

**THE
DESTRUCTION
OF THE
EUROPEAN JEWS
THIRD EDITION**

VOLUME

II

RAUL HILBERG

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OF THE
European jews

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DEPORTATIONS

The mobile killing operations in the occupied USSR were a prelude to a greater undertaking in the remainder of Axis Europe. A “final solution” was going to be launched in every region under German control.

The idea of killing the Jews had its shrouded beginnings in the far-distant past. There is a hint of killing in Martin Luther's long speech against the Jew's. Luther likened the Jews to the obstinate Egyptian Pharaoh of the Old Testament: “Moses,” said Luther, “could improve Pharaoh neither with plagues nor with miracles, neither with threats nor with prayers; he had to let him drown in the sea.”¹ In the nineteenth century

1. Martin Luther, *Von der Jueden und Iren Luejjen* (Wittenberg, 1543), p. Aiii.

the suggestion of total destruction emerged, in more precise and definite form, in a speech which Deputy Ahlwardt made to the Reichstag. Ahlwardt said that the Jews, like Thugs, were a criminal sea that had to be “exterminated.”² Finally, in 1939, Adolf Hitler uttered a threat of total annihilation in language far more explicit than that of his predecessors. This is what he said in his speech of January 30:

And one other thing I wish to say on this day, which perhaps is memorable not only for us Germans: In my life I have often been a prophet, and most of the time I have been laughed at. During the period of my struggle for power, it was in the first instance the Jewish people that received with laughter my prophecies that some day I would take over the leadership of the state and thereby of the whole people, and that I would among other things solve also the Jewish problem. I believe that in the meantime that hyenous laughter of the Jews of Germany has been smothered in their throats. Today I want to be a prophet once more: If international-finance Jewry inside and outside of Europe should succeed once more in plunging nations into another world war, the consequence will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thereby the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation [*Verichtung*] of the Jewish race in Europe.³

These remarks by Hitler have much more significance than the suggestions and hints of earlier German writers and speakers. To start with, the idea of an “annihilation” was now emerging in the context of a definite expectation: another world war. As yet the image was not a plan, but there was an implication of imminence in the utterance. In the second place, Hitler was not only a propagandist but also the head of a state. He had at his disposal not only words and phrases but also an administrative apparatus. He had power not only to speak but to act. Third, Hitler was a man who had a tremendous urge — one could almost say a compulsion — to carry out his threats. He “prophesied.” With words he committed himself to action.

Only seven months were to pass before the war began. It provided physical and psychological conditions for drastic action against Jewish communities falling into German hands. Yet, even as the anti-Jewish regime was intensified, unusual and extraordinary efforts were made to reduce Europe’s Jewish population by mass emigration. The biggest expulsion project, the Madagascar plan, was under consideration just one year before the inauguration of the killing phase. The Jews were not killed before the emigration policy was exhausted.

2. Reichstag, *Stenographische Berichte*, March 6, 1895, p. 1297.

3. Hitler speech, January 30, 1939, German press.

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The first forced emigration schemes were worked out in 1938, after the Germans had acquired Austria. When Hitler came to power, Germany had about 520,000 Jews. After five years, emigration and death had brought that number down to 350,000. However, in March 1938, when the Germans took Austria, 190,000 Jews were added to the 350,000, bringing the total to approximately 540,000, that is, 20,000 more than the original number.⁴ Obviously this was not progress. Some extraordinary measures had to be taken.

Thus, especially toward the end of 1938, Schacht, Wohlthat, and a number of other officials were conferring with the Western democracies on ways and means of facilitating Jewish emigration. In October 1938 the Foreign Office took a look at the statistics on the Jewish population and discovered that about 10 percent of all Jews under German jurisdiction were Polish nationals. However, the Polish government was not anxious to recover its citizens. On October 6, Polish authorities issued a decree providing that holders of Polish passports abroad would be denied entry into Poland after October 29 unless such passports were stamped by an examiner.

The German Foreign Office reacted instantly.⁵ By the end of October thousands of Polish Jews were arriving in sealed trains at the Polish frontier town of Zb[^]szyn. The Poles barred the way. The trains were now sitting in "no man's land" between German and Polish cordons. Soon the Germans discovered that they had made a ghastly miscalculation. From the other direction, Polish trains filled with Jews of German nationality were moving toward the German frontier.

On October 29 the chief of the Foreign Office's Political Division, Wormann, wrote a memorandum in which he expressed the view that conditions on the frontier were "untenable." The Foreign Office had not calculated on reprisals. "What will happen now?" asked Wormann. The administrative chief of the Security Police, Best, proposed that the Polish Jews be withdrawn to concentration camps. Wormann thought that this solution might be too risky. Finally the problem was solved by compromise. The Poles admitted about 7,000 Jews; additional thousands remained in Zb[^]szyn; the Germans took back some of their own nationals; and the remainder of the evacuees were allowed to return temporarily to their homes.⁶ During the discussions for the settlement of the problem,

4. Emigration statistics in Hans Lamm, "Entwicklung des Deutschen Judentums" (1951; mimeographed), p. 223.

5. Gaus (Foreign Office Legal Division) to German mission in Poland, October 26, 1938, NG-2014.

6. Memorandum by Wormann, October 29, 1938, NG-2012. Klumt (Foreign Political Office of the party) to Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office, January 24, 1939, NG-2589. See also Sybil Milton, "The Expulsion of Polish Jews from

Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office tried to prevail upon Polish Ambassador Lipski to take back the 40,000 to 50,000 Polish Jews in the Reich. Lipski contended that the figure was “exaggerated” and dien stated that Weizsäcker was demanding of Poland an “enormous sacrifice.”⁷

While Poland refused to accept Jews of its own nationality, some of the Western countries were liberally admitting Jews of German nationality. But even in the West the admission of poor Jews, who had no money, was considered a very painful duty. In December 1938 Ribbentrop had a discussion on Jewish emigration with the foreign minister of the country of traditional asylum, France. This is Ribbentrop’s record of his talk with the French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet:

1. The Jewish Question: After I had told M. Bonnet that I could not discuss this question officially with him, he said that he only wanted to tell me privately how great an interest was being taken in France in a solution of the Jewish problem. To my question as to what France’s interest might be, M. Bonnet said that in the first place they did not want to receive any more Jews from Germany and whether we could not take some sort of measures to keep them from coming to France, and in the second place France had to ship 10,000 Jews somewhere else. They were actually thinking of Madagascar for this.

I replied to M. Bonnet that we all wanted to get rid of our Jews but that the difficulties lay in the fact that no country wished to receive them.⁸

The attitude displayed by Ambassador Lipski and Foreign Minister Bonnet prompted Hitler to make the following remark in his speech of January 1939: “It is a shameful example to observe today how the entire democratic world dissolves in tears of pity but then, in spite of its obvious duty to help, closes its heart to the poor, tortured Jewish people.”⁹ This was not an idle accusation; it was an attempt to drag the Allied powers into the destruction process as passive but willing accomplices. It is significant that much later, when the killing phase was already under way and when its extent had become known in England and America, Goebbels remarked in connection with the Western protests: “At bottom, however,

Germanv — October 1938 to July 1939,” *Leo Baeck Institute Tear Book* 29 (1984): 169-99.

7. Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, Legal Division, Political Division, Minister Aschmann, Section Germany, November 8, 1938, NG-2010.

8. Ribbentrop to Hitler, December 9, 1938, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. IV, *The Aftermath of Munich, 1938-1939* (Washington, 1951), pp. 481-82.

9. Hitler speech, January 30, 1939, German press.

I believe both the English and the Americans are happy that we are exterminating die Jewish riffraff?"¹⁰

As if to strengthen its case, the German bureaucracy continued in 1939 to exhaust the emigration policy. This time, however, the primary effort was internal. Many bureaucratic encumbrances had impeded the emigration process: every prospective emigrant had to acquire more than a dozen official papers, certifying his health, good conduct, property, tax payments, emigration opportunities, and so on. Very soon the overburdened offices were jammed, and stagnation set in. The congestion hit Vienna first. To remedy the situation, Reichskommissar Bürckel (the official in charge of the "reunification of Austria with the Reich") set up, on August 26, 1938, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (*Zentralstelle für die jüdische Auswanderung*). Each agency that had some certifying to do sent representatives to the central office in the Vienna Rothschild Palace. The Jews could now be processed on an assembly-line basis.¹¹

The Bürckel solution was soon adopted in the rest of the Reich. On January 24, 1939, Goring ordered the creation of the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration (*Reichszentrale für die jüdische Auswanderung*)¹² The chief of die Reichszentrale was none other than Reinhard Heydrich. The *Geschäftsführer*, or deputy, taking care of the actual administrative details was Standartenführer Oberregierungsrat Müller, later chief of the Gestapo.¹³ Other members of the Reichszentrale were Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat (Office of the Four-Year Plan) and representatives of the Interior Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the Foreign Office.¹⁴

Emigration was still the policy after the war had broken out. In fact, the first reaction to the victories in Poland and in France was to punish these countries for their attitude toward Jewish emigration by sending there some of the Jews who had previously been kept out. At the end of 1939 and in the beginning of 1940, six thousand Jews were sent from Vienna, Prague, Moravska Ostrava, and Stettin to the Generalgouvernement.¹⁵ In October 1940 two Gauleiter in western Germany, Wagner and

10. Louis P. Lochner, ed., *The Goebbels Diaries* (Garden City, N.Y., 1948), entry for December 13, 1942, p. 241.

11. For history of the Vienna Central Office see *Krakauer Zeitung*, December 15, 1939.

12. Goring to Interior Ministry, January 24, 1939, NG-5764.

13. Heydrich to Ribbentrop, January 30, 1939, NG-5764.

14. Goring to Interior Ministry, January 24, 1939, NG-5764. Heydrich to Ribbentrop, January 30, 1939, NG-5764. Foreign Office to Heydrich, February 10, 1939, NG-5764.

15. See undated Heydrich memorandum, NO-5150, and correspondence of October 1939 in *Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen, Ludwigsburg, CSSR*, Red No. 148. The October 1939 transports from Vienna and Moravska Ostrava were directed to the small town of Nisko on the San River. The idea of building Nisko into

Biirckel, secured die cooperation of the Gestapo in the deportation of 7,500 Jews to unoccupied France.¹⁶ But by far the most ambitious project of 1940 was the Madagascar plan.

Until 1940, emigration plans had been confined to a consideration of the resettlement of thousands or, as in the case of the Schacht plan, 150,000 Jews. The Madagascar project was designed to take care of millions of Jews. The authors of the plan wanted to empty the Reich-Protektorat area and all of occupied Poland of dieir Jewish population. The whole idea was thought up in Section III of Abteilung Deutschland of the Foreign Office. (Indeed, Abteilung Deutschland was to concern itself a great deal with Jewish matters.) The plan was transmitted to a friendly neighboring agency: Heydrich's Reich Security Main Office. Heydrich was enthusiastic about the idea.¹⁷

The design of the scheme was simple. The African island of Madagascar was to be ceded by France to Germany in a peace treaty. The German navy was to have its pick of bases on the island, and the remainder of Madagascar was to be placed under the jurisdiction of a police governor responsible directly to Heinrich Himmler. The area of the police governor was to become a Jewish reservation. The resettlement of the Jews was to be financed through the utilization of Jewish property left behind.

This plan, according to Abteilung Deutschland, was greatly preferable to the establishment of a Jewish community in Palestine. In the first place, Palestine belonged to the Christian and Moslem worlds. Second, if the Jews were kept in Madagascar, they could be held as hostages to ensure the good conduct of their "racial comrades" in America.¹⁸ Heydrich did not need these arguments. For him it was enough that practically the whole island was to be governed by the SS and Police. But the Madagascar plan did not materialize. It hinged on the conclusion of a peace treaty with France, and such a treaty depended on an end of hostilities with England. With no end to the hostilities there was no peace treaty, and with no peace treaty there was no Madagascar.

a sizable Jewish settlement was evidently an experiment that failed. H. G. Adler, *Der vernünftete Mensch* (Tübingen, 1974), pp. 126-40. Jonny Moser, "Nisko: The First Experiment in Deportation," *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual 2* (1985) : 1 -30.

16. Unidentified report, Abteilung Deutschland of the Foreign Office, October 30, 1940 NG-4933. Radcmacher to Luther, October 31, 1940, NG-4934. Radcmacher to Luther, November 21,1940, NG-4934. Sonnlcithncr to Weizsäcker, November 22,1940, NG-4934.

17. Memorandum by Luther (chief, Abteilung Deutschland), August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

18. Memorandum signed by Radcmacher of Abteilung Deutschland, July 3, 1940, NG-2586-B. Radcmacher to Dannckcr (Security Police), August 5, 1940, NG-5764. Memorandum by Radcmacher, August 12, 1940, NG-2586-R. Rade-macher was a chief architect of the Madagascar plan.

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The Madagascar plan was the last major effort to “solve the Jewish problem”¹ by emigration. Many hopes and expectations had been pinned on this plan by offices of the Security Police, the Foreign Office, and the Generalgouvernement. Even as it faded, the project was to be mentioned one more time, during early February 1941, in Hitler’s headquarters. On that occasion, the party’s labor chief, Ley, brought up the Jewish question and Hitler, answering at length, pointed out that the war was going to accelerate the solution of this problem but that he was also encountering additional difficulties. Originally, he had been in a position to address himself at most to the Jews of Germany, but now the goal had to be the elimination of Jewish influence in the entire Axis power sphere. In some countries, such as Poland and Slovakia, he could act alone with his own organs. In France, however, the armistice was an obstacle and precisely there the problem was especially important. If only he knew where he could put these few million Jews; it was not as if there were so many (*so vide seien es ja nicht*). He was going to approach the French about Madagascar. When Bormann asked how the Jews could be transported there in the middle of the war, Hider replied that one would have to consider that. He would be willing to make available the entire German fleet for this purpose, but he did not wish to expose his crews to the torpedoes of enemy submarines. Now he was thinking about all sorts of things differently, and not with greater friendliness (*Er dächte über manches jetzt anders, nicht gerade freundlicher*)⁹

While Hider was thinking, the machinery of destruction was permeated with a feeling of uncertainty. In the Generalgouvernement, where ghettoization was viewed as a transitional measure, the unsightly Jewish quarters with their impoverished crowds were trying the patience of local German officials. These irritations and frustrations were expressed in monthly reports by the late summer of 1940. In the Lublin District the Kreishauptmann of Krasnystaw, surfeited with his administrative tasks, insisted that Jews who had Polonized their names spell them in German. In Madagascar, he said, they could have Madagascan names.^{19 20} At the same time, the Kreishauptmann of Jaslo (in the Krakow district), noting the “invasion” of his Kreis by Jews expelled from the city of Krakow, invoked the opinion of Polish residents who, he asserted, were doubting the German resolve to undertake an eventual total evacuation (*eine spätere*

19. Dian, of Gerhard Engel (army adjutant in Hitler’s headquarters), entry of Februar’ 2, 1941, in Hildegard von Kotze, ed., *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler* (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 94-95. The diary is a set of notes, and its dates are approximate. Goebbels, writing in his diary on March 18, 1941, still hinted at emigration from Europe “later.” Fred Taylor, ed., *The Goebbels Diaries, 1939-1941* (New York, 1983), p. 272.

20. Monthly report by Kreishauptmann of Krasnystaw, September 10, 1940, Yad Vashem microfilm JM 814.

gänzliche Evakuierung) of the Jews.^{21 22 23} Several months later, in the Radom District, the Kreishauptmann of Jdrzejow, complaining about the intractability of inflation, suggested that the principal tool for dealing with price rises was the early solution of the Jewish problem (*die baldige Lösung der Judenfrage*)²² Generalgouverneur Frank evidently shared these sentiments. On March 25, 1941, he revealed to his close associates that Hitler had promised him “that the Generalgouvernement, in recognition of its accomplishments, would become the first territory to be free of Jews [*dass das Generalgouvernement in Anerkennung seiner Leistungen als erstes Gebiet judenfreigemacht werde*]?”²¹.

In the neighboring Wartheland, a grass-roots movement to eliminate the Jews became even more pronounced. There, Sturmbannführer Rolf-Heinz Höppner wrote a letter to Eichmann on July 16, 1941, pointing out that in the course of various discussions in the office of Reichsstatthalter Greiser, solutions had been proposed that “sound in part fantastic,” but that in his view were thoroughly feasible (*die Dinge klingen teilweise phantastisch, wären aber meiner Ansicht nach durchaus durchzuführen*). A camp for 300,000 was to be created with barracks for tailor shops, shoe-manufacturing plants, and the like. Such a camp could be guarded more easily than a ghetto, but it was not going to be a complete answer. “This winter” said Höppner, “there is a danger that not all of the Jews can be fed anymore. One should weigh earnestly,” he continued, “if the most humane solution might not be to finish off those of the Jews who are not employable by some quick-working device. At any rate, that would be more pleasant than to let them starve to death. [*Es besteht in diesem Winter die Gefahr, dass die Juden nicht mehr sämtlich ernährt werden können. Es ist ernsthaft zu erwägen, ob es nicht die humanste Lösung ist, die Juden, soweit sie nicht arbeitseinsatzfähig sind, durch irgendein schnellwirkendes Mittel zu erledigen. Auf jeden Fall wäre dies angenehmer, als sie verhungern zu lassen.*]”²⁴ According to Höppner, the Reichsstatthalter had not made up his mind about these suggestions, but by the end of the year the Jews of the Wartheland were being killed in a death camp, Kulmhof, in the province (*Gau*).

In the Reich itself the ministerial bureaucracy was cementing the anti-Jewish process with decrees and ordinances. During the spring of 1941 there were deliberations about a complex legal measure: a declaration

21. Monthly report by Kreishauptmann of Jaslo (Dr. Ludwig Losacker), August 29, 1940, JM 814.

22. Monthly report by Kreishauptmann of Jdrzejow, January 3, 1941, JM 814.

23. Summary of Generalgouvernement conference, March 25, 1941, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

24. Höppner to Eichmann, July 16, 1941, text in Glowna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, *Biuletyn* (Warsaw, 1960), vol. 12, pp. 27F-29F.

that all Reich Jews were stateless or, alternatively, “protectees” (*Schutzbefohlene*). The Interior Ministry desired the measure in order to remove the “awkward” fact that harsh action was taken against people who were still viewed, at least in the outside world, as Reich nationals. Because of the legal complexities of the issue, it was decided to submit the question to Hitler.²⁵

On June 7, 1941, die Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, addressed two almost identical letters to the Interior and Justice Ministries, in which he wrote simply that Hitler considered the measure unnecessary. Lammers then addressed a third letter to his counterpart in the party, Bormann. In that letter Lammers repeated the message with a confidential explanation. “The Führer,” he wrote, “has not agreed to the regulation proposed by the Reich Minister of the Interior, primarily because he is of the opinion that after the war there would not be any Jews left in Germany anyhow. [*Der Führer hat der vom Reichsminister des Innern vorgeschlagenen Regelung vor allem deshalb nicht zugestimmt, weil er der Meinung ist, dass es nach dem Kriege in Deutschland ohnedies keine Juden mehrgeben werde.*]” Hence it was not necessary to issue a decree that would be difficult to enforce, that would tie up personnel, and that would still not bring about a solution in principle.²⁶

Toward the end of the spring of 1941, officials in France were still approached with applications from Jews who were trying to emigrate. On May 20, 1941, a Gestapo official from the RSHA, Walter Schellenberg, informed the military commander in France that the emigration of Jews from his area was to be prevented because transport facilities were limited and because the “final solution of the Jewish question” was now in sight.²⁷

On July 22, 1941, Hider, speaking to Croatian Marshal Kvaternik, said that if there were no more Jews in Europe, the unity of the European states would not be disturbed anymore. Wherever one might send the Jews, be it to Madagascar or Siberia, was all the same to him (*seigleichgültig*). But he was going to approach every state with this request. The last holdout, he predicted, would be Hungary.²⁸

25. Staatssekretär Pfundtner (Interior Ministry) to Reichskabinettsrat Ficker (Reich Chancellery), April 8, 1941, NG-299. See also earlier correspondence: circular letter by Stuckart, December 18, 1940, NG-2610; summary of interministerial conference, January 15, 1941, NG-306.

26. Lammers to Bormann, June 7, 1941, NG-1123.

27. Schellenberg to Gen. Otto von Stülpnagel, BdS France, and Foreign Office Abteilung Deutschland/III, May 20, 1941, NG-3104.

28. Summary by Gesandter Hcwel of Hitler-Kvaternik discussion, July 22, 1941, *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik*, Series D, vol. XIII.2 (Göttingen, 1970), pp. 835-38.

Heydrich now took the next step. He instructed his expert in Jewish affairs, Adolf Eichmann, to draft an authorization that would allow him to proceed against Jewry on a European-wide basis. In carefully chosen bureaucratic language the draft, not more than three sentences long, was submitted to Goring, ready for his signature (*unterschriftsfertig*) P The text, which was signed by Goring on July 31, 1941, is as follows:

Complementing the task already assigned to you in the directive of January 24, 1939, to undertake, by emigration or evacuation, a solution of the Jewish question as advantageous as possible under the conditions at the time, I hereby charge you with making all necessary organizational, functional, and material preparations for a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.

Insofar as the jurisdiction of other central agencies may be touched thereby, they are to be involved.

I charge you furthermore with submitting to me in the near future an overall plan of the organizational, functional, and material measures to be taken in preparing for the implementation of the aspired final solution of the Jewish question.^{29 30}

With the receipt of this letter, Heydrich held the reins of the destruction process in his hands. Soon he would be able to use his mandate.

For years, the administrative machine had taken its initiatives and engaged in its forays one step at a time. In the course of that evolution, a direction had been charted and a pattern had been established. By die middle of 1941, the dividing line had been reached, and beyond it lay a field of unprecedented actions unhindered by the limits of the past. More and more of the participants were on the verge of realizing the nature of what could happen now. Salient in this crystallization was the role of Adolf Hider himself, his stance before the world and, more specifically, his wishes or expectations voiced in an inner circle. Already, Frank had cited Hider's promise to him with respect to the Generalgouvernement. Lammers had quoted Hitler's intentions for the Reich, and Himmler had invoked Hitler's authority for the Einsatzgruppen operations in die invaded Soviet territories. Then, one day toward the end of the summer, Eichmann was called into Heydrich's office, where the RSHA chief told him: "I have just come from the Reichsführer: the Führer has now ordered the physical annihilation of the Jews. [*Ich komme vom Reichsführer; der Führer hat nunmehr die physische Vernichtung der Juden angeordnet.*]" Eichmann could not measure the content of die words, and he believed

29. Adolf Eichmann, *Ich, Adolf Eichmann* (I .com am Starnberger See, 1980), p. 479.

30. Goring to Heydrich, July 31, 1941, PS-710.

that not even Heydrich had expected this “consequence” (*Konsequenz*). When Eichmann reported to Müller shortly thereafter, he realized from the Gestapo chief’s silent nod that Müller already knew. He always knows, thought Eichmann, though he never moves from his desk.³¹

Deportations were now in the offing. On September 18, 1941, Himmler wrote to Greiser about Hitler’s wish to empty the Reich-Protectorat area, and suggested Lodz as a stopover for about 60,000 of the deportees.³² On September 24, Goebbels noted in his diary that he had had some “important things” to discuss with Heydrich. Goebbels wanted the Jews of Berlin to be evacuated as soon as possible, and that would be the case, he said, as soon as the military situation was resolved in the east. They should be transported to camps laid out by the Bolsheviks. These camps had been erected by the Jews; what would be more appropriate than to fill them with Jews?³³ At the beginning of October, Himmler proposed to Hitler the “storage” (*Verlagerung*) of Jews in Riga, Tallinn, and Minsk.³⁴ On October 10, at a Final Solution conference in the RSHA, Heydrich spoke about possible deportations of 50,000 Jews to Riga and Minsk, and of still others to camps prepared for communists by Einsatzgruppen B and C in the military areas of the occupied USSR.³⁵ Not long after that meeting, a new decision was made. When a high-ranking Slovak delegation visited the Führer headquarters on October 23 and 24, Himmler revealed to the Slovak prime minister and another senior Slovak official that Hitler had selected an area of Poland for the gradual concentration of the European Jews.³⁶

Heydrich was in a pivotal position to carry out any plan, but the obstacles were formidable. He could not deport all the Reich Jews before dealing with such knotty problems as intermarriage, the Jews in the arma-

31. Eichmann, *Ich*, pp. 178-79, 229-30. In his memoirs, Eichmann dates the meeting to around the end of the year (*zur Jahreswende 1941/42*). During his interrogation by Israel police in Jerusalem, he suggested more plausibly that Hitler’s order had come two or three months after the June 22 German assault on the USSR. Jochen von Lang, ed., *Eichmann Interrogated* (New York, 1983), pp. 74-75. Auschwitz commander Höss recalls having been summoned to Himmler in the matter of killing the Jews during the summer. Höss also states that Eichmann visited Auschwitz shortly thereafter. Rudolf Höss, *Kommandant in Auschwitz* (Munich, 1963), pp. 138, 157-60. Chronology and circumstances point to a Hitler decision before the summer ended.

32. Himmler to Greiser, September 18, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.

33. *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ed. Elke Fröhlich (Munich, 1996), Part II, vol. 1 (July-September 1941), entry of September 24, 1941, pp. 480-81.

34. Diary of Engel, October 2, 1941, ed. Kotz, *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler*, p. 112.

35. Summary of Final Solution Conference, October 10, 1941, Israel Police 1193.

36. Ivan Kamenec, “The Deportation of Jewish Citizens from Slovakia in 1942,” in Dezider Toth, compiler. *The Tragedy of Slovak Jews* (Banka Bystrica, 1992), pp. 81-105, on p. 85.

ment industry, and the foreign Jews. He could not even begin to move in the occupied areas and Axis satellite states. He knew that he had to call upon all the other agencies that had jurisdiction in Jewish matters to act with him. Accordingly, on November 29, 1941, he sent invitations to a number of Staatssekretäre and chiefs of SS main offices for a “Final Solution” conference. In his invitation Heydrich said:

Considering the extraordinary importance which has to be conceded to these questions, and in the interest of achieving the same viewpoint by all central agencies concerned with the remaining work in connection with diis final solution, I suggest that these problems be discussed in a conference, especially since the Jews have been evacuated in continuous transports from the Reich territory, including the Protektorat of Bohemia and Moravia, to the East, ever since October 15,1941.³⁷

This cryptic wording generated suspense. The recipients of the letter were familiar with the phrase “final solution,” but they had to ponder how the idea would be transformed into an act and how they themselves would be involved. They could surmise that all the Jews would be deported, and they could sense the fundamental nature of what was to follow. As yet, however, they had not met to verbalize and discuss the details among themselves. It was a historic moment and their interest was intense.

In the Generalgouvernement the news of the “final solution” conference was the thought, if not the topic, of the day. Frank was so impatient that he sent Staatssekretär Bihler to Berlin to sound out Heydrich. In personal conversation with the RSHA chief, Bihler found out everything there was to know.³⁸ The Reich Chancellery, too, was the scene of excited expectation. Even before the Heydrich letter was received, Lammers, who was one of the best-informed bureaucrats in the capital, had alerted his chancellery with an order that “if invitations to a meeting were sent out” by the RSHA, one of the chancellery officials was to attend as a “listening post.”³⁹ In die Foreign Office, Abteilung Deutschland received

37. Heydrich to Gencralgouvrcncur Frank, Staatssekretäre Meyer, Stuckart, Schlegelberger, Guttercr, and Neumann, SS-OGruf. Krüger, SS-Gruf. Hofmann (Race and Resettlement Office), SS-Gruf. Greifelt, SS-Obf. Klopfer (Part) Chancellery), and Ministerialdirektor Kritzinger (Reich Chancellery), November 21, 1941, PS-709. The Foreign Office received a separate invitation. (See memorandum by *Abteilung Deutschland*, December 8,1941, NG-2586-F.)

38. Testimony by Bühler, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XII, pp. 68-69. In this testimony Bühler did not disclose how much he had been told. That Bühler had definitely been informed about the projected “liquidation” of the Jews was revealed by Frank in a conference with his main division chiefs on December 16, 1941, Frank Diary', PS-2233. Frank's remarks were recorded verbatim.

39. Testimony by Lammers, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XI, pp. 50-53. As a

the news of the conference with enthusiastic endorsement. The experts of the division immediately drew up a memorandum entitled "Requests and Ideas of the Foreign Office in Connection with the Intended Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe." The memorandum was a kind of priority deportation schedule, indicating which countries were to be cleared of Jews first.⁴⁰

The conference was originally scheduled for December 9, 1941, but it was postponed, at the last minute, until January 20, 1942, at noon, "followed by luncheon."⁴¹ On that day the conference was held in the offices of the RSHA, Am Grossen Wannsee No. 50/58. The following officials were present:⁴²

SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich, chairman (RSHA)
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer (East Ministry)
Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leibbrandt (East Ministry)
Staatssekretär Dr. Stuckart (Interior Ministry)
Staatssekretär Neumann (Office of the Four-Year Plan)
Staatssekretär Dr. Freisler (Justice Ministry)
Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler (Generalgouvernement)
Unterstaatssekretär Luther (Foreign Office)
SS-Oberführer Klopfer (Party Chancellery)
Ministerialdirektor Kritzinger (Reich Chancellery)
SS-Obergruppenführer Hofmann (RuSHA)
SS-Gruppenführer Müller (RSHA IV)
SS-Obersturmbannführer Eichmann (RSHA IV-B-4)
SS-Oberführer Dr. Schöngarth (BdS Generalgouvernement)
SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Lange (KdS Latvia, deputizing for BdS Ostland)

Heydrich opened the conference by announcing that he was the plenipotentiary for the preparation of the "Final Solution of the Jewish question" in Europe; his office was responsible for the central direction of the "Final Solution" regardless of boundaries. Heydrich then reviewed the emigration policy and cited statistics on emigrated Jews. Instead of emi-

Reichminister, Lammers could not attend a conference of Staatssekretäre or Ministerialdirektoren. That was a matter of protocol. The Lammers testimony, like that of Rühler, must be read with caution. Lammers feigned ignorance and forgetfulness. Actually, he had excellent sources of information and a keen, analytical mind. For challenge by the prosecution, see his testimony on pp. 112-16.

40. Memorandum by Abteilung Deutschland submitted to Unrcrstaatssckretär Martin Luther (chief of the division). December 8, 1941, NG-2586-F.

41. Heydrich to Hofmann, January 8, 1942, PS-709.

42. Summary of the "final solution" conference (30 copies) of January 20, 1942, NG-2586-E.

gration, he continued, the Führer had now given his sanction (*Genehmigung*) to the evacuation of the Jews to the East as a further “solution possibility” (*Lösungsmöglichkeit*). The RSHA chief then drew out a chart that indicated the Jewish communities to be evacuated. The list included even the English Jews.

Next, Heydrich explained what was to happen to the evacuees: they were to be organized into huge labor columns. In the course of this labor utilization, a majority would undoubtedly “fall away through natural decline [*wobei zweifellos ein Grossteil durch natürliche Verminderung ausfallen wird*].” The survivors (*Ristbestand*) of this “natural selection” process, who represented the tenacious hard core of Jewry, would have to be “treated accordingly” (*wird entsprechend behandelt werden müssen*), since these Jews had been shown in the light of history to be the dangerous Jews, the people who could rebuild Jewish life. Heydrich did not elaborate on the phrase “treated accordingly,” although we know from the language of the Einsatzgruppen reports that he meant killing.

Practically, Heydrich continued, the implementation of the “Final Solution” would proceed from west to east. If only because of the apartment shortage and “sociopolitical” reasons, the Reich-Protectorat areas were to be placed at the head of the line. Next he touched on the subject of differential treatment of special classes of Jews. The old Jews, Heydrich announced, were to be sent to a ghetto for old people (*Altersghetto*) at Theresienstadt in the Protectorat. The Jews who had distinguished themselves on the German side in World War I also were to be sent to Theresienstadt. In that manner, he concluded, all interventions on behalf of individuals would be shut out automatically.

Unterstaatssekretär Luther, speaking for the Foreign Office, then made a few comments. Luther felt that the “deeply penetrating treatment of this problem [*tiefgehende Behandlung dieses Problems*]” would create difficulties in some countries, notably Denmark and Norway. He urged that evacuations in such areas be postponed. On the other hand, he foresaw no difficulties in the Balkans and in Western Europe.

Following the Luther remarks, the conferees got into an involved discussion of the treatment of the Mischlinge and of Jews in mixed marriages. Although this problem affected victims only in the Reich, the Staatssekretäre spent about half the conference time in discussion of the issue.

Finally, Staatssekretär Bühler urged that the “Final Solution” be organized immediately in the Generalgouvernement. He explained that in Poland the transport problem was negligible and that not many Jews were working there. The majority, he said, were incapable of work.

At the conclusion of the conference the participants, already quite

relaxed while buders were pouring brandy, talked about “the various types of solution possibilities” (*die verschiedenen Arten der Lösungsmöglichkeiten*). In the course of these remarks, Staatssekretäre Meyer and Bihlcr urged that certain preparatory measures be started immediately in the occupied eastern territories and the Generalgouvernement.

After the meeting was concluded, thirty copies of the conference record were circulated in the ministries and SS main offices.⁴³ Gradually the news of the “Final Solution” seeped through the ranks of the bureaucracy. The knowledge did not come to all officials at once. How much a man knew depended on his proximity to the destructive operations and on his insight into the nature of the destruction process. Seldom, however, was comprehension recorded on paper. When the bureaucrats had to deal with deportation matters, they kept referring to a Jewish “migration.” In official correspondence the Jews were still “wandering.” They were “evacuated” (*evakuiert*) and “resettled” (*umgesiedelt, ausgesiedelt*). They “wandered off” (*wunderten ab*) and “disappeared” (*verschwanden*). These terms were not the product of naivete, but convenient tools of psychological repression.

On the very highest level the full burden of knowledge revealed itself in the written word. Hider, Goring, Himmler, and Goebbels had a complete view of the destruction process. They knew the details of the mobile killing operations in Russia, and they saw the whole scheme of the deportations in the rest of Europe. For these men it was difficult to resort to pretense. When Goebbels found out that the SS and Police Leader in Lublin, Globocnik, was constructing killing centers, he wrote: “Not much will remain of the Jews. ... A judgment is being visited upon the Jews [which is] barbaric. . . . The prophecy which the Führer made about them for having brought on a new world war is beginning to come true in a most terrible manner.”⁴⁴

Goring spoke of burned bridges and of a position “from which there is no escape.”⁴⁵ Himmler and also Goebbels explained that the “Final Solution” was a task that could not have been postponed, because in world history there was only one Adolf Hider and because the war had presented to the German leadership a unique opportunity for “solving the

43. Heydrich’s remarks and the conference summary had been prepared by Eichmann. The summary went through several drafts with corrections by Heydrich. Under “solution possibilities” the conferees had discussed shooting and gas vans, not gas chambers. For these details and the general mood of the conference, see testimony by Eichmann, Eichmann trial transcript, June 23, 1961, sess. 78, pp. ZI, Aal. Bbl; June 26, 1961, sess. 79, pp. Al, Bl, Cl; July 21, 1961, sess. 106, p. 11; July 24, 1961, sess. 107, pp. El, Fl.

44. Lochner, ed., *The Goebbels Diaries*, entry for March 27, 1942, pp. 147-48.

45. *Ibid.*, entry for March 2, 1943, p. 266.

problem.” Later generations would have neither the strength nor the opportunity to finish with the Jews.⁴⁶

Hider himself addressed the German people and the world once more. This is what he said on September 30, 1942:

In my Reichstag speech of September 1, 1939, I have spoken of two things: first, that now that the war has been forced upon us, no array of weapons and no passage of time will bring us to defeat, and second, that if Jewry should plot another world war in order to exterminate the Aryan peoples of Europe, it would not be the Aryan peoples which would be exterminated, but Jewry. . . .

At one time, the Jews of Germany laughed about my prophecies. I do not know whether they are still laughing or whether they have already lost all desire to laugh. But right now I can only repeat: they will stop laughing everywhere, and I shall be right also in that prophecy⁴⁷

CENTRAL AGENCIES OF DEPORTATION

The implementation of Hitler's prophecy was a vast administrative undertaking. To start with, the preliminary process of defining the victims, attaching their property, and restricting their movements had to be extended to all the areas from which deportations were to be conducted. Before the completion of these steps in a particular territory, that area was not “ready.” Even a segregated community could still be tied in countless social and economic relationships to its neighbors. The more “essential” a Jew appeared to be in the economy, the more extensive his legal or family connections with non-Jews, the more medals he had to show for service in the First World War, that much greater was the difficulty of uprooting him from his surroundings. Outside the German and Polish frontiers these complications were multiplied. Wherever Germans did not exercise plena y power, they had to employ foreign machinery for the accomplishment of their aims, and they had to deal with foreign conceptions of the ramifications and consequences of the operation. Only then could transports begin to roll. Finally, the very departure of the Jews generated new tasks. Lost production had to be replaced, unpaid Jewish debts had to be regulated, and — after the fate of the Jewish deportees could no longer be

46. Himmler speech, June 21, 1944, NG-4977. Lochner, ed. *The Goebbels Diaries*, entries for March 27, 1942, and March 20, 1943, pp. 147-48, 314.

47. Hitler speech, September 30, 1942, German press. The reference to September 1, 1939, is a misstatement by Hitler, inasmuch as he had uttered these words already on January 30 of that year.

DEPORTATIONS

hidden —the psychological repercussions on the non-Jewish population had to be smoothed and eliminated.

The machine that carried out the “Final Solution” consisted of a large array of offices, German and non-German, uniformed and civilian, central and municipal. Two agencies were instrumental in carrying out the deportation process in its very center: one, the RSHA’s office IV-B-4, was relatively small; the other, the Transport Ministry, was one of the largest. Referat IV-B-4, under Adolf Eichmann, covered the entire deportation area outside of Poland (where SS and Police offices dealt with the dissolution of the ghettos). The Transport Ministry, with its subsidiaries and affiliates, was responsible for trains throughout Axis Europe.

Even so small a section as Eichmann’s was involved in manifold decisions. Within the Reich-Protectorat area, Eichmann’s jurisdiction extended to seizure and transport. For this purpose he availed himself of the regional Gestapo offices and the Central Offices for Jewish Emigration. In the satellite and occupied countries, from Western Europe to the Balkans, he stationed experts on Jewish affairs with German embassies or Higher SS and Police Leaders to work out deportation plans on the spot. There his control was less total than in the Reich, but in these foreign areas the Eichmann machinery concerned itself with the entire uprooting phase of the deportations, including the initiation of anti-Jewish laws, the various definitions and categorizations of the Jewish victims, and the time and procurement of transportation.

In the RSHA hierarchy Eichmann’s office, with its subdivisions, was placed as follows:¹

- RSHA: Obergruppenführer Heydrich (Kaltenbrunner)
- IV (Gestapo): Gruppenführer Müller
- IV-B (Sects): Sturmbannführer Hartl (later vacant)
- IV-B-4 (Jews): Obersturmbannführer Eichmann
- IV-B-4-a (Evacuations): Sturmbannführer Günther
- General matters: Wohn
- Transport: Novak (deputy: Hartmann, later Martin)
- Single cases: Moes (Kryschak)
- IV-B-4-b (Law): Sturmbannführer Suhr (later Hunsche)
- Deputy: Hunsche
- Finance and property: Gutwasser
- Foreign areas: Bosshammer

There was a direct line between Gruppenführer Müller, the Gestapo chief, and Eichmann. Müller, as Eichmann recalled after the war, was

1. From detailed organization charts, constructed after the war, in *Landesgericht für Strafsachen, Vienna, Strafsache Ocri Franz Novak, 1416/61, vol. 17, pp. 57-61.*

a “sphinx.”² A criminologist by background, he acted like a bureaucrat, committing everything to paper and holding frequent conferences with large numbers of subordinates. He also reserved power to himself. Whereas Eichmann made arrangements for deportations, only Müller could “take his orange-colored pencil and . . . write on top 5,000 Jews,”³ Nevertheless, the relationship between the two men, despite disparity of rank and position, was apparently close. Every Thursday, Müller would invite some of his specialists to an evening in his apartment, serving a little cognac, discussing business, and touching upon the personal affairs of his guests. There were chess games, Müller playing frequently with Eichmann. Müller always won.

Eichmann had come to Office IV from the SD and the Vienna Zentralstelle.⁴ In 1941 he was thirty-five years old.⁵ At his postwar trial in Jerusalem, he emerged as a drinker who on occasion had used abusive language toward Jews but who had paid a rabbi for Hebrew lessons.⁶ With his subordinates Eichmann maintained cordial relations. He played chess with diem, and a small IV-B-4 ensemble made music. Eichmann’s instrument was the second violin.⁷

In office IV-B-4-a the ascetic Sturmbannführer Günther and his assistant, Hauptsturmführer Novak, dealt with the crucial problem of transport. It is they who requisitioned the trains. The procurement of a transport was predicated on Günther’s ability to specify a point of departure and a place of arrival. If departure was the culmination of an uprooting process, the destination was primarily a matter of administrative preparation. Even so, the choice of a ghetto or camp for unloading a particular train could entail considerations of policy, and, especially at the beginning, such questions might have had to be referred to Himmler himself.

2. Character description of Müller in Adolf Eichmann, *Ich, Adolf Eichmann* (Leoni am Starnberger See, 1980), pp. 450-54.

3. Testimony by Eichmann, Eichmann trial transcript, July 21, 1961, sess. 106, p. G1.

4. In the Main Office of the SD, still Hauptscharführer, he was a member of the Referat Jewry (II 112), which was divided into several sections, including Assimilationists, Orthodoxy, and Zionists. The Referat was headed by Untersturmführer Wisliceny and Eichmann was given the Zionist section (II1123). Since prewar policy stressed emigration, the Zionists were to be strengthened vis-à-vis the advocates of assimilation. See the correspondence in T 175, Roll 588.

5. Eichmann’s personnel record, NO-2259.

6. For Eichmann’s assessment of himself and of the operations of his office, see his testimony in the Eichmann trial transcript, June 21, 1961, sess. 76, pp. A1, F1; June 27, 1961, sess. 80, p. S1; July 12, 1961, sess. 94, pp. Ddl. Eel. Jjl; July 17, 1961, sess. 99, p. Mml; July 20, 1961, sess. 105, p. Ftl, July 21, 1961, sess. 106, pp. B1, C1, D1, G1.

7. Eichmann, *Ich*, p. 461.

When the “Final Solution” was under way, routing became more and more a function of logistics, i.e., distances to and capacities of individual camps.⁸ Once a timetable with origin and destination was obtained from the Transport Ministry, IV-B-4-a could send the information to the appropriate police office for the seizure of the victims and to the intended camp for their reception. The number of deportees was then noted on a chart attached to the back of Giinther’s desk.

The transports were carried out by the Reichsbahn.⁹ This administrative juggernaut, which in 1942 employed almost half a million civil servants and 900,000 workers,¹⁰ was one of the largest organizations of the Third Reich. It was a component of the Transport Ministry, which dealt also with roads and canals and which was headed by Dormmüller, an older man who held the office from 1937 to the end of the war. The Staatssekretär in charge of the Reichsbahn was at first Kleinmann and later, from May 23, 1942, Ganzenmüller, a capable thirty-seven-year-old technocrat with Nazi credentials.¹¹ The Reichsbahn was an insulated, self-contained structure, as “nonpolitical” in its appearance as the Security Police, for its part, was the open epitomization of Nazism. Yet it was upon the railroads that Speer’s Ministry for War Production depended for the movement of goods, the armed forces for the transport of troops, and the RSHA for the deportation of the Jews. For all these operations the Reichsbahn was indispensable.

The central apparatus of the Reichsbahn consisted of several divisions. The Traffic Division set priorities and rates, the Operations Division was concerned with train formation and schedules, and Group L (*Landesverteidigung*) worked with OKH/Transport (General Gercke) in the dispatch of trains carrying troops and munitions.¹²

Reichsbahn: Ganzenmüller

E 1 Traffic and Tariffs: Treibe (from 1942, Schelp)

8. Ibid., pp. 152-53.

9. For the Reichsbahn’s involvement in the destruction process (with texts of documents) see Raul Hilberg, *Sonderzüge nach Auschwitz* (Mainz, 1981).

10. Dokumentationsdienst der DB, *Dokumentarische Enzyklopädie V-Eisenbahnen und Eisenbahner zwischen 1941 und 1945* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), p. 110.

11. On Ganzenmüller’s appointment and career, see Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York, 1970), pp. 222-25; Eugen Krcidler, *Die Eisenbahnen im Machtbereich der Achsenmächte während des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 205-6; prosecution at Düsseldorf to Langericht Düsseldorf, March 16, 1970, transmitting indictment of Ganzenmüller, File No. 8 Js 430/67, in *Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg and in Landgericht Düsseldorf*; statement and answers to questions by Dr. Albert Ganzenmüller, October 7, 1964, Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 5, pp. 216-27.

12. See the annual *Verzeichnis der oberen Reichsbahnbeamten*, particularly for 1941 to 1943.

(15-17: Passenger Traffic)
17 International Passenger Traffic: Rau
E II Operations: Leibbrand (from 1942, Dilli)
21 Passenger Trains: Schnell
211 Special Trains: Stange
L (Armed Forces): Ebeling

Territorially the railroad structure was composed of three regional *Generalbetriebsleitungen*, a larger number of subregional *Reichsbahndirektionen*, and many local railway stations. Of the three Generalbetriebsleitungen, the eastern was preeminent. It was from here that the stream of traffic to the eastern front as well as to the death camps was directed.¹³

Generalbetriebsleitung Ost (Berlin): Ernst Emrich
I Operations: Eggert (Mangold)
L: Bebenroth
P (Passenger Schedules): Fröhlich
PW (Passenger Cars): Jacobi
II Traffic: Simon (Hartmann)
III Main Car Allocation Office [freight cars]: Schultz
Generalbetriebsleitung West (Essen): Sarter
Generalbetriebsleitung Süd (Munich): Wilhelm Emrich

Each Reichsbahndirektion had an operations section and a car bureau. In each operations section there was an office “33” that handled passenger trains.

Even though Jews were carried in freight cars, they were booked by the Reichsbahn’s financial specialists as passengers. In principle, any group of travelers was accepted for payment. The basic charge was the third-class fare: 4 Pfennig per track kilometer (0.6 miles). Children under ten were transported for half this amount; those under four went free.¹⁴ Group fare (half of the third-class rate) was available if at least 400 persons were transported.¹⁵ The agency billed for the money was the one that requisitioned the transport. In the case of the trains carrying Jews, that agency was the RSHA.¹⁶ For the deportees one-way fare was payable; for the guards a round-trip ticket had to be purchased.¹⁷ Billings were sometimes

13. *Ibid.* Only GBL Ost had Main Car Allocation Office serving the entire Reich.

14. Deutsches Kirsb|ic|, *Jahresfahrplan, 1942/43*, effective May 4, 1942.

15. Treibe to Reichsbahndircktionen, copies to Generaldircktion der Ostbahn (Gedob), Protektorat railways, and Mitteleuropäisches Reisebüro, July 26, 1941, Case Ganzcnmüller, special vol. 4, pp. 47-55.

16. Eichmann to Reichsbahn, February 20, 1941, Case Ganzcnmüller, special vol. 4, pt. 4, p. 105.

17. Deutsche Reichsbahn/Verkehrsamt, lödz, to Gestapo in city, May 19, 1942,

channeled through the official travel agency, the Mitteleuropäische Reisebüro,¹⁸ and on occasion payment might be delayed.

The maxim that deportees were travelers was applied also in operations. That is to say that passenger train officials rather than freight car experts were engaged in the formation and scheduling of the death transports. For a deportation originating in the Reich itself, the chain of jurisdiction thus led from die RSHA IV-B-4-a (Novak) to 21 and 211 in the Transport Ministry, and through Generalbetriebsleitung (GBL) Ost/P and PW (a transport from the Rhine river city of Düsseldorf would also be processed by GBL West) to all Reichsbahndirektionen (offices "33") along the route.

The passenger concept was used outside the Reich as well. Payment, however, had to be made in foreign currency, and billings could be more complicated. The actual dispatch of the trains was the work of a large organization of railroads, including those under Reichsbahn control, autonomous railways in satellite countries, and networks supervised by the Chief of Military Transport (Gercke) in areas under military rule (Table 8-1). Where German railroad offices were established, as in Poland and France, their structure was patterned after the Reich model, down to offices "33" for the scheduling of Jewish trains. The preservation of these time-honored prerogatives was coupled with an adherence to routine decision making. In the daily administration of transport programs, the deportation of the Jews was therefore embedded in the regular procedures for allocations of rolling stock to users and assignments of time on tracks.

In Reich territory proper (including Austria, Polish incorporated areas, and Bialystok, but not the Protektorat and the Generalgouvernement), there were approximately 850,000 freight cars, some 130,000 of which were assembled for loading each day.¹⁹ About 60 percent of the equipment was specialized (open cars for coal or ore),²⁰ and a large portion of the remainder was used for the armed forces or for vital freight.²¹ Given the demands of war, every allocation of space became significant,

enclosing bill for twelve trains. Facsimile in *Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord* (Berlin, 1960), pp. 280-81.

18. E 1/16 to Reichsbahndirektionen Karlsruhe, Cologne, Münster, Saarbrücken, copies to Hauptverkehrsdirktionen Brussels and Paris, Plenipotentiary' in Utrecht, and Amstrat Strange, July 14, 1942, Case Ganzen mul ler, special vol. 4, pr. 3, p. 56.

19. Krcidler, *Eisenbahnen*, pp. 278-79, 338.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 338.

21. Rolling stock for the Wehrmacht was set aside every' morning, and from time to time attempts were made to establish priorities for industrial cargo. Statement by Dr. Fritz Schelp in letter to prosecutor Dr. Uchmann, July 14, 1967, Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 6, pp. 139-42.

TABLE 8-1

RAILROAD STRUCTURE OUTSIDE GERMANY

UNDER REICHSBAHN CONTROL

Generalgouvernement

Generaldirektion der Ostbahn (Gedob) in Krakow

German administrative apparatus operationally integrated with Transport Ministry

Occupied USSR

Generalverkehrsdirektion Osten in Warsaw

German administrative apparatus operationally integrated with Transport Ministry (initially under a directorate for eastern operations in the office of the Chief of Army Transport)

France

Hauptverkehrsdirktion in Paris

German administrative layer over French railways (initially Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion under Chief of Army Transport)

Belgium

Hauptverkehrsdirektion in Brussels

German administrative layer over Belgian railways (initially Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion under Chief of Army Transport)

Netherlands

Plenipotentiary of Reichsbahn with Dutch railways in Utrecht

Denmark

Plenipotentiary of Reichsbahn with Danish railways in Aarhus

‘AUTONOMOUS’ RAILROADS

Protektorat

Plenipotentiary of Reichsbahn (for liaison and directives) in conjunction with Reichsprotektor/Division of Transport over remnant Czech Transport Ministry in Prague

Slovakia

Plenipotentiary of Reichsbahn for liaison and directives to Slovak Transport Ministry in Bratislava

Axis Satellites: Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria

Reichsbahn Generalvertreter (representatives) in each of the capitals for liaison

SUPERVISED BY CHIEF OF ARMY TRANSPORT

Norway

Transport Commander over Norwegian railways

Croatia, Serbia, Greece

Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion Südost

An administrative apparatus in Belgrade over indigenous railroads

Italy

Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion in Verona

Installed after Italian collapse in 1943 over Italian railroads

Note: Table based on Kreidler, *Eisenbahnen*, pp. 324-25. See also Ministerialrat Dr. Werner Hausteil, “Das Werden der Grossdeutschen Reichsbahn im Rahmen des Grossdeutschen Reiches,” *Die Reichsbahn*, 1942, pp. 76-78, 114-25.

and at some point a shipment might have to be left behind. This problem existed also outside the Reichsbahn network, throughout Axis Europe. Within the Generalgouvernement, for example, the distances from the ghettos to the death camps were comparatively short, but the capacity of the Ostbahn to cope with demand was lower than the Reichsbahn's capability at home, and the number of prospective deportees, as a percentage of the Ostbahn's traffic volume, was much higher than in the Reich. In fact, there were times when all available locomotives and cars were preempted by military or industrial claimants or when civilian traffic as a whole was curtailed or eliminated on congested routes for weeks on end.²² Such emergencies called for special efforts to assure the loading of the Jews at the earliest possible moment. Indeed, on some occasions the impossible was done, and Jewish transports were dispatched as "armed forces trains" to accelerate their movement.²³

Generally, the decision flow would begin in the office of Hauptsturmführer Novak in Eichmann's office. Novak would take his request to 21 (Schnell) and 211 (Stange). The chief of 211, who was about sixty years of age, was for practical purposes the principal Jewish expert of the Transport Ministry. He acted as an expeditor and as a control point. Closeted in his office, choleric by temperament, he would speak loudly into the telephone. Although he was only an Amtsrat, he had held that rank for twenty years, and mail was addressed to him directly by name.²⁴ The Novak-Stange link of the chain affected transportation in all parts of Europe wherever territorial jurisdictional lines were crossed, as between a satellite system and the Reichsbahn, or between two or more Direktionen of the Reichsbahn itself. Within the Generalgouvernement, Security Police officials who were stationed in the area could negotiate with the Ostbahn directly.²⁵

When preparations were completed in the Ministry, a directive would

22. See, for example, Frank Diary, June 18, 1942, PS-2233, and Reichsbahndirektion Vicnna/33 H (signed Eigl) to Section 18, May 5, 1941, and March 12, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, folder Verschiedenes 301, AAe 112, at pp. 232 and 249.

23. Plenipotentiary of German Transport Ministry with Slovak Transport Ministry to Slovak Ministry, March 1, 1945, facsimile in Livia Rotkirchen, *The Destruction of Slovak Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1961), facing p. 224.

24. On Stange, see the following: Statement by Dr. Gustav Dilli, August 15, 1967, Case Ganzcnmiillcr, vol. 18, p. 31, insert (Hülle) pp. 18-27. Statement by Novak, Case Novak, vol. 8, p. 71. Statement by Gerda Boyce, April 2, 1969, Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 18, pp. 86-92. Statement by Karl Hein, April 18, 1969, Case Ganzcnmiillcr, vol. 18, pp. 98-103.

25. Statement by Erich Richter, June 11, 1969, Case Ganzcnmüller, vol. 19, pp. 5-12, and statements by Alfons Glas, October 21, 1960, Case Ganzcnmüller, vol. 4, pp. 284-88, and August 26, 1961, Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 5, pp. 148-53.

be sent by E II to the appropriate Generalbetriebsleitung for further action. GBL Ost, with its control of car allocation, would be involved in any case. Jewish transports were special passenger trains (*Sonderzüge*). Unlike regular passenger trains, which would always leave at a stated time, no Sonderzug would move without specific orders. The Sonderzüge were marked with a simple code: DA was the designation for Jewish deportation trains originating outside of Poland, Pkr or Pj for Jewish Sonderzüge assembled in the Generalgouvernement. The GBL Ost had a *Sonderzuggruppe* that dealt with Jews, forced laborers, children, and others. The two driving personalities in this group were Reichsbahnoberinspektor Fähnrich (in PW under Jacobi) for car assignments and Reichsbahnoberinspektor Bruno Klemm for scheduling. Periodically the Sonderzuggruppe would meet in Frankfurt am Main, Bamberg, or Berlin, to discuss twenty-five or fifty trains, including DA transports. Generalbetriebsleitung Ost/PW (Jacobi) would then issue a circulatory plan fixing the dates of departure and arrival of each transport as well as the return or rerouting of the empty train.²⁶ As far as possible, the cars were to be assembled by the Direktion responsible for departure from its own supplies,²⁷ but in cases of heavy demand, the GBL Ost could shift equipment from one Direktion to another.²⁸

The next refinement (at the level of Reichsbahndirektion, Hauptisenbahndirektion, etc.) was the scheduling and assembly of the train. Each Direktion operated with a basic traffic plan, the so-called book timetable (*Buchfahrplan*), divided into two parts: the regular timetable (*Regelfahrplan*), devoted to ordinary passenger trains whose schedules were posted, and a demand timetable (*Bedarfsfahrplan*) for trains dispatched only when

26. Jacobi to Reichsbahndirektionen, Generaldirektion der Ostbahn, Hauptisenbahndirektion Mitte in Minsk, Hauptisenbahndirektion Nord in Riga, copies to GBL West and GBL Süd, August 8, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Record Group 53.002 (Belarus Central State Archives), Roll 2, Fond 78, Opis 1, Folder 784. Jacobi to Reichsbahndirektionen Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, Erfurt, Halle (S), Karlsruhe, Königsberg, Linz, Mainz, Oppeln, Frankfurt (O), Posen, and Vienna, and to the Ostbahn, Reichsprotector/Eisenbahnen, Reichsverkehrsdirektion Minsk, and Generalverkehrsdirektion Warsaw (for military areas in occupied USSR), copies to GBL West and GBL Süd, January 16, 1943, *ibid.* The territories of Reichsbahndirektionen on the distribution list were those in which the trains were to originate or which they had to traverse. Riga and Minsk were arrival points of projected transports, and Reichsbahndirektion Oppeln had jurisdiction over the railroad station in Auschwitz.

27. Leibbrand to GBL West, GBL Ost/L and PW, Hauptverkehrsdirektion Paris, Hauptverkehrsdirektion Brussels, Plenipotentiary (*Bahnbenennungsleiter*) Utrecht, and Reichsbahndirektion Oppeln, June 23, 1942. Case Ganzenmüller, special vol. 4, pt. 3, p. 57.

28. Krcidler, *Eisenbahnen*, p. 247.

needed. The latter category comprised freight trains and all irregular passenger trains, including Jewish Sonderzüge.²⁹ Through traffic was assured by means of an interconnected plan (*durchjebenden Fahrplan*) under which segments of the demand timetables belonging to adjacent Direktionen were fused.³⁰ The Sonderzüge carrying Jews had to be entered on the Bedarfsfahrplan, but in the event that all the time slots were in use, an office “33” could prepare a special schedule (*Sonderfahrplan*) to permit the transport to move on empty track between other trains.^{31 32} As Eichmann pointed out, the construction of timetables was a science in itself (*eine Wissenschaft für sich*).³² The scheduling decisions were finally incorporated in a timetable order (*Fahrplananordnung*) specifying not only the exact hours and minutes of departure and traversal but also the station that had to supply the locomotives and cars.³³ Because of wartime conditions, the Fahrplananordnungen were frequently altered. Telephone calls and telegrams would then be required to deal with disruptions and congestion. In the end the Jews were delivered to their deaths, and the cars were returned to the circulatory flow. The task was being accomplished.

THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA

The deportations were to begin in the Reich. Decisions made for Germany itself were to be a model for occupied territories and an example to satellite countries. Measures against Jews had been taken over a much longer period in Germany than anywhere else, and the machinery of destruction was larger and more finely honed there than in other areas of Europe. On the other hand, the Reich-Protektorat area posed special problems, and uprooting the Jews of Germany was going to require special efforts.

29. Statement by Robert Bringmann (timetable specialist in Generaldirektion der Osrbahn), June 29, 1967, Case Ganzcnmiiller, vol. 16, p. 161, insert at 11-14.

30. See explanation by Mangold, undated, in Verkehrsarchiv Nuremberg, Collection Sartcr, folder aa.

31. For example, Generaldirektion der Ostbahn 30 H, Fahrplananordnung of March 26, 1942 (signed Schmid), Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, folder Polen 162, film 6, pp. 192-93. *H* stands for *Hilfsarbeiter*, a backup specialist covering for the incumbent.

32. Eichmann, *Ich*, p. 152.

33. For example, Reichsbahndirektion Königsberg/33, Fahrplananordnung of July 13, 1942, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Fb 85/2, p. 260.

THE UPROOTING PROCESS

The early movements of Jews from the Reich to neighboring areas in occupied France and Poland were marked by a sense of impatience. Berlin and Vienna, Hamburg and Munich were to be free of the remaining Jews, or at least free of most of them, as soon as possible. Before long, however, die Heydrich machine was intruding upon various jurisdictions. Many prospective deportees were in controversial categories, in that their inclusion in deportation lists would create complications or entail disadvantages. Among diese individuals were the Mischlinge and Jews in mixed marriages, prominent Jews, old Jews, war veterans, foreign Jews, and Jews in the armament industry. Other categories posed custody problems and required special arrangements, namely, the Jews in insane asylums, concentration camps, and prisons. In short, the RSHA had to negotiate on the very highest level with many agencies before deporting the Reich-Protektorat Jews.

With a view to shortening the negotiations, Heydrich had invited all interested agencies to the “final solution” conference held on January 20, 1942. He had hoped to dispose of all his problems at once, but that was not possible. The conferees dealt only with the 125,000 Mischlinge and 28,000 Jews in mixed marriages who were living in die Reich-Protektorat area.¹

Special Problem 1: Mischlinge and Jews in Mixed Marriages

The Mischlinge were the recurring problem children of the German bureaucracy. An original invention of Staatssekretär Stuckart and Ministerialrat Lösener, the Mischlinge comprised all half-Jews who did not belong to the Jewish religion and were not married to a Jewish person (the so-called Mischlinge of the first degree) and all quarter-Jews (Mischlinge of the second degree). The Mischlinge were neither black nor white, neither Jews nor Germans.

Discriminations against the Mischling group were comparatively slight. As non-Aryans they were barred, as a matter of principle, from the civil service and “analogously” (*sinngemäß*) from the legal profession. They could not be editors, and they were excluded from the Reich Chamber of Culture. Under the Farm Inheritance Law (*Erbhofgesetz*), Mischlinge could not inherit a farm. They could not belong to the party, the SS, the SA, the *Stamm-HJ* (Hider Youth elite), or any other party formations. In the army they could not rise to noncommissioned or commissioned

1. The definition of the term “Jew” was extended to Austria and the Protektorat by decree. Sec decree of May 20, 1938, RGBl, 594, and Protektorat decree of June 21, 1939, *Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektars*, 1939, p. 45.

ranks. A Mischling of the first degree could not be a guardian of a German child (or, for that matter, of a Mischling child of the second degree), and tax reductions were not extended to parents of Mischling children.

In other matters, however, the Mischlinge were treated like Germans. They did not wear the star, were not restricted in business activities, and were even permitted membership in such nonpolitical party organizations as the NSV (Welfare League) and DAF (German Labor Front).² Moreover, the "liberalization" procedure had enabled many Mischlinge to remain civil servants and to become officers.

In 1939 there were 64,000 Mischlinge of the first degree and 43,000 Mischlinge of the second degree in the Old Reich, Austria, and the Sudeten area.³ The civil servants strove for the complete absorption of the Mischlinge of the second degree into the German community. Marriages between Mischlinge of the second degree and Germans were permitted without special consent, whereas marriages with Jews were strictly prohibited. On the other hand, the Mischlinge of the first degree posed difficulties, and toward the end of 1941 party circles began to equate these Mischlinge with the Jews. The "final solution" was now at hand, and no solution could really be "final" unless the Mischling problem was also "solved."

On October 13, 1941, the chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, and the chief of the party's Race-Political Office, Gross, had a conversation about the Mischlinge, the first major conversation on this topic during the deportation phase. Lammers declared himself willing to support the sterilization of all Mischlinge of the first degree in order to prevent the birth of future Mischlinge.⁴ In addition, he proposed strict controls for the prevention of the marriage of a Mischling of the second

2. Restrictions against Mischlinge are enumerated by Wilhelm Stuckart in his *Rassenpflege*. 5th ed. (Leipzig, 1944), pp. 21, 26, 34, 40, 41; and in *Die Judenfrage (Vertrauliche Beilage)*, April 25, 1941, pp. 22-24.

3. "Die Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge," *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, vol. 20, p. 84; affidavit by Lösner, October 17, 1947, NG-2982. The census figure of the Mischlinge of the first degree is 72,738. However, the figure includes *all* half-Jews, because the census takers, for administrative reasons, simplified the questionnaire. The true number of Mischlinge is given by Lösner in his affidavit. See also the compilation of detailed statistics in Jeremy Noakes, "The Development of Nazi Policy Toward German-Jewish 'Mischlinge' 1933-45," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book*, 34 (1989): 291-354.

There is no precise figure of Mischlinge in the Protektorat. Judging from the statistics on intermarriages, it could have been as high as 30,000 in 1939. The bureaucrats in Berlin never discussed the problem of the Czech-Jewish Mischlinge, but their fate hinged on the treatment of the Mischlinge in the Reich.

4. The child of a Mischling of the first degree could have any status, from full Jew to full German, depending on grandparentage. In most cases, of course, the offspring of a first-degree Mischling was a Mischling of the second degree.

degree with another Mischling of the second degree.⁵ Lammers argued that if Mischlinge of the second degree were allowed to marry only Germans, the Jewish characteristics would disappear completely in accordance with Mendelian laws. Gross thought about the proposition and made a counterproposal: Why not do the opposite and, instead of diffusing Jewish traits in the German population, allow Mischlinge of the second degree to marry only other Mischlinge of the second degree? From such combinations, he said, there would emerge now and again persons possessing an accumulation of Jewish characteristics. Those persons, in turn “might succumb to some form of extermination.”⁶

One implication of this “scientific” discussion now came to the fore. The Mischlinge were unfinished business. The party wanted to subject them to the “final solution.” The civil service still did not want to kill these people, but the representatives of the ministries were ready to propose compromise measures with the aim of allowing the Mischlinge to die out.⁷

During the conference of January 20, the Mischling issue was raised again. Under the heading “Solution of the Mixed Marriage and Mischling Questions,” it was proposed that Mischlinge of the first degree were to be equated with Jews, with the following exceptions:

1. Mischlinge of the first degree married to Germans, who had children classified as Mischlinge of the second degree
2. Mischlinge of the first degree who, by reason of services rendered to the German people, had been accorded liberation permits. All liberations were to be reviewed, however, to establish that they had been granted because of the Mischling’s own merits and not those of his parents or spouse.

Mischlinge of the second degree were to be treated as Germans, but a Mischling of the second degree *who was not married to a German* was to be treated as a Jew:

5. Such marriages were already prohibited.

6. Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Wetzel (East Ministry and Race-Political Office) to Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Weitnauer and Oberregierungsrat Dr. Labs, January 5, 1942, enclosing summary of Lammers-Gross discussion, NG-978.

7. Hitler himself did not think that the Mischlinge could be absorbed. Experience had shown, he said, that after a diffusion of four, five, or even six generations “full Jews would Mendel out after all.” He could name several examples of that phenomenon (c.g., President Roosevelt). His explanation was the Jewish people simply were tougher (*Das jüdische Volkstum sei eben zäher*). Henry Picker, *Hitler's Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1942* (Bonn, 1951), entries for May 10, 1942, and July 1, 1942, pp. 303, 313. The *Tischgespräche* are a summon’ by Picker of remarks made by Hitler at the dinner table. From all indications, Hitler did *not* follow up his remarks with an order for action, one way or the other. Very likely, he was not asked for a decision.

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1. If he was a descendant of a “bastard marriage” (*Bastardehe*), that is, a marriage between Mischlinge,⁸ or
2. If he looked like a Jew (*Rassisch besonders ungünstiges Erscheinungsbild des Mischling 2. Grades das ihn schon äusserlich zu den Juden rechnet*), or
3. If particularly unfavorable reports by the police or political offices indicated that the Mischling of the second degree “behaved” and “felt” like a Jew.

Faced with the drastic implications of the new categorization, the conferees considered the possibility that Mischlinge who were candidates for deportation should be given an opportunity to remain in the Reich if they submitted to sterilization. Gruppenführer Hofmann, chief of the Race and Resettlement Main Office, suggested that preparations would have to be made for performing sterilizations on a large scale “because the Mischling, facing the choice of evacuation or sterilization, would prefer sterilization.”

Staatssekretär Stuckart of the Interior Ministry then voiced his opinion that the proposed “solution possibility” was much too complex for administrative reasons. He had a much simpler solution for the whole Mischling issue, one which would take into account the “biological facts”: compulsory sterilization.⁹

The issue was now narrowed down, but it was far from solved. On March 6, 1942, a second “Final Solution” conference was convened for the purpose of dealing with the Mischlinge and the mixed marriages. This time the chairman was Adolf Eichmann. The participants were personages of correspondingly lower rank—a circumstance that did not facilitate decision making. The East Ministry was represented by its expert on Jewish affairs, Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Wetzel. The Interior Ministry had dispatched Regierungsrat Dr. Feldscher. The Office of the Four-Year Plan had sent Amtsgerichtsrat Liegener and an attorney, Pegler. The Justice

8. Under the existing regulations, the child of two Mischlinge of the first degree had the same status as one who had a Jewish parent and a German parent. Normally the offspring of a Mischling of the first degree and a Mischling of the second degree would be a Mischling of the second degree, but such an individual could be classified as Gemian if the mother and father of the half-Jewish parent were Mischlinge themselves. Two Mischlinge of the second degree could nor produce a Mischling unless a grandparent of the child belonged to the Jewish religion.

