



sociology of the arts

Art and the Challenge of Markets Volume 1

National Cultural Politics and the Challenges
of Marketization and Globalization

EDITED BY
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Sociology of the Arts

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National Cultural Politics and the
Challenges of Marketization and
Globalization

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Preface

In common-sense thinking, *markets* have usually been understood as locations for the exchange of goods. Economists point out that at a more abstract level, markets can be defined as a special social space in which social agents (individuals, enterprises, communities) act in the roles of seller and buyer, and in which sellers' offers compete with each other for consumers' purchase decisions. Traditional social theory teaches that, in modern Western capitalism, these operations, that is, market competition and the buying and selling of goods, take place within a rational market order. Such market orders are ultimately guaranteed by the state, which controls economic life by means of its laws, policies, juridical norms, and courts of justice.

During recent decades, markets have expanded beyond economic sectors into areas of society which previously had not depended on markets. This occurred first in Western Europe and North America, and then spread across the world, for instance, to former Eastern Bloc nations after the collapse of different socialist experimentations. This process of *marketization* of society has primarily sprung from neoliberalist ideology. Neoliberalism has demanded that the entirety of society must, as far as possible, function in the same way as the private enterprise sector functioned in traditional capitalist and liberal democratic society. In the neoliberal model of society, the state must retreat from the production of goods and services and from the practice of entrepreneurship. Instead,

from a neoliberal perspective, the state should concentrate on the creation of a proper infrastructure and conditions of action for private economic agents.

Market-oriented politics have come to govern the sphere of culture. In the era of the classical welfare state (1945–80), art was, in many ways, under the protection of the state and was situated in the public sector. With the economic support offered by the state, art worlds could operate relatively autonomously with respect to the laws of markets. Since the 1980s and 1990s, however, art worlds have been exposed to market forces both in national societies and in world society. In this way, a great number of public institutions of art have been privatized, and those institutions that remained in the public sector are often required to follow the same operating principles as private enterprises. The latter phenomenon is usually called *managerialism*. Owing to changes such as marketization and managerialism, individual creators and arts institutions must consider the production and display of works as part of a larger commercial whole, considering sponsorship, market attractiveness, and ancillary products, along with (or in some cases, instead of) aesthetic excellence. In this respect, commercialism has become a characteristic feature of current art worlds. In more abstract terms, we can say that art's relative autonomy with respect to the capitalist economy has been reduced, and today, art is often seen as just one branch of an economy and as a source of economic growth. The popularity of conceptions such as “creative economy” and “creative industries” confirms this view.

Our book, in two volumes, demonstrates that the process of marketization has its limits. It has had a firm foothold in Anglo-American countries and in certain postsocialist countries, but several other countries have not carried it out on such a wide scale. The reasons for the resistance to marketization are both structural and normative. In several European countries, for example, in the Nordic countries, the size of the art markets is small and these markets are seen as unable to offer a basis for a well-functioning art world. The states and the public sector are, therefore, still central actors in Nordic art worlds. On the other hand, countries such as France and Germany have held that, in many respects, the creation or consumption of the arts is fundamentally incompatible with the laws of market capitalism. This conception suggests that the sphere of art

can best serve society by retaining its relatively autonomous position, and it rests on a belief that market forces might destroy the special good that a relatively autonomous sphere of art is able to offer.

The first volume of our book, *Art and the Challenge of Markets: National Cultural Politics and the Challenges of Marketization and Globalization*, explicates how European and North American national art worlds have adapted to the growing marketization and globalization of society, and traces changes in national cultural policies across a variety of countries. The volume also considers international and transnational art worlds. When dealing with the operation principles of international and transnational art worlds, the volume asks if the current process of globalization is undermining the traditional cultural hegemony of Western countries. Our book's second volume, *Art and the Challenge of Markets: From Commodification of Art to Artistic Critiques of Capitalism*, focuses on a number of theoretical themes that the turn in question has made topical. The authors of these volumes stand for different academic disciplines (sociology, political science, philosophy, cultural studies, and art studies). They do not share a common theoretical and political background, but they agree on the fact that marketization and managerialism have been important and, in part, underexplored trends in art worlds since the 1980s and 1990s.

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While the preparation of this book was in process, the author of Chap. 2, Vera L. Zolberg, passed away. Vera was an eminent scholar and a marvelous colleague, who was always warm, attentive, and sagacious. Her intellectual contributions to the sociology of art, as well as to the sociology of culture and the sociology of collective memory, are many and important.

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She was an arts sociologist well before it was fashionable, and indeed her work was instrumental in establishing the field, defining its parameters, and situating the work of art as a legitimate object of sociological inquiry. She died peacefully in November 2016, surrounded by family and friends, after a battle with cancer. We shall miss her.

June 9, 2017
London (UK) and Joensuu (Finland)

Victoria D. Alexander
Samuli Hägg,
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Part 1

Introduction

1

Varieties of National Cultural Politics and Art Worlds in an Era of Increasing Marketization and Globalization

Erkki Sevänen and Simo Häyrynen

Introduction

This book, in two volumes, considers contemporary capitalism from the standpoint of national cultural politics and art worlds. *Cultural politics* is used here as a broad concept, in a way that distinguishes it from the concept *cultural policy*. Usually, the latter refers to the decisions and practices of public cultural administration or, more narrowly, of public art administration, whereas the former is based on the thought that different sub-sectors of political action and decision-making might have cultural implications and consequences. This thought is true, for example, of economic policy, educational policy, media policy, innovation policy, research policy, and technological policy. Besides cultural policy, all of these sub-sectors can shape art worlds' habits of action and structures. Thus, *cultural*

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politics refers to the entirety of political action and decision-making that is relevant from the standpoint of art worlds. Our book aims to take this entirety into account, although it also more narrowly deals with cultural policy, that is, with the activities of public art administration. When doing so, we are aware that, in practice, the boundary between cultural politics and cultural policy is usually vague, since cultural administrations or art administrations often adopt—and they have to adopt—points of view, value principles, and ways of operation from other subareas of political action and decision-making.

As for the concept *contemporary capitalism*, it was at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s that the era of “organized” or “social” capitalism, as well as “the Keynesian national welfare state” and its cultural politics, began to come to an end in Western Europe and North America. In social sciences, the ensuing decades have often been called *an era of deregulation or neoliberalist politics*. Expressions like these point to the way in which the economic and political regulation mechanisms and social security arrangements built after the Great Depression in the early 1930s and, in particular, after the Second World War, have been attenuated or suppressed from the 1980s on; and, conversely, how Western European and North American societies have been opened up to market forces on a more global scale. These societies have, thereby, been ruled by a politics that attempts to treat the whole of society and the rest of the world as capitalist markets. Hence, if certain Western European countries, for example, France, Italy, and Germany, as well as the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), were formerly state-centric and corporatist capitalist societies, now they have, to a varying degree, changed toward market-based competitive societies.

In “traditional market-liberal” countries such as Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States, this shift toward a market-based competitive society and neoliberalist politics has perhaps not been equally sharp as in the above-mentioned countries, for economic liberalism was already formerly an important cornerstone in the structure of Anglo-Saxon societies, above all, of the United States. At any rate, they have changed into more market-orientated societies as well, and, within Europe and Northern America, it was precisely Great Britain and the United States that first began to widely practice neoliberalist politics during the right-

winged regimes of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–90) and President Ronald Reagan (1981–89). To be sure, before these two regimes, neoliberalist politics was carried out by force in Chile and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s. David Harvey (2005) points out that, actually, Chile and Argentina were, at that time, testing grounds for neoliberalist ideas.

After the collapse of Eastern European state socialism and comparable experimentations in traditional “underdeveloped” countries, nearly all of the individual countries have, since the 1990s, been parts of this new political–economic world order or global capitalism. It is only countries such as Cuba and North Korea that still attempt to stay outside it—at a price that, when acting in this way, at least North Korea has had to reject the principles of political democracy and human rights. Through this, capitalist economics, which was originally a European invention, seems to have victoriously spread throughout the world.

In the first instance, the contemporary political and economic world order has followed the rules of market capitalism or a free market economy. Besides American and British governments, certain powerful supranational organizations have maintained these rules globally. *Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Political Economy* (2013), a collection of articles edited by Vivien Ann Schmidt and Mark Thatcher, presents an overview of these sort of organizations, which include the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organization (WTO), and recent meetings of the world’s economic leaders (Schmidt and Woll 2013, 130–32). Likewise, the states belonging to the European Union (EU) form an area that is based on the free movement of capital, labor forces, services, and commodities. Within the EU, institutions such as the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), and the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) have committed themselves to neoliberalist politics (Thatcher and Schmidt 2013, 418–21). Thus, all of the organizations mentioned here have been protectors of market capitalism or a free market economy in the world or in certain of its subregions.

The shift toward a free market economy is not the only significant transformation in the nature of contemporary capitalism. At the same

time, capitalism's internal power structure has undergone a radical change. If "rational capitalism" emerged in Europe from the fifteenth century on in the form of farming and trading capitalism, and if industrial capitalism displaced this economic formation from the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on, then we have now come to the era that is dominated by finance capitalism, that is, by powerful banks and finance companies. Banks and finance companies such as these function on a global scale, and by means of an advanced digital technology, they are capable of rapidly transferring huge sums of money from one continent to another continent and, through this, also of fundamentally changing ordinary people's conditions of living.

To date, scholars of art have not systematically described in which ways national cultural politics and art worlds in Europe and North America have moved from the protection of the traditional welfare state or state socialism to the contemporary situation in which market competition and the impacts of a global capitalist economy increasingly shape the entirety of our societal-cultural reality. Have these national cultural politics and art worlds now merged with a capitalist economy, "creative industries," and commercial entertainment culture, as cultural theorists such as Jean Baudrillard (1983, 1997) and Jeremy Rifkin (2000), some decades ago, predicted? Or, do we rather live now in an era when they are being replaced by global cultural flows and by expanding international or transnational art worlds, as the most eager theorists of globalization have presumed?

The first volume of this book addresses these questions by describing how the transition from traditional welfare state or state socialist cultural politics and art worlds to contemporary cultural politics and art worlds was realized in different national societies in Europe and North America. Likewise, it pays attention to the fact that, since the 1980s, international or transnational art worlds have strengthened their position in comparison with national art worlds. This implies that this book regards concepts such as *national society*, *national systems of art*, and *national art worlds* as legitimate tools in an analysis concerning contemporary societal-cultural reality. Thus, the book does not stand for a position that finds them obsolete. The most well-known representative of a position like this is perhaps Niklas Luhmann, who has held that it is chiefly only *world society* and its subconcepts that form adequate tools in descriptions of modern and contemporary society.

National Societies and World Society

Luhmann differs from sociologists such as Zygmunt Bauman (1992), Ulrich Beck (1997), and Richard Münch (1998), who have tended to speak about globalization and world society chiefly in relation to the contemporary phase of societal development. Their way of conceptualizing current societal changes offers us a picture in which national societies have lost a great deal of their economic, political, and cultural sovereignty since the 1990s. And correspondingly, in the areas of economy, politics, science, education, art, sports, and mass communication, there have, according to this picture, emerged collective agents and webs which act on a worldwide scale, constituting in this way a world society. Due to this, in the contemporary phase of societal development or in “global modernity,” nation-states and national societies would no longer be such important agents as in “classical modernity,” which, roughly speaking, lasted from the latter half of the eighteenth century to the 1960s and 1970s.

Luhmann does not speak about world society quite in this way. His manner of using the concept at issue recalls Immanuel Wallerstein, even if the latter one is known as a Marxist theorist, whereas Luhmann has been seen as a politically conservative sociologist. Yet, both of them have argued for the view that *the modern world system* or world society already began to emerge at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Wallerstein (2000, 250) regards as its point of departure the late fifteenth century, when Europeans became increasingly aware of other continents and started to exploit their natural and human resources. During the next century, European states, then, launched their colonial conquests of and expansion into other continents. Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and England led this expansion, and, in a warlike manner, they competed with each other for the possession of these overseas areas. In Wallerstein’s theory, there has, thereby, for 500 years, been a modern world system in which Western states have formed a dominating centrum of power and forced the other continents to adapt themselves to a global division of labor imposed upon them by the Western world. This modern world system has, Wallerstein emphasizes, also been capitalist by nature, as Western countries have utilized and exploited other continents’ resources as a means in economic surplus value production.

Partly in a similar vein, Luhmann starts his description of the birth of world society from the end of the Middle Ages, when Europeans “discovered” the other continents and began to interact with them. Gradually, an interaction such as this deepened and enlarged, and led to the formation of world society. In Europe, this process originally took place in the lap of the aristocratic estate society, which fell into decay by the eighteenth century. At a structural level, the primary hallmark of this aristocratic estate society was stratified differentiation: this society was divided into various estate groups, each of which had its own position in society’s status hierarchy. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the aristocratic estate society was replaced by modern society, which has been based on *functional differentiation*; that is, modern society has been divided into functional subsystems (economy, politics, law, science, education, art, mass communication, sports, religion, private sphere) that are relatively autonomous with regard to each other. Each of these subsystems has had a specific function in society and its own principles of operation that have differentiated it from other subsystems (Luhmann 1997, 24–25, 30–35). Unlike Wallerstein, Luhmann does not, however, explain the emergence of world society only by economic factors. In addition, he takes into account the introduction of modern printing technology and mass media, for they have made possible a shift from local communicative networks to wider and wider networks; this development has, in part, also accelerated economic globalization.

Perhaps the most astonishing dimension in Luhmann’s theory is his rejection of the concept of national society. He does not state that the concept of national society has lost its credibility as a result of the current wave of globalization. Instead, his stand is more radical, since he suggests that, under conditions of modernity, there can hardly be any national or regional societal systems. Only political administrations and legal systems have clung to national or regional boundaries, while other functional subsystems have functioned as parts of world society since the beginning of modernity (Luhmann 1997, 166–68). Accordingly, it would be theoretically correct to speak about different national political–administrative systems and different national legal systems, but to talk about different national economic systems and different national systems of art would be inadequate (See, also, Sevänen 2001, 85–87; 2008, 50–80).

Wallerstein and Luhmann have presented good grounds for their statement that modernity has inherently been global. Hence, one can say that the contemporary phase of history has just made the process of globalization more and more concrete and intensive, but it did not start it. On the other hand, Luhmann's concept of system threatens to make a comparative study between different national economic systems or between different national systems of art practically impossible. As a critique of his theory, it is better to think that under conditions of modernity, national or regional societal systems have usually been relatively open formations that have been interwoven with comparable international or transnational systems. In this alternative way of thinking, it is theoretically legitimate to speak about the American, Austrian, British, Estonian and Swiss systems of art and to think that they are national social formations that, to a varying degree, participate in the functioning of international or transnational systems of art.

The latter aspect manifests itself widely in American and British systems of art, which have had a firm position in international or transnational art worlds. Austria and Switzerland cannot compare with them on a wide area, but in the area of classical concert music, Austria definitely belongs to the centers of the international world of music, and Switzerland is a commercial center of the international world of visual art, design and luxury goods. On the other hand, Estonian artists and art institutions have a marginal position in international art worlds. The concept of national art world or national system of art is theoretically acceptable also for the reason that national legal and political-administrative systems have regulated the functioning of modern institutions of art within corresponding national societies. Nationally distinctive and relatively stable systems of art have, in part, been constituted just by a regulation like this.

Varieties of Contemporary Capitalism

In order to be able to explain to what extent cultural politics and art worlds in Europe and North America have carried out market-based ways of action, we must first consider how widely European and North American societies have, at a general level, adopted neoliberalist dogmas.

Originally, the proponents of the neoliberalist politics endeavored to justify the contemporary phase of capitalism by explaining it as a necessary phase in societal development. According to them, for several reasons, the traditional Keynesian or Western welfare state came to its natural end in the 1970s and 1980s: it proved, among other things, to be too expensive, and, at the same time, these proponents regarded it as ineffective. In relation to the latter point, they meant that most of the goods and services that were formerly produced by the states can best be established by means of free competition between private enterprises.

Friedrich von Hayek (2005), the founding father of neoliberalist economic thinking, laid great stress on this point. He believed that a centralist-planned economy of any kind would necessarily lead to the waste of resources, because it could not take into account all of the information that is relevant in economic decision-making. Consequently, in the neoliberal model of society, commercial enterprises, and not the states, are, first and foremost, responsible for the production of goods and services in society. Hence, both global society and national societies must largely be organized in the same way that the private sector has been organized under capitalism. Thus, the neoliberal model has demanded *a marketization* of societies. However, unlike the laissez-faire liberalism of the nineteenth century, usually the proponents of neoliberalism have not been against all kinds of public regulation directed toward economics. To be sure, there is, among these proponents, a group of anarcho-capitalists or hyper-neoliberalists who would like to minimize the role of the state or even to abolish the state. In contrast to this minority group, neoliberalism's main stream has spoken for the strong state, for, according to this doctrine, it is the duty of the state to create and maintain the legal rules that guarantee a rational market order. The state must, thereby, control the behavior of economic actors and punish those actors that, for example, by creating cartels do not respect the principles of free market competition (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013b, 3–7).

After having seen the rise of the Polish Solidarity Movement in the 1980s, as well as the gradual decline of the Soviet Union and, more generally, the Eastern European state socialism, Social Democratic parties in Western Europe also adopted the notion that there is no real alternative to capitalism. This is why neoliberalism, which has, since the turn of the

1980s and 1990s, been the dominant economic and political strategy and ideology in the world, has not only been realized by right-winged (Margaret Thatcher, in Great Britain; Ronald Reagan, in the United States) and liberal democratic (Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, in the United States) politicians. Leftist politicians, such as Francois Mitterand and Lionel Jospin, in France; Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, in Great Britain; and Gerhard Schröder, in Germany, have promoted it as well. In addition, in the 1990s, former socialist states in Europe usually began to carry it out in a straightforward and orthodox way—with the result that, in that decade, they, especially, Estonia and Latvia, formed the most neo-liberal or market-based area in Europe (Hay and Smith 2013, 294–96; Schnyder and Jackson 2013, 330–31; Gualmini and Schmidt 2013, 363–67).

Yet, in spite of capitalism's and neoliberalism's worldwide dominance, there are striking differences between individual capitalist economies or between national capitalist societies. To be sure, social theorists do not agree on how the variety of capitalism should be categorized or what sorts of capitalism exist today. In *Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (2001), edited by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, the editors, as well as the authors of the articles, speak about two types of contemporary capitalism: *a liberal market economy* and *a coordinated market economy*. According to this classical book, the coordination of economic activities takes places differently in them.

A liberal market economy prevails in Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, and, above all, the United States. The markets have, in this type, a decisive role in the coordination of economic activities, whereas the role of the external regulation that is directed toward economic activities has been minimized. Thus, this type is based on the belief that capitalist markets can, within established legislation, largely form a self-regulating and self-correcting system in which economic actors have to adjust themselves (Table 1.1).

A coordinated market economy prevails in Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In this type, the coordination of economic activities is dealt with by social actors. In Germany, for example, such coordination has taken place in the industrial sector; in the Nordic countries, the state and

Table 1.1 Three types of contemporary capitalism and their political backgrounds, with representatives of these types

	Liberal market capitalism	Coordinated market capitalism or managed capitalism	State capitalism or state-led capitalism
Liberal democratic political system	Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, the United States, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Russia of the 1990s, Latin American countries in the 1990s	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan	France, Italy (?), and India. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, also Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela
Semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian political system	Hong Kong		Singapore, and since the beginning of the twenty-first century, also Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Turkey
Authoritarian political system Dictatorship	Chile 1973–90 Argentina 1976–83		China

Sources: Crouch (2005), Ebenau and Liberatore (2013), Gilpin (2001), 304–40. Hall and Soskice (2001), Hucka et al. (2016), Jackson and Deeg (2006), Jessop (2002), Kashara (2013), Lechevalier (2014), Schmidt (2002), Schmidt and Thatcher (2013a)

economic–political interest groups have been important agents in the coordination of economic activities; and in Japan and South Korea, the state and the conglomerates of banks and industry have, in this respect, played a major role. However, Sébastien Lechevalier (2014, 79–85) remarks that, since the 1990s, the coordinating role of banks and industry has been on the decrease in Japan, and, conversely, governmental innovation policy and a cooperation between companies and universities have created new forms of coordination in the Japanese economy.

Although we cannot here lean on systematic empirical studies, with all probability, today, public innovation policy and a cooperation between economy and academic institutions are important factors also in other “national economies”—considering that current capitalism is increasingly based on the utilization of the results of technological development work and scientific research.

Hall and Soskice’s book mentions France as a possible example of a third type, a state-led capitalism, without paying detailed attention to it. In her study, *The Futures of European Capitalism* (2002), Vivien Ann Schmidt deals with *state capitalism* or *state-led capitalism* as its own type. She distinguishes between three types of contemporary European capitalism: “market capitalism” (which, roughly speaking, corresponds to “liberal market economy” in Hall and Soskice’s typology), “managed capitalism” (rather similar to “coordinated market economy” in Hall and Soskice’s typology), and “state capitalism.” The most clear-cut instance of state capitalism in Western Europe is France, and certain other Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) have been close to it as well. Although the role of the state has clearly been reduced in France during the last decades, the French state still has, according to Schmidt, a considerable role in the maintenance and exploitation of national economic resources. For this reason, contemporary France represents state-led capitalism in her typology.

In practice, all of the societies in Western Europe and North America combine a capitalist economy with political democracy at the national level. However, in the current world order, Western countries do not give the principles of democracy a similar position. These countries have dominated the IMF, the WB and the WTO, which are formally the United Nations (UN) suborganizations that have subordinated individual countries into the current world order, for example, via debt arrangements. These three organizations have not followed the principles of open and genuine democracy, as the leading Western states and Japan have supremacy in their decision-making bodies. At any rate, a combination of political democracy and capitalism is not always a reality in non-Western national societies. China, for example, stands, in part, for state capitalism, for the Chinese state is itself, both nationally and globally, an important economic actor. In other respects, China can be labeled as a

representative of *authoritarian capitalism*, since in China, it is, in the last instance, the Communist Party that controls the Chinese state and economy.

In the 1990s, the former state socialist countries in Eastern Europe attempted to draw a sharp boundary line between their socialist past and market-based present, and in these efforts, they received massive financial support from Western European and North American governments, banks, and investors—on the condition that, at the same time, they committed themselves to carry out neoliberalist politics. This is why they were usually able to offer their citizens only a shrinking public sector, as well as a minimal or a practically nonexistent social security system. In the 1990s, these countries represented, therefore, a liberal market economy's crude version. Because most of them are nowadays also member states of the EU, they have continued to follow, in a more prosperous situation, neoliberalist politics. In particular, this generalization is true of countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, of which Poland has proved to be an economically successful representative of this form of politics. To be sure, in autumn 2015, “Law and Order,” a right-winged nationalist and conservative party, took over in Poland, and at present, it is unclear whether Poland will stick to the legacy of liberalism. Likewise, Czech Republic and Slovenia, which was formerly part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, have been economic successes, but their economies have been, instead of liberal market capitalism, close to a managed or coordinated market form of capitalism (see Hucka et al. 2016).

Despite this, during the last years, state capitalist and semi-authoritarian tendencies have strengthened in former socialist countries. The leading force in this respect has been Russia, a country outside the EU. Mitchell A. Orenstein (2013, 393–94) writes that when President Vladimir Putin came to power at the beginning of the 2000s, he initiated a radical shift in Russia's policy. His central priority has been order, which means that he has limited the power and space to move of the markets in Russia and increased the role of the state in economics and politics. As a result, Russia has moved toward a state capitalist and semi-authoritarian society whose ruling practices—a close relationship between President Vladimir Putin and economic oligarchs, a silencing of the economic and political opposition, serious defects in freedom of speech, discrimination against

ethnic and sexual minorities, aggressive foreign policy against former member states of the Soviet Union—are incompatible with the norms of political democracy. Similar tendencies toward state capitalism and semi-authoritarian order have emerged in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and—since autumn 2015—Poland, which are member states of the EU. To this group we may add Turkey, which has, since 2005, negotiated with the EU on potential membership into this supranational organization. Needless to say, these countries have received sharp critique from this liberal-minded organization.

Likewise, state capitalist tendencies have been strong in Latin America during the last 15 years. From the 1970s on, Latin American countries have combined elements of neoliberalism with several different forms of capitalist economics and political order. In the 1970s and 1980s, Chile's (1973–90) and Argentina's (1976–83) military rules represented a radical right-winged version of authoritarian societal order—a version that was close to fascism, as by means of a dictatorship and political terror, they forced their societies to obey the principles of a free market economy. After this period, most of the Latin American countries followed neoliberalist politics in a more peaceful and orthodox way, until, in the first decade of the new millennium, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela drew away, in part, from it and began to add elements of state capitalism and left-winged welfare thinking into their economic and social politics (Ebenau and Liberatore 2013, 105–58). This change was, among other things, based on the fact that the previous versions of neoliberalist politics had not managed to abolish the enormous economic–social contrasts between different classes in these countries. At present, the future of Latin American state capitalism is, however, uncertain. Namely, in autumn 2015, Mauricio Macri's center-right party won the parliamentary election in Argentina, and in August 2016, the Brazilian parliament discharged the leftist president Dilma Rousseff from her office because of the misuse of the state's money. It has been supposed that, for these reasons, Argentina and Brazil will, at least for a while, detach themselves from state-led capitalism in the near future.

In conclusion, despite the fact that free or coordinated market capitalism has had a firm position in Western Europe and North America, social theorists have often thought that, in the subsequent decades, we will

perhaps witness, within world society, a gradual shift toward a more regulated capitalism or toward a more protectionist capitalism—and that, since the recent global economic crisis, started in the United States in 2008, the world has already, to some extent, taken cautious steps to this direction, that is, toward a new kind of world order. During recent decades, these thoughts have often been based on the supposition that “emerging economies” such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which give the state a more central economic role than Western countries are ready to do, will, at the expense of Western countries, increase their importance in the global economy. In addition, at present, it is unclear how far the new US Federal government, conducted by Donald Trump (US president from 2017 on), will engage itself to neoliberalist politics. This new power constellation will obviously not lead the United States toward state capitalism or state-led capitalism, but at the level of world society, it is likely that it begins to produce protectionist barriers of trade between single national economies. In a situation such as this, neoliberalism would have significantly lost its ideological and practical–political value in world society.

Varieties of Contemporary National Cultural Politics and Art Worlds

In Europe and North America, the shift from the traditional welfare state or state socialism toward a market-based competitive society has profoundly affected cultural politics and art worlds. A growing marketization and managerialism have, consequently, been typical of art worlds in Europe and North America since the 1980s. During the last decades, several public art centers, museums, theaters, dance groups, orchestras, film productions, and art schools have been privatized in European and North American countries, and, in this way, have changed into commercial enterprises, all of which have not been economically successful. Simultaneously, the institutions of art that are still owned by the public sector, that is, by states, provinces, cities, towns, and villages, must today function more and more like commercial enterprises and acquire sponsorship money from the private sector; in this way, *managerialist principles*

have been applied to art worlds widely. Reasons for this have been taken from *New Public Management*, that is, from a doctrine that was elaborated in Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and that, in the name of cost efficiency, wants to change the public sector into a more market-oriented space. Through this, the principle of competition is increasingly present in contemporary art worlds, which have been forced to compete with each other and other media and leisure-time activities for popularity, attendance, and sponsor money.

In these respects, Europe and North America do not, however, form a homogenous block. Their national art worlds can be divided into different groups, which, only in part, correspond to the above-mentioned typology of capitalism. Here, we do not, however, aim to present a complete typology of these art worlds but rather to raise certain interesting contrasts between them. As for privatization and marketization of the institutions of art, among the European and North American societies, the clearest exception is France, which was traditionally a state capitalist country. Even if French society has adopted more and more neoliberalist and managerialist principles, as Elisabetta Gualmini and Vivien Ann Schmidt (2013) have demonstrated, the French state has not given up its own institutions of art. Authorities and politicians, as well as ordinary citizens, in France still think that it is the duty of the state to protect the sphere of art and culture against market forces and private interests. Extensive privatization tendencies have not, therefore, been typical of the French art world (see, also, McGuigan 2004, 65–70).

Several other Mediterranean countries have not been as stable as France. During the last years, Greece and Spain, for example, have been forced to cut their public spending and to make radical savings and changes in the public sector, including the institutions of culture and education. It is above all Greece that has, through this, reduced and suppressed its former public systems and brought crude neoliberalist principles into its economic, social, cultural, and educational policies. Stathis Kouvelakis (2011, 1) states that, since 2009, Greece has, in fact, carried out “the most punishing austerity programme ever implemented in post-war Europe.” Besides real poverty and social insecurity, this form of politics has produced general strikes, huge and violent demonstrations, and extreme right-winged mass movements among Greeks (Matsaganis 2013, 27–34).

The Nordic countries, that is, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, are close to France in the sense that, despite clear-cut marketization and managerialism tendencies, their art worlds are still largely dependent on the state and the rest of the public sector. Formerly, these small “Social Democratic” countries had a lot in common with the state capitalist model of society, but from the turn of the 1980s and 1990s on, they have come close to the model of a coordinated market economy. A characteristic feature of these small countries is the fact that their national art markets are quite limited in size; these art worlds cannot, therefore, function properly without the expansive financial support of the public sector. In Finland, for example, even 70–80% of the incomes of theaters and orchestras come as grants from the public sector, that is, from the Finnish state and local authorities. Of the other representatives of a coordinated market economy, Austria is close to the Nordic countries, whereas in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, marketization and managerialism tendencies are stronger in cultural life; despite this, their cultural life cannot be equated with the Anglo-Saxon or neoliberal model of cultural life (CPIF 1995; Rueschemeyer 2005).

On the opposite, extreme pole, there are Anglo-American countries such as Canada, Great Britain and the United States that underline the importance of markets and private sponsorship in art life. Notably, in the United States, business life and the markets have traditionally been much more central financial factors in art life than the Federal government and the states of the United States, and this tendency has strengthened after the neoliberal turn. Victoria D. Alexander (2005a, b) and Chin-tao Wu (2002) point out that during the last decades, the British art world has come closer to the American art world, but it is still economically more dependent on the state and the public sector than its American counterpart. On the other hand, Alexander and Wu remark that, actually, the difference between Great Britain and the United States is not necessarily as big as it looks at first sight. Namely, in the United States, private enterprises have been entitled to tax reliefs for their donations to the arts, and, through this, the American public sector has indirectly been a relatively important financer of art life.

In state socialist Europe, art worlds were usually maintained by the states. After the collapse of this system, postsocialist countries aimed at

basing their art worlds on other supporters, but when doing so, they have been faced with a serious dilemma. Some of these countries (among others, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Serbia) have been quite poor. As a result, their markets and nonprofit sector have not been able to maintain, on a large scale, a well-functioning art life—nor has the state, in these countries, been rich enough to widely finance art life. For these reasons, their art worlds have been on unstable ground. On the other hand, countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Russia, and the former German Democratic Republic are today, in an economic sense, closer to Western Europe. Yet, in these countries, the construction of a well-functioning market-based system of art has also been a complicated process, which seems to be still, to a varying extent, in progress.

In social theory, it is every now and then presumed that due to the current process of globalization, different societies will, in the future, adopt one and the same model of economics. By this model, these theorists usually mean market capitalism or a free market economy. On the basis of the current diversity between different countries, it is difficult to believe that a prediction like this will come true in the near future. These national peculiarities are usually based on the special conditions under which different societies have, in the long run, built their institutions and systems, by which the same model is hardly suitable for every society. Nor are the markets alone always the most efficient way of organizing the system of art, which indicates that neoliberalist politics has weaknesses of its own in the area of art.

The Competitive State and Its Cultural Politics

In contemporary societies, art worlds' position differs, in many respects, from the position that they gained in the era of the classical welfare state. Since the 1980s and 1990s, national and international or transnational art worlds have functioned in a world that has increasingly been characterized by relatively free markets and severe market competition. These two things have belonged to the central structural compulsions of the world order in question. The states have adjusted themselves to these

compulsions by transforming their values, goals, and ways of operation. Consequently, during the recent decades, the role of the states as providers of democracy and welfare for their own citizens has weakened—but not disappeared—and, instead of this, today, the states function more and more as competitive units or as *competitive states*. At the same time, the states practice a new kind of *economic nationalism* or *economic patriotism*. Today, both of these things largely shape their politics, including cultural politics.

Economic nationalism or economic patriotism can be defined as the aim that social actors, in particular the state, carry out in order to promote domestic economic life and to give this life a special meaning and position with regard to other economies. Formerly, economic nationalism was often identified with *economic protectionism*, but in the contemporary world order, protectionism has not been feasible on a wide scale, as national economies have been opened up to transnational and global economic actors and capital flows. In this seemingly borderless social space, states strive to be more competitive than others; this goal they wish to achieve by raising the competitiveness of domestic enterprises in world markets and by shaping their own national social systems and environments as attractive sites of operation for domestic and foreign companies and investors. During last decades, this has been the core content of economic nationalism, in particular, in the Western world.¹

The states have adjusted different subareas of their societies to serve the promotion of their competitiveness. Through this, economic–nationalistic discourse has spread into almost every subarea of society and become rooted in them, and these subareas take its view of the world as self-evident. In this way, economic nationalism has largely become a routinized element of societal–cultural reality; it stands, thereby, for “banal nationalism”—to use the apt concept introduced by Michael Billig (1995) two decades ago.

The nature of the competitive state becomes clearer if we take into account what has happened to the world order after the Second World War. In the decades after the Second World War, the then capitalist world system functioned on the basis of a limited economic freedom and competition. The reason for this was the existence of two world systems. Therefore, Western states had also to cooperate with each other, as they

aimed to establish a wide economic, political–ideological and military front against the Soviet Union and the socialist world system. On a national level, this capitalist world system was supplemented by Keynesian politics, through which the state regulated the rest of society widely. The Keynesian doctrine held that it is by creating stable economic growth and welfare that Western states can integrate the lower classes into democratic and capitalist society and guarantee its peaceful development. Hence, in this phase, the state was understood as a provider of welfare and democracy for its own citizens.

During the era of the classical welfare state, art was seen as a public good of which the public sector must, to a considerable extent, take care financially. In Western Europe, the states created, therefore, networks of cultural institutions for the purpose that cultural services would be accessible to each citizen—regardless of his or her age, gender, class, and dwelling place. This aspect of public cultural policy was called *cultural democratization*, and it was based on egalitarian principles. Even if these principles chiefly meant that, in practice, public institutions of art in Western European countries distributed products of high art to their citizens, it is important to note that, in this phase, cultural policy aimed to reach the entire population. The Nordic countries, especially, held that the entire population had a right to the cultural and social services provided by the welfare state.

This cultural policy was also paternalistic. In Western Europe, cultural politicians strived to protect the sphere of art from the invasion of cultural industry that was mostly American by origin. When doing this, they believed that “authentic,” “genuine,” or “pure” art does not, unlike cultural industry, strive for economic profit. Rather, it aims at satisfying people’s aesthetic and spiritual needs, and at enriching the national culture from which it originates (Bennett 1995, 20–21). In this way, capitalism was seen as a threat to the authentic values of high art and national cultures. Therefore, by means of public financial resources, cultural politicians in Western Europe defended art’s relatively autonomous position in society against capitalist economy, in particular, against the emerging cultural capitalism. However, from the 1970s on, cultural politicians also began to support people’s own cultural activities and artistic hobbies; in their own language, this new orientation was known as *cultural democracy*.

In the United States, public support for art was less encompassing than in Western Europe, and its motives and goals were diverse. At any rate, one can say that in this leading Western country, public support for art was, in part, egalitarian and paternalistic by its motives as well, since it was mainly addressed to nonprofit institutions and ways of action in art worlds. In addition, the Federal government and American local elite groups found public support for the arts important for the reason that, to their mind, it was possible, by means of the arts, to raise the prestige and status of the United States among the nations, as well as to develop the cultural and intellectual resources of its states. In this sense, the American public support system was based on patriotic motives. Despite this, in the 1980s and 1990, this system fell into the disfavor of conservative and neoliberal politicians, who attacked it, for example, by arranging several campaigns against avant-gardist or “indecent” art exhibitions financed by public or semi-public art institutions (Alexander 2005a, 20, 33, 34, 37–44).

If we choose one concept to describe the background values of public cultural policy after the Second World War, this concept would obviously be *universalism*. Universalism has perhaps been a more familiar concept in studies of social policy and in theories of the welfare state than in research concerning cultural policy, but it is relevant also in the latter case. In the case of the welfare state, universalism included a view that the entire population is entitled to social benefits and services, which must be understood as citizens’ basic rights; and, in the last resort, it is the state and the rest of the public sector that are responsible for the realization of basic social rights. In postwar Western societies, this sort of universalism functioned as an explicit political strategy by which Western states could restrain their internal tensions and class conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, several Western states institutionalized universalism as the core dimension of their national cultural policies as well. In this sense, they saw social and cultural welfare as analogous phenomena. The main promoter behind this development was the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), whose strategy regarded the highly centralized French state as the model country of cultural life (Girard 1972; Vestheim 2010). At a more concrete level, national cultural policies regarded cultural democratization, egalitarianism, paternalism, and cultural democracy as the means by which they could realize universal cultural goals within the corresponding nation-states.

This sort of universalism had its own restrictions. It should be noted that the welfare state cultural policy conceived of nation-states and their citizens as the prime actors in cultural life. The welfare state cultural policy aimed, thereby, at safeguarding the corresponding nation-states' hegemony in cultural life. However, in these nation-states, "national culture" and "national cultural interests" were, in the first instance, defined by ethnic majorities, but immigrant groups and minorities seeking for autonomy or independence often formed a problem for the welfare state cultural policy. These sovereign nation-states wished to base the cultural exchange between nation-states on intergovernmental agreements, whereas international or transnational cultural industry was seen by them as a threat to their own national cultural sovereignty. For this reason, they tended to apply protectionist restrictions to foreign cultural supply.

The concept of competitive state wishes to catch the state's new role in the current world order. On the basis of the above-presented description, we can conclude that the welfare state aimed at domesticating capitalism. This type of political arrangement was based on the belief that capitalist economy's power in society must be restricted—for the reason that, according to the Keynesian doctrine, it is only in a restricted form that this economy can be combined with political democracy, social solidarity, peaceful social development, and flourishing national culture. In contrast, in the current world order, capitalist markets are seen as self-evident ways of organizing social action. In this world order, politicians, therefore, tend to behave like salesmen. In this new role, they strive to make good offers and options for companies and investors, and to adjust the entire society, as far as possible, to serve the needs or imperatives of national economic competitiveness. As Tore Fougner (2006) aptly points out, no wonder then that ordinary citizens have estranged themselves from politics nowadays.

It is not only the states that function today as competitive units. Larger political units such as the EU, as well as smaller units, in particular, regions and cities, can have a similar function. The EU has promoted the development of cities, for example, by choosing an annual European Capital of Culture and by giving a relatively small sum of money for the development of its competitiveness. As for the competitiveness of larger units, in the beginning of the new millennium, the EU optimistically declared that it intends to itself become "the most competitive area in the

world” in the near future. This wish has not come true. On the contrary, for a long time, the United States, as well Asian countries such as China, India, and South Korea, have been economically more dynamic than Europe, which has suffered from a low economic growth, high degree of unemployment, and serious internal tensions and contradictions.

The result of Great Britain’s referendum on the EU membership in June 2016 (“Brexit”) and Eastern and Southeastern European countries’ resolute critique on the EU’s immigration policy are well-known instances of these deep problems within the EU. Likewise, the EU and the United States have, for several years, negotiated on the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership*, that is, on the TTIP agreement, but to date, these negotiations on the establishment of a common transatlantic free trade area have not led to a positive result—among others, for the reason that several European countries have not been ready to accept the American conception of “free trade.” This failure also indicates that, in the current world order, it might often be difficult to unite the principles of competition and cooperation. In this respect, the situation of the *Trans-Pacific Partnership* (TPP) agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam should be different, for as of autumn 2016, it lay waiting for the ratification of the states at issue. However, it is also possible that this agreement will be dropped, since President Donald Trump withdrew from it in January 2017. Instead of this sort of huge agreement, he favors bilateral agreements between countries.

The competitive state functions in a world that swears by market competition or by market freedom. It has, therefore, been difficult for individual states to avoid this sort of market competition or market freedom. To modify Jean-Paul Sartre’s well-known words, we can say that the states have largely been doomed to this “freedom.” In the 1980s and 1990s, it was chiefly the economic–political elite groups that strove to adjust the state to this world order. Later, other groups have adopted the idea of national competitiveness as well. Today, economic nationalism is, thereby, widely understood as a precondition of rational realpolitik. For example, in Finland, all of the political parties must nowadays declare themselves as promoters of “our national competitiveness”; otherwise, their political programs do not seem “realistic” and “rational”

enough (see also Kantola 2014). The discourse concerning national competitiveness is also a central element in current Finnish populist and extreme right-winged nationalism, which is partly overlapping with Finnish economic nationalism. In the same way, the boundary between official or “sound economic nationalism” and populist and extreme right-winged nationalism has become blurred in several other countries. This holds, in particular, true for countries such as Hungary, Russia, and Turkey, which have made of old-fashioned conservative nationalism an official ideology maintained and propagated by the state. In this sense, these states have also accused Western European and Northern American countries of nihilism and of a lack of fundamental values. Yet, at least in Western European countries, we may distinguish official nationalism and populist or extreme right-winged nationalism from each other by stating that the former has committed itself to neo-liberalist politics and free markets, whereas the latter aims to put more protectionism into the politics practiced by the state.

Although economic nationalism is today deeply rooted in our societal-cultural reality, different social groups and countries do not necessarily agree on the content of competitiveness. Here, we can compare the Nordic countries and Ireland with each other. In the Nordic countries, it has often been thought that an expansive welfare state, a stable political democracy, a well-functioning public educational system, a high level of equality between different social groups, a wide network of public cultural services, and a systematic environmental protection are, instead of being obstacles to competitiveness, competitive advantages. Despite this, since the 1990s, these countries have somewhat reduced their welfare systems, and the degree of economic-social and regional inequality has been on the increase in them.

The Nordic countries have traditionally been state-centric societies that began to limit the power of markets early. This long-term tradition is still, to a decreasing extent, visible in their political life. Ireland, in turn, is a market-liberal country in which the role of the state has been minimized. Consequently, in 1994–2007, Ireland experienced an exceptional boom whose social costs were high. Peadar Kirby (2009) writes that an important element in this boom was Ireland’s low tax rate on company profits (10.0–12.5%).² This low level of corporate taxation created

favorable conditions for economic activities, but during the boom at issue, Ireland also became the country with the second-highest level of inequality among the rich OECD countries. Namely, in 1994–2003, the rate of those in Ireland with incomes below the official poverty line increased from 15.6% to 22.7% (the official poverty line is 60% of the entire population's median income). For the sake of comparison, it should be mentioned that in Finland, about 12–14% of the population lives today below the official poverty line.

Thus, competitiveness can be understood either in a narrow or in a wide sense. In a narrow interpretation, it is, first and foremost, equated with the flourishing of domestic economic life or with domestic companies' success in world markets. In a wide view, "competitiveness" means an advanced state of entire society. According to this wide view, an individual society is competitive if its subareas are advanced and form a well-functioning entirety. In this interpretation, the competitive state comes close to the so-called *developmental state*. Usually, this concept has been applied to countries such as Japan after the decades of the Second World War, as well as to contemporary China, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In all of them, the state has played an active role in the advancing of domestic economic–social and cultural development. By promoting and steering domestic economic life, by raising its competitiveness in the world economy, and by investing in science and education, the developmental state has aimed to raise the whole population's economic–social and spiritual well-being and its status among nations. Consequently, developmental states have usually combined with authoritarian capitalism (China), state-led capitalism (Argentina, Brazil), or a coordinated market economy (Japan, South Korea), but not with a liberal market economy. Typically, developmental states have been broad nationalist projects that have included clear-cut elements of traditional economic nationalism; that is, they have protected their own domestic economic life from foreign enterprises and investors, and have often also prevented these foreign actors from penetrating it. In all, developmental states have deviated from the neoliberal model in the sense that they have subordinated economy to serve larger societal goals (see also Beeson 2013; Castells 2000, 197–99; Ebenau and Liberatore 2013; Gilpin 2001, 305–40; Kashara 2013).

Creative Economy or Creative Industries

The competitive politics has influenced the subpolitics of science, education, and technology profoundly. Since the 1980s and 1990s, governments, universities, research institutions, and economic life have together reorganized this area, which they see as a major source of innovations, economic growth, and competitiveness. Through this, science, education, and technology have increasingly been subordinated to serve the logic of capitalist economy and capital accumulation. In sociological research literature, this phenomenon has been termed *academic capitalism* or *cognitive capitalism*, since contemporary capitalist economy cannot be imagined or thought without it (see also Münch 2013). Everywhere in the world, states have been central actors in this reorganizing, for the reason that it is only them that are capable of coordinating and allocating national resources in an effective and widely accepted way. Unlike hyperneoliberalists have wished, in this sense, the current world order is by no means abolishing the state; rather, the meaning of the state has been on the increase in recent decades.

The social sciences and humanities have increasingly been excluded from the competitive politics and its resources. Thus, they have a marginal position in current academic or cognitive capitalism. This comes up also in that, during last decades, the number of students in the humanities and social sciences has sunk sharply in several countries. For example, in the United States, the rate of students taking up humanist degrees out of all academic degrees was only 6.1% in 2014, while it had been around 17% in the late 1960s.³ Several other countries (among others, India and Japan) have reduced the number of students in the social sciences and humanities as well. In her book *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (2010), Martha Nussbaum, an American philosopher, pays attention to the fact that this process is nowadays ongoing in India and its states. During recent decades, India and its states have not only reorganized their educational systems on the basis of economic, technical, and natural sciences but also massively criticized former humanist educational ideals for ineffectiveness and obsolescence.

Undoubtedly, changes like these have influenced contemporary aesthetic cultures and art worlds widely. Today, the traditional connection

between humanist education and art worlds is weakening. This process is, of course, also due to the fact that societies have, in part, given up the old dichotomy between art and mass culture. Instead, they have aimed to marketize the sphere of culture and to integrate it into economy, as far as possible. The concepts *creative industries* and *creative economy* refer, therefore, to contemporary commercial or market-based practices of culture in a positive way; unlike the cultural politics of the traditional welfare state, they are not critical of commercialism. Besides traditional mass culture or cultural industry, creative industries or creative economy comprises subareas such as art's market-based practices, design, fashion, copyright trade, game industry, digital media, advertising, sports, and tourism.

These subareas are connected to contemporary economic nationalism at least in two ways. When participating in national brand-constructing, they produce positive images of domestic economic life, as well as of its “dynamics” and its surroundings of operation. In this task, they tend to act like image consultants. But besides this, they have more demanding and more independent economic tasks, since, already in themselves, they form an important subsector in contemporary economy (McGuigan 2009, 149–65). In this latter respect, they are capable of producing immediate commercial or economic value. For these reasons, contemporary enterprises and states have been genuinely interested in them. Especially, this holds true for Tony Blair's (1997–2007) government in Great Britain, but later also, several other states have launched comparable programs for promoting their domestic creative industries. Today, several states support, thereby, their domestic cultural industries financially, legislatively, and symbolically. Besides Great Britain, this has happened, among others, in France, Switzerland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and in the same way, China, Japan and South Korea have helped their domestic creative industries to enter into wider markets.

In the United States, Federal governments have not usually supported American creative industries directly. Rather, they have presumed that the spread of a free market economy all over the world will unavoidably lead to a situation in which American companies, including American creative industries, have a dominating market position in the world. In the same vein, American economic–political elite groups have thought

that the contemporary process of globalization will turn out to be in the US benefit—mainly for the reason that, in this way this argumentation has gone on, American companies are superior to foreign companies. The rules of the contemporary world order have, in this sense, served the presumed interests of American companies and elite groups, and it is just these sort of social actors that, first and foremost, originally established the rules in question (Belina 2011, 99–101; Castells 2000, 142). However, Donald Trump’s astonishing success in the US presidential election in autumn 2016 and his selection as the country’s new president (taking office in 2017) seem to reveal that, today, the majority of American people no longer trust in the elite groups at issue. On the contrary, in his presidential campaign, Trump could lean on just those social layers that had been losers in the contemporary process of globalization.

Cultural theorists have pointed out that, in contemporary culture, it is difficult to distinguish between art and mass culture—or between a relatively autonomous art and a commercial cultural production. This difficulty is due to the fact that, today, commercialism is increasingly characteristic of all sorts of social action. It is even becoming our new “human condition”—if we may here borrow the title of André Malraux’s well-known novel *La Condition Humaine* (1933)—that is, today commercialism is more and more defining our entire life and existence in the world. Commercialism does not, however, always lead to the fall of traditional high art, although this threat is often real in current culture. For example, in the area of tourism, traditional and contemporary high culture can be a competitive advantage. Every year, millions of people visit cities such as Paris, London, Rome, Venice, Florence, Saint Petersburg, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, and Buenos Aires just for the reason that these cities have a rich and attractive cultural supply. In this respect, they are superior to the cultural supply of other cities. On the other hand, if a city or a town lacks a many-sided cultural supply, it has probably lost an important competitive advantage. Likewise, in the current cultural–political situation, multiculturalism is not necessarily seen as problem, since cities’ and countries’ cultural and ethnic diversity can also be understood as a potential economic resource and as a sign of these cities’ and countries’ spiritual well-being.

In brief, in current national cultural policies, universalism has lost a great deal of its former significance, since nowadays, it belongs to the

tasks of national cultural policies to increase the competitiveness of domestic economies and to help domestic companies to become successful actors in world markets. In this sense, national cultural policies have undergone a partial shift from the principle of universalism toward narrower and more selective tasks. This shift is not necessarily in accordance with the values of cultural democratization, cultural democracy, and cultural welfare, and it may even produce cultural–political inequality in national societies and world society.

The Structure of This Volume

When dealing with the above-presented themes, this volume is divided into two major parts (Parts 2 and 3). After Part 1 (Introduction), Part 2 (Contemporary National Cultural Policies and Art Worlds in North America and Europe) explicates the extent to which Western states have shifted from cultural policies embedded in welfare state ideology to a market-based and managerialist model of cultural policy that is usually called the “neoliberal model.” Part 3 (International and Transnational Art Worlds and Their Ways of Operation) considers, again primarily from a Western horizon, the strengthening of international and transnational art markets and art worlds, and analyzes their patterns of action and internal power relations. Together, these two parts show how Western cultural policies and art worlds have adapted themselves to the increasing marketization and globalization of social action. At the same time, they give readers a picture of how Western cultural policies, art worlds, and artists have managed to handle these two megatrends of contemporary societal development.

Part 2 consists of empirical studies of North American and European art worlds. In her own contribution, “The United States: A Case Apart?” (Chap. 2), Vera L. Zolberg analyzes, from a historical point of view, the specificity of American society and art’s troublesome position in it. Her chapter does not, primarily, strive for inductive or quantitative generalizations; its starting point is the fact that, from the very beginning, the United States has exhibited a reluctance to allot public financial resources to the arts. American art worlds have, as a consequence, been largely

supported by donations, sponsorship and sales proceeds. In this sense, the neoliberal turn has not meant a dramatic change for art worlds in the United States. However, Zolberg's chapter shows that, despite this, in recent decades, several American institutions of art have been faced with serious financial problems, and some of them have even had to cease their activities. Likewise, Victoria D. Alexander's chapter, "Enterprise Culture and the Arts: Neoliberal Values and British Art Institutions" (Chap. 3), considers contemporary British cultural policy as the most clear-cut instance of neoliberal doctrine and neoliberal cultural policy in Western Europe. Although there are affinities between US and UK cultural policies, the shift to neoliberal approaches to public arts funding has been much more dramatic in the United Kingdom, as the starting point in Great Britain was closer to a European model.

Nina Zahner's chapter, "The Economization of the Arts and Cultural Sector in Germany After 1945" (Chap. 4), demonstrates that the idea of art's autonomy has been important in German cultural policy up to the present. German cultural politicians have been deeply suspicious of commercialism and, instead of it, emphasized art's value for the entirety of society, and not just for markets. In the same vein, moderate autonomy doctrines that lay stress on art's long-term social responsibility have held an exceptionally firm position in German cultural life from the late eighteenth century on. The presence of these lines of thought can also be recognized in current Germany, even if increasing demands for the marketization and privatization of the cultural life have been typical of public cultural-political discussions in Germany in recent decades. Through this, the German art world has taken cautious steps toward the neoliberal model.

Traditionally, France stuck to the state-led model of cultural life, and, in this way, it protected art's independency with regard to capitalist economy and market forces. However, Olivier Moeschler and Olivier Thévenin's joint chapter, "The Changing Role of the Cultural State: Art Worlds and New Markets—A Comparison of France and Switzerland" (Chap. 5), argues that during recent decades, the French state has somewhat reduced and decentralized its strong regulative grip on the art world in order to make it more competitive. In contrast, but also to increase competitiveness, the Swiss state, in turn, has developed toward the

opposite direction; that is, it has become more active in matters of cultural policy. Formerly, regional and local authorities played a major role in cultural policy in Switzerland, whereas the Swiss state's role was quite modest. In our current world, the Swiss state can no longer be passive, Moeschler and Thévenin remark. On the contrary, when it has elaborated on its own economic competitive strategy for the world markets, it has increasingly been willing to integrate the sphere of culture into this strategy.

Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 consider three different types of capitalism. In this constellation, the United States and Great Britain stand for a liberal market economy. Yet, as Zolberg points out, the United States is an exception among the market-liberal countries because of its reluctance to support the arts by public funds. Perhaps Great Britain's art worlds have, for this reason, been more typical representatives of the cultural life in liberal market economies. In comparison with these two economies, Germany stands for a coordinated market economy or managed capitalism, whereas France has preserved state capitalist features in its economic and political systems. Until here, the boundaries between these types are clear-cut, but the situation becomes complicated when we take into account small European countries. This comparative extension indicates more clearly that, in a certain country, art worlds' degree of marketization and managerialism is dependent not only on their position in the contemporary world system but also on their size, population, material resources, and economic specificity. Each country's political and ideological power relations, as well as its historical traditions, have also shaped its art worlds.

The remaining chapters in Part 2 have been devoted to small European countries. Simo Häyrynen's chapter, "Renegotiating Cultural Welfare: The Adoption of Neoliberal Trends in Finnish Cultural Policy and How It Fits the Nordic Model of a Welfare State" (Chap. 6), deals with the Nordic countries, particularly, with Finland, whose art life is today a mixture of state-led and market-based elements. Albeit Finland and the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) can be regarded as representatives of coordinated or managed capitalism, the public sector has a strong position in their art worlds, mainly for the reason that domestic markets are, in these countries, limited in size and, as

such, incapable of widely maintaining a well-functioning art world. In addition, the welfare state and its egalitarian and paternalistic ideals still have a lot of support in the Nordic countries.

EGGE Kulbok-Lattik and Vesna Čopič's chapter, "Cultural Policies in the Baltic States and Slovenia Between 1991 and 2009" (Chap. 7), concerns postsocialist countries, in particular, the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Slovenia, as well as the problems that the shift from state socialism to contemporary capitalism has brought about in their art worlds. The Baltic countries aimed at basing their art lives chiefly on the market-based or neoliberal model, but this project has proved to be difficult to realize in these countries of very small size. In contrast, Slovenia has applied more elements of state capitalism and welfare state thinking to its art worlds. However, what the Baltic countries and Slovenia have in common with each other is that their art worlds have actively participated in the building of their own country's national identity, a task that became topical in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, particularly, in the countries that had, like the Baltic countries, belonged to the Soviet Union or, like Slovenia, to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both of whose population consisted of several different national or ethnic groups.

Part 2 reveals that European and North American art worlds have not reacted to the market-based turn in societal and cultural politics in a uniform way. Although the general tendencies of marketization and managerialism have been characteristic of these art worlds since the 1980s, there are striking differences between them. In Part 3, international or transnational art worlds are the object of analysis. The chapters here indicate that there are no sharp boundaries between national and international or transnational art worlds. Unlike certain theories of the globalization state, the latter ones do not function above local or national art worlds as certain kinds of higher-level actors that would be entirely independent of local or national art worlds. Instead, the functioning of local or national art worlds often includes an international or transnational dimension, and, in part, local or national art worlds maintain international or transnational art worlds. Thus, they reciprocally support each other.

In Part 3, Vaughn Schmutz and Timothy J. Dowd's joint chapter, "Globalization and Musical Hierarchy in the United States, France,

Germany, and the Netherlands” (Chap. 8), deals with the reception of classical and popular music, and the sociocultural status of these musical forms in the abovementioned four countries from the 1950s to recent decades. Their chapter confirms the supposition that, in the Western press, popular music has gradually become a more important and visible phenomenon than classical music. It is chiefly only German-speaking Europe that still gives classical music a special position in its press and cultural life.

Alain Quemin’s chapter, “The Uneven Distribution of International Success in the Visual Artists Among Nations, According to the Rankings of the ‘Top 100 Artists in the World’” (Chap. 9), analyzes central international ranking lists of visual artists. Lists such as these are important in international or transnational art markets, since they contribute to the construction of the artists’ status and reputation. International or transnational art markets need this sort of information when they aim to define the commercial value of art offered for sale. In this sense, the lists in question are functional from the standpoint of art markets. Quemin emphasizes that most of the artists on these lists are from Western countries or, if they are originally from non-Western countries, have later settled in Western metropolises such as New York, London, and Paris, where they can better promote their artistic career. Consequently, Quemin concludes that the current process of globalization has not really touched art worlds in a comprehensive way.

Larissa Buchholz’s chapter, “Beyond Reproduction: Asymmetric Interdependencies and the Transformation of Centers and Peripheries in the Globalizing Visual Arts” (Chap. 10), can be seen as a continuation of Quemin’s chapter. By dividing the global visual art world into a relatively autonomous subfield (the global exhibition space) and a more commercial subfield (the global auction market), Buchholz’s chapter shows that Western countries have a firm position in the former subfield, even if they have somewhat lost their positions since the late 1990s. This loss is due to the fact that, in the case of younger cohorts, that is, the artists who were born in 1957–66 or in 1967–76, the share of non-Western artists in the global exhibition space has increased rapidly since the late 1990s. As for the more commercial subfield, in the global auction market, the

change has been more radical. Here, Western artists have had to give way to non-Western artists. In the case of younger cohorts, non-Western artists, especially, Chinese artists, constitute today the largest group among the top 400 artists in the world.

Diane Barthel-Bouchier's chapter, "It's a Mad Mad Mad (Men) World': National and Corporate Strategies in the Global Audiovisual Market" (Chap. 11), considers the international or transnational production and mediation structures of films and television series. She pays, in particular, attention to competition and power relations in these markets. In this competition, American audiovisual companies have proved to be superior, even if several states in Europe and Asia have aimed at protecting their own national audiovisual cultures by different import and broadcasting restrictions.

As a conclusion to this volume (Part 4), in their joint chapter, "Reflections on the Challenge of Markets in National, International, and Transnational Art Worlds" (Chap. 12), Victoria D. Alexander and Samuli Hägg discuss central issues that arose in this volume. They start from the remark that although market-based and managerialist values and procedures and, more generally, the neoliberal model of society have profoundly shaped national cultural policies and art worlds in Western countries, there are clear-cut differences among these countries. In particular, the neoliberal model has been important in Anglo-American countries such as Great Britain and the United States, whereas certain other countries (Germany, France, Switzerland, the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries, and Slovenia) have been more moderate in this respect. Yet, in all of these countries, the sphere of art has increasingly merged with the creative or immaterial economy, and the states use art as a tool when their aim is to improve the global economic competitiveness of domestic enterprises. Market-based and managerialist values and approaches have also grown through the strengthening of international or transnational art worlds. Alexander and Hägg conclude that, in part, international or transnational art worlds have become stronger at the expense of national art worlds, and it is possible that they will ultimately weaken Western countries' traditional cultural hegemony in the area of art.

