapeutic intervention. In *Mедуsa's Hair* Gananath Obeyesekere compares two patients who were exorcised at a shrine in Sri Lanka:

One woman possessed by a demonic spirit ran around the ritual arena threatening to tear her clothes off. Her behavior was perfectly intelligible in terms of the *preta* [spirits of the dead] or demonic myth model. The other patient, a male, was pulling and pinching his skin, saying that demons were residing under it. Later on he abused the gods, the very beings who should help him to banish the demons. None of this was intelligible to the exorcist and his subculture in terms of available myth models. Demons do not get under one's skin in this culture, and it is unheard of for the gods to be abused in this manner. (Obeyesekere, 1981, p. 161)

The first patient was amenable to cure; the second was not. When Obeyesekere asked the exorcist what could be done for the second patient, the exorcist suggested taking him to a Western-trained psychiatrist! Exorcists are usually clever diagnosticians and avoid treating those patients whom they cannot cure.

The spirit idiom must be flexible enough to accommodate the individual if it is to establish itself and remain powerful. It may be composed of a highly elaborate demonology, as in Sri Lanka, Brazil, or Haiti. In these cultures the spirits have attributes and make specific demands on their hosts. In Haitian Voodoo, for example, the *lwa*, or possessing spirits, have highly developed characters. Legba, the master of the mystic barrier between men and spirits, is described as a feeble old man in rags who smokes a pipe, slings a knapsack over his shoulder, and walks painfully with a crutch. He is terribly strong, however, and anyone possessed by him suffers a violent trance. Dambala-wédo, another *lwa*, is

pictured as a snake; he forces those whom he possesses to dart their tongue in and out, crawl on the ground sinuously, and fall like a boa from roof beams headfirst. Ezili-Freda-Dahomey, a sea spirit, personifies feminine grace and beauty. (She has been likened to Aphrodite.) Men and women possessed by her behave in a saucy, flirtatious manner. By contrast, in other cultures, for example in North Africa, spirits are ill defined and ambiguous. Unlike their Haitian counterparts, many North African spirits have no "biographies."

While the spirits must not be so specifically characterized as to discourage individual elaboration and specification, this does not entail that they be simply random refractions of individual desires, as some scholars, notably the German classicist Hermann Usener, have argued. The spirits must resonate with both the psychological and the social circumstances of the possessed. Psychologically, they may mirror some aspect of the individual that he refuses to accept or some desire that he denies. Or they may compensate for deficiencies in his relations with others. Thus, I. M. Lewis (1971) relates the high frequency of possession among women and marginal men to their "inferior" position in society. The spirits relate to the social world of the individual. In his study of Tikopian spirit mediumship Raymond Firth writes, "The idiom in which these personal phenomena of anxiety, conflict, illness, and recovery was couched was one in which the physical and psychological syndrome of trance was described in terms of social constructs, including notions of spirit powers and spirit action" (Firth, 1967, p. 329). Whether elaborated or unelaborated, the spirits may relate to specific social groupings. In many societies that are organized into lineages, in Africa for example, the spirits are thought to be lineage members or to have some other significant relationship with a lineage. Often they are conceived of as ancestral shades or lineage or household spirits. Diagnosis of the spirit possessed involves discovering the spirit's identity, the cause of his displeasure that led to the possession, and the nature of his demands. Therapy involves the regulation of the relationship between the possessed and the spirit. (Many anthropologists have understood this regulation as symbolic of a regulation of the possessed's "real" social relations.) In societies with looser social organizations, for example in many urban centers, the spirits are not so closely related to specific social groups. They are "open" to a larger variety of social relations, but they are not devoid of symbolic social attachment.

Initial Possession. A first possession may be conceived of as an articulatory act. The possessed is thrust into a new symbolic order. His initiation frequently takes the shape of a dramatic illness—paralysis, mutism, sudden

blindness, or profound dissociation—or contrary behavior, such as a wild and seemingly destructive flight into the bush or, for women, nursing the feet of a newborn infant. Many psychiatrically oriented observers have considered these symptoms to be of a hysterical nature, but careful study reveals that they may be symptoms of other forms of mental disturbance or reactions to the stresses and strains inherent in the individual's social position. Even with such dramatic symptoms, the diagnosis of possession is not necessarily immediate. There may be other options within the "medical" system of the particular society. The initial symptoms may, however, be far less dramatic. The neophyte may have been attending a possession ceremony when he was seized by the spirit. Such "contagious possession" has been frequently described in the literature of spirit possession. (Aldous Huxley gives a particularly readable account of contagious possession in *The Devils of Loudun*, 1952, a study of demonic possession in seventeenth-century France.)

Often the initial possession is articulated in retrospective accounts in a stereotyped manner. These may be elaborate, particularly where the possessed becomes a curer, the account providing him with a culturally acceptable charter for his profession, or they may be a simple sentence or two. Alice Morton records the story given her by an Ethiopian curer, Mama Azaletch.

In 1936, I was caught by a certain spirit. I ran away from my home in Bale to the desert, and there I lived in a cave. I would not see anyone or speak to anyone, and I became very wild. But there was one woman of high rank there who was interested in my case, and she would send her son to bring me beans and unsalted bread. I stayed there in that place, eating very little and seeing no one, for four years and eight months. If they had tried to take me from that cave and put me in a house with other people, I would have broken any bonds and escaped back to the desert. It was the spirit that made me wild that way.

(Crapanzano and Garrison, 1977, p. 202)

Morton calls attention to Mama Azaletch's stereotypical flight into the wild, her fasting in the desert, and her renunciation of family. Mama Azaletch's story was told in both public and private. Many Moroccans with whom I worked had less elaborate but stereotypic stories of their "slippage" into the spirit idiom. They were at a possession ceremony, mocked the possessed or possessing spirit, and were immediately struck by the spirit.

The initiatory illness itself is an eloquent symbol, for not only does it focus attention on the possessed (who must be cured!), but it also requires definition. Such definition occurs through a variety of diagnostic and healing procedures. The initiate has to learn to be possessed

and undergo exorcism. This is particularly evident where possession involves incorporation into a cult. Technically, the initiate must learn to enter trance easily, to carry out expected behavior gracefully, and to meet the demands of his spirit. Almost all reports of spirit possession emphasize the clumsiness of the neophyte and the necessity of learning how to be a good carrier for his spirit. Members of the Moroccan religious brotherhood, the Hamadsha, who mutilate themselves when in possession trance, can explain how they learned to slash their scalps with knives and halberds without inflicting serious injury. Many have serious scars from their initial possession when, as they put it, they had not yet learned to hit themselves correctly. Similar stories have been reported from Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Fiji by adepts of the Hindu god Murukan who skewer themselves with hooks and wires. For possessions involving complex theatrical behavior, dancing, and impersonification, as in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, the learning process can be quite rigorous.

The neophyte must learn to recast conflicts in the spirit idiom and to articulate essentially inchoate feelings in that idiom, feelings of persecution or inferiority, of fear or bravado, of hatred or love. This process may proceed by trial and error, or it may occur through the guidance of a curer. The Puerto Rican Espiritistas "work" their patients through various levels of possession and develop in them, when possible, mediumistic faculties. (Such development resembles the mystic's passage through various stages of ecstasy.) The movement from initial illness to accommodation with the spirit and incorporation into the cult is often accompanied by an indeterminate period during which the possessed resists the call of the spirit and suffers depression, extreme alienation, dissociation, and even fugues. Such a period, analogous in many respects to what mystics refer to as the "dark night of the soul," may be symbolized as a period of wandering or isolation. Mama Azaletch's life in the cave may refer to such a period.

Exorcism. Spirit possession has the tripartite ritual structure first delineated by the folklorist Arnold van Gennep in 1908. The possessed is removed from his everyday world by his possessing spirit. He enters a liminal world—the world of possession, dissociation, trance—and through exorcism (which replicates the tripartite structure of possession itself) he is returned to his ordinary world. Exorcisms may be permanent or "transformational." In permanent exorcism, the patient is returned to the world from which he came, ideally as he was before he was possessed. Not much is known about such patients. Have they undergone some sort of social or psychological transformation through possession and exorcism? It would seem that they have been marked

by the spirit: they have been possessed, and they have been cured. In transformational exorcism, the patient is explicitly transformed. He has undergone a change in identity. He is now, to speak figuratively, more than himself; he is in intimate relationship with a spirit whose demands he must recognize. Usually he is incorporated into a cult, which not only provides him with legitimate occasions for future possessions but also gives him a new social identity. Often, as a member of such a cult, he becomes an exorcist himself or a member of a team of exorcists.

Exorcisms may comprise little more than simple prayers or incantations sung over the possessed, as happens in Christian and Islamic contexts. Sometimes exorcisms involve torturing the possessed (pulling his ear, flagellating or burning him) until the possessing spirit has revealed its identity and demands or has released the patient. In many societies that support possession cults, the exorcisms are semipublic or public occasions. Such ceremonies tend to be highly dramatic. There is music, most frequently drumming but also music of woodwind, reed, and string instruments, and dancing, which may be simple or quite complex. In Sri Lanka and elsewhere in Southeast Asia comic or other dramatic interludes often play a role. The exorcist, the possessed, and other performers may don masks, wear special costumes, and take on the part of well-known mythic and legendary figures. The ceremonies are often accompanied by sacrifices and communal meals, and last through the night. This passage from light through darkness to light again seems to parallel the tripartite ritual movement that culminates with the "rebirth" of the patient as cured or transformed.

Patient, exorcist, and other spectators may all fall into trance. There is considerable variation in the depth and style of these trances. In some the possessed fall into an ill-defined, seemingly superficial, dreamy trance. In others they become frenetic and out of control. [See *Frenzy*.] And in still others they take on the character of the spirit that possesses them, responding only to special songs, dancing characteristic dances, talking in a distinctive language (glossolalia), and demanding special costumes, perfumes, or objects. [See also *Glossolalia*.] In many parts of the world, the possessed perform uncanny feats, such as walking over burning coals (in the Greek *Anastenaria*), piercing themselves with skewers and pins (the followers of *Murukan* in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Fiji), slashing their heads with knives and halberds (the *Hamadsha* of Morocco), playing with poisonous snakes (the rattlesnake cults of Appalachia), or stabbing themselves with swords and spears without harm (in Java, Bali, and among the Cape Malay in South Africa).

The exorcisms provide an occasion for both an individual and a transcendent drama of order and disorder, of control and the absence of control. At least in societies that consider the spirit demonic, possession reveals the underside of social, cultural, and psychological order. Possession negates the "rational" order of everyday life; it displays the world in reverse. Ritual and exorcism restore order and rationality to that world. The anthropologist Bruce Kapferer has written that in Sri Lanka the demons embody human suffering and symbolize the destructive possibilities of the social and cultural order. They provide a "terrifying commentary on life's condition and individual experience in it." They cast the individual's experience into a wider social and cultural order, and his encounter with the demonic becomes a metaphor for his "personal struggle within an obdurate social world" (Kapferer, 1983).

Exorcisms regulate the relationship between spirit and host. Formally, spirit possession may be understood as a series of transformations of usually negative metaphorical attributions into occasionally positive and at least ritually neutral metonymic ones in a dialectical play of identity formation. The spirit often represents what the possessed is not or does not desire. The Moroccan man who is inhabited by the female spirit 'A'isha Qandisha is no woman; the chaste Haitian woman possessed by the promiscuous *Ezili-Freda-Dahomey* would disclaim any of *Ezili's* promiscuous desires. The host's identity and desires are here the opposite of the spirit's. During possession, however, the host becomes nearly identical with his spirit. The Moroccan man comes as close to being 'A'isha Qandisha, a female, as possible; the Haitian woman as close to the flirtatious, saucy *Ezili* as possible. A negative metaphor is transformed into a positive metonym, even to the limit of identity within a very special context.

Possession cults aim to transform the relationship between spirit and host much as the *Furies* were transformed into the gentle *Eumenides* in Aeschylus's *Oresteia*. The transformation usually involves the conversion of a "wild" possession, an illness, into an institutionalized, ritualized, and periodized possession in which negative metaphorical attributes become for the occasion metonymic ones. It is as though the host were allowed to play out in a sanctioned manner who he is not and to give expression to desires that he cannot express in everyday life. This movement from metaphor to metonymy is neither direct nor simple. The changing, essentially complex relationship between host and spirit or spirits is given a sort of theatrical representation. The two may enter into conversation with one another in a friendly or inimical manner, they may struggle with each other, or the host may succumb to the spirit.

Often, as in Sri Lanka, the possession includes a comic interlude that plays an important part in the exorcism itself. The comedy of exorcism, Bruce Kapferer (1983) has suggested, displays through its very irrationality the rationality of the world and allows the host to reformulate his self in accordance with that rationality. Although this movement toward the discovery or rediscovery of the rationality of the world is not immediately apparent in many simpler possessions, even these tend to bring about a transformation of the way the possessed sees his world. He takes on the view of his cult. He is attached to the demon, who becomes a primary orientation point for his understanding of himself and the world about him.

If the exorcism is successful, the patient has to become fully possessed and then released by the spirit. To be released from the spirit's influence the possessed must meet the spirit's demands, whatever they may be. In Morocco, for example, the spirit requires his host to wear certain colors, burn special incense, make regular pilgrimages to his favored sanctuaries. Often the demand includes the sacrifice of an animal with which, as the anthropologist Andras Zempléni (1984) has suggested, the spirit's host is identified. Thus the host is separated by the power of the sacrifice from the spirit with which he has become one. So long as the possessed follows the spirit's commands, he is blessed, protected, and generally favored. A failure to follow the commands usually leads to a renewal of the possession crisis: the host falls ill, becomes paralyzed, or is blinded. A new exorcism is then required.

Without doubt the spirit and his commands are of symbolic import to the host, resonating with significant events in his biography, reflecting his present situation, and orienting him toward his future. The commands may symbolize adherence to the social and moral obligations and commitments the individual has in his everyday life; a failure to follow the commands may represent a failure to live up to these obligations and commitments; the possession may make articulate feelings that in other "psychological" idioms are described as feelings of guilt. The roles played by the spirits and their commands, by "wild" and institutionalized possessions, differ in each individual case. Generalizations tend to become overgeneralizations. The spirit idiom is subtle and, as the existentialists would say, reflects the subtlety of the individual in situation. It is, of course, important to recognize that possession also plays an important role for those who witness it, providing them with an often theatrical representation, an objectification, of their cultural presuppositions, their social situation, and their psychological conditions. For them and for the possessed, possession confirms belief in the spir-

its. Exorcism affirms faith in a social and cultural order, an order that gives perhaps only the illusion of mastering the "irrational forces" that surround and on occasion besiege its members.

[See also Affliction; Devils; Enthusiasm; and Oracles.]

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VINCENT CRAPANZANO

SPIRITS. See Demons; see also Angels; Devils; Fairies; Ghosts; and Monsters.

SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE. Throughout history, religious traditions have noted that those people who long for a transformative or complete understanding of themselves and of their place in the world must somehow find a teacher or set of teachings to help them

along. That guide may be a person, an idea, or a set of values; whatever it is, it establishes the orientation and outlines the procedures the seekers should follow in order to make real the transformation for which they hope. Many traditions further maintain that, having found (or having hoped eventually to find) that guide, the seeker then must practice various regimens that will help him continue along the way to ultimate transformation. Such endeavors constitute spiritual discipline, the means by which people find their fullest potential in the context of any particular religious ideology.

The practice of spiritual discipline marks the notion that one who is in search of the guide is not only a human being but also a human "becoming," one on his or her way toward an ideal. Images of such discipline, therefore, often include themes of movement or passage. Mahāyāna Buddhists describe the spiritual endeavor as *bodhicaryāvatāra*, "entering the path to enlightenment"; Jewish traditions speak of religious norms as *halakhah*, "the way to go"; and traditional Hindu literatures outline the three sacred "paths," *mārga*, of proper action, proper meditation, and proper devotion. Not infrequently, religious systems refer to the sacred cosmos as a whole with terms meaning "the Way," like the Chinese *tao*.

The perfection such a person seeks may take a number of forms, each reflecting the fundamental worldview presented by the pertinent religious system. It may be the fulfillment of being or the return to nonbeing; it may be personal or impersonal; it may be the enjoyment of the good life or the release of the good death. Whatever the goal, spiritual disciplines claim to offer their adherents the means by which the religious ideal may be reached.

Without discipline, the seeker founders. The Ṣūfī mystic Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī spoke perhaps for many religious traditions besides his own when he noted that "whoever travels without a guide needs two hundred years for a two day's journey."

Connotations of the Term. The word *discipline* is a particularly apt one. To some people it rings of punishment, which in some cases is the point. But this certainly is not the primary meaning of the term, which carries a good number of connotations. The scope of its etymological cousins shows the broad applications the term can have in the study and practice of religion.

The word *discipline* comes to us through one of two ways, or, more likely, in a semantic combination of the two ways. It may come from the Latin *discere*, "to learn," and thus be directly related to the English word *disciple*, "one who follows the instructions of a teacher." *Discere* itself reflects the Indo-European root

**dek-* (“take, accept”), which also appears in the English *decent*, *docent*, *docile*, *dogma*, and *dogmatic*; *doctrine*, *doctor* (“one who teaches doctrine”), and thus *indoctrinate*; as well as *dignity*, “to be acceptable,” and *decorous*, “elegant, worthy of respect, graceful.”

Perhaps the word comes to us from the Latin *discipulus*, “pupil,” from *dis-capere*, “to grasp,” in the sense of “to take hold of mentally” and thus “to understand.” If so, then the word *discipline* derives primarily from the Indo-European **kap-* (“grab hold of”) and is related to such words as the English *captivate*, *capture*, and *captive*; *accept*, *precept*, *concept*; and *participate*. Often that sense of *reception* (a related word) is described as a safe and protected experience, as would be the sense of the Germanic derivative of the root **kap-*, **hafno*, appearing in the Old English *haefen*, which leads in turn to the modern English *haven*, “place of refuge.”

To be disciplined, then, is to be caught up by the teachings of a guide—whether that guide be a person, an ethic, a community, a historical tradition, or a set of ideas—and to organize one’s behavior and attitude according to those teachings. The person who undertakes such discipline may be understood, then, to be a disciple of that which is felt to be true, a captive of that which is valuable. Religious traditions do not tend to view this as “punishment.” Rather, they generally stress the notion that this very captivity allows one to become who he or she really is, or really could be. As Zen Buddhists have long noted, one is most free when one is most disciplined.

Types of Spiritual Discipline. Just what kind of teacher the student follows and what type of relationship exists between the two varies from tradition to tradition and within each tradition itself, so any typological classification of spiritual disciplines runs the risk of oversimplification. Classed very generally, however, the different kinds of spiritual discipline may be understood as heteronomous, autonomous, or interactive in nature. (Within these types one can discern various modes of discipline, to which we shall return.) These three should be understood as ideal types only: analysis of different examples of actual spiritual endeavors will show that individual disciples and specific traditions practice a combination of all three.

Heteronomous discipline. In heteronomous discipline, the disciple submits in his search for realization, completion, or genuine understanding to the guidelines presented by an external authority. While this authority may be personal or impersonal in nature, the structure of the relationship between guide and disciple is often represented as objective and depicted in oppositional images: creator/creature; lord/subject; teacher/apprentice; parent/child; shepherd/sheep; wise one/

foolish one; judge/judged. In obeying the commands or by imitating the paradigmatic actions of the central authority, the seeker finds his or her way to fulfillment and meaning.

One sees the ideals of heteronomous discipline in any account of a disciple who serves a master: the Ch’an Buddhist who sweeps the floor and washes the pots for his teacher; the American Indian who follows the instructions discerned in the tones of a coyote’s call; the orthodox Hindu who obeys the social regulations prescribed by the Dharmaśāstras. Heteronomy is found in those cases where people find meaning and validity in their actions as defined by an external authority of some kind. [See Obedience.]

Sometimes the teacher is so distant, either in time or in space, that the disciple first must learn from a fellow, but wiser, seeker who knows the teachings if not the teacher and who, having traveled it himself, can illumine the difficult passage from one mode of being and understanding to another. Such is the case, for example, in the Jewish figure of the rabbi, the Christian *pater spiritualis*, the Buddhist *arhat* and *bodhisattva*, the Chinese sage, and the Siberian shaman—although the particular ideologies in which each of these figures present their teachings vary immensely.

A good example of heteronomous discipline appears in Islamic spiritual traditions. Muslims repeatedly hear in the Qur’ān the notion that a person’s sole purpose in life is to serve the will of God (Allāh) by cultivating his or her potential in accordance with God’s “command” (*amr*). This submission (*islām*) to God is the purpose for which God sends through prophets and revealed literatures the divine “guidance” (*hidāyah*). The central revelation, the Qur’ān, describes itself as an invitation to come to the right path (*hudan li-al-nās*) and is the source of the Islamic sacred law (*sharī’ah*, literally “the way to the water hole,” an appropriate image for spiritual travelers in a desert region). Islamic tradition notes that examples of such guiding laws include what is known as *farḍ* or *wājib*—those duties and actions all Muslims must obey, such as daily prayer (*ṣalāt*), almsgiving (*zakāt*), and fasting during the holy month of Ramaḍān (*ṣawm*).

The paradigmatic disciple in this case is the prophet Muḥammad, who is said to have heard the sacred instructions from divine teachers and then to have obeyed the order to recite (*qur’ān*) those teachings to the community. Tradition holds that Muḥammad first received these lessons one night during Ramaḍān when he was visited by the angel Gabriel. After cleansing Muḥammad’s body and spirit, Gabriel swept him up into the air, carrying him first to the sacred shrine at Mecca and then upward through the seven heavens to the throne of

God. There, surrounded by mystic light, the Prophet received divine instructions on proper religious action, specifically the practice of the five daily prayers (*ṣalāt*), in which the Muslim is to cleanse himself and touch his forehead to the ground as he bows toward Mecca in the early morning, at noon, in midafternoon, at sunset, and in the evening. According to traditional stories, Muḥammad then returned from the heavens and shared those instructions with the human community on earth. “The key to paradise is *ṣalāt*,” Muḥammad is reported to have said; and the practice of the daily purification and prayer remains today one of the Five Pillars of Islamic faith. The four remaining pillars are *shahādah* (the profession of faith), *zakāt* (care for the unfortunate through almsgiving), *ṣawm* (fasting during the month of Ramaḍān), and *hajj* (pilgrimage to the Ka’bah in Mecca).

According to Islamic mystical traditions, primarily those influenced by Sūfī ideologies and practices, a person intent on gaining a direct experience of God’s presence and power first seeks out a teacher (Arab., *shaykh*; Pers., *pīr*) who guides the disciple (Arab., *murīd*, “one who wishes to enter [the path]”) through the stages of the spiritual journey. The teacher then watches over the *murīd* carefully, for the path (*ṭarīqah*) is a long and difficult one. The master comes to know the disciple at the most intimate of levels. He reads the student’s mind and sees into his dreams so that he can advise the disciple as he moves through the anxiety and doubt inherent in the religious transformation. He may make the *murīd* practice ascetic meditation for periods of forty days at a time and demand that the pupil direct all of his attention to God; or he may require the student to live in a community of fellow seekers in order to benefit from the support a group can give. The master is careful to keep the disciple attentive to his spiritual duties as he progresses through the “stations” (sg., *maqām*) on the path: repentance (*tawbah*), abstinence (*wara’*), renunciation (*zuhd*), fasting (*ṣawm*), surrender to God (*tawakkul*), poverty (*faqr*), patience (*ṣabr*), gratitude (*shukr*), the cultivation of ecstatic joy (*bast*) through constraint of the ego (*qabḍ*), and—finally—love (*maḥabbah*) and mystic annihilation (*ma’rifah*) into the being of God. Bringing the student through these stages, the Sūfī master shows him the way to *fanā’*, in which the seeker rids himself of all human imperfections and takes on the qualities of the divine.

Autonomous discipline. The typological opposite of heteronomous discipline is characterized by ideologies in which the guide is said not to live or exist somewhere outside of the seeker but, rather, to inhabit the very depths of one’s personal being. There, deep within the heart, the teacher rests timelessly beneath the swirling

currents of the seeker’s confused identity, unaffected by the vagaries of the objective world. The adept’s task is to discover that inner wisdom. The discipline that arises from this notion of the guide may be called *autonomous* in nature because the aspirant’s spiritual endeavors are self-contained and independent of external authority.

A good example of autonomous discipline would be the set of practices and assumptions reflected in the stories of Siddhartha Gautama’s enlightenment and subsequent life as the Buddha. According to traditional accounts, the prince led a comfortable and secure life in his father’s palace until, as a young man, he was shocked and utterly disillusioned with the passing enjoyments of the material world by the sight outside the royal walls of an old person, a sick person, and a corpse, sights that his father’s protection had hitherto prevented him from seeing. After encountering a wandering ascetic who seemed to have attained a certain equanimity in the world of sickness and death, Gautama at age twenty-nine left his father’s palace in search of a teacher who could help him understand the nature of life. He is said to have found successively two highly respected masters, but eventually left each one, unsatisfied, because he had become their equal in wisdom and yet still did not understand. He despaired of any teachings from another person, because even the most knowledgeable people did not know the full truth.

Traditional accounts say that Gautama then went alone into the forest, where he found a quiet place to fast and to control his breathing in order to enter into a trance in which he could gain transcendent knowledge. Eventually abandoning even some of these techniques because they led to what he experienced as a debilitating and therefore counterproductive physical weakness, he developed his own kind of meditation, which was neither austere nor self-indulgent. While meditating in this “middle way,” he was confronted by demonic forces who tempted him, unsuccessfully, with worldly power and prestige.

Gautama is said to have entered into four successive levels of meditation (Pali, *jhāna*), each one giving him deeper awareness of the origins and nature of suffering. Finally, at the dawn ending the night of the full moon, he gained complete understanding and stood up, alone. At that point he became the Buddha, the Enlightened One. He understood what have come to be known as the Four Noble Truths: (1) that all conditioned existence is permeated by suffering; (2) that there is a cause of suffering (namely, desire); (3) that there is a way to end suffering (namely, to cease desiring); and (4) that the way to cease desiring is to follow a set of principles that became known as the Noble Eightfold Path.

Traditional Buddhist hagiographies and commentaries note that one follows that path by maintaining and practicing the following disciplines: correct views (*sammā-ditṭhi*) to see things as they really are rather than as one wishes them to be; correct thoughts (*sammā-sankappa*), directed only to the goal of enlightenment; correct speech (*sammā-vācā*), in which one does not say anything that would harm his or other people's integrity; correct action (*sammā-kammanta*), in which one refuses to kill another creature, take what is not given, or enjoy illicit sexual relations; correct livelihood (*sammā-ājīva*), to earn a living only by ways in which living beings are not injured; correct exertion (*sammā-vāyāma*), characterized by dispassion and benevolence; correct mindfulness (*sammā-sati*), the remembrance of the Four Noble Truths; and correct meditative concentration (*sammā-samādhi*), which allows one to understand the harmful nature of selfish desire. The Eightfold Path thus combines the practice of proper wisdom (namely, correct views and thoughts), morality (correct speech, action, and livelihood), and meditation (correct mindfulness and concentration).

Buddhist tradition firmly maintains that the Buddha gained this insight by himself. Records of the Buddha's first discourse after his enlightenment note that he told his followers, "No one in any of the worlds—neither the gods, nor Māra, nor Brahmā, nor ascetics or priests or gods or human beings—had ever gained this highest complete enlightenment. I [alone] knew this. Knowledge arose in me, insight that even my mind cannot shake." No teacher is said to have given this insight to the Buddha; the implicit lesson here is that other people, too, can gain such knowledge if they cultivate autonomous discipline. Gautama himself seems to have resisted the role of a master. One text records his encouragement to others that "as wise people test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it, so are you also to accept my teachings only after examining them and not simply out of loyalty to me" (*Jñānasāra-samuccaya* 31).

Interactive discipline. In another form of discipline, the teacher is neither completely external nor completely internal to the seeker. Rather, teaching and learning occur in a continuing and flexive process. The discipline needed here centers on a dialectical way of seeing or knowing that in itself brings the seeker to the desired transformation. Outside authority exists in the form of tradition, *ethos*, or structures of the natural world; but that authority is affected in various degrees by the hopes, worldviews, and training of the disciple. Similarly, internal authority holds sway, but it is defined and given form by external structures. Interactive discipline centers on practices that arise in an open-

ended or multivalent relationship between the seeker and what he seeks.

Representative examples of interactive discipline might best come from the aesthetic arena. One thinks of a New England Shaker crafting a perfectly simple wooden chair; a *sitar* player quietly practicing a morning *rāga* in the Indian dawn; an Italian sculptor lovingly fashioning an image of the Virgin Mother out of a piece of marble. In such cases the disciple undergoes experiences in which the ideal is made real through his or her own creative power, but that ideal itself determines the form in which the disciple can make it real. Not only is there disciplined action; there is also a cultivated *interaction* between the disciple and the discipline itself.

At times the artist seems to be the effective agent in the creative process who brings his or her work to fruition through bold assertion. "This is not the moment for hesitation and doubt," Vincent van Gogh wrote of the creative process, "the hand may not tremble, nor may the eye wander, but must remain fixed on what is before one." Yet, no matter how subjective or personal this creative discipline may be, it frequently is described almost paradoxically as a participation in an impersonal event that transcends the idiosyncracies of the artist. "Everything vanishes around me," Paul Klee once noted to himself, "and works are born out of the void. . . . My hand has become the obedient instrument of a remote will." The artist cultivates a vision and undertakes a discipline in which the objective and subjective worlds converge and yet remain distinct.

Interactive discipline thus involves a kind of "attentive selflessness." Or perhaps it would be better to say that it centers on an "attentive wholeness"—for one who perfects this type of discipline is said to experience himself or herself as a creative and vital participant in the larger scope of life itself. Techniques of interactive discipline are different from those of heteronomous and autonomous discipline in that the former do not revolve around conceptual knowledge. The master is both external and internal, and neither external nor internal, to the disciple.

Interactive experience, like the artistic experience, centers on what the Japanese call *myō*, the wondrous mystery and rhythmic flow of life. One who disciplines himself or herself toward this experience seeks to know eternal truths within the mysteries of the constantly changing world. Such discipline is exemplified, to choose one of any number of possibilities, in the Japanese *haiku* tradition, in which poets compose short verses in moments of sublime understanding of the world. These poems reveal the unmediated nature of the world as it exists objectively but also the fond and at-

tentive regard the poet holds for that world. Bashō (1643–1694) is said to have set the *haiku* tradition with this verse, translated by D. T. Suzuki:

Furu ike ya!	The old pond, ah!
Kawazu tobikomu,	A frog jumps in:
Mizu no oto.	The water's sound!

Quite typically, the images presented in *haiku* come from the ordinary world, but the terseness with which they are described comes from the poet's discerning vision of that world as an entirely remarkable place. The poet Buson (1716–1783) once exclaimed:

Tsuri-gane ni	On the temple bell
Tomarite nemuru	Perching, sleeps
Kocho kana.	The butterfly, oh!

If perfected, such interactive awareness of the world is said to lead to *satori* (enlightenment), which finds its meaning in one's everyday activities such as eating, sleeping, and moving one's body. The meaning that *satori* illumines in these activities does not come from outside; it is in the event itself. It is beingness, or life itself. Better still, it is the "is-as-it-isness" of something, the quality that in Japanese is known as *kono-mama* or *sono-mama*. It is this discipline of "seeing the isness" of the world that led the *haiku* poet Jōsō (1661–1704) to find transformative appreciation in the following image:

Mizu soko no	Under the water,
Iwa ni ochitsuku	On the rock resting,
Kono ha kana.	The fallen leaves.

Or Bashō, in a moment's notice of

Nomi shirami,	Fleas, lice,
Uma no nyo suru	The horse pissing
Makuramoto.	Near my pillow.

The freedom to experience the world as it arises from such cognitive or perceptual discipline occurs only when the poet's mind is in perfect harmony with the rhythms of life itself. "Wonder of wonders!" Hō Kōji exclaimed in an eighth-century verse, "I carry firewood, I draw water!"

There are no heteronomous or autonomous authorities in this type of discipline, for to distinguish between object and subject is to bifurcate the essential unity of being. Interactional discipline takes a person beyond all dualities, including the duality of "self" and "other" or "disciple" and "master." Interactive discipline in the *haiku* tradition eventually frees the disciple from the need for a teacher. Such discipline recognizes that the guide, the way, and the wayfarer are one.

Modes of Spiritual Discipline. The three types of spiritual discipline just outlined should not be understood

as mutually exclusive. Despite the autonomous ideals reflected in his early discourses, for example, even Gautama's followers directed their lives according to the instructions given them by their master and subsequently codified in the Vinaya Piṭaka, a canonical collection of community rules and regulations established by the Buddha and his immediate followers. Conversely, even the Ṣūfī mystic who advances through the stages of the path under the heteronomous guidance of a shaykh finally experiences *fanā'*, the annihilation of ego-consciousness that brings knowledge of the unity of reality in a state similar to that called *jam'*, "unification." The Muslim, in fact, learns from the Qur'an itself that God is "closer to man than is man's jugular vein" (50:16) and that God has placed within each person an "inner torch" (*taqwā*), which, if allowed to burn brightly, guides that person toward fulfillment. And the Japanese notion of immediacy of *myō* is said to be taught at first by a master, who teaches the student either through example or through specific instructions how to see and to experience sublime beauty himself.

In all three types of discipline, therefore, the seeker and the path on which that seeker travels are inextricably linked. Within the general parameters of these three types of spiritual discipline, one may recognize a number of ways in which the disciple actually practices the regimens deemed necessary for movement along the path. For simplicity's sake, these modes of activity can be classified in the following categories: ecstatic discipline, constructive discipline, discipline of the body, discipline of the mind, discipline of the heart, and discipline of enduring personal relationships.

It should be stated, once again, that these categories serve typological purposes only; they are not rigid classifications but general descriptive groupings of a variety of practices and ideas.

Ecstatic discipline. Many religious traditions maintain that the desired state exists outside of the human realm. It may lie in some other place such as in the heavens, across the mountains, or at the bottom of the sea; or it may take place in some other time, typically the past or the future. Whatever the case, in order to reach that extraordinary state personally or in order to be able to communicate with spirits from that other world, the seeker must somehow cultivate the ability to move out of his or her physical body, since that body is limited by the confining structures of time and space. Such out-of-the-body experience is classified generally as "ecstasy" and is attested in a variety of religious traditions throughout history. [See Ecstasy.]

The discipline needed to attain ecstasy typically includes practices in which the seeker deprives himself or

herself of normal bodily pleasures in order to be free of his or her physical body. [See *Asceticism and Mortification*.] Such deprivational or ascetic discipline may begin with the seeker's withdrawal into solitude and spiritual tutelage under a master. It often culminates in the visitation by a guardian spirit and subsequent transformative vision or in an experience of death and resurrection.

Ecstatic discipline appears, for example, in North American Indian practices centered on what has come to be known as the vision quest. In such a quest practiced among the Thompson River Indians, for instance, a young man observed severe dietary restrictions and fasts, cleansed his spirit with such rituals as sweat bathing and immersion in a cold river, purged his body of impurities by forcing himself to vomit or by taking sacred medicines, and camped alone on a mountaintop, where he forsook sleep for nights on end. There he hoped to be visited by a guardian spirit who would teach him sacred ways and lead him through the dangers of life. The Ojibwa Indians of the Algonquin tribe near Lake Superior demanded that a boy entering puberty set up camp alone under a red pine tree, where he was to fast and to lie awake for days, waiting for a vision that would allow him to see who he was in the context of the sacred cosmos as a whole. These visions were often described as journeys taken into the worlds of the spirits, where the seeker was introduced to divine teachers who would guide him throughout his life.

Such ecstatic practices often included the seeker's ritualized symbolic death and resurrection. Shamanic initiates among the Pomo and Coast Miwok Indians of California lay on the ground and were covered with straw as if they had died and been buried; standing up and casting off the straw, the initiate was then known to have been resurrected from the dead. Among the Tlingit Indians of coastal Alaska, a man was recognized as a potential shaman when he fell to the ground in a deathlike trance and subsequently revived.

In some instances of ecstatic discipline, the value of an enduring, rather than temporary, out-of-the-body experience lies at the very center of religious ideology itself. Perhaps the best example is that of the Tibetan traditions based on the notion of *bar do'i sems can* (or simply *bar do*), the "intermediate stage" through which a departed soul moves over the interval of forty-nine days between death and rebirth. Tibetan priests read a series of instructions—most frequently from the the *Bar do'i thos grol* (often transliterated and simplified as *Bardo-Thodal*, the Tibetan *Book of the Dead*)—to the dying or dead person to help him through the dangers of the *bar do* and to help him gain a comfortable rebirth or, ideally, freedom from the cycle of rebirth itself.

Immediately at his death—in fact, before he even knows he is dead—a departed soul is said first to enter the '*chi kha* state, a realm of pure light and bliss. Reading set instructions from the *Book of the Dead*, the priest tells the deceased that this is the ultimate reality and encourages him to sever all emotional ties to the world left behind so that he can remain free in this state. Most spirits are afraid of such freedom, however, and turn from it toward a second state known as *chos ñid*, in which the dead person encounters wondrous and beautiful creatures. The priest tells the person that these beings are images of himself he has constructed through his own selfishness and that he must renounce all attachment to them because they will soon turn into demonic monsters. Fearing these terrors, the person then enters a third state, *srid pa*, in which he panics and flees into a new birth on earth as a way to avoid the horrors he has experienced in the intermediate realm. The priest attempts to keep the person from moving through the second two of these realms—and thereby allowing him to remain in the state of pure light and bliss—by reciting lessons and offering encouragement in the highly structured discipline of the long funerary ritual.

Constructive discipline. This mode of discipline does not seek in general to deprive the spiritual aspirant of unwanted or harmful characteristics; rather, it helps that person perfect his or her being by building on desirable characteristics that are already there.

Such constructive discipline often takes the form of personal imitation of a paradigmatic figure or figures who are said to embody desirable qualities or to have undertaken beneficial actions. Many times, therefore, such discipline takes the form of the correct performance of a ritual. "We do here what the gods did in the beginning," the priests report while explaining why they officiate at the sacred rites of Vedic India (see *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 7.2.14). For those priests, all work performed as part of the ritual thus becomes a disciplined imitation of a divine model. So, for example, the artist who fashions the utensils and ritual paraphernalia expresses his artistry in a religious context: "Those works of art produced here by a human being—[an image of] an elephant, a goblet, a sacred robe, a gold figure, a chariot—are works of art only because they imitate the art of the gods" (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 6.27).

But it need not be explicit ritual behavior only that embodies the ideals and techniques of constructive discipline. Such discipline appears in any system which assumes that within the seeker lie qualities that, although perhaps dormant, can be brought to the surface so that the ideal can be made real. "Be faithful imitators of Jesus, and perfect imitators of Mary," the fif-

teenth-century monk Thomas à Kempis wrote to his fellow Christians in his *Imitation of Mary*. "Be simple, like the simple children of God, without deception, without envy, without criticism, without murmuring, and without suspicion." In his *Imitation of Christ*, Thomas similarly taught others to "learn to turn from worldly things, and give yourself to spiritual things, and you will see the Kingdom of God come within you" (2.1).

Elements of constructive discipline may also be seen in the Chinese, specifically the Neo-Confucian, tradition of the cultivation of sagehood. Chang Tsai (1021–1077) defined the sage as one who understands the harmonious and holistic nature of oneself and one's relationship to the world. According to his teachings, a human being's essential nature (*hsing*) is identical with all of nature (*t'ien-ti*), and the sage understands the principle (*li*) that unites his essential nature with all things. According to Neo-Confucian thought, transformative understanding of this unity can be obtained through various techniques reflecting the ideology of constructive discipline. Kao P'an Lung (1562–1626), for example, advocated a combination of several attitudes and practices: the cultivation of an open-minded reverence (*ching*) for all things; an intuitive exploration (*ko wu*) of the unifying principle that links the inner and outer worlds; a pervasive appreciation of the natural world; a sense of one's place in history; and a practice he generally characterized as "quiet sitting" (*ching tso*) in which the student brings the body and mind together into a whole. Kao described this latter technique as "ordinary" (*p'ing ch'ang*) since it reflects the basic unified nature of being itself.

In his *Fu ch'i kwei* Kao notes that one may practice such quiet sitting by observing some general procedures:

Burn incense and sit in the lotus position. . . . Try not to be lazy. After eating one must walk slowly for a hundred steps. Do not drink too much wine or eat too much meat or you will stir up the muddy waters. When resting do not take off your clothes. If you feel sleepy, then lie down. As soon as you awaken, get up.

Discipline of the body. There is a general recognition among religious traditions that the body's tendency to please its own senses tends to distract the spirit from its more ethereal tasks. Therefore, most spiritual disciplines involve the seeker's control and restraint of his or her physical body.

Christian monastic traditions provide a good example of such discipline of the body. "The life of a monk should always be as if Lent were being observed" even though "few people have the fortitude to do so," wrote Benedict of Nursia in the sixth century (*Rule of St. Ben-*

edict 49), for "monks should have not even their bodies or their wills under their own command" (33). According to Benedict, monks were to "let one pound of bread be enough for one day, whether there be one meal only, or both dinner or supper," and "wine is not appropriate for monks at all" (39–40). Benedict nevertheless admitted, "Since it is not possible these days to convince the monks of this, let us agree at least on this: we should not drink excessively nor to the point of satiation. . . . one pint of wine a day is enough for each one" (40).

Benedict's *Rule* thus reflects the value he placed on the monk's renunciation of material goods, the primary purpose of which is to satisfy the body. "He should have nothing at all as his own: neither a book, nor tablets, nor a pen—nothing at all" (33). Six centuries later, Francis of Assisi restated and modified for his fellow monastics many of Benedict's rules, telling them, for example, "to go and sell all that they have and carefully give it to the poor," and that "all the brothers shall wear humble garments, and may repair them with sack cloth and other remnants" (*Rule of St. Francis* 3.2).

It may be, however, that the best classical example of the discipline of the body comes from the *rājayoga* tradition of India, particularly as represented by Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra* and its principal commentaries, Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* and Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvavaiśārādī*. According to that tradition, the path to the ultimate goal of meditation practices—namely, complete autonomy (*kaivalya*)—involves eight stages or "branches" (*aṅga*) and is therefore known as the "eight-limbed discipline" (*aṣṭāṅgayoga*).

The first of the eight steps given by Patañjali is known as restraint (*yama*) and is centered on injunctions not to kill, not to lie, not to steal, not to enjoy sexual contact, and not to envy other people's possessions (*Yoga Sūtra* 2.30). The second stage is comprised of the five traditional spiritual practices (*niyama*) of cleanliness, mental equanimity, asceticism, scriptural study, and devotion to a master (2.32). At the third level, the yogin masters the various limber body postures (*āsanas*, e.g., the lotus position) that strengthen the body against the rigors of severe asceticism (2.46), some of which take many years of training before they can be practiced without the risk of dangerous injury. The fourth level consists of breath control (*prāṇāyāma*) in which the adept slows down his rate of respiration, sometimes to the point of stopping his breathing altogether for long periods of time, and in so doing releases for his disciplined use all of the life force (*prāṇa*) that is said to reside within the breath itself (2.49–51).

At the fifth stage of the eight-limbed discipline, the yogin withdraws all of his senses from their objects in an enstatic process known as *pratyāhāra*, which in-

cludes in part his focusing all of his attention thus retrieved from external distractions on a single object—such as the spot between his eyebrows—in a technique described as *ekāgratā*, the sustained concentration on one thing (*Yogabhāṣya* 2.53). Mastering this technique gives the yogin power over all of his body, which possesses an almost immeasurable amount of energy.

The sixth level, known as *dhāraṇā*, a term that might best be translated as “mental concentration,” is a form of *ekāgratā* in which the yogin, under strict guidance of a master, concentrates all of his powerful attention on a single sacred syllable (*mantra*) or visual diagram (*yantra*) in such a way that his mind ceases to wander about in its constant fluctuations and he comes to know and experience the unity of his soul (*ātman*) with the soul of the universe.

In these first six stages of the eight-limbed discipline, the adept subdues and controls the instincts, desires, movements, respiration, senses, and mental activities of his physical body. He does so in order to prepare himself for the seventh and eighth levels of discipline, which may be said to transcend corporal existence. The seventh stage is known as *dhyāna* (deep meditation) in which the adept experiences the light of the Absolute within his own eternal soul. The final stage, *samādhi*, brings the yogic discipline to its fruition. At this point the yogin knows pure being, absolute consciousness, and complete bliss and is released from all suffering entailed in the cycle of rebirth.

Discipline of the mind. Many religions teach that one’s mind tends to distract one from the necessities of spiritual growth and that it, like the body, must be restrained. Sometimes religious masters admonish their students not to daydream. Sometimes they scold their students for being too analytical. In either case, they encourage them to retain control over the mind.

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* records a mythic conversation between Naciketas, a young boy desirous of sacred knowledge, and Yama, the lord of the dead. We see reflected in Yama’s teachings the notion, cited often in ancient India, that the mind must be restrained the way a charioteer must control his horses:

Think of the true self as [riding in] a chariot
and that the body is the chariot.

Think of the intellect as the charioteer
and the mind as the reins.

...

He who has no understanding, whose mind is out of control—
his senses are unchecked

Like wild horses [when unrestrained by a bad] charioteer.

He, however, who has understanding,
whose mind is always under control—
his senses are checked

Like the obedient horses [of a good] charioteer. (3.3–6)

The lord of the dead continues to teach Naciketas that the search for the absolute truth residing within the self is difficult because it “cannot be known through language, nor by the mind, nor by sight (6.12). According to Yama, one reason it is so difficult to comprehend the nature of the self is that it has no discernible qualities or characteristics: it is “without sound, without touch, without form, imperishable . . . without taste, eternal, odorless, without a beginning and without an end, beyond the great, constant.” Nevertheless, Yama asserts that “by discerning That, one is liberated from the jaws of death” (3.15).

Another Upaniṣad notes that the master should accept as a disciple only a student “whose mind is tranquil and who has attained peace. He teaches in its very truth that knowledge of *brahman* [absolute reality] by which one knows the true eternal soul” (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.2.12–13).

The adept who disciplines his mind undergoes here a kind of “unknowing” of all of the categories through which he normally understands himself, the world, and divine reality. Part of this mental discipline involves the practice of seeing the essence of things as distinct from their form. In a classic teaching recorded in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the Upaniṣadic sage Yājñavalkya repeatedly asserts (see 4.5.15, for example) that the eternal soul is “not this, not this.”

Christian mystical traditions centered on the *via negativa* present similar teachings regarding the need in one’s spiritual advancement to break down the categories to which one’s undisciplined empirical mind clings. In his work *The Mystical Theology*, Dionysius the Areopagite (sixth century) taught that “the universal and transcendent Cause of all things is neither . . . a body, nor has He a form or shape, or quality, or quantity, or weight; nor has He any localized, visible, or tangible existence; He is not sensible or perceptible” (Happold, 1970, p. 212). Dionysius accordingly encouraged his followers to “leave behind the senses and the operations of the intellect, and all things sensible and intellectual, and all things in the world of being and nonbeing, that thou mayest arise, by knowing, towards the union, as far as is attainable, with Him Who transcends all being and all knowledge” (op. cit., pp. 216–217).

Discipline of the heart. Some religious traditions teach that the final universal truth centers on a profound, delicate, and enduring love. According to these traditions, everything that is real arises from and returns into love; and it is through the openhearted awareness of that love that one comes closer to divine truth. The cultivation of those attitudes and actions that help one see and know that love may therefore be called the discipline of the heart. [See Love.]

At times such discipline of the heart is described as a way of seeing the world in its sublime nature. As the Ṣūfī poet Muḥammad Gīsūdarāz (d. 1422) proclaimed,

You look at the beautiful one and see figure and statue—
I do not see anything save the beauty and art of the creator.

Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273) saw the structures of the natural world as expressions of universal love:

If this heaven were not in love, then its breast would
have no purity,
and if the sun were not in love, in his beauty would be
no light,
and if earth and mountain were not lovers, grass would
not grow out of their breast.

The Hebrew *Song of Songs* (whose verses date as early as the tenth century BCE) presents classic love imagery set in a dialogue between a bride and her bridegroom. Traditional commentaries have interpreted the relationship between the characters of the bride and groom in four ways: literally, as a man and a woman in love with each other; figuratively, as a model on which proper marriage should be based; allegorically, as the people of Israel and their god; and anagogically, as the account of an individual soul's perfected relationship to God. Whatever its reference, the love between these two finds vivid expression:

Bride: Night after night on my bed
I have sought my true love;
I have sought him but not found him,
I have called him, but he has not answered.

Groom: How beautiful you are, my dearest, how
beautiful! . . .
Your lips are like a scarlet thread,
and your words are delightful;
your parted lips behind your veil
are like a pomegranate cut open. . . .
Your two breasts are like two fawns,
twin fawns of a gazelle. . . .

Bride: I am my beloved's, his longing is all for me.
Come, my beloved, let us go out into the fields
to lie among the henna bushes. (3.1–7.11)

The Cistercian monks of twelfth-century Europe tended to see the religious quest as an ongoing apprenticeship in the ways of love. In his *Sermons on the Song of Songs*, Bernard of Clairvaux urged his readers to remember that “when God loves, he wants nothing else than to be loved; for he loves for no other purpose than that he may be loved, knowing that those who love him are blessed by that very love” (83.4). Christian mystics of that era often defined God in masculine and the soul

in feminine terms and described the religious life as a relationship between the two. Richard of Saint-Victor, for example, outlined in *The Four Degrees of Passionate Charity* the stages through which the soul moves in its relationship to the loving God:

In the first degree, God enters into the soul and she turns inward into herself. In the second, she ascends above herself and is lifted up to God. In the third, the soul, lifted up to God, passes over altogether into Him. In the fourth the soul goes forth on God's behalf and descends below herself.

Discipline of the heart carries the seeker further and further into the depths, or heights, of divine love. We see this in India, too. As Kṛṣṇa (i.e., God) is reported in the *Bhagavadgītā* to have told his disciple, Arjuna:

Through loving devotion [*bhakti*] he comes to know Me—
my measure, and who, in very truth, I am.
Then, knowing Me in that complete truth,
he enters immediately into Me. (18.55)

Discipline of enduring personal relationships. According to some religious ideologies, religious fulfillment is best achieved through the observation of principles that serve to uphold the relationship between the human community and the deity or to maintain important familial and other interpersonal bonds.

A classical example of such relational discipline appears in the traditions centered on and developed from the Jewish notion of *mitsvah* (“commandment”; pl., *mitsvot*), a rule of discipline that is understood to have divine sanction. The rabbinic tradition of Judaism notes that God has given the people of Israel 613 *mitsvot* outlining the 248 positive instructions and 365 negative injunctions the people are obligated to honor. The most general and most familiar of the *mitsvot* are known as the Ten Commandments (see *Exodus* 20:2–14 and *Deuteronomy* 5:6–18), which combine strict monotheistic ideology with rules against destructive social behavior. According to these rules of discipline, the people of Israel are to believe in no other god but Yahveh, not to construct idols, to keep the commandments, not to misuse God's name, to observe the day of rest, to honor their parents, not to commit murder, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to testify falsely against their neighbors, and not to be envious of other people's possessions. Rabbinic traditions are careful to say that the Ten Commandments do not exhaust *mitsvot*, and remind the people of Israel of the religious duty incumbent on all Jews, for example, to marry and have at least two children in accordance with the divine commandment to “be fruitful and multiply” (*Gn.* 1:22).

Such relational discipline finds similar expression in Paul's teachings to the hellenized Jewish-Christians at

Thessalonica that the true disciple must "not [give] way to lust like the pagans who are ignorant of God; and no man must do his brother wrong in this matter, or invade his rights, because, as we have told you before with all emphasis, the Lord punishes all such offenses." Paul further noted to those disciples that we are "taught by God to love one another" in a selfless way and that "anyone who flouts these rules is flouting not man but God" (1 Thes. 4:4–9).

Discipline based on the maintenance of proper relationships also appears in another way in the classical Hindu notion of *varṇāśrama-dharma*, the sacred duties determined by one's vocation and stage of life. An entire science (*śāstra*) of such sacred duties developed in Brahmanic India in order to interpret and preserve those rules by which orthodox Hindus are to act in society.

According to the texts of that tradition, the Dharmaśāstras, society is divided into four classes (*varṇas*, sometimes translated as "castes") of people. Each *varṇa* has its own particular function, and the whole system may be understood as a symbiosis in which all parts depend on the others. The priests (*brāhmaṇas*) perform rituals that ensure the favor of the gods for specific individuals or for society in general. Warriors (*kṣatriyas*) protect the society from foreign invasions and increase its land holdings. The responsibilities of production and distribution of material goods throughout society fall to the merchants (*vaiśyas*), and the laborers (*śūdras*) perform the manual work the other classes need in order to fulfill their responsibilities.

Dharmaśāstra literatures similarly outline the four stages (*āśramas*) of one's individual life, each having its own disciplined requirements. According to a representative text, the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* (the Laws of Manu, second century BCE), a student (*brahmacārin*) must study the Vedic scriptures under the guidance of a master until he is old enough to marry. Becoming a householder (*gṛhasthin*), one must raise a family and secure its well-being. Having carried out these responsibilities long enough to see one's grandchildren grow to be adults, one leaves the demands of family life to his children and enters the stage of the forest-dweller (*vānaprasthin*) in order to offer private oblations to his ancestors and various deities. Only if one lives long enough, and only if he has met all of these other responsibilities, can one then become a wandering ascetic (*saṃnyāsīn*) who, having finally abandoned all possessions and family obligations, seeks the inner wisdom that will bring him eternal release.

[See further Meditation; Monasticism; Eremitism; and Retreat. For treatment of this topic in Eastern traditions, see also Yoga; Martial Arts; and Vinaya; in Christian

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Translations of traditional accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment, mostly from Pali sources, appear in E. J. Thomas's *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*, 3d rev. ed. (London, 1949), pp. 38–96, esp. pp. 61–80, and in Edward Conze's *Buddhist Scriptures* (Harmondsworth, 1959), pp. 34–66, which is a translation of Aśvaghōṣa's Sanskrit work, *Buddhacārīta* (Acts of the Buddha). For a traditional commentary on the Noble Eightfold Path, see Buddhaghosa's *Visuddimaggā* 16.77–83, translated by Bhikkhu Ñānamoli as *The Path of Purification* (Berkeley, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 583–584. For commentaries on the First Sermon, see Nalinaksha Dutt's *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Relations to Hīnayāna* (London, 1930), pp. 129–202. An example of Mahāyāna Buddhist spiritual discipline can be found in Marion L. Matics's translation and study of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* entitled *Entering the Path of Enlightenment* (New York, 1970). Robert C. Lester discusses Theravāda Buddhist ideals in *Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia* (Ann Arbor, 1973).

The quotation from Vincent van Gogh comes from *Dear Theo*, translated and edited by Irving Stone (New York, 1969), p. 114; that from Paul Klee is taken from *The Diaries of Paul Klee, 1898–1918*, edited by Felix Klee (Berkeley, 1964), p. 386.

Selections of Japanese *haiku* poetry appearing above come from D. T. Suzuki's *Zen and Japanese Culture*, 2d ed. (Princeton, 1959), pp. 215–268. See also R. H. Blyth's *Haiku*, 4 vols. (Tokyo, 1949–1952).

On the American Indian practices centered on the vision quest, see Ruth Benedict's "The Vision in Plains Culture," *American Anthropologist* 24 (1922): 1–23; Benedict's *The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America* (1923; Millwood,

N.Y., 1974; Åke Hultkrantz's *The Religions of the American Indians* (Los Angeles, 1979), pp. 66–83; and Sam D. Gill's *Native American Religions: An Introduction* (Belmont, Calif., 1982). For personal accounts of the vision, see Gill's *Native American Traditions: Sources and Interpretations* (Belmont, Calif., 1983). On patterns of initiation in North America, see Edwin M. Loeb's *Tribal Initiations and Secret Societies* (Berkeley, 1929). The best general discussion of shamanism around the world remains Mircea Eliade's *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, rev. & enl. ed. (New York, 1964).

Translations of the *Bar do'i thos grol* into English may be found in W. Y. Evans Wentz's *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, 2d ed. (London, 1949), and in Francesca Fremantle and Chögyam Trungpa's *The Tibetan Book of the Dead: The Great Liberation through Hearing in the Bardo* (Berkeley, 1975). The notion of *tao* in China is discussed by Arthur Waley in *The Way and Its Power* (New York, 1958). Rodney L. Taylor offers a concise discussion of Neo-Confucian sagehood in *The Cultivation of Sagehood as a Religious Goal in Neo-Confucianism* (Missoula, Mont., 1978). The translation from Kao P'an Lung's *Fu ch'i kwei* is taken from Taylor's work.

The only available complete English translation of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* is by Julius Eggeling, *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, 5 vols., "Sacred Books of the East," vols. 12, 26, 41, 43, 44 (Oxford, 1882–1900). The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* has been translated by Arthur Berriedale Keith in his *Rigveda Brāhmaṇas: The Aitareya and Kauṣītiki Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda*, "Harvard Oriental Series," no. 25 (Cambridge, Mass., 1920). The best English translations of the Upaniṣads are Robert Ernest Hume's *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, 2d ed. (London, 1931), and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's *The Principal Upaniṣads* (London, 1953). There are many translations of the *Bhagavad-gītā*. One of the best remains Franklin Edgerton's *Bhagavad Gītā* (Chicago, 1925), which includes helpful studies and a summary. Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra* with commentaries by Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra has been translated by James Haughton Woods as *The Yoga-System of Patañjali* (1914), 3d ed. (Delhi, 1966).

Those interested in the writings of Thomas à Kempis might look to *The Imitation of Mary*, edited and translated by Albin de Cigala (Westminster, Md., 1948) and his far better-known *The Imitation of Christ*, translated by Leo Sherley-Price (Harmondsworth, 1953). Those wishing to read Benedict's rule have available many translations, a good one being *The Rule of St. Benedict*, edited and translated by Justin McCann (London, 1921). For Bernard of Clairvaux, see Étienne Gilson's *The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard*, translated by A. H. C. Downes (London and New York, 1940). Translations from Dionysius the Aeropagite come from F. C. Happold's *Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology* (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 212, 216–217. The same is true for the translation from Richard of Saint Victor's *The Four Degrees of Passionate Charity* (see Happold, pp. 241–248, esp. p. 242). Happold's book contains short selections drawn from mystical tracts from a variety of classical religious traditions around the world.

For studies on rabbinic understanding of Jewish sacred law and custom, both written and oral, one might turn first to *The*

Code of Maimonides, 15 vols. (New Haven, 1949–1980). Less imposing works include *A Maimonides Reader*, edited by Isidore Twersky (New York, 1972), and *Maimonides' Mishneh Torah*, 3 vols., edited and translated by Moses Hyamson (New York, 1949). For other codes, see *Code of Hebrew Law: Shulhan 'Arukh*, 5 vols., edited and translated by Chaim N. Denburg (Montreal, 1954–), or *Code of Jewish Law: Kitzur Shulhan Arukh*, 4 vols., annot. rev. ed., compiled and translated by Solomon Ganzfried and Hyman E. Goldin (New York, 1961). Otherwise, see Alan Unterman's *Jews: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (Boston, 1981); *A Rabbinic Anthology*, edited by C. G. Montefiore and Herbert Loewe (New York, 1974); and *The Mishnah*, edited and translated by Herbert Danby (Oxford, 1933).

WILLIAM K. MAHONY

SPIRITUAL GUIDE. Since ancient times, the figure of the spiritual guide has stood at the center of contemplative and esoteric traditions. It would appear that all such traditions stress the necessity of a spiritual preceptor who has immediate knowledge of the laws of spiritual development and who can glean from the adept's actions and attitudes his respective station on the spiritual path as well as the impediments that lie ahead. Furthermore, the guide is responsible for preserving and advancing the precise understanding of the teaching and spiritual discipline to which he is heir, including both a written tradition and an oral tradition "outside the scriptures," which at its highest level is passed on from master to succeeding master and to certain disciples according to their level of insight. The precarious nature of this transfer has been recognized by all traditions, but no one has described the situation more succinctly than the fifth Ch'an patriarch, who warned that from "ancient times the transmission of the Dharma has been as tenuous as a dangling thread" (Yampolsky, 1967, p. 133).

Hinduism is not alone in its insistence that the spiritual bond (*vidyāsambandha*) that exists between the spiritual preceptor (*guru*) and his disciple (*śiṣya*) is no less real than a blood relationship. Taking Socrates as the model preceptor, Kierkegaard maintained that the maieutic relationship between teacher and disciple was the highest possible relationship between man and man. Socrates, writes Kierkegaard, entered into the role of midwife, not because his thought lacked "positive content," but because he "perceived that this relationship is the highest that one human being can sustain to another" (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 12; cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 150).

Whether he is regarded as a midwife, *daimōn*, or *bodhi-sattva*, the paradigmatic feature of the spiritual guide is always his intermediate status; in a hierarchically or-

dered cosmos, the guide is situated in an intermediary world of subtle possibilities, between the realms of pure matter and pure spirit, between earth and heaven, or, one might say, between the exoteric and esoteric. The mythological paradigm for this idea finds expression in a variety of forms: Eros is the half-mortal, half-immortal *daimōn* of special significance to Socrates (See Plato, *Symposium* 202); in Twelver Shiism the guide is the Hidden Imam who lives unseen in the third world of the esoteric Church, a Paradise *in potentia*, between the physical and spiritual cosmos; and as Hermes, he is both the messenger of the gods and their interpreter (*hermeneutēs*), an intermediary between the terrestrial and celestial worlds who has an additional function as the "guide of the souls of the dead."

The legitimacy of the unearthly, inner guide has been vouchsafed by all traditions; but the "masterless master" who has been initiated and guided by the inner spiritual guide without first having been counseled by an outer, human guide (as in the case of Ibn al-'Arabī, the "disciple of Khidr"; see Corbin, 1969) is especially rare. Hui-neng, the sixth Ch'an patriarch, said that if a man cannot gain awakening on his own

he must obtain a good teacher to show him how to see into his own self-nature. But if you awaken by yourself, do not rely on teachers outside. If you try to seek a teacher outside and hope to obtain deliverance, you will find it impossible. If you have recognized the good teacher within your own mind, you have already obtained deliverance.

(Yampolsky, 1967, p. 152)

On the other hand, the Indian guru Maharaj has suggested that it is the inner guru who leads the disciple to the outer guru, and it is the outer guru who reveals the inner guru (Maharaj, 1973).

Ancient Greece. Pythagoras and Socrates remind us that the worthy figure of the spiritual guide is not confined to the strict forms of religion but can also be identified in various fraternities, orders, and academies whose primary concern is the self-transformation and spiritual enlightenment of their members. As is often the case with founders of religions and lineages, there are no writings that have been attributed to Pythagoras or Socrates. The first written material on the "master" or founder of these traditions emerges often only after a long gap, so that in the instance of Pythagoras we find many of the earliest accounts idolizing and mythologizing him, attributing numerous miracles to him but remaining silent as to the essentials of his teaching.

According to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans taught that among rational beings there is that which is God, that which is man, and "that which is like Pythagoras" (Arist., frag. 192). The spiritual guide, as in the case of Py-

thagoras, stands between the human and the suprahuman worlds, between the mundane and the sacred; the guide is the intermediate *par excellence*, mediating energies from above and attracting disciples from below. The idea is further exemplified by the tradition quoted by Diogenes Laertius that Pythagoras was the son of Hermes in a previous incarnation and that he received from his father a memory of all things that had happened to him (Diogenes Laertius 8.4).

The historical Pythagoras, however, remains a mystery; we have inherited a fragmentary picture of his ascetic practices, taboos, *sumbola*, and orally transmitted maxims, but nowhere does the man Pythagoras emerge.

The problem with Socrates is somewhat different. Whereas Pythagoras had no single student to organize his teaching into a "system," Socrates was followed by his disciple Plato. But the problem here is trying to separate the real Socrates, whose stature as an exemplary guide emerges even in the dialogues, from Plato's literary achievement "Socrates." Jacob Needleman's study of the *Symposium* (in *The Heart of Philosophy*, New York, 1982) reminds us of certain aspects of Socrates' personality and energy as a guide, aspects that have been long overlooked by philosophers. Socrates, as in the other dialogues, is allowed to speak for himself to the extent that he alone among Athenians admits that he does not know; he is a man who is questioning. The state of questioning once again reflects the idea of the intermediate; it represents an intermediate state of unknowing, free at least from false and unexamined views. Similarly, Alcibiades, as the "authentic" pupil of Socrates, is also alone in that, unlike the other Athenians, he is neither for nor against Socrates; many times he wishes Socrates were dead, and yet he realizes that his death should make him more sorry than glad. Alcibiades is, alas, at his "wit's end" when he enters the symposium. A glimpse of Alcibiades' estimation of Socrates is given after the former recounts his failed amorous advances:

What do you suppose to have been my state of mind after that? On the one hand I realized that I had been slighted, but on the other I felt a reverence for Socrates' character, his self-control and courage; I had met a man whose like for fortitude I could never have expected to encounter. The result was that I could neither bring myself to be angry with him and tear myself away from his society, nor find a way of subduing him to my will. . . . I was utterly disconcerted, and wandered about in a state of enslavement to the man the like of which has never been known.

(Plato, *Symposium* 219, trans. Hamilton)

Many other of Socrates' extraordinary attributes are described by Alcibiades in the dialogue, including Socra-

tes' ridiculous and yet perfect choice of words (221), so that one might finally agree with Alicibiades that Socrates' "absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing" (221).

Judaism. Although it is difficult to speculate on the figure of the spiritual guide as he might have existed in ancient Judaism, as, for example, suggested in the texts of *Psalms* and *Ecclesiastes*, the dominant figure of later times became the rabbi. The title is derived from *rav* ("master" or "teacher") and a suffix of possession; hence its literal meaning is "my master" or "my teacher." In modern times the Western world has come to regard the rabbi as a congregation leader, but his original function as a "master" is indicated in the New Testament where Jesus is frequently referred to as rabbi. Similarly John the Baptist is indicated by the title in a singular instance (*Jn.* 3:26). Jesus, when he warned his disciples not to call themselves rabbis, surely meant that this title was not to be taken lightly.

In Talmudic times the rabbi was an interpreter and teacher of the Bible and the oral law (*Mishnah*). Like many teachers in the nonmonastic traditions of the East, the rabbi derived no income from these activities but had an additional occupation that produced private income; most often he was a simple artisan or craftsman. According to doctrine, all rabbis are mutually equal, while reserving their individual freedom to give ordination to suitable disciples. However, the rabbinical mysticism of the medieval period emphasized hierarchy in other ways; to belong to the inner circle of discipleship presupposed an extraordinary degree of self-discipline. Furthermore, the most esoteric level of exegesis and transmission of teaching was reserved for the most select: "It is forbidden to explain the first chapters of *Genesis* to more than one person at a time. It is forbidden to explain the first chapter of *Ezekiel* even to one person unless he be a sage and of original turn of mind" (*Hag.* 2.1).

The title was adopted and altered to *rebe* by Hasidism in the eighteenth century. The didactic and often humorous stories told by the *rebeyim* of Poland and East Europe were passed on by tradition, so that collections exist today that faithfully reflect the scope and activity of these remarkable guides (see Buber, 1947–1948 and 1974).

Christianity. The foundation for guidance and discipleship in the Christian tradition is naturally found in the reported actions of Christ: he called his disciples to him; they lived with him and were taught by his actions, words, and gestures.

For Christianity in general, Christ has remained the unequalled teacher, rabbi, a transcendent inner guide through whom man seeks salvation. Over and beyond

this tendency toward reliance on a transcendent guide, Eastern Orthodox Christianity has stressed the importance of the *starsy*, or elders, who guide one's spiritual and practical work. The primary texts of this tradition (called hesychasm) are contained in the *Philokalia*. They represent an unbroken tradition of practical guidance based on the teachings and disciplines of the Desert Fathers, having been written between the fourth and fifteenth centuries by spiritual masters of the Orthodox tradition. The texts show the way to awaken and develop attention and consciousness, and they describe the conditions that are most effective.

Many of the writings indicate the difficulty of accepting the vocation of spiritual guidance and attempt to discourage the false guide from destructive actions and consequences. Nilus the Ascetic (d. around 430) writes:

But what if someone, not from any choice of his own, is obliged to accept one or two disciples, and so to become the spiritual director of others as well? First, let him examine himself carefully, to see whether he can teach them through his actions rather than his words, setting his own life before them. . . . He should also realize that he ought to work as hard for his disciples' salvation as he does for his own; for, having once accepted responsibility for them, he will be accountable to God for them as well as for himself. That is why the saints tried to leave behind disciples whose holiness was no less than their own, and to change these disciples from their original condition to a better state.

(*Philokalia*, vol. 1, p. 223)

Not only is there a great temptation for the more advanced monks to consider themselves as highly evolved spiritual guides or directors, but the novice must face the temptation of relying merely on himself and trusting his own judgment when he has as yet insufficient material to understand the guile and cunning of the "enemy." The monk should bring his thoughts and confessions to an elder so that he might learn the gift of true discrimination. John Cassian (d. around 435) relates: "The devil brings monks to the brink of destruction more effectively through persuading him to disregard the admonitions of the fathers and follow his own judgment and desire, than he does through any other fault" (*ibid.*, p. 104).

But in confessing one's thoughts and concerns there is still the pitfall of following the pseudoguide. John Cassian further encourages monks to seek out spiritual masters who truly possess discrimination and not those whose hair has simply "grown white with age." He relates: "Many who have looked to age as a guide, and then revealed their thoughts, have not only remained unhealed but have been driven to despair because of the inexperience of those to whom they confessed." *Unseen Warfare*, a text with roots in both the Western and

Eastern traditions of Christianity, echoes the necessity of a qualified teacher: "A man who follows their guidance and verifies all his actions, both inner and outer, by the good judgments of his teachers—priests in the case of laymen, experienced *startzi* in monasteries—cannot be approached by the enemy" (Kadloubovsky and Palmer, 1952, p. 165).

Islam. It has been suggested that much of the wit, humor, and fullness of the image of the spiritual guide in the writings of the Desert Fathers and subsequent accounts of spiritual fathers in early Christianity has been gradually diluted and extracted through generations in an attempt to make the writings more generally palatable. The Ṣūfī master remains, as in the case with various Buddhist guides, a robust and vigorous man, full of life, paradox, and humor.

Shaykh or pīr. The *shari'ah*, or divine law, is meant for all Muslims, but beyond that lies the *ṭarīqah*, or spiritual path, for the *murīd* (literally "he who has made up his will", i.e., to enter the path). In order to enter the path, it is essential that the adept find and be accepted by a spiritual master, a *shaykh* (Arabic) or *pīr* (Persian); as a *ḥadīth* (tradition) says: "When someone has no shaykh, Satan becomes his shaykh."

Many accounts are given of adepts who have undergone seeming rejection and abuse by the master who must test the resolve and serious intent of the *murīd*. After this testing (sometimes the adept is made to wait for years), the *murīd* will only then actually begin on the path under the guidance of his master.

The Sheikh would teach him how to behave in each mental state and prescribe periods of seclusion, if he deemed it necessary. It was well known that the methods could not be alike for everybody, and the genuine mystical leader had to have a great deal of psychological understanding in order to recognize the different talents and characters of his *murīds* and train them accordingly. (Schimmel, 1975, p. 104)

The keen attention paid by the guide to the daily activities of the adept gradually developed in the course of time to the image of the shaykh "who acutely supervised every breath of the *murīd*." The problem of finding and dwelling in the presence of an authentic shaykh is particularly acute, for the adept must choose a guide (or be chosen by a guide) who possesses the qualifications for guiding that particular disciple. "Not every *sheikh* is a master for every disciple. The disciple must seek and find the master who conquers his soul and dominates him as an eagle or falcon pounces upon a sparrow in the air" (Nasr, 1970, p. 144).

The absolute necessity of a spiritual guide is so central to the credo of Sufism that at least one biography

of the Ṣūfī master Abū Sa'īd ibn Abī al-Khayr (d. 1049 CE) reports the maxim that "if any one by means of asceticism and self-mortification shall have risen to an exalted degree of mystical experience, *without having a Pīr to whose authority and example he submits himself*, the Ṣūfīs do not regard him as belonging to their community" (Nicholson, [1921] 1976, p. 10).

In this way the transmission of doctrine, method, and exercises is secured in a continuous lineage traced back through a series of dead pīrs or shaykhs to the Prophet. The appearance of Muḥammad and his son-in-law, 'Alī, at the head of a list fits in more with necessary fiction than strict historicity; the Ṣūfīs maintained they were the legitimate heirs of the esoteric teachings of the Prophet. Abū Sa'īd's lineage is traced by his biographer through ten pīrs to Muḥammad; the twentieth-century Ṣūfī saint Shaykh Aḥmad al-'Alawī (d. 1934) is credited with a "tree of spiritual mastery" including scores of generations as well as sectarian connections complex enough to require a navigator (see Lings, 1973, appendix B).

Although the shaykh has certainly undergone the ascetic and meditative training through which he guides his pupils—*dhikr* ("remembrance" [of God]), fasting, deprivation of sleep, intense physical labors, and so on—he abides in the fullness of life, active and yet detached from his actions. "The true saint," states Abū Sa'īd, "goes in and out amongst the people and eats and sleeps with them and buys and sells in the market and marries and takes part in social intercourse, and never forgets God for a single moment" (Nicholson, 1921, p. 55). For this reason the shaykh's actions often appear paradoxical or inconsistent with Islamic doctrine. Nicholson relates yet another story of Shaykh Abū Sa'īd from the *Asrār*: when the shaykh was holding one of his lavish feasts and entertainments, an arrogant ascetic—ignorant of the shaykh's novitiate and forty years' austerities—challenged him to a forty-day fast, hoping to humiliate the shaykh before his pupils and thereby earn their respect. The shaykh accepted and ate nothing while the ascetic continued to eat the small amounts of food allowed by the practice. Throughout the forty days the Ṣūfīs continued by order of Abū Sa'īd to be served delicious food while the two looked on. Finally the ascetic, no longer strong enough to perform his obligatory prayers, confessed his presumption and ignorance.

The Perfect Human Being. The idea of the Perfect Human Being (*insān-i kāmīl*) seems first to have been employed by the Ṣūfī theosophist Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) and somewhat later in a more technical sense when al-Jīlī (d. between 1408 and 1417) systematized his predecessor's work. Although the idea of the Perfect Human

Being has received several different treatments, a general definition might describe him as “a man who has fully realised his essential oneness with the Divine Being in whose likeness he is made” (Nicholson, 1921, p. 78). The saint (*walī*) is the highest knower of God, and consequently he occupies the highest of all human degrees, saintship (*walāyah*), as the Perfect Human Being *par excellence*. Al-Jilī maintained that the Perfect Human Being of any period was the outward manifestation of the Prophet Muḥammad’s essence, claiming that his own spiritual guide was just such an appearance. According to the system of Ibn al-‘Arabī and al-Jilī, the Ṣūfī shaykhs are “vicegerents” of Muḥammad, invested with the “prophecy of saintship” and brought back by God from the state of *fanā’* (“annihilation”) so that they might guide the people to God. Something of this idea is reflected in the definition by Maḥmūd Shabistarī (d. 1320) of the Perfect Human Being as he who follows a twofold movement: down into the phenomenal world and upward to the divine world of light.

Mention must also be made of the Ṣūfī master’s relationship to the role of the twelfth imam, who is the Hidden Imam in both Shiism and Sūfism. The Hidden Imam is the pole (*quṭb*) with whom all Ṣūfī masters are inwardly connected.

As Annemarie Schimmel writes:

The veneration shown to the *imām* and the *quṭb*, as manifested in the mystical preceptor, is common to Sūfism and Shiism. The Shia teaches: “who dies without knowing the *imām* of his time, dies an infidel,” and Jalāluddīn Rūmī (d. 1273), though a relatively moderate Sūfī, said: “He who does not know the true *sheikh*—i.e., the Perfect Man and *quṭb* of his time—is a *kāfir*, an infidel.” (Schimmel, 1975, p. 200)

Hinduism. The idea of a spiritual preceptor to guide one’s study of religion and philosophy has been a constant influence on the religion of India since the most ancient times. Already in the *R̥gveda* we see him referred to as the *ṛṣi* (“seer”) or *muni* (a sage, or “silent one”); as such, he is the possessor of deep spiritual insights (often resulting from performing austerities) and is considered to be the “author” of the sacred hymns. In later times we find him referred to as *ācārya*, *brahmāṇa*, and *svāmi* (swami), but he has most dramatically captured the attention of the West as the *guru*.

Only knowledge that was gained from a teacher was capable of successfully leading one to one’s aim (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 4.9.3). And from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.4.1f., it appears that the spiritual guide is also necessary in order to cut through and disperse mundane, empirical knowledge and to become conscious of true spiritual knowledge.

There is also the prevalent concern for the secret transmission of esoteric knowledge. Hence, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3.11.5 states that a father can teach the esoteric doctrine to “his eldest son or to a worthy pupil, and to no one else, even if one should offer him the whole earth”; see also *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* 3.2.6.9: “Let no one tell these *saṃhitās* to one who is not a resident pupil, who has not been with the teacher for at least a year, and who is not himself to become a teacher.” That the pupil is often tested by the *guru* and admitted only sometimes after a novitiate or probation is attested to in several sources (e.g., *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.7.3; *Praśna Upaniṣad* 1.2).

It would seem that the word *guru* is used in the sense of “teacher” or “spiritual guide” for the first time in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, but one should also point out that its original adjectival sense (“heavy one” or “weighty”) is illustrative of the widespread belief that holy persons are characterized by uncommon weight, not necessarily in the outer, physical sense. Hendrik Wagenvoort and Jan Gonda have both commented on this (Gonda, 1947, 1965; Wagenvoort, 1941). Wagenvoort has shown that *guru* is etymologically related to Latin *gravis*, which is remarkable only because its derivative, *gravitas*, was frequently used in connection with the nouns *auctor* and *auctoritas*. The Latin expression *gravis auctor* (“the important or true authority”) also carries the same general sense of a *guru* as a man of influence who takes the initiative, in other words, a man who can “do” and have an effect on others.

Although the tendency to deify the *guru* only gradually gained a doctrinal position, the idea can already be seen in the *Śvetasvatara Upaniṣad* 6.23, which speaks of a man who has the highest love and devotion for God and for his *guru* as for God. In later times this distinction is erased so that the *guru* is identified with the gods. The great poet and mystic Kabīr (d. around 1518) taught that the *guru* should be recognized as the Lord himself; a view echoed by Caitanya (d. 1533) and his followers. This process of deification (no doubt aided by the conception of *avatāras*) went to such extremes that the *guru* might be said to have usurped and displaced the gods in importance. Thus, the Śaiva texts teach that if Śiva becomes angry, “then the *guru* can pacify him, but if the *guru* becomes angry, no one can pacify him.”

It is in relation to this theme that the idea of the “*guru*’s grace” arose, a concept of particular force even today. Many Indian seekers feel that the mere presence of the *guru* (as in *satsang*, or keeping spiritual company) can somehow lead the pupil to liberation. This view, however, is not held universally. One can easily find numerous exceptions that suggest that the intensity of the

disciple's wish for knowledge and his earnest striving are all that is necessary; the *guru's* only true function then is to act as a messenger. Seen in this light, one can easily understand the statements that contend there is no lack of *gurus*, only of qualified and true disciples.

That the prestige and influence enjoyed by *gurus* has persisted to modern times is attested to by certain teachers of our century who possess the force and unmistakable ring of authenticity. One need only mention by way of example the writings by and about Nisargadatta Maharaj, Ramana Maharshi, and Shri Anirvan. Although in modern times there has been a great deal of speculation and criticism about the claims made by many spiritual guides of India, especially those offering their services to the West, it would be difficult and perhaps a mistake to attempt to judge those teachers on the basis of their outward actions. For no one, as Maharaj has said, could know the motives behind the actions of a truly realized *guru*. To illustrate this point, Maharaj tells the story of a *saṃnyāsin* (world-renouncing ascetic) who was told by his *guru* to marry. He obeyed and suffered bitterly. But all four of his children became the greatest saints and *ṛṣis* of Maharashtra.

Buddhism. Accounts of the Buddha's early life indicate that he retired to the forest in order to receive the teaching and guidance of various celebrated hermits and teachers. However, after practicing a series of austere yogic exercises for several years, the Buddha determined that their guidance was insufficient and set out on his own to attain enlightenment. Once the Buddha attained his enlightenment he remained in a blissful state of meditation for several days and contemplated the trouble he would cause himself should he attempt to share his vision and offer guidance to a deeply deluded and ignorant mankind. He overcame this final temptation of remaining secluded and private in his vision, resolving to share his knowledge with other seekers and to guide them towards a similar transformation. It is upon this fundamental attitude that the Buddhist tradition of spiritual guidance takes its precedence.

Unlike some Indian traditions that tend to view the *guru* as an incarnation of divinity or as an intermediary to the sacred, early Buddhism emphasized the humanity of the guide and his own attainment of spiritual knowledge. The term designated by the texts for the guide or teacher is "good or virtuous friend" (Pali, *kalyāṇamitta*; Skt., *kalyāṇamitra*). The *kalyāṇamitra* provides guidance based entirely on the insight he has gained from personal experience. In one instance the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* reports that when Ānanda suggested to the Buddha that reliance on "virtuous friends" was half

the holy life, the Buddha corrected him by declaring it the whole of the holy life. The same text (1:88) relates an episode in which the Buddha describes himself as the "virtuous friend" *par excellence*, as a spiritual guide who leads sentient beings to freedom from birth, old age, suffering, and death.

Bodhisattva. At the core of the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism was the role to be performed by the *bodhisattva* ("enlightenment being"). Mahāyāna doctrine argues that the old order was decidedly individualistic and that the emphasis on desiring a personal liberation, or *nirvāṇa*, was actually a hindrance to the full development of one's spiritual potentialities, stopping the larger movement toward "complete enlightenment." The *bodhisattva* relinquishes his personal enlightenment and vows to work for the enlightenment of all sentient beings. After attaining the requisite insight (*prajñā*), the final stage of the *bodhisattva's* career is devoted to the welfare of others as practiced via skillful means (*upāya*). The doctrine maintains that *prajñā* without *upāya* leads to the incomplete quietistic enlightenment, while possession of *upāya* without *prajñā* results in continued bondage to *saṃsāra*. Therefore, the skillful guidance of others toward enlightenment, as an expression of compassion, becomes paramount to the spiritual progress of the *bodhisattva*; through this process of guidance something "more" is gained by him.

The employment of skillful means or technique is essentially intended for use by those spiritual guides or masters who possess a complete and perfect knowledge of the teachings and the methods of practice and who are themselves free from the delusions of the mind and emotions. The *bodhisattva* perceives through spiritual insight (*prajñā*) the inner barriers and the potentialities of the pupil and can respond to each accordingly. Candrakīrti (fl. 600–650 CE) argued that contradictory teachings would naturally arise because the Buddhas were physicians rather than teachers; in considering the mental and spiritual stations of their disciples, the Buddhas would vary their teachings accordingly. The idea that the master could teach people by playing various roles while remaining inwardly free was presented in its ultimate form by the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*, which declared that even the Māras are all *bodhisattvas* dwelling in an "inconceivable liberation" and "playing the devil in order to develop beings through their skillful means."

Lama. In what historians have termed the "second diffusion of the teaching" in Tibet, the Buddhist masters emphasized the necessity of an authoritative tradition of teaching, the validity of which was assured by direct transmission from master to disciple. The first

two schools of Buddhism to appear in Tibet were the Bka'-rgyud-pa (Kagyüpa) and Bka'-gdams-pa (kadam-pa), founded by Mar-pa (d. 1096 or 1097) and Atiśa (d. 1054) respectively. With regard to the esoteric tradition of initiation and oral transmission, both schools recognize the same Indian teachers. It is also clear that the first objective of both Mar-pa and Atiśa was to gather around them tested disciples who would be capable of transmitting the tradition. When asked by a disciple whether scripture or one's teacher's instructions were more important, Atiśa replied that direct instruction from one's teacher was more important; if the chain of instruction and transmission is broken, the text becomes like a corpse, and no power can bring it new life. Mar-pa's Indian teacher, Nā-ro-pa (d. 1100), gave him similar instruction when he declared:

Before any guru existed
 Even the name of Buddha was not
 heard.
 All the buddhas of a thousand kalpas
 Only came about because of the guru.
 (Nalanda Translation Committee,
 1982, p. 92)

There is, perhaps, nowhere in world literature a more dramatic and haunting portrayal of the kind of guidance provided by a great master than is found in the *Life of Milarepa*, an account of Mar-pa's most famous disciple, Mi-la-ras-pa (d. 1123). Mi-la-ras-pa came to Mar-pa filled with remorse for the evil he had done by sorcery in his youth; he sought instruction that could free him from the karmic consequences in his future lives. But, as Lobsang P. Lhalungpa has pointed out, Mar-pa clearly perceived that, as a result of his previous actions, Mi-la-ras-pa could not gain the desired transformation by means of any normal training. "Thus, as the condition of receiving the Dharma, Mila was required to fulfill a series of bitterly demanding and dispiriting tasks. In enforcing the great ordeals, Marpa used shifting tactics and seemingly deceitful ways" (Lhalungpa, 1977, p. x). During the so-called "ordeal of the towers" Mi-la-ras-pa was commanded by Mar-pa to build single-handedly a tower. But each time Mi-la-ras-pa had completed a tower, Mar-pa ordered him to tear it down, claiming he had not paid enough attention to the plans or that he had been drunk when he gave the "Great Magician" directions. Finally, having constructed a ten-story tower (which is still said to exist today) and at the brink of suicide, Mi-la-ras-pa at last received from Mar-pa the secret teaching. Not just Mi-la-ras-pa but Mar-pa's wife and several of his disciples were baffled by the apparent cruelty and irrationality of

the lama Mar-pa, of the verbal and physical abuse he showered on Mi-la-ras-pa and his seeming lack of compassion. Mar-pa countered the doubts of the uninitiated by saying that he merely tested Mi-la-ras-pa in order to purify him of his sins.

After these trials, Mar-pa led his disciple through initiations and offered instruction and consultation on meditation. It is said that Mi-la-ras-pa became "even greater than his teacher" and he is today remembered in Tibet as the greatest of Buddhist "saints." Later, when Mi-la-ras-pa took on his own pupils, one disciple suggested that he must have been the incarnation of a Buddha or great *bodhisattva* owing to the extent of the trials and ascetic practices he had undergone and based on his great devotion to his lama. Mi-la-ras-pa replied tersely that he had never heard whose incarnation he was.

Zen patriarchs and Zen masters. It has been observed that every tradition emphasizes the importance of an oral tradition of instruction for the guidance of adepts. The foundation of Ch'an (Jpn., Zen) Buddhism is based squarely upon this premise, as is indicated in the following verses attributed to the "founder" and first Ch'an patriarch in China, Bodhidharma (d. before 534):

A special tradition outside the scriptures;
 No dependence upon words or letters;
 Direct pointing at the soul of man;
 Seeing into one's own nature, and the
 attainment of Buddhahood.

(Dumoulin, 1963)

Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch, was said to have been illiterate, and it is reported in a story that is most probably apocryphal that he ordered all of the *sūtras* of his monastery thrown into a heap and burned in order to teach his disciples not to rely on word and texts but direct experience only.

The golden age of Ch'an in China (the period from Hui-neng's death until the persecution of Buddhism in the ninth century) was a time in which Ch'an masters of the most remarkable originality won the day. These were vigorous and effusive men who sought to bring their disciples to new levels of insight by demonstrating their own inexpressible experiences of enlightenment by shocking and often violent methods.

One such figure was Ma-tsu (d. 786). A robust and unflinching presence, Ma-tsu is described in a Ch'an chronicle of the period as a man of remarkable appearance: "He strode along like a bull and glared about him like a tiger." He was the first to use shouting (especially the famous cry "ho!" [Jpn., "katsu"]) as a means to shock the disciple out of his habitually duality-con-

scious mind. In one famous story it is related that after a typically paradoxical dialogue with one of his disciples, Ma-tsu grabbed him by the nose and twisted it so violently that the pupil cried out in pain—and attained enlightenment.

For Ma-tsu the important thing was not a deluded attachment to quiet sitting in meditation but enlightenment, which could express itself in everything. This was impressed upon Ma-tsu by his own master, Huai-jang (d. 744). While still a student, Ma-tsu was “continuously absorbed in mediation.” On one occasion Huai-jang came across Ma-tsu while the disciple was engaged in meditation and asked, “For what purpose are you sitting in meditation?” Ma-tsu answered, “I want to become a Buddha.” Thereupon the master picked up a tile and started rubbing it on a stone. Ma-tsu asked, “What are you doing, Master?” “I am polishing this tile to make a mirror,” Huai-jang replied. “How can you make a mirror by rubbing a tile?” exclaimed Ma-tsu. “How can one become a Buddha by sitting in meditation?” countered the master (Dumoulin, 1963, p. 97f.).

Lin-chi (d. 866) led his numerous disciples toward enlightenment by continuing and enlarging the use of shouting, adding to that his own favorite method of beating disciples. The “shouting and beating” Ch’an of Lin-chi was not intended as punishment or random mischief. Experience had taught Lin-chi that harsh and unexpected encounters with “reality” could lead more quickly and certainly to enlightenment than endless lectures and discourses.

An unrelenting giant among Japanese Zen masters was Hakuin (d. 1769). Born in a “degenerate” period of Buddhism in Japan, Hakuin revived the Rinzai form of Zen begun by Lin-chi, particularly emphasizing the investigation of *kōans* and “sitting in the midst of activity.” Throughout Hakuin’s life he attacked forms of “silent-illumination Zen,” which he consistently referred to as “dead-sitting.” In his youth, Hakuin tells us, his *kōan* meditation was poor, and as a result he engaged in dead-sitting until his Zen-sickness was cured by the instruction of an insightful teacher, the hermit Hakuyū. As a result, Hakuin was totally uncompromising in his insistence of a right understanding of meditation; his ironic and acerbic tone seems to have been inherited from the harsh patriarchs and Zen masters of the past:

How sad it is that the teaching in this degenerate age gives indications of the time when the Dharma will be completely destroyed. Monks and teachers of eminent virtue, surrounded by hosts of disciples and eminent worthies, foolishly take the dead teachings of no-thought and no-mind, where the mind is like dead ashes with wisdom obliterated, and make these into the essential doctrines of Zen. They practice silent, dead sitting as though they were incense

burners in some old mausoleum and take this to be the treasure place of the true practice of the patriarchs. They make rigid emptiness, indifference, and black stupidity the ultimate essence for accomplishing the Great Matter.

(Yampolsky, 1971, p. 170)

It has been argued that the ultimate purpose of the Zen master is one thing alone: to produce a disciple who can carry on the teaching and preserve the transmission of the Dharma. The lineages of many famous monks became extinct after a generation or two because they had no disciples to hand down their teachings.

The biography of Po-chang (d. 814) states: “He whose view is equal to that of his teacher diminishes by half his teacher’s power. He whose view exceeds that of his teacher is qualified to transmit the teaching.” Hakuin was keenly aware of the necessity of producing a worthy disciple and in fact sanctioned several of his own pupils to carry on his teaching. Armed with spiritual powers and techniques for guiding others in their quest for enlightenment, the Zen master “smashes the brains of monks everywhere, and pulls out the nails and knocks out the wedges.” With typical Zen irony Hakuin describes the worthy successor he has produced who is qualified to transmit the teaching: “Without the least human feeling he produces an unsurpassedly evil, stupid, blind oaf, be it one person or merely half a person, with teeth sharp as the sword-trees of hell, and a gaping mouth like a tray of blood. Thus will he recompense his deep obligation to the Buddhas and the Patriarchs” (Yampolsky, 1971, p. 39).

[See also *Authority and Leadership*.]

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STUART W. SMITHERS

SPIRITUALITY, CHRISTIAN. See Christian Spirituality.

SPITTLE AND SPITTING. In the past, spittle was generally believed to have magical properties. Early man, seeing himself at the center of the universe, perceived connections between his own body and cosmic bodies, gods, and demons. He related parts of his body to colors, plants, elements, and directions. Spittle, blood, sperm, sweat, nails, and hair became magical substances not only as a result of this unity but also because, after leaving the body, they would retain some essence of that person. Spittle could therefore be positive or negative, depending on the intent of the spitter. Spitting and blood rites have many parallels, since both involve holy fluids that signify psychic energy and are necessary for sustaining physical life. Connections are still made between body fluids and feelings: anger makes our blood "boil"; we spit from contempt or "spit out" words in hatred; and our mouths water at the thought of some delight or become dry from fear.

In early myths, life created by spitting is equivalent to the breath of the creator or the divine word. In one version of an Egyptian creation myth, the primeval god

Atum spits out his children Shu and Tefnut. Shu was the god of air (e.g., breath), Tefnut was the goddess of moisture (e.g., spittle), and the mouth was their place of birth.

In Norse mythology a being called Kvasir was formed from the spittle of the gods. To commemorate a peace treaty among them, all the gods spat into a jar, and from this mixture Kvasir was created. He was so wise that there was no question he could not answer. Later he was slain by two dwarfs who mixed his blood with honey and concocted the mead of inspiration. By cunning, the high god Odin swallowed every drop of the mead, changed himself into an eagle, and returned to the waiting gods, who were holding out vessels for Odin once again to spit out the mead. A drink of this mead bestowed the gift of poetry on men. On his flight back, however, Odin had lost some of the mead when pursued by a giant who had also assumed the form of an eagle. This part of the mead became known as the fool-poet's portion.

In this myth, the holy spittle and blood have become identical, one being transformed into the other. Mead, blood, and spittle are three familiar sources of inspiration, here combined in one myth. The Norse gods' making a covenant by spitting is related to the custom of becoming blood brothers. Similarly, to spit into each other's mouth is a way to pledge friendship in East Africa.

To transmit something of himself, a holy man in his blessing will use some form of physical contact. Muhammad spat into the mouth of his grandson Hasan at his birth. Similarly, at ordination the priest or exorcist in ancient Babylon acquired his powers by having his mouth spat into, presumably receiving the spittle of the god. Among the Luba of present-day Zaire, a candidate being initiated into the order of sorcerers drinks a brew containing spittle from each of the elders; he becomes, thereby, not only blessed with their power but also placed forever under their control.

The role of saliva as a part of healing is well known all over the world. Sometimes the emphasis is on the curative effect of the spittle itself, which is known from the fact that wounds in the mouth heal faster. The observation of wild animals licking their wounds added to this belief. Spittle of people fasting is widely reported to be particularly effective, and it has even been thought strong enough to kill snakes.

Particular significance has been attributed to the spittle of men with unique powers. In his healing, Muhammad mixed clay with spittle. Similarly, Christ made mud of spittle and clay and anointed the eyes of a blind man, thus restoring his sight. When he spat and touched the tongue of a mute (presumably with saliva) the man

could speak. Conferring power of speech on an object spat upon is found in many folk tales.

Sickness is often considered a form of possession by demons who can be exorcised by spitting. In the Babar archipelago of Indonesia, all the sick people expectorate into a bowl that is then placed in a boat to be carried out to sea. In one Buddhist tale, even sins and misfortunes vanish, if one spits upon a holy ascetic.

Spittle is also a protective agent. In southern Europe, praise is sometimes accompanied by spitting to avert the evil eye. Fear of the gods' envy makes some people spit three times, since three is a lucky number. Seeing a black cat or magpies (animals associated with witches), hearing names of dead people (for fear they might return), or smelling a bad odor (to avoid contamination) are all occasions when spitting becomes a safeguard. Before discarding hair or nails, one should spit so as to prevent their being used by witches in black magic. Because of the same belief that something of the person continues to exist in the saliva, great care was taken not to be seen spitting. Behind the custom of spitting on money found in the street lies the fear that, as a fairy gift, it might disappear.

Good luck can also be invoked by spitting. And the familiar custom of spitting on one's hands before starting a strenuous task, thus adding power, also reveals some lingering faith in the magic of spittle.

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ANNMARI RONNBERG

SPORT. See *Games and Play*. For discussion of the Indian concept of divine sport, or play, see *Lilā*.

SPURGEON, CHARLES HADDON (1834-1892), English Baptist popularly known as "the prince of preachers." The son and grandson of Congregationalist pastors, Spurgeon was converted in 1850 at a Primitive Methodist chapel and joined a Baptist church in 1851. At age sixteen, circumstances compelled him to preach

unprepared in a cottage near Cambridge, England. Word of his oratorical skill and evangelical fervor spread. He was called to pastorates at Waterbeach (1852) and at New Park Street Chapel in London (1854). His preaching attracted such large crowds that it was necessary to rent public accommodations seating up to ten thousand people. In 1861 the Metropolitan Tabernacle was completed in London, and there Spurgeon ministered until his death. By age twenty-two he had become the most popular preacher of his day. He established several institutions, including orphanages and a pastors' college, the latter being the matrix for the founding of numerous churches and Sunday schools.

Although throughout his career Spurgeon preached to large audiences, his greatest immediate influence was through his weekly published sermons, numbering 3,561, which are estimated to have had more than a million regular readers. These sermons eventually amounted to sixty-three volumes, entitled *New Park Street Pulpit* (1855-1860) and *Metropolitan Tabernacle Pulpit* (1861-1917). By 1899 over a hundred million copies of his sermons had been printed in twenty-three languages. Among his many works was the seven-volume *The Treasury of David*, a commentary on *Psalms*. He also edited a monthly magazine, *The Sword and the Trowel*, for twenty-seven years.

Spurgeon's preaching was massive in scope and narrow in doctrine. Staunchly Calvinistic, he was called by some "the last of the Puritans." From his earliest ministry until his death, he consistently maintained the gospel of grace without deference to increasingly influential high-church and liberal teachings. In 1864 his sermon against "baptismal regeneration" excited a hearty controversy that resulted in his withdrawing from the Evangelical Alliance. During the last decade of his life, Spurgeon fought against what he called the "down-grade movement," that is, the rise of higher criticism, liberalism, and rationalism within Baptist circles in England. So firmly were such views entrenched there that he withdrew from the Baptist Union in 1887, remaining independent but a Baptist until his death. Although he never sought controversy, he never shied from it. In his own words, "Controversy for the truth against the errors of the age is . . . the peculiar duty of the preacher."

Within the confines of a thoroughly evangelistic Calvinism, Spurgeon's works include such an enormous variety of topics congenial to the mainstream of orthodoxy that his writings, especially his sermons, have been valued by Christians of diverse creeds. While his influence, particularly in evangelical circles, continued through the first half of the twentieth century, in the 1960s interest in Spurgeon began to grow. All sixty-

three volumes of his sermons have been reprinted, and more than 150 of his other writings are in print.

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DARREL W. AMUNDSEN

SRI AUROBINDO. See Aurobindo Ghose.

SRI LANKAN RELIGION. See Sinhala Religion.

ŚRĪ VAIṢṆAVAS. The Śrī Vaiṣṇava Sampradāya, one of six major Hindu denominations devoted to Viṣṇu, is the community of those who worship Viṣṇu (also called Nārāyaṇa) in conjunction with his consort Śrī (Lakṣmī), the goddess of auspiciousness and prosperity, along with Bhūdevī, the goddess of the earth, and Nīlā, more generally known by her Tamil name of Nappinai, the human wife of the young Kṛṣṇa. The community is strongest in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, but it also has many adherents in the three other South Indian states and some in other parts of India. Brahmins are strongly represented and have most positions of leadership.

Śrī Vaiṣṇavas are adherents of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and describe their theological position as Ubhaya Vedānta, “dual theology” or “theology of the two scriptures,” for, in addition to regarding as authoritative the Vedas (including the Upaniṣads) and other scriptures written in Sanskrit, the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas consider sacred the Tamil hymns of the poet-saints called the Ālvārs (those “immersed” in God) and treat the long poem called the *Tiruvāymoli* as equal in value to the Upaniṣads. Both divisions of the present community trace their spiritual lineage back to still earlier *ācāryas* (teachers), and then through Nammālvār, the author of the *Tiruvāymoli*, to the Goddess, Śrī, and Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa himself.

The Sanskrit canon of the community includes, in addition to the Vedas, the two great epics, the treatises on social morality and ritual, and the summary of the Upaniṣadic teaching called the *Vedānta Sūtra*. These

scriptures are themselves interpreted by a host of commentaries and didactic treatises in Sanskrit, and there is a corresponding, though much smaller, group of commentaries and treatises in Tamil. In both languages there are also a number of hagiographies of the Ālvārs and *ācāryas*; greatest attention is given to Rāmānuja (traditional dates 1017–1137), who wrote only in Sanskrit but who is represented in the biographies as commenting on the *Tiruvāymoli* in Tamil and assigning his cousin and disciple Piḷḷān the task of producing a written commentary on this long poem. It was Piḷḷān who first called the members of the community “Śrī Vaiṣṇavas” and demonstrated the confluence of the Sanskrit and Tamil “Vedāntas.” Three later commentaries are also considered authoritative.

By the end of the twelfth century there was an increasing shift in emphasis on works of a different kind, treatises on the secret meanings (*rahasyas*) of the three central *mantras* (ritual formulas) that specified the spiritual path and more fully discussed the doctrine of divine grace. These treatises stressed the indispensable role of Śrī as mediatrix (*puruṣakāra*). Since she is always full of maternal love, her favor should be sought first; she can persuade the Lord, who as a father must balance justice and mercy, to the side of mercy. Similarly one first humbly petitions one's own guru, who is already connected with the chain of grace, for his recommendation in approaching the Lord.

The various stories about the twelve Ālvārs assign them very ancient dates. Nammālvār, for example, is said to have lived some five thousand years ago, at the very beginning of the present, evil age, the *kaliyuga*. Modern historical scholarship places them from the sixth to ninth centuries CE. In contrast, the *ācāryas* are assigned dates that are accurate within one or two generations. The first *ācārya*, Nāthamuni (late ninth or early tenth century), received from Nammālvār in a yogic trance the entire corpus of hymns; he then arranged them to accompany Sanskrit verses in the temple liturgies. Still more stories are told about Nāthamuni's brilliant grandson Yāmuna (916–1036), but the largest part of the hagiographies focuses on the life of Rāmānuja. [See the biographies of Yāmuna and Rāmānuja.]

The gradual splitting of the community into the Vaṭakalai (“northern culture”) and Teṅkalai (“southern culture”) subjects is only in part related to the relative emphasis on the Sanskrit and Tamil scriptures; the two groups understand differently the relation of divine grace to human response. Both groups affirm the primacy of divine grace in rescuing souls from their bondage in the world and maintain that all seekers of salvation should solemnly surrender, first to the goddess Śrī

and then to Lord Viṣṇu. The great Vaṭakalai teacher Vedānta Deśika believed that the act of surrender gives the Lord a pretext or occasion (*vyāja*) for saving the soul, so that grace is not arbitrary. His contemporary, the Teṅkalai teacher Piḷḷai Lokācārya, on the other hand, considered it presumptuous for human beings to think they could make any contribution whatsoever to their salvation. Even "surrender," he taught, is not to be regarded as such an act; it is merely the acknowledgement of what the Lord has already done. The nicknames "monkey-hold" and "cat-hold" applied to the two groups come from a Teṅkalai source. The Teṅkalai claim that the Vaṭakalai theology likens the soul's position to that of a baby monkey, which has to hang on to its mother as she swings from tree to tree, while the Teṅkalai's own view makes the soul resemble the kitten, whose mother picks it up by the scruff of the neck without any effort on the kitten's part. [See also the biography of Piḷḷai Lokācārya.]

For neither group does the doctrine of grace lead to an antinomian lifestyle. On the contrary, the lives of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas are full of ritual injunctions and social obligations, but neither their good deeds nor scholarly attainments—not even emotional participation in intense devotion to God—can bring about their salvation. Their ritual act of surrender is the outward sign of a lifelong surrender of their worldly ambitions—even quite proper ones—to God's disposal. Having solemnly petitioned God's mercy, and having confidently expressed total reliance on that mercy, the devotee ought not to ask for anything else. This is clearly a difficult ideal to follow, the more so since the majority of their fellow worshipers at Viṣṇu temples are not initiated "surrendered ones" (*prapannas*) but Hindus from all walks of life who confidently ask the Lord and his consorts for all manner of material blessings.

Much of the spiritual leadership in the community is provided by various *maṭhas*, which are not communities of ascetics but groups of householder disciples of a *guru* who becomes a *saṃnyāsīn* after being chosen to head the *maṭha*. These *gurus* perform the formal initiation of *prapatti*, bestow spiritual blessings and deliver courses of lectures on periodic tours to visit their followers, and frequently give individuals practical advice in private audiences.

The key words in Śrī Vaiṣṇava worship are *darśana*, the reverent beholding of the image form of the Lord; *smaraṇa*, the remembrance of the Lord's gracious deeds, and *seva* or *kainkarya*, service to the Lord and to the Lord's disciples. While in their own homes Śrī Vaiṣṇavas perform the lengthy daily worship privately, in the one hundred and eight major Śrī Vaiṣṇava temples in South India (including the all-Indian pilgrimage cen-

ter of Tirupati and the central temple at Śrīraṅgam), and in many more minor ones, they are part of a mixed company. Their joining in the Tamil and Sanskrit chanting of the liturgy is for them a confident anticipation of their participation, after this present earthly life, in the eternal chorus of praise in the Lord's heavenly home.

[See also Ā[vārs; Kṛṣṇaism; and Tamil Religions.]

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JOHN B. CARMAN

SSU-MA CH'ENG-CHEN (647–735), known as the Master of the White Cloud; member of the Ssu-ma family that founded the Chin dynasty and reigned over China from 265 to 420. Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen was one of the most illustrious patriarchs of the Shang-ch'ing sect, a Taoist school that came into being in the fourth century with divine revelations to Yang Hsi (b. 330). The school spread among the Chinese gentry during the fifth and sixth century and, under Ssu-ma's brilliant leadership, became the predominant Taoist movement during the T'ang dynasty. As a disciple of P'an Shih-ch'eng (587–684), Ssu-ma was initiated into Taoist gymnastics and dietetics and ultimately succeeded his master to become the twelfth patriarch of the Shang-ch'ing sect. Although he spent much of his time residing in the mountains to which he was wont to withdraw, Ssu-ma received the patronage of the T'ang court. He was summoned to the court first by the Empress Wu, then in 711 by Emperor Jui-tsung, who had the T'ung-po Kuan built for him, and finally by Emperor Hsüan-tsung. He initiated Hsüan-tsung to the Shang-ch'ing methods of visual meditation and persuaded him to build sanctuaries dedicated to the Shang-ch'ing spirits. On the emperor's orders he inscribed, in his own calligraphy, Lao-tzu's *Tao-te ching* in 5,380 characters. It is said that when he died

a white cloud rose from his body to the sky while his corpse remained intact as if it were still alive. Of his seventy disciples, the most important was Li Han-kuang (683–769), the thirteenth patriarch of the Shang-ch'ing sect.

Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen was the author of a commentary on a series of pictures illustrating the apparitions of Wang-tzu Ch'iao, a famous Taoist immortal (*hsien*). According to legend, Wang is supposed to have lived, after his death, in a "celestial grotto" under the mountain where Ssu-ma's monastery was located. A short text on cosmic mirrors, which reveal the true inner and outer form of beings and are illustrated with the emblems of Heaven, earth, and man, is also attributed to Ssu-ma. He wrote two essays on meditation that are still extant, the *T'ien-yin-tzu* (The Master who is Hidden in the Sky) and the *Tso-wang lun* (Essay on Sitting in Oblivion), in which he distinguishes five stages of meditative progress. During the first phase—the observance of religious rules and fasting—the adept must learn to eat no solid food and to "feed on his own breath." In the second stage he must retire to a meditation chamber where the *yin* and *yang* influences are equally balanced. During the third step he meditates on his mind with his mind and meditates on his body with his eyes; that is, he practices visual meditation on the spirits of his body. In the fourth stage, or *tso-wang* everything—self and others, the internal and the external—is forgotten. The practice of *tso-wang* provides a wisdom that the adept must not employ, because to do so would dissipate his body and thereby prevent him from becoming inalterable and immortal. The ultimate step is that of deliverance and immortality, where the adept accords with the underlying pattern of change in the universe as taught in the *I ching*, with *tao* and *te* as understood by Lao-tzu, with the "identity of things" of the *Chuang-tzu*, and with the fully enlightened Tathāgata of the Buddhist tradition. Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen's thought is typical of the Taoist habit of combining a concern for corporeal immortality with well-developed and highly rationalized regimens of mental cultivation.

[See also Taoism, article on The Taoist Religious Community.]

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ISABELLE ROBINET

STARBUCK, E. D. (1866–1947), a prominent figure in the early academic study of the psychology of reli-

gion in the United States and the first scholar to use the phrase "psychology of religion." Edwin Diller Starbuck was born in Indiana to a devout Quaker farming family. After undergraduate work at Indiana University, he went on to Harvard University, from which he received his master's degree in 1895, and then to Clark University, where in 1897 he received his doctorate. In 1890 he was stirred by F. Max Müller's *Introduction to the Science of Religion* and decided to start studying religion. In 1893, at Harvard, he circulated two questionnaires, one on sudden conversion and the other on "gradual growth" toward religious commitment. In 1894 and 1895 he presented papers on his research before the Harvard Religious Union. After graduating from Clark University, he remained there as a fellow in the late 1890s, together with James H. Leuba.

Starbuck's 1899 book *The Psychology of Religion* was based on studies he started at Harvard under William James and continued at Clark under G. Stanley Hall; it enjoyed three editions, was reprinted several times, and was translated into German in 1909. Starbuck had the support and encouragement of James in his work, but as Starbuck himself reports in a frank autobiographical statement, there was some tension in his relationship with Hall, and mutual criticism is much in evidence.

After the turn of the century, Starbuck devoted most of his creative energy to "character training" and devised selections of fairy tales, novels, and biographies that would contribute to the moral education of the young. He taught a variety of subjects at a number of institutions, including philosophy at the State University of Iowa (1906–1930), and philosophy (1930–1938) and psychology (1938–1943) at the University of Southern California. Starbuck's important contribution remains his early survey of conversion cases, which work was immortalized by James, who used Starbuck's data in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). While the basic findings of the survey have been accepted, and seem to fit with classical and modern notions of conversion, the theoretical construction seems hopelessly naive today. Together with Hall, Starbuck regarded conversion as an adolescent phenomenon, and had the data to show it. His findings are still quoted today, and are beyond dispute, but his psychology and his definition of religion as an "instinct" no longer find serious adherents.

Starbuck's attitude toward religion was clearly positive, and he saw the importance of the psychology of religion as contributing to religious education. According to James, Starbuck's aim in starting his research in the psychology of religion was to bring about reconciliation in the feud between science and religion. According to Starbuck's autobiographical account, his interest

in religion was very much an attempt to answer, via systematic study, both doubts and curiosities about religion. If we attempt an evaluation of Starbuck's work from the perspective of several generations, we might conclude that it will be remembered more by historians of the field than by practitioners. His work may belong with the classics of the field, but it must be numbered with the unread classics, even among scholars.

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BENJAMIN BEIT-HALLAHMI

STAR OF DAVID. See Magen David.

STARS. In all times and places, the starry night sky has both challenged and satisfied the human need to order, categorize, and standardize the unknown. In their efforts to make the night sky a familiar place, our ancestors imposed on groups of stars the outlines of mythical and historical figures, thus linking the celestial and terrestrial realms. The two terms used for these star groups are *constellation* and *zodiac*. Constellations are groups of stars held together by the human mind and eye. While certain of them may be related mythologically, such as the Pleiades and Orion, they are essentially autonomous and not limited in number. The zodiac is an integrated system of twelve constellations, referred to by astrological signs, that forms a backdrop to the movements of the sun, moon, and planets. [See Astrology.] Each zodiacal sign is also associated with a part of the human body and thereby serves to link the celestial and terrestrial planes. Aries, the first sign, represents the head; Pisces, the feet; the ten remaining signs between them represent other parts of the body in descending order. While scholars credit Babylonia with devising the zodiac (c. 700–420 BCE), the Babylonians themselves in their creation epic, the *Enuma elish*, credit the god Marduk with that invention.

The ancient Egyptians also developed an integrated system of star organization. Here, the thirty-six decans, or star groups, each ten degrees in width and each

named for a deity, served two purposes. The heliacal rising (first appearance in the dawn sky) of the leading star of each decan was noted, then used to mark out the twelve-month Egyptian calendar. At night, the decans functioned as a star clock, enabling priests to know the correct time for the performance of religious observances. In this way the temporal rhythms of the earth were linked to those of the sky.

In Indian tradition the Nakṣatras, or lunar mansions, comprise another integrated system of stars. The passage of the moon through the sky was charted as the journey of the god Soma through his "resting places." Each star is thought to be inhabited by one of the twenty-eight wives with whom Soma spends one night each month.

The Sky in Myth. In religions around the world, the sky symbolizes transcendence and sacrality, stretching and satisfying the human imagination. [See Sky.] Whether it is understood as the home of the gods, the resting place of heroes, or the land of the dead, the sky is often envisioned as the transcendental model for human existence. The powers of the stars watch and guide us in life and welcome us in death. As the land of the ancestral dead, the stars represent the place of our future existence and reward. In them we will endure forever, see and know all, thus becoming godlike ourselves.

On the terrestrial plane, everything exists in a state of constant change. Nature is unpredictable—sometimes benign and sometimes malevolent. The sky alone remains constant, predictable, beyond change. Since the distant sky gods are usually the lawgivers of a culture, establishing order in human society, the celestial-terrestrial relationship is a reciprocal one: we order the uncharted night sky by imposing images on it, while the heavens, in return, impose lawful order on human society.

Catasterisms, tales in which either humans or animals achieve immortality by becoming stars, express the notion of the stars as the home of heroes. Catasterisms present a permanent image of the reward for heroic feats while providing an etiological explanation for the existence of individual stars and constellations. These tales exist in such diverse cultures as Australia, where a man becomes a star to avoid the wrath of the irate husband chasing him, and Greenland, where a group of lost seal hunters become stars. The Greeks and the Romans were the most prolific creators of catasterisms.

These stories relate that after death the soul becomes a star, a notion that originated with the Pythagoreans. The belief that only heroes become stars leads to the use of star groups such as Herakles and the Pleiades as

models for heroic effort and reward. Star groups such as Andromeda and Orion, by contrast, serve as demonstrations of the lasting punishment given for the sin of hubris. The star Antinoüs was named in 132 CE in honor of Hadrian's young lover who drowned himself in the belief that he could thereby add the years allotted to him to Hadrian's life.

The Milky Way, which is frequently called the River of Heaven or the Celestial Road, is connected with the notion of the stars as the land of the dead. In Norse mythology it is the road of the ghosts going to Valhøll; in Celtic lore it is created by Gwydion so that he can use it to seek his son's soul in the heavens; in Islam it is said that Muḥammad walked on it to reach God; in Akkad it was called the River of the Divine Lady and was traveled by ghosts; in eastern Washington state the Sanpoil Indians place the land of the dead at the end of it; the Pawnee say it is the path followed by the spirits of the dead, and the Lakota add that travel to the Spirit Land is interrupted just before arrival by an old woman who checks for wrist tattoos; those without tattoos are sent back to earth as ghosts.

Temples and the Stars. The most concrete way to establish the importance of the stars in the ancient world is to study the alignment of temples with particular stars. As sacred structures, temples—especially those dedicated to sky gods—are designed according to a celestial pattern. In 1894 J. Norman Lockyer published his research on Egyptian temples, under the title *The Dawn of Astronomy*. With the advent of modern technology, much of Lockyer's dating has been called into question, but his general theory of celestial alignment is still operative. In England, the Americas, and the ancient Near East there is evidence of such alignment. Ancient temples were most commonly constructed in relation to the sun's position at the solstice or equinox, but there are significant instances of design with relation to individual stars.

Astral alignments are established by astroarchaeologists, who calculate the age of a site from its remains and then use computers to recreate the star patterns visible at the time the site was built. England's Stonehenge (construction started c. 2800 BCE) is a good model. There, the large standing stones were arranged against the horizon to function as foresights; smaller stones served as backsights. In order to mark the passage of the sun, the astronomer-priest would fix a spot on which to stand to observe the sunset against the foresight stones. As the sun changed its course during the year, it would set to the right or left of these stones, its extremes marking the solstice and equinox points. Stonehenge was used as an elaborate observatory for marking

the important celestial events of the year. The movements of the sun, moon, planets, and important star systems such as the Pleiades and especially the heliacal risings of the stars and planets were all noted there.

The same principle was employed in Mesoamerica, most dramatically at Tenochtitlán, the political and religious capital of the Aztec, where the course of a river was altered in order to create the desired alignments for observing the rising sun at the equinox and solstice and the heliacal rising of the Pleiades. Other Mesoamerican sites were also constructed with relation to the Pleiades, as well as to the stars Capella and Sirius and the planet Venus.

Gerald Hawkins (in *Stonehenge Decoded*, Garden City, N.Y., 1965), using modern techniques, has checked Lockyer's thesis at several sites in Egypt. While disagreeing with some of Lockyer's findings, he does establish that Egyptian temples are aligned with certain stars. Edwin C. Krupp (1978) has made a connection between the alignments of the pyramids and the cult of Isis and Osiris, represented respectively by the stars Sirius and Orion. First, he notes that all stars are invisible for approximately seventy days when their light is lost in the brighter light of the sun; he finds it significant that the ancient Egyptians called this time "being in Duat" (i.e., the underworld). Krupp sees a relation between this time span and the period allotted for embalming: seventy days were required to prepare a body for burial. Because the stars are often thought of as the land of the dead, Krupp suggests further that the shafts in the pyramids aligning with Sirius and Orion were constructed so as to allow the souls of the pharaohs to rise up to these stars, the souls' final resting place.

In North America there are few sites of astronomical interest, but where they exist the myths and legends of the people also show astronomical characteristics. The *kivas* of the Anasazi, ancestors of the modern Pueblo, show some evidence of astral alignment, and modern Pueblo rituals preserve astral timings. Among the Plains Indians, medicine wheels constructed of large and small stones arranged in the shape of a wheel with spokes establishing alignments, mark the solstices. In Saskatchewan, Canada, the Moose Mountain Medicine Wheel is also aligned to the heliacal rising of the bright summer stars Aldebaran, Rigel, and Sirius.

The Polestar. Sometimes diverse cultures use similar images to describe the same star. The polestar, or North Star (the position held today by the star Polaris in Ursa Minor), because of its relative lack of motion as compared to other stars, is important for both land and sea navigation. In many cultures it is seen as the center of the universe.

Norse people believed that the gods ordered the universe by driving a spike through the earth and causing the heavens to revolve around this axis. The end of this spike was fastened to the polestar. For the Mongols, the polestar was the golden peg or nail that holds the turning heavens together. In India it is called the "pivot of the planets" and is represented by the god Dhruva, who was so immovable in his meditation that he became the polestar shining about Mount Meru, the center of the world. Because Dhruva began his meditation in a search for constancy after having been disappointed by the unsteadiness of his father's love, the star is worshiped in India as a source of constancy both in meditation and in marriage. The Mandaeans, along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, worshiped the polestar as the central star around which all other heavenly bodies move; their sanctuaries were built so that persons entering them faced the polestar. Worshipers prayed facing it, and the dying were positioned so their feet and eyes were aligned with it.

The constancy of the polestar also led to its popularity among sailors, as the epithets Steering Star, Lodestar, and Ship Star show. (Strabo, the Greek historian and geographer of the first century BCE, attributed its use among Greek sailors to Thales, the astronomer and philosopher of the sixth century BCE.) The constant position of the polestar made it useful to land travelers as well. In Mesoamerica it was thought both to protect and to guide traveling merchants, who burned copal incense in its honor. The Arabs used the polestar to navigate across the desert and believed further that fixed contemplation of it would cure itching of the eyelids. For the Chinese, the polestar was secretary to the Emperor of Heaven and as lord of the dead punished the dead according to their deeds.

The Pleiades. Even in societies where little attention was paid to the stars, the movements of the Pleiades were noted. For instance, the Bantu-speaking peoples of southern Africa regulated their agricultural calendar by them, and in Bali the Pleiades and Orion were used to keep the lunar calendar. In Australia, where the first annual appearance of the Pleiades coincides with the beginning of the rainy season, the Aborigines consider these stars the source of rain and curse them if rain does not follow their appearance. In general, the last visible rising of the Pleiades after sunset is celebrated all over the southern hemisphere as beginning the season of agricultural activity.

Where myths have developed about the Pleiades, these stars are generally associated with women. In the Greco-Roman world, these stars were called the "seven daughters of Atlas," and in China they were worshiped by women and girls as the Seven Sisters of Industry. In

Australia, they are seen as young girls playing instruments for a group of dancing young men, the stars of the Orion group. In the Solomon Islands they are called a "company of maidens," and among the Yurok of North America they are thought of as six women. In India they had a rich and varied identity as the nurses of Skanda, the infant god of war, and as the seven wives of the seven sages of Ursa Major. Myths in which they are depicted as wives describe the reasons for their being changed into stars as either punishment for infidelity or as a reward for fidelity. In one positive reading, the star Arundhatī is considered the ideal Indian wife because her virtue was great enough to resist the god Śiva's attempt at seduction. Like the polestar, she is worshiped by married couples as a symbol of constancy.

The Pleiades also played a central role in the religious life of the Aztec. The fifty-two year cycle of their calendar was measured by the Pleiades. Indeed, legend recalls that the destruction of the world in a past age occurred at such a moment. The ceremony at the end of the cycle, the "Binding of the Years," established that the movements of the heavens had not ceased and that the world would not end but was guaranteed to last for another fifty-two years. Not only was one of the alignments of the Aztec city of Tenochtitlán to the Pleiades, but a further clue to the importance of these stars is the fact that at the time of the city's erection (c. 150 CE), the heliacal rising of the Pleiades occurred on the same day as the first of the sun's annual passages across the zenith, a day of great importance in demarcating the seasons, and the day when the sun in Mexico casts no shadow at high noon. Additionally, this was the beginning of the rainy season so important to agriculture.

The Inca called the Pleiades the "stars of summer" and believed that their appearance on the first sighting predicted the success of the crops. If the stars were large and bright when they first appeared, the crops would be successful; if they were small and dim, the crops would fail. This connection to the agricultural season in part explains the emphasis placed on the Pleiades. In Greece the Pleiades presage temperate weather: the name of one of the stars of this group, Alcyone, is connected, by derivation, with the term "halcyon days," a clement and temperate time. In ancient Greece the season safe for navigation began in May with the heliacal rising of the Pleiades and closed with their setting in late autumn. In the Hervey Islands of the South Pacific they are the favorite guides for night sailing and are worshiped by sailors.

In North America the Blackfeet use the Pleiades to regulate their most important feast, which includes the blessing and planting of the seed. The Navaho believe

the Pleiades appear on the forehead of their principal deity, Black God.

Sirius. Regarded as one of the most important stars in ancient Egypt, Sirius played a role there similar to that of the Pleiades among the Aztec. Sirius's heliacal rising at the summer solstice coincided with the annual inundation of the Nile, thus beginning the Egyptian year. Seen as the goddess Sothis by the Egyptians, Sirius was also connected with the goddesses Hathor, Sekhet, and Isis and was generally considered to be the resting place of Isis's soul. Also called the "Nile star," Sirius had a dog for its hieroglyph and to this day is widely known as the "dog star." In ancient Rome, when the sun approached conjunction with Sirius at a festival for the protection of grain, farmers sacrificed a fawn-colored dog to the god Robigus. The Dogon of Africa also connect Sirius with a grain called *po*, and *Po* is their name for Sirius's smaller, darker companion star. That companion was first seen by Western astronomers in 1962, yet the Dogon discussed the star with Western anthropologists as early as 1940. Claiming to have known of the companion star for eight centuries, the Dogon correctly estimated that its orbit around Sirius took fifty years.

A Finnish tale explains the brightness of Sirius by the story of the lovers Zulamith the Bold and Salami the Fair: when they finally completed a bridge to each other (the Milky Way) after a thousand years of separation, they rushed into each other's arms and melted into one.

Comets, Meteors, and Shooting and Falling Stars. Noticeably short-lived celestial phenomena such as comets and meteors (shooting and falling stars) share in the sacred nature of the sky and add to the meaning of the "permanent" stars. The abruptness of their passage often made them seem to be omens full of meaning for good or ill. The American writer Mark Twain said of himself that he was born when Halley's comet approached the earth, and he correctly predicted his death upon its return. A comet recorded in 431 BCE gave support to the notion that Julius Caesar had become a comet upon his death a year earlier. Shakespeare made dramatic use of this idea when he wrote "When beggars die, then are no comets seen; / the heavens themselves blaze for the death of princes" (*Julius Caesar* 2.2).

In ancient Greece and Rome, comets were generally thought to portend unfortunate events. The astronomer Ptolemy (second century CE) said that the meanings of comets could be discerned by their individual shapes; their color revealed what they would bring (generally wind and drought), and their position in the zodiac indicated the country that would be affected. Pliny, the Roman writer of the first century CE, also believed that

comets signaled disaster and specified, for example, that a comet in Scorpio portended a plague of reptiles and insects, especially locusts. Seneca the Younger, writing in the first century CE, following Aristotle, said that comets were portents of bad weather during the ensuing year.

Such ideas persisted after the rise of Christianity. In the third century CE, the church father Origen held that comets appear on the eve of dynastic changes, great wars, and other catastrophes but also may be signs of future good: he seems to have taken the star of Bethlehem, which announced Christ's birth, to be a comet. The German philosopher Albertus Magnus (d. 1280) wrote that comets signified wars and the death of kings and potentates. According to Ptolemy of Lucca (d. 1377), a comet portended the death of Pope Urban IV in 1264. The pope had sickened as soon as the comet appeared and had died three months later, on the very day it disappeared. Elizabeth I of England gained great prestige by manifesting her indifference to the comet of 1557. When her courtiers tried to deter her from looking at the dreaded object she advanced boldly to the window, declaring, "the die is thrown." Seventeenth-century Christian preachers declared that comets were sent by God to draw human beings to repentance, and as late as 1843 the Millerites thought a comet confirmed their belief in the immediate destruction of the world.

Among the Aztec similar notions prevailed. They called comets "stars that smoke" and thought they usually signified the impending death of members of nobility; the death of the ruler of Tenochtitlán followed the appearance of a comet, and another was said to have predicted the fall of Moctezuma II. The Plains Indians also connected appearances of comets with disaster and misfortune.

In the Society Islands, comets (along with meteors) were believed to be the tails of gods, and when they were seen, the people threw off their upper garments (the mark of respect shown to gods and sacred head chiefs) and exclaimed, "A god! A god!" But in Samoa comets were believed to predict the death of a chief, or some other calamity such as war or bloodshed. The Indian astronomer and astrologer Varāhamihira (sixth century CE), while generally concurring with such theories, developed an elaborate system of analysis to predict the three types of events comets can bring: auspicious, inauspicious, and having mixed effects.

Shooting and falling stars, meteors, and meteorites have in common the sacred quality of having come from the heavens, whether for good or ill. Like comets they are preeminently seen as signs and portents. Ptolemy says they indicate the coming of winds and storms, while Seneca links them to violent political

events. By contrast, some believed them to be connected with healing. Pliny preserved the notion that a corn may be successfully extracted at the time of a shooting star; the physician Marcellus (fourth century CE) says the same of warts, adding that if you start counting while a star is falling, the number will equal the number of years you will be free of sore eyes. In India falling stars are thought of not only as reincarnating souls traveling back to earth, but also as demons who love the night and who are connected in a negative way with the souls of the dead. Such beings are especially dangerous to pregnant women.

Among the most famous meteorites in religious history is the Ka'bah of Mecca, which tradition says was brought to earth by the archangel Gabriel. Also important is the meteorite of the goddess Cybele of the Phrygians. It arrived in Rome in 204 BCE, when Rome was being threatened by Hannibal. The Sibylline Books, which had been consulted after a meteorite shower, foretold that a foreign army could be driven from Italy if Cybele's symbol, a meteorite, was brought to Rome. It was, and Hannibal was defeated. The Romans expressed their gratitude to the goddess by erecting a temple to her on the summit of the Palatine and held an annual celebration to commemorate her arrival.

The alignments of temples, the long history of astrological beliefs, and the abundance of myths and folktales about the stars provide ample evidence for the existence in many cultures of the notion "as above, so below." This view of the universe, in which the terrestrial and celestial realms are recognized as interrelated, has been a source of great richness to the cultural and religious experience of the human race.

[See also Ethnoastronomy.]

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SERINITY YOUNG

STCHERBATSKY, THEODORE (1866-1942), Russian Buddhologist and Indologist. Fedor Ippolitovich Shcherbatskii, who signed his non-Russian writings "Th. Stcherbatsky," was born in Kielce, Poland, and died in Borovoi, Kazakhstan. He studied philology and Indology in Saint Petersburg under I. P. Minaev, Sanskrit poetics in Vienna with Georg Bühler, Indian philosophy in Berlin with Hermann Jacobi, and Sanskrit and Tibetan logic with pandits in India and lamas in Mongolia. From 1900 to 1941, Stcherbatsky taught at Saint Petersburg (later Leningrad) State University. His students included O. O. Rozenberg, E. E. Obermiller, and A. I. Vostrikov. The Russian (later U.S.S.R.) Academy of Sciences named Stcherbatsky corresponding member (1910), academician (1918), director of the Institute of Buddhist Culture (1928-1930), and head of the Indo-Tibetan section of the Institute of Oriental Studies (1930-1942). He helped S. F. Ol'denberg produce the academy's "Bibliotheca Buddhica" series of texts, translations, and monographs (1897-), which included several of Stcherbatsky's own works.

Although Stcherbatsky wrote widely on Indology and philology, his works on Buddhist philosophy were most influential. Stcherbatsky relied on Sanskrit and Tibetan, not Pali, sources and preferred *śāstras* (scholastic treatises) to *sūtras* (canonical texts), considering them to be, respectively, technical and popular works, differing in style, not doctrine. Skeptical of the search for "original Buddhism," he investigated pluralist, monist, and idealist phases of Buddhism. Early Buddhist "pluralism" replaces substances (soul, God, matter) with innumerable, interdependent, momentary *dharma*s, which attain cessation in *nirvāṇa*. Stcherbatsky saw in later *abhidharma* literature, especially Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, the epitome of early Buddhist philos-

ophy. (Stcherbatsky's works emphasized traditional Buddhist scholarship and Tibetan sources but neglected modern historical criticism.) He began publishing the *Abhidharmakośa* and its commentaries in the "Bibliotheca Buddhica," summarized it in *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (1923), and translated its final section as "The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" (*Izvestiia Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk*, ser. 6, vol. 13, 1920, nos. 15, pp. 823–854, and 18, pp. 937–958).

According to Stcherbatsky, *Mādhyamika* "monism" sees interdependent, momentary *dharmas* as unreal or empty. Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and interdependence (*pratītya-samutpāda*) are identified as "relativity." *Nirvāṇa* is the realization of this one reality underlying an unreal plurality. Stcherbatsky's main work on *Mādhyamika*, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (1927), was a rejoinder to *Nirvāṇa* (1925) by Louis de La Vallée Poussin (see Guy R. Welbon's *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters*, 1968). Stcherbatsky later reinterpreted *Mādhyamika* as "relativism," reserving "monism" for the *Yogācāra* (see the preface to *Madhyānta-Vibhāṅga: Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes*, 1936).

Yogācāra "idealism" rejects pluralism and relativism. Subject and object, separately unreal, are really inseparable. Everything exists relatively, yet relativity really exists as the true nature of consciousness. This "idealism" led to the epistemology of *Dignāga* and *Dharmakīrti* (Stcherbatsky's "Buddhist logic"), which admits only two modes of valid cognition: non-conceptual "perception," and conceptual "inference." Stcherbatsky is best known for his work on this school: his earlier *Theory of Knowledge and Logic according to the Doctrine of the Later Buddhists*, and his *magnum opus*, *Buddhist Logic* (2 vols., 1930–1932). Stcherbatsky, admiring both philosophers, called *Dharmakīrti* "the Indian Kant." This comparison, and the Kantian language of *Buddhist Logic*, should be taken cautiously.

Stcherbatsky lacked sympathy for Buddhism as religion but admired Indian philosophy as rigorous philosophy. Refuting the common misconception of Indian thought as vague mysticism, his works challenge Western philosophers to acknowledge their Buddhist and Indian colleagues.

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BRUCE CAMERON HALL

STEINER, RUDOLF (1861–1925), author of more than 350 volumes on philosophy, science, and the arts and originator of an esoteric spiritual teaching called Anthroposophy (by which he meant both "knowledge of man" and "human wisdom"). Steiner was born in Kraljevo on the Murr Island of Hungary (present-day Yugoslavia); he was educated in Austria and lived in Germany during his middle years. His last years were spent in Dornach, Switzerland, where he designed and constructed the Goetheanum, the world center of the Anthroposophical Society.

From an early age, Steiner reportedly had access to spiritual realities, including an experience of a disincarnate form of a recently deceased relative; the inner, or "etheric," forces of the plant world; and the living power of geometric forms. At age twenty-two, Steiner was invited to edit the natural scientific writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, which were published in five volumes under the title *Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften* (1883–1897). Steiner's book *Die Philosophie der Freiheit* (1896), translated as *Philosophy of Freedom*, (1916; rev. ed. 1964) and also as *The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity* (1922), is an extension of his doctoral dissertation, *Die Grundfrage der Erkenntnistheorie* (The Fundamentals of a Theory of Cognition; 1891); it prepares the way for the theory of cognition that characterizes all of his later thought. His writings take on a discernibly more esoteric character after 1899, when he found himself "standing in the spiritual presence of the Mystery of Golgotha in a profound and solemn festival of knowledge" (*Rudolf Steiner: An Autobiography*, 1978, p. 319). In 1904 Steiner published *Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten?* (translated as *Knowledge of Higher Worlds and Its Attainment*, 1947) and *Theosophie*, which along with *Die Geheimwissenschaft im Umriss* (1909, translated as *Occult Science: An Outline*, 1969) form the basis of his entire spiritual and esoteric

teaching. Collectively, these three works present Steiner's fourfold theory of human nature (physical, etheric, astral, and Ego), his account of the evolution of consciousness (from spiritual to physical), and his description of the workings of *karman* and rebirth—concepts that are central to traditional Asian religious thinking and that Steiner sought to restore to Western, and particularly Christian, thinking.

In response to requests of his followers for guidance, Steiner delivered more than six thousand lectures on widely disparate topics in the sciences, the social sciences, the arts, education, and religions. In the tradition of Goethe (but claiming a supersensible power not found in Goethe), Steiner showed how to penetrate the natural world by imaginative seeing. He generated myriad insights on the inner dynamics of metals and crystals and of plants and soil and on the etheric forces working in the human body. He described in detail both the spiritual and physical effects of planetary bodies on the earth and on human life.

Turning to the arts, Steiner bequeathed a host of insights concerning color theory, painting, sculpture, and architecture. Many of his contributions in these areas are exemplified in the two Goetheanum buildings in Dornach that he designed. The first Goetheanum, which began construction in 1913, was nearly finished when it was destroyed by fire in 1922; the second Goetheanum still serves as the spiritual center for the General Anthroposophical Society. During the years 1910–1914, Steiner taught several courses on speech formation, based on his esoteric knowledge of the human larynx, and wrote and directed four dramas in which he attempted to use these innovations in speech to express the inner realities of human and spiritual beings. In 1912 Steiner began teaching a series of lessons for an entirely new discipline of his own invention, called eurythmy: using his knowledge of language and sound, he showed how the human body, particularly the limbs, can express in visible form the varied meanings of consonants, vowels, and musical notes.

In the social sciences, Steiner offered a novel theory in which he posits three principal divisions of society: the economic, the political, and the spiritual-cultural. He argued that these three realms should be regarded as separate but related and of equal importance. This threefold social theory also has profound implications for Steiner's approach to education, which he placed in the spiritual-cultural sphere, removed from economic and political (including governmental) influence. Steiner's attempt to develop an approach to education that would be modern, spiritual, and centered on the needs of the child dates to his lecture series of 1907, *Die Erziehung des Kindes vom Geschichts punkte der Geisteswis-*

senschaft (The Education of the Child in the Light of Anthroposophy), and finds full expression in the founding in 1919 of the first Steiner school in Stuttgart, thereby launching what is now the largest nonsectarian, independent school movement in the world. Waldorf Schools (so named after the school in Stuttgart, which was founded for the children of workers in the Waldorf-Astoria tobacco factory) employ a curriculum based on what Steiner saw as the seven-year cycles through which a child develops, and on the cultivation of the child's scientific and artistic imagination.

Steiner delivered more than a dozen lecture series on the spiritual and esoteric revelations that he gleaned from the events depicted in the Christian scriptures. In 1922, in response to an appeal for help from German and Swiss pastors and theology students, Steiner provided the spiritual foundation for a church called the Christian Community, or the Movement for Religious Renewal. He helped to lay the structure of this Christian church, which may be said to combine the Protestant emphasis on the individual conscience and the Roman Catholic emphasis on tradition and liturgy. Steiner himself composed the specific form of its liturgy, called "The Act of Consecration of Man," but he emphasized that the primary spiritual path for modern humanity ought to be Spiritual Science, or Anthroposophy. To this end, during Christmas week of 1923, Steiner reorganized the Anthroposophical Society to found the General Anthroposophical Society, with the Goetheanum as its spiritual and physical center. Steiner died at the Goetheanum on 30 March 1925.

[See also Anthroposophy.]

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ROBERT A. McDERMOTT

STHIRAMATI (c. 510–570), one of the ten leading Yogācāra scholars who developed the ideas originally formulated by Vasubandhu. Sthiramati was born in

Valabhī in Kāthiāwār, and became a disciple of Guṇamati, who had settled in Valabhī after some years of scholarly activity in Nālandā, where Buddhist studies were in full bloom. At the time of Sthiramati, Valabhī had attained a prosperity comparable to that of Nālandā, and it is known from inscriptions that King Guhasena of Valabhī, (r. 558–566) had a monastery erected for him there. Sthiramati was a contemporary of Dharmapāla (c. 530–561), a renowned scholar in Nālandā whose interpretation of the Yogācāra doctrine was introduced into China by Hsüan-tsang (602–664), who himself studied in Nālandā under Śīlabhadra, a disciple of Dharmapāla. On many doctrinal points, Sthiramati differed from Dharmapāla. In the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* of Hsüan-tsang, a compendium of ten commentaries to Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* chiefly based on Dharmapāla's interpretations, the views held by Sthiramati are often referred to.

Sthiramati set forth his ideas solely in commentaries on Vasubandhu's works, and did not compose any independent treatise. His *Triṃśikābhāṣya* is a lucid commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātrāsidhīh*, a systematic exposition of the Yogācāra philosophy. The *Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā* and the *Sūtrālamkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya* are Sthiramati's subcommentaries on Vasubandhu's commentaries on the works ascribed to Maitreya. In addition, he wrote commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa* and also on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*. A commentary on the *Kāśyapaparivarta* in the Ratnakūṭa collection of *sūtras* is ascribed by Tibetans to Sthiramati, but this ascription is doubtful.

Sthiramati maintained that a consciousness (*vijñāna*) is free from the forms (*ākāra*) of object and subject; on this point he differed from other post-Vasubandhu Yogācāra scholars. According to Yogācāra doctrine, objects of cognition are nothing other than the representations appearing in our consciousness. These representations are produced from the impressions left by past experiences, which are preserved in the subliminal consciousness, the *ālaya-vijñāna*; apart from consciousness there is no real object in the external world. Thus, it is admitted by the Yogācāras that a consciousness is endowed with the form of an object and that of a subject correlative to it. The former is called the "image-portion" (**nimitta-bhāga*) or the "form of the apprehended" (*grāhya-ākāra*), and the latter, the "sight-portion" (**darśana-bhāga*) or the "form of the apprehender" (*grāhaka-ākāra*). According to the information furnished by K'uei-chi, while Nanda and some other scholars held the view that these two forms are of dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), Sthiramati maintained that they are of imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) and

therefore are unreal. The latter's understanding was that consciousness itself, which is devoid of duality, is recognized as being of dependent nature and empirically real. This idea is close to that expressed in the Yogācāra works ascribed to Maitreya. Hsüan-tsang makes reference to Dignāga's view that the consciousness has, besides the aforementioned two portions, the "portion of self-awareness" (*svasamvedana*) and Dharmapāla's supplementary remark that the self-awareness is verified by a fourth portion, the awareness of self-awareness (**svasamvit-samvedana*). Their theories are based on the idea that a consciousness is endowed with the forms of apprehender and apprehended, and in this respect they are known to differ from Sthiramati.

[See also *Yogācāra and the biography of Vasubandhu*.]

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HATTORI MASAOKI

STIGMATA. See Bodily Marks.

STONES. Sacred stones have been known from the earliest times, and they occur all over the world in different cultures and religions. Often they are used as objects of sacrifice, elements in various magical rites, or instruments of divination. They may also serve practical purposes as witness or boundary stones, or as memorials; in such cases they may also evoke religious veneration. The unseen powers that are represented by such monuments are of as many different kinds as the reasons why people turn to them.

The general term *stone* includes many different objects, some of them characterized by names of Celtic origin: menhirs (tall, upright monumental stones); cromlechs (circles of standing stones); dolmens (table stones or large, flat, unhewn stones resting horizontally on upright ones); and cairns (heaps of stones). These four types as well as other monuments shaped like pillars or columns are all raised up or built by man (see Eliade, 1978, secs. 34ff.). But natural rocks that, in whole or in part, have peculiar or startling shapes or otherwise contrast with a flat or desolate landscape may also be venerated as sacred. Smaller, movable stones can serve as cult objects at home or can be carried as magical protection. [See Amulets and Talismans.]

The symbolic meaning of sacred stones is not fixed. They may represent qualities such as firmness or barrenness but they also may represent fertility. Interpretation is made difficult by the fact that many sacred stones come to us from religions and cultures for which there is little or no literary evidence. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that historians of religion have applied many different theories to such ancient religions, speaking of ancestor cults, nature worship, fetishism, noniconic (nonfigurative) cults, animism, and dynamism. If written sources are lacking (as in the case of prehistoric times) or few (as generally occurs with ancient historic cultures), the field is open for sheer speculation. [See Megalithic Religion, *articles on Historical Cultures and Prehistoric Evidence.*] Oral traditions recorded from illiterate peoples who are still living—or who lived into comparatively recent times—contain much detailed and valuable information that may throw light on older times. Treating primitive material in this way means, however, that we adopt the much-criticized survival theory, although this theory seems to be more applicable in the case of sacred stones than in other cases. Altogether, the immensity and variety of the material illustrates well the difficulties of a phenomenological method (see Eliade, 1958, secs. 74ff.; Heiler, 1961, pp. 34ff.). In the following discussion, I shall restrict myself to observations on sacred stones from various cultures for which there is at least some literary evidence to guide the interpretation.

Ancient Western Traditions. Stones or stone pillars (Heb., *matsisevah*, from the Semitic *ntsb*, “to stand”) figure prominently in the biblical story of the patriarch Jacob. When his wife Rachel died, Jacob erected a funerary stela on her grave (*Gn.* 35:20), probably as a memorial to keep her name alive. Such a pillar could also commemorate an important event, such as the pact between Jacob and the Aramaeans (*Gn.* 31:43ff.). However, the cultic use of stones was most common. During Jacob’s flight from the wrath of Esau, God appeared to

him in a dream, and he was struck with awe. Jacob took the stone that had served him as a pillow, raised it as a pillar, anointed it with oil, and called it *beit-El* (Bethel), the “house of God” (*Gn.* 28:16ff., 35:14). In this case, the stone appears to have signified the presence of God.

Such cultic pillars could be connected with altars as in *Exodus* 24:4. [See Altar.] Such use was proscribed by the Deuteronomic Code (see, for example, *Dt.* 16:22) as a consequence of the polemics against the corresponding Canaanite cult that was condemned as the worship of pagan gods. Indeed, archaeologists have frequently overinterpreted large, upright stones from the early Palestinian excavations as cult pillars from ancient Canaan. More critical study has unveiled them as, for example, ruins of mortuary shrines or remnants of Iron Age house structures. Actual pillars were discovered at Beit She’an and the ancient city of Megiddo in Israel, and at Jubayl, the ancient Byblos, in Lebanon; their meaning, however, is still not quite clear. The earliest pillar of this kind was discovered in 1933 at ancient Mari, a site on the Middle Euphrates, now in Syria (Tell Hariri). It dates from the Old Akkadian period, circa 2300 BCE (Kennedy and Wevers, 1963).

Light may be thrown on the cult of sacred stones in the ancient Near East by the later, rich material from pre-Islamic Arabia collected by the authority on Arab paganism Ibn al-Kalbī (737–829?). Sacrificial stones are alluded to in the Qur’an (70:43), and they are explicitly forbidden by Muḥammad (5:490–492). Observations by ancient Greek authors confirm the existence of sacred stones among the Arabs from much earlier times (Buhl, 1936; see also Clement of Alexandria, *Proprepticus* 4, 46). The rites that take place around the Ka’bah in Mecca represent a legitimated survival of the ancient worship of *’anṣāb* (stones). As elsewhere, such worship originally existed together with the veneration of trees, wooden trunks, and posts, or has been interchangeable with such veneration (Höffner, in Gese et al., 1970, pp. 359ff.).

It is uncertain whether the ancient Greek *baituloi* (“animated stones,” i.e., meteorites) can be compared to the Aramaic-Hebrew *beit-El* (Fauth, 1964). But the Greek author Theophrastus (fourth century BCE) characterizes the superstitious man as one who dares not pass the already oily stones at the crossroads without prostrating himself and pouring oil on them (*Characters* 16). These quadrilateral pillars, sometimes ending in a head and surrounded by a heap of stones (Gr., *hermaios lophos*) were called “herms.” [See Phallus.] This name is identical to that of the god Hermes, which etymologically means “stone.” He is the stone as god or the god in stone. The various specialties of Hermes may derive from his role as god of the crossroads. [See Crossroads.]

As such, he is the guide of those traveling on the road and therefore a protector of commerce and illegal business. He is a messenger too, and as a guide he develops into a psychopomp who accompanies the souls of the dead to the underworld. In his connection with border stones, Hermes becomes a god of the land and thresholds and finally a patron of the entire community. The ithyphallic form of the erected stone (also observed in the Hindu *lingas*) represents both the fertility and apotropaic powers of the god, which in turn make him a patron of the shepherds (Herter, 1976).

There were other gods of the ancient Greek pantheon who could also be represented by either uncut or sculptured stones. To the latter belong the common sacred column, tapered to a point and called Apollo Aiguius ("of the road"), commonly found set up in the street in front of a house door. They were anointed with oil, decorated with ribbons, and identified as altars. In the old gymnasium of Megara, the capital of the province Megaris to the west of Attica, was a small pyramidal stone that bore the name of Apollo. But the best-known sacred stone of ancient Greece was the conical stone of Apollo, the *omphalos* ("navel"), at Delphi. The poet Pindar (522–438 BCE) explains its sanctity with the belief that the sanctuary of Delphi is situated at the exact center of the earth. This interpretation might be secondary, however; the discussion of this Greek material reminds us of the difficulties of distinguishing earlier from later phases in historical development (cf. Hartland et al., 1920, p. 870, and Eliade, 1958, secs. 81f.).

Madagascar. On Madagascar there exists a richly developed stone cult. The traditions explaining why these monuments were raised and the rites and practices associated with them have continued to exist right down to our own times. They present a great richness of variations, a fact that constitutes a warning against simplified reconstructions when, in other places, only archaeological memorials survive.

According to the report of a Norwegian missionary, the most common practice involving these stones takes place in the context of an ancestor cult. A man who is prominent and rich calls together his extended family before he dies and decrees as follows: "My body shall certainly die and be buried, but my spirit shall always remain with you, my children. When you are eating, set out a little food in that place where I usually eat. And what I wish for you to offer up as a sacrifice to me is the following: [At this point, he names whatever he is fondest of, such as rice, meat, liquor, eel, different kinds of fish, or honey.] And should anyone fall sick or lack for anything or suffer bad luck, then call upon us, and we shall help you. We shall protect you, sending riches, good harvests and many children." The old man lists

the taboos to be observed and states where the stone or altar shall be raised and its size, which corresponds to his own importance. He himself will live in the memorial monument and accept the sacrifices. The choice of this stone, its difficult transport, and its establishment on a raised spot near the village are accompanied by many rites before the ceremonial dedication is accomplished (Ruud, 1947, pp. 117ff.). A French researcher, Charles Renel, has carefully recorded the occurrence, within the separate geographical tribal territories, of stones associated with bequests, graves, memorials, and sacrifice and the different, indigenous names that correspond to their changing appearance and varying functions. As gravestones, they are usually raised to the east on the location of the corpse's head, which is also called the grave's head. The stones are smeared with fat, flour, and the blood of sacrificed animals, and at the foot of the stone sacrificial gifts are deposited.

The older stones are generally uncut; the sculptured stones belong to more recent times. Both are called, among other things, "stone-upright" or "stone-man." Wooden scaffolding, occasionally freestanding, may sometimes have been built over them, and on these the skulls of animal sacrifices are placed. The height of the stone can vary with the social level of the deceased and sometimes directly corresponds to his physical stature; thus, the stone also acquires the character of a more or less nonfigurative statue or memorial. In this case, it may also be set up independently of the burial site. When the deceased has died in a foreign country or for other reasons has not been able to be buried, the importance of the local stone as a memorial becomes even more marked. Nevertheless, it can still be used religiously; one goes to it to make a vow, to leave a sacrificial gift, or to carry out a bloody sacrifice.

In some parts of Madagascar, wooden poles are used in place of stones and are called "intermediaries" or "transference vessels" of the spirits of the dead. A heap of stones of varying size can also be substituted for the single stone, often at the request of the deceased himself. Sometimes, passersby throw a new stone on the heap with a prayer to the unknown spirit for a fortunate journey or for protection against unknown powers reigning over the road. But most often it is relatives or fellow tribesmen who carry out this ritual piling of stones in connection with a sacrificial vow. The worship at stone heaps that are associated with particular persons is believed to promote success in love or fertility. Thus, votive gifts can consist of wooden carvings representing the male or female sexual organs, depending on the sex of the supplicant.

Other holy stones have functioned as coronation stones, for example, Stone-Holy and Stone of the Red

Head in Antananarivo (formerly Tananarive). During his coronation, the king placed himself on each stone in turn to signify that his sovereignty extended over both halves of the kingdom. At the same time, the stones were associated with his ancestors, so that in touching them he assumed the strength and holiness of his forefathers. This hereditary ceremony was carried out as late as 1883 by Queen Ravanalona III, despite her conversion to Christianity.

However, not all Malagasy menhirs are connected with the dead, ancestors, or spirits. Some of them commemorate special events, certify a treaty, or mark a boundary. Such monuments are called "stones-planted." But these, too, have been dedicated with religious rituals; for example, a stone was raised in 1797 to the memory of a royal wedding that united two tribes. The king called on the Holiness of his ancestors, the Holiness of the twelve mountains, and the Holiness of heaven and earth. Then a deep pit was dug, into which the king threw a silver coin and red coral beads. After the stone had been raised, they killed a black ox with a white face and also an unruly bull. The king took their blood, smeared his forehead, neck, and tip of his tongue, and then poured the rest over the base of the stone. Meanwhile he spoke to the two tribes and commanded them to be one, just as he and his queen were one, to endure as long as the stone lasted.

Other menhirs can symbolize the royal power present and prevailing among the people. In other cases, cults center around natural cliffs of peculiar appearance that are connected with divination. For example, women come to pray for children at the "stone with Many Breasts." They smear the "breasts" of the cliff with fat, then touch their own, and throw a stone toward the protuberances of the cliff. Should it strike a large protuberance, it is said that the child will be a girl; if a small one, it will be a boy. Should the devotee come to the cliff with a health problem, a votive vow is made that is to be discharged after one has regained one's health. Hunters pray for success in the hunt to the spirit dwelling in another holy cliff said to protect wild game. Each hunter in turn whistles as he walks around the cliff; if they are all able to hold the note, it is a good omen for the presence of quarry. On their return, they sacrifice the finest wild ox as a thanks offering, burning its fat and its liver at the foot of the cliff. The meat is eaten on the spot by the hunters and their families (Renel, 1923, pp. 94–111).

The Saami. The holy places of the pre-Christian Saami (Lapps) in northern Scandinavia and on the Kola Peninsula have been thoroughly investigated. Five hundred seven of them are registered in Swedish Lapland (Manker, 1957), 229 in Norway, 80 to 90 in Fin-

land, and about 10 in Russia west of the White Sea. If we restrict ourselves to the material from Sweden, the cultic sites are of various kinds: 149 hills and mountains; 108 steep cliffs, caves, springs, waterfalls, rapids, and lakes; 30 islands, skerries, peninsulas, meadows, and heaths. But the largest number consists of venerated stones or cliffs, of which there are 220. In this group, 102 examples are understood to be naturally occurring, uncut images of a deity; in only 2 cases are there indisputable traces of human intervention. In general, the majority are massive stones. These cult objects are called *seites*, a term of disputed meaning and origin that occurs in different dialectal forms.

Literary sources from the sixteenth century on, combined with anthropological records from the nineteenth century, provide a rich commentary on the *seite* cult, which, in some cases, has been directed toward wooden trunks, stumps, or sculptures in addition to the stone *seite*. A detailed Swedish account from 1671 describes the ritual slaughter of a reindeer behind a tent. Afterward the *seite* is approached by the Saami, who takes off his cap, bows deeply, and smears the *seite* with blood and fat from the animal. The prime cervical vertebrae, the skull, and the hoofs are offered to the deity, as are the horns, which are piled up behind the stone. In one such "horn yard" thousands of horns may be seen. The meat of the animal is eaten by the participants in the sacrifice. Then the drum tells them what kind of game they will capture and assures them of good luck with their reindeer (Manker, 1957, p. 306; cf. Holmberg, 1964, p. 109).

The god of the *seite* can also appear in human shape to his worshiper. Another seventeenth-century account tells how such a god showed himself as a tall, well-built man dressed in black like a gentleman, with a gun in his hand. A similar vision is transmitted from eighteenth-century Norway: "Then a being in human form, like a great ruler, extremely good to look at, dressed in expensive garments and trinkets, appears and sits down to take part in their meal, speaks with them and teaches them new arts, and says that he lives in the stone or mountain to which they sacrifice" (Holmberg, 1964, p. 105).

Omens are taken in connection with the sacrifice, not only with the help of the drum. From the 1670s in Finland, we have a story of a movable little stone god called *Seite* or *Råå* ("owner"). Holding this god in his hand, the Saami utters his prayers with great veneration and lists his requirements. If he then cannot lift his hand it is a bad omen, but he repeats his wishes again and again until the stone in his hand becomes so light that his hand leaps upward. When the Saami has received what he wishes, he asks the god what kind of

thanks offering he wants, using the same method to get an answer (Manker, 1957, p. 314).

When compared with the stone worship of Madagascar, the Saami cult lacks a clear connection with ancestors, concerning itself instead with the "owners" of the land and the lord of animals. On the African island, the sacred stone monuments are generally erected or constructed by human hands; but in Lapland, the veneration of natural boulders, often left from the glacial epoch, predominates. The belief is common here as elsewhere that the pillars or rocks are inhabited by unseen powers, or, in Mircea Eliade's words: "The devotion of the primitive was in every case fastened on something beyond itself which the stone incorporated and expressed" (1958, sec. 74).

American Indians. Sacred rocks and stones together with their spirits are highly venerated by the Indians of both North and South America. One volcano in Ecuador has even received human sacrifices by the Puruhá. The Dakota have decorated and painted great boulders, praying to them and sacrificing dogs upon them. The Crow keep small, animal-shaped stones as powerful medicine. The Algonquin around Lake Mistassini in Canada dare not cross the waters before having sacrificed to the spirit who inhabits a massive, anomalous block. Southward, in the United States, higher, personalized gods are also believed to dwell in stones. The Kiowa in Texas possess a little stone god to whom they pray during the Sun Dance. The Tao in New Mexico venerate at the foot of a sacred mountain the "stone men" who represent two war gods. The Pueblo Indians believe that the hunter's good luck depends on his possession of stones of a curious shape.

The statuettes of the West Indian Taino consist of slightly sculptured stones that are venerated in caves. Among the South American Indians of the Andes, stone worship is very common, but stone gods are found also in the tropical region to the east. The mother goddess of the Jivaroan people in northern Peru and the supreme being of the Warao of the delta of the Orinoco are both represented by stones (Hultkrantz, 1979, pp. 60ff.).

This little catalog needs a supplementary description of the modes of worship, but it can nevertheless be compared (at least in part) with the corresponding examples from the Saami. The ecological environment of North America and Lapland is the same, both with regard to natural objects of veneration and with regard to the motives for worship, primarily to ensure good hunting and fishing.

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Translated from Swedish by David Mel Paul and Margareta Paul

STORM GODS. See Meteorological Beings.

STRAUSS, DAVID FRIEDRICH (1808–1874), German biblical critic, man of letters, and freethinker. Strauss is best known for his monumental book *The Life of Jesus* (1835). In some fifteen hundred pages, half of which are devoted to an analysis of the miracle and the death-resurrection stories in the New Testament, he argued that neither a supernaturalistic nor a rationalistic interpretation of them is credible. Rather, these narratives should be regarded as the results of a naive, primitive mentality whose natural form of expression is myth. Under the flush of religious enthusiasm, messianic fervor, and the personal influence of Jesus, the early Christians applied specifically messianic myths and legends to Jesus. In short, the “logic” of the New Testament narratives is this: “When the expected messiah comes, he will do all these miraculous things; Jesus is the messiah; therefore, Jesus must have done these things.” In a concluding section of the book, Strauss explored the implications of his historical-critical work for Christian theology. He argued that it is contradictory and untenable to attribute divine predicates to a single person, Jesus, but not to the entire species, humanity. It is humanity as a whole in which the infinite incarnates itself.

The book was an immediate sensation and provoked a century-long “quest for the historical Jesus” involving much controversy over the New Testament sources and the historical inferences legitimately to be drawn from them. It is often regarded as a watershed in the development of New Testament criticism, as well as the earliest significant statement of the importance of the eschatological element in the preaching of Jesus. Even though Strauss made concessions to his critics in two later editions of the book, he bitterly withdrew these in the final, fourth edition after being denied a professorship. For a brief period in the late 1830s, he identified himself with the Young Hegelians by contributing to Arnold Ruge’s journal *Hallische Jahrbücher*, but he soon became disillusioned with their political radicalism.

Even though theologically radical, Strauss was always politically conservative and unhappy with the revolutionary tendencies in German society that erupted in 1848. “A nature such as mine was happier under the old police state,” he once wrote. He briefly engaged in political affairs as a member of the Württemberg Landtag but resigned after a parliamentary dispute. He wrote several biographies of well-known historical figures, and in 1864 published a more popular *Life of Jesus for the German People*, which he expected would bring him acclaim but did not. He became increasingly more nationalistic and a supporter of German unification under Bismarck.

In his last book, *The Old Faith and the New* (1873),

Strauss set forward his own worldview, which he believed to be representative of his time. He argued that an educated person can no longer be Christian but can be religious in the sense of having a piety toward the cosmos. He proposed a humanistic ethic compounded with his own conservative social views. The book was attacked by Christians but even more savagely by the young Nietzsche, who thought it to be the epitome of German cultural philistinism.

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VAN A. HARVEY

STRUCTURALISM. In their widely read anthology of this topic, Richard T. De George and Fernande M. De George (1972) note that “bibliographies on structuralism can be virtually endless if one succumbs to the temptation to include everything related to the topic,” but they claim that the following authors “are almost certain to be included in any list of structuralists” (p. vii): Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Lacan. This may be so, but the term *structuralism* was not used before 1950, and each of the last three individuals named has repudiated the label. Moreover, the list

need not begin with Marx; my own favorite protostructuralist is Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). My problem, therefore, is to indicate the core of the structuralist position within a very wide range of variation. The De Georges' formula can serve as a starting point: "An enterprise which unites Marx, Freud, Saussure and modern structuralists [is] . . . the attempt to uncover deep structures, unconscious motivations, and underlying causes which account for human action at a more basic and profound level than do individual conscious decisions" (p. xii).

History of the Term

The word *structure* has a much longer academic history than does *structuralism*. The symposium papers edited by Roger Bastide (1972) explore the use of *structure* in linguistics, ethnology, art history, economics, politics, law, psychology, psychoanalysis, social psychology, sociology, and history throughout the present century. But that was not the beginning. The ambitious prospectus for Herbert Spencer's system of philosophy which dates from 1858 refers to "The Inductions of Sociology—General facts, structural and functional, as gathered from a survey of Societies and their changes" (Rumney, 1934, p. 300). What Spencer had in mind was that human societies are naturally existing whole units which can be directly observed out there in the real world. The sum of the individual members of such a society is not just an aggregate crowd but a self-sustaining totality, analogous to a biological organism, in which individuals are linked together in a network of person-to-person relationships. In the positivist tradition, Spencer assumed that there are discoverable general laws which apply to all such social organisms.

"**Structural Functionalism.**" Structuralism of the sort associated with the name of Lévi-Strauss, which is central for the present discussion, developed within the general field of sociocultural anthropology in dialectical opposition to the "structural functionalism" postulated by Spencer, which in the early 1950s had become especially associated with the name of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. At this period British social anthropologists used the expression *structural analysis* (and sometimes the term *structuralism* itself) to refer to the work of Radcliffe-Brown and his close associates rather than to that of Lévi-Strauss. Although this usage was dropped after 1960, the contrast is illuminating.

In Radcliffe-Brown's vocabulary *social structure* denoted a set of key, enduring relationships, perpetuated from generation to generation, which express the bonds of jural obligation that link together the individual members of a particular society. He maintained that these relationships are empirical phenomena which can

be directly observed in the mutual interactions of individual members of the system. Social structure, in this sense, was considered to typify the morphology of the society in question, much as the bony structure of a vertebrate animal provides the principal basis for fitting a particular species into the Linnaean taxonomy of all species. Indeed, Radcliffe-Brown believed that a taxonomy of all human societies could be constructed from a comparison of their social structures, societies with similar social structures being placed in the same taxonomic class.

Lévi-Strauss's Formulation. Claude Lévi-Strauss's radically different view of social structure was first formulated in 1945, but the nature of that difference was not immediately apparent. His 1953 conference paper entitled "Social Structure" was an attack on Radcliffe-Brown's position, but the printed discussion (Tax, 1953, pp. 108–118) suggests that none of the American and British anthropologists who heard it understood what was at issue. This is not surprising, since parts of the argument are notably obscure and oracular.

This has remained a characteristic, and perhaps essential, feature of Lévi-Strauss's numerous pronouncements about the nature of structuralism. There are many possible interpretations of his thesis, so that even his closest disciples are often at loggerheads with one another.

Perhaps the key point is that, whereas Radcliffe-Brown's social structure was "out there" in the world, supposedly accessible to direct observation, Lévi-Strauss's social structure was, as he put it, "a model in the human mind." The general idea was borrowed from Roman Jakobson's theory of distinctive features (Lévi-Strauss, 1945).

According to Jakobson, our human capacity to encode and decode sound patterns into meaningful speech forms depends on a capacity (which is innate in all human beings) to discriminate sounds as bundles of binary oppositions. For example, in English we discriminate the phoneme /p/ in *pin* from the phoneme /b/ in *bin* because, in the matrix of distinctive features representing these sounds, /p/ is unvoiced and /b/ is voiced, as shown in table 1.

Altogether there are about thirty such distinctive features, though any particular language makes use of only about half that number. The details need not concern us, though it is important to note that the speakers and auditors who encode and decode sound patterns in this way are quite unconscious of what they are doing or how they are doing it.

Lévi-Strauss initially adapted this theory to his anthropological purposes by claiming that many of the nonverbal elements of human culture—such as cosmol-

TABLE 1. *Matrix of Distinctive Features of Speech*

	CONSONANTAL	CORONAL	ANTERIOR	VOICED	NASAL	STRIDENT	CONTINUANT
/p/	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
/b/	+	-	+	+	-	-	-
/s/	+	+	+	-	-	+	+
/k/	+	-	-	-	-	-	-

ologies, art styles, architectural design, the layout of villages, and rules concerning descent, residence, and the regulation of marriage, all of which were prominently featured in most ethnographic monographs published during the first half of this century—can similarly be broken down into sets of cultural distinctive features which are recognizable as binary oppositions. As in the case of phonology, it is the matrix combination of sets of such distinctive features which determines the characteristics of a cultural feature in any particular ethnographic setting.

In effect, Lévi-Strauss was maintaining that when anthropologists engage in cross-cultural comparison, it is not the contrast in manifestly observable social relationships that is of interest (as was maintained by Radcliffe-Brown), but rather the contrast of patterns of “relations between relations” which can be discovered by analysis yet are unconscious phenomena so far as the human actors are concerned. The theory seems to presuppose that at a very rudimentary level the variant possibilities of human culture are innate, or at any rate that human beings are innately predisposed to build up cultural constructs out of paired oppositions of a very simplistic kind, such as animate/inanimate, human/nonhuman, male/female, above/below, we/they, and symmetrical/asymmetrical.

There are other versions of modern structuralism, such as those of A. J. Greimas and Tzvetan Todorov, which similarly seem to require that the “socio-logic” of the human mind contain a wide variety of innate (i.e., species-wide) binary oppositions of this sort, though there is a notable lack of consensus as to what they might be (see Hawkes, 1977, pp. 88, 95–96). Many critics would regard any such proposition as entirely implausible, but it cannot be dismissed out of hand. Shorn of its highly sophisticated elaborations, Greimas’s version of distinctive-feature (*sémique*) theory requires only that the brain should have an innate propensity to make two associated types of discrimination, such that any entity held within the field of perception will always be associated with both its “opposite” and its “negation” (Greimas, 1966, pp. 18–29).

Furthermore, there is now increasing evidence that

all normal operations of the brain are computer-like, in that information is passed from one part of the organism to another in a digital binary code of on/off signals. If your biological processes are controlled in this way, it seems highly probable that processes by which thoughts are generated in the brain are of the same general kind.

But while at one level Lévi-Strauss is arguing that the reality of culture is “a model in the mind” rather than out there in the world, he is also claiming that the patterns of relationship that can be recognized in cultural phenomena out there in the world are directly linked, by transformation, with this preexisting model in the mind. Human culture and human society are made by men, but what is made is a projection of a structure which already exists in the maker’s mind.

Saussure’s Structural Linguistics. This aspect of the theory was derived, through Jakobson, from the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), which included two further types of paired opposition, both of which have been adopted in one form or another by nearly all modern structuralists.

First, there is the notion of the linguistic sign, which is a totality composed of two interdependent parts: (1) the concept in the mind (the signified) and (2) the sound pattern on the breath, which is out there in the world and which constitutes the linguistic signal (the signifier). The concept is a transformation of the sound signal, and vice versa. It is a crucial feature of Saussure’s argument that, where concepts form part of a system, they are “defined not positively, in terms of their content, but negatively by contrast with other items in the same system. What characterizes each most exactly is being whatever the others are not” (Saussure, 1983, p. 115).

Lévi-Strauss argues in exactly the same way both with regard to the relationship between the components of his cultural “model in the mind” and the components of objectively observable culture out there in the world, and also with regard to the significance of cultural elements stemming from differentiation. The meaning of any member of a set of components is determined by whatever all other members of the set are not.

The other type of paired opposition that Lévi-Strauss and most other modern structuralists have taken over from Saussure is the contrast between syntagmatic (metonymic, melodic) relations and associative (paradigmatic, metaphoric, harmonic) relations. In the first case the relations are those of contiguity: the links between elements are as in a chain. The sequence of words in a sentence provides the prototype of such a chain. In the second case the relations are those of asserted similarity: "My love is like a rose." All forms of linguistic utterance employ both these polar types of relationship, but whereas rational and scientific statements are heavily biased toward metonymy, poetic and religious utterances are biased toward metaphor.

In Lévi-Strauss's work these distinctions are particularly important for his analyses of myth, a concept which he discusses at enormous length but never defines. In practice, a Lévi-Straussian myth is almost invariably a story (or rather a set of stories) about "impossible" happenings, as when birds and animals talk like men, men fly like birds or are transformed into fish. Such transformations are metaphoric, but the society of birds, fish, or whatever which is then described is spoken of "as if" it were a society of human beings. The metaphor entails a transposition, as with a musical change of key. Social relations among real human beings are primarily relationships of contiguity depending upon metonymy; relationships among individual characters in myth are likewise metonymic. By implication, the stories are about men even when, in explicit terms, the characters are non-men. In many cases this is obvious, but the point about anthropological structuralist analysis is that intuitions of this sort can be systematized and shown to conform to unexpected regularities of pattern.

The Question of Validity. Admittedly, at the conclusion of a structuralist analysis the reader will often be left with a feeling that he has been told no more than what he knew already. But the exercise may still have been worthwhile, if what was originally no more than intuition has now become grounded in reason. Moreover, there are some occasions when a structuralist analysis will provide quite unexpected insights which are thoroughly convincing. The analogy with psychoanalytic procedures is very close.

But this immediately raises doubts about validity. In psychoanalysis the fact that a particular interpretation of dream material is acceptable to the dreamer does not mean that the interpretation has any truth outside the context of the immediate psychoanalytic session. Even the most celebrated examples of structuralist interpretation of myth are open to similar objections; they may be convincing, but they cannot be shown to be true in

any objective sense. A hard-nosed empiricist can always find good grounds for rejecting the argument lock, stock, and barrel.

Part of this skepticism arises because of the form in which Lévi-Strauss has cast his argument. His enduring anthropological purpose was to engage in cross-cultural comparison on a very large scale. His book *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté* (1949) is concerned with most of the recorded kin-term systems of East Asia and Oceania, while his *Mythologiques* (1962–1971) ranges all over the Americas and even beyond. He therefore needed to assume that the "mind" in which his transformational structuralist "model" is located is a human universal, and it is precisely this which the skeptics find unacceptable. It is one thing to suppose that we are genetically endowed with the capacity to encode speech sounds, but it is quite another to claim that, at some abstract level, the elementary structures of total cultural systems are innate.

If, however, we take a more modest view of what structuralist analysis might reveal, many of these difficulties disappear. It is part of Lévi-Strauss's thesis that different manifest features of the same cultural system may be metaphorical transformations of the same internalized unconscious "model in the mind." For a proposition of this sort to make sense, it is not necessary for the mind in question to be an innate human universal. If the territorial scope of the generalization is restricted, it will suffice if the postulated unconscious model is located in the multiple individual minds of the members of a single society. It seems perfectly plausible that a set of individuals who have all been reared in the same cultural milieu might have the capacity to generate identical or very similar unconscious models in the mind in the way that the theory requires. But the innate components of such models could be very limited indeed.

My personal view is that structuralist method is ill adapted to cross-cultural comparison on a grand scale. It becomes illuminating for an anthropologist only when it is able to show that contrasted patterns in very different aspects of the same cultural system are logically consistent transformations/transpositions of the same abstract structure of ideas. Christine Hugh-Jones's *From the Milk River* (1979) provides an excellent example of an anthropological monograph which adapts Lévi-Straussian theory in this way. It provides a deep structuralist analysis of a single cultural system as opposed to a grand-scale rampage right across the map.

Lévi-Strauss's Conservatism. The reader of this article should appreciate that, although most of the key doctrines of modern structuralism are to be found in prototypical form in the writings of Lévi-Strauss, many

of his followers and imitators, especially those who have adapted the theory for purposes of literary criticism and the analysis of religious texts, have deviated from Lévi-Strauss's orthodoxy on important issues.

Lévi-Strauss is a very conservative anthropologist. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he draws a sharp distinction between "primitive" and "modern" societies. He does not say that "primitive" societies are better or worse than "modern" societies, but he does assert that they are fundamentally different in kind, primarily in three binary dimensions. Primitive societies are non-literate, nonindustrial, and "cold." They are like machines (e.g., clocks) "which use the energy with which they are supplied at the outset and which, in theory, could go on operating indefinitely . . . if they were not subject to friction and heating; . . . they appear to us as static societies with no history." On the other hand, modern societies are literate, industrial, and "hot." They are like thermodynamic machines, "they interiorize history, as it were, and turn it into the motive power of their development" (Lévi-Strauss, 1961, chap. 3).

Now Lévi-Strauss's structuralism is, as we have seen, heavily indebted to the linguistic theories of Saussure, who drew a sharp distinction between diachronic linguistics, which studies the changes of speech forms over time, and synchronic linguistics, which is concerned with structuralist issues such as the relation between thought and organized sound, and the contrast between syntagmatic and associative relations discussed above. In imitation of this dichotomy, Lévi-Strauss has insisted that his own kind of structuralist analysis is appropriate only for the synchronic study of cultural phenomena. He assumes that the cultural systems of "primitive" societies are sufficiently static to be studied as total synchronic systems in this way. By contrast, he assumes that the value attached to diachronic historical change in modern society implies that the cultural data of modern society fall outside the scope of structuralist analysis.

Lévi-Strauss's Successors. Here, as elsewhere, Lévi-Strauss's doctrinal pronouncements, as well as his practical structuralist experiments, are elusive and inconsistent. With rare exceptions, he himself has confined his use of structuralist analysis to ethnographic data of the classic anthropological sort, but his imitators have not accepted this self-imposed restriction.

The first general handbook of structuralist method was Roland Barthes's *Elements of Semiology* (1964). In this book and in all his subsequent contributions to structuralist/semiotic analysis, Barthes concerned himself with materials drawn from contemporary Western culture and recent European literature.

In recent years structuralism, considered as a special

style of analysis, has had a greater influence on literary criticism than on anthropology. Here, however, the formal structures discussed in the work of Lévi-Strauss and Greimas have been transformed into the Nietzschean exaggerations of Jacques Derrida's theories of poststructuralist deconstruction. Elaborations of this sort cannot be brought within the scope of the present article, though I shall make some reference to the way these writers discuss texts as objects to be interpreted and re-created by the reader rather than as channels through which an author communicates to potential readers.

Structuralist analyses of a quite conventional sort have been used with success in a number of other more immediately relevant fields. Marcel Detienne and his close colleagues have applied Lévi-Strauss's methodology to materials from ancient Greece (see Gordon, 1981); Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (1973) has used an undiluted version of the theory to analyze a vast range of classical Indian texts; and Claude Chabrol and Louis Marin (1974), among others, have explored the applicability of the method to the analysis of biblical texts.

Continuity versus Discontinuity. It is time to show why an essay on structuralism, primarily of the Lévi-Straussian sort, should have a place in an encyclopedia of religion. First, however, attention should be drawn to a modification of the more orthodox binary-opposition versions of structuralist theory which is particularly relevant in applications of this type of theory to religious materials.

Lévi-Strauss writes of reality being a model in the mind made up of a network of relations between discontinuous mental entities linked in binary pairs. But the reality which is out there in the world and which we perceive through our senses is certainly not of this kind. It is continuous in both time and space. It is not naturally made up of separate things and separate events; the appearance of discontinuity is imposed on our experience by the way we perceive it and, more particularly, by the way we use words to describe it. We feel that there is a disjunction between day and night because we have these two words, *day/night*, linked in binary opposition; in our ordinary experience, however, daytime just fades into nighttime and vice versa.

Structuralist theorists have handled this incompatibility between the continuities of experience and the discontinuities of conceptual thinking in a variety of ways, but several anglophone writers, including Mary Douglas (1966), Victor Turner (1969), and myself (1976) have emphasized the relevance of the arguments of Arnold van Gennep (1909).

Van Gennep originally applied his arguments to rituals marking a change of social status. In the world of

experience out there, time is continuous. When a husband dies, there is no chronological discontinuity between the moment when his wife is his wife and the subsequent moment when she has become his widow. But in social time things are quite different: society imposes an intermediate stage of mourning when the wife/widow is removed from ordinary social relations and is subject to various kinds of restrictions. During this intermediate phase she is subject to taboo and is treated as a sacred person.

Van Gennep's insight can be generalized in a variety of ways. First, it is empirically the case that social transitions nearly always have a triadic structure which van Gennep himself described as (1) the rite of separation, (2) the marginal state (*rite de marge*), and (3) the rite of aggregation. Second, it is also an empirical fact that not only is the marginal state regularly marked by taboo, but that all forms of holiness, whether applied to particular persons or particular places or particular times, can be shown on analysis to be marginal; they represent an interface between two nonholy categories which we are thereby able to perceive as separated from each other. The argument is that, at the level of the model in the mind, the impression of disjuncture is achieved either by suppressing all consciousness of the ambiguities that lie at the margin or by treating the margin as belonging to a different order of reality: sacred-extraordinary-supernatural versus profane-ordinary-natural.

Implications for the Study of Myth and Ritual

To judge by the titles of their books, structuralist authors are quite centrally concerned with the analysis of myth, but they rarely explain what they mean by this elusive concept, and the definitions that have been offered are seldom mutually compatible. I must therefore offer my own.

To live comfortably in society, every individual must have access to a cosmology—an ordered set of topological, physical, and metaphysical ideas which make sense of immediate experience. The cosmology is not naturally known; it is given to us by the conventional assumptions of the cultural system in which we live; it is taught to us as part of the complex process by which we are transformed from animals into socialized human beings. Furthermore, as an adjunct to learning what the cosmos is like, we also learn how to behave in particular contexts of time and place and interpersonal relationship. These rules of behavior likewise derive from the process of individual socialization.

Both the cosmology and the rules of behavior have to be justified. They are justified by stories about the past which explain how things came to be as they are, and by stories of a rather similar kind which provide precedents for culturally approved behavior or, alternatively,

precedents for the supposedly dire consequences of ignoring local cultural conventions.

The entire corpus of such validating stories is myth.

Universal versus Local Applicability. Viewed in this way, myth has moral value. It is sacred for those who accept the validity of the cosmology and the associated customary rules, but in itself it is of strictly local validity. Anthropologists like me who accept the empirical evidence that there are no cultural universals which are not entirely trivial are likely to reject the view of Lévi-Strauss, Freud, and many others who argue that there is a universal human mythology associated with universal, unconscious motivations shared by all individual human beings.

It is important to notice that there is nothing in this context-restricted, functionalist definition implying that myth is fanciful or untrue in a realistic, positivist, historical sense. This point needs emphasis and exemplification.

The biblical story of the garden of Eden is a myth for devout Jews and Christians because of its cosmological and moral implications, and not because it contains such "untrue" incidents as God and the serpent both conversing with Adam and Eve. Likewise, the stories that are told about the signing of the Magna Carta at Runnemed near Windsor in 1215 are myth for all contemporary anglophone upholders of parliamentary democracy. In this case there is very little in the basic story which is obviously untrue (in the talking-serpent sense). Indeed, some parts of it are demonstrably true in a historical sense, since copies of the original document still exist. Yet the story is nonetheless a myth, because it is made to serve as a precedent for customary political conventions which are still significant in the societies in question.

In this approach to myth, the social context in which the stories are told is fundamental; a myth story isolated from its proper context is devoid of meaning. It follows that those who think about myth in this way are bound to regard Lévi-Strauss's extraordinary four-volume *Mythologiques* as largely a waste of time, since the whole exercise is devoted to the cross-cultural comparison of very abbreviated versions of manifestly untrue stories completely isolated from their very diverse original social settings.

Some of the myth analyses which Lévi-Strauss published prior to 1962 took note of a functional (contextual) factor, but in his later work he seems to assume that myth is an undifferentiated, species-wide phenomenon which the human mind is predisposed to generate, in much the same way as it is predisposed to generate speech. He seeks to show how the patterning and com-

bination of myth stories are capable of conveying meaning, but the meaning in question is very general and not context-determined. The superficial differences between the myths of various cultures are treated as comparable to the differences of phonology and grammar in different human languages. At the level of innate capacity, the deep structure is always the same. The myths that appear in ethnographic records are all transformations of a single universal myth which, like phonology, is structured according to a system of distinctive features based on binary oppositions. It follows that the themes with which this mythology is concerned are ultimately human universals of a physiological kind such as sex, metabolism, orientation, and life/death, rather than the solution of local, culturally determined moral issues.

This view of what mythology is about will not be congenial to anthropologists who feel that their basic concern is with cultural diversity, but it is not necessarily unacceptable to the students of universalist religions who may likewise feel that the metaphysical reality to which religion responds is always the same reality, no matter what its cultural form may be. And even those who, like me, believe that myth has a local rather than a universal significance, have much to learn from Lévi-Strauss about the way the messages conveyed by myth are embedded in the patterning and structure of the presentation, rather than in the manifest content of the stories themselves.

This contrast of view among structuralists as to whether myth has universal or local significance is also found in their view of ritual. For the universalists, ritual equates with nonverbal communication; what can be said about it is not very different from what can be said about language as verbal communication. The study of ritual is seen as a branch of a more general zoological field, the study of animal behavior. By contrast, those who see ritual as a localized, culturally determined phenomenon link it quite directly to the local mythology and to particular rather than general cosmological assumptions. Myth and ritual are mutual transformations; each validates the other in its local setting. But in either case the generalizations of the structuralists concerning binary oppositions, transformations, combinations, metonymic and metaphoric associations, and marginal states can prove illuminating.

Myths and Rituals as Related Sets. One particular structuralist proposition is especially relevant for my present purposes: the thesis that mythical stories or sequences of ritual behavior can never be decoded when considered in isolation but only when considered as related sets. A myth story does, of course, always have a manifest meaning considered as a folk tale or as a record of an incident in history. In the same way, an iso-

lated ritual sequence can always be viewed as a dramatic performance which the local customary rules require to be performed at a particular time and place. But the structuralists assume that there is always another deeper, unconscious meaning which is of equal or perhaps greater significance. The structuralist thesis is that such deeper meanings are apprehended by the listener to a myth, or by the participant-observer in a ritual situation, at a subliminal, aesthetic or religious level of consciousness. Structuralist analytical procedures are supposed to make such hidden meanings explicit.

The structuralists' thesis is that the auditor of a myth (or the participant in a ritual) is able to take account of many other myths and rituals with which he or she is familiar. The interpretation applied to the text of any particular story will then be influenced by the moral and aesthetic implications of other such stories.

Thus, devout Jews and Christians will associate any particular story from the Old Testament with a host of other stories both canonical and noncanonical, and it is the structure of the total set of such stories which carries implication. Invariably, analyses of myth in the structuralist manner derive their inferences from a comparison of a number of different stories treated as members of a single set. At the end of the analysis, it is the differences and not the similarities among the stories that prove to have been treated as significant.

This goes right back to the grounding of structuralism in phonological distinctive-feature theory: it is finely discriminated differences between sounds which allow us to discriminate the words of which they form a part, as for instance *bin/pin*. But there are great practical difficulties. In phonology the units that are discriminated fall within a limited set of possible phonemes specified by a limited set of phonological distinctive features. But if we use this mental process as a model for the analysis of myth, we need first to agree about the units of discussion. Within any particular story, how is the overall text to be cut up into segments for purposes of comparison? And among several stories which differ in detail but which seem to have a certain overall similarity, how is the analyst to decide whether any particular story is or is not a member of the same set? The structuralists' failure to formulate any rules about how such questions should be answered seems, on the face of it, to be a very serious defect in their methodology.

In practice, the procedure is intuitive. For those who consider that a structuralist methodology is appropriate to the analysis of religious literature, one obvious set of primary units consists of all the stories in the Bible, while another such set is provided by all the stories about Śiva in the classical Vedic and Puranic literature

of the Hindus. The bulk of the materials thus specified is enormous; any practical analysis would have to restrict the scope of the investigation still further by *ad hoc* criteria. But it is easier to justify arbitrary limits of this sort than Lévi-Strauss's universalist practice, which allows him to put into one set stories drawn at random from any part of the world and any cultural context.

It should be noted that the arbitrariness of structuralist analysis connects up with certain of the arguments of poststructuralist literary criticism. Myths (however defined) and sacred books and works of art in general, including music, drama, dance, and the plastic arts, can be regarded as text without authors. The message in the text is what the reader (or auditor or participant-observer) discovers. It is treated as the word of God, but it is an aesthetic response, something in the reader's own unconscious mental processes, which makes the discovery. Thus any "text" is polysemic, a multiple combination of signs; it has many possible meanings, and no particular possibility has any special authenticity that the others lack.

This is what makes sectarian diversity in literary religions so very common. The devotees may all share the same sacred book, but there are vast numbers of different ways to put an authentic interpretation on what it contains. Structuralist and poststructuralist theorizing have provided a sort of rational explanation for this all-too-obvious phenomenon of history.

Prerequisites for Structural Analysis. A convincing structuralist analysis of even a very abbreviated set of texts takes up a great deal of space, so that in an article of this sort exemplification is hardly possible. The following three prerequisites are essential.

1. The total text under consideration must contain a number of separate segments (stories) which differ in detail but which are also in some respects similar. Taken together, these similar stories form a set. The items in the set can be compared and contrasted. A case in point is provided by the four Gospels of the New Testament. At a certain level each of the Gospels tells the same story, yet the details differ and are in some respects radically contrasted. Whereas orthodox Christian biblical criticism has assumed that these contradictions are of minor significance, or can be satisfactorily explained away to leave a residual unitary account of what really happened in real historical time, the structuralist assumes that it is precisely in the differences that the message of the Gospels, considered as a set, is likely to be found. Within the total text thus considered, all parts of the text have equal value; it is quite inappropriate to the method to discriminate among different kinds of story element under such labels as *para-*

bles, *historical narratives*, and *folk tales* (see Leach and Aycock, 1983, chap. 5).

2. The major segments (stories) must themselves be segmentable into elements (incidents in the stories, motifs). There is a pattern of relationships between the elements in any one story. The patterns differ in the different stories. The analysis calls for a comparison of these differences. In other words, as in phonology, the coding of the total system is assumed to be a structure of relationships between relationships.

3. The establishment of the patterns and the contrasts between them call for close attention to very fine details in the texts under consideration. Ideally, the analysis should take account of every detail; it is a presupposition of the distinctive-feature thesis that, while the text may contain redundancies, it cannot contain accidents. Every detail adds something to the cogency of the message.

Examples of Structuralist Analysis. Multifaceted structuralist analyses often turn out to be more interesting than those confined to a single dimension. As we have seen, the structuralist thesis is that the fundamental pattern of the structure under examination is "in the mind." The patterns that can be observed out there in the world of cultural experience—in speech or written text or musical performance or ritual sequences, in the design of works of art and buildings, or in the layout of cultural space—are all transformations of the same mental structure. Thus, at one remove, they should also be transformations of each other. If structuralist analysis has application to religious studies, its principal value might be to give unexpected insight into how the aesthetic imagination is able to carry out these transformations from one artistic medium to another.

All this is very laborious. The linguistic analogy is with the parsing of a sentence, first into words related in a grammatical structure, and then into phonemes related in a phonological structure, and then into the patterns of distinctive features that constitute the phonemes. The skeptic needs to be persuaded that the demonstration of such a fine-grain hierarchy of relations could possibly be worthwhile.

I would not myself want to suggest that skepticism should be wholly abandoned, but I recommend a close reading of O'Flaherty's *Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Śiva* (1973), taking special note of the pull-out Chart of Motifs and of the complexities of Appendix A (pp. 319–320), which together show what I mean by saying that, in structuralist analysis, it is assumed that the message is embedded in relationships between relationships. This is a one-dimensional study, but it is a very distinguished example of its kind.

My own favorite definition of myth is that of Julius

Schniewind: "Mythology is the expression of unobservable realities in terms of observable phenomena" (Bartsch, 1953–1962, p. 47). This puts myth at the very core of all forms of religious expression. In the five pages of her concluding chapter, O'Flaherty provides as good an argument as any that I know for saying that a structuralist analysis of a corpus of mythology can show us how these unobservable realities become apprehensible through close familiarity with a set of stories which on the face of it are mutually contradictory.

But the determined skeptic can find reassurance in the fact that competent structuralists analyzing the same materials seldom arrive at the same conclusions. Chabrol and Marin's *Le récit évangélique* (1974) is a multi-authored structuralist monograph on the theme of the New Testament parables. Their work derives its theoretical basis from the semiotic theories of A. J. Greimas. Leach and Aycock's *Structuralist Interpretations of Biblical Myth* (1983, chap. 5) is a much shorter structuralist essay but is also concerned with New Testament parables, and the underlying theory is similar in many respects. The argument which Chabrol offers in his essay "De la sémiotique en question" (Chabrol and Marin, 1974, pp. 193–213) overlaps at many points with what I have been saying in the present article. Yet with the possible exception of Chabrol himself (see p. 135), the various French authors all agree that *parable* is a meaningful genre for structuralist purposes, while I, in the work cited above, argue quite specifically that it is not. A critical comparison of the arguments offered in these two, in some ways very similar, contributions might be of value for those who find the structuralist/semiotic treatment of religious texts too slippery to handle.

Conclusion: The Sistine Chapel. I shall conclude by offering the skeleton of part of one of my own essays showing how works of art, literary texts, and church practice can be combined in a meaningful structural pattern.

The nine main panels in the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican are of world renown. They are grouped in three sets of three, a cross-reference to the Holy Trinity. At the altar end, God as Creator and Light of the World appears alone without man; at the opposite end are three panels depicting Noah/Adam, the sinful but potentially redeemable man without God. At the center are three scenes where man and God are together: the creation of Adam, the creation of Eve, and the temptation of Adam and Eve and their expulsion from paradise.

The Sistine Chapel, which is the personal chapel of the pope, is dedicated to the Virgin Mary of the Assumption as Queen of Heaven. The Virgin in this role is the Second Eve; she also stands for the church itself. In

the center panel the figure of the newly created Eve is at the exact center of the entire ceiling. In the panel depicting the Fall, the serpent coiled around the tree of life is doubled and effectively cruciform. It has two humanoid heads. One, which forms a branch to the left, is that of the temptress who grasps the voluptuous but still innocent Eve by the hand. The other, which forms a branch to the right, is that of the angel armed with the flaming sword which drives the now haggard sinners into the wilderness. The face of the serpent-temptress is like that of the newly created Eve, but it looks in the reverse direction; the face of the voluptuous, innocent Eve is that of the uncreated Eve who appears wrapped in the womb of time in the panel showing the creation of Adam. According to a medieval legend, the cross on which Christ died was cut from the tree of life that had grown in the garden of Eden.

The cruciform depiction of this tree with its double-headed serpent was originally positioned so as to be directly above the screen dividing the secular antichapel from the sacred chapel proper. In a more ordinary church of the period, this position would have been filled by a crucifix standing above the rood screen.

The theme of the double-headed serpent turned into a crucifix recurs in the corner panel to the right of the altar, where the manifest depiction is the story of the healing of the sinful Israelites smitten by a plague of serpents in the wilderness. In this case there is a direct cross-reference to the passage in the *Gospel of John* that reads: "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up: That whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life" (*Jn.* 3:14–15).

This is only a partial outline. Even in minimally convincing form, full analysis calls for an essay substantially longer than the whole of the present article. Many of the themes in this analysis have also appeared in other interpretations of Michelangelo's iconography, but some are a peculiar product of structuralist methodology. Some art historians, theologians, and literary critics find the results convincing. Such is the only justification which I can put forward for structuralism in general. If some readers of structuralist analyses feel that they have thereby gained insights which they did not have before, the exercise has been worthwhile.

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EDMUND LEACH

STUDY OF RELIGION. [This entry consists of three articles:

History of Study
Methodological Issues
Religious Studies as an
Academic Discipline

The first article provides a thorough historical survey of the development of the scholarly study of religion. It investigates the beginnings of the "disinterested" study of religion among the ancient Greeks and Romans, explores early philosophical influences, and examines the scholarly approaches to the modern study of religious phenomena. The second article focuses attention on some of the key methodological issues confronted by students of religion. The third article traces the development of religious studies as a part of the liberal arts curriculum of secular and sectarian institutions of higher learning during the latter half of the twentieth century.]

History of Study

In the study of religion, as in other studies, it is difficult to separate method from theory: the "how" of the study of religion necessarily implies something about its "what." The question arises whether religion is to be broadly defined from the start or defined gradually in the course of inquiry. A wider or narrower definition of religion (e.g., whether or not to include nontheistic or nontranscendent traditions) necessarily affects the scope and thrust of the research. Moreover, there are theoretical elements found in methodological inquiry that involve decisions as to what can and cannot be known and as to how thought and expression are to be ordered. Method involves choices as to the procedures of investigation, the scope and limits of the subject mat-

ter, and the mental faculties and conceptual tools that are involved in particular kinds of study. On all these there has been a wide variety of opinion.

Many scholars in the study of religion have viewed any deliberate concern with theory and method as a speculative matter that does not contribute to the concrete advance of knowledge. However, a silence about theoretical assumptions need not imply their nonexistence, and quite often rather astute, though unstated, methods may be discerned in the creative work of scholarly practitioners.

Morris Jastrow began his classic work, *The Study of Religion* (1901), with an insistence on the salient importance of method in the study of religion. He perceived method to be the principal protection against the "personal equation" (i.e., the assumptions and beliefs of the author) that had distorted the study of religion. He saw the dangers of such distortion coming not only from traditional fideists, dogmatists, and apologists, but also from the "cultured despisers" of religion, who had their own subjective biases and closures. The "true believers" studied religions only to laud the superiority of their own and to depreciate those of others, while the skeptics started with the preconception that all religions were false and entertained a simpleminded theory of the nature and origin of religion. According to Jastrow, the cure for such naïveté and distortion was to adopt a historical approach. This approach consisted of gathering data from all times and places, arranging them systematically, interpreting them within a strictly natural and human framework, exploring their inner, emotional aspects, and doing a comparative study to discover the essential laws of the development of religion. All this—and only this—could, in Jastrow's view, prepare the ground for an authentic philosophy of religion. If one adds to this seemingly nineteenth-century positivistic view Jastrow's insistence on a methodological naturalism or agnosticism (i.e., a holding back of one's own views on ultimate truth and value) and on a sympathetic understanding of other faiths and ways, one has a thumbnail view of the problems and concerns of the study of religion up to the last quarter of the twentieth century. However, scholarly approaches to religion would take turns that were unimaginable at the time Jastrow's work was published.

Influences on the Modern Scholarly Study of Religion

From his vantage point Jastrow looked back on the development of the critical study of religion in the modern West. Of prime importance were the great geographical discoveries and explorations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which confronted Western

man with the fact of other ways of behavior, thought, and belief and required a broadening of the Western-centered view of human nature, culture, and religion. The discovery of these alien ways and faiths, occurring at the same time as the great advancements in the natural sciences, had intellectual consequences. The terms *nature* and *natural* became honorific and normative for truth and right. As the concept of natural law became dominant in political philosophy, so the idea of natural religion became the rage in religious philosophy.

Natural Religion. This new turn rested on the idea of a common human nature from which religious beliefs arise, eliciting universal agreement. In its Deistic form natural religion was acclaimed to be independent of and superior to revealed religion, and, unlike medieval or modern notions of a natural knowledge of divine things, to be a prologue to or an alternative of revelation. The proponents of natural religion assumed that belief in God (supreme power), divine providence, and other familiar Christian concepts were universal, but this God tended to be abstract and his governance rather remote. If the founder of the Deistic natural religious view was Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648), as most surveys declare, it was David Hume (1711–1776) who was its would-be executioner. His posthumously published *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779) contained vigorous arguments against the capacity of natural reason to attain truths about ultimate realities transcending sense experience. And in his *Natural History of Religion* (1757), Hume challenged the natural religionists' view of the pristine purity and nobility of primitive man, asserting that primitive (or prehistoric) religion arose out of fear, superstition, and irrationality, and that polytheism, not monotheism, was the religion of man in his crude, primeval state. Hume's basic concept was that of linear evolution from a rudimentary to a higher, more complex stage of thought and culture, an idea that was to play a dominant role in the later study of religion.

Many comparative works on the newfound multiplicity of religions were written in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Alexander Ross's *The Religions of the World* (1653), Bernard Picart and J. F. Bernard's *Ceremonies and Customs of the World* (1733), and Charles Dupuis's *Origin of All Cults* (1795). The last two works were attempts to understand sympathetically non-Christian religions, but the imposition of a preconceived natural religion theory, Jastrow notes, prevented Dupuis from perceiving all the facts. It may be that the heuristic moral here is not that one should have no theories, but rather that one should have a plurality of theories from which to view the variety of religious phenomena.

The Enlightenment. While the *philosophes* of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in France (e.g., Voltaire) viewed religion as the invention of cunning priests to secure their rule over the ignorant masses by playing on their fears and superstitions, German philosophers were venturing toward a broad and deep understanding of the variety of religions and their historical development. Preeminent among these philosophers was J. G. Herder (1744–1803), who viewed religion within the context of the development of human culture and the history of ideas. Thus viewed, religion in all its varieties is a universal and natural expression of the human mind, and its practices are the expression of basic religious ideas. Herder's method was a genetic analysis of the development of ideas, which related early to later stages, appreciating rather than depreciating the primitive and archaic forms. He is considered the founder of the genetic method of historiography and of the historical approach to the study of religion.

His contemporary Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) also viewed religion as a constituent element in the unfolding of the human mind and lauded the contribution of all religions to human development. Another contemporary, Christopher Meiners (1747–1810), who wrote solid critical works on the general history of religions, was one of the first modern writers to assert that no people has ever existed without a religion, despite the imperfect accounts of travelers to the contrary, and he thereby implied that religion is inherent in human nature.

Although these German thinkers were men of the Enlightenment era and spoke from a basically naturalistic viewpoint, they, unlike their French confreres, were open and appreciative of the various expressions of the religious spirit. This difference lay by and large in their genuinely historical point of view and their perception and appreciation of the particularities of human culture. However, it should be noted that the French Enlightenment thinkers (e.g., Voltaire, Montesquieu, Turgot, Condorcet), whatever their biases in the field of religion, were by no means nonhistorical and did substantial historical work.

Romantic Idealism. Another important German contribution to modern approaches to religion was Romantic idealism. As a reaction against Enlightenment thought, it emphasized individuality, feelings, and imagination, and it urged an openness to remote, ancient, mystical, and folk culture and religion. It included many eminent philosophers and literary figures, of whom one of the most influential for the study of religion was Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), a Protestant theologian who was deeply marked by his early Pietistic experience as well as by his later study of

idealistic philosophy. Of the three elements that he saw as constituting human personality—thinking, doing, and feeling—he assigned religion primarily to feeling, specified originally as the immediate experience of the infinite and later as the feeling of absolute dependence. Schleiermacher emphasized the social and historical context of religion, its corporate, communal character as well as its individual aspect. He viewed language as the essential medium of thought and made a seminal contribution to the theory of hermeneutics that was influential in cultural studies down to the mid-twentieth century. [See Hermeneutics.] His theory of religion and emphasis on religious experience were also of wide influence down to that time.

A giant in post-Kantian idealism was G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), who synthesized and transcended all the currents of thought in his time, and out of whose work came salient nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical movements, such as Marxism, existentialism, and phenomenology. From a basically historical and evolutionary stance he proceeded not only to give a general account of the development of “mind” or “spirit” to its ultimate state, but also to examine the philosophies of history and religion, including consideration of Asian and primitive cultures. In his philosophy of religion (he was the first to use the term) he proceeded from an examination of religion as a unique mode of consciousness, to an analysis of the religious consciousness (as feeling, perception, and idea) and attitude, and finally to a speculative idea of religion. He then went on to consider actual historical religions in terms of ascending stages of consciousness, from the immediacy of primal religion to the absolute religion of Christianity. For Hegel the concrete history of religions is the realization of the abstract idea of religion. His critics have held that this interpretation is wrong both in method and in content, that the right way is to proceed inductively from the historical data, and, moreover, that Hegel’s interpretation is a factually incorrect view of the development of religion. Yet even his critics acknowledge his salutary inclusion of the whole world of religious phenomena in principle, and the weighty influence of his evolutionary viewpoint on nineteenth-century thought.

Vico. Another monumental figure in the development of modern thought about human culture and religion was the Italian philosopher Giovanni Battista Vico (1668–1744), who was an astoundingly early forerunner of the distinction between the natural and the human, or cultural, sciences. Vico held that we can only adequately know what we have made, and that hence human culture and history as man-made phenomena can be more certainly known than the physical world. He insisted that there is no universal human mind or na-

ture, but a constantly changing sequence of cultural traditions, each of which has to be understood in its own terms, not in those of the culture of the inquirer. Like Schleiermacher, Vico stressed the intimate connection between thought and language, and, moreover, he emphasized myth and metaphor as expressions of the “poetic wisdom” of archaic cultures and as “imaginative universals,” which stand in contrast to the abstract ideas of later ages. Vico is most famous for his view of history as a series of cyclical stages through which societies pass in all their coordinated aspects—social, political, economic, artistic, religious, and so on—from an early bestial stage to a final stage of decline and fall, after which the entire cycle is repeated. He saw the origin of religion in fear of a superior power that was imagined to be divine, and he traced the development of religion from the god of individual men to that of the family, the city-state, and, finally, the nation. He perceived this development from polytheism to a spiritual monotheism as a gradual process, ruled by divine providence. Vico held that religion (and the fear of God) was a prerequisite for social order and the rule of law. Neglected in his own time, Vico’s thought gained wide recognition in nineteenth-century Romanticism and twentieth-century historicism.

A discussion of the various turns in the development of the study of religion in modern times will follow a brief survey of the seminal, anticipatory theories and approaches of classical antiquity.

Developments in Classical Antiquity

A cue to ancient Greek approaches to the study of religion may be suggested by the terms *theōria* (“speculation”) and *historie* (“learning by inquiry”). They sound the notes of critical thought and empirical inquiry that characterized the Greek intellectual response to the world. To them must be added the imaginative, or mythopoeic, response of the great poets (e.g., Homer, Hesiod) in their narrative and systematic presentations of the wide variety of gods known to the ancient Greeks, as well as the store of popular myths that provided materials for reinterpretation or criticism to poets and philosophers. Moreover, the store of religious myths, beliefs, and customs was by no means limited to Greek locales. Going back long before the flowering of Greek speculation and inquiry, Greek sailors, traders, and adventurers had reported on the religious practices and beliefs of foreign peoples and cultures. And among the materials for consideration were not only the conventional religious institutions of the Greek city-states but also the ecstasies and rites of initiation of the mystery cults, both native and imported, which provided impressive firsthand religious experiences.

Hecataeus and Herodotus. Stories that had been handed down and supplemented by firsthand travel experiences were the basis for ancient Greek writings on the myths, tales, and customs of various peoples. Among the most influential writers on these topics were Hecataeus of Miletus (fl. 500 BCE) and Herodotus (b. 484? BCE), who wrote ethnographic histories of foreign lands. The *Histories* of Herodotus provide a source (sometimes erroneous) of information on the ancient religions of western Asia and Egypt. They also provide examples of, as well as comments on, his methods of inquiry. He depends, he says, "on my own sight and judgment and inquiry," plus tales and reports he has heard about past events and about nations he has not visited. He was open and receptive to alien modes of religious experience and foreign beliefs and practices, and he was deeply interested in and admiring of the millennia-long civilizations of Eastern lands. He traced Greek cults to these alien cultures and identified Egyptian and Greek gods with one another on the basis of dubious racial, ethnic, and etymological filiations or of an analogy of divine functions, thus anticipating modern, more precise historical methods and providing an early version of religious syncretism (the reconciliation or fusion of different religions).

Although Herodotus's account was harshly criticized in both ancient and modern times, twentieth-century scholarship has tended to support its reliability, despite the fact that Herodotus was sometimes misled by prevaricating interlocutors. The philosopher Heraclitus (b. 540? BCE) criticized both the method of using the firsthand accounts of eye- and ear-witnesses and the gathering of facts as the aim of inquiry. He voiced a vigorous demurrer, directed at Hecataeus among others, noting that eyes and ears are poor guides for men who lack reflective minds and that "the learning of many things does not teach intelligence." It is a classic critique of the method of mere fact-finding that has been repeated down to the present day.

Closer to home were the Homeric writings with their vivid descriptions and tales of the Greek gods, which had a lasting effect on the Greek mind, and the works of Hesiod, which provided a systematic account of the origin and generations of the gods and the origin of the universe. Moreover, the great tragic poets, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, provided profound expressions of Greek religious themes in works lending themselves to theological or philosophical interpretations.

Ionian Philosophy. Specifically philosophical consideration of these matters began as early as the seventh century BCE in the Greek colony of Ionia in Asia Minor. The first Ionian thinkers and their successors were concerned with the basic principle in or behind all perceiv-

able reality. This they viewed variously as water, fire, the infinite or indeterminate, a cosmic *logos* or reason, the mathematical principle of unity, and so on. Scholars such as Werner Jaeger (1888–1961) have insisted that far from being mere natural philosophers or archaic scientists, these early thinkers were essentially theologians. "Nature" for them meant the ultimate origin of all things, a basic universal reality that they sought to grasp intellectually. Whatever it was called (e.g., the All, the Infinite), to it alone could be attributed divinity. This speculation brought early Greek thought into conflict with traditional myth and religion, of which it may be considered a reinterpretation, and led to an inquiry into the origin and nature of religion as such and to the first ventures into psychological and anthropological-sociological interpretations.

Early Greek thought attained its first systematic view of the ultimate principle behind all things in the work of Anaximander (b. 610? BCE) with his concept of the Infinite or Boundless encompassing all things, the divine ground of all entities (including the finite gods of popular religion). With Xenophanes (b. 560? BCE) this view became the basis for scornful ridicule of the polytheistic and anthropomorphic deities of the old myths, epic poems, and popular religion as inappropriate images of the divine, which Xenophanes characterized as one eternal consciousness. Democritus (b. 460? BCE) ascribed the popular gods to personifications of impressive natural phenomena and of abstractions, such as wisdom, and also to apparitions, beheld in dreams, that inspire awe and terror. With the Sophists of the fifth century BCE came a shift of focus from the nature of the universe to that of man, and thus to human culture and society, of which religion was viewed as a salutary function (and sometimes fiction). This pragmatic stance bypassed the question of the truth of religious beliefs to concentrate on the question of how and why they originated. Hence it usually was compatible with the state religion and its observances.

Plato and Aristotle. While critical of popular religion and the poets' tales about the gods, Plato (b. 428? BCE) opposed the apparent materialism of some early Greek thinkers and the skepticism of the Sophists, seeing a divine intelligence in the order of things and viewing the "barbarians" as acuter than these thinkers in ascribing divinity to the heavenly bodies. Far from seeing religion as an expedient lie for an inferior, primitive age, as did some Sophists, he held that religion had been purer and truer in earliest times. He also held, on the basis of what was known of various peoples and times, that the belief in divinity was a universal phenomenon. His most famous student, Aristotle (b. 384 BCE), was in general agreement with him in these matters. Although nei-

ther of them engaged in a comparative study of religions in the modern sense, they did refer to materials gathered from ethnographic and historical writings, as well as to the popular religion and mystery cults of their place and time. Moreover, Aristotle was the founder of the comparative method, applied by him primarily to biological studies, but later extended to many other areas.

Quasi-Religious Communities. Philosophical schools that were quasi-religious communities, dedicated to the attainment of a certain mental state or way of life, went back as far as the community founded by Pythagoras (b. 580? BCE), in which members sought to attain a state of purity that would release their souls from the cycle of rebirths. New schools arose in the wake of Alexander the Great's conquests (334–325 BCE), which brought contacts with a wide diversity of religious beliefs and conquests in many Eastern lands. For example, Pyrrhon (b. 360? BCE), the founder of an extreme skeptical philosophy, is reported to have learned from Indian ascetics encountered on Alexander's expedition how to extinguish all desires and attain a state of total suspension of judgment and of indifference to all things, a method that he taught to his disciples. The influential Epicurean and Stoic schools also taught various methods of contemplation and detachment to attain happiness.

Stoicism. Two main notions that affected reflections on religion in ensuing ages were contributed by Stoicism. The first was that the plurality of names for divinity express the various aspects of one divine being, leading toward a pantheistic doctrine and also to the syncretistic notion that all religions say the same thing in different terms. The second was the use of allegorical exegesis, a method of interpretation whereby the old myths and rituals were understood to be figurative expressions of Stoic philosophical doctrines.

A countercurrent to Stoic syncretism originated with Euhemerus (fl. 300 BCE), who wrote a fictional account of a land where sacred inscriptions provided evidence that the gods were divinized kings and heroes or courtesans (e.g., Aphrodite). This view of the origin of religious worship had been expressed before, but it became especially relevant in the context of the apotheosis of Alexander the Great and of the ruler cults of the Hellenistic world. "Euhemerism" became an accepted view among many Latin writers on religion. It later proved useful for Christian polemics against paganism and was reiterated in various ways by modern writers on religious origins. However, ancient Greek historians such as Strabo (b. 64? BCE) were sharply critical of the pseudo-historical character of Euhemerus's romance. Strabo, anticipating a nineteenth-century theory, found the explanation of the old myths in the special sites in which they originated.

Roman Writers. Among the great Roman writers on religion were Cicero and Varro. Cicero (b. 106 BCE) wrote a classic work on the various philosophical schools and on the religious beliefs and rites of the first century BCE (*On the Nature of the Gods*) as well as a work on divination, of which he had personal experience as a member of the College of Augurs. Although Cicero had a remarkable sense of the inner elements of piety and belief, his emphasis was primarily on theological matters, that is, "opinions about the nature of the gods." Varro (b. 116 BCE) wrote a monumental treatise on Roman religious personages, sites, rites, and gods, dividing theologies into three types: mythical, physical, and civil, of which the last has to do with the public cult of a city. Concerning his method, Varro stated that he wrote not as a philosopher but as a historian who was concerned with human matters before divine ones; and hence he saw the state as preceding sacred institutions, which develop to serve sociopolitical needs.

Information on foreign religions was provided by various Roman writers. Julius Caesar (b. 100? BCE) described the customs and rites of the peoples encountered during the Gallic Wars. Tacitus (56–120) wrote an ethnographic work on the German tribes, which contrasted the purity of the barbarians with the corruption of Rome. Plutarch (b. 46?) wrote an essay that displayed considerable knowledge of Egyptian mythology and of Zoroastrianism but that ventured superficial analogies between Greek and foreign myths based on dubious etymological links. There is also an essay ascribed to Lucian of Samosata (b. 120?) that appears to provide valuable knowledge and understanding of ancient Syrian religion. Closer to home were the various Oriental mystery cults that were imported into Rome and that promised purification and redemption through ritual performances.

Thus by the first centuries of the Christian era considerable knowledge of foreign religions had become available to Greeks and Romans, as well as firsthand experience in travel or conquest or with imported cults, in addition to reflections by philosophers on the nature of divinity and critical judgments on religions of their own time and place. The critical study of religion, and particularly the comparison between various religions, had begun, though not in the self-consciously theoretical and methodological manner of modern disciplines. Granted that dubious etymological and ethnological associations were made and that quite ungrounded syncretistic fusions of historically distinct and unrelated religions were attempted, yet one should recall the old adage that fingers came before forks. Many fashionable modern concepts, such as the sociopolitical function of religion and the origin of religious beliefs in psychological needs, originated in the centuries before the Chris-

tian era. Greek ethnographic historians, such as Herodotus, provided an ancient anticipation of the anthropological approach to the study of religion.

Beginnings of the Comparative Study of Religion

It is customary to set the beginning of the comparative study of religion somewhere in the third quarter of the nineteenth century with the work of the German-British philologist F. Max Müller (1823–1900). Müller's wide knowledge of Indo-European languages, his comparative approach to philology and extension of that method to the study of religion, and his eloquent advocacy of that study as a scientific discipline prepared the way, during his lifetime, for the establishment of chairs in the new field in leading European universities. Müller postulated an inexorable dependence of thought on language and pursued an etymological search for the origin of god-names, religious beliefs, and myths. His much-criticized summation of myth as "a disease of language" insisted that myth was the result of metaphors derived from impressive experiences of natural phenomena and then of taking the figurative for the real. [See the *biography of F. Max Müller.*]

Dutch School. Among other pioneers were C. P. Tiele (1830–1902) and P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848–1920), founders of the prestigious Dutch school of the history of religions. Tiele combined historical work on ancient Near Eastern religions with a systematic interest in religious phenomena and a philosophical search for the essence of religion. Chantepie, in his classic *Manual of the Science of Religion* (1887–1889), made an elaborate classification of religious phenomena (sacred stones, trees, animals, places, times, persons, writings, communities, and the like), a forerunner of later phenomenologies of religion. [See the *biographies of Chantepie and Tiele.*]

Auguste Comte. Scientific and intellectual developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provided the model for new approaches to the study of religion. The French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857) saw a progressive historical development of the sciences (from the simplest and most abstract to the most complex and concrete, from mathematics to sociology) and a corresponding development in society (from a theological-mythical stage to a positive-scientific stage). The social sciences for him are modeled on the natural sciences, though they adapt their techniques to their particular types of phenomena. They are concerned with society both as "social static" (i.e., an organic whole) and as "social dynamics" (i.e., historical development from past to present to future). Although he may seem to have relegated religion to an infantile social stage, he saw it as a progressive force in previous ages and even proposed a "religion of humanity" for the

modern scientific era. Comte had a tremendous influence on nineteenth-century thought. [See the *biography of Comte.*]

Herbert Spencer. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) was another writer of massive volumes propounding the theory of evolution from the simple to the complex in all fields of knowledge, including the biological and the sociological. Evolution for him was an "organic law," operating uniformly in all types of phenomena, so the societies could be viewed on the analogy of biological organisms. (Spencer's thought both preceded and followed the Darwinian hypothesis.) He saw the origin of religion in the belief in spirits or ghosts, which was derived from dreams and shadows, and hence in the belief in an unchangeable human soul and, later, in gods as eternal, divine personalities. From the belief in ghosts, he asserted, came ancestor-worship, the original religious cult. Although he deplored the resultant anthropomorphic views of the divine nature, Spencer considered religion to be a valuable social force, binding human beings together and conserving traditional values. Despite his inadequate knowledge of the historical development of religions, Spencer's insistence on a scientific approach to the study of society and, above all, his proclamation of evolution as the universal law had significant effects on the study of religion. [See the *biography of Spencer.*]

Together with Comte, Spencer made an evolutionary approach to that study possible, and the Darwinian hypothesis of organic evolution, with its revolutionary effect on nineteenth-century thought, soon made that possibility an actuality, extending the study to the whole history of human culture, including its earliest and presumably most simple stage.

Anthropological Approaches

The anthropological approach to religion as a systematic discipline has deep roots in Western culture. One could justly trace its pedigree to the ancient Greek ethnographic historians and their Roman successors. Also important were certain currents in eighteenth-century European thought that emphasized the particularity and diversity of cultures and the progressive development of culture and religion. This philosophical developmentalism was the prelude to nineteenth-century sociological and biological evolutionism, which was to play so prominent a role in anthropological theories of religion.

English School. E. B. Tylor (1832–1917), an English ethnologist, was one of the first scholars to apply evolutionary concepts to the study of religions, and is generally regarded as the founder of the anthropological study of religion. Assuming that the customs and beliefs of modern primitive cultures, described by Western

travelers, missionaries, colonial administrators, and so on, were survivals of an archaic, prehistoric era, he concluded that they provide evidence of the original stage of religion. He also assumed that the stage of spiritual culture corresponded to the crude stage of material culture in archaic or primitive societies. Tylor is most noted for his theory of animism: the earliest stage of religion, he asserted, consisted in the belief in souls, present not only in human beings but in all natural organisms and objects. Out of this came the concepts of the separable human soul, whether in sleep or in death, and of the pan-psychic aspect of the natural world, and thereby of the religious beliefs and customs associated with them. It has often been noted that this theory stresses the abstract intellectual capacities of primitive man.

Among those directly influenced by Tylor were the English anthropologist R. R. Marett (1866–1943) and the Scottish man of letters and gentleman scholar Andrew Lang (1844–1912). Marett went beyond his master to propose a preanimistic stage of religion (later called “dynamism” or “animatism”), in which men responded with awe and wonder to an impersonal supernatural force they experienced as present in extraordinary natural phenomena, events and persons. He pointed to the worship of such a power among various nineteenth-century primitive peoples and assumed that this was the original form of religion. Marett was pronouncedly evolutionist in his outlook, hailing the Darwinian hypothesis as the foundation stone of modern anthropology. Lang, however, contrary to current evolutionist presuppositions, pointed to a belief in supreme beings or high gods among presumed primitive peoples and suggested that this may have been the earliest form of religion, a thesis that later became a full-fledged theory of primitive monotheism.

Another Briton who had an immense influence on anthropological theories of religion was W. Robertson Smith (1846–1894), a Scottish scholar in Old Testament and Semitic-language studies. Departing from the individualist and intellectualist emphases of earlier theorists, his comparative study of pre-Israelite Semitic tribes maintained that primitive religion was essentially a matter of social institutions and ritual actions rather than of beliefs and doctrines. Taking up the concept of totemism—that is, the relation between a social group and an organic species—he asserted that the sacrifice of the sacred clan animal among the ancient Semites established a communion among the members of the clan and with the clan god through the consumption of the flesh and blood of the animal. Thus sacrifice was a socially integrative and conservatively traditional act. It was, in Smith’s view, the basis of later Hebrew sac-

rifice—a much-contested thesis. Like most of his contemporaries, Smith assumed a linear evolution from crude, simple stages to higher, more complex stages of culture. [See Animism and Animatism; Evolutionism; Preanimism; and the biographies of Lang, Marett, W. Robertson Smith, and Tylor.]

French School. Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), a French sociologist of great influence, followed Smith in his emphasis on the social character of religion and on totemism, the cult of the primitive clan, as the most elementary form of religious life. He further associated totemism with the distinction between the realms of the sacred and the profane. The totem is the concrete symbol of the sacrality of the group and its god and hence the focus of the group’s cult. His evidence for this view was derived from the study of a single Australian Aboriginal tribe, a noncomparative procedure that he defended as indicating the most elemental form of religion in general. He proceeded from a definition of religion as a system of beliefs and practices regarding the sacred, which unites men into a moral community, and from the conviction that the social group is the objective referent of the ideas and images of the sacred. For him religion is inherently a social reality and the social transcends the psychological (in the individualistic sense). With his nephew and favorite pupil, Marcel Mauss, he did a study of primitive systems of classification that viewed the categories by which men grasp all realms of human experience and activity, including religion and even the regions of space, as reflections of social divisions and classifications. Late twentieth-century commentators have seen Durkheim’s approach as symbolistic, in which the overt beliefs and rituals are “decoded” to grasp their underlying meaning in the social structure as a whole.

Also important among French anthropological-sociological students of religion was Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939). Originally a philosopher, Lévy-Bruhl focused on the way primitives think rather than on their underlying social structures, and concluded that there is a distinctive “prelogical” primitive mentality, characterized by “mystical participation,” as distinct from the abstract thought of modern Western man. In his last years Lévy-Bruhl modified this thesis to assert a common human mentality, in which the participative and ratiocinative factors are present for both primitives and moderns. He applied his theory to the study of myths, which he saw as the imaginative surrogate for actual mystical participation. Despite numerous objections to his dichotomy, he had great influence on later philosophical and religio-historical approaches to primitive man’s mental world and religious stance.

Also notable among scholars working in the French

culture sphere were N. D. Fustel de Coulanges (1830–1889), Arnold van Gennep (1873–1957), and Ernest Renan (1823–1892). In his famous work *La cité antique* (1864), Fustel examined the ancient Greco-Roman city, asserting that the basis of civil laws and institutions lay in the earliest religious beliefs and customs of the society, and that what these were could be discovered by a deep probe of the literature of a later period. Van Gennep, an anthropologist, folklorist, and historian of religions, is noted especially for his work on the rites of passage that mark significant transitions in human life, a work with enormous influence on later scholars as well as on imaginative literature. Renan, originally a specialist in Semitic philology, deserves mention because of his insistence on an autonomous critical study of religion, independent of traditional Western religion and theology but not thereby destructive of them. [See *Rites of Passage, overview article; Totemism; and the biographies of Durkheim, Fustel, van Gennep, Lévy-Bruhl, and Renan.*]

James G. Frazer. Meanwhile, in England, James G. Frazer (1854–1941) was at work on his enormous *The Golden Bough* (1890; 3d ed., 12 vols., 1911–1915), an opus that was to attain the widest fame of any work on comparative religion and that was to influence various fields of study and culture, including the design of T. S. Eliot's monumental poem *The Waste Land* (1922). Basing his work on a vast erudition in classical literature and ethnographic writings, Frazer sought through the comparative method to trace the evolution of human culture and religion through successive evolutionary stages. He affirmed that the earliest stage was a pre-religious one of magical thought and practice (where the aim was to master the external environment through human powers), while the succeeding religious stage involved the propitiation and conciliation of superhuman beings upon whom man was believed to be dependent. Frazer likened magic to science, which came at a still later stage in mankind's development, because both magic and science use techniques based on a coherent worldview (conscious or not) to attain human ends; the difference between them, according to Frazer, lies in the illusory premises of magic. His view of archaic culture and religion was just as intellectualist and individualistic as Tylor's and was even more evolutionist in the unilinear sense. Later scholars criticized the way in which Frazer compared heterogeneous data, his having magic precede religion, his rigid separation of magic and religion, and his extremely evolutionary scenario. [See *the biography of Frazer.*]

Diffusionist School. The predominantly evolutionist stance of the English and French schools (with notable exceptions, such as Lang and Mauss) was countered by

the German "diffusionist" or "culture-historical" school, which held that similarities in cultures in different regions are to be ascribed to diffusion from an original site, due to migrations or other contacts going back to primitive times. With this theory goes the notion of "culture circles" (i.e., distinctive cultural wholes) that may be found in the same geographical area, due to a variety of small-scale migrations. Diffusionists usually assumed that cultural discoveries could not be made in several places independently, and hence that diffusion from one original site was necessary for their appearance in various areas. The major German diffusionists were Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Leo Frobenius (1873–1938), Fritz Graebner (1877–1934), and Wilhelm Schmidt (1868–1954). Schmidt, the proponent of the theory of a primeval monotheism, applied the culture-circle theory to the study of religion and, labeling it "the historical method," lauded it as the only theory that could present an accurate account of the history of religions, including primitive religions. There was also an English school of diffusionists, of whom the most noteworthy are G. Elliot Smith (1871–1937), his disciple W. J. Perry (1868–1949), and W. H. R. Rivers (1864–1922). [See *Kulturkreislehre, and the biographies of Frobenius, Graebner, and Schmidt.*]

Franz Boas. The German-American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858–1942) had an enormous influence on the development of anthropological studies through his example of careful, disciplined fieldwork and the training of eminent disciples. He insisted on painstaking description and recording of all aspects of culture, including language, arts, tales, and prayers, so that the scholar could have on hand the equivalent of written documents in the humanistic disciplines and thereby penetrate the inner life of a culture. For example, visionary experiences were related by the experiencer, recorded by the researcher, and thus stored as firsthand data for the interpretation of primitive religion. In his general views Boas held that primitive mentality was similar to civilized mentality, both in its rational and allegedly irrational aspects. On the whole, he rejected broad universal generalizations about primitive culture and religion, insisting that each culture must be considered by itself, and that the complexity of cultural phenomena is not amenable to the statement of general laws. He insisted, moreover, that each cultural item—economic, artistic, religious, magical, and so forth—must be viewed as an element in an integrated whole, and because of this insistence Boas is included in the functionalist school of anthropology. [See *Functionalism.*] He is also associated with the diffusionists in his rejection of unilinear evolution as the pattern of socio-cultural development. [See *the biography of Boas.*]

Bronislaw Malinowski. Another eminent proponent and practitioner of firsthand observation and member of the functionalist school was the Polish-British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942). During World War I he did field studies among the Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia, living with the people, learning their language, participating in their activities, getting to know the way they thought, and absorbing the intimate tone and color of their customs and ceremonies, as well as making a statistically documented analysis of their social organization and culture and recording verbatim in the original language the statements, stories, folklore, and magical formulas of his informants. The aim of recording these “documents of native mentality” was to grasp the islanders’ own basic stance toward life, a project that requires from the participant-observer an open, serious, and respectful attitude toward strange ways of life and thought. Moreover, according to Malinowski, the observer must cover all aspects of a tribal culture, seeing them as parts of a coherent whole and not dwelling on isolated interesting facts, the mere gathering of which contains nothing of scientific value.

Malinowski is noted not only for his heralding of participant observation as a key method in anthropological research but also for his theoretical generalizations on the familiar Frazerian triad of magic, science, and religion. He distinguished religious rites issuing out of pure reverence from magical acts with a purely utilitarian purpose, yet viewed both as responses to life crises that are accompanied by intense emotional stress, for which both act as relief. Viewed functionally, primitive science aims through empirical observation to control the environment and meet basic biological needs; religion serves to inculcate and preserve tribal traditions and values and to provide a positive attitude toward the trials of life and death; and magic bestows the biologically salutary gift of confidence and hope amidst the incalculable dangers and traumatic emotional maelstrom of human existence. The basic difference between religion and magic is that religion lies in the unspecified realm of faith in supernatural powers, while magic rests on specific human techniques for specific ends and relies on human powers and skills. [See the biography of Malinowski.]

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. The English anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) is often coupled with Malinowski as one of the chief exponents of the functionalist approach. Although he had considerable field experience in various regions, he is often more noted for his significant contributions to anthropological theory and method. He was a forerunner of prominent late twentieth-century approaches, such as structuralism and semiotic or symbolic interpretation (see below).

Although originally a follower of the English diffusionist-historical school, he was deeply influenced by Durkheim, and he eventually shifted to an ahistorical, sociological approach to primitive culture and religion. Indeed, one standard history of ethnological theory lists him as a member of the French sociological school. He viewed anthropology as a “comparative sociology” that focuses on social behavior and seeks the underlying function of various acts and customs within the social whole or “system.” As a good Durkheimian, he usually downgraded the individual psychological aspect, to focus on social structures and functions. In later years he modified his approach to grant importance to the psychological as well as the historical and developmental aspects of human culture. He is also noteworthy for his attempt to find the universal laws of human society through the comparative analysis of particular cultures, on the assumption that the formulation of such laws is necessary for any discipline claiming to be scientific.

An example of how Radcliffe-Brown applied this approach to the study of religion may be found in his Frazer Lecture of 1939, “Taboo.” His key concept here is “ritual value,” which is either positive or negative depending on a society’s respect for or avoidance of the ritual object. Radcliffe-Brown views ritual value as one among many types of values that characterize a coherent social order. He grants the great diversity in ritual values among various cultures, but insists that “a natural science of society” must discern the underlying uniformities and determine “the relation of ritual and ritual values to the essential constitution of society”—their basic social function. He rejects the pragmatic interpretation of rituals as “technical acts,” intended to attain or avoid certain results, as being misguided and blind to the specifically expressive and symbolic character of rituals. Hence the inquirer must seek the underlying meaning of rituals, since the terms *symbol* and *meaning* go together, and he must employ reliable methods in carrying out his research.

Thus in investigating the totemic rites and associated myths of various Australian tribes, Radcliffe-Brown finds a common “ritual idiom” and cosmology, “a body of ideas and beliefs about nature and human society” that gives the rites their meaning: the maintenance of the natural order. He also finds that the tribal social structure is maintained through the regular expression of the cosmological ideas in myth and rite: this is their social function. Similarly he finds the avoidance of names and certain foods by expectant parents and mourners for the dead among the Andaman Islanders to be the symbolic expression of an anomalous social situation and thus an affirmation of social solidarity in accordance with traditional custom. He goes beyond these

particular cases to hypothesize a universal relation of ritual to "the invariant general characters" of "all human societies, past, present and future" and to speculate on the possibility that he may have arrived at the primary basis of all ritual, religion, and magic. A symbolical approach to ritual is necessary, he insists, because human societies, unlike animal societies coordinated by biological instinct, are held together by various types of symbols—a point that has often been reiterated by later scholars in the human sciences.

Despite his conceptual fertility and the fact that his early stress on symbolical expressiveness, cosmological meaning, structural function, and the linguistic analogy was pursued fruitfully by later inquirers, Radcliffe-Brown's work has been subject to a good deal of criticism. His thought seems to be rooted in nineteenth-century biological notions and in an outmoded and inappropriate view of social science as the formulator of universal laws. His generalizations are contested as unjustified by the evidence, and it is questioned whether his comparative method is genuinely comparative, rather than merely illustrative of his general ideas. However, the charge of a radical ideological functionalism is refuted by the fact that Radcliffe-Brown explicitly noted that not every item in a culture has a social function, and religious rituals are implicitly included under this qualification. His fieldwork on kinship systems and social organization was praised as brilliantly innovative by a severe critic of his theories, the American anthropologist Robert H. Lowie (1883–1957). Moreover, the structuralist movement has restored his name and his concepts to a position of prominence. [See the biography of Radcliffe-Brown.]

American School. Among others who contributed a combination of intense fieldwork and theoretical reflection were three American scholars—all students of Boas—whose main subject was North American Indian cultures. Alexander A. Goldenweiser (1880–1940) is noted for his challenge to the Durkheimian theory of totemism, rejecting it as a universal cultural foundation and associating it with an emotional response to nature. He saw religion and magic as parts of the supernatural realm, which evoked an intense feeling, a "religious thrill." Similarly Lowie, who followed the careful empirical procedures enjoined by Boas, saw primitive religion as accompanied by "a sense of the Extraordinary, Mysterious, or Supernatural" that may or may not involve a belief in spiritual beings and that elicits a special emotional response. Paul Radin (1883–1959) saw religion as basically consisting of a feeling of exaltation or awe and of accompanying beliefs and practices directed toward powerful spirits. According to Radin, religion arises out of man's physical, physiological, and

socioeconomic situation and from the pervasive fear evoked by man's painful struggle for existence, and it serves to maintain the "life values" of a culture. Thus religion is again seen as serving a biological and social function. Radin emphasizes the religious beliefs and stances of individuals at least as greatly as those of entire tribal cultures; he sees that there are, even among so-called primitives, both religious and nonreligious persons, both believers and skeptics, both religious formulators and critical philosophers. Radin insists that ethnologists must take primitive cultures with the same seriousness that humanistic scholars take the great historical civilizations and their works—as fully human. [See the biographies of Goldenweiser, Lowie, and Radin.]

Criticisms of Anthropological Approaches. Latter-day anthropologists criticized the methods of early "armchair" scholars as skewed by unreliable secondhand data, unsifted sources, inauthentic comparisons, and haphazard syntheses that stressed bizarre phenomena or that selected examples to support preconceived theories. Yet the later recourse to intimate, intensive fieldwork has also been criticized as impressionistic or haphazard, or simply meaningless busywork. Even "participant observation" has been dismissed as the romantic illusion that one can get an inside view of a strange culture in a few months or years. Paul Radin, who voiced this criticism, defended the early reports of missionaries, colonial administrators, and other outsiders, which were based on lifetime experiences, as superior to the work done later by visiting professional ethnologists.

What is involved here is the problem of hermeneutic distance from remote cultures, a problem that is raised with particular acuity in the case of nonliterate peoples. But understanding has usually been viewed as a mental act concerned with what is other and hence distant to some degree. And twentieth-century theorists of hermeneutics (e.g., Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer) have viewed preconceptions, prejudices, and the cultural tradition of the interpreter as necessarily involved in understanding what is other.

Historical-Phenomenological Approaches

Like the anthropology of religion, the history and phenomenology of religion had its philosophical fore-runners, especially in the work of Vico, Herder, Hegel, and Schleiermacher. From Schleiermacher a direct line can be drawn to the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) and his influence on various human studies, including the history of religions. Like Vico, he made a sharp distinction between natural and human studies, in opposition to a nineteenth-century tendency to cast the latter on the model of the former. The sub-

ject matter of human studies, he affirmed, can only be “understood” in terms of the meanings intended by their human subjects, not “explained” by causal laws. “Understanding” (*Verstehen*) in the empathetic sense was the key concept that he bestowed on generations of historians of culture and religion. For Dilthey, this concept was accompanied by an emphasis on the psychological aspects of history. Emulating Schleiermacher, he also emphasized a mastery of hermeneutics, the art or science of interpretation, for historical research on written texts, and he proposed a typology of worldviews to mark out a patterned order in the various ways the world has been envisioned. [See the biographies of Dilthey, Hegel, Herder, Schleiermacher, and Vico.]

In addition to this philosophical influence, there was paradoxically a marked theological or religious influence on the development of an independent history and phenomenology of religion. In contrast to the leading scholars in modern anthropology, who for the most part were disaffiliated from institutional religion and traditional piety, many of the seminal scholars in the development of the new discipline were also theologians and deeply pious Christians. Their emphasis on religious experience apparently was not derived merely from the reading of Schleiermacher, who was himself a Pietist and theologian and whose central focus was immediate personal experience. Many of them emphasized this experience not only as an object of study but also as a necessary element in the person and mind of the inquirer, and they regarded the study of religion as a religious vocation, contributing to the religious growth of the scholar.

Nathan Söderblom. The Swedish theologian and historian of religions Nathan Söderblom (1866–1931) provides an eminent example of this new school. Originally a specialist in ancient Iranian religion, he broadened his concerns to the whole field of the history of religions and its relation to Christian revelation. He wrote a work on the development of the belief in God, considering the whole span of man’s religions, including those of nonliterate peoples. Although he saw the ultimate goal and high point of this development in Christianity, he regarded all religions seriously and respectfully, viewing the whole history of religion as the history of revelation. An especially notable contribution to the study of religion was his concept of “Holiness” as the key term in religion, surpassing even the notion of God; for, he asserted, there may be religion without the concept of God, but none without the distinction between the holy and the profane. Religious experience, a unique experience marked by the presence of Holiness, was for him the heart of religion and hence the central object of its study. The emphasis of this archbishop of Uppsala and

primate of the Church of Sweden was on the personal, experiential aspect of religion, an emphasis that was to have a great influence on European scholarship and was to mark particularly the Scandinavian contribution. [See the biography of Söderblom.]

Rudolf Otto. Similarly, Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), a German theologian and specialist in Hinduism, worked out a systematic relation between Christian theology and the whole world of religious experience, which he insisted possessed a unique quality irreducible to non-religious categories (anthropological, sociological, economic, etc.). He found clues to this irreducible quality in the idea of “the Holy,” an *a priori* category of meaning and value, and in the sense of “the numinous,” that is, of an awesome, extraordinary, mysterious, “wholly other” presence that evokes feelings of both fascination and fear. He used a highly rational Neo-Kantian method to validate the idea of the Holy, but he stressed its nonrational, numinous aspect over its rational, ethical aspect, viewing the numinous aspect as primary (as evidenced in the religious experience of nonliterate peoples). This idea bears a striking similarity to views of anthropologists such as Marett and North American Indian specialists such as Goldenweiser, Lowie, and Radin. Radin, however, saw the “awesome” feelings described by Otto as arising from economic and psychic insecurity and claimed that Otto’s failure to grasp this was due to his being a theologian and mystic. Other commentators, more positively, have emphasized that Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy* (1917) is basically a theological work or an inquiry into the psychology of religion rather than a work in the history of religions. Otto’s book has come, however, to be recognized as a great founding work in twentieth-century phenomenology of religion, to which Otto’s personal religious experience, as well as his marked systematic capacities and wide knowledge of living world religions, contributed. [See the biography of Rudolf Otto.]

Friedrich Heiler. A disciple of Söderblom and Otto, Friedrich Heiler (1892–1967) was another German theologian and historian of religions of a mystical temperament, who developed an impressive phenomenology of religion that was linked with his theological concerns. He is most famous for his works on prayer and on the phenomena and essence of religion. Regarding the whole world of religion as a unity in which religious truths are revealed, he asserted that all religions are directed toward the Holy. These conclusions, he held, can be derived from a study of religious phenomena by an inquirer who is inwardly attuned to their specific nature. [See the biography of Heiler.]

Edvard Lehmann and W. Brede Kristensen. Besides Söderblom, two other Scandinavian scholars are impor-

tant in the development of a phenomenology of religion: Edvard Lehmann (1862–1930) and W. Brede Kristensen (1884–1953). Lehmann, a Danish scholar, is noted for a little book in Swedish on the science of religion that contains a phenomenological section with an elaborate, systematic coverage of religious phenomena pervaded by Söderblom's concept of Holiness. He also contributed a notable new phenomenological section to a revised edition (1925) of Chantepie's *Manual*, which is frequently referred to by scholars in religious studies. Kristensen, a Norwegian-Dutch scholar, emphasized the alien religious believer's own belief as the central object of study, discerned by the sympathetic understanding of an inquirer predisposed by personal religious experience. However, such knowledge can only be approximate, he cautioned, since one can never fully reexperience the faith of others. He saw phenomenology as a descriptive-typological discipline, distinct from the descriptive-factual discipline of history and the normative discipline of philosophy—the three divisions of the general science of religion. [See the *biographies of Kristensen and Lehmann*.]

Gerardus van der Leeuw. Kristensen's student Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890–1950) produced the most massive, richest, and most enigmatic work in the phenomenology of religion, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation* (1933). Like Söderblom, van der Leeuw was a Christian theologian and churchman, aware of the deeply personal aspect of religion, and sensitive to wide ranges of art and culture. Although he insisted on the autonomy of phenomenology of religion as an independent discipline, he also viewed it as necessarily involved with theological concerns and as “loving knowledge.” He saw the phenomenologist of religion as having both a believing and a cognitive stance, an awareness that is both subjective and objective. Going beyond the admittedly valuable systematic cataloging and classification of religious phenomena by Chantepie and Lehmann, he sought a deep introspection that would enable the inquirer to reexperience the inner life of alien phenomena in a systematic manner. He focused on a wholly other “Power” as the object of religious experience—equivalent to Söderblom's “Holiness” and Otto's “the Holy”—manifested in various types of objective forms and subjective responses. Van der Leeuw saw the work of the phenomenologist as “understanding” in Dilthey's sense, an understanding that could be accomplished by careful, open reexperiencing and the suspension of normative judgment. Van der Leeuw's phenomenology had an obvious and avowedly psychological emphasis, but this was a philosophical psychology that owed much to the work of Eduard Spranger (1882–1963), a student of Dilthey, as well as to that of the existential

psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966). His exact debt to Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of twentieth-century philosophical phenomenology, is hard to determine, although he made frequent use of Husserlian terms.

Van der Leeuw loomed like a colossus in the path of later historians and phenomenologists of religion as a scholar whose work was imposing but bewildering. He insisted on an autonomous phenomenological discipline and method and yet asserted that it could and must be accompanied by a specific theological stance, which in his case was that of a devout Protestant. Although he maintained that phenomenology of religion must start from and continually return to historical and philological research, he was seemingly uninterested in historical origins and development and devoted most of his efforts to the discernment and presentation of timeless types, structures, and essences. He propounded an intuitive method for arriving at his types and structures, far removed from the empirical procedures practiced by modern science and scholarship. His “phenomena” were not the objects of empirical observation and verification; rather, they were essences, or general characteristics, arrived at, as in philosophical phenomenology, by an intuitive act of vision. Although the breadth and depth of his erudition and the richness of his presentation were widely recognized, many scholars were disturbed by what they considered an academically unreliable procedure, which they pejoratively labeled “speculative” or “philosophical.” [See the *biography of van der Leeuw*.]

Joachim Wach. With Joachim Wach (1898–1955), the German-American historian of religions and sociologist of religion, the method that combined religious concerns with a descriptive-intuitive science of religion was fully realized. A scion of the distinguished German-Jewish Mendelssohn family, Wach was a devout Protestant layman who had a broad background in philosophical, theological, historical, and philological studies and who was strongly influenced by Dilthey's “understanding” approach to the human disciplines and his emphasis on the cultural “expressions” of human experience. Moreover, Wach learned firsthand about phenomenology from Husserl's lectures. Quite early he produced an incisive little work presenting the structure and agenda for a nonnormative discipline of religious studies, independent of theology and philosophy, that would do justice on the descriptive level to the whole religious experience of mankind (*Religionswissenschaft*, 1924). Also in this early period he published a monumental study of hermeneutics (*Das Verstehen*, 3 vols., 1926–1933), as well as an introduction to the sociology of religion (*Einführung in die Religionssoziologie*, 1931), which was the

basis for his later, expanded *Sociology of Religion* (1944). In a posthumously published work, *The Comparative Study of Religions* (1958), he summed up his most mature considerations on the nature and requirements of the critical study of religion. His major contributions to that study were the application of his architectonic mind to a heterogeneous variety of materials and disciplines and his training of a generation of American scholars in the history of religions from his chair at the University of Chicago. He made the history and phenomenology of religion a recognized field of study in American universities.

Wach's major concern was worldwide in its scope, for he sought an understanding of the practices and beliefs of all other cultures and religions. He assumed that this project could be accomplished because of his belief in a common human nature (and mind) that includes a universally inherent religious dimension. Although he emphasized strict scholarly procedures and urged the development of a methodical hermeneutic approach to the study of religion, he also insisted on the necessity of some personal religious predisposition in the inquirer, insisting that mere cool objectivity could not grasp the religious experience of other persons. Not only sympathetic but also hostile attitudes could stir the mind to perceive otherness. Like his immediate predecessors, Wach insisted that the scholar must grow in his religious dimension (that is, in his stance toward "ultimate reality"). Moving from the distinctly descriptive stress of his early *Religionswissenschaft*, he later proposed a discipline somewhere between the normative and descriptive disciplines. This later development evoked criticism from scholars who accused him of blotting out the distinction between an empirical, descriptive discipline and theology and of imposing a personal Christian theological stamp on the history and phenomenology of religion. What is clear is that in the work of Wach and his predecessors there had been a movement from purely historical considerations of the various religions to a concentration on the structures of religious experience.

Mircea Eliade. Wach's successor at Chicago, Mircea Eliade, a Romanian-born historian of religions and man of letters, fostered a new generation of American scholars and encountered a similar opposition to his intuitive approach. Far less explicit and much more reticent than Wach in his basic theory and methods, he produced a richly creative corpus of works on concrete subjects in the history of religions, such as Yoga and shamanism, and on the morphology or general patterns of religious experience, which culminated in an ambitious multivolume history of religious beliefs and ideas from the Stone Age to the Death-of-God era. Somewhat like

the early anthropologists, who sought the *arché*, or essential structure, of religion in its prehistoric and primitive forms, Eliade dwelt on the archaic expressions of religious experience. He saw these expressions as archetypal responses to the presence of the sacred in this-worldly objects and in events that are regularly repeated within a time frame that is cyclic rather than sequential. These events have provided man with an ontologically rooted model for his works and days. Eliade hoped that such a study would help modern man to cope with the chaotic flow of events and the "terror of history" experienced so traumatically in the twentieth century. In contrast to discrete historical phenomena, Eliade's emphasis was on the general patterns that he discerned. He examined, for example, whole systems of plant, or water, or moon symbols; only within the contexts of such systems, he claimed, can the meanings of individual symbols be grasped. This can be, and has been, challenged as a flagrantly ahistorical and speculative procedure, because, critics charge, Eliade took materials from various unconnected sites, eras, and cultural stages and put them under a single general rubric. (This criticism is similar to that earlier leveled against armchair anthropologists such as Frazer.) The question as to whether one can go from various archaeological, historical, philological, and ethnographic materials to postulate general structures and patterns is, of course, a serious epistemological and metaphysical problem, to which more than one answer is possible. [See also *Anthropology, Ethnology, and Religion; Phenomenology of Religion; and the biography of Eliade.*]

Psychological Approaches

Psychological approaches—often of a reductive kind—to the origin and nature of religion go back as far as the ancient Greeks. The Roman poet Lucretius put into immortal Latin verse the idea of religion's birth in fear. There is an obvious psychological component in hermeneutic and phenomenological thought, going back to Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" and culminating in Otto's "sense of the numinous." Moreover, the above survey of anthropological theories of religion should have made it evident that they comprise psychological as well as sociological viewpoints.

E. E. Evans-Pritchard. In the sprightly and sometimes caustic discussion of psychological theories that appears in his book *Theories of Primitive Religion* (1965), the English anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973) takes us from the nature-myth theory of F. Max Müller and others, which claimed that the idea of the infinite or divine was derived from the sensory experience of natural phenomena, down to the theories of latter-day anthropologists who ascribe religious experi-

ence to feelings of awe, excitement, stress, and so on. The intellectualist theories of primitive religion propounded by nineteenth-century scholars such as Tylor and Spencer, which view primitive religion as the product of essentially rational, if mistaken, human minds, were influenced by the fashionable association-of-ideas psychology of the time. Beliefs in spirits, souls, and gods were explained psychologically, as was the distinction between religion and magic (e.g., in the contrast drawn between dependent submission and independent activity).

With a fuller, more complex psychology, including the affective, emotional, and appetitive aspects of mind, came theories of religion (e.g., Marett's) that had religion originating in a sense of awe before what was experienced as sacred, mysterious power, an experience that Evans-Pritchard described as "a compound of fear, wonder, admiration, interest, respect, perhaps even love." Ernest Crawley focused on the element of fear, a response to physiological and psychological stress, as the functional stimulus to religion and its positive attitude to life. Malinowski, as noted above, also viewed religion and magic as cathartic responses to stressful situations. North American Indian specialists such as Lowie ascribed the origin of religion to "amazement and awe" in the presence of "the Extraordinary, Mysterious, or Supernatural." And Sigmund Freud (discussed below) emphasized "the omnipotence of thought" fallacy in primitive mentality as accounting for the belief in magic. Freud viewed religion as well as magic as an illusion, analogous to the neurotic patterns of psychopathology. He interpreted reverence for God the Father as a sublimation of the primeval guilt of parricide as well as an exercise in wishful thinking. [See the biography of Evans-Pritchard.]

Emergence of the Scientific Discipline. In addition to psychological approaches that have been undertaken by thinkers in all sorts of disciplines, there developed in the late nineteenth century a specific discipline or sub-discipline that was devoted to the study of the psychology of religion. It accompanied the general development of psychology as an independent scientific discipline and was characterized by somewhat the same conflicts of doctrines as those that occurred in its mother discipline, for example, between quantitative, natural science approaches and intuitive, introspective approaches. However, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), the great German pioneer of experimental psychology, combined laboratory experimentation with introspection, attempting nothing less than a scientific study of human consciousness in its immediacy and venturing to produce a stage-by-stage development of social and cultural consciousness, including religion. Thus this found-

er of experimental psychology was also a forerunner of phenomenological and social psychology as well as of the psychology of religion.

Wundt had a great influence on the development of experimental psychology and the psychology of religion in the United States through his student G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924) and Hall's students James H. Leuba (1868–1946) and E. D. Starbuck (1866–1947), and through George A. Coe (1862–1951). These scholars emphasized the study of experiences such as conversion, prayer, and mystical states, using such methods as questionnaires, personal interviews, autobiographies, and other empirical data that could be analyzed, classified, and statistically weighed. Whether or not religious beliefs and actions were regarded as rationally justified by these investigators, their theoretical tendency was to view religion in its pragmatic function as operating to stabilize or develop personality. With the work of Edward S. Ames (1870–1958) and, particularly, James B. Pratt (1875–1944) American psychology of religion moved beyond a concern with individual American Protestant experiences to worldwide religious experience and gained a social as well as an individualistic emphasis. [See the biographies of Hall, Leuba, Pratt, Starbuck, and Wundt.]

William James. The great name in the psychology of religion in the United States is William James (1842–1910); the great book is his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). James, originally a laboratory psychologist and a biological naturalist and functionalist, approached religion from a basically pragmatic viewpoint. To find this he focused on a descriptive survey and typology of personal experience, in keeping with his general view of the primacy of experience over reflective thought, and of the personal over the institutional. He held that religious experience arises from the same general psychological makeup as all human experience but that it differs in its intended object. He viewed religious experience as involving intense human emotions and feelings directed toward some unseen order, reality, or power "out there," to which the personal stance is adjustment and surrender. His most famous typology is the distinction he made in the *Varieties* between the religion of "once-born" healthy souls and "twice-born" sick souls, a difference reflected in their respective attitudes toward suffering and evil. Although constantly evolutionary, functional, and pragmatic in his account of religious experience, he warned against "the genetic fallacy" of going from the origin of religious experiences in psychological states to negative conclusions as to their value and meaning. And despite his concentration on conscious states, James referred to their eruption from the "subconsciousness" and emphasized the

continuity of the conscious person with a wider self through which saving experiences come. [See the biography of William James.]

Depth Psychology. Focus on the unconscious and its relation to religious states came later with the development of depth psychology. This school of psychology originated in the researches of two French psychologists, Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) and his student Pierre-Marie-Félix Janet (1859–1947). Charcot's emphasis on hypnosis and the study of the unconscious mind in the cure of psychoneuroses was developed further by Janet, who, moreover, produced a psychological analysis of various religious states and beliefs and their function in human life. It was another student of Charcot's—the Austrian founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)—who was to make the unconscious mind and its relation to religious phenomena the center of worldwide attention. Freud paid far more attention to anthropological materials (particularly the works of Frazer and Robertson Smith) than most contemporary psychologists of religion. The resultant account in *Totem and Taboo* (1913) of a "primal horde," the killing of the primeval father, and the subsequent repressed guilt and Oedipus complex buried in the unconscious of the whole human race, has been labeled a completely ahistorical fabrication without evidential foundation. What is important, however, is Freud's attempt to account for religious beliefs and actions in terms of psychoneurotic symptoms and patterns that arise from unresolved infantile fixations. His basic normative assumption is that religion is an illusion whose deceptive solace is to be forgone in the present mature stage of human development—a familiar assumption in the history of social thought.

Freud's apparent reduction of spiritual life to underlying biological instincts and drives aroused hostility in religious and academic circles that sometimes obscured the richness of his creative contributions to the understanding of human culture. For example, in his interpretation of dreams and other mental phenomena, Freud broke down once and for all the conventional hermeneutical restriction of interpretation to fixed forms, such as literary texts, a restriction that had excluded transient mental states. Moreover, traditional religious institutions, while rejecting Freud's biological reductionism, took seriously his discernment of pathological sources for religious expressions in certain individuals and used this discernment in selecting personnel and in judging saintliness.

C. G. Jung (1875–1961), a Swiss psychiatrist and for a time a colleague of Freud, developed a far more positive psychoanalytic view of religion. His studies of images in classical mythology, gnosticism, and alchemy and his observation of similar images in the dreams of

his patients led him to the concept of a "collective unconscious" underlying individual consciousness. He concluded that the similar (or identical) themes and symbols expressed in ancient myths and doctrines and in twentieth-century dreams were to be ascribed to "archetypes" in the collective unconscious of the human race. Further studies in Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism confirmed him in these conclusions and in his emphasis on myth and symbol as functionally necessary for the health and wholeness of the human psyche. Hence, he held that religious expression of some sort is necessary for mental integrity and that its repression leads to traumatic symptoms. He stated, however, that his analyses and conclusions were purely phenomenological, having to do solely with psychic states and processes, and that they make no assertions as to extrapsychic validity. Jung himself did not engage in the comparative history of religions, but he influenced many scholars in the study of myth and religion, becoming, for example, the dominant influence in the Eranos Conferences, which have been held at Ascona, Switzerland, since 1933. Like Freud he was vigorously criticized by conventional psychologists for concocting a farrago of fantastic, academically unreliable theories and conclusions and for being obscurantistically opaque and unsystematic in his presentation. His critical admirers stressed his focus on the present-day human mind and his engagement in what might be called an archaeology or speleology of immediately present mentality. [See the biography of Jung.]

Both Freud and Jung have had their followers and revisionists. Erich Fromm (1900–1980) and Erik H. Erikson, who emphasized character and personality development as well as societal factors, have viewed certain aspects of religion positively from a humanistic standpoint. Existential psychiatrists, such as Victor Frankl, also have perceived religion favorably. A radically contrasting and opposing approach to depth psychology has come from behaviorists, such as B. F. Skinner, who view consciousness as a derivative of physiological states and external stimuli, and have hence held a fully reductive view of religious beliefs and acts. A repudiation of the emphasis on religious experience has come from pro-religious scholars such as Evans-Pritchard, who considered it wrongheaded to focus on the emotional accompaniments of religious life, which, he held, was better approached from an institutional and societal perspective. [For more detailed treatment of issues discussed in this section, see Psychology.]

Sociological Approaches

As with psychological approaches to religion, thoughtful considerations of the relation between religion and society go back to the ancient Greeks. Eminent Chris-

tian thinkers, concerned both with the shaping role of religion on society and with religion's response to growing secular power and influence, continued these reflections. Modern secular philosophers carried on the study of the relation from a strictly secular viewpoint, as evident in the thought of Comte and Spencer, noted above. Also, the marked societal focus in modern anthropologists of religion such as W. Robertson Smith and Durkheim has already been observed. This section will deal with a few major critical approaches prevalent in modern times. [For more detailed treatment of writers and issues discussed below, see *Society and Religion and Sociology*.]

Karl Marx. Among philosophers who may very broadly be termed naturalistic humanists, the sociology of religion has been perceived as an aspect of the sociology of consciousness and culture. This is obvious in the thought of Karl Marx (1818–1883), who declared that men's consciousness is determined by socioeconomic relations; this claim applies particularly to religious consciousness and institutions. For Marx human oppression, deprivation, and "alienation" are not only political, social, and economic, but also spiritual. It is man's violated and distorted consciousness as well as his productive labor that must be uplifted and purified in a perfected humanity, which is to be made whole in a classless social order. In this secular eschatological vision, religion would be one of the traditional ideologies and institutions from which human consciousness would be freed. Obviously this is no merely descriptive analysis of historical actuality but a prophetic affirmation of man's realizable potential and destiny. In this sense Marxism belongs to the category of secular religions, no matter how scathing Marx's remarks about Judaism and Christianity and no matter how much, like other eschatological visions, it seems to have been refuted by historical developments. [See *Marxism and the biography of Marx*.]

Various revisions and critiques of the Marxist view followed its formulation by Marx and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). Prominent in these were the opposition to the reduction of human culture and spirituality to their socioeconomic determinants and to the emphasis on class conflict, as against the view of religion as consensual, stabilizing, and integrative that has been held by a long line of sociologists from Durkheim to Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). Attempts at viewing religion as playing a positive role in the life of a people have come from Marxist theoreticians such as the Italian Communist leader Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), and attempts to find common ground with Marxism have been made by Christian thinkers such as the "liberation theologians" in Latin America. [See *Political Theology*.]

German School. Very rich conceptual and methodological contributions to the sociological approach to religion were made by German scholars, of whom the most influential was Max Weber (1864–1920). Weber emphasized the mutual influence of the economic and social spheres upon one another; he discerned a tripartite typology of authority (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational) in both spheres; and he made sociological studies of specific historical religions (Chinese and Indian religion and ancient Judaism). A follower of Dilthey in the application of the intuitive method of *Verstehen*, he differed from Dilthey in believing in the possibility of general causal explanations of cultural phenomena arrived at through comparative and typological methods. Although Weber was an exponent of a "value free" approach to social phenomena, his central focus was on the values, including especially religious values, that are the dominant norms of social structures. [See *the biography of Weber*.]

Also important are the contributions of German theologians such as Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) and Joachim Wach (already mentioned as a historian and phenomenologist). Like Wach, Troeltsch was concerned with the development of a scientific study of religion and, like Weber, with the mutual influence of religion and society upon one another. He is notable for a monumental work on Christian social doctrines and for his tripartite typology of church, sect, and mysticism. The tension between the historical relativism assumed in his approach and the theological assumption of the absoluteness of Christianity was for him the subject of deep concern. [See *the biography of Troeltsch*.]

Wach won early fame not only for his works on *Religionswissenschaft* and hermeneutics but also for his works on the sociology of religion, a discipline that he regarded as essential in the study of religion. The social for him is one of the three basic expressions of religious experience (the theoretical and the practical are the others) and focuses on the relation of the religious community to "ultimate reality." Wach's work systematically and elaborately investigated the various types of religious communities, authorities, and symbols, as well as the mutual relation between religion and society. He insisted on the distinctive character of religious groups as against other social forms, because of their essential focus on transcendent reality or "the numinous." Due primarily to what seems to be a theological emphasis in an avowedly nonnormative study, Wach's work has tended to be neglected by secular sociologists of religion.

Also important among German contributors is Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936). Tönnies is especially noted for his distinction between *Gemeinschaft*, the organic social group guided by tradition, custom, and religion,

and *Gesellschaft*, "society" in the modern sense of a rationalized organization ruled by law and contract. The idea of *Gemeinschaft* influenced Wach, van der Leeuw, and many social thinkers, although it was criticized by some as a romantic notion. Troeltsch's inquiry into the typology of religious institutions was further developed by H. Richard Niebuhr (1894–1962), an American theologian, in his *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (1929), a study of church, denomination, and sect in relation to ethnicity, class, and other social factors. Although based on careful scholarship, his work goes far beyond sociological description and analysis to a prophetic condemnation of the compromise and collaboration of ecclesiastical bodies with an oppressive society ruled by the rich and educated classes. His approach has been criticized by secular sociologists of the value-free school for its judgmental Christian emphasis and for its imprecise definitions and analyses. [See the biography of Tönnies.]

Various attempts have been made to find a middle path between studies under the aegis of Christian social ethics and positivistic studies that view religion as a quantifiable social variable. The phenomenological method, with its suspension of normative judgments, naturally lent itself to such attempts. Alfred Schutz (1899–1959), an Austrian-American social philosopher, had the greatest influence on the development of this approach in the study of society, and disciples such as Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann have applied it to the study of religion, especially in modern secularized society.

The Current Situation

By the last quarter of the twentieth century various new approaches in the social sciences and humanities had become the center of attention and inevitably influenced the study of religion. The new approaches may be summed up by the terms *structure*, *symbol* (or *sign*), and *system*. These terms had played a role in previous generations in human studies, but they assumed a different tone and direction in a new age characterized by such new disciplines as structural linguistics, semiotics, and cybernetics, and the advent of the digital computer with its binary code. The notions of structure and system, for example, had previously been modeled on the biological concept of organism, whereas now they arose from linguistics, with a corresponding shift from the generally biological to the specifically human, and hence to the operations of the human mind. Although these notions had also been significant in the phenomenological hermeneutics of scholars such as Mircea Eliade, the new "structuralism" usually rejected phenomenology of religion's stress on sympathetic understanding and its openness to a transcendent, spiritual realm.

Claude Lévi-Strauss. The central figure in this development has been the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. He sees human culture, myth, and religion as basically sign-systems whose deep structures, embedded in the human unconscious, can be discerned through systematic analysis. He seeks order in the great variety and heterogeneity of myths, rites, and kinship systems, asserting the fundamental rationality of primitive thought, to which he ascribes a fully systematic "science of the concrete." Unlike Durkheim and Mauss, who derived primitive classification from the primitive social order, he finds the basis of social patterns in the structures of the human mind.

This mentalistic emphasis is accompanied by an apparent downgrading of empirical data about primitive customs, rites, and the like, which play so large a role in fieldwork anthropology. For Lévi-Strauss the basic meaning of a myth cannot be found in such background material, but only in a paradigm obtained through a study of other myths and mental creations, and thus ultimately in the structures of the human mind. This involves a study of logical processes, of the "codes" by which the mind grasps concrete experience, and hence the "decoding" of particular myths. Furthermore, the codes for the various aspects of the experienced world are mutually convertible or translatable, as are the myths they explain. To illustrate this convertibility, Lévi-Strauss uses an analogy from music: a melody can be converted from one key to another. The stress is on formal structure, not on manifest content. Lévi-Strauss's structuralism is logological rather than biological or sociological; it involves impersonal logical necessity rather than individual human choice or socio-cultural determinism.

This apparently contentless formalism has been vigorously criticized as basically unsatisfactory and humanly meaningless. However, Lévi-Strauss has denied the charge and has insisted on the complementarity of form and content in his kind of structuralism. His defenders have pointed to the bipolar oppositions that are central to his approach—such as male and female, sky and earth, left and right—as the basic content in his analysis of myths; to his use of the principle of exchange (derived from Mauss) to interpret the world of myth; and to his stress on the shift from nature to culture, as he finds, for example, in table manners. He has insisted that structuralism is just "a new way of apprehending content."

Lévi-Strauss has also been criticized for making general statements about worldwide patterns on the basis of data found in a few local cultures and regions, and also for ascribing the structural paradigms to a universal human mind. The English anthropologist Edmund Leach, himself an eminent structural analyst of myth,

suggests that Lévi-Strauss's structuralist approach can fruitfully be applied to particular societies, cultures, and religions, but that it should eschew specieswide universal statements. While sometimes labeling almost all such claimed universals as "trivial," Leach also points to the weightiness of some of the universal themes disclosed by myth analysis, for example, whether death is final, or why incest is forbidden, or how the human race began. He also thinks that Lévi-Strauss has made an invaluable contribution to the analysis of myths by looking to the basic patterning or structure of a tale, rather than its manifest content, in order to find its basic "message" or meaning. Moreover, he considers Lévi-Strauss's penchant for generalization a salutary corrective to the cautious, atomistic concentration on particular cultures by Anglo-American anthropologists. [See Structuralism.]

Clifford Geertz. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who is sometimes loosely associated with the structuralist approach, sounds a distinctly new tone, epitomized by his stress on the term *meaning*, both in its referential sense and in the sense of meaningfulness, that is, of what makes human existence meaningful. He is engaged in a kind of hermeneutical anthropology (his own label is "interpretive anthropology") and, making an analogy between anthropology and literary criticism, he has likened the cultures and religions he has investigated to works of art. This inevitably involves "a semiotic approach to culture," since the anthropologist is confronted with strange cultural contexts that he can understand only by unpacking the meanings of their signs (or symbols). Geertz's basic concept of "cultural system" is symbolical, since it refers to the discerned order or pattern of symbols and meanings in a particular culture. The term also applies to various aspects of a culture, such as art, science, philosophy, common sense, and, above all, religion.

Geertz sees sacred symbols as possessing a unique double quality. On the one hand, they provide a representation of the way things are—a cosmology or metaphysics. On the other hand, they provide a guide or program for human action—an ethics or aesthetics. Thus sacred symbols express both an "is" and an "ought." A religion consists of a cluster of such symbols that make up an ordered whole, a symbolic system that bestows meaning on human actions and events and provides a basic warrant for the ideas, values, and lifestyle of a society. Going further, Geertz ascribes the use of such symbols to the human need "to make sense of experience, to give it form and order," a need as vital as any biological need. He relates this approach to the study of religion to the current and widespread view of man as a "symbolizing, conceptualizing, meaning-seeking animal."

In his essay "Religion as a Cultural System" (Geertz, 1973, pp. 87–125), Geertz fills out this basic schema. The main focus of the anthropological study of religion should be the meaning of religious symbols. Culture is defined as a historically transmitted pattern of symbolic meanings. Religion, viewed in its cultural dimension, is defined as "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (p. 90). Symbol is defined as "any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a conception—the conception is the symbol's meaning" (p. 91).

Symbols and their meanings, according to Geertz, are available to empirical study because they are tangible, public, "out there," not merely in individual minds; that is, they are social. Geertz, like Eliade with his "hierophanies," cautions that one must not confuse the objects and acts that serve as vehicles for meanings (i.e., what they are "as such") with their symbolic role. We do not study them "as such"; rather, we study the patterns of meaning that can be discerned in their use as symbols. Religious symbols uniquely act both to express an image of reality and to shape reality by evoking certain moods and motivations. They serve to disclose meaning even in the most apparently irrational, enigmatic, paradoxical, chaotic, and negative situations and crises.

Geertz has proceeded from close studies of small communities to general statements and broad comparative portraits of, for example, the religions of Java and of Moroccan and Indonesian Islam. He holds that recurrent general patterns of meaning may be discerned in comparative studies and that insights and conclusions about religion derived from one local culture can be tested by applying them to a quite different one. He is keenly aware that the scholar's interpretation of an alien culture and religion is hardly the same as the indigenous participant's understanding, but he is hopeful that by "sorting out the structures of signification" intercultural dialogue is made possible. Yet he still holds to the aim of a scientific study of culture and religion, in which the scholar plays a disinterested role *qua* scholar, with no personal involvement. That Geertz speaks of the "cultural dimension" of religion may imply that he grants the existence of other dimensions. He explicitly confines himself to what "religion comes down to as a social, cultural and psychological phenomenon" and makes no ontological judgments.

Mary Douglas. The British anthropologist Mary Douglas is notable for her attempt to relate the sym-

bolic systems of small-scale primitive cultures to mainline movements in more complex societies—ancient and modern, Western and Eastern. Going counter to the mentalistic, logological trend initiated by Lévi-Strauss, whose work Douglas both admires and criticizes, she has returned to Durkheim's emphasis on social classifications as the basis for symbolic systems and to his focus on social relations as the model for logical relations, and thus for the way the world is viewed. Also in contrast to Lévi-Strauss, she has returned to Robertson Smith's emphasis on rites, rather than myths, as the central object of analysis.

Seeking a "cross-cultural, pan-human pattern of symbols," Douglas finds the common natural basis for this pattern in the human body, which she posits as the model for cultural systems and the locus for "natural symbols." She argues that how the body and its functions are viewed and controlled is a reflex of social structures and controls, and she relates various physiological models to varying cosmologies and theologies in both primitive and complex cultures.

In *Purity and Danger* (1966) Douglas concentrates on the rituals connected with pollution and taboo in primitive cultures, showing through a structural analysis that they are expressions of the universal human requirement for systematic order. This requirement is present in modern as well as in primitive societies—for example, in housecleaning and toilet training. Although Douglas still insists on the distinction between primitive, undifferentiated societies and complex, institutionalized societies, she rejects the characterization of primitives as obsessive ritualists and denies the validity of the customary dichotomy between magic and religion. She finds "magical efficacy"—the alleged capacity of ritual performances to obtain desired results, which is usually viewed as a distinctive characteristic of primitive religions—to be an essential concept, sometimes embraced and sometimes rejected, in major Western religions. Douglas applies her analysis to everything from primitive witchcraft, to the holiness code in *Leviticus*, to traditional Chinese customs, discerning the symbolic system underlying each of them.

In *Natural Symbols* (1970), Douglas considers ritual as the expression of a society's cosmology. She seeks to discern connections between specific cosmologies and symbol systems and the types of social relations in particular cultures. Douglas has come to recognize that there are wide variations in primitive cultures, ranging from intensely ritualistic cultures, to cultures that stress "magical efficacy," to cultures with a complete lack of interest in ritual, cosmology, or a supernatural realm. Following Durkheim's lead, she theorizes that the explanation for these cultural differences can be

found in the varying social contexts. For example, if her hypothesis is correct then the basic view of the human body, which presumably expresses a culture's understanding of the relation between matter and spirit, should be concordant with certain social structures—a theory that could be empirically tested. Thus for Douglas it follows that anthropological fieldwork will provide illumination on "the traditional subject matter of the history of religion" and will reveal "implicit forms of the great theological controversies."

Douglas finds a consonance between rigorously regulated social groups and firm controls and restraints of bodily functions. A high level of social formality, she asserts, corresponds with an intense concern for purity—the avoidance of pollution—and with an intense ritualism. The contrary is true of less regulated, more informal social groups. Douglas works out this theory in the form of a schema that locates cultures and their religions according to certain correlations of social pressures (labeled "group") and classification systems or worldviews (labeled "grid"). Where group and grid are high, the concern for purity rules and ritual performances is most intense, and so on down the spectrum to a situation where personal, spontaneous responses are encouraged and formal rituals eschewed. She applies this schema to the contrasting emphases on sacraments and inner experience in both primitive religions and leading Western religions.

In Douglas's work a familiar stress is made on the ordering and grasping of human experience through symbolic codes that express basic cultural worldviews. Her specific emphasis is on rituals as the bearers of these codes and on the consonance of the ritual codes with the social structures of particular cultures. Despite her marked sociocultural determinism, she allows for autonomous personal attitudes toward rituals and views the human body as a model for the social body, as well as the other way around. Although she states as her "rule of method" that comparison must be limited to a restricted social environment or cultural range, she often jumps from consideration of a small, remote tribal society to wide-ranging comparisons with traditional Roman Catholicism or Protestantism or with the New Left and "hippie" movements of the 1960s. In lamenting what she sees as the sociological and psychological evils of contemporary antiritualism (alienation and spiritual aridity) and in praising the wholesome effects of a consistently ritualistic way of living, she seems to depart from the objective detachment often claimed for anthropological scholarship and to opt for normative judgments and a sermonistic stance.

[The history of the modern scholarly study of a number of religious traditions is traced in a group of articles, each

entitled *History of Study, under the following entries*: African Religions; Arctic Religions; Australian Religions; Chinese Religion; Egyptian Religion; Finno-Ugric Religions; Indian Religions; Indo-European Religions; Mesoamerican Religions; Mesopotamian Religions; North American Religions; Oceanic Religions; South American Religions; Taoism; and Tibetan Religions. See also Buddhist Studies; Islamic Studies; and Jewish Studies. Further information concerning the development of the modern scholarly study of religion can be found in entries on the religious systems of specific areas and peoples.]

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SEYMOUR CAIN

Methodological Issues

The study of religion is hedged about by conditions and limitations. First, there is the individual student's motive for entering the field—a partly or wholly subjective matter on which it is unwise to generalize. Second, there is the availability of material and the extent to which the investigator is personally equipped to understand and analyze it. But given adequate motivation and access to relevant material, there remain, finally, questions of method. How is the material to be organized and classified? What analytical procedures are appropriate in a given instance? And how far may these procedures be elevated into general methodological principles? Further questions suggest themselves. To what extent do the personal presuppositions of the investigator affect the way in which a given body of material is approached and analyzed? Is the study of religion a "pure" or "applied" science, if indeed it is a science at all? Is it, or is it not, directed toward a goal beyond the intellectual understanding of the given instance? Ought the study of religion to remain aloof from matters involving personal commitment, or may the student be permitted (or even expected) to affirm the value of one religious tradition over against others?

These questions, and many more of a similar kind, have been hotly debated in recent years. Taken to-

gether, they have virtually made of "methodology" an independent subdiscipline within the study of religion—or rather two subdisciplines, one historical and the other systematic. The historical stream, comparable in most respects to the history of science, examines past methods and approaches, with a view to mapping out the course of the study itself over the past couple of centuries. The other has features in common with the philosophy of science on the one hand and with systematic theology on the other. It has its sights set on the past only to the extent to which yesterday's methods still remain in force; otherwise it concentrates on what is currently known or assumed about the nature of religion on the one hand and about the presuppositions of the investigator on the other.

Most current methodological issues in the study of religion arise in relation to this second, systematic stream, and are precipitated by the different sets of presuppositions that scholars bring with them into the field. It makes a great deal of difference whether the investigator has been trained initially as, for instance, a theologian, a philosopher, a classical philologist, or a fieldworking ethnologist. It is of more than passing significance whether he or she does or does not assume religion to be of "natural" origin. Presuppositions of this order are seldom clearly stated, and later generations of students may be left to draw their own conclusions. For this reason, among others, a history of ideas approach to methodological issues is virtually indispensable as a preliminary to systematic reflection.

Religion itself is of course notoriously difficult to define and circumscribe. This being so, it is only to be expected that there should be corresponding difficulties in respect of the study of religion. That religion is multifunctional—individual and collective, existential, intellectual, social, and ethical—is universally recognized in theory, while being difficult to apply in practice. Depending on the limits set by the individual investigator, the study of religion may concentrate on a single function or aspect of religion to the exclusion of others. A prior conviction on the observer's part that the "essential" component of religion is to be found in one of its functions rather than others has the effect of establishing a scale of priorities within the range of observable phenomena. The sociologist examines one function, the psychologist another, simply as a matter of professional competence and personal choice. The philologist has been trained to interpret words, and in the absence of textual material may be completely disoriented. Specialization of this order is necessary, of course, but may become a danger when alternative methods and approaches go unrecognized and unappreciated or when the range of religion's expressions is narrowed down to

what the specialist is capable of mastering: in such cases it is appropriate to speak of "reductionism." To the extent that the study of religion actually is a meeting-point of disciplines (many of which enjoy independent existence in the academic world), it must accept a great diversity of possible approaches and methods.

Judgments of Value. Problems of method in the study of religion are not all of one kind, however. Method may be related to either material or motive. In the former case, the issue has to do with the structure of religion itself, as demonstrated by texts and monuments, myths and rituals, and morals and ethics, as well as by the religious experiences of individuals. Here the problem is that of demonstrating the relationship between these factors in terms appropriate to the setting in which each appears. In the case of religious experience, the personality of the investigator comes to the fore. Today it tends to be assumed that no student is capable of evaluating material dispassionately or "objectively," since every student is in subtle bondage to a period, an ideology, a theology, a social class, and/or a climate of opinion. Presuppositions may or may not be recognized, and it has been one of the main objectives of the phenomenology of religion to recognize and dismiss (or at least "bracket") whatever of a personal nature may perchance give rise to inappropriate value judgments. But skepticism on this point is currently widespread. It is argued that even were a state of freedom from presuppositions attainable (which, by implication, it is not), the desirability of such a state is itself a judgment of value. Thus objectivity is a pipe dream, and methodological discussion a necessary meeting place of competing subjectivities. The student may achieve technical competence in respect of religious symbol-systems, but on the hermeneutical level the value-free approach is simply unattainable.

Vocabulary. To a great extent the study of religion over the past three or four decades has involved a determined attempt to settle accounts with an academic past dominated by evolutionist presuppositions. [See Evolutionism.] But the attempt has proved difficult. The evolutionists gave the study of religion a basic vocabulary; they classified religions historically, geographically, and culturally, systematizing them into various "isms," each the rough equivalent of a species in the biological sense. Where religious miscegenation was believed to have taken place, a further "ism" was devised as a label: *syncretism*.

It has been easier to call in question the easily identifiable presuppositions of evolutionism than to modify its vocabulary. Many popular textbooks today still follow a line little different from that in vogue at the turn of the century. In theory, *Hinduism* is a highly inappro-

appropriate term with which to label a highly complex network of interlocking phenomena; nevertheless, it continues to be used. Objections to such terms as *shamanism* and *totemism* have been made repeatedly; the terms have survived.

Despite these terminological survivals, it is recognized today that any religious "system" is made up of many interwoven strands, and one of the objectives of the present-day study of religion is to try to disentangle them, historically and functionally. Perhaps this is best done in a narrowly circumscribed setting, along the lines established by anthropologists. But there remains a lively interest in wider but less easily defined questions: the macro-history of religion, the "essence" of religion, religious "truth," the nature of religious experience, and religion as a human universal.

A complicating factor concerns the position from which questions like these are approached, either from within or from outside a community of believers. Here a wide range of motives may be brought into play. There may be a "will to believe" or a determination not to believe. A given tradition may or may not be assumed to be normative and therefore "true." There may be a broad acceptance of religion-in-general, coupled with a far-reaching skepticism with respect to religions-in-particular. The permutations and combinations are almost endless and introduce a highly subjective factor into the method question.

Response Threshold. Whereas in the past it tended to be assumed that the study of religion involved the discernment of the natural laws by which religion operates—that is, laws that function irrespective of the stance of the student—it has now come to be recognized that the sociology of knowledge is an independent and complex issue in the study of religion. In its most acute form, the question "How can I be sure that the method(s) I am using do justice to the integrity of what I am investigating?" can induce mental paralysis. In a less acute form, it leads to a wish always to defer to the believer's own interpretation of a given tradition—a desire that becomes the more pressing the more contemporary the object of study.

A "response threshold" is crossed when it becomes possible for the believer to advance his or her own interpretation against that of the scholar. In classical comparative religion this was hardly a problem, since most of the scholar's time was spent investigating the religions of the past and often of the very remote past. Interpretations might be challenged, but only by other specialists working according to Western canons and conventions. Today, by contrast, a greater proportion of study is devoted to contemporary, or at least recent, forms of living traditions. The study of religion often

shades into a dialogue of religions, in which the views of both partners are (at least in theory) equally important. The response threshold implies the right of the present-day devotee to advance a distinctive interpretation of his or her own tradition—often at variance with that of Western scholarship—and to be taken entirely seriously in so doing. [See *Dialogue of Religions*.]

Insider and Outsider. How far the student of religion who is not personally a "believer" can understand and enter into the spirit of a religious tradition is as hotly debated now as it was a century ago. With respect to the religions of the past, this has seldom been an acute problem: evidence was limited to texts and monuments, and the existential dimension of religion could at best be inferred. But at the present time, it tends often to be assumed that no specific form of religion can be understood in depth other than from the inside. By some students the contrary is, however, maintained with equal force: since, as a condition of being a bona fide member, the insider tends to be forced into a certain (and by implication narrow) understanding of the tradition to which he or she belongs, the ideal investigator is one who works from a position outside limitations of this kind. Neither view can be maintained as a general principle. Intellectual understanding is one thing, imaginative sympathy another, emotional arousal a third, and the study of religion may be directed toward any of these. Insiders and outsiders alike may have their sights set at various levels. Purely intellectually, the outsider may know far more about a given religious tradition, its history, structure, and social implications, than does the average devotee, while being untouched emotionally by any claim the tradition may make to divine revelation. The insider will hold that all else is unimportant in comparison with the revealed message and may remain indifferent or hostile to any question of fact that does not actually support it. In between these two perspectives every combination and permutation is known. But to the extent to which the student does not belong within the tradition under examination, the elusive faculty of imaginative sympathy is greatly to be desired—though where it does not exist, it is difficult to suggest any means by which it might be taught.

Problem of Translation. Consciously or unconsciously, every student of religion belongs within a tradition of discourse—that is, a basis of spoken or unspoken presuppositions and conventions—that supplies the terms with which religion is understood. Most of those terms are of eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Western origin; though complemented from time to time by newer coinings, by and large they express less what religion is than what post-Enlightenment Western rationalism believed it to be. The word *religion* itself, as

Wilfred Cantwell Smith has argued, belongs in this class, as do the various "isms" that have already been mentioned. On a different level, the only basic doctrinal vocabulary available was that of (largely Protestant) Christianity.

Classical comparative religion was of course a purely Western enterprise; it was, in intention at least, a science, but a science according to the nineteenth-century notion of what science ought to be. Ideas and concepts and doctrines were translated into their closest Western equivalents. But even when it was explained that, for instance, Hindu *mokṣa* is not synonymous with Christian "salvation" or that to associate the Sanskrit *sat* or *satya* with Western notions of "reality" is to convey an impression precisely the opposite of what is intended, the attempt at direct translation persisted. It must be recognized, however, that all religious symbols, words included, derive their meanings from the total context within which they are used. Each arouses a host of associations in the minds of "insiders" and "outsiders" respectively—associations which may differ markedly from one period to another even within a single tradition. Unless the range of possible associations and "meanings" can be grasped, understanding is bound to be elusive. The New Testament, say, is in an important sense a different scripture in Greek, Latin, seventeenth-century English, and late twentieth-century English; it might similarly be argued that the *Bhagavadgītā* assumed a new identity on its translation into European languages from 1785 on.

This is the most important reason why the study of religion has always had an important philological component, though even so, the ability to read a text and the ability to understand it may be two different accomplishments. For texts are never ends in themselves. Over and above what a text says, there is the matter of the images it conveys, its function in the life of a believing community, its relation to other forms of religious expression—music, dance, sacred space, prayer, incantation, symbols of power generally—and its own hermeneutical tradition. So while the student of religion must be able to grasp whatever texts are relevant, textual study is only one aspect of a complex whole. Where primal religions are concerned, there are in general no written texts to be studied, and the emphasis must lie elsewhere, in the function and transmission of sacred tradition as a whole.

Tradition and Transmission. The present-day study of religion has learned much from anthropology and sociology about the transmission of sacred tradition. But here as elsewhere not all students agree as to the approaches that are necessary and appropriate, especially where the "great traditions" (using this term only in ref-

erence to the numbers of their adherents) are concerned. The methods of literary criticism were first applied to sacred scriptures a century ago, and they are still warmly advocated in some quarters. But a sacred scripture is a living tradition arrested at a moment of time; it has a prehistory and it has a later history of interpretation. Oral tradition preceded written transmission, and there is a "traditio-historical" approach (advocated strongly in the 1950s and 1960s by Scandinavian scholars, among others) that attempts to analyze this "oral" phase. Later, there is the ongoing process of interpretation and reinterpretation within the living and developing community—the "cumulative tradition" of which Wilfred Cantwell Smith has written. Again, however, it must be stressed that this later phase involves much that is not necessarily religion, such as the complex relationship of a community of believers to the world in which it is placed and of its members to one another and to those who adhere to some other religious or secular tradition. All these matters need to be considered in estimating the process by which sacred tradition—whether written or not—is transmitted from one generation to another.

Secularization. Intruding into the whole question of the study of religion is the extent and effect of the process of secularization. The process as such has three well-defined phases: first, the phase of rejection, as former believers turn from religion to some secular authority, usually that of one or another form of science; second, the phase of adaptation, in which individuals seek to come to terms with what is new while reshaping the old to fit new patterns of thought (this is where liberalism emerges); and third, the phase of reaction, in which old values are refurbished and fresh allegiance is demanded. It is at this third stage that various forms of fundamentalism appear in direct opposition to both apostates and liberals.

The study of religion is itself caught up in this process in complex and subtle ways. Thus while the student may attempt to keep this aspect of the sociology of knowledge at arm's length, he or she is necessarily involved in it. Religion may be studied either from within a community of believers or from outside, but it can hardly be studied independently of the secularization process, and this leads to direct consequences with respect to what is seen as the object of the academic exercise or the personal quest. Probably few students at present see the study of religion as the laying out of a smorgasbord from which to assemble a solid meal. But a sharp line of demarcation passes between those who retain a conviction that there remains a seat of final authority somewhere within the world of religion and those who do not. To the latter, the study of religion can

hardly be other than a behavioral science, and religion itself something between idealism and pathology. The former—and they are many—may locate final authority narrowly, within a highly specific tradition, in which case that tradition will serve as a model for what religion ought to be or might be. Or they may concentrate on the one demonstrable universal in all religion, namely, that it involves human beings and human experience.

Experience and Mysticism. The study of religion in this century has been affected by a polarization similar to that found in Western religion generally between the individual and the corporate, the personal and the social. But on either count, “religious experience”—whether of the individual as such or of the individual in society—has offered an attractive alternative to a one-sided concentration on intellectual formulations of religious belief. Many consider it to be the scholar’s business to penetrate beyond the externals of religion to the personal experience of the “real,” “the transcendent,” “the numinous,” or “the holy” which validates them. From William James’s *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) by way of Rudolf Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy* (1917) to Ninian Smart’s *The Religious Experience of Mankind* (1969) this emphasis has been constant and cumulative, and was strongly reinforced by the intellectual disorder that followed in the wake of two world wars and the frantic experimentation of the 1960s. Anthropological researches into the phenomena of shamanism and experiments in the use of hallucinogenic drugs suggested parallels with the experiences of mystics of all traditions—mysticism being taken to be the highest point attainable by the individual within (or perhaps beyond) the religious sphere.

But of all the dimensions of religion, it is the experiential which is the hardest to define and analyze. The experiences of other human beings can be known only to the extent to which they are able and willing to communicate them—by word, action, or gesture. Physiological symptoms may be given a religious interpretation and perhaps vice versa. Individuals may be unable or unwilling to provide any but the faintest clues to the nature of their religious experiences. There may be deliberate or unconscious deception, and individual experience must be seen as being conditioned in innumerable ways by the expectations of others and as having its locus within a community, its values, and its symbols. That innumerable attempts have been made to communicate the nature of personal religious experience cannot be overlooked. But to treat the individual’s experience as determinative of all religions is simply mistaken. It is important, certainly, to the extent to which it is accessible to the investigator; in all but a few cases,

however, it can be dealt with satisfactorily only in relation to the community within which it is placed.

The study of mysticism is fraught with peculiar difficulties. Some are merely existential difficulties magnified, while others are entirely specific, including the virtual impossibility of arriving at a single acceptable definition of the word *mysticism* and the recognition of the wide range of experience that might be described as “mystical,” from cataleptic trance at one extreme to a sense of wholeness and well-being at the other. Here, as so often in the study of religion, the absence of terminological precision has made methodological coherence practically impossible. The study of the phenomena associated with “mysticism” will continue; the word itself is, on the other hand, of little or no use as an analytical tool. As with religious experience generally, mysticism needs further to be related to the social settings within which it occurs.

Religious Leadership. This issue regarding the place of the individual within the believing and worshiping community continues to be of great importance. A special question concerns the nature of religious leadership—a question made more acute in the wake of the new religious movements of the period since the 1960s. Whereas traditional leadership has been wholly or partly institutionalized within an accepted authority structure that locates trained leaders in conventional roles, recent developments have brought the “charismatic” leader to the fore. Whether guru, prophet, messiah, or revolutionary ideologist, the charismatic leader and his or her followers have provided fresh possibilities for psychological and sociological analysis. On the one hand this is a matter of the background and personality of the leader; on the other, of the alienations and affirmations of those who choose to become followers. On the whole analysis has so far been directed rather more to the latter than to the former. Surprisingly little is still known of the personalities and motives of those responsible for founding religious movements in any period, perhaps because of the difficulty of finding a middle ground between total affirmation and total negation of their claims to be vehicles of revelation.

The Question of Culture. Perhaps the single most pressing problem of method in the present-day study of religion has to do with the relation of religion to culture and the interrelations of separate religious traditions in a culturally plural world. That religion is related to culture is something of which all but the most naive are aware. How the relationship functions is another matter entirely. If culture is regarded as the sum total of those factors (language, law, history, dress, food, music, literature) that give members of a community their sense of belonging to that community rather than some other,

is religion to be added to the list or kept separate from it? Alternatively, if it is allowed that the outward forms of religion belong within the orbit of culture, can there be an "essence" of religion which is not so limited? Or may there be "ethnic" as opposed to "universal" religions—the former culture-bound, the latter not? That religions themselves frequently claim to be noncultural or supracultural, based on "eternal" and "universal" verities, affects the issue not at all. The student's problem is that although empirical methods can easily establish which elements of a given religious tradition have been or are anchored in a definite time and place, and which therefore may be regarded as culturally conditioned, there is no empirical method by which to measure the timeless and transcendental. At this point, the study of religion must pass over into theology (or at least metaphysics) or assume a judicious silence.