9. Summary of “Final Solution” conference of January 20, 1942, NG-2586-G. See also report by Radcmacher, July 11, 1942, NG-2586-1. Radcmacher did not take part in the conference, but he seems to have received information about the proceedings from sources other than the conference summary cited above. According to Lösener, sterilization had first been suggested by Reichsarztetführer Wagner in 1935 and was proposed by Stuckart during the “Final Solution” conference only after he had been told by his colleague Staatssekretär Dr. Conti that the measure was impractical. Testimony by Loscner, Case No. 11, tr. p. 7653.

Ministry's delegate was Oberlandesgerichtsrat Massfeller. The General-gouvernement emissary was Dr. Kammerl. The Foreign Office representative was the draftsman of the Madagascar plan, Legationsrat Rademacher. The Party Chancellery was expertly represented by Oberregierungsrate Reischauer and Ancker, the Reich Chancellery by Oberregierungsrat Dr. Boley, and the SS Race and Resettlement Main Office by Hauptsturmführer Preusch and Obersturmführer Dr. Grohmann.

One other agency, not previously represented in "Final Solution" matters, had sent emissaries to the conference. That was the Propaganda Ministry. Goebbels had received a copy of the protocol of the January 20 conference, and his interest was immediately aroused by the "large number of exceedingly delicate questions" raised in that conference.¹⁰ In matters of "delicacy" the Propaganda Ministry naturally had jurisdiction. Accordingly, two propaganda experts were dispatched to the second conference, Oberregierungsrate Carstensen and Dr. Schmid-Burgh.

The conferees immediately began a discussion of the Stuckart proposal for compulsory sterilization. Everyone agreed that a "biological solution" would call for the sterilization of all Mischlinge. But how could such a measure be decreed? One could not very well give publicity to it. Someone suggested a provision to authorize a particular office "to regulate the living conditions of Mischlinge." That suggestion was rejected. Then someone else pointed out that sterilization of 70,000 Mischlinge of the first degree would entail medical treatment equivalent to 700,000 hospital days. Further, it was noted that after their sterilization the Mischlinge would still be Mischlinge; none of the administrative restrictions upon Mischlinge would thereby be removed. There would still be the problem of Mischlinge in sports, Mischlinge in the economy, Mischlinge as members of organizations, Mischlinge in the armed forces, Mischlinge as attorneys, Mischlinge as guardians, and so on.

It was consequently agreed that, should the Führer for political reasons still order their sterilization, the Mischlinge would have to be removed from the German community somehow. Since Staatssekretär Stuckart had objected to their deportation across the border, the Mischlinge might be concentrated in some sort of ghetto near the border. The representatives of the Party Chancellery then reiterated that in their opinion a sifting of the Mischlinge, in accordance with the criteria suggested during the conference of January 20, was the simplest solution as well as the *only* one that would assure the disappearance of this "third race." The small number of Mischlinge who would remain in the Reich after the sifting could always be sterilized, and after sterilization they could be freed from all restrictions and live out their lives in peace.

10. L. »diner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entry for March 7, 1942, p. 116.

This “solution” appealed to the conferees so much that they decided to submit it to higher authority for decision, but since this would have been an affront to Staatssekretär Stuckart, the conferees also decided to submit the proposal for compulsory sterilization.¹¹ In short, the issue was no nearer to a solution now than before. Instead of being thrashed out in conference, it was now perpetuated in correspondence. On March 16, 1942, Staatssekretär Stuckart addressed a long letter to his fellow' Staatssekretäre as well as to Heydrich and Hofmann. Stuckart prefaced his letter with the remark that in considering this question it was hardly necessary to stress “that the interests of the German people must be the sole criterion to be applied.”

Stuckart then went on to say that while deportation of the Mischlinge would appear to be a conspicuously simple solution, it had certain fatal defects that were hardly in line with the interests of the German nation. In the first place, Stuckart wished to remind his colleagues that a sifting of part-Jews had already taken place. In the Nuremberg definition those half-Jews who inclined to Judaism by reason of their religion or marriage had already been relegated to the Jews. The other half-Jews, the Mischlinge of the first degree, had been integrated *de facto* into the German community. They were working and they were fighting. Many of them had been “liberated” by the Führer and had been given the status of Germans. Moreover, many persons classified as Jews under the Nuremberg definition had been elevated to the status of Mischling of the first degree. It would be incompatible with the authority inherent in a decision by the Führer if these persons were now rebranded as Jews by general ruling. But if the “liberated” Jews could not be touched, it would be nonsensical and illogical to deport real Mischlinge of the first degree, that is, half-Jews who had received the more favorable status to begin with.

Next Stuckart pointed out that each Mischling had a large number of German relatives. The psychological and political repercussions on the home front would therefore be beyond calculation. Even if all these objections were to be disregarded, Stuckart continued, there was one argument that in his opinion was decisive. “It is the fact,” he said, “that deporting the half-Jews would mean abandoning that half of their blood which is German.” Taking all these considerations into account, he preferred the half-Jews to become extinct within the Reich by a natural process. Although one should then have to wait thirty or forty years, he was prepared to resign himself to this “setback.” The alternatives to sterilization would be “an enormous number of applications for exemptions . . . consider-

11. Summary of “Final Solution” conference of March 6, 1942 (20 copies), NG-2586-H. Radmacher via Unterstaatssekretäre Luther, Gaus, and Wormann to Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, July 11, 1942, NG-2586-I.

able transport difficulties . . . the burdensome necessity of taking the half-Jews away from their work,” and so on.¹²

Upon the heels of die Stuckart letter, the acting justice minister, Staatssekretär Schlegelberger, wrote a letter of his own. Schlegelberger proposed that the Mischlinge of the second degree be equated with Germans, without exceptions and without restrictions. With respect to the Mischlinge of die first degree, Schlegelberger supported sterilization. He took care to point out that those Mischlinge who were already too old to have children would not have to be sterilized; neither, he said, would they have to be deported. No useful purpose would be served by either procedure. Furthermore, Schlegelberger thought that Mischlinge of the first degree who were married to Germans and who had children classified as Mischlinge of the second degree should also be left alone. Since the offspring, as three-quarter Germans, had to be accepted as equal members of the German national community—“and this must be aimed at,” he said, “if the solution of the Jewish problem is really meant to be final” —one could not very well burden such persons with the knowledge that one of their parents had been subjected to “measures for protection of the national community.”¹³

The Schlegelberger letter was the first indication of a status quo. Both deportation and sterilization became increasingly infeasible as party and ministerial offices heaped argument after argument upon each other. In fact, matters rested until September 1942, when new rumors began to circulate in the Interior Ministry that the RSHA was preparing to deport the Mischlinge of the first degree after all.

At this point Ministerialrat Lösener sat down to write a letter to save his Mischlinge. He was near desperation. Lösener had written (or helped to write) twenty-seven anti-Jewish decrees.¹⁴ Probably none of them had made him as proud as the one that defined the Jews. In the abortive East Ministry conference on definitions, he had vainly urged that the Nuremberg principle be adopted in the East “for the sake of uniformity.”¹⁵ Now the Mischlinge in the Reich-Protectorat area were threatened with deportation.

12. Stuckarr to Klopfer, Freisler, Heydrich, Neumann, Luther, Meyer, and Hofmann, March 16, 1942, NG-2586-I. Hitler himself had desired the removal of Mischlinge of the first degree from active military service lest they should later be in a position to refer to an “expenditure of blood and life for Führer and Reich.” NSDAP/ Party' Chancellery to Reich Minister for Eastern Occupied Territories, March 2, 1942, Wi/ID .358.

13. Schlegelberger to Klopfer, Stuckart, Heydrich, Neumann, Luther, Meyer, and Hofmann, April 8, 1942, NG-2586-I.

14. Affidavit by Lösener, February 24, 1948, NG-1944-A.

15. Summary of East Ministry conference of January' 29, 1942, NG-5035.

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Losener wrote his letter around September 10, 1942, and addressed it to Himmler. He repeated all the arguments that Stuckart had enumerated. He wrote that Hitler had granted the status of Mischling of the first degree to 340 Jews, that there were many Mischlinge who had already become Germans, and that 260 more had been promised German status. Losener admitted that sterilization was not feasible during the war. After all, he consoled Himmler, "one cannot rectify errors and sins committed during the last 200 years in one day." But after the war the sterilizations could be carried out easily. Since the census figure of 72,000 Mischlinge also included half-Jews who were Jews by legal definition, the true number of Mischlinge of the first degree was only 64,000; and since a large number of the true Mischlinge were already past childbearing age, the number of sterilizations would not have to exceed 39,000. Again Losener stressed that the Mischlinge of the first degree were loyal people and that they were severely restricted anyhow. Finally, he urged that the whole matter be submitted to Hitler for a decision.¹⁶

On October 27, 1942, the third "Final Solution" conference was convened. This time the roll of participants was as follows:

SS-OStubaf. Eichmann, presiding (RSHA IV-B-4)
SS-Stubaf. Gunther (RSHA IV-B-4)
Regierungsrat Hunsche (RSHA IV-B-4)
Regierungsrat Suhr (RSHA IV-B-4)
SS-OStubaf. ORR. Dr. Bilfinger (RSHA II-A)
SS-Stubaf. RR Neifeind (RSHA II-A-2)
SS-Stubaf. Dr. Gengenbach (RSHA III-A)
Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Wetzel (East Ministry)
Regierungsrat Dr. Feldscher (Interior Ministry)
Amtsgerichtsrat Liegener (Four-Year Plan)
Oberlandesgerichtsrat Massfeller (Justice Ministry)
Landesoberverwaltungsrat Weirauch (Generalgouvernement)
Gesandtschaftsrat Dr. Klingenfuss (Foreign Office)
Reichsamtsleiter Kap (Party Chancellery)
Regierungsrat Raudies (Party Chancellery)
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Boley (Reich Chancellery)
SS-HStuf. Preusch (RuSHA)
SS-OStuf. Harders (RuSHA)
Oberregierungsrat Schmid-Burgh (Propaganda Ministry)
Bereichsleiter Lendschner (Race-Political Office)
SS-Stubaf. Dr. Stier (Staff Main Office)

16. Affidavit by Losener, October 17, 1947, with enclosure containing his letter to Himmler, written in September 1942, NG-2982.

At the outset of the conference the participants were told that “owing to new knowledge gained in the field of sterilization” the reproductive Mischlinge of the first degree could be sterilized during the war. The conferees agreed upon a sterilization program to be implemented “without further ado.” Sterilization was to be strictly voluntary, i.e., a service rendered by the person “for being graciously allowed to remain in Reich territory.¹¹ Sterilized Mischlinge could live out their lives in peace, subject only to the restrictions in force. Mischlinge of the second degree, without exception, were to be treated as Germans, but they too were to remain subject to Mischling restrictions.¹⁷

The pendulum had now swung the other way. However, the report of “new knowledge” in the field of sterilization was strictly a false hope. Under the patronage of the SS and Police, sterilization experiments were conducted on Jews in the killing center of Auschwitz, and from time to time the experimenters sent in reports to the effect that a technique for large-scale sterilizations was about to be “perfected.” Actually, the doctors never succeeded. The upshot of their failure was that, after all the discussion and controversy, the Mischlinge were neither deported nor sterilized.¹⁸

To be sure, the anti-Mischling restrictions were somewhat intensified. For example, in the fall of 1942 the Education Ministry issued some elaborate regulations for the admission of Mischlinge to schools.¹⁹ As late as September 1944, Hitler ruled that Mischlinge of the first degree who were serving in the bureaucracy were no longer entitled to service medals and honors.²⁰ Moreover, Mischlinge were afflicted with a fatal vulnerability whenever they did or said something improper. A Mischling of the first degree had to be careful lest some overzealous party office report him as behaving “like a full Jew.” Such a charge could cost him his life.²¹ From

17. Summary of conference of October 27,1942, NG-2586-M.

18. An exception were the Mischlinge of the first degree in concentration camps. Himmler deported these Mischlinge to killing centers.

19. Mischlinge of the first degree were no longer admitted to secondary schools and colleges. They were permitted to remain in class only if they had completed a substantial part of their education or if they were receiving training in trades or professions. Mischlinge of the second degree could continue in their studies, but their admission to secondary' and higher schools was permitted only if there was no “overcrowding.” Regulations by Education Ministry', August 20, 1942, and October 12, 1942, in *Die Judenfrage (Vertrauliche Beilage)*, March 1,1943, pp. 17-19.

20. Staatsminister Dr. Meissner to Higher Reich Authorities, September 4,1944, NG-1754.

21. A Mischling of the first degree, Oskar Beck, who owned a radio repair shop and sometimes removed radios to his home, was suspected of listening to foreign broadcasts and of behaving like a “full Jew.” Party/Gau Vicnna/Krcis II/Orrsgmppe Rembrandtstras.se 2-the Ortsgruppenleiter to State Police, Vienna, April 5, 1943,

April 1944, Mischlinge of the first degree were inducted for labor in camps of the Organisation Todt. They served not only in the Reich-Protektorat area but also in France. At construction sites in French locations they were banded together in labor companies (*OT-Arbeitsbereitschaften*) of about one hundred men each, working without uniforms but with pay.*²²

The Mischling controversy illustrates the bureaucracy's tremendous urge to make the "Final Solution" really final. The Mischlinge had not been bothered very much, but the mere fact that they existed was disturbing. They were living proof of a task unfinished, for they were carriers of "Jewish blood" and Jewish characteristics in the German community. This type of penetration into the German nation was something the German bureaucracy could not cope with, and the Mischlinge survived.

Closely allied to the Mischling issue was the problem of Jews in mixed marriages. The fate of these Jews was linked to that of the Mischlinge of the first degree because most Jews in mixed marriages were the parents of such Mischlinge. We may recall that during the concentration process Goring had issued instructions providing for the following Jews in mixed marriages to be considered privileged:

1. The Jewish husband of a German wife, provided the couple had one or more children classified as Mischlinge of the first degree
2. The Jewish wife of a German husband, provided that the children were classified as Mischlinge of the first degree or that the couple was childless.

However, in the "star" decree of September 1, 1941, the concept of privileged mixed marriages was broadened so as to include Jews married to Mischlinge of the second degree. Furthermore, the privilege was also extended to Jews whose marriages had been terminated by divorce or death, provided that they were the parents of a Mischling child, and that privilege was upheld even in those cases in which the only Mischling child

NG-381. Shortly after the issuance of the report, Beck was condemned to death for remarking to a German woman who had volunteered for labor service that she was prolonging the war. He was thus guilty of *Wehrkraftzersetzung* or "undermining the war effort." Judgment by Volksggerichtshof/4th Senate (signed by Volksggerichtstrat Müller and Landgerichtsdirektor Mittendorf), September 21, 1943, NG-381.

22. Franz W. Scidler, *Die Organisation Todt* (Bonn, 1998), pp. 131-32. H. G. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch* (Tübingen, 1974), pp. 318-22. Also affected by the labor draft were men (German or Jewish) in mixed marriages. On induction of Jewish men, see form letter signed by Vertrauensmann of the Reichsvereinigung, Karl Oppenheimer, February 8, 1945, in *Kommission zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden, Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), p. 531.

had been killed in action.²³ At the time of the deportations, privileged status was consequently enjoyed in all cases by:

1. The Jewish parent of a Mischling child, regardless of the continuation of the marriage and even if the only Mischling son had been killed in action
2. The childless Jewish wife in a mixed marriage for the duration of the marriage

Not privileged were:

1. The Jewish parent whose half-Jewish children were classified as Jews
2. The childless Jewish husband in a mixed marriage (unless his only Mischling child had been killed in action).

Statistically, the picture looked like this:²⁴

Intermarriages as of December 31, 1942

Old Reich	16,760
Austria	4,803
Protektorat	6,211
	27,774

Intermarriages as of April 1, 1943

(Old Reich only)

Privileged	12,117
Unprivileged	4,551
	16,668

Evidently, there was a tendency' to exempt increasing numbers of Jews in mixed marriages from the application of anti-Jewish measures. Heydrich attempted to counter this trend, but without a resolution at the top level, he was not going to make progress.²⁵

During the conference of January 20, 1942, everyone had caught the "Final Solution" spirit. Without considering the matter in great detail, the conferees decided that all Jews in mixed marriages were to be deported. Jews were after all not Mischlinge, and, as of January 20, the fate of the Mischlinge themselves was in doubt. But while the bureaucrats

23. Decree of September 1, 1941, RGBI 1, 547. See also food instructions by Staatssekretär Ricck, September 18, 1942, NG-452.

24. Report by SS Statistician Korherr, April 19, 1943, NO-5193.

25. During the fall of 1941, an eager Gestapo man in Düsseldorf, Kriminalsekretär Pütz, who did not want to make "exceptions," took steps to place a Jewish widow of a privileged mixed marriage on a November transport to Minsk. When the Mischling son spoke for her, Pütz replied that a twenty-six-year-old man did not need a mother anymore. After the son appealed through military offices to Eichmann, she was deported, but not to Minsk, and ultimately survived eight camps. Judgment of a Düsseldorf court against Georg Pütz, May 27, 1949, 8 Ks 21/49.

were in a hurry, they were vaguely aware of certain difficulties in connection with the mixed marriages. Without distinguishing between privileged and unprivileged status, the conferees agreed that a decision would have to be made in each individual case whether the Jewish partner (*der jüdische Teil*) was to be “evacuated” or whether, in view of the possible repercussions “of such a measure” upon German relatives, he should be “transferred” to the “Old People’s Ghetto” at Theresienstadt. Before the end of the conference, however, Staatssekretär Stuckart raised an interesting question. He pointed out that before the Jews in mixed marriages could be deported, there would have to be a law which would say, in effect, “these marriages are dissolved.”²⁶

Here, then, was die germ of the new controversy—only this time the line of argument did not run between the part) and die ministries, but right across die hierarchies. The Stuckart proposal was certainly in the interest of the SS and Police. Not much imagination was required to realize what would happen to the secrecy of the entire killing operation if thousands of Germans, separated from their Jewish spouses only by the latter’s deportation and aiming to take over the Jewish partner’s property (or even to contract a new marriage), would crowd the courts with applications for the death certificate of the Jewish spouse. Clearly such a procedure would be embarrassing. Only a divorce instituted *prior* to the deportation could avoid these complications. Even if the Jewish victims were deported only to Theresienstadt, their physical separation from their German spouses (presumably for life) could be expected to lead to legal difficulties; hence the need for a compulsory divorce procedure. Nevertheless, the Stuckart proposal generated opposition.

The oppositional front involved two strange allies: the Justice Ministry and the Propaganda Ministry. The judiciary was hurt because the contemplated divorce procedure ignored the courts. The propaganda experts deplored the lack of “delicacy” in the automatic divorce method. When the second “Final Solution” conference was convened on March 6, 1942, the representatives of the Propaganda Ministry presented the case against the Stuckart method. First they pointed to the likelihood of interference by the Vatican. The Catholic Church did not like divorces, let alone divorces by decree. Next the propaganda men explained that the proposed measure failed to take into account die many-sidedness of individual cases. Finally, they voiced the opinion that even the simplest divorce procedure would involve the courts since the German spouses would go to court anyhow.

The conferees decided upon a compromise method. It was agreed that the German spouses would be permitted to apply for a divorce on their

26. Summary of conference of January 20, 1942, NG-2586-G.

own and that the courts would grant such applications automatically. (The usual grounds for divorce were improper behavior by one partner or a three-year separation.) The conferees realized, however, that such a simplification of divorce procedure would not be enough. How many Germans would take advantage of it? In ordinary times a divorce was a divorce; in these circumstances it was a death sentence. Without mentioning this consideration out loud, the experts decided that if die German partner failed to take advantage of the opportunity within a given time, the public prosecutor would be directed to file a petition for divorce. The courts were to grant a divorce decree in all such cases; the judiciary was to have no discretion.

For the Justice Ministry this was a bitter pill, but the conferees did not stop here. Since the fate of the Mischlinge was still in doubt, it was decided to include in the automatic divorce procedure (with few exceptions) marriages between Mischlinge of the first degree and Germans. There were thousands of such marriages, and they were not even “mixed” under existing regulations. To add insult to injury, the conferees agreed in all these cases that if the chief of the Security Police and SD classified one of the partners in a marriage as a Jew or a Mischling of the first degree, the determination was to be binding on the courts.²⁷

Staatssekretär Schlegelberger of the Justice Ministry had hardly been notified of these decisions when he dispatched a letter to Lammers. “According to the report of my advisors,” he wrote, “decisions seem to be under way which I am constrained to consider absolutely impossible, for the most part.”²⁸ On April 8, 1942, Schlegelberger set forth his objections in great detail. It is interesting to note how far the Staatssekretär was willing to go in order to frustrate the assault upon his jurisdiction. He insisted that no divorce be granted unless requested by the German partner. He rejected the automatic divorce procedure by the public prosecutor on the ground that emotional ties between the Jewish and German partners would not be severed thereby. In complete disregard for the police point of view, Schlegelberger insisted that compulsory divorces were superfluous in any case, “since the couples will be separated anyway by the deportation of the Jewish partner.” Finally, he suggested that those Jews who were scheduled to be transferred to Theresienstadt could be joined there by their German spouses.²⁹

In spite of the strong opposition by Schlegelberger, who would rather have shipped the German wife of a Jewish husband to the old people’s

27. Sum man,' of conference of March 6, 1942, NG-2586-H.

28. Schlegelberger to Lammers, March 12, 1942, PS-4055.

29. Schlegelberger to Klopfer, Stuckart, Heydrich, Neumann, Luther, Meyer, and Hofmann, April 8, 1942, NG-2586-I.

ghetto at Theresienstadt than permit a compulsory divorce, the third “final solution” conference, which was held on October 27, 1942, re-affirmed the decisions of the second conference.³⁰

In anticipation of the decree, the RSHA made preparations for the deportation of Jews in mixed marriages. In March 1943 the Gestapo, with growing impatience, picked up a handful of Jews who had enjoyed privileged status and deported them. Although the deportations occurred in Goebbels’s own Gau, Berlin, the Propaganda Minister refused to become “sentimental” about the matter.³¹ The question of compulsory divorce was submitted to Hitler himself, but as of October 1943, the Führer still had not reacted to the proposal.³² A further step was then taken by Himmler on December 18, 1943, when he ordered the deportation of intermarried Jews to Theresienstadt, with the proviso that two groups be spared: The Jews whose sons had been killed in action, and those whose removal would stir “some unrest” because of the presence of minor children at home. The roundup was to take place January 5-10, 1944.³³

The Mischlinge and the Jews in mixed marriages were the only candidates for deportation who escaped the fate that Heydrich had chosen for them. The Mischlinge were saved because they were more German than Jewish. The Jews in mixed marriages were finally made exempt because, in the last analysis, it was felt that their deportation might jeopardize the whole destruction process. It simply did not pay to sacrifice the secrecy of the whole operation for the sake of deporting 28,000 Jews, some of whom were so old that they would probably die naturally before the operation was over.

Special Problem 2: The Theresienstadt Jews

During the first “Final Solution” conference of January 20, 1942, Heydrich announced that all Reich Jews over the age of sixty-five would be sent to an old people’s ghetto to be allowed to die a natural death. To the old Jews he added a second group, the Jewish war veterans who were severely disabled (*schwerkriegsbeschädigt*) or who had received the Iron Cross First Class or better.³⁴ Later a small third category was made eligible

30. Summary of conference of October 27, 1942, NG-2586-M.

31. Lochner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entry for March 11, 1943, p. 294.

32. Summary of conversation between Lammers and Bormann, October 6, 1943, NO-1068.

33. Himmler order, December 18, 1943, PS-3366. H. G. Adler cites a count of 1,954 Jews of mixed marriages, plus 38 dependents, in the ghetto on May 14, 1944. *Theresienstadt 1941-1945*, 2nd ed. (Tubingen, 1960), p. 699. This figure probably included a few hundred Dutch Jews. The Jews in mixed marriages, he notes, were not shielded in subsequent deportations to Auschwitz. *Ibid.*, pp. 190, 193.

34. Summary of conference of January 20, 1942, NG-2586-G.

for Theresienstadt: prominent Jews whose disappearance in a killing center might have resulted in inquiries from abroad.

One might ask why Heydrich created a ghetto especially for the old people and the disabled and decorated war veterans. It goes without saying that the consideration that old people do not live very long was very much on his mind, but in itself this consideration was not decisive. After all, he had to create a special ghetto city to accommodate these Jews, whose number he estimated at fully 30 percent of the total Jewish population in the Reich, or 85,000 out of 280,000. Furthermore, the consideration of life expectancy did not apply to the veterans, most of whom were in their late forties or early fifties. The answer to the riddle was supplied by Heydrich himself: he wanted to avoid “interventions.” This precaution raises the question of why he would expect “interventions” for old people and war veterans but not for women and children. The answer lies in the whole structure of rationalizations and justifications that the bureaucracy had created as a means of dealing with its conscience.

The standard explanation for the deportations was that the Jews were a danger in the Reich and that therefore they had to be “evacuated” to the East, where they performed hard labor such as road building. The old people did not quite fit into the picture. They were no danger and they could build no roads; in fact, many were living in homes for the aged. Therefore, Heydrich created the “old-age ghetto” of Theresienstadt as a “reservation” for “old and sick Jews who could not stand the strains of resettlement.”³⁵ In this manner Heydrich not only perpetuated the “resettlement” legend but actually strengthened it. Even so, the “transfers of residence to Theresienstadt” (*Wohnsitzverleßung nach Theresienstadt*), as these deportations were euphemistically called,³⁶ did not remove all difficulties. Every once in a while someone would inquire whether, for example, an eighty-seven-year-old Jew had to be deported, or whether some other octogenarian could not be left alone.³⁷ During the deportations of old people from Berlin, Goebbels noted in his diary: “Unfortunately, there have been a number of regrettable scenes at a Jewish home for the aged, where a large number of people gathered and even took sides with the Jews.”³⁸

Like the old people, the Jewish war veterans presented a psychological

35. Testimony by Staatssekretär Böhler of the Generalgouvernement, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XII, 69. Böhler did not believe in this fairy tale himself.

36. Polizeipräsident of Frankfurt to Oberbürgermeister Krebs, October 9, 1942, G-113.

37. Staatssekretär Weizsäcker to Vortragender Legationsrat Wagner, April 10, 1943, NG-3525. Wagner to Weizsäcker, April 15, 1943, NG-3525.

38. Lochner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entry for March 6, 1943, p. 276.

problem. The war veterans had an argument so powerful that it did not have to be made at all: they had fought for Germany. Every German understood this point. No one, not even the most Nazified SS man, cared to face a Jew who was a war invalid or who had received high decorations. One of the charges by Obersturmbannführer Strauch against Generalkommissar Kube grew out of an episode in Minsk, where Kube had stopped a policeman who was beating a Jew and had shouted at the German whether perhaps *he* had an Iron Cross like the Jew whom he was beating. Strauch, in reporting the matter, noted with an air of relief: “Fortunately, the policeman could reply with a ‘yes’ ”

The Jewish war veterans had not only an argument but also an inter-venor: the German army. This is not to say that the German army actually protected any Jews, but it did take an interest in the fate of its former soldiers. We may ask why the army, which was cooperating so “cordially” with the Einsatzgruppen in Russia, adopted a different policy at home. The answer is simple. A German does not take a uniform lightly. Those who had worn the German uniform, especially if they had been wounded or decorated in it, were entitled to respect. If they were Jews, they were entitled at least to some consideration. Hence we find that in 1933 the first regulations for the dismissal of Jewish civil servants already contained exemptions for war veterans. When a few Jewish veterans were found among the deportees transported from Vienna to Poland early in 1941, the army requested that “officers of proven merit” and those with 50 percent disability be exempted from the action and permitted to live out their lives on German soil. Their deportation, the army argued, would not be in conformity with respect for the German Wehrmacht.

Relying upon their “argument” and the sympathetic interest of the Wehrmacht, the Jewish war veterans of Austria and Germany organized into two distinct pressure groups. In Vienna there was the *Verband Jüdischer Kriegsoffer Wien* (Organization of Jewish War Invalids in Vienna), under the direction of Siegfried Kolisch. It was one of the few organizations that remained outside the framework of the Kultusgemeinde. In Berlin the former *Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten* (Reich Society of Jewish Front-Line Soldiers) was maintained as the *Kriegsoffer* (war invalids) section in the welfare division of the Reichsvereinigung; that is, it became part of the central machinery of Dr. Leo Baeck, but without losing its special interest. The *Kriegsoffer* section was under the direction of Dr. Ernst Rosenthal.

When the “star” decree was published in September 1941, the war veterans looked in vain for a regulation exempting them from wearing the burdensome identification. The Vienna Verband Jüdischer Kriegsoffer wrote a letter of inquiry to the *Kriegsoffer* section in Berlin, but the reply

was negative.³⁹ However, at the end of September, just four weeks after the issuance of the star decree, Director Kolisch announced in a meeting of Kriegsofper officials that the Gestapo man in charge of Jewish matters in Vienna, Obersturmführer Brunner, had ordered a statistical recapitulation of all Jewish war veterans in Austria. The same order had already been given in Prague and Berlin. One of the Kriegsofper officials, Fürth, brought out that 2,071 had already been listed. Besides, Fürth suggested, one could add the widows of specially decorated men, and veterans who had quit the Verband.⁴⁰

Two weeks later the director of the “emigration” division of the Vienna Kultusgemeinde, Rabbi Benjamin Murnelstein, told Kolisch that he had made an “agreement” (*Vereinbarung*) with the Nazi Central Office for Jewish Emigration (the *Zentralstelle*) with respect to the compilation of “removal lists for the resettlement action” (*Enthebungslisten für die Umsiedlungsaktion*). The list contained six categories of persons who were *not* to be removed:

1. Members of the Jewish administrative machinery, with their parents, brothers, and sisters
2. Persons who had already made arrangements for emigration to South America
3. Inmates of homes for the aged
4. Blind persons, total invalids, and the very sick
5. Persons in forced labor
6. War invalids and highly decorated war veterans

Murnelstein invited Kolisch to submit a Kriegsofper list, keeping these criteria in mind.⁴¹

It should be noted that the “agreed-upon” stipulations had a significance that was not quite understood by the Jewish leadership. The old people and war veterans were exempted for the moment because the Theresienstadt Ghetto was not yet in existence. The division of the war veterans into invalids and highly decorated men, on the one hand, and ordinary' ex-soldiers, on the other, was undertaken by the RSHA in order to please the army. Actually, the list was not an agreement at all but a

39. Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland/Abteilung Fürsorge-Kriegsofper (signed Dr. Ernst Israel Rosenthal) to Verband Jüdischer Kriegsofper Wien, October 13, 1941, Occ E 6a-10. Hitler himself is said to have ruled out an exemption on the ground that “these pigs” had “stolen” their decorations. Ulrich von Hassel, *Vom Andern Deutschland* (Zurich, 1946), entry for November 1, 1941, p. 236.

40. Minutes of Kriegsofper conference, under chairmanship of Kolisch, with Diamant, Fürth, Kris, Hnilitschck, Sachs, Scharzberger, Weihs, Schornstein, Schapira, and Miss Schapira participating, September 30, 1941, Occ F. 6a-18.

41. Memorandum by Kolisch, October 13-14, 1941, Occ F. 6a-10.

piece of paper drawn up by the Gestapo to secure the cooperation of the Jewish community machinery in organizing the first transports to the East.

Nevertheless, Kolisch expressed to Murrelstein his disappointment that an “agreement so pregnant with consequences” (*weitgehende Vereinbarung*) could have been concluded without prior consultations with the Kriegsofopfer Verband. Kolisch found that points 1 and 6 as such were “favorable” (*günstig*); however, the “agreement” did not cover the very first transport, which was to leave on October 15, 1941. For this reason alone, Kolisch had to reserve the right to submit to the Obersturmführer his own list. Murrelstein countered that such a procedure was impossible. Kolisch answered hotly: “This means I should sacrifice the war invalids.” Thereupon Murrelstein proposed that Kolisch petition for a few single individuals in “asking-for-mercy form” (*Rachmonesform*). The two men parted angrily.⁴²

On October 15, 1941, Murrelstein telephoned the Verband that the war veterans who were to report for deportation had been made exempt at the last moment,⁴³ but on the very next day a German army officer, Hauptmann Dr. Licht, called Kolisch in order to inquire whether three Jewish veterans, Colonel Grossmann and Cavalry Captains Wollisch and Eisler, had been included in the “resettlement transport.” Kolisch’s answer was as follows: “I am not entitled to give out any information without permission of my superior office [Gestapo]. At the same time, I am announcing [*Ich gebe gleichzeitig bekannt*] that the Verband has ordered its members not to make requests to any Aryan office [*dass es ihnen verboten ist arische Stellen in Anspruch zu nehmen*].” Kolisch dien noted in his memorandum that only Eisler was a member of his organization. The closing line of his notation reads: “I shall report this telephone call to the Central Office for Jewish Emigration [Gestapo].”⁴⁴

After the establishment of the Theresienstadt Ghetto in the spring of 1942, the deportations of war veterans started in earnest. However, not all of the war veterans went to Theresienstadt. Only the privileged were eligible for transport to the old people’s ghetto; the remainder were deported to camps, to be killed. When the spring deportations started, the chief of the Vienna Verband, Kolisch, was absent. The deputy chief of die Verband, Fürth, was approached one day by the director of the Vienna Jewish community, Dr. Josef Löwenherz, who demanded from Fürth four lists: war veterans with 50 percent (or more) disability, highly decorated officers, highly decorated enlisted men, and all other members of

42. Memorandum by Kolisch, October 16, 1941, Occ E 6a-10.

43. Memorandum by Fürth, October 15, 1941, Occ E 6a-10.

44. Memorandum by Kolisch, October 16, 1941, Occ E 6a-16.

the Verband. When Fürth inquired why Löwenherz wanted the lists, the Jewish leader “answered evasively.” Fürth then made the disastrous mistake of giving him the lists.

On June 9, 1942, the Verband officials met in conference. The meeting was somber. Fürth announced that of 2,500 members, 1,100 had been “evacuated.” He concluded that within two months the Verband would no longer exist. Another conference participant, Schapira, cited statistics indicating that among those members who were still in Vienna, 200 were severely disabled and another 200 had high decorations. The conferees then considered “rescue” schemes. One wanted a petition for the concentration of war veterans in or near Vienna or, alternatively, a closed transport to a “favorable” destination. Another thought the best procedure would be an “agreement” with the Gestapo with respect to “high-ranking officers.” Fürth, who had handed over the fatal lists to Löwenherz, remarked: “I am of the opinion that whoever wears the star around here will have to disappear from here [*von hier wegr müssen wird*]”

Kolisch then began to speak. He thought that all the proposals discussed so far were sheer “insanity.” His colleagues were about to “destroy everything.” If they wanted to do that, he had no objection, but one thing he had to stress: every exemption granted to a veteran was “mercy” by the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (Gestapo). The Jewish community organization was nothing but an institution for the implementation of orders by the central office (*Die Kultusgemeinde ist nichts anderes als eine Institution zur Erfüllung sämtlicher Aufträge der Zentralstelle*). “There is certainly a reason,” he continued, “when lists of war invalids and decorated front-line soldiers are demanded of us.”

Fürth, who by now understood the reason only too well, proposed that the Gestapo be petitioned for a uniform transport of all war veterans. “I see black,” he said, “and I speak from sensibility and experience when I say that we shall be glad if in a month we are still here as today.” At this point Kolisch spoke openly about the lists that Fürth had given to Löwenherz, and when Fürth defended himself by stating in effect that Löwenherz had tricked him, one of the participants, Halpern, agreed with Fürth. “One can see,” said Halpern, “that the Jewish community is only a messenger of the Gestapo.” Löwenherz, he said, deserved to be punished.⁴⁵

Whereas Fürth had correctly seen “black,” the end did not come within a month. On August 4, 1942, the Kriegsofopfer leaders had occasion to meet again. On the agenda was “the reduction of employees by the Kultusgemeinde.” The Jewish community had to hand over some of its

45. Minutes of Kriegsofopfer conference under chairmanship of Kolisch and with participation of Fürth, Halpern, Hnilitschek, Kris, Sachs, Schapira, Schatzberger, and Schornstein, June 9, 1942, Occ E 6a-18.

own employees to die Gestapo for deportation, since many Jews had already been deported and there was no longer any need for a large Jewish organization. Among the Kultusgemeinde employees who were threatened with dismissal were many members of the veterans' organization. The leaders of the Verband were now meeting in order to find a way of protecting its members. Hauptmann Kolisch pointed out that the Jewish community "naturally" would not show the reduction list to him. He proposed, therefore, that the Verband hand in a list of "worthy" veterans to the Central Office for Jewish Emigration. Debating this proposal, some of the Verband leaders suggested that it might be better to appeal to the Jewish community. Fürth thought that the Verband should hand to the Kultusgemeinde a list in which veterans would be divided into three groups differing in degree of "worthiness." Halpern preferred to request from the Kultusgemeinde that "in a case of equal qualifications of two employees, the war invalid receive preference." Kolisch then remarked: "I don't want to fight a war with the Jewish community."⁴⁶

On August 7, 1942, the conferees met again to resume the discussion. Schatzberger proposed that a single undifferentiated list be handed to die community. Fürth "agreed" but felt that the "military qualifications" would have to be noted. The Kultusgemeinde would then dismiss "less qualified" members. If the community did not agree, the same list could then be handed to the Hauptsturmführer (Brunner of the Gestapo). Schapira put in:

I am fundamentally of the opinion that we cannot afford to fight a war against the Kultusgemeinde. It is senseless to enter into conflicts during these final hours [*Schlussdrama*] of the Jews in Vienna. The reduction will be carried out, whether we like it or not; the Zentralstelle has ordered a fixed number of reductions, and the Kultusgemeinde is sending out dismissal notices on the fifteenth of this month.

The conferees decided to negotiate with the Kultusgemeinde.

Only one question remained. What if the Kultusgemeinde was hostile? Should requests then be made to the central office? Schatzberger remarked: "The Hauptsturmführer will think, 'These are Jews and those are Jews. Let them fight among themselves; I don't care.' Eventually he will drop us in this matter." Kolisch answered: "In that case it is time to dissolve the Verband."⁴⁷

Shortly after this "battle" with the Kultusgemeinde, the veterans ap-

46. Minutes of Kriegsopfer conference held on August 4, 1942, under chairmanship of Kolisch, with Diamant, Fürth, Halpern, Hnilitschck, Sachs, Dr. Schapira, Schatzberger, and Schornstein participating, August 5, 1942, Occ E 6a-10.

47. Minutes of Kriegsopfer conference held on August 7, 1942, dated August 8, 1942, Occ E 6a-10.

parently dissolved. The last item in the files of the Verband is an undated order that reads in part: "Every day, beginning Friday, August 14, 1942, a hundred people are to be called, also Saturday and Sunday. The seizures [*Erfassungen*] are to be carried out by Diamant, Schornstein, Sachs, Neumann."⁴⁸

Thus the deportation of the war veterans ran its course. The less "worthy" or less "qualified" veterans who were *not* 50 percent disabled or who did *not* have an Iron Cross First Class or its Austrian equivalent were sent to their deaths, like all other Jews. The "worthy" and "qualified" veterans were sent to Theresienstadt as a concession to the Wehrmacht and to a vague feeling of German honor.

Originally Theresienstadt was to serve only as a concentration center for the Protektorat Jews. Since it was historically a garrison town, the planners thought that the small number of German troops stationed there could be moved easily and that local Czechs, dependent on the military for their livelihood, would have no reason to stay. Then the prominent Jews and other special categories were added to the pool of expected arrivals. There were, however, only 219 buildings, all somewhat old, that in peacetime had housed about 3,500 Czech soldiers and an approximately equal number of civilians. During the ghetto's existence barracks were built and the Jews, factories, dispensaries, and all else were packed into every available space.⁴⁹ The ghetto was the last major anti-Jewish measure by Reinhard Heydrich (he was assassinated shortly thereafter), who used his position as *Büchsprötektor*, that is, chief representative of the Reich in the Protektorat, to order the complete dissolution of the small city of Theresienstadt, its evacuation by the resident Czech population, and the creation there of a "Jewish settlement" (*Judenstedlung*) or, as it was known in the Reich, an old people's ghetto (*Altersghetto*).⁵⁰

Theresienstadt had its own SS command, headed (in succession) by Hauptsturmführer Dr. Siegfried Seidl, Hauptsturmführer Anton Burger, and Hauptsturmführer Karl Rahm — all Eichmann's men and all Austrians.⁵¹ Under the direction of the SS there was a Jewish elder (in suc-

48. File memorandum of Verband, undated, Occ E 6a-18.

49. Summary of "Final Solution" conference under Heydrich's chairmanship, October 10, 1941, and subsequent planning documents in U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record Group 48.005 (Selected Records of Czech State Archives, Prague), Roll 3. Early ideas called for two ghettos: Theresienstadt in northern Bohemia, not far from Prague, and Gaya in southern Moravia, not far from Brno. Gaya was dropped. See Adler, *Theresienstadt 1941-1945*, pp. 21-31 and *passim*.

50. Decree (signed Heydrich), February 16, 1942. *Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprötektors in Rohmen und Mähren*, 1942, p. 38.

51. Zdenek Lederer, *Ghetto Theresienstadt* (London, 1953), pp. 74-75, 90. See also interrogation of Dr. Siegfried Seidl in Vienna, June 4, 1946, Israel Police 109.

cession), Jakub Edelstein (originally head of the Jewish community in Prague), Dr. Paul Eppstein (Reichsvereinigung, Berlin), and Rabbi Dr. Murrelstein (Vienna).⁵² Edelstein was demoted in a meeting on January 27, 1943, with Seidl and Hauptsturmführer Moes (the RSHA IV-B-4 expert on prominent Jews). Moes first transmitted Eichmann's recognition (*Anerkennung*) of Edelstein's activities and then announced the creation of a triumvirate in which Edelstein would remain a member. Heading this triumvirate would be Dr. Paul Eppstein of Berlin. Edelstein replied "that after fourteen months of constructive labor, he could not receive this decision with a feeling of satisfaction [*dass er diese Entscheidung nach 14 Monaten Aufbauarbeit nicht mit einem Gefühle der Befriedigung annehmen könne*]." Seidl reassured him, saying his own expressions of gratitude were not "mere phrase making [*blasse Phrase*]." ⁵³ Not only was Eppstein going to be in charge, but the third member of the triumvirate turned out to be Dr. Murrelstein. ⁵⁴

More than 140,000 people were sent to Theresienstadt. Their fate is indicated in the following overall picture:⁵⁵

Arrivals in Theresienstadt to April 20, 1945:	140,937
Protektorat	73,603
Old Reich	42,821
Austria	15,266
Netherlands	4,894
Slovakia	1,447
Bialystok children	1,260
Hungary	1,150
Denmark	476
Others	20
Births and unverified additions:	247
	141,184
Reductions:	
Deported	-88,202
Died	-33,456
Released in 1945	-1,654
Fled	-764
Arrested by Gestapo and probably killed	-276
Of the 141,184, remaining on May 9, 1945:	<u>16,832</u>

52. Lederer, *Ghetto Theresienstadt*, pp. 41-43, 149-50, 166-67.

53. Memorandum by Edelstein and Zucker, January 27, 1943, Israel police document 1239. In the document Moes is spelled "Möhs."

54. In the message delivered by Moes, Löwenherz was to have come.

55. Adler, *Theresienstadt 1941-1945*, pp. 37-60, 725.

From 1942 to the middle of 1944, deportation from Theresienstadt was a complicated procedure. The SS determined the numbers and categories of the deportees, but the Jewish ghetto administration itself had to name the victims for the outbound transports. In this selection process, some people—like those considered worthy by reason of past contributions to their communities of origin, or those deemed essential for the enterprises of Theresienstadt—were spared, while others were sacrificed. The responsibility for the choices, according to a former Jewish functionary, was shared by more than a hundred individuals. The Jewish apparatus also conducted searches to find anyone hiding within the ghetto in order to protect the integrity of the final lists and to forestall any substitutions.⁵⁶

For the Protektorat Jews, to be sure, Theresienstadt had never been intended to serve as more than a stopover. Yet even the Jews from the Reich and Austria were not going to be preserved there. Not only did they die in large numbers of sickness and exhaustion, but many of them were deported, along with the Czech victims, first to the shooting pits in the Ostland and then to the killing centers in the Generalgouvernement and Auschwitz. That was the ultimate meaning of a “favored transport.”

Heydrich’s successor in the RSHA, Gruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, had even less understanding of psychological considerations and “privilege” than his predecessor. To Kaltenbrunner, Theresienstadt was a nuisance. With Himmler’s permission he transferred 5,000 Jews under the age of sixty from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz in January 1943. After their deportation, he counted 46,735 Jews in the ghetto. Taking a closer look at the statistic, he noticed that 25,375 of them could not work and that 21,005 were over sixty—a fairly close correlation. Kaltenbrunner therefore urged Himmler to permit the “loosening up” (*Auflockerung*) of the older inmates. These Jews, he explained, were carriers of epidemics. Besides, they tied up a large number of younger Jews who could be employed in “more useful work” (*einen zweckmässigeren Arbeitseinsatz*). Therefore, Kaltenbrunner asked Himmler to approve “for the moment” (*zunächst*) of the removal of just 5,000 Jews over sixty. He assured Himmler that care would be taken, as in the case of previous transports, to seize

56. Statement by Robert Prochnik in Paris, June 24, 1954, transmitted by his attorney to the Landesgericht für Strafsachen in Vienna and filed under Vg. 8 No. 41/54. Copy in the Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Vienna, E 21701. Prochnik worked in the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde in Vienna, and in Theresienstadt under Murmelsrein. On June 12, 1945, he received a certificate signed by Leo Bacck and two other surviving Theresienstadt leaders, thanking him for having been a “responsible, thorough, and reliable official.” Dokumentationsarchiv, *ibid.* As of September 1944, the SS alone decided who could remain.

only those Jews “who enjoy no special relations or connections with anybody and who possess no high decorations of any sort.”⁵⁷

All arguments notwithstanding, Himmler sent the following reply through his personal secretary, Obersturmbannführer Rudolf Brandt: “The Reichsführer-SS does not wish the transport of Jews from Theresienstadt because such transport would disturb the tendency to permit the Jews in the old peoples ghetto of Theresienstadt to live and die there in peace.”⁵⁸

This tendency was, of course, vital to the preservation of the “resettlement” legend, and that alone explains Himmler’s anxiety for the old Jews in Theresienstadt. Significantly, when the deportations came to a close, Himmler decided to empty Theresienstadt of most of its inmates. From September to October 1944, continuous transports left for the killing center of Auschwitz with 18,400 Jews. Practically the whole Judenrat of Theresienstadt was among the victims. On the eve of this deportation (September 27, 1944), the last Jewish elder, Rabbi Murrelstein, took office. He served alone until the liberation. With him, only a few thousand privileged Jews were still privileged at the end.⁵⁹

Special Problem 3: The Deferred Jews

In the order of privileged status, the Mischlinge and Jews in mixed marriages occupied top place. They were the only candidates for deportation who stayed at home. Next came the Theresienstadt deportees: old people, 50-percent disabled or highly decorated war veterans, and a handful of “prominent” persons. In third place were three groups of people whose deportation to killing centers was subject only to delays: the Jews in essential labor, foreign Jews, and members of Jewish administrative machinery.

By 1941 tens of thousands of Jews had become embedded in the armament industry. With the onset of the deportations, the efficiency of all the plants that were employing Jews was suddenly in jeopardy. The firm managers were acutely conscious of the turmoil which would inevitably beset them with the departure of their Jews. Here is a telegram dispatched by one of these firms to the army on October 14, 1941:

As a matter of common knowledge, there is now proceeding a new deportation of Jews that affects our Jewish workers who have been

57. Kaltcnbrunnccr to Himmler, February 1943, Himmler Files, Folder 126. January-February statistics arc from the same letter.

58. Brandt to Kaltcnbrunnccr, February 16, 1943, Himmler Files, Folder 126.

59. Lederer, *Ghetto Theresienstadt*, pp. 43, 149-50, 166-67, 248. For an exhaustive description of Theresienstadt life, see H. G. Adler’s *Theresienstadt* and his *Die verheimlichte Wahrheit* (Tubingen, 1958). The latter is a document volume.

arduously trained to become specialists. They have been broken in as electro-welders and zinc-plating experts, and their removal would entail a reduction of production, perhaps by a third. We are therefore telegraphing you in this matter.

According to the opinion of the local armament command, the procedure is such that the OKH, through the Reichsführung SS, has to issue a general order [*Ukas*] for our people to the *Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung*, Vienna IV, Prinz Eugen St. 22. We would be grateful if, aside from a lot of good advice, a positive contribution would be made for the preservation of our productive capacity, in that you obtain through the OKH a proper directive.

Parenthetically, we should like to observe that these Jewish workers are the most capable and industrious of all, because they are after all the only ones who risk something if their output is not satisfactory, and they are actually achieving such records that one could almost compare the productivity of a Jew with that of two Aryan specialists.

For the rest, we can only repeat with emphasis that we do not after all need these iron casks for ourselves but that the Wehrmacht needs them, so that it is the business of these agencies to repress such ordinances, which in our opinion are not quite purposeful.

Please let us know as soon as possible whether you are meeting with any success, because, on the one hand, the matter is urgent, and, on the other hand, the unrest among the Jewish workers is naturally considerable, since the deportation to Poland without any means of subsistence is more or less equivalent to a quick and certain doom and, under such auspices, their productivity must naturally decline measurably [*da die Verschickung nach Polen ohne jegliche Subsistenzmittel mehr oder minder den raschen und sicheren Untergang bedeutet und unter solchen Auspizien die Arbeitsleistung natürlich merklich nachlassen muss*].⁶⁰

From Berlin, too, the Wehrmacht was receiving word of impending disturbances in the labor situation. The capital was employing 10,474 Jews in the metal industry alone. In all of Berlin's industries a total of 18,700 Jewish workers were involved.⁶¹

On October 23, 1941, representatives of the OKW/Wi Rü met with Lösener and Eichmann to save the Jewish labor forces. Lösener and Eichmann assured the officers that no Jews employed in groups would be deported without the consent of the competent armament inspectorate

60. OKH/Chef HRüst. u. BdE (Replacement Army)/Wa Amt (Weapons Office') to OKW/Wi Rii-Rii V, October 22, 1941, enclosing letter by Brunner Verzinkerei/Brüder Boblick (Vienna) to Dr. G. von Hirschfeld (Berlin W62), October 14, 1941, Wi/ID .415.

61. Rü ln III/Z toOKW/Wi Rii, October 14, 1941, Wi/ID .415.

and labor office.⁶² During the conference of January 20, 1942, Staatssekretär Neumann, as representative of the Office of the Four-Year Plan and spokesman for Hermann Goring himself, requested Heydrich by way of confirmation not to deport Jews who held critical jobs in war industry. Heydrich agreed.⁶³ The situation seemed to be under control. The armament Jews were saved, and so were their families.⁶⁴

The task of protecting the working Jews from seizure by the Gestapo was now entrusted to the regional labor offices and the regional economy offices (*Landesarbeitsämter* and *Landeswirtschaftsämter*),⁶⁵ Most of the regional economy offices probably transferred their powers to the Chambers of Industry and Commerce.⁶⁶ The regional machinery had an absolute veto in deportations of Jewish workers. Thus the Chambers of Commerce and Industry' in the Koblenz district were specifically told that their decisions were "binding" on the police.⁶⁷ However, the field offices had been given the veto only for Jews employed in *groups*. Since the labor decree of October 31, 1941,⁶⁸ had provided that Jews were to be employed only in this manner, it was believed that all Jews were covered. This was a mistake. The decree of October 31, 1941, had not been implemented fully, and the Gestapo went from place to place to pick up all Jews who were employed not in groups but as individuals. Goring had to step in again and order that *all* Jews in war industries be exempt from deportation.⁶⁹

The deferment of the working Jews did not last very long. Economic considerations, after all, were not to be considered in the "Final Solution of the Jewish problem." In the fall of 1942 Hitler himself ordered that the Jews be removed from the armament industry.⁷⁰ But the problem of

62. Memorandum by OKW/Wi Rii October 23, 1941, Wi/ID .415. OKW/Wi Rii IVc (signed Fickentscher-Emdcn) to armament inspectorates and commands in Reich, Prague, and GG, October 25, 1941, Wi/ID .415.

63. Radcmacher via Luther, Gaus, and Wormann to Weizsäcker, July 11, 1942, NG-2586-1.

64. OKW/Wi Rii IVc to armament inspectorates, October 25, 1941, Wi/ID .415. Lochner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entry for May 11, 1942, p. 211.

65. Labor Ministry (signed Dr. Beisiegel) to presidents of regional labor offices, December 19, 1941, L-61. Labor Ministry (signed Dr. Timm) to presidents of regional labor offices, March 27, 1942, L-61. Regional Economy Office in Koblenz (signed Gmcinder) to Chambers of Commerce in district, March 4, 1942, L-61.

66. Instructions by Gmcinder, March 4, 1942, L-61.

67. *Ibid.*

68. RGB II, 681.

69. Labor Ministry (signed Dr. Timm) to presidents of regional labor offices, March 27, 1942, L-61. Economy Office in Wiesbaden (signed Dr. Schneider) to Chambers of Commerce in district, copies to regional economy offices in Koblenz and Saarbrücken, April 11, 1942, L-61.

70. Testimony by Speer, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, 519. According to Speer, many Jews were then employed in the electrical industry (AEG and Siemens).

replacing the Jews in the plants was not solved until the Reich Security Main Office hit upon an idea.

In the Generalgouvernement the Lublin District, which once was to have become a Jewish reservation, was now designated as a colony for the settlement of Ethnic Germans. All Poles in the district were to be removed. The “criminal and asocial” Polish “elements” were to be transported to concentration camps, while the remaining Poles, insofar as they were suitable for labor, were to be brought to the Reich as replacements for the Jewish labor force. The Reich Security Main Office submitted this plan to the official who had overall responsibility for labor recruitment and the labor supply: the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment in the Office of the Four-Year Plan, Gauleiter Sauckel. Armed with the RSHA proposal, which seemed reasonable to him, Sauckel ordered the regional labor offices to prepare for a shuttle system of deportations: Jews out, Poles in. Jews performing menial work could be deported as soon as their Polish replacements arrived. Skilled Jewish workers could be deported as soon as the Polish laborers familiarized themselves with the work.⁷¹

As a consequence of this order, tens of thousands of Jews were deported to killing centers in 1943.⁷² However, when the Poles arrived to “familiarize” themselves with the work, the Gauleiter of Berlin, Goebbels, became worried lest the “Semitic intellectuals” combine with the foreign workers to produce a revolt. He was determined to prevent any “concubinage” between the Berlin Jews and the imported laborers, and thus could not wait for the end of the deportations. “When Berlin is free of Jews,” he wrote, “I shall have completed one of my greatest political achievements.”⁷³

The labor replacement theory advocated by the RSHA had one basic defect: the Reich had an *absolute* labor shortage. If all available foreign laborers, prisoners of war, and concentration camp inmates had been added to the Jewish labor force, the labor gap might still not have been filled. It is true that the labor supply increased with German conquests in the West and East, but with the great industrial expansion of the 1940s the demand for labor increased faster than the supply. If Jews were “replaced” in one plant, the result was that another plant, which needed laborers to expand production, went short.

Speer and Labor Plenipotentiary Sauckel attended the conference during which Hitler gave the order.

71. Sauckel to regional labor offices, November 26, 1942, L-61. The RSHA plan is summarized in the Sauckel directive.

72. See letter by Sauckel to the regional labor offices, inquiring how they were getting along without their Jews, March 26, 1943, L-156.

73. Lochner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entries for March 9, 1943, and April 19, 1943, pp. 288, 290, 335.

It is therefore not surprising that industrial firms clamored for increasing allocations of skilled workers and heavy laborers. The clamor began in 1940 and grew more insistent in 1941 and 1942. The industrialists and construction bosses were not particular about the nationality or type of worker they got. "Volunteer" foreign worker, prisoner of war, concentration camp inmate — anyone at all who could perform skilled or heavy labor at starvation wages was welcome. But there is one phenomenon that, more than any other, illustrates the luxury of deporting Jewish workers. As the labor shortage grew, the industrialists were asking not only for replacements but, more specifically, for Jewish replacements. The number of such requests is significant.

In November 1940 the Army High Command requested the Labor Ministry to import 1,800 Jews for railway construction work in the Reichsbahn directorates of Oppeln, Breslau, and Lubin.⁷⁴

On March 14, 1941, the Labor Ministry sent a circular to the regional labor offices advertising the availability of 73,123 Warthegau Jews for labor in the Reich, or approximately 3,500 Jews per regional office. The ministry emphasized that requisitions for labor were already pending. For example, the Siemens-Schuckert Works had requested 1,200 workers for its plants in Brandenburg and central Germany.⁷⁵ On April 7, 1941, the circular was canceled. Hitler had decided against the importation of Polish Jews into the Reich.⁷⁶

In March 1941 the Reichswerke A. G. für Erzbergbau und Eisenhütten (Göring's own works) mapped out a production program that called for the utilization of 2,000 Jewish camp inmates as well as other workers.⁷⁷ Nothing happened. But the Reichswerke did not forget. On September 29, 1942, the Goring company sent a letter to the Speer ministry' (Oberstleutnant von Nikolai) requesting the allocation of the camp labor in pursuance of an agreement that Generaldirektor Pleiger of the Goring Works had concluded with Himmler. A copy of this letter was sent to the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office/Office Group D (WVHA-D), the agency that administered concentration camps.⁷⁸ On October 2, 1942, the concentration camp agency replied that Himmler had agreed to the utilization of camp inmates but that "Jews are not to be employed."⁷⁹

74. OKH to Ltsch (Labor Ministry), November 26, 1940, NG-1589.

75. Dr. Ltsch to regional labor offices, March 14, 1941, NG-363.

76. Staatssekretär Syrup to regional labor offices, April 7, 1941, NG-363.

77. Summary of meeting in Reichswerke A. G. (signed Rheinländer), March 13, 1941, WVHA-D, NI-4285.

78. Reichswerke to von Nikolai, copy to WVHA-D, September 29, 1942, NI-14435.

79. Chief of WVHA D-II (Maurer) to Reichswerke A. G. für Erzbergbau und Eisenhütten, October 2, 1942, NI-14435.

In September 1942 the Speer machinery went into action. The Speer ministry, which was in charge of armaments, operated through so-called industrial rings and main committees. Both rings and committees were stalled by industrial engineers. The rings were concerned with products (such as ball bearings) used in a number of different enterprises; the committees dealt with a finished product, for instance, shells.⁸⁰ During the middle of September 1942, just before preparations were made to deport the Reich Jews for forced labor, the *Hauptausschuss Munition* (Main Committee Munitions, under Prof. Dr. Albert Wolff) sent questionnaires to all major munitions industries to find out which enterprises could “receive Jews” (*mit Juden belegt werden können*) and which plants could establish concentration camps for Jewish workers.⁸¹ The Main Committee Munitions was soon joined in this survey by the Main Committee Weapons (*Hauptausschuss Waffen*),⁸² but the project was doomed to failure. The Gestapo protested that it was absolutely inadmissible to shove German Jews to the east only to import foreign Jews from the west.⁸³

Another deferred group comprised the foreign Jews. In May 1939 the Jews of non-German nationality in the Reich area numbered 39,466. At first glance this figure, amounting to almost 12 percent of the total Jewish population, seems rather large. However, 16,024 of these Jews were stateless. The actual number of foreign Jews was therefore only 23,442. But not all foreign Jews were considered foreign for deportation purposes. A Jew was a foreign subject only if he was protected by a foreign power. Therefore, all Jews who possessed the nationality of an occupied country were stateless in German eyes. An occupied state could not protect anybody.

Jews who had immigrated from the Bohemian-Moravian provinces of Czechoslovakia were first to be affected; there were 1,732. Next came the

80. For a description of the Speer Ministry apparatus, see Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth*, 2d ed. (New York, 1944), pp. 590-94.

81. Special Committee Munitions V (*Sonderausschuss M V*), signed Scheuer, to Direktor Dr. Erich Müller, artillery construction, Krupp, September 12, 1942, NI-5856. For organization chart of Krupp, see affidavit by Erich Müller, February 5, 1947, NI-5917.

82. Main Committee Weapons to Krupp, September 29, 1942, NI-5856. Krupp wanted Jewish labor. Krupp to Special Committee Munitions V. September 18, 1942, NI-5859. Krupp (signed by personnel chief Ihn) to Plenipotentiary for fobor (attention Landrat Beck), September 18, 1942, NI-5860. Krupp to Special Committee Munitions V. September 22, 1942, NI-5857. Krupp to Main Committee Weapons (attention Direktor Notz), October 5, 1942, NI-5855.

83. Memorandum by Kahlerr, Chief, Main Division Special Questions and fobor Allocation in Reich Association Iron (*Hauptabteilungsleiter Spezialwesen und Arbeits-einsatz, Reichsvereinigung Eisen*), September 23, 1942, NI-1626.

big block of Polish and Danzig Jews, numbering 15,249. The occupied countries of the West, including Norway, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, were represented by a total of 280 Jews. The number of Soviet, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Greek Jews was 515. In addition, about 100 Yugoslav Jews (those who were not citizens of the new Croatian state) were also considered stateless.

In short, the 23,442 foreign Jews dwindled, upon closer examination, to about 5,600 who belonged to enemy states, neutral states, and Germany's allies. The Foreign Office made no attempt to deport the handful of British and American Jews (together with those from British dominions and Latin American countries, only 386) because it wanted to exchange those Jews for Germans.⁸⁴ The "problem" was therefore confined to the 5,200 Jews who belonged to neutral states and Germany's allies, or whose nationality was doubtful.⁸⁵

Hungary	1,746
Romania	1,100
Doubtful category	988
Slovakia	659
Turkey	253
Italy	118
Croatia	ca. 100
Switzerland	97
Bulgaria	30
Sweden	17
Spain	17
Portugal	6
Finland	2

Long before the deportations started, the Foreign Office took the view that no measures should be taken against foreign Jews without its consent.⁸⁶ This was an obvious precaution, because the Foreign Office was the agency that had to answer to a foreign government for any discriminatory action. During the conference of January 20, 1942, Luther insisted that no foreign Jews be deported without Foreign Office clear-

84. Memorandum by Albrecht (Foreign Office Legal Division), February 4, 1943, NG-2586-N.

85. All statistics are taken from "Die Juden und jüdischen Mischlinge im Deutschen Reich" *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, pp. 84-87. The figures are census data, correct on May 17, 1939. Undoubtedly the numbers were smaller in 1942, but one would have to make an upward adjustment to include the foreign Jews in the Protektorat.

86. Wörmann to Dicckhoff, Luther, Albrecht, Wichl, Freytag, Heinburg, and von Grundherr, March 1, 1941, NG-1515.

ance.⁸⁷ His demand covered foreign Jews in the Reich and Jews in foreign countries.

Of course the latter group was far more important than the former. There were only a few thousand foreign-protected Jews in the Reich and Reich-occupied territories, whereas there were millions of Jews in territories controlled by Germany's allies. However, there was an important administrative connection between the two groups. The Foreign Office soon discovered that if, for example, Slovakia agreed to the deportation of its few hundred Jews in the Reich and occupied territories, Slovakia would soon agree to the deportation also of tens of thousands of Jews living in Slovakia itself. The foreign Jews in the Reich were consequently used as a wedge. Once a foreign government had forsaken its Jews abroad, it was easier to induce it to give up its Jews at home.

The first countries to be approached were Slovakia, Croatia, and Romania. The governments of these three states submitted to the German demand without much ado. (Romania subsequently decided to protect a few of its Jews.)⁸⁸ Next came the Bulgarian and Italian governments. The Bulgarians had no objection, but the Italian government held out until its collapse in September 1943.⁸⁹ The Hungarian government was approached again and again, but, like Italy, it refused to give up its Jews. The Italian and Hungarian governments consequently had to be treated like the neutral states.

The Foreign Office did *not*, of course, insist upon the deportation of the Jews in neutral countries, so there was little point in insisting upon the deportation of the handful of Jews with neutral nationalities in Germany. However, Germany had to become *judenjihi*. The neutral governments, together with Italy and Hungary, were therefore presented with an ultimatum that unless they withdrew their Jews within a specified time, these Jews would be included in general anti-Jewish measures. The limits were not heeded, though, and, as a result, the deportation expert of the RSHA, Eichmann, became very impatient.

On July 5, 1943, Eichmann reminded his counterpart in the Foreign Office, von Thadden, that the repatriation deadlines had already been passed. "We do not consider it worthwhile," he wrote, "to wait any longer or to meet these governments halfway. According to the present status of the final solution, there are now in the Reich area only those Jews who are partners in a Jewish-German mixed marriage and a few Jews of foreign nationality." In order to arrive at a "final solution" in this matter also.

87. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

88. *Ibid.*

89. Luther via Wiehl to Wormann, Weizsäcker, and Ribbentrop, September 19, 1942, NG-5123.

Eichmann requested von Thadden to fix one more deadline: August 3, 1943. Eichmann then listed the countries involved: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Turkey. "In closing," Eichmann wrote, "we ask that you put aside any possible scruples in the interest of finally solving the Jewish problem, since in this matter the Reich has met the foreign governments halfway in the most generous manner."⁹⁰

Von Thadden agreed with his colleague Eichmann but extended the deadline to October 1943. Only the Italian Jews, whose government had in the meantime surrendered to the Allies, were subject to deportation at once.⁹¹ The Turks requested a further postponement, thus incurring the displeasure of the Foreign Office, which pointed to its repeated "extraordinary" concessions." In the end the Foreign Office agreed to a final deadline of December 31, 1943, while the impatient Eichmann was demanding "general treatment" of all foreign Jews.⁹²

If foreign nationals might have had the protection of foreign governments, "prominent" individuals and the members of Jewish administrative machinery' were entirely at the mercy of German "supervising agencies." Two incidents in May 1942 were to have special consequences for Jews visible enough to be prominent. One was an act of arson by a small resistance group of young Jews (most of them Communists) that set fire to a Nazi exhibit, "The Soviet Paradise," and the other was the attempt on Hevdrich's life in Prague. Upon orders of Berlin Gauleiter Goebbels, five hundred leading Jews (*führende Juden*) were immediately taken as hostages to assure the "proper behavior" (*anständiges Verhalten*) of the many thousands of Jewish workers in Berlin.⁹³ A few days later, Jewish community leaders were informed that 250 were shot, including 154 of the hostages and 96 who had already been incarcerated in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen.⁹⁴

90. Eichmann to von Thadden, July 5, 1943, NG-2652-E. Denmark, though occupied, was respected as a neutral state until the fall of 1943. Finland, an Axis partner, was the only European ally that was never pressured into deporting its Jews. Finland had a democratic form of government and only about 2,000 Jews.

91. Von Thadden to German missions abroad, September 23, 1943, NG-2652-M.

92. Memorandum by Legationsrat Wagner, October 29, 1943, NG-2652-K. Eichmann to von Thadden, November 15, 1942, NG-2652-L.

93. Office of Gesandter Krümmer (Foreign Office) to Weizsäcker and Luther, May 27, 1942, NG-4816. See also Helmut Eschwege, "Resistance of German Jews against the Nazi Regime" *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 13 (1970): 143-80, and H. G. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, pp. 172-82. The leader of the resistance group was Herbert Baum.

94. Memorandum by Philipp Kozowicz (Berlin community), May 31, 1942, Leo Baeck Institute, microfilm roll 66. Memorandum by Löwenherz, June 1, 1942, Israel Police 1156.

In October 1941 the Reichsvereinigung and the Kultusgemeinden throughout the Reich-Protectorat area were still employing close to 10,000 people (some in training or in honorary positions) who, together with their families, were looking forward to a recognition of their special status.⁹⁵ In fact, the official Jews occupied first place in the exemption list “agreed upon” between Obersturmführer Brunner and Rabbi Murnelstein in Vienna, but this deferment was going to be brief for anyone who was no longer needed. As deportations were under way in March 1942, Hauptsturmführer Gutwasser of the Eichmann Referat ruled that there had to be a reduction of personnel proportional to the reduction of the Jewish population,⁹⁶ and by June of that year the Berlin Kultusgemeinde, down to less than a half of its March 1941 strength, had been thinned out faster than the community it served.⁹⁷ By the beginning of 1943 even the Jewish leaders were being deported. The Jewish “Führer” in Berlin, as one of Eichmann’s people called Rabbi Leo Baeck, was picked up in his home on January 27, 1943, at 5:45 a.m. Baeck, an early riser, was already awake, but he asked for an hour to put his things in order. During that hour he wrote a letter to his daughter in London (via Lisbon) and made out postal money orders for his gas and electric bills. He traveled to Theresienstadt in a railway compartment by himself.⁹⁸

In Vienna the Jewish deportation chief, Murnelstein, was deported to Theresienstadt, where he survived as the last “Jewish elder” of the ghetto. The chief of the Vienna Jewish community, Lfjwenherz, who according to the Eichmann man was a “nice fellow” (*ein braver Kerl*), stayed in Vienna until the very end as the head of a skeleton Jewish community organization that took care of a few thousand Jews in mixed marriages.⁹⁹

95. Statistics prepared for Eichmann by the Reichsvereinigung on November 14, 1941, indicate about 6,000 employees in the Old Reich, over 1,400 in Austria, and over 2,500 in the Protectorat, as of October 31. Leo Baeck Institute, microfilm roll 66.