Notes

1. The concept *the competitive state* or *the competition state* was launched in the 1990s by political theorists such as Susan Strange, Philip G. Cerny, Joachim Hirst, and Bob Jessop; see nearer, Fougner (2006). Current economic nationalism has been considered, for example, by Mayall (1990), Helleiner and Pickel (2005) and Brink (2011).
2. In Ireland, a 10% tax rate on manufacturing profits guaranteed for 20 years was introduced already in the early 1970s, and in 2003, this became a blanket 12.5% tax on all trading companies. See nearer, Kirby (2009, 3).
3. These rates concern the lower academic degrees, that is, the bachelor's degrees. The concept *humanities* refers here to disciplines such as languages and literatures, philosophy and history. See, for example, *Bulletin* (2016, 9).

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Part 2

Contemporary National Cultural Policies and Art Worlds in North America and Europe

2

The United States of Art: A Case Apart?

Vera L. Zolberg

Introduction

Beginning largely in the twentieth century, under pressure from political movements and parties, most Western nations had come to adopt policies to support their citizenry by providing certain aid to them as a social right. In Europe, in addition to societies of mutual support in a number of nations, and financial assistance for workers in old age, state support expanded in varying forms and to different degrees in countries ranging from relatively authoritarian to constitutional monarchies with relatively autonomous parliaments all the way to republics. Government policies were also directed toward the cultural capital of their nation's workforce by requiring that all children be educated so that they may achieve literacy (Hobsbawm 1975, 42–45). These essentially functional, practical programs, viewed as investments in a nation's prosperity or a tool to stave off a threat of revolution, varied in form and degree of generosity, but

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became entrenched almost everywhere as a part of the full modernization of independent nations. But aside from literacy, not every form of culture was included, except to a limited degree, and largely at more advanced levels, for the education of professional artists, sculptors, or musicians. The aesthetic sphere tended to be treated as a private matter, except as symbolic signs of a nation's standing. In many European nations, government innovations, old-age pensions, labor laws to provide a cushion of protection against exploitation of children by limiting the hours they were permitted to work, and at what age they were free to leave school, in addition to many other benefits, reached their apogee in the post-World War II expansion of such programs that represented "the welfare state."

In some ways, the United States did not differ appreciably from European nations, at least as far as outcomes were concerned. This has been especially the case with respect to living standards and access to higher education. America was ahead of most other nations, and public secondary education embraced the ideal of achieving the "common high school" that stood not only for education for its own sake, but as an aid to achieve the goal of uniting the new American nation. "Out of many, one" had been an often repeated slogan during the period of nation-building when the 13 disparate colonies shared little more than a language and, for most inhabitants, a common enemy (Kammen 1972). National unity was a goal of modernizing nations, but in the United States, it has been especially congruent with the rise of consumerism, and is typically characterized by decentralization in the organization of public services. Compared with other similar nations, the educational domain has been particularly marked by decentralization in that it has been left as the responsibility of states and local bodies rather than of the national government. Decentralization had certain benefits, but in the United States, it meant that funding almost everywhere came from local taxes, especially from real estate property. This set the stage for great disparities in the budgetary allocations for schools, affecting the salaries of teachers and provision of buildings, equipment, and books, among other things.

Yet, for the most part, there was little objection to publicly funded education for all children, at least in principle. The major exceptions were, first and most notoriously, the exclusion of children on the basis of

race (mostly) in the South and the deliberate inadequacy of facilities in many city neighborhoods, even in the theoretically racially integrated northern cities and suburban towns; and second, the refusal of certain religious groups to permit their children's attendance because of the generally secular nature of the education and the school's insistence on religious prayers other than those of their own religious preference. This led to the creation of a private, parallel school system by the Catholic Church, as well as among many orthodox Jews, and tense relationships between other religion-based communities, such as those of the Amish, who opposed state laws requiring that girls and boys attend school till they reached well into their teenage years.

But as has been correctly noted (see Sevänen and Häyrynen's "Introduction" in this volume), when it comes to cultural policy, many other nations have come to consider education and the support of cultural activities as a central government interest, which demands its support. Thus, even though it is to be expected that there would be divergences among nations because of historical, ethnic, and geographical experiences, the United States differs even from what had been its "mother country." Indeed, it is another aspect of what has been assumed about the United States: it is endowed with (or afflicted by) "exceptionalism," especially with respect to the absence of an effective socialist or labor movement. Without accepting this conceptualization of the United States vis-à-vis other countries, Aristide R. Zolberg (1986, 397–455) summed it up in his analysis of working-class formation that most such characterizations are too vague, overgeneralized, and omit the unique distinctiveness of every nation.

This background suggests that, for the United States, the market-based and managerial turn, the sphere that concerns us in this volume, may not be as foreign as it may be for European countries. This macrostructural development encompasses a framework that needs to be taken into account at both meso and micro levels in relation to changes in the sphere of art. In this regard, the notion of "the culture society" was adumbrated in July 2000 at an important international conference held in Barcelona, at a moment that coincided with the beginning of the new millennium. Scholarly participants tried to imagine "a *new* place for the arts in the twenty-first century." At the time, they discerned trends, many of which

have come to fruition. Specifically, “culture” was to be treated as a foundation for urban and regional social and economic development. Undoubtedly, development occurred with mixed results. But “mixed results” seem to be the fate of many other aspects of the world we had inherited (Rodríguez Morató and Vera L. Zolberg 2003, 245–46; Vera L. Zolberg 2003).

Politically, the optimism generated by that millennial mood did not last long, but at that moment in Barcelona, September 11, 2001 was not yet a date that came to reverberate in our thinking. Today, its aftereffects continue to play a part in our lives. Separately, the world’s environmental transformations were being debated among scientists, but had not yet begun to reach a wider audience. For Europeans, the early positive fruitful results of the European Union had not yet come to be challenged by what, in the past few years, seems like backsliding among the European nations, which suffer from weaker economies than their better endowed Union members. And although the Cold War had seemed to have become no more than a bugbear of the past, recent events are proof that a peaceful world has not been achieved, even within Europe itself. Even Americans, long reputed for their optimism, have had their spirits seriously dampened by recent economic hardships. In particular, the effect of the extraordinary increase and persistence of inequality in what was to have become an egalitarian society in the spirit of enlightened capitalism has, instead, become a chimera (Piketty 2014). No doubt, these unpredictable trends and events have contributed to the rise of extremist ideas that may have been latent but seem to feed on these macro changes.

In the United States, political decisions at different levels of government have led to an unusual degree of plutocratic influence on the outcomes of elections. Laws and regulations that had been put into effect since the great reform movement of Progressivism, which began in the early twentieth century and seemed largely accomplished under President Franklin Roosevelt’s (1933–45) New Deal, are now truly “history.” The success of extreme right-wing conservatism, even in the industrialized states of the North, which had been relatively sympathetic to the needs of industrial workers and their labor unions, is increasingly under attack. Thus, the Governor of the state of Wisconsin, which once had a strongly progressive tradition, was able to fight off the Recall election launched by indignant citizens, who objected to his

attack on the collective bargaining rights of public sector trade unions. As a result of a decision by the nation's Supreme Court, more than a century of legal precedents that limited corporations and labor unions from allocating funds in support of electoral outcomes that favored their desires were undone. According to the Court, such limits interfered with a corporation's right to the freedom of speech, as if a corporation was literally a human being.

Moreover, extremes of income inequality have come to characterize American society since the abandonment of a very different pattern of the immediate post–World War II era when government policies encouraged the expansion of the middle classes. Despite the troubled history of the United States' treatment of racially diverse peoples, most notably the traffic in and exploitation of black slaves, and once liberated, as a result of the Civil War, followed by a brief period of "Reconstruction," there ensued the toleration of extreme discrimination of freed African Americans in the Old South. Yet, in 2008, it was American citizens of every color who elected a black man to the presidency of the United States. Almost unexpectedly, given the anger of the defeated racists, President Barack Obama won reelection to his second term (2013–16). It should remind us that culture, even cultural tradition, is not as durable as one may think. In addition to new laws, and reinterpretations of old laws, secular trends, economic, demographic, and ecological, may help to bring about great change. We must also bear in mind that technological developments have provided the means by which social movements produce unexpected and often contradictory outcomes. As the sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (2012) reminds us in his recent study of political culture, the structures and tactics of social movement formation are fully capable of being applied by left liberals as by right libertarians or the most reactionary elements of the Right.¹

The Temptation of *Privatization à L'Américaine*

In this chapter, I look at one aspect of these historical changes, one which continues to have effects that are difficult to predict. It revolves around the temptation of the privatization of cultural support struc-

tures as a means of reducing public funding for culture. As I indicated in my introduction, this idea is drawn from what has been an American pattern that maintained suspicion of centralization. Western European nations, in particular, as I indicated above, had developed a considerable welfare state approach to ameliorating the condition of working-class citizens by providing educational and other cultural improvements. In the immediate postwar period, even the United States, where public welfare was viewed with suspicion, had joined in these efforts to help provide temporary aid to the unemployed and their families. By the later decades of the twentieth century, however, in a reversion to older reasoning, some of these “necessities” were being viewed as “luxuries.” The movement in the United States to downsize the national government’s activities in these domains, primarily by weakening and even eliminating labor unions, began almost as soon as social welfare was introduced. But in recent years, privatization has come to seem attractive to a number of European nations, especially in times of relative economic austerity. By the 1990s, for some Western European nations, the American approach seemed a simple solution to budgetary constraints after decades of governmental largesse. With England under Margaret Thatcher (1979–90), and the relative success of Ronald Reagan (1981–89) and a Republican-controlled Congress, the process of decline extended to national support of the arts and humanities (Alexander 2005, 34–35).

When I arrived in Amsterdam in 1992–94 as the Visiting Boekman Foundation Professor in the Sociology of the Arts, aspects of these ideas had already begun to gain traction with respect to support of museums and of artists in the Netherlands. Since then, for similar reasons, a number of other European nations have been inspired by the United States’ experience to join the trend to privatize. But over nearly two decades later, I believe it is time to ask if the American example is as appropriate for European nations as it seemed then. Indeed, it may not even be so good for the United States itself. I suggest that for reasons historical, structural, and political, this American “business model” (as it is often characterized) should be inspected more closely.² To do this, I start first by comparing the political structures of support in the cultural field, as

usefully outlined by the American political scientist Kevin Mulcahy (1997). He raises the recurrent general question as to whether, in comparison with other nations, America is “exceptional.”

In his examination (devoted, of course, exclusively to a group of liberal democracies), he discerns four patterns of support for the arts (Table 2.1). The United States, as he shows, is radically different from all the others. Thus, whereas France has a long tradition of nationalistic statism in the centralizing mode, in the United States, the arts and the nation-state have been and continue to be uneasy bedfellows. Whether “libertarian” is the most appropriate way to characterize the American model is not altogether evident to me, especially with the emergence of various “Libertarian” political parties in the United States, which reject tax and tax exemptions of any kind. For them, such practices are simply taking money out of someone’s pocket in order to place it in someone else’s. Beyond that, what the simplicity of the chart does not indicate is that although Canada and the United States share certain qualities, in practice, under a conservative regime in the United States, the “arms length” rule that had governed practice in the 1960s ceased to protect artists from interference from political pressure in the 1980s and 1990s (Alexander 2005, 34). Even before the rise of these political parties, however, a strong current of American opinion opposed the idea of central, national government spending. It was (and to some degree continues to be) the rationale that was adopted by the secessionist slaveholders who attempted to destroy the union of the United States. This tendency has been most likely to resist support for many programs, but especially for those involving culture and the arts.

Table 2.1 Different patterns of support for the arts

Public culture mode	Nation	Administrative model	Funding form	Cultural politics
Nationalistic	France	Statist	Subsidy	Hegemony
Social democratic	Norway	Localistic	Entitlement	Redistribution
Liberal	Canada	Consociational	Grant	Sovereignty
Libertarian	USA	Pluralist	Tax exemption	Privatization

Source: Mulcahy (1997)

The Reluctant Patron: America's Troubled Relationship with the Arts

For the better part of American history, the central government has tried to keep its distance from the arts. This would not have been surprising to Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s. Among his astute observations about democracy in America, he remarked on the pervasive hesitation in the American attitude toward the arts (de Tocqueville 1955 [1835]). For Americans, the fine arts, at one extreme, embodied elitism at odds with the nation's democratic project; at the other, the fine arts were vulnerable to the contamination of tasteless status-seeking and commercialism. In Tocqueville's somewhat pessimistic view, without a feudal tradition of institutional support of high-quality craftsmanship (as exemplified in the guild system), along with a nobility of refined taste, it seemed that excellence in every creative domain would at best be outweighed by mediocrity. Harsh as it may seem, his views were relatively nuanced considerations. In fact, many American politicians have resisted attempts to expend federal tax monies for cultural purposes. They shared a view common among certain opinion leaders in England, the "mother country," that provided a "model" for patronage characterized by "noblesse oblige." This view had its parallel among British utilitarian philosophers and has been summarized in the following terms: aesthetic culture was defined as a *private pleasure*, not to be paid for by ordinary rate-payers. The United States had rejected the existence of a caste-like nobility and wanted no part of it. Not only was this made clear at its very beginning in the Constitution, but the newly constructed rules of official protocol made it clear that the chief of state would be "Mr." President, even though George Washington might have preferred something more regal. Particularly with the rise of Jacksonian democracy in the late 1820s, the fine arts came to be even more tainted with the stigma of aristocratic decadence (Meyer 1979; Minihan 1977, 9).

A similar populist logic persists to present day, though additional reasons are adduced to buttress it: impropriety, political disloyalty, recurrent isolationism, and xenophobia. Certain politicians and their constituents assert their revulsion from what they see as obscenity (e.g., photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano, David Wojnarowitz), or as

“treason”—literary and other art forms that criticize American policy, and especially if they involve “desecration” of symbols of the nation, especially the American flag. These are the grounds on which many officeholders reject state support for culture altogether (Vera L. Zolberg 1992). There are other reasons, of course, that are influenced by aesthetic changes in the arts themselves.

Gingerly straddling commercialism and crass materialism on one side and disinterest, autonomy, and decency on the other, the arts have never become securely entrenched as a national government obligation. As the art historian David H. Solkin has succinctly put it in his study of eighteenth-century Britain, “Commerce and virtue have rarely been the best of friends.” He goes on to point out that this view had a long history, including the idea that “trading practices” were considered “a necessary evil, requiring strict vigilance lest the passions stimulated by the pursuit of economic gain destroy the citizen’s moral fibre, as well as the very fabric of civilization itself” (Solkin 1993, 1). Still, despite these seemingly insuperable barriers, a realm of culture, to which is imputed special value and whose appreciation was considered to distinguish elites from others, has come to be constructed in the United States, as well as elsewhere. It is one in which tax policies encouraged the establishment of cultural institutions, such as museums, in cities and states, by municipal and state agencies in response to initiatives by local elites, rather than through central planning. Since a single *official* national cultural policy has been nonexistent or, at most, barely discernible, except in rare circumstances, mapping American culture policy and its democratizing project is no simple matter. Simply focusing on the national governmental level of enacted legislation does not permit us to grasp the whole picture, and would give a distorted impression. Instead, what exists by way of American cultural policy is a patchwork of disparate elements, located at various levels of government. It encompasses the private as well as the public sector, a hybrid of the two, which together compose the functional equivalent of what elsewhere, especially in France, might seem to be a “neater,” more coherent cultural policy.

As in other domains, a plethora of laws and regulations, emanating from every level of government, national, state, or municipal, enacted for other more general purposes, have impinged upon the arts and their

publics.³ Directly and, to a great extent, indirectly, they affect the creation, distribution, and reception of the arts. Not only may the nation, the states, and many municipalities provide or withhold subsidies to artists or institutions, but at the national level, tariff regulations affect the art market; citizenship laws or passport and visa regulations and statutes foster or trammel travel by American artists and writers abroad, and the entry into the United States of foreign artists.⁴ Copyright regulation, embedded in the American Constitution, and modified by judicial interpretation, is another aspect of this function (see Shapiro 2001). Thereby, the national government sets the broad parameters within which creative artists function. Yet, although these include jurisdiction over certain areas that may affect artistic work, civil rights, sex discrimination, job or product safety, and the physical or “moral” safety of audiences, the arts and their publics are at least as much affected by rules at local and state levels.

State government agencies and municipal bodies play a considerable part in defining the environment within which creative artists work and attempt to distribute their works. State and local laws still largely determine the nature of pornography (though within a framework of national standards of freedom of speech, established or interpreted by the Federal court system, up to and including the Supreme Court), regulate residential or performance venues by zoning regulations, set fire safety standards, grant or withhold liquor licenses for nightclubs where bands may perform, tax theater tickets, and accredit educational programs in the arts, and other fields of study. The local was, if anything, even more prominent in the formative decades of the nineteenth century, when many of the fundamental components of the uniquely American structures of support were set in place. And nor has it entirely lost its force since then. As consideration of important cultural institutions such as museums and symphony orchestras indicates, paradoxically, their legitimization came to depend upon their supposed importance for a democratic polity, but they owed their very existence to the local levels of the states and cities. As a result, certain metropolises became renowned for the density and grandeur of their cultural institutions—art museums, symphony orchestras, opera companies, libraries, and historical institutes. But for a nation that was already extremely important internationally, the center of the national government, Washington, D.C. was for much of the nineteenth century

a cultural backwater, based on a temporary “community,” the capital mainly when Congress was in session. It is important to bear in mind that there was no major publicly owned art museum or major performing organization in the nation’s capital until the twentieth century. In the country as a whole, high culture was unevenly distributed, with most of it concentrated in the northeastern region. In the deliberate absence of a strong national state, the early part of the nineteenth century was characterized by a largely market-driven, varied, localized, mostly ephemeral series of cultural activities. With the exceptions of a few, primarily East Coast cities, where high-cultural activities had become regularized or frequent,⁵ cultural life was a mixture of elements, with little distinction between high arts and entertainment.

Symphonic music tended to be performed at first largely by British musicians, often itinerant players; museums were cabinets of curiosities, adjuncts to local philosophical societies, of varying quality; opera companies were, for the most part, itinerant troupes of Italian or pseudo-Italian performers. Following the changing trends in immigration patterns, with the mid-century influx of German immigrants, symphony orchestras came increasingly to be led and staffed by German players and conductors, playing their preferred repertoires. Museums or proto-museums began to diverge between the serious-respectable and the demotic-vulgar: the popular and (for a considerable time) commercially successful American Museum of P.T. Barnum, with its “freaks” and curiosities of nature, came to rest in the sphere of popular entertainment; its serious side became oriented toward historicizing, evolution-based, professionalizing, academic disciplines. But a striving for something less common or vulgar led Barnum to embrace what now would be called “classy”—the “Swedish nightingale,” the famous opera and oratorio singer Jenny Lind, whose American tour he organized in 1852 (*New Columbia Encyclopedia* 1975). Pursuing this transition, a Barnum son became active toward the end of the nineteenth century in the founding of the noncommercial, academically aspiring American Museum of Natural History in New York City.

This divergence of popular from serious was enhanced in the latter half of the century by a rising status-seeking, newly monied elite, striving to gain access to an appropriately distinguishing culture. Their

patronage permitted cultural entrepreneurs from local cultural institutions (impresarios, conductors, artists) to accelerate the process of improving their quality. Local elites and arts managers followed the model of Boston, whose art museum and symphony orchestra were transformed into high-quality institutions by, among other things, eliminating accessibly pleasing elements that did not sufficiently discriminate among their publics. This was the case in particular of the newer cities of the “middle border,” such as Chicago, which were competing with other rising cities of what has come to be called “the Midwest.” Eventually, art museums, such as Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Art Institute of Chicago, relegated their plaster cast copies of classical art to their cellars and accepted into their collections only (what was thought to be) authentic artworks by esteemed masters.⁶

The unique American pattern of local support for high-cultural institutions can be seen in New York City, which, under state laws regulating nonprofit charitable institutions, pioneered in bringing together elite patrons with subsidies, direct or indirect, from the municipality. These structures of support remain in place for a number of New York institutions, among them being the American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, both built on city-owned land and both receiving a significant part of their operating budgetary expenses from the city, under the authority of the state of New York. But the taxpayer received something in return. The *quid pro quo* is that the institutions are expected to provide access for a broader population than only elite patrons. Thus, when devout Presbyterian trustees on the board of the Metropolitan Museum of Art tried to keep the museum closed on Sundays, the municipal council (under the emergent Irish Catholic political machine) forced it to remain open by threatening to withdraw city funding, enabling working people to visit on the one day when they were not likely to be on the job. Several other institutions, most of them built in the last part of the nineteenth century, are also supported in this way, and many new ones have gradually been added. In New York City, the expenditures for a number of these cultural institutions are built into the city’s Charter and compose about 90% of all city expenditures on culture. Although there is little funding available for grants to individual creative

artists or, in the extremes of economic penury, to emergent artistic groups, certain cultural institutions can normally rely on a specified subsidy from local authorities.

To a limited and indirect degree, the cozy arrangements at the local level sometimes helped civic boosters and art lovers gain legal advantages for their city's cultural ventures from national agencies as they were created. Thus, local elites were able to lobby their Congressmen to pass national government legislation that eliminated tariffs on the importation of old artworks. This had the immediate effect of permitting J.P. Morgan (1837–1913) to repatriate with no duty payment the immense art collection he had acquired throughout Europe and kept in England. Once he was able to import his collection into the United States duty-free, he promised a substantial part of it to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, which had made him its president. While the legislation led to a loss of national revenue because of foregone income to the immediate advantage of elite art collectors, in the long run, it benefited cultural institutions that were obliged to be open to everyone. But that regulation did not apply to contemporary artworks. It took several more decades for contemporary artworks to be imported duty-free from abroad. Meanwhile, however, when European paintings and sculptures were being sold at the historic Armory Show of 1913, each purchase had to be recorded and the duty paid immediately (Brown 1988, 85). But in light of the extreme changes wrought by the ongoing avant-garde revolution, the question of what *is* art began to take shape.

Eventually, legislation provided tax incentives for charitable donations that would indirectly foster contributions of artworks to high-cultural institutions and tax advantages for their donors (unless they were the artists themselves). But without support from the partnership of elites and elected officials, it is difficult to envisage how the dense cultural matrix that came to characterize the United States could have grown. As Gary Larson (1983) has put it succinctly and accurately, the American nation-state has been and continues to be “a reluctant patron.” Many argue that the arts should not be confined only to elites, because the arts are supposed to elevate the spirit of ordinary people. In that light, it is necessary to imbue the public with proper respect for the arts, a rationale that their predecessors had used to loosen municipal, state, and, eventually, national

purse strings. It was largely on that basis that individual patrons—clergymen, civic boosters, businessmen, and professionals—gained support from local or state governments. In return for their generosity, these would-be patrons were obliged to inject a dose of didactic purpose for civic betterment, patriotism, and democracy in order to justify whatever tax support, direct or indirect, their institutions received. The large numbers of visitors to many American museums and opera and symphony societies of the late nineteenth century seemed to provide evidence for their trustees' claims to having accomplished "democratization." Yet, despite concessions, these art forms were not immediately open to all on an equal basis. This was certainly the case of opera and, to a large degree, of live, symphonic, or concert music, which generally require the purchase of fairly expensive tickets for entry or subscription membership.

Obtaining regularized national support for the arts might have been more feasible if there had been a large, unified, and powerful lobby of art world people, consisting both of patrons and of artists, to demand it. But members of the American arts community were not unequivocally in favor of urging the national government to support the arts. Just as many Americans feared what they saw as the potentially overwhelming power of the central government in relation to the autonomy of the states, many in the arts worried that central government support of *any* kind was a danger to the autonomy of their art form. Wanting to have their cake and eat it too produced concerns that they might lose *their own* artistic freedom, control over *their* public, and freedom to manage *their* institutions.

While it is true that without substantial governmental support, many cultural institutions suffered materially, the absence of centralization also offered them certain opportunities. Without an official academy, the founders of music and art institutions were relatively free to adopt models and genres congenial to themselves and their clientele, the audiences they were trying to build. In the absence of an official academic system, they were relatively free to permit experiments with repertoires and collections, seek advice from sources they trusted rather than from government bureaucrats, accept the tastes of their local elite collectors and patrons, and modify their institutions in a flexible manner. Perhaps without intending, politicians and arts entrepreneurs together produced a

complex system of organized patronage that relied on contributions by individuals or, later, by foundations and, later still, by corporations that intersected with local, state, and federal government programs. In the process, they created a *culture of donation* to cultural institutions in which traditional arts and new artworks were encouraged or, at least (mostly), not forbidden.

Once this “culture of donation” had become established and structurally embedded, another important legacy of its proponents’ arguments for arts patronage has been the insistence by funding agencies, whether governmental, foundations, or corporate, that whatever else they do, institutions need to provide opportunities for nonelite publics to benefit from them as well. Pressure to encourage large numbers of visitors stemmed from local agencies in different municipalities (they differed from one to the other), but rarely from the national government. A turning point in this process was marked by the innovation of federal funding under the New Deal, during the national emergency created by the Great Depression at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. Among many other parts of its programs, new federal agencies were created to pay unemployed artists, musicians, and writers, whose livelihood was among the most devastated during that period, to instruct teachers and school children in their arts. Artists and writers could apply for support of their studio painting, write guide books for each of the states to encourage tourism, or compete for the opportunity to paint murals representing appropriate national themes on the walls of public buildings, such as post offices or courthouses. These New Deal programs were allowed to lapse with the onset of the Second World War, but well over two decades after the demise of the first New Deal, its legacy was renewed under the Great Society programs of President Lyndon Johnson (1963–69), when similar policies were relaunched. This time, partly because of federal governmental requirements of “outreach,” taking into account local conditions⁷ and the Texan origin of the President, the Great Society went beyond bringing fine arts to the economically deprived in general. Instead of assuming a monocultural ideal, the Great Society expanded its outreach to a bilingual, especially Spanish-speaking, public. With the revocation of the “Quota System” that had made the possibility of immigration to the United States dependent upon the presence of residents of particular

national origins (mostly in the last decades of the nineteenth century) and the discriminatory exclusion acts, the nature of immigration was transformed. No longer were Chinese or other “non-whites” excluded from entry or citizenship. The National Origins Act, with its racist foundation, was ended in 1965, as were the barriers against most Asian immigration (Aristide R. Zolberg 2006, 333).

One strategy actors used to gain support for the enactment of new laws in a particular domain was to show that their own country compared unfavorably with other countries of significance. This argument, implicit and explicit during the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, was the basis of the rhetoric employed by American proponents of national governmental support for the arts and education. Indeed, the role of foreign policy “intruding” to promote a certain “Display Democracy” seems an anomaly in the long-standing tradition of keeping the federal government at arm’s length.⁸ In this period, the unfavourable comparison strategy was commonly used to highlight the disadvantages suffered by the arts in America in contrast to cultural subsidies by European states. For example, conveniently leaving aside local and state patronage, the economist Dick Netzer (1978) had argued that the United States lagged far behind the generous aid provided by many countries, with France being a leading example. Despite its wealth and power, in the United States, the national government’s role as cultural patron, as emphasized earlier, had always been deeply troubled and largely rejected. From the perspective of proponents of state support of the arts, why could the United States not be more like France?

Achievements and Shortfalls

It is easy to exaggerate the differences between the United States, a country lacking a courtly tradition, where the arts are more dependent on the private sector, either of the commercial realm or the world of philanthropic institutions, and Europe, with its tradition of royalty and, at times, absolutism, and of government cultural subsidy. Despite the long history of state patronage, in one respect, the trajectory of European countries has recently come to parallel that of the United States: many of them are being called upon to take on the relatively recent concern that state support be

contingent upon reaching out to underserved populations. When Joshua Taylor, at the time director of the National Collection of the Fine Arts at the Smithsonian Institution, wished that cultural institutions would provide “an elite experience for everyone,” he may have been invoking an oxymoron, but this goal is in keeping with American ideals (Vera L. Zolberg 1986). In France, similar goals have been announced, but as André Malraux’s, France’s Minister of Culture in 1959–69, *Maisons de la Culture* were largely dissolved or lost their national subsidies, their past record indicates that, even at their height, they paid more attention to artists and performers than to reaching out to new publics. For the most part, they did not serve much of the population that had been outside the usual cultural networks. Instead of unskilled workers, small business owners, dwellers in the *banlieues*, and farmers, they drew largely students, teachers, clerks, middle-level managers, professionals, and executives.

While French surveys over many decades indicated that participants in “high cultural” activities” tended to be the highly educated, as it happens, survey results for the United States were quite similar (Shapiro 2001). The Fifth Republic under Charles De Gaulle (1959–69) and Georges Pompidou (1969–74) did enlarge audiences for culture, but whether it actually expanded access so as to democratize the audience is a claim difficult to sustain. Even at the Centre Pompidou (founded in 1977), with its democratic surface offering its varied fare, like the user-friendly supermarket that Mollard envisaged, Nathalie Heinich found that offerings are received according to the usual social categories, or as Pierre Bourdieu (1990) would have it, according to the cultural capital that individuals bear with them. Within this mall-like institution, visitors carve out a mini-museum appropriate to their educational level (Heinich 1988).

Concluding Discussion

The United States, with its close ties between broad national government guidelines and dependence upon private sources of cultural support, corporate, individual, foundations, combined with state and municipal subsidies, once seemed to provide a safe haven for creative artists. If one source dried up, there were others to which one could turn for support

(Vera L. Zolberg 1983). Moreover, as a nation that encourages consumerism, myriad art worlds could find pools of supporters, ticket buyers, and donors. Heterogeneity of structural support seemed better than dependence upon the centralized state alone. However, recent economic and political conditions indicate that multiple sources of support are not protective when the economy is under extreme pressure, as has been the case recently. While commercial art forms are expected to take their chances with the risks of failure, the art forms that have come to be designated as worthy of governmental support inhabit a separate sphere. Their claim is based on the value of what they bring to the nation's standing in the world, as well as on the human capital that its citizenry embodies. Whereas in the past, only a limited set of art forms were recognized as worthy of such official patronage, what came to be called "fine arts," with its connotations of elitism, in recent years, the range of art forms that have gained entry into this cultural domain has broadened considerably. Not only symphonic music, opera, oil painting and marble or bronze sculptural works, but jazz, rock and roll, country music, and anything that is capable of being exhibited in some sort of museum may plead for government support. Yet, when austerity dominates government policy, even fine arts forms and their creators suffer. This is particularly true for certain performing companies in expensive art forms such as opera companies or symphony orchestras.

In recent years, a number of highly regarded orchestras have been obliged to renegotiate contracts with musicians and reduce their staffs. One of the leading American opera companies, the New York City Opera, found itself facing ruin. Significantly, it was the company that had been founded by New York's legendary Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia during the economic depression. The company gained a reputation for providing high-quality classic operas, as well as for commissioning new operas from promising composers, at low ticket prices. It was one of the first American opera companies to invite African American performers to participate in its racially integrated casts at a time when there were barely any opportunities for them in the United States. With this remarkable background, the City Opera should have been immune to failure, yet in the space of a few months, it was obliged to declare bankruptcy in 2013. In contrast, at approximately the same time, the general manager of the Metropolitan

Opera Company, known for his lavish spending on expensive productions, was negotiating new contracts with all of the unions of the company, from soloists, chorus members, dancers, orchestra players, stage hands, and administrators to office staff. Following the example of certain orchestral managers in other cities, he threatened to “lock out” the company if they did not agree to take pay cuts and make other important concessions. But while the City Opera was allowed to collapse, because no “white knight” came riding in to save it, the Metropolitan Opera has survived. Some believe that it resembles the American banks whose investments soured but that had been declared “too big to fail.” The national government’s financial experts advised that the banking system should be supported by the taxpayers to avoid a second great depression. This decision is said to have spared the nation. In the case of the Metropolitan Opera, its failure was not declared to threaten the entire economy. Still, a Federal Mediator was called in to examine the Opera’s “books” and arbitrate between the management and union members. What the outcome would be was unclear, but eventually, unlike the City Opera, the differences among the many labor unions and management were ironed out and the Metropolitan Opera was saved (Cooper 2014). It was difficult for the classical music world to imagine that certain European countries would allow an important opera house to fail. A way would be found, whether from taxes or the funds would be sought from the emergent private sector and foundations.

The examples I have used are far from being representative of all performers or would-be performing companies in the United States. Many of them have been far more deeply affected than these important institutionalized companies with their established networks of supporters. Few have the ability to negotiate contracts with media corporations to enlarge their access to large, even global, audiences, as do the Metropolitan Opera and other prestigious companies. It is not clear whether European artists and musicians are much better off, but at least they know that there is a legitimacy to state support, which still rarely exists in the United States, even when the reputation of a company is excellent and its budget well managed. This is the case of American public television, whose government support has been shrinking and whose slogan, “A great nation deserves great art,” appears to fall upon deaf ears when

Congressional and Presidential candidates vie for support from extremist, antitax voters. One consequence of publicly funded companies, as the New York City Opera's demise reveals, is that to maintain a high level of performance, a much higher level of subsidy than is likely to arise is required.

It may seem crassly materialistic to be so concerned with “business models” when certain other matters should remain central to our thinking: freedom of expression, privacy, civility in the face of political power, and above all, aesthetic quality. But even though it is not simple, these constitute the components of the “mission” that need to be preserved even when pragmatism may seem to be the best way to achieve democratic access to worthwhile culture, however defined. Speaking of the United States, it is sometimes surprising to find that politicians who are associated with conservatism have been generous in their cultural policies. It is not surprising that Lyndon Johnson, a New Deal Texan, was open to writers and artists who despised his Vietnam policy and told him so. But we should not forget that it was Richard M. Nixon (1969–74) who permitted national support for culture and the arts to rise to its highest point since its beginnings, and it is Barack Obama who has succeeded in returning national support to its (pitiful) USD 164 million a year in spite of the most hostile Congress and extremist political movement actions that have been seen in many decades. His support for culture will not gain him many votes, but it does remind us that even though the United States and European countries do not take the same political path when it comes to cultural policy, in some respects, they may face similar dilemmas.

Notes

1. As Jeffrey Goldfarb (2012) pointedly notes, in today's world, it is perfectly possible for political groups, whether of the left or the right, to make use of the same available technology and media.
2. While the term “business model” has become a hazy shorthand for a variety of things, this Assembly focused on the term as a system of choices to enable businesses, not-for-profit, for-profit, from sole contractor to multinational, to meet missions and market goals in sustainable ways (cf. Wyszomirski 2002).

3. Kevin Mulcahy (1997), as indicated above, has delineated this multilevel pattern of American cultural support in comparison with a number of other countries.
4. The issue of visas for artists and other cultural creators has been sorely exacerbated since September 11, 2001, as the crisis of security has produced extremes in caution in relation to visitors to the United States. See, for instance, the difficulties experienced by Julie, the daughter of filmmaker Costa-Gravas, who was denied entry because of the discovery upon her arrival of overstaying her visit years earlier. It took the then District Attorney of New York Robert M. Morgenthau, a friend of Costa-Gravas, as well as French and Greek consular officials, to stave off her confinement in administrative detention and virtually certain deportation. Having failed to sway the national security official (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Morgenthau was driven to ask that she be treated as a *criminal* so that she could be paroled into his custody, with the promise that he would ensure her departure at the end of her stay (*New York Times*, Oct. 28, 2011).
5. The most prominent during the early and mid-nineteenth century was Boston, with competing centers such as Philadelphia and New York. A few outliers with a long cultural tradition included Charleston, South Carolina, and New Orleans, Louisiana, where the earliest opera performances had taken place and relatively durable companies had been established.
6. This process, taking Boston as a model, is carefully analyzed by Paul J. DiMaggio (1990).
7. The Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles (MoCA), for example, made available informative pamphlets in English, Spanish, Japanese, and Korean so that parents could introduce their children to modern art. This practice has become increasingly widespread in American museums and in many other countries.
8. I owe the concept of “display democracy” to my husband, Aristide Zolberg.

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3

Enterprise Culture and the Arts: Neoliberal Values and British Art Institutions

Victoria D. Alexander

Introduction

This chapter examines aspects of British cultural policy that are aimed toward arts organizations and the national museums. The analysis shows that arts organizations have been deeply affected by state and corporate interests in recent years, notably with respect to neoliberal modes of thinking. Taking inspiration from Bourdieu's work, I argue that British cultural policy, and the actions taken by arts institutions in response, provides a fertile ground on which to study the interpenetration of the fine arts by commerce and by the state.

Bourdieu (1993, 1996) describes the field of cultural production as consisting of both autonomous and heteronomous (sub)fields. Autonomous fields are free to focus only on artistic issues, whereas heteronomous fields are interpenetrated by the commercial realm and are

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thereby constrained by commercial logics. This penetration by the business world is clearly evident in UK arts institutions. Consider the National Gallery, in London (see Fig. 3.1). Their home page carries the National Gallery logo, which consists of white letters and “National Gallery” on a gray background (National Gallery 2015a). There is a horizontal white line, and under this, also in white letters, but slightly smaller, are the words “Credit Suisse: Partner of the National Gallery”. In this way, a business corporation’s name is included with the Gallery’s logo. We have come to expect business names to be closely aligned with arts organizations (Wu 2002); however, even ten years ago, Credit Suisse would have appeared as a “sponsor” of the National Gallery. Now, business corporations are “Partners.”

Clicking on the Credit Suisse logo takes you to a page with the information that the company has been a partner of the National Gallery since 2008, and that it provides “a vital funding platform for the Gallery’s exhibitions and educational programmes” (National Gallery 2015b, n.p.). In addition to learning how it has funded several major special exhibitions, late-night opening hours, and educational initiatives, we also learn that the company’s “[o]ther sponsorship commitments include the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, the Shanghai Museum, the Taipei Fine Arts Museum, the Kunsthau Zurich, the Salzburg Festival and the Bolshoi



Fig. 3.1 The National Gallery, Trafalgar Square, London. (Photo © The National Gallery, London)

Theatre” (National Gallery 2015b, n.p.). So the National Gallery’s web page provides an advertising platform for a bank.

Compared with the National Gallery, the English National Opera (ENO) does not have such obvious corporate advertising on its home page (ENO 2015a). The “ENO” logo appears on the upper-right-hand corner and is not associated with any names of businesses. In advertising its own upcoming performances, however, the ENO shows that it has been looking to the business world for ideas on how to increase audiences, for instance, by offering programs to simulcast high-definition live opera performances in cinemas (see Fig. 3.2). Elsewhere on the website, visitors can view trailers of upcoming attractions.¹

At the top of the ENO’s home page is a “Support” tab, and this provides information targeted to different groups. Click the drop-down text “Opportunities for Business” and the next page says that ENO offers

a flexible and creative platform for your business to build a high-value partnership with us. We pride ourselves on working with a wide variety of businesses, delivering excellent return on investment whatever the level of partnership. (ENO 2015b, n.p.)



Fig. 3.2 English National Opera’s production of *La Traviata*, broadcast to cinemas in 2015. Production image of Elizabeth Zharoff (soprano) as Violetta, and Company. (Photo © Donald Cooper, used with permission)

And it continues,

ENO can provide your organization with the following benefits of association:

- Brand positioning to align your company with ENO's reputation for innovation, distinctiveness, collaboration and accessibility
- Access to desirable target audiences, including affluent professionals, younger, culturally curious urbanites and wealthy retirees
- "Money-can't-buy" entertainment experiences, including exclusive access to best-house seats in our home, the London Coliseum, "behind the scenes" special experiences and opportunities to work with our talented singers and musicians for your own private events. (ENO 2015b, n.p.)

So, in addition to providing an "award-winning artistic programme [that] is distinctive, highly-theatrical and accessible," ENO also provides services and marketing for businesses. And notice that the ENO promises a "money-can't-buy" experience to corporations that give money through their corporate membership scheme. So, then, money can buy these opportunities after all. Money can also buy hospitality for corporations and their clients or for individuals: "ENO's diverse programme of innovative and classic opera productions enables a wide range of exciting personalised entertainment opportunities. The London Coliseum, ENO's home, is a unique building with a number of private rooms and spaces which are available to hire" (ENO 2015c, n.p.).

The Field of Cultural Production

In this chapter, I sketch out a story of how British arts organizations got to where they are today. What we see is a shift of the fine arts from the pure, autonomous pole to a heteronomous one which is interpenetrated by commerce, as described by Bourdieu—and also by the state (Alexander 2017). In his academic work, Bourdieu (1993, 1996) discusses the field of cultural production. He argues that some art forms are "autonomous." They produce art for its own sake. Other art worlds are "heteronomous"—they are interpenetrated by other fields.

Bourdieu talked specifically about the interpenetration of these artistic fields by commerce. “Bourgeois art” has a claim to be art; that is, it can claim to be fine art or high art, which requires a degree of cultural capital to appreciate. But this art is sold in a marketplace. In contrast, “industrial art” is not particularly arty, by virtue of being thoroughly based in commerce. Here, Bourdieu is thinking of all forms of popular culture and kitsch.

While the marketplace is an important field that can become enmeshed with the arts, another source of heteronomy, I argue, is the state. In his later, more political work, Bourdieu writes about the “scourge of neoliberalism” (1998, vii) and considers the loss of autonomy in intellectual fields. His focus in this work is more about the “misery” of poor people, working people, and even the middle classes, than on the art world. Here, he foreshadows, but does not develop, the idea that the state plays an important role in bringing neoliberalism into the art world. This chapter therefore sketches out the role of the state in the changes wrought in British arts organizations in recent decades.

Backstory

The Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) was chartered in 1946 and ushered in a long period of state-supported arts initiatives. It received funds from the Treasury and disbursed them to “worthy” arts organizations, often the so-called “flagship” companies in London. It was set at an “arm’s length” from the government, to protect it and client organizations from party-political influence. That the state would support national culture was relatively uncontroversial: “A widely shared assumption of the time was that ‘authentic’, ‘high’ ... culture needed to be protected, maintained and ... disseminated against an ever more dominant and meretricious mass culture” (McGuigan 2009, 153; see also Minihan 1977; Pearson 1982).² To many in the art world, the arrangement seemed like a very good deal: free money made available to produce fine arts. The main debate was whether the Arts Council should concentrate resources on the very best-quality art, which was often thought to be produced in London, or instead, whether art should be sent to or produced throughout the United

Kingdom, as a way to improve all British citizens. The Arts Council tended more toward the former strategy, but either way, it followed the advice of elites in the art world, and the fine arts flourished. Supported arts organizations were able to increase output without compromising their ideals.

The Change

The story of neoliberal penetration of the arts starts about 35 years ago, with the General Election in 1979 when Conservative Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister. Thatcher's government changed the role of the state in funding of the arts by dramatically reducing available government funds, requiring arts institutions to engage in formal planning, encouraging private sponsorship, and changing the rhetoric used to discuss arts support. Up to this time, the relationship between arts organizations and the state was relatively unproblematic. This was because the state provided funds for the arts on the art world's terms. Art was seen as intrinsically valuable and elites in the art world were free to choose which types of art state funding would support. As government support for the arts had grown between 1946 and 1979, arts organizations had come to count on state largesse, and had grown and expanded operations and programs in response. Thatcher's government reversed the growth in arts funding, but the state remained very important in the cultural arena. A crucial change was the relationship between art and the state that altered the way that the arts were managed and valued.

In line with cuts in other sectors, the arts received less government funding during the Thatcher era (Hewison 1987, 1995). Consequently, arts organizations could either shrink operations to fit the reduced funding or could seek additional funding elsewhere. The Tories provided incentives to encourage supplemental funding from private sources. They changed tax law to encourage private, and especially corporate, sponsorship of the arts. And borrowing from American ideas, government introduced "Challenge" schemes in which public money was made available to match funds raised from private sources. (Matched funding programs give public money to match funds raised from private sources, often on a 2:1 or a 1:1 basis, meaning that for each £2 or £1 raised elsewhere,

government matches £1.) This mix of public and private sources of funds is now called a “mixed economy” approach to supporting public goods such as the arts.

Enterprise Culture

A key Tory focus was on “enterprise culture” (Heelas and Morris 1992)—an important ideological component in the movement of the arts world from an autonomous to a heteronomous field. Thatcher sought to instill this notion throughout what she called “UK, plc.” Enterprise culture enshrines the values of liberal economics, emphasizing three key principles: the efficiency of markets, the liberty of individuals, and the nonintervention of the state. Individuals and organizations alike were expected to become enterprising, rather than dependent, so they could look out for themselves. The welfare state, therefore, would shrink. All this was consistent with Thatcher’s neoliberal political philosophy (Harvey 2005).

Related to this was Thatcher’s emphasis on “value for money.” The philosophy behind this was that government should not support any activity from the public purse unless it had proven value. The 1983 National Audit Act turned this philosophy into law by empowering the Auditor General to assess government departments and public agencies in terms of the three E’s: “economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.” Funded organizations were required to formulate strategic plans, set performance targets, and assess outcomes against them. They were to take steps to use business tools to demonstrate their value for money.

What Thatcher did was to provide channels through which business-centered ideas could be injected into the arts (Gray 2000). But the seeds for this change had been planted when arts institutions first accepted public funds, many years before her government came to power. As arts organizations grew because of government largesse, they became dependent on it for their operations. The bargain had already been struck, and to receive funding—or to make up shortfalls through corporate sponsorship—arts institutions needed to act more like businesses and less like the scholarly, refined, and insulated organizations they had been. Indeed, while state funding was shrinking, the state became much more

important and influential on the arts, as government sought to implant its policy doctrines into arts organizations. Notably, under Thatcher, the role of arts minister became a senior position, as part of the Prime Minister's Cabinet (Hewison 1987, 111). This signaled the increasing importance of the arts to government at exactly the same time as funding was reduced.

New Labour, *Plus ça change*

The Tories (Margaret Thatcher and, subsequently, John Major) were in power for nearly two decades, but in 1997, Tony Blair's New Labour won the General Election. While they reversed some trends set by the Conservatives, they also continued with others. In the arts, New Labour increased arts funding, which was welcome by the arts world. However, New Labour continued to promote policies that judged arts institutions from an instrumental perspective (Gray 2000). As has been widely noted, New Labour continued with a neoliberal philosophy, an ideology which hitherto had sat uncomfortably with anyone left of the political center (Fairclough 2000, 14–16). Early on in Blair's tenure, the arts were exhorted to increase "social inclusion," and funded organizations had to include line items in their budgets for this purpose (Belfiori 2002). Later, Blair and, following him, Gordon Brown emphasized the importance of the arts to growing the commercial aspects of the "creative economy" (Garnham 2005).

Tony Blair gave a speech at the Tate Modern on March 6, 2007. He described his ten years in power as being a "golden age for the arts" because, under Labour, government funding for arts and culture had doubled and the arts had become "central, an essential part of the narrative about the character of a new, different, changed Britain" (Blair 2007, n.p.). But in the specifics of his speech, Blair did not suggest that the arts were intrinsically valuable. Instead, the arts were auxiliary actors with respect to key policy objectives, and they served by contributing to the economy, the balance of trade, and tourism, fostering inclusiveness and increasing human capital. These goals clearly present a view of the arts

that places them at the service of the commercial interests of the state (see Alexander 2008).

New Labour saw the arts as integral to the postindustrial, “weightless” information economy; they are part of the creative sector (see McGuigan 2009; Florida 2002). This is illustrated by a report produced under the New Labour government of Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown. The 2008 document *Creative Britain: New Talents for the New Economy* (DCMS 2008) demonstrates the commercial interests of the state and the New Labour government vis-à-vis arts policy. The Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) coproduced this document, along with the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, as an “action plan” for growing the “creative economy.” The strategies in this plan reflected the Brown government’s aspirations for this commercial sector.

During the New Labour years, and continuing to the present, the Treasury allocated funds to the DCMS, which in turn, provided funds for Arts Council England (ACE). (By this time, ACGB had been broken into four Arts Councils, one each for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.³) In the *Creative Britain* document, DCMS stated that ACE will “help deliver the objectives of the Creative Economy Programme” (DCMS 2008, 9). In turn, ACE stated in its 2008 strategy document: “It is clear that funding for the arts is a powerful stimulus for creative industries” (ACE 2008, 10). One Creative Economy objective for ACE was to provide “venture capital” to “entrepreneurs.” The DCMS wrote:

Arts Council England will ... take account of the Creative Economy Programme’s findings and commitments in its next corporate plan and its other work. Arts Council England will continue to support creativity through its regularly-funded organizations, its education and skills programmes and through *targeted support for projects that combine artistic excellence with commercial growth* ... Arts Council England runs venture capital schemes specifically targeted at entrepreneurs in the cultural sector who wish to move from reliance on grants to developing successful businesses. (DCMS 2008, 42, emphasis added)

The DCMS report cast another objective in business terms:

The Cultural Leadership Programme, one of Arts Council England's education projects, will expand its relationships with commercial and business partners to train future senior managers of arts and cultural institutions. This will help them to maximise their financial return on commercial activities, generating further revenue for their creative work. (DCMS 2008, 42)

Statements in policy documents such as this one make it clear that, as with the Conservative governments, New Labour governments saw arts organizations from a neoliberal perspective in which all social institutions need to be run in the manner of private businesses.

As a complement to the values of commercial enterprise for revenue enhancement, the arts under New Labour were encouraged to use market research to better understand their "customers." A "Public Value Inquiry" by ACE in 2006–07, called the "Arts Debate," included focus groups with the public. A wide range of responses were collected and analyzed, showing that the public agreed that art provides many benefits. Specifically, there was broad approval for art that benefits society at large, reaches as many people as possible, and provides lasting benefits. However, there was disagreement over high levels of funding for the large, national companies, funding for individual artists, and funding for public art (especially conceptual art). Notably, the public made a distinction between "the Arts" and "Art." "The Arts" were seen as elitist, and therefore not worthy of public support, whereas "Art" was seen in the everyday, fun sense, and as it was seen to benefit a much wider variety of people, "Art" was valued more highly by the general public (Bunting 2007).

The Art Debate suggests a shift in the position of fine arts organizations, as a focus on pleasing a broad range of the general public renders them more analogous to commercial organizations in the marketplace. As the scholar Nicholas Garnham writes:

From a creative-industries perspective, quality and excellence are open to the market test of consumer preference. And access is by definition not a problem, since a successful creative industry has solved the access problem

through the market. If it is successful, why does it need public support? If it is unsuccessful, why does it merit public support? (Quoted in McGuigan 2009, 162)

The development of cultural policy under the Conservatives and New Labour from 1979 to 2010 is a history of the institutionalization of business support in the arts. As ACE put it in their 2010 strategy document, “we have the conditions for excellence in the arts in this country that are quite simply working... Key to these conditions [is] the mixed economy of funding from public and private sources, where public investment is made to work hard” (ACE 2010, 7). And the need for arts institutions to attract both public and private funds leads to the increasing use of government-sanctioned, corporate-supported neoliberal philosophy and practice in these institutions. It is in this way that the arts world becomes increasingly interpenetrated by state, as well as commercial, interests.

Coalition Government

In May 2010, the UK General Election failed to give a clear majority to any political party. David Cameron’s Conservatives and Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government. In a time of economic crisis, their main policy objective was to enact their small-government philosophy. Reversing funding gains to the arts under New Labour, the Coalition government’s 2010 Spending Review slashed the budget for ACE by 29.6% over four years and axed the dedicated arts programs for children. ACE was also required to hold the cuts it made to “frontline” arts organizations to 15%, the rest of the reductions to be made in ACE offices and other activities. As a result, ACE replaced its program of ongoing funding for certain organizations (regularly funded organizations) with a new program called “National Portfolio” funding, which commenced in 2012. All arts organizations were allowed to apply for a place in the National Portfolio, including the former regularly funded organizations. This change was presented as a beneficial change

designed to encourage more “competition” in the grants-seeking game.⁴ DCMS funding for the national museums was also cut, by 15%.

The Coalition’s plan to counter the deep cuts in arts funding (and in other policy areas) involved the “Big Society,” the Conservative Party’s shorthand for voluntarism. The Coalition government set policies to encourage charitable donations and volunteering from both individuals and businesses. Their 2010 Green Paper on this topic asserted that “[t]he main lesson is to acknowledge the limits of government” (Cabinet Office 2010, 5). The opportunity for philanthropy and volunteering was set out under five topics (Cabinet Office 2010, 7):

- Great opportunities
- Information
- Visibility
- Exchange and reciprocity
- Support

This spells out “GIVES”—an example of painful cuts obscured by a cute mnemonic sticking plaster.

The Green Paper was supported by a speech by the Culture Minister, given on December 8, 2010. Jeremy Hunt, the then Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport, delivered this speech at the European Association for Philanthropy and Giving Conference, which was held in the London offices of the investment bank JP Morgan. Hunt (2010) described a ten-point plan to encourage philanthropy in the arts. Notably, he said that the funds raised from private sources, whether corporate or individual, should be used to build American-style endowments. Such endowments are considered valuable because they can generate investment income, and as a result, endowed nonprofit organizations are less dependent on the public purse.

Jeremy Hunt delivered a second speech on July 4, 2011 at the Whitechapel Gallery—a more strategically chosen venue than JP Morgan—to encourage an American-style philanthropy agenda as part of the Big Society. (Perhaps it was only a coincidence that the speech was given on the American Independence Day.) In this speech, Hunt (2011)

announced a match fund to encourage arts organizations to create endowments. A press release for the match fund states that it

is designed to enable arts and heritage organizations to diversify their income streams, attract significantly more funding by increasing their fundraising potential and help them to develop and explore innovative new approaches to securing private giving. (Arts Council England 2011a, n.p.)

Hunt also declared 2011 the “Year of Corporate Giving.” In retrospect, this year went ahead with little fanfare about corporate giving. But at the time, Hunt promised many events in 2011 “to boost corporate support.” He said:

The motivation for many businesses is around *marketing and branding* rather than being *philanthropic in its purest sense*. But as long as it respects the independence and artistic integrity of the recipient, then of course we want to encourage it. (Hunt 2010, n.p., emphasis added)

These initiatives hearkened back to Thatcher’s, in relying on notions of privatization, but they were deeper and more pervasive. In addition to encouraging corporate sponsorship in the arts, the Coalition government encouraged a new philanthropic culture for individuals as well. For instance, as Hunt highlighted in his speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne announced, in 2011, new tax relief to estates donating 10% of the estate’s value to charities and the arts (DCMS 2011).

Hunt’s successor, Maria Miller, said in a speech in 2013, “[t]he Government is committed to a mixed economy model where targeted public funding will stimulate money from other sources, whether that is philanthropy or commercially generated” (Miller 2013, n.p.), and she argued that “in an age of austerity, when times are tough and money is tight, our focus must be on culture’s *economic impact*” (Miller 2013, n.p., emphasis added). The subsequent Culture Minister, Sajid Javid, said in his “Culture for All” speech:

My name’s Sajid Javid. And I used to be a banker. No point denying it. When I became an MP back in 2010 I had a unique sensation – I was the

only member of the new intake who was moving into a more popular profession! I'm afraid there's more. I'm a firm believer in the benefits of free-market capitalism. And the rumours are true. On the wall of my office there is picture of the great Baroness Thatcher. (Javid 2014, n.p.)

The speech continued with some familiar items, “[a] lot of people who are paying to support culture through their taxes and lottery tickets seem to think that consuming it is simply not for them,” a point reminiscent of Blair’s social inclusion agenda. And with reference to Cameron’s Big Society, Javid said, “I’ll be encouraging philanthropists to support culture right across the UK” (Javid 2014, n.p.) The speech dovetailed with policy statements on UK arts:

To help keep our arts in their world-leading position, we need to encourage mixed funding from a variety of sources, including philanthropic giving and fundraising, alongside public funding. (DCMS 2013, n.p.)

The neoliberal philosophy underlying UK cultural policy has not altered much since David Cameron came into power in 2010—or indeed, since Thatcher did in 1979. Cultural policy has continued in the same vein after the Conservative victory in the General Election in 2015 changed Cameron’s status from Prime Minister of a Coalition government to Prime Minister of a Conservative one.

Problems with Philanthropy

The experience of philanthropy elsewhere can provide some insight into the effectiveness of the Conservative Party’s approach to cultural policy, which can be summed up as further privatization, with shortfalls made up via philanthropy. On the one hand, philanthropy can provide a variety of social and cultural goods. On the other hand, philanthropy is characterized by a set of widely noted problems. On a practical level, to reach philanthropists, arts organizations must engage in fundraising, which can be costly. In the United Kingdom, there is relatively little habit of philanthropy, suggesting that it may be harder to encourage the “Big Society”

ideal than the government hoped. More importantly, it is notable that all philanthropists have an agenda. On the whole, individual philanthropy favors class-wide, elite interests (Ostrower 1995). Corporations often sponsor the arts to make up for their own public relations issues (Wu 2002): sponsoring art enacts the so-called “halo effect,” where the good image of the arts shines brightly on the sponsoring corporation.

Even if individual or corporate philanthropists do act from a deep interest in the arts, and even if they do not try to change the organizations they fund, the fact of funding only the organizations they deem worthy can change the field through selection effects (see Alexander 1996). Further, mechanisms set in place to encourage philanthropy, such as tax relief and match funding, allow wealthy people and corporations to influence government expenditures. That is, monies from the public purse are given—as tax relief or matching funds—to those nonprofit arts organizations whose exhibitions or programs attract philanthropic or corporate support, so philanthropists or corporations, in effect, direct public spending.

Arts Councils in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland

In 1994, as noted, ACGB was split into four organizations, one each for England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. In the narrative provided so far, much of the focus has been on ACE. However, it is only one of the four successors to the ACGB. Given that it is located in London and that England is the only country in the United Kingdom that does not have a devolved government separate from the UK Parliament, could it be that the neoliberal focus of ACE is stronger than those of the other Arts Councils?

Government in the United Kingdom is somewhat complicated by devolution. The UK government has devolved powers in certain policy areas to Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland (but not to England). The Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly were established at different points of time and have

different remits, and this has led to different arrangements for their Arts Councils. The Arts Council of Wales (ACW) is funded by the Welsh government, which, in turn, receives a devolved budget from Westminster (UK Parliament). This means that although the lines of authority are different, the top-down pressure, especially to do more with fewer funds, remains. So, for instance, in 2014, the Welsh government cut funds to ACW mid-term, after funds had already been committed, causing the Council to warn its funded organizations not to rely on it for grants (Thomas 2014). This was in response to cuts to the Welsh government by the UK government. Similarly, the Arts Council of Northern Ireland (ACNI) faced an in-year cut of 8% (Meredith 2015). In Northern Ireland, funds are allocated to the Northern Ireland Assembly, which supports the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL), which in turn funds the ACNI as a “sponsored body.”