Science, Art, and Craft. That the study of religion is a science was maintained forcefully a century ago. The experiential wave has since attempted to force the study into the imprecise role of an art, sustained by impressions, furthered by dialogue, and transmitted as an aspect of a wider personal desire for self-realization and self-expression, "method" in any strict sense being rendered obsolete in the process. That the study of religion also involves the practice of one or more craft techniques has always been assumed, however. Encyclopedic knowledge may have been thought attainable two centuries ago; today it is no longer even a remote possibility. But the methodological problems affecting religion at large have a habit of reappearing in virtually identical forms at whatever point the student may choose to begin. There will always be the difficulties connected with the tension between the "inward" and "outward" expressions of religion, between religion's "essence" and "manifestations," and between its many observable functions. In almost all modern societies, there are the additional problems posed by secularization on the one hand and by religious and cultural pluralism on the other. It is hardly to be expected that such an intricate set of locks can be made to open with the help of only one key.

Methodological pluralism, in other words, is both necessary and desirable; methodological sectarianism is to be deplored. The study of religion—as distinct from confessional theology or its equivalents—can hardly claim to be a "discipline" in the medieval sense of a *disciplina* in which *discipuli* are taught by a *magister* only that which it is considered safe for them to know. Rather, it is—and must remain—a meeting point of disciplines, a polymethodic enterprise dedicated to the understanding and explanation of perhaps the most persistent expression of the state of being human.

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Religious Studies as an Academic Discipline

The years following World War II brought far-reaching changes to Anglo-American higher education: substantial increases in enrollment, a rapid expansion in the public sector of higher education, and the demand for new technical and professionally oriented programs. Many of the traditional liberal arts colleges and religiously affiliated institutions, influenced by larger secularizing trends and stimulated by competition with the burgeoning public institutions, broadened their purposes and programs, while many of the public institutions, pursuing expanded missions, allocated resources for new or expanded liberal arts ventures. In this atmosphere of transition and opportunity, the academic study of religion has, in general, prospered, but not without some fundamental changes in its nature and mission. The most significant of these changes can be traced along three intersecting lines: the transformation of the institutional context, the redefinition of the curriculum, and the development of the professional community.

Institutional Transformation. By the early 1970s, religious studies programs could be found in nearly every kind of institution offering undergraduate liberal arts study: private nonsectarian colleges, church-related colleges, public colleges and universities, community colleges, and professional schools. In many church-related colleges, where religion departments had traditionally enjoyed a special importance, a number of factors com-

bined to transform the nature of religious studies. Only the more conservative Protestant colleges retained an exclusively Christian focus in their religion programs. Mainstream Protestant colleges, responding to both ecumenical ideals and secularizing forces, broadened the focus of their religion programs to accommodate the interests of growing numbers of students from diverse religious backgrounds. In such institutions, the goal of fostering critical understanding of religious traditions and values tended to supplant the traditional aim of nurturing growth in the Christian faith. In many cases, a general loosening of ties with sponsoring religious communities accelerated the trend away from programs focusing exclusively on Christian scripture and doctrine. In addition, the related reduction or elimination of mandatory religion courses tended to diminish enrollments in religion programs at these schools and to create incentives for more imaginative and pluralistic curriculum development.

This pattern of change had already occurred in many of the nonsectarian liberal arts colleges. As many as one-third of the denominational and nonsectarian colleges have traditionally combined their religion and philosophy programs into one departmental unit. On many campuses, members of the departmental staff have teaching responsibilities in both areas. In those institutions where the roles were relatively distinct, however, the tensions between the two elements were often notoriously distracting. The religion faculty, no less than the philosophers, often resented the intellectual implications of the union of the two fields. The patterns of change in the field of religious studies in the 1960s and 1970s introduced new possibilities, however, for common purpose and cooperation between the two areas, as interests in, for example, Eastern philosophy and religion and questions of social ethics stimulated the imagination of both faculty groups.

Roman Catholic colleges and universities experienced changes of a different sort. Although Catholic institutions had always offered a substantial number of religion courses, primarily in Roman Catholic theology, history, and ethics, they rarely offered comprehensive major programs in religion. The primary candidates for that sort of concentrated study were thought to be those men and women whose religious vocations had already directed them to seminaries and convents. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, a growing number of Roman Catholic institutions, influenced by the popular ideals and demands of lay education, established major programs in religious studies. Unlike the programs in mainstream Protestant colleges, however, these initiatives tended with some important exceptions toward more parochial goals and curricula.

The most dramatic changes occurred in public colleges and universities. During the 1960s and early 1970s, scores of state-supported institutions established religious studies programs at the undergraduate level. Many campuses also established graduate programs leading to the master's degree, and a few of these institutions joined the handful of public universities that were already offering doctoral programs in religious studies. By the mid-1970s, nearly one-third of the public four-year colleges and universities in the United States had established religious studies programs. Although many public colleges and universities had offered a variety of courses treating religious issues—for example, sociology of religion, the Bible as literature, and philosophy of religion—only rarely were these scattered courses connected across departmental lines. On many campuses, the new religious studies programs provided bridges joining these isolated courses and, typically, supplementing them with core courses in religious studies taught by one or more faculty members with a full-time appointment in religious studies. Other public institutions moved more ambitiously to establish departments with several faculty lines and a comprehensive curriculum. A substantial majority of these religious studies programs are located in humanities departments or divisions, but they enjoy the support and contributions of faculty from a variety of social science disciplines. Although many of the new programs in the public institutions have placed more emphasis on Judeo-Christian thought than on other traditions, with rare exceptions they have been deeply influenced by pluralistic assumptions and have tended toward global perspectives on the nature and history of religion.

The remarkable growth of religious studies programs in public colleges and universities owed in part to the general prosperity and the expansion of public higher education in the 1950s and 1960s. In a mood of responsiveness to student and community interests and inspired by ideals of interdisciplinary education, state institutions established programs in fields such as urban studies, black studies, American studies, and regional studies. Religious studies programs, with their multidisciplinary and cross-cultural dimensions, proved to be especially attractive to both administrators and students. Occasionally voiced apprehensions concerning church-state relations and the constitutional status of state-funded religious studies programs were easily allayed, inasmuch as the federal courts, in a number of important decisions in the 1960s concerning religion and the public schools, had recognized a distinction between religious indoctrination and teaching *about* religion and had raised no objection to the latter. [See Law

and Religion, *article on Religion and the Constitution of the United States.*]

By the early 1980s, a shrinking pool of college applicants and diminished resources forced many institutions, both private and public, to adopt conservative measures, sharply curtailing the development of new programs in the arts and humanities and eliminating costly programs with small enrollments. In this austere climate, religious studies programs on many campuses have been forced to compete with more powerful and, in the public institutions, older departmental programs for students, funds, and faculty lines. The increasing tendency to link academic majors with career preparation, the institutional and, indeed, national preoccupation with science and technology, and the general decline of the traditional liberal arts ideals have placed religious studies programs in a clearly disadvantaged position. Nevertheless, on most campuses these programs have adapted remarkably well to the new environment. In many cases, interdisciplinary links to other programs and departments have been further developed, broadening the base of political support for religious studies. New courses and program concentrations have been developed that respond to the needs and interests of students in preprofessional, technical, and science-oriented programs. On many campuses further advantages have been derived from successful efforts to win a place for religious studies offerings within reinvented general education programs.

Redefinition of the Curriculum. The traditional religion department in the denominational college offered a layman's version of the seminary curriculum: courses in church history, the Bible, religious ethics, and theology. The faculty were themselves ordinarily seminary graduates, and many of their most capable students were also destined for seminary studies. The forces that swept through private and public institutions in the 1950s and 1960s stimulated a number of significant changes in the religion departments in many of the denominational and nonsectarian institutions, as well as in some of the more prominent Roman Catholic institutions. While retaining a core of courses in the traditional subject areas, these campuses broadened the curriculum, instituting additional courses in areas such as Jewish studies, African religion, Eastern religion, and contemporary social problems. As faculty lines and part-time teaching funds became available, many campuses assigned a high priority to acquiring staff with specialized training in comparative religion and history of religion.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many religious studies programs, especially those in private nonsectarian and public institutions explored ambitious new

methods for introducing students to the field of religious studies. Guided by a familiar canon—classics by Émile Durkheim, William James, and James G. Frazer and more recent works by Mircea Eliade, Peter L. Berger, and Harvey Cox—many of these programs searched for the transdisciplinary essence of religious experience and for the perennial patterns underlying the myths, rites, and symbols of diverse religious traditions. Other programs, influenced by the broad currents of opposition to the war in Vietnam and the concerns of a rekindled radical politics, developed courses around themes of social justice and liberation theology. In these programs, as well as in many of the institutions that continued to stress more traditional themes, much interest was shown in alternative teaching and learning methods: student-led seminars, experimental grading strategies, contract-based and self-paced courses, and participant-observer study techniques. In a time of general doubt about the methods of the traditional classroom, the religious studies programs on many campuses played host to some of the most imaginative and controversial pedagogical experiments.

These experiments were paralleled, and to some extent furthered, by a number of significant changes that occurred in the years following World War II in some of the leading graduate programs in religious studies. Responding to opportunities in the university and impulses in the larger culture, these programs redistributed curricular weights, seeking a better balance in their treatment of the great religious traditions. The conventional areas of concentration, such as theology, church history, religious ethics, and Near Eastern languages and literatures, were supplemented by new or enriched concentrations in areas such as East Asian, African, and Indian religions. Joint appointments and other patterns of cooperation were developed with cognate departmental and interdisciplinary programs. In step with these changes, a growing number of students were admitted directly from the undergraduate institutions, bypassing the traditional seminary preparation. In these restructured programs, the graduate student was ordinarily expected to demonstrate an advanced understanding of two or more religious traditions and mastery of a variety of methods used in religious studies research. Graduates of these programs, moving into faculty positions in the 1960s and 1970s, brought fresh perspectives to the undergraduate religious studies programs and new support for a broader approach to the study of religion.

By the early 1980s, the wave of creative interest in reshaping the religious studies curriculum had subsided. The political distractions and economic hardships experienced by many embattled programs in religious studies—and in the humanities at large—left little

time and few resources for pursuing larger projects. The decline of the traditional seminary model for the religious studies curriculum, coupled with a loss of confidence in many of the more ambitious projects of the 1970s, left a vacuum. The religious studies curriculum has become, increasingly, a crazy quilt of courses encompassing many disciplines, eras, regions, languages, and methods of inquiry. Among the subject areas included in contemporary religious studies programs one finds Christian history and theology, biblical studies, Jewish studies, comparative religion, the religions of India, East Asian religions, Islamic studies, African religion, history of religions, philosophy of religion, psychology and sociology of religion, religion and literature, religion and the arts, religion and society, religious education, religious ethics, women and religion, contemporary religious thought, and religion and science, as well as courses in theory and methods of religious studies. Within the range of these broad categories, thousands of different courses are offered in undergraduate and graduate programs.

The growing conviction among contemporary college students that baccalaureat studies should prepare them for specific careers has resulted in a sharp decline in the numbers of students majoring in religious studies and in other humanities programs. Efforts to resist this decline by appeal to traditional liberal arts values and by demonstrating the professional utility of humanities study have had little success. Although some religious studies programs have maintained their traditional volume of majors and a few have experienced increases, a majority of the programs have had to reorder their purposes, concentrating increasingly on the provision of service courses for students whose primary work lies elsewhere. In the 1980s, the percentage of students whose involvement in the religious studies curriculum is limited to one or two courses has continued to rise sharply.

The influence of these marketplace developments on the shape and quality of the religious studies curriculum has been profound. To meet the needs of students who are seeking elective credits or who are interested in meeting general education requirements, more lower-level introductory courses and a new generation of upper-level "topics" courses, free of prerequisites, have been developed. The hazards attaching to these new patterns are numerous. Guided by the imperatives of providing attractive service courses for transient students, the religious studies curriculum may become little more than an academic cafeteria, crowded with appealing but essentially unrelated courses. Moreover, the failure to attach prerequisites to upper-level topics courses invites the dilemma of having either to stint on

a course's intellectual rigor or to risk bewildering those students with no background in the relevant subject area. The maintenance of program coherence and high academic standards will require considerable vigilance and, perhaps, a willingness to accept some decline in program enrollments.

A Community of Disciplines. In academic life, few terms are used with more passion and less precision than "discipline." No one knows for certain what a discipline is, but most scholars prefer to think that they belong to one. Religious studies scholars are no exception. For some of them, matters are uncomplicated: they are historians, philosophers, or sociologists who have chosen to apply their disciplinary skills to the study of religion. There are others, however, whose work cannot be neatly placed in one or another of the disciplinary traditions. As specialists in, say, Chinese Buddhism or religious ethics, they are routinely crossing disciplinary boundaries in their teaching and research. The typical graduate student in religious studies is, in fact, trained in a multidisciplinary environment where diverse methods of inquiry—philosophical, historical, literary-critical, sociological—are used in the study of religious traditions, beliefs, and behavior.

Beginning in the 1960s, a number of publications and papers at scholarly meetings reflected a growing interest in the recognition of religious studies as a discipline. This interest owes as much, it would appear, to the tumult of academic politics as to the evolving sociology of knowledge. Although their arguments vary in form and force, most of the proponents of disciplinary standing argue that religious studies scholars are united by a common subject matter: the nature and diverse manifestations of religious experience. It is this shared focus that constitutes the discipline of religious studies. Some of the more ambitious arguments include elaborate taxonomies that place each of the many areas of religious studies under one or another of a handful of reassuring rubrics.

If such arguments prove on balance to be unsuccessful, this may owe to the excessive abstractness of the unity they presuppose. There is, after all, a remarkable distance between the biblical archaeologist's examination of the water system of Gibeon and a study of the impact of Vatican II on ecumenical theology. The fact that religious studies scholars have a common interest in the study of religion lacks sufficient power to warrant recognition as a discipline. The academic world has no shortage of multidisciplinary scholarly groups, brought together by general themes or shared subject matter. The arguments for disciplinary status also tend to overlook the role played by a distinctive method or family of methods in the constitution of a discipline. Here,

again, the realm of religious studies scholarship, with its openness to a wide range of methods and perspectives, appears to be too broad to be classified as a discipline.

Religious studies are, perhaps, best understood as a community of disciplines gathered around the complex phenomena of religious belief and practice. Some of the activity in the community takes place primarily within disciplines, as, for example, in sociology of religion or philosophy of religion. Other activity involves transactions among several of the associated disciplines: for example, the interdisciplinary work in comparative religion, history of religions, and religion and society. On hundreds of campuses, this metaphor of "community" has been translated into political reality, as faculty with diverse backgrounds, both disciplinary and interdisciplinary, collaborate in the work of religious studies programs. On a broader scale, the concept of religious studies as a community of disciplines is mirrored in the activities of such professional societies as the American Academy of Religion and the Council on the Study of Religion.

The future of religious studies in Anglo-American higher education is linked to the fate of the humanities and the changing fortunes of the university itself. Religious studies faculties have so far adapted remarkably well in circumstances of both plenty and want. Religious studies programs have been successfully rooted in public higher education; substantial ties have been formed on many campuses between religious studies programs and older, more secure departments; and the religious studies curriculum, if somewhat disordered, has demonstrated a perennial appeal. The continuing health of religious studies programs will depend upon their ability to sustain demanding multidisciplinary research and teaching in an environment of increasing competition for limited funds. The challenges are formidable. The rapidly expanding frontiers of research in religious studies and the patterns of increased specialization in the traditional subject areas are imposing difficult choices between depth and breadth on many graduate and undergraduate programs. The coherence of the religious studies community and the will of its members to work together will be severely tested in the 1990s and beyond, as scholarly possibilities continue to race ahead of institutional resources.

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STUPA WORSHIP. The Sanskrit term *stūpa* first occurs in the Vedas, where it conveys the meaning "knot of hair, top," or "summit." It is unclear how the term came to be used by Buddhists to refer to the mounds erected over the relics of Śākyamuni Buddha, but this usage can be traced back to early Buddhism, as can the practice of worship at stupas. The Jains too built stupas, but these postdate the earliest Buddhist structures. The terms *thūpa* (*thūba*) and *dhātugabbha* (Skt., *dhātugarbha*) are attested in Pali sources. This latter term derives from references to the Buddha's relics as a *dhātu* ("element") and to the dome or "egg" (*aṇḍa*) of the stupa as a *garbha* ("womb" or "treasury").

According to the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, after Śākyamuni Buddha achieved final *nirvāṇa* his body was cremated and stupas were erected to receive his remains. Śākyamuni's cremation and the installation of his relics in stupas are probably historical facts. The early Buddhists erected stupas because they believed that Śākyamuni had freed himself from the cycles of birth and death. Had Śākyamuni died and remained within those cycles it would have been pointless to build a stupa for him, for not only would the place of his rebirth be unknown, but one could not have expected him to act on the requests of his believers. According to the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, stupas could be built to receive the remains of the following four types of people (known as *thūparahā*, "worthy of stupas"), all of whom had transcended the cycles of birth and death (*saṃsāra*): *tathāgatas* (Buddhas), *paccekabuddhas* (self-enlightened Buddhas), *tathāgatassa sāvakās* ("hearers of the Buddha"), and *rājā cakkavattīs* ("universal rulers").

Such sages could be enshrined in stupas because they had entered *nirvāṇa*. In the Āgamas, such people were said to have realized *diṭṭhadhamma-nibbāna* ("nirvāṇa in

this world”) or *saṅghapadesa-nibbāna* (“*nirvāṇa* with remainder”). *Nirvāṇa* was also called the “*dharma* realm” (*dhammadhātu*). Such terms suggest that *nirvāṇa* was not always viewed as extinction but often as an actual state or realm a person enters upon realizing enlightenment.

When the Buddha died, he was said to have entered *parinibbāna* (“complete *nirvāṇa*”) or *anupādisesa-nibbāna-dhātu* (“*nirvāṇa* without remainder”). Thus, even after the Buddha died he was not viewed as having completely ceased to exist; rather, he was thought to exist in the realm of *nirvāṇa*. Consequently, believers could worship and offer their prayers to him through the medium of the stupa. It was at this time that the belief that the Buddha could respond to the petitions of his worshipers probably developed. If “*nirvāṇa* without remainder” had been considered a completely quiescent state, then such responses by the Buddha would have been impossible. Thus, the people who worshiped at Buddhist stupas seem to have believed that the Buddha continued to be active. This belief later led to Mahāyāna doctrines about the *dharmakāya*’s activity in the world. [See also *Nirvāṇa*.]

During the early period of Buddhism offerings to the Buddha’s relics (*śarīra-pūjā*) were made by laymen. According to the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, the Buddha was asked by Ānanda what type of ceremony should be held for the Buddha’s remains. The Buddha replied, “You should strive for the true goal [*sadatta*] of emancipation [*vimokṣa*].” The Buddha thus prohibited monks from having any connection with his funeral ceremonies and instead called upon wise and pious lay believers to conduct the ceremonies. According to this same text, it was the Mallas of Kusinārā who conducted the cremation. The Buddha’s remains were then divided among eight tribes in central India and stupas were built.

Closely related to the stupa in functional terms is the *caitya* (Pali, *cetiya*). *Caityas* are similar to stupas, although originally the two were distinct entities. In Buddhism, the term *caitya* referred originally to a place that was sacred. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta caityas* are described as places that men and women of good families “should see so that feelings of reverence and awe will arise.” Four of these are mentioned in the text: the Buddha’s birthplace at Lumbinī, his place of enlightenment at Bodh Gayā, the site of his first sermon at the Deer Park (in Banaras), and the place where he entered “*nirvāṇa* without remainder” (Kusinagara). Since the pilgrims who visited these sites were called *caitya-cārika*, the sites must have been known as *caityas*. Sacred objects of worship that helped people re-

member the Buddha were both present at and themselves identified as *caityas*. For example, in Bodh Gayā pious pilgrims could worship at the Bodhi Tree or the Adamantine Seat (*vajrāsana*) on which the Buddha sat when he realized enlightenment. Since the stupa was an object of worship, it too could be called *caitya*. The difference between stupas and *caityas* is explained in the *Mo-ho-seng-ch’i lü* (*Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya*): “If the Buddha’s relics are enshrined, the site is called a *stūpa*; if the Buddha’s relics are not enshrined, it is called a *caitya*” (T.D. 22.496b). This explanation suggests that by the time the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas was compiled, *caityas* and stupas had the same exterior shape. As time passed, the Buddha’s relics became increasingly difficult to obtain and other objects were enshrined when stupas were constructed. Thus, the distinction between stupas and *caityas* gradually vanished.

After the Buddha’s death, stupa worship became increasingly popular. With King Aśoka’s (r. 268–232 BCE) conversion to Buddhism, stupa worship spread throughout India. Aśoka ordered that the eight stupas erected after the Buddha’s death be opened and that the relics within them be removed, divided, and enshrined in the many new stupas that he had commissioned to be built throughout India. These events are described in the *A-yü-wang chuan* (*Aśokarājavadāna*; T.D. 50.102b) and in the *A-yü-wang ching* (*Aśokarājā Sūtra?*; T.D. 50.135a–b). In the records of his travels in India, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsüan-tsang mentions the stupas constructed by Aśoka, many of which have been identified in modern times by archaeologists.

The Formation of Buddhist Orders around Stupas.

Little is known about the history of stupa worship during the 250 years between Aśoka’s reign and the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism at approximately the beginning of the common era. However, archaeological evidence from this period indicates that stupas were built in many areas in India and that stupa worship was a growing practice. Clearly, religious orders must have formed around some of these stupas and doctrinal developments reflecting the increasing importance of stupa worship undoubtedly occurred. Although most of the stupas are in ruins today and little is known of these doctrines, the new teachings associated with stupa worship contributed much to the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Buddhism has long been formulaically defined in terms of the so-called Three Jewels: the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Order (*saṃgha*). Apart from the Mahīśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka schools, which held that the Buddha was a part of the jewel of the *saṃgha*, most schools argued that the Three Jewels were distinct ele-

ments, with stupas belonging to the jewel of the *saṃgha*. In fact, stupas and sects (i.e., the monastic order) do seem to have developed separately. Economic considerations played a role in this doctrinal debate. Given that the Three Jewels were separate, alms donated to the jewel of the Buddha could only be used for the jewel of the Buddha (i.e., stupas), not for the jewel of the Order (i.e., Buddhist sects). Thus, monks were not allowed to use items that had been offered at stupas, that is, to (the jewel of) the Buddha.

Originally, stupas were institutions independent of the Hīnayāna schools. Archaeological evidence reveals that the stupas were constructed and administered by lay believers and were not affiliated with any particular school or sect. However, as stupa worship continued to flourish, stupas came to be constructed within monastic compounds and monks began to worship at them. Yet even after stupas came to be affiliated with sects in this way, alms given to the stupa still had to be used for the stupa alone and could not be used freely by the monks. Monks who had received the full Vinaya precepts (*upasampadā*) were not allowed to live within the confines of stupas or to take custody of their assets. Thus, although a stupa might be affiliated with a particular sect, a clear distinction was maintained between the property and site of the stupa and those of the order of monks. However, as stupa worship became more popular and more alms were offered at stupas, the schools suffered adverse economic effects. To counter this, the schools argued that little karmic merit would result from such offerings; some even openly opposed stupa worship.

Once a stupa accumulated alms, believers began to live around it and use the food and clothing that had been offered at it. These believers, who were considered religious specialists in their own right, probably assisted pilgrims who came to the stupa by finding lodgings for them, giving instructions about worship, and explaining the carvings of the Buddha's life and of the *jātakas* ("birth tales") inscribed there. They probably preached about the greatness of Śākyamuni's personality, compassion, and power to help save sentient beings and formulated doctrines concerning these subjects that were independent of sectarian (*nikāya*) opinion. Of course, these doctrines differed from those that had been originally preached by Śākyamuni.

The religious specialists who lived around the stupas resembled monks and nuns in many ways. They served as leaders of orders, teaching lay believers and receiving alms from them. However, although these religious specialists led lives similar to those who had abandoned the life of a householder, they still were not monks

(*bhikṣus*). Since they had not taken the full set of precepts (*upasampadā*), they did not belong to the jewel of the *saṃgha* and thus were permitted to live at the stupas.

Because they felt that certain religious experiences were necessary if they were to teach others, these religious specialists not only taught lay believers but also engaged in strict religious practices. Consequently, they imitated the practices performed by Śākyamuni Buddha and strove to attain an enlightenment identical to that which Śākyamuni had experienced. Since Śākyamuni had been called a *bodhisattva* before he had realized enlightenment, they too called themselves *bodhisattvas*. The term *bodhisattva*, which had originally been used to refer to the period of practice prefatory to becoming a Buddha, was now used to refer to *all* religious practitioners who, unlike Hīnayāna devotees, aspired to realize the supreme enlightenment of the Buddha rather than arhatship.

The orders of religious practitioners that sprang up around the stupas were thus vitally interested in two major doctrinal themes: the Buddha's ability to save sentient beings and the types of practices that would enable people to realize Buddhahood. The religious activities of these *bodhisattvas* eventually led to the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of these doctrines developing among Hīnayāna monks. Since Hīnayāna monks respected Śākyamuni Buddha as a great teacher and believed that he taught the path of the *arhat* for their enlightenment, they probably would not have used a term such as *bodhisattva* to refer to themselves because it would have placed them on a level equal to that of Śākyamuni. In following the practices of the *arhat*, they had little reason to be concerned with new doctrines about the ways in which the Buddha could save sentient beings. However, lay believers, who were unable to follow the austere regimen of the monks, would have been vitally interested in teachings about how the Buddha could save them. The new doctrines that developed in the orders around the stupas did not stress the importance of observing the full set of precepts and performing all the practices required of a monk; rather, in these doctrines, a form of Buddhism for lay believers, one that emphasized faith (*śraddhā*) in the Buddha, was described.

Mahāyāna Buddhism and Stupas. At least some varieties of Mahāyāna Buddhism arose from the orders around stupas. Stupa worship continued to develop even after Mahāyāna Buddhism had begun to take form. Although the orders associated with stupas are not clearly described in Mahāyāna literature, the existence of such groups can be clearly inferred from these texts. Only a few do not mention stupa worship. The

"Chapter on Pure Practices" of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra* contains a detailed description of *bodhisattva* practices, many of which focus on stupa worship (T.D. 9.430ff.). According to the *Ugradatta-paripṛcchā* and the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā*, *bodhisattvas* could practice either at stupas or in the forest (Hirakawa, 1963, pp. 94–98). They were to meditate and perform austerities in the forest, but if they became ill, they were to return to a stupa in a village to be cured. Thus, *bodhisattvas* went to stupas for many reasons besides worship, including recovering from illness, nursing the sick, making offerings to teachers and saints (*āryapudgala*), hearing discourses on doctrine, reading scriptures, and preaching to others.

Stupas were more than objects of worship. They also served as centers for Mahāyāna practitioners, with quarters for devotees located nearby. These early Mahayanists abandoned their lives as lay believers, wore monastic robes, begged food, read *sūtras*, and studied doctrine under the guidance of preceptors. They also meditated, worshiped, and prostrated themselves at the Buddha's stupas. An important part of stūpa worship was the circumambulation of the stupa (usually three times) while chanting verses in praise of the Buddha.

Two types of *bodhisattvas* are mentioned in early Mahāyāna texts: monastic (i.e., renunciant) *bodhisattvas*, who lived and practiced at the stupas, and lay (i.e., householder) *bodhisattvas*, who made pilgrimages to the stupas in order to worship at them. Lay *bodhisattvas* placed their faith in the Three Refuges (or Three Jewels), observed the Five Precepts (*pañca śīlāni*) or the Eight Precepts (*aṭṭhaṅgikaṃ uposathaṃ*), and performed religious practices. In many ways, their practices resembled those of Hinayāna lay believers. However, the two groups had very different objectives in their practice. While Hinayāna lay believers (m., *upāsaka*; f., *upāsikā*) sought a better rebirth, Mahāyāna lay *bodhisattvas* strove to attain Buddhahood and based their practices on the Mahāyāna position that helping others results in benefits for oneself.

Bodhisattvas often observed a set of Mahāyāna precepts called the Path of the Ten Good Acts (*daśakuśala-karma-pathā*). However, according to some later Mahāyāna texts, monastic *bodhisattvas* were to receive full monastic ordination (*upasampadā*). Thus, at a later date monastic *bodhisattvas* began to use the complete set of precepts from the Vinaya for their ordinations. In such cases, they probably did not use monks from the Hinayāna sects as their preceptors (*upādhyāya*), since qualified preceptors could be found in the Mahāyāna orders.

According to the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra*, worshiping and making offerings at stupas were practices

that led to Buddhahood. In the *Upāyakaṣāya-parivarta* (Chapter on Expedient Means), a variety of practices leading to Buddhahood are discussed. These include not only the practice of the six perfections (*pāramitās*) but also the building of stupas, the carving of images, and acts of worship and offering made at stupas (T.D. 9.8c–9a). Since the realization of Buddhahood was the primary goal of Mahāyāna practice, stupa worship clearly had a close relationship to Mahāyāna beliefs.

The stupa also provided a model for many elements in Amitābha's Pure Land (Sukhāvātī). The Pure Land was said to have seven rows of railings (*vedikā*); railings were an important architectural component of the stupa. Other elements of stupas were also found in descriptions of the Pure Land, including rows of *tāla* trees (*tāla-paṅkti*), lotus ponds (*puṣkarīṇi*), halls (*vimāna*), and towers (*kūṭāgāra*). Thus, the portrayal of the Pure Land was apparently based on an idealized view of a large stupa. Moreover, according to the early versions of the *O-mi-t'ō ching* (the smaller *Sukhāvātīvyūha Sūtra*), the *bodhisattva* Dharmākara vowed that anyone who worshiped or made offerings at stupas would be reborn in his Pure Land (T.D. 12.301b). This vow was eliminated in later versions of the *sūtra*, suggesting that, as time passed, Amitābha worship developed independently of stupa worship.

The evidence from these *sūtras* suggests that the relationship between Mahāyāna Buddhism and stupa worship was very close. Even the Perfection of Wisdom literature, which emphasized the memorization and copying of *sūtras*, did not deny that merit was produced by offerings at stupas. Rather, it maintained that stupa worship produced less merit than copying the scriptures. Thus the origins of the Perfection of Wisdom tradition as well are related to stupa worship.

[For discussion of the architecture of the stupa, see Temple, article on Buddhist Temple Compounds. The role of stupas in the formation of Mahāyāna Buddhism is treated in Buddhism, Schools of, article on Mahāyāna Buddhism. See also Relics.]

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Translated from Japanese by Paul Groner

SUÁREZ, FRANCISCO (1548–1617), Spanish Jesuit philosopher, theologian, and jurist. Francisco de Suárez was born on 5 January 1548 at Granada, where his father was a wealthy barrister. Destined by his family to an ecclesiastical career, he prepared for it by studying canon law at the University of Salamanca. In 1564 he joined the Society of Jesus. From 1566 to 1570 he was a student of theology at the same university at a time when it was undergoing a lively Thomist revival.

In 1571, the year before he was ordained priest, Suárez was assigned to teach philosophy at Segovia, and over the next decade he taught both philosophy and theology at various Jesuit colleges in Castile, including Valladolid, where he delivered a set of celebrated lectures on the first part of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*. Called to Rome in 1580, he continued the series at the Roman College, where his subject was the second part and where, it is said, Pope Gregory XIII was occasionally in attendance. Uncertain health brought Suárez back to Spain in 1585, to Alcalá, and here his lectures on the *Summa*, specifically on the third part, were concluded. He transferred to Salamanca in 1592, and in 1597, at the instance of Philip II of Spain (now also king of Portugal), he went to Coimbra, where he taught until 1616. He died a year later in Lisbon.

Suárez's first published work, *De deo incarnato*, which grew out of his lectures on the third part of the *Summa*, appeared in 1590, and his last, *De defensione fidei*, a tract directed against the views on the divine right of kings held by James I of England, in 1613. In between he published eleven other works, of which the most popular and influential, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597), went through eighteen editions in the course of the seventeenth century. Ten more works were published posthumously before 1655, under the direction of the Portuguese Jesuits. The passage of time did not lessen interest in Suárez's writings; editions of his *Omnia opera* were published in Venice in 1747 and in Paris in 1856.

Suárez's thought was expressed always within a scholastic context, and he professed to be a Thomist. Certainly the work of Thomas Aquinas was basic to his own, but he often deviated from classical Thomism, a fact stressed particularly during the Thomist revival of the early twentieth century. Suárez, for example, did

not admit the real distinction between essence and existence, and his metaphysics was more a self-contained whole than a mere elaboration of Aristotle. He viewed philosophy in any case as a basis for theological research.

In the quarrel between the Jesuits and the Dominicans over the problem of the relationship between grace and free will he took no formal part, though during the crisis of the first decade of the seventeenth century he was active behind the scenes promoting the more liberal Jesuit position. Similarly, he did much to establish the moral school of probabilism, which was later associated with Jesuit confessional practice. As a jurist Suárez did much to elaborate the notion of penal law and the juridical force of custom. He was a powerful advocate of the principle of subsidiarity in civil society, and he insisted that the powers of the state were rooted in the free consent of the governed. His doctrine of *ius gentium*, based upon the precept of universal love that transcends national or racial divisions, contributed to the development of international law.

Suárez was probably the greatest of all the Jesuit theologians, and as such he has had continuing importance within the intellectual life of the Catholic church. But he was influential far beyond his own order or his own communion. Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Vico have all acknowledged their debt to Suárez. The title given him by Pope Paul V—Doctor Eximius ("distinguished scholar")—seems even now appropriate.

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ŚUBHĀKARASIMHA (637–735), Indian monk and missionary, founder of the Chen-yen school in China. Śubhākarasiṃha (Chin., Shan-wu-wei) arrived in the Chinese capital, Ch'ang-an, in 716. A missionary of Vajrayāna Buddhism, he was followed in 720 by Vajrabodhi and his disciple Amoghavajra. The three *ācāryas* ("teachers") established Chen-yen as the dominant form of Buddhism at the court.

Śubhākarasiṃha was born a prince in a small royal family near Magadha in North India, supposedly a descendant of Śākyamuni's uncle, Amṛtodana. The family

migrated to Orissa, where Śubhākarasiṃha's succession to the throne at age thirteen plunged him into a struggle with his brothers. Although victorious, Śubhākarasiṃha's piety led him to renounce the throne in favor of his elder brother, and he became a monk. He led a life of wandering, seeking out teachers in the "south seas," and he learned the craft of making stupas and other castings. Making his way to the monastic university of Nālandā, Śubhākarasiṃha became a disciple of Dharmagupta and was initiated into the Vajrayāna teachings of the *dhāraṇīs*, *yoga*, and the Three Mysteries. He debated with heretics and finally was sent by Dharmagupta as a missionary to China.

After his arrival in Ch'ang-an, the emperor Hsüan-tung (r. 713–756) lodged Śubhākarasiṃha in the Hsi-ming Temple. There, Śubhākarasiṃha translated a text aimed at the procurement of wealth, which apparently led to the emperor's order impounding the monk's Sanskrit manuscripts. Sometime later the texts were returned and the monk I-hsing was ordered to assist in Śubhākarasiṃha's translation work. The emperor was especially interested in texts dealing with magical and astronomical lore. In 724 Śubhākarasiṃha accompanied the emperor to the eastern capital, Loyang, and was commissioned to translate the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* (T.D. no. 848), which, along with the *Sarvatathāgatataṭṭvasaṃgraha* (T.D. no. 866), translated by Vajrabodhi, forms the basis of East Asian Vajrayāna. I-hsing composed the first six of seven volumes of the *Commentary* (T.D. no. 1796) on the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* before he died. The final volume (T.D. no. 1797) was completed by the Korean monk known in Chinese as Pu-k'e-ssu-i. The massive *Commentary* contains Śubhākarasiṃha's oral explanations of passages in the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* and represents a creative interpretation of the Vajrayāna for a Chinese milieu. Śubhākarasiṃha also translated the *Susiddhikāra Sūtra* (T.D. no. 893), a compendium of rituals. In 732 Śubhākarasiṃha petitioned the emperor, requesting that he be allowed to return to India, but his request was denied and he died in 735. Śubhākarasiṃha's body was embalmed and a stupa erected in his honor near the Lung-men caves.

Śubhākarasiṃha's importance lay in his translation into Chinese of key texts of the Vajrayāna tradition, including the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* and the *Susiddhikāra Sūtra*, and in his establishment of the Chen-yen school in the Chinese court. Through his oral teachings contained in the *Commentary*, Śubhākarasiṃha initiated a tradition of careful adaptation of Indian Vajrayāna ideas and practices for the East Asian milieu. In its original, and in its revised edition of Wen-ku and Chih-yen, the *Commentary* was a source of creative interpretation for both Chen-yen and, later, Japanese Shingon and the

Esoteric branches of Tendai. Finally, Śubhākarasiṃha applied his supernormal "powers" (*siddhi*) as a means of building political support for Chen-yen. He was a *siddha*, or "wonder-worker," as well as a translator, and his exploits caught the imagination of both courtiers and masses. Years after his death, emperors and officials visited his tomb to pray for rain.

[See also Chen-yen and Mahasiddhas.]

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SUBLIME, THE. The word *sublime* is rooted in the Latin *sublimis*, a word originally suggesting height, as in "Sublimi feriam sidera vertice" ("With head uplifted I shall strike the stars," Horace). Although the concept of the sublime has had little direct religious interpretation, Rudolf Otto has argued that the experience it has come to signify is religion's "essential characteristic."

Certainly, hints suggesting this religious significance were advanced as early as Pseudo-Longinus's treatise *De sublimitate* (first century CE). We read there that "true sublimity," which disposes the mind to "high thoughts," always leaves material for fresh reflection beyond what is actually presented (*De subl.* 7) and that a "great conception," such as one which springs from Demosthenes' "grand passages," is sublime if by its nature it has such force that it is impossible to ignore, if it "burns and ravages" all else in its violence, like "a lightning flash or a thunderbolt" (*De subl.* 12). Later in the text the author speculates that what we learn from our capacity to respond to such powerful manifestations as these is that

nature determined man to be no low or ignoble animal; but . . . did . . . implant in our souls an invincible and eternal love of that which is great and, by our own standard, more divine. . . . Our conceptions often pass beyond the bounds which limit it; and if a man were to look upon life all round, and see how in all things the extraordinary, the great, the beautiful stand supreme, he will at once know for what ends we have been born. (*De subl.* 35)

In effect we learn from pseudo-Longinus that the sublime wins our wonder and attention, takes us beyond the limits of our thinking, and, while doing so, raises us "almost to the intellectual greatness of God." Unfortunately, it seems that little cumulative attention was directed to this text until the eighteenth century when the

concept of the sublime began to assume its current aesthetic and religious significance. Edmund Burke was perhaps most responsible for the popular revival of the concept, while Immanuel Kant was most responsible for its continuing philosophical and religious significance. But with the revival of the concept there was a change from considering the ramifications of experiencing that which is of itself sublime to considering the ramifications of having a sublime experience. Whereas pseudo-Longinus reflected upon what humans can learn from their capacity to respond to the great, Kant reflected upon what it means for humans to have the capacity to reach beyond the great: that is, beyond every standard of sense.

Paralleling earlier suggestions from David Hume, who used the term *greatness* rather than *sublimity*, the sublime for Kant is no longer the great conceptions themselves which ravage the mind, nor even "rude nature" with its obvious magnitude, but "the mere ability even to think" of magnitude and infinity. Thus, Kant insists, "instead of the object, it is rather the cast of the mind in appreciating it that we have to estimate as sublime. . . . True sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging subject." Such a mind certainly feels "displeasure" or "fear" arising from its awareness of the inadequacy of the imagination to understand and control those high and mighty objects. But more important for Kant, a mind such as this also experiences a "soul stirring delight" arising from being "alive to the feeling of the supersensible side of our being" which is in harmony with the law of reason, by which we comprehend high and mighty objects, and thereby effect our "preeminence" over them.

Although Kant conceived of the sublime as an inward feeling or experience, he insisted that its significance points outward. This is to say he took the sublime as he took the moral idea, as an "attaining" not only to the supersensible side of ourselves but also "to the idea of the sublimity of that being which inspires deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it."

Rudolf Otto continued both Kantian leads. Rather than the word *sublime*, Otto preferred *numinous*, which refers not only to the Kantian experience of fear (*mysterium tremendum*) and delight (supreme fascination)—which is to say, to the experience of "that which is other and opposite of everything that is and can be thought" together with "the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow [one's] own"—but also to an attaining, or as Otto puts it, a religious "coming upon"

something inherently "wholly other: that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar . . . before which we . . . recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb."

Although Otto built upon Kant's "idea of the sublimity of a religion and of its object," Kant took this religious move as he took sublimity itself: into a transcendent realm wherein "religion is intrinsically distinguished from superstition." For Kant, the experience of the sublime implies an understanding through which the individual is "raised above the dread of such operations of nature, in which he no longer sees God pouring forth the vials of wrath." For Otto, on the other hand, the paradoxical assertion that the sublime may be experienced is integral to the religious impulse. By means of the experience of God as "wholly other" (as the void, the uncanny, and the awful), human beings are provided with an "indisputably true . . . glimpse of an Eternal, in and beyond the temporal and penetrating it, the apprehension of a ground and meaning of things in and beyond the empirical and transcending it. They are surmises or inklings of a Reality fraught with mystery and momentousness."

In fact, for Otto, there is no realm where the paradoxical quality of sublime experience is transcended, wherein the individual is "raised above the dread. . . ." For example, he explores Gregory of Nyssa's suggestion that "since one of the signs of the Divine Nature is its essential incomprehensibility, in this also must the copy be like the original." In this willingness to incorporate the sublime's lesson into a wider reality "fraught with mystery and momentousness," Otto is very much part of a continuing twentieth-century pattern of speculation originally influenced by G. W. F. Hegel. Martin Heidegger suggests that to be human is to be a particular kind of being, *Dasein*, or "being there," which is being in a process which includes the incomprehensible: specifically, *not* being (i.e., death). John Dewey, in most unsublime terms, insists that all experience is inherently ambiguous, "the union . . . of the settled and the unsettled, the stale and the hazardous." Hans Georg Gadamer points out that we do not experience objects that meet conditions of identity and individuation, but rather living identities in their "effective-history," a history which provides them their being, albeit a being which of necessity is negative toward itself.

The intellectual history of the sublime is all of a piece: the emphasis that is now placed upon the inherent negativity of all being toward itself may be seen as a gloss on the notion of pseudo-Longinus that true sublimity burns and ravages; to point out that all experience is hazardous is consistent with the notion of

pseudo-Longinus that true sublimity provides material for fresh reflection beyond that which is actually presented. What has changed is that the sublime has come to be perceived as an experience, rather than as an object of perception.

[See also the biographies of Otto, Kant, Gregory of Nyssa, Hegel, and Heidegger.]

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Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational*, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1950), is the most important text for understanding the importance of the sublime in religious experience. However, its primary focus is on Judeo-Christianity, and on the experience of the divine. My own work, *Religion As Art* (Albany, N.Y., 1981), widens that focus.

T. R. MARTLAND

SUFFERING. [This entry focuses on interpretations of suffering in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For discussion of beliefs about suffering in South Asian religions, see Karman; Saṃsāra; and Four Noble Truths. Religious ideas about and responses to suffering in human existence are also discussed in entries such as Cosmology and Myth.]

Suffering may be defined as the experience of organisms in situations that involve physical and mental pain, usually attended by a sense of loss, frustration, and vulnerability to adverse effects. As a fact of sentient life, pain is a phenomenon concomitant to existence itself and yet, on the human level at least, it is one that is inextricably linked with the sense of one's individuality. As such, pain can only be defined subjectively, and because of its implications for the survival of the individual, the experience of pain often provokes questions about the meaning of life itself.

The effort to understand the meaning of pain is natural, as is the human attempt to mediate painful experiences through recourse to secular or religious symbol systems. A major reason for the enormous influence of science and technology and the esteem in which they are currently held lies in their success in giving human beings power, or the illusion of power, over forces that

adversely affect them. However, while science, technology, and social institutions have done much to alleviate suffering, these means, even at their most beneficent, can eliminate only some aspects of pain, but not all.

Thus suffering, more than any other fact of human life, raises the philosophical questions that religion is customarily called upon to answer. When stricken with grief, we question the purpose of life and look for meaning in a universe that harbors such pain. Traditionally, religions have responded to the problem of suffering in two ways: first, by trying to place the human experience of pain within the context of an overall understanding of the universe and, second, by showing ways to overcome or transcend suffering through faith, piety, appropriate action, or change in perspective. Within this broad response, religions have worked out varied systems of answers to the questions and challenges posed by the problem of human suffering.

Judaism. Jewish tradition reflects a number of approaches to an assessment of the nature and meaning of suffering and offers a selection of options for transforming painful experiences in order to make them comprehensible. Basically, Judaism sees suffering as man's vulnerability to the negative effects of any number of occurrences over which he has little or no control; in other words, much suffering arises simply from being human.

In a brief review of some of the Jewish explanations for the fact of suffering, two categories emerge. The first attributes suffering either to sin or to ignorance of the right path that should be followed; the second postulates that suffering may attend spiritual progress.

It has been generally recognized in rabbinic Judaism that suffering is largely due to one's own misconduct. Numerous passages throughout both biblical and rabbinic literature indicate that suffering results from wrongdoing and is thus a punishment for sin (*Prv.* 22:8). A direct relationship exists between suffering and wrongdoing, on the one hand, and between joyfulness and right action, on the other. Suffering may also arise from a misconception about the true nature of the self, which leads to a course of action that is ultimately self-destructive rather than self-fulfilling. In the stories of Jacob and Joseph, for instance, suffering comes about because one does something fundamentally wrong or alien to one's being. In such cases, suffering may function as the means by which one comes to terms with one's true self. This view suggests that self-knowledge, as well as a proper understanding of the world and of truth, can come only through struggle and through becoming sensitized to things that one would not have been fully aware of without first having suffered.

Many rabbinic and biblical passages indicate that suffering does not simply punish, but also serves an educational purpose. For example, *Deuteronomy* 4:20 reads: "He brought you out of the iron furnace of Egypt to be his people." Here, Rashi (Shelomoh ben Yitshaq, 1040–1105) interprets "iron furnace" to mean a furnace made of iron for the purpose of refining a precious metal such as silver or gold. Samuel David Luzzatto comments that it is a furnace for smelting iron, emphasizing the purificatory purpose of suffering. We find a similar idea in *Jeremiah* 11:4 and in *Isaiah* 48:10, which states: "Behold, I have refined thee but not with silver, I have chosen thee out of the furnace of affliction." Suffering gives special insight and leads to self-transcendence and concern for others; without suffering, man is insensitive and given to self-interest and self-centeredness. As *Exodus* 23:9 admonishes: "Do not oppress a stranger, for you know the feelings of a stranger, since you, yourselves, were strangers in the land of Egypt."

There is another way in which suffering is understood in Jewish tradition: one may suffer not because one has done wrong but, on the contrary, because one has done right. Here a distinction is made between suffering that results from sin and suffering that results from acting virtuously. Having recognized one's responsibilities through one's own suffering, one is confronted with a new form of suffering that arises from the assumption of the burdens of others. In this respect, suffering is a necessary part of the burden of ascent, since it results from the assumption of tasks that the righteous take upon themselves. Acting virtuously necessarily entails suffering—not a slight, passing discomfort, but intense, agonizing suffering. The doctrine of chastisements of love affirms that God gives special burdens to those who have an unusual capacity to endure them. The righteous bear the burden of ascent; according to *Psalms* 11:5, "The Lord tries the righteous." In a rabbinical interpretation of this text, Rabbi Yonatan writes:

The Lord tries the righteous (Ps. XI, 5). The potter does not test cracked vessels; it is not worthwhile to tap them even once because they would break; but he taps the good ones because, however many times he taps them, they do not break. Even so God tries not the wicked, but the righteous. Rabbi Joe b. Hanina said, "The flax dealer who knows that his flax is good pounds it for it becomes more excellent by his pounding and when he knocks it, it glistens the more. But when he knows that his flax is bad, he does not knock it at all, for it would split. So God tries, not the wicked, but the righteous." R. Elazar said, "A man had two cows, one strong and one weak. Upon which will he lay the yoke? Surely upon the strong. So God tests the righteous."

(*Gn. Rab.*, 32.3)

The idea that those who are able to bear the burden are the ones who should carry it is interpreted by Henry Slonimsky to be the heart of the Midrashic teaching on suffering. He states: "The answer to the question why the good must suffer for the inadequacies of the world would be the fact that the world is growing, developing, and therefore inevitably defective, and there must be someone noble enough to assume the burden, as exemplification of a new insight, namely that nobility obligates, noblesse oblige" (Slonimsky, 1967, p. 39). Taking on the burdens of others can only be done by those individuals who are made capable by their own experience and understanding of suffering. Several *midrashim* indicate how dear and precious are these shattered ones of God. In the name of Rabbi Abba' bar Yudan, the Midrash states: "Whatever God has declared unfit in the case of an animal he has declared desirable in the case of man. In animals he declared unfit the 'blind or broken or maimed or having a wen' [Lv. 22:22], but in man he has declared the broken and contrite heart to be desirable." Also, Rabbi Yehoshu'a ben Levi said, "He who accepts gladly the sufferings of this world brings salvation to the world" (B.T., *Ta'an.* 8a).

A sublime individual response to suffering is seen in an incident in Rabbi Zusya's life:

When Rabbi Shemlke and his brother visited the *maggid* of Mezritch, they asked him the following. "Our sages said certain words which leave us no peace because we do not understand them. They are that men should praise and thank God for suffering just as much as for wellbeing, and receive it with the same joy. Will you tell us how we are to understand this, Rabbi?"

The *maggid* replied, "Go to the House of Study. There you will find Zusya smoking his pipe. He will give you the explanation." They went to the House of Study and put their question to Rabbi Zusya. He laughed. "You certainly have not come to the right man! Better go to someone else rather than to me, for I have never experienced suffering." But the two knew that, from the day he was born to this day, Rabbi Zusya's life had been a web of need and anguish. Then they knew what it was to accept suffering with love.

(Buber, 1947, pp. 217–218)

Innumerable *midrashim* embrace the doctrine of vicarious suffering. With regard to the *Song of Songs*, Raba states: "As the dove stretches out her neck to the slaughter, so do the Israelites, for it was said, 'For thy sake we are killed all day long' (Ps. 44:22). As the dove atones for sins, so the Israelites atone for the nation."

In this process of the transformation of the world through vicarious suffering, the role of the suffering individual and that of the prophet become linked with the idea of the suffering people. This concept appears in the

passages in *Isaiah* 53 on the suffering servant, who is the great symbol of vicarious suffering. The controversy over whether the phrase *suffering servant* refers to an individual or to the people as a whole can be resolved once it is seen that it stands for both: the prophet is to the people as Israel is to the nations. Just as the nations resist the witness of Israel, so the people resist the word of the prophet.

Jewish tradition affirms that there is a correlation between one's suffering and one's actions, that suffering is self-inflicted. There is, therefore, a just order of things, in the sense that evil acts bring about evil consequences. However, in late biblical and postbiblical Judaism, the doctrine of immortality and resurrection was introduced to account for the suffering of the innocent, which saves the justice of God by positing perfect retribution and reward in the world to come. It is often suggested that the wicked flourish because they are allowed to consume, while still in this world, whatever reward may be due to them, and the righteous suffer because they are exhausting whatever penalties they may have incurred. In qabbalistic (mystical) Judaism, the doctrine of reincarnation was accepted as a means of solving this problem, in that human souls were given repeated chances to atone in this world before a final judgment.

Nevertheless, Judaism finds suffering to be a very harsh, crippling, and disastrous experience—one that a person should strive to avoid whenever possible. Throughout their long history of suffering, persecution, exile, torture, and death, the Jewish people have wrestled with the perplexing problem of why they seem to have experienced such a degree of suffering. Even "the resolve to observe the commandments was, in itself, the cause of death and suffering" (Urbach, 1975, p. 442). Faced with the choice of disobeying God or submitting to the ultimate suffering of martyrdom, the rabbis refused to be swayed into any kind of masochistic fervor; they still realistically recognized how dreadful suffering is. All sufferings, as well as terrible martyrdoms, were not simply acquiesced to, but fiercely questioned.

Jewish teaching clearly acknowledges that there is great injustice in the world and great suffering on the part of the innocent. The pain and death of children is a frequent example, as is the slaughter of millions in wars, political upheavals, and concentration camps. [See Holocaust, The, *article on Jewish Theological Responses.*] Jewish tradition deals with this problem of mass suffering, of the undifferentiated fate of the innocent and the guilty, by claiming that this is an unfinished world in which justice and peace are not given, but have to be won. Suffering is a necessary part of

completing this world, and the individuals who take up the burden of striving to perfect it also suffer.

Such a concept, however, does not explain why God would so constitute the world, nor does it fully account for the sufferings of those ordinary people who are caught up in wars, earthquakes, or other human or natural catastrophes. Therefore, a tendency can be found in the rabbinic tradition to consider the problem of suffering as one of the areas beyond full human comprehension. In the popular tractate *Avot* (c. 200 CE), a portion of the Mishnah, Rabbi Yanna'i states: "It is not in our power to explain either the prosperity of the wicked or the affliction of the righteous" (4.19). The terrible death by torture of the venerable 'Aqiva' ben Yosef at the hands of the Romans (second century CE) illustrates the point. It is said that, on Sinai, Moses was granted a vision of the learning and wisdom of 'Aqiva' in expounding Torah and then was given another vision of the rabbi's martyrdom. When Moses protested to God, "Master of the Universe, is this the Torah and this its Reward?" he was told, "Be silent, for this is the way I have determined it" (B.T., *Men.* 29b).

God also suffers: he is a God who cares for his creatures and yet is unable to prevent their suffering. He is so intimately concerned with human destiny that what men and women do affects him directly: "In their afflictions I was afflicted" (*Is.* 63:9; cf. *Ps.* 91:15, *Gn.* 6:5–6). This is also poignantly illustrated in various *midrashim* where God is pictured as weeping and needing consolation because of all the suffering and tragedy in the world: "When God remembers his children who dwell in misery among the nations of the world, he causes two tears to descend to the ocean and the sound is heard from one end of the world to the other" (B.T., *Ber.* 59a).

Christianity. Many of the same responses to suffering found in Judaism are also quite understandably evidenced in Christian thought. For example, the statement in *Proverbs* 22:8 that one brings about one's own suffering ("He that soweth iniquity shall reap calamity") is paralleled in *Matthew* 26:52: "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword." In his letter to the Galatians, Paul concurs: "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (*Gal.* 6:7). Numerous passages, both in the New Testament and in other Christian writings, indicate that suffering is the just payment for sin. Such a penalty may even come in the form of a swiftly executed death sentence, as in the cases of Ananias and Sapphira (*Acts* 5:1–11) and the profanation of the eucharist (*I Cor.* 11:29–30). However, in *John* 9:3, Jesus specifically rejects the notion that suffering is always the result of sin, asserting that a man's blindness was caused neither by his own nor his parents' sin.

Explicit both in the New Testament and in other Christian literature is the secondary understanding that suffering may serve a disciplinary function. As Paul states: "Suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope" (*Rom.* 5:3–4). Such learning experiences are designed to conform the Christian to the image of Christ himself. This sense of suffering as a way in which God disciplines believers is echoed both in *Hebrews* 12:3–13 and in *James* 1:2–4. A corollary concept, which is also present in Jewish thought, holds that suffering may also be seen as a preventive dose of spiritual medicine, intended, as it were, to forestall the germination of sin.

Christianity absorbed other interpretations of suffering that are Jewish in origin. For example, in the Jewish tradition, suffering is a part of the prophetic situation that is a characteristic of the burden of ascent. In a development of this idea, *Acts of the Apostles* 20:23 states that Paul's sufferings—stonings, imprisonments, and other afflictions—resulted from his missionary activity. Paul himself states that the sufferings he endured resulted from his faithfulness to his task of bringing the Christian message to the whole world.

Upholding one's beliefs, it was acknowledged, would bring on the opprobrium of the world. The writer of *Matthew* warns: "Then they will deliver you up to tribulation, and put you to death; you will be hated by all nations for my name's sake" (*Mt.* 24:9); and, "They will deliver you up to councils and flog you in their synagogues" (*Mt.* 10:17). *Acts* relates that the apostles who had been imprisoned and beaten "left the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonor for the name" (*Acts* 5:41). Not just individuals, but whole Christian communities were persecuted and suffered for their beliefs.

From a Christian perspective, suffering is something that is both inevitable and welcome—something to be confronted rather than avoided. In *2 Corinthians* 12: 9–10, Paul exults: "Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake, for when I am weak, then I am strong." The sense that suffering is inescapable appears in Jesus' experience in the Garden of Gethsemane, where on the eve of his crucifixion, he prays: "Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me; nevertheless, not my will, but thine, be done" (*Lk.* 22:42).

In both Christianity and Judaism, the peak of suffering is reached when an individual (or a people) prefers to give his or her own life rather than transgress God's commandments or forsake and repudiate true religion. Many passages in Jewish literature are devoted to mar-

tyrologies (especially those detailing the martyrdoms of Rabbi 'Aqiva' and of Hananyah ben Teradyon), noting the martyrs' strong affirmations of faith at the time of their deaths. Christianity relates similar examples of the religious courage of the faithful, most notably Jesus himself. In the gospels of Matthew and Mark, Jesus asks, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (*Mt.* 27:46, *Mk.* 15:34); in the gospel of Luke he adds, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (*Lk.* 23:24). According to all three accounts, Jesus died as a martyr to his messianic mission.

Paul's theme of the necessity of sharing in the sufferings of Christ (*Rom.* 8:15) as a prerequisite of sharing in the glories of Christ was carried to extremes by some of the early church fathers. Ignatius of Antioch went so far as to suggest that martyrdom is the only way to become an authentic Christian and thus ensure one's arrival in the presence of God. In fact, Ignatius willingly embraced his own martyrdom to the extent that he encouraged his fellow believers not to do anything that might prevent it from taking place, so convinced was he of the necessity of imitating "the passion of my God" in order to ensure his salvation.

Jesus represents the Gospel's embodiment of the concept of the suffering servant. Seeing Jesus not only as the suffering servant, but also as the Messiah, the Gospel writers fuse these two roles into a synthesis that does not, however, occur in the Hebrew scriptures, where the two remain distinct. A corollary to this fusion of the Messiah and suffering servant is the view of Christ's crucifixion as a vicarious atonement both for the sinful nature of humankind as well as for the sinful acts of each individual: "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life as a ransom for many" (*Mk.* 10:45; see also *Jn.* 1:29, 3:5). The writers of the synoptic gospels view Jesus as the Messiah who has been sent into the world to bring about repentance and salvation and to usher in God's kingdom. Jesus' prediction of his own passion occurs throughout the synoptic gospels: his particular passion that is depicted at the end of each gospel portrays him as the being who, by his suffering, crucifixion, and resurrection, becomes the symbol through whom human beings may hope for a similar fate for themselves.

A different and distinctively Christian (as opposed to Jewish) view of suffering can be found in the Pauline writings. In working out his theology, Paul strives to answer certain questions concerning the role of suffering. First, why is there suffering in a world created by a good God who cares for and loves his creatures? Second, why must God not only allow the suffering of his chosen, but why must the best—like Job, or the suffering servant, or the prophet—suffer such grievous fates?

Most particularly, for the Christian, why must God's plan include the passion, suffering, and death of the individual designated to be the only begotten Son of God, Jesus the Christ?

In his discussion of Pauline theology in *Theology of the New Testament*, Rudolf Bultmann writes: "The death and the resurrection of Christ are bound together in the unity of one salvation-occurrence: 'he who died' is also 'he who was raised up' (*Romans* 8:34; *2 Corinthians* 5:15, 13:4). Similarly, 'as God raised Christ, so He will also raise us' (see *1 Corinthians* 6:14, *2 Corinthians* 4:14)." Bultmann then claims that the incarnation is also a part of that one single salvation process, referring to biblical assertion that "he who gave himself up to die is no other than the preexistent Son of God" (*Phil.* 2:6ff., *2 Cor.* 8:9, *Rom.* 15:3). According to Bultmann, the incarnation is never accorded a meaning independent of the crucifixion.

In fact, Christ's death is seen as the merger of propitiatory and paschal sacrifices. As a propitiatory sacrifice, Christ's blood expiates sin and achieves forgiveness for the believer (*Rom.* 3:25). That Jesus' death was viewed by the early church as such a propitiation is seen in the liturgy of the Lord's Supper (*1 Cor.* 11:24), not merely in Palestinian congregations, but also in the newly evangelized Hellenistic churches. Jesus' death is also viewed as significant for the congregation of the people of God as a paschal sacrifice (*1 Cor.* 5:7, *Heb.* 13:12). The vicarious nature of that sacrifice is reiterated in *2 Corinthians* 5:21: "He made him who was unacquainted with sin to become sin in our stead."

Christ died in the place of all, then, and for the sake of all. According to Paul's view, Christ's death is not to be seen either as a merely propitiatory or vicarious sacrifice, but as a colossal cosmic occurrence. Salvation signifies release from death and sin. This release from sin, in turn, is seen in terms of release from the law. Hence, centuries later, Bultmann could claim that the sacrifice of Christ's death does not merely cancel the guilt and punishment of sin, but also is the means of release from law, sin, and death. Bultmann believes that Paul viewed the powers of the age in a gnostic light, and in this sense the Redeemer becomes a cosmic figure and his body a cosmic entity. Thus, those who are bound up with him in one body share in a redemption from the sinister powers of this world.

For Paul, apparently, Christ Jesus is the means by which the suffering of this world, man's inherent sinfulness, and death itself can be overcome. By being at one with he who suffered, a person is able to finally achieve a state that is free both from suffering and from death. In *2 Corinthians* 1:5, Paul avers: "As we share abundantly in Christ's suffering so through Christ we share

abundantly in comfort too." More explicitly, in *Philippians* 3:8–10, he asserts: "I have suffered the loss of all things . . . in order that I may gain Christ and may be found in Him . . . that I may know him and the power of his resurrection and may share his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, that if possible I may attain the resurrection from the dead." At present, he who is one with—or in the body of—Christ will indeed continue to suffer. He has the promise, however, that he will not be left to suffer continually, but will eventually overcome that suffering through his faith in Christ. Christ himself is the evidence that, as he overcame suffering and death, so may the worshiper.

In his letter to the Romans, Paul exposes man's plight—bondage to the law of sin—which makes a man a miserable wretch groaning for deliverance from the body of death. In Christ, however, man achieves true freedom through the law of the spirit of life. Thus, salvation is to be seen as an eschatological occurrence insofar as it is not merely a historic fact, but a reality that is continually being renewed in the present. Hence, the prospect of overcoming sin, suffering, and death is available to those who decide to reorder their previous self-understanding and their past existence from one of egocentrism to one of radical surrender to the grace of God through Christ.

In short, according to Paul, it was necessary for Jesus to have been incarnated, crucified, and resurrected—that is, to have suffered and died—because this is the only way in which the individual might believe that his own suffering and death can, through faith in the risen Christ, be overcome. A god who simply promises redemption cannot engender the same depth of conviction as a God who not only promises but, as it were, delivers. God's birth into a human body and his suffering, together with his resurrection, are evidence of the possibility that believers, too, can hope to transcend sin, suffering, and death.

Islam. Islamic views of suffering may be categorized broadly under two headings. The first is that of suffering as the punishment for sin; the second, of suffering as a test or trial. The Qur'an repeatedly stresses that all who do evil will be punished for their actions in this world and the next. This doctrine is associated with an emphasis on the perfect justice of God, which is to be vindicated on Judgment Day, when the evildoers will be thrown into the fires of Hell (surah 52). Sin is associated with disbelief, which is the root of misconduct. Unbelievers suffer as they learn of their mistakes. Thus, the punishment of sin through suffering may serve an educational function—namely, to show unbelievers the truth of God's word. The idea that lack of belief is a root of evil reveals a central precept of Islam on the

subject of suffering. This precept may be expressed as the belief that evil is found within man, and that subsequently the punishment of suffering is also found there. It is written in the Qur'an: "God dealeth not unjustly with [unbelievers]; but they injure their own souls." Just as sin is inextricable from punishment in the moral system of Islam, the unbeliever always condemns himself to suffer, for, in the final analysis, disbelief is the greatest suffering—the suffering of the soul.

Equally important to the Muslim perspective on suffering is the idea that suffering is a test of man's belief. [See Ordeal.] This concept is premised upon the belief that the true Muslim stands by his faith despite his woes. Suffering not only tests men's strength of faith, it also reveals their hidden feelings, allowing God to look into the innermost depths of their souls. The judgment of and distinction between the righteous and the impious are central to God's universe. As the Qur'an points out, God "hath created the heavens and the earth . . . that he might prove you, and see which of you would excel in works" (surah 11). Suffering is incorporated into the fabric of the world and is instrumental to the purposes of God. Suffering both separates good and evil men and serves as the punishment and teaching for the unbeliever.

The response to suffering that Islam advises is a complex one and is essentially different from either the Jewish or Christian viewpoint. In Islam, suffering is not a welcome way of proving one's faith, as in Christianity; neither is it something that should be avoided whenever possible, as in Judaism. Rather, Islam sees suffering as a necessary though unfortunate component of man's life that should be alleviated where possible and endured otherwise.

According to Bowker (1970), Islam advocates both an active and a passive response toward suffering: one should not only endure one's own suffering, but also perform good works to alleviate the suffering of others. Both responses are required of the true believer. The passive response to suffering is based on the idea of suffering as a test of one's belief in God. One must live through suffering, accepting it as God's will and having faith that God will not force any soul beyond its capacity. Nonetheless, one should not surrender to fatalism when facing suffering, but should always keep hope and faith in God. This opinion is implied by the Qur'an's argument against suicide: God's plans will justify and vindicate the righteous in the end, and to deny this by suicide is to blaspheme against him.

The active response to suffering is grounded in the Islamic belief that man is the cause of his own suffering. Islam considers good those things that rid the world of suffering. The man who helps others is a righteous man;

the true believer is revealed by his good works as well as by his acceptance of suffering. Moreover, if suffering is punishment for sin, then doing good works will alleviate this punishment.

Within Islam there is a problematical contradiction between the belief in God's omnipotence and recognition of the existence of suffering. All suffering is believed to be part of God's overall design, and is thought to have a distinct and undeniable purpose. This has tended to lead to a determinist view of existence; the free will of man is questioned. Such a tendency was prominent in the early period of the development of Islam but was later challenged by several schools of thought. The Qur'an is ambiguous on this issue and points to both the designs of God and the free will of man as causes for suffering.

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JACK BEMPORAD

SUFISM. One of the truly creative manifestations of religious life in Islam is the mystical tradition, known as Sufism. The term derives most probably from the Arabic word for wool (*ṣūf*), since the early ascetics of Islam (Ṣūfīs) are said to have worn coarse woolen garments to symbolize their rejection of the world.

Origins.

Muslim mystical writers such as Abū Bakr al-Kalābādī (d. 990/5) and 'Alī al-Hujwīrī (d. 1071/2?), nonetheless, have proposed a number of etymologies for Ṣūfī: *ṣaff*, "rank," implying that Ṣūfīs are an elite group

among Muslims; *ṣuffah*, "bench," alluding to the People of the Bench, the intimates of the prophet Muḥammad who gathered at the first mosque in Medina; *ṣafā'*, "purity," focusing on the moral uprightness essential to the Sūfī way of life. The resolution of the etymological debate is less critical than the recognition that the terms *Ṣūfī* and *Sufism* evoke complex layers of meaning in Islam, including the denial of the world, close association with the Prophet and his message, and a spiritual attainment that raises one to a rank of unique intimacy with God.

Some earlier Western scholars of Sufism concluded that mysticism is incompatible with the Muslim perception of an almighty, transcendent God with whom one shares little intimacy. In their opinion Sūfī mysticism was born of Islam's contact with other major world religions, especially Christianity and Buddhism. This theory is no longer considered viable for two reasons: first, the Qur'anic perception of the relationship of the individual to God is quite complex, highlighting both immanence and transcendence, and second, while no one denies that Islam evolved in a religiously pluralistic environment, one need not conclude that phenomena common to both Islam and other traditions are therefore derivative.

The vision of the God-man relationship in the Qur'ān offers a study in contrasts. On the one hand God is the almighty creator and lord of the cosmos who sustains the universe at every moment (Qur'ān 10:3 ff.); men and women are but servants—finite, vulnerable, and prone to evil (2:30 ff. and 15:26 ff.). God is both lawgiver and judge (surahs 81 and 82); whatever he wills comes to be (2:142; 3:47; 3:129; 5:40; 13:27). Servants of God are enjoined to embrace his will, not question its import, for men and women will be rewarded or punished according to their deeds. To breach the lord-servant (*rabb-'abd*) relationship leads easily to the cardinal sin of *shirk*, substituting some other power for that of God.

On the other hand the inaccessibility of the transcendent Lord must be understood in the context of those Qur'anic verses that speak of his abiding presence both in the world and in the hearts of the faithful. For did he not actually breathe his own spirit into Adam at creation (Qur'ān 15:29, 38:72)? And is he not closer to humankind than his own jugular vein (50:16)? God's presence is all-pervasive, for to him belong the East and the West, the whole of creation,

. . . and wherever you turn, there is God's face. Truly God is omnipresent, omniscient. (2:115)

The Qur'ān enjoins on every Muslim the practice of recollecting God (33:41), for the peaceful heart is one in which the remembrance of God has become second na-

ture (13:28–29). The most crucial Qur'anic verse for Sūfīs, however, describes the establishment of the primordial covenant between God and the souls of men and women in a time before the creation of the cosmos:

And when your Lord took from the loins of the children of Adam their seed and made them testify about themselves (by saying), "Am I not your Lord?" They replied, "Yes, truly, we testify!" (7:172)

This unique event, which confirms the union between God and the souls of all men and women, has become known in Sūfī literature as the "Day of *Alast*," the day when God asked "Alastu bi-rabbikum" ("Am I not your Lord?"). The goal of every Muslim mystic is to recapture this experience of loving intimacy with the Lord of the Worlds.

The experience of mystical union need not, therefore, be seen as foreign to Islam. On the contrary, interior spiritual development becomes a concern at a relatively early date in the writings of important Qur'ān commentators. Of the two traditional methods of Qur'anic exegesis predominating in Islam, *tafsīr* emphasizes the exoteric elements of the text: grammar, philology, history, dogma, and the like, while *ta'wīl* stresses the search for hidden meanings, the esoteric dimensions of the Qur'anic text. It is among Sūfīs (and Shī'ī Muslims) that *ta'wīl* has found special favor.

Early commentators such as Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767) often combined literalist and allegorical methods depending on the nature of the verse in question. More important is the contribution of the sixth imam of the Shī'ah, Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 765), who stressed not only the formal learning of the commentator but also his spiritual development. An individual's access to the deeper meanings of the Qur'ān is dependent, therefore, on his or her personal spiritual development. Since text and commentator interact dynamically as living realities, the Qur'ān reveals more of itself to the extent that the Muslim makes progress in the spiritual life. The power of the text is such that for many later Sūfī commentators such as Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 896) simply hearing the recitation of the sacred text could induce ecstatic states in the soul of the listener.

The Ascetic Movement. The early catalysts for the development of mysticism in Islam, however, were not all spiritual in nature. The dramatic social and political changes brought about by the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty in the mid-seventh century also played a pivotal role. The capital of the empire was moved from Medina to the more opulent and cosmopolitan Damascus, and the rapid spread of Islam introduced enormous wealth and ethnic diversity into what had originally been a spartan, Arab movement. In re-

action to the worldliness of the Umayyads, individual ascetics arose to preach a return to the heroic values of the Qur'ān through the abandonment of both riches and the trappings of earthly power. The three major centers of the ascetic movement in the eighth and ninth centuries were Iraq, especially the cities of Basra, Kufa, and Baghdad; the province of Khorasan, especially the city of Balkh; and Egypt.

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. A leading figure of the period was Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who was born in Medina in 642 but settled in Basra, where he died in 728. Ḥasan was renowned for his almost puritanical piety and exceptional eloquence. At the heart of his preaching was the rejection of the world (*al-dunyā*), which he described in a letter to the Umayyad caliph 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz (r. 717–720) as a venomous snake, smooth to the touch, but deadly. Ḥasan contrasts this world of transiency and corruption with the next world, which alone is a realm of permanence and fulfillment.

The extreme to which Ḥasan's anti-worldly stance led him is reflected most vividly in this same letter where he implies that the creation of the world was a mistake. From the moment God first looked on his handiwork, Ḥasan insists, God hated it. Such a theological position runs counter to the basic understanding of the value of creation that Islam shares with Judaism and Christianity. As *Genesis* 1:31 affirms, "God saw all that he had made, and it was very good." To speculate on the origins of Ḥasan's gnosticlike condemnation of the material world would take us beyond the objectives of this present article; suffice it to say that ambivalence toward materiality remained a significant aspect of later Islamic mysticism. The impact of gnostic ideas, however, continued to mold later Sufism, especially in the eastern provinces of the empire. The work of Henry Corbin has done much to open for the student of Sufism this complex world of Ṣūfī, and especially Ismā'īlī, gnosis.

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's asceticism, although world-denying, did not entail the total abandonment of society or social structures. On the contrary, Ḥasan functioned as the moral conscience of the state and fearlessly criticized the power structures when he felt they overstepped moral bounds. He eschewed the role of the revolutionary and refused to sanction movements designed to overthrow irreligious politicians. In Socratic fashion, Ḥasan preferred to work for the ruler's change of heart through persuasion, not violence. Ḥasan's dedication to ascetic ideals did not, moreover, lead him to forsake family life. He married and raised a family, albeit in straitened circumstances. While Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is considered a pivotal figure in the early development of Su-

fism, he is also noted as a transmitter of traditions (*ḥadīth*) and as a defender of human freedom in the early theological debates of Islām.

Ibrāhīm ibn Adham. While there are some extant written materials attributable to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, textual sources for the lives and teachings of many early ascetics are of questionable value. Often the dearth of authentic historical sources makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between facts and pious embellishments. A prime example is the life of the famous ascetic Ibrāhīm ibn Adham (d. 770?). Ibrāhīm was said to be a prince of the formerly Buddhist city of Balkh; he gave up his throne in order to pursue the path of asceticism. Some Western commentators have pointed to the possible parallel between his life story and the Buddha legend.

The fables about Ibrāhīm highlight his generosity, altruism, and, most important, his complete trust in God (*tawakkul*). Ibrāhīm's quietism, however, did not lead him to depend on others for his subsistence. He preferred to work and scorned those who relied on begging. It would seem to be fact that he served in two naval battles against the Byzantines; while fighting in the second, he lost his life.

Many tales of Ibrāhīm's life stand out because of the ascetic practices they describe. He cherished ridicule and humiliation; more startling is his joyous acceptance of physical abuse—bloody beatings, being dragged by a rope tied round his neck, being urinated upon, and the like. Clearly such stories are later additions by hagiographers. Nonetheless these grotesque, seemingly masochistic acts are accepted as integral elements of his life history by many Ṣūfī writers. And such tales have helped to shape later authors' understandings of asceticism in this early period of Sufism.

Rābī'ah al-'Adawīyah. The actual transition from asceticism to true love mysticism in Islam is documented in the spiritual theory of one of the first great female Ṣūfīs, Rābī'ah al-'Adawīyah (d. 801). Sold into slavery as a child, she was eventually freed because of the depth of her piety. Rābī'ah's focus was not on asceticism as an end in itself, but rather on its ability to help foster a loving relationship with God. Asceticism was only one of the means necessary for the attainment of union; to make ascetic practices themselves the goal, and not intimacy with the Beloved, was, in her estimation, a distortion of the Ṣūfī path.

The love Rābī'ah nurtured was completely altruistic; neither fear of Hell nor desire for Paradise were allowed to divert her gaze from the Beloved.

Rābī'ah's vision of altruistic love (*maḥabbah*) and mystical intimacy (*uns*) are preserved in beautiful

prayers and poems attributed to her. These represent some of the earliest aesthetic expressions of mystical experience in Islam.

One particularly vivid body of fables scattered throughout the Muslim sources centers on the spiritual rivalry between Rābi'ah al-'Adawīyah and Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. The problem with these tales, however, is that they describe a relationship that was historically improbable. Ḥasan died in 728, when Rābi'ah was at best in her early teens. Despite its questionable historicity, the Ḥasan-Rābi'ah cycle provides a valuable insight into male-female relationships in early Ṣūfī circles.

In the vast majority of these didactic tales Rābi'ah's spiritual insight and emotional maturity set her far above her male rival, Ḥasan, whose naiveté and presumptuous self-confidence are held up to ridicule. On occasion the conflict is described in actual male-female terms, with Ḥasan and his male Ṣūfī companions insisting that no woman has the ability to match a man's spiritual perfection. While Rābi'ah proves them wrong beyond the shadow of a doubt, there remains the fact that her success is due partially to the abandonment of the traditional female role and the assumption of more male characteristics. For example, she is said to have repeatedly refused Ḥasan's marriage proposals and remained celibate and childless throughout her life.

Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī. A number of early Ṣūfīs such as Rābi'ah evinced a sophistication of esthetic expression and theoretical speculation that laid a solid foundation for later work by Ṣūfī mystics. Pivotal figures such as Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 859) were both poetic stylists and theoreticians. Although no complete text of his mystical writings has survived, many of his logia, prayers, and poems have been preserved by later writers. He was master of the epigram and an accomplished poetic stylist in Arabic. The full force of his literary talent comes to light, however, in his prayers.

The child of Nubian parents, Dhū al-Nūn was born in Upper Egypt at the end of the eighth century. While many of the factual details of his life are often indistinguishable from pious fiction, a reliable kernel of historical data emerges. Although he lived in Cairo, Dhū al-Nūn traveled extensively, and during one of his sojourns in Baghdad, he ran afoul of the caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861). The confrontation was sparked by his refusal to accept the Mu'tazilī doctrine of the creativeness of the Qur'ān. For this act of defiance, Dhū al-Nūn was imprisoned; during his heresy trial, however, he so affected the caliph with his *apologia* for the Ṣūfī life that al-Mutawakkil released him unharmed.

The preserved sayings of Dhū al-Nūn attest to the profundity of his mystical insight and to the skill with

which he developed terminology and structures to analyze the mystical life. He excelled at elucidating the nuances of the various stages (*maqāmāt*) and states (*aḥwāl*) encountered by the mystic along the Ṣūfī path. To him is attributed the first construction of a coherent theory of *ma'rifah*, spiritual gnosis, which he contrasts with *'ilm*, the more traditional path of discursive reason.

A pivotal aspect of Dhū al-Nūn's mysticism is the *coincidentia oppositorum*, the "conjunction of opposites." The God who pours out his love upon the faithful Ṣūfī wayfarer is, in Dhū al-Nūn's view, the same God who afflicts his lover with pain and torment. God is, at one and the same time, *al-muḥyi*, "the giver of life," and *al-mumīt*, "the one who kills." Legend has it that at his death the following words were found inscribed on his forehead:

This is the beloved of God,
who died in God's love.
This is the slain of God,
who died by God's sword.

Mystical Ecstasy. The evolution of ascetic and theological principles to guide the Ṣūfī wayfarer, and the growing sophistication of aesthetic expressions of love mysticism were not the only signs of a maturing mystical tradition in Islam. An additional area of creative exploration by a number of ninth- and tenth-century Ṣūfīs centered on refining the understanding of what actually constitutes the goal of mystical experience.

Rābi'ah's articulation of the primacy of love in mystical union provided a general framework for discussion; it did not, however, resolve the most vexing question. Does union entail the complete obliteration of the lover's soul in the Beloved or is the object of mysticism a loving relationship in which both lover and Beloved preserve their independence? Expressed more technically, of what do the experiences of mystical annihilation (*fanā'*) and persistence in union (*baqā'*) consist?

Abū Yazīd al-Biṣṭāmī. The debate was brought to a head in dramatic fashion by a number of mystics whose ecstatic utterances provoked and scandalized the traditional elements both within and without the Ṣūfī movement. One of the earliest ecstasies was Abū Yazīd (known also as Bāyazīd) Ṭayfūr ibn 'Īsā al-Biṣṭāmī (d. 874), who lived in seclusion at Biṣṭām in the province of Qūmis. Few details of his life are known, but it is said that he was initiated into the subtleties of mystical union by one Abū 'Alī al-Sindī and that he developed a friendship with Dhū al-Nūn.

Muslim hagiographers and spiritual writers have preserved, nevertheless, many of the ecstatic utterances (*shaṭaḥāt*) attributed to Abū Yazīd. These sayings differ

from earlier Ṣūfī expressions of union because of their seeming affirmation of the total identification of lover and Beloved. Cries of “Subḥānī!” (“Glory be to me!”) and “Mā a‘zama sha’nī!” (“How great is my majesty!”) shocked the uninitiated because they smacked of *shirk*, associationism, and aroused many Muslims’ suspicions that Sufism was a heretical movement.

In a famous text, considered spurious but existing in several versions, Abū Yazīd vividly describes his reenactment of the Prophet’s night journey (*mi‘rāj*) as a mystical ascent during which his “I” is gradually absorbed into the “He” of the Beloved. Eventually “He” and “I” become interchangeable, for in reality the attributes of Abū Yazīd’s essence have been subsumed into God.

This particular understanding of mystical annihilation (*fanā’*) is characteristic of Abū Yazīd’s mystical theory. Complete *fanā’* is attained only after the most arduous stripping away of one’s attributes. Nothing is spared, neither personality nor spiritual attainments. Abū Yazīd compares the process to the snake’s struggle to slough off its skin, or to the blacksmith’s violent manipulation of red-hot iron. The mystic experiences the most dramatic shifts of emotion and spiritual experience; the soul vacillates between the expansive rapture of *baṣṭ*, in which the self appears literally to fill a room, and the implosion of *qabḍ*, in which the self seems reduced to the size of the tiniest sparrow.

Because of the apparent extremism of his ecstatic utterances, al-Biṣṭāmī was revered by later Ṣūfīs as the advocate of the path of intoxication (*sukr*) in contrast with the path of sobriety (*ṣaḥw*) associated with the famous Baghdad Ṣūfī Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 910). The division between sober and intoxicated Ṣūfīs was to remain an important one throughout the history of Islamic mysticism.

Al-Ḥallāj. Despite their dramatic power, the ecstatic utterances of Abū Yazīd al-Biṣṭāmī are overshadowed by those of the most famous of the Baghdad mystics, Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj. He was born in 857 at al-Ṭūr, in the Iranian province of Fārs. His initiation into Sufism began early in life, while he was still a teenager. For over twenty years he lived in seclusion and was trained by a number of the great Ṣūfī masters of the period: Sahl al-Tustarī, ‘Amr al-Makkī, and al-Junayd.

Eventually, however, al-Ḥallāj broke away from his teachers and became an itinerant preacher. His wanderings led him through Arabia and Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent. He came into contact with sages and mystics from a number of other religious traditions who expanded the horizons of his own religious experience. As he continued to mature spiritually al-Ḥallāj attracted increasingly larger numbers of disciples. He be-

came known as *ḥallāj al-asrār*, “the carder of consciences,” a play on the family name al-Ḥallāj, which meant “cotton carder.”

The core of al-Ḥallāj’s preaching was a call to moral reform and to the experience of intense union with the Beloved. Among al-Ḥallāj’s poetic and prose writings, one phrase stands out as the paradigmatic expression of mystical ecstasy, his famous “Anā al-Ḥaqq!” (“I am the divine Truth!”). To the ears of non-Ṣūfīs and of more sober elements in Sufism, al-Ḥallāj’s self-divinizing cry was tantamount to *shirk*, if not a bald rephrasing of the Christian notion of incarnation (*ḥulūl*).

It is very doubtful that al-Ḥallāj wished to be considered primarily a metaphysician. Consequently the charges leveled against him were due to misperceptions of the intent of his mystical expressions. It would remain for later Ṣūfīs to articulate philosophically a doctrine of identity between God and creation. Al-Ḥallāj’s expressions of ecstasy, on the contrary, are part of a tradition whose main goal was to celebrate the transforming power of the experience of mystical union with the Beloved; secondarily the concern was to contribute to the growing body of technical terminology and theoretical speculation about the nature of mysticism.

Many scholars have considered al-Ḥallāj’s proclamation of unique intimacy with the divine to be one of the main causes of his eventual imprisonment and execution at the hands of the Abbasid authorities. There is no doubt that al-Ḥallāj’s ecstatic utterances and his reinterpretation of certain elements of Islamic ritual practice were objects of violent criticism by many of the religious hierarchy. His execution, however, was as much the result of politics as of mysticism.

Al-Ḥallāj’s insistence on announcing publicly his vision of mystical union transgressed a cardinal principle of the great Ṣūfī masters of his generation. The accomplished mystic was never to divulge to the uninitiated experiences that were beyond their comprehension; the true nature of union was to be discussed only with one’s fellow adepts or not at all. Such elitism did not conform to al-Ḥallāj’s more populist notion of mysticism. For his lack of prudence he was ostracized by his former teacher al-Junayd and was branded a political threat and rabble-rouser by the secular authorities.

Finally, al-Ḥallāj found himself embroiled in caliphal politics during the reign of al-Muqtadir (908–932). He was lionized and defended by one vizier and condemned by the next, protected by the caliph’s mother, but finally sentenced to death by the son. Al-Ḥallāj spent about eight years in prison before he was eventually executed in 922. The gruesome details have been recorded by his disciples: al-Ḥallāj was flogged, mutilated, exposed on a gibbet, and finally decapitated. The

body was then burned. For al-Ḥallāj, however, death was not a defeat; on the contrary, he desired fervently to become a martyr of love. Al-Ḥallāj was convinced that it was the duty of the religious authorities to put him to death, just as it was his duty to continue to preach aloud the unique intimacy he shared with the divine:

Kill me, my trusted friends,
for in my death is my life!
Death for me is in living, and
life for me is in dying.
The obliteration of my essence
is the noblest of blessings.
My perdurance in human attributes,
the vilest of evils.

The creativity of al-Ḥallāj's work is reflected perhaps most strikingly in his ingenious use of the science of opposites. In his *Kitāb al-tawāsīn* al-Ḥallāj describes his two role models in mysticism as Iblīs (the devil) and Pharaoh. Both suffered condemnation at the hands of God, al-Ḥallāj attests, yet neither swerved from his appointed course. The Qur'anic text affirms on several occasions that Iblīs, who was chief of the angels and the most dedicated of monotheists, was commanded by God to bow to the newly created Adam. He refused, despite God's threat to condemn him forever, and chose, like al-Ḥallāj, to become a martyr of love.

My refusal is the cry, "Holy are you!"
My reason is madness, madness for you.
What is Adam, other than you?
And who is Iblīs to set apart one from the other?

All three are outcasts who have transgressed the law to attain a higher goal. Yet the reason for the transgression is each one's love relationship with God, which functions as a higher law for the perfected Ṣūfī.

My friend and my teacher are Iblīs and Pharaoh. Iblīs was threatened with the fire, but he did not go back on his preaching. And Pharaoh was drowned in the Red Sea, but he did not acknowledge any mediator at all. . . . And if I were killed, or crucified, or if my hands and feet were cut off, I would not go back on my preaching.

'Ayn al-Quḍāt. An even more subtle treatment of the science of opposites (*coincidentia oppositorum*) is evident in the work of another martyr-mystic of Islam, 'Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī, who was born in western Iran in 1098. He proved himself a brilliant student as a young man, mastering the traditional Islamic religious sciences. He was also recognized for the quality of his literary style in both Arabic and Persian. The most influential Ṣūfī master in his spiritual formation was Aḥ-

mad al-Ghazālī (d. 1128), a preeminent teacher and the brother of the most famous mystic-theologian in Islam, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). Aḥmad's own contribution to Sufism is considerable, especially his classic treatise on mystical love, *Sawāniḥ*.

As 'Ayn al-Quḍāt's fame grew, his disciples increased and, like al-Ḥallāj, he soon incurred the wrath of the religious and political authorities. He was accused of a number of heretical ideas, the most serious being the claim that there was a complete identity between the Creator and his creation. Imprisoned in Baghdad, 'Ayn al-Quḍāt was later transferred to his native city of Hamadhān where he was put to death in grisly fashion in 1131; He was only thirty-three years of age.

The conjunction of opposites, according to 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, is reflected in the very notion of the God of Islam. One need look only to the Muslim confession of faith (Shahādah) for confirmation: "Lā ilāha illā Allāh" ("There is no god but God!"). *Lā ilāha* ("there is no god") is the realm of the malevolent divine attributes, which spawn falsehood and which seduce the soul of the mystic away from the truth.

To pass from *lā ilāha* to the realm of *illā Allāh* ("but God") requires that the Ṣūfī wayfarer confront God's chamberlain, who stands guard at the threshold of *illā Allāh*. Who is this chamberlain? None other than the devil Iblīs.

In the same way that al-Ḥallāj in his *Kitāb al-tawāsīn* purports that the devil Iblīs is a model of piety, 'Ayn al-Quḍāt employs this paradoxical motif to dramatize the tension of opposites in God. He links Iblīs with Muḥammad, claiming that both are but different aspects of the same divine reality. Iblīs is described as the black light of straying while Muḥammad is the white light of truth and gnosis; both spring, however, from the same attribute of God, namely his power. Muḥammad is the guiding light of God's power while Iblīs is its destructive fire.

Perhaps the most creative symbols employed by 'Ayn al-Quḍāt to capture the conflict within God are those of the curl and the mole that lay upon the face of the Beloved. The lock of hair that hangs in an arrogant curl over the cheek of the Beloved enjoys a privileged state of intimacy. Instead of driving away the seeker from the threshold of *illā Allāh* with the sword of divine power, or deceiving the soul with black light, the Iblīs-curl distracts and seduces the Ṣūfī with the amorous gestures of the coquette, thus entangling the soul in lesser spiritual attainments.

The image of the Iblīs-curl must, of course, have its Muḥammad counterpart. In addition to the curl, the mistress possesses another mark of beauty, a black mole on the cheek that is equated with Muḥammad. Both

curl and mole, however, spring from the face of God; the curl is seducer while the mole is the guide to Truth.

All of the paradoxical images used by 'Ayn al-Quḍāt—the tension between curl and mole, black light and white light, between *lā ilāha* and *illā Allāh*—point to the fact that God himself is the source of paradoxes. Moreover 'Ayn al-Quḍāt is convinced that both poles of the paradox must be experienced if one is to attain true spiritual gnosis:

Unbelief and faith are two veils beyond the throne between God and the servant, because man must be neither unbeliever nor Muslim.

Mystical Literature

The science of opposites, with its rich symbolism and provocative speculation, appealed only to a small number of Ṣūfīs because of the level of intellectual sophistication it demanded and because of its esoteric quality. In contrast, beginning in the late ninth century, a number of texts began to appear that were aimed at a broader spectrum of the Muslim faithful and functioned as training guides for men and women interested in cultivating mystical experience.

The Manual Tradition. The emphasis of the manuals was not on the arcane dimensions of Sufism, but on its accessibility and its conformity with Islamic orthodoxy.

One of the earliest manuals addressed to a Ṣūfī novice is the *Kitāb al-ri'āyah* (Book of Consideration) of Abū 'Abd Allāh Ḥārith ibn Asad al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857). He is remembered particularly for his skill in developing the examination of conscience as an effective tool for advancement in the spiritual life.

Among the classics of this genre of religious literature in Sufism are the *Kitāb al-ta'arruf* (Book of Knowledge) of Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Kalābādhi (d. 990 or 995), the *Kitāb al-luma'* (Book of Concise Remarks) of Abū Naṣr 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Alī al-Sarrāj (d. 988), *Al-riṣālah al-qushayriyah* (The Qushayrian Letter) of Abū al-Qāsim 'Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 1074), the *Kashf al-maḥjūb* (Unveiling of the Veiled) of 'Alī ibn 'Uthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī (d. 1071/2?), and the *Qūt al-qulūb* (Nourishment of the Heart) of Abū Ṭālib Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Aṭīyah al-Ḥārithī al-Makkī (d. 996).

Spiritual guidance. Doubtless the primary goal of these manuals was to serve as guides for novices newly embarked upon the Ṣūfī path. The literary structure reflected this; often the conceit was that of the master writing to, or answering the questions of, a particular disciple. The internal composition of the texts varies considerably from one author to the next. Some are collections of insights strung together like random pearls;

others, such as the *Kashf al-maḥjūb* of al-Hujwīrī, present a coherent and systematic analysis of Sufism.

Earlier Ṣūfīs had relied heavily on the personal relationship of master (shaykh, pir) with disciple (*murīd*, *ṭālib*) to provide the guidance necessary for spiritual progress. But as the number both of disciples and of famous shaykhs increased, written manuals became invaluable supplements to personal spiritual direction. The manuals preserved the teachings of many of the greatest Ṣūfī guides and made their wisdom available to a larger number of the brethren. While Ṣūfī manuals never supplanted the master-disciple relationship, they did attain a permanent place of influence and honor among Muslim mystics.

In addition to providing spiritual guidance, the Ṣūfī manuals also addressed a number of subsidiary issues of critical importance. The first was the need to legitimize the place of Sufism in the broader spectrum of Islamic religious life. To this end authors such as al-Kalābādhi and al-Qushayrī made deliberate efforts to demonstrate that Sufism was in conformity with the orthodox theological synthesis, namely Ash'arism. Al-Sarrāj as well took pains to prove that Sufism was completely in tune with the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and Islamic legal tradition (*sharī'ah*).

A further cause of heightened tension between Ṣūfīs and the champions of orthodoxy concerned the possible conflict between the roles of Ṣūfī saint and traditional prophet. Sunnī Islam presumed that prophethood was the pinnacle of spiritual perfection, exemplified by Muḥammad himself. To substantiate this claim, Muslim theology asserted that all prophets possessed the special gift of impeccability (*'iṣmah*); each had the power, moreover, to perform a unique miracle (*mu'jizah*) in order to verify his mission.

Some Ṣūfīs, on the other hand, suggested that sainthood was an even more elevated spiritual rank than prophethood because it presumed a unique intimacy with the divine. Most manual writers, however, evolved a less polemical stance, one designed to reinforce the mainstream character of Sufism. They concluded that the highest level of sainthood was only the first level of prophethood. While the prophet was impeccable from birth, the saint was only protected (*maḥfūz*) from committing serious sin, and this only after he or she had attained sainthood. Whereas the miracles of the prophets were unique and indisputable, the miracles of the saints (*karāmāt*) were repeatable and subject to satanic influence.

A common objective of all the Ṣūfī manuals is to analyze in depth the various stages and states that make up the Ṣūfī path. Stages are considered by spiritual

writers to be levels of permanent growth in the mystical life; states represent the more transient emotional and psychological experiences associated with the various stages. The process of scrutinizing in analytic fashion the stages and states of mystical experience resulted in the creation of a sophisticated technical vocabulary that provided a basis for common discourse among Ṣūfis of every generation.

The exploration of the stages and states of mystical experience resulted, as well, in the development of highly refined theories of spiritual psychology. Ṣūfī psychologists aimed first and foremost at providing trainees with the means to gain control over the *nafs*, or lower soul (see surah 12:53), which was identified as the satanic element within men and women. Al-Makkī describes the *nafs* as arrogant, deceptive, envious, a beast that wallows in excess.

The Ṣūfī novice was not helpless, however, in his confrontation with the *nafs*. Men and women possessed an angelic force (*malak*) sent by God to do battle with the *nafs* in the arena of the heart (*qalb*). As al-Muḥāsibī indicates, both *malak* and *nafs* employ similar weapons, notably the various internal impulses (*khawāṭir*) that arise in the heart urging one to good or evil.

On occasion the various movements in the heart are quickly identifiable either as the satanic whisperings (*waswasah*) of the *nafs* or as the impulses of the *malak*. Much more difficult, however, are those times when the origin of the *khawāṭir* is unclear. For the devil-*nafs* excels at deluding the soul of the Ṣūfī and seducing him to actions that, while not sinful, deflect him from the road to the greater good. It is in dealing with these spiritual dilemmas that the techniques of Ṣūfī psychology articulated in the manual tradition demonstrate their subtlety and true sophistication.

Al-Ghazālī. The effort of many of the manual writers to legitimize Sufism's place in Islam culminates in the work of a man whose contribution to the Islamic religious sciences ranges far beyond mysticism. Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī was born at Ṭūs near the modern Iranian city of Mashhad in 1058. His early training was in jurisprudence (*fiqh*), but he soon excelled in theology (*kalām*) and eventually in Arabic philosophy (*falsafah*), which was exemplified by the Neoplatonism of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna).

A recurring theme in al-Ghazālī's work is the relationship between reason and revelation. The great Arab philosophers tilted the balance in favor of reason, insisting that truth was attainable without the aid of revelation. The conclusions arrived at by philosophers, however, did not always conform to the standard orthodoxy derived from the Qur'ān. For example, dogmas on the cre-

ation of the world from nothing, the resurrection of the dead, God's knowledge of particulars as well as universals—all were called into question by the philosophers.

Al-Ghazālī championed the truth of revelation over that of philosophical speculation. He was not, like some fundamentalist extremists, antiphilosophical however. On the contrary, al-Ghazālī's fascination with philosophical logic is manifested in many of his works, for he was convinced that philosophy could contribute substantially to Muslims' understanding of law and theology. It was only against the excesses of philosophy that he railed in his *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), not against philosophical reasoning per se.

Al-Ghazālī's influence was enhanced by the political support he received from the ruling authorities, especially the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk, who appointed him professor at the Niẓāmīyah *madrasah* in Baghdad in 1091. It was during his professorship at Baghdad, however, that a personal crisis radically transformed the future shape of al-Ghazālī's career. Whereas his earlier concerns had been with more theoretical and speculative issues, the focus now shifted to the role of religious experience in the life of the Muslim.

In 1095 al-Ghazālī experienced what can only be called an emotional and psychological breakdown. As he described it later in his autobiography, *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* (The Deliverer from Error), his state of anxiety left him almost catatonic. He suffered terrible doubts about his ability to arrive at any religious truth; more important he was overwhelmed by the emptiness of external religious ritual and law. Al-Ghazālī abandoned his teaching career and sought a solution to his doubts in Sufism, which, he hoped, would provide him with the personal experience of truth or *dhawq* (lit., "taste").

The success of his quest is attested by his later writings, which foster the integration of an interior life with the life of external observance. Alone, each leads either to excess or to spiritual myopia; together, however, they constitute a life of balance and dynamic spiritual growth. To this end al-Ghazālī wrote what was to be his most influential work, the *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* (Revivification of the Religious Sciences), which epitomizes his vision of Islamic life and which remains an integral part of the training of Muslim scholars to this day.

After eleven years of absence from teaching, al-Ghazālī was persuaded to return once again to the classroom by the vizier Fakhr al-Mulk, son of his late patron, Niẓām al-Mulk. His second career lasted only several years, for he retired to a Ṣūfī convent at Ṭūs before his death in 1111. The measure of his impact on the intel-

lectual life of Islam is impossible to calculate. In the history of Sufism, however, he is especially remembered for having contributed substantially to the acceptance of mystical experience as an integral dimension of Islamic religion.

Other Genres. In addition to the *Şūfī* manuals, other important genres of mystical literature developed in the classical period. Fables, epigrams, epic poems, poetry, aphorisms, all were creative vehicles for mystical expression. Early Qur'ān commentators and street preachers had focused on the lives of the prophets for inspiration. This spawned the *Qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā'* (Tales of the Prophets), collections of lively didactic stories, often with moral themes. In similar fashion the lives of famous *Şūfīs* were assembled by mystical writers into biographical dictionaries, which evolved into important companion volumes to the manuals.

Despite the fact that authors rarely distinguished between historical fact and pious fiction, these hagiographic compendia are crucial for our knowledge of the lives and teachings of the great masters of classical Sufism. Individual compilers, moreover, offer important critiques of a number of *Şūfī* movements, mystical theories, and the like.

The first systematic history of the lives of *Şūfī* mystics is ascribed to Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī al-Sulamī (d. 1021). His *Ṭabaqāt al-şūfīyah* (Generations of the *Şūfīs*) became the basis for the expanded versions of two later *Şūfīs*, the *Ṭabaqāt al-şūfīyah* of Abū Ismā'il Abd Allāh Anşārī (d. 1089) and the *Nafaḥāt al-uns* (Wafts of Pleasure) of Nūr al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad Jāmī (d. 1492). The most comprehensive work of *Şūfī* hagiography, however, is the prodigious, multivolume *Ḥilyat al-awliyā'* (Necklace of Saints) of Abū Nu'aym al-Işfahānī (d. 1037). Later writers continued the tradition, including Farid al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār (d. 1221?) with his *Tadhkirat al-awliyā'* (Biographies of the Saints).

'Abd Allāh Anşārī and the epigram. Many of these authors excelled at more than one genre of mystical literature. 'Abd Allāh Anşārī of Herat, a city in present-day Afghanistan, for example, is noted for important works on mystical theory but most especially for his epigrams, the *Munājāt* (Intimate Conversations). This tiny book, a milestone in *Şūfī* literature, is the *vade mecum* of countless Persian-speaking Muslims. Although the text appears deceptively simple it contains the kernel of Anşārī's complex vision of mystical union.

To appreciate Anşārī's contribution to Islamic mysticism, it is essential to place him in the context of the theological debates that resulted in the classical synthesis of al-Ash'arī (d. 935) and his school. Controversies arose in the ninth century over differing interpretations of the Qur'anic verses dealing with freedom and predes-

ination, the nature of divine attributes, and the origins of good and evil. The most influential group defending radical freedom and moral responsibility were the Mu'tazilah, whose views were strongly influenced by Greek thought. Since human beings are responsible for their deeds, they insisted, God cannot be blamed in any way for human turpitude. Reward and punishment are absolutely just because God himself is just. Furthermore God's justice requires that actions have an intrinsic moral worth that can be recognized by men and women.

The logic of the Mu'tazilī view, nevertheless, was challenged by verses in the Qur'ān itself that emphasize God's complete omnipotence and question human beings' ability to determine their fates, for God "leads astray whomever he wills and guides whomever he wills" (16:93). A solution proposed by al-Ash'arī and his followers was to choose neither radical freedom nor complete predestination, but rather to affirm both as true. This use of paradox as a hermeneutical tool permeates both theology and mysticism in Islam.

It must be admitted, however, that al-Ash'arī's views leaned more in the direction of predestinarianism than of freedom. He was a staunch proponent of God's complete control over human actions; freedom is little more than God's willingness to allow us to participate in his determination of our fate. It is God alone who first creates our actions and then ascribes them to us.

Even secondary causality is called into question because to assert that nature functions independently according to its own laws seems to ascribe to nature an independent power separate from God, a position smacking of *shirk*. In defending God's absolute omnipotence, furthermore, al-Ash'arī was obliged to deny the intrinsic goodness or evil of human actions. An action is good or evil only because God has determined it to be so. Lying, for example, is evil because God has so decreed; if he changed his mind lying would be right.

Anşārī's theological views were even more conservative than those of al-Ash'arī. As a follower of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855), Anşārī defended the most literalist interpretations of the Qur'ān. Whereas the Mu'tazilah allegorized the anthropomorphic descriptions of God's attributes in the Qur'ān, and the Ash'arīyah affirmed their existence, albeit in a way beyond the grasp of human reason, Anşārī and the Ḥanābilah insisted that the verses must be taken at face value. Consequently his positions appeared even more paradoxical than those of the more moderate Ash'arīyah.

As Anşārī indicates in the *Munājāt*, God commands us to obey him and then prevents our compliance. Adam and Eve, for example, are seduced not by Satan, but by God. Their seduction is predestined and they are

obliged to participate. Despite the seeming victimization of humans by God, however, the *Ṣūfīs* are not to conclude that they are absolved of responsibility for their evil deeds. Paradoxical as it may sound, Anṣārī recommends that the true attitude of the devoted mystic is that taken by Adam and Eve when they were confronted with the tragedy of their sin. They realized they were God's pawns but blamed themselves for the deed: "And they both said, 'O Lord, we have wronged ourselves!'" (surah 7:23).

Anṣārī moves naturally in the *Munājāt* from a discussion of the paradoxical tension between freedom and predestination to that between good and evil. And he reflects an attitude toward ethics that is characteristic of many of the ecstatic *Ṣūfīs*: whatever God wills for the mystic, be it blessing or curse, intimacy or separation, is good because it comes from God. Such a stance runs counter to the mainstream ethics of Sunnī Islam, which locate the guide for human action and the determination of moral worth in the synthesis of Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and *sharī'ah*.

For the perfected *Ṣūfī*, however, there is a higher law, namely the love relationship, that determines action and provides the means to evaluate the goodness or evil of particular behavior. The upshot is that, for the *Ṣūfī* elite, certain practices are permissible that would be disproved according to the religious law of the community.

Such an attitude has often been cited as proof of the dangerous antinomian tendencies endemic to Sufism. On closer examination, however, such behavior is not that far removed from the classical Ash'arī synthesis. Al-Ash'arī, we have seen, claims that actions are good or evil because God determines them to be so; moreover, if he changed his mind about a particular action its moral worth would change. What one finds in the behavior of a number of *Ṣūfīs* is, in fact, the acting out of this hypothetical case, for the *Ṣūfī* elite insist that the quality of their love relationship with the divine raises them to a higher tier of ethics, one at times radically different from the lower tier. Anṣārī counsels the *Ṣūfī* to move beyond the everyday concerns with reward or punishment, and beyond the common notions of good and evil. The goal is to please the Beloved; that is what constitutes the good.

Anṣārī goes so far as to claim that the lover-beloved relationship moves one to a plateau on which even the five pillars of Islam appear superfluous. The pilgrimage to Mecca is an occasion for tourism; almsgiving is something that should be left to philanthropists; fasting is an ingenious way to save food; and ritual prayers should be left to old crones. The focus of the mystic should not be the laws and ritual structures of the Is-

lamic community (*ummah*); it is the love relationship that supersedes all.

Anṣārī is a dramatic example of the mystic whose basic theological and religious conservatism do not bar him from the most exuberant expressions of union. He is not, however, alone in perceiving that the *Ṣūfī* adept must often move beyond the constraints of Islamic law. Abū Sa'īd ibn Abī al-Khayr (d. 1089) of Mayhana in Khorasan, for example, mirrors as well the same paradoxical approach to religious practice. He began his life as a violent ascetic, isolating himself from normal social intercourse and faithfully observing the obligations of the law. It is said that he was discovered by his father hanging upside down in a pit, reciting the Qur'ān.

At the age of forty, however, Abū Sa'īd attained gnosis (*ma'rifah*) and his actions changed dramatically. He and his followers became renowned for their feasting. In place of ritual prayer, communal *Ṣūfī* devotions were substituted. Once, when questioned by a non-initiate about his attitude toward the pillars of Islam, especially the pilgrimage to Mecca, he replied that it was a waste of time to travel so far simply to circumambulate a stone house (the Ka'bah). Rather, the sacred cube should circumambulate him! These statements, shocking though they were to non-*Ṣūfīs* and even to some of the more sober mystics, were not intended to flout the law. On the contrary, the privileged spiritual elite understood their behavior as that which was enjoined on them by the Beloved.

The *mathnavī*: Farīd al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār. The epigrams of 'Abd Allāh Anṣārī, succinct and accessible to a wide range of people, are in sharp contrast with the poetic genre of *mathnavī*, which was introduced into Sufism by the Ghaznavid poet Ḥakīm Abū al-Majd Majdūd ibn Ādam Sanā'ī (d. 1131?). The rhyming couplets of the *mathnavī* had previously been made famous in secular literature by the renowned Persian poet Firdawsī in his *Shāh-nāmah* (The Epic of the Kings). The general structure of Sanā'ī's mystical *mathnavīs*, the most famous of which is the *Ḥadiqat al-ḥaqīqah* (The Garden of Truth), is imitated by later *Ṣūfī* authors. The framework consists of mystical teachings interspersed with illustrative fables, anecdotes, proverbs, and the like. The different *mathnavīs* vary, however, in length, the quality of their style, and in the organization and development of their themes.

Important as Sanā'ī's introduction of the *mathnavī* into Sufism was, he is not remembered as a great stylist. For a true master of the *mathnavī* form we must turn to the Persian poet and spiritual guide, Farīd al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār (d. 1221?). 'Aṭṭār lived most of his life in and around the city of Nishapur, near the modern Iranian city of Mashhad. It is reported that he was killed during

the Mongol sack of the city. His name indicates his occupation, that of apothecary, and it appears that he continued in his profession even as he composed his mystical treatises.

It is evident from 'Aṭṭār's work that he was a man learned in both the religious sciences and secular literature. He demonstrates enormous perspicacity in his treatment of the subtleties of the spiritual life. 'Aṭṭār's success, however, is due equally to the fact that he possessed the requisite literary skills to mold his ideas into an aesthetic whole of genuine quality. 'Aṭṭār is poet, storyteller, and spiritual theorist; he entertains, cajoles, and leads the reader through numerous levels of spiritual awareness.

Of his *mathnavīs* the best known is the mythic fable *Mantiq al-ṭayr* (The Conference of the Birds). The text operates on a number of levels. On the surface it is a lively fable about a group of birds who decide to seek out their king, the Simurgh, of whom they have only the barest recollections. The journey is long and arduous, the path uncertain. Many birds abandon the quest out of weakness, apathy or fear; others perish along the way. Finally thirty birds arrive at the palace of the Simurgh. This event constitutes the pun on which the story is based, for "thirty birds" in Persian is *si murgh*.

The far more serious level on which the fable operates is that of an elaborate analysis of the Ṣūfī path. Asceticism, illumination, and finally union are explored in depth. The internal structure of the work resembles an ascending spiral staircase. The bird-souls progress upward, often returning to an earlier point, except now at a more advanced level. The birds are not uniform souls but mirror a variety of human personality types. Their strengths and difficulties reflect, moreover, the issues faced by a wide variety of Ṣūfī seekers.

The overall power of the work is due to its meticulous organization. It is necessary to study the text closely to appreciate the care with which 'Aṭṭār develops his multileveled thematic structure. The last section of the work describes the seven valleys through which the tested remnant must pass in order to reach the Simurgh. The final valley is that of *fanā'*, "annihilation," where the thirty birds merge with their beloved Simurgh as the moth merges with the flame.

Lytic and mathnavī: Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. Despite 'Aṭṭār's obvious literary and analytic skills, his work is surpassed by the greatest of the Persian mystical poets, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (known as Mawlānā, "our master"). Rūmī was born in Balkh in 1207, the son of Bahā' al-Dīn Walad, who was himself a noted legist, teacher, and spiritual guide. Around 1219, however, Bahā' al-Dīn left Balkh because of the threat of invasion by the Mongols. The family set out on pilgrimage to Mecca, passing

through the city of Nishapur where, it is reported, Bahā' al-Dīn and his young son met 'Aṭṭār, who predicted Rūmī's future greatness.

Bahā' al-Dīn settled eventually in Konya in Anatolia (known as Rūm, hence the name Rūmī). He was warmly received by the ruling Seljuk authorities and resumed his career as teacher and shaykh. Following in his father's footsteps, Jalāl al-Dīn became well versed in the Islamic religious sciences and philosophical theology. After Bahā' al-Dīn's death in 1231, Jalāl al-Dīn assumed his father's teaching post.

Rūmī's Ṣūfī training progressed in serious fashion under the tutelage of Burhān al-Dīn Muḥaqqiq, one of his father's disciples. The critical moment in Rūmī's spiritual development, however, was his meeting in 1244 with Shams al-Dīn of Tabriz. For two years they were inseparable, Rūmī finding in Shams the vehicle through which to experience the true ecstasy of mystical love. Their relationship was a source of jealousy and scandal among Rūmī's family and followers. Abruptly, Shams departed Konya for parts unknown.

Rūmī was disconsolate, but, with the help of his son Sulṭān Walad, he engineered Shams's return. Rūmī's rekindled joy was shortlived, however, because Shams disappeared for the last time in 1248, and there is persuasive circumstantial evidence that Shams was murdered, perhaps with the connivance of Rūmī's family.

The intense love relationship Rūmī shared with Shams was the catalyst for the creation of some of the most extraordinary poetry in the Persian language. Rūmī was prolific; his poetic verses number close to forty thousand, collected in a work that bears the name of his beloved, the *Divān-i Shams-i Tabrizī*. He is a master of imagery, ranging from the mundane realities of food, weaving, and the like to more subtle treatments of nature, music, and religious symbols. Prominent, of course, is the image of Shams, "the sun," in whose brilliance and intensity Rūmī loses himself. Both the agony of separation and the exhilaration of union ebb and flow throughout his poetry. The emotions evoked run the gamut of human experience. Rūmī does not hesitate to shock; anger, cruelty, and vulgar sexuality share the stage with the ecstasy of annihilation in the Beloved, proving that the Ṣūfī quest must not be romanticized. Love not only has the potential to fulfill; it also destroys.

Rūmī's other masterpiece, his *Mathnavī-yi ma'navī* (Spiritual Couplets), was written at the urging of his cherished disciple Ḥusām al-Dīn Chelebī. Ḥusām al-Dīn, like many Ṣūfīs of the period, discovered in the *mathnavīs* of Sanā'ī and 'Aṭṭār a wealth of spiritual wisdom. It was imperative, Ḥusām al-Dīn believed, for his revered shaykh to preserve his teachings in similar fash-

ion for posterity. Thus Rūmī was persuaded to dictate his *Mathnavī* to Ḥusām al-Dīn, who transcribed the text and read it back to his master for correction. The final product is substantial, six books totaling almost thirty thousand verses. Several of Rūmī's lesser works—letters, discourses, and sermons—have been preserved as well.

Whereas 'Aṭṭār's works, especially his *mathnavīs*, are noted for their clear structural development, those of Rūmī resemble more the stream-of-consciousness style. One must be steeped in Rūmī's work before daring to analyze his thought.

The statement is often made that Rūmī's *Mathnavī* is the Qur'ān of the Persians. While the main point is the enormous popularity the text has had, and continues to have, in the Persian-speaking world, there is another level on which the comparison is apt. The Qur'ān communicates itself primarily in individual, sometimes self-contained, units, not as a structured whole. Similarly, many segments of the *Mathnavī* have an internal unity of their own. Yet the sections of the text are strung loosely together like a string of pearls of different sizes, shapes, and hues. Themes appear and disappear, only to be addressed again from a different perspective. To seek out a unifying structural element in the *Mathnavī* is perhaps to do an injustice to the intent of the author. Its appeal lies in its fluidity and allusiveness. True, this can be frustrating at times; frustration, however, soon turns to fascination as the reader is lured once again into the complex web of Rūmī's thought.

Gnosis and Ibn 'Arabī

The history of mysticism in Islam is replete with individuals of brilliance and creativity. Among these exceptional personalities, however, one stands out from the rest because of his unique genius. Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-'Arabī al-Ḥātimī al-Ṭā'ī was born at Murcia in Muslim Spain in 1165. He is honored with the titles "Al-Shaykh Al-Akbar" ("doctor maximus") and "Muḥyī al-Dīn" ("the revivifier of religion"). Eventually he came to be known under the name Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī.

While still a child, Ibn 'Arabī and his family moved to Seville, where he received the greater part of his education in the traditional Islamic religious disciplines. He was greatly influenced in his spiritual development by two female Ṣūfis, especially Fāṭimah of Cordova. A great deal of his mystical insight, however, evolved from visionary experiences, the first occurring during an illness in his youth. Throughout his life he continued to have visions on which he placed a great deal of reliance.

Ibn 'Arabī's visionary bent is equally evident in his claim to have been initiated into Sufism by the mythic figure Khidr, a mysterious being, said to be immortal,

associated with a Qur'anic fable (surah 18) and pre-Islamic legends. Khidr is renowned in Sufism as a saint and guide of exceptional spiritual power; to be chosen as one of his disciples is a rare privilege.

In his early twenties Ibn 'Arabī traveled extensively throughout Spain and North Africa and broadened his intellectual perspectives. He describes a unique meeting in Cordova with the greatest of the Muslim Aristotelian philosophers, Ibn Rushd (known as Averroës in the Latin West). The encounter is heavy with symbolism, for Ibn Rushd represents the total reliance of philosophers on reason (*'aql*), while Ibn 'Arabī champions gnosis (*ma'rifah*) as the only means to experience the fullness of truth.

In 1201 Ibn 'Arabī left Spain and North Africa for the last time, undertaking travels that brought him to many important centers of Islamic learning. In 1223 he settled in Damascus, where he remained until his death in 1240. His mausoleum continues to be an important pilgrimage center.

Ibn 'Arabī is unique because he was both an original thinker and synthesizer. Many of his ideas resonate with earlier intellectual developments in Sufism and in philosophical theology. His greatness, however, lies in his ability to systematize Ṣūfī theory into a coherent whole with solid metaphysical underpinnings. Ibn 'Arabī, therefore, should not be viewed as an eccentric outside of the mainstream, but rather as the genius who was able to gather together various strains of mystical philosophy and to mold them into an esthetic whole.

The corpus of Ibn 'Arabī's work is massive, which complicates considerably any attempt at a comprehensive analysis of his thought. In addition his style is often dense, reflecting the esoteric nature of his ideas. Two of his most influential works are *Al-futūḥāt al-makkiyah* (The Meccan Revelations), which he was ordered to write in a visionary experience while on pilgrimage, and *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (The Bezels of Wisdom).

Waḥdat al-Wujūd. The central concept in Ibn 'Arabī's system is *waḥdat al-wujūd*, "unity of being." Scholars have debated whether Ibn 'Arabī intends this term to describe a monist system, where nothing exists but the One. An affirmative response does not indicate, however, a dramatic shift in Muslim metaphysics because, in reality, Ibn 'Arabī is only taking the Ash'arī synthesis to its logical extreme. The Ash'arī insistence on God's total omnipotence and control over the universe implies that God is the only true agent. It is not illogical, therefore, to suggest, as Ibn 'Arabī does, that God must also be the only true existent.

The divine essence in itself is completely transcendent; it is, in fact, unknowable, the *lā ilāha* ("there is no god") of the Muslim confession of faith. This plane of

unconditioned unity (*aḥadiyāh*), however, is not the only plane on which divine reality exists. The plane of oneness (*wāḥidiyāh*) is characterized by a unity in plurality, a unity in which the qualities of all possible existents reside. Once again the ultimate solution is paradox. The divine is undifferentiated and totally transcendent; yet in the divine are discovered the qualities of all potential beings.

Reality, therefore, is tiered, a progression of spiritual manifestations. Ultimate reality is the *theos agnostos*, the "unknown God," from which emerge the different planes of divine existence, culminating in the God of revelation, Allāh, the *illā Allāh* ("but God"), of the confession of faith. The creation of the cosmos occurs, not out of nothing (*creatio ex nihilo*) as traditional Western theology would have it, but because of the yearning of the unknown God to escape from isolation. A *ḥadīth* dear to Sūfis encapsulates God's intent: "I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known, so I created the creation in order that I might be known."

Creation, therefore, is the manifestation of the One in the plurality of created beings. God's sigh of longing breathes forth the universe, the mirror in which he comes to know himself. The agency through which the cosmos is produced is the divine creative imagination. The process is not static but dynamic, for in the same way that God exhales, he inhales, drawing creation back to its source in the One. Gnosis for the Sūfi, therefore, entails progress along the path from illusion (the naive conviction that he is an independent reality distinct from God) to insight into creation's identification with God's self-revelation.

The Perfect Human Being. The mirror that the One projects forth is not uniformly polished. The created being in which the Absolute becomes most fully conscious of itself is man. And there is in every generation *al-insān al-kāmil*, the Perfect Human Being, who is the link between Absolute Being and the created realm. Through the mediacy of the Perfect Human Being the dynamic process of emanation and return takes place. In fact, the process would be impossible without that being, the most perfected Sūfi, the *quṭb* ("pole"), the axis around which the cosmos revolves.

Ibn 'Arabī's emanationist view of creation reinterprets, moreover, the traditional understanding of the goal of mysticism in Islam. Many early Sūfis described the path as a growth in loving union between a soul, which retains its essential independence, and the Beloved who, while being the source of creation, is distinct from it. For Ibn 'Arabī and his followers, the goal is not primarily love but wisdom, to move from the illusion of plurality to the gnostic insight that one has always

been, and will continue to be, totally united with the source of all being.

Waḥdat al-wujūd has enormous implications, furthermore, for the Sūfi understanding of human freedom and ethics. Nothing manifests itself in creation unless God wills it. This is an axiom of both Ibn 'Arabī and traditional Islam. In Ibn 'Arabī's system, the archetypes of all potential beings exist in the One. When these potential realities are actualized in the illusory realm of plurality, they function completely in accord with their celestial archetypes. In the realm of the created world, therefore, individual free choice is illusory. All change is predetermined by the archetype of the particular reality. Freedom exists only insofar as all creatures participate in the freedom of the One, with which they are ultimately identified.

Ethics, in addition, must be seen in the light of the determinative power of the celestial archetypes. In the realm of creation, the law (*shari'ah*) delineates what actions are in accord with God's revelation. From the perspective of the One, however, all actions are good since they are manifestations of the divine creative imagination and are in accord with the celestial archetypes. Culpability is relative because it is operative only in the realm of created illusion. Eventually all return to the undifferentiated One; thus there is no eternal reward or punishment in the traditional sense.

The complexity of Ibn 'Arabī's thought defies summation in a few brief paragraphs. Nor have scholars in the field yet gained sufficient mastery of his work to unravel his convoluted and sometimes contradictory ideas. What is clear, however, is the pervasive influence of Ibn 'Arabī and his school on later Sufism. Disciples such as Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 1274) in Anatolia and commentators on his work such as 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Aḥmad Jāmī (d. 1492) in Persia disseminated his ideas throughout the Islamic world.

Ṣūfi Fraternities

The history of Sufism is much more than the history of mystical theory and expression. There is a significant social dimension to Islamic mysticism that must be explored if the picture is to be complete. Even many of the early Sūfis, individualists though they were, sought out the advice and counsel of their fellow wayfarers. From the very beginning, therefore, companionship (*ṣuḥbah*) was considered essential for progress in the spiritual life. [See *Ṣuḥbah*.]

Fluid interaction among Sūfis soon evolved into the more structured relationship of master and disciple, adding a new level of social complexity. Not only would disciples visit their masters, but many also took up res-

idence with them. The earliest formal Ṣūfī convent seems to date from the latter part of the eighth century CE, on the island of Abadan.

Political changes in the Islamic empire contributed to the stabilization of Ṣūfī institutional structures. In the mid-eleventh century the Seljuks wrested control of the Abbasid caliphate from the Shī'ī Buyids. The Seljuks were staunch Sunnīs who took over the religious educational system of the *madrasahs* in order to reindoctrinate the intelligentsia with Sunnī orthodoxy. The public support they provided for Ṣūfī establishments afforded the Seljuks more control over the type of Ṣūfī piety inculcated in the new recruits, but at the same time, government patronage ensured the survival of the various Ṣūfī institutions.

By the thirteenth century, several types of Ṣūfī establishments had evolved, each with a different general purpose. The *ribāt* was a residence or training center, which originated in the Arab regions of the empire. *Khānqāhs* were similar establishments rooted in the more persianized environment of Khorasan; they eventually spread, however, into the Arab centers. The more serious training took place in the *zāwīyahs*, which usually housed a teaching shaykh; *khalwah* is the name given to the retreat of a single Ṣūfī or dervish. (Dervish is derived from the Persian word for Ṣūfī, *darvish*, "poor," "beggar.")

More important than the physical environment in which Ṣūfīs congregated is the evolving infrastructure of the Ṣūfī communities themselves. In the eleventh century, fluid organizations continued to predominate; their common link was the desire for *ṣuḥbah* and for the guidance of a shaykh. Frequently, a master and his disciples remained a cohesive social unit only until the death of the master, after which the group disbanded.

By the thirteenth century the situation had altered significantly. Many Ṣūfī groups became self-perpetuating social organizations whose central focus was the founder and his teaching. No longer was the survival of the group dependent on a particular living shaykh; authority was passed from shaykh to disciple, thus providing a stable structural basis for the continued growth and development of the community. The new master was the chief custodian of the founder's spiritual legacy and, on occasion, an innovator in his own right. [See also Dervishes; Khānqāh; and Madrasah.]

Silsilahs. These stable social organizations came to be called *ṭarīqahs* ("ways"), known in English as Ṣūfī orders, fraternities or brotherhoods. Each founding shaykh had his *silsilah* ("chain"), his spiritual lineage which contributed substantially to his stature in the Ṣūfī community. The *silsilah* is, more precisely, a ge-

nealogy, tracing the names of one's master, of one's master's master, and so on back through history. Often a prominent shaykh would have been initiated more than once, by a number of illustrious Ṣūfīs, thus adding additional stature to his spiritual pedigree.

There are two main *silsilah* groups, which later subdivided into literally hundreds of Ṣūfī fraternities. The first chain, generally considered the more sober of the two, traces its links back to Abū al-Qāsim al-Junayd, the famed spiritual guide from whom al-Ḥallāj eventually broke away. The second, and more intoxicated, *silsilah* derives from the first great Ṣūfī ecstatic, Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī. These designations are very general, and membership in either group indicates only a spiritual genealogy, not necessarily an actual attitude toward mystical experience.

The members of the Bisṭāmī branch are often called Malāmatī, "blameworthy." The appellation, however, can be overstressed, for it does not mean that they scorned Islamic law. On the contrary, many were meticulous in their observance. But eventually the name came to describe, in broad terms, those Ṣūfīs who eschewed completely all of the public trappings of Sufism and of piety in general; they were characterized by the virtue of absolute sincerity (*ikhhlās*). The Malāmatīyah rejected Ṣūfī initiation and the guidance of a shaykh, nor would they engage in public devotional practices common to Ṣūfīs. Whatever ritual acts they performed were carried out in private. Their individualism made them appear to some as suspicious and marginal. The Malāmatīyah, nevertheless, should be clearly distinguished from the Qalandarīyah, or wandering dervishes, many of whom did engage in practices that made mockery of the religious law and of traditional morality.

The centrality of *silsilahs* in Ṣūfī fraternities is not completely unique. One discovers an analogous emphasis in the *ḥadīth* literature, where the literary structure of a *ḥadīth* has two parts: the chain of transmitters (*isnād*) and the body of the text (*matn*). According to Muslim tradition, the authenticity of the *ḥadīth* is guaranteed by the reliability of the *isnād*. In the same way that the power of sacred word in the *ḥadīth* has been preserved by the chain of transmitters, so too do the teachings and powers of a particular shaykh remain alive through his *silsilah*.

Whether or not the *isnāds* are historically reliable is not a question that need be discussed here. Suffice it to say that the importance of *isnāds* for Muslims is to ground *ḥadīths* solidly in the period of the original revelation. Thus there can be no question that the teachings of the *ḥadīths* are innovations; rather *ḥadīths* are

but more detailed insights into God's will already expressed in general terms in the Qur'ān.

In similar fashion the *silsilahs* of Ṣūfī shaykhs provide them with religious legitimacy. Even though the Ṣūfī orders may vary considerably in their teachings and attitudes toward mystical experience, they each can claim, through their spiritual genealogies, to be solidly based upon the foundations of Sufism.

Veneration of Saints. The institutionalization of *ṭarīqahs* and the emphasis on *silsilahs* enhanced substantially the religious and political position of the master. Whereas in the past the shaykh functioned primarily as an expert and confidant, he now became a repository of spiritual power as well. A shaykh's lineage did not provide simply a list of teachers; it implied that the spiritual power of each of these great Ṣūfīs had been transmitted to this last member of the line.

The shaykhs of the great Ṣūfī orders, therefore, took on superhuman qualities. They became known as *awliyā'* (sg., *walī*), intimates or friends of God. Their spiritual perfection raised them far above the level of their disciples and of the masses of Muslim faithful. The spread of Ibn 'Arabī's teaching, particularly the notion of the Perfect Human Being, which was elaborated upon by Ibn 'Arabī's intellectual disciples, especially by 'Abd al-Karīm ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jīlī (d. 1428), provided an intellectual framework within which to explain this cosmic role of the saintlike shaykh. Many of the shaykhs of important orders were acknowledged by their followers as the *quṭb*, the "pole" or "axis" around which the cosmos revolves, the Perfect Human Being, the point at which the divine Creative Imagination most fully manifests itself in the world of illusion. The fact that a number of individuals claimed this status at one and the same time was cause for a certain amount of friction and rivalry among the powerful fraternities.

The concept of *quṭb* is linked by Ibn 'Arabī and his predecessors with a whole hierarchy of cosmic beings. Al-Hujwīrī describes them as the officers of the divine court, made up of three hundred *akhyār* ("excellent ones"), forty *abdāl* ("substitutes"), seven *abrār* ("piously devoted ones"), four *awṭād* ("pillars"), three *nuqabā'* ("leaders"), and one *quṭb* (known also as *ghawṭh*, "succor"). Ibn 'Arabī's hierarchy is somewhat different in structure. The *quṭb* is joined by two *a'immaḥ* ("guides"), four *awṭād*, seven *abdāl*, twelve *nuqabā'*, and eight *nujabā'* ("nobles"). The cosmic hierarchy, regardless of its particular description, is the spiritual power through which the order and continued existence of the cosmos are ensured.

The term *walī* is often translated as saint; this is misleading because there is no religious hierarchy in Islam empowered to canonize individuals as saints, as one

has, for example, in Roman Catholicism. Rather, the status of *walī* is attained through public acclamation. There are, nevertheless, analogies between Christian saints and Muslim *awliyā'*, insofar as both possess spiritual power that is capable of being transmitted to disciples or devotees. In Islam this power is called *barakah* ("blessing"). The *barakah* of a *walī* has the potential to transform an individual spiritually as well as to provide concrete material blessings. *Barakah* should be understood as concretely as possible. It is often transmitted through the power of touch, similar to the laying on of hands or the application of relics, practices common in other religious traditions of the West. [For further discussion of the *awliyā'* and *barakah*, see Folk Religion, article on Folk Islam, and *Walāyah*.]

The perfected shaykhs are objects of veneration both during their lives and after their deaths. It is generally accepted that they possess the power of miracles (*karāmāt*), although their miracles are subject to satanic influence in a way that the miracles of prophets are not. The extraordinary powers of the *awliyā'* are not diminished in any way after their death; on the contrary, their intercession often appears more efficacious. Consequently the tombs of great Ṣūfī *awliyā'* are vibrant pilgrimage centers to this day.

Ritual Practice. Much has been said thus far about the shaykhs of Ṣūfī orders. What were the general patterns of life of the members of these communities? It is difficult to generalize because of the different character of the various brotherhoods. There are, however, some areas of commonality. The full members of the fraternities committed themselves in obedience to the shaykh, who initiated them into the order and bestowed upon them the patched frock (*khirqah*), the sign of their entry onto the Ṣūfī path. They were encouraged to subject themselves completely to the master's will, to be like dead bodies in the hands of the body-washers. Some members of orders remained celibate while others married; some lived lives of extreme poverty while others had a very comfortable existence.

Common to most of the Ṣūfī fraternities were ritual practices called *dhikr* ("remembrance") and *samā'* ("audition").

Dhikr. The impetus for the practice of *dhikr* is derived from those Qur'anic verses that enjoin the faithful to remember God often. Among Ṣūfīs this duty evolved into a complex exercise performed by an individual or group. Many fraternities put their own particular stamp on the *dhikr* exercise. Most *dhikr* techniques, however, involve the rhythmic repetition of a phrase, often Qur'anic, in which one of the names of God appears. In Islam, Allāh has one hundred names, ninety-nine of which are known; the hundredth name is hidden. Cer-

tain Ṣūfīs who ascribed to themselves the rank of *qutb* claimed to have been blessed with this most precious secret.

The more sophisticated methods of *dhikr* usually involve breath control, body movements, and a number of other complex techniques to gain control over the five senses as well the psyche and imagination. In some Ṣūfī groups, such as the Naqshbandīyah, *dhikr* is a private exercise. The goal is to move from vocal *dhikr* to silent *dhikr*, with each stage representing a more intense level of union with the Beloved until, at the final stage, *dhikr* moves to the innermost recesses of one's being and one can no longer distinguish between the one remembering and the Remembered. [See *Dhikr*.]

Samā'. Like *dhikr*, *samā'* has become identified with Ṣūfī ritual practice. It involves listening to music, usually with a group. The music is often accompanied by Qur'ān chants and/or the singing of mystical poetry. The recital is intended to spark a mystical experience within the auditors. Those most affected by the *samā'* rise up to dance in unison with the music. Depending on the Ṣūfī group, the dance can be a marvel of esthetic movement or the frenetic writhings of the seemingly possessed.

From its inception *samā'* has been controversial among Ṣūfīs. No one questions the efficacy of chanting the Qur'ān. The doubts arise with music and the singing of mystical love poetry. Music and singing were considered by many shaykhs to be amoral: neither good nor evil by nature. *Samā'* possesses the power, however, to engulf the spirit of the disciples and to seduce them to immoral behavior. Consequently many shaykhs, if they approve of *samā'* at all, insist that only accomplished Ṣūfīs be allowed to participate. Novices are warned to beware. [See *Samā'*.]

Dhikr and *samā'* have served an important function outside of the ranks of the full-fledged members of the Ṣūfī orders. The theoretical developments in Sufism from the thirteenth century onward were shaped by the work of Ibn 'Arabī and his interpreters. The complex and esoteric nature of this school of Ṣūfī thought, however, placed it far beyond the reach of most Muslims. It was the ritual exercises of the orders that helped fill the gap and minister to the immediate spiritual needs of the faithful. Thus Sufism came to represent, for many, not abstruse theory but concrete practice that was accessible to all.

The emphasis on *dhikr* and *samā'* has helped to blur the distinction in popular Sufism between mystical experience that is attained after serious spiritual training and experience that is self-induced. Unsophisticated sessions of *dhikr* and *samā'*, to this day, often consist of self-hypnosis, hysteria, drug-induced states, and other

violent emotions that pass for mystical experience. Despite accusations of vulgarization, *dhikr* and *samā'* remain important emotional outlets in the Muslim community and are unique sociological events during which various levels of society find themselves interacting on an equal footing. And in the hands of spiritual adepts, *dhikr* and *samā'* remain potent tools for creating an ambience in which to attain heightened levels of religious experience.

The widespread interest in *dhikr* and *samā'* among the Muslim faithful has resulted in increased membership in the Ṣūfī fraternities. These new members, however, should more properly be called affiliates. They perhaps take some training from a shaykh; their primary vehicle for contact with the group, however, is attendance at periodic sessions of *dhikr* and *samā'*. Otherwise they lead the normal life of a layman or woman. In parts of the Islamic world today, membership in one Ṣūfī order or another has become for many a social obligation, even though those so affiliated have little interest in, or understanding of, mysticism.

Particular orders became associated with different strata of society, geographical regions, and guilds. The Suhrawardīyah, for example, were extremely influential in court circles in thirteenth-century Delhi, while orders such as the Bektāshīyah and Khalwatīyah in Turkey had a more popular appeal. The identification of order with social group became so complete that one could be said to be born into a particular fraternity. This did not, however, prevent an individual's eventual shift from one order to another.

The Orders: Individual Characteristics. The role of the shaykh and the ritual exercises of *dhikr* and *samā'* are integral elements in almost all of the Ṣūfī orders. The distinctive personalities of the fraternities, however, are as significant as their similar structures and practices. The contrasts are often striking. In Anatolia, for example, the Mawlawīyah (or Mevleviye) and the Bektāshīyah represent opposite ends of the spectrum.

Mawlawīyah and Bektāshīyah. The Mawlawīyah trace their *silsilah* to the mystic and poet Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. Rūmī himself, however, did not establish a formal *ṭariqah* during his lifetime; rather, it was his son, Sulṭān Walad, who took upon himself the task of organizing the order. The Mawlawīyah are known for their aesthetic sophistication, both in ritual practice and in mystical poetry. The order's particular identity is derived, of course, from Rūmī's *Mathnavī* and the *Divān-i Shams-i Tabrizī*.

Perhaps the most famous aspect of the Mawlawīyah is its ritual *samā'*, an exquisite combination of music, poetry, and whirling dance (hence their name in the West, "Whirling Dervishes"). It is hard to capture in

words the refinement of the choreography. The rhythmic, turning movements of the adepts are mesmerizing and executed with a subtle grace and precision equal to the best of European classical dance. The serene faces of the *Şūfis*, moreover, reflect the depth of the spiritual rapture achieved by the practitioners.

In contrast, the *Bektāshīyah* takes its name from a shadowy figure, *Ḥajjī Bektāsh* of Khorasan (d. 1337?). At first the group was loosely organized, but by the fifteenth century it had developed a highly centralized structure. The *Bektāshīyah* are noted for their syncretism; the rituals and beliefs of the order represent an amalgam of Shiism, Byzantine Christianity, esoteric cults, and the like. By the end of the sixteenth century, the *Bektāshīyah* had become associated with the Janissary corps, an elite military unit of slave-soldiers established by the Ottoman sultan *Murād I* (1360–1389). Despite the heterodox practices of the *Bektāshīyah*, their identification with the powerful and much-feared Janissaries provided them with security from persecution by the orthodox religious authorities. Where the *Mawlawīyah* attracted a more educated elite, the *Bektāshīyah* appealed to the less literate masses who were fascinated with the magic-like rituals and political power.

Suhrawardīyah and Rifā'īyah. In Iraq, as well, there arose two fraternities with diametrically opposed interpretations of religious experience. The genealogy of the *Suhrawardīyah* begins with *Abū al-Najīb al-Suhrawardī* (d. 1168), who was a disciple of *Aḥmad al-Ghazālī*. *Abū Najīb* is the author of an important rulebook for novices, *Kitāb ādāb al-murīdīn* (Book of the Manners of the Disciples). The text evinces *Abū Najīb's* long experience as a director; his rules are strict and comprehensive, yet attuned to the human frailties of the young and untutored.

The fraternity that bears the name *Suhrawardī* was founded by *Abū al-Najīb's* nephew, *Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Suhrawardī* (d. 1234). *Shihāb al-Dīn*, the author of the extremely influential work, *'Awārif al-ma'ārif* (Masters of Mystical Insights), is remembered in *Şūfī* circles as a great teacher. Teaching, in fact, became a characteristic note of the fraternity. The *Suhrawardīyah* made significant inroads into the Indian subcontinent, where its ranks included such important figures as *Bahā' al-Dīn Zakariyā* of Multan (d. 1268).

While the ethos of the *Suhrawardīyah* is characterized by serious training in the classical *Şūfī* tradition, the *Rifā'īyah* or "Howling Dervishes" focus primarily on dramatic ritual. This fraternity springs from the marshlands of southern Iraq, where its founder, *Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Rifā'ī* (d. 1182), spent most of his life. Contemporary observers describe vividly the bizarre practices engaged in by members of the fraternity: fire-eat-

ing; piercing ears, hands, necks, and penises with iron rings; biting heads off live snakes, and so forth. Clearly the appeal of the *Rifā'īyah* is primarily emotional.

Shādhiliyah. A fine example of a fraternity that responded to the religious needs of the larger community while cultivating a solid intellectual base in mystical theory is the *Shādhiliyah*. *Abū Ḥasan al-Shādhilī* (d. 1258) began his religious career at Tunis, where he was well known as a preacher. It was there that he founded his order in 1227. Impelled by a vision, he traveled eastward and settled eventually in Egypt, where the *Shādhiliyah* order came to flourish.

The most famous of the early *Shādhilī* shaykhs is not the founder but the third leader of the group, *Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh* (d. 1309). He was born in Alexandria and spent his early years in the study of *ḥadīth* and the law. *Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh's* training in the traditional religious sciences made him wary of any involvement with Sufism. His attitude eventually mellowed, and for twelve years he placed himself under the direction of the second shaykh of the order, *Abū al-'Abbās al-Mursī* (d. 1287), whom he eventually succeeded.

Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh's writings epitomize the spirit of the *Shādhiliyah* order. On one hand his work is very much in the intellectual tradition of the *Ibn 'Arabī* school. For example his book, *Laṭā'if al-minan* (Subtle Graces), written in defense of the fraternity and its practices, emphasizes the exalted role of the shaykh as *walī* and *quṭb*. On the other hand, the true genius of *Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh* is most evident in his collected aphorisms, the *Ḥikam* (Maxims). They remain to this day one of the most popular *Şūfī* texts in the Islamic world. Combining the erudition of the scholar with the vibrant, persuasive language of the enthusiast, *Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh* succeeds in communicating complex ideas in a way that is accessible to a wide range of individuals. Like the *Munājāt* of 'Abd Allāh Anṣārī, the *Ḥikam* of *Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh* must be savored time and time again, for their richness seems almost inexhaustible.

In the same way that *Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh*, through his writings, made the Sufism of the orders more accessible to larger numbers of Muslims, his fraternity as a whole adopted a structural form more in tune with the lives of the laity. Whereas some brotherhoods insisted on the abandonment of one's profession and even of family life, the *Shādhiliyah* allowed its members to remain involved in the secular world. In this respect, they were precursors of a similar development in the Christian West, when, in the sixteenth century, *Ignatius Loyola* founded the Society of Jesus, or Jesuits, whose members contrary to traditional monastic structures, were intent on fostering *contemplatio in actione*, contemplation while remaining fully involved in the secular world. *Ibn*

'Aṭā' Allāh's *Hikam* has a place of honor in Islamic spirituality equal to that of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* in Christianity.

There is not sufficient space to describe even briefly all of the great *ṭariqahs* that have become part of mainstream Sufism since the thirteenth century. The Qādiri-yah, whose eponymous founder, 'Abd al-Qādir Jilānī (d. 1116), is perhaps the most widely revered saint in all of Islam; the Naqshbandīyah, whose stern Sunnī spirit, disseminated in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, has spawned political movements and great poets such as Mir Dard (d. 1785); the music-loving Chishtīyah, Kubrawīyah, and so forth—all have played pivotal roles in the formation of Islamic religious life. [See *Tariqah* for further discussion.]

Decline of the Orders. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, have not been kind to Sufism, especially the Sufism of the orders. A number of factors contributed to the decline: the general secularization of world culture; colonialism, with its concomitant critique of Islamic religion and society; the response of Islamic modernism; and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

The changing political climate had profound effects on the Ṣūfī orders. In Turkey, for example, they were abolished by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1925 because they represented to him all that was corrupt and backward about Islam. Atatürk was in the process of transforming Turkey into a modern nation state from the rubble of the Ottoman empire. The traditional power of the Ṣūfī shaykhs and orders was incompatible with nationalism; the orders, therefore, were eliminated as public institutions.

At times, however, the orders were not victims of political change but its instigators. The Tijānīyah of West Africa and the Sanūsīyah of North Africa are prime examples. The Tijānīyah were militant revivalists. They fought bravely against the French in West Africa and eventually established a kingdom of their own during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The Sanūsīyah were similarly fundamentalist and militant. For decades they were at odds with Italian colonial power in North Africa. As a counterbalance they sided with the British who eventually invested the shaykh of the Sanūsīyah with authority in the region. The transformation of the shaykh into king of Libya and the accompanying solidification of political power eventually led to the decline of the Sanūsīyah as a Ṣūfī movement.

Despite the fact that many nineteenth- and twentieth-century Ṣūfī groups reflected fundamentalist tendencies, they still became the objects of attack by the ultra-orthodox, of whom the Wahhābīyah of Saudi Arabia are

but one example. Among such groups, any ritual practice not explicitly sanctioned by religious law is anathema. The very premise on which Sufism is based, namely union with God, is rejected as un-Islamic. We see today in many of the most vibrant Islamic revivalist movements a similar tendency to espouse the most puritanical forms of literalist religion. In such a world Sufism has little place.

In the Indian subcontinent, the involvement of many hereditary pirs (i.e., shaykhs) with Sufism has been based, in the modern period, more on family status, wealth, and influence than on any serious interest in mysticism. A backlash was inevitable. Muhammad Iqbal, one of the fathers of modern Muslim intellectual life in the subcontinent, rejected Sufism because of the corruption he perceived. He also reacted strongly against the Ṣūfī doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, because it entailed the negation of the self: if the self is nonexistent, why confront the problems of human existence? Nevertheless, his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, published in 1930, reflects Ṣūfī emphases on interiority, although his goal was to reinterpret Islam in humanistic terms that harmonized the spiritual and material realms of existence.

Attacks on Sufism are not new; they have occurred throughout the history of the tradition. The dramatic decline of Sufism in the modern period, however, is due as much to external as to internal forces. The intimate contacts between the Islamic world and the European West resulted in virulent critiques of Islamic religious practice, especially devotionalism. Muslim reactions were varied: some accepted the critique and mimicked Western secular societies (Atatürk's Turkey, for example); some reasserted their identity by returning to what was believed to be true Islam, devoid of Ṣūfī accretions (the Wahhābīyah, for example); others, such as the Muslim modernist Muhammad 'Abduh and his successors, proposed various more moderate plans for the adaptation of Muslim society to the demands of the modern world.

All of these responses, however, possessed anti-Ṣūfī elements, for most rejected Ṣūfī ritual practice and devotionalism as either non-Muslim or antimodern. Moreover, the power of the Ṣūfī shaykhs over masses of the faithful was seen by most to be counterproductive to modernization and to the development of a functioning secular state, for the shaykhs were often perceived as proponents of superstition, religious emotionalism, and outmoded power structures.

Mysticism in modern Islam is not an arid wasteland but rather more like a fallow field. There have been important modern teaching shaykhs such as Aḥmad al-'Alawī (d. 1934), whose influence is still felt in North

Africa. Moreover, the popular piety of Sufism still flourishes in many parts of the Islamic world, including North Africa, Egypt, the Indian subcontinent, and Indonesia. The great tradition of vernacular poetry, established by master artists such as the Turkish mystic Yunus Emre (d. 1321), continues to produce a rich literature. Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Africa, Indonesia—every corner of the Islamic world has produced its local poet-saints.

Doubtless Sufism has become increasingly more identified with popular ritual practice than with formal spiritual training. The transformation of Sufism into a mass movement could not help but lead to a certain vulgarization. There continue to arise, nevertheless, individual masters whose commitment to the path is reminiscent of the great figures of the classical period. Classical Ṣūfī literature survives because it still has the ability to touch the spirits of modern men and women. It is in this continued interaction between shaykh and *murīd* that hope for the future of Sufism resides.

[See also the biographies of al-Ghazālī, al-Ḥallāj, Ibn 'Arabī, Rūmī, and the other figures mentioned herein. For some aspects of Sufism not covered in the text, see Mawlid; Mi'rāj; Nubūwah; and Nūr Muḥammad.]

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ŞUHBAH (lit., "companionship"). In mystical parlance, *şuḥbah* can refer to (1) a mystic's return from seclusion (*'uzlah*) to human society; (2) the company of the spiritual mentor, which a new entrant to the mystical fold needs for spiritual training; and (3) social contact with all human beings. The value of *şuḥbah* was first to be appreciated when those near the Prophet became known as *şahābah* ("companions"), since they had the privilege of being in his company. Thereafter mystics looked upon the "company" of a superior mystic-master as a way to spiritual development. The spiritual guide (pir or shaykh) came to occupy a high position on account of his capacity to influence the thought and character of those who came near him.

Abū al-Ḥasan al-Hujwīrī (d. 1079) identified three types of companionship which he considered inseparable and interconnected: (1) companionship with God, the awareness of God's presence at all times which controlled and determined every detail of external behavior; (2) companionship with one's own self, which dictated the avoidance in one's own company of all that was improper in the company of others and unbecoming in the presence of God; and (3) companionship with fellow creatures. Operating within such a comprehensive concept of *şuḥbah*, mystical writings include the totality of a mystic's life—prayers and penitence, travels, sojourns in hospices, dealing with fellow mystics, relations with kin and friends, methods of earning a livelihood, marriage or celibacy—as aspects of that person's *şuḥbah*. As such, the principles of *şuḥbah* came to determine mystical actions in all their details, and many brochures and treatises were written on the subject. Notable works include al-Junayd's *Taṣḥīḥ al-irādah* (The Rectification of Discipleship), Aḥmad ibn Khadrūyah Balkhī's *Al-ri'āyah bi-ḥuqūq Allāh* (The Observance of What Is Due to God), and Muḥammad ibn 'Alī Tirmidhī's *Ādāb al-murīdīn* (Rules of Conduct for Disciples). Al-Sulamī's *Kitāb ādāb al-şuḥbah* (Book on the Rules of Company), al-Qushayrī's *Risālah* (Epistle), al-Hujwīrī's *Kaṣḥf al-maḥjūb* (The Unveiling of the Veiled), and Abū al-Najīb Suhrawardī's *Ādāb al-murīdīn* neatly consolidate all the information available in earlier works.

In the initial stages of mystical development in Islam, the term *şuḥbah* was used in a limited sense to mean

the company of the mystic teacher only; elaborate rules of residence and discipline were developed later. When Sufism came out of its first phase, designated by Reynold A. Nicholson as "the period of the Quietists," the value of companionship was emphasized and seclusion was considered of little significance in the building up of a spiritual personality. In mystical discipline, companionship and seclusion were paired as complements and supplements to each other. Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Nūrī (d. 907) remarked: "Beware of seclusion for it is connected with Satan, and cleave to companionship for therein is the satisfaction of the merciful God." Among the eleven veils that have to be lifted before gnosis can be attained, Al-Hujwīrī considered companionship the ninth. Meticulous care in the performance of duties pertaining to *şuḥbah* could lift this veil and make gnosis possible.

Islamic mysticism, particularly before the organization of the Şūfī orders (*turuq*; sg., *ṭarīqah*), considered travel an essential part of mystical discipline. The rules of *şuḥbah* therefore deal with both residents (Pers., *muqīmān*) and travelers (Pers., *musāfirān*). Regarding those who undertook travel as part of their spiritual training, rules were laid down about articles they took along, people with whom they could keep company, places where they could stay, and the way they had to conduct themselves while staying in a mosque, in a Şūfī center, or in an educational institution (*madrasah*). The main principle governing behavior in all these spheres was that a mystic did not forget God while involved in any of these activities and could utilize travel as a means for breaking undue attachment to material assets and family, for learning to live with complete resignation to the will of God, and for trying to develop a spirit of adjustment to different conditions of life and company.

Life within the Şūfī centers are similarly defined by elaborate rules of *şuḥbah*. Residents had to share responsibility for running the center; travelers were treated as guests for three days but after that they too were obliged to do some work to lighten the burden of the permanent residents. The Şūfī centers that provided facilities for *şuḥbah* were of different types: *khānagāhs* where separate accommodation was generally provided for all inmates; *jamā'at-khānahs*, where all lived a communal life under one roof and slept on the ground; *zāwiyahs* and *dā'irahs*, smaller institutions where persons of one affiliation lived in order to devote their time to meditation. Mystics following different masters laid down principles of *şuḥbah* according to the basic teachings of the order to which they belonged, but the 'Awārīf al-ma'ārif of Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1234) was generally accepted as the model on which

khānagāh life could be organized and the basic objectives of *ṣuḥbah* achieved. [See also *Khānagāh*.]

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SUHRAWARDĪ, SHIHĀB AL-DĪN YAḤYĀ

(AH 549–587/1153–1191 CE), more fully Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash ibn Amīrak Suhrawardī, Shaykh al-Ishrāq; Iranian philosopher and Ṣūfī. Born in the village of Suhraward in northern Iran, Suhrawardī studied Islamic law and philosophy at Marāgha and Isfahan. After completing these formal studies, he traveled around Iran, visiting Ṣūfīs and engaging in long periods of meditation and prayer. Next he embarked on a long journey through Anatolia and Syria, accepting the patronage of local princes and finally settling in Aleppo at the court of al-Malik al-Zāhir, son of the famed sultan Salāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin). Suhrawardī's ideas and his sharp debating tactics exposed him to criticism by the conventional religious scholars of Aleppo, who asked al-Malik al-Zāhir to arrest and execute him as a heretic. When the ruler refused their request, they appealed to Saladin, who overruled his son. Suhrawardī was imprisoned and, at the age of thirty-eight, died, either murdered or starved (hence the epithet of *maqtūl*—"martyr"—applied to him by his opponents).

In spite of the fact that he lacked a personal following during his brief lifetime, Suhrawardī was to have a deep influence on Islamic philosophy and Ṣūfī thought. The system of ideas associated with his name—"illumination," or *ishrāq*—drew upon diverse sources, hermetic, Mazdean, and Platonic, but remained within an Islamic framework. Suhrawardī departed sharply from the Aristotelian tradition in Islamic philosophy represented by Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). His masterpiece, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (Theosophy of Illumination), written during the year 1186, contains a criticism of the Peripatetics (and particularly of the Aristotelian categories of defi-

inition) and offers a new formulation of intuition (*dhawq*) by which one comes to know God. In this respect, Suhrawardī uses the Aristotelian metaphysics in its Islamic form as a point of departure toward a unitive metaphysics involving an experience of oneness with God. Here, the sole substance of being was divine light, a formulation prompted perhaps by the "light verse" in the Qur'ān (24:35). God's light must be allowed to shine in oneself to such a degree that one is united with that source. Furthermore, for every person, indeed for every substance, there is an angel, which demonstrates the spiritual and Eastern (*mashriq*, a pun on *ishrāq*) dimension added to the material, Western understanding of reality. The angels are arranged into two hierarchies in proportion to their perfection in effusion of light: one longitudinal, one latitudinal. In seeking to attain the divine light, one must have the guidance of prophets, particularly the last, Muḥammad, whose night journey to heaven (the *mi'rāj*) comes to symbolize the Ṣūfī novice's stages of consciousness of the way marked by Muḥammad.

The author of over fifty allegories, treatises, and other works in masterful Arabic and Persian, Suhrawardī had enormous influence on later Islamic thought. Since he was not known in the West through Latin translations, he was neglected there until brought to public attention by twentieth-century scholarship, particularly that of Henry Corbin. However, in the Islamic world Suhrawardī had influence on Iranian Shiism, especially through the commentary on the *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* by Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī in the thirteenth century and through the extensive work of Mullā Ṣadrā in the seventeenth century. Further influence extended to the Mughal court in India. Indirectly, but no less importantly, Suhrawardī, together with his near-contemporary Ibn 'Arabī, came to shape the metaphysics of Sufism in its gnostic forms among Sunnī and Shī'ī Muslims alike.

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SUICIDE. The topic of religiously motivated suicide is a complex one. Several of the major religious traditions reject suicide as a religiously justifiable act but commend martyrdom; among them are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These religions distinguish between actively willing to end one's life in suicide and passively accepting one's death as the divine will by means of martyrdom at the hands of another. Nonetheless, the actions of some of the early Christian martyrs and the deaths of the Jews at Masada in 74 CE blur this distinction. [See also Martyrdom.]

In contrast to religiously motivated suicide one may speak of heroic and altruistic suicide, the act of a person who decides that he or she has an ethical responsibility to die for the sake of community or honor. One must also differentiate between religiously motivated suicide and suicide that may be virtually forced upon an individual by the norms of society and may constitute either a duty or a punishment. One thinks of *satī*, widow burning in India, and of *seppuku*, self-disembowelment, when it occurred as a punishment in Japan. In these cases too, however, no simple distinction holds true. *Satī* became an accepted practice within medieval Hinduism, upheld by the brahmans, and accounts indicate that even into modern times it was often a voluntary practice. By her self-sacrifice the widow both achieved an honored status for herself and atoned for the sins and misdeeds of herself and her husband. *Seppuku* was often

the voluntary last act of a defeated warrior who chose to demonstrate both his fealty to his lord and his mastery over himself.

Like the major Western traditions, both Buddhism and Confucianism condemn suicide, but there are examples of self-immolation by Buddhist monks and of the seeking of honorable death by Confucian gentlemen. In contrast to these traditions, Jainism regards favorably the practice of *sallekhanā*, by which a Jain monk or layperson at the end of his lifetime or at the onset of serious illness attains death by gradual starvation.

These few examples demonstrate the complexity of the topic of religiously motivated suicide and the difficulty in distinguishing it from martyrdom or sacrifice, on the one hand, and from heroic or altruistic suicide, on the other. In addition, the occurrence in 1978 of the mass suicides at Jonestown, Guyana, raises the question of the relation between religious motivations for suicide and general fear of persecution, combined with mass paranoia. This question applies equally well to the mass suicide of Jews faced with persecution in York, England, in 1190 and to the mass suicides of Old Believers in Russia in the late seventeenth century.

On the whole, what we may term religiously motivated suicides constitute but a small proportion of the total number of suicides. In his classic work *Le suicide*, Émile Durkheim discussed the social causes for egoistic, altruistic, and anomic suicides. His work and that of many other scholars demonstrate that suicide has most often occurred for reasons other than religious ones. These include the desire to avoid shame, to effect revenge, to demonstrate one's disappointment in love, and to escape senility and the infirmities of old age. Suicide as a means of avoiding shame and upholding one's honor was considered a creditable act in societies as different as those on the Melanesian island of Tikopia, among the Plains and Kwakiutl Indians of North America, and in ancient Rome.

Scholars have argued that the incidence of and attitude toward suicide are largely dependent on the individual's and society's view of the afterlife. Where death is perceived as a happy existence, scholars such as Jacques Choron believe, there is an inducement to suicide. In the first known document that apparently reflects on suicide, the Egyptian text entitled *The Dialogue of a Misanthrope with His Own Soul*, death is seen as attractive because it will lead to another and better existence. The tendency toward suicide is strengthened when suicide is regarded either as a neutral act or as one worthy of reward. Suicide rates also increase when this life is regarded as no longer acceptable or worthwhile. For example, Jim Jones, the founder of the

Peoples' Temple, urged his followers in Guyana to commit suicide in order to enter directly into a new and better world, where they would be free of persecution and would enjoy the rewards of the elect. In the Jonestown community, suicide on a mass scale was appreciated as a religiously justifiable act that would be rewarded in the afterlife.

Ancient Greek and Roman Civilization. While the ancient Greek writers and philosophers did not consider suicide an action that would lead to a better existence, they did see it as an appropriate response to certain circumstances. The fact that Jocasta, the mother of Oedipus, chose to commit suicide upon learning of her incestuous relationship with her son was understood and appreciated by the ancients as an appropriate response to a disastrous situation. Heroic suicide in the face of a superior enemy and the choice of death to avoid dishonor or the agony of a lengthy terminal illness were accepted as justifiable actions. Through the voice of Socrates, Plato in his *Phaedo* did much to form the classical attitude toward suicide. Socrates himself chose to drink the hemlock, but he also affirmed the Orphic notions that man is placed in a prison from which he may not release himself and that he is a possession of the gods. The decision to commit suicide is thus an act against the gods, depriving them of their prerogative to end or to sustain human life. The key word for both Plato and Socrates is *necessity*. A person may appropriately end his life only when the gods send the necessity to do so upon him, as in fact they did to Socrates. Plato's disciple, Aristotle, argued even more strongly against suicide. He regarded it as an offense against the state, since by such an act a person fails to perform his obligations as a citizen. Thus it became a social outrage—a view that has continued to dominate thought in the West until the most recent times.

Whereas the Pythagoreans and Epicureans opposed suicide, the Stoics regarded it favorably under certain circumstances. The Stoic was obliged to make a decision that properly addressed the demands of the situation; at times the decision might be to commit suicide. Both Zeno and his successor, Cleanthes, are reported to have done so.

Heroic suicide and suicide to avoid dishonor or suffering became frequent within the society of the Roman empire. Seneca, in particular, moved beyond the insistence on a divine call or necessity for suicide to the assertion that suicide at the appropriate time is a basic individual right. For Seneca, the central issue was freedom, and he affirmed that the divine had offered humankind a number of exits from life; he himself chose to exercise the right to suicide. His successor, Epictetus, placed more limits on suicide, stressing again the belief

that one must wait for the divine command before acting: the suffering that is a normal part of daily life for much of humanity does not of itself constitute a sufficient reason for suicide—although exceptional pain and suffering offer justifiable cause. For Epictetus, Socrates was the best model and guide in deciding when one might legitimately choose to end one's life.

Judaism. Whereas suicide was at the very least tolerated, and often applauded, among the ancient Greeks and Romans, the Hebrew people disapproved of it. Judaism draws a clear distinction between suicide, which it defines as self-murder, and martyrdom, which it defines as death on behalf of one's faith and religious convictions. Nonetheless, the Hebrew scriptures, which contain few references to dying by one's own hand, do describe several instances of heroic suicide. The king Abimelech, gravely wounded by a woman, called upon his armor-bearer to kill him (*Jgs.* 9:52–54). Although he did not literally kill himself, his command to his aide may be regarded as effecting what he could not perform himself, so that he might not die in dishonor. The death of Samson (*Jgs.* 16:28–31) may certainly be judged a heroic suicide, since by his act he brought about the demise of a large number of the enemy Philistines. The gravely injured Saul fell upon his own sword in order to avoid a disgraceful death at the hands of his enemies (*I Sm.* 31:4), and his armor-bearer, who had failed his master's request to kill him, then fell upon his own sword. The death of Ahithophel, the counselor to David and then to David's son Absalom, would appear to be a suicide motivated by disgrace. When Absalom refused to follow the advice Ahithophel gave him regarding his battle with David, Ahithophel returned home, set his affairs in order, and hanged himself (*2 Sm.* 17:23). The last suicide recorded in the Hebrew scriptures, the death of the king Zimri, occurred because of the loss of a decisive battle (*I Kgs.* 16:18).

Although Hebrew scriptures do not explicitly forbid suicide, the Judaic tradition came to prohibit it, partly in the belief that God alone gives life and takes it away, and partly on the basis of the sixth commandment, which forbids unjustified homicide. However, rabbinic law regards persons committing suicide as most frequently being of unsound mind and thus not responsible for their actions. Under these circumstances, they may still receive normal Jewish burial rites. Furthermore, suicides committed under duress, as for example to avoid murder, idolatry, or adultery, were considered blameless and indeed even praiseworthy. The mass suicide at Masada in 74 CE and other mass suicides in Europe during the Middle Ages were considered in this light.

Concerning Masada, the historian Josephus Flavius

recounts, on the basis of the report of a few survivors, that on the eve of the Roman assault on that hill the leader of the vastly outnumbered Jewish resistance, El'azar ben Ya'ir, called the community together and reminded them of their vow not to become the slaves of the Romans. That night many of the soldiers killed their families and committed suicide. Others drew lots to decide who would kill his fellows and then die by his own hand. It is impossible to say how many of the over nine hundred defenders allowed themselves to be killed and how many ended their lives by suicide. In spite of the Jewish prohibition against suicide, Masada came to be regarded as a heroic sacrifice, and it remains a living symbol of a people's response to oppression.

Although accounts of individual suicide within Judaism are rare, there are examples of mass suicides during times of persecution. During the First Crusade, in 1096, Jews who had obtained sanctuary in the bishop's castle at Worms chose mass suicide over baptism; similar instances of suicide to avoid baptism occurred in various Rhineland towns, such as Mayence, and in York, England, where in 1190 some 150 Jews set fire to the building in which they had sought safety and then consigned themselves to the flames. Yet other instances of mass suicide occurred during the Black Death, when popular superstition blamed the outbreak of the plague on the Jews. Although abuse and persecution were certainly major motivating factors during the periods of the Crusades and the Black Death, these mass or multiple suicides appear to have arisen from a deep religious desire to remain true to the faith. They point again to the difficulty in distinguishing between, on the one hand, suicides motivated by fear of persecution and, on the other, suicides motivated by religious convictions and ideals, deaths that in the latter case the tradition judges to be acts of martyrdom. Certainly the deaths at Masada must be regarded as both faithful obedience to religious affiliation and identity and the culmination of a desire to give the Jews' enemies a hollow victory.

Christianity. Christianity repudiates suicide on much the same biblical grounds as does Judaism. The only suicide recorded in the New Testament is that of Jesus' betrayer, Judas Iscariot; it is described in such a way as to indicate that it was a sign of repentance for his deed (*Mt.* 27:3–5). The church father Tertullian referred even to Jesus' death as voluntary—a description approximating that of suicide, since clearly a divine being controls his own life. In his book *Conversion* (1962), Arthur Darby Nock points to the “theatricality” present in some of the actions of the early martyrs, as in “the frequent tendency of Christians in times of persecution to force themselves on the notice of the magistrates by tearing down images or by other demonstrations” (p. 197).

Bishop Ignatius of Antioch, writing to his fellow Christians in Rome, pleaded that they do nothing to hinder his martyrdom but allow him to be consumed entirely by the beasts. But whereas Tertullian asserted that only martyrs would reach paradise before the Parousia, Clement of Alexandria sought to stem the tide of those rushing to martyrdom by differentiating between self-motivated suicide and genuine martyrdom for the faith.

In his *City of God*, which appeared in 428 CE, the church father Augustine wrote against suicide in a way that became determinative for the tradition. He discussed various situations in which a Christian might find himself or herself, and concluded that suicide is not a legitimate act even in such desperate circumstances as those of a virgin seeking to protect her virtue. Augustine argued that suicide is a form of homicide, and thus prohibited by the sixth commandment; that a suicide committed in order to avoid sin is in reality the commission of a greater sin to avoid a lesser; and that one who commits suicide forfeits the possibility of repentance. Subsequent church councils, as well as such eminent theologians as Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, sided with Augustine. Suicide, in contrast to martyrdom, came to be regarded as both a sin and a crime. Dante placed suicides in the seventh circle of the inferno in his *Divine Comedy*, and popular opinion throughout Christian Europe regarded suicides in the same light as witches and warlocks. Indeed, their corpses were treated in a similar manner: suicides were frequently buried at crossroads with stakes driven through their hearts to prevent their ghosts from causing harm. The last recorded instance of such a burial in England occurred in 1823, and the law mandating confiscation of the property of a convicted suicide remained on the books until 1870.

In spite of ecclesiastical censure, religious impulse did lead to suicides, sometimes on a mass scale. Some thirteenth-century Cathari or Albigensians may have chosen suicide by starvation. Even more dramatic are the accounts of the Old Believers (*raskol'niki*) in late seventeenth-century Russia who chose death by fire over obedience to liturgical changes introduced by the archbishop Nikon, with the subsequent backing of the tsars. According to tradition, on several occasions one to two thousand people who had been besieged by government troops, as at Paleostrovskii monastery in 1688, locked themselves within chapels or monasteries and burned them to the ground, consigning their own bodies to the flames.

Although martyrdom as a testimony to one's faith continues to be honored within Christianity, suicide as an individual act undertaken for nonreligious motives is regarded as a sin, and until recently it was regarded

as a crime unless done in ignorance of its implications or in a state of lunacy. Few Christian theologians and philosophers challenged this view. John Donne, who served as dean of Saint Paul's in London, was a notable exception. In his book *Biathanatos*, written in 1608 but not published until 1644, Donne challenged the Augustinian belief that suicides cannot repent; he argued that a totally negative attitude toward suicide places limitations on the mercy and charity of God. New attitudes toward suicide were subsequently expounded by a variety of philosophers such as David Hume, who argued that suicide is not a crime. However, although the Christian attitude toward suicide may now be characterized as more compassionate than during earlier periods, the act of suicide, in contrast to martyrdom, continues to be regarded as a serious sin.

Islam. Islam joined Judaism and Christianity in prohibiting suicide (*intiḥār*) while glorifying those who die the death of a martyr (*shahīd*) or witness to the faith. While scholars debate whether or not the Qur'ān itself specifically forbids suicide, they agree that the *ḥadīth*, the traditions that preserve the words of the Prophet on a wide variety of issues, prohibit suicide. According to these sources, Muḥammad proclaimed that a person who commits suicide will be denied Paradise and will spend his time in Hell repeating the deed by which he had ended his life. By the tradition's own standards, religiously motivated suicide is an impossibility, since the taking of one's own life is both a sin and a crime. Nonetheless, as with Judaism and Christianity, the line between suicide and martyrdom is not clear. Since it is believed that the Muslim martyr who dies in defense of the faith is rewarded with immediate entrance into Paradise, where he will enjoy great pleasures and rewards, it would not be surprising if some Muslims readily participated in battles even when badly outnumbered, in the hope that they might die while fighting.

Within Islam the Shi'ī sect emphasizes the self-sacrifice and suffering of its imams, the successors to Muḥammad. The death of Ḥusayn, the grandson of the Prophet, and the third imam, was regarded by his followers as an act of voluntary self-sacrifice that could be termed a religiously motivated death. Although he died on the battlefield, his death was subsequently interpreted as a goal he both desired and actively sought; the passion play enacted as the climax of 'Āshūrā' (tenth of Muḥarram) depicts his death as actively willed. In a translation of this play (*Muhammedan Festivals*, edited by G. E. von Grunebaum, New York, 1951) Ḥusayn says: "Dear Grandfather [Muḥammad], I abhor life; I would rather go visit my dear ones in the next world" (p. 92). Within Shiism, and the Ismā'īlī sect, Ḥasan-i Sabbāḥ in the twelfth century formed the

order of the Assassins, which was devoted to establishing its own religious and governmental autonomy, in part by killing both Crusaders and Sunnī Muslims. The death of a member of this order was regarded not as a suicide, even when his mission had been one almost certain to result in his death, but rather as a glorious martyrdom that would earn him both the veneration of society and the delights of Paradise. The tradition cites many accounts of a mother who rejoiced on hearing of the death of her son, only to put on mourning clothes when she learned subsequently that he had not died and thus had not attained the glorious state of martyrdom.

Hinduism and Jainism. In discussing Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, I have pointed to the close relationship between suicide and martyrdom and the difficulty frequently encountered in distinguishing between them. Regarding the religions of the East, the difficult issue is the relation between suicide and sacrifice. In Hinduism, the Brāhmaṇas laid the foundation for religiously motivated suicide by declaring that the fullest and most genuine sacrifice is that of the individual's self. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* outlines the procedure by which one renounces the world, forsaking one's belongings and departing into the forest. Certainly Hinduism affirms that suicide must be a thoughtful decision—as in the resolve of a person to end the sufferings of old age—or that it must be a religiously motivated act. One Upaniṣad condemns those who attempt suicide without having attained the necessary degree of enlightenment. The Dharmasūtras firmly prohibit any suicide other than one religiously motivated. In ancient and medieval Hinduism a number of methods of committing suicide were regarded favorably, such as drowning oneself in the Ganges, jumping from a cliff, burning oneself, burying oneself in snow, or starving oneself to death. Various places of pilgrimage, such as Prayāga (present-day Allahabad) or Banaras, were seen as particularly auspicious places for ending one's life.

Two types of suicide in Hinduism, very different in form and intention, are worthy of special examination. The first is the death by suicide of the enlightened person, the world renouncer. Such a person, in his quest for release from *saṃsāra*, has devoted himself to increasingly difficult acts of penance and to a thorough study of the Upaniṣads. Once he has attained the goal of freedom from all desires, he may begin the great journey in the direction of the northeast, consuming nothing other than air and water. According to the lawgiver Manu, a brahman might also follow this procedure when he begins to be overcome by a serious illness.

The second form of suicide in Hinduism that deserves special attention is *satī*, widow burning. It appears to

have been a form of suicide motivated by both social and religious considerations. Although the custom is not unique to India, it nonetheless was practiced there most frequently and over the longest period of time. The practice may go back as far as the fourth century BCE, but it began to grow in popularity only after about 400 CE. According to Upendra Thakur in his study *The History of Suicide in India*, “*satī* in its latest forms was a mediaeval growth though it had its germs in ancient customs and rituals” (1963, p. 141). The practice of *satī* might take one of two forms. In one, *sahamarāṇa*, the woman ascended the funeral pyre and was burned alongside the corpse of her husband. In the second, *anumarāṇa*, when the wife learned that her husband had died and his body had already been cremated, she would ascend the pyre and die alongside his ashes, or with some belonging of his. Certainly, at least in some cases, *satī* was motivated by genuine feelings of grief and affection on the part of the widow. Although the practice remained voluntary, in some areas social pressure may have made *satī* more the rule than the exception. No doubt the practice also gained popularity because the life of a widow was both lonely and degrading. On the other hand, the blessing or curse of a woman on her way to perform *satī* was believed to be very powerful, and her act of sacrifice was believed to purify both herself and her husband. Thus, although the act of *satī* may not always have been religiously motivated, it did have its religious reward. The British, during their rule of India, made a determined effort to abolish the practice, finally outlawing it as homicide in 1829.

Perhaps the tradition that most explicitly condones religiously motivated suicide is Jainism. Following the teaching of their saint Mahāvīra, who lived in the sixth century BCE, the Jain monk and the Jain layperson lead, in differing degrees, a rigorously ascetic life in order to attain liberation and to free the soul from karma. Members of the laity as well as monks are encouraged to practice *sallekhanā* (austere penance), in order to attain a holy death through meditation. Jains believe it is their duty to prevent disease or the infirmities of old age from undermining the spiritual progress they have attained through asceticism and meditation. Jainism prescribes strict rules for when *sallekhanā* is appropriate. As Padmanabh S. Jaini indicated in his book *The Jaina Path of Purification*, Jainism distinguishes between impure suicide, by which the passions are increased, and pure suicide, the holy death attained with “inner peace or dispassionate mindfulness” (Jaini, 1979, p. 229). *Sallekhanā* involves gradual fasting, often under the supervision of a monastic teacher, until the stage is reached whereat the individual no longer consumes any

food or drink and thus gradually attains death by starvation. Jains perceive *sallekhanā* to be the climax of a lifetime of spiritual struggle, ascetic practice, and meditation. It allows the individual to control his own destiny so that he will attain full liberation or at the very least reduce the number of future reincarnations that he will undergo.

Buddhism and Confucianism. Turning to Buddhism and Confucianism, we find that suicide is legislated against in both traditions, but that there are notable exceptions involving religiously motivated suicide. Gautama Buddha, in his personal search for salvation, deliberately chose against the practice of fasting unto death. Nonetheless, under certain extraordinary circumstances, Buddhists see religiously motivated suicide as an act of sacrifice and worship. We find indications of this positive attitude toward suicide, or self-sacrifice, in some of the accounts of the Buddha’s previous lives contained in the *Jātakas* (Birth Tales). The stories of the Buddha’s previous lives as a hare (*Śaśa Jātaka*) and as a monkey (*Mahākapi Jātaka*) both describe suicide as an act of self-sacrifice to benefit another, and only in the story of the monkey does this act lead to death. Another famous account is that from the *Suvarṇaprabhāṣa*, a Mahāyāna *sūtra*, which describes the suicide or sacrifice of the Buddha, during his life as the prince Mahāsattva, in order to feed a hungry tigress unable to care for herself. Following this model, Buddhism in its various forms affirms that, while suicide as self-sacrifice may be appropriate for the person who is an *arhat*, one who has attained enlightenment, it is still very much the exception to the rule.

Confucianism based its attitude toward suicide on another consideration, that of filial piety and obligation. The person who commits suicide robs his ancestors of the veneration and service due them and demonstrates his ingratitude to his parents for the gift of life. The duty of a gentleman is to guide his life according to *li*, the code or rules of propriety. In rare cases, suicide was required of the gentleman who failed to uphold these rules. In some instances a gentleman might commit suicide to protest improper government, since above all a gentleman was obliged to uphold the virtue of humanness. Thus, in these unusual instances suicide was the correct way to demonstrate adherence to the precepts of Confucianism.

Although the Japanese tradition of *seppuku*, or *hara-kiri*, should be regarded in its voluntary form as heroic rather than as religiously motivated suicide, it nonetheless does contain certain religious elements. The standard by which all acts of *seppuku* (disembowelment) were judged was set by the heroic Minamoto Yorimasa during a desperate battle in 1180. While suicide was

usually performed as an individual act by a noble warrior or *samurai*, there are examples in Japanese history of mass suicides, such as that of the forty-seven *rōnin* who accepted the penalty of *seppuku* in order to avenge the death of their lord in 1703.

While Christian missionaries in Japan, from the time of the arrival of the first Jesuits, sought to prevent *seppuku*, the Zen Buddhist tradition continued to regard it as a form of honorable death. The selection of the *hara*, or belly, as the point at which the sword was plunged into the body reflected the belief that the abdomen is the place where one exercises control over one's breathing and is, indeed, the central point of self-discipline. More generally, as Ivan I. Morris states in his book *The Nobility of Failure*, the abdomen was considered in the Japanese tradition as "the locus of man's inner being, the place where his will, spirit, generosity, indignation, courage, and other cardinal qualities were concentrated" (Morris, 1975, p. 367). Thus, by committing oneself to the performance of *seppuku*, which became a clearly defined ritual, one demonstrated in this final act the greatest degree of self-control, discipline, and courage.

Conclusion. This article has focused directly on religiously motivated suicide. It has omitted references to suicide among elderly Inuit (Eskimo) and among young Tikopia islanders, to cite only two examples from a vast number of possibilities. In these cases, as in many others, although the suicides may be heroic or altruistic, they do not demonstrate a clear religious motivation. Suicides by reason of financial failure, or loss of honor or of a loved one, occur among the Kwakiutl and Iroquois Indians, as well as among Bantu-speaking peoples of Africa. Occurrences of suicide are not limited by geography or time, but of the many suicides that have taken place throughout the ages, only a small proportion can be judged to be religiously motivated.

The examples of religiously motivated suicide discussed here demonstrate the wide variety of forms and purposes that the act may take. Many of the examples, from both East and West, illustrate the difficulty in distinguishing between suicide that is religiously motivated and suicide that is motivated by heroism, altruism, or fear of persecution and suffering. The deaths at Jonestown in 1978 raise anew the problem of how we are to differentiate between religiously motivated suicide and suicide induced by paranoia and terror. There is no simple distinction between suicide and martyrdom, on the one hand, or between suicide and sacrifice, on the other. In formulating these distinctions and in evaluating the morality and religious value of certain acts that result in death, each person brings to bear his or her own religious and ethical values and tradition. Such personal judgment must, however, be conjoined

with the awareness that what may be perceived by one observer as needless self-sacrifice or even self-murder may be judged by another as the noblest example of religiously motivated suicide in behalf of beliefs, values, or tradition.

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Among the older studies of the topic, still useful are *Suicide: A Social and Historical Study* by Henry Romilly Fedden (London, 1938) and *To Be or Not to Be: A Study of Suicide* by Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel (New York, 1933).

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MARILYN J. HARRAN

SUJIN (r. late third to early fourth century), tenth emperor of Japan, according to early chronicles. Most of Sujin's predecessors are mentioned only briefly in the chronicles, with no significant achievements credited to their reigns. He, however, is described as having played an active role in the formative period of the Japanese nation. For this reason, some historians regard him as the real founder of the Japanese state.

In the earliest years of Sujin's rule, political instability prevailed. To restore peace, Sujin assembled eighty myriad deities and sought guidance from them: "At this time the Gods inspired Yamato-totohi-momoso-hime to say as follows: 'Why is the Emperor grieved at the disordered state of the country? If he duly did us reverent worship it would assuredly become pacified of itself'" (Aston, 1896, p. 152). The emperor worshiped as he was told, but without any effect. Then, having bathed and practiced abstinence, and purified the interior of the hall, he prayed. That night he had a dream. A man of noble appearance told him, "If thou wilt cause me to be worshiped by my child, Ōtata-neko, then will there be peace at once." Delighted, the emperor did so, and peace returned to the country.

After that, Sujin sent four shoguns, including Ōbiko, in four directions to conquer the local chiefs who refused to submit to him. Until recently, historians doubted that such an expedition had actually occurred, but a sword inscribed with the name Ōbiko and the date 471 CE has been discovered at a tomb near Tokyo (Inariyama, Kofun) that corroborates the account in the chronicles. According to this inscription, Ōbiko was regarded as the ancestor of the local chiefs. As the chronicles often refer to intermarriages between a central government official and the daughter of a local chief frequently resulting in children, the validity of the statement in the sword inscription is supported. There was an expedition, probably in the late third or early fourth

century, and it brought the eastern region, including what is now Tokyo, under the control of the Yamato rulers of central Honshu.

During his reign, Sujin first consolidated his control over the territory he had inherited from his predecessors by appeasing the local deities, and then expanded the kingdom. For this reason, he is given the name August Founder of the Country.

[See also Japanese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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KAKUBAYASHI FUMIO

SUKKOT is the Hebrew name for the Jewish autumnal festival, also called the Festival of Booths, or Tabernacles. Sukkot begins on the fifteenth day of the month of Tishri and lasts for seven days, followed by an eighth day called 'Atseret (possibly meaning "assembly"; see *Lv.* 23:36, *Nm.* 29:35). (Outside Israel, 'Atseret is observed also on the ninth day.) Thus, according to Jewish tradition, there are really two distinct but interconnected festivals: Sukkot proper and Shemini 'Atseret ("eighth day of 'Atseret"). The Sukkot rituals are carried out only on Sukkot proper; two are essential. The first is to dwell in booths or tabernacles (*sukkot*; sg. *sukkah*) as a reminder of the dwellings in which the Israelites lived at the time of the Exodus from Egypt (*Lv.* 23:33–44). The second is derived from the biblical verse regarding four plants: *lulav* (palm branch), *etrog* (citron), *'aravot* (willows), and *hadassim* (myrtles) (*Lv.* 23:40). It is traditionally understood that these four plants are to be ritually held in the hand. Sukkot, as the culmination of the three pilgrim festivals, is the season of special rejoicing (*Dt.* 16:13–17) and is referred to in the liturgy as "the season of our joy."

The Sukkah. The main symbol of the festival is a hut, having at least three walls, no roof, but covered with leaves or straw. During the seven days of the festival, all meals are eaten in the *sukkah*. Many Jews, especially those living in warm climates, sleep there as well. In addition to the biblical reason, medieval thinkers saw the command to dwell in the *sukkah*, a temporary dwelling, as a reminder to man of the transient nature of material possessions, and an exhortation that he

should place his trust in God. According to the mystics, the *sukkah* is visited on each of the seven days by a different biblical hero—Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron, Joseph, and David. It is the custom among many Jews to recite a welcoming formula to these guests (*ushpizin*) as if they were real persons visiting the *sukkah*.

The Four Species. The rite of the four plants consists in taking them in the hand during the synagogue service and waving them above and below and in the four directions of the compass. The stated reason is to dispel harmful “winds” and to acknowledge God as ruler over all. Various interpretations have been given of why it is commanded to take these four plants. For example, it has been said that they represent man’s backbone, heart, eye, and mouth, all of which must be engaged in the worship of God. Moses Maimonides (1135/8–1204) treated these as homiletical interpretations and suggested as the true reason a means of thanksgiving to God for the harvest. The harvest motif is also observed in the custom of having a procession in the synagogue while holding the four plants on each day of Sukkot. During the procession the Hosha’nah (“save now”) prayer for a good harvest in the year ahead is recited. On the seventh day there are seven processions, hence the name of the day, Hosha’nah Rabbah (“great Hosha’nah”). At the end of the service on this day, the ancient custom of beating bunches of willows on the ground follows. On Shemini ‘Atseret a special prayer for rain is recited. In a later development within Jewish tradition, Hosha’nah Rabbah is seen as setting the seal on the judgment made on Yom Kippur, so that the day is a day of judgment with prayers resembling those offered on Yom Kippur. There is a folk belief that if a man sees his shadow without a head on the night of Hosha’nah Rabbah, he will die during the year.

Shemini ‘Atseret. The last day of the festival has acquired a new character from medieval times. The weekly Torah readings—from the beginning of *Genesis* to the end of *Deuteronomy*—are completed on this day and then immediately begun again, so that the day is both the end and the beginning of the annual cycle. The day is now called Simḥat Torah (“rejoicing of the Torah”). In the Diaspora, Simḥat Torah falls on the second day of Shemini ‘Atseret (23 Tishri). In Israel, Simḥat Torah coincides with the one-day celebration of Shemini ‘Atseret on 22 Tishri, the day also observed by Reform Jews, who no longer observe the additional second day of festivals traditionally observed by Diaspora Jews. The person who has the honor of completing the reading is called the “bridegroom” of the Torah, and the one who begins the reading again is the “bridegroom” of *Genesis*. On this joyful day the scrolls of the Torah are taken in procession around the synagogue, and the

“bridegrooms” invite the congregation to a festive repast.

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LOUIS JACOBS

SUMERIAN RELIGION. See Mesopotamian Religions.

SUN. There can hardly be anyone on earth who has not been profoundly aware of the apparent progress of the sun across the heavens and who has not related to it, either personally or as a numinous force. The rising and setting of the sun provides one of the primal dichotomies, parallel to those between day and night, light and darkness, warmth and cold, life and death, *yang* and *yin*. Night is mysterious, dangerous, akin to the darkness of the womb. Daylight symbolizes renewed life, truth, logic. In modern thinking, the sun often stands for individual consciousness, and the moon (or night) for the unconscious, the ocean, or the feminine principle. In children’s drawings, a happy scene includes a huge round sun with rays like hair. Unhappy and frustrated children produce an entirely black sky. Mentally disturbed patients often draw their own bodies as the sun’s disk, complete with arms and legs like rays.

In classical poetry birth is described as “reaching the shores of light.” In the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, the conflict is between the fearsome Furies, avengers of the mother’s blood, who constantly invoke the “dark mother,” and the shining Apollo, revealer of truth and righteousness (and symbolic of paternal predominance). The west, where the sun sets, in most rituals represents death; the east, where the sun rises, life and birth. Even Neanderthal burials were oriented according to east and west. When a Greek priest faced north in sacrifices, the right hand, stretched toward the east, represented the fortunate side, the left, the “sinister.”

In many primitive mythologies, the sun is an object tossed up or hung in the sky by mortals or trickster figures. The Hopi Indians claim that they made their sun themselves, by throwing into the sky a shield made of buckskin together with a fox skin and a parrot’s tail to make the colors of sunrise and sunset. The San of Africa believe that the sun was once a mortal who gave out light from his armpit. In order to make the light brighter, some children threw him into the sky, where-

upon he became round and shines now for all mankind. Among the Tatars, the culture hero Porcupine took some fire on his sword and threw it up into the sky to make the sun. For the moon, he thrust his sword into the water; thus the sun is hot and the moon cool. The famous American Indian trickster Coyote is said to have sent the wolf to bring him fire to make the sun. In one of the Oceanic myths that describe life beginning inside a shell, the creator, Spider Woman, opened the shell and then threw up two snails to make the sun and moon. In Norse mythology the sun and moon are sparks from Muspelheim, the realm of fire. The gods, however, anthropomorphized them and set them to drive chariots across the sky.

In more sophisticated societies, the luminaries were set in the heavens by the high god. Sometimes, they represented his eyes. In ancient Egypt the sun was sometimes called the eye of Re; in northern Europe, the eye of Óðinn (Odin); in Oceania, the eye of Atea.

The creation myth of Mesopotamia, *Enuma elish*, relates how the conquering god Marduk, who had solar characteristics himself, "set up stations for the gods in the sky, determining the year by setting up the zones." According to the *Book of Genesis* "God made the two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night. . . . And God set them in the firmament of the heavens to give light upon the earth, to rule over the day and over the night, and to separate the light from the darkness" (1:16–18). In Plato's great myth the *Timaeus*, "the Demiurge [the creator] lit a light which we now call the sun. . . to shine through the whole heaven and to enable the living creatures to gain a knowledge of numbers from the uniform movements. In this way there came into being night and day, the period of the single most intelligent revolution" (39c). Thus the Demiurge, having set out all the heavenly bodies, put them in motion and brought time into being.

More often, the sun is anthropomorphized, sometimes as a female but more frequently as a male. He crosses the sky by the appropriate means of locomotion. In ancient Sumeria, he walked. In ancient Egypt, he sailed in a boat like the ones on the Nile, in company with some of the other gods and the pharaoh. When the horse was domesticated, about the beginning of the second millennium BCE, the sun drove a chariot pulled by white or flaming horses. The horse, the sacred animal of the Indo-Europeans, was one of the animals most closely connected with the sun and was often sacrificed to it. Another creature associated with the sun was the bird—a falcon, raven, or eagle, or, of course, the fabulous phoenix, which dies and is born again from the fire every five thousand years. The wings of birds are at-

tached to the sun's round form to produce the winged disk so common in solar iconography. In Africa and India the tiger and especially the lion are sun animals; in the Americas, the eagle and the jaguar. Leo is the zodiacal sign for the fiercest summer month; the lion is the royal animal on all the kingly architecture of the ancient Near East. The many representations of a lion attacking a bull may, some have surmised, reflect the heat of summer routing spring, represented in the zodiac by Taurus, the bull, or the paternal cult, attacking the female horned moon.

Eclipses of both sun and moon were experienced with great dread. The Tatars believed that an eclipse meant that the sun was attacked by a vampire who lived in a star. In Norse myth the sun was pursued by a supernatural wolf who will devour it when the world ends. The ancient Egyptians believed that a demon—the Chinese, a dragon—was attacking the sun. Some North American Indian tribes, on the other hand, believed that the sun and moon were eclipsed when they held their infants in their arms. In Tahiti it was believed that eclipses occurred when the sun and moon were mating.

Many devices were employed to "cure" eclipses, such as the beating of drums or the making of other loud noises or the shooting of arrows at the sun. "Snaring the sun" is one of the most widespread sun myths in Oceania and North America. This is one of the exploits of Māui, the Polynesian culture hero, for instance, who caught the sun and beat it so that it would not go so fast. It has been conjectured that stories of this kind are explanations for the solstices, when the sun is perceived to stand still for several days. The high cultures of the Inca and of Mesoamerican peoples were familiar with the stations of the sun, and the Pueblo measured sunrise points on the eastern horizon to divide the year. The Zuni used as a gnomon an erect slab with a solar effigy on top, and the sun temple at Cuzco, like Greek temples, was so oriented that the sun at the solstice would penetrate the shrine.

There seems to be no doubt that the impressive monument at Stonehenge in England was set up to mark the solstices and equinoxes as well as the stations of the moon. New carbon 14 readings indicate that Stonehenge is at least as old as the first pyramids, ruling out influence from the East on its construction. In view of the tremendous labor involved in moving and setting the megaliths, which occurred in three stages several centuries apart, there can hardly be any question that religious motivation was involved. Diodorus Siculus, writing in the first century BCE, described a "spherical temple to Apollo among the Hyperboreans," which may be a reference to Stonehenge as a great temple to the sun. Recent research has turned up other observatories

in Scotland, the Orkneys, and even in Carnac in Brittany. Gold and bronze disks engraved with crosses and spirals, daggers and horse trappings with the same designs, and amber disks with gold rims, all contemporary with the last phase of Stonehenge, have been found in the British Isles and in Scandinavia. It is tempting to imagine a crowd of people, each carrying a sun amulet, waiting for the summer sunrise at Stonehenge.

A spectacular object confirming northern sun worship is the famous disk found in Trundholm in northern Zealand, plated with gold and decorated with circles and spirals; it is set on wheels and drawn by a bronze horse, probably one of a pair. In all the Scandinavian countries have been discovered objects and rock carvings decorated with disks, boats, and scenes of humans raising their arms to a disk. Sometimes there are men in the shape of disks, carrying weapons. These have been interpreted as solar deities or mortals wearing the sun's emblem. The wheel, the boat, the cross in a circle, and the swastika (a moving wheel) can all be seen as sun symbols.

The summer solstice in northern Europe today is marked by bonfires and the rolling downhill of flaming wheels, as it was no doubt millennia ago. The winter solstice is a time to encourage the sun to grow again, represented by the burning of the Yule log, the Hanukkah light, and the lighted candles of Saint Lucy in Sweden. The boar's head at the Christmas feast represents the old year, or the old sun, and the suckling pig with the apple of immortality in its mouth is the new sun. [See also Winter Solstice Songs.]

It was the tendency of nineteenth-century scholars to search for a single key to the understanding of all mythology. One of the most popular of these keys was the concept of the sun hero, a ubiquitous figure who was either the sun itself or an offspring of the sun. It has become clear over the years that all myths cannot be traced to one source. Yet there are some elements of myth that do seem to have solar references in common, perhaps formulated by the ancients at the time when astral religion invaded the Mediterranean world. It has been pointed out (by Joseph Campbell, for instance, in *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*) that in most myths heroes have one divine parent and that they wander about on the earth and make at least one trip to the underworld. Also, most myths describe a wandering sun, which goes under or behind the earth at night, and in most myths the divine parent is perceived as a sun figure. One instance is the Greek Perseus, whose mother, an underground divinity, was impregnated by a shower of gold, the sun's metal. Another is the Irish Cú Chulainn, who is explicitly a son of Lugh Lamfhada, "Lugh of the long hands," an epithet that is reminiscent of the

long rays that end in human hands pictured at Amarna in Egypt. Lugh was a god of brightness and the sky and, like Apollo, master of all crafts. He fought at the mythical battle of Moytura, where he vanquished his grandfather, the giant Balor, who had one eye in the middle of his forehead, like the cyclopes, who were also sun figures. The Welsh counterpart of Lugh is Lleu Llaw Gyffes, or Lludd. Lludd had a temple at Lydney in England near the Severn where he is portrayed, perhaps through Roman influence, as a young man with a solar halo driving a chariot. The Samson of *Genesis*, a mighty and short-tempered Herakles figure, has a name derived from the Hebrew word for "sun." Samson's fight with a lion, and his birth, which is connected with a supernatural figure who vanishes in flames, seem to point to other solar connections.

Homer's Odysseus has been interpreted as a sun figure, since he wanders for nine years, which is the period the Greeks used to correlate solar and lunar calendars. He finally reaches his Penelope, who weaves by day and unravels by night. Most replete with sun details, however, is the story of Herakles, son of the sky god Zeus, who wanders the earth to perform his deeds, returns unhurt from the underworld, dies in a fire, and is taken up to heaven. He not only lives on in heaven but also has a shade who lives on in the underworld. Herakles' labors were perhaps limited to twelve (although others have been recorded) in order to fit them into the zodiac.

As an all-seeing eye who travels the world, the sun acquired the character of a spy for the gods and therefore a stern judge of mankind. When the heavenly bodies began to be seen as parts of a well-ordered and consistent system, more pure and dependable than that of the old gods, the sun, an obvious leader in the sky, took his place as a symbol of the newly emerging royal power. Thus, organized cults of the sun are strongest in the great civilizations, which were often kingships. A new sense of power and organization, as well as a new sense of justice, found its central source in kingship, just as the harmony of the heavens was centered in the sun. "It is a remarkable coincidence," writes Jacquetta Hawkes, "that a discovery and an invention attendant on the creation of Bronze Age civilization came just in time to provide symbols of the sun gods and their temples. These were gold and the wheel" (Hawkes, 1962, p. 73). Since its discovery, gold has been the royal metal, as well as the sun's. The sun royal was adopted by all kings but never so completely as by the Sun King, Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715). Elizabeth II of England at her coronation in 1952 wore a golden gown under her robe, and her archbishop prayed that her throne "may stand fast in righteousness forevermore, like the sun before her and as the faithful witness in heaven." One must

thus look to the high civilizations and imperial kingdoms to find the most highly developed cults of the sun.

Ancient Egypt. Very early in its history, somewhere in the fourth millennium BCE, Egyptians broke away from a moon calendar and organized time around the heliacal rising of the star Sirius, which occurs about 19 July. This date coincided with the yearly inundation of the Nile, the most important period in the agricultural life of a country that has no rainfall and no seasons. From that time on the year was divided into twelve months of thirty days each, with a five-day intracalendar period. Whether or not this arrangement affected the religious life of the Egyptians, as some have argued, the sun in various aspects became the dominant figure in Egyptian religious life, combining with, and in some cases supplanting, other deities.

One of the earliest manifestations of the sun was the falcon god Horus, who appears on the famous palette of Narmér, the unifier of the two lands that became Egypt. Horus was probably an ancient sky god, seen as a soaring bird who was manifest in the sun itself; he was known as Re Harakhte, the god of the horizon, or sunrise. He was at first the son of the sky goddess Hathor (in Egypt the sky is female and the earth male). Later, as the tendency to group the important gods into families developed, he was known as the son of Osiris, the god of fertility and the underworld. Osiris' sister-wife, Isis, mourns for her dead husband and secretly raises their son Horus to do battle with Osiris' murderer, his brother Seth. In this family, the sun god, Re, was combined with an older creator god, Atum. In Heliopolis, a temple compound just north of modern Cairo near the old capitol of Memphis, a powerful priesthood built up the cult of Re-Atum, beginning at least in the fourth dynasty (2600 BCE). This is the period in which were built the first great pyramids, which pointed toward the sun. In the mythology developed at Heliopolis, the creator Re-Atum produced land from the surrounding waters. A mound in the temple was known as the Ben-Ben and was supposed to represent the semen of Re. Out of his own substances the creator god made sky and earth, air and water, and finally the four divinities: Osiris, Seth, and Isis and Nephthys, their wives.

The powerful priesthood at Heliopolis proclaimed the pharaoh the son of the Sun. It seems likely that the earlier pharaohs had themselves represented the Sun, and that they lost power under the growing influence of the priesthood. It was also possible for the priests to control the selection of the pharaoh's divine successor from among his offspring.

The history of ancient Egypt is neatly divided into the Old, Middle, and New Kingdoms, with two intervening periods of anarchy. After the first intermediate period,

a new royal house arose in the south, at Thebes. There, Re was combined with a local god, Atum, the "Hidden One," probably representing the air. This god flourished throughout the New Kingdom, when Egyptian power spread into Asia. The great temples at Karnak and Luxor testify to the power and enormous wealth of the sun cult.

The sun was usually pictured as sailing across the sky in a boat, with various attendants and sometimes with the pharaoh himself. At other times the sun is seen sailing up the leg and belly of the sky goddess, who bends over the earth or straddles it in the form of a cow. Or the sun was swallowed at night by the sky mother and is born each morning from between her thighs. The sun was symbolized by a falcon but more notably by the mythical phoenix, which alighted on the Ben-Ben every five hundred years, was consumed in fire, and rose again. Another important symbol of the sun was the scarab, the dung beetle Khepri, which supposedly created itself by rolling its eggs in balls of dung. The obelisks, as well as the gold-topped pyramids, point toward the sun. On the early squat obelisk of the fifth dynasty, the sun is pictured as creator of life and lord of the seasons.

In the reign of Amunhotep III (1417–1439 BCE), the actual disk of the sun, called the Aton, began to appear as a numinous symbol. It was the pharaoh's son Amunhotep IV (1379–1362 BCE), however, who attempted, in one of the great religious revolutions of history, to convert the entire nation to monotheistic worship of the Aton as sole god. Whether he was religiously motivated or whether he wished to break the power of the enormously wealthy priesthood, he sought to abolish all other worship in favor of the Aton, the sun's disk. He changed his name to Akhenaton ("Aton is satisfied") and built a new capital at Amarna. In this city he supported a new school of art, which pictured him in naturalistic style with his beautiful wife Nefertiti and his five daughters, all under the brilliance of the sun, which reached down to earth with long rays ending in human hands. Akhenaton has left a well-known hymn to the Aton as creator of all the beauties of the world: "How manifold are your works. They are mysterious in men's sight, O sole incomparable god, all powerful. You created the earth in solitude as your heart desires. Men you created, and cattle, whatever is on earth." Akhenaton's revolution failed, and after his mysterious death the priesthood reclaimed their power, and a young man (probably his son-in-law) resumed the worship of Amun, adopting the name of Tut-Ankh-Amun (or Tut-ankhamen).

Mesopotamia. In the land between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, where are found the earliest traces of ur-

ban living, writing, kingship, and an organized priesthood, the sun was at first subordinate to the moon. To the first recorded inhabitants, known as the Sumerians, the chief god was An, a sky god who had retired from active control and left the rule of the universe to his son, Enlil, the Air. A son of Enlil was the important moon god, Nanna, whose children were the Sun—Utu—and the Evening Star—Inanna. In Sumerian times, the regions were divided into a series of independent cities, each devoted to the worship of a patron god. Only two minor cities, Larsa and Sippar, worshiped Utu, the Sun.

The Semitic-speaking states that followed the Sumerians took over the religious organization they found, calling the moon Sin and the sun Shamash. In that dangerously torrid land, the sun was considered a baleful god. But since he traveled continually across the sky, he was considered a spy for the high gods and a stern judge of mankind. Travelers prayed to him before setting out on a journey, and armies before an expedition. He was thus a warrior god and leader of armies. In the quest of the hero Gilgamesh for the secret of immortality, it was the Sun who guided him on his journey. Originally the Sun walked across the heavens; in later times he rode a cart drawn by onagers, wild asses from the desert. Still later, the horse drew the Sun's chariot. The Sun in his chariot appeared in the morning at the eastern gate on the Mountain of Sunrise, in the evening arrived at the Mountain of Sunset, and then passed through to the underworld. Because of his appearance in the underworld, the Sun was sometimes pictured in company with Tammuz, the Mesopotamian dying god, who dies and is reborn. There was very little concern for judgment of the dead in Mesopotamia, and Shamash's character as judge was thus reserved for the upper world. At Ur, it was the Sun who punished a corrupt judge for taking bribes and oppressing the people.

Shamash was the god of oracles and was supposed to inscribe the signs that the diviners read in the intestines of sheep. Soothsayers claimed they were descended from a king of Sippar, who lived before the flood; the diviners were the most prestigious of the priests in that city of the Sun. From Assyrian times are preserved a number of questions asked of the Sun concerning the state and the royal family. The diviner read the answers in the entrails of dissected sheep. Probably a result of this activity was the Sun's power to control witches and demons.

Shamash was also invoked to heal the sick, free captives from bondage, and help women in labor. One prayer reads, "O Shamash, lofty judge . . . may the knot that impedes her delivery be loosed . . . may she bear. May she remain in life and walk in health before the godhead." The Sun, in other words, brings the unborn

to light. He was also asked to deliver victims of spells, curses, and ghosts: "O Shamash, may I be strong and face the authors of my enchantment!"

The sun god is pictured as an old man with a long beard; sunbeams radiate from between his shoulder blades. He is seen sitting on a throne or sometimes on a horse. His special symbols are a four-pointed star in a disk with flames shooting out from between the points of the star and, of course, the winged disk, which was set above representations of royalty.

The study of heavenly bodies, conducted in Mesopotamia from at least 2000 BCE, led to a belief in an ordered universe and in the important position of the sun among the planets. Thus, with the rise of centralized imperial power in Assyria and Babylonia, the sun came into prominence as a symbol of royal power. The lawgiver Hammurabi (c. 1750 BCE) calls Shamash "great judge of heaven and earth" and proclaims that it was from Shamash that he received his laws. The sun god is seen seated on a throne, handing Hammurabi a ring and a staff. The sun temple at Babylon was known as "the house of the judge of the world."

Warlike Assyrians claimed Shamash as a great god of battles, almost the same as their own Ashur. Assyrian kings called themselves "suns of the world." Marduk, hero of the New Year festival at Babylon and a grandson of the high gods, is shown as a heavily bearded god with sun rays emanating from his shoulders. Thus the Sun in Mesopotamia, first perceived of as judge, lawgiver, and governor of magic, illness, and prophecy, grew into an image of the Sun Royal.

The Indo-Europeans. About the beginning of the second millennium BCE, people speaking related languages spread across western Asia into Europe, bringing similar pantheons into India, Iran, Asia Minor, and most of Europe. Their high god was a sky god—Dyaus, Pitar, Zeus, or Jupiter. But in many cases this high god tended to fade out of the pantheon, leaving the universe to his offspring, sometimes the sun god. This process, known as solarization, brought the sun to the fore as creator and ruler of the gods.

The most cherished animal of the Indo-Europeans was the horse, and they perhaps introduced the chariot to the western world. From this time on the sun is pictured as driving a chariot across the sky, and the horse became one of the sun's animals, often sacrificed to him.

In ancient Indian and Iranian texts appear the names *Varuṇa* and *Mitra*, which seem to mean respectively "the sky" and "the light of day." *Mitra* faded out in India, but in Iran, as *Mithra*, he was the subject of many hymns in the sacred writings, the Avesta. [See Avesta.] *Mithra* is said to represent celestial light, which appears before sunrise on the mountains, whence it

crosses the sky in a chariot. He is said to be neither sun, moon, nor star, but with his hundred eyes he constantly keeps watch on the world. None can deceive him, so he is viewed as a god of truth and righteousness. He is the enforcer of oaths and contracts and is also called "lord of the wide pastures who giveth abundance and cattle." He combats the forces of evil, spies out his enemies, swoops down and conquers them, and is the ally of the faithful in their wars. Thus Mithra, though not identified with the sun, shares all the attributes of the Mesopotamian Shamash. When the Persians conquered Babylon the name *Mithra* was translated as *Shamash*. A large number of the names of Persian aristocrats are compounds of *Mithra*.

The Greek historian Herodotus tells us that the Persians sacrificed to the sun as well as to earth, fire, and water and that leprosy was thought of as punishment for a sin against the sun (*Histories* 1.138). When Xerxes was leading his huge army through Asia Minor to attack Greece, he waited on the Asiatic shore until sunrise and then poured a libation from a golden cup, which he threw together with a golden scimitar into the sea (7.54). Xerxes' army was accompanied by a riderless chariot drawn by eight white horses, which Herodotus says was sacred to Zeus, the sky god. It was followed by a chariot of the sun, also drawn by white horses. Herodotus also tells us that along the route were led horses that were intended to be sacrificed to the sun. Horse sacrifices have been recorded from India to Ireland and have commonly accompanied the coronation of kings.

A true sun hymn occurs in the Avesta: "Unto the undying, swift-horse sun be propitiation and glorification When the sun rises up, the earth, made by Ahura, becomes clean Should the sun not rise up, the demons would destroy all things." Every layman in ancient Persia was required to recite a prayer to the sun at sunrise, at noon, and at three in the afternoon. Persian deities were established in Lydia, Cappadocia, and Armenia by Iranian officials, and it is probably through Persian influence that the sun god became prominent in places like Emesa, Baalbek, and Palmyra in Syria.

In India, the same divinities, Varuṇa and Mitra, are called in the *R̥gveda* "kings of gods and men." They drive chariots across the sky and live in heavenly palaces with a thousand gold columns and a thousand doors. Ten hymns of the *R̥gveda* are devoted to the sun under the name of Sūrya, who seems to represent the actual disk of the sun. Sūrya had the power to drive away darkness, witches, and evil dreams; he is also a healing god, particularly effective against jaundice. He is the husband of Dawn and drives a chariot, sometimes with one and sometimes with seven horses. Another name for the sun is *Savitṛ*. Sometimes it is said that the

sun is *Savitṛ* before his rising and Sūrya afterward. *Savitṛ* "brings all men and animals to rest; men lay down their work and birds seek their nests." Among other names given to the sun in the ancient poems is that of Viṣṇu, because "he strode across the sky in three giant steps" to ward off demons from mankind. Viṣṇu, of course, came to be one of the three great gods of Hinduism, the one especially benevolent to mankind [*See also Saura Hinduism*.]

Ancient Greece. In Hesiod's *Birth of the Gods* (c. 750 BCE) Helios is the son of Hyperion, also a sun figure, and is the brother of the Moon (Selene) and of the Dawn (Eos). He is not included in the family of Olympians who came into prominence after Homer and Hesiod (from about 800 BCE), but belongs to an older, less well defined group that was closely connected with natural phenomena. In Homer (c. 800 BCE), Helios reveals to Hephaistos the adultery of his wife, Aphrodite. In the Demeter myth he reports that Hades has carried off to the underworld Demeter's daughter, Persephone. The chariot of the sun is mentioned not in Homer but in the so-called Homeric Hymns (c. 700 BCE). Demeter stands before the chariot as she begs for help. According to the Homeric *Hymn to Helios*, "as he rides in his chariot, he shines upon all men and deathless gods, and piercingly he gazes with his eyes from his golden helmet. He rests upon the highest point of heaven until he marvelously drives down again from heaven to the Ocean." The poet Mimnernus (c. 630 BCE) describes the sun as floating back through the subterranean ocean in a golden bowl made for him by the divine smith Hephaistos. These descriptions laid the foundations for the hundreds of depictions of the sun in his chariot in Greek art, continuing into Roman times.

As in Mesopotamia, the Sun in Greece is involved in oaths and is a god of vengeance. In Aeschylus, Prometheus, bound upon his crag, calls upon "the all-seeing circle of the sun" to witness his woes. In *Oedipus of Colonus*, by Sophocles, Creon drives his brother-in-law out of the house so that "the sun may not look upon such a wretch." Cassandra in Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* calls upon the Sun for vengeance on her murderers. Medea in Euripides' play makes Aegeus swear by earth and sun that he will protect her. In the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius (third century BCE) she swears by the Sun and Hekate. In the *Iliad*, 19.196, a boar is sacrificed to Zeus and the Sun in confirmation of an oath.

There was little direct worship of the sun in ancient Greece, though there are traces of earlier rites. Plato says the earlier Greeks made obeisance to the rising and setting sun. Pausanias in his guidebook to Greece (second century CE) mentions several shrines to the sun in remote places. For instance, the people of a little town

north of Corinth, when suffering from a plague were told by the Delphic oracle to sacrifice a goat to the Sun. When they did, and the plague stopped, in gratitude they sent a bronze goat to the oracle, which many people, says Pausanias, thought was the Sun itself. Corinth itself was originally sacred to the Sun and, according to Pausanias, was called Heliopolis ("city of the sun"). Later the Sun gave the city to Aphrodite.

The island of Rhodes, however, had a true cult of the sun, influenced perhaps by the sun worship of the East. In legend, the island was brought up out of the sea to compensate Helios for his exclusion from the heavenly lottery. It was on Rhodes that Helios loved the nymph Rhoda and begot the seven wise men of the ancient world. An impressive festival of the sun, held on Rhodes every four years, included athletic games and a chariot race. Every year the Rhodians threw into the sea a chariot drawn by four horses. The famous colossus of Rhodes, one of the seven wonders of the world, erected in 284 BCE, was a figure of the sun god. Pliny recounts that it was 105 feet high and that one of its fingers was larger than most statues. It was thrown down by an earthquake sixty-six years after it was erected.

In addition to being an all-seeing eye and god of vengeance, the sun in Greece has a connection with magic. Among his children were Aetes, king of Colchis, Circe, the witch of the *Odyssey*, and Pasiphae ("all-shining"; perhaps a reference to the moon), who bewitched her husband, Minos of Crete. Most famous of the sun's lineage is Medea, daughter of Aetes, whose enchantments form the plot of Euripides' play.

The *Odyssey* tells the story of the cattle of the Sun, which were taboo to mortals. They roamed on the island of Trinacria, seven herds of fifty each, tended by two daughters. Odysseus had been warned not to touch the cattle, but his marooned sailors were starving and killed and ate some. The flesh on the spits writhed and lowed. The Sun appealed to Zeus for vengeance and threatened to go down and shine in the underworld if he were not appeased. Zeus therefore hurled a thunderbolt, which destroyed the ship and left only Odysseus alive in the water. These cattle have been interpreted in various ways: some say that they are the clouds that gather at sunrise and sunset, and Aristotle thought they stood for the days of the lunar year.

In ancient Greece, Apollo was a god of prophecy, sickness, healing, and death. He is connected by the historian Herodotus with the Hyperboreans, people of the north or east, who sent mysterious offerings to Apollo at Delphi. From the fifth century BCE on, there are suggestions that link Apollo to the sun. The best known myth of the sun from ancient Greece is the story of Phaethon, who begged to drive the chariot of the sun,

lost control of it, and would have scorched the earth if he had not been killed by a thunderbolt. In a fragment of Euripides, the mother of Phaethon says that the true name of the sun is *Apollo*, meaning "the destroyer," since he had destroyed her son. The Orphic poets, as well as the Cynic philosopher Crates (c. 300 BCE), called the sun Apollo. Cornutus, writing about Greek mythology in the first century BCE, says that the sun is Apollo and the moon is his sister Artemis. In Roman times, after the names of the Greek gods reached Italy, this identification was taken for granted. The first Roman emperor, Augustus, favored the worship of Apollo, built a temple to him on the Palatine, and had the poet Horace, in his secular hymns, speak of the sun as Apollo and the moon as Diana (identified often with Greek Artemis).

As the intellectual life of philosophy developed, the Olympians lost their appeal. Philosophers substituted for them the "visible gods," the fixed heavenly bodies. In Plato's *Laws* (10.3) Socrates prays to the rising sun. Star lore from Mesopotamia combined with Greek mathematics to produce astrology, which gave impetus to the tendency to believe that the heavens had a meaningful relationship with humans. Many philosophers opposed astrology, but the Stoics embraced it as an example of the pantheism they advocated. The sun was obviously the most important of the planets, and in the growing mysticism of the Roman era became the final destination of souls freed from the wheel of fate.

Ancient Rome. As in Greece, sun festivals are rare in ancient Rome, but there are indications of the early worship of Sol Indiges, that is, an original and native god. There was a public sacrifice to this god on the Quirinal on the ninth of August. Varro's book on agriculture (first century BCE) says he will mention not the city gods but those who are the best guides of the farmer, the sun and moon, "whose seasons are observed at seedtime and harvest." Varro believed that the Sabine king Tadius, a contemporary of the founder Romulus, brought to Rome the worship of the sun and moon. He also stated that the ancient family of the Aurelii (whose descendants founded the cult of Sol Invictus) came from the Sabine country and that their name was originally Ausel, the Sabine word for "sun."

The sun and moon were deities of the chariot races. It is possible that the famous "October horse" ritual, held on the ides of October, was originally a sacrifice to the sun. This ritual involved a sacrifice of the outside winning horse; a similar ritual occurred in March, and thus these rituals marked the planting and the harvest seasons. The Sun had a temple on the Aventine near the Circus, from which spectators could watch the races. The Sun's image in gold was on the roof, since it was

not proper to display the Sun indoors. It was to that temple that offerings were made when a conspiracy against Nero was revealed, since the Sun had discovered the plot (Tacitus, *Annals* 15.74). Augustus, returning from the conquest of Egypt, brought with him two obelisks with inscriptions declaring that he dedicated them to the sun, one of which he set up in the Campus Martius and the other in the Circus. They are now in the Piazza di Monte Citorio and the Piazza del Popolo.

Under the empire, various forms of sun worship spread into Rome from the East, imported both by slaves and by the Roman legions. The cult and mysteries of Mithra were the most widespread of these, apparently first taken up by soldiers of Pompey from Cilician pirates. [See Mithraism.] The cult was obviously derived from the older Iranian cult, but from the two intervening centuries that separate these cults little is known about Mithra; the cult spread, however, to all areas of the empire. It involved initiation in a simulated cave; immortality was promised to initiates as a reward for the soldierly qualities of courage and discipline. Some astral features were collected along the way, and the degrees of initiation were known by the names of the planets. Mithra, who was said to be a special comrade or son of the sun, was born from a rock and sacrificed a bull, from which all creation sprang. After his deeds on earth were accomplished, he partook of a special love feast with the sun god before being carried up to heaven in a fiery chariot. The initiates imitated the love feasts in *mithraea*, underground shrines, which can still be found wherever the legions went. In death they were to be carried to the sun in Mithra's chariot. It became traditional for steles of the emperor to depict this journey upward in the sun's chariot.

One of the more lurid incidents in the late Roman empire involved the short reign of a young man who called himself Elagabalus, or Heliogabalus, after his god. A relative of Septimius Severus (r. 193–211 CE) on his Syrian wife's side, the youth was the hereditary priest of a sun god who was worshiped at Emesa in Syria in the shape of a black meteorite. After the death of Severus and his son Caracalla, the ladies of the court contrived to have the youth named emperor, though he was then only fourteen years old. He brought his black stone to Rome and built for it a magnificent temple on the Palatine. In front of his temple every day the youth burned incense, poured wine, offered bloody sacrifices, and—most difficult for the Romans to accept—danced Oriental dances. According to the time-honored fate of unsuitable emperors, the young man was assassinated after four years of rule.

The final victory at Rome of the sun god came about through the emperor Aurelian, who in 270 CE assumed

the task of reconquering those parts of the empire that had defected. Aurelian's mother is said to have been a priestess of the Sun in the village in which he was born, from the old Sabine family of the Aurelii. The time was ripe for a new supreme deity who would symbolize imperial power, the person of the emperor, and the new astral religion. Aurelian found such a god in Palmyra, the oasis city in the Syrian desert. Aurelian dedicated a fortune in gold, silver, and jewels from his plunder to restore the temple of the Sun in Palmyra. In 274 CE he established Sol Invictus ("the invincible sun") as the official religion of the Roman empire, and was the first emperor to wear Oriental robes and the diadem, a sun symbol. [See Sol Invictus.] Sol Invictus continued as supreme god and patron of emperors until Constantine, who started his reign as a sun worshiper and later turned the empire over to Christianity. The coins of Aurelian and of succeeding emperors show the Sun offering the ruler, as Preserver of the World, a globe. The Sun portrayed in these coins is not Oriental; he has the features of the Greek Apollo, wearing a crown with solar rays. Sometimes he drives a chariot drawn by four horses. Such coins read: "To the Invincible Sun, companion of Augustus."

Julian, called the Apostate, in his brief reign (359–362) tried to bring back the worship of the sun. "From my childhood," he writes in his prose hymn to the sun, "an extraordinary longing for the rays of the sun penetrated my soul" (*Hymn to King Helios* 130c). The Neoplatonists, with whom Julian identified the leading philosophical school of the late empire, believed in one supreme ineffable god but were able to accept the sun as a symbol, "offspring of the first god." According to Julian, "His [Helios's] light has the same relation to the visible world as truth to the intelligible world" (*ibid.*, 133a). Julian recognized three aspects of the sun god: the sun of the intelligible world, of the intellectual world, and of the sensible world, which last he identified with Mithra.

The birthday of Sol Invictus and of Mithra were celebrated on 25 December, close to the time of the winter solstice. In 353 or 354 CE Pope Liberius set this date as the Feast of the Nativity, and a few years later he founded the Church of Santa Maria della Neva, now known as Santa Maria Maggiore, which became the center of the Roman celebration of Christmas. The Nativity gradually absorbed or supplanted all the other solstice rites. Solar imagery came increasingly to be used to portray the risen Christ (who was also called Sol Invictus), and the old solar disk that had once appeared behind the head of Asian rulers became the halo of Christian saints. Excavations under Saint Peter's Basilica, undertaken in hope of finding the tomb of Peter,

found a very early Christian mosaic that showed Christ driving a chariot, with rays above his head.

Japan. The national religion of Japan, Shintō, is an extraordinary combination of myth, national feeling, ancestor worship, and highly sophisticated mysticism. Japanese writers on the subject assert that theoretical analysis in the Western style is quite unsuitable for Shintō; it is rather a system of rites, feelings, and intense poetic appreciation. There is no doubt that the performance of the rites has over the centuries given the Japanese people a confidence in themselves and their place in society and the universe. The sun appears on the Japanese flag today, but the epithet "Land of the Rising Sun" was perhaps invented by the Chinese.

Japanese cosmogony, first recorded in the seventh century CE, relates how the islands came to be formed out of the primeval waters by a celestial couple, who gave birth to many other natural features. When the wife was burned and died in giving birth to fire, her husband, fleeing from the sight of her decomposing body, stopped to purify himself, and in the process produced from his right eye the Sun (female) and from his left eye the Moon (male). The Moon plays very little part in the mythology, but from the nose of the original husband was produced Susano-o no Mikoto, who represents violence, earthly qualities, and death, while the sun goddess, Amaterasu, stands for light and purity. [See Amaterasu Ōmikami.] Susano-o no Mikoto, realizing that the earth could only be created and peopled if the two powers cooperated, tried to force his way into the abode of Amaterasu, whereupon she hid in a cave and left the world in darkness. There are a number of caves in modern-day Japan that are identified as the cave where the goddess hid herself. Eventually the other gods persuaded Amaterasu to emerge. Among the sacred regalia they employed to ensure her emergence was a mirror—the mirror that is said to be part of the ritual at the famous Ise Shrine.

Shintō teaching maintains that Amaterasu and Susano-o no Mikoto represent not good and evil but complementary qualities that are necessary to produce life on earth. Eventually the world as it stands was completed, and Amaterasu became the ancestor of the first emperor of Japan. The sun goddess is the center of Shintō worship, which is intended to bind the people together in reverence for her earthly representative. The goal of Shintō is the maintenance of harmony among mankind, nature, and the gods. The greatest reality visible in the heavens becomes the symbol of the greatest reality known and revered on earth.

The earliest records of Shintō derive from the seventh century BCE, when writing was introduced, but the roots

of the system may stretch much further back. In the Middle Ages, it was much influenced by Buddhism, but the two became distinct in the eighteenth century. In 1946, the American occupation forces demanded that the emperor renounce his divine status as part of their abolition of the state religion. It appears that the formal renunciation has had little effect on the symbolic relationship that has endured for centuries between the sun goddess and the imperial family. On the other hand, the retreat of state Shintō, which had highly politicized overtones and which was the basis for a fanatical militarism, in a sense returned the religion to the people. The priests, without government support, turned to the population. When it became time for the reconstruction of the Grand Shrine at Ise, which is prescribed every twenty years, there was an unprecedented outpouring of donations from the entire populace. More than fifty million people contributed to the rebuilding of the shrine in 1953, even more in 1973.

The rituals have continued and the emperor has participated in the divine nature of his ancestors by praying for the well-being of his people. In the great ceremonies at the end of June and December (the solstices), the imperial families and ministers of state pray for purification from sin for the entire country.

The Americas. Many North American Indians regarded the Sun as their supreme deity. In the Plains, the Crow thought of themselves as descendants of the Sun and swore by it. In lower Mississippi, the Natchez maintained a total theocracy; their priest-chieftain was a substitute on earth for their supreme being, the Sun. For the Pueblo, the Sun is a powerful deity but subordinate to others, such as the Corn Goddess. They perform ceremonies at the summer solstice to slow down the sun and at the winter solstice to hasten his progress toward spring. It is presumed that these rites are a projection of the same religion that is a basis for the sun cults of the high cultures of Mexico and Peru.

Mesoamerica. The Maya of Mesoamerica developed a complex civilization that to date has not been entirely revealed to modern researchers. There are still discoveries to be made in the huge structures now in ruins; they are probably not cities in a real sense but religious establishments where a priestly caste expended tremendous energies on mathematical study and on astronomical observations. They invented a sign for zero and produced two complicated calendars, which come together every fifty-two years. The site of one of their complexes was itself a huge calendar by which they could determine solstices and equinoxes. Since the Maya hieroglyphics have not been entirely deciphered, and since many of their sacred books were destroyed by the Span-

iards, there is no clear picture of their complex religious pantheon, which involved four aspects for each deity (for the four points of the compass), or of the characteristics of their gods, which changed from one area to another. The supreme deity seems to have been a sky god, pictured as an old man with a Roman nose; he often performed as a sun god and was married to the Moon. Rain gods and fertility gods were also part of the pantheon. It is still unknown why the Maya civilization collapsed, although many theories, such as climactic change, conquest, or peasant revolt, have been suggested.

In the tenth century CE, conquering Toltec from Tula in central Mexico moved into Maya territory, took over the city of Chichén Itzá, together with many of the Maya achievements. The Toltec brought with them their culture hero, the Feathered Serpent, but also their belief that the sun god died every night and had to be resuscitated every morning with human blood. They established two priestly warrior groups, the Eagles, representing the sun in the daytime, and the Jaguars, representing the sun in the underworld. A frieze at Chichén Itzá from Toltec times shows members of the groups presenting a human heart to the sun. The sacrifice was often succeeded by a cannibalistic feast in which pieces of the victim, if he had been a great warrior, were passed out to the elite. A priest donned the skin of the victim and danced before the people.

The Toltec had perhaps been driven out of the valley of Mexico by the Aztec, who settled on islands in Lake Texcoco and built their elaborate city Tenochtitlán on the site that is today known as Mexico City. They took over from their predecessors the temple architecture, their fifty-two-year calendar, and the sacrifice to the sun, which they carried to even more grisly lengths. On some occasions as many as twenty thousand victims were sacrificed on the sun pyramid. The Aztec believed that on their journey north, their sun god, Huitzilopochtli, who took the form of a hummingbird, led them in the day, and the fearsome Tezcatlipoca, the sun of the underworld, led them at night. A third form of the sun represented the physical disk of the sun, under the name of Tonatiuh. He appears on the huge calendar stone, thirteen feet across, that is now in the Museo Nacional de Antropología. This stone pictures the four suns that the Aztecs believed had existed before them and the fifth, under which they lived. The former suns had been destroyed by storms, floods, and darkness, and the present sun, represented by Tonatiuh, was to end in an earthquake. The whole calendar is circled by fire serpents, which the Sun uses to fight his enemies at night. The entire religion of the Aztec was suffused with the

battle between light and darkness and life and death. The universe, they believed, would fall into ruins if they did not feed the "skeleton" sun every morning as he rose.

It seems to have been the priesthood, possibly under the influence of psychedelic drugs, who drove the armies to seek increasing numbers of conquests in order to provide prisoners for the sacrifices. Huitzilopochtli is said to have proclaimed, "My principal purpose in coming and my vocation is war." All young Aztec were educated for war and taught to endure pain. There is a story told of the gladiatorial battle that followed the morning sacrifice in which a captive was tied to a stone and given four staves to defend himself against two Eagle and two Jaguar knights. Once, a captive miraculously won his battle and was released, but he returned to die on the stone so that he would not lose the privilege of accompanying the sun across the sky every morning. In the afternoon, the sun was followed by women who had died in childbirth, for they had also died "taking a man prisoner."

Peru. In Mexico the Sun became one of the most bloodthirsty of all divinities, but the sun god of the Inca of Peru was an autocratic but paternalistic deity, who planned for the welfare of his people while controlling their every action. In the high civilization of Peru, the sun again symbolized royal power; images of the sun were emblazoned with the most lavish display of the sun's metal ever seen. In Peruvian society there was no trade in (as there was among the Aztec) nor use for metal, except for extravagant adornment of the gods and royal personages.

A number of Spanish chronicles have recorded Inca rule as one of the most orderly and regulated in the world. All land was owned by the state and was divided into church, state, and peasant holdings. Inca territory was divided into four quarters ruled by governors, who were subordinate to the emperor, the son of the Sun. The emperor controlled the priesthood, usually making his brother high priest.

The leading tribes that formed the Inca empire seem to have arrived in Cuzco from somewhere around Lake Titicaca. Their legend told that the founder and his sister, children of the Sun, were set down by their father on an island in the lake. The first emperor is said to have been sent by his father, the Sun, to establish a city at the place where the golden wand the Sun carried struck the ground. This site was Cuzco, at eleven thousand feet above sea level. It was apparently the custom for each new emperor to build his own palace, so that the site became a maze of buildings, temples, and palaces, lavishly decorated with gold. In the main square,

the Inca emperor himself was enthroned during festivals. From that square it was possible to see the sun columns on the hills east and west, markers of the solstices. The mummified figures of past emperors were seated, robed in gold, around the temple of the Sun, with their wives between them. The temple was called the Place of Gold and was so arranged that sunrise fell on a gold-sheathed solar disk and filled the whole temple with reflected light. On festival days the mummies were paraded around the city, preceded by the emperor on a palanquin, honored as if he were a god. Tradition held that the emperor married his sister, who represented the moon, but a large number of "virgins of the Sun" were available to him, so that he had many descendants. These were the "children of the Sun," the rulers of the bureaucracy, who paid no taxes. Others of the virgins were used for sacrifice or kept in seclusion, weaving or making brew.

The temple also housed the gods of conquered peoples, who were allowed to visit their gods and pay homage to them, although there was a strong missionary pressure on them to honor the sun god. By practicing efficiency and good military discipline, the Inca established an empire that stretched from Ecuador to northern Chile and that had just reached its height at the time of the Spanish conquest.

In the last century of the empire one of the Inca, by the name of Pachacuti, introduced a new high god, Viracocha, as creator. The legend relates that Pachacuti had a vision that prompted this religious revolution. He came to believe that the sun worked too hard on his daily journey to have created the universe. Viracocha may have been a local god from another tribe. Another possibility is that the new god was more acceptable to some of the conquered people, such as the Chimú of the coast, who worshiped the moon and the sea. It is recorded that they complained, "The sun is dangerous to us." A gold statue of the new deity was placed in the Sun's temple as an addition to its other resplendent embellishments.

Great Inca festivals consisted of dances, processions, prayers, and sacrifices, usually of llamas and guinea pigs but sometimes of human beings. The four chief festivals were those of the solstices and the equinoxes, the most important of which was the winter solstice. On this day, considered New Year's Day, all fires were relit by a piece of cotton kindled by the sun's rays. The relit fire was used for the sacrifices and then handed over to the Virgins of the Sun to be guarded until the next year. If the day was cloudy, the fire had to be kindled by friction and there was great anxiety among the people. At the summer solstice, the population gathered in the central square clothed in feathers

and golden robes to watch the Inca emperor pour a libation to the Sun from a golden vase.

The priesthood, like all the other members of Inca society, were organized in a strict hierarchy. Many were engaged in divination and in curing the sick. They divined by reading the intestines of llamas and the flight of birds. To cure the sick, they engaged in rites of exorcism. Public confessions were an important part of religious life. Anyone who was malformed or had lost children was considered to have sinned against the Sun and to have disobeyed the Inca emperor. It was necessary for the sinner to confess; he would then be given a penance by the priest and be purified in running water. Anyone who did not confess was believed to be destined for a place deep in the earth where there were only stones for food. Those who confessed, as well as those who had led blameless lives, were promised a happy afterlife in the Sun's heaven. The Children of the Sun and the Inca emperor himself were, as a matter of course, believed to live with the Sun forever.

[See also entries on the solar deities mentioned herein. For a broadly related discussion, see Light and Darkness.]

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JEAN RHYS BRAM

SUN DANCE is currently used as a generic term having reference to a rich complex of rites and ceremonies with tribal variations specific to at least thirty distinct tribal groups of the North American Plains and Prairie. Although tribal variations of beliefs, traits, and the structuring of ceremonial lodges are significant and of great importance to the groups concerned, there are nevertheless sufficient similarities to justify use of the generic term. Since these distinct tribal groups represent at least seven mutually unintelligible language families, understandably there is also present the once-universal sign language, a rich means by which even subtle and complex matters could be communicated to all the tribes. Traditionally the peoples have been divided into four major groupings: the northern tribes; the southern tribes; the village, or eastern, tribes; and the Plateau, or western, tribes. Each tribe within these groups gives the Sun Dance its own specific term, which has reference to particular ritual emphases. The Shoshoni and Crow, for example, refer to the complex as the Thirst Lodge, or Thirst Standing Lodge; for the Cheyenne it is the Medicine Lodge; and for the Siouan peoples it is known as the Dance Gazing at the Sun.

The precise tribal origin of the Sun Dance within the North American Plains groups cannot be determined with certainty, in part because calendric rites of world and life renewal involving sacrificial elements and shamanic-type acts of healing are very widespread throughout North America. Leslie Spier's extensive yet inconclusive study (1921) suggested that the complex possibly originated among—or diffused from—the Arapaho and Cheyenne. In terms of more ancient origins outside North America there are compelling parallels with the Tunguzic peoples of Siberia, who had new year festivals of renewal with ritual emphasis on a world tree as axis joining heaven and earth; offerings made of ribbons and sacrificed animal skins were made to this tree. Other shamanic elements described by A. F. Anisimov involve the rhythmic power of drums, the inducing of trances, visions, and curing ceremonies, all of which are strongly reminiscent of the North American Plains Sun Dance traits (Anisimov, 1963).

It is unfortunate that the early anthropological accounts of Native American religious practices were usually flat, ignoring or paying insufficient attention to the spiritual realities underlying religious beliefs and practices as the peoples themselves understood them. The rich values and sacred meanings encoded within cultural forms such as the arts, crafts, and architecture were also largely ignored. Even Robert Lowie, who was very familiar with the early history of the Crow Sun Dance, was able to write in 1915 that the Sun Dance "in large measure served for the aesthetic pleasure and entertainment of the spectators." The Swedish scholar Åke Hultrantz, commencing his early studies in 1947, challenged these prevailing reductionist perspectives; by giving proper recognition to religious beliefs and practices of primal origin and by integrating the perspectives and methodologies of both anthropology and the history of religions, an approach now found increasingly within current ethnohistorical studies. It is essentially this approach that is respected in the following descriptions.

The rich diversity of beliefs and traits specific to the Sun Dance traditions in some thirty distinct tribal groups, each of which manifests varying levels of acculturation and creative adaptations, can hardly be encompassed within a brief essay. Judicious selection must therefore be made of essential elements across a fair sampling of tribal groups. Attention will also be given to contemporary movements among many Native American peoples for revitalization of traditional sacred values and practices. Indeed, it is primarily the Sun Dance that, as its popularity increases, is acting as model and stimulus for traditionalist movements extending even to non-Plains tribes and to disenchanting

non-Native Americans who are seeking examples of what true religious traditions really are.

General Description. The major Sun Dance celebrations take place for all the tribal groups in late June or early July, "when the sage is long" and "the chokecherries are ripe," or, as some put it, in "the moon of fattening." In the times when these peoples were nomadic pastoralists, the grasses of the prairies would during these months be sufficient to feed the great herds of horses belonging to the tribal bands, who often were joined in the circles of camps with allied tribes. These springtime ceremonies (in the past they may have been held earlier than June) were actually the climax of an annual cycle of minor rites and meetings of many types. Among the Crow, for example, "prayer meetings" take place regularly at the time of the full moon; among all the tribes, groups of singers meet periodically around their drums in order to practice and to instruct younger singers in the extremely difficult and subtle Sun Dance songs, many of which have been faithfully transmitted from ancient times. There are also contemporary songs that have come out of an individual's sacred experiences or that have been learned from other tribes, for today there is much exchange of songs and other cultural elements in the course of the more popular pan-Indian summer powwow circuit. However, all songs that are used in the Sun Dance lodge must accord with particular styles and rhythms, since clear distinctions are made between ceremonial and social dance songs.

Given the complex logistics of the Sun Dances, with encampments of large numbers of people, many people volunteer or are selected during the year to fulfill a wide range of duties. Usually a sponsor coordinates the many details and materials for the construction of the sacred lodge or the provision of the feast at the end of the ceremonies, both of which are accomplished at considerable expense and sacrifice. The most important person however, is the spiritual leader, a "medicine person," who is guardian of the sacred lore and who usually has received special powers through the vision quest (or who may have received the authority to lead the ceremonies from a retiring elder who has passed on his sacred powers). These spiritual leaders have traditionally been recognized as holy people, for they know and live the sacred traditions and have powers for curing those who are ill in body or spirit. Such shamanic figures have been greatly respected as leaders within the tribe, or they have been feared because of the great strength of their mysterious powers. Such leaders should not be considered as belonging only to the past, however, for new leaders are taking their places and are living into the present-day among most of the tribes. Indeed, there are today a growing number of such lead-

ers, including younger men and women who have attempted to become acculturated within the dominant society but, often finding this to be a process of diminishing returns, have gone back to the wise elders for help in reestablishing traditional values in their contemporary ways of life.

Those who participate in the actual ceremonies within the sacred lodge are often individuals who were previously in situations of extreme danger, perhaps as members of the armed forces in wars the United States has conducted overseas, and who vowed that if they should survive they would participate in the next Sun Dance upon returning home. Paradoxically, their experiences in foreign wars have acted as a stimulus for the continuation, and indeed intensification, of the Sun Dance traditions into the present.

To those sacrificing in the lodge for the first time are assigned mentors who are experienced in the Sun Dance rituals and who—having known the suffering of being without food or water for a period of three or four days—are able to counsel and give support to the novice in the lodge. Other camp duties are taken care of by special "police" who see that proper conduct and respect for sacred matters are observed, functions once fulfilled by the warrior societies. A camp crier is also named, who has the responsibility of encircling the camp on horseback in the very early mornings and in the evenings, of chanting instructions to the people, or of giving useful information concerning the day's activities. On occasion such criers might relate humorous incidents, intending to bring great laughter from the circles of lodges, or from the wall tents used today. For in Plains life, now as in the past (and even in the context of the most serious affairs), humor has a legitimate and effective purpose—not just the momentary relief of tensions accompanying the enactment of sacred rites, but also the opening of the human person to deeper modes of understanding.

Lodge Construction. Once the Sun Dance encampment has been established at an appropriate place where there is good water and pasturage, the first ritual act is to select a special cottonwood tree with branches forking at the top. The tree is then cut in a ceremonial manner, the first blow of the ax often being given by a young woman who has been chosen for her virtue and purity (if any man present knows that she has been unfaithful he has the right and obligation to denounce her publicly). The tree must be felled in a specific direction and is not allowed to touch the ground; it is then carried on poles, with songs, ritual acts, and prayers performed along the way. The cottonwood tree is finally placed in a hole prepared at the center of what will be the sacred lodge, which is itself at the center of the en-

campment. The selected tree is now understood as the axis at the center of the world. It links heaven and earth, thus giving the people access to spiritual realities and conveying the images of the center and the heavens above, together with their larger implications. For most peoples who practice the Sun Dance, this special tree is understood as a "person." In a way akin to human participation in the sacrifice, the tree transmits to those who sacrifice in the lodge the cooling powers of the moisture it has gathered from the stream near which it grew, and then it dies.

The tree thus recapitulates the major themes of the Sun Dance, which involve the alternations of dry and moist, ignorance and wisdom, and death and life—for if there is to be life there must also be death. Once the tree has been ceremonially raised, offerings are placed at its base, and in its fork is put a nest of cherry or willow branches in which may be placed sacred offerings or, often, rawhide effigies. Colored ribbons, signifying heaven and earth, may be tied high on the tree's forking branches. Each tribal group has its own color symbolism and specific manner of dressing the tree. Among the Crow, for example, the head of a bull buffalo is placed, facing east, on the tree, and in the branches there is an eagle, both symbols recapitulating the theme of heaven and earth. Around the tree as spiritual center the circular lodge is then constructed in accord with symbolical variations specific to each of the tribal groups.

The general architectural design for most tribal Sun Dance lodges is the central tree around which are twenty-eight vertical, forked poles associated with the twenty-eight days of the lunar month. This circle of forked poles is then joined together by horizontal poles laid into the upright forks. In addition the Shoshoni, Crow, and Arapaho lodges have twenty-eight very long poles extending from the forks at the circumference and then all laid into the crotch high on the central tree, a structure that resembles a spoked wheel. The Siouan lodges do not have poles radiating out from the center; a distinctive feature of their lodge, in accord with their ceremonial usage, is the construction of a continuous overhead shade arbor around the inner periphery of the lodge. All styles of lodges, however, have entryways facing the east, the place of the rising sun, and brush is usually placed loosely around the outer walls for the greater privacy of the participants within. For all tribal groups, the lodge is not merely understood as a "symbolic model" of the world, but rather it *is* the world, universe, or created cosmos. Since construction of the lodge recapitulates the creation of the world, all acts in this process are accompanied by prayers and powerful songs associated with ancient myths of origin and cre-

ation. The occasion, reminiscent of a primordial time, is solemn, dignified, and of great beauty.

Around the sacred lodge in concentric circles the camps of family units are set up in accord with long-established protocol. At Sun Dance encampments the doorways of many tipis or wall tents are not toward the east, as is customary in daily usage, but rather toward the sacred lodge and tree at the center of the circle. To the west of the sacred lodge there are usually special tipis in which private ceremonies take place exclusively for those who will sacrifice in the lodge. Sweat lodges are also set up, but apart from the camp circle, so that those who have made their vows may be purified before entering the lodge.

Typical Performances. Even though there are many commonalities in all Plains Sun Dance ceremonies, there are also tribal variations that are of great importance to the peoples concerned. In the Siouan form, for example, which has been described by the Lakota Black Elk in *The Sacred Pipe* (Brown, 1952), there are at least two distinctive and central sacrificial elements, one of which is described by the Lakota term for the Sun Dance, *wiwanyag wachipi* ("dance gazing at the sun"). Here, during one complete daylight cycle, the dancers, who are also observing a total fast, move periodically around the inner periphery of the lodge in sunwise manner so that they are always gazing at the sun—a cause, no doubt, of intense suffering.

A second Lakota or Siouan emphasis, also involving sacrificial elements, is the practice of certain dancers, in accord with earlier vows, to have the muscles of the chest pierced by the presiding spiritual leader, who inserts wooden skewers by which they are tied with rawhide thongs to the central tree. These people then dance, encouraged by the drums and the songs of warriors (brave songs), pulling back on the thongs until the flesh and muscles tear loose. In addition to elements of self-sacrifice, there are spiritual implications of being physically tied to and thus identified with the tree as sacred center. A similar theme is also expressed by the ceremony wherein individuals have skewers inserted into both sides of the shoulders and into the muscles of chest and back. The thongs are then attached to posts set up to represent the four directions. The individual is thereby identified with the center in relation to the four horizontal directions of space. Such sacrificial acts are not just of former times, but are in increasing use today among a number of Siouan peoples. In distinction from prevailing traits and themes of the Siouan Sun Dance, which are strongly reminiscent of elements from earlier military complexes, the Arapaho, the Cheyenne, and the tribes of the Blackfeet Confederation place emphasis on rites of world and life renewal, employing ritual objects

that include sacred medicine bundles whose contents have reference to the origins of the tribes.

Finally, emphasis should be given to critical elements in the history of the Sun Dance and to a present-day modified Sun Dance movement that originated among the western Shoshoni and has been transmitted to the Crow. In 1881 the United States government attempted to ban all Sun Dances, believing that they were "demoralizing and barbarous." It was not until 1904, however, that the dances were rigorously prohibited by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. However, because these ceremonies were central to spiritual needs, they continued to be practiced in secret or in modified forms by almost all the Plains tribes with the exception of the Crow, who had already abandoned the ceremonies in 1875. One of the still continuing modified Sun Dances was that of the Wind River Shoshoni, whose version spread to the Northern Ute in 1890, to the Fort Hall Shoshoni and Bannock in 1901, and to the Shoshoni of Nevada in 1933. With the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, however, open practice of the dances commenced, but now in forms that gave greater emphasis to spiritual elements rather than to the extreme tortures associated with the earlier military societies.

In 1941 the charismatic Shoshoni Sun Dance leader John Truhujó brought the Sun Dance back to the Crow through the support of the tribal superintendent Robert Yellowtail. A tradition that had been abandoned for more than sixty-six years was thereby reinstated. In January of 1985 Truhujó died at the age of approximately 105, having transferred his sacred powers to Thomas Yellowtail, brother of the former superintendent. It is the Sun Dance in this particular form, faithfully led by Thomas Yellowtail to the present time, that has become for the Crow, as well as for many other tribes, an example and stimulus giving continuity and viability to the essentials of the spiritual heritage of the Plains peoples.

In this Shoshoni/Crow Sun Dance the dancers take positions in arbors that surround the inner periphery of the lodge, with the presiding spiritual leader, or "medicine man," always at the west. Women, who are allowed within the lodge to fast, take places slightly to the north of the east-facing entrance. The large ceremonial drum and the alternating teams of drummers and singers have their place a little to the south of the entrance, and they are surrounded by strong-voiced older women who help to sing the sacred songs. The dance's spiritual force resides in the movements of the fasting participants, who for the three or four days' duration of the ceremony are always oriented to the central tree, toward which they dance as often or as little as they wish. They blow on eagle-bone whistles tipped

with eagle down, as if they themselves were eagles; then they dance backward to their stalls, still facing the central tree. The rhythmic movements of the dancers are dignified, and their concentration on the tree is continual and intense; for them this is the center and source of life, and the lodge symbolizes the totality of creation. In the course of the ceremonies, participants often receive sacred visions; when they sleep—never for more than a few hours at a time—dreams of special meaning may come.

An especially powerful and beautiful ceremony central to the Sun Dance takes place every morning just before sunup, when all the dancers, under the direction of the group's spiritual leader, face the direction of the rising sun, moving slowly to the beat of the drum and blowing softly on eagle-bone whistles. As the sun rises the drum and the sunrise greeting-song come to a crescendo. Eagle plumes tied to the wrists of the dancers are held out to the sun's first rays and are then touched to parts of the body so that the dancer may receive purifying blessings. Once the sun is above the horizon, the dancers sit wrapped in their blankets while very ancient sacred songs are sung and communal prayers are offered. On the second or third day of the dance, people who are ill come into the lodge and stand at the sacred tree to receive help from the spiritual leader, who prays over them and often draws out the illness with the aid of an eagle-wing fan. Accounts of cures are legion. At the conclusion of the Sun Dance, water that has been blessed is ceremonially passed around among the participants, who have taken no food or water since they first entered the lodge. Thereafter, many people from the camp bring valuable gifts into the lodge, sometimes even horses loaded with blankets and beadwork, which are given away to particular persons who are called forward to receive them. The dancers themselves usually complete the ceremonies with a purifying sweat bath at a nearby creek or river, and in the evening there may be a special feast for all.

The power of sacred traditions of primal origin cannot be compromised by time, place, or number of participants, for in themselves the values and realities concerned are of timeless and universal validity. Though a world of other priorities ignores or neglects such values they may nevertheless be rediscovered as still enduring, even increasing in meaning into the present day. The history of the Plains Sun Dance is continuing witness to this reality.

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SUNDANESE RELIGION. Although the Sundanese of West Java, Indonesia, consider themselves Muslims, many pre-Islamic ideas still permeate their religious life. A key point in understanding Sundanese relations to the supernatural is the relationship between the soul and a creative or generative power that animates the universe. This power, *anu ngayuga* ("that which creates") is limited and is contained to varying degrees in the elements that make up the cosmos. The amount of power in a person is determined by ancestry and the time, place, and conditions of birth. It may further wax or wane according to the state of ritual or moral purity of the person (see Anderson, 1972).

Soul. The Sundanese have two ideas of soul; *nyawa* and *semangat*. Other words such as *roh* and *jiwa* are occasionally used, but these are adoptions from the Arabic and Sanskrit, respectively, and overlap in meaning between *nyawa* and *semangat*. *Nyawa* is simply life or breath, existing only while the person lives. *Semangat*, on the other hand, is that aspect of soul that connects a person to the ancestors and gives him or her various capabilities and strengths. It is the whole of a person's spiritual life. Provencher (1972) relates *semangat* to the Melanesian and Polynesian *mana*.

The *semangat* belongs with the person, but may occasionally leave if frightened or if a taboo is broken. In this case the person's soul must be coaxed back, or illness and death may follow. The *semangat* is also considered to be able to travel away from a person during sleep, making it dangerous to awaken him suddenly, and may further transmigrate and enter an animal such as a tiger.

The amount of *semangat* in a person is not constant but may be added to through study, especially of sacred texts and magic, as well as through the acquisition of sacred objects and heirlooms. It may also be diminished through impure and worldly actions. There must be an inner balance between the *semangat* and the social persona of the person. Too much or too little of it to fit the situation makes the person uncomfortable and may lead to disquietude or illness. These last two aspects of *semangat* are much like the cosmic power mentioned above, and we may see *semangat*, then, as the unique expression of cosmic creative power (*anu ngayuga*) in individuals.

Semangat is located throughout the body, although it seems to be focused on the navel. The Sundanese take care to bury brushed-out hair and nail clippings, as these are parts of the person and thus contain soul substance that may be used against one in magic. Amulets are worn around the waist, protecting the center of the soul.

The placenta (*ari ari*) is considered to be the elder sibling of the person. It is also believed that the same placenta comes back to the mother as she bears each successive child, creating a spiritual or soul bond between siblings.

The father, who planted the seed and made the body, is responsible for its physical maintenance. The soul is said to come from the mother, and she is responsible for the spiritual makeup of the child. For this reason there is a *tali batin* (spiritual tie) between the mother and her children and between the children via the shared placenta.

This connection goes back to the ancestors as well. Ancestral graves are visited and the ancestors are noti-

fied when a ritual is to take place or when one goes on an extended journey. Ancestral spirits may also be consulted in times of need. They are often associated with a particular piece of land. Traditionally, people were buried on family land, and inherited land could not be sold to outsiders. Placentas, especially those of infant girls, are also often buried on family land, with which the soul is thus intimately connected (Mus, 1975).

Ancestral souls may also be called on for aid in times of trouble, in which case the ancestor may appear in the form of a tiger. Deceased rulers are said to guard their realms in this form; shamans are said to be able to take on tigrine form while curing.

The Wider Supernatural World. The shaman (*dukun*, *kuncen*) is the vehicle for dealing with the wider supernatural world. Aside from being human soul stuff, cosmic power is also found in animals, plants, and the like. Like ancestral graves, places such as caves and mountains can be strongly imbued with it. Since this power is amoral, it may be dangerous to ordinary people. Through their craft, shamans are able to interact with these forces and thereby protect the community.

Ordinary people may make requests from these powers, which are often manifested as spirits or magical animals, after being introduced by the *kuncen*. Incense is burned and magical formulas (*jampes*) pronounced, after which the supplicant awaits the arrival of the power. If the power grants the petitioner's request, it may demand in return that the petitioner agree to be turned into a pig, a monkey, or a snake after his death or that a human life be sacrificed to it annually.

Other supernatural forces include place spirits (*jurigs*), which may be seen as disembodied bits of cosmic power. They tend to exist on boundaries such as the water's edge or in secluded, quiet places. One does not make requests of these spirits, but only takes care not to bother them excessively. They are said to be generally harmless, though some delight in frightening people, and one type of water spirit (*lulun samak*) sometimes grabs people and drowns them.

Also to be reckoned with are the *silumans*, the spirits of those who have died an unnatural death and the *kuntianaks*, the spirits of women who have died in childbirth. *Silumans* often inhabit caves and are then said to be the entities that make such places foreboding. The *kuntianak* is a danger to women who are about to give birth by causing difficulties that may lead to the woman's death; she would then become a *kuntianak* herself. For this reason, an expectant mother must take special precautions, such as carrying a sharp metal instrument and not going near the water alone during the

last month of her pregnancy. Further magical precautions are taken by the *paraji*, the midwife.

Like the *jurig*, the *siluman* and *kuntianak* may be seen as disembodied cosmic power. This power is dangerous because it must be contained, and in its search for an envelope may possess a person. For this reason also, these powers are found in caves because caves make good containers.

Plants are also imbued with cosmic power—especially rice, trees, and bamboo. Rice, which is the personification of the rice goddess Dewi Sri, is said to have a soul. Care must be taken not to offend the goddess, and offerings are made both in the rice field and in the storage room (*goah*). Offerings in the field are made by the *wali puhun*, the shaman who ensures the fertility of the field. When cutting down trees or large bamboo, permission must be asked from the spirit inhabiting either the area or the tree; otherwise this spirit is likely to cause mischief or to possess someone.

Ceremonies. Most ceremonies are conducted inside the house, which may be seen as a model of the cosmos itself. Ancestral spirits are invited to these ceremonies and thereby both add their power to the event and give it their blessing. The core of all ceremonies is the *hajati*, a ceremonial meal. Here the shaman, speaking for the householder, states the purpose of the occasion. Blessings from God (Allāh) are invoked, incense is burned while magical formulas are spoken, and then the food is consumed.

Each year on the birthday of the prophet Muḥammad, a *hajati* is held during which heirlooms and amulets are cleaned and restored. These items are said to contain cosmic power that may be added to by chanting over them during the ritual. On the same night, graves visited for help during the year are chanted over in order perhaps to infuse them with the power inherent in the Prophet's birth. This is also a good night to call up one's tiger ancestor, as such spirits are about, on their way to the ancient center of the Sundanese kingdom of Pajajaran at Pakuan near Bogor.

[See also Southeast Asian Religions, *article on Insular Cultures*. For an account of the introduction and spread of Islam on Java, see Islam, *article on Islam in Southeast Asia*.]

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SUNNAH. In every "founded" religious tradition, maintaining proximity to the founder has been an important source of legitimacy and authority, just as arguments about how to establish that proximity have been a source of conflict. In the Islamic tradition, the word *sunnah* has been the focal point of such issues. A word with a very old history in the Arabic language, *sunnah* comes from a root that is concretely associated with honing or molding, with something firmly rooted, like a tooth (*sinn*). *Sunnah*, by extension, came to mean habitual practice, customary procedure or action, norm, standard, or "usage sanctioned by tradition."

Early Evolution. Among pre-Islamic Arabs, *sunnah* had the force of what anthropologists would call "tribal custom," that is, the generally agreed upon "thing to do" in matters of piety, morality, and social activity. In fact, it was the *sunnah* of the prophet Muḥammad's Arab compeers that initially led them to reject him, since the habitual social and spiritual practices of their ancestors were incompatible with his vision and demands. And it was his reinterpretation of their *sunnah* that helped him win them over, for he "reminded" them successfully that what they took to be true tradition (polytheism, for example) was what modern scholars would call "invented tradition," and that the true *sunnah* of their ancestors was the same Abrahamic ethical monotheism that he was announcing, in that he called upon his listeners to fulfill Abraham's moral contract with the one God.

The Qur'anic revelations themselves did not establish an unequivocal meaning for *sunnah*. They referred either to the *sunnah* of those of old (the wrongheaded customs of Muḥammad's Arab brethren) or to the *sunnah* (or *sunan*, pl.) of God, namely his punishment of that

other *sunnah*. The Qur'an's flexible usage of the word *sunnah* never disappeared, but *sunnah* quickly came to be associated with the exemplary, imitable, normative words, deeds, and silent approval of the Prophet himself, whose behavior was assumed to be consistent with all previous prophets. In the sense of Muḥammad's exemplary pattern, *sunnah* took on an extraordinarily positive coloration and a predominant place in Muslim piety. The *sunnah* of the Prophet (*sunnat al-nabi*) began to preempt tribal *sunnah*; the new "tribe," the Muslims, acquired a new pattern of established practice. That development, along with the simultaneous revelation of the sacred text, the Qur'an, through Muḥammad produced one of these dynamic paradoxes that have enriched the histories of all the major religions: the relationship between Muḥammad's roles as vehicle of revelation and as exemplar of the most important *sunnah*. Muḥammad was only a man, receiving but not authoring God's word. Yet that word was difficult to follow without its bearer's example and explication; the Qur'an itself urged Muslims to follow God and his Messenger. Although the injunction not to deify Muḥammad was taken seriously, he was still a man set apart from others by his special intimacy with God and his role as the Seal of the Prophets. Some may also have attributed to him the special, magical powers they would have previously expected from any holy person. In his mission, Muḥammad was, more than many prophets, both messenger and exemplar, because he was a temporal as well as spiritual leader. There was always a thin line between emulation and veneration, between making him an ideal exemplar and dehumanizing him into a perfect man. One could imitate him, but not completely, because he was too special; but one could not make him so special that he was not human. Within this range, myriad authentic pious responses have flourished.

Furthermore, although scriptural religions have always developed sources of commentary that involve the founder, Muslims relied unusually heavily on Muḥammad. They produced a massive, multifunctional, multifaceted corpus of "news" or "reports" (*ḥadīth*) from the companions of the Prophet, whose humanness, though exceptional, had to be maintained. It is true that the *ḥadīth* did not establish Muḥammad as an exemplar apart from his role as bearer of revealed truth; but, ironically, it was the very denial of his divinity that made him so imitable, that allowed personal details to accumulate to a level almost unmatched in the history of religion, with the possible exception of the personality of Mohandas Gandhi. Ironically, too, it may have been the very size of the corpus that not only encour-

aged selectivity but also promoted, and reflected, disagreement about the norms to be derived from it.

Sunnat al-nabī. In time, and especially under the pressure of practical necessity, the two parts of Muḥammad's mission coalesced into two separate oral and written bodies of texts: (1) revelation (*waḥy*), that is, divine word or Qur'ān; and (2) inspired prophetic example (*sunnat al-nabī*). The most common literary vehicle of the *sunnat al-nabī*, the *ḥadīth*, functioned to maintain proximity to Muḥammad's *sunnah* in much the same way as the *ayyām*, a pre-Islamic literary form for preserving noble tribal exploits, had kept tribal *sunnah* alive. The early Muslim community, whose *sunnah* was based on that of Muḥammad, preserved the *sunnat al-nabī* through the memorization and transmission of *ḥadīth*. Some Muslims said that *sunnat al-nabī* had been revealed along with the Qur'ān, as has sometimes been said of the oral law and the written law (Torah) in Judaism; others have even relied on *sunnah* more than on the Qur'ān.

The range covered by the *sunnat al-nabī* was as broad as that of oral law too: food and eating, manners, clothing and jewelry, hygiene and grooming, social behavior, forms of greeting, and etiquette, as well as weightier religious, political, or economic matters. Consequently, the *sunnah* of the Prophet and the early community came to play a major role in the development of the Islamic legal system (*sharī'ah*) and systematic discussion about God (*kalām*). (This usage of the term *sunnah* should not be confused with the technical sense in which it is also used within the *sharī'ah* for a certain level of permissibility of acts.)

Sunnah also came to function in various extralegal, extratheological ways. The quoting of *ḥadīth* could have a performatory quality: the mere act of citing an apt *ḥadīth* could help one manage a given situation or display one's piety. Through literary presentations of Muḥammad's life pattern, or *sīrah*, which also came to be the name of a biographical genre, the *sunnah* was spread even wider. The use of *ḥadīth* as primary sources for the writing of historical narrative became common. Muḥammad's various roles, especially that of societal reformer, became paradigms for the behavior of many later leaders. At the popular level and especially among Sūfīs (mystics), Muḥammad became the soul's guide and the perfect universal human, showing people how to behave in the presence of God; numerous poetic genres emerged to capture this side of him. Above all, the cultivation of the *sunnat al-nabī*, not just in legally binding matters but in the smallest details of mundane daily existence, took on the salvific quality present in orthodox Jews' observance of *ḥalakhah* (law).

Until recently, most Western scholars have focused on

the authenticity and reliability of these materials. There is an old academic tradition that views the *ḥadīth*-based picture of the *sunnat al-nabī* as a *post hoc* creation of the second and particularly third centuries of Islam, when the major authoritative collections of *ḥadīth* were compiled. More recent scholarship has argued that *ḥadīth* emerged very early, in written as well as oral form, and that the very earliest Muslim community assumed sincerely that its *sunnah* was continuous with that of the Prophet.

Scholars have also disagreed about how closely to connect *ḥadīth* and *sunnah*. Although the derivation of *sunnah* for legal purposes depended heavily on the study and explication of *ḥadīth*, the two were not coterminous. The *ḥadīth* were simply verbal reports, tens of thousands of them, about something Muḥammad said or did. They contained many, many potential norms or standards, but those had to be derived or actualized to have legal force. Some matters that were traditionally agreed upon as *sunnah* were contradicted by particular *ḥadīth* or had no basis in *ḥadīth*. Furthermore, individual Muslims could easily disagree with one derivation of a norm and prefer another or prefer one *ḥadīth* to another or reject one and accept another. Finally, the *ḥadīth* format came to be used for conveying all sorts of information not directly related to the life of the Prophet.

As the *sunnah* gradually acquired the meaning of the received, recognized, normative practice of Muḥammad and, to an extent, his companions, its opposite came to be represented by the word *bid'ah* (literally, "starting new," "innovation"). It first became significant as a critique of the behavior of the Marwanid caliphs (685–750), who were seen to have deviated from the ideal of Muḥammad and his companions. Some Muslims always used the word in a negative way—to refer to something beyond the parameters of the acceptable. For others, *bid'ah*, like *sunnah*, can be good or bad—bad if it contradicted the accepted *sunnah*, good if it was consistent with it, even if not contained in it, and promoted the good of the community.

Western scholars often translate *bid'ah* as "heresy" when applied by Muslims to unacceptable religious practices and beliefs. However, "heresy" obscures the pragmatic bent of the Islamic tradition in favor of a dogmatic bent more appropriate to a tradition such as Christianity, which had, unlike Islam, institutionalized theological ways in order to judge and control deviation. The charge of *bid'ah* referred not so much to the content of beliefs as to their practical consequences; it was often made by rulers to reprove certain members of society and dissuade them from adopting socially appealing ideas that disrupted the status quo.

Sunnī and Shī'ī. During the first 120 years of Islamic history, disagreements emerged about how best to derive, understand, and be true to the Prophet's *sunnah*. Through a series of internal conflicts, sides and positions shifted frequently. By the time the Abbasid dynasty of caliphs overthrew and replaced the Umayyads (750), two major orientations had begun to crystalize, both of which were addressed by the Abbasid platform. For some, Muḥammad's unifying and lawgiving function was primary to his *sunnah* and would be best preserved if his community (*jamā'ah*) were kept together at all costs, in two ways: (1) by providing a system of rules (*sharī'ah*) as close as possible to those he brought, with a body of learned men (*'ulamā'*) to manage it; and (2) by providing a "nomocratic" leader (*khalīfah*) who would "stay close" to Muḥammad by uniting the community physically, by guaranteeing its security, and by ensuring a proper Muslim environment through protection of the *sharī'ah* and its learned managers. Muḥammad's charismatic function would not be imitated by a person but, rather, routinized in the law.

Another group found proximity to Muḥammad in a different device—physical descent. For them, maintaining proximity to his *sunnah* depended on recapturing his intimacy with God and his closeness to and divinely guided designation of a relative, his cousin and son-in-law 'Alī, to succeed him. Although they too gathered *ḥadīth*, established *sunnah*, and worked out *sharī'ah*, for them it was all unusable without a continuation of the charismatic interpretation the Prophet had provided. They had sought, unsuccessfully, to provide the community with a theocratic ruler (*imām*) who could incorporate the nomocratic functions of the *khalīfah* but whose legitimacy would not depend on doing only that. Muḥammad's charismatic function would not be duplicated by the imams but, rather, transformed and kept alive by them on the basis of their special inherited inner skills.

Although affection for the family of the Prophet was diffused throughout the Muslim community, this group carried partisanship further. In their hearts and minds, certain descendants of the Prophet through his cousin 'Alī (imams) partook of Muḥammad's special qualities; yet they suffered and were frequently martyred at the hands of wrongful rulers. The passing over of 'Alī for the caliphate the first three times it was awarded and the martyrdom of the third of their line, Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, at the hands of the fifth caliph, Yazīd (r. 680–683), as well as subsequent misfortunes, predisposed them to support the Abbasids, who claimed to represent the innate right of the family of the Prophet over those who had usurped it.

However, after they came to power, the Abbasids re-

jected the special claims of this group, which had generally been known as the partisans (*shī'ah*) of 'Alī, in favor of the nomocratic style favored by the majority, who styled themselves "the people of the *sunnah* and the community" (*ahl al-sunnah wa-al-jamā'ah*). Although the short form *Sunnī* stuck to them, as did *Shī'ī* to the others, nomenclature should not imply that only they were committed to *sunnah* and *ḥadīth* as sources of knowledge. Rather, they established proximity to the *sunnah* by maintaining a consensual *jamā'ah*, whereas the Shī'ah stayed close to it by resisting the decisions of the misguided *jamā'ah* and by trying to substitute what they saw as a more profound, esoteric understanding and style of leadership.

Subtle interpretations aside, however, "Sunnī" came to stand, in different senses, for the majoritarian, mainstream, "orthoprax" style of Islamic piety, especially among those who adhered to it (more than 90 percent throughout history). By the time of the influential legal theorist and schematizer al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820), an un-systemic and sometimes imaginative derivation and use of *ḥadīth* about Muḥammad's and his community's *sunnah* had become commonplace among the several early Jamā'ī-Sunnī "schools" of *fiqh* (jurisprudence), as had many other legal techniques. Simultaneously, intellectually important movements like Shiism and Mu'tazilī rationalism had developed modes of reasoning that downplayed the authority of a *ḥadīth*-borne *sunnat al-nabī*.

Responding to these and other factors, al-Shāfi'ī sought to rationalize and circumscribe the legitimate roots or sources (*uṣūl*) of jurisprudential deliberation. These he limited to a hierarchy of four, each of which had a fixed relationship to the one(s) before: Qur'ān, *sunnah*, *ijmā'*, and *qiyās*. The starting point had to be the Qur'ān. However, where the *sunnah* could explain or supplement revealed truth, it became a second source by virtue of a frequent Qur'anic injunction, "Obey God and his Messenger." The *sunnah* had to be based on *ḥadīth* traceable back to the Prophet himself or a companion through the supporting (*isnād*) of an unbroken chain (*silsilah*) of reliable transmitters. Thus did al-Shāfi'ī solidify for Jamā'ī-Sunnīs Muḥammad's role as uniquely authoritative exemplar.

Furthermore, where the entire community, as represented by its learned men (*'ulamā'*), had reached consensus (*ijmā'*), that too became law if it was consistent with the first two sources. In justifying the use of *ijmā'*, al-Shāfi'ī had recourse to a famous *ḥadīth*, "My community will never agree on an error." *Ijmā'* sometimes sanctioned, for example, the Arab custom of male and female circumcision, which in turn came to be known as *sunnah* too. Finally, the *'ulamā'* could make adaptive

extensions of the first three sources by using personal judgment limited to analogy (*qiyās*) to something in the other three sources. They were equipped to perform their functions not because they possessed any innate characteristics but because they had acquired, through devoted study of Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, the knowledge ('*ilm*) of what is right.

Deserving of comment is the relationship between this approach to *ḥadīth* and *sunnah* and *tradition*, a word that is often used to translate them. Al-Shāfi'ī's *ḥadīth*-oriented approach was actually antitraditionalist. By insisting on the use of texts in the form of *ḥadīth* that were traceable to Muḥammad, he was restricting the role "tradition" had been playing among legists because, by the second Islamic century, many things that had become "traditional" among legists had no textual base or were contradicted by the texts.

Al-Shāfi'ī's approach should more properly be viewed as "textualist": he accepted practices not because they were customary but because they were documented. Not long after his death, the *ḥadīth* began to be compiled into a series of six major authoritative collections. Although some of them may have reflected "traditions" in the narrower sense, the impact of this whole series of developments was to control the traditional in favor of what was based on a text and to undermine contemporary rulers' attempts to legitimize custom based on the court rather than *sunnah* based on *ḥadīth*.

Emergence of schools. Gradually, four major Jamā'ī-Sunnī "schools" (sg., *madhhab*; pl., *madhāhib*) of law, all influenced by al-Shāfi'ī's system, formed around the teachings of four leading early figures: Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (780–855), Mālik ibn Anas (715–795), Abū Ḥanīfah (699–767), and al-Shāfi'ī himself. Eventually, standardization set in to the point at which, by the fourteenth century, no further significant variation was anticipated—a situation expressed by the phrase "the closing of the gate of *ijtihād*" (individual inquiry).

Shari'ah-oriented Jamā'ī-Sunnism came to focus on the establishment of communal consensus and the maintenance of the public order—in worship, in marketplace behavior, or on the highways and frontiers. Judges (*qādīs*) judged what was brought to their attention, not what they ferreted out privately. Books of law focused on ritual obligations (summarized by the five pillars—confession of faith, daily prayer, alms, fasting during the month of Ramaḍān, and pilgrimage to Mecca) as well as on family and personal status law and economic and political matters. This style of piety came to accept as ruler (*khalīfah*) whomever the great majority of the community accepted and to define him as guarantor of physical security and provider of an atmosphere in which the *shari'ah* could prevail.

Some Jamā'ī-Sunnīs also used *ḥadīth* and *sunnah* as the basis for *kalām* (speculative discussion about God), although others viewed *kalām* itself as *bid'ah*, by virtue of its presumptuous attempt to prove what had already been revealed as true. By the eleventh century, two major *ḥadīth*-oriented schools—the Māturīdī (named after Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī, d. 944) and the Ash'arī (named after Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, d. 935)—had won out over more rationalistic groups such as the Mu'tazilah. The Ash'arīyah and Māturīdīyah emphasized emotional faith as opposed to the mere assent of intellectualized belief and relied on Muḥammad's own faith and the *ḥadīth* that expressed it as the best guides. They favored an exoteric (*zāhirī*) style of reading the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*. Although they insisted on the unity of God, they accepted the existence of his attributes as mentioned in the Qur'ān, asserting that those attributes were not part of his essence. They emphasized that God exercised power over human action through continuous atomistic creation, though they did not remove the power of human choice altogether. They set limits on speculation by accepting many difficult Qur'anic points outright, without regard to how they were true.

Sufism. Despite the emphasis of Jamā'ī-Sunnīs on *shari'ah*, they also began by the twelfth century to partake of mystical piety (Sufism), partly because of the accomplishments of al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), the *kalām* teacher and self-styled Ṣūfī. Al-Ghazālī managed to make a place in Jamā'ī-Sunnī legalism for the more spiritualized, ineffable qualities of the Ṣūfīs. Organized groups of Ṣūfīs (*ṭarīqahs*) of great scope and variety gradually appeared and expanded so that by the sixteenth century much if not most of the adult male Sunnī population may have belonged to one or the other of these groups.

Jamā'ī-Sunnism has been described as the "piety of solidarity." Its emphasis on the universal applicability and accessibility not only of the Qur'ān but also of Muḥammad's *sunnah* has promoted remarkable cultural homogeneity among the many diverse peoples who have come under the Islamic umbrella during the past fourteen centuries.

[See also Caliphate; Ḥadīth; Imamate; Nubūwah; and the biography of Muḥammad.]

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a classic statement on the role of *ḥadīth* in formulating *sharī'ah*.

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SUNOIKIA. The Athenian festival of Sunoikia (lit., "the making to live together") was celebrated on 16 Hekatombaion, the day after the full moon of the first Athenian month, and was part of the sequence of festivals surrounding the New Year (Skira, Dipolieia, Kronia, Panathenaia). According to its etiological myth, attested first at the end of the fifth century BCE (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 2.15.2), it commemorated the *sunoikismos* ("founding") of Athens by Theseus—that is, the creation of the city-state out of the independent villages of Attica. Since this Thesean *sunoikismos* is generally dismissed as unhistorical by modern scholars (see Hignett, 1952, pp. 34–57; Coldstream, 1977, pp. 70–71), the Sunoikia and its myth provide a prominent

example of the historization of Greek religion: the myth expresses the theme of beginnings, central to New Year festivals, in a quasi-historical narrative.

Only a few rituals of the Sunoikia are known, mainly from inscriptions, but they confirm its general theme. At one point in the festival the sacrificial meat was distributed raw to individual households, contrary to the custom of a common meal after a sacrifice; this act expresses the dissolution of the community, which necessarily precedes a new integration. In the festival as regulated around 400 BCE, the participation of the old tribes, which for administrative purposes had by then been replaced by a new system, expresses a similar resurgence of former fragmentation. The opposing theme of political unity was taken up by the sacrifice to the goddess Eirene ("peace"), celebrated by the whole populace in a common meal (at least after 375 BCE).

For other Greek states, evidence for such a festival is virtually nonexistent, except for Patrai. Here in the festival of Artemis Triklaria and Dionysos Aisumnetes, the villages that had combined to form the *polis* emerged once again under their former identities at the beginning of the ceremonies (see Pausanias, *Description of Greece* 7.19.1–7.20.2, 7.21.6f.).

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ŚŪNYAM AND ŚŪNYATĀ. "Empty," "open," "devoid," "nothing," and "nonexistent" are words used to translate the term *śūnyam*. "Emptiness," "openness," "nothingness," "nonsubstantiality," "relativity," and "the inexhaustible" have been used to translate *śūnyatā*. These two terms, of major importance in Buddhism, have been used to express a philosophical idea, a focus of meditation, a religious attitude, and a manner of ethical action. "Emptiness" may thus indicate deprivation (of self-substantiated reality in conventional experi-

ence), a complex implicit interrelatedness of all existing things, or blissful perfect freedom (from anxiety, anger, and pain). As general religious terms, *śūnyam* and *śūnyatā* are used in an attempt to indicate and incite an awareness of “the way things really are” (*yathābhūtam*).

The complexity of the concept expressed as “emptiness” derives from the recognition in Buddhism that teaching the truth about life is urgent for alleviating suffering, but that implicit in thinking and speaking resides a tendency to create an illusion (of self-sufficient realities) that is itself the cause of that suffering. The teaching of “the emptiness of things” is a medicine for the spiritual illness seen wherever there is greed, hate, and self-delusion; it is a response to a universal, problematic condition that is found in particular specific forms and thus requires different kinds and levels of correction. Assertions about the empty nature of existence pertain to different objects of concern, for example, conventional phenomena, the basic (usually hidden but more fundamental) causal factors of existence, the highest mode of perceiving phenomena, or the nature of everything. Similarly, different Buddhist schools have recognized the value of different interpretations but have judged the value of a particular interpretation on a scale from the most superficial understanding (for beginners) to the most profound (for spiritual adepts). In all the interpretations and explanations, however, there is a clear recognition that the notion of emptiness is closely tied to the practice of perceiving existence in an “empty manner,” which, in turn, results in behavior typified by patience, compassion, strength of character, and morality.

Teaching of Emptiness as Part of the Bodhisattva Path. During the second century BCE, Buddhist teachers in India emphasized “emptiness” as a basic description of the nature of existing things. They were known as “teachers of emptiness” (*śūnyavādins*). Their approach to enlightenment is dramatically portrayed in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras (The Perfection of Wisdom Discourses). These *sūtras* maintain that the teaching and meditation training of the contemporary traditional masters, as depicted in the analysis of the Abhidharma Piṭaka, resulted in only a partial enlightenment. The Abhidharma masters had insight only into the emptiness of “the self” and general empirical phenomena, which they could perceive by breaking up conventional perceptions of oneself and “the objective world” into their fundamental causal factors (*dharmas*). While reviewing the *dharmas* was recognized to be a monastic skill that provided the foundation for the cultivation of nonattachment to the self and the world, the “teachers of emptiness” held that such a review, with its emphasis on attaining *nirvāṇa* by avoiding attachment to the

“constructed world,” could itself become a subtle attachment. To prevent attachment to *dharma* analysis and the expectation of an individual *nirvāṇa* they insisted that even the *dharmas*, together with their identifying characteristics, had to be seen as empty. All distinctions, including those between *nirvāṇa* and the world in flux (*saṃsāra*) and between enlightenment and non-enlightenment, were empty of inherent characteristics. [See also Dharma, article on Buddhist Dharma and Dharmas.]

The emptiness of all things is a significant part of the Bodhisattva Path to enlightenment in Mahāyāna (“Great Vehicle”) Buddhism (which developed in northern India and spread to China, Korea, Japan, and Tibet). This path is a spiritual training that begins with instruction of the Buddha’s “Middle Way” to avoid attachment to “the appearances of the world” and acquisition of self-constricting energy (*karman*). The path includes putting the teaching into practice (perhaps through many lifetimes and even aeons of time) by meditation, by moral action that results in “seeds of virtue,” and eventually by the formation of “the thought of enlightenment” (*bodhicitta*) and the earnest resolution (*praṇidhāna*) to work for the welfare of all living beings. Progress on the path includes the perfection of charity, morality, effort, and wisdom. A distinguishing character of this wisdom is that the recognition of emptiness is combined with compassion for all living beings. Such wisdom is cultivated through a skill (*upāyakauśalya*) to fully engage the conditioned world (*saṃsāra*) without being tainted by its evil, delusion, and compulsive drivenness toward pain. The Bodhisattva Path is elaborated in subsequent centuries in such texts as the *Madhyamakāvātāra* (Entering the Middle Way) by Candrakīrti (sixth century CE), the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Compendium of Precepts) by Śāntideva (eighth century CE), and the *Bhāvanākrama* (The Course of Spiritual Development) by Kamalaśīla (eighth century CE). [See also Bodhisattva Path.]

In claiming to perfect the meditational practice of the Abhidharma masters within the Indian Buddhist community, the composers of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras claimed—as did the composers of such other early Mahāyāna discourses as the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* (Lotus of the Good Law Discourse) and the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra* (Exposition by Vimalakīrti)—that their teaching of emptiness was consistent with, and indeed the deepest comprehension of, the earliest recorded doctrine of the Buddha. The earlier recorded discourses (*Nikāyas*) had already used the notion of emptiness to describe the ephemeral quality of phenomena, especially the lack of permanence and self-existence of perceived objects. During meditative quieting of the mind,

and through a descriptive analysis of the many factors that constitute perceived objects, the monk sought to remove mental and emotional disturbances that arose from false expectations of permanence. Though everyday phenomena “exist” in a composite, conditioned manner, they are empty of anything that is permanent or self-existent.

In articulating this path of nonattachment to mental, emotional, or material “things,” the *Nikāyas* use designations such as “empty,” “impermanent,” and “nonessential”; however, they are aware that in conventional speech an assertion implies the denial of its opposite claim. To avoid such implications they also warn that enlightenment is not the same as holding a *view* of emptiness, of nonexistence rather than existence, of “it is not” rather than “it is.” Rather, one should avoid clinging to ideas or apprehensions that divide one’s experience into “is” and “is not,” “being” and “nonbeing,” or “if not this, then that.”

The path to enlightenment, expounded by the “teachers of emptiness” in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, absorbed the earlier Buddhist recognition that the self and objects of perception are empty of self-existence. The “teachers of emptiness” extended the awareness of the empty nature to everything. Thus the *dharma*s (causal factors of existence), the Buddha’s teaching, the path to liberation, the beings who seek liberation, liberation, and “emptiness as a teaching” were all viewed as being empty—all viewed in an empty manner. The Bodhisattva Path was described as “no-path” or “non-coursing”; the Buddha’s position was “having no place to stand.” The attainment of enlightenment was “no-attainment.” There was no defilement, no purification; no arising and no dissipation of existence; and no release from existence to attain *nirvāṇa*—since all these are empty of self-substantiated reality, inherent characteristics, and essential value.

This kind of teaching was meant neither for the “worldling” attached to the things of existence nor even for a novice in the Buddha’s Middle Way. Such people as these might become fearful and despondent or might interpret the teaching as a nihilistic view or simply as a negative expression of a transcendent essentialism. Only courageous pursuers of truth who had accumulated a resource of spontaneous virtue and clarity of perception could see that such “non-coursing” implies complete interrelatedness with all living beings and that the deepest cognition of emptiness is expressed as compassion.

The Mādhyamika School. The effort to formulate and justify the insight that all things are empty while living in a spontaneous, comprehensively caring manner was systematized differently by two Indian schools of Bud-

dhism, the Mādhyamika (“middle way”) and the Yogācāra (“yoga practice”) schools. Nāgārjuna (late second century CE) is often regarded as the founder of the Mādhyamika school. The invocation of one of his major writings, the *Mūlamādhyamakakārikās* (The Fundamentals of the Middle Way), includes a summary of “eight negations” that has epitomized the emptiness teaching for subsequent generations: no origination, no dissipation; no permanence, no ending; no differentiation, no identity; no coming (into existence), no going (from existence). Throughout this work, Nāgārjuna analyzes basic philosophical notions and views, for example, causal conditions, time, *karman*, self (*ātman*), the fully enlightened one (*tathāgata*), and *nirvāṇa*. He shows that none exists in the sense of self-sufficient existence (*svabhāva*) and, thus, that each is empty (of self-sufficient existence). At the same time, he demonstrates that all phenomena exist because emptiness is the same as dependent co-origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). As radical relational existence, emptiness is identical to existence. Contrary to the claim of his opponents that to designate everything as “empty” is to say that nothing exists, Nāgārjuna insists that one can account for changing existence or enlightenment only if one recognizes that these lack self-existent reality (i.e., emptiness as dependent co-origination). [See also *Pratītya-samutpāda*.]

To perceive all existing things as dependently co-originating, or empty, requires a shift from the conventional mode of perception. Conventional experience divides the world into likes and dislikes, desires and fears, and “you” and “me” as separate entities. This hides the fact that these perceptions can exist only in interrelationship. To perceive through the deep awareness of emptiness, people must become aware of how they construct attachments and fears while perceiving, conceptualizing, and judging. Concepts and language create the places for sensations and emotions “to reside.” Therefore, they are a prime focus for dissipating attachments.

Nāgārjuna and his followers in the Mādhyamika school use a critical dialectic to show how concepts that presume to describe independent, self-sufficient reality are illusory. The general structure of this dialectic is to assert that any self-subsistent, independent entity is unchanging and unrelated; to claim that such an entity accounts for any phenomenon in the continually changing world is either logically contradictory or contrary to common experience. Likewise in this dialectic is a rejection of the common assumption that any denial of something logically requires the opposite positive assertion. That is, when denying that an entity has “being,” a person implicitly asserts that the entity has “nonbe-

ing.” Thus in the Mādhyamika dialectic a common argumentative procedure is the denial of “four alternatives” (*catuṣkoti*). For example, in discussing the nature of the perfectly enlightened one (*tathāgata*), Nāgārjuna states: “One can say neither ‘empty’ nor ‘non-empty’; nor both, nor neither. The purpose of these designations is for communication only” (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* 22.11). The religious significance of the critical dialectic is to show the “non-abiding” character of “the way things are.” The empty character of existence cannot be encapsulated in language or in any perception that implicitly assumes permanent essential qualities or substances. By dislodging a person’s hope that language or logic can capture the empty, or intrinsically relational dynamic of existence, one can avoid the delusion of permanence as a condition for happiness and serenity.

The use of logic to justify the emptiness of experienced “things,” juxtaposed with the assertion that language distorts a true cognition of emptiness, led to the doctrine of two levels or modes of truth. The notion of two modes of truth recognizes that logic, metaphor, or verbal description has use in conventional day-to-day experience but that such conventional use also hides and distorts a deeper (or higher) cognition known through an immediate, direct, intuitive awareness. For the Mādhyamika, emptiness was the object of highest knowledge and, at the same time, accounted for the possibility of the conditioned, conventional forms in everyday life. However, to say that emptiness is “the object” of knowledge does not mean at the highest level of truth that emptiness exists as a separate entity. This is the realization of the “emptiness of emptiness.” Because “the two modes of truth”—like everything else—are related but distinct, the systematic formulation of how they were to be defined and related became a focus of much subsequent discussion and writing throughout the millennia. [See the biography of Nāgārjuna.]

Within the Mādhyamika school and between various schools or lineages of teaching in India, Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan, there were various understandings of the two levels of truth and the meaning of emptiness in the context of realizing the highest truth. Within Mādhyamika, the subschool called Prāsaṅgika (from *pra-saṅga*, a logical method of “necessary consequence”) stressed the distorting character of all concepts and logic. Its adherents applied their rigorous “consequential dialectic” to all concepts that purported to express the highest truth, in order to dislodge any pretense of language to do so. Language and logic are, nevertheless, important tools to show the self-contradictory and distortional character of conceptual formulation. In his *Prasannapadā* (Clearly Worded Commentary), on Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, Candrakīrti advo-

cates this position, emphasizing that the awareness of emptiness is the destruction of *all* views or formulations. Even the negation of self-existent reality (*svabhāva*) is not a positive cognition of anything.

In his commentary, Candrakīrti argues against Bhāvaviveka, an important spokesperson for the other Mādhyamika subschool, the Svātantrikas (“Independents”). The Svātantrikas held that language and logic cannot express the most profound aspects of the highest truth but that some assertions express the truth of emptiness more accurately than others. Further, the accurate statements are amenable to verification within conventional rules of logical justification.

This discussion continued outside India, especially in the development of Tibetan Buddhist lineages. [See Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Tibetan Buddhism*.] For example, the Prāsaṅgika position was elaborated by the Sa-skya and later by the Rñiñ-ma-pa commentators, while the Svātantrika position was advocated by the Dge-lugs-pa lineage, including the great master Tsoñkha-pa (1357–1419 CE). The Tibetan monasteries developed their own lineages by drawing on ideas and interpretations from various earlier schools. They attempted to synthesize the teachings from different sources and thus develop a more complete view, while the Prāsaṅgika view is said to be the basis for knowing emptiness and is found in all four divisions of the *tantras* (“deep meaning texts”). [See also Mādhyamika.]

The Yogācāra School. The ideas of the other major Indian school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Yogācāra, were systematically formulated during the fourth century CE by the two monks Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras also recognize that all phenomena are empty (i.e., conditioned, without self-subsisting reality). However, they insist that the “coursener in wisdom” should positively affirm the ultimate reality of consciousness. It is consciousness that is empty and that knows in an empty or delusive manner. All living beings, Asaṅga claims in his *Madhyāntavibhaga* (Distinguishing between the Middle and Extremes), have the capacity to pervasively construct “that which is not there” (*abhūta-parikalpa*). This capacity artificially divides the interdependent world into many dualities, for example, subject and object, being and nonbeing. The elimination of dualistic fabrication is true emptiness.

Consciousness, in Yogācāra reflection, is the comprehensive reality and is composed of three kinds of reality: completely fictive or illusory (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), dependent or conditioned (*paratantra-svabhāva*), and truly real or nondual (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). Through the practice of the Bodhisattva Path the illusory reality is recognized for what it is: nonexistent. This recogni-

tion purifies the conditioned existence, which itself is not a real object but a modality of consciousness. When this is realized, the nonduality (or emptiness) of all things is manifest and exists as the ultimate reality (*paramārtha sat*). Whereas the Mādhyamikas stress that both the conditioned forms and the unconditioned reality are empty, the Yogācāras emphasize that the true reality is neither empty nor nonempty.

Another aspect of the Yogācāra emphasis on consciousness, found in several Indian discourses that contributed to the Mahāyāna understanding of ultimate reality, was the notion of the “matrix of enlightened reality” (*tathāgata-garbha*). [See *Tathāgata-garbha*.] Vasubandhu had described the basis of multiple kinds of consciousness as a “store consciousness” (*ālaya-vijñāna*). [See *Ālaya-vijñāna*.] This store consciousness contains both pure and impure “seeds” (*bījas*) that influence subsequent consciousness. Similarly, the *tathāgata-garbha* is the womb, or matrix, from which pure consciousness in the manifested world arises. Such a Mahāyāna text as the *Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda Sūtra* (The Lion’s Roar of Queen Srimala) equates the *tathāgata-garbha* with emptiness. Here “emptiness” means both “being devoid of impurities” and the natural “power of enlightenment” to produce nonattached consciousness in worldly forms.