96. Memorandum by Eppstein (Reichsvereinigung) on meeting of March 21, 1942, with Gutwasser, signed March 23, 1942. Leo Baeck Institute, microfilm roll 66.

97. Moritz Henschel (Berlin Community) to Staatspolizeistelle IV-D-1, June 15, 1942, noting reduction from 2,900 to less than 1,400 persons. Leo Baeck Institute, microfilm roll 66. For later reductions, see the same microfilm. On Vienna, see memorandum by Lowenherz, July 24, 1942, Israel Police 1158.

98. See account by Baeck in Eric H. Boehm, ed., *We Survived* (New Haven, 1949), p. 290. The Eichmann man who called Baeck the Jewish “Führer” was Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny. See Eugene Lcvai, *Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian /nm* (Zurich and Vienna, 1948), p. 123.

99. Report by Löwenherz, dated Januar' 22, 1945, for 1944. Yad Vashem O 30/5, Dr. Rczsö Kasztner (Rudolf Kästner). “Der Bericht des jüdischen Rettungskomitees aus Budapest 1942-1945” (postwar mimeographed, in Library of Congress), pp. 154-55, 178.

DEPORTATIONS

Special Problem 4: The Incarcerated Jews

So far, we have discussed three broad deportation groups: the only truly exempt group, comprising the Mischlinge and the Jews in mixed marriages; the Theresienstadt Jews, including the old people, badly disabled and highly decorated war veterans, and prominent persons; and the deferred group, which consisted mostly of Jews who wound up in killing centers after suitable delays (the Jews in war industry, the foreign Jews, and the official Jews). A fourth group, the incarcerated Jews, comprised those in institutions: mental hospitals, prisons, and concentration camps. In order to deport these persons, the Reich Security Main Office had to make special arrangements with the agencies that had jurisdiction over them.

The institutions for the mentally ill were under the control of the Health Division of the Interior Ministry. During the concentration process Staatssekretär Dr. Conti of the Interior Ministry ordered the mental institutions to report to him all incarcerated Jews.¹⁰⁰ When the so-called euthanasia program began, institutionalized German patients were superficially screened for incurable conditions and gassed in several centers established for this purpose in the Reich. Jews were among these victims. On August 30, 1940, the Interior Ministry ordered the Jewish inmates to be separated from German inmates. The Jews were placed in a few designated asylums from which selections for gassings continued.¹⁰¹ At the end of 1940, all the remaining Jews were to be concentrated in a single institution operated by the Reichsvereinigung at Bendorf-Sayn.¹⁰² From now on, the Jewish mental patients could all be killed as Jews. In April 1942 the first transport of Jewish “imbecils” (*Vollidioten*) arrived in the Lublin Distria for gassing in one of the killing centers in the area.¹⁰³ Another transport with Bendorf-Sayn inmates was scheduled to leave

100. Dr. Leonardo Conri to *Heil-und Pflegeanstalten* (mental hospitals), October 24, 1939, NO-825.

101. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, pp. 240-45. Ernst Klee, “Euthanasie” in *NS-Staat* (Frankfurt am Main, 1983), pp. 258-61. Henry Friedlander, “Jüdische Anstaltspatienten im NS-Deutschland,” in Götz Aly, cd., *Aktion T-4* (Berlin, 1987), pp. 33-44. Hermann Pfannmüller (Director of Bavarian Asylum at Eglfing-Haar) to Bavarian Ministry of Interior/Health Division, September 20, 1940. Pfannmüller to Gemeinnützige Kranken-Transport-GmbH, May 2, 1941, NO-3354. Eglfing-Haar was specified in the order of August 30, 1940, as the institution for Bavarian Jewish mental patients. The Gemeinnützige Kranken-Transport-GmbH was the organization that transferred mental patients to euthanasia stations. See also Frieda Kahn to Eglfing-Haar about the death of her sister, March 2, 1941, NO-3354.

102. Klee, “Euthanasie,” p. 261.

103. Generalgouvernement Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from the district propaganda divisions, report by Lublin division, April 18, 1942, OccE 2-2.

Koblenz for the Lublin District during the following June.¹⁰⁴ By November 1942 Bendorf-Sayn was closed.¹⁰⁵ The problem of the Jewish mental patients was solved.

The transfer of the imprisoned Jews, who were in the custody of the Justice Ministry, was a more difficult affair. Although the imprisoned Jews were comparatively few, the judiciary's reluctance to surrender them was great. The reason for this hesitancy was not so much a sense of justice or compassion as an administrative consideration. The transfer of the Jews was bound up with the transfer of other inmates, and the relinquishment of judicial power over Jews was connected with the diminution of judicial power as a whole. The SS and Police used the Jews as a wedge to weaken the judiciary and, ultimately, to engulf it. In a completely totalitarian state the police organization alone dispenses justice.

The judiciary foresaw this development and tried to forestall it. Characteristically, the Justice Ministry's forestalling attempts were based on the notion that the judiciary, too, could make its contribution to the destruction of the Jews. The Justice Ministry's conception of a contribution was not merely the enforcement of anti-Jewish discriminatory measures. It goes without saying that a German court did not inquire into the constitutionality of a measure but enforced whatever decree bore the signature of a government authority. The judiciary wanted to do more than that. It wanted to add anti-Jewish discriminations of its own. It wanted to make life miserable for a Jew in court by reading an anti-Jewish intent into a decree that did not have it, or by aggravating the scope of a decree when the language of its provisions justified no aggravations, or by changing the procedure in such a way as to make it more difficult for a Jew to win a case, or by adding to the punishment so as to make a Jew pay a stiffer fine, serve a longer sentence, or even die.

It should be noted that most judicial discriminations were not centrally directed. On the whole, each judge made his own "contribution" to the extent of his eagerness to reveal himself as a true Nazi. Some justices, such as Rothaug in the Katzenberger "race pollution" case, were bent upon "achieving a death sentence against a Jew at any price."¹⁰⁶ ¹⁰⁷ As Rothaug explained after the war, "many of our judgments were National Socialist."¹⁰⁷

The statistics on criminality in the Old Reich for 1942 reveal that whereas the ratio of convicted to acquitted Germans was 14:1 (417,001

104. KJcc, "Euthanasie," pp. 261-62. Institutionalized Jewish mental patients in the Protektorat were brought to Theresienstadt. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, p. 244.

105. Circular decree of Interior Ministry, November 10, 1942. *Ministernabblatt*, 1942, p. 2150.

106. Affidavit by Dr. Georg Engert (prosecutor in Katzenberger case), January 18, 1947, NG-649.

107. Affidavit by Oswald Rothaug, January 2, 1947, NG-533.

to 29,305), the ratio of convicted to acquitted Jews was 20:1 (1,508 to 74). Of the 1,508 Jews convicted by the courts, 208 were sentenced to death. Since not a single Jew was convicted of murder, one must be highly suspicious of these death sentences.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, it is quite clear that in civil suits, also, Jews were subjected to discrimination. Although there are no statistics, a few of the cases already discussed in this book indicate a decided Jewish disadvantage in civil proceedings.

On the other hand, there were justices who could not bring themselves to subject the law to “artificial construction.” In Chapter 5, we have noted the case of the coffee coupons. There was also the Luftglas case. In October 1941 a special court in Katowice (Upper Silesia, incorporated Polish territory) sentenced a seventy-four-year-old Jew, Markus Luftglas, to imprisonment for two and a half years on the ground that he had hoarded 65,000 eggs. Hitler heard of the judgment and informed Acting Justice Minister Schlegelberger, through Staatsminister Meissner, that he wanted Luftglas killed. Schlegelberger thereupon handed Luftglas to the SS for execution.¹⁰⁹ To the bureaucracy, court decisions such as those rendered in the coffee coupons and Luftglas cases pointed to the need for central direction, but the Justice Ministry’s first inclination was to encourage rather than to direct the judges to be harsh in their treatment of Jewish defendants.

In May 1941 Staatssekretär Schlegelberger suggested an interministerial decree to deprive Jews of the right of appeal by directing the judicial machinery to carry out any sentence pronounced against a Jew without delay. Characteristically, Schlegelberger suggested also that Jews be prohibited from charging a German judge with partiality. Third, he proposed *leniency* for Jews who committed acts against their own people, as, “for example, in the case of a Jewess who submitted to an abortion.”¹¹⁰ Needless to say, the last proposal was not intended as a favor to the Jews; he meant merely that Jews were to be free to injure themselves.

The same type of “generosity” was later extended to Jews in health-protection matters, when the Interior Ministry, in agreement with the Party Chancellery, ruled that Jews, and Mischlinge of the first degree who wanted to marry Jews, were no longer required to show the customary certificates of health before marriage.¹¹¹ Schlegelberger’s proposals were

108. Data from Justice Ministry (signed Grau) to Präsident Reichsgericht, Präsident Volksgerichtshof, Oberlandesgerichtspräsidenten, Oberreichsanwälte beim Reichsgericht und Volksgerichtshof, and Generalstaatsanwälte, April 4, 1944, NG-787.

109. Correspondence in document NG-287.

110. Schlegelberger to Interior Ministry, May 8, 1941, NG-1123.

111. Circular decree by Interior Ministry, March 25, 1942, *Ministerialblatt*, 1942, p. 605, reprinted in *Die Judenfrage (Vertrauliche Beilage)*, April 15, 1942, p. 29.

not implemented in 1941, for he had intended to attach them to a decree that was not issued: the draft ordinance to deprive the Jews of their German nationality. But they were not entirely forgotten.

When “Final Solution” measures were initiated in Germany in the fall of 1941, the Justice Ministry was thrown into some confusion. The judiciary wanted to jump on the bandwagon. But how? On November 21, 1941, one of the Justice Ministry’s experts, Ministerialdirigent Lutterloh, wrote to Staatssekretär Schlegelberger about the whole dilemma. “In view of the present position of the Jews,” he said, “discussions are taking place here to determine whether the Jews are to be deprived of the right to sue and whether special regulations should be made about their representation in the courts.” The decisive question, said Lutterloh, was whether the Jews were going to be shoved out right away. So far, he pointed out, only 7,000 out of 77,000 Berlin Jews had been “shoved off” (*abgeschoben*). The Jews in war industry and mixed marriages had been “deferred” (*zurückgestellt*). On the other hand, all Jewish lawyers in Berlin (the so-called *Konsulenten*) had received “travel orders” (*Abreisebefehle*). In other words, he concluded, something had to be done.¹¹²

During the period of uncertainty, however, nothing happened. Perhaps Schlegelberger was too busy with the Jews in mixed marriages. When things had quieted down somewhat, the Präsident of the Volksgesundheitsgerichtshof (people’s court), Dr. Freisler, circulated a draft decree by the Justice Ministry that resurrected the original Schlegelberger proposal that Jews be barred from making appeals in criminal cases. The draft contained also a wholly unnecessary provision to the effect that Jews were to be deprived of the right to appeal to the courts for a decision against sentences inflicted by the police.¹¹³ The Interior Ministry proposed that appeals in administrative cases should also be abolished and that the effect of the decree should be extended to the Protektorat and the incorporated eastern (Polish) territories.¹¹⁴

Schlegelberger replied that he had no objections to these changes and added that Jews should be deprived of the right to take oaths, though they should continue to be held responsible for their statements.¹¹⁵ The Party Chancellery requested that Jews lose the right to institute civil suits and that they forego the right to challenge a judge on grounds of partiality.¹¹⁶ (Neither of the party’s suggestions was original.) On Septem-

112. Ministerialdirigent Lutterloh to Oberregierungsrat Dr. Gramm with request to inform the Staatssekretär, November 21, 1941, NG-839.

113. Freisler to Interior and Propaganda Ministries, Foreign Office, Party Chancellery, Reichsführer-SS, and Reichsprotektor in Prague, August 3, 1942, NG-151.

114. Interior Ministry to Justice Ministry, August 13, 1942, NG-151.

115. Schlegelberger to Propaganda Ministry, August 13, 1942, NG-151.

116. Bormann to Justice Ministry, September 9, 1942, NG-151.

her 25, 1942, an interministerial conference was held for the purpose of incorporating all the proposals in a new draft, which also contained the provision that at the death of a Jew his fortune was to escheat to the Reich.¹¹⁷ By that time the draft was obsolete.

At the end of August 1942 Acting Justice Minister Schlegelberger retired because of old age, and a new Justice Minister, Thierack, took over. Thierack started his regime by making some extraordinary concessions to the SS and Police. On September 18, 1942, Thierack and his new Staatssekretär Rothenberger met with Himmler, SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach (chief of personnel in the RSHA), and SS-Obersturmbannführer Bender (SS legal expert) to conclude an agreement. The two sides stipulated that all Jews who had received sentences of more than three years were to be handed over to the SS and Police and that in the future all punishable offenses of Jews were to be dealt with by Heinrich Himmler.¹¹⁸

In a fit of generosity the Justice Ministry subsequently decided on its own to surrender all Jews who were serving sentences of more than six months.¹¹⁹ The second part of the Himmler-Thierack agreement, which deprived the courts of criminal jurisdiction over Jews altogether, could not be carried out until a decree was published on July 1, 1943, in pursuance of which criminal actions by Jews were to be “punished” by the police.¹²⁰ In the meantime the Justice Ministry handed all newly convicted Jews over to the Gestapo on an assembly-line basis.¹²¹

It should be noted that the Himmler-Thierack agreement dealt not only with Jews but also with Gypsies, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Czechs, and even “asocial” Germans. It was a far-reaching breach in the existing system of criminal law. Thierack explained his move in the following letter to Bormann:

With a view to freeing the German people of Poles, Russians, Jews and Gypsies, and with a view to making the eastern territories that have been incorporated into the Reich available for settlement by German nationals, I intend to turn over criminal jurisdiction over Poles, Russians, Jews, and Gypsies to the Reichsführer-SS. In doing so, I

117. Frick to Party Chancellery, Ministries of Justice, Propaganda, and Finance, and Foreign Office, September 29, 1942, NG-151.

118. Memorandum by Thierack, September 18, 1942, PS-654. The agreement covered the Greater Reich area.

119. Directive by Dr. Eichler (Office of the Justice Minister), April 1, 1943, PS-701.

120. RGBl 1, 372. Order by Himmler, July 3, 1943, *Ministerialblatt*, p. 1085.

121. Affidavit by Schnatzpräsident Robert Heckcr, March 17, 1947, NG-1008. Heckcr was in charge of transferring Jews to the police: he worked in Division V of the Justice Ministry.

stand on the principle that the administration of justice can make only a small contribution to the extermination of these peoples.¹²²

The third group of Jews subjected to a custodial transfer were the inmates of the concentration camps. In the 1930s, tens of thousands of Jews had been arrested in Einzelaktionen and thrown into one of Himmler's camps for an indefinite period of time. Most of them were released for emigration, but a group of about two thousand still languished in the camps long after the war had broken out.¹²³ Now, in the fall of 1942, Himmler decided to make his German concentration camps *judenfrei*. The Jews involved were to be shipped to the killing centers of Auschwitz and Lublin.¹²⁴ The transfers involved no change of jurisdiction, because the concentration camps in the Reich and the killing centers in Poland were under the same management. However, the killing center was quite different in character from an ordinary concentration camp, as the victims were soon to discover.¹²⁵

SEIZURE AND TRANSPORT

With the conclusion of negotiations for the deportation of various troublesome categories of people, a major problem had been solved. What remained was the seizure and transport of the deportable Jews and the wearisome undertaking of confiscating the belongings they left behind.

Unlike questions involving definitions and deferments, the seizure of the Jews generated few difficulties and little friction in the bureaucracy'. The roundups were in the hands of the Gestapo. To the extent that it could not carry' out the task alone, it could call upon the Criminal Police, Order Police, SS, or SA in various cities for assistance. More generally, it could

122. Thicrack to Bormann, October 13,1942,NG-558. During a half-year period the Justice Ministry delivered to the concentration camp chief Pohl 12,658 prison inmates of various nationalities. The prisoners were intended for forced labor projects of the SS. They died, however, cn masse. By April 1, 1943, 5,935 were dead. Draft letter by Pohl to Thicrack, April 1943, NO-1285.

123. Statistics in Korherr report, March 27,1943, NO-5194.

124. Müller (Chief, RSHAIV) to all Staatspolizcilcitstellen, BdS and KdS offices, and Beauftragte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei, November 5,1942, NO-2522. The order stipulated that Mischlinge of the first degree were to be included in the transfers. These were the only Mischlinge killed alongside the Jews. The transfer of Jewish women inmates had already been ordered in September. OStubaf. Dr. Bcmdortf (RSHA IV-C-2) to Stapoleitstellen, etc., October 2, 1942, NO-2524.

125. The Reich camps wanted 1,600 Polish and Ukrainian labor replacements from Auschwitz. There were no replacements. WVHA D-II (concentration camp labor allocation) to commander of Auschwitz, October 5,1942. Centralna Zydowska Komisja Historyczna w Polsce, *Dokumenty i materudy do dziejow okupacji niemieckiej w' Polsce* (Warsaw, Lodz, and Krakow, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 73-74. Auschwitz Command/' III-A to WVHA D-II, October 10, 1942, *ibid*.

avail itself of the machinery of the Jewish Community, the Reichsvereinigung and the Kultusgemeinden, for lists, notification of victims, maps, supplies, clerks, and auxiliaries. The Jewish orderlies, variously called *Transporthelfer*, *Ordner*, *Ausheber*, or *Abholer*, would sometimes accompany police to the apartments of those selected for transport and would help supervise the arrested persons at collecting points, usually converted old-age homes or other institutional buildings renamed *Sammelstellen*, *Durchgangslager*, or *Abwanderungslager*, until there were enough people to fill a train.

Two phases may be noted in the evolution of the roundup procedure. At first, long lists were submitted by the Jewish Communities, from which the Gestapo could make its selection. During this period there were more victims than available transports or prepared destinations. Jewish Community offices could therefore ask for deferments or exemptions of named individuals, and often these requests were granted. In the initial period, moreover, the victims were told where they were going. On November 13, 1941, for example, the Jewish Community of Cologne sent a letter to all Jews in its jurisdiction announcing “another transport of 1,000 persons, specifically to Minsk [*ein weiterer Transport von 1,000 Personen und zwar nach Minsk*]” for December 8. In this communication every one was given instructions on how to prepare for transport, pending subsequent notification by the Community of those who would make the trip.¹²⁶

The second phase, beginning with the operation of the death camps, was carried out with multiple master lists, obtained from police precincts and Community' tax records, and supplemented by addresses kept by Community housing offices. The extent of the operation was not concealed from the Jewish leadership. On May 30, 1942, Eichmann went so far as to inform Löwenherz that he anticipated the complete evacuation (*gänzliche Evakuierung*) of the Jews from the Reich, Austria, and the Protektorat, the old ones to Theresienstadt, the others to the “East.”¹²⁷ Only the camps were not mentioned, and in the housing registers the whereabouts of the deported Jews were to be entered as “unknown” (*unbekannt verreist*) or a notation was to be made that the former Jewish inhabitants had “emigrated” (*ausgewandert*).¹²⁸

Each place had its own deportation history, and each history reveals special conditions and mechanics of the deportations. In the Protektorat, from where most transports were directed to Theresienstadt, the pro-

126. Text of letter in Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, pp. 398-99. Earlier transports had gone to Lodz.

127. Memorandum by Löwenherz, June 1, 1942, Israel Police 1156.

128. “Guidelines for evacuations to Generalgouvernement, Trawniki, near Lublin.” March 22, 1942, prepared by Günther (RSHA IV-B-4-a), Israel Police 1277.

cedurc began with the registration of all the members of the Jewish population, those of Prague and Brno in September 1941, and those of other cities in subsequent months. The Jewish community functionaries examined personal documents for the registration, and the Zentralstelle sent the deportation lists to the communities, which checked them for the ill, the dead, the essential Jews, and so on. Prior to departure, the deportees handed over apartment keys and unused ration coupons to the community organizations.¹²⁹ Within the Reich and Austria, variants appear city by city. They may be glimpsed from developments in three major locations: Frankfurt, Vienna, and Berlin.

In Frankfurt, where about 10,500 Jews were living at the beginning of October 1941, fewer than a thousand were left a year later.¹³⁰ The Frankfurt Gestapo had established its hold on the Community organization many months prior to the first transport. A survivor who worked in the Community's statistical division recalls that every day a representative of the Kultusgemeinde had to announce himself to the Gestapo by stating in a loud voice: "Here is the Jew Sigmund Israel Rothschild." During the spring of 1941 the statistical division was instructed to make up a roster of all members of the community in triplicate. One day in the fall, Rothschild brought back a list of 1,200 people from the Gestapo, which had to be supplemented with additional information. Rumors that the list was to serve the purpose of deportation were denied by the Gestapo. Two days later, on October 19, 1941, the roundup began.¹³¹ At 5:30 a.m. elements of two Standarten of the SA were assembled and given printed forms for the registration of Jewish property. They were to enter the Jewish apartments at 7 a.m. The SA men, drawn from various walks of life, were not prepared for this "juridical activity" (*juristische Tdtijikeit*), and the Gestapo, evidently short handed, would often arrive late at the scene.¹³² After multiple delays, a procession of Jews was moved through the city in broad daylight, as throngs of people stood on each side of the street watching silently.¹³³

Subsequent Frankfurt transports were handled with more expertise. The Community itself would draw up lists in accordance with categories

129. The procedure is described in the report of the Elder of the Council of Jews in Prague to the Central Office for die Regulation of the Jewish Question in Bohemia and Moravia, June 19, 1944, Israel Police 1237.

130. For detailed statistics, see *Dokumente zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden*, pp. 460,465-69,474,476-77,482-83,487-90,500-503,532-33.

131. Statement by Lina Katz, *ibid.*, pp. 507-8.

132. Report by SA Sturmbann 111/63 to SA Standarte 63, October 21, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 509-11. See also similar reports by other units, *ibid.*, pp. 511-14. ITic destination of the first transport was Lodz.

133. Statement by Katz, *ibid.*, pp. 507-8.

specified by the Gestapo, and it would then send out letters to the persons that had been selected, stating that the recipients were to remain in their apartment as of a certain hour on a certain day.¹³⁴ When the Gestapo needed the help of Order Police stationed in outlying areas for the seizure of Jews in the Frankfurt vicinity, it prepared detailed instructions covering every contingency, including the handling of dogs, cats, and birds. The participating personnel were expected to carry out the action with necessary toughness, correctness, and care (*mit der notwendigen Härte, Korrektheit und Sorgfalt*). In the event that a Jew committed suicide because of (*aus Anlass*) the evacuation, procedures for filling out papers were to be followed analogously (*sinngemäß*), as though he were being transported away, but a note was to be made of his death. And so on.¹³⁵

Vienna had a Jewish population of about 51,000 when mass deportations began there in October 1941.¹³⁶ For the Viennese Jews, however, these transports were not the first experience with “evacuations.” More than six thousand Jews had been sent from Vienna to the Generalgouvernement before the onset of the “Final Solution,” about fifteen hundred in the fall of 1939 and five thousand in February-March 1941.¹³⁷ In the months prior to the October deportations, the concentration of the Jews within the city had been increased, until 90 percent were living in three districts designated for Jewish residency: the II, IX, and XX.¹³⁸ After the Jews were forced to wear the star, they were even more salient and vulnerable. Symbolic was the experience of one star wearer, a welfare official of the Jewish Community, who was a disabled veteran of the First World War, with an artificial leg. He fell on an icy sidewalk and asked passersby for three hours to help him. They all left him and he finally raised himself with difficulty, breaking his wrist.¹³⁹ The Kultusgemeinde asked for no

134. List making is mentioned by Katz, *ibid.* Form letter by Jüdische Gemeinde in Frankfurt (signed Alfred Weil and Arthur Kauffmann), June 7, 1942, *ibid.*, pp. 518-20. Weil (chairman) was deported on August 18, 1942, Kauffmann (legal counsel), on September 15, 1942, both to Theresienstadt. *Ibid.*, pp. 545, 552.

135. Gestapo in Frankfurt to Landräte in the area, Gauleiter in Frankfurt, with copies to Police Presidents in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden and to Regierungspräsident in Wiesbaden and with appendixes, August 21, 1942, *ibid.*, pp. 520-28.

136. Löwenherz calculated the Jewish population as 47,578 for the end of October. Ixiwenherz memorandum of November 14, 1941, Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 66. Four transports had gone out to Lodz in October. Lodz Ghetto Collection, YIVO Institute, p. 11.

137. Herbert Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung—Die Juden in Österreich 1938-1945* (Vienna, 1978), pp. 217, 261.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

139. Menasch Maumcr's recollections of Vienna (1956) from the files of Yad Vashem, *ibid.*, pp. 281, 301.

assistance. On the contrary, it was working with the Gestapo, and Rabbi Murrelstein did his work assiduously.¹⁴⁰

The principal personalities of die Gestapo in Vienna were die following :

Director, Stapoleitstelle IV-B	ORR and KR Franz Josef Huber
Director, Zentrale Stelle:	Dr. Karl Ebner
Deputy	HStuf. Alois Brunner
Concentration and seizure	Anton Brunner
	UStuf. Ernst Girzick

The concentration of the Jews at collecting points was called *Kommisionierung*. Deportation lists were compiled by the Gestapo, which employed a number of Jewish clerks for this purpose. The Kultusgemeinde could “reclaim” certain individuals on specific grounds but then the Gestapo could add replacements, if a list no longer contained the names of a thousand people. Girzick recalls that “in principle, the Jews were shoved oft in families [*Grundsätzlich wurden die Juden familienweise abgeschotm*].”¹⁴¹ The most critical challenge to the Jewish leadership was the demand that they deploy guards (*Ausheber*, including *Ordner* and *Jupo*) that would assist the Gestapo in the roundups. The Jewish Community was now expected to do the ultimate: Jews had to seize Jews. It did so, rationalizing that thereby it would assure a more humane procedure (*humanere Vorgangsweise*). Murrelstein’s *Ausheber* would swarm into a Jewish apartment, stationing themselves at the door, while an SS man and the chief of the Jewish Kommando would seat themselves at a table to inquire about family members and to make sure of property declarations. The SS man might then depart, leaving the Jewish raiders with the victims, allowing them to help with the packing but admonishing them to prevent escapes.¹⁴² At the collecting points, service by the Jewish guards was to be arranged in such a way that flight by the inmates would be impossible. For each person missing from the premises, Löwenherz was told, two Jewish guards would be deported instead.¹⁴³ The houses converted into collection centers were relatively small and, in order to maximize the amount of space in them, there were no tables, chairs, or beds. The waiting in such a house might last weeks, before the deportees, standing

140. See Löwenherz’s characterization of Murrelstein in his letter to Zentrale Stelle für jüdische Auswanderung (Vienna), October 11, 1939, German Federal Archives R 70/9. Also, Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung*, p. 285.

141. Statement by Ernst Girzick, September 14, 1961, Strafsache gegen Novak. Landesgericht für Strafsachen, Vienna. 1416/61, vol. 6, pp. 85-94.

142. Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung*, pp. 285, 299.

143. Memorandum by Löwenherz, December 21, 1941, Israel Police 1152.

in open trucks and hearing jeers in the street, would be taken in daylight to the train station.¹⁴⁴

By the middle of October 1942 the Vienna deportations were virtually over,¹⁴⁵ and at year's end Löwenherz reported that fewer than 8,000 Jews remained.¹⁴⁶ In January 1943 the Community's staff was thinned out, and several of its functionaries (including Murrelstein) were sent to Theresienstadt. At about this time Löwenherz appeared in Ebner's office with a question. The following is Ebner's account of the meeting:

The director of the Israelite Community and later of the Jewish Council of Elders was Dr. Josef Löwenherz. I would come into contact with him several times, one could safely say often. He was the one who first brought to me a rumor that Jews in concentration camps were being gassed and annihilated. He came to me one day after 1942, in other words, presumably in 1943, an utterly broken man, and asked for a meeting with Huber. I asked him what he wanted, and he told me that the Jews were allegedly being put to death, and he wanted to be sure that this was in fact the case. I thought that he was going to have a bad time with the chief and that he might conceivably be charged with spreading enemy radio reports. Löwenherz said that was all the same to him, and thereupon we went to Huber. When Huber was put into the picture, he then called the chief of Office IV in the Reich Security Main Office (Müller) on the direct line, while we waited outside. As we went in again, Huber said to us Müller had dismissed these allegations as evil reports. Löwenherz was visibly relieved.¹⁴⁷

Almost 73,000 Jews lived in Berlin at the beginning of October 1941.¹⁴⁸ This number was more than 40 percent of all the Jews of the Old Reich. Inevitably, the fact that the community was in the capital was going to have significance for the RSHA as well as the Stapoleitstelle of Berlin, and its fate was going to preoccupy the Reichsvereinigung as well as the *Jüdische Kultusvereinigung zu Berlin*. The following abbreviated chart shows the key individuals of the Berlin Gestapo:

Director, Stapoleitstelle

OStubaf, ORR Otto Bovensiepen
(from November 1942,
Stubaf. RR Wilhelm Bock)

144. Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung*, pp. 298,300.

145. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

146. Report by Löwenherz for 1942. Yad Vashem O 30/3.

147. Statement by Karl Ebner, September 20,1961, Case Novak, vol. 6, pp. 111—16.

148. Gestapo report in Frankfurt, October 22, 1942, *Dokumente der Frankfurter Juden*, pp. 468-76, at pp. 474-75.

Jewish Affairs

KK Gerhard Stiibbs
(from November 1942,
KK Walter Stock)

Deputy

Kriminaloberinspektor Franz
Priifer
(until November 1942)

The principal figures in the Reichsvereinigung were Leo Baeck, chairman of the Vorstand, and Paul Eppstein, the main deputy on a daily basis. At the Community level, the chairman was Moritz Henschel, and the migration specialist was Philipp Kozower, who was assisted by the Community's director for housing referral, Dr. Martha Mosse. Baeck and Henschel, and Eppstein and Kozower were organizational counterparts. All four had been Vorstand members in the Reichsvereinigung from the very beginning.¹⁴⁹

The Berlin Jews, like those of Vienna, had been subjected to increased concentration before the deportations. In Berlin the aim was to move all the Jews into Jewish-owned houses.¹⁵⁰ The Gestapo could reach into the Jewish population also through a variety of files: addresses registered with the police, Community tax records, and Dr. Mosse's card file, which was continually being revised.¹⁵¹ At the beginning of October 1941 Priifer summoned two of the Community's Vorstand members (including Henschel) and Dr. Mosse and warned them not to speak to anyone about what he had to say now. The resettlement (*Umsiedlung*) of the Berlin Jews was going to begin, and the Jewish Community would have to participate in the action lest it be carried out by SA and SS, "and one knows how that is going to be [*und man weissja, wic das dann werden würrck*]" The Community was to hand in several thousand names and present questionnaires to all those on its list. The Gestapo would then select one thousand for a transport to Lodz. The Community was to see to it that the deportees were well equipped for travel. The entire action was to be represented to the Jewish population as a housing relocation (*Wohnungsf-*

149. See protocols of Vorstand meetings in Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66. Dr. Otto Hirsch, arrested, disappeared from the scene early in February, 1941. He subsequently died in Mauthausen.

150. Statement by Dr. Martha Mosse, July 23-24, 1958, Leo Baeck Institute Krcutzbergcr Collection, AR 7183, Box 7, Folder 6.

151. Memoranda by Bruno Mannheim (card file administration of Berlin Community), August 23, 1942, and September 1, 1942, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66. Statement by Mosse, July 23-24, 1958, Leo Baeck Institute AR 7182. Generalstaatsanwalt bei dem Kammergericht to Landgericht Berlin, enclosing indictment of Otto Bovensiepen, February 22, 1969, I Js 9/65, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 239, pp. 155-57, 196.

raumungsaktion). When Henschel asked whether the Reichsvereinigung could be informed, Priifer said yes. That same evening, according to Dr. Mosse, Vorstand members of the Reichsvereinigung and of the Community decided to accede to the Gestapo's wishes "in order to be able to do as much good as possible in the interest of the victims [*aufdieser Weise so viel Gutes me moglich im Intéresse der Betroffenen tun zu kihn*]" .¹⁵²

Although secrecy was increasingly important to the Berlin Gestapo, the dates of forthcoming transports were invariably shared with Jewish officials. Thus on July 29, 1942, Sriibbs and Priifer informed Kozower of three Theresienstadt transports anticipated for August 17, September 14, and October 5, and two "eastern" transports envisaged for August 15 and 31.^{153 154 155} In his memorandum about the conversation, Kozower indicated that he had communicated its contents to several of his colleagues. He also mentioned the transports in the Vorstand of the Reichsvereinigung, adding that every one present had to remain silent about this information (*Fur diese Mitteilung besteht Schweigepflicht*).¹⁵⁴ The reason that the Gestapo took the Jewish leaders into its confidence was its continuing reliance upon them for help in the preparations.

Part of the assistance was administrative. The Berlin Kultusvereinigung provided typists, clerks, baggage handlers, nurses, and *Transportheifer* or *Ordner* for special work (*Sonderarbeiten*).¹⁵⁵ Although Stiibbs and Priifer harnessed only Gestapo men, Order Police, and Criminal Police for roundups of Jews in their homes,¹⁵⁶ they needed Jewish auxiliaries at the collecting points for the processing and care of the victims until the moment of departure. Once the Kultusvereinigung was required also to march elderly deportees before daybreak to a trolley that was to leave promptly at 5 a.m. for the Anhalter railway station.¹⁵⁷ Provisioning the transports, including those originating in Berlin as well as those pass-

152. Statement by Mosse, July 23-24, 1958, Leo Bacck Institute, AR 7183.

153. Memorandum by Kozower, (early) August, 1942, Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 66.

154. Protocol no. 8 of Vorstand meeting (date almost illegible on microfilm, probably end of July 1942), signed Eppstein, Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 66. Bacck himself, usually presiding at these meetings, was absent, and he was not among those listed in Kozower's memorandum as having been informed directly. Mosse, not a Vorstand member, was listed as informed.

155. Sec memoranda by Kozower, May 31, 1942, and by Henschel, July 21 and September 4, 1942, Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 66.

156. Testimony by Franz Zilian, cited in indictment of Bovensiepcn, Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 239, pp. 186-88.

157. Memorandum by Kozower, May 31, 1942. Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 66.

ing through the capital, was another Jewish responsibility.¹⁵⁸ Kultusvereinigung officials negotiated with food offices to assure prescribed supplies, particularly when, at the end of a ration period, the selected victims could no longer obtain their allotments. An attempt to procure food for infants failed, however, when Direktor Morawski of the Berlin Food Office explained that Aryan children were not receiving special allocations either.¹⁵⁹

The Jewish leadership contributed not only personnel, space, and supplies, but it was involved also in the more sensitive task of filling the quotas for the projected deportations. At the beginning the Berlin Kultusvereinigung would prepare long lists of 3,000 to 4,000 names before each transport and intervene in behalf of some of those selected in the hope that the deportations would not be continued. So long as there was still a sufficient number of Jews in the city, the Gestapo would grant such requests without much ado.¹⁶⁰ By early summer of 1942, however, the situation changed. Only 54,000 Jews were left in Berlin at the end of June,¹⁶¹ and those classified as deferred or exempt had become a much larger percentage of the total. On July 29, 1942, Prüfer demanded that Henschel prepare a complete roster of the Berlin Jews (*Personalkartei sämtlicher Juden Berlins*) with detailed information about each person.¹⁶² On the same day, Prüfer's assistant, Kriminalsekretär Walter Dobberke, remarked to Kozower that on the basis of existing criteria, not more than 300 Jews could be gathered for the two transports leaving for the East on August 15 and 31, and requiring 1,000 each. In the light of the shortage, Dobberke wondered whether laborers and individuals in mixed marriages might not have to be added. Kozower then suggested that the goal might still be reached if inmates of concentration camps and their families could be included. Stübbs thought that this idea had sufficient merit to be raised at a meeting of German offices.¹⁶³ By early September, however, Prüfer and Dobberke brought up the basic question with Kozower and Mosse again, pointing out that "material" for old people's as well as eastern transports had now become very "tight." (*Es wurde die Frage erör-*

158. See, for example, memorandum by Henschel on Frankfurt transport, September 12, 1942. Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

159. Memorandum by Kozower, August 25, 1942, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

160. Statement by Mosse, July 23-24, 1958, Leo Baeck Institute, AR 7183.

161. Memorandum by Mannheim, July 3, 1942, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

162. Memorandum by Henschel, July 29, 1942, with copy to Kppsrein, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66. For a report on the cards, see memorandum by Mannheim, September 1, 1942. Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

163. Memorandum by Kozower, early August 1942, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

ten, dass das Material sowohl für die Alterstransporte wie für die Osttransporte jetzt sehr knapp geworden ist.)¹⁶⁴

At the end of October 1942 the Stübbs-Prüfer regime came to an abrupt end. Both had been suspected of having enriched themselves in the course of their official duties. Stübbs committed suicide before his arrest, and Prüfer died in a bombing attack while under detention.¹⁶⁵ At this point Alois Brunner arrived with several Jupo from Vienna. Brunner changed the atmosphere and introduced a new procedure. From now on, every Jew on the Community premises had to rise when a person of "German blood" entered and maintain a distance of at least two steps from the German. The capacity of collecting points was to be enlarged by the removal of all the furniture. From the center at Grosse Hamburger Strasse, the kitchen was to be taken out as well. Clerks were to do duty day and night. Maps of Berlin were to be prepared, including one with circles around blocks indicating densities of Jewish population. Finally, a Jewish Order Service was to be created to assist the Gestapo in the operations to come.¹⁶⁶ Following these directives, Dr. Eppstein explained to the Community's employees that the Ordner would have to accompany the Gestapo raiders to the homes of Jews and help the victims pack. Whoever refused this duty, warned any Jews, or helped them escape would be shot, and his family would be transported to the East. The Ordner, with red armbands, then moved alongside the Gestapo through the city from house to house.¹⁶⁷

Although the interim Brunner regime was very brief, it left its mark. Sturmbannführer Stock, who took over at the end of November 1942, ordered Henschel to organize a regular *Abholkolonne* of ninety men for roundups,¹⁶⁸ but the next major action, aimed at the Jewish factory

164. Memorandum by Kozower, September 9, 1942, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

165. Indictment of Bovensicpen, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 239, pp. 204-6.

166. Memoranda by Kozower, one on November 13 (?) and two of them on November 17, 1942, and memorandum by Henschel, November 14, 1942. Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66. Eppstein was present at the November 14 meeting and received copies of memoranda on the other meetings.

167. Statement by Mossé, July 23-24, 1958, Leo Baeck Institute, AR 7183.

168. Memorandum by Henschel, February 15, 1943, enclosing ninety proposed names, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66. Memoranda in the microfilm indicate that from November 30, 1942, Henschel and Kozower dealt with the new Gestapo chief Stock. Members of the Reichsvereinigung, including Baeck and Eppstein, were deported in January. Baeck survived and Eppstein was killed in Theresienstadt. The machinery of the Berlin community remained for a while. Henschel and Mossé survived in Theresienstadt. Kozower, after a stay in Theresienstadt, was deported to Auschwitz and killed. On Eppstein's and Kozower's fate, see Adler, *Theresienstadt*, pp. 191, 253.

workers, required much larger forces. In the course of this operation, trucks of the SS *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* moved into the plants themselves, where the Jews were seized in their working clothes. Other trucks halted at Jewish apartment houses, and anyone found at home was taken away. Dr. Mosse states that Gestapo and Community employees, in a joint effort, then looked for the relatives of arrested persons to "bring families together" (*die auseinandergerissenen Mitglieder einer Familie zusammen zu bringen*). From the overfull collecting points, covered trucks and furniture vans went at night with their victims to the train station for transport to Auschwitz.¹⁶⁹

In the wake of the factory action there were widespread problems. Some "shortsighted" industrialists, complained Goebbels in his diary, had "warned the Jews in time," and "we therefore failed to lay our hands on about 4,000. They are now wandering about Berlin without homes, are not registered with the police and are naturally quite a public danger. I ordered the police, Wehrmacht, and the party to do everything possible to round these Jews up as quickly as possible."¹⁷⁰

Not more than a few thousand Jews were hiding undiscovered until their liberation in the Reich-Protectorat area. Possibly half of these people were Christian by religion, or partly non-Jewish by descent, or the married partners, or widows, or widowers of Germans.¹⁷¹ For the other half survival was more difficult. In Berlin and several other cities, some Jews could pretend to be bombed-out Germans who had lost their papers. Hiding Viennese Jews, who were known as *U-Boote* (submarines) in Jewish parlance, had some access to a thin lifeline of support maintained by the Hungarian Jewish community until 1944.¹⁷² All the submerged Jews, especially those who were mainly on their own, had to depend on steady nerves, unusual presence of mind, and extraordinary social acting skills.¹⁷³ The hidden Jews received a little assistance from a few Germans; the Vienna Jews were helped by a Jewish relief committee in Budapest. Most of the time, however, the "immersed" (*untergetauebten*) Jews had to rely upon themselves. Hunted by the Gestapo and professional Jewish

169. Statement by Mosse, July 23-24, 1958, Leo Baeck Institute, AR 7183. Indictment of Bovensiepen, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 239, pp. 198, 201.

170. Lochner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entry for March 11, 1943, p. 294.

171. A study of postwar registrations in Austria reveals that 567 Jews according to the Nuremberg definition and 53 Mischlinge of the first degree had survived in hiding there. C. Gwyn Moser, "Jewish *U-Boote* in Austria, 1938-1945," *Simon Hasenthal Center Annual* 2 (1985): 52-61. Moser provides breakdowns indicating the heavy percentage of converts, part-Jews, and intermarried Jews.

172. Kasztner, "Bericht des jiidischen Rettungskomitees," pp. 7-8.

173. See the account by Werner Hellmann in Lamm, "Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums," pp. 324-29. Hellmann saved not only himself but also his girl friend, probably a unique achievement.

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informers employed by the Gestapo, dodging the entire network of party offices and Nazi vigilantes, living in ruins and passing themselves off as bombed-out people, the “U-boats” scurried to and fro, waiting for their liberation. Slim as their chances might have been, they still faced better odds than the deportees who arrived at the killing centers.

Even fewer were those who considered any form of opposition. The criminality statistics for the year 1942 indicate the conviction of only one Jew for “resistance to the state” (*Widerstand gegen die Staatsgewalt*).¹⁷⁴ An arresting officer in Berlin recalls that the Jews created the impression of being very composed (*einen sehr gefassten Eindruck*) and that without exception they went with him unprotesting (*undgingen ausnahmslos ohne Widerspruch mit*).¹⁷⁵ More than a handful, however, had thought of suicide; thus the “perpetual question” (*stehende Frage*) among Jewish acquaintances in Berlin was: “Will you take your life or let yourself be evacuated? [*Wollen Sie sich das Leben nehmen oder mit evakuieren lassen?*]”¹⁷⁶

The seizure of the victims was a weighty step in the process, but for the administrators of the deportations more remained to be done. They had to assure the availability of transport, the presence of police personnel to accompany the train to its destination, and the funding of the fare.

The dispatch of a particular transport would be the subject of negotiation between the RSHA and the Reichsbahn several weeks before its departure. In addition, local arrangements would be made for cars and loading. Thus Da 512, Nuremberg-Theresienstadt, September 10, 1942, appears in a list (*Zusammenstellung*) of special trains for resettlers, harvest helpers, and Jews compiled at a conference in Frankfurt of the Generalbetriebsleitung Ost on August 8, 1942.¹⁷⁷ Details relating to the composition and departure of Da 512 were specified in an order by Reichsbahndirektion Nuremberg/33 (Oberreichsbahnrat Schrenk). The cars were to be taken from an empty train labeled Lp 1511. Several cars of Lp 1511 were to be dispatched to Bamberg and Würzburg, from where 400 Jews were to be brought to the Nuremberg switching yard (*Rangierbahnhof*). The remaining cars of Lp 1511 were to be readied at the Nuremberg stockyards’ dung-loading point (*Nürnberg-Viehhof Fäkalienverladungsstelle*) by 5 p.m. on September 9 for the Nuremberg deportees

174. Circular by Justice Ministry, April 4, 1944, NG-787. The Baum group was tried in 1943.

175. Statement by Zilian, in indictment of Bovenicpen. Leo Bacck Institute microfilm 239, p. 187.

176. Adler, *Theresienstadt*, p. 61.

177. Generalbetriebsleitung Ost/PW (signed Jacobi) to Reichsbahndirektionen. Generaldirektion der Ostbahn in Krakow, HBD Mitte in Minsk, and HBD Nord in Riga, with copies to GBL West in Essen and GBL Süd in Munich, August 8, 1942, Institute für Zeitgeschichte, Fb 85/2, pp. 217-22, at p. 220.

and their baggage. At 3 p.m. on the following day, the loaded cars in the stockyards were to be moved to the switching yard to be connected with the cars that were to wait there with the Bamberg and Würzburg Jews, and the fully assembled train Da 512 was to leave at 6:14 p.m.¹⁷⁸ Such elaborate preparations signified that once the Transport Ministry had agreed to a special train, the Gestapo had locked itself in and that the scheduled departure was its deadline. As the RSHA guidelines repeatedly made clear, the available trains had to be utilized to the full, and their timetables were unalterable and binding.¹⁷⁹

The Reich Security Main Office had no personnel to guard the trains. Help came from the Order Police, which undertook to furnish one officer and twelve men for each transport.¹⁸⁰ Although the terms of this agreement were confined to the Reich-Protectorat area, the RSHA ultimately relied on the Order Police for deportations in other regions as well. In fact, the Order Police came to regard the guarding of special trains as one of its regular functions.¹⁸¹ Orders and reports in the file of the Police President of Vienna reveal something about the assignments (one officer and six men to Theresienstadt, one officer and fifteen men to the East, all drawn from regular personnel in precincts) and the weapons for each train (two machine pistols with 300 rounds of ammunition each, carbines with 60 rounds each, and pistols with 50 rounds each).¹⁸²

The trains moved slowly. A report of Schupo Lieutenant Josef Fischmann, who took Da 38 with 1,000 Jews (men, women, and children) from Vienna to the Sobibor death camp, indicates a route through Brno, Neisse, Oppeln, Czestochowa, Kielce, Radom, and Lublin, according to the following actual schedule:

June 14, 1942	Noon	Loading in Vienna
	7:08 p.m.	Departure
June 17, 1942	8:15 a.m.	Arrival in Sobibor
	9:15 a.m.	Unloading

178. Text of order, signed Schrenk, August 26, 1942, in Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, p. 448.

179. See guidelines of March 22, 1942, in Israel Police document 1277.

180. Inspekteur der Ordnungspolizei in Vienna to Polizeipräsident in Vienna/Kommando der Schutzpolizei (Protective Police), October 27, 1941, enclosing order by Chief of Order Police (Dalugec) to Inspekteure and Befehlshaber (IdO and BdO) in Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover, Münster, Kassel, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna, Breslau, Prague, and Riga, with copies to Higher SS and Police Leaders in Berlin, Hamburg, Braunschweig, Düsseldorf, Kassel, Munich, Stuttgart, Vienna, Breslau, Prague, and Riga and to Polizeipräsident in Berlin and Chief of Securin' Police (Hevdrichl), October 24, 1941, PS-3921 and Yad Vashem document DN/27-3.

181. Reichsführer-SS (by Daluege), *Vorschrift für die Führung und Verrichtung der Polizeitruppe* (Lübeck, 1943), p. 4.

182. Orders by Salat, May 4 and July 9 and 25, Yad Vashem document PN 2--3.

Fischmann reported that there were no incidents during the trip. In Lublin, 51 Jews were taken off the train; in Sobibor, 949 were delivered to the camp commander, Oberleutnant Stangl of the Schupo. The guards, however, were not altogether comfortable. Instead of sitting in a second-class coach, they had to travel third class, and in lieu of rations suitable for the summer, they had been given soft sausages that were beginning to spoil.¹⁸³

A train from Vienna to Minsk, in May 1942, had taken even longer. The transport, which started out with passenger cars and carried 1,000 Jewish men, women, and children, traversed Olmiitz, Neisse, Warsaw, Siedlce, and Wolkowysk:¹⁸⁴

May 6, 1942	Noon to 4 p. m . Loading	
	7 P.M.	Departure
May 8, 1942	11 p.m.	Arrival in Wolkowysk, followed by transfer of deportees to freight cars
May 9, 1942	2:45 a .m.	Continuation of trip
	2:30 p.m.	Arrival in Koydanov
		Train halted there upon orders of Security Police in Minsk. Eight dead Jews taken from cars and buried at railway station
May 11, 1942	9 a .m.	Continuation of trip
	10:30 a .m.	Arrival in Minsk

The apparent reason why the train was halted for forty-two hours in Koydanov was the desire of the Security Police to relieve the shooters of work on weekends. May 9, 1942, was a Saturday.¹⁸⁵

183. Report by Fischmann, June 20, 1942, Yad Vashem document DN/27-3.

184. Report by Schupo Lt. Johann Peter, May 16, 1942, Yad Vashem document DN/27-3. The train was Da 201. See the planned schedule of HBD Mitte/33 with Wolkowysk arrival projected for 7:05 p.m. in telegram to stations in Wolkowysk and points cast, with copies to Reichsbahndirektion in Königsberg, which was responsible for train formation in Wolkowysk, May 7, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record Group 53.002 (Belarus Central State Archives), Roll 2, Fond 378, Opis 1, Folder 784. See also a report of Order Police Captain Salitter about a train from Düsseldorf to Riga/Shiratova (morning of December 11, 1941, to morning of December 14). The train halted in Riga, without heat, for hours pending the arrival of the Gestapo. Text, in large extract, in Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, pp. 461-65.

185. See the letter of the KdS in White Russia/IIB (signed Heuser) to "Reichsbahnoberrat" Reichardt of the Reichsbahndirektion Mitte, May 23, 1942, referring to a meeting between Obersturmführer Lütkenhus, Oberreichsbahnrat Reichardt, Reichsbahnrat Logemann, and Reichsbahnrat Kayser on May 22, and thanking the

In addition to its manifest need for assistance to seize and guard the Jews, the Gestapo had a subtle financial problem. As procuror of the transports, it had to pay for them, but its ordinary budget could not cover such major expenses. The solution was to utilize funds of the Jewish Community machinery. The RSHA controlled the finances of the Reichsvereinigung and of the Jewish communities in Vienna and Prague. The Jewish organizations deposited taxes and miscellaneous receipts (such as the proceeds from the sale of land on which the synagogues had stood before November 1938) into various accounts in banks. Following the first transports on November 21, 1941, Paul Eppstein of the Reichsvereinigung, concerned about the increasing costs of equipping the deportees, asked Hauptsturmführer Gutwasser of the RSHA for permission to impose a special levy on those about to be deported for deposit in its special account W (*Sonderkonto W*). Gutwasser, seeing nothing wrong with the suggestion, asked for a written proposal and added that *Sonderkonto W* would probably be used to pay also for railway transports.¹⁸⁶ On December 3, 1941, Eppstein and Lilienthal, invoking instructions of "our supervisory agency" (*Anordnung unserer Aufsichtsbehörde*), directed communities and branches to induce every member of an evacuation transport to pay no less than 25 percent of his liquid assets (excluding securities) as a donation, the necessity for which was to be made clear in a suitable manner (*in geeigneter Weise*). The deportees were to be told in effect that their donation was required for their own needs, and that any surplus would be used by the Reichsvereinigung for welfare.¹⁸⁷ By December 3, two payments in the amount of RM 24,628.40 and RM 33,158.00 had already been made from funds in *Sonderkonto W* to the Reichsbahndirektion in Cologne for October transports.¹⁸⁸

Ministerialrat Maedel of the Finance Ministry, who had discovered this stratagem, reported it in a lengthy memorandum to Ministerial-

Reichsbahn for its flexibility in agreeing to halt future trains arriving Fridays, Saturdays, or Sundays, until Mondays. One train was to be halted over Whit-Monday to Tuesday. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Record Group 53.002 (Belarus Central State Archives), Roll 2, Fond 378, Opis 1, Folder 784.

186. Memorandum by Eppstein (F 28) of November 21, 1941, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

187. Instructions signed by Paul Eppstein and Arthur Lilienthal, December 3, 1941, Israel Police 738. See also the instructions sent by Sturmabführer Suhr (RSHA IV-B-4-a) to "offices concerned with evacuations," December 3, 1941, enclosing the text requesting the Gestapo offices to hand over transport lists to Jewish communities in time for collection of the sum, in *Archives of the Holocaust* (New York, 1993), vol. 22 (documents of the Zentralstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen, Ludwigsburg), ed. Henry Friedlander and Sybil Milton, pp. 15-16.

188. Memoranda by Eppstein (F 32 and F 34) of December 9 and 13, 1941, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

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dirigent Kallenbach on December 14, 1942. Noting in particular the Reichsvereinigung directive of December 3, 1941, Maedel said that, although the Gestapo did not have the power to dispose of the Jewish funds, occasional conversations with representatives of the Security Police indicated extensive Gestapo influence in the utilization of this money for payments of transport costs, etc. (*Bezahlung der Transportkosten usw.*). Moreover, similar arrangements had been made in Vienna, where the Gestapo's Zentrale Stelle had received special powers of attorney (*Sondervollmacht*), and in Prague, where those entitled to dispose of Jewish property could empower the Gestapo to be in charge of it (*Vermögensträger*). Maedel saw in these measures the financing of a program outside the budgetary process, and raised questions about Himmler's contention that Jewish properties used for the "Final Solution of the Jewish problem" were in the final analysis assets already committed to aims of the Third Reich. Should such self-financing, he asked, be given silent acquiescence? ¹⁸⁹ In the end (if not quite silently), it was.¹⁹⁰

At least 250,000 Jews were deported from the Reich-Protectorat area, half of them from the Old Reich, 50,000 from Austria, and the remainder from the Protectorat. Deportation statistics as of December 31, 1942, before the last major roundups in Berlin, were compiled for the SS by a specialist in numbers, Richard Korherr. They are shown in Table 8-2.

By November 1, 1944, the registered Jews of the Old Reich had been reduced to 12,930. Those in privileged mixed marriages were 8,312, in unprivileged mixed marriages 2,838. There were still 1,499 half-Jews not classified as Mischlinge (*Geltungsjuden*). The remainder consisted of 209 German "full Jews" and 72 foreign Jews.¹⁹¹ The Austrian number on December 31, 1944, was 5,799, including 3,388 Jews in privileged mixed marriages and 1,358 in unprivileged mixed marriages.¹⁹² In the Protectorat, the total at the end of 1944 was approximately 6,500.¹⁹³

The Jews deported to the Ostland were shot in Kaunas, Riga, and Minsk. Those who were routed to occupied Poland died there in the death

189. Maedel to Kallenbach, December 14, 1942. German Federal Archive, R 2/12222 and NG-4583. For a blunt statement about Sonderkonto W, see Eichmann's remarks at RSHAIV-B-4 conference at Düsseldorf, March 5, 1942, Case Novak, vol. 17, pp. 202-7.

190. For the continuing correspondence, see Schlüter (Finance Ministry) to Himmler, March 17, 1943, NG-4583.

191. Statistic transmitted by the remnant Reichsvereinigung to Reichsrippenamt/III Katasterverwaltung, Zentralarchiv Potsdam, file Reichsvereinigung 75c Re 1 Laufende Nummer 32.

192. Annual report of Löwenherz, January 22, 1945, Yad Vashem O 30/5.

193. On January 31, 1945, 3,669 Jews in mixed marriages were sent to Theresienstadt, and on May 5, 1945, 2,803 Jews were still in their homes. See Adler, *Theresienstadt*, pp. 40, 59, 700.

TABLE 8-2

DEPORTATION STATISTICS FOR THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA

AREA	EVAKUIERT* DEPORTED	REMAINING ON JANUARY 1, 1943	ELIGIBLE FOR DEPORTATION	IN MIXED MARRIAGE
Old Reich	100,516	51,327	34,567	16,760
Austria	47,555	8,102	3,299	4,803
Protektorat	69,677	15,550	9,339	6,211
Total	217,748	74,979	47,205	27,774

Note: Report by Korherr, April 19, 1943, NO-5193. The Old Reich statistics include the Sudeten. Korherr reported that the 51,327 Jews in the Old Reich had dwindled to 31,910 in the first three months of 1943. On June 19, 1944, the Jewish Council of Elders (Aeltestenrat der Juden) in Prague reported 69,809 Jews deported to Theresienstadt and 7,000 "evacuated," or a total of nearly 77,000. Aeltestenrat to Zentralrat für die Regelung der Judenfrage in Böhmen und Mähren, June 19, 1944, Israel Police 1192.

camps at Kulmhof, Auschwitz, Belzec, Sobibör, Treblinka, and Lublin (Majdanek). Most of the Theresienstadt Jews who did not succumb in the ghetto were ultimately gassed in Auschwitz. For all the secrecy of the killing operations, the signs and signals of a drastic perpetration permeated the entire Reich. Often the roundups of the victims were seen in the streets. If the seizures were unobserved, the apartments remained conspicuously empty. If the disappearance of the tenants was not noticed, there were stories and reports about the mysterious "East" that seeped into every town and social quarter until the Gestapo was surrounded by whispers.

Above the murmur, one man prepared to raise his voice in protest. On the eve of the deportations, a sixty-six-year-old Catholic priest, Dompropst Bernhard Lichtenberg of St. Hedwig's Cathedral in Berlin, dared to pray openly for the Jews, including those who were baptized and those who were unbaptized. Following a denunciation, he was arrested. In the course of a search of his apartment, the police found notes for an undelivered sermon in which the priest was going to ask the congregation to disbelieve the official claim that the Jews wanted to kill all Germandom. Held in custody, he insisted that he wanted to join the Jews in the East to pray for them there. He was placed on trial before a special court and given a sentence of two years. Upon his release on October 23, 1943, he was picked up by the Gestapo to be brought to Dachau. Too ill to travel, he died on the way in a hospital at Hof.¹⁹⁴ Thus a solitary figure had made

194. legations rat Dr. Haidlen (Foreign Office/Political Division, Section 111-

his singular gesture. In the buzz of the rumormongers and sensation seekers, Bernhard Lichtenberg fought almost alone.

To be sure, Lichtenberg was not the only one to be arrested. Every once in a while a careless man made a careless remark to the wrong person. The house painter Louis Birk, of Wiesbaden, could not do his work without a great deal of talk with *Hausfrauen* in whose apartments he was working. The charges assert that “from dark wells he scooped rumors about an unfavorable turn of the war” and spread them to his employers. With respect to the Jewish question, he remarked that all the remaining Jews in Germany would soon be poisoned with gas. Furthermore, he assured the housewives that the party leaders were all blacklisted and that they would some day be forced to reconstruct the Jewish synagogues. Louis Birk was executed.¹⁹⁵

By and large, only a handful of rumor-carriers could be caught, and the Party Chancellery therefore decided to combat the rumor wave by issuing an official explanation of the deportations. The Jews, said the party, were being sent “to the East” (*nach dem Osten*) in order to be employed there in work camps. Some of the Jews were being sent “farther East” (*weiter nach dem Osten*). The old Jews and decorated Jews were being resettled in Theresienstadt. “It lies in the nature of things,” the party circular concluded, “that these partially very difficult problems can be solved in the interest of the permanent security of our people only with ruthless severity (*rücksichtsloser Härte*)”¹⁹⁶The rumors continued unabated.

Vatican) via Ministerialdirigent Erdmannsdorff and Unterstaatssekretär Wörmann to Weizsäcker, November 11, 1941, NG-4447. Günter Weisenborn, *Der Lautlose Aufstand* (Hamburg, 1953), pp. 52-55. Following the public prayer, more than six weeks passed before Lichtenberg was placed under arrest. The court decided that he had disturbed the public peace. Text of the judgment, May 22, 1942, in Bernd Schimmler, *Recht ohne Gerechtigkeit* (Berlin, 1984), pp. 32-39. Prior to his release from prison, the Gestapo offered him his freedom, if he would abstain from preaching. He refused. Kevin Spicer, “Last Years as a Résister in the Diocese of Berlin,” in *Church History*, 70 (2001): 248-70, on pp. 265-70.

The Pope, praising Lichtenberg, sent his condolences to Bishop Preysing of Berlin. Preserving papal neutrality, he extended his thoughts to remember in the same paragraph the death of Preysing’s priestly secretary, killed in an Allied bombing attack. Secrctaire d’Etat de Sa Sainteté, *Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatif à la seconde guerre mondiale*, vol. II (Vatican, 1967), pp. 376-81, atpp. 379-80.

195. Indictment of Louis Birk, signed by *Oberreichsanwalt beim Volksgerichtshof* (Prosecutor at People’s Court), Lautz, April 29, 1943, NG-926. Judgment of People’s Court/6th Senate, signed by Presiding Judge Hartmann, July 13, 1943, NG-926. Prosecutor to Justice Ministry, September 14, 1943, NG-926.

196. Party Chancellery, *Vertrauliche Informationen* (for *Gau* and *Kries* offices only), October 9, 1942, PL-49.

CONFISCATIONS

The bureaucrats took for granted that the Jews would not return. They proceeded on that assumption to deal with the legacy that the deportees had left behind: personal property, apartments, community assets, blocked accounts, goods in customs houses, sequestered securities, firms and real estate still under trusteeship, credits and debts, pensions, insurance, and inheritance problems. All these odds and ends, unliquidated expropriations and unfinished business, were now dropped into the laps of the Finance Ministry's experts.¹⁹⁷

In order to proceed properly the Finance Ministry needed a law—that is, a decreed principle that all property left behind by the deported Jews would fall to the Reich. Up to the end of 1941 the principal excuse for confiscating Jewish property was the allegation that Jews were “enemies of the state”; in other words, the bureaucracy availed itself of decrees that covered the confiscation of property belonging to Communists and similar opponents of the Reich. In fact, there were instances when Jews were forced to sign papers stating that they were Communists and that, therefore, their property was subject to confiscation.

This procedure was not quite satisfactory for many reasons, the most important being that each Jew had to be declared a *Staatsfeind* (“enemy”) and that the property of each Jew had to be confiscated under a separate order. The Finance Ministry wanted a general order, an automatic “forfeiture” of all such properties to the Reich.¹⁹⁸ Hardly less important was the need to regulate the rights of German claimants and debtors. To what extent were German creditors to be paid from confiscated property? How much was to be given to German heirs? How much could the Reich collect from German debtors?

All these problems were dealt with in the 11th Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law, which was decreed on November 25, 1941.¹⁹⁹ This decree formulated the principle that a Jew “who takes up his residence abroad” could not be a Reich national and that the property of such a Jew fell to the Reich. The provision with respect to German creditors was that the Reich would assume Jewish liabilities only to the extent of the sales

197. In a report prepared by the Reichsvereinigung for Eichmann on November 14, 1941, the value of Jewish property in the Old Reich, Austria, and the Protektorat as of October 21, 1941, was estimated at RM 665,000,000. Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

198. Summary' of interministerial conference under chairmanship of Mimsrenaldirigent Hcring of the Interior Ministry' and with representatives from the Foreign Office, Justice Ministry, Finance Ministry', East Ministry', Reichskommissar for the Strengthening of Gemian-dom, RSHA, Deputy of the Führer, and Foreign Organization of the party' participating, January 15, 1941, NG-300.

199. RGBII,722.

value of the confiscated property, and only when such payments were not contrary to national sentiment. Non-Jews who had been supported by deported Jews were entitled to some compensation, but again not in excess of the sales value of the confiscated property. The compensation could consist of a single cash payment or the return of confiscated objects.

Undoubtedly, that stipulation had been drafted with a view to paying off German relatives of deported Jews. In effect, it was a provision to take care of the German heirs, although the term “heirs” of course was not used. In view of the subsequent exemption of the Jews in mixed marriages, the application of the dependents’ clause was in any case limited. If private German claims upon Jewish property received some consideration in the law, Jewish claims against private German interests could not be treated with less attention. The bureaucracy did not want to sacrifice these claims, since such a disposition would have benefited only the German debtors who had neglected to make payments, and one of the cardinal principles of the destruction process was that only die Reich was to profit from the destruction of the Jews. Accordingly, the ordinance directed debtors to the estate and possessors of property belonging to deported Jews to declare such debts within six months. Elaborate hardship clauses followed this provision. The designated central authority for the entire question of claims was the Oberfinanzpräsident in Berlin-Brandenburg. In the Protektorat the same function was performed by the property office of the Reichsprotektor.²⁰⁰

The 11th Ordinance then established for the first time the principle of the outright confiscation of Jewish property: all that the Jews possessed was to be taken away, and nothing was to be given in return, since the victims no longer needed anything. There were only two exceptions to this rule. The deportees were permitted to take along some personal possessions and money. This provision was necessary in order to give substance to the “resettlement” legend. (The personal items, by the way, were collected to the last hairpin in the killing centers.) The other exception was the property of Jews in mixed marriages. That property could not be touched, and the bureaucracy chafed about the situation to the very end.

The principle of outright confiscation was supplemented, as usual, by the rule that only the Reich was to profit from anti-Jewish measures. We know from the history of the expropriations in the 1930s how long it took to establish that principle, but even in 1941 it was not yet firmly rooted in bureaucratic practice. Properly interpreted and strictly enforced, the rule should have insured that the confiscated assets would be administered, like taxes, only for the benefit of the Reich and not for the

200. See decree on loss of Protektorat nationality, November 2, 1942, RGBI I, 637.

benefit of any of its agencies, let alone its employees. However, as we shall see, and as we have already seen in the case of the Jewish G>mmunity funds, that aspect of the principle was difficult to observe.

Least troublesome was the cessation of public pension and insurance payments. Already in 1939 the Minister of Postal Affairs had urged the revocation of pensions on the ground that the Jews were going to be incarcerated in protective custody, security arrest, “or the like” anyway.²⁰¹ However, pensions did remain in effect for officials who had served in the bureaucracy for at least ten years or who had been soldiers on the front line during the First World War. Now the pensions were indeed superfluous. They were consequently stopped as soon as the Jewish pensioners were on their way.²⁰² Similarly, insurance payments flowing from the Reich were cut off.²⁰³

In the matter of private pensions there were complications. These payments were subject to *confiscation*, since ‘Svaiver by the Reich of pension claims would benefit not the general welfare but a private institution.’²⁰⁴ The Finance Ministry expected to collect a lump sum, based on the normal life expectancy of the pensioner, but some firms evaded this rule. The Deutsche Bank discontinued all payments upon the deportation of its Jewish pensioners, regardless of whether the payment in question was discretionary or whether it was made pursuant to an agreement through a pension fund. In the case of the latter, the Deutsche Bank’s legal division found provisions allowing stoppage of payments if the pensioner was sentenced because of an offense, or if a lien had been placed on die pension, or if the pension was pledged or transferred to a third person. From these stipulations the Deutsche Bank concluded that under the statute of the fund, the payment had to benefit the employee himself.²⁰⁵ In a similar vein the legal division of the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft pointed out that all of its pensions were revocable and that payments had ceased to former Jewish employees “who have emigrated or been shoved off” (*im Falle der Auswanderung oder Abschiebung ehemaliger jüdischer*

201. Ohnesorge to Frick, November 30,1939, NG-358.

202. Schlüter (Finance Ministry') to Oberfinanzpräsidenten, April 29, 1942, NG-5313.

203. Labor Ministry (signed Dr. Zschimmer) to Reich Insurance Office, December 20, 1941 *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 1942, pr. II, p. 15.

204. Schlüter to Oberfinanzpräsidenten, April 29,1942, NG-5313. If the pension claim arose from the employment of a Jewish manager, the lump-sum payment was fixed, in principle, by an arbitrator of the Reich Administrative Court. *Ibid.* For regulation of pensions, see also the decree of die Labor Ministry, January 24, 1942, *Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 1942, Pt. II, p. 90.

205. Deutsche Bank/Rechts-Abteilung to Wirtschaftsgruppe Privates Bankgewerbe —Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- und Bankiergewerbes, June 29, W42, T 83, roll 97.