Shortage of funding remains an issue for arts organizations in these two countries. As Dai Smith, Chair of ACW, writes:

The arts are at risk because continuing economic pressures are forcing uncomfortable choices about which areas of civic life our national and local Government feels are deserving of support. (ACW 2015a, 1)

ACW works to support Welsh culture specifically, and it funds such flagship organizations as the Welsh National Opera and National Theatre Wales. It states: “Our vision is of a creative Wales where the arts are central to the life of the nation” (ACW 2015b, n.p.). However, it uses neo-liberal language unsurprisingly similar to that used elsewhere in the United Kingdom. For instance, it describes itself as “the funding *and development* agency” for the arts in Wales, highlighting the need for arts organizations to secure earned income or alternative funding, and it describes its priorities as:

- supporting the creation of the best in great art
- encouraging more people to enjoy and take part in the arts
- growing the arts economy
- making Arts Council of Wales an effective and efficient business (ACW 2015b)

Similarly, the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (funder of the ACNI) describes its vision and mission as follows:

To promote social and economic equality, and to tackle poverty and social exclusion, through systematically promoting a sustainable economic model and proactively targeting meaningful resources at sectors of greatest inequality, within areas of greatest objective need, in the wider context of effectively developing tangible opportunities and measurable outcomes for securing excellence and equality across culture, arts and leisure, and a confident, creative, informed and healthy society in this part of Ireland. (DCAL 2015)

These days, it is almost unremarkable that all governmental and public organizations have missions and values statements; however, it is worth noting that such statements are part of the wider practice of business enterprise. In the case of Northern Ireland, the mission statement focuses on policy outcomes largely removed from artistic goals, namely “*tangible opportunities and measurable outcomes.*”

In Scotland, devolution goes further than it has in Wales and Northern Ireland, with more legislative powers, although full independence for Scotland was rejected in a 2014 referendum. This greater separation between Westminster and Holyrood (Scottish Parliament) has allowed Scotland to follow its own priorities. However, despite a more progressive outlook in some respects, a neoliberal approach to arts management is also evident in Scotland. For instance, the Scottish government directly funds the National Museums and Galleries of Scotland (analogous to the UK government, via the DCMS, funding for the UK national museums, which are located in England). And accordingly, the National Galleries of Scotland, in its Corporate Plan (2014–18, 5, emphasis added), writes:

We also measure the economic impact of our work *in line with Scottish Government's emphasis on increasing sustainable economic growth.* Aside from the social and educational impact of NGS and its key role in informing national identity, the indirect economic impact can be quantified using the Association of Independent Museums' established methodology.

As in the United Kingdom as a whole with respect to UK government funding of cultural organizations, Scottish cultural organizations must follow government priorities. Indeed, as Galloway and Jones (2010) argue, Scotland's art sector had more autonomy before devolution than after. Before devolution, the Scottish Committee (later called the Scottish Arts Council, confusingly, well before the division of ACGB into four Arts Councils) was officially part of ACGB, but was orientated explicitly toward Scotland. It functioned as an extra step between (UK) government and Scottish arts institutions (the "double arm's length"). After devolution, the link between government (now Scottish) and funded arts institutions became direct.

It is notable, moreover, that there is no longer an Arts Council in Scotland. In 2010, the Scottish Arts Council was merged with Scottish Screen to form a new organization, called Creative Scotland. This organization, a nondepartmental public body (as are the other Arts Councils, along with the former Scottish Arts Council), aims to support the arts *and* the cultural industries in Scotland. It may be that the elision of a distinction between the for-profit creative industries and the nonprofit arts represented in the new body are a representation, *par excellence*, of a neoliberal approach to culture. Moreover, the organization has been the focus of some controversies, notably in 2012, when Creative Scotland planned to remove (often ongoing) "flexible funding" from approximately 50 arts organizations (Stevenson 2014; Higgins 2012a), replacing this with project-based lottery funding. This controversy was partly about cutting resources and stability (ongoing funds replaced by one-off, project-based funds) and partly about "Creative Scotland's use of the language of the financial world in relation to the cultural sector" (Higgins 2012b, n.p.):

[Creative Scotland's] corporate plan said that artists would be commissioned to "deliver services" and that Creative Scotland, which is chaired by [a] Royal Bank of Scotland board member ... would draw up "franchises" that would be "tendered." (Higgins 2012b, n.p.)

That this language is particularly remarkable in 2012 suggests that Scotland may have been insulated from the effects of neoliberalism on

the arts for longer than England (as Galloway and Jones 2010, suggest); however, it appears that Scotland is catching up fast.

No Such Thing as a Free Lunch

The anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1990) discussed gift-giving in archaic societies. He sees gifts as a form of exchange in which the act of giving elicits an obligation to reciprocate. This perspective is helpful in understanding the effects of contemporary cultural policy (see Alexander 2014). Mauss' work suggests that funding can be seen as a reciprocating system. The exchange, from the perspective of government, can be summarized in this way: government gives money and gets action relevant to policy objectives, such as social inclusiveness and the growth of the creative economy. (Whether these policy objectives are actually realized through the actions of arts organizations is a different question.) In addition, government agencies require that arts organizations provide the kind of strategic and financial plans as are found in the business world, so it gives money and gets business plans. Government funds enable the production of exhibitions and performances, and this creates a variety of public and private benefits.

For corporations, in exchange for money, the business receives advertising, prestige, the halo effect from the fine arts and organizations with which it is associated, and opportunities for highbrow corporate functions. And it is all tax-deductible as a business expense. Corporations do not completely forget the actual exhibition or performance that is sponsored, but the art itself is often a secondary consideration to the tangible returns to branding, reputation, and the bottom line.

From the other side of the exchange, arts organizations receive money and produce art that, they hope, is excellent. But as part of the bargain, they also take on the structural arrangements of more business-like organizations, in the neoliberal model. The neoliberal philosophy is part and parcel of the funding exchange. Economists are fond of saying that "there is no such thing as a free lunch." In anthropology, there is no free gift (Douglas 1990). This, I think, is a useful way to understand state funding of the arts. A neoliberal model is insinuated into the arts world via

government requirements (funding agreements, matched funding) and by the need to cater to corporate objectives (as part of the “mixed economy”). Though neoliberal thinking is alien to the arts and its core values, arts institutions have, nevertheless, been strongly affected by it.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed UK cultural policy to demonstrate how the neoliberal ideology of recent governments is embedded in it, and as a consequence, how neoliberalism leads to enterprise culture in the arts. Arts organizations seek funding (government grants, match-fund-leveraged sponsorship, and corporate and individual philanthropy). But in doing so, they are forced to accept a bargain and must trade their autonomy for a neoliberal frame of reference. The benefits of funding come with a high price.

Afterword: The Commercial Art World in London and the United Kingdom

One aspect of state funding for the arts, at least before the neoliberal turn, was that it provided a space for artistic creation that was free from the marketplace (Alexander and Rueschemeyer 2005). Whatever the effects of neoliberalism in commercializing the supported arts sector, it is worth taking a brief look at the vibrant commercial marketplace for British arts and culture. The United Kingdom is justifiably proud of its creative industries, which make up a large part of its domestic economy and provide a net benefit to the balance of trade (DCMS 2015). London, especially, has a lively contemporary arts scene, with successful commercial galleries operating on an international scale. Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the multinational arts auction houses, are located in London (Christie’s is headquartered in London, and Sotheby’s has a major branch office in London, and was founded there, though it has moved its corporate headquarters to New York). The European Fine Art Foundation provides figures showing the importance of the arts in the United Kingdom. It

reports that, in 2013, the United Kingdom had the third-largest art market (art and antiquities auctions and dealership sales) in the world, behind the US and China, with a share of 20% of the worldwide market of nearly €50 billion (The European Fine Art Foundation 2014).⁵

The reasons for the success of UK cultural and creative industries are many—and are debated. A London government website suggests that London's vital cultural scene has to do with its concentration of museums, galleries, and world heritage sites, along with its cosmopolitan and diverse population, including speakers of 300 languages, and a large range of artistic performances and festivals (Greater London Authority n.d.). Some commentators suggest that the tax regime for arts is more favorable in the United Kingdom than in many European countries, and that tax law “is a decisive tool to promote, or demote, global art market hubs” (Crefovi 2013, n.p.). Changes in tax law can affect the arts scene. For instance, payments to artists when their works are sold at auction (resale rights, or *droit de suite*) are not given in the United States and had not been given in the United Kingdom. However, the European Union has required the United Kingdom to change its policy on this issue, and resale rights were introduced in 2006 (the year that Sotheby's moved its headquarters from London to New York) and were expanded in 2012. Some observers argue that these changes in artists' resale rights reduce the competitiveness of the UK auction market (Grant 2012).

Nevertheless, it is clear that the UK government is keen to support its creative sector, at least rhetorically, and does so in neoliberal terms, as in this current statement of “what we do” from the DCMS (quoted in full):

The Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) is here to help make Britain the world's most creative and exciting place to live, visit and *do business*. We protect and promote our cultural and artistic heritage and *help businesses* and communities to grow by investing in innovation and highlighting Britain as a fantastic place to visit. Alongside this, we protect our deeply held beliefs in freedom and equality. We help to give the UK a unique advantage in the *global race for economic success*. (DCMS n.d., emphasis added)

As this chapter has shown, neoliberal discourse tends to frame the arts as valuable for instrumental reasons, whereas many artists and art lovers

prefer to focus on art's intrinsic value. While it seems clear that looking only at instrumental values is problematic, and that supporters of the arts should rally against that view, Stevenson (2014, 181) suggests that a largely universal antagonism in the arts world toward neoliberal policy can obscure some thorny issues. He describes such debates between the instrumental and the intrinsic value of the arts as a "well-worn discursive knot" that "entangles the discourse strands of cultural value and public accountability with those of artistic freedom, expertise and excellence" (p. 181). He argues that framing the issue around artistic autonomy versus constraints imposed by "prosaic and managerialist concerns" (p. 183) obscures enormous inequalities and power differences that already exist in the art world, among artists and among arts institutions. And while we may regret many aspects of the neoliberal turn and the loss of protection from the marketplace that had been afforded by enlightened state patronage, good art is still produced in both the nonprofit and the commercial sector.

These are clearly deep issues, and this short chapter cannot answer the question of the ultimate effects of neoliberalism on the arts, or what could be done to counter it. Nevertheless, it is clear that the sectors of the art world that were previously the most autonomous have lost autonomy to both the commercial and the state sector.

Notes

1. Many of these (rather wonderful) trailers exhort the viewer to "book now." Trailers for upcoming performances are on the ENO website (but often more easily found through a Google search than via the "What's On" tab on the ENO home page). Trailers from earlier productions can be seen on YouTube (<http://www.youtube.com/user/englishnationalopera>) or on Vimeo (<http://vimeo.com/englishnationalopera/videos>) (both sites accessed and confirmed January 30, 2015).
2. Of course, public arts funding was not without some criticism. Some objected to state funding on principle, some saw the supported arts sector as elitist, and some worried about the influence of funders (see Alexander and Rueschemeyer 2005).

3. The history of arts funding in the United Kingdom is complicated by continual changes in organizations and funding arrangements. For instance, in 1992, John Major created the Department of National Heritage (DNH), which amalgamated a variety of functions related to the arts and culture, and which became an intermediary disburser of funds from the Treasury to the Arts Council of Great Britain. New Labour changed the Department's name to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1997. The Arts Council of Great Britain was separated into the four Arts Councils (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) in 1994, and the funding arrangements for each have subsequently diverged. I have attempted to provide a coherent narrative of change, leaving out many of the details for the sake of clarity.
4. It also, to some extent, disguised cuts in funding by subsuming them into a competitive process. ACE reports: "We received 1,333 applications to join the National portfolio, submitting bids for a total of £1.4 billion. The 2012–15 National portfolio of 696 organizations replaces the previous regularly funded organizations portfolio of 849. 111 new organizations have been added to the National portfolio. 791 regularly funded organizations applied for National portfolio funding and 585 were successful. 206 regularly funded organizations will no longer receive funding" (ACE 2011b, n.p.).
5. However, the United Kingdom lost three percentage points of market share between 2012 and 2013 (The European Fine Art Foundation 2014).

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4

The Economization of the Arts and Culture Sector in Germany After 1945

Nina Zahner

Historical Background

The public cultural policy system of Germany differs significantly from that of most of the other European countries. In Germany, it is the federal states (*Länder*) that are primarily responsible for legislation and administration in the field of arts and fine arts.¹ The *Länder* decide on all matters of cultural policy, from museums and libraries to theaters and operas (Burns and Will 2003, 134). But according to the *Subsidiaritätsprinzip* (principle of subsidiarity), some of their power evolves downward and many museums, theaters, and libraries are, therefore, in fact governed by the municipalities. In addition, the German cultural field includes also institutions and organizations that are managed and owned by private sector actors.

This cultural federalism is an historical heritage. For centuries, Germany consisted of many autonomous feudal states and municipal republics that

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realized their own cultural policies by creating a large number of cultural institutions. With the unification of the German Empire (*Deutsches Reich*) in 1871, these autonomous cultural traditions were not leveled out. The newly established imperial government was simply held responsible for cultural foreign affairs. In the constitution of the Weimar Republic (1919–33), public responsibility for the funding of arts and culture was shared between the imperial government, the parliaments of the Federal States, and the local councils. During National Socialism (1933–45), this traditional diversity was forcibly centralized and culture was exploited for political purposes. After the end of World War II on May 8, 1945, Germany was split into three western zones, which later became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the Soviet occupation zone, the later German Democratic Republic (GDR). Forty years of separate development followed in the field of cultural policy in Western and Eastern Germany (ERICarts 2013, D-2; Bendixen 1997, 172–73).

The GDR did not return to the tradition of cultural federalism after World War II; instead, it practiced a state-run cultural centralism. Culture was seen as a political instrument of state control. Traditional cultural institutions, cultural centers (*Kulturhäuser*), youth clubs, and company-related cultural activities were maintained by the government and the unions, and were controlled by party politics (ERICarts 2013, D-2; Göschel 1994, 46). One major task of the cultural policy of the GDR was to implement a so-called *Breitenkultur* (broad culture) in the GDR. The idea was to achieve the intellectual and cultural rise of the *Arbeiter und Bauern* (working people) as a finite realization of humanist ideals. The image of the “singing workers” in the cultural center represents this idea. At the end of the 1980s, more than 10,000 broad culture circles, over 1000 houses of culture, 800 clubs for working people, 4200 youth clubs, 4500 village clubs, and so on were to be found in the GDR (Groschopp 2001, 15–16). This manifold cultural landscape could unfold only in the frame of suspicious censorship. Many artists, writers, and directors became skillful in expressing critical thoughts by evading censorship. And the audience was trained to understand the hidden criticism between the lines. Quite a few cultural workers paid for their desire for freedom with persecution, forced departures, or expatriation (Bundesregierung 2014, 82–83).

The collapse of the SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*/ Socialist Unity Party of Germany) dictatorship in 1989 led to a fundamental reorganization of the cultural field. With the accession of the GDR to the scope of West German Federal Law on October 3, 1990, almost all cultural activities in the GDR were temporarily suspended. It was agreed in the Unification Treaty that cultural federalism would be installed in “the acceding territory” (*Zutrittsgebiet*). The previously orchestrated culture should no longer be used to convey Marxist–Leninist ideology. The organizational structure of cultural life in the GDR, General Management, came to an end and a rapid change of personnel was initiated.² The autonomy of the municipalities was reinstalled and the ensembles became artistically independent. The municipalities could now decide on the amount and distribution of cultural subsidies and about how to deal with the cultural institutions that had been inherited from the GDR. Renaming would be the first step (Höpel 2015).

In 1991, many major cultural institutions were converted into public undertakings fully integrated into the municipal administrative structure (*Regiebetriebe*). Some minor institutions were converted from municipal institutions into either private sector enterprises or foundations receiving modest municipal funding. From the mid-1990s onward, the major cultural institutions were allowed to conduct their own business planning, accounting, and financial reporting.³ The cutting of the red tape was meant to install more flexibility and economic efficiency. This transformation process took place all over Germany and was not specific to the eastern states. It was accompanied by a clear shift toward the funding of classical bourgeois culture despite the optimistic announcements to equally promote high culture and *Breitenkultur* (broad culture) in the 1990s (Höpel 2015).

After the Berlin Wall came down, cultural policy efforts focused mainly on the preservation of the cultural substance of the new states and on reviving the dilapidated cultural institutions. Nearly 217 theaters, 87 orchestras, 955 museums, 112 music schools, 9349 libraries, 250,000 individual monuments and monument complexes, and around 180 town centers of national significance made up the cultural inventory of the GDR (BNL 2014, 76). Most of them were found to be in urgent need of

renovation, as they had been left to decay for decades. Since it was expected that the restoration of the cultural infrastructure would be too demanding for the new states and the restructured municipalities, the federal government transitionally cofinanced many projects in order to prevent any harm occurring to the rich *Kultursubstanz* (cultural substance) of the new states. In between 1991 and 1993, the federal government provided roughly €1.3 billion for the transitional funding of culture. By means of different investment programs, the federal government still today supports the modernization of cultural institutions and the increase in the international reputation of top institutions in the new states.

Today, the cultural policy of the newly formed German states is not very much different from that of the old FRG. The idea of *Breitenkultur* (broad culture) is nowadays—despite its very different ideological background—quite similar to that of *Soziokultur* (socioculture). Both in eastern and western parts of Germany, cultural policy is strongly related to the ideas of Idealism and refers to a common glorious cultural past⁴ (Wesner 2010, 444; ERICarts 2013, D-2).

After World War II, Western Germany had returned almost immediately to cultural federalism. This was a “prophylactic response” by the Allied occupying forces to the centralized “total” cultural policy of the Nazis, and partly a return to the historically constituted distinct political identity of the regional states (Ahearne 2003, 127). In the postwar years of the 1940s and 1950s, the main objective of cultural policy in the newly constituted Federal Republic was to connect to the prewar German and the postwar Western cultural traditions, and to rebuild the cultural infrastructure, entailing extensive reconstruction of schools and universities, churches, theaters, libraries, museums, and opera houses (Burns and Will 2003, 141). Due to the experiences with National Socialism, cultural policy was supposed to be “nonpolitical,” and restricted to only administration issues (ERICarts 2013, D-2; Sievers 1995, 24). The arts, and especially fine arts, were seen as the most preferable means to cultivate and educate people, and an haute-bourgeois concept of culture as “high culture” was applied. It incorporated the idea of the autonomy of art at its very center⁵ (Zahner and Karstein 2014, 192–93; Kösser 2006; Ruppert 1998). It is the idea of the autonomy of art on which the state

support for the arts has rested in Germany until today. Article 5, paragraph 3 of the German Constitution (*Grundgesetz*) states: “Art and science, research and teaching are free” (“Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei”). This provides the legal grounds for state subsidy of the arts (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 57, 333–34).

The Cultural Reform Policies of the 1960s and 1970s

In Western Germany, the political reform movements of the 1960s and 1970s strongly turned against the bourgeois understanding of culture which had been dominant in the late 1940s and 1950s. From the mid-1960s onward, it appeared not only to the young university intelligentsia but also to some political and administrative prominence that postwar Germany had not sufficiently reflected on its involvement with Nazism and its crimes, and that culture had not been conceived as anything other than an arcane aesthetic realm remote from the everyday needs of ordinary people (Burns and Will 2003, 141). Thus, embedded in the social discourses on the democratization of society, new reform movements called for an extension of the field of cultural policy. The concept of culture was now substantially extended through the integration of *Soziokultur* (socioculture) and the independent cultural scene. The *Neue Kulturpolitik* (New Cultural Policy) of the 1970s wanted to make the arts accessible to a wider scope of people. The need to extend culture into all niches of society was now stressed (Burns and Will 2003, 142).

New concepts of a more active cultural policy were introduced to build the conditions for a “culture for all” respective of a “culture of all” (ERICarts 2013, D-2; Sievers 1995, S.24–27; Glogner-Pilz 2011, 100).⁶ In the 1970s, this call for a “civil right for culture” led to a huge extension of the number of cultural institutions⁷ and to the establishment of many new fields of cultural policy. The goal of culture was now to generate emancipated citizens empowered to think critically about themselves and their position in the contemporary world (Burns and Will 2003, 143). Cultural policy became more and more social policy. But despite this massive increase on the cultural supply side, no significant growth

on the demand side could be observed. Even though the number of visits to cultural institutions increased, the number of visitors remained mainly constant (Glogner-Pilz 2011, 101–105; Sievers 2008). Hence, one central concern of the New Cultural Policy, the participation of enlarged social groups in society's cultural life, could hardly be realized. Yet, the expenses for the cultural sector at the municipal level grew constantly. Their share in the overall budget increased from 3.8% to 4.2% between 1981 and 1991, and it rose from DM 5.96 billion to DM 10.26 billion, an increase of more than 70% (Röbke 1995, 135; Heinrichs 1997, 34).

The 1980s and 1990s: The Convergence of Culture and Economy

In the 1980s, an understanding of culture as an economic factor and a location factor began to prevail in Western Germany. Profitability calculations were now used to legitimize public expenses on culture. Additionally, culture as an economic branch gained ever-growing public attention. From 1982 to 1986, one could see a 28% increase of taxable companies in the cultural industry sector—companies of music and theater industry, the publishing sector, art market, film industry, the broadcasting industry, and architecture and design industry⁸—and a growth in turnover in this sector of 32% (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 333–36; ERICarts 2013, D-3; Rauhe 1994, 21). Since then, the culture industry has been regarded as an extremely dynamic and important economic branch that is a “source of inspiration” to other economic branches. The percentage of the culture industry within the German gross domestic product (GDP) was 1.6% in 2004; together with the creative industry, it even reached a percentage of 2.6%. In 2009, this sector produced services and goods to a value of €60 billion and thus reached the magnitude of the automotive or electrical industries. In addition, the sector was not, essentially, affected through the recession in 2008 (Deutsche Bank Research 2011).

In 1991, Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen) published the first cultural economic report in Germany, and other states followed it.

In 2007, there were 25 cultural economic reports available. This development is accompanied by claims that culture is not an autonomous sphere, separated from other areas of society and opposed to economy, but is an integral part of society and society's economy. However, even though cultural industries are a major issue in cultural debates at present in Germany, it is very unlikely that the whole arts sector is going to be discussed in these terms. This is because of the still-dominant idea of "cultural exception" or "cultural diversity" in Germany. According to this, "cultural goods and services cannot be considered in the same way as other commercial goods and services" (Ahearne 2003, 128).

The theme of culture as a location factor obtained increased significance in this context. From the 1990s onward, a lively cultural city life is now being perceived as an important argument within the location decision of economic companies. Consequently, towns and regions would start to market their cultural life in order to boost the image of their region, as well as to attract tourism and to provide an interesting background for conferences, fairs, and events. Cultural megaevents were staged to systematically push the economic performance of the region, that is, its service sector. All these efforts promote the eventization of culture (Florida 2002; Rauhe 1994, 21; Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 335–56).

In the aftermath of the German reunification in 1990 the new challenges of a reunited Germany requested in addition a strengthening of cultural policy at the federal level. In terms of globalization and the integration of Europe, the multivoiced system seemed less and less able to cope with shifts due to the new position of a reunified Germany (McIsaac 2007, 372). In 1998, the position of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and Media Affairs (*Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für Angelegenheiten der Kultur und der Medien*) and the parliamentary Committee for Culture and Media (*Ausschuss für Kultur und Medien im Deutschen Bundestag*) were established. In 2002, the German Federal Cultural Foundation (*Kulturstiftung des Bundes*) followed (ERICarts 2013, D-16).

Berlin—the new capital of reunited Germany—was facing the task of amalgamating and integrating the representative cultural institutions of East Berlin with those of West Berlin, while giving a proper symbolic

expression to the capital's political iconography and topography. As a result, the *Hauptstadtkulturfonds*, a treaty between Berlin and the federal level, was installed to finance cultural facilities in Berlin that were clearly charged with a national, rather than a regional, mission. Until today, an ever-growing proportion of Berlin's cultural budget is being shouldered by the federal budget (Burns and Will 2003, 148).

From the mid-1990s onward, the public authorities have been strongly hit by the massive financial costs of the German reunification and an ever-expanding cultural sector (ERICarts 2013, D-3, D-46–47; Scheytt 1994, 142–43). Rising levels of unemployment and the high costs of the welfare state placed new financial pressures on the public authorities and led to a cut in the cultural budgets for the first time since World War II⁹ (Giese and Göke 1999, 60; Sievers 1995, 29; Wagner 1999, 188; Schnyder and Jackson 2013, 330). Noticeable transformations of the cultural sector were the result: institutions were closed or confronted with massive shortages.¹⁰ The independent scene suffered most, as short-term project funding decreased disproportionately.¹¹ Since that time, the German cultural policy discourse has been shaped by lively argumentations in favor of or against the liberalization of the cultural sector (ERICarts 2013, D-15). On the semantic level, culture is now often being addressed by means of economic concepts: the discussion on culture in terms of “cultural goods” and “demand and supply” is gaining more and more importance (Giese and Göke 1999; Bechler 1991). There are different positions within this discourse that need to be identified.

Radical liberal laissez-faire positions demand the complete restructuring of the arts sector toward an open market. Their argument is that only a radical liberalization of the arts will be able to democratize the prevailing cultural policy system and to counteract observed state failure. In the course of this argument, there is a democratic deficit identified in the practice of the state-dominated funding system. The criticism is that this system promotes an evaluation of the arts by politicians instead of empirical audiences. This system of funding is seen to be patronizing the citizens, while a free market represents consumers' decisions in a direct and, thus, more democratic way. Along the lines of this argument, a free market would thus develop distinguished, consumer-driven cultural services (Giese and Göke 1999, 64–68).

In contrast, some believe that the increasing market orientation of the arts sector results in a far-reaching loss of quality in the arts. Thus, these positions conjure the autonomy of art and see it guaranteed only by the existing state-run subsidy system. According to this position, the existing system has to be maintained by all means, and any form of commercialization of the arts has to be prevented. This line of argument often follows the assumptions of the “Cultural–Industry thesis” (*Kulturindustriethese*) of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2012), conceptualizing art in opposition to light entertainment and decoration. Following this argument, it is authentic art that prevents mankind from relapsing into “barbarism.” Thus, by no means should art adapt itself to the taste of the masses or to profit calculations. Instead, the freedom promises of the market have to be unmasked as sheer ideology, as it is *Kulturindustrie* that subjects all human creativity to the dictates of economic usability. Under market conditions, the true, the good, and the beautiful will lose their intrinsic, emancipatory values (Giese and Göke 1999, 60–61; Bechler 1991; Friedrich 1991).

Less radical positions consider a certain amount of convergence toward economic procedures as necessary to preserve the German cultural sector in an adequate form. These positions hold at the same time that the autonomy of the arts is threatened by the overly far-reaching processes of neoliberalization. Therefore, the arts should not be, under any circumstances, subordinated to a pure cost–benefit dictate, as this might result in the simultaneous loss of uneconomic cultural activities (Sievers 1995, 35–36; Detert-Weber 1997, 162; Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 142–43; Scheytt 1994, 147–48). Hence, this position recommends a moderate adaptation of economic strategies in cultural policy and cultural administration, as well as in the work of cultural institutions. It aims at sharing funds more effectively and wants to make the arts sector more flexible and efficient, while still keeping its autonomy (Röbke 1995, 136; Eichler 1995, 157). The introduction of new controlling tools provided by “New Public Management” (NPM) was to perform this balance act¹² (Sievers 1995, 31). Furthermore, in times of short budgets, a professional cultural management¹³ should be securing the efficient use of temporal and financial resources by drawing on economic methods of organization and planning (Rauhe 1994, 6–7). While a complete opening of the cultural sector

to the market is rejected, the adaptation of methods and techniques taken from economics should balance the deficits, largely developed by declining public subsidization. With reference to the United States, it is proposed that cultural institutions and projects should search for alternative, private funding and generate substantial income of their own (Giese and Göke 1999, 68; Siebenhaar 2001, 155–57).

It was this moderate position that formed the ideological basis of the restructuring of the arts sector since the 1990s until the mid-2000s in Germany.¹⁴ During the 1990s, the legal form of numerous public cultural institutions was changed. Many institutions were changed from public undertakings that were fully integrated into the municipal administrative structure (*Regiebetrieb*) toward self-maintaining public organizations (*Eigenbetrieb*) or hybrid shareholder organizations (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 96). New models of ownership were implemented which partially disentangled cultural institutions from their previous attachments to budgetary and public service law and the administrative structures of municipalities and state. This mostly took the form of changing the legal form to a limited company (GmbH), association (Verein), or foundation¹⁵ (Höpel 2015). This change of legal identity aimed at implementing a greater flexibility in funds management. The de facto result of these transformations was an increase in the proportion of project-based funding by the public authorities.¹⁶ But, taking all experiences to date into account, the changing of the legal forms could not avert a reduction in overall public funding.

All these initiatives were justified not only with an increase in efficacy. They were also meant to implement a new “activating” understanding of cultural policy in terms of “governance.”¹⁷ This new concept abandons a monopolistic idea of cultural policy and allows for greater codetermination of civil society actors (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 91; Röbbke 1995, 138; Sievers 1995, 31–32). It is the strengthening of voluntary work that gains momentum here: by means of voluntary work and private funding, citizens would now actively participate in shaping the future of society. References to the United States are made here, pointing to their higher rate of private funding and their long tradition of voluntary work (Fuchs 1997; Strachwitz 1991, 20–23). NPM was also brought into line with the New Cultural Policy of the 1970s and its concept of “culture for all” (Röbbke 1995, 137–39; Sievers 1995, 35–40). It is especially the field of art museums

where these tendencies can be witnessed to an ever-increasing extent until today. Public authorities and private sectors actors increasingly cooperate here in terms of public–private partnership: private collectors donate their collections to the public authorities, demanding their integration into famous museum exhibitions, the extension of existing museums, or even the construction of new ones in exchange. The operating expenses of these new spectacular buildings are often to be covered by the public authorities, worsening their tight budget situation even more.¹⁸ Critical voices sense in these developments a loss of influence on the content of cultural policy by the public authorities (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 93, 101–102).

Looking at Germany's cultural field today, it becomes clear that all of the attempts to strengthen civil society actors in terms of voluntary work or new public–private partnership models or by a new distribution of responsibilities have not turned out very successfully (Höpel 2015). The majority of the cultural institutions in Germany are still integrated into the structures and hierarchies of public administration, and despite the implementation of public–private partnership models and numerous voluntary work initiatives, the level of public cultural funding could not be reduced.¹⁹ Instead, the financial pressure on the municipal cultural institutions remained stable or was even accelerated, while the federal budget for cultural affairs increased since 2006 continuously, with rates between 1.5% (2009) and 9.7% (from 2010 until 2012) to €1.3 billion (ERICarts 2013, D-46–47, 51). The present situation is strongly related to the economic and financial crisis of 2008–09 and to transformations concerning the national/state (*Bund/Länder*) competencies that had been taking place during the period of the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*/Social Democratic Party of Germany) and Green coalition under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998–05).

The Present Situation: The High Debt Level of the Public Authorities and Calls for Cuts

The financial crisis of 2008–09 was quickly felt in Germany. The country's economy shrunk by –4.79% in 2009 and banks had to be bailed out by the public sector (Schnyder and Jackson 2013). The level of debt

of the public authorities reached the highest level since the end of World War II. Additionally, private cultural funding decreased massively during the crisis years. The consequences of these developments became only fully visible in 2010 and 2011, placing additional financial burdens on the public authorities. It is the municipalities that suffered most, because, under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, a growing number of governmental responsibilities had been delegated to the local authorities without providing significant additional financial funds for their realization. This, especially, exacerbated the financial pressure on the public cultural institutions predominantly funded by the municipalities. All this led to a massive decline in long-term and institutional funding, as well as to a decrease in employment with social insurance benefits and full-time jobs in the cultural sector (Deutscher Kulturrat 2013, 328–29). The massive increase in the share of project-based funding and fixed-term employment contracts resulted in increasing job insecurity and a lack of planning security in the field of culture²⁰ (Deutscher Kulturrat 2013, 160–61).

The situation is exacerbated still further, as the concept of culture had expanded so massively from the 1960s and 1970s onward. Nowadays, the municipal cultural institutions are faced with highly individualized and differentiated reception habits that they can serve to an ever-smaller extent, given the present financial constraints. It is this situation that provides the underpinning for increasingly vociferous calls for a greater demand and market orientation of the public cultural institutions (ERICarts 2013, D-15–16; Haselbach et al. 2012). The cultural sector has little to respond with here. The objectives of cultural policy have become too heterogeneous. A conceptual basis is missing. This is rather surprising, as initiatives for a more concept-based, strategic cultural policy have existed since the 1970s in Germany and Cultural Development Plans exist in most of the 16 German Federal States (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 93–94; Rübke 1995, 139). But a closer look at these concepts and plans reveal that they only mirror the diversity of cultural policy topics: active citizenship, cultural economy, cultural tourism, audience orientation, regional identity, and so on (Sievers 1995, 23). These Cultural Development Plans serve to reveal the hybrid objectives of cultural policy, rather than to counteract calls for an increasing marketization or

economization of the cultural field. This leads to a situation where neo-liberal concepts of cultural policy are gaining more and more attention within the German field of cultural policy, as they promise rather simple solutions to these complex problems.

The book *Kulturinfarkt* (Cultural Infarct), published in 2012 by Dieter Haselbach, Pius Knüsel, Armin Klein, and Stephan Opitz, four well-known players in the German cultural field, stands well in line with this trend. Attracting a great deal of attention within the cultural field, the authors argue that the New Cultural Policy of the 1970s—despite all of its rhetoric on democracy—is ultimately undemocratic, as it focuses on educating the citizens in terms of the autonomy of culture. They show how the autonomy of culture is a very specific cultural concept that strongly relates to the historical experience of “mass culture” under National Socialism and Communism. Under conditions of today’s society, they see it as outdated. According to their view, it is for incomprehensible reasons that Germany’s cultural sector is still operating in its spirit. In their opinion, the fixation on the autonomy of culture ignores the needs of a broader audience and hinders effective competition and hence the democratization of the cultural field. The book, then, promotes a concept of cultural policy that is not so much about intervention but more about neutral regulation of markets. The authors argue for a radical change in German cultural policy, suggesting the decommissioning of the existing cultural infrastructure by half and a new distribution of the funds released. These funds should be used to build a new European culture industry and to promote “amateur culture,” which would eventually contribute to cultural integration and the education of the citizens (Haselbach et al. 2012, 24–41, 94–108, 178–214, 227–29, 280–82).

In summary, it can be said that the broadening of the concept of culture since the 1970s in Germany, with its undoubted gain in freedom, was apparently won through the loss of binding rules and standards. Clearly defined cultural policy objectives and fixed criteria for funding simply do not exist. This situation opens door and gates to calls for market liberalization. A similar diagnosis could be stated for the German artistic field.

The Economization of the German Artistic Field

After World War II, artistic life in Germany largely laid low. Many artists of classical modernism—ostracized by the National Socialists—had emigrated, and with them, many of their galleries. The museums were bombed and robbed of their treasures. An artistic metropolis, such as Berlin or Munich, that had flourished in prewar times no longer existed (Gieseke 1996, 124; Thomas 2002, 462).

The rapid economic growth of the 1950s was most pronounced in Rhineland. The industrial production started again relatively soon after the war and high profits were already generated in the early 1950s. It was these profits that created a rapidly growing demand for modern art and gave rise to a vibrant gallery scene. While abstraction and Informel had been dominating the field in the 1950s, there was a fundamental transformation in the 1960s. A multifaceted, lively young avant-garde scene established itself in the Rhineland, Dusseldorf being its center (Posca 1999, 42). Some of these new avant-gardes—Happening and Fluxus—accused the Informel of being elitist and decoupling art from the everyday experience. They claimed that art had to get out of the ghetto of autonomy and question the existing structures of the art field. They took a strictly anti-institutionalist, anti-individualistic position and tried to establish an alternative conception of art beyond the powers of institutions, the art market and art criticism. Aesthetics was replaced by the discussion and analysis of the conditions of artistic production and reception. Art in this conception should no longer be the sublime, the distant aesthetic; it should instead affect social life more significantly (Ermen 2007, 44; Gassen and Scotti 1996, 65; Rothauer 1996, 242–43). Interpretation as a method of dealing with artistic works was now heavily questioned. It was criticized as an act of decoding that referred to bourgeois rule systems. Intuition as a way to deal with art was instead put forward, as it did not presuppose any aesthetic or art historical reference points (Stachelhaus 2002, 162). The result was the consequent delegitimization of aesthetics and art criticism as criteria for evaluating art. This delegitimization of the intellectual pole of the art field led to an

intellectual vacuum within the field that was quickly filled by economic practices.

In 1967, the gallerists Stünke and Zwirner established the first fair of contemporary art, the Cologne Art Fair. Its aim was to provide an overview of the current trends in contemporary art to the general public and to visibly remove art from its elitist sphere. For these reasons, art was taken out of the white-cube presentation context and was presented in a more market-like, fair-like context (Zwirner 2000, 7). The disempowerment of art criticism that had been taking place during the previous years had led to a situation where there no longer was a single reference point for the evaluation of contemporary art but only heterogeneous contexts. This led to a huge uncertainty when it came to judging the quality of contemporary art works. In this situation, the economic criterion “price” gained a significant symbolic importance within the quality ascription process of contemporary art.²¹ It still has this function today. Prices are nowadays important quality markers in art fields or at least in certain spheres of these fields (Velthuis 2003; Zahner 2006). The lack of enounced autonomous cultural or artistic standards leaves an ever-expanding room for the radical opening of the arts and culture sector for market logic. It also intensifies demand for orientation and pricing.

For a long time, it was believed that the growing hybridization of the cultural field and its gained freedom could be dealt with by a tempered appliance of management methods and moderate orientations toward efficacy, taking the form of privatizations, active citizenship, and NPM. Nowadays, the pathologies of this orientation are clearly visible: increasingly precarious working conditions in the cultural sector, tendencies toward event culture, and a growing orientation toward tourism and toward culture’s economic impact on regions are the signs of the times in German cultural policy. All attempts to deal with the precarious financial situation of the public sector by means of a moderate efficiency orientation appear to have failed. In this situation, the calls for radical cuts and extensive restructuring of the cultural field are growing ever louder.

In addition, there is a growing pressure coming from the United States, but also from the European Union (EU), to subject all areas of cultural life to the laws of free market competition (Ahearne 2003, 129). Paradigmatic for these pressures is the repeated debate about the praxis

of fixing book prices in Germany and Austria. An issue that is again publicly discussed on the occasion of the free trade agreement TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) between the United States and the EU. While the United States and some players in the EU want to abolish fixed book prices because they see this fixing as distorting free market competition, Germany sticks to this practice, believing it is crucial for the preservation of the rich German cultural landscape. Similar debates and conflicts can be witnessed when it comes to markets for services related to film and television—so-called audiovisual services. While the United States has a strong interest in gaining access to these markets in Europe, France and Germany believe that these services should be treated differently from other kinds of services, as they are cultural services (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2014; European Commission 2014).

German Discourse on Cultural Education

In light of these transformations, “Cultural Education” (*Kulturelle Bildung*) emerges as the latest buzzword in the German cultural policy discourse.²² It appears to be the latest attempt to hold on to the idea of an intrinsic value of culture and the arts. Cultural Education emphasizes the intrinsic emancipatory character of culture and the self-empowerment of the individual. Following this line of argument, Cultural Education encompasses

a cultural experience that contributes to enable individuals to a self-determined life, to discover and develop their expressive needs, as well as to take part in culture actively. [...] In a world, in which social, political and economic processes are shaped by a multitude of aesthetic media, cultural/musical-cultural education becomes an important prerequisite for an independent and critical participation in society and politics. (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2012, 157)

In 2012, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (*Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung*) started the biggest incentive program for

Cultural Education up to now. The aim of the program *Kultur macht stark* (Culture gives you strength) is to support extracurricular education programs for underprivileged children and teenagers. Locally based *Bündnisse für Bildung* (Alliances for Education) were founded. The program will run for five years and has a total budget of €230 million.

But a closer look reveals that the discourse on Cultural Education is not mainly focusing on emancipatory goals. Instead, these goals are often flanked by other objectives. In the statistics report on education in Germany, for example, several different goals for Cultural Education are mentioned: Cultural Education is “an understanding of education as a lifelong process that serves the free development of the individual just as well as its inclusion in social conditions” and helps to preserve the “outstanding cultural infrastructure” of Germany (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung 2012, 157, 160). Here, Cultural Education is, among other things, taken as a means to generate an ever-growing public interest in the arts and culture, which will help to legitimize its public funding. Cultural Education, according to this line of argumentation, is the necessary prerequisite to develop an interest in the arts (Klepacki and Zirfas 2012, 76; Mandel 2012, 279). Even so, it is often related to problems of an aging society and the increase of cultural diversity in society. In this context, Cultural Education is expected to increase the “cultural integration” of elderly people or migrants. It should help to “strengthen the connective links of society” and “to support the development of creative problem-solving skills” (Emert 2012, 237–39). It is also expected to supply the cultural economics sectors with qualified personnel and to increase the chances of children and teenagers in job markets. Thus, Cultural Education is, to a growing extent, evaluated economically, especially in terms of its position in the value chain (Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 566; Göschel 2012, 236; Höppner 2013).

One could say that plurality, diversity, and a lack of orientation do not spare the term Cultural Education. Instead, the discourse on Cultural Education is widening the concept of culture to now even include pedagogy, and it is leading to a further expansion of the number of institutions that can apply for cultural funding in Germany. Thus, the discourse on Cultural Education is extending the multitude of values and objectives of cultural policy even further, playing into the hands of those who

want to apply economic criteria to cultural policy (Haselbach et al. 2012, 210–14). Given this situation, it is at least questionable that Cultural Education will be able to fulfill the expectation to contribute to the society-wide emancipation of the individual—even more so, as Cultural Education is most of the time only taking place in the form of individual fixed-term projects that are not in any sense strategically aligned. It takes this form because of the dominance of project-based funding that has, to a growing extent, established itself in the cultural field since the 1990s.

Conclusion and Outlook

After a short, restorative phase post World War II, the implementation of the *Neue Kulturpolitik* in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s led to a widening of the concept of culture and, thus, to an unprecedented expansion of cultural services. Cultural policy now became more and more social policy and was thus confronted with an ever-growing hybrid system of objectives. During the 1980s, the massive expansion and heteronomization of the cultural field under conditions of stable cultural funds were dealt with by attempts in moderate application of management techniques and temperate efficiency orientation. Legal form changes, introduction of NPM, establishment of cultural management and marketing, and the enforcement of “civic engagement” were the measures adopted. The massive costs of the German unification challenged the public finance sector in the 1990s, resulting in a reduction in the cultural budget for the first time since 1945. The financial situation of the municipalities was worsened by the reforms under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. The cultural institutions came under further cost-saving pressure at the time. Against this background, the calls for the liberalization of the cultural sector, its opening in favor of market logic grew louder and louder, resulting nowadays in proposals for a radical remodeling of the German cultural field. These ideas are confronted with the slogan of “Cultural Education,” encompassing a further expansion of the cultural field toward pedagogy. The steadily increasing hybridity of the field adds more water to the mill of those who call for simple, easy-to-evaluate solutions and the democratization effects ascribed to market mechanisms.

The current situation can be seen as symptomatic of a cultural war that confronts the bourgeois idea of a hierarchy of culture with the postmodern notion of horizontal differences and heteronomy. One side of this conflict is shaped by the “offensive despise of the elites by the masses” (Sloterdijk 2000, 57). It is about making the everyday life of the middle class the measure of all things, while getting rid of the contemptuous bourgeois observer. This position confronts the bourgeois concept of the autonomy of art with questions of legitimacy and alternative social functions of art, such as social integration, the preservation of the diversity of the cultural infrastructure, economic interests of the region, and so on. Here, cultural policy is actively shaped toward social and economic policy. The other side is marked by the “contempt of the masses by the last elitist” (Sloterdijk 2000, 57), questioning the subjectification potential of the crowd and identifying the mass and mass culture as threats to the project of enlightenment. The intellectual bourgeois elite sees their goals despised by the mass, suspecting that under conditions of mass culture, all what they care about, namely autonomous art, may come to an end (Sloterdijk 2000, 57). Thus, the bourgeois elitist position sees the autonomy of art endangered by the hybrid orientations of social policy and observes economic interests entering the field unrestrainedly.

The rather surprising thing about this culture war is that it operates on both sides with a rather specific concept of audience. This concept has a rather strong bourgeois undercurrent. A closer look at empirical studies on German audiences reveals that the general public is here often pictured as defective. This is because these studies operate with the notion of adequate and inadequate art reception (Bourdieu 1974, 159–201; Rössel 2009; Behnke 2012), with a concept that actually legitimizes a specific bourgeois knowledge of art as adequate and everything else as inadequate (Zahner 2012, 2014). Thus, these studies produce a rather ideologized picture of broad audiences as a defective crowd that has to be educated in one way or the other. Furthermore, they tend to overestimate the “decoding abilities” of the elite, especially in relation to contemporary art.

What is lacking here are studies that aim at reconstructing the cultural interests and consumption habits of these people that form audiences, by investigating their practice of visiting cultural institutions and engaging with culture and the arts (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2010, 27–33).

Studies that aim at systematically recording subjective interpretations and attitudes of culture consumption as part of everyday life are, at present, almost nowhere to be found in Germany (for an exception see Domantis 2017). This type of research could perhaps reduce existing fears and prejudices and lead to a more fruitful cultural policy discourse beyond antielitism and mass paranoia. Maybe a discourse on the grounds of this knowledge could counteract the calls for the market-based liberalization of the field, which are, at present, growing louder and louder.

Saying this, one has to emphasize that the situation in Germany is still very different from e.g. that in Great Britain. German cultural policy is a social policy in a very specific sense. Its core ideas, in particular, the notion that culture is the basis for all spiritual and imaginary dimensions of mankind, still relate to Idealism (Wesner 2010, 434–36). In this notion, culture needs autonomy to enfold its beneficial function for the individual and society as a whole. This idea of culture and the notion of the autonomy of art are still deeply rooted in German society. These concepts evidently counteract many attempts to implement evidence-based policy-making in the cultural sector in Germany. Having seen what happened to culture under the Nazi and the GDR regimes, wide parts of the German population are convinced that the arts must be protected from the market *and* state and their attempts to functionalize art for their purposes. Statements such as that of Chris Smith, a former Secretary of State and Culture in Great Britain who said on arts funding, “[T]his is not something for nothing. We want to see measurable outcomes for the investments which are being made”, would produce vast storms of public protest in Germany at present. But one has to see that the financial pressures are growing and that the financing of arts and culture is being placed under growing pressures.

Notes

1. Inscribed in the original foundational act of the Federal Republic of Germany and expressed through its constitutional articles, the local and regional authorities are given special emphasis in Article 30 of the basic

law (*Grundgesetz*), stipulating the following: “The exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions is the task of the *Länder*, except where otherwise provided for or permitted by this Basic Law” (Burns and Will 2003, 134).

2. In Leipzig, the longtime general manager of the theaters was suspended on December 6, 1989, almost immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the SED Council for Culture was replaced by an elected head of the department for culture, a doctorate in law from the former Federal Republic (Höpel 2015).
3. They were changed into *Eigenbetriebe*. *Eigenbetriebe* remain integrated in municipal administrative structures. They are legally dependent, but organizationally and economically, they act independently. The management of an *Eigenbetrieb* has to present an annual business plan and report regularly to the municipality about its economic actions. The organizational basis of an *Eigenbetrieb* is commercial bookkeeping. See Deutscher Bundestag (2007, 97–98) and Eichler (1995, 157–58).
4. It promotes an understanding of *Bildung* as individual self-cultivation, as originally found in ancient Greece: “Emphasis on this cultural legacy has been articulated since the middle of the 18th Century, when the educated middle classes (*Bildungsbürgertum*) started to dominate State administration. This influential grouping in society, described by Hans Ulrich Wehler as the ‘state intelligentsia’, had no direct parallel elsewhere in Europe. They favored education, highlighted talent in art and science as important within the concept of the humanistic world interpretation.” Poets and thinkers, therefore, became the tools of the educated middle classes, which they had set successfully against the previously privileged aristocracy, who gained access to power via land ownership and birthright but not via their cultural achievements (Wesner 2010, 438–39).
5. During the times of Classicism and Romanticism in Germany, art became an antithesis to rationality and utilitarianism. The economically ambitious but politically powerless bourgeoisie (*Bürgertum*) created art as refuge opposing economy and politics. Moreover, it designed the aesthetic as a place of purely subjective experience, promoting human individuality in a unique way. Art was thought of as autonomous, inasmuch as forming an unique aesthetic normativity beyond the obligations of representation and decoration: “If art played the role of decorating the life of the aristocracy, it received the higher duty in the life of the free-thinking bourgeoisie to become the messenger of the highest and lowest,

- which urges for expression in the human chest” (Schücking 1961, 27; my own translation.) Therefore, during Romanticism, the theory of the higher truth of art achieved increasing reputation (Zahner 2006, 22–23).
6. One result of these new directions in cultural policy is the foundation of five self-governing, state-financed cultural funds acting as a mediator between the state and the arts sector. The fund “socioculture” is especially seen as exemplary for the successful democratization of funding in culture up to the present. In 1995, half of the 14 states (Länder) incorporated sociocultural associations directly or indirectly in the allocation of funds. See Wagner (1999, 205).
 7. It is estimated that the number of cultural institutions in German decoupled from 1960 to 2008 (Sievers 2008, 1).
 8. Advertising and software/games industry are described as creative industries. Deutscher Bundestag (2007, 335).
 9. In the city of Erlangen, the budget for culture dropped from 1991 to 1994 from 6.29% to 5.42% of the general budget, and in Nuremberg, from 5.14% to 4.40%. In Gelsenkirchen, the share of cultural expenditure within the general budget decreased from 1992 to 1995 from 4.6% to 3.5%, and in Dortmund, from 4.5% to 4.08%. In the mid-1990s in Frankfurt, DM 72 million had to be shaved of the cultural budget, which had been DM 400 million at the beginning of the 1990s. See Röbbke (1995, 135) and Burns and Will (2003, 147).
 10. In 1993, the Senate of Berliner decided to close the Schiller Theatre and discussed cutting down the funding of other theaters in Berlin. Theaters in the cities of Hamburg, Köln, and Frankfurt were forced to achieve significant savings. Management consultants advised the reduction of the funding for theaters in other cities; for example, McKinsey recommended a cutback of the cultural budget of the city of Bremen by DM 45 million within three years. See Giese and Göke (1999, 60–61).
 11. In Frankfurt, for example, the decision was made to cut the funding of the open scene by 10%. See Röbbke (1995, 136).
 12. The discourse on “New Public Management” (NPM) was initiated in the Western industrial states in the 1980s. (See Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 91.) The goal of this new administrative control system was to relieve public services from some of their duties, to improve their performance, and to achieve cost savings. Part of NPM is the decentralized administration of resources, management by objectives, contract management, and replacement of fiscal accounting by double-entry

economic accounting (Doppik). (See Sievers 1995, 30–34; Schrijvers 1995, 45–48; Detert-Weber 1997.) With reference to NPM, extensive privatizations were postulated: public services should be converted into commercial companies resp. public authorities transferred into private legal forms in order to appear on markets to improve their performance. Moreover, massive savings should be realized by “the participation of social groups in the creation of public goods” (Sievers 1995, 30–31; Fuchs 1997, 236) and the strengthening of the cooperation of public and private actors. (See Deutscher Bundestag 2007, 92).

13. In 1983, the *Zentrum für Kulturforschung* (ZfK) (Center for Cultural Research) and the *Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft* (Federal Ministry of Education and Research) founded the *Qualifikationsverbund Kultur* (Qualification Network for Culture) to develop continuous educational offers for cultural managers on federal, state, and local levels. Hamburg offered in 1989 the first master’s course in Cultural Management in Germany. See (Rauhe 1994, 14–16).
14. It goes along with the overall path of the German consensus-oriented policy system of that time. Even if the influence of neoliberalist ideas increased somewhat under the conservative chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–98) and a more liberal view of state activities was implemented, there was no aggressive liberalization taking place in Germany compared with Margaret Thatcher’s Britain or Ronald Reagan’s United States (Schnyder and Jackson 2013, 329).
15. More than 60% of the existing cultural foundations in Germany were established from 1980 to 1990, including cultural foundations of public authorities, for example, cultural foundations of the *Länder* (e.g., Stiftung Kulturgut Baden-Württemberg, founded 1986, Stiftung Niedersachsen, founded 1987, Kulturstiftung des Landes Sachsen, founded 1993). The public cultural foundations are provided with one-off assets that they have at their disposal and are therefore no longer bound to public budget regulations. See Wagner (1999, 191–92).
16. For example, the cultural foundation of Sachsen does not offer subsidy on a long-term or institutional basis, but only for projects.
17. “Governance” is an administration concept discussed since the mid-1990s. It extends methods of NPM toward an “activating state,” aiming at integrating social groups and institutions in solving social problems in a more structured way. The cooperation of public and private actors is to

- be increased and improved, and the development and promotion of networks and societies supported. Deutscher Bundestag (2007, 92).
18. A rather recent example for this practice is the Museum Brandhorst, which opened in May 2009 in the Kunstareal Munich. Anette and Udo Brandhorst had been collecting contemporary art since the 1970s and wanted to make their collection available to the public via a newly constructed museum. The state of Bavaria financed the €46 million building, and the *Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlung* (Bavarian State Painting Collections) covers the running costs of the institution. See Museum Brandhorst (2014).
 19. On an axis measuring nations' total public expenditure per capita on culture, Germany still figures toward the top of that axis, with \$85 per capita compared, for example, with the United States with \$6 per capita (National Endowment for the Arts 2000). The intervention of public authorities in Germany still vastly overshadows that of private foundations and the market. Governmental sources in Germany still supply roughly 90% of the funding necessary to sustain cultural undertakings compared with only 5% in the United States (Ahearne 2003, 128; McIsaac 2007, 372).
 20. Approximately 815,000 people were employed in the German cultural sector (public and nonprofit sector included) in 2003. Approximately 197,000 of these people were self-employed. With almost 25% of all employees in the cultural sector, this is well above the overall percentage of freelancers in the entire German job market and the tendency is rising. See ERICarts (2013, D-31), Söndermann (2005, 459–77), and Söndermann (2007, 387–406).
 21. This advanced function of prices is illustrated by the practice of the gallery René Block at the 1969 Cologne Art Market. Block priced the installation *The Pack* by Joseph Beuys at the same price as a comparable work by Robert Rauschenberg: DM 110,000. Rauschenberg was one of the leading American Pop Art artists at the time. He had won the “Great Award for Painting” at the 1964 Biennale in Venice and possessed immense prestige within the art field of the time. It was a huge sensation when *The Pack* was sold at that price on the last day of the show to a German collector. Beuys was immediately perceived on par with the first rank of American Pop Art.
 22. The term *Kulturelle Bildung* appeared for the first time in the 1970s and is strongly related to idea of “culture for all and from all.” It only gained momentum within the cultural policy discourse during recent years.

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5

The Changing Role of the Cultural State: Art Worlds and New Markets—A Comparison of France and Switzerland

Olivier Thévenin and Olivier Moeschler

Introduction

Our goal is to explicate and help to understand the changes the international market- and technology-based turn in society has brought about in the French and Swiss art worlds, with a special focus on public cultural policies. Far more than a mere frame setter, public administration in Europe traditionally plays a central role in the art worlds (Becker 1982). The State's position is central to the extent that the “relative autonomy” of the art (Bourdieu 1996 [1992]) cannot be thought of without linking it to public players and their aid. Therefore, the State is an intrinsic, and essential, part of the artistic “chain of cooperation” in which the production, distribution, and consumption of artworks take place. This is true for France, of course, with its well-known, but changing, tradition of a cultural *Etat mécène*. But it is also the case for federal Switzerland, where

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public institutions at different levels play an important, yet sometimes less visible role, and where the central government has lately become more important in cultural matters. One often forgets that the State also has its interests, and that its intervention influences the type of works produced, distributed, and consumed in society (Becker 1982). Public players often appear as the blind spot of analyses.

Methodologically, our research is based on a comparative analysis of discourses produced or initiated by the cultural administrations (reports, decisions, studies, programs, legislation), including programmatic or prospective documents produced by the governments of France and Switzerland. For France, this is the report *Culture et Médias 2030*, edited by the Culture and Communication Ministry in 2011 (hereafter “French Report 2030”), and foremost, its “strategic synthesis”, as well as *Un ministère nouvelle génér@tion. Culture & Médias 2020* (2012), again by the Culture and Communication Ministry (hereafter, “French Report 2020”). For Switzerland, we mainly considered the *Message sur l’encouragement de la culture pour la période 2016 à 2020*, also called *Culture Message*, published by the Federal Council—the collegium of the seven Swiss ministers—in 2014 and which defines the orientation of the State’s cultural policy for the next few years (hereafter “Swiss Message”), and the precedent *Culture Message*, in the period 2012–15 (published in 2011). It is in these programs and political measures, as well as in the debates arising from them, that the definitions of cultural categories emerge (work, players, institutions, devices, equipment, events, and training) and is built what could be called, as per Pierre Muller (1995), the “guidelines” (*référentiel*) for public cultural policies in both countries. In doing so, we will look at the “discourse of greatness” and the “justifications” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]) elaborated upon by public players, who define and legitimate their new place and their actions in a changed cultural environment, in this case, as we will see, in quite opposite directions.

Our analysis is structured as follows. France and Switzerland have specific national traditions in arts and cultural policies, and their reaction is also tributary of this history. In the first part, we will describe these specific, quite different national traditions. Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, powerful dynamics have been observed: growing globalization of all exchanges, development of the European dimension

as well as of the territorial agencies, accelerated revolution of digital technologies, and long-term demographic and social evolutions. These trends are sketched out in the second part of our text, as perceived by the French and Swiss governments. They have transformed the situation for France and its Ministry of Culture and Communication, which is, in this very state-centric country, a fundamental cultural institution, as well as for Switzerland and its federal government, the Confederation. In the third part of our contribution, we describe and compare the ways in which the two governments react to this new setting. Our conclusion reflects on what is at stake for the State in this new configuration of art worlds and new markets.

The Cultural Institution and the State

The new market-based and managerialist model and the technological innovations partly linked to it have entered the art worlds in France and Switzerland following their specific national traditions in arts and cultural policies. The reaction of the authorities to these new developments is tributary of this specific national setting. In France, there is a long-standing tradition of public policies directed toward sustaining the arts and democratizing access to it. Switzerland, as a federalist, fairly liberal country, has traditionally had more ambivalent relations toward the arts, as well as toward the role of the State and its relations to the market. The comparison of both traditions allows one to describe more accurately the habits and institutional legacies, centralized for France and inversely more polycentric or local for Switzerland, and to better understand the new public action strategies of art and culture.