The ultimate nature of the *tathāgata-garbha* is perfect purity. It is manifested in forms as well as being the formless reality. However, enlightened reality—also called “the Buddha nature”—is said to be nonempty in respect to the virtues of Buddhahood, which are manifested in the phenomenal world. Insofar as there is a strong emphasis on enlightened reality, which is manifest in particular concrete forms, the *tathāgata-garbha* is said to be neither simply empty nor simply nonempty. In India during the second half of the first millennium CE, in China beginning in the fifth century CE, and in the development of the Tibetan lineages, Buddhist scholars developed several formulations of the relation between the conditioned and the unconditioned realities, between the pure and the impure conditioning influences, and between emptiness and conditional form. [See also *Yogācāra*.]

Emptiness in Chinese and Japanese Schools. In China the Mādhyamika school maintained a teaching lineage for several centuries from the fifth century CE on as the San-lun (“three [middle way] treatises”) school. The teachings of the Mādhyamika were studied in Japan from the seventh century CE on but without a separate community following a lineage succession. The Yogācāra doctrine was transmitted to China through the translation of texts and a lineage of teachers that became known as the Fa-hsiang (“characteristics of dharma”) school. This school was transmitted to Japan

during the seventh and eighth centuries CE, where it was known as the Hossō school. The Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhists, during the fifth and sixth centuries, wrestled with the cognition of emptiness first in relation to Neo-Taoist notions of nothingness (*k’ung*), which implied that emptiness is a primary source from which all phenomenal forms arise. In the flowering of Buddhism in China (from the sixth century CE through the first half of the ninth century CE), Buddhist scholars understood emptiness within the context of the broad-based Chinese philosophical problem of the relation between the substance or foundation (*t’i*) of everything and its function or appearance (*yung*) in the changing world.

Within the San-lun school, contrasting understandings of this relation between substance and function are found in the writings of Seng-chao (374–414 CE) and of Chi-tsang (549–623 CE). Seng-chao assumed the identity of substance and function, affirming that emptiness is the foundation of all things that appear through dependent co-arising and is the nature of insight that recognizes the illusory (empty) character of phenomena; thereby the enlightened person abides in non-abiding (emptiness) and moves (in an empty manner) in conditioned existence. Chi-tsang, on the contrary, held that substance and function need to be clearly distinguished, and emphasized that the highest truth is manifest when the conventional truth is negated. Emptiness is basically the dialectical negation of both being and nonbeing and of both affirmation and negation. The highest truth is known in conditioned existence when names and characteristics of things are negated or transcended in nonphenomenal awareness.

During the sixth and seventh centuries CE, the Chinese Buddhists synthesized the notions of emptiness, multiple kinds of truth (reality), and dependent co-arising within a cosmological context in developing two distinctly Chinese schools or teaching lineages. These were T’ien-t’ai, formulated by Chih-i (531–597 CE), and Hua-yen, systematized by Fa-tsang (643–712 CE). Both are attempts to relate substance and function in one harmonious and interrelated matrix of reality. Chih-i held that there was a threefold truth—the empty (*k’ung*), the provisional (*chia*), and the middle (*chung*)—and that these three parts are reciprocally identical and simultaneous. Rather than view the truths in a lower-to-higher order, he presented them as different modalities of one universal consciousness. While they appear to be separate processes, he maintained, in their deepest character of interrelatedness they are one undifferentiated matrix whose principle is beyond dualistic or linear comprehension. [See also T’ien-t’ai.]

Fa-tsang held that the “nature of things” was emptiness, by which he meant the harmonious interdepen-

dent co-arising of particular, concrete phenomena. Such a universe is “the body of the *tathāgata*.” Rather than devaluing particular phenomena because they are conditioned (non-eternal), his system insists that each has supreme value in its interrelatedness to everything else. Fa-tsang held that the three natures (levels of awareness) proposed by Yogācāra teachers are intrinsically interrelated, and together form a whole, since they are all empty. The most profound nature is the incomprehensible “suchness” (formless emptiness), which is also the emptiness of the interrelatedness of conditioned existence (dependent co-origination); this, in turn, is also the non-self-substantial (empty) nature of illusory mental construction. To know the intrinsic emptiness (“suchness”) of all forms is the highest awareness. However, most people do not see the complex emptiness of everything. At a lower level of awareness, one can also say that the evil and pain experienced in the world represent only the potential for realizing incomprehensible “suchness” and that the *tathāgata-garbha* causes the transformation of enlightenment in particular minds and moments of consciousness. Nevertheless, in reality, the world is an inconceivably vast expression of emptiness that is the glorious manifestation of unchanging fullness, an overbrimming potential of “openness.” [See also Hua-yen.]

Another very important expression of emptiness is found in the “Meditation school,” which is known as Ch’an in China and Zen in Japan. The focus in Ch’an communities has been, and is, on “the practice of emptiness.” The basic negation of concepts as inadequate communication of “the way things are” and an emphasis on quieting the mind and extending the empty mode of perception into daily life continue the themes found in the Bodhisattva Path as portrayed in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. Zen masters have commented on these discourses as well as on the central Mādhyamika and Yogācāra treatises and on the poems and comments of previous Zen masters. Zen is the practice of manifesting “the Buddha mind,” which is also “no-mind.” The realization of “no-mind” is the loss of attachment to conventional perceptions, theoretical concepts about reality, and self-images. In that state of awareness, a Zen practitioner is directly confronted with emptiness—not as an idea or as the denial of an idea but as “what is at that moment.” Many Zen masters have emphasized that the notion of emptiness is misleading or useless when it is used to describe a distinctive quality of experience. At the same time, “emptiness” is prominently used as a focus of meditation, in which the meditator is called on to “become emptiness.” Basically, it is a mental tool to dissipate attachment to images and concepts. [See also Ch’an and Zen.]

In the contemporary discussion of cross-cultural philosophy and interfaith dialogue in which Buddhists are involved, the notion of emptiness and the negating dialectic are important points of engagement with other philosophies. The empty perception of “the way things are” has been compared with the critique of reason given by the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant and with the distorting character of language described by the twentieth-century philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. The claim that all things are dependently co-originated is compared with similar concepts in “process philosophy,” as expounded, for example, in Alfred North Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*. The notion of emptiness forms a central concern in the philosophical thought of the contemporary Japanese philosophers Nishida Kitarō and Nishitani Keiji as they discuss the nature of goodness, existence, and selfhood in a cross-cultural philosophical context. In interfaith dialogue, emptiness is a major topic in the Christian and Buddhist discussion of the nature of ultimate reality, human nature, and religious awareness. Likewise, the empty apprehension of oneself that is best manifested in compassion is compared with mystical disciplines that require the love of others found in various religious traditions. As a fundamental and multidimensional concept, emptiness continues to engage reflective people who pursue the tantalizing question of the nature of things.

[For further discussion of *śūnyatā* and related notions, see Prajñā; Tathatā; Soteriology, article on Buddhist Soteriology; Buddhist Philosophy; and Nirvāṇa. See also Numbers, article on Binary Symbolism. With the exception of Nishitani Keiji, all the thinkers mentioned in this entry are the subject of independent biographies.]

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SUPERNATURAL, THE. Mysterious occurrences and beings that habitually or occasionally impinge upon our everyday experience are called "supernatural." It is commonly said that belief in the supernatural characterizes all religions and that belief in the supernatural wanes in modern societies.

Historical Development of the Notion. The term *supernatural* was given wide currency by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and the Scholastics, but it had numerous antecedents in the idiom of the Hellenistic thinkers and church fathers. Neoplatonists in particular accumulated superlatives to speak of the realm of the divine: it was above the highest heaven, beyond the world, and even beyond being. Christians spoke of God as being above nature: he had not grown out of anything but was eternally self-subsistent. They also spoke of Christ as bringing to mankind benefits that were above nature, that is, benefits that were beyond what human beings could reach with their own powers. This link between grace and the supernatural became firmly entrenched in scholastic theology. Thomas taught that in the Fall man was hurt in his very nature (that is, weakened as a being) and lost his supernatural gifts, especially his access to the vision of God. God, according to Thomas, in his grace gratuitously heals the wounds (and thus restores to man what naturally belongs to him) and reopens man's path to his supernatural end, thus restoring access to the added bliss of life with God. This theology

expresses a constant theme in the Christian faith: the natural and the supernatural are at odds; the sacred and the profane are estranged. God, who is quite separate and distinct from the world, is not responsible for this state of affairs, and his intention is to rectify it. Nature and supernature will, in time, be reconciled.

The word *supernatural*, however, left the confines of the schools and began to lose its precise technical meaning. It became associated with the unusual, the marvelous, the surprising. Robert Lenoble (1968) has shown a continuity, from antiquity to our day, in what he calls "marvel psychology." Popular thought makes rough distinctions between what is natural, what is artificial, and what is miraculous: water flows down into valleys, human beings build dams, and the Virgin diverts floods from villages when dams break down. What characterizes common thinking about the subject is uncertainty about the precise borders between the natural, the artificial, and the miraculous. When the dam breaks down, does it do so by itself, through wear and tear, or because some man has put explosives in it or some woman has cast a spell upon it? And does the water spare the village because of its situation—the village is on high land—or because of divine intervention? While medieval theologians had used the term *supernatural* to refer to the moral and spiritual dynamics of salvation, ordinary Christians came to call supernatural any extraordinary occurrence that could not be accounted for by the usual explanations at hand.

The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century radically transformed the idea of cognition. With the mechanistic revolution came, certainly for some human beings, a precise knowledge of the limits of the natural. "Natural" causes have come to explain increasing amounts of experience, and it is commonly assumed that in time, natural causes will be found for events that currently resist explanation. Nature is seen to be a rigid, coherent system that works like a clock, does not pursue moral ends, and is indifferent to human aspirations. Modern men know how to build dams that are fail-safe; they know for sure that those dams cannot be destroyed by spells; and they do not count on the Virgin to intervene in the event of an accident. Nature, then, always works according to rigorous laws and, by definition, excludes the miraculous. (The older nature was malleable: it was quite willing to see God—who ruled over it—reorder its workings momentarily or locally to bring about a miracle for some special purpose.) At first, the new nature was deemed to magnify God even more than the older one: its strict regularity and its order seemed to testify to the awesome grandeur of its creator. That it was not a model and had nothing to teach man was deemed at first only to serve the inter-

ests of the dialogue between man and God. René Descartes (1596–1650) taught that human beings and God are alike in that both are spirits. Man, a finite spirit, cannot create *ex nihilo*, but like an engineer, he can shape everything: the whole of nature is matter in his hands (Lenoble, 1968).

At the same time, however, for reasons that had to do with the aftereffects of the wars of religion, the rise of the modern state, and the new demands for social conformity, the Baroque taste spread in Christian lands. What was infinite, awesome, powerful, overwhelming, and stunning was considered to convey a sense of God. Religious architecture and furniture became calculatedly impressive; oratory became stately. Miracles as powerful disruptions of nature's laws appeared, then, necessary to the cause of religion. Many theologians thus taught that human beings must regard the supernatural as contrary to nature: God, they said, intervenes providentially, and occasionally suspends the course of nature; he also reveals supernatural truths that we must obediently accept even though their truth is not manifest to our unaided reason. Rare were the theological voices like that of William Law (1686–1761), who taught that "there is nothing that is supernatural but God alone." Since it was evident that nature would always be what Newton said it was, salvation tended to become less cosmic and more interior. Nature and grace remained isolated: man would enjoy redeemed existence only in heaven. Eighteenth-century philosophers such as Voltaire, Hume, and Gibbon, for their part, gave currency to the idea that the supernatural was a notion accepted only by the ignorant and the credulous.

The far-reaching impact of the Baroque on sensibilities may be observed in the novel, a literary form whose real development began in the eighteenth century. The supernatural, the Gothic, and the fantastic were predominant themes in early examples of this mass-appeal genre. Suspense, terror, and pleasure were sustained by stories of desolate houses, mysterious dogs, vampires, murderous plants, doomed infants, premature burials, and preternaturally lascivious monks. An abundance of torture, carnality, magic, and solitary horror placed the protagonist and the reader in a world totally unlike the safe everyday middle-class world, and kept them thrilled, constantly on the verge of terrifying doom or unspeakable bliss. There was also a constant epistemological suspense, a specifically modern feature in fantastic tales: were the events or apparitions caused supernaturally, or were they in reality some clever manipulation of appearances? The protagonist's and the reader's senses of reality were kept constantly off balance, precisely at a time when science and society

worked together to give them a world as safe as possible (Penzoldt, 1952). The entry of the supernatural into literature raised interesting questions: did readers who enjoyed these novels believe in the existence of supernatural beings and the possibility of supernatural occurrences? We might agree that people believe anything while they are reading it, but what happens to their belief when they are not reading but instead dealing and coping with their everyday world?

Application of the Notion to the Study of Religious and Cultural Systems. Among scholars of the nineteenth century it came to be commonly admitted that belief in what Herbert Spencer has called "the supernatural genesis of phenomena" characterized religious people. All religions were said to feature belief in supernatural beings. Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) noted that religion thrives on the sense of things surpassing our knowledge, and he quoted Spencer's reference to the omnipresence of something inscrutable. But Durkheim also stressed that the idea of the supernatural appeared only very late in religious evolution, and that many Christians were confident that God and nature were as one, or that dogma and reason fully agreed. The idea that belief in the supernatural was characteristic of religion remained, however, firmly entrenched. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) in his early influential work argued that the primitive mind believed in "mystical," not "physical," influences, whereas practically all contemporaries recognize a clear line of demarcation between the supernatural (rejected by all except the credulous) and the data furnished by everyday ordinary sense experience and the broad light of day. R. R. Marret (1866–1943) confirmed that the notion gives a good minimal definition of religion. He classified the supernatural according to negative modes (taboo) and positive modes (mana). The sense of the supernatural, Marret stressed, is an existential and affective reality, a response to the extranormal and the uncanny, and is thus not related to a reasoned theory of nature. "Power belongeth unto God," and the sense of the supernatural is the sense of the nearly overwhelming presence of great power. Paul Radin (1883–1959) argued against Lévy-Bruhl and spoke of the supernatural as arising against a background of inevitable fears (stemming from economic and psychic insecurity) that he found to be present in all human beings, primitive and modern. He saw in the modern West a decline in religion and in recourse to supernatural beings for help, because other means of emphasizing and maintaining life values were available and on the ascendant. Revision of the initial positivist separation between credulous and rational people reached a climax with Lévy-Bruhl's famous reversal, recorded in his *Notebooks* (posthumously published in

1949): "Primitives reject contradiction, just as we do, when they perceive it." Lévy-Bruhl developed comparative epistemology, according to whose tenets anthropologists were to compare modes of thought, psychic capacities, and mental categories without assuming at the outset that they themselves were in possession of a language that could adequately give an account of everything other minds did (Needham, 1972).

While this should be admitted, scholars today should still try to speak adequately of the varieties of admittedly extreme and nonverifiable languages people have recourse to when they express their reaction to situations that have powerful impact on them but remain opaque in their meaning, or desperately baffling in their consequence. Light can be derived from recent developments in anthropology that have profited from comparative studies in mythology, literature, and folklore. In all cultures stories abound, ranging from myths to folk legends, that tell the adventures of heroes in a world or worlds teeming with supernatural beings and awe-inspiring circumstances.

Consider the example of the *Odyssey*, a fairly typical tale. (Supernatural occurrences there, however, are among the milder ones, and the range of unusual creatures is somewhat narrow: there is a shortage of evil spirits and demons such as abound in other types of literature.) In his travels Odysseus has to deal with (1) the remote but supreme authority of the king of the gods; (2) the support or enmity of powerful gods who have influence at court (Athena); (3) the support or enmity of powerful gods who rule in some corner of the world (Poseidon); (4) minor gods or goddesses (Calypso, who enjoys a perpetual vacation at her seashore home); (5) human beings with magical powers (Circe); (6) monstrous beings with terrifying powers (the Sirens); (7) powerful giants (the Cyclops); and (8) very unusual human beings (the lotus-eaters, who are more strange than ordinary foreigners). The hero himself is endowed with exceptional powers of endurance and prowess at the bow; he performs an extraordinary feat (he returns from Hades) and thus represents here the ninth type of being. Other heroes in such tales can fly, change their size, and so on. All nine types of beings may be called supernatural or said to have supernatural traits, although all may also be characterized by terms other than *supernatural*. Only the first three are the object of religious devotion or have cults. The fourth type, while divine, may be outside the religious world. Sirens and witches have powers ordinary human beings do not have, while giants (like dwarfs) have only their unusual size in their favor.

There is thus a whole range of modes of being and modes of power, finely shaded, for all these beings, and a whole range of appropriate human responses to them.

The hero is the man best equipped to survive in this perilous world, and he possesses an appropriately wide range of skills and attitudes. Senior gods are to be honored with sacrifices and piety. Sirens are simply to be avoided. One can do business with the Cyclops, but the game is dangerous. Transactions with Calypso and Circe are profitable and agreeable, provided the hero keeps them at arm's length or has some special protection. There is also a whole range of modes of belief, and only one part of it is appropriately labeled religious belief. The hero does not believe in Zeus in the same way that he believes in the Sirens. And it should not be immediately clear to us what it means to attribute belief to the bards who recite such tales and to the audiences that hear them. Whether a man believes in Zeus may be tested: does he perform the appropriate ritual, and does he exhibit the appropriate attitudes? But how can one verify behaviorally a belief in sirens? How often are human beings confronted with apparently beautiful women half visible above reefs? Needham (1972) has successfully argued that statements of belief are the only evidence we have of the phenomenon. Both theologians and anthropologists, he maintains, have taken too much for granted and have been too quick to specify what beliefs other people have and what difference these beliefs make.

Belief in anything, including supernatural beings, is thus a very elusive phenomenon. The Dorze of Ethiopia say that the leopard became a Christian and so eats no meat on the fast days of the Coptic church. Nevertheless, they watch their cattle just as carefully on those days. And they are baffled when the anthropologist professes to see a contradiction in this. So what does go on in their minds when they say the leopard fasts on Wednesdays and Fridays? Among our contemporaries, not everyone who reads horoscopes will profess belief in them, and among those who do profess such a belief, how many are actually to be found making a decision on a primarily astrological basis? It would be safer to characterize religion by attitudinal factors and ritual practice rather than by belief. And any statement of belief should be taken with a grain of salt. People like, for adaptive or escapist purposes, to tell and hear stories that provide a map clarifying the configuration of forces in the world, that show modes of coping with those forces, and that do not demand any firm commitment to belief and ensuring action. Children everywhere acquire their bearing in reality from fairy tales. What beliefs they fleetingly entertain or settle on matter less than the inferences they learn to draw about possible realities. The highly imaginative stories of primitives abound in wit and irony and cannot be pinned down with the psychology of belief common among sober sci-

entists (whose thinking often reflects the easy and moralistic recourse to expressions of belief characteristic of early modern theologians).

Systematic Considerations. The human being has in his favor a quick mobile mind, but he is frail and his body is destined to contract disease and, ultimately, to die. Men and women are thus constantly the potential victims of aleatory events that can be painful to them. Fearful of impending disasters, they seek the protection of stronger human beings. As infants and children they start life with such protection. Later they attach themselves to strong persons whom they count on to be successful and wise so that they themselves can live in a secure world, one without interstices from which unpredictable attacks might come. When successful, these strong ones ward off actual dangers. When unsuccessful, as they inevitably will be, the strong ones, if wise, will be an authority providing cognitive and affective reassurance: yes, loss and pain have occurred, but we are on the right path; it was inevitable, some good may come of it, and, in any case, there is lasting value in the attitude we have and the new turn we take (Sennett, 1980). Priests, who are typical examples of strong ones, are also thinkers. They teach survival skills and provide ritual and verbal comfort when these skills fail, as necessarily they must. Strong ones are therefore in touch with suitable explanations that ideally can help us in those boundary situations that occur when our ordinary world falls apart.

Our strong ones, in turn, feel themselves in touch with a strength or with other real and enduring strong ones who are beyond society, beyond this world, be they spirits, gods, God, history, or "the way things are." The label "supernatural" is appropriately attached to that strength or those preeminently strong beings that are not within the daily and social range of interaction. The authority of the social strong ones is thus always transitory and relative, more or less plausible. The limits to their authority stem from our own willingness or ability to trust them; but our trust rests on our sense of their reliability: are they in touch with the enduring strength so that they can help us to keep in touch with it, or do they devour our trust for their own petty human benefit?

Our modern concept of nature and natural causes firmly supports a reality principle: when physically sick (or, today, even when anxious) we mainly turn to scientific medicine. Fear of and belief in supernatural agencies do not color in any significant way our sense of what is feasible in our embodied condition. But we hold on to some nonscientific health lore passed on through oral, unofficial channels, and we nostalgically transmit recipes for more natural care of the human

body and its ailments. Alternative "soft" medicines prosper. In matters of wealth, prestige, and happiness there is no scientific establishment that rules over our expectations; unproved arts and pleasurable illusions abound. The reality principles that set limits to our desires are socially determined: rules are prescribed according to what is socially admitted, rewarded, or punished.

Human beings want both to be believed and to be understood, but usually not at the same time and not by the same people. Individuals want their words and their symbols (1) to be believed and accepted and (2) to create reality, a safe common reality that is not limited to the individual alone. Thus, individuals want to be supported and upheld, but they also want to be understood. They want to share something of their complex and problematic rapport by means of their words and symbols. Thus individuals want the liveliness of their consciousness to be acknowledged. When they want to be believed, they construct presumably strong structures (which are cemented by or rest upon strong ones) that they then deconstruct in the process of understanding. The characteristic feature of modern society is not fewer beliefs in supernatural beings but the variety of strong ones we turn to and include in our world for different purposes and at different times, and the variety of the structures of plausibility that buttress them.

Thus, somewhat polytheistically, in matters of health we turn to state-supported hospitals and the health-food stores of the counterculture; we believe in public schools and in private ones; we read mainstream literature and avant-garde poems; we watch television and go to art films; we attend institutionalized churches and buy books about spirituality in the free market of ideas. Alternative modes of knowledge prosper in the margins left by the dominant scientific or nonscientific modes. The symbolization of man's relation to the ultimate conditions of his existence is no longer the monopoly of any group explicitly labeled "religious." And, heroic or not, we, like the hero of many folk tales, have no permanent master to guide our steps through all the perils of life. We must encounter directly the Circes and Poseidons of this world. At different times we turn to different masters for help and protection. But in our libertarian society the quality of their services is uncertain, and, in any case, the good ones can help us only as long as we ask them to.

[*The entries Transcendence and Immanence and Sublime, The, discuss this topic from philosophical and theological points of view; see also Sacred and the Profane, The, and Holy, Idea of the, for comparable essays from the perspective of the history of religions.*]

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SUPERSTITION. [This entry traces the history of the term as it is used in religious contexts, especially by one group to distinguish its "legitimate" beliefs from the so-called superstitions of another group. For examples of superstition in its second, nontheological meaning—that is, beliefs of an indigenous culture that persist after the introduction of a second, dominant culture—see Folk Religion and Folklore.]

Superstition is a judgmental term traditionally used by dominant religions to categorize and denigrate earlier, less sophisticated or disapproved religious attitudes and behavior. A belief is perceived as superstitious by adherents of a particular religious orthodoxy, and it is from their perspective that the category acquires its meaning. An anthropological description of the same belief would use different, nonjudgmental language drawn from the perspective of people engaged in the beliefs and practices condemned as superstitious by others. The use of the term *superstition* is inevitably pejorative rather than descriptive or analytical, for super-

stition is defined in opposition to a given culture's concept of true religion. Its specific meanings vary widely in different periods and contexts, so that a survey of its historical application rather than an abstract definition is the best approach to the concept of superstition.

Origin and Classical Usage. The classical world criticized certain religious behaviors as irrational, or as reflecting an incorrect understanding of both nature and divinity. Greek writers from Theophrastus to Plutarch mockingly described a cringing, obsessive fear of the gods (*deisidaimonia*) as an inappropriate religious attitude. Roman philosophers sometimes echoed this theme, but the etymology of the Latin word *superstitio* (from *superstes*, "surviving, witnessing") indicates a separate evolution from a possibly neutral meaning of divination to a pejorative term. According to Émile Benveniste, *superstitio* included the idea of surviving an event as a witness and referred originally to divination concerning the past, the power to witness a distant event as though it were present. In its earliest Latin literary usage by Plautus and Ennius, *superstitio* was already a negative term describing divination, magic, and "bad religion" in general. Cicero gives a concrete example, explaining that "those who spent whole days in prayer and offered sacrifices, that their children might outlive them, are called superstitious" (*On the Nature of the Gods* 2.28). For classical Roman observers like Seneca, Lucretius, and Cicero, *superstitio* meant erroneous, false, or excessive religious behaviors stemming from ignorance of philosophical and scientific truths about the laws of nature. Such ignorance was associated with the common people (*vulgus*) and with the countryside (*pagus*), so that superstitious behavior had a social locus in the uneducated, lower orders of Roman society. As the empire expanded, the term *superstitio* was applied to exotic foreign religions of which the Romans disapproved, such as the Egyptian cult of Isis and later the Jewish sect of Christianity. Its meaning became more collective, referring to the "religion of others" in pejorative terms rather than to an individual Roman's inappropriate or exaggerated religious attitudes.

Early Christianity. The early Christians adopted this collective meaning, turning the category of superstition back on the Romans. In the period after the second century, pagans and Christians reciprocally condemned each other's religious beliefs and ceremonial practices as the superstitious cult of false deities. But the militant monotheism of Christianity intensified the negative meanings of these charges. The church fathers interpreted Roman statues as idols, their sacrifices as offerings to the devil, and their oracles as the voices of demons. Such false beliefs did not deserve the name of

religion, for, as Lactantius explained, "religion is the worship of the true, superstition is that of the false" (*Divine Institutes* 4.28). Wishing to condemn the pagans out of their own mouths, Augustine of Hippo quoted Cicero's description of superstitious attitudes among the Romans, but he rejected Cicero's distinction between religion and superstition as an inadequate attempt "to praise the religion of the ancients which he wishes to disjoin from superstition, but cannot find out how to do so" (*City of God* 4.30). This use of *superstitio* to categorize the whole of classical pagan religion as idolatrous and even demonic constitutes a basic core of meaning that persists throughout the Christian era.

Medieval Christianity. The religions of the Germanic tribes were perceived in a similar way by the Christian missionaries who undertook the conversion of these so-called barbarians in the period following the fall of the Roman empire. The cure for their idolatry and superstition was baptism and the acceptance of Christianity as the true religion. But even after the evangelization of whole tribes, attitudes, beliefs, and practices associated with pre-Christian religions persisted. Early medieval denunciations of such paganizing observances in sermons and treatises against the *superstitiones rusticorum* were frequent. The epistle *On the Correction of Rustics* (c. 572) by Bishop Martin of Braga condemned popular magical practices, divination, and the worship of "rocks, trees and springs" as apostasy to the devil. Not all superstition was rustic, however. Martin also rejected the use of Latin calendrical vocabulary, since the days of the week were named after pagan gods (in his view demons) like Mars, Jove, and Venus. The limited, local success of such polemics is witnessed by the fact that Portuguese, alone among the emergent European vernaculars, purged this ancient vocabulary under church pressure.

The difficulties of weaning newly evangelized peoples from their old ways led Pope Gregory I (590–604) to suggest a gradualist approach to their conversion. Writing to Augustine of Canterbury, a missionary in England in the early seventh century, he acknowledged that "it is doubtless impossible to cut out everything at once from their stubborn minds" (Bede, *History of the English Church and People* 1.30). Gregory proposed that heathen shrines be reconsecrated as churches and that existing days of celebration be adapted to the Christian calendar. The Feast of Saint John the Baptist, for instance, was fixed on the former date of a midsummer festival. These syncretic fusions of old and new religious observances were often the target of later reformers' campaigns against "pagan survivals" within Christianity. Throughout the medieval period, church councils and synods condemned paganizing and superstitious

observances in an effort to complete the process of christianization by enforcing more orthodox standards.

Scholastic theologians brought the analysis of superstitious error to a new level of thoroughness and sophistication. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) defined superstition as "the vice opposed to the virtue of religion by means of excess . . . because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not" (*Summa theologiae* 2.2.92.7). The idea of "undue worship of the true God" revived the classical meaning of exaggerated or overscrupulous religious behavior, now seen as occurring within Christianity rather than wholly or partially outside of it. Aquinas's systematic exposition also classified idolatry, divination, and magical practices in general as superstitious by virtue of the inappropriate object (demons rather than God) toward which they were directed. The Scholastic theory of the diabolical pact as the causative mechanism behind magical effects assured that superstition in its medieval version was perceived as neither "harmless" nor inefficacious. Even if a magical procedure did not directly invoke the power of the devil to gain its ends, it nevertheless drew on forces outside those controlled or sanctioned by the church and was therefore presumptively diabolical.

The gradual extension of the medieval Inquisition's jurisdiction to include cases of superstition as well as heresy was a turning point in the European attitude toward magical beliefs. Founded in the early thirteenth century to combat organized heretical groups such as the Waldensians and the Albigensians, the Inquisition was initially empowered to hear only those cases that involved an explicit diabolical pact and therefore "manifestly savored of heresy." Infrequent fourteenth-century sorcery trials involved literate men accused of conjuring demons or casting spells by using the techniques of learned, ritual magic associated with handbooks like the *Key of Solomon*. By the fifteenth century, however, the theory of the implicitly diabolical pact was invoked to extend inquisitorial jurisdiction to the magical activities of the illiterate population. As a result, the "new crime" of witchcraft emerged in this period, combining existing peasant beliefs in the possibility of magical harm (*maleficium*) with the scholastic theory of the implicit diabolism of all magical effects.

While customary law in many parts of Europe had treated magical harm (*maleficium*) like any other crime causing physical harm to persons, livestock, or crops, without attention to the fact that such harm was alleged to have occurred through magical means, the new theological approach focused directly on the means employed, not the end pursued. All magical activity implied that the perpetrator had obtained the power to

achieve those effects by apostasy to the devil. Superstitious offenses were no longer simply the topic of pastoral reprimand by bishops and synods. By the late Middle Ages such activities had been criminalized, and they were increasingly prosecuted in both secular and church courts during the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century.

This campaign against popular magic emphasized those activities that were, in Aquinas's terms, superstitious by virtue of their presumptively diabolical object. The humanist and Protestant reform movements of the early sixteenth century stressed another meaning of the term *superstition*. Many traditional Catholic religious observances were now judged superstitious because of the "inappropriate manner" in which they offered worship to God. The Catholic humanist reformer Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) denounced the externalized ceremonialism of the late medieval church as a superstitious deformation of the true religion. His *Praise of Folly* satirized clerical attachment to repetitious prayer, fasting, and other ascetic practices as well as popular devotion to relics, saints, and shrines. A character in his *Colloquies* observes that "Of all Our Ladies, I like best Our Lady of Walsingham," to which his companion replies, "And I Our Lady of Mariastein." These attitudes constituted, in Erasmus's view, a series of distractions from the central moral teachings of Christianity. People might travel to see a saint's bones, he complained, but they did not attempt to imitate the saint's holy life.

Catholicism and the Protestant Reformation. The Protestant Reformation intensified humanist critiques of Roman Catholicism. Starting with Martin Luther's attack on indulgences in the *Ninety-five Theses* (1517), the new theology of justification by faith rather than by works provided the theoretical basis for rejecting Roman Catholic reliance on external devotions as "works righteousness." To John Calvin, superstition was the "pharisaical opinion of the dignity of works" maintained by the "false religion" of Rome. Having rejected most of the ceremonial aspects of Catholicism, from holy water and saints' cults to transubstantiation and the Mass, Protestants of all denominations agreed in their denunciations of the papist religion as magical and superstitious. The term was also used to describe backsliding within the reformed camp, whether high-church fondness for vestments and incense or lingering attachments to rosaries and shrines among the less advanced segments of the population. In the extensive vocabulary of sixteenth-century religious polemics, one of the most common charges was that of superstition.

Although the Roman Catholic church had finer lines to draw in deciding what was and was not superstitious, a parallel effort to identify and eliminate popular

"ignorance and superstition" became a major preoccupation after the Council of Trent (1545–1563). Responding in part to humanist criticism, the church discouraged exaggerations of orthodox observances, such as the "desire for fixed numbers of candles and Masses" described as superstitious in the Tridentine decrees. The definition adopted by the Council of Malines in 1607 expressed the Counter-Reformation position: "It is superstitious to expect any effect from anything, when such an effect cannot be produced by natural causes, by divine institution, or by the ordination or approval of the Church." This ultimately jurisdictional approach left intact the indulgences and exorcisms condemned as "ecclesiastical magic" by the Protestants, but it rejected popular magic by asserting an institutional monopoly on access to the supernatural.

Following the anti-Protestant heresy trials of the mid-sixteenth century, the Holy Offices of Spain and Italy turned their attention to the suppression of popular beliefs and practices categorized as superstitious. Trials for magical healing, divination, and love magic occupied a prominent place in inquisitorial prosecution throughout the seventeenth century. This campaign against superstition occurred in different forms in both Protestant and Catholic countries as part of a wider "reform of popular culture," a systematic attempt by members of the clerical and lay elites to raise the religious and moral level of the European population. Historical studies of early modern Europe have shown that these efforts to suppress popular magical beliefs were not wholly successful; the persistence of magical assumptions among the peasantry has also been documented by twentieth-century anthropological field studies.

Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment Attitudes. If the Protestant Reformation viewed the entire Roman Catholic religion as superstitious, the radical anticlerics of the French enlightenment used the term in an even wider sense, dismissing all traditional religions as superstitious. Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary* (1764) asserts that "superstition was born in paganism, adopted by Judaism and infested the Christian church from the beginning." In place of the fanaticism and intolerance associated with organized religion, the *philosophes* proposed a "natural religion" that would acknowledge a supreme being but regard his creation as sufficient revelation. The scientific study of nature was thus proposed as a new cultural orthodoxy, and the concept of superstition was redefined to fit this frame of reference. From "bad religion" it came to mean "bad science," assuming its modern sense of misplaced assumptions about causality stemming from a faulty understanding of nature. Thus magical beliefs and prac-

tices continue to be regarded as superstitious, although the original religious sense of the diabolical efficacy of such practices has been replaced with a scientific sense of the impossibility of magical effects in a universe governed by natural law.

[See also Magic.]

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SUPREME BEINGS are divinities whose nature reveals a unique quality of being—generally, a transcen-

dent spiritual power—in a culture's religious system. Such divine beings figure in many different religious systems, yet they manifest values and symbolic associations that display remarkable similarities. The first section of this article presents, in a general way, the power, attributes, and values common to a large number of supreme beings. The second section illustrates these features by referring to specific historical forms of supreme beings. The final section summarizes the history of scholarly interpretations of the origin, nature, and meaning of these singularly important and complex supernatural beings.

General Features

A supreme being is generally described in symbolic terms that reflect the values most highly appraised in a specific historical situation. Considering the complexities of any culture's history, it is extraordinary that a comparative discussion of the nature of supreme beings constantly returns to the same cluster of religious ideas. Without prejudice to one or another aspect of supreme being highlighted in one historical moment or another, I present here a general view of the kinds of power and value revealed in supreme beings. It should be noted that the intricacies of history make general statements a source of great controversy. The supremacy of these divine figures marks with an appropriate intensity the heat of debate over their origin, nature, and form. Since each supreme being is a creative and unique composition of elements, the attributes described herein best serve to define the general category of supreme being, and, as we shall see, apply to specific beings only in one degree or another.

The power of supreme beings is inherently ambivalent, because they manifest their potent omnipresence in a passive mode. Unlike the activities of culture heroes, which are abundantly described in epic cycles of myth, the presence of supreme beings is generally acknowledged in mythology only in brief accounts. In contradistinction to the dramatic activities of vegetation deities, totems, ancestors, and solar and lunar divinities, supreme beings occupy almost no place in scheduled public cults. It has long been acknowledged that sky divinities, or "high gods," admirably reveal many of the central attributes and powers of supreme beings.

Not limited to any single sphere of concern or influence (e.g., fertility of plants or of animals), supreme beings are omnipresent and omnipotent, but, by that very fact, they remain uninvolved with particular activities. Their power—unreckoned by time, unbounded by space—applies to all spheres of life and not to any one alone. Great power and presence reside in a supreme being's inactive transcendence of historical particulari-

ties. This remoteness relates to the power of permanence that often reveals itself in symbolisms of the sky and heavenly heights. Standing immutable since before time began, supreme beings remain uninvolved with change. Their steadfastness and eternity go hand in hand with their relative withdrawal from the detailed alterations of historical circumstances. The uniqueness of their infinite character is often portrayed in myth as a kind of loneliness. By their very nature, they stand apart from creation. Nevertheless, they seldom withdraw altogether from the world; they withdraw only to that level that suits their infinite, omnipotent, omniscient character.

Transcendence enables supreme beings to see and to know everything. This strongly colors the nature of their spiritual force: by seeing and understanding all, they can do everything. In keeping with their passive nature, it is the omniscient thought of supreme beings that "actively" expresses their infinite knowledge. As creators, supreme beings create preeminently, but by no means exclusively, by the power of thought or word alone—*creatio ex nihilo*. Their word is creatively powerful.

If supreme beings know all things in the world and even think them into existence, such knowledge is not reciprocal. Knowing everything, they often pass beyond the comprehension of lesser beings. Once again, paradox pervades the nature of supreme beings. Present everywhere, they remain inaccessible. Seeing all, they may remain invisible. In relation to knowledge, supreme beings are the clearest revelation of mystery—a sacred meaning that can never be exhaustively known, despite its uninterrupted presence. Full knowledge of a supreme being always remains hidden. In this connection, supreme beings are often associated with religious specialists and esoteric societies, whose knowledge of special mysteries is made known in elaborate and secret initiations.

The majestic omnipresence of supreme beings involves them in all that is. Their involvement with being as such takes several particular expressions. They may create the universe directly, or they may create it indirectly through supernatural agents over whom they exercise control. In religious systems in which supreme beings have not bequeathed creation to the guardianship of other supernatural beings, they may be viewed as sustaining all life, assuring the fruitfulness of creation, or owning all that exists. As the foundation of all that is real, they may be the sovereign upholders of the world order, rulers of all beings, and even providers of moral commandments and socioethical mores. As guarantors of good order, supreme beings punish transgressions in passive ways, by withholding fertility (famine),

health (epidemic), or the process of the seasons (drought). As creators and maintainers of life, they fertilize the vital forms of the universe. Although a supreme being may be prayed to spontaneously by individuals at any time and in any place, public invocation is often limited to times of calamity when life itself seems threatened.

One response consonant with the enigmatic, transcendent, and passive power of supreme beings is the human tendency to replace them with other religious conceptions. In fact, supreme beings per se do not usually dominate the religious imagination. When myths recount the withdrawal to the transcendent heights appropriate to their nature, they are replaced in importance by more active religious forms: gods who specialize in fertilizing activity, vegetation deities, storm gods, culture heroes, divine twins, ancestors, the dead, world rulers, theological abstractions of virtues, or metaphysical principles of cosmic law. The passive is overtaken by the active. Transcendent station yields to the processes of the concrete world. Infinity gives way to the here and now. Yet, supreme beings reveal the very meaning of transcendence and infinity in all its forms: omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence.

Historical Forms

Although essential elements of the power and structure of supreme beings may be recognized and isolated for the sake of analytic discussion, it must be acknowledged that they have appeared across human history in complex forms that differ greatly in specific composition from one culture to another. Their manifestations are not limited to one or even several places on the globe. Nor does geographic distribution entirely explain the process of the historical development or diffusion of this religious idea. No matter how marginal to the history of technological development a culture might appear to be (e.g., the hunting cultures of Tierra del Fuego), that culture's complex notions of supreme being give evidence of a lengthy and complicated history. There appear to be no social or economic factors that determine, in cause-and-effect fashion, the compound of elements that constitute the form through which a supreme being reveals itself in a culture. After lengthy debate among scholars, little doubt remains that sophisticated theologies of supreme being predate the introduction, through missionary or colonial influence, of theological ideas from historical monotheisms. Because arguments based solely on geographic and historical evidence have failed to be convincingly clear, the survey of supreme beings presented here follows the logic of the structures that are evident in the forms of supreme beings themselves. Structures exemplified

briefly include (1) attributes, (2) activities, (3) relationships to other divinities, and (4) the place of supreme beings in cult.

Attributes. Even when the forms of supreme beings are only poorly outlined, they are more than vague supernatural forces. Supreme beings are divine persons, with names and epithets that convey their attributes and reveal something about their nature. In addition to personality, their characteristics include celestuality, primordality, and omniscience; associations with creation and death; remoteness and symbolic means of access; and their tendency to be replaced by other concepts.

Celestuality. The names of numerous supreme beings refer to their connections with the sky. Among the Samoyeds, the supreme being is called Num ("sky"). Along the Australian coast in the vicinity of Shoalhaven Bay, the name *Mirirul* ("sky," or "he who is in the sky") indicates the supreme beings found among the Yuin and their neighbors. In Africa, one of the names for the supreme being of the Galla and other Oromo peoples is Waq ("sky"), as in the phrases *guraci waq* ("dark sky") and *waka kulkullu* ("calm sky"). He is also called *Cólok* ("the sky"). Among some Ewe peoples, the universal father is called Dzingbe ("sky"); his wife is the earth. Northeast of the Ewe live the Akposo people, who call the supreme being Uvolovu ("the high one," or "the regions above"). Among the Selk'nam hunters of Tierra del Fuego, the name of the supreme being is Temáukel ("the one up there"), although this name is seldom uttered aloud. In its place, one uses the circumlocution *so'onh-haskan* ("dweller in the sky") or *so'onh kas pémer* ("he who is in the sky"). Among the Tsimshian south of the Tlingit, an irascible supreme being named Laxha (also called Laxhage or Laha, "sky") deluges the earth. The Haida of Queen Charlotte Islands call the supreme being Siñ or Sing ("bright sky"). The connection of supreme beings with the sky is not exhausted by the direct translations of their names. More important, in accounts that describe them as dwelling in the sky, or as expressing themselves through celestial elements such as the stars and the rains, these associations are extended.

Primordality. Another large number of names refer to the antiquity of supreme beings, who often reveal, as part of their own nature, the meaning of what is primordial, most fundamental, a part of the nature of existence from its earliest beginnings. Primordality is thus part of a supreme being's nature. The Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego call their supreme being Watauinaiwa ("the primeval," or "the ancient one"). The Botocudo of eastern Brazil believe in a supreme being who lives in heaven and is called Old Man or Father White-head.

During the great August sacrifices in Cuzco, Viracocha, the supreme being of the Inca, was praised as the one "who exists from the beginning of the world to its end."

Omniscience. A large body of epithets refers to the omniscience and omnivoyance of supreme beings. Baiame, supreme being of the Kamilaroi, Wiradjuri, and Euahlayi of New South Wales, sees and hears everything, especially at night, with his many eyes and ears. Daramulun, according to the Yuin, can observe all human action from his position in heaven. In Assam, the Khasis of the Mon-Khmer nucleus of Indochinese peoples believe in a female supreme being and creator who dwells in heaven and who sees and hears all that happens on earth. On Madagascar, the supreme being Andriamanitra sees all those things that lie hidden. In the Avesta, Ahura Mazdā is described as *vouru casani* ("widely seeing").

The clarity of a supreme being's knowledge may be manifested in the light of the bright sky, which, by virtue of its own luminosity, sees and knows all existence that lies below. The Altai Tatars call upon their supreme being as the Ak Ajas ("white light"). The Khanty refer to Ajas Kan ("the bright leader"). Buriats speak of the dwelling of their celestial god as "a house ablaze with silver and gold." For the Mansi, Tārem is a "good golden light on high." In Sumerian, the divinity is described as *dingir* ("shining, bright"), and in Akkadian, *ellu* expresses the same meaning.

Cosmogonic power. Other names refer to supreme beings as the source of all life and power. The Warao of the Orinoco Delta refer to Kanobo ("great father") as the author of life. Also in Venezuela, the Yaruro people believe in a great goddess who created the world. Everything sprang from her, and everything living returns to the western paradise where she now lives. The Calina and Galibi peoples from the Surinam coast maintain that the goddess Amana ("she without a navel") was not born but has lived forever. All life comes from her, for she begets and contains everything that comes to be. Her twin sons assist in creation. The supreme deity of the Koghi (Cágaba) of Colombia is also a universal mother who gives birth to all creation. She rules the cycles of life, death, and rebirth for all creatures. The mother is omnipresent. Life is an intrauterine existence. Among the Mbyá, a Guaraní people of Paraguay, the supreme being gives life to the world and continues to extend goods in the form of game and health. The Tupinamba of the southern Brazilian coast conducted a search for the land of Tamoi, the supreme being whose name means "great father." He created life and now governs a distant paradise wherein there is no death. In Australia, the supreme being's role as life-giver is recognized in the epithets extended to Baiame, who is ad-

dressed as Mahmanmu-rok ("our father") among the Kamilaroi and as Boyjerh ("father") among the Euhlayi. Among the Yuin, Daramulun is spoken to as Pa-pang ("father"). The Kurnai use Mungan-ngaua ("our father") as the proper name of their supreme being.

Specific references to supreme beings as creators occur in many cultures. By way of brief illustration one may mention examples from North America, Oceania, Africa, Australia, and South America.

Native American creator gods include Awonawilona, the Zuni supreme being whose solar associations are sublimated almost to the point of becoming a speculative philosophical principle of life. He creates the clouds and the waters of the world from the breath of his own heart. Tirawa Atius of the Pawnee lives above and beyond the highest heaven. The wind is his breath. Tcuwut Makai, supreme being of the Pima, dwells in the west, governing rain and winds. His first creation was crushed when he pulled the sky too close to the earth. In his second attempt, he fixed the stars and the Milky Way in the sky. Ahone is a sky-dwelling creator of sun, moon, and stars. The existence of belief in him is documented among peoples of the Virginia Colony in 1610. He had no cult to speak of; instead, sacrifices were made to Oke, a god who punished people with hurricane winds to make their crops suffer.

In Oceania, one may call attention to Tangaroa (Tangaloa, Taaroa, and many other variants), a widely known Polynesian divinity of the sea; Agunua, the supreme spirit of San Cristobal in the Solomon Islands; Yelafaz, the anthropomorphic sky-dwelling god of Yap; Djohu-ma-di-hutu ("lord above"), believed in by the Alfuri of Molucca; Qat, lunar supreme being of the Banks Islands; Hintubuhet ("our bird-woman"), supreme being in New Ireland; and Ndengei (Degei), the great serpent-god of Fiji. Ndengei usually lies immobile in his cave on Mount Kavandra on the northeast coast of Viti Levu, but occasionally, when he is stirred, he causes earthquakes and heavy rains.

African supreme beings who are creators include Deng, the omniscient "free-divinity" of the Dinka people, who is identified as Nhialic Aciek ("god the creator"). The term *nhial* ("up," or "above") is associated with multiple modes of supernatural expression. Among the Western Dinka, Deng has no shrines but is honored in sacrifice together with Nhialic ("divinity itself," an appellation applied to Deng) and the ancestors. Also in Africa, one may point to Cagn, the mantis-shaped creator of the San people; Kosane, the vaguely defined supreme being of the Venda; Olorun, high god of the Yoruba; Katonda, supreme being of the Ganda; Lugaba, supreme creator divinity of the Hima; and Ngai, supreme being of the Maasai.

In South America, too, there is no shortage of supreme beings who are creators. Among them one may mention Pelepelewa, god of the Trio of Surinam; Kamuscini, the talking sky-god of the Bakairi; Karu of the Mundurucú of the Tapajós River; and El-al, a supreme being known in Patagonia. In Australia, one finds many creator supreme beings celebrated in scholarly literature. Among those not mentioned above are Bunjil of the Kulin, Nurrundere of the Narrinyeri, Mangarrara of the Larrakia people, and, as a collective name for the high god of the Aboriginal peoples of southeastern Australia, the All-Father.

Such examples by no means exhaust the number of supreme beings whose complicated nature includes the role of creator. The supreme beings mentioned above seem principally interested in the creation of the sky, the stars, the earth, and meteorological phenomena. They concern themselves with the creation of vegetation only in a secondary way. However, other creators, a smaller group of supreme beings, interest themselves particularly in the creation of trees, vines, herbs, grasses, and other forms of vegetation.

In general, this second group is more dramatically involved with rain than with other, more ethereal celestial elements. Among many such supreme beings one may mention uNkulunkulu of the Zulu peoples; Bego Tanutanu, the creator of the landscape, source of foods, plants, and instruments of culture at Buin in the southern Bougainville straits; Tsui //goab, Khoi celestial god who unites the clouds and swells the rains; Teharonhia-wakhon, the Iroquois twin divinity who holds heaven at two points (or with his two hands); and Yuskeha, the parallel Huron divinity who sends good weather for crops and enjoys sexual relations with Ataentsic ("she whose body is ancient"), who is also called "the dark one" (i.e., the earth). One notices that supreme beings who are creators of vegetation tend to absorb or acquire attributes more commonly seen among culture heroes, specialized deities of vegetation, and storm gods.

Control over life is also reflected in the supreme beings' ability to end life when they will. For example, among the Yamana of Tierra del Fuego, the supreme being is called "slayer in the sky"; among the Maidu of north-central California, he is also called "a slayer." Supreme beings often figure in deaths that are mysterious, summary, and sudden. Celestial supreme beings strike humans with their thunderbolts. The Semang of Kedah believe that the supreme being Kari created everything except the earth and humankind. These last were fashioned by Plë, a subordinate deity. Kari sees everything from on high and punishes humans by dropping on them a flower from a mysterious plant. Where the flower lands, fatal lightning strikes. The Apapocuva-

Guaraní supreme being, Nanderuvucu ("our great father"), withdrew long ago into a distant dark country where the only light that exists comes from within his chest. Eventually, it is believed, he intends to destroy the world and thereby bring about the end of time.

Remoteness. More often than not, the sky is the principal manifestation of supreme being. From this preponderance of historical facts has come the term *high god*, over whose origin and nature the controversy surrounding supreme being once raged. Scholars have made clear the fact that supreme being is not a simple personification of the "natural" object, the sky. Rather, a supreme being is a distinct divine personality who reveals himself or herself in the power of the sky. Many peoples are careful to make the same distinction in various ways, speaking of their supreme being as dwelling beyond the sky, or as the invisible sky that lies beyond the visible one, or as wearing the sky for a vestment. Puluga, in the Andaman Islands, is said to reside in heaven. The sky is his house. For Baiame, an Australian high god, the sky is a campground, brightened with stars that serve as campfires and traversed by the river of the Milky Way. Num, the Samoyed divinity whose name means "sky," lies in the seventh heaven, but he cannot be a simple personification of the natural sky, for he is also believed to be the earth and the sea. For many Ewe-speaking populations, the blue color of the heavens is a veil that Mawu uses to shield her face, and the clouds are her clothing.

Because a supreme being dwells in inaccessible heights and displays a passive and transcendent character, his outline tends to be left undefined. Although his personality is awesome and powerful, he often avoids dramatic action in favor of inert omnipresence. He may remain mysterious and vaguely delineated. Such is the case with Moma ("father"), the supreme being of the Witóto of Colombia. Associated closely with the power of the word in rituals and chants, he created all things in the world from the mere "appearance" (*naino*) of each thing's "nonexisting substance." Moma calls himself Nainuema ("he who is or possesses what is not present," that is, illusive appearance). According to the Witóto, Moma captured the specter of appearances in his dream and pressed it to his breast until he could transform it into the earth. Earthmaker, supreme being of the Winnebago, comes to consciousness in the primordium in order to make the world keep still. He then remains aloof. What Earthmaker was like, or what there was before he came to consciousness, the Winnebago do not know. The Pawnee contend that Tirawa Atius ("father on high") is in everything. However, no one is able to know what he looks like.

The remoteness of the power of a supreme being may

even be portrayed as indifference. When the passivity of a supreme being is exaggerated to the point of his extreme withdrawal from creation, he takes the form of a *deus otiosus*, a god who has retired himself and his unique powers from the active world. He no longer captures the religious imagination in the commanding way of more dramatic supernatural beings. He may, nevertheless, remain the ground for all created and creative possibilities. The Lenape (Delaware), a southern Algonquin group, believe that Gicelamu'kaong ("he who created us through his thought") entrusted his supernatural responsibilities to subordinate beings: the winds, the lord of animals, the sun, the moon, and the thunder. He then withdrew to the twelfth heaven. Nonetheless, he looks over human activities, especially the longhouse ceremonies, for the center post of the cult house is the staff that he keeps in his hand. Temáukel remains rather indifferent to the affairs of the Selk'nam of Tierra del Fuego. He did not complete the work of creation but deputized Kénos, the mythical ancestor, to raise the sky and provide moral instruction. He now lives in the stars. Absent from cult, he still interests himself in moral behavior and punishes the wayward with sickness and premature death. The pre-Zoroastrian conception of Ahura Mazdā depicted him as a divine being who creates only through the mediation of the *spenta mainyu* ("good spirit").

The paradoxical coupling of power and passivity within the supreme being of the sky may be made known in sexual terms. Or the coupling of power and passivity may be expressed in terms of the alternations of the bright sky of day and dark sky of night. Thus Puluga, though omniscient, knows the thoughts within human hearts only in the light of day. In the Banks Islands, it is believed that at the beginning night did not exist. Qat spread the night over the earth so that creation remained obscure. However, after a while the situation did not suit him, and, with a red obsidian knife (dawn), he cut into the darkness. The rays of sunlight that enter through the roof of a house are said to be his spears. Among a western group of San, the supreme being, called Kággen, produces darkness by spreading the bile that spills when he splits open the gallbladder of an antelope. Upset by the darkness, he creates the moon.

The power of transcendent height is continued in the supreme beings who dwell on the tops of mountains. Well known are Mount Olympus of Greek mythology and Haraberazaiti in Iranian belief. In Palestine, Mount Tabor and Mount Gerizim stand as high holy places. Himinbjorg ("heaven's mountain") figures importantly in the Norse Eddas. Ngenéchen, divinity of the Araucanians of Chile and Argentina, lived on top of volca-

noes with his wife and children. In the same area, the god Pillán, who lives on mountains in the middle of the sky, seems to have served as a model for Ngenéchen.

Just as mountains symbolically express access to the transcendent realms of infinite power, so other paradigmatic symbols reveal the place of contact with the otherwise inaccessible source of life. In particular, the cosmic tree or world tree is a startling image of access to the dwelling of the high god. Flathead Indians believe that the roots of the cosmic tree reach down into the dwelling place of the evil being, Amtep. At the upper end lies Amotken ("the old one"), a good celestial creator. Rites are often celebrated in connection with an image of the cosmic tree. Thus, during the Turco-Tatar horse sacrifice, the shaman carries the soul of the victim to Ülgen, the supreme being, by scaling nine notches cut into a birch tree. Ascending the tree, the shaman reports his voyage through the nine heavens. Contact between this world and the celestial powers is reflected also in images of the Milky Way, the ladder reaching to heaven, and the liana. The *climax* ("ladder") in the mysteries of Mithra had seven rungs fashioned of seven different metals. Cultures in North America, Oceania, Africa, and ancient Egypt all possess myths concerning ascent to heaven along a cosmic ladder.

In Misminay, near Cuzco in Peru, the Milky Way is conceived of as a stream of semen that flows through the center of celestial space just as the Vilcanota River, its terrestrial counterpart, flows through the center of the earth. As the Milky Way encircles the world, it descends into the ocean in the west, absorbing the earth's waters, and travels underground to rise in the eastern sky. Taking the form of rain, fog, and hail, the heavenly water-semen falls into the headwaters that feed the Vilcanota River. The Milky Way also contains female elements, the *yana phuyu* ("dark spots"), which are the sources of various animal species.

Celestial bodies and elements are often portrayed as the more active constituents and expressions of a supreme being himself. Nurrundere, thunder-voiced god of the Australian Narrinyeri, produces the rainbow when he urinates. The Xhosa of southern Africa believe that hail falls when Utikxo arms himself for battle. On Timor, monsoon rains come forth from Usi Neno, a supreme being with strong solar aspects, as a result of the effort he expends in his intercourse with Usi Afu, goddess of the earth. In Indonesia, in the Ambon Islands, the supreme being called Upu Lanito ("lord heaven") sets stars in the sky as a sign that he has gone to warn the sun and moon about an impending attack of *nitu* ("spirits"). There are abundant accounts that describe the sky as the face of a supreme being; the sun and moon are his eyes.

We shall see that the more active divinities tend to specialize in one life-giving activity or sphere (e.g., crops, animals, the dead, military organizations, cosmic laws, or the laws of a kingdom) rather than to remain, as do supreme beings, vague and passive sustainers of life in general. In many instances, their activities are expressed in independent mythologies of active supernatural beings who overshadow the remote and transcendent supreme being. The end result is that there exist religious systems wherein the supreme being is supplanted by more active and specialized deities or, alternatively, wherein the formal expression of the supreme being itself is presented not as remote and transcendent but as quite intensely involved with the specific life processes of the universe. In the latter case, the form of the supreme being absorbs attributes from other important and more active supernatural beings like the culture hero, the trickster, or fertility gods.

Activities. We have seen that supreme beings are supreme by virtue of their unique nature, not necessarily by virtue of their achievements or exploits. Supreme being, by its very nature, underlies all that is; its character stands in a direct relationship to what exists, what is ontologically true. In this connection, supreme beings are often invoked as witness to oaths, as witness to what is. In northwestern Sumatra, among the Batak peoples, reference is made to Debata. When he smiles, his mouth opens to reveal his teeth in the form of lightning. He is invoked in oaths taken over serious matters. He punishes perjury with bolts of lightning. On Ceram, people swear to the truth by Upu Langi ("lord heaven") and his female counterpart, Upu Tapene. Otherwise, there seems to be no regular cult offered to them. Swahili speakers frequently testify to the truth of an assertion by swearing to "Mungu mmoja" ("the one god") or by saying "Mungu anaona" ("God is watching").

By no means are supreme beings always portrayed as creators. Nevertheless, cosmogonic activity is the single activity that befits their foundational character, their role as the ground of all existence. Some supreme beings leave no room for doubt about their cosmogonic activity. Their powerful thought alone brings the world into being. Such is the manner in which Wakonda, the Omaha supreme being, created the world. At first, all things were in his mind. The same is true of the Winnebago creator, Earthmaker. Creation proceeds from his thought. When he wishes something, it comes to exist, just as he wishes. We have already seen how the Witóto supreme being, called Nainuema ("he who is appearance only"), ties a phantasm to his breast with his dream-thread in order to create the world. The Maidu of California believe that Ko'dōyanpě ("earth namer") brought about creation after long and intense thought.

Likewise, Dasan, the high god—ancestor of the northern Pomo, called the world into being with his words. Whether such sublime notions are preserved from the most archaic traditions or whether they are the fruit of more recent theological speculations that have purified and rarefied earlier ideas is a matter of some dispute.

As we have seen in several examples above, supreme beings' involvement with creation may be more subtle and complicated. They may take responsibility only for the initial creative impulse toward form, leaving the final shaping of the world to other supernatural beings, especially to a "transformer," or culture hero. In many cases, the supreme being is only indirectly involved in creation. He engenders, empowers, or presides over those beings who create the world and its creatures. His creative activity remains supervisory. In other instances, he may create in cooperation (or in competition) with other powerful beings. In any case, a supreme being appears to be more than a rational "first cause" of creation. Life and existence, as a whole, stem from and are maintained in accordance with his own inner nature. I do not speak here of a necessary pantheism or emanationism, since a supreme being is a distinct personality who remains distinguishable from creation.

Regardless of the degree of his active participation in creation, once the universe exists a supreme being's major job is done. He then "retires" at some remove, often to the heavenly heights, where he devotes himself to the passive and transcendent pursuits of maintaining and sustaining life. He may thus leave the world to powers who preside directly over specific domains that are less than cosmogonic in scope and whose activities—the accomplishment and functioning of specific world processes—make sense in a world that already exists. Myths often recount the withdrawal of the high god as the event that marks the end of the primordium.

Relationship to Other Divinities. A supreme being rarely occupies the dominant position in a pantheon or a divine hierarchy. Once creation has ended, if indeed he was involved actively in the cosmogony, the supreme being yields the mythical stage to more active beings whose personalities are more clearly delineated.

A supreme being's link to the very foundations of being is often expressed in temporal terms (for example, he may exist before the other gods exist). Consequently, in the cases in which more active beings take over the religious imagination, his eventual passivity in relation to them may be expressed in terms of old age and its inactive fragility. In the Akkadian text *Enuma elish*, the primordial couple, Apsu and Tiamat, now grown old, are nettled by the noise and games of younger divinities, by whom they are eventually destroyed. The god El, as reported in the Ugaritic texts, is weak and senile.

While in his palace in Mount Tsafon, El is attacked by Baal. The younger god not only usurps the previously dominant position of the supreme being but routs him to the farthest reaches of creation. In explicitly sexual terms, younger gods may deprive a supreme being entirely of his no longer exercised potency by castrating him. Ouranos, the Greek cosmocrat and husband of Gaia (Ge), was castrated by his son and successor Kronos. This event interrupted the unbroken coitus between sky and earth during the primordium. When his sexual organs were tossed into the sea, Aphrodite came into being. In the Hurrito-Hittite theogony, which appears to bear North Syrian and Sumerian influences, Alalu was replaced by the god Anu. After nine years had passed, Anu himself was attacked by Kumarbi, who bit Anu's loins. Swallowing part of the god's sexual organ, Kumarbi became pregnant with three children. These violent divine beings express attributes quite different from those of the unchanging supreme beings. Their dynamism tends to alienate still further from myth and cultic activity the transcendent and passive character of supreme beings. Supreme beings are thus often obscured and their power eclipsed.

As can be seen in the above examples, the younger, "champion" divinities who usurp a supreme being's position are often associated with the fertility of fields and animals. In their connection with agriculture and fecundity, they are often known in the violent but necessary manifestations of weather and storm gods. Their character is bound up with tempestuous change, the violence of concrete life processes that make fertility of seed and stock possible but unforeseeable. Such violence is one important aspect of Indra, hailed as "bull of the world," "lord of the plow" (*śiraspati*), and "master of the fields" (*ūrvavapati*). He uses his *vajra* (thunderbolt) to kill the monstrous *Ṛta* and thereby release the waters. Also in South Asia one finds Parjanya, son of the sky and god of hurricanes. He unleashes the rains and assures fertility for animals, crops, and humans. In Iran, the meteorological divinity Verethraghna is dramatic and fertilizing. As illustrated by creators specializing in vegetation, the form of a supreme being may itself contain aspects of these fecundator beings. In such cases supreme beings maintain a more active role in the mythic imagination, but at the cost of losing something of their unchanging nature.

On the one hand, the passive involvement of a supreme being in the very ground of being in all its forms may give rise, eventually, to his usurpation or transformation by dynamic figures specializing in one or another specific life form or process: fertility and fecundator gods. On the other hand, in a parallel but separate development, a supreme being's supervisory

capacity, his general omniscience passively expressed, may develop into more active and concrete expression in the form of a sovereign god. Whether such a sovereign god is the result of a process in which a supreme being, for example a sky god, absorbs the traits of a cosmocrat, or vice versa, must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In all these cases, however, the emphasis of the resultant form no longer falls on the supreme being's transcendent supervision of the universe but on his active guardianship of the norms of world order.

Certain sovereign divinities enforce the most general cosmic or "natural" laws inherent in the structures of the universe. Varuṇa, called Sahasrākṣa ("thousand-eyed") in the *R̥gveda*, is the universal king (*saṃraj*), who guards the norms of world order. By virtue of his own nature, his power is over all existence. Unlike the champion gods of fertility, who violently conquer their specialized domains, Varuṇa reigns through his innate relationship to *ṛta* (the cosmic, ethical, and ritual order of the universe) and through his mastery of magico-spiritual influence (*māyā*), which allows him to bind with his "nets," "ropes," and "knots" those who transgress that order. In other cases, a sovereign divinity may be interested less in cosmic processes than in human moral action. In such instances, he may send forth moral commandments and laws and punish breaches of the ethical order. As sovereign, a supreme being may even interest himself in the details of socioethical behavior, upholding the proper performance of customs and mores.

The cosmic pillar that upholds the universe, or the *columna universalis*, is often associated with the sovereign being, himself the upholder of cosmic order. As an *axis mundi*, like the cosmic tree and mountain, it points to aspects of the sovereign that preserve celestial powers and associations. During their Winter Ceremonial, the Kwakiutl people of the northwest American coast wrap a cedar "cannibal pole" in red-cedar bark to endow it with *nawalak* ("supernatural power"). Projecting through the roof of the house, the forty-foot post is considered to be the Post of the World and the insignia of the great divinity Baxbakualanuxsiwae ("man-eater at the mouth of the river"). It is an image of the great copper pole that upholds the heavens and provides passage between the spatial realms of the cosmos. The Saxons maintained a cult of a cosmic pillar called Irminsul, one image of which Charlemagne destroyed in the village of Eresburg in 772. It was the "pillar of the universe" that supported all existing things. Horace reports the existence of such a pillar and similar associated beliefs among the Romans. In Vedic India, as reported in the first book of the *R̥gveda*, a similar pillar was called the *skambha*. The Achilpa, an Aranda group of Australia,

carry a sacred pole that they call *kauwa-auwa*, and they wander in the direction in which it leans. It is a replica of the pillar fashioned by the god Numbakula who, after covering it with blood, ascended along the *kauwa-auwa* until he disappeared into the sky.

Cult. In his most removed form, as noted above, a supreme being usually inspires no regular public cult. A relative absence of cult seems to characterize many of those celestial supreme beings whose passivity borders on otioseness. To a great degree this is true of Thakur (among the Santāl of India), Synshar (among the Khasis), Kari (among the Semang), Sammor or Peng (among the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula), Pirman (among the Benwa-Jakun of Johore), Tuhan Allah (also among Jakun groups), Muladjadi (among the Batak of central Sumatra), Petara (among the Sea Dyaks of Borneo), Opo-geba-snulat (on the Indonesian island of Buru), Lowalangi (on the island of Nias in Indonesia), Hintubuhet (in New Ireland), Ndengei (in Fiji), Takaro (on Malo Island, near Malekula), Gueggiahora (among the Camacães in Bahia, Brazil), Wendé (among the African Kaguru), Zame Asi-zame Ôyô (among the Fang of West Africa), Mpambe (among the Anjanja south of Lake Malawi), Ruwa (among the Chagga of Mount Kilimanjaro), and Yelafaz (on the island of Yap).

In fact, those celestial supreme beings who do call forth a regular cult seem to be exceptional cases. Among them are Agunua, venerated at Haununu on the southwest coast of San Cristobal in the Solomon Islands, and Tabuarik, who, together with his lightning-wife, De Itji, is celebrated in a cult that features sacred stones (for instance, on Nikunau in the Gilbert Islands). More often supreme beings are invoked spontaneously, and even frequently, by individuals or by a community in extreme circumstances of famine, earthquake, drought, and so on. When this irregular aspect of worship first came to scholarly attention, it led investigators to undervalue the importance of supreme beings. Unable to take seriously the profound truth of myth, early investigators were incapable of seeing that the absence of regular public cult was related to the supreme beings' associations with the ground of all being.

A supreme being is often associated with initiatory societies that focus on the knowledge of mysteries. In such secret initiations, many of a supreme being's celestial attributes are maintained. Such appears to be true among Native American tribes of California who possessed what was called the Kuksu cult, wherein the masked initiates impersonated spirits of the dead. The sound of a bull-roarer imitated the voice of the supreme being and other spirits. The area in which this secret society flourished coincides roughly with the area in which there are clearly delineated concepts of a high

god (e.g., among the Maidu). However, this connection is a complicated one. Among the Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego, the *ciexais* puberty initiations involve themselves deeply with Watauinewa, the supreme being who established them. In the *kina*, the secret society rituals of the Yahgan, however, no mention is made of him. Nor does the supreme being figure in the Selk'nam esoteric initiations (*klóketen*), on which the Yahgan probably modeled the *kina*. Although knowledge of a supreme being may be transmitted, refined, and reshaped in secret societies, it is unwarranted to draw the more general conclusion that supreme beings are the creation of such elites.

Among those supreme beings who merge with or yield to more active forms, there exists a tendency toward a more scheduled public cult. This can be seen in cults dedicated to solarized supreme beings. Although solarized supreme beings share something of the sacrality of the sky, their potency and periodic activity often highlight the manifest rational order of regulated life processes, which outshines the mysterious and unfathomable order of being commonly associated with celestial supreme beings.

Summary. The attributes and powers of supreme beings, often reflected in their very names, are most clearly made known in sky divinities. The activity that best suits the infinite and omnipotent nature of supreme beings is the creation of the world. Often, but not always, they create the world through thought, a *creatio ex nihilo*, which is in keeping with their passive nature. After creation, a supreme being often retires on high and becomes even more transcendent a power. When supreme beings do take a more active role, their form tends to merge with or yield to other divine forms. Such is true, on the one hand, with sovereign divinities who ruled the world and, on the other hand, with fecundators and "champion" divinities. Knowledge of a transcendent and mysterious supreme being is often better preserved in initiatory secret societies than in the public cults that surround the more active expressions of sun god, storm god, or meteorological beings.

There is no doubt that many forms of supreme being, as we know them today, have been influenced by the religious ideas of historical monotheisms. Such contacts reveal themselves in the very names of many supreme beings, not to mention the influences brought to light in careful study of the histories and religious ideas of cultures around the globe. However, the impact of such historical change ought not to be exaggerated. In the first place, no culture's religious ideas have remained without change through history. Even those forms held by scholars to be most archaic give evidence of complicated historical processes that involve borrowing, dete-

rioration, new inspiration, and reconstitution. The contemporary era ought to be seen as a further instance of a much larger historical process. In the second place, in those areas where absorption of ideas from monotheisms is clearly evident, one does not generally find inert imitations of monotheisms but lively new syntheses, often in terms that are best understood as part of the religious history of a local culture's conception of supreme being.

Scholarly Theories

In the development of the discipline of history of religions, the investigation of supreme beings has occupied a special place. For more than a century, three factors have especially affected the scholarly debate about the nature of supreme beings: the provenance of the materials studied; the dogmatic concerns of the investigators, whether theological or scientific; and the judgments in vogue regarding the nature of religious expressions. On the most general plane, we may distinguish four important positions taken during the study of supreme beings over the past 120 years.

Four Main Views. The first point of view, exemplified in the work of Leopold von Schroeder, interested itself in the sky gods known through sacred texts in the Indo-European family of languages. Interest in such exalted forms of supreme being was eclipsed when attention turned to the ethnographic data pouring in from cultures outside the Indo-European sphere. This second position, developed most successfully by E. B. Tylor, held that it was impossible to see supreme being as anything but a most recent religious form in human history. Tylor considered the idea of supreme beings to be a rational elaboration of simpler and earlier religious notions. The third perspective began with Andrew Lang, who called attention to the authentic existence of supreme beings outside Indo-European and ancient Near Eastern culture history, principally in Aboriginal Australia. Taking his cue from Lang, Wilhelm Schmidt carried on an intense and comprehensive investigation of supreme beings in traditional cultures of the Americas, Oceania, Australia, Asia, and Eurasia.

Regardless of their judgment on the antiquity and meaning of the various forms of supreme being, these three views of the issue never succeeded in detaching the inquiry into the nature of supreme being from the question of the appearance of historical monotheism with its concomitant theological constructs of revelation, creator (or first cause of creation), and moral rectitude. A historicist search for simple origins, an exaggerated rationalism in defining religion, and a dismal appraisal of the nature of myth are common to all three approaches.

It fell to Raffaele Pettazzoni to take a fourth position by reinstating a consideration of the supreme being of the sky, this time in a framework that treated the history of monotheism as a particular, even if related, historical instance. Drawing upon data from all over the world, Pettazzoni centered his research on what were called the "primitive" religions. Taking Pettazzoni's insight about the celestial being as a starting point, Mircea Eliade has presented a morphology of supreme beings that serves as the foundation for his comparative historical studies of religion. In addition to these general positions and their principal protagonists, a large number of scholars interested themselves in one or another specific aspect of the problem and contributed to the understanding of supreme beings.

Early Studies. During the nineteenth century many scholars of religion investigated religious texts from cultures in the Indo-European language family. Their main concerns were philological. When they investigated the meaning of specific religious images and forms, they took a special interest in those forms that were associated with natural phenomena. Nevertheless, the comparative philology of Indo-European languages pointed to the existence of a supreme sky god. The identification of the Indo-European radical *deiwos* ("sky") in designations meaning "god" (for example, in Old German *tivar*, Lithuanian *diewas*, Latin *deus*, Iranian *div*, and Sanskrit *deva*) lent support for a theory like that of Charles Ploix, who contended in *La nature des dieux: Études de mythologie greco-latine* (1888) that the sky was the principal subject of myth and religion.

In this way, the nineteenth-century attempt to discover a theory of origins of religion in natural phenomena made way also for a sky-dwelling supreme being. Unfortunately, a shallow understanding of myth in general led to the conclusion that supreme beings were merely personifications of one or another natural phenomenon. In *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks* (1859), Adelbert Kuhn gave a privileged place to meteorological phenomena such as rain, lightning, storms, and thunder, holding that these celestial phenomena were responsible for the development of mythological themes. [See Meteorological Beings.]

In *Die Geschichte der Religion* (1869), Otto Pfliederer also laid great stress on the importance of a celestial supreme being. He considered the sky god a natural starting point for the development of monotheism. By postulating that the origins of religion lay in the personification of natural phenomena in the heavens and by hypothesizing about the connection between the sky god and monotheism, he provoked reactions from investigators with theological concerns. E. G. Steude, in *Ein Problem der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft und ein*

Versuch einer Lösung (1881), argued that early belief in a sky god, although a vague form of monotheism, might easily degenerate into polytheism through the personification of other celestial phenomena. Therefore, "primitive" belief in a supreme being ought not to be judged a true monotheism.

F. Max Müller, the foremost spokesman of the school of nature mythology, attempted to avoid the theological pitfalls by positing the origin of religion in an innate capacity of the human soul to respond to the infinite. Consequently, in his studies of comparative mythology Müller placed great stress on those objects that are wholly intangible and that best express infinity: the sun, the dawn, and the sky. The experience of the infinite made available in the contemplation of these intangible objects (*numina*) ultimately gave rise to their designation by name (*nomina*). Through a "disease of language," the named objects were personified as gods, whose exploits were recounted in myths. According to Müller, the origin of supreme being lies neither in polytheism nor in monotheism but in what he termed "kathenotheism," the tendency of the religious perception to treat any particular god as the only one in any specific moment.

Much of the early interest in Indo-European supreme beings culminated some years later in the work of Leopold von Schroeder. In the first volume of his *Arische Religion* (1914), he presents in an exhaustive fashion the instances of supreme sky beings: Indian Dyauspitar, Latin Jupiter, Greek Zeus Pater, Scythian Zeus-Papaios, Illyrian Daipatures, and Thraco-Phrygian Zeus-Pappos. However, by the time von Schroeder's useful collection of researches had been gathered together, the investigation of supreme beings in the history of religions had already passed beyond the relatively narrow confines of Indo-European texts. An increasing amount of reliable ethnographic data and a better awareness of the enormity of culture history demanded that the question be debated on wider grounds. Rather than a contribution to the general history of supreme being, von Schroeder's work became a masterful synthesis of a generation of research by specialists in only one area of religion.

Evolutionary Theories. At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when scholars turned systematic attention to the history of religions outside Indo-European cultures, interest in the nature and meaning of supreme being waned. In their enthusiasm for evolutionary theories of the development of human ideas, various schools of scientific thought placed the concept of supreme being on the opposite end of history from the origin of religious thought. The idea of supreme being and its manifold forms were thus deprived of the prestige of origins.

Sir John Lubbock, for example, contended that the earliest stages of human development gave evidence of a total absence of religion. Religious inclinations began with a belief in fetishes and arrived at the concept of a supreme being only after passing through the intervening stages of totemism, worship of nature, shamanism, and anthropomorphism (idolatry). In a similar way, Herbert Spencer attributed the origin of religious ideas to a vague belief in ghosts, which culminated in ancestor worship. The worship of distinguished ancestors eventually gave rise to the notion of supernatural beings. Ultimately, the concept of supreme being was the outcome of a lengthy historical process of reflection on human personalities such as a chief famous for strength and bravery, a medicine man of high esteem, or a stranger with superior knowledge of arts and inventions.

Various evolutionary theories found it inconceivable that an exalted notion of supreme being could exist in antiquity. Instead, religious history was seen as a development from simple ideas to more complex ones. In this way, the "origin" of supreme beings was postulated in animal totems, rudimentary human emotions, the human will at work in primitive magic, or a vague universal magic force.

The most popular of these theories was that of animism, set forth by E. B. Tylor in *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art and Custom* (1872). For Tylor, the idea of supreme being was only the last in a long series of developments of religious ideas, which ultimately began with the idea of the human soul. The doctrine of a supreme being emerged only in the "later stages" of human history after it had been transformed, rationally projected on nature, and developed throughout a stage of ancestral worship and idolatry. Eventually it emerged in the form of a "pure" spirit that took its place in a polytheistic pantheon over which it gradually stood supreme.

The enthusiasm that greeted animism and other evolutionary theories succeeded in displacing scholarly interest in supreme beings. In placing the idea of supreme being in the most recent stages of human history, these theories implied or stated explicitly that the concept of supreme being was introduced into the cultures of Aboriginal Australia, Africa, and Native America by Christianity or Islam. In the opinions of these evolutionary theorists, the concept of supreme being was not an authentic local tradition. Scarcely heard in the din of scientific enthusiasm were opinions like those of the theologian C. von Orelli. Examining beliefs in supreme beings in Africa, Australia, and North America in his *Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte* (1899), von Orelli con-

cluded that the original form of religion was a monistic belief in a celestial divinity, whose nature was known through revealed truth.

Andrew Lang. A disciple of Tylor, Andrew Lang called for a reconsideration of supreme beings in the light of materials from southeastern Australia as reported by A. W. Howitt. Lang pointed to the authentic existence of the idea of supreme being among Australian Aborigines, Andamanese pygmies (Negritos), and certain peoples of Africa and the Americas, whose life-ways were deemed most simple and whose religious ideas were therefore considered most archaic. He thus questioned one of the fundamental presuppositions of the animistic theory.

Lang never abandoned totally the evolutionary scheme, but he did challenge its overall simplicity. He argued that the idea of supreme being stood quite apart from the religious conceptions of soul and spirit that emerged in response to such phenomena as death, illness, and dreaming. A supreme being was an entity with a quality of being unique unto itself. It could not be an elaboration of earlier and simpler notions, for, in some cases, the idea of supreme being exists where no evidence of ancestor worship is found.

In *The Making of Religion* (1898), Lang presents the supreme being as a deathless "maker" of all creation that is not fashioned by human hands. Lang considered the idea of supreme being a sublime religious conception that the human intellect was capable of conceiving at any stage of its historical development. Though recognized by the religious intellect, a supreme being was a creative power that the imagination eventually encrusted with mythical elements. Consequently, although the conception of a creator was exalted, the forms into which mythic fancy cast supreme beings were often erratic and degrading.

Lang's insistence on the authentic existence of a sublime supreme being in the religious thought of cultures that animists deemed "lower" or "savage" races met with little success during his lifetime. Nor was his the only voice to fall on deaf ears. As early as 1860, in his second volume of *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Theodore Waitz-Gerland had argued for the existence of an indigenous African religion whose ideas of supreme being were so exalted that they approached the limits of monotheism. In his *History of Religion* (1906), A. Menzies, too, had concluded that there existed a widespread belief in a vague and remote divinity who managed the world but found no place in cult, but he was not sure how archaic the form was.

Wilhelm Schmidt. In the very year of Lang's death, Wilhelm Schmidt published the first volume of *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* (1912), a twelve-volume work that

was to occupy him for the next forty years. An ethnologist of uncommon energies and linguistic abilities, Schmidt studied supreme beings in a comprehensive fashion. Although he acknowledged his debt to Andrew Lang for having recognized the existence of supreme beings outside historical monotheisms, his main thrust was to situate the study of supreme beings in a more accurate historical framework than the one provided by an ideology of evolution.

Following Fritz Graebner and Bernard Ankermann, Schmidt attacked theories of a unilinear and evolutionary development of religious history. He argued convincingly that human history was a more complicated reality. In the place of simple unilinear development, Schmidt, following the trend of continental historical tradition, proposed the existence of a number of culture circles (*Kulturkreise*), each with distinctive ecological, economic, political, social, and ideological components that developed in relative independence of one another. By first delineating the characteristics of supreme beings found in each culture circle and by comparing those traits seen to be common to distinct culture circles, Schmidt hoped to arrive, through reliable empirical and historical methods, at that original configuration of the idea of God existing in the common archaic culture (*Urkultur*). In this way, Schmidt argued that the contemporary societies of Oceania, Africa, the Americas, and Asia ought not to be ranked in any temporal order on a unilinear time line. On the other hand, features common to many of them pointed to the existence of a temporally earlier culture of shared beliefs.

Like Lang before him, Schmidt emphasized the moral and rational capacities, reflected in the conceptions of supreme beings, of those peoples who had been dubbed "savage" or "primitive." In fact, Schmidt exaggerated the importance of rationality in the nature of religion, for he held that supreme beings were inextricably bound to the rational process of inquiry into the first causes of the universe.

By studying those features common to the religions of African and Asian pygmies, Schmidt postulated the existence of shared religious beliefs stemming from the earlier historical stratum that he called the religion of Archaic Pygmy Culture (*Religion der Pygmätschen Urkultur*). Abstracting from American and Arctic materials in the same manner, Schmidt outlined the beliefs in a supreme being that characterized a hypothetical Archaic Arctic-American Culture. Finally, by comparing his constructions of Archaic Pygmy and Arctic-American cultures with religious beliefs in southeastern Australia, Schmidt postulated the "historical outlines" of earliest belief in a supreme being.

What Schmidt found in the reconstructed primordial

culture was a supreme being whose nature satisfied all human needs, in particular, the need for a rational first cause of the universe and its creatures. In this way, the supreme being was viewed as the father and founder of social realities, the family, and kin alliances as well as the author of moral realities in his role as lawgiver and ethical judge, who is himself free from all moral corruption. Schmidt argued that the belief that the supreme being was a protective father, supportive of the virtues of trust and love, provided archaic humans with the capacity to live and work toward supramundane goals. Rendering labor significant and providing a sense of responsibility, the belief in a supreme being proved to be an effective impetus for the forward struggles of human history.

Thus, the supreme being of Archaic Culture was the lord of human history because he was seen to fill all time and was the source of the beginnings of human life as well as the judge at its end. Furthermore, since the supreme being was believed to fill all the space of the universe, Archaic Culture could conceive of the existence of only one supreme being, unique and without peer. This being reigned as sovereign over all peoples of the earth. In short, through his historical investigation of ethnographic data, Schmidt contended that the religion of the most archaic human culture was a primordial monotheism (*Urmonotheismus*), whose existence could best be explained through a primordial revelation (*Uroffenbarung*) of the supreme being itself at the beginning of time.

Recognizing that the high god is found in contemporary cultures with less frequency than in the primordial culture, and acknowledging that the contemporary high god is often absent from scheduled cult and manifest in many obscure forms, or even supplanted by other divine figures, Schmidt attributed this degeneration to the very march of history, to the effects of change on human life and thought. Lang had made the same point. Where Lang had attributed the withdrawal of the high god to the cloak of mythic fancy put on over time, Schmidt also considered the economic and social realities of culture history. Thus, the experiences of matrilineal agrarian societies stressed the importance of a female supreme being, lunar associations, and blood sacrifices. Patrilineal totemic cultures contributed emphases on solar symbolism of a male supreme being. Patriarchal cattle-breeding cultures underlined the supreme being as a sky god, the highest in a pantheon of ranked beings increasingly associated with natural phenomena. Through such a historical process, the kernel idea of a primordial supreme being weakened over time, even while the images of supreme being multiplied themselves in number and breadth of special ap-

plication. History took its greatest toll on the idea of supreme being in those cultures with a long history of ethnological change. For this reason, Schmidt laid great stress on the study of cultures that remained on the margins of technological change.

Schmidt's historical extrapolations from ethnographic materials drew criticism from anthropologists. His assertions of the existence of a primordial monotheism and revelation disturbed theologians. From the point of view of history of religions, Schmidt's greatest shortcoming would prove to be his lack of appreciation of religious elements other than strongly rational ones. In short, although he helped break the stranglehold of evolutionary theories and renewed serious study of supreme being, he continued a rational tradition of interpretation that found it impossible to appreciate the many existential dimensions of myth subsequently disclosed by a more profound hermeneutics of religion. For these reasons, his ideas never gained widespread acceptance. Nevertheless, Schmidt's mammoth studies of supreme beings stand as a monument to his industry and to the existence of the concept of supreme beings in the general history of cultures.

In Schmidt's Wake. A distinguished school of culture history grew up around the researches of Wilhelm Schmidt. Although his disciples were very careful to emend or even to reject his historical conclusions about a primordial Archaic Culture and his theological conclusions about a primordial monotheism, they did continue to hold that the investigation of supreme beings outside monotheism constituted a high priority of research. In particular, the researches of Wilhelm Koppers, Josef Haeckel, and Martin Gusinde confirmed the importance of the position of supreme beings in many of the cultures that Schmidt had studied.

Reactions to Schmidt came from both theological and ethnological quarters. In general, his critics raised their objections on the basis of material from one special field or another. For the most part, however, other investigators—Preuss, Radin, Lowie, Söderblom, and van der Leeuw among them—agreed with Schmidt in recognizing the existence and importance of a supreme being in many cultures around the world.

In "Die höchste Göttheit bei den kulturarmen Völkern" (1922), Konrad T. Preuss claimed that supreme beings did not form a late stage of human development but rather the foundation of human thought. In *Glauben und Mystik im Schatten des höchsten Wesens* (1926), Preuss pointed out that the separate ideas concerning the world are woven into a universal scheme personified by the supreme being of the sky. Paul Radin, in *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (1927), put forward the idea that a supreme being was a creation of a special

type of religious person, one inclined toward intellectual reflection. Speculative thought inclined itself toward an unapproachable, abstract divinity, absent from cult and from the contamination of mythic fancy. Radin opposed this sublime figure to the figure of the transformer, a nonethical, materialistic, and dynamically dramatic figure who fascinated the more pragmatically inclined religious mind. Robert H. Lowie, who examined supreme beings in his *Primitive Religion* (1924), was not so much concerned with the historical origin of the idea of supreme being. Admitting its antiquity, he insisted on the need to consider it as an idea on its own merits, quite apart from notions of spirit, ghost, ancestor, or *mana*.

Nathan Söderblom, a great specialist in Iranian religions, also abandoned the quest for the historical origins of religion in favor of a threefold typology of religions distinguishing ethnic religion from mysticism of infinity and from prophetic revelation. He denied any connection between what he termed "primitive high gods" and the supreme beings of monotheisms. Since the high gods remained remote from their world and absent from cult, they appeared to him to be abstract reflections upon the origin of creation. Far from being true divinities, they were a rational construct of an "originator" (*Urheber*). In *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens: Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion* (1926), he postulated a different origin in human experience for the idea of a supreme being in the religions "of the Book." In these traditions, prophets interpreted their experience of a divine will making itself felt in both the legal and political arenas of daily life as an experience of the supreme (that is, most powerful and authoritative) being. This contrasts with the primitive notion of supreme being, which was, in his view, developed in response to questions about the origins of things.

Gerardus van der Leeuw employed several of Söderblom's key concepts in his treatment of supreme beings in "Die Struktur der Vorstellung des sogenannten Höchsten Wesens" (1931). Later, in *Phänomenologie der Religion* (1933), van der Leeuw extended the basic cognitive categories that Söderblom thought lay behind the concept of supreme being into a more refined Gestalt psychology of religion. The supreme beings outside monotheisms were an outgrowth of the basic cognitive structure of origination. Following Preuss, van der Leeuw also argued that these supreme beings, these high gods, preserved the world order by serving as systematic expressions of the mystical unity on which the conception of the world of everyday experience was grounded.

Like Söderblom and Preuss, van der Leeuw consid-

ered the question of the nature and structure of supreme beings in isolation from the history of the idea and the historical situations of particular expressions of supreme beings. An intrinsic element of such supreme beings is their otiosity, their remoteness. Whatever form a supreme being may take, whether sky god, weather god, or animal in form, it is always a form that remains in the background of the religious psyche. According to van der Leeuw, the supreme being created the world but now remains uninvolved with it in any practical way. He is looked upon as a being who in the past accomplished something extraordinary but who will never act in such a way again. Whereas Andrew Lang and Wilhelm Schmidt believed that the supreme being suffered mythic distortions accrued throughout history, van der Leeuw argued that the supreme being, as a structure of the religious psyche, exists outside history.

Raffaele Pettazzoni. It was Raffaele Pettazzoni who proposed that ambivalence is an essential component of the structure of supreme beings. Reappropriating the historical vision of Giovanni Battista Vico, who emphasized that every religious phenomenon is also a "genomenon" (something with a temporal history of development) and that the truths of human history are especially accessible through ideas forged in the symbolic terms of their time ("verum et factum convertuntur"), Pettazzoni embarked on an enormous study of the historical expressions and forms of supreme beings. Nonetheless, he respected the efforts and contributions of phenomenologists, who studied the forms of supreme beings in their essential structures.

The essentially ambivalent structure of supreme beings emerged from Pettazzoni's study of their historical forms. On the one hand, one finds relatively inactive creators who have retired to inaccessible regions once their acts of creation have been accomplished. On the other hand, one finds in history testimonies to supreme beings who are extremely dynamic overseers of the moral order. These active and omniscient sky gods often intervene directly in the course of human affairs by punishing transgressors of the statutes of social order with the weapons of weather and flood so characteristic of their own tempestuous natures.

Over the course of time, Pettazzoni argued, these historically separate features combined into a basic phenomenological structure of a dualistic nature. Their common meeting ground is the sky. Pettazzoni pointed out the primordial and cosmic quality of the remote and inactive creator. In his view, those features of a supreme being that emphasize his transcendence of the world are best suited to express his conservation of the very conditions that guarantee its existence and endur-

ance. Once the world is fashioned, the function of the creator can only be to prolong its duration and ensure its stability. Further action would endanger it. Creativity and passivity are thus indissolubly, if paradoxically, linked with one another. In this way, Pettazzoni rejected the hypothesis of Andrew Lang and Wilhelm Schmidt that the remoteness of the creator is a historical development of mythic fantasy.

On the other hand, criticizing the view held by van der Leeuw and Söderblom, which claimed that the dynamic features of supreme beings are foreign to the otiose figure of a primordial creator, Pettazzoni asserted that moral omniscience is also fundamental to the structure of supreme being. The capacity for moral supervision renders a supreme being morally relevant to historical and social order. Arguing that it is not only the God of historical monotheism who actively involves himself in the course of human events, Pettazzoni documented the existence of all-seeing, celestial supreme beings in Australia, Asia, Indonesia, Melanesia, Africa, and the Americas. Cultures in all of these places provide evidence of the existence of an ambivalent supreme being, both passive creator and omniscient sky god, who oversees the moral order and who is inclined to cede his place to more specialized forms of weather divinities.

Pettazzoni's contribution to the study of supreme beings was his positive evaluation of myth. Rather than viewing it as a degeneration or trivialization of a pure and primordial rational idea, Pettazzoni considered myth the most suitable vehicle for the expression of the sublime and exalted truth contained in the nature of the transcendent and omniscient supreme being. The full existential meaning of supreme being is manifest in myth as in no other form of rational discourse.

Mircea Eliade. In several of his studies in the history of religions, Mircea Eliade has given priority to the investigation of supreme beings. In his great morphological treatise, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (1958), the nature and meaning of supreme being becomes the foundation stone for his approach to the study of religion. Observing the results of earlier investigations, Eliade concludes that in every instance supreme being is a complex figure representing a very involved historical process of religious experiences, revelations, and theoretical systematizations. Nonetheless, Eliade agrees with Pettazzoni that supreme being best manifests its unique spiritual quality as a hierophany of the sky. Height and infinite space become especially suitable manifestations of what is transcendent and supremely sacred. Such supreme beings are primordial; they preexist the world as it is now known, and they act as creators who are beneficent and eternal. They establish

the order of creation and become the upholders of its laws. Consequently, Eliade holds that supreme beings are more than simple hierophanies of the sky. Instead, they possess a quality of being that is uniquely their own.

Eliade's special contribution to the study of supreme beings is his illumination of the process of their withdrawal or disappearance. He draws attention to the fact that myth often narrates the withdrawal of a supreme being to remote heights, whence he presides over the larger contours of life, destiny, and the afterlife of the soul, without, however, assuming any dominant role in public cult. In retirement, supreme beings are often replaced by other religious forms: by divinities of nature, by ancestors, by powers of fertility, by solar or lunar divinities, and so forth. Eliade contends that this tendency to give way to more concrete and dynamic forms is an essential element of the structure of supreme being.

Further, Eliade holds up the withdrawal of supreme beings as the exemplary model for the very process of the religious imagination in history. Considering "the sacred" as a structure of human awareness, he points to its historical occultation or withdrawal even as it manifests itself in concrete and, one could say, profane forms. The withdrawal of the supreme manifestation of being and the occultation of its fullness before active but more circumscribed divine appearances lead to a process of experimentation with sacred forms. This process constitutes the history of religious experience: a religious quest for the full manifestation of supreme being, which myth describes as existing "in the beginning."

Eliade has made a historical application of his morphological analysis of supreme beings in *Australian Religions: An Introduction* (1973), in several articles on South American religions, and in *A History of Religious Ideas* (1978–1986) as well as in other works. At first, Eliade draws attention to the replacement of supreme beings by other divine forms that share the celestial sacrality of supreme being even though they lose something of its transcendent omnipotence: weather, storm, solar, and lunar gods as well as universal sovereign gods who reign from on high. To this extent he develops suggestions made by Pettazzoni. However, his more general point is that supreme being is replaced in the religious imagination by a range of epiphanies of elementary life forces that come to compose a cosmic sacrality: water, stone, earth, vegetation, and animals. These epiphanies reveal themselves as particular modes of being of which a supreme being is the fullest manifestation. Because of this relationship to supreme being no longer fully manifest in history, each cosmic reli-

gious form tends, by "imperial" expansion of its meaning to all realms of life, to express itself as a revelation that, like supreme being, includes all other possibilities. However, these limited revelations are, by their very nature, incapable of expressing fully the sacred. They provoke the need for the experience of other forms.

Concluding Remarks. Understanding the nature, structure, and meaning of supreme beings outside monotheism has remained a priority for scholars who study religion in a comparative and historical frame of reference. The study of this important being has played a singular role in expunging several futile assumptions that plagued the early stages of investigation. Specifically, the naive premises that the origins of religion might be found in a single simple cause, that valid religious experience might be exhausted through rationalistic explanations, and that religious history is a unilinear progressive development had all to be abandoned. In their place, the study of supreme beings has substituted a deeper appreciation of the complexities of human experience in all cultures and in all times and a more profound understanding of the wider existential dimensions of mythic truth.

In particular, better acquaintance with supreme beings has underscored not only the inestimable value of the religions of Asia, Africa, Oceania, the Americas, and archaic cultures but also the inescapable need to know them well if we are to understand the religious experience of humankind.

[See also *Cosmogony*; *Deus Otiosus*; and *Polytheism*. For further discussion of phenomena associated with supreme beings, see *Axis Mundi*; *Mountains*; and *Sky*. For detailed treatment of related topics in the study of religion, see *Animism and Animatism*; *Evolutionism*; *Kulturkreislehre*; and *the biographies of Eliade*, Lang, van der Leeuw, Lowie, F. Max Müller, Pettazzoni, Preuss, Radin, Schmidt, Söderblom, Spencer, and Tylor. For discussion of specific supreme beings, see *Ahura Mazda* and *Angra Mainyu*; *All-Father*; *El*; *God*; *Great Spirit*; *Jupiter*; *Mawu-Lisa*; *Ngai*; *Nhialic*; *Num*; *Num-Türem*; *Qoqrun*; *Shang-ti*; *Tangaroa*; *T'ien*; *Ülgen*; *uNkulunkulu*; *Varuṇa*; *Viracocha*; and *Zeus*.]

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LAWRENCE E. SULLIVAN

SŪRDĀS (c. 1483–1563), North Indian devotional poet. Known for his brilliant *padas* (lyrics) in the Braj dialect of Hindi, Sūrdās is one of the most popular poets of Kṛṣṇa *bhakti* (devotion) in the North Indian heartland area.

The traditionally accepted story of his life has come down through the hagiographic accounts of the Vallabhite sect of Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*, which claims Sūrdās as the first of its "eight seals"—eight poets who lived during the early days of the sect and whose compositions are part of the sect's daily liturgy. According to these accounts, Sūrdās was born near Delhi in 1478, the same year as Vallabhācārya, the founder of the sect, and, like him, was of the Sarasvat brahman caste. Reputedly blind from birth, he was endowed with miraculous gifts of clairvoyance as well as great musical talent. At a young age, he left home to become an ascetic, eventually settling near Agra. There he composed devotional songs and attracted a following. In 1510, Vallabhācārya came through on one of his preaching tours and met Sūrdās. Until that time, all of Sūr's compositions had been of the *vinaya* type—hymns of supplication and humble pleas for salvation. Vallabhācārya taught him the story of Kṛṣṇa as embodied in the tenth chapter of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, instructed him in his doctrines, and enjoined him to sing about the *līlā* (divine play) of Kṛṣṇa. He then brought Sūr to the sect's newly established Shrinathji temple in Govardhan and put him in charge of composing songs for the liturgy. In this setting, where he spent the remainder of his life, Sūrdās composed the *Sūrsāgar*, a retelling of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in twelve chapters of verse. He died, according to Vallabhite sources, shortly before the death of Vallabhācārya's son Viṭṭhalnātha in 1585, his life thus spanning that of both the founder of the sect and his immediate successor.

Serious scholarly doubt has been cast on this account. Another nonsectarian Hindu tradition suggests that Sūr's dates are 1483 to 1563, that he was by caste a Bhat (panegyrist), and that he became blind only later in life. The issue is further complicated by references in Muslim sources to a renowned singer named Sūrdās at the court of the emperor Akbar (1556–1605). The most serious challenge, however, comes from the textual history of the *Sūrsāgar* itself. While the present-day standard edition of nearly five thousand *padas* is indeed divided into twelve chapters following the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the oldest extant manuscripts, which contain only a few hundred *padas*, are not. Nor do the older manuscripts follow the Vallabhite liturgical calendar, use the characteristic theological terminology of the sect, or group the *vinaya* lyrics at the beginning as a distinct genre. The present-day *Sūrsāgar* is thus the product of gradual accretion onto an original core of episodic lyrics and the imposition of a systematic framework by a self-conscious sectarian tradition. A critical edition is presently under preparation which, when completed, will force a radical reevaluation of the text.

Despite the incorporation of Sūrdās into the history and liturgy of the Vallabhite community, his importance as a religious figure extends far beyond the sectarian definition. His name has become a household word used to refer to blind persons, especially blind mendicant singers, while the *Sūrsāgar*, whose lyrics are sung by Indians of all sectarian persuasions, is considered one of the literary and devotional treasures of the Hindi-speaking area. Sūr's lyrics touch on all aspects of the Kṛṣṇa story, but he is best known for his depiction of Kṛṣṇa's childhood and adolescence. Among the childhood poems, those dealing with Kṛṣṇa as the butter thief are among the favorites. Also popular are the "flute songs," which describe the irresistible attraction of Kṛṣṇa's flute-playing and how it draws the cowherd women (*gopīs*) from their homes. Sūr's second most successful theme is that of the pain of separation (*viraha*) felt by Rādhā and the cowherd women after his departure from Mathura. Under this heading come the famous "bee songs," in which the cowherd women mock the cold monistic philosophy of Kṛṣṇa's emissary Uddhav and assert the superiority of their loving personal devotion to Kṛṣṇa. Sūr's third most popular theme is that of *vinaya*, in which he turns from dramatic third-person description and narration to the intimate first-person voice of the devotee humbly praying to his god for salvation.

[For further discussion of bhakti in North Indian religious movements, see Bhakti; Hindi Religious Traditions; and Vaiṣṇavism, article on Bhāgavatas. Hindi de-

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KARINE SCHOMER

SŪRYA. See Saura Hinduism.

SUSANO-O NO MIKOTO, one of the major deities in Japanese mythology, offspring of Izanagi and Izanami, and brother of Amaterasu. The meaning of the word *susano-o* is interpreted as either "a terrible man," or "the man of Susa," with *susa* read as a place-name. (*Mikoto* is a suffix used for a respected person or deity.) The character of Susano-o is extremely complex because he is an amalgam of several local and national deities. Although this deity personifies evil, several of his acts have an unmistakably beneficent character.

Susano-o caused the most dramatic event in Japanese mythology when he angered Amaterasu. He first aroused her wrath by emptying his bowels in the palace. But when Amaterasu was injured as a result of Susano-o's misbehavior she forthwith entered the Rock Cave of Heaven, and having fastened the Rock Door, dwelt there in seclusion. Eight hundred myriad deities then gathered to consider how to lure her out and restore light to the world. Their solution was to have Ame no Uzume, a female deity, perform an erotic dance in

front of the cave. This caused laughter among the deities, and Amaterasu, curious about the noise outside, opened the door a crack and peered out. Then Tajikara no Kami (god of strength) took her by the hand and led her out, and the radiance of the supreme deity filled the universe. For his role in provoking this event, the deities imposed upon Susano-o a fine of a thousand tables of gifts. They cut off his beard and his fingernails and toenails, and expelled him from the heavenly world.

In this myth, Susano-o plays a negative role, but his later activities are more positive. Following his expulsion from the realm of the gods, Susano-o descended to the province of Izumo, which was located in western Honshu, the main island of Japan. There he learned that an eight-headed serpent appeared in Izumo each year to devour a young girl. Susano-o intoxicated the serpent with liquor and killed it. As he cut into the serpent's body, the blade of his sword broke. Thinking this strange, he cut open the flesh and discovered a sword within. The sword, called Kusanagi no Tsurugi, became one of the Three Imperial Regalia. After this incident, Susano-o became the ancestor god of Izumo.

Susano-o is also the most important deity of northern Kyushu. Three female descendants of Susano-o were enshrined at Munakata, a religious center of that region. Thus there is a link between the Munakata and Izumo shrines, not only because Susano-o was the ancestor god of the female deities but also because Ōkuninushi, the son of Susano-o, married Takiribime, one of the three Munakata deities. The Munakata deities also had ties to western Honshu, for the deity enshrined at Itsukushima, near present-day Hiroshima and south of Izumo, is Itsukushima-hime, one of the three Munakata deities.

This geographical pattern suggests that Susano-o and his children were the deities of northern Kyushu and the western tip of Honshu. In sharp contrast, Amaterasu was originally the goddess of Yamato Province in central Japan. Susano-o and Amaterasu might therefore represent two separate political forces before the emergence of a unified Japanese kingdom—the one centered in northern Kyushu, the other in Yamato. When the rival forces merged, the myths were combined as they are found today in the *Nihongi* and the *Kojiki*. The *Kojiki* states that when Susano-o went to the heavenly world, there was consternation and alarm. Amaterasu said of the ascent of Susano-o that there was "surely no good intent. It is only that he wishes to wrest my land from me." Her reaction is understandable if the two deities were rivals before they were united as brother and sister.

Susano-o was also the god of the sea. Itsukushima-

hime, one of his three daughters, was also enshrined at Okinoshima, located in the Tsushima Strait north of Kyushu. In ancient times, when the government sent missions to Korea or China, prayers for a safe voyage were offered at Okinoshima. This supports the *Nihongi*'s description of Susano-o as ruler of the sea.

[Further discussion of individual deities referred to in this article can be found in Izanagi and Izanami and in Amaterasu Ōmikami. For a more general overview, see Japanese Religion, article on Mythic Themes.]

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KAKUBAYASHI FUMIO

SŪTRA LITERATURE. The Sanskrit term *sūtra* means "a thread"; it is also used, however, to refer to a short, aphoristic sentence and, collectively, to a work consisting of such sentences. *Sūtra* literature, as distinguished from *śāstra* literature, is in prose. The *sūtra* style, characterized by *laghutva* ("brevity, conciseness"), is a mnemonic device that attempts to condense as much meaning as possible into as few words, even syllables, as possible.

The most important *sūtra* texts in the context of the religious literature of India are the Kalpasūtras. The term *kalpa* has been variously explained by different traditional and modern scholars, but can best be rendered as "ritual." *Kalpa*, together with *śikṣā* (phonetics), *chandas* (prosody), *nirukta* (etymology), *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), and *jyotiṣa* (astronomy), is one of the six Vedāṅgas, or branches of learning auxiliary to the Vedas. The Kalpasūtras are closely connected with the individual Vedic schools (*śākhās*). (Even though not all the texts have survived, we may assume that at one time each Vedic school had not only its own *saṃhitā*, *brāhmaṇa*, *āranyaka*, and *upaniṣad* but also its own *kalpa-sūtra*.) There are three main classifications of Kalpasūtra: Śrautasūtras, Gṛhyasūtras, and Dharmasūtras.

The ritual performances described in the Śrautasūtras distinguish themselves by their—often extreme—complexity. First, in addition to the *yajamāna* (patron

of the sacrifice) and his wife, for whose benefit the ritual is performed, *śrauta* ritual can involve the presence of up to sixteen specialized priests. Second, it requires an elaborately laid-out sacrificial area in which three sacred fires are kept burning continually. Third, *śrauta* ritual includes not only *ekāha* ("one-day-long") ceremonies but also *ahīna* rituals, which last up to twelve days, and *sattra* "sessions," which can extend over several years. Large sections of the Śrautasūtras are devoted to the Agniṣtoma sacrifice, which is the prototype (*prakṛti*) for many variant forms of *soma* sacrifices collectively called *jyotiṣtoma*, among which are the seventeen-day-long Vājapeya and the Rājasūya, the royal consecration. Other well-known *śrauta* rituals are the sacrifices to the new and full moons (Darśapūrṇamāsau), the horse sacrifice (Aśvamedha), and the animal sacrifice (Paśubandha). Some Śrautasūtras end in more or less independent appendices called *śulbasūtras*; because they describe the exact layout of the sacrificial area (*vedi*), they are, in effect, the earliest Indian texts on geometry and mathematics.

In addition to rites that are part of the daily life of the householder and rituals on such occasions as building a house or digging a tank, the Gṛhyasūtras principally deal with the *samskāras*. These are the rites of passage that guide a Hindu through the various stages of his life, from conception until death, especially the Upanayana (his second birth, at which time he begins the study of the Veda and is invested with the sacred thread) and marriage. Many topics treated in the Gṛhyasūtras also appear in the Dharmasūtras, although the latter expand their teachings to cover all the duties and obligations of the different *āśramas* ("stages of life") and *varṇas* ("classes of society"). The Dharmasūtras, in prose, are considered to be the precursors of the versified Dharmasāstras.

Treatises in *sūtra* style also form the basic texts for the six Hindu *darśanas* (orthodox philosophical systems). They are Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras*, Bādarāyaṇa's *Uttaramīmāṃsā Sūtras*, or *Vedānta Sūtras*, Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtras*, Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, Kapila's *Sāṃkhya Sūtras*, and Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtras*. Some of these philosophical *sūtras* are so concise that they have lent themselves to divergent interpretations, and they have thus become the authoritative texts for very different philosophical systems. Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras*, for example, are the common source for all later schools of Vedānta, including Śaṅkara's Advaita, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭadvaita, and Madhva's Dvaita. The *sūtra* style was also adopted in certain Buddhist and Jain scriptures.

The area of *sūtra* literature in which the ideal of brevity and conciseness has been realized most perfectly is

the grammatical literature, which technically belongs to the Vedāṅgas, mentioned earlier. Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* not only uses as few words as possible; it has recourse to all kinds of devices to abbreviate the *sūtras*, such as the replacement of longer grammatical terms with shorter symbols. The commentators on Pāṇini's work go to great length to account for the presence and meaning of each and every syllable in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. [See the *biography of Pāṇini*.]

It would be misleading to suggest specific dates for the Kalpasūtras and for *sūtra* literature generally. The texts clearly belong to the end of the Vedic period, and they are thought to be earlier than the epic period. Allowing for exceptions belonging to earlier or later dates, we may safely situate the major part of the *sūtra* literature in the second half of the first millennium BCE.

[See also Śāstra Literature.]

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LUDO ROCHER

SUZUKI, D. T., westernized name of Suzuki Daisetsu Teitarō (1870–1966), Japanese lay Buddhist, author, and lecturer, known in Europe and America primarily for his expositions of Zen. Born on 18 October 1870 in Kanazawa in north central Japan, Suzuki was the youngest of five children. He attended local schools until age seventeen, when it became financially impossible for him to continue. Proficient at English, he taught it in primary schools for a few years and in 1891 moved to Tokyo, where he became a special student at what is now Waseda University. He then also began to frequent the Engakuji, a Zen monastery in Kamakura. His relationship there with the abbot Shaku Sōyen (1856–1919) was of critical importance for his later life. This was both because it was the basis for his knowledge of Zen and because Shaku Sōyen was chosen to represent Zen Buddhism at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 and would later arrange for Suzuki to become the assistant to the Illinois industrialist and amateur Orientalist Paul Carus (1852–1919), who was keenly interested in the translation and interpretation of Asian religious and philosophical texts. Suzuki went to America in 1897 and lived in LaSalle, Illinois, working as cotranslator with Carus until 1908.

During these years he made the first English translations of a number of important Buddhist texts and published his own *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism* (1907).

In 1908 Suzuki traveled to Europe and in Paris copied important materials on Chinese Buddhism newly discovered among the Tun-huang manuscripts. He returned to Japan in 1909 to teach English at the Peers' School (Gakushū-in) until 1921, at which time he accepted a chair in Buddhist philosophy at Ōtani University, a post held until his retirement. In 1911 he married Beatrice Erskine Lane, an American who frequently was his coeditor until her death in 1939. Although he made journeys to England, China, Korea, and America, Suzuki resided in Japan until 1950 and published voluminously both in Japanese and in English during these four decades. At the age of eighty Suzuki moved to New York. There, under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation, he began to lecture on Buddhism and Zen at a number of American campuses, especially at Columbia University, where he later became a visiting professor and until 1958 held lectures that were open to the general public. Most of his remaining years were spent in extensive travel and interaction with Westerners, including C. G. Jung, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Martin Heidegger, and Thomas Merton. He died in Tokyo on 12 July 1966.

Suzuki lived large portions of his long life both in Japan and in the West, and he pursued his work in both worlds. In Japan his career began differently from that of most academics, and for some years he was outside the mainstream there. Nevertheless his collected works in Japanese number thirty-two volumes, including many essays that contributed to a rekindling of scholarly and public interest in Buddhist subjects at a time when these were generally ignored by most of his Japanese contemporaries. Many of these studies are still untranslated; they include his content-analysis of certain Mahāyāna texts in Chinese as well as his appreciative appraisal of neglected Japanese such as the Zen monk Bankei (1622–1693), the records of the Myōkōnin or pious Pure Land believers of the Tokugawa era, and the religious component in the humorous art of Sengai (1750–1837). Many of his other more general essays in Japanese comprise a sustained insistence upon the formative importance of Buddhism—especially of its Zen and Pure Land forms—in the history of Japanese culture, a topic often less than popular in Japan during the first half of the twentieth century.

Suzuki's voluminous writings in English include *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (1930), a critical edition of the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* (1934–1936), and more popular works such as his *Essays in Zen Buddhism, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (1934), *Zen and Japanese Culture*

(rev. ed., 1959), and *The Training of a Zen Buddhist Monk* (1934). Certainly his facility with English, his extensive lecturing in America and Europe, and his participation in conferences all over the world brought Buddhism and Zen in particular to the attention of many who would otherwise have been totally unfamiliar with these topics.

Within the past few decades the Japanese have begun to refer to Suzuki as an important "thinker" (*shisōka*) and to assess his role in the intellectual and religious history of the twentieth century. An important full-length study in Japanese by Akizuki Ryōmin in 1959 compared Suzuki's Zen-based thought with the formal philosophy of Nishida Kitarō, widely considered the most important Japanese philosopher of the twentieth century. Akizuki stressed the continuity between the two scholars, pointing out that there is a philosophical dimension in Suzuki's writings on Zen just as there is an important Zen component in the more abstract writings of Nishida. The untranslated correspondence between these two lifelong friends bears witness to the closeness of their thought. Suzuki introduced the works of William James, particularly his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, to Nishida, and the latter found James's positive appraisal of religious experience much more to his liking than what he called the "lifeless" analyses of religion and ethics in the German philosophical works he was reading at the turn of the century. Suzuki, in turn, employed Nishida's analyses to insist upon the intellectual integrity of the Zen experience—even though he repeatedly resisted any suggestion that such experience could be grasped by the intellect alone. In his lecturing and writing for Westerners, especially when asked to suggest conceptual links to Western experience, Suzuki generally stressed the particularity of Zen and insisted that it was the the same as psychology, parapsychology, experience with hallucinogens, or even mysticism as a general category. His interest in Meister Eckhart was deep, however, and he recognized in Eckhart something equivalent to the basics of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Probably the most important change in his own thinking was a shift away from the identification of Buddhism as "scientific"; by his own admission, Suzuki came to hold that religion based on science is insufficient, and in his later years he even saw a need for religion to conduct a critique of science.

Concerning Suzuki's influence in the West, it is often said that he made Zen into an English word; certainly he helped to make Zen a topic of great public interest, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. His scholarship made basic Asian texts available in English, and although he has been criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to history, he clearly stimulated a dramatic surge of inter-

est in East Asia among American scholars. Through his lifelong dialogue with Western theologians and religionists, he contributed greatly to an awareness of the Buddhist tradition. Sometimes dismissed as merely a popularizer of Zen, he has also been hailed by the distinguished historian Lynn White, Jr., as someone whose writings broke through the "shell of the Occident" and made our thinking global. His influence upon twentieth-century Japan has also become increasingly clear: he championed Japan's inheritance of continental Buddhism during decades when nationalism focused upon Shintō. Moreover, his writings in Japanese and his obvious ability to make a credible presentation of Buddhism in the West have contributed to what some have called a twentieth-century renaissance of interest—at least an intellectual interest—in Buddhism on the part of the Japanese.

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WILLIAM R. LAFLEUR

SUZUKI SHŌSAN (1579–1655), Japanese Buddhist monk known for his advocacy of *Niō-zazen*, a meditative technique drawing upon both Zen and Pure Land methodologies. Shōsan was a bodyguard retainer (*hatamoto*) of Tokugawa Ieyasu and fought in the crucial battles that gave the Tokugawa family control of all Japan. In 1620, a few years after Ieyasu's death, Shōsan tonsured himself as a Zen monk, favoring the Sōtō sect. Yet he never formally became affiliated with any sect and soon set himself up as the master of a small temple and meditation center called Onshinji some miles out of Okazaki, near Asuke, his birthplace. After six or seven years there, he moved to the Edo (Tokyo) vicinity, where he lived the rest of his life as a semi-itinerant teacher and writer.

Although Shōsan was well known in Zen circles, his influence was negligible for two reasons: he never became an official member of any sect, and his meditative methods and emphasis were nontraditional. He

became widely known then and later for his so-called *Niō-zazen*. This "method" takes its name from Shōsan's use as models for meditation the images of the two fierce warrior-gods (Niō) that guard the entrance of many Buddhist temples in Japan, rather than the quietly seated Nyorai image. He also suggested as a model Fudō, the "angry" Buddha portrayed as wreathed in flames and with sword and lasso in either hand.

The reasons for this advocacy are given clearly by Shōsan. For beginners in meditation—and he considered every contemporary, including himself, as such—the Nyorai model was too passive. It did not embody the fierce energy necessary for successfully engaging in the hand-to-hand combat with one's self-love, which is essential for productive meditation. Hence he recommended setting the back teeth, tightly clenching the fists, scowling with a warrior's fierce glare, and repeating the Pure Land Nembutsu vigorously, all the while thinking, "I am about to die."

Although unique to Shōsan, *Niō-zazen* was not simply a casual mixture of Pure Land and Zen methodologies, as his detractors in both sects have alleged. Rather, it was a tangible embodiment of his dominant conviction that the Buddhist *dharma* must be made available to the masses in the most effective form, regardless of sectarian tradition. He was persuaded that Buddhism was being misperceived and bypassed as a passive, otherworldly faith in favor of "practical" and "useful" Confucianism. *Niō-zazen* was one way of combating this. But even more fundamentally, he sought to integrate Buddhism into the daily life of samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant. He preached the inherent sanctity of all honest labor as Heaven's appointment for earthly life. By so regarding it, and by combining daily activities with the continual saying of the Nembutsu, one could cut off evil thoughts, accumulate merit, and begin to walk the Buddha's way toward enlightenment. Hence he preached that all work could be made into Buddha work; that is, into genuine religious discipline.

This fusion of the sacred and the secular in daily life, made practical and specific in its form, was Shōsan's most important contribution to Buddhism. It is not to be seen as a mere assertion of the innate sacrality of the secular and the profane, regardless of religious tradition. It is an assertion of the potential sacredness of all human effort and a strong protest against a Buddhism interpreted as otherworldly detachment in the name of a religious transcendence of time and space.

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viceable treatment with substantial footnotes and a brief introductory treatment of Shōsan. Hajime Nakamura has dealt briefly with him in *A History of the Development of Japanese Thought*, vol. 2, *From 592 to 1868* (Tokyo, 1967), and "Suzuki Shōsan, 1579–1655, and the Spirit of Capitalism in Japanese Buddhism," *Monumenta Nipponica* 22 (1967): 1–14. Two essays, "Suzuki Shōsan, Wayfarer" and "Selections from Suzuki Shōsan," translated by Jocelyn and Winston King, appear in the *Eastern Buddhist* 12 (October 1979). See also my chapter "Practising Dying: The Samurai-Zen Death Techniques of Suzuki Shōsan," in *Religious Encounters with Death*, edited by Frank E. Reynolds and Earle H. Waugh (University Park, Pa., 1977), pp. 143–158, and my *Death Was His Kōan: The Samurai-Zen of Suzuki Shōsan* (Berkeley, 1985), which is a substantial treatment of Shōsan's life, thought, meditational method, and embodiment of Tokugawa social and religious values.

WINSTON L. KING

SVENTOVIT was the four-headed "god of gods" (*deum deus*) of the pre-Christian northwestern Slavs. His name, **Sventovit**, is variously written—as *Sventovit*, *Svantevit*, *Suatovitus*, and, in the *Knythlingasaga* (c. 1265), *Svantaviz*—but his cult is precisely described in the *Gesta Danorum* (14.564) of Saxo Grammaticus (late twelfth century).

The center for the worship of Sventovit was in Arkona, on the Baltic island of Rügen. In the center of town was the citadel-temple, a wooden structure of consummate workmanship, built with logs and topped by a red roof. Inside the surrounding fence was a barbican, whose four posts stood free of the outer walls of the temple and adjoined some of the beams of the roof. The inner chamber, partitioned by heavy tapestries, held an enormous statue of Sventovit. Its four heads and necks were joined together: facing north, south, east, and west, they apparently corresponded to the four columns of the barbican. The faces were beardless and the hair short. The statue's right hand held a drinking horn inlaid with various metals; the left was set akimbo. A close-fitting mantle, reaching to the idol's knees, was made of several kinds of wood. The idol stood on the temple floor, with its base hidden in the ground below. Nearby lay the god's bridle and saddle, along with an enormous sword whose blade and scabbard were richly chased and damascened with silver.

A retinue of three hundred horsemen served Sventovit, and the plunder they won in war went to the head priest. Saxo mentions that tribute was paid not only by the Wends but also by the Scandinavians. In time, a treasure of incredible value was amassed; when the Christian Danes stormed Arkona in 1168, they removed the statue and carried away seven boxes of treasure, including two gold beakers.

A white horse consecrated to Sventovit was venerated as an incarnation of the god himself. Success or failure in war was foretold through the horse in the following manner: three rows of palings or lances were laid by the priest in front of the temple; if the horse stepped across the first row with its right foot first, the omen was favorable. The prophetic role of the horse in the divination ceremonies of the northwestern Slavs is confirmed by its magic function in Russian popular tradition, particularly by the traditional horse epithet, *veshchii* ("seer"), which has an exact correspondence in the Avesta.

Shortly after harvest, a great festival was held in honor of Sventovit. Cattle were sacrificed, and prophecies were made from the quantity of mead that remained in the drinking horn held by the god: if the liquid had diminished during the previous year, a bad harvest was predicted for the next. At the end of the ceremony, the priest poured the old liquid out at the god's feet and refilled the vessel, asking the god to bestow victory on the country and to increase its wealth. Then a man-sized festal cake was brought in. Placing the cake between himself and the people, the priest asked if he was still visible; if the people answered in the affirmative, the priest expressed the wish that they would not be able to see him the next year. This ceremony was believed to ensure a better harvest for the following year. (Similar customs of foretelling the future from gigantic cakes are known among Belorussians and Russians in the twentieth century.)

Disposition of the Sventovit idol from Rügen is unknown. In 1857 a carved wooden post was discovered in Zbruch, near Husjatyn in southeastern Poland, that bears a striking resemblance to Saxo's description. Carved on all four sides, in four registers, it shows four terminal figures, one of which holds a drinking horn. Another four-headed statue, called Chetyrebog ("four-god"), stood in Tesnovka, near Kiev, until 1850. Prehistoric stone stelae depicting the same god, helmeted and holding a cornucopia in the right hand, and occasionally with a horse engraved on the back, are known from various Slavic territories. A stela from Stavchany, in the upper Dniester Basin, can be dated to the fourth to sixth century CE, but most of the finds are accidental and undated.

West Slavic four-headed military gods were variously named, but in fact they probably represent one multifaceted god, the archetypal Indo-European god of heavenly light. The gods Svarozhich, Iarovit, Porovit, and Sventovit, worshiped in West Slavic temples of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, seem to represent the seasonal aspects of the sun: the winter or "young" sun (Svarozhich), the spring sun (Iarovit), the summer sun

(Porovit), and the harvest sun (Sventovit). The Roman Janus Quadrifons ("four-faced") is a parallel, as is the Iranian four-faced warrior god Verethraghna.

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MARIJA GIMBUTAS

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA. See Vivekananda.

SWANS. Related to the elements of both air and water, the swan is a symbol of breath, spirit, transcendence, and freedom. In many religious traditions it is interchangeable with the goose or duck in signifying the soul. Swans connote both death beneath the waters and rebirth, or victory over death, in the air. The complexity of the symbol is reflected in its alchemical representation as the union of opposites, the mystic center.

A prominent motif among origin myths is the cosmogonic dive, in which a swan or other aquatic bird is sent by God to the depths of the primordial waters to bring back the "seed of earth," from which God creates the world. This image existed in manifold versions among prehistoric populations of northern and eastern Europe and, from the third millennium BCE, among the peoples of America. [See Prehistoric Religions, *article on Old Europe.*]

In Hindu iconography the swan personifies *brahman-ātman*, the transcendent yet immanent ground of being, the Self. Brahmā is often depicted borne on a swan, the divine bird that laid upon the waters the cosmic egg from which the god emerged. Variations of this image are common in Bali and Sri Lanka. The *paramahansa*

("supreme swan" or gander) represents freedom from bondage in the phenomenal sphere and is a term of honor addressed to mendicant ascetics. The *hansa* bird is carved on the ornamental bands of Kesava temple at Somnathpur, erected in 1268 and dedicated to Viṣṇu.

In ancient Egypt, swans were associated with the mystic journey to the otherworld, as they are in the shamanistic religions of North Asia. In ancient Greece, priests of the Eleusinian mysteries were regarded as descendants of the birds; after their immersion in the purifying waters they were called swans. Vase paintings of the fifth century BCE show the swan as their attribute. In its amatory aspect, the swan was sacred to Aphrodite and Venus and was the form assumed by Zeus as Leda's lover.

As a solar sign, the swan was the sun god's vehicle in Greece; it was assimilated to the *yang* principle in China and inscribed on one of the wings of Mithra, the Persian god of light. In Celtic myths, swan deities represent the beneficent, healing power of the sun. In the ancient religion of the Sioux Indians of the North American Plains, birds are reflections of divine principles, and the sacred white swan symbolizes the Great Spirit who controls all that moves and to whom prayers are addressed.

An ambivalent symbol in Judaism, the swan (or the duck or goose) is conspicuous on ceremonial objects although categorized as a bird of defilement in the Bible. In the Christian tradition, it symbolizes purity and grace and is emblematic of the Virgin. The belief that swans sing with their dying breath has linked them with martyrs.

Folklore is rich in legends of swan maidens and swan knights. Believed to have been totemistic figures and original founders of clans, the half-human, half-supernatural beings who metamorphosed into swans became images of spiritual power. The skiff that carried the archangelic grail knight Lohengrin, a savior sent by God to overcome evil, was drawn by a swan. The motif of the swan maiden or knight is widely disseminated in mythology and ritual throughout Europe, India, Persia, Japan, Oceania, Africa, and South America. [For further discussion of this motif, see Horses.]

The bird's sweet song has made it a perennial metaphor in the arts. The Egyptians associated it with the harp; the Greeks, with the god of music; and the Celts deemed its song magical. Shakespeare was known as the Swan of Avon; Homer, the Swan of Maeander; and Vergil, the Mantuan Swan. Ever since Plato had Socrates aver that swans "sing more merrily at the approach of death because of the joy they have in going to the god they serve," the term *swan song* has been an epithet for an artist's last work.

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ANN DUNNIGAN

SWAZI RELIGION. The Swazi are part of the vast Bantu-speaking population of southern Africa, and their rich cultural heritage is a fusion of Nguni and Sotho elements. Prior to the incursion of colonial and Western influences they were Iron Age horticulturalists and cattle pastoralists, organized into centralized chieftancies. Polygyny and patrilineal descent characterize the kinship system.

The Swazi developed their particular national identity under a dual monarchy represented by a hereditary king of the Nkosi Dlamini clan and a queen mother (the mother of the king or, if she is dead, a surrogate). Unlike other African kingdoms that came under British colonial rule, the Swazi were never conquered by direct force, and much of their traditional culture survived and flourished under the leadership of King Sobhuza II (1899–1982). A direct lineal descendant of the founder of the royal Dlamini dynasty, Sobhuza was internationally acknowledged in 1968 as king and head of the newly created, independent state of Swaziland.

In 1982, approximately half a million Swazi lived in the Kingdom of Swaziland, an arbitrarily demarcated country of 6,705 square miles wedged between the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Mozambique. This tiny kingdom, the heartland of traditional culture, is ecologically diverse and rich in natural resources. Its wealth includes fertile soils, abundant perennial bush pasturage, forests alive with wondrous trees and wild animals, precious minerals, and four major rivers and several streams. Some 40 percent of all land, the legacy of colonial concessions, is

owned by whites. Although few Swazi are able to support themselves with agriculture or pastoralism and most rely on wage labor, they remain deeply attached to their ancestral lands and to their cattle. The land is vested in the king as trustee for the nation, and its use is allocated by hereditary chiefs to heads of homesteads. Throughout the region, the king and queen mother are renowned for their knowledge of ritual "to work the rain," the symbol of fertility and "the water of life."

Swazi traditionalists perceive a majestic order in their universe, one alive with powers, *emandla* (a collective noun that has no singular). These powers continue through time and are not bound by space. They appear in diverse forms and operate with varying degrees of potency. They are *in* substance rather than *of* substance; in water, not of water; in earth, not of earth; in man, not of man. Among the Swazi, no rigid division is drawn between natural and supernatural. No substance is considered immutable. Sacred and secular are shifting dimensions of a total reality in which human behavior may influence the elements as much as the elements influence the human condition. Between them there is perpetual and dynamic interaction.

The Swazi have no elaborate myth of creation. The world is there, mysterious and wonderful. In the symbolic system of the Swazi, there is a diversified hierarchy of powers connecting humans to each other and to the cosmos. In the mythical distance is Mvelamqandi ("who-appeared-first") generally described as a power "above," unapproachable, unpredictable, of no specific sex. He/she is sometimes identified with, and sometimes distinguished from, Mkhulumqandi, the first *mkhulu*, a term applied to a grandfather, symbolic mediator between those living on the earth and those "below," the ancestors, *emadloti*. Mvelamqandi occasionally sent as his messenger Mlengamunye, the "one-legged" (interpreted as oneness, unity), who descended in a thick mist and whose appearance, visible only to women and children, portended the coming of "fever," a generic term for a variety of illnesses; thus Mlengamunye had to be propitiated with symbolic sacrifices. He was last seen in the reign of King Mbandzeni (1875–1889), during a period of early missionary activity. Although Mvelamqandi, Mkhulumqandi, and Mlengamunye are no longer mentioned in prayer or sacrifice, Swazi theologians, including Sobhuza, have referred to these three divinities, as well as to other powers in the pantheon—such as the rainbow, titled Inkosatana ("the princess"); the lightning, titled Inyoni ("the bird"); and a water serpent, titled Inyoka Yemakhandakhanaa ("the snake with many heads")—to emphasize a sacred and hierarchical order of the cosmos.

The earth is seen as stationary; the calendar of reli-

gious events, both national and domestic, is regulated by the visible movements of the sun against fixed points on the horizon and by its position in relation to the waxing and waning of the moon. The divinity of the king is associated with the sun—radiant, burning, source of both heat and light, journeying across the sky in a more or less regular path twice a year, controlling the seasons and the productive activities of nature. The moon has its own internal dialectic, associated with fertility, femininity and growth, decline and rebirth. Ceremonies to introduce a person into the fullness of a new status take place when the moon is growing or when it is full. A ceremony that temporarily isolates a man from his fellows is held in the period of the moon's decline and darkness.

The earth, mother to the living and the dead, must be approached with reverence. When a person dies, all in the homestead are prohibited from digging, plowing, or planting, or in other ways "wounding" the earth until the body has been buried and the mourners purified. When Sobhuza died in late August 1982 (the time of the first rains), such prohibitions were imposed throughout the kingdom until the rising of the third moon. The fact that rain did not fall for several weeks afterward and that the country was threatened by drought and famine was interpreted as a reaction to this disturbance in the balance between human actions, the ancestors, and cosmic powers.

The king and the queen mother together represent the physical embodiment of sacred power, as indicated by their traditional titles, *ingwenyama* ("the lion") and *indlovukah* ("the she-elephant"). These are two of the most powerful animals in nature: the lion—male, father of many cubs, aggressive, carnivorous; the she-elephant—maternal, matriarchal, stable, firm, herbivorous, mother of one calf after a long period of gestation. Together the two monarchs are spoken of as "a twin," a mysterious, unequal double, united in a relationship riddled with ambivalence. Their everyday actions—eating, drinking, bathing, dressing—are circumscribed by taboos, and they receive unique treatment to endow them with the "shadow of sovereignty."

At the observable, sociological level, the queen mother and king live in separate homesteads; hers is the sacred center, his is the administrative capital. Their duties are complementary; the balance of power is delicate, and tension between them is believed to endanger the physical condition of the country. The most sacred objects are in the care of the queen mother, and the king must come to the shrine of the nation to address his royal ancestors and offer sacrifices. The correct performance of rituals takes considerable time, concentration, and self-discipline. While the secrets of

specific rituals are known to appointed representatives of historically associated clans, only the king is "owner" of all.

Swazi religion sanctions enjoyment of the material and physical: food, women, and dancing. It does not idealize poverty or place a value on suffering as a means to happiness or salvation. To deal with the hazards of life—failure of crops, unfaithfulness of women, illness and ultimate death—the culture provides a set of optimistic notions and positive, stereotyped techniques that are especially expressed through the ancestral cult, the vital religion of the Swazi.

In the ancestral cult, the world of the living is projected into the world of spirits (*emadloti*), who continue the patterns of superiority and inferiority established by earthly experiences as man or woman, old or young, aristocrat or commoner.

Swazi believe that the spirit, or breath, has an existence distinct from that of the flesh. When a person dies, both flesh and spirit must be correctly treated to safeguard the living and show appropriate respect for the dead. Mortuary ritual varies according to both the status of the deceased and his or her relationship with different categories of mourners. The flesh is buried in a cattle kraal, hut, cave, or royal grove. The spirit, after a brief period of aimless wandering, is ritually "brought back" at a sacrificial feast to the family circle.

For conservatives, irrespective of rank or age, the ancestors are an integral part of the reality of routine daily life. Their presence is all-pervasive; their relationships to each category of members of the kinship circle—married, unmarried, agnates, and in-laws—affect the language, movements, and clothing of the living. This is particularly conspicuous in the laws of "respect" governing the behavior of a married woman, the outsider brought in to perpetuate the husband's lineage (e.g., she must avoid speaking any word containing the first syllable of the names of particular senior male in-laws; she must not walk in front of the entrance to the shrine or through the cattle kraal). Visitors, on entering a homestead, on receiving food or other hospitality, praise the headman, not as an individual, but by reciting the names of his clan; clan praises are ancestral commemorations.

It is through the ancestors that Swazi confront the universal issues of mortality and morality. *Emadloti* represent continuity through fertility. They may appear in dreams, or they may materialize temporarily as "snakes" (e.g., the king as a terrifying mamba, the queen mother as a beautiful lizard, a wife as a harmless green garden snake).

Illness and other misfortunes are frequently attributed to the ancestors, but Swazi believe that *emadloti*

do not inflict sufferings through malice or wanton cruelty. The mean husband, the adulterous wife, the over-ambitious younger brother, the disobedient son may be dealt with directly or vicariously by the spirits, who thus act as custodians of correct behavior and social ethics. Ancestors punish, they do not kill; death is brought about by evildoers (*batsakatsi*), who are interested in destroying, not in perpetuating, the lineage or the state. If an illness originally divined as sent by the *emadloti* later becomes fatal, evildoers are assumed to have taken advantage of the patient's weakened condition. Ancestors have greater wisdom, foresight, and power than the rest of mankind, but they are not considered omnipotent.

Swazi have no class of ordained priests, and the privileged duty of appealing to the *emadloti* rests with the head of the family. The father acts on behalf of his sons; if he is dead, the older brother acts on behalf of the younger. In this patrilineal society, ancestors of a married woman remain at her natal home, approachable only by her senior male kinsmen. Contact is usually made through the medium of "food" (meat, beer, or tobacco snuff); the dead, who are said to be often hungry, "lick" the essence of the offerings laid at dusk on an altar in the shrine hut and left overnight.

Emadloti are spoken of with respect and fear, and they are routinely addressed with the formality demanded by living elders. But they are not adored or worshiped. They are approached as practical beings, and appeals to them are sometimes spontaneous and conversational, interspersed with rebukes and generally devoid of gratitude. There is no conflict between the ethics of the ancestral cult and the mundane desires of life. Swazi desire the ends they say the *emadloti* desire for them.

Interpreting the messages of the ancestors is the task of diviners (*tangoma*), the main specialists in deep, esoteric knowledge. They are called upon to reveal the cause of illness or misfortune (the particular offense or the specific ancestor who must be "remembered" or appeased), and they indicate, but do not carry out, the cure (ritual sacrifice, purification, or medical treatment). *Tangoma* work in collaboration with specialists in medicines (*tinyanga temitsi*), but whereas the latter acquire their knowledge voluntarily and deliberately, each diviner is "entered," often against his or her will, by an ancestral spirit who takes control.

The training of diviners is lengthy and arduous. They suffer both mentally and physically, and when they finally qualify, "reborn like the new moon," their entire being has changed. Dressed in the strange costume of their new calling, they demonstrate their powers in a public séance, accompanying their performances with

inspired songs and dances. Techniques of divination vary; some diviners use material objects (bones, shells, roots), while others rely on "feel" or verbal cues. There is no fixed hierarchy of diviners, and reputations fluctuate. Though some individual diviners are recognized as frauds and others are seen as fallible, perception through possession by the ancestors is never challenged.

Diviners, who are often of exceptional intelligence, perform within the legal framework of religion. In this capacity they practice against evildoers (witches and sorcerers) who act illegally, in secret and horrible ways, some through an innate propensity for evil, others through deliberate use of material substances, including poisons and parts of the human body. Political leaders and other aristocrats employ medicine men and diviners to bolster their positions, but are actively discouraged from becoming either medicine men or diviners themselves, since this would interfere with their administrative duties and does not fit into their ascribed status. The Ingwenyama is believed to have deeper knowledge than any of his subjects and to be able to detect and destroy evildoers by virtue of his royal blood reinforced by unique royal potions.

The king and his mother take the lead in the cycle of national rituals. The most dramatic and illuminating example is the Ncwala, a ritual which grows in elaboration and potency as the king increases in power. If the king dies and his successor is a minor, a very attenuated ceremony, known as the Simemo, is performed. (On Sobhuza's death, the council selected as his heir a boy of fourteen years.) Traditionally, the first full Ncwala should be performed when the young king reaches full manhood and is married to two ritual queens.

Ncwala is divided into two parts, Little Ncwala and Big Ncwala. Little Ncwala, which opens when the sun reaches its resting place in the south and the moon has waned, lasts two days and symbolizes the break with the old year. Big Ncwala, which opens when the moon is full and lasts six days, symbolically revitalizes the king and fortifies the nation against evildoers within the country and enemies outside its borders. In the liminal period, sacred dances and songs are practiced throughout the country, ritual costumes are prepared, and sacred ingredients are collected by national priests. Swazi participants, as well as foreign analysts, interpret the complex ritual at various levels of meaning.

Ingwenyama is recognized as the "owner" of Ncwala. Anyone else who attempts to "dance Ncwala" is judged guilty of treason. Politically, Ncwala is a reflection of rank in which major social categories—princes, chiefs, queens, councillors, and warriors in age regiments—are visibly distinguished from each other by sacred costumes and perform distinctive roles in the service of

Ingwenyama as symbol of the nation. At another level, Ingwenyama is mystically identified with the miraculous and ever-changing powers in nature—the sun and the moon, not as separate elements but in their interaction. The king's body is bathed with "waters of all the world" drawn from rivers and from the ocean by two groups of national priests, each group carrying a sacred gourd titled Inkosatana, "the princess," which is also the title of the rainbow. Ingwenyama "bites" of the green foods of the new year and also of the organs of a fierce black bull which has been thrown and pummeled to the rhythm of a lullaby by a regiment of "pure youths who have not yet spilled their strength in children."

The king appears in the ceremonies in a variety of unique clothing, whether it be a penis sheath of ivory on his naked body or, as at the climax of the main day, an indescribably elaborate costume of bright green, razor-edged grass and evergreen shoots. With his face half hidden by a cap of black plumes over a headband of lion skin, he is an awe-inspiring creature of the wild.

On the final day of the ritual, the day of purification, relics of the past year are burned on a pyre in the *sibaya* (cattle kraal) of the capital village, and rain, symbolizing the blessing of the ancestors, must fall to extinguish the flame and drench the rulers and their people.

A complementary and less elaborate women's ritual, Mhlanga (from the word for "reed," a symbol of fertility), centers on the queen mother. Each winter, unmarried girls are sent on a pilgrimage to marshy areas to cut the long supple reeds needed to repair the fences surrounding the enclosures of the queen mother and the queens. The reeds must be golden ripe, not brittle, the tassles full, and the seeds not yet dispersed. The girls wear brief costumes to reveal their beauty and purity, and singing and dancing are essential for the performance. The king must be present; the girls are feasted and the ancestors offered their share.

Although early missionaries who preached the Protestant ethic condemned traditional Swazi beliefs and practices, Swazi rulers were interested in learning the new religion. From their point of view, the ancestral cult is not incompatible with the basic tenets of Christianity, only with the specific applications of the tenets that missionaries have made.

Sobhuza never identified himself with any specific denomination, but his role as priest-king of the entire country was increasingly recognized during his reign not only by independent African churches, but by some of the more conventional congregations as well. Queen mothers have retained their affiliation with individual churches while at the same time carrying out their traditional ritual duties. Priests of independent churches participate in Ncwala, and members of any denomina-

tion may hold services in the Lobamba National Church, an impressive structure completed in 1978 in the ambience of the ritual capital. The extent to which this symbiotic process will continue is unpredictable. As long as the myth of the Swazi divine kingship retains a political hold over the Swazi, this will be ritualized in the Ncwala. If the myth is abandoned and Swazi kingship ends or is made subordinate to other myths with different loyalties and interests (such as individual equality), both the ritual and the underlying political meaning of the Ncwala will be lost. But judging from the histories of other African societies, the Swazi will hold to their belief in the ancestors and in diviners.

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My study "A Ritual of Kingship among the Swazi," *Africa* 14 (1944): 230–256, also included in *An African Aristocracy*, is a detailed ethnographic account of Ncwala based on participant observation and texts. The ritual has received different interpretations by scholars with diverse theoretical approaches. The most significant of these studies are Max Gluckman's *Rituals of Rebellion in South-east Africa* (Manchester, 1954), which emphasizes political and social functions; T. O. Beidelman's "Swazi Royal Ritual," *Africa* 36 (October 1966): 373–405, which interprets the cosmological system and makes use of Jungian psychology; and Luc de Heusch's *Mythes et rites bantous*, vol. 2, *Rois nés d'un coeur de vache* (Paris, 1982), which sets the Ncwala in a broad comparative framework built on a brilliant, Lévi-Straussian analysis of sacred kingship in Africa.

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SWEARING. See Vows and Oaths.

SWEDENBORG, EMANUEL (1688–1772), Swedish scientist and mystic. He was descended from mining families, although his father was an ecclesiastic. After completing academic studies at the University of Uppsala, Swedenborg traveled abroad to study science and

its technical applications. On returning to Sweden in 1715 he became assessor in the Royal College of Mines, a position he held until 1747. At first he pursued research in mining technique and natural philosophy, but after a profound religious crisis in 1743–1744 he abandoned his scientific work, obeying a divine mission to teach mankind the true meaning of the scriptures.

Swedenborg founded his philosophy of nature on the system of Descartes. In a series of studies culminating in *Principia rerum naturalium* (1734) he presented a theory about the origin of the universe. Starting from a mathematical point of departure, he envisioned the planetary system as developing by a series of complicated particle combinations. Swedenborg tried to integrate the human soul into this consistently mechanistic structure, and in *De infinito* (1734) he presented his future research program "to prove the immortality of the soul to the senses themselves." This empirical intention led him into an extensive study of contemporary physiology and anatomy and of both ancient and modern philosophy, resulting in the publication of *Oeconomia regni animalis* (The Economy of the Animal Kingdom; 1740–1741), and *Regnum animale* (1744–1745).

Swedenborg's study of the human body as the kingdom of the soul led him to search for an adequate means of expression. Inspired by his reading of Leibniz and Wolff, he first attempted to construct a mathematical language but went on to develop his "doctrine of correspondence." According to this doctrine, all phenomena of the physical world have their spiritual correspondences. Consequently, the substitution of corresponding terms of a spiritual import for key words in sentences referring to nature transforms a natural statement into a spiritual statement or a theological dogma.

After his religious crisis, this doctrine of correspondence became Swedenborg's main instrument for uncovering the hidden meaning of scripture. In an eight-volume work, *Arcana caelestia* (The Heavenly Arcana; 1749–1756), he presented the results of his interpretation of *Genesis* and *Exodus*. After each exegetical chapter he also reported on what he had heard and seen in his supernatural experiences.

Swedenborg did not believe in Christian redemption. His theological system is extremely anthropocentric; the spiritual world is populated exclusively by deceased human beings grouped together according to their innermost affections into heavenly or infernal societies that together form a huge man, Maximus Homo. Swedenborg regarded Christ as the highest manifestation of humanity, *divinum humanum*. His teachings were thus seen as heretical, and in his last years ecclesiastical proceedings were taken against some of his Swedish disciples.

In England the first Swedenborgian congregation was founded in the late 1780s, and in the same decade his doctrines were introduced into the United States. Out of these small groups of dedicated pupils grew a worldwide movement of Swedenborgians. A number of congregations in several parts of the world are presently united in different branches of the New Church that Swedenborg was called to erect on earth. The most important center of the movement today is the New Church Academy in Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania.

Swedenborg may have been most influential in the sphere of literature. Emerson chose him as one of his subjects in *Representative Men* (1850), and many of the greatest poets of Western literature, particularly in the Romantic and Symbolist traditions, have referred to Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence as a vision of the truth hidden by the confusion of sense data and everyday language.

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WORDS. See Blades.

SYMBOLIC TIME is understood to be the temporal form that organizes the symbols of a religious system into an order of periodicity. The analysis of symbolic time extends the understanding of religion as a symbolic system, so that the major functions of time within the system may be taken into account: (1) the time intrinsic to the formation of religious symbols and to the ritual performance (i.e., the time that is internal to the sacred event), (2) the connection that symbolic time has with the history and dynamic of a religious social bond, and (3) the time that is specific to the intentional life of the individual.

Intentional Character of Symbolic Time. Symbolic periodicity encompasses, in its temporal structure, both change and duration, implying a sheer sequence of symbolic events and also a type of internal correlation of events and symbols that reflects the functional unity of the interval of time and the continuity of its structure.

The calendrical structure of the symbolic system has a complexity that differs from that of a means of time reckoning or chronology. The temporal order of symbolic events is quite different from the abstract concept

of time as a continuous quantity infinitely divisible into successive parts that are homogeneous and impenetrable (Hubert and Mauss, 1909, p. 190). When compared with the chronological succession of cosmological time units, the symbolic performative system of festivals within a given culture or historical religion appears to be discontinuous and to have an uneven distribution over the sequence of the year. An order of precedence among religious festivals emphasizes a single festival, or set of festivals, around which the entire calendrical performance of the symbolic system is organized and that is replicated as the periodical structure of the religious year. Calendrical periodicity has an order that is temporally specific and reflects the dynamics of the symbolic function. It cannot be adequately analyzed by means of a descriptive model of the immediate empirical form of cyclic repetition.

The analysis of symbolic time may be pursued by linking the periodical structure of the religious symbols to the relational character of the symbol itself. It is possible to identify the dominant symbols that constitute the paradigmatic structure of a symbolic system and to identify their symbolic components and processual aspects, which define the dynamic movement of symbolic time.

A dominant symbol is a processual unity of word, semiotic transformation of an object of mediation, and action. It is structured as a relation that mediates a dynamic order of reality. Each symbolic feature is formed in such a way as to be a relational structure that binds two or more polarities to each other. As a unity, the religious symbol is generated within the dynamic of a relation between the subject and God, or an ultimate reality that has the capacity to condition the life of the subject. In their complex temporal features, symbols are the work of reason and the structures of perception, the dynamics of value, and the form of action in an intentional condition that comes into being when a constitutive relation between polar subjects appears as a new possibility or a new necessity.

In this sense, religious symbols are structures that are formed in the course of action and in the elaboration of experience. Symbol formation is present in the mental activity of the individual from the earliest stages; it is the way by which the relation with reality is established. But the temporal analysis of the type of processual structures that are differentiated by the religious symbol shows that the relation may not be defined simply in terms of subjectivity or in terms of intersubjective exchange. The central structure of a religious symbol defines the condition itself of "being in relation," the condition that we shall call intentionality or intentional

bond; a symbol articulates the effective relation that conditions the life of the intentional subjects.

Symbols differentiate the direct expression and performance of the bond that relates the subject with the intentional object. The symbolic bond has a polar structure: it is constituted both by the orientation of the subject toward the object and by the way in which the object is determinant and active in the intentional life of the subject. The symbol is also performative because it elaborates the cognitive and dynamic structure of the intentional relation itself.

Symbolic time in its specifically religious form is the result of a temporal elaboration of the intentional exchange with an ultimate reality. This temporal elaboration represents a dynamic, generative process. In fact, symbols are temporally correlated in such a way as to constitute the nascent state of a bond with an intentional reality and to resolve unviable conditions in that relation. We shall call the temporal development and articulation of symbols within a symbolic system the *figura*.

As the specific modality of the bond, a religious "public" symbol and the *figura* have a temporally complex structure. The symbol does not define exclusively or simply a subjective or intersubjective perception of and orientation toward a significant reality. Nor does the symbol, as the synthesis of the intentional process of a bipolar dynamic, present merely the synthetic form of probability of a logical inference. Instead, being the structure that defines the dynamic of an effective relation of the intentional bond, the "public" symbol is a temporal relation of relations in the sense that it defines the transformation by which the subjective perception emerges into a form of reciprocity, which is constitutive of an intentional bond.

This process of transformation to public intentional form corresponds to the epigenesis of a new intentional and social reality and to the cultural creations that have produced, through time, a vital bond. The path from a subjective to a "public" symbol progresses through a symbolic innovation, differentiated by the *figura*. It traces into specific structures of dominant symbols and into their temporal correlation a sheer sequence from past to future of temporal symbolic modalities, from the original insight to a condition of vital presence to a new structural orientation of action that expresses the time and the creative character of the bond. The religious *figura*, itself, has an historical formation that has come about through the actions of founders, the creativity of individuals and collective movements that have produced innovation within a tradition of forms of religious relation. The temporal di-

mension is intrinsic to the public symbol because it corresponds to the dynamic structure of the intentional relation, to its unity and transformation.

Symbols are generated within the intentional relation and constitute necessary structures and functions by which the new reality becomes and remains intentional. Formed within the intentional exchange, symbols are complex facts that differentiate the generative force of relation. They elaborate the internal principle of causality, the order of necessity, and the temporal logic that is stated within an intentional reality.

Because the symbol is both temporal and intentional, it is possible to interpret the symbolic or religious system not primarily as a system of signification, as analogical representation, nor simply as a set of metaphors, but as a processual structure that elaborates the forms of the "condition of being in relation" and the dynamics of the nascent state that is created within the ultimate intentional relation. The connotative and denotative features of signification that the symbol clearly presents may, consequently, be seen to be functions of the primary structure of the symbol as intentional relation.

The temporal function indicates that the symbol is the constant empirical constituent of the intentional relation. The religious symbol is a temporal artifact specific to the dynamic generated in the intentional relation. It is not an independent object but the temporal creativity in which the actual intentional event has its passage to a public, new bond. This applies not only to the individual symbol but also to the symbolic system as it is shaped by the interrelation of sacred text, symbolic forms of intentional exchange, and symbolic action.

Three theoretical elements, therefore, define symbolic time, namely, *figura*, periodicity, and intentional epigenesis. The "*figura*" is the set of symbols that are temporally correlated into a periodical system, and it is the original central structure of time within the intentional event. For this reason, the *figura* is the minimal unit of analysis of the symbolic temporal function. Periodicity defines the correlation of the symbols within a temporal interval. Intentionality, as the relational character of the symbols, is the epigenetic process, the nascent state of an intentional bond.

The temporal function of the *figura* is the dynamic process of a presence that has an intentional character. In the development from the first insight to an intentional bond, the *figura* is directed toward the resolution of the tension between those factors that are generative of an intentional bond and those that move in a contrary direction and finally destroy the bond or reduce its vitality. The formation of a *figura* and its perform-

ance is the result of a sequence of historical choices and actions related to the formation and selection of symbolic institutional structures. The *figura* reflects the experience of long periods of trial and error in the historical formation of a religious tradition, a sacred history, and a people. The intentional character of the *figura* becomes most evident in the language and action of the sacrifice and in the formulation of the sacred bond.

By formalizing the "relational" aspect of the symbols and of the development of the *figura* and by correlating it with the symbolic, sequential, and performative movement of the *figura*, we may specify the intentional character of periodicity presented by symbolic time.

Intentional Epigenesis and Formation of the *Figura*. The process of formation of the religious bond within a sacred history corresponds to the development of symbolic structures of a divine encounter and union. Defined in its relational character both of divinization and of incarnation, the development is a process of transcendence that has the temporal structure of a total object relation. The total object relation is an intentional action that transforms the bond from subjective to public. It is a nascent state within the intentional event that guides the passage from an inadequate modality of relation (in which the subject attempts to appropriate the value of life represented by the object and to negate the intentional value of the object and the constitutive and vital character of the relation) to a modality of the bond in which the object is restored to its original value as object of relation. With this epigenetic movement, both subject and object come to be recognized in their wholeness as vital to the bond, and the bond becomes a creative condition of intentional life.

In theological or religious language, the epigenetic sequence is often expressed in terms of the transformation from death to life, from darkness to light, from slavery to freedom through a time and history of salvation.

A total object relation allows the recognition of the other as total object. This is achieved by means of a resolution of the dynamics and structural intentional modalities of a partial object relation that are destructive or appropriative of the object and therefore inadequate to the condition of reciprocity of an intentional bond. This occurs through a creative intentional initiative (gift, sacrifice) in which the intentional dynamics of the partial object relation are transformed from appropriative to reciprocal and through models of thought and action that sustain intentional reciprocity in the creation of sociocultural institutions that express the bond. It follows from this that the nascent state and the epigenesis of a total object relation, in its temporal sym-

bolic structure, is a sequence of intentional positions that build a symbolic intentional bond. Each passage from one intentional position to another is guided, in its unity, by particular dominant symbols.

The temporal correlation of the dominant symbols is the order of successive creations of the intentional relation; this develops the nascent state into a vital form of life and corresponds to the sacred history of the bond.

The initial stages of the sequence are not merely incidental to the development of a vital cultural and institutional bond. They are, instead, the necessary elements, stages, and modalities of the temporal process of the bond itself.

Symbolic time is a generative symbolic form. It traces and differentiates a specific way by which human action, in a given intentional bond, both at the level of the individual and of the collectivity, becomes intentionally creative. The nascent state related to the figura is a process of formation of something new, the specific event of the coming into being of an intentional bond, a dynamic covenant that constitutes a new order of possibility and the creation of new cultural and institutional forms. The figura is the generative time of an intentional public bond that has been brought about by a transformation of the structure of intentional relations and by the symbolic and institutional elaboration of intentional existence.

The intentional character of the figura within the development of a sacred history is differentiated as the paradigmatic action, the symbolic agent (identified as founder, hero, or prophet), and the normative order of intentional life. Symbolic time is, therefore, interior to the intentional relation of the bond, and symbols are structures that both differentiate and connect the initial perception of reality to the elaboration of concrete forms of relation and to their articulation through time.

Ritual Performance. The figura, as it is represented by a calendrical order, makes use of three types of temporal parameters: time units, rules of symbolic performance, and sets of festivals or rituals. The "time units" are periodical intervals normally related to astronomical measurements of the solar and lunar year, the solstices and equinoxes, the month, the week, and the day. [See Calendars.] The set of performative rules defines the logic of interrelation of the symbolic features of word, action, and object in the form of intentional exchange and coordinates the different symbols in such a way as to express the intentional structure of the figura through its temporal periodical performance. [See Ritual.] Festivals are symbolic public actions that have a mythic and ritual structure.

The features of the three main temporal parameters are correlated so that a condition of time is created that

is periodical. The temporal coordination of the dominant symbols is ritualized in a calendrical, repetitive form.

The different festivals and their distribution, which is, as we have seen, uneven and discontinuous through the year, correspond to the calendrical coordination of specific events of the epigenetic sequence. These events are correlated into a performative paradigm that has the pattern of a "fact coming into being" (*fait naissant*). This performative pattern, which structures the individual ritual and permeates the periodicity of the figura, has a tripartite structure consisting of a phase of separation and deconstruction, of limen, and of restructuration and organization into a new relationship (van Gennep, 1960; Turner, 1969). In the first phase the ritual subjects become detached from their former modalities of intentional relation and from their structural expression; in the last phase a new cultural and structural bond is created in which the individual and the collectivity express a new intentional modality. The celebration of the intentional bond occurs in the liminal phase of the ritual and is centered in the performance of the sacrifice. The central phase is liminal and transitional: the ritual actors are freed from structural or social definition while they acquire a new symbolic definition.

The performative paradigm of the figura elaborates the three main phases and conditions of the epigenetic sequence that are intrinsic to the formation of a bond: the originating occasion and condition of the fact coming into being, which carries with it the resolution of modalities that are contrary to the bond, the definition of the bond through the sacrifice, and the public and historical structures instituted by the bond. The whole corresponds to the nascent state and to the process of adaptation within the intentional bond.

Every festival, and indeed the figura as a whole, creates a confrontation between the new and the old, between viable and unviable modalities of the bond. Through the performative pattern, the figura roots the continuity of the cultural symbolic institution in a constant dynamic process.

The Periodicity of the Figura. The figura is predicated on the correlation of the epigenetic and performative paradigms. In the case of the Christian tradition, the figura is centered on the three initiatory sacramental symbols of baptism, eucharist, and confirmation. The epigenetic model is defined in terms of transformation from a condition of death to one of life. The transformation is elaborated in a structural and dynamic sequence of active and passive exchanges between God and man. The line of action of God toward man initiates the sequence and is coordinated—in a dialogical struc-

ture—with a complementary line of action of man toward God. Initiated by gift, the sequence passes through a creative intentional crisis that is specified in the sacrifice and leads, at the end of the process of transformation, to a differentiation of a total object relation. The performative model of the festivals of Easter time (which articulates the three dominant sacramental symbols and which is central to the religious year) constitutes an order of relation between intentional events that have been differentiated through the “history of salvation” from creation and the original relation with God to the constitution of the covenant.

From the point of view of the epigenetic performative sequence, the order of “events” in a sacred history derives its significance and constitutive character not primarily from the chronological aspect of the sequence but from its relation to the dynamics and transformations of the intentional bond and from the conditions of continuity of that bond. Together the two complementary models, the epigenetic and the performative, constitute the periodical order of a religious figura which, in its temporal unity, sustains the dynamic continuity of the intentional relation. The three phases of the ritual process translate each of the three epigenetic positions and the sequence as a whole, which develops the institutional forms of the intentional relation into the performative pattern of a fact coming into being.

The sacrifice is at the center of the figura both in the epigenetic sequence and in the performative process. As the point of qualitative change in the creation of the bond, the sacrifice is the active resolution of what is contradictory to the bond and the affirmation of a new condition of total object relation. In the ritual process, the sacrifice specifies the structural differentiation of the intentional bond in its “coming into being.” The ritual process may be described as a performative sequence that has an epigenetic function.

The performative articulation of symbols and festivals creates the temporal order of the positions of epigenesis through the ritual sequence while maintaining the explicit connection of each festival and dominant symbol with the central symbolic position elaborated by the sacrifice. This results in a periodical correlation of the different symbols with the transformative structure of the sacrifice. While festivals mark the change related to the symbolic positions, the sacrifice renews the central dynamic of the nascent state of the bond. This periodical process of the figura creates a “dynamic state,” which corresponds to the complex intentional relation of the bond.

The calendrical system elaborates the periodical temporal order of the figura, which is ritually performed in the interval of the year through a set of festivals. Recur-

rent intervals of the year, like the week or the day, offer a rhythmic movement of religious time repeating in ritual form the central paradigm of the figura.

The performance of the figura, which is the original central structure of time, is also the anamnesis and memorial of the foundation of the bond. The historical formation of the calendar shows a progressive differentiation of a set of festivals, which is correlated to the central structure of the figura and which celebrates the apotheosis of the historical founder, the unity of the people of the covenant, and the celebration of those events that have been most significant for the historical continuity and development of the bond. The two orders of time, the periodical symbolic structure of the bond and the celebration of the continuity and the tradition of the bond, are frequently positioned along two discrete temporal axes within the periodical interval of the year. For example, the epigenetic performance may be positioned on the lunar axis; the celebration of the historical formation of the tradition may be positioned on the solar axis. But the religious calendar expresses primarily the order of the temporal epigenetic symbols.

The intentional bond creates and sustains an objective order of relations that is linguistic, institutional, and normative. Although it may appear to be independent of the time of epigenetic performance, this symbolic institutional order has an inherently temporal structure and is ruled by the timelike order of the figura.

The figura is dynamic rather than static, synchronic as well as diachronic; it is related to the event but in such a way that the event may be understood as a nascent state and the creative element of history and continuity. The figura is not an ahistorical archetype, nor is it a rigid whole, obeying some closed formal principle. It is, instead, connected to the history of religious interpretation and ideas; it is internal to the process of formation of intentional action and to that of the social bond. The figura expresses a form of causality that is specific to the intentional character of the historical event.

The individual is directly active in forming and performing the figura but the figura is the way toward the bond for the individual. By defining the dynamic structure of the bond, the figura traces an initiatory path toward the public character of experience. The time of the figura becomes the time and depth of the religious structure of mind of the individual.

The symbolic time system within a culture may present a broad range of historical variation. By the way in which the polar aspects of the figura are emphasized, a tradition may differ in style and in institutional form. For example, Manichaeism and other forms of religious

dualism explain the confrontation inherent in the intentional relation as a conflict between two opposite and independent systems of reality and two orders of time. Other religious systems, such as Judaism, connect the religious polarities into one order of relation and correlate the intentional confrontation with the time itself of the intentional bond.

Particular historical styles within one religion, while maintaining the temporal integrity of the figura, may differ in the interpretation and emphasis that they give to the epigenetic or to the performative orders of symbolic time or to one of the dominant symbols. But the religious figura is simultaneously a transformative nascent state and a living tradition. Symbolic time, by sustaining a system of religious reciprocity, an intentional vision, and a processual articulation of reality, is structured in its development and unity as an epiphany of intentional life.

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SYMBOLISM. [This entry presents a history of the study of symbolism: issues, theories, and fields of approach. For a discussion of the symbols of various religious traditions, see Iconography.]

Symbolism is the very life's breath of religion. Every sentiment, every ideal, every institution associated with

the phenomenon of religion, be it noble or ignoble, subsists in an atmosphere of symbols. It is through symbols that religions survive in our midst and through symbols that we gain access to the religious life of past or alien cultures.

Religion in turn, at least up until the emergence of industrial society, has represented the single fullest embodiment of the symbolic dimension of the human. Nowhere throughout the broad spectrum of human culture do we consistently find the symbolic expressions of sight, smell, sound, word, gesture, and ideas woven into a single fabric of such expanse and durability as in the realm of religion.

In an important sense, then, the fates of religion and symbols are bound up with one another. When symbols lose their power, the religious traditions they inspire gasp for breath; when religious traditions fall apart, the symbols they organize lose much of their collective vitality. As obvious as this symbiotic relationship of religion and symbolism might seem when laid out in such general terms, and as many examples as there are to illustrate it at work in history, the precise nature of that interdependence continues to elude the understanding, let alone the prediction and control, of the various disciplines that attempt to study it. As with the notion of religion itself, which is notoriously resistant to universal definition, the more precisely one attempts to isolate the nature of the symbol the greater the theoretical tangles.

For all that, there is probably no greater indication of the resurgence of religious consciousness in the contemporary world than the revival of interest in symbols, both academic and popular, both theoretical and practical, both among those standing within a particular religious tradition and those standing without. Moreover, the study of symbolism has afforded one of the most promising bases for rapprochement among religious traditions searching for a way to protect their unique heritage in a religiously plural world and at the same time to defend religious pluralism as a model for world culture in the making.

This article attempts to survey the general outlines of the study of symbolism, highlighting certain key contributions relative to the study of religion and focusing attention on some of the main theoretical issues.

The History of the Study of Symbolism. To compose even a moderately comprehensive world history of symbolism would require an entire encyclopedia. It is much the same with the history of the study of symbolism. If the study of writing may be said to have begun no more than five thousand years ago in Mesopotamia and Egypt with those who established the first conventions for organizing visible markings into a writing system, a much

longer history lay behind it, reaching back perhaps hundreds of thousands of years into the impenetrable mists of the Paleolithic age, when people drew pictures on the walls of their dwellings. It was during that period, we may likewise suppose, that the first students of symbolism appeared. Today we can merely guess at what blend of social, religious, and aesthetic motives lay behind such remains as the famous sculpture and cave painting discovered at Altamira and Lascaux, but we do so always with the twofold assumption that fundamentally they are not far removed from the motives that inspire our own fascination with symbols, and that the use of symbols at any stage of human history implies some level of disciplined reflection.

While it is clear that the development of writing as a means of communication represented an advance over the cruder conventions of symbolism and thus opened the door to remarkable advances in civilization, it is also clear that the signs of a written language were never able fully to substitute for symbols. For one thing, symbolism has continued to develop and flourish on its own within highly literate cultures. For another, everywhere in the ancient and modern world, among civilized and primitive peoples alike, we find traditions in which the written word itself is accorded special symbolic importance, as is attested by the wide variety of religious beliefs about the divine origin of writing as well as the numerous forms of divination related to letters, numbers, ideograms, and words. It may be that these beliefs and practices originated in countries where literacy was restricted to special classes, but ever since the time of ancient Greece, where mystical interpretations of writing existed side by side with general literacy, they have maintained a foothold in the civilized world.

In general we may say that traditions devoted to the use and interpretation of symbolism have accompanied the progress of intellectual thought at every step. This is to be seen not only in the realms of philosophy, literature, and theology, but also in the more esoteric heritage of mysticism, magic, sorcery, astrology, alchemy, and the like that have been part of human culture as far back as evidence reaches. But with the advance of the scientific and philosophical methods of Western intellectual history, out of which developed the variety of academic disciplines currently engaged in studying symbolism, the idea that esoteric traditions deserve attention not only as forms of symbolic phenomena but also as contributions to a general theory of symbolism gradually lost favor. Although their role in the history of the study of symbolism may be more and more widely recognized among scholars today, and although they may serve the "critical" mind as a reminder of the

limits of understanding, the idea that such "precritical" traditions might still have a theoretical contribution to make is no longer accepted. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten when we turn to look at the more immediate sources of current approaches to the study of symbolism that ours is but a brief chapter in the much longer and complex history of the disciplined reflection on symbols, a story that still remains to be told and understood.

The Romantic movement. The turning point for contemporary interest in symbolic theory, and the most convenient point at which to begin a brief account of its origins, came around the middle of the eighteenth century with a group of thinkers and literary figures who have come to be known collectively as the Romantic movement. Their concern with symbols—less the outcome of any single current of symbolic theory than a constellation of ideas scattered throughout the disciplines of Western academia—was one aspect of their general spirit of resistance against what they perceived as the dangerous excesses of eighteenth-century rationalism. A look at some of the better-known Romantics should help to illustrate the point.

Johann Georg Hamann (1730–1788) reflected the general mood, though not the academic rigor of the times, in arguing the merits of poetic discourse as the "mother tongue of humanity." In protest against Kant, this most difficult and oracular of Romantic authors saw the perfection of knowledge not in abstraction but in symbols, since symbols enable one to view all the phenomena of nature and history as revelations of a divine communication. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who was taught by both Kant and Hamann, was more balanced in his approach to the Enlightenment and its representatives. For Herder the task of aesthetics lay in the search for a universal logic of artistic symbolization, to which end he developed his own theory of the evolution of language, giving a central role to folk poetry. His use of Rousseau's model of human growth as an analogy for the course of history and its "progress" away from the childlike innocence of the "noble savage" was widespread in the Romantic movement. Along much the same lines, Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772–1801) also defended the primacy of imagination and poetry as means to produce the symbolism of a higher reality, and drew special attention to the "magical" power of words.

Together with Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799), a physicist with a mystical bent who was actually anti-Romantic, the self-avowed "psychological novelist" Karl Philip Moritz (1757–1793) merits mention for drawing attention at the time to dreams as symbolic expressions of the inner self. The first major

achievement in this area came after the turn of the century with Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert (1780–1860), whose views of the dream as an abbreviated hieroglyphic language later earned him recognition by Freud as a forerunner of modern psychological dream interpretation. The work of Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869) on dream interpretation has more immediate links to modern psychology because of the extensive and systematic use he made of the notion of an unconscious mind, a notion incidentally widespread among the Romantics. His distinction between relative and absolute layers of the unconscious, and his argument for a participation of the latter in a sort of universal, pantheistic life force reflected in dream symbols, were an inspiration to theories later developed by Jung after his break from Freud.

One side effect of the Romantic movement, and perhaps the one that more than any other carried the attention to symbolism over into the nineteenth century, was the variety of opinion it sparked among classical mythologists, both among those sympathetic to the Romantics and those opposed. Such scholars as Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), Johann Ernesti (1707–1781), Christian Heyne (1729–1812), and Johann Hermann (1772–1848) reinterpreted the gods and heroes of ancient Greece as symbols expressing a primitive level of philosophy or psychology. The very tools of allegoresis that the medieval theologians—following a tradition going back to the Greek sophists and the Stoics—had used to rescue myth from the assault of skepticism were used to discredit its symbolic importance. Moritz, among others, was prompted to object against the reductionism in such interpretation and to argue more clearly for the primacy of understanding the historical conditions of classical antiquity. The complaints of Jacques Antoine Dulare (1775–1835), who is now remembered chiefly as an early student of phallic cults, against “symbolizing” what were basically pragmatic cults and beliefs, were typical of the new and more empirical approach to the symbol that was gaining strength at the time. It is also to this foment of opinion that many later efforts to link a personal meaning of symbols to a general morphology of nature myths, such as we find in the work of Georg Ferdinand Frobenius (1849–1917) and Paul Ehrenreich (1855–1914), trace their origins.

If we may point to one key figure in whose systematic treatment of symbols the influences of the Romantic movement on the study of classical mythology came together for the first time, it is Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858). Using a comparative approach that made use of material from Egypt, Greece, and Rome as well as India and Persia, he tried to develop a theory of symbolism that would at once respect the pragmatic mean-

ing of symbols as carriers of concrete tradition (including the scientific) and the religious meaning of symbols as the force to unify (*sym-ballein*) spirit and matter. Objections to Creuzer’s work, in particular to his attempt to show the influence of oriental symbolism on Christian symbolism, arose on every side, the most devastating of them from the pen of the classicist Johann Heinrich Voss (1751–1826). Even today the important place Creuzer deserves in the history of the study of symbolism, and in particular of religious symbolism, is often denied him.

Perhaps the best known of the Romantic students of symbolism is Johann Jakob Bachofen (1850–1887). A historian devoted to the nonliterate ancient world, he turned to myth as a guide to understanding the distant past, and from there developed a highly particularized exegesis of symbols. While Bachofen appears to have carried on his work independently of Dulare and Creuzer, he shared their concern with developing a universal, abstract theory of the symbol rooted in the facts of history. For him, the fundamental theme to the ancient myths—and hence also the basis for the symbols that myths interpret—was that of gynecocracy, or “mother right.” Although modern scholarship has since come to discredit this idea, along with most of his other historical arguments, the remarkable imagination and suggestiveness of Bachofen’s work has kept it alive to this day among those concerned with a general theory of the symbol.

The Symbolists. The Symbolist movement was one of literary esotericism that formed among a group of French poets in the final two decades of the nineteenth century around Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–1898), after whose death it virtually came to an end. Although its roots may be traced to the philosophies of Hegel and Schopenhauer, the Aesthetic movement in England, and the mystical writings of Swinburne, the movement took shape basically as a reaction against the impact of scientific realism on the literary arts.

Unlike the Romantics, who had been more concerned with the interpretation of specific symbols or a general theory about symbolization processes, the Symbolists were preoccupied with creating symbols of ideal beauty appropriate to their age. While the Romantics were overtly political and public—the idea of the “noble savage” so dear to them was part of the intellectual backdrop to the French Revolution—the Symbolists deliberately withdrew from the vulgar sentiments of public life. Theirs was a quasi-metaphysical, highly theoretical attempt to idealize absolute Beauty, to promote its contemplation, and at the same time to create it by restoring a musical sense to poetry and by using highly symbolic terms.

Given to theorizing about symbols in a symbolic, esoteric, Heraclitean language as these thinkers were, it is no surprise that their influence was restricted. In other respects, too, the major proponents of the movement seemed intentionally to run counter to existing traditions. Mallarmé used Christian ritual symbolism to erect a metaphysic to explain symbols. Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867), who may be credited as the first poet to exalt the value of symbols, did so by inverting the symbols of Christianity into a sort of diabolism. Paul Verlaine (1844–1896), too, gave more popular form to the principles of Mallarmé by locating them within a Christian context. In fact, however, all of the Symbolists stood firmly outside of the Christian frame in their search for an alternate center to their aesthetic-mystico-religious sensibility: ideal Beauty.

Although the Symbolist movement was short-lived, and what theory there was in it has long since faded from favor, there is no denying the impact it had on symbolism in literature by cross-fertilizing it with anthropology, classics, and religion. The American counterpart of the movement, represented by writers like Poe, Melville, and Henry James, as well as European post-Symbolists like Rilke, Blok, George, and Yeats, shared many of the Symbolists' instincts about the mystical dimension of symbolism. For all the movement's lack of influence on the study of symbols then being undertaken by philosophers and anthropologists, its turn away from the objective world of facts to the evocative, psychological power of symbols brought the symbolic process itself to the surface, thus foreshadowing developments in the twentieth century.

The rise of modern anthropology. By the time of Bachofen the influence of the Romantic movement on the study of symbols was already on the wane. Ethnological data gathered directly from primitive societies was beginning to accumulate, and empirical method for the study of symbols, including those of the ancient world, was becoming more disciplined. Here one may mention the important work done by Lewis H. Morgan (1818–1881) on Native American sacrificial rites; by William Robertson Smith (1846–1894) on Semitic sacrifice; by Henry Clay Trumbull (1830–1903) on the comparative study of sacrifice in India, China, the Near East, Africa, and Central America; by John Ferguson McLennan (1827–1881) on marriage symbolism; and by N. D. Fustel de Coulanges (1830–1889) on the influence of religious symbols on ancient Greek and Roman civil institutions. In these and other works of the period we find a new rigor in attention to the data coupled with an attempt to translate the meaning of symbols into abstractions more suitable to the modern critical mind.

As one might expect, this new scientific approach did

much to demystify the study of occult and secret symbolic traditions, as well as to open the way to a more objective study of sexual symbolism in primitive culture and religious rites. The censure that Creuzer and Dulare had encountered a century before began steadily to weaken.

No doubt the most important figure here is Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917), rightly credited as the father of modern cultural anthropology. Tylor's contribution to the study of the symbol has no direct links to the Romantics. Drawing rather from mid-nineteenth-century British philosophy, which had been rocked by evolutionary theory, he formulated a rather rationalistic and often condescending view of symbols. The myth-making faculty of primitive peoples that F. Max Müller and the brothers Grimm had helped to rediscover was for Tylor of great interest as a clue to the evolutionary development of mind, and led him to uncover a fundamental animism at the source of the symbolic process.

Another important influence on symbol theory at the time was James G. Frazer (1854–1941). The influence of his monumental study on the notion of the slain god, *The Golden Bough*, which had grown out of his work on nature symbolism and leaned heavily on insights from Robertson Smith, not only touched students in all fields of symbolism but carried over into literature. The sheer scope and wealth of Frazer's achievement, however, tended to overshadow the lack of development in his theory of symbols. And, like Tylor, he bypassed the important questions that the Romantics had raised in this line as well as the questions that had been raised by the Symbolists.

With the turn of the twentieth century, interest in symbolism continued to strengthen and to grow in academic respectability. Typical of this trend was Franz Boas (1858–1942), whose work on primitive art symbols led him to a number of interesting but controversial conclusions about the relation between religious ideas and the literalization of natural symbols. The major influence at the time, however, was Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). Turning away from the nineteenth-century bias toward treating symbols as discrete entities with meaning in themselves—and thus turning his back on the Romantics and the Symbolists alike—Durkheim sought to uncover their social implications. He did not much care about any "inner reality" in symbols, nor did he care where they came from; he was interested only in their effect on the society that used them. To this end he proposed the revolutionary idea of viewing society as a system of forces conditioned by the symbolizing process: symbols were social because they preserved and expressed social sentiments. In assuming that nonempirical symbolic referents must be distorted represen-

tations of empirical reality, many critics later argued, Durkheim viewed symbols too narrowly and failed to appreciate their polyvalent structure. While it is true that his concern with symbolic referents may thus have shut him off from the wider reaches of symbolic significance, the boldness of his hypothesis laid a challenge before students of the symbol that retains its force to this day.

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) owed much to Durkheim in his approach to symbols as “meanings” that give “expression” to sentiments in individuals in order to regulate collective needs or preserve relations and interests important to a particular society. Despite his numerous intuitions and descriptive distinctions, as well as a more scrupulous grounding in direct fieldwork than that of Durkheim, his work suffers from a certain theoretical unclarity by comparison.

Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) shared many of the views of Radcliffe-Brown, but approached symbols with a keener sensitivity to linguistic implications and a more thorough theoretical understanding of the symbol. In opposition to the view that words have meaning in themselves, he saw them as entirely relative to their context, where they both communicate conventions and organize behavior. Like all symbols (of which they are the prototype), words modify the human organism in order to transform physiological drives into cultural values. Although Malinowski confused speech with language and so was driven to generalizations that contemporary linguistic theory no longer accepts, his main concern in classifying and interpreting symbolic forms—to show how the process of symbolization bears on the formation and function of culture—was widely successful at undoing the generalized symbolic interpretations of myths that certain currents of anthropology had taken over from the Romantics.

The efforts of R. R. Märett (1866–1943) to trace the origins of religion to preanimist beliefs in superhuman forces, investigations from the armchair of a scholar who preferred common sense to actual work in the field, were of high literary value and had considerable influence on theoreticians from a number of disciplines working in symbolic theory. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939), remembered today largely for his attempt to relate the origins of religion to a “prelogical” primitive mind that shared in the realities of nature by means of what he called *participation mystique*—a position that he retracted later in life—should also be credited for drawing attention to the need to study symbolic thought and behavior as unique in themselves.

Even as the contributions of these pioneers have been carried up to the present day and given ever greater footing in data gathered in the field, an increased sen-

sitivity to the full complexity of the symbol has led to still greater diversity of opinion. Not only the awakening of the human sciences to the methodological assumptions latent in their own operations and theorizing but also an alertness to the role of psychological factors, the critical apparatus of philosophical hermeneutics, and advances in linguistic theory have all had an important role to play in this process.

Among the important figures of the latter half of this century, Victor Turner (1920–1983) deserves attention for having developed a thoroughgoing theory of symbolism out of his studies on ritual. Particular symbols can be understood, he argued, only by setting them in their wide “action-field context,” their immediate role in ritual, and the particular patterns of behavior associated with them. While Turner saw this series of expanding contexts as giving meaning to the symbol, he went further to focus attention on the context of the one who does the interpreting. On this basis he helped to clarify the now widely accepted distinctions between exegetical meaning (given by those who serve as indigenous informants), operational meaning (derived from observation of its use), and positional meaning (deduced from its place in the totality of symbols). The psychological functions that Turner accorded symbols—as both a check against a dangerous surplus of feeling and a catharsis for dangerously pent-up feelings—have, for all the controversy such ideas attracted in the early years of this century, become a commonplace of modern-day anthropology.

Despite the stress that anthropologists since Durkheim have put on the pivotal role of social structure (as both matrix and offspring) in the symbolic process, the concrete form that symbols take in practice obliges us to take a closer look at the way they mirror the visible world of nature. In his researches on Semitic religion, Robertson Smith pursued the timeworn course of suggesting that symbols of divinity, even those clearly wrought by human hands, were originally drawn from earth symbols, or “natural” symbols. A more developed and inventive tack on natural symbols is that taken by Mary Douglas, who links the origins of symbolization to the structure and processes of the human body. On this basis she has tried to show how the study of symbols relevant to the modern world needs to take into account the way in which social structures generate symbols that may alienate people from themselves, from one another, from the earth.

It is to Claude Lévi-Strauss that modern anthropological theory owes its strongest ties to advances made in linguistics and depth psychology, and this is particularly noticeable in the realm of myth and symbol. In opposition to the classical, “functionalist” approach

championed by Malinowski, and the more traditional "symbolic" approach that describes symbols primarily in terms of their meanings, Lévi-Strauss's "structuralism" resurrected interest in myths and symbols as phenomena more basic than the meaning they bear for those who use them, the social functions they fulfill, and the social systems that give them shape. They belong to their own systems, he would say, within which they are subject to certain basic relationships and patterns of transformation. His attempt to locate a universal human nature in common, relatively stable mental structures underlying all variation in behavioral expression, has helped both to reinstate the quest of the Romantics for a generalized theory and to keep anthropology sensitive to insights in symbolic theory developed in other disciplines.

Depth psychology. Although there were precedents in the Romantic movement and among the pioneers of psychotherapeutic medicine in the nineteenth century, it was only in our own century that developed psychological theories of the symbol came to the fore, notably in the work of Freud and Jung.

The psychoanalytic movement initiated by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) was grounded from the first on a theory of symbols whose refinement he pursued throughout his life. Freud used the dream symbols of the neurotically disturbed as fundamental data on which to base his theories of how one's perception of the past is distorted, displaced, condensed, and filtered according to the internal conscious and unconscious dynamics of the psyche. So startling and compelling were his ideas that by the early years of this century it was impossible for students of symbolism to ignore what he had to say. W. H. R. Rivers (1864–1922) and Charles Seligman (1873–1940), both British, were among the first anthropologists to take his ideas over into their ethnographic work. In 1935 Jackson Lincoln made a daring application of Freud's method of dream interpretation to primitive culture, and after him, Géza Róheim (1891–1953) to the study of myth and folklore. Freud's concept of condensation, applied early on by Edward Sapir (1894–1939), has appeared in the work of such contemporaries as Victor Turner and Mary Douglas. Even those who, like Malinowski, were repelled by Freud's neglect of social factors, or who, like Lévi-Strauss, rejected the primacy Freud gave to the sexual meaning and etiology of symbols, have had to acknowledge the significance of unconscious factors in the formation of myths and symbols.

The influence of Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) may have proved weaker among the more tough-minded students of symbolism, but for all that it continues to work as a powerful stimulus to interdisciplinary studies and

has won respect for depth psychology in many circles inimical to Freud. By seeing symbols not merely as private symptoms of unresolved repressions but as expressions of the psyche's struggle for realization and individuation, Jung opened the door to a more positive assessment of many neglected esoteric and mystical traditions East and West. The impact of his ideas is evident in the work of such thinkers as the Sinologist Richard Wilhelm (1873–1930) and the Indologist Heinrich Zimmer (1890–1943). In contrast to Freud, Jung has not attracted much attention in mainline philosophical circles; at the same time, he has offered certain anthropologists, such as Paul Radin (1883–1959), a balance to Freud's excesses. Mythologists such as Joseph Campbell and Károly Kerényi (1897–1973) as well as numerous critics of art and literature such as Herbert Read (1893–1968) and Maud Bodkin bear the stamp of Jung's symbolic theory clearly in their work. Although his methods of scholarship and use of data were a source of controversy both during his lifetime and later, Jung remains one of the outstanding witnesses to the power that the study of symbolism exerts over the inquiring intellect.

Philosophy and religious studies. Although interest in the problem of symbols has been part and parcel of philosophy and religious studies since the time of the Romantics, it was not until our own century that symbolic theory can be said to have come into its own.

The first important step in the direction of a philosophical clarification of the symbol was taken by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). His distinctions among sign, symbol, index, and icon posed a number of fundamental questions that for many philosophers still remain determinative, and for not a few anthropologists and historians interested in the symbol his work proved a stimulus to forge similar distinctions in their own work. Of critical importance to this dissemination of interest in Peirce's categories was the publication of *The Meaning of Meaning* in 1923 by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. Here, too, one may mention the valuable efforts of the contemporary American philosopher C. W. Morris to incorporate new insights from semantics and social psychology into the sphere of philosophical logic.

Much more ambitious in scope was the undertaking of Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), whose understanding of the philosopher's task as the quest for the human spirit at work in culture coupled with his Neo-Kantian leanings to produce a theory of "symbolic forms" as the basis to all human apprehension of the world. Although Cassirer's apparent neglect of criteria for verification has made him easy prey to later generations, his attempt to develop a consistent theory of mind grounded in the symbolic function represents a bold step beyond the purely logical frame of Peirce. His most notable suc-

cessor in this regard has been Susanne Langer, best known for her aesthetic theory.

Among contemporary philosophers who have grappled impressively with the legacy of symbolic theory and with data from psychoanalysis, anthropology, and linguistics, the work of Paul Ricoeur stands out for the wide influence it has enjoyed among students of religion. For Ricoeur, the proper task of philosophy is hermeneutics, which he understands as the recovery of meaning through attention to the symbol-making function that begins with language and carries over into our every attempt to be rational.

Religious studies in the twentieth century have become so closely bound to the study of symbols and the symbol-forming process that one is almost unthinkable without the other. The role that Mircea Eliade has played in this chapter of Western intellectual history is hard to overestimate. In an impressive array of studies in the history of religions ranging from primitive societies to esoteric traditions, Eliade has gradually constructed a comparative view of the phenomenon of symbolism that at once incorporates the deliverances of other disciplines and informs them with fresh insight. If it is often difficult to place his work in the accepted academic framework, it is equally difficult to carry on religious studies in any of its aspects without reference to his achievement.

The study of symbolism has not gone without leaving its impression on modern theological studies as well. Rudolf Bultmann (1884–1976) was the first to succeed in introducing the philosophical hermeneutic tradition from Dilthey to Heidegger and Gadamer into biblical research, all but redefining the domain of scriptural studies since the middle of the century. In the area of systematic theology, Paul Tillich (1886–1965), whose dependence on existential hermeneutics is equally apparent, though at a more abstract level, argued throughout his work for the positive and indispensable role that symbolism plays in religious language. Conversely, he tried to show how the place of the symbol in human culture argues for the notion of an “Unconditioned” as a universal solvent of human consciousness.

General Symbolic Theory. The word *symbol* came to Western languages from the Greek word *symbolon*, meaning a token, insignia, or means of identification by which parties to contracts, allies, guest and host, and other kinds of partners could identify each other. On the basis of this original sense, which points to a coherent greater whole identified through its parts, the word has come to represent the general phenomenon of metonymy found widely in all cultures: the use of a signal to mean something, and yet to mean something not apparent to the uninitiated. In other words, the symbol has

an esoteric or “closing” function as well as an exoteric or “disclosing” one. The theory of symbolism is thus concerned with defining the nature of the symbol and symbolic forms, and with describing the process by which the symbol comes to mean.

The nature of the symbol. In essence, the nature of the symbolic process consists in the fact that one thing, usually concrete and particular, stands for something else, usually abstract and generalized, and becomes a focal point for thoughts and emotions associated with that referent, or a trigger for a set of habits associated with it. While it is essential that the symbol itself be a clearly perceptible phenomenon, there is no reason for its referent to be such. Indeed, it is common among students of symbolism to define the symbol in such a way that the referent is unclear, particularly in the case of the more powerful and lasting of religious symbols, which generally resist direct connection to a single definable referent. In order to preserve this aspect of symbolism, the word is frequently used in such a way as to distinguish it from representations of a specific and clearly known referent (such as phonetic writing), which may also be present within a properly symbolic frame of reference (such as the written language of a sacred text). This calls for some distinction of terms, which is not always made or, even when it is, is not always made in the same language.

Peirce’s logical scheme provides a useful starting point. He speaks of the generic notion of “sign” as “something that stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity,” and subsequently specifies the symbol as “a sign that is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such.” Other forms of sign he characterizes either as “index” (a sign affected by its object, as smoke is by fire) or as “icon” (a sign that refers to its object only by virtue of its own quality, as a photograph does). In other words, what makes a sign a symbol is not in the first place any quality considered to be inherent in a particular objective phenomenon but is rather a particular form of subjective attitude centered on but not restricted to specific objects or acts.

From this starting point, theories of symbolism can be differentiated according to what factors are judged to be formative in the “symbolizing” attitude (tradition and convention, biological needs and processes, the occurrence of natural phenomena, the structure of the human psyche, divine hierophanies and revelations, and the like). Moreover, any further heuristic, classifying, or explanatory models adopted to bring order into an actual given array of symbols need not prejudice from the outset the question of what symbols mean for any individual or group, or what general patterns of meaning, if

any, there are to be discovered among them. In short, Peirce's shift of focus obliges us only to the assumptions that *anything*—including icons and indexes—can become a symbol for *anybody* under the right conditions without having to forfeit the whole of its presymbolic significance, and that it can by the same token lose its symbolic function in whole or part when those conditions are absent.

Although this standpoint is rather common among modern students of the symbol, wide discrepancies in the terminology used to express it reflect equally widely in the understanding of the process by which the symbol comes to mean something to someone. For instance, an opposing convention that has found some favor among more behaviorally minded anthropologists is Charles Morris's distinction between "signals" and "symbols" within the general class of "sign." For Morris, symbols—including religious symbols of an iconic and noniconic nature—are signs that have been substituted for other signs by an interpreter, but that remain synonymous with the original that they replace, as in the case of the transcript of a conversation. All other signs he calls "signals," which show, more clearly than the vague and open-ended symbol can, the disposition to respond that is characteristic of signs in general. In contrast, Susanne Langer has attempted to differentiate the symbol from the sign (her word for Morris's "signal"), by virtue of its greater ability to articulate and present concepts. Or again, the logician Susan Stebbing, while refusing to draw too sharp a distinction between sign and symbol, is still prepared to argue for a definition of the symbol as a sign *consciously* designed to stand for something.

A common, though largely tacit, assumption that runs through the entire spectrum of theories of symbolism is that the capacity to generate and use symbols is the universal property of human beings at all times and places, and does not differ essentially from the capacity for mentation in general. Cassirer made the point forcefully in referring to symbolization as the root of all social communication and to man as a symbol-making species he called *homo symbolicus*. Langer takes the argument a step further to see symbolization as one of the most basic, primitive functions of mind that appears not only in rational, discursive thought and behavior but also in the arts, which she attempts to define as varieties of "virtual" behavior. The quest for the symbolic process, therefore, typically involves a quest for the structure of the psyche itself in order to explain how meaning can pass from one generation to the next through the mediation of symbols.

It was from such a standpoint too, we might say, that the attempts of the linguistic analysts of the Vienna Cir-

cle and of the British analysts can be included in the story of symbolic theory: they were concerned with discovering the invariable patterns by which meaning enters into human communication and with disposing of the distorted patterns by which meaning is turned into nonsense. So, too, Freud's point of departure in the neurotic symptom and Jung's search for archaic, archetypal patterns both represent attempts to describe the universal structure of mind in terms of symbol-making processes.

None of these theories denies the point made earlier that anything can, under the right circumstances, become a symbol. Yet it is clear that not everything is a symbol at any given time for any given group, individual, or culture. It is thus part of the goal of symbolic theory to focus on representations actually operating as symbols and to determine their place in the general run of human life and culture. To do this, it must impose restrictions on the symbol by focusing on objective symbols within a restricted frame of reference, in order to enrich its initial understanding of the symbolic aspect of subjectivity.

We need hardly go further to appreciate the complexity of that task. Any attempt to study "religious" symbols, for example, must begin with a clear idea of what qualities—subjective, objective, or both—define a symbol as religious, and that requires in turn some operational definition of religion in general. Next, norms must be established to determine whether a candidate for the category of religious symbol is actually functioning in a given environment as a living symbol, or ought best be classed as some other form of communication. For it is clear that what works as a symbol in one age may, even within one and the same tradition, cease to work for the next age, whether by becoming an index or an icon (in Peirce's sense) or by failing to serve as a sign altogether. Naturally, the same holds true of differences from one cultural setting to the next, and even from one person to the next.

Problems like these underlie the distinction between a synchronic study of symbols, which seeks to locate a symbol within a certain living context or fund of symbols, and a diachronic approach, which looks for invariable patterns in religious symbolism. In addition to the many anthropologists referred to above as pioneers of the synchronic approach, I may mention the recent work of S. F. Nadel. In attempting to clarify the conditions regulating the use of symbols—which for him are always "artificial" in contrast to mere "signs," which have a more "natural" connection to their referent—Nadel has put new stress on the utilitarian and purposive function of the symbol, as well as on the methodological weakness in all symbolic theory stemming from the

general need to rely on the opinions of informants, on surveys, and on general impressions. Among the most representative examples of the diachronic approach at present is Lévi-Strauss, whose work on patterns of binary opposition has tried to bracket the question of the concrete meaning of symbols in order to concentrate on the "deep structure" of the symbol-making mind in general. Most students of the religious symbol part from him on this point, and many would say that Lévi-Strauss himself subsequently departed from this position in arguing that there is no way to clarify the process of signification without beginning from the concrete meaning of concrete symbols.

The meaning of religious symbols. In a sense, the problem of symbolic meaning is fundamental to all philosophic logic. But it was the Swiss linguistic theoretician Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) who in the early years of this century set the tone for much of general symbolic theory in this regard. For him the task was threefold: to identify the signifier, to determine just what it is signifying, and to describe the mechanism by which the signifying process takes place. However, it is another aspect, one that de Saussure neglected in his own work, that has proved of key importance to many of the most creative studies in religious symbolism to appear in our own times: namely, the nature and extent of the relationship between signifier and signified *apart from* the actual mechanism by which it is established.

One of the boldest attempts to describe this relationship in terms appropriate to religious symbolism is that of Mircea Eliade. Like some of the Symbolists and Romantics discussed earlier, Eliade has contended that the symbol reveals certain dimensions of reality that would otherwise elude our knowing. For him these "deeper" dimensions are disclosed not only through the reflection of the interpreter of the symbols but also in the "internal logic" proper to the symbols themselves. But this depends primarily on the fact that something actually contained "in" the symbol is being disclosed. This something he calls, with Rudolf Otto, "the sacred," a reality of an order distinct from the natural and possessed of a power beyond our comprehension and control. This shift away from the knowing subject does not deny the opening assertion that symbols are constituted as such subjectively, nor that they are basically cultural phenomena. It rather moves away from the approach of the anthropologist to one that seeks to remove the arbitrariness from the symbol. In this way a path opens to understanding "natural symbols" that goes beyond investigations into the natural capacity of mind to establish symbolic conventions in order to capture invariable patterns of meaning that those conventions communicate.

In this regard we may recall that Jung's researches

into "natural symbols" gradually deflected his mature work away from models of the psyche and questions of physiology, toward a search for "archetypal" patterns of meaning by which symbols could be classified and interrelated. Although his early work with Freud convinced him of the need to see the symbolic process at work in the psychic appropriation of physiological processes, as his work progressed he came to put greater emphasis on the religious and spiritual significance of universal patterns that appear in the individual experience of symbols.

If there is a broad range of opinion regarding the general nature, classification of forms, and function of symbolism in culture and psyche, the problems multiply when we come to the actual interpretation of particular symbols. The question is commonly divided into two areas: a general hermeneutics, or rules for interpreting symbols, and actual exegesis within a given hermeneutics. There are indeed scholars who would deny that symbols have any meaning at all, and thus locate their defining quality as their inability to fit into any accepted cultural lexicon. At the other end of the spectrum we find frequent examples of attempts, usually aimed at a more popular audience, to produce universally applicable lexicons of symbols purporting to decode the secrets of dreams, religious imagery, esoteric traditions, and the like. For the student of religious symbols, both of these extreme approaches sidestep the critical questions.

A philosophical approach to hermeneutics that is more congenial to scholarly endeavors and closer to the goal of the Romantics is Ricoeur's restatement of the principle that symbols both reveal and conceal (the language here recalls a similar distinction in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*), that they possess both a symptom-hiding and a truth-proclaiming dimension. In this view, meaning and the interpretation of meaning are essential and complementary moments in the general phenomenology of the symbol: interpretation involves purifying the symbol and purifying the interpretant for understanding everything condensed in the symbol. The symptomatic dimension of the symbol, for Ricoeur, finds its clearest exponent in Freud, who attempted to reduce without remainder all symbols to some repression of desire. (Jung he finds too obscure and difficult to follow.) To Freud's "hermeneutic of desire," which is basically a process of "demystification," Ricoeur adds a hermeneutic standpoint long preserved in the West through Christian interpreters of the words of the scriptures: opening oneself up to the inexhaustible "kerygmatic" capacity of the symbol.

The Future of Religious Symbols. In one sense, there is no doubt about the future of symbols. They have been with us from the dawn of human culture and we can

expect them to endure to its close. In another sense, however, the future is open to question. What *kind* of symbols will we have? Will they be more or less than we deserve? Which symbols of the many that affect our lives ought we to uphold and transmit, and which should we oppose and attempt to replace?

The question of our role in the birth and death of symbols cannot, of course, be divorced from wider questions of the oppressive and liberating capacities of religion, ideology, and, indeed, culture in general. For in one sense symbols are our own human creation and therefore our own responsibility. Yet in another sense symbols seem to have a life of their own, or rather to point to a dimension of human experience that stubbornly resists our every control. It may be that the symbols of the greatest power and durability can be expected to take care of themselves; but it may also be that our native sensitivity to the symbolic can significantly diminish under certain social conditions and therefore needs careful nurturing. Considered in this light, symbolic theory as we have it today appears to have little to say by way of response.

These questions are far from academic where religion is concerned, especially at present. With the advance of technological civilization, religious traditions across the world have found themselves being edged out of the modern imagination for want of a place in modern experience where their symbols can take hold. The dominant symbols of the major traditions (Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism) have succeeded by and large in maintaining their ties to agricultural worldviews, at the price of narrowing the reach of their relevance to problems of a private nature. This is in spite of the fact that a great deal of effort is being made by religionists at a theoretical level to face problems generated by science and technology. Indeed, these agricultural models are frequently used to determine the "naturalness" of symbols and hence to repudiate the "diabolical" aspects of industry and other forms of technology from the "sacred" world of nature. In principle, there is nothing more "natural" about the tools of antiquity than those of modernity (though one may be a more or less appropriate tool for environmental or human reasons). But to the extent that proponents and enemies of religion alike accept the way that science and technology have swallowed up previous ways of imagining the world, this failure of symbolism to keep pace cannot be dismissed as unimportant.

The collapse of religious worldviews in advanced technological societies is met by wave after wave of resurgent interest in symbolic expression. Whereas this process has led, at its extremes, to a proliferation of new cults that appropriate symbols from mainline religious and traditional esoteric traditions, as well as to

more "scientifically" inspired symbolic systems, none of the new movements has been able to recover the symbolic unity that religion provided for preindustrial societies. It seems that just as the great historical religions of the world have survived through their ability to adjust to and inspire the worldviews and values of other cultures, they will now have to learn to come to grips with the tools and communications of a global technological civilization in order to survive. The absence of a tradition of religious symbols to express the meaning of the relationship between people and their technology is one of the greatest challenges awaiting organized religions in the future. If the challenge is not taken up, the symbols of the past will one day slip and fall from our hands, leaving only scattered shards where there were once whole vessels—like the lost religions of the ancient world, more fit for historians and archaeologists than for the human spirit.

[Many of the scholars of religion mentioned herein are the subjects of independent entries. For a discussion of the role of the symbol in myth, see *Myth, overview article*. See also *Images, article on Images and Imagination, which deals with the visualization of symbols in religion*.]

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a good source of information for current interdisciplinary work going on in the interpretation of ancient and modern symbolism, both Eastern and Western.

JAMES W. HEISIG

SYMEON THE NEW THEOLOGIAN (949–1022), Christian mystic. Symeon is called "the New Theologian," first because, like John the Evangelist, he speaks of mystical union with the Trinity, and, second, because Gregory of Nazianzus, known as "the Theologian," had also written passionately on the Trinity. Symeon's personal life and his writings reflect a good deal of the polemical, because he considered himself a zealot battling the fossilized segments of the institutional church for a return to radical gospel Christianity. That he, as all mystics who articulated their experiences in writings, would be branded as a dangerous reformer walking the slender line between orthodoxy and heresy is not surprising. His ardent, passionate nature, plus the genuinely rare mystical graces that he had experienced, compounded to "force" him, as he confessed, to share his mystical experiences freely with others.

Symeon was born at Galatia in Paphlagonia (in Asia Minor) in 949. This was the time of the powerful Macedonian dynasty, which had given the Byzantine empire its greatest periods of peace and expanding prosperity. Symeon's parents, Basil and Theophano, belonged to the Byzantine provincial nobility, which had won favor with the administration and had acquired some modicum of wealth.

There are two main sources of knowledge about Symeon's life: the *Life* written by his disciple, Nicetas Stethatos, and the writings of Symeon himself. Symeon's uncle Basil brought him to the imperial court of Constantinople, where he continued his secondary education. Refusing to pursue higher studies, he was taken under direction by a holy monk of the Stoudion monastery in Constantinople, who allowed him to enter the monastery in his twenty-seventh year.

The fervent life of the novice under the guidance of his charismatic spiritual director caused jealousy among the monks, and Symeon transferred to the neighboring monastery of Saint Mamas. Here he made great progress in learning and in spiritual perfection, and within three years he was tonsured monk, ordained priest, and elected abbot. By his discourses (*catecheses*) to his monks, he strove to lead them into a greater consciousness of God's presence indwelling them, but not without stirring up great opposition, especially from Stephen, archbishop of Nicomedia and chief adviser to the patriarch of Constantinople. Stephen emphasized reason, philosophy, and rhetoric in his theology; Sym-

eon's theology was charismatic and apophatic, stressing a mystical and interior way of negation that doubts the capacity of reason to comprehend mystery.

Under attack, and desirous of more solitude for prayer and writing, Symeon resigned as abbot in 1005. Four years later, the official circle of theologians headed by Stephen succeeded in having Symeon exiled to a small town called Paloukiton, near Chrysopolis on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. There he passed thirteen years in the small monastery of Saint Marina in prayer and writing, dying in 1022.

Symeon, as one of the most "personal" writers in Byzantine spirituality, reveals himself in his writings in all his sinfulness and ecstatic joy in union with God. His central work can justly be considered his thirty-four discourses, *Catecheses*. As these were preached before a live audience of his fellow monks of Saint Mamas, usually during the morning office of matins, they represent a genre unique in Byzantine spirituality. Two characteristics shine forth in this writing. We see a most traditional presentation of classical themes common to all the Greek fathers who wrote on the spiritual life of asceticism and contemplation. But on the other hand, we find a new and insistent accent on the operations of the Holy Spirit to effect the end of the spiritual life and of all Christian asceticism and contemplation, namely, greater mystical union with the indwelling Trinity.

Other writings of Symeon developed around key theological issues as he engaged in controversy with Stephen and other official "scholastic" Byzantine theologians. In these writings Symeon is not exhorting monks but is struggling to combat the heavy rational theology that he felt was destroying true Christianity. His writings collected in *Theological Treatises* form an integrated series focusing on the unity of the Trinity.

The fifteen writings collected in *Ethical Treatises* are much more uneven. The first two treatises deal with the economy of God's salvation; the following nine (numbers 3–11) form a fairly unified presentation of Symeon's doctrine on mysticism; the last four (numbers 12–15) deal with a variety of subjects of a more practical nature concerning the way in which ordinary people in the world can attain salvation.

Symeon's *Practical and Theological Chapters* is a collection of ideas about a variety of topics, probably notes gathered by him on points touching the ascetical and contemplative life of Christians. But it is Symeon's *Hymns of Divine Love*, which he completed shortly before his death in 1022, that will place him in the ranks of the greatest mystics of all time. These are fifty-eight hymns without any unifying theme or system of mystical theology, but they show clearly Symeon's own mystical experiences through the power of poetic rhythm.

His mystical experiences and personal love toward Jesus Christ are expressed in a language rarely surpassed by other mystics except those who, like Symeon, had to resort to poetry, as did John of the Cross, to convey the intensity of such ecstatic mystical union. Each hymn is a poetic composition of great power and beauty that can ignite in the reader a desire to strive to attain such "endless light" as Symeon must have enjoyed.

In Symeon were combined the two predominant currents within Eastern Christianity of the earlier centuries. One was the mystical school of the Desert Fathers, which stressed the Semitic concept of a total experience of God and humanity in the *locus Dei*, the place of God in the person called in biblical language the "heart." The second approach was the intellectual mysticism of the Alexandrian school of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Evagrius of Pontus. The accent here was on the human mind, which, when purified of the hold of the sensible world of passions, was able to "see" God in an interior light. In addition to producing this synthesis, Symeon was an innovator in writing candidly of his own mystical experiences and in presenting these as normative for all Christians.

Symeon may be judged in the light of his unique, powerful, and affective personality as against the formalism that had suffocated much of the charismatic and mystical elements in the church of Constantinople. His works were rooted in the great traditions of the Eastern Christian fathers, both dogmatically and mystically and, as such, present a balanced Christian mystical theology.

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SYNAGOGUE. [This entry consists of two articles. The first, History and Tradition, discusses the origins, development, and characteristic features of the local assembly of Jews organized for public worship. The second, Architectural Aspects, is a historical survey of the architecture and appurtenances of buildings that have housed Jewish congregations.]

History and Tradition

The term *synagogue*, derived from the Greek *sunagōgē* ("assembly"), refers primarily to a congregation rather than to a place of meeting, although it has that meaning as well. The origins of the synagogue are shrouded in obscurity. Rabbinic tradition attributes its foundation to Moses, yet it is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Hebrew scriptures, though its existence is sometimes inferred from instances of biblical prayer; some scholars have considered the "people's house" in *Jeremiah* 39:8 as its ancestor. Others imagine that with the proscription of sacrifices at local shrines by the Deuteronomic Reformation, the populace gathered at such places to pray, thereby laying the foundation for the synagogue. Adduced in support of this hypothesis is an allusion in *Psalms* 74:8 to the burning of "all the meeting places of God [*mo'adei El*] in the land." So, too, in the early second century, the translation of the Bible by Aquila of Pontus renders *mo'adei El* as *sunagogas*.

The most venerated explanation traces the synagogue to the Jews taken captive to Babylon in the sixth century BCE. It suggests that in the absence of the Temple, the exiles gathered for worship and spiritual instruction, thereby creating proto-synagogues. This tradition goes back in part to two talmudic sages of the third century CE, Rava' and Yitshaq II Nappaḥa'. Rava' states that the word *ma'on* ("dwelling place") in *Psalms* 90:1 ("Lord, You have been our dwelling place in all generations") refers to "houses of assembly and study." Yitshaq II Nappaḥa' finds similar evidence in *Ezekiel* 11:16, where Ezekiel has God say that although he has scattered them abroad, "I will become a *miqdash me'aṭ* [small, or diminished sanctuary] for them in the land to which they have come." Yitshaq takes *miqdash me'aṭ* to mean the synagogues in Babylonia, which in his day were numerous (B.T., *Meg.* 29a). That his derivation is more frequently adduced than that of Rava' is due in no small measure to the fact that the Aramaic translation of the Prophets, known as the Targum Jonathan, also understands the biblical words *miqdash me'aṭ* to mean the synagogue. (The Targum Jonathan, which received its final redaction by the seventh century CE, was itself a product of the developing synagogue.)

Equally problematic are the efforts to discern the synagogue in the Greek *proseukhē*, meaning "prayer house" and used for Jewish places. The word appears in *1* and *2 Maccabees* and Josephus and in dedicatory inscriptions, such as those discovered at the beginning of the twentieth century in Egypt, one of them directed to King Ptolemy III Eurgetes (246-221 BCE) and his queen, Berenice. Many *proseukhai* were "loyalty shrines" to monarchs, whom Jews could not, as other peoples did,

worship as deities. But *proseukhē* is a generic term; the synagogue, on the other hand, is a specific kind of institution. Not until the first century CE, in works like Philo's, does the word *proseukhē* clearly refer in some cases to the synagogue.

The word *sunagōgē* first appears in Jewish sources in the Greek text of *1 Maccabees* (14:28), which speaks of *sunagōgē megalē* or "Great Assembly." Subsequent Jewish tradition held the Great Assembly to date from the Persian period. Although Hebrew borrowed many hundreds of Greek words, it did not borrow *sunagōgē*; the appropriate Hebrew term is *keneset*. For the place of meeting the Hebrew utilizes three compounds prefaced by *beit*, meaning "place of" or "house of." These are *beit ha-keneset* ("meeting place"), *beit ha-tefillah* ("prayer place"), and *beit ha-midrash* ("study place"). All of these terms were in use in the Talmudic period. Of the three, *beit ha-keneset* is the earliest and has been the basic term since Talmudic times.

The appearance of any of the three terms does not necessarily connote a separate, let alone a permanent, place. Separate structures or permanent rooms are therefore not inferable from Talmudic records of a synagogue within the Temple or from the large number of synagogues (394 according to the Babylonian Talmud and 480 according to the Jerusalem Talmud) in existence at the time of the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE. Because of their flexibility, the three terms may thus effectively focus on the congregation rather than its home. This is the case with *sunagōgē* in the Gospels and *Acts of the Apostles*.

The distinctive nature of the synagogue is best understood in contrast with the Jerusalem Temple. The Temple was a centralized institution. At least from the perspective of its ruling elite, it was the only legitimate Temple. [See *Biblical Temple*.] The Elephantine temple (late seventh to late fifth century BCE) and Onias's temple at Leontopolis (second century BCE) were probably secessionist. The synagogue, on the other hand, was a decentralized institution. Legitimate synagogues could be established wherever there were enough men to constitute a *minyān* (quorum). The traditional quorum of ten men dates back at least to the first century CE.

The collective term "synagogue" does not refer to an administrative unity. It is an abstraction, embracing the collectivity of all synagogues and, even more so, their adherents, the faith-people Israel. The Temple was an autocratic institution, ruled by a priestly caste; the priests mediately effected communion with God through the sacrificial cult, and except for major festivals, the presence of the faithful was neither required nor expected. Indeed, the laity were barred from entering the Temple's most sacred precincts and touching its

holy objects, including the Torah. By contrast, the synagogue was governed by laity of priestly and non-priestly descent—variously selected, but always with grounding in Torah and tradition. The synagogue's honors and positions were open to all, and participation was expected of all men. The Temple's design was carefully prescribed; that of the synagogue is nowhere prescribed, with the result that synagogue architecture and interiors reflect the variety of local conditions in which Jews have lived. Titles like *arkhisunagōgus* in the New Testament were either honorary or administrative or both. This is also the case with the terms *ro'sh ha-keneset* ("head of the assembly") and *hazzan ha-keneset* ("minister of the assembly"), from the early rabbinic tradition.

It is clear that the synagogue had coexisted with the Temple prior to the Temple's destruction in 70 CE, either as a complement to the Temple or, more likely, as an alternative to it. The most likely context for its origin was the accelerating disorientation in Judaea following the conquest of the Middle East by Alexander the Great (333-330 BCE). Discontent resulting from the changes introduced by Alexander and his successors engendered a restiveness that eventually led to the Hasmonean (more commonly but incorrectly called the Maccabean) Revolt (167-164 BCE) and the rise of the Pharisees. The Pharisees were lay oriented and critical of the operation of the Temple, both ritually and politically. They were careful, however, to treat the Temple with esteem because it was popularly viewed as God's dwelling and hence as a source of blessing and because it was ordained in the Torah, which was regarded as the expression of God's unchangeable will.

In its origins and development, the synagogue coheres with the Pharisees' lay orientation. So do the appearance in the Temple ritual of elements and antecedents of the rabbinic prayer service; of a distinctively Pharisaic theology; and of new and functionally lay participants. Not until the first century CE, well into the period of Pharisaic hegemony, does the synagogue in its present form appear in literary and archaeological evidence: when it does appear, its profusion in Judaea and the Diaspora suggests a lengthy development. Yet the early structure of its activities is inchoate. The present practice of three daily worship services (with an additional service [Musaf] on holidays and Sabbaths) was not made obligatory until Gamli'el of Yavneh (c. 83-c. 115), who also regularized the basic order of prayers and gave the Passover Haggadah its classical form.

An intermediate step between the local meeting and the synagogue may have been an obscure institution known as the *ma'amad* or "station," which seems to have had roots in the priestly theocracy between 450

BCE and 70 CE. To accommodate the growing number of officiating priests, a system was devised of twenty-four groups or *mahlaqot* (sg., *mahlaqah*), each of which served at the Temple for two weeks per year. During the Pharisaic period the term *mishmar*, meaning "watch" or "guard" (possibly originally a reference to the period of service of each *mahlaqah*), appears as a designation of the *mahlaqah*. In connection with the *mishmar*, the Mishnah introduces the word *ma'amad*, stating that "for every *mishmar* there was a *ma'amad* in Jerusalem, composed of priests, Levites, and Israelites." The *ma'amad* may have been a Pharisaic institution intended to give the populace a sense of direct participation in the cult, with its own priests and Levites acting as observers at the sacrificial offerings to ensure that they were carried out in accordance with Pharisaic legislation. This assumption facilitates the correction of an error during the transcription and redaction of the Mishnah at a time when the *mishmar* and *ma'amad* had long since disappeared. The Mishnah states that "when the time came for a *mishmar* to go up to Jerusalem, the priests and Levites went along to Jerusalem, while the Israelites' *mishmar* gathered in their various cities to read selections from the scriptural creation story." The Mishnah becomes more clear if we substitute *ma'amad* for the second *mishmar*, for the *mishmar* was composed exclusively of priests.

Little else is known about the *ma'amad*. One passage in the Mishnah speaks of a head or leader of the *ma'amad*. Another informs us that the members of a *ma'amad* had to fast and refrain from cutting their hair or washing their clothes until the Thursday of each duty week. The lifting of the prohibition on Thursday is attributable to the need of the members of the *ma'amad* to make their preparations for the Sabbath.

All of this suggests an institution with roots hardly traceable beyond the third century BCE. If this is the case, the reading of some undecipherable words in an apparently sixth-century BCE ostrakon discovered at Ela as *beit kenisah be-Yerushalayim* ("the synagogue in Jerusalem") is unfounded.

After the destruction of the Temple, the synagogue was said to have acquired the holiness that had inhered in the Temple, and its prayer service was regarded to have taken the place of the sacrificial service.

The Synagogue of the Organic Community. The synagogue was the central institution in Jewish life during the centuries when, first under the pagan Romans and subsequently under Sasanid, Christian, or Muslim rule, Jews were permitted to live in quasi-autonomous or organic communities. The individual synagogue enjoyed less autonomy in large, centralized areas like Muslim Iberia and more in smaller organic communities like

those in European feudal states. But to one degree or another, the synagogue of the organic community, the almost totally self-sufficient Jewish community in which the Talmudic heritage pervaded and guided society, could be found in many places in Europe and in parts of Africa and Asia and elsewhere, well into the twentieth century. In this phase of Jewish history, the synagogue reinforced the basic values which even in the darkness of persecution perpetuated the optimism, morality, creativity, and compassion which traditionally have shaped Jewish life. Socially it was the place where Jews met, commented on events, communicated their needs, planned their charities, adjudicated their disputes, and held their life cycle events. In the synagogue bridegrooms were given recognition, mourners comforted, strangers fed and housed, and the *herem*, or ban of excommunication, pronounced against recalcitrants. Announcements were made of pending lawsuits, of articles lost, found, or stolen, and of people about to move from the community—the latter to facilitate the filing of claims against them. Out of the synagogue emerged the traditional Jewish service organizations, including the *hakhnasat orehim*, for welcoming strangers; *hakhnasat kallah*, for dowering brides; *biqqur holim*, for visiting the sick; and *hevrah qaddisha'* for attending to the dead.

Social solidarity was reinforced by synagogues composed of workers in similar trades, as in ancient Alexandria or many medieval regions; foreign settlers from the same country or town, as in Italy and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century; or members of the same division or sect, like the Hasidim or Karaites. Different divisions and regions also had their distinctive synagogal customs, rituals, and prayer books.

The synagogue was always concerned with education and was often, in smaller communities, the sole locus of learning; among Ashkenazic Jews the synagogue is often called *shul*, a Yiddish word for school, and in Italy *scuola*, the Italian equivalent. Traditionally, the first goal of Jewish education was proficiency in reading the prayer book. The synagogue typically housed popular study groups in Mishnah and Talmud, while works like the *Me'am lo'ez*, discussed in the cafe-meetings or *tertulias* in the Ottoman empire, were geared to the strengthening of synagogue life and general Jewish commitment. Through such traditional study, and the discussion of external intellectual challenges as well, the synagogue reinforced the fundamentals of Jewish belief and spurred their more sophisticated formulation.

An extraordinary synagogal institution was the *bitṭul ha-tamid* ("interruption of the sacred service"). The privilege of such interruption was granted to all persons

seeking redress against wrongs they believed had been inflicted upon them by individuals in the community or even by the communal authorities themselves. Prevalent among the Ashkenazic Jews of the Middle Ages, it was known to other communities and continued well into the twentieth century in some places.

Psychologically, the synagogue bred respect for the nobility of the individual and the purposefulness of living, reinforcing these sentiments through ritual observances, the bestowing of honors, and liturgical creativity in music and poetry. Further enhancing life were the regular Sabbath and festival sermons, often delivered by resident preachers in the vernacular, including Yiddish for central and eastern Europeans and Ladino for the Sefardim of the eastern Mediterranean (though the sermons were often later written down in Hebrew). Where regular preaching fell into desuetude, there were Sabbath afternoon ethical exhortations, often delivered by an itinerant *maggid* or preacher. All of these customs enabled the faithful of the synagogue to withstand hardships, including the obligation frequently imposed upon them to assemble in their synagogues for proselytizing sermons by Christian clerics.

No less sustaining were the secret synagogues of Jews and prospective Jews, notably the Portugese and Spanish New Christians (Marranos), in areas where Judaism was proscribed. Removed from the mainstream of Jewish life, these secret synagogues developed their own rituals and clergy out of an extraordinary blend of biblical tradition, available to them through the Church, and rabbinic practice known to them only in diminished and garbled form, after the erosion of generations of oral transmission. [See Marranos.]

Synagogues were controlled by a powerful laity. There were variously chosen boards of officers, each officer often bearing the title *parnas*, which later came to be used by the presiding officer in various Sefardic congregations, and *gabba'i*, similarly later used in Ashkenazic congregations. The title *gabba'i* employed also in other communal functions, was often used to designate the synagogue official in charge of the distribution of honors, especially at the reading of the Torah. The salaried employees of the synagogue included the *hazzan*, or cantor, a professional position since geonic times, and the *shammash*, or sexton, whose functions included the summoning of Jews to prayer and the announcement of the arrival of the Sabbath. The rabbi, traditionally a communal official, did not become a synagogue functionary until the nineteenth century in western Europe. [See Rabbinate.]

The role of the synagogue was discernible in the regulations pertaining to the structure and use of its buildings. Wherever possible, the synagogue structure was to

be the tallest in a town, located near running water, and oriented toward Jerusalem. A place of prayer and study, it could not be used as a thoroughfare, a place of business, or an eating place, except in emergencies. (Communities regularly fed strangers in the synagogue, though connecting buildings in the synagogue complex were often utilized for this purpose.) According to rabbinic law one should come to the synagogue with clean body and clothes and wipe the mud from his shoes upon entering. Although one may run to the synagogue, one should not leave it on the run, in order to avoid the impression of eagerness to depart. Once within, one should conduct oneself with dignity and refrain from discussing trifles, mocking, or laughing.

A replacement synagogue should be built before razing an old one, unless its walls show signs of collapse. Even the ruins of a house of prayer should be honored. A village synagogue may be sold under certain conditions, but in a city where Jews from all over may come, no synagogue should be sold. If a synagogue is sold it must be on condition that the place not be converted into a bathhouse, cleansing house for vessels, tannery, or laundry, although a council of seven of the community's leaders may waive this condition.

The Synagogue in the Modern World. The synagogue in the modern world is largely a product of what Jewish historiography calls the Emancipation: conventionally, the acquisition of equal rights by Jews in France and the German states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but in a larger sense the transformation of Jewish life in increasingly secular modern states bent on the rationalization of both human and material resources. To this end such states were prepared to extend full citizenship, at least theoretically, to Jews, requiring in return the dissolution of the organic Jewish community and a primary allegiance to the state constitution. As a result, the role of the synagogue in emancipated communities was radically altered. Although its power often long survived through Jews' vestigial allegiance to the organic community and the insistence on religious affiliation by secular governments as a means of better controlling their subjects, the synagogue increasingly became a matter of private conscience and voluntary affiliation.

The synagogue responded to its new challenges by adopting a broad range of ritual and theological positions. By the end of the eighteenth century, two adjectives, "Orthodox" and "Reform," had appeared as designations of the synagogue's polar alternatives. The former described those synagogues that maintained a principled adherence to traditional rituals and theology, the latter those committed to various degrees of change. The adjective "Conservative" emerged before

the middle of the nineteenth century to describe commitment to the historical tradition with some changes but not radical ones. And in the twentieth century, from out of the American Conservative wing has come the Reconstructionist movement whose synagogue rituals are informed by an essentially humanist philosophy. Reform, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reconstructionist synagogues have formed national or international unions to support higher religious education and seminaries to coordinate programs of education and social concern. (Umbrella organizations like the Synagogue Council of America, formed in 1926, strive for cooperation among, and between, each different Jewish religious group.)

For all their differences, then, modern synagogues manifest important similarities that distinguish all of them from synagogues of the organic community. The modern synagogue has had to walk a tightrope between change toward assimilation and retention of tradition, all the while remaining mindful of its problematic distinctiveness from the majority culture and of its marginal adherents, whose desire for economic, political, and social acculturation has often occasioned their apathy toward the synagogue and even their defection from it.

Even more than the equivalent institutions of other faiths, the synagogue in the modern world, of whatever denomination, has been sensitive to the need for minimizing confrontation and maximizing cooperation with the state—for political parties and governments seeking compulsory homogeneity have often resorted to its suppression. Such actions reached their nadir with the desecration and destruction of synagogues on Germany's Night of the Broken Glass (*Kristallnacht*, 9–10 November 1938), an action presaging the elimination of nearly all synagogues and Jews in German-occupied Europe. The current curbs on the synagogue behind the Iron Curtain, if unaccompanied by equivalent physical violence, nevertheless also reflects the goal of enforced societal uniformity.

Consequently, all modern synagogues have to a greater or lesser extent adjusted traditional attitudes, activities, and articulations. From the most traditional, with a maximum retention of inherited texts and customs, to the most innovative, with a maximum alteration of the tradition, the general tendency of modern synagogues is to focus on Jewish ideals consonant with those of the general society, to the point of even presenting them as the state's inherent goals. Socially they have espoused the egalitarianism and compassion of the liberal wings of the surrounding culture, clothing them with traditional language, especially that of the biblical prophets. Theologically, they have adopted the prevail-

ing moods of the broader culture, dominantly rational until the late nineteenth century and thereafter increasingly antirational in many religious and some secular circles. They have also dwelt on concepts, like God and covenant, common to the religions in the surrounding cultures even though differently interpreted by them. For example, the Reform synagogue's emphasis on the Messianic Age, accompanied by its deletion of a personal Messiah, rests as much on Enlightenment utopianism as on the traditional conceptualization. At the same time, some have functionally de-emphasized (even where they have retained) ideas like miracle and resurrection, found also in the faiths of the general culture but unpalatable to some rational spirits.

The modern synagogue has been committed to a combination of secular and Jewish learning, but its Jewish learning component is often limited to only a few hours per week until *bar* or *bat mitsvah* or confirmation, and is at best only desultory thereafter. Psychologically, the modern synagogue has sought to inspire through architecture, music, and art apposite to, if not influenced by, the surrounding culture; liturgically, it has relied on the reinstatement of regular Sabbath and holiday sermons and on a variety of prayer books with vernacular translations and paraphrases, permitting, for example, the use of contemporary concepts and language.

Although the modern world has spurred some to flee the synagogue, the impossibility of complete societal acceptance has moved others to synagogue affiliation, particularly in democratic countries. Rapid societal change, including increased individual mobility and family instability, are tending to make the synagogue a surrogate family and revive many of its service institutions in contemporary form. Emerging from this atmosphere has been the *havurah*, a small association of individuals of common interest for worship and fellowship. *Havurot* originally developed outside established synagogues, but synagogues now often encourage their members to form *havurot* for worship and study within the synagogue or in private homes. In Israel, where the general environment provides an at-hand Jewish identification and other social agencies perform many of the synagogue's traditional functions, synagogue affiliation is with few exceptions undertaken primarily for purposes of worship.

[See also *Worship and Cultic Life*, article on Jewish Worship.]

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MARTIN A. COHEN

Architectural Aspects

The two most important buildings in Judaism have been the Temple and the synagogue. The First Temple of ancient Israel was built by King Solomon in Jerusalem in the tenth century BCE and destroyed by the Babylonians in 587/6 BCE. Rebuilt on a smaller scale by the exiles returning from Babylonia later in the sixth century and considerably enlarged by King Herod in the first century BCE, the Second Temple was destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE. Like other Near Eastern temples, the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem were cultic shrines—residences of divinity. Their prime purpose was to ensure fertility in the land of Israel. To achieve this goal, sacrificial offerings to God (Yahveh) were rendered daily on the altar of the Temple by priestly attendants. These sacrificial rites were regulated by the Pentateuch, particularly by the *Book of Leviticus*.

The origins, development, and ultimate destruction of the First and Second Temples are documented in the Bible and in extrabiblical literature. Not so with the synagogue. Its origins and early development are shrouded in silence, and there is no concrete archaeological proof of its existence prior to the third century CE. It is known that the synagogue existed by the first century CE, as the New Testament and Josephus Flavius (37/8–c. 100 CE) both make mention of it.

Theories regarding the earlier existence of the synagogue are grounded in *argumenta ex silentio*. Such arguments, which claim that the synagogue arose in ancient Judaea in the seventh century BCE or in Babylonia in the sixth century BCE, are largely based on semantics. Scholars promulgating these theories take words such as *miqdash me'at* ("minor" or "lesser sanctuary"), *beit ha-'am* ("house of the people"), and *mo'adei-el* ("meeting places of God"), tear them from their biblical contexts, and attribute to them meanings that they assumed only much later. Similarly, the enigmatic term *proseuchai* ("prayer shrines") of the Hellenistic world probably does not indicate a forerunner of the synagogue. Several buildings dating from the first century CE that have been found by archaeologists in Israel at places such as Masada and Herodium are, in all likelihood, not synagogues (as their excavators would have us believe) but assembly halls.

Scholars of Christian art have clearly demonstrated that no distinctly Christian buildings can be identified until the third century CE because they were probably indistinguishable from secular buildings. Synagogues mentioned in the New Testament and by Josephus in the first century CE are also probably indistinguishable from contemporary secular architecture and thus not readily identifiable.

After the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, the synagogue became the major Jewish religious institution. Synagogues were decentralized houses of worship; they had no independent sanctity since God did not reside there. Rather, God was called into being by the righteous actions and prayers of the worshipers, which took the place of the earlier sacrificial offerings at the Temple. In the time of the Jerusalem Temple, worshipers had not participated in the sacrificial animal offerings but simply watched the smoke ascend from the ritual sacrifices offered outside the Temple by the priesthood. By contrast, synagogal worship took place inside the building and involved the entire assembled congregation; scholar-rabbis replaced the hereditary priesthood of the Temple. While the most important implement for worship in the Temple was the outdoor sacrificial altar, in the synagogue it was the interior Torah ark, which housed the Torah scrolls—symbols of the entirety of God's revelation to Israel.

The goal of synagogal worship was not fertility of the land of Israel but the assurance of individual salvation and resurrection in the world to come, to be attained through prayers and ceremonies. A twofold legal system known as the oral and the written law regulated this mode of worship.

The Dura-Europos Synagogue. The synagogue excavated at Dura-Europos in 1932 is one of the earliest

known; inscriptions on the ceiling tiles date it to 244/5 CE. Without doubt one of the most exciting archaeological discoveries of the twentieth century, it has challenged long-standing theories about Judaism and art. Dura-Europos was a provincial Syrian frontier town located on the right bank of the Euphrates on the caravan route between Damascus and Baghdad. Occupied by a Roman garrison, Dura-Europos was strategic to Rome in its defense system against the rising Sasanid empire. The synagogue was preserved because it was near the western wall of the city. That area, designated by Rome for defense purposes, was covered by an earthen embankment in an effort to protect the city against anticipated Sasanid siege operations.

The Dura-Europos synagogue was similar in construction to Syro-Palestinian domestic architecture. The synagogue complex consisted of a pillared forecourt and a precinct surrounded by chambers facing the street. These chambers may have been used by transients and synagogue officials. The synagogue proper, measuring 13.65 meters long, 7.68 meters wide, and 7 meters high, could accommodate some sixty-five worshipers. Its inside walls were entirely covered with five horizontal bands of decorative and figural paintings. The top and bottom bands contained such decorations as animals and theater masks. The extant scenes in the three middle bands portray approximately fifty-eight figurative episodes in some twenty-eight panels, about 60 percent of the original paintings. On the western wall is a Torah niche, which served as the focal point of convergence for the three horizontal middle bands. Next to the Torah niche is a special seat for the elder of the synagogue. On the painted bands and on the ceiling were inscriptions in Greek, Aramaic, and Middle Iranian.

The paintings in the synagogue are taken from well-known biblical episodes with aggadic elaborations. They include such scenes as the Exodus from Egypt, the finding of Moses, the anointing of David by Samuel, and so on. As the paintings do not follow the biblical narrative consecutively but appear to be drawn in an apparently disorderly manner from various books of the Bible, they have elicited many attempts at interpretation. Many scholars agree that the complex cycle of paintings in the Dura synagogue was not an invention of that small town but probably reflected a practice in vogue in the synagogues of large neighboring cities such as Antioch or Palmyra. No scholarly consensus exists, however, about the possible meaning of the entire cycle. Some writers on the subject feel that there is no unifying idea present and that the paintings simply represent the fancy of individual donors. Thus, for example, someone named David would have commissioned the panel depicting the anointing of David. Other scholars, how-

ever, contend that one governing theme or perhaps several ideas are imbedded in the painting cycle. They hold that the overriding theme of the paintings may be messianic fulfillment, the three crowns of the Torah (royalty, priesthood, and kingdom), or Philo Judaeus's doctrine of the soul's mystic ascent to true being.

Recent scholarship has tried to indicate that these paintings are the visual accompaniments to the ongoing liturgy in the synagogue—a connection that is also found in later pictorial cycles in churches. These murals may also have served as wall advertisements or religious propaganda to win over converts to Judaism in a manner similar to the Mithraic and Christian pictorial programs found in the same town of Dura.

The Dura synagogue, along with other recent synagogue finds, has demanded reevaluation of three major areas of scholarship:

1. *The prevailing historiography of Judaism in the Roman and Byzantine period.* The pervasive picture of a "normative" rabbinic Judaism that flourished in the Roman and Byzantine age (found in so many scholarly works dealing with that historic period) has to be abandoned in light of the synagogues that have been excavated. The rich diversity of symbols, architectural forms, and decorations point to distinct regional traditions. Hence, the hypothesis of a uniform normative Judaism is a scholarly construct belied by the diversity of rabbinic Judaism that existed in various regions during the Roman and Byzantine period.

2. *The Jewish attitude toward images.* The strict iconoclastic stance that scholars have attributed to Judaism also demands revision. Evidence from the Dura synagogue and others clearly points out that there is frequently a wide gap between the pronouncements of religious leaders and the actual practices adhered to by their followers. While rabbinic writings often express hostile attitudes toward art, we do find that during the time of the prominent third-century rabbi Yohanan ben Zakk'ai, Jews "began painting figures on walls and he did not hinder them" (Gutmann, 1975). Similarly, Rabbi Abun of the fourth century informs us that figural mosaics existed and he had no objection to them. Even the Bible does not adhere to the strict observance of the biblical injunction: "You shall have no graven images." In the same book that clearly forbids images and likenesses (Ex. 20:4–5), there is the lofty description—paralleled in surviving ancient Near Eastern texts—of the desert artist Bezalel, who was "endowed with a divine spirit of skill, ability, and knowledge in every kind of craft" (Ex. 35:31–34).

What scholars have frequently overlooked is the fact that the second commandment is not an unchanging,

monolithic concept. New interpretations of it were constantly spawned in successive periods of Jewish history. Therefore, it would be more correct to speak of second commandments in the plural, as each age evaluated the commandment according to contexts radically different from that which first elicited the prohibition.

3. *Possible Jewish origins of Christian art.* Some scholars are of the opinion that behind the Dura paintings must lie vast cycles of lost illuminated Hebrew manuscripts that may have originated in Alexandria. Reflections of these pictorial cycles can be found not only in the Dura synagogue but in illustrations of Jewish legends that appear frequently in later Christian art. The theory that the Dura paintings are based on illustrated Hebrew manuscripts is not accepted by all scholars. Jewish legends in Christian art may point simply to literary borrowings, as the church fathers readily adapted Jewish legends for their own Christian purposes.

Early Palestinian Synagogues. The many synagogues that have been excavated in Palestine and in the Diaspora have been classified into three main types.

1. *The Galilean or basilican synagogue* was rectangular in plan, like a Roman basilica, and had interior colonnades. This type of synagogue had no fixed Torah shrine; the Torah ark may have been kept in a separate room and brought forth only for services. The entrance wall had windows and doors that faced Jerusalem. The Galilean synagogues of Capernaum and Bar'am are cited as typical examples. They are dated from the second to the fourth centuries CE.

2. *A later or Byzantine-type synagogue*, dating from the fifth to eighth centuries, had an apse for the Torah shrine that was housed permanently on the wall facing Jerusalem. The entrances were moved to the opposite wall, and the floors were frequently paved with figural or decorative mosaics. The sixth-century Beth Alpha (Beit Alfa) synagogue in the Jezreel Valley is given as a typical example of this type.

3. *Synagogues not fitting the above patterns* have been classified as experimental or transitional and dated from the third to the fifth centuries. In the light of recent research, these classifications generally have been abandoned. Many Galilean synagogues previously dated from the second to the third centuries have been re-dated; many scholars now believe that they may date from as late as the fourth century. In addition, it has been realized that not all of the synagogues that have been excavated were oriented toward Jerusalem. And contrary to earlier conjectures, the second-story galleries of some ancient synagogues were probably not set aside for women. Women seem to have had no special place assigned to them in the early synagogue. In the

Middle Ages in Europe, a separate adjoining room was added for women, and later still, balconies or galleries for women were introduced.

Many synagogue mosaics dating from the fourth to the sixth centuries contained representations of the Torah ark (open or closed) surrounded by such symbols as a seven-branched *menorah* (lampstand), a shofar (ceremonial animal horn), the *lulav* and *etrog* (palm branch and citrus fruit), and a shovel-shaped implement. These symbols may have been linked with synagogal festivities—the shofar with Ro'sh ha-Shanah, the *lulav* and *etrog* with the synagogal celebration of Sukkot. The interpretations of the seven-branched *menorah* and the shovel-shaped object are not certain. The latter has been identified as an incense shovel, although other explanations abound. Such Palestinian synagogues as Beth Alpha, Ḥammat near Tiberias, and Naaran also have mosaics depicting a zodiac and the seasons along with Helios, the Greek sun god. Many interpretations have been offered for the zodiacal depictions. They have been linked with the Sukkot holiday, interpreted as messianic or mystical symbols, or dismissed as a simple decorative motif. Recent studies have revealed that the zodiac and its inscriptions are related to contemporary synagogal *piyyuṭim* (liturgical poems).

Synagogue Appurtenances. Information about synagogue furnishings in the early period is meager. An important object of the synagogue was, of course, the Torah ark, which housed the sacred Torah scrolls. No Torah arks have been found from the early synagogue. They are depicted, however, on the mosaic floors of synagogues and in paintings in Jewish catacombs. Usually they resemble double-doored book chests, frequently with a curtain (*parokhet*) hanging in front. The ark is called a *tevah*. In Ashkenazic communities it came to be called after the Ark of the Covenant (Aron ha-Qodesh). In Sefardic communities it is called *heikhal*. Next to the Torah ark the most important appurtenance is the *bimah* (pl., *bimot*, "platform," "pulpit"; later called *tevah* among the Sefardim and *almemor* by the Ashkenazim) for the reading of the Torah. No early *bimot* have been excavated. The Eternal Light (*ner tamid*), usually placed in front of the Torah ark, and the Decalogue, inscribed on a plaque above the ark, are absent from the early and medieval synagogue. They did not become standard features in the synagogue until the seventeenth century.

Both the recitation of the Decalogue and its placement within the synagogue were strictly forbidden by the rabbis, yet by the seventeenth century popular custom managed to win out. The holiest object in the synagogue was the Torah scroll itself, of which there were

at least two. In Jewish communities living in Muslim societies it was placed in a copper or silver case known as a *tiq* or *nartiq*. The Torah scroll was not removed from this case but was read while it stood upright on the *bimah*. Such a *tiq* may be depicted in the Dura synagogue paintings, but actual examples are extant only from the sixteenth century on. In Ashkenazic communities the Torah was enveloped in a textile garment (*me'il*), which was removed when the Torah was placed flat on the *bimah* for reading. Silver adornments such as the Torah headpieces (*rimmonim*), a crown (*'ata-rah*), a silver pointer (*yad*), and a Torah shield (*ṭas*, frequently and erroneously rendered as Torah "breast-plate") were developed largely in Ashkenazic Europe during the late Middle Ages. No specimens dating from before the fifteenth century have survived.

Medieval European Synagogues. While the history of the synagogue in the Islamic world has not been adequately studied, its development in the Christian world can be traced through surviving buildings. A building excavated in 1976 in Rouen, France, dating from around 1100, is thought by some to be the oldest medieval European synagogue, but the subject is still a matter of scholarly debate.

The famous Worms synagogue is generally accepted by scholars as the oldest surviving medieval synagogue. Although the original was destroyed by the Nazis, a faithful reconstruction of the late twelfth-century synagogue now stands in its place. Its double-nave building, patterned after Romanesque chapter houses of convents and monastic refractories, became the model for such later Ashkenazic synagogues as the famous late thirteenth-century Altneuschul of Prague, the old synagogue of Cracow (in the suburb of Kazimierz), and those of Regensburg, in Bavaria, and Buda (now part of the city of Budapest). The *almemor* (*bimah*) in these synagogues predominated: it stood in the center between two columns or piers.

From Sefardic Spain there are two synagogues extant in Toledo, albeit transformed into churches after the expulsion: the five-aisled synagogue later known as Santa María la Blanca and the synagogue later known as El Tránsito. In style Santa María la Blanca resembles twelfth-century Moroccan mosques. El Tránsito was built around 1357 by Shemu'el ha-Levi Abulafia, treasurer to King Pedro the Cruel of Castile. Its ornamental plasterwork with Hebrew inscriptions and Mudejar designs is especially noteworthy. The Sefardic (Spanish-Portuguese) synagogue of Amsterdam, designed by the Dutch architect Elias Bouman around 1675, became the prototype for synagogues for the entire Sefardic world. The Amsterdam synagogue, a large, galleried basilican

hall, was clearly inspired by neighboring Protestant churches.

The many rural wooden synagogues that once existed in Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine are most interesting. Dating from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, these wooden synagogues, probably constructed by anonymous Jewish craftsmen, had multicolored painted interiors. In many of them, four wooden columns supported the interior domed *bimah*.

Modern Synagogue Architecture. Some synagogues have survived from the Baroque and Rococo periods. During the nineteenth century, when Jews in western Europe were emancipated and permitted to leave the ghetto, prominent architects, some of whom were Jewish, built impressive synagogues. These synagogues were built in the Islamic and Byzantine styles (although sometimes the Romanesque was employed), ostensibly to emphasize the Eastern origins of Judaism.

In all periods of Jewish history, the physical structure of the synagogue building usually followed the styles prevailing in contemporary non-Jewish architecture. Neither the Talmud nor rabbinic writings paid much attention to the architectural aspects of the synagogue. Architects, however, were confronted with a major liturgical problem. Since two major components of the synagogue were the ark in which the Torah was housed and the *bimah* from which it was read, the spatial relationship between the two had to be resolved. In central Europe the center of attention was the *almemor*, which dominated the entire space. In Italy, however, a harmonious solution was found between these two important liturgical components by placing them in such a way that neither dominated but both contributed to a sense of balance.

In the modern period, especially since the rise of Reform Judaism in America, many innovations have been introduced. Apart from Orthodox congregations, separate seating for women has been eliminated, thus making balconies or separate rooms unnecessary. An emphasis on preaching by the rabbi and on responsive reading has shifted the focal point away from the central *bimah* where the Torah is read. Today both the *bimah* and the rabbi's lectern are placed on a platform with the ark. In addition, daring experimentation by such leading architects as Frank Lloyd Wright and Erich Mendelssohn has brought about a revolution in synagogue architecture. Forms and symbols with contemporary meaning have been sought for the design of the synagogue. In contrast to the ostentation of nineteenth-century synagogues, quiet elegance and simplicity prevail. Synagogue buildings are consciously integrated into their surroundings, and the maximum use of glass brings nature into the sanctuary.

[See also *Biblical Temple and Iconography*, article on Jewish Iconography.]

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SYNCRETISM. The term *syncretism* usually refers to connections of a special kind between languages, cultures, or religions. This term is most frequently used in the history of religions, where a special effort has been made to give it a more precise meaning.

History and Usefulness of the Concept. The term *sugkrētismos* first occurs in Plutarch (*Moralia* 490ab). It was probably based on *sugkrētos* (Ionian form of *sugkratos*, "mixed together") and was explained by popular etymology or by Plutarch himself as referring to the behavior of the Cretans who, despite the discord habitual among them, closed ranks when an external enemy attacked them. Early interpretations, which reversed the relation between coinage and meaning, may be left aside. Discussions of the term in the *Suda* (4.451), the *Etymologicum magnum* (732.54f.), and Erasmus's *Adagia* (27) and *Epistolae* (3.539) are based on Plutarch's explanation, which was thus transmitted to the modern period. Efforts at reconciliation between Molinists and Thomists in the sixteenth century and between Lutherans and Calvinists in the seventeenth century can be criticized as syncretist. The first application of the term to a situation in the history of religions probably occurred in an anonymous review (of an edition of Minucius Felix) that appeared in *Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country* (London, 1853, vol. 47, p. 294). Thereafter it appeared

rather frequently in the science of religion and historical theology of the second half of the nineteenth century. Hermann Usener (*Götternamen*, 1896; 1928, pp. 337–340) rendered it as “mishmash of religions” (*Religionsmischerei*). In German, *Mischerei*, unlike *Mischung* (“mixture, blending”), has negative overtones, and in fact Usener regarded the phenomenon of syncretism as an unprincipled abandonment of the faith of the Fathers, even though it was at the same time a necessary transitional stage in the history of religions. Later on, the word came to be used mostly without negative overtones, but it continued to be applied in all sorts of ways.

As an explanatory category. Precise application makes it clear that no definition of syncretism is possible without a specific context and that the term cannot serve as an adequate description of homogeneous sets of phenomena. It is possible, nonetheless, to use the concept of syncretism as a category of historico-genetic explanation. It makes possible a critique of the Romantic ideological contrast between syncretism and pure national tradition or, as the case may be, uncontaminated popular religion. In addition, it is a useful heuristic tool for tracking down otherwise hidden antecedents of historical facts, as well as for identifying the phenomenon of syncretism itself as something (requiring later definition) that can in turn be an antecedent for subsequent factual situations. The concept also contributes to a sociopsychological clarification of a readiness for the balancing, subordination, superordination, and unification of truth.

As a description of phenomena. In the use of the concept of syncretism there is no *adaequatio intellectus et rei* (“correspondence of mind and object”). The concept is in principle a tool for interpretation and as such is in principle independent of the term inherited from antiquity. Agreement must be reached on what the term is to mean here and now. The parties to the agreement must see to it that the constituents of the concept are close enough to one another, despite the diversity in the phenomena, that a unity of type is preserved. An individual connection is not to be described as syncretist when taken in isolation but only when it is seen as an element in a complex unity.

Typology of Phenomena. Since it is not possible to apply the concept of syncretism in a universal, univocal way, a typology is needed. For present purposes we may propose two main headings, as follows.

Relations between complex wholes. A complex unity or whole can be any coherence of mental elements and of actions, representations, or objects related to these elements, which has the function of giving human beings an irreducible explanation of their world, as well as norms that are likewise not further reducible. The

coherence can take sociological form in an organization or institution, though it need not; in its intellectual expression it can be presented as a system but may also take some other doctrinal form.

Relations between particular components. Particular components of a religion (e.g., its gods) can also be linked to one another in various ways. They can be identified; new relations can be established between them; various shifts may occur within a pantheon due to encounters with another pantheon. Such particular relations, which are established quasi-organically (at least at the popular level) and anonymously, presuppose relations between complex units or wholes. But a particular component can also be the creation of a literary author. Here the establishment of particular relations can be undertaken by individuals and without any connection in principle with more comprehensive encounters between cultures and religions, even where the latter have occurred. Many an author has established his own syncretism (e.g., in the Hellenistic age of late antiquity certain Pythagoreans, astrologers, Orphics, Physikoi, the various compilers of the Hermetic corpus and the sibylline and Chaldean oracles, the Tübingen theosophists, alchemists, Lukianos of Samosata, Aelius Aristides, Numenius of Apamea, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Sallust). [See Hellenistic Religions.]

The Present State of Scholarship. When the concept of syncretism is used in describing phenomena, the application of the term is still not the result of an analysis; rather, it serves as a disparaging judgment on certain manifestations, a judgment assumed to be obvious. The adjective *syncretic*, used in this way, occurs in countless treatises on religions, where it designates both simple and complex phenomena; its definition is taken for granted and various inferences are drawn from it. Only in the 1970s were initial efforts undertaken to distinguish between the concept and the array of phenomena.

New stages in scholarship are represented by the conferences on the problem that were held in Åbo (1966), Göttingen (Reinhausen) and Strasbourg (both in 1971), Santa Barbara (1972), and Besançon (1973). These have led to various consensuses. The present article attempts simply to advance the consensus, but it cannot promise any certain results.

System and history. The concept of syncretism can be used to describe either a state or a process. It is used in the first way if, for example, an entire religion—or its particular components or traits—are described as a syncretism or as syncretic. In this case the concept is applied statically to describe a state or condition in which the characteristics of the object are systematically correlated among themselves.

The concept is used processually when we speak of a

syncretic tendency or development, or of a development that will end in syncretism. Syncretism is here understood as a process which extends through time and in which gradations or stages of development are to be distinguished. This may be called a dynamic concept of syncretism. An attempt has been made to capture this dimension of syncretism in neologisms like *syncretization*.

Syncretism in History. It follows from the above that a project for a "history of syncretism" would be inappropriate. All that can be done is to point out constellations in the general history of religions that have made possible what historians may, under certain conditions, call "syncretism." The syncretic results of these constellations as such are not initially cohesive in respect to content, although such cohesiveness may of course occur. The location of such results under the concept of syncretism depends on a genetic and typological analysis. At the present time such an analysis can only take the form of a classification. The present article is therefore organized along classificatory lines, but within the classes suggested the examples offered will be in chronological order.

Presuppositions. Religious entities that were originally separate can come together in such a way that a syncretism results. The first possible result is that what is superimposed predominates, while what is older survives. This happened, for example, in the Nabatean and Palmyrene religions of the Hellenistic period, and in the associations that arose as a result of Christian missionization in Africa. A second possibility is that the substratum continues to exercise dominance; for example, the Sumerian substratum in relation to the Akkadian superimposition, the Celtic substratum in relation to the Roman superimposition, and perhaps the Germanic eschatology in relation to a superimposed Oriental one. A third possibility is that a balance may be established between the various components, as, for example, in Manichaeism or in some pseudo-Islamic sects (such as Ahl i Haqq, the Druze, the Yesids). In addition to a syncretism of what was originally separate, there is a syncretism of elements from related sources. Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Marxist eschatologies, for example, are all related, yet each of them developed into something so independent of the others that the few attempts, mostly of a literary kind, which have been made to fuse them or reduce them to a common denominator can, with reservations, be called syncretist.

Syncretism in religion need not be accompanied by syncretism in other areas. In principle, the coincidence and noncoincidence of diverse syncretisms occur with equal frequency. Though it seems odd to speak of a "mixed" language or of a "mixed" culture, since any

culture in principle always has heterogeneous precursors, there are nonetheless examples of such that will clarify what is meant. The mixed Jewish-German culture of the Middle Ages also used a mixed language, Yiddish. But a cultural syncretism need not be accompanied by a linguistic syncretism; for example, on the islands of Japan, continental Asian and oceanic insular cultures have mingled, but the Japanese language has remained homogeneous. Conversely, a linguistic syncretism need not be matched by a cultural one; thus a certain form of Persian-Turkish literary language is in the service solely of Islamic culture.

Analogous relations exist between cultural and religious syncretisms. An example of the coincidence of a syncretic culture with a syncretic religion can be seen in hellenized Egypt, especially in the cult of Serapis and possibly also in modern nativist movements in some regions that were colonized by Western societies. A cultural syncretism is to be found, to a certain measure, for some time after the migration of the Israelites into Canaan; yet there was no corresponding religious syncretism, and where such threatened to occur, the prophets resisted it.

A linguistic syncretism matched by a religious syncretism often occurs when a language is pidginized or creolized in a group in which tribal religion has to some extent been amalgamated with Christianity. On the other hand, a linguistic syncretism was not accompanied by a religious syncretism when a Hebrew-Aramaic language was used for discussion in Rabbinic Judaism; nor was a religious syncretism accompanied by a linguistic syncretism in the mystery religions of late antiquity with their *hieros logos* only in Greek.

Symbiosis. A social presupposition for the rise of a syncretism can be the coexistence of various groups. It may be hypothesized that there were coexistences like this even in prehistoric times, insofar as inferences regarding that period can be made from the nonliterate cultures of modern times. The matrilinear traits observable, until their recent disappearance, in many food-growing cultures were ascribed to groups possessing a developing economy in the Neolithic period; scholars even went so far as to regard the transition to production through food cultivation as a cultural fact attributable to women.

Closer observation showed, however, that food-collecting and grain-harvesting peoples and early food cultivators, exhibited a characteristic that was typical of hunters—namely, the relating of a group of people to a particular animal. There is thus the possibility that from the outset food was collected or was grown and harvested not only for human consumption but for animal consumption as well. The conclusion would be not

that the relations of human groups to certain animals and their relations to certain plants were antecedently connected but rather that the two types of cultures and their modes of religious expression were fused.

The situation is clearer in cases where there is written evidence. In Asia Minor and Media in the first century CE worshippers of the Iranian goddess Anāhitā lived together with worshipers of the Greek goddess Artemis, and this symbiosis led to a limited syncretism. Other symbioses in the same part of the world did not, however, lead to any syncretism. Symbioses are to be presupposed prior to many other and varied linkings of divinities throughout the Hellenistic world. The doctrines espoused by modern messianic movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have demonstrably been shaped by the contacts of ethnic groups with representatives of Western civilization; the preaching of missionaries has played an important but by no means isolated role here.

Acculturation. If we locate the fact of symbiosis in the larger context of the systems in which those living together are socialized and to which a great many sub-systems also belong, we may speak of acculturation. Once movements of conquest became imperial in scope (e.g., the Achaemenid dynasty and the empires of Alexander the Great, the Romans, the Spaniards, and the English), they brought diverse cultures into contact; the conflation of tradition that resulted for one of the two sides could repeatedly lead to syncretisms.

Superposition. The most extensive example of this was probably the migration of the Aryans into the Asiatic subcontinent, which was already inhabited by non-Indo-European peoples. Depending on local circumstances, we may speak of a sanskritization of the Dravidian part of India, of a hierarchization of castes, and so on. In any case, Hinduism—the Hinduism of the epic and Puraṇic period and thereafter—became a religion very different from that of the Vedas. The comprehensiveness of which its representatives boast is one aspect of its syncretist character.

Parallel phenomena. Not every symbiosis, acculturation, or superposition, however, has led to a syncretism. Other formations may have resulted, the names of which are often, and misleadingly, used as synonyms for *syncretism*.

Synthesis. Although J. D. Droysen and others have called Hellenism a mixed culture, it was not syncretic throughout. The ideas of Droysen and later scholars who speak of Hellenism as a reconciliation of cultures or an integration of cultures into a higher unity are better represented by the term *synthesis*, which in turn is to be understood as a complex of synthetic phenomena. This can correctly be taken to mean that there were as

many kinds of Hellenism as there were cultures that established links of one or other kind with Greek culture. Egyptian, Babylonian, and Iranian Hellenism were the principal types, and most of the cults within each of the three were synthetic in character after the manner of Hellenistic Judaism or many of the city-state cults in the empires of the Seleucids and Antigonids. Syncretist formations in religion were special cases in these various Hellenisms.

Evolution. This term designates a process, internal to a system, that produces new elements and that is irreversible. The new elements can then become the center of a new unity and thus of a new system. The result of the process is a new religion, but this new religion is not syncretic. It was in this way that Buddhism arose out of the previous religious systems in India and not by way of a clash between Brahmanism and alien systems. The Bahā'ī religion and even its precursor, Bábism, arose because their founders took over, from the Twelvers, the institution of the imam, or mediator of revelation; non-Islamic elements played no part in this process.

Harmonization. Theosophists in particular incline to the conviction that all religions are true and lead to union with God. Thus Ramakrishna (1834–1886) said that he had tried all religions (i.e., Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity) and had found that all were moving toward the same God in different ways. The founders and adherents of other neo-Hindu reform movements hold similar views. Comparable tenets are also found frequently in the broad stream of tradition flowing from ancient gnosticism via the Neoplatonism of the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Neoplatonism was concerned to harmonize philosophy and religion rather than various religions) to modern anthroposophy. The claim is usually not made that all religions teach the same thing, nor are the lines of demarcation between them removed. But a harmony is established among them by the claim that they are all seeking the same goal. This assertion includes an emphasis on the unity of the goal (e.g., God), which is comparable to presuppositions of unity that can in other circumstances lead to a syncretism. In the cases mentioned here, however, no syncretism has resulted. [See also Religious Pluralism.]

Consequences. When a religio-historical development has in fact reached a syncretic stage, its syncretistic character is usually not communicated to the subsequent stages. To this extent it is correct to say that syncretism is always a transitional phase. Here again various kinds are to be distinguished.

Transformation. An example that was significant on the scene of world history because it accompanied the expansion of Islam was the dehellenization of the Ori-

ent. This process occurred not only in religion but also in the area of material culture, with which archaeology and aesthetics deal; in the institutions of government; and even in ideas. Once the languages spoken in Asia Minor and the Semitic, Iranian, and Egyptian languages spoken in various regions began to assert themselves again, after the spread of Greek culture in the cities of the East in approximately the second century CE, their revival did not bring a return to prehellenistic conditions but rather a transformation, or metamorphosis, of the synthetic and at times syncretistic character of Hellenism into a new unity. This unity operated in the direction of homogeneity, although analytically viewed it was itself not homogeneous and it did not, on that account, become uniform.

Earlier, a complex process of transformation had likewise given rise to the Christianity of the apostolic and postapostolic ages. Despite the multiform derivation of many of its basic concepts and views, this Christianity was not a syncretist religion (with, for example, rabbinic and Hellenistic Judaism as two of its chief components). The same must be said of Catholicism, which came into being after a further transformation, namely, a now non-Judaic Hellenization of Christianity. In a similar manner, various forms of Eastern Christianity developed that can no longer be described as Hellenistic and certainly not as syncretic; this development took place not only in the Nestorian and Monophysite churches, but in smaller churches as well.

Manichaeism and orthodox Zoroastrianism, among other religions, emerged in a region in which Baptist, Syrian Christian, and Zurvanite elements were in close but undefined proximity. Manichaeism was, in addition, syncretic, but the syncretism was held in check by systematization. Zoroastrianism was not syncretic. Even elements that from an analytical standpoint were not Iranian appeared in it as Iranicized, although there was no question of "absorption."

Disintegration. If the component parts that produced a syncretic formation had been independent for a sufficiently long time or if they continued to have an independent existence alongside the syncretism, they also tended to reassert themselves in a perceptible way within it. To the extent that this happened, the syncretist structure fell apart. Thus not only did the various Eastern Hellenistic societies undergo dehellenization, but there were also Greek reactions against them. From the eighth century onward in Japan there were syncretist unions of Shintō and Mahāyāna Buddhism, but people visited temples of each separate religion as well as temples shared by both; the result was a continuing awareness of the difference between the two. With the exception of Ryōbu Shintō, which did not break up until the fourteenth century and then did so for political

reasons, these syncretisms did not last long, although the symbiosis of Shintō devotees and Buddhists continued.

Absorption. When a superimposed level does not ultimately lose out to the subordinate level—as frequently happens—but remains dominant, absorption occurs. Thus, for example, it is very likely that the sky god of the invading Greeks became heir to the many mountain gods of the pre-Greek period. In a way, faith in Yahveh, who rules from Sinai, absorbed the faith of nomads from the tribes of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the God of their fathers as well as belief in the Canaanite high god El.

Connections between Complex Unities. Whole religions may be confronted with one another in processes of acculturation and superposition. This happened when the religion of the Greek city-state met local religions in Asia Minor, the Fertile Crescent, Iran, and Egypt. Ever since scholars began to pay closer attention to the consequences of Alexander's expedition, the "syncretism of antiquity" has been regarded as the classic instance of syncretism in the history of religions. It is to be noted, however, that the result of the confrontation was not simply new, limited syncretic religions along the whole line. Rather, the few institutionalized or organized religious systems of which this can be said already presupposed partial and more diffuse areas of syncretism. In many cases, the rise of such diffuse areas was promoted when the Greek conviction of the oneness of truth encountered a type of thinking that was imprecise in its concepts and tended to focus on the pictorial.

Between religions. In relations between the Sumerians and the Akkadians, only the process just described above occurred. On the other hand, the religio-political effort of Sargon of Akkad (r. about 2350–2294 BCE) and his daughter to unite the Sumerian and Semitic religions was of a different nature. Its thrust was to remove the distinction between originally different religious systems, in order that, contrary to what happened in Israel, the opposition between the incoming Semitic and native Sumerian religions, and thus their latent or open competition, might disappear.

In tenth-century China, theological systems were created out of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. There already existed—and still does today—a widespread popular conviction, which impacted on everyday life, that these three religions complemented each other and even intended the same thing.

Within religions. In Egypt the systems and mythologies of the gods that were represented by originally different priesthoods underwent a variety of combinations when individual districts were united, although the combinatory process did not occur solely under these conditions. Theologians among the priests felt impelled

by the universalist claims of their local gods to assimilate, for example, the cosmogonies of Heliopolis and Hermopolis, Heliopolis and Memphis, Hermopolis and Memphis, Memphis and Thebes. A similar process occurred in the formation of the imperial cult of Marduk at Babylon, but opportunities of this kind were far more numerous in Egypt and lasted far longer. The Egyptian-Hellenistic syncretism of the Ptolemaic period was therefore perhaps the richest of the syncretisms that arose in the confines of Alexander's empire.

The example of Egypt has led scholars to speak of syncretism also within Iranian and Greek religion. But the concept is not appropriate here. On the other hand, there were many instances of intrareligious syncretism in India: the myths of the gods Savitṛi, Indra, Vāyu, Arjayan, Rudra, Agni, Sūrya, and Yama could be regarded as the same amid numerous variations, while both Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism incorporated many other Hindu traditions.

Combination of Particular Elements. The reference here is to combinations established among, for example, rites, ideas, symbols, divinities, persons, writings, and so on. Either one element is enriched by other meanings or it continues to exist alongside other elements. But even this juxtaposition can take various forms and indicate either latent competition or reciprocal completion.

Addition. When the dividing line between diverse elements is removed (and with it the competition between them), but one element does not absorb the other, the result is a combination whose components not only are evident to the modern student but must also have been recognizable by the devotees of the time. That sort of thing happened both within individual religions and between religions. In Egypt, for example, one kind of eternity (*nhh*) was assigned to the god Re, another (*dt*) to the god Atum. The result was the god Re-Atum. Something comparable occurred frequently in Hellenism. The addition of Baal of Doliche to a Jupiter already assimilated with Zeus produced Jupiter Dolichenus, and so forth.

Theocrasies—combinations of gods—presuppose additions. They occur when for practical purposes one god is fused with another in the eyes of his worshipers, even though there may be no identification at the conceptual level. In the many half-theriomorphic gods of Egypt a tendency to blur the borderlines between forms and concepts is already recognizable. A number of the major Egyptian divinities arose in this manner, but the names of many lesser gods were also combined, and either kept their separate determinatives or were written with a common determinative.

Similar theocrasies occurred, though less frequently, among all the peoples of the ancient Near East. The de-

monstrable reason often was that polytheism caused difficulties for the faithful. But politics may also have been present in the background, especially in the encounter of different peoples. At the instigation of the Egyptian magnate the Uza-Hor-Resnet (a Persian collaborator) the Persian king Cambyses II (r. 528–522 BCE) prostrated himself before the image of Neith of Sais and had sacrifices offered to her in her temple as mother of Re (and therefore of the living pharaoh), as well as to Osiris (and therefore to the pharaoh after his death). One might assume that in honoring these divinities he actually intended to honor the corresponding Iranian divinities: the goddess later promoted by Artaxerxes II (r. 405–359 BCE) under the name *Anāhitā*, and the *fravashi* of the king. The Egyptian may also have composed the canal inscription in which Darius the Great (r. 521–486 BCE) describes himself as son of Neith and thus establishes a link with this goddess that the Iranian king did not have with *Anāhitā*. As a result, the character of *Anāhitā* likewise changed in the ensuing period.

This first instance of an international theocracy preceded the many theocrasies of the Hellenistic age. Among these, the Alexandrian triad of Sarapis, Isis, and Harpocrates calls for special attention. Sarapis developed out of Osiris, Apis, and probably a "Hades"/"Jupiter Dis" of Asia Minor into the god of an imperial cult that Ptolemy I (r. 323–285 BCE), with the aid of priests, philosophers, and masters of ceremonies, established for the Egyptians and Greeks of his empire. Isis "of a thousand names," the "manifestation in a single form of goddesses and gods," could in principle absorb every form on her peaceful triumphal march. Harpocrates, her underage son, who was an aspect of Horus, was equated with many other youthful gods and finally with Herakles.

A new divinity, Hermes Trismegistos, arose through a fusion of Hermes, the Greek god of fortunate inventions, and Thoth, the divine scribe of the Egyptians. This new god became the focus of an entire corpus of writings and remained the master and guarantor of esoteric knowledge down to the Renaissance. [See Hermetism.]

Philo of Byblus tells us of Greco-Canaanite theocrasies. Greco-Aramaic-Iranian theocrasies were widespread in the East, while theocrasies in general were rarer in the West; the latter included ancient Spanish-Phoenician or Celtic-Roman.

Forms of worship. When one rite adopts components from another rite, forms of worship are combined. But because the basic stock of possible ritual actions is relatively small, external influence in this area is often indistinguishable from the action of factors already present in the tradition. This situation is clearest in the area of the Christian liturgy and, indeed, from the be-

gining as far as the sacraments are concerned. Because ablution rituals of all kinds were so widespread, it is often unclear whether baptism was an act that stood out—because of its initiatory nature—in a series of already-existing ablutions, or whether the ablutions represented secondary repetitions of an originally unique act of baptism.

Baptism thus provides a fundamental example of the difficulty of clearly establishing a connection between various rites. Jewish proselyte baptism, for example, probably originated within Judaism and was not taken from outside baptist movements of the kind that lived on in the rites of the Elkesites and the Mandaeans. Christian baptism, for its part, rather than having been derived from that same external environment, represented an acceptance and development of the baptism of John, which itself was part of the Jewish milieu, but had acquired an eschatological dimension.

On the other hand, baptism clearly entered the Mithra mystery cults from outside, probably from Christianity. The ceremonies of many African independent churches and of the cargo cults of Melanesia are fusions of Protestant liturgies and ethnic cults. The cult of Umbanda in Brazil is a combination of the liturgy of the Catholic Mass with West African rituals.

Parallelization. The paralleling of elements is most easily practiced when one is persuaded of the unity of truth. If truth is one, diverse names do not point to real differences but may be shown to be simply different names for the same thing. This is the path very clearly taken by Greek thinkers, and in this respect Roman thought followed Greek. Primary among the various modes of parallelization is that of interpretation.

Interpretation. *Interpretatio graeca* and *interpretatio romana* were long regarded as a principal presupposition, or even as a principal phase, of syncretism itself. This is understandable in view of the wide diffusion of both. Behind these two “interpretations,” however, there was in most instances no real theocracy but only a tendency toward it. This tendency was most widespread in literature, so that we may speak first of all of a literary syncretism. In Porphyry, for example, the Arimanius Deus (“the god who apes”) is learnedly interpreted as *antimimos daimon*. Apollo appears in place of Mithra (probably in order to show the harmony between Greeks and Persians) on votive tablets in the Fire Sanctuary of Persepolis during the time of Alexander. Helios stands for Mithra in Xenophon and probably also in Plutarch (unless he stands here for Öhrmazd), in relief sculptures of the Parthian period, and so on.

Greek interpretation claimed to be interested, though not exclusively, in those individual traits of the alien object that already seemed familiar. The Roman renam-

ing of the Greek gods was also clearly a form of interpretation. But a new kind of *interpretationes Romanae* occurred once Rome had destroyed the Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires and conquered regions belonging to the Celts and the Germans. Thenceforth interpretations no longer simply established parallels, as they did among the Greeks; rather there was always present to some degree a subordination of the local god to the corresponding Roman god. The counterexample of the Hebrew Yahveh, who refused even to be interpreted as Jupiter, throws light on the exclusive character of Roman interpretation and the resultant tendency to theocracy. Interpretations of Yahveh occurred only on the fringes of Judaism, as, for example, in Elephantine (an island in the Nile), or among the Hypsistarians where, characteristically, interpretation was rendered possible only by using the Greek equivalent of the biblical El 'Elyon (Hypsistos). Appropriative interpretations of other traditions reached their high point in gnosticism, where the conviction of the unity of truth had become a faith in the unity of redemption that would not allow any division. For this reason, gnostic systems also provide the most impressive instances of the various kinds of syncretism. These were always preceded by an *interpretatio gnostica*.

Equivalence. Clearly, equivalence is a presupposition in all forms of parallelization, in identification and theocracy, and in the syncretism of complex unities. But it acquires a special developmental significance when unities, or elements of them, are assigned different values and are conceived as ways to the same goal, with the stipulation that one of them leads to the goal more effectively than the others. This type of valuation has found a place in the philosophy of religion, for example, in that of Śaṅkara (c. 738–822 CE), who speaks of a graduated way to God. The early Christian doctrine of a *praeparatio evangelica* (preparation for the gospel) among the Greeks and the Jews likewise belongs here to some extent, though it loses its syncretist character due to its apologetic function in relation to Judaism and paganism. On the other hand, a developmental or evolutionary equivalence is frequently admitted in the later stages of many religions (for example, post-Islamic, post-Christian, and post-Shintō), and, more generally, in numerous new entities of the present time, which, despite their claims to a higher truth, are forced to admit that the truth-claims of their predecessors have a relative validity.

Amalgamation. This term describes a fusion that is more irreversible than a simple mingling. The term *mingling* is more appropriate as a description of the phenomenon of syncretism. This is due to the origin of the term in ancient physics, in which there was much

discussion of combinations, mixtures, and fusions, while the problem of the mass or quantity that an element may no longer have if it is truly part of a mixture remained ultimately unresolved. This is very much in keeping with the dissolubility of a syncretism, which can become operative at any time. *Amalgamation*, on the other hand, describes a borderline case of syncretism and to that extent is by and large equivalent to *synthesis*.

Exchange of qualities. First mention belongs here to the exchange of qualities between the *bodhisattvas* of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the spirits and demons (including the *kami* of Shintō) of the peoples proselytized by this version of Buddhism. It is not a matter of equivalent figures, so that we cannot speak of parallelization or addition. Nor is it a matter of gods on both sides though gods might arise from the process. The *bodhisattvas*, now outfitted with qualities derived from the relevant folklore, had the important function of showing that redemption, for which the redemption accomplished by the Buddha paves the way, is present in the traditions of the proselytized peoples. To this end the figures involved must resemble one another; on the other hand, they have no personal core, but rather their characteristics are interwoven as in a jigsaw puzzle.

Identification. Wherever there is no theocracy, identification, which in principle supposes the same degree of identity on both sides, exists. It is difficult, however, to see that the logical process represented by identification has actually been at work in the linking of religious traditions. At most it can be said that in literary syncretisms, the authors of which have been trained in logic, identifications do occur, for example, between central concepts of spirit, or between these and personifications.

Syncretist Religions. These are the high points of syncretic processes inasmuch as they are not the first realizations of syncretism but already presuppose less organized syncretic fields. Such religions are as it were "metasyncretisms" or "second-level" syncretisms.

Mystery religions. "Mystery" as a cult form did not as such have a syncretist character. [See *Mystery Religions*.] This is clear from the so-called mysteries of the ancient world: the Eleusinian mysteries, the mysteries of the Cabiri of Samothrace, or, in the pre-Hellenistic period, those of Orpheus, Dionysos, and Cybele. Nonetheless, the kind of mystery worship in which the most important factor was the conformity in destiny between the initiate and his or her deity did foster the development of syncretic mystery religions in the Hellenistic period. The Isis mysteries of Egypt presupposed the faith in Osiris that had already acquired syncretic ties (though not related to the mysteries) in the Serapis cult

of the Ptolemies. The Mithra mysteries of Asia Minor did not presuppose any ancient Iranian mystery but only the god Mithra as such, albeit a Mithra equated with Sol and Helios. In this instance, the second-level syncretism emerged through the addition of a further link with a mystery type of worship native to Asia Minor. Something similar is to be said of the mysteries of Sebazio, who had been an ancient Phrygian or Lydian god, and of Jupiter Dolichenus, who had been the Baal of Doliche. Once the basic idea of the mysteries of Cybele and Attis was integrated into the context provided by the idea of the so-called dying and rising gods, these mysteries acquired a different character than they had had before the introduction of agriculture into Asia Minor.

Manichaeism. Syncretisms that were part Babylonian, part Iranian, part Christian Hellenism were presupposed by Manichaeism. Its founder, Mani, effected a further syncretism by creating a unique system in which previously existing linkages were interrelated in an entirely new and original way. [See *Manichaeism*.] Manichaeism could therefore be described, depending on those being addressed, as true Christianity, true gnosis, true Zoroastrianism, true shamanism, true Buddhism, and even true Taoism. At times these missionary efforts gave rise to new syncretistic formations. There is doubt whether the latter repeat earlier syncretisms—for example, the part played by Buddhism in the rise of Manichaeism is disputed—or, on the contrary, that they represent "third-level" syncretisms. To a certain extent, therefore, Manichaeism was the supreme syncretism, and it is not surprising that, given its power of suggestion, people saw medieval Bogomilism and Catharism as revivals of it. The latter, however, represented something different, namely, transformations of Paulicianism that retained to some extent a dualistic character, but were not on this account to be classified as properly syncretist.

Gnosticism. Only Valentinianism and Sethianism can be compared with Manichaeism in their degree of systematic formulation. The other gnostic doctrines were not systems but myths; all however, were syncretic in the same degree, despite differences in content. All were also preceded by Greco-Oriental syncretisms, though this does not mean that Greek teaching on spirit is to be understood as forming the nucleus of the gnostic doctrine of redemption. Central to the gnostic concept of redemption was the idea of a redeemer who himself needed redemption; around this spiritual nucleus the syncretic contents of the various gnosticisms were organized in very diverse ways. [See *Gnosticism*.] Such phenomena could arise even on the fringes of Judaism, although Judaism by its nature provided the fewest nec-

essary presuppositions. On the other hand, the process readily occurred in the Greco-Oriental religions. Second-level syncretisms made their appearance in the structure of the myths, in the peculiar character of the redeemer figures, and in the way history and the world were conceived. The result was a basic pattern that has recurred in the various gnosticisms down to the modern period, although this does not mean that all the details of these later gnosticisms derive from ancient gnosticism.

Middle Ages. Here I mean to speak of "Middle Ages" in both the West and the East, despite the fact that the line of demarcation from the modern period, which alone makes the term meaningful, is not the same in the East as in the West.

The unbroken transmission of the alchemy of late antiquity down to the Renaissance, the uninterrupted continuity of *heikhalot* mysticism and the Qabalah as a broad stream within the Jewish tradition, and the ever-possible revival of Neoplatonic thought meant that new syncretisms could constantly arise; these would be comparable to the ones that occurred in the period when alchemy, Jewish mysticism, and Neoplatonism first appeared. In many instances (for example, Ramón Lull (c. 1232–1315), related traditions from the Islamic world were added, although in Lull's case any basically syncretist pattern disappeared due to the level of conceptual abstraction. The same is true of Agrippa (1486–1535) in relation to Jewish mysticism and of Paracelsus (1493–1541) in relation to Neoplatonism. In the milieu of these two men, however, there were popular forms of both white and black magic that can be described as syncretic.

In the East, syncretisms of a new kind arose in various places. First mention belongs here to the connections between an already syncretic Hinduism and a nonsyncretic Islam, fostered in part by the religious policy of Akbar (1542–1605). This ranged from the so-called Muslim brahmans (via interactions between Muslims and Hindus at common festivals and common shrines in the Punjab and the Sultanates of Delhi) to the formation of a syncretistic organization, Sikhism. In the Near East, the continuance of ancient syncretisms despite the superposition of Islam led to syncretisms with the latter, as among the Druze, the Shamsiyah, the Yesid, the Ahl-i Ḥaqq, and in some Turkish orders of dervishes. In missionary Buddhism there arose the connections, mentioned earlier, between the *bodhisattvas* and the spirits (or demons) of Central Asiatic, Chinese, and Japanese folklore.

Modern age. The acculturation process of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has likewise produced new syncretisms that focus either on a utopian future or

on a present that is in need of improvement. [See *New Religions*.] Among the former type, the cargo cults of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia are intelligible only against the background of Christian missionary activity. These cults materialize the objects of the Christian hope proclaimed by the missionaries and turn them into forms of tangible prosperity imported from outside; they thus produce numerous new interpretations of Christ and other biblical figures in the light of indigenous saviors. The equal or higher status that these cults give to their own mythical tradition as compared with the Bible leads inevitably to the development of new myths that retain only a formal likeness either to Christian legend or their own older myths.

A similar situation is discernible in the so-called African independent churches, especially when ancestor worship and initiation are combined with Christian veneration of the saints and with baptism. Further linkages lead to a mythical topography into which the biblical topography can be incorporated and to a parallel-structured eschatological geography.

Of the new supraregional institutions of the present time, some are less syncretistic, others more; the most syncretistic is the Unification Church, in which old Korean shamanistic, Mahāyāna Buddhist, and Presbyterian contributions are still recognizable.

Other modern syncretic movements focus on a present that is in need of improvement. In Brazil the Catholic ecclesial tradition, Pentecostalism, and African and Indian cults, as well as, in some cases, an academic formation in the mythology of European classical antiquity, all had to come in contact in order that the great syncretic religions—Candomblé, Macumba, and Umbanda—might arise. The syncretic teaching on spirits and gods found in these religions can be interpreted in terms of Christian veneration of the saints or of Indian, African, or even Greek mythology. A common orientation to a Buddhist king and a socialist party leader, whose charisma ensured the prosperity of the country, led to a Buddhist-Marxist syncretism in Burma. In Vietnam, contacts between Buddhism, Christianity, and popular religion led to the establishment of a new organized religion, Cao Dai.

Conclusion. It can be stated as a principle that syncretism, where verifiable, is a late stage in a particular epoch of the history of religions. It will therefore always contain truth-claims, inasmuch as insight gained at last into the relativity of all that has preceded makes it possible to compare, combine, and interchange elements from the tradition. A tolerant attitude to all that is of value in the world is thus a basic condition for the rise of any syncretism, as well as a basic virtue of the human being who is shaped by syncretism and in turn

supports it. In addition, however, an enormous intellectual power is required in order to cement all the elements together into a new type of tradition and, further, to maintain the combination of the erudite and the popular.

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CARSTEN COLPE

Translated from German by Matthew J. O'Connell

SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF ANTIOCH.

The two Syrian Orthodox churches in Syria and India, along with the Egyptian (Coptic), Ethiopian, and Armenian churches, belong to the group of Ancient, or Oriental Orthodox, churches, wrongly called "monophysite." Their Christology is essentially the same as that of the Eastern Orthodox related to the patriarchate of Constantinople. They affirm the perfect humanity as well as the perfect divinity of Christ, inseparably and unconfusedly united in the divine-human nature of the person of Christ. They differ from the Constantinople Orthodox in rejecting the Council of Chalcedon (451) and subsequent councils, and in refusing to speak of two natures (divine and human) as having separate existences in Christ after the union. In Christology, the church follows Cyril of Alexandria and Severus of Antioch.

Known to the West as Jacobites (after Jacob Baradaeus, c. 500–578, the reorganizer of the West Syrians and Egyptians in the sixth century), the Syrian Orthodox church is found mainly in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, India, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Sweden. In 1985 the total number of Jacobites, including 1.8 million Indians, was about 2 million, in two separate jurisdictions—one with Patriarch Ignatius Zakka as head, in Damascus, Syria, and the other with Catholicos Mār Thoma Mathews I as head, in Kottayam, Kerala, India. Before the sixth cen-

tury they were probably the most numerous Christian group, larger than the Greeks, Latins, and Copts. Since the sixth century, they have lost large chunks of their membership to (1) the Persian or East Syrian church; (2) the Melchites, Egyptians and Syrians who accepted Chalcedon; (3) the Maronites, who broke away to join Rome in 1181 as a result of the Crusades; (4) Islam; and (5) Roman Catholicism, through uniatism.

History. The church in Antioch became practically the mother church of Christendom, as the Jerusalem community with the apostles gradually shifted there, following the death of James, bishop of Jerusalem (c. AD 62). The apostle Paul, a native of Syrian Tarsus, was converted on a road to Damascus (on Syrian soil) and spent considerable time in Syria and Nabatea. Ignatius of Antioch (c. 35–c. 107), who called himself the Syrian Pastor, succeeded Peter, who is regarded as the first bishop of the Syrian church. Although Jewish Christian in early leadership (though Ignatius was of gentile background), the church of Antioch was probably Greek-speaking at least in the city, while the rural Syrians practiced a Christianity of close communal unity, exuberantly joyful worship, and rather strict asceticism. The Greek-speaking populace developed schools of theology (the Antiochene school) and great scholars and thinkers such as Paul of Samosata (third century), Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350–428), and Diodore of Tarsus (d. 390?), all three of whom the West Syrians now repudiate as incipient unitarians or Nestorians. John Chrysostom (c. 354–407) also came from the Greek-speaking city church. In the third century the Syrians achieved, for a brief period, monarchs of their own in Udhainat II and, after his murder in 267, his wife, Zenobia, who organized a large Syrian state comprising Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Arabia.

The leadership of the Syrian church was decimated by the Diocletian persecution that broke out around 304. The persecution also led to the development of Syrian monasticism through the Christians who fled into the wilderness. The spirit of Syrian Christianity was shaped more by worship, martyrdom, and monasticism than by theology. At the time of the Council of Nicaea (325), the metropolitanate of Antioch had six Roman provinces under its jurisdiction (Palestine, Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Cilicia), with sixty-six bishops and ten rural bishops. Edessa, rather than Antioch, was the center of Syrian Christianity, and the catechetical school of Edessa, called the Athens of the Aramaic world, flourished until the Byzantine emperor Zeno destroyed it in 488/9. The center then moved to Nisibis.

The period between 325 and 636 is characterized by

the struggle with Byzantine and Persian imperial power. As the intellectualism and worldliness of Hellenic-Byzantine culture came into free play in the church, seducing leadership into luxury, avarice, and hunger for power, the Syriac-speaking populace grew restless and revolted against Byzantine domination. The Council of Constantinople (381) and the establishment of that city as the New Rome, were seen as signs of Hellenic domination. The eruption began with the Second Council of Ephesus, what the West called the Robber Synod (Latrocinium, 449) and exploded after Chalcedon (451). The Council of Chalcedon was seen by Syrians and Egyptians as a Byzantine synod with the intention to impose Hellenic domination. The council was convoked by the emperor and empress Marcian and Pulcheria, leaders of the hellenizing movement of the mid-fifth century, and chaired by imperial commissioners who had a mandate to suppress the antihellenic Asian-African wing.

By the end of the fifth century the Syro-Egyptian revolt found a great champion in Severus, patriarch of Antioch (c. 465–538), under whose influence the Synod of Tyre (513–515) formally rejected the Chalcedonian formula. This was seen as a revolt, and Byzantium crushed it through ruthless persecution. In 518, at the Second Council of Constantinople, Byzantium deposed and anathematized Severus, who fled to Egypt. In 521 the decree to expel all non-Chalcedonian monks and clergy drove the Syrian church again into the wilderness, leading to the renaissance of Syrian monasticism and the conversion of the nomads of the desert. In 542 Jacob Baradeus was ordained bishop through the influence of Harith ibn Jabalah, king of the Arabs (c. 529–569), with the support of empress Theodora (a Syrian) in Constantinople. Bishop Jacob Baradeus is reported to have secretly ordained more than one hundred thousand persons, including two patriarchs (of Antioch and Alexandria) and four metropolitans (of Isauria, Taurus, Laodicea, and Mesopotamia).

Persian invasions began with Khosrow I in 540 and were repeated in 614; by 616 both Syria and Egypt had fallen to the Persian Sasanids. The Syrian church reorganized itself during the period, and the great centers in Edessa and Seleucia-Ctesiphon developed. In 629 the Roman emperor Heraclius, who was an Edessan, drove out the Persians, but by 636 the Arab conquest of Syria was consummated and was welcomed by the Syrian Orthodox. The new Islamic empire, cultured and tolerant, especially after it shifted its capital to Damascus, permitted the Syrians to organize themselves into two *millets*, the West Syrian and the East Syrian. Marutha of Tagrit (629–649) became the first maphrian (prelate) in the East. Jacob of Edessa (c. 640–708), the ascetic

scholar and exegete, retranslated the Bible into Syriac and restructured the Syriac language.

As the Umayyad caliphate of Syria was replaced in 750 by the Abbasid caliphate, with Baghdad in modern Iraq as capital, the East Syrians and West Syrians organized themselves separately around Seleucia-Ctesiphon. During the period from 969 to 1171 when the Fatimid caliphate ruled from Egypt, there was persecution of Christians. Many Christians converted to Islam. Seljuk Turks conquered Jerusalem and Damascus in the eleventh century. In 1092 the Turkish empire collapsed, but from 1098 to 1124 European Crusaders (Latins) occupied Antioch and Jerusalem, and the Maronites of Lebanon defected to the West (1181), thus depleting the ranks of the West Syrian church.

Nevertheless, in the twelfth century the Syrian church was at the peak of its glory, with 20 metropolitan sees, 103 bishops, and millions of believers in Syria and Mesopotamia. King Ṣalāhad-Dīn (Saladin), who defeated the Crusaders and took over Palestine from them, was supportive of culture and encouraged learned Christians. An outstanding leader at this time was Michael the Great (d. 1199), catholicos of the West Syrians. The turbulent thirteenth century, wracked by invasions of Latin Crusaders from the West as well as of Mamluk Turks and Mongols from the East, produced such great leaders as Gregory Bar Hebraeus (1226–1286), a Jewish convert to Syrian Christianity, a chronicler and philosopher, and primate of the East. The Syrian Orthodox church grew to more than two hundred dioceses at this time; decline set in around 1401 with the attack by Timur, the Turkic conqueror.

The expansion of the Syrian church to India took place in the seventeenth century, when the Thomas Christians of Malabar, who had been forcibly inducted into the Roman communion by Portuguese imperial power (Synod of Diamper, 1599), revolted (Coonen Cross revolt, 1653) and accepted Syrian bishops in order to escape Roman domination. By this time the church in Syria had dwindled to about twenty bishops, from probably more than two hundred in the thirteenth century. The Capuchins and Jesuits, with money, diplomacy, and the cooperation of the ruling Ottoman Turks, maneuvered Andrew Akhijan, a Uniate, to become bishop of Aleppo (1656) and patriarch of all Syrians (1662). Akhijan was repudiated by most Syrians but acknowledged as patriarch by Pope Clement IX (1667). A Uniate patriarchate became permanently established only in 1782 when Uniate bishop Michael Jarweh became Uniate patriarch in a line that has continued into the twentieth century and has produced illustrious scholars such as Patriarch Ignatius Ephrem Rahmani.

In the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Turkish em-

pire, Kurds assaulted Syrian Christians, with large-scale massacres in 1843, 1846, and 1860. The Levant came under French protection in 1861, a considerable help to the Uniates. In Turkey, since 1909 with the beginning of the Young Turk movement, which was hostile to all non-Muslim elements, Syrians, along with Armenians, have been persecuted on more than one occasion by Turks or Kurds.

Protestant missions to the Middle East since 1819 also lured away many Syrian Orthodox. Migrations to Europe and America further depleted their numbers, with many of the émigrés joining other churches, Protestant or Catholic. Muslim males of the Ottoman empire were eager to have educated Christian wives, and the Syrian Orthodox lost many cultured women to Islam.

Recent Times. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been turbulent times for the Syrian Orthodox in the Middle East, and the struggle for survival becomes more and more intense, to the point of desperation, as the years pass. During World War I the patriarchate shifted from Mardin to Dayr-as-Zafraan, then to Homs (ancient Emesa), and later to Damascus, in 1959. Headed by Mar Ignatius XXXIX Zakka Iwas, the church has fourteen bishops and fewer than two hundred thousand members.

The Syrian church in India numbers 1.8 million and is divided into two jurisdictions. The smaller of the two jurisdictional groups (with five hundred thousand members and a dozen bishops) decided in the 1970s to revolt against the Indian catholicos and his synod, forming a wing of the church directly administered by the Syrian patriarch in Damascus and with its own maphrian see. The larger group, numbering about 1.3 million, is an autocephalous church in India under Moran Mar Basilius Mar Thoma Mathews I, catholicos of the East. This group has a flourishing theological seminary and a number of ashrams and monasteries, as well as hospitals, orphanages, schools, and other institutions. Its members have established a diocese in North America with about thirty congregations and a bishop residing in Buffalo, New York. There are hundreds of lawsuits in the Indian courts between these two warring factions of the Syrian church.