Angestellter). When the Oberfinanzpräsident of Berlin-Brandenburg had nevertheless demanded the payments accruing to one of its pensioners, he was informed that the stoppage had been instituted “because there is no indication here that this person is still alive [*weil hier nicht bekannt sei, ob der Betreffende noch lebe*]”²⁰⁶

In the case of private life insurance, the Finance Ministry could not very well act as the beneficiary) of the sum payable upon the death of a deportee. Insofar, however, as the owner of the policy had possessed the right to cash it in for some specified amount, the Ministry could step in to claim the sum.²⁰⁷

Without any serious difficulty the bureaucracy proceeded to confiscate goods of emigrated Jews in customs houses²⁰⁸ and securities deposited and blocked under the decree of December 3, 1938.²⁰⁹ Bank accounts belonging to emigrated Jews had been transformed into blocked accounts under the currency law,²¹⁰ and since the deported Jews were also “emigrating,” their accounts too were blocked under the law. Now, *all* blocked accounts were confiscated.²¹¹

When the deportations began, a few Jewish enterprises and quite a few parcels of Jewish real estate were still under trusteeship. These properties were automatically confiscated.²¹² In view of the large number of real estate items now in the hands of the Reich, the Aryanization expert of the Dresdner Bank, Dr. Rasche, suggested that the bank give the Finance Ministry a hand in the disposal of the property. (Rasche, it may be remembered, had once proposed collecting taxes for the Finance Ministry. His plan for the “mobilization of the confiscated Jewish real estate” consequently need not be startling.) He estimated that the properties were worth one billion Reichsmark, and he contemplated with pleasure the profit that awaited the Dresdner Bank in commissions.²¹³

206. Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft/Rechts-Abteilung to Wirtschaftsgruppe Privates Gewerbe — Zentralverband, July 20, 1942, T 83, Roll 97.

207. Heinz Keil, ed., “Dokumentation über die Verfolgung der jüdischen Bürger von Ulm/Donau,” City of Ulm, mimeographed, 1961, p. 240.

208. Notation by Ministerialdirektor Wucher (Finance Ministry/Customs Division), July 8, 1941, NG-4906.

209. Affidavit by Amtsrat Parpatt, January 23, 1948, NG-4625.

210. Law of December 12, 1938, RGBl I, 1734.

211. Circular decree by Economy Ministry, July 10, 1943, in Reichswirtschaftsministerium's Devisengesetz, *Durchführungsverordnungen und Richtlinien für die Devisenbewirtschaftung*, 1944.

212. Circular decree by Economy Ministry, December 15, 1941, in *Ministerialblatt des Reichswirtschaftsministers*, December 24, 1941; also in *Die Judenfrage (Vertrauliche Beilage)*, January 20, 1942, p. 6.

213. Busch to Dr. Leese (Dresdner Bank internal correspondence), March 16, 1942, NI-15651.

On March 12, 1942, Ministerialrat Maedel, expert on Jewish confiscated property in the Finance Ministry', met with three representatives of the Dresdner Bank, Deutsche Bank, and Commerzbank. During this meeting the enthusiasm of the banks must have waned. Maedel explained that under the 11th Ordinance the Reich was responsible for Jewish debts up to the sales value of the property, and the Jewish real estate had been mortgaged to the "roof antenna." Furthermore, there was a danger that if the banks participated in the realization of the property', emigrated Jews might institute lawsuits against bank branches in neutral countries.²¹⁴

During the following months the Finance Ministry went ahead on its own. By May 1943 the sales had proceeded so far that the Staatssekretär of the ministry ordered further disposals stopped. The remainder of the real estate was to be set aside for war veterans.²¹⁵

A special problem was posed by die Jewish Community property. The Finance Ministry could not get its hands on this property because the Community (a legal concept) did not emigrate. Needless to say, the Reichsvereinigung and the other organizations of the Community' were under the complete control of the Gestapo. To the SS and Police this relationship was an open invitation to move in. The SS society Lebensborn was charged with the care of young mothers and children of "good blood," and Lebensborn was forever on the lookout for buildings, particularly hospitals, Sanatoriums, convalescent homes, and similar Objekte. That was precisely the type of real estate owned by the Reichs vereinigung and the other Gemeinden. Since the Reichsvereinigung was an "institution of the Security Police" (*Einrichtung der Sicherheitspolizei*), the Lebensborn representatives did not ask many questions. An official simply wrote a letter to Obersturmbannführer Eichmann to ask him "to instruct the *Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland* to transfer the sanatorium [or whatever else it might be] to Lebensborn e. V, Munich 2, Herzog Max Strasse 3-7."²¹⁶

The biggest part of the confiscatory operation was the seizure and disposal of the apartments and furniture left behind by the deportees. Apartments in particular were objects of much attention. When a bombing raid on Hamburg occurred in September 1941, Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann requested Hitler to deport the Jews from the city' in order to ac-

214. Dr. Lee.se to Direktor Andre (Dresdner Bank correspondence), March 17, 1942, NI-6774.

215. Dr. R. Wölfel (Secretariat of Dr. Rasche) to Dr. Erich Rajakowitsch (interested legal expert with Gestapo experience). May 22, 1943, NI-4252.

216. HStuf. Dr. Tcsch (Lebensborn) via SS-Obcrabschnitt Süd to Fachmann, September 30, 1942, NÜ-3199. Gruf. Kaul to Obf. Dr. Ebner, October 2, 1942, NG-3201. For list of properties acquired by Lebensborn, sec affidavit by Max Sollmann (Lebensborn Vorstand), June 27, 1947, NO-4269.

commodate bombed-out people.²¹⁷ When Gauleiter Baldur von Schirach thought about building new housing in Vienna, Bormann wrote to him on November 2, 1941, that Hitler wanted von Schirach to work instead with Himmler to bring about the removal, first of the city's Jews and then of its Czechs.²¹⁸ Finally, when Heydrich spoke at the conference of January 20, 1942, he gave the apartment shortage as the main reason for according priority in the deportations to the Reich-Protektorat area. With pressures of such magnitude, the allocation of apartments was going to be a complicated, drawn-out process.

During the development of apartment regulation, much attention was given to Berlin and Munich, the capital of the Reich and the capital of the "movement." Within the city limits of Berlin, jurisdiction in this matter was exercised by Vizepräsident Claheß, chief of the Relocation Division under the *Generalinspekteur* of Berlin, Speer.²¹⁹ As early as March 20, 1941, Speer's office expressed interest in the 20,000 apartments still occupied by the Jews in the city, to create a reserve for Berliners who might be bombed out in the future.²²⁰ But in addition to families made homeless by bombs, or large families desiring more room, claims were made by officials, notably in the Foreign Office, who were relocated to the city.²²¹ Apparently, proposals were also made to convert some apartments into offices. Speer opposed these attempts as "alienation of purpose" (*Zweckentfremdung*),²²² As Minister of War Production he no longer considered apartments as germane to his new tasks and transferred the function to the mayor.²²³ A crossed-out paragraph in Speer's official diary indicates that between February 7, 1939, and November 15, 1942, the time of the transfer, about 9,000 of the vacated Jewish apartments, 2,600 of them newly renovated, had been assigned to designated beneficiaries.²²⁴ Munich was less crucial than Berlin, but Party Chancellery Chief Bormann wrote to Oberbürgermeister Fiehler about the needs of party men and of new members of the Bavarian State Opera. Bormann stated that it was

217. Kaufmann to Goring, September 4, 1942, T 84, Roll 2.

218. Bormann to von Schirach, November 2, 1941, German Federal Archives R 43 II/1361a.

219. Mathias Schmidt, *Albert Speer—Das Ende eines Mythos* (Berne and Munich, 1982), pp. 215-24. Susanne Willems, *Derentsiedelte Jude* (Berlin, 2002).

220. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch*, pp. 152-53.

221. Legationsrat Radcmacher to Foreign Office Personnel Division, August 1, 1940, NG-2879. Also, Gesandter von Erdmansdorff to Personnel Division, March 21, 1942, NG-2895.

222. Speer to Lammers, August 30, 1941, German Federal Archives, R 43 11/1171a.

223. Speer to Lammers, November 14, 1942, and subsequent correspondence, German Federal Archives, R43 II/1190.

224. Facsimile in Schmidt, *Speer*, p. 221.

Hitler's wish to help conductor Clemens Krauss obtain some Jewish apartments for the musicians.²²⁵

By June 12, 1942, a decree was issued that required official permission for the leasing of freed Jewish apartments in Berlin and Munich to new tenants. If they had already rented such apartments without an approval, the next available apartment, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, would be placed under control.²²⁶

On the very day of the publication of the ordinance, the General Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration, a coordinating office headed by Frick and run by Stuckart, demanded an extension of the regulation to the entire Reich area, with the provision that bombed-out persons and families with many children would have priority in the allocations.²²⁷ Finance Minister von Krosigk did not agree; he wanted to take care of civil servants. Moreover, von Krosigk felt that not even the huge postal service, the railway administration, and the armed forces should be included in the priorities, for he thought that these agencies were already taking care of their own needs.²²⁸ After another letter from the plenipotentiary, the Finance Ministry agreed to a compromise regulation,²²⁹ which was confined to apartments in houses confiscated by the Reich. If a Jewish apartment in such a house had not already been earmarked for a civil servant, the landlord was obliged to submit the name of the prospective tenant to the competent Oberbürgermeister or Landrat; and if within ten days no other tenant was designated, the lease could be concluded.²³⁰

In Prague, the Zentralstelle für die Jüdische Auswanderung processed applications from Germans in the city for empty Jewish apartments. Annoyed at being treated like a housing exchange, the BdS, writing to German offices in Prague, wanted to know at which point the most demanding gentlemen had become anti-Semites (*“zu welchen Zeitpunkt die anspruchsvollsten Herrschaften Antisemiten geworden sind”*).²³¹ Later, apartment allocation in the Protektorat was controlled by the Order Police, which facilitated occupancy by bombed-out Germans.²³² In the

225. Facsimile in *Fun lectn Churbn* (Munich), August 1946.

226. Decree of June 12, 1942, RGB11,392.

227. Finance Ministry' memorandum, January 16, 1943, NG-5784.

228. Von Krosigk to Stuckart, September 23, 1942, NG-5337.

229. Finance Ministry' memorandum, January 16, 1943, NG-5784.

230. Instructions by Finance Ministry to Oberfinanzpräsidenten (except Prague), undated, NG-5784.

231. BdS Prag (signed Bohme) to German offices in Prague, May 20, 1942, Israel Police 889.

232. Report by Order Police Einsatzstab II (signed Jurk), September 3, 1943, NO-2043.

Prague area 9,288 apartments that had housed about 45,000 Jews were vacated.²³³

Complications were not only the product of demand for space. They would also arise when Germans did not immediately occupy an emptied apartment. In Düsseldorf-Stockum the German owner of a house in which Jews had been concentrated complained to the Gestapo that the recent deportations of some of his tenants had caused him loss of rental income, since he could not very well expect Aryans to become the next-door neighbors of non-Aryans still living there.²³⁴

Whereas apartment allocation was sluggish, the distribution of the personal belongings in the apartments had to be handled quickly. The first move was an order, transmitted through the Reichsvereinigung and Kultusgemeinden by the “supervising agency” (*Aufsichtsbehörde*, the title given to the Gestapo by the Jewish bureaucracy), which prohibited the Jews from selling or disposing of their personal belongings in any way. It affected all Jews except those who lived in a privileged mixed marriage, and it came just after the first transports had left. The Reichsvereinigung added the following purposely misleading introduction: “In connection with the fact that, lately, considerable transactions in Jewish properties have taken place without any good reason, the supervising agency has decided to avoid disturbances in an orderly market by ordering that Jews of German nationality and stateless Jews in the sense of paragraph 5 of the First Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law” be forbidden to dispose of their property.²³⁵

Next, the Gestapoleitstellen and Gestapostellen distributed printed questionnaires on which the Jews had to list items of their possessions. The checklists were collected and handed over to the finance offices.²³⁶ All property except 100 Reichsmark and about a hundred pounds of luggage, which each Jew was permitted to carry along for his “resettlement” in the “East,” was to be confiscated.²³⁷ Of course, it was intended that all the things, whether left behind or taken along, should eventually find their way into the Reich Treasury.

233. Testimony by Ernst Recht (Jewish Council, Prague), May 18, 1961, Eichmann trial transcript, scss. 44, p. XI.

234. August Stiewe to Gestapolcitstelle II-B-4 in Düsseldorf, August 25, 1942, facsimile in *Archives of the Holocaust*, vol. 22, p. 32.

235. Announcement by the Reichsvereinigung, *Die Judenfrage (Vertrauliche Beilage)*, December 24, 1941, p. 85.

236. RSHA (signed Bilfinger) to Staatspolizeinstellen and Staatspolizistellen, December 9, 1941, NG-5325. Finance Ministry' (signed Schlüter) to Oberfinanzpräsidenten, November 4, 1941, NG-5784.

237. Schlüter directive, November 4, 1941, NG-5784.

As soon as an apartment was vacated, the Gestapo men deposited the keys with the janitor, and the finance officials took over. The Finance Ministry directive for the disposal of the contents of the apartments is quite interesting. It stated that before any items could be disposed of, articles useful to the Finance administration—particularly desks, book-cases, carpets, armchairs, pictures, and typewriters, but also musical instruments and even linen of better quality—were to be set aside for internal consumption. Articles of lesser value were to be sold to the NSV (a part) welfare organization) or to junk dealers. If precious metals (jewelry) and stamp collections were found, they were to be sent to the Municipal Pawnshop of Berlin (*Pfandleihanstalt*). Securities were to be delivered to the Reich Treasury (*Hauptkasse*). Cases in doubt were to be reported to the expert on Jewish affairs in the Finance Ministry, Ministerialrat Dr. Maedel.²³⁸

Apparently, quite a few items had not been anticipated in the directive, for a few months later additional instructions had to be sent to the Oberfinanzpräsidenten to take care of some of the diverse objects found in Jewish apartments. Thus “Jewish writings and other cultural and artistic creations of Jewish endeavor” were to be handed over to a Rosenberg agency, the *Einsatzstab Rosenberg*, for scientific studies. Phonographs and records were to be delivered to the Propaganda Ministry/Ministeramt (Regierungsinspektor Staiger). Sewing machines were to be sold to the Lodz ghetto administration, which needed them for the production of uniforms, while printing machinery was to be shipped to the president of the Reich Press Chamber.²³⁹

The idyllic setup which enabled the Finance Ministry to take sole charge of the distribution of Jewish furnishings—and, incidentally, to reserve for itself the pick of the lot—did not last very long. The first agency to break the Finance Ministry’s monopoly was the Gestapo. The Reich Security Main Office did not have to wait until the Finance Ministry threw a few crumbs to the Gestapo offices; the Gestapo could “secure” property *before* the Jews were deported. Items thus set aside were out of the Finance Ministry’s reach, since they were confiscated through the Reichsvereinigung and the Kultusgemeinden. In the beginning the Gestapo confined itself to the appropriation of typewriters, adding machines, bicycles, cameras, film projectors, and binoculars. The Gestapo alleged that it needed these things for the proper furnishings of its new offices in incorporated and occupied territories.²⁴⁰

238. Schlüter to Oberlinanzpräsidenten, November 4, 1941, NG-4905.

239. Schlüter to Oberhnanzpräsidenten (except Prague), March 31, 1942, NG-5340.

240. Finance Ministry (signed Groth) to Obertinanzpräsidenten (except Prague), August 31, 1942, NG-S312. See also questionnaire issued by Israelitische Kultusge-

As die Gestapo confiscations increased in scope, their repercussions were felt in a sister agency, the Stabshauptamt of the Reichskommissar for the Strengthening of Germandom. The Stabshauptamt was engaged in buying all sorts of useful household articles and clothes for its Ethnic Germans; these things were, of course, Jewish property. The Stabshauptamt acquired the goods from die Economy Group Retail Trade/Purpose Community Consumers Goods Trade (*Wirtschaftsgruppe Einzelhandl Zweckgemeinschaft Gebmuchswarenhandel*), which in turn bought the articles from the Finance Ministry.

One day the Stabshauptamt noticed that the flow of goods had thinned to a trickle. When it complained to the economy group about the “qualitatively and quantitatively meager supply of underwear resulting from the latest evacuations,” the economy group traced die decline to the fact diat “in a sense” the goods had been “skimmed” before they were sold. To “clarify” this “impossible” situation, the Stabshauptamt representative went straight to the Stapoleitstelle in Berlin, where he talked to the deportation expert (Priifer). The Gestapo man explained that he had indeed drawn on the supplies and that he had even taken aluminum pots from Belgian and French supplies, because these things were needed in Theresienstadt. The Jews had to have a pot from which to eat (*einen Essnapf*). The Stabshauptamt representative thereupon complained about the matter to the Higher SS and Police Leader in Berlin.²⁴¹

While the Gestapo was “skimming” the supply even before the Finance Ministry had a chance to confiscate the loot, a frontal assault was launched upon the Finance Ministry's dwindling stocks of furnishings by the East Ministry' and the party's Gau administrations. The East Ministry' required some good furniture for its new offices in occupied Russia; the Gau administrations could use almost anything for their bombed-out and other deserving constituents. The result of these demands was a new arrangement that allowed the East Ministry to work with the Finance Ministry in the disposal of the furniture. The object of the collaboration was the equipping of Rosenberg's eastern offices. Anything not needed by the East Ministry' was sold to the various Gauleiter. To handle the new business, the Gauleiter appointed “plenipotentiaries for the disposal of Jew-furniture.” However, the Rosenberg-von Krosigk partnership did not endure. In March 1943 the East Ministry charged the Oberfinanzpräsidenten with “stiffness” (*Unbeweglichkeit*) and announced that hence-

mcinde in Vienna, December, 1941, Occ E 6a-10, and confiscatory' orders pertaining to clothes and electrical instruments in *Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt* (Berlin), June 9, 1942, and June 19, 1942, respectively.

241. Labes (Stabshauptamt) to Regicrungsrat Dr. Reichert (Stabshauptamt), August 31, 1942, NO-2700.

forth its people would handle the furniture disposal by themselves. The East Ministry officials also claimed the proceeds from the sale of furniture for their own budget. A bit stunned, the Finance Ministry asked for an explanation.²⁴² We do not know the outcome of the quarrel. In any case, not much was left for that amorphous and all-encompassing beneficiary, the Reich.

One problem remained to be solved: the property of the Jews in mixed marriages. Somehow it irked the bureaucracy that these Jews were permitted not only to live but also to keep their personal belongings. It was difficult, however, to confiscate anything while both husband and wife were still living, because couples usually share their personal belongings. The only thing that could be done was to issue a regulation to cover the property of Jews who died in the Reich. The 13th Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law, dated July 1, 1943, provided that the property of a Jew was to be confiscated after his death. The ordinance also stipulated that, at the discretion of the Reich, the heirs could be granted a lump sum or some of the articles of the estate.²⁴³

The 13th Ordinance was inadequate in two respects. First, it put all Jews in mixed marriages on notice. Nothing prevented them from transferring all their earthly possessions to the German partner during their lifetime. In that case the Reich was cheated. Another contingency not covered by the ordinance was the possibility that the German spouse would die first, leaving all the property to the Jewish partner. To the SS and Police this was an intolerable situation. At the beginning of 1944 the Interior Ministry (then headed by Himmler) therefore requested the Justice Ministry to issue a new regulation that would (1) prohibit, during the lifetime of the Jewish owner, the sale and acquisition of Jewish property that would be subject to confiscation if he should die; and (2) prohibit Jews from inheriting the property of non-Jewish relatives.²⁴⁴

The inheritance problem had been tackled before. Under paragraph 48, section 2, of the inheritance law of 1938,²⁴⁵ the courts had been empowered to declare null and void any will that ran counter to the "healthy people's instinct" (*gesundes Volksempfinden*). The Justice Ministry, in September 1941, issued an authoritative interpretation of this provision, in pursuance of which all German wills in favor of Jews were

242. Finance Ministry memorandum, March 26, 1943, NG-5542. For "Gau plenipotentiaries for the disposal of Jew-furniture" (*Judenmobel*), see Gau Cologne - Aachen/Plenipotentiary Kreisleiter Eichler to Oberfinanzpräsident Dr. Kühne in Cologne, January 8, 1943, NG-5543.

243. RGB11, 372.

244. Affidavit by Ministerialdirektor Altstötter, chief of Justice Ministry's Division VI, December 12, 1947, NG-4015.

245. RGB11, 973.

invalidated.²⁴⁶ Under general principles of law, however, a person can inherit property in *two* ways: as a named beneficiary if there is a will, or as a legal heir if there is no will. In the latter case, the law makes provision for surviving relatives, who become “legal heirs.” The wills in favor of Jews were already voided, but the law had not been changed. A Jew could still be a legal heir. He therefore had a certain minimum protection, and that was the “inheritance gap.”

The Justice Ministry’s inheritance expert, Ministerialdirigent Dr. Hesse, pondered the problem and did try to induce the Interior Ministry to withdraw its proposals for an amendment to the 13th Ordinance. (This, it must be remembered, was 1944.) But the Interior Ministry had to have peace of mind. Accordingly, on September 1, 1944, the ministry issued a decree, without the participation of the Justice officials, to settle the inheritance problem once and for all.

POLAND

After Hitler had assured Generalgouverneur Frank in March 1941 that the Generalgouvernement would be the first territory to be freed of Jews, Frank was in a mood to make promises himself. On July 21, 1941, at a time when the rapid advance of the German armies in the USSR coincided with a precipitous rise of the disease and death rates in the Warsaw Ghetto, Frank said to the chief of his health division, Dr. Walbaum, that the ghetto of Warsaw would be the first place in the Generalgouvernement to be cleared.¹

On October 13, 1941, Frank spoke to the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg. On this occasion he raised the question of moving the Generalgouvernement Jews into Rosenberg’s new domains. Rosenberg replied that at the moment there was no possibility of such a resettlement.²

Temporarily stymied, Frank saw another opportunity when the Generalgouvernement administration received an invitation to attend the first “Final Solution” conference in Berlin. Frank immediately dispatched his deputy, BUhler, to Heydrich with instructions to find out more details. Biihler returned with the inside information. Shortly afterward, on December 16, 1941, Frank, Health Präsident Dr. Walbaum, Labor Präsi-

246. General instructions by Justice Ministry, September 24, 1941, *Deutsche Justiz*, 1941, p. 958.

1. Summary of discussion between Frank and Walbaum, July 21, 1941, Frank Diary, National Archives Record Group 238, T 992, Roll 4.

2. Summary of discussion held between Frank and Rosenberg on October 13, 1941, and prepared on October 14, 1941, *ibid.*

dent Dr. Frauendorfer, Security Police and SD Commander Schöngarth, Gouverneur Kundt of Radom, and Amtschef Dr. Hummel of Warsaw met in Krakow in conference. Frank did not speak about the topic weighing on his mind. Instead, he opened the meeting with a minor matter: measures against Jews who were slipping out of ghettos. It was agreed that they had to be put to death. Such Jews were a health hazard, for they carried typhus to the Polish population. Dr. Hummel said that the Warsaw administration was grateful to the Commander of the Order Police (BdO) for having issued an order in pursuance of which all Jews encountered on the country roads were to be shot on sight. The special courts, however, were working too slowly. So far, only forty-five Jews had been condemned to death and only eight sentences had been carried out. Something would have to be done to simplify the procedure. The discussion continued in this vein for a while. Then, suddenly, Frank changed the subject.

“I want to say to you quite openly,” he began, “that we shall have to finish with the Jews, one way or another. The Führer once spoke these words: ‘If united Jewry should succeed once more in releasing another world war, the peoples who have been hounded into this war will not be the only ones to shed their blood, because the Jew of Europe, too, will then have found his end.’ I know that many measures now taken in the Reich are criticized. Consciously, repeated attempts are being made to speak about harshness and brutality. Morale reports indicate that quite plainly. Before I continue to speak, let me therefore ask you to agree with me upon the following principle: we want to have mercy only for the German people, otherwise for no one in the whole world. The others had no mercy for us.”

Frank then pointed out that if Jewry survived the war, victory would be in vain. He was therefore approaching the problem from only one point of view: the Jews had to disappear. They had to go. For that reason he had begun negotiations in Berlin to shove the Jews east. In January a big conference was to be held in the Reich Security Main Office; Staatssekretär Bihler was to attend for the Generalgouvernement. “Certainly,” said Frank, “a major migration is about to start. But what is to happen to the Jews? Do you think they will actually be resettled in Osdand villages? We were told in Berlin: Why all this trouble [*Scherereien*]? We can’t use them in the Osdand either; liquidate them yourselves! Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourself against all feelings of sympathy. We have to annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wherever it is at all possible.”

This task, said Frank, would have to be carried out with methods quite different from those that Dr. Hummel had just mentioned. Judges and courts could not be made responsible for such an undertaking, and ordinary conceptions could not be applied to such gigantic and singular

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events. “At any rate, we will have to find a way that will lead to the goal, and I have my thoughts about that.” Frank continued, as though he were almost on the defensive: “The Jews are for us also very parasitical eaters. We have in the Generalgouvernement an estimated 2,500,000 [a gross overestimate], maybe—together with Mischlinge and all that hangs on, 3,500,000 Jews. We can’t shoot these 3,500,000 Jews, we can’t poison them, but we will be able to take some kind of action that will lead to an annihilation success, and I am referring to the measures to be discussed in the Reich. The Generalgouvernement will have to become just as *judenfrei* as the Reich. Where and how this is going to happen is a task for the agencies which we will have to create and establish here, and I am going to tell you how they will work when the time comes.”³

When the conference was adjourned, its participants were aware that a new phase of the destruction process had been inaugurated in Poland. They knew now that the Jews were to be killed. Still, an air of haze and unreality had pervaded the conference room. What precisely was meant by such phrases as “we can’t use them in the Ostland,” “liquidate them yourselves,” “we can’t shoot these 3,500,000 Jews,” “we can’t poison them,” “a task for the agencies which we will have to create and establish here”? Obviously, they were only hints. No one knew that at that very moment experts from the Reich Security Main Office, the Führer Chancellery, and the Inspectorate for Concentration Camps were peering at maps and examining the Polish terrain for places to establish killing installations. Poland was to become the headquarters of the killing centers. Poland was the “East.”

PREPARATIONS

The administrative officials in Poland found out about these things only by degrees. In the meantime, however, the bureaucrats lost no time in making preparations. All offices were on the alert, and everyone was in a hurry. Everyone, from top to bottom, was eager to clear the ghettos. In Berlin, Staatssekretär Bühler spoke up at the “final solution” conference of Januar) 20, 1942, to demand that the deportations in the Generalgouvernement get under way as soon as possible.⁴ To the west of the Generalgouvernement, in the neighboring Wartheland, Reichsstatthalter Greiser secured Heydrich’s agreement for an immediate Aktion encompassing the “special treatment” of 100,000 Jews in the Gau area.⁵ For that

3. Summary of conference of December 16, 1941, including verbatim remarks by Frank, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

4. Summary of conference of Januar) 20, 1942, NG-2586-G.

5. The agreement is mentioned in Greiser’s letter to Himmler, May 1, 1942, NO-246.

purpose, Greiser established with personnel of Higher SS and Police Leader Koppe a killing center at Kulmhof, in the middle of the Wartheland. Kulmhof, which was to serve a large part of Greiser's needs, was also the first camp to go into operation.

Locally, the civil offices, police, and railways jointly planned the details of the deportations. What concerned the planners most was the sheer magnitude of the operation. Although at least half a million Jews died in the ghettos, about 2,200,000 still remained in the deportation area, including 1,600,000 in the Generalgouvernement, 400,000 in the incorporated territories, and up to 200,000 in the Bialystok District. To the civil offices these figures meant that the entire structure of urban population was to be altered. With the disappearance of the ghettos, important changes in housing accommodations, the food supply, and the productive capacity were to be expected. In the Generalgouvernement the office most immediately concerned with these problems was the Population and Welfare Division (*Abteilung Bevölkerungswesen und Fürsorge*) of the Interior Main Division. A directive by Staatssekretär Bühler, dated December 16, 1941, consequently empowered the Population and Welfare Division to approve or veto every "resettlement" that affected more than fifty persons.⁶

In the main, the deportees were sent to death camps. The destinations of transports from the incorporated areas and the Generalgouvernement are shown in the following table:

Incorporated Areas	Death Camps
Wartheland	
1941-42	Kulmhof
1944	Kulmhof and Auschwitz
Upper Silesia	Auschwitz
East Prussia	Auschwitz
Bialystok District	Auschwitz and Treblinka
Generalgouvernement	
Warsaw District	Treblinka
Radom District	Treblinka
Lublin District	Sobibor, Belzec, and Lublin
Krakow District	Belzec
Galicia	Belzec

6. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Interior/Division of Population and Welfare to Lublin District/Interior Division/Subdivision Population and Welfare, February' 10, 1942, in *Centralna Zydowska Komisja Historyczna w Polsce, Dokumenty i materiały do dziejów okupacji niemieckiej*))' *Polsce*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, I (xi). and Krakow, 1946), vol. 2, p. 4. There is no record of any vetoes.

After 1942 die Jews from remnant ghettos and labor camps were sent also to Auschwitz, while many in Galicia were shot on the spot.

Police forces available for roundups in occupied Poland included a comparatively thin layer of several thousand Security Police and Security Service personnel,⁷ and the larger German Order Police (Einzeldienst in the incorporated areas, units in the Generalgouvernement, and both in the Bialystok District).⁸ In the Generalgouvernement, the Orpo was augmented by die Ethnic German Sonderdienst in the smaller cities and towns, local Polish police, and Ukrainian police in Galicia.⁹ Polish policemen were active mainly in smaller localities during later operations, assisting the Germans in roundups and tracking down escapees.^{10 11} In Lvov a sizable municipal Ukrainian police, serving in six commissariats, could be mobilized. During the spring and summer of 1942, before the complete ghettoization of the city's Jewish community, contingents of these men seized, on typical days, 1,648 Jews on March 27; 1,328 on March 30; 903 on April 1; 1,921 on June 24; 4,453 on August 14; and 3,051 on August 17." In Poland, as elsewhere, the numerical weight of the Order Police was important, but by 1942 Order Police persomiel were engaged not only in the deportation of Jews but also in two other major operations: the collection of die Polish harvest for German needs (*Ernteer-*

7. In the Generalgouvernement as of April 22,1940, there were fewer than 2,000. See Generalgouvernement conference of the date in Werner Præg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, eds., *Das Diensttagbuch des deutschen Generalpouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945* (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 182.

8. In April 1940 thirteen police battalions were stationed in the Generalgouvernement, *ibid.* At the end of 1942 there were 10,190 men in twelve battalions and smaller units. Police conference of January 25, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 605. Daluge cited 15,186 in a report to "Wolrtchen" (Obergruppenführer Wolff, Chief of Himmler's Personal Staff), February 18, 1943, NO-2861. Not stated is the possible inclusion in this figure of the 3,000 Ethnic Germans of the Sonderdienst, which was subordinated to the Stadthauptmänner and Kreishauptmänner before its incorporation into the Order Police in October 1942. (Only a fourth of the Sonderdienst men spoke German.) For the Bialystok District Daluge indicated 1,900 men in the Einzeldienst and 500 in a battalion.

9. In the conference of January' 25, 1943, the figure of non-German (*fremdvölkische*) police was 16,337. Daluge listed 14,297 Poles.

10. Zygmunt Klukowski, *Diary from the Tears of Occupation 1939-44* (Urbana, Illinois, 1993), entries of August 8 and October 22 to November 2, 1942, pp. 209, and 219-23, *passim*. The diarist was a Polish physician in the town of Szczepieszyn, Lublin District.

11. See reports by Major Pituley, commander of the Ukrainian city' police, in U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Accession Number 1995 A 1086 (Lvov Oblast Archives), Roll 3, Fond 12, Opis 1, Folders 37 and 38.

fassung) and the seizure of Polish workers for labor in the Reich (*Arbeitererfassung*).

Reinforcements were needed and obtained. In July 1942 the 22d and 272d Latvian battalions were imported from Riga for the great roundup in the Warsaw Ghetto,¹² and in 1943 a Ukrainian training battalion was deployed in the Warsaw Ghetto battle.¹³ Waffen-SS units were occasionally pressed into service, for example in the Sosnowiec area of Upper Silesia, where the personnel of an SS cavalry school were employed in a roundup.¹⁴ The Ghettoverwaltung of Lodz furnished about sixty of its employees for seizure operations throughout the Wartheland,¹⁵ and the army regularly dispatched units into action against Jewish escapees banded together in the woods or fields of the Generalgouvernement.¹⁶ Jewish police themselves were frequently used to assist in these operations. The Jewish Order Service of Warsaw was conspicuous in the summer deportations of 1942.¹⁷ In Lvov an officer of the 1st Commissariat of the Ukrainian police, reporting an action in its assigned sector on March 25, stated that the concentration of 512 Jews in a school on Sobieska Street was accomplished by ten German, twenty Ukrainian, and forty Jewish policemen.¹⁸ Jewish Order Service men were active also in smaller ghettos like Rawa Ruska, Galicia, where a roundup was conducted by police teams consisting of one German, one Ukrainian, and one Jew.¹⁹

In the Generalgouvernement, the major organizers of seizure operations were the SS and Police Leaders. One of them, Globocnik of Lublin, created a special staff (*Aussiedlungsstab*) under Sturmbannführer Höfle

12. G. Tessin, *Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei* (Koblenz, 1957), part II, pp. 102, 107. After the roundup the battalions were reassigned.

13. Stroop to Krüger, May 16, 1943, PS-1061.

14. Polizeipräsident in Sosnowiec to Regierungspräsident in Katowice, August 1, 1943, *Dokumente i materialy*, vol. 2, p. 60. Polizeipräsident in Sosnowiec via IdO in Breslau to Himmler, August 14, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 71. IdO in Bcslau to Polizeipräsident in Sosnowiec, August 25, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 70.

15. Gcttoverwaltung (signed Ribbe) to municipal health office in Lodz, September 21, 1942, *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 232.

16. See facsimiles of reports by Wehrkreisbefehlshaber Generalgouvernement/Ia, October 17, 1942 (forty-two Jews killed), and December 25, 1943 (seventeen Jews killed, one soldier also killed), in Stanislaw Wróriski and Maria Zwolakowa, eds., *Polacy Żydzi 1939-1945* (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 143, 216.

17. Bernard Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness* (New York, 1949), pp. 124-45; Mary Berg, *Warsaw Diary* (New York, 1945), p. 187.

18. 1st Commissariat (signed 1st Lieutenant Nebola) to Command of Ukrainian Police, March 25, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Accession Number 1995 A 1086 (Lvov Oblast Archives), Roll 3, Fond 12, Opis 1, Folder 38.

19. Statement by Wolf Sambol, May 4, 1945, Yad Vashem Oral History O 16/584.

that took charge of roundups not only in the Lublin District but also during the summer of 1942 in Warsaw²⁰ and in the summer of the following year in the Bialystok Ghetto.²¹ In both of these cities, specialization and, perhaps even more important, the impersonality of men coming from a distance were to leave their mark.

Transport to the death camps was almost invariably accomplished by railway, and this meant that Jews in villages would be marched to larger towns from where trains departed.²² The Jewish communities in the incorporated areas were deported in transports dispatched by the following Direktionen:

Reichsbahndirektion Oppeln (covering departures from Upper Silesia)

Reichsbahndirektion Posen (covering the Wartheland)

Reichsbahndirektion Königsberg (covering the Bialystok district and areas incorporated into East Prussia)

Reichsverkehrsdirektion (RVD) Minsk (covering the Oranczyce station in Reichskommissariat Ukraine, where many Bialystok district Jews were loaded for deportation to Auschwitz)²³

Generalgouvernement Jews were moved in trains organized by the Generaldirektion der Ostbahn (Gedob), an important railway system with major functions in the destruction of the Jews. In the following abbreviated table of its organization, special attention is paid to the Operations Division:

Präsident	Adolf Gerteis
Vizepräsident	Rudolf Fatgen
II Tariffs	Sulich
9 Passenger Trains	Peicher (Koch, Verbeck)
III Locomotives	Scharrer
IV (later V) Operations	Kohle (Massute, Gaecks)
31 Operations	Zahn
33 Passenger Trains	Binger (Zabel, Eugen Meyer)
Special Trains	Stier
34 Freight Trains	Massute (Zabel, Zahn)

20. Entry by Adam Czmiaków, July 22, 1942, in Raul Hilberg, Stanislaw Staron, and Josef Kermisz, eds., *The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czemiakow* (New York, 1979), p. 384.

21. Interrogation of Fritz Friedei (Bialystok KdS/IV-B), June 12, 1949, Israel Police 1505.

22. See, for example, report by Order Police Lt. Westermann to KdO in Galicia, September 14, 1942, *Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, UdSSR*, vol. 410, pp. 508-10.

23. Four trains are mentioned in RVD Minsk to stations from Oranczyce to Brest-Litovsk, all going to Auschwitz. Copies to the Generaldirektion der Ostbahn (Gedob) and KdS Bialystok, January 27, 1943, *Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, Fb 85/2.

It should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Gedob or a Reichsbahndirektion was not confined to the dispatching of trains, but that it included traversals and arrivals (e.g., Gedob for Theresienstadt-Generalgouvernement-Minsk, Oppeln for all trains to Auschwitz, Reichsbahndirektion Königsberg for Vienna trains en route to Minsk). For trains originating in their territories, moreover, these Direktionen had to concern themselves with more than the movement of the transports — they had to provide the rolling stock. Even though the Gedob in particular needed every car and locomotive at its disposal for the war effort, and even though it was heavily dependent on Polish employees, it did not fail to make its contribution to the deportations. Erich Richter, *Hilfsarbeiter* in the Gedob's Operations Division, recalls Eugen Meyer (33) saying to him that in accordance with instructions from the Transport Ministry, Jewish "resettlement trains" were to be dispatched as soon as they were "announced" (*angemeldet*) by the SS.²⁴

The Gedob would load a train with several thousand deportees²⁵ and dispatch it to a death camp.²⁶ Orders were given to count the victims (sometimes on arrival) for applicable financial charges.²⁷ Last but not

24. Statement by Richter, June 11, 1969. Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 19, pp. 5-12. Requests for trains originating in the Generalgouvernement were made by the Higher SS and Police Leader. Statement by Alfons Glas (33/Special Trains, under Stier), Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 5, pp. 148-53. See also statement by Friedrich vom Baur (Ostbahnbezirksdirektion Radom, including Lublin), May 11, 1962, Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 5, red number 36. In Bialystok, trains were ordered by the KdS (at the time, ORR Stubaf. Dr. Zimmermann). See Fahrplananordnung 290 of RBD Königsberg/33 (signed Hering). August 17, 1943, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 162, film 6, p. 194.

25. Ganzenmüller to Wolff, July 28, 1942, NO-2207.

26. Poles drove death trains. See statements by Polish personnel in Belzec case, 1 Js 278/60, vol. 6, pp. 1147-52, 1181-84. On German policy regarding employment of Polish locomotive drivers in general, see Transport Ministry to Chief of Transport in OKH, January 5, 1940, H 12/101.2, and internal correspondence, Office of Chief of Transport in OKH, December 4, 1940, H 12/102. Document files once in Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va.

27. For example, Gedob/33 H Fahrplananordnung 587, September 15, 1942 (signed Richter), Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 162, film 6, pp. 184-86. See also Reichsbahn (Lodz station Verkehrsamt) to Gestapo in March and May 1942, enclosing charges for transports to Kulmhof, including round-trip fare for guards, payable at the Lodz station ticket counter (*Fahrkartenausgabe*), and advances and reimbursements for transport costs in Sonderkonto of Gettoverwaltung as of March 31, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 315, pp. 75-76, 387-90, 442-47. Almost 5,000,000 Reichsmark were paid from confiscated Jewish assets for death transports originating in the Generalgouvernement. Report by Stubaf. Wippem, December 15,

least, care was taken to have the empty cars cleaned of all filth at the camp itself*²⁸ or to have them moved back for fumigation.^{29 30}

The mantle of routine was thrown around the entire operation. Commingled with transports carrying troops or supplies, the death trains were moved as a matter of course without so much as a secrecy designation. At most, timetable orders were marked “restricted” (*nur jur den Dtenst-gebnuh*),ⁱⁱⁱ and Stier, the Gedob’s chief of special trains in 33, recalls that in his office revealing papers were lying around quite openly (*keineswegs verschlossen*).³¹

THE CONDUCT OF THE DEPORTATIONS

In the Reich-Protectorat area considerable difficulties were caused by privileged or semiprivileged categories of Jews. No such encumbrances hindered the deportations in Poland. There was no Mischling problem, no mixed-marriage problem, no old-Jews problem, no war-veterans problem. There were only a handful of foreign Jews in Poland, some of whom were pulled out of the ghettos at the very last minute and some of whom were shipped to killing centers by mistake. Only one major difficulty arose in connection with any particular group of Jews, and that problem did not become acute until the end of 1942: the labor shortage. Arrangements had to be made to keep a few skilled laborers alive a little longer. These arrangements, which were concluded at the close rather than at the beginning of the deportations, will be discussed later.

As the ghetto-clearing operations began, notice of roundups would sometimes be given to the Polish population in announcements posted a day or so in advance. The Poles were told that any ghetto passes in their possession were canceled, and they were warned against lingering in the streets or opening windows while the evacuation was in progress. Anyone interfering with the operation or giving shelter to Jews was going to

1943, NO-57. Note, further, the general reference to special trains in Ostbahn’s financial statement for fiscal year 1942, German Federal Archives, R 5/877.

28. Gcdob/33 Fahrplananordnung 562 (signed Richter), August 22, 1942, and Gedob/33 Fahrplananordnung 566 (signed Zahn), August 26, 1942. Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 162, Film 6, pp. 179-80, 182-83. The destination was Treblinka.

29. Gcdob Fahrplananordnung 567 of March 26, 1943 (signed Schmid), Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 162, Film 6, pp. 192-93. Trains mentioned here were carrying 2,000 deportees each from the Reich to Treblinka and were to be fumigated in Warsaw.

30. Statement by Richter, June 11, 1969, Case Ganzenmüller, vol. 19, pp. 5-12.

31. Statement by Walter Stier, March 16, 1963, Case Novak, vol. 16, p. 355 ff’. One of Stier’s assistants, Stanislaw Feix, was a Pole.

be punished by death, and any unauthorized presence in a Jewish apartment was going to be construed as pillage.³²

Inside the ghettos, the policemen and their helpers had to cope with another problem: filth, sewage, and vermin. In the words of the Ghettoverwaltung, the work was "nauseous in the extreme [*im dussersten Grade ekelengend*]."³³ In the Galician ghettos the police were confronted by vast epidemics. In the ghetto of Rawa Ruska, the Jewish population had concealed its sick in holes in the hope of saving them from deportation. Before the Rawa Ruska Aktion was over, the SS and Police had dragged 3,000 sick and dying Jews out of their hiding places.³⁴ There are no overall figures for German losses incurred by reason of the epidemics, but in Galicia alone SS and Police Leader Katzmann reported that one of his men had died of typhus and that another 120 had fallen ill with the disease.³⁵

After a ghetto was cleared of Jews, the police and municipal officials had to reenter the Jewish quarter and clean it up. Although Poles and Jews could be used for some of the dirtiest labor, the job was still far from pleasant. A large ghetto could be emptied in two or three days, but the cleanup operation required weeks or even months. Thus the Lublin Ghetto was to be disbanded and its inhabitants deported April 17-20, 1942,³⁶ but the cleanup action (*Sauberungsaktion*) was still in progress two months later.

The operation was carried out in stages. First, a demolition Kommando entered the ghetto and blew up all uninhabitable buildings. Next came the salvage crew (*die Lumpensammelkolonne*), which collected all sorts of junk left behind by the deportees. This detachment was followed by a clearing Kommando (*die Aufräumungskolonne*), which had to do the hardest work: the cleaning of the latrines. In some latrines the feces were piled up to a height of three feet. The Aufräumungskolonne had to use hoses to clean up the mess. The fourth crew consisted of carpenters and glass workers who sealed hermetically all doors and windows in order to enable the gas column (*Verjiasungskolonne*) to kill all vermin in the apart-

32. Facsimile of announcement by Krcishauptmann of Sanok (signed Dr. Class), September 4, 1942, on action planned for September 6, and facsimile of similar announcement by Krcishauptmann of Tamow (signed by deputy Dr. Pernutz), September 15, 1942, on deportation to take place on the following day, in YVmriski and Zwolakowa, cds., *PolacyZydzi*, pp. 412,416.

33. Ribbc (Gcttoverwaltung) to Rcichstatthalter, in YVarthegau/nw<i>Arr-nahruwjsamt (regional food office)/Division A in Poznan, July 15,1942, *Dokument t material*, vol. 3, pp. 230-231.

34. Gruf. Karzmann (SS and Police Leader in Galicia) to OGruf. Kruger, June 30, 1943, L-18.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Kntkauer Zeitutiff*, April 18, 1942, p. 5.

menrs. Finally, the cleanup column (*R&trrmachungskolonne*) was called up to remove the dead rats, mice, flies, and bugs, and to tidy up the place.³⁷

In several places a ghetto could not readily be transformed into viable living quarters anymore. Generalgouverneur Frank complained to Hitler in June 1943 that his rival, the Reichsfiihrer-SS, had brought Ethnic German resettlers into the Lublin area. To make room for them, Polish men had been impressed for labor in Germany and their families had been sent into “empty Jew-ghettos.” In their new homes, these dependents were suffering and dying under some of the same privations that had plagued the Jews.³⁸

In Radom room had to be found for many Polish workers employed by an expanding German industry. After the chief of the local armament command, together with the local housing expert and a representative of Steyr-Daimler-Puch A. G., surveyed the situation in the empty ghetto in August 1943, they concluded unanimously that the former Jewish quarter had been looted, dilapidated, and damaged beyond repair.³⁹

The apartments occupied by 40,000 Jews in the Bialystok Ghetto were at some point intended for 40,000 Byelorussian peasants from partisan-threatened areas, but they were so inadequate that new housing was planned for 20,000. Construction was vetoed by Speer in a letter to Himmler on February 1, 1943, and Himmler replied that he would make do with existing housing stock.⁴⁰ Seven months later, the civil administration of die Bialystok District attempted to restore the former ghetto for army units, Reich Germans, and foreign laborers, but it did not have available manpower for this work. When it attempted to obtain labor from other places in the district, the city administration in Grodno replied that Grodno’s situation was similar to that of Bialystok.⁴¹

Yet the dilapidation and ruins were the direct consequence of the manner in which the ghettos had been maintained and the haste with which they had been emptied. Speed had been the primary consideration in the upper echelons of the German hierarchy. All that had really mattered was the progress of the deportations and the rate at which the Jews were disappearing. The top men were interested only in speed. As early as

37. *Ibid.*, June 24, 1942, p. 5.

38. Frank ro Hitler, June 19, 1943, PS-437.

39. War Diary, Armament Command Radom, August 24, 1943, Wi/ID 1.3.

40. Speer to Himmler, February 1, 1943, and Himmler to Speer, February 9, 1943, T 175, Roll 19.

41. Chef der Zivilverwaltung, Bialystok District (signed Gloatz) to Krciskommissare of the district, September 30, 1943, and City of Grodno (signed Pleskc) to Kreiskommissar Grodno, October 11, 1943, in U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record Group 53.004 (Belarus State Archives of Grodno Oblast), Roll 6, Fond 2, Opis 1, Folder 95.

June 18, 1942, Staatssekretär Dr. Bühler asked Higher SS and Police ¹ Leader Krüger when he would finish. Krüger replied that in August he would be able to ""survey" the situation.⁴²

Krüger was a bit cautious because just then he was experiencing his first *Transportsperre*, a complete shutdown of traffic in deportation trains. The *Transportsperre* was instituted for only two weeks, and Krüger managed even then to wangle a few trains from Präsident Gerteis of the Ostbahn. Moreover, after the lifting of the restrictions, Krüger expected to resume the deportations with redoubled effort.⁴³ Then, in July, another hitch occurred when the railway line to the killing center of Sobibor, on the Bug, broke down and had to be repaired. The SS and Police had hoped to deport several hundred thousand Jews to Sobibor.

On July 16, 1942, Obergruppenführer Wolff, chief of Himmler's Personal Staff, telephoned Staatssekretär Dr. Ganzenmüller of the Transport Ministry for help. Ganzenmüller looked into the situation and found that the matter had already been settled locally. Three hundred thousand Warsaw Ghetto Jews had been diverted from Sobibor to Treblinka. Beginning on July 22, 1942, a daily train crammed with not fewer than 5,000 Jews per run was to leave Warsaw for Treblinka, while twice weekly another train carrying 5,000 Jews was to run from Przemysl to Belzec.⁴⁴ When Wolff received this news, he wrote the following letter of thanks:

Dear Party Member Ganzenmüller:

For your letter of July 28, 1942, I thank you—also in the name of the Reichsführer-SS — sincerely [*herzlich*]. With particular joy [*mit besonderer Freude*] I noted your assurance that for two weeks now a train has been carrying, every day, 5,000 members of the chosen people to Treblinka, so that we are now in a position to carry through this population movement [*Bevölkerungsbewegung*] at an accelerated tempo. I, for my part, have contacted the participating agencies to assure the implementation of the process without friction. I thank you again for your efforts in this matter and, at the same time, I would be grateful if you would give to these things your continued personal attention.

With best regards and

Heil Hitler!
Your devoted
W.⁴⁵

42. Summary of police conference, June 18, 1942, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

43. *Ibid.*

44. Dr. Ing. Ganzenmüller to OGruf. Wolff, July 28, 1942, NO-2207.

45. Wolff to Ganzenmüller, August 13, 1942, NO-2207.

At the end of 1942, when the deportations were already two-thirds over, the SS and Police offices were confronted by another breakdown. Urgently, Kriiger wrote to Himmler:

SS and Police Leaders today report unanimously that by reason of Transportsperre every possibility of transport for Jewish resettlement is cut off from December 15, 1942, to January 15, 1943. Because of this measure, our master plan for Jewish resettlement is severely jeopardized.

Obediently request that you negotiate with central offices of Armed Forces High Command and Transport Ministry for allocation of at least three pairs of trains for this urgent task [*dass mindestens 3 Zugpaare für die vordringliche Aufgabe zur Verfügung stehen*] -⁴⁰

Apparently the negotiations were not very successful this time, for on January 20, 1943, Himmler wrote to Ganzenmiiller for more trains. The Reichsführer pointed out that he knew under what strain the railway network was operating but that the allocation of the trains was, in the last analysis, in Ganzenmiiller's own interest. The Jews, said Himmler, were responsible for all the railway sabotage in the Generalgouvernement, the Bialystok Distria, and the occupied eastern territories. Hence the sooner the Jews were "cleared out," the better for the railways. While writing about the eastern Jews, Himmler also took occasion to remind Ganzenmiiller that unless trains were made available for the Jews of the western occupied areas, sabotage would break out there too.^{46 47}

While the shortage of transport was a particularly pressing problem in die planning of the whole operation, a host of complications was to arise after the organizational problems were solved. These ramifications developed like shock waves from a single point of impact: the discovery by outsiders of the true nature of the "resettlements."

If concealment was difficult within the German-Czech area, it was doubly difficult in Poland. The Reich-Protektorat area had no death camps and most Reich transports were moving out to the east. Poland, on the other hand, was the home of all six killing centers and Polish transports were moving in short hauls of not more than 200 miles in all directions. Many eyes were fixed on those transports and followed them to their destinations. The deputy chief of the Polish Home Army London-directed underground force, General Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, reports that in the spring of 1942 he had complete information about the Kulmhof (Chelmno) killing center in the Warthegau. When the Germans

46. Kriiger to Himmler, December 5, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 94.

47. Himmler to Ganzenmiiller, January 20, 1943, NO-2405.

cleared the Lublin Ghetto, the Polish underground traced the transports to Belzec. The underground command could not find out what was going on inside Belzec, but, estimating that 130,000 Jews had been shoved into the camp, the Poles concluded that it “was not big enough to accommodate such a large number of people.” In July 1942 the Home Army collected reports from railroad workers that several hundred thousand Jews had disappeared in Treblinka without a trace.⁴⁸

Sometimes the information spilling out of the camps was quite specific. In the Lublin District the council chairman of the Zamosc Ghetto, Mieczyslaw Garfinkiel, was a recipient of such news. During the early spring of 1942 he heard that the Jews of Lublin were being transported in crowded trains to Belzec and that the empty cars were being returned after each trip for more victims. He was asked to obtain some additional facts and, after contacting the nearby Jewish communities of Tomaszow and Belzec, was given to understand that 10,000 to 12,000 Jews were arriving daily in a strongly guarded compound located on a special railroad spur and surrounded by barbed wire. The Jews were being killed there in a “puzzling manner.” Garfinkiel, an attorney, did not give credence to these reports. After a few more days, two or three Jewish strangers who had escaped from Belzec told him about gassings in barracks. Still he did not believe what he heard. On April 11, 1942, however, there was a major roundup in Zamosc itself. Counting the remaining population of his ghetto, Garfinkiel calculated a deficit of 3,150 persons. The next day, the thirteen-year-old son of one of the council functionaries (Wolsztayn) came back from the camp. The boy had seen the naked people and had heard an SS man make a speech to them. Hiding, still clothed, in a ditch, the young Wolsztayn had crawled out under the barbed wire with the secret of Belzec.⁴⁹

What the Home Army had found out through its investigations, and what Garfinkiel had discovered almost unwittingly, ordinary people were suspecting without much proof. The population drew its conclusions quickly and spread them as rumors throughout the occupied Polish territory. By late summer of 1942 almost every inhabitant of Poland, whether outside or inside a ghetto, had some inkling of what was going on. In the end even children knew the purpose of the deportations. When, during the summer of 1944 in the Lodz Ghetto, the children of an orphanage

48. Tadcusz Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army* (London, 1950), pp. 97-99.

49. Statement by Mieczyslaw Garfinkiel, October 5, 1945. Belzec case, Iandgericht München I, 1 Js 237/60, vol. 6, pp. 1100-1103. According to Garfinkiel, there were more roundups in Zamosc during May, August, and November 1942. He fled to Warsaw in October 1942. Apparently, not many others in his ghetto attempted to escape.

were piled on trucks, they cried, “*Mir viln nisht shtarbn!* [We don’t want to die!]”⁵⁰

What was the overall reaction of the Jews in the face of certain death? Did Jewry prepare for armed resistance? The district propaganda divisions in the Generalgouvernement watched the reactions of the Jewish population minutely. Here are three sample reports from the propaganda division in Lublin. On April 18, 1942, the Lublin division reported that Jews in the Hrubieszow area had approached the Catholic Church with requests for baptisms.⁵¹ On September 26, 1942, the division reported:

Among the Jews of Cholm there is a rumor that henceforth the extermination [*Ausrottung*] of Jewry will be carried out by sterilization. Although this method would be more humane than the current one, it would lead to the ultimate extermination of Jewry nevertheless. The Jews think they will just have to accept this fact. [*Die Juden müssten sich mit dieser Tatsache eben abfinden*]⁵²

On November 28, 1942, the Lublin division reported the following incident:

A seventeen-year-old Jewess reported to the director of the harvest-gathering troop, Majdan-Sopocki, in the Zamosc area, and requested to be shot, since her parents had already been shot. She referred to an alleged Führer order in accordance with which all Jews have to be done away with before the end of the year. Since the Jewess was an escapee, she was handed over to the competent offices for further treatment [*zur weiteren Veranlassung übergeben*].⁵³

With a few powerful strokes of the pen, the Lublin propaganda division had charted the trend of the Jewish reaction: a feeble conversion attempt in April, a sterilization rumor in September, and the offer of a seventeen-year-old girl to give up her life in November. Without a doubt, the Jews were not preparing for armed resistance. They were prepared for automatic compliance with German orders.

The Jewish leadership in the Polish ghettos stood at the helm of the

50. Solomon F. Bloom, “Dictator of the Lodz Ghetto,” *Commentary*, 1949, p. 120.

51. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for April 1942, reported by Lublin division, April 18, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

52. Consolidated reports for September 1942, reported by Lublin division, September 26, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

53. Consolidated reports/report by Lublin division, November 28, 1942, Occ E 2-2. With respect to the reference to an “alleged” Führer order, see the letter from Himmler to Krüger, of July 19, 1942: “I order that the resettlement of the entire Jewish population in the Generalgouvernement be carried out and finished by December 31, 1942.” NO-5574.

compliance movement, and ghetto chiefs were the implementors of the surrender. Always they delivered up some Jews to save the other Jews. Having “stabilized” the situation, the ghetto administration would bisect the remaining community. And so on. Moses Merin, president of the Central Council of Elders for Eastern Upper Silesia, presided over such a shrinking process. On the eve of the first deportations, Merin made his first decision. “I will not be afraid,” he said, to “sacrifice 50,000 of our community in order to save the other 50,000.” During the summer of 1942 the other 50,000 Jews were lined up in a mass review, from which half were sent to Auschwitz. Merin commented after that deportation: “I feel like a captain whose ship was about to sink and who succeeded in bringing it safe to port by casting overboard a great part of his precious cargo.” By 1943 there were only a few survivors. Merin addressed them in the following words: “I stand in a cage before a hungry' and angry tiger. I stuff his mouth with meat, the flesh of my brothers and sisters, to keep him in his cage lest he break loose and tear us all to bits.”⁵⁴

Generally, the poorest Jews were the first to be taken,⁵⁵ and throughout Poland the bulk of all the victims followed their captors compliantly to the collecting points and the waiting trains. Like blood gushing out of an open wound, the exodus from the ghettos quickly drained the Polish Jewish community of its centuries-old life.

However, in an operation of such dimensions not everybody could be deported so smoothly. As the circle of Jewish survivors shrank, the awareness of death increased, and the psychological burden of complying with German “evacuation” orders became heavier and heavier. Toward the end of the operations increasing numbers of Jews hesitated to move out, while others fled from the ghettos or jumped from trains to find refuge in the woods. In the Warsaw Ghetto a few of the surviving Jews rallied in a last-minute stand against the Germans.

The Germans reacted to the recalcitrant Jews with utmost brutality'. Howling raiders descended upon the ghettos with hatchets and bayonets. In the Warthegau the police were sent into such actions in a half-drunken stupor. Every Gestapo man assigned to ghetto-clearing duty received daily an extra ration of a little over half a pint of brandy.⁵⁶ The Gettover-

54. Philip Friedman, “Two ‘Saviors’ who Failed — Moses Merin of Sosnowiec and Jacob Gens of Vilna.” *Commentary*, December 1958, pp. 481-83.

55. Note the explicit statement in the monthly report of a Ukrainian police commissariat in Lvov, March 30, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, 1995 A 1086 (Lvov Oblast Archives), Roll 2, Fond 12, Opis 1, Folder 41. The Lvov deportations began in March.

56. Biczow (Gettoverwaltung) to Reichsnährstand/Reichsbauauftragter für das Trinkbrandweingewerbe (Agricultural Association/Plenipotentiary for the Brands Trade), June 25, 1942, *Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 3, p. 228.

waltung in Lodz demanded a brandy allocation for its employees, too, on the ground that employment without such brandy was “irresponsible.”⁵⁷ In Galicia the Jews were particularly aware of their fate because they had already witnessed the mobile killing operations in 1941. In the words of the SS and Police report, they “tried every means in order to dodge evacuation.” They concealed themselves “in every imaginable corner, in pipes, chimneys, even in sewers.” They “built barricades in passages of catacombs, in cellars enlarged to dugouts, in underground holes, in cunningly contrived hiding places in attics and sheds, within furniture, etc.”⁵⁸

The Galician deportations were crowded by *Tmnsporsperren* into March-May and July-December 1942. Massacres preceded and followed these movements of overloaded trains. Often, the old and infirm Jews were not transported at all, but shot in the course of the roundup.⁵⁹ So much pistol ammunition was expended that the KdO admonished the police to use carbines and rifles whenever possible.⁶⁰ The general mode of procedure in Galicia may be illustrated by events in three towns.

In Stanislawow, about 10,000 Jews had been gathered at a cemetery and shot on October 12, 1941. Another shooting took place in March 1942, followed by a ghetto fire lasting for three weeks. A transport was sent to Belzec in April, and more shooting operations were launched in the summer, in the course of which Jewish council members and Order Service men were hanged from lampposts. Large transports moved out to Belzec in September and October, an occasion marked by the bloody clearing of a hospital and (according to reports heard by a German agricultural official) a procession of Jews moving to the train station on their knees.⁶¹

The Galician town of Rawa Ruska, only about twenty miles from Belzec, was a railway junction through which deportation trains passed frequently. A survivor, Wolf Sambol, recalling scenes of shootings in the

57. *Ibid.*

58. Katzmann to Krüger, June 30, 1943, L-18.

59. Lt. Westermann (Commander, 7th Company, 2d Battalion, 24th Police Regiment) to KdO in Galicia, September 24, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record Group 11.001 (Center for Preservation of Historical Documentary Collections, Moscow), Roll 82, Fond 1323, Opus 2, Folder 292b.

60. KdO/la of Galicia (signed Major Heitzinger) to 2d Battalion (Reserve Police Battalion 133) of the 24th Police Regiment, the Guard Battalion (Wach-Baraillon), Breslau, the Police Cavalry Squadron, and various offices of the Order Police in Galicia, September 4, 1942, *ibid.* The KdO at the time of these operations was Lt. Col. von Soosten.

61. See the statement by Alois Mund (Viennese agricultural specialist stationed in Stanislawow), December 5, 1947, and the statements by survivors and Order Police personnel of Stanislawow, 1947 and 1948, in the collection of T. Friedmann on Stanislawow, Haifa, October 1957, 90 pp.

town, quotes a drunken Gendarmerie man shouting at the victims: “You are not Jews anymore, you are the chosen. I am your Moses and I will lead you through the Red Sea.” He then opened fire at the victims with an automatic weapon. The same survivor remembers a little girl under the corpses, pushing herself out covered with blood, and looking carefully to the right and left, rumiing away. Transports moved out of Rawa Ruska as soon as the *Sperre* was lifted in July 1942. Although die nature of Belzcc was no longer a secret that summer, the Rawa Ruska Jewish Council pursued a cooperative course, and large numbers of Jews gathered at the collecting point for transport. Their wish, said Sambol, was to live half an hour longer (*Ihr Wunsch ist es, eine halbe Stunde älter zu sein*).⁶² Several thousand others, however, sought to hide, and many jumped from trains.

One transport pulled out of the southern Galician town of Kolomea (Kolomiya, Kolomija) on September 10, 1942. In its fifty cars it carried 8,205 people, 4,769 from Kolomea itself, the remainder from outlying towns. From two of these communities the Jews had been driven to the train on foot. None of the deportees had had much to eat for days before departure. The train left at 10:50 p.m. and during the night it halted in Lvov, where nine pre-designated cars were emptied to supply a forced labor camp with workers. A thousand other Jews were loaded on. Locomotives were also exchanged. The machine that was substituted for the first one was old and underpowered, slowing the train and forcing it to halt frequently. The Jews stripped off their clothes, ripped the barbed wire off the apertures near the ceilings of the cars, and jumped out. The Order Police Kommando of ten men shot all of its ammunition, obtained 200 more rounds from army personnel along the way, and finally hurled stones at the escapees. Betzec was reached in the early evening of September 11. A few days later, the commander of the Order Police detachment aboard the train wrote a critical report, in which he said: “The ever increasing panic among the Jews brought on by the intense heat, overcrowding of up to 220 Jews in cars, the stench of corpses —there were about 2,000 dead inside the wagons during the unloading —made the transport an almost impossible task [*Die immer grösser werdende Panik unter den Juden, hervorgerufen durch die starke Hitze, Überfüllung der Wagons bis zu 220Juden, der Leichengestank — es befanden sich etwa 2000 Tote in den Wagen — machten den Transport fast undurchführbar*].”⁶³

62. Statement by Wolf Sambol, May 4,1945, Yad Vashcm, O 16/584.

63. Report by Zugwachtmeister Jäcklein (7th Company, 24th Police Regiment, and commander of transport detachment), September 14, 1942; report by Lt. Brenner, platoon commander of 6th Company, 24th Police Regiment, September 10, 1942; Lt. Westermann, Commander of 7th Company, to Commander of 2d Battalion, 24th Police Regiment, September 14, 1942; and Westermann to KdO in Galicia, September 14, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record

Such scenes aroused people in the entire district. Once a Polish policeman related his experiences freely to an Ethnic German woman who then wrote anonymously to Berlin. Her letter reached the *Reichskanzlei*. The Polish policeman, she wrote, had asked her whether she was not finally ashamed of being an Ethnic German. He had now become acquainted with German culture. During the dissolution of the ghettos, children had been thrown on the floor and their heads trampled with boots. Many Jews whose bones had been broken by rifle butts were thrown into graves and covered with calcium flour. When the calcium began to boil in the blood, one could still hear the crying of the wounded.^{64 65}

During the second half of 1942, reports were also received about Jews who scattered into the woods during the "evacuations." Again the greatest activity seems to have occurred in Galicia. In October 1942 the propaganda division of Lvov reported:

The resettlement of the Jews, which in part takes on forms that are no longer worthy of a *Kulturvolk*, actually provokes comparison of the Gestapo with the GPU. The transport trains are said to be in such bad condition that it is impossible to prevent breakouts by Jews. As a consequence there is wild shooting, and there are regular manhunts at the transit stations. Furthermore, it is reported that corpses of shot Jews are lying around for days in the streets. Although the German and also the non-German population are convinced of the necessity of a liquidation of all Jews, it would be appropriate to carry out this liquidation in a manner that would create less sensation and less disgust [*auf eine weniger Aufsehen und Anstoss erregenden Art durch Zuführen*].⁶³

The escapes from ghettos and transports also took place in other districts. On December 7, 1942, Gouverneur Zörner of the Lublin District complained in a Generalgouvernement conference that in the past few weeks the Judenaktion had become somewhat disorganized (*überstürzt*), with the result that a large number of Jews had left the ghettos and had joined the Polish "bandits."⁶⁶ On September 21, 1942, the SS and Police

Group 11.001 (Center for Historical Collections, Moscow), Roll 82, Fond 1323, Opis 2, Folder 292b. The two reports by Westermann are not identical. Brenner's platoon was assigned to Westermann for the roundup in Kolomea.

64. Anonymous letter via Frank to Hitler, received and stamped by the Reich Chancellery on March 25, 1943, NG-1903.

65. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for October 1942/report by Galician division, October 26, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

66. Summary of Generalgouvernement conference, December 7, 1942, Frank, Bihler, Bopple, Siebert, Fischer, Wachter, Zorner, Kundt, Wendler, and Oberlander's council Dr. Weh participating, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

Leader of Radom, Standartenführer Böttcher, complained that Jews from small ghettos in the flatlands of the district were being hidden by Poles.⁶⁷ Help to Jews (*Judenbeherbergung*) was being given by Poles and Ukrainians also in Galicia.⁶⁸ Before long, several thousand Jews were hiding in the woods, joining the partisans and sometimes, banded together in units of their own, shooting it out with German Gendarmerie units. There are reports of such clashes in all five districts of the Generalgouvernement.⁶⁹ In the district of Galicia the fleeing Jews were able to buy or acquire rifles and pistols from Italian troops who had fought in Russia and who were now going home. As a result the SS and Police in Galicia had eight dead and twelve wounded in its attempts to seize Jews in bunkers and forests. It appears that the Galician Jews also attempted to fight back with a primitive biological warfare weapon, for the police found several vials filled with lice that carried spotted fever (typhus).⁷⁰

The largest single clash between Jews and Germans occurred in the ghetto of Warsaw. For the further development of the destruction process, this armed encounter was without consequence. In Jewish history,

67. Böttcher to Gouverneur of Radom, September 21, 1942. Facsimile in Wronski and Zwolakowa, eds., *Polacy Żydzi*, p. 418. See also facsimile of announcement by Stadtkommissar Motschall of Ostrowiec (Radom District), September 28, 1942, noting that Jews had been given food and shelter again and again, and threatening death to Poles for such acts of assistance. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

68. Facsimile of announcement by SS and Police Leader of Galicia, December 14, 1943, listing persons condemned to death for helping Jews, *ibid.*, p. 438, and similar announcements printed in the same volume.

69. Wehrkreisbefehlshaber GG. to OKH/ChefHRüst. u. BdE/Stab, October 24, 1942, Polen 75022/10. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for November 1942/report by Lublin division, November 7, 1942, and report of Radom division, November 14, 1942, Occ E 2-2. Oberfeldkommandantur 372 (Lublin) to Wehrkreisbffi. GG, December 21, 1942, Polen 75026/12. OGruf. Krüger to Gruf. Knoblauch, chief of personnel and training in *SS-Führungshauptamt* (military main office) January 8, 1943, NO-2044. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for January 1943/report by Warsaw division, January 9, 1943, Occ E 2-2. Summary of remarks by Gouverneur Zömer in Generalgouvernement conference, January 25, 1943, Frank Diary', PS-2233, OFK 372 (Lublin) to Wehrkreiskdo. GG, March 26, 1943, Polen 75022/12. Wehrkreiskdo. GG to OKH/Chef HRüst. u. BdE, May 4, 1943, Polen 75022/12. OFK 365 (Galicia), signed Beuttel, to Wehrkreiskdo. GG, June 17, 1943. Polen 75022/12. Wehrkreiskdo. GG to OKH/Chef HRüst. u. BdE/Stab (on action by "Eingreifgruppe" 154th Reserve Division, Galicia), December 25, 1943, Polen 75022/14 (Alexandria, Va.). German casualties were extremely few, as Jews were almost unarmed.