From Cultural Policy to Public Policies of Culture in France

Since the seventeenth century, the influence of various monarchies left a lasting mark in France on the relationship between the government and the arts. By attacking the symbols of the monarchy and the privileges of

the nobility and clergy, the Revolution continued this will of the State to act in the cultural field by confiscating numerous goods and creating new institutions, such as the Louvre Museum, the National Library, and the National Archives. Most of what in the revolutionary turmoil consisted of accumulated artistic riches became property of the nation, entrusted to the regulation of public power taking over much of the national cultural heritage. It was under the reign of Napoleon that the double monarchical and revolutionary legacy was gradually constituted and a durable governance of culture *à la française* attained, by forming a model that cultural policy historians call the “*Beaux-Arts system*”.¹

The French administration and management model of culture prospered for a century until the advent of the presidential system and of a new constitution that established the Fifth Republic, under Charles De Gaulle (Goetschel and Loyer 1994). The conditions of the return to power of the latter in 1958 were linked to exceptional circumstances generated by decolonization. France was modernizing and seeking to return to the front of the international scene. The stature of De Gaulle as a providential man and the complicity he had with his minister André Malraux made it possible to promote a new form of state intervention in the field of arts and culture (Fleury 2006). The writer André Malraux belongs to the art world. Having sided with the political left in the days of the Spanish Civil War while being part of right-wing governments, he embodied and made possible a change in the relationship that artists have with power. Public support for artists became a legitimate objective of the action of the State under his leadership (Dubois 1999; Urfalino 1996), whose regulation is characterized by a spirit of tolerance and pluralistic support for culture in all its forms as long as the grandeur of France benefits from it (Ory 1989). This policy was probably one of the decisive contributions of the governments in place between 1959 and 1969, and all those who in the State had to deal with culture enrolled in this founding perspective of the Fifth Republic (Poirrier 1998).

The action of André Malraux and of his collaborators at the head of the Department also played a decisive role in institutionally anchoring culture and cultural production as a long-term project of the State (Girard and Gentil 1996). This period and the following 20 years witnessed the deployment of this policy and can probably be seen as a golden age. Jacques Rigaud, a key figure of the government of Alain Duhamel (1971–73), observes that what characterized cultural policy is continuity,

despite some dissonances related to political alternation, and the ability to guide and enrich the cultural life of the country with “the effective protection of the major national institutions, a legal arsenal and financial resources in the service of backup and enhancement of the national heritage in its components, the responsibility for training in arts and crafts, credit management for publicly commissioned works, the administrative and financial control of a very elaborate system of subsidies to support multiple cultural animation initiatives and thereby to encourage innovation and experimentation in the forms of dissemination of culture in the general public or to specialized audiences” (Rigaud 1990, 96).

The means that ministers have had at their disposal to define and implement the cultural policy in the first 30 years of the Ministry’s existence have profoundly changed and enriched the cultural landscape, including the creation of large institutions (such as the Centre Beaubourg, Orsay, la Villette, the Picasso Museum, the Opera Bastille, the Louvre, the Grande Bibliothèque, the Quai Branly), with an emphasis on the support for international festivals (including Cannes and Avignon) or the promotion of major festive appointments (the *Fête de la musique* or the Heritage Days, for example).

One of the other undeniable results of the Ministry’s action was the implementation of cultural decentralization. Through joint action with district and regional councils for the sake of greater efficiency, cultural policy has had a beneficial effect on regional planning, by redistributing responsibilities and relying on the plurality of modes of intervention with various players (Moeschler and Thévenin 2009; Thévenin 2011). This proactive action of the Ministry of Culture resonates with the cultural policies of cities that, in the 1970s, redirected their priority and institutionalized governance in favor of supporting artistic creation (Dubois and Poirrier 1998) and access to culture without neglecting cultural activities and leisure. This convergence led the State to transfer many charges and allowed communities to broaden their scope toward arts education, social cohesion, and economic development of their territories. This proactive action of the local authorities has continued to be particularly reinforced at the level of budgets² and results in a particular form of cultural governance that affects the cultural field and dimensions, such as identity, image, memory, citizenship, or communication and tourism.

Given these different modes of intervention, the Ministry of Culture has unquestionably renewed France's cultural landscape (Poirrier 2013) nationwide and maintained an artistic life relatively autonomous of market laws by basing its action on a strong complementation of public and private sectors. However, the "guidelines" (Muller 1995) that govern the missions of the Ministry of Culture underwent a shift at the turn of the 1990s, with a new discourse on the economic dimension serving as a legitimization of its actions and the defense of "cultural exception" soon to be reframed as "cultural diversity".³ This rejection of the hegemony of the American culture industry has allowed France to form the basis of a new discourse of legitimization for public action (Rioux and Sirinelli 1998), first, by recognizing the major international issues of public intervention in the cultural sector, and second, by providing legitimacy for the action of international organizations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁴ At the other end of the economic justification of cultural policies appears the motive of the defense of the territorialization of public culture in the competition between metropolitan areas and large cities.⁵ To illustrate this trend, one can refer to the "creative city" model (Florida 2005), whose benefits would generate a development of cultural industries by linking creative people, artists, and researchers in urban spaces, generally wastelands, reclassified as "cultural districts". With the emergence of the role of regions and cities and of new forms of legitimization of their action, the discourse on the economic impact of investments in the cultural sector had stronger resonance.

With this expansion of decentralized public policies, the model with a highly centralized administrative tradition, as in France, Italy, and Finland, and the decentralized model, such as that of Switzerland or Germany, slowly converge, and so, from this point of view, France and Switzerland are not in opposition to one another.

Policies Between Swiss "Laissez Faire" and "Cultural Diversity"

At the crossroads of French-, Italian-, and German-speaking Europe, the Swiss art world is inscribed in several traditions and national contexts. Swiss artists are known, sometimes even worldwide, in several domains,

but are often not known as Swiss or are mistaken for citizens of Switzerland's neighboring countries, to which their life and work are indeed often linked. In fact, Swiss artists are almost automatically inscribed into wider cultural areas, the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland being often described as subfields of cultural production in the sense of Bourdieu (1984).

For paintings, one can cite names such as Albert Anker (who often worked in Paris), Ferdinand Hodler, the French painter of Swiss origin François Vallotton, or Paul Klee and Meret Oppenheim (both born in Germany but who lived and worked in Switzerland); for sculpture, Alberto Giacometti and Jean Tinguely; for architecture, Le Corbusier, Jacques Herzog, Pierre de Meuron, Bernard Tschumi, and Mario Botta from the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino; for design, Max Bill; for photography, Werner Bischof and René Burri; for dance, Philippe Saire and Gilles Jobin; for music, Emile Jacques-Dalcroze, born in Vienna, Frank Martin, and Arthur Honegger; and for contemporary art, Pipilotti Rist, Fischli & Weiss, and Thomas Hirschhorn. In creative forms linked to language, Swiss artists often assimilate into the neighboring countries and are often taken for German, French, or Italian ones; this can be the case for literature (the well-known Max Frisch and Friedrich Dürrenmatt on the German-speaking side; Charles-Ferdinand Ramuz, Jacques Chessex, or Nicolas Bouvier in French-speaking Switzerland), theater (Christoph Marthaler), and cinema (the Franco-Swiss Jean-Luc Godard, Alain Tanner, Lionel Baier, and Ursula Meier, or, on the German-speaking side, Alexander Seiler and Fredi Murer).

Known among specialists for part of its artistic production and playing a major role in particular markets and also art fairs, Switzerland is not a country of great gestures in cultural policy. As for its artistic traditions, cultural policies in Switzerland are plural.⁶ German-speaking Switzerland strongly refers, in arts and culture, as in other areas, to the federalist model, also advocated in Germany, with its preeminence of communal governance, while western, French-speaking Switzerland looks toward France. Moreover, according to its federal structure, Swiss cultural policy is conducted at several levels: national, cantonal (the intermediary but essential level roughly corresponding to the *Länder* in Germany), and communal, which means mainly in the country's largest urban agglomerations. Following the principle of subsidization, art in Switzerland must

receive its major boost from the local level, the “closest” to the ground, to the citizens, and also to individual initiative, a situation which in the past led to bitter comments from observers (see, for example, Walzer 1988). The public expenditure on culture in Switzerland echoes this: in recent years, it generally amounts to 10% on the national level, to 40% on the cantonal level, and to 50% on the communal level and the cities.⁷ Therefore, the federal State is one stakeholder among others, and not the most important one, including Switzerland’s cultural exchange with foreign countries. This exchange is largely orchestrated by urban centers (Pidoux et al. 1998). These centers bear the brunt of public spending for culture, and they are also those who own the most prestigious cultural institutions, such as the Vidy Théâtre in Lausanne or, in Zurich, the Schauspielhaus and Opernhaus. Emphasis is also placed on private initiative: major cultural institutions are private, such as the Beyeler Foundation and its museum in Basel or, in the field of pop music and jazz, the Paleo Festival and the Montreux Jazz Festival, known worldwide. Thus, the private or semi-private sector plays an important role, also as support agencies.⁸

This discretion of the federal cultural policy has its history. Specific measures in the cultural field were, indeed, taken at the end of the nineteenth century, with the federal decree on the conservation of historical monuments (1886) and the establishment of the National Museum (1890) and the National Library (1895). But if, in the early twentieth century, there was even “a concept of national art” that was “taking place” in Switzerland, the Confederation did “not seek to direct and regulate Fine Arts” (Jost 1987, 21–22). There was no article in the federal constitution centered on culture and no unified law about it for a long time. In the mid-1970s, the “Clottu Report,” summarizing the work of an expert committee headed by Gaston Clottu, from the French-speaking part of the country, noted, not without regret: “The Swiss State has no orchestras, theatres or national art galleries on the national level.”⁹ In the 1980s and 1990s, two popular initiatives were launched to bring culture into the federal constitution. They failed, victims of the fears about a “State culture”, more outstanding in the German-speaking than in the French-speaking part of the country. In the 1960s, Federal Councilor Hans-Peter Tschudi, who had been decisive in the birth of a national film policy, liked to

quote Alberto Giacometti, who was said to have told him that “culture has to defend itself” (Tschudi 1993). Hence, there is a very liberal conception of art in Switzerland, and in the late 1990s, the head of the Ministry of the Interior, Ruth Dreifuss, from the French-speaking part, said in a quip: “The Swiss cultural policy does not exist.”¹⁰

The federal law on the encouragement of culture, which was recently implemented following the first constitutional article on culture, introduced as part of its overall review at the turn of the millennium, has somewhat changed the deal with an increase in the role at the national level—it is this change and its consequences that we will analyze in this chapter. In the mid-1970s, the Federal Cultural Office had been created within the Ministry of the Interior, but had little more in its portfolio than the National Museum, the Federal Archives, and the National Library, while performing arts were and still are supported by Pro Helvetia, the national foundation for culture.¹¹ Film, a small Swiss “cultural exception”, early recognized as of national interest, has long been one of the few areas to escape this tradition of the Swiss State remaining in the background of the cultural field (Moeschler 2011).

One reason for this disequilibrium, to the detriment of the central State, is simple: in Switzerland, with its federal political structure, culture, like other areas such as education, is under the sovereignty of the cantons. This principle is reaffirmed in the first paragraph of Article 69 of the Federal Constitution (2000), the first one dedicated to culture. “Culture is the responsibility of the cantons”, says the first paragraph, and the Confederation can only intervene when there is “a national interest”. The Federal Law on the encouragement of culture, passed nearly a decade later after long debates (it dates from the end of 2009, and entered into force in 2012), specifies the conditions under which the State may act in the cultural field: “The Confederation supports only projects, institutions and organizations of national interest”, especially when an artistic work or project has a national or even international impact or if it is particularly innovative.¹²

The setting of the Swiss cultural policy has, then, to be understood in terms of these characteristics: a federal system, direct democracy, and support for “cultural diversity”, as one of the central axes of the Federal Cultural Office, including language matters,¹³ based on respect for differences in identity and traditions. In this country that fears the rise of a

“federal bailiff of culture”, cultural policy at the national level is never acquired.¹⁴ It is particularly exposed to debates and controversies, or even unexpected budget cuts.¹⁵ It is in this context that new dynamics of change appear, which offers the federal government a potential lever to redefine its role in culture.

The Dynamics of Change

The joint effects of multiple poles of initiatives and of the complex set of interactions between supply and demand pose new challenges for the two countries. In France, one can speak of a new deal in arts and culture (Farchy and Sagot-Duvauroux 1994), whereas in Switzerland, a major shift in cultural policies is taking place. Sectors such as sales of music, the cinema industry, and the French publishing industry maintain a market share of more than half in the face of other nonnational cultures. Frederic Martel (2010) observed in this regard that globalization does not result in the disappearance of local or national French culture, but that American global mainstream culture now dominates unchallenged at the expense of Europe.

The decline of a certain French cultural policy model is actually both a result of multifaceted societal changes related to the globalization and of technological developments of the last 20 years. The Ministry of Culture is still a major player in the cultural life and continues to assume its sovereignty missions, such as protection of national heritage, cultural legislation, and the organization of artistic training and consultation conducted in partnership with representatives of the cultural professions and industries or linked with media groups such as Canal+, Overseas and Vivendi, Lagardès, and EuropaCorp. However, the renewal of cultural activities, the autonomization of cultural sites, the reactivity of the nonprofit sector and associations, and the enhancement of the role of local authorities lead to a questioning of its scope of action. In this new context, the Ministry of Culture has difficulties in articulating closely an ambitious policy of support of creation for a production of contemporary quality and coordinating the public policies of culture on the scale of territories (Wallach 2006). This sharing of expertise with the local authorities drastically changes the French model (Benhamou 2006), which not only leads to some discomfort for having to situate itself

in the context of a multipolar world (Saez 2012), but is also forced to adapt to a radically changing international environment. In Switzerland, the time also now seems to have come to redefine the guidelines of public cultural policies, but in another sense, as we shall see, toward a stronger national cultural policy. It is as if, threatened by these new international developmental trends, the opposite conclusion of a gathering of the forces at the national level was necessary in this small country, where there is, apart from the brief exception during World War II, no tradition of a marked national cultural policy.

Thus, in the “system of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]) created by both governments to establish and legitimize the new state action in cultural matters, dynamics of change play a fundamental role. National documents present themselves as a reaction, with opposite conclusions, to changes, yet they are presented basically the same way. The starting point of the need for the State to act is the “context,” as called by both sides (French Report 2020 [2012], 7; Swiss Message [2014], 464). Referring to the idea of an “environment” (French Report 2020 [2012], 5) outside the two public players involved, the Ministry of Culture in France, the Federal Cultural Office in Switzerland, or even outside of both countries, this “rhetoric of context” presented as a *fait accompli* and as a *force majeure* allows one to quite easily invoke “greatnesses” that justify and even demand state action in a threatening, even hostile universe. The two States identify “megatrends” at work, successively described as “major social transformation processes” that spread their effect over “several decades” (Swiss Message [2014], 485), as “profound societal changes” (Swiss Message [2014], 463), or as “very powerful dynamic” and “profound changes” that, moreover, “act as a system” (French Report 2020 [2012], 5). A closer look at the threats helps one understand the conclusions drawn.

Demography, Individualism, Identities: The Contrasting Effects of Globalization

Among the “challenges” that the “context” poses, globalization has a rather special status. It is cited as both a “trend” in itself and as a background force that marks all other developments. As the great processes of

social transformation “have an effect on a global scale” (Swiss Message [2014], 485), as it is said in Switzerland, so the “world map” of culture, including its diplomacy, changes, according to the French analysis (French Report 2020 [2012], 27).¹⁶ These “globalization dynamics” (French Report 2020 [2012], 6) take place not only spatially, but the world has become “multipolar” and “mobility increases,” says the Swiss Message (*ibid.*). It is also temporality that is affected, since the result is “acceleration and strengthening of exchanges of capital, of goods, of people and of information” (Swiss Message [2014], 485), with the French text evoking more precisely an “accelerated revolution of digital technologies” that is “detrimental to the temporality of the regulatory missions and support of national cultural players” (French Report 2020 [2012], 5, 46). In a certain sense, the spatiality, as well as the temporality, of globalization appear to be incompatible with those of national governments and cultural policies.

For the worlds of art, globalization does not only contain dangers, but also promises. On the one hand, by the “globalization of trade” (French Report 2020 [2012], 6), artists find themselves “involved in trade on a global scale” (Swiss Message [2014], 485) and have more opportunities. On the other hand, “cultural enterprises” such as publishers, film production firms, and so on, but also individual creators, face a “fierce international competition” (Swiss Message [2014], 463), both for the financing of their projects and for “attracting the attention of consumers” (Swiss Message [2014], 486), in particular in the face of the “globalization of services” (French Report 2020 [2012], 46). Thus, the fears on both sides are that globalization “can lead to a reduction in supply and forms of cultural expression” (Swiss Message [2014], 463) and lead to a “reduction in diversity,” particularly linguistic diversity (French Report 2020 [2012], 24).

The perceived effects of globalization are also related to the size of the players, and, of course, of the countries that face it. “Pressure” is increasing globally, which is a “challenge for the protection of cultural diversity”, states the Swiss Message (2014, 463). As for the French text, “a predominantly industrial, globalized supply” and “industrial structures of production and distribution of globalized cultural goods of all kinds” are opposed to a “high culture” that is “very different” (French Report 2020 [2012], 8). Positions are unequal, since France can make weight globally: “In global markets, France has large groups in publishing (book and press), film production, video games, recorded music” (*ibid.*). Thus, the effects of globalization

are ambivalent, as summarized in the Swiss document: “In the cultural, media and recreational areas, the pressure on the existing stakeholders increases,” but this “also offers newcomers a chance to enter the market” (Swiss Message [2014], 486).

Closely linked to globalization, one observes two developments which affect the population: the Swiss Message (2014, 464) speaks of “demographic change”; the French text of “demographic and social changes in the long term” and “population dynamics” (French Report 2020 [2012], 6, 7). Not without contradiction, these evolutions point in different directions. This is the double movement of an “aging society” due to higher life expectancy, which mainly concerns the local population, on the one hand, and the “growing number of inhabitants from immigrant background”, on the other hand (Swiss Message [2014], 486). The French text anticipates, above all, a growing gap between the cultural policies implemented to date and their recipients, as a result of demographic change: the “challenge the most predictable” of cultural policies in the next decade is even “of demographic and generational order,” since “from 2020 on, generations that accompanied the cultural democratization and development policies will reach the age of retirement or the fourth age” (French Report 2020 [2012], 21). Therefore, there is a kind of generational time lag that separates cultural policies and audiences.

In parallel to these changes affecting the population as a whole, but already perceived as favoring fragmentation, there is also a growing “individualization,” which, if not new (the first sociologists noted in the late nineteenth century), is “strengthening” (Swiss Message [2014], 464). It is the consequence of factors such as the rise of incomes and of the level of education of the population, but also a result of “the extension of the time devoted to leisure” (Swiss Message [2014], 464). Interestingly, culture is then both affected by this factor and at its very origin. One also observes that “conventional instances of meaning and values” such as churches, political parties, reference media, but also, this is obviously central, the State, “lose their dominance” in the context of a society that has become “multi-optional” and that is characterized by a “plurality of lifestyles” (Swiss Message [2014], 464). A cultural public, according to the Swiss Message (*ibid.*) “traditionally bound together”, has “turned into a disparate public”, with “tastes and cultural behaviors difficult to predict.” The French text (French Report 2020 [2012], 39, 24)

not only detects a rise of “individualism” and a “context of valorisation of individual identity,” but also “new forms of sociability.” These developments, such as the rise of the digital, changed the situation of state cultural policy.

Culture in the Age of Its Digital Reproduction

In France and Switzerland, the digital age is by far seen as the most important “challenge” that arises in the cultural field.¹⁷ The States’ leading role of direction, impulse, and regulation can no longer be apprehended without raising questions that appear different today in the context of the development of cultural and digital media industries (Thévenin and Wilhelm 2017), which are the main vectors of cultural globalization (Moeschler 2016).

This “digital revolution”, as it is also called (French Report 2020 [2012], 39), affects the entire process of creation, dissemination, and reception of works: together with globalization, this “digital revolution” has, since the end of the twentieth century, “largely transformed the industrial structures of production and distribution of globalized cultural goods of all kinds” (French Report 2020 [2012], 8). In Switzerland, one sees the “growing importance” of digital technology for “the production, distribution and reception of art and culture” (Swiss Message [2014], 496). By “digitalization”, as it is also called in the Swiss paper, “the entire chain is changing,” and “especially in music, literature and film” (Swiss Message [2014], 486). In France, the change is seen as more profound: the digital age “also changes the place and mission” of the more traditional cultural facilities (French Report 2020 [2012], 5), in a “race” which is “a priori unfavorable for the temporality of the regulatory missions and support of national cultural players” (French Report 2020 [2012], 46). This trend is fast and large scale, and it affects both the private and the public sector: “the effects of the digital,” says the French text, “turns economic structures upside down, changing market trends and practices of those industries”; one also speaks of a “digital economy” (French Report 2020 [2012], 47). The end of the chain, that is: the audiences, is also concerned, for the “consumer demands” change, particularly in terms of “temporal and mobile accessibility of written or audio-visual content” (Swiss Message [2014], 486).

Based on these observations, we can consider that the globalization of culture holds conflicting effects (French Report 2030 [2011], 29–43). In appearance, it diversifies decision centers and activities, but in reality, it focuses on players and strategic decision-making centers in key markets. This first movement is based on the domination in audiovisual communication as well as in music industries, and it ensures the deployment of a global culture dominated mainly by the United States. In the digital age, access providers, intermediation services, and players in the field of marketing of informational and cultural goods join these dynamic operators, leaving a small margin for European and national players. Seen as more threatening in France, this development is, however, also framed in terms of “opportunities” on the Swiss side, from the perspective of a small country that hopes to take advantage of these new global channels. Not only “new artistic formats” and “totally innovative services” arise, but these “cheap channels” can benefit “smaller producers” as they allow them to “occupy (...) niche markets” (Swiss Message [2014], 486).

In France, the digital is perceived as a “blind spot in contemporary cultural politics” (French Report 2020 [2012], 15), and it demands growth for the “implementation of a digital cultural policy”. Beyond the scattered initiatives, it is necessary to establish the “foundation of a sustainable digital cultural policy” (French Report 2020 [2012], 6, 15). Less vocal, Switzerland mainly confines itself to an observer position in the face of what is sometimes simply described a “new digital environment” (Swiss Message [2014], 539): “digitisation, as a global evolution, also includes new challenges,” and “it is essential that Switzerland closely monitors these technological developments,” of course also by “actively participating in their development” (Swiss Message [2014], 508). On the French side, the digital involvement is seen as much more direct: “The Ministry of Culture and Communication”, says the French strategic synthesis, “is now bound up with this industrial digital continuum that includes some of the largest global groups and which gives it an important responsibility” at the international level (French Report 2020 [2012], 9).

In the end, for the two governments, the rise of digital technology transforms the traditional value chain through the emergence of new practices and challenges, and reinforces the asymmetrical relations throughout the mainly Anglo-Saxon world of symbolic and cultural

audiovisual media production. This digital watershed changes consumption patterns and revolutionizes business models, since the consumer has more tools to access culture. The transformation of digital use and consumption is then the major issue for the Federal Cultural Office and even more so for the French Ministry of Culture, which leads them to invent media and public cultural services for the twenty-first century, to imagine a service offering rich and relevant culture and communication for the digital age.

An “invention of a policy of digital cultural practices” is called for, and also “support accompanying cultural and creative digital practices” in society (French Report 2020 [2012], 21–22). In fact, today, it is as if cultural supply and demand, as well as cultural policies, require the same issue, that of the digital.

The National Cultural Footprint in Globalization

Numerous and powerful international changes can be seen in France and Switzerland, calling for an internal change. They are even designated as “levers” for this purpose: “The digital, relationships between the State and territorial communities, governance (regulation of operators, links with the decentralised services, inter-ministerial actions), European Union, links to private players, innovation are the levers for the transformation towards a new gener@tion Ministry”, according to the French document (French Report 2020 [2012], 15). In Switzerland, “given the challenges that globalization, digitisation, demographic change, individualisation and urbanization pose to cultural policy”, the Confederation will, in the coming years, “adjust its incentive policy” according to these new requirements (Swiss Message [2014], 465).

Cultural policies are being called for to preserve the supply of and access to cultural goods in the face of market failures. The chances for maintaining this regulation depend on the responses given to the challenges of globalization, digital revolution, transformations of the relationship between the individual and society in the face of “generational effects, the slow decline of the printed and written culture, a new relation

to knowledge, the relativity of taste and to identity formation, the omnipotence of communicating terminals transmitting ‘content’ of any order with the lack of distinction between leisure, cultures, practices, the new configuration of territories and of sociability networks, the aspiration to choose multiple life forms” (French Report 2030 [2011], 180). Understanding, perception, and interpretation of each of these elements are the challenges for public policies of tomorrow. Interestingly, the proposed changes take different directions in the two countries.

French Perspective: Cultural Policies for a Creative Society

It is within the outlined framework that the Ministry of Culture and Communication has initiated a prospective study entitled *Culture & Media 2030* to define medium- and long-term strategies. The method adopted to conduct this consultation was to build a common representation and to identify the internal and external factors that may have a significant impact on both the Ministry’s policy and its external environment. Once the variables were identified, the authors’ approach formulated different scenarios, which include a description of national and international contexts. None of these scenarios is meant to foresee the future, and none of them will emerge as such, but all four of them are intended to illustrate the major potential developments, and in the future, they will probably draw on each other.

“The Continued Exception” is the first scenario and is characterized by the continuation of trends of cultural policy of the Ministry and the extension of the national logic that gave birth to the French cultural exception. The second scenario, the “Cultural Market,” spreads worldwide and primarily includes the major economic, geopolitical, and digital transformations. These changes strengthen economic entities, diminish the importance of the initiatives of civil society in cultural life, and promote a liberal logic of cultural policies. “The Creative Imperative,” the third scenario, is based on a strong desire for a proactive approach that opens up a strategy of economic development of culture by focusing on creativity and digital innovation in particular. Finally, the scenario of the

“Culture of Identities” promotes a pluralistic understanding of culture. Thus, it is driven by the social dynamics at all levels, be it Europe, the State that focuses on some jewels of “French culture,” or the local authorities working to promote cultural vitality of a “social” and community-based character, linked to people’s lives.

Rooted in its time, that is: the five-year term of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–12) with changes involving that grants will no longer continue to feed the cultural sector as consistently, this exercise in foresight has the merit of identifying potential changes in orientation of the cultural policy of the Ministry of Culture and Communication. The text raises the question of the legitimacy and future effectiveness of public policy in a context of decline of the welfare State, the pluralization of the doctrines of public cultural action, and the resurgence of liberal values. Also, as a result of this reflection, the Ministry has extended its prospective study, the strategic synthesis *Culture & Media 2020 a new Gener@tion Ministry*, 2012, to clarify its future strategy. This new governance entails prioritizing its activities in the fields of heritage, creation, industry, and communication, placing greater accent on a devolved and decentralized policy, less hierarchy and more partnership, better connection with artistic, cultural, and social and economic networks, in order to achieve policies for culture and communication tailored to the needs of the twenty-first century.

However, this consensual discourse does not pinpoint the limits of some top-down action of the State and underestimates the conflicts caused by the disparity of roles of different levels of players, a real blind spot in the prospective dimension of this synthesis. But with this text, one sees that the cultural policy of the State is torn between a logic of differentiation of its action and a pluralistic conception of culture that develops in the public policies of the local authorities. The spectacular development of the culture industries, the expansion of the definition of culture to include emerging arts, and the enhancement of economic development lead to a questioning of the foundations of the cultural policy model of the State.

The Ministry appears well aware that the eventual depletion of the French cultural and media influence in a multipolar globalization justifies public action through the need to regulate the dysfunctions of the cultural market and to guarantee a place within a cultural landscape which

has now become worldwide. The second underlying challenge the Ministry faces relates to the relationship between supply and demand, with the supposed risk of enhanced disaffection of certain practices emanating from the public service (it can be public service broadcasting as well as the policy of a cultural supply, of which many studies have highlighted the continued inequality of access). One of the ways advanced to implement at the central level as well as at the level of decentralized services a genuine logic of coproduction of public action is to foster the emergence of the model of the “creative society” (Greffé and Pflieger 2009). In the end, this perspective and ambition of the government has to be understood as a logic in which state intervention increases by addition and sedimentation through a policy of small steps.

Faced with social, economic, and international changes, the Ministry clearly maintains the direction by extending a diversified public action. Awaiting more favorable circumstances for reforms, it develops missions of consultation, expertise, and guidance, exactly like the “Culture & Media 2030” and “2020” works, instead of actively implementing a new strategy.

Swiss Perspectives: Increased Commitment of the State and Creative Economy

Whereas in France, the challenges lead to a repositioning and pluralization of the scenarios and hence of the cultural policies, in Switzerland, it is rather the strengthening of state action that follows these trends—for these developments have “too much scope to be influenced by the intervention of one body alone,” and they ask for “a concerted action of the major players at all political levels” (Swiss Message [2014], 487). More than ever, national action is needed, as “globalization, digitisation, demographic change, urbanization and individualization” concern “all state levels” and, for this reason, “call for common answers” (Swiss Message [2014], 465).

Quite new, in Switzerland, it is now openly spoken of a “national cultural policy” (Swiss Message [2014], 465), even if it is for the moment named only in quotation marks. It is actually designed as a collection of already existing actions and as a process: the Federal Council wants to “continue

to develop the existing elements of the ‘national cultural policy’” (ibid.). This new national policy consists less of a top-down action of the State than of an enhanced collaboration between all stakeholders: “The phenomena just mentioned requires close cooperation in the sense of a ‘national cultural policy’” (Swiss Message [2014], 465). The national cultural policy is less a single action or the designation of a unique player than the coordination of cultural policies, which are historically plural by definition in Switzerland, in a common direction, but that, precisely, is new. Cultural policy is less an action of a single player than (explicitly) a way of constructing common guidelines (Muller 1995): “By ‘national cultural policies’, reference is made to the need for the federal government, the cantons, the cities and the municipalities to analyse all these challenges and respond through coordinated action”, of course while “respecting the sovereignty of the cantons in culture” (Swiss Message [2014], 465). A “national cultural dialogue” was set up for this purpose in late 2011, which is a deliberative process unique to Switzerland (in the cultural field) and at the same time typically Swiss in its aim to compromise and to “strengthen collaboration between the various state levels”. This “dialogue” is destined to be, very indirectly though, “the ideal vehicle” to “develop the process leading to a national cultural policy” (Swiss Message [2014], 488), the latter being designed here less as a result than as a potentially long and indeterminate path.¹⁸

Therefore, the Federal Cultural Office sketches three lines of action for this so carefully designed new national cultural policy, to be implemented in concert with all players. Named “Cultural Participation”, the first axis concerns, in a somewhat classical way, culture and its access. The second axis aims at “Social Cohesion”, which had already been highlighted in the previous Swiss Message (2012–2015) and which refers to changes in the population as well as to ways to solve them by culture and its integrative power.¹⁹ The third axis, “Creation and Innovation”, concerns the relatively new fields of the digital and creative economy; it is the most original one, as it redefines more clearly both culture and the role of the State. Certainly, culture, according to the Swiss Message, “allows man to understand himself and the world which surrounds him”. But culture “also has the potential to positively affect the creativity and innovation of a State” (Swiss Message [2014], 491). Hence, the aim is, on a basic level, to foster a digital cultural offer—among other digital projects, there is talk of a “national

virtual gallery”, presenting to a large audience the Confederation’s collections (Swiss Message [2014], 493). But above all, the idea is to stimulate the creative economy: in order to “fully exploit” the “potential” of the digital, in the future, cultural policy “will encourage and stimulate more consistently innovative creative processes in the multi-sectoral trans-medial and digital areas” (Swiss Message [2014], 491).

True to its liberal tradition of restraint, the federal State does not want to replace the private players already active in the field, but to encourage a “deepening of existing collaborations between the promotion of culture, the industry, the economic promotion” and the “promotion of innovation in design and interactive digital media” (Swiss Message [2014], 465). Specifically, it is proposed to set up “a coordinated policy” to promote innovation and start-ups so that creative economy businesses can “fully exploit their creative potential and position their products successfully in both domestic markets and internationally” (Swiss Message [2014], 492). The argument here is, therefore, economic, and hence diplomatic. Indeed, the “development of cultural and creative skills” is seen as “essential to maintain Switzerland’s international competitiveness” and, furthermore, it contributes toward strengthening “the image of a creative Switzerland abroad” (Swiss Message [2014], 491). Thus, new developmental trends appear again as a welcome means to strengthen the position of Switzerland, also on the international stage.

Conclusion: New Markets Between Threat and Opportunity

There is an “increase in the demand for cultural goods” which is “unprecedented”, notes an observer. However, to respond to it, the public authorities dispose of “institutions and management methods of the 19th century”. Yet, according to this person, “to the ‘transformation’ of the demand must succeed a ‘transformation’ of cultural policy”. The author of these lines is no other than Augustin Girard, *chargé des études* at the Ministry of Culture; the year is 1965. And when Girard poses that, in the face of these changes, “the very nature of public intervention must be redefined,” he cannot think of anything else than a reinforcement of the

role of the State in the culture and leisure domain: “[T]he State cannot act differently than becoming an initiator, an animator, an organiser” (Girard 1965).

The issues of cultural globalization and new markets are undoubtedly a challenge for the worlds of art and for those in charge of cultural policies in European States (Thévenin and Moeschler 2012). In a certain way, it has already been the case for several decades. But the answer to these challenges can be very diverse, according to times and contexts. Programmatically, the two documents analyzed in this contribution are “systems of justification” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006 [1991]) that must establish and make one accept the action of the State in cultural matters. In the case of France, a country with a tradition of a strong cultural policy, the discourse must demonstrate a repositioning of the welfare State model and claim new plural forms of governance. In Switzerland, a federalist country with very little tradition of a central cultural State, and in many respects suspicious of it, the justification is used to legitimize a slight strengthening of its position, mainly as a reaction to external circumstances. The developments in France and Switzerland point in different directions depending on the history of their cultural policies. In both countries, these policies are still marked by the idea of unconditional support for the creation of the “classical” aim for cultural democratization linked with expectations in terms of social integration and intercultural dialogue. Simultaneously, they make a connexion with objectives related to economic attractiveness and revitalization, and to national or even international influence.

A challenge and a “threat”, the international trends can also become a welcome opportunity to redefine the States’ roles in cultural policies. In a way, the classical ideal of “cultural democratization” is maintained, provided it serves social cohesion. Instead of access to works of value, it is somehow access to society, in a certain sense, social rather than cultural participation, that is looked for. Culture, once considered as the creation of division and distinction (Bourdieu 1984 [1979]), is now being expected to play the unifying role of “social cement”. Indeed, it is essential for every individual to know the surrounding traditions and cultural references, in order to forge a strong identity, guaranteeing a form of confidence in the changing face of society; culture, and cultural

practices, themselves linked to these changes, must therefore become a kind of identity mark, a shared common base. In this context, culture acts as a factor of social cohesion, particularly in an urban environment marked by heterogeneity of populations. Furthermore, the incorporation of cultural industries and digital media in the sphere of public policy significantly alters the foundations of the model with this new sector identity and new conception of public action. Throughout the reshaping of social and economic justification of public cultural action of the French and Swiss models, and more broadly of the European countries, it is the very definition of culture that is changing. As stated by Pierre-Michel Menger:

The redevelopment of culture in a series of creative industries is best understood in that it signals a new dualism: cultural policy is clearly being divided between the heritage sector, a symbolic place of non-destructive accumulation, and the arts and practices now placed under the influence of technological innovation and of their power of creative destruction. (Menger 2010, 286)

It is as if, on the one hand, in Switzerland, the government wanted to strengthen the “cooperation chain” on which the worlds of art are based on (Becker 1982) by giving itself the role of a conductor who coordinates this enhanced collaboration, while in France, the State wants to make this chain and its role within it more flexible. Thus, the Ministry of Culture and Communication in France goes through a form of institutional marginalization which is accompanied by a reduction in subsidies and the establishment of a stronger pressure from the Ministry of Economy to contain the budgetary difficulties of the country while maintaining a public service logic for culture; in Switzerland, the need for new political and cultural action at the national level leads to a slight increase in the State’s cultural budget. But beyond money, this complex process is characterized by a constant extension and reconfiguration of the “cooperation chains” that shape art worlds. The latter include more and more social, economic, and political players, leading to a durable redefinition of the art’s configuration and, inevitably, of its artistic and cultural conventions.

Notes

1. The history of political and cultural institutions has become an area particularly well studied in France (see References).
2. According to Philippe Poirrier (2010, 70), in the middle of the 2000s, the financial burden of local authorities, with € 7 billion, is more than twice the budget of the Ministry of Culture.
3. Given the difficulties of competing with the United States in film but also music, and, thus, facing the risk of homogenization of culture, successive governments since the mobilization for the “cultural exception” in the negotiations with the World Trade Organization in 1993 used the concept of “cultural diversity”.
4. France has rallied many European countries around the defense of cultural diversity in the face of domination of North American culture industries and took the initiative in 2001 to build a Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which was extended with the Convention on “Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” of October 20, 2005 (available on the website of the UNESCO, www.unesco.org).
5. This competition is manifested through the mobilization of institutional players of local government policies to achieve certain labels such as “European Capital of Culture” or “UNESCO World Heritage.”
6. Although multiple and complex, cultural policies in Switzerland have seldom been the subject of major research work, or only at controversial standpoints (see Haselbach et al. 2012), also indicating its fragile base. Systematic analysis of the structure and strategies of cultural policy players is in its beginnings (cf. Bijl-Schwab 2014; Marx 2015; Moeschler 2011).
7. For a total amount of about €2.8 billion of public spending on culture (2014). See the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) website: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/culture-medias-societe-information-sport/culture/financement.html>
8. Some years ago, a study (FSO 2003) amounted private support to culture in Switzerland to be about €300 million per year. The Pour-cent Culturel—the “cultural percentage,” from the Migros, a large supermarkets cooperative, pay each year around €100 million (between 0.5% and 1% of its turnover) to culture, recreation, and education, somewhere between patronage and sponsorship (Moeschler 2009). Semi-private lotteries, whose aid is directly attached to those of the public authorities in German-speaking Switzerland, play an important role, with up to approximately €200 million paid annually for arts and culture.

9. Swiss Expert Committee for the study of issues concerning Swiss cultural policy (1975, 323). A vast mapping illustrating the hope of increased cultural commitment of the Confederation, the “Clottu Report” is still a (now somewhat dusty) reference. A smaller replica became advocate, conversely, for an increased involvement of the private sector in the arts (Schindler and Reichenau 1999).
10. See *Journal de Genève* and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (NZZ), May 31 to June 1, 1997.
11. Located in Zurich, founded in the aftermath of the Second World War and the “National Spiritual Defense” to counter the propaganda of fascist regimes, funded by the federal government but autonomous, Pro Helvetia supports the performing arts, while the State rather deals with archives and museums, but only when there is exchange between Swiss linguistic regions or with foreign countries (see Hauser et al. 2010).
12. For the text of the law, see <http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/official-compilation/2011/6127.pdf>.
13. See the website of the Federal Cultural Office: <http://www.bak.admin.ch/themen/04118/04119/index.html?lang=fr>.
14. This hackneyed image of the *Kulturvogt* (“cultural bailiff”), supposed to refer to a powerful Swiss imagery, since it goes back to the killing of the Austrian bailiff by William Tell in the national founding mythology, was mobilized by conservatives in the face of the federal reinforcement described here (see NZZ, October 29, 2014).
15. Considering that the widely noticed installation of Swiss artist Thomas Hirschhorn “Swiss-Swiss Democracy”, which contained an acerbic critique of the right-wing populist and then Minister Christoph Blocher (Swiss Peoples Party), at the Centre culturel suisse in Paris had gone too far, a majority of the Parliament decided to reduce €1 million from the annual budget of Pro Helvetia, which administers the Centre (Dubey 2009).
16. The reverse movement of the spatial scale of reduction is only mentioned by the French report, which speaks of the “development (...) of territorial institutions” (2020 [2012], 6). It is not by chance that the Swiss text, aiming to found a national action, evaded this regional aspect, which is precisely to be overtaken.
17. The words “digital,” “scan,” “digitization,” and so on appear no less than 97 times in the French document (64 pages; average 1.5 times per page) and 101 times in the Swiss text (143 pages, which is an average of 0.7 per page), while “World” and its derivatives appear 15 resp. 26 times,

- “individual” and so on 5 resp. 17 times, and “demography” and so on. 3 resp. 5 times.
18. Revealing potential tensions surrounding this approach, the first version of the Message, the one that was the basis of a consultation process, spoke (p. 25) more directly of an “ideal vehicle to determine the contours and content of a national cultural policy,” an element that was reformulated after the consultation.
 19. Culture was then designated as “an effective instrument of social integration and cohesion” (Point 1.1.1.1). For an analysis of the emergence of this “greatness” in the national cultural policy discourse, see Moeschler (2013).

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6

Renegotiating Cultural Welfare: The Adoption of Neoliberal Trends in Finnish Cultural Policy and How It Fits the Nordic Model of a Welfare State

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Introduction

Together with Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, Finland constitutes the group of states called the Nordic states. Apart from certain distinct cultural and historical features, such as a common majority religion, the Nordic countries have, especially after the Second World War, shared common political aspirations, which have given them a distinguished reputation as models of socially integrative welfare states. The Nordic model refers to an economic regime that combines a market economy with “an active state” that redistributes substantial economic resources to guarantee equal possibilities and decent standards of living for all parts of society. Consequently, a model such as this stands for a “coordinated market economy” (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013).

The model in question has been both popular among the populations of the Nordic countries (Einhorn and Logue 2003; Schnyder and Jackson

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2013, 323) and successful in international comparisons of society's functionality (Kautto 2001). For a long period, the same principles have formed the normative legacy of the Nordic cultural policies (e.g., Duelund 2003, 489). The cultural policies of these states have been formulated as part of the general welfare program that entails such fundamental principles as freedom of expression, equality of cultural distribution, and democracy between cultures (Bjurström 2008, 74; Frenander 2005). The art would fulfill its societal role through autonomous development, guaranteed by the public sector, as far as the well-being of artists does not violate the well-being of the rest of the population.

Behind the relatively stable political rhetoric, the content of cultural welfare is fluctuating in accordance with the changes in political and cultural climates. This chapter focuses on the incorporation of changing welfare ideas into the national art world of Finland. The other Nordic countries are used for the primary comparison of how the welfare state model has coped with the recent changes. During the past two decades, the distributive mechanisms and financial structures of the welfare state have faced increasing challenges and criticism. Most of the pressures have their origin in the globalization of economy, which calls for privatization and cuts in public expenditure (Harvey 2005). How, then, has the balance between cultural democracy and critical autonomy been adjusted and recontextualized in the changing combinations of political and cultural principles in a Nordic state?

Many policy analysts, especially in Anglo-American countries, believe that concepts such as consumerism and privatization signify market-oriented policy doctrines (McGuigan 2004). Such an interpretation is usually rejected in the Nordic states because an overwhelming proportion of cultural production is still publicly financed. To realize this, one needs only to check the financial basis of cultural education, municipal arts institutions, the system of art councils, and the nationwide broadcasting company in the Nordic countries. There are minor variations between the different funding models for the arts in the Nordic states. The fraction of gross national product (GNP) allotted to culture has remained almost constant. The combined amount of public funding of the arts in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden has varied between 0.4% and

0.6% of the GNP between 1975 and 2000 (Duelund 2003, 511, 522). The high degree of public funding of the arts and cultural institutions is partially a result of insignificant private sponsors, little support from nonprofit organizations, and low earnings on admission fees. In addition, it is based on greater emphasis on the egalitarian dimension in cultural policy by, for example, considerable state subvention in order to keep admission fees at a tolerable level and to maintain comprehensive cultural affairs throughout the countries. For instance, in Finland, most of the allocations to culture in the administrative sector of the Ministry of Education and Culture are directed toward national art and culture institutions and municipalities as statutory and discretionary state subsidies. Such a political modeling of cultural life has eventually reinforced the institutional forms of culture at the expense of more alternative and temporary forms. This, again, has caused critique on the stagnation of cultural policy. It has been not until recent years that the effects of the global market crisis on the public economy of Finland has caused changes in the stable budgets of most prominent national cultural institutions, such as the National Board of Antiquities and the Finnish Broadcasting Company (Yle—Yleisradio Oy).

The primary difference between the Nordic countries and other European states concerns direct forms of funding. In the Nordic countries, support is allocated primarily to individual artists in the form of work stipends, lifelong remunerations, and guaranteed incomes, while support in the rest of Europe is, to a large extent, allocated as funding for “artistic” activities, that is, for collective purposes, which indirectly benefit artists, covering all possible art forms and regions. Moreover, artists and their organizations in no other country have had the same formal powers regarding the choice of members for the select committees that allocate funding (Duelund 2003, 497). The systems of art councils in one form or another have been prevalent in all the Nordic countries since the 1960s. It was not until the revised act that created the Finnish Arts Promotion Centre in 2013 that there was a considerable reduction in the decision-making power of artists’ associations and committees. However, when attention is moved beyond the explicit cultural policy, it shows that traditional welfare institutions and ideas are reinterpreted to meet the logic of global competition.

Culture as a Policy Instrument of Nordic Welfare States

Culture refers to those actions, forms, values, and symbols that communities use to maintain their connections to the past and to construct their identities. Such a huge area of human activity is not easy to formulate for a policy target. What is culture to be protected, or the arts to be cherished, remains relatively open in the legislation. The content and value of culture are constantly reformulated in the context of mixed political and cultural factors. Though some analysts may think that, in the present phase of globalization, nation-states are little more than nostalgic echoes from the past, nation-states still form primary frameworks of the societal use of culture. The state-organized cultural policy is a political filter that adjusts complex culture to some nationally negotiated standards and constructs general political formulations of symbolic production, such as the arts (Häyrynen 2013).

The concept of cultural policy itself contains no predetermined ideology. Cultural policies have been instruments of both democratic and totalitarian domination. An analysis of the political use of culture depends on whether the main focus is on the explicit (often cross-nationally imitated) or implicit (nationally specific) dimension of cultural policy. The distinction, advocated by, for example, Jeremy Ahearne (2009), is criticized for being too polity oriented, as if the rest of society would only serve as a target for an administrative crusade of this particular area of expertise (McGuigan 2014). One problem in the analysis of institutional culture in the Nordic models may, indeed, be the domination of its formal side. Often in question are those categories that are less “scientific” than those produced by the state itself in constant dialogues between consultants and the politically guided research.

However, if the focus of an analysis is on the inclusion/exclusion mechanism of official cultural policy, the distinction between implicit and explicit cultural policy can be applied for a point of comparison on how cultural policy experts eventually recognize culture in different societal contexts. As such, the state cultural policy is a reflection of a complicated articulation of actual cultural traditions, the political exchange rate

of culture, and the relative influence of private initiatives in the field of cultural production. In a country such as Finland, without a long history as an independent nation-state, without an established cultural representation of an aristocratic society, and without strong ethnic or religious diversities, comparisons for a dominant notion of national culture may be less visible than in countries that entail those characteristics. If actual cultural features do not provide clear demarcations, indicators, which are chosen for the measurement of the societal role of culture, may turn out to be culturally thin.

Geographically close countries often share historical, economic, religious, social, and demographic conditions that have contributed to family resemblance (Kautto 2001, 31). The Nordic states maintained a “distinctive welfare model” at least up to the mid-1980s (Esping-Andersen 1999). The normative legacy of the Nordic welfare states is based, above all, on the idea of universal social rights, meaning, for example, a high participation of women and as full employment as possible (Kosonen 1998, 37, 386). Economic growth was not based on creating income differences as economic incentives, but on creating opportunities for economic participation for all citizens (Kananen 2011, 125). Social corporatism, that is, negotiation between the labor, employers, and the state has been a central part of the Nordic “coordinated market economy” (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). The value consensus between different expert groups follows on from their dedication to support the primary aims of the state and to lower their own autonomy accordingly. The Nordic countries are archetypal examples of small, open economies, in which an export industry and foreign policy usually have an influential voice in all policy sectors (Kosonen 1998, 60). Their national economies, which are credited among the strongest in Europe, are fragile because of their dependence on limited exports and sensitive geopolitical positions between the Eastern and Western hemispheres. Thus, foreign and domestic factors are mutually dependent, and a clear analytical line between them is difficult to draw.

What purpose may culture serve in small and open welfare states? The Nordic cultural policy model was formulated as part of the general welfare programs typical of those states in the decades prior to 1990. This model placed greater emphasis on the egalitarian dimension of cultural

policy and formalized funding programs for individual artists than any alternative models of Western cultural policy (Duelund 2003, 489–497). The latter has meant that artists have been provided opportunities to fulfill themselves without occasional interruptions from the market or politics. The model also emphasizes the constitutional justification of the critic and the rational-bureaucratic control of this right (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). According to most cultural policy papers, a fundamental requirement for a cultural sector to be operational is that it is provided with space and room for independent development (e.g., CP 1965, 1992, 2010).

As a sector-based horizon of expectations, a general political formulation of culture is still also an instrument of political influence over cultural producers, cultural mediators, and, finally, the receivers of cultural products. If the goal of the state social policy has been to secure a lifelong, middle-class standard of living for all (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 197), the task of the state cultural policy has been to produce common cultural images of what such a middle-class standard could be, to construct an ideal subject of the welfare state. The idea cries for an intensive deideologization of public culture. On the basis of what is pragmatic, for external reasons, cultural policy reinforces a compromise solution for all cultures.

Relatively small populations and narrow domestic markets for the arts give the state an especially strong position in the production of art and its social networks in the Nordic countries. Consequently, how art and culture are conceptualized, defined, and reasoned in the state strategies is particularly important for the conditions of national art worlds. Artists are never totally independent from society, but their optimal attachment varies. The value of an artist is constantly revisited by the ideological changes of the state. However, small nation-states are not only economically open. They are open for larger, more or less expansive civilizations that constitute fusions and conflicts of global and local, majority and minority, cooler and lamer cultures. Accordingly, the general political formulation of culture may be more open, context-based, and flexible than in countries in which cultural traditions are strongly institutionalized. Einhorn and Logue (2003, 117) believe that the Nordic pattern of party coalitions has proved durable because the principal issues of political

dispute were social and economic ones, which are susceptible to compromise, not the racial, religious, ethnic, and cultural conflicts, which are so intractable in many other countries.

Even if the models of the Nordic cultural polities are, by and large, similar (Nordic legal unity), it is not to say that they produce an exactly similar operational field for the artists. According to Esping-Andersen (1999, 96–97), the Nordic countries have “qualitatively different types of social policies” that, to a large extent, result from diverse social structures, and historical and political processes within differing state traditions. The question is as to what extent the realities of nationally different cultural conditions and nationally different fields of arts outstrip the explicit ideals of cultural policy. The most prominent artists of the Nordic countries, say, Norwegian painter Edward Munch (1863–1944), Swedish film director Ingmar Bergman (1918–2007), or Finnish composer Jean Sibelius (1865–1957), may have had many more fundamental impacts on the national art worlds, not to mention the international ones, than any single cultural policy decision of the state has.¹

In a static and linear phase of societal development, the Nordic pattern may provide reasonably predictable notions of “approvable culture.” However, even though the state desires to deal with prefabricated forms of artistic development, the idea of one politically correct culture is challenged occasionally by either changes in general political climate (e.g., economic crisis) or symbolic revolutions in cultural development. Unexpected forms are difficult to recognize by any formal criteria. A cultural policy system, therefore, requires a certain amount of strategic flexibility, constant modifications in its basic vocabulary, and refocusing among art forms and cultural production methods. This discursive restructuring reveals how a new ideology conquers the state (Harvey 2005, 71–85). However, in a policy narrative, a new stage of a policy development never totally replaces the previous one; instead, it uses and organizes previous systems for the purposes of new leadership. Discursive restructuring often follows what DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 151–55) call *institutional isomorphism*. It means that cultural policy experts try to define their subject matter by applying the expert knowledge, means, and statistical categories of other sectors which are progressive toward preferred ideological change.

The Formation of the Welfare-Based Cultural Policy in Finland

In the 1930s, as Social Democratic governments elsewhere in Europe collapsed or were destroyed, Scandinavian Social Democrats chose to undertake historic compromise with the agrarians and liberals, which postponed socialism by developing “the middle way” between capitalism and communism (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 334). As for cultural policy, not only the legal system but the interpretative frames of culture to be institutionalized developed similarly in the Nordic countries. The secular goals of the agrarian and labor popular movements were integrated into the nation-building based on a romantic cultivation of folk culture (Bjurström 2008, 74). Socially mobile artists and other intellectuals helped to include folk and rural elements in the art, and the national cultures received a popular slant (Danielsen 2008, 96). Such an ideal aesthetic helped to create images of a genuine people’s home (*folkhemmet*) in which every member of society has equal rights and requirements for a decent life, provided they adopted the ideal cultural prototype.

At the time, Finland took a fundamentally different route from that of the other Nordic countries. A deviant development traces back to Finland’s long history as a buffer state between the different political and religious systems of the East and the West. Before 1917, Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, Sweden and Denmark have been independent states for hundreds of years, with rich feudal and aristocratic traditions to build upon. Thus, for them, the development in the 1930s meant a symbiosis between the aristocratic tradition and the egalitarian goals of Social Democrats. However, in Finland, the bourgeois hegemony that followed independence and the bloody civil war in 1918 crushed any cooperation with the labor movement and the working-class culture.

In the Second World War, Finland, in contrast to the other Nordic countries, fought the Soviet Union as a companion in arms with the Axis. The defeat resulted in war compensation to, and eventually a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with, the Soviet Union. This specific relationship with the Soviet Union created a political agenda

of its own kind, with limitations on Finnish sovereignty between 1944 and 1989. This provided some room for the left-wing ideologies, but the war-time cleavage between the Social Democrats and the communists continued to divide the Finnish unions and weakened labor politically. This, in turn, provided room for nonsocialist parties and the traditional Finnish elite. Unlike the other defeated countries, the prewar cultural and intellectual elite of Finland remained mostly intact. This meant that the national-patriotic approach that was dominant before and during the war was still strongly present in the cultural reconstruction, though more careful. For the noncommunist parts of society, the welfare state ideology was not only a politically pragmatic solution. The Nordic identity was also an important proof of belonging to the Western world and the Western culture.²

The idea of Nordic legal unity was further reinforced when the system of state art councils and the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)-based “new cultural policy” were implemented almost simultaneously in all of the Nordic countries from the 1960s to the mid-1970s (Duelund 2003, 487–93). In Finland, the grounds for evaluating the quality of the art were stated by the State Committee for the Arts in the 1960s as follows: “[A genuine art work] is absolute, unique and impossible to imitate” (CP 1965, 48). The committee included a quite esoteric group of experts, mainly leaders of traditional national art institutions and art organizations, who emphasized the intuitive knowledge of a very limited group of experts on which forms of culture are good enough for gaining support and which are not. The policy problem identified by the committee was that there is not enough of “this art” throughout Finland, and the task of the cultural policy is simply to increase the quantity. Special policy programs, systems of regional art councils, and state scholarships were implemented to ensure a geographical and social spread of working opportunities for the artists.

However, the carefully negotiated system was not at all prepared for the Finnish version of the cultural modernization and radicalism that swept over the Western world in the 1960s. The spirit of the 1960s provided fundamental challenges for the traditional aesthetics, moral premises, and production methods of the arts. A new generation, new artistic styles, and new media took over the initiative in the field of arts by

producing totally new networks for the art worlds: public broadcasting, underground movement, and political theater gained coverage, with very different cultural notions from the traditional prefabricated formulation of culture. The cultural diversity of the nation was recognized in a new way—it included vigorous incorporation of previously excluded groups into society: women, ethnic minorities, and other underprivileged members of society. The majority of artists were comfortable with the increasing social role for the arts. They participated in the democratization of cultural production and in the development of people's cultural understanding. Swedish detective novelists Maj Sjöwall (born in 1935) and Per Wahlöö (1926–75) are famous examples of the artists who raised the social problems of the welfare state in their stories, and even affected the future actions of social policy. Similar orientation was evident in Finland as well: for example, film directors Mikko Niskanen (1929–90) and Risto Jarva (1934–77) made movies of the problems of society's structural change and the so-called Great Migration from the country to the city, and from Finland to Sweden.

After the Finnish joint Social Democratic and communist coalition government in 1966, Finnish industrial relations began to move toward a more general Scandinavian model, although being more strike prone (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 274–75). The main sign of consensus was the first total collective bargaining (1968). This bargaining took the traditionally high organization of Scandinavian civil societies to another level. Interest groups came to play an increased role as functional representatives in a formal sense. They were incorporated into making and implementing policies without occasional elections.

Since the end of the war, the nonsocialist parties and industrial establishment considered left-wing radicalism as the greatest threat to society. In the organizational field of culture, it was particularly threatening, because a relatively large proportion of Finland's top artists and young intellectuals identified with leftist ideologies from the 1960s onward. However, simultaneously, both the economic and the political establishment of Finland operated comfortably under the advantageous bilateral trade agreements with the Soviet Union. The German-originated term *Finlandisierung* (Finlandization) referred to the decision of a smaller [country](#) not to challenge a more powerful neighbor regarding foreign politics

while maintaining national *sovereignty*. The Finnish national economy was strongly based on forestry, which was a powerful adhesive for the Finnish political and economic elite. In Finland, a relatively narrow export to and a somewhat schizophrenic attitude toward the Soviet Union resulted in a more centralized and restricted welfare state model than, for example, in Sweden, which had a more diverse economic base (Kosonen 1998, 60) and less intensive relations with the Eastern superpower. In Finland, the conditions of export and investments in industry came before the unemployment rate, which has constantly been the highest among the Nordic countries (Kautto 2001, 78). In addition, unlike the other Nordic countries, Finland never carried out regional self-government. The power elite of Finland obviously tried to avoid disagreement and unpredictable subcenters. Thus, Finnish capitalism was organized on the ground of a “one nation strategy,” in which the whole population is included in the construction of a desired society (cf. Jessop 1990, 211–12).

The next step of the Nordic cultural policy model was to proceed from the dissemination of defined culture to the democratic definition of culture. This was also the primary purpose of the Committee for Cultural Activities in Finland (CP 1974). The aim was, among others, to clarify how people’s opportunities for practicing their own culture could be improved. “Besides the actual arts [cultural policy] contains... a considerable part of the mass media ... , and various forms of self-determined activities” (CP 1974, 99, 105). According to the committee, its definition of culture followed an international practice that originated in the United Nation’s cultural organization, the UNESCO, and was applied throughout the Nordic countries. It seems that values of aesthetic quality and cultivation were subordinated to those of democracy and egalitarianism (Bjurström 2008, 74–75). The major practical change between the two committees mentioned here involved the extension of artistic activities. Every established art form was enlarged with more popular activities, such as folk dance, pop singing, and popular literature. “Inside culture one can separate fields and currents that have their own special characteristics ... aesthetic aims ... [and] social and ideological frameworks” (CP 1974, 89). In contrast to the former policy, it wanted to focus on non-institutional activities in order to use culture as a solution for social problems (See CP 1965).

The expansion of the cultural sphere in the 1970s is understandable if the new organization of welfare state is taken into account. The reformation of taste was integrated into a gradually evolving political infrastructure, built on an alliance between the state and civil society. In the 1970s, the whole of society in Finland was split along lines drawn up by the ideological camps, agrarian, Social Democrat, communist, bourgeois, and that of the Swedish-speaking people, that formed the political “pillars” of society. Each of these camps included a party, colleges, several newspapers, and organizations for art, sports, and youth activities. The trade unions and certain wholesale companies were also tied into this “ideological pillarization.” After the introduction of consensus politics, the hegemonic leadership was based on a sensitive balance of the major pillars. Paradoxically, the expansion of the public cultural sphere, toward noninstitutional activities, took place, first of all, spatially by new state-subsidized institutional forms of regional and local cultural activities (municipal cultural offices with cultural secretaries, regional network of theaters, museums, and symphony orchestras).