The Orthodox Syrians of the Middle East have dwindled to a small minority. Emigrations continue, and there are Syrian Orthodox bishoprics in Sweden, Germany, and the United States. The lack of educated leadership in the Syrian jurisdiction of the church and the pressures of living in a secularized Western culture are both factors that give concern about the future survival of this once great church, inheritor of the culture and traditions of the apostles.

Liturgy. The Syrian Orthodox have perhaps the richest ancient liturgical tradition of all Christian churches, with about 100 different eucharistic anaphoras, three baptismal liturgies, and very poetic sets of daily offices and festal liturgies now available in English (few of which are in current use). The choir has not replaced the congregation in worship, as it has in the Byzantine tradition. The liturgy, originally in Syriac, is celebrated in the twentieth century in various local languages, notably Malayalam (in India), Arabic, and English. The principal anaphora is that of Saint James, which is rooted in the original Jerusalem tradition of the apostles. Many of the hymns in use come from Ephraem of Syria, the great ascetic and poet of the fourth century.

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PAULOS GREGORIOS

SZOLD, HENRIETTA (1860–1945), Zionist leader and founding president of Hadassah, the leading women's Zionist organization in the United States. Born in Baltimore, Maryland, the eldest child of Benjamin Szold and Sophia (Schaar) Szold, she was educated by her father, a rabbi, and in local schools, graduating first in her high school class. She subsequently taught, wrote articles in the Jewish press, and organized night classes for east European Jewish immigrants in Baltimore before leaving for Philadelphia in 1893 to work for the Jewish Publication Society of America (founded 1888). There, she edited and translated important volumes of Judaica, indexed Heinrich Graetz's *History of the Jews*, and for a time compiled the *American Jewish Year Book*. In 1903 she attended classes at Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York. In 1909, after her first love, Louis Ginzberg, professor at the seminary, mar-

ried another woman, she traveled to Palestine, where her Zionist commitments were renewed. In 1910, she became secretary of the Federation of American Zionists, and two years later joined with other women to found Hadassah on a nationwide basis. After 1916, she devoted her full attention to the organization and spent considerable time in Palestine involved in its medical and educational endeavors as well as broader Zionist affairs. She spent her last years directing the efforts of Youth Aliyah, the movement established to save Jewish youngsters in Nazi-occupied Europe by bringing them to Palestine.

Henrietta Szold espoused a Jewish way of life that was at once deeply religious, strongly ethical, and broadly tolerant. Her religious practices and outlook were shaped by Conservative Judaism, but she followed an independent course, evinced considerable interest in Jewish religious writings by women, and insisted on her right to recite the Qaddish prayer in memory of her mother, as well as to fulfill other Jewish religious obligations traditionally restricted to men. Impelled by her religious values as well as her lifelong pacifism, she associated during her last years with Jewish thinkers in Palestine who sought Arab-Jewish rapprochement and advocated a binational state. Her example of Jewish social activism coupled with her fostering of traditional Jewish ideals has inspired Jewish women throughout the world, particularly those associated with Hadassah.

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JONATHAN D. SARNA

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ṬABARĪ, AL- (AH 224/5–310/839–923 CE), fully Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī; Islamic religious scholar and historian. Born in Āmul in Tabaristan, northern Persia, al-Ṭabarī studied in Baghdad and eventually settled there, although he made a number of sojourns to Syria, Egypt, and his birthplace. He devoted his life to scholarly activities, collecting Muslim tradition from the preceding generations. While fairly traditional in his theological outlook, al-Ṭabarī attempted to strike out on his own in the juristic field. He formed his own school of law (*madhhab*), called the Jarīriyah after his father, but it quickly fell into obscurity after his death, since it was not substantially different from the school of al-Shāfiʿī.

As an author, al-Ṭabarī was an impressively prolific polymath. He wrote on subjects such as poetry, lexicography, grammar, ethics, mathematics, and medicine, although none of his works on these topics has survived. Al-Ṭabarī's fame rests primarily, however, upon his writings in the fields of history and the Qurʾanic sciences, as well as law. The scope of his accomplishment in the first two fields is especially significant, including a world history entitled *Taʾrikh al-rusul wa-al-mulūk* (The History of the Prophets and the Kings) and a commentary (*tafsīr*) on the Qurʾān entitled *Jāmiʾ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl al-Qurʾān* (The Gathering of the Explanation of the Interpretation of Verses of the Qurʾān). He is also understood to have written a comprehensive law book based upon the Qurʾān and to have made a massive collection and evaluation of textual variants to the Qurʾān; both of these works are apparently lost. A few other treatises from al-Ṭabarī's pen do exist, however, including some minor legal works.

Al-Ṭabarī's *Jāmiʾ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl al-Qurʾān* is, at least superficially, a voluminous compendium of traditional matter concerned with the interpretation of each verse of the Qurʾān. Some 35,000 traditions (with a significant degree of duplication present in actual interpretational material) going back to the first Islamic century (seventh to eighth centuries CE) are cited. Al-Ṭabarī was also a creative scholar, however, and his editorial functions in compiling this type of information cannot be ignored. Any reports of Qurʾanic interpretation attributed to Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767), for example, are omitted, presumably because of his tarnished reputation as a reliable source. Harris Birkeland has demonstrated in *The Lord Guideth: Studies in Primitive Islam* (Oslo, 1950), that in general al-Ṭabarī omits any information which was rejected by the consensus of the community at his time. In addition, al-Ṭabarī virtually always notes which interpretation of a given verse he prefers, and he is given to supporting his contentions with some philological analysis or poetical evidence not necessarily connected with any report of a traditional authority. He also discusses matters of dogmatics and law, in some instances on a quite sophisticated level.

Each section of *Jāmiʾ al-bayān* commences with a quotation from the Qurʾān, generally a verse or a thematic unit. Traditions are then cited, complete with their chains of authority (*isnād*) substantiating the transmission of the report; the traditions are grouped according to different possibilities of interpretation for the passage in question. The citation of these groups of traditions is frequently preceded by a statement such as, "Interpreters differ concerning the meaning of God's having said that. . . ." Following the enumeration of

all possible interpretations, al-Ṭabarī gives his own preference, saying, "In my opinion, the best of these statements is the following," and he argues the case on the basis of parallel Qur'anic passages, grammar, poetry, theology, or whatever seems appropriate.

Al-Ṭabarī also appended a fairly extensive introduction to *Jāmi' al-bayān*, entitled *Risālat al-tafsīr* (The Epistle on Interpretation), in which he sets forth some principles of interpretation along with a discussion of the standard disputed issues concerning the Qur'ān (the language of the Qur'ān, the notion of the seven readings of the text, and the collection of the Qur'ān). He argues for a concept of the "obvious" (*ẓāhir*) meaning of the Qur'ān, rather than metaphorical or figurative rendering, as the only legitimate mode of interpretation. This "obvious" meaning of a text can be overridden only by a positive indication of the necessity to do so, as by a tradition which is fully authoritative and convincing. Otherwise the *ẓāhir* meaning, defined as what "predominates in practice" (*al-ghālib fī-al-isti'māl*), must be accepted.

As a historian, al-Ṭabarī equaled his accomplishments as a Qur'anic exegete. His *Ta'riḫ al-rusul wa-al-mulūk*, which exists today in sixteen printed volumes, is said to be a greatly abbreviated version of al-Ṭabarī's original plan. The work commences with the era of the biblical patriarchs, details some early rulers, and then moves on to Sasanid history. As might be expected, the text becomes far more detailed after this portion: for the life of Muḥammad, the first four caliphs of Islam, the Umayyad dynasty, and the Abbasid rulers up to 915, it is organized year by year. Like his Qur'ān commentary, this work too is traditionally oriented in structure, although here al-Ṭabarī's editorial role is limited to selection, arrangement, and documentation of the material cited; rarely do the editor's own words intrude. Al-Ṭabarī's respect for his method of simple presentation results in much duplication of historical records, with similar accounts being repeated because they stem from different sources. Al-Ṭabarī's editorial role does allow him at least to support his own regional and partisan positions, as has been revealed in various analyses by Julius Wellhausen, such as *The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall*, translated by Margaret Weir (Calcutta, 1927).

Al-Ṭabarī is considered a master of history and *tafsīr* and since his lifetime has been seen as the most important intellect of his age. He has gained this stature not only because of his prodigious output but also because of his critical acumen, especially as displayed in *Jāmi' al-bayān*. The *tafsīr* is also the earliest complete and extensive work available today (although other briefer but much earlier works are most certainly known), and the

history has been a major source for all persons concerned with events in early Islam, since it is, like the *tafsīr*, the earliest comprehensive compilation of historical reports for the Islamic period. Considering the importance and value of the *tafsīr*, it is somewhat surprising that few manuscript copies have survived to the present and that until the end of the nineteenth century the complete work was believed lost. Perhaps because of the voluminous nature of the text, it never achieved far-reaching popularity in the Muslim world; to the present day, most people have preferred later summaries of those portions that are considered to be most important.

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1909–1938), provides brief summaries of al-Ṭabarī as a historian (pp. 139–142) and as an exegete (pp. 171–173).

ANDREW RIPPIN

TABERNACLES, FEAST OF. *See* Sukkot.

TABOO is a social prohibition or restriction sanctioned by suprasocietal (innate) means or a socially sanctioned injunction alleged to have the force of such a prohibition. Taboo stands at the intersection of human affairs and the forces of the larger universe. Generally it is determined by divine or animistic mandates; but it may involve “punishment” by inherent circumstances as well, for instance, the real, but exaggerated, danger of genetic damage to the offspring of incestuous unions implied in the incest taboo of American folk culture.

The word *taboo* (from the Tongan *tabu*, a variant of the more general Polynesian term *tapu* and the Hawaiian *kapu*) reached the West through Captain James Cook’s account of his third voyage. He was introduced to the term at Tongatapu, in the Tonga, or Friendly, Islands, and commented that the word had a very comprehensive meaning but generally signified a thing that is forbidden (Webster, 1942, p. 5). In fact, the general Polynesian usage implies that what is *tapu* is interdicted through its relation to the sacred, or its relation to cosmic forces. *Tapu*, then, relates the cosmic to human actions, and the realm of *tapu* amounts to a comprehensive system of religious mandate controlling individual and social life.

In Polynesian religion, *tapu* has the function of segregating persons, objects, or activities that are divine or sacred, or those that are corrupt or polluting, from the common, everyday realm. Thus chiefs, high-ranking persons, and their lineages were surrounded with *tapu*; the heads of all persons, and especially of chiefly persons, were *tapu*; but also the clothing and sleeping places of women in their menstrual periods were dangerous to men, who were *tapu* in relation to them (Best, 1905, p. 212). An “eating *tapu*” required men and women, and often all classes of persons of unequal status, to eat separately, or even to have their food prepared separately and with different utensils.

Consecrational *tapu* applied in circumstances of worship and labor performed for the gods and temples, and those involved entered a *tapu* state, which had to be neutralized later. Life-crises events (birth, marriage, illness, death) involving chiefly persons, wars, and fishing expeditions imposed community-wide restrictions on common activities, including the preparation and eat-

ing of food, movement, the lighting of fires, and noise-making. *Tapu* could also be invoked through appealing to the gods to enforce a prohibition on some object, crop, or piece of land; in the Marquesas Islands a chief could taboo land in this way by calling it his “head.” A temporary taboo laid on crops, trees, or fishing grounds was called a *rahui* (Handy, 1927, p. 46).

Tapu, as a state of sacred interdiction, stands in contrast to the neutral, or common, state, *noa* (whatever is free from *tapu* restriction). Fresh as well as salt water was used throughout Polynesia for the removal and neutralizing of *tapu* and of polluting influences harmful to one’s *tapu* (Handy, 1927, pp. 51–55). Fire and heat were also used ritually against baneful influences, especially spirits. Many communities maintained a “sacred water” or spring specifically for the removal of *tapu*.

The cosmic principle or force behind the restrictions and prohibitions of *tapu* is conveyed in the general Polynesian conception of *mana*. *Mana* is invisible and abstract, knowable only through its efficacy and through its manifestation in things, yet it is universal. Like the Arabic *barakah*, *mana* combines sacredness with the sense of “luck” or “power” in the most encompassing terms. Chiefs, chiefly persons and their possessions and doings, and rites involving the gods are *tapu* because they are suffused with *mana*. The danger of polluting influences is that they may discharge the *mana* of persons or objects that are more highly endowed; common persons, on the other hand, run the risk of being struck or overcome by *mana* greater than theirs. *Tapu* may be seen as the “insulator” between unequal degrees of *mana*. Thus Handy suggests that electricity may serve as a useful analogy in illustrating the nature of the concept of *mana* (ibid., p. 28), though of course it is fundamentally a religious rather than a naturalistic concept.

Even modern curers and others who have recourse to its manipulation consider *mana* distinct in its operation from the world of ordinary life processes, exchanges, and human interaction. Curers who use *mana* may not accept compensation in money (MacKenzie, 1977). As a universal power, *mana* is evidenced in every kind of efficacy: a woodcarver manifests *mana* in his talents and in the tools and circumstances of his work, and canoe makers, gardeners, curers, sorcerers all have their *mana*, capable of being lost or dispersed unless the proper *tapu* are observed. Of these examples of *mana* the chiefly *mana* is the highest and most concentrated, and it poses a serious danger for the unprotected commoner.

As an abstract and generalized conception of power, *mana* is analogous to Lakota *wakan*, Iroquois *orenda*,

and other concepts of power found among indigenous North American groups. The term is by no means universal among Austronesian-speaking peoples, though many have cognate notions. Among the major world religions *mana* has counterparts, perhaps, in the Islamic notion of *barakah*, the Hindu notion of *śakti*, and possibly in the Greco-Christian concept of *charisma*.

The notion of the "psychic unity of mankind," that is, that human cultures everywhere must pass through certain necessary stages of evolutionary growth, allowed speculative writers around the turn of the century to draw conspicuous examples of primitive religious concepts from particular ethnographic areas and universalize them. The Polynesian notions of *tapu* and *mana* lent themselves extraordinarily well to this search for the epitomizing evolutionary trait, for they were already quite abstract and, in Captain Cook's phrase, "very comprehensive" in their meanings. Early anthropologists deemed taboo noteworthy, for it marked the point where a religious idea (*mana*) affected the norms and regulation of everyday life. Breach of a taboo meant divine or other suprasocietal sanctions; hence, taboos, or a system of taboos, outlined the spiritual mandate and boundaries for social existence.

In the evolutionary model for primitive religion that emerged in the decades immediately before and after 1900, taboo played the role of archetypal religious rule, or mandate; as *mana* did of generalized supernatural force, or power; and as totemism did of collective or individual identification with supernatural (or quasi-natural) entities. [See Evolutionism.] Thus emerged the alliterative formula "totem and taboo" as an encompassing rubric for primitive religion, to which Freud turned in seeking socially expressed equivalents for psychological states.

In the writings of Émile Durkheim, and among his followers in the schools of French and British social anthropology, *taboo* came to have the sense of a largely social restriction, or mandate, through the Durkheimian proposition that the religious and the supernatural were the means by which society took account of its own existence—worshiped itself. If, in other words, the suprasocietal forces of the world around us are nothing more than the reflection of society itself, then taboo, however it may be regarded by the members of a society, is ultimately social in its origin. Even in this understanding of it, however, *taboo* carries a somewhat stronger connotation than mere "law" or "rule," for taboos are special instances in which social constraints are referred directly to the religious manifestation of the social rather than to a secular authority.

The modern sense of *taboo* has acquired a certain ambiguity through the widespread acceptance of a socio-

centric interpretation. Thus, depending on whether one accepts a formal, cultural, or a sociological understanding of the prohibition, the sanctions upon it will be, respectively, divine and innate, or human and social.

But the issue of the sanctioning force behind a taboo involves only a partial appreciation of the distinctiveness of this kind of prohibition. Taboo differs from abstract, codified law in the degree to which the prohibited object or act is specified and developed into a symbol, or even a fetish, of the prohibition itself. Taboo is not so much a system of regulations as it is a scheme of negative differentiation, in which the fact of prohibition and the prohibited act or object itself obscure the reasons for a prohibition. In this regard, the early theorists who saw "totem and taboo" as interlinked bases of "primitive thought" drew attention to a significant relation between them. For taboo designates items in order to prohibit them, whereas totemic representation is based on affinities between social units and phenomenal entities. Yet the practice of exogamy (marrying outside of one's totemic group), once felt to be an integral part of totemism, comprehends both of these at once, for it places a marriage taboo on those who share affinities with the same entity.

Thus taboos serve to control and channel human interaction and collective activity through a system of negative differentiation, marking out certain persons, objects, and occasions by specifying what may not be done to, with, or on them. Words used as names are sometimes tabooed when a person holding the name undergoes a change in status. In the Marquesas and Society islands, a common word included in the name of a king or heir apparent would be tabooed and also replaced in everyday language. When a king of Tahiti assumed the name *Pomare*, the word *po* ("night") was replaced in common speech by *rui*, and *mare* ("cough") was changed to *kare* (Webster, 1942, p. 301). Similar taboos are found among the Zulu and the Malagasy. Among the Tiwi of northern Australia, the name of a person who has died, together with the common-noun equivalent of that name, and all the names that the deceased had bestowed upon others, together with their equivalents, are tabooed for ordinary use and transferred to a sacred language (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, pp. 209–210).

Taboos on name use, and often on any sort of interaction, are frequently encountered in the norms for kin relationship. In Papua New Guinea these are so common that the Pidgin term for "relative by marriage" is simply *tambu* ("taboo"). The extreme case, widespread in Aboriginal Australia and New Guinea, is a taboo involving total avoidance between a man and his wife's (or future wife's) mother. A relationship is set up be-

tween them precisely by their not interacting, one that forces them to communicate solely through the bridal exchanges. Thus the taboing or, in this case, the negative differentiation of relationship creates the basis for future relationships by creating a marriage. Further taboos of affinity control and direct the subsequent course of the relationship by restricting overfamiliarity among other kinspeople brought into contact by the marriage.

Taboos on specific kinds, classes, or styles of food and on food preparation are perhaps the most commonly encountered of all human prohibitions. Many peoples who have no general term for "taboo" have a word for "food taboo." Food restrictions, probably universal in human cultures, often conceal (or initiate) preferences or are themselves disguised as health precautions. Well-known examples include the Hebraic prohibition against using the same utensils for preparing meat and dairy products, the Hebraic and Islamic restrictions against eating the meat of animals that have been incorrectly slaughtered and against eating pork, and the Hindu ritual distinction between *pakkā* foods, prepared in clarified butter, and *kaccā* foods, boiled in water. Among the Kaluli of Mount Bosavi in Papua New Guinea, an elaborate system of food taboos operates to prevent relationships among cultural domains that must not be mixed. Married men and women must not eat fresh meat, and smoked meat is available only through exchanges with in-laws; thus, bonds will form through marriage links rather than with single hunters (Schieffelin, 1976, p. 71).

Mourning restrictions most often take the form of taboos, ranging from prohibitions on speaking of, or using the names of, the deceased, through those on the use of the house or property of the deceased, to severe injunctions of seclusion (for widows or widowers). In parts of the Pacific, there are restrictions against washing or self-adornment, and often the mourners must wear relics. In traditional China, specific degrees of mourning behavior were specified according to one's relationship to the deceased. Among the Yi people of Yunnan Province in China visitors are prohibited from entering a compound where there are newborn infants or piglets, where someone is gravely ill, or where someone has died. Immediately upon a person's death, among the Usen Barok of New Ireland, a taboo called the *lebe* goes into effect: no gardening can be done, no fires can be made, and no arguments will be tolerated until the conclusion of the final mourning feast, up to a week later. It is also forbidden to utter a cry of lament until the mourners hear the first squeals of the pigs being slaughtered for the first feast.

Taboos surrounding ritual or worship are often the severest of all, for they involve mediation with the very

forces that are understood to mete out the sanctions. The major ritual of the Daribi of Papua New Guinea concerns the placating of an unmourned and angry ghost, who possesses the *habu* ritualists in the process. Any deviation from the prescribed format of the ritual results in the affliction of the offenders with the dread *habu* illness, a malign act of possession that is merely the intended therapeutic possession gone awry (Wagner, 1972, p. 156). Food taboos accompanying the Chihamba ritual among the Ndembu of Africa keep the participants from "eating Chihamba" or the characteristics associated with this spirit (Turner, 1975, pp. 71-72). The sense of ritual indiscretion as mediation gone wrong is conveyed by the Navajo belief that ghosts cause people to do the opposite of whatever has been decreed in taboos.

The emphasis of a taboo, however negatively it may be phrased, is always upon the thing, act, or word tabooed. We tend to contemplate the object of the taboo itself in a search for motives, or possibly origins, for the prohibition. Thus, for instance, pork is a potential carrier of trichinosis, mothers-in-law have many potential conflicts of interest with their sons-in-law, and interbreeding among close relatives may lead to the expression of deleterious recessive genes. The difficulty with this sort of literalistic thinking can be seen in these examples. Taboo is usually indirect; its real object is not so much what is forbidden as it is the cultural and social circumstances affected by the prohibition. The Kaluli do indeed say that the juices of fresh meat are unhealthy for women and that their husbands should avoid it out of compassion. But the taboo on the eating of fresh meat for married persons serves to force them into the painstaking and appropriate activity of preparing and exchanging smoked meat with relatives by marriage. It aligns with a number of other taboos to restrict interaction to culturally appropriate categories.

The Daribi, in another example, actually have no experience of disagreeable mothers-in-law, for a married person is never allowed to see the mother-in-law, much less speak with her. But the taboo forces each party to be especially aware of the other and to funnel their efforts into organizing the exchanges that must pass between the two sides. An effective relationship is formed through the principle of "not relating"! Finally, what we know as the "incest taboo" is actually the summation of a number of particular kin relationships, which are of differing extent and content in different cultures. What may be considered to be incestuous, or a relative, or a relationship, varies from one culture to another. But the fact of kin regulation through restriction, or kin taboo, if you will, is common to all cultures, for it is the essence of kinship. Hence, whether its prohibitions are

imposed by men or gods, taboo incorporates the regulatory imperative of culture itself.

[See also Purification and Power.]

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ROY WAGNER

TAFSĪR is an Arabic word meaning "interpretation"; it is, more specifically, the general term used in reference to all genres of literature which are commentaries upon the Qur'ān.

Tafsir and Related Terms. The word *tafsir* is used only once in the Qur'ān (25:33), but this is not overly surprising, for most technical terms involved in Muslim exegesis have been derived and adapted either from the field of rhetoric or from the legal tradition. In the case of *tafsir* the word appears to have evolved from a description of a poetic figure in which one hemistich contains an explanation of the preceding one.

There is much discussion in various Arabic sources concerning the precise meaning of the term *tafsir* and its relationship to other technical words such as *ma'ānī*, *ta'wīl*, and *sharḥ*, all of which connote "interpretation" in some way. Historically, *ma'ānī*, literally

"meanings," appears to have been the earliest major term used for the title of works of interpretation; *ta'wīl*, literally related to the notion of "returning to the beginning," was introduced perhaps late in the third century AH (early tenth century CE) as the general term for works of Qur'anic interpretation, only to have been supplanted in the eleventh century CE by *tafsir*. *Sharḥ* seems to have been reserved primarily for profane purposes such as commentaries on poetry, but it was also employed for Qur'anic super-commentaries. The prime focus of a dispute which took place probably in the early tenth century and which involved such central figures of early exegesis as Abū Ja'far al-Ṭabarī (d. 923 CE) and al-Māturīdī (d. 944) was the differentiation of *tafsir* from *ta'wīl*. Both of these major exegetes, note, used the word *ta'wīl* in the title of their commentaries upon the Qur'ān: *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy al-Qur'ān* (The Gathering of the Explanation of the Interpretation of the Verses of the Qur'ān) and *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān* (The Interpretations of the Qur'ān), respectively. The basic question at stake concerned the ways in which traditional material could be employed to provide exegetical data. *Ta'wīl*, in the understanding of some scholars, was interpretation which dispensed with tradition and was founded upon reason, personal opinion, individual research, or expertise, whereas *tafsir* was based upon material (*ḥadīth*) transmitted through a chain of authorities from the earliest period of Islam, preferably from Muḥammad himself or at least from one of his companions. However, the point was certainly never clear, because other proposed differentiations between *ta'wīl* and *tafsir* glossed those simple edges. Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, an early exegete (d. 767), for example, implies a distinction between *tafsir* as what is known on the human level and *ta'wīl* as what is known to God alone. According to a similar notion, *tafsir* applies to passages with one interpretation and *ta'wīl* to those with multiple aspects. And, of course, a further complication is indicated by the very title of al-Ṭabarī's *tafsir*: that is, *ta'wīl* could be used for a work that was quite tradition-oriented, at least in basic form. A further suggestion is that the dispute over *tafsir* and *ta'wīl* is to be traced back to the earliest sectarian disputes in Islam, between the general community and the followers of Muḥammad's son-in-law and cousin, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 661), known as the Shi'ah, who wished to appropriate the word *ta'wīl* for reference to interpretation of "concealed" (i.e., esoteric) parts of the Qur'ān as demanded by Shi'i doctrine.

It should also be noted that the terms *tafsir* and *ta'wīl* were not in fact the exclusive property or concern of Muslims; Jews and Christians writing commentaries on the Bible in Arabic used both words. The Jewish theo-

logian Sa'adyah Gaon (d. 942) titled his Arabic translation of the Pentateuch *Tafsīr basīṭ naṣṣ al-Tūrāh* (The Simple Interpretation of the Text of the Torah), and the Copt Buṭrus al-Sadamantī in about the year 1260 wrote *Al-muqaddimah fī al-tafsīr* (Introduction to Interpretation), which formed a part of his overall work on the interpretation of the New Testament Passion narratives. These are only two examples of use of the word *tafsīr* for scriptural interpretation outside Islam; many other similar instances could be cited.

Purpose of Tafsīr. Interpretation aims to clarify a text. *Tafsīr* takes as its beginning point the text of the Qur'ān, paying full attention to the text itself in order to make its meaning clear. It also functions simultaneously to adapt the text to the present situation of the interpreter. In other words, most interpretation is not purely theoretical; it has a very practical aspect of making the text applicable to the faith and the way of life of the believers. The first of these two interpretive aspects is generally provoked by insoluble problems in meaning, by insufficient detail, by intratextual contradiction, or by unacceptable meanings. Interpretation that fits the text to the situation serves to align it with established social custom, legal positions, and doctrinal assertions.

Other practical reasons can also be cited for the initial creation of *tafsīr* as an entity. As Islam expanded, it was embraced by a large number of people who did not know Arabic; interpretation, sometimes in the form of translations (although this was officially frowned upon) and other times in a simple Arabic which did not contain the ambiguities and difficulties of the original scriptural text, fulfilled the purpose of allowing easier access to the book. In addition, there was the basic problem of the text itself and how it was to be read. The early Arabic script was defective in its differentiation of letters of the alphabet and in the vocalization of the text; although eventually there arose an official system of readings (*qirā'āt*) which gave sanction to a basic seven sets of vocalizations of the text (with further set variations still possible to some extent), in the earliest period a greater freedom with regard to the text seems to have been enjoyed. This freedom extended to the consonantal structure of the text and was legitimized through the notion of the early existence of various codices of the Qur'ān, each with its own textual peculiarities. Differences between these versions and the later, official 'Uthmanic text (as far as these could be cited by the exegetes), as well as the variations created by the different official vocalization systems, then demanded explanation and justification in order to establish claims that a particular reading provided the best textual sense. The end result was that *tafsīr* acted to estab-

lish a firm text of scripture within what became the set limits of the *qirā'āt*.

Origins of Tafsīr. Traditionally it has been held that *tafsīr* arose as a natural practice, originating with Muḥammad and then continuing organically from that point forward; the earliest material has thus become known as *tafsīr al-nabī* ("the interpretation of the Prophet"). Various companions of Muḥammad and some early believers are also seen as the major figures who started interpreting the Qur'ān and teaching people exactly what their understanding of the text was; central among them was 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Abbās (d. 687?), who gained the title *tarjumān al-Qur'ān*, "the interpreter of the Qur'ān."

A debate rages in the scholarly literature on the nature of early *tafsīr*, most especially over the idea of opposition to the activity itself in the early Islamic period. This notion was first isolated by Ignác Goldziher in *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung* (Leiden, 1920); on the basis of traditional Muslim reports concerning the caliph 'Umar (d. 644) and his punishment of a certain person (variously identified) for interpreting unclear passages of the Qur'ān, Goldziher concluded that interpretation of Qur'ānic verses dealing with historical legends and eschatology was illegitimate. Harris Birkeland in *Old Muslim Opposition against Interpretation of the Koran* (Oslo, 1955) rejected this contention on the basis of his own evaluation of the traditional reports, which suggested to him certain contradictions, especially over the identity of the flogging victim and over whether such punishment was in keeping with 'Umar's character. Birkeland has argued that, rather than general opposition to *tafsīr*, there was no opposition at all in the first Muslim century, that strong opposition arose in the second century, and that thereafter the activity of *tafsīr* was brought into and under the sphere of orthodox doctrine and requirements. In particular, strict methods were introduced for the transmission of the information, which formed the core of interpretational procedure, and in this way, *tafsīr* gained total acceptance. Nabia Abbott, in an excursus to her *Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri II: Qur'ānic Commentary and Tradition* (Chicago, 1967), reasserted Goldziher's isolation of early opposition on the basis of traditional information that the person in question certainly existed and that flogging was in keeping with the character of 'Umar. For Abbott, however, the opposition was limited to the interpretation of a specific category of unclear verses (*mutashābihāt*), a claim that she based on the traditional biographical material, which indicates that those people who are mentioned as opponents of *tafsīr* in fact transmitted much material themselves. Therefore, for Abbott, the only opposition

to *tafsīr* that ever existed was that connected with the ambiguous or unclear verses. Precisely what is to be understood by the “unclear verses,” however, is glossed over in this argument. Exegetes never have agreed and never will agree on which verses are unclear, or even on what that expression means. Some things are unclear to one person while they are perfectly clear to another, often because of a different (especially religious) perspective on the material.

The major problem with all of these discussions is the lack of substantial evidence, with the result that the entire argument remains speculative. Manuscript evidence for *tafsīr* barely reaches back to the third century AH (ninth century CE), at which point several genres of commentary had already emerged. Much of the material found in these texts seems to have originated in a popular worship context (such as semiliturgical usage or sermons) or in the storyteller environment provided by wandering preachers (*quṣṣās*) and their didactic, homiletic sermonizing, which aimed to improve the religious sentiments of the uneducated majority of people. In other words, producing entertaining tales was a key to the development of *tafsīr*. From this point of view, the whole discussion of the origins of *tafsīr* as conducted by Goldziher, Birkeland, and Abbott is rendered rather redundant.

Legitimation of Tafsīr in the Qur’ān. While the Qur’ān does not explicitly state that it should be interpreted, commentators have been able to justify their profession over the centuries by reference to the text itself. The most famous and the most problematic passage applied in this way is surah 3:5–6, the terminology of which has been referred to several times in the preceding sections:

It is He who has sent down to you the book in which are clear verses [*muḥkamāt*] that are the essence of the book and others that are unclear [*mutashābihāt*]. As for those in whose hearts is a perversion, they follow the unclear part, desiring dissension and desiring its interpretation [*ta’wīl*]. But no one knows its interpretation [*ta’wīl*] except God. And those firm in knowledge say: “We believe in it; all is from our Lord.” Yet none remember except men who understand.

This passage establishes two categories of interpretation, perhaps most easily viewed as “clear” (*muḥkam*) versus “unclear” (*mutashābih*). Many different translations and identifications have been put forth for the latter, some of which render the category hermeneutically trivial (e.g., identification of the “mysterious letters” which precede various surahs as the *mutashābihāt*), while others prove more valuable (e.g., identification of all verses with more than one interpretive aspect as *mutashābihāt*). Even more crucial, however, was the punc-

uation of the verse. The original Arabic text provides no indication of where stops and pauses should be taken; as a result, it was also possible to render the latter part of the pericope:

But no one knows its interpretation except God and those firm in knowledge who say: “We believe in it; all is from our Lord.”

With such a reading, the interpretive task was not limited to the rather trite exercise of making totally plain the already clear verses; the unclear verses, too, became targets for the commentators, and with that concept defined in some appropriate manner, the way was opened for the creation of a *tafsīr* on every verse of the Qur’ān.

Emergence of Tafsīr Literature. It seems fairly certain that written *tafsīr* works began to emerge in the second century AH at the latest. Documentation starts to proliferate toward the end of that period, and various modes of analysis (e.g., attention to the convergent lines of transmission of a text) also suggest this as the earliest verifiable period. The emergent literature itself can be analyzed into various categories which not only display the distinctive literary qualities and differences of the texts but also suggest an overall relative historical ordering of them. The five sequential categories suggested by John Wansbrough in his *Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation* (Oxford, 1977) are narrative (aggadic), legal (halakhic), textual (masoretic), rhetorical, and allegorical. While the historical sequence itself may be open to some debate, the categorization itself is, in true scientific fashion, functional, unified, and revealing.

Narrative tafsīr. Narrative *tafsīr* is exemplified in the text by Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, which has subsequently been given the title *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān* (Interpretation of the Qur’ān), although that is unlikely to have been the original name, and is also embodied in various sections of the work by Ibn Ishāq (d. 768), *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh* (The Life of the Messenger of God). The creation of an edifying narrative, generally enhanced by folklore from the entire Near Eastern world (including the heritages of Byzantium, Persia, and Egypt, but most especially that of the Judeo-Christian milieu) is the main feature of such commentaries. Adding detail to otherwise sketchy scripture and answering the rather mundane questions which the curious mind will raise when confronted by a contextless scriptural passage are the central concerns of this genre. In fact, the actual narrative seems to be of prime importance; the text of scripture remains underneath the story itself, often subordinated in order to construct a smoothly flowing narrative.

For the first part of surah 2:189 (“They are asking you about the new moons. Say: ‘They are appointed times

for the people and the pilgrimage’”), Muqātil tries to provide the answers for the curious reader. Just who is asking? Why did they ask? Precisely what did they ask? This type of approach is the essence of aggadic *tafsīr*. Muqātil provides the following comment on the verse:

Mu’adh ibn Jabl and Tha’labah ibn Ghanamah said: “O Messenger! Why is it that the new moon is just visible, then it appears small like a needle, then brightens until it is strong, then levels off and becomes a circle, only to start to decrease and get smaller, until it returns just as it was? Why does it not remain at a single level?” So God revealed the verse about the new moons.

The identification of the participants and the precise question being asked (provided in a marvelously naive and therefore entertaining manner) are specified. The overall interpretation of the verse becomes clear through this supplying of contextual material.

Legal tafsīr. Muqātil ibn Sulaymān once again is a focal point in the development of legal interpretation. Here, the arrangement of the material becomes the prime indicator of the genre; whereas in narrative interpretation the order of scripture for the most part serves as the basic framework, for the legal material a topical arrangement is the definitive criterion. The fact that the actual content of Muqātil’s legal *tafsīr*, entitled *Tafsīr khams mi’ah āyah min al-Qur’ān* (The Interpretation of Five Hundred Verses of the Qur’ān), is probably derived from his narrative *tafsīr* reveals that the prime criterion is indeed the form of the work.

Muqātil’s text covers the following topics: faith, prayer, charity, fasting, pilgrimage, retaliation, inheritance, usury, wine, marriage, divorce, adultery, theft, debts, contracts, and holy war. This range of topics gives a fair indication of the nature of much of the material in the Qur’ān which was found to be of legal value.

Textual tafsīr. Activities centered on explanations of the lexicon of scripture, along with its grammar and variant readings, are the focus of textual commentaries. One of the earliest texts devoted to this type of analysis is that of the philologist al-Farrā’ (d. 822) entitled *Ma’ānī al-Qur’ān* (The Meanings of the Qur’ān), a fairly technical work which primarily explains the difficult points of grammar and textual variants. The work of Abū ‘Ubayd (d. 838), *Faḍā’il al-Qur’ān* (The Merits of the Qur’ān), is similar, although it is divided by topic rather than following the Qur’anic order, as does the work of al-Farrā’. Earlier simple texts also exist, including that by Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, *Kitāb al-wujūh wa-al-naḡā’ir* (The Book of [Word] Senses and Parallels), and al-Kisā’ī (d. 804), *Mushṭabihāt al-Qur’ān* (The Resemblances of the Qur’ān), both of which are devoted to

semantic analysis of the text. Muqātil’s text compiles lists of word usages according to the number of senses of meaning (*wujūh*) of a given word; al-Kisā’ī’s work is similar but deals with phrases rather than individual words.

Rhetorical tafsīr. Concern for the literary excellencies of scripture is the focal point of works such as that by Abū ‘Ubaydah (d. 824), *Majāz al-Qur’ān* (The Literary Expression of the Qur’ān), although the origin of this type of analysis may well be in textual exegesis (with a grammatical focus) rather than in a purely literary type. The impetus for its development as a separate genre, however, was the nascent notion of the miraculous character of the Qur’ān and the literary evidence for it. While this became a full doctrine only in the fourth century AH, its exegetical roots are to be found here. The work *Ta’wīl mushkil al-Qur’ān* (The Interpretation of the Difficulties in the Qur’ān), by Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889), proves to be an important transition point between this earliest rhetorical analysis based upon grammatical and exegetical niceties and that of the later doctrine of the miraculous character or inimitability of the Qur’ān (*i’jāz*). [For further discussion, see I’jāz.] In these texts attention is paid to the literary qualities of the Qur’ān which place it outside the norm of Arabic prose and poetry; various poetical figures are isolated, for example, are subjected to analysis for meaning, and, in many cases, are then compared with older Arabic poetry.

Allegorical tafsīr. Support for dissident opinion in Islam was generally found *ex post facto* through the expediency of allegorical interpretation. Supported through a terminological differentiation of the *zāhir* as *historia*, “literal,” and the *bāṭin* as *allegoria*, “symbolic,” the Ṣūfī *tafsīr* of Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 896) exemplifies this trend in the earliest period. No attempt is made in this work, however, to provide an overall allegorical interpretation; rather, it takes isolated passages from the text of scripture and views them in light of mystical experience. The order of scripture is followed in al-Tustarī’s text as it now exists, although the initial compilation may not have followed any such order. About one thousand verses (out of some sixty-two hundred) in the Qur’ān are covered in this manner.

The commentary itself, which is structured piecemeal and reads in a disjointed fashion, contains much more than straightforward allegorical interpretation: legends of the ancient prophets, stories about Muḡammad, and even some about the author of the work himself also find their place. Nor is any overall pursuit of mystical themes to be found; indeed, its general nature is fragmentary. The esoteric portions of the text are formed around typically Ṣūfī meditations on the Qur’ān, each

taking a key word from the text. Allegorical interpretation in this case becomes as much a process of thematic association as one of textual commentary.

Consolidation of Classical Tafsīr. It is with the fourth century AH (tenth century CE) that true works of *tafsīr* emerge, combining in various ways the five formative elements I have described above. The first landmark of this type of *tafsīr* is that of al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy al-Qur'ān*, which gathers together in a compendium reports from earlier authorities dealing with most aspects of the Qur'ān. Verse-by-verse analysis is provided, each detailed with virtually every major interpretational trend (except sectarian). The material supplied in this manner is given in its full form, complete with the chains of transmitters for each item of information to lend the weight of tradition to each statement. This type of work is classically called *tafsīr bi-al-ma'thūr* ("interpretation by tradition"), as opposed to *tafsīr bi-al-ra'y* ("interpretation by opinion"), but the categories are misleading. Al-Ṭabarī provides his own personal interpretation, both implicitly by his editorial selection of material and explicitly by stating his opinion where different trends of interpretation exist, sometimes even going against the entire thrust of tradition and providing his own point of view; in this sense, this work, too, is *tafsīr bi-al-ra'y*.

In the centuries after al-Ṭabarī, *tafsīr* as an activity increased and became more and more sophisticated and, in some cases, reached voluminous quantities. Al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 983?), al-Tha'labī (d. 1035), and al-Wāḥidī (d. 1075) are all prominent people who in the fourth and fifth centuries AH produced volumes of *tafsīr*, sometimes, as in the case of al-Wāḥidī, in multiple editions.

Theological concerns begin to make a greater impact upon *tafsīr* in this period; it is a trend which culminates in the production of the most famous Qur'ān commentaries in the Muslim world, those of the rationalist Mu'tazilī al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144), the philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), and the Sunnī traditionalist al-Bayḍāwī (d. sometime between 1286 and 1316). Debates rage among these authors, and many others, over the central questions of Islamic theology and the various positions to be found in the Qur'ān. Topics covered include free will and predestination, the attributes of God, the nature of the Qur'ān, the imposition of the tasks of the law, the nature and extent of the hereafter, and so forth. The Mu'tazilī al-Zamakhsharī opts for interpretation based upon reason in his commentary *Al-kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl* (The Unveiler of the Realities of the Secrets of the Revelation). Apparent contradiction between verses of the Qur'ān are resolved in favor of the Mu'tazilī doctrines of the unity

and justice of God. Al-Bayḍāwī produced an edited version of the text by al-Zamakhsharī in his *Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-ta'wīl* (The Lights of the Revelation and the Secrets of the Interpretation), removing in the process most of the Mu'tazilī tendencies and compressing the material into an even more concise form. Al-Rāzī's unfinished *tafsīr*, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb* (The Keys of the Unknown), discusses the Qur'ān in terms of a rationalist philosophy which for the most part involved a rejection of the Mu'tazilī position and argued in support of orthodoxy. Humans, for al-Rāzī, are predetermined, and God's freedom and power cannot be confined by human rationality.

Encyclopedist *tafsīr* works in the tradition of al-Ṭabarī also continue with writers such as Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), al-Shawkānī (d. 1839), and al-Ālūsī (d. 1854). The opposite trend toward distillation reaches its peak, in popular terms, with the *Tafsīr al-Jalālayn* of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 1459).

Specializations within Classical Tafsīr. While the all-encompassing commentary marks the highlight of exegetical activity in the classical period, the field of specialized Qur'anic sciences was emerging at the same time, providing a number of subdisciplines within *tafsīr*. Some of these are continuations of the earliest developments; others arise under new impetuses. General compendia of information on these sciences arise in the discipline known as *'ulūm al-Qur'ān* ("the sciences of the Qur'ān"), represented by such works as *Nukat al-intiṣār li-naql al-Qur'ān* (Gems of Assistance in the Transmission of the Qur'ān), by al-Bāqillānī (d. 1012); *Al-burhān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān* (The Criterion for the Sciences of the Qur'ān), by al-Zarkashī (d. 1391); and *Al-ittqān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān* (The Perfection about the Sciences of the Qur'ān), by al-Suyūṭī. The topics gathered in these books are also subjects of separate monographs by a wide variety of writers; these topics include *naskh*, abrogation of legal passages of the Qur'ān; *asbāb al-nuzūl*, the occasions of revelation of individual verses and surahs of the Qur'ān; *tajwīd*, recitation of the Qur'ān; *al-waqf wa-al-ibtidā'*, pauses and starts in recitation of the Qur'ān; *qirā'āt*, variants to the text of the Qur'ān; *marṣūm al-khaṭṭ*, the writing of the Qur'ān; *aḥkām*, the laws of the Qur'ān; *gharīb*, the strange or difficult words in the Qur'ān; *i'rāb*, the grammar of the Qur'ān; *qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā'*, the stories of the prophets; and *i'jāz*, the inimitability of the Qur'ān. As these topics indicate, it is indeed difficult to separate developed *tafsīr* from both legal concerns (*fiqh*) and grammar (*naḥw*).

Sectarian Tafsīr. Parallel to the development of mainstream Sunnī Muslim *tafsīr* in the classical period, works arose from various other Muslim groups, each pursuing its own particular sectarian aim and, once

again, attempting to make the Qur'ān relevant to its own particular point of view and situation.

Shiism. For the Shī'ah in general, the authority of the imams who descended from 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was ultimate in matters of interpretation of the Qur'ān. While *ḥadīth* traditions circulated in Sunnī circles were generally accepted, this material was often supplemented or corrected on the authority of the imams. The category of the *mutashābihāt* was particularly useful to the Shī'ah, for a number of appropriate "unclear" verses could be understood as referring to 'Alī and his family. Such verses were also useful for "discovering" stridently critical comments concerning the early leaders of the Muslim community, namely Abū Bakr (d. 634), 'Umar, and 'Uthmān.

The earliest Ithnā 'Ashariyah or Twelver Shī'ī *tafsīr* in existence today appears to be the somewhat fragmentary commentary of 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qummī (d. tenth century) with the ascribed title *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*; other prominent works include *Al-tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (The Explanation in Interpretation of the Qur'ān), by Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 1067), and a major commentary which is a compendium of information comparable to that of al-Ṭabarī, *Majma' al-bayān li-'ulūm al-Qur'ān* (The Collection of the Explanation of the Sciences of the Qur'ān), by Abū 'Alī al-Ṭabarsī (d. 1153 or later).

Allegorical interpretation is favored in Shī'ī *tafsīr* as a process of looking for the "inner" meaning in many passages. The special way of applying this method is to find references to 'Alī and his family, which, of course, serves to promote Shī'ī claims to power and legitimacy. For example, in al-Qummī's *tafsīr*, the notion of Islam itself is defined not simply as submission to God but also as submission to the authority of the line of imams. The use of textual variation is also present in some works, although whenever the Shī'ah have been powerful in political affairs and fully institutionalized, such notions have generally been rejected as anti-status quo. This was already true to some extent in the eleventh century but became even more so with the rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth century. The specific argument occurred over whether some of the Qur'ān had been changed, or even omitted by 'Uthmān when he ordered its compilation, in order to undermine Shī'ī claims. Passages referring directly to 'Alī had been erased, it was suggested. Al-Qummī argues, for example, that there are verses in the Qur'ān where "letters have been replaced by other letters," and he says that there are places where "verses contradict what God has sent down" (that is, they contradict or at least do not support Shī'ī beliefs). Al-Ṭabarsī argues, however, that the only change that has occurred in the Qur'ān concerns

the overall order of the text itself and not its contents. One common textual variant which does receive wide acceptance among Shī'ī commentators concerns the word *ummah* ("community"), which is believed to be properly read *a'immah* ("leaders") or imams (*a'immah* being the plural of *imām* and having the same basic consonantal structure as *ummah*).

The Shī'ah, like the Mu'tazilah, looked to the Qur'ān for support of the rationalist theological doctrines that were a key element of their belief system: free will and the created Qur'ān. Their interpretational method, therefore, is similar to that employed by al-Zamakhsharī. The Ismā'īliyah likewise employed the Qur'ān as a reference point for their theologizing; the group's esoteric leanings, often characterized as extreme, are not witnessed in many texts but are found, for example, in the fragmentary *Mizāj al-tasnīm* (The Condition of *Tasnīm*) by Ismā'īl ibn Hibat Allāh (d. 1760). In general, the Ismā'īlī movement sees the outer meaning of the Qur'ān as only the symbol of the true inner meaning. The imam of the age, who has in him the true, full revelation, adapts the Qur'ān to the spiritual and mental condition of humanity through interpretation; eventually, people will be brought to the true and full meaning of the text, which is essentially the knowledge of the unity of God. Such is the presupposition with which all Ismā'īlī *tafsīr* approaches the text.

The more recent Bahā'ī movement establishes its clear Islamic heritage through the existence of works of *tafsīr* written in Arabic by Sayyid 'Alī Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (1819–1850). Known as the Bāb, or "gate," he claimed to have initiated a new prophetic cycle and became the focal point of the movement which developed later as the Bahā'ī. Among his works are commentaries on surahs 12, 108, and 113 of the Qur'ān. In general these are marked by a spiritualistic interpretation of eschatology, including the notions of paradise, hell, death, and resurrection, all of which are taken to refer to the end of the prophetic cycle as well as the end of the physical world (although the latter is re-created by God in each prophetic cycle).

Sufism. Directly related to Shī'ī *tafsīr* in general is Sūfī interpretation, which provides a mystical speculation upon the Qur'ān. This interpretation usually justifies itself through reference to mystical activities believed to have been practiced and supported by Muḥammad. Sahl al-Tustarī, mentioned above, probably represents the earliest example of this tendency. Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 1012) compiled his *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* (The Truths of Interpretation) from various Sūfī authorities and other important personalities. All of the material can be considered allegorical, since it is devoted to finding the inner meaning of each pas-

sage as it relates to the mystical quest. A typical example is found in the interpretation of surah 17:1, the classical reference to Muḥammad's "night journey" to heaven, which is taken as a reference to each mystic's ascent to the higher levels of consciousness. Another prominent Ṣūfī, Abū Ḥamīd al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), did not write a commentary on the Qur'ān as such but found many occasions on which to record his approach to the text of scripture from the point of view of the intellectual Ṣūfī. For al-Ghazālī as for most other mystics, the Qur'ān works on two levels: the practical and the cognitive. The former applies to the inner self and its purification without neglect of the outer activities, while the latter is a meaning found through inner experience in light of mystical thought, and it can be reached only through firm knowledge of the practical or outer aspects. 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 1330?) compiled perhaps the most widely known Ṣūfī *tafsīr*, although it has often been mistakenly attributed directly to his teacher, the famous Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240), and thus is usually known under the title of *Tafsīr Ibn al-'Arabī* (The Interpretation of Ibn al-'Arabī). As with al-Ghazālī, the outer principles of religion are not to be forgotten, although within the context of the *tafsīr* they certainly become submerged under allegorical interpretation, here seen in terms of the esoteric inner meaning as well as the symbolism of real events in the world.

Emergence of Modern Tafsīr. The rise of colonialism and the impact of Western thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries certainly did not spell the end of *tafsīr* activity; in fact, at various times, the modern world has provoked more and more voluminous commentary upon the Qur'ān. Modern *tafsīr* is no different in basic impetus from its classical counterpart; it, too, desires to fit the text of scripture to the conditions of the era contemporary with the interpreter.

The impact of science has perhaps been the major factor in creating new demands and also the element of contemporary life to which much early modern *tafsīr* made its response. Muslims had not understood the true message of the Qur'ān, most modernists argued, and had therefore lost touch with the true scientific, rational spirit of the text. Out of this basic point several elements have emerged that unite all modernist interpretations: (1) the attempt is made to interpret the Qur'ān in the light of reason ("to interpret the Qur'ān by the Qur'ān," as it is frequently phrased) rather than with all the extraneous material provided by tradition in the form of *ḥadīth* reports and earlier commentaries; "Back to the source" often becomes the motto of such approaches; (2) the attempt is made, through the expediency of interpretation, to strip the Qur'ān of all leg-

endary traits, primitive ideas, fantastic stories, magic, fables, and superstition; symbolic interpretation is the primary means for such resolutions; (3) the attempt is made to rationalize doctrine as found in or as justified by reference to the Qur'ān.

The earliest focal point of modernist *tafsīr* activity arose in India. Shāh Walī Allāh (1703–1762) is often seen as the precursor of the Indian reformist movement, but that trend reached its true blossoming with the Indian civil servant and educator Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), who wrote the first major explicitly modernist *tafsīr*, entitled simply *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. His commentary was directed toward making all Muslims aware of the fact that Western influence in the world required a new vision of Islam, for Islam as it was actually practiced and believed in by most of its adherents would be seriously threatened by modern advances in thought and science. Where, therefore, was the true core of Islam to be found? How was its center to be defined? For Ahmad Khan, these questions were to be answered through reference to the Qur'ān, which, if it were properly understood through the use of the powers of reason, would provide the necessary answers. The basis of the required social and educational reforms, for example, were to be found in the Qur'ān. By returning to the source of Islam, the religion would be revitalized and the future would be secure.

In the Arab world, Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), a vigorous champion of educational reform, also wrote a commentary on the Qur'ān, commonly called *Tafsīr al-Manār* (The Interpretation of al-Manār), which was completed after his death by his pupil Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935). Not overly modernistic in outlook, 'Abduh's *tafsīr* does, however, urge the moderate use of rationality in matters of theology and tries to demonstrate that the Qur'ān is to be read primarily as a source of moral guidance applicable to the modern situation. The spiritual aspect of the Qur'ān was most important to 'Abduh, and he, like many commentators in the past, was quite prepared to leave certain matters in the Qur'ān unexplained and to concentrate on their mysteriousness rather than to suggest resolutions for interpretational difficulties.

This type of interpretation continues more recently in the Arab world, represented, for example, by the intellectual spokesman for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1959), who in his work *Fī zilāl al-Qur'ān* (In the Shade of the Qur'ān) interprets the text according to his own particular ideological leanings. India, too, has produced many such commentaries; examples are Abū al-Kalām Āzād (1888–1959), whose Urdu work *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* (The Interpretation [or Translation] of the Qur'ān) emphasized the no-

tion of the unity of man while its author faced the rising tide favoring the formation of Pakistan, and Abū al-A'lā Mawdūdī (1903–1979), the author of *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* (The Meaning of the Qur'ān), who uses the Qur'ān to establish a blueprint for a future Islamic society in Pakistan to be formed through his political party, Jamā'at-i Islāmī.

The impact of Western science is perhaps the most notable aspect of modern commentaries. Both Ahmad Khan and 'Abduh were intent on encouraging their compatriots to embrace the scientific outlook of the West in order to share in the progress of the modern world. Often this effort involved little more than simply stating that the Qur'ān enjoins its readers to seek and use rational knowledge, but at other times it also involved the historical claim that Islam had developed science in the first place and had then passed it on to Europe, so that in embracing the scientific outlook in the present situation Muslims were only reclaiming what was truly Islamic. A more distinctive trend in *tafsīr* emerges also, however, primarily in the person of Ṭaṭṭāwī Jawharī (1870–1940) and his twenty-six-volume work, *Al-jawāhīr fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (Jewels in the Interpretation of the Qur'ān). God would not have revealed the Qur'ān, so the argument goes, had he not included in it everything that people needed to know; science is obviously necessary in the modern world, so it should not be surprising to find all of science in the Qur'ān when that scripture is properly understood. Jawharī also makes reference to the classical notion of the miraculous character or inimitability of the Qur'ān (*i'jāz*), which he takes to refer primarily to the content of the text in terms of its knowledge concerning matters which are only now becoming clear to mankind. Since the scientific knowledge contained in the text is proof of its miraculous character, references are found in the Qur'ān for numerous modern inventions (electricity, for example) and scientific discoveries (the fact that the earth revolves around the sun).

Western thought has also influenced *tafsīr* in another way, although perhaps not so dramatically in terms of its popular acceptance as has "scientific" exegesis; the emergence of modern literary-philological-historical criticism has, thus far, played a fairly minor role but most certainly has found its supporters. 'Ā'ishah 'Abd al-Raḥmān, a university professor in Morocco who writes under the name Bint al-Shāṭi', represents a development of this line. This modern interpretation is not a resurrection of the philological type of commentary associated with al-Zamakhsharī, for example, who, although he wrote with great critical acumen, is for most modernists too full of unnecessary material which is seen to be a hindrance to understanding in the mod-

ern world; rather, 'Abd al-Raḥmān pursues a straightforward approach, searching for the "original meaning" of a given Arabic word or phrase in order to understand the Qur'ān in its totality. This process does not involve the use of material extraneous to the Qur'ān itself, except perhaps for the use of a small amount of ancient poetry, but rather it uses the context of a given textual passage to define a word in as many overall contexts as it occurs. Neither the history of the Arabs nor that of the biblical prophets nor scientific topics are to be found in the Qur'ān because providing such material is not seen to be the task of the text. The purpose of the narrative elements of the Qur'ān is to provide moral and spiritual guidance to the believers, not to provide history or "facts." Within the Muslim world, the attempt to demythologize scripture—as in this approach—marks the beginnings of an incorporation of a type of modern critical scholarship developed in the context of biblical studies; its future at this point, however, remains uncertain.

[See also *Qur'ān and the biographies of the principal scholars mentioned herein. For discussion of interpretation in other traditions, see Biblical Exegesis and Scripture.*]

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Four books are fundamental to the modern study of *tafsīr*: *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung* (Leiden, 1920), a collection of Ignác Goldziher's lectures delivered in 1913, has yet to be replaced as a general overview of the subject; Theodor Nöldeke's *Geschichte des Qorāns*, vol. 2, *Die Sammlung des Qorāns*, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1919), contains, especially on pages 123–192, much valuable and basic material; John Wansbrough's *Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation* (Oxford, 1977) is essential to the study of the formation and early development of *tafsīr* and to all discussions of terminology and genres of exegetical literature; volume 1 of Fuat Sezgin's *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums* (Leiden, 1967) records most of the known Arabic works of *tafsīr* up to the fifth century AH.

Jane I. Smith's *An Historical and Semantic Study of the Term "Islām" as Seen in a Sequence of Qur'ān Commentaries* (Missoula, Mont., 1975), discusses the works of seventeen exegetes

on specific verses of the Qur'ān and at the same time provides useful introductions to the lives and works of the individuals. On Ṣūfī *tafsīr* two excellent works exist: Paul Nwyia's *Exégèse coranique et langage mystique* (Beirut, 1970) and Gerhard Böwering's *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qur'ānic Hermeneutics of the Ṣūfī Sahl al-Tustarī, d. 283/896* (New York, 1980). The latter discusses both textual and thematic matters in exemplary fashion.

Modern *tafsīr* has been analyzed by J. M. S. Baljon in *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation, 1880–1960* (Leiden, 1961) and by J. J. G. Jansen in *The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt* (Leiden, 1974); both works provide basic yet informative overviews of the subject and bring Goldziher's work up to the present day.

Not many works of *tafsīr* have been translated, primarily because of their overly technical nature. Helmut Gätje has compiled extracts from various exegetes and arranged them thematically for the use of students in his *Koran und Koranexegese* (Zurich, 1971), translated by Alford T. Welch as *The Qur'ān and Its Exegesis* (Berkeley, 1976). Full works of *tafsīr* which have been translated are very few: *The Tales of the Prophets of al-Kisā'ī*, translated by Wheeler M. Thackston (Boston, 1978), a book of the *qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā'* genre, and *The Recitation and Interpretation of the Qur'ān: Al-Ghazālī's Theory*, translated by Muhammad A. Quasem (London, 1982), are two worthwhile texts. Attention should be paid to *The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq's "Sīrat Rasūl Allāh"* (1955; reprint, Lahore, 1967), by Alfred Guillaume for the passages of early *tafsīr* which are contained in it; reference to these is, however, unfortunately not facilitated by an index of Qur'ānic verses in the translation. Translations of two chapters from the *Tafsīr* of al-Bayḍāwī are available. These are primarily intended for students of Arabic, since the discussion frequently tends to revolve around the sense of a given Arabic word or grammatical construction; *Bayḍāwī's Commentary on Sūrah 12 of the Qur'ān*, edited by A. F. L. Beeston (Oxford, 1963), is the most accessible of such texts. Modern *tafsīr* has not been served well by translation either, although the following are available: *The Meaning of the Qur'ān*, 8 vols., translated by A. A. Maududi (Lahore, 1967–1979); Abū al-Kalām Āzād's *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān*, 2 vols., translated and edited by Syed Abdul Latif (New York, 1962–1967), and Sayyid Quṭb's *In the Shade of the Qur'ān*, translated by M. A. Salahi and A. A. Shamis (London, 1979).

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TAFTĀZĀNĪ, AL- (AH 722–791?/1322–1389 CE), more fully Sa'd al-Dīn Mas'ūd ibn 'Umar al-Taftāzānī; master of a range of intellectual disciplines including theology, philosophy, metaphysics, logic, grammar, and rhetoric, as well as fundamental principles of jurisprudence and Qur'ānic exegesis. Born in Taftāzān, Khorasan, he is re-

nowned for the breadth and quality of his scholarship, though little is known about his personal life. His writing career started at the age of sixteen, and before his death his works were known and studied from the eastern part of the Muslim world to Egypt in the West. Al-Taftāzānī's eminence in scholarship was noticed and recognized in his lifetime by the Mongol rulers, especially the famous Timur Lenk (Tamerlane), by whom he was personally honored.

Al-Taftāzānī's best-known work is probably his commentary on the creed of al-Nasafī (d. 1142 CE), *Sharḥ al-'aqā'id al-Nasafīyah*, still studied in major Muslim seminaries. His work on the fundamental principles of Islamic law, *Sharḥ al-talwīḥ 'alā al-tawḥīd li-matn al-tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, was published in Beirut in 1983. Because he wrote commentaries on Ḥanafī as well as Shāfi'ī works of jurisprudence his biographers differed as to which school of law he belonged to. The same was true in terms of his theological position. His commentary on al-Nasafī's *'Aqā'id* (written in 1367) led some to consider him a Mātūrīdī in view of his apparent espousal of their doctrines: for example, he viewed creation (*takwīn*) as eternal and an essential attribute of God, accepted the doctrine of free will, viewed the Qur'ān as an expression of God's eternal self-speech (a position also adopted by the later Ash'arīyah), and rejected the possibility of actually seeing God in the afterlife. Despite these apparent Mātūrīdī leanings, his *Maqāṣid* and *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid* (written in 1383) reveal him to be an Ash'arī. Clearly his was a mediating position in which he demonstrated independence of thought and a resistance to legal or doctrinal classification.

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WADI Z. HADDAD

TAGORE, RABINDRANATH (1861–1941), Hindu poet, novelist, playwright, educator, philosopher, reformer; winner of the 1913 Nobel Prize for literature. Rabindranath Tagore was born in Calcutta on 7 May 1861 to a prominent and wealthy Bengali brahman family that was at the forefront of the cultural revival known as the “Bengal renaissance.” His father, Debendranath Tagore, was a mystic and a leader of the theistic reform movement called the Brāhmo Samāj. The elder Tagore’s religious beliefs, particularly his reverence for the Upaniṣads and his rejection of image worship, combined with his practical outlook on life, helped to shape many of his son’s ideas.

Rabindranath Tagore composed his first poem at the age of eight. When he was fourteen, he left school, preferring to pursue his education in the stimulating environment of his home rather than in the stifling atmosphere of a traditional classroom. He studied Sanskrit, English, and Bengali literature and continued to write poetry. Among his favorite poets were the Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa and the English Romantics Shelley and Keats, all of whom significantly influenced his own work. His discovery, at the age of fifteen, of the lyrical love poems of the Bengali Vaiṣṇavas was a turning point in his poetic and spiritual development. Throughout his career he drew inspiration from them for his meter, his imagery, and his philosophy of divine love.

Tagore married Mrinalini Devi in 1883. In 1890 he took charge of the family estates in Shelidah (in present-day Bangladesh), where he stayed until 1901. Here he had the opportunity to observe at close hand the life and natural beauty of rural Bengal, an experience that gave new vitality to his writing and inspired him to begin composing short stories. Here, too, he heard the mystic songs of the Bāul cult. These songs, which express the Bāul’s longing for the Supreme One, who resides in man’s heart and not in images or temples, had a powerful effect on Tagore. He incorporated into his poems their message as he interpreted it, as well as much of their imagery.

Tagore’s book of devotional poems entitled *Gitanjali* (Song Offerings) was his first attempt at English translation. A limited edition of the English version was published in London in 1912, followed by a popular edition in 1913. Later that year the book brought Tagore the Nobel Prize. In addition to poetry, Tagore wrote novels, short stories, essays, an autobiography, and songs for which he composed his own music. It is, however, in his lyrical poetry with its roots in the mystic traditions of the Upaniṣads, medieval North Indian Sant poetry (particularly the poems of Kabīr and Dādū), medieval Bengali Vaiṣṇava poetry, and the songs of the Bāuls that his talents found their best expression.

Throughout his life Tagore was torn between the call of his muse and the need to serve his fellow man. In 1901 he turned his efforts to education. In order to provide an alternative to the stifling traditional education that he had experienced, he founded a school at Santiniketan modeled on the ideal of the *tapovanās* (“forest hermitages”) of the Upaniṣads. Here, classes were held outdoors and music and the fine arts were stressed. At Santiniketan in 1918 Tagore laid the foundation stone for Visvabharati, an international university whose aim was to promote understanding between East and West and to serve as a center of Indian and Eastern culture. Four years later, he established at nearby Sriniketan a center for rural reconstruction. An active lecturer in later years, Tagore traveled widely, speaking on such subjects as his religious philosophy and the evils of nationalism. He died on 7 August 1941.

Through much of Tagore’s poetry runs a mystic belief in the unity of God, man, and nature, a concept he referred to as “creative unity.” What he expressed symbolically in his poems, he explained more fully in books such as *Sadhana* (1913), *Creative Unity* (1922), and *The Religion of Man* (1931). Tagore’s religion was intuitive, arrived at through a gradual process of realization. He himself noted that the evolution of his religious thinking was closely linked to his poetic development, and he termed his creed “a poet’s religion.”

At eighteen Tagore had his first religious experience, a vision that lasted four days. At this first stage of his realization, he felt a personal relationship between himself and the god who was inspiring him. He called this being *Jivandevatā* (“lord of my life”). At a later stage he became aware that *Jivandevatā* was also *Viśvadevatā* (“lord of the universe”).

Tagore believed that God is immanent in his creation, both in the animate and in the inanimate, but that his fullest expression is in man. God created man in order to realize the bliss of love, which is only possible if lover and beloved are separate entities. Tagore did not view union between man and the divine as absorption of the individual soul into the supreme soul; rather he held that man retains his individuality even in union. Thus man is at once different from God and not different from him, a notion referred to in Vaiṣṇava philosophy as *bhedābheda*.

In Tagore’s view the aim of life is “to become more and more one with God” by realizing the infinite in the finite. This goal, however, is not attained through meditation alone. Tagore criticized the ascetic who turns away from the world and the Vaiṣṇava who gives way to excessive emotion; he espoused instead a balance between meditation and action. Combining the *Bhagavadgītā*’s doctrine of disinterested action with the

Buddhist ideal of compassion, Tagore defined action as working for love without any desire for personal gain, and as showing kindness to all creatures. He included creative activities such as music, art, and poetry among the kinds of actions that lead to realization of God, and he saw his own poetry as part of his *sādhana* (method of realization).

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CAROL SALOMON

TĀHIRAH. See Qurrat al-'Ayn Tāhirah.

TAI CHEN (*tzu*, Shen-hsiu; *hao*, Tung-yüan; 1724–1777), the most illustrious representative of the *k'ao-cheng* school of evidential research and one of the leading philosophers of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1911).

Tai Chen was born into a modest mercantile family of Hsiu-ning, Anhwei Province. He pursued his earliest education by borrowing books from neighbors. He learned very quickly and astonished his teachers by questioning the authority of everything he read. For a brief period he was apprenticed to a cloth merchant, but in 1742 he was sent to the home of a wealthy scholar and there studied with Chiang Yung (1681–1762).

The scholar Chiang Yung provided the formative influence during the first period of Tai Chen's adult life. He was a specialist in the *Li chi* (Book of Rites) and in mathematics and phonology; the training he gave Tai Chen in these areas became the foundation for much of Tai Chen's later scholarship in the *k'ao-cheng* tradition. This side of his education fitted him for the mainstream of Ch'ing intellectual life. Chiang Yung, however, also steeped his pupil in the philosophical systems of Sung Neo-Confucianism, inculcating the notion that practical scholarship and moral philosophy were the two legs of Confucian learning.

In 1754, Tai Chen moved to Peking, where he mingled with representatives of the *k'ao-cheng* school of evidential research, notably Hui Tung (1697–1758). *K'ao-cheng* scholars accused the Sung Neo-Confucians of pointless speculation influenced by the Buddhists; such learning, they claimed, was disdainful of the practical problems of the real world and neglected solid scholarship in fa-

vor of subjectivism. Although during his early years in Peking Tai Chen defended the need to ask larger questions about morality and meaning, his writings published between 1758 and 1766 show the influence of *k'ao-cheng* on his thinking. Some scholars interpret this period as a repudiation of his past philosophical training. It is certain that Tai Chen brought to Peking ideas that ran counter to the consensus of his peers, but whether his colleagues in Peking convinced him to change his orientation, or whether he simply emphasized the nonphilosophical side of his work to gain acceptance at the capital, is a question that remains unanswered.

However superficial or profound his conversion to evidential research, Tai Chen succeeded in gaining entry to the most illustrious intellectual circles. His publications in mathematics and waterway engineering earned him high renown. In 1773 the emperor appointed him to the elite board of compilers of the Imperial Manuscript Library (*Ssu-k'u Ch'üan-shu*). He had risen to the very pinnacle of scholarship, yet even during his tenure at the library he continued to write books on philosophy.

His colleagues and peers tended to view his philosophical writings as incidental digressions from his scholarly work. Although one or two of his closest disciples recognized the importance of philosophy to Tai Chen's intellectual life, none of them was able to carry on his philosophical work. Hu Shih revived Tai Chen's philosophy at a memorial conference in 1923–1924, claiming that Tai Chen, fully steeped in the empirical scholarship of his day, had attacked and transcended the errors and excesses of Sung Neo-Confucianism, laying the groundwork of a new Confucian vision. Others, notably Yü Ying-shih, have argued that Tai Chen's thought is in fact profoundly indebted to Neo-Confucianism and is a continuous development of that heritage. Yü maintains that Tai was never fully converted to the antiphilosophical prejudices of his peers. He saw scholarship as a handmaiden to the larger task of philosophy. Arguing from Tai Chen's letters and conversations, Yü contends that the real target of his philosophy was not the Sung school, but his narrow and pedantic contemporaries in evidential research.

Tai Chen's philosophy was based on a monism of *ch'i* ("ether"). He argued against the Sung Neo-Confucian distinctions between metaphysical and physical, between heaven-endowed nature and material nature. Such dualism, he claimed, led Confucians to neglect the empirical world and to believe that there was in human beings a dichotomy between nature and feelings. On the grand scale, Tai argued that the Tao was nothing other than the orderly patterns of the movements of ether; it

was not a metaphysical principle. Analogously, he held that the realization of human nature was nothing other than the orderly patterns of one's feelings. As the sages had channeled the floodwaters to restore the order of Tao in the world, so feelings, properly channeled, are the manifestations of human nature. Human life in the material world is made up of feelings or response. When feelings are healthfully expressed and fundamental needs satisfied, both the body and *hsin*, or mind and heart, of the person can be healthy and whole. To channel feelings and understand the order and movements of ether, the mind must weigh (*ch'üan*) its perceptions and responses carefully. Weighing requires accurate and informed perceptions that take account of all the evidence and, carefully comparing the evidence, come to a balanced response.

An organic connection ran between Tai Chen's scholarship and his philosophy. Only the former aspect of his work was appreciated during his lifetime, whereas the latter area is the subject of continued debate among Confucian scholars.

[See also the biography of Meng-tzu.]

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Three English-language works provide a brief introduction to Tai Chen's philosophy. Cheng Chung-ying discusses the philosophical system in the introduction to his translation

(above). Liang Ch'i-ch'ao provides an appreciative introduction to Tai's thought and scholarship in *Intellectual Trends of the Ch'ing Period*, translated by Immanuel C. Y. Hsü (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 54–62. Fung Yu-lan provides a critique of his philosophical position in *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, vol. 2, 2d ed., translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton, 1953), pp. 651–672. Finally Yü Ying-shih's article "Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of Ch'ing Confucian Intellectualism," *Tsinghua Journal of Chinese Studies*, n.s. 11 (1975): 105–146, provides a larger picture of the rise of evidential research that shows that Tai Chen's moral philosophy motivates his evidential research.

JUDITH A. BERLING

T'AI-CHI. In the *I-ching* (Book of Changes; a wisdom book in ancient China that is widely believed to have been a major source of inspiration for Confucianism and Taoism), the term *t'ai-chi* ("great ultimate") signifies the origin and ground of Heaven and earth and of all beings. It is the Great Ultimate that is said to engender or produce *yin* and *yang*, the twin cosmic forces, which in turn give rise to the symbols, patterns, and ideas that are, indeed, forms of *yin* and *yang*. The interaction of the two modalities of these cosmic forces bring about the eight trigrams that constitute the basis of the *Book of Changes*. Combining any two of the eight trigrams, each of which contains three broken (*yin*) and three unbroken (*yang*) lines, forms one of the sixty-four hexagrams. These are taken as codes for all possible forms of change, transformation, existence, life, situations, and institutions both in nature and in culture. The Great Ultimate, then, is the highest and the most fundamental reality, and is said to generate and underly all phenomena.

However, it is misleading to conceive of the Great Ultimate as the functional equivalent of either the Judeo-Christian concept of God or the Greek idea of Logos. The Great Ultimate is neither the willful creator nor pristine reason, but an integral part of an organic cosmic process. The inherent assumption of this interpretation is that the universe is in a dynamic process of transformation and, at the same time, has an organic unity and an underlying harmony. The universe, in Joseph Needham's understanding, is well-coordinated and well-ordered but lacks an ordainer. The Great Ultimate, so conceived, is a source or root, and is thus inseparable from what issues from it.

It was the Sung-dynasty Neo-Confucian master Chou Tun-i (Chou Lien-hsi, 1017–1073) who significantly contributed to the philosophical elaboration of the notion. In his *T'ai-chi t'u-shou* (Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate), strongly influenced by the cosmology of the *Book of Changes*, Chou specifies the cosmic

process as follows: the Great Ultimate through movement and tranquility generates the two primordial cosmic forces, which in turn transform and unite to give rise to the Five Agents or Five Phases (*wu-hsing*, water, fire, wood, metal, and earth). When the five vital forces (*ch'i*), corresponding to each of the five "elements" (agents or phases), interact among themselves and reach a harmonious order, the four seasons run their orderly course. This provides the proper environment for the Five Agents to come into "mysterious union." Such a union embraces the two primordial cosmic forces, the female and the male, which interact with each other to engender and transform all things. The continuous production and reproduction of the myriad things make the universe an unending process of transformation. It is in this sense, Chou Tun-i states, that "the Five Agents constitute a manifestation of *yin* and *yang*, and *yin* and *yang* constitute a manifestation of the Great Ultimate." This is the basis for the commonly accepted Neo-Confucian assertion that the Great Ultimate is embodied both singly by each thing and collectively by all things.

It has been documented that Chou's *Diagram of the Great Ultimate* grew out of a long Taoist tradition. Indeed, it is believed that Chou received the diagram itself from a Taoist master: Taoist influences are evident even in his explanatory notes. His introduction of the term "the Non-Ultimate" or "the Ultimate of Non-being" (*wu-chi*) generated much controversy among Sung and Ming dynasty Confucian thinkers because the notion "non-ultimate" or "non-being" seems closer to the Taoist idea of nothingness than the Confucian concept that the human world is real. However, by defining human spirituality in terms of the notion that it is "man alone who receives the cosmic forces and the Five Agents in their most refined essence, and who is therefore most sensitive," Chou clearly presents a philosophical anthropology in the tradition of Confucian humanism.

A similar attempt to read a humanist message into the seemingly naturalistic doctrine of the Great Ultimate is also found in the writings of Shao Yung (Shao K'ang-chieh, 1011–1077), perhaps one of the most metaphysical Confucian masters of the Sung dynasty. Shao's cosmology is presented as the numerical progression of the one to the many: "The Great Ultimate is the One. It produces the two (*yin* and *yang*) without engaging in activity. The two (in their wonderful changes and transformations) constitute the spirit. Spirit engenders number, number engenders form, and form engenders concrete things" (Chan, 1969, pp. 492–493). Shao further maintains that the human mind in its original state is the Great Ultimate. If one's mind can regain its

original calm, tranquility, and enlightenment it has the capacity to investigate principle (*li*) to the utmost. The mind can then fully embody the Great Ultimate not only as the defining characteristic of its true nature but also as an experienced reality, a realized truth. This paradoxical conception that the Great Ultimate is part of the deep structure of our minds but that it can be fully realized only as a presence in our daily lives is widely shared among Neo-Confucian thinkers.

Chu Hsi (1130–1200), in a rationalist attempt to provide an overall cosmological and metaphysical vision, defines the Great Ultimate as "nothing other than principle," or, alternately, as "merely the principle of Heaven and earth and the myriad things." Perhaps inadvertently, Chu Hsi restricted the Great Ultimate so as to acknowledge its function as the ground of all beings but not necessarily its role in the generation of the universe. However, there is fruitful ambiguity in Chu Hsi's position. In response to the challenging question as to whether the Great Ultimate must split into parts to become the possession of each of the myriad things, Chu Hsi employed the famous Buddhist analogy of moonlight scattered upon rivers and lakes. That there is only one moon in the sky does not prevent its being seen everywhere without losing its singularity and wholeness. Chu Hsi further depicts the Great Ultimate as having neither space nor form. The Great Ultimate, although symbolizing the principle of activity and tranquility, is not directly involved in the creative transformation of the universe. Nevertheless, like Chou Tun-i and other Neo-Confucian thinkers, Chu Hsi insisted that the truth of the Great Ultimate must be personally realized through moral self-cultivation: the truth of the Great Ultimate is not simply knowledge about some external reality but a personal knowledge rooted in self-awareness in the ethico-religious sense.

In the folk tradition, the symbol of the Great Ultimate carries a connotation of mysterious creativity. The spiritual and physical exercise known as *t'ai-chi ch'üan* (a form of traditional Chinese shadow boxing) is still widely practiced. This slow, firm, and rhythmic exercise disciplines the body and purifies the mind through coordinated movements and regulated breathing. It is a remarkable demonstration that cosmological thought can be translated into physical and mental instruction for practical living without losing its intellectual sophistication. After all, in the Chinese order of things, to know the highest truth is not simply to know about something but to know how to do it properly through personal knowledge.

[See also Confucian Thought, article on Neo-Confucianism; Yin-yang Wu-hsing; Li; and the biographies of Chou Tun-i and Chu Hsi.]

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TU WEI-MING

T'AI-HSÜ (1890–1947), Chinese Buddhist reformer, founder of the Wu-ch'ang Buddhist Institute and the Buddhist journal *Hai-ch'ao-yin*, and active participant in various Buddhist movements. T'ai-hsü's lay name was Lü P'ei-lin. Born in Hai-ning in Chekiang, he became a monk of the Lin-chi school of Ch'an Buddhism at the age of sixteen. Buddhist scriptures as well as the radical political writings of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others inspired him to act for the reformation of Chinese Buddhism. He tried to put his reform programs into practice by founding the Fo-chiao Hsieh-chin Hui (Association for the Advancement of Buddhism) in 1912, but the association was short-lived owing to opposition from conservative Buddhists. In 1917 T'ai-hsü visited Taiwan and Japan. Later, he established the Enlightenment Society (Chüeh-she) at Shanghai with the help of some eminent Chinese. The society organized public lectures and disseminated knowledge of Buddhism through its own publications. T'ai-hsü next made a preaching tour of several cities in China and in Malaya. In 1920 he founded the Buddhist periodical *Hai-ch'ao-yin*. He established the Wu-ch'ang Buddhist Institute in 1922, the first modern Buddhist seminary in China. In 1923, T'ai-hsü and a few followers founded the World Buddhist Federation, which included among its members Inada Eisai and K. L. Reichelt. Two years later he led the Chinese Buddhist delegation to the Tokyo Conference of East Asian Buddhists. In 1927 he became the head of the Min-nan Buddhist Institute. During that year, he associated with the Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, who financed T'ai-hsü's world tour in 1928. The Chinese Buddhist Association was founded by Reverend Yüan-ying (1878–1953) at Shanghai in 1929, but T'ai-hsü's early relation with it was not cordial, though he was on its standing committee. In 1930 he founded the Sino-Tibetan Buddhist Institute in Chungking; this became the headquarters of the Chinese Buddhist Association in the war years, 1937 to 1945. During the war, T'ai-hsü led a Chinese Buddhist mission of goodwill to

Burma, India, Ceylon, and Malaya to win support and sympathy for China, and he was awarded a medal by the Chinese government for his contributions to the war effort. His influence on Nationalist leaders declined after the war, and he died on 12 March 1947. His writings were published posthumously in thirty-three volumes.

Since the late nineteenth century, Chinese Buddhism has been under constant pressure from the government and from intellectuals. In 1898 a high official proposed that 70 percent of monastic buildings and their income should be taken over to finance the public school system. Although this was not put into practice, and although the Buddhists managed at times to put off or soften anti-Buddhist threats, the idea of using Buddhist property to finance education arose again in 1928 and 1942. T'ai-hsü's suggestions for reform were part of the Buddhist reaction to public pressure. As a compromise, T'ai-hsü suggested in 1942 that 40 percent of monastic income be used for educational and charitable institutions run by the Buddhists in exchange for government protection of monastic property, but his suggestion had no effect on either side.

T'ai-hsü's attempts to reform and modernize Chinese Buddhism were to some extent successful. A number of prominent scholars and religious leaders were trained at the academies and libraries that he founded, and his lectures and writings helped create a more positive public attitude toward Buddhism. But his larger dream of a worldwide Buddhist movement, and his plan for reorganizing Buddhist institutions throughout China never materialized during his lifetime. His ideas were often viewed by the conservative Buddhist establishment as radical and unacceptable. They cooperated with him reluctantly in times of crisis but were always opposed to his ideas on monastic affairs. Yet, viewed from a historical perspective, his program of reform and modernization (the establishment of Buddhist academies, journals, foreign contacts, and so forth) can be seen to have created new patterns for Chinese Buddhism.

The religious thought of T'ai-hsü falls in the mainstream of Chinese Buddhism. It recognizes that all sentient beings possess the Buddha nature and are subject to the law of causation. The operation of cause and conditions is universal and incessant, and all worldly phenomena are based on that operation. If one follows the five Buddhist precepts, a happy life in this world is achievable. This happy life is, however, not lasting; it is subject to change. One must therefore strive for a higher wisdom and thus attain *nirvāṇa*. When one realizes that there is neither self nor object and that only the mind is universal and unlimited, one will work for the salvation of all sentient beings so that they too may

become Buddhas. T'ai-hsü's contribution is his adoption of a new terminology and a modern style of writing, thus tuning the old philosophy to the new thought in China. He often used words like *revolution*, *evolution*, *science*, *democracy*, *philosophy*, and *freedom*, as well as other concepts popular in his time. Although he may not always have used these terms with a clear understanding of their modern meaning, by incorporating them into the context of Buddhism he made the tradition continue to appeal to young people at the beginning of the century.

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JAN YÜN-HUA

TÁIN BÓ CUAILNGE (The Cattle Raid of Cuailnge) is the longest and the most famous of the early Irish heroic tales. It exists in three recensions. The first of them is preserved in *Lebhor na hUidhre* (The Book of the Dun Cow), dated circa 1100 CE, and in the Yellow Book of Lecan, a late fourteenth-century manuscript. The second is preserved in the Book of Leinster, written in the mid-twelfth century, and the third in two manuscripts of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However, as with many other early Irish tales, the date of the earliest extant manuscript provides only a *terminus ante quem* for the first recording as well as for the composition of the text, and even in the first recension of *Táin Bó Cuailnge* there are several linguistic strata which make it possible to trace the earlier written history of the tale back to the seventh or eighth century. This recension seems to have been compiled about the middle of the eleventh century from at least two variant written versions dating from about the ninth century. (This is not to mention the possible influence of sources from the oral tradition.) On linguistic and other grounds Ru-

dolf Thurneysen (1921) concluded that the saga may have been recorded for the first time in the middle of the seventh century. Moreover, there is a poem composed not later than the seventh century in which the supernatural woman Scáthach addresses the principal hero of *Táin Bó Cuailnge*, Cú Chulainn, and foretells, cryptically and laconically, some of the main events of the tale; but whether the poet was drawing upon an oral tradition or a written version of the tale is uncertain.

In its extant form, the story tells of an attack on the province of Ulster organized by Ailill and Medhbh, king and queen of Connacht, and supported by the rest of Ireland. The object of the attack is to carry off the great bull of the Ulster people, the Donn Cuailnge ("the brown bull of Cuailnge"). Such was the prestige of *Táin Bó Cuailnge* in early medieval Ireland that it generated an extensive complex of ancillary tales and traditions and came to be accepted by native men of learning as the classic statement of the heroic ethos.

As it stands, the saga reflects something of Irish political conditions at the beginning of the historical period (fifth century) or earlier, but some scholars have suggested that its original theme was the rivalry of two bulls. The background to this rivalry is given in a separate tale: the bulls had formerly been magical swineherds who had quarreled and passed through a series of metamorphoses before reaching their actual form. Bruce Lincoln has argued that the account of the fight between the bulls at the end of *Táin Bó Cuailnge* is a reflex of an Indo-European cosmogonic myth: "a man . . . and a bull . . . are killed and dismembered, and from their bodies the world is constructed" (*Priests, Warriors, and Cattle*, Berkeley, 1981, pp. 86–92). However, several difficulties remain to be resolved before this attractive hypothesis can be accepted.

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prehension of the oral and mythological dimensions of early Irish literary tradition.

PROINSIAS MAC CANA

T'AI-P'ING ("great peace" or "great equity") denotes a pan-Chinese social ideal and utopian slogan of rebels and dynasty founders. *P'ing* ("level, balanced, just, harmonious"), *ta-p'ing* ("great peace"), or *t'ai-p'ing* ("supreme peace") first appear in Confucian texts of the pre-Han (pre-206 BCE) era. There these terms denoted the ideal state of the world that had existed in high antiquity and that could again be brought about by a sage ruler who practiced the proper rites and music (*Ta-hsüeh, Li chi*). The term never implied social equality in a modern sense but rather referred to a society where, as Hsün-tzu defined it, each individual occupies the place that he should and fulfills his task according to his capacities. At the same time, Great Peace was not limited to human society but denoted a cosmic harmony that resulted in a seasonal climate, plentiful harvests, and longevity of all living beings (*Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu, Yen-tieh lun*). It was a state in which all the concentric spheres of the organic Chinese universe, which contained nature as well as society, were perfectly attuned, communicated with each other in a balanced rhythm of timeliness, and brought maximum fulfillment to each living being.

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Great Peace became the social ideal of the official Confucian state doctrine (which it remains to this day). However, when the Han declined, "Great Peace" became the slogan also of popular movements of revolt inspired by Taoism. Taoism had earlier found a place for the concept in its own philosophy. The Taoist philosopher Chuang-tzu (fourth century BCE) had called a government that conformed to the order of nature *t'ai-p'ing*, an idea that was in no contradiction to the Confucian definition of the term. The Taoist popular movements were opposed not to the ideal of Great Peace but to the dynasty that subscribed to it and had failed to bring it about. Thus, *t'ai-p'ing* cannot be called a "revolutionary" ideal, although two of the greatest social upheavals in Chinese history are called T'ai-p'ing rebellions.

Twice during the Han period, a group of *fang-shih* ("masters of [esoteric] techniques") presented at court a *T'ai-p'ing ching* (Classic of Great Peace). It was rejected because of its Taoist tenor. This or a similar *Classic of Great Peace* became the sacred scripture of the first T'ai-p'ing or "Yellow Turban" Rebellion (184 CE), which eventually brought down the Han empire. This scripture, still extant in a revised version (probably sixth

century), elaborates the messianic element in the T'ai-p'ing tradition: the Great Peace that the princes of high antiquity brought about through a Taoist government of "nonintervention" (*wu-wei*) is a state that will be recreated in the near future as a result of revelations by a divine messenger called Celestial Master (T'ien-shih). The religious originality of this view lies in its substitution of the Confucian virtues and rites with Taoist spiritual exercises and other methods of longevity as the means by which to reach T'ai-p'ing.

The rebellion of 184 was crushed, but it engendered a messianic ideology that flourished during the Period of Disunion (220–581), was rekindled in all subsequent periods of upheaval, and formed the basis of Taoist as well as Buddhist messianism and eschatology in China. This T'ai-p'ing ideology centered around the expectation that a divine or human sage ruler, the Perfect Lord of Great Peace (T'ai-p'ing Chen-chün), emissary of Heaven, will appear on a prophesied date at the height of a period of cosmic chaos and human suffering. He will save the elect (*chung-min*, the "seed people") from the demonic forces sent to destroy all evildoers, and will usher in the reign of Great Peace (as related in the *Tung-yüan shen-chou ching*). Even in this religious setting, the messianic kingdom is often no more and no less than a glorious new Chinese dynasty, although in some Taoist traditions it is developed into a paradisiacal utopia.

Dynasty founders, especially those of the T'ang, 618–906, and the Ming, 1368–1644, tapped this messianic tradition by casting themselves in the role of the sage ruler of T'ai-p'ing. Ten times in Chinese history T'ai-p'ing was chosen as the name of a reign period (*nien-hao*). Emperor T'ai-Wu of the Northern Wei called both himself and a period of his reign (440–452) "Perfect Lord of Great Peace."

The second T'ai-p'ing rebellion (1850–1865) was the most powerful of several great uprisings toward the end of the Manchu dynasty. In 1851, the visionary rebel leader Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (1813–1864) from Canton proclaimed the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo) with himself as Emperor of Great Peace (T'ai-p'ing T'ien-tzu). His religion was a combination of Chinese traditions with many elements from Protestant Christianity (monotheism, ten commandments, Sunday worship, iconoclasm, condemnation of "Chinese idol-worship"). Hung called himself the younger brother of Jesus Christ. God had endowed him with imperial legitimation (in the shape of a seal), with the (Taoist) power to kill demons (a sword), and with divine scriptures (revelation in Chinese religion is always in the form of writing). The T'ai-p'ing theocracy established in Nanking was destroyed in 1864, but the T'ai-p'ing ideal lives

on in Taoism and in most of the modern Chinese syncretist religions.

[See also Millenarianism, *article on Chinese Millenarian Movements*, and Taoism, *overview article*.]

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ANNA SEIDEL

TAIWANESE RELIGIONS. Taiwan is an offshore island 100 miles southeast of the Chinese mainland. Three groups of people currently inhabit the island: mountain aborigines, Taiwanese natives (themselves originally émigrés from the mainland), and Chinese mainlanders. The mountain aborigines, the earliest inhabitants, migrated from Indochina and the Philippines in prehistoric times. (But some archaeological evidence suggests that the Philippines were inhabited by émigrés from Taiwan.) The Taiwanese natives are the descendants of Chinese who immigrated from South China before the end of World War II. The Chinese mainlanders are the Chinese who fled Mao Tse-tung's forces and took refuge on the island in 1949. Owing to ethnic differences and historical changes, the religions of Taiwan are multifarious and complex. They can best be described in terms of their historical development, which can be divided into five major periods: (1) the prehistoric period, before 1622 CE, (2) the period of Dutch and Spanish rule, 1622-1661, (3) the period of Koxinga and Manchu rule, 1661-1895, (4) the period of Japanese rule, 1895-1945, and (5) the modern period, 1945 to the present.

Prehistoric Period. The island of Taiwan was originally connected to the Chinese mainland. Many archaeological artifacts on Taiwan can thus be linked to those on the Asian continent. It has been hypothesized that during Neolithic times (c. 3000-2000 BCE) Oceanic Negroids brought in horticulture from Southeast Asia, followed by Mongoloids with millet from northern China, and Indochinese with Bronze Age culture. About 300 BCE a Megalithic and Iron Age culture was introduced

by peoples from the Philippines. The descendants of these ethnic groups have survived and now dwell mainly in the mountain regions. Known collectively as the mountain aborigines, they are divided into ten tribes: Atayla, Saisiat, Banun, Tsou, Rukai, Paiwan, Puyuma, Ami, Yami, and the Plains (or Ping-pu).

Each of these tribes has its own language and culture, and so it is rather arbitrary to generalize about their traditional practices and religion, but certain common elements do exist. While some of these groups are matrilineal and others are patrilineal, all tend to feature a hierarchy based on kinship and role. The chieftain, normally chosen from the eldest male members of the family with the most ancient lineage, plays the role of tribal chief and high priest. The medicine man and woman, who conduct shamanic rituals of healing, divination, exorcism, and magic, are next to the chief in prestige. The House of Ancestral Spirits, built at the center of the clan village, is used for communal worship of the tribal ancestors. The "public house," or "men's house," is for the administration of community affairs. The "youth house" is for the education of young people, which is supervised by the chief and elders. All members of society are divided into cooperative groups and perform various community functions such as field work, hunting, warfare, construction, and preparation for ceremonies.

The mountain tribes have a very rich collection of myths, legends, and genealogies. Myths of creation, the origin of man, celestial phenomena, gods and spirits, culture heroes, and sacred animals are popular among all the tribes. Many myths have etiological motifs identifying the sacred origins of cultural events and ritual actions. Besides these myths, fairly extensive legends and genealogies of tribal history and geography have been preserved. Rites of passage are common to all tribes and are normally observed by all members of the society. Communal rites of opening up the land, sowing and planting, weeding and purification, picking the first crop, harvest, and thanksgiving are observed by all the tribes. Rites of animal hunting and head-hunting are conducted on special occasions. During the rituals, myths are recited and mythic events are reenacted to strengthen the people's sense of identity and harmony with their environment.

The mountain aborigines were able to maintain their traditional culture and religion intact until the arrival of the Dutch, Spaniards, and Chinese in the seventeenth century. Their attitude toward foreigners was alternately hostile and conciliatory. The plains tribes, who lived on the western coastal plains, were conciliatory to the Dutch and Spanish and to their Christian missions. Many of them accepted Christianity, and others were

influenced by Chinese religion. However, the remaining aborigines were hostile to foreigners and engaged in head-hunting to resist foreign intrusion. Their primitive weapons were no match for firearms, however, and they had to withdraw into higher mountain regions for protection. During the period of Japanese rule (1895–1945), the Japanese government tried to introduce Japanese culture and religion to the aborigines, but this came to an end in 1945 when the Japanese withdrew from Taiwan. Since the end of World War II, Christian missionaries have been active among the aborigines. As of the late 1970s almost 90 percent have become Christians and more than seven hundred churches have been built in their villages. Many aborigines have been ordained as ministers. With recent rapid changes in society and culture, it is doubtful that the mountain aborigines will be able to maintain their traditional way of life.

Dutch and Spanish Rule. In the course of establishing new trade with China, the Portuguese discovered Taiwan and named it *Ilha Formosa* ("the beautiful island"). The Dutch and Spanish followed the Portuguese to the Far East, but when they could not establish trade directly with China, they set up a trade base on the island of Formosa. Thus a colonial government was established in southern Formosa by the Dutch in 1622 and in northern Formosa by the Spanish in 1626. As a part of their colonial policy, the Dutch brought in Protestant missions and the Spanish, Catholic missions. They were able to subdue the plains aborigines and convert them.

In order to build their fortresses and exploit the land, the European colonists hired many Chinese workers from South China. As these workers increased, they began to form their own communities and practice the traditional Chinese religions of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism as well as the folk religion. In 1641 the Dutch were able to take control of northern Formosa from the Spanish and so united its rule. However, Dutch rule of Formosa was brought to an abrupt end by the invasion of Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung), thus halting Christian missions as well. However, a Dominican mission returned in 1859, and a Presbyterian mission in 1865.

Koxinga and Manchu Rule. In 1661, retreating from the invasion of the Manchus into China, Koxinga, the last loyal general of the Ming dynasty, led his army and navy to invade the island of Formosa and expelled the Dutch. He changed the name of the island to Taiwan ("terraced bay") and made Tainan the capital. Soon massive Chinese migrations to Taiwan from the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung began. These immigrants opened up new land and pushed the aborigines farther back into the mountain regions. As their towns and cities grew in number, they also built many

shrines, temples, and monasteries. Often the temples became the centers of Taiwanese communities.

After Koxinga died suddenly in 1662, his successors were unable to carry out his mission to restore the Ming dynasty in China, and in 1692 the Manchurian navy took over control of Taiwan. During the early rule of the Manchu (or Ch'ing) dynasty, Taiwanese who were still loyal to the Ming revolted against the Manchus. Many secret societies such as the White Lotus Society and the T'ien-ti Society were introduced from China and organized in Taiwan to carry out uprisings. However, as the rebellions were gradually subdued and the welfare of the common people was improved by Manchu administration, the latter period of Manchu rule was peaceable.

The religion of the Taiwanese can be divided into two types, the family cult and the community cult. The family cult, which consists of ancestor worship, worship at the family shrine, and rites of passage, is observed by almost all Taiwanese. The community cults include the state cult, the religions associated with the Confucian shrine, the Buddhist monastery, the Taoist temple, the folk temple, and the individual cults of various religious associations. The state cult was established by the government in order to promote political stability and to provide a place for official ceremonies. Temples were erected in Tainan and other cities to commemorate the achievements of Koxinga. Many Confucian shrines were built with the sponsorship of the government to promote Confucian learning and to commemorate the merits of Confucius and Confucian worthies. Many of the earlier Buddhist monasteries were also built by the government in order to provide a retreat for officials.

Buddhism in Taiwan is divided into monastic Buddhism and lay Buddhism (the Chai religion). Monastic Buddhism, practiced by monks and nuns living in monasteries, is chiefly supported by the government and the elite. Two major schools of monastic Buddhism in Taiwan are Pure Land and Ch'an. While monastic Buddhism is isolated from the common people, lay Buddhism has the widespread support of the populace. Called Chai ("purity") religion because it stresses the purification of the mind and the practice of vegetarianism, it has three branches in Taiwan: the Lung-hua, Chin-chung, and Hsien-t'ien. All claim descent from the Southern Ch'an school of the Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng (638–713). However, elements from Confucian moral teachings, Taoist rites, and folk religious practices can also be seen in all three branches. Each branch is organized into a hierarchy consisting of patriarch, instructors, lay leaders, and lay devotees. Lay Buddhists believe in the imminent end of the world and expect the swift coming of the Maitreya Buddha, who will bring

them into the new era. Because of their strong eschatological beliefs, they have rebelled from time to time against corrupt government, and, in turn, censorship and oppression of their members have been frequent and harsh.

The religious Taoism founded by Chang Tao-ling during the second century CE in China was brought to Taiwan by Chinese immigrants. There it developed into five major sects: the Ling-pao, Lao-chün, Yü-chia, T'ien-shih, and San-nai. The Taoist priests (*tao-shih*) are divided into two groups, the Black Turbans, who are empowered to celebrate the all-important rite of cosmic renewal (*chiao*), and the Red Turbans, who officiate at a host of lesser popular ceremonials. These priests set up altars in their family shops to serve for both private and communal rites. They worship, among others, the Supreme Originator (Yüan-shih T'ien-ts'un), Lao-tzu, Chang Tao-ling, the North Star, the earth gods (*she*), the gods of the ditch (*ch'eng-huang*), and the god of the hearth (Tsao-kung). As the chief religious functionaries of the Taoist community, the priests have various duties, including exorcism, public ritual for the success of the community, religious instruction, the fabrication of charms and amulets for personal use, and the traditional practices of meditation and internal alchemy prescribed in the various texts of the Taoist canon.

The folk religion of Taiwanese natives is polytheistic and syncretic, its rituals complex, and its temples multifarious. Each temple has its own favorite gods, its own holy days and special ceremonies. The folk temple, supported by the common people and supervised by a trustee from among lay leaders, is very often the center of community affairs both sacred and secular. There are also innumerable voluntary religious associations organized by lay devotees for special purposes. Some of these are affiliated with a folk temple; others have their own meeting places. They choose a favorite deity to worship and conduct special rites. While a majority are primarily concerned with religious matters, some associations turn into secret societies and engage in political struggles. The Society of Heaven and Earth (T'ien-ti Hui) was one of the most active of these. Because of their insurgent activities, secret societies are often branded as heretical by the government and are thus the subjects of harsh repression. However, they always seem to revive at times of crises.

Japanese Rule. After China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. The Japanese colonial government, intending to make Taiwan a stepping stone in its advance toward Southeast Asia, promoted Japanese education and industries in Taiwan. As part of this attempt to establish cultural dominion over the region, the Japanese introduced State

Shintō into Taiwan, and the mountain aborigines and Taiwanese natives were forced to take part in Shintō worship. Sixty-three grand shrines and 116 local shrines were built by the government all over the island. In addition to State Shintō, Shintō sects such as Tenrikyō, Shinpikyō, and Konkōkyō, and various Buddhist schools such as Tendai, Shingon, Jōdo, Zen, Shin, and Nichiren were also introduced into Taiwan. However, most of their adherents were Japanese immigrants; the sects did not have much following among the Taiwanese people. Under Japanese imperial rule, the leaders of traditional Chinese religions suffered oppression, and many folk temples were closed by the government. After World War II, Japan returned Taiwan to China, and thus Shintō also ended on the island. However, the influences of Japanese Buddhism are still visible in Taiwan.

Modern Period. After World War II, the traditional religions of Taiwan underwent a strong revival. Many ruined temples were rebuilt, and ceremonial parades and pilgrimages became very popular. Conversion to Christianity continued to take place among the mountain aborigines. In the meantime, because of the Communist takeover of the mainland in 1949 and its initial religious persecutions, many religious leaders were among those who took refuge in Taiwan. These included K'ung Te-cheng, a descendant of Confucius; Yin Shun, an eminent Buddhist abbot; the Thirty-seventh Heavenly Master of Taoism; Lama Kangyurwa Hutukhtu, the nineteenth reincarnation of the Living Buddha of Kangyur monastery; and Archbishop Joseph Kuo and Cardinal Tien of the Roman Catholic church. About twenty thousand Muslims and innumerable Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Taoists, and Confucianists came to Taiwan, turning it into a rich showcase of world religions.

In 1982 the following religious associations with significant memberships existed in Taiwan: the Confucian and Mencian Academy, the National Taoist Association, the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China, the Chinese Muslim Federation, the Catholic Archdiocese of Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and about forty-five other Protestant denominations, and Li Chiao and Hsuan-yüan Chiao, two newly established religions.

[For further discussion of the origins, thought, and practice of the religious traditions of Taiwanese natives and Chinese mainlanders on Taiwan, see Chinese Religion; Taoism; Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in China*; and Christianity, *article on Christianity in Asia*.]

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MILTON M. CHIU

TAKAKUSU JUNJIRŌ (1866–1945), Japanese Indologist and Buddhist philosopher, a pioneer of Indian and Buddhist studies in Japan. Born in Hiroshima Prefecture on 17 May 1866, Takakusu was educated from 1884 to 1889 in a school run by the Nishi-Honganji. In 1890 he began studying Sanskrit and Sanskrit literature under F. Max Müller at Oxford, where he received his B.A. degree in 1894. After studying Pali, Tibetan, Mongolian, Indian philosophy, and other related subjects at the German universities of Kiel, Berlin, and Leipzig, he returned to Oxford and earned an M.A. there in 1896. In 1897 he became lecturer in Sanskrit at the Imperial University of Tokyo, a post previously held by K. Adolf Florenz, who had succeeded Nanjō Bunyū, the first lecturer in Sanskrit in Japan. In 1899 Takakusu was appointed professor of linguistics at the same university. In 1900 he was awarded the D.Litt. degree from the University of Tokyo, where in 1901 he took the first chair in Sanskrit while concurrently serving as principal of the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages. He was appointed a member of the Imperial Academy of Japan in 1912 and became emeritus professor of the University of Tokyo in 1913.

During his stay in London Takakusu translated into English the *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching*, under the reconstructed Sanskrit title *Amitâyurdhyânasûtra* (Oxford, 1894), and I-ching's records of his travels to India, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago [A.D. 671–695] by I-tsing* (Oxford, 1896). He also translated the Chinese version of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* and the *Suvarṇasaptati* into French, under the title *La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise* (Hanoi, 1904), and edited the Pali text of the *Samantapāsādikā* in collaboration with Nagai Makoto and Mizuno Kōgen (London, 1924–1938). Through these works he made a remarkable contribution to the international advancement of Indian and Buddhist studies by introducing Chinese sources that were otherwise not accessible to Western Indologists.

Takakusu also devoted himself to collecting and editing various kinds of research materials found in Japan and elsewhere. His efforts in this direction resulted in publication of the *Upanishaddo zensho* (Tokyo, 1922–1924), the *Nanden daizōkyō* (Tokyo, 1935–1941), and the

Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (1924–1934). This last work, a Sino-Japanese Buddhist canon compiled from the Koryō edition in comparison with the Sung, Yüan, Ming, and other editions, remains an invaluable contribution to Buddhist studies, and in 1929 it earned for its editor the Stanislas Julian Prize from the French Academy.

Takakusu was not only an excellent scholar but also an influential educator. In 1924, after having left the University of Tokyo, he founded the Musashino Girls' School for the purpose of promoting Buddhist education for girls. In 1931 he became the first chief director of the League of All-Japan Young Men's Buddhist Associations and the president of Tōyō University, which stresses Eastern philosophy.

Takakusu died on 28 June 1945, but his influence in consolidating the foundations of Sanskrit and Buddhist studies in Japan continues to be felt. Publication of the *Hōbōgirin*, *dictionnaire encyclopédique du Bouddhisme d'après des sources chinoises et japonaises*, conceived by Takakusu and Sylvain Lévi in the 1920s, has proceeded intermittently under the sponsorship of the French and Japanese academies since 1929, while the *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* remains a standard reference set for all students of Buddhism.

[See also the biography of F. Max Müller.]

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MAYEDA SENGAKU

TALIESIN. The ninth-century *Historia Brittonum*, usually attributed to "Nennius," names Taliesin as one of a famed group of Welsh poets of the latter half of the sixth century. The thirteenth-century *Book of Taliesin* contains a body of poetry of diverse origins and different dates that the scribe presumably associated with Taliesin, but modern research has isolated some twelve poems that are regarded as his authentic work. These are heroic court poems sung to royal patrons and to Urien, Owain, and Gwallawg, kings of the sixth century northern British kingdoms of Rheged and Elmet.

The early medieval Welsh poet was a complex persona, and Taliesin acquired the status of a vaticinary poet (perhaps conflated with the figure of Myrddin/Merlin) and purveyor of esoteric and learned lore, both bardic and Christian. Many of the poems in the *Book of Taliesin* reflect this role, which is given a spe-

cific context in the *Story of Taliesin (Hanes Taliesin)*. Although found in manuscript copies of the sixteenth century and later, this composite tale is certainly earlier. The first part relates how the witch Ceridwen concentrated her learning in three drops of a brew which she prepared for her son. At the crucial moment of fulfillment they fell onto the hand of a serving lad, Gwion Bach, who sucked his scalded finger and acquired the knowledge and bardic power intended for the son. In the ensuing pursuit Gwion and Ceridwen undergo several metamorphoses until the lad is swallowed as a seed of corn by Ceridwen in the guise of a hen to be reborn nine months later. He is taken up by Elffin, named Taliesin, and soon reveals his precocity as poet and sage. The rest of the tale recounts his feats of learning at the court of the sixth-century king Maelgwn Gwynedd.

Poems of the *Story of Taliesin* are spoken by Taliesin, but those in the *Book of Taliesin*, though lacking this specific context, nevertheless refer to similar circumstances and are to be dated to the tenth century. One such poem alludes to Taliesin's creation by the wizards Math and Gwydion, characters found in the Four Branches of the *Mabinogi*; another relates his transforming of trees into warriors in the Battle of Goddau. The poem entitled *The Spoils of Annwn* refers to the poet's return as one of the survivors of Arthur's disastrous attack on the otherworld, an episode underlying the Second Branch, which names Taliesin and a survivor. This early stratum of Taliesin's legend links him not with historical characters of the sixth century but with purely mythological figures and episodes. In later bardic tradition, Taliesin becomes the archetypal inspired poet.

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BRYNLEY F. ROBERTS

TALISMANS. See Amulets and Talismans.

TALMUD. In form, the Talmud is an extended, multi-volume elaboration of selected tractates of the Mishnah, but it must be emphasized that the contents of the Talmud go far beyond its ostensible base. No subject of in-

terest to the ancient rabbis failed to find its way into this immense body of teaching, and for that reason no question arising in later centuries was deemed outside the range that Talmudic teaching might legitimately claim to resolve. A document that seemed merely to elucidate an older text eventually became the all-embracing constitution of medieval Jewish life.

As noted, the Mishnah supplied the overall format for the Talmud. Like the former, the Talmud is divided into tractates, which in turn are divided into chapters and then into paragraphs. Each phrase of the Mishnah is discussed, analyzed, and applied for as long as the editors of the Talmud have materials to supply; when such materials are exhausted (sometimes after very long and quite wide-ranging digressions), the discussion simply moves on to the next phrase or paragraph. The digressions can be such that one loses track of the Mishnaic passage under discussion for pages at a time, but the Talmud always picks up again from its base text when the next section begins.

Origins and Development. Very soon after it began to circulate, the Mishnah of Yehudah ha-Nasi' (compiled c. 200 CE) assumed a central place in rabbinic study. As time went on, the structure and content of the Mishnah—the meaning and the sequence of its paragraphs—determined the manner in which the growing accumulation of rabbinic lore was organized. Non-Mishnaic legal materials (the so-called outside traditions; Aram., *baraitot*) were studied primarily in connection with their Mishnaic parallels, and an entire supplementary collection (Tosefta) that followed the Mishnah's own sequence of orders, tractates, and chapters was compiled. Similarly, post-Mishnaic rabbinic teachings—of law, morality, theology, and so forth—were remembered and discussed primarily as the consecutive study of Mishnaic tractates called them to mind, so that most such teachings eventually came to be linked with one or another specific passage (or, occasionally, several) in the earlier collection.

In this way, great compilations of rabbinic teaching, each in the form of a loose exposition of the Mishnah, came into being. Evidence suggests that various centers of rabbinic study developed their own such collections, though in the end only one overall collection was redacted for the Palestinian centers and one for Babylonia. For several generations, the collections remained fluid. Materials were added, revised, or shifted. Free association led to the production of extended discourses or sets of sayings that at times had little to do with the Mishnaic passage serving as point of departure. Early materials tended to be brief explanations of the Mishnah or citations of parallel texts, but later rabbis com-

mented as much on remarks of their predecessors that were not included in the Mishnah or were subsequent to it as on the Mishnah itself. Numerous recent scholars have seen in the developing tradition two sorts of material: brief, apodictic statements of law and much longer dialectical explanations of the specific laws and their underlying principles. Such discussions in turn eventually gave rise to a new generation of legal dicta, and these in turn provoked new efforts at dialectical complication. Thus the Talmudic tradition grew.

The Hebrew word *talmud* and its Aramaic equivalent, *gemara*, both mean "study." Each term had other meanings at various times, but in the end *gemara* came to be the name of the vast Mishnah commentary that had taken shape, and *talmud* the name of the combined text (Mishnah plus *gemara*) that eventually emerged. The rabbis of the immediate post-Mishnaic period (third to fifth centuries CE) are called amoraim (from the Aramaic 'mr, "say, discuss"), because their characteristic contribution to the developing tradition was the extended discussion of the Mishnah they produced.

Through a process that can no longer be traced with certainty, the text of the *gemara* underwent periodic reshaping until finally the two Talmuds as we now know them came into being. It should be emphasized that early rabbinic Torah study was oral, so that the *gemara* was not so much a fixed text as a more-or-less accepted formulation of accumulated lore. There is therefore no reason to assume that there ever was an authorized "original text" of the Talmud, although there may have been parallel recensions of these collections from the earliest stages of their history preserved in different localities. There is still no altogether accepted standard text, and even the relatively uniform wording of recent centuries has much to do with the eventual predominance of European over Asian and North African Jewry and the standardization that inevitably followed the invention of printing.

The Jerusalem, or Palestinian, Talmud. The so-called Jerusalem Talmud (Heb., *Talmud Yerushalmi*) is really the work of the rabbinic academies of the Galilee; it was substantially completed by the middle of the fifth century. The Jerusalem Talmud covers the first four orders of the Mishnah with the exception of two tractates (*Avot* and *'Eduyyot*); in the last two orders, only half of tractate *Niddah* has Palestinian *gemara*. The Jerusalem Talmud is characterized in general by brevity and an absence of editorial transitions and clarifications. Its discussions frequently seem laconic and elliptical and often take the form of terse remarks attributed to one or another amora with no connective phrasing at all between them. Occasionally, however, such comments are

built up into a more integrated dialectical treatment, with objections raised and answered, contradictions cited and resolved, and biblical proof texts adduced as the editors see fit.

The Babylonian Talmud. According to tradition, the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud (Heb., *Talmud Bavli*) was completed by the amoraim Ashi and Ravina' around the year 500. It is clear, however, that the distinctive features of this Talmud in contrast to the other are the work of several generations of rabbis who came after these authorities and are collectively known as the savoraim (from the Aramaic root *svr*, "consider, hold an opinion"), that is, those who reconsidered the Talmudic text and established its final version. Thanks to the labors of these latter revisers, the Babylonian Talmud is far more thoroughly worked out than the Palestinian. Its arguments are replete with a sophisticated technical terminology for introducing source materials, considering objections and counterobjections, offering refutations and defending against them, and so forth. In addition to their detailed contributions, the savoraim also composed entire sections of the Talmud; in particular, the first extended discussion, at the beginning of many tractates, is attributed to them. In general, the literary superiority of the Babylonian Talmud, its far greater logical clarity, and its considerably larger bulk can be attributed to the savoraim of the sixth and seventh centuries. The Talmud as we now have it did not exist until these had done their work.

While the Jerusalem Talmud treats the entire first order of the Mishnah, the Babylonian Talmud has *gemara* only for the first tractate (*Berakhot*), which deals with liturgy; the rest of the order treats agricultural rules that were not considered applicable outside the Holy Land. On the other hand, and harder to explain, the great bulk of the fifth order, which regulates the Temple cult and is not to be found in the Jerusalem Talmud, has very substantial Babylonian *gemara*. Otherwise, with minor exceptions, the two Talmuds cover the same parts of the Mishnah.

Later Developments. Over the several centuries following the appearance of the two Talmuds, the Babylonian Talmud gradually eclipsed the other. This predominance was rationalized by the claim that the Babylonian Talmud was the more recent, so that its editors already knew the Jerusalem Talmud and could include its acceptable teachings in their own work and suppress those portions for any reason found unworthy. In retrospect, however, it is clear that such a claim was part of the propaganda of the Babylonian geonim of the last centuries of the first millennium CE in favor of their own authority and against the rival authority of the

rabbis of the Land of Israel. The eventual predominance of the Babylonian Talmud throughout the Diaspora and even in the Land of Israel probably is to be explained through reference to such factors as the relatively stronger ties of the rising communities of North Africa and Spain to Babylonian Jewry and the relatively more severe decline of Palestinian Jewry, especially under the onslaught of the Crusades. Those parts of Europe, especially Italy, that retained strong ties with the community in the Land of Israel apparently maintained a tradition of study of the Jerusalem Talmud, but by the beginning of the second millenium this process had run its course. From then on, "the Talmud" always meant the Babylonian. It was taken for granted that issues of Jewish law should be resolved by reference to the Babylonian Talmud, not the Palestinian, and that the latter could provide rulings only in cases where the Babylonian Talmud was silent or ambiguous.

Once the primacy of the Babylonian Talmud was established, it was continually reinforced. The Babylonian Talmud received more attention. It was studied by more scholars, it became the subject of more and of better commentaries; it was copied more often and more carefully by larger numbers of scribes. The result is that modern scholars have a more solidly established text of the Babylonian Talmud and a more fully developed exegetical tradition with which to work. Modern critical study of the Jerusalem Talmud has much more fundamental analytical and restorative work to accomplish before a reliable and comprehensible text becomes available.

It should be noted as well that the power of the medieval Christian church affected the development of the Talmud in two important ways. Periodic waves of seizure and destruction reduced the number of Talmud manuscripts available in certain parts of Europe. The most important of these waves took place in thirteenth-century France and in Italy at the time of the Counter-Reformation; the last burning of the Talmud occurred in Poland in 1757. Occasionally thousands of copies of the Talmud or of Talmudic digests and commentaries were destroyed at a time. In addition, Jewish efforts to avoid such destruction often led to voluntary or involuntary submission of the Talmud to censorship by church authorities. As a result, much early rabbinic discussion of Jesus or the Christian religion has been lost or must now be recovered from scattered manuscripts.

Talmudic Religion. Despite its vast size and scope, the Talmud is not without focus. Certain themes and certain styles of argument and discourse strongly predominate in its pages, and as a result both the religion of the Talmudic sages themselves and the forms of Judaism based on the Talmud that flourished during the

Middle Ages are more compatible with certain types of spirituality than with others.

The role of law. Well more than half of the Babylonian Talmud and more than three quarters of the Jerusalem Talmud are devoted to questions of law. The Mishnah itself takes the form of a law code, and Talmudic discussions are chiefly concerned with clarifying, extending, and finding new applications for the provisions of Mishnaic law. This concentration on law is related to the ancient rabbis' role in their communities where they usually served as judges, teachers, or public administrators. Rabbinic piety came to be organized around gratitude for the law and joy in its fulfillment. The law was understood to be a divine gift, and observance of its provisions was seen as the appropriate response to this generosity. To observe the law meant to strengthen one's link to its giver, and in developing the law into a huge accumulation of detailed regulations covering all aspects of day-to-day living, rabbinic teachers were seeking to multiply occasions for strengthening this link. Study of the law was both the highest intellectual activity in which a Jew might engage and also a practical activity designed to further this expansion of opportunity. Enlarging the scope of the law was not felt to be adding to an already heavy burden; on the contrary, it increased the portion of one's life that could be conducted in response to the voice of God.

The role of study and intellect. While the Mishnah looks like a law code, in fact it is probably something other; its numerous unresolved disputes, its sporadic use of biblical proof texts, and its occasional narratives all reflect the value of study as a religious ritual in its own right, and eventually the activity of studying God's law was as important in Talmudic religion as was the content of that study. With respect to Talmudic law, this enhancement of study as religious rite led to the creation of an elaborate set of legal corpora, most of which are identified by the name of the master to whom the discrete opinions in each corpus were attributed. The well-known Talmudic penchant for hair-splitting dialectics reflects the rabbis' concern that each of these sets of teachings be internally consistent on the one hand and significantly different from any other such set on the other. Hence the frequency with which the Talmud records the chains of transmission by which individual sayings were passed on. Hence the steadily growing integration of teachings from widely disparate fields of law into a single web, and the often forced effort to find unifying principles behind teachings that seem to have nothing to do with one another. Hence, as well, the relative lack of personal interest in the personalities of early masters, except, paradoxically, for those few who became the subject of frequently incredible legends.

This intellectual tendency had several important consequences for Talmudic religion. It gave rabbinic studiousness a scholastic tinge that continued to sharpen as later centuries wore on. It made text commentary an important genre of religious literature; a standard edition of the Talmud even today contains several classical commentaries on the page along with the text and many, many more at the back of the volume. Rabbinic intellectualism turned into disciplined argument; the interplay of proof and refutation, into a holy activity. It also gave primacy to the correct formulation of the wording of sacred texts and recitations over the manner or the circumstances in which they were pronounced; this in turn had important effects on Talmudic and post-Talmudic conceptions of prayer, meditation, and inward spirituality.

Talmudic Learning and Religious Authority. In the ancient rabbis' view there was a connection between their emphasis on learning and the role of leadership to which they aspired. It was taken for granted that only the Torah, when properly and sufficiently studied and understood, could enable the people of Israel to become the "kingdom of priests and holy nation" (*Ex.* 19:16) that God intended them to be. This in turn meant that only those properly and sufficiently learned in Torah should be allowed to assume leadership over the community, since only such leaders could be trusted to guide the people in a divinely ordained direction.

Inherent in Talmudic and post-Talmudic Judaism is the assumption that Torah learning (once the Talmud was complete, this meant Talmudic learning) is the only proper criterion by which the leaders of the community should be selected. Whenever conditions permitted, rabbis sought to institutionalize their authority over the community. In the early period, this meant reaching an accommodation with the real rulers of the community (e.g., the Roman empire or, in Babylonia, the allegedly Davidic dynasty of the exilarchs). Later, it meant assuring that internal Jewish courts should be dominated by rabbis and that Talmudic law should govern those aspects of life where Jews maintained internal autonomy (marriage and divorce, religious ritual, educational institutions). Although rabbinical authority was not without challengers, it was never overthrown in principle until the breakdown of Jewish self-government, which began in the late eighteenth century and continued into the nineteenth.

Talmud Study as Religious Experience. Rabbis saw their own teaching as "oral Torah." They believed the contents of the Talmud represented a part of the revelation to Moses that had been kept oral but faithfully transmitted for centuries before its inclusion in the text of the Talmud. The name *Talmud*, in fact, can be un-

derstood as a short form of the common phrase *talmud Torah*, or "Torah study." Thus to study Talmud was in fact to let oneself hear the word of God, and to add to the accumulation of commentaries, digests, codes, and the like was to make one's own contribution to the spread of divine revelation in the world. To learn Torah was thus a kind of sober mysticism, a reliving of the events at Sinai, while to add to the growing body of "oral" law was to share in a divine activity. Already in the Talmud God is depicted as studying Torah several hours a day (*B.T.*, 'A.Z. 3b), but the kinship between the rabbi and God was felt to be even stronger. By increasing the amount of Torah in the world, the rabbi could do what previously only God had been held able to accomplish.

Thus the text of the Talmud became the center of an activity believed to be the most Godlike available to human experience. Everyone could study some Torah, and no one was considered incapable of adding a few original thoughts to a study session. In this way, Talmud study became a widespread activity among later Jewish communities. The degree of commitment to this activity might vary, from the ascetic twenty-hour-a-day devotion of the closeted scholar to one-hour-a-week popular learning on Sabbath afternoons. The climax of a boy's education was the point at which he was ready to learn *gemara*'. Such "learning" continues even in our own time, even after the functioning authority of Talmudic law has all but disappeared. It represents the most powerful and the longest-lived inheritance of classical Judaism.

[See also Mishnah and Tosefta; Biblical Exegesis, article on Jewish Views; and, for a survey of the development and structure of Jewish law, Halakhah.]

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ROBERT GOLDENBERG

TAM, YA'AQOV BEN ME'IR (c. 1100–1171), leading Jewish halakhic scholar, known as Rabbenu ("our teacher") Tam from the biblical description of the patriarch Jacob as *tam* (Gn. 25:27), a word often translated as "quiet," with the connotation of a studious, scholarly person. The scion of a learned rabbinical family, he was the grandson of Rashi (Shelomoh ben Yitsḥaq, 1042–1105), the most prominent Talmudic commentator, and the brother of Shemu'el ben Me'ir, the Rashbam. He was himself the greatest of the founders of the Tosafist school of Talmudic commentators in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. [See Tosafot.]

In his commentaries Tam employed the method of comparative examination of the Talmudic texts, aiming to explain contradictions and inconsistencies while elucidating the passages. He was against making any corrections in the traditional text of the Talmud unless there was absolutely no other way of understanding a particular passage. His concerns encompassed practical legal and religious applications as well as a theoretical understanding of the Talmudic system. He generally opposed current usages that seemed contrary to Talmudic teachings and customs and also did not allow deviation from ancestral practices. His reasoned legal decisions were based on the Talmud itself and not on the varying needs of the time, although he sometimes resolved contradictions between the Talmud and the religious and legal practices of the day by reinterpreting the traditional texts.

Tam was accepted by his contemporaries as the greatest scholar of his generation. Many disciples flocked to study with him from France and Germany and even as far away as Italy, Bohemia, and Russia; through them, his teachings and opinions circulated throughout Europe, reaching even to Spain. Considered the central halakhic authority of the age, he received halakhic and Talmudic questions and problems from all parts of Europe. By virtue of his position he issued various regulations (*taqqanot*) for the Jewish communities of the time. Tam's *responsa* (answers to questions posed) and comments on the Talmud were accepted as authoritative by later generations, especially among Western (Ashkenazic) orthodox Jewry.

His main work is *Sefer ha-yashar* (Vienna, 1811), which includes his halakhic *responsa* (annotated Berlin,

1898) and his *novellae*, or comments, on the Talmud (annotated Jerusalem, 1959). The book as we have it is a later unedited collection from the original with additions from other authors. However, the greater part of his teachings are not included in this work but are scattered throughout the *tosafot* and the collections of *responsa* and decisions of his time.

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SHALOM ALBECK

TAMIL RELIGIONS. The term *Tamil religions* denotes the religious traditions and practices of Tamil-speaking people. Most Tamils originated and continue to live in India's southernmost area, now known as the state of Tamil Nadu; however, millions of Tamils have migrated to other parts of India, especially to its large cities, as well as abroad, particularly to Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Australia, Great Britain and, more recently, to the United States and Canada. Many emigrant Tamils retain elements of a cultural, linguistic, and religious tradition that predates the Christian era and has experienced a complex interaction of influences from Dravidian, Sanskritic, and heterodox sources. At its apex between the eighth and fifteenth centuries, the Tamil region was the major center of Hindu civilization and, indeed, one of the major centers of civilization in the world. Today, while most Tamils remain essentially Hindu, some Tamils have embraced elements of Islam and Christianity.

Early Tamil Religion. A neolithic cattle-herding culture existed in South India several millennia prior to the Christian era. By the first century, a relatively well-developed civilization had emerged, still largely pre-Hindu and only marginally sanskritized. It is described in some detail in Tamil texts such as the *Tolkāppiyām* (a grammar written around the start of the Christian era) and by the "Caṅkam" poets—an "academy" of poets who wrote in the first two centuries CE. This culture was essentially Dravidian in nature.

The origins of the Dravidians are still a matter of dispute, but the South Indian culture known to us by the first century was probably based largely on the neolithic cultures that developed in the area. However, these cultures were influenced in prehistoric times to varying degrees by the filtering of some remnants of a

Negroid culture originating in East Africa; by migrations from the eastern Mediterranean world refracted through the Elamite and Indus civilizations; by a megalithic culture that made its way into Southwest India by the eighth century BCE; and by a people sometimes called "Proto-Australoid" who came into the subcontinent by way of northeastern India from the Malay peninsula. [See Indus Valley Civilization and Southeast Asian Religions, *article on Mainland Cultures.*]

The religious life of the Tamil civilization of Caṅkam times gave evidence of no significant mythological or philosophical speculation nor of any sense of transcendence in a bifurcated universe. Rather, it was oriented by a fundamental veneration of land and a sense of the celebration of individual life. Colorful flora and fauna were extolled and ascribed a symbolic significance that bordered on the sacred; for example, peacocks, elephants, and the blossoms of various trees were used as images for the basic realities of individual and cosmos. Earth's color and fertility were affirmed. Indigenous deities were venerated in field and hill, reflecting the attributes of the people in that zone and presiding over functions typical to their respective areas; thus, the god Murukaṅ presided over hill and hunt and battled the malevolent forces of the hills, while Vēntaṅ oversaw the pastoral region and afforded it rain. [See Murukaṅ.]

"Possession" is one of the most common ways in which the gods were believed to manifest themselves—both in their priests and in young women. Worship of the gods sometimes occurred in a special place—in the clearing of a field or the bank of a river, for example, where a small pillar or *kantu* was set up to represent the deity. The cult of the hero was a common feature of this period as evidenced by the erection of numerous hero stones (*naṭukkals*) over the graves of fallen heroes, be they hunting warriors or tribal chieftains. Urn burial, a remnant of megalithic culture, was used occasionally, especially after the death of the chieftain or hero.

The city was not foreign to this early culture and by the third century CE, at least, religious imagery reflected an urban setting. Poets likened the urban chieftains and warriors to the gods and spoke of urban festivals. Some of the earlier gods were merged together in an urban setting, even while continuing their earlier functions in extra-urban contexts. Rituals, however, often continued to reflect a seasonal or folk character: in the hills, garlanded young women are said to have danced, intoxicated, with priests (*vēlaṅs*) of Murukaṅ (*Cilappatikāram* 24), while in the plain, at the onset of monsoons, after harvests and transplantings, bathers gambolled in the waters, were garlanded and smeared with sandal, often astride elephants or horses, and drank intoxicating beverages (*Paripāṭal* 6, 7, 10).

The early character of Tamil religion, in sum, was celebrative and relatively "democratic." It embodied an aura of sacral immanence, sensing the sacred in the vegetation, fertility, and color of the land. The *summum bonum* of the religious experience was expressed in terms of possession by the god, or ecstasy. Into this milieu there immigrated a sobering influence—a growing number of Jain and Buddhist communities and an increasing influx of brahmins and other northerners. [See also Indian Religions, *article on Rural Traditions.*]

The Heterodoxies. By the third century BCE, pockets of Jains and Buddhists were settling in the deep South. Some may have migrated across the straits from Sri Lanka; others came southward during the reign of Aśoka, the Mauryan emperor. By the first century CE, both had established settlements and built small institutions and shrines known as *paḷlis*. Although both Jain and Buddhist monks tended to live outside the cities for centuries—the Jains often in rock caves and the Buddhist monks in monastic communities—their impact on Tamil country increased, enhanced by the influx and influence of lay members. The politics and literature of Tamil country were influenced by Jain and Buddhist savants, especially between the fourth and seventh centuries CE. Consequently, the dominant mood of religion in Tamil country for some three centuries reflected Jain and Buddhist values. There was little emphasis on theism or indigenous sacred places. Sobriety and self-effacement became a respected way of life, especially for the elite. [See Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in India, and Jainism.*]

The Hinduization of Tamil Country. Beginning in the third century BCE, migrating brahmins and other persons influenced by Vedic and epic traditions were also becoming a part of the Tamil landscape. In the early cities, chieftains who sought to enhance their status employed brahmin priests to perform Vedic rituals as had been the case in the North during the epic period. It was in the seventh century, however, that Hindu Sanskrit culture and religion merged with the indigenous Tamil society, leading to a pervasive hinduization of Tamil country and the emergence of a new and creative Hindu civilization.

The first significant feature of the "Hindu age" in Tamil India was the rise of devotional poetry (*bhakti*) in the vernacular language during the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries. Poets who were followers of Śiva (Nāyaṅārs) and of Viṣṇu (Ālvārs: literally, those who are "immersed") popularized these two deities throughout Tamil country. These poets were drawn from all walks of life, though over half of them were of brahmin or of royal background. At first, their attacks on Jains and Buddhists tended to be virulent, especially in the case

of the Śaiva *Tiruñānacambantaṅ*. But by the mid-eighth century, Hindu devotionalism had taken a significant hold in Tamil country and the poets could afford to take a more accommodating attitude toward the declining Jain and Buddhist presence.

Between the years 650 and 940 the twelve Vaiṣṇava poet-saints (Ālvārs) wrote some four thousand verses, which were eventually canonized in the *Nālāyira-divya-prabandham* (The Four Thousand Divine Verses) edited in the tenth century by Nāthamuni, the first major *ācārya*, or sectarian teacher, of Vaiṣṇavism. Of the earlier Ālvārs, the most prolific was Kalikaṅṅi (800–870), also known as Tirumaṅkai, who wrote 1,227 verses combining militant, heroic, and erotic imagery with the anguish of separation from his lord. The ninth and tenth century Ālvārs associated primarily with western Tamil country include Viṭṭuciṭṭaṅ, known as Periyālvār (“great Ālvār”), who wrote 473 verses largely from the standpoint of the deity’s mother expressing fondness for the child Kṛṣṇa. Periyālvār’s daughter Kōtai, popularly known as Āṅṅāḷ (“she who rules the lord”), wrote 173 verses. Often erotic, they focussed on Kṛṣṇa as an adolescent from the viewpoint of a *gopī* who spends time with the Lord in his inner chamber. Finally, Caṭakōpaṅ or Ālvār Māraṅ (880–930), also known affectionately as Nammālvār (“our own devotee”), wrote 1,296 verses that combine passionate devotion for Kṛṣṇa with the metaphysics of Vedānta, the philosophical system of Vaiṣṇava brahmins. Nammālvār has come to be seen as the most authoritative of the Ālvārs for the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas. [See also Ālvārs; Kṛṣṇaism; and Vaiṣṇavism.]

While tradition claims there were sixty-three Śaiva poet-saints (Nāyaṅārs)—perhaps in response to the traditional sixty-three saints of Jainism—there were in fact only eight who were poets of repute, while another Śaiva poet of the period, Maṅikkavācakar, who was important for the shaping of Śaiva devotionalism, was not accepted as a Nāyaṅār for several centuries. The earliest of the Nāyaṅārs was probably a woman, Kāraikkāl Ammaiṅār (seventh century CE), who renounced worldly pleasures for devotion to Śiva. Tirumūlar (eighth century CE) is noted for his 3,000-verse philosophical treatise, *Tirumantiram*, which interprets Sanskrit Agamic and Tantric material into Tamil. The best known and most prolific of the Nāyaṅār poets were the three whose poetry makes up the first seven sections of the *Tēvāram*, the Tamil Śaiva canon. Two of these are seventh century figures: Tirunāvukkaracar, better known as “Appar,” or “Father,” and his younger contemporary, Campantar or Tiruñānacampantar, who is generally believed to have been a child prodigy uttering all his poetry before the age of sixteen; the third poet is the ninth century (?) Cuntaramūrtti. However, perhaps the

best of all the Śaiva poets of these three centuries was the ninth century Maṅikkavācakar, for whom the religious experience was like ecstasy and “madness” when one was possessed by Śiva. [See also the biography of *Maṅikkavācakar*.] Maṅikkavācakar’s use of erotic imagery apparently was a major factor in keeping him from being accepted as a poet of the Śaiva canon until at least the twelfth century, when Cēkkiḷār included him in his *Periyapurānam*, the mythical hagiography of the Śaiva saints. [See also Śaivism, article on Nāyaṅārs.]

The religion propagated by the *bhakti* poets used epic and Puranic mythology selectively and gave it a locus in Tamil India. A number of basic themes were stressed: (1) the supremacy, greatness, even terror of Śiva or Viṣṇu, coupled nonetheless by the deity’s grace and compassion for those who were devoted to him; (2) the concrete and available presence of the god in his specific sacred places and, hence, the desirability of pilgrimage, festival, and temple ritual; (3) the affirmation of the individual in the experience of *bhakti* or devotion to god and the possibility of anyone’s attaining the god’s grace regardless of one’s station; (4) the sense of community among the god’s devotees and the merit in serving and being in such company; (5) the celebration of the experience of the god as the highest attainment of religion.

Tamil *bhakti* reflected many strands of religion at once. While it incorporated, on the one hand, certain aspects of Jain and Buddhist values (e.g., a sense of community among devotees; hospitality to fellow devotees; and the possibility of spiritual attainment irrespective of social or economic backgrounds); on the other hand, it directly confronted these heterodoxies with a vigorous theism; an affirmation of the phenomenal world as God’s creation; and the importance of the devotional experience and of pilgrimage to the deity’s special places. This *bhakti* movement reaffirmed elements of early Tamil religious perspectives: the emphasis on celebration, ecstasy, even possession by the god; the importance of the individual in religious experience; and the affirmation of the land and its special places. At the same time, Tamil *bhakti* illustrated the importance of a number of elements of post-Vedic orthodox, Sanskritic Hindu religion: the full-blown theism and mythology of the epics and Purāṇas, the spawning of temple-oriented ritual centered by *deva-pūjā* (worship through the icon), increased emphasis on liberation as the ultimate aim in religion, and others.

The centerpiece of Tamil *bhakti*, nonetheless, remained the personality of the god and his relationship with individual human beings. The god’s exploits were recited selectively; his awesome and terror-inspiring character (as with Śiva) or his miracle-working one (as

with Viṣṇu), was invoked. Yet at the same time, his grace (*aruḷ*), love (*aṅṅu*), and wooing of devotees was variously portrayed. The devotee, for his part, learned to attain the god's grace. The relationship was variously described as that of lover to a beloved; friend to friend; parent to child. The relationship generally differed in Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava *bhaktas*: for the former, a certain individuality of the devotee was thought to be retained in the devotional relationship with the god—a relationship said to be that between sun and light or flower and fragrance. In Vaiṣṇava *bhakti*, on the other hand, the loss of the devotee's selfhood in relation to the divine was stressed and the surrender of the one to the other celebrated. [See also *Bhakti*.]

Religion in the Medieval Period. From the eighth through the fifteenth century much of Hindu civilization was centered in Tamil India, where a prolific religious literature emerged in both Tamil and Sanskrit. In addition to the devotional literature, a number of ritual treatises were prepared in this region, including many of the Śaivāgamas, those texts used by Śaiva sects, as well as those of the Vaiṣṇava sects, the Pāñcarātrāgamas and Vaikhānasāgamas. Portions of several Purāṇas were authored by anonymous Tamil scholars and regional recensions of others prepared. Not least important of the literary corpus emerging after the twelfth century were the Tālapurāṇas, or mythological stories of temple sites throughout Tamil country. [See also *Hindu Tantric Literature*; *Vaiṣṇavism*, *article on Pāñcarātras*; and *Vaikhānasas*.]

In addition to the literature, Tamil India became the scene for an explosion of temple construction, incorporating an architecture that became characteristically Dravidian. There was also prolific sculpting in stone, and, during the years of the Cōḷa reign, in bronze. These architectural and sculpturing styles, together with the texts in which they were canonized, became the model for much of the architecture in city and temple building to be found in Southeast Asia from Burma to Cambodia. [See also *Temple*, *article on Hindu Temples*.] Another important achievement of the "medieval" centuries was the development of Hindu thought and of several philosophical schools. The religious history of this era is perhaps most easily divided into three periods: The Pallava (575–900); Cōḷa (900–1300); and Vijayanagar (1300–1700) periods.

The Pallava period. The Pallava period takes its name from the dynasty founded by Siṃhaviṣṇu and is best understood as a transitional or foundation era. In addition to the founding of *bhakti* sects devoted to Śiva and Viṣṇu, the period is characterized by the start of the South Indian tradition of temple-building in permanent stone. Canons for the building of these structures were

developed and included the classical Dravidian forms of the *vimāna* or central tower and the *maṅṭapa* or main hallway. The temple assumed the symbolic character both of a microcosm and of the human form, and became the major focus for ritual events. Temple icons and the deities they represented were ascribed the attributes of kingship, while rituals addressed to the icon increasingly assumed the character of the giving of gifts to a king.

Another important development of this period was the growth of Brahmanic settlements in South India. These rural settlements, which came to be known as *brahmadeyas*, were granted by Tamil landowners as emblems of the alliances that had developed between the two communities. The *brahmadeyas* became major loci of Sanskrit learning and culture and radiated Sanskrit influence into virtually all of Tamil life even while its brahman residents were being tamilized.

It is this period also that marks the life and work of Śaṅkara (788–820) and Bhāskaran, his contemporary. The former was especially instrumental in making Advaita (monism) attractive to intellectuals, and in substantially grounding the speculative tradition in the Upaniṣads, thereby strengthening the Brahmanic option in its dispute with Buddhist thought. [See also *the biography of Śaṅkara*.]

The Cōḷa period. The Cōḷa period (900–1300) was characterized by the formalization and systematic sanskritization of religion. Śaivism received special favor under the aegis of the Cōḷas; hence, there was construction and enlargement of Śaiva temples. These temples were symbols of the official state cult that overwhelmed or incorporated into themselves many of the lesser village cults. (One of the few major "folk" deities to survive and increase in strength in this period was the Goddess, whose cultus and symbols were permitted to flourish and increase in popularity.) [See also *Goddess Worship*, *article on The Hindu Goddess*.] The temples were at first characterized by the tall *vimāna* or central tower, but eventually by the building of several ornate *gopuras* or entranceways at each site. The temple, further, became a center for economic exchange, storage of land and goods, and social interaction, as well as a symbol of political liaison between kings, sectarian leaders, and land-owners. A considerable literature known as *tālapurāṇas*, purporting to relate to the mythic history of temple sites, began to develop.

Another religious institution emerging to prominence in the Cōḷa period was the *maṭam* (Skt., *maṭha*) or monastic center. The *maṭam* became a center of spiritual learning especially for non-brahmans, though it often assumed economic and political power as well. The *brahmadeya* or brahman settlement continued to be the

locus of much Sanskrit learning, radiating Brahmanic influence throughout the region.

Systematization in textual form continued in both Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism. This was expressed in the continued formalization of ritual texts—the Śaivāgamas for Śaiva sects and the Pāñcarātrāgamas and Vaikhānasāgamas for Vaiṣṇavism—and in philosophical treatises. Śaiva Siddhānta proved to be the philosophical systematization of the Śaiva religious experience. It was formally expressed in forty terse Tamil verses by the thirteenth century poet Meykaṇṭār (Meykaṇṭa Tēvar), and was known as the *Śivajñānabodham* (*Civaññāpōtam*). [See the biography of Meykaṇṭār.] A verse commentary, known as the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*, was written by his disciple Aruṇanti Śivācāriyar. Śaiva Siddhānta speaks of three realities—the lord (*pati*), the human soul (*pacu*; Skt., *paśu*), and the three bonds of human existence (*pāca*; Skt., *pāśa*). In Śaiva Śiddhānta the soul was to be freed from the bonds of *karman* (the law of cause and effect), *māyā* (the over-valuing of the phenomenal world), and *āṇava* (self-orientation) in order to become permanently attached to (and hence share the quality of) the lord Śiva. [See also Śaivism, article on Śaiva Siddhānta.]

Vaiṣṇava speculation, meanwhile, reached new heights during this period thanks largely to the work and thought of Yāmuna (918–1038), Rāmānuja (1017–1137), and Madhva (1199–1278). A central concern of these *ācāryas*, or preceptors, was that of affording a philosophical foundation for the devotional experience and hence in describing the relationship between the deity and the devotee, primarily in the form of surrender (*prapatti*). Yāmuna extolled the greatness of the lord and described the abject need of the devotee; Rāmānuja affirmed this theme but went on to argue for the “qualified” nature of supreme existence (*viśiṣṭādvaita*) in contradistinction to Śaṅkara’s more radical monism. Madhva, in contrast to the exponents of Śaṅkara’s system, argued for the reality and plurality of the world and the difference between the self and *brahman*. For each of these thinkers, *brahman* was perceived in terms of a personal deity. [See also the biographies of Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Yāmuna.]

The twelfth century was the period in which perhaps the greatest Tamil poet lived. Kampaṇ, the “imperial poet,” master of style and form, is best known for his transcreation of Vālmiki’s *Rāmāyaṇa*. While borrowing extensively from the content and style of the Sanskrit epic, Kampaṇ’s version, nonetheless, creatively adapts the finest of Tamil poetics, and locates the story in a distinctively Tamil landscape. [See also *Rāmāyaṇa*.]

It was during the Cōḷa period that the influence of Hindu (and especially Śaiva) thought, which had

started spreading into Southeast Asia under the Pallavas and Guptas, became more pronounced. Brahmins, now perceived as skilled and versatile advisers to kings, were to be found in such city-states as Polonnāruva (Sri Lanka), Pagan (Burma), Ayutthayā (Thailand), Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom (Cambodia) and Madjapahit (Java). These brahmins and other Hindu immigrants transported notions of divine kingship and cosmology; thus the architecture of capital cities, palaces, temples, and even the biers of dead kings, as well as some of the rituals in the courts of Southeast Asia, came to reflect motifs canonized in Śaivāgama texts of the Cōḷa period. [See also Kingship, article on Kingship in Southeast Asia.]

The Vijayanagar period. With the decline of the Cōḷa line and the rise of the Vijayanagar hegemony, whose capital was in Andhra Pradesh, shifts occurred in the character of religion in Tamil India. While the Vijayanagars, through political alliances, succeeded in keeping the expanding Islamic empire from making major political inroads in the South, there were nonetheless increasing Muslim influences. From the tenth century onward pockets of Muslims settled into small communities along the Tamil and Malabar coasts and radiated influence outward from these centers, and by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries occasional military expeditions had led to brief periods of Muslim rule in several portions of Tamil country.

Another important political development of the Vijayanagar period, due in part to the increase in military capability, was the rise of local and supralocal rulers known as *nāyakkas*, who sustained pockets of political stability under suzerainty of the Telugu Vijayanagars. These *nāyakka* domains often led to the patronage of local Hindu institutions and the enhancement of local temples and festivals. The rise of the *nāyakka* system in Tamil country also led to change in the role of brahmins and temples in the region. The *brahmadeya* declined in power and brahmins were no longer given gifts to the degree that had been true in the Cōḷa period. Yet brahmins, especially Telugu brahmins, became important consultants in military and ritual affairs, and the temples, their deities, and their festivals came increasingly to express the reciprocities, including gift giving and the exchange of honors, that had been a part of the Cōḷa socio-political order.

The Cōḷa period was a time for the formalization and institutionalization of religion, especially of Śaivism, into temples and literary texts written primarily in Sanskrit. In the post-Cōḷa period the vernacular once again became the chief medium for religious expression, and thus the more popular forms of Hinduism found expression across the Tamil region. Tamil Hin-

duism during the Vijayanagar period thus was characterized by resurgent devotionalism and increased participation in temple rituals and festivals by a broader spectrum of people. One might speak of this new era as the “silver age” of Tamil *bhakti*.

The harbinger of this post-Cōla trend was Aruṇakirainātar (c. 1475–1550). His poetry was characterized by an ingenious use of meter and sound as an accompaniment to dance; by a skillful combination of Sanskrit and Tamil terms, albeit in a Tamil idiom that celebrated its very Tamilness; by lavish praise of Murukaṅ and that deity’s consorts and sacred places; and by a call both to egalitarian issues and to a devotion to God. Aruṅakir likened the religious experience to a profound silence.

By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries *bhakti* literature had mushroomed. Such poets as Tāyumaṅavar, Kacciyapaciva, and Kumārakurupara celebrated the mythology, sacred places, and devotionalism of Śaivism. Tamil Tālapurāṇas, or mythologies of temple sites, proliferated in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries, each purporting to describe the mythical history and grandeur of local temples by localizing and re-enforcing themes that had been part of the Tamil landscape for centuries, especially the sacrality and power of land and waters. The role of the Goddess was an important theme in these temple myths, especially her identity with the land and the necessity to channel her considerable power into the patterns of normative theism.

The late Vijayanagar period saw a resurgence of temple construction. The number of temples almost tripled in the two centuries between 1550 and 1750. While the construction of Śaiva temples was relatively moderate, particularly in eastern portions of the Tamil region, temples to Viṣṇu, the Goddess, and Śiva’s sons Murukaṅ and Gaṇeśa proliferated much more rapidly than in earlier centuries, especially in western portions of the region. [See Gaṇeśa.] Further, these temples more frequently became the arena for public events, including marriages and festivals. Festivals such as the Cittarai festival (April–May) in Madurai and the Mahānavamī festival (September–October) in Vijayanagara were described by commentators in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as enormous celebrations and paradigmatic events. Such festivals came to express a wide range of social and religious realities; relationships between castes and sectarian groups; the role of the king as presiding presence, warrior *par excellence*, and agent of prosperity; celebration of harvest or significant seasonal transition; and the reenactment of the career of the deity and the extolling of him or her as celestial prototype of the king and cosmic ruler. Extant temples were enlarged, *gopuras*, or entranceways, were donated by

numbers of wealthier families, and the temple environs took on the character of a miniature city.

These centuries were also a time when some Sanskrit Purāṇas and epic literature were transcreated into Tamil. In the seventeenth century, for example, the Tamil version of the *Skanda Purāṇa* appeared, giving to the epic deity a flavor that incorporated all his appropriate Tamil heritage.

Another form of *bhakti* literature that proliferated by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a form of poetry known as *pillaitamil*, which worshiped the deity in the form of a child. While the Ālvār Āṅṅāḷ was apparently the first poet to celebrate in Tamil the childhood of Kṛṣṇa, there is increased use of this form of poetry in both Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva contexts. In this type of *bhakti* the poet often assumes the form of the deity’s parent and equates the stages of childhood to rhythms of the cosmos and of the poetic medium.

However, there was also a religious countermovement to be found in Tamil country during much of this period. Primarily between the tenth and fifteenth centuries a cryptic “antiestablishment” form of religion found its expression in the poetry and lifestyle of persons known as *cittars* (Skt., *siddhas*). Primarily Śaiva, the *cittars* were nonetheless committed to the notion that Śiva or Civaṅ was not to be worshiped in iconic form but rather as the supreme limitless one who was virtually identifiable with individual life-forms (*jīvan-ātman*). Theirs was a lifestyle therefore given to *yoga*, bodily disciplines, meditation, and healing practices. Temple cults, iconic worship, caste, and Brahmanism were criticized, and such notions as *karman* and reincarnation de-emphasized. Rather, the body was believed to be temple and microcosm, and internal power the noblest of virtues. In their poetry, natural objects became images of the individual’s spiritual quest: the dancing snake, for example, could be seen as the individual’s personhood or spirit, and the bee came to represent the life force. Pattiṅattar II (fourteenth–fifteenth centuries) and his disciple Pattirakiriyar, on the other hand, were more pessimistic: life is tragic, the body filthy, and the beauty of women detestable. Man is a frustrated beggar who longs to be delivered and liberated by God. This is a mood that appears, to varying extents, in the writings of Aruṅakirainātar (fifteenth century), Tāyumaṅavar (1706–1744), and Rāmaliṅka Cuvāmikal (nineteenth century).

In summary, the Vijayanagar period was a time when religion subtly reaffirmed Hindu and Tamil identities in the wake of the extensive sanskritization of the Cōla period and in the face of Muslim and Telugu influence throughout the period. Literary and architectural expressions of religion reflected a resurgence of devo-

tionalism and participation. The cultus of the Goddess had become widespread and devotional Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism were resurgent, most frequently expressing themselves in worship of the deity's childhood, the building of shrines, and the incorporation of aspects of popular religion. In the meanwhile the tradition had also produced a self-critical movement, focusing on the body as medium of worship and raising questions about the public cultus.

Pre-Modern Period. By the seventeenth century European influence had begun to leave its impact on Tamil culture and religion. As early as the fourth century Christians had inhabited areas along the southwest coast. Pockets of Jewish merchants settled in such western cities as Cochin where, by the eleventh century, they had negotiated extensive privileges and rights with local rulers. While these groups remained economically active in the area now known as Kerala, they tended to be socially insular and their impact on Tamil-speaking peoples was marginal. By the late sixteenth century, however, Christian missionaries had begun to influence Tamil letters and lifestyle more actively: Enrique Enriquez, a Portuguese Jesuit who was in southwestern India from 1546 to 1600, sought to prepare catechisms and grammars in Tamil in such a way as to make a permanent impact on the development of Christian Tamil theological vocabulary and to create a Catholic fishing community. Robert de Nobili, a Jesuit who spent much of his life in Madurai after arriving in Goa in 1605, sought to present Christian scriptures and thought as extensions and fulfillments of Tamil Brahmanism. Constantine Beschi, a Jesuit who was in Madurai from 1710 to 1747, made original contributions to Tamil literature.

The first of the Protestant missionaries was Bartholomaeus Ziegenbalg, who arrived in Tranquebar in 1706. He wrote relatively sympathetic manuscripts on the religious life of South India and continued the process of translating the Bible and Christian ideas into Tamil. Christian Schwartz, who arrived in 1750, served an important role as mediator between local rulers and British officials. Others, like Johann Fabricius, who died in 1791, and the nineteenth century's Bishop Caldwell, were instrumental in developing a dictionary and comparative Dravidian grammar respectively, implements which increased the exchange of ideas between the English and Tamil worlds. In the nineteenth century G. U. Pope's translation of *Māṇikkavācakar* and Henry Whitehead's description of Tamil village religion helped make elements of the Tamil religious landscape better known to Tamils as well as to the English-speaking world, even though the work of neither was free of the Western/

Christian bias of the authors. This sort of interpretive work continued into the twentieth century with the scholarship of C. G. Diehl and others. [See also Indian Religions, *article on History of Study*.]

An indigenous Tamil Christianity emerged during these centuries that included not only the conversion of large groups of people from the lower strata of the social order in specific villages or districts, but also the development of such articulate Tamil spokesmen for the "new" religion as H. A. Krisna Pillai, Vedanayagar Sastriar, and A. J. Appasamy. Christian hospitals, schools, colleges, orphanages, and presses dotted the Tamil landscape and influenced the shape of Tamil Hindu responses.

Quite apart from the attempts at christianization that accompanied the European presence were other forms of westernization that influenced the shape of religion in Tamil country. On the one hand, there were those Westerners who romanticized the Hindu tradition. Most notable of these was Annie Besant (1847–1933; active in India between 1894 and 1920), who established the international headquarters of the Theosophical Society in Madras and became both an active defender of Hindu values and a crusader for reform. [See *the biography of Annie Besant*.] On the other hand, there were tendencies to criticize or undermine traditional patterns of life and religion in the area. These included a range of activities from the relatively virulent "preaching missions" sponsored by missionaries to the more subtle acts of discrimination and exploitation associated with colonialism.

Still another dimension of religion evident in the pre-modern period that had an impact on current religious life was the continuing practice of indigenous village and folk forms of worship. Encouraged by the relative eclecticism of the Vijayanagar period, folk forms of religion became increasingly apparent and influential on the more literate forms of religion. Local deities designed to protect village and field and representing the social stratification of their worshipers have been an important part of the Tamil religious landscape even into the present century. These include such deities as Aiyānār, who has been a protector deity of Tamil villages since at least the eighth century; Karappacāmi, the black "servant" god, and various regional *virāṇs* (hero-warriors). Such deities as these are sometimes ascribed exploits of resistance to British forces in local mythology. Local goddesses such as Mariammaṇ are considered personifications of the world's natural forces and hence are propitiated lest pestilence or national catastrophe befall. During the mid-twentieth century many such deities have become linked to the "great tra-

dition" of Hinduism, particularly as those strata of society for whom these deities were paradigmatic have been integrated with the larger social order.

The Present. The Tamil religious response to the impact of the West has been expressed in a great variety of ways. Some of these have been characteristic of neo-Hinduism throughout India. There has been some adaptation of strategies (e.g., the use of preaching missions and the development of benevolent institutions) and of ideas from British and Christian sources. There has been the syncretistic combination of ideas drawn selectively both from within the tradition and from Christian or Western sources; most commonly, these "mosaics of religion" have been created by individuals and by certain *gurus* and their groups. Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) may be the best known of those southern thinkers of the twentieth century who have reaffirmed elements of the Hindu tradition in ways that interweave Western ideas. [See also the biography of Radhakrishnan.]

However, the last century and a half has been characterized by a rebirth of Tamil self-consciousness. The discovery, translation, and interpretation of Tamil languages and literature by Westerners has encouraged a resurgence of regional and ethnic pride among Tamils. Classical Tamil texts have been recovered and republished. Tamil devotional literature has been memorized and is invoked as the standard of ideal religion, albeit interpreted and used selectively. Shrines have been renovated and their mythical antiquity extolled. Often, regional traditions and myths assume precedence over national ones. Thus even though brahmanization continues to occur as folk and village cults are hinduized, and although various anglicizations have been accepted as normative, the Tamil and nonbrahman roots of religious practice are perpetuated and practiced with fervor. As Tamils, especially nonbrahmans, have migrated abroad in search of economic opportunities, they have taken with them to Malaysia, Sri Lanka, East Africa, Madagascar, and North America self-perceptions and religious lifestyles.

The character of much of this Tamil religion in the modern era is aptly described as neo-*bhakti*. Participation in festivals and pilgrimages at temple sites has increased geometrically. Renovation of some temples deemed significant began in the latter part of the nineteenth century; they began to welcome all spectra of society in the 1920s, and they have become more accessible by transportation systems since the 1930s. Deities such as Murukan have attained enormous popularity throughout the region for a variety of reasons, among which are his appeal to all spectra of society; his pre-

sumed Tamil antiquity and identity; and his amalgamation of much of the religious symbolism that has been part of Tamil cultural history. In more recent decades, local goddesses like Mariammaṇ have been increasingly brahmanized and made part of the great Hindu tradition even while retaining ties to local sites and folk culture. Aiyappaṇ, whose prototypical shrine is in Kerala, has nonetheless attracted increasing numbers of Tamil worshipers who see in him Tamil roots, genuine power, and an invitation to a sense of community that transcends caste. Various forms of ancient ritual continue to be practiced in the homes of the orthodox even while accommodations are made to the exigencies of commerce and contemporary life. At the same time, public pressures to "streamline" and "democratize" religion have led to the de-brahmanization of ritual in some temples and the privatization of some religious practices. Yet in many respects, religion is as much a part of the contemporary Tamil consciousness as it has ever been.

[The influence of Tamil culture on the culture of Sri Lanka is noted in Sinhala Religion.]

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FRED W. CLOTHEY

TAMMUZ. See Dumuzi.

TANGAROA is the most important of the “departmental” gods of Polynesia. In his many cognates, he was worshiped by most Polynesians as the chief god and creator of the world. His popularity, however, depended chiefly on his role as ruler over the ocean. Tangaroa stands as the origin and personification of all fish; his offspring are the creatures of the sea. Tangaroa was often appealed to by seafarers and fisherman, and, under the title Tangaroa-whakamautai, he was recognized by the Maori of New Zealand as the controller of the tides.

Mythological Context. The souls of the Polynesian ancestors live on in the spirit land of Hawaiki, which is

the symbolic place of origin of the Polynesian people. Ancestor deification was probably the original form of Polynesian religion. While some of the gods’ names were common throughout the Pacific islands, most Polynesian gods were strictly local deities. The Polynesian deities have been classified into four groups: supreme, “departmental,” tribal, and family. The departmental gods were classified according to the aspect of nature they ruled. The major departmental gods—Tane, Rongo, Tu, and Tangaroa—were often portrayed in eastern Polynesian mythology as the sons of Rangi (“sky”) and Papa (“earth”). Areas of authority were distributed among the four departmental gods, who, together with the tribal ancestors, constituted the pantheon of the earliest Polynesian mythology and who were shared by many island groups.

The parentage of these deities was often traced to ancestors: like the gods of Greek mythology, the Polynesian departmental deities had once been living persons with human desires and passions. The process of creating gods continued in Polynesia until the advent of Christianity in the Pacific islands during the early nineteenth century. In general, the study of Polynesian myths and religious beliefs has been dependent upon source materials from early missionaries, who were not free from prejudice. The religion and mythology of the Maori of New Zealand, however, were systematically studied and therefore constitute an important exception.

Tangaroa’s Role. In New Zealand, Tangaroa appears to have been venerated under several names, such as Tangaroa-nui, Tangaroa-ra-vaio, Tangaroa-mai-tu-rangi, Tangaroa-a-mua, Tangaroa-a-timu, and Tangaroa-aroto. On other Polynesian islands, Tangaroa was known as Ta’aroa, Tangaloa, Tanaroa, and Kanaloa. Tangaroa’s role varied because major gods were often fused with local or family deities. Tangaroa did, however, continue to exist as an independent major god in most of the Polynesian myths, and a distinct Tangaroa cult developed in parallel to other common worship practices. This cult apparently flourished on the islands where there was an affinity between gods and eponymous ancestors. On some islands, there remains only scant information about Tangaroa, but his former importance is proven by his appearance in many *fagu* (sacred) chants:

O Tangaroa in the immensity of space
Clear away the clouds by day
Clear away the clouds by night
That Ru may see the stars of heaven
To guide him in the land of his desire
(Buck, 1938)

Tangaroa was portrayed as the supreme being in western and central Polynesia, but he was worshiped as the god of the sea. In the Samoan Islands, Tangaroa was essentially a creator—the being who formed the islands or who raised them up from the depths of the sea. In Tongan mythology, Tangaroa appeared as the sky god. Tui Tonga, the founder of the Tongan royal family, was respected as having descended from Tangaroa. He was therefore held to be sacred and to possess great powers that were attributed to semidivine chiefs. Though Tangaroa was also referred to as the supreme being and first cause in Samoa, the Society Islands, and Hawaii, the complex was almost absent from the belief system of the Polynesian marginal islands according to E. S. Craighill Handy (1927).

In the Cook Islands, Tangaroa and Rongo are said to have been the twin children of the primal parents Papa and Atea ("heaven"). Tangaroa is said to have taken a wife, Hina, in the Cook Islands—a conjunction that was held throughout Polynesia. On Easter Island, the Ariki Mau ("great chief") was the possessor of *mana* ("power") that was transmitted down the genealogical line from the ancestral gods Tangaroa and Rongo. On Samoa, Rongo is said to be the offspring of Tangaroa and Hina. Thus the roles of the gods, as well as their names, frequently vary from region to region.

We see a striking contrast to the above in the interpretation given Tangaroa in the Marquesas Islands, where Tangaroa was elevated into a divinity who battled Atea for supremacy. A creation myth of the Marquesas, however, contains many references to Tangaroa as merely a god of the sea and winds. It is plausible that the status of Tangaroa declined under the growing influence of Christian missionaries on the islands. In Hawaii, where he is called Kaneloa, Tangaroa was less important than the other departmental gods. This lack of status may have been due to the fact that the people of Hawaii later arranged their pantheon to conform with the Christian triadic pattern, using Kane (Tane), Ku (Tu), and Lono (Rongo) to form a trinity.

Effects of Christianization. As might be expected, the advent of the Europeans led to radical changes in Polynesian religions. In the Austral, Society, Tuamotu, and Gambier islands, the people still know Tangaroa as the god of the sea. Polynesian contact with Europeans, however, and the eventual conversion of many islanders to Christianity destroyed the old gods' religious authority. Why, then, is Tangaroa the sole "survivor" among the many Polynesian gods? The answer is tied to the fact that for the Polynesians, descendants of great seafarers, the ocean is vitally important. The music-loving Polynesians continue to sing their old chants even though

they no longer fully understand the role that the texts had played in their religious traditions. The old *fagu* chants, still known in the extreme eastern end of the Tuamotu Islands, offer a sketch of the creation myths and of some of the religious concepts that existed before the advent of Christianity. These chants contain not only the name of Tangaroa but also the names of other gods; even ancestral gods often appear in parodies. But, in general, the gradual disintegration of traditional island society has coincided with the death of the Polynesian gods.

Radical change was enhanced by the modernization of island societies after World War II. In the 1960s, Tangaroa was mentioned in only one of the parody chants that was used on the occasion of welcoming visitors to the eastern Tuamotus:

We descend from Tangaroa
Manini, we are ready for you
We love you
Manini, with blessings
Has come to our land.

(Hatanaka, 1976)

It may be that one day even the name of Tangaroa will no longer be known to the Polynesian people; then all of the gods will have returned to the land of Hawaiki.

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SACHIKO HATANAKA

TÄNGRI. See Tengri.

T'ANG YUNG-T'UNG (1893–1964), eminent scholar of the history of Chinese Buddhism. A native of Huangmei County in Hupei Province, T'ang studied in Peking and graduated from Ch'ing-hua University in 1917. In order to pursue his studies he went to the United States in the following year, where he specialized in philosophy, Sanskrit, and Pali at Harvard University. T'ang received his master's degree in 1922 and returned to China, where he began a teaching career that spanned four decades.

By the 1940s, T'ang was already well established in the philosophy department of Peking University, be-

coming its chairman and eventually being named dean of the College of Humanities. In addition to his research on Buddhism and Indian philosophy, T'ang was an expert on the school of thought known as *hsüan-hsüeh* ("dark learning"), which flourished during the Wei and Chin dynasties (third and fourth centuries CE). He also lectured on such Western philosophical traditions as rationalism and empiricism, having studied European philosophy during his years abroad. In 1947 T'ang was named an academician of the Central Research Institute, and thereafter returned to the United States to give a series of lectures at the University of California.

Firmly rejecting suggestions that he go to Taiwan following the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, T'ang actively took part in academic affairs in the newly established People's Republic. He was appointed chairman of the Council for Academic Affairs and vice-president of Peking University, and was elected a member of the Academic Society of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In addition, T'ang was a member of the Standing Committee of the first, second, and third National People's Congresses.

Consonant with both Marxist theory and contemporary scholarship in the social scientific study of religion, T'ang focused more on the historical and social impact of Buddhist thought than on its religious influence. His principal works include *Han-Wei liang Chin Nan-peich'ao fo-chiao shih* (A History of Buddhism from the Han and Wei Dynasties to the Northern and Southern Dynasties), *Sui-T'ang fo-chiao shih-kao* (A History of Buddhism in the Sui and T'ang Dynasties), and *Yin-tu che-hsüeh shih-lüeh* (A Concise History of Indian Philosophy). Through his academic work and official posts T'ang influenced an entire generation of Chinese students of Buddhism.

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REN JIYU

T'AN-LUAN (traditional dates 476–542, but more probably c. 488–554), author of the first known systematic work to be produced in China on Pure Land (Chin., Ching-t'u) Buddhism, that branch of the Buddhist tradition that emphasizes faith in the Buddha Amitābha (Buddha of Limitless Light; Chin., O-mi-t'o-fo; Jpn., Amida) and rebirth in Sukhāvātī ("land of bliss"), Amitābha's paradisiacal realm in the western quarter of the universe, as a means of attaining enlightenment. T'an-

luan's writings were a major textual source for the Japanese monk Shinran (1173–1262), the founder of the Jōdo Shinshū, which therefore regards T'an-luan as one of its major patriarchal figures.

According to his biography in the *Hsü kao-seng chuan* (Further Biographies of Eminent Monks), T'an-luan was born in the north, near Wu-t'ai Shan in Shansi Province, and studied Buddhism in his youth. Following a serious illness, however, he took up the pursuit of techniques of immortality recommended in various Taoist texts. His quest eventually led him to a supposed encounter with T'ao Hung-ching (456–536), the eminent Six Dynasties alchemist and master of the Mao-shan Taoist tradition, who allegedly transmitted to him ten fascicles of "scriptures of the immortals" (*hsien ching*). [See the biography of T'ao Hung-ching.] On his way north again T'an-luan stopped in Lo-yang, where the Indian monk and translator Bodhiruci is said to have introduced him to the *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching* (Scripture on the Visualization of the Buddha Amitābha). Bodhiruci remarked to him at the time that Amitābha (known also by his alternate Sanskrit name, Amitāyus, Buddha of Limitless Life) was the "greatest immortal" (*ta hsien*), given his ability to lead beings out of the realm of rebirth altogether. This historically questionable episode is nonetheless suggestive of the close link that must have been popularly perceived between the soteriological goals of Taoism and some of the Buddhist traditions, a link that may have contributed to the rapid growth in popularity of the Amitābha cult in T'an-luan's time. In the aftermath of this encounter T'an-luan devoted himself to the study of the Pure Land scriptures, eventually gathering around himself a group of devotees to Amitābha.

Many Taoist and Buddhist works are attributed to T'an-luan, but only two, both of which are Buddhist, are unquestionably authentic. The first, a systematic treatise, is generally known by the abbreviated title *Wang-sheng lun chu* (Notes on the Treatise on Birth [in the Pure Land]; T.D. no. 1819). The second, the *Tsan O-mi-t'o-fo chi* (Canticles on Amitābha; T.D. no. 1978), is an apparently liturgical work. The *Lun chu* is T'an-luan's commentary (*chu*) to the so-called *Sukhāvātīvyūhopadeśa** (*Wu-liang-shou ching yu-p'o-t'i-she yüan-sheng chi*), a collection of Buddhist-style hymns (Skt., *gāthā*), with autocommentary, attributed uncertainly to Vasubandhu. T'an-luan's commentary proceeds carefully *au pied de la lettre*, with only a few insertions external to the format of "Vasubandhu's" text. His general intent is to show how one may achieve liberation by availing oneself of the pure *karman* of Amitābha, which is freely dispensed to all who seek it in accordance with a series of resolves (*prañidhāna*) taken by this Buddha while still the *bodhisattva* Dharmākara.

Drawing on the *Larger Sukhāvātyūha Sūtra*, the *Smaller Sukhāvātyūha Sūtra*, and the *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching*, T'an-luan shows how the power of Amitābha is effective for all beings who call upon him in faith, even for laypersons who cannot meditate or for those sunk in immorality. Faith in, and worship of, Amitābha is accomplished through what T'an-luan (imparting his own classification to "Vasubandhu's" discussion) termed the "five gates of recollection" (*wu nien-men*): bodily worship (i.e., bowing, etc.); vocal praise (especially, but not exclusively the invocation of his name, i.e., *nien-fo* practice); wholehearted resolve to be reborn in the Pure Land; visualization (*kuan*) of the delights of the Pure Land; and "turning toward" (*hui-hsiang*), a purposely ambiguous term that means both turning toward beings while the practitioner is still in *saṃsāra*, so as to give them the religious merit gained through one's own practice and, having been born in the Pure Land, turning back toward beings by being reborn in *saṃsāra* in order to liberate others. [See *Nien-fo*.]

T'an-luan's demonstration of these simple practices is sophisticated and profound, being based heavily upon the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra* (a commentary on the *Perfection of Wisdom Scripture* attributed to Nāgārjuna), but it is not necessary to understand the demonstration in order to use the practice. The *upāya* (skill in means) involved is that of the passionate longing for heavenly delights. The Pure Land is depicted as if it were a heaven of sensual delight (i.e., a *devaloka*, or realm of a deity), but in fact it is outside of the phenomenal world of *saṃsāra*. It is not a phantasm, however: "It exists extra-phenomenally," says T'an-luan, and is by its inner nature pure in every respect, even in respect of discursive thought. Thus, when one dies and, through Amitābha's power, is reborn in the Pure Land and sees Amitābha there as its lord, one is actually "not born." One's desires take on the Pure Land's nature of desirelessness as the water of rivers takes on the saltiness of the sea when it runs into it. One's passionate longing for delight is extinguished "like ice mixed with fire: the fire [of the passions] goes out, and the ice [of the Pure Land's delights] disappears." Thus, one has effectively achieved *nirvāṇa* and one functions like a *bodhisattva* of the upper levels (i.e., a *bodhisattva* who has achieved the state of nonretrogression), ever remaining fixed in the *dharmakāya* (unmanifest Buddha nature) yet constantly manifesting bodies in all the worlds where Buddhist teachers are needed, "like the sun that remains in the sky yet is reflected in hundreds of rivers and pools."

T'an-luan was virtually ignored in China, but his influence in Japan has been considerable since Shinran's

time. Shinran used the *Lun chu* as the major source of his *Kyōgyōshinshō*, a collection of proof texts on Pure Land Buddhism, and composed his own *San Amidabutsuge*, which was closely based on T'an-luan's *Tsan O-mi-t'o-fo chi*. Shinran built his even simpler practice of gratefully rejoicing in *already having been* liberated by the power of Amitābha on the intellectual foundation provided by T'an-luan.

[See also Amitābha; Ching-t'u; and the biography of Shinran.]

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ROGER J. CORLESS

TANNAIM. The term *tanna* is used to refer to an authority of the Mishnah and its related works, in contradistinction to *amora*, referring to a sage of the *gemara*'. The word derives from the Aramaic *teni* ("to repeat") and by extension means "to learn" or "to teach."

The tannaim were the sages of rabbinic tradition who lived immediately before, and then during the century and a half following, the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem (70 CE). This period is traditionally divided into five or six generations. The most prominent authorities of the period included Hillel, Gamli'el the Elder, Yoḥanan ben Zakk'ai, Gamli'el of Yavneh, Eli'ezer ben Hyrcanus, 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, Me'ir, and Yehudah ha-Nasi'. The period ends with the generation of Yehudah ha-Nasi', the editor of the Mishnah (c. 200 CE), although the following generation in Palestine is one of transition. The division in Babylonia is clearer, though the *amora* Rav is occasionally spoken of as having tannaitic authority.

The texts that record the traditions of these sages are termed "tannaitic," and they include the Mishnah, the Tosefta, the halakhic *midrashim*, and a broad variety of

traditions preserved in the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds. Traditions that are ascribed tannaitic authority are introduced, almost without exception in the Babylonian Talmud but with frequent exception in the Jerusalem Talmud, with a set of technical vocabulary that employs the root *tny*. Such traditions are termed *baraitot* (sg., *baraita*), meaning "traditions outside, or excluded from, the Mishnah" (from Aramaic *bar*, "outside").

The tannaitic texts, particularly the Mishnah but to a significant extent the *baraitot* as well, form the basis of later rabbinic legal deliberations. These texts were tested, interpreted, and sometimes emended by the amoraim, and they were in a very real sense accorded the authority of canon. The tannaim often became great legendary figures who were thought to have experienced, and sometimes even instigated, miracles.

The term *tanna'* is secondarily used to refer to the professional repeater or reciter of the rabbinic schools who functioned during both the tannaitic and amoraic periods, even into the centuries that followed (the amoraic period ended c. 500 CE). The *tanna'* may also have been referred to as *roveh* ("repeater"), later confused with *rabbah* ("the great").

The official traditions of the rabbinic schools were oral. The functionaries who memorized the official texts were the *tanna'im*, who were in all respects living books. The process of committing the official text to memory most likely occurred in the following way. First, the master would decide upon the version of the tradition to be taught. He would then call upon his *tanna'*, who would be asked to recite the tradition a great many times until its memorization was secure. At that time other *tanna'im* might be called in, for whom the first *tanna'* would then recite the tradition. He would test their memorization, and in this way the version of the text would be secured in the mouths of increasing numbers of *tanna'im*.

Such a method constituted genuine publication. There are several accounts in Talmudic literature in which the *tanna'* is consulted to clarify the official version of a tradition. When the *tanna'* testified to the reading of a text, his testimony was deemed authoritative. Even the Mishnah's editor, Yehudah ha-Nasi', is reported to have consulted his *tanna'* for a proper reading, and this particular *tanna'* is spoken of as having a "tested" or "revised" version of the Mishnah.

Because the *tanna'* was depended upon to provide published traditions, without commentary and without emendation, the *tanna'im* were apparently chosen for their phenomenal memories, not their intelligence. An overly intelligent *tanna'* might have been tempted to emend a text if he thought it to be problematic. One

sage speaks of a *tanna'* as "a basket filled with books" (B.T., *Meg.* 28b), that is, filled with information but not able to do much with it. A popular saying declares that "the *tanna'* recites and doesn't know what he is saying" (B.T., *Soṭ.* 22a). Still, some of the greatest sages also acted as *tanna'im*. In addition, the potential fallibility of oral publication was widely recognized, and it is probably for this reason that *Avot* 3.7 warns strongly against any interruption during one's repetition exercises.

The traditions of certain schools were thought to be especially reliable. This was true of the schools of Hiyya' and Oshaya', Palestinian sages of the transitional generation following the compilation of the Mishnah. The former of these teachers is also spoken of as being a repeater for Yehudah ha-Nasi'.

[See also the biographies of Gamli'el the Elder, Yohanan ben Zakk'ai, Gamli'el of Yavneh, Eli'ezer ben Hyrcanus, Me'ir, and Yehudah ha-Nasi'. For discussion of Hillel, see Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai; for a broad discussion of the tannaitic literature, see Mishnah and To-sefta.]

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DAVID KRAEMER

TANTRISM. [This entry consists of an overview article and a discussion of Hindu Tantrism. For Buddhist Tantrism, see Buddhism, Schools of, article on Esoteric Buddhism.]

An Overview

An objective and scientific assessment of Tantrism is not easy, for the subject is controversial and perplexing. Not only do authorities give different definitions of Tantrism, but its very existence has sometimes been denied. (These uncertainties apply more to Hindu Tantrism than to Buddhist Tantrism.)

The word *Tantrism* was coined in the nineteenth century from the Sanskrit *tantra*, meaning "warp" or "loom," hence a doctrine, and hence again a work, trea-

tise, or handbook teaching some doctrine, though not necessarily a Tantric one. But it so happened that it was in works known as *tantra* that Western scholars first discovered doctrines and practices different from those of Brahmanism and classical Hinduism, which were then believed to be the whole of Hindu religion. These texts also differed from what was known of ancient Buddhism and of Mahāyāna philosophy. So the Western experts adopted the word *Tantrism* for that particular and for them very peculiar, even repulsive, aspect of Indian religion.

There is no word in Sanskrit for Tantrism. There are texts called Tantras. There is *tantraśāstra*: the teaching of the Tantras. There is also the adjective *tātrika* (Tantric), which is used as distinct from *vaidika* (Vedic) to contrast an aspect of the religious-cum-ritual Hindu tradition not with Vedism properly so called but with the "orthodox" non-Tantric Hinduism that continues down to our own day, mostly in private (as opposed to temple) ritual, and especially in the "sacraments" (*sam-skāra*) enjoined on all twice-born male Hindus (the three highest classes).

The Tantric tradition thus appears as a revelation differing from that of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, and especially as having different rites and practices. It is not necessarily opposed to the Vedic tradition, which it often refers to as authoritative, but differs from it in being more adapted than Vedism to the present age of mankind, and in procuring benefits, worldly or nonworldly, that the other cannot give. Tantric Buddhism also opens up new ways and perspectives, but its relationship to the older doctrine is of another kind in that the status of the teaching of the Buddha, for the Buddhists, is different from that of the Veda for the Hindus. But both Hindu and Buddhist Tantrism can be described as reinterpretations, in a new spirit, of their respective traditions.

The complex and ambiguous relationship of Tantrism to Hinduism generally was not realized at first. Even though some scholars perceived that they themselves were partly responsible for the creation of a new category (Arthur Avalon wrote in 1922 that "the adjective *tantric* is largely a Western term"), they believed Tantrism to be limited and specific enough to be conceived of as only a particular, even a rather exceptional, aspect of Hinduism (or of Buddhism). But the progress of research brought the realization that, far from being exceptional, Tantrism was in fact very widespread and indeed the common property of all the religions of "medieval" India. The first to underline this fact seem to have been Louis Renou and Mircea Eliade; the latter said in *Techniques du Yoga* (Paris, 1948) that "from the fifth century CE onward Tantrism becomes a pan-Indian

'fashion.' One meets it everywhere in innumerable different forms." But if Tantrism is found practically everywhere, how is it to be differentiated from what is not Tantric? Is not Tantrism simply the form taken from a certain period onward by all Indian religions with the exception of a few conservative groups? Though the case of Buddhism differs somewhat from that of Hinduism, it was a student of Buddhism, Herbert Guenther, who called Tantrism "probably one of the haziest notions and misconceptions the Western mind has evolved" (*Life and Teachings of Naropa*, New York, 1971). In a different spirit, Jean Filliozat has considered Tantrism to be "only the ritualistic technical aspect of religion, be it Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Buddhist, or Jain: a treatise on religious architecture is necessarily Tantric" (*Journal asiatique* 256, 1968, pp. 267–268).

These two views, however interesting, are too negative. There is a specific Tantric aspect of Indian religions that, though it is often mixed up inextricably with the rest, does also exist in itself as something more than merely technical and ritual. This appears when one reads the literature, for the texts (Āgamas, Tantras, etc.) often distinguish between their teachings and those of non-Tantric, "Vedic" schools. True, the borderline between Tantric and non-Tantric religious groups in Hinduism is difficult to determine clearly; there are common traits on both sides. Still, one can admit Tantrism as a category of its own and define it generally as a practical path to supernatural powers and to liberation, consisting in the use of specific practices and techniques—ritual, bodily, mental—that are always associated with a particular doctrine. These practices are intrinsically grounded in the doctrine that gives them their aim and meaning and organizes them into a pattern. Elements of the doctrine as well as of practices may also be found elsewhere in Indian religions, but when both are associated and welded into a practical worldview, Tantrism is there.

The doctrinal aspect of Tantrism can be summed up, using Madeleine Biardeau's words, as "an attempt to place *kāma*, desire, in every meaning of the word, in the service of liberation . . . not to sacrifice this world for liberation's sake, but to reinstate it, in varying ways, within the perspective of salvation." This use of *kāma* and of all aspects of this world to gain both worldly and supernatural enjoyments (*bhukti*) and powers (*siddhi*), and to obtain liberation in this life (*jīvanmukti*), implies a particular attitude on the part of the Tantric adept toward the cosmos, whereby he feels integrated within an all-embracing system of micro-macrocosmic correlations. In Hinduism, these correlations, inherited from the Veda, were further developed in the Upaniṣads and culminated with Tantrism in a vast theo-anthropo-

cosmic synthesis. This does not apply to Tantric Buddhism, whose philosophy is different, but both Hindu and Buddhist Tantric share an analogous psycho-mental approach and a number of common practices, all grounded in the idea of using cosmic energy—especially as it is present in the “subtle body” within the adept’s physical one—for transcendental ends, where the attainment of supernatural powers is inseparable from progress toward final release. The conception of energy, *śakti*, is not the same in the two religions, but still, just as the illuminated Buddhist realizes the equivalence of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, so the Hindu Tantric, on attaining liberation in life, will enjoy this world while being free from it because he has realized the true nature of the supreme reality: the realization, the *coincidentia oppositorum*, is of the same type and is in both cases reached through a reversal of some of the traditionally accepted forms of conduct.

There is also in both religions an extraordinary multiplicity of practices, mental, physical, and ritual, in which rites and yoga are inseparable. This ritual proliferation is all the more remarkable as the Buddha expressly condemned all rites and as, in Hinduism, those who renounce the world for salvation are supposed to forsake all ritual. Here, on the contrary, ritual is fundamental. Equally characteristic is a proliferating pantheon, with a marked insistence on terrifying deities whose role is largely linked to the adept’s use of the “lowest” or more “dangerous” human tendencies: lust, anger, and the like. This is found in the *krodhāveśa* (possession by frenzy) of Kālacakra Buddhism, as well as in several antinomian practices of Hinduism. Sexual practices also (which, though important and characteristic, are not the main element in Tantrism) are to be understood in terms of the harnessing of “lower” impulses for “higher” aims. The impulse is here all the more important because it repeats at a human level the activity of the divine couple, whose creative bliss is echoed and possibly even reproduced by the human pair.

The essential role of all aspects of energy, especially in nature and in the human body, may explain the place in Tantrism of traditional medicine and still more of alchemy, which occupies an important place in all Tantric literature, both Buddhist and Hindu.

Tantrism, Buddhist as well as Hindu (and Jain, as there is also a Jain Tantrism, or Tantric elements in Jainism), insists on the role of the spiritual master, a role linked to the emphasis on initiation and secrecy. A Tantric adept is necessarily the initiated disciple of a master and must keep the teaching secret (hence the obscurity of most Tantric texts). This is linked to the sectarian aspect of Tantrism and may help to explain why Tantrism, in all religions, seems always to have been a

matter of small groups, of “active minorities,” to use Louis Renou’s phrase, which usefully suggests the contrast between, on the one hand, the small number of Tantric initiates together with the secrecy imposed upon them, and, on the other hand, the enormous impact of Tantrism on all Indian religions and the mass of its textual and artistic production. But Tantrism, however carefully one may attempt to trace and define it, remains in many respects a puzzle to the scientific mind.

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ANDRÉ PADOUX

Hindu Tantrism

Tantrism is fundamentally a Hindu phenomenon. Although most of its practices and some of its basic notions are found in all Indian religions, and although different factors may have played a role during its commencement and evolution, its developments (insofar as we can conceive them) seem to have resulted mainly from influences, notions, and practices already present, if only in embryo, in Vedic, Brahmanic religion: complex ritual, micro-macrocosmic correlations, even the role of feminine energy, are all part of the ancient orthodox tradition.

Tantrism may be briefly characterized as a practical way to attain supernatural powers and liberation in this life through the use of specific and complex techniques based on a particular ideology, that of a cosmic reintegration by means of which the adept is established in a position of power, freed from worldly fetters, while remaining in this world and dominating it by union with (or proximity to) a godhead who is the supreme power itself. All practices and notions constituting the Tantric way correspond to a particular conception of the deity, polarized as masculine and feminine, and of the universe and man, both imbued with this divine power. Thus it may be said that, for a Tantric adept, the quest

for liberation and the acquisition of supernatural powers result from a tapping, a manipulating of this ubiquitous power.

History. The history of Hindu Tantrism is impossible to write owing to the scarcity of data, especially for the earlier period. Little epigraphical evidence is available, and there are few datable ancient manuscripts, whereas many texts are still awaiting study. Most likely, a number of works remain to be discovered. Moreover, the dates of formation of Tantric groups, sects, or schools and their interrelationships are usually obscure.

The origin of Hindu Tantrism certainly goes back to an ancient store of beliefs and practices. Some sources are to be found in the Vedas (the *Atharvaveda* and *Yajurveda* notably, on magic and the role of speech or phonetic practices), in the *Āraṇyakas* and *Brāhmaṇas*, and in the earlier *Upaniṣads*. This Vedic esotericism was modified and further developed by the adjunction of other elements belonging to autochthonous cults, perhaps Dravidian, certainly an ancient fund whose existence is presumed rather than known. But although we cannot precisely define this fund, we may safely surmise that it existed and played a role in the rise of Hindu Tantrism. Despite these autochthonous and perhaps "popular" roots, Hindu Tantrism cannot be considered a popular form of religion in contrast to a "higher," non-Tantric Hinduism. Indeed, the fact that the main texts are in Sanskrit, and that learned brahmins are among the authors, proves the role played by Brahmanic circles, or at least by the higher castes. Tantrism, in fact, like the whole of Hinduism, has always been divided into practices for the higher and the lower castes. And though renunciates, ascetics, and saints did play an important part in its genesis and development, the fact that these people were on the margins of the Hindu social system does not mean that they were popular figures, still less revolutionaries. Socially speaking, Tantrism, even if theoretically equalitarian (in principle, all, once initiated, have access to its teachings, irrespective of caste or sex), is conservative. Its equalitarianism, like that of *bhakti*, has a ritual, religious scope, not a social one.

Granted that the history of Hindu Tantrism cannot yet be written, the following brief statements may be made:

1. There was no Tantrism in Vedic and Brahmanic times, but merely elements that later evolved and became part of Tantrism. References to the Vedic tradition in Tantric texts must not be taken as proof either of the "Vedic" nature of Tantrism or of direct links with the Veda. Quite likely such references were introduced later to facilitate the acceptance of Tantric texts or sects by orthodox circles.

2. Tantrism as such must have taken shape during the first centuries CE following an internal evolution of Brahmanism: a change whose cause and form escape us, but that can fairly reasonably be attributed in part to an influence of autochthonous elements.
3. Even if the oldest datable documents are Buddhist (they are Chinese, not Indian), Hindu Tantrism, in all likelihood and for several reasons, surely preceded Tantric Buddhism, even if both later interacted.
4. Tantrism appears well established in Hindu India from at least the sixth or seventh century CE. The Gangdhar stone inscription (424 CE) proves that Tantric deities were already worshiped in the fifth century, a period to which some *Āgamas* may possibly belong.

The sixth century and those following were the great creative period during which Hinduism—Purāṇic and Tantric—took shape. Though little precisely datable evidence is available, it is fair to say that the period from the eighth or ninth century to the fourteenth century was a time of flourishing Tantric production, both textual and artistic. The great *Tantras* and *Saṃhitās* and the *Āgamas* date back to that time, as do thinkers such as Abhinavagupta and the great temples of central India. Tantric Hinduism was then in full bloom.

Texts of all sorts, temples, ritual implements, and works of art continued to be produced until the eighteenth century, testifying to the vitality of Hindu Tantrism. It has been remarked that during this period the texts appear to come more and more from Brahmanic official circles. This may be proof of an increasing hold by Tantrism on the traditional centers of Hindu culture and learning. The steady flow of production, textual or otherwise, has continued until the present, but has yielded little of worth. Practically all ritual manuals and booklets on the practice of *pūjā* now sold in India reflect influences of the Tantric cult. This is not surprising, considering that postmedieval sectarian Hinduism has incorporated many of the ideas and practices of Tantrism. Accordingly, much of the Hindu pantheon is composed of Tantric deities. We must note, however, that the majority of sectarian Hindus using these publications do not regard themselves as Tantrists.

Effective practice by Tantric believers has not disappeared from India. In fact, in recent years, with the interest evinced in the West for Tantrism, and with a change in mental attitude among many Indians, a somewhat larger number of people (not only in Bengal) admit to being Tantric. Some periodicals and many books are published on the subject. Some Tantric and Śākta centers are openly active as such, in addition to the other traditional Tantric groups—no doubt more

authentic and effective if less publicized. Hindu Tantrism obviously remains a matter of small groups, but their importance is far from negligible.

Yet despite the prevalence of Tantric ideas and practices in Hinduism, it is unlikely that they ever concerned the majority of Hindus. Tantrics produced an enormous mass of doctrinal, ritual, and technical texts. They elaborated or at least influenced most of the Hindu ritual, both public and, to a lesser extent, private. Their imprint on traditional arts, techniques, and activities was also important (temples are still being built, adorned, and furnished with implements in accordance with the teachings of the Āgamas). In all likelihood, however, most Hindus who practiced or attended such rituals, or visited such temples, were not Tantric. As Tantrism implies effective practice, real practitioners were probably always in a minority. However great the role of Tantrism, however vast its literary output and important its theological and iconographic influence, its concrete, effective, and practical presence in the religious life of Hindus was probably, even in the past, limited to small groups of initiates. That is, although sectarian Hinduism may be said to have become tantricized, the number of true Tantrics has been, and remains, relatively small. Tantrism, despite—or perhaps because of—its insistence on the practical side and on the necessity of actual experience, seems always to have been primarily a matter of texts, secondarily of practicing adepts, and very little of the faithful community.

Geography. It is difficult to situate the dual Indian root—Vedic and autochthonous—of Tantrism in any precise area of India, still less in some region beyond the subcontinent. China, Tibet, and even the Middle East have been suggested as possible places of origin of Tantric ideas, or as having exerted a significant influence on them, but no convincing evidence has been put forward to substantiate this. Admittedly, the frontier areas of Indian civilization, such as Kashmir (or Swat) and Bengal-Assam, have been among the main centers of Tantrism. But so has Kerala. So were also regions such as Madhya Pradesh and Orissa (where the few surviving temples to the Yoginīs are to be found and where cults to the Goddess still seem very active). Among the non-Aryan elements that contributed to the shaping of Hindu Tantrism, some may have come from the shamanic cultures of Central Asia. The importance of the Himalayan region in the subsequent history of Tantric Hinduism, as proved by the cults still practiced there, by the civilization of Nepal, and by the numerous Tantric manuscripts from these parts necessarily implies an influence of the cultures of these northern border regions, but their real impact is not easy to assess.

On the other hand, Tantric Hinduism spread beyond India, especially in Cambodia, as attested by important iconographic and epigraphic evidence. The Sdo-Kak-Thom inscription of 1052 CE, for example, mentions several Tantras as having been introduced into Cambodia in the early ninth century. Tantric practice based on Tantric texts is still followed in Bali.

Sectarian Variations. Tantrism is essentially sectarian. It has always been divided into sects, mutually exclusive and sometimes hostile. The rare religious persecutions in Hindu India were perpetrated by Tantrics. The divisions differ according to the deities worshiped and the ritual practices followed. In this respect, the spirit of Tantrism is opposed to that of *bhakti*, although it, too, possesses the element of devotion.

The main division of sects is made between worshippers of Viṣṇu (Vaiṣṇavas), of Śiva (Śaivas), and of the Goddess (Śāktas), the last two groups being sometimes difficult to distinguish clearly, if only because Śiva and Śakti are metaphysically inseparable and therefore necessarily conceived, even in temples, in some relationship. There are also, or have been, Sauras (worshippers of Sūrya, the Sun) and Gāṇapatyas (worshippers of Gaṇapati, or Gaṇeśa). Among Vaiṣṇavas, the main group is that of the Pāñcarātra, although it does not consider itself Tantric nowadays. At least one other and more extreme group from Bengal, the Vaiṣṇava-Sahajiyās, must be mentioned, with their peculiar erotic mysticism, a related modern form of which can be found with the Bāuls.

Śaiva or Śākta sects are unquestionably Tantric. Among them were such groups as the Kāpālikas and Kalamukhas, or the Nāthas, a notable Śaiva group that transgresses the limits of Hinduism. Most important is the Kula (or Kaula) sect, also found in Buddhism and divided into several subgroups, but its precise nature and scope (sect or school? Śaiva or Śākta?) are difficult to assess. The classification into Śaiva and Śākta groups is generally a difficult matter, for several traditional divisions exist, corresponding to different criteria and impossible to reconcile with one another. Divisions are made between “currents” (*śrotas*), usually three—“right” (*dakṣiṇa*), “left” (*vāma*), and “accepted” (*śiddhānta*)—although sometimes five *śrotas* are mentioned; or between “remembrances” (*āmnāyas*), from five to seven in number; or between “doctrines” or “convictions” (*matas*), corresponding to the methods of worship or to the main deity, for example Kubjikā, Tripurā, Kālī. There is also a more doctrinal division into “teachings” (*śāstras*), such as Pratyabhijñā, Spanda, and Krama of Kashmir Śaivism, or Kula and Vāmakeśvara. But these classification terms are often used loosely. Kula, for instance, is indifferently called *mata*, *śāstra*, or

āmnāya. There exists also a “geographical” division into “steps” (*krantas*), and, finally, the well-known division into “conducts” (*ācāras*): *vāma* and *dakṣiṇa*, “left” and “right,” to which is sometimes added *samaya*. The overall picture is confusing. Further research may perhaps clarify it, although there always were, and still are, isolated ascetics or small groups that do not fit into any classification.

Doctrines. There is no coherent body of Hindu Tantric doctrine. It varies according to sect or school. Some ideological features, however, coupled with particular practices, are characteristic. Āgamas, Tantras, and Saṃhitās are not philosophical works. Even when they include a “section on knowledge,” which one would expect to treat doctrinal matters, one seldom finds there a complete and well-defined system. Some Tantric authors, especially those from Kashmir, did write metaphysical works, but they were of different persuasions, hence the absence of a unified doctrine. Tantric ideology, furthermore, is not original nor does it differ completely from that of non-Tantric Hinduism: it comes from the same source, being largely made up of elements from the classical Indian systems (the Darśanas). Tantric linguistic or metalinguistic speculations depend on those of the Mimāṃsā. The cosmology is based on the categories (*tattvas*) of the Sāṃkhya. There are also elements of Yoga. Tantric metaphysics are of a Vedantic type: dualist, semidualist, or nondualist, though mostly the last, which is more adapted to the Tantric conception of man and the cosmos. If, however, Tantrism has not been very inventive, it has given new meanings to old notions and organized them into a new pattern.

Regarding Tantric doctrine itself, the following remarks may be made. Although the Ultimate transcends all duality, the Godhead is conceived as having two aspects, masculine and feminine, whose conjunction, described as a sexual union, is the first and necessary step, within God, toward cosmic evolution, the active principle being the feminine. In Śākta sects, where the main deity is the Goddess, the feminine element clearly predominates, but in all sects it is energy, *śakti*, which produces, pervades, sustains, and finally reabsorbs the universe. She (Śakti) is thus the ultimate cause of human bondage and liberation. She is *māyā*, cosmic illusion, but is also equated with God’s grace, which is sometimes characteristically called *śaktipāta*, “descent of energy” into the world. Man’s response to grace is devotion, *bhakti*, which plays an important role in many Tantric schools. Though the spirit of Tantrism is in many ways opposed to that of *bhakti*, both can be reconciled and are even promiscuously associated by the Vaiṣṇava-Sahajiyās.

The energetic process giving rise to the world is one

of emanation. It is the outward manifestation, the shining forth, of what exists potentially in the Godhead, starting from the first principle and ending with this world, by a transformation, a condensation, from subtle to gross through a series of stages or cosmic categories (the *tattvas*). These usually number thirty-six, but the count is sometimes more or less, as the *tattvas* added to those twenty-five of the Sāṃkhya are not exactly the same in all Tantric schools. The Pāñcarātra has its own system of the unfolding (*vyūha*) of creation from the supreme Lord, Viṣṇu. In such systems, there is no discontinuity in the cosmic process: a stir, an imperceptible movement, appears within the Absolute and is then transmitted to the lowest levels of creation. When cosmic resorption sets in, the process is reversed and flows back to its source. *Māyā*, in this perspective, is less the great illusion than the mainspring of the infinite diversity of the world, the play of the gods, who manifest the cosmos in a purely gratuitous way. This element of joy and playfulness (*līlā*) may also be found in a non-Tantric context, but is one of the main components of the Hindu Tantric vision. It is especially important in the Kṛṣṇa cults, and is one of the fields where Tantrism and *bhakti* meet.

With such a philosophy, the Tantric adept feels he lives in a world suffused with divine energy, whose elements, even those apparently the humblest, may be used to gain liberation in this life (*jīvanmukti*), a liberation that is not a renunciation but a realization of the plenitude of the world. The Tantric system of microcosmic correspondences is inherent in this conception. The divine cosmic energy is the *prāṇa*, the cosmic “breath” symbolized especially by *kuṇḍalīnī*, which is the Goddess in her cosmic play and as present in the subtle body of man. Divine energy is also the word (*vāc*) or sound (*śabda*). This is very important, as Tantric practices related to the uses of the sounds of language play an essential role. *Vāc* is a fundamental aspect of energy, both the most powerful and effective and the most usable. Some Tantric schools, especially in Kashmir, have worked out a complex cosmogony whereby all levels of the cosmos are manifested just as the letters of the Sanskrit alphabet appear within the deity in their grammatical order. A particular way to liberation corresponds to this phonetic process.

With the universal pervasion of energy, the quest for liberation necessarily involves the use of this power. Consequently, the possession of supernatural powers (*siddhi*) is a normal result of this quest, when successful. Even if the adept does not use them and concentrates on final release, these powers are there. Fully merged in the deity (in nondualist sects), the adept naturally partakes of all divine powers. This adept—often called *sā-*

dhaka ("efficient, skillful")—does not necessarily look for salvation. He may seek enjoyment (perhaps the most normal case, in fact), or he may look for both. All three are legitimate aims for three different types of adepts, though supernatural attainments are always essential.

Practices. Practice is the main aspect of Tantrism. The Tantric course of action is usually called *sādhana*, which means performance leading to a goal. The first step in any practice is initiation (*dikṣā*) into a sect, a ritual sometimes very complex whereby a *mantra* is given secretly to the carefully chosen disciple by his *guru*. Initiation, secrecy, and the necessity of a spiritual master are essential Tantric traits. There are several forms and grades of Tantric initiation, all leading to different results. This *dikṣā*, with its consequent practices, is distinct from the initiation (Upanayana), with its consequent duties, of all twice-born male Hindus. It can theoretically be given to anyone irrespective of caste and sex. To ensure secrecy, Tantric texts use an elaborate symbolism and often a coded language. The most characteristic practices are those associated with the use of sacred and ritual formulas, *mantras* and *bījas* (phonic "germs"). These linguistic or phonetic elements—sentences, words, letters, sounds—symbolize spiritual entities and are believed to embody the very power of the main deity. Such formulas are used at all times and in all types of Tantric practice, initiatic and religious rites as well as usual duties or activities. There is no life for a Tantric adept (nor of any Hindu, but this is a Tantric trait) without *mantras*. Indeed, *mantraśāstra*, the teaching of *mantras*, is often taken as meaning *tantraśāstra*, the teaching of the Tantras.

Mantras are often accompanied by diagrams (*maṇḍalas*, *yantras*, or *cakras*); geometrical cosmic symbols used for ritual and meditation. Symbolic gestures (*mudrās*) expressing metaphysical or theological concepts are also used in most ritual practices.

Mantras, *yantras*, and the like must be assimilated spiritually by the adept and put into practice by way of a complex and often long process that is usually both physical and mental. Such are the *mantrasādhana* serving to master a *mantra* and the practices of Tantric yoga. These depend on the Tantric conception of *śakti* and micro-macrocosmic correlations. They usually consist in awakening, with the help of *mantras*, the *kuṇḍalinī* energy that lies dormant, coiled like a (female) serpent in the subtle body of the adept, and leading her up to the point where she unites with the Supreme while the adept merges into the Ultimate. This is done through *haṭhayoga* methods combining bodily postures and control of breathing with mental exercises leading ultimately to *samādhi* (enstasis) and realization of the essence of the *mantra* and of the deity. Mental exercises

are mainly *dhyāna*, which here means precise visualizations of the centers of the subtle body (the *cakras*) and of deities residing within or without them. The main and highest means to such a goal is *bhāvanā*, an intense meditation that brings into existence the subject of meditation: a deity, a cosmic entity, a state of consciousness. All this results in spiritual union with a deity, identification of the individual's mind and body with cosmic entities, and physical and mental integration into the cosmos. There is thus a "mystical physiology" that "cosmizes" the body, as well as a "mystical geography," traditional places of pilgrimage being integrated within. The resulting transformation of the body image changes the attitude of the adept to himself and to the world.

The assignment of various parts of the body, physical or subtle, to *mantras* and other entities in order to divinize them, follows a ritual technique using *dhyāna*, *mantra*, and *mudrā*, called *nyāsa* ("setting down, placing"). *Mantras* are used for every goal, whether mystical, magical, or ritual. They are used in ritual curing in Tantric medicine (still practiced now) or for alchemy (important in Tantrism) or astrology.

Among the powers of a Tantric adept are the "six actions" (*ṣaṭkarmāṇi*) whereby it is possible, with *mantras* and rites, to appease, fascinate, bind, drive away, create enmity, kill, and so on. However typical of Tantrism magic may appear to be, it is not by far its main aspect. Nevertheless, in modern India especially, Tantrics are commonly considered magicians or sorcerers and are mostly disapproved of. This is also largely due to the antinomian practices to which they sometimes resort. Tantric doctrine justifies the use of all aspects of life to attain salvation or powers. Hence the use of physical and mental techniques to deviate cravings and impulses—especially the sexual impulse—toward different aims. Hence the use of alcoholic beverages, which enhances energy and shows that the adept transcends normal rules. Hence also repulsive or frightening practices that prove the Tantric is above fear and disgust and is able to use the lowest objects for the highest aims. However, though these practices are part and parcel of Hindu Tantrism, their importance should not be exaggerated. All practices are acted in a ritual context. The whole of Hindu life, in fact, is ritualized, and this ritual is either Tantric or tantricized. This is particularly true of the worship or cult (*pūjā*) of divinities.

The Tantric *pūjā* is not only the worship of a god or goddess. It is the transformation (played out rather than mystically effected) of the worshiper into that deity—a transformation deemed indispensable, for "only a god may worship a god." Several rites lead to this "change of ontological status." *Dhyāna*, *mantra*, *nyāsa*, and

mudrā transform the worshiper's body into a divine one. A "purification of the elements" (*bhūtaśuddhi*) and a replacement of the limited self (*ātman*) by that of the deity are undergone. This is followed by an "inner sacrifice" (*antaryāga*), an exercise in Tantric yoga whereby the deity is experienced as being present in the adept's body and all the customary services of the cult are imagined and visualized as offered to it there. Then comes the "external" worship. This may be done with an image, although a diagram may be preferred. First it is drawn according to ritual; then the main deity and attendant deities are visualized and mentally placed on the diagram and are instilled with the *prāṇa* that will make them fit for worship. This "breath" or energy is often conceived as springing from the heart of the previously deified worshiper. *Nyāsa* (there can be up to thirty series of *nyāsas* in a *pūjā*), *dhyāna*, and repetitions of *mantras* (*japa*) are used. Yoga and mantric practices are integral parts of Tantric worship.

Not always present but typical is the use of the "five elements" (*pañcatattva*) in this worship: alcohol, meat, fish (the second and third elements imply animal sacrifices), *mudrā* (usually parched grains), and sexual intercourse (*maithuna*). The first four items are offered to the deity, then partaken of by the worshiper. The last one is, or can be, a ritual sexual union with a woman previously initiated and "transformed" by *nyāsa* and such rites. This may also take place in a collective worship called *cakrapūjā*, "cult made in a ring," where the rite is performed by participants arranged in a ring, in pairs of male and female. This is considered very secret and is reserved for higher initiates. A woman or girl may also be worshiped (*kumārīpūjā*) as a form of the Goddess, with or without sexual union. The female organ (*yoni*) is in such case equated with the Vedic altar on which the male seed is the offering. Another "secret" worship is done with a corpse. It is used to achieve particular goals, usually evil. *Pūjās* made with a special intent (*kāmyapūjā*) may be used for black magic (especially the "six actions") but can also serve any other end, good or bad: *śakti* as such has no moral connotation. Though sexual symbolism is encountered everywhere and magic is part of the Tantric vision, none of these rites is a compulsory part of Tantric practice.

Pantheon. Several features of the Hindu pantheon (which has continued to evolve throughout the centuries) are Tantric in form or nature. No complete and systematic study of the Tantric pantheon, as distinct from the epic and Puranic ones, seems to have been carried out so far. Nevertheless, it can be said to be marked by a proliferation of deities emanating from a main supreme god—Viṣṇu, Śiva, the Goddess—in a complex hierarchy wherein feminine entities are especially numer-

ous and even predominant, as befits a system in which the whole cosmic process is the work of the feminine energy (*śakti*) in her different forms. The importance in Hinduism of terrifying deities may also be attributed to Tantric influence. The myths and legends of these deities, particularly those of the Goddess in her various aspects, are present in a considerable part of the Tantric texts.

Deities are all the more numerous as the main gods have several forms and secondary divinities sometimes emanate from them in long series. Even the attributes, qualities, or aspects of the different deities are divinized. Śiva, for instance, has various aspects and names: Sadāśiva, Bhairava, Maheśvara, Kāmeśvara, and so on. He is said to have five "faces," each being also a divine form. He holds at least four attributes or "weapons" and has six "limbs"; all are deified. The energies emanating from him through Śakti, starting with Vāmā, Jyeṣṭhā, Raudrī, and Ambikā (there are still others), are goddesses, who engender other deities. Entities can thus multiply almost indefinitely. Similarly, a number of divinities emanate from Viṣṇu through the agency of his *śakti*, starting with the four *vyūhas*: Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. He, too, has Tantric forms, such as Hayagrīva. The main aspect of Śiva in the Āgamas is Sadāśiva; in the Tantras, it is Bhairava. A curious composite form of Sūrya (the sun god) and Viṣṇu is Mārtaṇḍa-Bhairava. In the Āgamas and Tantras, Sūrya is a form of Śiva. Gaṇeśa is also important in the Tantric pantheon.

The Goddess, omnipresent in higher as in "popular" Hinduism, appears under several forms and names. Her nature being ambivalent, some forms are benevolent, such as Gaurī, Umā, and Pārvatī; others are terrifying, such as Durgā or Kālī. She is worshiped as supreme goddess under several names: Tripurā, Kubjikā, Mālinī, and others. As the *śakti* of Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa, she is Śrī or Lakṣmī. She is also manifested in many other ways, all of which constitute forms, or her "emanations" (i.e., like rays emanating from the sun), at different levels of cosmic energy. Her various cosmic activities are accomplished through these aspects, some of which can be her supreme form in certain schools. Such are the sixteen *nityās*, one of which is Tripurasundarī, the main deity of the Tripurā school. Or the ten Mahāvīdyās: Kālī, Tārā, and others. In the Krama school, there exists a "wheel" of twelve Kālīs in charge of the different cosmic processes. Mention should also be made of the Mothers (Mātr) numbering seven, eight, or nine. The fifty "Little Mothers" (Mātrkā) are deities of the Sanskrit phonemes over which preside also the eight Mothers. There are usually sixty-four Yoginīs, powerful and often terrible, forming a circle, or circles, around Śiva

or Bhairava. Their number varies, however, sometimes reaching 640 million. All these are found in Śaiva and Śākta contexts, but very similar deities or divinized forms of energy playing analogous cosmic roles exist in the Pāñcarātra.

There are corresponding hierarchies for male gods, if only because in Tantric Hinduism deities always come in couples, so as to be able to create. This abundance sometimes results from the division of one entity into several others. Such, for instance, is the case of the eight Bhairavas (Asitaṅga, Ruru, Unmatta, etc.), who, together with Śiva, are often associated with the nine Durgās (Navadurgā). The Rudras (gods of Vedic origin, in fact), who normally number ten or eleven, can also be fifty and then become male deities of the alphabet, coupled with the Mātṛkās. There are also 118 Rudras. The Gaṇas, or Gaṇeśas, headed by Gaṇeśa or Vinayaka, elephant-headed gods, are associated, together with their śaktis, with the fifty pīṭhas, the places of pilgrimage marked by the parts of the dismembered body of Satī, Śiva's consort. The Gaṇas are also associated with the Sanskrit phonemes, which are also linked with fifty Viṣṇus. Although the *mantras* (sometimes said to number seventy million) are primarily ritual and mystical formulas, they are also considered gods, and then Lords of Mantras (Mantreśvara) and Great Lords (Mantramaheśvara) are added to the pantheon. Also divinized are the ritual gestures (*mudrās*) or the supernatural powers (*siddhis*) and even the three daily acts of worship (*sandhyās*). All these entities are often said to be distributed in concentric rings (especially in cosmic diagrams such as the *śricakra*) surrounding in hierarchical order the main deity at the center. A host of godlings, spirits, demons, ghosts (*piśāca*, *vetala*, *preta*, *bhūta*), and the like play inferior but not unimportant roles in the religious and still more in the magical beliefs and practices of Tantric Hinduism.

[For a discussion of the literature of Hindu Tantrism, see Hindu Tantric Literature. For a discussion of Tantric elements in Śaiva thought, see Śaivism; for Tantric elements in Vaiṣṇava thought, see Vaiṣṇavism, article on Pāñcarātras. For further discussion of related topics, see Goddess Worship, article on The Hindu Goddess; Cakras; Kuṇḍalīnī; Maṇḍala, article on Hindu Maṇḍalas; Mudrā; and Mantra.]

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ANDRÉ PADOUX

T'AN-YAO (mid-fifth century CE), Chinese Buddhist monk and central figure in the revival of Buddhism after its suppression by the Northern Wei dynasty (385–534). Little is known about the early life of T'an-yao except that he was eminent monk in the non-Chinese Pei Liang kingdom (397–439, in what is now Kansu Province) before it was conquered by another non-Chinese kingdom, the Northern Wei.

As was the case in many of the northern dynasties, Buddhism was popular among the rulers of the Northern Wei. Thus when T'an-yao arrived in the Northern

Wei capital of P'ing-cheng (modern Ta-t'ung), he found allies among the many Buddhists at the imperial court, the most prominent of whom was Crown Prince Huang. But Huang's father, the reigning emperor T'ai-wu-ti, came under the influence of an anti-Buddhist clique led by the Taoist adept K'ou Ch'ien-chih and the Taoist literatus Ts'ui Hao, both openly hostile toward Buddhism. In 446 the emperor instituted a series of repressive measures against Buddhism, culminating in the issuance of an edict for its wholesale proscription. [See the biography of K'ou Ch'ien-chih.]

The guiding hand behind the edict, which among other things ordered the execution of every monk in the realm, was Ts'ui Hao, who effected it by taking advantage of the emperor's fury upon discovering a cache of weapons in a monastery in the city of Ch'ang-an, a fact that the emperor took to be evidence of Buddhist complicity in a rebellion he had only recently suppressed. Other officials at court, including K'ou Ch'ien-chih, presented memorials urging the amelioration of the harshest points of the edict, thus delaying its actual promulgation and allowing monks time to flee or return to lay life, T'an-yao resisted giving up the robe until the concerned crown prince convinced him of the prudence of this action, but he nevertheless maintained the sacerdotal paraphernalia in secret.

K'ou Ch'ien-chih died in 448, and in 450 Ts'ui Hao was executed along with his entire clan for including unsavory aspects from the lives of the emperor's ancestors in the official history of the dynasty that he had been commissioned to write. With the passing of this duo, anti-Buddhist strictures began to relax. But full restoration occurred only after the assassination, by a eunuch, of T'ai-wu-ti in 454 and the accession of his grandson, Wen-ch'eng-ti.

Buddhism had been subject to state control since the beginning of the dynasty, when Emperor T'ai-tsu granted the Chinese monk Fa-kuo the official title of *tao-jen t'ung* ("director of monks"). In that capacity Fa-kuo set a precedent in Chinese Buddhist history by identifying the emperor with the Tathāgata and requiring monks to bow down to him, an act in clear violation of monastic precedent. The *tao-jen t'ung*, which was abolished with the proscription of Buddhism, was revived with the restoration under a new name—the *chien-fu ts'ao* ("office to oversee merits"), a name later changed to *chao-hsüan ssu* ("office to illumine the mysteries")—and presided over by a Kashmiri called Shih-hsien. The new office was the center of a network, more finely woven than ever before, of governmental control over religious affairs.

T'an-yao was Shih-hsien's successor and held the

post, now called the *sha-men t'ung* ("office of the *śramaṇa* superintendent"), for more than twenty years. It was he who took advantage of the augmented interpenetration of government and religion to expand and glorify the Buddhist church.

One of his first important accomplishments was to convince the new emperor, who was anxious to reverse the karmic effects of his grandfather's crimes, to undertake the costly project of chiseling into the walls of the Yün-kang caves (a few miles west of the capital) massive images of Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, works still considered some of the greatest achievements of Chinese Buddhist art. The first group of caves (nos. 16–20 on modern charts) contains five Buddhas, one seventy feet tall, representing the first two emperors of the dynasty; the then-reigning emperor Wen-ch'eng-ti; his father, Crown Prince Huang (who never reigned); and the infamous T'ai-wu-ti. The association of the imperial family with Buddhism could not have been represented in more intimate terms.

Another step taken by T'an-yao to expand the influence of Buddhism was the establishment of Saṃgha Households (*seng-chi hu*) and Buddha Households (*fo-t'u hu*). A Saṃgha Household was a voluntary association of a certain number of families responsible for paying sixty bushels of grain to the local branch of the *sha-men t'ung*. That office then stored the grain for distribution to the poor in times of famine. Those Saṃgha Households faithfully fulfilling their responsibility were exempted from taxation.

Buddha Households consisted of a group chosen from among criminals or slaves who as bondsmen of the monastery had the responsibility of cultivating its fields and maintaining its buildings and grounds. With numerous monasteries under construction under T'an-yao's leadership, amnesty after amnesty was granted to provide them with Buddha Households.

The Saṃgha Households and the Buddha Households were important for other reasons as well. On the one hand, they served the state by opening up new lands for cultivation during the years when war-induced underpopulation left so much land uncultivated that there were frequent famines. They also lightened the government's burden of supporting prisoners. On the other hand, they provided the church with a source of revenue and a pool of potential converts.

In addition to his many administrative accomplishments, T'an-yao also translated scripture. His translations of the *Samyuktaratnapīṭaka Sūtra* (*Tsa pao-ts'ang ching*), completed with the assistance of Indian monks in 462, and the compilation *Fu fa-ts'ang yin-yüan chuan*, both containing many stories in the Jātaka and

Avadāna genres, provided edifying themes for sculptors working in the Yün-kang caves.

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MIYAKAWA HISAYUKI

TAO-AN (312-385), also known as Shih Tao-an, Chinese Buddhist monk, scholar, and gifted exegete whose organizational abilities and doctrinal acumen helped shape the direction of early Chinese Buddhism. Tao-an was born to a family of literati in what is now Hopei Province in North China. He became a novice at the age of twelve. In 335 he journeyed to Yeh (Hopei Province), the new capital of the Later Chao kingdom, where he studied with Fo-t'u-teng (d. 348), the thaumaturge-monk whose magical prowess and success at predicting the outcome of battle had served to recommend Buddhism to the non-Chinese rulers of the kingdom. With the death of Shih Hu, then ruler of the Later Chao, in 349, Tao-an left Yeh and began a peripatetic career in North China that was to last until 365, when he was forced by war to flee south to Hsiang-yang (Hupei Province). During this period he gathered around himself an ever-growing band of disciples and developed the scholarly and organizational skills for which he is esteemed.

Tao-an's interests during the period 349-365 were conditioned by the pronounced orientation of the Buddhism of North China around primarily Hinayanistic techniques of meditation designed to advance the practitioner through successively rarefied transic states (Skt., *dhyāna*; Chin., *ch'an*). The enumeration of these states constituted the topic of several *sūtras* introduced to China in the second century CE by the Parthian translator An Shih-kao. During his time in the North, Tao-an wrote commentaries to no fewer than six of An Shih-kao's translations, remarking at one point that the study of *dhyāna* categories constituted "the very pivot of the religious life." That the practice of the techniques described in An Shih-kao's translations occupied a central role in the community of monks gathered around Tao-an can scarcely be doubted.

This interest in some of the earliest products of the interaction between India and China may reflect something of the growing historiographical and text-critical concerns that would become the hallmark of Tao-an's later years. His biographies emphasize his concern lest the meaning of the scriptures be obscured by the translation process or by the efforts of well-meaning exegetes to couch Buddhist ideas in "equivalent" Chinese terms bearing only a nominal relationship to the original Sanskrit. Like no one before him in the history of Chinese Buddhism, Tao-an recognized that profound differences separated the original teachings of the scriptures from the hermeneutical framework devised for them in China. In light of this, he undertook his own program of textual exegesis, including careful notation of the history of various texts in China, and formally repudiated a prevailing method of textual interpretation known as *ko-i* ("matching meanings"), under which numerical categories from the scriptures were paired with terms from secular literature.

The year 365 found Tao-an in Hsiang-yang with an entourage of over four hundred disciples. Once there he moved quickly to establish a monastic center and to forge links with the local government and aristocracy that would ensure its institutional stability. Aware of the difficulties in regulating monastic life in the absence of a complete translation of the Vinaya, or monastic rules, he promulgated a series of ordinances of his own devising. These appear to have treated the daily regimen of the monks and their observance of the Uposadha (Pali, Uposatha), or fortnightly confessional ceremony.

But the distinguishing feature of Tao-an's fifteen-year stay in Hsiang-yang was his shift in attention from *dhyāna* texts and practices to the Mahāyāna Prajñāpāramitā ("perfection of wisdom") literature. Although there is evidence that he had become acquainted with these *sūtras* prior to 365, the years in Hsiang-yang were characterized by a radical reorganization of his religious interests: six of Tao-an's commentaries from this period are devoted to the Prajñāpāramitā literature. He is also said to have lectured twice yearly on the *Fangkuang ching*, Moksala's translation (291 CE) of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* in twenty-five thousand *slokas*. It is as an outgrowth of this interest in speculations on *prajñāpāramitā* that he is credited with establishing the "teaching of original nonbeing" (*pen-wu tsung*), one of seven so-called *prajñā* traditions that flourished in China during the fourth and fifth centuries. From the scant evidence remaining to us, Tao-an's teaching appears to have emphasized the existence of an underlying substrate (*pen-wu*) that stands to phenomena (*mo-yu*) as both fundamental substance and source. By focusing the mind in meditation upon this radically

other, "empty" absolute, Tao-an taught, release from phenomenal existence can be won.

Two other hallmarks of Tao-an's stay at Hsiang-yang bear mentioning. The first is his compilation, in 374, of the first critical catalog of Chinese Buddhist texts. As a culmination of his lifelong interest in the fidelity of the sources available to the Chinese, the *Tsung-li chung-ching mu-lu* (Comprehensive Catalog of the Collected Scriptures) became a model for all future works of this sort. Tao-an personally inspected each of the more than six hundred works in the catalog, laboriously copied the colophons, where available, and scrupulously passed judgment on the authenticity of the information given there. The other noteworthy feature of Tao-an's career in Hsiang-yang is his inauguration of a cult to the *bodhisattva* Maitreya. In this cult, clearly the model for his disciple Hui-yüan's own Amitābha confraternity (402 CE), Tao-an and seven other devotees gathered before an image of Maitreya and collectively vowed to be reborn in Tuṣita Heaven, the abode of the *bodhisattva* prior to his rebirth in this world. His biography relates how, in a miraculous visitation to Tao-an shortly before his death, Maitreya vouchsafed to him a vision of Tuṣita. [See Maitreya.]

The final era of Tao-an's career began in 379 when Fu Chien, ruler of the Former Ch'in kingdom, laid siege to Hsiang-yang. In the aftermath of the capitulation of the city Tao-an was brought to Ch'ang-an to preside over a monastic community several times larger than that at Hsiang-yang. With Fu Chien's restoration of Chinese hegemony over Central Asia, Ch'ang-an was once again the eastern terminus of a trade and information network that stretched through Chinese Turkistan, beyond the Hindu Kush, and into India itself. In the final years of Tao-an's life a number of important missionaries and translators arrived in Ch'ang-an from the "Western Regions," especially from Kashmir, where the Sarvāstivāda community was exceptionally strong. They brought with them texts that gradually began to fill the lacunae in the canon so lamented by Tao-an. The *Ekottara* and *Mādhyama Āgamas*, the *Jñānaprasthāna* (the central work in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Piṭaka), and important sections of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya were all introduced at this time. As head of an officially sponsored translation bureau, Tao-an advised the translation team in matters of style (Tao-an, of course, knew no Sanskrit), and composed prefaces to some of the texts. His classic guidelines for translators, consisting, formulaically, of five parameters for changing the text (*wu shih-pen*) and three conditions under which deviation from the original was not encouraged (*san pu-i*), date from this period.

Tao-an's influence over the exegetical and biblio-

graphical traditions of Chinese Buddhism during its formative years can scarcely be overestimated. As the first Buddhist on Chinese soil to confront the problem of understanding Buddhist texts on their own terms, free from the conceptual distortions imposed on them by their association with indigenous thought, Tao-an brought to the young church a new measure of maturity. He is also significant for having combined in a single career the emphasis on pietism and *dhyāna* practices characteristic of the Buddhism of North China with the gnostic speculations of Prajñāpāramitā and *hsüan-hsüeh* thought that engaged the Buddhist thinkers of the South. That Buddhism emerged with the doctrinal and institutional autonomy that it did during the fifth century is attributable in no small measure to Tao-an's efforts.

[See also the biographies of Hui-yüan and Kumārajīva.]

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MARK D. CUMMINGS

TAO AND TE, the "way" and "virtue," respectively, are basic Chinese philosophical concepts. The ninth-century poet and Confucianist Han Yü begins his *Yüan-tao* (The Origin of the Way) with the statement that "tao and te are empty marks, while jen and i [often translated as "benevolence" and "righteousness"] are terms

with fixed content"; by this he meant that the meanings of the words *tao* and *te* vary greatly from one school of thought to another, and in particular that they have meanings for Taoists that are quite different from their Confucian meanings. [See also Jen and I.] The binom *tao-te* in modern Chinese means "morality." When the two terms were first systematically linked, however, probably in Taoist thinking of the third century BCE, as in the title of the Taoist classic *Tao-te ching* (Classic of Tao and Te), the sense of the terms was entirely different. I shall first examine the evolution of the meaning of each term in antiquity, and then show how and why they are conjoined.

The term *te* is by far the older of the two. It has been identified in the earliest oracle inscriptions on bone and shell, dating to about 1200 BCE (Jao, 1976; Nivison, 1978–1979). Here it appears already to have a sense, important later, denoting a psychic quality of the king that is approved by the spirits and that gives him influence or prestige. (The graph also has a verbal use, perhaps to display or apply this quality; other scholars argue that in this use it is not read *te* and must mean "inspect.") The word also meant "generosity," or "to admire someone for his generosity"; elsewhere I have argued that the philosophical-religious sense of moral goodness and psychic force ("moral force" is Waley's translation) derives from the sociopsychological compulsion to return a gift in kind (Nivison, 1978–1979). In this transaction the recipient identifies his own compulsion to respond as a psychic hold that the generous person has on him, this being his *te*. (For a different view, see Munro, 1969.)

In the earliest literary texts *te* denotes an energy in the ruler that enables him to found or continue a dynasty. The theory was that T'ien (Heaven), surveying the world and finding the people suffering from disorder, conferred its *ming* ("mandate") on the man of greatest *te* ("virtue"), whose subsequent success both attested and realized Heaven's choice. [See T'ien.] The *te* of the dynastic founder was believed to continue in his line, eventually diminishing in strength until it could no longer sustain the dynasty. Early Chou-dynasty texts insist that a dynasty's demise is not fated, however; the ruler forfeits his right by failing in his religious duty to "care for his virtue" (*ching te*; see, e.g., *Shang shu* 32, "Shao kao") through restraint and ritual correctness. The paradigmatic "bad last ruler," as depicted in the *Shang shu*, is one who has lost his *te* (or has evil *te*), a condition that results in, and perhaps also is caused by, typical misbehavior: sensual indulgence, heeding the advice of evil (especially female) favorites, harsh government, and neglect of the religious rites.

In contrast, a ruler with *ming te* ("shining virtue") has

just the opposite characteristics. As idealized by Confucius, the ruler who "governs by virtue" rules without effort (*Lun-yü* 2.1). He does not need to use punishment to gain obedience; the wisest men are eager to serve him, knowing that he will heed their advice. They would flee a bad ruler, however, unwilling to seem to approve of his rule by taking part in it. This conception of kingship explains why local rulers pretending to be "kings" in the last century of the Chou dynasty eagerly showered attention on philosophers like Meng-tzu, Tsou Yen, and Hsün-tzu; they wished to project the appearance, at least, of being kings who had *te*. Meng-tzu's long conversation with King Hsüan of Ch'i (c. 319 BCE) on the cultivation of innate compassion opens with the king's question, "What kind of virtue [*te*] does one need to be king?" (This conversation shows, incidentally, that the concept of *te* leads directly to self-cultivation ethics.)

The result is a paradox: the ruler who needs to be straightened out lacks good counsel and would not listen if he had it, while the one who has good counselors and is wise enough to recognize their wisdom and listen to them is the one who is "virtuous" already. As the concept of *te* becomes more recognizably "virtue," which all men may have, it leads to a persistent difficulty in moral philosophy, the question of how virtue is to be imparted to the person who lacks it. The problem exasperated Confucius (e.g., *Lun-yü* 5.9; 6.10); subsequent philosophers had various solutions (Meng-tzu, notably, in his famous principle of the goodness of human nature).

Another paradox arises not from the aspect of *te* as moral virtue but from its aspect as psychic force. The man with *te* has prestige, effectiveness, and status—things men desire. However, in order to acquire and strengthen *te* one must be self-denying, sincerely generous, and so forth. Therefore, efforts to gain *te* in this sense must be self-defeating, unless one seems to be trying to avoid it. This understanding of *te* underlies, for example, battles of politeness. It also figures prominently in Taoist texts, for instance, "The one of highest *te* does not [display/seek] *te*; therefore he has *te*" (*Tao-te ching* 38). The sure sign of perfect *te* is seeming to be unimpressive.

From "moral character," good or bad, *te* comes to be the essential character of anything, effective in its causal interactions with other things. Thus, Confucius can say that "the *te* of the ruler is wind; that of the people is grass" (*Lun-yü* 12.19); and the causal theory of *wu hsing* ("five elements") is also called the theory of *wu te* ("five powers"). So, also, in the *Tso chuan*, a girl's sexual attractiveness is her *te* (*Tso chuan*, Hsi 24.2).

Tao means a road or pathway; it has no other sense

in the earliest texts. By the time of the Eastern Chou dynasty (770–256 BCE) it comes to mean the correct or natural way something is done; verbally, it also meant “show the way,” or “guide,” hence “teaching” or “doctrine,” and so “moral truth.” Thus the *Lun-yü* speaks of “the *tao* of the ancient kings,” says a state “has the *tao*” if it is well-governed, says that a gentleman “devotes himself to the *tao*,” and speaks of people as “not having the same *tao*” if they adhere to different principles. Any philosophical school could use the word *tao* in these ways (which was perhaps part of what Han Yü was pointing out).

From “a way” to “a way to do” something, to “the way to do” that thing, to “the way to do” things of highest importance, such as conducting oneself morally or governing the world, *tao* comes to mean “the way the whole universe operates,” whether actually or ideally. Ultimately, it is the underlying order or law that makes the universe operate in the way it does, or simply, its being so, “nature” itself in a universal sense. This is the sense of the word in later Chou dynasty philosophies called “Taoist”; in this type of thought the *tao* so conceived becomes the object of religious awe: the ultimate reality behind or “in” ourselves and everything we experience. The religious goal of the philosophical Taoist is to grasp this fact (necessarily intuitively, for any account of it would itself fall within the *tao* being accounted for). One who has this insight will see that death itself, as but one more change within the scope of the *tao* that includes himself and everything, is to be regarded with equanimity, as Chuang-tzu (fl. late fourth century BCE) often insists.

The Taoist’s *tao* can be thought of as an undifferentiated first cause (in its aspect as “that which is without name,” it is, according to the *Tao-te ching*, “the beginning of Heaven and earth”), or, non-temporally, as undifferentiated stuff out of which all nameable things are articulated. It is more typically conceived as instantiated in the various individual things and processes of the natural world, accounting for their being what they are. One important point must be added here, however. The Taoist makes a sharp distinction between what is “of Heaven,” or natural, and what is “of man,” that is, the contrived and intentional intrusion of the human mind into nature. Their *tao* excludes the latter as artificial; hence, they insist that the *tao* is “non-activity” (*wu-wei*), the absence of intentional human action.

It is at this point that *tao* and *te* are joined. The history of the concept of *te* prepared the way for this development. In the Shang-dynasty inscriptions and early literary texts, Heaven, or sometimes the ancestors, recognize and “approve” the *te* of the sacrificer, preferring the “fragrance” of his *te* to that of the offerings (e.g.,

Shang shu 30). The good king observes a religious duty to “care for” the *te* in himself, which thus seems to be something other than himself, a psychic entity implanted in him by Heaven (which thus both gives virtue and rewards one for having it—a familiar religious puzzle). Confucius explicitly says that “Heaven created the *te* in me” (*Lun-yü* 7.23). *Te* thus seems to be a fragment of the divine in the individual psyche; to the extent that it is a person’s “character,” it is the divine determinant of what the person will be. Meng-tzu talks similarly of the *hsing* (“human nature”): “If one knows his nature then he knows Heaven” (*Meng-tzu* 7A.1).

A thing’s *te*, therefore, in a nonmoral sense (but one must not forget that the Taoist is a moralist: he thinks that a thing ought to be what it “naturally” is) is a chip, so to speak, of Heaven in the individual, determining what it is. However, in late Chou-dynasty thought, especially Taoist thought, “Heaven” is replaced by, or becomes synonymous with, *tao*. A partly Taoist miscellany of the third century BCE, the *Kuan-tzu*, makes this explicit; the argument is interestingly philological:

Te is the localization of *tao*. It is what a thing gets when it comes into being, and coming into being gets so as to function according to the subtlest requirements of the *tao*. Thus *te*, “virtue,” is *te*, “to get.” What it refers to is what a thing gets in order to be what it is. “Non-action” is what we mean by *tao*, and “localization of it” [in the thing] is what we mean by *te*. For this reason there is no gap between *tao* and *te*, and in speaking of them we do not separate them.

(*Kuan-tzu*, “Hsin shu,” part A)

This linking of *tao* and *te* lies behind the title and organization of the *Tao-te ching*, probably a late Chou dynasty collection of Taoist sayings and hymns that is traditionally ascribed to Lao-tzu, supposedly a person of the sixth century BCE.

Since in Confucian thought one has the *tao* if one knows the *li* (“rites,” in the broadest sense of the word), both knowing what they are and knowing how to observe them, and one has *te*, “virtue,” if one’s conduct is actually good, there comes to be a similar essence/instantiation relation between *tao* and *te* in ethics. It was thus natural for the combination *tao-te* to be used to translate the Western term “morality” in modern Chinese.

In later philosophy and religion, self-cultivation ethics becomes ever more important. Even so, the term *tao* overshadows the term *te*, and not only among Taoists. The Neo-Confucian metaphysical systems identify *li*, the “principle” of all nature and also the “principles” of diverse things and institutions, with *tao*, again thought of as being instantiated in individual embodiments or “vessels” (*ch’i*). The most significant development in

this line of thought is the implicit rejection of the Taoist "Heaven-man" distinction, which already occurs in late antiquity. When Hsün-tzu writes "He who governs the people marks the Way (*tao*) . . . ; rites are the markers" and "The ten thousand beings are only one corner of the Way" (Watson, 1963, p. 87), he is appropriating Chuang-tzu's sense of *tao* and extending it. His *tao* is realized equally in the orderly movement of the stars, the sequence of the seasons, the historically given and validated rules (*li*) of all human intercourse, and the order of all nature, non-human and human. [See Li]. This concept of the *tao* is a commonplace in all later Confucian ethics and metaphysics. We find it again in a famous line by the Han metaphysician Tung Chung-shu (fl. second century BCE), "The great source of the *tao* [i.e., the source of man] comes from Heaven." One notable consequence in philosophy is that a clear distinction between descriptive laws of nature and prescriptive rules of morality, between what is and what ought to be, cannot be made. When something like this distinction is formulated in later times, it is conceived as two different aspects of the same principle of regularity.

[See especially Chinese Religion, overview article; Confucian Thought; and Taoism, overview article.]

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TAO-CH'Ō (562–645), known in Japan as Dōshaku; Chinese pioneer of Pure Land Buddhism in East Asia. Tao-ch'ō advocated devotion to Amitābha Buddha and rebirth in his Pure Land as the only practice in our age that would guarantee salvation. Although Pure Land devotion was popular among most Mahāyāna Buddhists as a supplementary practice, Tao-ch'ō followed T'an-luan (c. 488–c. 554) in regarding it as necessary for salvation. Other forms of Buddhism he branded as the "path of the sages" (*sheng-tao*), too difficult to practice during these times. [See the biography of T'an-luan.]

Living in the Ping-chou area of Shansi Province during a period of war, famine, and a religious crisis caused in part by the overwhelming demands Indian Buddhist texts made on their practitioners, Tao-ch'ō was the first Pure Land thinker to proclaim that the ten-thousand-year historical period predicted by the scriptures for the final decline of Buddhism (i.e., the *mo-fa*; Jpn., *mappō*) was at hand. Accordingly, he deemed traditional practices inadequate since no one could attain enlightenment based on self-effort. For Tao-ch'ō, the only hope was through outside help. He preached that the *Wu-liang-shou ching* (the *Larger Sukhāvativyūha Sūtra*) was designed for this period and that reliance on the compassionate vows of the Buddha Amitābha, which guarantee people of ordinary religious capacities rebirth in his Pure Land and speedy and painless enlightenment there, was the only soteriologically effective action remaining.

After his conversion to Pure Land in 609, Tao-ch'ō took up residence in the Hsüan-chung Ssu. There, he lectured over two hundred times on the *Kuan wu-liang-shou ching* (**Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra*) and advocated its practices, especially the vocal recitation of Amitābha's name (*nien-fo*; Jpn., *nembutsu*). Departing from the view of T'an-luan, for whom *nien-fo* involved a transcendent quality of mystical union with Amitābha's name, Tao-ch'ō was the first Chinese Buddhist to teach reliance on verbal recitation, which was to be aided by bushels of beans or rosaries to record the number of recitations. (Tao-ch'ō himself is alleged to have recited the name of Amitābha as much as seventy thousand times a day.) As a consequence, Pure Land devotion spread rapidly among the laity under the slogan "chant the Buddha's name and be reborn in the Pure Land" (*nien-fo wang-sheng*) and rosaries became ubiquitous in Chinese Buddhism.

Because the Prajñāpāramitā literature affirmed that reality is characterized by both form and emptiness, Tao-ch'ō argued for the legitimacy of using verbal recitations and attention to the physical aspect of Amitābha and his Pure Land. These practices, he believed, were

temporary expedients to lead people to formlessness, nonattachment, and nonduality after rebirth in the Pure Land. In his only surviving writing, the *An-lo chi*, Tao-ch'ò acknowledges that understanding the Pure Land as formless is superior to seeing it as form, and that one's original motivation should be a desire for enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) in order to save others, not just desire for the bliss of Pure Land. However, according to the Mahāyāna doctrine of "two truths," those who understand the ultimate truth of emptiness are able to use the conventional truth of form to save beings, thus legitimizing temporary attachment to concrete forms in Pure Land devotionism.

The most important disciple of Tao-ch'ò was Shan-tao (613–681), who wrote systematic works that firmly established Pure Land as a major religious tradition in East Asia. [See the biography of Shan-tao.] Nevertheless, it was the sense of crisis and urgency that permeates the *An-lo chi* that dramatized the necessity of Pure Land devotion, while the concrete methods of practice that Tao-ch'ò promoted made Pure Land attractive and accessible to common people. Pure Land devotion thus became a popular social movement in China for the first time, and the sound of Amitābha's name has been chanted unceasingly in Chinese Buddhist worship ever since.

[See also Ching-t'u and Mappō.]

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DAVID W. CHAPPELL

T'AO HUNG-CHING (456–536), Taoist scholar of the Mao-shan school of Chinese Taoism and early authority on Chinese pharmacology and alchemy; also known as the Hermit of Hua-yang. T'ao was born into a renowned landowning family in the modern province of Fukien. His father and grandfather were particularly skilled in calligraphy and the properties of medicinal plants, while both his grandfather and mother were devout Buddhists. While still young T'ao gained a growing reputation as a man of letters and held several prestigious court appointments under the Southern Sung (420–479) and Ch'i (479–502) dynasties.

During the prescribed mourning period for his mother (484–486), T'ao began to study Taoism, eventually seeking formal instruction from the renowned master Sun Yu-yüeh, whom Emperor Wu of the Ch'i dynasty had just appointed head of the Hsing-shih Abbey in the capital of Chien-k'ang (modern Nanking). Under Sun's tutelage T'ao came in contact with the major scriptural currents of Six Dynasties period (317–589) Taoism. These included, for example, the Ling-pao liturgical texts of Sun's own teacher, Lu Hsiu-ching (406–477); Ko Hung's (283–343) *Shen-hsien chuan* (Biographies of the Immortals), which T'ao is said to have studied day and night for its information on elixirs of immortality; as well as copies of the *Shang-ch'ing ching* (Scriptures of Supreme Purity), the purported revelations of the Perfected of the Heaven of Supreme Purity dictated to Yang Hsi at Mao-shan (Kiangsu Province) from 364 to 370.

Impressed by both the content and fine calligraphy of a few fragments of the original Supreme Purity scriptures, T'ao set about in search of more original texts from this corpus. In 492 he retired at a relatively young age to a hermitage of his own at Mao-shan itself, where these scriptures had been revealed more than a hundred years earlier. There he undertook the scholarly work for which he is so important in the history of Taoism as well as the alchemical pursuits upon which his more popular reputation rests. Due to his close relationship with Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty (502–549), T'ao's alchemical research and the community that grew around him at Mao-shan received official support and even exemption from the harsh imperial ban imposed on Taoism in 504, the year the emperor officially converted to Buddhism.

T'ao's significance in the development of Taoism derives for the most part from his editorial work on the Supreme Purity scriptures. In *Chen-kao* (Declarations of the Perfected), composed about 499, T'ao provided a definitive collection of these scriptures (books 1–6), followed by a detailed account of their revelation and subsequent diffusion that is a model of historical research and exactitude. This work was intended to bring the scriptures to the attention of a large public and improve upon an earlier compilation of traced copies of the original texts, Ku Huan's *Chen-chi* (Traces of the Perfected), which is no longer extant. In a more esoteric work, *Teng-chin yin-chüeh* (Secret Instructions for Ascent to Perfection), which probably predates his *Declarations*, T'ao assembled and discussed specific Taoist practices mentioned in the Supreme Purity texts, arranging them as a guide for the advanced Taoist adept. Only a small part of this latter work is extant in the Taoist canon

(*Tao-tsang*). In a third major work, T'ao composed his own *Chi-chu* (Collected Commentaries) on the famous *Shen-nung pen-ts'ao ching* (Shen Nung Pharmacopeia), thus completing his contribution to the field of research in which his father and grandfather were known.

A T'ang dynasty biography dates T'ao's active involvement in alchemical research from about 504, when he and Emperor Wu both had auspicious dreams about an elixir and the latter offered financial support for T'ao's experimental research. Due to his scriptural studies, T'ao probably arrived at Mao-shan already well aware how suitable its history, location, flora, and mineral deposits all were for alchemical pursuits.

Elixirs of immortality figured prominently in the writings of southern Taoism, a milieu well represented by Ko Hung's internal and external alchemies and further elaborated in the later scriptures of Supreme Purity. The latter, however, made a distinction between elixirs that merely rendered one an immortal (*hsien*) and those that conferred "perfection" (*chen*), a rank of spiritual refinement indicative of the more elevated heavens from which these texts derived. Although the legacy of T'ao's alchemical research is thought to have stressed interiorized methods over more experimental or liturgical ones, T'ao himself worked with debatable success to concoct an ingestible elixir according to the formulas and instructions contained in these scriptures of the Perfected.

In 517 he presented the emperor with his final literary work, *Chou-shih ming-t'ung chi* (A Record of Master Chou's Communications with the Unseen World), an account of the life and mystical experiences of a young disciple whose visions had culminated in a "summons" to leave the world by alchemical suicide. T'ao's own death at the auspicious age of eighty-one, symbolic in Taoism of a regenerative cycle of gestation and "re-birth" as an immortal, suggests either hagiography or a similarly ritualized end.

T'ao's tremendous influence on the development of Taoism also derives from the organization he founded at Mao-shan, which grew to be the most influential school of Taoism during the T'ang and which was known for its synthesis of the various Taoist traditions of interior meditational practice and public liturgy that had developed during the Six Dynasties period.

[See also Alchemy, article on Chinese Alchemy, and Taoism, overview article and articles on Taoist Literature and The Taoist Religious Community.]

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TAOISM. [This entry introduces the thought and practice of one of the major religious traditions of China. It consists of four articles:

An Overview

The Taoist Religious Community

Taoist Literature

History of Study

The overview article identifies the unifying themes of this diverse tradition and reviews its influence on Chinese history, literature, and the arts; The Taoist Religious Community traces the development of organized Taoist communities and sects from the second century of the common era; Taoist Literature surveys the organization and contents of the Taoist canon and other collections; and History of Study treats the rise of modern historical scholarship on Taoism in East Asia and the West.]

An Overview

It is no easy task to define Taoism, for throughout its history this philosophical and religious system assumed very different aspects. The period of the Warring States (403-221 BCE) produced a wide variety of philosophical currents, an obvious source of embarrassment for the philologists and bibliographers of the Han dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE), who set themselves the task of ordering this abundant literature. In contrast to the Confucian classics, the writings of the "hundred philosophers" were not easy to classify. This fact is evident both in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shi chi* (Historical Records) and in the *I-wen chih* (bibliographical catalog) of the *Ch'ien Han shu* (History of the Former Han Dynasty). We read in the former work that certain authors who at first blush belonged to another current, nonetheless found their inspiration in utterances or maxims of Huang-ti and Lao-tzu. The *I-wen chih* classifies among Taoist authors some thinkers who in other lists appear under very different headings. These include specialists in the military arts, storytellers, and Legalists. Ssu-ma Ch'ien

states that Han-Fei-tzu, the most important theoretician of Legalism (Fa-chia), was inspired by Huang-ti and Lao-tzu, that is by Taoism—an intriguing assertion since the ideas of the Fa-chia were often thought to oppose those of the Taoists. (However, it is true that the *Han-Fei-tzu* contains a partial commentary of the *Tao-te ching*.) In the same way, the *Kuan-tzu*, often classified among the Fa-chia but considered Taoist by the *I-wen chih*, does contain some Taoist chapters.

Ancient thinkers were not always aware of belonging to any specific school. Rather, the classification of ancient writings into various ill-defined schools was mainly the work of Han scholars. The philosophers classified under the rubric "Taoist school" (Tao-chia) formed rather small circles comprising a master and a limited number of disciples. Since most of the writings of these Taoist circles were lost, the Taoism of that (the pre-Ch'in) era is essentially represented by the teachings expounded in the *Tao-te ching*, attributed to Lao-tzu, and the *Chuang-tzu*, so named for its putative author. In addition to their philosophical and literary value, these two works have great religious significance. On the one hand, they reveal the existence of mystical circles at the time they were written; on the other hand, they exerted a fundamental influence on subsequent religion and Taoist practices. A third work, the *Lieh-tzu*, was written at a later date, although it does contain ancient materials.

Formative Concepts

It has become customary to distinguish the Taoism of the philosophers of the fourth and third centuries BCE from the religious Taoism that presumably appeared in the second and third centuries of our era. In Chinese the former is called Tao-chia (Dōka in Japanese) and the latter, Tao-chiao (Dōkyō). This distinction was often accompanied by a value judgment wherein much profundity was attributed to the philosophical authors, while religious Taoism was perceived as a mixture of superstition and magic. Recent studies have attempted to rectify this relatively simplistic view. The complex development of religious Taoism gave birth to numerous "schools" or currents, which were in general rather open, despite the esoteric character of their teachings. Some of these currents were very scholarly and erudite; others came closer to the popular milieu from which the "superstitious" aspects of their practices were derived. But all, in different ways, claimed the patronage of the ancient philosophers.

In its development, religious Taoism did not break with the fundamental conceptions of the philosophers, although it remains true that these concepts were much transformed. This evolution owed much to China's

transformation from a congeries of contending feudal states to a unified empire that brought together the ancient local cultures, and to the presence of foreign influences, the most important being that of Buddhism. The various Taoist currents shared the quest for longevity, even immortality; it was only their methods that distinguished them. While the ancient philosophers were not unaware of the physiological methods of "cultivating the vital principle," they had recourse mainly to mysticism and ecstasy for escape from this base world. The different schools of later Taoism taught a wide variety of medical, hygienic, alchemical, or magical recipes that, in the end, aimed at attaining the same result. This is also true for the messianic and millenarian movements that, throughout the course of Chinese history, announced the advent of a new golden age.

Conception of the World: Macrocosm and Microcosm. To understand Taoist theories and practices, one must first understand what the Taoists regarded as the general principles governing the world and man. One should also note that the ancient Chinese did not have the same conception as we do of the body and soul—or, more accurately, of souls—and of their relationship to each other.

According to ancient Chinese cosmology, the world was governed by a set of fundamental notions related to unity and multiplicity, space and time, and microcosm and macrocosm. The concepts of *tao* and *te* were not specific to Taoism but belonged to all currents of Chinese thought. Literally, *tao* means "road," or "way." There are many derivative meanings: "way to follow, method, utterance, doctrine," and "rule of conduct." *Tao* was also the efficacious power of kings and magicians who knew how to make the three spheres of the world—Heaven, Earth, and Man—communicate with one another. In cosmology the *t'ien-tao* ("way of Heaven") was the natural order as it manifests itself through the circulation of the sun and, more generally, through the movement of the celestial vault. The royal *tao* (*wang-tao*) existed solely for the sovereign in order that he might ritually restore the natural order of heavenly *tao*, which was constantly threatened by disorder. In case of catastrophe such as drought or flood, the sovereign was held responsible and had to expiate either his own sins or those of the world. In this way his virtue (*te* or *tao-te*) was manifested. For Confucians, *tao* represented a general, ethical ideal, while *te* referred to particular virtues. *Te* conferred an inner force that exerted a beneficial influence on the entourage of the sage who possessed it.

If in Confucian parlance *tao* had a strong ethical connotation, in the current language it nonetheless retained the sense of doctrine or method; thus, each philosophi-

cal school had its *tao*, that is, its doctrines and rules of conduct. While the *tao* of Lao-tzu was a metaphysical principle, the expression was often used in Taoist texts to refer to a body of particular prescriptions. [See also Tao and Te.]

Yin-yang and Five Elements. The original meanings of *yin* and *yang* seem to refer to the shaded and sunny slopes of mountains, respectively. Eventually, the two terms came to describe the two antithetical and complementary aspects of the Tao as natural order: a shady aspect and a luminous aspect; a cold, passive aspect and a warm, active aspect; and finally, the feminine aspect and the masculine aspect. The terms are therefore relative classificatory headings only; any one thing can be either *yin* or *yang* in relation to another. These two notions played a fundamental role in all philosophical, scientific, and religious thought. The same applies to the "five elements," or "five phases" (*wu-hsing*) theory as it appeared in the *Hung-fan* (Great Norm), a treatise inserted in the *Shu ching* (Classic of History). Here the elements were presented as related to numbers: (1) water, (2) fire, (3) wood, (4) metal, and (5) earth. These were not merely substances or chemical phenomena but represented instead the principal cosmic forces or influences and classificatory headings. All phenomena—seasons, directions, flavors, foodstuffs, the viscera of the body, human activities, and so forth—could be classified under one or another of the Five Phases. Earth was central and neutral; the four other elements corresponded to the four directions and to the four seasons and were further classified as either *yin* or *yang*. Thus, spring and summer were both *yang* and corresponded, respectively, to wood and east, fire and south; fall and winter were *yin* and corresponded to metal and west, water and north. In addition, the elements were symbolized by the five fundamental colors: water is equated with black, fire with red, wood with green, metal with white, and earth with yellow. Added to this symbolism were four animals, which often appeared in representations of sacred space: the dragon to the east, the red bird to the south, the white tiger to the west, and the tortoise, enlaced by a snake, to the north. [See also Yin-yang Wu-hsing.]

Symbols of I ching. The *I ching*, originally a manual of divination, became a philosophical treatise included in the Confucian classics as a result of the appendices that were added to it. Abundantly commented upon throughout history, it was much used by the Taoists, especially for the symbolic interpretation it received at the hands of Han commentators. The divinization of the *I ching* is founded on a series of symbols or diagrams formed by the combination of unbroken lines (representing *yang*) and broken lines (representing *yin*). When

these lines are tiered three at a time, we obtain eight trigrams. The combination of any two of the trigrams yields one of the sixty-four possible hexagrams. Trigrams and hexagrams symbolized the totality of realities, the former in a more synthetic fashion and the latter in a more analytical fashion. By arranging them in a circle representing space and time, we readily see how *yin* and *yang* alternate, how one passes from a purely *yang* reality (Heaven, represented by the trigram or hexagram *ch'ien*) to a purely *yin* reality (earth, represented by the trigram or hexagram *k'un*). The other trigrams or hexagrams, composed of varying combinations of *yin* and *yang*, symbolized phenomena, situations, or intermediate times. [See also Chinese Religion, article on Religious and Philosophical Texts.]

Although the ancient Chinese availed themselves of many systems of correspondence and symbols to describe the universe, in general they conceived of the universe as a great hierarchical whole whose parts, spaces, and times corresponded to one another. However, nothing in this whole was static: all entities—man included—were subject to changes and transformations. Man was a little universe, a microcosm, a little "Heaven-earth." It was said that his head was round like Heaven, his feet square like earth, and that all his organs were homologized to different parts of the universe. The system of classification based on the Yin-yang Five Elements theory made it possible to describe the microcosm and its harmony or disharmony by means of the rhythms of the outside world. A correct hygiene and a proper cultivation of the vital principle naturally required a perfect adaptation of the vital rhythms to those of the universe. For example, the "five viscera," in close relation with the Five Elements and therefore with the seasons and directions, were "nourished" by the "five flavors"—whence the requirements of a diet in harmony with the seasons. Such requirements were particularly important for the Taoists, whose spiritual exercises began with the care of their physical health.

Mysticism. The two main works of Taoism during the Warring States period, called the "period of the philosophers," were the *Lao-tzu* and the *Chuang-tzu*. The authors are known to us only through legends. Lao-tzu (Lao Tan or Li Erh) was presumably an elder contemporary of Confucius. The two philosophers were said to have had a conversation in which Confucius assumed the part of the disciple. Toward the end of his life Lao Tan, who held the position of archivist at the Chou court, realized that the dynasty was sinking into decadence. Traveling west, he arrived at the pass of Hsienku, where he transmitted a "book of *tao* and *te*" to the guardian of the pass, Yin Hsi. Thereafter, he continued

his travels and was never heard of again. The historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145?–90? BCE), attempting to explain the mysterious character of Lao-tzu, referred to him as a "hidden sage" who had fled the corrupt world to maintain his inner purity. Of the author of the *Chuang-tzu*, Chuang Chou, we know nothing, except that he lived in the fourth century BCE. It is stated that he refused the official posts offered him, preferring freedom to honors.

Both works are characterized by their emphasis on quietism and mysticism and by the metaphysical dimension they attribute to the Tao. As a primordial and eternal entity, the Tao exists before all visible things, including *ti*, the superior divinities of the official religion, such as Shang-ti ("lord on high") and T'ien-ti ("lord of heaven"). The Tao is beyond the grasp of the senses and is imperceptible. But from "nothingness" (*wu*) the visible world (*yu*) is born and particularized phenomena are produced. Tao is formless, limitless, and nameless: the term *tao* is not a name but a practical referent.

In the last chapter of the *Chuang-tzu*, which summarizes the doctrines of the foremost philosophers of antiquity, it is said that Lao-tzu belonged to the mystical current of thought and that his system of philosophy was founded on two concepts: that of an eternal principle devoid of all attributes and that of a supreme unity (*t'ai-i*). The Tao of the Taoist philosophers actually assumes many aspects. On the one hand, it is transcendent with respect to the world of phenomena, where diversity and change prevail; on the other hand, it becomes immanent as it manifests itself, penetrating the beings that it animates and orders. In the *Tao-te ching*, the Tao is a feminine principle, the mother of the world. It gives birth to all beings, and its *te*, or nourishing virtue, preserves them and brings them to maturity. In a famous passage, the Tao is called the "spirit of the valley" and the "mysterious female." The idea of femininity is linked to that of vacuity, symbolizing both the absence of perceptible qualities of the Tao and the mental emptiness of the sage.

The Taoists in fact condemn all discursive knowledge, for, they maintain, it introduces multiplicity into the soul, which should, rather, "embrace Unity," that is, be unified in the Tao. This unity is preserved through the mastery of the senses and passions. The sense organs are conceived as apertures through which the vital principles escape if they are not controlled. The passions and emotions are a cause of depletion of vital and spiritual power. A certain amount of self-denial is advocated, but such aims at the harmonious use of the sense faculties, not as their suppression. The Taoist should be especially careful not to intervene in the course of

things. This non-intervention is called *wu-wei* (nonaction), a term that suggests not absolute nonaction but an attitude of prudence and respect for the autonomy of other things. Through nonaction the Taoist does nothing other than conform to the Tao, which itself is "always without action but nevertheless brings about everything." The result is a universalistic ethic. The Taoist saint is not only a "good savior of men"; he rejects no entity and by his virtue alone attracts beings and converts them without their being aware of it. He simply lets them follow their natural spontaneity (*tzu-jan*).

Lao-tzu compares the power issuing from *wu-wei* to that of water; in the same way, he says, femininity far surpasses the manly virtues. Furthermore, he proposes that all aggressive action elicits a contrary balancing reaction, and that all energy that has developed to the point of exhaustion reverts to its initial tranquil state. Lao-tzu calls this the "return," which is the movement of Tao itself, the regulator of the rhythms and balances of nature. The knowledge of this law—the only knowledge deemed worthwhile—insures a serene illumination and spiritually places the sage outside the interplay of contradictions.

Some passages of the *Tao-te ching* allude to longevity practices that were assuredly being used among quietist circles. If such techniques—gymnic, respiratory, and others—were of interest to wisdom and religion, it was because holiness was believed inseparable from the potent vitality that was acquired and nourished by regulating one's vital energy. By living in accordance with the principle of *wu-wei* one can preserve the suppleness and energy of an infant and, consequently, one may hope to live the longest possible life. Lao-tzu goes so far as to assert the invulnerability of the saint.

Lao-tzu is far from explicit regarding the mystical experiences to which he alludes. In some passages he merely recommends that the adept act in such a way as to lead the corporeal and spiritual souls to "embrace Unity," and in others he simply refers to the "inner light." Chuang-tzu is more explicit, describing in detail the stages that lead to union with the Tao and to ecstasy. For, while the Tao is not a divinity, it is undoubtedly the object of religious feelings.

If a spiritual purification is necessary to attain illumination, it is because the Tao is veiled in our consciousness by the artificialities of civilization. Hence, a critical reflection on the relativity of commonly received ideas is the necessary first stage on the way to salvation. Under the silent direction of a master, the adept gradually sheds the constitutive elements of his social self. Thereafter, he loses awareness of his body, and his sense perceptions are no longer differentiated—

he hears with his eyes and sees with his ears. Finally, the adept's entire being communes with the totality. According to Chuang-tzu, he has the internal impression of flying off and moving about freely in space but externally the individual in a state of ecstasy resembles a piece of dead wood. His vital essence seems to have left him: it has gone "to gambol at the beginning of things." Chuang-tzu uses the perennial theme of the spiritual voyage to illustrate the state of absolute freedom the saint attains when he lives in symbiosis with the cosmos. By identifying his vital rhythm with that of the natural forces he participates in the infinity and persistence of the universe. He thus attains a superior life that is no longer biological; he lives the very life of the Tao.

Mystical ecstasy is neither accessible to all Taoists nor permanent. A Taoist saint did not necessarily withdraw from the world, but he could at the same time be "outside the world" and live as an ordinary man among others. He could also be "internally a saint and externally a king"—the ideal of the ruler not only for the Taoists but for all Chinese thinkers. For Lao-tzu, the power of the king is exerted without his subjects being in the slightest aware of it. [See the biographies of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu.]

The Immortals. Chuang-tzu describes in poetic terms the immortals, whom he calls *shen-jen* ("divine men"). These immortals dwell on a certain mythical mountain. They abstain from eating cereals, feed on the wind and dew, and can operate in the air borne by the clouds or flying dragons. The early mythology of the immortals (*hsien*, *hsien-jen*, *shen-hsien*) developed independently of Taoism. The *Shan-hai ching* mentions, among the legendary peoples of the east, birdmen whose bodies were covered with feathers, and the commentary to the text states that they resembled the immortals. These are often called "feathered men" (*yü-jen*) because they were capable of flying like birds.

There are many Taoist hagiographic collections that describe *hsien-jen* as beings so fully identified with the universal life, with its diversity and fantastic character, that they could transform themselves at will and appear, disappear, and multiply themselves. It is said that, at the opportune moment, the immortal would announce his imminent disappearance and give himself the appearance of death. Although the immortal seemed dead and, indeed, was buried, upon opening his casket one found a stick, a sword, or a sandal. This "deliverance from the perishable corpse" (*shih-chieh*) was a technique of immortality through which the body was transmuted into an imperishable one. The Taoists came to distinguish many degrees of *shih-chieh*, more or less exalted, which led to different destinies. Thus the Taoist who succeeded in the "great accomplishment," which

involved either the smelting of a sacred caldron as performed by Huang-ti (the Yellow Emperor) or the transmutation of alchemical cinnabar, would rise to the heavens in full light at midday. At this degree, the Taoist immortal transmutes himself into a being of light, as brilliant as the sun.

In ancient mythology, the immortals went to reside in paradisiacal countries. Later, theologians invented a series of heavens arranged hierarchically and administered by celestial servants of different ranks paralleling those of the imperial court. The destiny of the *hsien-jen* was to occupy a position in this transcendental bureaucracy, from which they would be exiled to this lowly world if they committed a fault. Nonetheless, the ancient legends concerning the countries of the blessed were not forgotten.

From remote antiquity mountains were worshiped as sacred powers. With the imperial era, the *wu-yüeh* "five [sacred] peaks" were particularly important and remained so in religious Taoism as the abode of numerous immortals. To penetrate into the mountains, the Taoists had to use prestigious talismans, in particular the *Wu-yüeh chen-hsing t'u* (Diagram of the Real Form of the Five Peaks) and other sets of "five talismans."

The best known of the Five Peaks was T'ai Shan, the sacred mountain of the east, in Shantung. According to legend, it was on this mountain that the seventy-two sovereigns of antiquity performed the solemn *feng* sacrifice in which they announced to Heaven the complete success of their government. In fact, the ritual of this sacrifice was designed by the *fang-shih* magicians for the First Emperor (Ch'in Shih-huang-ti) and for Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (r. 140–87). The *feng* sacrifice may plausibly be regarded as having influenced later Taoist liturgy. At a more popular level, the god of T'ai Shan was lord over human destiny; he kept an account of the life span of each human being. From the beginning of the common era, it was believed that the dead went to reside on T'ai Shan. Later, beliefs held that the god of T'ai Shan was an infernal judge. Among the abodes of the immortals that were most often evoked in Taoist literature one must mention the Isles of the Blessed in the Eastern Sea and K'un-lun, a mythical mountain located on the western border. On the three sacred islands where the immortals dwelt was found the drug that saved one from dying; there, all beings were white, and the palaces made of gold and silver. If one should attempt to approach, the islands would suddenly collapse under water.

For the Taoists, K'un-lun was a path leading to Heaven. It was made up of several stories representing the stages one had to ascend in order to be admitted into the spiritual hierarchy. One acquired, in succes-

sion, physical immortality—owing to the plants of immortality and the water of the River of Cinnabar that one crossed on the way—spiritual power, and finally the divine condition, as soon as one reached the abode of the Supreme Emperor, no doubt the Yellow Emperor. However, K'un-lun was primarily known as the abode of Hsi Wang Mu, Queen Mother of the West. She became the queen of the immortals, who, it was believed, frolicked in this mountain, riding dragons and geese. [See Hsi Wang Mu.]

Since the Taoists sought the vegetal or mineral drugs of longevity deep in the mountains, they had to protect themselves from all kinds of dangers. To this end they availed themselves of talismans and magical formulas. Thus they traveled from mountain to mountain with the hope of encountering a master who would initiate them in the mysteries of religion. They sometimes had to penetrate labyrinthine grottoes in their quest for medicinal substances as well as for the talismans and salvific scriptures said to have been hidden there by ancient heroes. The most sacred were the *tung-t'ien* ("heaven-grottoes"), holy places said to be connected by underground passages and illuminated either from within by their own light (which owed nothing to the sun), or from without through an opening that let in a luminous ray from Heaven. It was in these places, thought of as the womb of the earth, that were hidden the principles of life, elixirs, and sacred scriptures. [See also Hsien.]

Historical Survey

Lao-tzu is generally considered the patron, if not the founder, of Taoism. From the first centuries of our era he became a popular divinity, and his text, the *Tao-te ching*, was used by the propagandists of sectarian movements. It was the latter who were at the origin of collective Taoism, which differed significantly from the small chapels of philosophers. The success of these mass movements was contingent on their finding favorable conditions among the population and their leaders' ability to exploit popular beliefs, especially millenarian beliefs.

Taoism at the Beginning of the Imperial Era: 221 BCE–220 CE. We know that as early as the end of the Warring States and the beginning of the imperial era *fang-shih* ("prescription-masters") were active in the eastern coastal regions of China. They specialized in the occult sciences and propagated the theory of history as set forth by the philosopher Tsou Yen (fourth century BCE). Some of these *fang-shih* peddled prophetic works and pseudo-Confucian writings (*wei-shu* or *ch'an-wei*), which exerted much influence on Taoism. It was as propagandists of religious ideas and practices that some *fang-shih*, among whom were found a few charlatans,

introduced themselves into the inner circle of Ch'in Shih-huang-ti and of Emperor Wu. These magicians offered formulas that would allow the sovereigns to establish communication with the immortals and to become immortals themselves. Ch'in Shih-huang-ti even sent an expedition to the Isles of the Blessed. Wu-ti aspired to follow the example of Huang-ti, who ascended to Heaven in a beautiful apotheosis after having smelted a caldron. The *fang-shih* taught the Han emperor alchemical recipes that were supposed to enable him to become a *hsien-jen*. However, it was this same Wu-ti who established Confucianism as the official doctrine of the imperial state and who instituted the examination system to recruit candidates for public office. Such examinations dealt exclusively with the Confucian classics. This double attitude was typical of the ruling class and the lettered bureaucrats of all periods. Ostensibly Confucian in their public life, they were nevertheless Taoists in private. However, the practices of the *fang-shih* were not yet entirely associated with Taoism. Their doctrine synthesized the metaphysical and mystical ideas of the ancient philosophers and elements borrowed from the occult sciences, especially the belief in the immortals. [See Fang-shih and the biography of Tsou Yen.]

In the first century CE Buddhism made its appearance in China. From historical sources we learn that the new religion had already been introduced in some provinces by the year 65 CE. Equally clear is that Buddhism was at first confused with Taoism and that Taoist terminology was used to translate Buddhist concepts. At the court of Liu Ying, a brother of Emperor Ming (r. 58–75) who had a fief in present-day Kiangsu, there were Buddhist monks as in the capital. Our sources report that Liu Ying was surrounded by *fang-shih*, favored the Huang-Lao doctrine (i.e., the cult of Huang-ti and Lao-tzu, an expression referring to Taoism), and made common offerings to Huang-ti, Lao-tzu, and the Buddha. [See Huang-lao Chün.] Later, the emperor Huan did the same in the imperial palace and in 165 ordered that rituals be performed at the birthplace of Lao-tzu. The stela erected to commemorate that occasion indicates that Lao-tzu was considered a divinity, a fact that is confirmed by other texts of the same period. Here, Lao-tzu was presented as a cosmic man endowed with traits borrowed from the myth of Pan-ku, common to the religion of southern populations. In the developing legend, Lao-tzu became Lao-chün ("Lord Lao"), a sovereign god who in the course of successive reincarnations came down from Heaven to instruct past sovereigns and to reveal sacred scriptures. His successive births were miraculous; in the last one, narrated on the model of that of the Buddha Śākyamuni, his mother is said to

have borne him in her womb for seventy-two years until he issued from her left side. About this time the legend of Lao-tzu's departure for the west had given rise to the notion that the Buddha was none other than Lao-tzu, the author of *Tao-te ching*, and that Buddhism was thus the Taoist doctrine adapted by Lao-tzu following his departure for the west to the mentality of the *hu* ("barbarians"). Around 300, a Taoist by the name of Wang Fou wrote a *Hua-hu ching* (The Book of the Conversion of the Barbarians) on just this theme. This apocrypha was naturally denounced by the Buddhists and for centuries suscitated endless polemics between the two religions.

As the cult and mythology of Lao-chün spread in popular circles they sporadically gave rise to messianic movements. The first took place in the year 3 BCE, when a mass of people left Shantung and headed west carrying the "talismans of Hsi Wang Mu." Doubtless they expected to reach K'un-lun the mythical abode of the goddess. Other more important movements occurred during the last decade of the Han dynasty, contributing to its decline. These movements seem to be more or less connected to a famous work, the *T'ai-p'ing ching* (The Book of Great Peace), whose history is obscure. This text was presented many times to the throne, once during the Former Han dynasty and then again during the reigns of the emperors Shun and Huan of the Latter Han, each time by *fang-shih* from Shantung. The work belonged to a genre of prophetic literature, and its authors clearly hoped to obtain reforms from the court. The extant text, preserved in the Taoist canon (*Tao-tsang*), is a later revision but still preserves elements of the original. It is utopian in outlook, aiming at establishing an era of *t'ai-p'ing* ("great peace") modeled on the golden age, a time when sages reigned who nourished themselves on air, as do true Taoists. [See *T'ai-p'ing*.]

In order to retrieve *t'ai-p'ing*, one must find the Tao within oneself. There is much discussion of ethics and politics in the work, but it remains distinctly Taoist in the importance it gives to spiritual exercises and methods of longevity. On this last theme, it asserts that people cannot live long except in an era of *t'ai-p'ing*. We nonetheless find in it the methods revealed by Heaven to transcend the normal human condition: the most important is the "meditation on the One" (*shou-i*), a technique that culminates in a vision of colored light. Another method consists in concentrating on images representing the inner gods, who have a human form and are dressed with vestments the color of the Five Elements and the seasons, and corresponding to the organs of the viscera. We also find directions concerning breathing, medicinal plants, talismans, magical

formulas, and medical techniques such as acupuncture, moxa, and control of one's pulse.

A certain version of the *T'ai-p'ing ching* was used by the leaders of a rebellion that exploded in 184 in eastern China and spread to many provinces. This so-called Rebellion of the Yellow Turbans, or *T'ai-p'ing Tao* ("way of great peace"), announced the end of the Han dynasty and the advent of a new era. [See the biography of *Chang Chüeh*.] In the same year, in northern Szechuan, another movement, called the *T'ien-shih Tao* ("way of the celestial masters") established a state organized like a church, with a *t'ien-shih* ("celestial master") at its head and local parishes under the authority of *chi-chiu* ("libationers"). The first and most famous Celestial Master was Chang Tao-ling, who is often considered the founder of the Taoist religion. This legendary figure began a religious movement using spells and talismans after having received a revelation from *T'ai-shang Lao-chün* (the divinized Lao-tzu). Converts had to offer a contribution of five pecks of rice, whence the other name of the sect, the *Wu-tou-mi Tao* ("way of the five pecks of rice"). One of the reasons for the success of the movement was that its religious leaders presented themselves as healers. The sick were considered sinners, or as those who inherited faults perpetrated by their forebears, and thus had to repent and confess themselves as part of the salvific process. The written confessions were conveyed to the gods of Heaven, earth, and water. Furthermore, parishioners had to redeem their sins by participating in public works, such as the construction of roads and bridges. [See the biographies of *Chang Tao-ling* and *Chang Lu*.]

A text that could have been written by Chang Lu, a grandson of Chang Tao-ling, was retrieved among the manuscripts unearthed at the Tun-huang caves early in the twentieth century. It constitutes an important fragment of a commentary on the *Tao-te ching*. It appears that the book of Lao-tzu was actually used by the Celestial Masters to instruct the faithful. It was with this view in mind that the so-called *Hsiang-erh chu* (*Hsiang-erh Commentary*) was written. Not unexpectedly, the commentary is not a philosophical or philological gloss: the original thought of Lao-tzu is not respected but becomes the pretext to convey an elementary moral teaching. The Tao is presented with very personal traits, although it is forbidden to represent it in images. There is much discussion about the precepts and interdictions of the Tao; the "true Tao" is constantly opposed to the "false doctrines." The moral prescriptions, here as in the *T'ai-p'ing ching*, deal mainly with filial piety, which is also one of the foremost Confucian virtues. Henceforth, the practice of moral virtues was always required

from the Taoist adepts, even in the most esoteric and individualistic circles. Besides morality, collective ceremonies played a very important role in this new communal Taoism. The Celestial Masters seem to have, if not invented, at least given definite form to certain rituals, some of which survive to this day. Some of these ceremonies, such as the *ho-ch'i* ("union of breaths"), are very exalted in character and consist of arcane sexual rites that later became the object of sharp criticism from the Buddhists. If we may judge from the very esoteric treatises preserved in the *Tao-tsang*, these so-called sexual orgies were ritualized adaptations of ancient agrarian celebrations that became highly stylized rites for the regeneration of the cosmos.

Taoism of the Six Dynasties: Fourth to Sixth Century. In 215 the Celestial Master Chang Lu submitted to the authority of Ts'ao Ts'ao, the *de facto* founder of the Wei dynasty (220–265). As a result, the sect was acknowledged by this dynasty and remained in favor under the succeeding Western Chin (265–316), exerting its influence on the important families of North China. The division of the country into the Three Kingdoms following the fall of the Han dynasty fostered regionalism that was exacerbated by the fall of North China to the domination of non-Chinese invaders at the beginning of the fourth century. The South remained under the control of the Chinese emperors of the Wu dynasty (222–280), who withdrew south of the Yangtze in 317. Prior to that time, the Celestial Masters exerted no influence in the South.

Taoism of the Southern Dynasties. The Taoism of the South preserved an esoteric and individualistic character that is aptly characterized by one of the most important figures of the religion, Ko Hung (283–343), author of the *Pao-p'u-tzu*. Ko Hung was in touch with the prevailing Taoist currents of the South and inherited an extensive library of Taoist works, a catalog of which is included in the *Pao-p'u-tzu*. This work deals primarily with alchemy, medicine, magic, and the practices of longevity. Ko Hung was particularly fascinated with alchemy, and provided recipes that treat the transmutation of alchemical cinnabar, a substance that he believed to be the only true drug of immortality. [See the *biography of Ko Hung*.]

Before Ko Hung, a certain Wei Po-yang, about whom we know that he was a southerner of the mid-second century CE, wrote one of the earliest extant treatises of alchemy, the *Chou i ts'an-t'ung-ch'i*. The title, which could be that of a *wei-shu* (Confucian apocryph), seems to indicate that the book deals with the threefold way of the *I ching*, the Taoism of Lao-tzu, and alchemy. It actually discusses the production of cinnabar, an im-

portant ingredient of the pill of immortality, in very esoteric terms using the symbolism of the *I ching*. The influence of this book was nonetheless significant for subsequent alchemical theories.

The fall of the Western Chin provoked an important migration southward, placing the Celestial Masters and their followers in the presence of the popular cults and Taoist circles of these regions. Inevitably, there ensued a syncretism between the Way of the Five Pecks and the religious traditions of the lower Yangtze, giving rise to a new Taoist sect, the Mao Shan school (also known as the Shang-ch'ing sect), named after a mountain in the region of Kou-jung in present day Kiangsu. This sect or school originated with an important series of sacred scriptures that were revealed through the mediation of the visionary Yang Hsi. It is said that in the course of the visions, between 364 and 370, Yang Hsi was visited by a group of *chen-jen* (high-ranking immortals of purity and perfection). [See *Chen-jen*.] These immortals descended from the Shang-ch'ing ("superior purity") Heaven (hence the school's alternate name) and revealed to him a series of scriptures, including the *Huang-t'ing ching* (Book of the Yellow Court), the *Ta-tung chen ching* (Book of Great Profundity), and other works forming the Shang-ch'ing scriptures. A selection of these revelatory texts appears in the *Chen-kaio* (Revelations of Immortals), compiled by T'ao Hung-ching (456-536), who after Ko Hung is the most illustrious among the Taoists of this period. T'ao's broad knowledge won him the friendship of Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty. Not only did he collect, edit, and annotate the Shang-ch'ing writings, but he was also known as a poet and calligrapher. In addition, his commentary on the *Pen-ts'ao* (Great Pharmacopoeia) is still considered authoritative. He was well-versed in Buddhism and maintained good relations with the Buddhist monks in hermitages on Mao Shan. [See the *biography of Tao Hung-ching*.]

Another important Taoist of this period was Lu Hsiu-ching (406–477), best known for having classified Taoist works into three *tung* ("grottoes") and for having transmitted the tradition of the Ling-pao ("sacred jewel") writings. [See the *biography of Lu Hsiu-ching*.] The history of the latter can be traced back to Ko Hung, who quotes excerpts from the *Ling-pao wu-fu ching* (Book of the Five Ling-pao Talismans), and to one of his nephews, Ko Ch'ao-fu, who wrote the *Ling-pao tu-jen ching* (Book of the Salvation of Mankind). The two foregoing Ling-pao texts were quite different. While the *Book of the Five Talismans* dealt mainly with techniques of longevity, the *Book of the Salvation of Mankind* held that the recitation of the text a given number of times would

save the living from ill-fortune and free ancestors from the hells where they were held captive. This last work was much influenced by Buddhism, both in style and in its adoption of ideas such as that of *kalpas*, or cycles of cosmic time.

Taoism of the Northern Dynasties. During these centuries of division, the Taoism of the northern part of occupied China developed independently of the southern traditions. During the Wei dynasty (386–556), Taoism became the state religion owing to the activity of K'ou Ch'ien-chih, a member of the Celestial Masters. According to legend, in 415 K'ou was visited by Lao-chün, the divinized Lao-tzu, who ordered a reformation of the sect's practices, especially the sexual rites and the rice and money contributions imposed on the faithful. This led to reforms more radical than those that were imposed in the South following the Shang-ch'ing revelations. K'ou Ch'ien-chih received the title of "Celestial Master" from the emperor T'ai-wu (425) and thereby gained authority over all religious affairs in the territory. He conferred the Taoist insignia on the emperor, who considered himself the representative on earth of Lao-chün. In 446, K'ou finally succeeded in influencing the emperor to officially prohibit Buddhism. This was the first of many persecutions of Buddhism and the first serious manifestation of hostility between the two religions. [See the biography of K'ou Ch'ien-chih.]

Since its introduction in China at the beginning of our era, Buddhism had been widely disseminated and its devotees had become aware of the doctrine's independent identity. Taoists, while subjected to Buddhist influence, were beginning to perceive Buddhism as a formidable rival. Taoism's first victory was but temporary, and Buddhism was rehabilitated under the following reign. The quarrels, however, went on, centering on such issues as the "conversion of the barbarians" outlined in the *Hua-hu ching*, the mortality or immortality of the soul, and karmic retribution. The Buddhists accused the Taoists of falsifying history and plagiarizing the Sūtras, while the Taoists never lost an opportunity to emphasize the "barbarian" character of this foreign religion. But in fact, the two doctrines influenced each other. The Mādhyamika notion that there is no difference between mundane existence and *nirvāṇa*, and that the Buddha is present within oneself was perceived as congruent with the concept of the Tao dwelling in the heart, where one must find it through nonaction. The Taoist influence on Buddhism was particularly manifest in Ch'an (Jpn., Zen), the most Chinese of the Buddhist sects, in which one finds the distinctive flavor of Taoist mysticism. [See also Ch'an.]

Taoism under the T'ang: 618–907. Many of the T'ang emperors are noted for their lavish patronage of

Taoism. Because the imperial family and Lao-tzu shared the surname Li, the former traced its genealogy back to Lao-tzu and proclaimed him the ancestor of the dynasty. The *Tao-te ching's* importance as a sacred work increased. Emperor Hsüan-tsung (Ming-huang, 712–756) wrote a famous commentary on it and included it among the required texts for the civil service examinations, which had hitherto been based on the Confucian classics. Furthermore, each family had now to keep a copy in its possession, and the birthday of Lao-tzu became a national holiday. The most outstanding Taoist of this period was Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen (647–735), a member of the very influential Shang-ch'ing sect, which had centers at both Mao Shan and Sung Shan. It was at Sung Shan that a master transmitted to Ssu-ma the talismans, registers, and techniques of longevity central to the sect. Ssu-ma was the author of many works, including the *Tso-wang lun*, a tract on meditation. Besides gaining a reputation as a Taoist master, he became well known as a calligrapher and recipient of imperial favor. [See the biography of Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen.] The many Taoist temples and monasteries of this period were, like their Buddhist counterparts, subject to extremely strict regulations, for the signal favor the Taoist religion enjoyed on the part of the emperor was not completely disinterested; it served foremost to extol the glory of the dynasty. In addition, Taoism spread throughout the vast empire and came into contact with other religions, such as Nestorianism and Manichaeism. Copies of the *Tao-te ching* were sent to the king of Tibet and a Sanskrit translation was completed at the request of the sovereign of Kashmir.

During the period between the end of the T'ang dynasty and the beginning of the Sung, China was once again divided. In the kingdom of Shu (in present-day Szechuan) Tu Kuang-t'ing (850–933) gained the support of the sovereign to undertake the search for Taoist scriptures. He wrote many important works, including some dealing solely with ritual. [See the biography of Tu Kuang-t'ing.] Another Taoist of the same period, Ch'en Tuan, devised the diagram that was to be a source of inspiration for Chou Tun-i's *T'ai-chi t'u* (Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate), an important factor in the formation of Sung Neo-Confucian metaphysics. Ch'en Tuan was supposedly a friend to Lü Tung-pin, a semilegendary figure but well known as one of the "eight immortals." [See also T'ai-chi and the biography of Chou Tun-i.]

Taoism under the Sung and Yüan Dynasties. During the reign of Chen-tsung (r. 998–1022) of the Northern Sung dynasty (960–1126), Taoism once more became the official religion. The dynasty was given a prestigious ancestor in the figure of Huang-ti, who was assimilated

to the Jade Sovereign (Yü-huang), considered the supreme divinity of Heaven in popular belief. [See Yü-huang.] It was also during this period that the lineage of the Celestial Masters was officially recognized at Lung-hu Shan (Dragon and Tiger Mountain), in the province of Kiangsi. Official temples and monasteries were established in all provinces and were administered by retired high officials. According to the extant statistics of this period, however, religious Taoists seemed to diminish in number in relation to Buddhist monks and nuns. It is true that the official statistics do not include the *tao-shih* (Taoist priests) who lived among the population and thus escaped administrative control. Under Chen-tsung's rule, the collection of Taoist works was reorganized and collated, and the very important Taoist encyclopedia, entitled *Yün-chi ch'i ch'ien* (Seven Bamboo Slips from the Book-pack of the Clouds), was compiled to preserve many texts predating the Sung.

The reign of Hui-tsung (1101–1125) was also an era of prosperity for Taoism. A devoted believer, the emperor installed a theocracy with himself as the supreme head of the Taoist pantheon and, like Hsüan-tsung of the T'ang dynasty, wrote a commentary on *Tao-te ching*. Also of note are the steps taken during Hui-tsung's reign for the first printing of the Taoist canon. His reign is marked by the appearance of new movements based on the entire corpora of revealed ritual texts, the most important being the Shen-hsiao ("divine empyrean") order, the T'ien-hsin Cheng-fa ("correct method of the heavenly heart") and the T'ung-ch'u ("beginning of adolescence") rites. The T'ien-hsin Cheng-fa ritual is still used by the Yao population of China, living in Thailand today. The Shen-hsiao order was founded by the emperor himself under the influence of the Taoist magician Lin Ling-su. It was also at the latter's instigation that Hui-tsung took measures against the Buddhists. One of his more significant acts vis-à-vis the Buddhists was to change both their status and name; they were to be called *te-shih* and degraded to *tao-shih* of the second rank. However, the Chin invasions of North China in 1127 brought an end to the Northern Sung dynasty and, thus, to the recognition of Taoism as the official religion.

Many new Taoist sects appeared in the northern regions ravaged by war and occupied by foreign armies. The most important were the T'ai-i ("supreme unity"), Chen-ta-tao ("perfect and great Way" or "authentic great Way"), and Ch'üan-chen ("integral perfection") sects. The first was noted for its magical techniques to fight disease and the second for its essentially ethical teaching; both disappeared after the fall of the Yüan dynasty in 1367.

The Ch'üan-chen sect was to become one of the most significant and prevailing currents of Taoism. Its founder, Wang Ch'ung-yang (Wang Che; 1113–1170), supposedly met with Lü Tung-pin, the immortal whose cult had become widespread since the beginning of the Sung dynasty and to whom several important works were attributed. Following the meeting, Wang Ch'ung-yang decided to devote himself to religion: he recruited Ma Tan-yang (1123–1183), who was to become the sect's second patriarch, and six other disciples, all natives of Shantung. As seen in their required curriculum—the *Tao-te ching*, the *Hsiao ching* (Classic of Filial Piety), and the *Pan-jo hsin ching*, a summary of the famous *Pan-jo ching* (*Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*)—the Ch'üan-chen sect promoted a form of syncretism that reflected popular notions of the unity of the "three religions" (i.e., Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). Such syncretism is evident in the *Li-chiao shih-wu lun* (Fifteen Essays on Religion), a breviary wherein the teachings are condensed into fifteen points. New adepts were invited to sever all links with the secular world and to steep themselves in meditation so that their hearts and minds might become as firm as T'ai Shan, that is, impervious to the lures of the outside world. According to the Ch'üan-chen sect's synthesis of Ch'an Buddhism and mystical Taoism, man must retrieve his pure, original nature in order to enjoy an increased life span. The sect was characterized by its tendency toward asceticism and its rejection of magical practices. In many ways it represented a new form of Taoism, although it continued and adopted many practices of the Shang-ch'ing tradition. The sect spread by organizing associations of the Three Religions; in these associations the teachings of Wang Ch'ung-yang were put into practice, and ceremonies for the living and the dead were performed. [See *the biography of Wang Che*.]

Wang's most famous disciple, Ch'iu Ch'ang-ch'un (1148–1227), was invited to the court of Chinggis Khan, who hoped to obtain the drug of immortality from him. Although the Taoist master answered that he knew only about hygienic techniques to prolong life, Chinggis Khan proffered sentiments of friendship and promulgated an edict ordering tax exemptions for Taoist monks.

The Taoists, availing themselves of the protection of Yüan emperors, took advantage of the situation to harass the Buddhists. Their polemics, based on the *Hua-hu ching*, backfired however, and the Taoists lost much prestige. A series of edicts condemning the Taoist apocrypha culminated in their being burned in 1281.

The other major current of the period was the Cheng-i ("orthodox unity") sect, which was none other than the sect of the Heavenly Masters, whose patriarchs were be-

lieved to be descendants of Chang Tao-ling. From the Sung dynasty to the present this school has continued to have a great impact on Taoism. Unlike the *tao-shih* of the Ch'üan-chen sect, who practice celibacy, the *tao-shih* of the Cheng-i marry and their charge is hereditary. The most important temple and monastery of the Ch'üan-chen sect is the Po-yün Kuan in Peking; that of the Cheng-i is the Temple of the Eastern Peak (Tung-yüeh Miao), also in Peking. The latter was built during the Yüan dynasty by Chang Liu-sun, who was held in favor at the court and was responsible for the revival of the order.

Other groups active during this period were the Shang-ch'ing on Mao Shan, the Wu-tang on Wu-tang Shan (in present-day Hupei), and the Ching-ming on Hsi Shan (in present-day Kiangsi). The patron of the Ching-ming sect was Hsü Chen-chün, an immortal of the Six Dynasties period. The sect was characterized by the predominant importance accorded to filial piety in its teaching. The Wu-tang sect distinguished itself by its belief in the god of the Pei-tou, the Big Dipper, also known as Chen-wu or Hsüan-wu (the "dark warrior"), the symbol of the north. Wu-tang, a collective name of a number of peaks, has been a cult center for Hsüan-wu at least since the thirteenth century, if not earlier. This deity had been promoted "god of war" during the Sung dynasty, and the Taoist theocrat Hui-tsung had dedicated a cult to him. It was, however, during the transition period between the Yüan and Ming dynasties that the cult acquired great favor. The most famous master of the Wu-tang at the end of the Yüan dynasty and the beginning of the Ming was Chang San-feng. This sect was, along with Shao-lin Temple on Sung Shan, one of the two centers where the martial arts techniques known as T'ai-chi-ch'üan developed.

The Books of Edification: Shan-shu and Pao-chüan

While morality was never the most distinctive aspect of religious Taoism, it always played an important role in doctrine, especially in the circle of the Heavenly Masters. In the sect of Five Pecks of Rice of the Han dynasty, for instance, illness was considered a direct result of sin. Consequently many of the commentaries on the *Tao-te ching* were used as handbooks of morality, from which lists of precepts and interdictions supposed to have been enacted by Lao-tzu were drawn. Some, such as the *Hsiang-erh chieh* (Precepts Drawn from the *Hsiang-erh* Commentary), are still extant in the Taoist canon. The *Precepts* classified nine principles of conduct under three categories: (1) to practice *wu-wei* ("nonaction"), "weakness and suppleness," and the "conservation of one's feminine nature"; (2) to practice humility,

benevolence, and quietude; and (3) to practice "non-desire," "contentment," and the "art of yielding." More specific were the Twelve Precepts of Lao-chün, taken from the *Hua-hu ching*. These prohibited meat, insults and curses, infidelity to one's word, theft, fornication, greed, hardheartedness, curiosity, idle talk, anger, and blood sacrifices.