70. Katzmann (SS and Police Leader, Galicia) to Krüger, June 30, 1943, L-18. With casualties from accidents and the fever, Katzmann's total losses were 11 dead, 117 wounded and ill.

however, the battle is literally a revolution, for after two thousand years of a policy of submission the wheel had been turned and once again Jews were using force.

As might be expected, the Jewish resistance movement did not emerge from the Judenrat, because that organization was composed of precisely those elements of the community that had staked everything on a course of complete cooperation with the German administration. To mobilize the Jews of the ghetto against the Germans, it was necessary to create a new hierarchy that was strong enough to challenge the council successfully in a bid for control over the Jewish community. The nucleus of such an illegal organization was formed from the political parties that had been represented in the prewar Jewish community machinery. These parties, which had managed to survive in the ghetto by looking out after their members, now banded together into a resistance bloc.

Not all parties veered to a resistance policy with the same speed. The movement began in two extreme camps that had no contact with each other: the Moscow-dominated Communists (PPR) and the self-reliant nationalists (Revisionist party). From there the idea spread to the Zionist youth groups (*Hechalutz*), the socialist trade unionists (*Bund*) and the Left Labor Zionists (*Poaki Zion*). Ultimately the movement embraced all major parties save one: the Orthodox party (*Agudath*). By that time, however, 85 percent of the ghetto Jews were already dead.⁷¹

In April 1942, when the ghetto community was still intact, the oppositionist movement confined itself to verbal action. Clandestine papers were handed out, and the Gestapo, striking back, shot fifty-one people. Several ranking Judenrat members reacted to this development by expressing the view to the chairman, Czerniakow, that the underground papers might bring untold harm to the Jewish population.⁷² At that time the idea of physical resistance was the subject only of conversations. One of these exchanges, between Emmanuel Ringelblum (the ghetto's unofficial historian) and a Jewish welfare official, took place in mid-June. It is revealingly summarized by Ringelblum in his notes:

71. For growth of the resistance movement, see, in general, Philip Friedman, ed., *Martyrs and Fighters* (New York, 1954), pp. 193-218, and Joseph Tenenbaum, *Underground* (New York, 1952), p. 82 ff. The Jewish Communists had no party of their own. They belonged to the Polish Workers (Communist) Part): the *Polska Partija Robotnicza* (PPR). The Jewish nationalists had seceded from the Zionist Organization to form the Revisionist party (later, in Israel, *Herut*). The military arm of the Revisionists was called the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organization). The *Flechalutz* consisted of the youth groups of various Zionist parties. The *Bund* was the party of the Jewish trade unionists. Socialist in leaning, it was both anti-Communist and anti-Zionist. It maintained contact with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS).

72. Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds., *Diary of Adam Czerniakow*, entries of April 17-22, 1942, pp. 343-46.

I had a talk, the other day with a friend from Biala-Podlaska, head of the Social Relief organization. He had been assisting with the population “transfer-” (it would be more correct to say “transfer to the other world”) to Sobibor near Chelm, where Jews are choked to death with gases. My friend asked in anger, up to when . . . how much longer will we go “as sheep to slaughter?” Why do we keep quiet? Why is there no call to escape to die forests? No call to resist? This question torments all of us, but there is no answer to it because everyone knows that resistance, and particularly if even one single German is killed, its outcome may lead to a slaughter of a whole community, or even of many communities.⁷³

Ringelblum, as well as many others, had not yet concluded that all of Europe’s Jews were the target of the German drive and so long as there was no certainty in this matter, resistance was considered a provocation of the Germans and an endangerment of Jews too old, too young, or too ill to defend themselves.

Adam Czerniaköw himself had a sense of foreboding from the very beginning. In his diary he entered the reports he heard, more and more of them as the months progressed. Already on October 27, 1941, he referred to “alarming rumors about the fate of the Jews in Warsaw next spring.” On January 19, 1942, he heard that Auerswald had been summoned to Berlin. “I cannot shake off the fearful suspicion,” he wrote, “that the Jews of Warsaw may be threatened by mass resettlement.” It was the day before the “Final Solution” conference in Berlin, in which Staatssekretär Bühler of the Generalgouvernement was an important participant. By February 16 Czerniaköw noted that disturbing rumors about expulsions and resettlements were multiplying in the population. In March, as mass deportations were beginning in several cities, Czerniaköw made note of what was happening. On March 18 he mentioned deportations in Lvov, Mielec, and Lublin, and on April 1 he recorded the news from Lublin that 90 percent of the ghetto’s Jews were going to be moved out in the next few days and that the Lublin council members, including chairman Becker, were under arrest.

Later that month, on April 29, the Warsaw Ghetto Kommissar, Auerswald, wanted Czerniaköw to supply statistics of the population by street and apartment building, and one of Auerswald’s assistants added a request for ten maps of the ghetto. In his diary Czerniaköw asked himself:

73. Ringelblum’s entry for June 17, 1942, *Tad Vashem Studies* 7 (1968): 178. The entry had not been published before. See also the diary of a Warsaw asstviare of Ringelblum, which mentions the Kulmhof and Belzec death camps. Joseph Kernis/, “Daily Entries of Hersh Wasser,” *Tad Vashem Studies* 15 (1983): 201-82, with Wasser’s entries for May 26 and 30, 1942, on pp. 277, 282.

“Is a decision in the offing?” On May 3, when the Transferstelle demanded a list of all those who were working. Czerniaków wondered if the deportation of unproductive elements was being planned. In July, the rumors became numerical: on the 1st, that 70,000 would be deported, on the 16th, that 120,000 would be removed, and on the 18th, that the deportations would begin on the following Monday and that they would encompass all. Czerniaków went on with his daily routine, including the sponsorship of concerts and children’s festivals. Invoking the image of the captain on the sinking ship, he noted on July 8 that he had ordered the jazz band to play to raise the spirits of the passengers.

On the 20th of July, as panic increased in the ghetto, Czerniaków asked an SS sergeant whether there was truth in the rumors. The SS man had heard nothing. The chairman then approached an SS Untersturmführer in the Gestapo (Brandt of IV-B) with the same question. Brandt said he knew of no such scheme. Czerniaków then inquired of Obersturmführer Boehm (IV-A) what he knew. Boehm answered that this matter was not in his department, but that Hauptsturmführer Höhmann (Chief of IV-A) might have some information. Höhmann assured Czerniaków that if anything were to happen he would know about it. Yet another Gestapo officer told him it was all nonsense (*Quatsch und Unsinn*). The very next day, council members were arrested, and at 10 a.m. of the 22nd, Sturmbannführer Höhe of Globocnik’s Aussiedlungsstab arrived at the council office. The telephone was disconnected, and Czerniaków, with some of the council staff present, was told that all Jews, irrespective of sex or age save for certain categories, would be deported to the “East.”⁷⁴

Höhe decreed that 1,000 Order Service men be assigned to the roundups and that 6,000 Jews be assembled by 4 p.m. that day and every day thereafter. Initial contingents of Jews (*Kontingente an Juden*) were to be drawn from the population at large, and directives were going to be issued subsequently for seizures by streets and blocks. Exempt would be only those employed by German offices and firms, Jews capable of labor, employees of the council, members of the Order Service, Jewish hospital and disinfection personnel, all with their wives and children, and hospitalized Jews not capable of travel.⁷⁵

On July 23, Czerniaków, worried about the children in the orphanages, proposed additional categories for exemption to Höfle’s deputy, Obersturmführer Worthoff. He was informed that students in vocational

74. See Czerniakow’s entries for these dates in Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds., *Diary of Adam Czerniaków*, pp. 293, 317, 326, 335, 339, 348, 349, 373, 376-77, 381-85.

75. Text of Höfle’s directive in report by Lichrenbaum to Ghetto Kommissar Auerswald for July 1942, dated August 5, 1942, *Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen* 365 e, pp. 650-53. The wording appears to be a summary of oral instructions.

schools and husbands of working women could stay, but that the status of the orphans was to be decided by Höfte himself. When Czerniaków asked I for how many days a week the operation would go on, he was told seven days a week. Czerniaków, observing the great rush to start new workshops, noted: “A sewing machine can save a life.” It was afternoon and he was thinking about 4p.m.⁷⁶ That evening, alone in his office, Czerniaków asked for a glass of water and took a cyanide pill that he had kept in his drawer.⁷⁷

The council promptly elected Czerniakow’s deputy, Marek Lichtenbaum, as his successor.⁷⁸ The “authorities” (*Behörden*), said Lichtenbaum in his first monthly report, had promised the council normal rations for August and September and in addition 400,000 pounds of bread and 80,000 pounds of marmalade for the resettlers. Three times the Jewish police (in the absence of Jozef Szerynski, who was still under arrest for alleged corruption, led by his deputy Jakub Lejkin) posted announcements—the last one on August 1—promising 3 kilograms (about 7 pounds) of bread and 1 kilogram (about 2 pounds) of marmalade for every person reporting at the *Umschlagplatz* voluntarily.⁷⁹ On that day, two newly arrived Latvian Schutzmannschaft battalions, the 22d and 272d, were assigned as guards at the perimeter of the ghetto.⁸⁰

While the impotent machinery of the Judenrat responded mechanically to German command, feverish activity began in the Jewish party organizations. Committees were established, meetings were held, coordinating bodies were set up. On the afternoon of July 23, the very day of Czerniakow’s suicide, about sixteen representatives of all major parties except the Revisionists (who were not invited) met to discuss the crucial question of immediate resistance. From the fragmentary postwar accounts of that conference, it is not altogether clear how the conferees divided on that question. All accounts agree, however, that the advocates of resistance were voted down. The consensus was that the Germans

76. Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds. *Diary of Adam Czerniaków*, p. 385.

77. For accounts of Czerniakow’s suicide, see Friedman, *Martyrs and Fighters*, pp. 148-52. Also, Leonard Tushnet, *The Pavement of Hell* (New York, 1972), pp. 127-28.

78. Lichtenbaum’s report for July in *Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen* 365 e, p. 643.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 653. Text of August 1, 1942, poster in Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, *Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord* (Berlin, 1961), p. 309.

80. Andrew Ezergailis, *The Holocaust in Latvia* (Riga, 1996), pp. 327-29. The battalions, which had a combined strength of more than 900 officers and men, were sent out on July 26 from Latvia. Strength Report of the Schutzmannschaft as of July 1, 1942, with departure dates, German National Archives, R 19/266. Ezergailis notes that the battalions went back in mid-September. By then, the operation was over.

would deport perhaps 60,000 people but not all 380,000 Jews in the ghetto. It was felt that by resistance the ghetto's doom would be hastened and that, for the acts of a few, the multitude would be punished.⁸¹

The assumptions of those who had argued against resistance were shown to be false by the end of July. Some 60,000 Jews had already been moved out at that point,⁸² and the roundups continued unabated. Soon it was the turn of the orphans for whom Czerniakow had made his last plea. Janusz Korczak, in charge of an orphanage in the ghetto, was given an opportunity to escape. On July 27 Korczak wrote in his diary: "Choose: either get out, or work here on the spot. If you stay, you must do whatever may be necessary for the resettlers. The autumn is near. They will need clothes, footwear, underwear, tools." By August 1, this was his entry: "A casino, Monaco. The stake— your head." On August 4, he decided to hand over a "mentally underdeveloped and maliciously undisciplined"

81. A list of the conference participants was sent to London in a report from the remnant Jewish underground in March 1944. Excerpts from the report in English are reprinted by Friedman, *Martyrs and Fighters*, p. 199. The absence of a Revisionist representative may be explained by the Communist version of the conference. According to that source, the Communist leader, Jozef Lewartowski-Finklstcin, initiated the conference by inviting all "activists" (apparently including even a member of the Judenrat and an Orthodox rabbi), but not the Revisionists, who have often been described by the Communists as bourgeois-nationalistic Jewish fascists. See M. Edin, "The TPR and Ghetto Resistance," *Jewish Life*, April 1951; pp. 12-15. (*Jewish Life* was a Communist monthly published in the United States.)

On the division of opinion in the conference, we know with certainty only that the (Communists and the Hechalutz were for immediate resistance, while *Judenrat* member I. Szyper and Rabbi Zishie Friedman were against it. Szyper, a historian, apparently recited instances from Jewish history when the Jews had gained more by not fighting than by fighting. Rabbi Friedman cautioned the Jews not "to raise our hands" against the Germans, lest disaster be visited upon hundreds of thousands of Jews. I. Cukierman (Hechalutz leader) in Friedman, *Martyrs and Fighters*, pp. 193-95.

The position of the Socialists (Rund) at the conference is not quite clear. According to the postwar accounts of two prominent Bund leaders, the Bund, through its representative Maurvey Orzch, urged the participants to resist. Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness*, pp. 108-12; Marek Edelman, *The Ghetto Fights* (New York, 1946), p. 18. However, Hechalutz leader Cukierman and the Communists in *Jewish Life* report that Orzch urged resistance subject to the condition that the Poles fight too.

There is some question as to whether a meaningful offer of help was made by the major Polish underground force, the London-directed *Armia Krajowa*, at this point. See the claim by Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, pp. 99-100, and a refutation by Ysrael Gutman, "The Attitude of the Poles to the Mass Deportations of Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto in the Summer of 1942," in Ysrael Gutman and Efraim Zuroff, eds., *Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 399-422, at pp. 414-21.

82. Office of the Gouverneur of Warsaw to Staatssekretär of the Generalgouvernement, report for June and July 1942, dated August 15, 1942, Occ E 2-3.

boy to the police in order that the entire house not be exposed to danger. It was Korczak's last entry'.^{83 84}

Józef Szerynski, released from German captivity to conduct the round-ups, resumed command of the Jewish police. According to a contemporary chronicler, he was approached toward the middle of August by a group of Jewish porters and cart drivers who had a "resistance project." Szerynski told them that he had seen postcards from deportees in Treblinka indicating that everyone there was safe. The porters believed him "with the childish naïveté of athletes [z dziećmi cf. naimwscia atlety]\T⁸⁴

A few leaders in the Zionist youth movement who wanted to stir up the people discovered that even calling a meeting was difficult. Those invited were preoccupied with personal worries or they feared being caught on the way. When the advocates of action issued a proclamation with the call: "Jews, don't go, Treblinka is death," Jews tore the placards off the walls "by force, with blows."⁸⁵

Starting on August 9, streets were cleared systematically, and by the 18th, the large bulk of the eligible deportees had disappeared.⁸⁶ Officials of the German city administration were now expressing concern about unpaid utility bills,⁸⁷ and proprietors of German armament firms in the ghetto, together with armament officials and representatives of the Transferstelle, moved quickly to save their Jewish labor. The industrialists had no time to lose.⁸⁸ After a lapse of ten days or so, in the course of which the

83. Janusz Korczak, *Ghetto Diary* (New York, 1978), pp. 176, 185, 187. According to Igor Newerly, to whom the diary was handed that month, Korczak and his orphans were deported on August 5.

84. Stefan Ernest, "Trzeci front: O wojnie Wielkich Niemiec z Żydami Warszawy 1939-1943," pp. 143-45. Unpublished manuscript in the private collection of Dr. Lucjan Dobroszycki.

85. Yitzhak Zuckerman (Cukierman), *A Surplus of Memory* (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), pp. 196-97.

86. Council report for August, dated September 5, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 365 d, pp. 654-62.

87. Dürrfeld (Dezernat 3) to SS and Police Leader von Sammern-Frankencgg, August 10, 1942, and memorandum by Kunze (Dezernat 4/11), August 13, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 365 d, pp. 275-77. The municipal electric works had 47,000 ghetto customers, the gas works about 22,600. City officials advocated the establishment of a reserve fund from Jewish assets and priority' for their claims among creditors.

88. The principal ghetto firms were Tobbens, Schultz, Wilhelm Döring, and Transavia. An agreement concluded with the SS and Police on August 26, 1942, provided that 21,000 workers in ghetto enterprises be retained. Tobbens and Schultz got 8,000 each in this deal. War diary Armament Command Warsaw, reports for July, August, and September 1942 (signed Oberst Freter), Wi/ID 1.91. On fluctuations of the numbers in Schultz, see Helge Grabitz and Wolfgang Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren* (Berlin, 1988), pp. 151-52, 162-71, 183, 207.

raiders emptied the small ghettos of the Warsaw Distria, the deportations were resumed. Each Jewish policeman was told to bring seven people for deportation each day or face “resettlement” himself. Now every policeman brought whomever he could catch — friends, relatives, even members of his immediate family. By September 5, there was a remainder of about 110,000. On that day all Jews were called out to the Umschlagplatz for a giant seleaion.⁸⁹ During the weeks of deportations, workers were almost collapsing of hunger at their machines, while unemployed families huddled in cellars. Bribes were offered to Jewish policemen. Real and forged certificates were waved in last-minute desperation to ward off arrest. A middle-aged woman held on to a lamppost and a line of Jews crawled on a catwalk on roofs, trying not to slip. Furniture, crockery, and shoes of those seized littered the streets.⁹⁰ In its report for August the Judenrat noted 2,305 deaths from bullet wounds (*Schussmrttden*), and for September that figure was 3,158.⁹¹

When the Aktion was over, 310,322 Jews had been deported. About 63,000 may still have been alive at the end of September, including 35,533 who were registered, and all the others, without rations, employment, or a regular address, who were on their own.⁹² The size of the ghetto had also been reduced, and the principal inhabited seaion was now confined to the northeast comer. However, faaories were still in existence on Leszno, Karmelicka, Twarda, Prosta, and a few outlying streets (see Map 5). The rest of the ghetto was empty.⁹³

Many questions were asked in the ghetto upon the conclusion of the operation, as illustrated by the self-interrogation of the historian Emanuel Ringelblum, recorded in mid-Oaober:

Why didn't we resist when they began to resettle 300,000 Jews from Warsaw? Why did we allow ourselves to be led like sheep to the slaughter? Why did everything come so easy to the enemy? Why didn't

89. Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness*, pp. 124-45. The Jewish police themselves were caught in the final action; about 2,000 policemen were among the victims. Berg, *Warsaw Ghetto*, p. 187. A “combing-out” (*Auskmmeaktion*) of the factories took place on September 2, and again on September 6-7. The object of these selections was the reduction of the working force to the agreed 21,000. War diary', Armament Command Warsaw, report for September 1942, Wi/ID 1.91. Jewish policemen in the factories were subjected to a “comb-out” on September 11. *Ibid*.

90. See the description by Vladka Meed, *On Both Sides of the Wall* (Kibbutz Lahomei Haghcttaot, Israel, 1977), pp. 15-105.

91. Monthly reports by Lichtenbaum, September 5 and October 5, 1942, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, Polen 365 d, pp. 654-72.

92. On 310,322: Brif. Stroop to Kriiger, May 16, 1943, PS-1061. On 35,533: Glowna Komisja Badania, *Obozy hitlerowskie na ziemiach polskich* (Warsaw, 1979), p. 551.

93. Berg, *Warsaw Ghetto*, p. 188.

the hangmen suffer a single casualty? Why could 50 SS men (some people say even fewer), with the help of a division of some 200 Ukrainian guards and an equal number of Letts, carry out the operation so smoothly?

And again:

The resettlement should never have been permitted. We ought to have run out into the street, have set fire to everything in sight, have torn down the walls, and escaped to the Other Side. The Germans would have taken their revenge. It would have cost tens of thousands of lives, but not 300,000.⁹⁴

Reminiscing thirty years after the event, Hechalutz leader Cukierman (Zuckerman) said that something should have been done before the onset of deportations:

the Jewish police were armed with rubber truncheons and knives. That is, they didn't have guns. All we had to do was kill them. If a few of them had been killed, others would have been afraid to join the police. They should have been hanged on lampposts at night, to threaten them; but we didn't. We could even have sent our boys to ambush and scare them; but we didn't do that either.⁹⁵


The Germans had left behind a relatively large number of people who were capable of having such thoughts. The remnant ghetto had very few children and elderly individuals. The weak, the sick, and the helpless masses had largely disappeared. In the remaining registered population the majority fell into the age group 20-39.⁹⁶ The unregistered, for whom no data exist, may have been even younger.

This was the time, in the fall of 1942, when earnest preparations for resistance began. One of these developments took place in the youth movements of the political parties. Even before the crisis, youths had separated themselves from their elders, forming their own groups, forging bonds of friendship with one another, and conducting themselves in a distinct manner of style and speech. When the deportation wave engulfed the ghetto, some of them coalesced physically, moving away from their families, and gathering in their own hiding places. While they might have appeared at that moment as potentially cohesive forces, they still did not think of themselves as fighters or regard their individual groups as mili-

94. Emmanuel Kngc|b|\\m, *Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto* (New York, 1958), entry for October 15, 1942, and subsequent entry in the fall, pp. 310, 326.

95. Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, p. 192.

96. Ysracl Gutman, *The Jen's of Warsaw 1939-1945* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1982), pp. 270-71.



Ghetto boundary before
deportations of 1942

Remnant ghetto in 1943

Umschlagplatz

Map 5 The Breakup of the Warsaw Ghetto

tarv platoons. That function emerged only as a reaction to the events of the summer, after they had abandoned their ideological debates and had turned their attention to the immediate problem of what to do next.¹⁷

The lighting organization of this youth was built in steps. Links had to be fashioned between the groups and an umbrella had to be created to represent them as a whole vis-a-vis the ghetto population as well as the Polish underground outside. In this process, the Zionist groups allied themselves with the Communist PPR under a Jewish National Committee (ZKN).^{97 98 99} The merged Zionists and Communists were then brought together with the Socialist Bundists under the roof of a Coordinating Committee (KK), as shown in Table 8-3. This political amalgamation was accomplished by October 20, 1942," but the Committee met only a few times, because the Zionist leaders were afraid that prolonged internal discussion might lead to doubts and hesitations about resistance.

The small groups were now transformed into "battle groups," that is to say Hashomer Hatzair battle groups, Communist battle groups, Bundist battle groups, and so on. As of October 20, these units, twenty-two in all, were placed under the command of the military arm of the KK: the Jewish Fighting Organization (ZOB). The commander-in-chief of the ZOB was a Hashomer Hatzair leader, Mordechai Anielewicz. He came from a poor family, had lived in a Polish milieu, and is variously described as having been ambitious, intelligent, practical, fearless, and decisive. His age was twenty-four.¹⁰⁰

Two major parties, however, remained outside the framework of the new resistance organization: the Orthodox Jews of the Agudah, who had no fighters, and the nationalist Jews of the Revisionist Party', which had a National Military Union (ZZW) with three battle groups under the command of Pawel Frenkel.¹⁰¹ The representatives of the ZOB and the Revisionists had met to consider unification, but each side had a demand that could not be reconciled with the position of the other. The ZOB, in which

97. Interview of Yisrael Gutman, "Youth and Resistance Movements in Historical Perspective," *Tad Vasbem Studies* 23(1993): 1-71.

98. The Zionist groups were: Dror, Hashomer Hatzair, Akiba, Gordonia, Poalei Zion Left, Poalei Zion Z.S., and Hanoar Hazioni.

99. See detailed history in Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw*, pp. 283-306.

100. On the founding of the ZOB, see Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, pp. 202, 219, and 221. On Anielewicz, see *ibid.*, pp. 256-59 and 343, and an interview of Marek Edelman by Hanna Krai, "Es ging darum, wie man stirbt," in *Die Zeit*, April 23, 1976, pp. 9-10.

101. Underground Report A of the Bund, received in New York on June 22, 1943, in Edelman, *The Ghetto Fights*, p. 46. David Wdowinski, "The History of the Revolt," *The Answer* (Revisionist Publication in the United States), June 1946, pp. 18, 24, and his book *And We Are Not Saved* (New York, 1963), particularly pp. 77-82. Wdowinski chaired the political committee of the Revisionists.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JEWISH RESISTANCE IN THE WARSAW GHETTO

KK-----ZOB

(Zydowski Komitet Koordynacyjny)

Yitzchak Cukierman, Secretary

Abrasza Blum

Menachem Kirszenbaum

(Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa)

Mordechai Anielewicz

22 battle groups

ZKN

(Zydowski Komitet Narodowy)

(18)

Hechalutz,

(11)

Dror
(Freiheit and
Hechalutz
Hatzair)

Hashomer
Hatzair

Akiba
1

Gordonia
1

PPR
4

Poalei Zion
Left
1

Poalei Zion
Z.S.
1

Hanoar
Hazoni
1

Bund
4

leftists rejected the philosophy of the nationalists, insisted that the ZZVV dissolve its units to join the battle groups of the ZOB as individuals. The Revisionists pointed out that there were former officers and noncommissioned officers of the Polish army among the organizers of the ZZW, as contrasted with a militarily inexperienced leadership of the ZOB. Accordingly, the ZZW wanted the command of the whole operation.¹⁰²

For both the ZOB and the Revisionists, the most immediate need was money to purchase food and weapons on the black market. Some of the bakers supplied bread free of charge, and a few Jews in the economic hierarchy provided funds to die resisters out of sympathy. The principal source of financial means, however, was a system of "expropriations," which consisted of threats directed at well-to-do Jews and the Jewish Council itself.¹⁰³

The resistance movement also had to neutralize the Jews who were cooperating with the Germans. On August 21, 1942, when the deportations were at their peak, Izrael Kanal of the ZOB fired the first shot at the Jewish police chief, Jozef Szerynski, wounding him in the face.¹⁰⁴ Szerynski's successor, Jakub Lejkin, was shot and killed. Other bullets struck down policemen, informers, and collaborators, including the director of the economic division of the Judenrat, Izrael First.¹⁰⁵ "In general," said Yizhak Cukierman after the war, "all our death sentences were justified."¹⁰⁶ Under the steady fire of the underground, the Judenrat, under its new chairman, Ing. Marek Lichtenbaum, gradually atrophied and ultimately lost its power.¹⁰⁷

Defense measures were rushed to completion. While pretending to build air-raid shelters, the Jews constructed several hundred dugouts, some of which were connected with the sewer system. Generally, well-to-do Jews enjoyed more luxurious quarters than the poor. A propaganda campaign was launched by means of posters, handbills, and word of

102. Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, pp. 225-27. Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw*, pp. 293-97. One of the ZOB's territorial commanders, Eliczer Geller, who was also twenty-four, had fought as a soldier in 1939.

103. Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, pp. 304-5, 310-11, 317-19, 331, 333-35. Wdowinski, *We Are Not Saved*, p. 82.

104. ZOB report in Friedman, *Martyrs and Fighters*, pp. 196-97. According to this report, two shots fatally wounded the police chief. In fact, he later returned to duty and on January 24, 1943, killed himself. Stanislaw Adler, *In the Warsaw Ghetto* (Jerusalem, 1982), p. 323.

105. Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness*, pp. 178-79; Jonas Turkow (survivor) in Friedman, *Martyrs and Fighters*, p. 84.

106. Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, p. 319. See also his pp. 320-22, 325.

107. During the revolt Lichtenbaum and his assistants were shot by SS men "alter a scuffle." Bulletin no. 7 of the KK, April 29, 1943, in Friedman, *Martyrs and high ten*, pp. 242-43.

mouth, calling upon the Jews not to give themselves up “like sheep to slaughter,” and impressing upon them the thought that nothing awaited those who surrendered except “a hideous death in the suffocation machine of Treblinka.” They were not to go to the train but stay in their dugouts, come what might.¹⁰⁸

The Germans came sooner than expected. During a visit to Warsaw in early January 1943, Himmler was informed that 40,000 Jews were still in the ghetto. The actual number was much higher, but even 40,000 were too many for him, and he ordered that 8,000 be deported at once. From the remainder he wanted to save 16,000 for forced labor camps.¹⁰⁹ To Colonel Freter of the Armament Command he remarked that Keitel had agreed to this plan.¹¹⁰

When the Germans struck on January 18 to implement Himmler’s order, the ghetto was caught completely by surprise.¹¹¹ Sixty-five hundred Jews were deported and 1,171 died of bullet wounds. The Germans had several casualties.¹¹²

The armed encounter prompted Himmler to order the complete dissolution of the ghetto. The emptied Jewish quarter was to be torn down completely. No Poles were to be permitted to settle there, for Himmler did not want Warsaw to grow back to its former size.¹¹³

The industrial enterprises Tobbens and Schultz lost no time to make agreements with Gruppenführer Globocnik for the transfer of their production to Lublin. They began to remove equipment and to send out small transports of Jews. Globocnik appointed Walther Tobbens as the plenipotentiary for the relocation of the sixteen German firms in the ghetto. When the ZOB posted notices on walls, casting doubt on German assurances, Tobbens countered with a lengthy detailed proclamation of

108. Text of ZOB appeal, probably composed in the first half of January, and text of a Revisionist appeal issued at the same time, in Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman, and Abraham Margalit, eds., *Documents on the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 301-4.

109. Himmler to Krüger, copies to RSHA, Pohl, and Wolff, January, 1943, NO-1882.

110. Freter to Riisruningsinspektur Schindler, January 12, 1943, Wi/ID 1.46.

111. Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw*, pp. 312-16.

112. Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness*, pp. 176-77. Stroop to Krüger, May 16, 1943, PS-1061. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions, report by Warsaw Division, January 18, 1943, Occ E 2-2. The number of Jewish dead of bullet wounds is found in Lichtenbaum’s report for January, dated February 23, 1943, Yad Vashem O 6/21a. According to the Stroop report, one German police captain was severely wounded in the abdomen. A German policeman who kept a private diary noted two dead and two wounded. Citation from the diary in Wolfgang Schefler and Helge Grabitz, eds., *Der Ghetto-Aufstand Warschau 1943* (Munich, 1993), p. 140.

113. Himmler to Krüger, February 1, 1943, NO-2514. Himmler to Krüger, Februar) 13, 1943, NO-2494.

his own. He also called together the Jewish foremen of the firms and said] to them bluntly that the Jewish workers and their families could survive the war only by following him. Now, however, the Jews were no longer prone to place their trust in any German.¹¹⁴

Even while the German businessmen were taking steps to salvage their operation, the Jewish resisters were trying to obtain more weapons. The three possible suppliers were isolated individuals, dealers in the black market, and the Polish underground. Individuals and dealers demanded high prices. The underground organizations were the London-oriented *Armia Krajowa* (AK) and the Communist *Gwardia Ludowa*.

For the AK, assistance to the Jews was a dubious venture from the start. The summer deportations had convinced the leaders of the AK that the Jews would not fight, and even after the deportations the AK was reluctant to hand firearms to the ZOB, which it regarded as an untrained youth movement. The January clash, in which the ZOB was pitted against the German raiders, changed the image of these Jewish youths in Polish eyes, but at the same time that combat raised a more fundamental problem for the AK: any showdown in the ghetto was going to be a Jewish battle, and the spread of a conflagration to Aryan Warsaw, before the time had come for a Polish rising, was to be avoided. The AK, which had delivered ten pistols to the ZOB before the January clash, limited itself to sending fifty more, together with hand grenades and explosives. To the ZZW, it was somewhat more responsive, but its combined aid to the two Jewish commands was still only a bare minimum.

The poorly armed Communists, who supported actions against the German occupants if only to help the Soviet Union, promised twenty-eight rifles to the ZOB on April 19, 1943, but these weapons never reached the ghetto, because the ZOB had deliberately not built an escape tunnel, and the ZOB negotiator on the Aryan side, Cukierman, did not know the passages through the sewer system.

As a result, the ZOB, ZZW, and a few wildcatters had only sidearms, Molotov cocktails and grenades, handfuls of assorted rifles, plus a few machine guns and submachine guns. The ZOB had to stop accepting volunteers because of its arms shortage. The more successful ZZW could augment its strength with newcomers. The combined forces, however, did not reach 1,000, counting approximately 500 in the ZOB, about 250 in the ZZW, and die few independent fighters with privately acquired weapons. Thus prepared, the Jews waited for the final blow. (See Table 8-4.)¹¹⁵

114. Grabitz and Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren*, pp. 184-210. Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory*, pp. 314-15.

115. On Jewish attempts to obtain arms, see the following: Gutman, *The Jew's of Warsaw*, pp. 355-61. Zuckerman, *! Surplus of Memory*, pp. 201-2, 252-53, 265,

The SS and Police Leader in Warsaw, Oberführer von Sammern-Frankenegg, did not expect special difficulties. He assembled his available battalions and threw a cordon around the ghetto. (The forces arrayed against the defenders are shown in Table 8-5.)

At 3 a.m. on April 19, 1943, the ghetto was surrounded and three hours later the Waffen-SS entered Nalewki Street. (See Map 5.) Now it was the Germans' turn to be surprised. The SS men were met by the ZOB with concentrated fire, and their tank was stopped with incendiary bottles. They withdrew with casualties, and at 8 a.m. Brigadeführer Stroop replaced von Sammern-Frankenegg.¹¹⁶ The raiding parties reentered the ghetto and this time they proceeded systematically from house to house. In the late afternoon they encountered machine gun fire in the Muranowski area, which was held by the Revisionists. Since it became apparent that the resisters could not be swept away, the Germans withdrew again to resume operations in the morning.

On April 20, Wehrmacht detachments lent by the Oberfeldkommandantur went into action with the flame thrower and explosives in the northern area of the ghetto. Farther south, in the workers' section, where only a small number of Jews responded to a German manager's call to surrender, the army's howitzer and 2 cm guns opened a bombardment of the buildings. On the next day Stroop was able to seize 5,200 workers.

By April 22, several sections of the ghetto were afire, and Jews jumped from the upper stories of the burning buildings after having thrown mattresses and upholstered articles into the street. The raiders attempted to drown Jews moving around in the sewers, but the Jews managed to

292-97, 312-13, 329, 344, 353, 356-57, 375, and his testimony, Eichmann trial transcript, May 3, 1961, scss. 25, p. Wl. Polish report of unidentified authorship on contact with ZZW, October 18, 1942, in Ber Mark, ed., *Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto* (New York, 1975), p. 108. Two Polish reminiscences of arms deliveries to the ZZW are in VVIadislav Bartoszewski and Zofia Lewin, eds., *Righteous among Nations* (London, 1969), pp. 548-55 and note on pp. 573-74. In one of these recollections, by Wiclaw Bielinski, three Bergmann submachine guns are mentioned. The Bergmann type of submachine gun (also called machine pistol), which was widely used in the German and Soviet armies, could be fired with 9 mm Parabellum pistol ammunition. Although German soldiers would not part with their weapons, they would sell booty. The two deliveries discussed in the two Polish accounts were made by truck through a gate (with bribes) and through sewers, respectively. Bor Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, pp. 104-5, notes AK contributions, without distinguishing between ZOB and ZZW recipients. Cukierman (Zuckerman) is emphatic in stating that the ZOB had no machine gun, only an automatic rifle. See his *A Surplus of Memory*, p. 356. Gutman refers to it as a submachine gun, *The Jews of Warsaw*, p. 375.

116. The politics of the changeover was described by Stroop to a Polish journalist with whom he shared a Warsaw jail cell in 1949-50. He characterized von Sammern as a weakling, an Austrian intellectual from Tirol, who loved women and alcohol. Kazimierz Moczarski, *Gespräche mit dem Henker* (Düsseldorf, 1978), pp. 187-96.

TABLE 8-4

COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES IN THE WARSAW GHETTO: JEWS

Jewish War Organization (*Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa*, or ZOB)

Commander: Mordechai Anielewicz

Manpower: Twenty-two platoon-size “battle groups,¹ composed of men and women between 18 and 25, territorially divided and commanded as follows: Central District (Izrael Kanal), nine battle groups; Tobbens-Schultz area (Eliezer Geier), eight battle groups; Brushmakers¹ area (Marek Edelman), five battle groups

Not operating under the ZOB:

National Military Union (*Zydowski Zwiazek Wojkowski* — ZZN), commanded by Pawel Frenkel, with three battle groups

A few Poles who were inside the ghetto and Polish partisans (Communists and nationalists) who carried out diversionary attacks outside the ghetto

Total armed strength: about 750

Total equipment: Two or three light machine guns; about a hundred rifles and carbines (give or take a few dozen); a few hundred revolvers and pistols of all types, including German Lugers and Polish Vis pistols; a few thousand hand grenades (Polish and homemade), homemade incendiary bottles (Molotov cocktails), a few pressure mines and explosive contraptions (*Höllmaschinen*); gas masks, German steel helmets, and German uniforms

Note: ZOB report in Friedman, Martyrs, pp. 201-3. Wdowinski in ihc Answer June 1946, pp. 18-19, 24. Stroop to Krüger, May 16, 1943, PS-1061.

block off the flooded passages. Sewers and dugouts were then blown up one by one. Captured Jews reported to the Germans that men and women in the dugouts “became insane from the heat, the smoke, and the explosions.” A few of the Jewish prisoners were forced to reveal hiding places and centers of resistance. The Jewish commander, Mordechai Anielewicz, writing to his deputy on the Aryan side, pointed out that revolvers were useless and that he needed grenades, machine guns, and explosives.¹¹⁷

The Jews now tried to slip out of the ghetto through the sewer system. The army engineers countered this move by blowing up the manholes.

117. Anielewicz to Cukierman, April 23, 1943, *Jiidisches Hisrorisches Insritur Warschau, Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord*, pp. 518-19.

DEPORTATIONS

TABLE 8-5**COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES IN THE
WARSAW GHETTO† GERMANS**

Commander: Oberführer von Sammern-Frankenegg, relieved at 8 a .m.
on April 19,1943, by Brigadeführer Stroop

Manpower:

Waffen-SS, including cadre, men with three or four weeks of basic
training, and veterans recuperating from wounds
SS-Armored Grenadier Training and Replacement Battalion No. 3,
Warsaw: Ostufaf. Bellwidt
SS-Cavalry Training and Replacement Battalion, Warsaw: Stubaf.
Plank

Order Police, including veterans of the eastern front
1st Battalion of the 22d Police Regiment: Major Sternagel
3d Battalion of the 22d Police Regiment: Major Schôppe
Technical Police (*Technische Nothilfe*)
Polish police for perimeter duty
Polish fire brigade

Ukrainian battalion from Trawniki camp

Members of the Security Police

Oberfeldkommandantur Warsaw: Generalmajor Rossum
Detachments of Railway Armored Train Replacement Battalion,
Rembertow
Kommando of 14th Reserve Engineer Battalion, Gora Kalwaria
Platoon of Light Anti-Aircraft Battery 3, Luftgau VIII
One howitzer crew

Average daily deployment in the ghetto and at the perimeter: 2,090

SS and Police equipment: One old captured Renault training tank with a
machine gun substituted for a cannon, two armored personnel
carriers, and small arms

Army equipment: a 10-cm howitzer, a Soviet 7.62-cm gun (after initial
use, considered impracticable), two Skoda light tanks mounting a
3.7-cm gun (similarly impracticable), three 2-cm anti-aircraft
guns, a flame thrower, and demolition charges

iNote: Stroop to Krüger, May 16,1943, PS-1061. Statements of German veterans in
Wolfgang Scheffler and Helge Grabitz, eds., *Der Ghetto-Aufstand Warschau 1943* (Mu-
nich, 1993). French MacLean, *The Ghetto Men* (Atglen, Pa., 2001). MacLean, an Ameri-
can colonel, focuses on the makeup of the German units and their equipment, with
rosters of names, battle photos, and maps.

Smoke candles were lowered into the underground passages, and Jews who mistook the candles for poison gas came up for air. The ghetto was aflame. Thick smoke rose over the houses, and outside the wall Polish civilians with schoolchildren watched.¹¹⁸ Only a few parties of Jews were still above ground in burned-out buildings. In dugouts Jews were buried in debris and suffocated. Corpses were observed floating in the sewers. The Jews were thinning out.

In the Muranowski Square area, the local ZZW commander, Dawid Apfelbaum, was wounded. On April 27, a Polish relief party led by Major Henryk Iwanski of the AK moved through a ZZW tunnel to carry him out with other casualties. In this action Iwanski lost a son. Apfelbaum refused to leave and died on the next day.¹¹⁹

On May 1, Stroop began to send out night patrols. The defenders were segmented, and on May 8, the bunker of ZOB headquarters at Mila 18 came under attack. In this encounter, Anielewicz died. Two days later, a remnant unit emerged from a sewer in broad daylight and was whisked away in a truck by Polish Communists. By May 15, the shooting had become sporadic. The Jews had been overwhelmed. At 8:15 p.m. on May 16, Stroop blew up the Tlomacki Synagogue in the Aryan section as a symbol that the battle was over. The 3d Battalion of the 23d Police Regiment was assigned to the ghetto territory to look for hidden Jews.

According to Stroop, 5,000 to 6,000 Jews had been buried in the debris, and 56,065 had been taken alive. During the first week, however, most of his daily figures were rounded, and the actual total of captured Jews is probably somewhat smaller than the palindrome in his recapitulation. About 7,000 of the captives were shot, while 7,000 were transported to the death camp at Treblinka, 15,000 to the camp at Lublin (Majdanek), and the remainder to other camps. Further, nine rifles, fifty-nine pistols, and several hundred grenades, explosives, and mines were seized. The rest of the Jewish equipment was destroyed.

The losses to the Germans and their collaborators consisted of sixteen dead, including two SS men of the SS Armored Grenadier Battalion killed outside the ghetto in a Soviet air raid on May 13, and eighty-five wounded. Stroop listed all hundred and one at the beginning of his account as if to emphasize his losses. It is possible that one or another name appeared on the list in error, or that someone was overlooked, but in the main the summation of his casualties is correct.¹²⁰

118. Photos in Meed, *On Both Sides of the Wall*.

119. See the accounts, with notes, in Bartoszcwski and Ixwin, *Righteous atonotq Nations*, pp. 148-52, 551-74. Iwanski and Apfelbaum had been in the same company during the battle for Warsaw in 1939.

120. Stroop to Krüger, May 16, 1943, PS-1061. Stroop titled his report "The Warsaw Ghetto is No More." It contains daily battle reports, a summary, and photo-

Alter the armed resistance of the Jews was broken, two tasks had to be completed. In accordance with Himmler's wish, the entire ghetto was to be razed, and every dugout, cellar, and sewer was to be filled in. After the conclusion of this work the whole area was to be covered with earth, and a large park was to be planted in the former ghetto.¹²¹ Thus, in the summer of 1943, Oswald Pohl, the chief of the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office, established a concentration camp in the ruins,¹²² and Brigadeführer Dr. Ing. Kammler, chief of the construction division of the Economic-Administrative Main Office, was put in charge of the demolition work. Contracts were let with three construction firms. The Ostbahn laid twelve miles of narrow-gauge railway track to haul away debris. Twenty-five hundred concentration camp inmates and 1,000 Polish workers labored for more than a year in clearing the 445 acres of demolished buildings and breaking down the 3,400,000 cubic yards of wall. The work was interrupted in July 1944, before the park could be planted. For the incomplete job Himmler presented to Finance Minister von Krosigk a bill for 150 million Reichsmark.¹²³

graphs. When Generaloberst Jodi (OKW/WFSt) was shown the report after the war, he exclaimed: "The dirty arrogant SS swine! Imagine writing a 75-page report on a little murder expedition, when a major campaign fought by soldiers against a well-armed enemy takes only a few pages!" G. M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary* (New York, 1947), p. 69. For the 3d Battalion of the 23d Police Regiment, see the postwar statement by Major Otto Bundkc in Scheffler and Grabitz, *Der Ghetto-Aufstand*, pp. 362-66, and recommendations for decorations for Bundkc and some of his men in the Archives of the Main Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland, File SS- und Polizeiführer Warschau, 1940-1944, IV/1, K. 19-39. The Jewish accounts of Cukierman (Zuckerman) and Edelman, who were the only two Jewish commanders who survived the battle, supply some detail about various Jewish units and their fates. Polish forays from outside the wall, including AK and Communist attacks, are described in Bartoszewski and Lcwin, *Righteous among Nations*, pp. 555-78. Stroop does not attribute any of his losses to fighting with Polish units. The figure of 15,000 Jews transported to the Lublin camp is taken from the affidavit of OSruf. Friedrich Ruppert (Chief, Technical Division, Lublin Camp Administration), August 6, 1945, NO-1903. There is also a compilation showing the arrival of 6,113 Jews at the Schultz firm in Trawniki. Facsimile from the files of the firm in Grabitz and Scheffler, *Letzte Spuren*, pp. 208-9.

121. Himmler to Pohl and Kaltcnbrunner, June 11, 1943, NO-2496.

122. Pohl to Himmler, July 23, 1943, NO-2516.

123. Pohl to Himmler, October 29, 1943, NO-2503. Pohl to Himmler, February 13, 1944, NO-2517. Pohl to Himmler, April 20, 1944, NO-2505. Pohl to Himmler, June 10, 1944, NO-2504. Kammler to Staf. Rudolf Brandt (Himmler's personal secretary), July 29, 1944, NO-2515. Von Krosigk to Economic-Administrative Main Office, June 15, 1944, NG-5561. Memorandum by Gossel (Finance Ministry), July, 1944, NG-5561. Lorncr (Economic-Administrative Main Office) to Finance Ministry, August 25, 1944, NG-5561. The project was interrupted when the Russians approached the east bank of the Vistula at Warsaw.

Less expensive but not less difficult than the rubble-clearance work was the task of rounding up the 5,000 to 6,000 Jews who were believed to have escaped from the ghetto and to have remained hidden in the district at the end of 1943.¹²⁴ The Poles appear to have aided the Germans in this roundup only “in a handful of cases” (*in einzelnen Fällen*).¹²⁵ However, Polish gangs roamed the city, seeking out Jewish hiding places and forcing the victims to pay high sums of money or face denunciation. We have no exact statistics on how many Jews were left when the Red Army arrived in January 1945. In the city itself it seems that only 200 survived.¹²⁶

After the conclusion of the Warsaw Ghetto fighting, only a few major ghettos were still in existence, particularly Lvov in the Galician District, the Bialystok Ghetto, and the Warthegau Ghetto of Lodz. In Lvov a ghetto was formed on September 7, 1942, during a pause following the deportations of March-August.¹²⁷ Even though the ghetto was clearly intended as a temporary compound, the Higher SS and Police Leader mandated the construction by the date of its establishment of an 8-foot-high fence tipped with barbed wire. This undertaking necessitated the allocation of 475 cubic feet of lumber.¹²⁸ Notwithstanding such precautions, the SS and Police Leader Katzmann still had his difficulties after inroads into the depleted community were resumed. In the course of comb-outs in May and June 1943, he discovered that the 20,000 remaining Jews had begun to build bunkers and dugouts on the Warsaw pattern. “In order to avoid losses on our side,” he reported upon the conclusion of the action, “we had to act brutally from the beginning.” Blowing up and burning down houses, Katzmann’s men dragged 3,000 corpses out of their hiding places.¹²⁹

The Bialystok District was quasi-incorporated territory attached to East Prussia. The regime in the district was the following:

Oberpräsident of East Prussia: Erich Koch

Chef der Zivilverwaltung, Bialystok District: Koch. In his absence in Ukraine, he was deputized by Waldemar Magunia, and in Magunia’s absence in the Generalbezirk Kiev, by Fritz Brix

124. Report by Armament Command Warsaw for October 1, to December 31, 1943, Wi/ID 1.43.

125. Report by Armament Command Warsaw for January 1, to March 31, 1944, Wi/ID 1.74.

126. Goldstein, *The Stars Bear Witness*, pp. 207-95. Goldstein hid in Warsaw.

127. For a history before, during, and after the ghetto, see Philip Friedman, *Roads to Extinction* (New York, 1980), pp. 244-321.

128. Stadthauptmann of Lvov/Construction Orticc/Streets (signed Honecki to Gouverneur/Forest Division, August 24, 1942, Lvov Oblast Archives, Fond 3~, Opus 4, Folder 62.

129. Katzmann to Krüger, June 30, 1943, L-18.

Higher SS and Police Leader of East Prussia: Priitzmann. In his absence in the Eastern Occupied Territories, deputized by Gruf. Ebrecht

IDS: Konstantin Canaris

SS and Police Leader, Bialystok District: Brif. Fromm (succeeded by Brif. Hellwig)

KdS: Altenloh (succeeded by Zimmermann)

KdO: Hirschfeld (succeeded by von Bredow)

On two occasions in 1943, the local SS talent pool was augmented by visitors from the outside. When a “militant anti-Fascist bloc” was formed in the Bialystok Ghetto, Eichmann’s deputy, Gunther, appeared to help uncover the sabotage group.¹³⁰ As in the case of Warsaw, the Jews were caught unprepared. The onslaught, in February 1943, left a thousand dead in the streets and one German casualty.¹³¹ In August 1943 a detachment of Globocnik’s Aussiedlungsstab under Hauptsturmführer Michalsen arrived on the scene. Michalsen conferred with Zimmerman for the final clearance of the Bialystok Ghetto, which was to begin on August 16. On that day Globocnik himself visited the city to observe the operation. The Germans entered the ghetto head-on and the Jews defended themselves with pistols, grenades, and two automatic weapons. In the words of Friedel, the IV-B specialist in the office of die KdS, “there was shooting on both sides and both sides had dead and wounded [*Es wurde von beiden Seiten geschossen und es gab auf beiden Seiten Tote und Vermindete*]”¹³² The Germans brought up a tank and broke the resistance on the same day.¹³²

The Lodz Ghetto followed the cycle of Warsaw and Lvov: partial

130. Interrogation of Fritz Friedel, June 12, 1949, Israel Police document 1505.

131. Testimony by Abraham Karasick (survivor), Eichmann trial transcript, May 4, 1961, scss. 28, pp. Bbl. Cel. Ddl.

132. Friedel in Israel Police Document 1505. Statement by Georg Michalsen, February 23, 1961, in Serge Klarsfeld, ed., *Documents Concerning the Destruction of the Jews of Grodno, 1941-1944*, 5 vols. (Paris and New York, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 180-87. Statement by Lothar Heimbach (KdS-IV), June 30, 1946, *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 142-49. Jewish armaments are described by Karasick, Eichmann trial transcript, May 4, 1961, scss. 28, p. Eel. Proclamation by anti-Fascist bloc, February 9, 1943 (“Evacuation means death!”), and its proclamation of August 16, 1943, citing three million dead in Kulmhof, Belzec, Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Sobibor, Jüdisches Historisches Institut VVarchau. *Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord*, pp. 498, 558. Account by survivor Liza Czapiuk of preparations and fighting, *ibid.*, pp. 500-502, 562-63. According to Czapiuk, several anti-Nazi German civilians and soldiers in the area (two or three of them Communists) helped the ghetto defenders with weapons. On this revolt, see also Josef Tcnenbaum, *Utuerground* (New York, 1952), pp. 231-46.

reduction of the population, employment in war labor of those able to work, followed by total dissolution. Deportations during the first five months of 1942 resulted in the disappearance of 55,000 Jews, about a third of the ghetto's population.¹³³ On April 12 official Jewish chroniclers in the ghetto noted the visit of an SS officer who had brought word that the deportees were being housed in a well-equipped camp, previously used for German resettlers, near Warthbrucken and that the Jews were building roads and farming the land. By May 25, however, large shipments of clothes wrapped in blankets and bedsheets began arriving in four ghetto warehouses. The bundles contained prayer shawls, window curtains, skirts, pants, underwear, jackets, and coats with torn seams. During the sorting, letters and identification cards fell out of the garments. To the chroniclers it was clear that these belongings had not been packed by their owners.¹³⁴

In September 1942, two further actions were taken to thin out the Lodz Ghetto. This time the ghetto was to become more cost efficient. On September 1-2 the patients in the hospitals were sent off, and the health division was all but dissolved, its employees becoming day laborers. During the week of September 5-12 a total curfew (*Gehsperre*) was instituted, and the entire Jewish Order Service was deployed to drag out individuals who were ill at home, the old people, and a large number of children. Following the September reductions, which encompassed almost 16,000 victims, large machines were delivered to the ghetto to modernize the carpentry and metal workshops, and major orders were placed by the army for furs and other clothing.¹³⁵ The chief of the Gettoverwaltung, Biebow, sent out the clarion call for work in the following poster:

133. Lodz Ghetto Collection No. 58, pp. 14,18-19.

134. Entries for April 10-14 and May 30-31, 1942, in Danuta Dabrowska and Lucjan Dobroszycki, eds., *Kronikagetta Lodzkiego* (Lodz, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 457-58, 619-20.

135. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, September and October 1942 entries, pp. 456-78, particularly pp. 457,459-60,467,473,477-78. The number of ghetto children up to the age of ten before September 1942 was approximately 14,000. See Lodz Ghetto Collection No. 58. Those over ten were already working in factories, and the younger children of ghetto administrative personnel (including police and fire brigades) were exempt. Rumkow'ski wanted the working Jews to hand over their small children to save the ghetto as a whole, and on the eve of the action, he made a speech attempting to justify the sacrifice. See Tushnet, *The Pavement of Hell*, pp. 50-54. On January 11, 1944, following more deaths inside the ghetto, the remaining population of 80,122 consisted of 60,200 laborers, 13,943 administrative employees, 614 hospitalized patients, and 5,365 children under ten. Report by Dr. Horn (SS-Economic-Administrative Main Office), January' 22-24, 1944, T 580, Roll 316. Horn considered Jewish productivity "catastrophically low."

REOPENING
of all factories and workshops
as of Monday, September 14, 1942
Since the resettlement has been concluded yesterday,
ALL FACTORIES WILL RESUME FULL OPERATION
on Monday, September 14, 1942.

Every foreman, worker, and employee had better report for work as usual, if he desires to protect himself against the greatest conceivable unpleasantness [*denkbar ;jrossten Unannehmlichkeiten*]. Every recognized [registered] laborer will now be asked to fulfill his task with utmost diligence, and to do his utmost to make up for production lost during the rest period [*Ruhepause*].

I am going to institute the strictest controls for the enforcement of this order.

Gettoverwaltung
BIEBOW¹³⁶

On September 17, a chronicler in the ghetto wrote the following in his private diary.¹³⁷

Six Gestapo held 100,000 in check during resettlement. Rumors that the reseters were brought to Litzmannstadt [the Aryan part of Lodz]. From there, clothes to here as rags. Apparently all those “unfit” gassed, etc., i.e., no longer alive. Naturally no positive facts to be obtained.

The Jews went on working, even after the disquieting news in October about massive summer deportations in Warsaw.¹³⁸ In fact, Lodz had become the largest ghetto by default, its 80,000 people struggling with a prison diet and a twelve-hour day for two more years. Then, in August 1944, announcements were posted in the ghetto under the heading “*Verlagerung des Gettos* [transshipment of the ghetto].” The Jews were ordered to present themselves for *Verlagerung* on penalty of death.¹³⁹

This time the Jews sensed the fate that was in store for them, and something like a sitdown strike ensued in workshops I and II. These Jews had held out for so long that now, with the end of the war in sight, they were not willing to go to their deaths voluntarily. The Germans decided

136. Order by Biebow, September 12, 1942, *Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 3, p. 236.

137. Diary of Oskar Roscnfeld, *Wozu noch Welt*, ed. Hanno Locwy (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p. 156.

138. Entry of October 8, 1942, in D[^]browska and Dobroszycki, cds., *Kronika*, vol. 2, p. 486.

139. Announcement No. 418, signed Oberbürgermeister of Lodz, August 4, 1944, *Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 3, p. 269. Announcement No. 422, signed Biebow and Rumkowski, August 7, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 270.

to proceed with propaganda warfare. On August 7, 1944, at 4:45 i\m., the Jewish workers were called together for a speech. After a few introductory remarks by the *Präsident of the Ältestenrat*, Chaim Rumkowski, Amtsleiter Biebow of the Getto Verwaltung began to speak. Biebow was not a very fluent speaker, but his words had the desired effect.

“Workers of the ghetto,” he began, “I have already spoken to you various times, and I hope that what I have said until now you have always taken to heart. The situation in Litzmannstadt [Lodz] has again changed, and I mean from today noon. There is a total evacuation of women and children on the German side. That means that all Ethnic Germans have to leave this place. Whoever thinks that the ghetto is not going to be dissolved totally is making a tremendous mistake. To the last man, everyone has to be out of here and will be out of here. Some will think it is better to be the last to go. In the vicinity of Litzmannstadt bombs have already fallen, and if they had fallen in the ghetto, not one stone would have remained on another.”

It would be insanity, Biebow continued, if workshop areas I and II refused to go along. For four and one-half years, they —the Getto Verwaltung and the Jews — had worked together. Biebow had always tried to do his best. He still wanted to do his best—namely, “to save your lives by moving this ghetto.” Right now, Germany was fighting with her last ounce of strength. Thousands of German workers were going to the front. These workers would have to be replaced. Siemens and Schuckert needed workers, Union needed workers, the Czestochowa munitions plants needed workers. In Czestochowa everybody was “very satisfied with the Jews, and the Gestapo is very satisfied with their output. After all, you want to live and eat, and that you will have. After all, I am not going to stand here like a silly boy, make speeches, and nobody comes. If you insist upon measures of force, well then, there will be dead and wounded.” The trip, said Biebow, was going to take ten to sixteen hours. Food had already been loaded on the trains. Everybody could take along 40 pounds of luggage. Everyone was to hold on to his pots, pans, and utensils, because in Germany such things were given only to bombed-out people. So, common sense. If not, and then force were used, Biebow' could not help anymore.¹⁴⁰

The Jewish workers of workshop areas I and II changed their minds. They surrendered. By the end of August the ghetto was empty except for a small cleanup Kommando.¹⁴¹ The victims were shipped not to Germany,

140. Speech by Amtsleiter Biebow, August 7, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 267-68.

141. Proclamation No. 428 by Gestapo, August 22, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 2-1-2. Proclamation No. 429 by Gestapo, August 23, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 273-4. Gettoverwaltung ro Oberbürgermeister of Lodz/Treasury, October 17, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 2-4.

to work in plants, but to the killing center in Auschwitz, to be gassed to death.¹⁴²

Why did the striking Jewish workers of Lodz surrender to Biebow's appeal? For the Jews of Poland, resistance was not merely a matter of digging fortifications and procuring arms; it required in the first instance a shake-up of the entire institutional structure of the community and a reversal of ancient thought processes. The ghetto inmates of Lodz were not capable of breaking with a historical pattern under which they had survived destruction for two thousand years. That was why the flight into fantasy, the false hopes, and the voice of Biebow were more assuring to them than the new and untried path into violent, desperate self-defense. Only the ghetto of Warsaw had produced the complete turn from compliance to resistance, and this feat was accomplished, after the loss of more than 300,000 Jews, under the leadership of young men, including a twenty-four-year-old commander. It came too late to change the fundamental Jewish reaction pattern, and it was too feeble to interfere with German plans.

The Germans did not suffer much from Jewish resistance. However, the breakdown of secrecy resulted in disturbances, not only in the Jewish community but also in the local population and, ultimately, among the Germans themselves. These repercussions were in some respects more serious than the reactions of the Jews. In speaking of the local inhabitants, one must remember that there were essentially *two* populations: the Ukrainians in Galicia and the Poles. The reactions of these two groups were not the same.

The Ukrainians were involved in the fate of Polish Jewry as perpetrators. The SS and Police employed Ukrainian forces in ghetto-clearing operations not only in the Galician District but also in such places as the Warsaw Ghetto¹⁴³ and the Lublin Ghetto.¹⁴⁴ The Ukrainians had never been considered pro-Jewish. Ukraine had been the scene of intermittent pogroms and oppression for 300 years. On the other hand, these people had no stamina for the long-range systematic German destruction process. Short violence followed by confession and absolution was one thing, organized killing was quite another.

In September 1943 a French collaborator, going under the name of Dr. Frederic, had a discussion with Monsignor Szepticki, metropolitan of

142. Economic-Administrative Main Office (WVHA) D-IV (signed Stubaf. Burger) to WVHA-B (Gruf. Lorner), August 15, 1944, NO-399.

143. See names of Trawniki camp trainees in Stroop report, May 16, 1943, PS-1061.

144. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for March 1942, report by Lublin division, March 21, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

the Greek Catholic Church in Lvov. The metropolitan accused the Germans of inhuman action against the Jews. In Lvov alone they had killed 100,000, and in Ukraine, millions. He had heard the confession of a young man who had personally slain seventy-five persons in one night at Lvov. Dr. Frederic replied that according to his information the Ukrainians had certainly taken part in these massacres but that, in view of the execution of 18,000 persons in and near Lvov by the Soviets, such participation was only natural. Furthermore, almost all members of the NKVD had been Jews, which should explain the hatred of the population. Moreover, wasn't Jewry a deadly danger to Christendom, and hadn't the Jews avowed the destruction of Christianity? The metropolitan agreed, but repeated that the annihilation of the Jews was an impermissible action.¹⁴⁵

While the Greek Catholic metropolitan in Lvov was troubled by the fact that the Germans were drawing the Ukrainians into the destruction process as partners, the Poles began to fear that they would soon be joining the Jews as victims. This consideration was expressed in pamphlets circulated in the Warsaw District in August 1942, calling upon the Poles to help the persecuted Jews. The theme of these pamphlets was that only dumb people and idiots, who could not understand that after the Jews the Poles would get the same treatment, would be happy about the Jewish fate.¹⁴⁶

The Polish leadership (to say nothing of the Polish people) did not know that the Germans actually were toying with the idea of getting rid of the Poles. No one knew, for example, that on May 1, 1942, Gauleiter Greiser had proposed to Himmler the "special treatment" of some 35,000 tubercular Poles in his Gau as a sanitary measure for the protection of the Ethnic Germans in the incorporated territory.¹⁴⁷ Even without this knowledge the anxiety was real, not only in informed underground circles but in every workers' section of every Polish city. Their fear came to the surface in October 1942.

The SS and Police (i.e., Himmler) had decided to make Lublin a Ger-

145. Memorandum by Dr. Frederic, September 19, 1943. Document CXLVa 60, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris: courtesy of Dr. John Armstrong. Thoughts similar to those that troubled the metropolitan were expressed by Sapicha, Prince-Archbishop of Krakow, in a letter to Generalgouverneur Frank: "I shall not enlarge upon so dreadful a fact as the employment of the inebriated youth of the Labor Service [*Polnischer Baudienst*] for the extermination of the Jews." Sapicha to Frank, November 8, 1942, quoted by L. Poliakov in "The Vatican and the 'Jewish Question,'" *Commentary*, November 1950, p. 442.

146. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for August 1942, report by Warsaw division. August 8, 1942, Occ E 2-2. Authorship of the pamphlet was not identified.

147. Greiser to Himmler, May 1, 1942, NO-246. The proposal was vetoed. See Greiser to Himmler, November 21, 1942, NO-249.

man city and to make the Lublin District a German district.¹⁴⁸ On October 1, 1942, the police carried out a *razzia* in the northern section of the city of Lublin. All inhabitants of the section were called out and assembled in one place. All work certificates were checked, and all Poles, male or female, who could not prove that they were employed were carted away to a camp, while children under fifteen were sent to an orphanage.

Immediately rumors swept the city like wildfire. Many Poles stopped in the streets and said: "Weren't we right that the resettlement across the Bug was going to come? It has come, earlier than we supposed. Punctually on October 1, 1942, in the morning it has come!" The Poles were convinced that this Aktion was the same as the "resettlement" of the Jews. In Lublin the belief was strong that the Jewish "resettlers" had been killed and that the fat from their corpses had been used in the manufacture of soap. Now pedestrians in Lublin were saying that it was the turn of the Poles to be used, just like the Jews, for soap production.¹⁴⁹

When the first Polish deportees from Lublin arrived at the labor camp at Lubartow, the rumors were fanned still further, and the belief was formed that all Poles in the Generalgouvernement would be shipped across the Bug. Heaping rumor upon rumor, the Polish residents of Lublin also voiced the opinion that a few privileged Poles would be offered Reich citizenship in preference to "resettlement," and a number of Lublin inhabitants were already discussing the acceptance of such citizenship as an escape from death.¹⁵⁰

The Polish fears were not altogether irrational. In the German city administration of Warsaw, Dr. Wilhelm Hagen, the man who had pitted himself against a group of planners who had wanted to reduce the size of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1941, was himself convinced that an action against Poles was being contemplated. On December 7, 1942, he wrote a letter to Hitler in which he said:

In a tuberculosis meeting, the director of the Population and Welfare Division, Oberverwaltungsrat Weirauch, informed us in secret that of 200,000 Poles who are to be resettled in the east of the Generalgouvernement to make room for German defense farmers, a third — 70,000 old people and children under 10 — might be dealt with in the

148. For the effects of this policy on the Generalgouvernement, see Frank to Hitler, May 23, 1943, NO-2202; Frank to Hitler, June 19, 1943, PS-437.

149. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for October 1942, report by Lublin division, October 3, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

150. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions, report by Lublin division, October 24, 1942, Occ E 2-2. OFK 372 (signed Moser) to Wehrkreiskdo. GG, January 20, 1943, Polen 75026/12. Folder once located at Alexandria, Va.

same manner as the Jews, that is, it was intended or considered that they might be killed [*« sei beabsichtigt oder werde erwogen ... so zu verfahren, wie mit den Juden, dass heisst, sie zu töten »*].¹⁵¹

Weirauch, incensed, called the charge “nonsense” (*Unsinn*) and attributed to Hagen a desire to give to Poles comprehensive tuberculosis care in contravention to policy' established by die Population and Welfare Division.¹⁵² ¹⁵³ Himmler thought that Hagen should spend the rest of the war in a concentration camp, but Conti dissuaded him from that decision.¹⁵¹ The killings did not take place, but the Polish population was never completely sure of its safety.¹⁵⁴

Last but not least, the breakdown of secrecy had repercussions on the Germans themselves. In Poland particularly, the Germans were jittery and afraid. They feared reprisals and retribution. On October 3, 1942, the Propaganda Division in Radom reported a disturbing incident that had resulted from the dispatch of a postcard. The Germans published a paper in Poland, the *Krakauer Zeitung*, for the local German population. The chief of the Radom branch of the paper had received from Lvov a postcard that began (in German): “I don't know German. You can translate everything from the Polish into German.” The card then continued in Polish:

You old whore and you old son of a whore, Richard [In the German translation: *Alte Hurenmetze und du alter Hurenbock Richard*]. A child has been born to you. May your child suffer throughout his life, as we Jews have suffered because of you. I wish you that from the bottom of my heart.

This anonymous note actually disturbed its recipient and worried the propaganda experts. The Propaganda Division feared that it was the beginning of a flood of postcards, and the card was transmitted to the Security Police for tracing.¹⁵⁵

151. Hagen to Hitler, December 7, 1942, T 175, Roll 38.

152. Weirauch to Krüger, February' 4, 1943, T 175, Roll 38.

153. Brandt to Conti, March 29, 1943, Conti to Brandt, March 31, 1943, and Brandt to Conti, April 4, 1943, T 175, Roll 38. See also Wilhelm Hagen, "Krieg, Hunger und Pestilenz in Warschau 1939-1943," *Gesundheitswesen und Desinfektion* 65 (1973): 115-43.

154. See Krüger's remarks in Generalgouvernement police conference of January 25, 1943, Frank Diary, PS-2233. Ding after the Lublin affair, in April, 1944, Archbishop Sapieha advised Generalgouverneur Frank to convince the Poles in newspaper propaganda that they would not be treated "worse" than the Jews. Summary of conference between Frank, Staatssekretär Dr. Bocpple, Präsident Dr. von Craushaar, Archbishop Sapieha, and Prelate Domasik, April 5, 1944, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

155. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly re-

In September 1942 a German army officer in Lublin told a German judge that in the United States reprisals against Germans had started because of the treatment of the Jews in the Generalgouvernement. A large number of Germans, according to this officer, had already been shot in America.¹⁵⁶

The jittery feeling reached the very top of the German administrative apparatus in Poland. On August 24, 1942, forty-eight officials of the Generalgouvernement met in conference to discuss some problems in connection with anti-Jewish and anti-Polish measures.¹⁵⁷ Generalgouverneur Frank was particularly candid in referring to a "sentence of hunger death" against 1,200,000 Jews. At the end of the meeting Staatssekretär Dr. Boepple pointed out that he had the attendance list and that, if any rumors should reach the public, he would trace them to their source. Again, during the conference of January 25, 1943, after much talk about anti-Jewish measures, Frank remarked:

We want to remember that we are, all of us assembled here, on Mr. Roosevelt's war-criminals list. I have the honor of occupying first place on that list. We are therefore, so to speak, accomplices in a world-historical sense.¹⁵⁸

The following story is told by the KdS (Commander of Security Police) in the Lublin District, Johannes Hermann Müller. He had once attended a conference under the chairmanship of the Lublin SS and Police Leader, Odilo Globocnik. The SS and Police Leader was thinking just then about the transport of Polish children from Lublin to Warsaw and the death by freezing of many of these children. Globocnik turned to Sturmbannführer Höfle (one of his trusted assistants) and told him that he had a three-year-old niece. Globocnik could no longer look at the little one without thinking about the others. Höfle did not know what to reply and "looked at Globocnik like an idiot." In the spring of 1943, Höfle's two children, twins who were only a few months old, died of diphtheria. At the cemetery Höfle suddenly went wild and shouted: "That is the punishment of heaven for all my misdeeds!"¹⁵⁹ It is perhaps not accidental

ports from district propaganda divisions for October 1942, report by Radom division, October 3, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

156. Generalgouvernement/Main Division Propaganda, consolidated weekly reports from district propaganda divisions for September 1942, report by Lublin division, September 5, 1942, Occ E 2-2.