This development led to a party political categorization of cultural democracy as a method to cope with radical symbolic reforms that surprised cultural strategists in the 1960s. It largely neglected controversies on taste, aesthetic quality, and the high/low divide (Frenander 2005, 127). This meant that the publicly cherished idea of critical autonomy was lamented as another politically determined form of taste. Therefore, the Nordic model has succeeded in lowering the economical and geographical barriers to participation in cultural activities (Danielsen 2008, 110). However, if someone diverges from the mutually agreed cultural standards, it may be regarded as a suspicious individualism. The paradox of the explicit cultural policy has been that measures (e.g., pedagogical programs) that aim at compensating cultural differences tend to be used primarily by people who already are well endowed in terms of cultural interests and competence. Therefore, such measures may have reinforced the differences they were supposed to help level out (Girard 1972).

The economic and political changes of the 1980s challenged the welfare state-based cultural model. Deregulation of the banking system in Finland, Norway, and Sweden caused what can be called “investment hysteria.” An economic boom gave a boost for private and commercial

initiatives of art worlds, temporarily increasing the proportion of private money available for cultural producers (Oesch 2010). Simultaneously, the field of culture underwent great changes. Market-led local radio stations obtained permissions to operate and introduced so-called city culture; architects were assigned to build pompous office buildings; newly rich bankers organized exaggerated gallery openings. It was not only a change in cultural production methods but a major attitudinal change, the spirit of a free market economy and individualism, that took place in cultural life.

Renegotiation of Cultural Welfare

A renegotiation of the postwar order started almost simultaneously in all of the Nordic countries at the end of the 1980s (Kananen 2011, 170). The collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally changed the geopolitical position of Scandinavia and, in particular, Finland. Furthermore, unrestricted capital flows and neoliberal economic globalization undermined the economic sovereignty and capacity of an interventionist state. Conservatives of the Nordic countries argued that the labor market needed greater flexibility and more economic incentives (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 295–96, 306). Global economic competition caused pressures to cut taxation and public expenditures in view of competitiveness (Kautto 2001, 20–23). The new adjustment was explained by “the collapse of the paternalistic nature of the welfare state” (CP 1992, 233). Many analysts anticipated that the centralist model of the previous Nordic cultural policy would be replaced by much more *consumerist*, *privatized*, and *fragmented* models. Public cultural institutions, from the nationwide public broadcasting company to the municipal theaters, were expected to implement consumer sovereignty and self-financing. It seems that the cultural policy experts aimed at fulfilling the supposed expectations of the market toward the arts; artists themselves seemed incapable of this.

It is difficult to decide, though, if the development signified the end of the welfare state. Many reasoned that to increase market orientation in the arts is an absurd aim because Scandinavian countries have such

narrow domestic markets for the arts (CP 1993b). Regardless of the intention of cultural policy to stress the private sector as the financier of cultural production, the promise of private finance has clearly been overestimated. The amount of sponsor money for the arts has steadily diminished since the “investment hysteria” of the 1980s (Oesch 2010, 88–89). Meanwhile, the absolute amount of public support for the arts and culture increased until 2013, and even its percentage of overall state expenditure increased, up to 2009 (Cultural Statistics 2014, 187–89). Thus, much more than a material change being in question is an ideological shift (cf. McGuigan 2004). In addition, the idea of a welfare state has been very popular among the populations of the Nordic countries (Schnyder and Jackson 2013, 323). Thus, it has been politically risky to criticize welfare state institutions.

None of these measures (flexible labor markets, privatization, outsourcing) rolled back the welfare state in any fundamental area. The normative legacy of the Nordic cultural policy has not disappeared. Yet, some of its basic elements have been reinterpreted. The political and economic agenda now emphasizes growth, productivity, and efficiency more than redistribution, equality, and security (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 328). The ideological shift has primarily been possible due to a strong maintenance of a political rhetoric about preserving old welfare state ideals. In order to avoid any blame that tough decision might incur, politicians have “outsourced” attacks on welfare state to consultants and the Ministry of Finance (Kananen 2011, 237–38). Traditional welfare state institutions, universities, and other cultural institutions have been modified to serve the new purposes of the competitive state.

New Content for Cultural Welfare

What are the effects of the ideological shift on the general political formulation of culture? It has meant a new justification for the public expenditure on culture, a new content and criteria of cultural welfare. Attacks against the former dominant concept of a politically harmonic culture were based on its allegedly elitist (cf. Girard 1972) and anti-individualist outcomes. Ideas of postmodern culture such as discontinuity, diversity,

and playfulness, popular among the expert groups in the 1990s, broadened the gulf between the real-world experience and expert knowledge. Through postmodern conceptualization, the field of culture was easy to portray as an illustration of an ongoing dedifferentiation process in which the line between art and business becomes blurred (Røyseng 2008, 37–38). Individual consumerism was interpreted as a sign of postmodern multiculturalism and contrasted with the allegedly unifying models of previous times.

The idea of postmodern individualism was backed by the intensive technological progress of cultural production that was expected to neutralize the still-awkward demarcation between popular and high-brow culture. Instead of being guided by the state, individuals would have the right to create their own identities and desired “other lives” with the help of constantly changing media technology: through virtual tribes and social media (CP 2010, 28). The strong belief in the positive societal effects of information technology has been introduced mainly as a commitment to the markets as a guiding mechanism of society (cf. Roivas 2009). An implicit requirement for cultural strategies is to construct a consumer, a new ideal subject of cultural citizenship, as part of viewer statistics, virtual lives, top 10 lists, or other referenda of good or bad culture. This gives a new idea of what is desired from the art worlds: more immediate international success, Music-TV coverage, and blockbuster movies.

Nevertheless, the *postmodern new deal of cultural welfare* was eventually just an articulation of the formal practices and postmodern illusion of culture. This means that ongoing economic crises, political struggles, and regulation prevented natural “neoliberal” cultural evolution from continuing and resulted in a *centralized market orientation* (Häyrynen 2013). This means the state-assisted freedom of the market, because the market rarely worked as expected under given circumstances.³ Owing to the narrow domestic markets and the still relatively low volume of cultural export, such a policy, in fact, means growing competition about the taxpayers’ money.

In order to reach a better certainty of the good effects of public cultural expenditure, Finland’s Minister of Culture noted an immediate need for a redefinition of the objectives of cultural policy (see also CP 1993a, 15).

The reforms included a new system, called the New Public Management, that emphasized a long-term planning and result-oriented governance derived from the logic of the private market. Result-oriented contracts for the arts have produced an instrumental management of content and form in the arts, that is, a regulation of practices with regard to the stimulation of the labor market, regional development, and national profiling, according to global market development (Duelund 2003, 500). The instrumentalization has meant an active deideologization of culture. Contrary to a neoliberalist and postmodern political rhetoric, the decision-making in Finnish cultural policy has, in the long run, moved steadily toward formal and impersonal criteria at the expense of the apparently intuitive criteria of expert groups (see, for example, CP 2011). This tendency implies that the cultural policy-makers consider ad hoc-type negotiations to be too decentralized and unpredictable for a system to be operational and effective. Even if the state finance for cultural institutions has steadily increased up to 2013 (Cultural Statistics 2014, 187), the interpretative frames of public culture have been formalized as a result of the new economic regime.

The formalization of cultural policy effectiveness coincides with the leaping modernization of cultural production methods, rapidly developing information technology, digitalization, and creative industries (cf. Bruun et al. 2009). These forms helped economic principles and economic vocabulary to penetrate the whole culture sector. They represent cultural forms that really can fulfill the expectations of the national economy by creating new working opportunities for cultural producers and by feeding foreign capital into the national cultural sector (CP 2009a). Traditional forms of cultural welfare allocation (public cultural institutions, regional decentralization) are easy to regard, from this point of view, as less developed sediments of cultural evolution.

As a result of this development, political formulation of cultural welfare has been opened from two ends. On the one hand, it tends to extensively support the commercial content production of private companies. On the other hand, artistic production could add extra economic value to mobile phones, computer games, and so on (CP 2010). Consequently, new partners for art worlds are found in such sectors as advertising and recreational activities, which already understood the economic significance

of images (see CP 1992 before). Suspicions, which formerly characterized the cultural industry, based, for instance, on Theodor W. Adorno's skepticism regarding the industrial production of mass culture, in the course of a mere two decades, have transformed into an enormous enthusiasm.

Yet, the patriotic tone of cultural policy has been reinforced, at least, by two societal factors, which have combined neoliberalism with the uprising of neonationalism: the European Union (EU) and increasing migration. By the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the EU left cultural policies to be conducted by the nation-states. In other words, culture has not been regarded as one of the fundamentals of European integration but compensation, and a proof, for lost political and economic independence of nation-states. The systemic independence of national cultural policies has not necessarily led to a greater cultural autonomy of nation-states though. National cultural policies have adopted globally instrumentalist economic strategies based on the idea that while material production is transferred to the developing countries for lower labor costs, the developed countries should invest in the knowledge-, and innovation-, based operations and services in order to take care of their competitiveness. Consequently, culture is more and more measured by its competitive skills with respect to global standards of heavy metal or good composers and less by its national content. Thus, all the Nordic EU members (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) have experienced similar dual movements by achieving political autonomy to organize cultural issues on the basis of their own national interests and attempts to modify their national cultural images to be more suitable for global competition.

Increasing immigration is another thing that has prompted nationalistic tones in the Nordic states. Immigration became a major campaign issue, with a significant impact on parliamentary elections of, first, Denmark and Norway, and, later, Sweden and Finland. Populist parties have not been against the welfare programs but against their misuse by outsiders. Immigrants from certain areas of the world are accused of being social refugees seeking to exploit the collective generosity of the Nordic countries (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 312). Such debates not only sharpen cultural conflicts. They crumble the basic elements of the normative legacy of welfare state, that is, solidarity and universal rights. In the

formative phase of the welfare state, the promotion of national identity was all-inclusive. Most artistic and cultural organizations were either built or incorporated into the state administration (Stenström 2008, 25). Through the idea of culture as singular, politically formulated, and indicating commercial potentiality, an implicit line is now drawn on the basis of economic success between those cultures that are pro-development and those that conflict with the desired development (Harrison and Huntington 2000). This cultural policy implies the responsible “us” against the odd, inefficient, hysterical, and cunning “other” of, for example, Southern (Euro crisis) or Eastern (Schengen problems) Europe.

Even if a European nation-state has become a less effective unit for making economic policy, it has become an important cultural construction, a brand that provides desired images for international investors and other potential allies. Small countries have often found it hard to gain international recognition for their cultural products in comparison with larger countries, where a large part of domestic cultural production can be immediately regarded as international. It is precisely the common fear of being regarded as a provincial obstacle to economic harmonization that has provoked the Nordic cultural policy to urge artists and other cultural producers to create images that cement their country’s position in the group of successful nations (CP 2009a, 34–35; 2010, 27–29;). There is no need to overstress the similarity between the formal development of cultural policy and the current economic situation in Europe. However, messes such as the present European crisis, caused by the combined forces of market liberalism and powerful nation-states with protected culturally based national voices, may have sharpened nationalistic tones in the state cultural policies as well.

Nordic States in Comparison

If the focus is set on the development of the narrow administrative sector of cultural policy, the state cultural policy of Finland has mainly followed and even imitated the development of that in the other Nordic countries. However, if the political tradition and societal environment of cultural policy is examined more accurately, it clearly shows that largely similar

external impulses often produce different results in different national contexts (Esping-Andersen 1999, 96–97). All of the Nordic countries have undergone an ideological shift that has included a positioning against the imperatives of the international competitive state paradigm. They all have experienced deregulation in financial markets, privatization, and an introduction of market principles into public services, to some extent (Einhorn and Logue 2003, 233). Denmark started cutting its public economy already in the 1980s, and tax incentives for cultural investments have been put into operation in Denmark (Stenström 2008, 30; Kananen 2011, 234). At first, Sweden was rather restrictive toward collaboration between the arts and the business sector, but this attitude has been changing, especially due to the electoral success of the conservatives (Stenström 2008, 25; see also Schmidt and Thatcher 2013, 324).

Among Nordic countries, Finland and Iceland have been most far reaching in their application of neoliberalist ideas. A distinct factor behind this is the centralist nature of the Finnish political culture that traces back to the postwar period. Meanwhile, forestry, the traditional leader of the national economy, was symbolically replaced, at least temporarily, by the information and communication technology (ICT) industry and Nokia in particular, and the Soviet Union as an international reference by the EU. While the government coalitions of Sweden and Denmark openly discussed the ideological aims of their policies, Finnish renegotiation of welfare principles initiated fairly independently from the general public (Kananen 2011, 239). Broad “rainbow coalitions” have governed Finland under very strict governmental programs since the economic crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. Finland entered the EU in 1995 and, as a sole Nordic country, also the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998. Entering the EMU with a minor public discussion compared with that of Sweden and Denmark and without a referendum has been regarded as a means to shake out the historical baggage of *Finlandisierung*. The total collapse of the special trading relationship with the Soviet Union (more than 20% of Finnish exports) made the global recession hit Finland worse than the other Nordic countries at the beginning of the 1990s.

Sweden is, undoubtedly, internationally the most well-known and appreciated country for its cultural accomplishments among the Nordic

countries. Sweden jointly ranks fifth in the list of countries with the most Noble Prize laureates in literature. The production of world-class film directors (Ingmar Bergman, Jan Troell), actresses (Ingrid Bergman, Greta Garbo), and actors (Max von Sydow, Stellan Skarsgård) has been sustainable throughout the history of filmmaking. In addition, the relationship between high-brow and popular culture (such as pop groups Abba, Roxette, and the Cardigans) has never been too fierce. In a way, they have both historically formed separate internationally successful art worlds, whereas, for instance, Finnish popular culture, for a long time, formed a solely national fraction. International success eluded Finnish pop culture until the end of 1990s, when especially heavy-metal music (HIM, Apocalyptica, Nightwish) became something of an export article. Similar progresses have taken place in Norway and, with TV series and film production, in Denmark. Nevertheless, the Swedish development may have created a more confident and homing environment for the artists, and, thus, a more resilient national art world than in its Nordic neighbors.

Though the state cultural policy after the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) has had a patriotic tone, Finland has not, so far, experienced similar official nationalism as that of, for example, Denmark, in which cultural policy has openly emphasized “Danishness” (Duelund 2008, 18–19).⁴ One reason might be a relatively late increase in immigration, which has taken the ideal of universalism to another level. Recently, though, Finland, as well, has experienced a change from a previously tolerant public discourse on the topic of immigration toward a much more conflicted one. A major change reached its climax in the 2011 parliamentary elections when a previously fairly small party calling itself the “Finns Party”, critical toward not only EU integration and immigration but “high-brow” art, won a landslide victory.

Diversity Among the Artists

The state cultural policy constitutes frameworks in which the artists and other participants of the art world maneuver and compete for public prizes and recognition, with all the capacities they possess. How has the national art world absorbed the shift in general political formulations of

culture, and in the ideal type of a societal artist it implies? The most remarkable change since the peak of the welfare state expansion must be a shift from the admiration of collective conscience and the preparedness of artists to build alternative visions of society around them, to the appreciation of individual talent pursuing personal success as part of a private value chain.

The change in the condition of top-level art education is expected to have an extensive impact on the cultural sector in Finland, both as a funding model and in terms of the immediate impact on production networks. This has not been a particularly Finnish, or even Nordic, phenomenon. A movement regarding arts as business and artists as entrepreneurs has been witnessed all over Europe (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007, 16–20). However, given the traditionally dominant role of the public sector, such a change could be much more drastic in the Nordic states.

In order to be regarded as legitimate, an artist in the Nordic states can no longer rely solely on public funding, but has to show a willingness to search for other sources of funding (Stenström 2008, 30). The postmodernist political legitimacy of popular taste has helped such trends to intervene in the national art world. Art forms that have an initial market orientation, such as the film industry, popular music, industrial design, and computer games, such as *Angry Birds* by Rovio, are easy to integrate with the logic of global competition. Artists are, in consequence, identified as subcontractors in support of centrally organized export strategies or technological advancement. Traditional art forms, literature, painting, and theater, have been regarded as subordinated not only to new policies but also to the new forms of cultural production.

Artists never construct a unanimous social community: owing to their differing production methods and social dispositions, they do not respond similarly to the expectations and hopes of the state. However, a relatively large volume of art education has meant the extension of the artistic proletariat in all the Nordic countries (Cultural Statistics 2014, 202–203). When the new market-based policy formulations were launched in the beginning of the 1990s, the Finnish artists' organizations and arts councils quite unanimously criticized them for weakening artists' opportunities to work independently in the narrow Finnish art markets (see CP 1993b, 4–10). Not all the artists can create a successful start-up company

or conform to the ethical values of Silicon Valley, which have been presented to them as a solution by the cultural policy experts (e.g., CP 2009b).

Although no artists can totally ignore the cultural policy surrounding them, its influence is more improbable on the group of most talented and distinguished artists. New political ideas are not necessarily able to make a major difference in the minds of internationally recognized conductors, opera singers, or solo instrumentalists. Hence, rather than having a trade union attitude toward cultural strategies, they may have opportunities to evaluate cultural policies from a much more extensive ideological perspective. The variation in the cultural political attitudes of top artists is easy to observe from the arguments presented for and against the intentions to establish a new Guggenheim art museum in Helsinki.⁵ On the other hand, the effects of cultural policy may not be the most comprehensive on amateur artists, who practice arts only part time, and whose motivation to do so is more vocational than economical. Both of these groups may pursue their artistic projects with relatively little regard for public cultural policies. Instead, the political manipulation of the value of art may influence how the great majority of the artists between these two ends see the societal function of the arts. Thus, the state cultural strategy is probably the most effective for those who undergo the Finnish system of arts education, starting from the very basics, and finally find themselves in constant competition for scanty financial options.

The critical autonomy of art is officially cherished in neoliberalist cultural policy. It is not considered an ideological aim but a fundamental element of Western civilization—something that even the most populist movements may use as an argument against more restrictive civilizations. Yet, the neoliberalist economy is incorporating more and more artistic elements and processes, which makes it difficult for artists to remain autonomous (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Critical autonomy is easy to guarantee financially because artists themselves are obliged to seek for the acceptance from the markets. The policy pattern may lead to systemic populism, that is, a tendency to please the dominant expectations of state policies in advance. Such a rational-bureaucratic governance of individual creativity is an immanent characteristic of a paternalist welfare state model.

Concluding Remarks

The cultural policy system that was originally constructed to protect a free artistic expression and an equal distribution of cultural opportunities has, in recent decades, been in the front line of a neoliberalist invasion in Finland. The invasion is modeled rhetorically after the ideas of cultural pluralism and economic efficiency. However, in practice, the fight has been a technocratic one, between different notions of what are governmental responsibilities. The neoliberalist tendency has recently faced fundamental challenges internationally, the global market crisis, and social and environmental problems, yet it is still an influential ideology in Finnish political society. The market-liberalist guideline has been introduced not only as a positive but, for the globalization of the economy, as an inevitable basis for any policy.

However, the Finnish cultural policy has advocated market orientation without really diminishing the power of the central government since the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, it has implemented a strategy that can be called “centralized market orientation” (see also Harvey 2005). This mechanism stresses formal procedures at the expense of ad hoc negotiations, leading to a narrow interpretation of liberalism as a guiding method. It seems that the state cultural policy has lost its faith in the competence of cultural producers as a guiding mechanism of the societal role of culture. In addition, the centrally organized market liberalism does not come into existence only within the cultural sector by its new production methods and new economic language. It also occurs in the societal uses of culture in order to promote certain overall ideological aims within the rest of society. In Finland, the political reorientation has been based on mixed factors of postmodernist pluralism, fear of dissident ideas, and a history of *Finlandisierung*.

The ideological shift of cultural policies points out that states are no longer static economic and political units. States, rather, act as fortresses of righteous cultural identity in the symbolic struggles of global geoculture. Thus, as far as cultural politics is concerned, the hollowing-out of nation-states (Jessop 1990) is partially a myth supported by the neoliberalist trends of the global economy. Rather, cultural policy has lost its specific mission, its cultural foundation that is required in order to understand its distinct nature from the other sectors.

The social stratification of artists is just the reason why cultural policy analyses should not only concentrate on the strategic priorities of governing officials. They should also recognize and assess the culture factors behind the complicated policy processes. In these processes, new cultural ideas, tactical choices, and technological innovations create new ideological constructions (formations), which can open and shut the doors of a cultural policy agenda for practically anyone, no matter who. A conceptual flexibility in defining “culture” and its place in society has, indeed, brought new partners into national art worlds and changed their power relations. Through carefully determined cultural taxonomies, the more and less significant parts of art, the useful and the useless, are divided according to the prevalent goals of society.

Notes

1. Links between the valuation of Jean Sibelius and contemporary fields of symphonic music is highlighted by a relatively great number of Finnish composers, conductors, opera singers, and solo instrumentalists in the international field of symphonic music.
2. In cultural life, welfare ideology was, perhaps, best manifested by the domestic and international success of *utility art*, by companies such as Arabia, Marimekko, and Iittala, which quickly furnished and modernized the homes of average Finnish families.
3. One example of this is the recently renewed funding principle for Finnish universities, in which the private/external donations to universities are rewarded by public money.
4. In 2004, the Danish Minister for Culture announced his idea of a cultural canon and appointed seven canon committees corresponding to the art forms within the purview of the Danish Ministry of Culture. The overall aim was to stimulate a public discussion and further public activities related to the question of national identity and discuss how to improve and estimate the quality of art. Notably, the cultural canon was promulgated alongside the so-called Muhammad cartoon crises in 2006 and Denmark’s joining with the US-led frontier in Iraq.
5. Still, the continuing debate on Guggenheim museum in Helsinki shows that internationally recognized artists are useful for providing artistic

substance and credibility to whatever main arguments of primary discussion that might exist, for example, ones that concentrate on how many visitors the investment would attract to Helsinki or how it might affect the national brand of Finland.

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7

Cultural Policies in the Baltic States and Slovenia Between 1991 and 2009

Egge Kulbok-Lattik and Vesna Čopič

Introduction

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia are small member states of the European Union (EU). According to Eurostat, the population in Estonia in 2011 was 1,340,194, in Latvia 2,229,641, in Lithuania 3,244,601, and in Slovenia 2,050,189 people. While Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania belong to the Baltic Sea region, Slovenia shares borders with countries in Central Europe: Italy, Austria, Croatia, and Hungary. All four countries differ ethnically, culturally, and also religiously: the Estonian language, for example, belongs to the Finnic branch of the Uralic language family, while Latvian and Lithuanian are the last living examples of the Baltic branch of the Indo-European language family. The Slovenian language belongs to the South Slavic linguistic family. While in Estonia and Latvia,

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the prevailing religion is Lutheranism (although a large part of the population considers themselves as nonreligious and the Latgale part in Latvia has Catholic roots), the Lithuanians identify themselves more as Catholics (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993). In Slovenia, the largest part of the population considers themselves to be Catholics.

Nevertheless, despite the various historical and political differences, the Baltic states and Slovenia also share similarities. All three Baltic countries have experienced independent nation-statehood (1918–40), which was conceived, on the one hand, as a result of the collapse of European empires and, on the other hand, due to the cultural, national, and political emancipation of suppressed ethnic populations, which enabled them to establish the nation-states as new socioeconomic and political systems by the end of World War I (WWI). New boundaries were then laid down in Europe and the principle of self-determination became a legal basis for the new European order, as was suggested by US President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference that followed WWI.

However, Slovenia did not solve its national question after WWI, as it had become a part of another multiethnic state, Yugoslavia, which was a result of having united the South Slavic nations of former territories of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with the dominant Serbian Kingdom. Driven by “centrifugal forces of ethno-politics and ethno-economics,” as noted by Andrew C. Janos (1997, 16), Slovenia became a nation-state for the first time in June 1991 when the Eastern Bloc of the Cold War started to collapse, which removed the most compelling Western reason for working to keep the Yugoslav state together (*ibid.*, 20).

While the three Baltic states share the Soviet experience and communism, Slovenia, as a part of ex-Yugoslavia, had avoided Soviet rule. The Yugoslav communist regime distanced itself from the Soviets in 1948 (cf. *Cominform and Informbiro*) and started to build its own way toward socialism, referred to as *self-management*. While the Baltic countries had been subordinated to the Soviet state practices and cultural politics with the main idea of creating a homogeneous society and a *Soviet man*, in Slovenia, this real socialism was after the first war decade, with the help of the unique Yugoslav sociopolitical experiment, transformed into so-called socialism with a human face. These different starting positions put democratic promises in the countries in different perspectives. However, the main feature

was the same in all four countries, and this is a central role of national culture in resistance and ethnopolitics driven by the idea of nationhood.

Thus, it could be said that in 1991, after the collapse of communist regimes, when all four countries gained independence, they also shared differences related to the communist legacy as well as similarities. All the countries had to make deep reforms in different fields (establish a democratic political system, a free market economy and a public administration, a judicial area, etc.).

As they tried to establish contemporary, market-based, competitive societies, all four countries have experienced similar challenges, which could be summarized as follows: on the one hand, strong globalization and Europeanization tendencies that contribute to the homogenization of different fields (including the art world), as all four countries are now part of the EU, and on the other hand, the sunset of the welfare cultural policy model, as it already was at that time when Western cultural policies were undergoing a profound and continuous transformation influenced by the general neoliberal discourse. We will look at the historical developments in cultural policy as a public policy that is rooted in the development of modern state practices of the Baltic states and Slovenia, trying to frame our findings within the concept of *multiple modernities*.¹ The concept of “multiple modernities” is an approach that acknowledges divergent trajectories of development of the modern era and offers a theoretical umbrella to discuss and relate different macrohistorical path dependencies of Western and Eastern European states.

As the cultural policy never exists in isolation from the major debates (ideologies) of the day, as Anita Kangas et al. (2010) have mentioned, and general political–economic discourses have a direct impact on the developments of the field of politics of culture, a brief overview about the choices in the political–economic developments of the Baltic countries and Slovenia will also be given. The chapter will focus on three questions:

1. What were the similarities and differences in the historical impact of the cultural politics of the Socialist era at the starting point of the transition in the Baltic states and Slovenia?
2. What kind of overall political–economic changes prevailed in Europe when the Eastern Bloc of the Cold War collapsed and postsocialist

states started to construct their own cultural policy models? How could the different paths of the trajectories of the capitalistic development in the Baltic states and Slovenia be interpreted?

3. What were the main changes in the cultural policy during the transition and in 1991–2004, and then since the four countries joined the EU in 2004–12? How did the different paths of capitalism affect (and continue to affect) the politics of culture?

First of all, a brief reflection on the similar but still different communist legacy will be discussed in order to understand that *democratic promises* did not mean the same in the Baltic states in comparison with Slovenia. Second, to open the wider context of different trajectories of the capitalistic development and change in the Baltic states and Slovenia, we briefly explore the overall political–economic changes that prevailed in Europe when the Baltic states were restored and Slovenia established its independence and started to construct and develop its own political, economic, and cultural models. Third, we will try to point out the main changes in the cultural policy during the transition and in 1991–2004, and then since the four countries joined the EU in 2004–12.

The Historical Impact of the Socialist Cultural Policy: Similarities and Differences at the Starting Point of the Transition for the Baltic States and Slovenia

The Historical Impact of the Soviet Cultural Policy in the Baltic States

The roots of Estonian and Latvian cultural policies derive from the nineteenth-century civil society initiatives (society movement) of the prestate period, as most of the cultural institutions, theaters, artistic associations, and community houses, which became significant pillars of the cultural policy of independent statehood, were formed under the conditions of the Russian Tsarist Empire. In Lithuania, the tradition of an

independent association movement was weaker and developed in the quite corporative framework of religious communities, as Ruutsoo (2002, 74–80) points out.

However, a characteristically Western modern social structure gained ground in all the Baltic countries for two decades of independency (1918–40) while Western modern state practices were applied by the establishment of state-supported cultural institutions, as well as the arm's length principle (1920s in Estonia and Latvia). Estonia and Latvia lost their young democracies in the middle of the 1930s, and Lithuania some years earlier, when the political–economic turbulence (economic crises and nationalist ideas) spread in Europe between the two world wars. This era of the Baltic nation-states encouraged nationalist ideologies developed by the propaganda offices. However, after 1940, Western modernity in the Baltic states was replaced by Soviet modernity (1940–91). The main aims of the Soviet cultural policy were to civilize the masses and to create a unified multinational Soviet nation with a homogeneous identity: the Soviet person. The civilization and cultivation of the masses were the main purposes of state cultural policies in the majority of the European nation-states at that time.

In general, Soviet state practices were coercive and violent, as Olaf Mertelsmann (2012) remarks: class struggle and terror, oppression of the “enemies” of the Soviet state, *kulaks*, priests, the elite of the previous era, attempts to achieve total control over the population in all spheres of life, nationalization of private property, establishment of a planned economy, heavy industrialization, censorship, and political agitation were some of the key elements of the *sovietization*. While Soviet state practices *did change* over time (being influenced by the development of its own inner policies as well as by external pressures of the Cold War), the main structures of the state model of the USSR established in the 1930s persisted until its collapse in 1991. To reeducate the population of occupied territories, the Soviet cultural canon, values, and cultural policy model² was imported to the Baltic states as one of the tools for creating the new socialist reality.

From the very first moments after the Soviets grasped power in 1940, constantly repeated slogans began to appear in the press and public places, such as “Soviet Culture Is Nationalist in Form and Socialist in

Content,” “Art Belongs to the People,” “Friendship of Soviet Brotherly Nations,” and “Socialist Realism.” These slogans expressed the main aims of the Soviet cultural policy and the cultural canon, set by authorities. Through the creation of a cultural canon, Soviet leaders sought to provide a set of shared values and common heritage of Soviet mass culture to form a monolithic Soviet society, to transform people’s behavior and to create a new social order, a Soviet society, and a Soviet person—a mass-man in an atomized society, as described by Hannah Arendt (1985, 318–23). Culture served *that top-down Soviet nation-building project*, which differed from the previous ethnic nation-building experiences of the Baltic nations.

The Soviet cultural policy was implemented through bureaucratic control and top-down governance of cultural institutions. As all cultural enterprises were state owned, and they were also controlled by a range of party officials and administrative professionals, who established canonized artistic norms and cultural routines for the rest of the population to follow. The Soviet state was moving toward welfare paternalism, where the state acts with a strong sense of the responsibilities of leadership over the dependent population, claims Sheila Fitzpatrick (1999, 225) and refers to Janos Kornai (1980, 315), who has pointed out that, in Soviet-type systems, the population is under the “paternalistic tutelage” and care of the party and the state:

All other strata, groups, or individuals in society are children, wards whose minds must be made up for them by their adult guardians. (Ibid.)

According to Fitzpatrick (1999, 226), the paternalistic dominance of the state apparatus was one of the significant features of the Soviet political system. In cultural policy research, such a dominant role of the state has been described according to Harry Hillmann-Chartrand and Claire McCaughey’s (1989) theoretical framework as the *engineer state*, which acts as the owner of all means of artistic production and supports only the art that meets political standards of excellence. Funding decisions are made by political commissars. And the biggest change in the Baltic societies was the suppression of artistic freedom and the entrepreneurial spirit. Activities of civil society were prohibited and replaced by

patronizing state interference in culture. Even the citizens' leisure-time self-expressions were replaced by guided cultural practices. This *Sovietization* changed the mental structure of society and led to the mentality of state guardianship and alienation of people.

However, Soviet state practices were never fully accepted by the Baltic nations, as Jelena Zubkova (2007, 184–206) has mentioned:

Yet even the mass deportations did not help the central power to completely solve the task, [...] to make the Baltic region loyal on the example of other union republics.

Open and more often disguised anti-Soviet feelings became part of the social consciousness in the Baltic countries, which made them a problematic zone for Moscow. Jelena Zubkova (2007) has discussed the reasons why the Sovietization failed, even if it managed to demolish civil society, by pointing out the following:

- 1) previous experience of Western modern nation-state of Baltic states; 2) general orientation of the Baltic region toward the West and weak position of the Communist ideology and the Communist parties in the region; 3) presence of the strong inclination toward the national culture; 4) presence of the hidden resistance against the Russification and sovietization policy.

Resistance to the repressive regime consisted of uniting around cultural institutions as a survival strategy by the Estonians and Latvians against the Russification policy, as Mikko Lagerspetz (1998) has pointed out. As a result of the Soviet modernization, urbanization, and industrialization, which included a large inflow of employees from other Soviet republics, the share of ethnic Estonians within the population decreased from 94% in 1945 to 62% in 1989 and Latvians from 80% in 1945 to 52% in 1989 (Kasekamp 2010, 155). The share of ethnic Lithuanians increased during the Soviet era in Lithuania.

All three Baltic states share a specific feature, the dualistic and ambivalent role of the public cultural institutions, which emerged out of the civic initiatives of the nineteenth century, with the main task of creating a national identity for the Baltic nations, but became under the repressive

regime, the channels for mediating controversially both official ideologies and the hidden resistance and preservation of national identities (Kulbok-Lattik 2015). If, in the Stalinist era, the state did not tolerate any deviation from the official party course and the guiding principles of the Soviet cultural policy had to be followed, then in time, when the socialist content lost importance and the pressure of political propaganda eased, the national form of culture, nurtured and fostered by state support, started to take central stage more and more.

Another important aspect of the Soviet cultural policy was the wide access to cultural participation and to professional, amateur, and folk arts, as well as to sports, which was ensured for the whole population. As it was one of the cornerstones of the Soviet welfare state's cultural policy, wide access to traditional cultural practices, even if it was covered with red propaganda, ensured a possibility for the whole population to deal with the national culture, and it was retained as a form of covered resistance, which was also one of the key factors in attaining mass mobilization and independence.

Summing up, the Soviet cultural canon and cultural policy model dialectically worked against its imperialist aims: with homogeneous cultural practices by an indoctrinated nationalist form of culture, the Socialist state promoted ethnic particularism, which was the actuating power behind the Singing Revolution in Estonia and other Baltic states. Thus, artistic circles and intellectuals in the Baltic countries, with the massive support of the whole population, wanted to regain self-determination and their nation-state, and to place distance between themselves and the Soviet legacy. This was the first priority for the people, despite the disastrous economic impact it caused. However, after 50 years of paternalistic care by the state, very few could really imagine what kind of impact the radically market-orientated economy may have on peoples' lives.

The Slovenian Special Experience of Socialism

The main Slovenian peculiarity in comparison with the Baltic States has been connected with its self-management legacy. After the spectacular split from Stalinist influence, the socialist realism, together with "the counter-

cultural styles of the young, ranging from beat and film noir to rock” (Council of Europe 1999, 243), followed. But the main innovation was the self-management system, a unique social experiment that reached its spring in the middle of the 1970s, causing Yugoslavia to develop its own version of socialism, that is, self-management socialism. A third way between Soviet communism and Western capitalism was invented to show that the distance from Stalin was not a submittal to a democratic Western-style alternative. Instead, Slovenia, together with the rest of Yugoslavia, preserved the one-party system but still developed some kind of quasi-democracy, quasi-market, and quasi-civil society.

The quasi-democracy, which produced a democratic appearance of the system, was a product of the process then known under the label of socialization and the “withering away” of the state. The task of programming all social affairs (health, education, science, social affairs, and culture) was transferred to self-management communities, which even had their own income from special levies (for health, science, culture). In the field of culture, this delegation of the cultural programming to the so-called cultural communities composed of the representatives of cultural producers and consumers could be understood as a specific arm’s length approach, which is otherwise one of the main features of the democratic cultural policy models. A quasi-market was a mixture of a planned socialist economy and of a decentralized, worker-managed market socialistic economy. Not only companies, but also public institutions were separate legal entities, with their own business and legal capacities registered in the same register and having their own bank accounts.

This model allowed operational autonomy of public schools, hospitals, theaters, museums, and so on under the safe umbrella of the prevailing public funding.³ The expression “quasi-civil society” refers to the existence of some kind of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Namely, in the field of culture, independent artistic groups, publishing houses, and professional journals were allowed to operate under the label of “associations,” which were permitted as a proof of the existence of freedom of association. Although the model placed this part of cultural production within the realm of amateur culture and not as a civil alternative to the professional cultural activities organized in the public sector, this concession allowed the development of private or better civic artistic and

cultural circles, which were even subsidized. In this setting, artists and other cultural workers enjoyed a lot of freedom as long as their democratic inspirations remained limited within narrow intellectual circles.

This democratic appearance was possible, since the public authorities, under the leadership of the communist party, developed an effective system of administrative measures to suppress problematic decisions without direct confrontation.⁴ From a functional aspect, the self-management model proved to be ineffective, as it was overregulated, centralized, and exclusive. The author of the system was himself aware of the increasing conviction of his contemporaries that “self-management is at best a formality and at worst a fraud” (Pirjevec 1995, 343). According to J. Županov (1989), the system was considered utopian, with little connection to reality, and its purpose was to distort and replace reality with moralist fabrications, as Janko Kos (1996, 91) has noted.

Nevertheless, after 1974, the development of the self-management system resulted in the establishment of around 60 cultural communities at the local level, followed in 1981 by the creation of the Cultural Community of Slovenia, which could be considered the main step in the aspiration toward a national cultural policy platform. Thus, due to the delegation of the responsibility for social fields at the level of all six Yugoslav republics, Slovenia, as one of them, already enjoyed a high level of cultural autonomy when it gained its independence, together with all of the Baltic states during the historical moment of the fall of communism.

In order to help realize the lack of political capacity for structural changes in the transition in Slovenia, another important characteristic of Josip Tito's specific approach toward democracy and pluralism should be presented. According to Andrew C. Janos (1970), the self-management experiment was not so much about political inclusion of different actors, but more of an attempt to organize areas in a way that they would lose their political significance by changing them into operational issues of a technical nature. The result was the “de-politization” of society, by placing a clear demarcation line between active and passive concerns of the ruling party (Janos 1970, 541). The difference between the classic communist pattern and post-Stalinist Yugoslav communism is that, in the former, an average citizen was aware of the political importance of every

societal act, while in Tito's Yugoslavia, there was "a very elaborated set of devices and institutions" aimed to make the citizen convinced that the majority of his or her self-management activities had nothing to do with politics, explains Ulam (1965, 152). "Politics is the business of the League of Communists, and the average citizen is relieved of the presence and pressure of Big Brother; indeed, he is asked not to notice that Big Brothers exists" (ibid.). Inspired by the self-management illusion, the cultural sector expected even more from the promise of democracy, only it had no idea of what that might mean and how it could be accomplished. All these differences placed the Western democratic promise in Slovenia into different perspectives from those of the Baltic states.

What Kind of Political–Economic Discourses Prevailed in Europe When the Baltic States and Slovenia Started to Restore and Establish Their Nation-States

The Estonian scholar Rein Müllerson (2010) has described the ending era of the Cold War as the *triumph of liberté* over *égalité*, and claims that the situation in Western world politics during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology was dominated by the ideas of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, although, post–World War II Europe had for long periods, and to a great extent, been Social Democratic, and had flourished as such. Different Social Democratic policies were seen as cornerstones of the creation of Western welfare states and anticommunist or antitotalitarian measures when the industrial world was ideologically and politically polarized and socialism, along with communism of the Eastern Bloc, *yet offered considerable alternatives* to the capitalist economies, Müllerson (2010) explains.

Thus, the welfare state and the development of economic and social rights was a response of Western European capitalism to the specter of communism haunting Europe, while the fate of Russia was sealed by the communist response, claims Müllerson (2010), referring to John Maynard Keynes, who "wanted to save capitalism from itself," and to Anthony

Giddens, who wrote: “The British welfare state, was created partly to dispel/avoid the socialist menace.”

Concerning cultural policy, general Social Democratic political discourse also meant a relatively strong state interference in cultural politics in Western Europe. In cultural policy research, this trend has been conceptualized as *cultural democratization*. It appears that the enlightening intentions to cultivate masses by giving people access to the predetermined set of cultural goods and services, usually understood as high culture or *fine arts*, did not differ so much from those in East and West, regardless of how their state practices differed.

However, the Western welfare state as known in Europe, aimed at being an alternative to the communist regimes or to the socialist paternalistic version of welfare, did not manage to become a proper answer to the modern challenges, and in many cases, the welfare state had turned into what is sometimes called a “nanny state” in need of substantial reforms, as Mikko Lagerspetz (2010) claims. Neither was the Soviet welfare state sustainable. Left-wing politics in the West started to fall back from its previous position simultaneously with the fall of socialism, until the socialist Eastern Bloc bipolar world was ruined in the 1980s and 1990s, as Lagerspetz (2010) has pointed out. And once again, as it was in the context of the nineteenth-century modernization, liberalization in the economy also brought liberal ideas (or the other way round) in the politics of culture in Western European nation-states. The new trend was conceptualized as *cultural democracy* in cultural policy research and has been concluded by Kevin Mulcahy (2006) to be a movement from the top-down to a bottom-up policy; that is, the government’s responsibility is to provide equal opportunities for citizens to be culturally active on their own terms. Mulcahy (ibid.) has also mentioned that this shift involved a change in the interpretation of the notion “cultural activities” by broadening the meaning from the *fine arts* to popular entertainment, folk culture, amateur sports, choral societies, and so on.

Vesna Čopič (2014) has described the paradigmatic changes from 1980 onward with the term “postcisms,” namely postwelfare, postmodern, and postnational trends. The era in which the welfare cultural policy is endangered due to a diminishing public spending initiated a Western government transformation, known under different labels, such as New

Public Management or “reinventing government” as David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1994) describe it, or performative management as Peter Duelund (2003, 525) has pointed out. The common feature of them was the introduction of market mechanisms into public services provision and the search for new funding models of a mixed, or even tripod, economy, whereby each source of income (public, private, earned) accounts for a third of total income, which changed the previous predominantly state funding of culture. The postmodern era in which the cultural autonomy was replaced by managerial subordination undermined the very foundations of the cultural policy. The obvious connection between the neoliberal turn and globalization is also reflected in the postnational trend that Colin Leys describes:

[I]nstead of talking about policies for “national development”, then, politicians propose alternative ways of “positioning” their countries in the global marketplace. (2002, 94)

Thus, the collapse of communism happened when the West was in one of its libertarian phases. Free market ideologies and practices prevailed, while postcommunist countries rapidly began to reform their economic and political models. However, there were different trajectories of the capitalistic development in Eastern and Central Europe. How could the different paths of the trajectories of the capitalistic development in the Baltic states and Slovenia be interpreted?

Nation-Building Within Liberal Capitalism in the Baltic States

There is a broad expert consensus (Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Norkus 2011; Rupnik 2009) that Estonia is the most pure case of a liberal market economy among the Central European and Baltic countries, while Slovenia is the sole comparatively clear-cut case of a coordinated or Social Democratic market economy among the new members of the EU.

To interpret the historical legacies of the different paths to postsocialist capitalism, we should note that are more permanent constituents of the

emerging political arena. Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits (2012, 75–76) argue that a major dividing line across the Eastern European countries runs among those *countries that inherited independent nation-states and those that did not*. Reform radicalism in the subregion has been intrinsically tied to the agenda of nation-state building. As the Baltic elites saw national independence as the highest priority and nationalism also had a strong popular base, it legitimized the economic and social costs of the transformation as the price for autonomy from the Soviet Union. According to Bohle and Greskovits, it is the idea of national independence which has been the “Switchman” setting on the neoliberal track of the Baltic countries.

If in 1940, the Baltic states had been conquered and sovietized, which meant a break from *Western modernity*, then rooting out the Soviet period’s legacy could rightly be termed *normalization*. The Baltic states were united in considering Russia’s economic and political influence as the biggest threat to their national sovereignty and security. Their transformation strategies aimed at a radical departure from the past, responded to the perceived needs of independent statehood, and served the purpose of forging national identities. Estonia has implemented the most comprehensive strategy and has been the first mover in major reform area, thereby influencing the other two countries (Norkus 2011; Rupnik 2009). Typically, Latvia has come in a close second, while Lithuania has chosen neoliberal solutions only as a result of prolonged political struggles.

Coordinated Welfare Capitalism in Slovenia

In spite of all the anomalies of self-management, Slovenia left behind a more positive image of the state property and an appreciation of the role of the state in the provision of public services. Slovenia is, together with Iceland and Norway, among the three most egalitarian countries in Europe as far as the incomes of the population are concerned (Luthar 2014, 17). With an ambition to explore the social function of the property, Slovenia decided for a gradualist approach to economic transition that was based on the belief that the changes ought to be brought about

in small incremental ways rather than in radical strokes. The main features of gradualism are gradual privatization, excessive regulation of the labor market, and closed financial sectors. In spite of the permanent rhetoric of debureaucratization, the business environment has been hindered by strong administrative burdens. In the public sector, such a conservative approach is reflected in the preservation of state paternalism in fields such as health, education, science, and culture, which has even been reinforced by the introduction of the traditional bureaucratic mode of organization, a central system of public servants and exhausting administrative procedures. The previous paternalistic socialist state produced a strong public sector which has, to a large extent, remained unevaluated, unchallenged, and unchanged.

In this way, Slovenia has avoided any kind of shock therapy needed while preserving social welfare, on the one hand, and protecting workers' rights, on the other. Until recently, Slovenia had been considered as the most developed transition country, believing that this is so due to its gradualist economic policy.⁵ We shall now discuss how these different paths toward the capitalistic development affected the politics of culture in the Baltic states and Slovenia.

Major Changes in Cultural Policies Since the Early 1990s

The Changing Role of the State in Culture

Mainly, the changing role of the state in the Baltic states and Slovenia in 1991–2004 was related to the facilitation of privatization (above all publishing houses, cinemas, and media), the building of a new legal system to provide for democratic legislative frameworks in harmony with international legal standards, and also the provision of funding for existing and emerging cultural institutions, while looking for alternative models for funding. In addition, international foundations, such as the Soros Open Society Institute, invested resources into the modernization of the cultural sector. This was a limited focus on independent cultural projects,

organizations, and art initiatives but contributed to the diversity of the funding system (CoE-ERICarts 2011).

In the Baltic states, one of the main aims of the cultural policy was to decentralize the funding system and redistribute financial and managerial responsibilities between different levels of government, state, counties, and municipalities. The idea was not only to decrease the role of the state in the policy-making by decentralizing funding to the regions, but also to give experts from the cultural field the responsibility for allocating grants. So, the former *engineer model* was replaced by the reestablishment of *the arm's length principle mechanism* in the Baltic states, as Birgit Lüüs (2012)⁶ has pointed out.

Slovenia preserved the main elements of the previous self-management system, to be identified with the *patron model*. According to Harry Hillmann-Chartrand and Claire McCaughey (1989, 7–8), the *patron state* stipulates that there should be, in the name of artistic freedom, an “arm’s length” between artistic activities and the state. The method of peer reviewing has been implemented by ministerial professional commissions for each of the artistic areas and three public agencies (for film, books, and amateur culture).

Nevertheless, neither elected politicians nor the cultural elite had the vision or the pragmatic knowledge to make a step forward and harmonize cultural policy with current European trends. When the cultural circles recognized that the democratic changes could mean, above all, less social security for them, the transition and related structural changes were side-tracked and the legislative procedures started to serve as an opportunity to preserve the status quo. Therefore, main concern of cultural policy, became how to protect existence of cultural circles and not how to democratize the cultural field. The survival of the concept of culture allowed the old model of a highly institutionalized cultural sector to continue to operate under the appreciated protectionist logic, reproducing relations that had been established in the previous era.⁷

Simultaneously, the NGOs, like in the Baltic states, successfully participated in different international programs but remained outside the regular funding at home. Two parallel systems had emerged, one intensively modernized via internationalization, capacity-building, and professionalization, and the other preserved within old operational patterns of

traditional bureaucracy and state paternalism. The model that was based on a binary choice between the public institutions and NGOs was not able to capture all of the cultural potentials and to integrate new generations of artists. As in other postsocialist countries, in the Baltic states and Slovenia, very large hopes were placed upon sponsorship. However, the first fascination with private investments in the 1990s has been followed by a bitter experience of unrealistic expectations.

Another common trait of the cultural policy of postsocialist societies during the first decade of the transition was a lack of any monitoring and analysis system or public discussions on the cultural policy issues. Since 1995, relatively vivid public discussions stemmed the need to publicly formulate new objectives for the cultural policy. Partly, these discussions were facilitated by the compilation of suggestions by the experts of the Council of Europe (CoE). “National Cultural Policy Reviews” (1998), written in the middle of the 1990s, by local experts and specialists appointed by the CoE, highlighted *the need for democratization in the cultural administration system in all three Baltic states*.

In Estonia, the open discussion was initiated and led by the Ministry of Culture and Education in 1996. The process ended with the adoption of the “Main Principles of Estonian Cultural Policy” in 1998. A major task of the cultural policy since then has been the preservation of the existing network of cultural institutions against budget cuts (Lagerspetz 2003). This is well exemplified by the declaration of the Minister of Culture Jaak Allik in 1995:

The network of state cultural institutions that Estonia has, is a legacy from the past is like Egyptian pyramids, which in its uniqueness requires preservation and therefore, the process of privatisation of cultural life had come to its end. (Allik 1995, 4)

This may be considered a cultural policy aimed at retaining the former models (Lagerspetz 2003). The era has been named as a period of the *elitist-preservationist cultural policy* in the historical periodization of Estonian cultural policy by Egge Kulbok (2008).

In Latvia, the first cultural policy document, “The Main Cultural Policy Proposals of Latvia” (1995), outlined the most important tasks

of the state cultural policy for the first ten years after regaining independence:

Not to interfere with the regulation of creative process, simultaneously ensuring favorable conditions and necessary resources for the development of cultural process and cultivation of creative initiative. (CoE-ERICarts 2013)

With the next document, “The Law on Cultural Institutions,” the new system of Latvian cultural institutions was regulated in 1998. The type of cultural institutions (state, local government, private), their legal status, commercial activities, and funding sources were defined in the document. In 2000, the Latvian National Programme “Culture,” a complex long-term strategic document for the period until 2010, was launched. The general cultural priorities defined in this document were:

provision of continuity of cultural process and encouragement of the development of new cultural processes in the future; improvement of the cultural administration system and infrastructure; decentralisation of the cultural administrative system; improvements in the cultural financing system and diversification of financial sources; promotion of accessibility and participation in cultural life; development and strengthening the role of cultural education. (Ibid.)

Baiba Tjarve (CoE-ERICarts 2013) argues that, in many points, the Programme “Culture” was appreciated as an ideal, yet it lacked linkage to the economic situation and legal procedures in the country, and it was not always harmonized with other normative acts (ibid.).

In 1990, the Lithuanian Cultural Congress also set the guidelines for national culture and formulated strategic aims for cultural life: creating a culture legislation system and defining the role and responsibility of the state, counties, and municipalities in the administration of culture. In 2001, after various heated public discussions since the middle of the 1990s, a long-term document, “The Principles for Lithuanian Cultural Policy,” was adopted. One of the important tasks outlined in the document was

decentralisation of the cultural administration and redistribution of financial and managerial responsibilities between different levels of government state, counties and municipalities. (CoE-ERICarts 2011)

A longer-term objective was

to move all territorially decentralised art and cultural institutions (cultural centres, public libraries, museums etc.) under the jurisdiction and financial control of the municipalities. (Ibid.)

Decentralization has been facilitated in Lithuania also by passing the Law on the Amendment of the Law on Local Self-Government (2000), which grants local governments the legal and administrative capacities to shape and implement the cultural policy in line with their communities' needs. In 2002, the "Cultural Development Programme of the Regions" was adopted by the government to form administrative, financial, legal, and information regulations (CoE-ERICarts 2013).

The main findings of the international experts who were appointed for the review of the Slovenian cultural policy were (Council of Europe 1998a, b, c):

1) the situation in the field of culture is at a stand-still; 2) the characteristic mentality of public institutions, bureaucrats and state artists has been preserved; 3) the Ministry is a fire brigade/crisis headquarters, whereas its technical service operates the machine for the distribution of funding.

In 1997, Minister Josef Školč (1998, 14) commented on the abovementioned findings: "Instead of democratizing the engine, the passengers were activated." When it became clear that local self-government meant a full discretion of local communities to maintain their cultural institutions, the influential cultural groups prevented decentralization of the funding of all larger municipal institutions (approximately 40), which created a controversy, as the state contributes more than 80% of the public funds for their operation while the communities preserve all founding rights (such as influence on the governance structure). And even when the first national strategy for culture was adopted in 2004, nothing fun-

damental happened, as this was a long text of more than 100 pages that encompassed more than 50 objectives without priorities. However, this “frozen situation” (Council of Europe 1998b, 358) preserves the relatively high cultural standards in Slovenia in spite of the fact that the arts and culture lost the central position they once had. In the absence of structural changes, all attention was turned to overregulation of the public sector and to complex administrative procedures for the allocation of public funds, which resulted in the “bureaucratic instrumentalization of culture,” as has been pointed out by Čopič (2014).

Thus, the prevailing similarities of the changes for the transitional decade 1991–2004 in the cultural policies were privatization of some previously state-run cultural institutions, cinemas, publishing houses, film and broadcasting, and so on, and the introduction of new legislation, while the attitude toward the decentralization differed. However, the clear trend of liberalization and decentralization of the cultural policy in the Baltic states during the first decade of independence resulted in a preservative reaction of cultural policy-makers at the end of the 1990s.

The Main Objectives of the Cultural Policies After Joining the EU

After 2004, when the countries joined the EU, the main elements of the cultural policy in the Baltic states and Slovenia were *the broader democratization*⁸ of the funding system and the aim to reduce the role of the state (strengthening the “arm’s length principle” institutions, giving more responsibilities to the municipalities in the cultural field, harmonization with the EU’s Sixth Directive on value added tax (VAT) for the cultural goods,⁹ and so on).

In order to analyze the main objectives of the cultural policy, the authors used strategic documents that have been accepted in the Baltic states and Slovenia after the countries joined the EU.¹⁰ Common keywords in these strategic documents that reflect the discourse of the EU (Programme Culture by the European Commission 2007–13) are as follows:

cultural access; diversity (creative diversity, cultural diversity); the economic value of culture (cultural industries, creative industries); strengthening of the arm's length principle; more decentralisation of decision-making and financing by different levels of government and arm's length principle institutions (programme in case of Lithuania); importance of supporting local cultural identities; cultural export; inter-sectoriality, modernisation of the public sector/new model (Slovenia).

As noted by Egge Kulbok-Lattik and Birgit Lüüs, (2013), even though almost identical to the European discourse, all the governments in the Baltic states emphasize the importance of *national identity* and the promotion of *one's national culture*, which explains the basis for the diversity in the EU. On the other hand, nationalist feelings had a strong popular base, which helped to legitimate the economic and social costs of the transformation as the price for autonomy from the Soviet Union. The connection between *national identity and liberal capitalism in the Baltic states* has been discussed by Bohle and Greskovits (2012), who claim that the idea of national independence was the main vehicle behind the neoliberal development setting in the Baltic countries. Common keywords stressing the importance of national culture and liberal market development in the Baltic states are expressed with *various forms of rhetoric*. For example, the Estonian Ministry of Culture's developmental plan for 2011–14 states the mission of the Ministry:

[T]o support the maintenance and sustainability of the Estonian *national cultural space*, which is said to be “a far larger concept than creative arts and folk culture only.”

The “Resolution of Seimas on the Guidelines of Changes of the Lithuanian Culture Policy” (2010) declares:

Globalization tendencies are directly related to the *creative industries and to the Lithuania's ability to compete in world markets*, to win this competition, to receive new investments in different areas of the creative industries.

In addition, the Latvian “National Culture Policy Guidelines” (2006–15, 25) emphasize the *importance of culture in the economy*:

Emphasis 3: Alongside knowledge the *creativity that is cultivated by culture and art is the main resource of the new economic growth*. The creative industries as a new sector of economy ensure the use of this recourse in the creation of goods and services with high added value.

According to Tjarve (2012, 6), in Latvia, supranational institutions have left a positive influence on cultural infrastructure, as significant investments from the EU Structural Funds have improved the public cultural network. The same tendency has been visible also in Estonia and Lithuania: national heritage boards, theaters, concert organizations, libraries, museums, public broadcastings, national operas, national libraries, orchestras, and so on.¹¹ Mostly, these institutions are connected with nation-building, such as national archives, and cultural heritage, such as national museums, but also fine arts institutions, such as national operas, theaters, and so on.

It appears that the Baltic states have completely accepted the European discourse and understanding of the objectives of the cultural policies, and have added their own strong view of national identity and national culture, and orientation of a liberal market economy. This is why it is difficult to tell the difference between the country-specific aims and the goals that the governments have in the field of cultural policy. It is clear that the application procedures and planning of the funding periods of the EU are also contributing to the homogenization of the understanding of the objectives of the cultural policy in all countries. Investments in infrastructure are seen to facilitate access, although this might not always be the case. As Anita Kangas et al. (2002, 375–90; 2010) have explained, in Finland in the 1990s, while making applications to EU programs, cultural institutions started to use the same rhetoric as the EU, and so it became difficult to see any difference between country-specific aims and the goals that the government has in the field of cultural policy. Similar standardization or homogenization in rhetoric happened in the Baltic states (Kulbok-Lattik and Lüüs 2013).

In Slovenia, the main characteristics of all three, so far adopted national programs for culture (2004–07, 2008–11, 2014–17) are the abundance of specific objectives (40 and more), the length of the document (100 pages and more), and the lack of priorities. In the introductory notes of the “National Programme for Culture 2008–2011,” it was explicitly stated that more radical changes

can be perceived as long-term and very important for the situation in Slovenian culture, but the question is if this requires and if it is possible to introduce a radical reform in cultural policy, which would in the next four years provide opportunities for top creativity.

In such a situation, all substantial changes were executed by general legislation: for local self-government, public finances, taxation, and public servants. The last are the most responsible for the frozen situation, as they reaffirmed the status quo by granting to all employed actors, musicians, custodians, and so on the status of public servants, with lifelong employment and administrative regulation of their payment and advancement.

The unstable political situation from 2010 onward and related frequent changes in the Minister of Culture made it impossible to adopt the national program for culture on time when the 2007–11 program expired. One illustrative comment was: “In spite of this political handicap the cultural sector did not stop to function normally” (Delo 2012).

A different phenomenon refers to the relationship of all four countries to the question of national minorities. After dissolution from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively, the historically motivated resentments resulted in the so-called stateless persons in Estonia and Latvia (Russians who were not granted citizenship) and “erased people” in Slovenia (around 20,000 peoples who were born in other parts of Yugoslavia and were deprived of permanent residency once they did not decide to apply for Slovenian citizenship). In Slovenia, the problem had been later settled by granting them a permanent residency, while the monetary compensation is on its way. A study for the European Commission (2008, 64) illustrates these feelings in relation with Latvia

toward the application of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The framework applies only to

citizens of Latvia who differ from Latvians in terms of their culture, religion or language, who have traditionally lived in Latvia for generations and consider themselves to belong to the State and society of Latvia, who wish to preserve and develop their culture, religion or language.

The same attitude is present in the Slovenian practice. Namely, although the cultural policy has paid special attention over all these years to the public funding of the cultural projects of the new minorities (8.1% of the whole population), there is a significant difference in comparison with two traditional minorities, the Italians and Hungarians, which enjoy substantive protection, including collective rights and their own parliamentary deputies.