Ko Hung asserted in his *Pao-p'u-tzu* that without the practice of virtues it was useless to wish to become an immortal. His text provided a list of good and evil deeds that remained the code of popular morality. Morality tracts (*shan-shu*) many of which were based on Ko Hung's list, began to appear in the twelfth century. The most famous are the *Kan-ying p'ien* (Book of Divine Responses to the Conduct of Men) and the *Kung-kuo ke* (Diagram of Meritorious Actions and Sins). Among the books of edification, the *pao-chüan* ("precious opuscles"), which appeared in the thirteenth century, have a distinctive character. They were circulated among the faithful of the more or less secret societies and were often condemned by the authorities as subversive. The monks living in communities had their own disciplinary codes. The rules enforced in the monastery of the Ch'üan-chen sect, for example, provided a suitable penalty for each fault, the most serious punishment being exclusion from the community.

The Taoists believed that at birth man was allotted a definite number of years and that the divinities responsible for human destinies kept a record of the actions of each individual. For each evil deed a specified number of years was subtracted from the original life span. The three principles of death, called the *san-shih* ("three worms"), were spies who dwelt in the Three Cinnabar Fields (three sectors of the body) and who at given times in the year reported to Heaven the sins of their host.

Under the influence of Buddhism, Taoism developed the notion of the afterlife whereby sinners must either undergo rebirth in nonhuman form or be condemned to suffer in the hells located under T'ai Shan or Feng-t'u. These hells were composed of series of tribunals similar to those of the imperial bureaucracy. In the temples, symbolic representations depicted the horrible punishments incurred by sinners. [For a survey of pre-Buddhist notions of the afterlife, see Afterlife, article on Chinese Concepts.]

Taoism in Literature and the Arts

The influence of Taoism extends to all areas of Chinese culture, most notably poetry, painting, and calligraphy. The literature of the ancient philosophers—Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, Lieh-tzu, and Huai-nan-tzu—was

universally admired by the Chinese intelligentsia. Even Confucian scholars, who were traditionally hostile to Taoist thought, praised, if not imitated, the literary style of the early Taoist texts. The *Chuang-tzu*, in particular, was constantly evoked for its innumerable anecdotes or poetic passages. Throughout history, authors were not only influenced by the style of these early Taoist texts, but their writings were infused with the spirit of Taoism. Indeed, a thorough understanding of poetry depends on the assimilation of the thought and writings of the ancient philosophers. The legends of the immortals proved to be rich sources for the philosophical and romantic allusions of later poets. The happy ramblings of the immortals (*yu-hsien*) were a particularly popular motif in the poems of the Six Dynasties period. The influence of Taoism was decidedly profound in the works of such famous poets as T'ao Yüan-ming, who was not a Taoist believer, and Li Po of the T'ang dynasty, who, while still a Taoist, is known to have been friends with many Buddhist monks. [See also Poetry, *article on Chinese Religious Poetry*.]

In Chinese painting, a Taoist influence is most obvious in the temple friezes and scrolls depicting the numerous deities of the Taoist pantheon. A second-century funerary scroll found in the Han tombs at Ma-wang-tui shows, among other figures, the deceased, divinities, animals, and a variety of objects distributed on three planes representing the celestial, human, and subterranean worlds. This Ma-wang-tui scroll provides evidence of the early tendency of mixing Taoist motifs with those of ancient mythology. For all its beauty and interest, the scroll must be classed as "primitive art," especially when compared to the sophistication of the later landscape paintings. This latter genre was imbued with the Taoist spirit, combining aesthetics and mysticism. [See also Temples, *article on Taoist Temple Compounds*, and Iconography, *article on Taoist Iconography*.]

An excellent example of this kind of landscape painting is described in the *Hua Yün-t'ai-shan chi* (Notes on Painting the Cloud Terrace Mountain) by the famous painter Ku K'ai-chih (345–406). The painting, which no longer survives, depicted Chang Tao-ling strolling through the mountainous landscape. From a note by Ku that accompanied the painting, we learn that it was originally conceived as a guide or map of the Cloud Terrace Mountain for wanderers, spiritual or otherwise. The goals of the landscape painter were formulated by a sixth-century theoretician. From this source we learn that the painter must aspire to "accord with the breath [*ch'i-yün*]." Here, the breath signifies the cosmic energy and the Tao present in all beings. This accord with universal harmony was obtained through nonaction and

"spontaneity" (*tzu-jan*), as noted in Chuang-tzu's famous anecdotes about artisans who had achieved the mastery of their skill through the interiorization of their movements.

Closely related to painting, calligraphy is perhaps the Taoist art *par excellence*. The practice of calligraphy is a spiritual exercise requiring long apprenticeship. Having reached the mastery of his art, the adept, without any apparent effort, produces graphic forms embodying cosmic rhythms. The revelatory texts of the Mao Shan sect were authenticated by T'ao Hung-ching on the basis of the Yang Hsi graphs. This visionary had in fact transcribed in this-worldly script cosmic graphs he had the privilege to see in the course of his ecstasies. Calligraphy was all the more important for a Taoist inasmuch as the duplicating of sacred texts was considered a meritorious deed. One of the most famous calligraphers, Wang Hsi-chih (321–379), an adept of the Celestial Masters sect, made a time-honored copy of the *Huang-t'ing ching* (Book of the Yellow Court) and, it is said, of the *Tao-te ching*. [See also Calligraphy, *article on Chinese and Japanese Calligraphy*.]

The Search for Longevity

Rather than being the exclusive prerogative of the Taoists, the ideal of longevity was deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition. Longevity, or at least living out one's allotted life span, was considered proof of sainthood. For the most part, the methods used to attain longevity centered on avoiding the depletion of vital spirits.

While the Taoists accepted the anatomy described by traditional Chinese medicine, they nonetheless held peculiar notions about physiology. They conceived of the body as a microcosm that incorporated the totality of the universe, that is, Heaven, earth, and the celestial bodies. In accordance with ancient symbolism, the head was round like Heaven, the feet were square like the earth, and the 360 joints represented the 360 days of the Chinese year, the eyes were the sun and moon, and the "five viscera" (lungs, heart, spleen, liver, and kidneys) represented the Five Elements and the Five Sacred Mountains. Universe within the universe, the body was often depicted as a mountain or a gourd, the Taoist symbol of the cosmos. Taoist cosmology holds that before the beginning there existed a kind of cosmic energy, referred to as the *yün-ch'i* ("primordial breath") and synonymous with the invisible and with the void. This primordial breath split into *yin* and *yang*, the gross and pure elements that, respectively, formed Heaven and earth. Each being hides within itself this primordial breath. Since its presence is needed to maintain life, and since its exhaustion brings about death,

the goal of many Taoist practices was the preservation of the *yüan-ch'i*.

The most important elements in the body were considered the *ch'i* (breath, ether), *ching* (essence), and *shen* (spirit). *Ch'i* originally referred to the vapor emitted in the process of cooking rice but came to mean breath, the air that is inhaled, vital energy, or emanations. [See *Ch'i*.] *Ching* signifies sifted, unadulterated rice, and by extension, the pure, subtle essence, concentration of the mind, and spermatic essence. *Shen*, which referred to sacred power, came to denote spirits, divinities, temples, and talismans. The Taoists believed that *ch'i*, *ching*, and *shen* were present throughout the body but were especially concentrated in the *tan-t'ien* (three "cinnabar fields"), the psychic centers in the head, heart, and just below the navel.

Although the Three Cinnabar Fields were centers of life, they were also inhabited by malevolent spirits called the "three corpses" or "three worms" (*san-shih*), whose main goal was to bring about death. Popular belief held that the *san-shih* left the body on specified days of the year in order to denounce their hosts to Ssu-ming (the god of destiny), who punished the transgressor by shortening his life span. Most Taoist practices and precepts aimed at both neutralizing the ruinous power of the "three worms" and preventing the three *hun* "souls" and the seven *p'o* "souls" from leaving the body. The *hun*, *yang* in nature, had a tendency to return to Heaven, whereas the *p'o*, which were *yin*, tried to return to earth. The departure of the souls from the body meant death. Thus, the *Huai-nan-tzu* describes the Taoist saint as one who preserves the *hun* and *p'o* souls through ataraxy and who avoids all agitation of the vital spirits. Ataraxy was attained by means of concentration and interior contemplation; vital spirits were preserved with disciplines such as respiratory and gymnastic techniques, dietary practices, sexual hygiene and the absorption of mineral, vegetal, or alchemical drugs. [See also *Soul*, article on Chinese Concepts.]

Methods of Inner Contemplation. Perhaps the most important of the Taoist contemplative practices was that of *shou-i* ("preserving the One" or "meditating on the One"). Derived from the phrase *pao-i* ("to embrace the One") in Lao-tzu's *Tao-te ching*, *shou-i* came to represent many different methods of spiritual concentration. Although the One is identified with the Tao, *hsü* ("emptiness") and *wu* ("nonbeing"), it is at the same time understood as the cosmos, the mother, the matrix, the primordial breath, and the origin of all beings. Thus we read in the *Lao-tzu*: "The Tao gave birth to the One . . . the One to the Three, and the Three to the Ten Thousand Things" (chap. 42). According to a late Taoist def-

inition, "to preserve the One" is to return to the origin, the root, and to unite with the Tao. This formula served to explain the oneness and multiplicity of the Tao.

In practice, these abstract ideas were given concrete forms. The One was represented by the anthropomorphic images used in visualization exercises. The *T'ai-p'ing ching* alludes to a process of concentrating on the "light of the One" (*shou i-ming*). Another work presents the One as T'ai-shang Lao-chün (Lao-tzu divinized and the Tao personified). In most cases, however, the One is visualized in its dynamic aspect, that is, in the form of three divinities symbolizing the "three primordial breaths" and otherwise called the San I ("three ones"). It is believed that this triad, later called the San Yüan ("three primordials") dwells inside man in the Three Cinnabar Fields and inhabits the "three superior heavens." By visualization, the adept causes the triad to descend into his own body. According to T'ao Hung-ching, a famous Taoist of Mao Shan, these divinities inhabit the body of each individual, but they return permanently to Heaven if the individual does not practice visualization. The departure of the divinities brings about illness and even death. However, this visualization is possible only for initiates, since to visualize the divinities one must know their names, physical appearance, and complete attributes.

The related practice of "preserving the nine" consists of concentration on the "nine palaces" in the head that are the abodes of the divinities of the *chiu-t'ien* ("nine heavens"). These nine divinities are derived from the original triad, the numbers nine and three representing the totality of the One. Unlike the Three Cinnabar Fields, which are inhabited by the Three Divinities, the Nine Palaces are empty. It is the practice of visualization that enables the Nine Divinities to descend from the Nine Heavens.

Other methods of "preserving the One" are related to the visualization of the *tz'u-i* ("feminine One") in the form of a triad of feminine divinities and, at the same time, the visualization of T'ai-i ("supreme One"), an ancient male divinity that resides in the Pei-tou, or Big Dipper, and in the head.

Visualization of the gods of the body. Each point and organ of the body possesses a subtle energy that the Taoists represented with a divinity. These divinities were arranged hierarchically into a celestial bureaucracy whose ranks, posts, and functions were as complex as those of the imperial bureaucracy on which it was modeled. The recitation of certain sacred texts and the simultaneous practice of visualization exercises served to actualize these divinities in the body. Famous works such as the *Huang-t'ing ching* (Book of the Yellow

Court) and the *Ta-tung chen-ching* (Book of Great Profundity) provide detailed information about the divinities, their personal names, their dress, their size, and so on. Besides the Three Ones, the most important divinities were those of the five viscera, who, according to the *T'ai-p'ing ching*, keep the registers of life and death. Through visualization the adept strives to have his name removed from the register of death and inscribed in that of life. The ritual recitation is often preceded by the exercises for "preserving the One."

Visualization of the heavenly bodies and the planets.

Another of the Taoist contemplative techniques is the visualization of the heavenly bodies and planets. The adept visualizes either the light of the heavenly bodies as they descend into his body or the inner light that he "preserves" in, or directs to, a particular point in his body (*lien-hsing*). These exercises make the adept's body progressively luminous like the heavenly bodies. The *Pao-p'u-tzu* describes the technique whereby the *chen-jen* ("perfect man") preserves and purifies his body. The sun and moon rise up to the head where they unite; the elixir, sweet as honey, then descends into the mouth; the adept swallows the elixir and sends it to the *ming-men* ("door of destiny") located in the navel, where he preserves it.

Visualization of circulation of the sun and moon within the adept's body corresponds exactly to their actual spatio-temporal course (daily, monthly, and annual). The sun and moon are often visualized according to the color of their radiance or in the guise of colored breaths, generally red or crimson for the sun and yellow for the moon. The visualization is also accomplished by the absorption of the rays of the heavenly bodies.

Predominant among the exercises for the visualization of stars and constellations were those involving the Pei-tou. For the Taoists, the Pei-tou is made up of seven visible and two invisible stars. Owing to its circumpolar position as the central axis of Heaven it was always visible. Its handle indicated the progress of the year and determined the four seasons and the degrees of Heaven. Visualization of the Pei-tou was practiced in different ways, either in communal rituals or in individual exercises. The adept marked the place of the stars of the constellation in the holy enclosure and then proceeded to "pace the stars." Each time he stepped on one of them he visualized its divinity with all its attributes. The devotee accompanied this practice by holding his breath, swallowing, and reciting various invocations. The walk was performed according to the "steps of Yü," a cosmogonic dance performed by the legendary hero Yü the Great of the Hsia dynasty. Yü was supposed to have limped and jumped as he walked, dragging one

foot after the other, in the manner of a sorcerer in a trance. The *Pao-p'u-tzu* describes the "steps of Yü" as a process to be used before entering the mountains. [See also Yü.]

The Pei-tou visualizations were believed to help the adept to ascend to paradise. In the course of the visualizations he crossed the gates of the three celestial passes to enter the Yü-ching Heaven, where he undertook an excursion through paradise. Other exercises required the practitioner to visualize himself lying in the light of the Pei-tou or to visualize the divinities of each star nourishing him by the radiance of their light. The adept could also see himself ascending to paradise in the company of the Three Ones (i.e., the three divinities residing in the Cinnabar Fields).

Breathing Techniques and Gymnastics. In conjunction with contemplation and meditation, breathing exercises, gymnastics, and dietetics were important techniques for the attainment of longevity. The efficacy of such practices was believed to lie in their clearing the channels of circulation, freeing the body of impurities, and nourishing the primordial breaths.

Embryonic breathing (t'ai-hsi). Among breathing exercises, the process known as *t'ai-hsi* ("embryonic breathing") occupied a central place. The interpretation of this ancient expression differed according to the school and the period. Embryonic breathing is often described as "the art of breathing through the umbilical cord like the fetus in its mother's womb." Following one definition, it consisted primarily of retaining the breath (*pi-ch'i*), a technique that resembles the *prāṇayama* of the Indian yogins. In his *Pao-p'u-tzu*, Ko Hung advocated that beginners retain their breath for a period of 120 ordinary respirations, and that advanced adepts try to reach as many as 1,000 respirations. Having attained this stage, one became an immortal. According to other texts, embryonic breathing involved the retention and absorption of the breath (*fu-ch'i*, "feeding upon breath"), a process also used in dietetics. The absorbed breath may be either the external or internal breath. Since the retention of breath was often ruinous to the health, some masters replaced it with "tenuous breathing." This process, attributed to the Indian monk and legendary first patriarch of the Ch'an school, Bodhidharma, advocated concentration on breathing followed by the practice of *nei-kuan* ("inner vision"). Through "tenuous breathing" (*mien-mien jo ts'un*) the adept achieved the return to the Origin, for, says one text, "the common man breathes by the throat, the sage inhales the breath and preserves it in the ocean of breath." The adept practices long, slow breathing until the day when his breathing becomes so imperceptible

that a feather placed on his nose remains unmoved. At this point it is said that breathing has "ceased." Some interpret this statement to mean that the adept then breathes through the navel, whereas others believe that he breathes through the heels, like the sage referred to in the *Chuang-tzu*.

Guiding the breath (*tao-yin*). The ancient technique of guiding and directing the breath is a combination of meditation practices, breathing techniques, and gymnastic exercises that make the body supple. The most ancient of these methods seems to have been the "dance of the five animals" mentioned to the *Chuang-tzu*. It involved imitating certain movements attributed to the tiger, bear, monkey, deer, and owl. The gestures were accompanied by mental concentration, which directed the breath to the different parts of the body so as to insure a better circulation of the blood and breaths. In the course of centuries, other gestures were added and the techniques of *tao-yin* became more and more refined.

To be most effective, *tao-yin* had to be accompanied by a diet that prohibited cereal-based foodstuffs, for such vulgar foods were thought to strengthen the "three corpses," or principles of death within the body of man.

Sexual Practices (*Fang-chung*). Among the recipes for longevity, those related to the *fang-chung shu* ("art of the bedroom") were particularly important. The *Han shu* (*I-wen chih*) lists eight works on the subject. This art, attributed to ancient sovereigns, was supposed to enable one to reduce one's desires in order to enable the adept to attain longevity. Like the gymnastic and breathing practices, the art of *fang-chung* first developed independently of Taoism. In a recently excavated tomb near Ch'ang-sha an important text of the subject dating to the early Han dynasty was found beside another text dealing with *tao-yin*. The practices described in these early works are similar to those discussed in other sources. It was believed that by avoiding ejaculation during coitus the adept made the sperm (*ching*) circulate through internal channels up to the head, in order to "repair the brain." The sperm was thought to circulate with the breath from the Lower Cinnabar Field to the Higher Cinnabar Field, where it strengthened the power of the brain. In this way, *yin* energy was transformed into *yang* energy. For this reason the immortals were often represented with particularly highly developed brains. Knowledge of the art of *fang-chung* was indispensable for the success of the other techniques of longevity. If these arts are rarely discussed it is because passages treating them were often expurgated from the texts; moreover, the *fang-chung* techniques were most likely the object of oral teaching.

Alchemy. Among the Taoist techniques of immortality, alchemy is perhaps the most significant. Two types of alchemy may be distinguished: *wai-tan* ("external alchemy," also called laboratory alchemy) and *nei-tan* ("inner alchemy"), the concoction, in meditation, of internal elixirs of immortality. The former was an ancient technique developed by the *fang-shih* ("prescription-masters"), the heirs of the ancient smelters, metallurgists, and magicians. *Nei-tan* gained popularity during the Middle Ages, when Taoist adepts began to apply alchemical theories to the body, using other techniques of longevity, such as meditation, breathing, dietetics, and gymnastics. The alchemy practiced by the *fang-shih* was closely related to the Yin-yang Five Elements theories expounded by Tsou Yen. Under the patronage of Duke Hsüan (342–323) of the state of Ch'i, Tsou Yen wrote a history of the succession of the five mythical emperors. This work begins with Huang-ti, the legendary emperor revered by the *fang-shih*. Huang-ti was associated with the arts of the anvil and fire and is praised as the smelter of nine magical caldrons and the vanquisher of the monster Ch'ih-yu, the symbol of the anvil, who was thought to eat metals. Huang-ti was also credited with inventing techniques of longevity. He was considered the patron of medicine and pharmacopoeia and the inventor of the calendar, divination, and cooking. It is thus not surprising that the first mention of Chinese alchemy was linked with the cult of fire and with the *fang-shih*. [See Huang-ti.]

During the Han dynasty the magician Li Shao-chün persuaded Emperor Wu to worship the "god of the stove." Through this sacrifice, Li Shao-chün hoped to be able to transmute cinnabar into gold in order to produce magical vessels that would bestow immortality on any person who ate or drank from them. [See the biography of Li Shao-chün.] Physical immortality was therefore the first goal of Chinese alchemy, although later its techniques were used to produce artificial gold and silver for profit. Ancient terminology, however, established a clear distinction between these two kinds of alchemy. The word *tan* (cinnabar, pill, elixir, and the color red) came to mean alchemy in general. It is used in very important alchemical expressions like *chin-tan* (gold cinnabar, gold elixir, alchemy), *lien-tan* (smelting or purification of cinnabar or elixir), and later *wai-tan* and *nei-tan*. Cinnabar, as well as some other natural stones and drugs, had been associated with the notion of longevity since antiquity. An early Taoist work, the *Lieh-hsien chuan* (Biography of Immortals; second century CE), describes cinnabar as rendering the body of one who ingests it both immortal and as red as the sun and as brilliant as the stars. The concepts of longevity

and immortality were also related to the terminology of Taoist physiology, as for example in the expression *tan-t'ien* ("cinnabar field"), which refers to the three central points of the body.

Alchemical theory. The theory of alchemy encompasses the whole range of naturalistic thought and Chinese conceptions of the universe, including the permutation laws of the *I ching*, the notions of *yin* and *yang*, the Five Elements, the climatic changes, and the divisions of time. Although alchemical experiments gave rise to numerous important, but incidental, discoveries (such as gunpowder), the main goal remained the discovery of an elixir that would make the body imperishable. It was believed that, given sufficient time (some texts speak of 4320 years), stones and metals would be transmuted into cinnabar or gold. The alchemist obtained the same result with his equipment by accelerating the process of transformation. The ingredients of alchemy were presumed to possess magical affinities. They were classified as either *yin* or *yang*, and a "theory of categories" gradually developed according to which an amalgam would be composed by mixing only those ingredients belonging to the same group.

The "marriage" of ingredients was shrouded in mystery. The rituals associated with alchemy included selection of an auspicious location, demarcation of the holy precinct, installation of the laboratory, and consecration of the utensils. The alchemical process itself was accompanied by imprecations, invocations, talismans, prayers, and fasts. The alchemist performed both internal and external purification. Through his work he became the master of time and space, for in addition to choosing and blending the ingredients, he supervised the process of transmutation in the microcosm—symbolized by the oven and the cauldron. By increasing and reducing the intensity of fire (called *huo-hou*, "fire phasing") the alchemist imitated the cosmic rhythms. In accordance with the symbolic system, he could also accelerate the process to suit his own purposes. Thus, the transformation of metal, which would take thousands of years in the natural world, could be accomplished by the alchemist in a year, a month, a day, or even an instant. The sublimation of the ingredients was also connected with the notions of cyclical renewal and the return of all things to their most perfect state or origin. This is implicit in the names of some elixirs listed in the *Pao-p'u-tzu*, such as *huan-tan* ("returned cinnabar") or *chiu-chuan huan-tan* ("cinnabar returned nine times"). [See also Alchemy, article on Chinese Alchemy.]

Development of modern techniques: internal alchemy (*nei-tan*). It was primarily under the T'ang and Sung dy-

nasties that the technique of *nei-tan* spread. During the Sung dynasty, *nei-tan* represented a syncretistic system whereby the ancient techniques of longevity were practiced under the guise of alchemical theories and language. But it is difficult to speak of only one technique of *nei-tan* because each master and each Taoist group devised its own system.

The development of *nei-tan* in the Sung dynasty was marked by the appearance of a series of prose texts attributed to the semilegendary immortals Chung-li Ch'üan and Lü Tung-pin (thus, the abbreviated expression Chung-Lü), which clearly describe a system of *nei-tan*, and by the emergence of a poetic alchemical tradition distinctly influenced by Ch'an Buddhism. Both of these *nei-tan* traditions relied on two works, still influential today: the *Pi ch'uan cheng-yang chen-jen ling-pao pi-fa* (Secret Transmission of the Ultimate Methods of the Ling-pao of the Perfect Man of the True Yang; eleventh century) and the *Wu-chen p'ien* (Book of the Realization of Perfection) by Chang Po-tuan (d. 1082). The commentator of the *Wu-chen p'ien*, Weng Pao-kuang, was himself influenced by the Chung-Lü texts, using the terminology and notions found there to explain the *Wu-chen p'ien*. In his preface, dated 1173, he claims to divulge the secret teachings of Chang Po-tuan concerning the great medicine of the gold elixir. To refine the elixir one must first take the primordial breath as the basis, then establish the *yin* cauldron and *yang* store, and finally, gather into the cauldron the Primordial Breath, which will thereupon form a parcel the size of a grain of millet. It is this grain that is called *chin-tan* ("gold elixir"). One then swallows the *chin-tan* and guides it into the five viscera, where it will attract the breath (*ch'i*) and essence (*ching*) of the body and immobilize them, thereby preventing their escape. Afterward one induces the *chin-tan* to circulate, thereby nourishing the breath and essence, which then transform into a gold liqueur.

One day this liqueur will rise from the coccyx and reach the *ni-wan* (probably from an early transcription of the Sanskrit word *nirvāṇa*) in the brain: this is the *chin-i huan-tan* ("gold liqueur returned cinnabar"). When the *chin-i huan-tan*, shaped like the egg of a sparrow, descends into the mouth, it is then swallowed and guided to the Lower Cinnabar Field where it coalesces to become the "holy embryo." After a ten-month gestation period, the Holy Embryo will be born in the form of an earthly immortal (a rank inferior to that of the celestial immortals). Having reached this stage, the adept must withdraw from the world and practice *pao-i* ("embrace unity") for nine years, at the end of which time body and spirit will both be perfect.

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Translated from French by Charles Le Blanc

The Taoist Religious Community

There is no trace in the historical records of any organized Taoist community before the Latter Han dynasty (25–220 CE). Among the various politico-religious movements that sprang up during the second century as the dynasty went into decline, the most famous are the Way of the Heavenly Masters (T'ien-shih Tao) and the Way of Great Peace (T'ai-p'ing Tao). Although the historical evidence linking these two groups is slim, both clearly aimed at the total transformation of society and the establishment of a Taoist utopia; both were founded by people surnamed Chang, probably because the Chang clan was thought to be descended from the Yellow Emperor, who, together with Lao-tzu, was revered in Han Taoism as the divine source of Taoist teachings; both organized the faithful into cosmologically determined units; and both considered sickness a sign of sin and therefore prescribed confession as a prerequisite for healing.

Han Period. At least partly inspired by a *T'ai-p'ing ching* (Scripture of Great Peace), presented to the throne during the reign of the emperor Shun (r. 126–145 CE), the Way of Great Peace was founded by three brothers who called themselves the generals of the lords, respectively, of Heaven, Earth, and Man. In addition to healing by means of confession and "symbol-water" (*fu-shui*), they and their subordinates spread the message that a new era, the era of Yellow Heaven, was about to begin. Having organized their adherents, known as the Yellow Turbans, into thirty-six military regions (*fang*) covering eight of the twelve provinces of the empire (all of eastern China), they rose in revolt in the first year of a new sixty-year cycle, a *chia-tzu* year (184 CE). It took government forces a full ten months to crush the revolt. [See *T'ai-p'ing and the biography of Chang Chüeh*.]

The Way of the Heavenly Masters was founded, according to the mid-third century *Cheng-i fa-wen t'ien-shih chiao-chieh k'o-ching* (Scripture of the Rules and Teachings of the Heavenly Masters, a Text of the Method of Orthodox Unity), by Chang Tao-ling. He is there said to have received, in the year 142, from the Newly Manifested Lord Lao (Hsin-ch'ü Lao-chün), the "Way of the Covenant of Orthodox Unity with the Powers" (*cheng-i meng-wei tao*). He set up twenty-four "governances" (*chih*) and "divided and spread the energies of the mysterious (celestial), the original (terrestrial), and the beginning (the Way) in order to govern the people." The earliest list of these governances appears in the late sixth-century *Wu-shang pi-yao* (Essentials of the Supreme Secrets): it places all but one of the governances in what is now Szechuan Province and clearly confirms that the movement started in the western part of that province.

According to the dynastic histories, Chang Tao-ling was succeeded by his son Heng, and Heng by his son Lu. Chang Lu controlled northeastern Szechuan for over thirty years, until he surrendered in 215 to Ts'ao Ts'ao, future founder of the Wei dynasty (220–264). Ts'ao Ts'ao gave him the title "General Who Controls the South" (*chen-nan Chiang-chün*), enfeoffed him, and married his son P'eng-tsu to Lu's daughter. It was probably at this time that the last of the twenty-four governances was located in the capital city of Lo-yang and that the Way of Orthodox Unity (Cheng-i Meng-wei Tao) became the dominant religion in the state of Wei. It remains to this day the most important form of religious Taoism.

Six Dynasties Period. The dynastic histories note that the adherents of Chang Tao-ling were called "rice rebels" because a tax of five bushels of rice was levied on initiates. Throughout the Period of Disunion (220–589), the nickname Way of the Five Bushels of Rice (Wu-tou-mi Tao) continued to be applied to the "church" of the Heavenly Masters. Its original organization consisted of a hierarchy of lay people called "demon soldiers" (*kuei-tsu*), low-level priests called "demon clerks" (*kuei-li*), higher-level priests called "libationers" (*chi-chiu*), and chief priests called "head libationers." Each of the libationers was in charge of an "inn of equity" (*i-she*). Said to be like the postal relay stations of the Han government, these inns were open to travelers, and free "meat and rice of equity" were supplied them.

That the "church" had in fact virtually supplanted the state may be seen from the fact that justice was administered by the libationers. Minor infractions were punished by the obligation to repair the routes between the inns: the word *tao* means "way, route," and free circulation of goods, persons, and ideas was considered essential to a society built on Taoist principles.

The basic institutions and attitudes of the movement all reveal its utopian character. Perhaps most striking in this regard is the equal treatment accorded to men and women—both could become libationers—and to Chinese and tribal populations. There were, as a result, a large number of these tribal people among the adepts of the Heavenly Masters. The various titles given the leaders of the movement, and in particular that of libationer, were taken from the Han system of local administration, where they referred to individuals selected locally for their moral qualities and their wisdom. The hierarchy envisaged was one that was communally oriented and merit based. Although the position of Heavenly Master was in later times a hereditary one, it is not certain that this was true at first; until as late as the Five Dynasties period (907–960) there are many references to heavenly masters of surnames other than Chang. [See the biographies of Chang Tao-ling and Chang Lu.]

In addition to running the inns of equity, the libationers were charged with the task of explaining the *Lao-tzu* (*Tao-te ching*) to the faithful. Part of a commentary on the *Lao-tzu*, the *Hsiang-erh chu*, found in the Tunhuang caves at the beginning of this century, is generally attributed to Chang Lu. The commentary insists above all on the moral conduct of the faithful: "Who practices the Tao and does not infringe the commandments will be profound as the Tao itself; Heaven and Earth are like the Tao, kind to the good, unkind to the wicked; therefore people must accumulate good works so that their spirit can communicate with Heaven."

The "demon clerks"—so called, no doubt, because they had direct charge of the "demon soldiers"—had as their chief task the recitation of prayers for the sick. After the sick person had first meditated on his sins in a "quiet room" (*ching-shih*), the demon clerk would write down the person's name and the purpose of his confession. He drew up this "handwritten document for the Three Officers" in three copies, one to be sent to each of these governors of Heaven, Earth, and the Waters. It was for this service that the faithful contributed five bushels of rice, as well as the paper and brush for preparing the documents.

An early Taoist text, the *T'ai-chen k'o* (Regulations of the Most Perfect) states that every household should set up a meditation room and place the list of the names of its members in five bushels filled with "faith-rice" (*hsin-mi*). Every year, at the beginning of the tenth month, all the faithful were to gather at the governance of the Heavenly Master himself and contribute their faith-rice to the Heavenly Granary. They would then go in to pay their respects to the Heavenly Master and listen to an explanation of the rituals, ordinances, and command-

ments. The family registers of all the faithful were to be brought up to date at this time, that is, births, deaths, and marriages were to be recorded, so that the centrally held registers agreed with the family registers.

Similar gatherings were held in the first and seventh months, the former to determine, according to their respective merits, the advancement of the officers of the movement, the latter that of the lay people. On each of these three "days of meeting" (*hui-jih*), linked respectively to the Three Officers (San Kuan) of Heaven, Earth, and the Waters, a "memorial stating the merit [of each and all] was sent up." These days of meeting, especially the grand assembly of the tenth month, are clearly the origin of the community Offerings (*chiao*), which continue to constitute, to this day, the most elevated service performed by Taoist priests at the request of temple communities. [See also Chiao.]

Progress in this vast meritocracy was marked by the graded transmission of a whole series of commandments and registers. According to the *Regulations of the Most Perfect*, the first series of commandments was transmitted to seven-year-old children. Starting at the age of eight, they could receive a register with the name and description of one general on it, then the register of ten generals at age twenty. Next came the registers of seventy-five generals, of which there were two, a feminine (*yin*) one giving control over seventy-five immortals (*hsien*), and a masculine (*yang*) one, to which were attached the same number of potentates (*ling*). Anyone who had received both of these had completed lay initiation and could go on to become an officer in the church. The *Regulations* state simply that these two registers are to be transmitted successively to the same person. It is probable, however, that the second transmission occurred only after successful accomplishment of the rites of sexual union called "mingling the energies" (*ho-ch'i*), for the reform-minded Heavenly Master K'ou Ch'ien-chih (d. 448), in forbidding the practice of these rites by other than married couples in his *New Regulations*, refers explicitly to the "registers of male and female officers."

In general, each additional register increased the adept's power over the invisible world of the spirits and added thereby to his understanding of the Covenant of Orthodox Unity with the Powers. To enter the Way of the Heavenly Masters meant to worship only those powers enrolled, like the adepts themselves, on official registers and to cease to worship the "gods of ordinary people" (*su-shen*). According to the *Hsiang-erh* commentary, "the Way is most venerable, it is subtle and hidden, it has no face nor form; one can only follow its commandments, not know or see it." The ultimate goal was to know this invisible way, to "hold on" to its mys-

terious—"orthodox"—Unity. This required forswearing all contact with the multiple "heterodox cults" (*yin-ssu*) current among the people. Throughout the Period of Disunion and, in somewhat diluted form, down to the present day, Orthodox Unity Taoists have been, like the Confucians, implacable opponents of these cults.

This well-formed, cosmologically comprehensive ecclesiastical organization survived, more or less intact and with appropriate modifications, through the T'ang dynasty (618–907). One of the reasons for its survival was its readiness to come to terms, in the manner of Chang Lu, with the state. The Scripture of the Teachings of the Heavenly Master cited above explicitly criticizes the Yellow Turbans as a "perverse way" (*hsieh-tao*) responsible for the death of millions. The same text states that the Tao, that is, Lord Lao, had often in the past appeared as the "teacher of kings and emperors." But after his "new manifestation" in the year 142, he would appear no more, for "Lord Lao had then bestowed on Chang Tao-ling the position of Heavenly Master." Now, in the year 255, the Heavenly Master urges the faithful to obey the "pure government of the Wei."

The power and the appropriateness of this conception in the context of the Confucian state may be seen from the fact that in 442 the emperor T'ai-wu (r. 424–452) of the Northern Wei (386–535) became the first of a long line of emperors to "receive registers" (*shou-lu*), that is, to receive a Taoist initiation that was tantamount to ecclesiastical (divine) investiture. Emperors—especially, but not exclusively, those favorable to Taoism—perpetuated this practice until the end of the Northern Sung dynasty (960–1126).

The man who thus invested the emperor T'ai-wu was K'ou Ch'ien-chih. In 425, K'ou was named Heavenly Master and his *New Regulations*, partly of Buddhist inspiration, was promulgated throughout the realm. In 431, in what may be considered a forerunner of the system of officially sponsored abbeys (*kuan*) begun under the T'ang and continued through the Ch'ing (1644–1911), altars (*t'an*) were set up and priests assigned to officiate on them in every province. [See the *biography of K'ou Ch'ien-chih*.]

It is also noteworthy that the first great persecution of Buddhism occurred under the reign of the emperor T'ai-wu: inspired by K'ou's Confucian friend, Ts'ui Hao (381–450), and with K'ou's reluctant cooperation, a decree promulgated in the year 444 attacked, in the same breath, the "heterodox cults," with their mediums and sorcerers, and Buddhism. Although the proscription of Buddhism that followed in the year 446 was rescinded by a new emperor in 454, these events proved to be the

opening round of a long competition for imperial favor. In southern China, in 517, the emperor Wu (r. 502–549) of the Liang dynasty (502–557) abolished all Taoist temples and ordered the return of Taoist priests to the laity. [See the *biography of Liang Wu-ti*.] In the year 574, after a series of debates between representatives of the "three teachings" (*san-chiao*)—Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism—the emperor Wu (r. 560–578) of the Northern Chou dynasty (557–581) proscribed Buddhism and made Taoism the state religion. Taoists were later instrumental in bringing about the suppression of Buddhism by the T'ang emperor Wu-tsung (r. 841–847) in the year 845 and its reduction to subordinate status by the emperors Hui-tsung (r. 1101–1126) of the Northern Sung dynasty, in 1119, and T'ai-tsu (r. 1206–1229) of the Yüan dynasty, starting in 1224.

The most telling arguments used in these various conflicts were, on the Buddhist side, that the only authentic Taoist works were those of its philosophers, the *Lao-tzu* and the *Chuang-tzu* and, on the Taoist side, that Buddhism was a foreign religion suitable only for barbarians. The court debates themselves often focused on a Taoist text called the *Hua-hu ching* (Scripture of the Conversion of the Barbarians). The idea that Lao-tzu, at the end of his life, had gone into the western regions beyond China and there transformed himself into the Buddha in order to convert the barbarians is first attested in a memorial presented to the throne in the year 166 by one Hsiang K'ai. At that time, Buddhism was still perceived in China as a form of Taoism, and so the legend was useful, even complimentary to the Buddhists. But by the time the libationer Wang Fou wrote the first known (now lost) version of the *Hua-hu ching* around the year 300, Buddhism had become an entirely autonomous force in Chinese life, and the compliment had turned into a polemic slur.

The Taoists rarely won the court debates, and the *Hua-hu ching* was regularly proscribed over the centuries, starting in 668 with its suppression by T'ang Kao-tsung (r. 650–684). But before the work disappeared definitively from circulation, after Yüan Shih-tsu (r. 1260–1295) ordered all copies burned in 1281, it had served for nearly a millennium as a means of conveying a central Taoist conviction, based on many a passage in the *Lao-tzu*, that the Tao embraced all things, large and small, high and low, Chinese and barbarian. To the Taoists it followed logically that "Taoism"—the "teaching of the Way" (*tao-chiao*)—included within itself all other teachings.

Outrageous from the Buddhist point of view, Taoist universalism was most attractive to Chinese emperors. The emperor Wu of the Northern Chou dynasty, for ex-

ample, began the decree in which he ordered the foundation of the Abbey for Communicating with the Way (T'ung-tao Kuan) a mere eleven days after proscribing Buddhism as follows: "The supreme Way is vast and profound: it envelops both being and nonbeing; it informs highest heaven and darkest hell." According to Buddhist sources, the people appointed to staff this state abbey were all "enthusiasts of the *Lao-tzu* and the *Chuang-tzu* and proponents of the unity of the Three Teachings."

Another expression of Taoist universalism constantly attacked by the Buddhists was its regular "fabrication" of new texts by plagiarizing Buddhist *sūtras*. This criticism applied especially to the Ling-pao ("numinous treasure") scriptures that began to appear in southeastern China in the 390s. The most important of these texts, the *Wu-liang tu-chen ching* (Scripture of Universal Salvation), may be described as pure "Mahāyāna Taoism." From start to finish, it has the flavor of a Buddhist scripture, but the revealed words come from the mouth, not of the Buddha, the "World-honored One" (*shih-tsun*), but from that of the "Heaven-honored One of the Primordial Beginning" (Yüan-shih T'ien-tsun), that is, the Tao. These texts also take over Buddhist notions of karmic retribution and introduce Buddhist-inspired rituals for the dead.

Some twenty years prior to the appearance of the first Ling-pao texts, another group of texts had been revealed in the same part of China that was to play an extremely important role in the court Taoism of the T'ang dynasty. Owing little to Buddhism, this new Shang-ch'ing ("high purity") literature completely transformed the methods of the traditional, eremitic Taoism of the South—alchemy, gymnastics, diet, visualization, and sexual practices—by incorporating them into a complex system revealed in ecstatic prose and poetry by a kind of automatic writing during séances. Recitation of these sacred texts and visualization of the spirits described in them became the high roads to spiritual realization in this movement.

The milieu in which these revelations occurred was that of the southern aristocracy, a group that recently had been supplanted by émigrés fleeing North China after the barbarian capture of the capital city of Lo-yang in 311. These émigrés, who founded the Eastern Chin dynasty (317–420), with its capital in Chien-k'ang (modern Nanking), brought with them the Way of the Heavenly Masters, and many Southerners—among them the father and uncle of Hsü Mi (303–373), one of the main recipients of the new revelations—had adopted the Northerners' religion. Wei Hua-ts'un (d. 334) herself, the "teacher in the beyond" of the inspired calligrapher of

the revealed texts, one Yang Hsi (330–?), had been, during her life on earth, a libationer. Hsü Mi continued to employ his father's libationer, Li Tung. One of the "real persons" (*chen-jen*) who was revealing to Hsü the new methods for spiritual (as opposed to physical) rites of union criticized Hsü for his excessive use of the old methods of the Heavenly Masters: "The method for mingling the energies is not practiced by the Real Persons; it is an inferior Way that destroys the orthodox energies of the real vapors." Also, illness was attributed not to sin and consequent attacks by demons, but to physiological causes, and massages and drugs were therefore prescribed instead of the confession of sins. [See Chen-jen.] The demons of the Shang-ch'ing texts are those forces that try to keep the adept from achieving the level of concentration necessary for the spiritual union with a divine spouse, which alone can lead to "realization" (immortality).

It was probably a second- or third-generation practitioner of the new techniques of realization who first classified Taoist literature into the "three caverns" (*santung*). Traditionally, it is Lu Hsiu-ching (406–477) who is credited with this hierarchical classification, which places Shang-ch'ing texts first, Ling-pao second, and San-huang (Three Sovereigns) last. The San-huang scriptures, of which only small portions survive, represent the talismanic, exorcistic literature of popular Taoism. It may be that they represent the tradition of the Yellow Turbans, for the Three Sovereigns are those of Heaven, Earth, and Man, whose lords the brothers Chang served as generals.

Heavenly Master texts are conspicuously absent from this classification, but it may well be that they were felt by Lu, who is one of the most important liturgists in Taoist history, to be unnecessary: not only would he have shared, as a practitioner of Shang-ch'ing methods, the dim views of the sexual rites of the Heavenly Masters, but also, and more importantly, he had incorporated the basic Heavenly Master liturgy into the Ling-pao texts, which he himself had edited. The Three Caverns thus constituted a complete and self-contained canon of exorcistic, liturgical, and meditational texts: together, they met every religious need, from that of a sick peasant requiring an exorcism to that of the refined aristocrat seeking sublime spiritual union. [See the *biography of Lu Hsiu-ching*.]

The idea of this tripartite division was no doubt inspired by the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, but whereas the division of the latter was generic, that of the Taoist was practical. Correspondingly graded registers, moreover, were created to accompany initiation into each successive level of texts. Five separate rituals of transmission

were included in the original *Wu-shang pi-yao* (compiled c. 580 at imperial behest): progressive initiation into the texts of the Three Caverns was preceded by the transmission of ten commandments (against murder, robbery, adultery, etc.) and of the *Lao-tzu*.

The addition of these two rituals of initiation was a clear sign that the idea of the Three Caverns, however coherent ideologically, was too far removed from the reality of Taoist practice to survive without major modifications. The other ritual chapters in the *Wu-shang pi-yao* provided further evidence of this: nine of ten chapters were taken directly from the texts of the Three Caverns, but one, the "mud and soot fast" (*t'u-tan chai*), a ritual of confession, required an officiant who was at once a "libationer belonging to a diocese of the Heavenly Masters" and a "ritual master of the Three Caverns." This situation was remedied, probably in the early T'ang period, by adding the Four Supplements (*ssu-fu*) to the Three Caverns. In the resulting initiation hierarchy, Orthodox Unity texts occupied, appropriately, the bottom of the seven rungs: emperors interested in Taoism invited Shang-ch'ing masters to court and received their registers, but the typical country priest required no more than the registers of Orthodox Unity—and the skills they implied. The remaining three of the Four Supplements also incorporated older Taoist traditions: alchemy, the Scripture of Great Peace, and the *Lao-tzu*.

T'ang Period. The T'ang dynasty saw the development of the more or less definitive forms not only of the Taoist canon, but also of Taoist messianism and monasticism. Closely related to its utopianism, Taoist messianism always had an intensely political character. In the second-century *Lao-tzu pien-hua ching* (Scripture of the Transformations of Lao-tzu), Lao-tzu puts himself forward as the messianic leader. But during the Period of Disunion, it was usually a "descendant" of Lao-tzu, the Perfect Lord (*chen-chün*) Li Hung, who excited the messianic hopes of the people. Thus K'ou Ch'ien-chih, in his *Lao-chün yin-sung chieh-ching* (Scripture of the Recitation of the Prescriptions of Lord Lao), complains that many false prophets "attack the orthodox Tao and deceive the common people. All they have to say is, 'Lord Lao should reign, Li Hung ought to manifest himself.'" Li Hung messianism even appears in the Shang-ch'ing scriptures: according to the *Shang-ch'ing hou-sheng tao-chün lieh-chi* (Shang-ch'ing Biography of the Latter-day Saint and Lord of the Way), Li Hung will appear in a *jen-ch'en* year (the twenty-ninth year of the sixty-year cycle, possibly 392) to establish a new world populated by the chosen and governed directly by the Latter-day Saint.

The centuries-old conflict between this popular Taoist

messianism and the Heavenly Master tendency—seen in the careers of both Chang Lu and K'ou Ch'ien-chih—to opt for the role of spiritual advisor to the emperor, found its perfect resolution in the T'ang dynasty when, at last, not Li Hung himself, but another family of the same surname as Lao-tzu, Li, came to power. This advent, moreover, is said to have been predicted toward the end of the Sui dynasty (589–618) by one Chi Hui, a Taoist who had entered the Abbey for Communication with the Way at the beginning of the Sui dynasty: "A descendant of the Lord Lao is about to rule the world, and our teaching will prosper." No sooner had T'ang Kao-tsu (r. 618–627) come to power than he asked Chi Hui to celebrate an Offering to pray for divine benediction on the dynasty. He then ordered the complete rebuilding of the Lou Kuan (Tower Abbey) and, in 620, changed its name to Tsung-sheng Kuan (Abbey of the Holy Ancestor). In 625, after holding a debate between representatives of the "three teachings," Kao-tsu ranked them in the order Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism.

Tower Abbey occupied the site where Lao-tzu was said to have revealed the *Lao-tzu* to the keeper of the pass, Yin Hsi, before disappearing into the western regions. Taoist sources make it out to have been a center for the cult of Lao-tzu already in the time of Ch'in Shih-huang (r. 221–209 BCE) and describe it as an important northern Taoist center throughout the Period of Disunion. In the T'ang dynasty, it became a dynastic cult center. In 679 its abbot, Yin Wen-ts'ao (d. 688) compiled, on the order of the emperor, the *Sheng chi* (Annals of the Saint) in ten volumes. Judging on the basis of its Sung-dynasty successor, the *Hun-yüan sheng chi* (Annals of the Saint of the Womb), this was a "salvation history" of Taoism, presented as the successive divine interventions of Lord Lao in human history. In 741, after the emperor Hsüan-tsung (r. 713–756) had encountered his divine ancestor in a dream, a statue corresponding to the face he had seen in his dream was found near the Abbey of the Holy Ancestor. The emperor had the statue set up in the inner palace for his own worship. He then ordered that similar statues be cast and sent to all the state-sponsored abbeys in the country, declared a general amnesty, and had an inscribed tablet set up at the Tsung-sheng Kuan to commemorate these events.

The first network of Taoist buildings was that associated with the twenty-four governances of Heavenly Master Taoism in the second century. The first state-sponsored Taoist abbey in history is generally thought to be the Ch'ung-hsü Kuan (House for the Veneration of the Void) founded in 467 by the emperor Ming of the Liu Sung (420–479) for Lu Hsiu-ching. But it was not

until 666, after performing the *feng-shan* ritual of celestial investiture on T'ai-shan, that the T'ang emperor Kao-tsung (r. 649–683) decreed the creation of a system of state-sponsored Taoist (and Buddhist) monasteries in each of the prefectures—there were over three hundred—in the empire. This dual system was perpetuated under all successive dynasties, until the fall of the empire in 1911.

It is generally assumed, with good reason, that these and other non-state abbeys were populated by monks and nuns. First, people who entered these institutions were said, like their Buddhist counterparts, to have “left the family” (*ch'u-chia*). Second, from the mid-sixth to the mid-eighth century, a new type of Ling-pao scripture, clearly designed for monastic living, was very much in vogue: the vocabulary and long-winded style of these texts is that of Buddhist scholastics; repeatedly, they recommend such Buddhist virtues as charity and compassion and such Buddhist practices as scripture-copying, recitation, and preaching; above all, they explicitly recommend celibacy. The *T'ai-shang i-ch'eng hai-k'ung chih-tsang ching* (The Reservoir of Wisdom of Sea-void, a Scripture of the Unique Vehicle of the Most High), after speaking in derogatory manner of Orthodox Unity Taoists, affirms that only those who “leave the family” can liberate themselves from all attachments and achieve enlightenment. Preaching is important in this *ekayāna* (“unique vehicle”) Taoism because it frees people from doubt and ignorance.

Other texts in this group, however, such as the *Yüan-yang ching* (Scripture of the Primordial Yang) suggest that these Buddhist practices are but a preparation for more traditional Taoist ones, among which it names the rites of sexual union. Indeed, Taoist monks and nuns often lived in the same community and are known to have practiced these rites: they had “left their families,” but Taoist commandments forbade only concupiscence, not intercourse. On the contrary, carefully regulated sexual intercourse was one of the oldest of Taoist roads to immortality, said to have been practiced by Lao-tzu himself.

State support entailed state control. The emperor Hsüan-tsung introduced registration of Buddhist and Taoist monks and nuns and restriction of their movement. He set limits on the size of monastic communities and on their land holdings. He ordered all monks who had not received official ordination certificates to pass an exam. A commissioner was appointed for each religion to ensure that these various ordinances were respected. Specific ritual services were also required of these state clergy: both Buddhists and Taoists were to perform services for the deceased of the imperial family on the anniversaries of their deaths; Taoists also cele-

brated rituals for the prosperity of the state on the three “days of origin” (the fifteenth day of the first, seventh, and tenth months) and on the emperor's birthday. This latter was made a three-day national holiday, to be celebrated with feasting throughout the empire.

Hsüan-tsung favored Taoism in still other ways: he inaugurated imperial use of a ritual known as “throwing the dragon and the prayer slips” (*t'ou lung-chien*); its aim was to report dynastic merit to the Three Officers and to pray for personal immortality. In 731, upon the suggestion of the Shang-ch'ing patriarch Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen (647–735), sanctuaries dedicated to the Taoist Perfect Lords of the Five Sacred Peaks were set up on these mountains and Taoist priests selected to staff them. [See the biography of Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen.] In early 742 the emperor ordered all Taoist temples in the empire to copy the *Pen-chi ching* (Scripture of the Original Term) throughout the coming year. At the end of the year he issued a second decree attributing the good harvest to the merit thus obtained. In 748 he added to the Taoist monastic network a system of shrines on all forty-six mountains that had “cave-heavens” (*tung-t'ien*). He also ordered the establishment of abbeys on the various sites where famous Taoists of the past had “obtained the Way.” Between two and five Taoists were appointed for each of these new shrines and abbeys.

Hsüan-tsung also went to considerable lengths in giving institutional form to the special relationship between the ruling house and its divine ancestor: in 737 he placed the Taoist clergy under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Imperial Clan; in 741 he ordered the creation of temples for the worship of Lao-tzu in the two capitals (Ch'ang-an and Lo-yang) and in each prefecture, as well as a parallel network of Taoist academies and examinations. The imperial ancestral tablets were henceforth to be kept in the temple dedicated to Lao-tzu in Ch'ang-an, and statues of the imperial ancestors were set up in the T'ai-ch'ing Kung (Palace of Grand Purity), which had been built in Po-chou, Lao-tzu's birthplace. In the mid-740s Hsüan-tsung had his own image set up next to that of Lao-tzu in the T'ai-ch'ing Kung in Ch'ang-an, and later added those of his chief ministers as well. A first imperial commentary on the *Lao-tzu* was published in 732, a second in 735, and in 745 the *Lao-tzu* was declared superior to the Confucian classics. Among Hsüan-tsung's successors—at least five of whom died of elixir poisoning in their Taoist-inspired quest for immortality—only Wu-tsung (r. 840–846) found anything to add to Hsüan-tsung's ideological edifice: he made Lao-tzu's birthday a three-day national holiday.

Five Dynasties, Sung, and Yüan Periods. Later dynasties naturally could not make use of this link with

Lao-tzu; the Sung replaced it with a similar genealogical tie to the equally Taoist Yellow Emperor, but the T'ang system of state control and support survived. Registration statistics preserved over the centuries provide interesting insight into the shape and functioning of the system. (See table 1.)

The figures for the year 739 show that even the extravagant patronage of Hsüan-tsung did not suffice to bring the number of Taoist monastic centers on a par with those of the Buddhists. This is not a reflection of the relative popularity of the two religions, but of the fact that lay clergy continued to be the norm among Taoists. A text compiled at imperial behest around 712, the *Miao-men yu-ch'i* (Origins of the School of Mystery) distinguishes between hermits and those who "leave the family," on the one hand, and libationers and those who "live at home," on the other. These latter categories, whose chief function is healing, are said to be particularly numerous in Szechuan and the South.

The figures from the eleventh and seventeenth centuries show a marked decline for the Buddhists and remarkable stability for the Taoists. Although Buddhism is generally said to have lost much influence under the last two dynasties, what these figures really demonstrate is the success of the policy restricting the number of ordinations. Ordination implied exemption from taxation, conscription, and corvée. A Southern Sung-dynasty (1127–1260) compilation of the Ch'ing-yüan period (1195–1201) restricts the number of Taoist novices to one per fifty and of Buddhist to one per hundred of the population as a whole. Ch'ing-dynasty (1644–1911) law allowed monks and nuns of both religions to adopt a single pupil to whom they could transmit their ordination certificate. No religious institution could be founded without imperial permission.

All nineteenth-century observers note that the result of these restrictive policies was a glaring gap between the law and reality. At the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, a state census revealed 12,482 monasteries and temples founded with imperial permission and 67,140 without. Already in the eighth century, Chang Wan-fu

(fl. 711), in his *Shou san-tung ching-chieh fa-lu che-jih li* (Calendar for the Selection of Days for the Transmission of the Registers, Prescriptions, and Scriptures of the Three Caverns), complains that the Taoists of these areas paid attention neither to the fasts of the official liturgy nor to the proper transmission of ritual knowledge: "Their only interest is in Offerings and sacrifices." Moreover, their "vulgar ways" had become popular of late in the capital cities of Ch'ang-an and Loyang as well.

These comments of Chang suggest that, by his time, the aristocratic, meditative Shang-ch'ing tradition already was losing ground to more popular forms of Taoism. Other indications of this are the gradual rise of a "Confucian" Taoist movement called the Way of Filial Piety (Hsiao-tao). First heard of in the seventh century, claiming to have been founded by one Hsü Sun (239–292?), it was in fact a local cult whose growth from its base in Hung-chou (Kiangsi) had led to its adoption and absorption by Taoism. This process was to be repeated many times in the future, most notably in the case of a local Fukien cult of two brothers, which was converted by imperial decree in 1417 into a state Taoist cult. The emperor Ch'eng-tsu (r. 1403–1425) decided on the elevation of these two "perfect lords of boundless grace" (*hung-en chen-chün*) after a nagging illness had been cured by a drug prescribed, apparently, by the Fukien temple's medium. The brothers' official titles in the imperial "canon of sacrifices" were lengthened, a second temple built for them in the capital, a special Taoist liturgy created, and, in 1420, a Ling-pao scripture produced. It taught the virtues of loyalty to one's superiors, filial piety, charity, and justice, and the emperor had it printed for dissemination on a wide scale in order to repay his debt to the divine brothers.

Another example of the increasing imbrication of popular cults, imperial ideology, and Taoist liturgy occurred at the beginning of the Sung dynasty. Between 960 and 994, a commoner by the name of Chang Shou-chen received a series of revelations on Mount Chung-nan, the site of Tower Abbey. The god, who was an assistant of the Jade Emperor, revealed himself to be the divine protector of the new ruling house and instructed Chang to find a Taoist master. Having been initiated by a Taoist of Tower Abbey, Chang received further revelations leading to the establishment of an imperially funded temple in 976, an official title in 981, and, above all, a system of Taoist Offerings that has survived, at least in part, until the present day.

The basic feature of the new system is the grading of Offerings according to the number of "stellar seats" (*hsing-wei*)—from 24 to 3,600—used to construct the al-

TABLE 1. *Monastic Populations*

YEAR	REGISTRATIONS	BUDDHISM	TAOISM
739	Monasteries	3,245	1,137
	Convents	2,113	550
1077	Monks	202,872	18,513
	Nuns	29,692	708
1677	Monks	110,292	21,286
	Nuns	8,615	—

tar. Divided into nine grades (3 × 3), the upper three altars were reserved for the emperor, the middle three for his ministers, and the lower three for gentry and commoners. The upper three altars had, respectively, 3,600, 2,400, and 1,200 stellar seats, corresponding to the Grand Offerings of All Heaven (*p'u-t'ien*), the Entire Heaven (*chou-t'ien*), and Net Heaven (*lo-t'ien*). Perfect expression of the hierarchical universalism common to both Taoist and imperial ideology, this system was adopted as the universal norm in the year 1009 by the emperor Chen-tsung (r. 998–1023). It was to remain in official use throughout the Yüan (1279–1368) and perhaps beyond.

A 1,200-seat version, based in part on an official edition of Taoist ritual promulgated under Hui-tsung (r. 1101–1126), has been preserved by Lü T'ai-ku in his *Tao-men ting-chih* (The Taoist System Normalized) of 1201: starting from the highest celestial and stellar divinities, the list descends—by way of the celestial officials linked to the texts of the Three Caverns, the perfect lords and immortals of Taoist history and geography, the vast bureaucracy of the Three Officers, and all the governors of hell—to the humblest gods of the soil and agents of the time cycle. Among the Taoist sites for whose lords a seat is reserved are the Five Sacred Peaks, the various “cave-heaven” paradises, and the twenty-four governances; famous Taoists mentioned include Chang Tao-ling, Hsü Sun, Lu Hsiu-ching, Tu Kuang-t'ing, various patriarchs of the Shang-ch'ing lineage, T'an Tsu-hsiao, Jao Tung-t'ien, Chung-li Ch'üan, and Lü Tung-pin.

The last two named are semilegendary Taoist immortals who came to be revered together as the patrons of an important school of *nei-tan* (internal elixir alchemy) first heard of in the eleventh century. T'an Tzu-hsiao (fl. 930) and Jao Tung-t'ien (fl. 994) were the co-founders of the T'ien-hsin Cheng-fa (“orthodox rites of the heart of heaven”), a new form of exorcistic healing based on texts discovered on Mount Hua-kai (Kiangsi Province) and attributed to Chang Tao-ling himself. The movement spread throughout southern China—the Yao tribes that have since migrated to Thailand still practice these rites today—and by the start of the twelfth century was deemed important enough to merit imperial attention (the oldest extant collection of these rites was presented to the throne by one Yüan Miao-tsung in 1116).

Tu Kuang-t'ing (850–933) was at once an important Taoist liturgist and one of Taoism's greatest hagiographers. His liturgical compilations draw on both the Ling-pao and the Cheng-i traditions; his collections of anecdotal literature are a gold mine of information on

local cults and popular Taoism. The liturgies may be described as a synthesis of past practice, the stories as a harbinger of future developments: Tu's career marks a watershed in the history of Taoism.

Suddenly, the veil is lifted on the world of popular piety—a world of miracles, exorcisms, pilgrimages, and portents—and on the place of Taoism in that world. In his *Tao-chiao ling-yen chi* (Records of Taoist Miracles), for example, Tu tells a story about Hsü Sun's magic bell: when a military governor tried to remove it from the Taoist abbey where it had been ever since the time of Hsü Sun, Hsü appeared to the governor in a dream and told him his life was in danger. The governor returned the bell and went to burn incense and confess his fault in the abbey, but his sin was too grave to be pardoned and he died in battle soon afterward.

Another tale recounts how a mysterious visitor, later rumored to have been Chang Tao-ling himself, visited the Heavenly Master of the eighteenth generation and repaired the sword used by the first Heavenly Master to “punish and control gods and demons.” The sword had been in the family, adds Tu, for twenty-one generations. Elsewhere in the same book, in introducing the story of a man who was released from hell because he was wearing a register transmitted to him in the year 868 by the nineteenth-generation Heavenly Master, Tu notes that, until the thirteenth-generation descendant of Chang Tao-ling, the registers transmitted to the faithful had been made of wood, but “because they were being transmitted on such a vast scale, the thirteenth Heavenly Master could not make them in sufficient numbers and so started using paper and silk instead.”

Tu no doubt owed his knowledge of such events to his own master, Ying I-chieh (810–894), who, at the age of eighteen, had gone to Lung-hu Shan (Dragon-tiger Mountain) in Kiangsi to be initiated by the eighteenth Heavenly Master. Much later accounts claim that Chang Sheng, the fourth-generation descendant of Chang Tao-ling, had been the first to take up residence on Mount Lung-hu. The first contemporary trace of a Chang family in southern China dates to 504, when according to a stele, the twelfth-generation descendant lived in an abbey in what is now Kiangsu. In the mid-eighth century Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen mentions a Chang living on Mount Lung-hu. The next reliable witness is Tu Kuang-t'ing. It is therefore impossible to ascertain whether the Chang family, which apparently lived on this mountain in unbroken succession from at least the mid-eighth century until 1949, was indeed descended from the first Heavenly Master.

What is certain is that, from Tu Kuang-t'ing's time on, the lineage grew steadily more important in Chinese

religious life. Already in 1015, the emperor Chen-tsung (r. 997–1023) recognized its hereditary rights. By 1097 Mount Lung-hu had won official recognition as an authorized center for initiation into Taoist practice, along with Mount Mao (Kiangsu) for the Shang-ch'ing tradition and Mount Ko-tsoo (Kiangsi) for the Ling-pao. The thirtieth Heavenly Master (1092–1126) played a prominent role at the court under Hui-tsung, and his reputation for magical powers was already celebrated in a contemporary novel. Full consecration came in the thirty-sixth generation, to Chang Tsung-yen (d. 1291): invited to the capital by the emperor Shih-tsu (r. 1260–1295) in 1277, he was commissioned to perform a Grand Offering of the Entire Heaven (two thousand four hundred divinities) in the Ch'ang-ch'un Kung (Palace of Eternal Spring). Shortly thereafter, he was appointed head of all Taoists in southern China. The emperor Ch'eng-tsung (r. 1295–1308) decreed in 1295 that Heavenly Master texts for the Offering be used throughout the empire. Finally, under the first Ming emperor, T'ai-tsu (r. 1368–1399), the Heavenly Masters were put in charge of all Taoist affairs. [See the biography of Tu Kuang-t'ing.]

During the Yüan dynasty, the control of Taoism in the North was entrusted to the successive leaders of the Ch'üan-chen ("integral perfection") order. One of three major Taoist movements to emerge in the North during the twelfth century, when that part of China was ruled by the foreign Jurchen Chin dynasty (1115–1234), it alone was destined to survive beyond the Yüan. Its founder, Wang Che (1112–1170), a native of the same village in Shensi as Chung-li Ch'üan, had witnessed, at the age of eighteen, the takeover of his native province by the invading Jurchen. He nonetheless served for a time in the military before deciding to abandon both his career and his family. In 1160, after a period of living in reclusion in Liu-chiang village, not far from Tower Abbey, two mysterious encounters with Taoist immortals led him to dig a grave, to which he gave the name "tomb of the living dead," and to live in it for three years; having built a thatched hut, he lived next to it for another four. In 1167 he suddenly burned down his hut and left for Shantung to begin proselytizing. According to Wang's hagiographers, the three immortals who appeared to him were Chung-li Ch'üan, Lü Tung-pin, and Liu Hai-ch'an, all of whom Wang refers to in his writings as his teachers. [See the biography of Liu Hai-ch'an.]

Wishing to shock people into enlightenment, which necessarily entailed a complete break of the sort he had made from his own family and career, Wang's methods were apparently uncompromising and even violent. In this manner he selected seven disciples, including one

separated couple, to carry on his work. He also established five *san-chiao hui* ("assemblies of the three teachings") before dying while on his way back to his home in the west. His disciples are portrayed by their hagiographers as ascetics and, in some cases, eccentrics. Ch'iu Ch'ang-ch'un (1148–1227) lived for seven years in a cave. Hao Ta-t'ung (1140–1212) spent six years under a stone bridge neither moving nor speaking and eating only when people offered him something. For nine years Wang Ch'u-i (1142–1217) spent his nights in a cave standing on one foot so as not to fall asleep. Wang is also depicted as a wandering exorcist and healer (herbal medicine was one of the arts that Wang Che insisted "those who study the Way must master"). [See the biography of Wang Che.]

The reputations of the Seven Real Persons (*ch'i-chen*), as Wang's disciples came to be known, soon made the movement of Integral Perfection a force to deal with. It attracted lay followers from all levels of society, including the gentry class, to which most of the seven and Wang Che had belonged. Their following seems to have been particularly large among women. The emperor Shih-tsung (r. 1161–1190) summoned Wang Ch'u-i in 1187, questioned him about the methods for "preserving life and ruling the country," and constructed for him the Hsiu-chen Kuan (Abbey for the Cultivation of Perfection). In 1197 Wang was involved, together with the Cheng-i Taoist Sun Ming-tao, in the celebration of a Grand Offering of the Entire Heaven in the T'ien-ch'ang Kuan (Abbey of Celestial Longevity) in the capital. In 1202 the emperor Chang-tsung (r. 1190–1203) ordered Wang to perform an Offering in the Palace of Grand Purity in Lao-tzu's birthplace.

But it was Ch'iu Ch'ang-ch'un's three-year westward trek to meet Chinggis Khan in Central Asia that assured the order's future, for when Ch'iu returned to China in 1223, he did so armed with decrees granting tax and labor exemption to himself and his disciples and control over "all those in the world who leave their families" to him. The result was the rapid growth of the Integral Perfection order and the start of another round of confrontations with the Buddhists. When Ch'iu died, the T'ien-ch'ang Abbey was renamed the Abbey of Eternal Spring (Ch'ang-Ch'un Kuan) in Ch'iu's honor, and his disciples inherited his position. One of them, Li Chih-ch'ang (1193–1273), abbot between 1238 and 1256, precipitated the crisis with the Buddhists by printing and distributing the *Lao-tzu pa-shih-i hua-t'u* (Pictures of the Eighty-one Transformations of Lao-tzu). One of these transformations, of course, was that into the Buddha. The Buddhists protested and also accused the Taoists of appropriating their temples. Debates were held in 1255, 1258 (the burning of the offending books

was ordered, but not carried out), and 1281 (Chang Tsung-yen also participated in this debate). After the last confrontation, the Taoist canon was ordered destroyed—an order carried out, at least in part, and the Ch'üan-chen order went into a partial eclipse until the end of Shih-tsu's reign.

Strictly speaking, Integral Perfection Taoism taught nothing new. It was a reform movement that sought, in the tradition of Taoist universalism, to synthesize the best in the Three Teachings. Like Ch'an Buddhism, which Wang Che apparently knew fairly well, it preached celibacy and "sitting in meditation" in order to control the "apelike mind and the horselike will"; as in Neo-Confucianism, perfect authenticity was prized as the ultimate goal of self-cultivation. But it was eminently Taoist in insisting that both one's "nature" (*hsing*) and one's "life force" (*ming*) had to be nurtured, and in having recourse for the latter to the usual panoply of physiological practices. Ch'üan-chen masters were also frequently renowned adepts of the martial arts, and Wang Che himself must have practiced internal alchemy inasmuch as his divine teachers were its patrons.

Chung-li Ch'üan and Lü Tung-pin, especially the latter, appear frequently to convert and save people in a number of Yüan operas (*tsa-chü*) of clearly Ch'üan-chen inspiration. A temple on the presumed site of Lü Tung-pin's house was converted into a Ch'üan-chen abbey toward the end of the Chin dynasty and then, after the abbey had burned down in 1244, rebuilt on a vast scale between 1247 and 1358. The three surviving halls of the resulting Yung-lo Kung (Palace of Eternal Joy) are dedicated, respectively, to the Three Pure Ones, Lü Tung-pin, and Wang Che. The magnificent murals of the latter two halls tell the stories of Lü and Wang and of Wang's conversion by Lü. The murals of the first hall portray many of the same divinities as were listed in Lü T'ai-ku's list of 1201: they are all "going in audience before the Origin" (*ch'ao-yüan*), that is, before the Three Pure Ones. The other great surviving monument of Taoist history, the fabulous complex of abbeys and palaces on Mount Wu-tang (Hupei), built by the Ming emperor Ch'eng-tsu in honor of Pei-ti (Emperor of the North), divine patron of the exorcistic and martial arts, was also a Ch'üan-chen center. It was reopened in 1982, and Ch'üan-chen Taoists are now busily restoring the buildings. The same is true of Tower Abbey, which was first taken over by the order in 1236, when disciples of Ch'iu Ch'ang-ch'un rebuilt it.

Later Developments. Both the site of Lü Tung-pin's house and Mount Wu-tang were important pilgrimage centers from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on. As such, they reveal an important aspect of Taoism's role

in Chinese society in those centuries: Taoists occupied and ran important cult centers and their temples. In particular, the Taoists, together with the Buddhists, inhabited the many sacred mountains of China and took care of the pilgrims who came to them. Several of the more important pilgrimage centers also developed networks of "branch offices"—local centers where the layperson who lacked the means or the motivation to make a long pilgrimage could nonetheless worship the divinity of his choice. On the Taoist side, the most numerous temples of this kind were those dedicated to Lü Tung-pin, the Emperor of the North, and the Emperor of the Eastern Peak. The first two were centers for the practice of divination by selection of slips, which were then interpreted by an attendant. The halls dedicated to Lü Tung-pin in most Ch'üan-chen abbeys served simultaneously as temples for the local populace.

The temples of the Eastern Peak (Tung-yüeh Miao), on the contrary, were without exception run by Orthodox Unity Taoists. According to an inscription written by one Chao Shih-yen in 1328 and set up on the grounds of the Temple of the Eastern Peak in Peking, such temples "first became widespread in the middle of the Sung dynasty." By the Yüan dynasty they were to be found in every town of any size, and mediums and their Taoist masters worked in them side by side, the former to contact the souls of the dead and the latter to save them, for the Eastern Peak, the abode of the dead already in Han times, was associated at once with the tribunals of hell and the hope of immortality. Veritable nerve centers of the traditional Chinese religious system, the temples of the Eastern Peak seem to have been singled out for destruction by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

It is not known when the original Taoist community organized by the Heavenly Masters disappeared. As early as the third century, leaders of the community were complaining that libationers were increasingly self-appointed or at least not appointed by the hierarchy. The office of libationer, moreover, seems very early on to have become a hereditary one. It is nonetheless fairly certain that laypersons continued to practice the initiatory rites of sexual union as late as the mid-T'ang, and Heavenly Master "congregations" must therefore have continued to exist. But by the mid-Sung, when the Heavenly Masters themselves began once again to play a political role, it was as hierarchs not, as in the time of Chang Lu, of an organized lay community, but of all Orthodox Unity priests. Over the centuries, laypersons of means continued to make the pilgrimage to Dragon-Tiger Mountain in order to be invested before death with a "register of immortality," but the main function of the Taoist "pope" was the transmission of registers to

priests. By the 1920s and 1930s even the number of such registers had dropped off to from one to three hundred a year, and it was estimated that only one percent of Cheng-i priests actually applied for such a register.

This situation was in part due to the fact that the foreign Ch'ing dynasty had terminated the special relationship between the ruling house and the Heavenly Masters. During the Ming dynasty, by contrast, emperors were constantly inviting the Heavenly Master to the capital to perform Offerings; the compilation of the *Tao-tsang* (Taoist canon) was entrusted to the Heavenly Masters; and several emperors even arranged high marriages for what had in effect become their spiritual counterpart: the emperor controlled the (Confucian) administration; the Heavenly Master had final authority over all gods and demons. He was, in other words, not only the nominal head of all Taoist priests, but also the overseer of all local cults. Throughout the Ming period, the Heavenly Master continued to be associated with imperial campaigns against heterodox cults. At the same time, local Orthodox Unity priests were "infiltrating" local temples—of the Eastern Peak, of the City God (Ch'eng-huang Miao), of the third-century patriot and general Kuan Yü (Kuan-ti Miao)—and performing Offerings for the consecration of temples dedicated to gods who, although not "Taoist," had been officially invested by imperially promulgated titles inscribed in the "canon of sacrifices." The collective ceremonies of initiation of original Taoism seem to have survived only among tribal peoples such as the Yao: there, ordination remains a prerequisite for salvation and is therefore extended to the entire community.

The number of Taoist monks—mostly of the Ch'üan-chen order since the Yüan dynasty—never approached that of lay Taoist priests (or Buddhist monks). The monks nonetheless played an important part in shaping Taoist history from the fifth century on. Not only did their leaders have privileged relations with emperors, at least until 1281, they also regularly exchanged visits and poems with the members of the gentry class from which many of them came. Wang Che's first convert and eventual successor, for example, Ma Yü (1123–1183), was known locally as Ma *pan-chou*, Ma "half-the-prefecture," because of his extensive land holdings. Also, it was these Taoists who controlled the network of official abbeys first created in the T'ang dynasty.

In the 1940s the White Cloud Abbey of Peking, originally built around the grave of Ch'iu Ch'ang-ch'un and hence long the headquarters of the Ch'üan-chen order, still had at least nominal control of twenty-three such abbeys throughout the country. Ch'iu's birthday on the nineteenth day of the first lunar month was one of Peking's biggest festivals. The only complete copy of the

Ming-dynasty Taoist canon to survive to the present is that of the same White Cloud Abbey. It was only natural, therefore, that it was selected by the government in the 1950s as the seat of the National Taoist Association. Among the major abbeys that have been restored since the government began, in the early 1980s, to allow and even encourage the restoration of religious buildings, many are on the 1940s list of twenty-three, and all reopened abbeys send their best novices to Peking for a six-month training period. Some Cheng-i Taoists have joined the Ch'üan-chen-dominated national association and perform rituals in their abbeys. Most continue, as under the Ch'ing dynasty, to practice with semilegal status in homes and even, since 1982, in the reconstructed temples dedicated to the gods of the people.

[See also Priesthood, *article on* Taoist Priesthood; Worship and Cultic Life, *article on* Taoist Cultic Life; Millenarianism, *article on* Chinese Millenarian Movements; and the biography of Lao-tzu.]

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Taoist Literature

Compared to Buddhism, the literature of Taoist traditions remains largely unexplored. Large-scale study in this area was greatly enhanced in 1926 with the appearance of the first widely accessible reprint of the *Tao-tsang*, or Taoist canon, which, at 1120 fascicles, is the largest repository of Taoist literature ever compiled. Research on Taoism prior to that time was, with few exceptions, generally confined to studies of texts such as the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu* that are widely available in editions outside the canon. For the most part, the West has also had its understanding of the Taoist legacy

shaped by what has been summarized from the writings on the subject by Buddhist polemicists and unsympathetic Chinese literati. The one-sided view of Taoist traditions that such limitations promote is easily amended when the resources of the *Tao-tsang* are taken into account, together with subsidiary compilations and pertinent collections of epigraphy and manuscripts. The social and historical context of much of this material has only recently come under intensive scrutiny. Continued research on the Taoist literary heritage is likely to challenge many long-held perceptions about the nature of religious traditions in Chinese society.

The Tao-tsang

Before 1926, very few copies of the Taoist canon were available outside of those kept in the temple archives of China. The state traditionally sponsored both the compilation and distribution of the *Tao-tsang*. While it cannot be said that the newly founded Republic of China was a patron of Taoism, the reprinting of the canon between 1923 and 1926 came about only through government subvention. The former minister of education and renowned bibliophile Fu Tseng-hsiang (1872–1950) was instrumental in convincing President Hsü Shih-ch'ang (1855–1939) of the scholarly value of the *Tao-tsang* and to underwrite its publication by the Commercial Press of Shanghai. The edition that was selected for photographic reproduction in the 1920s and that has since been reprinted in at least three modern editions was the wood-block concertina edition housed in the Pai-yün Kuan (White Cloud Abbey) of Peking, the central Taoist seminary of the People's Republic of China. It is thought that this edition of the canon was largely derived from the 1445 printing, apart from the lacunae reconstituted in 1845.

History of Compilation. Among the earliest inventories of Taoist writings are those recorded in the bibliographic monograph of Pan Ku's (32–92) *Han shu* (History of the Han) and Ko Hung's (283–343) *Pao-p'u-tzu*. [See the biography of Ko Hung.] It was not until the late fifth century, well after the establishment of the Shang-ch'ing and Ling-pao scriptural traditions, that a single, comprehensive catalogue of Taoist texts was attempted. Lu Hsiu-ching (406–477), principal codifier of the Ling-pao corpus, undertook the task on the order of Sung Ming-ti (r. 465–472). The *San-tung ching-shu mu-lu* (An Index to the Scriptural Writings of the Three Caverns), which Lu presented to the emperor in 471, was said to list over twelve hundred *chüan* (scrolls or chapters), ranging from scriptures and pharmaceutical works to talismanic diagrams. [See the biography of Lu Hsiu-ching.] Nearly three centuries later, T'ang Hsüan-tsung (r. 713–756), confident that he was the descendant of

Lao-tzu, issued a decree dispatching his envoys throughout the empire in search of all existing Taoist writings. The collection that followed was given the title *San-tung ch'üing-kang* (Exquisite Compendium of the Three Caverns) and reportedly included around thirty-seven hundred or fifty-seven hundred *chüan*. It was the first canon from which multiple copies were to be transcribed for distribution to Taoist temples. But not long after Hsüan-tsung officially authorized this undertaking in 748, the imperial libraries of the capitals of Ch'ang-an and Lo-yang were destroyed during the An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming rebellions, and much of the *San-tung ch'üing-kang* was apparently lost.

Subsequent compilations were attempted upon the command of various Sung emperors, who similarly viewed their mandate as part of a larger Taoist dispensation. Sung Chen-tsung (r. 998–1022) assigned his trusted adviser Wang Ch'in-jo (962–1025) the task of preparing a new catalogue of Taoist texts in the imperial archives. By 1016 an assistant draftsman named Chang Chün-fang (fl. 1008–1029) was put in charge of a staff of Taoist priests to make copies of a new canon for distribution to major temples. The *Ta Sung t'ien-kung pao-tsang* (Precious Canon of the Celestial Palace of the Great Sung; 4,565 *chüan*) that resulted was the first definitive edition of what has come simply to be called the *Tao-tsang*.

A century later Sung Hui-tsung (r. 1101–1125) initiated an even more ambitious program for the compilation and dissemination of a new Taoist canon. In 1114 he issued an edict ordering all local officials, clergy, and laity to submit whatever Taoist texts they had to the capital of Kaifeng. A number of Taoist priests answered his call to help with the collation of the incoming literature. Their work culminated in the *Cheng-ho wan-shou tao-tsang* (Taoist Canon of the Longevity of the Cheng-ho Reign), the first canon to be printed. The blocks for nearly fifty-four hundred *chüan* were cut sometime around 1118 to 1120. It is not known how many copies of the *Tao-tsang* were subsequently made and there is also some question as to how much was lost upon the Jurchen takeover in 1127. But it appears that at least some blocks survived, for in 1188 it is reported that Chin Shih-tsung (r. 1161–1189) commanded their removal from Kaifeng to the T'ien-ch'ang Kuan (Abbey of Celestial Perpetuity) in the central capital of the Jurchen empire, the predecessor to the Pai-yün Kuan in Peking. His grandson and successor, Chin Chang-tsung (r. 1190–1208), had the temple enlarged in 1190 and then appointed two imperial academicians to assist the abbot in reediting the canon. With the carving of additional blocks two years later, the *Ta Chin hsüan-tu pao-*

tsang (Precious Canon of the Arcane Metropolis of the Great Chin) totaled over sixty-four hundred *chüan*.

In 1215 the capital of the Jurchen fell into the hands of the Mongols and it is not known how much of the enlarged canon of the Chin escaped destruction. But by 1237 work on a new edition was undertaken, sponsored this time by the local administration of Shansi Province. Two Ch'üan-chen masters, Sung Te-fang (1183–1247) and his disciple Ch'in Chih-an (1188–1244), oversaw a staff in the hundreds. The *Hsüan-tu pao-tsang* (Precious Canon of the Arcane Metropolis), completed in 1244, was apparently the largest ever, comprising altogether seven thousand *chüan*. Over a hundred copies were said to have been made, but in 1281 Khubilai Khan decreed that all texts and printing blocks of the *Tao-tsang* be burnt, save the *Tao-te ching*. Fragments of the 1244 canon were nonetheless spared and, together with what remained of the Jurchen and Sung canons, came to serve as the foundation of the Ming *Tao-tsang*.

The canon currently in print is based on the compilation completed between 1444 and 1445 and a supplement dating to 1607. Ming Ch'eng-tsu (r. 1403–1424) initiated the project in 1406 by appointing the forty-third Celestial Master, Chang Yü-ch'u (1361–1410), as compiler-in-chief. But the final version of the *Ta Ming tao-tsang ching* (Scriptures of the Taoist Canon of the Great Ming) was actually completed under the guidance of Shao I-cheng, a prominent Taoist master at the court of Ming Ying-tsung (r. 1436–1449). The fiftieth Celestial Master, Chang Kuo-hsiang (d. 1611), supervised the preparation of a 240-*chüan* supplement to the 5,318 *chüan* of this edition. It is known as the *Hsü tao-tsang* (Supplementary Taoist Canon) of the Wan-li reign (1573–1619), whereas the fifteenth-century core is sometimes referred to as the *Cheng-t'ung tao-tsang* or Taoist canon of the Cheng-t'ung reign (1436–1449).

Organizational Divisions. As the title of Lu Hsiu-ching's catalogue of 471 suggests, Taoist writings were traditionally classified according to the "Three Caverns" (*san-tung*). This tripart division became a fundamental organizational feature of the *Tao-tsang*. Although there has been a tendency in the past to equate these three compartments of texts with the "Three Receptacles" (*san-tsang*) of the Buddhist canon, the closer parallel is actually the Buddhist *triyāna* or *san-sheng* ("three vehicles"). Rather than being representative of three genres of literature such as the Sūtra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma of the Three Receptacles, the Three Caverns reflect three distinct revelatory traditions. And like the Three Vehicles, the Three Caverns are viewed as a ranking of textual legacies. The Tung-chen section evolved around the Shang-ch'ing (Supreme Clarity)

scriptures, the Tung-hsüan around the Ling-pao (Numinous Treasure), and the Tung-shen around the San-huang (Three Sovereigns). Since this categorization gives primacy to the Shang-ch'ing traditions, it is assumed that it was devised well before Lu Hsiu-ching compiled his catalogue, perhaps by the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century. There is less certainty about the origins of the Four Supplements that follow the Three Caverns, what are known as the T'ai-hsüan, T'ai-p'ing, T'ai-ch'ing, and Cheng-i components of the canon. The term *ssu-fu* ("four supplements") does not seem to date before the turn of the sixth century. The first three have commonly been regarded as individual appendices to the Three Caverns, but in fact they appear to have been organized around very specific literary collections. Central to the T'ai-hsüan division is the *Tao-te ching*. Likewise, the *T'ai-p'ing ching* (Scripture on the Grand Pacification), the T'ai-ch'ing (Grand Purity) legacy of alchemical writings, and the Cheng-i (Authentic Unity), or Celestial Master heritage lie at the heart of the T'ai-p'ing, T'ai-ch'ing, and Cheng-i subdivisions. It may be that these four supplements were inspired by demands to establish a more cohesive body of Taoist literature vis-à-vis the rapidly developing corpus of Chinese Buddhist writings. Although the preeminence of the Shang-ch'ing revelations was apparently never in question, it seems that by the sixth century there was more awareness of the diversity of inspiration from which they arose. Liturgical texts of the T'ang dynasty, moreover, seem to suggest that the arrangement of the canon corresponds to descending ranks of ordination, from the top level of Tung-chen down to the first step of the Cheng-i initiation.

Whatever the underlying significance of the organization of the *Tao-tsang*, accretions over the centuries have resulted in a less than systematic presentation of texts. Each of the Three Caverns is subdivided into twelve sections: (1) original revelations, (2) divine talismans, (3) exegeses, (4) sacred diagrams, (5) histories and genealogies, (6) codes of conduct, (7) ceremonial protocols, (8) prescriptive rituals, (9) special techniques (i.e., alchemical, geomantic, numerological), (10) hagiography, (11) hymnody, and (12) memorial communications. The distribution of texts is not always in keeping with either the major headings or these sub-headings. No categorical distinctions are applied to the Four Supplements and the *Hsü tao-tsang*, the contents of which are as diverse as the Three Caverns.

Facets of Research. Nearly half of the volumes in the canon either bear dates after 1126 or can be directly linked to new scriptural traditions developing after the Northern Sung dynasty. Moreover, the prefaces of at

least sixty titles in the *Tao-tsang* indicate that they circulated in printed editions prior to their incorporation into the canon. Prefaces and colophons, however, are not always reliable guides to the history of a text. Fictive lineages are often invoked in order to establish the historical antiquity of newly codified writings. It is not unusual to find, for example, the provenance of a text traced directly to the founder of the T'ien-shih Tao (Way of the Celestial Masters), Chang Tao-ling (fl. 142 CE). [See the biography of Chang Tao-ling.] An even larger number of texts are simply presented as the word of divine authority. The names of the deities cited often prove critical to the identification of a text vis-à-vis established scriptural traditions. Other internal dating features that help clarify the historical and social origins of a compilation include reign titles, datable place names and official titles, as well as the titles of canonization granted by imperial decree to various patriarchs and apotheosized cultic figures. The language itself, particularly the use of specialized terminology, also helps determine the setting in which a text arose. The *terminus a quo* or *terminus ad quem* of a work can likewise be determined with the help of a number of inventories of Taoist texts.

Contents. The range of literature in the canon is as diverse as the beliefs and practices associated with Taoism since the Han dynasty. Much research to date has concentrated on the scientific significance of Taoist alchemical and pharmaceutical works. Aside from the early Shang-ch'ing and Ling-pao scriptural traditions, little has been reported on the textual legacy of Taoist revelatory and cultic inspiration. The *Tao-tsang*, furthermore, has yet to be fully appreciated as a valuable repository of belles-lettres in its own right. The following survey highlights a few of the texts in the canon with enduring literary and religious interest.

Revelation and ritual. As a work ostensibly transmitted from master to disciple, the *Tao-te ching* or *Lao-tzu* has long been regarded as a revelation in itself. The writings that Lao-tzu reportedly delivered to the gatekeeper Yin Hsi on his journey west have served as the inspiration for centuries of instruction on the attainment of the Tao. To the Celestial Masters, the *Tao-te ching* seems to have functioned foremost as a code of behavior for young initiates. It is thought that the Hsiang-erh commentary on the *Lao-tzu* (*Hsiang-erh chu*) discovered at Tun-huang was compiled by one of the first, if not the first, patriarch of the Celestial Masters. The commentary extrapolates not only rules of conduct but also techniques of meditative practice from the text and is the only substantial writing associated with the early Celestial Masters to survive. The apotheosis of

Lao-tzu, that is, T'ai-shang Lao-chün, or Lord Lao the Most High, who appeared before the founder Chang Tao-ling was said to have revealed not scriptures but the sacred registers and talismans of divine guardians. [See the *biography of Lao-tzu*.] Both were essential to the demonifuge mission of the T'ien-shih Tao. Divine commanders on high could be summoned only by those privy to their names and capable of infusing talismanic communications with their vitality. Countless texts, including even Ko Hung's (283–343) *Pao-p'u-tzu*, purport to preserve the apotropaic talismans of the Celestial Masters. The manipulation of such talismans was and still is thought to keep spectral forces at bay. Throughout the centuries the codifiers of later revelatory and ritual writings have never forgotten the ultimate heritage of the T'ien-shih Tao as a healing cult. Many anthologies of ritual are based precisely on the understanding that the ultimate mission of their founders was to convey hope in the salvation of mankind from all forms of suffering.

Salvation was also the message behind one of the earliest scriptures recorded in the canon, the *T'ai-p'ing ching* (Scripture on the Grand Pacification). An early version of a text by this title was apparently promoted during the Western Han in support of a faction that sought to influence the direction of the ruling house through its expertise in the interpretation of cosmological omens. What circulates as the *T'ai-p'ing ching* can be traced in part to another faction that arose during the Eastern Han on the Shantung Peninsula. Because of the text's link with Chang Chüeh, leader of the Yellow Turban peasant rebellion, and the fall of the Han empire, the *T'ai-p'ing ching* fell out of favor for several generations. [See the *biography of Chang Chüeh*.] It was not until the sixth century that a new, and much larger, edition of 170 *chüan* appeared, portions of which are preserved in the canon as well as in Tun-huang manuscripts. This edition, the provenance of which can be traced to the Shang-ch'ing *axis mundi* of Mao Shan (in present-day Kiangsu), seems to retain many of the major themes promoted in the Han dynasty works. The text was generally regarded as the omen of a more prosperous era. While there is difficulty in distinguishing the second-century text from later accretions, it appears that one consistent feature was the hint of an apocalypse should the divine teachings recorded within not be put into effect. The sixth-century editors enlarged upon this theme by interpolating references to the promise of deliverance by a messianic figure sacred to Shang-ch'ing, Hou Shen-chün, or the Sage-lord to Come. Overall, however, the *T'ai-p'ing ching* stresses the importance of creating a utopian society in the present, one in which the political, social, and economic welfare

of all could be assured upon the recitation of the scripture and the keeping of behavioral precepts in accordance with the will of the heavens above. This ideal of equity is tempered in part by instructions on techniques for prolonging life, a pastime in which only a select few could indulge.

The common denominator between the practices prescribed for attaining longevity in the *T'ai-p'ing ching* and in the Shang-ch'ing scriptures is a large body of macrobiotic literature that is traditionally associated with the *fang-shih* or technocrats of Chinese society. [See *Fang-shih*.] The titles of many of these works are recorded in early hagiographies. Central to these guides on the pursuit of a life everlasting is the ability to gain communion with the gods residing within one's own body as well as with those on high. One of the earliest and more provocative instruction manuals on gaining communication with the corporeal hierarchy is the *Huang-t'ing ching* (Scripture of the Yellow Court). The innate ambiguities of this lengthy verse composed in heptasyllabic meter were apparently thought to be at least partially resolved upon repeated recitation. A revised and less arcane version of the *Yellow Court Scripture* was reportedly among those texts conveyed to Yang Hsi (b. 330), the prime recipient of the Shang-ch'ing revelations during the years 364 to 370. The most comprehensive record of Shang-ch'ing beliefs and practices was made over a century later by the eminent Taoist master T'ao Hung-ching (486–536). The *Chen-kao* (Declarations of the Perfected) that he edited is largely intended to be a verbatim account of the instructions given Yang during the visits of divine transcendents. [See the *biography of T'ao Hung-ching*.] Central to the expectations of those promoting the new dispensation of Shang-ch'ing was the imminent descent of a messiah who could replace the disorder of their age with order. The eschatological scenario for the advent of a savior by the name of Li Hung is set forth in the *Shang-ch'ing hou-sheng tao-chün lieh-chi* (Annals of the Lord of the Tao, the Sage-to-Come of Shang-ch'ing). The vision of Li Hung's epiphany continued to inspire a number of messianic movements as reflected, for example, in the *Tung-yüan shen-chou ching* (A Scripture of Spirit Spells from the Caverned Abyss), a composite work dating from the fifth and sixth centuries that has its analogues in the newly compiled *dhāraṇī sūtras* of that era. [See *Millenarianism, article on Chinese Millenarian Movements*.]

The Shang-ch'ing visionaries worked not only toward the restoration of terrestrial order but also toward their own promotion into the ranks of the divine. The methods by which their eschatological hopes could be realized ranged from the rigid control of diet to stringent respiratory exercises and experimentation with phar-

maceutical compounds. But the main sustenance for adepts pursuing such a regimen were the vital forces of the sun, moon, and stars. It was thought that the regular and concentrated absorption of these powerful sources of radiance would lead ultimately to one's cosmic transmigration. Feeding on the illumination of astral bodies is among the most fundamental techniques of the Taoist master—central to his private meditative sessions as well as his liturgical performances—and is by and large a technique of visualization, the skill of which is the concern of many manuals predating the Shang-ch'ing revelations. Those texts in which the ultimate goal specified is ascent to the celestial realm of T'ai-ch'ing are commonly regarded as part of a T'ai-ch'ing scriptural tradition, the origins of which remain unclear. The teachings of these T'ai-ch'ing manuals were incorporated into both the Shang-ch'ing revelations and the slightly later scriptural tradition known as Ling-pao. The prolongation of life through the ingestion of astral essences is, for example, a lesson in the *T'ai-shang ling-pao wu-fu hsü* (Prolegomena on the Five Talismans of the Numinous Treasure of the Most High), a text originally dating to the late third century and recycled by spokesmen for the Ling-pao tradition in the late fourth century.

The major recipient of the Ling-pao revelations was Ko Ch'ao-fu, a nephew of Ko Hung. In the 390s, Ko Ch'ao-fu began ascribing the origin of some twenty-seven Ling-pao scriptures to his grand-uncle Ko Hsüan (164–244). This set of sacred writings actually owes its inspiration to not only the centuries-old arcana of southern Chinese religious practice and the more recent Shang-ch'ing innovations, but also to the Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions of the Nanking area. The message of Ling-pao, as epitomized in the *Tu-jen ching* (Scripture on the Salvation of Mankind), was that all could ultimately be released from the cycle of suffering and ascend to the celestial realm by adhering to the teachings of the Yüan-shih T'ien-tsun, or Celestial Worthy of Primordial Commencement. The foremost contribution of the Ling-pao tradition was in fact a whole program of liturgical services to be performed on behalf of the living and dead. Equally significant was the articulation of a code of behavior to be followed by the faithful in their struggle to escape the bonds of the mundane realm. As with the Shang-ch'ing tradition, a systematic presentation of the Ling-pao corpus came some time after the original revelations. What is preserved in the canon from this syncretic development is due to the efforts of Lu Hsiu-ching, the compiler of the first known catalogue of Taoist writings.

Expansion on the Ling-pao rituals continued for centuries, as is reflected, for example, in the *Wu-shang*

huang-lu ta-chai li-ch'eng i (Protocols on the Establishment of the Great Chai Retreats of the Yellow Register), a compilation based on the writings of Lu, as well as two major T'ang liturgists, Chang Wan-fu (fl. 711) and Tu Kuang-t'ing (850–933), and the Sung Taoist masters Liu Yung-kuang (1134–1206) and Chiang Shu-yü (1156–1217). Tu Kuang-t'ing was by far the most prolific T'ang liturgist, for in addition to editing a number of Ling-pao codes, he also compiled the protocols for various ordination rituals, including those marking the bestowal of the *Tao-te ching* and the divine registers of Shang-ch'ing and Cheng-i. He issued, moreover, a series of ritual texts associated with the *Scripture of Spirit Spells*, as well as with the archaic practice of casting propitiatory prayers inscribed on metal or wood into caves and streams. The diversity of Tu's contributions reflects in general the trend of his age toward a consolidation and systematization of diverse ritual practices in which the Taoist priesthood was engaged. [See the biography of Tu Kuang-t'ing.]

The editorial enterprises of the T'ang dynasty soon yielded to a new wave of scriptural innovation during the Sung dynasty. The creation of more innovative ritual traditions was apparently stimulated in large part by Sung Hui-tsung's patronage of Taoist masters. Among the most influential at his court was Lin Ling-su (1076–1120) of Wenchow (in present-day Chekiang). Lin convinced the emperor that he was the incarnation of Ch'ang-sheng Ta-ti (Great Sovereign of Long Life) and, as such, was responsible for the salvation of all under his domain. To this end, Lin drew on the soteriological features of the Ling-pao legacy and the messianic expectations of the Shang-ch'ing tradition to devise what he called the Shen-hsiao (Divine Empyrean) dispensation. The *Kao-shang shen-hsiao tsung-shih shou-ching shih* (Formulary for the Transmission of Scriptures according to the Patriarchs of the Exalted Divine Empyrean) is a record of the evolution of the Shen-hsiao scriptures from their origins as cosmic script to their bestowal upon the Grand Sovereign himself. Large ritual compendia were eventually compiled based on this new scriptural heritage, with the *Tu-jen ching* uniformly established as the central focus. Among the largest of such corpora are those associated with the teachings of Ning Pen-li (1101–1181), also of Wenchow, namely the *Shang-ch'ing ling-pao ta-fa* (Great Rites of the Shang-ch'ing Ling-pao Legacy), compiled by a disciple named Wang Ch'i-chen, and the *Ling-pao ling-chiao chi-tu chin-shu* (Golden Writings on Salvation, Based on the Instructions Conveyed by the Ling-pao Legacy), edited originally by Lin Wei-fu (1239–1302) of Wenchow.

Another scriptural tradition codified during Sung Hui-tsung's reign was the T'ien-hsin Cheng-fa (Authen-

tic Rites of the Celestial Heart), the origins of which were traced to the discovery in 944 of sacred texts at Hua-kai Shan (in present-day Kiangsi). One of the Taoist masters working on the compilation of a new canon at Kaifeng, Yüan Miao-tsung (fl. 1086–1116) sought to make amends for a lack of talismanic healing rituals by compiling the *T'ai-shang chu-kuo chiu-min tsung-chen pi-yao* (Secret Essentials of the Most High on Assembling the Perfected for the Relief of the State and Delivery of the People). At the heart of this corpus are the instructions on the application of the three talismans central to the T'ien-hsien legacy: San-kuang (Three Sources of Radiance; i.e., sun, moon, and stars); Chen-wu (Perfected Martial Lord); and T'ien-kang (Celestial Mainstay; i.e., Ursa Major).

The best testimony to the diversity of healing ritual from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries is the *Tao-fa hui-yüan* (A Corpus of Taoist Rites), compiled after 1356. The most voluminous work in the canon, this corpus is devoted largely to what are known as *lei-fa* ("thunder rites"), based on the practice of quelling demonic forces through the absorption and projection of thunder pneumas. The opening chapters of the work are derived from one of the later Thunder Ritual traditions called Ch'ing-wei (Purified Tenuity), codified in part by Chao I-chen (d. 1382). Many rituals that evoke the authority of the Cheng-i tradition appear to reflect the influence of the thirty-ninth Celestial Master Chang Ssu-ch'eng (d. 1343). Most outstanding of all are the ritual instructions to be enacted on behalf of various astral deities and cultic figures such as the martial lord Kuan Yü (d. 219). These therapeutic rites were prescribed for a wide range of ailments, from conjunctivitis to manifestations of possessing spirits. Many attest, moreover, to a long tradition of collaboration between Taoist masters and spirit-mediums.

Hagiography. Not unlike Confucian and Buddhist biographical accounts, Taoist hagiographies were compiled primarily as commemorative works, usually with a didactic message in mind. The lives of transcendentals were generally intended to instruct on the paths by which one's divine destiny might be realized, as well as on the rewards inherent in venerating those who gained entry into the celestial ranks. The visionary Yang Hsi was reportedly conveyed the full biographies of a number of divine transcendentals with whom he was in communication, but only a few survive. Some of his contacts are memorialized in the *Lieh-hsien chuan* (Lives of the Immortals), traditionally attributed to Liu Hsiang (77–6 BCE) but apparently based on several centuries of oral tradition surrounding various local cults. [See Hsien.]

More extensive hagiographic accounts were compiled

during the T'ang dynasty, most notably by Tu Kuang-t'ing. One work of his, the *Yung-ch'eng chi-hsien lu* (A Record of the Transcendentals Assembled at Yung-ch'eng), is entirely devoted to the lives of divine women, starting with an account of the cosmic evolution of the primordial goddess who gave birth to the historical Lao-tzu. Tu Kuang-t'ing was above all a good storyteller and, as his *Tao-chiao ling-yen chi* (An Account of the Divine Efficacy of the Teachings of the Tao) and *Shen-hsien kan-yü chuan* (A Record of Inspirational Encounters with Divine Transcendentals) further attest, he was most interested in recording accounts of sacred phenomena. Such works, together with Buddhist miracle tales, contributed significantly to the development of the narrative in Chinese literary history.

By far the most comprehensive hagiographic work in the canon is one compiled by a specialist in Thunder Ritual named Chao Tao-i (fl. 1297–1307), the *Li-shih chen-hsien t'i-tao t'ung-chien* (A Comprehensive Mirror on Successive Generations of Perfected Transcendentals and Those who Embody the Tao). Largely derivative of earlier works, this text preserves much material that has otherwise been lost. Among more specialized works is the *Hsüan-p'in lu* (A Record of the Ranks of the Sublime) edited by a prominent literatus named Chang Yü (1283–c. 1356). The author, who was himself temporarily in residence at Mao Shan, dedicates a large portion of his text to the Shang-ch'ing heritage, from Yang Hsi to the twenty-fifth patriarch Liu Han-k'ang (1035–1108). A separate account of the Cheng-i patriarchs, the *Han T'ien-shih shih-chia* (A Genealogy of the Celestial Masters since the Han), is a composite work, based on editions dating from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. The imprimatur of the fiftieth Celestial Master, Chang Kuo-hsiang (d. 1611), is found not only in this text but in the latest hagiography of the canon, the *Sou-shen chi* (In Search of the Sacred), edited by Lo Mao-teng (fl. 1593–1598). Also a composite work, this text opens with the biographies of Confucius, Śākyamuni, and T'ai-shang Lao-chün. Most predominate thereafter are the accounts of apotheosized cultic figures from south of the Yangtze. The dates of birth and ascension recorded in many of these entries give some indication as to the annual cycle of festival days authorized by church and state.

Several hagiographic works honor the Ch'üan-chen heritage founded by Wang Che (1112–1170). [See the *biography of Wang Che*.] One of the earliest is the *Chin-lien cheng-tsung chi* (An Account of the True Lineage of the Golden Lotus), completed in 1241 by Ch'in Chih-an, editor of the 1244 canon. This work was apparently lost in the book burning of 1281 and only recovered in the Ming. It was unknown to the compilers of a similar ha-

giography, the *Chin-lien cheng-tsung hsien-yüan hsiang-chuan* (An Illustrated Biographical Account of the Transcendent Origins of the True Lineage of the Golden Lotus). Liu Chih-hsüan and Hsieh Hsi-ch'an completed this text in 1326, according to what written documents and stone inscriptions remained. They differ with Ch'in in attributing the origins of Ch'üan-chen teachings to Lao-tzu, but there is unanimity on the following four patriarchs: Tung-hua Ti-chün (Sovereign Lord of Eastern Florescence), Chung-li Ch'üan, Lü Yen (b. 798?), and Liu Ts'ao (fl. 1050). Central to both works are the hagiographies of the founder Wang and his seven disciples, known to the tradition as the Seven Perfected Ones (*ch'i-chen*) of Ch'üan-chen: Ma Yü (1123–1183), T'an Ch'u-tuan (1123–1185), Liu Ch'u-hsüan (1147–1203), Ch'iu Ch'u-chi (1148–1227), Wang Ch'u-i (1142–1217), Hao Ta-t'ung (1140–1212), and the single matriarch, Sun Pu-erh (1119–1183).

Among hagiographies for individual Ch'üan-chen patriarchs is an anonymous compilation in tribute to Wang Ch'u-i, the *T'i-hsüan chen-jen hsien-i lu* (A Record of the Marvels Manifested by the Perfected who Embodies Sublimity). The nineteen episodes in this text offer a rare view of the therapeutic mission of Ch'üan-chen masters, in the roles of healer, rain-maker, and demon queller. Even more well-known is the patriarch Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, whose journey into Central Asia for an audience with Chinggis Khan is commemorated in the *Ch'ang-ch'un chen-jen hsi-yu chi* (The Journey to the West of the Perfected Ch'ang-ch'un). Ch'iu's disciple Li Chih-ch'ang (1193–1256) completed this work in 1228, following Ch'iu's death at the T'ien-ch'ang Abbey in Peking. The transcendent Lü Yen, conventionally credited with Wang Che's enlightenment, is the subject of a lengthy chronicle by Miao Shan-shih (fl. 1324), the *Ch'un-yang ti-chün shen-hua miao-t'ung chi* (Annals of the Wondrous Communications and Divine Transformations of the Sovereign Lord Ch'un-yang). As with similar narrative sequences, this text appears to have evolved from centuries of storytelling traditions that also found their expression in temple wall paintings.

Most numerous of the hagiographies focused on local cults are those dedicated to Hsü Sun (239–292?), whose career as a healer and subduer of malevolent dragons was established from Szechwan east to the central Kiangsi River valleys. The earliest text to survive intact is the *Hsiao-tao Wu Hsü erh chen-chün chuan* (A Hagiography of Wu and Hsü, the Two Perfected Lords of the Filial Way). Hsü's association in this account with Wu Meng, the legendary exemplar of filiality, attests to an early ritual tradition that evolved around his cult in Kiangsi, apparently a T'ang variation on Ling-pao liturgy. The *Yü-lung chi* (An Anthology of Jade Benefi-

cence), a later work compiled by the well-known specialist in Thunder Rites, Pai Yü-ch'an (fl. 1209–1224), reveals the extent to which Sung Hui-tsung patronized this cult as a symbol of unity in the face of the Jurchen invasions. Veneration of Hsü Sun eventually led to the development of a nationalistic cult known as the Ching-ming Tao (Way of Purity and Perspicacity), generally thought to have been founded by Liu Yü (1257–1308), an abbot of the Yü-lung Kuan, an abbey established in Kiangsi at the putative site of Hsü's ascension. Liu's disciple Huang Yüan-chi (1269–1325) edited the *Ching-ming chung-hsiao ch'üan-shu* (A Comprehensive Compilation on the Ching-ming Tradition of Loyalty and Filiality), the biographies of which exemplify the role of Hsü's disciples as guarantors of political stability. The traditional attributes of *chung* (loyalty) and *hsiao* (filiality) are reinterpreted in this context as metaphors for submission to authority and the suppression of rebellion. Shrines to Hsü are still maintained in Taiwan today and, even more remarkably, the Yü-lung Abbey is officially designated as a historical monument worthy of preservation.

A number of other hagiographic accounts testify to the popularity of local cults at various sacred mountain sites, including Lu Shan on the northern border of Kiangsi, once a popular missionary resort, and Hua-kai Shan, the source of the T'ien-hsin revelations. Most well-known perhaps is the guardian of Wu-tang Shan (in present-day Hupei), referred to as Hsüan-wu (Dark Martial Lord) or Chen-wu (Perfected Martial Lord). How early this deity associated with the north was enshrined in China is not known, but well over three hundred shrines are established in his name on Taiwan today. Hsüan-wu's role as defender of the Sung empire against the Western Hsia invasions and other threats is commemorated in the *Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti ch'i-sheng lu* (An Account of the Revelations Conveyed to the Sages by the Supreme Sovereign of the Dark Celestial Realm). A composite work, it is derived largely from the textual counterpart to the wall paintings of a shrine dedicated to the Martial Lord by Sung Jen-tsung in 1057. A later anthology reveals in turn that many literati of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries promoted Hsüan-wu as the special guardian of the Mongol empire. Similarly, the *Ta Ming Hsüan-t'ien shang-ti jui-ying t'u-lu* (An Illustrated Account of the Auspicious Responses of the Supreme Sovereign of the Dark Celestial Realm during the Great Ming) is a collection of encomia dating from 1405 to 1418 that honor the deity's role in establishing the mandate of the Ming.

Topography, epigraphy, and historiography. The chorography of sacred space, in the heavens above, on the earth below, and in the subterranean caverns be-

yond, is the subject of many works in the Taoist canon. Certainly among the most renowned of such texts from antiquity is the *Wu-yüeh chen-hsing t'u* (Mappings of the True Form of the Five Sacred Peaks), talismanic variations of which were introduced into the Ling-pao textual corpus. The apotropaic value of these diagrams was recognized by Ko Hung and inspired Taoist liturgists for many generations later. The five sacred peaks also serve as a crucial point of reference in Tu Kuang-t'ing's *Tung-t'ien fu-ti yüeh-tu ming-shan chi* (A Record of the Celebrated Mountains, Conduits, Sacred Peaks, Munificent Terrains, and Caverned Heavens). In addition to mapping out the *wu-yüeh* ("five [sacred] peaks," e.g., T'ai Shan in the east, Heng Shan in the south, Sung Shan in the center, Hua Shan in the west, and Heng Shan in the north) and the interlocking network of ranges, Tu identifies ten major and thirty-six supplementary *tung-t'ien* or subterranean chambers, as well as seventy-two sites traversed by various transcendents and the twenty-four original parishes established by Chang Tao-ling in western Szechwan.

Larger descriptive topographies date from the Sung to Ming. The canon preserves individual records for three of the Five Sacred Peaks. That compiled in commemoration of the Sacred Peak of the East, *Tai shih* (A History of Tai), was presented to Ming Shen-tsung (r. 1573–1619) on New Year's Day of 1587. In compiling this work the editor, Cha Chih-lung (fl. 1554–1586), sought to reinforce the ritual obligations of the court toward T'ai Shan, devoting large portions of the text to the history of imperial sacrifices and various temple compounds, as well as the supernatural phenomena witnessed at the site from 78 BCE to 1586.

Earlier and less ambitious accounts are available for the sacred peaks of the west and south. The *Hsi-yüeh Hua-shan chih* (A Treatise on Hua Shan, Sacred Peak of the West) is attributed to a Wang Ch'u-i, not to be confused with the Ch'üan-chen patriarch of the same name. This text, derived in part from the *Hua-shan chi* (A Record of Hua Shan) dating to the T'ang, may in fact be the work of the author of an 1183 preface, Liu Ta-yung. Unlike the treatise on T'ai Shan, there is little discussion of ritual traditions in propitiation of the spirits embodied in the mountain. Instead, the compiler was far more interested in recounting stories about supramundane forces and in identifying indigenous plants and minerals with magical properties.

The *Nan-yüeh tsung-sheng chi* (An Anthology on the Collective Highlights of the Sacred Peak of the South) is wholly devoted to the history of Taoist sanctuaries on Heng Shan. The edition of this text in the *Tao-tsang* is an extract from a fuller account of sacred shrines, including Taoist, Buddhist, and folk, that is printed in the

Buddhist canon. Ch'en T'ien-fu (fl. 1131–1163), who completed this text in 1163, relies in part on the *Nan-yüeh hsiao-lu* (A Short Account of the Sacred Peak of the South) compiled by Li Ch'ung-chao in 902. Of considerable interest are Ch'en's own contributions on the history of rituals on behalf of the emperor's longevity and national prosperity. As the inventory of canonizations reveals, Sung Hui-tsung was a particularly avid patron of the shrines at Heng Shan.

Five topographies in the canon celebrate mountain ranges in Chekiang, the most famous of which is T'ien-t'ai Shan. Central to the *T'ien-t'ai-shan chih* (A Treatise on the T'ien-t'ai Mountains) is the history of the T'ung-po Abbey, located on a peak of that name. It was for centuries the most prominent temple compound in the T'ien-t'ai range. Built originally for the Taoist master Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen (647–735), the T'ung-po Kuan reportedly once housed one of the largest collections of Taoist texts in the country. [See the biography of Ssu-ma Ch'eng-chen.] With the fall of Kaifeng and the reestablishment of the Sung mandate at Hangchow, the temple became an even more important talisman of the state and was evidently at the height of its glory in 1168, following thirty-seven years of construction activity. It later served as a haven for refugees during the fall of the Mongol regime and by 1367 went up in flames.

To the sacred font of the Shang-ch'ing revelations is dedicated the largest topography in the canon, the *Mao-shan chih* (A Treatise on Mao Shan). The forty-fifth Shang-ch'ing patriarch, Liu Ta-pin (fl. 1317–1328), completed this text in 1328, at a time when the site enjoyed a renewal of royal patronage. His account opens with a comprehensive collection of imperial communications concerning Mao Shan, dating from 1 BCE to 1319. Other outstanding features include the hagiographies of the three eponymous transcendents surnamed Mao as well as the ranks of Shang-ch'ing patriarchs and matriarchs, the history of various shrines and hermitages, an anthology of stone inscriptions dating from 520 to 1314, and a large selection of prose and prosody sustaining the sanctity of the region.

The *Tao-tsang* also preserves a few works solely comprised of texts carved on stone. Most notable are the anthologies of epigraphy prepared on behalf of the Ch'üan-chen heritage. The largest is the *Kan-shui hsien-yüan lu* (An Account of the Origins of Transcendents at Kan-shui) compiled by the Ch'üan-chen archivist Li Tao-ch'ien. The title refers to the Kan-he Garrison (in present-day Shensi), where the founder Wang Che reportedly achieved enlightenment in 1159. Most numerous are the tomb inscriptions commemorating worthies ranging from Wang Che to a contemporary of the editor. Another anthology, the *Kung-kuan pei-chih* (Epi-

graphic Memorials of Palaces and Abbeys), is devoted largely to the early history of the Pai-yün Kuan in Peking. One inscription marks the conclusion of a massive renovation of the T'ien-ch'ang Kuan, as the earlier abbey was known, in 1179. Also included is the proclamation issued upon the completion of the Chin canon at the T'ien-ch'ang Kuan in 1191.

Chu Hsiang-hsien (fl. 1279–1308) of Mao Shan is the editor of two works commemorating the site where Lao-tzu reputedly left behind the *Tao-te ching* in answer to the gatekeeper Yin Hsi's pleas for instruction. One is a set of hagiographic inscriptions entitled *Chung-nan-shan shuo-ching t'ai li-tai chen-hsien pei-chi* (An Epigraphic Record of the Successive Generations of Perfected Transcendents at the Pavilion for the Recitation of Scripture on Chung-nan Shan). Chu composed these accounts and had them inscribed on stone following a pilgrimage in 1279 to the Lou Kuan (Tiered Abbey) established in honor of Yin Hsi's discipleship. He derived much of his data from an earlier work compiled by Yin Wen-ts'ao (d. 688), a Taoist master who apparently regarded himself as a descendant of Yin Hsi. The second work compiled by Chu, the *Ku Lou-kuan tzu-yün yen-ch'ing chi* (An Anthology from the Abundant Felicity of Purple Clouds at the Tiered Abbey of Antiquity), includes inscriptions on the history of the shrine dating from 625 to 1303.

The historical works in the *Tao-tsang* do not match the size and scope of those in the Buddhist canon. There are a large number of brief historical surveys embedded in various texts, composed generally to establish the ultimate antiquity and thus authority of a scriptural tradition. The earliest separately compiled history in the Taoist canon is the *Li-tai ti-wang ch'ung-tao chi* (A Record of Reverence for the Tao on the Part of Sovereign Rulers over Successive Generations) of Tu Kuang-t'ing. The opening summary of the pre-T'ang era is little more than a statistical analysis of the number of temples established and Taoist masters ordained from one period of state patronage to the next. The discussions thereafter focus on the role of T'ai-shang Lao-chün as the ancestral guardian of the T'ang, especially his defense of the empire during the uprising of Huang Ch'ao (d. 884).

The unifying feature of all later histories in the canon continues to be the providential manifestations of Lord Lao. Prototypes of this historiographic approach include the early writings on *hua-hu* ("converting the barbarians") that were essentially chronicles of Lao-tzu's incarnations as the supreme preceptor of all peoples. To write a history of the faith was, in other words, to write a hagiography of Lord Lao as the messiah. This approach is exemplified in Chia Shan-hsiang's (fl. 1086) *Yu-lung chuan* (Like unto a Dragon), the title of which

is drawn from Confucius's putative characterization of Lao-tzu as recorded in the *Shih chi* (Records of the Historian) of Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145–86 BCE). Chia concentrates on Lord Lao's role as instructor to the ruling house and the history of the T'ai-ch'ing Kung (Palace of Grand Clarity, in present-day Lu-i, Honan Province), the reputed birthplace of the "historical" Lao-tzu.

Nearly a century later, Hsieh Shou-hao (1134–1212), a prominent Taoist master at the site of the Hsü Sun cult in Kiangsi, presented an even more comprehensive chronicle to Sung Kuang-tsung (r. 1190–1194). In compiling the *Hun-yüan sheng-chi* (A Chronicle of the Sage from the Primordality of Chaos), Hsieh sought to correct the inconsistencies in Chia's account by drawing on a wider range of readings from the *san-chiao*, or "three teachings" (i.e., Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism). Hsieh's work is an invaluable source of citations from works no longer extant, such as the early chronicle on Lord Lao compiled by Yin Wen-ts'ao. He is also particularly attentive to the history of the compilation of the canon. Among those who found Hsieh's work indispensable was the hagiographer Chao Tao-i.

Literary collections and dialogic treatises. Among the most informative sources on the beliefs and practices of Taoist masters are their collected writings, editions of which were commonly prepared by devotees. The prime example is of course T'ao Hung-ching's assiduous collation of Yang Hsi's revelatory verse. The writings of Wu Yün (d. 778), an ordained Cheng-i master often summoned by T'ang Hsüan-tsung, were brought together more expeditiously. According to a preface by Ch'üan Te-yü (759–818), a scribe named Wang Yen rescued what remained of the master's writings and presented them to the imperial archives. The edition in the canon, the *Tsung-hsüan hsien-sheng wen-chi* (A Literary Anthology of Master Tsung-hsüan) is that which a disciple Shao I-hsüan conveyed to Ch'üan. Among Wu's most well-known compositions is a sequence of verse entitled *Pu-hsü tz'u* (Lyrics on Pacing the Void) and a lengthy essay arguing that divine transcendence can indeed be learned. The history of a second T'ang anthology in the canon, the collected works of the renowned Tu Kuang-t'ing entitled *Kuang-ch'eng chi* (An Anthology of Kuang-ch'eng), is more obscure. It, too, is a valuable resource on the ritual activities of Taoist masters whose reputations made them favorites at court.

By far the most numerous of literary collections in the canon are those compiled after the T'ang. A vast corpus, for example, has evolved around the semi-legendary Lü Yen, claimed as the patriarch of both the Ch'üan-chen and Nan-tsung (Southern Heritage) traditions. A substantial collection of verse conventionally ascribed to him in truth probably dates no earlier than

the thirteenth century. One anthology, the *Ch'ung-yang chen-jen hun-ch'eng chi* (An Anthology of the Perfected on Arising from Turbulence), was prepared by Ho Chih-yüan, a disciple of Sung Te-fang (1183–1247). Ho was among those assigned to work on the Canon of 1244, the opportunity of which no doubt led to this edition. What Ho claimed to be the product of Lü's divine inspiration appears instead to reflect the literary legacy of Wang Che and his disciples.

Over a half-dozen works alone purport to be the teachings and writings of founder Wang. A number of the texts were compiled in direct tribute to Ma Yü's discipleship under Wang. The master's basic pedagogy was apparently to recite a verse that would provoke a response from his devotees. Two works, the *Ch'ung-yang chiao-hua chi* (An Anthology on the Proselytism of Ch'ung-yang) and the *Ch'ung-yang fen-li shih-hua chi* (An Anthology of Ch'ung-yang on the Ten Transformations According to the Sectioning of a Pear), preserve hundreds of these missives between Wang and Ma. The exchange began, according to legend, when Wang locked himself up for one hundred days on the grounds of his hosts Ma and wife Sun Pu-erh and communicated with them merely by submitting a gift of food, often a section of pear, accompanied by instruction in verse. There is unfortunately no comparable record of Sun's responses, although late editions of her writings available outside the canon suggest that at least a few considered her to have been equally literate.

Other texts in the canon reveal that Wang was also willing to entertain the questions of his disciples. Records of such question-and-answer sessions, known as *yü-lu* or dialogic treatises, were as popular with the Ch'üan-chen masters as with their Ch'an Buddhist counterparts. A somewhat redundant example of this genre, the *Ch'ung-yang shou Tan-yang erh-shih-ssu chüeh* (Twenty-four Lessons Conveyed by Ch'ung-yang to Tan-yang), is composed of a series of questions and answers attributed to Ma and his master Wang. Among the lessons taught is that the devotee should speak very little, control all emotions, and minimize anxiety and cravings. Further details on Wang's instruction are found in the *Ch'ung-yang li-chiao shih-wu lun* (Fifteen Discourses on the Teachings Set Forth by Ch'ung-yang). Moderation in all things appears to be the central message of this dialogue. According to the concluding statement ascribed to Wang, departure from the mundane realm was to be accomplished mentally, not physically. The closing simile, obviously borrowed from the Buddhist translator and exegete Kumārajīva, is that one's body is like the root-stock of a lotus mired in mud, whereas one's heart-mind is suspended in space as the lotus blossom itself.

The writings associated with Ma Yü are even more

numerous than those of his master. Aside from three works based on exchanges with Wang, there are altogether six separate collections of prose and prosody printed under his name in the canon. One compilation, the *Tung-hsüan chin-yü chi* (An Anthology of the Gold and Jade of Tung-hsüan), includes a particularly revealing verse that exhorts Buddhist monks and Taoist masters to come together in accord and do away with slander. Another work, the *Chien-wu chi* (An Anthology on Gradual Enlightenment), features onomatopoeic verses that were apparently designed to illustrate, as the title implies, that enlightenment is a gradual process. A significant number of Ma's verses are expressly dedicated to female adepts, including his wife Sun. All men and women of the Tao, he urges, would best bring under control their *i-ma hsin-yüan*, or "horse of the will and monkey of the mind."

Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, the youngest disciple of Wang and eventually the most renowned, has comparably fewer writings to his name in the canon. The *Ch'ang-ch'ün-tzu P'an-hsi chi* (An Anthology of Ch'ang-ch'ün-tzu from the P'an Tributary) preserves compositions dating both from Ch'iu's seclusion in the upper reaches of the Yellow River valley as well as from his later ritual activities at Ch'i-hsia (in present-day Shantung). Among his verses are commemorations of various *chiao* fetes over which he had presided, personal communications to Chin Shih-tsung (r. 1161–1189), and instructions on meditative practices. In addition to Li Chih-ch'ang's account of Ch'iu's later years, the *Hsüan-feng ch'ing-hui lu* (A Record of a Felicitous Convocation on the Sublime Spirit of the Tao), ascribed to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189–1243), provides a record delivered before his patron, Chinggis Khan.

All but a fraction of the collected writings associated with the other select members in Wang's circle are lost. The single anthology of T'an Ch'u-tuan's teachings in the canon arose directly from the initiative of the junior patriarch Liu Ch'u-hsüan. Of the five anthologies attributed to Liu, only one survives, although a dialogic treatise compiled by his disciples reveals somewhat more about his career. Liu's sayings, many of which were inspired by lines in the *Tao-te ching*, were reportedly so popular as to have become part of the local culture of his circuit. The two paragons of filial piety, Wang Ch'u-i and Hao Ta-t'ung, are remembered with one anthology each. The *Yün-kuang chi* (An Anthology from Yün-kuang), named for the cavern in which Wang secluded himself for nine years, is a valuable supplement to the hagiographic *Hsien-i lu*. The one edition of Hao's teachings to be preserved attests to his training as a diviner and abiding interest in the *I-ching*.

The influence of the early Ch'üan-chen patriarchs is easily measured by the volume of writings that emerged

from later generations. Among those whose teachings expanded upon this legacy are Ch'iu's successor Yin Chih-p'ing (1169–1251), Liu's disciple Yü Tao-hsien (1168–1232), and Hao's disciple Wang Chih-chin (1178–1263). Later syncretists for whom there is ample record in the canon include Li Tao-ch'un (fl. 1290), Miao Shan-shih (fl. 1324), Wang Chieh (fl. 1310), Ch'en Chih-hsü (fl. 1329–1336), Wang Wei-i (fl. 1294–1304), and Chao I-chen (d. 1382). Many of these figures drew equally from the Ch'üan-chen and Nan-tsung traditions. The fullest documentation on the latter is to be found in late encyclopedic anthologies of the *Tao-tsang*.

Encyclopedic anthologies. The earliest comprehensive encyclopedic work in the canon is the *Wu-shang pi-yao* (The Essentials of Unsurpassed Arcana). Only two-thirds of the original one hundred *chüan* survives of this anonymous compilation. Citations from a wide selection of texts are organized under 288 headings, ranging from cosmology and sacred topography to the protocols for transmitting divine scriptures and instructions on meditative practices. The origins of this text are revealed in a Buddhist, not Taoist, compilation, namely the *Hsü kao-seng chuan* (Supplementary Biographies of Exalted Monks) of Tao-hsüan (596–667), which states that Chou Wu-ti (r. 561–578) ordered its compilation following his pacification of the state of Northern Ch'ü in 577. It is thought that work began on this vast anthology as early as 574, when Wu-ti issued a decree establishing the T'ung-tao Kuan (Abbey of Communication with the Tao) as a symbol of the anticipated political and ideological reunification of the empire. The text is not only an invaluable resource for citations from the original Shang-ch'ing and Ling-pao revelations, but also for the later codifications they inspired.

Two smaller compendia were compiled a century later by a relatively unknown recluse named Wang Hsüan-ho (fl. 683). The larger of the works, the *San-tung chu-nang* (Pearl Bag of the Three Caverns) is organized under thirty-four categories dealing with various aspects of conduct befitting an adept and includes extracts from a number of texts on contemplative pursuits that are otherwise lost. The second corpus attributed to Wang is the *Shang-ch'ing tao-lei shih-hsiang* (A Categorical Survey of the Tao of Shang-ch'ing), which specializes in citations dealing with six types of sacred quarters, from private retreats to the cosmic chambers of revealed literature.

A much larger encyclopedic anthology, the *Yün-chi ch'i-ch'ien* (Seven Lots from the Book-pack of the Clouds), was compiled by Chang Chün-fang, inspired apparently by his assignment to oversee the copying of a new canon on the order of Sung Chen-tsung. Chang states in his preface that his intention was to prepare a reference work for the emperor's personal use. But since

the *Yün-chi ch'i-ch'ien* was not completed until 1028 or 1029, it must have been presented to his successor Jen-tsung (r. 1023–1053). The writings Chang selected for this work date from the earliest revelations to the first decades of the eleventh century. Recorded, for example, in the opening essays on cosmogony and scriptural transmission are unique copies of the prefaces composed for the first catalogues of Shang-ch'ing and Ling-pao literature. Additional subheadings include sacred topography, behavioral precepts, ritual purification, visualization techniques, and hagiography. Notably absent are any instructions on liturgical procedure, a subject that Chang clearly considered to be beyond the scope of this corpus.

Two remarkable collections of writings treating "inner alchemy" (*nei-tan*) appeared during the Southern Sung period. The first in print was the *Tao-shu* (Pivot of the Tao) compiled by the bibliophile Tseng Ts'ao (fl. 1131–1155). Among the rare texts Tseng records is the *Pai-wen p'ien* (A Folio of One-hundred Questions), based on a putative exchange between Lü Yen and his mentor, the late Han transcendent Chung-li Ch'üan. The entire last chapter is devoted to the *Ling-pao p'ien* (A Folio on Ling-pao), a variant edition of the *Ling-pao pi-fa* (Conclusive Rites of Ling-pao), which was also compiled as a tribute to this legendary discipleship. A related theoretical work on the cultivation of the *chin-tan* (metallic enchymoma), the *Chung Lü ch'üan-tao chi* (An Anthology on Chung [-li]'s Transmission of the Tao to Lü), is found in both the *Tao shu* and a later Sung collectaneum of *nei-tan* literature, the *Hsiu-chen shih-shu* (Ten Writings on the Cultivation of Perfection). This anonymously compiled anthology also includes many texts associated with the Nan-tsung, or Southern Heritage, the "five patriarchs" (*wu-tsu*) of which are: Liu Ts'ao (d. ca. 1050), Chang Po-tuan (d. 1082), Shih T'ai (d. 1158), Hsüeh Tzu-hsien (d. 1191), and Ch'en Nan (d. 1213). The establishment of this patriarchy appears to be a rather late innovation inspired by the legacy of the Seven Perfected of Ch'üan-chen. By the early fourteenth century a number of texts began to assert that Liu conveyed the teachings of the venerable Chung-li Ch'üan and Lü Yen to both Wang Che in the north and Chang Po-tuan in the south. [See also Alchemy, article on Chinese Alchemy.]

Chang Po-tuan is popularly regarded as the "founder" of Nan-tsung. His writings were initially viewed as treatises on *wai-tan*, "exterior," or laboratory, alchemy. More recent research suggests that they fall, rather, into the mainstream of *nei-tan* literature. An edition of the major corpus attributed to him, the *Wu-chen p'ien* (Folios on the Apprehension of Perfection), is recorded in the *Hsiu-chen shih-shu*, with a preface by Chang dating to 1075. The same anthology also includes variant edi-

tions of similar lyrical sequences ascribed to Shih T'ai, Hsüeh Tzu-hsien, and Ch'en Nan. But by far the most dominant in the *Hsiu-chen shih-shu* are the writings of Ch'en's putative disciple, the renowned Thunder Ritual specialist Pai Yü-ch'an. Nearly half of the text is devoted to a record of his instructions on *chin-tan* and Thunder Ritual traditions, as well as his liturgical activities in Fukien and his accounts of the Hsü Sun cult in central Kiangsi. It may be that the *Hsiu-chen shih-shu* was compiled by devotees of Pai, for the latest work included is a set of texts on *chin-tan* by Hsiao T'ing-chih (fl. 1260), a second-generation disciple.

Other Sources

While the *Tao-tsang* is the most comprehensive collection of Taoist literature, it is by no means the only source available. Among the number of publications issued during the Ch'ing dynasty, the next largest corpus is the *Tao-tsang chi-yao* (An Edition of Essentials from Taoist Canon). The reedition of this work in 1906 includes 287 titles, compared to nearly fifteen hundred in the canon. Over half of the titles are found in the *Tao-tsang* as well, but this anthology also contains works otherwise unknown, including tracts attributed to Sun Pu-erh and Liu Ts'ao, as well as the writings of later syncretists such as Wu Shou-yang (d. 1644).

Perhaps one of the most neglected resources for Taoist literature is epigraphy. Aside from the few, mainly Ch'üan-chen, collections in the canon, there is a wide range of stone and bronze inscriptions pertinent to the history of the faith. An anthology of epigraphy compiled by Wang Ch'ang (1725–1806), for example, includes a transcription of the *T'ai-shang Lao-chün jih-yung miao-ching* (A Wondrous Scripture of Lord Lao and Most High for Daily Use) carved on stone in 1352 at the Pavilion for the Recitation of Scriptures in Shensi. A variant redaction of this text is found in the *Tao-tsang* and, at 141 words, is among the shortest works in the canon. It is essentially a code of conduct based on many traditional Chinese attributes such as filiality. Study of epigraphic documents will soon be greatly facilitated by the imminent publication of a comprehensive anthology of inscriptions bearing on the history of Taoism, a project begun by Ch'en Yüan and now being completed by Ch'en Chih-ch'ao at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Peking.

Scriptures and related sacred writings found in various archives constitute another essential source of Taoist literature. The Tun-huang manuscripts preserved in a number of libraries worldwide, for example, include texts that clarify the early history of several scriptural codifications. One such work, of which only a por-

tion survives in the canon, is the *Pen-chi ching* (Scripture on the Original Juncture). Over seventy fragments of this text are in the British and French archives of Tun-huang manuscripts. One of the compilers is known to have taken part in debates before the court of T'ang Kao-tsu (r. 618–626) on the issue of whether the Buddha was a disciple of the Tao. The text itself, designed apparently in part to support this theory, seems to have taken its inspiration from discussions on the cosmogonic concept of *pūrvakoṭi* (Chin., *pen-chi*) in the *Madhyamāgama* and *Samyuktāgama*, Chinese translations of which appeared in the fourth and fifth centuries. Parables in one section of the *Pen-chi ching*, moreover, were evidently drawn from the *Dharmapada*. The text reached the height of its popularity during the reign of T'ang Hsüan-tsung (r. 713–755), who ordered all Taoist priests not only to copy it out but also to recite and lecture on it during official religious festivals. In short, the lessons within were thought to lead to the salvation of the state as well as of the individual.

Later collections of manuscripts and rare blockprints also have much to reveal about the continuity and change in Taoist traditions. Among published works is the *Chuang Lin hsü tao-tsang* (Supplementary Taoist Canon of the Chuang and Lin Clans) edited by Michael Saso, a collection of Taoist works largely gathered from a Cheng-i fraternity in Hsinchu of north Taiwan. These texts, as well as those recovered by Kristofer Schipper in the Tainan area of south Taiwan, suggest a remarkable continuum of Taoist liturgical practice. A scripture dedicated to T'ien-fei (i.e., Ma-tsu) in the Schipper Archives of Paris, for example, proves to be a variant of a text in the canon dating to 1409–1412. The manuscript version conveys an image of this well-known Fukienese patroness of seafarers that accommodates a folk vision of her as an *avatāra* of Kuan-yin. T'ien-fei's assimilation to this all-compassionate *bodhisattva* is promoted in popular narratives on the life of the goddess compiled during the late Ming dynasty. Just as she continues to inspire poets, novelists, and even scriptwriters in this age, so, too, has much of the Taoist literature both in and outside the canon left its mark on centuries of Chinese belles-lettres. Further study of this literature can only disclose how deeply the Taoist heritage pervades all aspects of Chinese society.

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JUDITH MAGEE BOLTZ

History of Study

Although Taoism represents a tradition as ancient and as rich as the other major religions of the world, the serious study of this tradition has been almost entirely a twentieth-century phenomenon, and largely a phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century at that. The reasons for this are not far to seek: the Taoist canon (*Tao-tsang*), a compendium of over one thousand different works representing the full scope of the tradition, was from its fourth and last printing in 1445 until its reproduction by photomechanical means in 1926 a decidedly rare work, the jealously guarded possession of a handful of monasteries. Until the twentieth century, moreover, few outsiders would have been inclined to persist in seeking them out. To the traditional Chinese scholar, raised in the Neo-Confucian belief that Buddhism and Taoism alike were little more than gross superstition, there was little reason to take an interest in such literature. Although certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars made use of the Taoist canon to obtain good editions of ancient philosophical or historical texts (which, as in the case of the *Mo-tzu*, were often not Taoist works but were included in the canon for reasons unrelated to their contents), it was not until 1911 that any Chinese scholar seems to have lingered over the rest of the canon. This was Liu Shih-p'ei, a fervent nationalist whose attitude toward tradition had been enlarged by the modern world to embrace a less orthodox range of study.

By the time Liu published the results of his readings, non-Chinese scholars who had inherited the best of the

traditional Chinese polymath's zeal for knowledge without his blind spot with regard to religion had begun to show a lively interest in Taoism also. French Sinologists such as Édouard Chavannes and Paul Pelliot and Japanese such as Tsumaki Naoyoshi came to Taoism out of a general interest in Chinese civilization, but from societies where the study of religion was an accepted branch of learning. Japan in particular had at an early stage accepted much of China's medieval culture, including the Buddhist faith, but had not undergone a Neo-Confucian rejection of this legacy to the same degree. Thus learned Buddhists, such as Tokiwa Daijō, were already confronting the complex issue of the relationship between Chinese Buddhism and Taoism in the 1920s, while one, Ōfuchi Eshin, had even traveled abroad to investigate the millennium-old manuscripts of Taoist scriptures that had been discovered among other ancient materials at Tun-huang in northwest China at the turn of the century.

The increased political role of Japan in China during the 1930s also brought many Buddhist scholars to China. Some, such as Fukui Kōjun, returned to Japan to pursue research in the Taoist canon, now available in its modern printing in academic libraries, while others, such as Yoshioka Yoshitoyo, stayed longer to gain first-hand experience of Taoist monastic life. Yoshioka's 1941 *Dōkyō no jittai* (The Actual State of Taoism), published in Peking, remains an invaluable source on a mode of religious life now largely vanished. The expulsion of the Japanese from China after 1945 effectively halted all such opportunities for fieldwork and even led to the loss of much material already painstakingly collected. However, as *Dōkyō to Chūgoku shakai* (Taoism and Chinese Society), a slim volume published in Tokyo in 1948 by Kubo Noritada, demonstrates, even after their return to Japan these scholars were concerned to relate their historical and bibliographical research to the fuller picture of Chinese society that they had witnessed. Their numbers were also sufficient to found in 1950 the Japan Society of Taoistic Research (Nippon Dōkyō Gakkai) and to start the publication of a journal, *Tōhō shūkyō*, the following year.

By contrast, 1950 saw the publication in Paris of the posthumous writings on Taoism of the sole French scholar to have followed up the pioneering work of Chavannes and Pelliot by carrying out research into the materials provided by the Taoist canon. Henri Maspero (1883–1945), like others of his generation, came to the study of Taoism not as a specialist but as a broad-ranging scholar who had published in the fields of Egyptology and Vietnamese studies and had produced a Sinological masterpiece, a one-volume survey of pre-imperial China, before his research into the China of the

Latter Han period and thereafter brought him face to face with the Taoist religion. During the 1930s he applied himself to unraveling the formative stages of the religion, working independently of but using similar methods to his Japanese contemporaries (for example, comparing materials in the Taoist canon with the Tun-huang manuscripts and with Buddhist sources). Maspero perished at Buchenwald in 1945 before he had published more than a portion of his findings. In his three-volume collected writings, compiled by Paul Demiéville, his equally erudite literary executor, an entire volume is devoted to Taoism. Maspero's description of Taoism remains to this day a highly rewarding record of the first encounter between a modern European mind and the full complexity of this ancient religion.

Sadly, Maspero had no students; the experts on Chinese religion who rose to prominence in postwar Paris were more immediately influenced by Maspero's great contemporary in the study of Chinese religion, Marcel Granet. Yet Granet had not been unaware of the importance of Taoism, and the work of such men as Max Kaltenmark, Rolf Alfred Stein, and Michel Soymié helped maintain the primacy of Paris as the center of Taoist studies in the Western world. Nor were these men, for their part, unaware of the achievements of their Japanese colleagues: Soymié established with Yoshioka Yoshitoyo in 1965 a second Japanese journal devoted to Taoism, the *Dōkyō kenkyū*. By this time a number of studies of Taoism had been published in Japan and many points of controversy were being hotly debated. A new generation of European researchers specifically interested in Taoism was emerging, and the new publication was soon introducing the findings of Anna Seidel and K. M. Schipper to a Japanese audience.

While the two major streams of Taoist studies were beginning to flow together, research in China remained almost as it had been in France in the 1930s, the domain of one lone scholar. True, since the reprinting of the Taoist canon, established specialists in the history of Chinese religion, such as Ch'en Yin-k'o and Ch'en Yüan, had devoted articles to aspects of Taoist history, and one small volume attempting an account of the whole development of Taoism had been published, partly on the basis of early Japanese research. But from 1949 onward the only aspects of Taoist studies to see publication were those connected with the history of peasant uprisings or the history of science. In the former area the textual scholar Wang Ming produced in 1960 an excellent edition of the *T'ai-p'ing ching*, a major Taoist scripture associated with the Yellow Turban insurgents of the Han dynasty, but subsequent discussion of the text by a number of academics tended not to focus on religious issues.

In 1963 Ch'en Kuo-fu, a historian of science and the "lone scholar" to whom I refer above, managed to republish an expanded version of an outstanding monograph, originally published in 1949, on the formation of the Taoist canon. Ch'en had initially undertaken his lengthy and painstaking research during the 1940s when his interest in the history of Chinese alchemy led him to the question of the dating of Taoist texts on this subject. But especially in the 1963 edition of his *Tao-tsang yüan-liu k'ao* he also included his gleanings on many other topics that had caught his eye in the course of his readings. Other scholars, unable to claim to be furthering the study of science rather than religion, were less fortunate. Man Wen-t'ung, who had published some worthwhile research on Taoist texts in the 1940s, saw his work confiscated during the late 1950s; only a few further notes were published posthumously in 1980. The Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s ended the activities of the Chung-kuo Tao-chiao Hsieh-hui (the Chinese Taoist Association), a group formed in 1957, but unable even then to achieve much in either religious or academic terms.

Ch'en Kuo-fu had begun his alchemical researches while studying in the United States under Tenney L. Davis at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and it was almost exclusively this scientific aspect of Taoism that has continued to attract the attention of the English-speaking world—apart, that is, from the perennial fascination with the *Tao-te ching*, which has only produced a growing list of increasingly otiose translations. Thus when the first international conference on Taoism met in Italy in 1968, it was two historians of science, Joseph Needham of Great Britain and Nathan Sivin from the United States, who joined with experts on religion such as Schipper and Seidel. No Chinese scholar attended, nor did any senior scholar from Japan. This situation was rectified at the next conference in 1972, which was held in Japan so that a number of Japanese scholars could attend, as did Hou Ching-lang, originally from Taiwan but trained in Paris. Hou was by no means the first Chinese to have conducted research into Taoism there: in 1960 Wu Chi-yu had used the Tun-huang manuscripts to compile an edition of an important Taoist scripture, the *Pen-chi ching*. A few other Chinese scholars had by now published on Taoism in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or farther afield—Liu Ts'un-yan in Australia, for instance. But it was not until 1979, at a third conference held in Switzerland, that the situation in Peking had changed sufficiently for Ch'en Kuo-fu to participate. Thus Taoist studies finally were able to achieve true international status and to win a degree of recognition in the land where Taoism originated.

The change of climate in the People's Republic of China manifested itself in a number of other ways. The year 1979 also saw the first publication of a new academic periodical, *Shih-chieh tsung-chiao* (World Religion), marking the start of the officially recognized study of religion in post-1949 China. Although the first issue was much concerned with the history of atheism, in the following year articles on Taoism were included. The first volume of an outline history of Chinese Taoist thought, *Chung-kuo Tao-chiao ssu-hsiang shih-kang*, and a new textual study by Wang Ming also appeared at this time. By 1980, the Chinese Taoist Association was active once more. In 1981 a dictionary of religion (*Tsung-chiao ts'e-tien*) was published, containing a large number of entries devoted to Taoism. The first dictionary of Taoism as such, the *Tao-chiao ta-tz'u-tien* by Li Shu-huan, had appeared in 1979 in Taiwan, but while Li's status as a Taoist priest contrasts markedly with that of the Marxist compilers of the more recent volume, it must be admitted that inasmuch as neither dictionary incorporated the findings of non-Chinese scholars, both works fell well below the standard that could have been achieved through international cooperation.

Although Chinese scholarship on Taoism has lagged behind that of France and Japan, the potential for development remains great. In the early 1980s Taoist priests appeared once again in the streets and marketplaces of Chinese towns. It seems that the living tradition of the religion has not been cut off entirely by the Cultural Revolution, and that scholars might still learn from it firsthand. Furthermore, China's bibliographic resources are still the envy of the outside world. One might mention, for example, the epigraphical sources on Sung Taoism used by the historian Ch'en Yüan, and the (incomplete) set of the Taoist canon in Szechwan, details of which are as yet unpublished but which may prove useful for the study of the history of the canon's early printings.

At the start of the 1980s, work was already progressing rapidly on a complete bibliographic guide to the canon in its modern reprinted form. Based in Paris and under the direction of K. M. Schipper, this project is truly international, as it is sponsored by the European Association for Chinese Studies and involves scholars from European countries and beyond. Even before publication of the guide, the project has led to the publication of concordances to important Taoist texts and to an analysis by John Lagerwey (1981) of a sixth-century Taoist encyclopedia, the *Wu-shang pi-yao*. It has also indirectly stimulated a monograph by P. van der Loon entitled *Taoist Works in the Libraries of the Sung Period* (1984).

In Japan major collaborative ventures were preceded

by publications that reflected the work of individual careers. First Yoshioka Yoshitoyo and then Kubo Noritada produced histories of Taoism aimed at general audiences. Ōfuchi Ninji completed a catalogue of all the Taoist manuscripts from Tun-huang, with a companion volume of photographs of every text; these two works were published as *Tonko Dōkyō*, respectively subtitled *Mokuroku-hen* and *Zuroku-hen*, in Tokyo in 1978 and 1979. Collaborative ventures began when a volume on Taoism was required for a series on the rich material of Tun-huang, and no fewer than ten writers (including K. M. Schipper) joined under the editorship of Yoshioka. Yoshioka died in 1979, but the volume, entitled *Tonkō to Chūgoku Dōkyō*, did eventually appear in 1983; it includes a sixty-two-page general bibliography of Taoism based on material Yoshioka had earlier collected. Yoshioka had in a sense initiated cooperative scholarship in Japanese Taoist studies somewhat earlier: a festschrift in his honor, *Dōkyō kenkyū ronshū* (Collected Essays in Taoist Studies), drew on the work of fifty-four Japanese and foreign contributors and was published in Tokyo in 1977.

In 1983 a comprehensive survey of Taoism involving the work of twenty-three scholars was published in Japan under the general title *Dōkyō*. This was the first collaborative attempt at a full description of the religion in any language. The three volumes of this survey, *Dōkyō to wa nani ka?*, *Dōkyō no tenkai*, and *Dōkyō no dempō*, are devoted, respectively, to a description of Taoism itself, an assessment of its importance in relation to other aspects of Chinese life and thought, and a survey of its spread beyond its Chinese origins. The last volume also contains surveys of research in Japan and elsewhere. The study of Taoism outside mainland China has become increasingly prominent, especially as it has moved from historical to anthropological research. Historical research has not, however, decreased in importance: a pioneering work such as the *Han'guk Togyosa* of Yi Nūng-hwa, a study of the history of Taoism published in Seoul in 1959, has its successors in the more recent publications of Japanese scholars concerned to reassess the impact of Taoist beliefs on the history of their own culture. Of these, the symposium *Dōkyō to kodai tennōsei*, which appeared in Tokyo in 1978 under the editorship of Fukunaga Mitsuji, deals with an issue of no slight importance to the Japanese of today, namely, the possibility of Taoist influence on such a quintessentially Japanese institution as the emperorship.

However, it is in the investigation of Taoism as it is practiced nowadays outside mainland China that the greatest diversity of scholarly activity is apparent. Kubo, in his research into Taoist beliefs associated with

the hour *keng-shen*, has covered not only Japan but also Okinawa. Of the many ethnographers and others concerned with the recording of Taoist practices in Taiwan, one scholar based on that island, Liu Chih-wan, has published the first part of his study *Chūgoku Dōkyō no matsuri to shinkō* in Tokyo in 1983. In 1975 the American Michael Saso published in Taipei twenty-five volumes of Taoist texts currently used under the title *Chuang-lin hsü Tao-tsang*. The Taoist practices of the Yao tribesmen of northern Thailand have been recorded by Japanese scholars and have attracted the attention of French and American scholars also. Taoism in Hong Kong, Singapore, and other overseas Chinese communities has been investigated to some extent as well.

In the 1980s Taoist studies are thus no longer confined to one or two pioneers working in isolation. There is still plenty of scope for individual interpretations of the Taoist religious and philosophical traditions, as witness the very different outlooks of K. M. Schipper's *Le corps taoïste* (Paris, 1982) and A. C. Graham's *Chuang-tzu* (London, 1981). It must be said that there is still plenty of scope, too, for greater academic recognition of the importance of Taoist studies. In the West there are as yet no academic posts specifically devoted to research and teaching in Taoism, while in Japan they may be counted on the fingers of one hand. But doubtless such formal acknowledgment of the importance of Taoism as a part of the religious experience of mankind will come in time. When that happens it will be in no small part due to the efforts of the scholars of many nations whose contributions have been reviewed here.

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TAO-SHENG (360?–434), also Chu Tao-sheng; Chinese Buddhist monk, student of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and early proponent of a doctrine of sudden enlightenment. The precise age at which Tao-sheng entered the religious life is unknown. Accounts of his early career state only that he studied under Chu Fa-t'ai (a disciple, with Tao-an, of Fo-t'u-teng) in Chien-k'ang, the southern capital. In 397 he journeyed to Mount Lu and became the disciple of Tao-an's most famous student, Hui-yüan. During his first year on Lu-shan, Tao-sheng took advantage of the presence of the Kashmiri monk Saṃghadeva to study the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature. Around 406 he left Lu-shan for the northern capital of Ch'ang-an, where he presumably attended Kumārajīva's translation seminars of the *Vimalakīrti* and *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtras*. Later, he wrote commentaries to both of these scriptures. [See the biographies of Kumārajīva and Hui-yüan.]

In 407 Tao-sheng abruptly left Ch'ang-an and returned to Lu-shan, bearing with him a copy of Seng-chao's *Po-jo wu chih lun* (*Prajñā Is Not Knowledge*). Liu I-min's correspondence with Seng-chao regarding this text, included in the *Chao-lun*, resulted from this fortuitous transmission. [See the biography of Seng-chao.] Shortly after arriving on Mount Lu, Tao-sheng was off again, this time to Chien-k'ang, where in 418 Fa-hsien translated a recension of the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. This text, like its Hīnayāna namesake, purported to record the last discourse of the Buddha, a fact that very naturally conferred on it a prestige and authority all its own. Quite unlike the Hīnayāna version, however, the Mahāyāna text preached that *nirvāṇa* was "permanent, joyous, personal, and pure" (Chin., *ch'ang, le, wo*!, *ching*), assertions that are substantially at odds with the normative Mahāyāna teaching that the nature of *nirvāṇa*, like that of all *dharmas*, is itself "empty" (*śūnya*) of all attributes. More curious to Tao-sheng's ears, however, was the statement in Fa-hsien's translation that the *icchantikas* (Chin., *i-ch'an-t'i*, beings who have cut off their "roots of virtue" and seek only to gratify their desires) could never attain Buddhahood. To Tao-sheng, such a statement vitiated the central claim of Mahāyāna Buddhism to be a vehicle of salvation for all beings. Disdaining to accept the letter of the text, he insisted on the ultimate Buddhahood of the *icchantikas*, and in so doing brought down upon himself the wrath of the monastic community in Chien-k'ang. Tao-sheng was forced to leave the capital in 428 or 429 when accusations of heresy were formally brought to the attention of the emperor.

Back on Lu-shan, Tao-sheng did not have to wait long for vindication. In 430 a new recension of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, translated by Dharmakṣema in Liang-

chou in 421, reached the southern capital. Eight chapters longer than Fa-hsien's recension, this text contained passages in the sections hitherto unavailable to the Chinese that explicitly guaranteed salvation to the *icchantikas*. When the contents of this text became known in Chien-k'ang, Tao-sheng was invited to return to the capital. He died on Mount Lu in the year 434.

Tao-sheng's works, nearly all lost, reflect the broadened textual horizons of the Chinese Buddhist world of the early fifth century. They include essays on the Buddha nature and the *dharmakāya* (the transcendental, "absolute" body of the Buddha); a treatise on the "two truths," presumably a Mādhyamika-oriented work deriving from the influence of Kumārajīva; and commentaries on several *sūtras*, including the *Vimalakīrti*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (Lotus), the *Nirvāṇa* (the principal scriptural warrant for many of his notions), and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā*. But what we know of his thought is based principally on secondary sources, the testimony of Seng-chao, for instance, who liberally cites Tao-sheng's views in his own commentary on the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*. Of Tao-sheng's scriptural commentaries only that on the *Lotus* survives.

For Tao-sheng, the phenomenal world is supported by an absolute, a principle of cosmic and moral order (*li*) that is unitary, indivisible, and immanent in all things. This cosmic order is *dharma*. As the source of things, it is also their *t'i*, or "substance," and yet it is ultimately without any qualifying attributes whatsoever: it is *k'ung*, "empty," *wu*, "without existence," or *tzu-jan*, "self-same," what is naturally so. The personification of this principle is, of course, the Buddha, but as the Buddha is in a sense no more than a reification of the *dharma*, the "body of the *dharma*" (*dharmakāya*), Buddhas and ordinary beings share a common substance. The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* asserts, in its most well-known passage, that all beings possess this Buddha nature (*fo-hsing*). If so, argues Tao-sheng, the religious life does not culminate in the acquisition of some new quality but in an awareness within each of us of an already present enlightenment. Once this awareness dawns, there then arises what the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* refers to as the "true self" (*chen-wo*), an unqualified, blissful, and unchanging consciousness. It was in terms of this True Self that Tao-sheng understood the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*'s teaching that *nirvāṇa* is "permanent, joyous, personal, and pure."

Classical Mahāyāna thought conceives of the religious path as commencing with a "mind set on enlightenment" (*bodhicitta*) and progressing through a series of ten *bodhisattva* stages (*bhūmis*) in which deluded thought is suppressed and nondual insight (*prajñā*) into reality cultivated. The seventh of these *bhūmis* is usu-

ally considered a decisive point in the spiritual life. From that point on, the practitioner is considered no longer subject to spiritual retrogression; his consciousness is wholly oriented toward enlightenment, even if that path involves, as it must, the decision to delay final *nirvāṇa* for the sake of others. [See Bodhisattva Path.] But is the experience of enlightenment itself a sudden, radical break in consciousness, or is it of a piece, more rarefied perhaps, with the gradual steps of spiritual progress along the *bodhisattva* path?

A document contemporary with Tao-sheng, Hsieh Ling-yün's *Pien-tsung lun* (Discussion of Essentials; included in the *Kuang hung-ming chi*, T.D. no. 2103) apprises us that for many Chinese the *bodhisattva* path was seen as a course of gradual progression and graded stages of enlightenment. Against this view, the *Pien-tsung lun* sets forth what it calls the "new doctrine" of Tao-sheng. According to this doctrine, as the Absolute is unitary, indivisible, and without any qualifiers whatsoever, so too must the wisdom that comprehends it be a sudden, intuitive insight (*tun-wu*) into the whole of reality. Such an insight can admit to no gradation. Tao-sheng likens the process of enlightenment to that of a fruit ripening on a tree. Religious practice may inculcate confidence and faith in the *dharma*, but at the moment when one reaches enlightenment there is a qualitative leap or disjunction, just as the fruit suddenly falls away from the tree when it reaches maturity.

Tao-sheng's teaching of sudden enlightenment was not the first such doctrine in China. Previous thinkers such as Chih Tun and, allegedly, Tao-an, had spoken of the seventh *bhūmi* as the critical stage at which insight dawns. For them, however, this insight was deepened in later stages. Tao-sheng rejected this "lesser" doctrine of sudden enlightenment (*hsiao tun-wu*), as he did the gradualist notions of his former companion in Ch'ang-an, Hui-kuan (354–424), who argued that practitioners of different levels of spiritual maturity perceive the truth in different ways and to differing degrees: the truth may be whole, but some are capable of seeing only a portion of it. This subitist versus gradualist controversy was one of the issues subsumed within the discourse of fifth- and sixth-century debates on the *chiao-p'an*, the "divisions of scriptures" that attempted to account for the diversity, even incongruity, the Chinese found among the teachings of the Indian *sūtra* literature. These organizing schemes classified texts both genetically, according to the type of teaching embodied therein, and "historically," according to the period in the career of the Buddha in which they were said to have been preached.

In one of the most prominent of these early systems, Hui-kuan proposed that the Buddha preached at least

two types of doctrine, *tun-chiao*, or "sudden teachings," and *chien-chiao*, "gradual teachings" (a third type, "indeterminate," is often attributed to Hui-kuan and was widely found in *chiao-p'an* contemporary with his). But Hui-kuan's emphasis here does not bear directly on the nature of the enlightenment experience itself; as the term *chiao* ("teaching") implies, what is at issue is the *method* employed in various texts to bring beings to enlightenment, suggesting that in their quest for a systematization of the Buddhist scriptures, the scholar-monks of Tao-sheng's time admitted, in best Mahāyāna fashion, a plurality of religious paths without necessarily denying the suddenness of enlightenment itself.

For his part, Tao-sheng too proposed a classification of the Buddha's teachings according to the capacities of the audience. In the *Miao-fa lien-hua ching su*, his commentary to the *Lotus Sutra*, Tao-sheng acknowledges the need for various "devices" to provoke faith in *dharma* and posits a fourfold division of the Buddha's teachings: (1) Good and Pure Wheel of the Law; (2) Expedient Teachings; (3) True Teachings; and (4) Teachings Without Residue. Whether these refer, as commonly interpreted, to specific texts or, as also maintained (Ōchō, 1952, pp. 232–238), merely to teaching methods, they are indicative of Tao-sheng's recognition that although the Truth may be indivisible, the means to attract people to it must take heed of their capacity to comprehend what is taught. Clearly, Tao-sheng never intended to preclude the necessity for religious cultivation by promulgating his doctrine of sudden enlightenment.

Crucial as these issues may have been for the Indian Buddhist tradition, where both subitist and gradualist tendencies are attested, it is important to recognize the extent to which the debate over the topic in China was carried out against a backdrop of indigenous values and perceptions. Despite the provocative fact that Hsieh Ling-yün classed as "sudden" the doctrines of Confucius, Confucian teachings were perennially associated with a gradual path of moral and intellectual cultivation epitomized in their concept of the ideal man, the *chün-tzu*. By contrast, the very notions most typically associated with the subitist doctrine, the unity and indivisibility of the Truth and the ineffability and spontaneity of the experience of it, are characteristically Taoist. As Demiéville points out (1973, pp. 256–257), Tao-sheng's most well-known assertions—that works are in vain, that acts engender no retribution, that *karman* is a mere nominal designation, and that Buddhahood is innate in all beings—handsomely recapitulate the notions of sagehood championed in the immediately preceding centuries by the *hsüan-hsüeh* thinkers. [See *the biographies of Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang.*]

In later centuries, subitist and gradualist patterns would manifest themselves again in the controversies of the Southern and Northern Ch'an teachings (upon which Tao-sheng's thought has no real bearing whatsoever) and, in another form altogether, in the division of the Neo-Confucian teachings into the so-called Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang traditions, testifying to the power of these motifs over Chinese intellectual and religious history. It is thus important to see in Tao-sheng's thought the extent to which Buddhist and indigenous patterns of religious thinking fertilize each other and to recognize in the concerns of the still young Chinese Buddhist church of Tao-sheng's day the resumption of perennial Chinese themes and conflicts.

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TAPAS. The Sanskrit term *tapas*, from *tap* ("heat"), was in ancient India an expression of cosmic energy residing in heat, fervor, and ardor. Through anthropocosmic correspondences established in early Vedic sacrificial traditions *tapas* became one of the key concepts of South Asian religions and the accepted term in Sanskrit and other Indic languages for ascetic power, especially a severely disciplined self-mortification that produces both personal and cosmic results.

A wide range of religious expressions concerning *tapas* appears already in the *Ṛgveda*. The gods Agni, the sacrificial fire, and Sūrya, the sun, both possess heat inherently, whereas *tapas* is generated within the warrior deity Indra and his weapons as a concomitant of heroic fury in battle. [See also Agni and Indra.] Indra's heated rage may be connected to certain proto-Indo-European warrior-cult phenomena; Ṛgvedic references to ascetics who handle fire, as well as other references to sweating as an initiatory technique, may be connected with pre-Vedic ecstatic or shamanic experiences. *Tapas* can be a weapon itself, used by Indra, for example, to encircle Vṛtra, or employed, perhaps ritually, by enemies of priests who pray to Indra and Varuṇa for protection (*Ṛgveda* 10.167, 7.82). In Hymn 9.113 the ritual production of divine *soma* is accomplished by *tapas*, faith, order, and truth. But perhaps the most influential Ṛgvedic speculations on *tapas* occur in such late cosmogonic hymns as 10.129 and 10.190, where *tapas*, existing prior to both divine and human beings, is linked in the procreative process with primordial desire (*kāma*), mind, order, and truth, a cosmic association that served as a template for late Vedic soteriologies as well as post-Vedic popular mythologies. Finally, the *Ṛgveda* reveals that the ancient sages and godlike ancestors also embody this cosmic fervor, the *ṛsis* sitting to perform *tapas* (10.109), and the *pitrs* ("ancestors") attaining their invincible places in the heavens by means of *tapas* (10.154).

It is in the *Yajurveda* recensions, the *Atharvaveda*, and the several Brāhmaṇas that *tapas* receives full recognition: the human body becomes a metaphor of sacrificial fire and *tapas* is simultaneously the means to and the experience of transformation. The Vedic student (*brahmacārin*), according to *Atharvaveda* 11.5, generates such powerful *tapas* that it fills his teacher, the gods, and the three worlds. *Tapas* is primal energy ready to be drawn upon by the knowledgeable, the adept, and the aggressively self-disciplined. Prajāpati, lord of creatures, continues, in the Brāhmaṇas, the older impersonal cosmogony involving *tapas* and blends with it the personal one of self-sacrificing Puruṣa (*Ṛgveda* 10.90): overcome with desire (*kāma*), Prajāpati discharges in heated procreation, exhausting himself into the substance of the uni-

verse by repeated emission. That this striving to create by self-heating provided a ritual model is clear from the many correspondences defining the Vedic sacrificer, who maintains the created worlds by laborious ritual (*karman*); he is simultaneously identified with the sacrificial fire, Agni, and Puruṣa-Prajāpati, as he undergoes spiritual regeneration. The way is now clear for ascetic technique to replicate, and in some ways to replace, sacrificial technique. Both are performances on an exhaustive, even painful scale: procreative on a sexual model, yet requiring chastity; bearing personal cosmic fruits, results that can be stored; and burning away, by inner heat, those impurities that are hindrances to transcendent, immutable being. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.4.4 is an illustration of the Brahmanic bond between cosmogony through sacrifice, and transcendence (rebirth) through ascetic perseverance, all declared in Prajāpati's thousand-year *tapas*.

The Upaniṣads further explore these mysterious connections in the heat of sexuality, hatching, ripening, digestion, strife, grief, rage, ecstasy, and mystical vision. The way is opened for a normative *tapas* practiced by every religious seeker in the third stage (*āśrama*) of life, and thus a modification or lay version of the extreme *tapas* professed by the ascetic bent upon world- and self-conquest. In the texts of the Jains and Buddhists, in various traditions of yoga and Tantra, and in popular myths and folklore collected in the Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas, a profile emerges of ascetic *tapas*. By degrees of fasting, chastity, silence, meditation, breath-control, and difficult postures, usually practiced in solitary vigil in forests and mountains, the yogin or *tapasvin* "heats the three worlds." His techniques include a "five-fires" position (sitting naked between four fires beneath the midsummer sun), immersing himself in a river in midwinter, and remaining unsheltered in monsoon rains.

The ascetic, like the sacrificer, demonstrates his interior fire as a cosmic force capable of recreating, reordering, or dismissing the world. So powerful is this religious model that much of the dramatic tension of post-Vedic mythology is provided by world-threatening *tapas* produced from ascetic ardor. Gods, goddesses, demons, kings, heroes, married sages, celibate yogins, young children, even animals perform *tapas*. The god Brahmā produces by *tapas*; Śiva's *tapas* and magical fire alternately create and destroy; Pārvatī maintains *tapas* for 36,000 years; a host of demons (*asuras* and *daiṭyas*) concentrate on world domination by *tapas*; the Pāṇḍava heroes exercise *tapas* in forest exile. *Tapas* and *kāma* cooperate in keeping the created world together; erotic desire poses the strongest threat to ascetic world-transcendence, and therefore repression and lust to-

gether with self-control and self-abandon provide antiphonal parallels to the ancient Indra-Vṛtra cosmic opposition, a cooperative discord that threads the drama of creation and recreation.

Whereas Hinduism routinized *tapas* into ordinary observance of fasts, meditations, and yogalike practices, and Buddhism elected a middle path between austerity and indulgence, Jainism perfected *tapas* in both lay and monastic careers as a means of burning off old *karman* and blocking accretions of new *karman*. In Jainism and in some traditions of Tantric yoga *tapas* survives today as disciplined self-mortification and as an internal experience of transformation.

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TAPU. See *Polynesian Religions and Taboo*.

TAQĪYAH ("safeguarding, protection") and *kitmān* ("concealment") are terms applied, primarily in the Shī'ī branches of Islam, to two broader types of religious phenomena: (1) the "prudential concealment" of one's allegiance to a minority religious group in danger of persecution and (2) the esoteric "discipline of the arcane," the restriction of a spiritual reality or mystery (or its symbolic form) only to those inwardly capable of grasping its truth.

Juridical and Ethical Dimensions. The classical discussions found in all Islamic legal schools are based on various Qur'anic verses (16:106, 3:28, 40:28, etc.) permitting the neglect of certain religious duties in situations of compulsion or necessity. In each school an

elaborate casuistry was developed, detailing the special conditions for such exceptions. However, the crucial practical question for Shī'ī groups, given the endangered minority position of the Shī'ī imams and their followers from earliest Islamic times onward, was that of concealing the outward signs of their Shī'ī allegiance (for example, their distinctive forms of the ritual prayer and profession of faith) under threatening circumstances. Hence, Shī'ī legal discussions of *taqīyah* traditionally focused on this aspect, emphasizing, for example, surah 16:106, which was taken to describe the divine forgiveness of a companion of the Prophet, 'Amr ibn Yasir, who had been forced to deny his faith by the idolators of Mecca.

Sunnī polemics against Shiism have traditionally stressed this narrowly prudential aspect of *taqīyah*, portraying it as a sign of moral or religious hypocrisy, passivity, and the like. However, neither that polemic (which overlooks the central theme of martyrdom and heroic resistance in Shī'ī piety and sacred history) nor the narrowly ethical reasonings of the legal schools (including those of the Shī'ah) accurately conveys the distinctively positive symbolic function of *taqīyah*: for the Shī'ah themselves, and like the martyrdom of so many imams and their supporters, it is a perennial and fundamental form of "witnessing" their essential role as the faithful spiritual elite of Islam, and not simply another communal sect or school.

Spiritual and Esoteric Dimensions. This uniquely Shī'ī conception of *taqīyah* (or *kitmān*) as a high spiritual duty, rather than a pragmatic necessity, is grounded in a large body of reported sayings (*ḥadīth*) of the first Shī'ī imam, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. AH 40/661 CE), and other early imams (notably Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Ja'far al-Ṣādiq) which repeatedly stress the positive, essential role of *taqīyah* as an integral part of religion (*dīn*) and true piety (*taqwā*; see Qur'ān 49:13). In Shī'ī tradition, the concept of *taqīyah* is intimately bound up with the fundamental role of the imams, and their initiates, as the divinely instituted guardians of the esoteric wisdom or "hidden secret" (*sirr maknūn*) constituting the essential spiritual core and intention of the Qur'anic revelation. In this context, *taqīyah* refers primarily to the initiate's strict responsibility to divulge the forms of that spiritual knowledge only to those rare individuals capable of perceiving (and safeguarding) their inner truth.

Similar assumptions of esotericism—especially the basic distinction between a public level of formal "belief" and ritual practice, and a higher level of contemplative insight and perception accessible only to a spiritual or intellectual elite—were equally fundamental to such widespread (though by no means specifically Shī'ī)

Islamic spiritual traditions as Sufism and the philosophic schools. Those assumptions, along with corresponding practices, came to be pervasive not only in the high literate culture (for example, Sūfī mystical poetry) but also in social domains not involving strictly "religious" activities. Moreover, the social and political conditions underlying *taqīyah* in Shī'ī circles, and such later offshoots as the Druze or Nuṣayrīyah, likewise encouraged similar precautionary developments among other minority religious groups or sects, whether Islamic (certain Sūfī *ṭarīqahs*, religio-political "brotherhoods," and so forth) or non-Islamic. Hence, "*taqīyah*-like" phenomena—whether or not justified in specifically Shī'ī terms—have continued to form an essential, if still relatively unstudied, dimension of religious and social life in many regions of the Islamic world down to the present day.

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JAMES WINSTON MORRIS

TĀRĀ (Tib., Sgrol-ma) is a Buddhist deity who represents the female counterpart of the *bodhisattva* Avalokiteśvara. She appears as the savior of the world whenever people are in distress and thus is known in Tibet, where she has gained great popularity, as the Great Savioress. By the time Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Bud-

dhism were firmly established in Tibet, Tārā had become one of the most important female deities, one whose influence was reflected back as the very source of the Tibetan people. One tradition has it that Avalokiteśvara and Tārā, in the semblance of a monkey and a rock demoness, had monkey offspring who gradually became humans, thus accounting for the origin of the Tibetans. As the *śakti* of the Buddha Amogāsiddhi, Tārā also personifies “all-accomplishing wisdom.”

Tārā is said to represent the very essence of loving devotion, extending her loving care to the bad as well as the good. She always accompanies the faithful in their religious practices; hence, it is customary in monastic communities to meditate on the *maṇḍala* of Tārā (Sgrol-ma Dkyil 'khor). However, it is difficult to determine whether, during the early spread of Buddhism, the influence of Tārā extended beyond the court or scholarly circles.

It is the opinion of some scholars that the cult of Tārā was brought to Tibet by Atīśa (982–1054). As evidence of this, they point to the tradition that holds that Atīśa's trip to Tibet and his meeting with 'Brom-ston-pa were predicted by a *yoginī* whom Atīśa met under the tutelage of Tārā, and to Tārā's alleged appearance before Atīśa at Mña'-ris, where he met 'Brom-ston. However, tradition has it that when Sroṅ-bstan-sgam-po (d. 649) received the Nepalese princess Bhrikutī and the Chinese princess Wen-ch'eng as his brides, they brought Buddhist images and other objects with them. In later times, these two princesses were believed to have been incarnations of the green, or prosperous, and white, or helpful, Tārā. If this latter tradition is accepted then the introduction of Tārā into Tibet predates the arrival of Atīśa. However, it can scarcely be doubted that it was Atīśa who gave new emphasis to the cult of Tārā, to whom he was especially devoted.

It is difficult to determine exactly when and how the cult of Tārā emerged. Tārā shares many mythic parallels with Brahmanic deities. For example, Durgā and Tārā hold several names in common. Thus, although some scholars claim the priority of one over the other, it seems impossible to determine whether the cult of Tārā has a Brahmanical origin or a Buddhist origin. The early sculptural representations of Tārā seem to point to a sixth-century beginning for the image of the Buddhist Tārā. These early images, found in caves such as Ellora, Aurangabad, and others, depict a placid form in contrast to the fierce representation of her corresponding Hindu goddess. Later, however, Tārā in her Mahāmāyāvijayavāhinī, or fierce, aspect is conceived as a war goddess in the manner similar to that of the Hindu Devī. The iconic representations seem to indicate that Tārā in her early and simple form is seated and

possesses two arms and two hands. As time passes, her iconic representations became more complex: not only is there an increase in the numbers of heads, arms, and hands, but the number of accessory figures attending her gradually increases. Another feature of her iconic representation is her appearance with four—Amogāsiddhi, Ratnasambhava, Amitābha, and Akṣobhya—of the Five Buddhas (the fifth being Vairocana). In these representations, Tārā usually, but not always, appears in colors corresponding to the colors of these Buddhas. The complexity of her iconic representation can be appreciated through a careful study of the *Sādhanamālā*, the *Niṣpannayogāvalī*, and other texts.

Tārā is said to manifest herself in five forms for the benefit of her worshipers. She takes on the five forms of the protective goddesses—Mahāpratisarā, Mahāmāyūrī, Mahāsāhasrapramardanī, Mahāsītavatī, and Mahāmantrānusārīnī—in order to protect beings from all sorts of earthly troubles and miseries. Her protective power is categorized as defense against the “eight great terrors” (*aṣṭamahābhaya*), poetically expressed in verse by Candragomin. In time, the “eight great terrors,” the perils of elephants, lions, fire, serpents, robbers, fetters, sea monsters, and vampires, were each assigned their own Tārā, and the depiction of eight Tārās became a popular subject for artists.

Tārā has been propitiated and invoked in various ways, for various reasons, by various people. Many of her devotees hope for relief from a variety of worldly ills. For example, Candragomin, feeling sorry for a beggar woman who had no means to arrange for her daughter's marriage, is said to have prayed with tears in his eyes to a picture of Tārā. The image thereupon became a real Tārā who took off her ornaments made of various jewels and gave them to Candragomin, who in turn gave them to the beggar woman. Asvabhāva composed a long eulogy to Bhaṭṭārikā Ārya Tārā when his disciples were bitten by a poisonous snake, whereby the snake encountered great pain. He then sprinkled water charmed with a Tārā *mantra* on his disciples and the poison came out of their wounds.

The cult of Tārā that was reintroduced to Tibet during the second diffusion of Buddhism did not become the exclusive property of any one sect. Indeed, in the course of time the cult of Tārā found its way into most of the countries where Mahāyāna Buddhism spread.

[See also Avalokiteśvara and Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Tibet.]

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LESLIE S. KAWAMURA

TARANIS, a Celtic deity, appears as a Gaulish equivalent of the Irish Daghdha, and he was associated by the Romans with their Jupiter, a characterization that seems to be supported by indigenous evidence. The name appears in Gallo-Roman epigraphy as *Taranis* or *Taranus*. Also found are the theophoric anthroponyms *Taranutius* and *Taranucnos* ("born of Taranis"). The oldest form is the Gaulish dative *taranoou* in an inscription at Orgon (Bouches-du-Rhone). The name corresponds to the word for "thunder" in the neo-Celtic languages (Ir., *torann*; Welsh and Breton, *terann*), but no Gaulish myth about Taranis is known, and it is not impossible that Taranis's name is the translation or adaptation of the Roman title *Jupiter Tonans*. The connection between insular and continental Celtic myth is, however, sufficiently clear to make Taranis the Gaulish equivalent of the Irish Daghdha in his function as master of the elements, particularly of celestial fire.

Gallo-Roman iconography consistently depicts Jupiter armed with a wheel or with spirals associated with thunder. The wheel and the spiral may easily be taken as solar symbols, but are in fact cosmic symbols. The symbolism of the wheel is explained by an avatar of Daghdha, the druid Mog Ruith ("servant of the wheel"): blind becomes he who sees it, deaf he who hears it, and dead he upon whom it falls.

A Celtic or Gallo-Roman divinity disguised as Jupiter also appears on monuments spread throughout Gaul and the Celto-Germanic areas of the Rhine valley: columns showing a horseman with giant serpentine feet have been interpreted by modern scholars sometimes as Jupiter laying low the Titans, sometimes as the emperor conquering the barbarians. But neither interpretation predominates. Beyond the link between Mog Ruith and the great god Daghdha in insular myth, there exists insufficient Gallo-Roman evidence to consider

Taranis a very great god in the continental Celtic pantheon.

Taranis is cited in only one literary text, the *Pharsalia* of Lucan (1.444–446). [See *Esus and Teutates*.] Lucan's Bernese Scholium identifies Taranis with Dis Pater and attributes to him sacrifice by fire: "Taranis Ditis Pater hoc modo aput eos placatur: in alveo ligneo aliquod homines cremantur" ("They appease Taranis Dis Pater in the following manner: they burn a certain number of men in a wooden cage").

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Translated from French by Erica Meltzer

TARASCAN RELIGION. The Tarascan Indians, speakers of a genetically unaffiliated language, created one of the major empires of pre-Conquest Mexico, rivaling and successfully repulsing the Aztec. Like the latter, they had a complex religious hierarchy, a priest-king, and a developed system of rites, myths, and religious legends. During and following the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century, however, over 90 percent of these people were destroyed in a holocaust of slaughter, disease, and slave labor. Today about ninety thousand Indians (about two-thirds Tarascan speaking)—surrounded by non-Tarascons—live on in the high, cool, green Sierra Tarasca, where they subsist by various combinations of lumbering, arts and crafts, fishing, farming (mainly maize), and raising livestock. Immediate to moderately extended families are grouped into villages of several hundred to several thousand persons. Factional rivalries within the villages are exceeded by the nearly ubiquitous intervillage hostilities, and both, like the rivalries between families, are balanced by a strong ethic of familial and communal solidarity and the integrative function of religious ritual.

Tarascan history is still reflected in today's religious culture. Prehistoric ritual groups such as the "moon maidens" and mythical symbols such as deer masks and "the tigers" figure in the fiestas. But the main his-

toric source of Tarascan religion is Spain of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—evident not only in “the Moors” and other ritual actors in Tarascan religious fiestas but also in the dogmatically simple focus on Saint Francis and the holy family brought to them by Franciscan missionaries, notably the great humanist Don Vasco de Quiroga. Tarascan religious practice, whatever its sources, is marked by aesthetic integration, perhaps above all in the music of its many bands, and the diagnostic Dance of the Little Old Men (hunched, red-masked figures who alternate between hobbling on canes and jiggling with adolescent energy).

A major axis of Tarascan religion lies in individual rites of passage. Baptism, ideally, takes place a week after birth: a man and a woman, usually spouses, become the child’s godparents and, more important, the ritual co-parents (Span., *compadre*; Tarascan, *kúmpa*) of the child’s parents. At two or three subsequent rites, notably that of confirmation, the parents acquire additional but less valued *compadres* who, in particular, help with obligations in religious ritual. The major individual rite, the wedding, includes a ceremony in a Roman Catholic church and a great deal of folk religious ritual—conspicuously the climactic and widespread *kúpera* dance between the couple and their siblings and cousins, who successively dance up to each other, exchange drinks, and lightly scratch each others’ faces with rose thorns. This wedding also invokes and creates ties of ritual kinship (kinship and religious ritual are largely thought of and acted out in terms of each other). Death is celebrated by a night-long wake, with much drinking, and a funeral procession through the entire village. (If the deceased was an infant or a child, the body is borne on a table.)

The main way the Tarascan relates to the supernatural, however (aside from individual sorcery and witchcraft), is through familial and communal ritual. Every town stages an annual fiesta for its patron saint; most towns organize four to six such affairs each year, each for a different saint; and at least one town, Ocumicho, puts on a fiesta every month—with a correspondingly great expenditure of time and energy. These fiestas are run by elected officials or *cargueros* (Span., “load bearers”), who, with the support of dozens or even scores of kin or ritual kin, may spend huge amounts of pesos on the bands, elaborate fireworks, alcohol, ceremonial dishes, Catholic masses, livestock for slaughter, and other elements of the fiesta. While these expenses are often said to be ruinous, the average person is quite ready to incur them, or at least resigned to them because of the social status they imply. Also, the debts can be a source of prestige that links the *carguero* into a larger human network. In some of the more conserva-

tive towns the offices of the different saints are ranked in terms of prestige, forming a sort of “ceremonial ladder,” in which the *carguero* who sponsors the associated fiestas gradually ascends a series of metaphorical rungs. Although most *cargueros* are men, women do most of the work of organizing and preparation. Some annual fiestas—for example, to Our Virgin of the Assumption—are purely religious, but the great majority involve commercial and market functions (these functions constitute the primary emphasis of some festivals).

Religious ritual is diagnostically regional. Some fiestas are essentially local—for example, that of Saint Cecilia in tiny San José, where many of the men actually are musicians. But people are aware of fiestas and practices in their entire region as well, and a large number of fiestas are pan-Tarascan, either because they attract many pilgrims or because the day is celebrated in the several villages where a given saint is patron, as in the cases of the popular San José and San Francisco. All Saints and All Souls days are observed in all towns by quiet vigils with flowers and bread figures at the graves of the recently deceased. In Janitzio, on the other hand, a thousand candle-bearing canoes hover around the island during the night of 1 November. An individual whose personal saint coincides with that of a village often makes a pilgrimage, or at least says a special prayer. (Prayer generally focuses on help with practical, personal problems such as illness or jealousy and envy, and so is inextricably intertwined with the culture’s pervasive witchcraft and sorcery.)

A notable feature is the great variation in the religious autonomy of a village, which is reticulated closely with its political orientation and economic standing. At one extreme the annual and personal rituals (baptism, confirmation, marriage, and the wake) are managed by local societies and religious specialists (who, for example, may know an oration by heart). A priest may come to a village once a month (or even less often), or the person or persons concerned may go to the county seat for the priest’s ministrations. Some villages categorically refuse to allow a priest to participate in such sacred matters as the construction of a new church or the organization of a passion play because they realistically fear financial loss. At the other extreme a local priest may be active and highly influential not only in religious ritual but also in local politics—to the extent of controlling the external relations of the village. The grass-roots role of the priest is so important because the Tarascan do not in general own or read the Bible or other religious literature (with the exception of a few thousand Protestants, limited to a few pueblos, who do have a superb Tarascan translation of both Testaments). The Tarascan concern is not with doctrine, ar-

gument, theology, or texts, but with a costly ritual and its economic, social, and political implications.

Nevertheless, the Tarascan share a network of explicit and implicit understandings, symbols, and attitudes that have been synthesized and transmitted largely by word of mouth. Every village, family, and individual holds to a different subset of these beliefs—pagan, local, Catholic, and secular—but there is cohesion in the area as a whole. This is in large part due to the fiestas. “Because of the fiestas,” modern industry has attracted few Tarascan; “because of the fiestas,” Protestant missionaries have made few converts; agrarian reform has had to compromise with the fiestas; and work and the family are strongly motivated by their roots in the fiestas. Fiestas, not as symbols or surface phenomena only, but as vivid, primary experiences, are the basis of Tarascan religion.

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TARASIOS (c. 730–806), patriarch of Constantinople from 784 to 806. Tarasios was born to a prominent family in Constantinople. His father, Georgios, had served as a judge and prefect (mayor) of the capital. Tarasios was excellently trained in theology and secular learning, which helped him to rise in both the civil and ecclesiastical ranks. During the reign of Leo IV and his wife Irene, Tarasios was chief secretary (*protoasikritis*) of the imperial court, perhaps from 775 to 784, when he was ordained and elevated to the patriarchal throne. His speedy elevation to the ranks of the priesthood was

not unusual in the Byzantine church even though it was objected to by several iconophiles.

As patriarch, Tarasios became instrumental in the convocation of the Second Council of Nicaea in 787, which condemned iconoclasm. Not only was he the power behind the council, but it was on that occasion that the right of presiding over a council was transferred entirely to the patriarch. Tarasios, a prudent man, proved moderate in his policies toward both the problems of the imperial house and the Iconoclastic Controversy. His moderation was perceived as laxity, and Tarasios was attacked by the rigorous monastic party of Theodore of Studios.

Tarasios fostered the building of social welfare institutions, including a hospital and homes for the poor. He restored good relations with Rome and upon his death was honored by both the Greek and the Latin churches. Only a few of his letters and a sermon survive. His biography, which constitutes an important source for the period, was written by Deacon Ignatios.

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ṬARFON (late first and early second centuries CE), Palestinian tanna. A Jewish resident of Lod, he was the teacher of Yehudah bar Il'ai and a prominent leader of the generation of rabbis active at the seaside town of Yavneh after the destruction in 70 CE of the Temple in Jerusalem.

There are two strands within the traditions associated with Ṭarfon. One group of traditions makes Ṭarfon subservient to his colleague 'Aqiva' ben Yosef and occasionally mocks Ṭarfon for foolishness in his behavior or opinions. A second group of traditions cites Ṭarfon's actions as precedents for the rulings of Yehudah bar Il'ai and appears to have been formulated by Yehudah's disciples.

In establishing the criteria for legal decisions on the performance of religious obligations, Ṭarfon emphasized the importance of deed over intention, of formal action or objective fact over subjective thought. This

posture differs sharply from that of 'Aqiva', who placed greater emphasis on the role of intention. In several instances Tarfon's view is included in the text as a foil for the authoritative opinion of 'Aqiva'.

Tarfon's major rulings frequently concern rituals performed by priests. In matters of dispute he consistently ruled in favor of the priestly families. He ruled, for instance, that a priest may receive gifts of heave-offerings of wine and oil from a householder throughout the year, an economic advantage for the priest. Ṭarfon's dicta emphasized that the priests could play a central role in the life of the Jews even after the destruction of the Temple.

[See also Tannaim.]

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ṬARĪQAḤ. The *ṭarīqahs* are a rich and diverse complex of religious associations that have developed all over the Islamic world. Some are regional, others are widely distributed; few are centralized. They exist or have existed in clusters throughout the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa, Arabia, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and China. Their role is manifold: they add an emotional and spiritual dimension to religious devotion; they contribute to the intimacy of social life; they are associated with trade and craft guilds; they have provided staging posts and hospices for travelers and merchants; and they have served as credit and finance institutions. Equally important, they have made a great contribution both to business confidence and to the stability of the Muslim trading system throughout the Muslim world, especially along the great distances of the Silk Road across Central Asia to China, and in the maritime trade of the Indian Ocean. Their functions, then, range from leading souls to the highest levels of spirituality to providing guidance and support in the requirements of everyday social, political, and economic life. When they were in their prime (between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries), to be a member of a *ṭarīqah* was virtually synonymous with being a Muslim. But even today, despite the efforts and, indeed, the significant measure of success achieved by the reformist movement in its efforts to eliminate them, they still exist, and it is quite wrong

to assume that they have played out their role and are destined to disappear from history.

Origins and Early Development. The word *ṭarīqah* (pl., *ṭuruq*) literally means "road" or "path," and this is still its primary sense in modern Arabic. The specialized use of the word to indicate a group of individuals dedicated to the mystical life developed, in the ninth or tenth century, from its metaphorical sense of a mystical path. In the early stages of this use, the connotation was primarily individual. *Ṭarīqah* was used to describe a method of moral psychology for the guidance of individuals directing their lives toward a knowledge of God. It is used in this sense in the writings of al-Junayd (d. 910), al-Ḥallāj (d. 922), al-Sarrāj (d. 988), al-Hujwīrī (d. 1072), and al-Qushayrī (d. 1074). All of these great figures understood the term as descriptive of a method (that is, the road to be followed) by which an individual passing through various psychological stages in the obedience to and practice of the law may proceed from one level of knowledge of God to a higher one, until he or she reaches the ultimate reality of God himself.

The elaboration of this path derived from a spiritual impulse that established itself very early in Islam; indeed, an intense, passionate spirituality is evident in the life of the Prophet and certain of his companions and is part of the message of the Qur'ān. It was an impulse that grew stronger at the beginning of the seventh century. The compromise of 'Alī at the battle of Ṣiffin in 658, which was to cost him both the caliphate and, in 661, his life, led to the shift of the seat of government from Medina to Damascus and the founding of the Umayyad dynasty. This dynasty, and the court that served it, adopted a lifestyle far removed from the austere ideals of the caliph 'Umar (r. 634–644).

The worldliness and luxury of the Umayyads, the fecundation of a whole new range of ideas from various traditions, continued revolts of the descendants of 'Alī and their followers against the dynasty, and the violence of the sectarian Khārijīs against the 'Alids and the Umayyads alike all contributed to the development of an identifiable mystical tradition in Islam, a tradition emerging as a kind of alternative to both the political and the religious establishments. Although the analogy should not be pressed too far or taken too literally, there has always continued within the mystical movement something of the element of protest, which often has made establishments uneasy and at times has led to denunciations and persecutions.

Those who were prompted by religious idealism to withdraw from social life in order to satisfy their yearning for God and uphold the values of primitive Islam were already heirs to the rich spiritual traditions of Hellenism and Christianity in the eastern Mediterra-

mean. They established a visible presence when a number of them, in the manner of the desert monks and other ascetics in Syria and Egypt, began to wear, as a distinctive dress, a type of habit of coarse wool. It is probably from this wearing of wool that the term *ṣūfī* derives: it is documented from the second century AH (eighth century CE) in reference to a man who wore such a garment; and the plural form of the word, *ṣūfīyah*, used to indicate groups or nascent communities of Ṣūfis, is attested in the next century.

Spiritual exercises. From this period too there is evidence of the types of ritual that were practiced alongside the ascetic life. The aim, of course, was to draw close to God, to feel the presence of God. One basic spiritual exercise devoted to this goal that was to undergo extensive development was the *dhikr*, or “remembrance.” This involved the repeated recitation of words and phrases taken from or based on the Qur’ān in order to internalize them totally, so that through the intimacy achieved with God’s word, the divine presence itself might be experienced. [See *Dhikr*.]

Another exercise, not always distinguished from *dhikr*, is *samā’* (“listening [session]”). As early as 850 CE, there were *samā’* houses in Baghdad in which the Ṣūfis could listen to music and let themselves be drawn into mystical states. If *samā’* had wider and more spectacular possibilities than the *dhikr*, it was also open to abuse. Some *ṭarīqahs*, not to mention the ‘*ulamā’*, condemned it, and its legitimacy as a spiritual exercise was argued constantly, to be accepted by some and rejected by others. [See *Samā’*.] One result of the debate, however, was the development of an ethic and an etiquette to guide the novice in the performance of spiritual exercises, which took the form of regular recitation of litanies based either on the Qur’ān or on the ninety-nine “most beautiful” names of God. Such exercises were intended to bring the seeker to a total state of concentration in which he or she would discover a deep interior silence. In this silence the adept would perceive a series of lights of different colors, which gradually exposed, from within its formulation (verbal form), the inwardness of the recited litany and located it within the heart, so that the heart itself might participate in the divine essence of the prayer. It needs to be stressed, however, that these devotional exercises were not a substitute for the ritual law; rather, they represented a reaction to laxness in the keeping of the law and a desire not only to keep it in an exemplary fashion but to go beyond it.

Communal life. The nucleus from which the *ṭarīqah* was to develop at its earliest and simplest was the relationship established between master and pupil—in Arabic terminology, between *murshid* (“guide”) and *murīd* (“seeker”). The relationship of the disciples to one

another was initially unstructured apart from a common element of devotion to the master. If he traveled, his disciples traveled also, with the group supporting itself either by working or by begging for alms.

Ṣūfī teachers who established a reputation were sometimes able to set up lodging places of their own to accommodate their students. One of the earliest was on the island of Abadan in the Persian Gulf, for the students of an ascetic called ‘Abd al-Waḥīd ibn Zayd (d. 793); it maintained its stability and grew in fame after his death. Similar institutions dating from around this time were known in the area bordering on Byzantium, in Damascus, and in Khorasan, as well as in Egypt (Alexandria) and North Africa.

As a fraternity grew, its center ceased to be the master’s private house or shop. A new center, and concomitant institutional structures, emerged. The name of these centers or “convents” varied according to location: *zāwīyah* and *ribāṭ* were used largely though not exclusively in the Maghreb; *khānqāh* in Egypt and the Levant; *khānagāh* from Iran to India, where it is sometimes pronounced *khāngāh* and the term *dargāh* is also used; and *tekke* in Turkish-speaking areas. Such Ṣūfī dwelling places were connected with a mosque and included a large kitchen for guests and disciples and sometimes a school. The tomb of the founder was usually located in the same compound. Sometimes the members lived in individual cells, sometimes in a dormitory.

Khānagāhs were variously arranged. Some kept open house, while others might be visited only by appointment. Arrangements for long- and short-term visitors were available. The shaykh would live with his family in one quarter, see his disciples at fixed hours, and lead the five daily prayers. Some *khānagāhs* were very large. The Sa’īd al-Su’adā’ in Egypt, founded by Salāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin) in 1173, accommodated three hundred dervishes, and contemporary chronicles record how every Friday people used to gather round to gain blessings by watching them leave the compound for the Friday noon prayer. [See *Khānagāh*.]

The proto-community life of the *ṭarīqah* had obvious attractions. Solitude as an ascetic technique is not a permanent ideal in Islam, nor is solitary prayer. Indeed, special merit applies to the performance of every one of the obligatory ritual prayers (not simply the noon prayer on Fridays) in a group or congregation. In any case, for the ordinary people, the corporate pursuit of the Ṣūfī way was easier than the spiritual struggle of the individual. The common prayer-meetings gave strength and warmed faith. The *ṭarīqah* developed collective methods of spiritual education that could uplift its followers into a type of ecstasy. Veneration for the

holy man, as well as participation in festivities with music and whirling dance, provided disciples with an important emotional outlet.

As the various modes of mystical theory and practice became established, the internal discipline of the *ṭarīqah* was formalized and the relationship between disciple and shaykh elaborated. This relationship had become one of great intimacy, and as it further developed in some of the *ṭarīqahs*, it was exemplified in the technique of *tawajjuh*, or total face-to-face concentration, whether that of the disciple concentrating on his shaykh as he performed the *dhikr* or that of the shaykh who reciprocated by concentrating on his disciple, entering his heart, and guiding him.

The *ṭarīqahs* also generated the concept of the *silsilah* ("chain" [of transmission]) by which a shaykh justified his special authority. A master of outstanding reputation and charisma might create so strong an impression on his followers that his method and the community of disciples he had made his own would continue after his death. His mantle would fall upon one of them, who would inherit his authority and continue his work. This new shaykh would be succeeded in turn by one of his disciples. In this way a line of transmission of authority and *barakah* ("blessing") was established, so that the spiritual power of the founding shaykh could be transmitted to future generations of disciples. The legitimation of the transfer of authority from shaykh to shaykh was by either descent, appointment, or election. Even the founding shaykh, however, needed a *silsilah* to legitimize his special authority, which was ultimately that of the prophet Muḥammad himself.

Although there are many *silsilahs*, depending on the date and birthplace of the founder of particular *ṭarīqahs*, most converge on Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (d. 765) and ultimately derive from Muḥammad via his cousin and son-in-law 'Alī. (This convergence has raised the intractable issue of the relationship between Sufism and Shiism, but such lines of transmission are used by Sunnī and Shī'ī Ṣūfīs alike.)

A new disciple, then, did not become simply the follower of a shaykh. He made his oath of allegiance both to his shaykh and to the founder of the line of transmission to which his shaykh was heir. By so doing, he gained the right to have knowledge of the special *dhikr* formulas that were distinctive to the order and to share in the spiritual power of the entire line of transmission. Thus to the relationship between teacher and disciple joined by their mutual desire to draw closer to God was added the component of initiation into a source of spiritual power that extended over generations and was not always distinguished from magic.

The Ṭarīqah as an Established Institution. By the mid-twelfth century, when the basic rules of mystical education were elaborated, the *ṭarīqahs* were well established in their present form: communities of individuals held together by a distinctive set of rules relating to lifestyle, religious practice, and aspiration and functioning in addition to and alongside those required by Islamic jurisprudence. As the movement continued to gather strength and popularity, *ṭarīqahs* were established all over the Muslim world. The factors contributing to this development include the recognition won for mysticism by al-Ghazālī, the loss of authority of the caliphate, together with the disorder and uncertainty caused by the early Mongol invasions, and the consequent subjection of many Muslims to non-Muslim rule. From the eleventh century on, and especially after 1258 (the year the Mongols captured Baghdad), what are now recognized as the great orders appeared. Despite the esoteric character of the theosophy they developed—a theosophy which, however, was only for the initiates—the *ṭarīqahs* became greater and more comprehensive. It was easy for the ideas and rituals to be diluted with popular belief and to attract the masses with the hope of obtaining spiritual and temporal benefits from the sanctity and spiritual power of the great figures in the orders, from the tombs in which they were buried, from the places with which they were associated, and from the relics. Thus the *ṭarīqahs* became great communities, comprising all strata of society, offering something to the educated and uneducated alike, tolerating a wide range of folk practices, yet preserving and extending a great tradition of spirituality. They likewise played a major social role. Their hospices (*khānagāhs*) offered lodging to travelers, medical treatment for the sick, and help for the poor. They also became centers for popular devotion. One of the ways in which they extended their membership was by granting associate tertiary status to individuals who, while living outside the community, practiced their normal trades, performed certain rituals of the *ṭarīqah*, such as the daily prayers, under the shaykh, and took part in *dhikr* exercises, litanies, and in some cases, dances.

Initiation rituals. Basically all the rituals of admission to the *ṭarīqah* are very similar, although degrees of fervor, sincerity, and integrity varied over time and place. In other words, inclination to join a *ṭarīqah* may become a social convention, and performance of rituals may become perfunctory, but such developments do not affect the basic ideals involved.

An initiation, a great event in the life of both the initiate and the community, is marked by a day of festival. The ceremony has three basic components: the teaching

of the *dhikr* formula and the secret instructions for performing it, the oath of allegiance, and investiture with the Ṣūfī habit, the *khirqah*.

A model initiation ceremony for the Qādirīyah *ṭarīqah* is described in one of the manuals as follows: the candidate first performs ritual ablutions; he then prays two *rak'ahs* and sits facing the shaykh, with his knees pressed together. Claspng his shaykh's right hand, he recites the Fātiḥah (the opening surah of the Qur'an), a series of formulas invoking blessings upon the Prophet, and the various *silsilahs*, especially those of the Qādirīyah line, by which his shaykh establishes his authority.

Afterward the shaykh has him repeat, phrase by phrase, a formula containing various components: a prayer asking God's forgiveness; a testimony that the vow he is taking is that of God and his apostle; recognition that the hand of the shaykh is that of 'Abd al-Qādir, founder of the order; and a promise that he will recite the *dhikr* as the shaykh requires him to do.

The shaykh utters a prayer and then recites the Qur'anic verse of allegiance (48:10): "Those who vow their allegiance to you, vow their allegiance to God; the hand of God is upon their hands. Thus whoever violates it, violates himself, but whoever fulfills what he has promised God he will undertake, God will give him a mighty reward." Alternately verse 16:91 is used: "Fulfill the pact of God once you have made a pact with him."

Social awareness. One of the earliest treatises on the norms of proper behavior among members of a *ṭarīqah* is a twelfth-century work, *Ādāb al-murīdīn* (The Manners of the Disciples). It is representative of practice in a number of orders, and apart from its intrinsic interest, and the exquisite care with which it describes an etiquette of great sensitivity to human feeling, it demonstrates that in such *ṭarīqahs* human values and human courtesies come before both rigorous asceticism and complex theosophical ideas. It also shows clearly that the *ṭarīqahs* did not see themselves as subjects outside the regular religious disciplines. The work classifies religious scholars into three groups: traditionalists, jurists, and (Ṣūfī) '*ulamā*'. The traditionalists are the watchmen of religion, who deal with the external meaning of *ḥadīth*. The jurists are the arbiters of religion, whose specialty is their ability to make legal inferences. The Ṣūfīs in their turn base their lives and conduct on both groups of specialists and refer to them in case of difficulties. Tradition and law are the bases for their lives, including both their inner modes of spirituality and their outward behavior. In the description of this outward behavior we see an extraordinary concern for personal relations in both family and community life:


patience with the ignorant, compassion with one's wife and family, agreement with brethren. Openness, modesty, and humility are everywhere the norms. The movements of tongue, ear, eye, of heart, hands, and feet, are to be directed to charity.

Meticulous attention is given to the details of social behavior, personal cleanliness, modesty in dress, and restraint in eating. The brethren in the *ṭarīqah* at any hospice should exercise great care in their treatment of guests. As host, the shaykh should encourage them to overcome their shyness at the table and offer them whatever food he is able to provide. The guest, for his part, should sit where he is directed, be pleased with what is given to him, and not leave without excusing himself. The host should then accompany the departing guest to the door of the house. To many of the rules are added thoughtful dispensations. In certain circumstances, joking is permitted provided that slandering, mimicry, and nonsense are avoided. This practice is supported by a tradition relating words attributed to 'Alī: "When the Prophet saw one of his friends distressed, he would cheer him up by joking."

So large is the number of manuals filled with stories illustrating and enjoining behavior of this delicacy and tact that the *ṭarīqahs* themselves would appear to be responsible in no small part for the remarkable social sensitivity that has characterized the Muslim world for centuries. At the very least, that sensitivity on the part of the growing number of Ṣūfīs clearly had a role to play in the transformation of Sufism and its *ṭarīqahs* from the preserve of an elite into a mass movement.

The *ṭarīqahs* of the twelfth century, then, are the culminating point in a shift from an individualistic, elitist, ascetic spirituality to a corporate, congregational organization with a place for individuals representing a whole range of spiritual attainment and every stratum of society. There may be an inclination to see in them a counterpart to the religious orders that developed in the Christian tradition from the fifth century onward and which also channeled a large part of the impulse to solitary asceticism into an institutional framework. The analogy is only partly valid, for the two types of organization were very different. The shaykh of a *zawīyah* did not have the administrative authority of an abbot, nor did the *ṭarīqahs* have the same centralized government and formal lines of communication that linked the houses of the Benedictine order, for example. While the *ṭarīqahs* were, in one meaning of the term, corporate, they did not become corporations in the Western sense.

Individual Ṭarīqahs. There are over two hundred *ṭarīqahs*, and in fact very many more if the numerous subgroups and divisions are included. The selection pre-



sented here is intended to show aspects of their individuality as reflected in the social classes to which they made their appeal, their attitudes toward government authority, their spiritual exercises and theosophy, and the circumstances in which they flourished.

Suhrawardiyah. One of the oldest *ṭarīqahs* is the Suhrawardiyah, named after its founder, 'Abd al-Qāhir Abū Najīb al-Suhrawardī (d. 1162), the author of the *Ādāb al-murīdīn* referred to above. Significantly, he was a pupil of Aḥmad al-Ghazālī, younger brother of the great Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) who established a place for the Ṣūfī dimension of Islam within the Islamic community. The influence and scope of the order was extended and given its decisive character by 'Abd al-Qāhir's fraternal nephew and student, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Suhrawardī (1145–1234), whose treatise *'Awārif al-ma'ārif* (Masters of Mystical Insights) became a standard work on the theory of Ṣūfī devotion.

'Abd al-Qāhir al-Suhrawardī's career furnishes an example of the founder of a *ṭarīqah* as a high government official. Al-Nāṣir, the last caliph of Baghdad before the Mongol capture of the city in 1258, appointed him both as master of the Ṣūfī associations in Baghdad and as his personal envoy to the rulers of Egypt, Syria, and Rūm (Asia Minor). He charged 'Abd al-Qāhir with reviving spiritual life in the territories of Islam and with uniting Muslim rulers against the Mongol threat; it was this challenge that led to the foundation of the *ṭarīqah*. Certainly it had a spiritual goal. Yet its role was not simply to guide initiates toward the mystical union, but to address itself to the spiritual and moral needs of the Islamic community as a whole when it was under threat.

Founded in response to political danger, the order quickly established itself in the declining years of the Abbasid caliphate; the close association with government was maintained, and its members continued to play a role in political life and worldly affairs. The Suhrawardiyah can be found today in the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan.

Qādiriyah. Of almost equal age is the Qādiriyah, another *ṭarīqah* that is extant today but exercises a wider and rather different kind of appeal than that of the Suhrawardiyah. It too began in Baghdad but became established as far afield as the Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, the Maghreb, West Africa, India, and Southeast Asia. It was founded by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (1088–1166) from the Gilan region of the Caspian Sea, and its *silsilah* is traced through al-Junayd. 'Abd al-Qādir was a Ḥanbalī legal scholar—a follower of the strictest and most literalist school of Islamic law—and was invested with the Ṣūfī habit by the founder of the first Ḥanbalī *madrasah* (the *madrasah* as an institution of higher learning did not appear in this region until the eleventh cen-

tury). [See *Madrasah*.] Thus he illustrates the commitment of such *ṭarīqah* founders and the mystics they nurtured to one or another of the four main schools of law. (Ibn al-'Arabī, it will be recalled, was a Zāhiri.) Although a stern teacher, 'Abd al-Qādir has become perhaps the most famous saint in the Islamic world, and stories of his miracles abound from Java to Morocco. His tomb in Baghdad is still a place of pilgrimage for members of the order, many of them from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, where it was introduced in the late fourteenth century. The pilgrims, who may remain there for weeks, silently sweep his sanctuary with little brooms. Old Sindhi songs tell how his spiritual realm extends to every town and region between Istanbul and Delhi, all equally blessed by him. As late as 1850 Sir Richard Burton told of a hundred large trees in Sind bearing the name Jīlānī. These trees became the foci of cult practices: each had a pole and a flag hung on it to fulfill a vow made to gain the saint's intercession. The fruit and leaves of the trees were sacrosanct, and under them sweetmeats were distributed to the poor.

The Qādiriyah had a very catholic appeal; all strata of society from ruler to peasant found a place within it. In popular belief 'Abd al-Qādir was a renewer of Islam, and among members of the order there is a well-known story that he discovered a man by the wayside on the point of death and revived him. The "man" then revealed that he was the religion of Islam. The order, it should be noted, was to play a particularly important role in the islamization of West Africa.

Rifā'iyah. Slightly later than the Qādiriyah is the Rifā'ī order, founded in south Iraq by Aḥmad al-Rifā'ī (d. 1175). Although never as popular as the Qādiriyah, it is distinguished by one of its ritual practices, a particularly loud recitation of the *dhikr*, which led members to be known as the Howling Dervishes. It too still exists and is well represented in Egypt.

Mawlawīyah. Somewhat later is the Mawlawīyah (Turk., *Mevleviyye*), the order of "whirling dervishes," which has a certain notoriety in Europe. It was founded by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, who was born in Balkh in 1207. His family became refugees in about 1217 as a result of the Mongol invasions and found their way into Anatolia. It was there that Jalāl al-Dīn began Ṣūfī training under his father's guidance. In 1244 he became obsessed with a wandering dervish, Shams al-Dīn of Tabriz, and abandoned his responsibilities as a teacher in Konya after Shams al-Dīn disappeared. In fact, the dervish had been murdered by Jalāl al-Dīn's students with the connivance of one of his sons. The shock of this murder released a current of creative energy that was to result in the extraordinary mystical poem cycle the *Mathnavī* ("rhymed couplet") and the establishment of the Maw-

lawī order. The order never spread far beyond the boundaries of the Ottoman empire, but it became a wealthy corporation and maintained close links with the courts. It was a hereditary order and, thanks to its central organization, did not fragment. It is distinguished by its attachment to music and dance, elements that have a long history in Šūfī movements. Its members are called the Whirling Dervishes because of their characteristic way of reciting their *dhikr* while revolving, using the right foot as a pivot, to the musical accompaniment of various instruments. Such meetings used to be held after the Friday prayer at the mosque. Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century observers describe an orchestra, sometimes of six instruments (reed flute, zither, rebec, drum, tambourine, and one other, perhaps a small cymbal) and sometimes of three (flute, violin, and kettledrum).

Shādhiliyah. Rather different in character is the Shādhiliyah. It was founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī of Tunis (d. 1256), who traveled widely in the Maghreb and Spain and finally settled in Alexandria, where he died.

In contrast to both the Rifā'iyah and the Mawlawīyah, this *ṭariqah* practices internalized and silent devotions. Thus its appeal is individualistic, focusing on the development of private prayer. Nonetheless, the emphasis of Abū al-Ḥasan's teaching was against the solitary and the institutional life alike, and he urged his followers to realize their yearning for God through faithful attention to their daily responsibilities in society. They were not enjoined to beg or even to live in voluntary poverty; Egyptian sources quoted by Annemarie Schimmel refer to their tidy attire, which distinguished them from many of the other Šūfis thronging the streets of Cairo. The Shādhiliyah is also credited with discovering the value of coffee as a means of staying awake during periods of night prayer.

This order has no special theosophical ideas apart from the fact that members are held to have been predestined to join it from pre-eternity. Rather, the goal is a deep yet sober spirituality drawing on al-Muḥāsibī, the teacher of al-Junayd, on al-Makkī and especially his *Qūt al-qulūb* (The Nourishment of the Heart), and on the spiritual teaching of al-Ghazālī in the fourth volume of *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* (The Revivification of the Religious Sciences). Its teaching is subtle and not directed at the masses, as can be seen from the *Ḥikam* (Maxims), an enduring classic of Šūfī spirituality written by Abū al-Ḥasan's immediate successor, Tāj al-Dīn ibn 'Aṭā' Al-lāh (d. 1309). This work, a collection of 262 brief sayings followed by four short treatises and a number of prayers, has generated numerous commentaries in many of the languages of the Muslim world.

Like many of the orders, the Shādhiliyah produced a variety of local offshoots all over the Muslim world. Among them, the Ḥāmidīyah Shādhiliyah is one of the few modern orders that still attract and provide a basic spiritual formation for many people in Egypt. The appeal of the Shādhiliyah extends primarily to the officials and civil servants of the middle class, whose responsibilities, values, and attitudes are embodied in the order's attention to detail. Even after the Atatürk government prohibited Šūfī orders in Turkey in 1925, the Shādhiliyah retained its attraction for the middle class. It has also gained a following among some European Muslims.

Chishtīyah. India was to be a particularly fertile ground for the development of the *ṭariqahs*, and it is impossible to write the history of Islam in the subcontinent without a detailed study of them. One of the first great Indian orders was the Chishtīyah, actually an Indo-Afghan order by origin, founded by Mu'in al-Dīn (Muinuddin) Chishtī, the most outstanding representative of the Šūfī movement in India. He was born in Sistan and was for a time a disciple of Abū Najīb al-Suhrawardī. He arrived in Delhi in 1193 and then, after the authority of Delhi extended to Rajputana, moved to Ajmer, an important city in that state. There he founded a *khāngāh*. The simplicity and ardor of his followers' teaching, and their extreme hospitality and readiness to welcome guests without discrimination, attracted many people. In fact, the Chishtīyah illustrates in an exemplary manner the extraordinary contribution of the *ṭariqahs* to the islamization of the subcontinent.

At first they kept their distance from government but were later to develop a close association with the Mughal court. Salīm (later Jahāngīr), the heir apparent of Emperor Akbar (d. 1605), was born in the home of a Chishtī shaykh, and in gratitude Akbar commissioned a splendid *dargāh* for the Chishtīyah in Fatehpur Sikri. Jahāngīr himself decorated the Chishtī city of Ajmer with beautiful buildings of white marble. The Chishtīyah, like other *ṭariqahs* in India, fecundated the development of literature in the vernacular languages, and a Chishtī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, who lived during the reign of Awrangzīb (1658–1707), is regarded as the greatest mystical poet in the Pashto language. This *ṭariqah* was noted for its active encouragement of the practice of *samā'*, and its example was followed by various other orders in India.

Naqshbandīyah. About a century later, Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1388) founded the Naqshbandī *ṭariqah*, an order that was to become as widespread and popular as the Qādirīyah. Although it originated in Bukhara, it was to have an important role in India, and also developed branches in China, Central Asia, and the Middle

East, as well as Sumatra, the Riau archipelago, Java, and other of the Indonesian islands. The order still has a strong following scattered over the length and breadth of the Muslim world. In the first Indonesian elections in 1955, a Sumatran Naqshbandī was elected to the national parliament as the sole representative of the Tarīqah political party.

After he founded his *ṭarīqah*, Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband rapidly established connections with trade and craft guilds and merchant houses, and as his spiritual influence grew, so did his wealth. The order soon gained a position of power in the Timurid court and, assuming a custodial role over government, supervised the administration of religious law. Indeed, under the leadership of Khwājah Ahrār of Herat (1404–1490), the Naqshbandīyah virtually dominated political life in Central Asia. It was his conviction that “to serve the world, it is necessary to exercise political power”; in other words, it is necessary to maintain adequate control over rulers in order to ensure that they implement the divine law in every area of life.

Unlike the Chishtīyah and those who followed their example, the Naqshbandīyah recited their *dhikr* silently and banned music and rhythmic movements. They believed that through *dhikr* without words one could achieve a level of contemplation in which subject and object became indistinguishable, and the individual soul returned to God as it had been before creation. Among their techniques of meditation was concentration on their shaykh; another practice was regular visitation of saints' tombs in the hope that, by concentrating on the spirit of the departed shaykh, they would increase their spiritual strength.

The Naqshbandīyah was a moderate order that did not demand heroic austerities; it regarded spiritual purification and education of the heart as more productive than harsh mortification designed to conquer the lower soul. In this it resembled the Shādhilīyah. It taught a middle way, that the mean between excessive hunger and excessive eating was the safest. Those who truly fast are those who keep their minds free from the food of satanic suggestions. Despite its essential sobriety, this method proved congenial to the poets of the time, and by the turn of the eighteenth century, all the leading poets in the Indo-Persian style were either members of the Naqshbandī *ṭarīqah* or under its influence.

The order played an important role in the religious and political history of Mughal India as leaders of a movement of reaction against the syncretist Dīn-i Ilāhī (Divine Religion) of the emperor Akbar. An important figure in this reaction was Aḥmad Sirhindī, who was initiated into the order by its shaykh, Khwājah Bāqī Billāh, in 1600. The order was to remain involved in

political developments, including a strong reaction against Hindu practices, up to 1740. The Naqshbandī Shāh Walī Allāh (1703–1762), enrolled concurrently in the Qādirīyah, became the greatest reformer of eighteenth-century Delhi and one of the leading figures in the renewal of Islam; his influence was to fecundate reform movements in the nineteenth century and beyond.

Tijānīyah and Sanūsīyah. The eighteenth-century revival movements, such as those of Shāh Walī Allāh and then Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb in Arabia, had a counterpart in the *ṭarīqahs*. Sometimes this revival was expressed in reforms of orders, sometimes in the development of suborders, sometimes in the appearance of new ones. The generation of orders in fact never ceased. In North and West Africa, for example, between 1500 and 1900 at least twenty-eight *ṭarīqahs* emerged, one-third of them originating in Morocco. Here it is sufficient to draw attention to two that were to play an important role in Islamic revival movements in the Sudan, Egypt, and North and West Africa. The first was the Tijānīyah, based in what is now Algeria and Morocco, and the other was the Sanūsīyah in Libya.

The founder of the Tijānīyah was Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Tijānī (1737–1815). He spent several years studying in Fez, then in Abyad for five years, and in 1773 he went to Mecca and Medina and finally to Cairo, where he studied under various shaykhs, one of whom suggested that he found a *ṭarīqah*. He then returned to Fez, where, although he continued to travel extensively, he maintained his center.

The demands of the order are exclusive, and members may not join any other order. The Tijānīyah have their own formulas for *dhikr*, to be recited as many as a hundred times at particular points in the day. They are further distinguished from many of the other orders by their submission to established government, even where this has been non-Muslim. Thus throughout the French occupation of Algeria they remained for the most part on good terms with the French authorities. When the emir 'Abd al-Qādir, a Qādirī, attempted to enlist them in a struggle against the French in 1836, the Tijānī chief refused, saying it was their purpose to live a religious life in peace. The emir then marched on their town to demand that they submit to him, but they again refused and, although outnumbered, resisted a siege for eight months, took refuge in another town, and in the following year offered moral and material aid to the French.

The members of this *ṭarīqah* won adherents in Egypt, Arabia, and other parts of Asia, and it still has a strong following in those parts of Africa that were under French rule. In the first half of the nineteenth century, it was propagated in French Guinea by 'Umar Tāl after his return to Dinguiray, which became one of the most

important religious cities in the region, and it took over and displaced the Qādirīyah tradition.

Sidī Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Sanūsī was born in Algeria in 1791. From 1821 to 1828 he lived in Fez, where he studied Qur'anic exegesis, *ḥadīth*, and jurisprudence. Traveling to Mecca for the pilgrimage, he remained from 1830 to 1843 and founded his first *zāwīyah* there in 1837. On leaving Mecca he settled in Cyrenaica, where he founded additional *zāwīyahs*. After his death in 1859, the order was continued by his two sons, Sidī Muḥammad al-Mahdī (1844–1901), his successor, and Sidī Muḥammad al-Sharīf (1846–1896). Al-Sanūsī left detailed instructions relating to initiation into his order, and his devotional writings were to become the basis of the Sanūsī routines. At the same time, all his activities were imbued with a rigorous work ethic. He inspired his followers to work together to build roads, to form trade cooperatives, to undertake irrigation projects, and to establish agricultural communities.

In fact, such activities were integral to the work of many *ṭarīqahs*, such as the Tijānīyah and its offshoot in Senegal, the Murīd movement. The discipline of the brethren had a counterpart in the discipline of a trade guild or corporation. Likewise, the tremendous vitality of the nineteenth-century *ṭarīqahs* was also channeled into political activity, and especially diplomatic negotiations with the European powers. Throughout this period it is clear that they operated as an invisible international network attempting to protect the cultural and religious identity of Islam against the European powers. As Bammate points out in an unpublished paper, 'Abd al-Qādir, the Qādirī emir who had tried to involve the Tijānīyah in an uprising against the French in 1836, had received an *ijāzah* ("license") to found his own branch of the Qādirīyah when he led the 1832 revolt against the French in Algeria and proclaimed a *jihād*. Captured by the French in 1847, he wrote to Napoleon III in 1865, petitioning him to ask Alexander II of Russia to release another Naqshbandī, Shamil, who had been imprisoned for taking part in a *jihād* movement in the northern Caucasus, so that he could go to Mecca. There are also grounds for seeing a Sanūsī inspiration in the late nineteenth-century Achehnese war against the Dutch, just as there had been a strong international Naqshbandī movement in West Sumatra and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago behind resistance to the Dutch. These influences, inspirations, networks, and personalities thus ranged between Algeria and the Caucasus, Cyrenaica, Malaya, Indonesia, and East and West Africa, and the hub of the network was Mecca, where the shaykhs of the various regional establishments of the orders met and pooled information and ideas.

Tradition and Change. In spite of this political vitality, the influence of the *ṭarīqahs* was reduced to a minimum after the reformist movement inaugurated by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh resulted in an intensive campaign against them. There had been movements against the *ṭarīqahs* before, as schools and personalities in different regions emphasized one perspective or another within the rich complex of options and experiences in the Islamic tradition, yet the relative strength of support and opposition had always remained in balance. In the early twentieth century, however, there was a qualitative change and a definite shift in balance as the convergence of various factors militated against the *ṭarīqahs* in a special way.

The reform movement was inspired in part by nineteenth-century European rationalism and in part by a renewed emphasis upon the rationalist component in Islam. As a result, many of the practices of the order were seen not only as creating innovations, such as the celebration of the birthdays of deceased saints, the honoring of their tombs, and certain forms of meditation, but also as harboring superstitions that disgraced Islam by making it appear contemptible to Europeans. Moreover, since the reformists believed that the *ṭarīqahs* attracted people to otherworldliness and magic instead of challenging them to face reality, they considered it a root cause of the backwardness of Muslims. Muḥammad 'Abduh and Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, for example, while accepting the ethical and spiritual ideas of a great Ṣūfī such as al-Ghazālī, regarded every aspect of the *ṭarīqahs* as degenerate.

Abuses were easy to find. Some shaykhs believed that holiness was hereditary; certain heads of orders regarded great wealth as a right, an outward manifestation of the spiritual favors they had received. *Barakah* (the blessing that a shaykh and his *silsilah* could give) was something to be bought and sold. Moreover, despite the international networks so characteristic of the *ṭarīqahs*, many individual shaykhs remained too attached to family clan and local traditions to respond to the rise of nationalism. They were at a further disadvantage because a gap had developed between those who, hoping for government employment, specialized in jurisprudence at mainstream educational institutions such as al-Azhar in Cairo and those whose lives revolved around the *ṭarīqah* tradition, its festivals, and its cult practices and remained outside the changing mix of the establishment.

There were other difficulties as well. Growing secularization and the central role of modern governments eroded the areas in which the *ṭarīqahs* traditionally had an effective role to play. Government instructional fa-

cilities, for example, removed their educational role as "study circles" (*ḥalaqāt*); clubs and associations took over their social role; economic changes and creeping industrialization weakened the trade and craft guilds with which they had been associated formerly. There were in addition rival religious organizations: for example, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, because of its dispersion into local groups, was able to offer the community individual guidance and service that had previously been the province of the *ṭarīqahs*. Moreover, the local orientation of many branches of the orders made them appear irrelevant to communities increasingly related to the outside world. As a result the shaykhs were largely isolated from their traditional clientele and the sources of economic strength for their *ṭarīqahs*.

At the close of the twentieth century (already the beginning of the fifteenth century AH), it must be acknowledged that not only in the Middle East but in many other areas of the Muslim world, particularly in urban centers, *ṭarīqahs* appear to be a spent force. Rumors of their impending death, however, are very much exaggerated.

Their historical importance is profound. After the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258, they served to prevent the breakup of the Muslim world into Arabic-, Turkish-, and Persian-speaking regions. They had a stabilizing role in critical periods of change and political uncertainty, and as new political centers of power became established, notably the Mughal and Ottoman empires, they either associated themselves with the ruling classes or else became a significant element in the social fabric of the new polity. Far from being rivals to the *'ulamā'*, the founders of the *ṭarīqahs* and their successors, the great *Ṣūfī* shaykhs, were masters of the law, and their spiritual exercises were a further dimension of their competence in *fiqh*, not a substitute for it. In India in particular, their contribution to a creative acceptance of Islam and faithful observance of the norms of Islamic law—the Naqshbandī-inspired reform movement in seventeenth-century Delhi is a notable example—is enormous. The new centers of political authority both recognized them as the standard-bearers and exemplars of the norms of religious behavior and provided them with ample opportunities to gain wealth, power, and influence. Given such acceptance, they added a richness and color, a vitality, and an emotional intensity to every stratum of religious and social life.

The emphases of the *ṭarīqahs* were diverse, as is illustrated in the *silsilahs* of their shaykhs, in their theosophy, in their *dhikr* and *samā'*, in the social class to which they made their appeal, in their participation in

or their abstention from the political process, their acceptance or rejection of any particular government. Their cultural significance—their role in islamizing the vernaculars of many regions of the Muslim world, their fecundation of music and literature—is enormous.

It needs to be stressed, nevertheless, that this essay has barely skimmed the surface of the topic. For the periods between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries, it is hardly possible to write on any aspect of religion and society in the Islamic world without reference to the *ṭarīqahs*, yet it is precisely this period that has been most neglected by modern scholars. For although the reform movement has attracted a great deal of interest, products of the living heritage of traditional Islam have not been studied at a comparable depth. Thus the modern history of the *ṭarīqahs* and their present role is yet to be written.

It is unlikely that the puritanical, rationalist Islam of Rashīd Riḍā and his followers will satisfy the profound religious instincts of vast numbers of people who are the legitimate heirs both to a rich and varied tradition of spirituality and to social institutions that render community participation in it a rewarding experience. Thus, despite the present decline in the importance of the *ṭarīqahs*, it needs to be stressed that the limitations of a purely rationalist Islam are already becoming apparent. These limitations may lead either to strident militancy, to religious indifference, or to a search for the deep, inward spirituality that the *ṭarīqahs* provide.

In Cairo, for example, the celebrations of the *mawlid*s, or saints' birthdays, are still extraordinary public events; thus, even in the heart of the Arab world the *ṭarīqahs* cannot be overlooked. And in any case, the Arab world is not necessarily a model for the entire domain of Islam. It is striking that in Indonesia, for example, the reformist-oriented, anti-*ṭarīqah* party, the Masyumi, which during the 1950s appeared to reflect the dominant Islamic ethos, has now been eclipsed by the traditional, adaptive, *ṭarīqah*-tolerant group, the Nahdatul Ulama. In Malaysia the *ṭarīqahs* also have great vitality. Recent research in African Islam likewise shows that the *ṭarīqahs* contribute both to social stability and, in a very special way, to the work ethic. The Murīdiyāh of Senegal, born in an African environment, is an example of the moral authority and social dedication of a modern *ṭarīqah*. Equally important, various offshoots of the Naqshbandī order in Dagestan and Chechnia in the Soviet Union have become numerous and influential in an unexpected development that has caused concern to the Soviet authorities. There is more than enough evidence to show that the *ṭarīqahs* still have an important social and political role to play

alongside the enrichment they bring to the spiritual lives of millions of people.

[See also the biographies of the principal figures mentioned herein.]

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TATAR RELIGION. See Inner Asian Religions.

TATHĀGATA. In the Pali scriptures of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition this term occurs frequently as a title applied to the Buddha. The derivation of the word, however, is uncertain. The renowned Theravāda commentator Buddhaghosa offered eight possible explanations of its derivation (*Sumaṅgala-vilāsini* 1.59–68). Leaving aside the fanciful or homiletical derivations in his list, three derivations seem most probable. First, the term might be derived from *tathā-gato*, meaning "one who has gone thus," that is, one who has attained the final liberation characteristic of a Buddha. A second possible derivation is *tathā-āgato*, "one who has come thus," that is, one who has arrived at perfection over many lives in the same way as all previous Buddhas. Finally, the term may be derived from *tatha-āgato*, meaning "one who has come to the truth (*tatha*)." Indeed, several of Buddhaghosa's definitions relate *tathā-gata* to *tatha*, "truth."

The contexts in which the word *tathāgata* is used in the Buddhist canon indicate that all of these derivations may be at least partially valid, for *tathāgata* is used in several ways. Before the Buddhist tradition began, this term seems to have been in circulation in India as an epithet for a liberated individual, a religious sage. The

term was used by the Jains, for example, to refer to Mahāvīra. The Buddhist *suttas* say that Gotama, after attaining Enlightenment, identified himself to his former associates as a *tathāgata* (*Majjhima Nikāya* 1.171). A *tathāgata* was understood to be a “most high person, a supreme person, one who attains the supreme goal” (*Samyutta Nikāya* 3.118).

Among the speculative questions that Gotama refused to answer were those regarding the status of a *tathāgata* after death. These questions seem to have been standard debating points for religious teachers in the Buddha’s time. In one passage, a non-Buddhist questioner links with these questions similar ones about the status after death of a liberated monk, thus implying that the two were more or less synonymous (*Majjhima Nikāya* 1.484–489).

In some instances, the Buddhist texts use the word *tathāgata* as a synonym for *arahant*. A *tathāgata* can be described in the same way as an *arahant*, as one who has crossed the stream, laid down his burden, and cast off his fetters (*Majjhima Nikāya* 1.139–140). Since the primary referent of *tathāgata* for the Buddhists, however, was always the Buddha, “the Tathāgata” in this sense is most often said to be the *arahant* above all others. A standard phrase used to refer to the Buddha describes him as “a *tathāgata*, an *arahant*, a fully enlightened Buddha,” implying that he fulfills all of these titles. Many passages in the Pali canon make clear that the Tathāgata is the highest, the chief of all creatures. The Tathāgata surpasses lesser *arahants* because he points the way that *arahants* must follow to the goal (*Majjhima Nikāya* 3.6). When ranking individuals worthy of offerings, the Buddhists placed the Tathāgata first on the list; *arahants* who were the Tathāgata’s disciples were third in rank, behind *paccekabuddhas* (*Majjhima Nikāya* 3.254–255). In the Theravāda usage an ordinary person, even though he may attain *nibbāna* and perfection, can neither become nor equal a *tathāgata*.

Thus, the Theravādins referred to Gotama Buddha as the *tathāgata* for this age and identified him with the previous Buddhas. The etymological ambiguity of the term was doctrinally useful since it allowed the Buddhists to imply both that Gotama was the one who had gone to the supreme goal (*tathā-gata*), and that he had come in the same way as the Buddhas of the past (*tathā-āgata*), in the line of previous *tathāgatas*.

The Buddhists’ belief that Gotama was the supreme teacher led them to adopt the term *tathāgata* as a designation for the Buddha. He was not, however, just another *tathāgata*, but the Tathāgata surpassing all other teachers in this age.

Buddhism expresses the oneness of the Buddha and the Tathāgata by giving the identical definition for the terms *buddha* and *tathāgata*. Both a Buddha and a *tathāgata* are described by the standard formula as “worthy, fully enlightened, endowed with wisdom and virtuous conduct, well gone, the knower of worlds, unsurpassed charioteer of men to be tamed, teacher of gods and men, an enlightened one, an exalted one” (*Majjhima Nikāya* 1.401; *Anguttara Nikāya* 1.206). Like a Buddha, the Tathāgata is said to be one of the two beings (the other is a *cakravartin*, or universal monarch) who are born for the welfare of humanity (*Anguttara Nikāya* 1.75). [See Cakravartin.] *Tathāgatas* possess ten special powers that set them above all other beings. These powers consist of higher knowledge concerning the operation of karmic laws in the world and the means to liberation from them, the same powers characteristic of a Buddha (*Majjhima Nikāya* 1.69-71).

The Pali scriptures of the Theravāda tradition represent the Buddha as employing the term *tathāgata* to refer to himself. Indeed, the majority of the occurrences of the term in the Tipiṭaka are of this nature. We cannot be certain, of course, about the authenticity of these passages, but it appears that at least the early Theravādins, and perhaps Gotama himself, used the designation *tathāgata* to refer to the Buddha. As the Tathāgata, Gotama roars his “lion’s roar” and proclaims the Dhamma. As the Tathāgata, Gotama sets forth the “Middle Way.” At the end of his life, Gotama declares that “the Tathāgata has no closed fist of the teacher” (*Dīgha Nikāya* 2.100).

Gotama the Buddha, the *tathāgata* for our age, is also the embodiment of truth, an association that supports the third derivation noted above. Possibly this was an implicit nuance of the term that a devout Buddhist would recognize immediately. Some passages in the Tipiṭaka make this nuance explicit. For example, it is said that “*Tathāgatas* do not speak untruth (*vitatha*)” (*Majjhima Nikāya* 2.108). The Tathāgata is described by the Theravāda texts as the one who knows and proclaims the Dhamma, the highest truth, the salvific truth for humanity. *Dhammakāya* (“Dhamma body”) is said to be a designation of the Tathāgata (*Dīgha Nikāya* 3.84).

Whereas for the Theravāda Buddhist tradition *tathāgata* signified Gotama Buddha, the liberated teacher for humanity, Mahāyāna Buddhism developed the metaphysical and transcendental implications of the term. Mahāyāna stressed the unity of all *tathāgatas* or Buddhas as proclaimers of the one doctrine (*ekayāna*). Indeed, *tathāgatas* are the embodiment of *dharma*; they are personal revelations or mediators of the supreme truth. The Tathāgata is “an emanation of the Absolute”

(Murti, 1955, p. 277). When this Absolute or absolute truth is called *tathatā* ("suchness"), the relation of a *tathāgata* to it can be clearly seen, for the Tathāgata reveals the true nature of things as they are (*yathā tathā*). For Mahāyāna, there are many *tathāgatas* besides Gotama Buddha who are available to human beings. Yet all are manifestations of the same reality. Furthermore, Mahāyāna employs the term *tathāgata-garbha*, "the womb of the Tathāgata," to indicate the unity and source of all things and all beings.

[For further discussion, see *Buddha and Tathāgata-garbha*. See also Perfectibility.]

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TATHĀGATA-GARBHA. Early monastic Buddhism emphasized the reality of "selflessness" (*anātmata*) as the essential nature of all beings. The "ignorance" (*avidyā*) at the root of suffering in the samsaric life cycle was said to be the misperception of a fixed and independent "self" (*ātman*) within a selfless, wholly relative person. The overcoming of the delusion of self was called "wisdom" (*prajñā*), and it was commonly explained as the "wisdom of selflessness." However, the earliest sermons of the Buddha are replete with such expressions as "mastery of the self is the real mastery," "he who conquers his own self is the supreme warrior," and so forth. Self-control was a prime goal of the early Buddhist monk or nun. Thus, the term *self* had two distinct connotations. In one, it referred to a fixed, independent, self-substance, and in the other, it referred to the living, empirical, continuum of the person; the former was denied and the latter, clearly presupposed.

With the rise of the messianic Buddhism of the "universal vehicle" (Mahāyāna), both sides of this ambiguity were developed in various ways. The "self" that was thought not to exist was equated with "intrinsic reality"

(*svabhāva*), "intrinsic identity" (*svalakṣaṇa*), and "intrinsic objectivity" (*svarūpa*). Its systematic denial was expanded beyond "subjective selflessness" (*puṅgala-nairātmyā*) to encompass "objective selflessness" (*dharma nairātmyā*), which was understood as equivalent to "emptiness" (*sūnyatā*). Notions concerning the other "self," the living, empirical personality that was acknowledged to exist, developed into two major concepts, "enlightenment-spirit" (*bodhicitta*), and "Buddha essence" (*tathāgata-* or *sugata-garbha*). The "spirit of enlightenment" concept dates from the earliest Mahāyāna scriptures (first century BCE); its systematization was begun by the scholastic master Nāgārjuna (c. second century CE). The second dates from the second and third centuries CE, with the emergence of the later Mahāyāna scriptures such as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, the *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra*, the *Śrīmālādevī Sūtra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. It was systematized by the Yogācāra masters Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu during the fourth and fifth centuries CE.

The enlightenment-spirit (*bodhicitta*) theory eventually began to reflect the original ambiguity of the Buddha's use of *self*, by employing the scheme of "two realities" (*satyadvaya*), the absolute and the relative. The absolute spirit was equated with the wisdom of selflessness, and the relative spirit with the loving mind seeking the welfare of all beings. The perfection of the absolute spirit was thought to result in the achievement of the *dharmakāya* ("truth body") of Buddhahood, and the perfection of the relative spirit in the achievement of the *rūpakāya* ("form body") of Buddhahood, with its heavenly *sambhoga* ("beatific") and earthly *nirmāṇa* ("emanation") bodies. An important point is that the duality between the two spirits, as between the two realities, only obtains from the relative perspective. In the enlightened view, the two are ultimately the same: wisdom and compassion are one, the absolute is no different from the relative, and truth is equivalent to form. This is summarized in Nāgārjuna's famous statement, "Emptiness [is] the essence of compassion" ("Śūnyatā-karuṇā-garbhā").

Against this background, we can understand the emergence of the Buddha-essence doctrine. The Absolute Truth Body (*dharmakāya*) of the Buddha is transcendent and eternal, yet omnipresent and immanent in every atom of infinity. Thus, from a Buddha's perspective, all beings are already immersed in the "truth-body realm" (*dharmakāyadhātu*) and persist in suffering only because they do not know their own actual situation. Each being's presence in the truth-realm is the *essence* of each; it is each one's essential participation in Buddhahood. Thus, each has an essence of Buddhahood,

that is, a Buddha essence within him or her that is one's very selflessness or "natural ultimate freedom" (*prakṛti-parinirvāṇa*). One's critique, through *prajñā*, of the mis-knowledge of self and the resultant realization of selflessness amounts to the removal of the obscurations of the Buddha essence and the revelation of the natural luminosity of the Buddha realm.

To refer to the useful compendium of sources written by the Tibetan scholar Bu-ston (1290–1364), the *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra* gives nine similes of the Buddha essence: like a Buddha in a closed lotus, like the honey in the comb, like the grain in the husk, like gold in ore, like treasure buried beneath a pauper's house, like a tree-seed in its sheath, like a Buddha-image wrapped in a filthy cloth, like a world monarch amid the impurities of the womb, and like a golden image contained within its clay mold. Of these nine similes, the first three are said to indicate the *dharmakāya* in its senses of "absolute" and "element" (*dhātu*), the simile of the golden image to indicate "suchness" (*tathatā*), and the remaining five to indicate the "spiritual gene" (*gotra*), an important equivalent concept in which one's inherent Buddhahood is conceived of as a genetic cause of the *dharmakāya*.

The *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* reveals the Buddha essence of all beings as permanent, happy, omnipresent, pure, and free, for this is how beings appear in a Buddha's vision. The *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* extends its visionary theme of the mutual interpenetration of all things to illustrate how the Buddha wisdom exists in the mind of every being as each one's jewel-like essential perfection. The *Āṅgulimāliya Sūtra* states that "the Buddha essence is the reality, the absolute body, the permanent body, the inconceivable body of the transcendent Lord It is the self." The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* mentions the Buddha essence and equates it with the "fundamental consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*), the basic seat of ignorance underlying the six usual consciousnesses and the afflicted mentality (*kliṣṭamanas*) in the idealist psychology of that scripture. Finally, the *Śrīmāladevī Sūtra* mentions the Buddha essence as indispensable both to the process of enlightenment and to the afflicted world.

The apparent contradiction between these revelations and the earlier teachings that all beings are impermanent, miserable, selfless, and impure is addressed in the scriptures themselves by referring to the two realities and the two perspectives, using the hermeneutical concepts of "interpretable meaning" (*neyārtha*) and "definitive meaning" (*nītārtha*). The Buddha uses his "skill in liberative technique" (*upāyakauśalya*) to teach according to the abilities of his disciples. The notion of an "intention" (*abhiprāya* or *abhisamdhi*) underlying a teaching is introduced to explain the Buddha's various

strategies. Bu-ston extracts a number of such "intentions" from the texts. The *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine is taught in order to (1) eliminate despair and generate effort, giving the practitioner hope of attaining liberation; (2) eliminate pride and produce respect for others; (3) eliminate absolutistic reifications and nihilistic repudiations and produce wisdom.

In the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Mahāmāti asks the Buddha how his Buddha-essence teaching differs from the "supreme-self" teaching of the brahmans. The Buddha replies:

The perfect Buddhas have taught the Buddha essence intending emptiness, reality-limit, *nirvāṇa*, non-creation, signlessness, and wishlessness. For the immature to be free of their terror of selflessness, they teach the realms of non-conceptuality and non-appearance by the gateway [i.e., teaching] of the Buddha essence. . . . They teach the essence to attract those heterodox persons who are too deeply attached to their "self" notions to awaken to the profound enlightenment.

(*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1959, p. 33)

And in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* the Buddha tells a story about his meeting with five hundred ascetics who admired his beauty and inner composure and wanted to follow his teaching, but were afraid because they thought he was a nihilist; he reassured them that he was not a spiritual nihilist by teaching them the Buddha-essence doctrine.

Among the great Indian treatises, Maitreyanātha's *Ratnagotravibhāga* is the *locus classicus* of the systematic exposition of the Buddha-essence doctrine. It is elucidated by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in great detail, without departing from the basic principles given in the scriptures above. On the basis of this treatise, the Jonān order of Tibetan Buddhism developed an elaborate theory of the Buddha essence, connecting it to various Tantric ideas. In Tantrism as well, the Esoteric concept of the "indestructible drop" (*akṣayabindu*) as the basis of transmigration and Buddhahood and the life essence of a living being is extremely similar to the Buddha-essence doctrine. Philosophically, the Tibetans tended to the explanation given in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* that the *tathāgata-garbha* theory referred to selflessness in a manner soothing to those still unprepared for the more radical denial of self.

In East Asia, the notion of the *tathāgata-garbha* enjoyed great popularity. In a treatise attributed to the Indian Aśvaghoṣa, known in East Asia by the translated title *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna), the idealistic idea of mind as world-creator is wedded to the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine to elevate the *tathāgata-garbha* to the status of a divine mind responsible for the creation of the world of transmigration.

tion as well as the attainment of liberation and enlightenment. The Chinese master Ching-ying Hui-yüan (523–592 CE) developed an elaborate idealistic (*vijñānavāda*) Buddhology on this basis. His theories were critiqued by the Centrist (Mādhyamika) master Chi-tsang (549–623), who sought to avoid the theistic implications of doctrines such as Hui-yüan's. Later systematizers such as Chih-i of the T'ien-t'ai school, Fa-tsang of the Hua-yen school, and many of the greatest Ch'an masters used the Buddha-essence doctrine in various ways, sometimes with an Idealist (Yogācāra) twist, at other times with a Centrist (Mādhyamika) twist. In modern East Asian Buddhism, the doctrine is again serving Buddhist popularizers and dialogists as a strategy for reassuring cultures where "soul" theories are traditional.

It is noteworthy that the English popularization "Buddha nature" comes from the East Asian writers, for the Chinese *hsing* can be read as "nature," whereas the Sanskrit *garbha*, *dhātu*, or *gotra* cannot be stretched without considerable effort from the meanings "essence," "element," or "gene," respectively, to that of "nature."

[See also Soul, article on Buddhist Concepts; Nirvāṇa; Buddhist Philosophy; Tathatā; and Ālaya-vijñāna.]

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TATHATĀ. According to the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (The Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna), "suchness" (Skt., *tathatā* or *bhūtatathatā*; Chin., *chen-ju*; Tib., *de bzin nyid*) denotes the totality of reality in both its transcendental and phenomenal aspects. It establishes the oneness and unity of the absolute and relative spheres and expresses the totality of all things (*dharmadhātu*). Suchness is held to exist in all beings and thus to undergo no changes either in its perfect or defiled state: its nature remains uncreated and eternal. All events and things of *saṃsāra* (i.e., all *dharmas*) make their appearance in the form of individualizations or mental constructions as a consequence of the beginningless continuity of the subconscious memory (*smṛti*) of past

experiences acquired during previous existences. It is through the elimination of all mental projections that the world construed in the mind (*citta*) ceases to make its appearances. When seen in this radically transformed way, all things in their essential nature escape and defy any explanation or description because they are free and beyond distinction, remain unchanged, and are characterized by their absolute sameness (*samatā*), which precludes any transformation, destruction, or distinction. Since they cannot be explained in any way, their verbal or conceptual descriptions must be regarded as mere representations; they do not denote realities. All things remain ever as they are; they are such (*tathā*) as they are, and it is their Suchness (*tathatā*), free of all attributes, that expresses the nature of their oneness and totality.

Suchness can only be understood through the inner realization that the true nature of existence does not manifest itself through dichotomous appearances: knower-known, subject-object, perceiver and perceived. The notion of Suchness embraces two aspects, the immutability, purity, and totality of all things, on the one hand, and the activities that evolve within *saṃsāra*, on the other. However, these two aspects of Suchness denote fundamentally one and the same reality. They cannot be considered as two separate entities; rather, they are simply representations of Suchness "operating," as it were, in its transcendental and phenomenal spheres. When equated with *śūnyatā* ("emptiness"), *tathatā* represents the absolute negation of all phenomena and their attributes. Thus, in its metaphysical aspect it has nothing in common with the conditioned and defiled world. It stands beyond and above the impurity and relativity of *saṃsāra*. Suchness remains free and undefiled; it cannot be comprehended precisely because it comprises within itself the totality of things and because its nature escapes conceptual categorization.

Saṃsāra, the sphere of defilement and imperfection, has no beginning but it can be brought to an end. Suchness, which is eternal, pure, and perfect by nature, is present in *saṃsāra* but it remains obscured by defilements. Yet while it is in the sphere of phenomenal existence that Suchness and *saṃsāra* coincide, they are neither identical nor distinct from one another. *Saṃsāra* makes its appearance as a chain of dependently originating phenomena issuing from the *tathāgata-garbha* ("womb of the Tathāgata"); which represents, as it were, the personified principle that stands between the absolute sphere, which is transcendent to human thought, and the relative sphere, which is pervaded by imperfections. When absolute reality becomes manifest in the relative world it projects itself as, or is called, the store-consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), which contains

within itself two opposite principles. One is the principle of nonenlightenment and the inclination to perpetuate the cycle of samsaric existences; the other is the principle of enlightenment, which represents the highest quality and state of mind, free of all subjectivity.

When it is devoid of all attributes and conceptual projections, the mind may be compared to space insofar as it is ubiquitous and constitutive of the unity of all things. This universally perfect mind, enlightenment itself, constitutes the *dharmakāya* ("Dharma body, Dharma essence") of all the Tathāgatas. The mind aware of its perfect and pure nature abides in the state of enlightenment, yet so long as it is restricted and obscured by ignorance it remains in the state of nonenlightenment. In other words, perfect enlightenment is embedded in phenomenal existence through the presence of *prajñā* ("transcendental wisdom") and through the law of retribution (*karman*). By perfecting and unveiling *prajñā*, and through the performance of meritorious acts, the element of enlightenment within the mind becomes purified and freed from karmic residues and wisdom becomes manifested in its fullness as the *dharmakāya*. The impurities and mental projections that obscure the mind in its nonenlightened state are produced under the influence of *avidyā* ("ignorance"). It is ignorance that induces the appearance of all mental constructs. When ignorance is subdued and eliminated it is merely the "reenlightened" wisdom that shines forth. Ignorance, although it is the cause of all mental states and projections that obscure the clarity of enlightenment, is nonetheless inherently present in enlightenment. Here again, the two are neither identical nor nonidentical. Just as waves are present on water stirred by the wind, so are mental projections stimulated by the "winds" of ignorance. Once ignorance is eliminated, the mental "waves" subside and the purity of the mind in its enlightenment-essence remains undisturbed.

The nature of perfect and timeless enlightenment is characterized as unattainable by any means within the relative sphere. When enlightenment is totally free of all hindrances (*kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*) and of the store-consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), which becomes entangled in phenomenal events, it remains pure and immutable in its nature. Yet at the same time, this pure and unhindered enlightenment unfolds itself and becomes manifest as a *tathāgata* (i.e., a Buddha), or in some other form, in order to bring living beings to spiritual maturation. Pure and perfect enlightenment may be spoken of as being present and manifest in the phenomenal sphere precisely as nonenlightenment when, owing to the mind's ignorance, the true nature of Suchness is not fully perceived. In this sense, the state of nonenlightenment has no true existence of its own; it can

only be considered in relation to perfect enlightenment, which, as nonenlightenment, is obscured by ignorance. Thus, perfect enlightenment, which remains unchanged and unimpeded at all times, is not really produced (it is ever present within all things) but rather becomes manifested through and within the defiled world that has evolved under the influence of ignorance. A full understanding of the Suchness of all things depends on the degree of the mind's purity and the mind's ability to perceive it. Ordinary people, overwhelmed by defilements and hindrances, do not perceive the nature and presence of Suchness. On the other hand, the Tathāgatas understand it perfectly.

All beings are innately endowed with Suchness and with all the innate impulses necessary to eradicate imperfections and defilements and to pursue the path of moral activities. From the moment that beings give rise to the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) until the moment they attain Buddhahood they are protected and guided by the *bodhisattvas* and *tathāgatas*, who assume various manifestations in order to guide them along the path. Suchness, although variously described as the effulgence of wisdom, as true knowledge or pure mind, as tranquil, pure, eternal, and immutable, nevertheless remains free of all distinctions and attributes precisely because all things are of "a single taste," a single reality unaffected by any modes of particularization or dualism.

Sources of the *tathatā* theory include such canonical works as the *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*, and *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras*, and several other Mahāyāna works including the *Awakening of Faith*. The theory of *tathatā*, although present within the writings of both the Mādhyamika and (especially) Vijñānavāda schools, has never been represented by a separate tradition. It has nonetheless exercised influence on philosophical and religious speculation and was particularly and predominantly present in the latest phases of Buddhist writings known as the Tantras.

[See also Tathāgata-garbha; Ālaya-vijñāna; Prajñā; Nirvāṇa; Śūnyam and Śūnyatā; and Soteriology, article on Buddhist Soteriology.]

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TATTOOING. See Bodily Marks.

TAULER, JOHANNES (c. 1300–1361), German Dominican and mystic. Born at Strasbourg, Tauler entered the convent of the Strasbourg Dominicans as a young man and was probably a student, and certainly a disciple, of Meister Eckhart. Living at a time of political upheaval, aggravated by the social excesses that came in the wake of the Black Death, Tauler was distinguished by a remarkable sobriety of language and thought, a refusal of extremism, and a profound understanding of human nature, which did not keep him from being a demanding spiritual guide. His surviving sermons, all in German, were preached to Dominican nuns, written down, copied, and sent to other convents eager for spiritual nourishment, then often in scarce supply.

Primarily a pedagogue and a "master of life," Tauler takes as his starting point a carefully defined conception of "man as being really like three men (*Menschen*), though remaining one": the sensible man, with sensations, perceptions, imagination, action, and sensible will; the rational or intellectual man, capable of abstract thought, conceptualization, and deduction; and the higher, or interior and essential man, the "depth" (*Grund*) from which the spark emerges and in which the birth of God takes place.

The spiritual life starts with sensible devotion (images of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ) and a love that is felt strongly at the time of the first "conver-

sion" of the heart, often with a degree of exaltation that approaches intoxication. But such devotion and love, though useful, remain "in nature," and there follows a lengthy period in which the person advances with difficulty, under the guidance of reason as it exercises discernment, often amid obscurity and aridity when reduced to its own powers and sustained by naked faith. If the person perseveres, this period brings a detachment that will do away with all obstacles to the unmediated encounter with God. In this process an experienced teacher is needed. If God wills it, the person will attain supernatural contemplation, a pure gift that cannot be merited.

In addition to Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint-Thierry, and Meister Eckhart, Tauler drew on Christian (Dionysius the Areopagite) and non-Christian (Proclus) Neoplatonism. Tauler exercised an extensive influence in the Germanic countries (as a young man, Luther read and reread him) and also—through Latin translations and complex channels—on Spanish and French spiritual writers.

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Translated from French by Matthew J. O'Connell

TA'ZIYAH, more fully known as *ta'ziyah-khvānī* or *shabīh-khvānī*, is the Shī'ī passion play, performed mainly in Iran. The word itself is derived from the Arabic 'azā', "mourning," and the *ta'ziyah* performance

marks the death of Ḥusayn, the grandson of the prophet Muḥammad and the third imam of the Shī'ah, who was brutally murdered, along with the male members of his family and a group of followers, while he was contesting his hereditary right to the caliphate. The horrors of this hot and bloody scene, which took place on the plain of Karbala near the Euphrates on 'Āshūrā', the tenth day of the Muslim month of Muḥarram, in AH 61/680 CE, became the prototype of Shī'ī martyrdom.

Beginning in the middle of the tenth century, annual parades held in Baghdad during the month of Muḥarram vividly portrayed the fate of the martyrs, loudly lamented by attending crowds. When the Safavid monarch made Shiism the state religion of Iran in the sixteenth century, these demonstrations became highly elaborate, featuring men, on caparisoned horses and camels, acting the role of martyrs with bloody wounds and gruesome injuries. Floats were also constructed to depict the various events at Karbala, and the entire parade was accompanied by funerary music while bystanders wailed and beat their breasts. Contemporaneously, the lives, deeds, and sufferings of Ḥusayn and other Shī'ī martyrs were also treated in a book entitled *Rawḍat al-shuhadā'* (The Garden of the Martyrs), which in turn gave rise to readings called *rawḥah-khvānīs*, or "garden recitations" in Persian. It was from a combination of the Muḥarram parades and the *rawḥah-khvānī* that the *ta'ziyah* drama emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Nowadays, *ta'ziyah* can be performed throughout the year, but originally it was staged only in the month of Muḥarram and the following month of Ṣafar. From the crossroads and public squares where they were first presented, *ta'ziyah* performances soon moved to caravansaries and private houses, and then to a special type of theater called *takīyah* or *Ḥusaynīyah*. Over the next century and a half theaters of various sizes and constructions were built, reaching enormous proportions in the elaborate Takīyah Dawlat (State Theater) built by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in the 1870s.

In all these performance areas or playhouses the main action takes place on a raised circular or square platform around which the audience is seated on the ground, but the movement of the actors in and around the audience preserves the traditional interaction of performers and spectators in the Muḥarram celebrations. Audience participation is so intense that men and women weep and mourn as though the historical scenes before them were taking place in the immediate present.

The protagonists, dressed predominantly in green, sing their parts, while the villains, who wear red, speak their lines. Symbolic stage properties, such as a bowl of

water to represent a river, are improvised according to need, particularly in the villages, where costumes are few. The director/producer is omnipresent on the stage as prompter, property man, and regulator of the actors, musicians, and viewers. Villagers and townsmen participate when professional actors are scarce, but troupes of actors travel from place to place, with men playing the women's roles. Parts are often passed from father to son in family groups: acting is a hereditary trade.

The Islamic Revolution of 1978–1979 utilized the Ḥusayn paradigm and was carried out in accordance with the Shī'ī calendar. The stationary rituals such as *ta'ziyah* and the *rawḥah-khvānī* served as political rallies at which the assembled people were stimulated by speakers who mixed the Karbala mourning slogans with political ones. The digressions and the comparisons of the plight of Ḥusayn with the contemporary political, moral, and social situation have long been a tradition at these rituals and can evoke in the audience a particular social and religious climate which can move the audience to political action.

Ta'ziyah reached its peak in Iran in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the 1960s and 1970s, because of overt westernization and other social and political factors, the performances, which had been an urban creation, retreated to the rural areas. The fate of this original theater form in the world of Islam is now uncertain. The Shī'ah of the Caucasus (part of Iran until the early nineteenth century) and of Iraq and southern Lebanon know it on a more limited scale. Innovative Western theater directors and producers are now very much interested in the *ta'ziyah* as a means of breaking down the barriers that divide the audience from the actors in Western theater.

On the Indian subcontinent the name *ta'ziyah* is given to a symbolic miniature reproduction of Ḥusayn's tomb as well as of the tombs of other Shī'ī martyrs. These *ta'ziyahs* are not literal facsimiles of any particular tomb but imaginary re-creations. Usually made of bamboo and/or sticks covered with colorful paper and papier-mâché, these structures resemble Indian architecture more than the architecture of Western Asia, where the original tombs were built. The *ta'ziyahs* are carried in processions (during the months of Muḥarram and Ṣafar) and are housed in *imām-bārahs* and private houses, including those of Sunnī Muslims. They may be small enough for two men to carry or immense structures carried by many people. At the conclusion of the procession some of the *ta'ziyahs* may be buried in a local "Karbala ground." Other models, known as *zarihs*, are made of durable material, generally silver, and are not carried in processions or buried.

[See also 'Āshūrā' and Rawḥah-khvānī.]

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TE. See Tao and Te.

TEARS are a symbol of our humanity at its deepest, most common level. In its first reaction to separation from its mother's womb, the newborn infant cries out, although actual tears do not appear until about the third month, at approximately the same time as the baby's first smile. Like smiles, tears signal essential information to the mother; the baby cries when it needs the mother, when it is in pain, cold or hungry, afraid or lonely. Thus, from the start, tears are bound to an experience of intimacy with the other. As adults, tears carry us back to this primal level of emotion where we exist in need of attachment to the other and dependent on something outside ourselves. And because the divine is most often experienced as both powerful and benevolent, it is not surprising that in many religious traditions the god is addressed as "Mother" or "Father" and that the worshiper is encouraged to approach the deity as a child its parent. For example, *Revelations* 7:17 presents a vision of the Kingdom that includes a scene in which God the Father wipes away the tears from the eyes of his children.

To acknowledge with tears our vulnerability, that is, the dependence of the creature on the creator, is in a religious context the primary sign of blessedness. Throughout his life, the holy man Arsenius (c. 354–c. 455) wept so much that he had always to keep a cloth on his lap while he worked to catch the tears as they fell. One Christian saint, the Syrian Thomas, lived in a cave and wept day and night; of another saint it is said that he wept and howled like a jackal over death's approach and the terrible judgment of righteousness to come.

Lamentation and grief express loss of attachment, fear of death, loneliness, and primal need, and they are most often accompanied by weeping. Ancient Egyptian tomb murals depict women with tears streaming from their eyes. The Madonna of Sorrow weeps over the crucified Christ. In some parts of Scotland, it used to be the custom, upon the death of a distinguished person, to paint teardrops on the doors and window shutters, white tadpole-shaped forms against a black ground.

Yet tears are sometimes forbidden in times of mourn-

ing. Many tales in European folklore recount the return of the dead as angry ghosts who reproach those who grieve too long and too loud. Similar notions are known from India, where storytellers may be engaged to drive away by their skill the sorrow of mourners. Fear of excessive weeping may be connected with the belief that tears are a vital and irreplaceable fluid.

Theodor H. Gaster (1969) suggests that Psalm 126:5—"those who sow in tears shall reap in joy"—takes its meaning from an ancient conviction that tears are actually a substance harboring the life principle (or soul) of an individual: for instance, among the Toradjas, Galilese, and Javanese of southeast Asia, the shedding of tears over the soil at planting time is intended to reinvigorate the earth. That the shedding of tears may also be a sacrifice on the part of man is clear from a comparable set of ideas found among the ancient Greeks. In the writings of Hesiod and Homer, the word *aiōn* (whence the English *aeon*) had the fundamental meaning of "a period of existence," and so "life" or "lifetime." Homer relates that at death *psuchē* and *aiōn* leave the body, exposing it to decay (*Iliad* 4.478f., 17.302f.). Like *psuchē* ("soul, breath"), *aiōn* was not simply an abstract principle but a concrete reality. It was identified with the cerebrospinal fluid, excreted from the body as sweat, semen, and tears. To weep for love, especially for loss of the beloved, was to emit *aiōn*, that is, to lose life force. Yearning for one's mate also causes the *aiōn* "to be wasted in weeping" (*Odyssey* 5.160, 19.204).

Because tears are sometimes regarded as a vital fluid, they may share in the creative power of the cosmogonic waters. Often it is mankind itself that is created out of divine tears. In a possibly Orphic poem preserved in part by Proclus, men are engendered by the tears of the creator (*Orphicorum fragmenta* 354). Greek legend includes the tale of the Titan Prometheus, who after the deluge created mankind anew by mixing earth with his own tears. In the Bremmer Rhind Papyrus, a fourth-century copy of what was originally an Egyptian text of the Middle Kingdom, the author speaks of the eye as a symbol of the Great Mother, propagating mankind by means of its tears. These myths suggest that mankind is created out of a divine need for intimacy.

The word *empathy* (like *compassion*, its Latin cognate) refers to a sharing of feeling between two persons, the basis of intimacy. Empathy involves a level of deep emotion that is often expressed in weeping: both the tears of the sufferer and the tears of the fellow-sufferer. In a religious context, tears of compassion are recognized as a source of healing. For example, Christian lore includes the tale of the blind man who is healed by the tears of the Virgin as they fall from her image. In Islam, the tenth day of Muḥarram is connected with the death

of Muḥammad's nephew, Husayn ibn 'Alī. This date is a time of ritual lamentation for Shi'i Muslims. Weeping for Husayn (an act of empathy) opens the doors of paradise. The tears are wiped on a piece of cotton wool and squeezed into a bottle, which serves then as a charm against disease and misfortune. This calls to mind a line of Psalm 56, "Put thou my tears in thy bottle." In Germany, tear bottles were once buried with the dead; in Russia, tear-stained handkerchiefs.

Even the capacity to raise the dead has been ascribed to tears of compassion: in Scandinavian mythology, Baldr, the beautiful son of Óðinn (Odin), is accidentally killed. Only if all things in creation shed tears for him can he leave the underworld of Hel and return to live among the gods. One creature only, the giantess Þökk (Thok), refuses, saying "Þökk will weep dry tears at Baldr's funeral. Dead or alive, I care nothing for the Old Man's kid. May Hel keep what she has" (*Gylfaginning*, in *Edda Snorra Sturluson*).

The penitent tears of the devout may evoke divine compassion and saving grace, as in the story of the woman who bathed Jesus' feet with her tears and was set free from sin (*Lk.* 7:36–50). In the gnostic Christian homily *Exegesis on the Soul*, Psyche is depicted in her natural state as an androgyne. Attracted to the world of Aphrodite, the feminine half of the soul is drawn into the cosmos of begetting and dying, away from her masculine (spirit-giving) half, which remains alone in the presence of God the Father. But Psyche grows lonely in the realm of Aphrodite; she looks everywhere for her masculine counterpart. As a result, she gets caught up in a life of prostitution, seeing in every man she meets the image of her lost husband. The issue of these temporary unions (for she is deserted again and again) are deficient in every possible respect (lame, blind, demented). Finally, realizing the full extent of her loss, her present vulnerability, and her dependence on some power greater than herself, she sits down and weeps. In this state of total receptivity she is restored to her original nature, for God hears her weeping and sends her spirit-giving partner to her. Reunited with him, she is reborn spiritually whole, able to return on her own to the side of the Father. Psyche's tears awaken God's saving empathy toward her.

In contrast to the blessedness associated with weeping, the inability to shed tears has often been interpreted as the sure sign of one who is possessed by an evil spirit, as set forth, for example, in the *Malleus maleficarum* (the famous antiwitchcraft handbook of 1490). One of the fairy tales by Hans Christian Andersen illustrates this insight into the dynamics of possession: *The Snow Queen* is the story of a young boy whose feeling is deadened and whose vision is distorted when splinters

from a mirror belonging to the Devil enter into his heart and his eye. Consequently, he comes to love all that is evil and to hate all that is good, and ends up living in the chilly isolation of the Snow Queen's ice palace. Eventually, his childhood friend, after searching through all the world, finds him and, in her compassion for him, weeps over him. Her tears fall upon his breast and release there the splinter that numbs his heart, freeing him to weep with her. His tears wash away the glass from his eye, and with it, the power of the demonic possession.

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BEVERLY MOON

TECUMSEH (1769–1813), Shawnee war chief and prime mover of the pan-Indian alliance of the Old Northwest. Tecumseh was born in western Ohio by the Mad River, the fifth of nine children. His childhood was filled with reverberations from the restless frontier; his father died in battle against the Americans in 1774, and his mother migrated west in 1779 in response to frontier violence. His devoted sister Tecumpease sheltered him, and he was taught the skills of a warrior by his brother Chikseka. However, Tecumseh was again shocked when he saw Chikseka killed during a Tennessee raid in 1788. Brooding on these events and gaining experience as a warrior, he emerged in the 1790s as a formidable young war chief deeply distrustful of Americans.

Indian land cessions gained through a series of suspect treaties following the Revolutionary War involved millions of acres in Ohio and Indiana. Continued pressure from white settlers and their militias served to crystallize in Tecumseh's mind his plan for the formation of a united front by the Indians to protect their way of life.

Shawnee culture was showing signs of serious deterioration by the end of the eighteenth century. Alcohol exacerbated the situation, contributing to internal violence and moral corruption. Dependency on the whites for an increasing number of goods was undermining the

traditional skills of both men and women. Hunting was becoming more difficult as land was devoured by the "Long Knives," white adventurers from Kentucky. Some leaders, such as Black Hoof, saw salvation through acculturation while many young warriors sought other answers.

One of these answers came from a most unlikely source: Lalawethika, a younger brother of Tecumseh. Lalawethika had proven inept at hunting, at fighting, and in his role as shaman. In April 1805 all of this changed. While lighting his pipe one day, Lalawethika fell into a prolonged trance-like state and was given up for dead. However, he revived and told of a great vision and of his calling as a prophet. Lalawethika became Tenskwatawa ("open door"). This vision and those to follow were strongly nativistic, calling for the Indians to abandon the ways of the whites and to reform their lives. In return, the Master of Life would bless them with bountiful game, rich crops, and the return of the dead, and would drive the Americans from the continent.

Witches were accused of being agents of the same evil spirit who had created the Americans. Both sought to destroy traditional ways of life. The witches had to either renounce their practices or suffer death. Those who embraced Tenskwatawa's teachings were to go forth to preach his message and teach the converts new rituals, songs, and dances.

Tecumseh helped his brother establish a center of influence at Greenville (the Old Northwest, now Ohio). The overwhelmingly positive response to the prophet Tenskwatawa convinced Tecumseh that the catalyst had been found for uniting the Indians into a solid wall of opposition to the Americans. Tecumseh gave his brother's message a practical political platform. First, the American practice of dividing the Indians by making separate land treaties must be stopped. All Indian lands were to be held in common, and the sale of any piece of land would require the consent of all the tribes. Second, narrow tribal or village loyalties must be transcended in the interests of a larger pan-Indian alliance. This would require a political and military superstructure that could formulate policy and respond militarily to American incursions in a united way.

The Treaty of Fort Wayne (1809) surprised many reluctant chiefs, causing them to reevaluate the situation and to loosen their narrow loyalties. That treaty, which ceded three million acres of Indian land to the Americans, was signed by chiefs who supported the policies of the U.S. government and by other illegal representatives of the Indians. Tecumseh vehemently denounced the treaty to William Henry Harrison at Vincennes and

then proceeded south in a rather fruitless attempt to recruit followers among the Creek, Choctaw, and Cherokee. Harrison, long fearful of Tenskwatawa's movement, launched an attack on his new headquarters at Prophetstown on the Tippecanoe River. The fall of Prophetstown on 7 November 1811 was largely seen as the result of Tenskwatawa's ineptitude and marked the end of his power.

Tecumseh assumed control of the movement and reshaped it into a much more overtly political framework. He strengthened already existing ties with the British in Canada who had been supplying his followers with guns, ammunition, and food. When the War of 1812 broke out, Tecumseh linked his efforts with those of the British. They operated out of Amherstburg (southeastern Ontario, near present-day Detroit) but except for a few minor victories were unable to mount a successful campaign. The west was lost with the defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie. Tecumseh refused to subscribe to a planned retreat and through his eloquence and leadership forced the British to alter their strategy. Their new plans failed, however, and Tecumseh was killed in the Battle of the Thames, near Moraviantown, on 5 October 1813.

Tecumseh must be seen as one of the greatest Indian leaders and political visionaries. His role as a spokesman was marked by personal charisma and rhetorical brilliance that awed the otherwise sanguine American political and military figures. Hampered by traditional tribal divisions and caught up in the conflict between the British and the Americans, Tecumseh was unable to realize his vision. Yet his analysis of the situation was subsequently proven correct while his message of solidarity has continued to inspire pan-Indian movements.

Success in building such a movement was largely due to the cooperative efforts of Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa. Tecumseh sought to channel the religious enthusiasm that the prophet Tenskwatawa was able to ignite, while Tenskwatawa was willing to modify his views to accommodate political realities. The efforts of the two brothers have shown that even a partial realization of the nativistic vision requires political leadership and that political success depends on a cultural transformation that only the power of religious symbols can achieve.

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DONALD P. ST. JOHN

TEHUELCHÉ RELIGION. [*This entry discusses the religious system of the Aónikenk, or southern Tehuelche Indians.*] Known as the Aónikenk ("southerners"), the southern Tehuelche Indians inhabited the region of Argentine Patagonia, which extends east and west from the Atlantic Ocean to the foothills of the southern Andes and north and south from the Chubut River (43° south latitude) to the Strait of Magellan. The ethnographic data used in this essay come primarily from fieldwork done in the 1960s, when the surviving Aónikenk population was estimated to number about two hundred, although barely seventy were still speaking their own language, which is part of the Araucanachon family.

Until their final biological, social, and cultural annihilation—due to pressures exerted by the Araucanian peoples to the north and to European conquest and colonization during the nineteenth century—they were nomadic hunters with set patterns of movement, encampments, and territories. Their displacements were subject to seasonal variations: summer hunting in the coastal region was accompanied by a certain social dispersion, whereas the western areas of Aónikenk territory were associated with more stable winter settlements and some degree of population concentration. The Aónikenk were subdivided into three groups, with a varying number of exogamous patrilineages; their residential pattern was patrilocal. There are numerous gaps in our knowledge of the religious system of the southern Tehuelche, but an imposing, if fragmentary, mythology stands out. By the time travelers began to be familiar with Aónikenk mythology, it had already begun to disintegrate, in part because it was forbidden to share it with outsiders.

Cosmology. The mythic chronology speaks of four ages. The chaos of the first age is expressed in the image of a deep sea (the Flood?) or of a thick, wet darkness. During the second era, the high god—known variously as Weq.on ("truthful one"), Kooch ("heaven"), the Old One, and the Everlasting One, among other paraphrases—creates and gives order to the cosmic elements. Third is the epoch of Elal, the young god who

shapes the earth, performs the ontological schism between undifferentiated and differentiated reality, and makes possible present-day human life with his ordering of technoeconomic, social, ritual, and ethical phenomena. His actions cover the end of the mythic era and mark the transition to the fourth age, the present one.

The cosmology describes the world as a system of four superimposed strata: the celestial sky, the atmospheric sky, the earth, and the subterranean region. The first is considered to be the highest, the second and third are rated ambiguously, and the last stratum is ranked as the lowest. The cardinal points are rated similarly: the east is the best, the north and south are ambiguous, and the west is very bad.

Ritual. No form of cult to the high god is recorded. The women possessed a repertory of sacred songs, dedicated to Elal and to Moon and Sun and their daughter, that were transmitted matrilineally. The canonical and reduplicated form of periodic exhortations given before hunting expeditions, which were uttered loudly by the chief of the local group, suggests the transformation of an ancient prayer addressed to Elal, inventor of hunting weapons and techniques.

Moon is the feminine deity who rules over periodic and alternating processes: menstruation, gestation, the life cycle, and the tides. During the new moon and eclipses, the members of the community would assemble behind their tents looking to the east; the women intoned the song of the deity and addressed prayers to her, begging her to "return to illuminate the world," to grant them health, longevity, and good luck.

The song to the daughter of Sun and Moon was included in a rite for regulating high tide. This rite is related to an episode of Elal's cycle that associates the tides with the daughter's animistic states. According to it the goddess was transformed into a siren; her excitement over the maternal apparition was linked to high tide during the first quarter of the moon, and her unhappiness during the last quarter to low tide. The life cycle was marked by rites of passage: birth, puberty initiation, marriage, and death were culturally meaningful milestones. The events of the life of Elal symbolically reflect these experiences, suggesting in both instances evolutionary stages of understanding, with special powers gained at each stage.

The ritually and mythically significant classification of colors is based on the white-red-black triad. The highest opposition sets up white and black as symbols of life and death (or concealment), respectively. New-born babies were ritually painted white, while grave-diggers (a strictly female role) were painted black. The lowest opposition, according to a hypothesis formulated

by Carlos J. Gradin (1971, p. 113), contrasted the attraction of favorable aspects, denoted by white, with the rejection of the malefic, indicated by red; in contextual terms, however, the two colors complemented each other through their shared protective nature. Gradin's hypothesis reaffirms the sequence of colors used in therapeutic and funerary rites, where red accompanies the segregative phase, staving off the dangers entailed by impurity, and white accompanies the reincorporative phase, capturing the virtues to which a renewed condition allows one to aspire.

Pantheon. The Aónikenk deities' spheres of activity and their relationships of complementarity and exclusion present a confusing panorama, which I will attempt to clarify. Elsewhere, I have noted processes of superimposition and transposition of attributes from the high god to other deities (Siffredi, 1969–1970, p. 247): for example, Elal possesses omnipotence and creativity as well as characteristics of a culture hero, while atmospheric phenomena are assigned to Karuten ("thunder"), a being of the atmospheric sky who is subordinated to Elal. The role of judge of the dead is assigned to the dyadic deity High God/Seecho; the high god judges how well the ethical ideal has been realized by the deceased, while Seecho, the "old woman" goddess, seconds his judgment. She admits to the afterworld—the eastern celestial sky—those among the dead who have tattoos on their left forearms (formerly such tattoos were the mark of initiates) and throws into the ocean those who lack tattoos. The belief that the dead were reunited with Elal and the high god in the eastern celestial sky, a land that knows neither penury nor illness, was well established. Elal moved definitively there after finishing his acts on earth, mounted on the swan goddess Kukn, the young goddess who assists Elal in many of the cycle's most important events.

The dyad Elal/Kukn displays a similar structure to that of the dyad High God/Seecho. The connection and hierarchical relationship between both dyads appears in the fact that the genesis and permanence of Elal's and Kukn's powers are ascribed to the high god. The secondary role and the spatial liminality of both feminine deities—expressed by their placement in the atmospheric sky—symbolically confirms the social dominance of men. The resulting tetrad, articulated along the criteria of age and sex (Old God/Old Goddess—Young God/Young Goddess), suggestively resembles the composition of Araucanian divine tetrads. [See Mapuche Religion.]

A similar coincidence between Tehuelche and Araucanian belief can be seen in a dualism that goes back to the primary confrontation between high, portrayed by

the high god, and low, represented either by darkness (*tons*) or by the deep sea (*xóno*); high and low are the foundations of Order and Chaos. This dialectic extends over a vast semantic field in which roles, states, orientations, luminosity, numerical properties, zoological and color classifications, and behavioral and cognitive qualities converge. One pole links the celestial deities, life, healing, shamans, the masculine, east, day, evenness, water birds, herbivores, white, red, temperance, and wisdom—all of which contrast with the chthonic beings, death, illness, witches, the feminine, west, night, oddness, carrion birds, carnivores, animals that live in dens, fish and sea mammals, black, intemperance, and ignorance.

Mythology. The southern Tehuelche anthropogony includes motifs that relate to the differentiation of the human species and to the origin of copulation, marriage, and death. The beginning of Aónikenk people is accounted for in two ways. One is that Elal modeled male and female genitals out of clay into which he then blew the breath of life; another is that a role reversal between sea and land animals converted the former into the Aónikenk. Since land creatures were turned into marine fauna, the Aónikenk attribute the taboo on eating fish to this second mythical account.

The cosmogony recounts that the high god abandons his typical inactivity to begin the work of creation, which results from acts that are not always deliberate or conscious. One version of Aónikenk cosmogony contrasts the high god with *xóno*, the aquatic chaos that covered almost all primordial space except for a small piece of land in the valley of the Senguer River, in which the high god, little by little, grew larger. This region, the true "cosmic center," contains the palpable signs of divine action (i.e., certain topographical features) and is also the setting for the fabulous birth of Elal and for his acts on earth.

Manuel Llaras Samitier's versions of Aónikenk cosmogony (in Wilbert, 1984, pp. 17–18) contrast Kooch with *tons*, ubiquitous darkness. Saddened by his overwhelming solitude, Kooch's tears generate the "bitter sea" and his breath creates the wind that dispels darkness. The creation of Sun and Moon also plays a part in the darkness's attenuation. The amorous coupling and uncoupling of Sun and Moon evoke the rhythmic succession of darkness and light. Such images express the establishment of a temporal ordering by means of the alteration of day and night and of spatial ordering through the regulation of the cosmic elements: light, wind, and clouds.

The Cycle of Elal. Elal is the fruit of the union of antinomial conditions: his father, one of the chthonic

monsters engendered by *tons*, devours his pregnant mother, one of the clouds created by Kooch. Elal's maternal grandmother rescues and raises the newborn Elal. Two testimonies enlivened the Aónikenk's memories: a bottomless spring, risen from the corpse of the Cloud, Elal's mother, marks the spot where Elal was born, appropriately called Beautiful Water. The red dawns observed from high vantage points reaffirmed for the Aónikenk this primordial shedding of blood.

Elal symbolically represents a mediation between heavenly and chthonic, the mythical and the present era, nature and culture. His quasi-earthly condition is in harmony with the formation of a world on a human scale. His mediation of the chthonic realm, for purposes of giving it order, is evident in the battles against cannibalistic giants, whose peculiarity lay in the vulnerability of their heels, a complementary and converse trait to that shown by the solar people, whose mouths operate as anuses. Elal's slaying of the ogres, beginning with his own father, culminates in their petrification. They can thus be observed by the Aónikenk in the immutable form of rocks or fossil remains.

The mediation of the high aspect is developed during Elal's celestial journey to the region of Sun and Moon, his future in-laws. The couple show their hostility by assigning him to perform deadly trials for a three-day period—not unlike the Aónikenk's shaman's apprentice, who was required to spend three days of initiation in caves—before giving him their daughter. Unlike other suitors, Elal is able to carry out all the trials with the help of Kukn, the swan goddess.

In sociological terms, Elal's unsuccessful marriage to the daughter of Sun expresses the risks of extreme exogamy. Conversely, the cycle's next episode, in which Elal's grandmother attempts to seduce him, highlights the Aónikenk's abomination of incest in that the grandmother is transformed into a mouse and condemned to live underground. The gravity and eschatological meaning of this is supported by one old Aónikenk woman's assertion: "My grandmother trod on the mouse whenever she saw it, because it was to blame for the departure of her powerful grandson, whom she had raised."

The transition between the mythical and present eras is understood as the passage from predifferentiated to clearly defined reality. The Aónikenk believed that the earth emerged from the unformed sea, which was forced to the east by Elal's unfailing arrows. Elal's comings and goings from west to east, resembling the Aónikenk's seasonal migrations, endowed their habitat with the contrasting topography of mountains, woods, plateaus, valleys, lakes, rivers, and islands. The image of an almost empty sky is opposed to that of one peopled

with constellations representing earthly animals and objects, a tradition shared by many hunting peoples. Molded by Elal, the constellations constitute visible guides for human action.

The schism between animal, human, and divine natures is marked by the confinement of each to a defined sphere. Although there is room for mediation between these spheres through shamans and witches, easy communication disappears after the mythical era. A rock with the imprints of Sun's feet—probably a reference to the petroglyphs of the "footprint style" (2500 BCE) of southern Patagonian rupestrian art (Gradin, 1971, p. 114)—locates the site where Sun, exiled by Elal, was supposed to have helped himself up in order to climb to the sky.

Temporally, the homogeneity of the original, predifferentiated reality—eternal life, continuing winter, and the unformed sea—is contrasted with the periodicity and alternation suggested by the appearance of the driving forces of the cycle of death and reproduction, of seasonality (and each season's specific activities), and the movements of the tides. In ontological terms, the lack of differentiation between the many primordial beings and things—indicated by their shared humanoid condition—is set against the delineation of specific identities. On a sociological plane, the antisocial and incestuous nature—or the "meanness"—of the primordial humanoids is contrasted with human sociability based on the adequate sharing of goods, collaboration in hunting, sexual division of labor based on complementarity, prohibition of incest, and the exogamy of the local group. On an ethical plane, the formation of an Aónikenk ideal focused on courage, industriousness, tolerance, hospitality, respect for the property of others, and reserve in front of outsiders.

Conclusion. We are now witnessing the deplorable annihilation of this ethical ideal, extending throughout the southern Tehuelche religious system. Although in mythical terms the Aónikenk recognized the shock of the changes wrought by Europeans and their own consequent frustration, they did so merely by becoming aware of, and not by actively resolving, the conflict.

The absence of revivalist or revitalizing reactions would have been compensated for, at the very least, by mythical reflection on the meanings of alcoholism, of being deprived of their hunting lands, and of having to submit to foreign power. Incorporated as part of the cycle of Elal, the Aónikenk's great penury is reflected in the final impotence of the once-powerful deity. Thus one sees a religiosity that, since it is unable to form new relationships, is signaling the demise of its foundations as a rationale for cultural practice.

I hope in this article to have begun to fulfill, in at least a limited fashion, the mission entrusted by the last of the Aónikenk: that of revealing and spreading their "Word," which they knew would outlast their own lifetime and that of their gods, annihilated by history.

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The cultural links between certain southern Tehuelche, northern Tehuelche, and Selk'nam (Ona) mythic themes are outlined by Marcelo Bórmida and me in "Mitología de los Tehuelches meridionales," *Runa: Archivo para las ciencias del hombre* (Buenos Aires) 12 (1969–1970): 199–245. For a comparison of these elements with those contained in the anthropogonies of the Gran Chaco, see Edgardo J. Cordeu's and my "En torno a algunas coherencias formales de las antropogonías del Chaco y Patagonia," *Relaciones de la Sociedad Argentina de Antropología* 5 (1970): 3–10. An interesting literary analysis that excerpts an episode from the cycle of Elal and reformulates it in its context was done by Juan Adolfo Vázquez in "Nacimiento e infancia de Elal: Mitoanálisis de un texto Tehuelche meridional," *Revista iberoamericana* (Pittsburgh) 95 (April–June 1976): 201–216. For a typological-comparative analysis of the deities and hierophanies and a summary exposition of the rites of passage and shamanistic and witchcraft conceptions and practices, see my "Hierofanías y concepciones mítico-religiosas de los Tehuelches meridionales," *Runa: Archivo para las ciencias del hombre* 12 (1969–1970): 247–271. Carlos J. Gradin makes many valid suggestions on the magico-religious meaning of southern Patagonian rupestrian art in "A propósito del arte rupertre en Patagonia meridional," *Anales de arqueología y etnología* (Cuyo, Argentina) 26 (1971): 111–116. A reconstruction of the mythico-religious components of the Aónikenk habitat can be found in my own "Aspectos mítico-religiosos de los Tehuelches meridionales (Aonik'enk): El Habitat," *Boletín del Centro Argentino de Estudios Americanos* (Buenos Aires) 1 (January–April 1968): 49–54.

ALEJANDRA SIFFREDI

Translated from Spanish by Erica Meltzer

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, PIERRE (1881–1955), paleontologist, philosopher, and theologian. Born near Clermont-Ferrand, France, Pierre was the fourth of eleven children of a wealthy gentleman farmer; his mother was the great-grandniece of Voltaire. Teilhard entered the Society of Jesus in 1899. Between 1905 and 1908 he taught at the Jesuit secondary school in Cairo, and it was in the Egyptian desert that he began his lifelong study of minerals and fossils. Following his ordination to the priesthood in 1911, he pursued doctoral studies in geology and paleontology at the Sorbonne. These studies were interrupted in 1914 by World War I, in which he served as a stretcher-bearer, and they were not completed until 1922, when he was appointed to the chair of geology at the Institut Catholique in Paris. In 1925 the Jesuit superior general removed him from this position because of a paper he wrote on the relation of evolution to the doctrine of original sin. Considered henceforth by the Vatican to be a dangerous innovator, he was forbidden to publish anything of a philosophical or religious nature, and he was exiled to China. There he remained for twenty years, exploring with fellow Jesuit scientists the vast geological resources around Tientsin and Peking.

Teilhard's scientific writings, which now fill ten large volumes, brought him into contact with the leading paleontologists of the day and involved him in numerous expeditions, including the one that discovered the skull of the 200,000-year-old Peking Man at Chou-k'ou-tien. After World War II he returned to Paris, where he became director of research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. In 1948 he was asked to be a candidate for the chair of paleontology at the Collège de France, but his superior general, fearing adverse publicity and further difficulties with the Vatican because of Teilhard's ideas on evolution, refused permission. In 1951 Teilhard settled in New York at the invitation of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, subsequently making two trips to fossil sites in South Africa. Between 1916 and 1955 he wrote three books and a great number of essays on the philosophical and religious meaning of evolution and on Christian spirituality, all of which were finally published in fifteen volumes following his death in New York on Easter Sunday 1955.

Beginning in 1955, with the French publication of his two major works, *The Phenomenon of Man* and *The Divine Milieu*, Teilhard's fame grew rapidly as volume after volume of his philosophical and religious writings appeared in many languages. These showed him to be a thinker of extraordinary breadth and originality who wanted to reconcile evolution with Christian faith and

to respond to what he insisted was our century's most pressing human need: hope for the future.

Teilhard's overall system of thought seeks to elaborate, on three different levels, a guarantee for the human future. On the first, or scientific, level Teilhard considers what has been happening over the centuries to the phenomenon of life. His master idea, his law of complexity-consciousness, is that in all life the more developed consciousness will always be found, by observation, to correspond with the more complex organic structure. Applied to human beings, where the most complex organism (the human brain) corresponds to the most sophisticated consciousness (reflection), this law shows that change in the universe, over millions of years, has been directional, that is, oriented toward the human person as goal and therefore toward human consciousness, thought, and love. He asks, should we not, as a species, presume that these forces of directional change will continue to move us toward future goals?

On his second, or philosophical, level Teilhard analyzes more precisely the changes now taking place in the human being. We should not suppose, he says, that evolutionary development ceased once it crossed the first threshold of reflection into the sphere of *Homo sapiens*. Significant directional change is still going on, no longer in the biosphere but in the sphere of human mind and thought, the "noosphere." The social phenomenon is the culmination, not the attenuation, of the biological phenomenon, and the same energy that originally unified molecules continues now to operate among human beings as "love energy." This human energy unifies the species by tightening humanity like a coil closer and closer around the surface of the earth, heightening the psychic temperature of the noosphere and moving persons toward an ever greater sharing of thought and consciousness. For Teilhard, human progress is synonymous with this growth in consciousness: millions of years hence, the capacity for love and union should have its outcome at the converging point of the coil, where the unifying tension in the human psyche reaches its maximum and pushes the species across a second threshold of reflection into a collective and interpersonal act of reflection.

Teilhard was forced by his critics to admit that such progress would not necessarily be moral progress, since evolution at the human level contains within itself a profound ambiguity: growth in the capacity for love and union means growth also in the capacity to refuse both. He had to find some assurance of support for the frailty of human love, some guarantee that human beings will use their freedom well. This led him to postulate a personal source of love outside the evolutionary

process, one that is "loving and lovable at this very moment." Such a transcendent absolute, which he named Omega, would activate the love energy of the world and so bring the evolutionary movement to successful completion.

This second guarantee for the human future, however, was for Teilhard a philosophical hypothesis and conjecture, and so he was forced to move to the third level of his thought, that of Christian theology, to find an ultimate source of hope for the species. At this stage, Teilhard identifies the Christ of revelation with the Omega of evolution, and by so doing gives to human progress not some vague completion but the well-defined reality of the historical Jesus, whose second coming in the Parousia has always been for Christians the goal of God's creation.

Teilhard's method on this third level was to compare the data from two sources of knowledge, that of Christian faith, concerning the person and mission of Jesus, and that of science, concerning evolution. What he found was not just intellectual coherence but also important consequences for human living because Christianity teaches that God entered into human history, through the Incarnation, in order to redeem and transform humankind at the end of time. Christ's relationship to the species is thus somehow a physical relationship, a position emphasized by the doctrine of the Eucharist and by the cosmic role of Christ in the writings of Paul and in the Greek patristic tradition. For Teilhard, this means that Christ is both the physical center of the evolutionary movement and its Omega, the source of that love energy needed for the process to reach its eventual goal in the Parousia. Teilhard thus derived a spiritual vision of creation and creativity in which human beings are summoned to collaborate with God's creative action in and through dedication to the human task; for efforts to build the earth also build up the body of Christ, who by his redemptive death and resurrection has triumphed over the passivity of life and the mystery of evil. Ultimately it is on this Christian promise of an unlimited future that Teilhard built his confidence in the final success of evolution.

Teilhard, with something like a sense of mission, sought to assuage modern anxiety by helping others to see what he saw, and he strongly opposed any theology that fostered mistrust of the world and separation from its life and creativity. His greatest influence, both within and outside of institutional religion, has been and continues to be among those who resonate with Teilhard's own faith experience. His thought has been important enough to elicit serious criticism, in particular the charge that his theories of evolution are not sci-

entifically verifiable and that his religious convictions regarding human freedom are overly optimistic.

[For another assessment of Teilhard's relation to evolutionary theory, see Evolution.]

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CHRISTOPHER F. MOONEY, S.J.

TEKAKWITHA, KATERI (c. 1656–1680), native American convert to Christianity. Tekakwitha was born in the Iroquoian town of Gandahouhague, near present-day Fonda, New York. Her father was Mohawk, and her mother Algonquin, a captive adopted into the Turtle clan after a raid. When she was four years old Tekakwitha survived an attack of smallpox that killed her immediate family. The disease weakened her eyesight, and she afterward exhibited a general tendency to withdraw from social contact. By 1667, when Tekakwitha first encountered Jesuit missionaries, she was already inclined to a way of life that Christianity sanctioned. Indian townspeople exerted strong pressure to make her conform to native ways, but she persisted in her new interest. This determination culminated on Easter Day, 1676, when she was baptized by Jacques de Lamber-ville, S.J. The following year, local opposition to her Catholicism mounted, and she fled the region to take refuge with other Catholic Indians living along the Saint Lawrence River in Upper Canada.