157. Generalgouvernement conference of August 24, 1942, Frank Diary, PS-2333.

158. Generalgouvernement police conference of January 25, 1943, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

159. Interrogation of Müller, November 5, 1947, Occ E 2-134.

that the Germans, who were particularly brutal in their treatment of Jewish children, were now most afraid for their own.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

The relentless manner in which the deportations were brought to their completion is most clearly recognizable in their economic consequences. The economic results may be divided into losses and gains: losses incurred primarily in the sacrifice of productive Jewish manpower, and gains resulting from a saving of food and the collection of some personal belongings (mostly *Lumpen*, or rags). On balance the deportations in Poland were costly. Much time and effort were expended in the municipalities to balance the books after the loss of rent owed by deported Jews for apartments in public housing and of fees the Jews had not paid for public local services. Even modest amounts were of concern. In Tarnow, for example, the Stadtkommissar and his financial division scraped together 106,287.93 zloty and allocated an initial portion of this sum for trolleys, garbage removal, street and sidewalk repair, gas and electrical installations, the missing rent, and the cleaning of public toilets.¹⁶⁰

City officials were interested in the restoration of normalcy. The employers of Jewish labor had the much more serious problem of maintaining their levels of production. When the ghettos began to be emptied out in 1942, the army representatives in Poland, who were most anxious to keep production going, were caught in a squeeze. Gauleiter Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, was just launching his *Ostarbeiter* recruitment drive; that is, he was shipping Polish and Ukrainian workers to the Reich. To replace the Poles the army was counting on the increased employment of Jews. Whereas until 1942 Jews had been utilized only in construction projects and ghetto workshops, the present situation required that they be employed also in war industry, including aircraft plants, munitions works, the steel industry, and so on.¹⁶¹ This replace-

160. Stadtkommissar Hackbarth of Tarnow to Finance Division of the Stadtkommissar's office, November 18, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Record Group 15.020 (Polish State Archives in Tarnow), Roll 10. Major deportations from Tarnow had taken place in June and September-November 1942.

161. As late as November 22, 1941, the Armament Inspectorate in the Generalgouvernement had directed that, in the interest of security, no ghetto labor be employed in secret war work. Report by inspectorate to OKW/Wi Rii/Rii III-A, covering July 1, 1940, to December 31, 1941, dated May 7, 1942, p. 153. Wi/IDI.2. By April 1942, however, the first Jews were sent to a war plant: the aircraft works in Mielec (Krakow district). War diary, Armament Command Krakow, containing report for October 1 to December 31, 1942, Wi/ID 1.148. Shortly thereafter, Jews were detailed to other plants in the district, including the steel works Stalowa-Wola and the aircraft-motor works at "Reichshof" (Rzeczow). War diary. Armament Com-

ment program was just getting under way when the SS and Police swept into the ghettos and deported Jews by the hundreds of thousands. The army was now in the impossible position of trying to replace the departing Poles with the vanishing Jews and to make up for the dead Jews with unavailable Poles. (Some of the Poles, incidentally, were replacing deported Jewish workers in Germany.)

Three armament inspectorates were involved in the attempt to conserve the Jewish labor supply: Armament Inspectorate XXI in the Wartheland, Armament Inspectorate VIIIb in Upper Silesia, and the Armament Inspectorate in the Generalgouvernement.

In the Wartheland the efforts of the armament officials were directed toward the conservation of the Lodz Ghetto. This attempt met with many ups and downs and was, on the whole, successful beyond expectations, since the ghetto was not destroyed until August 1944.¹⁶²

In Upper Silesia tens of thousands of Jews had been drawn from ghettos into camps by the Organisation Schmelt, an agency in charge of labor impressment in the Silesian region.¹⁶³ Thousands were employed in the construction of war plants. They were indispensable enough to cause Obergruppenführer Schmauser, the Higher SS and Police Leader of Upper Silesia, to write to Himmler in April 1942 that replacements for 6,500 Jews in major construction projects (*Grossbauten*) would hardly be available.¹⁶⁴ Several months later, when Krupp was planning to build a plant for the production of naval artillery at Markstadt, near Breslau, the firm discovered that the Organisation Todt (Speer's construction agency) was employing many Jews in projects nearby. With the "complete approval" of Vizeadmiral Fanger, Krupp suggested that these Jews stay on to erect the naval factory.¹⁶⁵ In 1944 the Silesian Krupp plant was still employing thousands of these Jews.¹⁶⁶

mand Krakow, August 3-9,1942. August 17-23,1942, and September 7-13,1942, Wi/ID 1.145.

162. Sec conference summary of Armament Commission XXI, November 30, 1943, Wi/ID 1.26. Defense Economy Officer (*Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier*) of Army District XXI to OKW/Defense Economy Staff (*Wehrwirtschaftsstab*), March 6, 1944, Wi/ID 1.13.

163. Korherr report, April 19, 1943, NO-5193.

164. OGruf. und General der Polizei Schmauser via chief of the Order Police (attention Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Goebel) to Himmler, April 20, 1942, NO-1386.

165. Memorandum by Dr. Erich Müller (chief of artillery construction, Krupp) on discussion with Admiral Schmudt, Vizeadmiral Fanger, and Konteradmiral Rhein, September 9,1942, NI-15505.

166. Krupp directorate to Reich Association Iron/Construction Division (*Reichsvereinigung Eisen/Abteilung Neubauten*), Februars' 2, 1944, NI-12342. Krupp/Technical Bureau (signed Rosenbaum) to Krupp Armament and Machine Sales (Eber-

However, with the onset of mass deportations in Upper Silesia in August 1943, many Jewish laborers were taken from their jobs. The representative of the Reichskommissar for the Strengthening of Germanism in Katowice (a Himmler man) reported that a Jewish construction unit (*Judenbaustruppe*) of 500 that had built homes for German resettlers had been completely withdrawn.¹⁶⁷ Armament Inspectorate VIIIb in Katowice reported at the same time the sudden loss of 700 Jews employed in the Adolf Hitler *Panzer* (construction) program of the Iron Works Trzynietz and A. G. Ferrum/Works Laurahiitte. In addition, 130 Jews in the company camp of the Ernst Erbe firm of Warthenau had been withdrawn during the night of August 24-25, 1943, without notice.¹⁶⁸

In the Generalgouvernement, as elsewhere, the start of the deportations coincided with a rapidly contracting labor supply. On April 24, 1942, the director of the Interior Division of the Gouverneuer's office in Galicia, Bauer, warned the Kjeise that save for seven categories of Jews, together with wives and children under sixteen, no one was to be spared. The protected groups were employed specialized workers, independent registered skilled laborers, certified public workers, auxiliary workers integrated in the labor force, the Jewish councils and their employees, the Jewish Self-Help organization and its employees, and the Jewish Ordnungsdienst. All others were "dispensable" (*entbehrliche*) Jews. The indispensability of anyone "for now" was to be decided by the Kreishauptmann and the local Security Police representative.¹⁶⁹

In the Kolomea Kreis, Galicia, the Kreishauptmann and the Security Police made their views known with particular reference to dependents. The Kreishauptmann objected to the retention by working Jews in the small towns of relatives or "whole families." It was in total contradiction to the intended effect of the "Jewish evacuation," he said, and he wanted all those not employed to move to the ghetto in the city of Kolomea (Kolomija).¹⁷⁰ The local Security Police commander, Obersturmflihrer

hardt), March 14, 1944, NI-8989. Krupp Bcrthawcrk A. G./Markstädt plant to chief of Krupp steel plants, Prof. Dr. Houdrcmont, April 13, 1944, NI-12338.

167. Stabshauptamt/Stabsfiihrer in Katowice (signed OStubaf. Brehm) to Schmauser, August 21, 1943, NO-3083.

168- War diary, Armament Inspectorate VIIIb in Katowice, August 27, 1943, Wi/ID 1.224.

169. Instructions by Bauer, March 24, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Accession No. 1997 A 0193 (Ivano-Frankivsk [Stanislawmv] Archives) Roll 1, Fond 37, Opis 1, Folder 1. See also the instructions (signed in draft by Frauendorfer) to labor offices, June 25, 1942, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Accession No. 1997 A 0194 (Ternopil [Tarnopol] Oblast Archives), Roll 1, Fond 181, Opis 1, Folder 110.

170. Order by the Kreishauptmann, undated, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum

Leideritz, notified the indigenous mayor of Sniatyn, in the Kreis Kolomea, that by agreement with the Kreishauptmann and the director of the labor office in Kolomea, all the Jews would have to move from Sniatyn, Horodenka, and Kosow to the city, excepting only a small number of Jewish workers and, for each ten of them, one Jewish “woman-person” (*Fmuensteperson*) to perform household chores.¹⁷¹

Before long, the struggle began for the retention of the Jewish workers themselves. The civil administration, the Ostbahn, private firms under contract with the military commander or the Armament Inspectorate, as well as the SS itself, were all making use of Jewish labor. Some of their projects, such as a construction site for the German theater of Lvov, were leftovers of an earlier vision of quick victory,¹⁷² but the Ostbahn was another matter. In September 1942, Gerteis pointed to the necessity of continuing the exploitation of Jewish labor to raise the capacity of his network. As many as 8,568 Jews were employed by the Ostbahn for repairs of equipment, such as locomotives, and another 15,383 Jews by firms under contract with the Ostbahn in its construction program. That was a total of 23,951 and a withdrawal of such a number was simply “impossible.”¹⁷³ No less serious was the problem of the military commander, General Gienanth, and the Armament Inspector, Generalleutnant Schindler. Their attempts to check the loss of irreplaceable Jewish labor was a protracted affair.

The first move of the military in the labor preservation drive was made in July 1942, when Schindler came to a hurried understanding with Higher SS and Police Leader Kruger, pursuant to which Jewish workers in armament enterprises were to be held in plant barracks or SS labor camps for the sake of production.¹⁷⁴ On July 19, 1942, Himmler accepted the agreement, but emphatically stated that no further concessions would be made: “I order that the resettlement of the entire Jewish popu-

Archives Accession No. 1997 A 0193 (Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Archives), Roll 1, Fond 93, Opis 1, Folder 54. The order specifies a deadline of July 1, 1942. The handwritten signature appears to be that of Regierungsassessor Volkmann.

171. Leideritz to the mayor of Sniatyn, September 10, 1942, *ibid.* The Kreishauptmann at this point was Gorgon.

172. See the bill presented by the Oberschlesische Bauunternehmung—Dipl. Ing. Wolfgang Dronkc to Stadthauptmann/City Construction Directorate Lvov, for the use of Jewish limestone carriers, September 29, 1942, Lvov Oblast Archives, Fond 37, Opis 4, Folder 148.

173. Gerteis to Higher SS and Police Leader, September 16, 1942, and his letter to the Transport Ministry of that date, Zentralarchiv Potsdam, collection 43.01 Reichsverkehrsministerium, Laufende Nummer Neu 3128. Also, summary of discussion between Gerteis and Frank, September 22, 1942, Frank Diary, T 992, Roll 7.

174. See Kruger to Himmler (copy to SS and Police Leader of Krakow, Obf. Schemer), July 7, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 94.

lation in the Generalgouvernement be carried out and completed by December 31, 1942. As of December 31, 1942, no persons of Jewish descent must remain in the Generalgouvernement unless they are living in camps at Warsaw, Krakow, Czestochowa, Radom, or Lublin. All other undertakings that employ Jewish labor have to be finished by that time or, if completion is not possible, have to be transferred to one of the camps." These measures, Himmler continued, were necessary for the new order in Europe as well as for the "security and cleanliness" of the German Reich and its spheres of interest. Every violation of this regulation would endanger peace and order and would create in Europe "the germ of a resistance movement and a moral and physical center of pestilence."¹⁷⁵

The military offices soon found out that Himmler's concessions were even more restrictive than they appeared to be in the agreed stipulations. The army had not protected its own installations. An army supply depot, loading cattle and flour for the front, lost half of its Jewish labor force overnight even while empty freight cars were waiting on the sidings.¹⁷⁶ Soon another, more serious omission began to make itself felt. The generals discovered that their understanding with Krüger covered only a part of the armament industry, the so-called *Rüstungsbetriebe*, or armament plants under contract with the Armament Inspectorate. Apparently the agreement did not cover armament enterprises that were filling orders placed directly by agencies in the Reich or the myriads of small repair shops and finishing plants that were under contract with the military commander (*Wehrkreisbefehlshaber im Generalgouvernement*).

On September 18, 1942, Wehrkreisbefehlshaber von Gienanth reported to the Armed Forces High Command/Operations Staff that urgent contracts with priority designations "Vinter" were falling by the wayside in the "resettlement" action of the police. Von Gienanth estimated that at the moment the labor situation in the Generalgouvernement was as shown in Table 8-6. The replacement of the 200,000 *unskilled* Jewish workers might have been possible were it not for the urgent requirement of 140,000 Polish workers by the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation. Under the circumstances, von Gienanth asked the OKW for its assistance in negotiating for a slower reduction (*Zug um Zug*) of the

175. Himmler to Krüger, July 19, 1942, NO-5574.

176. Militärbefehlshaber im GG/OQu via OFK Krakau to VO/MiG, August 5, 1942, Polen 75022/9a. See also incident at Przemysl on July 26, 1942, during which army personnel were actually shooting at police taking away their Jewish workers. Report by KdS Kraków/Grenzpolizeikommissariat Przemysl (signed Renrhm) July 27, 1942, Israel Police 1113; Grenzpolizeikommissariat to OKW Kommission, August 23, 1942, Israel Police 1114; Himmler to Bormann, October 3, 1942, Israel Police 1115. The episode infuriated Himmler.

TABLE 8-6
LABOR FORCES IN THE GENERALGOUVERNEMENT,
SEPTEMBER 1942

		TOTAL WORKERS	JEWS ONLY	JEWISH SKILLED LABOR ONLY
All enterprises		1,000,000	300,000	100,000
Firms producing military shoes, uniforms, etc.	1 J	22,700	22,000	16,500

Jewish workers. "The criterion should be," he wrote, "to shut out the Jews as fast as possible without endangering the war work."^{177 178}

When Himmler received a copy of this letter, he replied to it as follows: There was a difference between "so-called armament enterprises," which consisted mainly of tailor shops, carpenters' workshops, and shoe shops, and the "real" armament enterprises, such as weapons plants. As for the "so-called" war work, Himmler was prepared to confiscate the shops. "The Wehrmacht should give its orders to us, and we shall guarantee the continuation of deliveries of the desired uniforms. However, if anyone thinks he can confront us here with alleged armament interests, whereas in reality he only wants to protea the Jews and their business, he will be dealt with mercilessly."

In the "real" armament enterprises, Himmler continued, the Jews would have to be segregated in work halls. In the weeding-out process the work halls could then be consolidated into faaory camps, which in turn would give way to a few big Jewish concentration camp enterprises, preferably in the eastern portions of the Generalgouvernement (*tunlichst ttn Osten des Generalgouvernements*). "However, there too, the Jews should in accordance with the Fuhrer's wish, disappear some day [*Jedoch auch dort sollen eines Tages dem Wunsche des Fuhrer's entsprechend die Juden verschnHnden*]"^{177*}

Himmler was now actually proposing that the SS itself go into busi-

177. Wehrkreisbefchlshaber im Generalgouvernement (signed von Gicnanth) to OKW/WFSt (Jodi), September 18,1942, Himmler Files, Folder 126. The number of Jews then working for the direct needs of the armed forces was approximately 50,000. Report by Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvernement for July-September 1942, Wi/ID 1.131.

178. Himmler to Pohl, Kruger, the RSHA, and Wolff, copies to Gncralquartiermeister Wagner and Oberstflcutnant Tippelskirch, October 9, 1942, NO-1611.

ness and handle all the "'so-called'" armament production, principally the manufacture of uniforms. In the heavy, or "real," armament enterprises the SS proposed to be in charge of the labor supply. That control was to be assured through the establishment of labor camps. Needless to say, all wages were to be paid not to the laborers but to the SS. The profit motive shone very clearly through Himmler's proposal.

The army accepted Himmler's conditions word for word.¹⁷⁹ On October 14 and 15, 1942, Oberst Forster, the Oberquartiermeister of the military commander in the Generalgouvernement, met with Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger to iron out a few points. This time the military found the SS much more receptive to production problems. The new agreement covered all firms operating under contract with the army (that is, the Armament Inspectorate *or* the Wehrkreisbefehlshaber). The keynote of the arrangement was the *organized* reduction of the Jewish labor force, to be undertaken only after mutual consultation. The key phrase of the understanding was "no disturbance of production." The SS was to be paid for camp labor at the daily rate of 5 zloty per man and 4 zloty per woman, from which the firms were to deduct a maximum of 1.60 zloty for maintenance¹⁸⁰ (5 zloty equaled 1 dollar; 1.60 zloty was 20 cents).

The October agreement was a last-minute arrangement to save a Jewish labor force for military needs. No provision had been made for firms in civilian endeavors, for the Ostbahn, or for the civil administration. By the tens of thousands, Jews were withdrawn from projects and plants that were outside the scope of the written stipulations. The unblunted effects of the deportations were consequently felt everywhere except in a narrowly defined armament industry, and even in that industry the Jews were to disappear eventually.¹⁸¹ On December 9, 1942, Generalgouverneur Frank said in conference:

179. OKW/WFSt/Qu 11 to Wehrkreisbefehlshaber im GG/OQu (Forster), October 10, 1942, passed on by Forster to Oberfeldkommandanturen in Lvov, Kielce, Lublin, Krakow, Warsaw, Luftgaukommando II and III, Armament Inspectorate, and offices of the Wehrkreisbefehlshaber, October 11, 1942, NOKW-134.

180. Forster to IVa, IVb, 02, and liaison officer of military commander to Generalgouverneur, October 14, 1942, NOKW-134. Wehrkreisbefehlshaber/Chef Generalstab to Oberfeldkommandanturen and offices of Wehrkreisbefehlshaber, copies to liaison officer and Armament Inspectorate, October 15, 1942, NOKW-134. A detailed agreement, naming the firms involved, was concluded by the Armament Command in Galicia with the local SS and Police Leader. Brif. Katzmann to Armament Command in Lvov, October 23, 1942, in report by Katzmann to Krüger, June 30, 1943, L-18. Galician firms not protected by inscription in that agreement were deprived of their workers "pretty ruthlessly" (*ziemlich rücksichtslos*). Armament Command Lvov (signed Sternagel) to OKW/Rü Ic, July 8, 1943, Wi/ID 1.73.

181. This was the understanding of armament officials. See report by Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvernement for July-September 1942, Wi/ID 1.131. During October 1942 the expectation was that the arrangement would last only to the begin-

Not unimportant labor reserves have been taken from us when we lost our old trustworthy Jews [*altbewährten Judenschaften*]. It is clear that the labor situation is made more difficult when, in the middle of the war effort, the order is given to prepare all Jews for annihilation. The responsibility for this order does not lie with the offices of the Generalgouvernement. The directive for the annihilation of the Jews comes from higher sources. We can only deal with the consequences of this situation, and we can tell the agencies of the Reich that the taking away of the Jews has led to tremendous difficulties in the labor field. Just the other day I could prove to Staatssekretär Ganzenmüller, who complained that a large construction project in the Generalgouvernement had come to a standstill, that that would not have happened if the many thousands of Jews who were employed there had not been taken away. Now the order provides that the armament Jews also are to be taken away. I hope that this order, if not already voided, will be revoked, because then the situation will be even worse.*¹⁸²

The Jews, on their part, sensed what the new arrangement had in store for them. There was no hope for anyone who could not work. Only the best and strongest workers, “the Maccabees,” as Krüger called them,¹⁸³ had a chance to live. All others had to die. There was not even room in the SS-army agreement for dependents. Survival had become synonymous with work. The Jews were grasping labor certificates as a drowning man grasps a straw. How deeply this labor-survival psychology had penetrated into the Jewish community is illustrated by a small incident observed by a Pole. In 1943, when an SS officer (Sturmabführer Reinecke) seized a three-year-old Jewish girl in order to deport her to a killing center, she pleaded for her life by showing him her hands and explaining that she could work. In vain.¹⁸⁴

The Jews who were selected for work were filled with apprehension and forebodings. In the words of one of the Wehrmacht officers who watched them closely in Galicia,

These measures, which brought about a separation of the workers from their families, naturally had a disastrous effect on the psychic and, in

ning of 1943. See summary of first conference of the Generalgouvernement Armament Commission, October 24, 1942, Wi/ID 1.155. (The armament commission was composed of top officials of the Armament Inspectorate and civil administration.) In fact, the arrangement was to last until 1944.

182. Remarks by Frank in Generalgouvernement conference of December 9, 1942, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

183. See Kriiger's remarks in conference of May 31, 1943, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

184. Affidavit by Jerzy Skotnicki, August 26, 1947, NO-5257. The incident occurred at or near Sandomicrz, in the Radom District.

that connection, also physical constitution of the Jews in question; they say to themselves correctly that even though they themselves enjoy temporary protection, their families will in all probability become victims of coming Aktionen. How right the Jews are in that assumption will be demonstrated on the occasion of a major evacuation Aktion that is due in Lvov in the next few days. Understandably, under such circumstances the productivity of the Jews is falling off sharply, cases of bodily and spiritual collapse are increasing, and there are also instances of suicide. *[Diese Massnahmen, die eine Trennung der Arbeiter von ihren Familienangehörigen mit sich brachten, haben naturgemäss eine vernichtende Wirkung auf die psychische und im Zusammenhang damit auch auf die physische Verfassung der in Frage kommenden Juden ausgeübt; sie sagen sich mit Recht, dass sie zwar selbst jetzt einstweilen Schutzgeniessen, dass aber die Familienangehörigen voraussichtlich ein Opfer kommender Aktionen sein werden. Wie recht die Juden mit dieser Vermutung haben, wird sich gelegentlich einer grösseren Aussiedlungsaktion, die Jur Lemberg in den nächsten Tagen bevorsteht, erweisen. Dass unter solchen Umständen die Arbeitsleistung der Juden stark abfällt, dass körperliche und seelische Zusammenbrüche sich häufen und auch Selbstmorde sich ereignen, ist erklärlich.]*¹⁸⁵

The Himmler program called for the deportation of all nonproductive Jews in the Generalgouvernement by the end of 1942. Because of administrative difficulties, Himmler was behind schedule. Even so, fewer than 600,000 Jews were still alive in the Polish deportation area on December 31, 1942 (around 250,000 in Upper Silesia, the Wartheland, and the Bialystok District, and somewhat more than 300,000 in the Generalgouvernement itself).¹⁸⁶ In the Galician District the remaining Jews were being shot,¹⁸⁷ in the Warsaw Ghetto more roundups were planned, while in Lodz, Bialystok, Krakow, Radom, and such other ghettos as were still in existence, the survivors were cut down relentlessly. From the remnant ghettos of the Generalgouvernement, particularly Warsaw, Lvov, Radom, and Krakow, the SS and Police drew the strongest and best-trained workers to build up an industrial forced-labor reservoir that was to last for about two years.

185. OFK 365 (signed Bcuttel) to MG GG, November 17, 1942, Polen 75016, 12. Folder once at Alexandria, Va.

186. Sec Korherr report, April 19, 1943, NO-5193. His deportation figures as of December 31, 1942, were 1,274,166 for the Generalgouvernement and 222,177 for the incorporated areas. Korherr's figure of die remaining Jews in the Generalgouvernement is 297,914, but it includes a rounded number of only 50,000 in the Warsaw District, where many Jews were not registered.

187. The deportation figure as of November 10, 1942, was 254,989, and the total by June 27, 1943, was 434,329. Katzmann to Krüger, June 30, 1943, 1.-18. His second count in Galicia includes a large group shot in 1943 near Lvov.

Jewish laborers were dispatched from the ghettos to SS labor camps (*SS Arbeitslager*) and to company camps (*Firmenlager*). The SS camps housed two SS-owned enterprises, a Galician project of the Ostbahn, and some armament firms. In addition, the SS supplied workers from ghettos and SS camps to companies that maintained their own installations (see Table 8-7). AU Jews who had left the ghettos were labor prisoners of the SS. Insofar as these Jews were not employed by the SS itself, the employers had to pay wages to the SS and Police at the agreed rates of 5 zloty per man and 4 zloty per woman, minus 1.60 zloty for food. While the SS thus maintained its clutch on all laboring Jews in the Generalgouvernement, there was a significant difference between the type of hold exercised by the SS on the Jews in its own camps and the somewhat more remote control it wielded in company compounds. The SS labor camps were subjected to a constant consolidation and weeding-out process, from which the company camps remained largely immune.

The SS camps were originally under the jurisdiction of the SS and Police Leaders, but starting in October 1943 and continuing in 1944, a series of transfers took place in the course of which the camps were taken over by the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office (WVHA), i.e., the agency that controlled the concentration camps. A heretofore undisputed territorial and functional control of the camps by the SS and Police Leaders was now reduced to a purely territorial (disciplinary) jurisdiction. The new master was the WVHA. The following is a list of the principal labor camps under their new functional direction.¹⁸⁸

Satellites of the WVHA Lublin camp :

- Trawniki
- Poniatowa
- Old Airport, Lublin
- SS-Company DAW, Lublin
- Blizyn
- Radom
- Budzyn


Independent WVHA camps:

- Krakow-Plaszow
- Lvov (Janow Street)

Notwithstanding these steps toward consolidation, mass shootings were carried out in the Lublin camp complex on November 3, 1943. The decision was prompted by reports of Jewish unrest in the camps and by a

188. Memorandum by Obergruppenfuhrer Pohl (Chief of WVHA), September 7, 1943, NO-599. Globocnik to Himmler, January 18, 1944, NO-57. Memorandum by HStuf. Oppcrbeck (WVHA W-IV), January 13, 1944, NO-1036. Obf. Baier (WVHA-W) to Oppcrbeck (WVHA W-IV), January 19, 1944, NO-1036.

TABLE 8-7
THE FLOW OF GHETTO LABOR



breakout on October 14 from the killing center of Sobibor. On the morning of October 19, a security conference attended by police commanders and military generals took place under the chairmanship of Frank. On that occasion the BdO, General Griinwald, mentioned a “great danger¹ from the Jewish labor camps and, without identifying Sobibor, referred to a revolt in one camp. Frank immediately instructed Armament Inspector Schindler, BdS Bierkamp, and Griinwald to look over the lists of the inmate population and to make sure that only workers remained. All others were to be removed “from the Generalgouvernement.” Following a discussion of other topics, Frank then summarized the findings of the conference, saying that the Jewish camps had turned out to be an “acute danger” to the Germans.¹⁸⁹

The consequence of these deliberations was momentous. By the end of October preparations began with the digging of graves in the Lublin camp. This work went on by day and, under lamps, at night. Two loud-speaker trucks, borrowed from the local propaganda office, were brought into the Lublin compound to drown out the shootings with music. On the eve of the operation, which was designated “Harvest Festival” (*Erntefest*), SS and Police Leader Sporrenberg mobilized and deployed the personnel of the KdS in Lublin, as well as elements of motorized Watfen-SS

189. Summary of Security Conference of October 19, 1943, Frank Diary, National Archives Record Group 238, T 992, Roll 9. In the early afternoon Frank talked to Bierkamp and Griinwald alone, but that discussion was not summarized in the diary.

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units and of the 22d and 25th Police Regiments. On the day of the killing, large columns of Jewish laborers were marched into the Lublin main camp (Maydanek) from the Old Airport and the Lublin workshops of the Deutsche Ausriistungswerke (DAW). Approximately 10,000 Jews were shot in Trawniki, about 15,000 in Poniatowa, and 17,000 or 18,000 in the main Lublin camp. All the district farms that had depended on SS camp labor “lost the ground under their feet.”¹⁹⁰

A special chapter in this history is the fate of the industries operated by the SS itself. Originally, SS enterprises had been set up in the concentration camps with a view to exploiting the cheap inmate labor supply. Now that the end phase of the Polish deportations had arrived, one of the SS firms, the DAW, emerged from the concentration camps and stretched out its arms for a share of the surviving Jewish labor force. But the SS entrepreneurs faced one major difficulty: they had no capital. The DAW solved that problem in a typical SS manner. One of the so-called armament firms in the Galician District, Schwarz and Company, which was exclusively engaged in the production of uniforms and which employed 2,000 Jewish slave laborers, fitted the needs of the DAW nicely. The SS moved swiftly. In July 1943 the management of Schwarz and Company was arrested “because of serious irregularities,” and the entire firm, with laborers and machines, was swallowed by the DAW.¹⁹¹

A more ambitious project than die acquisition of Schwarz and Company was the SS plan to take over all the machines located in the ghettos. On December 1, 1942, Himmler wrote to chief of the Economic-Administrative Main Office, Pohl, that he had just had a look at the machinery and equipment in the Warsaw Ghetto. These machines, according to Himmler, were worth “hundreds of millions,” and such a

190. Jo/cf Marszalek, *Maydanek* (Hamburg, 1982), pp. 138-41. Affidavit by Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert (Lublin camp administration), August 6, 1945, NO-1903. Statement by Johann Offermann (Sporrenberg's stall), no date, Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, *Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord*, pp. 366-67n. The shootings in the Lublin main camp are described in the trial of Hermann Hackman by a Düsseldorf court, XVII 1/75S: judgment, vol. II, pp. 456-502; statements by SS-guards Johann Ludwig, November 6, 1964, vol. XIV, pp. 2326-29, Georg Hörauf, October 30, 1964, vol. XV, pp. 2483-93, Gotthard Tschölsch, July 28, 1965, vol. XVIII, pp. 2994-98, and Andreas Lahner, October 2, 1968, vol. XXVII, pp. 4763-68; the statement by a former German political prisoner and Kapo, Erich Homung, September 12, 1972, vol. XLIII, pp. 8320-30; and the statement by a Jewish survivor, Felix Niedzielak, November 6, 1972, vol. XLIII, pp. 8560-67. The shootings were conspicuous enough to have been reported in the Polish underground paper *Riuletyn Informacyjny*. See Shmuel Krakowski, “Holocaust in the Polish Underground Press;” *Tad Vasbern Studies* 16 (1984): 241-70, on p. 253.

191. Armament Command in Lvov (signed Stemagel) to Armament Inspectorate/lc, July 8, 1943, Wi/ID 1.73.

uniquely high value was “not to be lost to the Reich.” Pohl was instructed to cart away the machines as quickly as possible.¹⁹² The Economic-Administrative Main Office chief immediately sent three experts to Warsaw to take inventory of the machines and raw materials in the ghetto; then he informed Himmler that preparations for their removal had been made.¹⁹³ On the very next day Himmler wrote that he agreed with this arrangement “wholeheartedly” (*sehr einverstanden*). “Believe only” he said, “that it is necessary that you get written permission from the Economy Ministry to transfer the machines to our industries.”¹⁹⁴ The machines in question were for the most part private property.

In January' 1943 Himmler was in Warsaw again. He summoned Oberst Freter, the chief of the Armament Command in Warsaw, to tell him that he was astonished (*erstaunt*) that so many Jews were still in Warsaw. In Himmler's opinion it was necessary that the German businessmen who owned enterprises in the ghetto, particularly the biggest one, Walther C. Tobbens, be inducted into the army just as soon as possible and sent to the front line (*tunlichst eingezogen und an die Front gebracht werde*). He ordered the RSHA to examine Tobbens's books “with a microscope.” “If I am not mistaken,” he said, “a man who had no property three years ago has become a well-to-do man here, if not a millionaire, and only because we, the state, have driven cheap Jewish labor into his arms.”¹⁹⁵

That, in short, was Himmler's way of getting hold of the necessary machinery and labor. Actually, he failed, not because of Tobbens, to be sure, but because of Jewish resistance and the resulting destruction of property. As the SS and Police Leader in Lublin, Gruppenführer Globocnik, put it in a rare Nazi understatement: “A major loss has occurred only in Warsaw, where, owing to a misunderstanding of the situation, the windup was carried out incorrectly.”¹⁹⁶

Nevertheless, the SS went ahead. On March 12, 1943, it formed a brand new company, the Ostindustrie GmbH (Osti), within the framework of the WVHA. The Osti was a peculiar company. It was established with an initial capital investment of only 100,000 Reichsmark. The Vorstand consisted of the chief of the WVHA, Pohl, and the chief of Amtsgruppe B of the WVHA, Gruppenführer Lörner. The Aufsichtsrat contained the following membership: Pohl, Krüger, Lörner, and the Warsaw SS and Police Leader von Sammern-Frankenegg. Krüger and von Sam-

192. Himmler to Pohl, December 1, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 188.

193. Pohl to Himmler, December 4, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 188.

194. Himmler to Pohl, December 5, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 188.

195. Himmler to Krüger, copies to RSHA, Pohl, and Wolff, Januar 1943, NO-1882.

196. Globocnik to Himmler, January' 18, 1944, NO-57.

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morn subsequently withdrew, and the representative of the WVHA in the Generalgouvernement, SS Economist Schellin, was elected in their stead. The managers of the company were the SS and Police Leader in Lublin, Odilo Globocnik, and the WVHA accountant, Dr. Max Horn.¹⁹⁷

Although most of the Warsaw Ghetto machinery was destroyed, the company started operations in the summer of 1943 with odds and ends recovered from the Warsaw and Bialystok Ghettos, and with exceedingly primitive tools. Thus, in the brush factory, 600 Jewish workers who had only one or two dozen hammers had to use pieces of iron and stones. Even so, 396,000 brushes were produced from May to October 1943.¹⁹⁸ The Osti enterprises grew until they employed, at their height, the following numbers of people:¹⁹⁹

Peat works in Dorohucza	1,000
Brush factory in Lublin	1,800
Equipment works in Radom (textiles)	4,000
Iron foundry in Lublin	1,500
Fur manufacturing works in Trawniki	<u>6,000</u>
	14,300

In the fall of 1943 the Ostindustrie combine failed. Its failure was due to the usual reason: no profits. However, the coup de grace was delivered by the SS itself, on November 3, 1943, when the Osti suddenly found itself without a labor force.²⁰⁰ Thousands of Osti Jews were being shot in the Lublin killing center.²⁰¹ This is how the Osti had the ground cut from under its feet.²⁰²

The sudden end of the SS business venture should not be too surprising. In the words of one of the Osti managers, Dr. Horn, the economic task of the Ostindustrie met with “negation” and “lack of understanding” even in SS circles. When, for example, one of the Osti representatives reported to the SS and Police Leader in Warsaw (in all probability Stroop), the SS leader reacted to the whole venture in these words: “Ostindustrie!

197. Report by UStuf. Fischer, March 1944, NO-1271.

198. Report by Dr. Horn, March 13, 1944, NO-2187.

199. Report by UStuf. Fischer, March 1944, NO-1271.

200. Globocnik to Himmler, January 18, 1944, NO-57.

201. Report by Dr. Horn (WVHA, SS company Osti), March 13, 1944, NO-2187. Affidavit by Ruppert, August 6, 1945, NO-1903.

202. The DAW plant in Lvov lost all its workers at the same time. War diary, Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvernement/Administrative Division, November 19-26, 1943, Wi/ID 1.93. The DAW Lvov works, however, were rehabilitated with new workers allocated by the WVHA. Memorandum by WVHA W-IV, January 13, 1944, NO-1036; WVHA-W (Obf. Baicr) to WVHA W-IV, January 19, 1944, NO-1036.

I only have to hear 'industry' to become nauseated! [*Ostindustrie! Wenn ich schon 'Industrie' höre, wird mir übel!*]"²⁰ⁱ

The Ostindustrie people still did not give up. In January 1944 Dr. Horn went to Lodz, where he discovered that the profits shown by die Gettoverwaltung were actually "disguised losses." He had a solution to the problem: transfer of the Lodz Jews to the Osti.^{203 204} However, once again the SS failed (Greiser demanded payment of 18-20 million Reichsmark for his ghetto enterprises),²⁰⁵ and so the liquidation of the Ostindustrie proceeded upon its course. Its assets were taken over by one of the more permanent SS enterprises, the aforementioned Deutsche Ausrüstungswerke (DAW), operated by section W-IV of the WVHA.²⁰⁶

The SS companies Osti and DAW at no time employed more than about 20,000 Jewish laborers; on the whole, therefore, the SS industries were no great success. But Himmler had still another source of profit. Under his agreement with the army, all Jews in the Generalgouvernement were labor prisoners of the SS, for sale at daily rates. Here, too, Himmler's expectations were not wholly fulfilled.

Table 8-8 contains the statistics of Jewish workers employed by the armament industry in the Generalgouvernement from January 1943 to May 1944. These employment figures, which represent the armament industry's utilization of Jews in SS labor camps and company camps, were somewhat smaller than those that Himmler and Globocnik had hoped to realize.²⁰⁷ In the SS labor camps several thousand Jews were idle. In June 1943 Globocnik complained to Himmler that in the big Trawniki camp the SS industries and private firms employed 90 percent of the available labor force; in camp Poniatowa employment was only 60 percent. Globocnik accused the Wehrmacht of "stuffing" the Lodz Ghetto with contracts only in order to prevent a "resettlement" there, and he accused the business organizations of boycotting his own labor for "profit" reasons.²⁰⁸

203. Report by Horn, March 13, 1944, NO-2187.

204. Dr. Horn to Pohl, copies to Oberführer Baier and HStuf. Dr. Volk, January 24, 1944, NO-519.

205. Memorandum by Volk, February 9, 1944, NO-519.

206. WVHA W to W-IV, January 19, 1944, NO-1036. The DAW inherited the Osti plants at Radom and Blizyn. Eight thousand workers were employed there in July 1944. Memorandum by HStuf. Sommer (deputy chief, WVHA D-II), July 31, 1944, NO-4181. The DAW also operated a small plant at Lublin and the firmer Schwarz factory in Lvov (together, 3,000 workers). These two enterprises were liquidated in July 1944, WVHA W-IV/Krakow office (signed Oberscharführer Dorndorf) to WVHA W-IV, October 25, 1944, NO-3765.

207. The success was even smaller when it is considered that some of the DAW plants were classified as armament works.

208. Globocnik to OSrubaf. Brandt (Himmler's secretary), June 21, 1943, NO-485.

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TABLE 8-8
LABOR FORGES IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY

	JEWES ONLY	TOTAL WORKERS
January 1943	15,091	105,632
April 1943	15,538	112,499
July 1943	21,643	123,588
October 1943	22,444	130,808
January' 1944	26,296	140,057
April 1944	28,537	179,244
May 1944	27,439	172,781

Note: Draft report by Army District Command Generalgouvernement/Armament Economy officer to OKYV/Field Economy Office, July 7,1944 Wi/ID 1.246. The Army District Command (*Wehrkartiskotnmando*) was a new designation for the military commander; the armament economy officer (*Wehrmrtschaftsoffizier*) took the place of the Armament Inspectorate; the Field Economy Office of the OKW (*Feldmrtschaftsamt*) was the successor of the Economy Armament Office (Wi Rii). Jews had been employed in the armament industry since April 1942.

To be sure, the employment of Jewish labor had its advantages. There was a critical labor shortage, and skilled Jewish workers were made available at very' low rates. On the other hand, it was hazardous to depend upon labor that could be withdrawn by the SS without a moment's notice. Hence there probably was an attempt to keep the percentage of Jews in the total labor force within bounds.*²⁰⁹

The principal beneficiaries of Jewish labor were large firms engaged in heavy industry. The following is a list of some of the more important enterprises with Jewish labor forces:²¹⁰

209. See statistics in Tables 8-6 and 8-8. On November 2, 1943, Schindler and Kruger agreed that 10,000 Jewish workers would be transferred from SS labor camps to armament firms. Globocnik to Himmler, January 18, 1944, NO-57; war diary. Armament Inspectorate GG/Central Division, November 4, 1943, Wi/ID 1.93. On the very next day, mass shootings began in the Lublin camp. Only 4,000 Jews from the Krakow-Plaszow camp (not part of the Lublin complex) could be delivered. War diary, Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvcmment/Central Division, November 18,1943, Wi/ID 1.93; war diary', Armament Command Radom/Central Group, November 18, 1943, Wi/ID 1.30.

210. From war diaries of the Armament Inspectorate and Armament Commands, 1942-44, in the following document folders: Wi/ID 1.15, Wi/ID 1.17, Wi/ID 1.21, Wi/ID 1.30, Wi/ID 1.46, Wi/ID 1.93, Wi/ID 1.121, Wi/ID 1.145, Wi/ID 1.148, Wi/ID 1.152.

Stahlwerke Braunschweig/Werk Stalowa-Wola
Stahlwerke, Starachowice
Ostrowiecer Hochöfen
Ludwigshütte
Kabelwerk, Krakow
Warthewerk
Luftwaffenbetrieb Vereinigte Ostwerke GmbH, Mielec
Heinkel Flugzeugwerk, Budzyii (under construction)
Flugzeugmotorenwerk Reichshof (Rzeszów)
Steyr-Daimler-Puch A. G., Radom
Hasag, Kamienna
Pulverfabrik, Pionki (with plants also at Kielce and Czestochowa)
Delta Flugzeughallen- und Barackenbau GmbH, Muszyna and
Zakopane
Karpathen-Öl, Drohobycz
Walther C. Tobbens, Poniatawa
Schultz & Co., Trawniki

All except three of the listed firms maintained their own company camps. The three enterprises in SS camps were Heinkel Budzyii, Tobbens Poniatawa, and Schultz Trawniki. Tobbens and Schultz were in a shaky position. Himmler did not like them. They had been forced to move into the SS labor camps after the Warsaw Ghetto battle in order to retain a labor supply,²¹¹ and the new arrangement did not last very long. On November 5, 1943, the Armament Inspectorate noted in its diary that the two firms had suffered an “unexpected and complete withdrawal” of their Jewish workers.²¹² Globocnik’s successor, Sporrenberg, had massacred, together with the workers of the Osti and DAW, the entire labor force of Tobbens and Schultz.²¹³

The enterprises that maintained their own installations for Jewish workers enjoyed, on the whole, a little more stability. They were not so vulnerable to “sudden withdrawals” of their Jewish labor; they were left alone. There was, however, an exception in this picture — Galicia. In Galicia the SS and Police displayed an “overenthusiasm” (*Überreifer*), whereas the interventions of the Armament Command were only very

211. Report by Armament Command Warsaw for Januarv-March 1943, Wi/ID 1.46.

212. War diary, Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvernement/Central Division, November 5, 1943, Wi/ID 1.93. Report by Armament Command Warsaw for October 1-December 31, 1943, Wi/ID 1.43.

213. The Heinkel works in the SS labor camp Budzyii received notice in March 1944 that its workers were to be withdrawn by the end of the following month. War diary, Armament Command Krakow, March 20-26, 1944, Wi/ID 1.21.

cautious (*Intervention des Rüstungsjskommandos nur sehr behutsam*).²¹⁴ By August 1943 all but two Galician armament firms, the SS company DAW and Karpathen-OI, had lost their Jewish labor.²¹⁵ One additional firm, Metrawatt A. G., was permitted to keep twelve absolutely irreplaceable watchmakers. The twelve men were transferred to die Lvov SS labor camp, where they continued to work for Metrawatt until November 19, 1943, when the inexorable fate of Polish Jewry caught up with them.²¹⁶

'file Jews in the arms industry tried to hold on. They had lost their families, they were starving, and they did not know each night what the morning would bring. Still they were efficient and reliable workers. Those whose strength was ebbing" were "resettled" and "replaced";²¹⁷ die others continued to labor. To Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart, Frank's former deputy, this submissiveness never ceased to be a source of wonder. "I could not imagine " he said, "that Jews capable of labor were working while their relatives were being destroyed. I believed that in that case one could expect nothing else than that every Jew would attack a German and strangle him."²¹⁸ But Jews do not react to such disasters by strangling their opponents. There was no armed resistance, there was little sabotage.²¹⁹ Only the number of escapes is significant. The company plants were weakly guarded by Galician Ukrainians, which the Armament In-

214. Armament command in Lvov via inspectorate in Krakow to OKW/Wi Rii, January 5,1943, Wi/ID 1.75.

215. Armament Command in Lvov to OKW/Wi Rii/Ic, October 7, 1943, Wi/ID 1.60. For complete list of Galician firms, sec Katzmann to Kriiger, June 30, 1943, L-18.

216. Armament Command Lvov to Wi Rii/Ic, October 7, 1943, Wi/ID 1.60. Armament Command Lvov to Wi Rii/Ic, January' 7, 1944, Wi/ID 1.62. Drohobycz ÓI still had 2,000 Jewish workers in March 1944 when the commander of Security' Police Generalgouvncment, Bickkamp, approached the Armament Inspectorate to discuss their "evacuation" (*Abtransport*). War diary, Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvncment Central Division, March 24, 1944, Wi/ID 1.92. For withdrawal of Jewish workers from Krakow firms, sec war diary, Armament Command Krakow/Central Group, August 30-September 5, 1943, Wi/ID 1.121, and war diary, Armament Command Krakow/Group Army, August 30-Scptember 5, 1943, Wi/ID 1.121.

217. Report by Armament Command Krakow on conditions at Heinkel construction in Budzyn, April 12, 1943, Wi/ID 1.17. Stalowa-Wola Works/Counter-intelligcncc Plenipotentiary Schultc-Mimberg to Industry Plenipotentiary' Major Schmolz, February 25,1943, NG-5694.

218. Testimony by Scyss-I nquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, 3.

219. At Starachowicc Ostbahn freight cars were sabotaged. War diary. Armament Command Radom/Central Group, October 15,1943, Wi/ID 1.30. At Stalowa-Wola two Jews were shot because of "mutiny." Schultc-Mimberg to Major Schmolz, December 28, 1942, NG-5692. The Jews at the Pionki ammunition plant, how'ever, were specially cited for their reliability. Report by Propaganda Division Radom, February' 13,1943, Occ 1: 2-2.

spectorate and the SS had organized into a *Werkschutz*, and by army-recruited collaborators imported from the occupied USSR. The small Jewish labor camp at Janiszow in the Lublin District had an Ethnic German commander and no other German guards. When it was attacked by partisans of the Communist Gwardia Ludowa, 133 of its 295 inmates fled.²²⁰ At least a few hundred Jews took advantage of this police shortage to make their getaway before the final breakup of the camps.²²¹

The end came for several thousand armament Jews in the summer of 1944. In July of that year the Red Army, in a lightning offensive, engulfed the Galician and Lublin Districts, occupied the Przemysl region in the Krakow District, and smashed thirteen miles across the Vistula River into the Radom District. In the face of this advance, the DAW plants in Lvov and Lublin were hurriedly evacuated.²²² On July 20, 1944, BdS Oberführer Bierkamp issued a circular order that inmates of prisons and Jews in armament enterprises were to be evacuated before the arrival of the Red Army. In the event that sudden developments made transport impossible, the victims were to be killed on the spot and their bodies disposed of by "burning, blowing up of buildings, etc."²²³

In the Radom District the SS and Police Leader (Böttcher) ordered the removal of all Jews east of the line Pionki-Radom-Kielce as soon as transport became available.²²⁴ Although the Russian spearhead had come to rest some miles east of that line, the evacuation fever reached much farther into the hinterland, as thousands of Jews were withdrawn from

220. KdO Galicia to various police offices and units in the Galician District, November 13, 1942, enclosing a report by the KdO in Lublin, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record Group 11.001 (Center for Preservation of Historical Documentary Collections, Moscow), Roll 82, Fond 1323, Opis 2, Folder 292b. The Ethnic German, Peter Ignor, was killed and a Polish policeman was wounded. A Jewish order service had guarded the inside of the camp. The Gwardia Ludowa is mentioned in *Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, Obozy hitlerowskie na ziemiach polskich 1939-1940* (Warsaw, 1979), p. 202.

221. For escapes at Stalowa-Wola, see monthly reports from Schultc-Mimberg to Major Schmolz, July 1942-March 1943, NG-5687 through NG-5695. Also, report by Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvernement for April-June 1943, July 24, 1943, Wi/ID 1.45. A Tartar guard of twenty-one men (*Ostruppen*) deserted from one of the camps, Judenlager C "Hasag" Kamienna. War diary, Armament Command Radom/Central Group, April 15, 1944, and May 5, 1944, Wi/ID 1.4.

222. WVHA W-IV (Krakow office) to Chief of WVHA W-IV in Berlin, October 25, 1944, NO-3765.

223. KdS Radom district to SP and SD commander in Tomaszow (HStuf. Thiel), July 21, 1944, enclosing order by BdS, dated July 20, 1944, L-53. Before his assignment to the Generalgouvernement, Bierkamp headed Einsatzgruppe D in Russia.

224. War Diary, Armament Command Radom/Central Group (signed Major Ohcrr), July 24, 1944, Wi/ID 1.64.

DEPORTATIONS

Steyr-Daimler-Puch, "Hasag," and Pionki.²²⁵ In the Krakow District a nervous SS and Police Leader, together with the SS Economist (representative of the WVHA) and the Armament Command, decided to cut the Jewish labor force in the armament plants by 70 percent.²²⁶ This move, too, was premature, because the Russian offensive was not resumed until January 12, 1945, but in the meantime, transports with thousands of Jews were moving to the killing center of Auschwitz, while the army hunted down escaped Jews to turn them over to the SS or to shoot them outright.²²⁷

Hitler's wish was thus fulfilled. Even in the SS enterprises and the munitions-producing armament plants, the Jews had to "disappear," and indeed, few lived to see the light of day.²²⁸

That was the price paid for the "final solution" in Poland. What about the profits? Not much could be placed on the plus side of the balance sheet. The principal gains consisted of food savings and the confiscation of personal property abandoned by the deported Jews.

As early as August 1942 the Prasident of the food and agriculture division of the Generalgouvernement, Naumann, made plans for the curtailment of food allocations to Jews. His food reduction program, which was to affect also the Poles, was designed to achieve increased shipments to the Reich. While outlining his ideas in a Generalgouvernement conference, Naumann pointed out that he was simply cutting all food allotments to 1,200,000 Jews about to be deported and that he was reserving food only for 300,000 Jews who were employed in the German economy. Frank, in complete agreement with Naumann, pointed out that it was

225. Armament Inspectorate Generalgouvernement to Armament Command Radom, July 23, 1944, Wi/ID 1.146. War diary', Armament Command Radom/Central Group (signed Major Ohcrr), July 23-24, 1944, Wi/ID 1.64. War diary, Armament Command Radom, July 26-August 22, 1944, Wi/ID 1.64. Generalleutnant Schindler (Armament Inspectorate) to Army Group Center Chief of Staff (Krebs), August 21, 1944, NOKW-2846. "Hasag" Kamicnna retained 1,000 Jewish workers under the "full responsibility" of the plant manager. War diary, Armament Command Radom, July 29, 1944, Wi/ID 1.64.

226. War diary, Armament Command Krakow, August 7-13, 1944, Wi/ID 1.141.

227. Auschwitz is specifically mentioned as the destination of 1,800 Jews withdrawn from Steyr-Daimler-Puch. War diary', Armament Command Random/Central Group (signed Major Ohcrr), July 23, 1944, Wi/ID 1.64. On army activities, see war diary, 9th Army/Ia, October 28 and October 31, 1944, NOKW-2636. The commander of this army was General der Panzertruppen Freiherr von Lüttwitz.

228. In the Plaszow camp, near Krakow, the Institut fur Deutsche Ostarbeit employed teams of Jewish specialists in chemistry, physics, mathematics, and bacteriology. These Jews were still alive in September 1944 when Higher SS and Police Leader Koppe proposed their relocation to Flossenburg. Koppe to Himmler, September 8, 1944, and Himmler's approval, in Brandt to Koppe, September 9, 1944, T 175, Roll 60.

better for a Pole to collapse than for a German to succumb and that the decision to condemn the nonworking Jews to a "hunger death" (*Hungertod*) should result in the acceleration of measures against them.²²⁹

It is impossible to estimate how much food the Germans were able to save as a result, or in anticipation, of the deportations. Table 8-9, which indicates food deliveries from the Generalgouvernement to the Reich, shows food savings, but a substantial portion of these quantities must be ascribed to reduced allocations for Poles.

Not much use could be made of the rags, furnishings, and other things left behind by the ghetto Jews. In Grodno, damaged houses were exposed to the weather and to people walking in. A German custodian had moved the furniture into a few buildings, which were kept under guard, but an inventory was impossible, because he had only illiterate native assistants.²³⁰ In the emptied ghetto of Lvov, looters tore out ovens, doors, windows, pipes, wires, and stairs.²³¹ In a Wartheland ghetto, police employed in deportations helped themselves to the contents.²³² Relatively few of the Jewish apartments were suitable for German habitation. These few, however, were much in demand. An apartment, said an official of the Upper Silesian city of B[^]dzin, was the only pleasure (*die einzige Freude*) for an overburdened employee after a strenuous day.²³³

The remaining properties were the subject of considerable controversy between Himmler, who issued a confiscatory decree on his own, and Generalgouverneur Frank, who did not recognize the decree.²³⁴ It appears that for once Frank won his point, for he took over the depots in which the abandoned Jewish property was kept.²³⁵ However, this victory'

229. Remarks by Naumann and Frank in Generalgouvernement conference of August 24,1942, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

230. Office of the Mayor (signed Boikat) to Kreiskommissar of Grodno, September 14, 1943, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Record Group 53.004 (Belams State Archives of Grodno Oblast), Roll 6, Fond 2, Opis 1, Folder 95.

231. Stadthauptmann in Lvov/Economy to Governor of Galicia/Chef des Amtes, February' 4, 1943, State Archives of Lvov Oblast, Fond 37, Opis 4, Folder 77.

232. Biebow to Gaulcitung Wartheland/Krcislcitung Wclungen, October 5, 1942, *Dokumenty i materiudy*, vol. 2, pp. 147-48. Proclamation by Mayor A. Wasilowski of Biala Podlaska (Lublin District), threatening death penalty for looting of the ghetto. September 28,1942, *ibid.*, p. 57.

233. Stadtamt memorandum, Bcndsburg, June 23,1943, Yad Vashcrn microfilm JM 2702. Two hundred "halfway decent apartments" (*einigermnnen zumutbaren Wohnungen*) had been allocated to German tenants following the spring deportations of Jews in the city.

234. Remarks by Frank in Generalgouvernement conference of January 26, 1943, Frank Diary', PS-2233.

235. Agreement between Staatssekretär Böhler and Higher SS and Police leader Koppe, February' 21, 1944, reported in circular of Generalgouvernement Main Division Economy, PS-2819.

TABLE 8-9**FOOD DELIVERIES FROM THE GENERALGOUVERNEMENT TO THE REICH (IN SHORT TONS)**

	1940-41	1941-42	1942-43
Wheat	0	58,500	695,000
Potatoes	133,500	148,000	573,000
Sugar	5,000	4,900	31,500
Cattle	8,300	23,700	61,000
Fats	882	992	8,300

Note: Report by Staatssekretär Bihler, October 26, 1943, Frank Diary, PS-2233.

was achieved only after Himmler had removed machines,²³⁶ confiscated some choice real estate,²³⁷ and collected debts owed by Poles to Jews in the amount of 11,000,000 zloty, a sum that helped balance the books of the Ostindustrie at its liquidation.²³⁸

The Polish Jews were annihilated in a process in which economic factors were truly secondary. A Nazi expert on the East, Peter-Heinz Seraphim, described eastern Jewry as “the greatest concentration of Jews anywhere, the spiritual center of Orthodox Jewry and, above all, the inexhaustible reservoir from which the Jewish migrations were fed and which, again and again, had released smaller and larger groups of Jews to be soaked into other countries.”²³⁹ That great concentration, spiritual center, and inexhaustible reservoir of Jewry was now destroyed, leaving a few straggling survivors of labor camps and killing centers.

THE SEMICIRCULAR ARC

The destruction process was to reach its maximum potentialities not only functionally, in its step-by-step development, but also territorially, in its country-by-country spread. We have seen how the “Final Solution” was carried out in the Reich itself and how it was then applied against the

236. These machines were transferred to the Osti. Report by Dr. Horn, March 13, 1944, NO-2187.

237. Obt. von Sammern-Franknegg to Prof. Teitge (Main Division Health), urging transfer of Jewish hospital Zofioska to Lebcnsborn, since the Jewish patients “did not exist anymore [*nicht mehr vorhanden sind*]?” February 1943, NO-1412.

238. Globocnik to Himmler, January 18, 1944, NO-57.

239. Peter-Heinz Seraphim, *Das Judentum im osteuropäischen Raum* (Essen, 1938), p. 10.

center of gravity of the European Jewish community: Polish Jewry. The destruction of the Jews was not to be confined to the Reich and Poland; it was to be implemented in all European areas under German domination. Heydrich had been authorized to organize the deportations in the entire “German sphere of influence in Europe.”¹ And that is precisely what he did.


Before long the German machinery of destruction covered a vast semi-circular arc, extending counterclockwise from Norway to Romania (see Map 6). This arc may be divided into three broad sections: the North (comprising Denmark and Norway), which had fewer than 10,000 Jewish inhabitants; the West (including the Low Countries, France, and Italy), with a Jewish population of 600,000; and the Balkan area, with a Jewish community of 1,600,000. In the center of that huge semicircle, the death camp of Auschwitz received the special transports converging with their victims from north, west, and south.²

The geographic widening of the “Final Solution” was the most complex administrative operation of the destruction process. Unlike the Reich-Protectorat area, in which the Germans were at home, and unlike Poland and Russia, which were regarded as a kind of private reserve suitable for German colonization and settlement, the semicircular arc was more nearly a German power sphere, a “sphere of influence.” In the occupied East no central authority of non-German character was allowed to exist.³ In the great semicircle the Germans gave orders to puppet agencies and presented demands to satellite governments. The Poles and Russians had no right to a national existence; they were regarded as subhumans and work slaves, destined perhaps to disappear some day. On the other hand, the northern, western, and southern Europeans were allies, or at least potential allies. The Poles and Russians did not have to be consulted about anything; the puppet and satellite authorities in the great semicircle were at least heard, and sometimes their sensibilities had to be taken into account. In short, we are going to deal here with an area in which the Germans were masters, but not absolute masters, powerful but not all-powerful.

German authority in the semicircular arc was exercised by civil administrators in tightly controlled territory, by military governors in other occupied areas, and by the Foreign Office in the more loosely controlled satellite regions. Let us consider each in turn.

Civil administration was established in incorporated territories (shaded

1. Goring to Heydrich, July 31, 1941, PS-710.
2. Anti-Jewish measures were introduced also in the French and Italian possessions of North Africa. The region was liberated during 1942-43.
3. The Protectorat had central Czech ministries.



Map 6 Axis Europe in Mid-1942

black on the map) and in die Nedierlands and Norway (horizontal lines). Each incorporated area was rilled by its neighboring Gauleiter, as follows:⁴

The French areas:

Alsace, Gauleiter Robert Wagner of Baden

Lorraine, Gauleiter Biiirckel of Saarpfalz

Luxembourg, Gauleiter Simon of Koblenz-Trier

The northern Yugoslav areas:

Oberkrain, Gauleiter Dr. Rainer of Kärnten

Untersteiermark, Gauleiter Dr. Uiberreither of Steiermark

The nonincorporated areas under civil administration (Norway and the Netherlands) were each placed under a Reichskommissar responsible direcdy to Hitler: Terboven in Oslo and Seyss-Inquart in The Hague. Norway had a complete puppet government headed by Vidkun Quisling, whereas the Netherlands retained only the Dutch administrative network headed by the top civil servants (secretaries general).⁵ Neither occupied country' was permitted any diplomatic relations with other countries.⁶ The two states were cut off, isolated under their Reichskommissare.

The German armed forces controlled important areas in the West and in the Balkans (dotted on the map). Control in these regions meant not merely the presence of occupation forces but also the exercise of *territoriale Befugnisse und die vollziehende Gewalt*—"territorial jurisdiction and functional power."⁷

In western Europe the German army maintained two territorial commands exercising functional power. One command was called "Belgium and Northern France" the other was "France."⁸ In Belgium, just as in Holland, there was a central administration headed by the highest Belgian civil servants. In occupied France the Vichy government maintained a complete bureaucratic apparatus that was responsible to Vichy, subject

4. For purposes of party administration, the new areas were merged with the old Gaue. Thus Alsace was joined w'ith Baden, Untcrsteiermark with Steiermark, Oberkrain with Kärnten. Lorraine and the Saarpfalz became the Gau Westmark, Luxembourg and Koblenz-Trier became the Gau Mosclland. State offices, however, were not merged. In the new areas each Gauleiter had the tide *Chef der Zmlverwaltung* (Chief of Civil Administration or CdZ). Stuckart and Schicdcrmair, *Neues Staatsrecht* (Leipzig, 1944), II, pp. 82-87. The Belgian areas of Eupcn-Malmcdy and Moresnet were simply incorporated into the Regierungsbezirk Aachen of the Rheinprovinz in Prussia. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

5. The ministers were in London.

6. Stuckart and Schicdcrmair, *Neues Staatsrecht*, II, pp. 123-125, 126-27.

7. The German troops in Noway, Denmark, and Holland were merely occupation forces.

8. The map shows the border between the two commands, *not* the border between the two states.

to overriding orders, directives, and requests by the German military administration. In 1942 unoccupied France was occupied, but the territory just west of Italy was held by Italian troops, and the final integration of all of France under German rule did not occur until the Italian collapse in September 1943.

On the Balkan peninsula three areas were originally under military rule: Serbia, "Saloniki-Aegaeis" and South Greece (the latter consisted of a few enclaves in the Athens-Piraeus area plus part of the island of Euboea). When Italy weakened as a German ally, the Southeast Command took over "Fortress Crete," and at the time of Italy's collapse in September 1943, an additional expansion took place. The areas of "Saloniki-Aegaeis" and South Greece were merged into a single region called "Greece," which included all previous Italian areas on the Greek mainland. To the north, the Southeast Command acquired Montenegro and Albania. West of the Greek mainland German military control was extended to the island of Corfu. In the eastern Aegean the Dodecanese Islands (Italian since 1912, now renamed *Ost-Aegatis*) became part of this military organization. Within the framework of the German Southeast Command, three puppet governments were set up: one in Belgrade, Serbia; one in Tirana, Albania; and one in Athens, Greece.

The most important agency in the semicircular arc was the German Foreign Office. To the Foreign Office's jurisdiction fell all areas in the arc which are unshaded on the map. Foreign Office influence was especially strong in Slovakia and Croatia, satellites par excellence. Both states were German creations promoted by the Foreign Office. Two other countries under the mercy of the Foreign Office were Vichy France and Denmark. Their reason for submission was overwhelming German military power. Three countries were reduced to satellite status because they had thrown in their lot with Germany for purposes of territorial aggrandizement: Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. (A glance at the map will indicate the peculiar borders that these three countries enjoyed under the Nazi regime.) Finally, there was one state that fell from full-fledged partner to impotent satellite in a few years: Italy. It was the only ally of Germany in Europe that was considered a great power and that expanded considerably its holdings in the Mediterranean area before and during World War II. The Dodecanese Islands were acquired by Italy in 1912 and Albania in 1939. "New Albania," Montenegro, part of the Dalmatian coast, western Slovenia, most of the Greek mainland together with some of the Greek islands were taken over in 1941, and the French region adjacent to Italy for some forty miles inland in 1942. By 1943, however, Italy had collapsed and became an occupied country itself under German rule.

The influence of the Foreign Office was not confined to the satellite

areas. Ribbentrop's ministry had quite a bit to say in the military territories as well. Generally speaking, foreign offices have always looked askance at military efforts to rule territory. The diplomats are always ready to help out with advice and counsel in an army-ruled area, and they are eager to contribute their adroitness and skill to the conduct of military government. The object of all this concern is, in most cases, an eventual transfer of jurisdiction. While the German Foreign Office did not wrest any territory from the army, the trend was nevertheless discernible. Ribbentrop's men were busy in the southeast, handing out advice and participating in decisions, while in the west the course of German-French relations was dictated in no small measure by the German Embassy in Paris. Even in civilian areas, where no open Foreign Office competition could be tolerated, representatives of the Foreign Office (*Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amts*, abbreviated VAA) reported in detail about every event transpiring before their observing eyes. No wonder, then, that some Foreign Office officials regarded the entire semicircular arc as a kind of Foreign Office area. In Jewish matters, that was almost true.

Who were the Foreign Office officials charged with the implementation of the "Final Solution" in the satellite areas? Table 8-10 is an abbreviated chart showing the Foreign Office apparatus in 1940 and 1943. As can be seen from the chart, the division most concerned with Jewish affairs was *Abteilung Deutschland* (Germany) and its successor, *Inland II*.⁹ The peculiar designation *Deutschland* stemmed from the days of the Weimar Republic, when the office was a liaison agency to the Reichstag.¹⁰ After 1933 there was no longer a functioning Reichstag, but administrative agencies die hard. Still titled *Deutschland*, we find the office in 1936 as a *Referat* under the chief of protocol. There it dealt with such minor and miscellaneous matters as maps, buildings, surveys, and so on.

In 1938 *Referat Deutschland* was taken over by Martin Luther. Unlike his predecessors and associates, Luther was not a civil servant. He was a party man, more specifically, a protegee of the new Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. Under Luther, *Referat Deutschland* was raised to a division. It began to concern itself with party matters, and by 1940 it had also acquired jurisdiction over Jewish affairs.

Luther's division was located not on the Wilhelmstrasse in die main Foreign Office building but in the Rauchstrasse, quite a few blocks away. Physical isolation, as any administrator knows, is conducive to independence, and there is some evidence that Luther took advantage of his

9. Except where indicated otherwise, the description of *Abteilung Deutschland* has been taken from Paul Scabury's comprehensive work, *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime* (Berkeley, 1954), pp. 71-74, 107-8, 131-33.

10. Testimony by Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, Case No. 11, rr. p. 8571.

separate address.¹¹ However, he always asked the Political Division to countersign *all* instructions.¹² Thus before a deportation directive was dispatched to a Foreign Office mission in a foreign country, the paper was sent to the proper desk in the Political Division (e.g., Pol. IV), from where it was sent to the deputy director of the division and to the division chief.¹³ Luther wanted his colleagues to share in the responsibility for the frightful decisions he made.

In 1943 Luther developed delusions of grandeur. He wanted to replace his old boss, Ribbentrop. In a letter to Himmler, Luther revealed confidentially that Ribbentrop was insane. Himmler backed Ribbentrop. Luther spent the rest of his career in a concentration camp, and his division was broken up.¹⁴ Horst Wagner, Luther's successor in Jewish matters, carried on the work relentlessly.

If Luther was a party man and a driving force in the deportations, most of his subordinates were party men also. Does this mean that the "Final Solution" in the satellite areas was a party affair? Not exactly. The Foreign Office was not a party club. The chief of the Political Division, Dr. Ernst Wormann, was an old civil servant;¹⁵ his deputy Otto von Erdmannsdorff, was a civil servant;¹⁶ and the chief of Pol. IV (Balkan desk), who was described by Wormann as one of his experts in Jewish matters, was not even a nominal member of the party.¹⁷ In Abteilung Deutschland itself, the chief of the Jewish Referat, Rademacher, was a civil servant.¹⁸ Luther's successor, the chief of Inland II, appears to have started out in

11. Luther was reluctant to inform Weizsäcker of things that were going on or of action he was taking. See Luther-Weizsäcker correspondence of September 1941 on Jewish star decree in document Weizsäcker 488. Luther's reluctance to part with information also affected Ribbentrop. See Luther memorandum of August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J; also, Ribbentrop's admonition to Luther not to undertake independent action in letter by von Rintelen to Luther, August 25, 1942, NG-2586-K.

12. Affidavit by Dr. Karl Klingenfuss. November 7, 1947, NG-3569. Klingenfuss was a subordinate of Rademacher (D-III).

13. Affidavit by Dr. Kurt Heinrich Franz Heinburg, September 5, 1947, NG-2570. Heinburg was chief of Pol. IV (Italy and the Balkans).

14. According to Scabury, who made an exhaustive study of Luther's career, the division chief survived his incarceration but died shortly after the war. Scabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, pp. 131-33.

15. Affidavit by Wormann, May 27, 1947, NG-1639. Wormann joined the party' in 1937.

16. Affidavit by von Erdmannsdorff, November 21, 1947, NG-3650. Von Erdmannsdorff joined the party' in 1937.

17. Interrogation of Wormann by Kempner, June 9, 1947, NG-4158. Affidavit by Heinburg, September 5, 1947, NG-2570.

18. Scabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 108. On Rademacher and his *Referat*, see Christopher Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office* (New York, 1978), particularly pp. 23-24.