Summarizing the Changes

To summarize, the prevailing similarities of the changes for the transitional decade 1991–2004 in the cultural policies were the privatization of some previously state-run cultural institutions, cinemas, publishing houses, film and broadcasting, and churches. Also, the decentralization of cultural processes (administrative as well as financial) and the introduction of new legislation belonged to this phase in the Baltic states and Slovenia, but very often, these changes were not supported by sufficient public funding. In all of these four states, under fertile conditions of open borders, new directions and forms of art, such as contemporary dance, theater, and visual arts, were able to emerge and spread as a result of newcomers' free initiatives and various festivals, as Kulbok (2008) notes, but remained outside regular public support, which created two parallel systems. The lack of structural changes in spite of the proliferation of the laws and strategic documents announcing democratization, decentralization, privatization, and other promising developments is in close relation with the fact that such new initiatives have been left without sufficient funds and supportive schemes to be really feasible. As a result, the new art

phenomena and liberalization trends of the cultural policy could not present a reliable alternative to the traditional institutionalized model. The clear trend of liberalization and decentralization of the cultural policy in the Baltic states during the first decade of independence resulted in a preservative reaction of cultural policy-makers at the end of 1990s. Partly, it was due to the weak cultural market and the undeveloped third sector, but the cultural market was weak also because of the radical economic change, which limited access to culture for many people.

In Slovenia, at the beginning of the 1990s, democratic expectations were great, but when artistic circles discovered that the weak cultural market and the underdeveloped free initiatives questioned their existence, their main concern became as to how to preserve the high level of social security and autonomy from the self-management period, which finally happened through the central system of public servants, the preservation of the separate legal status of cultural institutions, and the surrender of the sector to itself.

The main explanation for the opposition to the liberalization of the cultural policy of the Baltic states would be connected with the historical function of cultural institutions—originating from the nineteenth-century *nation-building*, they also played an ambivalent role during the hidden resistance against the Soviet Regime. Therefore, in the 1991–2004 period, cultural institutions in the Baltic states and Slovenia retained their primary function (as well as budget) to support national identity, which under the conditions of neoliberal rhetoric of politicians, globalization trends, and painful market forces became vulnerable. As Lagerspetz (1998, 55–59) has claimed, the most important priority of the transition period—to legitimize the new economy and the political institutions with the help of a new cultural (national) identity (which would be common for all members of the nation)—was not congruent with the deepening of cultural dispersion. The paradox became evident as a liberal and independent social system supported national identity less than covert resistance to a repressive regime or a self-management experiment. This is why the cultural policy in Estonia (and in the Baltic states and Slovenia) is strongly connected to the politics of identity, and a deeper involvement by the state is accepted by policy-makers even when surrounded by strong liberalization tendencies.

After joining the EU since 2004, the Baltic states, being the most liberal newcomers in the EU, have completely accepted the European discourse and understanding of the objectives of the European cultural policies. Although the liberal rhetoric has prevailed for the whole period of independency in the Baltic states, the preservation of large networks of cultural institutions, centralized cultural funding, and the aim of strengthening and constructing strong national identity show that, in reality, the liberal discourse might not be applied in the policy-making as it is reflected in the official documents. In Slovenia, the national cultural policy remained the main guarantee for the well-being of the cultural sector.

As Milena Dragičević-Šešić and Sanjin Dragojević (2005, 29) claim, culture lost the ideological position it once had to legitimize the socialist social order and became “a sector like any other,” which caused marginalization of culture in postsocialist countries. Due to the EU principle of subsidization, the arts and culture have also been left outside the modernization granted by harmonization with the EU to the other fields, such as agriculture. The conformist Western cultural policies with a double agenda, one following the culture and creative industries discourse, and the other maintaining a supply-driven cultural production led by national cultural institutions, have been successful until 2009, when the public funding began to decrease almost everywhere in the EU.

However, as seen from previous discussions, cultural policy as a phenomenon of modern state practices varies in accordance with the prevailing political system, but state-funded cultural institutions have kept their considerable role in the modernist project of national identity-building and civilizing aims as historical cornerstones of the politics of culture during every political regime in the Baltic states and Slovenia. The Eastern European historical experience within various political systems enables us to speak about the experience as multiple modernities, and it will be the task for further research to examine the connections between the institutions, nation-building, and liberal, as well as coordinated, capitalism.

Notes

1. As typically presented, modernization refers to socioeconomic (industrialization, urbanization), political (democratization and mass participation), and intellectual (secularization, rise of mass literacy) transformations that began in Western Europe by the late eighteenth century, although their roots include the cumulative impact of key elements in earlier centuries such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution (Raun 2009, 39). See also, Eisenstadt (2000), Giddens (1990), and Hoffmann (2003).
2. By 1940, when the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Soviet official culture had gone through different phases. The avant-garde and iconoclastic proletcult, with slogans of class fight and Cultural Revolution that aimed to destroy the traditional culture of tsarist Russia, was replaced by neoclassicism and socialist realism during the mid-1930s—the era of Stalinist rule. Socialist realism became the Stalinist canon of official culture. (See Hoffmann 2003; Slezkine 1994; Kulbok-Lattik 2014.)
3. With the exception of the cinema and publishing, where, already in the 1980s, the majority of income was earned on the market.
4. For example, a well-thought-out and effective system of preliminary censorship made the postpublishing censorship exceptional and mostly applied against the works printed abroad, especially those published in the mother tongue by Slovene anticommunist emigrants, as pointed out by Gabrič (2008, 230–31). The result was an atmosphere of self-control and a very small number of Slovenian political dissidents.
5. But the current financial crisis specifically revealed several structural weaknesses and imbalances related to productivity, competitiveness, and governance. Persistent macroeconomic imbalances in public finances (growth of the public debt from 47% to more than 80% of the gross domestic product) call for reconsidering not only public expenditure, labor relations and labor costs, state property, market regulation, and the business environment, but also the organization and management of public services provision in fields such as health, education, and culture.
6. In Estonia, the Cultural Endowment of Estonia Act was passed in the Parliament in 1994; in Latvia, the (re)establishment of the institution occurred in 1997; and Lithuania established a targeted program named

the Culture and Sport Support Foundation under the administration of the Ministry of Culture in 1998 (Lüüs 2012).

7. Such sectorial development has been backed up with general legal changes in the public sector since the central system of public servants was introduced in Slovenia in spite of the fact that, in the West, the traditional bureaucratic model was already in decline while trying to introduce more flexibility in working relations. Therefore, all musicians, actors, custodians, and the rest of the staff became public servants, with fixed salaries, rigid rules of advancement, and lifelong employment. Since all public institutions preserved the inherited separate legal status, they have been formally independent but highly regulated.
8. Decentralization in the Baltic states has been facilitated by delegating tasks from the central government to the municipalities. In all countries, the municipalities (in Latvia, since 2009, local governments aka counties) are responsible for the maintenance of large networks of cultural institutions (cultural centers, theaters, museums, etc.). This arrangement has also been problematic in times of financial crises (2008–10). When the budgets of the municipalities decreased, local governments reduced significantly the funding for the cultural field. This has also brought out by Baiba Tjarve that, in Latvia, in 2010, municipalities spent 37.4% less on culture, recreation, and religion than in 2008 (CoE-ERICarts 2013).
9. In Slovenia, the harmonization with the Sixth Directive of the EU on VAT was frustrating, as it required the taxation of books (although with the reduced tariff) and the regular level of VAT on audiovisual holders. It is still under permanent public debate, which insists on a zero rate tax for books in all forms.
10. Lithuania: *Guidelines for Alternation of the Lithuanian Cultural Policy* 2012; Latvia: *The Cultural Policy Guidelines “National State” (2006–2015)*; Estonia: <http://www.kultuuripoliitika.ee/>
11. In 2011, in Estonia, around 46% of the state cultural budget of €252 million consisted of expenses for professional theaters, museums, libraries, sports schools and centers, and state-run concert organizations. This share of the budget has somewhat increased in comparison with the corresponding figure of 39.7% in 2006 (CoE-ERICarts 2013). In Slovenia, according to the data acquired from the Ministry of Culture, the percentage of the national cultural budget for the public institutions has been increasing over the last three years, from 62% in 2011 to 67% in 2013, which already presents a serious threat for the sustainability of independent cultural production.

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Part 3

**International and Transnational
Art Worlds and Their Ways
of Operation**

8

Globalization and Musical Hierarchy in the United States, France, Germany, and the Netherlands

Vaughn Schmutz and Timothy J. Dowd

Introduction

Various scholars have described an array of social and cultural changes in Western societies that have contributed to the erosion of traditional cultural hierarchies. Some fear that the once-vaunted positions of the performing and visual arts, for example, are being undermined by commercialization—whereby crucial choices about the production and dissemination of works are increasingly informed by the economic bottom line rather than by aesthetic concerns (Alexander and Bowler 2014). Alongside the declining hierarchy and growing commercialization of the arts, some scholars point to the rapid expansion in the volume and variety of cultural goods in the global marketplace and the weakening of national boundaries and cultures, which, to an unprecedented extent, has

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destabilized and “de-territorialized” global cultural flows to an unprecedented extent (Appadurai 1996). Of course, the impact of the heightened pace and reach of globalization on cultural fields remains a topic of debate in the literature. Certain scholars take a more positive view when arguing that globalization serves to “relativize” national boundaries and strengthen a sense of belonging to a world society (Robertson 1992), while others take a more negative view when arguing that this international flow is better described as an asymmetrical imposition of cultural goods from the United States and other affluent countries on the non-Western world (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997; Hamm and Smandych 2005).

Yet, amid this vibrant debate, a growing body of comparative research shows significant cross-national variation in both the degree of change in cultural hierarchies and in the extent and impact of cultural globalization (Janssen et al. 2008; Lamont and Thévenot 2000). However, most studies focus on a single country or on a single point in time (Janssen and Peterson 2005), thereby making it difficult to examine the territorial and temporal aspects that lie at the core of the globalization debate. By focusing on changes in the musical field in four countries from 1955 to 2005, our aim is to build on cross-national comparative research that addresses how cultural hierarchies change over time and, in particular, to explore what relationship such changes have to the degree of international orientation to musical actors.

Music provides an interesting case by which to explore such changes because it has experienced considerable “de-hierarchization,” as indicated by the waning status of classical music relative to popular music (Schmutz et al. 2010). Using media coverage in elite newspapers in the four countries from 1955 to 2005 as an indicator, this chapter considers whether there is an increasingly global orientation toward musical “actors” (e.g., soloists, ensembles, composers) over time in the United States, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. If so, to what extent has this occurred, and how is such attention distributed temporally? Is there a greater attention toward “non-Western” countries in newspaper coverage of music, as suggested by deterritorialization? By exploring such questions, we aim to address the relationship between cultural classification systems and cultural globalization from the vantage of these nations, while taking into

account their respective relationships with music from other nations around the globe.

Much of the debate about the impact of globalization on cultural fields focuses solely on popular cultural forms (e.g., hit songs; Achterberg et al. 2011). We diverge by focusing simultaneously on forms of both high culture (e.g., classical music) and popular culture (e.g., rock music). This makes sense because the emergence of Western high culture and popular culture as salient distinctions went hand in hand (DiMaggio 1982, 1991). Hence, the creation of a field devoted solely to “transcendent” music of the past occurred alongside the creation of a large-scale field devoted to “faddish” music of the present, with the former emphasizing a “logic of consecration,” and the latter, a “logic of commodification” (Dowd 2011). Their connected trajectories continue in the present, including a “blurring” of their boundaries. For example, scholars have noted a shift toward consecration occurring in popular music—as when some (but not all) rock is celebrated as art (Schmutz 2005; Schmutz and Faupel 2010; Van Venrooij and Schmutz 2010)—and a shift toward commodification in classical music—as when orchestras perform music from Hollywood soundtracks (e.g., *Star Wars*) in an effort to offset shrinking audiences and declining funding (DiMaggio 1991; Dowd and Kelly 2012). Indeed, the “de-hierarchicalization” mentioned above deals squarely with the relative positioning of classical and popular music. Hence, we shall see below how both fare in the face of globalization.

Music and Globalization

Cultural Imperialism

Some view the global circulation of cultural objects (e.g., music) as fettered and homogenous rather than free flowing and diverse, with powerful nations shaping that circulation to their advantage to the detriment of local cultural autonomy. Ritzer (1994) sees globalization as a process that secures the dominance of imperialistic nations and firms through the spread of a culture lacking distinctive content. From a similar perspective,

globalization is referred to as cultural imperialism and seen as an invasion of local cultures by Western or American cultures (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997; Beck et al. 2003). A similar conceptualization argues that globalization has produced a “cultural world system” in which certain countries (e.g., the United States) dominate the production, distribution, and consumption of cultural products, and that English has become the dominant language in the system (de Swaan 1995, 2001). All these variants share an emphasis on what could be called the “hegemons”—those nations that dominate the global flow of cultural products such as music.

Two preconditions had to be met before hegemons could arise in what would be known as “classical music.” The first involved musical innovations: the notational system that allowed compositions to be specified with exacting precision—and, hence, allowed them to circulate easily beyond their initial time and place—and the mass production of instruments (especially the piano) capable of rendering those compositions. Max Weber (1958, 2005) famously located those developments in the West, noting that they made possible the rise of the individual composer, the virtuoso performer, and the large symphony orchestra. The second involved innovations among the audience. For centuries, European audiences were oriented toward music that was both functional and contemporary, as when wealthy patrons pressed their employed composers for new music to accompany social gatherings (Weber 1977, 1984). A decisive shift occurred in Vienna of the late 1700s and early 1800s: a key group of aristocrats developed a “serious music ideology” in which they went from being patrons who employed musicians to being listeners who valued complex music that demanded intense attention (DeNora 1991). In the process, they elevated such past composers as Haydn and Mozart and, especially, the still-living Beethoven, while pushing aside more “entertaining” work associated with Italian composers. That would begin a trend of European (e.g., Austro-Germanic) composers dominating the repertoires of many performance organizations for centuries to come, as well as dominating the emergent curriculum devoted to classical music (Murningham and Conlon 1991; Bevers 2005; Dowd and Kelly 2012). Indeed, in opera—which is tilted toward Italian composers, given its roots—Austro-Germanic composers still hold quite prominent positions (Martorella 1982; Santoro 2010; Kim and Jensen 2011).

The hegemonic position of European composers was made possible by the construction of an “infrastructure” that supports classical music. The rise of publishing industries, international copyright law, and the proliferation of performance venues all enabled music to move beyond the location of its initial creation, particularly that of such composers as Beethoven (Roy and Dowd 2010). This “serious music ideology” was eventually imported to the United States, where urban elites founded nonprofit organizations (e.g., the Boston Symphony Orchestra) that celebrated European classical music, with the help of immigrant musicians from Europe; where educators constructed a sprawling system of new academic disciplines, university music programs, and conservatories; and where foundations, corporations, and, eventually, the government funded the presentation of this music (DiMaggio 1982, 1991; Dowd et al. 2002; Olmstead 1999; Santoro 2010). Hence, the United States likewise arose as a hegemon in classical music—not because of its composers but because of the sheer expanse of its infrastructure.

Hypothesis 1a Media attention to classical music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to musical actors from Europe (musical hegemon) and the United States (infrastructural hegemon).

Although what would eventually be called “popular music” circulated by way of print publishing and performance venues, the rise of the modern mass media played major roles in terms of its global flows—particularly in the recording and radio industries. Indeed, large record companies of the early 1900s (based in the United States and the United Kingdom) were among the first wave of multinational corporations to dominate the global economy (Chandler 1994). In terms of infrastructure, the United States rose to global prominence, given both the reach and power of its major recording companies, and the sheer volume of recording companies of all sizes. However, due to patterns of merger and acquisitions, the major recording companies would be headquartered not only in the United States but also, at various times, in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Hence, the infrastructural hegemon would be spread out among the world’s most affluent

nations (Negus 1999; Dowd 2004; Hitters and van de Kamp 2010; Marshall 2013).

If the infrastructural hegemon of popular music are scattered among various nations, certain scholars emphasize that its musical hegemon are the United States and the United Kingdom (Negus 1996). Even scholars not subscribing to the imperialism argument have documented the post–World War II spread of Anglo-American music/recordings across Asia, Central and South America, Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet bloc (e.g., Ryback 1990; Condry 2006; Kahn-Harris 2007; Achterberg et al. 2011; Regev 2013). Not only did Elvis and the Beatles diffuse across borders and continents, so too did emergent genres such as rock, metal, and hip-hop. According to some, this diffusion occurred at the expense of domestic music in those places (Banks 1997).

Hypothesis 1b Greater media attention to popular music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to musical actors from the affluent countries, where the major recording firms are headquartered (infrastructural hegemon) and the United States and the United Kingdom (musical hegemon).

De Swaan (1995, 2001) emphasizes the hegemonic position of the English language in the cultural world system. Given the dominance of European composers, as well as the receptivity of audiences and musicians to opera performed in a language different than their own (Atkinson 2006; Benzecry 2011), we wonder about the extent to which that hypothesis holds for classical music. Indeed, the hypothesis seems more apt for popular music, given previous research: some point to the tendency for global media firms to focus on musicians from English-speaking countries (Negus 1996) or for radio stations in places such as Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands to feature popular music in English (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994; Achterberg et al. 2011). Even “world music” has been argued to primarily benefit musicians and firms in core countries—such as those “Celtic” musicians performing in English (Taylor 1997; Théberge 2003). From this view, rather than promoting a general openness to foreign musical actors, greater attention to popular music is likely associated with an increased focus on those from English-speaking countries.

Hypothesis 2a Greater media attention to classical music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to musical actors from English-speaking countries.

Hypothesis 2b Greater media attention to popular music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to musical actors from English-speaking countries.

Cultural Imperialism Reconsidered

Many scholars counter the notion of cultural imperialism on a variety of grounds. Tomlinson (1991) argues that global cultural flows, since the 1960s, generate cultural insecurities in all nations, producing countervailing trends toward localization in countries at all levels of development. Thus, countries are often selective in the degree to which they engage with globalization and foreign culture (Robertson 1992). In addition, reception studies indicate that responses to global cultural products are highly varied (Crane 2002), and that they can even be altered and appropriated for use in the construction of local musical fields. This has been occurring for some time in classical music. For example, the founding of the Paris Opera under Louis XIV (1638–1715) was as much about building a national tradition to challenge the prominence of Italian opera as it was about the music itself (Johnson 2006). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, classical music became an important element of national culture and of national identity (Bohlman 2004; Curtis 2008; see also Kelly 2008; Hart 2008). Even some in the United States pushed for a distinctly American classical music tradition in the face of Austro-Germanic dominance of repertoires (Tischler 1986; Cameron 1996). The push toward the construction of local fields is likewise evident in popular music. In the wake of American and European popular music flowing into their respective countries, actors in Italy developed a new genre known as *canzone d'autore*, while those in Israel developed such national genres as *musica mizrahit* (Santoro 2002; Regev and Seroussi 2004). Not surprisingly, Yoffe and Collins (2005) argue that popular music has joined classical music as a catalyst in the development and revitalization of nationalism.

Cultural policy also influences the degree to which countries are internationally oriented (Crane 2002). Whereas the United States tends to favor the free trade of cultural imports, France and the Netherlands set cultural policy at the national level and take steps to protect domestic cultural industries, though France has more extensively pursued this “cultural exception” (Crane and Janssen 2008), while the Netherlands is generally more open to foreign cultural products. German cultural policy is set at a more local level than in France, but educational curricula emphasize national culture and classical music in both countries relative to the Netherlands’ greater emphasis on popular and foreign music (Bever 2005). While the United States and European countries differ in cultural policy, they all provide support for national cultural institutions, including orchestras and groups that perform classical music. Such tendencies in cultural policy and curricula are also evident in the popular music field. In France, 40% of radio programming must feature Francophone songs (Hare 2003), while the Dutch government has offered substantial support to its popular musicians since the 1970s (Rutten 1993). German policy gives less attention to popular music, but reinforces national identity through extensive support for classical music, a field in which it holds a more central position (Applegate and Potter 2002). Thus, the globalization of both classical and popular music may contribute to an emphasis on one’s own national musical fields and actors.

Hypothesis 3a Media attention to classical music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to domestic musical actors.

Hypothesis 3b Media attention to popular music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to domestic musical actors.

Contrary to cultural imperialism, some also argue that globalization “relativizes” national boundaries and strengthens a sense of belonging to a world society (Robertson 1992). In the process, the boundaries between “local” and “global” cultures become less potent, and the interplay between the two produces syncretic tendencies referred to as *hybridization* (Appadurai 1996), *glocalization* (Robertson 1992), or *creolization* (Hannerz 1992), to name a few. From this perspective, global cultural

products take on new forms and meanings as they interact with local cultural styles. In the case of music, such tendencies are thought to increase musical diversity, as new musical genres and styles emerge from the interaction of disparate musical traditions (Regev 1997; Mitchell 2001). This push toward hybridization has a long tradition in classical music—such as when Claude Debussy drew upon the Gamelan music of Indonesia, when composers on both sides of the Atlantic drew upon jazz (e.g., Darius Milhaud, Aaron Copland), and, more recently, when the so-called “Minimalists” (e.g., John Adams, Steve Reich) have drawn upon aspects of African and Indian music (Potter 2000; Burkholder et al. 2014). That turn to “foreign” sources is likely amplified by infra-structural concerns in classical music: as the performances of ensembles grew and grew, so too did their attention to music beyond the usual European core, and as academic study of music became more established, so too did its attention to non-Western music (Dowd et al. 2002; Dowd 2011; Dowd and Kelly 2012). Thus, it may be that attention to classical music in the United States, France, Germany, and the Netherlands has included more foreign musical actors outside of the United States and Europe over time.

Hypothesis 4a Greater media attention to classical music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to musical actors of foreign origin.

Similarly, the “ethnicization” of mainstream popular music creates an assortment of styles and generates new networks of production and distribution that challenge historically privileged actors (Guilbault 2006). Such a perspective resonates with musicologists, who describe a “post-national” turn in musical identities and in the marketing practices of recording firms (Corona and Madrid 2008). Thus, even as globalization tends toward the creation and adoption of “standardized models,” it also centers on the cultural distinctiveness of individual and national identity, which typically directs attention to aspects of expressive culture and cultural heritage (Meyer 2000). In the aftermath of the global proliferation of Anglo-American “pop-rock,” for example, actors in numerous nations devised their own idiosyncratic versions of this genre, a response mirrored

years later as the global diffusion of rap music prompted locally based permutations in such places as Germany, Greece, and Japan (Bennett 1999; Condry 2006; Elafros 2013; Regev 2013). Hence, a shift in attention toward popular genres may be accompanied by a shift away from traditional hierarchies rooted in national culture and a greater openness to musical actors from foreign countries.

Hypothesis 4b Greater media attention to popular music, over time and across countries, is associated with greater attention to musical actors of foreign origin.

Data and Methods

Media attention to music was measured through content analysis of newspapers in the United States, France, Germany, and the Netherlands in four sample years: 1955, 1975, 1995, and 2005. Newspaper coverage provides an appealing basis for obtaining comparative information about musical classification systems and the legitimating ideology that sustains them (Peterson 2005). Two newspapers were selected from each country, all of which were widely circulated at a national or supraregional level and were in print from 1955 to 2005. While all articles related to many forms of art and culture were coded, this chapter is based on the 3766 articles about music for which the nationality of the primary actor could be determined. With a team of coders, each article was measured in square centimeters (cm²), which is the primary indicator of newspaper space used in this chapter. The music articles were also coded as being either about classical or popular music and were classified into a variety of sub-genres (see Appendix 1 for details about newspapers sampled and categories of classical and popular music). Table 8.1 displays the number of classical and popular music articles by country and year, the mean size of the articles (in cm²), as well as the overall proportion of newspaper space occupied by classical versus popular music.

In assessing hypotheses regarding the prevalence of attention to European musical “actors” (e.g., ensembles, bands, composers), we

Table 8.1 Number of articles, size, and total distribution of classical and popular music space, by country and year

Year		1955	1975	1995	2005
USA	Classical music articles	377	209	147	120
	Average article size (cm ²)	75.3	113.0	248.6	367.4
	Total percentage of music space	87.6	53.2	37.0	37.2
	Popular music articles	83	144	290	255
	Average article size (cm ²)	48.5	144.1	215.1	292.0
	Total percentage of music space	12.4	46.8	63.0	62.8
FRA	Classical music articles	47	78	109	89
	Average article size (cm ²)	85.9	112.3	127.6	201.6
	Total percentage of music space	61.9	76.6	38.3	47.2
	Popular music articles	27	21	189	113
	Average article size (cm ²)	91.9	127.2	118.4	177.5
	Total percentage of music space	38.1	23.4	61.7	52.8
GER	Classical music articles	64	92	115	135
	Average article size (cm ²)	124.5	215.6	265.7	311.9
	Total percentage of music space	91.3	86.3	67.8	61.3
	Popular music articles	7	19	77	96
	Average article size (cm ²)	107.8	165.5	188.5	277.4
	Total percentage of music space	8.7	13.7	32.2	38.7
NL	Classical music articles	108	122	98	117
	Average article size (cm ²)	96.9	216.1	233.7	221.4
	Total percentage of music space	89.9	79.4	38.2	33.6
	Popular music articles	10	49	143	216
	Average article size (cm ²)	117.6	139.2	259.2	236.5
	Total percentage of music space	10.1	20.6	61.8	66.4

collapse the 35 categories used to code actors from Europe. Likewise, when considering the prevalence of music from English-speaking countries, we include England, Scotland/Wales/Northern Ireland, Ireland, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For the hypothesis regarding the prevalence of musical actors from affluent countries, we use membership in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a proxy for affluence. In terms of OECD countries, we include the 24 countries that joined before 1975. For the sake of analysis, we calculated a *domestic ratio* for each country by dividing the total space devoted to music featuring a domestic musical actor by the total music space featuring a foreign musical actor. Thus, a higher domestic ratio signifies greater attention to domestic musical actors.

Results

Classical Music

As reported in Table 8.1, there has been a general decline since 1955 in the amount of newspaper space devoted to classical music relative to popular music, though the timing and extent vary by country. France is least focused on classical music in its coverage in 1955 (62.1%), but increases its attention in 1975 (to 76.6%), nearly putting it on par with the Netherlands and Germany, while the United States makes the most pronounced move away from classical music (87.6% to 53.2%). By 1995, the United States, France, and the Netherlands all give less space to classical music than to popular music, while Germany continues to devote most of its newspaper space to classical music (67.8%). In 2005, the German newspapers give only slightly less attention to classical music relative to 1995 (61.3%), the United States and Dutch newspapers stay fairly stable (37.2% and 33.6%), and the French newspapers increase their attention to classical music (47.2%).

In terms of how such trends in classical music coverage relate to the international orientation of the coverage, it appears that classical music coverage remains relatively stable in its attention to foreign actors amid globalization and declining attention to classical music. Table 8.2 reports domestic ratios for both classical and popular music in each country by year. In contrast to popular music, domestic ratios for classical music are quite consistent—between 1.2–2.2 in the United States, 0.7–1.1 in France, 0.7–1.2 in Germany, and 0.8–1.4 in the Netherlands.

In 1955, the country that gives the most attention to classical music (Germany) and the country that gives the most attention to popular music (France) have the same domestic ratio (0.7)—lower than in the United States and the Netherlands. By contrast, when the United States gives the least attention to classical music in 1975, it has the highest domestic ratio in its classical coverage (2.2). In fact, even with slight declines over the last three reference years, the United States is the most focused on domestic classical music actors among the four countries in every year. The domestic ratio in France rises and falls, along with its

Table 8.2 Domestic ratios for classical and popular music coverage, by country and year

	Year	1955	1975	1995	2005
USA	Classical music	1.7	2.2	1.7	1.2
	Popular music	17.5	1.5	5.5	3.9
FRA	Classical music	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.9
	Popular music	2.1	3.7	0.5	1.0
GER	Classical music	0.7	0.7	1.2	1.2
	Popular music	1.7	0.7	0.4	0.4
NL	Classical music	1.4	0.8	0.9	0.8
	Popular music	4.9	0.8	0.3	0.6

Domestic ratios are calculated by dividing the total space devoted to domestic musical actors by the total space devoted to foreign musical actors. Thus, a higher domestic ratio indicates a stronger focus on domestic music

amount of attention to classical music, but only slightly. Classical music coverage in Germany becomes slightly more focused on domestic musical actors in the later years (1995 and 2005) relative to the earlier years (1955 and 1975). Finally, Dutch newspaper coverage becomes somewhat less focused on domestic musical actors from 1955 to 1975, but then is stable after that point. Thus, there is no systematic increase in attention to domestic musical actors in classical music coverage, contrary to Hypothesis 3a, except in the case of Germany.

Table 8.3 provides additional insight by showing the number of different countries represented and how many different countries are represented per 1000 cm² of newspaper space. In the United States, the number of different countries represented in classical music coverage declines over time. While this would be expected due to the general decline in attention to classical music in the US newspapers, the number of countries per 1000 cm² of newspaper space declines as well. Thus, the slight decline in attention to domestic actors in the United States is concentrated in a smaller number of countries over time. In France, the total number of countries appears to increase slightly, but when controlling for the amount of space, it gradually declines as well. This suggests that, though attention to domestic musical actors remains fairly stable in France, its classical coverage also becomes focused on fewer countries. The same holds true for Germany—the number of countries increases slightly over time, but the number of countries per 1000 cm² of newspaper

Table 8.3 Number of countries receiving newspaper coverage in classical and popular music, by country and year

		Year	1955	1975	1995	2005
USA	Classical music	Total number of countries	30	24	25	21
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.5
	Popular music	Total number of countries	9	14	19	27
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	2.2	0.7	0.3	0.4
FRA	Classical music	Total number of countries	17	16	23	23
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	4.2	1.8	1.7	1.3
	Popular music	Total number of countries	2	6	28	23
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	0.8	2.2	1.3	1.1
GER	Classical music	Total number of countries	13	19	22	22
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	1.6	1.0	0.7	0.5
	Popular music	Total number of countries	4	6	13	14
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	5.3	1.9	0.9	0.5
NL	Classical music	Total number of countries	14	22	17	22
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	1.3	0.8	0.7	0.8
	Popular music	Total number of countries	3	6	18	30
		^a Per 1000 cm ²	2.6	0.9	0.5	0.6

^aPer 1000 cm² refers to the number of different countries covered per 1000 cm² of newspaper space

space gradually declines. The Netherlands does not follow a similar pattern, but the number of countries per 1000 cm² of newspaper space remains the same from 1975 to 2005. Overall, this does not suggest a steadily growing international orientation in classical music coverage, contrary to Hypothesis 4a.

Table 8.4 provides information about the amount of classical music space devoted to domestic, US, and European musical actors. The overall picture is again one of relative stability, as the vast majority of attention to classical music centers on musical actors from the United States and Europe. In only 2 out of 16 cases does the percentage of space devoted to US and European actors fall below 90% (France in 1975 and 1995); the highest concentration occurs in the Netherlands in 1995 (98.8%). In the European countries, classical music actors from the United States never attract more than one-tenth of the newspaper space, which suggests that Europe's musical hegemony in the classical music field is more decisive than the infrastructural hegemony of the United States. Likewise, there is no systematic change in attention to classical music actors from English-speaking countries (Hypothesis 2a)—except perhaps in Germany, where

Table 8.4 Distribution of classical music space among various foreign and domestic actors, by country and year

Year		1955 (%)	1975 (%)	1995 (%)	2005 (%)
USA	USA	63.2	68.5	62.6	55.5
	Europe	35.0	26.8	33.0	38.8
	Non-US, non-European	1.8	4.7	4.4	5.7
	English-speaking	68.8	70.5	68.6	62.0
	OECD country	88.5	82.2	81.2	87.0
FRA	USA	6.6	0.3	9.4	2.4
	Europe	84.3	85.0	80.2	89.7
	<i>France</i>	41.6	52.7	42.1	46.1
	Non-US, non-European	9.1	14.7	10.3	7.9
	English-speaking	6.6	4.1	20.1	4.2
GER	OECD country	81.3	73.6	82.2	79.7
	USA	3.7	6.8	6.0	9.6
	Europe	96.1	83.6	88.7	83.5
	<i>Germany</i>	41.1	39.8	53.8	54.3
	Non-US, non-European	3.5	9.6	5.3	6.9
NL	English-speaking	3.4	8.7	16.5	15.6
	OECD country	90.1	84.2	89.0	91.6
	USA	6.1	4.6	4.0	3.3
	Europe	92.4	92.3	94.8	93.7
	<i>Netherlands</i>	58.4	44.5	48.4	43.4
	Non-US, non-European	1.5	3.1	1.2	3.0
	English-speaking	8.1	10.0	6.5	6.1
	OECD country	92.4	80.9	83.5	83.0

such actors attract more attention in the later years (1995 and 2005) than in the earlier years (1955 and 1975). Although the amount of attention to musical actors outside of the United States and Europe is generally higher in later reference years relative to 1955, it reaches modest peaks in France, Germany, and the Netherlands in 1975, and declines somewhat thereafter. France and Germany give more attention to classical music actors outside the United States and Europe relative to the United States and the Netherlands.

In sum, there appears to be considerable support for Hypothesis 1a, particularly in terms of European centrality to the classical music field. Even amid cultural globalization and declining cultural hierarchies in the four countries, classical music coverage has remained highly consistent in its focus on European musical actors and, to a lesser extent, on those from the United States. With the exception of Germany, there is no

systematic shift in attention to actors from English-speaking countries, so support for Hypothesis 2a is limited. Likewise, there *is* no general support for increased attention to domestic actors in the face of globalization, as Hypothesis 3a predicted. The United States, France, and the Netherlands remain relatively stable or even decline in their attention to domestic actors, but this tends to primarily boost attention to other actors in Europe. Furthermore, this tends to become concentrated among fewer countries over time, when controlling for total newspaper space (cm²). Germany is the only exception here, as it gives more space to German actors in 1995 and 2005 relative to 1955 and 1975, implying modest support for Hypothesis 3a. Finally, there is some indication of an increase in attention to classical music actors outside of the United States and Europe, as Hypothesis 4a predicts. However, the biggest jump in such attention occurs from 1955 to 1975, then levels off or declines thereafter, which is inconsistent with the late-twentieth-century erosion of cultural hierarchies and national boundaries. Thus, support for Hypothesis 4a is minimal.

Popular Music

In contrast to classical music coverage, the international orientation of popular music coverage appears to fluctuate much more over time and vary cross-nationally to a greater extent (see Table 8.2). In 1955, all countries focus most popular music coverage on domestic actors, and to a much larger degree compared with classical music. The United States and France remain more focused on domestic actors in popular music relative to foreign actors and in comparison with classical music coverage. By contrast, Germany and the Netherlands give more attention to foreign popular music actors than to domestic actors in all years after 1955. Likewise, the country is less focused on domestic actors in popular music relative to classical music after 1975. As in classical music, the United States exceeds other countries in its attention to domestic popular music actors in all years (except for France in 1975). After a steep decline between 1955 and 1975, the United States devotes 5.5 and 3.9 times as much space to domestic actors relative to foreign ones in 1995 and 2005, respectively.

As Table 8.3 shows, popular music coverage has enlarged the range of countries receiving newspaper coverage to a greater degree over time than has classical music coverage, although to differing degrees across countries. The growing number of countries receiving attention does not typically keep pace with the expanding space devoted to popular music. For example, although the United States goes from covering popular music actors in 19 countries in 1995 to actors in 27 countries in 2005, there is only a slight increase in countries per 1000 cm² (0.3–0.4). For all countries but France, which peaks in 1975, the ratio of countries to cm² of newspaper space peaks in 1955. In general, this does not suggest a growing international orientation toward popular music.

Table 8.5 offers mixed support for the prediction that popular music coverage is associated with more attention to actors from the United

Table 8.5 Distribution of popular music space among various foreign and domestic actors, by country and year

Year		1955	1975	1995	2005
USA	USA	94.6	60.2	84.6	79.5
	UK	0.0	27.3	4.4	3.3
	Europe	3.8	29.4	6.3	7.9
	Non-US, non-European	1.6	10.4	9.0	12.6
	English-speaking	94.8	96.8	90.2	88.0
	OECD country	98.7	98.9	91.4	91.8
FRA	USA/UK	32.4	10.7	39.0	28.5
	Europe	67.6	91.2	64.8	63.0
	<i>France</i>	67.6	78.9	33.3	49.3
	Non-US, non-European	0	1.4	20.7	16.6
	English-speaking	32.4	12.8	44.2	33.3
	OECD country	100	98.6	84.5	88.2
GER	USA/UK	4.3	35.1	51.0	53.2
	Europe	86.9	57.9	41.6	65.8
	<i>Germany</i>	63.3	39.8	27.9	26.9
	Non-US, non-European	8.8	9.0	11.0	6.0
	English-speaking	4.3	35.1	52.6	62.9
	OECD country	91.2	91.0	90.6	95.8
NL	USA/UK	0	51.7	60.8	43.0
	Europe	100	55.0	56.0	54.1
	<i>Netherlands</i>	83.2	45.4	24.9	37.6
	Non-US, non-European	0	2.6	3.5	10.5
	English-speaking	0	51.7	61.4	46.1

States and the United Kingdom (the popular music hegemons in Hypothesis 1b). To begin with, the United States actually experiences a sharp decline in attention to popular music actors from the United States from 1955 to 1975 (94.6% to 60.2%), but most of that attention shifts to musical actors from the United Kingdom; space to actors from the United States then rises in 1995, but does not return to the same level as in 1955. Meanwhile, France initially gives more attention to popular music actors from the United States and the United Kingdom than the other European countries, but then sharply reduces its attention to American or British actors in 1975. Although French attention to actors in the United States and the United Kingdom rises thereafter (driven mostly by attention to British musical actors), it never again matches its European counterparts. Indeed, after giving virtually no attention to American or British popular music in 1955, Germany and the Netherlands give 35.1% and 51.7% of their popular music space to American and British actors in 1975, respectively (predominantly to American musical actors). In Germany, attention to actors from the United States and the United Kingdom rises to 51.0% in 1995 and remains high (53.2%) in 2005. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, newspaper space for American and British actors increases to over 60% in 1995, before declining to 43.0% in 2005. Overall, there is considerable support for the idea that popular music coverage is associated with increasing attention to musical actors in Germany and the Netherlands, consistent with Hypothesis 1b. By comparison, France draws the strongest boundary against popular music actors from the United States and the United Kingdom (especially the United States) from 1975 to 2005, after being the most open to American popular music in 1955. Likewise, US newspapers give somewhat less attention to domestic and British actors relative to 1955, though it remains quite high throughout the time period.

France's apparent move away from American actors, however, does not seem to equate to a wholesale rejection of popular music in English. Although attention to actors from the United States and other English-speaking countries is minimal in 1975, the amount of space devoted to the latter increases substantially in 1995. Although American actors make up a bigger share of the space given to actors from English-speaking countries in 2005, there is still considerable space given to other

Anglophone, especially British, popular musical actors. By comparison, German newspapers steadily increase the amount of attention they give to popular music actors from English-speaking countries in every reference year and reach 62.9% by 2005. Thus, even as attention to American and British actors remains stable in Germany, additional space is devoted to actors from other English-speaking countries. Likewise, attention to English-speaking actors comprises more than half of Dutch popular music coverage in 1975 and rises to 61.4% in 1995, before slightly declining to 46.1% in 2005. By contrast, the United States does not show nearly as much openness to foreign-language popular music, with almost all space devoted to actors from English-speaking countries. Thus, there is fairly strong support for Hypothesis 2b, in that nearly all popular music space in the United States, a little more or less than half of the space in Germany and the Netherlands, and one-third of the space in France is devoted to actors from English-speaking countries in 1995 and 2005. Hypothesis 1b also predicts that popular music coverage will become increasingly dominated by the infrastructural hegemon, which are the affluent countries where the production and consumption of popular music are centered. In general, Table 8.5 shows that popular music actors from OECD countries do, in fact, dominate popular music coverage in the four countries. However, the prevalence of OECD actors actually declines somewhat over time, though it increases modestly in France and Germany between 1995 and 2005. Germany peaks in its attention to actors from OECD countries in 2005 at 95.8%, which is higher than any other country in that year. Thus, the general trend is toward a modest increase in attention to actors from non-OECD countries, though Germany provides some minimal support for the infrastructural hegemony of affluent countries, as predicted in Hypothesis 1b.

Taken together, there is little support for the notion that popular music coverage becomes more associated with domestic musical actors, except perhaps in the United States. The three European countries all generally reduce their attention to domestic popular music actors over time, which is contrary to Hypothesis 3b. Thus, there is more support for Hypothesis 4b among the European countries, which predicts that popular music is associated with greater attention to foreign actors over time, and a modest but growing share of that international attention is given to actors

from outside of the United States and Europe. This is particularly the case when compared with classical music coverage, which remains much more domestically oriented and relatively more stable over time. By contrast, the United States sees fluctuations in its attention to domestic actors in popular music, but remains much higher in its domestic ratios relative to the European countries (except in 1975). Thus, there is some support for Hypothesis 3b in the United States, particularly compared with classical music coverage in the American newspapers, which is less domestically oriented and becomes gradually less so over time.

Discussion

In an era of globalization, coverage of classical music in the elite newspapers of four nations remained surprisingly resilient to change. In general, the classical music field has remained highly focused on musical actors in Europe—or the United States and Europe in American newspapers—even amid a modest shift to foreign musical actors in the United States, France, and the Netherlands. Thus, any decline in attention to domestic classical music actors is likely to accrue to European musical actors. This is consistent with the view that performed music tends to focus on classical forms (Zolberg 1980) and with the tendency for symphony orchestras to play the canonical works of a relatively small number of composers (Dowd et al. 2002). Likewise, the finding suggests that the classical music field and its culture are institutionalized to an extent that promotes considerable stability even in the face of external shocks. Germany is the only country where there was a general shift toward more attention to domestic actors in its classical music coverage, which may be partially explained by Germany's consistently central position in the field (Applegate and Potter 2002).

As a result of the relatively stable focus on European actors in classical music coverage, attention to classical music actors outside of the United States and Europe remains highly limited, even during a period associated with heightened globalization and a decline in the cultural status of the field. Somewhat unexpectedly, France and Germany give more atten-

tion to such actors, though it remains slight. American newspapers also increase their attention to classical music actors from outside the United States and Europe, but it is even more minimal than in France and Germany. On the one hand, this may indicate a slightly greater openness to foreign music and culture than we might expect from France and Germany (see Bevers 2005), but it may be better understood as a by-product of the global diffusion of European classical music to other parts of the world. For instance, several Asian countries were only just beginning to establish orchestras at the beginning of the time period studied (mid-1950s), but, more recently, Asian musicians, as well as European and American musicians of Asian descent (e.g., Vanessa-Mae, Yo-Yo Ma), have found widespread acclaim and fame in the United States, Europe, and Asia (Yang 2007). Consistent with such an interpretation, newspaper coverage of classical music shows that actors from China, Japan, and Korea began to attract attention from all four countries in the later time periods (1995 and 2005).

By contrast, the popular music field appears to be in much greater flux since 1955. One consequence of the rapidly increasing attention to popular music in newspapers is an increasing focus on actors from the United States. For both classical music and popular music, the United States is the least internationally oriented in its newspaper coverage, which is consistent with findings from other cultural fields (Crane and Janssen 2008). Germany and the Netherlands greatly increase their attention to popular music from the United States and the United Kingdom, which seems consistent with a “cultural world system” argument and the centrality of the United States and the United Kingdom in the popular music field. France, on the other hand, drastically reduces its attention to American and British actors in 1975; although the attention gradually increases thereafter, it does not reach the same level as the other two European countries. One likely explanation for this difference is the cultural policy approach in France, particularly quotas on foreign cultural products and limits on radio airplay for non-Francophone popular music (Hare 2003). Another contributing factor to the apparent differences among the three European countries in their openness to American and British musical actors may be the types of popular music that receive the most attention

in the three European countries. In particular, rock music is one of the top-two popular genres in terms of newspaper space in Germany and the Netherlands from 1975 on, while rock does not receive much attention in French newspapers until 1995 and still receives relatively less attention in 2005 (Schmutz et al. 2010). Thus, the French case could represent a response against the United States and the United Kingdom, a response against rock music, or some of both. In any case, this suggests that arguments about American and British dominance of popular music should take into account the role of cultural policy, as well as the contingent character of the two countries' presumed position in the field, which may not extend to all popular genres.

Another factor that complicates the picture is that France, which is least open to musical actors from the United States, increases its attention to actors from the United Kingdom and other English-speaking countries. Likewise, although Germany slightly declines in its coverage of American musical actors in 2005, it continues to devote more space to those from the United Kingdom and other Anglophone countries. This lends a somewhat stronger support for the claim that the largest media conglomerates tend to focus on English-language popular music at the expense of musicians who do not perform in English (Negus 1996). Taken together with the consistent dominance of actors from affluent OECD countries in newspaper coverage of popular music, it would seem that global popular music flows are more decentralized than cultural imperialism or the Americanization thesis typically implies, with multiple sites of musical production around the world being concentrated in the wealthy countries where large recording firms operate. As a consequence, in all countries, except the United States, there is a general decline in attention to domestic musical actors and a corresponding increase in attention to foreign musical actors. From 1975 on, the three European countries give more newspaper space to foreign popular musical actors than to domestic musical actors. However, the range of countries included does not keep pace with the increase in newspaper space devoted to popular music, so the attention to foreign musical actors remains heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, almost all of which are affluent OECD

countries, especially the United States and other Anglophone countries. This somewhat complicates the claims of media scholars who argue that music is an easily transportable medium due to its lesser reliance on language.

At the same time, however, there are some modest increases in attention to popular musical actors from outside of the United States and Europe, as well as from non-OECD countries. Rather, the fluctuations in the extent of international orientation and the shifting focus of attention evident in newspaper coverage of popular music appear to be consistent with a view of globalization as a largely disorganized process that generates unpredictable outcomes (Tomlinson 1991; Robertson 1992). Nonetheless, a focus on newspaper coverage also gives a picture of the global field of popular music as one that remains centered in affluent countries—especially the United States and other English-speaking countries—but that also features considerable “reversed cultural flow,” which appears to be gaining strength, albeit slowly. Thus, the findings pose a challenge to claims of Americanization and cultural imperialism in the popular music field, while also calling into question the most optimistic claims that “globally successful sounds may now come from anywhere” (Frith 2000, 213). Relative to the perpetual focus on the European centers of classical music in newspaper coverage, however, popular music coverage exhibits more potential for shifting attention to musical actors outside of the typical centers of the cultural world system.

Our findings also highlight the complex relationship between domestic and transnational fields of music, as well as the role of media attention in processes of cultural globalization. For example, modest increases in the international orientation of popular music coverage in the most recent decades of our study (i.e., 1995–2005) occurred even as major multinational recording firms were shifting to decentralized production (Dowd 2004), including an enhanced focus on building a national repertoire to compete with local independent labels (Hitters and van de Kamp 2010). Simultaneously, many independent labels responded by looking for more opportunities in the international market, which sometimes included distribution agreements with multinational firms (Huygens et al. 2001). Thus, localizing majors and internationalizing

independents blur national and transnational fields of music and complicate global musical flows. Although local music has gained popularity in some countries since the 1990s (Achterberg et al. 2011), we find a slowly growing international orientation in newspaper coverage of popular music during this time period. Overall, this suggests the need for a multidimensional approach to understanding global musical flows and changing hierarchies that accounts for the role of music critics and media outlets in such processes.

Appendix 1: Additional Information About Coding of Newspaper Articles

Newspapers sampled

France: *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*

Germany: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Suddeutsche Zeitung*

Netherlands: *NRC Handelsblad*, *de Volkskrant*

United States: *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*

Genre codes for classical and popular music

Main genre

Subgenre

Classical music

Solo performer

Instrumental—solo

Instrumental with orchestra or ensemble

Vocal—solo

Vocal with orchestra or ensemble

Opera/Operetta

Symphony

Chamber music

Choir music

Popular music

Jazz and improvised music

Traditional jazz/Ragtime/Dixieland

Big Band/Swing

Bebop/Cool jazz

Fusion jazz

Free jazz

Latin jazz

Other improvised music

Blues and country

Traditional American music (e.g., bluegrass, zydeco)

Blues

Country (and Western)

Pop music	Rock/Rock 'n' Roll Black music/Rhythm and Blues (soul, funk, R&B) Punk/New wave Metal/Hardrock Disco Rap/Hip-hop Techno/Dance/House New age music/Ambient Other pop music (including mainstream top 40)
World/Folk music	European traditional/Folk music Latin/Latin American music Asian music Reggae/Ska Combination/Other world music
Other popular music	Easy listening Film music/Soundtracks Chanson Schlager Smartlap/Levenslied Brass band Carnival music Kleinkunst/Cabaret

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9

The Uneven Distribution of International Success in the Visual Artists Among Nations, According to the Rankings of the 'Top 100 Artists in the World'

Alain Quemin

The sociology of art in its present conception emerged in the 1960s in France with a double tradition due to two main authors who developed strong empirical research: Raymonde Moulin (1967), who studied the art market, and Pierre Bourdieu (and his collaborators) (Bourdieu and Darbel 1969), who offered a major contribution through innovative and seminal visitors' studies. Since that time, empirical research has permitted a remarkable development of the sociology of art, first in France and then internationally. Still, although globalization started raising much attention

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among social scientists in the 1990s (Bartelson 2000; Therborn 2000), the theme did not really develop in the sociology of art domain at first, so empirical analyses remained limited for many years before developing very significantly (Bellavance 2000; Quemin 2001, 2002a, 2006, 2013a, b; Van Hest 2012; Velthuis 2013).

In this chapter, we study the impact of territory, be it nationality or country of residence, on artistic success (Bowness 1989) and the consecration process using empirical data; this will enable us to show that, even at a time when globalization is supposed to be the rule in the art sector, national entities still matter, and that there still exists a strong hierarchy among nations. Although we conducted more than 100 more or less formal interviews and identified and analyzed a dozen different indigenous rankings of the most famous/visible/recognized artists, as some of them have been published for decades now (about 70 different editions of rankings dealing with contemporary art were analyzed), in this chapter, we will focus on two major rankings of artists only, the *Kunstkompass* and the *Capital Kunstmarkt Kompass*, in order to illustrate the extremely uneven distribution of success between countries in the contemporary art world. As a matter of fact, our results constantly deny the strong belief of the art world that, through globalization, we would see the total disappearance of the influence of national borders, and that fluxes in cultural exchanges would not be strongly oriented.

Objectivizing Visibility or Talent Through Rankings

As soon as reflection on art emerged as a specific discipline, authors tried to discern the most talented artists who deserved to be the most famous ones. The selection of artists was made according to the criterion of excellence that included numerous components in Giorgio Vasari's much-touted *The Lives of the Most Excellent Italian Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, from Cimabue to Our Times* (*Le Vite de' pi' eccellenti pittori, scultori, e architettori da Cimabue insino a' tempi nostri*, as it was originally known in Italian), first published in Florence in 1550 (Vasari 1896/1550)

and then republished in an enlarged version in 1568 and generally considered the first important book in art history. Later in the history of writings on art, at the very beginning of the eighteenth century, in his treaty called *Cours de Peinture par Principes composé par Mr. de Piles*, Roger de Piles both gave advice to other artists in order to create good art and discussed the esthetic value of works of art (Roger de Piles 1969/1708). During the, very long, phase covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, art history emerged progressively as a specific discipline, and it was already important and even crucial for commentators to evaluate the work of artists in order to identify the most important of them. Therefore, discerning more talented ones among them was already a constant concern. However, there was no *ranking* or attempt of any kind to create a hierarchy of the artists.

Things changed radically with the apparition of contemporary art. It is necessary to first define this expression before studying the implication of this new form of art, what Nathalie Heinich (1998) calls a “paradigm.” Although art historians tend to consider that contemporary art emerged as early as after the Second World War, museum professionals, among them curators, more often consider that it really began at the very end of the 1960s or very beginning of the 1970s with the historical and seminal exhibition *When Attitudes Become Form* organized by the curator who was to become the most important of them, Harald Szeemann, at the Kunsthalle Bern, in Switzerland in 1969. This exhibition totally changed our perspective of art and gave birth to a profoundly renewed standpoint on art creation. As we have underlined in previous works, expert judgment in contemporary art strongly favors innovation and creation (Moulin and Quemin 1993).¹ The emergence of contemporary art as a category was simultaneous to the following characteristic: today, internationalization is at the core of contemporary creation—the more international an artist is, that is, the more international visibility he or she receives, the more *contemporary* he or she is supposed to be. Still, as we will see in this chapter, this kind of internationalization is not neutral: being very visible in Germany and, even more, in the United States makes an artist more international than if he or she was very visible in less central countries (Quemin 2002a, b, 2006, 2013a, b). Before the emergence of what is now considered and called *contemporary art*,

internationalization was not as central in the creation of art value, although art has always been associated with some internationalization to various degrees. Today, the most international creation coexists with other more local (i.e., most of the time national) creations that are considered less contemporary or that can even be questioned as being real contemporary art or even as proper art when their territorial scope is too limited.

For our purpose, it is important to note that the change in norms and social values underlying contemporary art as a new paradigm, to use Heinrich's terminology, is simultaneous to the appearance and immediate triumph of lists organized on a hierarchical basis, or rankings, in the contemporary art world that strive to objectivize the positions of the "best" artists. As early as 1970, the first ranking to be then regularly published on a nearly yearly basis was created and published by the economic journalist Willy Bongard in the German magazine *Capital*.² From 1970 to 2008, this indicator called *Kunstkompass*, the compass of art, was to be published nearly annually by the same magazine, unveiling to readers the ranked list of the top 100 artists (or best artists) in the world. Although Willy Bongard died in 1985, his widow, Linde Rohr-Bongard, continued publishing the results of the *Kunstkompass* year after year (until 2015), which illustrates the strong social demand for such an indicator, although, as we will see, it can be (and often has been) criticized for its obvious biases. Moreover, when the collaboration with *Capital* ended in 2008 and the annual editions of the *Kunstkompass* were from that time published in another German economics magazine, *Manager Magazin*, the editors of *Capital* developed a new partnership with a different team, a firm called Artifacts, in order to publish another (competitive) annual ranking of the top 100 most visible or successful artists, now called *Capital Kunstmarkt Kompass*, showing once again the strong demand for such indicators.

Today, rankings are proper actors of the contemporary art world, as they are supposed to synthesize information about the esthetic quality of the artworks that are produced by an artist, and that information can be compared to prices that are widely accessible today, at least for auction sales. Therefore, commercial art worlds need ranked lists of artists, especially for the reason that these rankings help them to define the status of

the artists whose works are for sale; likewise, these lists can also help them to define the prices of the works of those artists.

As already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, in a piece of research that we conducted on the topic, we found no less than a dozen different rankings of artists, among which some have been published on a regular basis for decades (which made a total of about 70 different rankings that we analyzed) (Quemin 2013b). As we conducted some interviews with various actors of the art world, we could regularly check that, although the importance of rankings tends to be quite systematically denied, simultaneously, their results (and sometimes also their main methodologies and limits) are quite widely known. In some other cases, the method of fieldwork observation proved to be particularly fruitful in showing a disconnection between discourses and practices. When we informally exchanged information on some artists with people in galleries, on several occasions, these people with whom we were talking connected to a database to check the rank of an artist whom we had mentioned and with whom he or she was not familiar! Still, when we had made formal interviews before and asked about the importance of rankings in the contemporary art world, these same people would often claim that they believed neither in the appropriateness of rankings nor in their use.

One fact should be stressed: from 1970 onward, with the emergence of contemporary art and the constitution of a contemporary “art world” (Becker 1982), not only did analysts and thinkers dealing with artistic creation, and more precisely artistic creation of their time, feel the need to try and identify the “best” artists, as had then been the case for centuries and even since the apparition of art history, but, from that time, they also regularly needed to “rank” them, which was a tremendously important addition. As uncertainty regarding art value, both esthetic and financial, is a major characteristic of contemporary art (Moulin 1992; Moulin and Quemin 1993), producing rankings of the best artists constituted and still constitutes an attempt to reduce the uncertainty associated with contemporary creation and artists. In this chapter, we will first present the two main rankings for contemporary artists and then show how they tend to reveal a very uneven distribution of artistic success (Bowness 1989) in terms of nations, although we could have also chosen other

angles such as the impact of gender or age on artistic success and consecration (Quemin 2013b).

The Kunstkompass and the Capital Kunstmarkt Kompass Based on the Artfacts Data Ranking: A Brief Presentation of the Indicators and Their Methodologies

For all types of rankings, the results depend directly on the methodology that is used, which in turn is the product of certain perspectives. It is therefore necessary to briefly present the method used by these two major rankings that aim at drawing up an annual list of the top 100 visual artists in the world. Since its creation in 1970 until its last edition, which was published in 2015, the Kunstkompass was based on a system of points allocated to different forms of artists' visibility. The system evolved slightly over time (and was not perfectly transparent, as its methodology³ was published some years only) (Rohr-Bongard 2001). Nevertheless, it can be schematically summarized as follows. Artists received points for three major occasions:

- Solo exhibitions in museums or contemporary art centers: the more prestigious the institution, the higher the number of points. For instance, a solo show at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York City, at the Tate Modern in London, or at the Centre Georges Pompidou—Musée National d'Art Moderne in Paris brought a very high number of points, whereas other solo shows in other less important but significant institutions brought fewer points.
- Participation in collective exhibitions such as biennials or in collective shows in museums or contemporary art centers: once again, the more prestigious the institution, the higher the number of points (for instance, participation in the most prestigious biennials, such as Venice's in Italy, or the Kassel Documenta in Germany, brought a very high number of points, whereas other significant biennials organized in other cities were also considered as qualifying but brought less

points). As a solo show gives more visibility to artists and plays an even greater part in their consecration process, participation in the most prestigious collective exhibitions weighed less than the most important solo shows.

- Reviews in the most influential contemporary art magazines such as *Flash Art*, *Art in America*, and *Art Forum*.

A certain number of points were allocated to each of the previous visibility occasions and, at the end of the year, they were all summed up, which then enabled the *Kunstkompass* team to publish its annual ranking of the top 100 contemporary (living) artists in the world.

It is important to mention here that since nearly as early as its creation, the *Kunstkompass* had been criticized for presenting a strong bias mostly in favor of Germany (by overrepresenting German institutions among qualifying ones and by attributing them coefficients that have often been considered too heavy compared with their real weight in the international contemporary art world) and, to a lesser extent, of neighboring countries that belonged to its cultural zone of influence (such as Austria). Still, it existed for more than 40 years and its general methodology fundamentally remained the same.

What is the methodology used by *Artfacts* to produce the competing *Capital Kunstmarkt Kompass*? Unlike the team that prepared the *Kunstkompass*, *Artfacts* uses a very wide number of qualifying institutions: private contemporary art galleries, public institutions (with or without a collection of their own, that is to say, museums and contemporary art centers), biennials and triennials, other spaces of temporary exhibition, contemporary art fairs, auctions, art hotels, art reviews, journals and magazines, art books, art schools, festivals, nonprofit organizations, or even art management institutions or private collections. Although it cannot be totally exhaustive, this extremely wide collection of information limits certain risks of biases.

Whereas some instances are crucial in the consecration process, others seem more secondary or even marginal. It is therefore important that the coefficients attributed to each of the different instances reflect this. Hence, *Artfacts* has created an algorithm that determines the weight of each instance based on the fame of the artists who are associated with it.