Tekakwitha settled at Caughnawaga, or La Prairie de la Madeleine, an intertribal village of Christian Indians bound together more by religious allegiance than by tribal heritage. There she quickly established a reputation for austere self-denial and pious virtue. From her First Communion at Christmas, 1677, until her death

less than three years later, the maiden impressed all about her with her modest fervor and ardent prayers. Beset with a frail constitution, she worked as best she could in village gardens, fasted two days a week, administered flagellations, and kept a private vow of chastity. In 1678 she began a quasi convent patterned after the Hospital Sisters of Montreal, but such rigors hastened her own end. Her death enhanced local stories about her exemplary conduct, and Indian as well as French neighbors made a shrine of her gravesite. Many were inspired by her extraordinary life, and in 1932 she was nominated for sainthood. On 22 October 1980 John Paul II pronounced her blessed, thus acknowledging her as an example of Catholic piety in colonial New France.

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HENRY WARNER BOWDEN

TEKKE. See Khānaqah.

TELEVISION. See Religious Broadcasting.

TEMPLE. [This entry surveys forms of religious architecture known as temples and the related buildings that constitute temple compounds:

Hindu Temples
Buddhist Temple Compounds
Taoist Temple Compounds
Confucian Temple Compounds
Ancient Near Eastern and
Mediterranean Temples
Mesoamerican Temples

For discussion of the history, institution, and architecture of the Jerusalem Temple, see Biblical Temple. For discussion of Jewish houses of worship, see Synagogue. See also Architecture.]

Hindu Temples

"The Indian temple, an exuberant growth of seemingly haphazard and numberless forms," wrote Stella Kramrisch in 1922, "never loses control over its extravagant wealth. Their organic structure is neither derived from any example seen in nature, nor does it merely do justice to aesthetic consideration, but it visualizes the cosmic force which creates innumerable forms, and these are one whole, and without the least of them the universal harmony would lack completeness" ("The Ex-

pressiveness of Indian Art," *Journal of the Department of Letters*, University of Calcutta, 9, 1923, p. 67). This intuitive understanding of the temple's structure and significance has been fleshed out and confirmed by Kramrisch and others in the years since those words were penned.

Axis, Altar, and Enclosure. Hindu temples are built to shelter images that focus worship; they also shelter the worshiper and provide space for a controlled ritual. Between the fifth and the fifteenth century CE, Hindu worshippers constructed stone temples throughout India, but sacred enclosures of another sort had been built centuries before. Tree shrines and similar structures that enclose an object for worship (tree, snake, *liṅga*, pillar, standing *yakṣa*, all marked by a vertical axis) within a square railing, or later within more complicated hypaethral structures, have been illustrated in narrative relief-sculptures from the first few centuries BCE and CE (see figure 1). Whatever the variations, these structures mark a nodal point of manifestation, as does Viṣṇu in reliefs from the fifth century CE that show him lying on the cosmic ocean, with a lotus that springs from his navel supporting Brahmā, who proceeds to generate the universe.

In creation myths and in the imagery of the lotus, as in the structure of Mauryan monolithic pillars (from the third century BCE), the cosmic axis separates heaven from the waters. Creation flows from this nodal point toward the cardinal directions, producing a universe

that is square, marked by the railing-enclosure of these early shrines, by the *harmikā* (upper platform) of the Buddhist stupa, and by the edges of the brick altar used for sacrifice. The *Āpastamba Śulbasūtra*, a text probably of the fourth century BCE, comments that "though all the earth is *vedi* ['altar'], yet selecting a particular part of it and measuring it they should perform the *yajña* ['sacrifice'] there" (6.2.4). The identity of the altar and the entirety of creation is thus established quite early, and this configuration of vertical axis, square altar, and enclosure persists in Indian architecture to demonstrate the participation of each monument in the cosmogonic process.

Diagram of Construction. The *Vāstupuruṣa Maṇḍala*—the square diagram on which the altar, temples, houses, palaces, and cities are founded—also outlines creation (see figure 2). The myth of the *vāstupuruṣa* portrays the first sacrifice, in which a demon is flayed and his skin held down by divinities who ring the diagram (*padadevatās*; lit., "feet deities"). In the center is the "place for *brahman*"—the formless, ultimate, "supreme reality." The use of this diagram for the construction of houses and the laying out of cities on a grid of eighty-one squares (nine by nine) is recorded in a chapter on architecture in Varāhamihira's sixth-century CE text, the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā*; the use of a grid of sixty-four squares (eight by eight) as a special case for the construction of temples (figure 2) is recorded in a separate chapter.




FIGURE 1. Early Buddhist Tree Shrine (*Bodhighara*). Drawing after a relief; Amarāvati, Andhra Pradesh; third to second centuries BCE.

Roga	A-	Mu-	Bhal-	So-	Bhu-	Adi-	Diti
Pāp.	hi	khya	lāṭa	ma	jaya	ti	Agni
Śo sa		Rājay	Prthvidhara		Āpah		Parjanya
Asara		Rud-			Apav-		Jayanta
Varuṇa		Mi-	Brahman		Arya-		Indra
Kusumad		tra	Brahman		man		Sūrya
Sugrīva		Jaya	Vivasvant		Sav		Satya
		Indra			Sāvīt		
Dauvār		Gan-	Ya-	Brhat-	Vila-		Bhr̥sa
		Bhr̥ga-			Pā-		
Pit	rāja	dharva	ma	ksata	tha	san	Antar
Mrga							Anila

FIGURE 2. *Vāstupuruṣamaṇḍala*. Ritual diagram for temple construction as described in Varāhamihira's *Bṛhat Saṃhitā*; sixth century CE.

Cave, Mountain, and Shelter. By the early centuries CE the use of anthropomorphic images to focus worship had moved from “substratum” cults into mainstream Hinduism and into Buddhism. Early Hindu images often represented cosmic parturition—the coming into present existence of a divine reality that otherwise remains without form—as well as “meditational constructs,” to use T. S. Maxwell’s phrase. The representation of the Buddha became permissible with the emergence of two new conceptions: the Buddha in cosmic form, replacing or supplementing the stupa as focus for meditation, and the *bodhisattvas*, figures who mediate between the aspirant and the ultimate reality of nonexistence. Behind anthropomorphic imagery in India, however, is always an ultimate reality without form.

Early shelters for anthropomorphic images were of several types: apsidal brick structures resembling the *caitya-gṛhas* of the Buddhists, elliptical structures perhaps suggesting the “cosmic egg,” open altars and hypaethral structures (both extending earlier aniconic formulas), small stone *chatris* (umbrellas or pavilions), cave shrines, and eventually temples with towers. Rock-cut shrines of the early fifth century CE (particularly those at Udayagiri, near Vidiśa, in central India), present two imperative metaphors for the temple: the sanctum as womb (*garbha*) in which the seed of divinity can be made manifest, and the temple as mountain. As the cave opens up the earth, so the sanctum opens up the temple.

If existing cave shrines emphasize the cave metaphor, an inscription dated 423/4 CE from Gaṅgadhāra in western India already compares a temple there to “the lofty peak (*sikhara*) of the mountain Kailāśa,” and the so-called Pārvatī Temple at Nachna of about 465 CE ornamentally rusticates its exterior walls to suggest Kailāśa’s piled rocks and animal-filled grottoes. The metaphors of cave and mountain for sanctum and temple are explicit in inscriptions and texts, but it is the concept of divinity made manifest and the practice of devotional worship (*bhakti*) that make the temple possible. The cosmic mountain and its womb/cave ultimately shelter a tender divinity, in the form of an image, and must open out to include and give shelter to the worshiper, who approaches the central point of cosmic manifestation along a longitudinal axis.

Iconicity of Architectural Form. In North India, the fifth century CE saw experimentation in the means by which architecture could supply shelter to images. Small cave shelters were excavated (Udayagiri), cave-like cells were constructed (Sāñcī), structures with towers were built in impermanent materials (Gaṅgadhāra), and stone “mountains” were built (as at Nachna) with

cavelike sanctums. Some temples began to show multiple and variant images of the central divinity on the walls (Maḍhia), and others became complexes by adding subsidiary shrines to shelter other deities (Bhumara, Deogarh). Such a proliferation of images can be seen as a product of the Hindu conception of cosmic parturition: if divine reality is formless, through the process of creation it takes an infinity of forms in this (created) world; though the individual may choose one divinity as “trunk” for worship, others take up appropriate positions as “branches.”

Only in the sixth century did such experiments lead to a North Indian temple form that was complete in its symbolism and architectural definition. On plan, the North Indian temple grows from the Vāstupuruṣa Maṅḍala (see figure 2): its corners are those of the square *vedi*; its walls are half the width of the sanctum in thickness (as prescribed in the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā*); at its center is the *brahmasthāna*. The outer walls begin to acquire projecting planes that measure the dimensions of the interior sanctum and the “place for *brahman*”. The central projections on the wall now and then show closed doorways but most often frame secondary images (*parśvadevatās*) that extend and differentiate the form of the divinity within. In elevation, these planes continue up through the superstructure as bands that curve in to meet a square slab at the top of the temple, from which a circular necking projects (see figure 3). The necking supports a large, circular, ribbed stone (*āmalaka*) that takes the form of an *āmala* fruit and normally is crowned by a stone waterpot (*kalaśa*) from which leaves sometimes sprout.

The imagery (and its iconicity) is explicit. Just as the block of the temple’s walls projects planes outward in order to display the images that make its sacred content manifest (see figure 3), so too the temple “grows” in altitude, marking the process of cosmic parturition by its form. The womb of the temple, its sanctum (*garbhagṛha*), provides the dimension for an *uttaravedi* (“upper altar”) that terminates the tower (some seventh-century shrines show this altar as a shallow, pillared platform at the top of the curvilinear superstructure). Extending the dimensions of the *brahmasthāna*, the necking above this *vedi* takes the form of the emerging “world pillar” (*axis mundi*), which passes symbolically through the sanctum with the body of the temple as its sheath.

As North Indian architecture evolves between the sixth and the thirteenth centuries, the plan of the temple shows more and more offsets, the walls gain more images, and the central tower of the temple becomes clustered by other, miniature towers, increasingly giving the effect of a mountain peak through specifically architectural means. If this variety of constructional




FIGURE 3. *Brahmesvara Temple*. Elevation and axonometric diagram; Bhubaneswar, Orissa; c. eleventh century CE.

forms, buttresses, and images “body” forth reality in the manifest world, the ribbed *amala* stone at the top of the temple, much like the staff that sprouts in *Tannhäuser*, presents the ripening seed’s potentiality for fruition. Both the pot with germinating seeds that is buried under the foundation and the vase finial placed on top of the temple as an act of final consecration ritually help to perpetuate cycles of cosmic growth and fruition.

Palace, Hut, and Fortress. The temple thus combines physically the pillar that marks the axis of cosmic par-turition, the altar of sacrifice taking the shape of the created universe, and the need for shelter of the tender divinity and the human worshiper; it unites the cosmic mountain and potent cave. South Indian temples, built in stone from the seventh century CE, give emphasis to the temple’s role as shelter for anthropomorphic divinities by retaining throughout their evolution a terraced, palatial form crowned by a domed *sikhara* that has the shape of the ascetic’s hut (see figure 4). As early as the Ājīvika caves in the Barabār Hills of Bihar, dating from the third century BCE, the hut of the living ascetic had

been an architectural form appropriate for presenting the concept of sacred potentiality.

The temple is called *prāsāda* (“palace”) in North India, and the architectural veneer of its superstructure, in both north and south, allude to forms of palace architecture. In the north, these have been completely subordinated to the temple’s vertical ascent, becoming body for the altar that still presents itself at the top of the temple, open to the sky. In the south, deities sheltered within the temple’s compact, palace-like structure increasingly took on the accoutrements of a secular ruler, through ritual and the cycle of festivals. While divinity in the form of images (*mūrtis*) could take on qualities of royalty, and kings did validate their role by patronage of temples, the king was considered a reflection of divine order principally through the quality of his actions and the nature of his responsibilities, not by divine right.

If the temple is palace for divinity, it also is fortress, protecting the world from disorder and chaos. Corners are “attended with evils” according to the *Bṛhat Saṃhitā* (53.84), and “the householder, if he is anxious to be happy, should carefully preserve Brahman, who is stationed in the center of the dwelling, from injury” (53.66). In the Puranic legend of Śiva conquering the three worlds, he frees three “cities” of demons, making them his devotees and transforming the cities into his temples. In fact, images of Guardians of the Quarters (*dikpālas*) are placed on the corners of temples from about the seventh century, and a number of geometric




FIGURE 4. *Dharmarāja Ratha*. Axonometric diagram; Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu; late seventh century CE.

experiments with plans based on the rotation of squares seem to play on the fort as a form for temple architecture.

Large temples in South India often enclose the sanctum in a series of ambulatory paths and walls that simulate rings of fortification around a walled city, and in fact use the eighty-one-square *maṇḍala* appropriate for the city, with a single square at the center surrounded by concentric rings of squares, to define the temple's plan. If practice in South India increasingly emphasized the royal personality of the divinity and his relation to his subjects and kingdom by use of great festival processions, it also began to surround temples and contiguous sections of the city with walls pierced by gateways (*gopuras*) that became the focus of patronage themselves.

Access and Aspirant. The Hindu temple must also act as access and approach for aspirants and worshipers. This role changes the temple from a centralized, bilaterally symmetrical structure (reflecting the nature of the cosmogonic process) to one with a defined longitudinal axis. On that axis the worshipers approach their personal divinity within the sanctum; but also on that axis the aspirants increasingly can place themselves, in halls built for that purpose, as if under the umbrella of the sacrificer, positioning themselves for ascent. "The whole intention of the Vedic tradition and of the sacrifice is to define the Way (*mārga*) by which the aspirant . . . can ascend [the three] worlds," wrote Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. "Earth, Air, and Sky . . . compose the vertical Axis of the Universe . . . [These are] the Way by which the Devas first strode up and down these worlds . . . and the Way for the Sacrificer now to do likewise" ("*Svayamātr̥ṇṇā: Janua Coeli*," in *Coomaraswamy*, vol. 1, *Selected Papers: Traditional Art and Symbolism*, ed. Roger Lipsey, Princeton, 1977, pp. 465–467, 470). The temple is as much a monument to the procession of time as it is a static model of the cosmos or a marker of its origin. *Padadevatās* ringing the *Vāstumaṇḍala* (grid) are identified with the asterisms (*nakṣatras*) of the lunar calendar, and the temple both helps generate and acts as a focus for the ritual time of the festival calendar. Personal ritual within the temple involves both approach and circumambulation, and movement by the aspirant through time toward release had to be a recognized part of the architect's program for the temple.

All sides of the temple allow access to the divinity through imagery, but the entry that pierces and makes ritual approach possible, most frequently on the east, is given increasing importance and architectural definition as temples evolve. Halls for ritual and assembly are added along this axis and sometimes used for dance or music to entertain the divinity, but often they serve

simply as shelters for approach. One common and potent configuration places the sanctum (sometimes surrounded by an enclosed ambulatory path) behind a closed hall that may also be fronted by an open hall and an entry pavilion.

In the *Kaṇḍariya Mahādeva Temple* at Khajuraho (c. 1025–1050), for example, space for the worshiper within the closed hall takes the same dimensions as the sanctum, with parallel rings of the *maṇḍala* defining walls of the sanctum, the space within the hall, ambulatory walls, and the outer enclosure (see figure 5). Ceilings in such halls imitate the canopy over the ritual sacrificer; this intention is made architecturally clear in some cases by having a separately defined pavilion within the




FIGURE 5. *Kaṇḍariya Mahādeva Temple*. Ground plan with proportioning grid; Khajuraho, Madhya Pradesh; c. 1025–1050.

hall over the central platform, as at Sinnar in Maharashtra or at the great Jain temple at Ranakpur. The ritual fire can be placed in this position, and worshipers gather there as much to carry out ritual as to face the image of the deity.

The Temple in the Human Image. In such an architectural context, *yogin* and god are equal participants: the place of divine manifestation and the path of the aspirant have been given consubstantiality along the temple's longitudinal axis; sanctum and sacrificer's space both have become altars manifesting supreme reality in human form. In the Hindu temple, the axis of cosmic creation and the ritual path for release of the aspirant/worshiper/sacrificer (*yajamāna*) meet; the temple shares in the image of the "Supernal Man" (Puruṣa). As Kramrisch has written, "Puruṣa, which is beyond form, is the impulse towards manifestation" ("The Temple as Puruṣa," in *Studies in Indian Temple Architecture*, ed. Pramod Chandra, New Delhi, 1975, p. 40). This is true whether that manifestation is of the cosmos, of divine forms, or of human potential.

[See also Maṇḍalas, article on Hindu Maṇḍalas, and Iconography, article on Hindu Iconography.]

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MICHAEL W. MEISTER

Buddhist Temple Compounds

During the life of the Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE), he and his disciples were sheltered by lay followers near various urban centers in North India. After his death, according to Buddhist tradition, his body was given royal cremation, and relics were distributed among eight city-states, which then established royal burial mounds (stupas) incorporating these relics in order to memorialize him. Two centuries later the Mauryan emperor Aśoka (ruled 273–236 BCE) is said to have reopened these stupas to distribute the relics more widely in his attempt to spread the Buddha's teachings; Buddhist tradition relates that Aśoka established eighty-four thousand stupas throughout his empire. [See the biography of Aśoka.]

Compounds in South and Southeast Asia. Though shelters for the monks and stupas as monuments to memorialize the Buddha and his teaching defined the physical requirements of Buddhist architecture for many centuries, symbolic and ritual requirements gradually transformed such elements into what properly can be called Buddhist temple compounds.

Stupas and stupa-shrines. A stupa originally was used to mark the relics of the Buddha or of one of his principal disciples, significant objects (such as his begging bowl), or places related to his life or sanctified by his presence. At the same time, however, the structure of such a memorial stupa incorporated cosmogonic and cosmological references as to a point or place of cosmic origination (the egg, *aṇḍa*), to a vertical axis marking cosmic parturition, and to the cardinal orientation of the created universe. Rituals related to such cosmogonic and cosmological beliefs must have been carried out around large stupas such as those constructed at Sāñcī (see figure 1), Taxila, or Amarāvati. Small stupas were often used as votive markers of a follower's devotion, set up by laity as well as by members of the Buddha's order (*saṃgha*). A major complex such as that at Sāñcī grew to include large stupas, monastic establishments, clusters of votive monuments, and eventually temples enshrining objects intended for devotional worship.

Initially, the Buddha himself, as a great teacher who had transcended the cycle of birth and rebirth through his teachings, was not the focus of devotional practice. The stupa, however, standing both for his presence and for a Buddhist and Indian conception of universal or-




FIGURE 1. *Stupa*. Stupa 1, Sāñcī, Madhya Pradesh, India. Elevation shows (1) *chatravāli* (umbrellas); (2) *yaṣṭi* (pillar); (3) *vedikā* (railings); (4) *aṇḍa* (lit., "egg," i.e., the dome); (5) *uṣṇīṣa* (coping); (6) *medhi* (platform); (7) *sopāna* (stairway); (8) *toraṇa* (gate); and (9) *stambha* (pillar).

der, took on its own devotional aspect; shelters were constructed for the stupa and its worshipers, as in the structural stupa-shrine at Bairat or the excavated (rock-carved) stupa-houses (*caityagr̥ha*) at Guntupalli (see figure 2) and Junnar.

From these early enclosed stupas evolved a major type of Buddhist structure, the *caitya* hall, housing an object used as a focus for worship (*caitya*). These *caitya* halls are typically apsidal structures with a central nave and side aisles; a stupa is placed prominently (and mysteriously) in the apse. The structural examples are




FIGURE 2. *Rock-cut Stupa Shelter (Caityagr̥ha)*. Guntupalli, Andhra Pradesh, India; c. first century BCE.

known only from their foundations, but a number of rock-carved *caitya* halls survive in the western Ghat Mountains.

The earliest of these, at Bhājā and Bedsa, date from the second or first centuries BCE; the largest, at Kārli, from the first century CE; the latest, at Ellora, from perhaps the early seventh century CE. Located on trade routes and patronized by merchants and others from nearby urban centers, these large establishments also provided monastic cells for wandering monks and abbots and sheltered pilgrims and travelers. At Bhājā, the abbot's cave has a veranda guarded by large images of the sun and rain gods, Sūrya and Indra; the individual monastic cells at Kaṇherī, scattered across a hillside outside of Bombay, have stone beds and pillows, verandas and grilled windows, each carefully located to take advantage of views through the neighboring hills to the harbor beyond.

In early centuries of the common era, much sectarian debate occurred within Buddhism over the role of the stupa—whether its function was primarily votive, memorial, or cultic. The concept of the transcendent Buddha with emissaries (*bodhisattvas*) to assist the devotee led to the introduction of images of the Buddha for worship; at the site of Nāgārjunikoṇḍa (third–fourth centuries CE) excavations have revealed a complex that combines a large, freestanding stupa, a monastic dormitory (*vihāra*), and a pair of apsidal *caitya* halls facing each other, with a stupa in one apse and an image of the Buddha in the other. In the fifth-century *caitya* halls excavated at the great Buddhist cave site of Ajantā, an image of the Buddha, placed against the apse-stupa as if emerging from it, is a standard part of the complex. In cave 29, a gigantic image of the Buddha, reclining at

the moment of his death and transcendence, fills one side of the cave as well.

Ajantā has more than thirty-two rock-cut Buddhist caves placed along the face of a horseshoe-shaped gorge; several date between the first century BCE and the first century CE. Two of these early caves and two dating from the fifth century CE are *caitya* halls; the remainder take a *vihāra* form. The concept of a cosmic Buddha, still accessible to his monastic aspirants, led to a significant change in the nature of such a Buddhist establishment, however. [See also Stupa Worship.]

Monasteries and monastic shrines. For many centuries after the death of the Buddha, monastic retreats were principally provided for the assembly of monks during the rainy season, but such places took on other functions over time, becoming retreats for lay travelers and eventually centers for learning. Foundations at Taxila in the northwest and at the important Buddhist university of Nālandā in Bihar show monastic complexes in the shape of rectilinear compounds with cells enclosing a central shared court. Monks lived in these cells much as students live in a Banaras Hindu University dormitory today.

Early monastic caves, carved in conjunction with major *caitya* halls (as at Bhājā and Kārli), show cells arranged along verandas set into the surface of the rock. Gradually such rock-carved sites began to mimic constructed monastic compounds, with cells surrounding an "open" court encased in the rock (the actual cave ceilings over these courts were painted to resemble cloth coverings hung as shelters from sun and rain).

At Ajantā, side by side with fifth-century CE apsidal *caitya* halls, members of the royal Vākāṭaka court had similar monastic caves excavated but added to them an enlarged cell on axis with the cave entrance (see figure 3), in which an image of the cosmic Buddha was enshrined. These caves served as votive "temples" donated by the Vākāṭaka kings and their ministers.

Temples. Bodh Gayā, the site in Bihar at which the historical Buddha is said to have achieved enlightenment, clearly reflects successive changes in Buddhist belief and practice. Under the present Bodhi Tree rests a stone altar set up in the time of Aśoka Maurya to mark the place of the Buddha's enlightenment. The tree and altar are surrounded by a modern railing, but railing pieces from the Śuṅga period (second to first centuries BCE) remain nearby. Such open enclosures set around objects of worship (trees, pillars, images of nature spirits, stupas) represent pre-Buddhist practices that were absorbed into the iconography of popular Buddhism. Set next to the tree shrine is a large brick temple, pyramidal in shape, its surface ornamented to suggest a multiterraced palatial structure. By the sixth




FIGURE 3. *Vihāra Cave with Shrine*. Ground plan of Cave 1, Ajantā, Maharashtra, India; late fifth century CE.

century CE, a large image of the Buddha had been enshrined within it for worship. (The image on a second-century CE terra-cotta plaque from Kumrāhār suggests that a shrine in the same form was already there by that period.) Though such a structure was based exclusively on Indian palatial forms, its conceptualization already suggests a model for the later pagoda temples that range from Nepal through East Asia, although these draw on a different architectural language for their sheltering roofs.

Terraced "temples" of a different sort were built across North India, most notably at Kumrāhār, Paharpur, and Lauṛīya-Nandangaṛh. These structures, suggesting temple-mountains, featured cruciform bases with reentrant angles, on which stood either stupas or temple structures. The temples, and sometimes the stupas, had shrines facing the cardinal directions. The great terraced temple at Paharpur was also set within an enormous monastic court.

The most extensive representation of such terraced temple structures is found among the monuments scattered across the vast plains of Burma, particularly at Pagan. The Ānanda Temple there has a cruciform plan, interior ambulatories, and a central templelike superstructure dating originally from the early eleventh century.

Cosmological compounds. The grandest expression of such an architectural conception within the Buddhist tradition, and one that reflects an increasingly perceived relationship between a manifest cosmic order and the responsibilities of Buddhism to provide visible aids to the aspirant struggling toward release, was the monument at Borobudur in Java, begun in the eighth century. Though we are told that the compound underwent four periods of construction, with changing, possibly even conflicting, conceptions of its final design, one overriding metaphysical interpretation seems ultimately to emerge. In the opinion of most scholars, its five square terraced galleries covered by sculpture and its three upper circular terraces set with seventy-two perforated stupas and crowned by a solid stupa (with two empty chambers) were meant to incorporate and represent a Buddhist metaphysics, both cosmological and ontological, through which aspirants could ultimately find their way to release. In Cambodia, where Khmer rulers patronized both Hindu and Buddhist structures, the association of the king with the *bodhisattva* Lokeśvara reflected the former's role as representative of such a cosmic order on earth.

From their simple beginnings as shelters for aspiring monks and structures to memorialize a past teacher, Buddhist compounds became cosmogonic and cosmological monuments, accommodating both state structures and lay rituals, and eventually restoring the Buddha to his worshipers as a cosmic presence, accessible to monks and laity for devotion as well as instruction. Indeed, they became institutions to mold human aspiration as permanent in form as the urban society the Buddha once had renounced. This transformation reflected the strength, pragmatism, and flexibility of the Buddha's teachings and provides us some explanation for the success of Buddhism's great missionary expansion from India into other parts of the Asian world.

Expansion into East Asia. Buddhist architecture first appears in East Asia some seven or eight centuries after the birth of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni and several hundred years later than the initial construction of Indian Buddhist stupas and worship halls in the first century BCE. The transmission of Buddhism and its monastic architecture from India via Central Asia was the first and only significant time in China's history that a monumental architectural tradition, fully established but in sharp contrast to the native one, would have a widespread impact on the already age-old building practices. By the sixth century Buddhism would be the primary focus of building activity in China, in Korea, and, a century later, in Japan as well.

Temple compounds in China. As in India, Buddhist monuments in China began on a small scale. By the last

decade of the second century CE at least one shrine had been built to house a Buddha image. This two-story pavilion with a multitiered tower may have resembled worship shrines for native gods that were under construction in China at the same time.

Beginning in the third and especially the fourth centuries, the spread and acceptance of Buddhism in North and South China was so rapid that it was almost immediately necessary for craftsmen and builders to come to terms with the new religion's architecture. Although a variety of structures constitute a standard Buddhist monastery anywhere in East Asia, two building types are most fundamental: the Buddha hall and the towerlike structure known in English as a pagoda.

For the hall dedicated to the Buddha himself, the Chinese would build a likeness of the imperial hall of state, in which the Buddha could be enshrined in the posture of an enthroned Chinese emperor. (Only Mahāyāna, the form of Buddhism replete with a pantheon of deities, ever gained widespread popularity in China.) Texts and more recent archaeological confirmation tell us that these were four-sided buildings of timber frame, supported by columns on each side and sometimes on the interior, often with the roof form that was reserved for the most important Chinese halls, namely the simple hipped roof, consisting of a main roof ridge and two ridges projecting at angles from each of its sides.

The towerlike pagoda had its origins in the Indian stupa but evolved in northwest India and Central Asia as a higher and narrower structure; by the time it reached East Asia, it found its only semilikeness in the Chinese gate, or watchtower, which dates back to the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). By the sixth century, square-, octagonal-, and dodecagonal-plan pagodas with up to thirteen eaved tiers could be found in China. Although its functions were the same as their Indian stupa counterparts, and therefore a necessity to the East Asian monastery scheme, it was clear early on that the pagoda was to be the single element whose shape and placement might be dramatically altered within an otherwise slowly evolving, even static architectural setting. In a sense, the Chinese were never really comfortable with the pagoda, ever looming above the low buildings of a Chinese plan as a symbol of the foreign origins of the Buddhist faith. Two pagodas believed to represent the earliest period of sinicization of western styles are the ten-sided pagoda from Sung-yüeh Monastery on Mount Sung, Honan, built in 523, and a square-plan, single-story pagoda from Shen-t'ung Monastery in Shantung from 544.

Buddhism introduced another new concept for worship to Chinese architecture: the cave-temple. In pre-Buddhist China, a few imperial tombs had been carved

into rock, but nonfunerary religious and imperial architecture was exclusively freestanding. Yet by the fourth century, following the model of famous Indian and Central Asian sites, Buddhist rock-cut cave-temples were excavated at Tun-huang in northwestern China; they are found a century later at Yün-kang near modern-day Ta-t'ung, and subsequently, at scores of other sites throughout the country.

The earliest Buddhist timber architecture that survives in China was built in the T'ang dynasty (618–907) on the holy pilgrimage mountain of Wu-t'ai in northeastern Shansi Province. The simple three-bay, square main hall of Nan-ch'an Monastery was built in 782, and the grander main hall of Fo-Kuang Monastery stands as it was rebuilt in 857 (see figure 4). Important architectural features of T'ang Buddhist halls include crescent-shaped beams, diagonal cantilevers cutting through the multi-armed bracket sets that stand atop exterior columns to support the overhanging roof eaves, intercolumnar bracket supports, and surrounding porches where worshippers could stand.

Buddhist architecture that survives in North China from the tenth to thirteenth centuries reflects the diversity of monastic life in medieval East Asia. In Shansi and Hopei are main halls for the worship of the Buddha, a fantastic *sūtra* repository with intricately carved shelves recessed on each wall, multistory pavilions dedicated to individual *bodhisattvas*, storage halls for temple treasures, Chinese ceremonial gates, and a stable. Medieval Buddhist monasteries also include lecture halls, refectories, residences for all levels of Buddhist clergy, and towers for the bell and drum that sounded to announce prayer times; the scholarship and other activities of Buddhist clergy are comparable to those of their monastic counterparts in western Europe. Remarkable among surviving Buddhist architecture of China's medieval period are the tallest and oldest tim-

ber structure in the world, the 67.31-meter pagoda of Fo-kung Monastery in Ying-hsien, Shansi; the 22.5-meter pavilion in modern-day Tientsin, which has a unique three-tiered interior constructed to house a 16-meter image of the *bodhisattva* Kuan-yin (Avalokiteśvara); Mo-ni Hall of Lung-hsing Monastery in Hopei, the only example of a building with sharply sloping roofed porches projecting from each side (see figure 5); and the above-mentioned *sūtra* repository from the Lower Hua-yen Monastery in Ta-t'ung. The period is also known for distinct styles of masonry pagodas, introduced to North China by the Liao rulers.

Buddhist temple compounds built in China after the rule of the Mongols (known as the Yüan dynasty, 1279–1368) are similar in plan and building function to those from the Sung, Liao, or Chin. New in Buddhist temple construction at the time of the Mongols are buildings for Lamaist Buddhist worship, introduced to China from the region of Nepal and Tibet. The White Pagoda built by Khubilai Khan in 1271 at Miao-ying Monastery in Peking is one surviving example of the "bottle-shaped" Lamaist style that entered China at this time. Monasteries for Mahāyāna sects continued to be built in China through the Yüan dynasty and in the centuries following the return to native rule in 1368.

From the time of the Mongols on, the most impressive Buddhist structures and those exhibiting the most innovative features were built at Lamaist monasteries. Under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) one innovation is the so-called five-pagoda cluster, composed of a central tower and four lower ones at its corners, all on a single platform, and representing a Lamaist *maṇḍala*. An example of this construction is found at the Five-Pagoda Monastery at Ta-cheng-chüeh Monastery, Peking, built in 1573. An outstanding Lamaist monastery in Peking, built in the eighteenth century under Manchu rule and active well into this century, is Yung-ho Kung, famous for its wall paintings as well as its buildings.

Two other sites show the tremendous impact of non-native Buddhist architecture in China under Manchu rule (1644–1911). Beginning in 1767 the Ch'ien-lung emperor had Lamaist temples constructed at Ch'eng-te (formerly known as Jehol) in Hopei Province. Built in imitation of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, the buildings included a copy of Potala Palace in Lhasa. In Hsi-shuang-pan-na T'ai Autonomous Region of Yunnan Province, near the Burmese border, there are countless small monasteries generally composed of a Buddha hall, monks' quarters, and one or two pagodas all enclosed by a wall and decorated in the regional Sino-Burmese style.

Temple compounds in Korea and Japan. Like much of Korean architecture, Buddhist monuments were




FIGURE 4. T'ang Buddhist Temple. Infrastructural section of Main (East) Hall of monastery, Fo-kuang Temple, Wu-t'ai Shan, Shansi, China; rebuilt 857 CE.




FIGURE 5. *Mo-ni Hall*. Lung-hsing Temple, Chen-ting, Hopei, China; c. 1053 CE. Figure shows placement of images of the Buddha and *bodhisattvas* within the hall.

transmitted directly from China, so that in the initial stages, before the year 668, Korean Buddhist buildings reflect the styles of the continent. Yet, owing to native taste and a harsher climate, Korean Buddhist architecture, while accommodating certain norms dictated by the faith, is never exactly identical to its Chinese sources.

Some of the earliest surviving Korean Buddhist monuments are seventh-century stone pagodas from the monasteries Miruk-sa and Chong-nim-sa in the Paekche kingdom. During this period of the Unified Silla (668–935), approximately contemporary with T'ang China, the most important Korean Buddhist architectural site is the capital, Kyongju. Within the walls of the T'ang-style capital, most of which was destroyed at the end of the sixteenth century, are the monasteries of Sokkulam and Pulgak-sa. Sokkulam, the best-preserved early Buddhist monument in Korea, more closely resembles a cave temple in the tradition of the rock-cut temples to Korea's west than any other type of temple compound construction. Yet it also includes a stone antechamber connected to a domed structure in the manner of earlier Korean tombs.

The most important surviving Buddhist temple compound of early Japan is Hōryūji, located just south of modern-day Nara. In its initial building phase in the early sixth century it was huge. The nucleus of the late seventh-century monastery consists of pagoda and *kondō* (main hall) enclosed by a covered corridor, with the middle gate and lecture hall (a later building) adjoining the corridor to the south and north, respectively.

During the Tempyō period (711–781), about fifty years after the rebuilding of the Hōryūji, an octagonal Buddha hall known as Yumedono (Hall of Dreams) was

built on the former site of the residence of Prince Shōtoku (574–622), founder of the original monastery. This memorial hall to the prince is the focus of what is known as the Hōryūji East Precinct, in contrast to the so-called West Precinct that predates it. The conversion of a ruler's residence into a Buddhist monastery was a common practice in China and Japan at this time and later; indeed, since the architectural style of a Buddha hall replicates that of a ruler's palace, sometimes the residential structures could be converted with little emendation.

The great Japanese Buddhist building project of the eighth century was Tōdaiji, the East Great Monastery begun in the 740s by the order of Emperor Shōmu. Aspects of T'ang monastery architecture are evident in the Tōdaiji and in many contemporaneous buildings that survive in Nara today. In addition to T'ang-style architecture, the Tōdaiji is known for its Great Buddha Hall, built to house the 16.19-meter bronze image of Vairocana; for the South Great Gate, constructed under the direction of the monk Chōgen during the Kamakura period (1185–1332); and for the Shōsōin, a treasure repository that held foreign gifts and other rarities acquired by Emperor Shōmu. Only the storage hall, elevated on posts sunken directly into the earth, reflects native, pre-Buddhist building practice in Japan.

After the transfer of the Japanese capital north to Heian (modern-day Kyōto) at the end of the eighth century, a move due in part to the increased power of the Buddhist clergy within Nara, new forms of Buddhism necessitated new architectural spaces. The Esoteric sects, also introduced to Japan from China, were characterized architecturally by smaller, more modest temples, often built in isolated mountain settings. Among the buildings that survive at Daigoji and Jingoji in the

Kyoto suburbs, and Murōji farther south, are those with cypress bark roofs and plank floors. New Buddhist structures for Esoteric worship also included halls for ritual circumambulation, purification halls, halls dedicated to the Five Great Kings of Light (Godaimyō-ō), and a bottle-shaped pagoda called *hōtō*. Yet another new feature of Esoteric temple halls was an additional narrow hall or corridor, sometimes more than one, for worshippers.

Buddhist temple compounds of around the year 1000 possess the elaborate yet subtle decorative aesthetic of the late Heian period, named Fujiwara after the powerful aristocratic family. The popular form of Buddhism at the time was Pure Land, also originally introduced from China, but by this time Buddhist temple architecture had abandoned much of T'ang style and given way to Japanese taste. The Phoenix Hall dedicated to Amida (Amitābha) Buddha of the Byōdōin in Uji, originally a Fujiwara family estate, is the epitome of the period's architectural taste. Its extraordinary construction combines a small central hall with a false second story as well as flanking two-story "wing" corridors with corner towers. This residential style probably imitated paintings of Amida Buddha's Western Paradise.

Beginning in about the twelfth century, halls as small as one bay square dedicated to Amida Buddha were built all over Japan. The ascendancy of military generals in the Kamakura period led to two important developments. One was the rebuilding of many of the old Nara monasteries such as Kōfukuji and Tōdaiji, which had been destroyed in the power struggle of the twelfth century. The other was the building of a new government headquarters at the mountainous town of Kamakura, a site graced by the Five Great Zen Monasteries (the Gozan monasteries) and numerous smaller ones. The ascendancy of Zen Buddhism and its architecture at this time has been attributed to the appeal its austerities and restraint had for the ruling military lords. [See Gozan Zen.]

The final important phase of Buddhist architecture in Japan occurs in the Muromachi, or Ashikaga, period (1392–1572), again an age of military rule. Several building complexes stand out among the many surviving period structures. Two of these, the Gold and Silver Pavilions of the large villas of the ruling Ashikaga family, in the eastern and western suburbs of Kyoto respectively, were residential in style but functioned in part as Zen chapels. The abbot's quarters (*hōjō*) of a Zen monastery in fact came to be a standard feature of residential, or *shōin*, architecture from this time onward. Indeed, since the Heian period the aesthetic taste of Japanese ruling families had been largely determined by current Buddhist practices and ideals.

The history of Buddhist temple architecture in Japan is a continuous interplay of Chinese influence and native taste. As late as the seventeenth century new Buddhist architectural styles entered Japan together with new religious sects from the Asian continent. Mampukuji, built in Kyōto by a Chinese Buddhist monk of the Ōbaku Zen sect from the Fukien Province of South China, is one of the last examples of an imported branch of Chinese Buddhism that would introduce with it an architectural style. Yet even at Mampukuji, as at every Buddhist temple compound in Japan of every age, subtle decorative changes from the Chinese can be detected.

[See also *Iconography, article on Buddhist Iconography*.]

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Taoist Temple Compounds

It is difficult to say what was the first Taoist structure in China or where or when it was built. It seems certain that large monasteries were not erected during the age of the philosophers Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu in the Warring States period (403–221 BCE) nor, it appears, under the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), by which time small temples were built to popular gods. By the period of Chinese history known as the Six Dynasties (220–589), however, Taoism had evolved from a philosophical system with a focus on individuality or the attainment of immortality into an organized religion; with this new religion came a clergy, an increasing number of deities, and buildings to house and serve them. The change in the Taoist religion is due largely to the intensified fervor of worshipers from the competing foreign faith of Buddhism beginning in the fourth century. Indeed, the forms and functions of Taoist architecture in China from this time onward directly reflect the styles and purposes of Chinese Buddhist buildings to the extent that Taoist images stand on altars in the center of worship halls, Taoist male and female clergy are trained and reside in monastic settings, and certain temple compounds include halls for both Buddhist and Taoist worship.

Taoist temple compounds are made up of halls dedicated to a variety of purposes. The majority are built for Taoist deities and usually house their images; some of these deities are purely legendary; others are believed to have had terrestrial existences prior to their elevation to the Taoist pantheon or are actual people of the past such as Lao-tzu; still others are popular or household gods worshiped in China in the pre-Buddhist centuries before the Six Dynasties period. Taoist architecture also includes buildings located at potent sites, notably the five sacred peaks or other natural phenomena, which are themselves objects of worship. Frequent recipients of Taoist halls are the Three Pure Ones (San Ch'ing), the eight Immortals, the god of war (Kuan-ti), city gods, mountains, and streams.

In Chinese terminology for Taoist buildings and building groups, the words *kung*, *kuan*, and *miao* occur




FIGURE 1. *T'ai Shan Temple*. Ground plan; T'ai Shan, Shantung.

most often, and *an*, *tz'u*, and *ko* less frequently. The first two, *kung* (monastery or palace) and *kuan* (abbey), are restricted to Taoist architecture. Each is basically equivalent to the Buddhist *ssu* (monastery or temple compound), consisting, in general, of a large group of buildings facing courtyards and enclosed by walls and covered arcades, with the main architectural structures arranged along a north-south axis and other less important buildings located along less dominant north-south or east-west lines. *An* (nunnery) is the same term used for Buddhist architecture, and *miao* (temple), *tz'u* (shrine), and *ko* (pavilion) are similarly not restricted to Taoist architecture. *Miao* and *tz'u* generally refer to a single hall or one hall with only a small number of associated buildings that may be part of a more extensive Taoist, Buddhist, or imperial building complex. *Ko* refers to a multistory hall usually dedicated to one deity. *Kung*, *kuan*, and *an* function as living, training, and learning centers for Taoist monks and nuns, who may be attached to more than one monastery in their lifetimes.

Standard histories of Chinese architecture mention only a few Taoist temple compounds, none of which includes buildings earlier than the Sung dynasty (960–1279). Like all Chinese timber structures, those dedicated to the Taoist faith fell subject to natural disaster, and many a Taoist monastery suffered destruction from an anti-Taoist imperial or Buddhist faction. However, literary records relate that almost every important Taoist building site has a history much older than its earliest surviving structure, in most cases going back as far as the T'ang dynasty (618–906) and often earlier.

Of the forty or so sites in China where Taoist temple compounds survive today, three are most noteworthy.

First is T'ai Shan, the Eastern Peak, most popular of the five sacred peaks of Taoism. Located in Shantung province, it is considered the abode of life-giving forces as well as the site to which dead souls return. At times the gods of T'ai Shan have been revered as royalty, and, according to Édouard Chavannes, the powers of T'ai Shan and the emperor have been more or less equal, both being appointed by the heavens to ensure human happiness. When Chavannes studied T'ai Shan at the beginning of the twentieth century, more than 250 Taoist temple halls or shrines were located there. One of the most important is the T'ai Shan Miao (see figure 1). Inside the main shrine, the god of T'ai Shan is enthroned in the yellow robes of a Chinese emperor, and the emperor's journey from his capital to T'ai Shan is painted on the interior walls. Directly behind this main hall is the bedchamber of the wife of T'ai Shan, situated according to prescribed imperial palace layout.

The two other great repositories of Taoist temple architecture are located northeast of T'ai Shan, in Shansi province. More than thirty halls stand at the Chin shrines, just outside the provincial capital T'ai-yüan. The site is dedicated to Prince T'ang Shu-yin, son of the founder of the Chou dynasty (1122–255 BCE), but the focus of worship is the eleventh-century Holy Mother Hall, built to Prince T'ang's mother, who in the Sung dynasty was believed capable of giving rain and foretelling the future (see figure 2).

At the southern tip of Shansi is the Yung-le Kung (Monastery of Eternal Joy), where three halls and a gate from the thirteenth-century temple compound still stand. Its worship halls are dedicated to the Three Pure Ones, Lü Tung-pin, and Wang Che, the latter two being the patron saint and legendary founder of the popular northern Chinese syncretic Taoist sect known as Ch'üan-chen (see figure 3).

Taoist temple compounds are very much alive today, especially in Taiwan. Now as in the past, the principles




FIGURE 3. *Hall of Three Pure Ones*. Front elevation; Yung-le Kung, Shansi; thirteenth century.

of Chinese imperial and Buddhist construction are apparent in the temple halls, and the focus of worship still includes local and national heroes, legendary beings, renowned sages, historical figures, and natural phenomena.

[See also Iconography, article on Taoist Iconography.]

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NANCY SHATZMAN STEINHARDT

Confucian Temple Compounds

The architecture of Confucianism in China is built in honor of men. It is dedicated to Confucius (551–479 BCE), sage and secretary of justice of the ancient state of Lu, or his disciples and their teachings. Confucian monuments are distinct from other Chinese religious structures in their avoidance of images—it is the teachings that are venerated at ceremonies or by visitation to a temple; man is not worshiped as a deity. The Confucian building is also a center of homage to the Chinese civil (in contrast to the military) official.

The temple or temple compound is the predominant form of Confucian architecture. The 3,500-year-old town of Ch'ü-fu, in Shantung province, birthplace of Confucius, has been the site of the most important Confucian




FIGURE 2. *Holy Mother Hall*. Front elevation; Chin Shrines, Shansi; eleventh century.

temple in China since the time of the sage himself. However, a temple dedicated to Confucius was built in nearly every major city of traditional China. Several important Confucian temples survive in continental China and in Taiwan; the most active are located in Taiwan, in its capital city Taipei, in the former provincial capital of Tainan, and in the central island town of Chang-hua.

The first Confucian temple was built in Ch'ü-fu in 478 BCE; by the second century BCE it is recorded that a Chinese emperor stopped there when passing through the state of Lu to offer animal sacrifices. In the following century the emperor conferred posthumous titles on the sage, and by the T'ang dynasty (618–907 CE) imperial rites were conducted at the memorial service for Confucius. By the late fourteenth century the Confucian memorial service was held biannually, in the second and eighth months of the Chinese year. Through these centuries a Confucian temple could only be erected by government order, but by the second half of the seventeenth century the law changed, and temples dedicated to Confucius and his teachings came to be built in every province of China.

Confucian temples are open year-round and have traditionally served the important function of instructing boys in ancient music and rites. Even today one can see young students drawing or composing under the shade of an old tree on the temple grounds. Passage through the central front gate of the Confucian temple was a symbol of the importance of classical learning, a privilege traditionally reserved for successful civil-service candidates of the highest rank.

The most important event at the Confucian temple, both in ancient times and today, is the celebration of Confucius's birthday, which occurs around the twenty-eighth of September. Wearing the costumes of civil officials, attendants carrying ax-shaped weapons, fans, umbrellas, instruments in the style of those of Confucius's day assemble to perform music and dances. The spirit of Confucius is venerated by bowing before a tablet bearing his name, and by the offering of silk and wine. After bidding farewell to the spirit, the words of the eulogy and the silk are burned.

The number and arrangement of individual structures of a Confucian temple compound vary, but the architectural style of the buildings and the general plan always follow the standards set for an emperor's palace. The temple compound is isolated in its own precinct, enclosed at least partially by covered arcades. The important halls of the temple stand in a line, all facing south. Generally three or four structures are situated on this prominent north-south axis: a gate serving as the main,

central entryway to the temple grounds at the far south; a gate or hall adjoining the temple enclosure at the north; and at least one major, multi-eaved structure dominating the center. Other buildings radiate around the central structure or structures, sometimes built with bilateral symmetry in mind but always giving the impression of perfectly planned order and balance (see figure 1). This basic arrangement dates back at least one thousand years: a drawing of the Confucian temple in Ch'ü-fu from the Sung dynasty (960–1279) survives in the important Chinese text *K'ung-shih tsu-t'ing kuang-chi* (Compendium of the Ancestral Hall of Confucius).

The main shrine of the Confucian temple complex is either the central multi-eaved structure or the north one. Because it is approached through the series of slightly elevated gates or halls along the main north-south temple axis, worshipers sense their passage through more and more hallowed spaces. The four-sided surroundings and courtyards formed by the north-south arrangement and subsidiary buildings not only direct the approach to the center but at the same time are symbolic of the perfect and rational order designed by Confucian morality. Indeed, the symbolic shape of the Confucian temple complex is a focus for reverence toward a way of life, namely, the value system of the ancient sage.



FIGURE 1. *Chang-hua Temple*. Ground plan shows (1) Main Gate; (2) Halberd Hall; (3) Main Hall; (4) Venerable Confucian Shrine; (5) East Gallery; (6) West Gallery; (7) Propriety Gate; (8) Ritual Gate; (9) White Sand College; (10) Education Hall; (11) Bright Moral Hall; (12) Prosperity Virtue Shrine; (13) Scholars' Residence; (14) Famous Officials' Shrine; (15) Local Worthies' Shrine.

The function of the main temple building is in accordance with the human-oriented world of Confucianism: it houses tablets inscribed with the names of the sage, his disciples (the four best known are Meng-tzu [Mencius], Yen Hui, Tseng-tzu, and Tz'u-tzu), or the so-called twelve wise men (eleven of Confucius's disciples and the twelfth-century Confucian scholar Chu Hsi). The simplicity of a Chinese building interior, which contains only inscribed tablets, is in sharp contrast to the multitude of polychrome images that fill the halls of a Chinese Buddhist or Taoist temple hall. Only rarely can one find a statue of Confucius, and in such a case the making of the image represents the influence of popular religion.

The best place in China to see many examples of Confucian architecture is Ch'ü-fu. In addition to the main Confucian shrine, the Shantung town is the location of the K'ung family mansion. Situated adjacent to the Confucian shrine, the K'ung mansion has been the residence of Confucius's direct descendants since the first century BCE, when the fiefdom was awarded to the K'ung family. At times in Ch'ü-fu's history fully one-half of the architecture in the walled town was associated with Confucius. Beginning in Ming times the county *yamen* (office of the magistrate) was actually located within the walls of the K'ung mansion. Previously, the only other residence where government was conducted had been the emperor's palace.

[See also Confucian Thought, *article on The State Cult.*]

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NANCY SHATZMAN STEINHARDT

Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean Temples

Modern writers use the term *temple* in different ways. Applied to Egyptian religion, it refers to a complete architectural complex, integrated in a coherent axial arrangement, including an inner shrine or sanctuary. Applied to classical architecture, *temple* refers to the equivalent of this inner shrine, while the whole complex is termed *sanctuary*.

Egypt. Essentially, Egyptian religion is based on the performance of ritual, and the temples are the location for that cult. The forms and practices of the religion first developed in the Old Kingdom of the third millennium BCE and had become definitive by the Middle Kingdom in the second millennium. Thereafter they are marked by a characteristic conservatism, so that there is no essential difference between the temples built by the powerful pharaohs of the New Kingdom in the second part of the second millennium BCE and those of the Macedonian and Roman rulers of Egypt a thousand or more years later.

Architecturally, the basic characteristic of an Egyptian temple is its axial alignment from the entrance pylon—a gateway flanked by towers—in the outer wall to the innermost shrine room. Rooms and unroofed spaces are always rectangular. Their exact sequence corresponds to requirements of the daily ritual conducted in private by the priests, and the regular but less frequent ritual of the public festivals. Each temple was surrounded by a high outer wall, which served to exclude those not permitted to participate in the ritual. The pylon leads to the outer courts in which the populace gathered to watch sacred processions at the great festivals. [See Drama, *article on Ancient Near Eastern Ritual Drama.*] Beyond the courts are colonnaded (hypostyle) halls, vestibules, and the inner shrines housing the statue of the god and the sacred boats which were carried in processions. In this inner area there were also storerooms for the treasures of the god and for the paraphernalia of ritual, and rooms serving administrative purposes. This inner part is set at a higher level, usually as the result of a gradual rise at each successive door passage; the elevation probably symbolizes the "Island of Creation" which, emerging from the primeval flood, was the place on which the god first settled, thus creating the first temple.

The courts are unroofed, though often surrounded by a colonnade; the inner parts are completely roofed and increasingly in shadow. The roof level decreases as the floor level rises, thus enhancing a sense of mystery. Only the priests would enter the shrine, the private

dwelling of the god, and tend the cult statue it contained; this daily ritual in essence provided the god with the needs of life, which were the same as those of humans. The priests acted on behalf of the king, who was depicted performing the appropriate actions in the wall decoration. This decoration was important, for it continued the ritual even if the service of the human priests failed. [See *Iconography, article on Egyptian Iconography.*] In the daily ritual, the cult statue, enclosed in a shrine, was carried by the priests from the sanctuary down into the court and beyond for its epiphany before the assembled worshipers. Thus the axial progression in the temple is, in a very real sense, from the interior outward.

The precise arrangement of this plan varies from temple to temple, with some larger and more complex than others. Temples might be enlarged with additional sections, often over a considerable period of time. The degree of complexity possible can be illustrated by the Temple of Amun at Karnak, one of the most important, which has been added to and altered over millennia. Elements go back to the Middle Kingdom (presumably obliterating even earlier construction) and extend down to the Ptolemaic and Roman periods (figure 1 shows a portion of the final arrangement). Complex though it is, in principle it is the same as the smaller temples which share its twenty-five-hectare precinct.

Aegean (Bronze Age) Sanctuaries. Places set aside for the cult of the gods can be recognized in the material remains of the Bronze Age, in non-Greek Crete as well as on the Greek mainland. The Cretans worshiped at

shrines of various types. Natural caves were used for the deposit of offerings. The peaks of certain mountains were also sites of sanctuaries—some simply defined by enclosure walls, others given a number of rooms, usually rectangular—in which large stones served as altars. Thick layers of ash show that bonfires were lit, which would have been visible from sanctuary to sanctuary. The use of these sanctuaries ended abruptly, perhaps as a consequence of the cataclysmic eruption of the volcano of Thera in the fifteenth century BCE. Finally, there are sanctuaries in the palaces of the Cretan kings, shrine rooms marked by central pillars, with the symbolic double ax. These rooms are small and shallow, functioning as a focus for offerings rather than for any form of congregational ritual. It is likely that other parts of the palace complexes served ritual functions, including the bull-leaping depicted in Cretan art, but here the interaction of religion and architecture is, at best, uncertain: clearly none of it constitutes a temple in the normal sense. There is now clear evidence for human sacrifice, which previously had been implied in later Greek legends referring to the Crete of Minos.

Sanctuaries on the mainland of Greece were probably influenced by Cretan practice. One at Mycenae consists of a set of small, irregularly shaped rooms containing benches on which offerings could be placed, along with terra-cotta figurines apparently intended as representations of the deity, a goddess. There was also a mural painting of her. Such shrines are found in the fortified sites close to the walls and gateways; they seem to have had a special role in the protection of the community.




FIGURE 1. *Egyptian Temple.* Ground plan of a portion of the temple complex at Karnak, showing (1) portions of the outer wall of the complex; (2) Temple of Sety II; (3) Great Court; (4) Temple of Ramses III; (5) Great Hypostyle Hall; (6) Sanctuary of the Middle Kingdom; (7) Temple of Men-kheper-ra-akhmenon ("Festival Hall"); (8) Eastern Sanctuary of Ramses II.

The possibility of religious functions in the palaces cannot be excluded.

Classical Greece. There are few certain traces of religious practice other than funerary in the dark age that followed the collapse of Greek Bronze Age civilization. The most spectacular funerary example is the large horseshoe-shaped building surrounded by a colonnade of wooden posts over a burial at Lefkandi on the island of Euboea, dated about 1000 BCE. Similarly shaped buildings elsewhere (such as Thermum in northwestern Greece) have been recognized as forerunners of the Classical temple, though the connection, at present, must be regarded as uncertain.

In the Homeric poems the gods are at times associated with shrines and have images, particularly at Troy; this seems to be a memory of Bronze Age practice, as, perhaps, is the legend of Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia. Otherwise the gods are worshiped at open-air altars, without temple buildings. So in Classical Greek worship the essential feature is the altar for burnt sacrifices in an open area set aside for the god. The temple was an added embellishment which housed the cult statue, enhancing the prestige of the god and of the city responsible for the sanctuary.

The origin of the Classical temple is uncertain. The essential plan consists of a single rectangular room (*cella* or *naos*) with a porch at one end. All else is added decoration, but except in the poorest structures, the porch at least would be embellished with columns, while the more splendid have *cella* and porch surrounded by a colonnade. The columns are of distinctive regional types, Doric on the mainland and in the west, Ionic on the islands and in the east, though the geographical divisions are not rigid. Rooms with porches existed in the Bronze Age palaces of the mainland and are, indeed, the simple basic house-type of prehistoric Greece. This may be the origin of the temple as an architectural type (the temple as the house of the god), but the concept of religious continuity from the Bronze Age palace organization is dubious. Though some temples are found built over the principal rooms of the destroyed palaces, there is always an interval of several centuries between destruction and temple.

Similar temples are found in the Levant (Tell Taay-*anat*, Hazor) with a continuous ancestry going back to the Bronze Age. Since Greek temples are first found in the eighth century BCE, when Greek traders were renewing direct contacts with this area, they may be a copy or adaptation of these Levantine prototypes. Certainly the details of at least the Ionic order are Eastern in inspiration. Toward the end of the seventh century BCE, Egypt was opened to Greeks as traders, soldiers, and even settlers. Ancient Greek authors, particularly the

historian Herodotus (fifth century BCE), stressed the interrelationship between Egyptian and Greek gods. Much of their speculation is unlikely, but Egyptian architectural influence on the Greek sanctuaries is possible. It was not a wholesale copying of Egyptian forms, but the influence can be seen in the use of large numbers of columns, and particularly in the development of stoneworking techniques. The purpose of the temples, the practice of religion and ritual, remains purely Greek. Processions, for example, led to the shrine, not from it as in Egyptian ritual, and consisted of the populace, not priests.

Greek temples were not congregational buildings. The congregation (which at the chief festivals of major cults was very large, to be counted in tens of thousands) gathered round the altar. Like the crowds, the cult statue watched the sacrifices. Temples were normally oriented to face the point at which the sun rose on the day of the festival. Though some cult statues were large and valuable, the rooms in which they stood did not have to be particularly spacious. Even in the largest temples a surprising proportion of the total area was taken up by external embellishment. Otherwise, temples served as storerooms for objects, particularly those of value, offered to the gods. From inscriptions we learn that the quantity of these was often considerable.

The Parthenon on the Athenian Acropolis, dedicated to Athena, is probably the most famous, certainly the most lavishly decorated, but not the largest of Greek temples (see figure 2). A forerunner, started shortly after 490 BCE as an offering for the victory over the Persians at Marathon, was destroyed, still incomplete, by the Persians when they captured Athens in 480 BCE. Work was resumed, with an improved and enlarged design, in 447 BCE. The temple has seventeen Doric columns on each long side and eight at both short ends, and it measures overall some thirty-one by seventy meters. It has two rooms, the eastern *cella* and the western "rear




FIGURE 2. *Greek Temple.* Ground plan of the Parthenon (Temple of Athena Parthenos), Athens; enlarged design, 447–438 BCE.

room," which held the valuable offerings. Innumerable temples smaller than the Parthenon also exist, such as those in the sanctuary of Asklepios at Epidaurus, as well as the temple of Asklepios himself and the buildings relating to his healing cult, for example the Abaton, the building in which the sick were visited by the god in their sleep.

Hellenistic Greece. Hellenistic Greek temples and sanctuaries were essentially similar to those of Classical Greece, though they might now be constructed in regions conquered by Alexander the Great which were not Greek in origin. The more florid Corinthian order was occasionally used, perhaps under the influence of local architectural taste. In these areas the traditional, non-Greek religious practice had to be respected; in Egypt, for example, the ruling Macedonian Greek dynasty of the Ptolemies assiduously built temples in the traditional Egyptian manner described above.

Rome. Early Roman temples were built in the Etruscan manner, which had been influenced by early Greek temples of the seventh century BCE; the Etruscans (neighbors and, for a time, overlords of Rome) did not follow later Greek developments. They placed their temples on high bases, approachable by a flight of steps at the front only. Timber and mud brick, with tiles and embellishment in terra-cotta, were the normal building materials. Roman temples inherited the strictly frontal emphasis and high bases. Little survives from the early period of Rome, but it is unlikely that there were any significant improvements in design or construction before the Second Punic War at the end of the third century BCE. Thereafter Rome was increasingly involved in the affairs of the Hellenistic East, and Roman buildings were influenced by Hellenistic forms, particularly the Corinthian order, though temples still retained the essential Etruscan arrangement with high bases and steps only at the facade. Plans were conservative, with columns across the facade only or, if extended along the sides, terminating in front of a wall across the back. Occasionally the Romans copied the full surrounding colonnades of Greek temples.

In essentials, a Roman temple functioned like the Greek as a house for a god and for offerings to the god. Burnt sacrifices were made at an altar, which was usually placed immediately in front of the temple at the bottom of the steps so that worshipers faced the altar (and the temple) rather than surrounding it. Where possible, the temple stood in a colonnaded precinct, which also emphasized the axial symmetry. Roman temples, however, showed greater concern than the Greek for the use of the *cella* as a room. The Roman *cella* often occupied a greater proportion of the total area, was wider, and was invariably freed from encumbering internal

supports for the roof, a consequence of better carpentry techniques and the availability of better timber. This enhancement of the *cella* does not signify congregational use in the full sense, but the temples were certainly used for gatherings, which might have been political rather than fully religious in character—meetings of the Senate, for example.

These developments culminated in the best-preserved of all Roman temples, the Pantheon in Rome, built by the emperor Hadrian (117–138) to replace an earlier building of Augustus's time (see figure 3). Dedicated to all the gods, it is circular rather than rectangular (a permissible plan for Roman but not Greek temples). It had a conventional precinct and porch, but the *cella*, 150 Roman feet in diameter, is roofed with a concrete dome. Light is admitted, for deliberate effect, through an opening in the center of the dome.

In the provinces of the Roman empire, temples sponsored by the authorities usually imitated those of Rome; such buildings are found, for example, in Provence (the Maison Carrée at Nîmes) and in North Africa. They most often employ local building techniques and,



FIGURE 3. *Roman Temple.* Interior of the Pantheon, Rome; rebuilt during the reign of Hadrian (117–138).




FIGURE 4. *Roman Temple, Eastern Empire*. Temple of Jupiter, Heliopolis (modern Baalbek, Lebanon); first to third centuries CE. This temple complex exhibits a mixture of Roman, Greek, and local architectural elements.

usually, local materials, but are essentially similar to Roman prototypes.

Local tradition, however, often influenced form. This is very clear in Egypt, where Egyptian-style temples were still built under the Romans. In Greek areas the relationship is different, since Roman temples were themselves already influenced by Greek form and served similar religious concepts. Here the local tradition is architectural rather than religious, and was not insisted on. Roman temples on high bases were built, some distinctly frontal, but there was a more ready tendency toward fully colonnaded arrangements, when money was available. The eastern Roman empire was wealthy—Asia Minor and Syria in particular—and some temples of the Roman period are very splendid. The major Greek cities were already well provided for—Artemis of Ephesus (Diana of the Ephesians) still had the temple last rebuilt for her in the fourth century BCE—and new building was mostly concerned with the political cult of Rome and with individual emperors (Trajan, for example, at Pergamum). Pergamum also possesses, in the sanctuary of Asklepios patronized by the emperor Caracalla, a unique example of a temple based on the Pantheon at Rome.

The most splendid of these temples in the eastern Roman provinces is that dedicated to Jupiter at Heliopolis, the Roman military colony at Baalbek in Lebanon

(see figure 4). A huge temple stands on a high podium in the Roman manner, but it was constructed in the local tradition. On the podium is a Greek-type stepped base. The surrounding Corinthian colonnade is arranged in the East Greek (Ionic) manner with a wider central spacing at each end. In the *cella* (now ruined) was a shrine structure with a cult crypt underneath (better preserved in the neighboring so-called Temple of Bacchus) serving local religious ritual. Outside was a tall tower altar of Eastern type. Eastern influences can be detected in the architectural decoration, such as Persian-style bulls on the frieze. Finally, the temple was given a precinct (never completed) and forecourt with a gateway building flanked by towers which derives from local, not Roman, concepts.

[See also Iconography, article on Greco-Roman Iconography.]

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R. A. TOMLINSON

Mesoamerican Temples

The most common form of sanctuary in Mesoamerica is the temple-pyramid-plaza, that is, the peculiar combination of an elevated foundation, almost always artificially built, with a temple on the upper platform (see figure 1). Usually adjoining this unit at the base of the access staircase is a series of open spaces (plaza, esplanade, altar platform). This basic combination was perpetuated for over twenty-five centuries, with several constants that gave it relative coherence within an extremely varied panorama and allowed it to be integrated into larger and more complex architectural clusters.

Structures. The embryonic form of this temple combination can be found in the principal mounds built from compressed soil or from *adobe* (sun-dried brick) by

the Olmec in areas around the Gulf of Mexico, such as San Lorenzo (in the present-day Mexican state of Veracruz) and La Venta (in Tabasco) between 1200 and 900 BCE. Associated with a thrust toward monumentality that reflected the cultural vigor in Mesoamerica at the end of the Preclassic period (600 BCE–200 CE), the temple-pyramid-plaza soon spread to other regions. Thus, in the central plateau of Mexico we find, as antecedents to the Pyramids of the Sun and the Moon in Teotihuacán, the large, elongated mounds of Totimehuacán (Puebla) and the superimposed circular platforms (150 meters in diameter) in Cuicuilco, in the southeast corner of the Valley of Mexico. In the northern part of Petén (Guatemala), in the heart of the Maya area, the massive pyramids of El Mirador, with their apexes emerging from the dense forest, foreshadow the great Maya temples of Tikal in the same region.

Together with this tendency toward monumental building there was a great preoccupation with architectural permanence. This concern was reflected in the emergence of large retaining walls for the compressed fill of earth and rubble. These walls constituted the solid nucleus of the pyramid, and their taluses tended to follow the natural sloping angle of the fill. The access staircase, generally the only one placed on the axis of




FIGURE 1. *Temple Pyramid*. Pyramid of the Diviner, Uxmal, Mexico. Shown here in artist's reconstruction is the typical form of a Mesoamerican temple, a pyramid serving as the foundation for the temple structure.

the temple, was initially incorporated into the general mass of the pyramid itself. With the passing of time it tended to project outward, frequently bordered by two *alfardas*, or flat ramps, which in turn often projected slightly beyond the steps or, according to local or regional style, assumed more complex shapes. In the same manner, the sides of the pyramid could be decorated with large masks or other sculptures or ornamented rhythmically with moldings, notably variations on the talus panel (*tablero-talud* or *talud-tablero*, a panel, or *tablero*, usually framed with moldings, that projected from the slope). These architectural elements, together with the proportions, divisions, and other formal characteristics of the foundation, define the principal masses of the structure and highlight their respective horizontal or vertical features.

Finally, the temple itself, which usually occupies the upper platform of the pyramid, evolved from a simple hut to a more elaborate building made of masonry. Depending on the region, it was covered with a flat roof supported by wooden timbers and surrounded by low parapets or, as can be observed among the Maya, with vaulting made up of different types of projecting (corbeled) arches. Various types of panels, moldings, and sculptures enrich the temple silhouettes, which could be crowned with more or less massive roof combs, as in the case of Classical Maya architecture, or with sculptured finials distributed at regular intervals on the outside perimeter of the parapet in the style of a battlement. Such finials can be observed in the architectural tradition of Mexico's central plateau from the period of Teotihuacán until the Spanish conquest.

Interpretations. From the Spanish chroniclers of the sixteenth century we learn that in spite of the staircases, which were usually wide and well proportioned in relation to the whole (and independent of the scale, large or small, of the rooms inside), the sanctuary that usually topped each pyramid for the most part remained closed to the common mortal. This observation seems to indicate that, at least in its community aspects, worship was conducted outdoors, either on the upper platform of the pyramid in front of the main entrance to the sanctuary or, if there was one, on the altar platform in the center of the plaza located at the foot of the pyramid, where the congregation gathered.

Naturally, there are a few exceptional cases in which the pyramid was conceived without a temple. If in fact worship was essentially an outdoor activity, the interior space of the sanctuaries, relatively large in Mexico's central plateau, Oaxaca, and other regions of Mesoamerica, could be reduced to very small dimensions, apparently without undermining its sacred character. This is particularly evident in the Maya area, where the

width of the interior spaces fluctuates on the average between three meters and seventy-five centimeters, as we can see when we compare, for example, a temple in Palenque, in southern Mexico, with one in Tikal (see figure 2). There are, however, extreme cases, such as Building A in Nakum (Petén), where the narrow chambers measure only fifty and forty-two centimeters in width (perhaps to function as a "loudspeaker" that dramatically amplified the voice of the priest). Such considerations likewise help to explain those full-scale simulated temples in the Rio Bec region of Campeche, which are sometimes crowned by two or three solid "towers." These towers, incorporated into the mass of a low, functional building, in turn constitute versions of compressed pyramids, complete with simulated staircases. This imitation of the temple-pyramid was not detrimental to the symbolic meaning of certain privileged parts of the building, such as the staircase, the sides of the tower, the main doorway (or its upper frieze alone), and the roof comb.

The primary function of the Mesoamerican pyramid was to elevate the temple; occasionally it served as a ruler's mausoleum (as in the outstanding example of Palenque). However, the pyramid could lack a temple




FIGURE 2. *Maya Temples.* Cross sections and ground plans of temples at Palenque, Mexico (left), and Tikal, Guatemala (right), showing very small dimensions of interior space.

altogether (as in the twin-pyramid complexes of Tikal), or it could have twin staircases leading to two clearly differentiated temples (as occurs during the last three centuries before the Spanish conquest).

The Mesoamerican tradition of not razing buildings to the foundation before undertaking new construction is fortunate for archaeology. As a result of much remodeling, expansion, and superimposing, which on occasion generated artificial acropolises (the particularly high and compact clusters of buildings that resulted from centuries of adding new layers of construction, as found at the North Acropolis of Tikal), the remains of temples, dismantled only to a certain height to become part of the fill for a new building, reappear bit by bit from their burial ground to tell us the history of their city, their gods, and their rulers. While the effigies of deities (as well as the sacrificial stone) speak to us about a place designed for rituals, other features, particularly among the Maya (where we find so many roof combs, stelae, and other dynastic records), suggest the self-glorification of a ruling prince.

[See also *Pyramids, overview article, and Iconography, article on Mesoamerican Iconography.*]

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PAUL GENDROP

Translated from Spanish by Gabriela Mahn

TEMPTATION. Approaches to the complex phenomenon of temptation are as diversified as are cultures, worldviews, the self-understanding of men and women, the concept of sin, and so on. But behind all the astonishing differences there might well be discovered agreement on one point: that the center of human temptation is egocentricity, and genuine love is its victor. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, reflection on temptation arises in the quest for the sources of evil, which leads to a questioning of both God's nature and the nature of man. [See *Evil.*] However, for the Hebrews, these questions were further complicated because of their own negative reactions to earlier solutions put forth by their neighbors. A continuing theme in Israel's history is the belief that their neighbors were tempting them to abandon faith in Yahveh and the law of Moses. Consequently, they must destroy those who were or could become such a temptation. This sad pattern reappears in Christianity as a motive for the crusades, inquisitions,

and the burning of so-called witches. Christians were thus diverted from the actual, horrifying temptations that drew them away from humanness, love of neighbor, and even from the true image of God as a merciful Father of all.

The problem of temptation seems to resist a rational, conceptual approach. Perhaps the most adequate approach to its historical study is by way of its symbols. The prototype of these symbols and myths is the *Genesis* story of Adam and Eve. Similar symbols are to be found in most African cultures. It seems that with these stories there is not yet the question of original sin but, rather, the more basic question: what is the response of humanity when confronted with evil?

The Fall of Adam and Eve—of humanity in general—and its consequences are presented in the first twelve chapters of *Genesis*. [See *Fall, The.*] There we see Cain tempted to do violence, a temptation to which he yields, killing his brother. The increase in violence finds its symbol in Lamech, whose warlike attitude is reflected also in his relationship with women. Finally, the world is so flooded with sin that Noah can withstand it only with utmost difficulty.

However, while a one-sided, legalistic understanding of faith and morality warned against the temptation of disobedience, it remained blind to the temptation to disown the prophetic tradition and blind to unjust structures and the unjust exercise of authority, which today's Christians sharply denounce as "institutionalized temptations."

All too often in Christendom the tendency prevailed to condemn any form of doubt about religious and moral doctrines and traditions, while today many Christians pray that God may grace them with the courage to doubt at the right point and, thus, to be preserved from the disgraceful temptation of choosing a false security over the sincere search for truth. Some Christians seem not to care much about the existential question of whether they are truly on the road to salvation, but for Martin Luther and many other Christians of all denominations, it has been a matter of faith to fight desperately against such a temptation.

In Western religions there have always been conflicting trends between those who gave primacy to the fight against temptations arising from one's own heart and those who gave first place to fighting unjust and dehumanizing structures as the main sources of temptation. There were and still are those who are overly optimistic about the individual's battle against temptation and, at the same time, pessimistic about changing immoral society. Today many who call for renewal of church institutions fall into the temptation of overlooking the interwovenness of persons and society and the difficulty of

achieving simultaneously the ongoing individual conversion and the changing and healing of public life, including church structures.

For many religious people in the West it is still difficult to recognize the enormous temptation involved in renouncing one's own responsibility and yielding to anguish instead of making clear decisions about the Christian's mission to be salt to the earth. One aspect of this all-pervasive temptation is easy conformity to a culture of greed, consumerism, and a wasteful style of life.

Christians are awakening only gradually to the temptation to waste our human and ecological resources. Many are struggling with the temptation to render indiscriminate military service and grant one's own government a blind presumption of righteousness in respect to armaments, arms sales, and military actions. Perhaps here, however, we are beginning to perceive a major shift in Western Christianity's approach to the theme of temptation.

Definition of Temptation. For Immanuel Kant, temptation is the paradoxical expression of the human person, destined by nature for the good yet inclined to do evil. He defines temptation as a challenge to live one's freedom for good in the purest way.

In the Septuagint, and consequently in Christian tradition, the Greek word *peirasmos* indicates quite different concepts in different contexts. Often it refers to sinful man "tempting God," murmuring against him and challenging him in unbelief and distrust (cf. *Ex.* 17:1–7). The New Testament, too, warns against this temptation of man "to tempt God," to challenge him (*1 Cor.* 10:9), to defy him in disobedience (*Heb.* 3:8), to request from him miraculous interventions at man's whim or for man's self-exaltation (cf. *Mt.* 4:7: "You are not to put the Lord your God to the test").

Most frequently, however, the word *temptation* is used to describe man being tempted in various ways. Two forms of *peirasmos* have to be distinguished carefully. One concerns the various troubles and trials seen as an opportunity, or *kairos*, for the believer to strengthen his faith, his endurance, and, finally, his capacity to share in Christ's redemptive suffering. *James* 1:2–3 describes this kind of *peirasmos*: "Whenever you have to face trials of many kinds, count yourselves supremely happy in the knowledge that such testing of your faith breeds fortitude, and if you give fortitude full play you will go on to complete a balanced character." Sometimes only the victorious conclusion of such a trial allows the positive evaluation of the event, as in *James* or, even more evidently, in the beatitudes (*Mt.* 5:11–12, *Lk.* 6:21–23).

The other kind of *peirasmos* refers to temptation in the sense of endangering salvation, that is, when the person is assaulted from within and/or from without by

godless powers aimed at his downfall. The Lord exhorts us to pray that we may not be brought to such dangerous tests: "And lead us not into temptation" (*Mt.* 6:13, *Lk.* 11:4). Christ warns his disciples that his own terrible trial can become for them a dangerous test: "Stay awake, all of you; and pray that you may be spared, that you may not enter into temptation" (*Mk.* 14:38).

Martin Luther is particularly anxious that we do not confuse those tests in which God guides us through the trial from beginning to end with those temptations into which we walk self-confidently from the start and thus expose ourselves to the danger of downfall.

Temptation and the Tempter. While the scripture warns us against the tempter in his various disguises, the main emphasis is on our own "heart," our personal response to temptations. The Bible calls on Christians to take responsibility by consistently rebuking the sinner who wants to exculpate himself by inculpating others.

Temptation arises from within. *James* is most explicit: "Temptation arises when a man is enticed and lured away by his own lust" (1:14). Here the author of *James* follows the main line of the synoptic Gospels, as when Jesus calls for change of heart, for purification of one's inmost thoughts and desires: "It is from within men's hearts that evil intentions emerge" (*Mk.* 7:20). *James* speaks of *epithumia* ("desire"), which in the Jewish thought of the time referred to the ambivalent impulses and inclinations (or *yetser*) assigned to Adam and Eve in rabbinic literature to explain their capacity for being tempted. Augustine's term *concupiscence* does not correspond exactly to *yetser*. While the Hebrew scriptures and rabbinic literature try to understand man's vulnerability to temptation as *epithumia*, Augustine believes temptation to be based on our heritage of sin from Adam. We may understand *concupiscence* as that inner inclination for temptation and sin, the intensity of which depends on unrepented sins, the weakness or lack of a fundamental option for God and for the good, and the attraction to sin that comes from a sinful world around us, where the sins of the past continue to poison the human environment.

This same idea is present also in thought about the struggle that exists in our inmost being between *sarx* and *pneuma* (or "body" and "spirit"). For Paul, temptation manifests in our lower nature, the body, and is supported by the collective selfishness and arrogance present in all humanity. The *sarx*—and with it, temptation—loses power to the degree that we are renewed and guided by the *pneuma*.

God does not tempt anyone. *James's* great concern that "God is untouched by evil" (1:14) already existed in Jewish wisdom literature. The main concern of the

oldest Israelite tradition, however, was the absolute rejection of any kind of dualism: God has absolute sovereignty. The distinction found in this tradition between being "put to the test" by dangerous temptation or by trials destined to purify or refine had not yet been neatly elaborated.

A striking example is in a comparison of the story of David's temptation regarding a census, as told in *2 Samuel* with the later story in *1 Chronicles*. The first account says, "The anger of Yahveh once again blazed out against the Israelites, and he incited David against them. 'Go,' he said, 'take a census of Israel and Judah'" (*2 Sm.* 24:1). In those days a census was considered an attack on God's prerogative to give increase to his people. Hence David was punished by a pestilence that diminished the nation. The author of *1 Chronicles* is more careful about the image of God as one of absolute goodness; he gives another version: "Satan rose against David to take a census of the Israelites" (*1 Chr.* 21). In this later tradition monotheism had become so firmly established that the introduction of a tempter inimical to God's people was not to be feared.

The wisdom literature provided helpful distinctions and directions of thought. The authors were careful not to allow the sinner any exoneration and to avoid any contamination by dualism. Their greatest care was to show God's wisdom in the sovereign government of world and history.

Temptation, uncomfortable as it may be, is an ingredient of life. Those who put their trust in God will overcome it, and it serves moral growth in their life. God does not incite to evil, but he allows both suffering and temptation as tests for the virtuous. "God has put them to the test and proved them worthy to be with him; he has tested them like gold in a furnace, and accepted them as holocausts" (*Wis.* 3:5). The sinner has no excuse, since he falls because of lack of love and fear of God. Those who truly adhere to God will make good use of freedom.

This is succinctly expressed by Jesus, son of Sirach: "Do not say, 'the Lord is responsible for my sinning,' for he is never the cause of what he hates. Do not say, 'it was he who led me astray,' for he has no use for a sinner. The Lord hates all that is foul, and no one who fears him will love it either. He himself made him in the beginning, and left him free to make his own decisions To behave faithfully is within your power" (*Sir.* 15:11-16).

The serpent and the woman in Genesis 3. The narrative of the Fall is an anthropological myth of great depth and complexity. Its symbols express ancient Israelite reflections on the origin of evil. It depicts in a lively way the diversionary rhetoric of the sinner, who always needs a scapegoat for his own vindication. Adam

attempts to use Eve as his scapegoat, while Eve blames the serpent. Some see in the role attributed to Eve a deeply ingrained misogyny in the Yahvistic authors. Paul Ricoeur may come closer to the intention of the narrative when he writes in his *La symbolique du mal* (Paris, 1960) that the woman here is not so much the "second sex" as, rather, an expression of the human being's frailty, man's as well as woman's (vol. 2, p. 239). The story exposes the sin of Adam more than that of Eve, because it unmasks Adam's domineering attitude toward the woman (*Gn.* 3:16). In the Fall, man too must confess: "This is flesh of my flesh." There is a solidarity in both salvation and perdition.

Why is the serpent introduced to allow man to exonerate himself? We can respond that the very mechanism of exculpation is part of sinful man, since when he confesses his sin humbly before the merciful God, he finds no need to accuse others. Yet there is still more in this anthropological metaphor. The serpent is also a creature, one that is "the most subtle of all the wild beasts God has made" (*Gn.* 3:1). It becomes a metaphoric presentation of man's subtle pursuit of his egotism and his no less subtle self-defense and self-belying mechanisms (cf. Philbert Avril, *Délivre-nous du mal*, Paris, 1981, p. 23).

Ricoeur thinks that this is also the way James's epistle explains the self-deceptive concupiscence. The serpent is a part of ourselves as long as we have not the strength of truth to unmask the shrewdness of our exonerating maneuvers. It might also symbolize "the chaotic disorder in myself, among us and around us" (*La symbolique du mal*, vol. 2, p. 242). That would bring into the whole vision of the first twelve chapters of *Genesis* a sharper awareness of the various dimensions of solidarity in either good or evil, including the cosmic dimension and the need for man to decide one way or the other.

While theologians and preachers during the last centuries frequently identified the serpent of *Genesis* with Satan or the devil, there seems to be a growing consensus among biblical scholars and theologians that in the early tradition reflected in *Genesis* 3, nobody thought or spoke of Satan, the personified Evil One. In his 1937-1938 work *Creation and Fall: A Theological Interpretation of Genesis 1-3 and Temptation*, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was insisting already that this narrative has no need of *diaboli ex machina*. The serpent symbolizes the ambiguity of man, his human relationships, and his environment.

Satan and his helpers. Satan interests us here only in relation to temptation. What does the tempter add to the understanding of temptation? In the older tradition, Satan never appears; it is God who tests man and calls him to decision (Seesemann, 1968, p. 25). In the *Book of Job*, we find God testing man in much the same way as he tested Abraham. The successful end is decisive: the

person who counts on God will overcome temptation. What is new in *Job* is that God acts through intermediary forces.

The nebulous Satan here has nothing to do with the super-Satan of the Persian religion or with the apocalyptic and threatening "prince of darkness" of later writings in Judaism and Christianity. This Satan is a not very effective literary effort meant to exonerate God from appearing as the source of evil. Such a Satan becomes a real threat to the sufferer through those "friends" who, having a false image of God, judge the sufferer to be one who deserves such punishment. For the sufferer, these friends are indeed Satan's cruelest helpers. Even Christ on the cross was exposed to them: the pseudo-religious men who insulted him. Job's victory over this temptation occurs because of his trustful adoration of the ever greater God.

The shrewd Satan who tempts Jesus in the desert embodies the insidious temptation put to Christianity in the first and following centuries. The misuse of the Bible by cleverly twisting its words to create false meanings tempted people away from the faith.

Satan represents also the terrible temptation of a too earthly understanding of the messianic hope of Israel and the mission of Christ. This is seen strikingly when Jesus rebukes Peter for refusing to believe in a suffering and humble servant-Messiah: "Away with you, Satan; you are a stumbling-block to me, because the way you think is not God's but man's" (*Mt.* 16:23).

Satan at his most shameless—asking Jesus to adore him—mirrors the vain self-glorification of the earthly powers of the time, particularly in the divinization of the Roman emperors. The figure of Satan should not turn attention away from these perennial temptations but should emphasize the superhuman dimension. It is a sharp warning against belittling any situation of temptation.

As we saw in *Genesis* 3, for the believer there is no way of denying guilt by pointing to a tempter or to the devil. Aware of the powers of darkness in their mysterious solidarity of perdition, the followers of Christ put their trust in God and make the wholehearted decision for his reign, a reign of justice, peace, and love. They put on "all the armor which God provides to stand firm against the devices of the devil" (*Eph.* 6:10). They will not only avoid being tempters in any way, helpers of the powers of darkness, but will commit themselves to active and generous membership in a solidarity of salvation.

This was the mind of the early church in an integrated discourse on the Christian's decision for Christ and for battle against temptations arising from the gnostic and Manichaean trend toward speculations on angelic and demonic hierarchies. We find this sobriety

still in Thomas Aquinas. But in the following centuries great parts of Western Christianity indulged in fantastic speculations about witches and a slavish fear of devils as well as ritual exorcisms of them, while lacking trust in God and making no firm decision for an all-embracing solidarity.

Today there is a strong reaction, partially in favor of the original sobriety and partially in indifference to the figure of Satan, whereby the vast dimensions and blinding powers of evil are lost to sight. Referring to Ernst Bloch, Leszek Kolakowski, in his *Gespräche mit dem Teufel* (3d ed., Munich, 1977), wonders whether some Christians realize the depth and cosmic dimensions of evil. Reading Kolakowski one thinks of the devilish temptation to expect a paradise of peace in the midst of ever increasing conflict and hatred.

The Christian discourse on the tempter points to the great temptations arising from bad example and evil "friends" who initiate the inexperienced into the skills of crime and corruption. The diabolic temptation seeks directly the moral corruption of others. It is masterfully described in the famous novel *Les liaisons dangereuses* (1782) by Choderlos de Laclos. Laclos exposes both the superficial optimism of the Enlightenment and the libertinism of the time preceding the French Revolution. The book aroused much anger in its time, since it disclosed the truth of fallen man, who can go to the limits of malice and cunning in tempting others, especially those devoted to virtue. But even to those most skilled and aggressive tempters there come moments when humanness somehow shines through, insinuating "that malice does not constitute a hopeless and irrevocable fact in human existence" (Knufmann, 1965, p. 202).

This idea was theologized by Origen, who wanted to leave open the hope that after a long duration of "eternity" even the devil and his helpers might be converted and saved by the divine power of *apokatastasis*. Origen's thought, problematic as it may be, opposed tenaciously the dualism of Manichaeism. Sinners—even the tempter and his helpers—because they are God's creatures, keep, somehow, a remnant of goodness. The theory also intended to emphasize that no sinner on earth should be considered a hopeless case. [See *Apocatastasis*.]

For many contemporary Christians this thought is unacceptable in view of the diabolical crimes in our times. Mohandas Gandhi, however, thought that the coherent and thorough spirituality of *satyāgraha* ("doing the truth in love") could hope to change even persons like Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin into *satyāgrahins*. For Gandhi, "it is an article of faith that no man has fallen so low that he cannot be redeemed by love" (quoted by Pie-Raymond Reagmey in *Nonviolence and the Christian Conscience*, London, 1966, p. 199). This optimism is not a blindness to the horrifying evil present in man but a

recognition of the power of his spirit, enkindled and guided by the universal spirit to overcome such evil at all costs. It may be one of the most diabolic temptations of Western people not to consider this opportunity and be willing to pay its price in order to overcome the diabolically vicious circle of nuclear madness.

Psychological Perspectives. Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have made major contributions to a better understanding of the mechanisms of various temptations. We note especially the ego-defense mechanism of repression (unconscious forgetting or prevention of consciousness) of what is too difficult to face consciously. It could be, for instance, a call to a more truthful search for life's deeper meaning. Repression usually works through a security complex which refuses to let reality challenge it.

Karl Menninger notes that temptations and sins arise from the "huge world of the unmanifest" (1973, p. 221). The "unmanifest" includes not only whatever the filter of repression is hiding but also unconfessed guilt feelings which often become confused with real guilt. On this point, Menninger refers to the Bible: "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 Jn. 1:8).

The result of the individual and collective temptation to deny sin and guilt is frequently undefinable anguish, feelings of senselessness, and/or despair about human freedom and dignity. The deeper source of these temptations is an unwillingness "to do the truth in love," thereby hindering truth from setting us free (cf. Jn. 8:31-41).

Another ego-defense is the tendency to project one's own evil inclinations on another, on some villain. In her work with children, psychotherapist Christine Lutz found that the healing and growth of moral sense progressed when the children realized that what they saw in others was, to a great extent, a projection of their own shortcomings (*Kinder und das Böse: Konfrontation und Geborgenheit*, Stuttgart, 1980).

Depth psychology has studied the mechanism of aggression. On the one hand, there is the danger of trying to repress it instead of channeling it wisely. On the other hand, there is the uncontrolled and mutually contagious mechanism that leads to the vicious circle of aggressive challenges and aggressive reactions. Although psychology suggests that it is sometimes liberating to allow one's anger an honest expression, Menninger rightly warns: "But there is always a temptation to use it as a whip, and what begins as a device for relief continues as a weapon for aggression" (1973, p. 144).

Sociological Perspectives. The broad theological expression "sin of the world" is given sharper contours in

modern studies on "institutionalized temptation." In his book *Our Criminal Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969), Edwin M. Shur has an apt formulation: "In a sense, existing patterns of crime represent a price we pay for structuring society as we have structured it" (p. 9). In a society and culture that emphasize "having" over "being," with an educational system oriented to personal success and a whole economic system that encourages increasing consumption, people yield thoughtlessly to temptations, and nobody feels guilty. "No one thinks sin was involved" (Menninger, 1973, p. 120). The "respectable crimes" of the wealthy and powerful, their unpunished corruption, and their clever manipulations are constant incitement for others to further injustice and dishonesty in smaller matters. The little thief is caught and condemned to a prison system in which massive temptations are forced upon inexperienced transgressors of the law.

The people of wealthy countries have adopted lifestyles inseparably connected with the predatory exploitation of the earth's resources and pollution of the environment. Here we see temptations of planetary dimensions that increase the tensions between countries of free enterprise and those of massive state capitalism. How many horrifying temptations are involved in the arms race, the arms trade, and, above all, the nuclear threat! One source of the massive "institutionalized temptations" is the lack of prophetic voices; another is the unwillingness to pay earnest attention to those voices that might be heard.

Theological Perspectives. In a brief synthesis of theological perspectives that recur continuously, the point of departure for the Christian is Jesus having been tempted as we are: "Since he himself has passed through the test of suffering, he is able to help those who are meeting their test now" (*Heb. 2:18*). The church fathers stressed the point that it was after his baptism that Jesus underwent the temptation, and they connect this with the final test of his passion. Similarly, those baptized in Christ can best face temptation and suffering by putting their trust in Christ and holding fast to their baptismal commitment.

Jesus overcame temptation not just by enduring the suffering it brought but by making this very suffering the supreme sign of God's love and saving solidarity. That this love is the goal of all Christians is revealed by gospels that unmask the temptations involved in clinging to laws while betraying the covenant, now understood as the supreme law of unselfish, all-embracing love between God and man.

Another biblical direction is to combat evil by doing good, to overcome violent injustice by doing the truth of love in nonviolent commitment (cf. *Rom. 12:21*;

1 Thes. 5:15; 1 Pt. 3:9; and above all, Mt. 5). For believers, all temptations—but particularly those arising from the vicious circle of violence—are a challenge to sanctity, to redemptive love. An unrenounceable perspective grows out of Paul's understanding of the combat between *sarx* and *pneuma*, whereby false images of love and freedom are exposed by searching wholeheartedly for true love aided by the promptings of the spirit (cf. Gal. 5:13, 6:2).

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Of the numerous studies about the impact of a poisoned environment and a defective culture and society on temptation, Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York, 1932) and Edwin M. Shur's *Our Criminal Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969) are noteworthy. In his much-read book, *Whatever Became of Sin?* (New York, 1973), Karl Menninger points to the mechanisms and temptations of denying sin and thus, also, human freedom and responsibility. C. S. Lewis attempts to unmask real temptation in his widely known book *The Screwtape Letters* (New York, 1946). Helmut Knufmann reflects on novelists' treatment of temptation as a theme in his book *Das Böse in den Liaisons Dangereuses de Choderlos de Laclos* (Munich, 1965).

BERNHARD HÄRING

TEN COMMANDMENTS. The Ten Commandments (or the Decalogue) appear twice in the Hebrew scriptures, at *Exodus* 20:1–17 and at *Deuteronomy* 5:6–21. There are differences between the two listings, but

the order and the general contents are substantially identical. The commandments may be grouped as follows:

- *Commandments 1–3:* God's self-identification, followed by commandments against the worship of other gods, idolatry, and misuse of the divine name (*Ex.* 20:1–7, *Dt.* 5:6–11).
- *Commandments 4–5:* Positive commands to observe the Sabbath and to honor parents (*Ex.* 20:8–12, *Dt.* 5:12–16).
- *Commandments 6–7:* Prohibitions of violent acts against neighbors, namely, killing and adultery (*Ex.* 20:13–14, *Dt.* 5:17–18).
- *Commandments 8–10:* Prohibitions of crimes against community life, namely, stealing, testifying falsely, and hankering after the life and goods of neighbors (*Ex.* 20:15–17, *Dt.* 5:19–21).

In the Jewish and Christian communities the order has occasionally varied, and the numbering has varied considerably, especially in the different Christian communions. Tables listing the various enumerations can be found in works by Harrelson (1980) and Nielsen (1968). The prologue with which the list opens, both in *Exodus* and in *Deuteronomy*, belongs to the Ten Commandments: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." In the oldest listing of the "Ten Words" (*Ex.* 34:28), the prologue may not have appeared, but it became attached to the list early in Israel's history, setting the demands of God into the context of divine grace and mercy.

The origin of the Ten Commandments is traditionally traced to Moses. There is no adequate reason to doubt the accuracy of the tradition, even though the present form of the Ten Commandments is considerably later than Moses' time. None of the individual commandments, which were probably originally brief, pithy prohibitions of actions ruled out in principle, requires a dating later than the time of Moses. The grouping of the ten may belong to the time when the tribes of Israel had settled in Canaan and maintained ties across tribal lines; some scholars would assign the collection to a later time, perhaps to the ninth century BCE. The closest analogies to the Ten Commandments in the Hebrew scriptures appear in the curse ritual of *Deuteronomy* 27:15–26 and in portions of the section of the Torah sometimes called the "Book of the Covenant" (*Ex.* 20:23–23:33). See, for example, *Exodus* 21:15–17, where short, categorical legal pronouncements appear.

The Ten Commandments are alluded to in a number of places in the Hebrew scriptures, in the Qumran literature, and in the New Testament, although they are

rarely quoted exactly and do not appear at all in a complete listing outside of *Exodus* and *Deuteronomy*. The prologue is found in a number of places (*Hos.* 13:4, *Ps.* 81:10/11), and there are lists of some of the prohibitions in several places (*Hos.* 4:2, *Mk.* 10:17–22 and parallels). But the fundamental outlook of the Ten Commandments is characteristic for the Jewish and Christian communities through the centuries. God will not have the divine name and selfhood profaned, for the Creator remains free and sovereign over against the creation. God demands rest from labor as well as labor, and he will not tolerate the mistreatment of elderly parents by adult children. God claims authority over human life and demands respect for life on the part of all. God will not permit the violation of the extended life of human beings in their social and institutional relations.

The Ten Commandments became a fixed part of Christian catechetical practice and worship. Less prominent in Islam, they are implicit in much that Muḥammad taught. In the course of Christian history they have frequently contributed to narrowness of vision and legalism. Yet it seems likely that they have contributed much more by way of positive guidance to the community. Negatively put categorical statements of this sort provide moral orientation of the community, the defining characteristics of a people, showing what is simply not allowed. The Ten Commandments require positive statements of what idolatry means, what murder is, how the Sabbath is to be observed, and the like. They constitute not so much a constriction of human freedom as an invitation to the community to claim its proper freedom within the confines of what would be ruinous for it.

[For further discussion, see Israelite Law, overview article, and Israelite Religion.]

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TENDAISHŪ. One of two major schools of Japanese Buddhism to emerge in the Heian period (794–1185), the Tendaishū, or Tendai sect, encompasses a systematic doctrinal and practical program of universal salvation based principally on the teachings of the *Sad-*

dharmapunḍarīka (Lotus) *Sūtra*. The school was founded in the early ninth century by the monk Saichō (764–822), who had returned from a visit to T'ang China bearing the texts and teachings of the T'ien-t'ai lineage (Tendai is the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai) that had been conferred on him there.

By the Heian period, the so-called six sects of Nara Buddhism, the Buddhist ecclesiastical establishment centered in the old capital of Nara, represented for many an attenuated scholastic tradition devoid of genuine religious vitality. Both Saichō and Kūkai (774–835), the founder of the Shingon sect, the other great tradition of Heian Buddhism, were seminal figures in the creation of a new religious climate, one that promoted, within the still largely aristocratic society of their times, a spiritual egalitarianism. They criticized the Nara sects, themselves the direct importation of the prevailing doctrinal traditions of eighth-century China, for appealing principally to the aristocratic elite and aiming at the salvation of but a few spiritually advanced adepts. In their place both Saichō and Kūkai promoted religious programs that avowed as their goal the enlightenment of all beings through a practical path of study, liturgy (largely Tantric), and meditation.

The Tendaishū, like its Chinese counterpart, regarded the teachings of the *Lotus Sutra* (Jpn., *Myōhōrengekyō*; abbreviated title, *Hokekyō*) as constituting the core religious message of the Buddha Śākyamuni. They referred to it as the "perfect" or "round" teaching (*engyō*) and believed that the very reason for the appearance of the Buddha in this world was to make known its doctrines. The school also held in high regard the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (Jpn., *Daihatsu nehanyō*), a text they considered to have been preached by the Buddha just prior to his *parinirvāṇa* in order to guide to salvation all those who might have failed to benefit from the teaching of the *Lotus*, and the treatises and commentaries of Chih-i (538–597), the *de facto* founder of the T'ien-t'ai lineage in China. [See the biography of Chih-i.] Tendai also stressed the value of Esoteric (Mikkyō), that is, Tantric, practices. As Mikkyō grew in popularity, the Tendai sect gave increased prominence to the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* (Jpn., *Dainichikyō*). It was this combination of Tendai universalism and egalitarianism with Tantric practices and ritual that brought Tendai its widespread favor and patronage.

Saichō. Saichō, also known by his posthumous title Dennyō Daishi, began his formal Buddhist training at the age of twelve and was ordained at the age of nineteen at the Tōdaiji in Nara. Although his early training was typical for his time—he had studied the teachings of the Sanron (Skt., Mādhyamika; Chin., San-lun), Hossō (Skt., Yogācāra; Chin., Fa-hsiang), and Kegon

(Chin., Hua-yen) sects—shortly after his ordination Saichō climbed to a small hermitage on Mount Hiei in order to study and meditate in seclusion. It remains unclear whether this unusual move was precipitated by his desire to seek a reprieve from the political instability of the period or by his disillusionment with the increasing corruption and scholasticism of the Nara sects. During the ten years that he remained on Mount Hiei Saichō discovered T'ien-t'ai scriptures and the writings of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai master Chih-i. It was also during this period that Emperor Kammu moved the capital of Japan from Nara to Kyoto. Saichō began to attract the attention of many court nobles, and in 802 he was invited to be the main speaker at a *Lotus Sutra* assembly in the capital. Favorably impressed with Saichō, the emperor came to regard the close proximity of Mount Hiei and Saichō's presence there as an auspicious and protective influence on the newly established capital city. Saichō's temple came to be known as the "chief seat for the protection of the nation." In 804, through the patronage of Emperor Kammu, Saichō traveled to China to study with the T'ang masters and to collect T'ien-t'ai texts.

Saichō spent nine months in China, during which time he studied four forms of Buddhism. He was initiated in the *bodhisattva* rites on Mount T'ien-t'ai and studied T'ien-t'ai doctrines with Tao-sui and Hsing-man, the leading disciples of Chan-jan (711–782), the ninth (sixth, by another reckoning) patriarch of the sect. He also studied Ch'an (Jpn., Zen) meditation with Hsiao-jan and was initiated into Esoteric Buddhism by Shun-hsiao. After his return to Japan Saichō received even greater court patronage as a result of his knowledge of Esoteric Buddhism and his performance of Esoteric rituals to heal the ailing emperor. In 806 Kammu granted Saichō's temple two annually appointed official priests, an event that marked the official establishment of the Tendai sect in Japan.

With the death of Emperor Kammu in 805 Saichō lost much of his court patronage to Kūkai, founder of the Shingon (Esoteric) sect. Despite this, the two religious leaders were able to maintain a friendly, if somewhat ambivalent, relationship until 816, when their differences became irreconcilable, and the friendship came to an unhappy end. That same year Saichō left Mount Hiei for the Kantō region, where he hoped to propagate Tendai doctrines and attract a larger following. The rest of Saichō's life was spent defending Tendai doctrines and practices against the attacks of the Hossō sect and fighting for the establishment of an independent Tendai ordination center on Mount Hiei. [See the *biographies of Saichō and Kūkai*.]

In general, Saichō closely modeled his school after

the example of Chih-i and the Chinese T'ien-t'ai sect. He did, however, introduce certain elements that were to influence significantly the development of the Tendai school in Japan. Unlike the T'ien-t'ai school in China, which had remained apolitical, under Saichō's leadership Tendai was infused with a strong sense of nationalism that was expressed in its role as the nation's protector and preserver. Saichō's notions of universalism and his syncretic tendencies led him to compromise with Shintō, at least to the extent that he promoted respect for the native *kami*. With but a few modifications, such as the inclusion in his curriculum of the four forms of Buddhism he had studied in China, Saichō adhered to the T'ien-t'ai formulation of the threefold study of morality (*śīla*), meditation (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*prajñā*). This program blended well with Saichō's firm belief that the Japanese people had so highly developed their religious understanding that they were prepared for the perfect teachings of the "one vehicle" (Skt., *eka-yāna*; Jpn., *ichijō*) of Tendai.

Doctrine. Syncretism had always been a hallmark of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism. Chih-i held that the teachings of the *Lotus Sutra* could unite the various Buddhist doctrines and reveal their true, perfect meaning. Traditionally, Chih-i has been credited with classifying the development of Buddhism into five periods, eight teachings, and three truths. He also regarded the *Lotus Sutra* as having two sections. The first, dealing with the life and teachings of the historical, manifest Buddha, Śākyamuni and the teaching of the One Vehicle, was called the "section of manifestation" (Jpn., *shakumon*; Chin., *chi-men*); the second, elucidating the eternal life of the Buddha Śākyamuni and the teaching of the One Vehicle, was called the "section of origin" (Jpn., *honmon*; Chin., *pen-men*). Saichō strictly upheld Chih-i's doctrinal distinctions and categories. At the same time, however, he hoped to offer an alternative to the teachings of the Hossō and Sanron sects. Following the later Chinese classification systems, Saichō identified Tendai as the superior Buddhist teaching and Japan as the country in which the "one vehicle" of the true Mahāyāna teachings would reach its pinnacle. In rejecting the Nara sects of Buddhism, Saichō attacked their reliance on commentaries for doctrinal authority and held instead that one must read the actual *sūtras*, which contain the true words of the Buddha.

The unity and oneness inherent in the term *one vehicle* was expressed in Saichō's faith in three ways:

1. Like Chih-i, Saichō attempted to resolve the dichotomy between relative and absolute truth, a resolution inherent in Chih-i's three categories of truth—empty (Jpn., *kū*), provisional or temporary (Jpn., *ke*),

and “middle” (Jpn., *chū*). This categorization attempts to avert one-sided identification with the Absolute as “devoid” of mundane existence altogether by interposing between Absolute and mundane a middle term, dialectically conceived, that allows one to function in the provisional world of phenomena while constantly realizing its emptiness. For Saichō, the truth of the Middle Way allows the practitioner to avoid extremes with respect to the self and enlightenment and to transcend all conceptualizations.

2. In accordance with the doctrine of the unity of the Buddha and all other beings, Saichō held that Śākya-muni was but one manifestation of eternal, absolute truth, or Buddha nature. The Buddha nature is inherent in all beings and can be realized through sincere practice, contemplation, and moral rectitude.
3. In contrast to the Hossō sect, which held that enlightenment was a goal that could only be attained by a few spiritually perfected beings, and only then after aeons of rebirths, practice, and study, Saichō held that salvation was universally attainable. He argued that all beings have the potential to realize their inherent Buddha nature and to attain enlightenment in this world and in this existence.

Morality. Throughout his life Saichō called for the reform of monastic discipline and the establishment of independent Tendai ordinations. He differed from his Chinese predecessors in arguing that as the traditional Vinaya precepts were Hinayanist they were a hindrance to Tendai practice. He proposed that the Tendai school adopt purely Mahāyāna precepts that, although fewer in number than those prescribed by the Vinaya, would emphasize the notion of universal salvation and the *bodhisattva* ideal. Saichō’s greatest desire was to establish an ordination platform on Mount Hiei that would be independent of the ordination center in Nara. He also envisioned a system in which ordained monks would spend twelve years on Mount Hiei in solitary study and meditation. Thereafter, they would leave Hiei for administrative posts in provincial monasteries where they would work toward improving the community and saving all beings. Saichō’s plans were perceived as a challenge to both the established Buddhist sects and to the government, which controlled ordination. It was not until one year after Saichō’s death that the main temple of the Tendai school was granted official permission to ordain monks.

Meditation. The practices and meditation exercises employed on Mount Hiei were, for the most part, direct adoptions of those devised by Cih-i. The form of meditation used in Tendai is known as *shikan* (“concentration and insight”; Chin., *chih-kuan*) and corresponds to

the notion of threefold truth. Sincerely and properly executed meditation allows the practitioner to concentrate on and experience the emptiness of existence, to recognize and have insight into the provisional and temporary nature of all phenomena, and finally to avoid either extreme of awareness by following the Middle Way. The actual method of meditation was not established until Saichō’s disciple Ennin returned from China and introduced a fourfold practice that included (1) perpetual sitting (*jōza zammai*), in which the practitioner sits for ninety days before an image of the Buddha; (2) perpetual walking (*jōgyō zammai*), a ninety-day practice in which the practitioner circumambulates an image of Amida (Skt., Amitābha) Buddha while reciting his name and visualizing his body; (3) both sitting and walking (*hangyō hanza zammai*), in which the practitioner spends alternate weeks for ninety days in the first two practices; and (4) neither sitting nor walking (*higyō hiza zammai*), in which the practitioner concentrates on the nature of good and evil in the midst of his daily activities. [See also Meditation, article on Buddhist Meditation.]

Esoteric Buddhism. At the same time that Saichō adhered to the T’ien-t’ai conceptions of morality, meditation, and doctrine, he believed that they could be supplemented and improved by the introduction of elements from Esoteric Buddhism. Saichō considered Esoteric Buddhism an essential part of Tendai teachings and practices, and held that both were virtually identical in their pursuits. On Mount Hiei two official ordinands were appointed to study both Tendai and Esoteric texts. When Kūkai returned from China in 806, Saichō was anxious to meet with him and to study the texts and practices he had not seen during his own brief study of Esotericism in China. Saichō and several of his disciples studied with and were initiated into Esoteric rituals under Kūkai. The friendly relationship between Saichō and Kūkai became increasingly strained as the two men found it difficult to reconcile their doctrinal differences. While Saichō held that Tendai and Esoteric practices were equal and complementary, Kūkai argued that Esoteric practices were superior. In 816, when Kūkai refused to lend a rare Esoteric text to Saichō and, at the same time, Saichō’s disciple and designated successor, Taihan, decided to join Kūkai’s sect, the relationship came to its final, bitter end.

Unlike the T’ien-t’ai school in China, Tendai teachings as determined by Saichō gave great prominence to Esoteric practices; the term *mikkyō* (“esoteric teachings”) was equally applied to both the Tendai and Shingon sects. However, it fell to Saichō’s disciples to fully integrate and systematize Esoteric practices within the context of Tendai doctrines and the *Lotus Sutra*. Indeed,

the partisanship and sectarianism that arose after Saichō's death were ostensibly the result of debates and controversies concerning the role and interpretation of Tendai Esotericism (called Taimitsu, in contrast to Shingon Esotericism, known as Tōmitsu). [See also Chen-yen and Shingonshū.]

The Theory of Original Enlightenment. A variety of doctrines concerning the relationship of phenomenal and absolute existence coalesced in Tendai thought around the so-called theory of "original enlightenment" (*hongaku*). Although not indigenous to the Lotus tradition proper, so thoroughly was it imported into Japanese Tendai that by the Kamakura period *hongaku shisō* ("hongaku theory") served as a common religious and aesthetic denominator for Japanese culture as a whole. To the extent that Tendai served as the locus of the Kamakura schools, the concept of *hongaku* constituted one of the primary ontological stances of several of the major schools of the medieval era.

The principal locus of *hongaku* theory is the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna; T.D. no. 1666), a text attributed to Aśvaghōṣa but possibly a fifth or sixth century work of Indian or Chinese pseudography. The *Ch'i-hsin lun* was first translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (499–569) and became a central text in the Hua-yen tradition at the time of its third "patriarch," the systematizer of Hua-yen doctrine, Fa-tsang (643–712), who commented upon the work in his *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun i-chi* (T.D. no. 1846). [See the biographies of Paramārtha and Fa-tsang.] Hua-yen doctrines were, of course, known to the Japanese through the Kegon (the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese Hua-yen) scholarship of the Nara period, and had been studied by Saichō prior to his retreat to Mount Hiei. In addition, by Saichō's time the doctrines of the *Ch'i-hsin lun* had come to play a significant role in Chinese T'ien-t'ai itself through the writings of the school's ninth patriarch, Chan-jan (711–782). Presumably, these doctrines were transmitted to Saichō in China during his brief discipleship under Chan-jan's disciple Tao-sui. But the doctrines of the *Ch'i-hsin lun* were given greater currency in Japan through the work of Kūkai, whose esteem for the *Shih-ma-ho-yen lun* (Jpn., *Shaku makaen ron*; T.D. no. 1668), allegedly Nāgārjuna's commentary on the *Ch'i-hsin lun*, helped to instantiate the notions of *hongaku* and *funi* ("nonduality") in the Shingon synthesis. It was after the death of Kūkai that *hongaku* theory made its greatest inroads in Tendai thought.

The term *hongaku* (Chin., *pen-chüeh*) refers to an original or fundamental principle of enlightenment immanent in all things. Like the term *tathāgata-garbha* ("womb of the Tathāgata"), it denotes an underlying purity and reality behind the impure flux of phenomenal

existence, but unlike *tathāgata-garbha*, which takes as its standpoint the Absolute alone, *hongaku* theory was based on the reconciliation of Absolute and phenomenal realms. The *Ch'i-hsin lun* proposes a trinity of "original enlightenment" (*hongaku*; i.e., enlightenment as fundamental and essential nature), "actualized enlightenment" (*shigaku*, i.e., enlightenment as experienced), and "nonenlightenment" (*fugaku*, i.e., delusion as the condition of phenomenal existence and yet ultimately dependent upon *hongaku*).

The theory of original enlightenment is rooted in the traditional stance of the Mahāyāna toward the apparent antinomies that dominate our view of the world. This stance tends to see in duality nothing more than a reification of conceptual and linguistic categories. Seen in this way, even such apparently distinct categories as life and death, delusion and enlightenment, ordinary being and Buddhahood are devoid (*sūnya*) of real existence; they "exist" only as opposites of one another, the way that long and short "exist" as purely relative distinctions. In other words, those dual aspects are nondual (*advaya*), grounded on voidness (*sūnyatā*), as explained in the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*. Emphasizing this nonduality, the Japanese Tendai theory of original enlightenment affirmed all the apparently dual aspects of the phenomenal world as equally manifestations of nonduality. For example, in the *Shōji kakuyū shō* (Life and Death as a Manifestation of Enlightenment) or the *Honmushōji ron* (Nonlife and Nondeath in Essence; a work attributed to Ennin but presumably composed about 1150), it is said, "the wonderful coming of noncoming, the true life of nonlife, the perfect going of nongoing, the great death of nondeath, the unity of life and death, the nonduality of voidness and existence." The *Sanjūshika kotogaki* (Writing on Thirty-four Things; attributed to Kōkaku but composed about the year 1250) insists that not only in the Buddha but also in ordinary man are manifested this nonduality of Buddha and (ordinary) man. Accordingly, any particular practice leading to enlightenment is deemed unnecessary.

Initially, *hongaku* theory developed in parallel with Tendai doctrines derived principally from the *Lotus Sūtra*. But by the mid-Kamakura era (c. 1250), Tendai scholiasts tended to see a consonance between *hongaku* theory and the *honmon* theory of the *Lotus*, reinforcing the world-affirming tendencies inherent in both concepts and lending *hongaku* theory even great flexibility as a conceptual tool. The influence of attitudes and orientations indigenous to Japanese thought can be clearly perceived in this thoroughgoing affirmation of the world.

During this period, an integration between Buddhism and Shintō developed. It is often maintained that the

Sannō-ichijitsu Shintō derives from the Tendai sect and that Ryōbu Shintō derives from the Shingonshū. However, both can equally be regarded as products of the integration of *hongaku* theory and Japanese thinking. In the *honjisuijaku* doctrines formulated at the end of the Heian era, Shintō deities (*kami*) were regarded as manifestations (*jaku*) of the Buddha, who stood as their source or principle (*honji*). During the mid-Kamakura era, however, Shintō writers attempted to elevate Shintō to supremacy over Buddhism, and in the Muro-machi era (1338–1573) countertheories to the *honjisuijaku* doctrine were proposed by Jihen and Ryōhen, converts to Shintō from Tendai. They advocated a *han-honjisuijaku setsu* (“converse doctrine of origin and manifestation”) in which the Buddha is regarded as ontologically subordinate to the *kami*. This doctrine culminated in the Yuiitsu Shintō of Yoshida Kanetomo (1435–1511). [See *Honjisuijaku* and Shintō.]

The Pure Land thinkers of the Kamakura and later eras were perhaps the most distant ideologically from *hongaku* thought. Hōnen (1132–1212), the founder of the Jōdoshū, and Shinran (1173–1262), founder of the Jōdo Shinshū, both insisted on the undesirability of this world in comparison to Sukhāvātī (the Pure Land of the Buddha Amida), but we can perhaps see in Shinran’s views that beings are already saved and that as a result religious practice does not bring about salvation a reflection of *hongaku* thought. Other Kamakura era thinkers, such as Dōgen (1200–1253) and Nichiren (1222–1282), basically affirmed *hongaku* theory, but from the standpoint of practice they criticized its world-affirming tendencies, which could be used to deny that religious cultivation was necessary. Shinran, Dōgen, and Nichiren each endeavored to unify the relative dualism or world negation of Hōnen’s Pure Land Buddhism with the absolute nondualism or world affirmation of Tendai *hongaku* theory.

Consolidation and Sectarianism. The most urgent task belonging to Saichō’s immediate successor, Gishin (781–833), was to seek greater financial support, popularity, and patronage for the Tendai sect. He was to find, however, that the aristocracy of Japan, which was most interested in Esotericism, chose to favor the highly developed Tōmitsu practices of the Shingon sect. In 831, in an attempt to develop their inferior and scant Esoteric practices and rituals, Gishin’s successor, Enchō (771–838), sought permission to study with Kūkai and to send several Tendai scholars to China. It remained for Ennin (794–864), a disciple of Saichō’s, and Enchin (814–891), a disciple of Gishin’s, to fully develop and systematize Tendai Taimitsu doctrine and practices.

Ennin. In 838 Ennin traveled to China as a member of Japan’s last official embassy (*kentōshi*) to the T’ang

dynasty. Unable to receive permission to study on Mount T’ien-t’ai, the center of the T’ien-t’ai school in China, Ennin spent his nine years in China at the Pure Land center on Mount Wu-t’ai and in the capital city of Ch’ang-an. There he studied Tendai, Pure Land (Chin., Ching-t’u; Jpn., Jōdo), and Esoteric doctrines and practices. Upon his return to Japan Ennin introduced several Pure Land practices, most notably the *jōgyō zam-mai*, or perpetual walking meditation, that was to become a standard Tendai meditation exercise. Also known as *nembutsu zam-mai*, this was the precursor of the later Nembutsu (i.e., invocation of Amida Buddha’s name) practice that was made popular by the Jōdo sect and Amida cults in the Kamakura period. [See Nien-fo.] Ennin also introduced to the Mount Hiei curriculum Esoteric rituals, ceremonies, and *mandalas*. He conducted several Esoteric consecrations and initiation rites that were attended by the emperor, the crown prince, and large numbers of the aristocracy. With these developments, Taimitsu was finally able to compete with, if not surpass, the popularity of Shingon Tōmitsu. In 854, Ennin succeeded Enchō as the chief abbot of Enryakuji on Mount Hiei. [See *the biography of Ennin.*]

Enchin. With the support of wealthy patrons, Enchin was able to travel to China after Japan had discontinued its practice of sending official missions. He spent six years in China, studying on Mount T’ien-t’ai and in the capital, Ch’ang-an. When he returned to Japan in 858, Enchin became the master of the Onjōji (also known as Miidera), a temple on the shores of Lake Biwa, where he propagated Tendai and Esoteric doctrines and practices and completed the esotericization of the Tendai school. Enchin obtained the patronage of the court nobles and aristocracy, enabling Tendai to far surpass the strength and popularity of the Shingon school. In 866 Miidera was granted the status of an official branch temple of the Enryakuji on Mount Hiei. In 868 Enchin became the chief abbot of Enryakuji, succeeding Ennin. [See *the biography of Enchin.*]

The Sanmon and Jimon subsects. Following the deaths of Ennin and Enchin, the efforts of such masters as Annen (841–879?) and Ryōgen (912–985) increased Tendai’s influence and attraction. The sect boasted large numbers of followers and official branch temples. The most important of these temples was that established by Enchin, Miidera, which became known as the center of the Jimon subsect, as opposed to the center of the Sanmon subsect located on Mount Hiei. Initially, the division between the two groups was not based on either doctrinal or sectarian differences but, rather, on location and lineal affiliations. The Sanmon subsect traced its lineage back to Ennin, and the Jimon traced its lineage to Enchin. Although the chief abbot of the

Tendai school was to be appointed from both centers equally, it happened that, until 989, all abbots who succeeded Enchin were affiliated with Sanmon. During this period the issue of succession was at the heart of the continuous disputes between the two groups. By the time Ryōgen was appointed chief abbot of Enryakuji in 966, both subsects displayed a marked degeneration in moral rectitude—monks had become corrupt and more interested in arming themselves and procuring worldly pleasures than in adhering to the moral and spiritual discipline that had characterized earlier Tendai activities. In the late Heian period large armies of “warrior-monks” (*sōhei*) had become so commonplace and moral discipline so lax that Ryōgen was forced to take action to restore the former respectability and vitality of the Tendai sect. He enforced the rules and precepts set down by Saichō, instituted twenty-six articles to guide the moral conduct of monks, and revived the earlier system of education and meditation. These measures were, however, destined to fail.

In 989 the appointment of Yokei, a member of the Jimon subsect, as chief abbot was perceived by the Sanmon monks to be an affront to their supremacy. They refused to accept Yokei as abbot and stole the imperial edict announcing the appointment. In 993 the monks affiliated with the Jimon subsect left Mount Hiei and took up permanent residence at Miidera. The dispute over Yokei’s abbacy lasted several years and marked both the final rift between the two subsects and the onset of centuries of internecine wars. After this rift the *sōhei* attached to the two centers became more powerful, attracting patrons to support their battles against the rival sect. Both temples were attacked and burned several times. Eventually their battles spread beyond the Tendai school and the *sōhei* became involved in skirmishes with the Hossō monks and local landlords.

Toward the end of the Heian period, the Tendai sect had split into many different branches, each promoting the Esoteric practices they claimed were the essential teachings of Saichō, Ennin, and Enchin. The center on Mount Hiei remained the stronghold of Tendai thought, and it is perhaps there that one ought to seek the true legacy of the school. The schools of the Nara period had been unable to attract followers outside the academic and aristocratic pale, and Tendai schools had been unsuccessful in penetrating the minds of the common people. With the establishment of the Kamakura regime, Buddhism in Japan entered into its third phase of development, a phase that brought the Tendai notion of universal salvation to its fullest expression. All the founders of the major sects of Kamakura Buddhism—Hōnen, Shinran, Nichiren, Eisai, and Dōgen—had their early training at the Tendai center on Mount Hiei and

took with them the influence of the practices and doctrines associated with the Tendai school.

[*The antecedents of Tendai doctrine are discussed in T’ien-t’ai.*]

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TENGRI. The earliest attested occurrence of a word in an Altaic language is the transcription into Chinese of the word *tengri* in the *Ch’ien Han shu* (*chüan* 94). It has kept this or a related form (*tenggeri*, *tanara*, *tängri*, *tanri*, *tari*, et al.) down to the present day. Etymologically, the word appears to be linked with a verb that means “to turn.” It has been used continuously, not only by the “shamanistic” or “animistic” Turco-Mongols but also by those who have adopted universal religions. I shall concern myself here only with its meaning in the former case.

The original use of the word *tengri* was in designating the physical sky, as in such statements as “The sun is in the sky” or “The clouds darken the sky.” This long-held meaning eventually was lost. With the deification of the sky, the word took on two other interpretations as well, either that of sky god or the more vague sense of “god,” “deity,” and, adjectivally, “celestial” and “divine.” It is not always possible to determine whether *tengri* is being used as an adjective or a noun.

Deities Named Tengri. At the same time that Tengri the sky god emerges (second half of the first millennium CE), Old Turkic inscriptions mention various deities named Tengri, but little information is available on these. Yol Tengri is the “god of roads or paths” or “god of luck” (*yol* has these two meanings), Öd Tengri is the “god of weather”; there is a Tengri who lies among the reeds as well. No evidence indicates the nature of the relationship between these characters and the sky god. Any attempt to make such a determination is compli-

cated by the fact that the same inscriptions more often refer to much greater divine powers that were never called *tengri*. "Venerated" or "worshiped" celestial bodies also were never called *tengri*.

From toponymy and foreign sources, we know that in certain cases mountains are called *tengri* (for example, Tengri Tag, "celestial mountain"; Chin., T'ien-shan), as are some lakes (for example, Tengri Nor, "celestial lake," in Mongolia). To add to the confusion, an eleventh-century observer, Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, remarked that the word *tengri* applies to everything that appears enormous—a huge tree, for instance. Knowing this, it is no surprise today to see the sky god, who has a greatly attenuated reality, gradually replaced by great deities who are often called Tengri. Even if one has every reason to believe that the word is an adjective, does this usage not make a god out of a divine being or object? Such is the case with certain shamans, like the one who enthroned Chinggis Khan, Teb Tenggeri ("very celestial"); certain sorcerers ("a holy old woman"); the nation ("my sacred nation"); and most of the khans ("my holy khan"). In fact, there was a Türk sovereign who had no name but Tengri Khan (734–741). Finally, scholars are unsure to what extent something called "blue" (in Turkic languages, *kök*; Mong., *köke*), in the sense of an attribute of the sky, is to be identified with God. Examples of this usage are found among the Turkic peoples and among the Mongols; as, for instance, in the case of the Mongol emperor Möngke: Köke Möngke ("blue eternal").

The Sky God. The modern Turco-Mongol peoples who have preserved their ancient religion have less of an interest in the sky god than previously. Most often, the sky is the abode of a celestial god, sometimes anthropomorphized, who has numerous assistants—his sons and daughters, his wife, and many others. The sky is divided into levels, generally seven according to the supposed number of planets. Even in areas where Russian Orthodoxy or Buddhism has had little influence, there are many unstable *tengris*, a fact that corresponds perfectly to the traditional ideology. All attempts to classify them are wholly imposed from without and lack foundation in the tradition. As for the sky god, in areas where belief in him persists, he is nonetheless considered to be very distant. The Altaic tribes call him Tengere Kaira Khan ("merciful lord sky"), but his sons and assistants hold the real power, notably the power of creation: they are Bai Ülgen alone or together with Kysogan Tengere and Mergen Tengere. [See Ülgen.] The great god of the Yakuts is Iuriung Aiyy Toïon ("white lord creator") or Aiyy Toion. It is believed that he gradually became a *deus otiosus*. In fact, it appears that he has always been such for the masses. As early as the

tenth century, Balik Bayat, "supreme old one" or "supreme wealthy one," is regarded as the creator. I must point out, however, that the ancient cosmogonies are inconsistent and that the problem of origins has only recently been addressed. When creation was later attributed to the sky god, it seems likely that it was in response to questions posed by Muslims or Christians.

The active sky god is an imperial creation that concerns only the imperial religion: the people devoted attention to him only in times when imperial power was sufficient to command widespread obedience to the deity. Occasionally, sincere devotees of the sky god would appear. Such mystics were claimed to be "slaves of Tengri," but no Islamic influence can be discerned in this appellation. The sky god appears already before the common era among the Hsiung-nu, then later, continually, in all the great political formations up to the fourteenth century. Under the Türk (sixth to eighth century) and under the Mongols (thirteenth to fourteenth century), he is particularly visible. The former call him "blue," "elevated" or "above," and "endowed with power"; the latter add to these qualities that he is "eternal," a characteristic supposedly long implied.

It is not an exaggeration to say that no other deity has responded so much to the needs of his loyal followers. The Turco-Mongol emperor first wanted to gather all those of his race, then the entire world. His god was national (the Tengri of the Türks and Mongols), then universal and unique. There is but one god in the sky and one sole sovereign on earth: such is the ideology. It represents a desperate but unsuccessful effort to promote monotheism; the other deities remained alive in the minds of the people and were more or less associated with the sky god. Even so, the sky god is as predominant as the emperor himself, who "comes from him," "resembles him" (and is sometimes his son), conducts privileged conversations with him, receives and transmits his orders, conquers in his name, names dignitaries in his name, rewards and punishes with death (the only punishment of Tengri, used often against those who revolt), distributes to everyone, man or beast, *kut*, a vitality that brings happiness, and *ülüg*, luck. Nevertheless, the sky god can do without the emperor when he is weakening or has lost his divine mandate. In such a case he "applies pressure," or sends his messengers: an eagle, an enigmatic angel, some rays of light often accompanied by "dazzling daughters," or the animal guides, particularly the wolf, who are none other than the imperial ancestors. Anyone can talk to the sky god, but shamans are forbidden to have closer relationships with him than the prince does: any pretension of having such a relationship will lead to the shaman's destruction. In contrast, great respect is shown to all those who

are specialists in spirituality, notably to foreign priests who are protected and exempted from taxes on the condition that they pray for the emperor's longevity.

It appears that in ancient times the Tengri cult thrived for only short periods; nevertheless, it developed rapidly. Sacrifices of white horses or other animals were offered to Tengri annually or daily, usually on fixed dates or during special events. Prayer itself spread and became an essential element in the Tengri cult in the thirteenth century. Great orisons were conducted by the sovereign from an elevation where, over a period of time lasting from one to three days, he continually bowed in prayer to the sky with bare head and loosened belt. It has always been common practice to go around in a circle on horseback: this is called "going around the sky."

It is a common belief among practitioners of the Tengri cult that souls reside in Tengri before their incarnation and that the souls of the deceased return to him. In fact, when a death is announced, one says "He flew off" or "He became a gyrfalcon." The destination is specified: "He climbed to the sky with his body" and "In the sky you will be as among the living." However, beliefs probably concern particularly great personages and those who will be needed in the beyond to serve them.

[See also Buriat Religion; Chuvash Religion; Mongol Religions; and Turkic Religions.]

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Translated from French by Sherri L. Granka

TENRIKYŌ. A monotheistic Japanese religion established in 1838, Tenrikyō preaches a doctrine of world renewal and individual salvation. Its founder, Nakayama Miki (1798–1887), received a revelation from Tenri Ō no Mikoto (also known as Oyagami, or "God the parent"), and became Kami no Yashiro ("the living shrine

of God"). According to Tenrikyō church tradition, God revealed himself through Nakayama in order to deliver people from individual sufferings and social evils, and to prepare the way for the *kanrodai sekai* ("perfect divine kingdom"), in which humankind will enjoy *yōki-gurashi* ("joyous and blissful life") in union with God the Parent. Tenrikyō spread rapidly throughout Japan during the tumultuous eclipse of the Edo period (1600–1868).

History. The eldest daughter of Maekawa Masanobu and his wife Kinu, Maekawa Miki (later, Nakayama Miki) became a pious devotee of Pure Land Buddhism early in life. Although she wished to become a nun, in obedience to her parents' wishes she married Nakayama Zembei in 1810. In her marriage she affirmed the values of worldly life through moral compassion toward others and devotion to Shintō deities. The revelation she experienced in her forty-first year resulted in a dedication to almsgiving, leading her family into extreme poverty. She affirmed her credibility by working miracles, teaching that divine protection was attainable only through a life of sincere piety. Her mission to achieve the new world order of *kanrodai sekai* was misunderstood by many, and she and her followers were persecuted for many years, she herself being imprisoned several times.

Despite intensifying persecution, Nakayama wrote two books, the *Mikagurauta* and the *Ofudesaki*, taught her disciples the movements for the Kagura Zutome ("salvation dance service"), the essential rite in Tenrikyō, and determined the location of the *jiba*, the sacred spot that is believed to be the original birthplace of man. On the morning of 26 January 1887, she urged her disciples to perform the Kagura Zutome (which had been prohibited by the police), asking them to decide for themselves whether the laws of man or those of God are supreme. As they performed the service around the Kanrodai, a symbolic monument erected at the *jiba*, Nakayama died. Her followers believed that she had passed from a corporeal to a spiritual state, remaining in her sanctuary and helping them to realize God's kingdom in this world. Nakayama's ascension to this new state, together with the *hinagata* ("model life") she exemplified, became the focal point of the Tenrikyō faith.

After her passing, God spoke through Iburi Izō (1833–1907), Nakayama's most trusted disciple. The *Osashizu* was compiled from revelations made to him and fostered the emergence of a structured Tenrikyō church system. Tenrikyō was sanctioned by the government and officially classified as one of the sects of Sect Shintō in 1888. The church was then forced to alter its teachings and activities to conform to government policies.

Nevertheless, Nakayama's teachings were retained intact and spread throughout Japan by 1895. Missions were established in the United States in 1896, in Taiwan in 1897, in Korea in 1898, and in China in 1901. After World War II, with the guarantee of religious freedom under the 1947 Constitution, the Fukugen ("restoration of the original teachings") movement was carried out to purify Tenrikyō teachings, which had been distorted by the influences of Shintō and state nationalism. This movement marked a step toward a redefinition of Tenrikyō as distinct from Sect Shintō. By the 1980s, Tenrikyō had approximately three million followers, with 16,664 churches and 20,039 mission stations scattered worldwide. Tenrikyō also operates social and cultural institutions, including a university, a library, a museum, a publishing house, a hospital, and an orphanage.

Doctrine. Tenri Ō no Mikoto ("lord of heavenly reason"), as revealed through Nakayama, is the creator of the world, and is also defined as the *moto no kami* ("original god") and the *jitsu no kami* ("true god"). God has ten attributes, which are manifested symbolically as *tohashira no kami* ("ten deities"), each representing a particular aspect of God working in the physical world. God is further posited as Tsukihi ("sun and moon") and finally as Oyagami ("God the parent"), revealing his pantheistic and immanent nature as well as his transcendental and personal existence. He is the god of parental love, who created the world in order to enjoy seeing the harmonious life of human beings. Believing in neither original sin nor the fall of man, Tenrikyō holds that the revelation was necessary to rectify man's selfishness, which is contrary to God's original intent. The revelation occurred through three preordinations—the soul, the place, and the time—which are historically manifested in the soul of Nakayama, the *jiba* (the place of the original creation), and the time of revelation. This triad comprises the core of the Tenrikyō doctrine, and emphasizes the historical inevitability of the revelation.

Tenrikyō defines human physical existence as a *kashimono-karimono* ("something lent or borrowed," i.e., from God) and death as a *denaoshi* ("restart"). The progressive purification of the human heart is recognized through the process of reincarnation. Its ethical teaching is founded upon the doctrine of *yattsu no hokori* ("eight dusts"), consisting of *oshii* ("grudge"), *hoshii* ("covetousness"), *nikui* ("hatred"), *kawaii* ("selfish love"), *urami* ("enmity"), *haradachi* ("fury"), *yoku* ("greed"), and *kōman* ("arrogance"). These are defined as pollutants to be cleansed in order to uncover one's true nature and attain a state of *makoto-shinjitsu* ("sincere piety"). Salvation requires three activities. Receiving *osazuke* ("the holy grant") is the most important

rite; it enables one to be reborn at the *jiba* and to become an agent of God to help others through prayers. Performing *hinokishin* ("daily service") in one's given social position is another means to achieving personal maturity. Last, frequent pilgrimages to the *jiba* are urged to renew one's faith and to enjoy a blissful and joyous life in union with God.

Scriptures. The essential Tenrikyō canonical texts are the *Mikagurauta* (Songs for the Sacred Dance), the *Ofudesaki* (Tip of the Divine Writing Brush), and the *Osashizu* (Divine Directions), the first two personally written by Nakayama under divine inspiration and the third revealed through Iburi. Written between 1866 and 1875, the *Mikagurauta* consists of five sections. The first three comprise the verses for the Kagura Zutome service. The fourth, containing eight verses, and the fifth, consisting of twelve stanzas of ten verses each, are the songs for the Teodori (Sacred Dance) service. Revealed to Nakayama between 1869 and 1882, the *Ofudesaki* is composed of seventeen parts comprising 1,711 verses written in the 5-7-5-7-7-syllable *waka* style. This scripture introduces the basic creed of Tenrikyō and elucidates the creation of the world, the nature of God, the significance of the *jiba* and the Kanrodai, and the importance of the Kagura Zutome.

The *Osashizu*, a large collection of directions revealed to Iburi from 1887 to 1907 after Nakayama's passing, is divided into two categories: *kokugen* (prophecies and directions to meet the exigencies of salvation) and *ukagai no sashizu* (directions in response to individual inquiries). The *Osashizu* contains concrete and detailed instructions concerning church organization and personal conduct, and offers Tenrikyō adherents guidance for solving the problems of daily life.

[See also New Religions, article on New Religions in Japan.]

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TERESA OF ÁVILA (1515–1582), epithet of Teresa de Ahumada y Cepeda, Christian saint, Spanish mystic, religious reformer, and author of religious classics. Teresa was born at Ávila in the Castilian region of Spain on 28 March 1515, the third child of Don Alonso Cepeda, a moderately wealthy merchant. She was a spirited child, and early in life she began to manifest deep religious feelings. When she was seven she and her eleven-year-old brother ran away from home, intending to go to the country of the Moors and offer themselves for martyrdom. Later, writing about the episode in her *Life*, she said that she had done this because she “wanted to see God.” However, the adventure ended abruptly a few meters outside the walled city of Ávila when the two children met their uncle, who promptly took them home.

In her early teens Teresa took a great interest in clothes, read romantic stories, and apparently had a romance with a cousin. When she was fifteen her mother died at the age of thirty-three, having produced nine children, and her father sent Teresa to board at Our Lady of Grace Convent, a kind of finishing school for girls from comfortable families. She remained there for a year and a half, and during that period her contact with the Augustinian nuns prompted her to start thinking about a religious vocation.

Illness forced Teresa to leave the school, and she went to live with a sister to recuperate. She began to visit the Carmelite Convent of the Incarnation in Ávila to talk about becoming a nun. One of the nuns later recalled the charm and beauty of the nineteen-year-old Teresa. In 1535, at the age of twenty, Teresa entered the Convent of the Incarnation, where she remained for twenty-eight years until she left to found her own reformed Carmelite convent. At the time of Teresa’s entrance the convent had 140 nuns, and although the reform movement was to emanate from it, there was nothing scandalous about life there; it was simply a comfortable and not particularly demanding existence. The nuns, especially those from affluent families, lived in a suite of rooms, often attended by a servant. They were able to visit freely outside the convent, and they spent long hours each day in the parlor visiting with outsiders. Teresa lived this type of life until she was about forty, when she experienced what she called her “conversion” while reading the *Confessions* of Augustine. From that point until the end of her life, she followed a rigorous personal program of discipline and prayer that culmi-

nated in frequent religious experiences in which she saw the Lord and heard him speak. Teresa herself described these experiences as “intellectual visions and locutions.”

For seven years after her “conversion” Teresa continued to live at the Incarnation, but she began to plan the establishment of a small Carmelite convent that would follow the original Carmelite rule of 1209, which had been mitigated by Eugenius IV in 1435. She claimed that she had been encouraged to do this in her visions, but at first, there was much opposition from the nuns in the convent and other ecclesiastics. She finally obtained permission from Rome, and on 24 August 1562, along with four other nuns, she established in Ávila a convent of discalced Carmelite nuns. The word *discalced* (lit., “without shoes”) referred, in the religious parlance of the time, to a reformed group that usually went barefoot or in sandals. Teresa’s reformed convent in Ávila was dedicated to Saint Joseph, and the nuns who lived there followed the original Carmelite rule, rather than the mitigated one observed at the Incarnation. This meant a much stricter observance of such conventual disciplines as fasting, silence, and restriction of contact with outsiders.

Teresa, who now called herself of Teresa of Jesus, remained at that first convent for just over four years, a time later described as “the most restful years of my life.” Her original intention had been to establish only that single reformed convent, but in 1567 the Carmelite general, Giovanni Rossi, on a visitation from Rome, approved Teresa’s work and commanded her to establish other convents. During the next fifteen years she would personally found about one convent a year in Spain, and after her death similar reformed Carmelite convents were established all over the world.

While she was still a nun at the Incarnation, Teresa began writing an account of her life, a task she completed during the first years of her reform. She always called it her *libro grande*, but it was only the first effort in an impressive body of Christian literature. These works, never originally intended for general publication, were written at odd moments during a busy career of religious administration. She wrote four major prose works, a series of shorter works, poems, and numerous letters, of which 445 are extant. Principal among these works are *Foundations*, which describes her adventures in founding convents, *Way of Perfection*, which explains prayer, and *Interior Mansions*, which describes the dimensions of spiritual and mystical growth. Her works are considered Christian masterpieces, and she is undoubtedly one of history’s great authorities on mysticism.

Teresa also developed the idea of establishing reli-

gious houses of reformed Carmelite men. She obtained permission from the general in Rome and in 1568 opened the first monastery of reformed Carmelite friars at Duruelo, twenty-five miles from Ávila. One of those original friars was Juan de Yepes y Alvarez, who was to be known to history as John of the Cross. Soon there were reformed Carmelite monasteries all over Spain, and eventually they spread around the world.

In 1582 Teresa founded the last of her fifteen convents, at Burgos. On her return trip to Ávila she was taken ill and stopped at her convent at Alba de Tormes. At sixty-seven, suffering from uterine cancer, she died there on 4 October 1582. Paul V beatified her in 1614; Gregory XV canonized her in 1622; and Paul VI, who called her "the light of the universal church," declared her a doctor of the church in 1970.

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TERTULLIAN (160?–225?), Quintus Septimius Florens, first Christian theologian to write extensively in Latin. An African, Tertullian laid the foundations for Western theology through the range of issues he addressed and his precise formulations. Although he became an adherent of the Montanist sect, his thought exerted much influence on Cyprian, bishop of Carthage (248–258), and later Latin authors.

Life. Little is known of Tertullian's life. Data supplied by Jerome in his *Lives of Famous Men* (392–393) were apparently inferred from remarks in Tertullian's own writings and are now generally discounted by scholars. Probably born and reared in Carthage, he received an excellent education and was considered one of the luminaries of his day. Although he employed considerable legal jargon and argument in his writing, he probably cannot be identified with the jurist Tertullianus whose

opinions were cited in the *Digest* and *Codex Justinianus*. His extensive legal knowledge would have come from classical education.

Tertullian converted to Christianity around 193 to 195, doubtless attracted by the discipline of Christians, especially their willingness for martyrdom. His unusual gifts, education, and commitment quickly propelled him into a position of leadership, but, contrary to Jerome's assumption, he was never ordained a presbyter or elder in the Carthaginian church, identifying himself several times in his writings as a member of the laity. He did, however, preach or teach, for several of his writings are sermons.

Sympathetic by inclination with the rigorous views of discipline held by the Montanists, a charismatic sect that originated in Phrygia about AD 170, Tertullian veered toward that sect as the catholic church in North Africa moved away from it. [See also Montanism.] For him this entailed no radical shift in views, but rather a hardening of certain ones held earlier on remarriage, flight to avoid persecution, and repentance for serious sins—all of which, as a Montanist, he prohibited absolutely. His new affiliation notwithstanding, he continued as the chief spokesman against gnosticism and Marcionism and as the major theologian in the West until Augustine.

After several years in the Montanist camp Tertullian separated from them and formed a sect of his own called Tertullianists, which still existed in Augustine's heyday (c. 400–430). This schism could well have resulted from the growing tendency of Montanists to make exaggerated claims for their founder Montanus, as Tertullian was horrified by any ideas that were not thoroughly orthodox.

Throughout his career Tertullian belonged to the literary circles in Carthage. In his writings he cited numerous classics, perhaps drawn in part from anthologies but certainly also from works he knew in depth. As a stylist, he surpassed both Jerome and Augustine. He was a creative and passionate debater whose erudition and technique place him in the second Sophistic movement. The exact date of his death is unknown.

Writings. Tertullian's writings, thirty-one of which are extant, are notoriously difficult to date. They were once neatly divided into pre-Montanist, or catholic, and Montanist, according to "Montanistic" allusions. Recent studies, however, have demonstrated Montanist leanings not only in Tertullian but in early North African Christianity, hence this method has been discarded and the dating of many works revised.

The writings range across a wide spectrum, but they can be conveniently grouped under the headings of apologies for Christianity, treatises on the Christian life,

and antiheretical works. In the summer of 197, Tertullian drafted two apologies, *To the Nations* and *Against the Jews*, the latter intended for Christian readers but never completed. Shortly thereafter, he revised *To the Nations* and published it as the finely argued and highly stylized *Apology*, his best-known work. In *On the Testimony of the Soul* he departed from his custom of citing scriptures and elaborated a purely psychological argument set out briefly in chapter 17 of the *Apology*. Years later, in 212, he reiterated in summary form arguments of the *Apology* in an appeal addressed to Scapula, proconsul of Africa, to halt the persecution of Christians.

Tertullian reflected a characteristic rigorist bent in the sermons and treatises on Christian life he composed throughout his brief career; his tone merely became sterner in Montanist days. In what is probably his earliest writing, *On the Shows*, dated 196 or early 197, he explained why Christians should not attend pagan games, theatrical productions, or contests. He saw no hope for the person who attended, for "he openly 'denies,' who gets rid of the distinctive mark by which he is known." To go from church to the shows is to go "from sky to sty." In *On Idolatry* he widened his prohibitions. Christians had to live with pagans, he said, but they did not have to sin with them. In *On the Dress of Women*, at least part of which was composed in his catholic years, he urged Christian women to set themselves apart from pagan women in clothing, adornment, hair style, and even in the way they walked. About the same time he exhorted Christians in *The Martyrs* to view prison as a place of withdrawal from the corrupt world and their imprisonment as discipline for heavenly citizenship.

In other treatises titled *On Baptism*, *On Prayer*, *On Repentance*, *On Patience*, and *To His Wife*—now dated between 198 and 203—Tertullian exhibited similar tendencies to distinguish Christian from pagan life. Those being baptized should come not to have sins forgiven, he insisted, but "because they have ceased sinning." For those who sin after baptism martyrdom is "a second baptism." In some contrast to his later stance in *On Modesty*, written about 210 or 211, Tertullian reluctantly followed *The Shepherd of Hermas* (c. 140) in permitting repentance for serious sins following baptism, but he openly expressed admiration for the Montanist prohibition of second marriages and refusal to grant forgiveness to fornicators or adulterers. In *To His Wife* he urged her, first, not to remarry if he should die, but then, if she should nevertheless marry again, not to marry a pagan. *On Modesty* classified second marriages, whether after the death of a spouse or not, "the same as adultery" and labeled Hermas "the shepherd of adulterers." In *On Patience* Tertullian lauded patience as the

Christian virtue *par excellence*, especially in the face of death and martyrdom.

During his Montanist years, Tertullian sharpened the lines separating Christian and pagan. In *On the Wearing of the Laurel Wreath* he set forth the rule that whatever scriptures do not explicitly permit is forbidden. Since wearing the laurel was of pagan origins, it was idolatrous and thus prohibited for Christians, as was military service. In *On Flight in Persecution* Tertullian negated the more humane view presented in *To His Wife* and *On Patience* and sternly forbade escape. Persecution is God's, not the devil's, will, thus no Christian should flee. He saved his harshest words, however, for the Valentinian gnostics who encouraged the faithful to flee persecution. Their teaching he called the "scorpion's sting" in a work bearing that title. In *On Exhortation to Chastity* and *On Monogamy* the formidable rigorist stoutly defended the Montanist insistence on a single marriage and preference for celibacy. Christian perfection, he argued, descended from virginity from birth, to virginity from the new birth, to continence within marriage. Against the Marcionites, however, Tertullian did affirm the sanctity of marriage. In *On Fasting* he commended also the zeal of Montanists for more fasts. In *On the Veiling of Virgins* he urged virgins to take the veil and flee the temptations of the world.

Apart from his curious defense of his wearing the pallium as an appropriate Christian "philosopher's" dress, the remaining writings of Tertullian are antiheretical. Here, too, Tertullian manifested his separatist inclinations. "What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the church with the academy, the Christian with the heretic?" he demanded to know. Like Irenaeus, he proceeded to set forth the "prescription" that heresy represented a departure from the truth that Christ delivered to the apostles and they to apostolic churches. He reiterated the point in the polemic *Against Hermogenes*, in which he countered the view that God created the soul from preexistent matter. In a more extensive work, *On the Soul*, Tertullian again took up his cudgels against the philosophers, "those patriarchs of the heretics." Although grudgingly admitting that some philosophers had happened on the truth, he himself insisted on obtaining truth from revelation, including that obtained through Montanist seers. A prophetess, for instance, confirmed his (and the Stoics') concept of a corporeal soul. In his five books *Against Marcion*, the longest of his writings, and in the treatises *On the Flesh of Christ* and *On the Resurrection of the Flesh* he repudiated Marcionite and Valentinian views as being of pagan origin. Similarly, the polemic *Against the Valentinians* ridiculed the Valentinian system for inconsistencies and contradictions characteristic of pagan philoso-

phies. Finally, in *Against Praxeas* he rejected modalism in godhead on the grounds of inconsistency and its conflict with "the rule of truth."

Thought. Tertullian labored assiduously to defend Christianity from the culture of his day. With that end in view he accentuated the authority of the rule of truth, a summary of the faith, and of the Bible interpreted more or less literally but with careful reference to context and his own situation. He also invented ecclesiastical Latin. These factors notwithstanding, he in no way equaled Irenaeus, whose treatise *Against Heresies* he invoked often, in development of a biblical theology. On the contrary, he drew many of his basic presuppositions from Stoicism and thus laid the ground for a distinctive Latin theology. His enduring contribution lay in his gift for finding apt formulas to state particular truths of faith.

Stoicism influenced Tertullian's concept both of God and of the soul as corporeal. He asserted that nothing can exist without a body. Thus, even though God is spirit, God is also body. So also is the soul corporeal. If it were not corporeal, it could not desert the body.

From this important assumption Tertullian deduced another: the transmission of sin through generation. Every human soul is a branch of Adam's soul; therefore, every soul inherits characteristics of Adam's soul, including sin. Tertullian, however, did not add to this a conclusion Augustine reached, that is, that guilt is also inherited.

In his refutation of modalism Tertullian won a victory for the Logos Christology of the apologists and Irenaeus. The first to use the term *Trinitas* ("trinity"), he argued that one God is simultaneously Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not successively, as Praxeas held. Simultaneity is possible if the Trinity is "one substance in three persons": "three, however, not in unchangeable condition, but in rank; not in substance, but in attitude; not in office, but in appearance;—but of one nature and of one reality and of one power, because there is one God from whom those ranks and attitudes and appearances are derived in the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit." At the same time Tertullian recognized that to say the Son is "of one substance" with the Father poses a problem for his humanity and might lead, as it did later, to confusion as to the Son's personhood. Anticipating later debate, he repudiated the idea of a mixing or confusion of natures in some *tertium quid*.

On some matters of doctrine Tertullian's Montanism left a mark, although it is difficult to say exactly what the mark was, since both Montanism and Tertullian adhered rather closely to primitive Christian views. Most significant was his acceptance of the eschatological framework of Montanist thought. According to this, the

age of the Paraclete promised in *John* 14:16 was inaugurated by Montanus and the prophets Priscilla and Maximilla. The dawning of this dispensation signaled a time of new prophetic revelations and of greater Christian discipline—fasting, prohibition of second marriages, and willingness to suffer martyrdom. Christ was expected to return soon and set up his millennial kingdom with headquarters at Pepuza in Phrygia, Montanus's hometown. In the interim the church would be divided. On the one side were the psychics, on the other the pneumatics. The former, catholics, would not accept the discipline of the new prophecy; the latter, Montanists, would. In line with this understanding of the church, the Montanist Tertullian shifted his views of ministry so as to give a greater weight to prophecy.

Given his allegiance to Montanism, a sect increasingly regarded as heretical, it is remarkable that Tertullian had so great an impact on later Christian theology. This must have been due not to his personality but to his unquestioned orthodoxy on most matters and his genius for coining just the right phrase.

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TESHUB was the Hurrian god of the storm. His name, also spelled *Teshshub*, *Te*, and *Teya*, is attested in theophoric Hurrian personal names in documents from Mesopotamia, Syro-Palestine, and Anatolia. Since the few Hurrian religious texts from outside the Hittite sphere are still somewhat poorly understood, most of what we know about the god, his mythological roles, and his cult is from Hittite Anatolia.

During the last two centuries of the Hittite kingdom (c. 1400–1200 BCE) Teshub was the chief god of the pan-

theon, with his cult center at Kummiya. He was the son of Anu (An), the sky god. His wife was the goddess Hebat. He had four brothers: Aranzakh (the Tigris River), Tashmishu, and two others whose names are unknown, and a sister, Shawushka, who was the goddess of love and war. Teshub and Hebat had a son, Sharruma, and a daughter, Allanzu.

Teshub is represented anthropomorphically in low relief on the rock walls of the sanctuary of Yazılıkaya, near Bogazköy (Bittel, 1975, pp. 167–169), standing upon two unnamed anthropomorphic mountain gods and holding a club in his right hand. At the head of a procession of male deities, he meets and faces his wife, Hebat, the principal goddess of the pantheon, who heads a procession of goddesses. Around Teshub are represented other members of his immediate family. His size and position on the relief are in keeping with his rank as the chief god of the Hittite empire, but otherwise his dress and complements are those of a normal Hittite storm god.

In the mythological texts Teshub is always referred to by one of the two cuneiform signs for “storm god,” not by the name Teshub. In the first myth of the so-called Kumarbi cycle, usually titled *Kingship in Heaven* (English trans. in Pritchard, 1969, pp. 120f.), Anu, who had usurped the throne of kingship over the gods from Alalu, is driven from his throne by Alalu’s son Kumarbi. During the struggle Kumarbi bites off Anu’s penis and swallows it. Anu curses Kumarbi and promises that from the seed thus implanted in Kumarbi five gods will be born, to defeat and depose him. The first one mentioned (and therefore the eldest) is Teshub.

In the sequel, called the *Song of Ullikummi* (ibid., pp. 121ff.; Güterbock, 1951–1952), the god Kumarbi, whom Teshub has displaced as head of the pantheon, seeks to overthrow him by means of a stone monster named Ullikummi, whom Kumarbi had engendered through having sexual intercourse with a huge boulder. Thus the pattern of the offspring of a former king of the gods overthrowing his father’s successor, which was set in *Kingship in Heaven*, continues. Teshub is first defeated by the monster and must hide, but he eventually triumphs with the help of the god Ea (Enki).

A prayer of King Muwatallis is addressed principally to Teshub, called the Storm God of Kummanni. Although this is the only prayer in the Hittite archives addressed primarily to Teshub, other Hittite prayers contain sections in which subordinate deities—Teshub and Hebat’s children or grandchildren, and once even Teshub’s bull, Seri—are asked to intercede with Teshub or Hebat for the person praying. The Hittite archives also contain descriptions of religious festivals in honor of Teshub and Hebat (Laroche, 1971, pp. 123ff.).

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TEUTATES, a Celtic deity of uncertain attributes, was variously identified by the Romans with Mars and with Mercury. The theonym *Teutates* is attested in Lucan’s *Pharsalia* (1.444–446), together with *Taranis* and *Esus*: “Et quibus inmitis placatur sanguine diro / Teutates horrensque feris altaribus Esus / Et Taranis Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae” (“And those who appease ferocious Teutates with horrible bloodletting, hideous Esus in his savage sanctuaries, and Taranis, whose altars are no less cruel than those of Scythian Diana”).

The Bernese Scholium confirms this attestation by attributing to Teutates a rite of sacrifice by immersion in a caldron: “Teutates Mercurius sic apud Gallos placatur: in plenum semicupium homo in caput demittitur ut ibi suffocetur” (“Teutates Mercury is propitiated thus among the Gauls: they plunge a man headfirst into a full vat to asphyxiate him”). And also: “Teutates Mars sanguine diro placatur siue quod proelia numinis eius instinctu administrantur, siue quod proelii Galli antea soliti ut aliis deis quoque homines immolare” (“Teutates Mars is appeased by the blood of death, either because they attribute the outcome of warfare to his will, or because the Gauls previously were in the habit of making sacrifices to the gods, including this one”).

Teutates is the oldest variant or form of the substantive stem **touta*. This stem, variously attested either with the diphthong *-ou-* or the more recent diphthong *-eu-*, means “people, tribe, nation.” The Gaulish *touta*, which Caesar calls *pagus* (“canton”), signifies both a geographic or administrative subdivision and an ethnic grouping, corresponding to the Irish *tuath*.

Joseph Vendryes once explained the name by a hapology of **touto-tatis* (“father of the tribe”). But this hypothesis is unnecessary: *-atis* is a suffix of anthroponymic, ethnic, and geographic derivation widely attested

in all the Celtic languages. Etymologically it means "man of the tribe" or "man of the city," or again, because of a morphological analogy duplicating a taboo, "the man from the north," in which case the name is clear allusion to the Nordic and polar origins of Celtic tradition. It is with this sort of semantic reasoning that this god of the "community" can be better understood. But since there are no documents, it is difficult to say more about him. (Unlike Taranis and Esus, Teutates is not attested in Gallo-Roman iconography.) The Teutates-Esus-Taranis triad in Lucan still awaits a clear explanation beyond its evident Jupiter-like character.

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Translated from French by Erica Meltzer

TEXTILES. Processing fiber into thread and transforming those threads into fabrics first appear on the human cultural horizon during the Neolithic period, between twelve and fifteen thousand years ago. Not until the sixth millennium BCE, however, do fragments of textiles excavated at sites in central Europe and the Middle East provide evidence for their inclusion in ritual or religious contexts. These grave furnishings and occasional finds from refuse dumps suggest purpose and intent; however, the archaeological record is far from complete. The documentation of the actual meanings of many ritual practices involving fabric is, in most cases, relatively recent.

Despite differences in time and space and the fact that few causal links exist among the cultures discussed here, the practices involving textiles in religious rites and ceremonies can be considered in three broad categories: (1) symbolic meanings associated with textiles, (2) ritual functions for textiles within religious practices, and (3) links between the sacred and the profane realms.

Textiles as Symbol. In many societies cloth and its production serve as metaphors for life. In Greek mythology, for example, three goddesses known as the Moirai controlled the lives of mortals. The Fates, as we know them, include Clotho the spinner, who creates the

web of life; Lachesis, who measures its length; and Atropos, who cuts it.

Present-day Hindu practice continues to use a thread or cord as the symbol of renewal, creating a closed circle that ties the worshiper to the principles of the faith. During Upanayana, a rite-of-passage ceremony, a sacred cord is placed over the shoulder of adolescent boys to signify their eligibility for education within the caste tradition. For the brahman caste the thread is cotton; for the *kṣatriya* (warrior or ruler) caste the cord is hemp; for the *vaiśya* (artisan or merchant) caste the cord is wool. Women also use the sacred thread within ritual. For example, at the annual festival of the goddess Gaurī, a cotton thread sixteen times the woman's height is wound into a skein and laid before images of the goddess. Later the skein is worn around the neck, then buried or burned.

Ritual bonding frequently uses textiles. The priest's stole that drapes the joined hands of a couple during the marriage ceremony in the Western Christian church in effect becomes the tie that binds man to woman and the couple to the church, reinforcing the sanctity of marriage. In many Muslim societies ritual bonding occurs when the bridal couple are invited to sit on a shared mat or textile. Among the Batak tribes of northern Sumatra the climax of the traditional marriage ceremony is the enveloping of the couple in a single textile by the bride's father. Other members of the immediate family are also wrapped in shawls during the course of the ceremony, further emphasizing the bonds that this event celebrates.

The physical act of interlacing prepared threads on a frame to create textiles is another powerful symbol. The spinning of thread, its winding onto bobbins, and the warping of the loom symbolize conception, gestation, and birth. The process of weaving evokes the vicissitudes of life, growth, and maturity. Cutting the cloth from the loom can symbolize death, but more frequently it symbolizes rebirth and renewal because the process creates an object that can then be used.

In parts of South Asia and the South Pacific the physical form of a newly woven cloth is circular or tubular because the warp yarns are continuous, and they form an uninterrupted circle between the two beams of the loom. When the cloth is finished only a small section of the warp yarns remains unwoven. For normal use the textile is cut open across this area. The rich metaphorical potential of the continuous yarns in the uncut cloth became obvious to diverse groups within the Indonesian archipelago. Among the Sasak tribes on the island of Lombok in eastern Indonesia three sacred circular cloths are made for a child at birth by the eldest woman

weaver in the family. These are stored in a sacred area of the house until needed. In the course of the hair cutting, circumcision, and marriage rites the warps of these textiles are cut. Although deceptively modest in appearance, these red, yellow, black, and white striped cotton textiles are endowed with significance affecting the general well-being of individuals. Farther west, on the island of Bali, the more elaborate *geringsing*, decorated with double ikat-patterns, have similar metaphorical significance. *Geringsing* also have a circular warp that must be cut to form a cloth. A single cloth, which may take over a year to produce, accompanies an individual throughout each life-crisis ceremony; ultimately it serves as a funeral pall for the corpse.

The link between textiles and life process is particularly evident in nonindustrialized societies where spinners and weavers are exclusively female. The productive and fructifying qualities associated with women are transferred to textiles, which in turn function as fertility symbols. When juxtaposed with male symbols in metal or agricultural products, textiles evoke a complementary polarity, a polarity well illustrated in the archaeological and ethnographic record. The second-century CE graves of Tien nobles excavated in southwest China at the sites of Shih-tsai Shan and Li-tsai Shan, for example, contained bronze models of looms, other weaving tools, and sewing boxes in female graves; comparable male burials were furnished with bronze weapons and models of agricultural tools.

Together, tools or weapons and textiles symbolized completion and ideals of cosmic harmony. Echoes of this notion are found in legends of the ancient Mediterranean and Asian worlds that personified the annual conjunction of two stars within the Milky Way as the weaving maiden and herdsman.

Ritual Uses for Textiles. Throughout history textiles have conveyed both symbolic and economic meaning. Before the industrial age reduced most textiles to the realm of disposable consumer goods, all textiles possessed real value as the product of the labor invested in cultivating, spinning, dyeing, and weaving. These labor factors as well as the materials, skills, and ritual meanings conferred prestige that could be transferred.

Offering. Literally hundreds of blankets, bolts of cloth, and other utilitarian textiles, as well as great quantities of nontextile domestic and ritual goods, were amassed by extended family groups among the tribes of the northwest coast of North America for potlatch feasts. Here they were presented to guests or burned in extravagant demonstrations of exchange. In contemporary revivals, commercial cloth and clothing are exchanged. Although less dramatic, the imported Chinese

white silk scarves patterned with Buddhist symbols and the simple Indian white cotton gauze scarves used by Tibetan Buddhists convey a similar sense of offering and sacrifice. In the wool-producing regions of the Tibetan plateau these exotic imports were tokens of exchange between individuals upon meeting and offerings to images. Tibetans also offer rectangles of cotton cloth block-printed with prayers to the elements as acts of devotion. Flown from poles, suspended on lines, or tied to the roofs of temples and shrines, these textiles are literally destroyed by the winds that activate intercessions with the gods.

Funeral customs provide other insights into textile-offering practices. Although our knowledge of the actual practice is far from complete, the archaeological record for pharaonic Egypt and pre-Columbian Peru is spectacular. The dry climates of the Egyptian desert and of coastal Peru have preserved vast quantities of textiles used in burial. Egyptians wrapped mummies of the dead in fine linen. Complete wardrobes of clothes and household linens, reflecting the status and means of the individual in life, were also interred to provide the comforts of this earth in the next world. Along the dry south coast of Peru, pre-Columbian mummy bundles of aristocrats contain numerous finely woven and embroidered sets of clothes as well as large quantities of other fine textiles.

In China, where silk was a principle trade commodity as well as the imperial standard for the payment and collection of taxes, silk textiles played a major role in life and death. The number and quality of burial clothes reflected the status of the individual in life. The remarkably well-preserved chambered tomb of the Lady Tai at Ma-wang-tui, Chang-sha, which dates from about 160 BCE, contained over twenty-seven items of silk apparel, including some twelve coats, forty-six rolls of uncut silk, and numerous silk wrappers and bags. During the later imperial period the custom of preparing coats especially decorated with characters meaning long life (the so-called *shou-fu*, or "longevity" coats) arose, but burial clothes were frequently part of the individual's official wardrobe, conferred by rank at court. Since Chinese Confucian women had no official court rank, hence no official costume, they were often buried in their bridal garments. Marriage conferred the single highest status a woman could attain in the rigid patriarchal society: for that day, the bride was considered an empress. Although many of the actual funeral textiles were recycled from life, the obligation and expense for a Confucian funeral were borne by the next generation of the family. By contrast, nineteenth-century aristocrats on the island of Timor in eastern Indonesia de-

voted considerable amounts of time and money to amassing quantities of prestige textiles for their own burials.

Sacrifices do not always involve fabrics of the greatest economic or aesthetic value. For some cultures specific textiles are produced for shrouds. The traditional burial cloth of Jews is a set of simple, untailed linen garments. In Bali, the sacred cloths called *bebali* are in effect token textiles made only for offering. Loosely woven, they are too fragile for use; most are too small to function as clothing for the living. During the late imperial period in China and continuing to the present day, sets of paper clothes and models of bolts of silk have been burned as offerings to the dead for the next life.

In some cultures textiles themselves are venerated. The effigies of the hearth deities worshiped by nomadic Mongols were made entirely of felt. These special effigies, called *ongot*, one identified as male, the other female, were kept inside the yurt. In Buddhism, before the development of a rich figural iconography following the second century CE, images of the Buddha's attributes including his mantle and his throne with its textile-covered cushion served the faithful as a symbolic focus for worship. The legend and the numerous illustrations of Veronica's veil or the much-celebrated linen shroud preserved in the cathedral at Turin, which bears a human image said to be that of the crucified Christ, are two examples of venerable textiles from the Christian tradition. Among Muslims, the presentation of the cloth cover from a saint's tomb is a means of conveying blessings on an honored visitor.

Among the Toraja tribes of central Sulawesi, a group of sacred textiles called *ma'a* and *sarita* embody spiritual power. These textiles are heirlooms, handed down through families; they are used for display on many ritual and ceremonial occasions. Some of these textiles are of local manufacture, but many are made of imported Indian cotton cloth that has been painted with Torajan symbols.

Textile offerings were important in rituals honoring personified deities. In pharaonic Egypt images of gods within cult temples were centers of elaborate ceremonies that imitated human life. Gods were awakened in the morning, fed, bathed, and clothed, taken on festive outings, and put to bed at night, not unlike the pharaoh, the living manifestation of god on earth. Quantities of cloth as well as clothes were among the essential offerings required of the faithful. Perhaps the most celebrated textile offering of antiquity was the annual Panathenaia in Athens, an event commemorated on the inner frieze of the Parthenon. The climax of the festival was a procession carrying the costly new *peplos* made

by the women of Athens to the Acropolis and the presentation of this garment to the cult image of the Pallas Athena.

Offerings of clothing to temple images were frequent occurrences throughout Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist, and Confucian Asia. In late imperial China, for example, where the giving of prestige cloths marked the new year as well as birthday celebrations, many of the city gods were presented on these occasions with new robes, cut especially large and often without side seams, a fact frequently recorded in pious inscriptions by donors.

By contrast, the *bambino* robes to dress statues of the baby Jesus, capes for statues of the Madonna, and similar garments used in the Christian church to dress statues for procession often feature fabrics that have been transformed from secular uses for the purpose. Many churches encouraged the donation of secular prestige textiles by the faithful as a meritorious deed, and this cache of prestige goods was available for recycling. Particularly valuable textiles were often used to wrap relics and other sacred items before placing them in reliquaries for storage. In the West many examples of the medieval silks survive only from these contexts.

Within Jewish practice many of the ritual textiles used in the synagogue are made from recycled secular fabrics. In the Ashkenazic tradition the strip of cloth used to bind the Torah scroll for storage is often made of textiles with particular domestic significance. Mothers traditionally prepare and donate Torah binders made from the textiles used as the swaddling cloth at a boy's circumcision.

In Tibet, *manḍalas* depicting various deities in the Buddhist pantheon were constructed in the appliqué technique from Chinese silks and other exotic fabrics donated to monasteries. The most impressive examples were the gigantic *manḍalas*, measuring over twenty meters in length, that were displayed once a year against the facade of the Potala in Lhasa.

Creation of a sacred place. The place where a ritual or ceremony is performed may have a temporal as well as a spatial dimension. The suspension of normal time to create a temporal framework in which humans can commune with the supernatural can be aided by textiles in several ways. For example, the repeated use of textiles or sets of textiles, such as the red vestments and altar furnishings that are employed in the Western Christian church within the same context over time (e.g., for feast days of martyrs), emphasizes a sense of ritual cycle that is permanent despite the passage of real time. The use of the same textile within a sequence of events, as is done with the *geringsing* cloths from the island of Bali, achieves for the participant a sense of suspended animation. A third sense of ritual time is em-

bodied in the notion of transformation: special furnishings or clothing can dramatize the transformation of a place into the presence of a god or of the individual into a servant or intermediary of the god.

Textiles also have spatial functions, creating a sacred precinct within a larger profane context. On the most fundamental level, textiles can provide a focus for ritual. The act of spreading a cloth, whether it is the simple linen textile which covers the top of the Christian altar or the elaborately patterned silk covers for the Buddhist incense tables, transforms a table into an altar.

The *kiswah*, the most important textile in Islam, covers the Ka'bah in Mecca, a square granite structure that immures the Black Stone. The stone itself predates the founding of Islam, but it became the most sacred relic of the religion and the focus of Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. The *kiswah* is made of black silk with Qur'anic inscriptions woven or embroidered in gold. Covering a cubical structure roughly twelve meters high, the *kiswah* is a dramatic indicator of a sacred precinct. It is replaced annually, and the older textile is cut in pieces that are sold as relics. [See Ka'bah.]

Textiles suspended over a ritual area transform the space beneath to offer real or symbolic protection. Some are portable, like the wedding canopies that are common to many faiths. In effect they transform any space beneath them into a ritual area and are reused as occasion demands. Other canopies convey cosmological meaning. Those placed over altars or above images in Christian or Buddhist buildings, for example, serve as metaphors for heaven, contrasting the visual universe or firmament with the larger perceived but invisible heaven beyond.

The pierced quatrefoil canopy called *yün-chien* in Chinese, meaning "cloud collar," which is placed on the apex of Mongol felt yurts, is of Central Asian or southern Siberian origin. Its four pendant points promote spatial orientation with the cardinal points of the compass; the hole at the top is called a sky door and symbolizes the gate to heaven, through which the earth axis passes.

Fabric may also cover the area on which ritual occurs. Mats and carpets indicate places for prayer and meditation in most Asian cultures, which did not develop elaborate furniture for sitting but lived primarily on the floor. For example, small square woolen carpets decorated with Buddhist symbols were commonly used by Buddhist monks in Tibet. High-ranking clergy, however, often sat on silk-covered cushions.

Some floor coverings promote ideas of spatial orientation. Within many of the powerful agrarian empires across the world, the precise arrangement of specific

floor coverings and other furnishings within a ritual area ensured the success of the ceremony. A fourth-century BCE text, the *Shu Ching* (Book of History), describes the proper procedure for setting up the offerings for the burial of a prince, with detailed instructions concerning the appropriate carpet, offering table, and sacrifice for each of the cardinal points within the tomb area. In other instances single textiles function as spatial indicators: the organization of motifs in certain Mongol, Turkish, and Chinese carpets within the rectilinear confines of the textile imply a correct alignment.

The most famed ritual floor covering, the so-called Muslim prayer carpet, is traditionally decorated with an arch at one end echoing the *mihrab* niche in the mosque, which orients prayer toward Mecca. However, the function of these carpets is independent of decoration, since they provide a spatial substitute for worship within a mosque to assist the faithful in discharging the obligation of prayer five times a day. No specific carpets are prescribed for the mosque floor. If anything were to be considered the first religiously prescribed floor covering, it would be the simple plaited palm-leaf mat used by nomadic Arabs. But once Islam came into contact with the artistically sophisticated cultures of western Asia, custom and taste dictated design. Historically, many carpets were merely decorative; however, some were undoubtedly used for prayer within the home.

Textiles have served as portable shrines for nomadic peoples, and some of these textile environments survive among settled populations. The *mahmal* tents used during the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca are one example.

Textile curtains act as screens shielding sacred ritual areas and guarding access to them. Although a distancing device, these textiles afford the celebrants of ritual dramatic effect when they are suddenly parted to reveal mystery. The ark curtain, or parochet (Heb., *parokhet*), is the main ritual textile within Jewish practice. Its precedents can be found in the tabernacle described in chapter 26 of *Exodus*. This record of one of the most celebrated of the portable ritual-textile environments profoundly influenced the ritual trappings of later Jewish and Christian practice. Within Ashkenazic tradition the standard parochet consists of a prestige cloth framed between two pillars and a lintel, a device previously thought to relate to sixteenth-century title pages from printed books. The form may well have more ancient precedents, however, recalling times when practice demanded large curtains hung between architectural bays to subdivide areas of worship. Archaeological evidence from the third-century CE synagogue at Dura-Europos in Syria reveals that a large curtain divided the area in front of the Torah shrine from the congregation. This custom of using curtains to subdivide

spaces within religious and secular architecture was widespread in the Near East and Mediterranean during classical times.

This pattern influenced early Christian worship as well. In the early centuries of the Christian era large curtains were used to articulate space within the church or meeting room to accommodate different audiences. Part of the building was accessible to nonbelievers, and other provisions were made for those under instruction but not yet baptized. The faithful were divided into groups, with men and women occupying different areas; the clergy had an area around the altar. In the West large curtains disappeared from the interiors of religious buildings with the rise of the Romanesque architectural style around the year 1000. The parochet and the tabernacle veils of the Western Christian church are humble reminders of times when interiors were lavishly decorated with textiles.

Large curtains remained in use in the Eastern Christian church for a time, but the development of the iconostasis on which icons were displayed gradually replaced the portable curtains separating the sanctuary from the nave. The amphithyron, a smaller curtain that hung behind the central doors of the iconostasis, is all that remains of the more elaborate curtaining systems. Only in Ethiopian churches practicing Coptic rites do large dividing curtains survive today.

The notion of concealment is present at other levels as well, particularly in practices that shield sacred paraphernalia from the eyes of the uninitiated or from direct contact with the profane hand. In the Christian church the chalice and the Host, as well as many of the accoutrements used in the service, are only revealed at the appropriate moment in the ritual; at other times they are veiled from sight. The Torah mantles, made of the most costly silk and gold-enriched fabrics, the simple tie-dyed silk curtains that hang in front of the painted images of Tibetan Buddhist *maṇḍalas*, and the elaborately embroidered *epitaphios sindōn* of the Greek Orthodox rite, which veils the chalice and paten, serve identical functions.

Textile Links between the Sacred and the Profane Realms. The largest number of textiles used within religious ceremony have neither ritual function nor meaning as religious symbols. Rather, their purpose is self-consciously decorative. Whether temporary or permanent, these textiles enhance ritual through splendid display.

Banners and hangings announce the special character of ritual space. They can be carried in procession or used for interior display. Most of these objects are showy and made of lightweight materials; some, such as the banners used in Buddhist temples, have long

streamers that add movement as well as color to ritual space. Banners bearing images of deities convey popular iconography and may serve an informal educative function, but in general they are difficult to distinguish from comparable secular decoration.

Textiles that adorn the interior walls of worship halls, like the wall paintings many of them replaced, are commonly didactic. The painted cotton temple hangings from northern India, for example, often depict stories from Hindu mythology. Many of the tapestry sets woven for religious institutions in medieval Europe illustrate the lives of the saints or depict apocalyptic visions. In the West the popularity of such monumental textiles lapsed with the rise of the Gothic architectural style. The Graham Sutherland tapestry at Coventry Cathedral is an outstanding example of the twentieth-century revival of tapestry weaving that has affected contemporary Western Christian church decoration.

Carpets may cover the floors, cushioning bare feet as in the mosques of Islam, decorate the space before the altar as in Christian practice, or wrap the pillars of the worship hall as in Tibet and China. In most cases these lavish displays are more apt to result from pious donation of secular goods than from ritual requirements.

A vast range of covers for lecterns, reading desks, books, scrolls, cushions, kneelers, and furniture utilize fine textiles. Textile valances enhance architectural settings. The *kapporet* ("cover") placed over the Torah curtain transforms the Torah shrine into the mercy seat of the Ark of the Tabernacle. In East Asian religious contexts, elaborately embroidered valances were often added to the niches in which image shrines were placed. Some of these were special commissions donated to the temples. One popular Chinese Buddhist valance type was made as a patchwork by members of the congregation from personal textiles or from temple supplies of donated textiles.

In the same way that most vestments used by religions throughout the world were derived from secular clothing, many of the decorative textiles that have become associated with ritual also have secular origins. One group of textiles in particular, however, remains virtually unchanged from its secular usage. Cloths of state, throne covers, footstool covers, umbrellas, and baldachins are statements of secular political power. They designate rank and position within the clergy for purposes of prestige and control rather than ritual.

[See also Clothing.]

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JOHN E. VOLLMER

TEZCATLIPOCA ("the smoking mirror") was one of the four Aztec creator gods who arranged the universe and set the cosmic ages in motion through periodic celestial battles. Tezcatlipoca was sometimes cast as the supernatural antagonist of Quetzalcoatl, the deity associated with cultural creativity, urban order, and priestly wisdom. Yet Tezcatlipoca has the most overwhelming power and protean personality of any Aztec

deity. Among his aspects were Itztli, a calendar god; Tepeyollotl, an ancient jaguar-earth god; Ixquimilli-Itztla-coaliuhqui, a god of punishment; and Omacatl, the spirit of revelry. His many forms reflect the omnipotent character of numinous forces in Aztec religion. The range of Tezcatlipoca's power is perhaps best represented in his designation as "the enemy on both sides."

As in all pictorial representations of Mesoamerican deities, Tezcatlipoca's costume contains elements crucial to his identification. His primary emblem, a smoking mirror made of obsidian, is often depicted as a circular disk with a shaft through it and two curling forms representing smoke attached to the edges. The mirror emblem is located either in the deity's headdress or in place of one foot. According to one source, his foot was bitten off by an earth monster during the struggle for the creation of the world. On the social level, this emblem of the smoking mirror was intimately associated with the divine power of the Aztec *tlatoani* (king).

Tezcatlipoca's specific ritual significance was expressed in the great annual festival of Toxcatl. In book 2 of Fray Bernardino de Sahagún's *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España* (compiled 1569–1582; also known as the Florentine Codex), we learn that for a full year prior to Toxcatl, Tezcatlipoca's *ixiptla* (deity impersonator) lived in the Aztec capital in complete splendor and honor, treated as a great lord. Usually a captive warrior, the *ixiptla* had to be physically perfect in size, proportion, skin color, and beauty. By women he was called "tall one, head nodder, handful of stars." He moved regally about the capital dressed in flower headdresses and luxurious ornaments, carrying his smoking pipe and flute and speaking graciously to all who greeted him. Twenty days prior to his sacrifice at the height of Toxcatl, the *ixiptla* was given four beautiful maidens in marriage. Following his heart sacrifice to the Sun, his head was strung on the public skull rack in the main ceremonial center of Tenochtitlán. Of the dramatic turnabout in the life of Tezcatlipoca's impersonator, the Florentine Codex states: "And this betokeneth our life on earth. For he who rejoiceth, who possesseth riches, who seeketh and coveteth our lord's sweetness, his gentleness—riches and property—thus endeth in great misery. For it is said, 'None come to an end here upon earth with happiness, riches and wealth'" (trans. Anderson and Dibble, vol. 2, p. 69).

According to the sacred historical traditions of the Aztec, which trace back to the paradigmatic kingdom of Tollan (900–1100 CE), Tezcatlipoca, a great sorcerer, drew uncanny powers from his obsidian mirror in a struggle against the Toltec priest-king Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl ("our young prince the feathered serpent"). Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl was tricked into drunkenness and

sexual incontinence, which led to the utter collapse of his well-ordered city-state. Several primary sources suggest that the conflict between the great king and his magical antagonist was centered on Tezcatlipoca's desire to replace animal and insect sacrifice with human sacrifice.

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DAVÍD CARRASCO

THAI RELIGION. Thailand must be counted as one of the preeminent Buddhist countries in the world. Official figures place the percentage of Buddhists in a population of 47 million in 1980 as more than 95 percent. If those, mainly of Chinese and Vietnamese extraction, who follow Mahāyāna and Confucian traditions are excluded from the census category of Buddhists, wherein they are officially subsumed, still well over 90 percent of the populace of Thailand can be counted as adherents of Theravāda Buddhism. Despite the apparent uniformity of religion that such a characterization suggests, there are many facets of Thai religion. As different sectors of the Thai populace have attempted to find meaningful ways to confront fundamental problems of disease and death, threats of social disorder, and experienced or perceived injustices, they have turned to different types of religious practice, each with its own distinctive history. Although these different types can be said in some basic sense to belong to an encompassing tradition of Thai Theravāda Buddhism, they are still sometimes in tension with each other.

Traditional Thai Religion. In 1292, Ramkhamhaeng (Rāma Khamhaeng), the king of the principality of Sukhōthai in what is today north-central Thailand, put up a stele on which was recorded the first known text in any Tai language—that is, in any of the languages spoken by the ancestors of such modern-day peoples as the Lao, the Yuan (Northern Thai), and the Siamese (Central Thai). The inscription is notable for being the first

historical evidence that Tai-speaking peoples had become adherents of Theravāda Buddhism. Prior to the thirteenth century, Tai-speaking peoples living in northern mainland Southeast Asia and in southern China had followed animistic traditions based on beliefs in a realm of spirits (*phī*) and deities (*thāēn*) and in a vital essence (*khwan*) that made human beings, rice, and certain animals more than mere physical organisms. Some Tai-speaking peoples such as the Red Tai, or Tho living in northern Vietnam and northeastern Laos, remained animistic until at least the middle of the twentieth century. Others, such as the Siamese, the Yuan of northern Thailand, the Lao of Laos and northeastern Thailand, the Shan of Burma, and the Lue of southern China and northwestern Laos, while retaining beliefs in spirits and a vital essence, also came to understand the world in terms of the Buddhism of the Pali tradition.

Initially, Buddhism among the Tai, as among other peoples in mainland Southeast Asia, appears to have centered primarily on the cult of relics. The enshrinement of such relics in stupas and the placement of images and other reminders of the Buddha served to establish the presence of the Buddha in the domains (*muang*) of the Tai. Having accepted the Buddha, the Tai were open to the teachings of missionary monks belonging to what has been termed the "forest monastery" tradition who traveled from domain to domain in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. One of the most important consequences of the work of these monks was the establishment of *wats* (temple-monasteries) in villages as well as in court centers. The members of the *sangha* (Skt., *saṃgha*), or order of monks, who lived in these monasteries popularized the Dhamma, the doctrines of Buddhism, by using texts written in the vernacular rather than in Pali, the canonical language of the Theravāda tradition. Among the most influential were the *Sermon on the Three Worlds*, written by a prince of Sukhōthai in the middle of the fourteenth century, and sermons in the form of *suttas*, written probably in northern Thailand in the fifteenth century, that tell of the "blessings" (*ānisaṃsa*) acquired through ritual acts.

In the Buddhist worldview adopted by the Tai, all sentient beings—human, animal, demonic, and divine—are understood to be situated along a continuum of relative suffering, the place they occupy on the continuum being determined by the consequences of *kamma* (Skt., *karman*; Thai, *kam*)—that is, consequences of actions performed in previous existences. The differences among human beings—male and female, ruler and peasant, rich and poor, beautiful and ugly, healthy and sickly—can also be interpreted with reference to the theory of *kamma*. Tai continued to believe in a personal

vital essence (*khwan*), in spirits (*phī*), in gods—now construed in Hindu-Buddhist terms as *devatā* (Thai, *thē-wadā*), as well as in “fate” or cosmic influence—notions adapted from Indian thought and conceived of as *khro?* (from Skt., *gr̥ha*, astrological mansion or the place of a planet in the zodiac) or *chatā* (from Skt., *jāta*, “born”). These beliefs, however, related to proximate, not ultimate, causes of fortune and misfortune. One’s *kamma* ultimately determined whether one could be successful in securing one’s wandering vital essence, in propitiating spirits, in worshiping the deities, or in dispelling cosmic influences.

A significant change of one’s position along the continuum of suffering could only be accomplished through accumulating merit (*puñña*; Thai, *bun*) and not acquiring demerit (*pāpa*; Thai, *bāp*). To “make merit” (*tham bun*) as a layperson one was to offer alms (*dāna*; Thai, *thān*) to the *sangha*. A male could also make significant merit through becoming a member of the *sangha* and subjecting himself to the monastic “discipline” (*vinaya*; Thai, *winai*). To avoid demerit one was to observe a code of morality (*sīla*; Thai, *sīn*) that ensured that one would transcend ignorance and resist the temptation to act so as to fulfill one’s lust, greed, or anger. The consequences of immoral behavior—such as punishment in hell (*naraka*; Thai, *narok*)—as well as of moral and meritorious action—such as rebirth in heaven (*sagga*; Thai, *sawan* from Skt. *svarga*) and eventual rebirth on earth at the time of the next Buddha, Śrī Ariya Maitreya (Thai, Phra Sī Ān)—were detailed graphically in such sermons as the popular tale of the travels of the monk Mālaya to hell and heaven.

These Buddhist ideas, as well as the articulation of these beliefs with notions deriving from the pre-Buddhist past of the Tai, were organized into three major popular religious traditions followed by Tai-speaking peoples living in what is today Thailand. To this day, the ritual practices of the Siamese of central Thailand, the Yuan of northern Thailand, and the Lao of northeastern Thailand, while sharing some basic similarities, remain distinctive.

The Buddhist worldview adopted by Tai peoples shaped their orientation toward society. Fundamental to this order was the division between the sexes. The ideal Buddhist man should become a member of the *sangha* in order to pursue the Path. In practice, very few Tai men ever became members of the *sangha* for life, but it became the norm among all peoples living in premodern Thailand for young men to spend at least a lenten period of three months as either a novice or a monk. For women, a connection was made between the secular role of woman as mother and woman as nurturer for the religion. The hierarchical order of tradi-

tional society was understood in terms of differences in the karmic legacies that each person was assumed to have been born with.

Most monks in premodern Thailand acted primarily to preserve and transmit the local religious traditions of the communities where they lived. Although they traced their lineage to the “forest monastery” monks of the fifteenth century, there is no evidence to suggest that monks during the period between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries were known for withdrawing from the world to devote their lives to meditation. Some monks, however, lived in monasteries that served as centers of study of the Dhamma. It was these monks who kept alive a tradition of Pali scholarship as well as of composition of vernacular religious texts. These centers were supported mainly by rulers of the traditional kingdoms or by lords of domains subordinate to the kings.

Kings and lords of premodern Tai realms and domains were held in popular belief to have the right to rule because they “had merit” (*mī bun*); that is, they had inherited at birth a large store of positive consequences of *kamma* from previous incarnations. They were expected to display their meritoriousness in their conspicuous support of the religion and in ensuring the peace and order of the worlds over which they held sway. This concept of merit can be seen to be similar to the Mahāyāna notion of compassion shown by *bodhisattvas* toward the world. Some Tai kings did claim to be *bodhisattvas*, but such a claim was far less common in Tai kingdoms than in those of premodern Burma.

In the major premodern Tai kingdom, the Siamese kingdom of Ayutthayā (1350–1767), court traditions, especially after the fifteenth century, showed strong Brahmanic influences, influences introduced from Angkor, which the Siamese had conquered. When the new Siamese kingdom with its capital at Bangkok was founded in 1782, its first rulers downplayed the Brahmanic state cult in favor of such Buddhist activities as unifying the *sangha*, restoring the scriptures, and sponsoring public almsgiving. At the end of the nineteenth century, King Chulalongkorn (c. 1868–1910) restored many Brahmanic state rites in an effort to enhance the image of the monarchy. The observance of some of these rites persisted even after a coup in 1932 transformed Siam into a constitutional monarchy, but by the second half of the twentieth century they had assumed a more dramaturgical than religious significance.

Contemporary Religion in Thailand. Religion as practiced by the peoples living in what was to become modern Thailand was rarely rendered problematic to its adherents. Only when the world collapsed, as it did following the destruction of Ayutthayā by the Burmese

in 1767, did people question the efficacy of traditional practice for making sense of their lives. The period between the fall of Ayutthayā and the founding of Bangkok in 1782 is notable for the appeal that Buddhist millennialism held for many. Millennial experimentation was brought to an end, however, when in 1782 General Cakkri deposed the then-reigning monarch, Taksin, who claimed to be a *bodhisattva*. Cakkri, as Rama I (1782–1809), the founding ruler of the present dynasty, laid the foundations for a new order by restoring peace throughout the kingdom and, indeed, by extending his political control even farther than his predecessors. He moved to purify the religion by purging the *sangha* of monks who were deemed not to be observing the Vinaya (disciplinary code), by convening a Buddhist council to ensure that the Tipiṭaka (Skt., Tripiṭaka), the Buddhist scriptures, were available in an error-free Pali form, and by promoting the study of both the scriptures and commentarial literature written in Pali.

The new order established by Rama I proved to be fertile ground for the development of a major reform movement led by a man who would become King Rama IV, better known as Mongkut. Mongkut, who served as a monk between 1824 and 1851, was stimulated by his conversations with Christian missionaries and other Westerners who had begun to come to Siam to search for what could be taken as the essential elements of Buddhist practice. He became the leader of a small coterie of monks who spurned what they considered to be “superstitious” accretions in traditional practice and turned to Pali scriptures and commentaries to find the basis for “true” Buddhism. When Mongkut became king (r. 1851–1868), his associates in the *sangha* became the vanguard of a new fraternity, one called the Dhammayuttika-nikāya (“the fraternity of those who adhere to the Dhamma”), in contrast to the larger fraternity, the Mahānikāya (Mahanikai), of monks who continued to follow traditional practice. [See the biography of Mongkut.]

Under King Chulalongkorn, Mongkut’s son and successor, leading Dhammayuttika monks, and especially Prince Wachirayān (Vajirañāṇavarorasa), another of Mongkut’s sons and the head of the Dhammayuttika fraternity, were given effective authority over the whole of the *sangha* in Chulalongkorn’s domains. Prince Wachirayān, even before he became prince patriarch (*sangharāja*) in 1910, was able with the backing of the king to bring monks from the several different local Theravāda traditions into a single national order. Prince Wachirayān also instituted reforms throughout the *sangha* on the basis of Mongkut’s and his own interpretations of Pali texts. The religious reforms instituted by Prince Wachirayān became the basis for what might

be termed officially sanctioned orthodoxy in contemporary Thai Buddhism.

Under King Chulalongkorn, Siam began a transformation into a modern state. To meet the threat of colonial expansion by the British and the French, Chulalongkorn instituted administrative reforms that entailed the replacement of local lords by centrally appointed officials who adhered to common bureaucratic norms. So long as Siam was ruled by absolute monarchs, however, it still retained an important characteristic of the traditional state; that is, order depended upon the personal efficacy of the monarch. This traditional characteristic was eliminated in the “revolution” of 1932, during which a group of nonroyal “promoters” forced King Prajadhipok (r. 1925–1935) to accept a constitution that proclaimed Thai sovereignty to rest not in the monarch but with the people as a nation.

Although the name Siam persisted for a time after 1932, modern Thailand can be said to have begun in this year. The revolution of 1932 focused attention on the question of who made up the national community of Thai, a question that emerged in the wake of large-scale migration of Chinese to Thailand, the integration of peoples of different traditions into a single state, and the drawing of clear territorial boundaries around the state as a consequence of pressures from neighboring colonial powers. Since 1932, successive governments have made use of a unified *sangha* and a statewide system of compulsory education to inculcate in the populace the idea that Thai nationalism is rooted in what is taken to be a common Buddhist heritage.

Both the reformation of Buddhism led by the Dhammayuttika fraternity and the emergence of state-sponsored Thai Buddhist nationalism served to stimulate a self-consciousness in many Thai about their religion. This self-consciousness, in turn, stimulated yet further changes in Thai religion. While the refiguration of Theravāda thought begun by Mongkut early in the nineteenth century reached a climax in the works of Prince Wachirayān, works that still today form the basis of religious studies carried out by most monks, a number of monks have continued to pursue significant theological inquiries. By far the most influential of contemporary Buddhist thinkers is Phutthathāt Phikkhu (Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu), who lives at a center called Sūan Mōk (“garden of liberation”) in southern Thailand. Phutthathāt (b. 1906) has sought in lectures and writings to interpret the Dhamma with reference to the theologies of other religions, most notably Zen Buddhism, and with reference to the experiences of Thai living in a much more secularized world than did their forebears. Writing for a more learned audience, the monk known under the title of Phra Rāṭchawaramunī (Rājavaramunī)—

given name Prayut (b. 1941)—has sought also to make the Buddhist message relevant to modern life. His *Phut-thatham* (*Buddhadhamma*), published in 1982, has been acclaimed as one of the most significant works on Theravāda ethics ever written.

The radical reformulation of Buddhist practice also begun by Mongkut and the founders of the Dhammayuttika fraternity has been carried yet farther by some monks. Ācān Man Phūritthatta (Bhūridatto Thera), a Lao-speaking Dhammayuttika monk from northeastern Thailand who died in 1949 at the age of 78, concluded early in his life that to follow the Path to ultimate salvation, one must withdraw from the world and devote one's life to meditation. His life as a *dhūtanga*, or wandering ascetic, became the model for many other monks. A number of his disciples, and the disciples of his disciples, known in Thai and Lao as *ācān* (Skt., *ācārya*), or teachers, have achieved fame as meditation masters and strict followers of the Dhamma. A new interest in the significance of meditation for Buddhist practice has also been strongly encouraged by a number of non-Dhammayuttika monks and lay masters. Phut-thathāt's center, Sūan Mōk, and satellite centers elsewhere, like the forest retreats of the *ācān*, attract many laypersons as well as monks who wish to learn to meditate. In the 1950s Phra Phimonlatham (Vimaladhamma Thera; given name Āsatha), a high-ranking monk from Wat Mahāthāt, a major temple-monastery in Bangkok, introduced and worked to popularize a form of *vipassanā* ("insight") meditation that he had learned from a master in Burma.

Prior to the death of Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat in 1963, Thai governments considered the burgeoning popularity of meditation monks as potentially, if not actually, threatening to establishment Buddhism. Since the mid-1960s, however, the disciples of Ācān Man in particular have been accorded increasing official support, and the king and queen have been conspicuous in their patronage of these monks and in their attendance at the funerals of Ācān Man's major disciples. Forest monasteries today are popular retreats for urban laypersons who seek to temper their active involvement in the world with a detachment that comes from meditation practice. Meditation centers have also been established in Bangkok and other cities, not only by monks but also by the laity. Among the most famous lay masters is Ācān Nāēp, a woman. Since the late 1970s, Phimonlatham has also undertaken a program to stimulate the popularity of insight meditation in rural communities as well as in the cities and towns.

Although what might be termed the "meditation movement" has been accommodated to establishment Buddhism in Thailand, other movements have emerged

in reaction to official orthodoxy and to government-sponsored Thai Buddhist nationalism. Millennial uprisings in northeastern Thailand in 1901–1902 and resistance in the 1920s and 1930s by Khrūbā Sīwichai (Siri-vijoyo Thera), a highly revered popular northern Thai monk, to the authority of the state-appointed *sangha* hierarchy were precursors to contemporary religious dissent in Thailand. In the mid-1950s and especially in the 1970s, a number of monks emerged as conspicuous critics of government policies. While most of these "political monks" could be considered leftists, there were also a number associated with right-wing causes. Of particular note is Kittiwutthō Phikkhu (Kittivuddho Bhikkhu), who gained notoriety in the mid-1970s for arguing that killing communists was not murder as understood in Buddhist terms and thus did not produce demerit. Although only a few monks have taken active roles in Thai politics, there are many lay Buddhist leaders who have contributed to a widening discourse on the salience of religious values for public life. Among the best known of what might be termed "social gospel" Buddhists is Sulak Sivarksa, who has exerted significant influence through his numerous essays and the organizations he has helped to create.

Members of the laity have also assumed leadership roles in the many cults that have emerged and continue to emerge in contemporary Thailand. The typical cult is one in which a spirit medium (who typically would be a woman) is believed able to gain the assistance of her control spirit to aid a client who is ill or otherwise in distress. Some cults have assumed a wider significance; the most famous of recent years is one known under the name Samnak Pū Sawan (Center of the Heavenly Ancients). The male leader of this cult claimed to be the vehicle for the spirits of a number of famous men in Thai history, including a former patriarch of the *sangha*. As it developed, the belief system of the cult became increasingly syncretic, uniting Christian, Muslim, and Chinese elements with magico-Buddhist ones. In the late 1970s, the cult, which had gained thousands of followers, including several high-ranking military officers, took on a distinctly political cast as its leader sought to use it for promoting an international peace center that he would head. In 1981 the government attempted to arrest him, but he disappeared before the arrest was effected.

Although the ecumenicalism of the Samnak Pū Sawan movement was idiosyncratic, more significant connections between Thai Buddhism and other religions in Thailand have evolved in recent years. A number of Protestant and Catholic leaders have joined with Buddhist leaders in religious dialogue and in human rights activities. The smallness of the Christian popula-

tion (about 0.6 percent of the total) has perhaps helped to encourage relatively good relations between Christians and Buddhists. In contrast, Muslims (who account for about 4 percent of the population) have found it much more difficult to relate to Buddhists. A Muslim-Buddhist dialogue may, nonetheless, prove to be a means leading to a reconstrual of Thai civil religion in other than strictly Buddhist terms.

Life in Thailand in the twentieth century has become increasingly secularized and rationalized as more and more aspects of experience are interpreted with reference to bureaucratic regulations, market transactions, technological processes, and scientific medicine. While these processes of change have led many Thai to turn away from traditional religious practices as being no longer significant to their lives, they have also served to make people aware of those experiences that do not make sense in terms of secular, rational meanings. It is the awareness of those illnesses that do not respond to modern medicine, of increasing disparities in wealth and power, of the potential collapse of order as occurred in Kampuchea, that leads many Thai to consider what ritual and ethical practices are most meaningful to them. This religious consciousness is what gives contemporary Thai religion its dynamic character.

[See also Southeast Asian Religions, *article on Mainland Cultures*; Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia*; Theravāda; Saṃgha, *article on Saṃgha and Society*; and Kingship, *article on Kingship in Southeast Asia*. For a discussion of the interrelation of popular and elite traditions in local Buddhist cultures, see Folk Religion, *article on Folk Buddhism*.]

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THEATER. See *Drama and Dance*.

THEISM is the philosophical worldview that perceives the orders of existence (physical things, organisms, persons) as dependent for their being and continuance on one self-existent God, who alone is worthy of worship. Theists differ among themselves about the nature of God and the relation of God to these orders, but they close ranks against deists, who, in principle, exclude revelation and divine intervention in world order, and against pantheists, who identify God with these orders. Theists hold that God, transcendent creator of the orders, remains an indivisible unity as he sustains them in accordance with their capacities and his ultimate purposes.

In formulating their views, philosophical theists remind themselves of the many obstacles that impede the human search for the true, the good, the beautiful, and the holy. They distinguish between the ultimate mystery of being and mysteries that vanish as human understanding increases. Aware that the last word on the mystery of being is beyond their grasp, they pursue the best clues to the relation of the ultimate reality to themselves and the quality of their existence. In the history of theism and of monism, it is almost invariably claimed that immediate experiences of the divine are the most authentic, inspiring sources of truth about the ultimately real, and that these religious experiences take priority over claims based on rational, moral, and aesthetic experience.

However, since religious experients, including seasoned mystics, make conflicting claims about what is revealed, most philosophical theists (hereafter referred to simply as "theists") will take into account the claims based on religious insight but will not grant them arbitrary priority over other interpretations of experience. Broadly speaking, the drift in theistic thinking is toward improving insight into the nature of God and the attributes that are essential for conveying his transcendence and immanence. This essay, in the main, stresses the drift of these reflections without expounding paradigm arguments as such, even as they have been articulated by great theists.

Ontological Argument. When Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury (1093-1109), formulated the ontological argument for God, he was expressing an invincible con-

viction: the human intellect is, in fact, gripped by at least one idea that, clearly understood, proves the knower's kinship with the ultimate reality as inherently one and good. Anselm's fascinating proposal is that every mind has the idea of a perfect being, namely, of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" (*Proslogium*, chap. 2). The uniqueness of this idea is missed by any opponent who counters that to argue thus is like deducing the existence of an island from the idea of a perfect island; after all, any island, to be an island, must be perfect. But the idea of a perfect island is not "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," namely, a self-existent being.

Proponents deduce that this one self-existent being is intrinsically immutable, omnipotent, omniscient, and good. These attributes dominate their interpretations of the perfection of this transcendent God's immanence in the world orders. The conclusion of the ontological argument is not grounded in interpretations of human experiences of sense and of value. Indeed, the mind's awareness of perfection is the guiding norm for evaluating claims based on these dimensions of human experience. Nevertheless, theists, whether or not they are sufficiently impressed by the ontological proof, usually explore the family of ideas associated with perfect being in order to help resolve conflicts that do originate in experiences of sense and of value.

Cosmological Argument. The cosmological argument for God centers attention on the explanation of the dependable regularity of changes among the countless beings that make up the spatiotemporal world and constitute it an orderly whole (a cosmos). The cosmological theist emphasizes that the cause-and-effect connections (and other relations) in this world are contingent and not self-existent, that they cannot of themselves ground the cosmic order assumed in so much theory and practice. He therefore proposes that this, or any, cosmic order is the product of a self-existent cause. For without such a cause, the successions of beings and events, having no reliable frameworks of their own, are in fact happenstance. Moreover, the cosmos is a collective whole whose unity is actually contingent, unless the succession of beings and events is grounded in the activity of a self-existent cause. Such a cause is not one supreme being alongside other beings, and it cannot be conceived adequately on the model of any dependent being.

The argument thus far presented allows all contingent beings to be modes of the One, which is consistent with forms of monism. But, for reasons to be noted, the theist holds that the cause, although immanent in all orders, must not be conceived as absorbing them, as in pantheism, nor identified with them, as in pantheism.

While some theists regard such cosmological conclu-

sions as logically demonstrative, most theists regard them as more reasonably probable than alternative explanations of the cosmos. "More reasonably probable" does not mean statistically probable, however. Because there can be no observation of a series of world orders (as there can be of, say, repeated throwings of dice), there can be no calculation of mathematically probable trends. After all, cosmological theists seek the explanatory ground for trusting connections (including statistical calculations) that underlie the uniformity of nature.

Some critics of cosmological theists charge that they commit the fallacy of composition in affirming that a whole of contingent parts must itself be contingent. For example, they contend that a whole of overlapping, contingent beings and events may logically be an everlasting cosmos. To this a cosmological theist replies that to explain cosmos by self-existent cause is, in fact, not to commit the fallacy of composition. Surely, there is no fallacy in concluding that a group composed of blind members is never more than a totality of blind individuals. Similarly, a whole composed of intrinsically contingent beings and relations cannot be other than contingent. Moreover, the theist points out that a continuous, everlasting contingency is still contingency and certainly no substitute for a whole, unified by a self-existent cause.

Theists and monists agree that the self-existent cause (the One) is indivisible and immutable. Were it composite or changing in any way, we would be back seeking an adequate ground for dependable change. Other philosophical considerations influence the theist's and monist's differing conceptions about the immanence of the transcendent One. But they agree, in principle, that analogical inferences from the dependent orders can serve as pointers to the nature of the One. They both discourage the mythological mode of anthropomorphism in depicting the One. And it is on the foundation of the self-existent, immutable One as the essence of perfection that they proceed to refine conceptions of the transcendent One in itself and in its immanence within the dependent orders.

Thus, both theists and monists agree that the self-existent One is incorporeal, since corporeal being is limited by its spatial nature. But is this incorporeal One to be conceived as a person? For example, is its nature compatible with the influential, first formal definition of a person as proposed by Boethius (c. 480–525): "an individual substance of a rational nature" (*Against Eutyches* 6)? The line of reasoning that favors belief in the personhood of the One is fundamental also to the cosmological argument for the self-existent, immutable cause: any successive change cannot be a succession independent of an unchanging, unifying agent. Further-

more, a succession cannot be known as a succession apart from a nonsuccessive experient of succession. In the last analysis, reasoning itself is not possible without a time-transcending unity, free from limitations of corporeal composition. The self-existent cause is best conceived, therefore, as an unchanging, indivisible Person.

However, monists in the West (e.g., Plotinus, Spinoza, Hegel, F. H. Bradley) and in the East (especially Indian exponents of Advaita Vedānta, from Śaṅkara in the ninth century CE to Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan in the twentieth century) developed the concept of incorporeal unity, but they considered the attribution of any concept of a person to the suprapersonal One as misleading. The theist, nevertheless, contends that an infinite Person, inherently and fully rational, is the least misleading view of the contemporaneous One. Can the adherent of the suprapersonal One intelligibly deny that the One is self-aware and aware of all that is (omniscient)? Moreover, can we avoid theoretical shipwreck if the very insistence on the fathomless depths of the One leads to the conclusion that the finite person's ideals of logic and of truth, goodness, and beauty bear, in principle, no trustworthy clue to the nature of suprapersonal unity?

Nor does the theist stop here. The spearhead of the theist's rejection of an all-absorbing One is the conviction that the individual person experiences free will to choose between alternatives within his powers. The theist stresses that without free will it makes no sense to refer to conclusions as true or false. For a conclusion that cannot be drawn from a relatively free, impartial weighing of evidence for and against hypothesis is nothing but the outcome of the regnant play of factors in the knower. Such an outcome is one event among other events and is neither true nor false.

Furthermore, if personal free will is nullified, so is the difference between moral good and moral evil, since each depends on a person's having the free will to choose between alternative courses of action deemed to be good or evil. It is such freedom of will that is vital to the theist's conception of a person's responsibility to other persons and to his interpretation of a person's relation to the physical, the subpersonal orders of being, and to God himself.

Hence, when the theist is told that the orders of being are ultimately machinelike and indifferent to the values of persons, or that the whole framework of things is a logical network that allows for no (supposedly capricious) free will, or when mystical union with the One is taken as indubitable evidence that a person is in fact only a particular center of God's being, the theist will stand by a person's experience of limited free will while pointing out the theoretical and moral consequences of

its denial. This stand is basic to his conception of the Creator as person.

Although theists are not of one mind as to the self-existent Person's relation to the order of physical things and of subpersonal living beings, they concur that God creates persons out of nothingness (*creatio ex nihilo*). This concept, unthinkable to any Greek or Indian philosopher, is admittedly mysterious, but what is posited must be understood in its context. *Creatio ex nihilo* does not mean that God, as it were, takes nothing and makes what he creates therefrom. Rather, he creates what did not exist prior to his creative act. God does not create from being(s) independent of him, nor does he create from his own being; the created orders do not emanate from his being. God creates persons to be free within their potential and in relation to the other orders. The Indian philosopher Rāmānuja (c. 1017–1173) argued against the absorption of persons in the distinctionless One (*brāhman*), as held in the prevailing *advaita* (non-dualist) philosophy of Śāṅkara—although, in the end, he, too, insisted on their ultimate union with the supra-personal One.

Does the creation of persons, free to develop their own potential and, within limits, their own environments, not conflict with the attribute of God's omnipotent will? No, since God's creating of free persons is self-imposed and is, therefore, an instance of God's omnipotence.

But may not a person's use of freedom influence the fulfillment of God's purposes? On this, theists disagree, depending, in good part, on their conception of God's other attributes. It is worth noting that often, when it seems that God's attributes in effect conflict with each other, theists warn that God's attributes must not be isolated from each other, since this would violate the indivisibility of God's being. The application of this doctrine here supports the view that God's self-imposed creating of persons as free and not as puppets will not issue in the thwarting of his purposes.

But, if the attribute of God's omniscience is defined as God's knowing all that is, has been, and will be, must not God's foreknowledge be limited (and his power affected) by a person's freedom? What can it mean to affirm human freedom of choice if God knows in every instance and in every detail what any person will choose? Some theists take omniscience to mean that the Creator knows all there is to know (including all the options possible and available). They cannot understand how the freedom of persons at the point of choice is compatible with foreknowledge of what the choice will be, let alone compatible with the necessary fulfillment of the omnipotent God's will. Their theistic opponents, however, urge that the creation of free persons should

not be interpreted as curtailing either God's power or his knowledge in any way that would limit his control of all there is and will be. They argue that we should not impose on the perfect, timeless Person the conditions of temporal succession to which finite persons are limited in knowing. They suggest that something like human intuitive knowing "all at once," which differs markedly from discursive inference "from one meaning to the other," provides a more helpful clue to God's knowing.

It is plain that the self-existent Creator, whose immutable transcendence is contemporaneous with his immanence in the temporal world, leaves theists with theoretical tensions. But they find these tensions more acceptable than the identification of all that exists with the One.

Teleological Argument. In advancing the concept of the contemporaneous cause as Creator-Person, the theist implies his conviction that causal order is best understood in terms of some goal. Such teleological thinking examines composite things and series of events that strongly suggest design, namely, the cooperation of parts that produce one kind of goal and not another. The spring of a watch is best understood in terms of its relation to the other parts that, along with it, effect the purpose of the watch. So, also, although every animate cell has its own order, understanding of that cell is increased once its contribution to the orderly function of the whole organism is specified.

Accordingly, the teleological argument for God does not arbitrarily add purposeful goal seeking to nonpurposeful causes. It centers attention on the designs that can be reasonably inferred as causal patterns when they are viewed in the context of unifying goals. For theists moving from cosmological considerations to teleological understanding, the controlling conviction is that the physical, the organic, and the human orders are most reasonably understood as fitting together within the comprehensive purpose of the Creator. Moreover, teleological theists hold that the inanimate and subhuman orders are so created as to provide for the good of persons, persons who can and should realize that they live in God's world, a training ground for the life to come.

Insofar as theists expound and defend a teleological argument that calls to mind a Creator-Architect-Carpenter who provides the specific physical environment for specific biological species and who does so to suit the created endowments of persons, they continue to encounter strong opposition from scholars who draw on scientific data to support their conviction that no such planned creation and no such Creator is tenable. Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859) spurred on the explanation of present organic structures as con-

sequences of gradual modifications that favored the survival of the fittest. Other scientific discoveries relevant to the theory of evolution and scientific and philosophical interpretations of pertinent new data have enlarged the area of confrontation between teleologist and non-teleologist.

The teleological theist argues, however, that, even granting explanation of evolution in terms of the survival of the fittest, it is the arrival of the fit that still calls for teleological explanation. Nonetheless, the Darwinian theory of evolution led many theists to emphasize the demands of moral consciousness and religious consciousness as *independent* sources of belief in God.

Wider Teleological Argument. All the more significant is the comprehensive rethinking of teleological theism that has produced a "wider teleological argument," a position that has developed systematically in the context of historical philosophic issues. The outstanding statement of this position is in the two volumes of *Philosophical Theology* (1928–1930) by Frederick R. Tennant. Tennant defends the irreducible unity of the person and explores the cognitive limits of knowledge based on a person's sensory and nonsensory capacities; he concludes that no dimension of personal experience can arrive at logically coercive beliefs.

Tennant does not assume that a nonteleological view of the universe is already established. Nor is our world, as known, more reasonably explained as the product of ultimate, random variations or chance happenings. Rather, such knowledge as we guide ourselves by is the joint product of continuing human interaction with an amenable framework of things. Accordingly, to postulate planning in the ultimate collocation of things is to understand better what the human search for truth and values presupposes, namely, the basic relevance of cognitive activities to the order of things. Thus, "If Nature evinces wisdom, the wisdom is Another's" (Tennant, 1930, p. 107).

This wider teleology is articulated when Tennant points out that the nonbiological, physical order does not itself require either the existence or the progressive evolution of species. Yet, the drift of subhuman evolution allows for the arrival of the new order of conscious-self-conscious persons, for whom "survival of the fittest" does not adequately account. Persons, in turn, cannot exist unless their comprehensive reasoning with regard to the other orders guides their moral efforts to improve the quality of their individual and communal survival.

Tennant does not exclude the inspirational value of religious experiences from the chain of evidence for the Creator-Person. But, in his analysis of the varieties of religious experience, he does not find the immediate,

uninterpreted knowledge of God to warrant the conclusion that religious experience should be independent of criticism grounded in the rational and moral dimensions of experience. Religious experience with all its suggestiveness is not given cognitive priority, but it does serve as an important confirmatory link in the chain of evidence, reasonably interpreted.

All in all, then, the claims to reasonably probable knowledge are the more reliable insofar as they can be viewed as joint products of persons interacting with each other in their ongoing interchange with their total environment. No one link in this chain of evidence for cosmic teleology is, by itself, strong enough to justify the conclusion that the Creator-Person is immanent in the orders of being. Consequently, the wider teleological argument is to be judged for its reasonableness as a cumulative whole. But this is no cause for alarm, since, to take an example from the scientific realm, the hypothesis of biological evolution is accepted as a cumulative whole despite weaker and missing links of evidence. Accordingly, the theoretical backbone of the broader teleological theism is its more reasonable interpretation of human experience cumulatively viewed.

Moral Argument. There are theists sympathetic with Tennant's wider teleology who hold that his view of the ethical link simply does not do justice to the experience of the moral consciousness. Their crucial contention is that the value judgments of persons, although related to their desires and feelings, are not experienced as originating in them. Rather, the irreducible moral consciousness becomes increasingly aware of an objective order of values that exerts imperative authority over persons' lives. This unique, normative order, not dependent on human desiring and not descriptive of actual processes in the natural world, is most coherently interpreted as expressive of the Creator's goodness.

In sum, according to this moral argument for God, an unconditional, universal order of values is gradually revealed not only as morally imperative for persons but necessary in their struggle for fulfillment. Most reasonably understood as rooted in God's nature, it is this objective order of values that is the strongest link in any argument for a God worthy of worship. Indeed, without this independent source of normative values, the cosmological and teleological arguments do not suffice to assure the goodness of God.

Tennant, however, provides an elaborate critique of this account of the moral consciousness and the objectivity of value judgments. He argues that to root value-experience in desires and feelings does not, of itself, justify the charge that value judgments are relativistic. He interprets the objectivity and universality of value-experiences and value judgments as joint products of each

person's interaction with at least the natural and social orders. It is the most coherent organization of such value judgments that is, indeed, the capstone of the wider teleological argument. For now, persons, experiencing and organizing their values as joint products of their interaction with orderly trends not of their own making, can better interpret the immanent direction of the collocation of things. Hence, the progressive appreciation of the conditions of the qualitative range of value-experiences remains the normative insight into what kind of personal growth this kind of world fosters.

Theoretical Problems. Whichever of the above approaches to God is most acceptable to the traditional theist, central to his vision remains the perfection of the self-existent, transcendent Creator, immanent in his creations and, especially, in the optimum development of morally autonomous persons. This vision of "absolute" perfection poses obstinate theoretical problems for the theist himself, as he tries to clarify the dynamics of the perfection of an immutable Creator-Person who is immanent in his temporal, changing creation. This article confines itself to three questions of especial concern to theists. Adequate discussion of these alone would require analysis of other knotty metaphysical issues (such as the ultimate nature of space and time or the specific nature of God's relation to the spatiotemporal world).

The first question is "How can God be immutable and yet immanent in a changing world, let alone in the kind of changing relations that obtain between him and developing moral agents?" The theist invariably does not flinch as he grants that this theoretical conflict is intrinsic to the theistic transcendent-immanent situation. [See also *Transcendence and Immanence*.] For a perfect Creator cannot create without creating dependent, imperfect beings; and he will not annul the will of persons free to choose changes within their power. Nevertheless, while thus holding that there is no intelligible bridge from the changing created realms to the immutable Creator, the theist urges that God's immutability is not to be conceived in rigid and timeless mathematical fashion. He does suggest analogies within human experience that render the impasse less stark, such as those concentrated moments in which the past and future seem to fuse with a timeless, transcendent unity.

The second question moves the first into perhaps the most sensitive area of the theist's belief: the passibility of God, that is, God's responsiveness to human need. If God's immutable perfection is appropriately responsive to the created orders in their kind, how can he be unchanged and unchangeable? If he is unchanged and unchangeable, how can he be anything but impassive to the moral struggle of persons? What can it mean to say

that he appropriately responds to their situations (that he "knows," "suffers," "redeems," or "liberates") without enduring any change himself? Here the theist, avoiding anthropomorphism, urges us to realize that the Creator-Person will not, in the nature of the case, undergo the psychic states of persons and suffer as we do.

Nevertheless, the moral-religious thrust of the theist's resistance to both deism and monism is at stake, for he defends the concept of a morally free person who is ultimately responsible to God, a God who "knows" and is appropriately responsive to the ranges of human striving. Can this person-to-Person relation be honored by a God who, in his immutability, does not change at all in response to even the worthy appeals of his repentant creatures? In the face of this impasse, some theists hold that God's immutability is compatible with his passibility, if his responses to need are conceived as the overflow of his essence and, hence, neither diminish nor improve it.

The third question is "In view of the amount and quality of evils, how can one reasonably believe in a Creator who, omniscient and limited by nothing beyond or within himself, is perfect in purpose and accomplishment?" [See *Theodicy*.] The response of the theist depends to some extent upon what he claims to be the pearl of great price in the human ideal of the good. There are differences among theists on this matter, but the exposition here takes as vital to all theistic views of the ideal good the freedom of persons to choose, within limits, their own destiny. Such freedom does not exist in a vacuum; indeed, it would be powerless without a network of order that helps a person to know the good and evil consequences of his actions. Without such freedom a person would not experience the profound satisfaction of building the character so essential to the conservation and increase of values available to him as he develops.

So important is this pearl that the theist, never unaware of the maldistribution of values and disvalues, is poignantly mindful of the undeserved and vicious evils inflicted by man's inhumanity to man and by natural forces beyond human control. He is not given to holding that evil is illusory, or that it exists as a privation of goodness. But neither will he minimize a fact that becomes the foundation of his thinking about evil. Evil, in the last analysis, has no independent power of its own; it lives parasitically on the good. The theist's trust in the goodness of the Creator-Person is, therefore, grounded in this priority in the very nature of things. This fact also fortifies his belief in a personal immortality that is not an external addition to life in this imperfect world but is, rather, the extension of the creative goodness of God.

Even if all this be granted, serious concerns persist. Can it be conceded, even to so acute a theist as Tennant, that a Creator-Person, both omnipotent and omniscient, cannot, in the collocation and governance of things, create water that quenches thirst but does not drown? Again, it may be granted that, without the possibility of evil, persons would not experience the qualities of creativity resulting from their developing virtues. Nevertheless, would a Creator who is all-good, omnipotent, and omniscient create a world in which so much "non-disciplinary evil" occurs? Nondisciplinary evils are evils that, as far as we can see, are not instrumental to the realization of other values. They are those evils that undermine even the most heroic moral effort; they finally fell the oak that has weathered many storms. They, too, are parasites upon the good, but whatever the source, they are the irreducible evils that defy being classified as means to some good.

The traditional theist now reminds us of our keyhole vision in this life. To other theists, this appeal to ignorance is unavailing. After all, it is open to opponent and exponent alike. These "finitistic" theists, determined to explain the evidence at hand as reasonably as possible, reexamine the concept of perfection presupposed by traditional theists. They suggest that the impasses of transcendence-immanence ultimately hinge on the assumption that perfection necessarily excludes all temporality and change in the self-existent Creator. Why must we hold, finitists ask, that self-existence necessitates God's immutability in every respect? Why cannot perfection characterize a transcendent, self-existent Creator who expresses his purposes in the temporal orders without danger of becoming the victim of the changes required? Indeed, why suppose that only immutable perfection is worthy of worship?

In any case, finitistic theists contend that the actual course of natural and human history is more reasonably explained if the Creator-God's omnipotence and immutability are limited in the interest of his creative goodness. And his moral perfection consists in God's conservation and renewal of value realization despite recalcitrant conditions within his own being. This Creator-Person, thus limited in power by uncreated conditions within himself, creates and re-creates situations most consistent with his purposes.

The specific way in which the morally perfect Creator-Person is limited in power depends upon the particular theist's conception of God's immanence in the inorganic, organic, and personal orders and, especially, on that theist's view of God's relation to persons as individuals and in community. Finitistic theists, however, cannot tolerate, theoretically, the conception of a self-existent Creator limited by any being(s) completely in-

dependent of his own will. Such theists vary in their description of the recalcitrant factor(s) that are inherent in the self-existent Creator. But the basic thrust of their views inspires the worship of a God who, dealing creatively with recalcitrance, continues to create, in accordance with his concern that the conditions for creativity be preserved and increased at every level possible.

Such finitistic theism saves transcendence from the pantheistic absorption of persons. At the same time, it is free from the dangers of a theism that, in the name of immutable perfection, sets up impasses that encourage the conception of a deistic Creator who knows not the quality of continuing, creative caring.

[For further discussion of the arguments treated here, see *Proofs for the Existence of God. Alternate views of the nature of ultimate reality can be found in Deism; Pantheism and Panentheism; Monism; and Atheism.*]

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THEOCRACY means "rule by God" and refers to a type of government in which God or gods are thought to have sovereignty, or to any state so governed. The

concept has been widely applied to such varied cases as pharaonic Egypt, ancient Israel, medieval Christendom, Calvinism, Islam, and Tibetan Buddhism.

The word was first coined in the Greek language (*theokratia*) by the Jewish historian Josephus Flavius around 100 CE. Josephus noted that while the nations of the world were variously governed by monarchies, oligarchies, and democracies, the polity of the Jews was theocracy. This, he thought, went back to Moses, who was not attracted by the model of these other polities and therefore "designated his government a theocracy—as someone might say, forcing an expression—thus attributing the rule and dominion to God" (*Against Apion* 2.165).

From Josephus's coinage the term found its way into modern languages, though most early uses were references to the government of ancient Israel, and thus faithful to the original context. The poet John Donne, in a sermon of 1622, stated that the Jews had been under a theocracy, and the Anglican bishop William Warburton, in his *Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated* (1737–1741), engaged in a long discussion of Israelite theocracy.

Impetus for wider use of the word came from G. W. F. Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, where the term was employed to describe that early phase of ancient oriental civilization in which there was no distinction between religion and the state. In the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the term became what Karl Mannheim called a *Kampfbegriff*, by which "enlightened" contempt for "priest-ridden" societies could be expressed. It was with something of this force that it was used by W. E. H. Lecky in his *History of Rationalism* (1865) and by Brooks Adams in *The Emancipation of Massachusetts* (1887).

Theocracy has not become a rigorously defined concept in either social science or the history of religions, although the term is frequently used in historical writing. This is probably because it does not name a governmental system or structure, parallel to monarchy or democracy, but designates a certain kind of placement of the ultimate source of state authority, regardless of the form of government. In biblical studies, where the notion of theocracy has had its longest currency, it has probably also been used with the greatest consistency and fruitfulness.

This article deals with the various meanings that the term *theocracy* may be usefully given, with examples relevant to each meaning: hierocracy, or rule by religious functionaries; royal theocracy, or rule by a sacred king; general theocracy, or rule in a more general sense by a divine will or law; and eschatological theocracy, or future rule by the divine.

Hierocracy. *Theocracy* has often been used as a term to describe societies where the clergy or priests rule, but this is not the exact denotation of the word, and another word, *hierocracy*, is available for such situations. Some have called this "pure" theocracy. Among such theocracies, a distinction can be made between those in which the religious functionaries who exercise rule are priestly in character and those in which they are more prophetic-charismatic.

Theocracies of this type have not been very numerous. Several of the stages in the history of ancient Israel exemplify it: the early period, beginning with the Sinai covenant and continuing with the leadership of Moses and Aaron; the religious confederation of the tribal amphictyony; and the charismatic (though occasional) leadership of the Judges down to the time of Samuel. Thus, Israel had strongly theocratic elements, in the sense of rule by religious functionaries. Centuries later, after the return from exile in the late sixth century BCE, a theocracy emerged with the priestly leadership of the generations after Ezra. The priestly theocratic pattern became so important among the Jews at this time that the later Hasmoneans legitimated their rule by claiming the high priesthood. This was the case until the end of the rule of Alexander Yannai over the small Jewish state in 67 BCE.

This kind of theocracy has been rare in Christianity, which grew up as a clandestine religion at odds with a hostile state. Nonetheless, a kind of theocracy in the sense of priestly rule appeared in the Papal States of central Italy and lasted for over a millennium (756–1870). However, this situation was not usually thought of as a prototype of the ideal but, rather more pragmatically, as a way of securing the independence of church authority, centered in Rome, from interference and control by secular powers. Another Christian example of pure theocracy can be found in the early years of the Latter-Day Saints, or Mormons, in the United States, where the prophetic leaders (first Joseph Smith and then Brigham Young) exercised religious and temporal authority in the life of the community, both in earlier settlements and then in Salt Lake City.

The early years of Islam, under the prophet Muhammad and his first successors, the caliphs, were also theocratic in the sense that there was rule by the religious leadership, though it was not a priestly but a prophetic-charismatic leadership. It is, however, difficult to say at exactly what point the caliphate ceased to be a primarily religious institution.

Tibetan Buddhism has often been cited as an example of priestly theocracy. After the thirteenth century, Tibet was ruled by various elements of the Buddhist priesthood; in the seventeenth century, the Dge-lugs-pa sect

gained the temporal rule of the land and governed through the Dalai and Panchen lamas, as successive incarnations of Avalokiteśvara and Amitābha Buddha, respectively, until the Chinese Communist invasion destroyed this pattern in 1959. The Dalai Lama was the principal ruler from his capital at Lhasa, and administration was exercised by him (or by a regent ruling in his name when a new Dalai Lama was being sought) through a cabinet composed partly of monks.

Many short-lived communal and revolutionary movements inspired by religion have functioned as pure theocracies. Examples of this include the Taiping Rebellion in China in 1858; the seizure of Khartoum in the Sudan by a claimant to the role of the Mahdi in 1885; and the People's Temple of Jim Jones, which was established in Guyana in 1977, only to end in mass suicide.

Royal Theocracy. Rule by a king thought to possess divine status or power, or to be entrusted by God with authority over the earth, is a second kind of theocracy. Such sacred kingship has many ramifications beyond what can be considered in relation to the concept of theocracy. Traditional Japan was ruled by such a royal theocracy, the emperors being regarded as descendants of the sun goddess Amaterasu. Some societies of the ancient world were theocratic in this sense: the ancient Mesopotamian kings were regarded as chosen servants and regents of the gods, and the Egyptian pharaohs were thought to be directly descended from the sun god, who had created the earth and had at first ruled it personally, later ruling it through them. In both Egypt and Mesopotamia, as well as among other ancient peoples, kings also fulfilled many important roles in ritual, thus acting as intermediaries between men and the gods. Analogies have frequently been drawn between ancient Near Eastern sacred monarchy and Israelite kingship, but such inferences should be drawn with caution, especially since Israel's monarchy had been established within the time of Israel's historical memory and had been opposed by a school of thought that felt that Yahveh alone should be recognized as king (*1 Sm.* 8:6–22, *Hos.* 8:4, 13:10–11). However, Israelite monarchy borrowed some of the theocratic features of its Near Eastern predecessors, especially elements of court ritual. Still, Israel under the monarchy was a royal theocracy, for the kings were considered to be the anointed and chosen servants of Yahveh and the earthly representatives of Yahveh's theocratic authority. [See Israelite Law, *article on* State and Judiciary Law.]

Monarchy as the fulfillment of a sacred role of divine regency also appeared in Christianity. The most obvious examples have been in Eastern Christianity, both Byzantine and Russian, in which the imperial office was regarded as God-given, and the emperor regarded as

God's representative on earth in all temporal matters, as well as in the external affairs of the church. In Byzantium, the distinction between the religious and the secular was not as sharply drawn as it usually was in the West, and the Byzantine emperor had certain liturgical prerogatives that were closed to the layperson. Such sacred kingship also appeared in Western Christianity among the early Germanic kings who ruled after the dissolution of the Roman empire, and especially in the rule of Charlemagne. It reappeared with some of the Holy Roman emperors who sought to counter the claims of papal theocracy after the eleventh-century Gregorian reform, and at the courts of Henry VIII and Louis XIV.

General Theocracy. A third type of theocracy, by far the most common, is that more general type wherein ultimate authority is considered to be vested in a divine law or revelation, mediated through a variety of structures or polities. In a sense, both priestly and royal theocracies may be of this sort: for example, in Israelite monarchy the Law stood as an authority beyond that of the king at the time of the Josianic reform; Byzantine emperors in spite of their choice by God were subordinate to the principles of revealed truth; and even the Egyptian god-kings were supposed to rule according to the eternal principles of *maat*, or justice. Theocracy in this third sense has been quite common as a conception in such universalizing religions as Christianity and Islam, where there has often been a thrust toward bringing the whole human sphere under the aegis of the divine will; but it has also appeared in some ancient and tribal societies where the laws and customs of the people are understood to be revealed by the gods, as in some of the ancient Greek city-states.

Historical conditions have made this type of theocracy less common in Christianity than might otherwise have been the case; in earliest Christianity, theocracy was ruled out by the sharp dichotomy between the church and a hostile world that prevailed in Christian thinking, and in modern times, secularization has rendered otiose any program for the rule of Christian norms over all of society. Furthermore, some kinds of Christian thinking about society—for example, the two-kingdom theory of Lutheranism; Christian Aristotelianism, which grants to the state a basis in its own right; and the modern acceptance of the separation of church and state—have weakened the theocratic impulse.

In Christianity, the two most commonly cited examples of this kind of theocracy have been medieval Roman Catholicism and some of the Calvinist societies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Earlier medieval thought looked upon the spiritual and the temporal as two coordinate powers under God,

with their own separate structures of rule. After the Gregorian reform of the eleventh century, however, papal theorists sought to divest the temporal overlord of his sacred character and promoted the view that the church, through the pope, was sovereign in all temporal affairs, even if this sovereignty were not exercised directly but through secular rulers whom the church had the authority to direct, judge, or remove. This papal theocracy reached its height in the early thirteenth-century pontificate of Innocent III, who made good his claim to have the authority to dispose earthly powers when he disciplined various European monarchs, including King John of England. Defenders of papal theocracy, however, made even more far-reaching claims in the next century, asserting that the popes, as vicars of Christ on earth, exercised all the prerogatives of Christ's heavenly kingship, which was both royal and priestly, and were, theoretically, not only the possessors of all earthly political sovereignty but the ultimate owners of all property. Late medieval developments, including the papal captivity and schism, the rise of conciliarism, and nationalism, led to the decline of effective papal theocracy.

Theocracy has often been attributed to the government of certain Reformed or Calvinist states, whether Zurich under Ulrich Zwingli, Geneva under John Calvin, England under Oliver Cromwell, or Puritan Massachusetts. In none of these cases was there a hierocratic theocracy, since in most of them the clergy were less likely to hold public office than they had been previously—for example, Cromwellian England abolished church courts and the House of Lords with its bishops, and the Massachusetts Bay Colony forbade the clergy to serve as magistrates. Even in Geneva, the clergy had only an advisory role in checking and balancing the civil government. But all of these societies had an ideal, well expressed by the Strasbourg theologian Martin Bucer in his *De regno Christi*, of a holy community on earth in which the sovereignty was God's and in which the actual law should reflect the divine will and the government seek to promote the divine glory. In the Puritan examples of Cromwellian England in the 1650s and Massachusetts Bay in the first generations of its settlement, there was both a hearkening after Old Testament theocratic patterns and a sense of the importance of government entrusted to truly regenerate persons—or the saints—in an effort to create a holy commonwealth. In fact, however, rule was exercised in both cases more through a godly laity than through the clergy, and in both Cromwellian England and Puritan Massachusetts the state had considerable power in church affairs.

It is also in this general sense of theocracy that Islam

ought to be considered theocratic. Islam grew up as a religious community that was its own state, and thus from the beginning there was no distinction of church and state; rather, there was a unitary society under God's revealed rule and law. Islam was much less a church than a theocratic state, but as a theocracy, it was laical and egalitarian, with traditions neither of sacred kings nor of a powerful priesthood. The basis of this divine rule is to be found in *shari'ah*, or law, which provides for a pattern of life uniting all the aspects of human existence—political, social, religious, domestic—into a grand whole under divine rule. Such rule has been variously exercised in Islamic history, but the 'ulamā' as well as the caliphs and, in Shiism, the imams have been important in its application. Many modern Islamic revival movements, reacting against Western aggression and internal decline, have tended toward the repristination of the theocratic elements in Islam; this was true of the Wahhābiyah in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has been true of many contemporary movements.

Eschatological Theocracy. A fourth kind of theocracy is eschatological, centering on visions of an ideal future in which God will rule. Restoration eschatology and messianic ideas in ancient Israel were of this type. In Christianity, such eschatological theocracy appeared in the beliefs of the medieval followers of Joachim of Fiore, who anticipated the emergence of a third age in which all would be perfect, and in the beliefs of the sectarians of seventeenth-century England, such as the Seekers, Quakers, or Fifth Monarchists, who dreamed of a coming millennial age when Christ would rule. Such modern offshoots of Christianity as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon present recent examples of groups anticipating an earthly reign of Christ. Islamic eschatology centering on the figure of the Mahdi has occasionally begotten similar hopes.

[For general discussions of theocracy and related issues, see Kingship; Church and State; and Kingdom of God; for specific examples of theocracies in the history of religions, see Dalai Lama; Imamate; Shiism; Constantine; and Charlemagne.]

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THEODICY. Why do the righteous suffer? Why do the wicked prosper? Why do innocent children experience illness and death? These are ancient questions, but they have been given new poignancy in our day by the events of the European Holocaust. The fact that many who died in the Holocaust were devout Jews or Christians also poses a special problem for the faiths to which these victims belonged. Traditionally, Jews and Christians have affirmed God's goodness and his absolute sovereignty over history. But how can this faith be reconciled with suffering on the scale for which Auschwitz is the symbol?

Theoretical Positions

The effort to answer questions of this sort is commonly referred to as *theodicy*. The term was apparently

coined by the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) and is a compound of the Greek words for God (*theos*) and justice (*dikē*). Theodicy may thus be thought of as the effort to defend God's justice and power in the face of suffering. Theodicies result from this effort: they are specific explanations or justifications of suffering in a world believed to be ruled by a morally good God.

The Theodicy Problem. The "problem of theodicy" arises when the experienced reality of suffering is juxtaposed with two sets of beliefs traditionally associated with ethical monotheism. One is the belief that God is absolutely good and compassionate. The other is the belief that he controls all events in history, that he is both all-powerful (omnipotent) and all-knowing (omniscient). When combined with some other implicit beliefs—for example, the belief that a good being would try to prevent suffering insofar as he is able—these various ideas seem contradictory. They appear to form a logical "trilemma," in the sense that, while any two of these sets of ideas can be accepted, the addition of the third renders the whole logically inconsistent. Thus, it seems that it can be affirmed that God is all-good and all-powerful, but not also that there is suffering in the world. Similarly, the fact of suffering can be affirmed along with God's goodness, but the insistence on God's omnipotence appears to render the whole ensemble of beliefs untenable. Theodicy may be thought of as the effort to resist the conclusion that such a logical trilemma exists. It aims to show that traditional claims about God's power and goodness are compatible with the fact of suffering.

Alternative Definitions. Some writers have tried to expand the term *theodicy* beyond its classical Western philosophical and theological usage. The sociologist Max Weber, for example, sought to redefine the term in order to render it applicable to religious traditions that do not involve belief in one just, all-powerful deity. In Weber's usage, *the theodicy problem* referred to any situation of inexplicable or unmerited suffering, and *theodicy* itself referred to any rationale for explaining suffering. This wider definition has value for the comparative study of religion. Nevertheless, without neglecting other religious responses to suffering, I shall here be using the term *theodicy* in its classical sense, as the effort to defend God's justice and power in a world marred by suffering.

Dissolutions of the Theodicy Problem. One reason for holding to the narrower definition of theodicy is that it allows us to see that theodicy in its classical sense is very much a feature of ethical monotheism. Theodicy in this sense does not arise in traditions that fundamentally deny or reject any one of the three major sets of ideas that form the theodicy problem: the belief in God's goodness, the belief in his power, or the belief in

the real occurrence of suffering. Religious positions that fundamentally dissolve the problem may be classified according to which of the three basic beliefs they do not accept.

Denials of God's justice. Some religious positions avoid theodicy by denying that God (or the gods) is morally good. Very few religious traditions openly hold God to be evil, although Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, in her book *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology* (Berkeley, 1976), has argued that at least one important motif in Hindu mythology traces suffering to the gods' pettiness and fear of human power. More common than an outright denial of the deity's justice, however, is the claim that God's justice is somehow qualitatively different from our ordinary human ideas of right and wrong. Words like *justice* or *goodness* when applied to God have no relation to their meaning when applied to human beings. What would be regarded as wickedness on the part of a human being—for example, the slaughter of children—may not be unjust where God is concerned. We shall see that this view has had some currency in Islam and in Calvinist Christianity.

Denials of God's omnipotence. Rather than compromise the divine goodness, some religious traditions have avoided theodicy by qualifying the divine power. This view is especially characteristic of religious dualisms, which explain the fact of suffering by positing a power or principle of disorder that wars incessantly with God for control of the world. In Zoroastrianism, for example, imperfections and suffering in this world are traced to an ongoing cosmic struggle between the good deity, Ahura Mazdā (Ōhrmazd), and his evil antagonist, Angra Mainyu (Ahriman). Similarly, the gnostic religion Manichaeism explained suffering in terms of a struggle between a "spiritual" god of goodness and light and an evil "creator" demon associated with darkness and matter.

Apart from dualism there are other ways by which religions can deny God's omnipotence. One of the most important of these is found in Buddhism, where suffering is traced to the automatic operation of the moral law of retribution known as *karman*. I shall return to *karman* in connection with Buddhist teaching as a whole, but for now it may be noted that *karman* eliminates the need to justify God (or the gods) in a world of suffering because it places that suffering almost wholly beyond divine control.

Denials of the reality of suffering. The final major way by which to avoid the problem of theodicy is to deny the third component in the trilemma, that is, that there really is suffering in the world. This position may seem impossible since unhappiness, illness, and death are all around us. Yet in various ways, religious thinkers and religious traditions have sometimes denied the

ultimate reality or significance of suffering. The philosopher Spinoza, for example, affirmed that the world seems filled with evil only because it is regarded from a narrow and erroneous human point of view. From the divine perspective, however, the world forms a necessary and perfect whole. Some Hindu thinkers have also denied the reality of suffering by advocating adoption of the divine point of view. According to the Vedantic tradition, what we call evil or suffering is really an aspect of *māyā*, the cosmic principle of dynamism and individuation. This principle is not ultimate, and the sage who attains the divine perspective sees *māyā* as an illusory process that does not really affect the eternal soul. This teaching renders the world of suffering inconsequential.

Classical Theodicies. Those familiar with the Western religious traditions may be unpersuaded by these various dissolutions of the theodicy problem. They may find that some of these positions, such as the denial that God is just in humanly understandable terms, seriously jeopardize a religious faith based on belief in God's goodness. Other dissolutions may seem to ignore the importance of the evil that God seeks to overcome or may erode confidence in God's ability to master that evil. Yet we have seen that the alternative position—affirmation of God's absolute goodness and power in a world of serious suffering—appears to be illogical. Defenders of ethical monotheism, however, have usually refused to accept this apparent illogicality. With varying degrees of self-consciousness, they have maintained that the alleged contradiction between monotheism and suffering does not exist. This view underlies the specific theodicies that have been elaborated to defend belief in a just and all-powerful God.

The key to these positions is an understanding of what it means to say that God is omnipotent. Typically, it is argued that while God can do anything he wills himself to do and anything that is capable of being done, he cannot do what is logically impossible. This is not because his power is limited but only because what is logically impossible cannot really be thought or conceived. Thus, God cannot make a "square circle," and we cannot ask or desire him to do so, because the very idea of a square circle is nonsense. Only the accident of language that makes a "square circle" seem as possible as a "seedless apple" leads us to think that God's inability here represents some limit to his power.

With this as a basis, it is further argued that the claim that God's goodness and power are logically incompatible with suffering is not correct, because it is not true that an all-good, all-powerful being would necessarily eliminate all suffering from the world. What is true is that such a being would want to bring about the

greatest state of goodness in the world. But creating such a state may involve the creation of some specific goods whose existence logically entails the possibility of certain evils, and these evils may be the source of the suffering we see around us.

The enterprise of theodicy, therefore, essentially involves the identification of those eminently valuable goods whose existence may entail certain states of suffering or evil. Proponents of specific theodicies usually contend that a world without these goods would be of lesser value than one that contains them, and so God is morally justified in having created a world in which these goods, with their attendant evils, exist.

While those involved in the enterprise of theodicy frequently focus on one good or the other in their defense of God, theodicy is inherently an eclectic activity. A variety of distinct values and arguments are commonly advanced to defend God's goodness. Some of the major theodicies listed here are not even theodicies in the most precise sense since they involve less the identification of specific values whose existence justifies suffering than the assertion that such values might exist. In any case, none of these classical theodicies is necessarily exclusive of the others, and adherents of ethical monotheism usually hold several of the following positions.

The free-will theodicy. One of the most powerful and most frequently adduced explanations of suffering is the free-will theodicy. Those who hold this position maintain that a world containing creatures who freely perform good actions and who freely respond to their creator's goodness is far better than a world of automatons who always do what is right because they cannot do what is wrong. Now, while God can create free creatures, if they are truly free he cannot causally determine what they do. To create a creature freely capable of doing what is morally right, therefore, God must create a creature who is also capable of doing what is morally wrong. As it turned out, some of the free creatures God created have exercised their freedom to do wrong, and this is the source of the suffering we see around us. Some of this suffering is directly caused by these wicked beings, while some results when they are justly punished by God for their conduct.

As easily stated as this theodicy is, it has many complexities, and it has frequently been challenged. Recent debate has been especially vigorous. Philosophers such as Antony Flew and J. L. Mackie, for example, have questioned the link in this argument between free will and the possibility of wrongdoing. Since the conduct of free beings is not unshaped by causal factors, they contend, God might have molded human nature and the physical environment in such a way that free beings

never do wrong. Or, they argue, since it is logically possible for any free being never to do wrong, there is nothing illogical in God's having created a whole race of free beings none of whom ever does wrong. However, other philosophers, notably Nelson Pike and Alvin Plantinga, have rejected these arguments, claiming either that they run counter to our commonsense understanding of freedom, which involves essentially an idea of nondetermination by causal forces, or that they mistakenly derive from ambiguities in what it means to say that God can create free beings who never do wrong. While it is true, they would say, that God can create a race of free beings none of whom ever happens to do wrong, it is not true that God can create free beings and bring about their never doing wrong. Whether wrong is done depends on the beings themselves. This leads these philosophers to the conclusion that God must expose the world to the possibility of suffering and evil if he chooses to create beings who are genuinely free.

A more traditional and long-standing objection to the free-will theodicy is that it does not apparently handle the problem of natural (or physical) evil as opposed to moral evil. Moral evil may be thought of as states of suffering traceable to the agency of free beings, such as war, racism, or genocide. Natural evil is that evil or suffering that is not traceable to acts or volitions of free beings, including such things as earthquakes, floods, and pestilence. Even if it is granted that this distinction is not sharp (some of the damage wrought by earthquakes, for example, is the result of shoddy construction techniques and other forms of human ignorance or avarice), clearly there are instances of suffering utterly beyond human control. Because this suffering is not traceable to human abuse of freedom, these critics contend, God must ultimately be held responsible for its existence.

Defenders of the free-will theodicy have responded to this objection in various ways. They have sometimes traced natural evil to the agency of demonic beings (fallen angels or Satan) whose own malevolence results from a perverse exercise of free will. They have also sometimes argued that natural evils are ongoing punishments for wrongful acts by mankind's first parents, so that suffering is a result of Original Sin. Despite occasional efforts at their revival, these responses have little currency today. As a result, many proponents of the free-will theodicy find themselves forced to turn elsewhere to supplement their defense of God. They frequently resort to one of the educative theodicies.

Educative theodicies. The force of the educative theodicies lies in their ability to justify at least some of the suffering experienced by innocent persons. This suffering exists, it is argued, because it serves to enrich hu-

man experience, to build moral character, or to develop human capacities.

Within the broad assertion that suffering has educative value, at least several distinct claims can be identified. It is sometimes maintained, for example, that modest suffering enhances our appreciation of life's satisfactions (as separation from loved ones can enrich moments spent with them). On a far deeper level, it is argued that even very serious suffering can toughen us to adversity and can help us develop depth of character, compassion, or new capabilities. Finally, it is common in this connection to stress the value of a world based upon regular laws of nature. Certainly, much suffering results from the operation of natural laws. Had God wished to, he might have created a world in which no regular laws existed—a world in which the flames threatening a sleeping family suddenly turned cool. But such a world, it is argued, would be a magical garden with little opportunity for growth in human knowledge. The human race would forever remain in intellectual infancy. This explanation in terms of natural laws is also sometimes advanced to explain the puzzling problem of animal suffering.

These educative theodicies are important, but their limits are apparent. Many of life's satisfactions do not require suffering to be enjoyed. Good health can be appreciated without the experience of disease. It is true, and perhaps profoundly true, that serious suffering can stimulate the development of our capacities and character. But this is not always so. Sometimes suffering embitters, diminishes, or destroys people. Finally, while growth in our understanding of nature's laws is valuable, we must ask whether this knowledge can be justified if its price has been the wasting of lives down through countless generations. What kind of education is it, some ask, that kills so many of the students?

Eschatological (or recompense) theodicies. Many of the difficulties of the educative theodicies derive from the brevity of human life. If an individual's existence were to continue beyond death, some of these problems might be overcome. Then, unmerited or unproductive suffering might be placed in a larger context of experience and meaning. Eschatological theodicies are based on the conviction that human life transcends personal death and that the righteous eventually receive their full reward. (It is also frequently maintained that the wicked receive appropriate punishment.) These theodicies differ from one another on the question of just when or how such recompense occurs. The *eschaton* ("last thing") can be envisioned as a historical epoch that begins at the end of history, a time when the righteous are resurrected in renewed bodies. Or it can be understood as an eternal heavenly realm that one enters

after death. In either case, eschatological theodicies assume that the blissful future life more than compensates for present suffering. [See Afterlife.]

Eschatological theodicies clearly play an important part in reconciling many religious believers to the fact of suffering. Nevertheless, this kind of theodicy faces many difficulties today. Some persons regard the idea of an afterlife as incredible. Others reject the idea that future bliss can compensate for present misery. They point out that while suffering may come to an end, the painful memory of suffering endures. Such novelists as Dostoevskii, Camus, and Elie Wiesel have also asked whether anything can compensate for the massive suffering inflicted on children during the persecutions of recent times.

Theodicy deferred: The mystery of suffering. Long before Auschwitz, religious believers recognized that any effort to justify severe suffering in terms of identifiable values risks trivializing the enormity of human anguish. Rather than renounce their faith in God's justice and power, however, some of these believers have chosen to deny that the mystery of suffering can be fully understood. They have preferred to defer comprehension and to trust in God's ultimate goodness and sovereignty. Frequently they have connected this with their eschatological expectations and have looked forward, not just to recompense but to a final understanding of God's purposes in the world.

Very often, those who stress the mystery of suffering also emphasize the limited nature of human understanding and the enormous differences that exist between God and man. This position should not be confused, however, with the view that God's justice is somehow qualitatively different from our own. The latter perspective dissolves the problem of theodicy by placing God beyond moral accountability, whereas the view discussed here insists that God's justice will ultimately be vindicated. Faith is not the belief in a God beyond justice but the belief that God's justice will finally be upheld.

Communion theodicies. Emphasis on the mystery of suffering and the need to defer our understanding of it may help to sustain religious faith in the face of evil; but it also imposes new burdens on that faith, because human beings may come to regard themselves as pawns in a cosmic game, and God may come to be viewed as distant and indifferent. To offset this, religious traditions have sometimes presented suffering itself as an occasion for direct relationship, collaboration, and even communion with God.

Several related positions may be identified here. One refuses to accept the seeming distance of God in the mystery of suffering by insisting on God's presence

with the sufferer in the midst of anguish. God is a *com-passionate* God, who *suffers with* his creatures and who is most intensely present when he seems farthest away. This position may not explain why God allows suffering in the first place, but it comforts and sustains the believer in the moment of trial. Moreover, since God is a suffering God, suffering also affords the believer a unique opportunity to obey and to imitate his creator. Those who suffer for a righteous purpose do God's will and make known his presence in the world. Suffering thus provides the most intense opportunity for collaboration and communion between God and man.

With this emphasis on communion, the enterprise of theodicy comes full circle. That which first threw open to question God's goodness and power, the bitter suffering of innocent persons, now becomes the supreme expression of love between God and man. Unlike the mystical dissolutions of the theodicy problem that were looked at earlier, the fact of suffering is not here denied. Instead, the reality of suffering and its importance in human life are heightened. But suffering itself is transvalued: what is usually viewed as an experience to be avoided is now seen as an opportunity for intense religious fulfillment.

Teachings on Theodicy in the History of Religions

These theoretical positions on suffering and theodicy are not just abstract logical possibilities. They find concrete expression in the life and teachings of historical religious communities. Religions may even be characterized in terms of which of these theoretical positions they favor. While all of these positions may have some presence in a tradition, one or another is usually emphasized and serves as a distinguishing trait. Even closely related traditions like Judaism and Christianity evidence their uniqueness by subtle preferences among these different theodicies.

Judaism. In Jewish tradition, the theodicy problem is addressed not only in Hebrew scriptures but in rabbinic teachings.

Biblical foundations. The Hebrew scriptures provide the basis for both Jewish and Christian theodicies. With varying degrees of emphasis, they contain many of the positions we have reviewed. However, the free-will theodicy is probably to the fore. This view is firmly anchored in the account of history given in *Genesis*, where a world created as "good" or "very good" by God is viewed as corrupted by human sinfulness. From the first deliberate but unnecessary transgression of the divine commandment by Adam and Eve, we follow a process of recurrent and accelerating wrongdoing that vitiates the goodness of nature and that pits person against per-

son. While the account in *Genesis* does not answer all the questions that troubled later thinkers (why, for example, God chose to create human beings in the first place), it does place primary blame for both natural and moral evil on man's abuse of freedom.

Much the same view is conveyed in the portions of the Bible that were influenced by the Deuteronomic writer and the early prophets. Here, suffering is explained in simple retributive terms: loyalty to the moral and religious conditions of the covenant brings prosperity and peace; wickedness brings plague, famine, and war. Since the prophetic literature often aims to summon the sinful nation to covenantal obedience, it is recognized that the connection between conduct and its consequences is not always immediate. The result is an immanent eschatological theodicy based on confidence in a prompt, future balancing of moral accounts. Thus said Isaiah (*Is.* 3:10–11):

Tell the righteous that it shall be well with them,
for they shall eat the fruit of their deeds.
Woe to the wicked! It shall be ill with him,
for what his hands have done shall be done to him.

This simple equation between suffering and punishment was not unchallenged in biblical thinking, and the disasters of the period from the Babylonian exile onward, when the Israelites were often most intensely loyal to the covenant, forced an explanation of seemingly innocent suffering. In wisdom literature, especially the *Book of Job*, the older theodicy is rejected. Job is an innocent man, blameless and righteous in every way; yet he suffers (*Jb.* 1–2). The prose epilogue, apparently appended at a later date, seeks to maintain the retributive schema by suggesting that Job is eventually more than compensated for his trials (42:10–17), but the book's most decisive response to suffering borders on a radical dissolution of the theodicy problem. Answering Job out of a whirlwind, God asks, "Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?" (38:4). A litany of God's mighty deeds in nature and history follows, with the suggestion that man is too puny a creature to question his maker's justice. Job repents his presumption: "I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know" (42:3).

The *Book of Job* may be read as an abandonment of the very effort to comprehend God's justice, as an assertion that a creature cannot ask its maker to render account. Or, less radically, it may be read as a deferred theodicy—not the claim that God is unjust or beyond justice but that we are unprepared here and now to fathom God's righteous ways. The repeated assertions of God's control of the wicked support this interpreta-

tion. In any case, the more radical stance, amounting to a dissolution of the theodicy problem, finds expression elsewhere in the wisdom literature. *Ecclesiastes*, for example, repeatedly emphasizes the obscurity of God's ways in dealing with man. Occasionally the text despairs of there being any justice in the world: "one fate comes to all, to the righteous and the wicked, to the good and the evil" (*Eccl.* 9:2).

These dramatic responses of the wisdom tradition are not the only positions of the exilic and postexilic period. In some of the later prophetic writings, especially in "Second Isaiah," a complex, new theodicy appears: the idea of the suffering servant. This is the innocent "man of sorrows," an "offering for sin" who bears the sins of others and is "wounded for our transgressions" (*Is.* 53:3–10). Just who this figure is remains unclear. Is he the prophet himself or some other charismatic figure? Is he the nation as a whole or a righteous remnant? Whatever the answer, this idea embodies a new theodicy, combining the free-will theodicy with elements of the educative and communion theodicies. Suffering is still produced by sin, but the servant suffers vicariously. He bears his stripes to absorb the punishment of others, to highlight and communicate the consequence of sin and God's wrath against it. His suffering teaches others and is also a unique form of service to God. Finally, in a bid to the eschatological theodicy, it is promised that this servant will ultimately have his reward. He will be given a "portion with the great" and will "divide the spoil with the strong" (*Is.* 53:12).

In the latest texts of the Hebrew Bible, as well as in many writings of the intertestamental period, these eschatological and recompense themes move to the fore with the appearance of apocalyptic writings, such as the *Book of Daniel*. In these, history is viewed as moving toward a final cosmic resolution, when God will smash the empires of the wicked and raise the righteous dead to "everlasting life" (*Dn.* 12:2). The Hebrew scriptures thus draw to a close with a reassertion of the ultimate connection between suffering and sin.

Rabbinic teaching. Many of the motifs found in the Hebrew scriptures are continued in rabbinic thinking. Foremost once again is the free-will theodicy and the link between suffering and sin: "If a man sees that painful suffering visits him," says the Talmud, "let him examine his conduct" (B.T., *Ber.* 5a). Or again, more radically, "There is no suffering without sin" (B.T., *Shab.* 55a). It follows from this that any apparent discrepancy between conduct and its reward must be overcome or denied. Eschatology becomes acutely important. The righteous may look forward to the world to come (*'olam ha-ba'*), where all inequities will be overcome and the wicked must fear hell (Gehenna). Whatever observable

suffering one experiences may be regarded as expiation of those inevitable sins that all human beings commit. Suffering thus prepares one for final reward: "Beloved are sufferings, for as sacrifices are atoning so is suffering atoning" (*Mekilta' de Rabbi Yishma'e'l* 2. 280).

This stress on the positive value of suffering is emphasized in a series of rabbinic teachings that go beyond the view of suffering as retribution and emphasize its educative dimensions or the opportunity it provides for obedience to God and communion with him. Sometimes, for example, suffering is seen as having disciplinary value. Frequently alluded to is *Proverbs* 3:11, which teaches that God is like a father who chastises a well-loved son. 'Aqiva' ben Yosef, martyred by the Romans in the Bar Kokhba Revolt, is said to have laughed during his torture. When asked by his tormentor why he did this, 'Aqiva' replied that all his life he had been reciting the *Shema*, the ritual formula in which the pious Jew is commanded to love God with all his heart, soul, and might, and now, amidst his tortures, he realized that he had finally been given the opportunity to fulfill this commandment. For 'Aqiva', as well as for many Jews who looked to him, suffering becomes an occasion for divine grace. Amidst suffering, these Jews came to see the presence of a God whose purpose, at a price in suffering to himself and to his people, was to render Israel a holy community.

Christianity. The crucifixion of Jesus clearly forms the focal point for all Christian thinking about suffering. But the interpretation of this event varies widely in Christian thinking, as do the theodicies that it brings forth.

The New Testament. Although the problem of suffering is everywhere present in the earliest Christian writings, what theodicies we can identify in the New Testament writings are largely implicit. Expectedly, many of the theodicies we examined in the context of biblical and rabbinic thought are clearly assumed. Particular emphasis, for example, is given to aspects of the free-will theodicy. It is true that the crucifixion provides for Christians decisive evidence that not all who suffer are guilty. Nevertheless, the death of Jesus is also the result of almost every form of human wickedness. Factionalism, nationalism, militarism, religious hypocrisy, greed, personal disloyalty, and pride all conspire here to effect the death of an innocent man.

The fact that Christ is clearly blameless provokes the further question of why he should be allowed to suffer at all. At least several answers appear throughout the New Testament, some of which are also applicable to other innocent victims. On one level, in many New Testament texts a qualified dualism makes its appearance.

Evil and suffering are traced to the agency of demonic forces or to Satan (e.g., *Mk.* 5:1–13; *Mt.* 9:32–34, 12:22–24). On another level, the eschatological theodicy is vigorously reasserted, with Christ's resurrection furnishing proof that the righteous are able to vanquish all the forces of wickedness and to surmount suffering and death. The apostle Paul typically insists that the Resurrection is a source of personal hope and confidence for all who follow Christ (*1 Cor.* 5:15–19; *2 Cor.* 4:14). Side by side with this, and found everywhere from the Gospels to *Revelation*, is a vivid apocalyptic expectation. Christ is the "Son of man" whose life (and death) will usher in the kingdom of God. In this kingdom, worldly hierarchies of reward will be overturned: "Many that are first will be last and the last will be first" (*Mk.* 10:31; *Mt.* 5:19).

Also running through many texts are elements of the educative theodicy. The letter to the Hebrews and the letter of James sound the note that suffering is sent by God as a test and a discipline of those he loves (*Heb.* 12:3–13; *Jas.* 1:2–4, 12). Paul continues this theme, adding to it elements of a communion theodicy. Christians should rejoice in suffering because it produces endurance, character, and hope (*Rom.* 5:3–5). Suffering also presents the opportunity to imitate Christ (*1 Cor.* 11:1), who has shown that power is made perfect not in strength but in weakness (*2 Cor.* 12:9). This emphasis on Christ's fellow-suffering is a constant theme in Paul's letters.

Finally, in Paul's writings we find an important extrapolation from the free-will theodicy: emphasis on the universality of sin and the universal deservedness of suffering. This theme is not altogether new—it has deep roots in biblical and Jewish thought—but it is radicalized by Paul, especially in his *Letter to the Romans* (3:9–10, 23). The implications of this teaching for the theodicy problem are dramatic. Since all are sinners, what is extraordinary is not that some suffer in a world ruled by God, but that anyone is spared the divine wrath (*Rom.* 9:22–24). The fact that not all are punished is explained in terms of God's grace being manifest in Christ's vicarious suffering and in God's willingness to suspend the punishment for sin (*Rom.* 3:24). This teaching clearly builds on dimensions of theodicy encountered in the Hebrew scriptures, including the suffering servant motif (now applied singularly to Christ). Nevertheless, it has the effect of revolutionizing Christian thinking about theodicy by converting the mystery of suffering into the mystery of divine grace.

Subsequent developments. It is impossible to review briefly all the contributions of later Christian thinking to theodicy. Suffice it to say that the major lines of

thought build upon those established in the New Testament. Paul's ideas, especially, play a major role. Augustine (354–430) developed Paul's suggestions into a fully elaborated doctrine of original sin. According to Augustine, Adam and Eve's transgression and punishment, "sin and its penalty," are to be viewed as passed on to their descendants through sexual reproduction. Because everyone thus "merits" punishment, emphasis is on God's grace and his election of those who are spared a just fate. Election itself is explained in terms of divine predestination, in accordance with which God has eternally decreed who shall be spared the punishment merited by all.

This position clearly does not solve the theodicy problem entirely, and in some respects the problem is sharpened in a new way. The question becomes not why human beings have incurred suffering but why God, in his foreknowledge and power, should have allowed the whole disastrous course of events proceeding from the Fall to have occurred in the first place. Sometimes the legitimacy of this question is denied. In Calvinism, for example, Paul's admonitions against questioning the creator (*Rom.* 9:19–21) are expanded to a doctrine that places God altogether beyond measurement by human justice. With this denial of God's accountability, the theodicy problem is dissolved. Not all Christians, however, have accepted this extreme view, and repeated efforts have been made to explain and to justify God's creation of beings capable of sin.

In his book *Evil and the God of Love* (London, 1977), John Hick argues that at least two major responses to this question may be identified in the Christian tradition. One is traceable to Augustine and constitutes the historically dominant line of thinking about the problem. (A similar view, for example, is taken by Thomas Aquinas and many other Catholic theologians.) It begins by explaining evil in creation not as a substantial reality in itself (as the Manichaeans had contended) but as an aspect of nonbeing. Thus, evil does not stem from God but represents the unavoidable and nonculpable absence of his goodness or presence in mere "created" things (the doctrine of evil as a *privatio boni*). Why God should have created free human beings is explained aesthetically in terms of the desirability of his creating a graded hierarchy of being. Once created and given every inducement for obedience, however, human beings nevertheless inexplicably turned away from God toward nonbeing. As a result, they have been justly punished, and the suffering that results (within a retributive theory of punishment) is fitting, as is the eternal damnation of those not rescued by God's grace. Indeed, the whole outcome is sometimes justified by Augustine

in terms of its overall moral balance and aesthetic perfection.

Contrasted with this view is a position that Hick associates with Irenaeus (c. 130–202) but that also has resonance in the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and F. R. Tennant (1866–1957). It, too, traces suffering to the abuse of freedom. But its explanation of the place of both freedom and transgression in the divine plan is quite different from that of the Augustinian tradition. Here the Fall is fully within God's intention. God has knowingly created imperfect beings who are distanced from the divine splendor and destined to fall, but he is justified in doing this because he has the moral purpose of affording these beings the opportunity for growth and free development so that they may establish a mature personal relationship with him. In this view, the world is a "vale of soul making" and it is possible to apply to the Fall the words of the Easter liturgy: "O felix Culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem" ("O fortunate crime, which merited such and so great a redeemer!"). A further implication of the Irenaean theodicy, in Hick's view, is that it casts doubt on older retributive theories of punishment that may justify the consignment of some persons to eternal suffering in hell. The Irenaean theodicy suggests a more generous "universalist" eschatology, which sees all who have lived as eventually becoming "children of God."

Hick himself expresses a strong preference for this view. While not all contemporary Christian thinkers share this preference, it is reasonable to say that there exists among contemporary Christian theologians a predilection to stress God's moral purpose in creating free beings and to see God himself as personally involved in the venture and risk of human freedom.

Islam. In his book *The House of Islam* (1975), Kenneth Cragg observes that because of its emphasis on God's transcendence, Islam "does not find a theodicy necessary either for its theology or its worship" (p. 16). With one or two important qualifications, this is a reasonably accurate assessment of the state of theodicy in a tradition that insists on surrender to the divine will (one meaning of *islām*) and finds it blasphemous to hold that God is accountable to human moral judgments. Nevertheless, while theodicy has not been a major preoccupation of Muslims, there are, especially in the earliest texts, implicit efforts to understand the sources of suffering and why God might allow it to exist.

The Qur'ān. We know that one of the most persistent explanations and justifications of human suffering traces that suffering to free creatures' abuse of their freedom. At first sight, this free-will theodicy seems to have little footing in the Qur'ān because of its repeated

emphasis on God's sovereignty and his absolute control over human behavior. In surah 6:125, for example, we read:

Whomsoever God desires to guide,
He expands his breast to Islam;
whomsoever he desires to lead astray,
He makes his breast narrow, tight. . . .

Or again, in 61:5:

When they swerved,
God caused their hearts to swerve;
and God guides never the people of the ungodly.

Although passages like these shape the later emphasis on predestination in Islamic thought, they may not have this meaning in the Qur'an. For one thing, these utterances are frequently used to explain the recalcitrance of Muḥammad's opponents, and thus are more properly understood as affirmations of God's ultimate control of the wicked than as philosophical disquisitions on freedom. In addition, these passages are offset by many others in which a substantial measure of human freedom, initiative, and accountability is assumed. "He leads none astray save the ungodly," says surah 2:24, while surah 4:80 makes what seems to be an explicit statement of the free-will theodicy:

Whatever good visits thee, it is of God;
whatever evil visits thee is of thyself.

In addition, the Qur'an displays two other themes associated with the free-will theodicy. One is a view of suffering as a test of righteousness. More than once the question is asked, "Do the people reckon that they will be left to say 'We believe,' and will not be tried?" (29:1; 3:135; cf. 14:6; 2:46). Because such testing can sometimes lead to martyrdom and death, the Qur'an also supports a vivid eschatological expectation. Those who withstand the test shall have their reward. All human deeds are said to be recorded in books kept by the angels. These will be opened following the general resurrection on the day of judgment (*yawm al-dīn*). Those whose record is wanting shall descend to the Fire, while the righteous shall dwell in the Garden (*al-jannah*) where their bliss is depicted in spiritual as well as vividly material terms (surah 9:74; 75:23; 52:24; 56:17f.; 76:11–21).

Later developments. If the Qur'an's perspective on suffering and its implicit theodicy display substantial similarity to some familiar positions in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, subsequent Islamic thought strikes off on a path of its own. From the eighth century CE onward, the free-will position becomes involved in a series of bitter disputes between the Mu'tazilī school of

"rationalists," or "humanists," and more orthodox defenders of God's sovereignty (including his role as sole creator of human acts). Entangled in extraneous political conflicts, this debate continued for several centuries, until the victory of the orthodox position through the work of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (d. 935 CE) and others. What emerged was an extreme predestinarian position, according to which not only suffering or blessedness but the acts and volitions that lead to them are totally in the hands of God. Al-Ash'arī himself tried to secure some limited room for human responsibility through a doctrine of "acquisition," according to which acts proceed from God but attach themselves to the will of the individual. Nevertheless, this teaching remains overwhelmingly deterministic. An oft-quoted tale presenting an imaginary conversation in heaven between God, an adult, and a child captures the resulting orthodox view. The child asks God, "Why did you give that man a higher place than myself?" God replies, "He has done many good works." The child then asks, "Why did you let me die so young that I was prevented from doing good?" God responds, "I knew that you would grow up to be a sinner; therefore, it was better that you should die a child." At that instant a cry arises from all those condemned to the depths of hell, "Why, O Lord! did you not let us die before we became sinners."

In the context of such determinism, all responsibility for good and evil devolves upon God himself. Lest it be thought, however, that God may legitimately be accused of injustice, Islamic orthodoxy hastens to add that in his sovereignty, God may not be subjected to human moral judgment. God's command is itself the defining feature of right, and what God wills can never be morally impugned. The great medieval theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) affirms that "there is no analogy between his justice and the justice of creatures. . . . He never encounters any right in another besides himself so that his dealing with it might be a doing of any wrong."

This emphasis on God's omnipotence does not mean that Muslims (any more than Calvinists) view God as a capricious despot. On the contrary, their constant affirmation is that God is "merciful and compassionate." Yet in the encounter with suffering, man's response must not be to complain, to question, or even to try to defend God. Hence, for Islamic orthodoxy at least, theodicy remains an undeveloped dimension of the religious life. Its place is taken by the sentiment conveyed by the Qur'anic formula "Ḥasbunā Allāh" ("God is sufficient unto us").

Hinduism and Buddhism. It would ordinarily not be advisable to lump together any treatment of such complex traditions as Hinduism and Buddhism. But where

the issue of theodicy is concerned, this approach has much to recommend it since it emphasizes the fact, already mentioned, that both traditions share a common perspective on suffering. This is the view that suffering derives from the operation of the automatic law of moral retribution known as *karman* working in conjunction with a process of reincarnation. [See *Karman*.] In his *Sociology of Religion* (Boston, 1963), Max Weber characterized *karman* as "the most radical solution of the problem of theodicy" (p. 147), but this reflects Weber's own broader use of the term *theodicy* to cover any explanation of suffering. In fact, because *karman* traces suffering to one's own thoughts and deeds, and because it denies the gods any involvement in or control over the process of suffering, it is not a theodicy in our sense at all. Rather, it is a fundamental dissolution of the theodicy problem as we encounter it in ethical monotheism.

How decisive a resolution of the problem of suffering are the combined teachings of *karman* and reincarnation may be illustrated by a famous tale concerning the assassination of Mahāmoggallāna, a respected disciple of the Buddha. When the Buddha was asked to explain Moggallāna's brutal death, he replied that, while undeserved in terms of his present life, it was altogether suited to his conduct in a previous existence. In that life, said the Buddha, Moggallāna had been guilty of cruelly killing his elderly parents. (This tale is reprinted in Henry Clarke Warren's *Buddhism in Translation*, New York, 1963, pp. 221–226.) The implication of this tale is that in a world ruled by *karman* there is no such thing as "innocent suffering." All suffering (even animal suffering) is deserved. We have seen that the free-will theodicy has sometimes tended toward this same conclusion, but in all the Western traditions where this theodicy has been espoused, there have always been voices affirming the reality of innocent suffering. In Hinduism and Buddhism, however, these voices have been silenced by a drive toward the total and lucid explanation of worldly suffering afforded by *karman*.

A further implication of this teaching is that the gods may be neither blamed nor appealed to when suffering occurs. In Buddhism, belief in *karman* helps explain the subordinate place of God or the gods in the schema of salvation. Not only may divinity be attained by any righteous individual, but the gods themselves, through sins that create bad *karman*, may plunge from their lofty state. As a result, it makes no sense to look to the gods for release from suffering, since they are as subject to suffering as anyone else. Nor can they be held responsible for what suffering occurs.

Hinduism appears somewhat less certain about these conclusions. In the earlier Vedic texts, the gods are

sometimes presented as powerful, righteous figures who reward and punish human beings and to whose compassion one may appeal. Varuṇa, in particular, bears many of the marks of a supreme deity, and it is possible to see here an implicit free-will theodicy with human suffering traced to transgression of God's righteous law. Nevertheless, these lines of thought are not developed in later Hindu thinking, and in the post-Vedic period, when *karman* moves to the fore, even the gods are subordinated to it. According to one tradition of Hindu mythology, for example, the god Indra slays a wicked brahman, but, in so doing, he becomes subject to the moral penalty for brahmanicide. In an effort to free himself of this burden, Indra ends by inflicting suffering on human beings. Thus, even the goodness of the gods is compromised as they find themselves powerless before the operation of this moral law of cause and effect. It is true that in popular and mythological traditions the gods are frequently seen as able to free themselves from the effects of *karman*. They are also viewed as able to benefit their devotees. But what power they have in this regard does not usually extend, within the world of *karman*, to helping human beings escape automatic punishment for serious sin.

Neither can the gods be held responsible in these traditions for the shape of reality. Buddhism explicitly denies the gods any role in creation. The universe is conceived of as an ongoing, eternal, and cyclical process of becoming, and only an error on the part of the first-born god Brahmā allows him to think himself its creator. Hinduism gives a more active role to the gods in this cyclic process of evolution and devolution. The world proceeds from Viṣṇu and is actively brought forth by Brahmā. But this process is not understood in moral terms. Instead, creation is a process whereby every potentiality within the great God is allowed to manifest itself in the world of differentiation. This means that everything in creation, blessings and suffering, the gods and the demons, all good and all evil, represent the working out of the divine plenitude. If creation is conceived in anthropomorphic terms at all, it is not a morally intentioned act for which God is accountable but an expression of the deity's spontaneous creativity or play (*līlā*). [See *Līlā*.]

There is, therefore, in neither of these traditions any question of morally justifying the gods, and there is no real theodicy. Instead, the paramount religious questions become how (in popular Hinduism especially) one can procure some favor from the gods, how one can produce good *karman*, and how, finally, one can altogether escape *saṃsāra*, the world of karmically determined becoming. This latter question becomes particularly important when it is realized that within *saṃsāra* suffer-

ing is virtually inescapable. [See *Saṃsāra*.] While deeds that generate good *karman* may lead to prosperity or bliss in some future life, it is almost certain that such a state will not endure. Because every transgression brings its penalty, and because those who are spiritually or materially well placed are more likely to transgress, existence in *saṃsāra* is an endless shuttle between momentary respite and prolonged misery.

We need not review in detail here the various Hindu and Buddhist answers to the question of how one may escape *saṃsāra*. These answers constitute the core teachings of their traditions. They range from Hinduism's stress on the profound recognition that one's soul (*ātman*) is identical with Being-itself (*brahman*), and hence basically unaffected by the flux of becoming, to Buddhism's opposing insistence that there is no eternal soul capable of being affected by *saṃsāra* (the doctrine of *anātman*). Despite the enormous differences between these teachings, they have much in common: suffering is viewed as endemic to the world process, and the goal is extrication from this process. Suffering is not a reason for praising or blaming God. The legacy of *karman* thus colors Indian thought from beginning to end, from its conception of the problem of suffering to that problem's resolution. Within this intellectual context, theodicy in its classic sense finds little room for development.

Conclusion

Along with the corrosive effect of modern scientific knowledge, the problem of innocent suffering poses one of the greatest challenges to ethical monotheism in our day. In the wake of the mass suffering of this epoch, some have rejected such monotheism, agreeing with the remark by Stendahl that "the only excuse for God is that he does not exist." Others have been drawn to various dissolutions of the theodicy problem, ranging from the Eastern stress on *karman* to an extreme fideism that abandons the insistence on God's justice.

Before rejecting ethical monotheism or the theodicies it has stimulated, however, it is worth keeping in mind that both spring from a profound moral intentionality. Ethical monotheism expresses the conviction that a supreme power guides reality and that this power is characterized by righteousness and love. Theodicy is the effort to sustain this conviction in the face of innocent suffering. Theodicy, therefore, is often less an effort to provide an account of the immediate facts of experience than an expression of hope and confidence that despite worldly reverses or human resistance, goodness and righteousness will triumph. Theodicy may not violate the requirements of logic, nor may it ignore the experienced reality of suffering. Theodicy's deepest impulse,

however, is not to report the bitter facts of life but to overcome and transform them.

This essentially moral motivation should be kept in mind as we evaluate theodicies and their alternatives. Various dissolutions of the theodicy problem, from denials of God's power or justice to denials of the reality of suffering, may seem intellectually satisfying, but they may have moral implications we hesitate to accept. Theodicies, too, are subject to a moral test. If some older theodicies, such as reliance on the harsh idea of original sin, are no longer widely held, this may reflect their moral inadequacy. Conversely, theodicies that still attract attention are those that draw upon and deepen our moral self-understanding. The idea that God is committed to the perilous enterprise of creating free, mature human beings exemplifies this approach. This theodicy draws on certain aspects of our deepest moral experience—for example, the experienced relationship between parents and children—and uses these to illuminate the relationship between God and his creatures. Unless this ultimate moral basis and intention is kept in mind, neither theodicy's purpose nor its persistence will be well understood.

[For a survey of numerous responses to suffering in the history of religions, see *Suffering*. For a discussion of religious views on the cause of suffering, see *Evil*. For a discussion of the free-will theodicy in context, see *Free Will and Predestination*. See also, for a more particular discussion, *Holocaust, The, article on Jewish Theological Responses*.]

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Some of the most important classic discussions of this problem include Augustine's treatment of the issue in his *Confessions*, bk. 7, chaps. 3–5 and 12–16, in his *Enchiridion*, chaps. 3–5, and in *The City of God*, bk. 11, chaps. 16–18, and bk. 12, chaps. 1–9. Thomas Aquinas has a very similar discussion in his *Summa theologiae*, first part, questions 47–49, as does John Calvin in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, bk. 1, chaps. 1–5 and 14–18, bk. 2, chaps. 1–5, and bk. 3, chaps. 21–25. The great medieval Jewish philosopher Mosheh ben Maimon (Maimonides) also advances a theodicy in his *Guide of the Perplexed*, pt. 3, chaps. 11 and 12, which relies heavily on the connection between wrongdoing and suffering.

Modern philosophical discussion of theodicy has its start with Leibniz's *Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal* (1710), translated by E. M. Hugard as *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil* (London, 1952). On the other

side, penetrating criticisms of theism and theodicy are offered by David Hume in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779) and by John Stuart Mill in his *Three Essays on Religion* (1874).

In this century, debate in this area has been especially vigorous. Important theological discussions include Nels Ferré's *Evil and the Christian Faith* (New York, 1947), Austin Farrer's *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), and the works by Hick, Schilling, and Griffin mentioned above. A critique of these and other efforts at theodicy is offered by Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare in their *Evil and the Concept of God* (Springfield, Ill., 1968).

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The problem of evil and the issue of theodicy has also had an important place in fictional writing during the modern period. Particularly noteworthy are Fedor Dostoevskii's *The Brothers Karamazov*, translated by David Magarshack (London, 1964), esp. bk. 5, chap. 4; Albert Camus's *The Plague*, translated by Stuart Gilbert (New York, 1948); and Elie Wiesel's *Night*, translated by Stella Rodway (London, 1960).

A sign of how much the problem of theodicy is a Western concern is that no comparable body of literature exists on the theodicy problem in Islam, Hinduism, or Buddhism. Nevertheless, there are some discussions worth noting. Max Weber's treatment of theodicy in his *Religionsoziologie* (Tübingen, 1922) is a pioneering effort to look at the problem of suffering and theodicy in a comparative context. This essay is translated as "Theodicy, Salvation, and Rebirth" in Weber's *Sociology of Religion*, translated by Ephraim Fischhoff (Boston, 1963). Weber's view is critically examined and developed by Gananath Obeyesekere in his article "Theodicy, Sin, and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism," in *Dialectic in Practical Religion*, edited by E. R. Leach (Cambridge, 1968).

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"Best of All Possible Worlds" (Princeton University, 1981). Brief mentions of this problem may also be found in Kenneth Cragg's *The House of Islam*, 2d ed. (Encino, Calif., 1975) and W. Montgomery Watt's *What Is Islam* (London, 1968). Watt's *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* (London, 1948) is an influential discussion of the deterministic themes that have tended to minimize the presence of theodicy in this tradition. On the other side of the issue, Jane I. Smith and Yvonne Haddad's *The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection* (Albany, N.Y., 1981) provides a useful review of the themes of accountability and recompense that form an implicit theodicy in this tradition.

RONALD M. GREEN

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA (350–428), Christian biblical exegete and theologian. Theodore was born in Antioch about the same time as John Chrysostom, who became his friend and fellow student. Since Theodore belonged to the noble class, he attended courses given by the most renowned professor of rhetoric at that time, Libanius. He was later admitted to the Askesterion, the famous school near Antioch, of Diodore (later bishop of Tarsus) and Karterios. Even after his ordination as bishop of Mopsuestia, in Cilicia, he occasionally lectured at the school, where his reputation as a teacher attracted such distinguished pupils as Rufinus, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and Nestorius. His work in uprooting the remnants of polytheism in his province was very successful.

Theodore wrote widely on various subjects, but only a part of his literary production has been preserved. A pioneer in biblical exegesis, he basically followed the hermeneutic principles of his teacher Diodore, although he diverged from them in some important points. He showed greater confidence in his personal understanding than in the authority of traditional hermeneutics, with the result that he rejected the canonicity of many books of scripture.

Only four of his commentaries have been preserved: *On the Twelve Prophets*, parts of *On the Psalms*, *On John*, and *On the Epistles of Paul*. In all of these he uses critical, philological, and historical methods and rejects the Alexandrian method of allegorical interpretation. Also of great importance are his *Catechetical Homilies*, which were discovered in a Syriac translation.

As an indefatigable combatant against the heresies of his time, Theodore's attention was particularly directed toward Apollinaris of Laodicea. Theodore's dogmatic fragments that have been preserved, especially *On the Incarnation*, are directed against him. Theodore's extreme position on the two natures of Christ is largely a response to Apollinaris's teaching about the mutilation of Christ's human nature. Following the Antiochene line

of thought, which combined the spiritual element with the material in such a way that they are not confused, Theodore admitted that the two natures of Christ are perfect and also remain two. His only concession on this subject was to conceive a single person only in reference to the union of the two natures; in this case the being of the person is not in essence, but in God's will, and the union is not natural but moral. Accordingly, Mary, the mother of Christ, is only nominally *theotokos*, mother of God.

As an Antiochene, Theodore stressed the great importance of the human contribution to salvation, which he developed beyond the position of the Antiochene school. He ascribed all human achievements to free will, thus destroying the meaning and the importance of original sin. He also attributed free will to Jesus Christ, who, according to this understanding, is subject to sin, believing thereby that Christ's perfection would be worthy of greater estimation. In this area he was a forerunner and probably a teacher of Pelagius.

Because of these doctrines, and especially because of his position as a forerunner of Nestorianism, Theodore was the posthumous victim of strong polemics. Some of his writings together with his doctrine on the incarnation were condemned by Justinian and by the Second Council of Constantinople (533).

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PANAGIOTIS C. CHRISTOU

THEODORE OF STUDIOS (759–826), theologian and monastic reformer of the Byzantine church. Born to an aristocratic family in Constantinople, Theodore received an excellent secular and religious education under the close supervision of his mother, Theoktiste, and his mother's brother, the abbot Platon.

Eighth-century Byzantine society was greatly disturbed by the Iconoclastic Controversy. Theodore's family had sided with the Iconophiles, those who favored the use of icons in Christian worship. His uncle Platon was a leader against the Iconoclasts, and Theodore followed in his footsteps, as a result of which he suffered persecution and was sent into exile three times.

When the persecution of the Iconophiles ceased under Emperor Leo IV, many monks, including Platon, returned to Constantinople. Under his influence, Theodore's family moved in 780 to Bithynia, where they established a monastic community on their estate of Fotinou, not far from the village of Sakkoudion. Here Theodore was ordained a priest in 787 or 788 and his monastic career began. In 794 Platon resigned as abbot in Theodore's favor. When Theodore became abbot, he reorganized the monastery according to the rule of Basil of Caesarea (c. 329–379), and the Sakkoudion community prospered for a while with a hundred monks. Because of Saracen raids in Bithynia, Theodore and most of his community were allowed by the patriarch in 798 or 799 to move to the monastery of Studios in Constantinople.

Under Theodore's leadership, the Studios monastery underwent a period of renaissance and exerted great influence on Byzantine society. It had more than seven hundred monks and perhaps as many as a thousand. Theodore became one of the most powerful men in Constantinople and found himself in conflict with both emperors and patriarchs. He tried to integrate monasticism and society and engage monks not only in spiritual matters but in social welfare activity, in hospitals, in *xenones* (hospices), and in work among the needy.

Theodore was a prolific author of doctrinal, apologetic, canonical, and ascetic theology. He also wrote poetry, homilies, and letters. His doctrinal and apologetic works defend the use of icons as part of the christological teachings of the church and stress that the event of the Incarnation fully justifies the use of iconography. His canonical and ascetic works aimed at the improvement of monasticism's image and discipline. His poetry

includes many church hymns and liturgical services which remain in use, as well as iambic epigrams for different nonreligious occasions. His homilies delivered on various feast days and ecclesiastical occasions display style and logic. Theodore's letters, addressed to private persons, monks, emperors, other state dignitaries, popes, and patriarchs, are an important biographical source. More than 550 of them survive.

Theodore's significance is twofold. First, his writings constitute a mirror of eighth- and early ninth-century Byzantium. Second, his life reveals agonistic efforts to free the church from imperial influence. In this he was more concerned with an orderly and moral society than with mystical theology, more attuned to the legalisms characteristic of Roman theology than to the spiritual aspirations of the Christian East.

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DEMETRIOS J. CONSTANTELOS

THEODORET OF CYRRHUS (c. 393–c. 458), bishop, theologian, and church historian. Theodoret was born in Antioch to wealthy Christian parents. From early childhood he devoted himself to learning and study. After the death of his parents, he entered the monastery at Apamea. In 423, against his will, he was elected bishop of Cyrrhus, east of Antioch. The young, successful bishop was imbued with an apostolic zeal for christianization. In an attempt to show the superiority of Christianity, he wrote at this time *The Healing of the*

Greek Passions, which was directed toward pagan intellectuals.

As an Antiochene, at the outbreak of the Nestorian dispute, Theodoret sided with Nestorius (who accepted two distinct natures in Christ) and refused to condemn him at the Council of Ephesus (431). Theodoret's *Pentalogion* and *A Refutation of Twelve Chapters of Cyril*, neither of which is fully extant, reflect his criticisms of Cyril of Alexandria's attack on Nestorius. Theodoret contributed decisively to the compromise of 443 and probably wrote the declaration of faith of that union, but the peace move did not last long. Theodoret wrote his *Eranistes* in 447 in opposition to Eutyches (who taught one nature in Christ). The Robber Synod of 449, which affirmed Eutyches' position, deposed Theodoret, who retreated from his see until the new rulers, Marcian and Pulcheria, restored him in 450.

Theodoret's condemnation of Nestorianism before the Council of Chalcedon (451) prompted the council to acknowledge him as orthodox. Theodoret, like the council, rejected both those who sought to distinguish the existence of two persons in Christ and those who maintained, as Eutyches did, that the divinity and humanity of Christ became one nature (see Theodoret's *Epistle* 119). Theodoret's activities after 451 are unknown, and it is likely that he died around 458. The Second Council of Constantinople (553), convened to settle the dispute that became known as the Three Chapters Controversy, condemned Theodoret's writings against Cyril, but Theodoret himself was not condemned as a heretic.

Theodoret's literary output covers important areas of the life and activity of the church. In addition to the works already mentioned, Theodoret wrote the apologetic *On Providence* (c. 436), ten discourses delivered at Antioch, and *On Chrysostom* (incomplete). Along with the several dogmatic writings referred to above, *On the Holy and Undivided Trinity* and *On the Incarnation of the Lord*—which have been falsely attributed to Cyril of Alexandria—were actually composed by Theodoret, as were *An Exposition of the True Faith* and *Questions and Answers for the Orthodox*, both wrongly attributed to Justin Martyr. *Libellus against Nestorius* is falsely attributed to Theodoret.

Along with Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret is regarded as the principal exegete of the theological school of Antioch and as one of the most important interpreters of scripture. His *Ecclesiastical History* (449–450) continues Eusebius's work of the same title and covers the period from 323 to 428. *History of Divine Love* (or *Ascetic Citizenship*) presents the lives of male and female ascetics in Syria. *Summary of Heretical Slander* (c. 453) presents in its first four discourses all the here-

sies up to the time of Eutyches, and, in the second part, the exceptional *Summary of Divine Dogmas*. Some 230 letters written by Theodoret are preserved, and they are an important source of the history and dogma of Christianity in the fifth century.

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THEODORE ZISSIS

Translated from Greek by Philip M. McGhee

THEODOSIUS (c. 347–395), Roman emperor (379–395). In the worst disaster since the days of Hannibal the Roman army and the emperor Valens were wiped out near Hadrianopolis by the Goths in August 378. The senior surviving emperor, the young Gratian, summoned from his Spanish homeland a certain Theodosius who was elevated as emperor in January 379 at the age of 33. His first task was to come to terms with the barbarian invaders. He allowed them to settle and used them as federated troops. He dealt with the other military threat, Persia, by establishing a policy of coexistence that yielded a century of peace.

Since religious stability was accepted as the architectonic element through which the empire was held together, it occupied Theodosius's continuous attention. It is not easy to tell exactly how much of subsequent imperial policy was initiated by the emperor himself. We may suppose his influence on the laws was direct and strong; on the councils and church affairs generally it was indirect and deeply affected by practical politics as well as by those around him. These included women of the household, episcopal politicians, and court officials.

In 380 Theodosius was baptized (possibly in connection with a serious illness), despite the fact that people of his class ordinarily postponed baptism until they were beyond the occasions for sin inherent in public office. Accordingly, he was the first emperor brought up in a Christian family who was a fully initiated and believing Christian for the greatest part of a long reign. As a full member of the church, it was his duty to assist in church affairs. Further, the theory was beginning to take shape of the pious Christian monarch who, as *per-*

sona ("personification") of the laity and of the body politic, prepared and made possible the oblation offered by the priests; he also, in some sense, represented the mind and heart of the body of Christ. (This idea was taken over not only by the Byzantine monarchies but may be detected in monarchical thinking in France, Britain, and Russia.)

In February 380, possibly even before his baptism, Theodosius issued an edict (Theodosian Code 16.1.2) commanding all people to walk in the way of the religion given by Peter to the Romans, and more recently exemplified by Damasus of Rome (d. 384) and Peter of Alexandria (d. 381). Those who hold the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be one godhead in equal majesty are catholic Christians. Others are heretics who will be struck by the divine vengeance as well as by the imperial action undertaken according to heaven's arbitration. In January 381 Theodosius followed this up with a law stating that everywhere the name of the one supreme God was to be celebrated and the Nicene faith observed (16.5.6). A person of Nicene faith and a true catholic is one who confesses the omnipotent God, and Christ his son, God under one name, and who does not violate the Holy Spirit by denial. The law quotes parts of the creed promulgated by the Council of Nicaea (325) and then interprets it in accordance with the teachings of the Cappadocian fathers, one of whom, Gregory of Nazianzus, had been ratified in his position as bishop of Constantinople by Theodosius.