TABLE 8-10**FOREIGN OFFICE MACHINERY IN 1940 AND 1943**

AUGUST 1940

SEPTEMBER 1943

Foreign Minister:

(von Neurath) Ribbentrop

Ribbentrop

Office of the Foreign

Minister (Büro RAM):

Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt

Dr. Schmidt

Dr. Erich Kordt

Dr. von Sonnleithner

Dr. von Sonnleithner

Dr. Bruns

Dr. Bruns

Dr. Johann Georg Lohmann

Bergmann

Hilger

Staatssekretäre:

In charge:

(von Bülow,

von Mackensen)

von Weizsäcker

Steengracht van Moyland

For special purposes:

Keppler

Keppler

Foreign organization of

the party :

Bohle

Bohle

Minister for special purposes:

Ambassadors for special purposes:

Dr. Ritter

Dr. Ritter

von Rintelen

Gaus

Hewel

Personnel: Kriebel

Schröder

Protocol: von Dörnberg

von Dörnberg

Special tasks: Wagner

Inland I (party): Frenzel

Germany: Luther)

Party: Luther

1 Inland II (SS and Police): Wagner

Deputy: Kramarz

II A (Jews): von Thadden

II (SS and Police): Likus

II B (RSHA, Order Police,

Deputy: Picot

police attaches):

III (Jews):

Geiger

(Dr. Schumburg)

Rademacher

TABLE 8-10
CONTINUED

AUGUST 1940

Political: Wormann
Deputy: Ritter
Second Deputy: von Rintelen

II (England, _____
France
Belgium,
Netherlands,
Switzerland):
Dr. Schlitter

III (Spain, _____
Portugal,
Vatican):
Dr. Haidlen

IV (Italy, _____
Bulgaria,
Greece,
Yugoslavia,
Albania,
Romania,
Slovakia,
Hungary):
Dr. Heinburg

V (Poland, Russia):
Dr. Schliep

VI (Scandinavia):
von Grundherr

VII (Near East):
Dr. Melchers

VIII (Far East):
Dr. Kroll

SEPTEMBER 1943

Hencke
von Erdmannsdorff
Special Ambassador: Dr. Prüfer
Special Minister: Dr. von Hentig
I (England): Dr. Weber

<
II (France,
Belgium,
Netherlands,
Switzerland):
von Barga

III (Spain,
Portugal):
< Dr. Heberlein

„XV (Vatican): Dr. Hoffmann

IV (Italy): Dr. Mey

<
. IV b (Bulgaria,
Greece,
Croatia,
Serbia,
Montenegro,
Albania,
Romania,
Slovakia,
Hungary,
Protektorat):
Feine

von Tippelskirch

von Grundherr

Dr. Melchers

Dr. Braun

(Continued)

TABLE 8-10
CONTINUED

AUGUST 1940

SEPTEMBER 1943

IX (United States, Latin America):	
Freytag	Reinebeck
Political Economy: Wiehl	
Deputy: Dr. Clodius	
Legal: Dr. Gaus	Dr. Albrecht
Deputy: Dr. Albrecht	Dr. Sethe
I (International Law):	
Dr. Conrad Rödiger	Dr. Conrad Rödiger
V (Labor):	
Gustav Rödiger	
Cultural: Dr. vonTwardowski	Dr. Six
Press: Dr. Paul Schmidt	Dr. Paul Schmidt

Note: Organization charts of the Foreign Office, dated August 1940 and September 1943, NG-35.

the Protocol Division.*¹⁹ His *Referent* in Jewish affairs, von Thadden, “was a man from the Foreign Office who knew his job.”²⁰ In charge of all divisions, the powerful Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker had come to the Foreign Office from the navy, in which he had served as an attache.²¹ In the Foreign Office, as in the RSHA, party zealots and bureaucratic efficiency experts had joined hands.

The “Final Solution” brought the Foreign Office into close association with Heydrich’s machinery. On October 30, 1941, the RSHA sent the first five monthly summary reports of Einsatzgruppen activities to the Foreign Office, where Botschaftsrat Hilger perused them and where they were distributed to be read by specialists in several divisions before being

19. Organization chart of the Foreign Office, August 1940, NG-35.

20. Testimony by Staatssekretär von Stcngnach, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, X, 133. Von Thadden was an assessor in Pol. V before the war. Organization chart of the Foreign Office, June 1, 1938, Dept. of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Ser. D, II, 1031-40.

21. Affidavit by Ernst von Weizsäcker, November 21, 1947, NG-3708. Weizsäcker was *Leitender Staatssekretär* (Staatssekretär in charge), as distinguished from Keppler and Bohle, who were Staatssekretäre charged with special tasks. Weizsäcker became Staatssekretär in 1938. At the same time, he joined the party’ and became an honorary SS-Oberführer.

DEPORTATIONS

presented in suitable digested form to Ribbentrop.²² With the onset of European-wide deportations, contacts between the diplomats and Heydrich's men became even closer, particularly in the field. Table 8-11, a chart of Foreign Office missions and consulates, also shows the representatives of the Eichmann Referat (RSHA IV-B-4) who either were attached to Foreign Office embassies and legations (as in Paris, Croatia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) or who worked in close cooperation with Foreign Office representatives (as in Salonika and elsewhere).²³

The Foreign Office's representatives in the Balkans (Kasche, Ludin, Beckerle, von Killinger) were former SA men, that is, brownshirts.²⁴ The SA had once included the SS in its ranks, but in 1934 Himmler broke away, killed many SA leaders, imprisoned others, and in general reduced his parent organization to impotence. Needless to say, not much love was lost between the SA and SS after 1934, but this animosity did not have much effect upon SA-SS cooperation in the four Balkan countries, except perhaps in Romania, where the friction between the minister, von Killinger, and the Eichmann representative, Hauptsturmführer Richter, developed into an open quarrel.

The substantive task of the Foreign Office in the satellite states was, first of all, the introduction of those preliminary steps (definition, expropriations, and concentration) without which no large-scale deportations could be commenced with any chance of success. So far as possible, the introductory measures in the satellites were to be patterned after their prototypes in the Reich. This was particularly true in the case of definitions, for the Foreign Office interpreted any deviation from the Nuremberg principle as an attempt to save thousands of Jews.

When a Jewish community was finally "ripe" for deportation, the Foreign Office diplomats shifted into second gear. As an entering wedge, the foreign government was asked to forgo protection of its Jewish citizens in the Reich. With the achievement of this "harmless" concession, the critical moment had arrived. The satellite country was now asked to agree to the "resettlement" of its Jews in the "East." To reduce the possibility of objections and resistance, the Foreign Office did not make claims upon

22. RSHA to Foreign Office, October 30, 1941, with enclosure of first five reports; memorandum of Büro RAM, November 12, 1941; Picot via Luther to D [Germany] III, Pol IV, Pol V, Pol VI, Culture, and Information, November 15, 1941, enclosing the reports; Picot to Büro of Staatssekretär, January 8, 1942, enclosing digest prepared by Legationssekretär von Hahn (D III) on December 10, 1941; all in NO-2650. See also Browning, *The Final Sedation and die German Foreign Office*, pp. 72-76.

23. For a history of these men in action, see Hans Safrian, *Die Eichmann-Männer* (Vienna, 1993), and Yaacov Lozowick, *Hitler's Bureaucrats* (London, 2002).

24. Scabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse*, p. 127.

TABLE 8-11

REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE AREA

FOREIGN OFFICE REPRESENTATIVES		EICHMANN REPRESENTATIVES
Minister, Denmark	(von Renthe-Fink) Best	
VAA, Holland	(Kühn) Bene	Zoepf
VAA, Belgium	von Bargaen	Asche (Erdmann)
Ambassador, Paris	Abetz	Dannecker (Röthke, Brunner)
Consul General, Monaco	Hellenthal	
Representative, Tunisia	Rahn	
Ambassador, Italy	(von Mackensen) Rahn	Dannecker (Bosshammer)
Ambassador, Vatican (1943-45)	von Weizsäcker	
Minister, Serbia	Benzler	
Consul, Salonika	Schönberg	Wisliceny Brunner
Special Plenipotentiary, Southeast (Athens, 1942-	-44) Neubacher	Burger
Minister, Croatia	Kasche	Abromeit
Minister, Slovakia	(von Killinger) Ludin	[Wisliceny [Brunner
Minister, Bulgaria	Beckerle	Dannecker
Minister, Romania	(Fabrizius) von Killinger	Richter Eichmann Krumey Hunsche
Minister, Hungary (v. Erdmannsdorff, v. Jagow)	Veesenmayer	Wisliceny Dannecker Abromeit Novak Seidl

Note: Names of Foreign Office officials are taken from several documents and newspapers. Most of the RSHA men were listed by Wisliceny in his affidavit of November 29, 1945. *Conspiracy and Agression*, VIII, 606-21.

^J Best, Rahn, Benzler, and Veesenmayer also had the title of "General Plenipotentiary" (*Generalbevollmächtigter*). The list does not include traveling emissaries.

the property of the deportees. However, arrangements were made to “resetde” the Jews with their personal belongings, and this baggage was later collected by the Reich in the killing centers. In addition, the Foreign Office would sometimes demand from a satellite government payments to reimburse Germany for the cost of the deportations. Behind this demand was the reasoning that the removal of the Jews was a favor rendered by Germany to her allies, who could then derive lasting benefits from remaining forever *judenijht*.

At one time the international lawyers in the Foreign Office also considered the possibility of confiscating the property of refugees from the Reich who were residing in the satellite states. This idea, however, was given up in a conference held on July 30, 1942. It was decided to press the “territorial principle”: the property of all Jews in a foreign country would fall to that country, whereas the property of all Jews in the Reich would fall to the Reich.²⁵

Sweeping over Europe, an army of specialists was now at work attempting to root out all vestiges of continental Jewry. To be sure, the German machinery of destruction was not quite as successful in these areas as in the Reich itself and the territories to its east. However, the special difficulties that had to be overcome in the semicircular arc mattered little to the prime mover of this vast operation, Heinrich Himmler. As the Reichsführer wrote (April 9, 1943) to the chief of his Security Police:

To me the most important thing, now as before, is that there be shipped off to the East, in Jews, all that is humanly possible. In the short monthly reports of the Security Police I want to be informed only of what was shipped off during the monthly interval and what was still left, in Jews, at the end of the month.²⁶

THE NORTH

Compared to the events that transpired in Poland, the destruction process in northern Europe was microcosmic. The three northern countries within the German sphere, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, contained only about 10,000 Jews. That figure was no accident. For centuries Lutheran Scandinavia had not liked the Jews, and very few had been allowed to settle there. However, the few who had been permitted to

25. *Gesandtschaftsrat Klingenfuss* (a Radcmacher subordinate in D-III) to *Ministerialrat von Normann* (Office of the Four-Year Plan), *Ministerialrat Löscncr* (Interior Ministry), *Oberrcgicrungsrat Bangert* (Justice Ministry), and *Oberrcgicrungsrat Dr. von Coclln* (Economy Ministry), July 31, 1942, NG-424.

26. Himmler to *Kaltenbrunnrcr*, April 9, 1943, NO-5197.

come were given complete equality of treatment by about 1870.¹ Henceforth the Jews were not merely emancipated; they were absorbed into the Scandinavian way of life. That was a process from which the North was reluctant to retreat even under Nazi pressure.

The Germans knew their problem in this region. They would have to make strenuous efforts to achieve meager results. It is therefore understandable that Unterstaatssekretar Luther should have suggested in the conference of January 20, 1942, a postponement of action in the northern domain.² Still, a postponement is only a delay. The German bureaucracy could not look on forever while Jews lived peacefully within its reach. No matter how big the cost, no matter how small the yield, the Germans had to strike. They struck first in subjugated Norway; then they engulfed the occupied state of Denmark. The destruction process never did reach remote and independent Finland.³

Norway

In 1939 about 1,800 Jews were living undisturbed in Norway, most of them in Oslo and Trondheim. A half-Jew, Hambro, had risen to leadership of the Conservative party and to the post of chief Norwegian delegate to the League of Nations. Hambro's position, and the position of all Jews in the country, was resented by a small political group, the nationalistic, pro-Nazi, and anti-Semitic "National Union" (*Nasjonal Samling*, or NS) party, which had 15,000 members and was headed by a former General Staff officer and Minister of War, Vidkun Quisling.¹

When Norway was occupied in a lightning invasion in the spring of 1940, Quisling became the head of the new Norwegian government. He was, of course, no absolute ruler. Above him stood his German masters: Reichskommissar Terboven, in charge of all German offices in the country; Generaloberst von Falkenhorst, commander of the German armed

1. Hugo Valentin, "The History of the Jews in Sweden," in Hermann Bary, ed., *European Jewish Yearbook* (Frankfurt and Paris, 1953-54), pp. 290-94.

2. Summary of the "final solution" conference of January 20, 1942, NG-2586-E.


3. On November 6, 1942, five foreign Jews arrested by Finnish police on various charges were deported with three accompanying family members and a group of other aliens to Estonia. One of the Jews survived. Hannu Rautkallio, *Finland and the Holocaust* (New York, 1987), pp. 180-236. Rumors in Finland of this deportation caused a reaction strong enough to weaken the position of pro-German Interior Minister Horelli. Bliicher (German Minister in Helsinki) to Foreign Office, January 29, 1942, *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik*, Series E: 1941-1945 (Göttingen, 1969-79), vol. 5 (1978), p. 152. German policy toward Jewry, wrote Bliicher, was alienating the Finnish people.

1. Memorandum by Rosenberg on discussion with Quisling in Berlin, December 1939, C-64. For a history of the Quisling administration, see Paul Hayes, *Quisling* (Bloomington, Ind., 1972) and Oddvar K. Hoidal, *Quisling* (Oslo and Oxford, 1989).

forces in the area; and Obergruppenführer Rediess of the SS and Police. Below him Quisling faced his own unruly Norwegian people, whose rebellious elements were rumbling even in his party.

To understand what happened in Norway, one has to glance at a map and observe the position of neutral Sweden, paralleling the Norwegian peninsula along a thousand-mile frontier. The Swedes could not remain indifferent to the fate of Norwegian Jewry. The Norwegian Jews were, after all, Scandinavians. When the roundups began in Norway, Sweden opened her frontier to the victims and offered them refuge.

Preparatory measures were started slowly, and the initiative came from offices of the SS and Police, particularly the Security Police, staffed by the following:



Following a request by Rediess, the Norwegian Police Minister, Lie, gave orders on January 10, 1942, to stamp the identity cards of Jews with a /. This measure necessitated a definition of the term “Jew,” which followed the Nuremberg principle, with the added stipulation that all members of the Jewish religious community were to be considered as Jews. Shortly thereafter, the Jewish population was instructed to fill out questionnaires at the local police stations. Driven by an interest in the “Jewish problem,” the Quisling party’s statistical office on its part compiled a register of all Norwegian Jews.²

During the next few months, no further moves were made, save for a plan by Reichskommissar Terboven to seize the possessions of the 300 Jewish refugees in Norway and — subject to the agreement of the Finance Ministry — to retain the proceeds in his office.³ Not until the fall, however, did the final solution overtake Norway.⁴

2. Samuel Abrahamsen, *Norway's Response to the Holocaust* (New York, 1991), pp. 94-97, 105, 120.

3. Finance Ministry memorandum prepared by Dr. Delbrück and initialed by Ministerialräte Kallenbach, Dr. Macdcl, and Breyhan. April 2, 1942, NG-4039.

4. A comprehensive account of actions against the Jews in Norway is that of Oskar Mendelsohn, *Jodenes histone i Norge*, vol. 2 (Oslo, 1986), pp. 1-335, and notes.

Acts of sabotage in Trondelag province (which contained the city of Trondheim) prompted the KdS, Flesch, to order on October 7, 1942, the arrest of Jewish men over fourteen years of age in his area.⁵ The seizures caused enough disquiet among Jews to trigger escape attempts to Sweden. On Saturday, October 24, Hauptsturmführer Wagner drove to the home of the chief of the Norwegian State Police, Marthinsen, with instructions to extend the arrests of Jewish men all over the country'.⁶ The State Police was a small organization formed in the summer of 1941 and filled entirely with reliable NS men.⁷ Working through the weekend, it drew up lists with the aid of the statistical office, and on October 26, Marthinsen began the roundups with his own personnel, helped by members of the Criminal Police, regular police in rural areas and police precincts, and men from the Germanske SS-Norge Division. The raiders, who were armed with mimeographed sheets containing names and addresses, as well as questionnaires filled out by Jews, went out in pairs to knock on Jewish apartment doors in Oslo, Lillehammer, and other towns. The arrested Jews, numbering several hundred, were held in a provisional Norwegian camp at Berg.⁸

Also on October 26, the Quisling administration rushed to issue a law confiscating Jewish property. Bank accounts were closed; movable items were to be sold at public auction; office furniture was to be distributed to government agencies; real estate was to be placed under government administration; and gold, silver, and jewelry were to be handed over to the Germans as a contribution to the war effort.⁹

On November 17, the Quisling government directed all those who had at least one Jewish grandparent to register at local police headquarters.¹⁰ At that moment, the rumor network was already in high gear.¹¹

5. Abrahamsen, *Norway's Response*, pp. 97-104. Trial of OStubaf. ORR. Gerhard Flesch, U.N. War Crimes Commission, *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*, VI, pp. 112-13.

6. Abrahamsen, *Norway's Response*, pp. 104-5.

7. Hoidal, *Quisling*, p. 480.

8. Abrahamsen, *Norway's Response*, pp. 105-12.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-93. The law was signed by Quisling, Interior Minister Hage- lin, Justice Minister Riisnaes, and a member of Quisling's cabinet who represented the *Nasjonale Samling*, Fuglcsang. Regulations for implementing the law were subsequently signed by Finance Minister Prytz. The worth of the property was rather unspectacular and a German observer in Norway did not fail to notice this fact. He concluded that the Jews had lived "quietly and withdrawn," unable to acquire a "position" in the economy. Mendelsohn, *Jodenes historie i Norge*, vol. 2, p. 136.

10. Hayes, *Quisling*, p. 288.

11. Shipping Minister Irgens of the Quisling administration is reported to have sabotaged the arrests by tipping off the Home Front, which was Norway's under-

Many Jews went into hiding and on the two Sundays of November 15 and 22, 1942, special services were held for the arrested Jews in the Lutheran churches of Sweden.¹²

Then, on November 25, 1942, Günther of the RSHA wrote to the BdS in Oslo (Fehlis) about a sudden opportunity (*plötzlich angebotene Möglichkeit*): the German navy had provided a transport. The ship, the *Donau*, was already in harbor.¹³ Once again, the Norwegian Secret Police, augmented by Oslo police, the Germanske SS-Norge, and members of the Hird (a Quisling party formation), went out and this time seized women and children.¹⁴ On November 26, the *Donau* left with a cargo of 532 victims, including men and their families, for Stettin. In the rush, the transport officer, Untersturmführer Grossmann, forgot to leave the Gestapo's typewriter in Oslo, and his superior, Sturmbannführer Reinhard, wired back for it.¹⁵ The Jews went on to Auschwitz, where a receipt was written out for them on December 1.¹⁶ There had been no time to load the Jews from Trondheim.¹⁷ They arrived in Oslo some hours after the ship had left, but they were not saved.

After the first victims had been loaded on the boat, excitement ran high throughout the Norwegian peninsula. The disturbance of the population reached into circles of collaborators, who purveyed the scene with "lack of comprehension" (*Verständnislosigkeit*), and there were rumors of resigna-

ground, that the Jews were in danger. Hoidal, *Quisling*, p. 845, n. 13. Hoidal bases himself on Mendelsohn, *Jodenes historie i Norge*, vol. 2, pp. 221, 329, 593. Irgens, brother-in-law of Interior Minister Hagelin, had previously succeeded in saving Norwegian shipping in territorial waters from being placed before a prize court in Hamburg as booty. Hoidal, *Quisling*, p. 489.

12. Hugo Valentin, "Rescue and Relief Activities in Behalf of Jewish Victims of Nazism in Scandinavia," *TIVO Annual of Jewish Social Sciences* 3 (1953): 232. See also Steven Koblik, *The Stones Cry Out* (New York, 1988), pp. 59-61, 103-5. For a detailed statistical recapitulation of the fate of Norway's Jews, see Oskar Mendelsohn, "Norwegen," in Wolfgang Benz, ed., *Dimension des Völkermords* (Munich, 1991), pp. 187-97.

13. RSHA IV-B-4 (signed Günther) to BdS in Oslo, copy to Stapolcirstelle in Stettin, November 25, 1942, Israel Police 1622.

14. Samuel Abrahamsen, "The Holocaust in Norway," in Randolph Braham, ed., *Contemporary Views on the Holocaust* (Boston and The Hague, 1983), pp. 128-31.

15. BdS Oslo/IV (signed Reinhard) to Stapolcirstelle Stettin, November 26, 1942, Israel Police 1622.

16. Transfer protocol (*Übergabeprotokoll*), signed by Grossmann and representative of Stapolcirstelle Stettin, November 30, 1942, Israel Police 1622. KL Auschwitz/Kommandantur/II, receipt (*Überrahmebestätigung*), December 1, 1942, Israel Police 1622.

17. Abrahamsen, "The Holocaust in Norway," in Braham, ed., *Contemporary Views*, p. 135.

tions from Quisling's movement.¹⁸ On December 17, 1942, the Swedish minister in Berlin, Richert, declared his government's readiness to accept the (remaining) Norwegian Jews. Staatssekretär Weizsäcker replied that he would not even enter into a conversation on this subject.¹⁹ In Oslo the Swedish Consulate General made strenuous attempts to renaturalize Jews who had formerly been Swedish citizens. To the great annoyance of the Germans, these attempts were carried to the point of inviting some of the arrested Jews, whose connections with Sweden were somewhat tenuous, to apply for Swedish nationality. When the Germans protested against that interference, a Swedish consular official admitted being in possession of an official directive to extend to the "poor Jews who, after all, are only human beings" his helping hand.²⁰

In the face of all these protests, the Germans continued on their course. In February 1943, 158 Jews from Trondheim and other northern areas were loaded on the *Gotenland*.²¹ By 1944, the total number of deportees was 770.²² Nevertheless, the German drive had not been altogether successful. Many prospective victims had been smuggled in small parties across the long border into hospitable Sweden. By the end of the war 930 Jews had found sanctuary there,²³ and a few more had survived in hiding.

In the Oslo area a group of sixty-four Jews in mixed marriages were "quartered" in a camp (*lagermässig untergebracht*). In the fall of 1944 the Swedish Consulate in Oslo approached the BdS with a request to permit the passage of these Jews to Sweden. The matter was referred to Eichmann's deputy in the RSHA, Sturmbannführer Günther, who advised rejection of the Swedish offer.²⁴ Von Thadden of the Foreign Office's Inland II concurred.²⁵ Ribbentrop too wanted the sixty-four Jews to remain in Norway.²⁶ However, in March 1945 they were allowed to leave for Sweden.²⁷

All in all, the diminutive character of the operation did not escape the

18. Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Norwegen/Wehrmachtpropagandagruppe to OKW/Abt. Wehrmachtpropaganda, OKW-637.

19. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, December 17, 1942, NG-2461. Also, Weizsäcker to Albrecht (Legal Division) on Richert's attempt to save five families who had or had formerly possessed Swedish nationality, December 17, 1942, NG-3516.

20. Terboven to Foreign Office, February 18, 1943, NG-5217.

21. Correspondence in Israel Police document 1621.

22. Valentin, "Rescue and Relief Activities," *TTVO Annual*, 3:232.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 234.

24. Günther to von Thadden, October 2, 1944, NG-5217.

25. Gruppe Inland II via Hencke and Stencgracht to Ribbentrop, October 11, 1944, NG-5217.

26. Brenner (Büro RAM) via Stencgracht to Wagner, October 27, 1944, NG-5217.

27. Valentin, "Rescue and Relief Activities," *TWO Annual*, 3:234.

attention of the perpetrators. Some hundreds of Jews had been sent to Auschwitz to be gassed. How could the killing of this handful be justified? That could be done only by exploring in some way the Jewish “influence” in the country. In 1943 Ministerialrat Huhnhäuser of the Education Ministry, endowed with a grant of 2,000 Reichsmark from the SS organization *Ahnenerbe*, went to Norway to study Jewish migrations and intermarriages there. His researches in libraries, archives, and church-registration offices aroused the ire of SS colleagues in the Race and Resettlement Main Office, who protested that uniformly planned research into Jewish genealogy was hampered by separate projects like these.²⁸

Denmark

On the day on which the German army invaded Norway, it also occupied, without resistance, the kingdom of Denmark. For their lack of resistance and also for their “racial” qualities, the Danes were awarded a degree of autonomy that was unusual for a region under German occupation. They were allowed a Danish government, headed in succession by Prime Ministers Stauning, Buhl, and Scavenius, complete with a Parliament, a Foreign Office, and an army. The German agencies in Denmark were limited in their functions. The *Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Dänemark*, at first Kaupisch, then Lüdke, and finally General der Infanterie von Hanneken, was a troop commander, not a military governor. The German envoy in Copenhagen, Gesandter von Renthe-Fink, was a diplomat, not a Reichskommissar. Any interference in Danish internal affairs, particularly Jewish affairs, was considered out of the question.

Nevertheless, the German bureaucrats could not sit still while 6,500 Jews were living freely in a country dominated by German arms. From time to time, therefore, the two Foreign Office officials most concerned with Danish and Jewish matters, the chief of the Scandinavian Referat in the Political Division, von Grundherr, and his colleague in Abteilung Deutschland, the Jewish expert Rademacher, prodded the minister in Copenhagen, von Renthe-Fink, to remind the Danish government of the Jewish problem.¹ However, there was little that von Renthe-Fink could do. His only suggestion was that Jewish firms in Denmark no longer receive allocations of coal and fuel from Germany.²

In November 1942 von Renthe-Fink was replaced by a young, adroit individual, Ministerialdirigent Dr. Werner Best, whose career in Nazi times included appointments in three different hierarchies: as chief of the

28. Srubaf. Osiandcr to Chief of RuSHA OGruf. Hildebrandt, June 3, 1943, NO-4039.

1. Luther to Weizsäcker, January 15, 1942, NG-3931.

2. Luther to legation in Copenhagen, October 1942, NG-5121.

administrative office of the Security Police Main Office, as an official in the military administration in France, and now as the Foreign Office's minister and plenipotentiary in Denmark.³ But even Best had few ideas. Fie reported that Prime Minister Scavenius had threatened to resign with his entire cabinet if the Germans raised a demand for the introduction of anti-Jewish measures. Under the circumstances, Best could propose only the following: (1) the systematic removal of Jews from public life by reporting them individually to the Danish government as intolerable for further cooperation, (2) the systematic removal of Jews from commerce through a stipulation in all orders by German firms that no business would be done with Danish companies owned or partially owned by Jews, and (3) arrests of individual Jews for political or criminal activities.^{4,5} Ribbentrop liked the proposals and scribbled on them his *Ja*.⁵

FFowever, Best was not quite satisfied with his own suggestions. Fie surveyed the situation to discover further possibilities for action and found that the Danish Jews actually had little influence in the country. There were no Jews in Parliament and only thirty-one Jews served in public administration, most of them in positions of little importance. Thirty-five Jews were lawyers, twenty-one were artists, fourteen were editors, though none were editors in chief. A total of 345 Jews were in business, but here too the Jews played no important role. The armament officials in Denmark found that only six out of 700 firms that had armament contracts could be considered Jewish under the German definition of a Jewish enterprise. Two of these firms had already completed their orders, and one had been "Aryanized" by the resignation of a Jewish member of the Verwaltungsrat.

That was the sum total of Jewish influence in Denmark. Was it worthwhile to step on the Danish government to take action against these Jews? Best thought that there was a possibility of taking some action at least against the Jewish refugees in the country. They numbered 845 men, 458 women, and 48 children, or 1,351 in all. But these Jews had been deprived of their German nationality by the 11th Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law. They were therefore stateless and under Danish protection. If only that ordinance could be revoked, Best reasoned, the Reich could take hold of these Jews without stepping on Danish sovereignty.⁶ That proposal, however, seemed much too complicated in Berlin,⁷ and so the Jews in Denmark were still undisturbed when, in August 1943, the situation changed radically.

3. See the biography by Ulrich Herbert, *Best* (Bonn, 1996).

4. Luther to Ribbentrop, January 28, 1943, NG-5121.

5. *Ibid.*, Sonnleithner via Weizsacker to Luther, February 1, 1943, NG-5121.

6. Best to Foreign Office, April 24, 1943, NG-5121.

7. Memorandum by von Thadden, undated, NG-5121.

What happened in Denmark in the late summer and early fall of 1943 is of great interest not because of the physical extent of the operation, which was small, but because of an extraordinary obstacle that arose in the path of the German destructive machine: an uncooperative Danish administration and a local population unanimous in its resolve to save its Jews.

For some time during 1943 the situation in Denmark had been deteriorating. Restlessness had increased, and sabotage had grown to disturb the war effort. In August 1943 Best was called to the *Führerhauptquartier*, where Hitler himself demanded to know what was going on. Hitler ordered Best to declare a state of military emergency in Denmark, a decision which meant that Best would temporarily have to hand over the reins to the military commander. When Best returned to Copenhagen on August 27, 1943, "pale and shaken" by the rebuff he had received, he found that General der Infanterie von Hanneken and members of the legation staff were already discussing the imposition of a state of emergency and the internment of the Danish army.⁸ Two days later, with the Danish army in dissolution, the Scavenius government resigned and left the direction of its ministries in the hands of permanent civil servants. The emergency had begun.

On August 31 the director of the Danish Foreign Ministry, Nils Svenningsen, who was now chief spokesman of the Danish administration, was sitting in his office when a representative of the Jewish Community organization telephoned that Community records containing the names and addresses of all Jews had just been seized by the Germans. Svenningsen immediately went to see Dr. Best, but the German plenipotentiary replied that he did not know anything at all about the seizures.⁹ On September 17 confirmation of the document confiscations came from the German legation. The confiscations were described, however, as a "very small action" (*eine recht kleine Aktion*), a routine search for proof of anti-German activity; they had nothing to do with the "Jewish question."¹⁰

The Jews were still worried. On September 25 the chairman of the Jewish Community organization, C. B. Henriques, accompanied by the deputy chairman, Lachmann, visited Svenningsen in his office and voiced the fear that the Germans might raise the Jewish question now. Svenningsen repeated what the Germans had told him. The Jews wanted to know what would be the attitude of the Danish department chiefs in the

8. Summary of testimony by Präsident Paul Ernst Kanstcin (legation, Copenhagen), April 29, 1947, NG-5208. Summary of testimony by von Hanneken, December 10, 1947, NG-5208.

9. Memorandum by Svenningsen, August 31, 1943, NG-5208.

10. Memorandum by Svenningsen on conversation with Director Dr. Stalman, September 17-18, 1943, NG-5208.

event that the Germans started an Aktion anyhow. Svenningsen answered that the Danish officials would under no circumstances cooperate with the German administration, and that they would protest as strongly as possible against any unilateral German move. Lachmann then inquired whether the Jews might not be "expatriated." Svenningsen replied that an attempted flight to Sweden might provoke the Germans into action. He advised against the move.¹¹ These explanations apparently quieted the Jewish leaders, but in the meantime the Germans were planning their Aktion.

On September 8 Best sent a telegram to Berlin suggesting that advantage be taken of the present emergency to deport the Jews. For this purpose he needed police, soldiers, and ships.¹² This was the kind of proposal Berlin wanted to hear, and on the very next day Best was reinstated with full powers as plenipotentiary.¹³ He was now dictator of Denmark. By September 18 Hitler had decided that the Danish Jews were to be deported,¹⁴ and at the same time, Ribbentrop requested Best to submit data on his plans and needs for the coming operation.¹⁵

In Copenhagen, Best discussed the project with his advisers, particularly Paul Kanstein and Georg Duckwitz. Both, like Best himself, had a background in the Nazi party. Duckwitz had served in Rosenberg's office. He had also been in Denmark for a lengthy period before the war, concerned with shipping. His reaction to the anti-Jewish measures was negative, and reportedly he advised General von Hanneken to refrain from participating in the operation.¹⁶

The man in charge of the undertaking was the newly installed BdS, Standartenführer Mildner. He received 185 members of the Security Police. In addition, three Order Police battalions were available.¹⁷ When

11. Memorandum by Svenningsen, September 25, 1943, NG-5208.

12. Best to Foreign Office, September 8, 1943, NG-5121.

13. Summary of testimony by Kanstein, April 29, 1947, NG-5208.

14. Sonnleithner via Steengracht to Hcnckc, September 18, 1943, NG-5121.

15. Von Grundherr to Best, September 19, 1943, NG-5121. Sonnleithner via Steengracht to Hcnckc, September 18, 1943, NG-5121.

16. Gustav Meissner, *Dänemark unterm Hakenkreuz* (Berlin, 1990), pp. 299-301, 338-41. Meissner was a press attache in the German legation at Copenhagen during the war. Duckwitz traveled to Berlin in September to discover what would happen and to Sweden for the purpose of passing the word to the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39. Loni Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry* (Philadelphia, 1969), pp. 148-51, 173-74. Harold Flender, *Rescue in Denmark* (New York, 1963), pp. 46-50. It is unlikely, however, that Duckwitz acted without the knowledge and at least tacit approval of Best. Tatiana Brustein-Berenstein, "The Historiographic Treatment of the Abortive Attempt to Deport the Danish Jews," *Tad Vashem Studies* 17(1986): 181-218.

17. Rasmus Krøth and Michael Mogensen, *Fluften til Sverige* (Copenhagen,

further augmentations were sought from the military commander's Secret Field Police and Field Gendarmerie, General von Hanneken refused to transfer his men to the BdS.*¹⁸ Plenipotentiary Dr. Best then requested the general to issue a decree requiring the Jews to report at Wehrmacht offices for "vork." Again von Hanneken refused. This refusal meant that instead of catching the Jews by ordering them to present themselves at assembly points, the police would have to institute a door-to-door search.¹⁹

On September 23 von Hanneken wrote to Berlin to request postponement of the deportations to a period *after* the conclusion of the state of emergency. He did not wish the emergency to be used as an excuse for anti-Jewish action. "The implementation of die Jewish deportations during the military state of emergency," he wrote, "impairs the prestige of the Wehrmacht in foreign countries."²⁰ Generaloberst Jodi did not take to this suggestion kindly. Reading the report, he wrote on it the following words: "Nonsense. These are matters of state necessity [*Geschwätz. Esgeht um staatliche Notwendigkeiten*]."²¹ Rebuffed, von Hanneken agreed to a minimum of cooperation. He promised the dispatch of a fifty-man detachment to cordon off the harbor area as a precaution against disturbances during the loading. This measure, he reasoned, involved the army not in "arrests" but only in the maintenance of law and order.²²

By that time Best had some second thoughts himself. Pointing to possible repercussions, he expressed the fear that the political situation would be exacerbated, that there might be disturbances and a general strike, that conceivably the king might abdicate. Ribbentrop thereupon

1995), pp. 22-24. Affidavit by Dr. Rudolf Mildner, November 16, 1945, PS-2375. The Gestapo chief was Karl Heinz Hoffmann. His testimony may be found in the International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XX, pp. 156 ff. A Gestapo post in the eastern port city of Helsingor was established under Heinz Juhl. Resistance Museum, Copenhagen. As to the Order Police, one small battalion was in Denmark before September, and two others were ordered there. OKW/WFSt/Qu Z(N), signed by Jodi, to Foreign Office, att. Ambassador Ritter, and General von Hanneken, with copies to Reichsführer-SS/Kommandostab and Chief of the Replacement Army (Fromm), September 22, 1943, UK-56. One of the battalions, Polizeiwachbattailon Danemark, formed June 18, 1943, had already been destined for the country'. Georg Tessin, *Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936-1945* (Koblenz, 1956), pt. II, p. 82.

18. Ritter to Best, September 19, 1943, NG-5105. Best to Foreign Office, September 29, 1943, NG-5105. Ribbentrop to Best, September 29, 1943, NG-5105.

19. Best to Foreign Office, October 2, 1943, NG-3921.

20. Befehlshaber Danemark Abt. Ia/Qu to OKW/WFSt (Jodi), September 23, 1943, NOKW-356.

21. Remarks initialed by Jodi, on report by von Hanneken, NOKW-356.

22. Summary of testimony by von Hanneken, December 10, 1947, NG-5208.

resubmitted the question to Hitler, who doubted that the action would have these consequences. It was to be carried out as ordered.²³

On September 28, 1943, Best reported that the operation would take place in one night, October 1-2.²⁴ Two thousand Jews in the interior of the country were to be transported by rail, and the four thousand in Copenhagen by ship.²⁵ In the Transport Ministry's Railway Operations Division (E II), Ministerialrat Schnell of Referat 21 (Passenger Trains) was visited by Gunther and Kryschak of the RSHA. Acting without delay, Schnell instructed Karl Hein of 212 to dispatch telegrams to the German Railway Plenipotentiary in Denmark for thirty freight cars and to the railway directorates of Hamburg and Stettin for sixty.²⁶

The hardening of the decision prompted Duckwitz to reveal the German plan to a prominent Danish acquaintance, Hans Hedtoft (later a Prime Minister of Denmark) on September 28.²⁷ Hedtoft lost no time in notifying his friends of the news, and he himself set out to warn Henriques, the president of the Jewish community. After requesting to speak to the president in private, Hedtoft informed Henriques of the impending deportation in all its details. When the Dane had finished, the Jewish leader spoke only two words: "You're lying." It took a long time before Hedtoft could convince Henriques of the truth. The president repeated despairingly that he just could not understand how it could be true; after all, he had just returned from a visit to Svenningsen, who had assured him that nothing could happen. At last, however, Henriques was convinced. On the following morning, September 29, when the Jewish congregation met in synagogues on the occasion of the Jewish New Year, the news was communicated to the entire community.²⁸

At the very moment when the Jewish leaders warned the community to scatter, they informed Svenningsen that they were absolutely certain of the advent of the deportations. Svenningsen called together the top civil servants and, following a conference of the department chiefs, looked up the German plenipotentiary, Dr. Werner Best. Svenningsen began the conversation with Best by pointing out that ordinarily it was proper to

23. Ribbentrop memorandum of September 23, 1943, with Hitler's reactions recorded in marginal notation initialed most probably by Horst Wagner of Inland II. Facsimile in Yahil, *Rescue of Danish Jenny*, pp. 162-63. See also Erdmannsdorff to Best, September 28, 1943, NG-5121.

24. Best to Foreign Office, September 28, 1943, NG-5121.

25. Best to Foreign Office, October 1, 1943, NG-3921.

26. Statement by Karl Hein, April 18, 1969, Case Ganzenmuller, 8 Js 430/67, vol. XVII, pp. 98-103. Hein filled in for Stange of 211, who was hospitalized at the time.

27. Account based on the foreword by Hans Hedtoft, in Aage Bertelsen, *October '43* (New York, 1954), pp. 17-19.

28. Hedtoft in Bertelsen, *October '43*, pp. 17-19.

ignore rumors. The rumors of the impending deportations, however, were so persistent and so detailed that they could no longer be ignored. Best had to understand that the consequences of this action were not predictable. Excitement was running high throughout the country, for the question was of tremendous importance to the population as a whole and to the civil servants and the leaders of the Danish administration in particular. Best replied cautiously by asking a few questions. What precisely was being said? What were the rumors based on? Where did they originate? Svenningsen told Best what was being said: Deportations to Poland. Only full Jews. Ships in harbor.

Then Svenningsen reminded Best that almost a month before, the Germans had raided the Jewish community headquarters on Nybrogade and Ny Kongensgade, where they had seized the address lists. Everything, therefore, pointed to a completed deportation plan. Best reiterated that he had no plans. He did not know anything about ships. Svenningsen then asked the plenipotentiary whether he was prepared to deny the truth of the rumors. Best replied that it was rather difficult to explain that something was *not* going to happen, but if Svenningsen insisted, he would ask Berlin whether he could issue a denial.²⁹

In Berlin, in the meantime (October 1), the Swedish Minister, Richert, offered on behalf of his government to accept the Danish Jews about to be deported. Staatssekretär Steengracht replied that he knew nothing about an intended operation against the Jews.³⁰ That same night, the roundups began.

Svenningsen, with a letter from the King and a decision of the Danish Supreme Court in his pocket, attempted to see Best again. The German plenipotentiary, however, was indisposed, and Svenningsen handed the documents to Best's deputy, Minister Barandon. Shortly thereafter, the Danish chief prosecutor, Hoff, received notice from the legation that the roundups were under way. Hoff was requested to inform the Danish police of the action, "in order to avoid clashes between the police and German agencies participating in the arrests."

Svenningsen now tried to reach Best by phone but found that the telephone lines had been cut. Shortly after midnight he at last succeeded in seeing the plenipotentiary. Best confirmed everything but explained that Jews capable of labor would be employed and that the older and unemployable deportees would be sent to Theresienstadt in Bohemia, "where the Jews were enjoying self-government and where they were living under decent conditions [*wo die Juden Selbstverwaltung genössen und*

29. Memorandum by Svenningsen, September 30, 1943, NG-5208.

30. Memorandum by Steengracht, with copies to Hcncke and von Grundherr, October 1, 1943, NG-4093.

unter anständigen Verhältnissen lebten]" Best then told the Danish official some good news. The imprisoned Danish soldiers would be released; only officers would remain under detention. During the following morning Präsident Kanstein of the legation telephoned Svenningsen and promised him that the seizures would cease. At the same time he requested that the Danish bureaucracy establish a trusteeship administration over the empty Jewish apartments.³¹

Throughout the night German police armed with address lists moved from door to door to arrest Jews. Because the policemen had to be careful to avoid clashes with Danish police forces, they were under orders to seize only those Jews who voluntarily opened their doors in response to ringing or knocking.³² In the morning it was clear that less than 10 percent of the Danish Jews had been apprehended. Only 477 Jews were shipped to Theresienstadt.³³ The drive was a failure.³⁴

Anticipating the roundup, a small number of Jews fled Denmark on boats just before it began. One of the first refugees was the half-Jewish physicist Niels Bohr. Upon his arrival in Sweden, Bohr met with Swedish Foreign Minister Günther and the Swedish king and asked them to make a public declaration granting asylum to the Jews of Denmark.³⁵ During the evening of October 2, the Swedish government released a communique revealing its offer to the Germans to receive all the Danish Jews in Sweden.³⁶ But the Jews were still in danger.

Almost the entire Jewish community went into hiding with Danish families. On Sunday, October 3, a pastoral letter, signed on behalf of all the Danish bishops by H. Fuglsang Damgaard, was read from the pulpits

31. Memorandum by Svenningsen, October 2, 1943, NG-5208.

32. Best to Foreign Office, October 5, 1943, NG-3920.

33. Judgment of Danish court in trial of Best et al., September 20, 1948, NG-5887. Theresienstadt statistics indicate 456 arrivals in 1943 and 11 in 1944. Fifty-two died there. H. G. Adler, *Theresienstadt* (Tubingen, 1960), pp. 42-43, 47. Danish Jews were not deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz, and representatives of the Danish Red Cross and International Red Cross were permitted to visit the deportees in the ghetto. Affidavit by Eberhard von Thadden, June 21, 1946, Ribbentrop 319.

34. Sec Hencke to Copenhagen legation, October 4, 1943, NG-3920, and also. Best to Foreign Office, October 5, 1943, NG-3920. Understandably, Best heaped all the blame upon the military.

35. Yahil, *Rescue of Danish Jenny*, pp. 327-30; Flender, *Rescue in Denmark*, pp. 75-77. Bohr was a Nobel laureate. Both authors interviewed him after the war. See also account by Stefan Rozenal, "The Forties and the Fifties," in S. Rozenal, ed., *Kiels Rohr* (New York, 1967), pp. 149-90, at pp. 168-69. Rozenal, a scientist in Bohr's Copenhagen institute, escaped to Sweden at the same time.

36. George Axelsson, "Sweden Offers Aid to Denmark's Jews," *New York Times*, October 3, 1943, p. 29. Bohr's arrival in Sweden is noted on the same page. See also report in *The Times* (London), October 4, 1943, p. 3.

of most of the churches. The message stated that persecution conflicted with the gospels, and then continued: “We will struggle for the right of our Jewish brothers and sisters to preserve the same liberty that we prize more highly than life itself?”³⁷

The struggle was just beginning, for the Jews could not remain in hiding forever. On October 4 the Swedish minister in Berlin, stressing public opinion in his country, requested the German Foreign Office to grant exit permits for Jewish children. Staatssekretär Steengracht brushed off the request and, in a memorandum written on the same day, criticized the “Bolshevik” attitude of the Swedish press, which had given so much publicity to the operation.³⁸ By now, however, the Swedes were resolved to pursue their course. In Copenhagen the Swedish envoy, Gustav von Dardel, assured Danish officials that sanctuary would be given to all Jews who could be ferried across to Sweden.³⁹ What followed was one of the most remarkable rescue operations in history.

The organizers of the expedition were private people who made themselves available for the task at a moment’s notice. They were doctors, schoolteachers, students, businessmen, taxi drivers, housewives. None were professionals in a business like this. They faced considerable problems. To reach Sweden the Jews had to cross the Sund, a stretch of water live to fifteen miles in width. The organizers had to mobilize the Danish fishing fleet to ferry the Jews to the opposite shore, they had to see to it that the fishermen were paid, and they had to make sure that the Jews were moved undetected to the beaches and loaded safely on the vessels.

The German commandant of Copenhagen harbor, on the advice of his friend Duckwitz, sent his speedboats into repair for overhaul and reported them inoperable.⁴⁰ Coastal control was now in the hands of the Danish Coastal Police, which was not going to interfere with the traffic.⁴¹ The operators of the small boats, which made hundreds of trips to Sweden, could not be sure, however, of their safety.⁴²

The financial problem was solved in a unique manner. On the average, the one-way trip cost 500 kroner (\$100) per person, and theoretically, the Jews were to pay for their own passage. However, the Danish Jews were

37. Text in Jorgen H. Barford, *Escape from Nazi Terror* (Copenhagen, 1968), pp. 12-13.

38. Steengracht to von Sonnleithner, October 4, 1943, NG-4093.

39. Birtelscn, *October '43*, p. 73. The author, a Danish schoolteacher, was one of the rescue organizers.

40. Meissner, *Denmark*, p. 341.

41. Krcth and Mogenscn, *Flugten*, pp. 44-53, 64-85. On October 5, Best wrote to the Foreign Office that there were no available ships for interception, NG-3920.

42. See the details of precautions as told by rescuers and survivors in Leo Goldberger, ed., *The Rescue of the Danish Jews* (New York, 1987).

not particularly well off, and many did not have the required cash. The deficit had to be made up somehow. Danish state funds and Jewish community reserves could not be used because of German surveillance. It was therefore necessary to rely heavily upon contributions by Danes.

In the words of one of the organizers, Aage Bertelsen, “the entire economy of the assistance to the Jews could be based on nothing but a personal relationship of trust. Money was paid and received without the giving of any receipts at all, to say nothing of any kind of accountkeeping.”⁴³ Bertelsen sent Pastor Krohn to a lumber merchant, Johannes Fog, to borrow some money. “Mr. Bertelsen? Who is he?” inquired the merchant, as he handed over 2,000 kroner with a promise of 10,000 more. When Pastor Krohn turned to go, Fog shouted after him, “Tell him I’ll make it 20,000.” Within ten days this merchant had lent almost 150,000 kroner to the undertaking.⁴⁴

The financial problem was not the only one to be solved. The organizers required many additional forms of assistance, and help came from every quarter. The Danish police shielded the operators by warning them of danger, individuals helped sell Jewish belongings, taxi drivers transported the Jews to the ports, house and apartment owners offered the victims shelter, Pastor Krohn handed out blank baptismal certificates, druggists supplied free stimulants to keep people awake, and so on.⁴⁵

The Jews were moved to fishing ports north and south of the capital. At the northernmost point on Zealand Island, the town of Gilleleje, whose population in 1940 consisted of 1,682 persons, harbored almost as many Jews as it had inhabitants. A Gestapo raid from nearby Helsingør (Elsinore) resulted in the seizure of several dozen Jews hiding in the loft of the Gilleleje church.⁴⁶ There were other mishaps. Some of the organizers were arrested, a few were subjected to a rifle fusillade, and one, the twenty-year-old engineering student Claus Heilesen, was killed by German bullets when a loading party was discovered.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, boats left almost every day throughout October, and when the operation was over, 5,919 full Jews, 1,301 part Jews, and 686 non-Jews who were married to Jews had been brought ashore in Sweden.⁴⁸

One of the ironies of the Danish operation was a propagandistic announcement by Best on October 2, 1943. In this declaration he under-

43. Bertelsen, *October '43*, p. 60.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 64 ft.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-48, 64, 138, 84 ft., 168.

46. Barford, *Escape from Nazi Terror*, pp. 17-20, 23-24.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 23; Bertelsen, *October '43*, pp. 168, 172. See also detailed descriptions of flights in Yahil, *Rescue of Danish Jenny*, and Flender, *Rescue in Denmark*.

48. Hugo Valentin, “Rescue and Relief Activities in Behalf of Jewish Victims of Nazism in Scandinavia,” *TIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 3 (1953): 239.

scored the necessity for the deportations by pointing out that the Jews had “morally and materially abetted” the Danish sabotage movement. The Danish population, for whom the proclamation was intended, was not taken in by the propaganda, but the German Foreign Office was. The Foreign Office bureaucrats wired for additional facts on Jewish espionage and sabotage. On October 18 Best was forced to report that there really was no Jewish sabotage, that ever since the occupation had started the Jews had “restrained themselves very much,” that the announcement had been made only in order to justify the deportations (*um des Zweckes Willen*), and that it was not based on any concrete proof (*ohne dass konkrete Unterlaßen hietfür vorlaßen*)*⁴⁹

THE WEST

German influence was extended westward and south, from the Netherlands to Italy, as a consequence of the lightning war of May and June 1940. In the course of that campaign the Low Countries and a large part of France were delivered into the German power sphere as occupied territories, while Italy was brought into the German fold as an ally. Ultimately all of France was engulfed, and Italy too was to be little more than an occupied area.

Proceeding counterclockwise through the western regions, one can observe the progress of this consolidation. From the outset the German hold was strongest on the Netherlands, whose central administration, devoid of ministers, was completely subjected to the dictates of a Reichskommissar. Belgium, like the Netherlands, had a central administration without any political direction save that supplied by a German military governor. In France the armistice marked the establishment of a satellite regime that enjoyed diplomatic relations with the outside world and maintained armed forces in unoccupied portions of the metropolitan area and in possessions overseas. The French jurisdiction, however, was subject to the overriding orders of a German military government in the occupied territory and to German diplomatic and military pressure in the unoccupied zone. Late in 1942 the free zone too was occupied. Now Italy alone remained fully independent in policy and action, and after the Italian downfall of 1943, German power became paramount there too.

In general, the extent of Jewish vulnerability in a western territory varied with the degree of German control exercised therein. Thus we find that the Jews of the Netherlands were living in the greatest jeopardy, whereas the Jews of Italy were for the longest time in the safest position. These geographic differences in vulnerability may be viewed in the percentages of survivors: the lowest undoubtedly in the Netherlands, the

49. Best to Foreign Office, October 18, 1943, NG-5092.

highest most probably in Italy. To some extent the vulnerability pattern was reflected also in a southward flight of Jews from the Netherlands to Belgium, from Belgium and Luxembourg to northern France, from northern France to southern France, and—within the southern French area — from German-controlled provinces to regions dominated by die Italians.

Within each country of the western arc there was also a difference in the vulnerability of old Jewish residents and more recent arrivals. The western areas had old established, wholly assimilated, and completely integrated Jewish populations that had resided in their homes for centuries. But the western states were host also to a fairly large number of newly arrived, unassimilated, and frequently stateless Jewish immigrants who had been admitted from Poland and Germany in the period between the two wars. These immigrants (whose numbers approached roughly 40 percent of the total Jewish population) were more vulnerable to anti-Jewish action than the established segment. The new Jews tended to be siphoned off in the first deportation transports.

Many factors contributed to this situation. The refugees were poor, alone, and conspicuous. Above all, they had too little protection. The indigenous western authorities were somehow prone to defend and protect their recently admitted Jewish charges with less fervor and less determination than they expended for their old, well-established, and thoroughly absorbed Jewish communities. In France, Jewish immigrants were sacrificed in an attempt to save the long-assimilated Jews.

We find, therefore, that the operations in the West were marked by variations in destructive effect. The Germans could count on maximum damage only where power and might were all their own. Where help was needed from indigenous sources, native Jews became immune. In the total operational picture, the persistence of these variations spelled out something less than complete success. Nevertheless, the Germans managed to inflict upon the western Jewish communities frightful wounds in size and depth.

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands the Jews were destroyed with a thoroughness comparable to the relentless uprooting process in the Reich itself. From the outset, the Dutch Jews were vulnerable because of their geographic position. The terrain of the Netherlands is flat and, apart from marshlands in the coastal regions, there are no large woods or other natural hiding places. To the east, the country was bordered by the Reich, to the south by occupied Belgium, and to the north and west by the open sea. The Jewish community of some 140,000 people had settled primarily in the coastal provinces of North and South Holland, and the pattern of this

Settlement was overwhelmingly urban, with 80,000 Jews in Amsterdam alone. It was as though the Dutch Jews were already living in a trap.

A second catastrophic factor in the situation of the Jews was the efficiency of the German administration in the Netherlands. The office of the Reichskommissar was an agency not merely invested with absolute power but prepared to exercise its power with utter ruthlessness and efficiency. Several Austrian personalities stood at the helm of that destructive machine: Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart; his Generalkommissar for Administration, Wimmer; his Generalkommissar for Economic Affairs, Fischböck; and Higher SS and Police Leader Brigadeführer (later Obergruppenführer) Rauter. Propaganda Minister Goebbels had already said in admiration of the Austrians that their Habsburg training had endowed them with special abilities in the treatment of subject peoples.¹

Unlike Norway, the Netherlands had no puppet regime, but the Dutch government had left behind secretaries general in the ministries, who continued to run the Dutch bureaucracy and who conferred with each other frequently between 1940 and October 1942. They attempted to maintain stability without identifying themselves with German aims, but in that difficult role they were more pliant than rebellious.²

The Reichskommissar lost little time in beginning the destruction process in Holland. As Seyss-Inquart stated himself, he acted not upon instructions from Berlin but upon his own initiative.³ As a jurist he was perhaps not wholly without scruples in proceeding toward a headlong clash with international law, but he reasoned that the armistice that had been concluded with the Netherlands did not apply to Germany's eternal enemy, the Jews. "The Jews for us," he said, "are not Dutchmen. They are those enemies with whom we can come neither to an armistice nor to a peace."⁴

Toward the end of August 1940, Generalkommissar Wimmer instructed the groups of Dutch secretaries general to "see to it" that there would be no civil service appointments or promotions of persons having "Jewish blood." After some discussion, the chairman of the secretaries general, A. M. Snouck Hurgronje and the Secretary General of the Interior, K. J. Frederiks, replied to Wimmer that "for the moment" they would refrain from promotions. Frederiks then inquired how one should define Jewish blood and was told that the provision applied to anyone who had a Jewish grandparent. On October 1, Frederiks went on to direct the provincial authorities to cease appointments of such persons.

1. Lochner, *Goebbels Diaries*, entry for September 8, 1943, p. 426.

2. Sec Gerhard Hirschteld, *Fremdherrschaft und Kollaboratimi* (Stuttgart, 1984), pp. 86-100.

3. Testimony by Seyss-Inquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XV, 666.

4. Seyss-Inquart, "Four Years in Holland," 1944, PS-3430.

To discover who was Jewish or partly Jewish in the public sector, the Dutch Interior Ministry issued a circular to provincial and local bodies requiring all civil servants and employees to fill out forms with information about Jewish descent. The survey had barely been ordered, when Snouck Hurgronje informed his colleagues on October 5 of a German demand to dismiss all Jews from the civil service. The Dutch secretaries general replied to Seyss-Inquart on November 25 that this measure was repugnant to them, but that they would comply with it loyally, since they regarded it as a provisional action taken for the maintenance of order and security. A total of 2,092 persons identified as Jewish or part-Jewish on the questionnaires were subject to dismissal. There were no repercussions.⁵

As in the case of Germany, so also the move against non-Aryans in the Dutch civil service was to be followed by a definition of the term "Jew" with broader purposes in mind. Decreed on October 22, 1940, the formulation followed the Nuremberg principle in every respect.⁶

The only change was in the date from which half-Jews had to be free from adherence to the Jewish religion or marriage to a Jewish partner in order to be excluded from the ranks of the Jewish victims. In the Reich the cutoff date was September 16, 1935 (that is, the day before the publication of the Nuremberg decree), whereas in Holland that date was May 9, 1940 (the day preceding the commencement of the western campaign). All in all, then, the definition decree was an orthodox measure.

Similarly, the economic destruction process in the Netherlands followed almost in its entirety the German pattern, from dismissals from office and jobs to the curtailments of Jewish activities in the professions. Only in the field of Aryanizations did the pattern differ from that in the Reich, but even here the Aryanization problems were not unlike those of the Protektorat. Both Holland and the Protektorat were areas in which German enterprises were interested in Jewish property not only for its own sake but also as a lever to be used against native industrial concen-

5. Hirschfeld, *Fremdherrschaft*, pp. 90-91 and footnotes on pp. 245-46. Jacob Presser, *The Destruction of the Dutch Jews* (New York, 1969), pp. 16-33. The secretary general for economic affairs, Hans Max Hirschfeld, was identified as a half-Jew by the Security Police. Special report by the BdS for 1942, p. 71, T 175, Roll 670. Louis De Jong identifies the father of Hirschfeld as a Jew and the mother as a Protestant. See his *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldwlog* (VGravenhage, 1969-82), vol. 4, pt. 1 (1972), pp. 150-53. Hirschfeld, who was born in Bremen and baptized a Protestant himself, had gained considerable experience in banking and foreign trade before the war. He had received a decoration from the Germans in 1939, and is said to have abhorred any resistance to German rule during the occupation. Untouched, he remained in office. Nanda van der Zee, *Um Schlimmeres zu verhinderst . . .* (Munich and Vienna, 1999), pp. 203-4.

6. *Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete*, 1940, p. 33.

option, and in every Jewish claim, for one could never tell when a minority Jewish holding in an enterprise or in a market could be combined with a minority' German share to produce control.¹²

Holland was a wide-open market, and within a few months it was overrun by a phalanx of German businessmen in search of opportunities for capital penetration. Among the enterprises with representatives in the Netherlands were Siemens; Brown, Boverie et Cie; Schering A. G.; Rheinmetall-Borsig A. G.; Vereinigte Papierfabriken, Nuremberg; Reiwinkel K. G., Berlin; and a host of others.¹³ To bring together buyers and sellers, German banks moved into Holland and established branches there. The most important financial institution in the Dutch Aryanization business was the Dresdner Bank; its subsidiary in the Netherlands was the Handelstrust West.¹⁴

After a few months of unhampered "voluntary Aryanizations" the Reichskommissar stepped in to lay the foundation for a bureaucratic regulation of the Aryanization process. The function of the Reichskommissar was a difficult one: in a broad sense, he had to safeguard the German interest vis-a-vis the Jews and the Dutch. Thus the marking and registration of enterprises tended to frustrate Jewish camouflage, the provision for official approval of transactions was a device for eliminating the interested Dutch concerns, the appointment (wherever necessary) of trustees responsible to the state could hurry the process along, and the compulsory deposit of Jewish securities assured to the German investor an opportunity to penetrate a variety of Dutch enterprises.

At the same time, however, the Reichskommissar had to preserve also a more narrow interest, for he had to protect the claims of the state vis-a-vis those of the German business sector. In the last analysis the Jewish sellers were acting as agents of the state, for the less they received for their property, the less could be confiscated from them in the end. In attempting thus to use the regulatory mechanism not only to help German business but also to supervise its activities, the Reichskommissar faced an

12. Aryanizations accounted for about one half of all capital penetrations (*Kapitalverflechtungen*) in Holland. Affidavit by Dr. Robert Hobirk (Dresdner Bank capital-interlacing expert), November 12, 1947, NI-13647. The largest outright acquisitions, moreover, involved purchases of Jewish, rather than Dutch, concerns. Rademacher to Luther, November 22, 1941, NI-8853.

13. Rinn (Dresdner Bank director in charge of Securities Division) to Rasche, March 13, 1942, NI-8863. Affidavit by Dr. Robert Hobirk, October 2, 1947, NI-13743.

14. Rjonecker (Handelstrust West) to Dr. Rasche (Dresdner Bank), December 9, 1940, NI-13416. Organization plan of Handelstrust West (signed Stockburger), March 28, 1941, NI-8864. The Dresdner Bank itself was also a purchaser of Jewish securities. See Vorstand meeting, June 11, 1942, NI-14841.

almost impossible task; for, while the German businessmen were quite ready to accept official assistance, they were far less happy to submit to official control.

On October 22, 1940, the first decree was issued.¹⁵ It provided for the registration of enterprises and the approval of transactions. For the enforcement of these measures the Reichskommissar created a new agency, the *Wirtschaftsprüfstelle*. This agency, which was headed by a Foreign Office bureaucrat, Konsul Kühn,¹⁶ was soon in difficulty. It goes without saying that in making its decisions to approve the price and the purchaser in proposed transactions, the *Wirtschaftsprüfstelle* had to take into account the “preparatory work” done by the banks. But that was not all. A second agency was set up with very similar functions in the Generalkommissariat for Finance and Economic Questions, where it was directed by a triumvirate consisting of Dr. Mojert (Deutsche Bank), Dr. Ansmami (Dresdner Bank), and Dr. Holz (Reichskreditgesellschaft).¹⁷ The functions of the Mojert office comprised the approval of all transactions exceeding 100,000 guilders in value and the disposal of all Jewish securities.¹⁸ As one German observer noted, the two agencies were engaged in a certain amount of “duplication” (*Nebeneinanderarbeiten*).¹⁹ To put it plainly, the businessmen had actually succeeded in neutralizing the power of the *Wirtschaftsprüfstelle* by building their own agency right into the central administration of the Reichskommissar.

A Jewish enterprise in Holland was exposed, just as in the Reich, to one of three fates: liquidation, “voluntary Aryanization,” or Aryanization in pursuance of trusteeship administration. As a matter of general policy, small firms were to be “bled white” through an interruption of their merchandise supply.²⁰ The effect of this bleeding could be the death of the enterprise. Liquidation was the fate of about 10,000 Jewish firms in Holland.²¹ Companies classified as Jewish only because of the presence of

15. *Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete*, 1940, p. 33.

16. Memorandum by Dellschow (Handelstrust West), October 23, 1940, NI-13415. Rienckcr to Dr. Rasche, Bardroff, Dr. Hobirk, Dellschow, Dr. Entzian (all of Dresdner Bank), March 5, 1941, NI-8866. Note by Dellschow, March 17, 1941, NI-13418.

17. Rienckcr to Rasche and other Dresdner Bank officials, March 5, 1941, NI-8866.

18. Affidavit by Dr. Robert Hobirk, November 12, 1947, NI-13647, Handelstrust West to *GcnemUummissariat*, attention Dr. Pfeffer, March 16, 1942, NI-8929, 100,000 guilders = RM 132,000 = \$53,000.

19. File note, Handelstrust West, April 2, 1941, NI-13398.

20. Armament Inspectorate Niederlande/Z/WS to OKW/Wi Rü, Februar' 11, 1941, WI/IA 5. 12.

21. Report by Dutch government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726.

a minority of Jews on the board or in the management were encouraged to remove the “Jewish influence” by means of “self-Aryanization.” “Self-Aryanization” occurred in the case of 8,000 companies.²² The remaining firms, consisting of a hard core of about 3,000 Jewish enterprises whose productive capacity was suitable for acquisition, were the subject of scrutiny for the possible installation of trustees.

A trustee was empowered to act with complete freedom from the owners. He could sell the enterprise to a buyer, subject only to the permission of the two competing agencies that had jurisdiction in approving transactions: the Wirtschaftsprüfstelle and the Generalkommissariat. And who controlled the trustees? A clue may be found in a report of the Handelstrust West to its parent institution, the Dresdner Bank. According to that report the Handelstrust West advised clients who were interested in Jewish firms to submit names of prospective trustees, complete with recommendations from the party and competent Chamber of Commerce, to die Wirtschaftsprüfstelle of Konsul Kühn.²³ In other words, the initial choice of a trustee was in the hands of the very people to whom he was going to sell the property. Here again was a procedure that had evolved in the Reich and the Protektorat.²⁴

The last stage of the Aryanization process, the deposit of securities, was ordered in August 1941. The depository was a liquidated Jewish bank (Lippmann-Rosenthal) that had been taken over by the Reichskommissar. However, the agency that controlled the disposal of the securities was the aforementioned bank-oriented Generalkommissariat. To obtain a parcel of papers for a client, the interested bank had only to request an official in the Kommissariat to direct Lippmann-Rosenthal to free the securities for sale.²⁵

Statistics are lacking to determine precisely how much the German investors profited from pocketing the difference between die purchase

22. *Die Judenfrage*, May 15, 1942, p. 101.

23. Handelstrust West to Dresdner Bank/Syndicate Division, March 22, 1941, NI-10617.

24. The German investors in Holland were serviced also by the *Niederländische Aktiengesellschaft für die Abwicklung von Unternehmungen* (NAGU). The NAGU had been established by three accounting firms (including the Treuhandvereinigung A. G., which was owned by directors of the Dresdner Bank). Affidavit by Dr. Hans Pilder (Vorstand, Dresdner Bank), October 2, 1947, NI-13738; Handelstrust West N. V. (signed Knobloch and Dellschow) to Dresdner Bank/Auslandsssekretariat S. March 29, 1941, NI-13758.

25. Dutch banks participated in this business. However, the Dresdner Bank subsidiary, Handelstrust West, got the lion's share. File Note, Handelstrust West, undated, NI-13754; affidavit by Dr. Walter von Karger (German manager of Lippmann-Rosenthal), September 24, 1947, NI-13904. The Dresdner Bank itself purchased Jewish securities, Vorstand meeting, Dresdner Bank, August 11, 1941, NI-14-98.

price and actual value. We may assume that the amount was in the hundreds of millions of guilders.²⁶

The Jews in Holland had few opportunities to spend their money before the machinery of destruction closed in on them. In August 1941 all Jewish assets, including bank deposits, cash, claims, securities, and valuables, were blocked with a view to their ultimate confiscation. A maximum of only 250 guilders a month was made available to a Jewish owner for his private use.²⁷

Yet there were moments when the well-to-do had a chance to save themselves and, in some cases, a part of their wealth. For example, at the very beginning of the occupation, when Germany was still looking forward to the conclusion of peace treaties with the Western countries, emigration, even with some allocations of foreign currency, was not altogether impossible.²⁸ During this early phase of the Aryanizations, the owner of one of the major retail establishments, Reveillon, was able to obtain sympathetic consideration for his request to emigrate with some foreign currency.²⁹ That case was not the only one.

Three refugees from Germany, Dr. Lippmann Bloch, Dr. Albert Bloch, and Karl Ginsberg, owners of the Nord Europeesche Erts- en Pyriet Maatschappij N. V. (NEEP), a trading company in ores and minerals in Amsterdam, managed to leave Holland in 1940 without relinquishing their hold on the enterprise. The two Blochs were able to accomplish this feat because they were nationals of Liechtenstein. Throughout the occupation the enterprise was run by a Dutch director and two agents (*Prokuristen*), one of whom was the Swiss consul. (Switzerland handled Liechtenstein's foreign affairs.) Moreover, the company was able to pay

26. The Reichskommissariat ultimately confiscated 400,000,000 guilders from the Jews. Testimony by Scyss-Inquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, pp. 65-66. The few individual transactions at our disposal reveal not only that the Jews contracted to sell their property for less than it was worth but that often long-term payment features reduced still further the effective compensation. Thus, if a business worth 100,000 guilders was sold for 50,000 guilders with the proviso that payment be made in ten equal yearly installments, no more than perhaps 10,000 guilders (for one-tenth of value) may ultimately have been collected.

27. The agency in charge of blocking was Lippmann-Rosenthal. Affidavit by Dr. Walter von Karger, September 24, 1947, NI-13904.

28. Memorandum by Stiller (Dresdner Bank), February 13, 1941, NI-9915. Memorandum by Knobloch (Handelstrust West), May 5, 1941, NI-13771. BdS Niederlande to Generalkommissariat for Finance and Economy, December 14, 1942, NI-13768. Handelstrust West to Kammergerichtsrat Dr. Schröder (Reichskommissar/Enemy Property Division) July 21, 1942, NI-13770.