Fundamentally, *network points* are allocated: all artists who are collected by museums and represented by galleries receive such points, which are then conferred to the institutions that collect or represent the artists. These *network points* reflect the reputation of the institution that is concerned. For each exhibition in a museum or gallery, an artist receives points. Although, from a logical point of view, it may seem surprising that artists and institutions mutually influence each other's weight and, therefore, the position of artists in the ranking, sociological analysis has shown that, in the world of contemporary art, artists and galleries (and also gallery owners), but also artists and institutions, mutually influence each other's reputations (Moulin 1992; Moulin and Quemin 1993). This is precisely one of the major interests of the method that has been developed by Artfacts: to try and reflect that peculiarity of the world of contemporary art. Unlike other methodologies, such as that of the *Kunstkompass*, in which the important part of subjectivity in determining coefficients generated very significant biases (leading to an overrepresentation of German artists), the coefficients in the case of Artfacts are not set once and for all, and only occasionally reconsidered, as was actually the case with the *Kunstkompass*; instead, they are constantly actualized (i.e., every week) by the algorithm, taking into account the certifying power of the institutions based on the reputation of the artists with which they are then associated. Besides, the width of the database is an essential dimension, with no less than 70,263 artists in the world in June 2012! A good illustration of the expansion of the database can be given through the following piece of information: in August 2014, 100,000 artists were ranked and 336,500 others were referenced in Artfacts' database without being ranked. At that time, nine collaborators integrated information concerning nearly 30,000 exhibitions organized in 188 countries in the world.

As a private firm, Artfacts does not publish or even communicate on demand the construction mode of its algorithm, which is protected by industrial secrecy. This fact is frustrating for the social scientist who would like to judge the rigorousness of the methodology used, but an indirect reconstitution of some of the coefficients could be done and was found to be very satisfactory and pertinent. Although the main ranking is established on the basis of the number of points that have been accumulated since the indicator was created in 1999, the ranking is not that

different from the one that would be obtained by considering only the number of points accumulated during the last 12 months: success generally begets success, which constitutes a good illustration of Robert Merton's (1968) Matthew effect.

Rankings and the Impact of the Nationality of Artists on Fame and Consecration

As mentioned before, for this contribution, we decided to focus on the nationalities of artists, as both rankings mention them. It seemed pertinent to us to explore the possibility of an existing phenomenon of uneven concentration on the surface of the globe in terms of artistic fame and consecration (Quemin 2001, 2002a, b, 2006, 2013a; van Hest 2012; Velthuis 2013). But, to exemplify one of the two rankings, the *Kunstkompass* also gave other significant indications for each artist, such as their age or year of birth, their main type of practice (such as painting, sculpture, installations, videos, photography), or the name of their main gallery, among other characteristics that can be analyzed sociologically and that can tell a considerable amount about the traits or networks that can favor artistic success (Quemin 2013b). Both the *Kunstkompass* and the *Artfacts* ranking also mention the number of points obtained by each artist, which determines their position in the ranking. In order to make the presentation of the tables simple, we did not reproduce this information here, but we will analyze what we can learn from it later in the text, when summing up the number of points granted to each country in each of the rankings and when calculating percentages.

Both in the case of the *Kunstkompass* and of the *Artfacts* ranking, we decided to reproduce the information on nationality as it appears in the lists that are published, even if, very punctually, there are mistakes concerning the nationality, on which we are going to focus now to illustrate its link to artistic reputation and consecration. It is also necessary to mention that some artists, yet, as a matter of fact, very few of them, even at the most international level at which it could be expected that such a trait would be favored, have two different nationalities (Tables 9.1 and 9.2).

Table 9.1 The Kunstkompass ranking (2011)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality
K1	Richter Gerhard	D
K2	Nauman Bruce	USA
K3	Baselitz Georg	D
K4	Sherman Cindy	USA
K5	Kiefer Anselm	D
K6	Trockel Rosemarie	D
K7	Serra Richard	USA
K8	Eliasson Olafur	DK
K9	Kelley Mike	USA
K10	Kentridge William	ZA
K11	Gursky Andreas	D
K12	West Franz	AT
K13	Twombly Cy	USA
K14	Koons Jeff	USA
K15	Baldessari John	USA
K16	Boltanski Christian	F
K17	Rist Pipilotti	CH
K18	Ruff Thomas	D
K19	Johns Jasper	USA
K20	Christo & Jeanne-Claude	USA
K21	Oldenburg Claes	USA
K22	Barney Matthew	USA
K23	Viola Bill	USA
K24	Schütte Thomas	D
K25	Hirst Damien	UK
K26	Cattelan Maurizio	IT
K27	Knoebel Imi	D
K28	Struth Thomas	D
K29	Fischli & Weiss	CH
K30	Holzer Jenny	USA
K31	Gilbert & George	UK
K32	Gordon Douglas	UK
K33	Demand Thomas	D
K34	McCarthy Paul	USA
K35	Alÿs Francis	BE
K36	Ruscha Ed	USA
K37	Wall Jeff	CA
K38	Kabakov Ilya & Emilia	RUS
K39	Förg Günther	D
K40	Weiner Lawrence	USA
K41	Neshat Shirin	IR
K42	Graham Dan	USA

(continued)

Table 9.1 (continued)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality
K43	Hatoum Mona	UK
K44	Rainer Arnulf	AT
K45	Orozco Gabriel	MEX
K46	Höller Carsten	D
K47	Bonvincini Monica	IT
K48	Rehberger Tobias	D
K49	Dean Tacita	UK
K50	Calle Sophie	F
K51	Prince Richard	USA
K52	Tuymans Luc	BE
K53	Huyghe Pierre	F
K54	Buren Daniel	F
K55	Dumas Marlene	NL
K56	Genzken Isa	D
K57	Uecker Günther	D
K58	Becher Bernd & Hilla	D
K59	Rauch Neo	D
K60	Lüpertz Markus	D
K61	Pettibon Raymond	USA
K62	Meese Jonathan	D
K63	Horn Rebecca	D
K64	Abramovic Marina	SRB
K65	Walker Kara	USA
K66	Whiteread Rachel	UK
K67	Stella Frank	USA
K68	Kelly Ellsworth	USA
K69	Kounellis Iannis	GR
K70	Gillick Liam	UK
K71	Penck A.R.	D
K72	Kapoor Anish	IND
K73	Graham Rodney	CA
K74	Hirschhorn Thomas	CH
K75	Tillmans Wolfgang	D
K76	Cragg Tony	GB
K77	Schneider Gregor	D
K78	Gober Robert	USA
K79	Feldmann Hans-Peter	D
K80	Tiravanija Rirkrit	THA
K81	Kirkeby Per	DK
K82	Hockney David	UK
K83	Fritsch Katharina	D

(continued)

Table 9.1 (continued)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality
K84	Long Richard	UK
K85	Horn Roni	USA
K86	Perjovschi Dan	RO
K87	Wurm Erwin	AT
K88	Bock John	D
K89	Doig Peter	UK
K90	Signer Roman	CH
K91	Hamilton Richard	UK
K92	Sugimoto Hiroshi	JP
K93	Smith Kiki	USA
K94	Rosler Martha	USA
K95	Oursler Tony	USA
K96	Spoerri Daniel	CH
K97	Lawler Louise	USA
K98	Ackermann Franz	D
K99	Dijkstra Rineke	NL
K100	Farocki Harun	CZ

Table 9.2 Artifacts ranking (June 2012)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality
A1	Nauman Bruce	USA
A2	Richter Gerhard	D
A3	Sherman Cindy	USA
A4	Ruscha Ed	USA
A5	Baldessari John	USA
A6	Baselitz Georg	D
A7	Weiner Lawrence	USA
A8	Ruff Thomas	D
A9	Kentridge William	ZA
A10	Eliasson Olafur	DK
A11	Johns Jasper	USA
A12	Fischli & Weiss	CH
A13	Graham Dan	USA
A14	Gordon Douglas	UK
A15	West Franz	AT
A16	McCarthy Paul	USA
A17	Gursky Andreas	D
A18	Trockel Rosemarie	D
A19	Serra Richard	USA

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality
A20	Alÿs Francis	BE
A21	Tillmans Wolfgang	D
A22	Rist Pipilotti	CH
A23	Hatoum Mona	LB
A24	Kiefer Anselm	D
A25	Hirst Damien	UK
A26	Abramovic Marina	RS
A27	Oursler Tony	USA
A28	Struth Thomas	D
A29	Oldenburg Claes	USA/SE
A30	Kelly Ellsworth	USA
A31	Rainer Arnulf	AT
A32	Viola Bill	USA
A33	Goldin Nan	USA
A34	Graham Rodney	CA
A35	Koons Jeff	USA
A36	Export Valie	AT
A37	Wurm Erwin	AT
A38	Boltanski Christian	F
A39	Andre Carl	USA
A40	Acconci Vito	USA
A41	Holzer Jenny	USA
A42	Orozco Gabriel	MEX
A43	Wall Jeff	CA
A44	Smith Kiki	USA
A45	Förg Günther	D
A46	Stella Frank	USA
A47	Prince Richard	USA
A48	Pettibon Raymond	USA
A49	Cragg Tony	UK
A50	Cattelan Maurizio	IT
A51	Huyghe Pierre	F
A52	Hockney David	UK
A53	Sugimoto Hiroshi	JP
A54	Kusama Yayoi	JP
A55	Marclay Christian	USA/CH
A56	Dean Tacita	UK
A57	Gillick Liam	UK
A58	Buren Daniel	F
A59	Katz Alex	US
A60	Kabakov Ilya & Emilia	RU

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality
A61	Long Richard	UK
A62	Becher Bernd & Hilla	D
A63	Monk Jonathan	UK
A64	Dine Jim	USA
A65	Ono Yoko	JP
A66	Neshat Shirin	IR
A67	Hirschhorn Thomas	CH
A68S	Schütte Thomas	D
A69	Barney Matthew	USA
A70	Muniz Vik	BR
A71	Armleder John M.	CH
A72	Tiravanija Rirkrit	TH
A73	Calle Sophie	F
A74	Tuymans Luc	BE
A75	Pistoletto Michelangelo	IT
A76	Sala Anri	AL
A77	Fleury Sylvie	CH
A78	Höfer Candida	D
A79	Dumas Marlene	NL/ZA
A80	Feldmann Hans-Peter	D
A81	Demand Thomas	D
A82	Close Chuck	USA
A83	Walker Kara	USA
A84	Morellet François	F
A85	Kounellis Jannis	IT/GR
A86	Zobernig Heimo	AT
A87	Penck A.R.	D
A88	Horn Roni	D
A89	Höllner Carsten	BE
A90	Oehlen Albert	D
A91	Artschwager Richard	USA
A92	Knoebel Imi	D
A93	Rosler Martha	USA
A94	Dijkstra Rineke	NL
A95	Gober Robert	USA
A96	Morris Robert	USA
A97	Kawara On	JP
A98	Tuttle Richard	USA
A99	Moffatt Tracey	AU
A100	Kosuth Joseph	USA

Before commenting on the topic of national belonging in respect to the artists in the two main rankings of the most famous or recognized artists, a few comments can be made concerning these rankings. Most of the time (and by far), the two rankings mention the same piece of information concerning the nationalities of artists, but in a few cases, they provide different ones (in this case, either the nationality is different or two nationalities are mentioned in one of the rankings, while the other ranking considers only one). Although the two rankings have about one-fourth of artists who are different, three quarters of them are the same, a very high proportion if one considers their differing methodologies, a fact which tends to show that, at such a high level of consecration, the impact of methodology and its associated biases remains somewhat limited.

Still, the two indicators unveil extremely strong concentration phenomena in terms of distribution of artistic success among the countries. In its 2011 edition, the *Kunstkompass* welcomes no less than 27 German artists, also due to the overrepresentation of German institutions and their excessive weight already mentioned earlier. The number of German artists among the top 100 in the world is nearly as high as that of American artists (28) and much higher than that of British artists (12), Swiss (5), and French (4), followed by Austrians (3), then Italians, Dutch, Belgians, Danes, and Canadians (2 artists each), with 12 other countries being represented by one artist only. It is important to mention that, as we will discuss later, very often, these artists, who possess the nationality of a country that appears to be very *peripheral* to the contemporary art world (Quemin 2002b), have, in fact, lived for many years in the United States and have strengthened the vitality of the American art scene.

If we now consider the percentage of points represented by each country in the *Kunstkompass* by summing up the number of points of all artists sharing the same nationality and dividing it by the sum of points of all artists in the ranking, the result is as follows: the United States (30.4%) and Germany (30.0%) come in far ahead of all other countries, while the United Kingdom occupies the third position, with only 10.4%, but clearly outranks Switzerland (4.5%) and France (3.9%). The concentration of artistic success in only a very small number of countries, which all pertain to the Western world, either the United States or a very limited group of

Western European countries (but, even in this territory, only very few countries play a significant part in terms of their artists' presence in the highest segment of the international contemporary art scene), is extreme. Only five countries represent close to 80% of the most successful or visible international artists, with Germany and the United States constituting a sort of duopoly on the international art scene, far ahead of all other nations.

However, it seems to us that the data produced by Artfacts offer an even better illustration of the positions occupied by the different nations on the international contemporary art scene, as they are not affected by the pro-German bias, which we have been forced to underline earlier on several occasions. According to these data, if one considers the nationalities of the artists, the United States comes far ahead of all other countries, with no less than 35 artists, while Germany, with only 17 artists, occupies a very comfortable second position, but at a much more marked distance than seen in the *Kunstkompass*. The third position is occupied again by the United Kingdom (eight artists); then come France, Switzerland, and Austria (with five artists each); Japan (four artists); Belgium (three artists); then Canada, the Netherlands, and Italy (two artists each); and, finally, 12 other countries, which are represented by only one artist each.

Once again, calculating the share of each country in the total of the points for the top 100 artists of the Artfacts ranking synthesizes information about the number of artists per country and about their ranking in the hierarchy. The ranking is as follows: the United States comes far ahead (37.1%), far before Germany (18.2%), which comfortably outdistances the United Kingdom (7.63%), then follow Austria (5.0%) and Switzerland (4.9%), which reach a position slightly ahead of France (4.4%). Although Italy occupied strong positions on the international contemporary art scene in the 1970s, sustained by renewed vigor with the trans-avant-garde during the 1980s (Quemin 2013b), its influence is very limited today, with only 1.7% of the previous indicator. Considering the Artfacts data of the top 100 contemporary visual artists, countries of Western Europe and North America account for no less than close to 90% of the indicator (87.3%)!

Although, for about two decades, the ideology of globalization through the mixing of different cultures and the alleged erasure of national borders has been very popular in the contemporary art world, and even if most actors of the art world love to believe that nationality, country, or

place of residence do not matter, our analysis tends to unveil a very different reality. The international contemporary art world remains very territorialized and hierarchized in terms of countries, under forms that can be different for its various segments. For instance, although, for several years, Chinese artists have been extremely successful on the market, notably at auctions, challenging the eminently strong positions of British, German, and especially American artists in this domain, when it comes to the presence in art institutions such as major museums and contemporary art centers or even biennials organized in Western countries, China's presence, while much commented upon, remains very limited and Chinese artists are still absent from the lists of the top artists in the world. It may be necessary to mention here that the only real exception was made by *Art Review*, when it promoted Chinese artist Ai Weiwei to the first position of its ranking of the most influential actors of the art world. However, the methodology used by *Art Review* (asking experts) is much more basic than that used by the teams of the *Kunstkompass* and *Artfacts* (Quemin 2013b), and in the case of Ai Weiwei's coronation, everybody understood that the nomination was mostly political, in order to give him the support of international contemporary art world community in his fight with the Chinese regime. Still, it does not really make sense to consider Ai Weiwei more powerful in the art world than star gallerist Larry Gagosian or megacollector Francois Pinault, who ranked below him that year. In terms of artistic consecration, the certification power is still concentrated within the hands of a small number of institutions and players who are nearly all Westerners and who still elect Western artists much more than all others.

Introducing the Country of Residence Versus Nationality: The Persistent Importance of Territory

Already extremely marked in the previous data, the phenomenon of concentration is even more extreme if one now considers the different *countries of residence*, as artists from the “periphery” of the international

contemporary art world (Quemin 2002b) tend to migrate to the more central countries in order to become consecrated. To study this, we decided to correct the data published by Artfacts by no longer taking nationality into account, but rather considering the country of residence and creation. A certain part of approximation is inevitable, as artists, especially when they are still supported by their country of origin, do not generally want to publicize the fact that they have moved to another country, which seems more appropriate when they have been consecrated as important creators. However, the results obtained are large enough to be commented upon here, and the possible inaccuracy that might exist cannot affect the general tendencies that emerge (Table 9.3).

The first and most important result is that, even in an era of so-called globalization, a very vast majority of the most consecrated artists in the world, those who are most susceptible to travel and leave their countries of origin, still live and create in the countries where they were born: 80% of them.⁴ Endless artistic wanderlust appears to be a myth, and no artist lives in more than two countries for the long term. Even today, the creative act is still very much embedded in a given territory (Quemin 2006). When artists travel abroad for a project, they still keep a base that is their home (and that is generally the country in which they were born). Of the top 100 most visible artists in the world, no less than 96 live and create durably in just one country, and only 4 in two countries!

Besides, if one examines the countries of residence and not the passports, one notices a change in only 19 cases. This number is far from being negligible, but the phenomenon concerns a real minority (and even when artists tend to move to reach an important center for international creation and consecration, they sometimes continue to live and create partly in their home countries). As a matter of fact, artists whose presence in the rankings is most unlikely as regards their nationalities, as they appear very “exotic,” have often settled for many years in the “center” of the international contemporary art world, that is to say, the United States, and New York City in particular, and have contributed to the vitality of the American creative scene while increasing their chances to gain better recognition in the international art world.

As mentioned earlier, the United States has already 35 artists among the top 100 in the world when only nationality is concerned. However, the

Table 9.3 Reconsidering the Artfacts ranking in terms of country of residence (when the nationality and the country of residence differ, the country is emboldened)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality	Country of residence
1	Nauman Bruce	USA	USA
2	Richter Gerhard	D	D
3	Sherman Cindy	USA	USA
4	Ruscha Ed	USA	USA
5	Baldessari John	USA	USA
6	Baselitz Georg	D	D
7	Weiner Lawrence	USA	USA
8	Ruff Thomas	D	D
9	Kentridge William	ZA	ZA
10	Eliasson Olafur	DK	DK
11	Johns Jasper	USA	USA
12	Fischli & Weiss	CH	CH
13	Graham Dan	USA	USA
14	Gordon Douglas	UK	UK
15	West Franz	AT	AT
16	McCarthy Paul	USA	USA
17	Gursky Andreas	D	D
18	Trockel Rosemarie	D	D
19	Serra Richard	USA	USA
20	Alÿs Francis	BE	BE
21	Tillmans Wolfgang	D	D
22	Rist Pipilotti	CH	CH
23	Hatoum Mona	LB	UK
24	Kiefer Anselm	D	F
25	Hirst Damien	UK	UK
26	Abramovic Marina	RS	USA
27	Oursler Tony	USA	USA
28	Struth Thomas	D	D
29	Oldenburg Claes	USA/SE	USA
30	Kelly Ellsworth	USA	USA
31	Rainer Arnulf	AT	AT
32	Viola Bill	USA	USA
33	Goldin Nan	USA	USA
34	Graham Rodney	CA	CA
35	Koons Jeff	USA	USA
36	Export Valie	AT	AT
37	Wurm Erwin	AT	AT
38	Boltanski Christian	F	F
39	Andre Carl	USA	USA
40	Acconci Vito	USA	USA

(continued)

Table 9.3 (continued)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality	Country of residence
41	Holzer Jenny	USA	USA
42	Orozco Gabriel	MEX	MEX
43	Wall Jeff	CA	CA
44	Smith Kiki	USA	USA
45	Förg Günther	D	D
46	Stella Frank	USA	USA
47	Prince Richard	USA	USA
48	Pettibon Raymond	USA	USA
49	Cragg Tony	UK	UK
50	Cattelan Maurizio	IT	USA
51	Huyghe Pierre	F	USA
52	Hockney David	UK	UK
53	Sugimoto Hiroshi	JP	JP & USA
54	Kusama Yayoi	JP	JP
55	Marclay Christian	USA, CH	USA & UK
56	Dean Tacita	UK	UK
57	Gillick Liam	UK	UK
58	Buren Daniel	F	F
59	Katz Alex	USA	USA
60	Kabakov Ilya & Emilia	RU	USA
61	Long Richard	UK	UK
62	Becher Bernd & Hilla	D	D
63	Monk Jonathan	UK	D
64	Dine Jim	USA	USA
65	Ono Yoko	JP	USA
66	Neshat Shirin	IR	USA
67	Hirschhorn Thomas	CH	F
68	Schütte Thomas	D	D
69	Barney Matthew	USA	USA
70	Muniz Vik	BR	USA
71	Armleder John M.	CH	CH
72	Tiravanija Rirkrit	TH	USA & D
73	Calle Sophie	F	F
74	Tuymans Luc	BE	BE
75	Pistoletto Michelangelo	IT	IT
76	Sala Anri	AL	F & D
77	Fleury Sylvie	CH	CH
78	Höfer Candida	D	D
79	Dumas Marlene	NL, ZA	NL
80	Feldmann Hans-Peter	D	D
81	Demand Thomas	D	D

(continued)

Table 9.3 (continued)

Rank	Surname and first name	Nationality	Country of residence
82	Close Chuck	USA	USA
83	Walker Kara	USA	USA
84	Morellet François	F	F
85	Kounellis Jannis	IT, GR	IT
86	Zobernig Heimo	AT	AT
87	Penck A.R.	D	D
88	Horn Roni	D	D
89	Höllner Carsten	BE	SE
90	Oehlen Albert	D	D
91	Artschwager Richard	USA	USA
92	Knoebel Imi	D	D
93	Rosler Martha	USA	USA
94	Dijkstra Rineke	NL	NL
95	Gober Robert	USA	USA
96	Morris Robert	USA	USA
97	Kawara On	JP	USA
98	Tuttle Richard	USA	USA
99	Moffatt Tracey	AU	USA
100	Kosuth Joseph	USA	USA

figure would rise to no less than 44.5 if one considers countries of residence⁵! In other words, the United States itself accounts for nearly half of the most visible artists in the world today! As far as other nations are concerned, the number of artists per country is generally less affected when one adopts this new perspective on the country of residence: the figure moves from 17 to 18 for Germany, from 8 to 8.5 for the United Kingdom, from 5 to 6.5 for France; Austria remains at 5, Switzerland moves slightly from 5 to 4, but Japan moves more markedly down from 4 to 1.5 only, with the consecration of Japanese artists appearing to be very dependent on settlement in the United States. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada have two artists each in the ranking with respect to the country of residence and creation, whereas Denmark, Sweden, Mexico, and South Africa have only one artist each. Although 21 different countries appeared in the list when passport and nationality were considered for the Artfacts ranking of the top 100 artists in the world, the concentration became even stronger when countries of residence were regarded, for the space in which the most recognized international artists live and create is limited to 15 countries only. In this respect, non-Western countries, in particular, tend to almost disappear.

If, once again, we decide to consider the share of each country in the sum of points of the top 100 artists of the Artfacts ranking by taking countries of residence into account, the results are as follows: 46.2% for the United States (nearly ten more points than when nationality was considered), far ahead of its usual challenger, Germany (18.0%), which is at a fair distance from the United Kingdom (8.3%), before France (5.8%), Austria (5.0%), Switzerland (4.0%), Belgium (1.9%), the Netherlands and Italy (1.6% each), Denmark (1.3%), Sweden (0.8%), Canada (2%), Mexico (1.0%), Japan (1.3%), and South Africa (1.4%). Once more, it is necessary to underline the fact that Western European countries (as a matter of fact, a very small number of them) and North America account for the concentration of nearly the entirety of the indicator (96.5%); that is to say, they tend to account for all contemporary creation at its highest level of visibility and success.

Our approach, which focuses on the territorial dimension and considers the influence of countries of residence and creation, shows extremely strong concentration effects. There appears to be creative countries, as there are creative cities (Florida 2002), all the more as the existence of creative countries is mostly limited to the presence of one major creative city among all of them (such as Berlin, London, Paris, and, above all, New York City). We decided to take into account the country of residence of the artists, as this is nearly always the indication that is given in the rankings that mention the nationality of the creators and not the cities they live in. Still, the scale of the cities is particularly relevant, and when the United States, the United Kingdom, or France are mentioned, it is most of the time New York City, London, or Paris that is mentioned (the situation is somewhat more complex for Germany, where artistic creativity in the national art scene tends to be less exclusively concentrated in Berlin, although that city has considerably reinforced its preeminence over the last 15 or 20 years). Still, it should not be underestimated that each of these cities is embedded in its own country and is directly influenced by the laws of the latter. For instance, New York City may sometimes be described as a “global city” (Sassen 1991) whose limits go far beyond American territory, to take just one example that is relevant to our study in this contribution; still, when it comes to welcoming artists migrating from foreign countries, the laws that regulate immigration are nothing but American ones. In that sense, it should be remembered that

all these cities, however strongly international and open to the world they may be, are also fundamentally part of a national territory and entity.

Besides, it should not be underestimated that the fluxes of international migrations are very oriented and strongly determined by the various positions occupied by the different countries in the art world. In the end, as a matter of fact, no actual globalization exists in the contemporary art world if one understands the term as all parts of the world being concerned, and that even fluxes are not affected by uneven exchanges and by domination effects. The national context remains particularly significant, as the majority of artists in each city are of national origin but have come, most of the time, from the rest of the country to the artistic capital city in order to achieve or reinforce their recognition as important artists.

Conclusion

The concern for rankings that we have analyzed in this chapter is widely spread among the art world and goes far beyond the case of only artists, even if they represent the social actors that are most concerned with this reduction in uncertainty through objectivization of positions via the production of rankings by the art world itself. Not only were there, until 2015, two major rankings that tried to objectivize the positions occupied by the most recognized artists in the art world today, the *Kunstkompass* and the *Artfacts* rankings analyzed above, but other rankings have emerged that also try to objectivize the positions occupied more generally by the various actors of the art world (Quemin 2013b). The most famous of these indicators is the *Power 100*, which has been published annually by the British magazine *Art Review* for more than ten years now and is supposed to identify and rank the most powerful 100 players of the international contemporary art world, be they artists, curators, museum directors, collectors, gallery owners, auction house leaders, or art critics. The existence of these other indicators (Quemin 2013b; Quemin and van Hest 2015) also perfectly shows that there is a very strong demand, probably a growing one, for rankings of artists and even other players of the contemporary art world that go far beyond the creators themselves or, as Pierre Bourdieu (1993) put it, that try to identify who creates the creators.

In this chapter, we decided to focus on the contemporary visual arts and “indigenous” rankings in order to explore and objectivize the visibility of art-ists. We could have probably chosen some other domains, such as gastronomy, that seem to have known a similar evolution to that encountered by the visual arts at the very beginning of the 1970s. For instance, the *Michelin Guide* was created in France as early as 1900 as a travel, tourist, and gastro-nomic guide, and many other gastronomic guides have been published since that time, in particular the *Guide Gault & Millau*, which rivaled the domi-nant position of the *Michelin Guide* in the 1970s. Still, it is only recently that, although there had been a strong tradition of attributing marks to restaurants and thus determining groups of similar quality or even regularly publishing lists of the best restaurants (e.g., the best 100), *rankings* of the best restaurants or chefs in the world have appeared and strongly developed (the ranking of the top 50 restaurants in the world by *Restaurant* being the most famous one). In spite of the fact that, on the one hand, they are often criticized, it should not be underestimated that, on the other hand, such rankings now tend to have sufficient legitimacy, and that there is enough social demand for them to be regularly published. Besides, as in the case of the contemporary visual arts, they show strong concentration effects among nations.

Appendix 1: Table of the Country Abbreviations Used in the Ranking Lists

AL = Albania	IT = Italy
AT = Austria	JP = Japan
AU = Australia	LB = Lebanon
BE = Belgium	MEX = Mexico
BR = Brazil	NL = The Netherlands
CA = Canada	RO = Romania
CH = Switzerland	RS = Serbia
CZ = The Czech Republic	RU = Russia (see, also RUS)
D = Germany	RUS = Russia
DK = Denmark	SE = Sweden
F = France	SRB = Serbia
GB = Great Britain (see, also, the United Kingdom)	TH = Thailand (see, also, THA)
GR = Greece	THA = Thailand
IND = India	UK = The United Kingdom
IR = Iran	ZA = Republic of South Africa

Notes

1. The public, for its side, generally favors works of art that resonate with their lives (Halle and Tiso 2014).
2. As a matter of fact, preliminaries of rankings of contemporary artists can be found in the French art magazine *Connaissance des Arts* as early as 1955. Still, the methodology was much looser than that of *Kunstkompass* and rankings were only published five times, on a five-year periodicity (Verger 1987). Besides, it should be mentioned here that, once again, 1955 is, more or less, simultaneous to 1945, the date of the emergence of contemporary art as a category for art historians. There, again, the very first attempt to *rank* artists in terms of visibility or talent was close to the emergence of a new category of art, that of contemporary creation.
3. Although one is supposed to be able to ask for the methodology, our demands have generally been ignored.
4. Two artists share their time between the country where they were born and another one.
5. We attributed a half-point for each country in the case of artists sharing their time between the two of them.

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The figures analyzed in this contribution come from the various editions of the *Kunstkompass* or from the competing ranking published by *Artfacts*. Although the main methods used here are quantitative, the research was also based on a hundred or so interviews, some of which were proper in-depth ones and others were much more informal, especially as we were doing fieldwork as an art journalist and art critic.

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10

Beyond Reproduction: Asymmetrical Interdependencies and the Transformation of Centers and Peripheries in the Globalizing Visual Arts

Larissa Buchholz

In 1978, the postcolonial theorist and artist Rasheed Araeen railed against what he considered a myth, namely the “internationalism of contemporary art.” In a manifesto on visual art, presented at the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) in London, he declared:

The myth of the internationalism of Western art has to be exploded ... Western art expresses exclusively the peculiarities of the West ... It is merely a transatlantic art. It only reflects the culture of Europe and North America ... The current “Internationalism” of Western art is nothing more than a function of the political and economic power of the West, enforcing its

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values on other people. The word international should mean more than just a couple of Western countries. (Araeen 1997 [1978], 98)

Only two decades later, Rasheed Araeen—who had meanwhile become the editor of the British journal *Third Text*, one of the most influential theoretical platforms for non-Western art or art produced by “Diaspora intellectuals”—had drastically changed his opinion. In his view, the recognition of non-Western artists in the globalizing art scene had decisively grown; “young, post-colonial artists from Africa or Asia” would no longer be segregated from their white/European counterparts, he remarked, adding “[b]oth of them display and circulate within the same space and the same art market, recognized and legitimated by the same institutions” (Araeen 2001, 23). Other intellectuals of the artistic field echoed this assumption of a tendency toward a more egalitarian globalism with even stronger claims, purporting either the dawn of a new “global dialogue between Western and Non-Western art” (Scheps 1999, 16ff; Dziewior 1999, 345) that would overcome asymmetric center–periphery relations, or the demise of a “Western-centric” model that would entail “essential changes to definitions, functions, and existential states of contemporary art” (Hanrou 1994, 79).

Such rather euphoric proclamations have been strongly debunked as “illusions” by Alain Quemin (e.g., Quemin 2002, 2006, 522). Based on systematic empirical research, he and other sociologists (Quemin 2002, 2006; Buchholz and Wuggenig 2005; Buchholz 2008) argued that despite important global transformations in contemporary art, this cultural realm continues to be heavily dominated by artists from select Western countries, whereas artists from so-called non-Western regions (such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia) remained highly marginalized. As Quemin poignantly summarized, “globalization has certainly not challenged in any way the US-European duopoly” (Quemin 2006, 543f).

What are we to make of such strikingly different accounts? The declaration of radical shifts versus the argument of an unchallenged reproduction of center–periphery configurations? Drawing upon and extending tools of Bourdieu’s field theory, in this contribution, I seek to propose an intermediate position that moves beyond the dichotomous alternatives of

either radical change or outright reproduction. My argument unfolds in four parts: I first provide a brief review of conceptions of center–peripheries in globalization of culture research. In this context, I discuss how a field approach could offer useful contributions to elaborate upon them, particularly in regard to the notion of the relative autonomy of culturally—in relation to economically based hierarchies in cultural fields. The second part delves into empirical analysis. Informed by the field approach, I examine the evolution of asymmetries in the global exhibition space and the global auction market. This analysis reveals that transformations of center–periphery hierarchies are underway in both global spaces, but that they follow different temporalities. In the third part—drawing from additional qualitative interview and discourse data—I show how intermediaries’ invitation strategies of artists across borders defy a simple binary logic of dominating “Western” centers vis-à-vis dependent “non-Western” (semi)-peripheries. My findings point instead to relational, albeit asymmetric, dynamics that inform multidirectional cross-border flows of valuation—and that, I argue, are best captured through the notion of asymmetric interdependencies. I conclude by making the case for a multidimensional and relational global field approach to examining (shifting) asymmetries in global cultural production, permitting to account for three key aspects: their duality, their cyclical nature, and their embeddedness in asymmetric interdependencies.

The Multidimensionality of Center–Periphery Inequalities

While the center–periphery distinction has been disqualified as a perspective to account for the directionality of flows or cultural influences in the global cultural economy (e.g., Appadurai 1990), several empirical works have shown that it fertile to engage with the unevenness of global cultural markets. This also holds true for the case of the contemporary visual arts, as the introduction indicated: sociologists have found that strong inequalities regarding the success of artists from different countries persisted well into the new millennium. For decades, very few countries from the Northwest, particularly the United States and Germany, have

dominated this artistic realm (Quemin 2002, 2006, 2012; Buchholz and Wuggenig 2005; Buchholz 2008). As Quemin concludes, “a strong hierarchy of countries controls the organization of and participation in the international contemporary art world and market ... beyond the development of international exchanges, the art world has a clearly defined center comprising a small number of Western countries, among which the US and Germany are preeminent, and a vast periphery, comprising all other states” (Quemin 2012, 70ff.). Similar conclusions regarding the persisting unevenness of globalizing cultural markets have been reached in studies that examined the market for book translations (Heilbron 1999; Sapiro 2010), world music (Brandellero and Pfeffer 2011), or entertainment movies (Moretti 2013c [2001]). In all cases, the center–periphery distinction highlights just how big a gap in macrolevel inequalities remains, and how much such gaps remain intertwined with geographic reference units, such as countries.

Nevertheless, while empirical scholarship has demonstrated the utility of the center–periphery distinction to describe persistent macroinequalities in globalizing cultural markets, to theorize them, I suggest, it is useful to refine the model in two important directions. First, it is crucial to disentangle more precisely what dimension of geographic macroinequalities one is addressing: place-based inequalities among sites of production/mediation (e.g., the hegemony of New York/United States), or inequalities at the level of cultural producers/goods (e.g., US American contemporary art)? In empirical terms, both dimensions of macroinequalities can strikingly drift apart. They should thus be kept analytically apart. For example, Phillips’ insightful study of the international market for jazz recordings revealed that locations that are at the margins in terms of place-based inequalities can be central with regard to the success of artistic creations—and vice versa. Specifically, while New York figured as a central place for the global diffusion of jazz tunes (Phillips 2013, 51f.), at the level of cultural goods, a “disproportionate advantage” existed for “recordings that emerged from more disconnected cities than when compared with more central cities like New York (...) particularly when the outputs in question are difficult to categorize” (Phillips 2013, 9, 16). In other words, “music from highly disconnected sources tended to have glob-

ally broader long-run appeal than those originating from [central] places like Chicago and New York” (ibid., 51).

Yet apart from the importance to distinguish between two analytically distinct dimensions of center–periphery inequalities, the second modification that I deem important is to take into account that center–periphery configurations at the commercial pole of a globalizing realm of cultural production can and do differ from those at the more cultural–institutional pole. In other words, one may have to deal with a dual macropower structure. At the level of places, such a duality becomes immediately apparent when one looks to the literary realm. While in the contemporary visual arts, New York City has been consistently at the very top, in literature this is not the case: Paris is the preeminent intellectual literary center, and London and New York are the major commercial publishing centers (Casanova 2004 [1999], 164–72).

Yet also at the level of cultural production, a duality between specific cultural and commercial inequalities is important to consider and theorize. One model to work with in this regard is Bourdieu’s theory of the field of cultural production. This approach argues that cultural realms are fundamentally structured around a dual symbolic economy. It consists of the opposition between a heteronomous pole—in which competition for economic gains prevails and in which cultural producers are evaluated particularly according to their economic success—and a relatively autonomous pole (e.g., Bourdieu 1993, 115–19; Bourdieu 1996, 142–46). The latter sphere adheres to an economy of specific cultural legitimacy that does not coincide with and even reverses principles of the economic pole (ibid.). Here, the primary stake is “specific symbolic capital,” that is, specific recognition by a highly specialized professional public (such as other artists, critics, curators). Artists become evaluated on the basis of culturally specific criteria that are relatively autonomous from “profane,” commercial or temporal considerations (Bourdieu 1993, 29–73). Transposed to the global arena, the field approach would thus lead us to analytically distinguish and theorize two distinct modes of hierarchization, based on conflicting principles within the same cultural universe: the principle of specific symbolic recognition and the competing principle of economic success, corresponding to a hierarchy that is based on “specific

criteria of peer judgement” and a “hierarchy according to commercial success” (Bourdieu 1996, 114).¹

Nonetheless, Bourdieu formulated his autonomy versus heteronomy distinction with regard to a particular place and time: France at the end of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, alternative models have emerged that have called Bourdieu’s dualistic model of fields of cultural production into question (cf. Zahner 2006; Graw 2009; Crane 2009). With the rise of market forces, they argued that the opposition of art versus money has become blurred. Market success has become an integral factor of artistic prestige and may even precede and determine cultural evaluation. As Diane Crane (2009, 337) suggested by referring to an American art critic, “prices now determine reputations” (Tomkins 2007, 71). Is Bourdieu’s model of a dual symbolic economy outdated? There are two ways to approach this question: first, conceptually it is necessary to disentangle more precisely the different dimensions in which the distinction between an autonomous and a heteronomous pole, between art versus money has been cast. In the evolving debate, distinct dimensions have tended to be conflated, and positions to have talked past each other in view of the kinds of evidence they draw upon. Second, empirically. Often the debate has relied on particular cases or case studies (especially Andy Warhol or Damien Hirst) to argue for the dissolution of the old opposition of art versus money. However, it has not supplemented the evidence with more large-scale statistical analyses of the broader structure of an art field.

Against this background, a research study on the global context found that the autonomy versus heteronomy distinction holds on empirical grounds in view of two specific indicators: the distribution of artistic recognition and the temporality in which specific symbolic capital precedes the accumulation of economic capital in transnational artistic careers (Buchholz 2013). Specifically, drawing from statistical analysis of several hundreds of the worldwide leading contemporary visual artists, this examination discerned an overarching divergence between artists whose success is based on “specific criteria of peer judgement” and artists who rank high in terms of “commercial success” (Bourdieu 1996 [1992], 114). Only a minority group of artists is successful in both dimensions. Indeed, the stakes of symbolic artistic prestige and economic capital tend

to be invested in the global arena: higher economic capital goes along with lower symbolic capital, and vice versa. The same Chinese artist who achieves multimillion-dollar prices at Sotheby's and joins the ranks of the economically most successful artists globally is unlikely to gain worldwide cultural esteem to the same extent. This dual constellation is also reflected in the distribution of aesthetic media, with a clear polarity between installation art versus painting. Furthermore, in all examined careers, symbolic capital came before the accumulation of economic capital. In no case did success in the global auction market precede or even strengthen global symbolic success.

To be sure, these structural findings do not mean that the autonomy versus heteronomy polarity might not prove outdated in other dimensions. In addition, in the global context, its institutional basis is a completely different one and thus has to be reformulated, also in view of the rise of new financial circuits and logics (cf. Buchholz 2013). What such findings do indicate, however, is that the contemporary visual arts in the global context have a dualistic structure in terms of the (e)valuation of cultural production—something that I depict as a dual cultural world economy. Hence, it seems fertile to transpose the distinction to an examination of center–periphery dynamics, too.

If we do so, the dualistic field model also offers us interesting hypotheses that pertain to the analysis of patterns of transformations. In fact, Bourdieu's model argues that changes in the hierarchical orders of an autonomous and a heteronomous pole follow dissimilar mechanisms and temporalities. In particular, it states that at the relatively autonomous pole, a major mechanism for change rests in the opposition between fractions of the heterodoxy and of the orthodoxy. Representatives of the former are frequently composed of new, younger entrants who dispose of relatively low field-specific recognition and seek to acquire it by challenging dominant modes of evaluation through strategies of distinction (Bourdieu 1996, 154–61, 239–42; cf. Swartz 1997, 124f.). The orthodox fractions, by contrast, tend to be older and already wield a high amount of symbolic capital, as well as to defend established norms. Importantly, this polarity implies, in turn, that changes at the relatively autonomous pole should unfold in the more gradual rhythm of cohorts or generations, since innovative strategies tend to be enacted by younger aspirants and

their peer intermediaries, who still need to build up field-specific recognition over time until they can fully establish their distinctive position-takings.

Extended to the global level, the argument of the heterodoxy versus orthodoxy polarity as a mechanism for change carries a crucial, but hitherto overlooked, implication: it leads us to hypothesize that any effects of globalization on challenging a West-centric orthodoxy would be refracted in relation to the relative power position of artists and their peer intermediaries, which in turn tends to correspond to differences in age. By implication, transformations of center–periphery inequalities in regard to the most successful artists should follow a more gradual rhythm of cohorts. Such systematic variations should not be observed in regard to the economic heteronomous pole, however. According to the field model, the heterodoxy versus orthodoxy opposition does not apply here. In this context, changes would be driven by more market driven factors and would be more susceptible to the external environment, such as broader economic boom or bust periods.

The following section will test these arguments of Bourdieu's field model by comparing how globalization has affected center–periphery inequalities at the level of cultural production in the global exhibition space and the global auction market. The last section will complement this analysis by exploring the effects of global transformations on *place-based* center–periphery relations.

The Duality of Transformations

To extend the field approach for investigating the dynamics of center–periphery inequalities in the contemporary visual arts, an important question to ask of course is whether we can presume a global field to begin with. Several indicators speak for it. Since the end of the 1980s, this cultural realm has witnessed a number of important global transformations that entailed the emergence of an interdependent global space for cross-border flows, competition, and valuation in which the ultimate stakes of contemporary art have become redefined in global terms (Buchholz 2013, 2016): first, the creation of an institutional infrastructure

for cross-border circulation and valuation that reaches across six continents. This infrastructure evolved not only out-of-the-spectacular global expansion of the art auction market (e.g., Moulin 2003 [2001]; van den Bosch 2005). It also emerged through the extension of cultural–institutional circuits to a worldwide scope, with globally recruited artists, cosmopolitan star curators, and contemporary art biennials and art museums spread around the globe. Second, the rise and proliferation of global art discourses, which, as I show elsewhere in detail, entailed the emergence of new global imaginations and meanings, and the gradual construction of a more global gaze (Buchholz 2013). Third, the establishment of global practices of evaluating artistic recognition and value, notably the rise of global artist rankings since the end of the 1990s. Although such global rankings have been quite contested within the contemporary art field, their establishment and worldwide visibility have contributed to globalize the stakes and forms of capital among players from different corners of the world (ibid.). It is the convergence and partial interaction of these three transformations over the past three decades—the establishment of a global art infrastructure, the cultural construction of a global gaze, and the institutionalization of genuinely global practices of evaluation—which, I argue, have laid the institutional ground for the emergence of a global field (Buchholz 2013, 2016).

Regarding novel global artist rankings, two of them can serve us also as sources to scrutinize whether and how center–periphery inequalities at the level of cultural production diverge between the specific symbolic and economic dimension: (1) the *Artprice* ranking, which assesses the most successful visual artists in the global auction market on the basis of their annual volume of sales. As the ranking draws from information of more than 2900 auction houses on five continents, it represents an indicator of economically based inequalities.² (2) The *Artfacts* ranking, which determines the uneven distribution of artistic recognition in the global exhibition space, relying on a vast database of more than 100,000 artists and exhibitions across 140 countries.³ The ranking thereby operates with a complex multidimensional index that assigns artists “exhibition points,” which, in turn, define their relative positions in a world artistic hierarchy. Since the index seeks to represent criteria of art professionals that operate outside of immediate market constraints (Artfacts.net 2003),⁴ the ranking

offers a suitable and reliable indicator for the evolution of specific symbolic inequalities in Bourdieu's sense (for more methodological remarks on reliability, cf. endnote 5).⁵

With each of these data sources, two kinds of analyses were pursued: first, an examination of the evolution of the hierarchies from 1998 to 2007 at the level of the top 100 artists only. The year 1998 was the earliest year for which valid data could be obtained from *Artprice* for the contemporary art category of interest (interview). The end year of 2007, in turn, represents the year when journalistically published rankings reported the rise of Chinese contemporary artists in the global auction market for the first time. Departing from prefabricated journalistic rankings, this contribution comparatively reexamines the extent of their success by drawing upon an academically informed sampling strategy that is consistent for both rankings.⁶ For each sample, the geographic origins of the 100 selected leading contemporary visual artists were identified. Afterward, the relative shares of artists' "exhibition points" or sales volumes were summarized at the level of the countries of origin (cf. Quemin 2002, 2006; Buchholz and Wuggenig 2005).

This first kind of analysis serves as a background for a second and previously not pursued examination of dynamics across cohorts. Here, the same analytical procedures as above were employed to compare developments between different age groups within *either* the global auction market *or* the global exhibition space in the last year of analysis. In this regard, the greatest available number of artists for both ranking databases ($N = 500$ for the *Artprice* ranking) was divided into four age groups of equal size. These groups were cohorts of those born in (a) 1976–67, (b) 1966–57, (c) 1956–46, and (d) <1945, and each contained 40 artists.⁷

Tables 10.1 and 10.2 show results for the top 100 tier of the global auction market and the global exhibition space from 1998 to 2007. The shares of countries are each listed from the highest to the lowest percentages. Tracing first dynamics among the three most dominant countries in the global auction market reveals considerable changes (cf. Table 10.1). In 1998, the distribution of economic success still resembled what Quemin (2006) has called a US–German duopoly, since contemporary art from the United States (36%) and Germany (32%) clearly dominated, followed by a relatively feeble third position of the United

Table 10.1 Countries of origin of the leading contemporary visual artists in the global auction market, 1998 and 2007

1998			2007	
Rank	Country	Percentage share	Country	Percentage share
1.	United States	36.0	United States	29.9
2.	Germany	32.0	China	29.8
3.	United Kingdom	8.5	United Kingdom	13.0
4.	Italy	3.3	Germany	12.5
5.	Colombia	2.4	Japan	4.3
6.	Romania	1.7	Colombia	1.8
7.	Belgium	1.6	Italy	1.6
8.	Japan	1.6	India	1.4
9.	Cuba	1.6	Spain	1.2
10.	Austria	1.5	Korea	1.0
11.	Australia	1.3	Romania	0.8
12.	Nicaragua	1.2	South Africa	0.5
13.	Chile	1.1	Ukraine	0.5
14.	Spain	0.9	Russia	0.5
15.	France	0.8	Australia	0.3
16.	Mexico	0.8	Ireland	0.3
17.	Argentina	0.7	France	0.2
18.	Uruguay	0.5	Denmark	0.2
19.	Sweden	0.5	Belgium	0.2
20.	Canada	0.4		
21.	Iran	0.4		
22.	Israel	0.4		
23.	India	0.3		
24.	Iceland	0.3		
25.	Brazil	0.2		

Source: Artprice © 2008

Kingdom (8.5%). However, this West-centric constellation has not remained unchallenged ten years later. In 2007, art from China rose up to the league of central countries (29.8%), while approaching the leading position of the United States rather closely, with a share that is only 0.1% lower. In the same year, the position of Germany weakened (32–12.5%). It fell back to the fourth position, being excelled by the rise of artists from the United Kingdom (8.5–13%).

In comparison, such strong changes are not evident in the global exhibition space, which is marked by more inertia (cf. Table 10.2). While one can recognize shifts within the US–German duopoly from 1998 to 2007,⁸

Table 10.2 Countries of origin of the leading contemporary visual artists in the global exhibition space, 1998 and 2007

1998			2007	
Rank	Country	Percentage share	Country	Percentage share
1.	United States	38.5	United States	33.0
2.	Germany	15.1	Germany	18.8
3.	France	8.5	United Kingdom	12.6
4.	Switzerland	5.8	France	5.0
5.	United Kingdom	4.7	Austria	4.0
6.	Italy	4.6	Belgium	3.6
7.	Japan	3.6	Switzerland	3.5
8.	Denmark	3.0	Japan	2.1
9.	Austria	2.6	South Africa	1.8
10.	Belgium	1.9	Canada	1.7
11.	Romania	1.7	Slovenia	1.4
12.	Netherlands	1.7	Mexico	1.4
13.	Sweden	1.5	Ukraine	1.2
14.	Ukraine	1.3	Denmark	1.0
15.	Canada	1.2	Serbia	0.9
16.	Argentina	1.0	Romania	0.8
17.	India	0.9	Netherlands	0.8
18.	China	0.9	Spain	0.8
19.	Australia	0.8	Poland	0.8
20.	Lebanon	0.7	Lebanon	0.8
21.			Italy	0.8
22.			Cuba	0.7
23.			China	0.7
24.			Argentina	0.6
25.			Albania	0.6
26.			India	0.6

Source: Artfacts.net © 2008

the overall dominance of these two northwestern countries has remained largely unchallenged. They continued to command most specific symbolic capital, with a share of more than 50% (from 53.6% in 1998 to 51.8% in 2007).

The impression of inertia is amplified if one further interrogates how much countries outside the Northwest could improve their overall share from 1998 to 2007, as summarized in Table 10.3. It rises by merely 2.9% (from 10.9% to 13.8%). This stands in stark contrast to the global auction market, where the share of non-northwestern countries almost

Table 10.3 Share of non-northwestern countries among the leading 100 contemporary visual artists of the global auction market and the global exhibition space, 1998 and 2007

(a) Global auction market		(b) Global exhibition space	
1998	2007	1998	2007
14.5%	40.9%	10.9%	13.8%

Sources: Artprice © 2008 | Artfacts.net © 2008

triples in the same period, increasing from 14.5% to 40.9%. This remarkable change is mainly due to the dramatic rise of China (0 to 29.8%), as detailed above. Yet it also results, to a lesser degree, from the rise of other Asian countries in the upper ranks, such as India (0 to 1.4%) and Korea (0 to 1%). And while South Africa (0 to 0.5%), Ukraine (0 to 0.5%), and Russia (0 to 0.5%) have also improved their position, the rise of non-northwestern countries in the global auction market can thus be largely attributed to the ascension of countries in Asia, most notably China.

The comparison between the upper tier of the global auction market and of the global exhibition space thus reveals that the latter is marked by a stronger tendency toward the reproduction of older center–periphery asymmetries. However, once one directs the focus to an analysis between cohorts, as reported in Table 10.4, one can discern changes in the structure of hierarchy in the specific symbolic dimension of inequalities in the global exhibition space, too. However, these changes follow a more gradual rhythm across cohorts. Indeed, as the field model would predict, one can find systematic variation between different age groups: the younger the cohort, the more decentralized and dewesternized the structure of hierarchy among countries.

For one, the number of the included countries more than doubles from the oldest to the youngest cohort, rising from 11 to 14, then to 20, and, finally, to 21. Moreover, the presence of non-northwestern countries rises significantly from 8.8% in the oldest cohort to 16% and 22.8% among the two middle cohorts to, finally, up to 27.9% in the youngest. Interestingly, a closer look reveals that the strongest jump occurs for the age group of artists born between 1957 and 1966. While it is outside the scope of this contribution to provide a complete explanation, it is helpful to keep in mind, as stated at the beginning of this section, that the

Table 10.4 Countries of origin of four cohorts of the leading visual artists in the global exhibition space, 2007

Cohort	Country	%	N Countries of origin	Percentage share of non-Western artists
<1945	United States	46.0	11	8.8
	Germany	19.9		
	United Kingdom	9.0		
	France	6.2		
	Austria	4.1		
	Japan	3.3		
	Ukraine	3.2		
	Canada	3.0		
	Serbia	2.3		
	Greece	1.5		
1946–56	Italy	1.5	14	16
	United States	41.4		
	Germany	22.3		
	Austria	6.2		
	South Africa	5.9		
	Italy	4.8		
	Japan	2.7		
	Switzerland	2.4		
	France	2.4		
	Lebanon	2.4		
	United Kingdom	2.4		
	Canada	2.1		
	India	2.0		
	Hungary	1.6		
Chile	1.4			
1957–66	United Kingdom	19.4	20	22.8
	Germany	16.0		
	United States	12.9		
	Belgium	12.2		
	Switzerland	5.4		
	Netherlands	5.4		
	Argentina	3.4		
	Algeria	3.0		
	Mexico	2.4		
	Romania	2.4		
	France	2.3		
	Spain	2.2		
	Cuba	2.1		
	China	1.8		
Brazil	1.7			

(continued)

Table 10.4 (continued)

Cohort	Country	%	<i>N</i> Countries of origin	Percentage share of non-Western artists
1967–76	Bulgaria	1.6	21	27.9
	Lithuania	1.6		
	Australia	1.4		
	Ireland	1.4		
	Japan	1.4		
	United Kingdom	23.0		
	United States	13.7		
	Germany	10.6		
	Poland	8.6		
	Denmark	6.0		
	Austria	5.1		
	Mexico	3.0		
	China	2.9		
	Albania	2.7		
	Brazil	2.4		
	Netherlands	2.4		
	Italy	2.3		
	Sweden	2.3		
	Belgium	2.2		
	Switzerland	2.1		
	Estonia	2.1		
Israel	2.0			
Algeria	1.7			
Venezuela	1.7			
South Africa	1.7			
Romania	1.5			

Source: Artfacts.net © 2008

globalization of the art field has gained momentum since the end of the 1980s—regarding both the formation of global institutional circuits and the rise of global art discourses. This coincides with the period when the artists in this cohort stood largely at the beginning of their careers. Thus, in view of the global transformations that were underway at that time, this age group can be considered as the first actual “global generation” regarding the globally expanded context in which it could operate.

In the global auction market, by comparison, similar systematic variations across cohorts cannot be observed. Here, there are no linear transformations, but rather volatile patterns (cf. Table 10.5). The

Table 10.5 Countries of origin of four cohorts among the top 500 visual artists in the global auction market, 2007

Cohort	Country	%	Number	Percentage share of non-Western artists
<1945	United States	43.3	13	23.0
	Germany	26.1		
	China	7.6		
	Colombia	5.1		
	Japan	4.3		
	United Kingdom	3.8		
	Italy	2.2		
	Romania	2.0		
	Russia	1.7		
	Australia	1.7		
	Spain	0.8		
	Ireland	0.8		
	Korea	0.6		
1946–56	United States	52.0	12	33.3
	China	21.7		
	Germany	9.2		
	India	4.3		
	Japan	3.7		
	Italy	3.5		
	South Africa	2.2		
	United Kingdom	0.9		
	Cuba	0.7		
	Serbia	0.7		
	Denmark	0.6		
	Austria	0.5		
	1957–66	China		
United Kingdom		25.4		
Japan		3.7		
United States		3.1		
Germany		2.3		
Spain		2.3		
Australia		0.6		
Switzerland		0.5		
Italy		0.5		
Brazil		0.5		
France		0.4		
India		0.4		
Ireland		0.4		

(continued)

Table 10.5 (continued)

Cohort	Country	%	Number	Percentage share of non-Western artists
1967–76	China	29.5	12	48.6
	Germany	15.3		
	United States	15.2		
	United Kingdom	15.2		
	India	10.2		
	Denmark	4.7		
	Indonesia	2.8		
	Poland	2.6		
	Korea	1.3		
	Kenya	1.2		
	Italy	1.0		
	Japan	1.0		

Source: Artprice © 2008

overall number of countries changes from 13 to 12, then to 13, and, finally, to 12. And although the share of countries outside the northwest increases between the oldest and the youngest age group, a non-linear pattern is virulent, beginning from 23% to 33.3%, and 65.1% down to 48.6%. While such more volatile dynamics might be the result of an array of complex factors, they confirm the hypothesis that the commercial pole principally differs in patterns of change across cohorts.

Taken together, the findings of this section suggest that changes of center–periphery asymmetries at the level of cultural production have occurred in both the specific symbolic and the economic dimension, but that they follow different temporalities. Whereas the global auction market is characterized by a comparatively rapid, yet principally more volatile pattern, the global exhibition space is marked by cycles of *longue durée*, characteristic of more autonomous subspaces with charismatic structure in which change tends to unfold across cohorts. In this sense, the field model of a dual symbolic economy—with its theoretically grounded distinction of different dimensions of hierarchies and respective logics of change—leads us to question a totalizing dichotomy between change and reproduction. By distinguishing different segments of a globalizing art

field, one can discover more complex dynamics of change, marked by the simultaneity of shorter and longer cycles in which transformations of center–periphery configurations at the level of cultural production occur.

Asymmetric Interdependencies and the Globalization of Strategies

Having explored dynamics of center–periphery asymmetries at the level of cultural production, this last section illuminates how globalization in the contemporary visual arts has affected place-based center–periphery relations. In this regard too, I propose to go beyond a reproduction perspective. The latter holds that, despite globalization, the overarching locus of control has remained in Western centers, and that intermediaries from these centers—which group into “informal academies” with shared conventions—continue to prefer artists from central Western countries as a strategy to minimize the risk of selection in a highly uncertain evaluation process (Quemin 2002, 131ff., 147–55).

By contrast, directing the focus from a small elite in Western centers to globalizing field-level dynamics leads us to a more dynamic and relational view in two ways: first, an artistic field is a space of constant contestation over specific forms of capital which no group can control permanently. In global fields, such struggles assume cross-continental dimensions. Indeed, in the contemporary visual arts, globalization has entailed the morphological and geographic expansion of intermediary and institutional players that seek to position themselves in an emerging global game, both from the centers and from the peripheries (Buchholz 2013). Thus, instead of the perpetuation of one-sided control at Western centers, a global space of rivalry is emerging. Second, and related, in the wake of such global transformations, the strategies of selection and support among gatekeepers can themselves globalize. This applies both to intermediaries at the centers, which support artists from (non-Western) peripheries, and, conversely, to more peripheral locations, which support art from the centers to enhance their legitimacy in the global arena and

to promote their own artists more effectively. These field-level dynamics—which I will illustrate next with regard to the global exhibition space—indicate that it is fertile to go beyond a binary and deterministic view of dominating Western centers versus dependent (non-Western) peripheries. Rather, in a period of accelerated globalization, we can conceive of both as becoming increasingly interdependent through an emerging global logic and related competitive exchanges, leading to complex, multidirectional, and yet *asymmetric* interdependencies (Straubhaar 1991).

To consider at first transformations in regard to (semi-)peripheries: over the past decades, art institutions for exhibiting “international” contemporary art have considerably spread around the world, beyond the traditional Western strongholds. Indeed, by 2011, they reached 92 countries on six continents (Buchholz 2013). Yet, crucial is not just the mere fact of diffusion. More importantly, this development entailed that (semi-)peripheral locations have assumed a greater share in the dynamics of cross-border flows and valuation of successful “international” contemporary artists. For example, if we examine the exhibition activities of US American artists who were part of the top 100 league in 1998 and 2007, we see a clear dynamic of territorial expansion, with an increasing involvement of exhibition institutions at more peripheral sites. Whereas in 1998, the leading US American artists were exhibited in 24 countries, in 2007, their exhibitions considerably expanded to 45 countries.⁹ More important in this context, the number of exhibition sites outside the dominant Northwest significantly increased in the same period from 8 to 21. To be sure, these locations’ relative significance in the global culture game should not be overestimated. Yet such figures signal that the conditions of cross-border flows and valuation of art from the centers have become more global, encompassing the increased involvement of exhibition institutions beyond the Western centers.