In May 381 a council of 150 bishops met at Constantinople. (A sister council met at Aquileia in Italy, but it is not possible to determine the exact interrelationship of the two.) The creed associated with Constantinople took up and reaffirmed the teaching of the Council of Nicaea with modifications in keeping with the teachings of Athanasius and other Fathers, who had upheld the Nicene faith during a half century of civil war inside the church. Without the *filioque* clause (which says that the Holy Spirit proceeds "also from the Son" and is a later Western addition), it remains one of the great central affirmations of faith acceptable to most Christians. The canons of the council give precedence to Rome as the see of Peter but insist that Constantinople, as the new Rome, must have appropriate standing. No doubt the decisions were made by the council itself, but the emperor and his ecclesiastical policymakers had largely determined who was to be present and what issues were on the agenda.

The beliefs adumbrated by the laws and the council had immediate implications. Trinitarian heretics, like the various followers of Arius, were cajoled and coerced. People who in the minds of the legislators insulted God by apostatizing from Christianity or following the

teachings of Mani were fiercely attacked. A mere decade was to pass before pagans (a contemporary word designating followers of the old Greco-Roman ways of worship) also became the object of this zeal for conformity. During this reign the independent status of the Jews was maintained despite mob and demagogic attacks, but later they, too, met the Theodosian logic.

During these years of policy-making, Theodosius had made Constantinople the definitive capital of his empire and, since the murder in 383 of Gratian, his senior colleague, had permitted Maximus, a staunch Nicene Christian, to govern the far western end of the empire. Italy was nominally under the rule of the young Valentinian II, whose powerful mother, Justina, was friendly to the Arians and earned the title "Jezebel" from Ambrose. In 387, Maximus invaded Italy and Justina's family fled to Thessalonica. Theodosius, whose wife Flaccilla had died in 385, visited them there and married the daughter Galla, thereby absorbing the claims of the dynasty of Valentinian. Obviously, much else became subsumed in his ambition to found a lasting dynasty with control of the whole Roman world. In an easy victory, he defeated Maximus and sent his pagan barbarian general Arbogast over the Alps to govern the far west on behalf of Valentinian.

Late 388 found Theodosius in Italy, the last person to rule de facto from the Atlantic to the Euphrates. It was not long before he came into collision with Ambrose, the bishop of Milan. At Callinicum, on the Persian border, a Christian mob had destroyed a synagogue, and Theodosius, as became a Roman magistrate, ordered the bishop to rebuild it. Ambrose forced the emperor to rescind the order. Then, in the latter part of 390, Ambrose imposed excommunication and public penance on the emperor for ordering a blood bath at Thessalonica that had resulted in the deaths of ten to fifteen thousand people. During mass on Christmas Day 390, the emperor was reconciled.

These events had a tremendous effect on the emperor. He seems to have determined, as his laws express, to cooperate with zealous Christian leaders to prevent further insult to heaven by barring the pagan cults. Until now, legislation had not worsened the pagan position, and the commando raids by Christian monks and mobs had been kept in some check. In 391 and 392, Theodosius caused surviving pagan sacrifices at Alexandria and Rome to cease and proscribed domestic cults (16.10.10–11). The world-renowned Temple of Serapis at Alexandria was destroyed by monks led on by the local bishop, while Roman officials stood by. Riots by the Christian mobs, fueled by the promise of spoils, spread like wildfire. Alarmed, the pagan aristocrats in the west looked for allies.

In May 392 Valentinian II died mysteriously. Arbogast elevated a certain Eugenius to the position of emperor and in 393 invaded Italy. The western pagans offered their help and were enthusiastically received. The struggle was likened by both sides to that of Jupiter and Hercules versus Christ. As Theodosius tried to enter Italy through the valley of the Frigidus River in September 394 his enemies gave battle. He was facing defeat when the bora, a violent Adriatic wind, sprang up from behind him. Both sides took this as showing that God was on Theodosius's side. The panic-stricken pagans died at their posts or fled.

At the time of his triumph in January 395, gout and death overtook Theodosius. He was survived by his son Arcadius in the East where the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire lived on until the Turks struck down the last Christian emperor in the gateway of Constantinople in 1453. In the West, his young and feeble son Honorius sat enthroned. The Goths sacked Rome in 410; within the century the Western Empire had collapsed and the medieval papacy had emerged.

Despite his title, Theodosius the Great was a mediocre man who completed the work of Diocletian and Constantine and put together a scheme of survival for the East Roman Empire. Behind its fortifications, Western civilization gained time to take shape. Thanks to the religious policy of Theodosius, his predecessors back to Constantine, and his successors down to his redoubtable granddaughter Pulcheria (399–453), certain features of the Greek, Hellenistic, Roman, African, and ancient Near Eastern heritages that might otherwise have been excluded were decisively imbibed by Christianity. This process created and presented a face of Christianity that for centuries has obscured her innate affinity with the powerless, the underprivileged, and the non-Western, as well as her heritage of detestation of coercion, violence, and triumphalism.

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THEOLOGY. [This entry consists of two articles. The first, Comparative Theology, is a discussion of the humanistic dialogue in the academic setting that seeks to relate widely divergent views of truth and the nature of religion. The second article, Christian Theology, is a treatment of the nature and history of theology in the Christian tradition.]

Comparative Theology

Historically, the term *comparative theology* has been used in a variety of ways. First, it sometimes refers to a subsection of the discipline called “comparative religion” wherein the historian of religions analyzes the “theologies” of different religions. Second, within the discipline variously named “the science of religion,” *Religionswissenschaft*, or “history of religions,” some scholars have used the term *comparative theology* to indicate one aspect of the discipline. F. Max Müller, for example, in his *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, used the term to refer to that part of the “science of religion” that analyzes “historical” forms of religion, in contrast to *theoretic theology*, which refers to analysis of the philosophical conditions of possibility for any religion. As a second example, in 1871 James Freeman Clarke published a work entitled *Ten Great Religions: An Essay in Comparative Theology*, which concentrated on the history of religious doctrines in different traditions.

Problems and Possibilities. On the whole, contemporary scholars in history of religions or religious studies do not use the term *comparative theology* in Müller’s or Clarke’s senses, and these earlier usages are therefore now of more historical than current disciplinary interest. In the contemporary scholarly world, the term can be understood in two distinct ways. First, it may continue to refer to a comparative enterprise within the secular study of history of religions in which different “theologies” from different traditions are compared by means of some comparative method developed in the discipline. Usually, however, *comparative theology* refers to a more strictly theological enterprise (sometimes named “world theology” or “global theology”), which ordinarily studies not one tradition alone but two or more, compared on theological grounds. Thus one may find Christian (or Buddhist or Hindu, etc.) comparative theologies in which the theologian’s own tradition is critically and theologically related to other traditions. More rarely, comparative theology may be the theological study of two or more religious traditions without a particular theological commitment to any one tradition. In either theological model, the fact of religious pluralism is explicitly addressed, so that every theology

in every tradition becomes, in effect, a comparative theology.

In principle, the two main approaches are complementary and mutually illuminating: any comparative enterprise within history of religions (or comparative religion)—that is, a secular or scientific study—will interpret theologies as material to be further analyzed from the perspective of, and by means of, the comparativist criteria of that discipline. Any theological attempt at comparative theology—that is, from within the context of belief—will interpret the results of history of religion’s comparisons of various theologies by means of its own strictly theological criteria.

The fact that theology itself is now widely considered one discipline within the multidisciplinary field of religious studies impels contemporary theology, in whatever tradition, to become a comparative theology. More exactly, from a theological point of view, history of religions, in its comparativism, has helped academic theology to recognize a crucial insight: that on strictly theological grounds, the fact of religious pluralism should enter all theological assessment and self-analysis in any tradition at the very beginning of its task. Any contemporary theology that accords theological significance (positive or negative) to the fact of religious pluralism in its examination of a particular tradition functions as a comparative theology, whether it so names itself or not. The history and nature of this new, emerging discipline of comparative theology as theology bears close analysis.

A difficulty with the phrase *comparative theology* is that *theology* may be taken to describe a discipline in Western religions but not necessarily in other traditions. Indeed, the term *theology* has its origins in Greek religious thought. Historically, theology has functioned as a major factor within the religious discourse of Christianity that has been influenced by Hellenistic models—and, to a lesser extent, within that of Islam and Judaism. Any enterprise that is named “comparative theology,” therefore, must establish that the very enterprise of theology is not necessarily a Greco-Christian one.

To assure this, two factors need clarification. First, to speak of “theology” is a perhaps inadequate but historically useful way to indicate the more strictly intellectual interpretations of any religious tradition, whether that tradition is theistic or not. Second, to use *theo logia* in the literal sense of “talk or reflection on God or the gods” suggests that even nontheistic traditions (such as some Hindu, Confucian, Taoist, or archaic traditions) may be described as having theologies in the broad sense. Most religious traditions do possess a more strictly intellectual self-understanding.

The term *theology* as used here does not necessarily imply a belief in "God." Indeed, it does not even necessarily imply a belief in the "high gods" of some archaic traditions, nor the multiple gods of the Greeks and Romans, nor the radically monotheistic God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Whatever the appropriate term used to designate ultimate reality may be, that term is subject to explicitly intellectual reflection (e.g., the term *sacred*, as in the "dialectic of the sacred and the profane" in the great archaic traditions, as analyzed by Mircea Eliade; the term *the holy*, suggested as the more encompassing term, in distinct ways, by Nathan Söderblom and Rudolf Otto; the term *the eternal*, as suggested by Anders Nygren; the term *emptiness*, as used in many Buddhist traditions; or the term *the One*, as in Plotinus; etc.). Insofar as such explicitly intellectual reflection occurs within a religious tradition, one may speak of the presence of a theology in the broad sense (i.e., without necessarily assuming theistic belief). However useful it may be for the purposes of intellectual analysis, the term *theology* should not be allowed to suggest that the tradition in question names ultimate reality as "God"; or that the tradition necessarily considers systematic reflection on ultimate reality important for its religious way. (Indeed, in the case of many Buddhist ways, "systematic" reflection of any kind may be suspect.) "Theology," thus construed, will always be intellectual, but need not be systematic. With these important qualifications, it is nonetheless helpful to speak of "comparative theology" as any explicitly intellectual interpretation of a religious tradition that affords a central place to the fact of religious pluralism in the tradition's self-interpretation.

Among the theological questions addressed by a comparative theology may be the following. (1) How does this religion address the human problem (e.g., suffering, ignorance, sin), and how does that understanding relate to other interpretations of the human situation? (2) What is the way of ultimate transformation (enlightenment, emancipation, salvation, liberation) that this religion offers, and how is it related to other ways? (3) What is the understanding of the nature of ultimate reality (nature, emptiness, the holy, the sacred, the divine, God, the gods) that this religion possesses, and how does this understanding relate to that of other traditions?

Such comparative theological questions may be considered intrinsic to the intellectual self-understanding of any religious tradition or way, and one may thus speak of the implicit or explicit reality of a "comparative theology." More specific proposals will result from particular comparative theological analyses; for exam-

ple, the suggestions of a radical unity among many religions (Frithjof Schuon, Huston Smith, Henry Corbin), or suggestions that one may have a Christian or Hindu or Buddhist or Jewish or Islamic comparative theology (Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Raimundo Panikkar, Masao Abe, Ananda Coomaraswamy, S. H. Nasr, Franz Rosenzweig, et al.). All these more particular proposals, however, are based on theological conclusions that have followed an individual theologian's comparative assessment of his or her own religious tradition and other traditions. Prior to all such specific theological proposals, however, is the question of the nature of any comparative theology from within any religious tradition.

In general terms, therefore, comparative theology always accords explicit theological attention to religious pluralism, despite radical differences in theological conclusions. In methodological terms, contemporary comparative theology provides an intellectual self-understanding of a particular religious tradition from within the horizon of many religious traditions. It is a hermeneutical and theological discipline that establishes mutually critical correlations between two distinct but related interpretations: on the one hand, the theological interpretation of the principal religious questions given a context of religious pluralism in an emerging global culture; on the other, an interpretation of the responses of a particular religious tradition to that pluralism.

As this general methodological model clarifies, the comparative theologian cannot determine before the analysis itself what ultimate conclusions will occur, for example, that all religious traditions are either finally one or irreversibly diverse, or that a particular tradition must radically change or transform its traditional self-understanding as the result of pluralism. It is clear that to start with an explicit (and usually, but not necessarily, positive) assessment of religious pluralism challenges the position of traditional theology, which argued, implicitly or explicitly, that the fact of religious pluralism (and therefore of a comparative hermeneutical element as intrinsic to the theological task) was of no intrinsic importance for theological interpretation. A contemporary Christian comparative theology, for example, will inevitably be different from a Hindu or Jewish or Islamic or Buddhist comparative theology. But, just as important, each of these emerging comparative theologies will be different from all those traditional theologies which disallowed a comparative hermeneutics within the theological task, either explicitly (through claims to exclusivism) or implicitly (by denying its usefulness). There is as yet no firm consensus on the results of "comparative theology," but it is possible that those engaged in this increasingly important task

may come to agree on a model for the general method all comparative theologians employ. The further need, therefore, is to reflect on this method. First, however, it is necessary to review the historical precedents for this emerging discipline.

History: Premodern Developments. For reasons of clarification and space, this historical survey will be largely confined to Western traditions where strictly theological issues have been especially acute. Westerners should not forget, however, that other traditions (especially those of India) have struggled for a far longer period and with great philosophical sophistication with the question of religious pluralism. (See Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 5 vols., Cambridge, 1922–1955, and Eric J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion: A History*, London, 1975.)

Monotheistic religions until early modernity. Although the term *comparative theology* is not employed in discussions of the premodern period, comparative elements in traditional Western philosophies and theologies were present, in positive and negative ways, in the premodern period. In the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, the insistence upon the exclusivity of divine revelation led, on the whole, to a relative lack of interest in analyzing other religions, save for polemical or apologetic purposes. This lack of interest was based (especially in the prophetic trajectories of those religions) on an explicitly and systematically negative assessment of other religions or ways from the viewpoint of scriptural revelation. Attacks on the ancient Canaanite religions by the prophets of Israel in the Hebrew scriptures are the clearest among many examples of this “exclusivist” development. Still, as modern scholarship has shown, the borrowings by ancient Israel from other religious traditions, or those by early Islam from Jews, Christians, and “pagans,” suggest a more complex scenario than traditional Jewish, Christian, and Islamic exclusivist theological interpretations suggest. Moreover, there are elements (especially in the wisdom tradition) that suggest more positive appraisals of other religious traditions (e.g., the covenant with Noah, the *Book of Ecclesiastes*, universalist tendencies in the New Testament, as in *1 Timothy* 3–5). Other exceptions are found in the Logos tradition of Philo Judaeus in Judaism and the distinct but related Logos traditions of three Christian theologies (Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen). The esoteric and gnostic strands in all three monotheistic traditions challenged orthodox biblical theologies through more syncretic theologies, which were sometimes based on a belief in an original (and shared) revelation. The use of ancient Greek and Roman philosophical sources in the theologies of all these traditions

also provides some partial exceptions to exclusivist emphases.

Yet even the use of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neoplatonists in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theologies was strongly conditioned by the framework of the received traditions, especially traditional theological interpretations of the subsidiary position of philosophical reason to revelation (Ibn Sinā, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas). Inevitably, the use of the “pagan” philosophies of ancient Greece in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theological self-understanding generated some comparativist interests in all these monotheistic theologies—but these were usually colored by traditional apologetic and polemical concerns. The greatest exception to this general rule may be found among Islamic thinkers, especially al-Sharastānī (d. 1153), whose treatise *The Book of Sects and Creeds* provides a comparative theological analysis from an Islamic perspective of most of the major religions of the then-contemporary world. Most Christian theologies, for example, did not agree with Tertullian’s implied negative response to his famous rhetorical question, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”

The most common understanding on the part of Christian theology was that the use of philosophical resources did not necessitate any assessment of the religions to which these “pagan” philosophers may have held. For example, the use of Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism by Christian theologians emerged at those locations (e.g., Alexandria) where the relationship of Neoplatonism to the mystery religions and occult practices was weakest in the ancient world. Hence theologians like Origen and Clement could appeal to Middle Platonic philosophy without comparativist analyses of the explicitly cultic practices sometimes associated with Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The dominant comparative question for Christian theology (and, in their distinct but related ways, for Jewish and Islamic theologies) was the relationship of theology to philosophy, of revelation to reason. There was little explicit theological interest in comparativist religious analyses—again save for the traditional apologetic and polemical treatises on the “pagans.”

Ancient Greece and Rome. Provided that a particular religion did not interfere with civic order, the ancient Greeks and especially the Romans were generally more tolerant of religious differences than were the monotheistic religions. This tolerance, in certain somewhat exceptional circumstances, gave rise to some interest in the fact of religious diversity. Among the classical Greeks, the major writer with an interest in comparativism is undoubtedly the great historian Herodotus.

His work demonstrates remarkable concern with non-Greek religions (especially the religions of the Egyptians, Persians, and Babylonians), as well as with the religious diversity within the Greek world itself. As a “comparativist,” his “syncretist” sympathies are equally clear. His most notable successor in these interests (especially as regards Egyptian religion) is Plutarch.

The Stoics were the first in the West to attempt to establish the existence of common beliefs within the diversity of beliefs in the ancient world. They did so through their invention of the term *religio naturalis* (“natural religion”). The most famous work of what might be called comparative theology in the ancient world remains Cicero’s famous dialogue *De natura deorum*, in which the theologies and philosophies of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Academics are discussed. (Cicero’s great dialogues encouraged comparativist interest in later ages as well—witness David Hume’s use of him as a model for his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.) The Stoics also developed allegorical methods of interpreting the ancient myths and gods (e.g., Zeus interpreted as the sky, Demeter as the earth, etc.). These methods were later employed by some Jewish (e.g., Philo) and many Christian theologians as an implicitly comparativist, hermeneutic method of scriptural interpretation. Comparativist interests may also be noted in the writings of Varro and comparative elements are evident in texts with other major interests—for example, Strabo’s *Geography* and Tacitus’s *Germania*. In the medieval period, the outstanding figure with comparativist interests was the Christian philosopher-theologian Nicholas of Cusa.

Early Western Modernity. The Renaissance, of course, occasioned new interest in the works of antiquity, including the classical mythologies. The most remarkable expression of this interest can be found in the speculations on the existence of an original revelation in all religions, in the texts of the Christian thinkers Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Giordano Bruno, and others. These men not only revived the ancient myths for Christian theological purposes but also argued for the “esoteric tradition” as the common stream present in all the known religions of both antiquity and the modern world.

The age of Western exploration in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries stimulated new interest not only in the religions of antiquity but also in the newly observed religions of the Americas and those of Asia. The most remarkable example of an exercise in “comparative theology” during this period remains the work of a Jesuit missionary to China, Matteo Ricci,

whose positive assessment, on Christian theological grounds, of Confucianism is unique. Indeed, Ricci’s letters and reports, although unsuccessful with authorities at Rome, were, in the eighteenth century, deeply influential upon the interest in Chinese religion among such thinkers as Leibniz, Voltaire, Christian Wolff, and Goethe. The comparative theological interests of the Enlightenment were characteristically addressed to classical Confucianism (somewhat bizarrely interpreted as eighteenth-century “natural religion”), rarely to Taoism or Chinese Buddhism.

With the advent of historico-critical methods, the comparative theological interests of Western thinkers shifted in both their approach and in the areas of their dominant interest. The Romantic thinkers (e.g., Johann Gottfried Herder) analyzed distinct cultures as unitary expressions of the unique genius of particular peoples. This interest encouraged the development of historical studies for each religion as unitary and unique. Earlier negative assessment by Enlightenment thinkers of what they had named “positive religions” (as distinct from a presumed common “natural religion”) yielded, in the Romantics, to a positive comparativist assessment of particular religious traditions and cultures. The simultaneous nineteenth-century historical interest in the ancient Near East spurred renewed comparativist interest in the religions of ancient Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt.

The rise of interest in Indian religions, moreover, paralleled both Western colonial expansion and the scholarly development of Indo-European studies in the expanding search for the sources of Western culture. Indeed, in the nineteenth century that interest in Indian religious traditions arose not only among scholars in Indo-European studies but also among philosophers with little strictly scholarly competence, but with strong comparative theological interests—such as the American Transcendentalists (Emerson, Thoreau, et al.) and the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. With the emergence of historical consciousness, the transition from ancient, medieval, and early-modern comparative theological interests to a more complete modernism may be said to have begun.

The Modern Period. The crucial intellectual development in the rise of comparative theology in the modern period was the emergence of historical consciousness and historico-critical method. The recognition of the historically conditioned character of religious traditions led to a crisis of cognitive claims for Western Christian and Jewish theologians. The Enlightenment’s hope that a universal “natural religion” could be abstracted from all “positive” (i.e., particularist) religions was a hope

shared, in different ways, by most thinkers of the period, including both the Christian philosophers Leibniz and Kant and the Jewish thinker Moses Mendelssohn.

But the combined force of Romanticism's fascination with past cultures as living and unique wholes expressive of particular peoples and the scholarly development of historico-critical methods and a resultant historical consciousness led to a widespread awareness of the need to incorporate that historical sense in all the exercises of reason, including philosophy and theology. Thus Western philosophy and theology, by becoming historically conscious, became implicitly (and often explicitly) comparativist as well.

The two major thinkers who initiated this comparative philosophy and theology—although it is important to recall that neither ever so named it—were Friedrich Schleiermacher and G. W. F. Hegel. Schleiermacher, a Reformed theologian, developed a Christian theology that deeply influenced all later Christian theology, among other reasons because it incorporated explicitly comparative elements. Schleiermacher defined religion as “the sense and the taste for the Infinite” and, later and most influentially, as “a feeling of absolute dependence”; as such, religion is the central reality for humankind. Moreover, in his Christian theology he attempted a comparison of religions. He argued for the superiority of the monotheistic over the polytheistic religions and for the superiority of the “ethical monotheism” of Christianity over the “ethical monotheism” of Judaism and the “aesthetic monotheism” of Islam. The details of Schleiermacher's controversial theological arguments are less important here than his insistence that Christian theology should include genuinely comparative elements.

Schleiermacher's great contemporary and rival, Hegel, had a similarly controversial influence on the development of historical and comparative elements in philosophy (and, to a lesser extent, in Christian theology). Hegel's complex developmental-dialectical model for philosophy demanded, on intrinsic philosophical grounds, a systematic and comparativist account of the major civilizations and the major religions. The thrust of his argument was that Spirit itself (at once divine and human) had a dialectical development that began in China and moved through India, Egypt, Persia, Israel, Greece, and Rome to the “absolute religion” of Christianity. This last reached its climax in German Protestantism and in his new dialectical philosophy. Hegel's formulation of the intellectual dilemma for comparative theology and comparative philosophy is an attempt to show the “absoluteness” of one religion (Protestant Christianity) by relating it explicitly to a developmental and comparative (i.e., dialectical) schema.

This attempt to demonstrate absoluteness proved influential upon both Western Christian theology and secular philosophy.

Although the comparativist conclusions of both Schleiermacher and Hegel are generally accorded little weight among contemporary philosophers and theologians, their joint insistence on the incorporation of comparativist elements into both Christian theology and secular philosophy has proved enormously influential. In the twentieth century, their most notable Christian theological successor has been Ernst Troeltsch. Troeltsch engaged in several disciplines: he was a major historian of Christianity, a sociologist of religion, an interpreter of the new comparative “science of religion,” an idealist philosopher of religion, and an explicitly Christian theologian. His ambitious theological program has proved more important for its methodological complexity and sophistication than for any particular theological conclusions. Troeltsch insisted throughout his work in these different disciplines that Christian theology as an academic discipline must find new ways to relate itself critically not only to its traditional partner, philosophy, but also to the new disciplines of sociology of religion and the general science of religion. Troeltsch became, in sum, the systematic theologian of the newly emerging “history-of-religions” school of Christian theology centered at the University of Göttingen.

It is also notable that Troeltsch shifted his earlier theological judgment on the “absolute superiority” of Christianity among religions to a later position in which he held that Christianity was only “absolute” for Westerners. This controversial theological conclusion was based, above all, on Troeltsch's conviction (as a historian) of the unbreakable relationship of a religion to its culture. This was true, for Troeltsch, even for such relatively culture-transcending religions as Christianity and Buddhism. This theological conclusion of merely relative absoluteness was also warranted by Troeltsch's conviction that it is impossible to assess the relative value of a religion through objective or neutral criteria that are independent of the diversity of particular cultural and religious values. Similar comparative theological enterprises (generally without Troeltsch's methodological sophistication and without his conclusion of the merely relative superiority of Christianity for Westerners) may be found in both liberal Protestant and Catholic modernist theologies in the early twentieth century.

However, the relative optimism, as well as the comparativist theological interests, of both the liberal Protestant and Catholic modernist theologians soon disappeared. In Catholicism, the end came through the

intervention of Rome. Among Protestants, it occurred through the collapse of liberal optimism following World War I. The major theological alternative for Protestant thought at that time (generally called dialectical theology, or neo-Reformation theology) was found in the work of Karl Barth. Barth rejected most of the liberal Protestant theological program, including its comparativism. He held that Christian theology was a discipline not intrinsically related to the larger question of the nature of religion (including Christianity as a religion). Christian theology was determined only by the question of the meaning of God's self-revelation in the Word of Jesus Christ. As such, any Christian theological interest in comparativist analyses of religions was improper to the strictly theological task.

Barth's great theological contemporaries Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, however, continued to include some major historical and comparative emphases in their distinct and non-Barthian formulations of dialectical theology. Indeed, at the end of his long career, and influenced by his seminar work with Mircea Eliade, his colleague at the University of Chicago, Tillich returned explicitly to his earlier Troeltschian interest in history of religions in an important lecture entitled "The Significance of History of Religions for Systematic Theology" (1965). Other Christian theologians, moreover, continued and refined aspects of the program set forth by Troeltsch. It is notable that three of the most important founders of the discipline known as phenomenology of religion in the modern period, Nathan Söderblom, Gerardus van der Leeuw, and Rudolf Otto, were also Christian theologians who incorporated their phenomenological and historical work on religion into their constructive proposals for Christian theology.

Even granted these notable and important exceptions, however, Christian theology of the period between the wars largely abandoned its earlier comparativist interests: in Roman Catholic theology through the suppression of modernism and the revival of scholasticism; in Protestant theology through the ascent of Barthian dialectical theology. These developments tended to remove Christian theology from its earlier intellectual alliance with the "scientific" study of religion. Both Protestant dialectical theology and Roman Catholic scholastic theology gave relatively little attention to comparativism.

However, a comparativist theological analysis within the Barthian perspective, designed to show the radical contrast of Christian revelation to that of other religions, may be found in the notable work of Hendrik Kraemer, especially in his detailed study of other religions, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (1938). In Roman Catholic theology (especially in the work of Jean Daniélou and Henri de Lubac), more-

over, the "return to the sources" movement of the *nouvelle théologie* of the 1940s and 1950s engaged in historical and comparative work on the relationships of non-Christian religions and philosophies to historical Christianity in the scriptural, patristic, and medieval periods.

This scholarly work helped set the stage for the affirmative declarations on the world religions by Rome both during and after the Second Vatican Council (1961–1965). Roman Catholic theologians (most notably Karl Rahner and Hans Küng) began to include comparativist elements in their Catholic theological proposals. In Jewish theology, an earlier notable comparativist theological enterprise was achieved by the great Jewish theologian Franz Rosenzweig with his development of a "two-covenant" theme.

In our own period, many Christian theologians have returned to the kind of comparativist theological program initiated by Schleiermacher and Hegel and refined by Troeltsch. Without necessarily accepting the conclusions of earlier comparative theologies, and without abandoning the strictly theological gains of dialectical theology, many contemporary ecumenically oriented Christian theologians (whether Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox) are concerned to include explicitly comparativist elements within their theologies. There are, at present, many alternative proposals for how this might best be accomplished. Among Christian comparative theologians these include the "theology of the history of religions" proposal of Wolfhart Pannenberg; the Christian theologies of religious pluralism of John Cobb and Raimundo Panikkar that allow for mutual and radical self-transformation; proposals of Hans Küng and Langdon Gilkey for dialogue among the religions as intrinsic to all Christian theological self-understanding; proposals for a "global" or "world" theology by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, a thinker who is both a Christian theologian and a historian of religion; a proposal for radical rethinking of Christianity's traditional christological claims by the Protestant theologian and philosopher of religion John Hick and the Catholic theologian Paul Knitter; explicitly comparative theological proposals based on the pluralism within the Christian tradition as a central clue to a pluralism among all religions (George Rupp); and revisionary comparative proposals for different religious models (saint, sage, etc.) from a Christian theological perspective (Robert C. Neville). Comparative theologies in other traditions have also been developed, such as the Hindu global theologies of Swami Vivekananda and Ananda Coomaraswamy, the Buddhist comparative theology of Masao Abe, and the Islamic global theology of the sacred of S. H. Nasr.

Important comparativist theological elements may also be found in the modern period in the philosophers Ernest Hocking and F. S. C. Northrup, the historian Arnold Toynbee and the psychologist C. G. Jung. Each of these thinkers, although not a theologian, exerted a powerful comparativist influence upon many theological enterprises.

General Theological Method and the Possibility of a Shared Method for Comparative Theology. As contemporary theologians in a religiously pluralistic world grope for new, inevitably tentative formulations of a paradigm to guide their deliberations and inform their expectations, they are confronted with the question of method. Theological method must always be a secondary matter for comparative theology, subsidiary to concrete interpretations of the specific symbols of a particular religious tradition. Method—precisely as a necessarily abstract, heuristic guide—must always be secondary to the concrete interpretations of each particular theology. But the secondary also serves. Reflection on method serves the common cause of all concrete comparative theologies by bringing into sharper focus the principles behind the common search for a new paradigm—principles that are often obscured in the present sharp conflict among particular proposals and conclusions in this emerging discipline. The abstract does not merely extrapolate from the concrete; the abstract also enriches the concrete by highlighting and clarifying what is essential.

It is helpful, therefore, to reflect on what kind of general theological method may be shared by contemporary comparative theologians despite otherwise sharp differences among them. The present hypothesis can be described by four premises. First, comparative theology must be a reinterpretation of the central symbols of a particular religious tradition for the contemporary religiously pluralistic world. Second, a new paradigm for comparative theology must be so formulated that the interpretations of a tradition can no longer be grounded in older, classicist bases but must rely on new foundations that incorporate both past tradition and the present religious pluralism. Third, in keeping with the demands of an emerging globalism and a pluralistic world, theologians in all traditions must risk addressing the questions of religious pluralism on explicitly theological grounds. Fourth, it follows from these first three premises that contemporary theologians must engage in two complementary kinds of interpretation of a tradition—those now known as the “hermeneutics of retrieval” and the “hermeneutics of critique and suspicion.” [See *Hermeneutics*.] There is no innocent interpretation, no unambiguous tradition, no history-less interpreter. There is no merely abstract, general “situa-

tion” and no theological method that can guarantee certainty. There is only the risk of comparative theological interpretation itself: the risk of interpreting the great symbols in all the traditions for the present pluralistic situation and then presenting those interpretations to the wider global theological community and the wider community of religious studies for criticism.

This general model can be made more specific by introducing the following definition of a shared theological method in the new situation: any theology is the attempt to establish mutually critical correlations between an interpretation of a particular religious tradition and an interpretation of the contemporary situation.

Thus, contemporary theology as a discipline shares with history of religions, the humanities, the social sciences, and, more recently, the natural sciences, a turn to reflection on the process of interpretation itself. For theology is one way to interpret the elusive, ambiguous, and transformative reality named, however inadequately, “religion.” Theology is not merely a synonym for any interpretation of religion but rather bears its own methodological demands and its own criteria. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify this definition of theology and to show how it can yield a common model for a theological method, one appropriate to a contemporary comparative theology in any tradition.

Theologians interpret the claims to meaning and truth in the religious classics of a particular tradition for a new situation. The religious classics are theologically construed as human testimonies to some disclosure of ultimate reality by the power of ultimate reality itself, as that power is experienced by human beings. The questions to which such testimonies respond are the fundamental “limit-questions” of the ultimate meaningfulness or absurdity of existence itself. Religious questions are questions of an odd logical type, emerging at the limits of ordinary experience and ordinary modes of inquiry (ethical, aesthetic, political, scientific). Like strictly metaphysical questions, the fundamental questions of religion must be logically odd, since they are questions concerning the most fundamental presuppositions, the most basic beliefs about all knowing, willing, and acting. Like strictly metaphysical questions, religious questions must be on the nature of ultimate reality. Unlike metaphysical questions, religious questions ask about the meaning and truth of ultimate reality, not only in itself but also as it relates existentially to human beings. The religious classics, therefore, are theologically construed as testimonies by human beings who cannot but ask these fundamental limit-questions and, in asking them seriously, believe that they have received an understanding of or even a

response from ultimate reality itself: some disclosure or revelation bearing a new and different possibility of ultimate enlightenment, or some new way to formulate the questions themselves, or some promise of total liberation that suggests a new religious way to become an emancipated human being through a grounded relationship to that ultimate reality which is believed to be the origin and end of all reality.

It is not the case, of course, that theology has only become hermeneutical in the modern period. However, the explicit concern with hermeneutics after Schleiermacher has been occasioned, among Westerners, by the sense of cultural distance from the religious traditions caused by the seventeenth-century scientific revolution and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. This sense of distance has been intensified by the emergence of historical consciousness (as expressed by Troeltsch and Joachim Wach), and the development of the great liberation movements and their attendant hermeneutics of suspicion (with respect to sexism, racism, classism, etc.). And it has been still further intensified by the Western sense of cultural and religious parochialism stimulated by the emerging pluralistic and global culture as well as by the tensions, conflicts, and possibilities present in North-South and East-West relationships. The epoch-making events of modernity have brought about a need for explicit reflection on the hermeneutical character of all the religious disciplines, including the hermeneutical developments (as elucidated by Wach, Mircea Eliade, Joseph M. Kitagawa, Charles H. Long, et al.) in history of religions and the widely recognized hermeneutical character of all theology.

In order to understand the present situation of radical religious pluralism, theologians must interpret it theologically. Interpretation is not a technique to be added on to experience and understanding but is, as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur argue, anterior and intrinsic to understanding itself. This is especially the case for any theological interpretation of the contemporary situation. For theology attempts to discern and interpret those fundamental questions (finitude, estrangement, alienation, oppression, fundamental trust or mistrust, loyalty, anxiety, transience, mortality, etc.) that disclose a religious dimension in the contemporary situation.

Paul Tillich described this hermeneutical character of theology as the need for an explicit analysis of the given "situation," that is, for a creative interpretation of our experience which discloses a religious dimension (for example, of cultural pluralism itself). It is possible to distinguish, but not to separate, the theologian's analysis of the "situation" from his or her analysis of a particular religious tradition. Theologians, in sum, inter-

pret both "situation" and "tradition." In some manner, implicit or explicit, they must correlate these two distinct but related interpretations. Like any other interpreter of the contemporary pluralistic situation, and like any other interpreter of the religious questions in that situation, the theologian brings some prior understanding to the interpretation—an understanding influenced by the historical givens of a particular religious tradition. A Buddhist comparative theology, for example, will inevitably be different from a Jewish comparative theology.

The clarification of the emerging discipline called "comparative theology" follows from this brief analysis of theology itself as an academic and hermeneutical discipline. In the sense outlined above, theology is an intrinsically hermeneutical discipline that interprets intellectually a particular tradition in a particular situation. Further, any interpretation of a tradition will always be made in and for a particular situation. In classical Western hermeneutical terms, this means that every act of interpretation includes not only *intelligentia* ("understanding") and *explicatio* ("explanation"), but also *applicatio*, an application of the interpretation to its context that is at the same time a precondition to any understanding and interpretation.

A properly theological interpretation of the contemporary situation demands that those fundamental religious questions cited above be raised, for the responses to them by a particular religious tradition are the primary, strictly theological, means of interpreting that tradition (e.g., an interpretation of the way of Buddhist enlightenment as the response to a fundamental situation of suffering and a fundamental state of inauthentic existence seen as "ignorance"; an interpretation of the Christian creed of faith, hope, and love as a response to the fundamental situation of suffering and an existential state of inauthentic existence seen as sin). Internal to each theological interpretation of each religious tradition, moreover, is a theological assessment and identification of the normative elements of that religion (e.g., identification of the proper canons of the religion, of the proper role of "tradition," of the proper role of modern historical research, etc.).

Any theology, therefore, involves the development of a set of mutually critical correlations between two distinct but related interpretations: an interpretation of the tradition and an interpretation of the contemporary situation. But it is important not to presume that a tradition will always supply adequate responses to the questions suggested by the contemporary situation. Rather, as the qualifying phrase "mutually critical" suggests, the theologian cannot determine before the concrete interpretation itself whether the traditional re-

sponses of a religion are adequate to the contemporary situation.

In strictly logical terms, the concept of "mutually critical correlations" suggests a number of possible relations between the theologian's two somewhat distinct interpretations: (1) identities between the questions prompted by and the responses to the situation and the questions and responses given by the tradition (as in many liberal and modernist Christian theologies); (2) similarities-in-difference, or analogies, between those two interpretations (as in many Neo-Confucian "theologies"); and (3) radical disjunctions, or more existentially, confrontations, between the two (as in the Hindu and Buddhist insistence on the necessity of the reality of a "higher consciousness"); or the radical dialectic of the sacred and the profane in archaic ontologies; or the radical correction of traditional self-interpretations of a religion after the emergence of historical consciousness.

In properly general and heuristic terms, therefore, theology is an intellectual enterprise that may now be described more exactly as the hermeneutical attempt to establish mutually critical correlations between the claims to religious meaningfulness and truth of a religious tradition and the claims to religious meaningfulness and truth within the historical situation for which that tradition is being interpreted.

This general model of theology as an intellectual discipline within religious studies may be further specified to demonstrate how "comparative theology" both fits and challenges it. Comparative theology fits the model insofar as it also demands that the theologian attempt to establish mutually critical correlations between the claims to religious meaning and truth in the same two sets of interpretations. What renders any theology within a particular tradition explicitly comparative, however, is a substantive (and not merely methodological) change in the interpretation of the contemporary situation. Any comparative theology in a particular tradition will insist on theological grounds that religious pluralism in the contemporary situation must receive explicit theological attention. Insofar as that crucial hermeneutic and theological change of focus is made at all, the theological task is notably altered. For now the different questions and responses of the various religions present in the contemporary pluralistic situation must be explicitly and comparatively analyzed as part of the task of any theological interpretation in any tradition. A sense of the cultural parochialism of traditional theological interpretations of both situation and tradition is likely to follow. A confrontation with any traditional, purely exclusivist, interpretation of the one tradition is also likely—just as earlier confrontations with traditional interpretations were occasioned by the emergence of historical and hermeneutical conscious-

ness. A sense of the need for any comparative theological interpretation to take account of the comparative analyses of history of religions is also likely to arise, with the result that comparative theology will also recognize the need for the kind of interdisciplinary discourse found in "religious studies."

Comparative theology is an emerging discipline with as yet no firm consensus on conclusions, but with a possible agreement on the revised method of correlation that it implicitly employs. It is a branch of the general field of religious studies that must learn from the comparative method used in the study of history of religions, by reflecting on the results of those studies in explicitly theological ways. Traditional theological self-interpretations in all traditions are likely to undergo radical revisions—indeed, even at this early stage in the discipline, such revisions are visible. The final conclusions for any tradition's self-understanding in a religiously pluralistic world will be determined only by further, concrete comparative theological studies in and among all the traditions. Yet this much is clear: any contemporary comparative theology in any tradition must relate itself explicitly to the comparative studies of theologies in history of religions and to the theological dialogues among the religions. It must also explicitly raise the traditional theological questions of meaning and truth that earlier, secular comparative enterprises were legitimately able to "bracket."

In sum, comparative theology, as theology, is an academic discipline that establishes mutually critical correlations between the claims to meaningfulness and truth in the interpretations of a religiously pluralistic situation and the claims to meaningfulness and truth in new interpretations of a religious tradition. [See also Truth.] The central fact of religious pluralism, as well as the existence of religious studies (especially history of religions), has challenged all theologies in all traditions to become explicitly comparative in approach. The future is likely to see the evolution of most traditional theologies into comparative theologies in all non-fundamentalist traditions. With that development, the conflict in interpretations among various models and differing conclusions among contemporary comparative theologians may eventually yield to a disciplinary consensus for all theology. Any theology in any tradition that takes religious pluralism seriously must eventually become a comparative theology.

[See also Religious Diversity; Religious Pluralism; and Comparative-Historical Method.]

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DAVID TRACY

Christian Theology

The word *theology* always means discourse or speech about God. But which God is meant and what does this God do? Plato, in his *Republic*, assigns *theologia* to the poets (379a5); by *theology* he means narratives about the gods and theogonies. Aristotle contrasts the "theologians," who offer mythological explanations of the world, with the "philosophers," or "physiologists," who look for the explanation of things within things themselves. On one occasion he divides "theoretical" philosophy into three parts: mathematics, physics, and theology, this last being identical with "first" philosophy, or metaphysics (*Metaphysics* 6.1025a). Toward the end of the second century BCE, Panaetius of Rhodes distinguished three kinds of theology and was followed in this by Varro, whom Augustine cites (*City of God* 6.5): mythological, "natural" or philosophico-cosmological, and civil or political. "Civil theology" or "political theology" referred to the cult of the Caesars.

Among Christians, the first applications of the term *theology* to knowledge of the God in whom they believed occur in the writings of Origen (d. 254). For Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 339), *theologia* no longer applied to paganism at all but designated exclusively the knowledge of the Christian God and of Christ. Eusebius was also familiar with the distinction that would become classic among the Greeks and would be known to the Latin Middle Ages as well, between *theology*, which means discourse about the inner life of God, and *economy*, meaning God's activity for our salvation, which includes Christ, church, sacraments, and eschatology. Proclus (d. 485), the Greek philosopher, wrote an *Elements of Theology*, a treatise on the ultimate principles of reality.

In the West, *theologia* was for a long time used only infrequently; other terms prevailed, such as *sacra scrip-*

tura ("sacred scripture"), *sacra erudito* ("sacred knowledge"), and *divina pagina* ("divine pages"). Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) preferred *sacra doctrina* ("sacred doctrine"). But in his time, *theologia*, which Peter Abelard (d. 1142) had used as the title of a work on Christian dogma in its entirety, meant the knowledge elaborated and taught in the faculty of the same name. Our modern use of the term was thus established.

Historical Development. Theology exists because the godhead is revealed in historical actions or events, the meanings of which are conveyed in language or inspired writings. The words of a sage, even one who is "inspired," are not enough. The writings provide food for a meditation of a sapiential kind that is geared to the conduct of human life. God revealed the relationship he wants to establish with man and in the process was also self-revelatory.

Before the end of the first century after the Hijrah, Islam was already discussing the dilemma of predestination and free will. Next to be discussed were the last things and the salvation of unbelievers who were in good faith. In these discussions and in the texts of the mystics were to be found only fragments of a theology. While Judaism had too lofty an idea of God's absoluteness to make an effort to investigate his nature, it did gather into the Talmud the discussions and interpretations of the rabbis; it developed an apologetic for dealing with Islam; it reflected on the anthropomorphisms of the Bible; and it produced great religious philosophers (e.g., Maimonides, d. 1204).

Christians for their part not only had inherited the Jewish scriptures and the revelatory deeds that these scriptures narrate and explain; they also found themselves confronted with the fact of Jesus Christ. First an object of faith, this fact became also an object of thought. It was a complex fact: a man who is Son of God, dead yet living, weak yet Lord. It demanded that God be seen as Father of a Son, the two of them acting through a Holy Spirit who is at once immanent in the "hearts" of the faithful and transcendent over them. Help in expressing these ideas was found in the Stoicism of the day, which was widespread even among slaves. This philosophy provided the idea of a Logos and a Spirit (*pneuma*) that permeated the cosmos, kept it in motion, and quickened minds as well. On the other hand, to take this approach was to cosmologize God and turn the Logos and Pneuma into subordinate intermediaries between God and the things of the world. Before the Council of Nicaea (325), even Christians who proved their fidelity by martyrdom had been influenced by these ideas and had formulated their faith in an unsatisfactory manner. Various interpretations publicly expressed were judged to cast doubt on essential aspects of the object of faith. The result was that an ortho-

doxy—true praise, true faith—emerged and, with it, the beginnings of a reflection on faith and in faith or, in other words, something of a theology.

Faith, which is already in the realm of thought, must necessarily express itself in an active way. It looks for coherence among many facts and elements that, however diverse, all come from the same God who is carrying out a homogeneous plan. Since faith is also fidelity, and therefore orthodoxy, it develops in response to deviations. Since it has to do with mysterious realities that are irreducible to the facts grasped by our sciences and are very complex, the very assent of faith is accompanied by the questioning that Augustine and Thomas Aquinas call *cogitatio*: "Credere est cum assentione cogitare" ("To believe is to assent while thinking"). When this reflection in faith ceases to be occasional and becomes systematic, it is theology.

This process began in the East. Schools of higher-level catechesis were established there; in these schools the quest was for gnosis, that is, a deepening both of knowledge and of Christian life. "True gnosis," as it is called by Irenaeus (*Against Heresies* 4.33.8), fights the false gnosis of Basilides and Valentinian in the name of the authentic tradition guaranteed by apostolic succession. This true gnosis is in accordance with reason (3.12.11). The Didaskalion, or Catechetical School, of Alexandria was headed by Clement and then by Origen, who in his *On First Principles* gives the first complete theological statement that is linked to a philosophical culture. As a result, he distinguished what we now call dogma and theology. In contrast to platonizing Alexandria, Antioch, another great Christian metropolis, practiced a more historical and literal reading of the scriptures. At Nisibis and Edessa, on the other hand, Ephraem of Syria (d. 373) theologized in a poetical and lyrical way that was alien to Greek culture.

The second half of the fourth century and the first half of the fifth saw in both the East and West a flowering of geniuses and saints: the Fathers. These included Athanasius (d. 373), Basil of Caesarea (d. 379), Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 391), Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395), Chrysostom (d. 407), and Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444), in the East; and in the West, Hilary (d. 367), Ambrose (d. 397), Jerome (d. 420), Augustine (d. 430), and Leo I (d. 461). These men defended and lent luster to the Christian faith chiefly by a rational explanation of scriptures that focused on the Christian mystery and made use of typology. In Origen's thought, and that of some others, typology is pushed to the point of allegory. Even at this time, however, there were signs of a difference in the way theological activity was carried on in the Greek East and in the Latin West, at least beginning with Augustine in the West.

The Latin fathers (including Augustine) regarded the

literary and philosophical culture of the patristic age (Second Sophistic, Platonic, and Stoic) to be a human formation of the Christian although it was acquired in the pagan schools of the time. Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Chrysostom insisted on the value of this formation, while Julian the Apostate denied Christians access to it to prevent their being weakened by it. The Fathers engaged in argument chiefly in order to invalidate the conclusions drawn by heretics, but they did not use philosophical concepts and arguments in order to develop new theses that went beyond the traditional faith. From the philosophers, and especially from Platonism, they borrowed certain broad ideas and expressions but little with conceptual content new to their faith. They saw the philosophers rather as fathers of heresies. This did not prevent later philosophical borrowings by John of Damascus (d. 749), Photios (d. about 891), Cerularios (d. 1058), and Michael Psellus (d. 1078?). Even today, however, Orthodox theology dutifully follows the Fathers. The nineteenth canon of the Trullan Synod (692) says "The church's pastors must explain scripture in accordance with the commentaries of the Fathers." While the medieval and modern West has been receptive to many questions and currents of thought and has even formulated new dogmas, thus making the proof from tradition difficult and complicated, Eastern Christianity has kept a kind of direct contact with its patristic tradition. It derives its faith directly from the liturgy, in which that tradition finds expression. When the attempt was made on numerous occasions to introduce into Eastern Orthodoxy a creative appeal to reason, especially because of the influence of the West and in imitation of it, there was a reaction. Thus there was a reaction against John Italus, who succeeded Michael Psellus as head of the University of Constantinople; the seventh article of his condemnation in 1082 reads "Cursed be those who devote themselves in depth to the sciences of the Hellenes and do not use these simply to exercise the mind but instead adopt their sterile opinions." The reaction was even more vigorous in the fourteenth century when, after the great Latin classics had been translated into Greek, rationalist and humanist claims roused the opposition of Gregory Palamas (d. 1359), who developed a new systematization of the spiritual tradition of the Greek East. Since the fourth century this tradition had devoted itself to reflection on the incarnation of the Word and the divinization of creatures, to the union of the divine and the human, the uncreated and the created. This was the background for the two great debates peculiar to the East—the iconoclastic struggle, which was the final phase of the christological controversies (union of the spiritual and the sensible), and the debate over Palamism (divinization, communication of God to the hu-

man creature, and rejection of any rationalism in theology)—the victorious outcome of which is celebrated by the Feast of Orthodoxy. Established in 843, this feast commemorates the restoration of icon worship and Orthodox rejection of the theological rationalizers.

There have been other developments in Orthodox theology; for example, in the nineteenth century, the influence of G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Schelling in Russia. But even in fairly personal systematizations this theology has remained faithful to its special character. It is not a simple intellectual exercise but a call to live in a personal way the truth revealed by Jesus Christ and proclaimed in the faith of the Orthodox church, which draws its life and inspiration from the Holy Spirit. Theoretical knowledge must be integrated with life experience and with prayer that is practiced as part of the church community and in its liturgical celebration.

The Latin fathers differ very little from the Greeks. However, beginning with Anselm and continuing throughout Scholasticism, a favorite formula of Augustine's became the motto for an exercise of reason in theology that is peculiar to the medieval West. In Augustine, reason and faith supply each other with nourishment within the unity of contemplation, in accordance with his formula: "Intellige ut credas, crede ut intelligas" ("Understand that you may believe, believe that you may understand"; *Sermons* 43.9). The second part of this formula has often been expressed by means of *Isaiah* 7:9: "Nisi credideritis non intelligetis" ("Unless you believe, you shall not understand"; Septuagint and Vulgate). Augustine himself focuses less on the duality of the two spheres than on the union of the two activities or ranges of activity in reaching the fullness of truth. For truth in itself is one. It exists in the triune God; it is to be found in the Wisdom of God that has come to us in sensible form in Jesus Christ. On our side, there is an *intelligere*, or knowing, that prepares for and nourishes faith, and an *intellectus*, or understanding, which is the fruit of a devout and loving faith that makes use of the resources and analogies supplied by nature and reaches the *intellectus fidei*, or understanding of faith, so that "what faith grasps the mind sees" (*On the Trinity* 15.27.49).

The *intellectus fidei* of Anselm (d. 1109) is not quite the same as that of Augustine. Anselm means a use of reason on the basis of faith ("I desire to gain some understanding of your truth which my heart believes and loves"), but reason, for him, has the power to discover at its own rational level the necessary connection that gives the truth of faith its objective coherence. That is what he means by understanding what we believe; this is true of the existence of God and it is true of redemption, which we can think out "as though we knew nothing about Christ."

The monastic theology of Bernard of Clairvaux, who was nineteen years old when Anselm died, is quite different in character: a theology of the spiritual struggle and of the life of mystical union as experienced in the cloister. However, from Anselm and the theologians at Bec came the initiatives, timid at first, that produced Scholasticism. Anselm of Laon was a disciple at Bec. He in turn had Abelard for a pupil, but the pupil was too gifted and too aware of his gifts to find satisfaction at Laon. Abelard inaugurated what became systematic theology and the dialectical method of bringing together opposed theses that call for a solution. This method of the *quaestio* (interrogation) was applied in commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*, which was to be the textbook for the teaching of theology down to the sixteenth century. The teaching was done in schools or universities and came to be known as "Scholasticism."

Scholastic theology had very great practitioners in Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas (both of whom died in 1274). Thomas's intention was to search out and express, with the help of analysis, the perceived order of things and reason, an order determined by God. That which revelation discloses to us provides the starting point, of course, but the Scholastic also had a fearless trust in the rational mind as trained in the school of Aristotle. Profound insights, rigorous arguments, honesty about the data, and sureness of Catholic sensibility have made Thomas the "Common Doctor" of the Catholic church. Following the Augustinian tradition, Bonaventure insisted more on the interior supernatural enlightenment and transformation that are necessary conditions for understanding sacred doctrine.

Although opposed to one another as realist and nominalist, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham in the fourteenth century were at one in criticizing the trust in speculative reason when this takes God and Christian realities for its object. Ockham marked the beginning of the *via moderna* which was introduced in the universities in the fifteenth century. The development of a theology marked by abundant discourse and nice distinctions led by way of reaction to spiritual currents and a mysticism that were unrelated to dogma (Thomas à Kempis, *Imitation of Christ*). But another and different current was also born: humanism with its cultivation of the ancient languages, its criticism of Scholasticism, its publication of texts that printing carried far and wide. Martin Luther (d. 1546) was heir to all three currents: Ockhamist voluntarism, mystical inwardness, and the textual resources of humanism. Nonetheless, he would mark a new beginning.

The Protestant Reformation led, in Catholic theology, to the development of a scholarly apologetics (e.g., the

Controversiae of Bellarmino, 1621); the criticisms of the *philosophes* likewise elicited an abundant apologetic production in the eighteenth century and down to the first third of the twentieth. Theology found itself faced with new activities of critical reason: history, science of religions, critical exegesis, psychology of religion. The serious urgency of the questions thus raised led to the modernist crisis. There had been creative minds that cultivated a healthy openness to modernity as well as close ties with tradition (Johann Adam Möhler, Matthias Joseph Scheeben, John Henry Newman), but the chief fruit of the Catholic restoration that the nineteenth century found necessary was a renewed scholasticism possessing little creativity. Once the modernist crisis was past, theology regained its vitality from a renewed sense of the church, a renewed contact with its own sources (Bible, Fathers, liturgy), and with the questions raised by twentieth-century thinkers (ecumenism, problems of unbelief, theology of liberation, and so on).

Luther began his Reformation with a reform of theology. In reaction to Scholasticism and Aristotle he eliminated philosophical concepts and expressed the religious relationship of salvation in biblical terms. The object of his theology is man as sinful and lost and God as the one who justifies and saves him; a "theology of the cross," not a theology of the inner ontology of God; a theology that draws its life not from a symbiotic relationship with metaphysics but from pure faith in the gospel of grace, which is consonant with the spirit of scripture. Luther himself did not compose a comprehensive systematic treatise. His disciples made up for the lack by their *loci communes*, or dogmatic expositions (Melancthon, 1531; Chemnitz, 1591; Gerhard, 1610–1625; Hutter, 1619). John Calvin produced his *Institutes of Christian Religion* as early as 1536, but he also commented on scripture daily. Protestant theology took the form of an exposition of what the church ought to be teaching in the light of its biblical norm and also in the light of the church's own past. Thus Luther and, to an even greater extent, Melancthon and Calvin, referred back to the Fathers and especially to the ancient symbols or creeds and the first four ecumenical councils.

Starting at the end of the sixteenth century, Lutherans reintroduced into theology the metaphysics of Aristotle along with that of Francisco Suárez. Seventeenth-century Lutheran orthodoxy was much like Catholic Scholasticism. In the eighteenth century, however, two divergent currents exercised their influence: Pietism, which expressed theology in terms of personal experience, and rationalism, which interpreted religion and God in terms of man and not of God and rejected the heteronomy involved in supernatural faith. An example

of this theology based solely on reason is Julius Wegscheider's *Institutiones theologiae Christianae dogmaticae* (Institutes of Christian Dogmatic Theology; 1815). The culture of the day had cut itself off from the faith as celebrated by the church. Some philosophers who had begun as theologians (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) treated religion as a branch of their philosophy. Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834) took up these challenges and ushered in a new era of Protestant theology. He asserted the originality of religion, which is not to be identified with either metaphysics or morality: "The essence of religion is neither speculation nor action, but intuition and feeling," and specifically the feeling of dependence, which constitutes our relation to God. Jesus Christ gave supreme expression to this feeling, and a community of believers took shape that found its origin in him. Theology, for Schleiermacher, is the sum total of scientific knowledge without which the life of the Christian community could not be ordered.

All subsequent Protestant schools of theology—the confessional, the orthodox, the liberal, as well as the contemporary restoration in the form of a return to the Reformers under the influence of Karl Barth (d. 1968)—have depended on Schleiermacher. Rejecting a simple description of what is believed and preached (*Glaubenslehre*), Barth began with the sovereignty of God's word understood as an act of God. The Bible as such is not the word of God, but only a testimony to the acts through which God spoke and ultimately to Jesus Christ, who is God's Word made flesh. The word can be received only in faith, which is the act by which God (the Holy Spirit who bears witness within us) enables us to understand when he speaks. This word has given rise in the course of history to the special community, the church, whose mission is to confess its faith in the word of God within the circumstances of the particular historical moment. At this point theology comes on the scene. Theology is the reflective critical act by which the church goes back over the word it speaks and the confession it makes of Jesus Christ; the purpose is to test the truthfulness of that word and confession, that is, their conformity to the word of God as attested in scripture. This theology has three parts: does the Christian word come from Christ? (biblical theology); does it lead to Christ? (practical theology); is it in conformity with Christ? (dogmatic theology).

The whole of Protestant theology is, of course, not reducible to Barth, and not all Protestant theologians accept his radicalism. Thus, while the pragmatism of William James (d. 1910) is not a genuine theology, the dogmatic theology of Emil Brunner (d. 1966) admits the validity in theology of a natural knowledge of God. There are even strict Calvinists in Holland, Scotland,

and France, who allow a value to a natural knowledge of God. Paul Tillich (d. 1965) sought to bridge the gap between the modern mentality or culture and Christianity by establishing a correlation between the ultimate questions raised by human beings and the ever new challenge of the word of God. His work elicited an enormous response.

Catholic theologians for their part carry on their work not only under the supervision of a teaching authority but also in the context of a fidelity and a continuity that is provided by a tradition developed through the centuries. Protestant theologians, on the other hand, are bound solely by the word of God and think under their own responsibility. They do, however, have the aid of the faithful witnesses who have gone before them and of their church's profession of faith. Many Protestant theologians work within a confessional dogmatics that derives its norms from the creedal documents and classical writings of their churches. In our time we find, for example, Werner Elert, Paul Althaus, and Edmund Schlink among the Lutherans, and Auguste Lecerf and G. G. Bekouwer in the Reformed church.

Since its beginnings Anglican theology has endeavored to integrate three tendencies and has been unwilling to abandon completely any one of them: a traditional and "Catholic" tendency (Fathers, liturgy, episcopate), a Protestant and Puritan tendency, and a rational and critical tendency (history; in extreme cases, certain "modernist" theses). One or other tendency may dominate in a given age or in a particular author but without excluding the other values and while endeavoring to remain in a *via media*. Thus a writer like Richard Hooker (d. 1600) resists the Calvinist tendency but rejects a number of Roman positions (papacy, transubstantiation) and remains closely associated with the political structure of the nation. After him it is the "Caroline divines" who are the classical authors of Anglo-Catholicism, which was revitalized in the nineteenth century by the Oxford Movement (1833–1845). In the interval, however, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been marked by a rational and liberal current of thought (Latitudinarianism), and then by the "evangelical" movement (John Wesley, Methodism). After 1860, rational criticism began to be heard, but this was also the time of the Oxford Movement and ritualism; the second half of the century saw the appearance of great scholars now classical in biblical and patristic studies. In the twentieth century, Anglican theology has focused chiefly on Christology, on the vital ecumenical questions of the day (church, ministry), and on the problems of modern society. On the whole, Anglican theology is a theology that always seeks a balanced outlook. It endeavors to express the realities of

Christian existence but without pressure from a Roman-style teaching authority.

The Practice of Theology. Theology is discourse through which believers develop and express the content of their faith as confessed in the church; to this end the theologian uses the resources of the culture and focuses on the questions asked by the mind of the time. This activity involves the theologian, who is first of all a believer, in a series of intellectual operations, such as those analyzed by Bernard Lonergan (d. 1984). The theologian's starting point is the witness given to God's revelation of the divine plan and mystery in the Bible, tradition, and the current life of the faithful; the theologian attempts to lay out, explain, and communicate the rich and complex content found in this witness. In addition to the labor required in handling the great mass of data, theologians face two major difficulties. (1) How are they to express supernatural mysteries when they have at their disposal only concepts and terms from our earthly experience? (2) How are they to overcome the dislocation between ancient testimonies that reflect histories and cultures no longer ours, and the needs and desires of our own day?

The answer to the first question is to be found in analogy. Certain terms contain an inherent imperfection and limitation: the Bible calls God a "rock," a "lion," a "fortress." These are metaphors expressing not the being of God but God's relation to us and the divine manner of acting. The Bible uses such language because it is concerned primarily with what God is *for us* and we for God. Other terms, however, do not inherently, or in their very notion (*ratio*), contain any imperfection, even though they exist only imperfectly in us: being, intelligence, wisdom, goodness, truth, substance, person, and so on. These terms are open to infinity. They can be applied to God, although we do not fully understand the nature of their existence in God. In the case of many of these concepts and terms, however, only positive revelation allows us to predicate them of God. Without revelation we would not have thought of applying to God such terms, for example, as *father*, *son*, and *generation* (for a discussion of this last, see Thomas's *Summa contra gentiles* 4.11).

The answer to the question concerning the dislocation of past and present is supplied by hermeneutics. This enables the theologian to express the meaning of a traditional statement in the language of the day and in response to present needs. But in the form hermeneutics takes today it is not restricted to the expressing of traditional statements in the language of contemporary culture and in response to its needs. Nor is theology a body of knowledge *organized* on the basis of an objectivist reading of the revealed "given" (scripture, dogma,

tradition); it is not what Dietrich Bonhoeffer criticized, even in Barth, as "revelational positivism." The act of theologizing is an act of interpretation that actualizes the meaning of revelation, the event that is Jesus Christ, and the church's experience, and makes these relevant to contemporary believers. The danger in this process is to introduce the subject into the object in such a way that we substitute our ideas and questions for those of God. Hermeneutics can turn into a way of evading the authority that imposes itself on the subject. Was there not something of this in certain of the moral and allegorical readings of scripture by the early Fathers? Texts, after all, intend to say something. A text is not simply a stimulus to an existential decision (the demythologization program of Rudolf Bultmann). And there are certain objective norms—dogma, the ecclesial community's profession of faith: "The living tradition whose agent is the interpreting community defines a hermeneutical field that excludes erroneous or arbitrary interpretations" (Claude Geffré). It is true, however, that the inheritance is open to rereadings which are not simply repetitions.

Theology as science. Theology claims the status of a science, and this claim is supported by its publications and its place among the university disciplines. Its status as a science is justified (1) because it has a specific object given to it by the foundational events of Christianity, which were historically real; and (2) because it employs a specific method for taking possession of this datum and organizing its complex content in a coherent intellectual way. This method, moreover, is not naive but critical, making use of the rational disciplines that study the religious fact: history, philology, critical exegesis, psychology, sociology, sociology of knowledge, and so forth. Theology is thus able to enter into competition with these disciplines, which, because they offer various interpretations of religious facts, are in danger of being reductionist. Theologians, however, must maintain the twofold fidelity of which I spoke above. They would cease to be theologians if they were to betray the originality of the faith, even as they employ the methods of other disciplines to analyze it. Theology may not, therefore, be reduced to a philosophy of religion. Contrary to David S. Adam, in his essay "Theology," philosophy of religion is not "the highest stage or form of theology" (*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hastings, vol. 12, 1921, p. 299). The philosophy of religion analyzes the religious fact and reflects on religious experience as thematized in religions. This is, after all, one area of human experience. The philosophy of religion may therefore have the same material object as theology. It differs from the latter, however, (1) because it does not consider the objects of

belief—the mysteries—as such, but studies religion as an activity, along with its conditions and the categories it uses, and (2) because it does not take revelation as a normative source of true propositions. On the other hand, unlike the science of religions or even religious psychology, the philosophy of religion is not purely descriptive. It studies the whole range of religious activity in order to discover the rational structures implied in it, examines these in a critical way, and sometimes strives to provide a critical justification of them. Theology goes further: it pursues its task while certain about the supernatural reality of what faith asserts.

Parts and forms of theology. Considered in its own proper nature, theology has some constituent parts. Materially, it includes various statements its object calls into being, for example, doctrines concerning the Trinity, Christology, the sacraments, ecclesiology, and Mariology. Formally it includes positive theology and speculative theology. Positive and speculative theology are two parts, or phases, that must not be separated but must rather be cultivated together. They incorporate the necessary appropriation of the “given” (the positive phase) by a scientifically competent study of the sources (scripture, monuments of tradition, magisterium, experience of the Christian people and of mankind generally) and the act of contemplation (the speculative phase) leading to the organization of a developed and communicable discourse.

Dogmatic theology and moral (or practical) theology are two different types of knowledge, but since no mystery is proposed for our belief except insofar as it is a source of salvation for us, the faith that seeks understanding (dogmatic theology) finds in this understanding the rules for our living (morality or ethics). In Protestant theology, practical theology includes what Catholics call pastoral theology, and even ecclesiology. In the fifteenth century, when Scholasticism was getting lost in purely logical or dialectical subtleties, writings on spiritual or mystical theology multiplied in isolation, being connected less with the mysteries than with spiritual experience. Pietism played a comparable role in seventeenth and eighteenth century Protestantism. The separation was not a fortunate one; it pointed to a lack of spiritual depth in scholastic methodology. Similarly, we must not distinguish or separate “kerygmatic theology”—the communication of the essential gospel message—from dogmatic theology, a position proposed in 1936 in Austria by Franz Lackner. There must certainly be a connection between knowledge and a life-giving communication of a message. This connection is the problem of the apostolate and may call for an output of adapted works of theology, but it must not be turned into a division of theology.

The term *negative theology* comes from the unknown author at the end of the fifth century who wrote under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius). *Apophatic theology* would be a better term. This is not a special theology but a way of respecting the “unknowableness of God” (which is the title of a work of John Chrysostom). In it positive statements are put negatively, as in the Chalcedonian christological definition: “a union without confusion, without separation.”

It is commonly assumed today that one person’s work can no longer embrace all areas of theology because theology has become so comprehensive and complex and requires such a variety of knowledge. We may think, however, of the work of Barth, Michael Schmaus, and others. It is even more legitimately acknowledged that theology can no longer claim to control the culture through an all-embracing body of knowledge, as it could do in the West in the thirteenth century. It might more accurately be said that a pluralism is required in a world that has grown complex and secularized and in which ideas are exchanged without any possible compartmentalization. It should be observed, however, that there has always been a pluralism in theology: Alexandria and Antioch; Augustinianism, Thomism, and Scotism; realism and nominalism; pietism and rationalism; liberalism and confessional tradition; and so on. Pluralism is valuable. It is a quality of unity itself, provided the unity involves plenitude and communion. Nevertheless, all theology is required to be faithful to the apostolic confession of faith.

Contemporary theology. In contemporary theology three dimensions or functions in particular are being developed.

1. In a world of secularized cultures, fundamental theology is being developed as a critical justification of the foundations of faith and therefore of theology. It has replaced the apologetics of a bygone time. Apologetics sought to provide rational proof of the suitability and existence of a revelation, and of the divine authority of the Roman Catholic magisterium. Fundamental theology, however, starts with the facts of the Christian message and shows its meaning and the way in which it meets the needs of the contemporary world. Christianity represents one existential possibility. We can see immediately that this approach is very close to the idea of theology as a hermeneutic and is subject to the danger, mentioned earlier, of giving too large a place to human subjectivity.

2. In dealing with contemporary men and women, theologians must take them in their real situations and with their real dimensions, and thus fundamental theology allies itself to a “political theology” (J.-B. Metz; Jürgen Moltmann). The latter seeks to overcome the

"privatization" characteristic of bourgeois religion and establish itself as critic of society in the name of suffering and the cross of Jesus Christ; in so doing it brings a message of hope and Christian eschatology. Latin American "theology of liberation" examines the situation of the poor, who are deprived of their rights and their dignity, and determines the "given" which is to serve as a starting point for rethinking God, Christology, and the church and its mission (Gustavo Gutiérrez). The practice of struggle becomes a matrix within which theological reflection develops. The same is true, with modifications, of the theologies directed to the liberation of all those who are oppressed or excluded from a place in history: black theology, African theology, feminist theology.

3. Ecumenism has its theological literature, its periodicals, its meetings, but it is above all a dimension of every vigorous theology today. The name "ecumenical theology" is given more specifically to a well-informed reflection on ecumenism and its purpose and methods, to a theological study of the World Council of Churches, or to the subject matter of a professorship in *Konfessionskunde*: the study of the Christian churches in their history, worship, theology, and life. It is no longer possible to theologize without taking account of ecumenical questions and of the contributions of all the churches, the theological originality of each, and the confessional life of each. As theology reexamines the sources of particular Christian beliefs and continues to develop in a pluralistic setting, it is becoming "meta-confessional"; chapters on particular subjects in works of theology are sometimes written by theologians from different churches. Closely associated with the ecumenical outlook is a critical attitude toward "dogmatism"—a dogmatic fundamentalism that has no sense of the historical development of dogmas.

All churches have their traditions. Many have norms for orthodoxy and the regulation of life. The work of the theologian is a specific ministry alongside the ordained or hierarchical pastoral ministry; it continues the ministry of the *didaskaloi*, the teachers, in the New Testament and the early church. The two ministries are subject to the same rule of apostolic faith and serve the same believing people and in the same world, but their tasks and responsibilities differ. Theologians are dedicated to research; they associate with intellectual and cultural innovators; they claim a legitimate freedom to be innovators themselves. The hierarchic pastors, who are responsible for keeping communities united in orthodox faith, intervene at times in the theologians' work, depending on the discipline of the various churches. Many churches have institutions and laws for settling such conflicts.

[On the philosophical background of early Christian thought, see Platonism and Neoplatonism. See also Philosophy, article on Philosophy of Religion, for further examination of the relation of Christian theology and philosophy. For discussion of particular currents of Christian thought, see Scholasticism; Humanism; Reformation; Enlightenment, The; Modernism, article on Christian Modernism; Neoorthodoxy; and Political Theology. Details concerning particular theological issues are discussed in Atonement, article on Christian Concepts; Attributes of God, article on Christian Concepts; Canon Law; Christian Ethics; Church; Councils, article on Christian Councils; Creeds, article on Christian Creeds; Free Will and Predestination, article on Christian Concepts; Dogma; Ecumenical Movement; various articles under God; Gospel; Grace; Heresy, article on Christian Heresies; History, article on Christian Views; Icons; Jesus; Justification; Mary; Merit, article on Christian Concepts; Proofs for the Existence of God; and Trinity. For discussion of distinctive theological positions in various branches of the Christian church, see Eastern Christianity; Roman Catholicism; Protestantism; and related articles on particular churches, orders, and denominations. See also the biographies of particular theologians and philosophers mentioned herein.]

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Translated from French by Matthew J. O'Connell

THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. In 1875, a group that included the Russian aristocrat H. P. Blavatsky, the American lawyer and journalist Colonel Henry S. Olcott, and W. Q. Judge, also a lawyer, inaugurated the Theosophical Society in New York City. The brilliant, witty Blavatsky, who claimed to have highly developed psychic powers, remained the spiritual head of the movement until her death in 1891. Olcott was the author of books on agriculture and insurance. He became the society's president upon Blavatsky's death and remained so until his own death in 1907. Judge later became vice-president of the society and the first head of the American section.

In 1879, Olcott and Blavatsky moved to India, where they traveled extensively and gathered followers from both the European and native communities. In 1882, they bought property at Adyar, near Madras, where the international headquarters of the society is still located. Olcott became a Buddhist and traveled throughout Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), where he spearheaded a movement to revive Buddhism. Olcott and the Theosophical Society founded Ananda College and several other Buddhist schools, and, for this, Olcott is still considered a saint and national hero in Sri Lanka. After visiting and lecturing widely in Southeast Asia and Japan, he compiled a Buddhist "catechism" for the purpose of adumbrating the essentials of that faith, which could be adopted by conflicting Buddhist factions.

As the international society grew, with its headquarters in India, national sections (with their own officers and bylaws) began to spring up. The first was formed in the United States in 1886, followed by one in England in 1888, in India in 1891, and in Australia in 1895. By the 1880s, two future leaders had joined the society: C. W. Leadbeater, an Anglican clergyman who worked with Olcott in Ceylon and also in India, and Annie Besant, a well-known freethinker and social reformer who turned to theosophy and who traveled widely for the society, lecturing to audiences in Europe, the United States, Australia, and India. She became president of the society upon Olcott's death in 1907, and she remained so until her death in 1933. Besant and Leadbeater produced a body of popular theosophical literature during a period of worldwide expansion when

dozens of new national sections came into being, including many in Latin America.

The society presented a worldview that integrated science, religion, and philosophy. Its teachings drew from great religious and philosophical classics of the East—many of which were new to Westerners, and relatively unexplored by them—as well as from Western sources. The society's objectives are (1) "to form a nucleus of the universal brotherhood of humanity, without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or color"; (2) "to encourage the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science"; and (3) "to investigate the unexplained laws of nature and the powers latent in man."

Because of the society's stand on brotherhood, the international headquarters at Adyar became one of the few places in colonial India where all races, faiths, and religions could live together. Later, Besant established small temples of the world's religions on this property, a gesture that made Adyar a focal point for the meeting of East and West. This example of brotherhood was duplicated by the society in many other nations, and it succeeded in attracting new members.

Since the 1930s, the society has progressed quietly, and today there are branches throughout much of the world. The Theosophical Society has been parent to several other organizations: the best known are the United Lodge of Theosophy; the Point Loma Theosophical Society; the Anthroposophical Society, which was founded by Rudolf Steiner; and the Arcane School, which was founded by Alice Bailey. By 1975, there were scores of groups and organizations that drew on theosophical literature and espoused some of its principles. Blavatsky's seminal work *The Secret Doctrine* (1889) remains an important source of esoteric philosophy. Recognition of the principle of brotherhood and the equality of races has spread widely, as has cross-fertilization of Eastern and Western thought. The unification of science with religion and philosophy has become a goal for other modern thinkers.

Theosophists believe that theosophy's spread is due to the universality of its fundamental propositions, which embody a worldview and a vision of human self-transformation:

1. The universe and all that exists within it are one interrelated and interdependent whole.
2. Every existent being—from atom to galaxy—is rooted in the same universal, life-creating Reality. This Reality is all-pervasive and reveals itself in the purposeful, ordered, and meaningful processes of nature, as well as in the deepest recesses of the mind and spirit.
3. Recognition of the unique value of every living being

expresses itself in reverence for life, compassion for all, sympathy with the need of all individuals to find truth for themselves, and respect for all religious traditions.

In accord with these principles, the Theosophical Society attempts to direct individuals to the source of unity beyond all differences.

[See also *Anthroposophy and the biographies of Besant, Blavatsky, and Steiner.*]

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THEOSOPHY is a part of a broader religious phenomenon known as esotericism. In the strict sense, the word *esotericism* refers to a gnosis that offers the individual enlightenment and salvation through a knowledge of the bonds that are believed to unite him to the world of divine or intermediary spirits. [See *Esotericism*.] Theosophy in particular is concerned primarily with the knowledge of the hidden mysteries of divinity. By extension, it also deals with the universe as related to God, as well as to man. Thus one may speak of esotericism in the broad sense as being enriched by a theosophical dimension.

History of the Term. Etymologically, *theosophia* means "wisdom of God." The word appears in works of several church fathers, both Greek and Latin, as a synonym for *theology*. This is only natural, since *sophia* means at once knowledge, doctrine, and wisdom. The *sophos* is a sage, the *theosophoi* are literally "those who know divine matters," and are not necessarily theologians. It would be interesting to examine systematically all the uses of this word by religious authors from the beginning of Christianity to the Renaissance. During that time it occasionally departed from the meaning of its synonym *theologia*, as this term is understood today. It was distinguished by its reference to a gnostic kind of knowledge (which must not be confused with the gnosticism of the early centuries of the common era). It is in this sense that Dionysius the Areopagite used the word

in the sixth century. It was used even more plainly in the thirteenth century, in the *Summa philosophiae*, a work once attributed to Robert Grosseteste, and probably written by someone from his milieu. This author distinguishes between the philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Rushd, etc.), the moderns (Alexander of Hales, Albert of Cologne), the theosophists (all authors inspired by holy books), and the theologians (those whose task it is to teach theosophy, i.e., Dionysius the Areopagite, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Origen, et al.). In the works of other contemporary authors the concept remained equally fluid. It was not until the Renaissance that the word came into more frequent use, but it was at that point still more or less synonymous with *theology* or *philosophy*. Johannes Reuchlin, who made important contributions to the spread of the Christian Qabalah at the beginning of the sixteenth century, spoke of *theosophistae* in designating decadent scholastics, and was followed in this usage by Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa. Charles Du Cange, in his *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis* (1678), reported that at that period *theosophia* meant simply *theologia*. Thus the *Theosophia* of Johannes Arboreus (Alabri), published in several volumes from 1540 to 1553, did not have a word to say about esotericism.

The word was clearly defined at the beginning of the seventeenth century, perhaps under the influence of the *Arbatel*, a book of white magic that appeared around 1550 or 1560 and circulated widely. In this work the word acquired its current meaning. From that time on it appeared in the works of other important authors, such as Heinrich Khunrath's *De igne*, Oswald Croll's *Basilica chymica*, and, above all, the writings of Jakob Boehme. At the end of the eighth chapter of his *De signatura rerum*, in paragraph 56, responding to those who reproach him for confusing nature with God, and thus for being "pagan," Boehme points out that he is not speaking of nature ruled by the *spiritus mundi*, but of another nature, the interior Word, or Mercury, and comments: "I write not as a pagan, but as a theosophist." The word also appears in the title given to a book by Valentin Weigel published in Neustadt in 1618, thirty years after its author's death, under the title *Libellus theosophiae: Ein Büchlein der göttlichen Weisheit*.

As these examples show, the word *theosophy* acquired its distinctive meaning at a time when the subject to which it refers was taking its definitive form in Germany. This moment coincided with the height of German Baroque literature, and literary historians have consequently tended to associate theosophy with the Baroque. It also coincided with the beginning of the Rosicrucian movement in the early seventeenth century. From that time on, and throughout the seventeenth cen-

tury, the word was used frequently, as, for instance, in the works of Johann Georg Gichtel and Gottfried Arnold, both theosophists. During this same period, it was often found in conjunction with the term *pansophy*, a word very much in vogue in Rosicrucian and Paracelsian circles. As defined by Will-Erich Peuckert, *pansophy* refers to a knowledge of divine things that is acquired by deciphering the "signatures," or hieroglyphs, of the concrete universe, conceived of as the "book" of nature. This "book" aids one's understanding of scripture and of God himself. The word *theosophy* is properly reserved for the reverse process, that of acquiring knowledge of the universe through one's knowledge of God. In practice, however, and especially from the beginning of the eighteenth century on, the word *theosophy* was applied to the pansophic approach as well.

In the eighteenth century, the word and concept of *theosophy* entered the vocabulary of philosophy and came into widespread use. The two most important theosophical works from the beginning of the century were the widely influential *Theophilosophia theoretica et practica* (1710) of Sincerus Renatus, and the *Opus magocabalisticum et theosophicum* (1721) of Georg von Welling, both German. Franciscus Buddeus recorded the word in his *Isagoge* (Leipzig, 1727), and the pastor Johann Jakob Brucker dedicated a long chapter to theosophy (*De theosophiis*) in his monumental *Historica critica philosophiae*, published in Latin in Leipzig in 1741. Brucker's history included all the theosophists; he seems to have forgotten no one. Through his work, the term *theosophy* received its official consecration in the world of letters, since Brucker remained the standard reference in the history of philosophy through the Enlightenment. Few authors, even among the esotericists themselves, did more to make theosophy known, although Brucker was not himself theosophically inclined.

On the whole, the word is absent from the great French dictionaries of the Enlightenment. It is not to be found in Antoine Furetière's *Dictionnaire universelle*, nor in the editions of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie*, nor in Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire*. It merits a brief mention in the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux* (1704). With the great *Encyclopédie* of Denis Diderot, however, things were different. In the copious article "Théosophes," which he himself wrote, Diderot quotes long passages from Brucker, though without citing his source. Occasionally he misinterprets the material, something that his practice of free translation cannot entirely excuse. While his French is much more elegant and charming than Brucker's awkward Latin, the content is more superficial. Diderot wavers between sympathy and scorn.

Despite his attraction to some of theosophy's advocates, he himself can hardly be said to have had a theosophical mind. Nevertheless, his article gave the word *theosophie* a permanent place in the French language. Although it continued to be used for some time in other senses, as for example by Immanuel Kant in his criticism of such philosophers as Nicolas de Malebranche, this mattered little. The meaning established by Diderot served from then on as the prevailing literary norm. An element of confusion reappeared only in 1875, when H. P. Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society, which bears only a distant relationship to traditional theosophy. Unfortunately, one usually thinks of that movement when the word *theosophy* is used today. [See *Theosophical Society and the biography of Blavatsky*.]

Theosophical Hermeneutics and Mythic Discourse.

Let us return to our initial concern: the place of theosophy within the broader context of esotericism. Fundamental to both theosophy and esotericism is a hermeneutic, or method of interpretation, applied to the forms of divine revelation. This method of interpretation combines an intellectual or speculative approach, based on the analogical and homological principles that relate man and the universe to God, with a dependence on divine revelation, received through inner enlightenment. In the case of theosophy, this form of interpretation may be aimed at an understanding of the inner mysteries of the divinity itself (theosophy in the narrow sense), or at an understanding of these mysteries as they are related to the created universe (theosophy in the broad sense, which is our topic here).

The theosophist always starts with a specific revelation, for instance a myth such as the story of creation at the beginning of *Genesis*. To this he applies his active imagination, in an effort to draw forth from it a stream of symbolic resonances. He attempts to penetrate the mysteries of the universe and of the bonds that unite it with man and with the divine world. Similar to gnosis, understood as a way of individual salvation, the idea of such theosophical penetration involves an aspect of "interiority." Here, however, it is a matter of descending not only into oneself but also into the depths of God and of the universe. These two movements are harmoniously interrelated. According to Boehme, the deity in his depths "rests in himself"; that is, he remains in his absolute transcendence, while at the same time going out of himself. God is "a hidden treasure aspiring to become known." He makes himself known by dividing himself within an ontological sphere situated between our created world and the divine, unknowable world. This sphere is the scene of the encounter between God and creature, the place where God reveals himself to

man, in accord with the latter's capacities. At the same time, the created world itself comes into being in order to provide a place for divine manifestation.

The theosophist inquires into the hidden meaning of the ciphers or hieroglyphs of nature. This quest necessarily remains inseparable from an intuitive immersion in the myth to which he adheres by his faith and active imagination, and on which he bases his investigation. At times he starts from a reflection on the things of this world, in order to rise up to an understanding of God—the attitude sometimes called “pansophic.” At other times he begins by trying to comprehend the becoming of the divine world. He asks not whether God is (*an sit Deus*), but rather what God is (*quid sit Deus*), so as to attain an inner vision of the principle that underlies the universe and its becoming, and confers upon it its intelligibility. The aspects of myth that he naturally emphasizes are often those that the established churches have a tendency to neglect or to pass over in silence: the nature of the Fall of Lucifer and of Adam, the androgyny of Adam, sophiology, arithmosophy, and so forth. He believes in a continuing revelation of which he himself is the object, and his words give the impression that he receives not only inspiration, but knowledge as well. He places each concrete observation within a total system that is nonetheless indefinitely open, resting always upon the triad of origin, present state, and last things, that is, upon a cosmogony (tied to a theogony and an anthropogony), a cosmology, and an eschatology. Paul seems to have justified this active and operative inquiry when he wrote that “the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God” (*1 Cor. 2:10*). For the theosophist, as for the gnostic in general, any increase in knowledge is accompanied by a change in being, a process that seem happily inevitable as he plays out the theogonic and cosmic dramas, and mimes the spirits and the elements. He believes the words that he utters, the speech that he shapes, to be not his own but rather the work of an angel, who uses him as a mouthpiece. It is in his choice of images and in the form of his speech that one can detect its actual origin. For him this speech is not so much a matter of inventing or discovering as it is of remembering, since ignorance is a prime consequence of the Fall. The theosophist dedicates his energy to inventing (in the word's original sense of “discovering”) the articulation of all things visible and invisible, by examining both divinity and nature in the smallest detail.

In the so-called Archaic epoch of Greece, when *muthos* and *logos* were as yet one, mythology evoked a sacred tale of gods and heroes. Yet little by little, *logos* came to prevail over *muthos*, philosophy over my-

thology, with a consequent loss of significant levels of meaning. Contemporary hermeneutics has recovered the plurality of meanings to be found in myth, but the theosophical approach goes further. It does not rest content with mere translation. It progressively deepens a speech that desires to express only itself. The revealed narrative upon which it is based is retraced and relived, lest it be dissipated in abstract concepts. Thus theosophy, although in the shadows, has always come to the aid of theology when it risked becoming bogged down at a purely conceptual level. For Boehme, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Franz von Baader, and other theosophists, every concept awaits its reinterpretation in and through a *muthos-logos*, within which the concept, stripped of its privileged status, functions only as a methodological and provisional tool. It is the symbol, much more than the concept, that assures the grasp of a mythic experience. Every myth, if it is complete (i.e., if it comprises the above-mentioned triad), is by definition a narrative of origins. It tells of events that occurred *in illo tempore*, as Mircea Eliade has demonstrated. It establishes the ritual acts that are indispensable to man in establishing a rapport with the universe.

The theosophist reveals the “natural tableau of the bonds that unite God, man, and the universe,” in the phrase of Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin. He exploits the exploratory range of the mythic story by unveiling the infinite richness of its symbolic function, a richness that makes it possible to live in the world as in a “forest of symbols” (in Victor Turner's phrase). Symbols, then, are the key tools in theosophical interpretation, as distinguished from allegories, since this interpretation is not a matter of seeking some meaning beyond the story that the images themselves express, a meaning that could then be expressed in some other kind of language. The theosophist returns ceaselessly to the latent meaning of the book of nature, a meaning that only the book itself can reveal, in cooperation with the Spirit. The theosophist links the origin to the end, theogony (indeed, anthropogony) to eschatology; to these dimensions, he then adds the further dimension of cosmology (here called cosmosophy), which is the unceasing reflection on the different levels of material and spiritual nature. Thus human existence is grasped as a totality, a totality that gives life—and history—its orientation and its meaning.

Theological Perspectives. Like prophecy, but in a somewhat different way, the purpose of theosophy is to amplify revelation. Christian revelation in particular lends itself to amplification. Does not the *Gospel of Luke* begin with the words “Inasmuch as many have undertaken to compile a narrative of the things which have

been accomplished among us . . .”? In the Judaic tradition, the function of *midrash* is to actualize revelation by interpreting it in relation to the present. Christianity retains, as an inherent necessity of its nature, this need for a continued revelation, for although definitive in essentials (*Heb.* 10:12–14), it of necessity remains partially veiled and apophatic. Revelation remains open to prophetic elucidation, and here theosophy too has a role to play. Both the prophet and the theosophist enter into an ever-deepening understanding of the mystery at the core of the religious experience; this mystery is not an insoluble enigma, nor a problem to be solved once and for all, but a message offered as a support for endless meditation.

One could say that there are two complementary kinds of theology. The first is the teaching of the church, or of a church, concerning revealed truth. This is the most accepted definition of what the established churches teach. Yet there is also another kind of theology, one that corresponds to the attempt to acquire the knowledge (gnosis) of the immense domain of reality within which the work of salvation takes place. This is a knowledge that pertains to the structure of the physical and spiritual worlds, to the forces at work within them, and to relations that these forces maintain among themselves (microcosm and macrocosm), to the history of their transformations, and to the relationships among God, man, and the universe. It is a domain that deserves to be explored, for the glory of God and for the well-being of one's self and one's neighbor. Its exploration responds to the call to make fruitful use of one's talents (*Mt.* 25:14–15). In Christianity, there have indeed been fathers and theologians, such as Bonaventure, who were inclined to take a theosophical approach to nature. The deciphering of the “signature of things” constitutes one of the two complementary directions open to theology. In this light, the theosophist can be seen as a theologian of the sacred scripture called the universe.

In characterizing the theosophist's understanding of the universe, one can distinguish, as does Valentin Tomberg, two approaches, each based on the idea of universal correspondence. There is, first of all, a theosophy dealing with temporal bonds, which focuses on mythological symbolism. Mythological symbols express the correspondences between archetypes in the past and their manifestations in time. For example, the nature of Adam's sin, the Fall of Adam and Eve, and their original glorious state, can occasion a theosophical interpretation of man as he is now, and of the task that he is called upon to perform, namely the redemption of nature. A myth of this genre is thus an expression of an eternal idea in the framework of time and history.

There is, on the other hand, a theosophy dealing with space and its structure, and which focuses on typological symbolism. This deals essentially with the central element of the theosophical triad mentioned above (theogony-cosmogony, cosmosophy, and eschatology). It is concerned with the symbols that connect the prototypes from on high with their manifestations below. The vision of Ezekiel (*Ez.* 1), for example, expresses a typological symbolism that implies a universal cosmological revelation. The type of Jewish Qabbalah called Merkavah, or the mystic way of the chariot, is based entirely on this vision. The author of the *Zohar*, for instance, sees in the living creatures and the wheels described by Ezekiel a set of symbolic images that are interpreted as a key to cosmic knowledge. These two modes of theosophical approach, the one through mythological symbolism and the other through typological symbolism, can usually be found together in the work of a theosophist.

The revelations described by the theosophists can give the impression of “objectifying in a macrocosm that which occurs in the individual psyche astray from God.” This is the reason why, as Pierre Deghaye points out, the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach reduced theosophy to the status of “esoteric psychology.” Deghaye, however, prefers to see in it, especially as represented by Boehme, “a veritable depth psychology.” He does this without passing judgment on the objective reality of that to which the Boehmian revelations refer. Certainly it is to be admitted that there is, among theosophists, an alliance of desire and concept. Because of this, some mystics have seen theosophy as too scientific, while adherents of a pure objective rationality have dismissed the theosophical philosophers of nature—in the romantic sense of *Naturphilosophie*—as too mystical. In either case, they are thought to be people whose words reveal at best only the movements at work in their own unconscious. And yet such studies continue to the present day and should be given their due. They embrace the possibility of a co-naturality between our spirit and the universe—the notion that certain of our images effectively reflect the hidden structures of the universe, and that the great founding myths are bearers of essential knowledge. The theosophical outlook can prove extraordinarily valuable by counterbalancing dualism and ideologies of every sort. Theosophy does not seek to go beyond man, nor transform him into anything other than what he is. It only reminds him of what his true powers are, and tries to make him open to them. It teaches that nothing is ultimately accomplished by seeking to ascend to heaven while scorning earth; and, conversely, that to be satisfied with the descent of the gods without seeking to visit with them on Olympus is

equally flawed. *Anabasis* and *katabasis*, like Castor and Pollux, are indissociable and complementary. It is the task of theosophy to make of the fragmented and isolated "multiverse" a coherent universe, a world bearing meaning within a living diversity.

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Translated from French by Paul C. Duggan

THERAVĀDA. The term *Theravāda Buddhism* refers, first, to a "school" and closely related "orientations" within the history of Buddhist monasticism and, second, to forms of Buddhist religious, political, and social life in various Buddhist countries. Although these two aspects of Theravāda Buddhism must be distinguished, they overlap and interact in various ways at different points in Theravāda history. In the present article, the specifically monastic aspects will receive priority, but reference will be made to the civilizational dimension as well.

What is the best way to identify the school and the related orientations that should appropriately be considered under the Theravāda rubric? This is a very difficult question, and there is no answer that proves appropriate in all circumstances. For our purposes, however, the following characterization may be helpful. The Theravāda school and orientations within Buddhist monasticism are those that have been self-consciously identified with the "Way of the Elders" (Skt., *Sthaviravāda*; Pali, *Theravāda*) and have maintained Pali as the language in which they have preserved what they hold to be the authentic teaching of the Buddha. Within the larger divisions of the Buddhist community, the Theravāda is the sole surviving member of the so-called Eighteen Schools, the eighteen (by traditional reckoning) *nikāyas* that together made up what its detractors would come to call Hīnayāna Buddhism, the "lesser vehicle" to salvation. With the other Hīnayāna schools,

the Theravāda shares a soteriology centered around the figure of the *arahant* (Skt., *arhat*), forms of community life strictly regulated by the Vinaya, or code of monastic conduct, and a canon that rejects the authenticity of the Mahāyāna *sūtras*. [See *Arhat and Vinaya*.] Theravāda remains today, as it has been for nearly a thousand years, the dominant Buddhist tradition in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.

Once this way of identifying the scholastic expressions and orientations of Theravāda Buddhism has been established, the identification of Theravāda forms of Buddhist civilization is much easier. Quite simply, Theravāda forms of Buddhist civilization are those that have been strongly influenced by the Theravāda school (including its conceptions and prescriptions relevant to society as a whole as well as to the monastic community) and heavily supported by Theravāda monks.

The recognition of these two dimensions of Theravāda Buddhism, and the specification of very general criteria for identifying each of them, does not resolve the very serious problems involved in generating an adequate historical description. It does, however, establish parameters that will facilitate the discussion.

Origins and Early Development

Theravāda Buddhism, like other forms of Buddhism, had its origin in the life of the early Buddhist community. However, during the earliest stages of Buddhist development schools had not yet crystallized in any formal sense. Although the claim to represent the earliest Buddhism is doctrinally important, none of the schools that developed later can be considered, on the basis of purely historical scholarship, to be the sole inheritor and preserver of the original form of Buddhist teaching and practice.

The First Centuries. We know that not longer than 110 years after the death of the Buddha the different emphases that existed within the earliest community culminated in a major schism. The school known as the Mahāsāṃghika ("those of the great assembly") was more populist in its attitude toward doctrinal matters, disciplinary practices, and modes of communal organization. By contrast, the Sthaviravāda school was more conservative in its approach to doctrine and practice and was more hierarchical in its patterns of community life.

Although a Theravāda tradition using Pali as its sacred language probably existed in the earliest days, its differentiation from other related traditions at this point was still quite nascent. The preferences for versions of the received tradition according to language or dialect were, as far as we know, not yet correlated with particular differences in doctrinal or practical orienta-

tion. Nor had the issues that later led to the more refined scholastic divisions been formulated in any hard and fast way.

Similarly, it is impossible to identify "Buddhist civilization," much less its Theravāda form, during the first centuries of Buddhist history. This is not to say that the Buddhist tradition generally, and the Theravādins in particular, did not have civilizational aspirations. From texts dating to this period, it seems clear that they did. But at this point the opportunity for implementation had not yet arisen.

Aśoka and After. By the period of the reign of Aśoka (third century BCE) the initial division of the Buddhist community into those of the "Great Assembly" and those of the "Way of the Elders" had subdivided further. Exactly how many groups existed, what range of languages or dialects were used to preserve their Master's teachings, and how sharply these groups were divided remains problematic. But according to Theravāda accounts dating from at least the fourth century CE, Aśoka himself sponsored a council that clarified the major differences.

According to these later accounts, Aśoka requested that a Buddhist council be held under the leadership of his monastic preceptor, a Theravāda monk named Moggaliputtatissa. At this council, the Theravādins claim to have bested their opponents in heated debates on numerous disputed issues. Not only was the Third Council supposed to have upheld the Theravādins' orthodoxy but also to have resulted in the expulsion of the defeated heretics from the *saṃgha* (Pali, *saṅgha*), or monastic order. The lack of corroboration from non-Theravāda sources casts doubt on the ecumenical character of the Third Council; however, most scholars accept that some sort of council was held. [See the biography of Moggaliputtatissa.]

Further Theravāda accounts record that Aśoka sponsored Buddhist missions that traveled beyond the frontiers of his considerable empire. These accounts date the founding of the Theravāda school in Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka to Aśoka's missions to Suvaṇṇabhūmi (i.e., Southeast Asia) and Tambapaṇṇi (i.e., Sri Lanka), respectively. Aśoka's Pillar Edicts corroborate only that he sponsored the mission to Tambapaṇṇi. Other inscriptional evidence, however, supports the chronicles' accounts about a mission to Himavanta (typically identified with the Himalayan areas), whereas again the Pillar Edicts are silent. Therefore, the chronicles' accounts about a mission to Suvaṇṇabhūmi may well be accurate.

There is no substantial reason to doubt that by Aśoka's time the Theravādins formed a distinctive group within the Buddhist *saṅgha*. They preserved the teach-

ings of the Buddha in Pali through their oral tradition; by the Third Buddhist Council or shortly thereafter, the Theravādins held their own positions on specific points of doctrine and practice. They also actively contributed to the Buddhist missionary activity during the third and second centuries BCE. It may nevertheless be premature to speak of Theravāda's influence as having achieved civilizational scale apart from its role within the Indian *saṅgha* as a whole. During the centuries that followed Aśoka's death, the Theravāda tradition continued to spread its influence in India, but as one school among many (eighteen is the traditional number given). Specific information remains scanty. [See also the biography of Aśoka.]

Sri Lanka and the Dhammadīpa Tradition. In Sri Lanka, however, the situation was quite different. Within this distinctive provincial area, Theravāda traditions became firmly established and prospered. The Pali chronicles compiled and preserved by the Sinhala monks, inscriptions, and extensive archaeological remains make it possible to reconstruct a comparatively full picture of Theravāda Buddhism in the Sri Lanka of the first century BCE.

For example, the Pali chronicle written in fifth-century Sri Lanka and known as the *Mahāvamsa* (Great Chronicle) records the momentous decision to commit the Theravāda canon, preserved and transmitted for centuries by oral tradition, to writing. According to the *Mahāvamsa*, between the years 29 and 17 BCE Sri Lanka was threatened by foreign invasion and famine, and the Theravāda monks feared that the monastic community would be dispersed and the oral tradition broken and lost. In an effort to prevent this, they gathered together and committed to writing the Tipiṭaka (Skt., Tripiṭaka; "three baskets"), that is, the Buddhist canon. As a result, this aspect of the tradition was solidified in a basic form that has remained largely intact through Theravāda history.

The first two Piṭakas, or "baskets," are the Sutta Piṭaka, which contains sermons, discourses, and sayings attributed to the Buddha, and the Vinaya Piṭaka, which contains stories about the Buddha that introduce rules concerning the conduct for monks and nuns and the proper functioning of the monastic order. These two baskets comprise many strata of traditions ranging in dates from the time of the Buddha himself up to at least the time of Aśoka. Most of the material that they contain is present also in the traditions preserved by other Buddhist schools in various forms of Prakrit and Sanskrit, sometimes in slightly different form and often much embellished.

However, in the case of the third Piṭaka, called the Abhidhamma, or "Higher Teaching," the situation is

quite different. Here we have a collection of seven compositions, each unique to the Theravāda school. These seven compositions represent a relatively late scholastic formulation, compiled possibly during the Aśokan or early post-Aśokan period. Together they present and summarize Buddhist teachings in a systematic form that differentiates Theravāda scholasticism from that of the other schools that were developing during the same period. This Theravāda distinctiveness is perhaps most explicitly expressed in the *Kathāvatthu*, an Abhidhamma text attributed to Moggaliputtatissa and associated with the Third Council. In this forensic and polemic text over two hundred Theravāda positions are defended against opposing doctrines. For example, the doctrine of *anatta* ("no-self") is defended against an opponent who asserts the existence of some kind of continuing personal entity (a view usually associated with the Pudgaḷavāda school); the doctrine of *anicca* (momentariness) is defended against an opponent who affirms the existence of past, present, and future times (a view usually associated with the Sarvāstivāda school); and the attainments of the *arahants* (Skt., *arhats*; fully perfected saints) are defended against opponents who questioned their perfection (a view associated most often, but not exclusively, with the Mahāsāṃghikas).

There is strong evidence to suggest that before the beginning of the common era an extensive tradition of commentaries on many portions of the Pali Tipiṭaka already existed in the Sinhala vernacular. To what extent the original forms of these commentaries were brought to Sri Lanka by the legendary missionaries of Aśokan times is unclear. Nor can we be sure to what extent these commentaries were composed in India in Pali and subsequently translated into Sinhala and to what extent they were actually composed or adapted in Sri Lanka. Since none of these commentaries has survived in its early Sinhala form, the contents cannot be determined with certainty. We know only that before the beginning of the common era a significant corpus of Tipiṭaka commentaries, preserved in Sinhala, formed an integral component of the Theravāda tradition in Sri Lanka.

By this time, too, Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka had become a civilizational religion. It may be, as the later chronicles maintain, that the civilizational character dates to the time of the Aśokan missionaries to Sri Lanka. Said to have been the son of Aśoka, the monk named Mahinda (Skt., Mahendra) supposedly succeeded in his missionary goal of establishing the Theravāda lineage in Sri Lanka and converting the Sinhala king, Devānaṃpiyatissa. Shortly thereafter, according to the texts, Aśoka's daughter, the nun Sanghamittā, brought to Sri Lanka the ordination lineage for women. King

Devānaṃpiyatissa is credited with founding the famous Mahāvihāra monastery, which not only encompassed the king's capital within its boundaries, but later housed the monks who authored the chronicles that we now possess.

Another possible point for the emergence of Theravāda as a civilizational religion is the reign of the Sinhala hero, King Duṭṭhagāmaṇī (r. 161–137 BCE). According to the fifth-century *Mahāvamsa* account (whose preeminent hero is Duṭṭhagāmaṇī, as opposed to the fourth-century *Dīpavaṃsa* account, whose hero is Devānaṃpiyatissa), Duṭṭhagāmaṇī sought to evict the South Indians who had established their hegemony in northern Sri Lanka. While still a prince he organized a campaign in which the struggle to establish centralized rule and the struggle to establish Theravāda Buddhism as the "national" religion became closely identified. With the victory of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī and his construction of the Mahāthūpa (a funerary mound that enshrined relics of the Buddha and formed a key monument within the Mahāvihāra's monastic complex) in the capital of Anurādhapura, the civilizational character of Theravāda found a powerful vehicle of expression. Certainly, by the end of the first century BCE, after the Pali scriptures had been committed to writing, the Theravāda ideal of Sri Lanka as the Dhammadiipa, the "Island of the Dhamma," seemed well-developed not only in Sri Lankan religious and political institutions, but in Sinhala identity as well. [See the biography of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī.]

Theravāda Buddhism in Greater India

The history of Theravāda Buddhism in India and Southeast Asia during the first millennium CE continues to be extremely obscure. We know that Theravādins held sway in a number of important Buddhist centers in India, especially in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. And we also know that several of the most famous Theravāda scholars were of Indian origin and, among these, some did their primary work in Indian monasteries.

In Southeast Asia, specifically among the Burmese of Lower Burma and the Mon peoples of Lower Burma and Thailand, the Theravāda tradition became firmly rooted and exerted a significant civilizational influence. Later legends trace the founding of this tradition to Soṇa and Uttara, the two missionaries reportedly dispatched to Suvannabhūmi by Moggaliputtatissa. The first archaeological evidence of Buddhism's presence has been found along inland and coastal trade routes, and dates to early in the first millennium CE. In Lower Burma inscriptions have been found that confirm a preeminent Theravāda presence in Pyu/Burmese royal

centers beginning from the fifth century CE, and some sort of Theravāda influence is attested in Pagan somewhat later. In Thailand, similar evidence indicates that the Theravāda tradition was an important, perhaps central, religious element in the Mon civilization of Dvāravatī that flourished over a wide area of central, northern, and northeastern Thailand from the sixth to the eleventh century. Such sources notwithstanding, information concerning the kind or kinds of Theravāda Buddhism that existed among the Burmese and Mon is virtually nonexistent. Moreover, there is little data that illumines the relationship between the various Theravāda traditions and the other schools—notably other Hīnayāna schools that used Sanskrit as their sacred language—that were also very influential throughout the mainland areas of Southeast Asia.

In Sri Lanka, literary and archaeological remains provide many more details regarding local Theravāda history. According to fifth-century chronicle accounts, the first major division within the Theravāda *sangha* in Sri Lanka occurred soon after the Pali Tipiṭaka was committed to writing, probably between 29 and 17 BCE. A famous monk named Mahātissa evidently built, with royal support, an impressive new monastery in Anurādhapura. Sometime thereafter, monks of the long-established Mahāvihāra fraternity (by whose account this story is preserved) accused Mahātissa of violating the monastic discipline and tried to expel him from the *sangha*. Monks loyal to Mahātissa then formed the fraternity of the Abhayagiri monastery, which became for some time the Mahāvihāra's archrival. The Abhayagiri lineage maintained independent institutional traditions that eventually gave rise to branch monastic communities as far distant as Java.

Like the Mahāvihāra, the Abhayagiri came to include an order of nuns among its residents. These nuns seem to have been very active and were responsible for transmitting the women's ordination lineage to China in the fifth century. With an extensive network of affiliated monasteries, the Abhayagiri controlled its own sizable collection of wealth and property. This new fraternity also came to possess its own version of the Pali Tipiṭaka, its own distinctive version of certain aspects of Theravāda doctrine, and its own interpretation of particular points of monastic discipline. In addition—in contrast to their Mahāvihāra rivals—the Abhayagiri *nikāya*, like the communities that supervised the great monastic universities of India, welcomed into their midst monks from other Hīnayāna schools, and from various Mahāyāna and, later, Tantric traditions as well.

This willingness of the Abhayagiri Theravādins to welcome Mahāyāna adherents into their company generated, some three centuries after its founding, a schism

within its own ranks. In the middle of the fourth century three hundred monks declared their aversion to the presence of Mahāyāna monks at the Abhayagiri, withdrew from that fraternity, and formed an independent group that came to be known as the Jetavana fraternity. The new Jetavana *nikāya* acquired affiliated monasteries and also considerable land and other wealth. But compared to the Mahāvihāra and Abhayagiri *nikāyas*, the Jetavana remained relatively small. From time to time, it became associated with particular doctrinal and disciplinary interpretations of its own, but a sustained distinctive orientation never emerged to compete seriously with its two rivals. Although by the end of the third century the Theravāda *sangha* in Sri Lanka had become divided, certain tendencies remained common to all three *nikāyas*. For example, the Theravāda scholasticism that blossomed during the fifth century drew scholars from the Mahāvihāra and from other *nikāyas* as well.

The most influential scholar associated with this efflorescence, if not Theravāda scholasticism generally, was Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa. Probably a native of northern India, Buddhaghosa traveled to Sri Lanka in order to translate the Sinhala commentarial tradition, preserved by the Mahāvihāravāsins, into Pali, which by this time was recognized as the lingua franca of the international Theravāda community. Buddhaghosa's industriousness during his residence at the Mahāvihāra produced a rich and extensive corpus of Pali commentarial literature that became a fundamental resource for subsequent scholarship and practice throughout the Theravāda world. In addition, Buddhaghosa produced a comprehensive meditational guide and doctrinal summary known as the *Visuddhimagga* (The Path of Purification). Rich with historical anecdotes, the *Visuddhimagga* remains an authoritative resource for Theravāda scholars and adherents from his own time to the present. Although there is no corroborating evidence, a Southeast Asian tradition records that Buddhaghosa traveled to Burma late in his life and that his influence inaugurated a renaissance of Burmese Theravāda. [See the biography of Buddhaghosa.]

Two monks from South India, Buddhadatta, a younger contemporary of Buddhaghosa, and Dhammapāla, his successor, also made significant contributions to the new literature in Pali. And many scholars believe that it was a monk from the Abhayagiri monastery who composed a manual entitled *Vimuttimagga* (The Path of Liberation), which, while not as wide-ranging, was nevertheless remarkably parallel to Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*. Some scholars suggest there may be a common source for both of these manuals that has parallels or variations in India as well.

Another movement in Sri Lanka that drew interested monks from all Theravāda *nikāyas* was ascetic in character and led to the rise of at least two prominent groups. The first group, known as the Paṃsukūlikas ("those who wear robes made from rags"), began to play an important role during the seventh century and continued to be noted in historical records until the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Although little is known about the group, it is quite possible that at least some of the Paṃsukūlikas were strongly influenced by Tantric trends that were becoming increasingly prominent throughout the Buddhist world, including Sri Lanka.

The second group, which attracted many proponents, especially from among the Mahāvihāravāsins, first began to be mentioned in tenth-century records. Referred to as *ārañṇikas* ("forest dwellers"), these monks declined to reside in the rich monasteries of the capital and established their own monastic centers in the countryside. They adopted a more stringent discipline than their urban contemporaries, and emphasized more rigorous modes of scholarship and meditation.

Throughout the entire first millennium CE, as Sri Lankan Theravāda Buddhism developed its monastic teaching and modes of practice, it also developed various civilizational aspects of its orientation. There was often serious and sometimes destructive competition between segments of the monastic community for royal support in particular and lay support in general. Serious disagreements among different Theravāda groups concerned various matters such as the propriety of monastic land ownership and wealth, the status and authority of the king, the appropriateness of various forms of ritual practice, and the like. But despite the differences, several general trends emerged. For example, over the course of the millennium monastic institutions controlled increasing amounts of land and accumulated increasing amounts of wealth. With regard to royalty, the Theravāda notion of kingship became gradually more exalted until, by the end of the period, the king was generally portrayed as a *bodhisatta* (future Buddha). Various relics of the Buddha, especially the tooth relic and the alms bowl relic, came to be regarded as palladia of the kingdom, and also became centers around which large-scale "national" festivals were celebrated.

The Great Revival and Beyond

During the first centuries after the turn of the second millennium CE, the center of gravity in the Theravāda world shifted significantly to the east. In India, Buddhism, including Theravāda Buddhism, succumbed almost completely to the pressures exerted by Hinduism and Islam. But in Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand, Theravāda gained new vitality and spread to new areas.

Establishing centers in the Mekong Valley, the Theravādins attained preeminence by the mid-fourteenth century both among the Khmer (Cambodians) and the Lao.

At the beginning of the period Theravāda fortunes were at a low ebb. In Sri Lanka, the Theravāda *saṅgha* had suffered serious setbacks as a result of Cōla invasions from South India and the collapse of the hydraulic civilization of northern Sri Lanka. In Southeast Asia, the Pyu-Burmese and Mon civilizations in which the Theravādins had played a major role had lost much of their vitality. During this period, the kingdom of Pagan seemed to be more oriented toward Hinduism and Sanskrit forms of Buddhism than toward Theravāda. And with hegemony over most of what is now Thailand, the powerful and expansive Khmer court at Angkor was strongly oriented toward Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Accounts of the beginnings of the Theravāda resurgence that occurred in the latter half of the eleventh century vary according to the tradition that has preserved them. However, one primary fact stands clear both in Sri Lanka and in Burma: Theravāda became the favored tradition at the major centers of political power. In Sri Lanka this occurred after the expulsion of the Cōla invaders and the restoration of Theravāda-oriented Sinhala royalty by Vijayabāhu I. In Burma, it occurred through the conquest of the Mon by King Aniruddha of Pagan, his introduction of Mon Theravāda monks and their traditions to Pagan, and the subsequent recognition in Pagan of the preeminence of the Theravāda *saṅgha*.

Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the revitalized Theravāda tradition was given an important new direction in the twelfth century when, during the reign of Parākramabāhu I, a major reform and reorganization of the *saṅgha* was implemented. Parākramabāhu I requested the Mahāvihāra-oriented *ārañṇikas*, who had begun to appear on the scene two to three centuries earlier, to preside over a council. The goal of the council, not dissimilar from the goals of previous but less successful royal policies, was to purify and unify the Sri Lankan *saṅgha*. This time a number of factors contributed to success. On one hand, the *nikāyas* had been weakened by the recent confiscation of monastic property by King Vikramabāhu I (r. 1111–1132) and, on the other, there was a respite in the warring between Sinhala and South Indian groups.

The council "purified" the *saṅgha*, which meant that the code of proper monastic conduct was ascertained and monks who refused to comply were expelled. The reforms then unified the *saṅgha* by bringing all the remaining factions (and it is clear there were many) together into a single communal order. In so doing, the

reforms provided the basis for a new structure of ecclesiastical organization that was established either at that time or shortly thereafter. The new system involved the appointment, by the king, of a *mahāsvami* or *sangharāja* to act as the monastic head of the *sangha* as a whole, and also the appointment (under him) of two *mahāsthaviras* to supervise the *gānavāsins*, or village-dwelling monks, and the *vanavāsins*, or forest-dwelling monks (also called *ārañṇikas*), respectively.

The reform movement that the council expressed and abetted also generated a tremendous burst of literary creativity that matched and perhaps even exceeded the literary achievements of Buddhaghosa and others some seven centuries earlier. This new literary efflorescence had two very important dimensions. The first was the production, primarily by a monk named Sāriputta—a leading figure at the council who later seems to have held the position of *mahāsvami*—and his disciples, of a whole new strata of Pali literature. The new Pali compositions included a series of subcommentaries on the commentaries of Buddhaghosa, especially on Vinaya; also included were a number of very important texts dealing with the lineages or histories (*vaṃsa*) of various relics of the Buddha and monuments to him, as well as the more wide-ranging historical chronicles that brought the narrative of the *Mahāvamsa* up to date. This new literary dynamism also generated new genres of Pali and Sinhala literature that were often permeated with devotional themes. This literature vividly expressed the new reformist concern to convey the Theravāda message in linguistic and religious idioms acceptable both to monastic and lay constituencies in the countryside as well as in the urban centers.

This reformed tradition by and large remained preeminent and creative in Sri Lanka up to the coming of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, and persisted for some centuries thereafter. The *sangha* retained its symbiotic relationship with the Sinhala kings, and the monasteries acquired new lands and wealth. However, during the period after 1500, when the authority of the indigenous Buddhist kingdom was increasingly confined to the inland highlands, the *sangha* suffered a serious erosion of standards. By the early eighteenth century, the level of monastic scholarship and discipline had reached a very low level indeed.

Burma. In Southeast Asia, the resurgence of Theravāda proceeded rather differently. At the time King Aniruddha came to the throne in Pagan (eleventh century) the Mon in Lower Burma preserved a very ancient Theravāda tradition associated with the Aśokan missionaries Soṇa and Uttara. Through the reforms initiated by Aniruddha and his monastic preceptor, Shin Arahan, and renewed by his successor, King Kyanzitha, a

strong Theravāda tradition was established in Upper Burma and given powerful royal support. In the twelfth century a further reformist element was introduced at Pagan by a monk named Chapaṭa, who had gone to Sri Lanka during the reign of Parākramabāhu I and had been reordained in the newly purified and unified Sri Lankan *sangha*. Thus, by the end of the twelfth century, when the Pagan dynasty was still a very powerful force, the Theravāda tradition had become firmly established as the preeminent religion in Burma. What is more, the three major subtraditions that were to coexist and compete with one another through the entire premodern period—those associated with Lower Burma, Upper Burma, and Sri Lanka—were all more or less firmly in place.

The Burmese monastic reforms, which in some respects corresponded to those that had been implemented in twelfth-century Sri Lanka, took place when the fifteenth-century Mon king named Dhammaceti assumed the throne in Lower Burma. Formerly a monk, King Dhammaceti sponsored a delegation of eighteen monks to be reordained in Sri Lanka. When these monks returned, Dhammaceti insisted that all those within his realm who wished to remain in the *sangha* be reordained by the new fraternity. Following this “purification” and unification process, the king proceeded to establish a monastic hierarchy whose responsibility it was to maintain strict adherence to the Vinaya rules. King Dhammaceti’s efforts served to emphasize the influence of Sinhala monastic traditions in Burma. Moreover, his activities gave impetus to a new tradition of Pali Abhidhamma scholarship and commentaries that has been a hallmark of Burmese Buddhism ever since.

Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. Farther to the east, the Theravāda resurgence developed later than it had in Burma. The first hint that an expansion of Theravāda influence might be in the offing came from the report that one of the five monks who accompanied Chapaṭa on his journey to Sri Lanka in the late twelfth century was a member of the royal court of Angkor. However, it is not until the latter part of the thirteenth century that hard evidence becomes available. Based on the report of a Chinese visitor, Theravāda—possibly with connections both to Mon and Sinhala traditions—had become one of the major factors in the religious life at the Khmer/Cambodian capital at Angkor.

The newly established (thirteenth-century) Thai kingdoms of Lānnā in northwestern Thailand and Sukhōthai in central Thailand assumed the reigns of power from their Mon predecessors in areas formerly defined by the ancient Dvāravatī civilization. Like their Mon predecessors, the Thais also venerated Theravāda traditions. But during the mid-fourteenth century, Mon Theravāda tra-

ditions had to make way for a Sinhala reformist movement that spread from a center at Martaban in Lower Burma to several Thai capitals including Ayutthayā, Sukhōthai, and Chiangmai (Lānnā).

Theravāda monasteries continued to proliferate throughout the region. By the latter part of the fifteenth century the Lānnā capital of Chiangmai had emerged as one of the major intellectual centers in the Theravāda world. In central Thailand, where the locus of power gradually shifted from Sukhōthai to Ayutthayā, the Theravāda presence was consolidated. Farther east in Cambodia, Theravāda gradually displaced the deeply entrenched traditions of Hinduism and Mahāyāna Buddhism, a transition facilitated by the abandonment of the old capital of Angkor in the mid-fifteenth century. According to chronicle accounts, Theravāda became the preeminent tradition in Laos beginning with the conversion of a Laotian prince during his exile in the court of Angkor in the mid-fourteenth century. He subsequently became the ruler of the powerful Laotian kingdom of Luang Prabang. Through the entire area during this period, appropriation of reformist Theravāda influence from Sri Lanka continued. Indeed, by the beginning of the sixteenth century, reformist Sinhala fraternities dominated in all of the major royal centers and in many of the lesser ones as well.

Throughout the later premodern period in Southeast Asia there were a number of Theravāda kingdoms that held sway over various geographical areas for varying periods of time. A succession of such kingdoms constituted and fostered a loosely linked "national" tradition in Burma, and a more stable Thai kingdom was governed from Ayutthayā. A series of leading Theravāda kingdoms succeeded one another in Laos, and in Cambodia still another royal center was established. Since the pattern and development of Theravāda religion, both monastic and civilizational, varied from area to area and from kingdom to kingdom, generalizations are necessarily problematic. However, at least two important characteristics can be observed across the entire area.

First, monastic history, punctuated as it has been by reform movements, has necessarily also been subject to the considerable tensions intrinsic to that process. In Southeast Asia a continuing tension, more or less explicit, characterized relations between reformist movements and other Theravāda traditions that continued to coexist with them. Reformist groups vied with each other and indigenous groups over the purity and authenticity of their monastic observances. An extremely sensitive matter, monastic factionalism could readily be interpreted as a sign of the king's inability to maintain order in his kingdom (and often was). By way of dem-

onstrating their authority to rule, royal sponsors had to act judiciously to balance the often contradictory demands of monastic purity and unity.

Generally speaking, the reformists were associated with Sinhala fraternities and sooner or later with royal sponsors. On the other hand, the Theravāda fraternities that resisted these reforms (fraternities that were often themselves the products of earlier reforms) typically maintained their own traditions about monastic discipline and the propriety of monastic wealth. In some instances these latter groups preserved texts and practices originally derived from Sanskrit Buddhist schools that had once exerted considerable influence in the area. They were often involved with localized modes of sacrality and were very resistant to attempts from the capital to exert centralized authority. In addition, they often utilized both Pali and vernacular texts, as well as mystical and magical modes of practice, that were clearly Tantric in character. It should be noted, however, that beliefs in the magical power of properly intoned sounds—especially Pali words—to effect order or secure protection seem to have been common to both groups.

The second characteristic of the premodern Theravāda tradition throughout Southeast Asia was the distinctive manner and extent of its civilizational role. Like the Theravāda *sangha* in Sri Lanka, the Theravāda *sangha* in Southeast Asia maintained symbiotic relationships with the various kings who ruled in specific areas. The *sangha* supported the veneration of *thūpas* and Buddha images that had connections with political and social life at every level. Also like the Theravāda *sangha* in Sri Lanka, the *sangha* in Southeast Asia developed a textual tradition in Pali and in the various vernaculars (some translated, some originally composed) that addressed the religious, social, and moral concerns of all groups from court to village. But in Southeast Asia there was a special practice that further enhanced the civilizational impact of Theravāda, namely, the temporary participation of a significant segment of the male population in the life of the monastic order. In some areas this involved a temporary ordination as a novice. In other areas it involved temporary ordination, or several temporary ordinations, as a full-fledged member of the Order. But whatever form this practice took, it provided the context for a monastic acculturation that has given the societies of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos their distinctive Theravāda flavor.

Theravāda Buddhism since 1750

During the past two and a half centuries Theravāda Buddhism has retained its basic structure, and the ma-

jour regional traditions have maintained many of the particularities that had come to characterize them during premodern times. However, during this period there have been important developments in the Theravāda world, some the result of internal dynamics and others the result of the external pressures of colonialism and “modernity.” Since most of these developments have appeared throughout the Theravāda world, we will pursue our discussion thematically. However, since these developments took very different forms in different areas, it will be necessary to give careful attention to regional and national differences.

In the monastic context the stage was set for the developments of the modern period by major reforms that were implemented in each of the three major Theravāda regions. In Sri Lanka the relevant reform took place in the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Centered in the independent kingdom of Kandy and led by the *sangharāja* named Vālivita Saranaṃkara, this movement received royal support. Believing their ordination lineage to be defective, the reformers invited Thai monks to Sri Lanka to reintroduce an authentic Theravāda lineage. Through their efforts a new Siyam (Thai) *nikāya* was established.

Later in the eighteenth century King Bodawpaya (r. 1781–1819) succeeded in uniting Burma under his rule and in establishing a considerable degree of royally regulated discipline within the Burmese *sangha*. Through his efforts Bodawpaya officially resolved the long-standing and rancorous dispute between monastic factions about the proper way of wearing the monastic robes. Having more or less unified the *sangha*, Bodawpaya’s reforms established the basis for the Thudhamma segment of the Order that has continued to include the majority of Burmese monks.

In Indochina the corresponding reforms were sponsored by King Rāma I, the founder of the Thai kingdom of Bangkok. Having claimed the throne after a period of severe disruption following the destruction of the former Thai capital of Ayutthayā, the first ruler of the new Cakkrī dynasty introduced a series of reforms that unified the *sangha* and strengthened discipline within its ranks. This more or less unified fraternity—later called the Mahānikāya—has never lost its majority position within the Thai *sangha*. In Cambodia and Laos closely related, although less reformed, Mahānikāya fraternities were dominant at the beginning of the modern period and have held that position ever since.

During the nineteenth century there emerged within the *sangha* in each area a major competing faction or factions. In Sri Lanka two competing fraternities appeared on the scene—the Amarapura *nikāya* (so called because it received its new ordination lineage from the

branch of the Burmese *sangha* that was recognized at the Burmese capital of Amarapura) and the Rāmañña *nikāya* (so called because it received its new ordination lineage from the Mon *sangha* that had its center in the Rāmañña country of Lower Burma). The Amarapura *nikāya* came into being because ordination in the Siyam *nikāya* had quickly become limited to members of the highest (*goyigama*) caste. Although the intrusion of caste distinctions into the Theravāda *sangha* in Sri Lanka was not a new phenomenon, such discrimination led, in the early nineteenth century, to the formation of a competing fraternity. This new fraternity was—and remains today—a rather loose confederation of several smaller groups from various other castes that are especially prominent in southwestern Sri Lanka.

The Rāmañña *nikāya* was established in 1864 when a group of monks with a more uncompromising attitude toward any kind of caste distinctions within the *sangha* and a more “modernist” approach to all aspects of Buddhist teaching and practice formed their own independent fraternity. (“Modernist” in this article refers to a skeptical attitude toward traditional beliefs regarding cosmology, the existence of gods and spirits, and the efficacy of rituals.) Although this stricter and more modernist Rāmañña *nikāya* has remained by far the smallest of the Sinhala fraternities, it has nevertheless exerted considerable influence on the Buddhist community in Sri Lanka.

During the nineteenth century many of the same factors and orientations were present in Burma as in Sri Lanka, but a different kind of political and social context led to a much greater proliferation of *nikāya* and similar groups called *gaings*. In Burma, much more than in Sri Lanka, the nineteenth-century British conquest disrupted the fabric of social life. In response to a disrupted environment, numerous small, more tightly organized groups formed alongside the majority Thudhamma monks who continued to accept the authority of the royally sponsored Thudhamma Council through the reign of King Mindon (d. 1878). These various groups both complemented one another and competed with each other for purity of monastic observance and its attendant lay support. Among these groups the Thudhamma monks and the Shwegyin fraternity came to play the most important role. In comparison with the Thudhamma monks, the Shwegyin group succeeded in maintaining a more rigorous level of scholarship and discipline. The Shwegyin and the other smaller reformist communities, although less explicitly “modernist” in their orientation than the Rāmañña fraternity in Sri Lanka, had close affinities with it.

In western Indochina during the nineteenth century a single new *nikāya*, the Thammayut, emerged to com-

plement and compete with the established Mahānikāya fraternity. The Thammayut (Dhammayuttika) *nikāya* was founded in Thailand in the mid-nineteenth century by the future king Mongkut (Rāma IV) during his more than twenty years in the *sangha*. Clearly modernist in its orientation, the group received its ordination lineage from the same Mon tradition to which modern-oriented reformists in other Theravāda countries also turned. But unlike the Rāmañña fraternity in Sri Lanka and the Shwegyin fraternity in Burma, the Thammayut fraternity received special support from Thailand's unconquered monarchy all through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This, plus the closely related fact that its members were drawn largely from the highest levels of the Thai elite, enabled it to exert a powerful influence on the much larger Mahānikāya. The Thammayut's favored status and elite membership also enabled it to play an important role in drawing provincial traditions into the central Thai *sangha*, and in extending central Thai influence into the *sanghas* of Cambodia and Laos as well. [See the biography of Mongkut.]

Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century the various fraternities that still constitute the Theravāda *sanghas* in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia had already come into being. But there is one related twentieth-century development that should also be mentioned, namely the very tentative and controversial reemergence of the order of nuns. For almost a millennium the order had not existed in the Theravāda context, although in some Theravāda areas there were many, typically older women who adopted a celibate mode of life and frequented the monastic environs. But in recent years a few determined women from Theravāda countries have gone to Taiwan, where they have been ordained into the lineage of nuns that had been transmitted from Sri Lanka to China in the fifth century. The number of such nuns in Theravāda countries is currently still minuscule, and the authenticity of their ordination is not recognized by the great majority of Theravāda monks and laity. But the seeds for a possible revival have clearly been planted.

During the modern period these essentially monastic developments have been complemented by a number of civilizationally oriented movements, all of which have drawn on long-established Theravāda traditions. But at the same time they have appropriated and adapted these traditions in new ways. Four movements may be cited as examples.

1. Millenarian movements, which constitute the first example, may be subdivided into at least two major types. The first type, which has appeared primarily in Burma and other Southeast Asian countries, is represented by more mystical, politically passive movements

that have at their respective centers a cult devoted to a charismatic personage (sometimes identified with the future Buddha Metteyya) who is expected—at some very indefinite future time—to usher in a new age. The second type is represented by more activist movements that have arisen in periods and contexts where crises of power have occurred. Such politically active millenarian movements appeared in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia during the period of British and French colonial conquest. They have appeared within the colonial context itself—most notably in the famous Saya San rebellion in Burma. They have also appeared when indigenous governments (particularly in Burma and Thailand) have sought to extend their authority into outlying areas.

2. A closely related set of movements that has been particularly strong in Southeast Asia has involved the cultivation of meditational practice. Many of these movements have coalesced around charismatic individuals who have achieved advanced meditational states and are in some instances rumored to be *arahants*, or fully perfected saints. Often in such cases these meditatively advanced individuals make their power available to their followers in the form of appropriately blessed amulets and other sacred objects. On the other hand, many of the movements in this set emphasize the importance of meditation for all. Special forms of practice have been developed for less committed monks and for the laity. Numerous lay-oriented meditation centers have been set up in Burma where the contemporary meditational emphasis began to take form in the early twentieth century, in Thailand where lay meditation has enjoyed great popularity in recent years, and increasingly in Sri Lanka as well.

3. A third set of movements that have had a significant impact are those that can be characterized as “modernist” in the specific sense noted above. In the monastic context, modernist concerns were very much involved in the formation of several of the monastic fraternities that developed in various Theravāda countries during the nineteenth century. Equally important, major lay movements with modernist ideologies have appeared and taken root. In Sri Lanka in the late nineteenth century, Anagārika Dharmapāla and those who shared his views emphasized a “this-worldly” mode of lay asceticism (*Anagārika* is a title designating a lay ascetic) and rejected many traditional Buddhist beliefs and practices as superstitious and useless. During and since Dharmapāla's time many other modernist movements and associations have developed among the laity all across the Theravāda world, particularly in the urban areas. The influence of these movements and associations has been most evident in Sri Lanka and Thai-

land, but they have been—at certain points—active components in the Theravāda communities in Burma and, to a lesser extent, in Cambodia and Laos as well. It is also important to note that several of these modernist movements and associations have been instrumental in the establishment and maintenance of a significant Buddhist ecumenical organization known as the World Fellowship of Buddhists.

4. Considering Theravāda Buddhism's civilizational character, it is not surprising that it became involved in the political processes and ideological trends that have affected the various Theravāda countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In Sri Lanka and Burma certain segments of the Theravāda community, including the monastic community, became very deeply involved with movements for national independence. These same groups were also involved with attempts, during the postindependence period, to build new, democratically structured societies that would be both Buddhist and socialist. In the 1950s such hopes were strongly expressed in the context of the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's death, celebrated in 1956. These celebrations included a much-heralded "sixth" Buddhist Council that was sponsored by the Burmese government of U Nu.

Since the late 1950s the situation in both countries has changed considerably. In Sri Lanka the early hopes for Buddhist nationhood have been seriously eroded, and a nonsocialist government has come to power. Moreover, some Sinhala spokesmen representing both the left and the right have used a Buddhist idiom in the rhetoric surrounding communal violence between the Sinhala majority and the substantial Tamil minority. In Burma the hopes for Buddhist nationhood also dimmed, and the military government that took over in the early 1960s—despite its nominal support for Buddhist socialism—sought to keep Buddhism isolated from the mainstream of national life. But in the Burmese case it should also be noted that in recent years the military government has taken a significantly new tack by initiating a reform of the monastic order that is intended to "purify" it, demonstrate government interest in monastic affairs, and open channels of communication between the government and the *sangha*.

Further east, the interactions between Theravāda Buddhism, politics, and ideology have been equally important but quite different in character. In Thailand the affinity between the Theravāda tradition and nationalism has been as strong as in Sri Lanka or Burma. But since Thailand was never conquered by a Western nation, this affinity has resulted in a basically cooperative relationship between Buddhism and the established government, and a rather stable continuation of the traditional symbiotic relationship between the *sangha* and

state. In recent years Buddhism has become closely associated with capitalist development, while socialism—Buddhist or otherwise—has remained on the political and ideological periphery.

In Cambodia and Laos an early continuity with the received tradition was followed by a break that has been both dramatic and devastating. The continuity that characterized the religio-political situation during the colonial period was made possible by the fact that the French—who were the colonial overlords in the area—chose to rule at a distance and to leave the established religious and political order largely intact. The radical break was, of course, the result of the disruption caused by the war that racked the area in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and by the victory of the Communists in both countries. In Cambodia, the Communist devastation of Buddhism during the Pol Pot regime (1975–1980) was widespread and brutal. In Laos (and, since 1980, in Cambodia), the approach of the Communist authorities has been considerably more restrained; but even in these contexts traditional Buddhist institutions have suffered serious damage and traditional Buddhist values have been directly and severely challenged.

Theravāda Today

Theravāda Buddhism remains very much alive in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, both as a monastic tradition and as a civilizational force. The *sangha*, despite its many problems, carries on its traditions of Pali scholarship and meditational practice. It continues to produce persons with intellectual substance and spiritual prowess. And it continues to generate movements (often conflicting movements) aimed at monastic reform, spiritual development, and societal well-being.

In addition, Theravāda Buddhism continues to exert its influence on the institutions and values of the societies in the traditionally Theravāda areas. This influence takes quite different forms in Sri Lanka, where ethnic differences often involve religious differences; in Burma, where the nation's leaders have sought to insulate the populace from many aspects of "modernity"; in Thailand, where the pace of "modernization" is rapid indeed; and in Cambodia and Laos, where Theravāda Buddhism has been "disestablished" by recently installed Communist governments. But in each instance Theravāda Buddhism continues to provide meaning in the everyday life of its adherents.

[See also Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Hīnayāna Buddhism*, *Buddhism*, *article on Buddhism in Southeast Asia*, *treats the role of Theravāda as a civilizational tradition in the region*. For a related discussion focusing on the interrelationships between Buddhism and local cultures, see *Southeast Asian Religions*, *article on Mainland Cultures*, and *Sinhala Religion*; *Thai Religion*; *Burmese*

Religion; Lao Religion; and Khmer Religion. See also Saṃgha; Kingship, *article on Kingship in Southeast Asia*; and Worship and Cultic Life, *article on Buddhist Cultic Life in Southeast Asia*.]

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Because of vast translation efforts, primarily by the Pali Text Society, the nonspecialist has access to a large body of Theravāda literature. Virtually the entire Tipiṭaka has been translated into English and is included in either the "Sacred Books of the Buddhists" or the "Translation Series" of the Pali Text Society. Among the most important postcanonical texts that are available in English are Wilhelm Geiger's translation of *The Mahāvamsa*, or *The Great Chronicle of Ceylon* (London, 1964); Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's translation of Buddhaghosa's fifth-century work, *The Path of Purification*, 2d ed. (Colombo, 1964); and Frank E. Reynolds and Mani B. Reynolds's translation of Phya Lithai's fourteenth-century cosmological treatise, *Three Worlds according to King Ruang* (Berkeley, 1982).

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THÉRÈSE OF LISIEUX (1873–1897), epithet of Thérèse Martin, French Carmelite nun and Catholic saint. Thérèse was the youngest of nine children born to Louis and Zélie Martin. When Thérèse was eight her family moved to the small Norman town of Lisieux,

where she was to spend the remainder of her life, with the exception of one pilgrimage to Rome shortly before she entered the convent. Within a few years of the family's arrival in the town, Thérèse's two older sisters became nuns at the cloistered convent of Discalced Carmelites in Lisieux, and at an early age Thérèse decided to join them. Her first application to enter the convent, made when she was fourteen, was rejected on account of her age, but at fifteen she entered the convent.

In the cloister Thérèse exhibited unswerving fidelity to the Carmelite rule and unfailing kindness to the convent's twenty-five nuns, some of whom had quite unattractive personalities. However, the full dimensions of her spiritual life became evident only in her posthumously published autobiography. Eighteen months before her death she manifested signs of a fatal tubercular condition, and her last months were plagued by extreme pain and even nagging temptations against faith. She died at the age of twenty-four, exclaiming, "My God, I love you."

During the last years of her life Thérèse wrote her memoirs in three separate sections, mostly at the request of the convent's superior. One year after her death the memoirs were published under the title *L'histoire d'une âme* (The Story of a Soul). The simple book, written in epistolary style, is a candid recounting of her own unfailing love for and confidence in the goodness of God, and it achieved instant and enormous popularity in translations into many languages. In the next fifteen years alone more than a million copies were printed. This worldwide response prompted the Holy See to waive the usual fifty-year waiting period, and Thérèse was beatified in 1923 and canonized in 1925. In the bull of canonization, Pius XI said that she had achieved sanctity "without going beyond the common order of things."

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PETER THOMAS ROHRBACH

THERIANTHROPISM is a term derived from the Greek compound of *thēr* ("wild beast") and *anthrōpos* ("human") and is usually used to denote a deity or crea-

ture combining the form or attributes of a human with those of an animal. As an analytic category, it has little salience, since scholars have variously included under its rubric not only animal-headed gods, were-animals, mythological demihumans and monsters (such as centaurs, sphinxes, and minotaurs) but also examples of animal impersonation in rituals, spirit possessions by animals, mythological beings of animal aspect but human character (such as the North American Indian figure Coyote), and anthropomorphic gods (such as Zeus and Dionysos) who sometimes transform themselves into animals. [See Shape Shifting.] Ideas about the supernatural linkage of humans and animals are probably universal—even in cultures with anthropomorphic monotheism, there are ideas of were-animals, therianthropic demons, and the possession of human souls by animals. [See Animals.] Visual or literary images of therianthropic beings can be found in virtually all of the world's cultures, where they contrast with and complement representations of other forms of supernatural beings.

Historical Interpretations. Discussions of therianthropy were most prevalent during the nineteenth century, when the idea of a part human, part animal deity was seen as a critical development stage in human history, midway between the totemic identification of hunter and prey that was supposed to characterize savage religions and the anthropomorphic deities of civilization. The occurrence of therianthropic deities was interpreted either as a survival of savage ideas in later religions or as the result of a historical diffusion of these more advanced representations of the divine from their Egyptian/Mesopotamian point of origin. The fact that most therianthropic figures known at that time came from the civilizations of the Middle East, where most of the archaeological research was being conducted, and that these civilizations were seen as midpoints between savagery and civilization gave added weight to the idea that therianthropy was a partial progress toward a rational, anthropomorphic religion. (Interestingly, Plato uses an account—one that is probably spurious—of a rural Arcadian cult of lycanthropy to contrast with the rational religions of urban Athens.)

Contemporary Interpretations. The categorical distinctions between primitive and civilized mentalities that provided the rationale for developmentalist interpretations of religious history have not been supported by anthropological research, and most contemporary interpretations of therianthropic symbolism take a semiotic approach to the subject. Animals are seen as emblems of principles, as vehicles for symbolically expressing existential truths about the human condition. Therianthropic images juxtapose two principles in a un-

ified being. Thus, it is not the animality of the image that is important but its duality, its ambiguity, its nature as a dialectic category that simultaneously contrasts and synthesizes two opposing metaphorical principles—images of noncontiguous categories made continuous (culture-nature, wild-domesticated, rational-emotional, independent-submissive, etc.). Therianthropic images, given their nature as a category of representation betwixt and between other categories, as a category whose elements are neither separate nor unified, are frequently associated with rituals of transition and liminality (as in initiation rites and carnivals) or with the intermediate stages of creation, when the world is in neither its primal nor its finished state.

Only as the psychology of religion and the theory of symbolism permit the development of new modes of understanding can we hope to deal with the historical and theological questions that are posed by differentiating therianthropic images of the divine from those that are theriomorphic or anthropomorphic. All three kinds of images may exist simultaneously in the psychologies, if not the artistic representations, of the world's peoples. Therianthropic ideas simultaneously differentiate and synthesize the qualities that define humanness with those that define the nonhuman other, and they may not represent significantly different, historically traceable, understandings of the nature of divinity so much as conventional representations of a universal religious phenomenon.

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STANLEY WALENS

THESMOPHORIA. The Thesmophoria was an annual women's festival widely celebrated in ancient Greece. In most areas it took place in autumn, at the season of plowing and sowing, and it was held in honor of the grain goddess Demeter and her daughter Persephone. Fertility of crops and of women was evidently the essential theme.

The Athenian form of the ritual is the best known. Here the festival occupied three days. On the first day the women went up to the sacred grove of Demeter Thesmophoros, set up an encampment there, out of sight of all males, and made some preliminary sacrifices. On the second day they fasted, sitting humbly on the ground, as Demeter was said to have fasted in grief over the abduction of her daughter. This abstinence was probably understood as a kind of purification in prepa-

ration for the main ceremonies. The third day featured pomegranates to eat, obscene jesting, and perhaps flagellation—all things associated with fertility. Piglets were slaughtered, and parts of them, it seems, were cooked and eaten; substantial portions, however, were thrown into *megara*, deep holes in the earth, together with wheat cakes shaped like snakes or like male genitals, and an otherwise unknown goddess, Kalligeneia, whose name means "fair birth," was invoked. At some stage—perhaps the night before—certain women who had for three days observed purity restrictions climbed down into the hole, and while others clapped, brought out the decayed remains of the previous year's offerings. These were ceremoniously carried out of the camp and set forth on altars. (The Thesmophoria itself took its name from this "bringing of the deposits.") If a farmer took a little portion of the remains and mixed it in with his seed corn, he was supposed to get a good crop. This element of primitive agrarian magic suggests that the Thesmophoria's origins lay in a remote past.

[See also Demeter and Persephone.]

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M. L. WEST

THEURGY (from the Greek *theourgia*) means literally something like "actuating the divine" and refers to actions that induce or bring about the presence of a divine or supernatural being, whether in an artifact or a person. It was a practice closely related to magic—not least in its ritual use of material things, sacrifices, and verbal formulas to effect the believer's fellowship with the god, demon, or departed spirit. It is distinguished from ordinary magical practice less by its techniques than by its aim, which was religious (union with the divine) rather than secular. Use of the term *theourgia*—as well as of the related *theourgos*, referring to a practitioner

of the art—arose in the second century CE in Hellenistic circles closely associated with the birth of Neoplatonism. The practice was commended and followed, in the third and later centuries, by certain Neoplatonist philosophers and their disciples.

The origins of this movement can be traced, in all probability, to a work called the *Chaldean Oracles*, plausibly attributed to the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161–180). A collection of obscure and pretentious oracular utterances written in Homeric hexameters, this work, now known only in fragments, was apparently assembled (if not composed) by one Julian the Chaldean or (perhaps more likely) by his son Julian the Theurge. Much of its content is quasi-philosophical, and its account of the first principles shows affinities with the thought of the Pythagorean philosopher Numenius, who was teaching around the middle of the second century. It also contained, however, prescriptions for theurgic rites and indications of the “sights” that they produce, for example, “a formless fire whence a voice proceeds” (frag. 146).

Concerning the value of such practices, there was significant disagreement among Neoplatonist thinkers. Plotinus himself, it is now agreed, either knew or thought nothing of the *Chaldean Oracles*. His way to human fulfillment in the divine was the way of *theoria* (“contemplation”), not that of *theourgia*. It was his disciple Porphyry who was the first among philosophers to give some status to the practice of theurgy. In spite of the severe criticisms of it that he had leveled in his *Letter to Anebo*, Porphyry came, according to Augustine (*City of God* 10.9f.), to acknowledge a theurgy whose aim was purification of the soul and that produced “appearances of angels or of gods.” At the same time Porphyry insisted that the value of such practices was strictly limited. What they purified was not the intellectual soul, but only its lower, pneumatic adjunct, which is adapted to visions of spirits, angels, and inferior deities; they had no power to bring people into the presence of Truth itself. Presumably Porphyry continued to believe, with Plotinus, that it is only the practice of virtue and of philosophical contemplation that raises the soul to fellowship with the supreme God.

This conviction was not shared, however, by Porphyry’s own disciple, the Syrian Iamblichus (d. 325), who, in his long treatise *On the Mysteries*, replied to the strictures expressed by his teacher in the *Letter to Anebo*. According to Iamblichus, there exists, in theurgy, a mode of fellowship with the divine that is independent of philosophical thought and that “those who philosophize theoretically” do not achieve. “What effects theurgic union is the carrying through of reverently accomplished actions which are unspeakable and

transcend any intellectual grasp, as well as the power of mute symbols which only the gods understand” (*On the Mysteries* 2.11).

This debate, however, did not end with the exchange between Iamblichus and his teacher. In his youth the emperor Julian was a disciple of the philosopher Eusebius, who taught that “the important thing is purification [of the soul] through reason” and who condemned wonder-working. Julian, however, was more impressed in the end by the teaching of one Maximus, who, by burning incense and reciting a formula in the temple of Hecate, caused the statue of the goddess to smile and the torches in her hands to blaze; the emperor-to-be accordingly adopted Maximus as his teacher (Eunapius, *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists* 474).

What the practice of theurgy involved becomes plain from the text of Iamblichus’s treatise itself. There he defends and interprets a variety of rites and practices that involve either the use of offerings or tokens of some sort or the various phenomena that accompany divine possession. It is plain, however, that in his mind the practices he explains can be understood and entered into—and indeed function—at more than one level. True theurgy, he suggests, is, “the summit of the priestly art” and is reserved “to a very few”—those, indeed, who “share in the theurgic gods in a way which transcends the cosmos,” because they “go beyond bodies and matter in service of the gods, being made one with the gods by a power which transcends the cosmos” (*On the Mysteries* 5.20–5.22). For all this, however, there is little new or unfamiliar in the phenomena he alludes to, from the “enthusiasm” of the Corybantes to the sacrifice of animals. He refers, for example, to levitation as one manifestation of possession by a god. He is also familiar with situations in which the theurgist makes use of a medium (*ho dechomenos*), and both he and the medium—and sometimes the assembled spectators—see the “spirit [*pneuma*] which comes down and enters” the one who is possessed (3.6). In another vein, he refers to theurgic use of hollow statues that are filled with “stones, herbs, animals, spices, [and] other such holy, perfect, and god-like things,” so as to create a receptacle in which the god will be at home (5.23). Though this practice seems to have been especially favored by late classical practitioners of theurgy, it clearly draws on widespread and ancient practices of sympathetic magic.

What is interesting and new, then, in Iamblichus’s account of *theourgia*, as over against *theoria*, is precisely the terms in which he understands and defends it. For one thing, it is plainly his conviction that theurgy is not a matter of manipulating the gods. Over and over again he denies that material objects or circumstances, or psychological states of human subjects, can supply the

explanation of theurgic phenomena, which by their nature transcend the capacity of such causes. Similarly, he denies that the power of the gods is compelled by human agency. The presence of the human soul with the gods is effected through a gift of divine agencies—through their universal self-bestowal. It is this self-bestowal that empowers the invocations and actions of the theurgist, which reach out to the transcendent by reason of “assimilation and appropriation” to their object (3.18). Behind this conception there lies, of course, a rationalized concept of universal sympathy, which emphasizes not merely the interconnectedness of things at the level of the visible cosmos but also the presence and participation of all finite realities in their immaterial ground, the divine order. At the same time, however—and somewhat paradoxically, in view of this insistence on the mutual indwelling of the various levels of reality—Iamblichus insists that “the human race is weak and puny . . . possessed of a congenital nothingness,” and that the only remedy for its error and perpetually disturbed state is to “share as far as possible in the divine Light” (3.18). Thus the practice of theurgy, through which the gods themselves bestow their light and presence, is the one hope of humanity. Iamblichus had lost not the philosophy so much as the faith of a Plotinus.

In Christian circles, the term *theourgia* and its derivatives came into use in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), himself a student of the Neoplatonist Proclus, who, after Iamblichus, was the weightiest philosophical advocate of theurgic practice. In Dionysius, however, the term is employed in the sense required by the Christian doctrine of grace: theurgy is not the effect of a natural and universal sympathy between different orders of being, but the self-communicating work of the divine. For Dionysius, Jesus is “the Principal [*archē*] of all hierarchy, holiness, and divine operation [*theourgia*].” The priesthood, by imitating and contemplating the light of the higher beings—who are, in their turn, assimilated to Christ—comes to be in the form of light, and its members are thus able to be “workers of divine works [*theourgikoi*].” The operative sense of Dionysius’s use of the term is captured later by Maximus the Confessor, for whom the (new) verb *theourgein* means “to divinize”; he uses it in the passive voice to denote the effect of divine grace conferred through Christ.

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RICHARD A. NORRIS

THIASOI is a term in Greek religious cults that designates the followers or adherents of a deity who, as a more or less formally organized group, participate in communal and private celebrations. While the Sanskrit root-word *dhiyaindhas* denotes devout and reverent supplication, the Greek term *thiasos* has become most strongly associated with the orgiastic and ecstatic frenzy of the worshipers of Dionysos, with features made famous through Euripides’ *The Bacchae*, such as omophagia (tearing animals apart and eating their raw flesh). The Dionysian *thiasoi* comprise such groups as the Maenads and Thyiads, which during the winter months performed their frenzied dances in trancelike states beyond “civilized” regions (i.e., cities and temple precincts) in the “wilderness,” in order to reenact the mythic fate of Dionysos himself (who was torn apart by Titans) as well as to reawaken the god of spring and fertility. While the *thiasoi* may have originated with the celebrations of any deity of the *polis*, after the fifth century BCE they seem to become more privatized, to be divorced at the same time from any specific sanctuary, and to lose their gender-specific separation of initiation rituals through which an individual becomes conversant with the mystery.

Thiasoi could be interpreted as the sometimes more public, sometimes more esoteric and secret fraternities, guilds, or clubs that are devoted and dedicated to any deity: in short, they are cult associations. Most commonly these associations were segregated by gender and age: as we find female attendants of Dionysos, we have also male clubs such as the Corybantes and Curetes for Zeus. The tendency toward dramatic representation and enactment of a deity’s mythic deeds appears in all such cult associations. All of them seem to have used such paraphernalia as masks and costumes.

Thiasoi may be closely related to such phenomena as women’s and men’s initiation clubs as found in the form of secret societies in many extant cultures. The Greek understanding would have come close to such dramatization of mythic events through imitation and identification: Plato mentions that the human *thiasoi* imitate their divine prototypes (Plato, *Laws* 815b). The initiation ordeals and actions of some cult associations can be historically verified, while the content and existence of many other such organizations must remain conjectural, such as the Idaean Dactyls, the Telchines, or the Cyclops, which could all have been mythic rep-

representations of existing secret craft associations of smiths.

What is certain is the development from purely religious and mystical cult associations to guild and craft associations (*technitai*), which continue to have religious characteristics. These guilds enjoyed many privileges, such as the right to asylum and freedom from taxation or military service. They were led by a priest of the Dionysos cult. In many ways the Greek development of clubs organized by gender and age seems to run a similar course, from mystical initiation and dramatic enacting of sacred history to rational organization of crafts and guilds, as we find in the development of fraternities and sororities in the history of Christianity.

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KLAUS-PETER KOEPPING

THOMAS À KEMPIS (1379/80–1471), also known as Thomas Hemerken, late medieval Christian mystic. Born in the German town of Kempen, near Cologne, Thomas at age fourteen entered one of the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life in the Dutch city of Deventer and spent the rest of his long life in the Netherlands. Ordained to the priesthood in 1413, he entered an Augustinian monastery near Zwolle, where he remained until his death. A reputed portrait of Thomas carries this inscription: "In all things I sought quietness and found it only in retirement and books." Whether or not the portrait is indeed one of Thomas, the legend is one that accurately describes him.

His lasting fame proceeds from the book *Imitation of Christ*. While its authorship cannot be firmly established and has been disputed by many scholars, the preponderance of opinion is that Thomas was the author. A devotional manual for personal spiritual growth and development, *Imitation of Christ* has been an influential guide to personal piety for persons as different as Samuel Johnson and John Wesley. The number of known editions far exceeds two thousand.

The fifteenth century saw a reaction against what was felt to be the excessively intellectual quality of medieval scholasticism. *Imitation of Christ* reflects these feelings in its marked Christocentricity and its insistence upon experience rather than reason, and it presents a kind of

piety that has appealed far beyond the Middle Ages. It shares many basic assumptions with eighteenth-century Protestant pietism and was an influential work for this movement, particularly in England and Germany.

The reputation of the book has diminished in the twentieth century because of its innate quietism. The social implications of the gospel and the activism that it might require find no support in Thomas's book. But wherever Christianity is seen as consisting primarily in personal devotion and private piety, the work's traditional reputation still holds.

Apart from *Imitation of Christ*, Thomas's writings have attracted little lasting attention. His *Small Alphabet for a Monk in the School of God* is in much the same vein as *Imitation*. A number of biographies of leaders in the Brethren of the Common Life breathe the same spirit but have never attained the same popularity.

Scholars have disagreed rather sharply about the relationship of Thomas to later movements, such as the Protestant Reformation. Albert Hyma argued that there was direct continuity between him and his school and Martin Luther. R. R. Post, on the other hand, maintained that the discontinuity was far greater than the continuity, especially in the way Thomas insisted on the virtues of monastic life. No definite answer is possible. Whatever his influence on Luther and Erasmus, it is known that *Imitation* was the favorite book of Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus.

For the most part Thomas simply ignored the peculiarities of later medieval theology, concentrating instead on his own inner experience. It is for this reason that the popularity of *Imitation of Christ* has far transcended the author's time and place. A devotionalist rather than a theologian, Thomas has had a continuing appeal to persons of similar disposition.

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HOWARD G. HAGEMAN

THOMAS AQUINAS (Tommaso d'Aquino, 1225–1274), Italian Dominican theologian, doctor of the church, patron of Roman Catholic schools, and Christian saint. One of the most important and influential

scholastic theologians, Thomas is seen by the Roman Catholic church as uniquely "her very own" (Pius XI). He has been honored with the scholastic titles Doctor Communis (thirteenth century) and Doctor Angelicus (fifteenth century), among others.

Life and Works. The youngest son of Landolfo d'Aquino, lord of Roccasecca and Montesangiovanni and justiciary of Emperor Frederick II, and his second wife, Teodora of Chieti, Thomas had five sisters, three older brothers, and at least three half brothers. The family castle of Roccasecca, where Thomas was born, midway between Rome and Naples, was on a mountain in the northwest corner of the kingdom of Sicily. Sicily was ruled by the Hohenstaufen emperor Frederic II (1194–1250), who was in almost continual warfare with the papal armies of Honorius III (1216–1227), Gregory IX (1227–1241), and Innocent IV (1243–1254). Divided political and religious loyalties rendered the position of the d'Aquino family precarious.

Thomas spent his first five years at the family castle under the care of his mother and a nurse. As the youngest son of the family, Thomas was given (*oblatus*, "offered") to the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino by his parents at the age of five or six in the firm hope that he would eventually choose the monastic life and become abbot. His earliest training was in the spiritual life, mainly through the Latin psalter, and in the rudiments of reading, writing, and mathematics. The struggle between the pope and the emperor reached a climax in 1239, when Frederick was excommunicated a second time. The imperial troops occupied the abbey, foreigners were expelled, and the young students were sent to one of the Benedictine houses in Naples to attend the imperial university founded in 1224 as a rival to Bologna. At the university, where Thomas remained until 1244, he studied under Master Martin (grammar and logic) and Peter of Ireland (natural philosophy). It was there that he was introduced to Aristotle's philosophy.

By 1243 Thomas was attracted to the Dominicans living nearby at the priory of San Domenico. This order of mendicant friars, founded by Dominic (1170–1221) and confirmed by Pope Honorius III in 1216, was devoted to preaching, study, and the common life. Impressed by their apostolic zeal, poverty, and simplicity and free from obligation, Thomas received the habit in April 1244 at the age of nineteen. Under normal circumstances he would have made his novitiate at San Domenico, but because the friars feared that Thomas's family might intervene forcibly to prevent his entrance to the order, he was sent to Rome. At Rome it was decided that he should go to Paris, and so early in May 1244 he left Rome in the company of John of Wildeshausen, third master of the order, and John's compan-

ions, who were traveling to Bologna for the general chapter that met annually at Pentecost.

Learning of her son's entry into a begging order, Teodora, now head of the family, hastened to Naples, then to Rome, only to learn that her son had departed for Bologna. She sent orders to her older son Rinaldo, who was with Frederick's army north of Rome, to intercept Thomas and bring him home by force if necessary. Rinaldo and his escort intercepted the travelers near Acquapendente, north of papal territory, and forced Thomas to return on horseback. Stopping for the night at the family castle of Montesangiovanni in papal territory, the soldiers secured the services of a local prostitute to seduce Thomas, but to no avail. The next day the group rode to Roccasecca, where Thomas was restricted to the castle until Frederick II was excommunicated and deposed by the Council of Lyons on 17 July 1245. By then Teodora and her daughters saw that further attempts to change Thomas's resolve were useless and allowed him to rejoin the friars in Naples, from whence he was sent to Paris.

Arriving at the priory of Saint-Jacques by October 1245, Thomas began his studies at the University of Paris under Albertus Magnus, who was then lecturing on the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite. After three years of study in Paris, Thomas and others accompanied Albertus to Cologne, where a new *studium generale* was to be established, as decreed by the general chapter of Paris in 1248. For the next four years Thomas continued to attend and write down Albert's lectures on Dionysius and his questions on Aristotle's *Ethics*. As Albert's junior bachelor (1250–1252), Thomas lectured cursorily on *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, and *Lamentations*.

The position of the mendicant friars at the University of Paris came under increasingly severe attack from secular masters, particularly William of Saint-Amour. By 1252 the Dominican master general was eager to send promising young men to the university to prepare for inception as master (full professor). Albert convinced the master general to send Thomas, despite his young age, to study for the university chair for non-Parisians. Thomas began his studies under Elias Brunet de Bergerac in the fall of 1252, lecturing on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* for four years. His originality and clarity of thought were conspicuous in his teaching and writing, notably in his commentary on the *Sentences*; *On Being and Essence*, on the meaning of certain metaphysical terms; and in a short treatise entitled *Principles of Nature*. In the latter work he unequivocally defended (1) a real distinction between essence and existence (*esse*) in all creatures, (2) the pure potentiality of primary matter, (3) absence of matter in spiritual substance (*substantia separata*), (4) participation of all created reality,

material and immaterial, in God's being (*esse*), and (5) the Aristotelian dependence of abstracted universals on individually existing material things.

Under tense circumstances in the spring of 1256, Thomas, though underage, was given license to incept by an order of Pope Alexander IV dated 3 March. When finally he was allowed to incept, by an order of the pope dated 17 June, he and his audience had to be protected by soldiers of Louis IX because the animosity of the town and some students against the mendicants was so great. William of Saint-Amour's antimendicant book *On the Perils of the Last Days*, sent to Rome by the king for examination, was condemned by the pope on 5 October, and William was permanently exiled from Paris by the king. Thomas's reply to William's charges (*Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem*), completed in late September or early October, arrived in Rome after the pope had made his decision and, therefore, did not influence the outcome.

Enjoying a respite from the antimendicant polemic, Thomas lectured from 1256 to 1259 on the Bible, held scholastic disputations (*Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*) over three years, preached, and began composing his *Summa contra gentiles* (1259–1264), apparently for Dominican missionaries in Spain and North Africa. This systematic summary in four books is an arsenal of sound and persuasive arguments "against the gentiles," that is, nonbelievers and heretics.

Having served the order's interests in Paris, Thomas returned to Italy where he taught, wrote, and preached from 1259 to 1268. After spending two years in his home priory of Naples, he was assigned to teach at Orvieto (1261–1265), where he lectured to the community on *Job* and was of great service to Pope Urban IV. At the pope's request, he composed the liturgy for the new Feast of Corpus Christi and expressed his views in *Against the Errors of the Greeks* on doctrinal points disputed by Greek and Latin Christians. Having thereby discovered the richness of the Greek patristic tradition, he also began compiling a continuous gloss, or exposition, of the Gospels (*Catena aurea*), made up almost entirely of excerpts from the writings of the Greek and Latin fathers, dedicating the commentary on *Matthew* to Urban IV. In June 1265, the provincial chapter of Anagni assigned Thomas to open a school of theology at Santa Sabina in Rome. Soon realizing that Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, then in common use, was unsatisfactory for young beginners, Thomas projected a three-part survey of Catholic theology (*Summa theologiae*) that would be simpler, more orderly, and more inclusive than other works available. The first part was completed and in circulation by 1268. More subtle questions

were disputed in the Roman school in a special series on the power of God (*De potentia*) and on evil (*De malo*). In addition, Thomas lectured on the Bible during this period.

By the end of 1268, Thomas was ordered to return to Paris, as was the Frenchman Peter of Tarentaise (the future Pope Innocent V), to counter a revival of antimendicant sentiment among secular masters. When Thomas and his secretary Reginald of Piperno arrived in Paris early in 1269, Thomas realized that the situation was far more complex and serious than he had assumed. Almost single-handedly he was required to fend off attacks on three fronts: with all mendicants against secular masters opposed to mendicants' being in the university; with a few of his confreres against most of the Dominicans, Franciscans, and secular theologians, opposed to using Aristotle in theology; and with most theologians against young philosophers who tended to promulgate heretical views under the name of Aristotle or his commentator Ibn Rushd (Averroës). Over the next five years Thomas fulfilled his university obligations to lecture on the Bible, to hold disputations, and to preach, while also carrying on a vigorous polemic against the antimendicants, expounding all the major works of Aristotle, writing his *Summa theologiae*, and replying to numerous requests for his opinions.

Revival of the antimendicant controversy under Gérard d'Abbeville and his colleagues at Paris (encouraged by the exiled William) centered largely on the role of evangelical poverty in the spiritual life and on the practice of admitting young boys into their novitiate. Thomas attacked the views of Gérard in his quodlibetal disputations (1269–1271), in two polemical treatises on Christian perfection, and in his *Summa* (2.2.179–189). This phase of the controversy ended with the death of its chief protagonists, William of Saint-Amour on 13 September 1272 and Gérard at Paris that same year on 8 November.

On 10 December 1270 thirteen philosophical propositions opposed to the Catholic faith were condemned by Étienne Tempier, bishop of Paris. To prevent such views from developing in the classroom, Thomas undertook a detailed literal commentary on all the main texts of Aristotle then in common use at the University of Paris. It is possible that Thomas began his commentary on *De anima* in Italy, but all the others were written after his return to Paris in 1269, namely, the commentaries on *Physics*, *On Interpretation*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Ethics*, *Metaphysics*, *Politics*, and certain others left unfinished at his death. Because all these works of Aristotle were used as textbooks in the arts faculty and had to be taught by the young masters whose best guide to date

had been Ibn Rushd, Thomas therefore felt a particular urgency in writing his own commentaries that remained closer to the original sources and within the context of Christian faith. His unfinished expositions of Aristotle's *De caelo*, *De generatione*, and *Metheora* were among his last writings at Naples.

The extensive second part of the *Summa theologiae* was entirely written at Paris during the intense years 1269 to 1272. This part, later subdivided into two parts, discusses the ultimate goal of human life, namely, eternal life (2.1.1–5) and the means of attaining it, namely, human acts, reason (law), grace, and all the virtues considered in general (2.1) and in particular (2.2) as practiced in various states of life. The third part, begun at Paris, considers the incarnation and life of Christ (3.1–59) and the sacraments, and was left incomplete on the subject of penance when Thomas died.

Shortly after Easter 1272, Thomas left Paris with Friar Reginald for the chapter at Florence, which commissioned him to establish a theological *studium* anywhere he liked in the Roman province. He chose his home priory of Naples, where he subsequently taught, wrote, and preached. After five years of intense activity, however, Thomas had a traumatic experience while celebrating mass in the Chapel of Saint Nicholas on 6 December 1273. Although medieval biographers were uncertain about the nature of this experience, it seems that Thomas suffered a breakdown of some sort. In any case, his productive life had come to an end, and although he did remain physically mobile, he lived as if in a stupor.

Pope Gregory X personally requested that Thomas attend the Second Council of Lyons due to open on 1 May 1274. He also asked him to bring a copy of his treatise *Against the Errors of the Greeks*, composed for Urban IV. Leaving Naples with Reginald and others early in February, Thomas had a serious accident near Maenza in which he hit his head against an overhanging branch and was knocked down. Growing weaker, Thomas asked to stop at the castle of Maenza, home of his niece Francesca, the wife of Annibaldo, count of Ceccano. Lent had already begun on 14 February, and Thomas's condition became so serious that he asked to be transported to the nearby Cistercian monastery of Fossanova, where the old abbot Theobald was a member of the Ceccano family. There he received the last rites and died early Wednesday morning 7 March 1274. Thomas's remains stayed at Fossanova until they were transferred by order of Urban V to the Dominican priory in Toulouse on Saturday, 28 January 1369, where they are today. Since the anniversary of Thomas's death always falls in Lent, the Latin church celebrates his feast on 28 January.

Thomas had no immediate successors capable of grasping his originality and profundity, although he had many admirers. His labors in Paris were effectively dissipated by the condemnation of 219 various propositions at Paris on 7 March 1277 and of 30 different propositions at Oxford on 18 March that same year. Sixteen propositions of the Paris list reflected the thought of Thomas; three of the Oxford list directly concerned unicity of substantial form in material composites, a pivotal Thomistic thesis. It was not until Thomas's canonization on 18 July 1323 that a new generation of largely self-taught Thomists could begin to teach and develop his teachings freely.

Thought. Thomas Aquinas was first and foremost a theologian whose teachings have been officially endorsed by the Roman Catholic church. Since 1567 Thomas has been considered one of the doctors of the church and has been numbered among the great teachers of antiquity such as Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, and Gregory I. Moreover, the Latin church has regarded Thomas as the model for all theologians, requiring that his philosophy and his theology be taught in all seminaries and Catholic colleges.

Philosophy. While giving primacy of place and importance to what God has revealed through the Jewish people and through Jesus Christ, Thomas recognized the much larger, though less important, realm of knowledge available to unaided human reason. Unlike many of his contemporaries who merged reason into faith, Thomas emphasized the distinctness and importance of Aristotelian philosophy and the sciences, even for theology. His own strictly philosophical thought is found in his numerous commentaries on Aristotle and in independent treatises. In the manner of his contemporaries in the universities, he adapted his own understanding of Aristotelian ideas, terminology, and methodology to the study of "sacred doctrine," especially in his *Summa theologiae*.

Thomistic "philosophy" is basically Aristotelian, empirical, and realist, or what G. K. Chesterton called "organized common sense." Thomas preferred an order of study that presupposed the liberal arts and mathematics and began with Aristotelian logic, principally *On Interpretation* and the *Posterior Analytics*; moved through natural philosophy, involving all the natural sciences, including psychology; treated moral philosophy, including political science; and concluded with metaphysics, or first philosophy, which today would include epistemology and natural theology.

In logic the Aristotelian categories, syllogisms, and rules of correct reasoning for "demonstration" as distinct from "dialectics" and "sophisms" are considered

essential for an accurate understanding of all other disciplines. Of special importance are the meaning of "scientific" knowledge based on "first principles" and the two ways in which both are acquired: experience (*via inventionis*) or education (*via disciplinae*).

In natural philosophy the existence of a physical world and its substantial mutability are taken as self-evident in order to establish the first principles of change: matter (potentiality), form (actuality), and privation (immediate possibility). Natural science is about natural things (not artificial or incidental), things that have within themselves "nature" either as an actual principle (form as a dynamic source of activity) or as a passive principle (matter as receptive of outside forces). The aim of natural science is to understand all natural things through their material, efficient, formal, and final causes. In so doing the naturalist discovers an ultimate, intelligent, efficient, and final cause that is not physical (i.e., not material and not mutable) and is the "first cause" and "agent" of all that is natural. The noblest part of this science is the study of the whole human person composed of matter (body) and form (soul). This study also shows that the human soul has functions, namely, understanding and free choice, that transcend the limitations of animal nature, thereby proving the soul to be immaterial, created, and immortal.

Moral philosophy for Aristotle and Thomas presupposes psychology and deals with human happiness, which is the goal of each person in this life, and the optimum (morally good) means of attaining that goal for the individual, the family, and the body politic. The foundation of both goal and correct means is called the natural law, which is knowable by human reason but open to rejection by the individual. There are four cardinal virtues, or optimum means, for use in every state of life: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The highest of these is prudence, which binds all virtues together and securely guides humanity to happiness.

Finally metaphysics, or speculative wisdom (natural theology), is about all being-as-such and about the First Cause as the source of all being. For Thomas the most "sublime truth" of this wisdom is the realization that all creatures are composed of a "nature" and a borrowed existence (*esse*), while God's nature alone is "to exist." God is subsistent existence itself (*ipsum esse subsistens*), the Necessary Being that cannot not be. As the highest science, metaphysics has the added task of ordering, defending, and safeguarding all other sciences, speculative and practical. In this role it examines the roots and foundation of all human knowledge (epistemology), natural religion, and public worship.

Theology. Thomistic "theology," which Thomas calls sacred doctrine, is distinct from pure philosophy and

depends on the divine gift of faith, which involves the whole realm of revelation, divine law, ecclesial worship, the spiritual life, and human speculation about these. The realm of faith is in the strict sense "super-natural" in that its truths, values, and efficacy transcend the realm of "nature." Faith's abilities are freely given by God for human salvation and are beyond the abilities of pure nature (cf. *Rom.* 11:5–6). The content of faith concerns what one must believe (faith) and do (morals) to gain eternal life as revealed by God. The life of faith is a personal sharing by grace of the intimate trinitarian life of God here and hereafter. The efficacy of the life of faith is derived from the passion and death of Jesus Christ, God's only begotten Son. These beliefs and morals are transmitted in history through the Bible and through the living church founded by Christ on Peter and his successors.

Thomas did not divide theology into such modern disciplines as biblical and scholastic, positive and speculative, dogmatic and moral, spiritual and mystical, kerygmatic and academic, and so on. In his day, however, each master in sacred theology lectured on the Bible, presided over scholastic disputations on specific points, and also preached regularly to the university community. Thomas wrote his *Summa theologiae* not as a replacement for the Bible but as an extracurricular aid for beginners who needed an overview of "sacred doctrine." Although the *Summa* is divided into three parts, its conceptual unity is the Dionysian circle of the *exitus* ("going forth") of all things from God and the *reditus* ("return") of all things to God. The First Part considers God and the coming forth of all things from God. The Second and Third parts consider the final goal of human life and the actual return of all things to God. The two parts of the Second Part consider the intrinsic means such as virtues, law, and grace, while the Third Part considers Christ and his sacraments as indispensable extrinsic means to salvation. Without doubt Thomas's most original contribution to theology was the large Second Part, on the virtues and vices, inserted between the original *exitus* and *reditus* found in all contemporary *summae* of theology. The "Supplement" to the *Summa* fills out what Thomas left unfinished when he ceased writing on 6 December 1273. It was compiled with scissors and paste by Reginald and other secretaries from Thomas's earlier commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (4.17–46). Certainly if Thomas had lived to finish the *Summa*, many more developed views would have been written than are now expressed there.

Because theology concerns mysteries revealed by God, it can in no way "prove" or "understand" these or any other mysteries. But it can clarify the terms used, determine what cannot be said, and defend the truth of

revealed mysteries against attacks from nonbelievers. Of all the revealed mysteries, Thomas considered two as absolutely basic to the Christian religion: the trinity of persons in one God and the incarnation of the Son of God as true man born of Mary.

For Thomas the supernatural gifts of sanctifying grace and the virtues (faith, hope, love, and the moral virtues) are normally conferred through baptism by water in the name of Jesus or the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But in an adult the beginnings of this supernatural life are stirred up by God before actual baptism by water. The supernatural life of grace (*gratia*) experienced in this life is, for Thomas, already a foretaste of eternal life (*gloria*) in heaven. The overflow of grace is expressed in good works and in the exercise of all the virtues.

Faith, hope, and love are called "theological" virtues, because they alone have God as their direct object. In the life to come, faith will give way to sight and hope will give way to the possession of God. Love, alone, which Thomas defines as friendship with God, will continue essentially unaltered in heaven in the degree of intensity achieved in this life. This divine friendship, which is none other than the indwelling of the Trinity, is initiated by baptism, nourished by the Eucharist, and increased by prayer and service to one's neighbor. For Thomas, one's place in heaven, or the intensity of beatitude, is determined by the capacity for love developed in this life.

The sources of Thomas's theology are the Vulgate Bible, the life and practice of the church, and the writings of all the available Latin and Greek fathers in Latin translation. The terminology, however, is always traditional, largely philosophical, and often Aristotelian. For this reason it is important to understand such technical terms as matter and form, substance and accidents, essence and existence, nature and operations, and soul and faculties, as well as the four Aristotelian causes, if one is to grasp the meaning of Thomas's exceptionally lucid and simple Latin.

Influence. Apart from the admiration, love, and respect accorded him by scholars and theologians, Thomas exerted little influence by the time he died in 1274. At Paris his literary and personal efforts could neither stem the tide of heterodoxy among teachers of philosophy nor abate the growing fears of Augustinian theologians against the use of Aristotle or any pagan philosopher in the schools of theology.

From 1278 onward, however, the general chapters of the Dominican order showed an increasing concern that the writings of Thomas be at least respected within the order. By 1309 the chapter required all Dominican lecturers to lecture from the works of Thomas, to solve

problems according to his doctrine, and to instruct their students in the same. Even before his canonization, Dominicans were obliged to teach according to Thomas's doctrine and the common teaching of the church. In 1279 the Parisian Franciscan William de la Mare compiled a "correctory" (*Correctorium*) of Thomas's writings, indicating therein where Thomas differed from Bonaventure and Augustine. In May 1282 this correctory was made mandatory for all Franciscan teachers, but by 1284 there were five defensive replies by young Dominican teachers, three of whom were Oxonians influenced by the brilliant Thomas Sutton, a self-taught Dominican Thomist. The canonization of Thomas on 18 July 1323 and the lifting in 1325 of the Parisian condemnation insofar as it touched or seemed to touch Thomas removed the foremost barriers to the teaching of his ideas universally. But it was not until the sixteenth century that Thomists began to develop his seminal principles in a notable way. An exception was the French Dominican John Capreolus (1380–1444), "the Prince of Thomists," who in his *Defensiones* on the *Sentences* incisively expounded and defended Thomas's views against Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, John of Ripa, William of Ockham, and others.

In the sixteenth century four influential teachers substituted Thomas's *Summa* for the standard *Sentences* of Peter Lombard: Peter Crockaert in Paris (in 1509); Thomas de Vio Cajetan at Pavia (in 1497), author of an important commentary on the *Summa*, (1507–1522); Konrad Koellin at Heidelberg (1500–1511), author of a commentary on the first two parts of the *Summa* (1512); and Francisco de Vitoria at Salamanca (in 1526) and his many disciples throughout Spain. These Thomists were concerned not so much with defending Thomism as with replying to issues raised by the reformers, resolving new problems of an expanding civilization, and applying Thomas's principles to developments in international law and the treatment of Indians in the New World. By the time of the Council of Trent (1545–1563), most of the outstanding Roman Catholic theologians were Thomists. The influence of Thomas is clear throughout the council's decrees, notably on justification, the sacraments, and the mass. [See Trent, Council of.] The influential *Roman Catechism*, published by order of Pius V in 1566, was the work of three Dominican Thomists. Pius V declared Thomas a doctor of the church (1567) and ordered that the first *Opera omnia* (the "Piana") be published with the remarkable index (*Tabula aurea*) of Peter of Bergamo at Rome (18 vols., 1570–1571). Since the Piana edition, there have been ten editions of complete works apart from the current critical edition ordered by Pope Leo XIII in 1879 (the "Leonine").

After the Reformation and throughout the scientific and industrial revolutions, there was little interest in Thomistic philosophy or theology outside the decimated Dominican order and scattered groups in Catholic countries. However, a Thomistic revival in Italy and Spain slowly grew and reached its culmination in the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII (4 August 1879), urging the study of Thomas's works by all students of theology, and in subsequent legislation by Leo and his successors. This revival focused on Thomistic philosophy as a system capable of countering the effects of positivism, materialism, and secularism on Catholic beliefs and practices. This polemical intention was modified by the attitude of dialogue with the modern world that characterized the approach of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). In this spirit Paul VI, in his encyclical on the seventh centenary of Thomas's death (1974), proposed Thomas as a model to theologians, not only with respect to his teachings but with respect to his example of openness to the world and to truth from whatever the source. As a result, there has been increased study and critical reappraisal of Thomas's thought, principles, and methodology. Although Thomism in the restricted sense of a closed system seems no longer tenable, philosophers and theologians of all traditions continue to have recourse to Thomas's thought as a milestone in human thought and to develop his seminal insights in dialogue with modern thought and issues.

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THOR (ON, Þórr) was presumably the most popular god of the ancient Scandinavian peoples, who conferred upon him such epithets as *ástvinr* ("dear friend"), *fulltrúi* ("trusted friend"), and the like. The spread of his cult is abundantly documented by onomastic evidence; his name is found all over present-day Scandinavia in place-names designating either cult sites or places dedicated to him—woods, fields, hills, brooks, and lakes (de Vries, 1957, pp. 116–120).

Equally abundant are the personal names with *Thor* as first component. About one-fourth of the immigrants to Iceland had such names, according to the *Landnámabók*. The Vikings venerated him as their most powerful god and honored him in their new settlements. Local sources report the worship of Þórr by the Norse invaders of Ireland; Þórr's hammer, Mjöllnir, appeared on the coinage of the Scandinavian rulers of York in the tenth century; there was apparently a temple dedicated to Þórr by Varangian Northmen in Kiev in 1046; the Danes settling in Normandy are said to have invoked "Tur." Even the Lapps, who were strongly influenced by their Germanic neighbors, took Þórr Karl into their pantheon as the hammer god Horagalles. Furthermore, artifacts such as Þórr's-hammer amulets bear witness to the strength and survival of his worship even some time after the conversion to Christianity (eleventh century). In this context the Cross of Gosforth in Cumbria, England, is particularly striking, for this essentially Christian symbol bears a graphic representation of one of Þórr's major myths, namely his fishing expedition with the giant Hymir at the rim of the world ocean to catch the cosmic serpent Miðgarðsormr: the scene represents the god "digging his heels so hard into the bottom of the boat" to draw the serpent on board "that both his legs went through it" (Snorri Sturluson, *Gylfaginning* 48).

When Adam of Bremen visited the temple of Uppsala in the eleventh century, he noticed that although a triad of gods—Óðinn, Þórr, Freyr—was worshiped there, Þórr occupied the central position "because he was the most powerful of them all." This statement, which contradicts Snorri's ranking of Þórr in the second place, after Óðinn, presumably points to the fact that his closeness both to warriors and to peasants gave him more prominence in popularity than the more "aristocratic" Óðinn. In spite of the derogatory assertion of the ferryman in the *Hárbarzljóð*—"Óðinn gets all the jarls slain by edge of swords, but Þórr, the breed of thralls"—the Old English homily *De falsis diis* (Concerning False Gods), commonly ascribed to Ælfric, identifies Þórr with Jupiter and calls him "arwurðost ealra þæra goda" ("the most venerable of all gods"). For Snorri Sturluson (*Gylfaginning* 21), Þórr is the strongest of the Æsir and the most important among them (after Óðinn); his domain is Þrúðvangar ("fields of force"), and his home, Bilskirnir (presumably "shining in flashes," a reference to his connection with lightning). He has two goats, Tanngnjóstr ("tooth gnasher") and Tanngrnisnir ("grinner"), which pull his chariot; therefore, Þórr is called Okuþórr ("Þórr the charioteer"). He also has three precious objects: his hammer Mjöllnir, which all giants fear, his "power belt," which doubles his strength, and

his iron gauntlets, which he needs to manipulate his hammer. His adventures are so numerous that no one is able to tell them all.

This describes rather well the personality and function of Þórr: he is a characteristic second-function god in the Dumézilian tripartite system, the typical representative of the warrior class, the champion of the gods, the bulwark of the Æsir against the onslaughts of the giants. His whole career illustrates this functional role.

Perhaps one of the best examples is the story of his combat with Hrungnir (Snorri Sturluson, *Skáldskaparmál* 3). The sequence of events can be summarized as follows. Having followed Óðinn in a wild gallop into Ásgarðr, the giant Hrungnir is invited by the Æsir to drink with them. His obstreperous behavior soon compels the Æsir to call upon Þórr to put an end to his drunken boasts and threats, but the laws of hospitality prevent the champion of the gods from sealing the giant's fate then and there. As a result, Þórr is challenged to a single combat with Hrungnir at the boundary between the realm of the Æsir and Jötunheimr (the land of the giants). To back up Hrungnir in his fight, the giants build the monstrous Møkkurkálfi, a huge clay warrior equipped with a mare's heart. Þjálfi, Þórr's astute attendant, persuades Hrungnir that he will be attacked from below, and makes him stand on his shield, exposing him to a fulgurant assault from the sky. Þórr's hammer clashes in midair with the hurled hone of the giant; Mjöllnir smashes Hrungnir's skull while fragments of whetstone are scattered all around. One lodges in Þórr's head as Hrungnir drops dead over him and has to be removed by Þórr's fantastically strong three-year-old son, Magni. Meanwhile Møkkurkálfi has ingloriously collapsed under Þjálfi's strokes. A last episode shows how the witch Gróa attempts to remove the piece of Hrungnir's whetstone from Þórr's head but forgets her spells and incantations in the joy of learning that her husband, Aurvandill, has been safely brought home out of the icy North by Þórr.

Snorri's narrative illustrates important features of the ethics and usages of the warrior class: respect for the laws of hospitality (e.g., in spite of Hrungnir's outrageous behavior, Þórr cannot touch him as long as he is a guest in Ásgarðr); taboo on striking down an unarmed adversary (killing him would be an act of cowardice); moral obligation to accept a challenge to a duel; single combat to be waged in the no-man's-land between two enemy territories.

The significance of the dummy (Møkkurkálfi) that the giants erect at the location of the duel has been ingeniously explained by Georges Dumézil: Þórr faces and defeats the "stone-hearted" monster, and his "second," Þjálfi, duplicates his exploit by destroying Møkkurkálfi.

He sees a warrior initiation pattern in this two-level account, in which Þjálfi reproduces in a realistic terrestrial way the almost cosmic martial exploit of Þórr (Dumézil, 1970, pp 158–159).

His interpretation is supported by the slightly ludicrous episode in the *Hrólfs saga Kraka* (chap. 23), in which the wandering hero Þóðvar Bjarki has taken the young Hǫttr under his wing. On the eve of the midwinter festival (Yule), King Hrólf forbids his men to leave his stronghold because an enormous winged troll has appeared and has killed any champion who challenged him. Þóðvar, however, goes out secretly to face the troll, dragging the fearful young Hǫttr along. The monster appears, and while Hǫttr shrinks in the mud in terror, Þóðvar dispatches the beast with one thrust of his sword. Picking up Hǫttr, he forces him to drink two gulps of the troll's blood and a piece of his heart, after which he engages in a duel with the young man. Hǫttr comes out of this test a truly strong and courageous fighter. They then stand the monster on its feet, as if it were still alive, and return to the king's castle. The following morning, much to the king's surprise, Hǫttr volunteers to go out and "kill" the monster. Ultimately, Hrólf is not fooled, but he accepts Hǫttr's overnight transformation into a real champion and renames him Hjalti, after the king's sword Gullinhjalti ("golden hilt").

Another well-known adventure of Þórr is narrated in the Eddic *Þrymskviða*. One day Þórr wakes up and realizes to his dismay that Mjöllnir has been stolen. He dispatches Loki, equipped with Freyja's falcon coat, to Jǫtunheimr to look for it. Loki soon finds out that the giant Þrymr has gotten hold of Þórr's mighty weapon and refuses to return it unless he gets Freyja as a bride in exchange. Freyja does not want to hear anything about marrying the uncouth giant, and the gods assemble in council to look for a solution to Þórr's dilemma. Upon Heimdallr's advice, they decide that Þórr himself must go to Þrymr, disguised as a bride and escorted by Loki. After their arrival in Þrymr's hall, a lavish meal is served to the travelers from Ásgarðr, but Þórr almost betrays himself by his gluttony. Loki, however, saves the day by stating that "Freyja yearned so much for Jǫtunheimr that she fasted for eight full nights." The situation threatens to deteriorate again when Þrymr attempts to kiss his "bride" and discovers the murderous flames in "her" eyes. Again, Loki finds the proper excuse: "So much did Freyja long to be in Jǫtunheimr that she did not sleep for eight full nights." Then, Þrymr's sister comes to claim her bridal gift, and Þrymr has the hammer Mjöllnir brought in and placed on his alleged bride's knees, whereupon Þórr grabs his weapon

and ruthlessly crushes the skulls of all the giants around him.

No other source duplicates the contents of this remarkable Eddic lay, which achieves its effect with an admirable economy of means and a robust sense of humor, paired with a well-structured scenario and marvelous characterization of the actors in this little drama. Although the poet undoubtedly took his material from older mythological sources, the ballad style of the text and the jocular presentation of the argument clearly indicate that the *Þrymskviða* is one of the more recent poems of the Edda. The ludicrous disguise of the champion of the gods is unthinkable in the older tradition, where it would have been completely excluded by the explicit abhorrence of the Æsir for transvestism and other forms of *ergi* ("unmanly behavior"), as illustrated by the *Lokasenna* (23–24), for example.

The text, however, indicates the importance of Þórr's hammer, Mjöllnir, which is not only associated with the thunderbolt, as its name perhaps indicates (it has been etymologically connected with Russian *molniia* and with Welsh *mellt*, "lightning," but it can also be cognate with Old Norse *mala*, "grind," *mølva*, "crush") and appears to be used to hallow the bride (*Þrymskviða* 30: "brúði at vígja"). This latter function has sometimes been associated with fertility, as the hammer can be considered a phallic symbol, but there is obviously more to the consecration with Þórr's hammer, as the description of Baldr's funeral indicates (Snorri Sturluson, *Gylfaginning* 49): "Þórr vígði bálit með Mjöllni" ("Þórr hallowed the pyre with Mjöllnir"). This would be done either to restore the god to life or to protect him from danger on his journey to the world of the dead. Since Baldr does not come back until after Ragnarǫk, the second hypothesis presumably prevails. It is furthermore confirmed by the repeated mention of Þórr as protector of the dead in memorial inscriptions on rune stones, especially in Denmark and southern Sweden, the earliest being found in Rök, East Götland, mid-ninth century. Thus, the inscription of Glavendryp (which is found on the Danish island of Fyn and dates to about 900–925) reads: "Þur uiki pas runar" ("May Þórr hallow these runes").

The control of Þórr's hammer over life and death is also illustrated by the following tale about Þórr's goats (*Gylfaginning* 44): One day, while on a journey with Loki, Þórr decided to ask a farmer for hospitality for the night. For the evening meal, Þórr slaughtered his own goats and after skinning them, cooked them in a caldron. When the stew was ready, he invited the farmer and his family to share it with him and his travel companion. The next morning, Þórr rose at daybreak and

went to the goatskins with the leftover bones. Raising his hammer, Mjöllnir, he consecrated them, and the goats stood up as if nothing had happened to them. However, one of them was found to be lame in a hind leg. When he noticed it, Þórr realized that a thigh-bone had been broken, and he was angry with the farmer and his household for doing such a stupid thing. The farmer was terrified, and Þórr's angry reproach sounded like a death knell to him. As his frightened family screamed, he begged his dangerous guest for mercy and offered him all he had in compensation. Þórr relented and specified that he would take along the farmer's two children—his son, Þjalfi, and his daughter, Rǫskva—as bond servants.

The association of Þórr with goats is abundantly documented. They pull his chariot; the *Húsdrapá* (st. 3) calls him *hafra njótr* ("user of goats"), and the *Hymiskviða* (st. 31) describes him as *hafra dróttinn* ("lord of goats"). The picture of Þórr riding a vehicle drawn by goats appears repeatedly in the literature (e.g., in *Hauslǫng* 15), and according to a story in the *Flateyjarbók* (late twelfth–early thirteenth centuries), when king Óláfr Tryggvason entered the pagan temple at Mærin in the Trondheim district, he found a statue of Þórr, adorned with gold and silver, seated on a splendid carriage drawn by finely carved wooden goats (Turville-Petre, 1964, p. 82).

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THOTH was the god of wisdom from Hermopolis in Middle Egypt. According to the Hermopolitan cosmology (which is best known from texts found at other sites), the eight primordial gods representing "hiddenness," "darkness," "formlessness" (?), and the "watery abyss" produced an egg that appeared at Hermopolis when the inundation subsided and from which the creator god appeared and brought everything else into

being. When mentioned in the the Heliopolitan Pyramid Texts, this creator god was Atum, but in the local Hermopolitan tradition he could have been Thoth.

Thoth was the moon god and as such was the companion of Re, the sun god, but he also had his own following among the stars in the night sky. One mortuary tradition, probably originating at Hermopolis, permitted the dead who knew the correct spells to accompany Thoth in the sky. Thoth was the son of Re, but he also represented the injured eye of the falcon-headed sky god, Horus, whose sound eye was Re. For unknown reasons Thoth is identified with both the ibis and the baboon. He is regularly depicted as a human with the head of an ibis. Baboons often appear in temple reliefs worshiping the sun god, and this association might indicate his subordinate relationship to Re. In the judgment scene of chapter 125 of the *Book of Going Forth by Day*, Thoth as the ibis-headed god presides over and records the weighing of the heart of the deceased owner of the book. A baboon is also represented in this scene seated atop the balance, apparently to ensure its accuracy. Thoth is credited in Egyptian mythology with separating the two contenders, Horus and Seth, as well as with magically restoring Horus's injured eye. He has one of the major supporting roles in much of Egyptian religious literature, and a number of hymns are addressed to him directly, although Re and Osiris are the principal gods discussed and invoked in these texts.

Thoth was renowned for his wisdom and praised as the inventor of writing. The *mdw-ntr* ("god's words," i.e., hieroglyphs) were recognized as perhaps his greatest contribution, and he was frequently shown with brush and papyrus roll in the attitude of the scribes, whose patron he was.

In the eighteenth dynasty several kings took as their throne name *Thothmose* ("Thoth is the one who bore him"). This Thutmoseid family included several other members with *'i'h* ("moon") in their names, so it is clearly Thoth's position as moon god that is being recalled. Remains of two small temples to Thoth survive in the Theban area, one very late and poorly decorated. Since the eighteenth dynasty was of Theban origin and the son of Amun-Re at Thebes was the moon god, Khonsu, these two moon gods could have been assimilated, but the family could also have chosen the name of the northern god (Thoth) when they moved their residence (capital) to Memphis.

In Egyptian literature there clearly was an ancient tradition concerning the secret knowledge of Thoth. Secret rooms and mysterious books were sought by learned scribes, priests, and princes. This tradition was carried over into some of the Coptic gnostic library

tractates, and the question arises whether these were Egyptian or Greek in origin since the Greeks had early identified their god Hermes with Thoth. The origins of the continuing traditions of Hermes Trismegistos and gnosticism can be traced to Egypt, to Thoth, and perhaps even to the Hermopolitan cosmology, but the extent of Egyptian influence on these beliefs remains to be determined. [See Hermes Trismegistos.]

The great temple of Thoth at Hermopolis has not survived, although its location is known from finds in the area. A large catacomb for the burial of mummified ibises and baboons has been found nearby at the necropolis of Tuna al-Gabal.

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THRACIAN RELIGION. In ancient Greece the name *Thrakes* referred to most of the inhabitants of the northeastern Balkan Peninsula. Their neighbors to the east were the Scythians; to the west the Pannonians, Dalmatians, and Illyrians; to the north the Balts and the Celts. The name seems to have initially belonged only to the Thracian tribes in close proximity to Greece. Later on, it was extended to related tribes to the north, just as the name *Graeci*, which originally belonged only to a western Greek tribe, was later given by the Romans to all the Hellenes. Nevertheless, the location of the land called Thrake was always restricted to the area south of the Balkan Mountains, principally to the Chalcidice Peninsula.

Thracian Peoples. Nearly two hundred tribes are known under the generic name of Thrakes, of which the most important were the Odrysi, who lived in what is today southeastern Bulgaria; the Dentheleti, north of Macedonia; the Serdi, in Serdica, today the region of Sofia, the capital city of Bulgaria; the Bessi, west of Serdica; the Moesi, between the Balkan Mountains and the river Danube; and the Daco-Getae, who occupied a northern territory approximating modern-day Romania. Other Thracian tribes—the Thyni and Bithyni—settled in Asia Minor. The Phrygians and the Armenians, who originated in the Balkans, were related to them.

History. In the ancient world, the Thracians were, according to Herodotus (fifth century BCE), the most nu-

merous people after the Indians. Thracians are attested in connection with the Trojan War, and they seem to have had a share in the foundation of Troy (in Asia Minor, or modern-day Turkey). Only occasionally did they form larger unions of tribes: the only known confederations are the kingdom of the Odrysi (fifth–fourth centuries BCE), the Geto-Dacian kingdom of Burebista (c. 80–44 BCE), and the Daco-Getic kingdom of Decebalus (87–106 CE). Nonetheless, a certain material and spiritual unity of the Thracians (though not without important inner distinctions) was preserved by several tribes, despite their frequent displacements. Herodotus (*Histories* 5.3) notes that most of the Thracians had kindred customs, with the exception of the Getae, the Trausi, and those living beyond the tribe of the Crestonians.

According to the Greek geographer Strabo (first century BCE), the Getae spoke the same dialect as the other Thracians. Recent scholarship has shown, however, that both the culture and the language of the Getae, whom Herodotus calls "the most religious and valiant among the Thracians," were distinct from those of the southern Thracians. Scholars such as Vladimir Georgiev, Ivan Duridanov, and Cicerone Poghirc have established a clear distinction between two linguistic areas: the Thracian area, in which toponyms ending in *-para*, *-bria*, and *-diza* are dominant, and the Daco-Getic area, in which these endings are replaced by *-dava* and *-sara*. Anthroponyms and phonetic transformation both confirm this distinction. Culturally, the southern Thracians were related to the Iranians, to the Pelasgians, and to some peoples of Asia Minor. They exerted a certain spiritual influence on the Greeks, but they felt, in turn, the decisive impact of Greek civilization. The northern Thracians, the Daco-Getae, were, however, culturally closer to the Illyrians, the Celts, and the Balts. Before the Roman epoch, Greek influence north of the Danube was minimal: in Dacia only thirty Greek inscriptions have been found, representing 1 percent of the more than three thousand Roman inscriptions. In the northern territories the passage from the Hallstatt culture to the La Tène culture was determined by the Celtic invasions during the fourth and third centuries BCE.

Testimonies. The Thracians may be attested in documents written in Linear B, a form of writing used in Mycenaean records dating from the fifteenth to the twelfth century BCE. They are mentioned by Homer and by numerous later Greek and Roman authors. In the fourth century CE, the language of the Thracian tribe of the Bessi was still in use in Christian liturgy. A difficult question is whether any of the Thracian tribes ever used writing. It seems that they did, but only a few records have survived. At least the Geto-Dacians, who formed an impressive theocracy in the first century BCE, seem

to have used the Greek and Roman alphabets to transcribe their own language. No document is attested, however, apart from some mysterious inscriptions, each composed of three Greek letters, on stone slabs from the ruins of sanctuaries at Sarmizegetusa Regia (modern-day Grădiștea Muncelului, Romania). In all probability these inscriptions are not marks used by the Greek builders of the sanctuaries but are, instead, numbers related to the complicated astronomical computations of the Dacian priests. Because the slabs were scattered, it has so far been impossible to reconstruct the pattern by which the series of numbers can be read.

The basic sources on Thracian religion are Greek and Roman authors, including Herodotus, Plato, Strabo, the geographer Pomponius Mela, and the Moesian-born Gothic historian Jordanes (sixth century CE). Other sources usually depend on these authors and only occasionally provide important information; a notable exception is the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry (third century), who wrote on Zalmoxis. For southern Thrace, Greek votive inscriptions are particularly important; the collection edited by Georgi Mikhailov (1955–1956) contains about 160 names of divinities, together with epithets.

The Thracian regions bordering the Aegean Sea were completely hellenized. The province south of the Balkan Mountains remained under Greek influence even during Roman occupation. The northern regions were decisively influenced by the Romans after being subdued by them: Moesia Superior in 15 CE; Moesia Inferior, along with the Greek Pontic colonies, on the western shore of the Black Sea, in 46 CE; and Dacia in 106 CE. The last speakers of Thracian dialects disappeared from the region south of the Balkan Mountains after the invasion of the Slavs in the sixth century.

Thracian Religion: Some General Features. Religion among the southern Thracians developed along different lines from that of the northern Thracians (the Daco-Getae) owing to what could be called the religious reformation of Zalmoxis in the north. Whether Zalmoxis was a god or a human is an open question, but it can safely be stated that his priests, forming an uninterrupted line of succession that was at times indistinguishable from Daco-Getic kingship, introduced among the northern Thracians religious principles and, later on, scientific speculations that conferred upon their religion a peculiar character. [See Geto-Dacian Religion.] Different sources inform us of the penetration of these ideas among southern Thracians in early times, but Zalmoxis is uncontroversially known as a Gete. It is difficult to speak of a common religious heritage in regard to all Thracian peoples, for different beliefs and customs are attributed to various groups in various

sources, but it is easy to recognize in the sources features pertaining to the cult of Zalmoxis. [See Zalmoxis.] With the exception of Zalmoxis, whose influence extended from the north to the south, all Thracian divinities known in Greece from the fifth century BCE (e.g., Sabazios, Bendis, and Cotys) and the mythic characters to whom the Greeks attributed a Thracian background (e.g., Orpheus and Dionysos) originated among the southern Thracians.

According to Herodotus (5.7) the Thracians worshiped three divinities, corresponding to the Greek Ares, Dionysos, and Artemis, and their kings worshiped a fourth divinity, corresponding to Hermes, to whose posterity they were believed to belong.

As for Ares-Mars, the god of war, Jordanes (*De origine actibusque Getarum* 40–41) confirms his importance among the Getae, in whose land he was supposed to have been born (“apud eos . . . exortum”) and to have reigned (cf. Vergil, *Aeneid* 3.35). Prisoners of war were sacrificed to him, and his devotional cults were particularly intense in their affective tones.

Whether Herodotus in his mention of Dionysos was referring to Sabazios is a controversial point, since he could have directly mentioned the name of Sabazios. The same argument applies as well to the goddesses Bendis and Cotys, who are usually identified with Artemis. At the time of Herodotus both of them were known at Athens, and yet the historian did not mention their names in connection with the Thracian Artemis.

Ancient authors attributed to Dionysos himself a Thracian background. In the myth of Dionysos, a Thracian episode, mentioned by Homer (*Iliad* 5.130ff.), is particularly interesting. In numerous variants, it is recounted that the Thracian king Lykurgos (lit., “wolf’s anger”) pursues Dionysos, who, in his turn, brings down madness upon the king. The king then either kills himself or is eventually killed by Dionysos. The symbolism of this myth is very complicated. It refers, in all probability, to the cosmic effects of a battle between opposite principles represented by Apollo and Dionysos. As a matter of fact, the wolf is related to Apollo, who is often called Apollo Lukeios, a name referring both to the wolf (Gr., *lukos*) and to light (Gr., *lukē*, “dawn”; Lat., *lux*, “light”).

In several variants of the myth, Lykurgos tries to cut down a vine with an ax. Dionysos confuses him so that instead he kills his own son and cuts off one of his own legs. The mythologist Nonnus of Panopolis (fifth century) reports that Lykurgos, an Arab king who pursues Dionysos with an ax in order to kill him, hits one of the Maenads, Ambrosia, who is then changed into a vine. It is difficult to unravel the implications of this myth: while Lykurgos appears to be a vine hater, an enemy of

Dionysos, his action may instead simply represent a viti-culturist's pruning of his vines. There is nothing typically Thracian in all this, except perhaps the contradictory characterization of Thracians as either vine lovers or vine haters. Strangely enough, the calendar temple in the stronghold at Sarmizegetusa Regia seems to indicate that the Daco-Getic priests under Decebalus were concerned with the vegetative period of the vine, and that this concern was a major element in their culture; yet King Burebista is said to have ordered all vines in his kingdom to be cut down. Is the latter, perhaps, only a wrong assumption on the part of Strabo (*Geography* 7.7–11), who mistakenly expects wine hatred from the spiritualistic, Pythagorean features of Getic religion? This hypothesis deserves further investigation.

As for the Thracian Artemis, both Bendis and Cotys have been identified with this goddess. Bendis appears to be a goddess of marriage, while Cotys, or Kotyto, is an orgiastic Thracian divinity in whose cult men wore women's garments. Her name has been related to the Indo-European **kot-u-* ("avenger"; cf. the Greek *koteō*, "I am angry") and has thus been taken to mean "angry [goddess]" or "[goddess] of fight." Gheorghe Mușu prefers the etymology "[goddess] energy," from the Indo-European **kued-*, *kuod-* ("stimulate, urge on"). Both Bendis and Cotys were known at Athens from the fifth century BCE onward.

Neither worship of a heavenly god nor the institution of sacred kingship was confined to the northern Thracians. The military historian Polyaeus (second century) reported that the priests of Hera were kings of the tribes of the Kebrenoi and Sykaiboai. One of them, Kosingas, gathered many wooden ladders with the intent, he said, of climbing to heaven in order to indict the Thracians before Hera for their disobedience. Impressed, the Thracians swore to obey his orders.

Two practices that were general among the Thracians rested, in all probability, on religious bases: tattooing and the burial or cremation of living wives together with their dead husbands. Among the Getae, tattooing was probably related to the story of the sufferings once inflicted upon Zalmoxis, and was thus applied to members of certain social categories (e.g., women and slaves) as a sign of suffering. Among the southern Thracians, where only the nobles were tattooed, it must have had another symbolic meaning.

As for the burial or cremation of living widows, archaeological finds confirm the rather puzzling written evidence that the Thracians practiced either one or the other, and sometimes both in the same place. No reasons for this variation are given. Two works based on the findings at several necropolises in Dacia (Protase, 1971; Nicolaescu-Plopșor and Wolski, 1975) have con-

firmed the concurrent existence of both ritual practices, although cremation prevailed. Wives, sometimes accompanied by their infant children, were sacrificed at the death of their husbands and were buried or cremated in the same tomb. Both Herodotus and Pomponius Mela (*De situ orbis* 2.2.19–20) report that among polygamous Thracians the wives of the deceased vied for the great honor of being killed and buried together with the corpse of their husband.

Herodotus also reports a three-day exposure of the corpse, followed by animal sacrifices, feasting, mourning, and burial or cremation. To the historian Hellanicus (fifth century BCE) is attributed the information that the animal sacrifices and the banqueting were based on a belief that the deceased would return to the human world to participate in the feast. Pomponius Mela (2.2.18) affirms that some Thracians mourned a child's birth and rejoiced over death. Therefore the feasts following one's death were an expression of collective participation in the happy destiny of the dead. The Getae were not the only Thracians to believe in immortality, but their beliefs, which relate to the cult of Zalmoxis, are better known, for they impressed the Greek authors who came in contact with them after the fifth century BCE.

Strabo (7.3.3) reports that, according to the Stoic Posidonius of Apamea, the Mysians (whom Strabo correctly identifies as the Moesi, i.e., inhabitants of Moesia) practiced vegetarianism, feeding themselves on honey, milk, and cheese. These are called *theosebeis* ("worshippers of the gods") and *kapnobatai* ("walkers on smoke"). Some among the Thracians lived in continence and are recorded as *ktistai* (lit., "founders"). To the latter applies the Homeric epithet *abioi* (lit., "lifeless," i.e., poor), which was attributed to some of the inhabitants of Thrace. The epithet *kapnobatai* may refer to a practice mentioned by Pomponius Mela (2.2.21), according to which some Thracians did not use wine as an intoxicating liquor but instead inhaled smoke from fires upon which had been thrown seeds whose scent provoked exhilaration. The *Lexicon* of Hesychius of Alexandria (fifth or sixth century CE) reports under the word *kanabis* ("hemp") that hemp seeds were burned, and so *Cannabis sativa* may be a plausible identification of the intoxicating plant referred to by Pomponius.

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THRACIAN RIDER. The so-called Thracian Rider, a demigod who was the focus of a cult in ancient Thrace, is known principally from sculptures and inscriptions dating from the fourth century BCE to the early fourth century CE. In Greek and Latin inscriptions he is identified simply as "the hero" (*hērōs* or *heros*, usually, but also *hērōn*, *heron*, *eron*, etc.). According to Dimiter Detschew (1957, p. 200), the name of the Thracian horseman was probably related to the Thracian term for "hero," **ierus*, or **iarus*, which has Celtic parallels. If so, this linguistic fact reinforces the religious analogies between this Thracian type of divinity and the Greek heroes.

The oldest monuments of the Thracian Rider belong to the fourth century BCE, but his cult was particularly influential in Thrace and in Moesia Inferior (i.e., Lower Moesia, the region of Greco-Roman settlements on the western shore of the Black Sea) during the second and third centuries CE. Roman iconography and inscriptions of that time show that he was identified with Asklepios, Apollo, Dionysos, Silvanus, and other divinities. He bore the epithets *sōtēr* ("savior"), *iatros* ("healer"), and even *megas theos* ("great god"), the last in the city of Odessus (present-day Varna), where he was also known by the Thracian name of Darzalas.

The extant monuments to the Thracian Rider are reliefs and statuettes having either a votive or a funerary character. The horseman is usually represented as riding to the right, toward a tree on which a serpent is coiled. In the inscriptions, Greek and Latin epithets are often added to the generic name of the hero, showing that the cult was adapted to particular heroes, who sometimes were known by Thracian names. The epithets are usually toponyms, names of tribes, or attributes of the horseman.

The names of the worshipers are known from votive inscriptions. It is interesting to note that 61 percent of

the worshipers recorded in Moesia Inferior and Dacia (modern Romania and Bessarabia) bore Greek or Greco-Roman names, 34 percent bore Roman names, and only 5 percent bore names of Thracian or Thracio-Roman origin. Accordingly, it can be inferred that the majority of the adepts of the cult in Moesia Inferior were Greek.

Little is known about the cult itself, which was a combination of Greek and Thracian beliefs. At its height it was certainly related to concepts of survival after death and to healing, and it may have involved notions of survival either in the netherworld or in heaven. It was widespread among the population of Thrace and Moesia Inferior, and its devotees included people of various social standings and ethnic backgrounds. So far as we know, the cult never took the form of a mystery religion with secret communities organized in a hierarchy. The cult of the Thracian Rider died away in the first half of the fourth century CE.

[See also Dacian Riders.]

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TIBETAN RELIGIONS. [This entry consists of two articles. An Overview surveys the various religious traditions of Tibet and their interrelationship. History of Study treats the growth of modern historical studies of the Tibetan people and their religions. For further discussion of specific traditions, see Buddhism, article on Buddhism in Tibet; Buddhism, Schools of, article on Tibetan Buddhism; and Bon. The Tantric systems that characterize much of Tibetan Buddhism are introduced in Buddhism, Schools of, article on Esoteric Buddhism.]

An Overview

To the Western mind, Tibet has traditionally appeared as a remote yet uniquely fascinating country. Profoundly Buddhist in all aspects of its social, cultural, and religious life, it was, until 1959, dominated by a monastic hierarchy. In the imagination of some, the so-called Land of Snow (as the Tibetans style their country) has also been regarded as the home of mysterious,

superhuman beings, *mahatmas*, who, from their secret abodes in the Himalayas, give mystic guidance to the rest of humanity.

As sources become more abundant, a more realistic and complex view of Tibetan history and religion is gaining ground. The following points, which make this clear, should be kept in mind.

First, Buddhism in Tibet is represented by several traditions, monastic "orders," or schools, which have certain basic traits in common but also differ in significant respects. This must be taken into account when working with written sources, since traditional Tibetan historiography (which invariably is religious historiography) tends to reflect the more or less partisan views of the authors.

Second, Buddhism is not the only religion that must be taken into account. Buddhism penetrated into Tibet relatively late—perhaps not before the eighth century CE—and only gradually succeeded in supplanting a well-established indigenous religion that is still only fragmentarily known. Furthermore, from the tenth or eleventh century onward, the various Buddhist orders have existed alongside a religion known as Bon, which, while claiming, certainly not without some justification, continuity with the pre-Buddhist religion, is nevertheless almost indistinguishable from Buddhism in many respects. Bon has retained its own identity to this day. In addition, there remains a vast area of rites and beliefs that are neither specifically Buddhist nor Bon but may be styled "popular religion" or "the religion without a name." There is also a small minority of Tibetan Muslims (who will, however, not be treated in this article).

Third, it should be recognized that *Tibet* is a somewhat ambiguous term. In the present context it can only be used in a meaningful way to refer to an ethnically defined area—including parts of India and Nepal—that shares a common culture and language, common religious traditions, and, to a large extent, a common history. The so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region of China only comprises the western and central parts of Tibet, including the capital, Lhasa. The vast expanses of eastern and northeastern Tibet (Kham and Amdo) have since the 1950s been incorporated into China proper, but are ethnically and historically entirely Tibetan. Beyond Tibet (thus defined), Tibetan Buddhism is the official religion of Bhutan; until the early years of the twentieth century it reigned supreme in Mongolia; and it is still found among the Buriats and Tuvin in the Soviet Union. Its recent spread in the West will be discussed at the end of this article.

The term *Lamaism* is frequently used to refer to Tibetan religion. Tibetans often object to this term, as it

could be taken to imply that Buddhism in Tibet is somehow basically different from Buddhism in other parts of Asia. To the extent that the term *Lamaism* points to the important role of the lama (Tib., *bla ma*), or religious guide and expert in Tibetan religion, it can be said to refer equally to Buddhism and Bon, and thus it retains a certain usefulness. However, as a term intended to describe Tibetan religion as a whole, it remains one-sided and hence misleading.

The Pre-Buddhist Religion. When Buddhism was introduced into Tibet in the eighth century, it did not enter a religious vacuum. At present, however, it is not possible to arrive at an adequate understanding of the pre-Buddhist religion because of the incompleteness of the sources.

These sources fall into two categories: ancient and later. Ancient sources are those that predate the collapse of the royal dynasty in the middle of the ninth century. Archaeological sources are practically nonexistent, since only sporadic excavations have been undertaken to date. The royal tombs at 'Phyoñ-rgyas in central Tibet are still prominently visible but were plundered at an early date. The vast majority of the written sources are later than the introduction of Buddhism and thus often show traces of syncretic beliefs. These sources include inscriptions on pillars and bells, manuscripts containing fragments of rituals and myths or of divinatory practices, Buddhist texts that refute the ancient religion, and Chinese chronicles from the T'ang dynasty (618–907). The language of these Tibetan texts, however, is archaic and all too often obscure, and the manuscripts themselves are not infrequently in a fragmentary condition.

The later sources date from the twelfth century onward and are found mainly in the historical writings of Buddhism and the Bon religion, which, between them, had by this time been completely successful in an institutional sense at least in replacing the ancient religion. Many indigenous beliefs and practices have persisted until today in the popular, nonmonastic religion, but as they are usually closely intermixed with elements of Buddhism (or, as the case may be, with Bon), it is an exceptionally delicate task to use folk religion as a basis for reconstructing the pre-Buddhist religion.

Thus the picture of pre-Buddhist religion that emerges on the basis of the ancient sources is, unfortunately, fragmentary. Certain rituals, beliefs, and parts of myths may be discerned, but the overall feeling of coherency is lacking. Those elements that are known focus largely on the person of the king. It is safe to assert that the Tibetans, at least from the sixth century onward, if not earlier, had a sacral kingship. The welfare of the country depended on the welfare of the king. Ac-

cordingly, rites of divination and sacrifice were performed to protect his life, guarantee his victory in battle, and ensure his supremacy in all things. It is said in the ancient sources that "his helmet is mighty" and his rule "great, firm, supreme," and "eternal." The king "does not change"; he is endowed with "long life."

The king was regarded not only as a vitally important personage but above all as a sacred being. According to a frequently encountered myth, the first king of Tibet descended from heaven ("the sky") and alighted on the summit of a mountain (according to later sources, he made the descent by means of a supernatural rope or ladder). At the foot of the mountain he was received by his subjects. The earliest kings were believed to have ascended bodily to heaven by the same means, thus leaving no corpse behind. Furthermore, the king was assimilated to the sacred mountain itself, just as in later popular religion the distinction between a sacred mountain and the deity residing on it was often blurred.

The myth relates that when the seventh king was killed, funerary rites had to be performed for the first time. In fact, in historical times (i.e., from the sixth century CE onward) huge funerary mounds were erected, assimilated both to the sacred mountains and to the kings, the tombs being given names that consisted of the same elements as those found in the names of the kings themselves. The death of a king was surrounded by elaborate rituals: processions, sacrifices, and the depositing on a lavish scale of all sorts of precious objects in the burial chamber. The officiating priests were known generically as *bon pos*, but apparently there were numerous specialized subgroups. Animals were sacrificed: in particular, sheep, horses, and yaks. The sacrificial sheep seem to have had an important role as guides for the deceased along the difficult road leading to the land of the dead—a land apparently conceived of in terms analogous to that of the living. Servants and officials, perhaps also members of the family, were assigned to the dead king as his "companions"; it is uncertain, however, whether they, too, actually accompanied him to the grave, or, as certain later sources suggest, only lived within the precincts of the tomb for a specified period.

A surviving early text outlines an eschatological cosmology that embodies a cyclical view of time. In a "golden age" plants and animals are transposed from their celestial home to the earth for the benefit of humanity. Virtue and "good religion" reign supreme. However, a demon breaks loose from his subterranean abode and causes a general decline in morals as well as in the physical world. Those who nevertheless follow the path of virtue and honor the gods are led after death to a land of bliss. In the meantime, the world rapidly

reaches a point at which everything is destroyed, whereupon a new golden age begins in which the virtuous dead are reborn. Thus the cycle presumably—the text is not explicit—repeats itself.

Little is known of the pantheon of the pre-Buddhist religion. The universe was conceived of as having three levels: the world above (the sky), inhabited by gods (*lha*); the middle world (the earth), the abode of human beings; and the world below (the subterranean world, conceived of as aquatic), inhabited by a class of beings known as *klu* (and later assimilated to the Indian *nāgas*). [See also *Nāgas* and *Yakṣas*.]

According to some sources, the heavenly world above had thirteen levels, inhabited by a hierarchy of male and female deities. Both Chinese sources and epigraphic evidence speak of the sun, the moon, and the stars being invoked as guardians and guarantors of treaties. Sacrifices in the form of various animals were made at the conclusion of the treaty of 822 between China and Tibet. By this time, however, Buddhism had appeared on the scene and the Three Jewels of Buddhism (i.e., Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha) were also invoked. A Buddhist monk with the rank of minister was at the head of the Tibetan delegation.

The subterranean beings, the *klu*, posed a constant danger to humanity, since they were particularly prone to be annoyed by activities that interfered with the surface of the land, such as plowing and digging. The *klu* could cause the eruption of diseases, especially leprosy and dropsy, that could only be cured through rites of atonement and propitiation. However, in determining the details of these rites and in obtaining specific information about the host of demons presumably populating the supernatural world of the ancient Tibetans we are to a large extent reduced to speculation on the basis of later, popular religious practices. Likewise, we meet with the names of various types of deities that are of great importance in later, popular religion: warrior god (*dgra bla*), god of the fireplace (*thab lha*), life god (*srog lha*), god of the land (*yul lha*), and so on.

It is difficult to establish which elements in the pre-Buddhist religion are truly indigenous. The later sources insist that many of the Bon-po priests came from countries bordering Tibet, in particular, areas to the west. After Buddhism had triumphed, the Tibetans themselves speculated whether the Bon-pos were Śaiva adepts from Kashmir. Possible influences emanating from the Iranian world have also been the subject of speculation by Western scholars, so far without conclusive evidence. On the other hand, the importance of the Chinese influence, long ignored, has now been firmly established. The royal tombs have obvious Chinese prototypes, as does the sacredness of the king: he is "god

son" (*lha sras*), corresponding to the Chinese emperor, the "Son of Heaven"; he is "sacred and divine" (*'phrul gyi lha*), corresponding to the Chinese *sheng-shen*. This sacredness is manifested in a supernormal intelligence and in the power to act, politically as well as militarily. [See Kingship, *article on East Asian Kingship*.]

It has been suggested that the pre-Buddhist religion was transformed into a coherent political ideology in the seventh century, modeled on the Chinese cult of the emperor. This royal religion was, according to this view, referred to as *gtsug* or *gtsug lag*, a word that was defined as "the law of the gods." However, the later sources, Buddhist and Bon-po, unanimously refer to the ancient religion as Bon, a claim that is supported by recent research. In any case, the cult of the divine kings disappeared together with the organized priesthood.

Buddhism. Buddhism was established in Tibet under royal patronage in the eighth century. In the preceding century, Tibet had become a unified state and embarked upon a policy of military conquest resulting in the brief appearance of a powerful Central Asian empire. The introduction of Buddhism was certainly due to the need to provide this empire with a religion that enjoyed high prestige because of its well-established status in the mighty neighboring countries of India and China. The first Buddhist temple was built at Bsam-yas (Samyé) in approximately 779; soon afterward the first monks were ordained. From the very start, the Buddhist monks were given economic and social privileges.

When Buddhism was introduced, the Tibetans had a choice as to whether the new religion should be brought from India or China. Modern scholarship has established the important role that China played as a source of Buddhism in the early stages of its history in Tibet. Nevertheless, it was the Indian form of Buddhism that eventually predominated. According to later sources, the Tibetan kings were guided by spiritual considerations and the proponents of Indian Buddhism emerged victorious from a doctrinal debate with Chinese monks representing a form of Ch'an Buddhism. However, hard political motives were surely equally important: in military and political terms China was Tibet's main rival, and Chinese influence at the Tibetan court would be unduly increased if it gained control of the powerful Buddhist hierarchy.

In any case, Tibet turned to India for its sacred texts, philosophical ideas, and rituals, in the same way as it had adopted, in the seventh century, an Indian alphabet. Once set on its course, Buddhism rapidly became the dominant religion, suffering only a temporary setback after the collapse of the royal dynasty in 842. In several important respects, Buddhism in Tibet remained faithful to its Indian prototype. It must, of

course, be kept in mind that this prototype was, by the seventh and eighth centuries, a form of Mahāyāna Buddhism that was, on the one hand, increasingly dependent on large monastic institutions, and on the other, permeated by Tantric rites and ideas. Both these features—vast monasteries and a pervasive Tantric influence—have remained characteristic of Buddhism in Tibet. Similarly, there has been little development in the realm of philosophical ideas; the Tibetans have, on the whole, been content to play the role of exegetes, commentators, and compilers. However, the political domination that the monasteries gradually obtained was without precedent. A uniquely Tibetan feature of monastic rule was succession by incarnation—the head of an order, or of a monastery, being regarded as the reincarnation (motivated by compassion for all beings) of his predecessor. In other cases, a religious figure might be regarded as the manifestation of a deity (or a particular aspect of a deity). In the person of the fifth Dalai Lama (1617–1682) both ideas were combined. Each Dalai Lama was already regarded as the incarnation of his predecessor; the fifth, who established himself as head of the Tibetan state, also came to be regarded as the emanation or manifestation of the great *bodhisattva* Avalokiteśvara (Tib., *Spyan-ras-gzigs*), as have all subsequent Dalai Lamas down to the present, the fourteenth. [See also Dalai Lama and Avalokiteśvara.]

The choice of Avalokiteśvara was not made at random. As early as the twelfth or thirteenth century, Avalokiteśvara had come to be regarded in a double respect as the divine protector of Tibet. In the form of an ape he had, in ancient times, assumed the role of progenitor of the Tibetan people in order that the teachings of the Buddha might flourish in Tibet in due course; in the form of the great Tibetan king Sroñ-btsan-sgam-po, who created the Tibetan empire in the seventh century, Avalokiteśvara had established Buddhism—according to this retrospective view—in the Land of Snow. The Potala Palace in Lhasa, the ancient capital, was built in its present form by the fifth Dalai Lama and made his residence; situated on a hill, it symbolically reestablished the pre-Buddhist connection between the divine king and the sacred mountain.

Popular Religion. It would be illusory to draw a sharp line of demarcation between popular and monastic religion. Nevertheless, while the study of the Mahāyāna philosophical systems and the performance of elaborate Tantric rites take place within the confines of the monasteries, monks actively participate in a wide range of ritual activities outside the monasteries, and beliefs that do not derive from Buddhism are shared by monks and laypeople alike.

These rites and beliefs may be styled "popular reli-

gion," a term that only signifies that it is nonmonastic, traditional, and related to the concerns of laypeople. It does not imply a system representing an alternative to Buddhism (or the Bon religion). For the last thousand years, Buddhist ideas have provided a general cosmological and metaphysical framework for popular religion. In many cases one may also assume that there is continuity with the pre-Buddhist religion, but it is often a delicate task to determine this continuity in precise terms.

Turning, first of all, to elements inspired by Buddhism, the most important—and conspicuous—are undoubtedly the varied and ceaseless efforts to accumulate merit. [See Merit, *article on Buddhist Concepts.*] The law of moral causality (*karman*) easily turns into a sort of balance in which the effect of evil deeds in this life or in former lives may be annulled by multiplying wholesome deeds. While an act of compassion, such as ransoming a sheep destined to be slaughtered, theoretically constitutes the ideal act of virtue, the accumulation of merit generally takes a more mechanical form. Hence the incessant murmuring of sacred formulas (in particular the *mantra* of Avalokiteśvara, "Om mani padme hūṃ"), the spinning of prayer wheels (ranging in size from hand-held wheels to enormous cylinders housed in special buildings), the carving of *mantras* on stones (which may eventually grow into walls several miles in length, so-called *mani-walls*), and the hoisting of banners and strings of flags on which prayers are printed ("prayer flags"). Ritual circumambulation of holy places, objects, and persons is also a distinctly Buddhist, as well as truly popular, practice. Showing generosity toward monks and observing—lightly or scrupulously, as the case may be—the universal precepts of Buddhism (particularly the prohibition against taking the life of any living being, however small) are ethical norms that Tibetans share with all Buddhists. [See also Worship and Cultic Life, *article on Buddhist Cultic Life in Tibet.*]

Pilgrimages constitute an important religious activity: above all to the holy city of Lhasa—sanctified by its ancient temples and (since the seventeenth century) the presence of the Dalai Lama—but also to innumerable monasteries, shrines, and caves in which relics of holy men and women may be seen, honored, and worshiped. Sacred mountains, such as Mount Kailāśa in western Tibet, attract a stream of pilgrims who circumambulate, perhaps for weeks or months, the holy abode of the chosen deity. The supreme pilgrimage is the long journey to the sacred sites of Buddhism in India and Nepal (Bodhi Gayā, Rājagṛha, Lumbinī, Sārnāth); although the flow of pilgrims to India virtually ceased after the thirteenth century, it has once more become possible in the

twentieth century. [See also Pilgrimage, *article on Tibetan Pilgrimage.*]

Ritual practices, while generally having an overall Buddhist conceptual framework, often contain elements that point back to the pre-Buddhist religion. One such element, frequently met with, is the "ransom" (*glud*) in the form of a small human figurine that is offered as a gesture of propitiation to demons. In the New Year rituals as traditionally practiced in Lhasa, the *glud* was in fact a human scapegoat who was driven out of the city and who, in earlier times, was symbolically killed.

As in other Buddhist countries, regional and local deities have remained objects of worship, generally performed by laypeople. In particular, the deities connected with (or even identified with) sacred mountains, powerful gods of the land (*yul lha*), are worshiped during seasonal festivals with the burning of juniper branches that emit clouds of fragrant smoke; horse races; archery contests; drinking bouts; and songs extolling the might of the deity, the beauty of the land, the fleetness of its horses, and the valor of its heroes. These gods have a martial nature and are accordingly known as enemy gods (*dgra bla*); they are also known as kings (*rgyal po*). Usually they are depicted as mounted warriors, dressed in archaic mail and armor and wearing plumed helmets.

The house ideally reproduces the outside world, and it has its own guardian deities, such as the god of the fireplace (*thab lha*). Care must be taken to avoid polluting the fireplace in any way, as this angers the god. On the flat rooftops are altars dedicated to the "male god" (*pho lha*) and the "female god" (*mo lha*) and a banner representing the enemy god. The "male" and "female" gods are tutelary deities of the household, supervising the activities of its male and female members, respectively. The "enemy god" is—in spite of its name—a deity who protects the entire household or, as a member of the retinue of the local "god of the land," the district. The worship of these gods on the rooftops corresponds to that performed in their honor on mountaintops and in passes: spears and arrows dedicated to them are stacked by the altar and juniper twigs are burned amid fierce cries of victory and good luck.

The person, too, possesses a number of tutelary deities residing in different parts of the body. Every person is also accompanied, from the moment of birth, by a "white" god and a "black" demon whose task it is, after death, to place the white and the black pebbles—representing the good and evil deeds one has done in this life—on the scales of the judge of the dead. The basic opposition between "white" and "black," good and evil, is a fundamental concept in Tibetan popular religion and figures prominently in pre-Buddhist traditions as

well. Iranian influences have been suggested, but it seems likely that the Chinese conceptual dichotomy of *yin* and *yang* lies closer at hand. [See also Yin-yang Wu-hsing.]

The ancient cosmological scheme of sky, earth, and underworld remains fundamental in popular religion. In particular, the cult of the *klu*—subterranean or aquatic beings easily irritated by activities such as house building or plowing, which provoke them to afflict people as well as animals with various diseases—remains widespread and provides a direct link to the pre-Buddhist religion.

An important aspect of popular religion (and, indeed, of the pre-Buddhist religion) is the emphasis on knowing the origins not only of the world but of all features of the landscape, as well as of elements of culture and society that are important to man. Tibetans have a vast number of myths centering on this theme of origins; while some of them have a purely narrative function, others serve to legitimate a particular ritual and must be recited in order that the ritual may become effective.

Rites of divination and of healing in which deities “descend” into a male or female medium (*lha pa*, “god-possessed,” or *dpa’ bo*, “hero”) and speak through it are an important part of religious life, and such mediums are frequently consulted. Other, simpler means of divination are also extremely widespread.

A special kind of medium is the *sgruñ pa*, the bard who in a state of trance can recite for days on end the exploits of the great hero Ge-sar. Regarded as an emanation of the *bodhisattva* Avalokiteśvara, Ge-sar has been approved by the Buddhist hierarchy; but essentially he is a popular, epic hero, a mighty king and warrior. His epic is a storehouse of myths, folklore, and pan-Eurasian narrative motifs, and is widespread outside Tibet in the Hindu Kush and, above all, among the Mongolians. [See Geser.] Other visionaries (*das log*) travel in trance to the Buddhist purgatories, their bodies lying as if dead; on awakening, they give detailed accounts of the punishment awaiting sinners beyond the grave. Still others find hidden “treasures” (*gter ma*) consisting of texts or sacred objects; indeed, this has remained until today an important way of adding to the body of authoritative texts translated from Sanskrit (and, to a lesser extent, from Chinese), for the “treasure-discoverers” (*gter ston*) claim to bring to light texts that have been hidden away (especially by the eighth-century Tantric master Padmasambhava) during times of persecution of Buddhism, to be rediscovered, usually with the assistance of supernatural beings, for the benefit of humanity when the time is ripe. Finally, ecstasies and visionaries point the way to earthly paradises such as the mythical kingdom of Shambhala or to hidden

valleys, untouched by man, in the secret recesses of the Himalayas.

Summing up, Tibetan popular religion may perhaps be characterized as an infinitely varied attempt to circumvent, or at least mitigate, the mechanism of the law of moral causality. According to orthodox Buddhist doctrine, this law is inexorable and its justice cannot be avoided; however, since one cannot know what acts one has committed in the past for which one may have to suffer in the future, the intolerable rigor of the law of cause and effect is in practice modified by a religious worldview in which the destiny of the individual also depends on ritual acts and on spiritual beings—benevolent as well as malevolent—who may at least be approached and at best be manipulated.

Bon. It has already been noted that a class of ritual experts in the pre-Buddhist religion were known as *bon-pos* and that certain early sources indicate that their religion was known as Bon. In any case, the later sources all agree that the pre-Buddhist religion was in fact known as Bon, and these sources tend to describe the struggle between Bon and Buddhism in dramatic terms. This is true not only of the later Buddhist sources but also of texts emanating from a religious tradition, explicitly styling itself Bon, that emerged in the eleventh century, if not before.

While virtually indistinguishable from Buddhism in such aspects as philosophy, monastic life, ritual, and iconographical conventions, this “later” Bon has always insisted that it represents the religion that prevailed in Tibet before the coming of Buddhism. In spite of occasional syncretic efforts on both sides, the Buddhists have tended to regard Bon as heretical, and not infrequently the term *bon-po* has been used in the sense of “heretic,” “black magician,” and so forth.

Two points about Bon must be made. First, the historical background of the Bon religion that emerged in the eleventh century is far from clear. There is a significant element of continuity with the pre-Buddhist religion, but nothing approaching identity. Second, it is seriously misleading to identify Bon with popular religion in general. On the level of popular religion, followers of Bon and Buddhism alike share the same beliefs and perform, to a very large extent, the same rituals, although details may differ (for example, the Bon-pos spin their prayer wheels and perform circumambulations in the opposite direction than the Buddhists do, i.e., counterclockwise; they worship different deities and hence use other *mantras*, and so forth). These correspondences do not represent a case of “perversion,” “contradiction,” or the like (as has been too hastily suggested), for Bon and Buddhism share the same religious ideals and goals, and they approach them by essentially similar means.

Tibetan Religion Today. An overview of Tibetan religion would be incomplete without an attempt to take stock of the situation in the mid-1980s. The most significant single fact is the downfall of monastic religion. Starting in the 1950s and culminating in the period of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese unleashed a violent antireligious campaign in Tibet that resulted in the total destruction of monastic life. A large number of monks were killed, and the rest were, without exception, defrocked. Most monasteries were razed to the ground, and others were converted into secular buildings such as granaries or army barracks. Vast libraries were destroyed, and ritual objects, Buddha images, and relics were systematically profaned. At the height of the campaign, even the most insignificant expression of religious faith would be severely punished by Chinese soldiers or Red Guards.

The new and more pragmatic policy in China began to take effect in Tibet around 1980. A number of buildings, officially regarded as historical monuments, have been carefully restored; a limited number of monks have been installed in a number of the largest monasteries: 'Bras-spuñs (Drepung) near Lhasa, Bkra-sis-lhunpo (Tashilhunpo) outside Gzís-ka-rtse (Shigatse), and Bla-brañ (Labrang) and Sku-'bum (Kumbum) in eastern Tibet; a few temples have been reopened for worship; and hundreds of other monasteries are being reconstructed on a voluntary basis by the Tibetans themselves. On the whole, religious activity seems to be tolerated as long as it does not interfere with economic policies. The 1980s have in fact seen a remarkable resurgence of religious fervor that finds outlet, among other things, in the reconstruction of monasteries and the traditional practices of the popular religion, including extended pilgrimages to sacred mountains and other sites throughout Tibet. Within the limits set by the political and economic conditions imposed on Tibet, it is clear that religious belief and practice remain a fundamental factor in the overall situation in the Land of Snow.

Among the Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal, religious life flourishes, to a large extent along traditional lines. There is a tendency to emphasize monastic life together with those aspects of Buddhism that are common to all Buddhists. In the West, a number of Tibetan lamas have become highly successful "gurus," and numerous Tibetan Buddhist centers have been established, generally focusing on the teachings of one particular order and emphasizing meditation and ritual rather than conventional, scholastic studies. In exile, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho (Tenzin Gyatsho; b. 1935), has become an internationally respected Buddhist figure, pointing out to a world in turmoil the

Buddhist way to human happiness and world peace through the development of insight and compassion.

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General Studies. A classic and still useful introduction to the subject is Charles A. Bell's *The Religion of Tibet* (1931; reprint, Oxford, 1968). More recently, several excellent studies have been published: David L. Snellgrove and Hugh E. Richardson's *A Cultural History of Tibet* (1968; reprint, Boulder, 1980); Rolf A. Stein's *Tibetan Civilization*, translated by J. E. Stapleton Driver (Stanford, Calif., 1972) and republished in a revised French edition as *La civilisation tibétaine* (Paris, 1981); and Giuseppe Tucci's *The Religions of Tibet*, translated by Geoffrey Samuel (Berkeley, 1980). Tucci's monumental *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, 2 vols., translated by Virginia Vacca (1949; reprint, Kyoto, 1980), remains a work of fundamental importance to the field. In the 1980 edition, the plates accompanying volume 2 are reproduced in the form of slides. A particularly lucid exposition is Anne-Marie Blondeau's "Les religions du Tibet," in *Histoire des religions*, edited by Henri-Charles Puech, vol. 3 (Paris, 1976), pp. 233-329.

Pre-Buddhist Religion. Most studies of the pre-Buddhist religion can be found only in specialized publications. The works of Snellgrove and Richardson, Stein, and Blondeau, however, all contain pertinent discussions based on their own research. The most recent study of the early inscriptions is H. E. Richardson's *A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions* (London, 1985).

Buddhism. Snellgrove and Richardson's work is particularly strong on the formation of the orders and the subsequent political history of the church. Tucci's *The Religions of Tibet* contains a most useful survey of Buddhist doctrine and monastic life. A concise presentation of Tibetan Buddhism is provided in Per Kvaerne's "Tibet: The Rise and Fall of a Monastic Tradition," in *The World of Buddhism: Buddhist Monks and Nuns in Society and Culture*, edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard F. Gombrich (London, 1984), pp. 253-270. For Tibetan art and symbols Tucci's *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* remains unsurpassed. A recent useful work by a Tibetan scholar is Loden S. Dargyab's *Tibetan Religious Art*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1977). For a discussion of ritual and meditation, see Stephan Beyer's *The Cult of Tārā: Magic and Ritual in Tibet* (Berkeley, 1973).

Popular Religion. General surveys of Tibetan popular religion are given by Stein in *Tibetan Civilization* and in Per Kvaerne's "Croyances populaires et folklores au Tibet" in *Mythes et croyances du monde entier*, edited by André Akoun, vol. 4 (Paris, 1985), pp. 157-169. A basic reference work is René de Nebesky-Wojkowitz's *Oracles and Demons of Tibet. The Cult and Iconography of the Tibetan Protective Deities* (1956; reprint, Graz, 1975). The reprint edition contains an introduction by Per Kvaerne in which numerous corrections and additions to the earlier edition are provided. A useful supplement to this work is Tadeusz Skorupski's *Tibetan Amulets* (Bangkok, 1983). A major study of ritual texts has been published by Christina

Klaus, *Schutz vor den Naturgefahren: Tibetische Ritualtexte aus dem Rin chen gter mdzod* ediert, Übersetzt und Kommentiert (Wiesbaden, 1985). A discussion of Tibetan myths intended for the nonspecialist is provided by Per Kvaerne in a series of articles in *Dictionnaire des mythologies*, edited by Yves Bonnefoy (Paris, 1981), vol. 1, pp. 42–45, 249–252; vol. 2, pp. 194–195, 381–384, 495–497. A survey of the most important pilgrimages is provided in Anne-Marie Blondeau's "Les pèlerinages tibétains," in *Les pèlerinages*, edited by Anne-Marie Esnoul et al. (Paris, 1960), pp. 199–245. The most complete study of Tibetan festivals is Martin Brauen's *Feste in Ladakh* (Graz, 1980).

There is a considerable body of literature on the Ge-sar epic. The fundamental study is R. A. Stein's *L'épopée et le barde au Tibet* (Paris, 1959). Several translations of the text exist, mainly in the form of summaries. The most easily accessible is probably that of Alexandra David-Neel, *La vie surhumaine de Guésar de Ling* (Paris, 1931), translated with the collaboration of Violet Sydney as *The Superhuman Life of Gesar of Ling* (1933; rev. ed., London, 1959). More scholarly translations are R. A. Stein's *L'épopée tibétaine de Gesar dans la version lamaïque de Ling* (Paris, 1956), and Mireille Helffer's *Les chants dans l'épopée tibétaine de Ge-sar d'après le livre de la course de cheval* (Geneva, 1977). On visionary journeys to Śambhala and related phenomena, see Edwin Bernbaum's *The Way to Shambhala: A Search for the Mythical Kingdom beyond the Himalayas* (New York, 1980).

Bon. An important translation of a Bon text is David L. Snellgrove's *The Nine Ways of Bon: Excerpts from the gZi-brjid* (1967; reprint, Boulder, 1980). Gamten G. Karmay surveys the Bon religion in "A General Introduction to the History and Doctrines of Bon," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko*, no. 3 (1975): 171–218. On Bon literature, see Per Kvaerne's "The Canon of the Bonpos," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 16 (1975): 18–56, 96–144. See also the works of Snellgrove and Richardson, Stein, and Blondeau cited above.

Contemporary Religion. By far the best treatment of the subject is Peter H. Lehmann and Jay Ullai's *Tibet: Das stille Drama auf dem Dach der Erde*, edited by Rolf Winter (Hamburg, 1981). The book is remarkable not least for its photographic documentation of contemporary Tibet.

PER KVAERNE

History of Study

The historical basis of the study of Tibetan religions lies in a twofold approach: first, the use of Tibetan materials to supplement Indian data on the origins of Buddhism and, second, a fascination with Tibetan Buddhism itself. The first sections of this essay will sketch this twofold approach. Following sections will discuss research into Bon, Tibet's other major religious tradition, research into "popular" religion, and current approaches that have come about as a result of recent developments.

Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism. The great Western pioneer student of Tibet's religious culture was the

Hungarian traveler, Alexander Csoma de Kőrös (1784?–1842), some of whose work still retains value while that of many of his near-contemporaries is completely outdated. I should note that his work parallels that of the founders of Buddhist studies in Europe, who worked from Indian sources. His *Notices on the Life of Shakya, Extracted from the Tibetan Authorities* (1838; reprint, New Delhi, 1980) is a very early work in the field, as is F. Anton von Schiefner's "Eine tibetische Lebensbeschreibung Čakyamuni's, des Begründers des Buddhatusms" (*Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de Saint Pétersbourg* 6, 1851).

The best of the early monographs is Emil Schlagintweit's *Buddhism in Tibet* (London, 1863). It deals fairly comprehensively with the Buddhist world in Tibet, from its basis in Indian Mahāyāna theory to local customs; other topics that Schlagintweit treats include demonology, Bon, and divination. Equally rich in data is L. Austine Waddell's *The Buddhism of Tibet* (1895; reprinted as *Tibetan Buddhism*, New York, 1972); however, it is not as disciplined as, and represents no advance over, Schlagintweit's study. The best recent overview is Giuseppe Tucci's *Die Religionen Tibets* (Stuttgart, 1970; translated as *Religions of Tibet*, Berkeley, 1980). The author's abundant use of Tibetan sources and good knowledge of the philosophical and historical background enhances the value of this work.

Tibetans have written many works on the introduction and spread of Buddhism in their country and on its origins in India. Studies by European scholars of three such works are particularly important. Schiefner's *Tāranāthas Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien* (Saint Petersburg, 1869), a translation of Tāranātha's 1608 Tibetan-language history of Buddhism in India, has sufficient interpretations and explanations by the translator to make it very useful for the student of Tibetan Buddhism as well. Eugene Obermiller's translation of Bu-ston's *Chos-'byuñ, History of Buddhism* (Heidelberg, 1931–1932), contains more data on Tibet, but Indian subjects still predominate. The great achievement in scholarship in this area is George N. Roerich's *The Blue Annals* (2 vols., 1949–1953; reprint, Delhi, 1976), a translation of 'Gos Lo-tsā-ba Gzön-nu-dpal's *Deb ther shon po*; this classic text describes some major developments in Tibet up to the 1470s. Roerich's diligence as a scholar, combined with the various indexes to the text, have made this translation an invaluable reference work.

Works attempting synthetic interpretations of major events or trends in Tibetan religious history have appeared in the twentieth century. Two essays and an encyclopedic reference work should be mentioned here. Charles Bell's *The Religion of Tibet* (1931; reprint, Ox-

ford, 1968) analyzes the history of Buddhism to modern times, including Tibet's influence on Mongolian Buddhism and the political dimensions of the rule of the Dalai Lamas. A complementary work is Helmut Hoffmann's *Die Religionen Tibets* (1956; translated as *The Religions of Tibet*, New York, 1961), which concentrates on the formative period of Buddhism in Tibet and describes the gradual definition of Bon and Buddhism in that environment. In the guise of a description of canvas painting, Tucci's *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* (2 vols., Rome, 1949) contains much material on topics, from mythology to iconography, concerning the history of Tibetan religions and sectarian developments. Fortunately, this standard reference work on history, religion, and mythology in Tibet is well indexed.

A few important works on the principal traditions (sometimes referred to as "sects," perhaps an inappropriate term in the Tibetan context) within Tibetan Buddhism should be noted here. Günther Schulemann's *Geschichte der Dalailamas* (1911; 2d ed., Leipzig, 1958) was the first extensive work on the structure, history, and some elements of the rituals of the Dge-lugs-pa. Wilhelm Filchner's *Kumbum Dschampa Ling, das Kloster der hunderttausend Bilder Maitreyas* (Leipzig, 1933) and Robert Bleichsteiner's *Die Gelbe Kirche* (Vienna, 1937) are two other standard works on the Dge-lugs-pa that are rich in ethnographic and historical data. Li An-che's "The Sakya Sect of Lamaism" (*Journal of the West China Research Society* 16, 1945, pp. 72–86) and Sherab Gyaltzen Amipa's *Historical Facts on the Religion of the Sa-skyapa Sect* (Zurich, 1970) survey the Sa-skyapa. An-che's "Rñiñ-ma-pa: The Early Form of Lamaism" (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1948, pp. 142–163) and Eva Dargyay's *The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet* (2d ed., Delhi, 1978) provide data on the Rñiñ-ma-pa; this last work, in particular, discusses Rñiñ-ma-pa's "discovered" literature and its history. Tucci's "A propos the Legend of Nāropa" (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1935, pp. 677–688), An-che's "bka'-brgyud-pa Sect of Lamaism" (*Journal of the American Oriental Society* 69, 1949, pp. 51–59), and Hugh E. Richardson's "The Karma-pa Sect: A Historical Note" (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1958, 139–164) provide useful background to study of the Bka'-brgyud-pa traditions.

The basis of all Buddhist practice is yoga and meditation, and studies on this practice with the commentaries by learned lamas (Tib., *bla ma*) are appearing now in great numbers. Among older, established studies frequently consulted today the following are notable either for their lucidity of presentation or their accompanying commentary. Herbert Guenther's translation of Sgam-po-pa's twelfth-century account of Tibetan religious practice, *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation* (Berke-

ley, 1971) and Guenther's *The Life and Teaching of Nāropa* (Oxford, 1963), on an eleventh-century yogin, are characterized by a sophisticated analysis of the psychology of Buddhist practice. A very clear exposition is made by Bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho (the fourteenth Dalai Lama) in his *The Opening of the Wisdom Eye and the History of the Advancement of Buddhadharma in Tibet* (Wheaton, Ill., 1966). An analysis of philosophical positions, meditation, and ritual is found in F. D. Lessing and Alex Wayman's *Mkhas-grub-rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (The Hague, 1968), a translation of a fifteenth-century work. Anagarika Govinda's *Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism* (1959; reprint, New York, 1969) is well organized and easy to read.

Traditional Buddhist biographies (*rnam thar*) are being used more and more as sources to put meat on the bones of the doctrinal studies. Perhaps the best of the earlier efforts is Jacques Bacot's *La vie de Marpa le "traducteur"* (Paris, 1937); also worthy of recommendation is Rolf A. Stein's *Vie et chants de 'Brug-pa Kun-legs le yogin* (Paris, 1972).

Bon. The Bon religion has been much less studied than Buddhism. Apart from the obvious point that it is a Tibetan phenomenon and not a worldwide religion, the relative lack of interest in it may be attributed to two results of its adherents' persecution in recent times by Lhasa authorities: its literature and teachers are not accessible, and some Tibetan Buddhists succeeded in giving early Western visitors a highly inaccurate view of its origins and practices.

Apart from scattered and often inaccurate notices in the early works of, for example, Schlagintweit and Waddell (mentioned previously), the earliest research is Schiefner's *Über das Bonpo-Sūtra "Das weisse Nāga-Hunderttausend"* (Saint Petersburg, 1881), the only translation yet of one of the best-known Bon texts. Other early studies that are still valuable include three by Berthold Laufer: *Klu 'Bum Bsdus Pai Sñiñ Po: Eine verkürzte Version des Werkes von den Hunderttausend Nāga* (Helsinki, 1898), *Eine Sühngedicht der Bonpo* (Vienna, 1900), and "Über ein tibetisches Geschichtswerk der Bonpo" (*T'oung pao* 2, 1901, pp. 24–44); this last work is the first work on Bon historiography. A valuable contribution to the study of Bon mythology and a veritable catalog of the Bon pantheon is A. H. Francke's "gZer-myig: A Book of the Tibetan Bonpos," a translation that was published in five unsuccessful volumes of *Asia Major* between 1924 and 1949.

Where are the origins of Bon to be sought—beyond Tibet or within? What is its relationship to Buddhism and other religions, in particular to those of Iran? These questions are increasingly attracting attention as time goes by; the work that originally stimulated most dis-

cussion of these points is Helmut Hoffmann's *Quellen zur Geschichte der tibetischen Bon Religion* (Mainz, 1950), which analyzed available (mostly Buddhist) textual materials. On these questions the reader should also consult Hoffmann's "An Account of the Bon Religion in Gilgit" (*Central Asiatic Journal* 8, 1969, pp. 137–145), Samten G. Karmay's *The Treasury of Good Sayings: A Tibetan History of Bon* (London, 1972), and, above all, Per Kvaerne's "Aspects of the Origin of the Buddhist Tradition in Tibet" (*Numen* 19, 1972, pp. 22–40), the best-organized discussion of questions about the origin of Bon and Buddhism in Tibet to date.

Modern studies on Bon that are particularly valuable include a lengthy essay in Tucci's *Die Religionen Tibets* (mentioned previously) and Samten G. Karmay's "A General Introduction to the History and Doctrines of Bon" (*Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko* 33, 1975, pp. 171–218). An extensive doctrinal text is presented by David L. Snellgrove in *The Nine Ways of Bon: Excerpts from the gZi-brjid* (London, 1967). An important study and the first work on Bon yoga is Kvaerne's "Bonpo Studies: The A Khrid System of Meditation" (*Kailash* 1, 1973, pp. 19–50, 247–332).

Popular Religion. Thus far, research on "normative" Buddhism and Bon has been discussed. Of course, the literature, adherents, and physical culture of these Tibetan traditions were the first elements to strike the eyes of Csoma de Kőrös and his successors, and they remain today the center of focus. However, an interest in Tibet's epic hero King Ge-sar, an important figure in "popular" Tibetan literature and religion, dates back to the eighteenth century, when Mongolian-language texts of the epic became known to Western travelers. A comprehensive analysis of the religious and ethnographic data in these materials certainly lies far in the future, but two works may be cited here that analyze quite different versions of Ge-sar's life and deeds and thus give an idea of the variety of data available: A. H. Francke's *Der Frühlings- und Wintermythus der Kesarsage; Beiträge zur Kenntnis der vorbuddhistischen Religion Tibets und Ladakhs* (Helsinki, 1902) and Rolf A. Stein's *Recherches sur l'épopée et le barde au Tibet* (Paris, 1959). The former study shows the influence of the "nature mythology" school of religious studies, while the latter, perhaps the best study of Ge-sar to date, includes sections dealing with Buddhist, Bon, and "popular" religious influences and motifs.

In the twentieth century, the anthropological investigation of regions, ethnic groups, and ceremonial structures is a fast-growing field. Most such studies are too recent or specialized to be evaluated in the context of Tibetan religion as a whole; among earlier studies, Louis Schram's *Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan Border:*

Their Religious Life (Philadelphia, 1957) and Robert V. Ekvall's *Religious Observances in Tibet* (Chicago, 1964) are frequently consulted. An extensive analysis of the iconography and hierarchical ordering of Tibet's spirits and deities in ritual and literature is René de Nebesky-Wojkowitz's *Oracles and Demons of Tibet* (1956; 2d rev. ed., Graz, 1975), which uses abundant primary material and is very well indexed. Many anthropologists have studied "shamanism" in Tibet: for example, see Joseph Rock's "Contributions to the Shamanism of the Tibetan-Chinese Borderland" (*Anthropos* 54, 1959, pp. 796–818) and Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf's *The Sherpas of Nepal* (Berkeley, 1963).

Discovery of Sources. Two events of momentous import for research into Tibet's religious life have occurred in the twentieth century. These events have driven some Tibetans into a Western-oriented study of their own religion, have brought Western scholars into close contact with learned lamas, and have drawn scholarly attention to a very early period of Bon and Buddhism in Tibet while almost simultaneously revealing contemporary practices with a precision and on a scale previously impossible for various political or geographical reasons.

The first event was the discovery of Tibetan texts from the eighth to eleventh centuries in a grotto at Tunhuang, Chinese Turkistan, in 1900. For the next several years, British, French, Russian, and Japanese scholars were able to study manuscript materials that were much older than those previously known. These materials have revolutionized the study of Bon and Buddhism in Tibet, as well as the study of the religious currents flowing through the Tibetan empire from the east and the west. One excellent study is Ariane Macdonald's "Une lecture des Pelliot tibétain 1286, 1287, 1038, 1047 et 1290: Essai sur la formation et l'emploi des mythes politiques dans la religion royale de Sroñ-bcan sgampo" (*Études tibétaines dédiés à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou*, Paris, 1971, pp. 190–391).

The second event was the Chinese conquest of Tibet, completed in 1959. Hundreds of thousands of Tibetan refugees, symbolized in the minds of Westerners largely by the exile government of the Dalai Lama, have taken up life in Nepal, northern India, Europe, and elsewhere. Some of their vast literature and physical culture has come with them and continues to be made accessible to Western scholars.

These events have broadened and forever changed research into Tibet's religious culture. The amount of written literature and the number of learned informants from all traditions has exploded. Tibetans today for the most part feel a great urge to accommodate Western research into their traditions, and many are now working

in research institutes in Europe, Japan, and North America. Indeed, it may be said that Tibetan studies are now awash in resources, just enough of which have been examined to call into question many of the most important positions that were only recently thought to be firmly established.

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MICHAEL L. WALTER

TIELE, C. P. (1830–1902), Dutch historian of religions. Cornelis Petrus Tiele studied theology at the University of Amsterdam and was a Remonstrant minister for twenty years (1853–1873). During this time he applied himself to the study of ancient religions and taught himself the Avestan language as well as Akkadian and Egyptian. In 1872 he obtained the Th.D. degree at the University of Leiden; and the following year he became a professor at the Remonstrants' seminary in Leiden, where he taught the history of religions. In 1877, Tiele was appointed to the new chair in history of religions and philosophy of religion at the University of Leiden, in the faculty of theology. He retired in 1900.

Tiele was a pioneer of the "science of religion" and one of the first to offer a historical survey of a number of religions based on the study of source materials. His own research opened up the religions of ancient Iran, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, putting the history of religions on a firm philological-historical basis that was long to be the hallmark of the discipline.

Tiele was much concerned with the broader notion of a "development" of religion, a notion that was natural at a time when evolution and progress were accepted ideas. He saw religion—man's "disposition of the heart toward God"—as a distinct province of life that can be found everywhere, and he was convinced that there is a

unity and independence of religious life underlying all its different external forms. The gradual development of the human mind in history implies a parallel development in religion, which is, basically, a progressive expansion of self-consciousness. According to Tiele, the historical changes of the forms of religion show a process of evolution in the course of which the "religious idea" and the religious needs receive an ever fuller and more perfect expression. The historical forms of religion represent different stages of this evolution, in particular from nature religions to ethical religions. The historian of religions has to compare and classify religious phenomena in accordance with the state and direction of their development.

Tiele sharply distinguished all forms of religion from religion itself, and his deeper concern in the study of religion is the question of the real nature and origin of the religion that "reveals" itself in its manifold forms and phenomena. He therefore divides the study of religion into two parts. The first is *morphology*, that is, the inductive study of the phenomena and their changes and transformations as a result of a continuing development. This study requires, among other things, a comparative history of religion.

The second part of the study of religion is *ontology*, the study of the permanent element, beyond and through all changes and passing forms, that is the core and the source of religion. The real nature of religion is under investigation here, and this part of the study demands a deductive reasoning on the basis of what has been reached by means of inductive "empirical" research. The ontological study contains both a phenomenological-analytical part, in which the religious phenomena are studied in each stage of development, and a "psychological-synthetic" part in which the essence and origin of religion are investigated; in fact this stage is philosophical (rather than "psychological") in nature. For Tiele historical, phenomenological, and philosophical questions logically followed from each other. Because Tiele took as his departure the premise that religion fundamentally is a general human phenomenon and that the way in which it has manifested itself as well as the elements of which it is composed are the same always and everywhere, the study of permanently recurring phenomena made sense.

Tiele's history of religions may have been somewhat schematized, but it was dynamic; further, his phenomenology had a dynamic character because of his notion of the development of the human mind. His insistence that religion "manifests" itself in the phenomena, and that this manifestation happens through the activity of the human mind, has an almost modern, phenomenological flavor, like the idea that religions are different

expressions of that "religion" that as a tendency slumbers in every person. Religion here is investigated as a human phenomenon, and the unifying factor of all religious phenomena is the human mind.

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JACQUES WAARDENBURG

T' IEN. A term of basic importance in the worldview and religious life of the Chinese from the remote past to the present, *t'ien* has two principal senses: as the supreme god of the universe, and as impersonal nature. Often it is not clear in a particular instance which of these meanings is intended, and it may well be that the distinction is vague to the user.

T'ien as God. The root meaning of *t'ien* is sky or the heavens, the abode of numinous beings. When used without qualifiers the term may denote the supreme deity. The earliest known use of the graph for *t'ien* occurs in ancient texts of the Chou period (c. 1111–256 BCE), where it refers to the supreme deity of the Chou people. In early Chou times T'ien was conceived as the all-powerful, purposeful, apparently anthropomorphic god who sent down blessings or disasters according to whether he was pleased or displeased with human behavior. Politically, T'ien was the source of the legitimacy of the king, conferring upon the most righteous man the mandate of Heaven (*t'ien-ming*) or withdrawing this mandate from corrupt or unworthy rulers. In this conception of divinity the early Chou rulers successfully assimilated the supreme god of the preceding Shang dynasty (eighteenth century? to 1111 BCE), called Ti, or Shang-ti. This assimilation blurred the historical and cultic distinction between the god of the Shang and the god of the Chou. Subsequently, the terms *hao-t'ien* ("heaven of the vast-primal-vital-breath"), or *huang-t'ien* ("august heaven"), and *shang-ti* ("supreme ruler") were used interchangeably to denote the greatest power of the universe. As T'ien and as Shang-ti, this supreme power was conceived of as the creator (*tsao-wu-chu*). In some texts, including the *I ching* (Book of Changes),

t'ien and *ti* (Heaven and Earth) are at least figuratively anthropomorphized as the cosmic father and mother, from whose sexual intercourse all beings are produced.

Worship of T'ien, as performed in the elaborate imperial rituals, was forbidden to any but the ruler, as it was the most impressive demonstration of his possession of the mandate of Heaven. But it would hardly have been possible to prevent the people from believing in and expressing their awe of T'ien. In the course of time, the notion evolved that the supernatural dimension was an invisible counterpart to the temporal world. T'ien was then personified as the emperor of that spirit world who, like the emperor in this world, headed a heavenly bureaucracy of deities. In this role T'ien was called Yü-huang Shang-ti ("supreme ruler of jadelike augustness"). The common people invoked his aid when in dire trouble, and there were temples in which he was the chief deity. Many homes contained some representation of communication with him, such as an incense brazier. Among the people he was familiarly called T'ien-kung ("celestial duke") or Lao-t'ien-yeh ("old celestial lord"). [See Yü-huang and Shang-ti.]

The omnipresence and concern of T'ien with the human world are themes of many proverbs. In some of these, the deity is obviously personified: "T'ien's eyes are everywhere, they see all without anyone escaping"; "Man can be fooled, but not T'ien"; "T'ien punishes the sinner"; "Blessings come from T'ien"; "T'ien helps those who help themselves"; "T'ien knows the good and evil hidden in human hearts." Other sayings, however, are either ambiguous or definitely refer to an impersonal power: "The cyclical revolutions of *t'ien* cause things to be as they are"; "*T'ien* is empty; earth is broad"; "Intelligence is endowed by *t'ien*"; "There may not be two suns in *t'ien*"; "It is difficult to go against the Way (*tao*) of *t'ien*."

The arrival of Buddhism from India and Central Asia at approximately the beginning of the common era introduced new and complicated notions of celestial beings and celestial realms. The Buddhist realms, for example, were divided into the Realm of Desire (*kāma-dhātu*), the Realm of Form (*rūpadhātu*), and the Realm of Formlessness (*ārūpyadhātu*). These and other Buddhist realms were called *t'ien*. In the third and fourth centuries, as Taoism became a cohesive religion, it too developed elaborate notions of supernal realms and called them *t'ien*. In general, the *t'ien* of Taoism, variously twenty-eight, thirty-two, or thirty-six in number, were derived from Buddhism, although one novel idea held that counterparts to *t'ien* existed in the subterranean world. The Taoist *t'ien* are the abodes of gods and their subordinates, the perfected immortals (*hsien*), as well as of the souls of the virtuous dead who will one day

attain immortality as perfected beings. The term *t'ien* also figures in Taoist cosmology, where *hsien-t'ien* ("pre-cosmic") and *hou-t'ien* ("cosmic," that is, the phenomenal universe) denote stages of evolution that are represented in the performance of liturgical rites.

T'ien as Impersonal Nature. The word *t'ien* often appears in writings of the classical period of philosophy (sixth to third century BCE), where it is used with the connotation "nature." Taoist texts of the period frequently express the idea of *t'ien* as an impersonal force that produces all natural phenomena. In this usage were blended the ideas of the will of a personal deity and a natural law. Thus, events, in particular, omens, commonly taken to signify the "decree" of *t'ien*, were here interpreted simply as having occurred spontaneously or of themselves (*t'ien-ming chi tzu-jan*). The most forceful assertion of the impersonality of *t'ien* was made by the Ju (Confucian) scholar Hsün-tzu (fl. c. 298–238), who denied that *t'ien* acted in response to human actions or pleas. In his view, *t'ien* was simply the operation of the physical universe. In another instance of the impersonal use of *t'ien*, the term refers to something akin to "fate," as in the expression *ming-yün ti t'ien* ("Heaven-determined destiny").

As with the anthropomorphic conception of *t'ien*, the naturalistic interpretation was given its most authoritative expression in the *Book of Changes*. There, *t'ien* is symbolized by the trigram *ch'ien* ☰, and is thus another term for the positive, male, creative principle or force (*yang*). Its complement is *ti*, or earth, symbolized by the trigram *k'un* ☷, representing the negative, female, receptive principle or force (*yin*). The ceaseless, ever-changing interactions and permutations of these complementary principles or forces produce the universe and all beings, and are responsible for their birth, growth, decay, and death.

Although impersonal, the "naturalistic" *t'ien* has a close functional relationship with man. The classical philosophers see this relationship in a variety of not necessarily reconcilable ways:

- Human life or life span depends upon *t'ien* (*jen-chih-ming tsai t'ien*).
- Man is a microcosm of the universe, his feet being "square," as earth is, and his head round, as Heaven is.
- Man's nature (*hsing*) is conferred at birth by *t'ien*.
- Man should model himself upon *t'ien* (*fa-t'ien*).
- Since *t'ien* is impersonal, it is man who acts as the mind (or heart) of *t'ien*.
- Man and *t'ien* constantly interact in mutual stimulus and response (a view denied, as we have seen, by Hsün-tzu).

- The function of *t'ien* is to create, while the function of man is to nurture and bring to perfection those created things.
- *T'ien* serves as the moral example for man, who can only attain his complete human development through the discipline of moral steadfastness (*ch'eng*).

Here again, the concept of *t'ien* is ambiguous: while moral perfection would seem to be possible only for a person, yet the unflinching regularity, benevolence, and impartiality of *t'ien* could also be interpreted in moral terms.

In the Neo-Confucian movement, which began during the T'ang dynasty (618–907) and came to maturity during the Sung period (960–1279), philosophers again utilized the term *t'ien* in various new ways. The Neo-Confucian goal may be stated in religious terms as an ultimate self-transformation for the attainment of sainthood or sageliness (*sheng-jen*). Most important was a concept called the *t'ien-li* ("principle of *t'ien*" or "heavenly principle"), which was interpreted in a number of ways. It stood for the sum of the anciently enunciated virtues of the Confucian tradition; it was a name for the metaphysical substance or embodiment of the *tao* (*hsing-shang tao-t'i*); it was identified as mind; it was identified as conscience, which produced the innate knowledge of good and evil, right and wrong (*liang-hsi* or *liang-chih*); it was moral perfection, the very opposite of human desires (*jen-yü*), a proposition rejected by certain later Neo-Confucians; or it designated the totality of all principles, being cosmic Principle. These were some of the concepts the Neo-Confucians used in constructing a metaphysics that had been lacking in the ancient Confucian system. They attempted, in this way, to arrive at an understanding of the nature of ultimate reality or the Absolute. In their philosophies, the term *t'ien* was used for this ultimate reality and also identified with other terms that had the same meaning—*tao*, *li*, *t'ai-chi*, and (in Wang Yang-ming's thought) *hsin* ("heart-and-mind"). Although the *t'ien* of the Neo-Confucians was an impersonal metaphysical principle, even in this usage theistic implications were not entirely absent. [See also Tao and Te; Li; T'ai-chi; and Hsin.]

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LAURENCE G. THOMPSON

T' IEN-T' AI. The T'ien-t'ai tradition of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism is a lineage centered around the writings of the monk Chih-i (538-597) and his successors. This tradition is characterized by the emphasis it places on the practice of meditation, its exegetical method, and the centrality it accords the teachings of the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtra* (Chin., *Miao-fa lien-hua ching*; abbreviated title, *Fa-hua ching*; the Lotus Sutra) and the *Ta pan nieh-p'an ching* (Skt., *Mahāyāna-parinirvāṇa Sūtra*). The T'ien-t'ai tradition forms, together with the Hua-yen tradition, one of the two major academic and doctrinal systems of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism. [See also Hua-yen.]

Origins. Chih-i's major meditation text, the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (The Great Stilling and Insight; T.D. no. 1911), states that the T'ien-t'ai lineage began with Hui-wen, who transmitted the essence of his enlightenment experience to his disciple Hui-ssu, who in turn instructed Chih-i. Later T'ien-t'ai church history therefore refers to these monks as the first three (Chinese) T'ien-t'ai "patriarchs."

Hui-wen. Other than the fact that he was active during the Northern Ch'i period (550-557), little is known of the life of Hui-wen. Even late accounts admit that both his place of birth and his dates are unknown. His importance to the tradition derives from his adumbration of certain key concepts that, in the writings of Chih-i, would become central to T'ien-t'ai thought. One source relates that while reading the *Ta chih-tu lun* (a commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* in twenty-five thousand *ślokas* that is traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna) he was struck by a passage that notes, "When

one moment of mind obtains all wisdom, the wisdom of the Path, and all species of wisdom, then all of the defilements and their traces are cut off." This concept of "three wisdoms in one mind" (*i-hsin san-chih*) became identified in the writings of Chih-i with his concept of "three insights in one mind" (*i-hsin san-kuan*), a core teaching of the T'ien-t'ai system.

This link to the teachings of Nāgārjuna, founder of the Mādhyamika system and perhaps the greatest of all Buddhist thinkers, was later formalized by recognizing him as the tradition's first Indian patriarch and the inspirator of the system as a whole. Such *post facto* linkage with Indian figures of unquestioned authority was a common means of bestowing legitimacy and prestige upon the Buddhist traditions indigenous to China. Nāgārjuna, in fact, is counted as "first patriarch" of several East Asian Buddhist traditions. [See the biography of Nāgārjuna.]

Hui-ssu. The master Hui-ssu was a native of Honan Province; later biographies state that he was born under the Northern Wei on the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 515. At the age of fourteen he entered the monastic life and received full ordination, devoting himself to chanting the text of the *Fa-hua ching*. At the age of nineteen he had an enlightenment experience while reading the *Miao-sheng-ting ching* (Sutra of Marvelous, Unsurpassed *Samādhi*; otherwise unknown); from this time on he retired to the woods and forests to practice meditation in solitude.

Sometime after this experience Hui-ssu met the master Hui-wen and received instruction from him concerning meditation and its concomitant, the experience of enlightenment. Thereafter, he confined his practice to meditation. Tradition alleges that he attained enlightenment only at the point when, despairing of ever realizing the goal of his practice, Hui-ssu climbed to the top of the monastery wall to throw himself off. The resulting breakthrough he later termed *fa-hua san-mei*, or "*Lotus samādhi*."

A recurrent theme in his preaching is summarized in one of his biographies: "The source of enlightenment is not far away, and one's (Buddha) nature, like a sea, is not distant. Only direct your seeking inward upon yourself; do not get enlightenment from another." Hui-ssu died peacefully in 577, at the age of sixty-two.

Some six extant works are attributed to Hui-ssu: the *Ta-sheng chih-kuan fa-men* (The Mahāyāna Teaching of Stilling and Insight; T.D. no. 1924); the *Chu-fa wu-ch'eng san-mei fa-men* (The Teaching of Noncontentious *Samādhi* with Respect to All Phenomena; T.D. no. 1923); the *Sui tz'u-i san-mei* (The *Samādhi* Attained at Will; *Zokuzōkyō* 2.3); the *Fa-hua ching an-lo hsing-i* (The Cultivation of the An-lo Chapter of the *Fa-hua ching*;

T.D. no. 1926), a work that treats the ethics of a *Lotus* devotee in an era of the decline of the Dharma, as outlined in the fourteenth chapter of the *Lotus*; the *Shou p'u-sa chieh-i* (The Ritual for Receiving the Bodhisattva Precepts; *Zokuzōkyō* 2.10); and the *Nan-yüeh Ssu-ta-shih li-shih yüan-wen* (The Vows of Master Ssu of Nan-yüeh; T.D. no. 1933). The authenticity of some of these works remains open to scholarly investigation. Attributions, in later catalogs, of some four other inextant works to Hui-ssu may, to judge from the titles of these works, represent a retrospective attempt to ascribe many of the major teachings of Chih-i to his master's inspiration.

Chih-i. Chih-i, the *de-facto* founder of the T'ien-t'ai tradition, was born in Ching-chou (present-day Hunan Province) in 538. At the age of seventeen he entered the monastic life under the direction of the master Fa-chu of the Kuo-yüan Ssu in Hsiang-chou; after his ordination he began the study of the Vinaya (rules of monastic discipline) with Hui-k'uang, reading at the same time various Mahāyāna texts. Sometime later Chih-i made a pilgrimage to Mount T'ai-hsien, where he went into retreat, reciting the "three Lotus scriptures," the *Fa-hua ching*, the *Wu-liang i ching*, and the *P'u-hsien-kuan ching*. He continued his chanting for twenty days, at which time he fully understood the meaning of these texts.

In 560 Chih-i journeyed to Mount Ta-su, where he met Hui-ssu, who was now destined to become his chief instructor. Hui-ssu instructed him in devotions centered around the figure of the *bodhisattva* Samantabhadra (Chin., P'u-hsien) and in the *An-lo* practices, practices taught in the fourteenth chapter (*An-lo-hsing p'in*) of the *Fa-hua ching*. Following Chih-i's enlightenment experience Hui-ssu named him his Dharma heir and successor. Thereafter, Chih-i took up residence in the Wa-kuan Ssu in Chin-ling (Nanking), where he was to stay for eight years. During this period he lectured on the *Lotus* and the *Ta chih-tu lun* and taught a path of gradual meditative cultivation to his disciples. These teachings formed the basis for his *Fa-chieh tzu-t'i ch'u-men* (T.D. no. 1925). In 575 he moved to Mount T'ien-t'ai, a mountain that was to remain his major headquarters for the rest of his life and from which the tradition derives its name. In 577 Chih-i and his followers were, by imperial edict, given the tax levies from Shih-feng Prefecture (*hsien*), and two clans were indentured to him to provide his community with fuel and water. Sometime in this period Chih-i lectured on the *Ching-ming ching* (the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra*) and the *Chin-kuang-ming ching* (a Prajñāpāramitā text); both of these lectures served as the basis for later written works.

In 585 Chih-i lectured before the last emperor of the Ch'en dynasty on the *Ta chih-tu lun*. While in the Ch'en

capital (Chin-ling) he also lectured on the *Jen-wang p'an-jo ching* (Sutra of the Benevolent Kings; T.D. no. 246) and admonished the emperor against state intervention in the affairs of the *saṃgha*. In 587 Chih-i gave a series of lectures on the *Fa-hua ching* in the Kuang-tse Ssu; these lectures became the basis for his *Miao-fa lien-hua ching wen-chü* (Sentences and Phrases of the *Lotus*; T.D. no. 1718). With the establishment of the Sui dynasty (589–618) and the reunification of China after some three and a half centuries, the area around the two regions of Hsiang-chou and Hsing-chou was pacified and Chih-i was able to make a pilgrimage to Mount Lu, a site famous in the history of Pure Land Buddhism. In 591 he administered the *bodhisattva* precepts to the later-to-be second Sui emperor, Prince Kuang, in Yang-chou.

In 593 Chih-i lectured on the *Fa-hua ching* at the Yü-ch'uan Ssu, a monastery in Tang-yang Prefecture whose construction he had overseen. The transcription of these lectures by Chih-i's disciple and amanuensis, Kuan-ting, served as the basis of the *Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i* (The Profound Principles of the *Lotus*; T.D. no. 1716). The following year Chih-i lectured on the practice of meditation; these lectures, again transcribed by Kuan-ting, formed the basis for the last of his three major works, the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. In 595, once more at the request of the prince, Chih-i found himself in the capital, Chin-ling, where he composed a commentary on the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* on behalf of his most eminent patron. Soon thereafter, however, inspired by a premonition of impending death, he returned to T'ien-t'ai to impart his final teachings to his disciples. These were transcribed under the title *Kuan-hsin lun* (On Visualizing the Mind; T.D. no. 1920). Chih-i died in the eleventh month of 597.

Although Chih-i considered himself part of a spiritual lineage that derived ultimately from Nāgārjuna and that had been transmitted through Hui-wen and Hui-ssu, the doctrines that have in East Asia been most typically associated with (early) T'ien-t'ai are the products of his own skill as a teacher and exegete. His biographies record that Chih-i was responsible for the construction of some thirty-five monasteries, had fifteen copies of the Tripiṭaka copied and thousands of Buddha images cast, ordained over a thousand monks, some thirty-two of whom became advanced students under his personal guidance, and produced a large number of works on doctrine and meditation. (Forty-six are attributed to him, but a number are clearly later forgeries.)

Also important were the links he established with the Sui ruling house, who saw in Chih-i's synthesis of diverse strands of the Buddhist tradition a compelling analogue to their own political unification of the empire.

Unfortunately, the close relationship enjoyed by Chih-i with the Sui rulers, and the lavish patronage he and his community received at their hands, were responsible for the school's dramatic loss of prestige in the aftermath of the fall of the Sui in 518. The new dynasty, the T'ang, wishing to disassociate itself from Sui policies, naturally eschewed the symbols of religious legitimacy treasured by its predecessor. [See also the biography of Chih-i.]

Doctrine and Practice. The T'ien-t'ai tradition is characterized by the use of an exegetical method developed by Chih-i and employed by him in his works; all subsequent T'ien-t'ai writers employed this same method. [See also Buddhist Literature, article on Exegesis and Hermeneutics.] T'ien-t'ai doctrine is founded upon a particular reading of the *Lotus Sutra*, to which is imputed a wide variety of teachings associated with other texts and traditions and an organizational principle whereby the disparate texts and teachings of Mahāyāna Buddhism are seen in the context of an overarching scheme of revelation and levels of textual interpretation. Although the systematization of this insight into the so-called Five Periods and Eight Teachings doctrine is probably the work of a later hand, the basic inspiration for the system clearly derives from Chih-i. Three works in particular, all by Chih-i, are recognized by the tradition as constituting the core and epitome of its teachings.

Miao-fa lien-hua ching wen-chü. The first of these, the *Miao-fa lien-hua ching wen-chü* (*Fa-hua wen-chü*, for short), or *Words and Phrases of the Lotus Sutra*, is based on Chih-i's lectures at the Kuang-tse Ssu in 587 on the meaning of key words and phrases in the *Lotus Sutra*. Kuan-ting's compilation and redaction of notes taken at this lecture series were completed in 629.

The *Wen-chü* employs four types of explanation (*ssu-shih*) in commenting on the text:

1. The explanation according to conditions (*yin-yüan shih*), in which the author analyzes the Buddha and his audience and the four "benefits" (*siddhāntas*) produced by this *sūtra* (it leads to joy and happiness, it generates roots of good, it destroys evil, and it enables the devotee to enter into an understanding of the Absolute).
2. The explanation in which this and all other *sūtras* are analyzed on the basis of the place they occupy in the teachings of the Buddha over his entire lifetime (*yüeh-chiao shih*). The standards for evaluating any teaching are two: whether is it "partial" or "perfect" (i.e., whether it is fully expressive of the insights of the Buddha or only partially so), Hīnayāna or Ma-

hāyāna; and where it is included in the scheme of the Five Periods and the Eight Teachings.

3. The explanation based on whether the teachings in question constitute the "basic" or "peripheral" message of the *sūtra* (*pen-chi shih*).
4. The explanation based on the type of meditational practice taught in the *sūtra* (*kuan-hsin shih*).

These four exegetical methods are employed on the *Lotus Sutra* as a whole, and then on each chapter's title and on selected passages from each chapter. The first three explanations are theoretical, the last practical.

Chih-i divided the contents of the *Lotus Sutra* into three parts, two parts, and a combination of the two. He divided the whole of the scripture into three parts: an introduction (chapter 1), the core teachings (chapter 2 to the first half of chapter 17), and a postscript (the last half of chapter 17 to the end of the work, chapter 28). He also divided the scripture into two parts (based on the *pen-chi shih* method, mentioned above): the first fourteen chapters constitute the fictive or provisional teachings; the second fourteen chapters constitute the basic or absolute level of teaching. Here again, a tripartite analysis is employed against each section. The fictive or provisional teachings are composed of an introduction (chapter 1), a core teaching (chapters 2 to 6), and a postscript (chapters 7 to 14). The basic or absolute teachings are similarly divided into the introduction (the first half of chapter 15), the core teaching (latter half of chapter 15 to the first half of chapter 17), and the postscript (latter half of chapter 17 to the end of the text).

For Chih-i, the teachings of the first half of the *Lotus* (the first fourteen chapters) center around the promise of salvation for all beings. In this section, the Buddha Śākyamuni reveals that the traditionally articulated soteriological paths (*yānas*)—that of the *śrāvaka*, or "Hīnayāna" devotee, consisting of the teaching and practice of the Four Noble Truths; the *pratyekabuddha*, or self-enlightened Buddha, epitomized by the teaching of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*); and the *bodhisattva*, or Mahāyāna practitioner, characterized by the practice of the "perfections" (*pāramitās*)—are only apparently distinct religious paths. In fact, the end of each is nothing less than full and complete Buddhahood; there are not three vehicles to salvation, only one, the *ekabuddhayāna*, or "One Vehicle of the Buddha." This section of the *sūtra* also preaches, according to Chih-i, that phenomenal existence is identical with the absolute, and that all *dharmas* have real and tangible characteristics.

The second half of the *sūtra* proclaims, however, that

Śākyamuni's very appearance in the world is a mere fiction, a device employed, so says Chih-i, by the one, eternal Buddha to aid in the salvation of all beings. Under this interpretation, the historical Buddha, indeed all Buddhas of the ten directions, are nothing more than emanations of this one Buddha, and their earthly careers—the paradigmatic sequence of birth, renunciation of family life, cultivation of ascetic practices, even the enlightenment and final *nirvāṇa* (*parinirvāṇa*)—mere elements in a great soteriological drama designed to reveal the Dharma to sentient beings. For this reason, Chih-i termed the teachings of the first half of the text provisional; only the latter half constitutes the full revelation of absolute truth.

All subsequent T'ien-t'ai writings having the words *wen-chü* in their titles employ the fourfold exegetical method described here.

Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i. The second of the major works of Chih-i, the *Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i*, is primarily an exegesis of the five words in the title of the *sūtra* from five points of view. The exegetical method of this commentary is thus called the "five types of profound principles" (*wu-chung hsüan-i*). These five exegetical categories characterize all subsequent T'ien-t'ai writings having the term *hsüan-i* in their titles and were used to analyze all Buddhist scripture, not merely the *Lotus*. The first explains the name of the *sūtra* (*shih-ming*); the second is a detailed analysis of its philosophy, a philosophy that may not be necessarily expressed in the text itself (the *pien-t'i* explanation); the third clarifies important points expressed in the body of the text (the *ming-tsung* explanation); the fourth discusses how the *sūtra* expects persons to act or to think with respect to the teaching presented therein (the *lun-yung* explanation); and the fifth evaluates the *sūtra* and ranks it in relationship to the Absolute teachings presented in the *Lotus* (the *p'an-chiao* explanation). Chih-i continues with an explanation of the meditational practice taught in the *Lotus*, how the devotee should visualize that the different characteristics of all *dharma*s are all in one's own mind and that this mind actually (not merely potentially) possesses all *dharma*s.

Chih-i's specific explanation of the meaning of the word *fa* (*dharma*) derives from the explanation that he learned from his master Hui-ssu: the word *fa* includes the aspect of mind, the Buddha, and sentient beings. All these three are at once provisional and absolute, a truth that is realized when the devotee sees that he and all other sentient beings possess the "ten suchnesses" (*shih-ju-shih*) and the "ten *dharmadhatus*," or realms of rebirth (*shih-fa-chieh*). Each realm possesses each of the ten suchnesses for a total of one thousand characteris-

tics, and each one of these one thousand characteristics are empty (*k'ung*), provisionally existent (*chia*), and both empty and existent at the same time (*chung*). This threefold characterization is referred to as the "three wisdoms."

In the last part of the commentary, Chih-i refutes various theories of early Hua-yen and Wei-shih (Yogācāra) masters. He also denies the equality, maintained by many, of the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Hua-yen ching* and refutes the theories of several early Lotus thinkers.

Mo-ho chih-kuan. The last of the major works of Chih-i is the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. Unlike the former two works, which deal primarily with theory and only peripherally with meditation, this work constitutes the core of T'ien-t'ai teachings concerning practice. The text of the *Chih-kuan* was composed by Chih-i, but the introduction to the work was written by Kuan-ting. In it, Kuan-ting speaks of the lineage of T'ien-t'ai meditational practice and teaching. He speaks of two lineages: the first is taken from the *Fu fa-tsang ching* and posits a line of transmission that begins with the Buddha Śākyamuni and may be traced to the Indian monk Siṃha. This lineage also includes Nāgārjuna. Because it begins with the "golden mouthed" words of the Buddha it is called the "golden mouth lineage." The second lineage is called the "lineage of contemporary masters"; it traces its origin from Nāgārjuna, through Hui-wen to Hui-ssu, to Chih-i.

The Five Periods and the Eight Teachings. One of the most distinctive features of T'ien-t'ai thought was its classification of the whole of Śākyamuni's teachings, that is, the whole of Buddhism, into five periods, during which the Buddha is said to have taught different doctrines to different classes of persons. These teachings are further subdivided on the basis of their contents.

The "five periods" (*wu-shih*) are (1) the Hua-yen (Skt., Avataṃsaka) period, (2) the period of the O-han, or Āgamas, also called the Lu-yüan (Skt., Mṛgadāva, "Deer Park") period, (3) the Fang-teng (Skt., Vaipulya) period, (4) the Po-jo (Skt., Prajñāpāramitā) period, and (5) the Fa-hua (Skt., Saddharmapuṇḍarīka) or Nieh-p'an (Skt., Nirvāṇa) period. These take their names, as is obvious, from specific scriptures or scriptural collections preached during these eras.

The "eight teachings" (*pa-chiao*) are two sets of four teachings, so divided on the basis of the method and the type or content of the teaching employed. The first four, the *hua-i*, or methods of conversion, are (1) the Sudden Teaching (*tun-chiao*), (2) the Gradual Teachings (*chien-chiao*), (3) the Secret Teachings (*pi-mi chiao*), (4) the Indeterminate Teachings (*pu-ting chiao*). The *hua-fa* teachings, that is, the teachings classified on the basis

of their contents, are (1) the Piṭaka Teachings (*tsang-chiao*), (2) the Common Teachings (*t'ung-chiao*), (3) the Separate Teachings (*pieh-chiao*), and (4) the Perfect Teachings (*yüan-chiao*).

When the Buddha Śākyamuni was first enlightened he is reputed to have sat silently for twenty-one days, during which time various emanations from his body are said to have taught several sermons that were later compiled into one work, the *Hua-yen ching* (*Avataṃsaka Sūtra*). During this twenty-one-day period the Buddha presented the teachings to advanced *bodhisattvas*, the only beings capable of comprehending their lofty contents.

After this twenty-one-day period, the Buddha then spent the next twelve years preaching the Hīnayāna teachings to an audience that was incapable of understanding the "sudden" presentation of the Mahāyāna teachings of the *Hua-yen ching*. These Hīnayāna teachings, also called the Āgamas (known in Pali as the Nīkāyas), were first preached in the Deer Park (Mṛgadāva) in the town of Sārnāth, a suburb of Banaras, and were intended as an initial step in preparing his listeners for more advanced (i.e., Mahāyāna) teachings. These Hīnayāna discourses were thus deemed expedient (*upāya*) teachings designed to lead the Buddha's hearers eventually to greater understanding of the ultimate or absolute level of the Truth.

Following this, the Buddha then preached for eight years to those followers who had attained the fruit of the Hīnayāna teachings, that is, to *arhats*, in order to bring them to the realization that arhatship does not represent the acme of the religious career. Thus, the Buddha preached a large number of Mahāyāna sermons—represented by such scriptures as the *Wei-mo ching* (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*), the *Sheng-man ching* (*Śrīmālādevī Sūtra*), the *Chin-kuang ming ching* (*Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra*)—which were taught, in the words of Chih-i, "to deprecate the partial and to praise the perfect; to demolish the Hīnayāna, and to praise the Mahāyāna," so that the followers would "be ashamed of the Hīnayāna and long for the Mahāyāna."

Next, the Buddha taught the Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) teaching of the emptiness of all *dharma*s. This twenty-two year period was followed by the presentation, for the first time since the teachings of the *Hua-yen ching*, of the absolute truth: for the next eight years the Buddha taught the *Lotus Sutra*. As the Buddha was about to die, he spent his last day and night preaching the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, the *Nieh-p'an ching*. In this teaching he emphasized that all beings have the Buddha nature, or the potential to become fully enlightened Buddhas, thus converting those who had remained unswayed by the preaching of the *Lotus*

Sutra. In order to remove the delusions of those "of weak capacities among later generations" who would come to have the "false view of extinction and annihilation," he stressed the importance of the Vinaya and its precepts for the moral life, and taught the eternal existence of the Buddha. Since the message and the approximate time period of the preaching of the *Lotus Sutra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* were the same, these two scriptures were said to make up a single era.

Chih-i did not assign any specific number of years to each of these periods; these were first added to this scheme in the early thirteenth century by the scholar-monk Yüan-sui in his *Ssu-chiao-i pei-shih* (*Zokuzōkyō* 2.7.1). This identification with a specific number of years for each period became standard in T'ien-t'ai circles, although it was criticized by Chih-hsü (in his *Chiao-kuan k'ang-tsung*), the Japanese master Shōshin (in the *Hokkegenji shiki*), and by the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Japanese masters Fujaku and Hōtan.

Of the four methods of conversion, the Sudden Teaching is identified with the Hua-yen period and the Gradual Teachings with the second, third, and fourth periods. The Secret Teachings are those in which one group of persons is taught the Sudden Teaching and another group is taught a Gradual Teaching, yet neither group realizes that the other has received a different presentation of the teachings. Hence, they are termed "secret [and indeterminate]." But should these two groups realize that each is receiving a different teaching and a different type of spiritual benefit, then the teachings are termed the "[revealed] indeterminate teachings." No specific scriptures are assigned to these last two categories.

The classification of the teachings according to their contents begins with the Piṭaka Teachings, a synonym for the Hīnayāna. In this teaching the Four Noble Truths are taught differently for the *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and *bodhisattvas*. Then the Four Truths are taught with respect to emptiness and nonarising to these three categories of followers equally. This is termed the Common Teaching. When an unlimited number of Four Truths are taught only to Mahāyāna *bodhisattvas*, this teaching is coupled with a presentation of the three insights, emptiness (*ku*), provisional existence (*chia*), and the middle, or reconciliation of these two (*chung*), in a sequential manner. This is the Separate Teaching, as each defilement is cut off separately. When the three insights are taught, cultivated, and realized simultaneously, and when the three defilements are cut off all at once, this is the Perfect Teaching.

The teaching of the Hua-yen period is the Perfect Teaching, but not exclusively so; it also contains traces of the Separate Teaching. The Deer Park period is de-

voted exclusively to the Piṭaka Teaching. The third period, the miscellaneous Mahāyāna or Vaipulya period, contains elements of all four teachings, and the fourth period teaches the Perfect Teaching but with strong traces of both the Common and Separate Teachings. In the fifth period, the *Lotus Sutra* is purely the Perfect Teaching, with no admixture of any of the other teachings, whereas the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* constitutes a subsidiary teaching, and includes all of the four types of teachings.

Meditation. According to Kuan-ting, Chih-i's teaching of meditation can be traced to the master Hui-ssu, and comprehends "three types of stilling and insight meditation" (*san-chung chih-kuan*): the gradual attainment of stilling and insight (taught in full in Chih-i's *Shih-ch'an p'o-lo-mi tzu-t'i fa-men*, T.D. no. 1916), the indeterminate attainment of stilling and insight (represented by his *Liu-miao fa-men*, T.D. no. 1917), and the perfect and sudden attainment of stilling and insight (represented by the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*).

The *Mo-ho chih-kuan* is divided into ten major sections; sections one and seven are further subdivided into important subdivisions. Section one is entitled Ta-i, ("great teaching") and is subdivided into (1) generating the *bodhicitta* (in which ten types of good and bad *bodhicitta* are enumerated); (2) cultivating the great practice, in which four types of *samādhi* are enumerated: the "samādhi of perpetual walking," the "samādhi of perpetual sitting," the "samādhi of half-walking and half-sitting" (which, coupled with the perpetual recitation of the Nembutsu, became important in Japanese Tendai and Pure Land practice), and the "samādhi of neither walking nor sitting"; (3) experiencing the great result (i.e., the *sambhogakāya*); (4) rending asunder the great snare of doubts, in which the author refutes doubts and objections based on other writings and teachings; and (5) returning to the great source, *nirvāṇa*.

