This
August 14, 1944 letter from
John McCloy, the U.S. Assistant War Secretary, says that a study was
done about whether it was necessary to bomb Birkenau. Although the
study disappeared after 1944, it must have concluded no mass murders
were occurring and recommended against bombing because bombing was not
ordered by U.S. President Roosevelt, the War Department, or the
military.
14 August 1944
Dear Mr. Kuboeitski:
I refer to your letter of August 9, in which you request consideration of a
proposal made by Mr. Ernest Frischer that certain installations and railroad
centers be bombed.
The War Department has been approached by the War Refugee Board, which raised the
question of the practicality of this suggestion. After a study it became apparent
that such an operation could be executed only by the diversion of considerable air
support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations
elsewhere, and would, in any case, be of such doubtful efficasy that it would not
warrent the use of our resources. There has been considerable opinion to the affect
that such an effort, even if practicable, might provoke even more vindictive action
by the Germans.
The War Department fully appreciates the humanitarian motives which prompted the
suggested operation, but for the reasons stated above it has been felt that it can
or should not be undertaken, at least at this time.
Sincerely
John J. McCloy (Signed)
JOHN J. McCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War
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This August 2, 1944 letter by
Chief Air Marshall Norman Bottomley asks
that a study be quickly conducted about whether it was necessary to
bomb Birkenau. The study disappeared after 1944, but it must have
determined no mass murders were occurring at Birkenau and recommended
against bombing because bombing was not ordered by Prime Minister
Churchill, Bomber Command, or
the military.
TOP SECRET
Secretary of State Polder
A. C. A. S. (I)
Copy to: Y. C. A. S.
P.S. to S. of S.
Reference minute 1 at noq. I have discussed this subject with General Spaatz, who is
quite sympathetic.
1. Before we can consider any action, however, it is necessary to know more about
the precise location, extent, and nature of the camps and installations at Birkenau.
It is particularly necessary to have some photographic cover.
2. Will you please have this produced as early as possible, so that the operational
possibilities of taking some effective action from the air can be studied by the
operational Commands and the Deputy Supreme Commander. I need not emphasize the need
for absolute secrecy in this investigation.
M. H. Norman Bottomley (signed)
\ D. C. A. S.
2nd August 1944
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