At first glance, these dynamics may suggest simply an expansion of art institutions in dependent peripheries that dutifully adhere to reproducing dominant Western aesthetic positions. However, interviews with representatives of art institutions that exhibited US American art in 2007 suggest a more complex competitive impetus, which even lends itself to usurpation.¹⁰ All of the interrogated exhibition spaces understood

themselves as “international” in their mission and practice, both in view of self-presentations on their website and of statements made during the interviews.¹¹ Yet while respondents remained generally vague about the criteria that qualify an institution as “international,” several converged with the assumption that it is important to stage exhibitions with artists who are “internationally” acclaimed.

When asked more specifically about the reasons for exhibiting art from the United States, most rejected the idea that the institution’s choices would be based on explicit considerations of the “nationality” of an artist; that is, that specific artists would be chosen because they are US American. Nevertheless, at the same time, interviewees stated that it is crucial to present “US American” artists, saying, for instance, that it is “very important to have them,” that “of course we try to get them,” or that “it is very significant, of course . . . one cannot claim an international position without showing them.” Thus, in a globalizing art field, the most successful national art traditions seem to be credited with more universal cultural legitimacy. This intricate symbolic mediation between dominant “national” artistic positions and their assumed “universal” artistic authority becomes more apparent in remarks that justify the importance of US American artists with reference to nonnational categories, stating that they have assumed a “very strong cultural influence over the world since the 1950’s and 1960’s,” that “modern art history is very focused on US American art,” or, as one respondent put it, that “they have a very high quality; [that] they were and to some extent still are in the contemporary spearhead of art world culture, which means that our artists are sort of in a dialogue with American artists, which means that they are close to new thinking in the arts, which we of course are.”

Given the universal aesthetic authority attributed to established US American art and statements that the “international” legitimacy of an exhibition space is partly defined by the kind of internationally acclaimed work it shows, the interviews convey that art institutions in more peripheral non-northwestern contexts import dominant Western art to also enhance their own symbolic standing. Importantly, such dynamics do not stand in opposition to local loyalties. On the contrary, most institutions saw it as one of their tasks to support the work of artists from their own countries. The import of aesthetic positions

with “universal” appeal would thereby allow to build up a “context” for their promotion in the first place—creating greater visibility, while constructing a symbolic bridge for a “dialogue” between established global and more emerging local aesthetic positions. In this sense, art institutions at (semi-)peripheries that display globally recognized aesthetic positions do not so much operate within a simple logic of dependency. By thereby striving to strengthen their own symbolic position and to become more forceful in supporting “local” artists, they actually engage in intricate strategies of usurpation.

Conversely, to direct the focus to developments at centers: here, a closer analysis of the exhibition sites of non-northwestern artists from the two youngest cohorts of globally leading artists (cf. Table 10.4) reveals the globalization of strategies among intermediaries. In the period from 1998 to 2007, 93% of the leading non-northwestern artists had the highest number of exhibitions in a dominant Northwestern country. In fact, the United States and Germany figure clearly as the two most important contexts for the showcasing of their work: 60% among them had the majority of their exhibitions in the United States, 18% in Germany, and 11% in France.¹² These proportions imply that globalization did not go unnoticed among gatekeepers in Western core countries, too. It affected also their logic of competition and position-takings: the extension of the field and growing interculturalization in the arts (Zijlmans 2007) seem to have contributed to a greater propensity for heterodox choices and strategies of distinction vis-à-vis West-centric artistic orthodoxies.

The emerging global outlook and its cohort-related support can be illustrated by paying attention to the evolution of global art discourses (Buchholz 2013). Since the new millennium, such discourses gained in momentum and greater take-for-granted status, signaling a growing belief in the global as an actually existing (immanent) condition for contemporary art and its institutional landscape. In this vein, they also became associated with stronger appeals to rethink institutional strategies and curatorial methodologies and norms. A ground-breaking and widely discussed example in this context was the global restructuring of the prestigious *Documenta* exhibition in 2002. By breaking up the exhibition structure into a “series of events” that crisscrossed “the globe,” the Documenta XI was interpreted to contribute to the invention of a new

“global exhibition” genre. Importantly, the curators explained their innovative approach not only with reference to a critique of the Documenta’s Eurocentric past. They justified it also in relation to an actually existing global present and future, for example, when they argued that it was the current “global moment” that required a “reevaluation” of this institution’s “methodology.”

Interestingly, the director and lead curator Okwui Enwezor (born 1963) was not only Nigerian in origin, but also falls into the same age group as the first, more global cohort of leading contemporary artists (cf. Table 10.4). As the established *Artforum International* reported, in the new millennium, other curators from the same age group too underlined their plans to pursue a “global perspective” or “global issues” at the time of their appointment to established art exhibition spaces in London and Paris—as if such an expanded vision was seen as a critical component for innovative curatorial work. Yet, the strengthening of an emerging global outlook is perhaps nowhere more discernible than in the way in which the accusation of the *lack* of a “global perspective” against the curator of the 2007 Venice biennial—the established and older Robert Storr (born 1949)—could inflame a whole controversy in the same prestigious *Artforum*, involving heated justifications, counterarguments, and clarifications among other more established exhibition-makers, too. To be sure, while further systematic research is required to specify the globalization of curatorial strategies at Western centers, these findings implicate that an account of artistic selection processes in Western centers that relies on the idea of risk-averse “informal academies” is not sufficiently complex. It implies a too consensual and static model of strategies of aesthetic selection and distinction among cultural intermediaries that operate in the artistic core.

Conclusion

Taking the contemporary visual arts as a case, this chapter has addressed a central question in debates about the globalization of culture, namely as to what extent global transformations affect older center–periphery hierarchies in realms of cultural production. Theoretically, I argue that to

engage with this question, it is necessary to analytically distinguish clearly between inequalities in terms of geographic places and in view of the cross-border success of cultural producers from different parts of the world. Additionally, I argue for the importance to theorize more specifically how dynamics of inequalities can diverge in different segments of the same globalizing cultural universe. In this regard, I make the case for a globally extended field approach as one fertile path for developing a more differentiated understanding in view of differences between cultural–institutional and economic global art spaces.

Against this background, the chapter has empirically examined the evolution of country inequalities in the global exhibition space and the global auction market. This analysis reveals that transformations of center–periphery hierarchies at the level of cultural production have occurred in both cultural and economic cross-border art spaces, but that they follow different temporalities. Characteristic of relatively autonomous subspaces with charismatic structure, changes in the global exhibition space tend to unfold more gradually in cycles of *longue durée*, mediated across cohorts.

Finally, the chapter also explored how globalization in the contemporary visual arts has affected place-based center–periphery relations. Focusing on dynamics of cross-border flows in the global exhibition space, I argue that, in a period of accelerated globalization, geographic center–periphery configurations in the arts do not have to remain static and one-sidedly determinist. A holistic field-level approach reveals increasingly interdependent dynamics, albeit in a principally asymmetric constellation. Peripheries can employ strategies of usurpation that simultaneously strengthen the established artistic orthodoxies of the centers, but may also challenge their status in the long run. Centers in turn remain not completely independent and static. They are themselves affected by an emerging global logic, which also manifests itself in the rise of cosmopolitan strategies of showcasing art from “non-Western” peripheries.

Overall, the chapter underlines that the question of whether globalization has affected older center–periphery configurations cannot be answered in a totalizing fashion. A global field approach offers a multidimensional and relational perspective. It allows to uncover a variety and, partially, even contradictory set of processes. Together, they suggest

going beyond the dichotomy between reproduction and radical change. The intermediate, transformational view that I advocate acknowledges that global transformations over the past three decades have had effects on an older West-centric order and related practices of mediation, without, however, going into the opposite extreme and proclaiming its complete demise.

Notes

1. Sapiro (2010) has demonstrated the usefulness of this distinction for examining effects of globalization on diversity in the French and US American national book market, but has not extended its implications to an examination of center–periphery dynamics at the global level.
2. Information on the database as provided in 2008 in an interview with a specialist working for *Artprice*.
3. *Artfacts* assigns “exhibition points” on a multidimensional basis according to the logic of a weighted index for visibility and reputation, mainly considering: (a) the number of artists participating. It thereby assigns the following weighing of points: solo shows > duo shows > group shows; (b) the type of institution: public institutions with a permanent art collection (usually international art museums) > no permanent collection (such as contemporary art centers); (c) geographic location: capital cities with vast numbers of museums and galleries > small cities or towns; (d) the international reputation of other artists who participate in the exhibition. These dimensions are related in a series of equations for determining the weighed sum of an artist’s exhibition points, which yields a ranking of his or her international visibility. For a theoretical and methodological justification of this international reputation index, see *Artfacts.net* (2003).
4. As the director of *Artfacts* underlined in an interview in Spring 2012, the index seeks to represent the evaluation of professional curators, that is, “the curator’s point of view,” and not the judgment of dealers. Thus, *Artfacts* deliberately excludes information on the market success of artists.
5. In contrast to an alternative indicator for international artistic prestige (the *Kunst-Kompass* ranking), the *Artfacts* ranking seems a more reliable source. Instead of drawing from surveys of subjective judgments by art

professionals (whose design may change over time, such as in the *Kunst-Kompass* ranking), the *Artfacts* list is derived from a set of objective algorithms that are deployed across all exhibitions and years in a consistent way. Thus, the data source offers a more reliable indicator of artistic recognition for analyzing trends over time. Another benefit is the relational logic of the database in the sense that artists are qualified by the status of the exhibitions, cities, other artists, and so on with which they become associated as well as by the strength of these relationships. Such a measurement logic does not only correspond with the relational perspective of the field approach (cf. Bourdieu 1996, 166–73); it also has been empirically validated for understanding “the dynamics of artistic prestige” at a more local level (De Nooy 2002).

6. The sample included only living visual artists who were born in 1925 or after, corresponding to the birth year of Robert Rauschenberg, the oldest core member of Pop Art. This style was chosen as a reference point for defining the selection of artists because it represents a turning point for the historical emergence of “contemporary art” (cf. Crane 1987) as defined by Moulin (2003, 39).
7. That was the maximum size that could be obtained for *all* age groups in *both* rankings. More specifically, as the *Artprice*’s base source for sampling contained only 500 ranked visual artists (modern and contemporary) for 2007, the youngest cohort that could be sampled reached the number of 40 artists only.
8. In view of the relative position of artists from the United States, which changed from 38.5% to 33%, and from Germany, with an increase from 15.1% to 18.8%.
9. Information about the geographic distribution of exhibitions of US American artists was derived from *Artfacts*, which lists for each artist the institutions and locations by year in which they have presented their work.
10. In 2008, ten semi-structured phone interviews were conducted with directors or leading representatives of the group of art institutions in non-northwestern countries that exhibited US American artists in 2007. These art institutions were selected at random among the total of respective exhibition spaces. The interviewees included English-speaking art professionals in China, Estonia, Israel, Hungary, Singapore, Brazil, Poland, and South Korea. Each interview lasted at least half an hour.

11. The prevalent emic term used was “international,” rather than global. The findings from the interviews suggest however equivalency with the way the term global is used in this contribution, namely as referring to a scale that is multicontinental, that is, covers several continents. For this territorial qualification of the concept “global,” see Held et al. (2003).
12. The data are again derived from the documentation of exhibition activities and respective locations in the *Artfacts* database.

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11

“It’s a Mad Mad Mad Mad (Men) World”: National and Corporate Strategies in the Global Audiovisual Market

Diane Barthel-Bouchier

In 2014, the French-produced film *Welcome to New York*, directed by Abel Ferrara, made waves by opening online rather than by means of the customary theater run. The producers saw this marketing maneuver as a protest against French legislation that requires a delay of several months from a film’s theater opening to its availability in alternative formats (DVD or online) and an additional delay before it appears on television (TV). The producers were able to use this maneuver only because the film had not received a *centime* of French funding. With its 100% funding by American sources, it was able to open simultaneously in theaters and online in the United States, where regulation of the audiovisual industry differs from that of France.

This is only one example of how the global audiovisual industry has assumed a complicated pattern of national and international marketing techniques. It also suggests some of the innovative strategies facilitated by the introduction of new technologies and alternative outlets. Some of these strategies revolve around the classic tension between film as art and film

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as entertainment, others between the desire to protect national cultural industries (or even simply cultural values, where such industries are not present) and the attractiveness of cultural products coming in from other nations, such as the United States. Formerly national audiovisual production companies have become truly international corporations, with their products finely tuned to succeed in a variety of markets. One significant result of this process is increased domination of a neoliberal model of global commercialization, with films that do not fit this model needing to resort to alternative forms of marketing.

Previous theories have tried to understand the global audiovisual market in terms of US cultural imperialism, or the popularity of certain universal themes, or more purely economic analyses (Fu 2006). I argue here that we need to first understand the complex environment in which audiovisual companies operate. This environment represents a set of marketing opportunities and constraints at the intersection of the global and the national. After first reviewing some relevant theoretical considerations, I will discuss the various strategies that have been used by nation-states and corporations to respond to globalization in general and to US dominance in particular. Then, I will consider how new technologies help further the interest of dominant players while providing space for innovation and social criticism.

Theorizing the Global Audiovisual Market

It is widely acknowledged that Hollywood dominates the global audiovisual market. Hollywood accounts for more than 70% of film tickets sold in most of the countries of the world. By comparison, European films account for less than 4% of films in the US market. Only six national markets remain totally closed to US films for political reasons, namely Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria (Farchy 2011, 122).

Fu (2006) provides three different theoretical explanations for the imbalance among nations as audiovisual exporters and for the ever-increasing dominance of Hollywood. To some, such dominance is a form of cultural imperialism through which the powerful media conglomerates, aided by US government policies, spread American values throughout the world.

The result is a cultural hegemony that crushes indigenous cultures and all resistance to cultural images and their ideological content (e.g., Lee 1980; Rantanen 2002).¹ The cultural studies school, by contrast, sees media domination not as promoting specifically US popular culture and American ideology. Rather, it views such domination as resulting from the decision of media giants to attack the global market by creating films that present universal themes and that rely on the sense-stimulating appeal. Thus, a film such as *The Bourne Identity* attracts global audience not so much because it glorifies American lifestyles but because it draws on universal themes of resistance and victory against the odds, all the while providing some love interest. A TV series such as *The Simpsons* becomes a global phenomenon because of its offbeat approach to families in general, not American families in particular (Kuipers 2008). Finally, what Fu calls the economic approach is based on the assumption that the sheer size and buying power of the North American market, extended through other English-speaking nations, leads to greater profit-maximizing investment, which, in turn, creates export dominance. Drawing on the work of Wildman and Siwek (1988), Fu writes, "the highly commercial and competitive industry fuels the scope and variety of its movie production output, which in turn advances the movies' acceptance both domestically and internationally" (Fu 2006, 815).

While these three approaches are presented as alternative explanations for the globalizing audiovisual market in general and the dominance of Hollywood in particular, in fact they are not mutually exclusive. The economic approach, descriptive of a structural situation, can easily coexist with either the cultural imperialist or the cultural studies approach, each of which has more to contribute regarding implied agency. Each of these two more interpretive approaches appears inadequate to the task of comprehending the complex audiovisual industries, most particularly because their contrast between particularistic national values and universal themes and values simply does not fit the data. A TV program can present a universal theme (heroism) in a particular setting (Brooklyn or Mumbai). It can approach such content in a respectful or even celebratory fashion, or in a manner more critical, satirical, or ironic. A film can wittingly or unwittingly be read on several levels. For example, on one level, a film can be critical of a government action (war, repression), while nonetheless presenting images of lifestyles that will be viewed positively in other nations.

Research demonstrates that overseas audiences differ markedly in how they evaluate US film and TV programs (Antonini and Kuipers 2008; Meers 2004; Rohter 2013). Not only can audiences engage in “discrepant readings”; producers and directors themselves may not be able to distinguish clearly which elements of their films or TV series speak to universal values and which are ideological. Clearly, many US values are dear to other nations, and thus can be read as either universalistic or particularistic. For example, if US citizens value liberty and equality, so too do the French, who of course add “fraternity.” Thus, a better starting point might be to concentrate on identifying the different strategies available to multinational audiovisual corporations and to the smaller national industries as they compete to increase market share. This would include examination of the activities of the major studios in different national contexts, a fertile field as the work of Kamp (2009) demonstrates, as well as the different relationships formed by national film industries of other nations with their major markets.² Such a study would also include tracking the different alliances being formed between and among the major and smaller players, and how this is reflected in the actual content of films.

In addition to the above, the global audiovisual industry can be seen as a field of power (Bourdieu 1993; Heise and Tudor 2007). What clearly differs from the classic Bourdieusian definition of field is, however, the role of the state. While Bourdieu saw the state as constituting the field of power par excellence, here specific states are themselves players who both struggle to protect their domestic market and battle for export shares abroad. It is to a consideration of the strategies available to them that we now turn.

Governmental Strategies

International Trade Agreements

Since the earliest days of the film industry, nation-states have used trade agreements to pursue their economic ends. Indeed, Great Britain imposed trade quotas in 1927 to protect its nascent film industry against the

unfurling wave of US films. While the postwar period yielded important financial and political agreements, the United States refused in 1948 to support the creation of a World Trade Organization (WTO), believing that the proposals provided too little protection for free trade. As a result, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947, initially intended as a stop-gap measure, assumed a permanent quality, with subsequent rounds of negotiation clarifying its purposes and extending its jurisdiction. The Uruguay Round, initiated in 1986 in Punta del Este, took up the important topics of services and intellectual property. Under the latter topic, films were included, especially full-length productions, and TV shows such as serials, dramas, and documentaries that made good exports, as opposed to talk shows or news programs with a shorter period of relevance and often a narrower level of geographic interest.³

The most recent development in terms of international agreements dates from 2001, when France and Canada spearheaded an effort to protect national cultural industries that resulted in the UNESCO's (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. This Declaration read, in part, "Market forces alone cannot guarantee the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity, which is necessary for sustainable human development." This declaration helped pave the way for a convention that was passed in 2005 by a vote of 145 for and only two nation-states against (the United States and Israel). Although diplomats discoursed about cultural diversity and culture "not being for sale," it was precisely because culture *was* and *is* for sale that the convention was first proposed and then passed so overwhelmingly. The heart of the matter is contained in Article 20, which states that the new convention would have the same status as other existing legal instruments, such as those of the WTO and/or bilateral trade agreements. More specifically, the purpose of the statement was to separate out cultural goods from the then-upcoming WTO meeting in Hong Kong. Thus, they were not so much removed from the global market as given special treatment on the market.⁴

In theory, the convention's emphasis on diversity could be seen as opening up opportunities for films from independent producers in a wide variety of social settings to critique not just the forces of globalization, but also specific political policies and programs within their own

nation-states. In practice, the convention may have reinforced the power of national governments to control audiovisual products. For the United Nations (UN), cultural diversity is defined as that occurring *between* nation-states, where diversity *within* nation-states is more problematic and often associated with divisiveness (Tomlinson 1991). Thus, the convention added legitimacy to nation-states that had developed or were in the process of developing strategies to manage internal markets and to control the entrance of audiovisual products from foreign competitors.

Protectionism

UN conventions and global trade agreements have had only limited effect in restricting the penetration of Hollywood audiovisual products into foreign markets. Consider, for example, the US presence in Europe. If we take the top 20 commercial successes in Europe in 2008, a full 18 were American productions or coproductions, including the top four. Fewer than 10% of European films travel outside their country of origin. As for programming on European TV channels, in 2007, 23% of imported programs came from other European nations, while 61% came from outside of Europe (Farchy 2011, 124).

The superior marketing clout of the Hollywood studios has led European nations to develop protectionist practices. France, in particular, has developed a complicated system of quotas, taxes, and subsidies to support its audiovisual industries. As Scott writes, “There is indeed virtually no corner of the industry that is not touched in one way or another by the visible hand of the state” (2000, 12; see also Gournay 2002; Regourd 2004). The *Centre Nationale du Cinéma*, founded in 1946, oversees the central support fund for the film industry. Its monies come primarily from a tax of approximately 11% charged on all film admissions and from a tax of 5.5% on the revenues of TV networks.⁵

These policies have encouraged heavy investment by French TV, most notably the cable channel Canal Plus, in films. These films appear on TV only a short time after opening in movie theaters (often only a matter of months) and enjoy a tremendous popularity. By the early 1990s, there were more than 20 TV viewers for every viewer who paid for theater

admission (Farchy 1992). It is also important to note that French law requires that 60% of all films shown on TV must be of European origin, of which 40% must be French (Scott 2000, 11). In addition, the French government has also established mechanisms for encouraging private investment in film as well as loan guarantees to support fundraising by producers (ibid., 15).⁶

Other European nations also provide internal sources of support for their audiovisual industries. In smaller nations such as Scotland or the Netherlands, the particular institutional structures associated with subsidies can end up creating disincentives as well as incentives. Kamp (2009) demonstrates how a switch in strategy from supporting films as art to films as a commercial product in the Netherlands led to increased availability of tax supports and revenues for Dutch filmmakers. It also, however, encouraged the Hollywood major studios to invest in the Netherlands, who found in this improved financial climate another means for continuing their dominance over the local industry.

Asian nations have also had to develop strategies for balancing the need to protect internal production with the power of transnational media giants. Among these strategies one finds a range of restrictive measures, including active or latent suppression (Thomas 2005, 75). Several Asian nations impose quotas on external audiovisual products. For example, South Korea requires that over 50% of all film programming must be Korean and over 80% of TV programs must also be Korean. China recently revised its own quota system to allow more foreign films to be shown, but these still need the approval of the censorship board. As Cieply and Barnes write, "Studios are quickly discovering that a key to access in China is the inclusion of Chinese actors, storylines and locations. But the more closely a film examines China, the more likely it is to collide with shifting standards, unwritten rules, and unfamiliar political powers who hold sway over what can be seen on the country's roughly 12,000 movie screens" (2013, B6). Indeed, objections were even raised over the seemingly innocuous *Kung Fu Panda*, purportedly for profaning a nationally revered animal. Such controls can obviously have a chilling effect on innovation, as producers adopt conservative strategies and self-censure even before facing state control boards.⁷

India is in a different position compared with China. With its thriving Bollywood industry, which in a typical year produces more than double the number of films produced by Hollywood, it dominates its own national audience while reaching out to the Indian diaspora around the world. Language barriers and cultural traditions serve to protect this industry and restrict the presence of Hollywood films largely to the major urban centers. Nigeria's film industry (Nollywood) has specialized in producing small-budget films that now also outnumber Hollywood films. Most of these films are seen not in regular cinemas but rather in make-shift theaters throughout the country. Much of Africa remains very open to dominance by foreign companies. Farchy cites a 1999 UNESCO report that showed that Africa produced only 42 full-length films annually and imported 2811, while the Arab countries showed ten times more foreign films than domestic (2011, 138).

TV in developing nations also reveals the penetration of the major audiovisual companies, and not just those that are US or UK owned. As Thomas points out, both Japan and Mexico have found a place for their products in the global market. He points to the Japanese program *Oshin*, which has been broadcast in over 30 countries (Thomas 2006, 27). With its total TV audience estimated at anywhere between 500 and 700 million and an impressive growth rate, Asia represents a particularly attractive market. Major broadcasters active in Asia include such global channels as CNN and BBC World for news and ESPN, MTV, HBO, MGM, and Disney for entertainment. These are in addition to a number of regional channels such as StarTV, Channel News Asia, and Sony ET, as well as national channels (Thomas 2005, 25; see also Bouissou 2013).

In Latin America, genre plays a major role in determining which programs are imported and from where, with telenovelas from within the region widely shown, and other programs such as action series often imported from the United States. Mexico's Televisu and Brazil's Globo have proved particularly successful in penetrating Hispanic markets worldwide through program production and satellite TV (Thomas 2006, 27–28). By contrast, most TV in Africa is imported from elsewhere, with indigenous production held back by a number of factors. These include the diversity of languages and the high rate of poverty in rural areas, which restrict the TV audience largely to urban centers.

International Alliances

The major Hollywood studios have long drawn on what they have considered the best of foreign talent in screenwriting, directing, acting, and technical support (Barnier and Moine 2002; Schwartz 2007; Viviani 2007). Coproductions have also existed for decades, often encouraged by national and supranational legislation and taxation policies.⁸ By comparison, the rise in transnational mergers and acquisitions across national borders is relatively more recent. These mergers often end up melding distinctive cinematic traditions. Some of the major studios once closely identified with American society are now under non-US ownership (Marling 2006; Scott 2005). The Japanese arrived first, as Sony bought Columbia in 1989 and Matsushita acquired MCA-Universal in 1990, only to sell it in 1995. In the 1990s, the Europeans, including German (Intaertainment, Kinowelt), French (Canal+, Vivendi, Pathé), and Italian (Eagle and Medusa) companies, bought into the US studios (Farchy 2011, 126). Recent years have seen Hollywood, the most profitable film industry, join forces with Bollywood, the most prolific, in a variety of ventures. These include the investment of some \$500 million by the Indian conglomerate Reliance ADA Group in Steven Spielberg's DreamWorks. On the one hand, innovative films can result from such alliances, while, on the other hand, industry consolidation may reduce opportunities for independent filmmaking.

In principle, such alliances can be based on either horizontal or vertical consolidation. Chantepie and Le Diberder provide the example of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, which branched out from its original stronghold in the written press to acquire a powerful position in US cinema and information (Fox), and also a strength in Italian and German pay-per-view TV and in Asia with its Star network (2010, 100–101). Major film studios are globally present in distribution, although the desire to form exclusive alliances between Hollywood content and alternative outlets has proven more difficult, insofar as new information technology has increased competition through the multiplication of networks available.

Extending Market Exposure

As opposed to these measures designed to protect industries internally and give them a chance against powerful foreign producers, other measures available to nation-states seeking to increase exports include more active and aggressive marketing at film festivals and trade fairs. Baumann (2001) has demonstrated how the creation of film festivals, beginning largely in the post-1960 period, was instrumental in supporting the movie industry's claims for its products as constituting an art form. Amid the awarding of prizes and associated glamour, it must not be forgotten that such festivals are also major arenas for the marketing of films, with Cannes providing the largest arena for international deal-making. Camilleri (2007, 150) describes some of the pros and cons involved for studios in including festival participation as part of a marketing strategy. The financial costs alone for a film presentation can run into hundreds of thousands of dollars; such participation may also require changes in the film's date of release. Although a positive reception can provide an important marketing boost, there is always the risk that a mixed or negative reception will cancel out all other marketing initiatives.

Some festivals focus specifically on innovative films, such as New York's New Directors/New Films, which showcases the work of little-known directors from around the world, or the *Un Certain Regard* rubric of the Cannes Film Festival, which also presents innovative films that might otherwise be overlooked. Such critical attention does not, however, guarantee commercial success. For example, the Turkish director Nuri Bilge Ceylan won the Cannes Best Director prize for *The Three Monkeys* in 2008, but the film attracted only 130,000 viewers within Turkey itself, where an indigenous cinema based more on entertainment values dominates (Farchy 2011, 122).

By contrast, much of the global marketing of TV programs happens at four major trade fairs or conventions held annually. The NATPE (National Association of Television Program Executives) convention is held in the United States every winter, and the MIPCOM and MIP-TV conventions take place in Cannes, France, every autumn and spring. In addition, Los Angeles (LA) Screenings holds a by-invitation-only event in LA in late May or early June. Each event attracts tens of thousands of participants, including not just TV executives but also owners of

Web-based businesses and marketers of new technologies (Bielby and Harrington 2008, 2). The NATPE events, originally conceived to showcase US programs, have developed to include a broader emphasis on technological developments across all media. The Cannes events are more focused and overall more businesslike, and the LA Screenings serve to market US prime-time series to overseas buyers (ibid., 2–9). In addition to these international fairs, national marketing events, such as NBC Universal's "Upfront" presentations, present a range of TV products to potential advertisers (Elliot 2014). All of these events provide important arenas for sales, not only of stock programs but also of concepts that can be adjusted to fit other cultural settings.

Additional Corporate Strategies: Form and Content

Global cinema can be conceived not only as a competition between different national cinemas but also as a struggle of small independents to survive in a field dominated by a relatively small number of major firms.⁹ Indeed, the scale of the operations of the major studios is so large and lucrative that they have increasingly concentrated their efforts on producing blockbusters (Elberse 2013; see also Odello 2013), which are usually released during the summer. Between the first weekend of May and the first weekend of September, US cinemas take in 40% of their annual sales. Films such as *Man of Steel* or *Iron Man 3* have production budgets in the range of USD 200 million and may cost another USD 150 million to market globally. Other blockbusters compete for audiences in the winter holiday season, but few appear during autumn or before April.¹⁰

In producing their blockbusters, the major studios have embraced the concept of marketing across audiences. For example, for *Iron Man 3*, 61% of the audience was male, but many families also viewed the film in theaters. As a Disney vice president commented: "This confirms our ambition at Disney to focus on movies that are everybody pictures" (Barnes 2013, C7). It is worth noting that the movie also broke records in important overseas markets, including China and Russia.

The major studios' reliance on blockbusters has created opportunities for smaller, more innovative companies. For example, Robert Simonds, a Hollywood producer, recently announced plans to form a studio in association with the Shanghai Media Group and with both US and Chinese financing. The proposed studio will specialize in films in the USD 40 million budget range that the big studios no longer feel are worth the effort but that can fill in the off-season at cinemas. Such films seldom lose money (Merced 2014). In addition, they often do very well globally, earning between 40% and 60% of their total gross outside of the United States (Barthel-Bouchier 2012a).

The marketing of US TV series has followed similar strategies to those of the major film studios in attempting to make programs that are culturally accessible to broad audiences and attractive across demographic categories. Given the importance of overseas markets, US producers demonstrate a global orientation in the development of programming. They take care to internationalize content, leaving out American cultural referents, which would only confuse foreign audiences, and keeping the content sufficiently vague such that these audiences can relate it to their own values and normative expectations.

The biggest market for US-produced TV series in Europe is France. In 2013, 58 of the top individual program emissions, in terms of audience, on French TV were episodes of American TV series such as *The Mentalist* or *Unforgettable* or *The Experts*. Taking the lists of top ten audiences recorded for programs of TV fiction during the period 2009–12, France counted 24 American programs. By way of comparison, in Great Britain and Italy, no American program was placed among the top ten during this four-year period. In Germany, there was only one program, and in Spain, there were four.¹¹ Media experts put this US dominance down to the weakening of French production and its tendency to stick to the old program formulas in the very period when American TV series were getting more creative and adventurous. One should also note the fact that US programs cost less: €300,000–500,000 per hour or approximately half of what a French series would cost and a fraction of what it costs to deliver a major sporting event (Piquard 2014).

While importing programs directly, foreign channels receive the right to adapt formats to fit different cultural expectations. They can adjust the pace of narrative developments or determine that a soap opera will have a basically open or closed format. Such has been the case with Britain's *Downton Abbey*, which has enjoyed a global success but has had to be in some instances condensed into fewer episodes per season, and in other cases, extended. Occasionally, certain scenes are edited out by censors. For example, Greek state TV cut a scene involving a kiss between two male actors (Egner 2013).

In the United States, networks have adapted the South American telenovela, usually shown daily, by making it a weekly prime-time program. One example of this is the success of *Ugly Betty*, adapted from Columbia's *Yo Soy Betty La Fea*. Along with importing new genres, US channels also import concepts. In spring 2013, numerous TV pilot series based on shows from Australia, Argentina, Britain, and Israel were in production. The US *All in the Family* was an American version of its equally successful British predecessor *Till Death Us Do Part*, and today's hit series *Homeland* was inspired by the Israeli *Prisoners of War*. Such cross-fertilization can result in critical programming that challenges the status quo, or it can simply provide new vehicles for its transmission and reinforcement.

Finally, there are also different linguistic strategies available for both film and TV series. For cinemas representative of smaller linguistic communities, one marketing strategy is to shoot two versions, one in the mother tongue and the other in English. For example, the Norwegian film *Kon Tiki* qualified for the US Oscars "Best Foreign Language Film" category because, though it was shot in Norwegian, the English-language version was the one that was marketed to audiences outside of Norway. France's Luc Besson takes the strategy one step further by sometimes shooting just in English, while Michel Hazanavicius avoided the problem altogether in the Academy Award-winning *The Artist* by making a silent film about silent films (Barthel-Bouchier 2012b). TV series also face the choice of being exported in the original English version, dubbed, or remade to suit different cultural contexts.

The Impact of New Technologies and Competing Outlets

A major challenge to the dominance of the major TV networks came from independent cable channels' replacement of their former reliance on repeats of old programs with an emphasis on their own new programs. The creation of successful series such as *Mad Men*, begun in 2007, allowed the cable channel AMC to dramatically increase fees charged to cable and satellite providers. This, in turn, forced the networks to enter into a quality war. As Davidson (2012, 22) argues, "Basic-cable channels have to broadcast shows that are so good that audiences will go nuts when denied them. Pay-TV channels, which kick-started this economic model, are compelled to make shows that are even better." This quality war has led to a greater willingness among producers to take innovative risks in terms of program content. One US example is the US company Netflix, which in 2014 expanded into the European market. Its highly successful program of Washington intrigue, *House of Cards*, is delivered via Internet. During the first three months of 2013, customers watched some four billion hours of streaming, which would make it the most watched cable TV network except, as one media commentator remarked, that "it isn't on cable, isn't on television, and isn't a network" (Carr 2013, B8).

There is also a generational element to the adoption of new technologies. Although older subscribers appear to tolerate the high fees charged by cable companies, younger generations are turning to file-sharing services such as BitTorrent to view their favorite series or waiting until they appear on iTunes. To the extent that new viewing habits based on new technologies destroy the power of cable cartels, they may also reduce the quality of the programs which are developed out of the enormous profits that the cable industry has generated in the past decade.

Another major advance has been the introduction of digital technologies. Dargis (2012, 50) cites the film theorist David Bordwell as saying, "[T]heaters' conversion from 35-millimeter film to digital presentation was designed by and for an industry that deals in mass output, saturation releases and quick turnover ... Given this shock-and-awe business plan, movies on film stock look wasteful." Indeed, in many different national

settings, both in the United States and abroad, the movement toward digital projection has forced the closure of many small theaters unwilling or unable to make the necessary investments. As the above citation suggests, it has also encouraged a rapid succession of films, in which smaller films that are not heavily marketed do not have the time to benefit from the traditional "word of mouth" publicity. This has had a chilling effect on innovation within the industry as a whole.

The consolidation among theater outlets has been accompanied by a movement away from movie theaters altogether. Many independent films end up being shown on the small screen rather than on the large one. Some that start in theaters are there only to receive critics' reviews or because of contract stipulations, and are quickly replaced by others. Distributors who base much of their activity on digital outlets have become among the most active buyers at film festivals, such as Sundance, whereas some independent filmmakers are bypassing both festivals and distributors altogether by putting their films out on a very limited release and making them available through digital outlets such as DirectTV (Barnes and Cieply 2014).

Despite these technological breakthroughs and their potential for innovation, big TV and film producers still dominate the market via a "winner take all" logic, in which their initial advantages are compounded. The largest audiences are still attracted first to the blockbusters and major TV series with their familiar stars. As Kersten (2012) demonstrates, these products tend to contain more conventional features than do others that pursue an artistic goal. Furthermore, new information technology has encouraged audiovisual audiences to participate in their own seduction. Fans are developing strategies, from blogs and Internet games to tweets sent in the guise of specific TV characters, that reveal the extent to which such global programs have found a place to live in the minds of their viewers (Rose 2011). It nonetheless remains the case that, by easing entry-level costs, digital technology *has* allowed independent producers to embark upon audiovisual projects that would otherwise prove prohibitive. This, in turn, has created important outlets for social criticism and innovative filmmaking, although whether such films find a significant audience often remains an issue (Elberse 2013).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that global marketing strategies have broken down national boundaries without, however, resulting in a uniform product. The market for audiovisual products is vast. It provides opportunities for cultural products that, as readily consumed forms of entertainment, reinforce the status quo. It also provides opportunities for films that raise troubling issues and/or that critique existing power and market relations. New technologies are providing important new outlets for critical and innovative voices. Overall, however, even critical audiovisual products rarely display reflexivity in challenging their own role as consumer products within a capitalist society.

Notes

1. Herbert Hoover is famously quoted as saying, in the 1930s, “In the countries where American films have penetrated, we sell twice as many American cars, American phonographs, American caps” (Farchy 2011, 132).
2. For example, France is very active in marketing its films, not just in Europe and the United States, but also in Japan and in francophone nations or regions such as Quebec.
3. In contrast to manufactured goods, what services and intellectual property had in common was a certain intangibility. By 1986, services and intellectual property had developed into a major sector of the global economy, worth more than USD 6000 billion annually and representing approximately 50% of the gross domestic product and 60% of the jobs in developed nations (Djian 2005, 135).
4. As Uricchio (1996) has remarked, national strategies that use trade negotiations such as those discussed here to further the interests of their audiovisual industries may reflect the taste of elite audiences more than they do those of the general movie-going public.
5. Smaller sums come from taxes on video sales and rentals and other miscellaneous sources. The sums collected are then distributed through a system involving automatic subsidies (by far the largest amount) through a competitive system of reimbursable advances on receipts (with special opportunities for first-time directors), and selective subsidies for improving film scenarios or developing film music (Scott 2000, 13–15).

6. These funds provide a safety blanket for French independent producers, especially those making art films or experimental films (*art et essai*), which American independent producers lack. Donald Morrison, whose controversial article in the European edition of *Time* magazine regarding the supposed death of French culture launched a wave of negative reaction, goes so far as to propose that this system of funding is in itself, in large measure, responsible for the limited success of French films abroad, insofar as producers have little pressure to think in commercial terms about their products (Morrison and Compagnon 2008). This policy may encourage cinematographers to make more critical and challenging films. But such films still then face the challenge of finding an audience during a period in which an increasing number of films are competing for a declining number of theater runs.
7. By contrast, Nakajima (2013) sees civil society emerging in film scenes dedicated to Chinese independent films.
8. For example, a decreasing number of Hollywood films are, in fact, being produced in Hollywood; they are more likely to be shot in whatever US state or foreign nation that offers the most advantageous tax breaks. Carroll and Gibb (2013) report that on-location movie production in Los Angeles fell 60% in 50 years. While tourists still flock to Hollywood to tour the homes of the stars, it is highly likely that these stars are away on location in North Carolina, Vancouver (Canada), or Australia.
9. Benhamou (2004) provides an overview of the field, demonstrating the dominance of firms such as Time-Warner, Viacom, Disney, Sony, and Vivendi-Universal.
10. However, there are only so many summer weekends available, and in recent years, there has been an overproduction of blockbusters. The competition has led to a number of major flops, most notably Disney's *Lone Ranger*, Sony's *After Earth*, and Universal's *R.I.P.D.*
11. This is a relatively recent trend, for back in 2005, there were only five US TV programs among the top 100 emissions.

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Part 4

Conclusion

12

Reflections on the Challenge of Markets in National, International, and Transnational Art Worlds

Victoria D. Alexander and Samuli Hägg

This volume, *Art and the Challenge of Markets: National Cultural Politics and the Challenges of Marketization and Globalization*, has explored national cultural policies and cultural politics in a variety of countries, and has examined several international or transnational art worlds. In this concluding chapter, we explore several themes that emerge from this volume, and briefly look forward to the companion volume, *Art and the Challenge of Markets: From Commodification of Art to Artistic Critiques of Capitalism*.

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Contemporary National Art Worlds

The most notable impression that emerges from the chapters in this volume is that a large variety of nations have been influenced by market-based or neoliberal models of governance, and national cultural policies have—more or less—converged toward a model of arts funding that draws on neoliberal or market-based models, many of which require the involvement of corporate or other private funders along with marketized management structures. The United States has long used market-based models of funding for arts organizations, and indeed, in Europe, the combination of state funding with various forms of private sponsorship and commercial activity is often called “the American model.”

Along these lines, Nina Zahner (Chap. 4) has shown us that in Germany, the market mechanisms endorsed by the “New Public Management” (NPM) have been used to conduct the affairs of German cultural institutions. Tight public budgets in Germany meant that these organizations have been encouraged to search for private funding, and in some cases, new models of ownership were adopted, including the transfer of cultural organizations into limited companies. Simo Häyrynen (Chap. 6) also states that Finland adopted NPM, which led to results-oriented contracts and instrumentalized management. Finnish artists are expected to look for nonstate funding, and until the economic crisis hit, various initiatives increased the amount of private money for cultural producers. Similar ideas, described by Victoria D. Alexander (Chap. 3) as “enterprise culture” but which draw on NPM ideals, have played a strong role in the development of British cultural policy.

Häyrynen notes that the largest change in Finland was ideological, rather than material, as Finland, along with other countries, absorbed globalized, neoliberal economic strategies. In this way, the arts and culture are judged by their economic added value and contribution to national competitiveness. Other countries show a similar orientation to national competitiveness (perhaps with more material as well as ideological effect). For instance, Olivier Thévenin and Olivier Moeschler (Chap. 5) describe how Switzerland has developed a national cultural policy specifically to maintain and advance Swiss international competitiveness and to highlight the perception of the country as creative.

It is also clear that the economic crisis of 2008–09 has provided a strong impetus to various nation-states to encourage plural funding and more commercial activity on the part of arts institutions, as a direct result of significant economic pressures on public funders. Although trends toward market-based systems arose in many countries in the 1980s (e.g., as a consequence of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, or a turn toward culture as an economic factor in Germany), the financial crisis provided an acceleration, as many nations succumbed to what Vera L. Zolberg (Chap. 2) described as the “temptation” of privatization in the cultural arena as a way to reduce state expenditure. The shortage of funds is a reality everywhere.

Yet there are differences. Although former Eastern Bloc countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia have been influenced by neoliberal Western ideologies after gaining independence in 1991, their newly formed cultural policies are much more complex, as Egge Kulbok-Lattik and Vesna Čopič (Chap. 7) show us. These countries, all formed in 1991, have focused their cultural policies more on national identity-building than on marketizing or democratizing existing cultural systems, despite rhetoric in the states’ policies promising such changes. Nevertheless, some previously state-run institutions were privatized, notably in areas that exist in the marketplace in many other countries, such as cinemas, publishing houses, film, and broadcasting.

Kulbok-Lattik and Čopič describe how the arts in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia tend to fall into two parallel systems, in which newer initiatives (for instance, in contemporary dance, theater, and visual arts) have not received public funds, whereas many cultural institutions (notably those that were established in the nineteenth century) remain state funded, if somewhat inadequately. And though there are similarities among these four nations, there are significant differences as well. For instance, the Baltic states have been influenced by their membership in the European Union, from which they draw policy language which appears in documents, but which is not implemented in practice. This occurs for a variety of reasons that differ across the three countries. Slovenia similarly adopted principles of decentralization and democratization, but the cultural policy there was captured by elites in the existing cultural institutions who wished to retain a semblance of the

support and autonomy they had experienced under the previous political regime. These observations highlight the fact that government rhetoric may be decoupled from the actual systems of cultural funding and the supported arts sector, as Häyrynen has suggested in his discussion of ideology versus actual material changes in Finland.

Historical trajectories matter. The United States and the United Kingdom are both more purely neoliberal than the other countries covered in the chapters, but their “two roads to market” were very different. In the United States, marketization of fine arts institutions began in the 1960s and 1970s. The actions of nonprofit arts organizations, in seeking institutional (foundation and corporate) and newly available government funding to supplement traditional individual philanthropy, led to marketization in the fine arts arena (Alexander 1996). The United Kingdom’s path was quite different, and occurred later, as successive national governments from the 1980s onward imposed a market logic on organizations in the supported arts sector, as Alexander’s contribution to this volume describes. Along these lines is the interesting convergence of France and Switzerland, described by Thévenin and Moeschler, as both countries tried to solve the same problems of national competitiveness from the opposite direction.

Thévenin and Moeschler’s chapter points out the significant differences between centralized and federalized governmental systems. Recently, the French government has decentralized cultural matters to some extent, to support cultural diversity and to encourage creative enterprise in neglected urban spaces along the lines of economically competitive “creative cities” as promoted by Richard Florida (2002). In contrast, Switzerland, which until recently, left cultural matters largely to the cantons and communities (i.e., the largest urban agglomerations), has increased national-level cultural activities. Both the United States and Germany are also federal systems. Zahner shows that Germany has tended to devolve culture to the *Länder* and municipalities, and Zolberg discusses the historical tradition of local support in the United States. In this sense, the United States is more similar to Germany and Switzerland, given a shared focus on decentralized funding and devolution to or reliance on states/*Länder*/cantons and municipalities for cultural policies and funding, than to more centralized systems such as in France, despite

recent changes. The United Kingdom retains a central role in culture, through its Department for Culture, Media & Sport, but has delegated cultural policy to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (though not to England, which does not have a devolved government). British local authorities also play an important role in the public support of cultural institutions.

Zolberg (Chap. 2) discusses the United States as “a case apart.” Certainly, the United States is unique in its level of indirect support of the arts through tax relief offered to donors. Its National Endowment for the Arts is small compared with national government cultural agencies in many countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, or even the Nordic countries. And the United States may lose even this small agency, as the new President, Donald Trump, has proposed eliminating the National Endowment for the Arts, along with the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (Deb 2017). Nevertheless, the theme of difference is common. For instance, Zahner discusses the unique situation of Germany with respect to the politics and financial costs of reunification. Häyrynen describes how Finland, as a small state with a weak cultural market, is different from the larger European countries, and moreover, Finland and the Nordic countries are distinct in that major support goes to artists directly rather than to arts institutions. In large part, this theme of difference is a matter of focus: a wide shot shows many similarities across all countries, but on close-up, there are many differences. Each nation has a unique set of cultural policies, structures, and activities that share a range of commonalities and display distinct differences, as each chapter has shown clearly.

Each state’s cultural policies draw from its broader cultural politics, and they are strongly historically contingent. This crucial observation was taken up by Erkki Sevänen and Simo Häyrynen (Chap. 1) in their overview of theories of globalization. In their consideration of varieties of contemporary capitalism, they show that there are different political systems (such as liberal democratic or authoritarian) and different manifestations of capitalism (such as liberal market capitalism, managed capitalism, and state-led capitalism) which can be cross-classified into six major sets of countries. The chapters in this book show that these systems matter for the particular instantiation of cultural policies across nations.

For instance, Kulbok-Lattik and Čopič show how Slovenia's roots in Yugoslavia, in which cultural institutions under "self-management socialism" were more autonomous, followed a path in which established cultural elites worked to protect their funding and support. In contrast, the Baltic states reacted against the legacy of Soviet control of cultural expression as they implemented the arm's length principle in their cultural policy, with the explicit aims of giving experts from the cultural arena decision-making freedom and building their own national identities. Häyrynen notes that the Nordic states' history of Social Democratic governments and Finland's unique history as a buffer state between the East and the West were crucial in the formation of welfare-based cultural policy. Thévenin and Moeschler explain that Switzerland was slow to develop cultural policy at the national level due to the Swiss federal structure and the principle of subsidization (with the majority of cultural funds spent at the local level), bolstered by long-held fears of "state culture." France's centralized protection of its culture, now complemented with cultural decentralization to regions (Thévenin and Moeschler), and Germany's cultural federalism (Zahner) also have deep roots in the respective country's past.

To a significant degree, all of the countries discussed in this volume have broadened their cultural policies to embrace cultural diversity or to promote the democratization of culture, at least at the level of rhetoric. This has often involved a shift in focus from the fine arts and elite culture to a more inclusive range of creative expression. For many nations, this broadening predates the challenge of markets, as it sprung from the anti-elitist spirit of the 1960s. Nevertheless, instrumentalist cultural policy has furthered this trend. For instance, the United Kingdom provides funds, and in exchange, it expects the arts to fulfill social agendas, which are measured by performance targets about audience numbers or audience composition. While problematic in many ways, as Alexander outlines, such requirements have led fine arts organizations to broaden their horizons and expand their audience base. Some nations have always had a greater focus on local cultures, for instance, Germany and Switzerland, where cultural policies have traditionally been in the remit of regional and municipal governments. Zahner describes how the idea of *Breitenkultur* (broad culture) in East Germany was championed after reunification,

along with high culture. However, despite calls for equal support for both broad culture and high culture, the latter attracted more funding. Immigration and the changing ethnic composition of populations have also provided an impetus toward cultural diversity, and complexities of this are discussed by Thévenin and Moeschler and by Zahner for France, Switzerland, and Germany. Häyrynen brings up the darker manifestation of diversity in the form of neonationalism, which reinforces a nationalistic tone in Nordic political culture (and no doubt, elsewhere).

A final theme is the justification for state involvement in cultural policy. Thévenin and Moeschler discuss the “market failure” argument—that the fine arts need support from the state sector, as these art forms, unlike more popular and commercialized art forms, are unable to compete in the marketplace. The market failure argument is used explicitly in policy documents in both Switzerland and France. The “French exception” of 1993, in which cultural matters are explicitly the realm of individual nation-states and are not subject to free trade agreements, has proved an important adjunct to the justification of state intervention in art worlds. France has used this agreement to protect national cultural expression, along with cultural industries such as French cinema, against the perceived hegemony of American culture and its cultural industries. Both France and Switzerland speak of hostile wider systems which demand state action to protect the “greatness” of French and Swiss culture, and yet both countries also speak of the economic competitiveness of their cultural activities. The Nordic countries, in turn, have sought to support their own, smaller cultural markets, which would struggle to survive if they had to compete in their small, domestic cultural markets or against more powerful European and international ones.

Zahner explains that the German constitution provides explicit legal grounds for state subsidy of the arts, namely that art should be free. More recently, arguments about the economic importance of the arts in Germany have created certain pathologies such as a focus on tourism and economic impact, as well as insecure working conditions in the cultural arena. New efforts in German “Cultural Education,” Zahner explains, are attempts to retain notions of the intrinsic value of art. Although not fully successful in this, as such initiatives are often valued by economic yardsticks, German cultural policy remains a social policy much more than in

countries such as the United Kingdom, and continues to rest on the ideal that culture must be autonomous.

A key justification for state support of the arts in the Baltic states and Slovenia was national identity-building, although, as Kulbok-Lattik and Čopič explain, this justification has become vulnerable in the face of the global economic crisis and neoliberal casting of culture as an economic sector. It is precisely this neoliberal view that culture is an economic arena which gives rise to a model of state funding in Finland which Häyrynen calls a “centralized market orientation,” leading him to state that cultural policy has lost its “specific mission,” which had been to “protect free artistic expression and an equal distribution of cultural opportunities.”

A nation’s cultural politics, and the cultural policies it inspires, is a moving target. Ongoing research is needed to keep up with national developments and the interaction of these with globalized trends and local trajectories. In today’s world, it is common to find that the arts are treated as if they were an economic sector like any other. The arts are less protected from the marketplace in the twenty-first century than they were in the twentieth. And yet, all of the countries discussed in this volume continue to support the arts and culture to some extent, and while arguments about the intrinsic value of arts have lost force, they have not completely disappeared. In her chapter, Zolberg reminds us that it can be “crassly materialistic to be so concerned with ‘business models’ when certain other matters should remain central to our thinking: freedom of expression, privacy, civility in the face of political power, and above all, aesthetic quality.” A pragmatic approach toward business models and the like nevertheless appears to be the new normal across the Western world.

On the whole, the chapters on national cultural policies have focused on artistic endeavors in arts institutions, be they governmental organizations, nongovernmental nonprofit bodies, or voluntary/charitable nonprofits, and on policy toward individual artists. Arts institutions, along with artists, have been asked to adopt more market-oriented approaches to their creative endeavors. Governmental policies that support profit-seeking enterprises, such as intellectual property and copyright or protectionary policies for national creative industries, are also important components of culture, in the broad sense, but tend to be ignored in discussions of cultural policy, perhaps due to the historical

focus of cultural policy on the fine arts and elite culture. Commercial forms of culture are brought into a sharper focus in Part 2 of the volume. International or transnational art worlds encompass both high and popular art forms, and although they tend to be commercial, there are nonmarket, as well as commercial, global flows of culture. It is to these topics that we turn to next.

International or Transnational Art Worlds

One of the most pressing questions that arise in the chapters is whether market-based international or transnational art worlds represent globalism that accomplishes a balancing and empowering movement among Western and non-Western art worlds and reduces asymmetric center-periphery relations. One view on the matter, held, among others, by Alain Quemin (Chap. 9), is that, allegedly, the globalized contemporary art world is still territorialized and hierarchized, and hence reproduces center-periphery asymmetries. Larissa Buchholz (Chap. 10), on the other hand, discusses the question from an alternative perspective and suggests that the binary logic of centers and peripheries is not capable of capturing the multifaceted interaction of globalizing art, or “multidirectional cross-border flows of valuation” and asymmetric interdependencies. Alain Quemin’s and Larissa Buchholz’s intricate implicit dialogue on center-periphery relations suggests that more research is needed to better grasp the imminent shifts in international art world and their consequences for cultural hierarchies.

The emerging or rising economies (China, India, South Korea, Russia, Brazil) play a growing part in international and transnational art worlds. For instance, Buchholz shows that during the last two decades, China has become an important actor in global visual art markets—in some cases, rivaling the United States in terms of the sales volume of top-ranked artists in the auction market. However, as Vaughn Schmutz and Timothy J. Dowd (Chap. 8) argue, globalization is disorganized and unpredictable, with considerable differences across artistic discipline—in their case, popular and classical music. Differences occur across cultural forms within one country as well as from country to country. For instance, as

Diane Barthel-Bouchier (Chap. 11) shows, China enacts a quota system to allow Chinese cinema to compete against the transnational media giants. South Korea also places quotas on external audiovisual products. In other words, China, along with other East Asian countries, does not compete effectively in the global audiovisual market. This stands in contrast to the global visual arts market, where, as we have seen, their influence is strong and growing. The genre of cultural products is also important in international flows of television. In Latin America, for instance, “telenovelas” are dominantly produced in Latin America, circulating within and across countries there, but action series are more often made in the United States and imported.

The transnational audiovisual market is extremely complex, as Barthel-Bouchier shows. India’s large Bollywood industry competes effectively in its domestic market and exports significantly to many countries across the world, whereas Nigeria’s film industry (Nollywood) produces a large number of small-budget films mostly for the informal section of its domestic market. On the whole, African countries import the lion’s share of both film and television from elsewhere. Hollywood is still a dominant player in the global market, but Hollywood firms are truly multinational (not just American owned and operated), and complex regional and “reverse” flows (from periphery to center) obtain. This complexity is partly a result of the dispersion of audiovisual materials across the globe. The global visual arts market, in comparison, appears much more concentrated, with New York City arguably still the center, as Quemin suggests.

National cultural politics still matter in global art markets. By way of paradox, the present discussion of international or transnational art worlds is impossible without revisiting the various national cultural policies with which globalization interacts. In the first instance, it is worth noting that national governments negotiate and enter into the international trade agreements that govern the market for cultural goods, and they agree to declarations such as UNESCO’s (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. The exceptional cultural politics of France has been noted in several chapters of this volume. For instance, in Schmutz and Dowd’s empirical research, the French music press stands out as the

most resilient in neither giving in to the Anglophone “cultural world system” nor supporting rock music. Further research is needed to find out why; for now, it is enough to once again note the decisive role of national cultural politics in different territories of the globe. Globalization does not automatically lead to homogenization.

Globalizing art markets and governmental strategies clash most explicitly in the protectionist practices of nation-states. The allocation of funding to domestic film or television productions has been standard procedure for decades in many countries. France again stands out in its level of cultural protectionism, with substantial state subsidies and tight legislative control, for instance, on television airtime. The many models of protectionism range from monetary action in European countries to the imposed quotas and censorship in China and other Asian nations. In general, as elegantly demonstrated by Barthel-Bouchier, protectionist practices are not very effective. Studios and international media corporations devise tactics that help penetrate even the most protected national markets. Indeed, Barthel-Bouchier points out the irony that the largest market in Europe for US television series is France. Interestingly, it is the grassroots audiovisual activity in developing countries that persists even against the power of Hollywood—most likely because money or competition over prime time is not at stake. Overall, however, among art forms, film and television are clearly most amenable both to neoliberal managerialism and to global markets.

Also hierarchies among varieties of art have been influenced by the move toward market-based and global art worlds. Schmutz and Dowd’s research suggests that the valuation of European classical music fares well even in the face of globalization. In other words, old-world hegemony still rules. In contrast, popular music experiences at full strength the waves and fluctuations of global art markets. It is noteworthy, though, that this is not a simple case of Americanization. Instead, globalization of popular music proceeds through the infrastructure of transnational corporations. This entails homogenization in terms of content and (English) language, with less emphasis on any given source nation. Following Barthel-Bouchier, one may draw similar conclusions regarding the global film and television markets. What is sometimes dubbed “cultural imperialism” turns out, on closer inspection, to be born out of the complex

environment in which international companies operate. National legislature and cultural policies and corporate marketing strategies collide and interpenetrate to create a complex network of opportunities and constraints. No overall description succeeds in capturing the economic power struggles in the field of production. The same is true regarding the ideological aspects of international audiovisual markets. On the one hand, transnational audiovisual corporations produce commodified noncritical entertainment that reproduces existing societal and cultural structures. On the other, the globalized and technologically advanced audiovisual market provides opportunities and outlets for critical and innovative films.

Conclusion

In the course of this volume, it has certainly become evident that European and North American national art worlds and cultural policies have adapted to marketization and globalization, and thus converged to market-based models. The Western shift toward managerialist and neoliberal art markets has by no means been straightforward or homogeneous, however. The chapters of this book have described many and often radically different transitions from welfare state or state socialist cultural politics to more market-oriented cultural politics.

This alleged triumph of global and liberal art markets has encountered the real-world contingencies of varying cultural policies, historical traditions of art, persevering national legislature, and economic nationalism. The traditional Western cultural hegemony encounters the power and allure of neoliberalist models and the potential tidal wave of globalizing art worlds. Could Western cultural hegemony be weakening? Recent decades have also witnessed international or transnational art worlds strengthening their position in comparison with national art worlds. The discussions in this volume suggest that the manifold and varying negotiations between the global art world and national societies, national systems of art, and national art worlds are current developments of greatest interest. Depending on the focus in terms of geographical territory or form of art, there are different things to learn about the state of the art

world. The chapters in this volume provide a point of departure for more extensive future research.

The first volume of *Art and the Challenge of Markets* is, in many ways, about this (incomplete) triumph of neoliberalism over art worlds. Nevertheless, art will remain a crucial part of human endeavor, whether or not it needs to be (or is) protected from the marketplace, globalization, and capitalism. The second volume of this collection, *Art and the Challenge of Markets: From Commodification of Art to Artistic Critiques of Capitalism*, similarly analyzes the ways in which contemporary art and art worlds have been commodified and instrumentalized. It also turns this relationship on its head as it grapples with the ways that artists and art worlds react against capitalism, globalization, and neoliberalism. Issues of protest and censorship are taken up more directly. In providing discussions of the ways that art has triumphed over neoliberalism, Volume 2 suggests that art will find its way.

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