Section two discusses the name (*Stilling and Insight*) of the text. Section three discusses its characteristics; section four states that this practice embraces all *dharma*s; section five discusses whether this practice is partial or perfect; and section six gives some twenty-five external and internal preparations for the practice of meditation. Section seven is entitled "The Real Practice" and is subdivided into ten subdivisions. According to section seven, on the first of the devotee's intensive meditations he should meditate on "the three thousand *dharma*s in one instant of mind" (*i-nien san-ch'ien*), a practice that has become one of the hallmarks of T'ien-t'ai meditation. This teaching states that the devotee's five *skandhas* presently contain all of the *dharma*s ("the three thousand *dharma*s") of existence. These three

thousand are the ten realms of rebirth (hell, *pretas*, animals, *asuras*, humans, *devas*, *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, *bodhisattvas*, and Buddhas) multiplied by the ten "suchnesses," or real, tangible characteristics (nature, external characteristics, body, power, creative ability, causes, conditions, results, recompenses, and the totality of the Absolute), in turn multiplied by the three realms (the realm of sentient beings, their physical lands, and their five *skandhas*).

The remaining portions of section seven elucidate meditational practices designed to remove the influences (*vāsanās*) of one's past *karman*. At this point the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* comes to an abrupt end; that is, it ends at the seventh subdivision of section seven; the remaining sections (eight to ten) are missing, although we know the names of their titles from the introduction to the work: section eight is concerned with karmic results, section nine with the teachings, and section ten with the general purport. There are two traditional reasons given for this abrupt ending to the text: either Chih-i was asked to speak for a certain period of time and his time ran out, or he was beginning to speak of states of attainment that could not be expressed in words. That is to say, if the devotee progressed as far as was already described in the text, he would automatically know the ending of the book for himself. [See also *Meditation, article on Buddhist Meditation*.]

Introductory manuals. Even though the major writings of the T'ien-t'ai tradition are large, voluminous works, early on it became obvious to Chih-i that his thought would be best presented in shorter epitomes of his teachings. One of the distinctive features of the T'ien-t'ai tradition is that it produced a number of one-volume works that present the salient points of T'ien-t'ai doctrine in a brief, easy to remember form.

One of the first of these works was Kuan-ting's *T'ien-t'ai pa-chiao ta-i* (The Major Points of the Eight Teachings of the T'ien-t'ai; T.D. no. 1930). Another popular one volume introduction to T'ien-t'ai thought is the *T'ien-t'ai ssu-chiao-i* (Kor., *Chōndee sagyōngui*; T.D. no. 1931) by the Korean monk Chegwan (Chin., T'i-kuan). This text is divided into two sections: the first describes the "five periods" (in the teaching career of the Buddha) and the "four teachings" (four types of doctrine preached by Śākyamuni); the second describes the meditational practice of the lineage. With this arrangement the author appears to separate the doctrinal from the practice aspect of the teaching, a point upon which he was criticized by later writers (e.g., Chih-hsü).

Another short, one-volume introductory work is the *Chiao-kuan k'ang-tsung* (T.D. no. 1939) by the Ming dynasty master Chih-hsü (1599–1655). In this work Chih-hsü attempts to present the orthodox T'ien-t'ai teach-

ings without any admixture of his own interpretations, yet his definition of orthodox T'ien-t'ai are the thoughts of the *shan-chia* masters of the Sung dynasty. This work was written along the lines of Chegwan's *Sagyōngui*, but whereas Chegwan presents the meditational practices of the various Four Teachings apart from their doctrines, Chih-hsü stresses the close interrelation between teaching and practice (meditation) in each of the Four Teachings.

Another short introductory work by Chih-hsü that is still widely read in both China and Japan is the *Fa-hua lun-kuan* (A Synopsis of the *Lotus Sutra*; *Zokuzōkyō* 50). In this work Chih-hsü adopted Chih-i's exegetical method and selected passages from Chih-i's *Fa-hua hsüan-i* and *Fa-hua wen-chü* to illustrate the purport of the *sūtra* and its title. He also quotes from these two works to illustrate the teaching of each of the twenty-eight chapters of the *Lotus Sutra*.

T'ien-t'ai historiographical works. The T'ien-t'ai contribution to Chinese Buddhism is not confined to doctrinal works alone. Two major church histories, the *Fotsu t'ung-chi* (Comprehensive Record of the Buddha and the Patriarchs; T.D. no. 2035) and the *Shih-men ch'eng-t'ung* (*Zokuzōkyō* 2.3.5), bear the imprint of T'ien-t'ai thought.

The former, composed in 1269 by Chih-p'an, is a general history of Buddhism in both India and China rendered from the T'ien-t'ai point of view. In it are preserved biographies of the Buddha and major patriarchal figures, chronologies of Chinese and Indian church history, histories of rival orders, T'ien-t'ai cosmology, accounts of church-state relations, miraculous tales, and the texts of important steles. The work contains much material pertaining to the *shan-chia-shan-wai* debates of the Northern Sung period, and is altogether notable for the attention it accords the Pure Land tradition in China, an account of which occupies a full three volumes.

The latter work, the *Shih-men ch'eng-t'ung*, is in its present form the work of the Southern Sung master Tsung-ch'ien, who rewrote the text from an earlier history, the *Tsung-yüan lu*. It is modeled after secular Chinese historical writings. In its five sections are chronicles of the Buddha and major Indian figures; sectarian lineages; monographs treating such topics as popular customs, social welfare, monastery administration, and so forth; biographies of lesser T'ien-t'ai masters; and records of other traditions.

Later Masters. Although Chih-i represents the lynchpin of Chinese T'ien-t'ai, his work was carried on and developed by a succession of later masters whose efforts ensured that T'ien-t'ai remained one of the most influ-

ential and doctrinally sophisticated traditions of East Asian Buddhism.

Kuan-ting. Chih-i's successor as abbot and leader of the T'ien-t'ai lineage was Kuan-ting (561–632). A native of Chang-an (Chekiang Province), Kuan-ting entered the monastic life at the age of six, particularly distinguishing himself in literary studies. He was fully ordained at the age of nineteen. After the death of his ordination master Kuan-ting left the local monastery and went to the Hsiu-ch'an Ssu (later the chief monastery of the T'ien-t'ai tradition) on Mount T'ien-t'ai, where he met Chih-i for the first time. It was here that he began his study of the T'ien-t'ai meditational practices and doctrinal synthesis established by Chih-i.

In 583 Kuan-ting accompanied Chih-i to the Kuang-tse Ssu in Chin-ling; here he studied Chih-i's meditational teachings and was certified as Chih-i's successor and permanent attendant. In 614 Kuan-ting completed his two-volume commentary on the *Mahāyāna-parinirvāṇa Sūtra*, his *Ta-nieh-p'an ching hsüan-i*, and the thirty-three volume commentary on this same scriptures, his *Ta-nieh-p'an ching shu*. With the completion of these works the T'ien-t'ai tradition now had complete commentaries on the two most important scriptures in their lineage, the *Lotus Sutra* and the *Mahāyāna-parinirvāṇa Sūtra*, whose doctrines, in the view of Chih-i and Kuan-ting, make up the "perfect" or "round" teaching (*yüan-chiao*). Kuan-ting's biographer states that, owing to the civil disorder attendant upon the collapse of the Sui, the five years it took him to complete his commentaries were ones of extreme privation.

In his later years Kuan-ting lived in the city of K'uai-chi, where he lectured on the *Lotus Sutra*. His biography records that contemporary popular rhyme said that he "surpassed Fa-lang, Hui-chi, Fa-yün and Seng-yin," the ranking scholar-monks of his day. It was through the efforts of Kuan-ting that the monastery on Mount T'ien-t'ai began again to enjoy imperial patronage; Kuan-ting was also responsible for the transcription and propagation of the major and minor works of Chih-i, thus ensuring their survival for later generations.

In addition to the works mentioned above, Kuan-ting's extant corpus includes the *Kuan-hsin lun shu*, a commentary on Chih-i's *Kuan-hsin lun*; the *Sui T'ien-t'ai Ta-shih pieh-chuan*, a one-volume biography of Chih-i and the primary source for our knowledge of his life and works; and the *Kuo-ch'ing pai-lu*.

Chan-jan. Chan-jan, counted as the ninth T'ien-t'ai patriarch, was born in 711 in Ching-hsi (present-day Kiangsu Province) to a family that had for generations produced Confucian scholars and officials. His biography states that in his youth he excelled in scholarship;

at the age of sixteen he developed an interest in Buddhism and began to search out teachers of the faith. His first recorded teacher was Fang-yen, who taught him the elements of *chih-kuan* meditation. At the age of seventeen he met Hsüan-lang (later to be counted as the eighth patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai tradition), who, it is said, immediately recognized the youth's intelligence and taught him both the doctrines and the meditation techniques of the T'ien-t'ai tradition.

For the next twenty years Chan-jan, still a layman, devoted himself to the study of T'ien-t'ai doctrines, finally becoming ordained in 748. After his ordination, Chan-jan journeyed to K'uai-chi where he studied the monastic discipline with the Vinaya master T'an-i (Kor., Tamil). Sometime thereafter Chan-jan gave a series of lectures on the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* in the K'ai-yüan Ssu in Wu-chün. Following the death of Hsüan-lang in 754, Chan-jan took upon himself the task of propagating the T'ien-t'ai doctrines. This he did by writing commentaries to the three major works of Chih-i, polemics against the Hua-yen, Yogācāra, and Ch'an systems, and short manuals of meditational instruction. His voluminous writings earned him the informal title of *chi-chu*, the Master of Commentaries. Chan-jan died in 782, and was buried next to the remains of Chih-i. For his role in propagating T'ien-t'ai doctrines at a time of their eclipse Chan-jan has been termed "the patriarchal restorer of the T'ien-t'ai tradition" (*T'ien-t'ai chung-hsing tsu*). He had some thirty-nine disciples, including Tao-sui and Hsing-man, as well as the academician Liang Hsiao.

Chan-jan's fame rests on his literary works. These include commentaries on Chih-i's three major works: *Fa-hua wen-chü chi* (T.D. no. 1719), *Fa-hua hsüan-i shih-ch'ien* (T.D. no. 1717), and the *Chih-kuan fu-hsing chuan-hung-chüeh* (T.D. no. 1912). In addition to these, Chan-jan also reedited the *Nieh-p'an shu* and composed three commentaries on the *Wei-mo ching* (*Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra*), a selection of significant passages from the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (his *Chih-kuan wen-chü*), works on Hua-yen (his *Hua-yen ku-mu*), on selected topics in T'ien-t'ai doctrine (*Chin-kang pi lun* and *Shih-pu-erh men*, important works in the subsequent Sung-dynasty *shan-chia-shan-wai* debates), and a number of introductory manuals of meditation.

Chih-li. Chih-li, later to be counted as the seventeenth patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai tradition, was born in 960 in Ssu-ming (Chekiang Province). At the age of six, he lost his mother, and his father sent him to live in a local monastery. It was there, at the age of fourteen, that he received full ordination. At nineteen he began his study of T'ien-t'ai doctrine with I-t'ung (Kor., Ŭitōng). After

Chih-li had been with I-t'ung for one month the master had him lecture on the *Hsin-ching* (the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya Sūtra*), and after a period of three years Chih-li was giving all of his master's lectures. I-t'ung died in 988; in 991 Chih-li took up residence in the Ch'ien-fu Ssu, where he stayed for four years, lecturing on T'ien-t'ai doctrines and writings. As his students grew in number the accommodations of the Ch'ien-fu Ssu proved to be too small, so in 995 he moved to the Pao-en Yüan; in the following year the abbot of the Pao-en Yüan resigned his office and Chih-li was able to turn the monastery into a T'ien-t'ai teaching center.

Chih-li's entire life was devoted to religious instruction. In addition to a voluminous corpus of writings, twenty-three titles by one account, and his lectures on the major T'ien-t'ai works and commentaries, he also pursued a rich liturgical and meditative career. He was responsible for the construction of hundreds of monasteries, the mass printing of T'ien-t'ai literature, the casting of devotional images, and the inauguration of an "Assembly for the Recitation of the Name of the Buddha and for Giving the Precepts" (*nien-fo shih-chieh hui*), convened annually on the fifteenth day of the second month. But Chih-li is perhaps best known for his role in the so-called *shan-chia-shan-wai* debates, the seminal T'ien-t'ai dispute of the Northern Sung period (960-1127).

The *shan-chia* ("mountain school," the "orthodox" position) centered around Chih-li and his followers; the *shan-wai* ("outside the mountain," i.e., non-orthodox) position centered around the monks Ch'ing-chao and Chih-yüan. The dispute turned on whether the correct object of meditation should be the "mind as it currently is," defiled and ignorant, or the "true mind," in which case the devotee was to visualize a deity or some other transcendental object in order that the mind might take on the feature of the object of meditation. In the course of the debate the authenticity of various works popularly attributed to Chih-i and Chan-jan was also disputed, so that what came to be at issue was the very question as to which teachings would be recognized as "orthodox" T'ien-t'ai doctrine. The debate was joined initially in a series of correspondence between Chih-li and his *shan-wai* counterparts Wu-en, Ch'ing-chao, and Chih-yüan. Many of these documents are preserved in Chih-li's collected works, the *Ssu-ming tsun-che chiao-hsing lu* (T.D. no. 1937). In the course of this correspondence Chih-li made a case for the everyday mind, replete with defilements as it is, as the proper object of meditation, a point around which a variety of notions concerning the nature of the Absolute also crystallized.

By the time of his death in 1028 Chih-li had gathered

around him a large number of students, more than thirty of whom were his close disciples. Chih-li also personally ordained over seventy monks.

Chih-hsü. The scholar-monk Chih-hsü was born in 1599 in the Su-chou district of present-day Kiangsu Province. In his youth he was an ardent student of the Confucian classics. Like many of the Confucian scholars of his day, he had an intense dislike for Buddhism and even composed an essay purporting to refute Buddhist doctrine. But at the age of sixteen he chanced to read the *Tzu-chih-lu* and the *Chu-shuang sui-pi* of the master Yün-ch'i Chu-hung (1535–1615) and was converted to Buddhism. At nineteen he underwent an enlightenment experience while reading the *Lun-yü* (Analects) of Confucius; as his biographer put it, "he was enlightened to the mind (*hsin-fa*) of Confucius and Yen-tzu."

In 1638 Chih-hsü resolved to compose a commentary on the *Fan-wan ching* (T.D. no. 1815), the standard Chinese Mahāyāna text treating the precepts. Undecided as to which doctrinal point of view he should adopt in his explanation of the text, he made four tokens in order to practice a rite of divination in front of a Buddha image. On these tokens he wrote "the Hua-yen tradition," "the T'ien-t'ai tradition," "the Wei-shih tradition," and "my own tradition," respectively, signifying by this last that he would develop his own understanding of the Buddha's teachings. In this rite, the token marked with the T'ien-t'ai tradition came to the fore, and from this time onward he composed all of his textual commentaries based on T'ien-t'ai principles.

In the summer of 1655 Chih-hsü fell ill, and on this occasion compiled the *Ching-t'u shih-yao* (Ten Essential Works on the Pure Land), an anthology of ten essays dealing with the Pure Land doctrines. At the end of summer his illness abated and he was then able to complete his *magnum opus*, the forty-four-volume *Yüeh-tsang chih-chin* and the five-volume *Fa-hai kuan-lan*. Later that year his illness returned, whereupon he established a Pure Land religious sodality and composed a set of vows for the group. He also composed some stanzas on seeking rebirth in the Pure Land (the *Ch'iu-sheng ching-t'u chieh*). Chih-hsü died in 1655 at the age of fifty-six; his popular posthumous title was Ling-feng Yü-i Ta-shih. His extant corpus of writings is voluminous: some forty-six titles appear in various canonical collections and a number of texts still circulate independently. Chih-hsü's miscellaneous pieces were collected in 1678 by his disciple Ch'eng-shih into the ten-volume *Ling feng Yü-i Ta-shih tsung-lun*.

Chih-hsü's corpus includes several works concerned with the *Leng-yen ching*, a scripture hitherto not commented upon from the T'ien-t'ai standpoint, and works dealing with the precepts, Buddhist logic, different as-

pects of Buddhist philosophy, many different scriptural commentaries, and interestingly enough, a Buddhist commentary on the Four Books (four Confucian classics) and a ten-volume *Chou-i ch'an-chieh* (a Ch'an commentary on the *Book of Changes*). Chih-hsü's largest work is the forty-four-volume *Yüeh-tsang chih-chin* (Examining the Canon and Determining Its Depth). In this work he comments on every book included in the Buddhist canon, a task he began when he was twenty-nine years old.

Chih-hsü's text divides the whole of the canon into four parts: Sūtra, Vinaya, Śāstra, and Miscellaneous. The Sūtra section is divided into Mahāyāna Sūtras and Hīnayāna Sūtras, and the Mahāyāna Sūtras are divided on the basis on the Five Periods: Hua-yen, Vaipulya, Prajñā texts, Lotus-related texts, and Mahāparinirvāṇa texts. The Vaipulya scriptures are divided into Revealed Teachings and Secret Teachings, and the Secret Teachings are further divided into Secret (i.e., Tantric) scriptures and *sādhana* literature.

The Vinaya is here divided into Mahāyāna Vinaya texts and Hīnayāna Vinaya texts. The Śāstra section is divided into Mahāyāna Śāstras and Hīnayāna Śāstras. Mahāyāna Śāstras are divided into three: Śāstras that comment on scriptures, sectarian Śāstras, and Śāstras that comment on other Śāstras: this section is also broken down on the basis of those composed in India and those composed in China. The Miscellaneous section is divided into works composed in India and those composed in China, and the section of those works composed in China is divided into fifteen subsections: repentance rituals, Pure Land, T'ien-t'ai, Ch'an, Hua-yen, Wei-shih, Tantrism, Vinaya, compilations, biographies, defense of the faith (i.e., polemical writings), glossaries, indices, "prefaces, hymns, poems, and songs," and last, a list of works that *should* be included in the canon. Chih-hsü comments on a total of 1,773 titles; for each work he gives the name of the translator or author, a summary of its contents, and the names of its chapters. Chih-hsü's classification of Buddhist scriptures was employed in the printing of the *Dai-Nippon kōtei shukkoku daizōkyō*; the influence of Chih-hsü's classification can also be found in the internal arrangement of the *Taishō daizōkyō*.

The *Yüeh-tsang chih-chin* was not published during Chih-hsü's lifetime. It was first printed by 1669, and was reprinted in 1892 in Nanking. The first full Japanese printing came in 1783, and the work is now included in volume 3 of the *Shōwa hōbō sōmoku-roku*, appended to the *Taishō daizōkyō*.

Chih-hsü also wrote a small work, the *Fa-hai kuan-lan* (Drops of Insight into the Sea of Dharma), treating his classification of the canon, which first circulated in a

printed edition of 1654. In this work Chih-hsü divides Buddhist literature into five sections: the Vinaya, texts dealing with "teaching and insight" (T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Wei-shih), Ch'an, the Secret Teachings, and Pure Land works.

[See also Nirvāṇa; Buddhist Philosophy; and Buddhism, Schools of, article on Mahāyāna Buddhism. For a discussion of T'ien-t'ai in relation to other schools of Chinese Buddhism, see Buddhism, Schools of, article on Chinese Buddhism. The development of T'ien-t'ai as practiced in Japan is treated in Tendaishū.]

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LEO M. PRUDEN

TIKHON (born Vasilii Ivanovich Belavin; 1865–1925), patriarch of the Russian Orthodox church. Prior to becoming metropolitan of Moscow (1917), Tikhon served as archbishop of Vilna and archbishop of Yaroslavl. Before that he was bishop and archbishop of the Aleutians and North America (1898–1907), laying the foundations of the Orthodox church in America. The Alaskan mission, founded in 1794, was extended and coordinated, so that it was able to grow into an autocephalous church in 1970. Tikhon's plan was to permit the Ortho-

dox of various nations to form a single church, initially dependent on the Russian church, but eventually becoming autocephalous. The goal of a single church in the United States remains to be achieved, its delay being one of the consequences of the Russian Revolution.

Patriarch Tikhon was elected twelve days after the Bolshevik coup by the Great Sobor, or Pomestnyi Sobor (1917–1918), the first assembly of magnitude in the Russian church since the Great Sobor of 1666–1667. His election signaled the successful outcome of a nearly two-hundred-year struggle by the church to emancipate itself from control by the Russian state. Yet, Tikhon and the sobor delegates were aware of the danger in the demise of the provisional government that left the Orthodox church as the only pan-Russian institution to which the masses could turn. The contest that ensued between the church and the Bolsheviks developed into the most extensive persecution experienced by Christians since the days of the Roman emperor Diocletian.

Tikhon's first months as patriarch witnessed the first onslaught of Bolshevik violence when monasteries, cathedrals, and churches were bombarded and desecrated, and priests, bishops, and lay defenders of the church murdered. Tikhon countered through an encyclical urging the Bolsheviks to cease the massacres and telling them that they were doing the work of Satan; he also excommunicated all collaborators in the terror. The encyclical, combined with the reaction to persecution, produced a major groundswell of support for the church. The Bolshevik regime reacted by depriving the church of its legal status, confiscating all its properties and revenues, and launching a holocaust designed to devastate the church and eliminate its legacy in Russian history and culture.

During the persecution the regime pursued two methods of weakening and discrediting the patriarch. First, it supported dissident schismatics who splintered the ecclesiastical administration, and second, it tried to compromise Tikhon with the public in a dispute over the disposition of church values during the famine of 1921–1922. The Living Church, composed of those opposed to restoring traditional canonical authority to the patriarchal office, was created as a result of the schism. Its leaders were allowed to seize the patriarchal palace, the patriarchal administrative offices, and the offices of the metropolitanate of Moscow in May 1922. By this time Tikhon was already under arrest, and leading Moscow clergy had either been tried and condemned to death for inciting the masses "to engage in civil war" or were under indictment for that offense. In the resulting paralysis, the Living Church takeover was accomplished under the guise of providing leadership in unu-

sual circumstances and with the assistance of the secret police. Clergy and bishops who refused to acknowledge the takeover were immediately declared unfrocked by the Living Church administration and arrested, tried, and, in many cases, executed by the secret police.

The takeover coincided with vitriolic attacks upon Tikhon, the hierarchy, and the clergy for refusing to hand over eucharistic vessels for famine relief. Tikhon had already agreed to strip the churches, monasteries, and cathedrals of precious metals and jewels except for the eucharistic vessels. The regime accused the church of hoarding its valuables and launched a massive propaganda attack. Churches were plundered anew, and their defenders arrested and indicted for antistate activities. The Living Church administration went through the motions of deposing Tikhon, and the Soviet government prepared to put him on trial for treason.

A major part of the government's indictment consisted in the accusation that Tikhon was working to overthrow the regime. That accusation was based upon a resolution passed by émigré hierarchs and lay leaders at Karlovci, Yugoslavia, in November 1921, demanding the restoration of the Romanov dynasty. Tikhon had already ordered his faithful and clergy to desist from antistate activities in September 1919 and repudiated the Karlovci statement. He also formally dissolved the émigré church administration in May 1922.

The Soviet regime soon realized that the Living Church did not have the support of the majority of Orthodox believers. Moreover, a general intensification of persecution of the Orthodox church in 1922, during which the popular metropolitan of Petrograd, Benjamin Kazanskii, was tried and executed, produced a deepening of dissatisfaction with Bolshevik rule among the masses. The regime also had put on trial Ioann Cieplak, acting Roman Catholic archbishop in Russia, together with Konstantin Budkiewicz, pastor of the chief Roman Catholic church in Petrograd. The execution of Budkiewicz had raised such an international outcry that the Bolsheviks faltered in their determination to execute the patriarch.

The circumstances led to a compromise. Tikhon wished to meet the Living Church challenge head-on, while the regime was concerned to avoid creating a martyr. Tikhon agreed to issue an encyclical in which he stated his personal loyalty to the Soviet government. He implied that the Living Church, rather than the regime, was the key danger to the Orthodox church. The regime slackened its support for the Living Church and Tikhon was released from prison. However, he was required to live in seclusion in the Donskoi Monastery, where he remained, except for brief hospitalization, until his death on 7 April 1925. While Tikhon contained

the damage from the Living Church, he paid the heavy price of being effectively isolated from his shattered flock and of paving the way for further subordination of the Orthodox church to the Soviet regime.

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JAMES W. CUNNINGHAM

TIKHON OF ZADONSK (Timofei Savelich Sokolov, or Sokolovskii; 1724–1783), Russian Orthodox bishop and saint. Son of a church reader in the Novgorod province of Russia, the young Sokolov spent his youth in poverty. After graduating from the Novgorod seminary in 1754, he taught Greek and rhetoric until his monastic tonsure and priestly ordination in 1758, when he received the name *Tikhon*. Having held several academic positions, Tikhon was consecrated suffragan bishop in the Novgorod diocese in 1761 and became bishop of Voronezh in 1763. He retired from episcopal service in 1767 and finally settled in 1769 in the Zadonsk Monastery (hence his popular appellation), where he lived until his death. He was canonized a saint of the Russian Orthodox church on 13 August 1860.

Tikhon surrendered his episcopal ministry for reasons of ill health, probably emotional as well as physical. He was a high-strung person, radically committed to his pastoral work and greatly frustrated in his activities by the ecclesiastical and secular conditions of the imperial Russia of his time. In monastic solitude Tikhon lived a life of continual prayer, reading the Bible (in particular the Gospels, *Psalms*, and Prophets, especially *Isaiah*), as well as the Fathers and saints of the Orthodox church (particularly Chrysostom). He also read Western Christian literature and was particularly interested in the books of the Anglican bishop Joseph Hall and the Ger-

man Pietist Johannes Arndt, in imitation of whom he wrote his most famous works, *A Spiritual Treasure Collected from the World* and *On True Christianity*. The collected works of Tikhon are in five volumes, including letters, sermons, and instructions of various sorts written mostly for seminarians, pastors, and monastics.

Tikhon regularly attended liturgical church services in the monastery and always participated in the sacraments, but he celebrated in his episcopal rank only at the matins of Christmas and Easter. In his everyday life he practiced great simplicity and poverty. He rarely met with people, particularly those of rank and wealth, and found communication generally very difficult. He did speak with peasants and beggars, however, giving them money, food, and counsel, and he frequently visited prisoners and criminals.

Tikhon was of melancholy spirit until the end of his life, frequently despondent and depressed. He was much given to prayerful lamentation and often wept over the state of the church and the world, particularly within the Russian empire. Even during church services he could be heard weeping and begging God for forgiveness and mercy. His main visual aids to devotion in his monastic cell were not classical Orthodox icons, but Western pictures portraying the passion of Christ in realistic form. Tikhon's life and works had great impact upon subsequent generations in the Russian church, particularly upon intellectuals such as Fedor Dostoevskii, who used Tikhon as a model for figures in his novels, and Bishop Feofan Govorov, known as Feofan the Recluse.

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Numerous editions of Tikhon of Zadonsk's many writings, sermons, and letters were made in nineteenth-century Russia, mostly by the official synodal press in Saint Petersburg. None of Tikhon's major works exists in entirety in any other language but Russian. Extracts of his writings can be found in such works as G. P. Fedotov's *A Treasury of Russian Spirituality* (1950; reprint, Belmont, Mass., 1975). The definitive work on Tikhon in English is Nadejda Gorodetzky's *Saint Tikhon of Zadonsk, Inspirer of Dostoevsky* (1951; reprint, Crestwood, N.Y., 1976). This work contains many long quotations from Tikhon's writings as well as an exhaustive bibliography of writings concerning the man, his life, times, and works.

THOMAS HOPKO

TIKOPIA RELIGION was traditionally an indigenous small-scale system of belief and ritual characteristic of about one thousand people living on a remote postvolcanic island at 12°18" south latitude, 168°49" east longitude in the extreme east of the Solomon Islands. About 8 square kilometers in area, and rising to a peak

of 360 meters, the island is heavily wooded with coconut and sago palm, breadfruit, and other useful trees, with extensive cultivation of taro, manioc, yams, and other root vegetables. The Tikopia are expert fishermen on the coral reef and at sea. An important food source is flying fish, caught from canoes at night off the coast by torchlight and long-handled nets.

Settlement on Tikopia is of permanent village and hamlet type, with houses of timber and sago-leaf thatch—some serving until recently as religious temples—and occupied by nuclear families, often with additional kin. Social structure is markedly of patrilineal lineage type, each such group having a set of named house sites, with land rights in orchards and cultivations, controlled by the senior male and inherited primarily in the male line. These lineages are aggregated into four clans, each headed by a chief, with an order of ritual precedence: Kafka, Tafua, Taumako, and Fangarere. These chiefs and their immediate descendants constitute a social class distinct from the mass of commoners. Formerly there were barriers to intermarriage between these classes, especially between women of the chiefly class and men of commoner status. In the traditional system the four chiefs were sacred (*tapu*), and they are still credited with elements of taboo in their persons and of mystical power in their formal pronouncements. But for much of this century the development of Christian proselytization and, more recently, the increasing settlement of Tikopia people elsewhere in the Solomons have considerably modified the social, economic, and religious system.

Linguistically and culturally the Tikopia are Polynesian, having much in common especially with the peoples of Samoa, Tonga, and various "outlier" communities in the western Pacific. In religion, all Polynesians seem traditionally to have shared some major beliefs and practices that are also found in other Pacific religious systems. They believe in an invisible counterpart or soul of man, which, as in dreams, has limited mobility apart from the body; in an analogous life-principle of animals and plants; in an afterworld, variously located in the sky, the sea, or a remote region on earth; in the worship of the spirits of founding ancestors or other noted forebears, and of spirits of nonhuman origin (gods), believed to have wide-ranging power over natural phenomena and human prosperity; and in concepts of mystical force capable of mobilization in personal terms, with powerful effect upon human activities.

Traditional Polynesian religion showed much abstract thought and capacity for symbolization. When offerings (for example, of food) were made to the spirits, it was not the material substance that they were supposed to consume but the immaterial essence; hence

food once offered was often later withdrawn and eaten by the human participants in the ritual. Material symbols of gods and ancestors were likewise envisaged as memorials of unseen presences, not actual figurations. Anthropomorphic images of the gods were few; the people were content to conceive their spiritual guardians as invisibly represented by such mundane objects as stone pillars, temple posts, war clubs, or living animals and plants. Occasionally, however, a god was believed to manifest himself through a human medium and to give oracular or prophetic utterance, as for timing a rite or healing the sick. Of high importance in all Polynesian religious performance was the recital of formulas of appeal, demand, or prayer to gods and ancestors. These recitals used liturgical language of often great obscurity that required special training to master; during the performances, participants invoked the names of gods whose secret titles were treasured as instruments of power.

Within the general set of Polynesian and, still more widely, Oceanic religious beliefs and practices there was much diversity, correlated to some degree with the size of each community, its ecological conditions, its history, and the complexity of its structure. A major contrast existed, for instance, between the "departmental" god system of the large islands of eastern Polynesia and New Zealand, in which the gods Tane, Rongo, Tu, and Tangaroa had prime responsibility for forests, cultivated crops, warfare, and marine creatures respectively, and the more fragmented and diversified system of spirit control characteristic of the smaller communities of western Polynesia, where more local gods and ancestors were in charge. But the whole field of Polynesian religion is hard to characterize in detail because for nearly a century and a half all the larger groups have been Christian, and a great part of the traditional religious knowledge has been lost. Hence the record from a few small western Polynesian societies, for which that of Tikopia is probably the most complete example, is important, since traditional beliefs and ritual persisted there until well into the twentieth century.

In the wider Pacific field the Tikopia description and analysis are also significant since they present a participant account of a range of basic religious themes: offering and prayer, communion between human and spiritual in various representational forms, sacralization of secular activity, symbolization of male and female spheres and roles, and relation of priesthood to social and political structure. An illustration of a cognitive approach to religion is also given in the description of the concept of mystical power (*mana*).

Tikopia Concepts and Ritual. Tikopia religion traditionally rested upon a belief that a set of spiritual

beings (*atua*) controlled the fertility of nature and the health and prosperity of the people. These *atua* comprised the spirits of dead officeholders—chiefs and their attendant ritual elders—and a number of major gods, including those of primary clan relationship popularly known as Te Atua i Kafika, Te Atua i Tafua, and the like, whose origin and relationships were set out in elaborate mythic narrative. They included a few female deities, regarded as sometimes benevolent but often highly dangerous to men, and some other beings of special power such as the spirits of fetal children, stillborn or products of miscarriage. Significant in the Tikopia pantheon was the leading spiritual figure, Te Atua i Kafika, who was believed to have lived as a mortal man, a chief and a culture hero, responsible for many Tikopia traditional institutions. Killed by an opponent in a struggle for land, he abjured retaliation by violence as he lay dying, and thus morally elevated, he succeeded to the highest position among the gods. Every important Tikopia god had several personal names or titles that were held as secret information by the religious leaders, since it was through invocation of the name that the god could be stimulated to listen to and grant the wishes of his worshiper when addressed in ritual formulas. In ritual these spiritual beings were not an undifferentiated group, but were aligned in clan and lineage operation, indeed in a sense "owned" in such terms. Although the system of multiple names or titles allowed for considerable sharing and overlapping, and was an important feature in religious integration, each spirit had a primary social affiliation.

The Tikopia religious system was not a democratic one in that no ordinary individual had access to any spirits except those of his or her immediate kin and ancestors. The gods were approached to some extent by men and women who had trance potential as "vessels of the spirits," that is, mediums, but their functions were limited mainly to healing the sick and occasional public displays of major god manifestations. The official mediators with the world of gods and ancestors were socially determined. Unlike the larger Polynesian communities, the Tikopia had no separate category of priests with religious duties as their primary profession. The heads of the major descent groups were the priests, and they communicated with the gods and ancestor spirits with prayer and offering on behalf of their people, as well as performing secular social roles as heads of lineages and prime administrators of group lands, canoes, and other property. As heads of principal lineages in the four clans, the chiefs were the outstanding priests. The Ariki Kafika had prime responsibility for success of the yam crop, the Ariki Tafua for that of coconut, the Ariki Taumako for that of taro, and the Ariki

Fangarere for breadfruit. But chiefs and ritual elders did not merely carry out individual rites for agricultural fertility, productive fishing, and general welfare for members of their own social group; they also cooperated under the general aegis of the Ariki Kafika in religious celebrations for the benefit of the whole community.

The basic Tikopia religious rite was the presentation of *kava* to the gods. As a drink, *kava* is an infusion of water with the macerated root of a kind of pepper plant (*Piper methysticum*). Nowadays in Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji, *kava* is prepared and drunk in ceremonial style, as an integrative symbolic act on social occasions, but in pre-Christian times it also had a religious function. In Tikopia the *kava* liquid was hardly drunk at all; it was offered to the gods as libation poured out on the ground to the accompaniment of prayers for welfare. To perform a *kava* rite a chief or elder assumed ritual purity by bathing, donned a special waistcloth and a leaf necklet as sign of formal religious dedication, and set out offerings of barkcloth and food, which with the libations served as channel for invoking the spirits. The language used was highly symbolic and honorific, adopting a tone of great humility, pleading poverty and signifying abasement before a god, even to the extent of using conventional phrases for eating the god's excrement, a figurative expression for consumption of the food that the god's bounty was believed to provide.

The Work of the Gods. A notable feature of Tikopia traditional religion was a collective set of seasonal rites that involved elaborate organization of manpower and assembly of large supplies of food devoted to religious ends. These seasonal cycles of ritual may be called the Work of the Gods, a figurative title sometimes applied to them by the Tikopia because of the way in which so much of the energy of the people during the ritual period was absorbed by these symbolic procedures.

The basic theme of the Work of the Gods was the periodic resacralization of some of the most important elements of Tikopia culture. Under religious auspices canoes and temples were repaired and rededicated to their practical functions, yams were harvested and planted, and a red pigment for ritual use was extracted from turmeric rhizomes and preserved. But not only technical and economic ends were given a religious cloak. The Work of the Gods also included a sternly moral public address, under conditions of great sanctity, instructing the people on proper behavior as members of Tikopia society. The period ended with ritual dancing in which formal mimetic displays and chanting of archaic songs were succeeded by freer performances by firelight at night, in which men and women could indulge in often ribald reference to sexual matters, al-

though still in a highly controlled setting. This aspect of the festival, partly cathartic in nature, was thought to give the gods' tacit approval to human re-creation. (Some aspects of this Tikopia religious cycle seem reminiscent of what from fragmentary accounts we infer the Hawaiian *makahiki* or the Tongan *inasi* to have been, although the parallels are in principle rather than in detail.) Much of the Tikopia ritual cycle occurred on ceremonial assembly grounds known as *marae* (a term widely used in Polynesia) in which stone slabs served as backrests or markers for the seats of chiefs and also stood as symbols and altars for particular gods involved in the religious events.

The Work of the Gods had other characteristics that are significant in helping to fill out the pattern of our understanding of Oceanic religions. Its periodicity was not strictly calendrical; it was determined by major seasonal alternation between the trade winds, each year springing up from the southeast about April and dying away about October, and what can be called a monsoon period of variable light northwesterly winds and calms, punctuated by occasional storm or even tropical cyclone. The climatic indicator of ritual timing was reinforced by observation of the movement of such constellations as the Pleiades, the migration of birds, and the flowering of the spectacular bright red coral tree (genus *Erythrina*). Each ritual cycle lasted about thirty days (counted by "nights" in Polynesian style) and was elaborately organized, with much mobilization and exchange of food supplies, drawing in almost the entire community in a vast network of social and economic relationships. In this chiefs and other leading men had special roles, often with individual official tasks to perform, which they carried out with great solemnity. Indeed, two clear functions of the whole series of religious performances seemed to be to provide occasion for expression of personal and role status, and by contrast to demonstrate communal solidarity through the pyramidal structure of political hierarchy.

The Work of the Gods had a special quality of sanctity through traditional authority. No particular myth was told by the Tikopia people to account for the genesis of the ritual cycle; they merely described it as having been instituted by the supreme deity, the Atua i Kafika, about whom there were many stories in other contexts, illustrating his supernatural power and the awe in which he was held. Hence the main religious performances of this cycle were regarded as a continuation and replication of what the deity had initiated, every effort was made to see that they were repeated in accurate detail, and they were treated as sacred (*tapu*) to a high degree. The whole series of rites was thus in a sense a reaffirmation of the value of tradition. Once the

cycle had begun—indicated by the ceremonial burning through of a firestick—all secular activities elsewhere in the island were much curtailed. Dancing, the most common and most enjoyed recreation, was forbidden, and so too was any loud noise, as chopping at a tree to fell it. (The taboos were applied with greatest force during the period of yam harvest rites, since this vegetable was symbolically associated with the person of the supreme god.) The taboos had finally to be removed by another specific ceremony known as “freeing the land,” which emphasized by deliberate loud noise the contrast with the previous peace. From early morning on, children ran about shrieking, and men whooped and yelled from the hills as they went about their work, making hollow booms by beating the buttresses of giant Tahitian chestnut tree trunks.

Throughout the ritual series great attention was paid to the symbolism of basic technology. Canoes were essential to fishing. Central to canoe rites was the lifting down from their shelf in the clan temple of the sacred adzes, which were then carried out from the inland temples to the seacoast in an impressive formal march. In the canoe yards on the coast the adzes were reassociated with the sacred canoes in elaborate *kava* performances. These sacred adzes had gleaming white blades of giant clam shell up to twenty-five centimeters long. They were used for hewing out canoes from tree trunks before the introduction of modern tools early in the nineteenth century, but they have long since been superseded by steel adzes for the actual work on the timber. Although now without any practical utility, these white shell adz blades continued each year to be rededicated to the gods as the symbols of the importance of canoe construction in the maintenance of fishing productivity (and formerly also long-distance sea voyaging).

One of the most striking symbolic performances was a communion rite in the Kafika temple after yam harvest. As a crowd of men waited tensely in the temple an attendant burst in with a basket of yams, smoking hot from the oven, and distributed one to each participant, who then bent over and bit into his yam. In competition, the first man to swallow a morsel uttered a chirruping sound as the winner of this spiritually inspired contest. For the chief of Kafika sat looking on, as a human being but also representing in his person the controlling deity, the Atua i Kafika, who was believed to be gazing out through the chief's eyes to see that the ritual he had instituted long before was still being carried out correctly. This performance was a true eucharist (i.e., a thanksgiving), with the added theme that the substance of the yam represented the body of the god, who in immanent form was thus watching the ingestion of his own figurative material. (The conceptual implications

of this are very interesting from a comparative point of view.)

Another characteristic symbolic act arose out of the practical work of recarpeting the sacred temples. Annually, new floor mats plaited from coconut leaf were brought in to replace the old worn mats. But this was not a haphazard process. Each mat was dedicated to a noted ancestor, was provided only by a man who was taking food from the gardens or orchards that the ancestor had cultivated, and was regarded as a formal token of acknowledgment and gratitude to the ancestor for his spiritual help in continuing to maintain the fertility of the lands.

The fundamental importance of the Work of the Gods in part was that it gave a religious dimension and legitimacy to the economic and social life of the Tikopia people. It reinforced the basic allocation of sex roles by representing certain tasks as both duties and privileges, validated by mythic example and protected by taboos. Women's tasks included plaiting mats, which work took place sometimes in surroundings from which men were barred; on the other hand, women were not allowed in the canoe yards, which were essentially associated with the work of men. The Tikopia earthen oven, which used hot stones to cook the food, required oven pads of large leaves pinned together. A special task in the Work of the Gods was the collection of such large leaves from the orchards by women moving in silence without communication with men. Since they were identified with the female deity, their patroness, it would be highly improper, even dangerous, for the men to speak to them. When the oven pads had been pinned together, also in silence, they were ritualized in a *kava* performance, thus emphasizing the importance of the oven in the Tikopia cult of food and the significance of the role of women in cooking, a task they shared with men. The Work of the Gods also drew special attention to problems of population control in relation to food resources, with a solemn public injunction to the people to limit the number of their children.

But the Work of the Gods had further functions, related to other than economic values. For much of their life the Tikopia worshiped the gods at a distance. Spirit medium séances provided households with occasional, more direct contact with the invisible world. But one of the most impressive events of the Work of the Gods was the appearance on a grand public scale of the principal god, the Atua i Kafika, in the person of his official human medium. Girt with a new waistcloth, with bands of crimson turmeric pigment smeared on his arms and belly, a black charcoal stripe on his forehead, and a huge spray of leaves as an ornament at his back, he would suddenly emerge onto the *marae* and in a state of

trance would address the assembled people in formal language, while they remained mute before the terrifying presence of their prime god. Such a ceremonial occasion helped to impress upon the Tikopia the interest the gods were believed to show in human affairs. The ritual performances in general were also a powerful force of political integration. Lineage households supported their heads by contributions of labor and food; these leaders supported their clan chief likewise; and the clan chiefs were brought, through elaborate interlocking institutions of food exchange and collective worship, into interdependence and mutual acknowledgment of the supreme god's position at the apex of the religious system and, correlatively, of the position of his representative, the one chief, at the apex of the political system.

Modern Religion. The coming of Christianity to Tikopia brought about a radical change. In 1955, after losing ground for about thirty years, the traditional religion was totally abandoned in favor of the new faith, which had been promulgated by the Melanesian Mission (now absorbed into the Anglican province of Melanesia). All Tikopia are now nominally Christian, and with very few exceptions belong to the Melanesian Anglican church. The local Christian priest (at first an alien Melanesian but now a Tikopia) is the religious leader, supported by local mission teachers, and the local churches are the foci of religious interest, with the ancient temples left to decay. The traditional chiefs are simply members of the church congregation, and they share with church leaders many day-to-day secular decisions. But the chiefs retain critical power in external affairs, and their devotion to the church has meant that the political and religious systems of Tikopia, although no longer so united as before, are still capable of harmonious accommodation.

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For comparative purposes many parallels to Tikopia religious phenomena can be seen in E. S. Craighill Handy's *Polynesian Religion* (Honolulu, 1927), which though old-fashioned in treatment is still a very useful general study. Our understanding of Polynesian religion relies so largely on accounts by early observers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that works such as *Hawaiian Antiquities*, 2d ed. (Honolulu, 1951), the reminiscences of David Malo, and volume 2 of Douglas L. Oliver's massive synoptic study, *Ancient Tahitian Society* (Honolulu, 1974), are very important sources. Many ethnographic monographs on Polynesian communities have information of limited scope on traditional religion. But especially illuminating data have come from studies of Polynesian "outlier" communities of the western Pacific, such as Kenneth P. Emory's *Kapingamarangi* (Honolulu, 1965) and Torben Monberg's *The Religion of Bellona Island* (Copenhagen, 1966).

RAYMOND FIRTH

TILAK, BAL GANGADHAR (1856–1920), known as the Lokamanya ("he who is revered by the people"); Hindu religious and political leader. Born a Citpavan brahman, Tilak inherited the unique cultural traditions of Maharashtra that juxtaposed an apolitical, ascetic Vaiṣṇava devotionism with the martial spirit and values of the *kṣatriya* class. The Citpavans, alone among India's brahmins, wielded both spiritual and temporal leadership. The resulting tensions between the saintly and political were reflected in Tilak's own life. His paternal grandfather adopted *saṁnyāsa*, but Tilak came to reject such world renunciation as escapist. He admired Vaiṣṇava poet-saints like Jñānadeva for their rejection of the renunciatory ideals of Śaṅkara, although he was uncomfortable with their emphasis on devotion and personal salvation. Tilak accepted a life of self-sacrifice, but only as directed toward service to his countrymen. He found his model in the Maratha hero Shivaji (1627–1680), who, in opposition to the Mughals, established the last great Hindu state, based on the ancient religious ideals of caste duty. Tilak used Shivaji's example of independence ("swaraj," from Skt. *svarājya*, "self-rule") in his own struggle with the British raj. While rejecting certain religious ideals, Tilak was no secularist; rather, he favored the religion of *dharma*, the establishment of divine cosmic order in the world and specifically in the political realm, in contrast to the religion of *mokṣa* or, as he would have put it, the redefinition of *mokṣa* as selfless action in the world rather than as world transcendence. Although in his school days at Deccan College Tilak was impressed by Western science, he became distrustful of utilitarianism, agnosticism, and positivism.

Tilak's religious writings include two works that at-

tempt to use scientific methods to support his Hindu revivalism: *The Orion* (1893) and *The Arctic Home in the Vedas* (1903). His greatest religious work was his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Śrīmad Bhagavadgītā Rahasya* (1915), written in a British jail while he was serving time for sedition. Tilak espoused the *Gītā*'s path of action, dismissing the path of renunciation and knowledge as applicable only to an earlier age. Similarly, while the *Gītā* assigns martial activity to the *kṣatriyas*, Tilak argued that military duty was appropriate for all Indians in times of national emergency.

Tilak charged others with distorting the scriptures, because of their sectarian biases. Yet his own commentary, in support of his nationalist and activist aims, is more eisegetical than exegetical, exerting greater influence in the political than in the philosophical or theological realms. In his newspapers, the Marathi-language *Kesari* and the English-language *Mahratta*, Tilak put forth his nationalist ideas in traditionalist terms, referring, for example, to the boycotting of British goods as a form of yoga. His traditionalist stance, along with his promotion of religious festivals, particularly that in honor of the deity Gaṇapati, both aided and hurt his cause. He captured the loyalty of orthodox Hindus, but for a time alienated the Muslims.

The myth and power of the Lokamanya was to give way to that of the Mahatma. Gandhi saw a role for the saint-renunciate in the political world and thus reunited the goals of *dharma* and *mokṣa* that the Lokamanya had partially sundered. Yet it was Tilak's cry, "Swaraj is my birthright and I will have it," that made Gandhi's achievement possible.

[See also the biography of Gandhi.]

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C. MACKENZIE BROWN

TILĀWAH. Recitation of the sacred words of scripture in Islamic contexts of prayer, liturgy, and public performance is designated by the Arabic terms *tilāwah* and *qirā'ah*. The very name of Muslim scripture, Qur'ān, is a cognate of *qirā'ah* from the finite verb *qara'a*, which means "he read," in the sense of "recited." *Tilāwah* is the more general term for Qur'ān recitation, and its root carries the double sense of "to recite" and "to follow." Thus, the Muslim concept of scripture entails the notion of divine speech meant to be recited, as indeed is the case with several other scriptures, such as the Hindu Vedas and the Jewish Torah. The sacred archetype of Muslim scripture is the Preserved Tablet (*lawḥ mahfūz*, surah 85:22) or Mother of the Book (*umm al-kitāb*, 13:39, 43:4), the heavenly inscription of God's word from which it is believed that scriptures had been sent down to other prophets (e.g., the *torah* to Moses and the gospel to Jesus) and ultimately from which the angel Gabriel recited the Arabic Qur'ān to Muḥammad. This notion of divine speech, preserved and transmitted in heaven and on earth in both written and oral forms, can be traced among Semites to ancient Near Eastern cosmologies. In both its inscribed and its recited Arabic forms, the Qur'ān lies at the heart of Islamic symbolism, ritual, and social experience—indeed, even among many non-Arabic-speaking Muslims.

The tendency of Western scholars to concentrate on problems of textual history and interpretation to the neglect of the contextual modes of oral transmission and performance has resulted in a general failure to appreciate the significance of *tilāwah* in Islamic society. Although the textual form of the Qur'ān is paramount in such areas of classical Muslim scholarship as law (*fiqh*), theology (*kalām*), grammar (*naḥw*), and scriptural commentary (*tafsīr*), it is in its oral form that most Muslims down to the present have learned the Qur'ān.

Tilāwah and the Question of Canon. In Islam, the problem of establishing an authoritative text was not a question, as it was in Judaism and Christianity, of authorized councils deciding which writings were inspired or otherwise authentic. Materials for the body of scripture (*kitāb*, "book, writing") were from the beginning regarded as simply and exclusively the accurate preservation of Muḥammad's recitation of God's speech, which tradition affirms had circulated orally, and in a less well-assembled form in writing, among contemporaries of the Prophet. Of greater significance was the question of collecting—implying also the arranging—of the Prophet's recitation of *sūrahs* and *āyahs* ("chapters" and "verses"). Tradition assigns the beginning of this task to the Prophet himself and stipulates further that the Qur'anic text was rehearsed in the presence of the

angel Gabriel periodically until the revelation ended at the time of Muḥammad's death (632 CE). It is also held that through his secretary, Zayd ibn Thābit (and others), Muḥammad had at least some of the Qur'ān written down during his own lifetime. Various copies (*ma-ṣāḥif*, sg., *maṣḥaf*) of these and the transcription of others were collected by the first two caliphs (Muḥammad's successors as head of the community). Islamic tradition regards the definitive collection ordered by the third caliph 'Uthmān (d. 656), however, as the official copy to which all authoritative copies since that time are traced.

As is often the case when the texts of sacred speech assume written form prior to the development of widespread functional literacy, the *scriptio defectiva* of the earliest transcriptions of the Qur'ān did not present the full and unambiguous script that was later developed for the enunciation, phrasing, and punctuation of each vocable, and it did not provide for other matters of enormous significance for meaning and consistency in oral recitation, such as guidance for phrasing and pauses. *Scriptio plena*, the full and precise system of writing, had neither fully evolved nor was it really necessary in the early stages when the "text" was transmitted primarily in oral form. As a result, slightly different variant readings (recitations) of the written Qur'anic text have existed and been accepted since the formative period of Islam.

Tenth-century Qur'ān scholars, the most famous of whom was Ibn Mujāhid (859–935), analyzed and evaluated the existing variant readings of their day and established the orthodox systems of reciting from the written text attributed to the caliph 'Uthmān (r. 644–656). Tradition accounts for the variations among the reciters, as Ibn Mujāhid's work shows, on the basis of a report (*ḥadīth*) that Muḥammad had been given the Qur'ān to recite according to seven *aḥruf* ("letters"), a term that is sometimes taken to mean the dialects spoken by Arab tribes contemporary with the Prophet. In this view, God revealed the Qur'ān to Muḥammad in the seven dialects of Arabic understood by the various tribes in Arabia, and these phonetic variations account for the different *qirā'āt* of the text of 'Uthmān. The connotation of *aḥruf* as "dialects" is controversial among Islamicists, however. Ibn Mujāhid's work, *Kitāb al-sab'ah* (The Seven Recitations), identified the most renowned orthodox eighth-century reciters of the Qur'ān, and although later authorities boosted to ten and fourteen the number of acceptable recitation systems, Ibn Mujāhid's seven remain the most widely recognized among Muslims today. Disciples of the seven charter reciters promulgated slight variations from their masters;

these seven secondary transmitters are known as *rāwīs*, and their traditions of recitation have also survived and found acceptance in the Muslim community.

Thus, for example, in the postscript to the official edition of the Qur'ān printed in Egypt, the editors state that the basic orthography is that of 'Uthmān's copy and that it reflects the phonetic qualities of the oral transmission by the *rāwī* Ḥafṣ (d. 805), whose master was the reciter (*qāri'*, *muqri'*) 'Āṣim (d. 744)—one of Ibn Mujāhid's seven. Many professional reciters know several of the phonetic systems of the classic reciters and their disciples, and they will often repeat a given Qur'anic phrase in other *qirā'āt* in order to bring out several possible emphases and meanings allowed by the basic script.

Tilāwah and the Rules of Tajwīd. The significance of acceptable variations in the enunciation of the text is considerable insofar as meaning is established not only by written symbols but also by sounds. Although written texts of the Qur'ān, such as the modern Egyptian edition traced to the *qirā'ah* of 'Āṣim, are elaborately marked to reflect the phonetic qualities of a given *qirā'ah* and are further coded to guide the reciter in proper phrasing and oral emphasis, the actual art of reciting can be learned properly only from a teacher. This oral, performative, pedagogical context has characterized Qur'anic studies in Islam since the seventh century. Nonetheless, a considerable literature about the rules that govern recitation has accumulated over the centuries.

Learning to recite the Qur'ān traditionally began in the Qur'ān school (*kuttāb*, *maktab*), where rote memorization of Qur'anic passages by children seated around a teacher (*shaykh*) marked the first, and for some the only, stage of formal education. Even with increasing government control of public education in modern times and the changes this has brought about, many contemporary Muslims are attempting to retain some form of the traditional Qur'ān school as an important first stage of Islamic pedagogy. At more advanced levels, students specializing in *tilāwah* learn the rules of *tajwīd*, that is, the rules for rendering correctly the recitation of the Qur'ān (and their application) in more critical learning and performance situations. Again, this is primarily an oral context dominated by a *shaykh* who has received special training and earned recognition as a reciter. In one of the most popular recitation manuals in use in Cairo today, *tajwīd* is defined as "articulating each letter from its point of articulation, giving it its full value. The intent of *tajwīd* is the reciting of the Qur'ān as God most high sent it down. . . . Knowledge of it is a collective duty, and the practice of it is a duty

prescribed for all who wish to recite something from the holy Qur'ān."

Rules for proper recitation are usually printed at the back of the Qur'ān. These include specifications on how to produce the correct phonetic sounds, assimilation of certain juxtaposed phonemes, proper duration of vowel sounds, and sectioning (the rules for pauses and starts in reciting). The first three kinds of rules account for the unique sound of Qur'anic recitation—a sound that easily distinguishes *tilāwah* from the pronunciation of Arabic for any other purpose. Sectioning allows the reciter to build a cadence or stress a particular phrase through the use of required and optional points of pausing and starting within each verse of the text and through calculated repetition of phrases. The rules of *tajwīd* also cover the proper Arabic formulas used before and after each recitation, such as "I take refuge in God from the evil Satan," followed by the Basmalah, "In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate." At the completion of each recitation one recites: "The majestic God has spoken truly."

Two general styles of recitation may be distinguished. *Murattal* is the more straightforward type, appropriate for individuals reciting in the context of prayer and private devotions; *mujawwad* refers to the more melodious and ornate styles employed by trained and professional reciters for religious celebrations and public performances. Both *murattal* and *mujawwad* are governed by the rules of *tajwīd*, although *mujawwad* is an art form that takes years to master, and its practitioners receive high recognition in Islamic society.

The term *tilāwah* (which has thus far been used synonymously with *qirā'ah*) has the special connotation, as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) put it, of being an act of recitation in which the tongue, heart, and mind are equally involved. Thus, *tilāwah* involves three essential ingredients: sound, thought, and emotion. Insofar as the rules of *tajwīd* and the contexts in which they are taught are intended to realize all three factors, Qur'ān recitation cannot be regarded as an empty verbal exercise, a cultural form without content. Muslim literature about *tilāwah* indicates that "the necessary, obligatory recitation is the thoughtful one that engrosses the whole self," or "those who would listen to the Qur'ān with their ears, not attending with their hearts, God faults them for that." The rules of *tajwīd*, then, have to do with sound production in relation to the proper cognitive and emotional responses.

The *tilāwah* literature addresses the rules of *tajwīd* for listening to Qur'ān recitation as well. This dual focus reflects the facts that the Qur'ān is an integral aspect of Muslim piety and worship and that most occasions of Qur'ān recitation entail a speaker/listener social rela-

tionship. The reciter's skill and correct frame of mind for his task are to be matched by listeners who likewise are prepared to hear the word of God.

Besides the manuals on *tajwīd*, other sources contributing to the cognitive and intellectual understanding of the Qur'ān include phrase-by-phrase commentaries (*tafsīr*), biographies of the prophet Muḥammad (*sīrāt*), and descriptions of the specific occasions of revelation during Muḥammad's mission (*asbāb al-nuzūl*). Then too, there are the personal meanings each phrase might symbolize for individual reciters and hearers: when an individual or community feels tempted or threatened by an intrusive outside force or circumstance, for example, a passage about Satan may be recited. In general, the rules of *tajwīd* and Qur'ān recitation are closely connected with these other sources—both literary and social/contextual—of meaning. Any adequate appreciation of the meaning of the Qur'ān would have to involve knowledge of the written text, the commentary literature, the performance of recitation, and the social-ritual contexts—in short, the whole spectrum of Qur'anic presence in Islamic culture.

The Contexts of Tilāwah. Among the most important settings for Qur'ān recitation are the ritual celebrations appointed by the Muslim calendar. The ninth month, Ramaḍān—the month when Muḥammad's mission was first announced to him with the transmission of the first revelation (surah 96) by the angel Gabriel, and also the month of the obligatory fast—is the occasion for public recitation of one-thirtieth of the text each day in mosques and special gatherings. The written text of the Qur'ān indicates these liturgical divisions with symbols in the margins marking each thirtieth part (*juz'*), the halves of each of these, and the quarters of each half. Another set of markings divides the text into seven weekly sections. The apportioning of the text in this fashion is separate from the literary chapter divisions (surahs) and specifically applies to the liturgical and mnemonic functions of reciting.

The actual speed with which a Muslim may choose to recite the entire text (over a month, a week, three days, or even in one night), like the question of which passage to recite on a given occasion, is a matter of personal preference. Various recommendations of the Prophet and his companions on these matters are found in the *ḥadīth* and are quoted in the literature on Qur'ān recitation.

On important calendrical festivals (*'uyūd*; sg., *'īd*), such as the Prophet's birthday (Mawlid al-Nabī), the Feast of Fast-Breaking ('Īd al-Fiṭr, at the end of the month of Ramaḍān), and during the pilgrimage assemblies in Mecca during the twelfth month, Qur'ān recitation also plays an important role. Whereas such pub-

lic occasions call for the skills of a trained reciter, every Muslim individually recites a portion of the Qur'ān during the five daily prayers. The most frequently recited passage is the brief first surah, the Fātiḥah (Opener).

The Muslim lunar calendar captures in its festivals and holidays the rhythms of sacred history that center around God's revelation to the Prophet and the sacred time of the formation of the Prophet's community (*um-mah*) in Mecca and Medina. Another set of social rhythms, the human life cycle, is also celebrated by moments of recitation. The Muslim rites of passage, including birth and naming of the child, circumcision, acquiring the ability to recite the entire Qur'ān from memory, marriage, and death, are normally celebrated among family, friends, and neighbors, and it is common practice to hire a Qur'ān reciter for the edification and enjoyment of those gathered. Numerous political and social occasions also call for a religious blessing attended by Qur'ān recitation. Because Qur'ān recitation in the more ornate *mujawwad* style is also a critical art form, a well-known reciter can attract a large and responsive crowd just to hear him perform his art. Indeed, the ethnomusicological field research of Kristina Nelson has shown that public knowledge and appreciation of different personal styles of *mujawwad* performance are very keen among reciters and their audiences in Egypt today; such intense appreciation of Qur'ān recitation is characteristic of all Muslim societies including regions outside the Arabic-speaking Middle East.

The development of electronic media in the twentieth century has created new contexts for Qur'ān recitation. Tape recordings of the *murattal* and *tajwid* styles of recitation by famous recent and contemporary reciters are widely available for private and public listening. Cassettes also allow individuals to record their favorite reciter from the radio or at private reciting sessions and to exchange tapes with other connoisseurs. Television stations in Muslim countries typically begin and end each program day with a passage of Qur'ān recitation; as the shaykh recites, the Arabic text rolls down the screen in place of or in addition to the image of the reciter. In some non-Arabic-speaking countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, a simultaneous translation of the text in the local language may also appear on the screen. Radio, however, is by far the most widely used broadcast medium for Qur'ān recitation today. Most stations broadcast Qur'ān recitation at selected intervals, along with religious poetry, readings of the Prophet's *ḥadīth*, and homiletic materials. Some stations devote programming entirely to Qur'ān recitation and other religious materials, and listeners are able to select times for listening or recording their favorite passages and reciters from broadcast schedules in the print me-

dia. Along with reciters famed for their skills and in high demand for public and private recitations in person, those chosen for broadcast performance are carefully screened, and many become well-known personalities in Muslim societies. Given the new media contexts of modern Islam, it is not uncommon, therefore, for someone walking down a street to hear the Qur'ān being recited from several sources at once—from radios and cassette recorders in private homes, small shops, and automobiles, along with those carried by passersby. Throughout the Muslim world students, both male and female, compete in local and national Qur'ān reciting contests, which are decided internationally each year at such renowned centers as al-Azhar University in Cairo.

The contexts of Qur'ān recitation described above have a striking symbolic association with "occasions of revelation" during the sacred time of the Prophet's mission in Mecca and Medina. Recitation then and now belongs to those significant moments in the life of the community that call for enunciation of the divine word. *Tilāwah* is, then, a meaningful speech act governed by rules that situate the speaker and the addressee within the sacred paradigm of God's address to humankind. The recited Qur'ān is, however, no more considered by Muslims to be the actual words of the contemporary reciter than it is attributed to the prophet Muḥammad. The Qur'ān is enthusiastically held to be God's beneficent revelation to the Arabs in the seventh century and, through the Arabs and their language, to the rest of humankind. *Tilāwah* as an Islamic cultural framework embraces not only the sounds but also the cognitive processes of meaning and the emotional responses appropriate to this symbol of divine manifestation. A full appreciation of *tilāwah*, therefore, engages the student of religions with texts, rules, and practices that touch virtually every aspect of Muslim society.

[*The historical background of the Qur'anic text is addressed more fully in Qur'ān, article on The Text and Its History. See also Dhikr; Samā'; Tafsīr; and Rites of Passage, article on Muslim Rites.*]

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RICHARD C. MARTIN

TILlich, PAUL (1886–1965), German-American theologian and philosopher. Paul Johannes Tillich became through his teaching and writings one of the leading religious thinkers of the twentieth century and contributed a distinctive theory of religion and religious symbolism. Born in Starzeddel, Germany (present-day Starosiedle, Poland), the son of a Lutheran pastor, he attended the universities of Berlin, Tübingen, Halle, and Breslau, earning a doctorate in philosophy at Breslau (1910) and a licentiate in theology at Halle (1912); from 1919 to 1933 he taught theology and philosophy at the universities of Berlin, Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt am Main. Removed from his position at Frankfurt by the Nazi government, he emigrated to the United States, where he taught at Union Theological Seminary in New York (1933–1955), Harvard University (1955–1962), and the University of Chicago (1962–1965).

The core of Tillich's theory of religion and religious symbols is to be found in his understanding of religion as "ultimate concern." This phrase, which Tillich adopted as the technical term for what in his early German writings had been designated by such phrases as *das, was uns unbedingt angeht* ("that which matters to us unconditionally") and *Richtung auf das Unbedingte* ("directedness toward the unconditioned"), was intended to have both subjective and objective connotations, referring to the state of being unconditionally concerned as well as to that about which one is so concerned; it was Tillich's understanding that religion necessarily involves both aspects.

Theory of Religion. Ultimate concern is a universal human possibility; in that sense every person is potentially religious. But Tillich did not conceive of this as a religious *a priori* in the Neo-Kantian sense, for it is not a special capacity or function alongside the theoretical and practical but a centered act of the whole self, which is, as he put it in "Religion," his essay in *Man's Right to Knowledge* (New York, 1955), "the dimension of depth in all [life's] functions" (p. 80). It unites science and art in theoretical reason and, in practical reason, law and community. In his early writings, prior to about 1919, Tillich appears to have understood this unity in accord with the principle of identity contained in the thought of his philosophical mentor, Friedrich Schelling, that is, as a synthesis in which opposites (subject, object; cognition, art; law, community; concrete, universal) are fused. In his later writings, he interpreted this unity rather in terms of "correlation," that is, as a connection of two independent but related elements.

The dynamics of actual religion are determined in Tillich's thought by the interplay of the two sides of a correlation. For example, the certainty of the state of being unconditionally concerned plays against the doubt whether the object that elicits that concern is really unconditional. The two sides meet at a point that must be indicated by such paradoxes as the one Tillich uses in *Dynamics of Faith* (1957): the only ultimate truth is "the one that no one possesses" (p. 98). The point of identity does not normally appear in religion as a constitutive principle but only as a "guardian standpoint" to protect against idolatry. This standpoint is expressed by a second-order symbol, depending for its effectiveness on other, primary symbols, in which the concrete and ultimate aspects partly contradict each other. However, in special circumstances the identity of unconditioned and conditioned can be provided in a first-order symbol as well. The term that Tillich applies to such a special time of identity is the Greek word *kairos*, which means "right time." This notion of time is opposed to sequential, chronometric time, as the English word *timing* suggests. Tillich made only one application of this concept to any historical moment other than to the founding of Christianity: namely to Germany after World War I. For this was a time, Tillich observed in a retrospective judgment, in which the decision for a political movement (religious socialism) was simultaneously a decision for a religious symbol (the kingdom of God). But this one application is echoed in the special role played by the symbol "kingdom of God" in Tillich's systematic theology: this is the one religious symbol that can be a religious symbol only if it has a real historical and political connection.

As ultimate, or unconditioned, religion tends toward the abstract; as concern, it tends toward the concrete.

Tillich saw both the history of religions and the typology of religion in terms of this dual tendency. The history of a religion begins in an event of revelation, in which a person or group is grasped by an ultimate concern and, correlatively, something is established as a religious symbol (that is, as the objective side of the concern). The three phases of this event are the breakthrough (*Durchbruch*), the conversion (*Umwendung*), and the realization (*Realisierung*). The concept of breakthrough indicates that one cannot arbitrarily decide what is going to be of ultimate concern; instead, something breaks into one's consciousness and into one's world in such a way as to elicit a response to it (*Umwendung*). What it is that has broken through is expressed in symbols and rites, that is, in those real things (or meanings) and practices that make the unconditional a perceptible part of the world (*Realisierung*). The further history of a particular religion is shaped by the way in which every realization tends to become idolatrous (by making itself unconditional) and to provoke an inner protest and critique against itself as idolatrous. The element that preserves the holiness of the symbol or rite is the priestly or sacramental; the element that fights against the idolizing of it is the prophetic or Protestant. These two elements are constituents of every living religion. Neither of them has a superior rank, for it is essential to any living religion that there be both a concrete expression that presents the unconditional and also a protest against identifying the unconditional with its presentation. If the two elements lose their relation to each other, a living religion dies, by splitting into idolatry on the one side and secularism on the other.

Although the tension between the two elements is always present in any living religion, the two need not be equally emphasized. Hence, Tillich could derive a typology of religions from them. The type of religion in which the concrete predominates is polytheism, with its subtypes of universalistic, mythological, and dualistic; the type in which the universal predominates is monotheism, with its subtypes of monarchic, mystical, and exclusive; and the type in which the concrete and the ultimate are balanced is trinitarian monotheism. Philosophical systems, too, can be subsumed under these types, since every whole philosophical system is based on an implicit understanding of the meaning of the unconditional, on a mystical intuition of an ultimate concern. Thus, monistic naturalism, pluralistic naturalism, and metaphysical dualism are transformations of the polytheistic type of religion; gradualistic metaphysics, idealistic monism, and metaphysical realism, of the monotheistic type; and dialectical realism, of trinitarian monotheism.

That there are both direct (religious) and indirect

(philosophical) expressions of ultimate concern provided the basis for Tillich's distinction between ecclesiastical theology and cultural theology. In the idea of a theology of culture Tillich blazed a trail on which many have followed. He opened the possibility of seeing in all of culture, and not only in the religious sphere, an awareness and expression of something unconditional. In his essay "Über die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur" (1919; English translation in *What Is Religion?*, 1969), he proposed that such a theology of culture would make it possible to understand a given period of history by reference to how religion is expressed in it. This proposal does not mean that cultural forms are to serve religious purposes; such forms are instead to be regarded as autonomous, following their own law of formation. But it does mean that even fully autonomous culture contains a definable understanding of what is of ultimate concern. A theological analysis of culture is assigned the task of elaborating that understanding by showing how the dimension of depth (the unconditional aspect) is made known in the way in which form and content appear in cultural works. In expressionistic paintings, for example, the ordinary shapes of things are distorted and their ordinary content becomes inessential as the power of the depth, or the ground and abyss of things, becomes perceptible in the painting.

Tillich himself did not produce a systematic theology of culture. But in essays published over the years, including *Die religiöse Lage der Gegenwart* (1926; translated by H. Richard Niebuhr as *The Religious Situation*, New York, 1932) and "The World Situation," in *The Christian Answer*, edited by Henry P. Van Dusen (New York, 1945), he offered analyses of several aspects of contemporary culture; and most of his work in the philosophy of religion was guided by this underlying conception. In one of its variations it serves as the basis for his *magnum opus*, the three-volume *Systematic Theology* (1951–1963), which belongs among the important presentations of Christian theology from all periods of history. Following a method of correlation, Tillich interprets religious symbols by reference to the existential questions to which they provide answers. These questions are discovered by analyzing and interpreting the way in which human beings implicitly understand themselves in a given period or a given culture. Tillich called such a self-understanding the "situation." It is expressed in works of science, art, law, and morality, particularly through the style in which they are done; but these expressions must be interpreted in order to make explicit the question that is implicit in them concerning the meaning of being.

Human existence, Tillich said, is itself a question—that is, it has the structure of being open to something beyond it and complementary to it—but the way in

which that question is formulated changes from time to time. To interpret how it is being asked in a given situation is the task of the analysis of culture. Over against the question there are the religious symbols of a tradition (in Tillich's case, the Christian tradition). They too must be interpreted in order to make explicit how they convey answers to the question that is being asked. Thus, to take one example, the imagery contained in the narrative of the creation of the world in the first chapters of *Genesis* is interpreted as a religious symbol that can answer the question implicit in human finitude when this imagery provides the courage to accept the human anxiety that accompanies being finite and insecure. As this example indicates, existential questions express an ultimate concern—a concern about being anyone or anything at all in spite of the possibility of not being; their power is felt in the mood of anxiety. Religious symbols are answers when they actually convey what is of ultimate concern—the possibility of being in spite of the threat of nonbeing; their power is felt in the mood of courage.

This theory of religion, which sees religion as a dimension of being in all the human functions, began to appear in Tillich's very early works and, when combined with critical phenomenology, resulted in the disciplined approach to religious phenomena—a *Religionswissenschaft*—that was characteristic of Tillich. In principle, it involved the investigation of direct and indirect expressions of religion in any culture or religious tradition. But not until his later years did Tillich, prompted in part by a visit in 1960 to Japan, go beyond standard textbook examples from religions other than Christianity and Judaism in order to include some of the rich materials that, in the meantime, had become better known through studies in the history of religions. His last public address recorded the change; it was entitled "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian" and was published in Tillich's *The Future of Religions* (New York, 1966).

Theory of Symbols. Tillich proposed a distinctive theory of religious symbolism, which met both wide acceptance and wide criticism during his lifetime. The theory can be defined by contrast with the Neo-Kantian theory of Ernst Cassirer on one side and with supranaturalist theories on the other. In contrast to Cassirer, Tillich maintained that religious symbolism was not one among several ways of construing one and the same reality (along with the symbol systems of art, language, and science) but was instead created by a response to a depth-reality that breaks into the whole. In contrast to supranaturalist theories, however, Tillich maintained that the different reality to which symbols refer cannot be made known in any way other than through symbols.

One can indeed say that what such symbols refer to is the same as what is experienced in numinous encounters, such as those described and analyzed by Rudolf Otto in *The Idea of the Holy* and the same as what is asked about in existential questions concerning the meaning of being at all. But these latter are indirect ways of pointing out that to which religious symbols refer. A symbol is a symbol because it has the capacity to make directly perceptible, or to present, what it symbolizes.

This does not amount to saying that there are no criteria for judging religious symbols. But the criteria come from the nature of this symbolism instead of from something external to it. Among the criteria that Tillich cites in various places—he has no single, uniform list of them—one is whether a symbol is demonic. The concept of the demonic, which was one of his main contributions to the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of history, refers to a negative quality contained in the experience of the holy, or the experience of being grasped by something unconditional in meaning, value, and power. The unconditional can appear either as divine or as demonic. It is divine when the power of its creativity is united with the creation of new forms to receive it; it is demonic when the power of its creativity is united with the destruction of all forms.

Other criteria for evaluating symbols are those of subjective and objective adequacy. Symbols are subjectively adequate if they are capable of creating reply, action, and community. In these terms, all symbols have a limited tenure; they die out after the situation in which they arise has changed. Tillich cited as one example of a dead symbol that of the Virgin Mary within Protestant Christianity. An apparent exception to this limited tenure is provided by the idea of natural symbols (water, for example). Tillich apparently came upon this idea in his work with the Berneuchner group, which was concerned with questions of liturgical renewal; but it did not play a prominent role in his thinking otherwise. The objective adequacy of symbols involves the question of whether a symbol is really ultimate—that is, whether it does really represent what is a matter of being or not being at all. Objective adequacy can be judged in relative and in final terms. Relatively speaking, symbols that incorporate more dimensions of reality are more adequate than others. Thus, a human being, having self-consciousness, is objectively more adequate a symbol than a stone, which lacks even the dimension of consciousness. But, finally, the only adequate (and true) symbol is one that expresses both the ultimate and its own lack of ultimacy; it affirms itself through its self-negation. Among the symbols of the Christian religion, it is the symbol of the cross that

bears this final criterion; for what this symbol means, in wording that Tillich adapted from Schelling, is that Jesus sacrifices "himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ" (*Systematic Theology*, vol. 2) and that "the Christ is Jesus and the negation of Jesus" (*Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, Chicago, 1955).

As a whole, Tillich's religious thought, like that of other original thinkers, does not fit into any standard classification. Tillich was not a positivist (but neither was he a rationalist); he was not a supranaturalist (but neither was he a naturalist). He was existentialist (but he was also essentialist); his thought was Protestant (but it was also Catholic). Many influences and strands were taken into his works, but none of them escaped transformation as he appropriated them.

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TI-LO-PA (988–1069), also known as Tillipa and Te-lo-pa; one of the eighty-four Indian Vajrayāna *mahāsiddhas* ("completely perfected ones"). Ti-lo-pa is considered the human founder of the Vajrayāna lineage that

was later named Bka'-brgyud, one of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism. His own chief disciple was the Indian Nā-ro-pa (1016–1100); the succession of master-disciple continues through Nā-ro-pa's Tibetan disciple Mar-pa (1012–1096), thence to Tibetan Mi-lar-pa (1040–1123) and the lineage holders of the Bka'-brgyud school that derive from him. Ti-lo-pa is held to have had other Indian disciples but nothing is known of the lineages they may have continued or the historical impact they may have had.

There is a brief, one-page account of Ti-lo-pa's life in a late eleventh or early twelfth century Indian work on the eighty-four *siddhas* preserved in Tibetan. In addition, reflecting Ti-lo-pa's special stature in Tibetan tradition, a number of long biographies of him exist in that language, composed by Tibetans but in some cases clearly based on original Indian texts no longer extant. As with biographical materials on the other of the eighty-four Indian Buddhist *mahāsiddhas* and other *siddhas*, Ti-lo-pa's life represents a convergence, on the one hand, of historical specificity and concreteness, and on the other, of the cosmic symbology and mythology of the Vajrayāna. The number and diversity of Ti-lo-pa's biographies indicate that his life story was in the process of formation for decades and even centuries following his passing, such that no end point in the biographical process can be identified. The biographies of Ti-lo-pa are perhaps best understood as accounts of the Tibetan Buddhist understanding of and devotion toward that *siddha*, which evolved over the centuries and continued to inform Bka'-brgyud tradition. In spite of the multiplicity and diversity of Tibetan biographies of Ti-lo-pa, one of his foremost biographers, the Bka'-brgyud historian Pad-ma Dkar-po (sixteenth to seventeenth century) identifies certain themes common to the biographies and held today by consensus among Tibetans as Ti-lo-pa's most significant characteristics.

Ti-lo-pa, according to Pad-ma Dkar-po, was born a brahman in an eastern Indian city called Jago. As a young child he met the great *siddha* Nāgārjuna, who identified him as a worthy vessel for Vajrayāna teaching. Ti-lo-pa began his Buddhist career as a monk at Somapuri Monastery. Later, Ti-lo-pa traveled as a wandering yogin, receiving teaching from Nāgārjuna, Kṛṣṇācārya and other *siddhas*, and performing Vajrayāna meditation and liturgies. He then spent twelve years in Bengal crushing sesame seeds by day and serving a prostitute at night as part of his spiritual practice. (The name *Ti-lo-pa* comes from the Sanskrit *tila*, meaning "sesame seed".) When Ti-lo-pa attained insight into the sacredness of his ordinary workaday activity, thus gaining some realization, he began to wander about again, teaching others. Like several other great *siddhas*,

Ti-lo-pa is depicted as a powerful and unpredictable figure who commands respect among both human and nonhuman beings, and who holds within his hands all manner of magical power. In particular, he is shown challenging and converting many non-Buddhist holy men.

In spite of his realization, Ti-lo-pa was not satisfied, and felt that the highest enlightenment still eluded him. He repaired to a grass hut in a charnel ground where, we are told, he remained motionless in meditation until he met the celestial Buddha Vajradhāra ("holder of adamantine awakening") and received the highest teachings. Pad-ma Dkar-po quotes Ti-lo-pa as commenting after this encounter, "I have no human *guru*. My *guru* is the Omniscient One. I have conversed with the Buddha." It was after the highest awakening that Ti-lo-pa met his chief disciple, Nā-ro-pa, and transmitted to him his teachings.

These are, according to Pad-ma Dkar-po, the outlines of the "outward biography" of Ti-lo-pa. Pad-ma Dkar-po tells us, however, that there is another more profound, secret biography of Ti-lo-pa, which concerns his emerging Buddhahood. This biography, also recounted by Pad-ma Dkar-po, focuses on Ti-lo-pa's initial belief in a mundane and conditioned identity, as being such and such a person, with a particular background and life history. Through a variety of trials and tribulations Ti-lo-pa gradually rediscovers himself as someone timeless and transhistorical, as a person whose father is the male celestial Buddha Cakrasaṃvara, whose mother is the female celestial Buddha Vajrayoginī, and whose country is the timeless land of enlightenment. He himself, he discovers, is none other than an enlightened Buddha. It is with this timeless realization that Pad-ma Dkar-po's biography of Ti-lo-pa ends, thus providing the basis for the belief that Ti-lo-pa's presence continues in the lineage as a potent and active force.

Ti-lo-pa's central accomplishment was founding the lineage later to become the Bka'-brgyud, which from the beginning played a central role in the religious and political life of Tibet. Among the most important of his teachings were the four "special transmissions," four sets of Tantric yogic practices he received from several of his teachers. These became a keynote of the Bka'-brgyud tradition. Ti-lo-pa's name is also linked with the propagation of an important cycle of Tantric practices, the *Kālacakra Tantra*. Ti-lo-pa is the author of some nine works in the Tibetan Bstan-'gyur (Tanjur), including a collection of Tantric songs, several commentaries on Vajrayāna topics, and some Tantric liturgical texts.

[See also Buddhism, *article on Buddhism in Tibet*; Buddhism, Schools of, *article on Tibetan Buddhism*; and Mahāsiddhas.]

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REGINALD RAY

TIME. See Calendars; Chronology; Cosmogony; Eternity; Eschatology; History; Immortality; Rejuvenation; Sacred Time; and Symbolic Time.

TIMOTHY AILUROS (d. 477), known as Timothy II, fifth-century monophysite theologian who became the first patriarch of the Coptic church in Alexandria (457–460; 475–477). He was surnamed by his opponents Ailuros ("the cat") because of his small stature and his weasel words and ways. Venerated as a saint by the Coptic church, Timothy, along with other monophysite patriarchs, was anathematized by the church of Rome under Pope Hormisdas (514–523).

Little is known of Timothy's early life. It is certain that during the christological controversies of the fifth century he sided with those who rejected the decree of the Council of Chalcedon (451), which defined Christ as "one hypostasis in two natures." The council appointed the orthodox Proterios as patriarch of Alexandria. But the local mob lynched Proterios, and in 457 the Egyptian bishops elected Timothy to succeed him. He served as patriarch for three years, until 460, when he was removed from the patriarchal position and banished. While in exile, Timothy carried on a correspondence against the Chalcedonian decisions and wrote several essays promoting monophysitism.

Timothy's fate changed again when, upon the death of Emperor Leo I, Basiliskos usurped the throne and turned to the monophysites for support. He reinstated Timothy, who became instrumental in the writing of an encyclical that Basiliskos issued in an attempt to impose monophysitism as the official Christology of the church. Timothy ruled the church of Alexandria for two more years, until his death in 477. His ecclesiastical policy was characterized both by ambiguity and by fanaticism.

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TĪRTHAṂKARAS. According to the Jains, one of the oldest religious communities in India, the *tīrthaṁkaras* (called *tittthagaras* in the Jain canon), are the prophets who periodically teach the world the truth of the imperishable Jain tradition; the term is almost equivalent to *jina* ("victor") or *arhant* ("saint"). The term *tīrtha(ṁ)-kara* refers literally to one who "builds the ford" that leads across the ocean of rebirths and suffering, and thus builds or renews the Jain fourfold community of monks and nuns, laymen and laywomen.

Twenty-four *tīrthaṁkaras* are said to appear at given periods in selected regions. As they are capable of ultimate spiritual perfection they are thus regarded as having more than a human status. Together with the *cakravartins* (universal sovereigns) and other such heroes, they form the class of the venerated sixty-three personages of the Jain "universal history." [See also Cakravartin.] They are called *mahāpuruṣas* ("great men") by the Digambaras and *śalākāpuruṣas* ("men with the staff") by the Śvetāmbaras.

Members of the Lineage. *Tīrthaṁkaras* are born only in the "middle world" (Madhyadeśa), and there only in the very few *karmabhūmis* (regions where one reaps the fruit of one's actions) of the central continent (Jambūdvīpa): in the southern land of Bhārata (i.e., India), in the northern land of Airāvata, and in half of the central land of Videha. Except in Videha, where conditions differ, they are said to live exclusively during the third and fourth of the six stages of the *avasarpinīs* and *utsarpinīs*, that is, the descending and ascending halves of the endless temporal cycle, thus at times of mixed happiness and misery.

In Bhārata, the teacher of the present era is Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the twenty-fourth and last of the series of *tīrthaṁkaras* in our *avasarpinī* half cycle. According to tradition, he was born seventy-five years and eight and one-half months before the end of the fourth period, in which he lived for seventy-two years. Three years after his death, in 523 BCE, the present period began, characterized by misery.

The first *tīrthaṁkara* was Rṣabha, who is said to have

been born toward the end of the third period and to have died three and one-half years before its completion. His life span extended over millions of so-called Pūrva years. In the fourth period, after Rṣabha and before Mahāvīra, the law was preached by twenty-two *tīrthaṁkaras*: Ajita, Sambhava, Abhinandana, Sumati, Padmaprabha, Supārśva, Candraprabha, Suvīdhi (Puṣpadanta), Śītala, Śreyāṃsa, Vāsūpūjya, Vimala, Ananta, Dharma, Śānti, Kunthu, Ara, Malli, Munisuvrata, Nami, (Ariṣṭa)nemi, and Pārśva.

Tradition also gives the lists of their contemporaries in Airāvata, as well as of past and future *tīrthaṁkaras* of Bhārata. In Videha, the prevailing conditions of happiness mixed with misery are always akin to those of this, the third period in an *avasarpinī* half cycle, so that a *tīrthaṁkara* can be preaching there at any time.

The Career of a Tīrthaṁkara. No soul will become the soul of a *tīrthaṁkara* unless it has gone through a considerable number of rebirths and has finally practiced exceptional virtues resulting in a special *karman*. The soul is urged by gods to "fall" from its divine mansion and be reborn to practice and propagate the true law. *Tīrthaṁkaras* are usually considered to become incarnate only through male figures; the Śvetāmbaras nevertheless consider the nineteenth, Malli, to be a female, although the Digambaras deny this point.

The career of a *tīrthaṁkara* conforms to a well-structured pattern, and traditional descriptions of the *tīrthaṁkaras* provide very few or no distinctive individual characteristics. The biography of a *tīrthaṁkara* is stereotyped, listing in an almost formulaic sequence the following information: (1) some details of his former existence, (2) the five *kalyāṇas*, or religiously significant moments of his life (i.e., conception, birth, renunciation, attainment of omniscience, *nirvāṇa*), (3) the names of his parents, (4) the number of his followers, (5) the duration of his life, (6) the color of his body (most are golden, but the twentieth and twenty-second are black, the eighth and ninth are white, the sixth and twelfth are red, the twenty-third and another [the nineteenth, according to the Śvetāmbaras, the seventh, according to the Digambaras] are blue-green), (7) his height, (8) his guardian divinities, and (9) the length of time elapsed since his predecessor's *nirvāṇa*. All are born to princely families, and, with two exceptions, are related to the Ikṣvāku dynasty. The conception of a *tīrthaṁkara* is announced to his mother by a standardized succession of auspicious dreams (fourteen according to the Śvetāmbaras, sixteen according to the Digambaras).

Iconography. Like their biographies, the images of the *tīrthaṁkaras* are all fundamentally similar. The figures are represented in meditation, either seated cross-legged or standing in a *kāyotsarga* pose (representing a

particular type of Jain austerity), with arms stretched slightly apart from the body. Although the canon for the *tīrthamkara* images appears to have been well fixed by the beginning of the common era, there have been some developments through the course of time. After the fifth century, Śvetāmbara icons are characterized by a *dhōti* (a wrapped garment of draping layers of cloth) and various ornaments; Digambara icons remain naked. Moreover, a series of characteristic marks (*cihnas*) are added to the pedestals in order to distinguish the individual *tīrthamkaras*: Rṣabha's symbol is the bull; Nemi's, the conch shell; Pārśva's, the snake; Mahāvīra's, the lion. Representations of Rṣabha, Pārśva, and Mahāvīra are particularly numerous; Pārśva is easily recognized by the snake hoods over his head.

The comparative monotony of the *tīrthamkara* images is somewhat striking. These icons, however, are not meant to be picturesque but to suggest omniscient awareness and absolute detachment.

Mythic Importance. Despite such uniformity, several *tīrthamkaras* emerge as prominent figures. On the whole, the general trend of the present *avasarpinī* implies a notable decline from a golden age and is marked by the considerable shortening of life span, prosperity, and happiness. Thus the legends concerning Rṣabha, the "first lord" of this cycle, are of special significance because in them he is shown in a pioneering role.

Rṣabha is said to have set the groundwork for civilization: first as a sovereign, when he organized kingdoms and societies, instituted legislation, taught agriculture, fire, cooking, arts and crafts, writing, and arithmetic, and later, when he renounced the world and became the first mendicant, thus shaping the religious life of the present *avasarpinī*. These two spheres of influence were further served by two of Rṣabha's sons: Bharata is renowned in Indian tradition as the first *cakravartin* of Bhārata. Bāhubali became a forebearing ascetic and as such has long been revered by the Digambaras, especially in the South, where several impressive monoliths representing this hero were erected. One of the best known is a colossal fifty-seven-foot image towering at the top of one of the hills overlooking Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa, about one hundred miles northwest of Bangalore.

The twenty-second *tīrthamkara* (Ariṣṭa)nemi, is allegedly related to Kṛṣṇa and the Yādavas. He is extremely popular, especially in Gujarat, where on the sacred Girnar Hills he practiced austerities and eventually understood the ultimate truth, thus achieving enlightenment; after many years he reached final emancipation, *nirvāṇa*, on the same mountain. His revulsion at the sight of the animals awaiting slaughter for his wedding ceremonies as well as his subsequent refusal to marry his

betrothed, Rājimatī, are highly significant and are the subject of many narratives, songs, and paintings that illustrate the greatness of the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*, or noninjury. [See also *Ahiṃsā*.]

Pārśva, the twenty-third *tīrthamkara*, has been regarded by most scholars as possibly being a historical figure. He is said to have lived for a hundred years, some two hundred and fifty years before Mahāvīra, and to have been born in Banaras and ended his life in Bihar on Mount Sameta, which is now also known as Pārasnāth in his honor. He is alleged to have established the "law of four restraints" (*caturyāma-dharma*), which is generally, though not unanimously, considered to be the forerunner of the five "great vows" (*mahāvratas*) followed by Mahāvīra's disciples. Pārśva is associated with serpents and consequently the object of much veneration.

Cultic Life. Immediately after death, the *tīrthamkaras* become *siddhas* ("perfected" souls), and thus became completely inaccessible. But the example they set should be meditated upon, and it is extolled daily when the Jains recite the *Caturviṃśatistava* (Praise of the Twenty-four [*Tīrthamkaras*]); the images of the *tīrthamkaras* should serve only as meditative supports. Archaeological evidence indicates that this method of worshiping the *tīrthamkaras*, known as *deva-pūjā*, goes back to the first few centuries BCE.

Many lay believers, however, cannot refrain from appealing to superhuman benevolence. They direct their worship and supplications for assistance to the pairs of guardian deities who serve the *tīrthamkaras*. Among the most popular are the snake god Dharaṇendra and his consort Padmāvati, both of whom flank Pārśva. The Jain teachers, however, have always insisted on the inferior position of these deities and have succeeded in preventing them from usurping the supremacy of the *tīrthamkaras*.

Tīrthamkaras and Indian Religious Experience. In Jainism it is clear that the recurrent presence of *tīrthamkaras*, who periodically appear in the human realms in order to preach and show the true law, have a function similar to that of the seven (later twenty-five) Buddhas in Buddhism, and also to that of the Hindu *avatāras* of Viṣṇu. On the other hand, by promoting civilization, the first *tīrthamkara*, Rṣabha, recalls the role played by Pṛthvi in the epics, by Mahāsammata in Buddhism, and by Prometheus in the Greek and Roman traditions. Thus from many perspectives Jainism offers a coherent system that links the evolutions of time, cosmos, mankind, and the Jain church.

[See also *Jainism*; *Mahāvīra*; and *Cosmology*, article on Hindu and Jain Cosmologies.]

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COLETTE CAILLAT

TITHES. In the ancient Near East lie the origins of a sacral offering or payment of a tenth part of stated goods or property to the deity. Often given to the king or to the royal temple, the "tenth" was usually approximate, not exact. The practice is known from Mesopotamia, Syria-Palestine, Greece, and as far to the west as the Phoenician city of Carthage. Tithing also continued in Christian Europe as a church tithe and as a tax upon Jewish landholdings formerly owned by Christians (or claimed so to have been). Tithes paid in support of parish rectors continued in England into the twentieth century.

Early texts associate the tithe with support of the king and of temples of the royal house (see *Amos* 4:4, 7:1, 7:13; see also Samuel's forecast of actions to be taken by the king: *1 Samuel* 8:15, 8:17). The early biblical references to the tithe in *Genesis* 14:20 and 28:22 are also related to sites where royal shrines were located, Jerusalem and Bethel. It is not certain, however, that the tithe originated as a royal levy in support of temples and their personnel.

It is difficult to be sure whether the offering of the firstborn of animals and the first fruits of field and orchard should be treated as a tithe. It seems unlikely, since the two are distinguished in *Deuteronomy* 12:17. Perhaps the first-fruit offerings, which would vary in amount, came to be regularized as to amount by the introduction of a fixed quantity, the tenth. First fruits

and tithes are closely related in *Deuteronomy* 26:1–15 and in *Tobit* 1:6–8.

From the time of the monarchy in Israel, and especially from the eighth century forward, the Levites came more and more to be recognized as the beneficiaries of the tithe. They were not to share in the allotment of land along with the other tribes but were set apart to the service of the Lord (*Nm.* 18, *Dt.* 18:1–8, *Jos.* 21). The Levite cities seem to have been the store-cities in which the tithes collected by the Levites were stored up (see *Nehemiah* 10:38), just as the tithes in Mesopotamia were collected by temple personnel and stored in the temples or in their vicinity.

The tithe came to be recognized as the means of livelihood for the Levites during the middle and late periods of the monarchy. Once the city of Jerusalem had been designated by Josiah's reform as the central sanctuary for Israelite worship (622/1 BCE), the need for the tithe to support the Levites at the many local sanctuaries would have disappeared. Accordingly, the law in *Deuteronomy* 14 specifies a quite different character and purpose for the tithe (14:22–29). The tithe is to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there before the Lord with rejoicing. It can be converted to money, if need be. And every third year the tithe is to be set aside for meeting the needs of the Levite, the resident alien, the orphan, and the widow.

If the legislation in *Numbers* 18 is later than that in *Deuteronomy* 18, however, then the tithe will originally have been an offering first associated with the king and with royal sanctuaries, and then democratized to become the basis for a celebrative meal before the Lord at the places of worship. After that, the priests and Levites will have claimed the tenth for themselves, with the first fruits in particular going to the priests and the tithes going to the Levites (*Nm.* 18). Many scholars assign the priestly literary deposit to a period later than that of the Deuteronomic legislation. All acknowledge, however, that the priestly materials contain elements older than *Deuteronomy*; it seems probable that, in this case, the materials found in *Numbers* 18 are the older.

With regard to tithes in other parts of the ancient world, Egyptian sources are not very informative. There is no indication that the vast temple complexes in ancient Egypt were supported by a tithe. In Greece, the situation is different. Numerous references to tithes of the annual harvest and to tithes of spoil taken in battle are known. Delphi, Delos, and Athens are mentioned as recipients of tithe offerings made to the gods. The offering of first fruits and of tithes seems to have been quite closely associated.

As a part of the Jewish legislation, the tithe becomes

fixed and, indeed, extends beyond the original prescription. The tractates *Terumot* and *Ma'aserot* give particulars on postbiblical understandings, along with other Talmudic collections. The *Book of Tobit* (second century BCE) offers important testimony of the changes in the understanding of the tithe. Tobit reports that when he was a young man, prior to his having been taken captive by the Assyrians and transported to Nineveh, he would bring first fruits, tithes of the produce, and first shearings to Jerusalem. He also gave three tithes: he presented the first tenth to the Levites (as required by *Numbers* 18), offered the second tenth in Jerusalem (as required by *Deuteronomy* 14), and gave the third tenth to the needy (as specified in *Deuteronomy* 14 as well).

In the early church, tithing became a means of securing a livelihood for church leadership, although in the earliest days of the Christian movement, tithing seems to have been abandoned entirely in many Christian circles, as a practice not in harmony with the Christian divergence from Jewish observances. The tithe remained of great importance for the church as a means of securing a stable institution, providing for ecclesiastical establishments, and offering resources for the care of the poor and the needy. In Judaism the tithe helped the community to meet human need, although complaints were voiced that a "second tithe," amounting to 20 percent (as apparently demanded by the different specifications in *Numbers* 18 and *Deuteronomy* 14), was too heavy a burden on the community. Christian understanding of the tithe has had to combat both an overzealous application of the law of tithing (as some communities have understood it) and the supposition that to provide a tenth of one's goods to the church or to charitable purposes meant that the remainder of one's goods could be used in complete disregard of the claims of Christian stewardship.

[See also Israelite Law, article on Property Law, and Levites.]

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TIV RELIGION. The Tiv, who live in the central Benue valley of Nigeria, have a name for God, Aondo ("sky"), but are not much interested in him because they say that he is not much interested in them. God, in their view, created the earth and everything within it—including the forces of evil. Then he walked away—the Tiv do not ask where he went.

The Tiv are concerned with health (and with death, the ultimate manifestation of poor health), with fertility of crops, animals and themselves, and with social harmony. To be healthy, to have plenty, and to live in harmony are natural states. Although the Tiv have some lore about spirits, no spirits manipulate the forces that interfere with these desirable states; Tiv respect their ancestors, but no ancestors manipulate the forces. Rather, the acts and devices of living human beings activate the forces of evil. Tiv ritual is designed to overcome these forces.

The Tiv say that some people grow a substance called *tsav* on their hearts that acts much like a physical organ. *Tsav* is both a sign of and source of special talent or ability, whether musical and artistic, social and political, or the ability to live to old age. One such special talent is to manipulate the forces that "repair" the society ritually.

Tsav is not present in all people. It becomes enlarged and nefariously powerful in any person who eats human flesh. *Tsav* itself does not tempt its bearers to eat human flesh—but lust for power may. Cannibalism is a metaphor for antisocial misuse of other people, their property and substance.

The Tiv postulate that some of those with the special talents of *tsav* meet at night as an organization to keep the social and cosmic forces working for the benefit of society as a whole. The *mbatsav* (people with *tsav*) perform rituals to "repair the land," but they may, through reckless human emotions such as spite, envy, or fear, use their power (as may any individual with *tsav*, acting alone) for antisocial and deadly purposes that "spoil the land." To call the *mbatsav* "witches" is not accurate, even though they were labeled as such in some of the early literature.

The postulated activities of the *mbatsav*, both for the good of the community and for the evil purposes of some individuals, are associated with certain rituals

performed with symbols called *akombo*. This ritual manipulation is called "repairing the *akombo*." Those aspects of the natural and social world about which Tiv are most concerned are parceled out among named *akombo*, which exist as amulets, figurines, pots, or plants. Each is associated with a disease (although certain diseases are not associated with *akombo* because the Tiv recognize that some diseases are merely contagious). Each has its own ritual required to activate it or to pacify it. *Akombo*, however, are not personalized and are not "spiritualized"; they are certainly not gods. They work by forces akin to what Westerners think of as laws of nature.

When Tiv become ill, they assume that an *akombo* is the cause. That means either that some person of ill will who grows *tsav* has ritually manipulated the *akombo* so that it would "seize" a victim, or else that the victim or one of his or her close kinsmen has performed an act that was precluded by that *akombo* at the time of its creation (usually a commonplace and neutral act, although adultery and battery are prohibited by one or more *akombo*). To determine just which *akombo* is involved, Tiv consult diviners who throw chains of snake bones and pods to determine which *akombo* have been used to cause an illness or create social misfortune.

When the responsible *akombo* is revealed, the Tiv perform rituals to neutralize it. They must also remove the malice that activated it. The latter is achieved by a modest ritual in which every person concerned takes a little water into his or her mouth and spews it out in a spray, signifying that any grudges are no longer effective. Medicines will work only after the ill will is ritually removed and the *akombo* repaired. The ritual for each *akombo* varies, but the climax of all is a prayer that "evil descend and goodness ascend." These rituals are as much group therapy sessions as they are religious acts.

Tiv recognize two major categories of *akombo*. "Small *akombo*" attack individuals and their farms; their repair demands minor sacrificial animals, usually a chicken. A few small *akombo* require special sacrificial animals such as turtles or valuable ones such as goats or rams. Coins or other forms of wealth can be added to a less valuable sacrificial animal to "make it taller" and so serve as a more valuable one.

The "great *akombo*," on the other hand, attack social groups; they must be repaired either by the elders of the community acting "by day," or by a secret group (the same people) acting as the *mbatsav* "by night." Repair of great *akombo* "at night" may demand sacrifice of a human being. I cannot be certain that human sacrifice never occurred among the Tiv, but I do know that by declaring natural deaths to have been the secret work

of the *mbatsav*, and by making a lesser animal—particularly a dog—"taller," it could be avoided.

At the end of any *akombo* ritual carried out by day, or as the last act of any funeral, the Tiv prepare and break a symbol called *swem*. Made in a potsherd from hearth ashes and symbolic plants, it is held high, then smashed to earth. The ashes, spreading on the breeze, mean that justice spreads through the land and that *swem* will punish evildoers.

Most Tiv claim not to know the details of any *akombo* or its ritual, and all deny knowing that the ritual was carried out "at night." But they never postulate that any part of it is a mystery. Somebody knows. Tiv say "God knows" at funerals if they can find no other reason for the death. They mean that they have not yet discovered the human motivation behind the misfortune. But they do not question that the motivation is there and that ultimately it will be detected and either neutralized or punished.

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TJURUNGAS. Originally an Aranda word referring to a particular type of secret-sacred object (a stone board bearing engraved designs), the term *tjurunga* has now become generic in anthropological literature and is used to identify a wide variety of Australian Aboriginal religious objects. (The term *tjurunga* also has by now generally replaced the term *churinga* in anthropological writing.) The term covers a wide variety of meanings and can refer not only to the stone and wooden objects to which it was originally restricted but also to bull-

roarers, ground paintings, ritual poles, headgear, and religious songs (Strehlow, 1947, pp. 84ff.).

Tjurungas and *tjurunga*-type objects are widely distributed throughout central, southern, and western Australia, as well as the Northern Territory. They are usually secret-sacred and may be viewed only by initiated men, although in some cases women too possess religious boards. In all cases, *tjurungas* are closely associated with the mythic and totemic beings of the Dreaming. [See Dreaming, The.] In the beginning, these beings shaped the physiographic features of the Aboriginal countryside and were, ultimately, responsible for creating human beings, who are regarded as their spiritual descendants. They also established particular Aboriginal social orders and were especially responsible for instituting religious ritual. The Dreaming characters are believed to be as alive today, spiritually, as they were in the past, and their significance continues. It is through the sacred objects that they live on in spiritual form. *Tjurungas* are often considered to represent particular mythic beings, and their engraved designs to represent specific localities and the activities associated with them; some *tjurungas*, however, are undecorated.

Stone *tjurungas* are flat oval platters that vary in size from nine to more than fifty centimeters in length and that, for the most part, are engraved on both sides. Smaller wooden objects are similarly decorated, but they are lenticular in cross section and elongated with rounded ends. Larger boards, between two and three meters in length, are made from tree-trunk sections; they are flat or slightly concave on the incised side and convex on the reverse. Traditionally, the lower incisor of a wallaby's jaw was used to engrave both stone and wooden *tjurungas*, but today steel rasps are used to shape the basic form and chisels to make the design. The act of incising the *tjurunga* is accompanied by songs relevant to the mythological associations of the pattern being made and is itself a ritual act. The knowledge of such songs is held by members of particular local groups, which have the responsibility of maintaining and reproducing the range of emblems and the designs connected with their own territories. Cognate groups collaborate with them in a complex patterning of ritual information between members of a number of similarly constituted social groups.

Tjurungas have a profound religious significance in contemporary desert Aboriginal cultures. Decorated with incised meandering lines, concentric circles, cross-hatching, zigzags (see figure 1), and, more rarely, naturalistic designs of bird and animal footprints and stylized human figures, they represent a compact and conventionalized statement of land occupation, utilization, and ownership, seen in terms of specific areas of land

associated with particular mythic beings who in turn have their living representatives today. Beliefs about the origin of *tjurungas* vary according to culture (Davidson, 1953; Strehlow, 1964). Basically, though, it is believed that *tjurungas* were either created by mythic beings or represent tangible aspects of their bodies or something directly associated with them. In virtually all cases a *tjurunga* served as a vehicle in which resided part of a mythic being's spiritual essence. Some stone *tjurungas*, particularly those with well-worn designs or those having none, are regarded as the actual metamorphoses of mythic beings and may be ritually relevant to several sociodialectal groups. Usually, however, a *tjurunga* is personal; it is connected with both men and women and is symbolic of their mythic associations: men look after those belonging to the women of their own local group. As far as men are concerned, *tjurungas* play an important part in conception, initiation, and death.

While the Aranda may manufacture stone *tjurungas*, ensuring that male members of the oncoming generation possess such objects, they basically replicate the older ones according to their particular mythic and topographic type—that is, new *tjurungas* must correspond with those concerning the place of a person's conception and/or local group. In the Western Desert, Aborigi-




FIGURE 1. *Tjurunga*. A sketch of a religious board depicting two Dreaming beings, Bandicoot and Blue-tongue Lizard.

nes believe that all stone *tjurungas* are of supernatural origin, and these groups manufacture only wooden sacred boards. Small wooden boards or bull-roarers are made and presented to a novice during the final stages of his initiation; they signify his acceptance into the religious life of his people. It is only some years after a man's first initiation that he is introduced to the *tjurungas* of his own group. Later, he may prepare and incise such examples, either alone or in the company of close kin who share the same mythological associations.

The designs that appear on these religious objects are similar to those on spear-throwers, some shields, pearl-shell pendants, and a variety of head ornaments (all of which are used or worn publicly in contrast to the actual ritual objects). Clearly the form of an object and its purpose, rather than the design, indicate whether or not the item is to be regarded as open-sacred or secret-sacred (see Berndt, Berndt, and Stanton, 1982, pp. 114–116). The designs depict, through a repetitive but symbolic structure, a particular segment of territory linked to an artist, his mythological connection with it, and some of the physiographic features that characterize this area of land (see figure 1). Moreover, this is usually shown looking from above rather than horizontally from the ground level. This is because mythic beings saw the land in this way. Some Western Desert Aborigines believe that the spirits of men who live a far distance from their own country travel through the sky on their sacred boards during sleep, and they, too, see the country in that way.

The same designs that appear on *tjurungas* are also reproduced in ochers on the bodies of participants in rituals. Depending on the area and the particular ritual being performed, ground structures of furrows and mounds have blood and red ocher superimposed on them and are decorated with feather down: these too represent stylized versions of territories within their mythic context. In such circumstances, *tjurungas* are hung from pole emblems or are worn in the men's head-dresses. Since these objects are considered to be ritually and mythologically alive, they signify that the mythic being is actually present in a spiritual form.

The major function of *tjurungas* is to provide a tangible, visible representation of personal and social identity, but it is in fact much more than this. The *tjurunga* affirms and reaffirms a particular group's rights to a specific stretch of country through the land-based associations of mythic personages. These objects are always stored close to the places to which they belong, and such sites fall within different local group territories, the members of which are their custodians. When Aborigines moved away from their own countries as a result of European contact and eventually settled on gov-

ernment and mission stations, they brought some of their sacred objects with them, leaving others behind at their mythic sites. Smaller *tjurungas*, however, are often carried from one place to another when groups gather to hold large rituals that involve both men and women. In the Western Desert, these meetings, in which expressions of hostility are forbidden, are also occasions for settling interpersonal and intragroup disputes and grievances.

Deep reverence and respect are displayed toward all *tjurungas*, whether they are of stone or of wood. For example, fully initiated men may be specially invited to have revealed to them particular boards stored within a repository. This revelation must take place in the presence of a senior man who has the religious right to show them and explain their significance. In such cases, the boards have been prepared by a small group of elders who reanoint them with red ocher mixed with fat: they are treated as if they are living creatures. On approaching the place, the invited men use small branches of leaves to stroke the backs and heads of the sitting elders. This act is said to insulate the power that is believed to be inherent in the *tjurungas* and that can be dangerous to the unprepared. Mythic songs are sung and explained, and the objects are pressed to the bodies of the men who are seeing them for the first time. This action indicates that the men share in their power, which is regarded as eternal and is symbolized by the *tjurunga* objects.

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TLALOC. One of the most popular and widely worshiped deities in Mesoamerican religion was Tlaloc, the fertilizing rain god who was believed to dwell on the many mountain peaks of the region. Tlaloc was known as Chac in Maya culture, Cociji in Zapotec culture, and Tajin in Totonac culture. His image, which included a buccal mask with multiple fangs, snake hoops for eyes, and a mustache-like upper lip, has been found in ceremonial centers from Teotihuacán (100–750 CE) to Tenochtitlán (1325–1521 CE), where he was a major deity in the state cult.

Tlaloc, whose name is derived from the Nahuatl word for “earth,” was sometimes conceived in quadruple and quintuple forms called the Tlaloques, each associated with one of the sacred directions of the universe and given a sacred color and characteristic influence. A typical manifestation involved a preeminent central Tlaloc with dwarfish Tlaloques around him. The Tlaloques, who carried names like *Opochtli*, *Nappatecuhtli*, *Yauhuqueme*, and *Tomiauhtecuhtli*, were believed to dwell in the prominent peaks, where rain clouds emerged from caves to fertilize the land through rain, rivers, pools, and storms. Tlaloc’s power was also manifested in the thunder, lightning, snow, and cold sicknesses that threatened the community.

One mountain near the Aztec capital Tenochtitlán, called Mount Tlaloc in Spanish colonial times, was believed to be the original source of the water and vegetation that nurtured the Aztec world. The supreme importance of this deity is reflected in the fact that his shrine was placed alongside Huitzilopochtli’s at the Templo Mayor (Great Temple) in the center of Tenochtitlán. According to some scholars, the Templo Mayor was conceived as a symbolic re-creation of Mount Tlaloc. At the same time, Tlaloc was the god of the masses, who worshiped him in every agricultural community in the region. His pervasive influence is reflected in the fact that the majority of the more than one hundred offerings uncovered during the excavation of the Templo Mayor are associated with the cult of Tlaloc.

Two other major gods were intimately associated with Tlaloc: Chalchiuhtlicue, the goddess of waters, and Ehécatl, the wind god. Chalchiuhtlicue was usually identified with the maize-earth gods, while Ehécatl, an aspect of the great god Quetzalcoatl, was known as *in*

tlachpancauh in tloaque (“roadsweeper of the rain gods”), meaning that Ehécatl’s forceful presence announced the coming of the fertilizing rains. Tlaloc’s supreme importance is reflected in the notion of Tlalocan, the terrestrial paradise located on mountains halfway between the earth and sky. The Teotihuacán murals of Tlalocan picture a paradise where sea animals, spirits, human beings, butterflies, and moisture mingle together in a realm of abundance. In Aztec religion this abundance demanded large-scale human sacrifice, often of children, at the various feasts of Tlaloc that took place in different towns and cities. In one major festival the rulers of the Aztec empire solemnly participated in a special ceremony on Mount Tlaloc to sanctify the waters for the coming agricultural year.

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DAVÍD CARRASCO

TLAXCALAN RELIGION. What is today the Mexican state of Tlaxcala occupies roughly the same territory as the old pre-Hispanic Tlaxcalan confederacy, an alliance of several indigenous principalities independent of the so-called Aztec empire. Its inhabitants were Nahuatl-speaking Indians, and they were the main allies of Hernán Cortés in the Spanish conquest of Mexico from 1519 to 1522. Present-day Tlaxcala is located on the western fringes of the central Mexican highlands. It is the smallest state in the nation, with a population of slightly more than 600,000. Although less than 15 percent of the population still speaks Nahuatl, the ethnic and somatic composition of Tlaxcala is predominantly Indian, and there persists a strong identification with the Indian past.

Pre-Hispanic Background. When the Spaniards arrived in Mexico in 1519 they found a polytheistic religion widespread throughout the area that in the twentieth century came to be known archaeologically and ethnologically as Mesoamerica. Mesoamerica exhibited a rather high degree of cultural uniformity, and in no

cultural domain was this more true than in the realm of religion. Thus, Tlaxcalan polytheism was a variant of a pan-Mesoamerican religion, minimally different from, say, Méxica-Aztec, Huastec, Tarascan, Zapotec, or even Maya polytheism.

The main characteristics of Tlaxcalan polytheism were seven:

1. A highly diversified and specialized pantheon, in which hundreds of patron gods and goddesses relating to nearly every human activity, natural phenomenon, or social grouping were arranged in a somewhat hierarchical order
2. A complex and extensive ritual and ceremonial yearly cycle regulated by the calendrical system
3. A sophisticated cosmology and theology centered on the origins and nature of the gods, the creation of man and the universe, the regulation of man's relationship to the gods, the disposition of the dead, and afterlife
4. A religious ideology that emphasized pragmatism in the relationship between man and the supernatural at the expense of values and morality, which were almost exclusively an aspect of the social structure in operation
5. An extensive and well-organized priesthood in charge of the administration of religion and several ancillary aspects of the social structure
6. A tremendous emphasis on human sacrifices to the gods and a significant degree of ritual cannibalism
7. A pronounced concern with bloodshed and the dead, and a cult of the dead approaching ancestor worship

Tlaxcalan religion pervaded every significant cultural domain of the confederacy: society, economy, polity, administration, and the military. Indeed, religion was the driving force of Tlaxcalan culture. In many distinct ways, however, Tlaxcalan religion was not that different from Old World polytheistic systems such as those of the Indo-Europeans and the Chinese: the gods were made in the image of man, and they exhibited the foibles, virtues, and vices of human beings; the gods were hierarchically arranged in an organized pantheon; the social structure of the gods mirrored that of humans, with whom they interacted in a variety of ways; and religion was essentially a pragmatic ritualistic system regulating the relationship between man and the supernatural.

Syncretic Development. Tlaxcala was one of the first regions of the continental New World to be subject to systematic efforts to convert its inhabitants. In 1524, the task of indoctrinating the Indian population in the ritual, ceremonial, and theological practices of Roman Catholicism was assigned to the Franciscan friars. For

nearly a century the Tlaxcalans were under the religious leadership of the Franciscans. During the second decade of the seventeenth century, the Franciscans were replaced by secular priests and clerics, who continued the catechization of the Indian population. By the end of the seventeenth century, Tlaxcalan Indian Catholicism had essentially crystallized into what it is today.

The context of conversion and indoctrination to Catholicism in Tlaxcala can be characterized as "guided syncretism," a policy that the Franciscans consciously followed for two principal reasons: first, to convert the Indians rapidly; and, second, to soften the impact of forced conversion and thus make the new religion more palatable to the masses of the Indian population. This policy of conversion was greatly facilitated by the symbolic, ritual, ceremonial, and formal similarities between the lengthy roster of Catholic saints and the highly diversified Tlaxcalan pantheon. As early as the turn of the seventeenth century, the Tlaxcalan Indians were already practicing a syncretic kind of Catholicism. This was partly the result of the Franciscans' efforts in fostering identifications between the interacting religious traditions, particularly between Tlaxcalan gods and Catholic saints. The same process is evident in the emergence of local (community) religious hierarchies, in which such pre-Hispanic institutions as the priestly houses (*calmecac*) and men's houses (*telpochcalli*) came to interact with such similar Catholic institutions as stewardships (*mayordomías*) and sodalities (*cofradías*). The syncretic process undergone by Tlaxcalan religion from 1524 until approximately the last quarter of the seventeenth century permanently marked Indian Catholicism, and to a lesser extent all rural and urban Catholicism throughout the region.

Contemporary Tlaxcalan Religion. Contemporary Tlaxcalan Catholicism is centered on the following institutions: the cult of the saints, the cult of the dead, the *mayordomía* system, the *ayuntamiento religioso* (local religious hierarchy), and the magico-symbolic system. It may be characterized as primarily a type of folk religion; that is, its ritual and ceremonial complex is markedly different from the national Catholic religion of Mexico and is carried on by the *barrios* (quasi-socioreligious units), *hermandades* (brotherhoods), *cofradías*, and other religious institutions of a syncretic nature. The single most important institution in the administration of Tlaxcalan religion is the *república eclesiástica* (ecclesiastic republic), which includes all annually elected officials of the numerous stewardships and the local hierarchy.

One fundamental aspect of Tlaxcalan religion remains unchanged: the present-day folk Catholicism retains the essentially pragmatic and ritualistic character

of pre-Hispanic polytheism. The supernatural belief system has one general, predominant aim: to make the individual and the collective world of social existence safe and secure by the proper propitiation of all supernatural forces, regardless of the structural means employed. The relationship between humans and the supernatural, then, is characterized by pragmatic and rather selfish motives for which the individual and the group pay dearly in terms of time and economic and social resources.

Finally, there is a significant magical component to Tlaxcalan religion. It coexists side by side with folk Catholicism and is regulated by the same belief system. Although the practice of magic sometimes merges with folk Catholicism and is part of the syncretic complex, more often it forms a separate system. Witchcraft, sorcery, soul loss, and belief in a series of anthropomorphic or animistic supernaturals constitute the bulk of the magical component. All these practices are of pre-Hispanic origin, but they do contain elements of European and even African witchcraft and sorcery, some of which became syncretized independently of Catholicism.

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TOADS. See Frogs and Toads.

TOBACCO. A common theme in the origin mythology of tobacco among American Indians is that this most widely distributed psychoactive plant in the New World was given to the first people by the gods. The gods themselves—indeed, all spirit manifestations—were generally believed to require tobacco as their sacred and sometimes only proper food. But in making it a gift to men they neglected to keep any for their own use ("not even one pipeful," in the words of an elder of the Fox Indians of Wisconsin). So they must rely on human beings to give it to them. In exchange the gods listen to petitions and confer their blessings, or, conversely, withhold evil. Reciprocity is thus extended from the social realm to interaction between the spirit world and human beings, whose control over a spirit food fervently desired by the supernaturals gives them some leverage; gods are said to crave it so intensely that they are unable to resist it.

The craving for tobacco attributed to the supernaturals among many American Indians can thus also be understood as an extrapolation from human experience, in this case nicotine addiction, especially among tribes whose shamans regularly intoxicated themselves with tobacco. The use of tobacco as smoke, snuff, cuds mixed with lime, or liquid infusions to induce "drunkenness" for the purpose of "communicating with demons" is repeatedly described by sixteenth-century sources from the Caribbean, Mexico, and South America. In some cases the intoxicating substance was probably not tobacco but another of the many botanical hallucinogens then and now in ritual use among American Indians. Still, at least in South America, tobacco continues to be so employed.

A particularly complex and apparently ancient form of "tobacco shamanism" was found by Johannes Wilbert among the Venezuelan Warao, whose sacred geography and cosmic architecture are virtually constructed of tobacco smoke and whose shamans smoke themselves into "out-of-body" ecstatic trance states with cane cigarettes three and four feet long. Warao shamans travel to the House of Tobacco Smoke in the eastern part of the universe over a celestial bridge of tobacco smoke conceived of as a channel of energy that guarantees health and abundance on earth as long as the supernaturals continue to be properly fed with tobacco smoke. Wilbert reports that Warao shamans crave tobacco smoke with such "tremendous physiological and psychological urgency" that they are literally sick without it. They believe that the gods likewise await their gift of tobacco with the craving of an addict and will

inevitably enter into mutually beneficial relationships with human beings as long as humans provide the gift.

This attribution of addictive craving to the gods probably diffused together with cultivated tobacco itself, presumably from those regions in aboriginal South America where Warao-like tobacco shamanism was particularly well developed. The notion dominates tobacco mythology and ritual even among peoples who, like those of the North American Plains and Prairies, customarily reduced the potency of tobacco with such nonpsychoactive plant materials as red willow bark and who, in any event, smoked only very small quantities ceremonially in sacred pipes with chimneys of limited interior diameter, to please gods and spirits and sanctify the spoken word, and never to the point of intoxication.

A significant dichotomy may be noted between the origin mythologies of the cultivated hybrid Indian species *Nicotiana rustica* and the less potent and less widely distributed *N. tabacum* from which modern commercial varieties are descended, on the one hand, and the wild species (*N. attenuata*, *N. bigelovii*, *N. trigonophylla*, etc.) of aboriginal western North America, on the other. While the origin of the Indian species is commonly credited to the divine realm, the latter two species are frequently attributed to the dead, perhaps because as casuals these species, like the daturas, which also belong to the Solonaceae, are sometimes seen to grow in disturbed soil (e.g., on graves). In California and the Great Basin they are often highly valued as gifts of the ancestors, but in transitional areas, where both wild and cultivated species are available, the wild varieties are sometimes feared for their association with death.

The oldest evidence thought to point to smoking comes from California, where conical stone pipes dating to c. 4000 BCE have been excavated, and where wild tobaccos were widely employed for shamanistic, magico-religious, and medicinal procedures, including the ecstatic trance. The Shoshonean (Uto-Aztecan) Kawaiisu of south central California used virtually every technique of ingestion reported from South America, including smoking, snuffing, licking, chewing, and swallowing. Likewise, the prophylactic, therapeutic, and metaphysical uses for cultivated species in South America and eastern North America were paralleled by these and other California tribes with the native wild species. The most common method was mixing the pulverized, dried leaves with slaked and powdered lime and either swallowing the mixture dry or liquified, or licking and sucking it.

The Kawaiisu participated in the ecstatic-initiatory *toloache* (*Datura innoxia*) religion common to other Cali-

fornia Indians, but tobacco, whose magical potency was given to the first people by the trickster-culture hero Coyote, was much more generally employed by them and their neighbors. They used it as a mild-to-potent dream-inducing soporific, as a shamanistic and initiatory intoxicant, or for preventing and curing illness, repelling and killing rattlesnakes, driving away ghosts, monsters, and other threatening supernatural beings, and divining and manipulating the weather.

In North America the widespread function of tobacco to please the spirits is particularly well documented among the Iroquois and Algonquin of the Eastern Woodlands, and the Plains and Prairie tribes. Seneca mythology attributes the origin of tobacco (*Nicotiana rustica*) to Awen'hai'i, "ancient bodied one," the pregnant daughter of the Great Chief in the Sky, who stripped the heavens of tobacco when she fell onto the newly created earth island through a hole in the sky. This left not only the heavenly powers but the vast company of other spirits that manifest themselves in nature without their most essential divine sustenance. To induce these spirits, which included masters and mistresses of animals and plants, as well as the "faces" that appear to hunters in the forest or in dreams and that are represented by the wooden masks of the shamanistic medicine societies of the Iroquois, to act on one's behalf requires the indispensable gift of tobacco.

A profoundly shamanistic Seneca myth tells of a youth who encounters a skeletonized man in a place heaped with the bones of dead people. Skeleton Man tells the youth that the only thing he desires is tobacco but his pipe and pouch are empty. He sends the youth on a harrowing journey—past or through different variations on the well-known shamanistic motif of the clashing rocks, the Symplegades-like "paradoxical passage"—to a distant place where tobacco is guarded by Seven Sisters and their terrible old mother. Using his *orenda* (spirit power) and trickery, the youth succeeds in entering the lodge of the female spirits, evading their war clubs and escaping with the magical tobacco. When he returns and fills Skeleton Man's pipe, the bones of dead people are re clothed with flesh and return to life.

Indian North America, then, can be seen to share fully in the South American conception of tobacco as what Wilbert called a "bond of communion" and a powerful "actualizing principle" between the natural and supernatural worlds with the shaman and his tobacco ceremonies as essential mediator. Originating millennia ago in South America in an archaic shamanistic substratum and a shamanistic worldview characteristic of all American Indian religion, the divine tobacco first cultivated in the valleys of the Andes between Peru and Ecuador has diffused together with associated myths and rituals

as an integrated cultural complex that has persisted—with local modifications but with extraordinary stability of its underlying ideological core—into the present time.

[See also Smoking.]

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TOLSTOI, LEV (1828-1910), Russian writer. Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoi was born on his family's estate of Yasnaia Poliana (Bright Meadow), in Tula Province. His parents, both from the high aristocracy, died in his early boyhood. Tolstoi was a melancholy child, self-centered but filled with the desire to be a better person.

He entered the University of Kazan in 1844, planning to become a diplomat, but left the university in 1847 without taking a degree. That same year, he inherited Yasnaia Poliana and went there to live. In 1849 he opened a school for the village children and was one of its teachers. At this time, as later, he was strongly under the influence of Rousseau.

Tolstoi volunteered in 1851 for army service in the Caucasus, and he subsequently took part in the Crimean War (1854-1856) in the Danube region and at Sevastopol. He left the army in 1856 and returned to Yasnaia Poliana. By the following year he had published a semi-autobiographical trilogy on his childhood and youth and a group of short stories on the war in the Caucasus and at Sevastopol. These works soon brought him fame.

Tolstoi made the first of two trips to western Europe in 1857 and was repelled by the absence of spiritual values and the materialism he found there. In Paris he wit-

nessed a public execution and from it concluded that all governments were immoral. During his second trip abroad in 1860 his favorite brother, Nikolai, who had tuberculosis, died in Tolstoi's arms. The next year Tolstoi returned to Russia and resumed teaching at the Yasnaia Poliana school.

In 1862 Tolstoi married Sof'ia Andreevna Bers, eighteen years old. They had thirteen children, of whom five died. The first decade of his marriage was the happiest time of his life. During this period he wrote *War and Peace* (1863-1869).

Tolstoi's concern with moral development and religion was evident from his childhood. At the age of nineteen he wrote out rules of behavior for himself that were close to the precepts of his later Christianity. In 1855 he wanted to found a new religion, free of dogma and mysticism. Happiness would be achieved not in heaven but on earth, by following the voice of one's conscience. His letters from the 1850s on, and his literary works from *Childhood* (1852) to *Anna Karenina* (1873-1877), reflect the development of his ideas.

Beginning in the early 1870s, Tolstoi engaged in a moral and religious quest that was to continue until the end of his life. He had begun reading Schopenhauer in 1867 and was influenced by Schopenhauer's negative view of life. In the fall of 1869, while on a trip to buy land, he stopped at the provincial town of Arzamas, staying overnight at an inn. There, in the middle of the night, he had a terrifying vision of death. From this time on, Tolstoi was obsessed with thoughts of his own death—although earlier works, like *Three Deaths* (1859), were witness that the problem of death had been on his mind for years. It was this obsession that led to his search for a viable religious faith, one that would make life worth living and would reconcile him to the bitter fact that he too must die.

Tolstoi's spiritual crisis began during the writing of *Anna Karenina* and lasted until 1879. It is mirrored in the seekings of Levin, the novel's hero, and is akin to the spiritual quest that had occupied Pierre Bezukhov, the hero of *War and Peace*. But whereas *War and Peace* had ended in optimism, in *Anna Karenina* a dark force seems to take over. Levin cannot accept a materialist explanation for his life. That would be "the mockery of Satan," the power that remains in the universe if there is no God. This power is Schopenhauer's blind force of will, the same force that destroys Anna. Levin thinks that suicide is the only possible escape from his situation.

In *A Confession*, which he wrote from 1879 to 1882, Tolstoi described his own crisis. Reason and the sciences gave him no answer to his questions, which marriage and family life had stifled only temporarily. He

read extensively, but the thinkers he studied—Socrates, Solomon, Buddha, Schopenhauer—all concluded that life was an evil and that the greatest good was to free oneself of one's existence. Tolstoi then turned to the peasants. He saw that their simple faith in God gave their life meaning. They did not fear death, which they regarded as the natural outcome of life. Tolstoi concluded that the answer was simply to believe, without reasoning. Belief in God and in the possibility of moral perfection made life meaningful. The peasants' faith, however, was bound up with Orthodox ritual and dogma, which Tolstoi could not accept. He ended *A Confession* promising to study the scriptures and the church's doctrines in order to separate the truth in them from falsehood.

Tolstoi taught himself Greek and Hebrew in order to read the biblical texts in the original. In his *Translation and Harmony of the Four Gospels* (1880–1881) he rearranged the Gospels, rewriting or eliminating material he thought incomprehensible or untrue. Miracles, including the Resurrection, were discarded. Tolstoi's version presented the tenets of Christianity as he saw them. He said that this book was the most important thing he had written. The other promised work, *A Criticism of Dogmatic Theology* (also 1880–1881), was an attack on the Orthodox church. In it, Tolstoi examined the church's doctrines and said they were distortions of the true teachings of Christ, who had wanted only love, humility, and forgiveness.

His next book, *What I Believe* (1882–1884), was a summing-up of Tolstoi's creed. He listed in it five commandments of Christ: (1) do not be angry; (2) do not lust; (3) do not swear oaths; (4) do not resist evil with force; (5) love all persons without distinction. Observance of these rules would transform life on earth by putting an end to courts of law, governments, and wars between nations. Tolstoi's other religious and moralistic works, such as *On Life* (1887) and *The Kingdom of God Is within You* (1892–1893), contained essentially the same ideas as the earlier ones. All of these books, including *A Confession*, were banned by the censor, but they circulated in underground editions or were published abroad and smuggled into Russia.

Tolstoi's new religion was basically a system of personal ethics, the same rules he had been trying to live by since boyhood. The church, he said, had obscured true Christianity with ritual, miracles, and symbols. It tried to keep from people the true Christ, a man and not a divine being, who wanted to unite men in peace and make them happy. Tolstoi's Christianity was based primarily on the Sermon on the Mount, and especially on Christ's principle of turning the other cheek (*Mt.* 5:38–42). God had placed the light of conscience within each

person. By heeding their inner voice, people would act with simple truthfulness and love and would achieve happiness. The only way to combat evil was by a constant effort at self-perfection, not by opposing the evil of others with force. If each person does good whenever possible, evil will die of itself. Nonresistance to evil became Tolstoi's main tenet.

But Tolstoi's Christianity did not bring him peace and did not end his search, any more than Levin's quest in *Anna Karenina* had ended with his conversion. Never believing in personal immortality, Tolstoi was not able to accept death's physical finality and the thought of his own physical annihilation. He returned again and again to the theme of death, which continued to haunt him. Efforts to include death in his vision of harmony on earth by viewing it as a peaceful merging with nature warred with flashes of nihilism. Only in his last years did he make his peace with death.

After his conversion Tolstoi condemned his own pre-1878 fiction, saying that it contained morally bad feelings. He resumed writing literary works in the mid-1880s, but they had changed. He now used a bare, plain style that would be accessible to every reader. Tolstoi wrote two kinds of works, both fundamentally tracts: short stories for peasants and children that presented his views on love and nonviolence, and longer stories for the educated reader, such as *The Death of Ivan Il'ich* (1886), *Kreutzer Sonata* (1889), *The Devil* (1889), and *Father Sergii* (1890–1891). He still had all his literary force, but the joy in life that had animated his earlier fiction was gone; the longer stories are dominated by gloomy, strong passions. Most of them express a hatred of the flesh, the source of life and of death.

Tolstoi's last work to be published in his lifetime was *Resurrection* (1899). It depicts the moral regeneration of Nekhliudov, a nobleman whose early debauchery had ruined the life of a young servant girl. In prison, Nekhliudov observes a religious service during which the priest, after giving communion, "took the cup back with him behind the partition and drank all the remaining blood and finished all the remaining pieces of God's flesh." Because of the heretical passages in *Resurrection* and his attacks on the church and state, the Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoi in 1901. On the day the decree was announced, a cheering crowd of supporters gathered around his house.

By the 1880s Tolstoi had numerous disciples in Russia and abroad, many of them misfits or half-mad. One of his followers, Vladimir Chertkov, gained increasing influence over him. Tolstoi's disciples regarded him as a living saint, and Yasnaia Poliana became a goal of pilgrimages. Groups of Tolstoyans formed who tried to live by his ideas. All these groups eventually fell apart.

(Many of the early *kibbutsim* in Palestine, however, were inspired by the ideology of a Russian-Jewish Tolstoyan, Aharon David Gordon.) Tolstoi continued to write in the final years of his life, expressing his views on most of the social, religious, and political issues of the day. He corresponded with Mohandas K. Gandhi, and Gandhi's doctrine of *satyāgraha* was an adaptation of Tolstoi's nonresistance to evil.

Tolstoi's relations with his wife had deteriorated as he became more and more preoccupied with religion. Friction between her and Chertkov made Tolstoi's life at home unbearable and led to his flight from Yasnaia Poliana in late October of 1910. He had long wanted to live quietly in solitude. On the train journey he fell ill and was taken to the stationmaster's house at Astapovo, where he died on 7 November.

While Tolstoi's religious writings are peripheral to his literary achievements, his art is unimaginable without the moral and religious vision that informs it. Perhaps he cheated death better than he knew; as artist and seeker he has continued, generation after generation, to attract passionate adherents, and Yasnaia Poliana remains a focus of pilgrimages from all over the world.

In one of his Sevastopol stories, Tolstoi had written: "The hero of my narrative, whom I have tried to render in all its beauty and who was, is, and always will be beautiful, is truth." Tolstoi's brother Nikolai had said that in a certain spot at Yasnaia Poliana there was a green stick on which was written a secret that would destroy evil in men and make them happy. As a boy, Tolstoi searched in the bushes at Yasnaia Poliana for this stick. Much later, he wrote: "I believe that this truth exists, and that it will be disclosed to men and will give them what it promises." According to his wish, Tolstoi was buried at the place where he thought the green stick was hidden.

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SYLVIA JURAN

then the name had no single application, and it has none today. Because there was more than one place called Tollan, the word *Toltec* refers not to a single culture or religion, but rather to at least five specific groups of people, all belonging to Postclassic Mesoamerica: (1) the inhabitants of what is now the archaeological site of Tula de Allende near Mexico City, (2) the inhabitants or, more precisely, the elite, called Toltec-Maya, of Chichén Itzá, Yucatán, (3) the inhabitants of Tollan as it is described in central Mexican historical documents of the sixteenth century, (4) militant leading groups in other parts of Mesoamerica claiming descent from a place called Tollan, (5) members of various, often quite different, ethnic groups, all bearing the typological name Tolteca, that migrated to central Mexico. In addition, the term *Toltec* was generally applied to any person who exhibited extraordinary skills, arts, or wisdom.

The present article discusses, in turn, each of these five groups, which overlap only to a certain degree. The familiar hybrid picture of "Toltec," resulting from an unsophisticated merging commonly found in overall descriptions, can no longer be supported. Presumably there never existed either a single, homogeneous Toltec culture or, consequently, a single Toltec religion. But many traits are certainly common to various of the above-mentioned "Toltecs," including religious traits. In this article, common features will be stressed, but the reader should be aware that they are not necessarily all elements of one coherent whole.

✧ **Toltecs of Tula.** The rather extensive archaeological site of Tula de Allende in the modern Mexican state of Hidalgo, 75 kilometers north-northwest of Mexico City, has been excavated professionally since 1940. Its main ceremonial center, Tula Grande, flourished from about 950 to 1200 CE (dates established by ceramic cross-ties but only very few radiocarbon readings). In its final shape, Tula Grande consisted of some ten hectares of magnificently arranged buildings, surrounded by ten to twelve square kilometers of living quarters. So far, Tula-Toltec religion can be reconstructed only from the archaeological remains of the main ceremonial center. In contrast to buildings of the earlier metropolitan civilization of the region, Teotihuacan, Tula-Toltec religious buildings were designed for the full participation of large groups of people, who gathered in pillared halls, or colonnades, along one side of the huge central square. Different types of benches along the walls of the colonnades suggest that they were intended for groups of people of varying rank, although all participants probably belonged to the social elite. Numerous bas-reliefs show them dressed as warriors and aligned in rows, emphasizing their function in the cult as a homogeneous group: no single person is highlighted.

TOLTEC RELIGION. In pre-Columbian central Mexico, *Tolteca* literally meant "people living at a place named Tollan [i.e., among the rushes]." However, even

Archaeological vestiges indicate that the ceremonies of the Tula-Toltecs focused on the strange effigies known as chacmools. These are approximately life-size sculptures of a reclining male figure dressed in some of the paraphernalia of a warrior, but clearly no warrior himself. He holds an object, perhaps a receptacle, over his belly and glares with sharply turned face at approaching worshipers. Despite recent attempts to interpret the chacmools as the stones on which human sacrifice was made, their specific function is as yet unknown. The practice of human sacrifice, however, was not uncommon among the Tula-Toltecs. The practice seems to be addressed metaphorically in endlessly repeated sculptural reliefs depicting eagles devouring human hearts. There are also frequent allusions in the reliefs to death in the form of skulls and bones.

More difficult to establish from archaeological data is the deity to whom the devotion of the presumed caste of warriors was directed. Most probably it was that highly complex being that in Tula is metaphorically depicted by a combination of reptilian, avian, and human elements: the face of a man with circular, spectaclelike eyes is shown looking out of or emerging from open reptilian jaws. The figure, depicted *en face*, is surrounded by feathers and supports itself on legs with birdlike claws. Despite clear analogies, this hybrid being is not the famous feathered serpent, which in Tula architecture is represented only as a subordinate element.

Another quite different aspect of Tula-Toltec religious activities centered on a ritual ball game, which is generally believed to have been important as a symbolic reenactment of cosmic movement. In Tula Grande at least three giant ball courts existed, but there is no basis for any extensive interpretation.

Toltec-Maya. Similar to Tula-Toltec culture in its essential expression, Toltec-Maya also seems to have been restricted to a single, extremely important place: Chichén Itzá in north-central Yucatán. The great resemblances between Chichén Itzá and Tula, 850 kilometers away, as the crow flies, are a commonplace in Mesoamerican archaeology, although the site of origin of these particular traits has not been definitively established. Chichén Itzá was always an important center of late Classic Puuc Maya, which toward its final period (c. 900 CE) exhibited an increased extra-Mayan influence. Subsequent development, to be found only at Chichén Itzá, shows a merging of traditional and newly introduced elements, the latter having been found so far only in Tula. The center of the Toltec-Maya city covers some thirty hectares, the general outline very much resembling that of Tula: large courts, colonnades, and ball courts. The more abundant and detailed iconography and a historical tradition, albeit a faint one, give the picture a little more color: the dominant social stratum,

that of the warriors, is principally the same as in Tula, but a wider variety of grades is displayed.

The central deity of Toltec-Maya culture at Chichén Itzá is depicted, as in Tula, as the man-reptile-bird combination. The image is omnipresent, but there are practically no variations to provide deeper insight, although sometimes artists misinterpreted the stereotyped picture and made it look like a heavily adorned warrior with his pectoral and feathered headdress. The theme itself is an old Maya one: a man's head emerging from a snake's mouth. It is already known in Classic Maya representations and is frequent in the Puuc-style ruins, where the feathered rattlesnake is also common. Colonial sources call this mythological animal *k'uk'ulkan* ("quetzal-feathered serpent") and mention a famous leader of Chichén Itzá who bore this name and who is said to have "returned" to central Mexico. A person intimately associated with this feathered serpent serves as the focus of a story with a mythical flavor, the wording of which is unknown but which is depicted with considerable detail in various Chichén Itzá temples. The sculptural narration makes clear that this feathered serpent was the center of devotion for the Toltec-Maya elite.

There is evidence, however, that the feathered serpent did not occupy the paramount place in the Toltec-Maya pantheon. Not infrequently, what seems to be a supreme deity is depicted seated on a low throne-bench in the shape of a jaguar before a giant sun disk designed in the manner of central Mexico. This theme demonstrates the preoccupation of Toltec-Maya religion with the sun, which is presumably also the main concern of the ritual ball game. Based on central Mexican analogies, long rows of reliefs of strangely reclined warriors have been interpreted in relation to the sun cult: the sun that passed beneath the earth during the night had to be revived every morning through rituals executed by the warriors.

To the water deities was directed a special cult peculiar to Chichén Itzá: on certain occasions, human beings were thrown into the sacred cenote (natural well) and drowned to appease the rain gods or to act as intermediaries between them and men. The continuing belief in the old Maya water god Chac is clearly visible in the large masks with elongated noses that adorn the corners and facades of most temples, sometimes together with the bird-snake-man motif.

A great variety of human sacrifice was practiced among the Toltec-Maya, in contrast to earlier Maya times. The sheer quantity of victims, whose skulls were displayed on special racks, is impressive. Striking, too, is the constant presence of the death symbol on buildings, as well as on warriors' clothing. The act of human sacrifice is frequently depicted, not only in the meta-

phorical form of wild beasts (symbolizing warriors) feeding on human hearts but also in naturalistic representations found on the interior walls of temples and along the field of the ball court. In the latter, the decapitation of the leader of the losing team is depicted. The rubber ball of the game in this scene is a symbol of glorious death, and snakes emerging from the victim's neck symbolize precious blood.

These are examples of the abundant metaphorical motifs, also seen in the chacmools and the images of feathered serpents, whose interpretation is fraught with difficulties. Chichén Itzá clearly presents a syncretic religion in which the veneration of old Maya water gods mingles with foreign solar-astral ideas. Everything points to the martial rituals as being associated with the elite warrior group, or "Toltecs," whereas the cult of the water deities is likely to have been connected with the commoners, the Maya farmers.

Toltecs of Tollan Xicocotitlan. Although identified by Jiménez Moreno with Tula de Allende, the famous Tollan Xicocotitlan referred to in colonial sources is not this town alone. As epithet or name, the word *Tollan* has been used to designate other famous cities, and the description of this Tollan corresponds—if to any place on earth at all—more to Classic Teotihuacan than to Tula de Allende. As described in the written sources, Tollan Xicocotitlan was a sort of paradise. Thanks to their prudence, the inhabitants of Tollan possessed everything they needed in abundance, including maize and cotton, precious stones, and gold.

They worshiped only one god, whom they called Quetzalcoatl ("quetzal-feathered serpent"), a name also given to the highest priest of the deity. This god did not require any sumptuous service and reportedly abhorred human sacrifice (although scholars believe that these accounts were designed to please the Spanish missionaries and divert from historical truth). People were admonished to offer their god only serpents, flowers, and butterflies. They considered their incomparable wisdom, science, skill, and arts as emanating from their god and strictly obeyed the orders given by Quetzalcoatl and voiced by his priest. The god, resembling a monster, lay like a fallen rock, as one source says, in his temple on the top of a tall pyramid. He had a long beard. He—or perhaps his priest—repeatedly made autosacrifice by bleeding himself with sharp thorns, thus becoming a prototype for all later priests in central Mexico. [See Quetzalcoatl.]

This account, given to the sixteenth-century Spanish missionary and historian Bernardino de Sahagún by educated Indians, is incompatible in its details not only with the ecological situation of Tula but also with a warrior-dominated society like that of archaeological

Tula. It seems to correspond to earlier times, when the idea of a divine feathered serpent was developed or introduced in Teotihuacan iconography and later refined and elaborated in places like Xochicalco and Cacaxtla. On the other hand, Sahagún and other sources tell the story of a famous ruler of Tollan Xicocotitlan, who, confusingly enough, bore the title of Quetzalcoatl in addition to his personal name Topiltzin ("our beloved prince") and the name of the date of his birth, Ce Acatl. Details of his origin, genealogy, and life are contradictory. He may have belonged to the Nonoalca, the culturally (and perhaps politically) dominant group of multiethnic Tollan Xicocotitlan. Scholars assume that the Nonoalca migrated from the southern Veracruz region, where they had been in contact with a more sophisticated civilization, which would explain their opinion of themselves and of Quetzalcoatl as the incarnation of cultural superiority.

One of the more important virtues of the people of Tollan Xicocotitlan was their forthrightness. According to Sahagún, they spoke thus: "It is so, it is true, yes, no." But the very personification of their integrity—Topiltzin himself, the Quetzalcoatl—was attacked by three demons, two of them bearing the names of later, Aztec deities (Huitzilopochtli and Titlacahuan, that is, Tezcatlipoca), although they do not seem to have been identical with them. One should refrain from interpreting this incident as the mythic rendering of an antagonistic struggle between divine principles or between two religious factions practicing and opposing human sacrifice. Topiltzin was eventually overthrown, and consequently one disaster after the other befell his city. Finally he had to gather his followers and leave the place. It is generally accepted that part of the story reflects internal dissent in Xicocotitlan between Nonoalca and Tolteca-Chichimeca, another constituent ethnic group.

From here on, history once more becomes legend. On his flight, Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl worked miracles in many places. Eventually, on reaching the Veracruz coast, he either burned himself and became the morning star, or, according to other versions, he walked or sailed on a raft, miraculously made by intertwining serpents, to the mythical land Tlapallan, where he may have died. After his departure from Xicocotitlan, Topiltzin was replaced by a more secular ruler, Huemac, perhaps Topiltzin's kinsman, who himself was also persecuted by the demons and who finally fled to a cave where he killed himself or disappeared—the sources are hopelessly contradictory on this point. Huemac, too, assumed divinity, as lord of the underworld.

Conquerors of "Toltec" Affiliation. In various parts of Mesoamerica during early Postclassic times a local pop-

ulation had to submit to small groups of militant immigrants. These usurpers, who showed positive "Toltec" traits, established themselves as ruling elites. In the case of the Quiché and Cakchiquel Maya in highland Guatemala, the respective elites claimed descent from a mythical place of origin called Tulán, far to the north, and ethnic affiliation with those they called the Yaqui (Nahuatl-speaking Mexicans). After their initial migration the Quiché settled for a long time near the Laguna de Términos on the Gulf of Mexico and later continued their migration into the Guatemalan highlands. They carried with them a "sacred bundle"—in Mesoamerica generally considered the very essence of their god and the sacrosanct symbol of ethnic identity—which they were given by Nacxítl at Tulán. Nacxítl or Acxítl is one of the names of Quetzalcoatl, according to central Mexican sources.

Quiché tradition of the sixteenth century, amply preserved in their "sacred book," the *Popol Vuh*, relates that at Tulán their four ethnic subdivisions had each been given tribal deities: Tohil, Avilix, Hacavitz, and Nicacatah. The most powerful, Tohil, who was identified by the *Popol Vuh* with Quetzalcoatl, was the possessor of fire; he offered this cultural achievement to other starving tribes at the price of using them as victims for human sacrifice, hitherto unknown at Tulán. The other tribes thus came under Quiché dominance, which they unsuccessfully tried to shake off.

The creation myth recorded at length in the *Popol Vuh* is generally considered an adaptation of central Mexican ("Toltec") prototypes: here, the creation of the world in various stages of completion is referred to as the work of Tepeu and Cucumatz (Gucumatz). The name *Tepeu* recalls the ruler of Tollan, named Totepeuh (*to* is a Nahuatl possessive prefix), sometimes referred to as the father of Topiltzin or Huemac; the name *Cucumatz* is a literal translation of *Quetzalcoatl* into Quiché. The account of the *Popol Vuh* also gives deep insight into the wide corpus of legends of the Quiché that do not seem to be of "Toltec" origin.

Tolteca Chichimeca. As a rule, central Mexican ethnic groups have ample traditions regarding their migration to their present homes. Most of these refer to a place of origin at Chicomoztoc (Seven Caves), and they count Tollan among their stopping places during their long migration. This holds true for the inhabitants of Cholula (Cholollan) in the Puebla valley. They report in the monumental *Historia Tolteca-Chichimeca* that their forefathers, bearing the characteristic name Tolteca-Chichimeca, had to leave the decaying Tollan. Before starting off, their messenger-priest asked the god of Cholollan, then already a famous place of pilgrimage, for permission to settle in his city, which was granted.

The god is referred to in the Nahuatl text as Quetzalcoatl Nacxítl Tepeuhqui and is addressed as Tloque' Nahuaque' (Lord of Proximity and Vicinity), the omnipresent deity. The allusion of the source to Quetzalcoatl as already present in Cholollan seems to indicate that well before the fall of Tollan the god's cult had begun to spread, certainly fostered by "Toltec" groups, into wider parts of central Mexico.

Conclusion. Only a few characteristic elements common to various facets of "Toltec" religion can be singled out so far: a supreme deity, Quetzalcoatl, who gave his name to priests and rulers; a cult dominated by eagles and jaguars (i.e., the warriors); a ritual ball game as reenactment of cosmic processes; and the importance of human sacrifice. These traits, whose roots go back far into Classic times, survived, sometimes altered or obscured, into late Postclassic times. For example, Quetzalcoatl ceded his rank to the Aztec Tezcatlipoca, the former being reduced to a mere wind god while the latter assumed titles peculiar to the "Toltec" Quetzalcoatl. Thus many religious descriptions in the colonial sources contain "Toltec" nuclei, although they are often barely recognizable.

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No special treatment of Toltec religion in any form has yet been published. The most comprehensive study of the Toltecs, written from an ethnohistoric point of view but making full use of available archaeological data is Nigel Davies's *The Toltecs* (Norman, Okla., 1977). The subsequent period and developments are covered in detail by the same author in *The Toltec Heritage* (Norman, Okla., 1980), an expanded version of his *Los Mexicas, primeros pasos hacia el imperio* (Mexico City, 1973). There is no published synthesis yet of archaeological work at Tula de Allende, but Jorge R. Acosta's "Los Toltecs," in *Los señortos y estados militaristas* (Mexico City, 1976), can be profitably consulted. The Toltec-Maya period of Chichén Itzá is summarized, although not very satisfactorily, in Román Piña Chan's *Chichén Itzá, la ciudad de los brujos del agua* (Mexico City, 1980).

The Quiché text of the *Popol Vuh* has been translated many times. *Popol Vuh: The Sacred Book of the Ancient Quiché Maya*, translated by Delia Goetz and Sylvanus G. Morley from the Spanish edition of Adrián Recinos (Norman, Okla., 1950), was the standard English version until it was superseded by the more scholarly work of Munro S. Edmonson in *The Book of Counsel: The Popol Vuh of the Quiché Maya* (New Orleans, 1971). A recommendable interpretation of this highly important text is, however, still lacking.

HANNS J. PREM

TOMBS. Ritual disposal of the dead seems to be a phenomenon unique to humans; inhumation (burial in the earth) in various forms has been universally practiced

except where supplanted by other rites, such as exposure of the dead to birds of prey. It is clear from evidence dating back as far as the Paleolithic period (for example, artifacts found buried in the grave, the position of the corpse, and so on) that disposal of the dead has always primarily served a ritualistic rather than utilitarian function; indeed, historical and anthropological investigation reveals that such burial rituals reflect any given society's view of the nature not only of death, but also of the totality of human existence within the cosmos.

The Living and the Dead. The great variety of equipment found in the earliest graves suggests that human beings have always been unable to accept death as the end of life. In addition, it may be deduced from the widespread ritual of inhumation that the new dwelling place of the dead was seen typically as beneath the earth. The location of the burial site itself indicates whether the worlds of the living and the dead were regarded as separate and hostile to each other or as part of a continuum. Thus, when there is affection or reverence for the dead or some benefit is thought to accrue from their presence, burial may take place within the house or within the family compound (as in China). When, however, the dead are regarded as objects of fear and death is viewed as a source of pollution for the living, the place of disposal is a location that thereafter is seen as belonging to the dead.

Accordingly, burial in the earth may be understood by some cultures as the recognition of the eternal cycle of life and death in which human beings, as part of nature, participate. Just as the earth lives and dies and is reborn again, so humans may be seen to undergo the same process. The mythic image of humankind as autochthonous, born out of the earth or created out of dirt or clay, is then carried to its logical conclusion by the practice of returning humans to the place that had once brought them forth. And in those cultures where earth is associated with the female principle, humankind can be seen as being received back into the mother who gave birth to it. Thus we find even in those cultures that cremate their dead the common practice of burial of the ashes within a grave.

In other cultures, however, burial of the dead may also reflect the desire of the living to separate themselves from the dead, to establish strict boundaries between the terrestrial and subterranean worlds, and to ensure that through proper disposal the dead will not harm the living. Thus we may note such practices as the constriction of the dead through binding or weighting down with stones as well as the strict injunctions concerning the disposal of the dead, which are found in all

cultures and which may be interpreted as a display both of kindness toward the dead in hastening their departure from this world and of fear in preventing them from remaining in this world where they may do harm. The concept of the necropolis or city of the dead may be seen as the natural consequence of such beliefs; the modern cemetery represents the continuity of such belief.

Often geography, topography, and conditions of life may combine with worldview to produce the mode of disposal of the dead. Exposure of the dead, for example, may reflect the fear of polluting the sacred elements of earth or fire with death (as among the Parsis) but also may be the consequence of a soil too hard to be excavated (as among the inhabitants of the far northern hemisphere). Similarly, burial within caves may be a reflection of the belief in caves as openings into the subterranean world of the dead, but such a practice cannot develop without the existence of caves (or their potentiality). Cremation may be more convenient for the nomad, but it is also practiced by settled peoples who believe it a necessary prelude to freeing the spirit from the body.

Abodes of the Dead. Although ritual burial is evident during the Paleolithic period, little can be deduced about the function of the grave other than what is cited above. It may be remarked, however, that there is widespread evidence of cave burial during this period. Nevertheless, there seems to have been no attempt, even in the later Paleolithic period, to establish boundaries between the living and the dead by separating them from areas of settlement; it would seem that the living and dead often shared the same space. It is not until the Neolithic period that the understanding of the nature of death is marked not only by the contents of the grave but by what is visible to those who are still living; it is during this period that we see the development of the tumulus, or mound, grave as the most characteristic form of burial. It is possible that the tumulus grave arose in part out of humanity's need to establish psychic boundaries between itself and the world of the dead by placing them either in a specified area (for example, within a stockade or ditch) or in a mortuary house reserved for the dead, which was then covered over with mounds of earth. The houses or enclosures, made of either stone or timber, found within these mounds suggest that they were considered dwelling places of the dead, while their location within areas of settlement would seem to indicate that the dead, once properly buried, were regarded as protectors of the land in which they were interred; the location of their tombs would serve to reinforce the family's claim to the land.

The Chinese practice of *feng-shui*, geomancy, which reveals to the practitioner where to locate graves, temples, and houses in order that the dead, the gods, and the living may find their rightful places of habitation, is predicated on such a belief. Further, the tomb as the residence of the dead is demonstrated by the widespread practices of making offerings at the site of burial (sometimes even pouring the offering into the grave itself through specially constructed apertures) and of invoking the dead at the grave.

The tumulus burial, which expressed itself in a variety of forms during the prehistoric period, found its architectural continuity in such varied structures as the *tholos* or beehive-shaped tomb of the Mycenaean Greeks and the pyramid of the ancient Egyptians. The mound, the *tholos*, and the pyramid may be interpreted both as abodes of the dead and as re-creations of the archetypal cosmic mountain. The primeval mountain may be envisioned as the source from which all life arises (as in Egypt), the center of the world (as in China), or the link between the worlds of the gods, the living, and the dead. The rounded form of certain of the tumuli may also serve to re-create the dome of heaven; it seems certain that this motif survived in the rounded tombs of the Roman and Byzantine emperors. Finally, the mound may serve as a marker that simultaneously signifies the reverent remembrance of the dead and a warning to the living that the site belongs to the dead. The stone circles of the Neolithic period, such as those at Stonehenge and Avebury in England, clearly seem to delineate the boundaries between the two worlds. To enter into the sacred circle was to enter into another world. [See Megalithic Religions.]

The tumulus as a place of contact between the sacred and profane worlds may also be seen in the Buddhist stupas, which were originally dome-shaped mounds surrounded by a railing but were later also built in the shape of towers. Stupas were said to have been erected at the request of the Buddha himself as a place for the enshrinement of his and his disciples' relics. In their construction they may be considered models of the cosmos, and they are venerated as sacred places of pilgrimage. The pagoda is a later development of the form. Similar in function is the Tibetan *chorten*, a monument erected over relics of the Buddha or his saints or as a cenotaph (empty grave) to mark a sacred spot. Built in the form of a spire, its top is decorated with a tongue-shaped spike, which is said to represent the sacred light that emanated from the Buddha. [See Stupa Worship.]

The link between the world of the dead and the primeval mountain may also be noted in the rock-cut chamber tombs, found among the various Semitic cul-

tures of the ancient Near East, whose facades, re-creating the monumental entrances of temples, have been carved on the faces of cliffs and whose chambers burrow into the rock itself. Into this category may be placed as well the tower-tombs found throughout the Roman world and especially in the East; these are decorated on the outside with various mythological and religious symbols and contain burial chambers within.

The recognition of the tomb as the abode of the dead, in whatever form the dead may survive, is given further credence by the great variety of articles buried in the tomb: there seems to be a universal connection between the status of the individual and the quality of grave goods, while the expected continuation of earthly occupation is often reflected by the tools found in the grave. The interior decoration of tombs, clearly meant to gratify the dead and found among a great number of ancient cultures, depicts ordinary activities, such as banquets and athletic contests. Such representations suggest that the world of the dead is not so different from the land of the living as to be unrecognizable.

The function of the tomb as a dwelling place is further revealed by the widespread custom of placing the remains of the dead, either beneath the earth or above, in containers that imitate in architectural form the dwelling places of the living (for example, Etruscan cremation urns and Phoenician sarcophagi). The concept of residency in the tomb, however, is often contradicted by a concomitant belief in a land where the dead reside. This difficulty is sometimes resolved through the consideration of the tomb as a temporary shelter to be occupied only until the physical remains have decayed or the time of judgment has come, or it may be seen as an abode that is only sometimes inhabited by the dead. Within the burial mounds of the ancient Scandinavians, the dead were sometimes placed in ships that seem to symbolize the voyage to the other world. In some sects of Islam, on the other hand, it is necessary to prepare a tomb of ample size, which resembles a house with its arched roof, in order that the corpse may sit up when responding to the examining angels, but the dead remain within that tomb until the time of final judgment.

The Shift to the Living. The location of the grave, its contents, its internal decoration, and the disposal of the remains within it present clear evidence of the concerns and beliefs of the living about the dead. The complex history of funerary architecture and art, however, would seem to indicate a gradual shift in emphasis from the internal, timeless world of the grave to the temporal world of the living. Whereas the tumulus served to enclose the dead within their world along with any goods that they might need there, burial prac-

tices after the prehistoric period reveal increasingly elaborate construction and decoration of the exterior of the tomb, while the furnishings of the interior grow increasingly modest. The shift is certainly not clear-cut: a pile of stones above the grave may serve to keep the dead within but is also the simplest form of remembrance of the dead contained there. Similarly, highly decorated sarcophagi are found both buried in the earth and uncovered in aboveground structures.

The changing nature of the grave may be seen through a brief survey of Greek burial practices. During the Bronze Age, we find every sort of burial—monumental *tholos* tombs, rock-cut chamber tombs, and simple pit graves (both lined and unlined)—with a great variety of grave furniture and offerings; both inhumation and cremation were practiced. During the protogeometric period (twelfth to ninth centuries BCE), we find our first evidence of grave markers, in the form of amphorae placed on small tumulus graves. By the geometric period, we find clay vases decorated with a variety of scenes from the funeral ritual, but there are still a number of objects buried in the grave. The archaic period (seventh to mid-fifth centuries BCE) produced the clearest indication of a shift in belief and practice: while vast sums of money were then being spent on the outward appearance, objects placed within the grave for the benefit of the dead became increasingly scarce, a trend that continued into the classical age (mid-fifth to late fourth centuries BCE). Although built tombs replaced the burial mound, the principle of burial remained: the dead were buried beneath the structure, not within it.

So elaborate were some of these monuments that sumptuary laws were enacted at the end of the sixth century BCE and periodically renewed; these limited the amount of money and labor that could be expended on the burial and the grave marker. During the Hellenistic period, when the grandeur and even the divinity of kings became an acceptable concept, the further elaboration of the notion of the tomb as the abode of, and monument to, the dead was seen in the development of the mausoleum, an aboveground structure that contained or covered the burial chamber. Imitating various forms of domestic and sacred architecture, the mausoleum takes its name from Mausolus, the fourth-century BCE dynast of Caria, in Asia Minor. Perhaps the most spectacular combination of the themes discussed above, however, is found in the first-century BCE funeral monument of Antiochus I of Commagene, built in the Taurus Mountains at Nimrud Dagh in present-day Turkey. There, upon three terraces surrounding the high tumulus that contains the funerary chamber, sat colossal statues, originally between eight and ten meters high, of the gods and the deified Antiochus. Also adorning the

terraces are various mythological creatures of the Greek and Persian traditions as well as a zodiacal lion giving the royal horoscope.

The art found decorating graves during the archaic and classical periods (amphorae, freestanding statuary, and carved, freestanding stones called *stelae*) reflects the development of a standardized funereal iconography: the most frequent representations, found painted on vases, in relief, and on freestanding statuary, are sirens singing laments for the dead, sphinxes, heavily draped female figures of mourning, *kouroi* and *korai* (idealized male and female forms), and the representation of *dexiōsis* (two adults linked by the clasping of hands or by the clasping of a symbolic object, such as a bird, perhaps indicating the link between the worlds of the living and the dead). In addition, the frequent appearance of inscriptions commemorating the dead emphasizes the memorializing function of the monument. These motifs in turn were absorbed into the Western tradition of religious iconography: the fierce sphinxes and winged lions of the Near Eastern and Greco-Roman funereal traditions became the guardian angels standing watch above the Christian grave.

In all cultures, the themes of funerary iconography generally reflect the concerns of both the living and the dead. Thus we find the symbols of belief in a life beyond death represented through the elaborate portrayal of religious rituals, banquets of the living and the dead, and gods of the underworld as well as the simple depiction of the fruits of immortal nature, such as olive branches, grapes, flowers, vines, and cornucopias. The eternity of the cosmos is reflected in some cultures by the appearance on the monument of astrological symbols, such as the crescent moon or zodiacal signs; while in Christianity, for example, the symbol of the faith, the cross, reflects the belief in everlasting life promised by the crucifixion. Sometimes the monument may merely be an indication of the faith of the one buried; for example, we find in Hellenistic and Roman Palestine the representation of specifically Jewish motifs, such as the *menorah* (seven-branched candelabrum) and the shofar (ceremonial horn), along with the traditional pagan symbols of immortality. One such sarcophagus is carved with two Greek Nikes (figures representing victory) who hold a roundel containing a large *menorah* above a scene of Bacchic wine making.

The temporality of human existence, however, is often a theme of funereal art as well. In the Greco-Roman world, for example, a portrait of the deceased on the gravestone was common, as were scenes from everyday life, sometimes denoting occupation or social status. Medieval effigies of the deceased upon the tomb represent the continuity of this tradition. Humanity's need to

continue to participate in both the sacred and the profane worlds, even after death, is amply illustrated by its tombs and funerary monuments.

[See also Death; Funeral Rites; Caves; Pyramids; Temple; and Towers.]

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TAMARA M. GREEN

TÖNNIES, FERDINAND (1855–1936), German sociologist. Tönnies provided elaborate definitions of branches of sociology long before it was recognized as an academic discipline.

Ferdinand Julius Tönnies's academic preparation for his work as sociologist was uncommonly broad. In 1877 he received his doctorate in classical philology. Beginning his teaching career at the University of Kiel in 1881, he successively taught philosophy, economics, statistics, and sociology, and meanwhile published many articles on public policies. From 1909 to 1933 he was president of the German Sociological Society (founded by him along with Georg Simmel, Werner Sombart, and Max Weber). Having been publicly opposed to rising National Socialism and anti-Semitism, he was later illegally discharged from this post by the Hitler regime.

In 1887 he published his most famous book, a typological study, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (translated as *Community and Society*, 1957). Outside Germany the reputation of this work overshadowed his other important writings such as those on Thomas Hobbes, on Karl Marx, on custom and morals, and on public opinion. Employing his dichotomous ideal types, *Gemeinschaft* ("community") and *Gesellschaft* ("society"), he attempted to define fundamentally different kinds of human relationships in their dimensions and structures. He took into account biological and psychological as well as institutional perspectives, and he expounded the typology with impressive erudition and poetic imagination. He leaned heavily on English literature from Hobbes to Herbert Spencer and Henry Maine. He com-

pared his typology to Maine's distinction between status and contract.

For Tönnies, all social groupings are willed creations manifesting different kinds of human will. He saw these differentiations in terms of another dichotomy. On the one hand is a common "natural will" consisting of life forces associated with instincts, emotions, and habits, forming personal bonds and obligations that engender an unconscious sense of organic unity and solidarity of persons and groups. On the other hand is a deliberate, consciously purposeful "rational will" manifest in the impersonal pursuit of individual and group interests. In the rational will is a combination of motifs issuing from romanticism and rationalism. These differentiations become evident also in religion. (In his later period he envisaged the possibility of a nondogmatic universal religion to unite mankind.)

The "natural will" of community is integrative; the "rational will" of society is pluralistic and segmental, reaching its peak in capitalism. Both kinds of will are always present in some form or degree, but Tönnies favored a community-oriented socialism.

Some critics have seen these typological dichotomies an inimical to strictly empirical studies. Typology, they say, should not replace historiography, though the latter requires the former. Tönnies was aware of the danger of oversimplification and reduction in one's view of social reality. This becomes readily evident in his sharp critique of statisticians.

In his early essay on Spinoza, "Studie zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Spinozas" in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* (1883), Tönnies spoke of the emphasis on will as revealing a philosophy (stimulated by Arthur Schopenhauer) that he called "voluntarism," which entails the recognition of the primacy of will over intellect, and which is applicable to psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. His old friend Friedrich Paulsen in his *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1892) spelled out the conception of voluntarism in psychological terms. Paul Tillich in *Socialist Decision* (1933) adapted Tönnies's concepts of community and society. William James was so enthusiastic about Paulsen's book that he provided a lengthy introduction for the English edition, and one can see voluntaristic elements in James's concept of the "will to believe."

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JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

TORAH is a term that is used in many different ways. Of the etymologies suggested for the word, none has been proved, but most of them derive from the use of the word in the Hebrew scriptures. In *Genesis* and *Exodus* the plural of *torah*, *torot*, is usually coupled with other words, as in “mitsvotai huqqotai ve-torotai” (“my commandments, my laws, and my *torot*,” *Gn.* 26:5), and “mitsvotai ve-torotai” (*Ex.* 16:28). Even when the word occurs in these books in the singular, it refers to specific commandments. In *Leviticus* and *Numbers* the word *torah* denotes specific groups of ceremonial rules for the priests; sometimes the word occurs when the rules are introduced, as in *Leviticus* 6:1 (“This is the *torah* of the burnt-offering”) and *Numbers* 19:2 (“This is the law of the *torah*”), and sometimes it serves as a summary and conclusion, as in *Leviticus* 11:46–47 (“This is the *torah* of the beast and the bird . . . to distinguish between the ritually impure and the ritually pure”). In *Deuteronomy* the word *torah* is used with the emphatic *he’* (“the”) as a general term including not only the laws and rules, but also the narrative, the speeches, and the blessings and the curses of the Pentateuch. All these are written in “this book of the *torah*” (*Dt.* 29:20, 30:10).

In the prophecies of Hosea, Amos, and Isaiah the word *torah* carries a broad meaning that includes cultic, ethical, and legal matters. The concept of *torah* in *Jeremiah* is likewise broad and all-inclusive, while in *Ezekiel* the use of the plural returns, referring to groupings of laws and rules (*Ez.* 44:24).

In the historical books one finds exhortations encouraging observance and study of the Torah, as in *1 Kings* 2:2–6, along with a clear allusion to the “book of the *torah* of Moses,” in *2 Kings* 14:6, citing *Deuteronomy* 24:16. In *Chronicles*, changes made by the kings in both the cult and the legal system are said to have been carried out “according to all that is written in the *torah* of God” (*1 Chr.* 16:40, 22:11–12; *2 Chr.* 14:3, 17:9).

In *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* a number of citations from the Torah appear together with exegetical activity of the scribes and the Levites (*Ezr.* 9:11; *Neh.* 8:14, 10:35). Of *Ezra* himself it is said that “he prepared his heart to expound the *torah* of God and to do and to teach among the people of Israel law and justice” (*Ezr.* 7:10), while the Levites “read from the book, from the *torah* of the Lord, clearly, and gave the sense, so the people understood the reading” (*Neh.* 8:8).

In private and communal prayers and in the psalms, the word *torah* exhibits a broad range of meanings in accordance with the various literary types and historical circumstances represented in them. In *Proverbs* the word *torah* is used as a parallel for the terms *musar* (“instruction,” *Prv.* 1:8), *mitsvah* (“commandment,” *Prv.*

3:1, *6:20*), and *leqah tov* (“a good doctrine,” *Prv.* 4:2), and thus it is also used to refer to the person who draws upon the wisdom found in international wisdom literatures. Nevertheless, the word still preserves the primary religious connotation that characterizes its use in the rest of the books of the Hebrew scriptures, by referring to the totality of the commandments of the covenant between God and his people.

Content of the Pentateuch. The collection of writings that we call “Torah” or “the Torah of Moses” comprises the first five books of the Bible (the Pentateuch) but in fact has been considered one unified work, unlike the Prophets and the Hagiographa (or Writings), which together with it make up scripture. In content the Pentateuch is a continuous composition reporting history from the creation of the world until the death of Moses—when the people of Israel are arrayed in the plains of Moab—interspersed with groups of laws and rules. More precisely, in consideration of the central purpose of the Pentateuch, one ought to say that it is a collection of several groups of laws and commandments that were given to the people of Israel, set in a framework of stories that explain the special status of the people before God.

As is usual in Hebrew, the books of the Pentateuch are referred to by the first significant word in each book. The first book, *Bere’shit* (“in the beginning”)—opens with a description of the creation of the world—whence the designation *Genesis*—and the genealogy of mankind and continues with the genealogy of Noah and his descendants after the great flood. The book emphasizes the covenant that God makes with Abraham (“the covenant of the parts”) in which he promises Abraham that he will bring his descendants out from Egypt, where they will sojourn, and will give them the land of Canaan.

The second book, *Shemot* (“names”), contains the description of the events from the time of the bondage in Egypt until the revelations at Mount Sinai, where God establishes his special covenant with Israel, gives the Torah, and prescribes the tabernacle and the ceremony in which it is to be consecrated. This book is also known as “the book of the departure from Egypt,” while in Greek and other languages it is called *Exodus*.

The third book, *Vayiqra’* (“and he called”), is known in tannaitic literature as *Torat Kohanim* (“*torah* of the priests”) and in Greek as *Leuitikon*. Other translations, following the Latin, call the book *Leviticus*. It includes laws relating to worship in the Temple and the laws of sacrifices; special commandments of sanctity applicable to the priests and commandments of sanctity incumbent on the entire people of Israel; laws of ritual purity and impurity and of incest and other forbidden sexual

relations; laws about the sanctity of particular times, festivals, and holidays; and laws about the sanctity of the Land of Israel, the Sabbatical year, and the Jubilee year.

The fourth book of the Pentateuch is usually called *Bemidbar* ("in the wilderness"), after the first significant word, but is sometimes referred to by the first word in the book, *va-yedabber* ("and he said"). The sages called it *Ḥumash ha-pequdim*, while it was designated in the Septuagint as *Arithmoi* and in the Vulgate as *Numeri* ("Numbers"). It records the history of the people of Israel in the desert from the second year after they left Egypt until the death of Aaron. Thus it includes the description of the censuses and journeys of the people of Israel and a recounting of their complaints, the sending of spies to the land of Canaan, the rebellion of Korah, and the episode involving Balaam. Intermixed with these accounts are various legal sections, namely, the trial by ordeal of the unfaithful wife (5:11–31); the rules of the Nazirite (6:1–21); the laws of tithes (18:25–32), the red heifer (19:1–22), and inheritance (27:6–11, 36:1–9); the commandments of sacrifices, daily sacrifice, and additional sacrifices (28:1–29, 39); and the laws of oaths (30:3–17), manslaughter, and cities of refuge (35:9–37).

The last of the five books of the Pentateuch is *Elleh ha-devarim* ("These are the words"), or *Devarim* ("words"). The original designation of this book in the literature of the sages is *Mishneh Torah* (in the Septuagint *Deuteronomion*), which connotes the nature of the book as "a repeated Torah." In a series of speeches before his death, Moses summarizes the history of the people, intermixing his account with ethical teachings, warnings, and reproof. At the end of the book (chap. 32) is a poem that begins with the word *ha'azinu* ("give ear"), followed in chapter 33 by the parting blessings pronounced by Moses on all the tribes of Israel.

Literary and Historical Criticism. Comparison of *Deuteronomy* with parallels in the other books of the Pentateuch reveals numerous inconsistencies between both the narratives and the collections of laws as well as linguistic and stylistic differences. This fact stimulated the growth of an extensive exegetical literature that attempts to reconcile the discrepancies. Modern biblical scholarship has attempted to uncover different sources upon which the five books of the Pentateuch are based. It is true that allusions to works more ancient than the Pentateuch are not lacking. In the Torah itself there is a reference to the *Book of the Wars of the Lord* (*Nm.* 21:14), which according to some medieval commentators and modern scholars was a specific book that served as a source for the narrative parts of the Pentateuch.

In the second century CE, tannaim attempted (*Mekh-*

ilta' de-Rabbi Yishma'e'l, Ba-ḥodesh, chap. 3) to identify the nature of the "book of the covenant" from which Moses read to the people (*Ex.* 24:7). Yose ben Yehudah said, "From the beginning of *Genesis* until here," while Yehudah ha-Nasi' considered this a reference to a collection of laws that the people had been commanded to observe up until that time. Two generations earlier, however, the tanna Yishma'e'l ben Elisha' identified this "book of the covenant" with *Leviticus* 25:1–26:46, a section that opens, "And God spoke to Moses at Mount Sinai saying," and concludes with the verse, "These are the laws and the judgments and the *torot* which God gave, between him and the people of Israel at Mount Sinai by the hand of Moses." This identification is in agreement with a principle of interpretation transmitted in the name of the same tanna, that is, "No strict order as to 'earlier' and 'later' is observed in the Torah" (*Mekh. de-R. Y.*, Shirah, chap. 7), which means that the chapters and verses of the Torah are not necessarily recorded in the order in which they were given or the order in which they happened. This interpretative principle and the identification of the "book of the covenant" can be explained only if one assumes that the Torah was not given all at once. Indeed, the amora Yohanan bar Nappaḥa' (fl. first half of the third century CE) transmits in the name of the tanna Bana'ah that "the Torah was given section by section" (B.T., *Giṭ.* 60a). *Midrash Tanḥuma'* tells that while the people of Israel were still enslaved in Egypt, "they possessed scrolls, in which they delighted from Sabbath to Sabbath, which said that the Holy One, blessed be he, would redeem them" (Va'eira' 1). Opposed to these opinions I have mentioned were tannaim and amoraim who held that "there is an order to the sections of the Torah" and expounded passages based on their proximity. Thus 'Aqiva' ben Yosef (fl. beginning of the second century CE) is cited as saying, "Every passage which is next to another learns from its neighbor" (*Sifrei Nm.*, 131).

A concerted effort to reconstruct the process that brought into being the books of the Torah as we have them was begun only in the middle of the eighteenth century. This effort resulted in the hypothesis that there are four sources or documents, given the designations J, E, P, and D. The distinction between J and E is based primarily on the different usages of the names of God (JHVH, or YHVH, and Elohim) and the names Jacob and Israel. Similar criteria were used to differentiate passages based on the priestly source, P, and the Deuteronomomic source, D.

Besides the discernment and differentiation of these sources, there were also attempts to establish a chronology among them. A pioneer in this research, Wilhelm de Wette (1780–1849) proposed that *Deuteronomy*,

which emphasizes the concentration of the cult in one place, reflects the situation that began to crystallize during the reign of Hezekiah, who concentrated the cult in Jerusalem (2 Kgs. 18:3–6), and that concluded in the time of Josiah, during whose reign Hilkiah discovered “the book” (2 Kgs. 22:8). This book, according to de Wette, was none other than the *Book of Deuteronomy*, which stands at the end of the development of the sources, as it is the only one in which there is any demand for the centralization of the cult.

Julius Wellhausen, in his studies during the second half of the nineteenth century, perfected and consolidated this type of historical criticism, according to which the Torah did not exist during the early part of the history of the people of Israel in their land, but rather reflects the historical circumstances of later generations. To de Wette’s assertions Wellhausen added others appertaining to other aspects of the worship of God among the people of Israel, such as the nature of the sacrifices and the holidays and the status of the priests and Levites. In all of these subjects Wellhausen discerned a movement in the priestly sources from the natural to the abstract and non-natural. He concluded that the P source dated only from the time of the Second Temple, when the priests wielded political power.

Objections to and criticism of this approach were voiced already in the time of Wellhausen, and they have increased in recent decades. Even scholars who accepted the documentary hypothesis (Hermann Gunkel, Hugo Gressmann, and others) tried to discover ancient traditions in the Torah and investigate their nature and source. Using knowledge of other civilizations of the ancient Near East and their literatures, they turned their attention to the form and structure of the traditions and the way in which they became established in cultic life. Without intending to, these scholars significantly undermined the documentary hypothesis, for they showed that all those institutions that Wellhausen considered artificial and late had existed in the ancient Near East centuries before the people of Israel appeared on the scene. Thus comparison of the biblical account with Mesopotamian, Hittite, and Ugaritic cultures weakened Wellhausen’s claims about the late development of the Priestly source. Wellhausen’s theories were also undermined by the work of scholars who stressed the central role of oral traditions and the accuracy of their transmission in ancient times (Johannes Pedersen, Sigmund Mowinkel, Henrik Nyberg, Ivan Engnell). They claim that oral transmission influenced the sources even after they were reduced to writing. While this approach has not been accepted in its entirety, it has served as a restraining influence (e.g., for Roland de Vaux). Some have expressed doubt about the independent status of

the P source (e.g., R. von Rentdorf), while others doubt the validity of the entire documentary hypothesis (David Hoffmann, Umberto Cassuto, Benno Jacob, F. Dornseiff).

Even those who adopt the critical view, which sees the Pentateuch as a work compiled from different sources that reflect differing trends and styles, are nevertheless forced to admit its function and influence as a single, unified book. Every law and commandment in it is presented as the word of God to Moses, and taken together these laws form for Judaism an authoritative code whose authority infuses even the narrative sections with which they are intermixed. [See also *Biblical Literature, article on Hebrew Scriptures.*]

Written Torah and Oral Torah. We hear of the Torah in the documents of the return to Zion: “The Torah of the Lord which he gave by the hand of Moses” and is accepted by all Israel (*Ezr.* 7:10; *Neh.* 8:1, 9:3, 10:30). The book of the Torah is a complete and sealed scripture, and every innovation in legislation or exegesis of the commandments of the Torah, many of which are stated without specification of details or directions for their implementation, has become a companion tradition, an “oral Torah.” The word *torah* returns in this usage to its basic meaning, “teaching,” as in the Mishnah: “These and those come to the Great Court which is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah goes out to all Israel” (*San.* 11:2). In *Ben Sira*, the *torah* of Moses and the *torah* of wisdom join to form a single concept. The remnants of the myth of preexistent wisdom and its necessity for the creation of the world, which are found in *Proverbs* (8:22–31), were transferred to the Torah. Thus it is said of Torah that it existed before the creation of the world (*Sifrei Dt.* 37, *Gn. Rab.* 4, 3, p. 6), and El’azar ben Tsadoq (fl. beginning of the second century CE) and ‘Aqiva’ speak of Torah as “the instrument used to create the world” (*Sifrei Dt.* 48, *Avot* 3.14).

During the Hellenistic period, prior to the Hasmonean rebellion, the word *torah* had two distinct referents. On the one hand, it included not only the commandments but also the teachings of the prophets and the wisdom of the elders, while on the other hand, it meant the *torah* of Moses in its entirety. This duality explains the fact that Paul and the author of the *Gospel of John* refer at times to verses from the Prophets and the Hagiographa as *nomos*. They thereby reflect a more ancient tradition, which is already traceable in the words of Daniel: “the *torah* of Moses the servant of the Lord,” yet also, “His *torot* which he put before us by the hand of his servants and prophets” (*Dn.* 9:10–13, 2 *Chr.* 29:25, *Ezr.* 9:10–14).

It would seem that for the Jews of Alexandria, *torah*

was an institution that embodied the covenant between the nation and its Lord, reflecting a system of commandments, laws, customs, and traditions connected with the history of the people and the activities of their judges, kings, and prophets. If this was really the meaning of *torah*, then the translation *nomos* is in fact appropriate. Thus the translator of *Isaiah* 1:10 interpreted *torah* in the passage “Hear the *torah* of our Lord, people of Gomorrah” as *nomos*, for such prophetic statements as “I cannot suffer injustice together with public assemblies” and “Wash and purify yourselves; remove from yourselves your evil deeds” are also *torah*.

The term *oral torah* first appears in a story said to be from the time of Hillel and Shammai (fl. first century BCE—first century CE). In response to a prospective convert’s question about how many *torot* exist, Shammai answered, “Two: the written Torah and the oral *torah*” (B.T., *Shab.* 31a). The answer of Gamli’el of Yavneh (in the next generation) to a Roman consul who asked the same question was the same (*Sifrei Dt.* 351, p. 408). Thus it seems that even gentiles and prospective converts were aware that besides the written Torah there was a “tradition of the ancestors” that was also considered *torah*.

The term *oral torah* does not imply a *torah* precedent to and more valuable than the written Torah, unlike the Greek *agraphos nomos* (“unwritten law”) which is not legislated by god or man but like nature simply exists, so that whether it is written or not makes no difference at all. In contrast, the characteristic feature of the oral *torah* is precisely the fact that it is not written. Still, the oral *torah*, like the written Torah, is not natural law but, rather, revealed law. Philo Judaeus (d. 45–50 CE) though, accepted and identified with the Greek conception and therefore identified the unwritten tradition (*agraphos paradosis*) with the unwritten law (*agraphos nomos*) (Philo, *On the Special Laws* 4.149–150). This explanation of *torah* not only paved the way for allegorical exegesis; it even led some hellenized Jews to the conclusion that precisely the allegorical interpretation, which reveals the inner meaning, is primary. It is true that Philo himself opposed extreme allegorists, who explained the commandment of circumcision allegorically and felt that their inner understanding of the commandment sufficed; still, in his own words one can see the influence of such a conception (*On the Migration of Abraham* 92–95). This same idea is echoed in Paul’s writings: “For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly . . . but he is a Jew inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit and not in the letter” (*Rom.* 2:28–29). For Paul, however, all the tension between the letter *gramma* and the spirit *pneuma*, which is intended to bring about the abrogation of the Torah, derives from

his belief in the Messiah. Allegorical exegesis enables him to provide the justification for and evidence of the belief that “the Messiah is the end of the Torah, that everyone who has faith may be justified” (*Rom.* 10:4). In contrast, the saying of Eli’ezer ha-Moda’i in *Avot* 3.11 that “he who denies the covenant of our father Abraham [i.e., circumcision] and he who exposes inner meanings in the Torah are denied a portion in the world to come” seems to be directed against such extreme allegorical interpretations—the one “who exposes inner meanings in the Torah” is he who explains allegorically, thereby causing the abrogation of commandments and the denial of the covenant of Abraham.

Among the Jews of the Land of Israel understanding of the meaning of *torah* developed differently. Along with the written Torah, the ancestral traditions, legislation, and decrees all became *torah*. The expositions and explanations of the sages also became oral *torah*. Among the sects, such as the Dead Sea sect, *halakhot* (the laws in the Covenant of Damascus Scroll and the Manual of Discipline) and exegesis (the *pesharim* of Habakkuk, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, Nahum, and others) were written in scrolls, and interpretations were even interpolated among verses of the Torah (the Temple Scroll). The Sadducees had a “written and sealed book of decrees.” However, the Pharasaic sages preserved the distinction between the Torah and everything else that had been added to it—legislation and decrees, homilies and interpretation—by forbidding the writing of the latter category. This very distinction made possible a great measure of freedom in interpretation. On the one hand, scriptural support was found for *halakhot* whose sources were actually tradition, custom, testimonies, and firsthand reports; on the other hand, “the details of biblical exegesis and whatever new interpretations the sages will establish in the future” (J.T., *Meg.* 4.1, 71d) were claimed to have been given to Moses at Sinai.

‘Aqiva’ saw the oral *torah* as implicit in the written Torah, in its words and in its letters, whence it is recorded that he expounded: “These are the laws and the rules and the *torot*’ [*Lv.* 26:46]—from which we learn that two *torot* were given to Israel, one written and one oral. . . . ‘On Mount Sinai by the hand of Moses’ [*ibid.*]—from which we learn that *torah* was given complete with all its laws, details of interpretation, and explanations by the hand of Moses at Sinai” (*Sifra*, *Beḥuqqotai* 8, p. 112c). In light of this, one can understand the term “*torah* from heaven”; the statement of ‘Aqiva’ was in response to those who said, “*torah* is not from heaven” (*Sifrei Dt.* 102, p. 161), meaning that they denied the revealed nature of the oral *torah*. In *Sanhedrin* 10.1 such people are among those excluded from a portion in the world to come.

The third *Sibylline Oracle* (sec. 256), which dates from around 140 BCE, says that "Moses . . . [led] the people . . . to Mount Sinai, then God gave them the *torah* forth from heaven, writing all its ordinances on two tablets." For the school of 'Aqiva' and in the Mishnah, though, *torah* does not refer solely to the Ten Commandments. Furthermore, the revelation included not only the Torah and its interpretations, but also the assertion of the authority of the interpretation. Thus the amora Rav (Abba bar Aiyvu, fl. beginning of the third century) summed up the conception of oral *torah* held by 'Aqiva' and his disciples in a paradoxical story about Moses: "When Moses ascended on high and the Holy One, blessed be he, showed him 'Aqiva' expounding, Moses had no idea what he was saying, but nevertheless his mind was set at rest when he heard 'Aqiva' answer a student's question, 'Teacher, how do we know?' by saying 'It is a *halakhah* ["law"] given to Moses at Sinai'" (B.T., *Men.* 29b).

According to the method developed by 'Aqiva' and his school, the Torah scholar and exegete, by application of the principles used for the interpretation of the Torah and through his reasoning, can uncover within the Torah those same laws, details of interpretation, and explanations that were given together with it. In adopting this doctrine they follow Yehoshu'a ben Ḥananyah, teacher of 'Aqiva', who refused to admit the continued intervention of divine forces in the determination of halakhic matters. This contrasts with the position of Eli'ezer ben Hyrcanus and others, who refused to discount the possibility of further revelations, whether in the form of a heavenly voice or through prophecy. According to the understanding of Yehoshu'a and his disciples, "Torah is not in the heavens, so we do not listen to heavenly voices" (B.T., *B.M.* 59b). Those who adopted this position even denied that earlier prophets could have established innovations on the basis of their gift of prophecy. Rather, the exposition and expansion of the Torah were severed from any and all dependence on supernatural forces.

The desire to confine revelation to a single, unique event is already found in tannaitic sources (*Sifrei Nm.* 78, 111, 133). The amoraim Yitshaq and Shim'on ben Laqish (fl. c. end of the third century) even went so far as to say that not only is no prophet permitted to establish any innovations after the giving of the Torah (*Sifra' Beḥuqqotai* 13), but that the prophecies of the prophets of every generation were already included in the voice heard on Mount Sinai; the words already existed from antiquity, and only their articulation occurred at various times. Thus the prophets turn out to be no different from the sages of each generation, "each of whom received his portion from Mount Sinai" (*Ex. Rab.* 28.6,

Tan. Yitro 11). The only difference between the words of the prophets and those of the sages is that the former are written while the latter remained oral. This distinction does not necessarily reflect well on the prophets, who only appeared among the people of Israel in response to the sins of the people, whereas "had Israel not sinned, they would have received only the Pentateuch and the *Book of Joshua*, which emphasizes the value of the land of Israel" (B.T., *Ned.* 22b).

This is not true of the oral *torah*. According to Yoḥanan bar Nappaḥa', "the covenant at Sinai was established only for the sake of the oral *torah*" (B.T., *Git.* 60b; *Shav.* 39a), for the explanation and understanding of the written Torah is dependent on the oral *torah*. Furthermore, one who learns and explains the Torah can merit a renewed "revelation at Sinai." In *Leviticus Rabbah* (16.6) it is told of Ben 'Azza'i, a disciple of 'Aqiva', that as he expounded, a fire burned around him. When 'Aqiva' was informed of this fact, he asked his pupil whether he was occupying himself in mystical endeavors. Ben 'Azza'i answered, "No, but I am joining the words of the Torah to the Prophets and the Prophets to the Writings and the words of Torah are happy as on the day they were given from Sinai, and were they not given at Sinai primarily in fire? as it says, 'And the mountain is burning with fire unto the heart of the heaven' [*Dt.* 4:11]."

Many of the meanings of the word *torah* developed from polemics against different approaches and conceptions. One of the last amoraim, Yehudah bar Shalom, explained the prohibition of writing oral *torah* thus: "When the Holy One, blessed be he, told Moses to 'write yourself [this book of the Torah],' Moses wanted to write down the Mishnah also, but since God saw that the nations of the world would eventually translate the Torah and read it in Greek and claim 'I am Israel,' and up to this point the scales of judgment are balanced, he told the nations: 'You say you are my children, but I recognize only he who possesses my mystery; they are my children.' And to what does this refer? To the Mishnah" (*Tan. Vayeira* 5, *Tisa* 34). Clearly this saying defines the preference of the oral *torah* as a response to the claims of Pauline Christianity that the church is the true inheritor of Israel because it is the son of the free woman, while Israel is of the flesh, at best the progeny of the maidservant (*Gal.* 3:26, 4:21; *Rom.* 2:28). Following Paul, the church fathers from Justin through Augustine claimed scripture was no longer the property and heritage of the Jews (Justin, *Apologia* 1.53; Augustine, *Against the Jews*, 4.8). The oral *torah* supposedly refutes such claims.

Contradictions between various sayings about the relationship between Torah and the books of the prophets

can be explained if one views these statements in a polemical context. Levi in the name of Ḥanina' said: "The eleven psalms which Moses composed are set down in the books of the prophets. And why were they not included in the books of the law? Because the latter are words of *torah* and the former are words of prophecy" (*Midrash Tehillim* 90.4). According to this statement, even the words of prophecy by Moses himself are distinct from *torah*. In this saying and in others like it the revelation at Mount Sinai is restricted to a single, unique, all-inclusive event, thereby making impossible any additional revelation that could challenge the completeness of Torah. However, there were also sects that did not recognize the authority of the prophetic books at all. (The church fathers ascribed this position to the Sadducees; it was also adopted by Christian gnostic sects.) The words of the following Midrash were directed against these groups:

When Assaf came, he began to say, "Listen, my people, to my Torah" [*Ps.* 78:1]. Similarly, Solomon said, "For I have given you a good teaching, my Torah, do not abandon it" [*Prov.* 4:2]. Israel said to Assaf, "Is there some other *torah*, such that you say, 'Listen, my people, to my *torah*?' We have already received it at Sinai." He answered them, "The sinners of Israel say that the Prophets and the Writings are not *torah* and that they do not believe in them, as it says: 'For we did not listen to the voice of God, the Lord, to go in the way of his *torah* which he put before us in the hands of his servants, the prophets' [*Dn.* 9:10]. Behold, the Prophets and Writings are *torah*, as it says, 'Listen, my people, to my *torah*.'" (*Tan. Re'eh* 1)

Still, beyond all polemic, the books of the Prophets and Writings were sanctified as parts of the tripartite Torah (B.T., *Shab.* 88a; *Tan.* Yitro 10): the Pentateuch (Torah), Prophets (Nevi'im), and Writings (Ketuvim). Readings from the Prophets and some of the books of the Writings (*Esther*, *Lamentations*, and, according to some customs, the other three *megillot*, i.e., *Song of Songs*, *Ruth*, and *Ecclesiastes*, as well) are included in the synagogue service, preceded and followed by blessings. Nevertheless, the distinction between them and the Pentateuch is preserved, for the sanctity of the rest of the books is not equal to that of the Torah scroll: it was forbidden to join together the Torah and prophetic books in a single scroll (*Sofrim* 3.1) or to lay a prophetic book on top of the Pentateuch (B.T., *Meg.* 27a).

The Ten Commandments. There are also differing understandings of the relationship between the Ten Commandments and the rest of the Torah. Philo saw the Ten Commandments as the principles and sources, while the rest of the commandments of the Torah are only specific details. Thus he organized the specific commandments, grouping them according to their roots—that is, accord-

ing to their agreement with the Ten Commandments. Yet Ḥananyah, nephew of Yehoshu'a, and others following him asserted that "the details of the Torah were written in the intervals between the commandments of the decalogue" (J.T., *Sheq.* 6.1, 49d; *Sg. Rab.* 5, 14). Thus these sages were interested in deemphasizing the Ten Commandments and denying them any special status, in order to prevent people from claiming that they alone were given from Sinai and not the rest of the commandments (J.T., *Ber.* 1.8, 3c). This approach is intended to reject an antinomian orientation, which would limit observances to ethical commandments alone. [See also Ten Commandments.]

Concept of Torah among the Medieval Philosophers. Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages in the lands under Muslim dominance stood before two challenges: philosophical justification of Torah as a religion of divine revelation and rejection of the Muslim claim that the revelation to Israel was superseded by the revelation to Muḥammad. For Sa'adyah Gaon (882–942), who is considered the father of medieval Jewish philosophy, the divine revelation is identified with the content of reason. Reason can recognize both the speculative and the ethical content of revelation, which is nevertheless necessary to reveal truth in a universally accessible form, making it available to the common man, who is incapable of thinking for himself, and also to the philosopher, who is thereby presented *a priori* with the truth that he could otherwise discover only through great effort. Still, it is a religious duty to come to truth also through the use of reason (Sa'adyah Gaon, *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions*, translated by S. Rosenblatt, New Haven, 1961). Out of this conception Sa'adyah developed the distinction between the commandments of reason, which revelation simply repeats, and the traditional commandments, which are known only through revelation. The latter category includes the sacrificial and ceremonial orders of the Torah (*ibid.*, treatise 3, sections 1–3). Sa'adyah applied this conception in composing a liturgical poem in which he attempted to fit all 613 of the commandments into the framework of the Ten Commandments (*Azharot* in *Siddur Rav Sa'adyah Ga'on*, 1941, pp. 185ff.), which as in Philo can be considered general principles. This undertaking also answers those who claim that numerous divine revelations are possible: there was no such multiplicity of revelation to Israel, and the divine will is certainly not prone to change or to cancel the content of the true revelation (*The Book of Beliefs and Opinions*, treatise 3, sec. 7).

Maimonides (1135/8–1204) ascribed two purposes to *torah*: to order communal life and to enlighten the spirit of men by revealing to them the truth. The political

laws, ethical commandments, and ceremonial and sacrificial laws of the Torah are all means toward the attainment of these two goals. All the laws that serve to educate the people ethically work toward the achievement of the first goal, while all the laws that strengthen certain specific beliefs advance the second goal. Maimonides attempted to demonstrate this point by developing an elaborate system of explanations of reasons for the commandments, some of them rationalistic and some historical, presenting certain commandments and prohibitions as protection against polytheistic ideas and customs of worship (Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* 3.29–3.44). With great consistency Maimonides stressed in all of his works the uniqueness of the revelation of the Torah of Moses. For him the role of the prophets was not to create a religion: “As for the prophets from among us who came after Moses our master, you know the text of all their stories and the fact that their function was that of preachers who called upon the people to obey the Torah of Moses. . . . We likewise believe that things will always be this way, as it says, ‘It is not in heaven’” (ibid. 2.39; translation by Shlomo Pines, Chicago, 1963). [For further discussion, see Biblical Exegesis, article on Jewish Views.]

View of the Qabbalists. Qabbalistic literature, which is mostly made up of commentaries on the Torah, emphasizes the absolute virtues of the Torah over the rest of the books of the Bible. The conceptions of the qabbalists about the Torah are in part a radical development of ideas found in *midrashim* of the sages and in part bold innovation. A saying ascribed to the amora El’azar, which appears in *Midrash Tehillim* 3.2, explains a verse in *Job* (28:13) as follows: “The sections of the Torah were not given in order, for had they been given in order, anyone reading them would be able to resurrect the dead and to perform wonders. Therefore the order of the Torah was hidden, but it is revealed before the Holy One, blessed be he, as it says, ‘And who is like unto me? Let him read and declare it and set it in order for me [Is. 44:7].’” The author of this saying hints at the possibility of use of the Torah for magic, but he rejects that possibility. Nevertheless, such magical use was described in the work *Shimushei Torah*, which apparently dates from the geonic period.

Nahmanides (Mosheh ben Nahman, c. 1194–1270) mentions reading the Torah “in the manner of the names,” which was transmitted to Moses verbally, “for we possess a true tradition that the entire Torah is made up of the names of the Holy One, blessed be he” (Introduction to Nahmanides’ commentary on the Torah). Similarly, the *Zohar* (Yitro 87.1) says, “The entire Torah is the holy name, for there is not a word in the Torah which is not included in the holy name.” Based

on this idea, Me’ir ibn Gabbai wrote in the beginning of the fourteenth century that Torah is called “the Torah of God” because it is in fact the name of God. This supposition relates to the preexistent reality of the Torah, in which it was used to create the world. The fact that the Torah is thought to have been made up by the interweaving of divine names implies that the Torah has multiple meanings. The different kinds of interpretations were summed up in the *Zohar* in the acronym *PaRDeS*, standing for *peshat*, *remez*, *derash*, and *sod*. *Peshat* includes the understanding of scripture evinced in the oral *torah*; *remez* includes allegory and philosophy; *derash* is the homiletic approach; while *sod* is made up of the qabbalistic explanations. In the qabbalistic exegesis, precisely those verses and words that seem unimportant are raised to the level of profound symbols.

The qabbalists propounded a distinction between the *torah* of the names of the messiah and the revealed Torah. In so doing they diverged from the saying of Yoḥanan that “the books of the Prophets and the Writings will in the future be canceled, but the Pentateuch will not be canceled in the future” (J.T., *Meg.* 3.7, 70d) as well as from the *midrashim* in which one may uncover hints of the possibility of changes, like: “The *torah* that a man learns in this world is empty in comparison with the *torah* of the Messiah” (*Eccl. Rab.* 11.8) or “*Torah* will go out from me’ (*Is.* 51:4)—a renewal of the Torah will go out from me” (*Lv. Rab.* 13.3). In these *midrashim* the innovative nature of the Torah is not specified, but the qabbalists explained the nature of the change in the light of their conceptions: the Torah will be understood in accordance with its spirituality, and its letters will join together to form a different reading.

Qabbalistic literature of the thirteenth century explained that in the dictum of Shim’on ben Laqish, “the Torah which the Holy One, blessed be he, gave to Moses was white fire engraved on black fire” (J.T., *Sheq.* 6.1); “white fire” refers to the Torah itself, while “black fire” refers to the oral *torah*. Thus the written Torah is hidden in the white parchment, but in the future the blank spaces in the Torah will reveal their letters.

The Ḥasidim of the eighteenth century essentially adopted the qabbalistic understanding that the elevated religious value of the Torah is found in its inner essence rather than in its exoteric manifestation. The simple meaning of the Torah is a symbolic expression of divine truths. In keeping with the individualistic tendency within Hasidism, achieving understanding of the secrets of Torah was considered to depend on the mending of the individual’s specific personal soul and on his attempts to cleave to God in every aspect of his being.

An opponent of Hasidism, Eliyahu ben Shelomoh

Zalman (1720–1797), known as the Vilna Gaon, emphasized the all-encompassing, eternal nature of Torah. Everything that ever was, is, or will be existent is included in the Torah. The specific details of every person, animal, plant, and inanimate object are included in the Torah from the word *bere'shit* until the phrase *le-'einei kol Yisra'el* (the words that close *Deuteronomy*). He studied qabbalistic literature in the same way in which he studied the books of the Bible and halakhic works. Rather than expecting personal revelations as a result of occupying himself with Qabbalah, he anticipated that his devotion and absolute dedication to Torah study would aid him in understanding the Qabbalah.

Talmud Torah (“Torah Study”). Alongside the demand that one must uphold the commandments written in the Torah, there is also in the Torah an explicit requirement to study, learn, and teach it (*Dt.* 6:6–7, 11:18–20; see also *Jos.* 1:8). This commandment from the start related to every part of the Torah. During the time of the First Temple, the priests were the main group entrusted with teaching the Torah (*Jeremiah* 2:8 mentions together with them “those who handle the Torah”). In the time of the Second Temple, the *sofrim* (“scribes”) were the teachers and explicators of *torah*, while the authority for halakhic instruction and legal determination was invested in the Great Court. The legislation and decrees, reports of the acts of the courts, and explanations of the words of the Torah all become part of the oral *torah*, and the commandment of *talmud Torah* was considered to apply also to them. The tannaim and amoraim and scholars of subsequent generations dealt at length with the commandment of *talmud Torah*, considering its meaning and nature and ways of fulfilling it.

The desire to know how to fulfill accurately the commandments of the Torah is only one of the justifications for *talmud Torah*. Also significant is the desire to gain understanding of the Torah, its intentions, and the way in which it develops and expands. Already the author of Psalm 119 emphasizes repeatedly the intellectual enjoyment that the study of *torah* provides, and he says, “Were not your *torah* my pleasure, I would have perished in my affliction” (verse 91). The requirement to study *torah* is incumbent on every man, whatever his situation. The Babylonian amora Rav, describing God’s daily schedule, declared that during the first three hours of the day he “sits and engages in *torah* study” (B.T., ‘A.Z. 3b).

The requirement of *talmud Torah* is one of the four “things which have no limit, and a person enjoys the fruits of it in this world, while the capital is laid up for him in the world to come” (*Pe’ah* 1.1). The students in *yeshivah*, the main institution for the study of *torah*,

are expected to devote the bulk of their time to study, even in conditions of financial distress and even if doing so entails living a difficult life (*Avot* 6.4). At the time of the Hadrianic persecutions, the sages continued to reach and learn *torah* despite the actual risk to their lives.

The content of the studies, their breadth, and the method of study varied in different times and places. There were times when the study of the rest of the biblical books was not included together with the study of the Torah itself. Some students concentrated only on the study of *halakhah*, while others preferred the *aggadah*. There were those who included the study of philosophy and Qabbalah, while some stressed attention to *musar* (“ethical teachings”). Within the study of *halakhah* itself there were various methods of study: some emphasized casuistry and sharp-wittedness, while others stressed the importance of broad knowledge of the sources and drawing conclusions for practical application. Still, everyone recognized that the requirement to study *torah* is incumbent on the entire community in some form or another. Thus public homilies in the synagogues on Sabbaths and holidays were instituted. Starting in the first century BCE, a framework of schools for children was established. Besides, every man was required to fulfill the commandment to recite the Shema’ morning and evening. This recital includes references to the requirement of *talmud Torah*, and a blessing similar to the blessing over the Torah was instituted, to be said prior to the Shema’. Nevertheless, in most times Jews were not satisfied to fulfill their obligation to study in this minimal fashion. Instead, communities saw that there would be people spreading *torah* among the masses, while workers, merchants, and clerks all organized themselves in groups whose designated purpose was to fix times for *torah* study.

The stress on *talmud Torah* as an ultimate value found expression in the dispute between Ṭarfon and ‘Aqiva’ concerning whether learning or deeds is more important. The dispute ended in general agreement with the position of ‘Aqiva’ that “learning is greater for learning leads to deeds” (B.T., *Qid.* 40b). [See also *Halakhah; Midrash and Aggadah; and, for a discussion of the history of the study of Torah, Yeshivah.*]

Reading the Torah in the Synagogue. Today the reading of the Torah occupies a central role in communal prayer. Public reading of the Torah is mentioned three times in the Bible, but always on special occasions. The first mention is in *Deuteronomy* 3:10–13: Moses commanded the reading of “this Torah before all Israel” in the Sabbatical year during the festival of Sukkot (Tabernacles). In the opinion of tannaim (*Soṭ* 3.8, *Sifrei Dt.* 160), the king was commanded to read *Deuteronomy*

with certain abridgments during this ceremony. Another reading is mentioned in *2 Kings* (23:1–2), where King Josiah is said to have “read in their ears all the words of the book of the covenant which was found in the house of God.” It seems reasonable to assume that this account served as a source for the aforementioned tannaitic description.

Nehemiah (8:1–8) tells how Ezra the scribe brought the scroll of the Torah before the congregation on the first day of the seventh month and read from it “in the ears of the entire people clearly, and he gave the sense.” In this reading the people found “written in the Torah which God commanded by the hand of Moses that the people of Israel sat in tabernacles during the festival of the seventh month” (8:4). When they then celebrated this festival of Sukkot, they again read “in the book of the Torah of the Lord every day, from the first day until the last day” (8:18). This account can be viewed as the start of the custom of reading the Torah publicly on festivals.

Reading the Torah on the Sabbath is mentioned by Philo (*Moses* 2.216; see Eusebius’s *Praeparatio evangelica* 8.2) and Josephus (*Against Apion* 2.175) and in the *Acts of the Apostles* (15:21) as an ancient custom. In *Megillah* 3.6 the requirement to read the portion about each festival at the time of that festival is deduced from the verse “And Moses spoke the festivals of God to the people of Israel” (*Lv.* 23:44). The tannaitic Midrash *Sifra* ascribes the institution of this custom to Moses himself: “This teaches us that Moses told them the *halakhot* of Passover at Passover time, those pertaining to Shavu’ot (Pentecost) at the time of Shavu’ot, and those pertaining to Sukkot at Sukkot time.” In the description of the ceremonial rite of Yom Kippur, the Mishnah (*Yoma* 3.1) reports that the high priest read sections of the Torah appropriate to the day (*Lv.* 16:1–34, 23:26–32; *Nm.* 29:7–11). In addition to the readings on Sabbaths, festivals, and the holidays mentioned in the Torah, the Mishnah also fixes public readings for Hanukkah, Purim, New Moons, public fast days, Mondays and Thursdays (which were market days), and during the afternoon service on the Sabbath (*Meg.* 3.6, 4.1) as well as during *ma’amadot*, assemblies of the watches that gathered in the Temple and in their towns to pray and read from the Torah while the priests and Levites from their region performed the rites in the Temple (*Ta’an.* 3.4). The tannaitic *midrash* notes that “the prophets and the elders established for them the requirement to read from the Torah on Sabbaths, Mondays, and Thursdays” (*Mekhilta*, Va-yehi 1). However, the Jerusalem Talmud ascribes to Moses the readings on Sabbaths, holidays, New Moons, and the intermediate days of the festivals (*Meg.* 4.1, 75a), and Ezra is credited with establishing the readings on Mondays and Thursdays and on the af-

ternoon of the Sabbath. The Babylonian Talmud attempts to reconcile the two traditions (*Meg.* 32a).

The Mishnah specifies only the portions to be read on festivals, on the four special Sabbaths between the beginning of the month of Adar and Passover, on public fast days, and during *ma’amadot* (*Meg.* 3.5–6). Thus the order of the portions of the Torah and their division among the Sabbaths of the year are not mentioned at all in the Mishnah. The Babylonian Talmud reports that in the Land of Israel it was customary to complete the reading of the Torah scroll once every three years (*Meg.* 29b). Indeed, this custom is reflected in the *midrashim* composed in the Land of Israel and in the masoretic division of the Torah into between 153 and 167 *sedarim* (“sections”). There were as well those who divided the Torah into 54 *parashiyot* (“portions”) so that they could complete it once yearly. This was the custom in Babylon. The one-year cycle supplanted the three-year cycle, which remained in use in just a few places. In 1170 the traveler Binyamin of Tudela found the three-year cycle still in use in the synagogue of the Palestinian Jews in Cairo.

In the one-year cycle the reading of the Torah is completed each year on the last day of the festival of Sukkot, which came to be called Simḥat Torah (“Rejoicing of the Torah”). On every Sabbath afternoon and on Mondays and Thursdays, one reads from the beginning of the *parashah* of the following Sabbath, in accordance with the opinion stated by Yehudah bar Il’ai in a *baraita*. According to Me’ir, however, one ought to start reading at the Sabbath afternoon service at the place in the scroll where the reading left off in the morning; on Monday, where the Sabbath afternoon reading ended; on Thursday, where the Monday reading ended; and on the following Sabbath, where the Thursday reading left off. This opinion does not allow for a three-year cycle.

The Mishnah also fixes the number of people who go up to read from the Torah on each occasion. On Mondays, Thursdays, and Sabbath afternoons, three people read; on New Moons and the intermediate days of the festivals, four; on holidays, five; on Yom Kippur, six; and on the Sabbath, seven (*Meg.* 4.1–2). The first two people to go up to read are a *kohen* (one of priestly descent) and a Levite (*Git.* 8.8), if such are present. In Mishnaic times, the first person to go up pronounced the blessing before reading the Torah and the last person recited the afterblessing, while everyone who went up in between read without making a blessing (*Meg.* 4.1). Subsequently the custom was changed so that each reader recited a blessing before and after reading (B.T., *Meg.* 21b). The accepted wording of the first blessing is “Blessed are you Lord our God, King of the universe who chose us from among the nations,” which is the version adduced in the Babylonian Talmud (*Ber.* 11b),

but other conclusions of the blessing were also extant such as ". . . who gives Torah from heaven" (*Sofrim* 13.8) and ". . . who chose this Torah" (*Dt. Rab.* 11).

The Mishnah mentions the custom of translating each verse into the language spoken by the people—that is, Aramaic—at the same time as it was read in Hebrew (*Meg.* 4.4). This custom is apparently very ancient, perhaps as old as the custom of public Torah reading itself. In places where the vernacular was Greek, it was customary to begin and end the reading in Hebrew but to read the intermediate portions in Greek so that the congregation could understand the portion (*Tosefta, Meg.* 3.13). The emperor Justinian in 553 CE decided a dispute between two groups within a certain community who argued about whether one ought to read the Septuagint or the translation of Aquila. Over an extended period of time the translation of Onqelos was read in most communities, but nowadays only the Yemenite Jews continue this custom.

The public Torah reading was supplemented with a reading from the prophetic books. This reading from the Prophets is called the *haftarah*. Generally the portion chosen to be read as the *haftarah* parallels in some way the content of the *seder* or *parashah* read from the Torah on the same occasion.

Sefer Torah. Only a scroll including the five books of the Torah written on parchment may be used for public reading. A whole system of *halakhot* fixes the procedures for the preparation of the parchment and the ink as well as the details of the proper form of the letters of the square Hebrew script in which the scroll must be written. *Sefer Torah*, one of the minor tractates from the period of the geonim, deals with these *halakhot*, and they also found their place in the codes of the decisors. The Torah scroll and everything connected with it are treated with an exceptional measure of sanctity. In the Mishnah the holy ark with the scrolls of the Torah in it is referred to as the *teivah* ("chest") (*Ta'an.* 2.1). It is considered more holy than the synagogue building (*Meg.* 3.1). The name *aron ha-qodesh* ("holy ark"), which calls to mind the Ark of the Covenant referred to by that name in 2 *Chronicles* 35:3, is already used in the Talmud (B.T., *Shab.* 32a). The name *heikhal* ("palace") is also commonly used in rabbinic literature, and it was adopted by the Sefardic and Eastern Jews.

When the Torah scroll is removed from the ark, it is customary to recite the verse "And when the ark moved . . ."; as it is returned, the congregation recites, "And when it rested, he said . . ." (*Nm.* 10:35–36). One stands when a *Sefer Torah* is displayed and kisses the cloak or case in which it is wrapped. The cover and cloak in which the Torah scroll is tied and wrapped, as well as the finials and crown that ornament it, are all considered secondarily sanctified articles. While it is to-

tally forbidden to illustrate the Torah scroll itself, or even to change in any way the form of the letters written in it, the holy ark and the religious articles connected with the Torah have throughout history been fashioned and adorned artistically, in accordance with the economic status, cultural level, and artistic taste of the various Jewish communities of the world.

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Translated from Hebrew by Akiva Garber

TORAJA RELIGION. The Sa'dan Toraja, a people numbering about 325,000, live in Tana Toraja, the mountainous northern part of the southwest peninsula of the Indonesian island of Sulawesi (formerly Celebes). The name *Sa'dan* is derived from the Sa'dan River, the

main stream in the region. *Toraja* is a contraction of *To-ri-aja* ("men of the mountains"), a name given the people by their Bugis neighbors. Following local customs, we refer to these people as Toraja. [See map accompanying *Southeast Asian Religions*, article on Insular Cultures.]

The region of approximately 3,180 square kilometers, originally heavily forested, has been changed by cultivation. The few remaining forests cover slopes unsuitable for cultivation. The principal means of subsistence is agriculture. Rice, cassava, and maize are the staples; coffee and cloves are the principal cash crops. Animal husbandry is practiced on a large scale, but only the breeding of pigs is of economic importance. The buffalo, a status symbol, is rarely used for work in the fields. The animal has primarily a ritual function, for the superior type of death feast demands the sacrifice of about a hundred buffalo.

Social change began with the introduction of coffee growing and the coffee trade in the last quarter of the previous century. The subduing of the Toraja country by the Dutch (1906), the period of the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), and the independence of Indonesia (1945) accelerated this process. Tourism, a recent development, has brought further change. The school system introduced by the Dutch government and missionaries opened a new world for a people who had known only an oral tradition. Tana Toraja became the missionary field of the Reformed Alliance of the Dutch Reformed Church and half of the population has been converted to Christianity.

The "Belief of the Old." The autochthonous religion of the Toraja is called *Aluk To Dolo* (*to dolo* literally means "people bygone"), that is, "belief of the old," or "rituals of the ancestors." In this religion, ancestor cult, myth, and ritual are intertwined. During the celebration of major rituals, the *to minaa*, a priest well versed in tribal lore and history, recites the lengthy litany of the tribe's origins. He tells of how the cosmos and the gods came into being, how man, his food plants, and animals had originated in heaven and were brought down when the first nobleman descended to earth, landing on a mountain. The *to manurun*, that is, the person of status who descended from heaven, brought with him the entire social order and a complete heavenly household, including a house, slaves, animals, and plants. With the *to manurun* also came priests: the *to minaa*, the *to burake* (the highest rank of religious functionary), the rice priest, and the medicine man. The death priest, however, is not mentioned. The descent of a nobleman was believed to have occurred several times in Toraja history. With regional variations these main themes are found throughout Tana Toraja.

The Tripartite Cosmic World. In the Toraja view, the cosmos is divided into three parts: the upper world, the world of mankind (earth), and the underworld. In the beginning, however, heaven and earth were one expanse of darkness, united in marriage. With their separation came light. Several gods sprang from this mythical marriage. Puang Matua ("the old lord") is the principal god and the deity of heaven. Pong Banggai di Rante ("the master of the plains") is the god of the earth. Gaunti Kembong ("the swollen cloud") resides between heaven and earth. Indo' Belo Tumbang ("the lady who dances beautifully") is the goddess of the medicine that cures the sick in the Maro ritual. Pong Tulak Padang is the Toraja Atlas; he carries the earth, not on his shoulders but in the palms of his hands. Together with Puang Matua in the upper world he keeps earth, the world of mankind, in equilibrium, separating night from day. His bad-tempered spouse, Indo' Ongon-ongon, however, upsets the equilibrium by causing earthquakes when she is in a bad mood. She is much feared, as is Pong Lalondong ("the lord who is a cock"). Puya ("the land of souls") lies in the southwest under the earth's surface. The underworld and upper world have other deities, and there are also *deata* (deities, ghosts) residing on earth and in rivers, canals, wells, trees, and stones. Eels are revered as fertility symbols.

The Bipartite Division of the Rituals. By observing the rules of deities and ancestors, man observes his part in maintaining the equilibrium between the upper worlds and the underworlds. He does so by means of rites and rituals. Rituals are divided into two spheres, one of the east, the Rising Sun or Smoke Ascending (Rambu Tuka), and the other of the west, the Setting Sun or Smoke Descending (Rambu Solo'). The north is associated with the east, the south with the west. Rituals of the Rising Sun are those celebrating joy and life. This category includes birth, marriage, rice ceremonies, and feasts for the well-being of the family, the house, and the community. Ceremonies for healing the sick are also rituals of the Rising Sun; yet to the extent that sickness poses a danger to the community the rituals of healing share some traits with those of the Setting Sun. The Setting Sun ritual is associated with darkness, night, and, of course, with death. With the exception of the healing rituals, the ritual spheres of east and west are kept quite distinct from one another.

The most important ritual of the eastern sphere is the Bua' feast, a ceremony for a whole territory, the Bua' community. During this feast the *burake*—in some districts a priestess, in others a priest who is considered a hermaphrodite—implores the gods of heaven to bestow their benevolence on the community. Another feast of importance is the Merok, held for the welfare of a large

family. At the center of the Merok is the *tongkonan*, the dwelling founded by the family's first ancestor. The most important of these houses are the ones considered to have been founded by a *to manurun*. These major rituals of the east have their ritual counterparts in high-ranking death feasts. Ritualizing the dead is a major focus of Toraja culture. A ranking order in funerals exists that corresponds to the status of the deceased. Toraja society is a stratified one, with much emphasis laid on the display of wealth. By the efforts and the devotion of the family, and through the expenditure lavished on buffalo, entertainment, and care of the death priest, the deceased of rank will reach Puya. After being judged by Pong Lalondong he climbs a mountain and reaches heaven. There he will occupy a place among the deified ancestors, who form a constellation that guards mankind and the rice. Thus the spheres of death and life, notwithstanding an apparent opposition, meet each other.

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TORQUEMADA, TOMÁS DE (1420–1498), Spanish inquisitor. Tomás de Torquemada, nephew of Juan de Torquemada (1388–1468), the celebrated Dominican theologian, canonist, and cardinal, was born at Valladolid and as a youth entered the Order of Preachers. For

twenty-two years he was prior of the Dominican convent of Santa Cruz at Segovia. In 1474 he was appointed confessor to Queen Isabella I of Castile, and later he performed the same service, nominally at least, for King Ferdinand V of Aragon.

By a brief of 11 February 1482, Pope Sixtus IV named Torquemada, along with ten other Dominicans, to replace former officers of the Spanish Inquisition who had been charged with corrupt practices. On 2 August 1483 Torquemada was appointed grand inquisitor for the kingdoms of Castile and León; a few months later his authority was extended to Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and Majorca. He forthwith established tribunals at Seville, Cordova, Jaén, and Villarreal (later transferred to Toledo). Between 1484 and 1498 he set down the basic procedure of the Inquisition in a series of *instrucciones*—fifty-four articles in all—that guided the activities of succeeding grand inquisitors. These were published in 1576.

Torquemada, though himself descended from Jewish forebears, was particularly harsh in carrying out the mandate of the Inquisition against crypto-Jews (Marraños), Jews who continued to practice Judaism in secret after their forced conversion to Christianity. In 1492 he supported, and perhaps promoted, the expulsion of the Jews from the newly united Spain. Complaints about his severity moved Pope Alexander VI in 1494 to add four colleagues to his judicial bench, but as early as the next year they were accused of financial misconduct, and there was no discernible change in the Inquisition's practices after Torquemada's retirement or even after his death.

Torquemada became, and has remained, the personification of religious intolerance at its worst. It is believed that as many as two thousand people were burned to death under his regime, and many thousands of others suffered imprisonment, confiscation of their property, and various other forms of harassment and indignity. Papal efforts to moderate the inquisitorial zeal in Spain were usually ineffectual, because the Spanish Inquisition, as Torquemada fashioned it, was an instrument to secure the racial and religious uniformity that was a primary concern of the Catholic kings and of Spanish policy for a long time afterward.

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Inquisition (1932; reprint, London, 1949), and a popular account of a special subject is Thomas Hope's *Torquemada, Scourge of the Jews* (London, 1939).

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TORTOISES. See Turtles and Tortoises.

TOSAFOT is the Hebrew word that designates the glosses printed alongside the commentary of Rashi (Rabbi Shelomoh ben Yitshaq, eleventh-century French sage and commentator) in most editions of the Babylonian Talmud. Yet these *tosafot* are only a fraction of those composed by the French and German scholars (*tosafists*) of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The descendants of Rashi and his students edited his commentaries and added glosses to them. Even after these additions became much more extensive than the original commentaries, they continued to be called *tosafot* (additions). The *tosafot* emerged from disputations in the Talmudic academies that were recorded by teachers or by students under their direction. Students traveled from place to place recording the novel interpretations of their rabbis, and an academy of study acquired a good name based on the collections of *tosafot* available there.

Emergence of the Tosafot. The beginnings of this new literary form are discernible already in the commentaries of Rashi's son-in-law Yehudah ben Natan, and even more so in the commentaries of his other son-in-law, Me'ir ben Shemu'el, and those of the latter's son, Rashbam (Rabbi Shemu'el ben Me'ir), who wrote addenda to Rashi's commentaries on the Talmud. The new style can be seen also in the works of Riva' (Rabbi Yitshaq ben Asher), who was Rashi's student in Troyes, France, and who later settled in Speyer, in southwestern Germany. While Rashi's commentaries generally explain each *sugyah* (Talmudic discussion of a specific subject) where it occurs (i.e., on the same page), in the works of these others the dialectical and polemic tendency and the trend to comparison predominate.

In the establishment and perfection of the distinctive style of the *tosafot* a decisive influence was exercised by Rashi's grandson, Ya'aqov ben Me'ir, known as Rabbenu ("our teacher") Tam (after *Genesis* 25:27). With his immense breadth of knowledge and his sharp and penetrating mind, Tam influenced the scholars of his generation. The students who came to learn with him in his academy in Ramerupt adopted his method of study. His students were subsequently active in all regions of France, in England, in the communities on the Rhine, and in southern Germany, Bohemia, Carinthia, and

Hungary, and in Kiev. Many others who never studied under him personally accepted his authority as binding and were influenced by his method.

Rabbenu Tam's successor was his nephew, generally known by the acronym Riy (Rabbi Yitshaq [ben Shemu'el]). Students flocked to Riy's academy in Dampierre from every country in Europe that was inhabited by Jews, including Spain. Moses Nahmanides, known as Ramban (Rabbi Mosheh ben Nahman), the thirteenth-century rabbi and commentator from Barcelona, described the influence of Rashi and his successors thus: "The French sages . . . they are our teachers, they the instructors; they reveal to us everything that is hidden" (*Dina' de-garmi*, intro.). The academy of Riy could be considered the forge of the *tosafot*. His work and that of his disciples established the method for writing *tosafot*: verification of the text of the Talmud and clarification and analysis of each *sugyah* through comparison of parallel passages in the Babylonian Talmud with the rest of the halakhic and aggadic sources, thus uncovering and resolving contradictions and fixing methodological principles. Few of Riy's *tosafot* have reached us in their original formulations, but they were included in the collections compiled by his students—his son Elhanan, Rash (Rabbi Shimshon [ben Avraham]) of Sens and his brother Yitshaq, Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris (also known as Rabbi Yehudah Sir Leon), Eli'ezer ben Shemu'el of Verona, Barukh ben Yitshaq of Worms, and others. Riy's teachings were recorded in their works and, through them, in the *tosafot* of later generations.

Types of Tosafot. The greatest of the teachers edited collections of their *tosafot*, but their disciples did not consider these closed collections. On the one hand, they abridged long *tosafot*, while on the other, they added to the collections more recent *novellae*. As a result, the students appended glosses in the margins of the *tosafot*, which copyists subsequently introduced into the body of the text.

The disciples of Riy did not simply record his teachings. Moreover, they did not all study with him at the same time, and later students often added to the *tosafot* of their predecessors the new explanations that grew out of their discussions and decisions of their master, which were rendered to them orally or in writing. Even within the works of given individuals we can sometimes discern development. The *tosafot* of Rash of Sens to tractate *Ketubbot* (modern edition, Jerusalem, 1973) were compiled, it would seem, when he was still young. In them the teachings of his teacher Riy are exceptionally predominant, and one can still sense in his style the give and take of the discussion in the academy. In contrast, the second edition of his *tosafot* to tractate *'Avodah Zarah* (modern edition, New York, 1969) exhibit lit-

tle of the style of disputation characteristic of most *tosafot*; they are instead rather similar to the style of the Rash in his Mishnah commentaries.

Authority in the academies of the *tosafists* was not institutionalized; there was no well-defined hierarchy within them. Whoever could demonstrate exceptional capabilities and great erudition gained authority, but this authority was constantly subject to the challenges and criticism of younger scholars and students.

With the passage of time, different styles of *tosafot* developed. Some scholars were content to record their critical notes on famous *tosafot*, such as those of Rash of Sens. This is what El'azar of Worms (the author of *Sefer ha-roqeah*) and Berakhiah of Nicole (modern-day Lincoln, England) did. In contrast, after the burning of the Talmud in Paris in 1244, there is a clearly discernible tendency, especially in the academy at Évreux, to compose *tosafot shiṭah*—a presentation of the Talmudic *sugyah* together with various explanations of it and the discussions of *tosafists*. One such *shiṭah* from Évreux on tractate *Nazir* was published from a manuscript in New York in 1974.

Toward the end of the thirteenth century, in the wake of the emigration of many of the sages of northern France and the increasing persecutions in Germany, original creativity among the scholars became rarer, while the collection of existing *tosafot* became more widespread. The great compilers, whose works spanned the entire Talmud, were Perets of Corebeil, Eli'ezer of Touques, and Asher ben Yeḥi'el. The *tosafot* of Perets of Corbeil were extant in Italy until the time of the printing of the Talmud, and they also reached Spain. Eli'ezer of Touques abridged and edited the *tosafot* compiled by Rash of Sens, added to them from other collections, and appended his own *novellae* in the margins. His *tosafot* quickly spread through France and Germany.

When Asher ben Yeḥi'el, known as Rabbenu Asher (also as Ro'sh), left Germany, he brought with him to Spain collections of *tosafot* from the collections of Riy and Rash of Sens and copied them almost unchanged, occasionally adding an explanation of his teacher, Me'ir ben Barukh, known as Maharam of Rothenburg. Rabbenu Asher prepared this work in order to present the community of scholars in Spain with an important collection of the teachings of the outstanding scholars of France. His son Ya'aqov (that is, Ya'aqov ben Asher), author of the halakhic codex *Arba'ah Turim*, wrote to a German scholar who was preparing to come to Spain: "Bring whatever books you have, whether commentaries of Rashi, or *gemara'*, or other works, but you needn't bring the *tosafot*, for they only learn the *shiṭah* of my father and teacher, may the memory of the righteous be a blessing." These *tosafot* did not spread beyond Spain,

though, and they were subsequently dispersed abroad (especially to Italy and the Ottoman Empire) with the exiles from Spain. While the scholars of Germany and Poland remained unaware of their existence, for us these *tosafot* are an important source for reconstructing the original formulation of the *tosafot* of Riy and his disciples.

The aforementioned compilations sealed a period of nearly two hundred years of creativity. The earlier *tosafot* were superseded by the later collections, but many of the former were preserved by individuals, some of whom copied from them into their own compilations and collections. This phenomenon can be observed in various collections: the catalogs of decisions and *responsa*, like *Or Zaru'a*, compiled by Yitshaq ben Mosheh of Vienna, and the *Mordekhai* of Mordekhai ben Hillel; in the *Haggahot Maymuniyyot* and the *Teshuvot Maymuniyyot* of the school of Maharam; the collections of exegesis of the Pentateuch (such as *Da'at zeqenim*, *Hadar zeqenim*, *Moshav zeqenim*, and *Minḥat Yehudah*); and in manuscripts. All of these works help us to identify the editors of extant collections of *tosafot* and the authors of anonymous interpretations recorded in them.

Printing of the Tosafot. The spread of the *tosafot* encouraged printers of the Talmud to print these commentaries alongside the commentary of Rashi, which were already being printed alongside the Talmudic text. Yehoshu'a Shelomoh first printed the *tosafot* to tractate *Berakhot* in Soncino, Italy, in 1484. By 1519 his nephew Gershom Soncino had printed twenty-three tractates with *tosafot*. The Bomberg Press in Venice (1520–1523) generally copied the *tosafot* from the Soncino edition, but they corrected them from manuscripts. After that time, the *tosafot* were printed in every edition of the Talmud, except in some early Eastern editions, until the *gemara'*, the commentary of Rashi, and *tosafot* came to be studied as a single unit, referred to as GePeT (from *gemara'*, *perush Rashi*, and *tosafot*).

Editing of the Tosafot. Examination of the *tosafot* printed in standard editions of the Talmud in relation to other collections that have been printed or preserved in manuscript and in comparison with other sources demonstrates that the standard *tosafot* originated in various academies and at different times. A summary of the conclusions that can be drawn about the origins of the *tosafot* of the various tractates can be found in table 1.

The Method of Interpretation in the Tosafot. Despite the diversity and the convoluted process of development of all the various collections, the *tosafot* nevertheless share a common method of explication, for they all are characteristically dialectical and critical. These

TABLE 1. *Origins of the Tosafot*

B.T. TRACTATE	ORIGINS OF TOSAFOT	B.T. TRACTATE	ORIGINS OF TOSAFOT
<i>Berakhot</i>	A reworking of the <i>tosafot</i> of Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris, including material added by his students, edited by a German scholar who studied in the academy at Évreux.	<i>Bava' Batra'</i>	Avraham of Sens, and German students of the disciples of Yitshaq ben Shemu'el. Until page 144a, edited by Eli'ezer of Touques based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens, Mosheh of Évreux, and Yitshaq ben Mordekhai (known by the acronym Rivam), who worked under the supervision of Ya'aqov ben Me'ir; after page 144a, the primary source was the <i>tosafot</i> of a disciple of Yitshaq ben Shemu'el.
<i>Shabbat</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques. The editing of the final section (from page 122b) was never completed.	<i>Sanhedrin</i>	<i>Tosafot</i> from the school of Perets of Corbeil, based on the <i>tosafot</i> compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham.
<i>'Eruvin</i>	Compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens (Rash), edited by students of Yitshaq ben Avraham (known as Ritsba').	<i>Makkot</i>	Edited during the lifetime of Perets of Corbeil.
<i>Pesaḥim</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques. The first nine chapters are based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens while chapter 10 is based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Yehi'el of Paris.	<i>Shavu'ot</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques, after the <i>tosafot</i> of Elhanan of Sens.
<i>Yoma'</i>	Edited by Me'ir ben Barukh of Rothenburg.	<i>'Avodah Zarah</i>	Edited by a disciple of Perets of Corbeil, who copied unchanged the <i>tosafot</i> of Shemu'el of Falaise, who had drawn from the <i>tosafot</i> of Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris, whose explanations were in accordance with the <i>tosafot</i> of Elhanan, son of Yitshaq ben Shemu'el. The <i>tosafot</i> of Elhanan, composed around 1182, were in fact used as a major source for all the aforementioned <i>tosafot</i> on <i>'Avodah Zarah</i> .
<i>Sukkah</i>	Compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens.	<i>Horayot</i>	German <i>tosafot</i> , based primarily on the explanations of Simḥah of Speyer.
<i>Beitsah</i>	Edited by a disciple of Perets of Corbeil.	<i>Zevahim</i>	Compiled and edited by Barukh ben Yitshaq of Worms.
<i>Ro'sh ha-Shanah</i>	Compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens.	<i>Menahot</i>	Compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens.
<i>Ta'anit</i>	Late <i>tosafot</i> , apparently from the fourteenth century.	<i>Hullin</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques, based on the <i>tosafot</i> compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens and the <i>tosafot</i> of Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris.
<i>Megillah</i>	Edited by Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris.	<i>Bekhorot</i>	Compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens.
<i>Mo'ed Qaṭan</i>	Edited by Shemu'el ben Elhanan, grandson of Yitshaq ben Shemu'el.	<i>'Arakhin</i>	<i>Tosafot</i> from Évreux, edited by a disciple of Shemu'el of Évreux's son.
<i>Ḥagigah</i>	Edited by Mosheh of Évreux, based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Elhanan and Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris.	<i>Temurah</i>	<i>Tosafot</i> from Évreux, the handiwork of a different editor.
<i>Yevamot</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques based upon the <i>tosafot</i> compiled by Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens up to chapter 12; from there, based primarily on the <i>tosafot</i> of Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris.	<i>Keritot</i>	Edited by a disciple of Yitshaq ben Shemu'el.
<i>Ketubbot</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques but without a final editing; apparently a first edition.	<i>Me'ilah</i>	Edited by a disciple of Perets of Corbeil during the life of his master.
<i>Nedarim</i>	Edited by a student of Perets of Corbeil, based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Évreux.	<i>Qinnim</i>	German <i>tosafot</i> , used as sources for the <i>tosafot</i> of Yitshaq ben Asher and Ya'aqov ben Yitshaq ben Eli'ezer ha-Levi (known as Ya'avets).
<i>Nazir</i>	Edited by a student of Perets of Corbeil based upon the <i>shiṭah</i> of Yitshaq of Évreux.	<i>Niddah</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques, based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Shimshon ben Avraham of Sens and other disciples of Yitshaq ben Shemu'el.
<i>Soṭah</i>	German <i>tosafot</i> , edited by a disciple of Yehudah and Me'ir, the sons of Qalonimos.		
<i>Giṭṭin</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques.		
<i>Qiddushin</i>	<i>Tosafot</i> from Évreux, from the end of the thirteenth century.		
<i>Bava' Qamma'</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques based upon the <i>tosafot</i> of Yehudah ben Yitshaq of Paris.		
<i>Bava' Metsi'a'</i>	Edited by Eli'ezer of Touques, based on the <i>tosafot</i> of Elhanan, Shimshon ben		

methodological foundations, as drawn by Rabbenu Tam and Riy, remained fixed, with variation only in the quality of their employment. On the one hand, the tosafists themselves adopted the style of discussion of the amoraim and developed special techniques by which to express it; on the other hand, they traced and criticized the way in which the amoraim used this style. Every single line of the Talmud was analyzed acutely and tested, sometimes by uncovering contradictions between it and other statements in the sources, and sometimes by drawing from it the most extreme inferences and conclusions possible. Precisely because they perceived the Talmud to be the eternal source of halakhic decision, the tosafists considered it incumbent upon them to compare, to question, and to solve contradictions between the cases in the contradictory sources by formulating "distinctions" (*hilluqim*). In this manner they hoped to advance the determination of the *halakhah* by supplementing what was already explicit in the Talmud.

The efforts of the tosafists were directed toward the verification of the accurate text of the Talmud. Rabbenu Tam condemned those who emended texts in order to remove difficulties and problems, and he and his disciples developed a whole methodology for textual criticism. The principles and explanations they elaborated to explain the development of defective texts anticipated modern philology.

In their work supplementing the commentary of Rashi and expanding its bounds, the tosafists had at their disposal a number of additional sources, such as the commentaries of Ḥanan'el ben Ḥushi'el and the Talmudic dictionary, *Sefer ha-'arukh*, of Natan ben Yehi'el, an eleventh-century rabbi. They relied primarily on their broad knowledge of the classical sources, however, including not only the Babylonian Talmud but also the Tosefta, the halakhic and aggadic *midrashim*, and the Palestinian Talmud (Jerusalem Talmud). While using these works the tosafists also contributed toward the establishment of their correct versions and toward a better understanding of their contents. Nevertheless, the tosafists' main aim remained the clarification of every *sugyah* of the Babylonian Talmud from all possible angles, including the testing of the logical arguments, distinctions, and classifications that they posited and the marshaling of support for their conclusions. All this activity was directed toward the attempt to see every subject and problem in its widest context. Every dictum of the *tosafot* demonstrates the extent to which the tosafists had assimilated the way of learning embodied in the Babylonian Talmud; they studied until they were willing and able to comment on what is the "way of the *sugyah*" and what is the "method of the Talmud." Taken

together, the principles governing their study constitute a complete methodology. Their formulations describe the use of the "rules for expounding scripture"; the relationship between the Talmud and *baraitot* (teachings of the tannaim that were not included in the Mishnah); the proper identification of tannaim and amoraim; the proper definition of the terms of the *sugyah*; the order of the Mishnah; and the editing of the Talmud. In this aspect of their endeavor, also, several of the tosafists' conclusions anticipated modern research.

The Method of Tosafot in Deciding Halakhah. The tosafists did not ignore the normative aim of the Talmudic discussions. Although their comments generally do not explicitly contain halakhic summaries or decisions, the clarification of the various strains of Talmudic thought nevertheless essentially contributed to the formation of the *halakhah*. This fact justifies the work of the author of *Pisqei tosafot* (The Decisions of Tosafot)—whether he was Rabbenu Asher or his son Ya'aqov—who abstracted the halakhic decision from each dictum of *tosafot*. Indeed, the later rabbinic authorities (decisors) learned much practical *halakhah* from the *tosafot*.

While the tosafists used the books and *responsa* of the geonim and the halakhic codices of the decisors, such as Rif (Rabbi Yitshaq Alfasi), the Talmud remained for them the primary source, and they evaluated the decisions of the geonim and the decisors in its light. Rabbenu Asher explained: "Who is as great in our estimation as Rashi, may the memory of the righteous be a blessing, who enlightened the entire Diaspora with his commentary? Nevertheless his descendants Rabbenu Tam and Riy, may their memories be a blessing, disagreed with him in many instances and refuted his positions, for the Torah is known as 'the *torah* of truth,' so we do not allow flattery of anyone" (commentary to *San.* 4.6). Likewise he wrote elsewhere, "[We do not flatter the geonim] for respecting any subject not explicitly dealt with in the Talmud which Rav Ashi and Ravina' edited, anyone can rise and build up [arguments], even if he opposes the conclusions of the geonim" (*Responsa* 54.10).

The tosafists' method of study provided them with powerful tools to harmonize, circumvent, and redefine, but nevertheless their contemporary reality, with all its conflicting claims and conditions, sometimes asserted itself as a challenge to their methods. The tosafists had to take account of "everyday occurrences" and justify "generally accepted custom." Thus, just as they found means to abrogate laws and customs well supported in the sources, they likewise managed to include within the system of *halakhah* late developments that were without a basis in the sources. To a certain extent, the

willingness to venture bold new explanations was a function of the differing personalities of the tosafists, who differed from one another in their personal inclinations and in their spiritual characteristics. However, they were united in their intention to continue the formulation and further the organic development of the Talmudic project as a way of life.

The Tosafists and the Glossarists. Several scholars have noted the similarity between the method of the Scholastics and that of the tosafists. Some of these scholars speak in terms of influence, but the spiritual meeting ground between Christians and Jews took place in biblical exegesis; there is no hint of direct contact in the fields of law and *halakhah*. The *tosafot* were not known to the glossarists, nor were the tosafists familiar with the works of the Roman and canonical legal scholars. Nevertheless, comparison of the *tosafot* and the glosses shows similarities both in the way they came into being and in details of terminology and presentation. Both presume that contradictions in the sources could and must be resolved, whether by distinguishing the cases from one another or by clarifying differences in the time, place, and social position of the various personalities. The way in which the *tosafot* spread and the way in which they were studied also parallel the success of the activities of the glossarists of both Roman and canon law. Despite the differences between the political and social contexts of the Jewish and Christian communities, which lived in a constant, unequal struggle with one another, their assumptions and aspirations were similar. Both communities acknowledged the authority of the Bible and considered themselves commanded to draw from it instruction for their day-to-day existence. Thus both communities greatly esteemed the intellectual ability, sharp-wittedness, and breadth of knowledge that made it possible to solve contradictions and deal with social change in the context of the tradition.

The Influence of the Tosafot. *Tosafot* came to occupy a central role in the system of study and education of the Jews. It is true that Yehudah Löw ben Betsal'el (known as Maharal of Prague) bitterly decried the teaching of *tosafot* to children, but only few paid any attention to his objections, and until the modern period the traditional schoolbook remained *gemara'*, the commentary of Rashi, and *tosafot*. In the more advanced stages of education the *tosafot* were learned not only in relationship to the Talmud but also as independent sources whose own internal contradictions required resolution. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the circles of Yisra'el Isserlein, Ya'aqov Molin, Yosef Qolon, and Yitshaq Stein in Germany devoted much energy to deriving positions implied by *tosafot*. The *tosafot* stood

in the center of the course of study of the Polish and the Turkish scholars. In Vlorë, Albania, scholars of the sixteenth century debated about the *tosafot*, which they called "the short profundities of Touques." In the contract of Italian rabbis, the rabbi "accept[ed] upon himself the obligation to come to the synagogue and teach the *tosafot* for an hour or more before the afternoon prayer."

Suspicion of casuistry and excessive exhibition of sharp-wittedness were concerns already of the first tosafists. Rabbenu Tam, who understood the power and possibilities of casuistry as few others did, decried "casuists" who find "bundles and bundles" of answers to every question. In similar fashion, Mosheh al-Ashqar (1462–1542) declared himself against "those who scrutinize the words of the *tosafot* and say senseless things about the redundancies in their language" (*Responsa* 29–30). The influence of the methodology of *tosafot* far exceeded the tendency toward dialectics that arose in their study. This influence is clear in the works of the decisors, in the *responsa*, and in the works of *novellae* of interpreters trying to get at the simple sense of the text, as well as in various aspects of modern Talmudic research.

[See also the biographies of many of the scholars mentioned herein.]

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that had previously been published in corrupt editions also appeared. There have also been a number of studies of the historical and social reality discernible through the compilations of the tosafists, as well as works on their ideas and influence. A summary is given in Salo W. Baron's *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, vol. 9, 2d ed., rev. & enl. (New York, 1965). A full bibliography can be found in the expanded and corrected fourth edition of my book mentioned above (Jerusalem, 1980).

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TOSEFTA. See Mishnah and Tosefta.

TOTEMISM is the systematic symbolization of social entities (individuals, social units) through concrete phenomenal images, often natural species, and the development of these symbols into relationships of identity, power, and common origin. The term *totem* derives from *dotem*, a term used by the Ojibwa, an Algonquin people of North America, to denote clan membership. As a concept, totemism has been treated in two distinct senses, or phases, of anthropological theory. In the first, or evolutionary sense, it was postulated as an institution of primitive thought, a necessary stage of religious conceptualization that all peoples must pass through in the course of cultural evolution. This notion was developed by such theorists as James G. Frazer and Émile Durkheim, and it was the subject of a definitive critique by Alexander A. Goldenweiser. The second, more modern sense of the term might be called its "systematic" sense, one that allows for a wide range of variance in culture-specific schemes of symbolization and classification and that approaches the significance of totemism through its relationship to these schemes. This modern sense informs the viewpoint of Claude Lévi-Strauss's critique *Totemism* (1963) and forms the basis for his subsequent idea of a "science of the concrete" (*The Savage Mind*, 1966).

The first sense of totemism tends to exaggerate its unitary aspects and make of it something of a universal primitive institution; the second tends to dissolve it into general issues of denomination and symbolism and to underplay the distinctiveness of the term and the usages to which it refers.

Instances of the naming of clans for natural species among North American peoples were known long before the practice came to be called totemism. By the time the origin, significance, and definition of totemism became a major topic of controversy among theorists of tribal religion, the area of ethnographic exemplification had shifted from the Americas to central Australia. This

shift was in part a consequence of the splendid ethnography of Baldwin Spencer and Francis James Gillen, but it also coincided with the widespread adoption of the evolutionist notion of the "psychic unity of mankind." According to this idea, human culture was essentially unitary and universal, having arisen everywhere through the same stages, so that if we could identify a people who were "frozen" into an earlier stage, we would observe modes of thought and action that were directly ancestral to our own. Australia, a continent populated originally by hunting and gathering peoples alone, seemed to furnish examples of the most primitive stages available.

Together with the concept of taboo, and perhaps also that of *mana*, totemism became, for the later cultural evolutionists, the emblem (or perhaps the "totem") of primitive thought or religion—its hallmark, and therefore also the key to its suspected irrationality. The origin and significance of totemism became the subject of widespread theoretical speculation during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Much of the early theorization developed along the lines of E. B. Tylor's conception of the evolution of the soul (for example, totemic species as representations or repositories of the soul), or as literalizations of names (as in Herbert Spencer's hypothesis that totems arose from an aberration in nicknaming).

The controversy over totemism reached its peak after the publication of Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy* (1910). In that work, Frazer distinguished totemism, as implying a relationship of equality or kinship with the totem, from religion, as a relationship with higher powers. He emphasized the solidarity function of totemism, which knits people into social groups, as a contribution to the "cause of civilization." Frazer's speculation concerning the origin of totemism, however, came more and more to reflect the particulars of his Australian exemplars. From an initial theory identifying the totem as a repository for a soul entrusted to it for safekeeping, Frazer turned to an explanation based on the Intichiuma rites of central desert Aborigines, in which each subgroup is responsible for the ritual replenishment of some (economically significant) natural species. The idea of the economic basis of totemism was later revived, in simplified form, by Bronislaw Malinowski. Finally, Frazer developed the "conception theory" of totemism, on the model of the Aranda people of central Australia, according to which a personal totem is identified for a child by its mother on the basis of experiences or encounters at the moment she becomes aware that she is pregnant. A creature or feature of the land thus "signified" becomes the child's totem.

In 1910, Goldenweiser, who had studied under Boas,

published "Totemism: An Analytical Study," an essay that became the definitive critique of "evolutionary" totemism. Goldenweiser called into question the unitary nature of the phenomenon, pointing out that there was no necessary connection between the existence of clans, the use of totemic designations for them, and the ideology of a relationship between human beings and totemic beings. Each of these phenomena, he argued, could in many cases be shown to exist independently of the others, so that totemism appeared less an institution or religion than an adventitious combination of simpler and more widespread usages.

Despite the acuity and ultimate persuasiveness of Goldenweiser's arguments, the more creative "evolutionary" theories appeared in the years after the publication of his critique. Like Frazer's theory, Durkheim's conception of totemism is exemplified primarily through Australian ethnography. Durkheim viewed totemism as dominated by what he called a quasi-divine principle (Durkheim, 1915, p. 235), one that turned out to be none other than the representation of the social group or clan itself, presented to the collective imagination in the symbolic form of the creature that serves as the totem. Totemism, then, was a special case of the argument of *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, a work stating that religion is the form in which society takes account of (reveres, worships, fears) its own collective force.

Sigmund Freud included the concept of totemism, as an exemplar, (like the notion of taboo) of contemporary ideas of primitive thought, in his psychodynamic reassessment of cultural and religious forms. Freud's *Totem and Taboo* (1913) projected human culture as the creative result of a primal oedipal guilt. The totem was selected and revered as a substitute for the murdered father, and totemic exogamy functioned as an expiatory resignation on the part of the sons of claims to the women freed by the murder of the father.

In the last major theoretical treatment of "evolutionary" totemism, Arnold van Gennep argued, against Goldenweiser, that its status as a particular combination of three elements did not disqualify totemism's integrity as a phenomenon. Yet Gennep rejected the views of Durkheim and other social determinists to the effect that totemic categorization was based on social interests. Anticipating Lévi-Strauss, who based his later views on this position (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 162), Gennep saw totemism as a special case of the more general cultural phenomenon of classification, although he did not pursue the implications of this position to the degree that Lévi-Strauss did.

Claude Lévi-Strauss's modern critique effectively concludes the attack on evolutionary totemism begun by

Goldenweiser, although it aims at the term *totemism* itself. In *Totemism* (1963), Lévi-Strauss critically reviews the history of the subject and reaches the conclusion that totemism is the illusory construct of an earlier period in anthropological theory. Reviewing the more recent ethnographic findings of writers like Meyer Fortes and Raymond Firth, he arrives at the proposition that it is the differences alone, among a series of totemic creatures, that serve to distinguish the corresponding human social units. He disavows, in other words, any sort of analogic relationship (of substance, origin, identity, or interest) between a totem and its human counterpart, and he thus reduces totemism to a special case of denomination or designation. This leaves unexplained (or reduces to mere detail) perhaps the bulk of the ethnographic material to totemism, concerned as it is with special ties and relationships between totem and human unit. In order to deal with this question, Lévi-Strauss developed, in *The Savage Mind* (1966), his notion of the "science of the concrete," in which totemic "classifications" are but a special instance of a more widespread tradition of qualitative logic. Thus Lévi-Strauss is able to substitute the systematic tendencies of an abstract classifying schema for the specific relations between a totem and its social counterpart.

What is the place of totemism in the life of an ongoing community? Consider the Walbiri, an Aboriginal people of the central Australian desert. Walbiri men are divided into about forty lines of paternal descent, each associated with a totemic lodge devoted to the lore and ritual communication with an ancestral Dreaming totem (kangaroo, wallaby, rain, etc.). When they enact the Dreaming rituals, the men are believed to enter the "noumenal" phase of existence (Meggitt, 1972, p. 72) and to merge with the totemic ancestors themselves. Here the analogies between human beings and totemic creatures are sacramentally transformed into identities, made ritually into real relationships of mutual origin and creation, so that men of the different lodges actually belong to different totemic species. When the ritual is concluded, however, they return to everyday "phenomenal" existence and reassume their human character, so that the totemic designations revert to mere names, linked to respective moieties, linked subsections, and other constituents of the complex Walbiri social structure. [See Walbiri Religion.]

Thus the "noumenal phase" of Walbiri life, the ritual state, is constituted by the analogies drawn between human beings and their totems, whereas in the "phenomenal phase" these analogies collapse into arbitrary labels. Only in the latter phase does Lévi-Strauss's proposition about the "differences alone" being the basis for coding human groups apply, for, as human

beings, the members of these subsections and moieties can marry one another's sisters and daughters, something that different species cannot do. Within the same culture, in other words, totemic distinctions can serve either as "labels," to code the differences or distinctions among human groups, or, by expanding into metaphorical analogues, accomplish the religious differentiation of men into different "species."

The totemic symbolization of social units is, in many cultures, integrated into a larger or more comprehensive categorial or cosmological scheme, so that the totemic creatures themselves may be organized into broader categories. Among the Ojibwa of North America, totems are grouped according to habitat (earth, air, or water). Aboriginal Australia is distinctive in carrying this tendency to the extreme of "totem affiliation," in which all the phenomena of experience, including colors, human implements, traits, weather conditions, as well as plants and animals, are assigned and grouped as totems (Brandenstein, 1982, p. 87). These universalized systems, in turn, are generally organized in terms of an overarching duality of principles. Brandenstein identifies three of these—quick/slow, warm/cold, and round/flat (large/small)—as generating, in their various permutations and combinations, the totemic-classificatory systems of aboriginal Australia (*ibid.*, pp. 148–149). A similarly comprehensive system is found among the Zuni of the American Southwest, for whom totemic clans are grouped in respective association with seven directional orientations (the four directions, plus zenith, nadir, and center), which are also linked to corresponding colors, social functions, and, in some cases, seasons.

At the other extreme is individuating, or particularizing totemism, for the individual is also a social unit. Among the Sauk and Osage of North America, traits, qualities, or attributes of a clan totem will be assigned to clan members, as personal names, so that members of the Black Bear clan will be known for its tracks, its eyes, the female of the species, and so on (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 173). Among the Kujamaat Diola of Senegal, on the other hand, individuals are totemized secretly through relationships with personalized animal doubles, which are produced by defecation from their own bodies, and which live in the bush near their dwellings (Sapir, 1977). Among the Usen Barok of New Ireland, individual names are taken from plant or animal manifestations of the essentially formless *masalai*, or tutelary clan spirit. Wherever personal names are conceived of as a relation between the bearer of the name and some phenomenal entity, we can consider naming itself to be a form of individual totemism.

Totemic individuation of this sort, in which the char-

acter of the name itself bears a specific relational significance, occurs frequently in the naming of modern sports teams, and in formal or informal national symbols, such as the eagle or the bear. Totemism has been proposed as the antecedent of the syncretistic religion of ancient Egypt, with possible indirect connections to the Greco-Roman pantheon. Predynastic Egypt was subdivided into a large number of local territorial units called *nomes*, each identified through the worship of a particular theriomorphic deity. As the unification of Egypt involved the political joining of these *nomes*, so the evolution of Egyptian religion led to the combining of the totemic creatures into compound deities such as Amun-Re ("ram-sun"), or Re-Harakhte ("sun-hawk"). There are possible archaic connections of these theriomorphic deities, with Homeric Greek divinities: for example, the cow Hathor with the "ox-eyed Hera." Alternatively, of course, these divinities may have acquired such characterizations as the heritage of an indigenous totemism.

Totemism may not be the key to "primitive thought" that Frazer, Durkheim, and Freud imagined it to be, but the use of concrete phenomenal images as a means of differentiation is not easily explained away as merely another mode of designation, or naming. Wherever social units of any kind—individuals, groups, clans, families, corporations, sports teams, or military units—are arrayed on an equal footing and in "symmetrical" opposition to one another, the possibility arises of transforming a mere quantitative diversity into qualitative meaning through the use of concrete imagery. Diversity is then not merely encoded but instead enters the dimension of meaning, of identity as a concrete, positive quality.

Whenever we speak of a sports team as the Braves, Indians, Cubs, or Vikings, or speak of the Roman, American, German, or Polish eagle, or consider Raven, Eagle, and Killer Whale clans, we make the differences among the respective units something more than differences, and we give each unit a center and a significance of its own. Whenever this occurs, the possibility arises of developing this significance, to a greater or lesser degree, into a profound relationship of rapport, communion, power, or mythic origin. Viewed in this light, the "totems" of a social entity become markers and carriers of its identity and meaning; to harm or consume the totem may well, under certain cultural circumstances, become a powerful metaphor for the denial of qualitative meaning. When theorists of totemism sought to explain the phenomenon solely in terms of the food quest, marriage restrictions, coding, or classification, they subverted the force of cultural meaning to considerations that would find an easier credibility in a materialistically and prag-

matically oriented society, "consuming," as it were, meaning through its markers and carriers.

The ostensibly "primitive" character of totemism is an illusion, based on a tendency of literate traditions to overvalue abstraction and to reduce the rich and varied spectrum of meaning to the barest requirements of information coding. In fact abstract reference and concrete image are inextricably interrelated; they imply each other, and neither can exist without the other. Certainly, peoples whose social organizations lack hierarchy and organic diversity (e.g., social class or the division of labor) tend to develop and dramatize a qualitative differentiation through the imagery of natural species, whereas those whose social units show an organic diversity need not resort to a symbolic differentiation. The choice, however, is not a matter of primitiveness or sophistication but rather of the complementarity between social form and one of two equally sophisticated, and mutually interdependent, symbolic alternatives.

[See also Anthropology, Ethnology, and Religion; Australian Religions, *overview article*; and the biographies of the scholars mentioned herein.]

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TOTONAC RELIGION. In the city of Zempoala (Cempoallan), situated in what is today the state of Veracruz, Mexico, the Totonac people were the first to receive Europeans to the great land mass of continental America. The year was 1519 and the Spanish conquest of Mexico had begun. At that time the Totonac occupied a strip of land flanked by the Atlantic Ocean and the Sierra Madre Oriental, between the Cazonces River in the north and La Antigua River near the present port of Veracruz. Two important Totonac ceremonial centers existed in this territory. The first, El Tajín, was located in the north and had ceased to function before the arrival of the Spanish. The second, Zempoala, is reputed to have been populous when the Spanish arrived; soon after, it witnessed the collapse of its idols and their replacement with the Christian cross.

Well before the Conquest, the Totonac people had extended even farther south, to the margins of the Papaloapan River. The Nahuatl-speaking Aztec had, however, reduced the extent of the Totonac's southern territories, and at the time of the Spanish arrival Zempoala, the Totonac capital, was paying tribute to its Aztec rulers. By this time Nahuatl was the lingua franca in the region, and thus the Spanish priests used Nahuatl terms to describe Totonac religion, a practice still common among scholars today.

At present some one hundred thousand Totonac-speaking people survive in the northern part of their original territory between the states of Puebla and Veracruz. Linguistically, the Totonac are related to the Zoqueano- and Mayan-speaking peoples. However, there is no evidence connecting the religion and culture of the Totonac to those of the Maya and the Zoqueano. Our understanding of the Totonac religion is based upon archaeological evidence primarily from Zempoala, El Tajín, and Puebla, and upon analysis of early descriptions provided by Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas and Fray Andrés de Olmos.

Evidence from Zempoala. According to Las Casas, who relied on information supplied by a young page of Cortés, daily homage was paid in Zempoala to the Sun (Chichiní in Totonac), who was the creator of all other

gods. Early in the morning seven priests would attend the temple. One of the priests would gaze skyward, paying reverence to the Sun before bathing the Sun's image, as well as the images of other gods, in incense. On ceremonial occasions nobles and officials would go to the temple to worship. According to Las Casas, every Saturday everyone was obliged to gather in the atrium of the temple to pray. Scholars now believe that this took place every fifth day. There, the nobles and principal dignitaries mutilated themselves before their gods by passing numerous straws through incisions made in various parts of their bodies. Las Casas mentions in particular tongues, thighs, and ears. The act of bleeding was a mechanism of purification.

At the winter solstice an important festival was celebrated during which eighteen people, men and women, were sacrificed. Eighteen is also the number of *veintenas* (Span., "set of twenty," i.e., "months" composed of twenty days each) into which the Mesoamerican year was divided. The human sacrifice took place at midnight; the hearts of the victims were ground into the mouths of the principal idols. Blood was the food of the Sun. The persons sacrificed were messengers sent to plead with the Sun to send his son to liberate the Totonac from the practices imposed on them by the Aztec. (Fine illustrations of human sacrifice are to be found in the reliefs at El Tajín.) Similar practices were followed at Zempoala for at least two other important festivals. The flesh of the victims was eaten by dignitaries and a few other influential people. Besides this elitist communion, there existed a practice popular among men who were more than twenty-six years of age: every six months they consumed a paste prepared from the blood of infants' hearts, seeds from plants grown in the temples, and a milky latex from the *Castilla elastica* tree. This sacrament was called *yoliaimtlaqualoz*, a Nahuatl word meaning "food for the soul."

Another regular custom was a confession of sins, called *maiolcuitta* in Nahuatl. A person would retire to some isolated spot and confess his wrongdoings aloud. According to Las Casas, penitents would often wring their hands and cry out in anguish with such conviction that it was, in his words, a custom "well worth consideration."

The Totonac had a goddess, the consort of the sun god, whose temple was high in the sierra. She received sacrifices of decapitated animals and birds as well as offerings of herbs and flowers. Her name was Tonacayohua, which means "preserver of the flesh" in Nahuatl. In contrast to many other Mesoamerican cultures, the Totonac did not believe the Sun's consort to be the Moon, since Totonac tradition considered both the Sun and the Moon to be male deities. The Totonac's hope,

reported by Las Casas, that the sun god would intercede by sending his son to liberate them from servitude to the Aztec's gods, who required human sacrifice, may well have been a Christian interpretation of Totonac belief. Similarly, although the Sun, the Moon, and the planet Venus together figure prominently in the paintings in the temple of Las Caritas in Zempoala, it is improbable that the Totonac viewed these three celestial deities as forming a unified Trinity.

In the same city a temple was dedicated to Xolotl, the twin brother of Quetzalcoatl. These brothers were personifications of the different manifestations of the planet Venus as Morning Star and Evening Star.

To the south of Zempoala, large sculptures were erected of women who had died during their first childbirth. Such women were venerated, their deaths being seen as equivalent to the deaths of soldiers killed while taking prisoners (new servants for the Sun). Called *cihuateteo* (Nah., "deified women") by the Aztec, they were responsible for transporting the Sun on his course across the sky. Statuettes from the same area provide evidence that human beings were flayed in homage to a god similar to the Aztec deity Xipe Totec; the sacrifice was made to ensure a bountiful harvest.

Evidence from El Tajín and Puebla. The relief sculptures among the archaeological remains of El Tajín reveal the existence of another god, Huracán (whence the English word *hurricane*). While in Zempoala Huracán is represented as a *chacmool*, a reclining anthropomorphic figure, in El Tajín he is represented as a one-legged deity whom I consider analogous to Tezcatlipoca. [See Tezcatlipoca.] From the Sierra Madre near El Tajín, Olmos reported the existence of (and denounced) a god called Chicueyozumatli ("8 Monkey"), to whom homage was paid at a time near that of the Christian festival of Easter. Like Huracán, Chicueyozumatli is analogous to Tezcatlipoca. Huracán was also equivalent to the god Tajín himself; this storm god survives today among the Totonac, who give him various names, including Trueno Viejo (Span., "old thunder"), Aktsini', and Nanahuatzin.

It was also from the Sierra Madre that the Spanish first reported a festival, called *Calculusot* by the Totonac, which was held in November for the remembrance of the dead. This festival was widespread among the indigenous peoples of Mexico and survives today in a modified form celebrated on All Souls' Day.

Religious beliefs bore upon sexual practices. Totonac priests were required to maintain celibacy. The high priest and the secondary priest were responsible for the circumcisions of month-old boys, and they also broke the hymens of infant girls. Priests would recommend that mothers repeat the latter operation once their

daughters had reached the age of six. Through Olmos we also know that those seeking good health for some relative would refrain from sexual contact for eighty days before making their petition. The general regard for abstinence is demonstrated in a popular tale in which an old man arrives too late for a competition as a result of his libertine ways. The winner of the competition is transformed into the Sun; the old man is transformed into the Moon.

Several popular tales today constitute the remnants of the Totonac religion. In the area of Zempoala the Totonac language is no longer spoken, but in the area of El Tajín (present-day Papantla de Olarte) it still survives. Here the Totonac religious tales have become syncretized with Roman Catholic beliefs. One example is that the Sun and Jesus Christ are often considered to be the same. Another example is that Saint John and the god Tajín (or Trueno Viejo) are also identified as the same. The spread of Catholic (and, more recently, Protestant) religion continues to break down the original Totonac religion.

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Translated from Spanish by Robert Allkin

TOUCHING. In religious usage touching often implies more than simple physical contact with the hands or other parts of the body. One may confer a touch to heal or assert power, to convey or obtain grace, or to consecrate or constrain a person or object.

Healing Touch. A classic instance of touching is recorded in the first three Gospels. They relate that a woman who had had an issue of blood for twelve years came behind Jesus in a crowd and touched the fringe of his garment. According to Luke, Jesus asked, "Who touched me?" and added, "I perceive that power has gone out from me" (*Lk.* 8:45–46). When the woman saw that she was hidden despite the pressing crowd, she fell down before Jesus and declared that she had been immediately healed. As a charismatic healer, Jesus laid his

hands upon sick folk, touched lepers, and put his fingers into the ears of a deaf mute and touched his tongue; he also put his spittle on the eyes of a blind man and twice laid hands on his eyes to effect a cure (*Mk.* 8:22–26).

In the Hebrew scriptures, the prophet Elisha is said to have laid himself upon the corpse of a child and to have put his mouth on the child's mouth, his eyes on his eyes, and his hands on his hands. The child's flesh became warm, and the prophet got up and then again stretched himself upon the body. Then the child sneezed seven times and opened his eyes (*2 Kgs.* 4:34–35). The prophet Isaiah, after having had a vision of God "high and lifted up," confessed his own sinfulness, whereupon a seraph flew to him with a live coal from the heavenly altar and touched his mouth with it to purge his iniquity (*Is.* 6:1–7).

Not only the touch of a sacred person but the touch of anything connected with him could exercise healing power. The New Testament reports that the shadow of Peter was sought by the sick, who were brought into the street to be cured as he passed by (*Acts* 5:15). And miracles were wrought not only by the hands of Paul but by the clothes that were taken from his body and given to the sick, whereupon diseases and possession by evil spirits went out of them (*Acts* 19:12).

The disciples of Jesus healed the sick by anointing them with oil (*Mk.* 6:13), and the elders of the church were instructed to pray for the sick and anoint them with oil in the name of the Lord (*Jas.* 5:14–15). From this developed what came to be called the unction of the sick, in some Eastern and Western churches, and extreme unction (a sacrament) in the Roman Catholic church. To the accompaniment of prayer, anointing oil is administered to the eyes, ears, nose, lips, hands, and feet of the sick person "for the health of body and soul." This rite is to be distinguished from the viaticum ("provision for a journey") of Holy Communion, which is administered to those near death.

Although Islam affirms that Muḥammad was a man and that the one miracle he wrought was the Qur'ān, devotees have credited the Prophet with a healing touch. Al-Bakhārī recorded that when one of Muḥammad's companions broke his leg, the Prophet passed his hands over the limb, whereupon it seemed as if nothing had ever been wrong with it. A woman brought him her son who was possessed, and Muḥammad stroked the boy's breast and prayed until the lad vomited and was healed. The Prophet even had power over nature: a palm tree that was one of the pillars of his mosque is said to have shouted out until it almost split, whereupon the Prophet embraced it until it calmed down and was quiet again.

In ancient and preliterate societies, power is attrib-

uted to the touch of healers, priests, and shamans. [See Power.] Doctors of the Ndembu of Zambia, for example, encircle a patient's hut and bring medicines of roots and leaves. The patient's chest and shoulders are washed, and then the doctor catches him by the little finger and directs him to a fire to warm himself. Still holding the patient's little finger, the doctor gives him a rattle, and after a while the patient begins to tremble and dance. A helper puts his hands on the patient's shoulders while the doctor places a medicine basket on the patient's head; after further dancing, the patient is led backward into his own hut to rest and recover.

The practice of touching an animal in order to transfer evil to it is illustrated in the Bible. The priest Aaron was instructed to take two goats into the wilderness, one to be sacrificed as a sin offering and the other to be given as a scapegoat to 'Aza'zel, a desert demon. The priest placed his hands on the head of the second goat, confessing over it the sins of the people, and sent it off to wander in the wilderness (*Lv.* 16:7–10, 21). In West Africa, a mother of twins who had died took a goat by the horns and placed her forehead three times against it in order to transfer her evil to it. Then the animal was sent away to wander outside the village. [See Scapegoat.]

In Asia and North America, both medicine men and shamans alike have performed functions of healing by touching. Although the shaman may utilize the curative properties of plants and animals or may massage patients, many illnesses are regarded as spiritual, that is, caused by injury to the soul. Thus the shaman's method is meant to restore the soul, and this he accomplishes by ascending to the heavens or descending to the underworld in a trance. If he perceives the disease to have been caused by a foreign body, visible or invisible, he may extract it by sucking the part of the body that he saw while in trance, sucking the skin either directly or through a bone or wooden tube. The shaman then dances and afterward may paint magical designs on the patient's body or instruct the patient's family on how this is to be done.

In Japan, Nakayama Miki (1778–1884), founder of the Tenrikyō religion, sought to heal sick people by giving them food or one of her belongings. [See Tenrikyō.] As the numbers of her followers increased, she prepared amulets to give them. Relatives of the sick consulted her and brought with them some of the afflicted one's clothes. She took them in her hands and breathed on them, and it was said that recovery followed at once. Miki also distributed to her disciples pieces of paper on which she had breathed, and when the demand on her became too great she granted this power of breath to her chosen disciples.

Touches of Power or Reverence. According to the *Laws of Manu*, a Hindu high-caste student must clasp the feet of his teacher both at the beginning and at the end of each lesson in the Vedas, crossing his hands so that he touches the left foot with his left hand and the right foot with his right hand. Similarly, he should touch the feet of his teacher's wife and the wife of his teacher's brother, if she is of the same caste (*Manu* 2.72, 132, 217).

Down to modern times, the physical presence of a teacher or guru has been treasured above books or learning, since true knowledge, power, and even divinity come through him. Sometimes the guru sits before his disciple in silence, and the latter squats with eyes closed. The guru may eventually touch the disciple's forehead or gaze into his eyes, and thus power is felt to pass from one to the other.

In daily religious practice, a devout Hindu asks pardon from the earth for touching it with his feet as he rises from bed. When he is ready for worship, he invokes his god by *nyāsa*, "placing" or "fixing" the presence of the divinity in his body by holding the right hand successively in front of the mouth, eyes, ears, nostrils, top of the head, forearms, navel, and back. The touching is accompanied by recitation of a mantra, a scriptural text, and prayers that the gods who protect different parts of the body may each take up his special place. *Nyāsa* is also performed on images to install the gods within them. With bunches of sacred grass, the breast of the image is touched to install Brahmā, the hand is touched to install Indra, the feet for Viṣṇu, and other parts for the appropriate gods.

In Sri Lanka, Buddhists perform comparable rites. In the presence of a superior, one joins the hands in reverence, bows or kneels, and even touches the ground with the forehead or touches the feet of the person saluted. Similar reverence is accorded images of the Buddha and other holy figures. The "eye festival," which is held on completion of an image of the Buddha, is an elaborate ritual performed to ensure that the gaze of the image does not fall directly on the craftsman who paints in the eyes. He looks into a mirror to see the eyes as he paints them, thus avoiding the dangerous gaze; afterward he is led blindfolded from the room, and the covering is removed only when his eyes will fall on something harmless, such as water.

In Buddhist myth and imagery occurs the symbolic gesture (*mudrā*) of the Buddha "touching the ground" (*Bhūmisparsa Mudrā*). There are several versions of this event. In one version, the Buddha at the point of attaining perfection was warned that he would be attacked by demons. So he pointed to the ground with his finger and called on the gods of the earth to rise up and kill the

demons. In another version, the demon king Māra claimed the Buddha's throne and summoned his troops as witnesses. The Buddha then touched the earth as his witness, and it proclaimed his right to the throne. Yet other accounts call this symbolic gesture the *mudrā* of the defeat of Māra, or touching the earth to oblige its gods to swear eternal fealty. Touching the ground has the meaning of repressing evil and also of calling the earth to witness. The five fingers of the left hand hold the Buddha's robe at the level of the breast, and with the right hand five fingers touch or press the earth. In Buddhist imagery, this gesture is a distinctive sign of the historical Buddha, Śākyamuni, whereas other gestures in images and pictures are common to several Buddhas.

An Islamic tradition, from al-Bukhārī, says that once, when there was only a little food, Muḥammad blessed it until there was enough for a great multitude. This is similar to the gospel accounts of Jesus praying, blessing, and breaking five loaves of bread for five thousand people. Another Islamic narrative says that once, when the followers of Muḥammad were thirsty, he put his hand into a bucket and water gushed out from between his fingers like a spring. One follower said that the Prophet came to him in a dream and kissed his cheek, so that when he awoke the house was full of scent.

In Christianity, laying on of hands is said to communicate power. The Gospels record that parents brought children to Jesus in order that he might touch them. He brushed aside the protective barrier formed by the disciples and, taking the children in his arms, "he blessed them, laying his hands upon them" (*Mk.* 10:16).

The Gospels record that the first Christian apostles chose deacons to help in secondary duties, laid hands on them, and prayed, whereupon the deacons became filled with power. Peter and John laid their hands on converts so that they would receive the Holy Spirit (*Acts* 6:6). The magician Simon tried to buy this power so that the Spirit might also descend on those on whom he laid his hands (*Acts* 8:18–19). Paul and Barnabas had hands laid on them for success in a special mission, but a warning to Timothy to "lay hands suddenly on no man" shows that care was needed in such dedication.

Commission to service by laying on hands, especially in the ordained ministry of the church, has continued through the ages. It is practiced by nonepiscopal and free churches as well as by those that claim an unbroken apostolic and episcopal succession transmitted through this sacred touch. In the Church of England, the ordination of priests by the episcopal touch gives power as well as office, as reflected in these words from the traditional *Book of Common Prayer*: "Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest in the

Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands." In the consecration of a bishop, other bishops lay hands on his head and exhort him to "stir up the grace of God which is given thee by this imposition of our hands."

At the investiture of a high-caste Hindu, the candidate passes from low or neutral status to that of a "twice-born." The central rite is the Upanayana, the "donning of the sacred thread," nowadays confined usually to boys, although in former times girls also were invested with this symbol of rebirth. While the preceptor recites appropriate texts, the candidate, facing the sun, slips the cotton threads over his head and across his breast. The teacher puts his right hand on the right side of the boy, alternately touching the candidate's shoulder and his own breast while exhorting obedience and unity of mind. The teacher then takes the boy's right hand into his own and asks him his "old name"; he then gives him a "new name" (which is uttered only at this ceremony). When the candidate is finally considered ceremonially pure, he performs *nyāsa*, touching his own head, eyes, nostrils, hands, arms, limbs, and other parts of his body to purify them all. The third finger of the right hand is considered the most auspicious, and, with it, the newly "twice-born" man touches some of the ashes of the sacred fire that is burning nearby and puts them on his forehead, throat, and right shoulder and over his heart. Then he is blessed and bows to his teacher and all his elders.

Not only prophets and healers but secular rulers have been credited with a potent touch, thereby expressing the divinity that "doth hedge a king." European kings touched their subjects who suffered from scrofula, also called "the king's evil," a swelling of the glands that supposedly was cured by the royal touch. French kings had done this since ancient times, and the custom was introduced to England in the eleventh century by the saintly Edward the Confessor. In the late fifteenth century, Henry VII, perhaps to encourage support for his claim to the throne, instituted a ceremony for touching persons suffering from scrofula and presented the afflicted with gold coins; in the seventeenth century, Charles I distributed silver pieces for the sufferers to touch. From then until 1719, the Anglican *Book of Common Prayer* contained an office called At the Healing, in which the monarch laid hands on the assembled infirm persons and put gold or silver about their necks while a chaplain recited the following prayer: "God give a blessing to this work, and grant that these sick persons on whom the king lays his hands may recover."

The practice of royal touching to gain popular support reached its peak in England under Charles II, who reigned from 1660 to 1685. Charles touched nearly one

hundred thousand people. According to Thomas Macaulay, "in 1684, the throng was such that six or seven of the sick were trampled to death." A short time later, William III called the practice "a silly superstition," though his wife and coregent, Mary II, continued it. Queen Anne, who reigned from 1702 to 1714, was the last British monarch to practice royal touching. James Boswell recorded in his biography of Samuel Johnson that the infant Johnson had been taken to be touched by Queen Anne because he had a disfigured face, "his mother yielding to the superstitious notion, which, it is wonderful to think, prevailed so long in this country, as to the virtue of the regal touch." Queen Anne's touch, however, had no effect on the young Johnson, and Boswell teased him that "his mother had not carried him far enough, she should have taken him to Rome."

A practice comparable to the royal healing touch is the washing of feet performed on Maundy Thursday by notable people in imitation of Christ's washing his disciples' feet. The practice took its name from the Latin *mandatum*, the translation of the "new commandment" that is given in *John* 13:34. Popes, bishops, and kings practiced the ablution; the pope would wash the feet of his cardinals or, in modern times, the feet of selected poor men. In England, kings did such washing until the reign of James II in the late seventeenth century. Specially minted "Maundy money" is still distributed by the monarch to certain old people during a religious ceremony that takes place at a different cathedral in England each year on Maundy Thursday, the Thursday before Easter.

Power in the royal touch, look, or presence is attested in many places. In the *Laws of Manu* the presence of the king, like the sun, is said to burn eyes and hearts, and nobody on earth can even gaze on him; even an infant king is a deity in human form. The monarch's responsibilities are great, and he must conquer his own senses if he is to require obedience from others. The king rules by the rod but must do no bodily injury unjustly. If he fights his foes in battle, he must not strike with poisonous weapons or smite one who surrenders. His highest duty is to protect his subjects and gratify with a kindly reception all who come to see him.

West African kings often wore beaded veils over their faces, a practice that seems to be very ancient, from the evidence of bronze masks with holes for veils. To look directly at a king's face or to receive his unveiled gaze were considered equally dangerous. For the monarch to point at or touch a commoner might be seen as either a mark of favor or of danger.

In China, the physical obligations of a king were detailed by the Confucian scholar Tung Chung-shu, who

stated that the monarch must personally grasp a plow handle and plow a furrow, pluck mulberries and feed silkworms, and break new ground to increase the supply of grain. As the representative of Heaven, the king formally touched the plow or sickle to initiate the harvest. In Japan, to this day the emperor cuts the first rice of the harvest. Photographs in public newspapers show him dressed in shirt, suspenders, and trousers, harvesting rice. The rice he has cut is sent to the central Shintō shrines at Ise.

Kissing and Handshaking. Kissing is a form of close touching, a sign of reverence as well as of greeting or affection. It is performed on human beings and objects alike. The Bible's report that the prophet Elijah was assured that there were in Israel seven thousand people who had not kissed the god Baal indicates that the Canaanite and Phoenician custom of kissing the images of their gods was being practiced by the Israelites. The prophet Hosea also spoke despairingly of the Israelites kissing silver idols of calves. The Greeks and Romans also kissed images of their gods, and early Christians were persecuted for refusing to make such homage.

The ancient Hebrews kissed the floor of the Temple. Jews still kiss the scroll of the Torah when they are about to read it, and they kiss any holy book if it has been accidentally dropped. When the Torah scrolls are taken around the synagogue in procession, worshipers touch them and then place their hands on their own breasts. When a Jew puts on a prayer shawl, he kisses it, and upon entering or leaving a room, Jews may kiss or touch a *mezuzah*, the miniature container holding several verses of scripture that is affixed to a doorpost. At the Western Wall in Jerusalem, worshipers handle and kiss pieces of paper on which they write prayers and that they then put into cracks in the wall.

In the celebration of the Mass, Roman Catholic priests kiss the altar and the corporal cloth on which the sacred elements are laid. A priest also kisses the cross on a stole before he puts it on. In both Eastern and Western churches, ritual kissing is also performed with relics and with books of the gospel, crosses, candles, palm branches, vestments, and utensils of the liturgy. In British courts, oaths are sworn by taking the Bible or another holy book in ungloved hands; formerly the book was kissed.

Images and icons are popular objects of the kiss. In Saint Peter's Church in Rome, the toe of a statue of the apostle has been partly worn away by the kisses of devotees. In Ireland, the kissing of the Blarney Stone is a modern tourist attraction that may look back to prehistoric times. Part of the ritual of the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca is kissing the Black Stone, which is set in the wall of the Ka'bah. Because the crowds are vast, some

pilgrims use long sticks to touch the stone, or from a distance they simulate a gesture of touching and afterward pass their hands over their faces while praising God and his prophet. In the opposite corner of the Ka'bah is another stone, which it was the Prophet's custom to touch. When the crowd prevents a pilgrim from touching it, he says a prayer for blessing and forgiveness. Followers of the late shah of Iran may still be observed kissing his portrait, and the same gesture of reverence is offered to pictures of his rival, the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Second Psalm (2:11) exhorts Israelite worshipers to "kiss [the Lord's] feet," no doubt an act of homage. This carried over to the kissing of kings' and popes' feet. In India, to kiss the feet or take the dust of the feet upon one's own head is a sign of submission and reverence. A farewell kiss to the dead is an old practice, one that was sometimes forbidden. It is still practiced in an attenuated form by touching the coffin.

In the Islamic world, kissing the shoulder, the foot, or, especially, the hand of a holy man is believed to communicate spiritual benefit. The water in which saints have washed their hands confers grace, and schoolboys may drink the water they have used to wash the board on which they write passages from the Qur'an, in order that they may learn the text more easily. The saliva of a holy man is said to have medicinal value, and schoolboys are thought to learn their lessons better when their teachers spit into their mouths.

The kiss of peace became a distinctive Christian ritual: both Paul and Peter exhorted their readers to "salute one another with a holy kiss," but by the time of Tertullian, in the second century, it was ruled that men should kiss only men and women should kiss only women, to prevent suggestions of scandal. The kiss had a sacramental value. It was an outward sign of spiritual union or blessing: bishops were given a kiss at their consecration and kings at their coronation. The practice of the kiss of peace has been revived in modern times, either by shaking hands and uttering a phrase of peace or, for the less reserved, by giving a holy kiss.

The shaking of hands may also transfer grace or mark privilege. In Morocco, when equals meet they may join hands in salutation, and then each person will kiss his own hand. Among the West African Ashanti, during intervals of dancing, priests walk around the circle of spectators, and each places his right hand between the extended palms of the person saluted. The right hand is usually considered the proper or fortunate one, and the Ashanti may refuse to take a gift or even the payment of a debt from the left hand of the giver. In Latin, the word for left is *sinister*, and the Greeks euphemistically called the left the "well-named" side in order to avert bad luck. Shaking with the left hand, or with a finger

bent back, is practiced by special societies and copied by Freemasons and Boy Scouts.

Touching Prohibited. On the negative side, the prohibition against touching may be as important as the act itself. Usually it serves to save a person from contamination. When Moses brought the Israelites to Mount Sinai, he alone went up into the presence of God. Although the people were sanctified by ritual washing, they were exhorted not to touch the mountain or its border, for "whosoever touches the mount shall surely be put to death" (*Ex.* 19:12).

The elaborate regulations described in *Leviticus* include many prohibitions against touching objects and people that were deemed sacred or dangerous. Touching any unclean thing would bring guilt and pollution and would require purgation by the presentation of a sin offering and an atonement effected by a priest. Touching a dead body was considered particularly dangerous, and there are repeated warnings against such action. The power of blood was always perilous, and touching a menstruating woman or anything she sat on required washing and the presentation of a sin offering. Because blood was considered the life or soul, prohibitions against its consumption were imposed on Jews, and this rule was extended to Muslims as well. [*See Blood; see also Kashrut.*]

The Bible also strictly forbade touching to harm, or even to suggest disrespect for, a sacred object or person. When Uzzah put out his hand to steady the Ark, "God smote him" (*2 Sm.* 6:7). The Bible records God's command, "touch not mine anointed, and do my prophets no harm," a sentiment echoed in the vicar of Bray's damnation of those who "touch the Lord's anointed"—a reference to the execution of Charles I. An example of reverential and perhaps numinous prohibition against touching is found in the words of the risen Christ to Mary: "Touch me not" (*Jn.* 20:17).

There are many other examples of religious figures who kept themselves from being touched. When Nakayama Miki felt herself to be filled with divinity and chosen for a special mission, she separated herself from the common people. She ordered that a separate fire and separate vessels be used to cook her food, and she wore only red robes to show that she was not an ordinary person. This emphasized the numinous value of the amulets that she gave to her faithful, since she claimed to be the mediatrix between God and men, saying, "I must be set aside and live in a special and separate room."

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TOWERS. The ziggurats of Mesopotamia, the pyramids of ancient Egypt and Central America, the stupas of the Far East, the modern skyscrapers of the Western world—all may be seen as models of the cosmic mountain, the sacred center of the world, uniting heaven and earth. As such, these various forms may also be seen as the primeval mound, which arose from the abyss at the beginning of creation and is the source of all life. Cosmogony is understood to be a process of division and separation: of heaven from earth, divine from human; thus the construction of towers represents the universal human need to reunite the celestial and terrestrial worlds as they were at the beginning of time. They are expressions of our desire to escape from the world of temporal, profane geography, which stands as a constant reminder of our mortal nature, and to unite ourselves once more with the eternal, timeless, and sacred.

It is for this reason that mountains play such an important role in the central myths of many religions. Moses, the leader of the Israelites, climbed Mount Sinai to confront the divine and to receive the sacred law, which would provide the link between the Jews and their god. The ancient Greeks believed that the residence of their gods was on Mount Olympus, from whose cloud-shrouded peaks Zeus hurled his thunderbolts and made known his will to mortals. Both Buddhists and Hindus revere as the central mountain, the vertical axis of the cosmos, the mythic Mount Meru, more than

135,000 kilometers (84,000 miles) high, which they say is located north of the Himalayas. Mount Fuji in Japan is venerated by the Shintō sect as the center of the world, the guardian of the nation, and the earthly dwelling place of the supreme god. So essential to humanity's vision of the universe are mountains that artificial mountains have been built in order to re-create and affirm this link between the sacred and profane worlds.

The tower's function as the celestial mountain is demonstrated by the names given to the various ziggurats (staged towers built of mud brick) of ancient Mesopotamia. The ziggurat at Til Barsip was called "the house of the seven directions of heaven and earth" and consisted of seven sections, each representing a ruling planet; the staged tower at Babylon was revered as "the house of the foundation of heaven and earth." According to the Greek historian Herodotus, it was topped by a temple containing a bed upon which the union of the priestess and the god was consummated; this sacred marriage signified the fusion of the worlds of gods and mortals. The ziggurat at Ur, whose angles are oriented to the cardinal points of the compass, was similarly built on three levels, said to represent the divisions of the universe, and at its top was an altar where both sacrifice and observation of the heavens could take place. Perhaps the most famous ziggurat is the tower of Babel, by which, according to *Genesis*, humans attempted to climb to the heavens. The ziggurat as a celestial ladder is echoed in the biblical story of Jacob's dream, in which the patriarch envisioned a ladder joining heaven and earth and beheld "the angels of God ascending and descending it" (*Gn.* 28:12).

In India, Hinduism produced elaborate versions of the primeval mountain, Mount Meru, from which Śiva reigned as supreme god. Kailas (Śiva's paradise) at Ellora is an artificial mountain carved out of an actual mountain; built as a replica of Mount Kailāsa, Śiva's retreat in the Himalayas, and covered with elaborate carving, it took two hundred years to complete. Perhaps the most ornate of the carved mountains is the remarkable temple-tomb of the twelfth-century Cambodian ruler Suryavarman II, which served as both the king's tomb and a symbol of his divinity.

The Buddhist stupa (mound) is said to be a replica of the dome of heaven enclosing the celestial mountain. Supposedly commended by the Buddha himself, these monuments were constructed as shrines for the relics of the Buddha and his saints. The triple-terraced temple complex of Borobudur on Java consists of seventy-two stupas, each containing an image of the Buddha; it is said that to ascend to the peak of this artificial mountain is to make an ecstatic journey to the center of the world. In China, the *t'a*, a staged tower originally built

as a Buddhist shrine, became an important feature of *feng-shui* (geomancy).

The connection between the burial of the dead and the attempt to regain the sacred is also seen in the Egyptian pyramid, which may serve as the model of the primeval mound upon which sat the god Re-Atum when he called the world into being. The earliest pyramids were built as staged towers around a central core and may have provided the celestial staircase by which the pharaoh ascended to heaven. At particular times of Egyptian history, when the worship of the sun god Re was dominant, the pyramid may also have served as a solar symbol, representing, like the obelisk, the creative rays of the sun. This solar function of the pyramidal form may be more clearly seen in the Pyramid of the Sun at Teotihuacán, said to have been the place at which the sun was created.

Like the cosmic tree, which is also situated in the cen-

ter of the universe and extends into both the terrestrial and heavenly worlds, the primeval mountain, which manifests itself in these various artificial forms, enables human beings to both transcend their earthly existence and place themselves in the center of the cosmos. Through the construction of these varied replicas of the cosmic mountain, we ensure for ourselves a means of communication and even union with the sacred.

[See also Mountains; Pyramids; Stupa Worship; Temple; and Tombs.]

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