29. Dellschow (Handelstrust West) to Dr. Rasche, Dr. Entzian, and Kühnen (all of Dresdner Bank), December 21, 1940, NI-13748. Reiwinkel K. G. — Das Haus für Geschenke (purchaser) to von Richter (Dresdner Bank), October 9, 1941, NI-3948. The ultimate fate of the Reveillon owner is not indicated.

salaries to its Jewish employees who were in hiding. The only loss sustained by the owners during the occupation period was the relinquishment, under pressure of the Handelstrust West, of the company's share in a Greek mining establishment. The share was bought for a token payment by Krupp.³⁰

Again, the Gerzon family, which owned Gebr. Gerzon Modemagazijnen N. V, Amsterdam, one of the largest department stores in Holland, concluded a contract with Helmut Horten, owner of the Warenhaus Helmut Horten K. G., Duisburg, for the sale of their enterprise in exchange for \$100,000 and exit permits. (The \$100,000 represented about 10 percent of real value.) The exit permits, it seems, did not materialize in full, for at least one of the directors spent the remainder of the occupation period in a concentration camp.³¹

In 1941, when prospects of peace settlements were beginning to fade, emigration became more difficult. The Jews were now fortunate if they could escape without any funds at all.³² In the summer of 1941 discussions were held about a project that one Dresdner Bank official called the "ransoming of Dutch Jews against payment of a penance in Swiss francs [*Auslösung holländischer Juden gegen Zahlung einer Busse in Schweiz, Francs*]"³³ In other words, instead of receiving part of their proceeds in foreign exchange, prospective emigrants now had to add to the German haul by drawing upon whatever accounts or credit they possessed in neutral countries. Initially the amount of the "penance" was fixed at 20,000 Swiss francs per family;³⁴ later the requirement was raised to 50,000 francs, and, with the advent of the deportations, to 100,000 francs.³⁵ On October 28, 1942, the Handelstrust West informed a client that "the amount of a hundred thousand Swiss francs that you mentioned

30. Statement by Karl Ernst Panofsky (postwar Generaldirektor of the company), November 6, 1947, NI-12694. Statement by Beclacrts van Blockland (Dutch director during the occupation), November 6, 1947, NI-12694. Handelstrust West N. V. (signed Knobloch and Dellschow) to directorate of the NEEP, October 29, 1941, NI-12695. Affidavit by Blockland, February 9, 1948, NI-14879.

31. Affidavit by Arthur Marx (member of the Gerzon family), September 24, 1947, NI-13751. Summary of discussion between Marx, Worst, Horten, Dr. Hobirk, and Bardroff, October 10, 1941, NI-13773. Handelstrust West to Dr. Schröder, July 21, 1942, NI-13770.

32. L. Keesing of the Rothschild interests attempted to secure the emigration from Holland of ten family members in exchange for a sales contract calling for payment in 180 monthly installments (fifteen years). Memorandum by Stiller (Dresdner Bank), February 3, 1941, NI-9915; I. Keesing correspondence with Handelstrust West in NI-9916.

33. Entzian to Stiller, August 8, 1941, NI-9914.

34. Dresdner Bank to Economy Ministry, attention RR Meek, August 5, 1941, NI-8928. Entzian to Stiller, August 8, 1941, NI-9914.

35. RSHA to Himmler, November 24, 1942, NO-2408.

will certainly not be sufficient for the departure of the entire family.”³⁶ Survival had become expensive in Holland. As the deportations came closer, only a handful of Jews could afford to buy their lives in this manner.

The Aryanaization process had affected the entire Jewish community. The rich were made poor, the shopkeepers were brought down to a subsistence level, and thousands of Jewish laborers who had lost their jobs were taken over by the *Werkvertmittig*, an agency of the Dutch Welfare Ministry, to work segregated in industrial plants or outdoor projects.³⁷

While the German economic apparatus in Holland gradually impoverished the Jews, the machinery of the SS and Police was preparing for the total removal of the Jews to killing centers in the East. The officials who were chiefly responsible for that stage of the operations are listed in Table 8-12. Two of these men were seasoned veterans of anti-Jewish actions in eastern Europe. Brigadeführer Erich Naumann, who took command of the Security Police in the Netherlands in September 1943, had previously served as commander of Einsatzgruppe B in Russia. His successor, Schöngarth, came to Holland in June 1944, after rich experiences as BdS in the Generalgouvernement.³⁸ In the spring of 1943, the total strength of the Security Police in the Netherlands was 487 men.³⁹ The Central

36. Handelsruist West N. V. to D. J. I. van den Oever, October 28, 1942, NI-14818. Up to November 1942, only eight permits involving thirty-six Jews had been granted by the RSHA. The payments for these authorizations totaled 1,290,000 Swiss francs, plus certain additional concessions. RSHA to Himmler, November 24, 1942, NO-2408. The money apparently was retained by the SS and Police for their own purposes. An attempt was made to broaden the scheme. Thus it was proposed that Swiss banks advance 5,000,000 francs to bail out 500 Jews, repayment of the loan to be guaranteed by the Dutch government in exile. The British indignantly refused to entertain the proposal. British Foreign Office/Press Division/Special Service for Political News/PXII, *Bulletin*, November 25, 1942, NG-3379. Gruppenführer Berger of the SS-Main Office, who needed 30,000,000 Hungarian pengo for recruitment of Waffen-SS men in Hungary, wanted to introduce the Dutch method to Slovakia. Thus Slovak Jews who had pengo would be able to buy their freedom for suitable amounts. RSHA to Himmler, November 24, 1942, NO-2408. These ransoming schemes spread later from Slovakia to Hungary. They were not very successful because of British opposition.

37. Report by Dutch government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726. Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter to Himmler, September 24, 1942, in *Nederland in Oorlofstijd*, March 1949, p. 7.

38. Böhmcker (see Table 8-12) had functions not only in Amsterdam. He was Scyss-Inquart's deputy for deportations in all of Holland. Testimony by Scyss-Inquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, 3.

39. Numerical compilation of civil personnel in areas outside the Reich, spring 1943, Zentralarchiv Potsdam, Collection 07.01 Reichskanzlei, Folder 3511.

TABLE 8-12
DEPORTATION MACHINERY OF THE SS AND POLICE IN
HOLLAND

THE HAGUE	AMSTERDAM
Reichskommissar ----- Seyss-Inquart	— Stadtkommissar Böhmcker (Schröder)
Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter	
BdS----- Harster (Naumann, Schöngarth)	----- KdS: Lages Central Office for Jewish Emigration Aus der Fünfen
IV-B-4----- Zoepf	

Office of Jewish Emigration operated with a staff of 20 Germans and 100 Dutch employees.⁴⁰ Order Police Chief Daluege reported that he had 3,079 men in the Netherlands, and that the Dutch police totaled **12,886**.⁴¹

The first step to ensnare the Jews in a tight network of identification and movement controls was a decree signed by Seyss-Inquart on January 10, 1941, which provided for the registration of the victims.⁴² The decree contained an interesting feature, although it remained without decisive significance: not only Jews were obliged to register but also all persons who had so much as one Jewish grandparent. The total registration figures showed that there were 140,000 Jews and 20,000 Mischlinge.⁴³

40. Johannes Houwink ten Cate, "An Evaluation of Dutch Archival Findings Related to the Shoah," in Centre de documentation Juive contemporaine, *Les archives delaShoah* (Paris, 1998), p. 472.

41. Daluege to Wolff, February 28, 1943, February 1, 1943, NO-2861. On Dutch police, see Hirschfeld, *Fremdherrschaft*, pp. 105-16.

42. *Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Niederländische Gebiete*, 1941, pt. 2, p. 19. The enforcement of the measure was in the hands of the Dutch Secretary General for the Interior, Fredcriks. On Dutch secretaries general, see testimony by Hans Max Hirschfeld (Secretary General for Economy and Agriculture), *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, 210-11.

43. Presser, *Destruction of the Dutch Jews*, pp. 33-39. Report by Dutch Government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726.

In the office of the police president of The Hague, a genealogical division (*Genealogische Afklijnng*, or GA) maintained a pink card file of all the Mischling registrations.⁴⁴ The man in charge of the file, the Dutch SS-Untersturmführer ten Cate, was certain that the 20,000 Mischling registrants represented only a fraction of all the people in Holland who had foreign or mixed “blood.” He wanted to establish a card index of 300,000 records of such people, and complained that already two Dutch SS men with Jewish names had been killed in action and that their names were being read with the names of Aryan heroes at official celebrations.⁴⁵ Untersturmführer ten Cate, who set out to “seize” in his files “the totality of Mischling blood” (*samtliches Mischlingsblut*) in Holland, pursued his task until September 1944, when he suddenly deserted the SS and his cards.⁴⁶

The German administration’s second step followed closely upon the heels of the registration order. A Jewish council was established. Dutch Jewry had not developed a comprehensive central organization until the end of 1940, when a Coordinating Committee was founded, with the newly suspended president of Holland’s supreme court, Lodewijk Ernst Visser, in charge. This committee had existed for only a few months when Stadtkommissar Bohmcker of Amsterdam called in two rabbis and a diamond merchant, Abraham Asscher (then serving as president of the Ashkenazic Jews), and told them to set up a *Joodsche Raad* for the city. Asscher approached a classics professor, David Cohen, and the two became co-chairmen of the new body, Cohen its *de facto* chief executive in the conduct of daily affairs.⁴⁷ The *Joodsche Raad* of Amsterdam began with twenty members, including rabbis, lawyers, and men who were prominent in the community’. A few were Zionists, among them Cohen himself.⁴⁸ Both Asscher and Cohen were knowledgeable in the art of political dealings and they spoke German fluently, but they and the council as a whole were distanced from the Jewish poor, who were old constituents of Dutch Jewry and who made up a half of its population in Amsterdam.⁴⁹

Soon the council, groping for power, developed friction with the Coordinating Committee, and a strained correspondence ensued between Visser and Cohen. At one point Cohen wrote that in every epoch there

44. OSrubaf. Ispcrt to Raurer, copies to Stubaf. Aust and Stubaf. Osiander of the RuSHA, February 25, 1944, NO-4038. Report by UStuf. Dr. Grotfend (in charge of *Ahnentafeln*, or ancestral charts), August 23, 1944, NO-3807.

45. Ten Cate to OSrubaf. Osiander (RuSHA), December 25, 1941, NO-3643.

46. Report by OStuf. Neumann-Roppert, September 20, 1944, NO-4033.

47. See Joseph Michman, “The Controversial Stand of the *Joodse Raad* in the Netherlands,” *Tad Vashem Studies* 10 (1974): 9-68.

48. For list of members and turnover, see Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5 (1974), p. 493n.

49. Van der Zee, “*Um Schlimmeres zu verhindern ...*” pp. 130 ff.

were two kinds of people who paved the way for the future, the strong-minded revolutionaries and those who made the best of things. The latter, who were realists, might admire the former, but the admiration was never reciprocated. Visser, in turn, writing a few months before his death, asked whether the price was not too high. Did one have to pay it, no matter what?⁵⁰ By then, it was already clear that Cohen, unadmired, held the reins. His policy would steer the Jewish community toward fulfillment of all German demands. The Germans on their part extended the Council's jurisdiction in October 1941 to cover all the Jews of Holland. The expansion, like the original establishment of the Council, was accomplished not by decree but by fiat. As Lages pointed out to Cohen, the Council was but an office for the transmission of German orders (*Befehlsübermittlungs-ite Ik*). The Coordinating Committee, superfluous in German eyes, had to be disbanded.⁵¹

The Joodsche Raad was given not only greater territorial scope but also a larger variety of tasks. It published a paper, the *Joodsche Weekblad*, containing German instructions, and issued travel passes for up to four days. During the summer of 1942 it dispatched messengers and orderlies calling on people to report and helping them pack for "labor service" in Germany.⁵² In January 1943 the individual deposits, from which a maximum of 250 guilders had hitherto been paid to the Jewish owners, were transformed into a collective account from which payments were made only to the Council. A sum of 600,000 guilders was handed over to the Council that month, and lesser amounts followed thereafter.⁵³ During the deportations, that accumulation of power in the Council was to reveal itself in all its importance.

At the time of the Council's formation, a series of incidents in Amsterdam tested the Germans' ability to crush all opposition to the unfolding destruction process in Holland. On a February day in 1941, military formations of the Dutch Nazi party (NSB), "in extension of training exercises," swarmed over the city into the Jewish quarter.⁵⁴ In Seyss-

50. Text of letters in Michman, "The Joodse Raad."

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-29.

52. Cohen to Visser, November 13, 1941, and Visser to Cohen, December 30, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 61-63, 65-67. Presser, *I be Destruction of the Dutch Jews*, pp. 45-65, 251-52. Report by Dutch Government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726. *Die Judenfrage*, March 10, 1941, p. 43. To perfect the system, Jakub Edelstein of the Prague council and an associate were brought in as expert advisors. H. G. Adler, *Theresienstadt* (Tübingen, 1960), pp. 727, 737-38, 836. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* ». vol. 5, pp. 962-68.

53. Affidavit by Dr. Walter von Karger (German manager, Lippmann-Rosenthal), September 24, 1947, NI-13904.

54. Armament Inspectorate Niederlande/Z/WS to OKW/Wi Rii, March 11, 1941, Wi/IA 5.12.

Inquart's words, "synagogues were also burned. Apparently, someone ambitiously tried to imitate the 8th of November 1938."⁵⁵ The Dutch Nazis, however, had a rougher time of it in Amsterdam than their German party colleagues had experienced during the Einzelaktionen in the Reich. The NSB raiders were attacked by Dutch workers and "hordes of youthful Jews who were equipped with all sorts of weapons." Dutch Nazi stores were smashed, and a uniformed Dutchman was "literally trampled by a band of thirty Jews" to the point that he could not be identified upon his delivery at a hospital. He died from his wounds.

The Germans now struck back. Six of the defenders were killed, and many more were wounded. The Jewish section was cordoned off, and the Dutch inhabitants of the quarter were evacuated.⁵⁶ The new Jewish Council hurriedly called upon all Jews to surrender their weapons.⁵⁷ The ghetto was born.

If the Germans thought that everything was now under control, they were mistaken. A German Security Police detachment, patrolling in the Jewish quarter, entered an apartment on Van Wonstreet and surprised a group of people there in a "secret meeting." The policemen were attacked with bullets and acid. Higher SS and Police Leader Rauter thereupon proclaimed that, in reprisal for the assault, 400 Jews in the age group 20-35 had been sent to a German concentration camp.⁵⁸ The deportation of these Jews resulted in a series of unforeseen repercussions.

On February 25, 1941, a wave of strikes began to paralyze transport and industry in the provinces of North Holland and Utrecht. The trolleys stopped in Amsterdam, utilities went dead, shipyards were deserted, and the Focker Works, the Hollandschen Draad- en Kabelfabrik, and the Staatsbedrijf in Hemburg stopped operations. In Hilversum, where the Germans had arrested ten prominent physicians as hostages, 2,000 workers struck at the Phillips plant. All together, 18,300 workers had walked out of the armament industries alone.

On the second day of the strike, German Order Police clashed with crowds in the streets as Dutchmen hurled "insults" at die German Wehrmacht. Intercepted leaflets revealed that the population's antagonism over the seizure of over 400 Jews was linked to a fear that the Dutch shipyard workers would forcibly be transported for labor to the Reich.

The commander of the German armed forces in Holland, General der

55. Testimony by Scyss-Inquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XV, 667. Most of the raiders belonged to the NSB's *Weerafdeling* (WA), an organization similar to the German SA.

56. Armancnt Inspectorate Niederlande/Z/WS to OKW/Wi Ru, March 11, 1941, Wi/IA 5.12.

57. *Die Judenfrufe*, March 10, 1941, p. 43.

58. Proclamation by Rauter, February 25, 1941, NG-2285.

Flieger Christiansen, now stepped into the picture. Martial law, with threats of the death penalty, was established in the two northern provinces, as the general ordered the strikers back to work and forbade all gatherings and meetings. Within three days the strike was broken. To penalize the Dutch population for its behavior, fines were imposed on three cities: 15,000,000 guilders on Amsterdam, 2,500,000 guilders on Hilversum, 500,000 guilders on Zaandam. The money was collected in the form of a special income tax from people whose incomes exceeded 10,000 guilders a year.⁵⁹

In die meantime, 389 Jews from Amsterdam and Rotterdam arrived in Buchenwald, where more than a tenth of them died in the next few months. The survivors were sent on to the concentration camp Mauthausen. In June another 291 Amsterdam Jews were shipped to that camp directly.⁶⁰ There the Dutch Jews were detailed to the stone quarries to carry heavy boulders up a long steep slope. The “work” took its toll, and men began to drop from exhaustion. After a while the Jews joined hands and jumped down, splattering the quarry with bones, brains, and blood.⁶¹

The Mauthausen command, following the old concentration camp routine, sent death notices to the survivors in Holland. This was a mistake. The notices were collected by the Jewish Council and transmitted to the Swedish government, which, according to the customs of war, was entrusted with the protection of Dutch citizens in the Reich and of German nationals in the Dutch colonies. The Swedish minister in Berlin, Richert, protesting to the Foreign Office legal expert, Albrecht, pointed to the fact that the deaths occurred on certain days each time and that all the victims were “rather young men.” He therefore wanted to visit the camp in fulfillment of Sweden’s function as a protective power.⁶²

Albrecht could not flatly refuse the Swedish request, for the Jews in question were Dutch nationals on German soil, but he managed to forestall the unwelcome visit. His colleague Luther meanwhile wrote to Ges-

59. Armament Inspectorate Niederlande/Z/WS to OKW/VVi Rii, March 11, 1941, Wi/IA 5.12. Also, memoranda by Unterstaatssekretär Wörmann (Foreign Office Political Division), February 25 and 26, 1941, NG-2805.

60. Statement by Gustav Herzog, inmate of Buchenwald in charge of the Dutch block, in *Nationale Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, Konzentrationslager Buchenwald* (Buchenwald, 1990), p. 54. Hans Marsalek, *Die Geschichte des Konzentrationslagers Mauthausen* (Vienna, 1980), p. 282. Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat* (Frankfurt am Main, 1949), pp. 209-10.

61. Kogon, *Der SS-Staat*, pp. 209-10. Kogon, a German journalist, was an inmate of Buchenwald.

62. Memorandum by Dr. Albrecht, October 31, 1941, NG-2710.

tapo chief Müller to request that the SS be more careful in the future.⁶³ A lengthy chain of complications had thus been brought on by the Dutch Nazis who on February 9, 1941, had decided to look, for excitement in the Jewish quarter.

The concentration process was now continued with systematic deliberation. With the addition of a7 to the identification cards of Jews in July 1941, the Rauter machinery began to tighten the screws. Travel restrictions were imposed in September and October, to be followed by a partial clearing of the provinces and the completion within Amsterdam of three ghetto sections which housed about half of Holland's Jews. After May 1942 the Jews also had to wear the star.⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ Once again the Germans noted signs of opposition, but the character of die resistance now had changed. Although several days had been allowed for putting on the star, the Jews began to wear the yellow mark on the first day. Dutch inhabitants openly showed their sympathy for the victims by wearing yellow flowers on their coat lapels, and in Rotterdam signs were plastered on walls to remind Dutchmen to show respect if they should see a Jew with a star on the street.⁶³

The population remained quiet, however, and anti-Jewish restrictions followed one another in more rapid succession. A curfew was instituted to keep the Jews off the streets between 8 p.m. and 6a .m., shopping was allowed only between 3 and 5 p.m., public conveyances could no longer be used without special permission, telephoning was henceforth prohibited, and Jews were forbidden to enter the homes of non-Jews.⁶⁶ The Jewish community was now immobile, helplessly awaiting its fate.

On June 22, 1942, the deportation chief of the RSHA, Eichmann, informed the Jewish affairs expert in the Foreign Office, Rademacher, that arrangements had been concluded with the railways for the deportation of 90,000 Jews from the Netherlands, Belgium, and occupied France to Auschwitz. The Dutch quota was 40,000.⁶⁷

The Eichmann letter was a routine communication in which the Foreign Office was asked to "kindly take note" of the SS operation. Eichmann had received no protests from any quarter, and so he added: "I

63. Luther to Miiller, November 5, 1941, NG-3700. Virtually all of the Mauthausen Jews died. Kogon, *Der SS-Stat*, p. 210.

64. Report by Dutch government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726.

65. Armament Inspectorate Nicderlandc/Z/WS to OKW/Wi Rii, May 13, 1942, Wi/IA 5.20. See also BdS, "Meldungcn aus den Nicderlandcn, No. 93, May 12, 1942, T 175, Roll 670.

66. Report by Dutch government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726. See also the multitude of other restrictions catalogued in the cumulative report of the BdS to the end of 1942, T 175, Roll 671.

67. Eichmann to Rademacher, June 22, 1942, NG-183.

assume that there are no objections against these measures on the part of the Foreign Office, either.” Indeed, the Foreign Office had no objections “in principle” to the planned deportations. For certain “psychological” reasons, however, the diplomats desired that the first transports be composed of stateless Jews. “There are,” said Abteilung Deutschland, “nearly 25,000 of these Jews in the Netherlands alone.”⁶⁸

Apparently the echoes of the strike in Amsterdam and the interventions of the Swedish Minister in Berlin were still reverberating in the Foreign Office, although the proposed solution was only a device, and hardly a practical one at that, for it would have been difficult to conduct selective seizures. Thus, on July 17, 1942, the Foreign Office representative in Holland, Bene, transmitted to Berlin a proposal that the Reichskommissar divest all Jews of their nationality as a means of preventing all future Swedish interventions.⁶⁹ The idea was considered in the legal, political, and Luther divisions. The principal difficulty was that in the eyes of neutral states the Reichskommissar could not deprive people of Dutch nationality; only a Dutch government could do that.

After a while, the diplomats’ thinking was reduced to a single idea, which can be summarized in the words of the Foreign Office legal expert, Albrecht: “Should it be unavoidable to place the Dutch Jews outside Holland, it would be expedient if the police would not allow any information to leak out with regard to their whereabouts, especially in possible cases of death.”⁷⁰ Rademacher of Abteilung Deutschland agreed. He thought that the protective power had no jurisdiction in the eastern territories anyway, but added by way of reinforcement: “In principle, no information whatsoever will be given to the outside world by the police.” There would then be no visits to camps, “etc.”⁷¹

The Jewish Council was informed of the impending deportations on Friday evening, June 26. Summoned by the Zentralstelle, Cohen (without Asscher, who was absent from Amsterdam at the time) met with aus der Fiinten and his deputy, Hauptsturmführer Karl Worlein, to be told that men, women, and entire families would be placed under police supervision and sent to work camps in Germany. The Council was to report on the following morning how many Jews it could process per day. Cohen brought up the question of international law. Not succeeding with

68. Foreign Office note (initialed by Luther) to RSHA IV-B-4, attention Fichmann (undated, presumably July 1942), NG-183. The “stateless” Jews were mainly refugees from the Reich. There were few Jews with foreign nationalities in Holland; the largest group consisted of 193 Hungarians. Foreign Office Representative in Holland (Bene) to Foreign Office, July 3, 1942, NG-23.

69. Bene to Foreign Office, July 17, 1942, NG-2634.

70. Albrecht to Weizsacker, July 31, 1942, NG-2633.

71. Memorandum by Rademacher, August 10, 1942, NG-2632.

that argument, he asked what effect the removal of many Jews would have on the financial base of the council. He was told that a great many Jews would remain in the Netherlands.⁷²

During the following days there was haggling between the two Joodsche Raad presidents and aus der Fiinten about the numbers. The Germans insisted on a bottom line: 4,000 Jews would have to move out in mid-July. On July 14 the Germans seized about 700 Jews in the streets as hostages and threatened them with deportation to Mauthausen if the 4,000 Jews did not present themselves for “work camps” in the Reich. On the very next day, the first deportees were on a transport, and the hostages (with the exception of a few dozen) were released. A historian of the destruction of the Dutch Jews who was in Holland at the time recalls the frantic hopes and sinking feelings in the Jewish community: “Rumor had it that the British would smash Central Station to smithereens. They did not come. There would be a strike of railway workers. It did not materialize. The invasion would begin just in time. It did not. The Communists would spirit away all those who went to the station. They failed to do so.”⁷³

The Foreign Office representative in die Netherlands watched with satisfaction the departure of the first two trains. He reported that there were no “incidents.”⁷⁴ The legend was spreading among Jews that the deportations were a true “resetdement.” “In Jewish circles the opinion is widespread,” wrote Bene, “that the Jews who are fit for labor service are being deported to prepare the necessary quarters for Jews in the East.”⁷⁵ Two weeks later Bene noted a change in the situation. The Jews, he wrote, had discovered what kind of games were played with them. Most of those ordered to report no longer presented themselves voluntarily, nor did they stay in their apartments.⁷⁶

72. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 5, pp. 1052-57.

73. Prosser, *The Destruction of the Dutch Jew*, pp. 135-46. Facsimile of special edition of *Joodsche Weekblad* with Asscher-Cohen proclamation of July 14, 1942, on the 700 threatened with concentration camp if the 4,000 did not report, on p. 145. Prosser's observations are quoted from p. 146.

74. Bene to Foreign Office, July 17, 1942, NG-84.

75. Bene to Foreign Office, July 31, 1942, NG-2631. The 14,000 refugees from the Reich were deportable alongside the Jews of Dutch nationality from the beginning. Summary report by the BdS for 1942, T 175, Roll 671. Obersturmführer Rajakowitsch (BdS IV-B-4 in The Hague) informed the BdS in Paris and the Plenipotentiary of the Chief of the German Security Police in Brussels on August 12, 1942, that there was no objection in his office to the evacuation of Dutch Jews from France and Belgium as well. Israel Police 1243.

76. Bene to Foreign Office, August 13, 1942, *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik*, Series E: 1941-1945 (Göttingen, 1969-79), vol. 3 (1974), pp. 315-16. Ety Hillesum notes rumors about gas in her diary on July 11, 1942, *An Interrupted Life*

From August 6 a Dutch police battalion was deployed to seize the Jews, and in September this unit was used extensively. The battalion, newly organized by city's police chief, Sybren Tulp, had 254 men who were housed together, military style. Its raiding parties, according to Tulp, were very efficient. They always arrested the Jews found at listed addresses, and if no Jews were present, they would extend their search to houses nearby. "You will understand, Gruppenführer," Tulp wrote to Rauter, "that the sight of roundups averaging 450 Jews every evening for weeks causes the Dutch onlookers to burst with sympathy and indignation." The sheer presence, however, of two members of the battalion was enough, he said, to prevent any voicing of discord. Such was the respect, he noted, for these men, as contrasted with earlier incidents when other police agents would have their hands full dealing with the agitation.⁷⁷

The unease in the Dutch population was spreading. Its morale, observed an armament officer, was strained by "the confiscation of bicycles, the evacuation of the Jews to the labor camps of the East, and the continued arrests of hostages."⁷⁸ At the Amsterdam stock exchange, dejected traders were congregating in small groups, discussing the measures of the Security Police and voicing pity for the Jews.⁷⁹ The churches intervened with German offices, and the resistance organization *Vrij Nederland* forged papers, picked up valuables for safekeeping, and made arrangements to hide Jews.⁸⁰ But no word of protest was received from the Dutch Secretary General of the Interior,⁸¹ and soon nothing was heard from ordinary Dutchmen. "The Jewish action," reported an intelligence officer of LXXXVIII Corps, "continues almost everywhere without repercussions. There is hardly any reaction to it anymore; one has become accustomed to it and has enough troubles of one's own. [*Die Judenaktion*

(New York, 1983), p. 147.

77. Guus Meershoek, "De Amsterdamsche hoofcommissarissen en de deportatie van den joden" in *Oorlogsdocumentatie '40-45. De derde jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie*, ed. N. D. Barnouw et al. (Zutphen, The Netherlands, 1992), pp. 9-43, particularly pp. 30-43, and his *Dienaren van het gezag* (Amsterdam, 1999), particularly pp. 176-79 and 250-57. The letter by Tulp to Rauter, September 26, 1942, lauding the battalion, is cited by Meershoek in his book on pp. 253 and 256. Tulp became ill and died in October. Statistics of Amsterdam roundups are on pp. 478-79.

78. War Diary, Armament Inspectorate Nederlande, July 31, 1942, Wi/IA 5.8. See also the report for August 1942 by the LXXXVIII Corps/Ic, September 7, 1942, T314, Roll 1614.

79. BdS, "Meldungen aus den Niederlanden" No. 103, July 21, 1942, 1 175, Roll 670.

80. Cumulative report by the BdS to the end of 1942, T 175, Roll 671.

81. Bene to Foreign Office, July 31, 1942, NG-2631.

geht fast überall sang- und klanglos weiter. Man nimmt kaum noch dazu Stellung; man hat sich daran gewöhnt und hat mit eigenen Sorgen genug zu tun].”⁸²

To smooth the way, deferments were instituted for several special groups. The largest of these categories comprised functionaries of the Jewish council and their families, together with medical personnel, pharmacists, barbers, bakers, and owners of shops serving the Jewish community. In December 1942 their number was over 17,000.⁸³ A second group consisted of the Jews in mixed marriages, the figure for which was 8,000-9,000,⁸⁴ although early overestimates ranged from 20,000 to 22,000.⁸⁵ Converts, many of whom were married to Christians in any case, also received a reprieve. There were more than 1,500 of them.⁸⁶ Essential armament workers and their families were deferred as result of an agreement between the Armament Inspectorate and the Central Office of Jewish Emigration.⁸⁷ This group of several thousand included employees in the fur, leather, and textile trades, as well as chemists, engineers, and so forth.⁸⁸ Diamond cutters and dealers were protected by the Office of the Four-Year Plan.⁸⁹ Also privileged for economic reasons were a few dozen

82. Report by LXXXVIII Corps/Ic for October 1942, T 314, Roll 1614.

83. Fräulein Slottkc (police employee, BdS IV-B-4) to Stubaf. Zoepf, December 2, 1942, and notation, probably by Slottkc, for Zoepf, May 27, 1943, T 175, Roll 671.

84. Report on deferred groups as of March 20, 1943, in the files of the BdS, T 175, Roll 671. The Jewish partners of childless mixed marriages in Amsterdam were to be sent to a special barracks in the transit camp at Westerbork. Summary of conference held on May 18, 1943, at the Zentralstelle under the chairmanship of Zoepf, T 175, Roll 671.

85. See Bene to Foreign Office, August 31, 1942, NG-2631, and Rauter to Himmler, September 24, 1942, *Nederland en Oorlogstijd*, March 1949, p. 7. Mischlinge, including 14,895 half-Jews and 5,990 quarter-Jews counted in October 1941, were untouched. Report on deferred groups as of March 20, 1943, T 175, Roll 671.

86. Cumulative report by the BdS to the end of 1942, T 175, Roll 671. There was, however, a complication splitting Catholics from Protestants. Upon the news of impending deportations, both churches indicated that they would read a protest letter from the pulpits. The Germans countered by threatening the deportation of the converts. The Protestants backed down and the Catholics did not. Catholic Jews were consequently no longer protected by virtue of their religion. Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945* (Stanford, 1963), p. 161. See also the Security Police data of converts deferred on various dates in 1942 and 1943 in T 175, Roll 671. A few Protestants were deported.

87. War diary, Armament Inspectorate Niederlande, June 24, 1942, Wi/LA 5.10. Also, war diary of the inspectorate, April 30, 1942, and July 14, 1942, Wi/LA 5.8. The armament inspector was Vizeadmiral Reimer.

88. Report on deferred groups as of March 20, 1943, T 175, Roll 671.

89. *Ibid.*

Jews employed by Colonel Veltjens of the Four-Year Plan for purchases on the black market.⁹⁰ Finally, exceptions were made for foreign Jews, persons whose ancestry was in question, people claiming that their Portuguese background entitled them to freedom, Jews who had special merit because of past services to Germany, Jews for whom the indigenous Dutch administration had intervened, and even a dozen or so prewar members of the Dutch Nazi movement, the NSB, which had neglected to keep itself purely Aryan before 1940.⁹¹ Much in this pattern of deferments duplicated the strategy adopted in the Reich. At the same time, the SS and Police apparatus in the Netherlands was as adamant as anyone in Berlin when it made its continuous attempts to diminish and extinguish privileged groups. Above all, it lost no time to begin the deportations, and it began with a sweep of the unprotected Jews.

On September 10, 1942, Rauter revealed to Himmler some of his detailed plans. The classification of the mixed marriages, munitions workers, diamond cutters, and so on, was expected to be completed by October 15. By that time, too, Rauter hoped to have two big transit camps running. One, Westerbork, at Assen, had originally been established by Dutch authorities for Jewish refugees. It was already receiving Jewish deportees. The second camp, Vught, was under construction at 's-Hertogenbosch. The two camps were to have a combined capacity of 40,000 Jews and were to serve as assembly points for masses of Jews seized in sudden paralyzing raids. "I am harnessing up everything that exercises police or assistant police functions," said Rauter, "and anything anywhere that looks as if it belongs legally or illegally to Jewry will be put into these camps after October 15, 1942."⁹²

On September 24, 1942, Rauter sent another progress report to Himmler. "Until now," he wrote, "we have set in motion — together with the Jews shoved off for penal reasons to Mauthausen — a total of 20,000 Jews to Auschwitz. In all of Holland some 120,000 Jews are being readied for departure, although this includes the mixed Jews [*Mischjuden*], who after all will remain here for a while. In Holland there are approximately 20,000 mixed marriages. With the agreement of the Reichskommissar, however, I am going to shove off also all Jewish parts of the mixed marriages, insofar as these marriages have produced no children. There will be about 6,000 cases in that category, so that ca. 14,000 Jews in mixed marriages will stay here for the moment."

Rauter then continued: "In the Netherlands there is a so-called *Werkverming*, a labor service of the Dutch Welfare Ministry, which sends

90. *Ibid.*

91. *Ibid.*

92. Rauter to Himmler, September 10, 1942, NO-2256.

Jews for labor to enclosed enterprises and camps. We have not touched these Werkverruiming camps so far, in order to let the Jews take refuge there. In the Werkverruiming camps there are ca. 7,000. We hope to have 8,000 Jews there by October. These 8,000 Jews have ca. 22,000 dependents in the entire country. On October 1 the Werkverruiming camps will be occupied by me with one lightning blow, and on the same day the relatives outside will be arrested and taken to the two big Jewish camps newly erected at Westerbork near Assen and Vught near 's-Hertogenbosch.”

Having thus accounted for 55,000 Jews, Rauter had a vision of uprooting the remaining victims in one vast manhunt: “Every Jew found anywhere in Holland will be put into those big camps.” Aryans who undertook to help Jews across the border or to hide them in the country would have their property seized, and the perpetrators would be taken to a concentration camp. Nothing was now going to stand in the way of success.⁹³ Himmler read that report with approval; he wrote on the paper, *Sehr gut*. As yet, however, all the obstacles had not been overcome. The deportations were not completed in 1942 or even in 1943.⁹⁴ It took two years to finish the job, but in the end few Jews were left alive.

The concentration point for Jews seized in Amsterdam was a building with an interior that could be sealed from public view: the Dutch Theater, used by Jewish artists for performances attended by Jews and renamed in October 1941 *Joodsche Schouwburg*, where more than a thousand people could be held.⁹⁵ One day in mid-July 1942, a Gestapo officer arrived during the second act of an Emmerich Kalman operetta, and motioning his policemen to tiptoe, ordered the theater closed.⁹⁶ It was to be the concentration point from which the Amsterdam deportees were transported by the Dutch railways to Westerbork.⁹⁷

Both Vught in the south of Holland and Westerbork in the north became regular institutions of the deportation machinery. Although Vught had been built by the Reichskommissar, it was taken over in January 1943 by the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office (WVHA) and placed under the command of Hauptsturmführer Chmielewski, whose previous

93. Rauter to Himmler, September 24, 1942, *Nederland in Oorlogstijd*, March, 1949, p. 7.

94. Deportations from Holland totaled 38,571 by December 31, 1942. The figure rose to 52,403 by March 31, 1943. Report by Korherr, April 19, 1943, NO-5193.

95. Presser, *Destruction of the Dutch Jew*, pp. 163-64.

96. Eike Geisel in Eike Geisel and Henryk Broder, eds., *Premiere und Pogrom* (Berlin, 1992), p. 308.

97. On transport by Nederlandsche Spoorwegen (Dutch railways) see de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 6 (1975), pp. 251-52. Also Nederlandsche Spoorwegen to Bds/Zentralstelle, May 15 and June 10, 1944, submitting bills for various small transports of Jews from Amsterdam to Assen, and memorandum by Reichsbahn Bevollmächtigte Dr. Fritzen, August 10, 1944, T 175, Roll 485.

experience had been at Gusen in the Mauthausen complex.⁹⁸ Westerbork, already set up by the Dutch government before the invasion as a camp for refugees, was under the jurisdiction of Higher SS and Police Leader Rauten Until September 1942 its commander was Sturmbannführer Deppner. The camp was then commanded for a short period by Obersturmführer Dischner, and finally, from the end of 1942 to 1944, by Obersturmführer Gemmeker.⁹⁹ Security for the camps was provided, in view of the police shortage, by forces of the Dutch SS Guard Battalion Northwest, a group of volunteers who had agreed to tours of duty within the country.¹⁰⁰ Incidentally, Gruppenführer Jüttner, chief of the SS Operational Main Office, was not happy with this arrangement. "Through the task given to these men" he wrote, "to guard Jews and criminals, the idealism and readiness for unrestricted performance of duty will not be furthered in the WafFen-SS." Nevertheless, for want of German manpower, the Dutchmen continued to be exposed to this strain upon their idealism.¹⁰¹

Westerbork was the principal camp from which trains were dispatched to occupied Poland. Vught deportees (with the exception of two transports routed directly to Auschwitz) were consequently shunted through Westerbork on their way to the east. In each of the two camps the Germans set up an elaborate Jewish camp directorate, or *Kampleiding*. At Westerbork, where the *Kamplleiding* operated through not fewer than twelve divisions, three key positions were held by refugees from Germany: Kurt Schlesinger as chief, Arthur Pisk in charge of the Order Service (*Ordnungsdienst*, in Dutch, *Ordedienst*) and the baggage handlers (flying column, or *Fliegende Kolonne*), and Dr. R Spanier as head of the medical department.¹⁰² There were also school barracks, a camp orchestra, and a cabaret with humor in German.¹⁰³ The clerks of the *Kamplleiding* at Westerbork would make up weekly lists of 1,020, and on Monday nights the barracks elder would call out the names of the chosen people, sealed in the huts, in alphabetical order. Under die eyes of the Jewish *Ordnungsdienst*, which supervised the loading, trains left the

98. Pohl (chief of WVHA) to Himmler, December 17, 1942, T 175, Roll 18, and subsequent correspondence in same microfilm roll. Chmielewski's successors were Sturmbannführer Grünewald and Sturmbannführer Hüttig.

99. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 8 (1978), pp. 691-94.

100. Rauter to Himmler, September 10, 1942, NO-2256.

101. Jüttner to Himmler, May 27, 1943, NO-8024.

102. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 8, pp. 706-8. In Wight the Jewish camp elder was Richard Süsskind, and his chief for internal administration was Dr. Arthur Lehmann. *Ibid.*, p. 678.

103. Photos of the school barracks and camp orchestra in Presser, *Destruction of rite Dutch Jews*, after pp. 434 and 274. On the cabaret, see the account by Hans Margules, a Westerbork survivor, in Geisel and Broder, *Premiere und Pogrom*, pp. 161 -70.

tracks inside the camp on Tuesday mornings at 11 a . m .¹⁰⁴ The concentration of power in the hands of Schlesinger, Pisk, and Spanier was not unnoticed by Dutch Jews waiting to hear their fate. The refugees, it seemed, were deporting the natives.^{104 105}

Relentlessly the Rauter machinery drew its victims into the transit camps and death. The exempt categories dissolved in this process. Converted Jews, among the first to be seized, were kept as a group in Westerbork, the Protestants among them scheduled to be last in the deportations.¹⁰⁶ The Jews in mixed marriages were going to be radically split into two groups. The Security Police was reaching for the Jewish partners in childless intermarriages to deport them. At the same time, Seyss-Inquart accorded to intermarried Jews complete exemption from anti-Jewish measures, to the point of permission to dispose of the star, if they could prove their sterility.¹⁰⁷ Yet when an emissary from the BdS Netherlands arrived in Berlin, he discovered strong disapproval of these measures among experts of the Eichmann Referat. In the Reich itself, Regierungsrat Hunsche pointed out to his visitor, the RSHA was still waiting for a compulsory divorce decree. Until then, Jews in mixed marriages were under no circumstances to be sent to work in the East. Eichmann's deputy, Sturmbannführer Günther, complained that the RSHA had heard about the sterilizations through broadcasts from London. Insisting that in these matters the Reich had to be "exemplary" (*vorbildlich*), Günther made no secret of his displeasure that an occupied territory should get ahead of things. Sterilization, he added, could not confer immunity in any case, because the goal was the eventual deportation of all Jews, including the sterilized ones.¹⁰⁸ Deportations of Jews in mixed marriages were thereupon stopped. Regarding the sterilizations, as Seyss-Inquart noted, "Our

104. Testimony by Dr. Joseph Melkman (Michman), Eichmann trial transcript, May 10, 1961, scss. 34, pp. JI, MI. Copies of lists were distributed to camp command, IV-B-4 in the Hague, Zentralstelle, *Joodsche Road* (for as long as it existed), and transport commander. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 8, p. 718.

105. See in particular the diary of Philip Mechanicus, *Tear of Fear* (New York, 1968). Mechanicus, a journalist of the *ALgemeen Handelsblad*, made his Westerbork entries in 1943 and 1944. His deferment was due to a former marriage to a non-Jewish woman and children from this marriage. He was, however, deported and did not survive.

106. Bene to Foreign Office, November 16, 1942, NG-2631. Summary by Zoepf, dated November 11, 1943, of deportation conference chaired by Naumann on November 10. Israel Police 1352. Seyss-Inquart to Bormann, February 28, 1944, Israel Police 1439.

107. Harster to Zentralstelle Amsterdam, Westerbork, 'sHertogenbosch, and Ausscnstellen, May 6, 1943, Israel Police 1356.

108. Untersturmführer Werner (BdS/IV-B-5, Netherlands) on discussion with Hunsche and Günther to Harster and Zoepf, July 9, 1943, Israel Police 591.

Security Police carried out a few hundred such cases [*Unsere Sicherheitspolizei hat ein paar hundert solche Fälle durchgeführt*].¹⁰⁹ By February 1944, a total of 8,610 intermarried Jews remained in the Netherlands, 2,256 having submitted proof of their sterility.¹¹⁰ Several hundred of these people had subjected themselves to an operation. Most of the volunteers were men, since the surgical intervention in the case of the “Jewesses” was obviously more difficult.¹¹¹

The armament Jews followed in the path of “indispensable” Jews everywhere. In November 1942 the armament industry lost hundreds of its fur and textile workers.¹¹² On December 3, 1942, Himmler ordered that the diamond cutters be brought to Vught to work under the supervision of the SS. The new enterprise was appropriately placed under the direction of the WVHA-WI (the Earth and Stone Works). The diamond workers were deported en masse in March 1944, and while the Dutch diamond industry in Amsterdam closed under the eyes of the Germans on May 18, 1944, there was some talk in the WVHA of saving 150 or 200 Jewish specialists for a diamond workshop in Bergen-Belsen.¹¹³ Some of these specialists survived to the end.¹¹⁴

We have seen that in Poland Jewish laborers often lost their families before the end of their own deferment, and the same appears to have been true in Holland. During the late spring of 1943 the Germans decided to ship out of the Vught camp two transports consisting of the children and wives of working men. According to the proclamation issued by the Jewish camp directorate (the *Kamplleiding*) on June 5, 1943, children from the age of less than one to sixteen were to be accompanied by their

109. Scyss-Inquart to Bormann, February 28, 1944, Israel Police 1439.

110. Bene to Foreign Office, February 9, 1944, NG-2631. Scyss-Inquart’s letter to Bormann indicates a somewhat larger number of exemptions and a somewhat smaller remainder.

111. Scyss-Inquart’s letter. About 600 operations may have been performed on men, and a few on women. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation*, p. 66. The churches protested against the sterilizations in May 1943. *Ibid.*, p. 162. Scyss-Inquart countered that “no compulsion” was being exerted upon the victims. Testimony by Scyss-Inquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, 45. A sterilization offer was made to about 300 people already at Westerbork by camp commander Gmmcker, but a few weeks later all were informed that they could go back to Amsterdam. Mcmechanicus, *Tear of Fear*, entries for June 12 and 13, and July 3, 1943, pp. 44-46, 73. It appears that, while the policy was applied, the sterility of the Christian partner was not an acceptable ground for grant of immunity. It was the Jewish husband or wife who had to be sterile.

112. Report by Armament Inspectorate Niederlande for November, 1942, Wi/IA 5.1.

113. WVHA-WI (OStubaf. Mummcnthcv) to WVHA-W (Obf. Baicr), June 8, 1944, NO-1278.

114. Report by Dutch government, October 16, 1945, PS-1726.

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mothers to a “special children’s camp.”¹¹⁵ That camp was Sobibór, a pure killing center in which all but a handful of people were gassed upon arrival. A Westerbork inmate watched the deportees being unloaded and reloaded on their way. The first train, with 1,750 victims, pulled in at 4:30 a.m. on Monday, June 7. Pneumonia, scarlet fever, and intestinal ailments were rampant among the children, some of them without parents, alone. The second Vught transport entered Westerbork a day later in the middle of the night. It contained 1,300 tired, filthy people who were transferred, “amid snarling and shouting, beating and pummeling,” from the dirty freight cars in which they had come to the dirty freight cars that would take them out. “The quota,” noted the inmate, “had to be complete. People here cannot see a single one of these trains without either cursing or sobbing or feeling revulsion. The train goes according to schedule, and this is a torture and a torment. It is never late, it is never hit by a bomb.”¹¹⁶

At the end of 1942, the Dutch police were pressed into service again,¹¹⁷ and in the spring and summer of 1943 the last large-scale roundups were begun. At his headquarters in the office of the BdS, Sturmbannführer Zoepf, an “on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand” man, was weighing his difficulties. For his May quota of 8,000 Jews, he had allocated 5,780, and 2,220 were missing. Tapping Jews already at Vught was “technically” easy but “psychologically” difficult, whereas seizing more of them in Amsterdam seemed politically appropriate but administratively impossible, because of the lack of Order Police.¹¹⁸

Whatever the obstacles, there was to be no letup. The drive to ensnare new victims rolled first into the small towns and countryside. The Foreign Office representative, Bene, observing the progress of the operation, noted that 1,320 Jews had reported voluntarily at Vught. “With the aid of the Jewish Council,” he wrote, “the deportations from the provinces proceeded without a hitch.”¹¹⁹

During the week of May 19-26, plans were made to engulf Amster-

115. Proclamation by *De Kampeiding* of Vught, June 5, 1943, *Nederland in Oorlofstijd*, January 25, 1947, p. 87. The order provided that in the case of nonworking fathers, both parents could go along.

116. Mcmechanicus, *Tear of Fear*, entries for June 7 and 8, 1943, pp. 37-38.

117. Presser, *The Destruction of the Dutch Jew*, pp. 350-55. On February 2, 1943, the Dutch Reformed and Catholic Churches called upon their members not to participate in hunting down Jews and others. The Catholic Church subsequently distributed a definition of “duress” that included only confrontation with a concentration camp or death, not loss of livelihood. It was understood that the Church stood ready with financial support to help those who lost income as a result of refusing collaboration. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation*, pp. 160-61.

118. Zoepf to “Juden lager” Westerbork, May 10, 1943, Israel Police 590.

119. Bene to Foreign Office, May 3, 1943, ÑG-2631.

dam. Security Police, augmented by Order Police in Amsterdam and from Tilburg, Dutch police in Amsterdam and from The Hague, voluntary Dutch auxiliary police (*VrijmUige Hulppolitie*), and Jewish police (die Ordedienst) from Westerbork, were assembled in the city. Members of the professional Dutch police contingents were shown anti-Semitic films in die Roxy theater.¹²⁰ A large segment of the prospective victims were to be salaried or unsalaried personnel of the Joodsche Raad itself. On May 21, aus der Fiinten informed the council that it would have to select 7,000 of its own employees for deportation, a demand that brought about the last of the debates in die leadership of the community.¹²¹ The roundup began on the 26th with a German proclamation calling upon the Jews to report on their own, and already a half hour later some of the people appeared with packed bags at the collecting point. Then the police fanned out to comb the Jewish quarter systematically. The deportations affected, in addition to the council's staff, various armament Jews, and some Jewish partners in mixed marriages.¹²² On June 20, a raid took place in South Amsterdam, where another 5,500 Jews were seized. This time die deployed forces were Security Police, Order Police, Dutch auxiliary police, and the Jewish Westerbork Ordedienst.¹²³ At the conclusion of these operations, Bene reported that at the sight of council functionaries among the deportees, many Jews, particularly refugees from the Reich, "did not conceal their heartfelt joy."¹²⁴ Oblivious to these reactions, Asscher and Cohen moved "like stars" among the Westerbork crowds.¹²⁵

Even as the deportation machinery ground on, Jews went into hiding. The decision to submerge was seldom based on hard information. Occasionally there were disquieting rumors, such as a report in the underground paper *De Omnjekrant* in January 1943 that Jews in special trains were "coldbloodedly gassed" in the course of the journey.¹²⁶ Sometimes

120. Mcershock, *Dienaren van hetjezaci*, pp. 289-90.

121. Prcsscr, *The Destruction of the Dutch Jews*, pp. 202-11. See also account by Gertrude van Tijn, October 2, 1944, Leo Baeck Institute document AR-C.1367/3477. Van Tijn, a functionary in the *Joodsche Road*, came to Naharia, Palestine, from Bergen-Belsen.

122. Slotkcc to Zoepf, May 27, 1943, T 175, Roll 671.

123. Bene to Foreign Office, June 25, 1943, NG-2631. Photo of uniformed Dutch Auxiliary Police in glossy center of Mcershock, *Dienaren van hetjezap*.

124. Bene to Foreign Office, June 25, 1943, NG-2631.

125. Mcmechanic, *Tear of Fear*, entry for October 1, 1943, p. 169. See also pp. 167-70, 173. Asscher lived through Bergen-Belsen, Cohen survived in Theresienstadt. Adler, *Theresienstadt*, pp. 253, 270.

126. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk derNederlanden*, vol. 7 (1976), p. 335. For a similar rumor in Croatia, see Daniel Carpi, "The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia," in Ysrael Gutman and Efraim Zuroff, eds., *Rescue Attempts dunna the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 520.

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there were accounts of happenings in Poland, but a lack of substantiation prompted Westerbork's Jewish camp elder, Schlesinger, to dismiss talk of gassings at Auschwitz as fables.¹²⁷ With or without hints, the prospective deportee knew: the transports that had left were not heard from again.¹²⁸ Given this silence, a large number of Jews went to their deaths with a residual faith in German civilization. A smaller but not insignificant group chose the uncertainties of concealment. The hindrances in store for these people were plain from the beginning. It was more difficult to seek refuge as a family than to stow away a child, harder to find shelter in Amsterdam than in a small town, more problematical to approach strangers than old friends, more frustrating to seek help without money than with some means.¹²⁹ The Dutch providers of space and food had problems as well. They faced a constant risk. Frequently they had not bargained for a long-lasting arrangement, and yet the weeks would turn into months, and the months into years. What prompted them to carry this burden? Often the motive was a sense of moral duty, even for people who may have harbored a dislike for Jews, and often enough it was money, some of which was still being paid after liberation. Of the Dutch upper middle class, it was said: "The poor offer you shelter, the rich someone else's address."¹³⁰

In the end, many of the hidden Jews were caught, as may be deduced from statistics of Jews reported as hiding at specified periods during the occupation:¹³¹

September 11, 1942	25,000
March 20, 1943	10,000 to 15,000
June 25, 1943	20,000
February 11, 1944	11,000

Concealment nevertheless offered increased chances for survival, the more so for all those who could not assert a claim for privileged treatment.

Just before Holland was emptied of its Jewish population, a few thousand remaining victims became eligible for deportation to a special destination. As early as the fall of 1942, Zoepf received word from Eichmann that a transport of privileged Jews might "at some time [*zu beliebiger*

127. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 7, p. 334.

128. Mechanicus, *Tear of Fear*, entry for July 18, 1943, pp. 95-96.

129. Louis de Jong, "Jews and Non-Jews in Nazi-Occupied Holland," in Max Beloff, ed., *On the Track of Tyranny* (London, 1960), pp. 139-55. See also account, with favorable comment about help received from the branch of the *Joodsche Raad* at Entschede, by Gcdulla Menko (1958), *Yad Vashem Oral History* 228/15.

130. Presser, *The Destruction of the Dutch Jews*, pp. 381-405. Presser himself was hiding.

131. Reports by Bene to Foreign Office, bearing dates cited above, NG-2631.

Zeit]” be directed to the “propaganda camp [*Propagandalaager*]” Theresienstadt.¹³² On August 19, 1943, Harster requested Seyss-Inquart’s permission to “resettle” to Theresienstadt three classes of Jews: those decorated in the First World War, those who had performed services for Germany in peacetime, and those who had relatives in the Protektorat ghetto.¹³³ As the lists were compiled and revised at Westerbork, the camp was filled with the sound of “Theresienstadt, Theresienstadt, Theresienstadt, Auschwitz, Auschwitz, Auschwitz.”¹³⁴ There were to be more beneficiaries of German generosity. A January 1944 transport to Theresienstadt carried — in addition to 344 persons in Harster’s categories — a group of 526 individuals and dependents rewarded with Eichmann’s approval for meritorious contributions to the “dejewification” (*Entjudung*) of the Netherlands and the operation of Westerbork.¹³⁵ In the end, the count of Jews brought from Holland to Theresienstadt was 4,894,¹³⁶ but at least half of these people were swept from the ghetto to Auschwitz in September-October 1944. During the first few months of 1944, another 3,750 deportees were shipped to Bergen-Belsen in anticipation of their possible exchange for Germans from British-controlled areas.¹³⁷ Almost half of the people in this group did not survive either.

In the final tally, 105,000 Jews were deported from the Netherlands to the following points of arrival:

Mauthausen (1941 and 1942)	1.750
Various concentration camps	350
Auschwitz complex	60,000
Sobibor	34,300
Theresienstadt	4,900
Bergen-Belsen	3.750

One returned from Mauthausen, 19 from Sobibor, over 1,000 from Auschwitz, and over 4,000 from Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen.¹³⁸ To

132. Notation by Zocpf, October 5, 1942, Israel Police 619. Note by Fräulein Slottke of telephone call from Günther to Zocpf, January 25, 1943, Israel Police 623, Eichmann to Zocpf, March 2, 1943, Israel Police 621.

133. Harster to Scyss-Inquart, *August 19, 1943, Nederland in Oorlogstijd*, January 25, 1947, p. 88.

134. Mcchanicus, *Tear of Fear*, entry for September 9, 1943, pp. 151-52.

135. Aus der Flinten to Obersturmführer Burger (Theresienstadt), January 24, 1944, in H. G. Adler, *Die verheimlichte Wahrheit* (Tubingen, 1958), pp. 31-32.

136. Adler, *Theresienstadt*, pp. 40-44.

137. Bene to Foreign Office, February 9, 1944, NG-2631.

138. Statistics of deportees and returnees compiled by de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*, vol. 8, p. 673.

the 100,000 dead deportees must be added about 2,000 who were killed, committed suicide, or died of privation inside the country, particularly in the transit camps Vught and Westerbork.¹³⁹

With transport, the process was not over. As soon as the victims had disappeared, an economic apparatus closed in to confiscate their property. The abandoned Jewish belongings comprised mainly papers and valuables in banks and apartment furnishings in homes. Two agencies were employed in Holland for the purpose of seizing these assets: Lippmann-Rosenthal and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.

The liquidated Jewish bank Lippmann-Rosenthal, which had been designated as the official depository of Jewish papers and valuables, was now set in motion to digest the loot. Some of the Jewish investments were turned into cash: securities were sold, claims were called in, and insurance policies were redeemed as soon as possible. Special regulations applied to the disposal of valuables. In the case of jewelry, the most valuable items were delivered to Goring (attention: Obersdeutnant Veltjens). Odier valuable jewelry was offered to the highest bidders in the Reich. Cheap jewelry was to be handed over to Oberregierungsrat Dr. Heinemann for Goring's Christmas Aktion. Jewelry with metal value only was to be melted down.

Similar directives were issued with respect to art objects. The most valuable items were to be offered to art experts Mihlmann and Posse, second priority was to be given to Reichsführer-SS Himmler, moderately valuable art objects were to be sold to the German art trade, cheap paintings were to be made available for the Christmas Aktion, and "degenerate art" was to be sold, with the consent of the Economy Ministry, in Switzerland. Pictures of Jews and pictures by Jews posed a special problem whose solution appears to have been deferred.

Stamp collections were to be delivered to the Reichspost, and coins were to go to the Reichsbank.¹⁴⁰ Jewish cash deposits and the proceeds from all sales were transferred to a special agency of the Reichskommissar, the *Vermögens- und Rentenanstalt*.¹⁴¹ According to postwar testimony by

139. See Dutch Government report, October 16, 1945, PS-1726. The remainder in Holland consisted of 8,000 to 9,000 intermarried Jews, a similar number who had been hidden, and about 4,000 in special categories (Portuguese Jews, persons pursuing legal remedies to determine their non-Jewish descent, etc.). Up to 5,000 may have fled or emigrated, and the excess of deaths over births during the occupation was also a few thousand.

140. Generalkommissar for Finance and Economy/Personal Referent (signed Dr. Holz) to Lippmann-Rosenthal & Co., att. Dr. von Kargcr, October 16, 1942, enclosing Seyss-Inquart directive of same date, NI-13772.

141. Affidavit by von Kargcr, September 24, 1947, NI-13904.

Seyss-Inquart, the amounts accumulating in the Vermögensanstalt ultimately reached 400,000,000 guilders.¹⁴²

The second part of the confiscatory operation, comprising the seizure of furniture in empty apartments, was carried out by the East Minister and party ideological chief Alfred Rosenberg. For Rosenberg this activity was almost a natural extension of his work in the Reich, where he laid claim to Jewish furniture in order to equip his offices in Russia and sold the surplus to the *Gauleitungen* for bombed-out people at home. In the West, Rosenberg invoked his position as Reichsleiter for ideology to get his hands on all “ownerless” Jewish cultural property (*Kulturgut*), a jurisdiction soon expanded to embrace furniture in France, Belgium, and Holland.

The seizures in the occupied areas were entrusted to a special agency, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.¹⁴³ The great bulk of the furniture was made available to bombed-out persons in the Reich on a “permanent loan” basis.¹⁴⁴ Many of the empty Jewish homes were ripped apart and carried off piece by piece by a suffering Dutch population during the winter of 1944-45.¹⁴⁵

While the Einsatzstab Rosenberg carted away Jewish furnishings, it did not neglect its original “cultural” mission to collect, among other things, private libraries for the *Hohe Schule*, the Party’s ideological university. The Einsatzstab seized libraries from rabbinical seminaries and also such choice items as the library of the Spinoza Society, which contained “extremely valuable works of great importance for the exploration of the Spinoza problem,” and the Rosenthaliana, a collection that had been donated to the City of Amsterdam and that was examined carefully for the

142. Seyss-Inquart deducted from that account the sum of 14,000,000 guilders to cover the cost of constructing the Vught camp. Testimony by Seyss-Inquart, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, XVI, 65-66. According to the official exchange rate, 400,000,000 guilders = RM 530,800,000 = \$212,320,000. The arrangement between the Reichskommissar and the SS and Police came to the attention of the Reich Auditing Office (*Rechnungshof*) and Ministerialrat Kallenbach of the Finance Ministry. In April 1944, however, the ministry acquiesced in the transaction. Rainer Weincrt, “Die Sauberkeit tier Verwaltung im Kriege” (Opladen, 1993), pp. 117-19. Seyss-Inquart also used, without permission of the Finance Ministry, over 8,000,000 Reichsmark of the confiscated funds for the acquisition of art objects that were to be shipped to a new museum in Linz. Frank Bajohr, *Parvenis und Profiteure — Korruption inderNS-Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), p. 130.

143. Sec draft report by Dienststelle Western of the Einsatzstab on furniture Aktion, end of 1944 or beginning of 1945, L-188. Also, memorandum by Dellschow (Handelstrusr West), July 31, 1943, NI-14822.

144. Rosenberg to Hitler, October 3, 1942, PS-41. Lippmann-Rosenthal, which claimed the proceeds from the sale of the furniture, never received any payments. Affidavit by von Karger, September 24, 1947, NT 13904.

145. Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution* (New York, 1953), pp. 341-42.

light it could shed on Cromwell's attitude toward the Jews and "possibly even on the Jewish influence on the development of the secret service."¹⁴⁶

The confiscations of Jewish property in Holland were as thorough as the killings of its owners. In no other occupied territory of the great semicircle did the Germans manage, in one form or another, to collect so much Jewish wealth. The phenomenon is explained by the fact that in most of the areas under Axis domination the Germans had to make property concessions to indigenous authorities in order to obtain all possible cooperation in the deportations. In Holland such concessions were not necessary. Three out of every four Jews who inhabited the Netherlands at the beginning of the occupation were dead at its end.

The geographic situation of Holland and the nature of the German administration installed there favored the destructive work. Extraordinary efforts on the part of the Jews and the Dutch would have been required to change these odds, and the Jews were incapable of concerted counteraction.

Jewish survival efforts in Holland were essentially a product of individual initiative for private benefit. The pattern was set with the individual deals for emigration conducted by well-to-do Jews at the beginning of the occupation. It was continued with appeals for exemption or deferment on grounds ranging from indispensability to sterility. As a last resort, a desperate Jewish family could hope to save itself only by hiding. Those who could not help themselves were seized by Rauter's police or delivered to the Germans by the collaborators. This was the fate of the vast majority.

What about the role of the Dutch? What kind of factor was the Dutch population in the destructive arena? When the Germans attacked Holland in May 1940, the Dutch reacted by fighting openly for a few days, to settle back for five years to a mixture of bureaucratic collaboration and underground sabotage. Much the same thing happened on a somewhat smaller scale in relation to the Jews. Once, on the occasion of the Mauthausen deportation in February 1941, the Dutch had signified their feelings toward their Jewish neighbors with an unmistakable general strike; but when the strikers were overwhelmed, there were no further demonstrations. There was, in fact, a great deal of administrative cooperation, from the participation of Dutch banks in the disposal of securities to the registration work by the Dutch civil service and the role of the Dutch police. Considerable as this collaboration may have been, it was

146. Hohe Schule report, undated, PS-171. Report by Working Group Netherlands of Einsatzstab Rosenberg, undated, PS-176. Rosenberg had authorin' to seize all libraries and archives in Holland. Keitel to von Brauchitsch and Befehlshaber in the Netherlands, July 9, 1940, PS-137.

matched at least in part by the attempt to sabotage the destruction process through massive concealments of thousands of Jews in cloisters, orphanages, and homes. Few Jews survived in Holland, but those few were saved as a result of the most strenuous efforts, for Holland was the one territory' of the occupied West in which the Jews did not have an even chance to live.

Luxembourg

Wedged in between the Reich, Belgium, and France, a small country' was quickly overrun in the lightning campaign of 1940. This was Luxembourg. The Grand Duchy became a quasi-incorporated territory under the jurisdiction of Gauleiter Gustav Simon of the neighboring Gau of Koblenz-Trier.¹ Simon had the title *Chef der Zivilverwaltung* (Chief of Civil Administration) in the new territory. There was thus no automatic application of Reich statutes in Luxembourg, but Simon lost little time in catching up with the mother country.

The census count of Jews in the Grand Duchy as of December 31, 1935, was 3,144. A substantial number of these residents fled during the initial period of invasion and occupation. Following a threat of mass expulsion by Simon, a further exodus — partly in small organized groups — began in August 1940 and continued until the beginning of 1941, encompassing up to about 1,400 Jews. By July 1941, fewer than 800 were left.² Simon moved against all those still in his grasp with swiftness and dispatch. Drafts of ordinances with definitions, expropriatory provisions, and concentration measures were submitted for his approval within a matter of weeks.³ The economic part of the program was carried out expeditiously.

On September 5, 1940, barely one month after he took office, Simon issued a decree for the expropriation of Jewish property. The administra-

1. Order by Hitler, August 2, 1940, NOKW-3474.

2. Ino Arndt, "Luxembourg," in Wolfgang Benz, *Dimension des Völkermords* (Munich, 1991), pp. 95-104, on pp. 100-101. Memorandum by Berthold Storfcr (Jewish Community of Vienna), April 24, 1941, on a meeting he and other Jewish leaders held with Eichmann on Luxembourg emigration, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives Accession Number 1997 A 0080 (Luxembourg Archives), Roll 2. Also Einsatzkommando Luxemburg/SD Führer to SD Abschnitt Koblenz, July 15, 1941, EAP 173-g-12-14/7, document once in the Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Virginia. According to the Kommando, 425 Jews were capable of work and 305 were old or ill. Its overall figure of the remaining Jewish population was 796. A few months later, the Jewish Communin' of Luxembourg estimated the total at about 750. See its memorandum of October 13, 1941, Holocaust Museum Archives Accession Number 1997 A 0080, Roll 2.

3. Frick to Lammers, August 31, 1940, NG-2297. Reich Chancellery memorandum, September 6, 1940, NG-2297.

tion of that ordinance was entrusted to Gauinspektor Ackermann, “who had previously carried out with great success the Aryanizations in the Gau Moselland [Koblenz-Trier] and who brought to his new task a large measure of experience.” The Jewish population was now counted, and its property was catalogued.

The expropriators discovered that there were 335 Jewish enterprises in Luxembourg; only seventy-five of them were judged worthy of Aryanization. Trustees appointed for the management of these firms were drawn exclusively from the ranks of “Luxembourg Ethnic Germans.” The liquidated enterprises were in “overcrowded” branches and were therefore struck off the list with the approval of the director of the local Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

In Luxembourg the Jews also owned 380 farms. These properties were immediately leased to new managers. Another 394 acres of uncultivated Jewish land was going to be offered to neighboring “Luxembourg Ethnic German” peasants for sale.

The furniture that had been left behind by the fugitive Jews was placed at the disposal of the administration, including the Zivilverwaltung, the Reichsbahn, the Reichspost, the Hitler Youth, and other agencies. A small portion of the furniture was sold to “local Germans.”⁴

Within a year (by summer of 1941) Gauleiter Simon was ahead of the Reich in the implementation of his anti-Jewish measures. He had instituted a number of prohibitions affecting freedom of movement, and his Jews were forced to wear yellow armbands on their left sleeves.⁵

A partial concentration began in August 1941 in the cloister Fiinfbrunnen at Ulflingen, in the north of the Grand Duchy. The lot of the Jews incarcerated there, most of them elderly, was complete isolation. The single telephone that connected them with the Community in the city of Luxembourg was removed in November 1941,⁶ and on June 10, 1942, Alfred Oppenheimer, the Jewish “Elder,” asked the Commander of

4. “Verwaltung und Verwendung des Judenvermögens in Luxemburg“ *Die Judenfrage*, May 31, 1941, p. 97. Not everything, however, could be disposed of. Some stocks and bonds remained, and at the end of June 1944 Dr. van Hces of the Economy Ministry offered them for sale on behalf of the Chef der Zivilverwaltung. At this point, neither the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit nor the Dresdner Bank was interested. Hces to Rinn (Dresdner Bank), June 26, 1944, and subsequent correspondence in German Federal Archives, R 7/3169.

5. *Die Judenfrage*, September 10, 1941, p. 167. With respect to marking, Simon anticipated every jurisdiction in the deportation area, save only Poland.

6. Alfred Oppenheimer (President of the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde in Luxembourg) and his Bureau Chief Martin Meyer to Einsatzkommando/2E, November 20, 1941, U.S. Holocaust Museum Archives Accession No. 1997 A 0080, Roll 2. The Arabic numeral 2 should be II, a section under Kriminalkommissar Sebastian Ranncr. E was headed by his specialist in Jewish affairs, Otto Schmalz.

the Security Police Einsatzkommando Luxemburg, Oberregierungsrat Fritz Hartmann, for a second time to allow them a short time of fresh air daily—they had not been permitted out of the building for five months.⁷

By dien, the Luxembourg community had experienced its first deportation. On October 5, 1941, the Jewish leaders of the Grand Duchy informed its Jews that a transport was in the offing to the “East.” It called upon them to face their fate, “head” held “high.” They were not going to be alone, because 20,000 brothers and sisters in the Reich were affected as well.⁸ Two days later, a departure date was publicized: it was to be October 17.⁹ On October 13, the Jewish leadership, clinging to the hope that the Germans might be content to remove the Jews only from their homes, proposed that the entire community be concentrated in Fünfbrunnen. Inasmuch as the cloister could not hold all the Jews, its memorandum included a suggestion that barracks be erected and charged to the community.¹⁰ But the train left Luxembourg on October 16 with 334 Jews, stopping in Trier to load on another 180 deportees.¹¹ Its destination was the Lodz Ghetto.¹² No mail came from the ghetto, but the Community in Luxembourg had reports that the deportees needed money.¹³ When an attempt was made to obtain permission to send small sums, Ackermann’s office rejected the request peremptorily.¹⁴

The idea of the barracks was not immediately discarded by the Einsatzkommando. As yet there were no death camps, and in the meantime Fünfbrunnen would mean complete SS control of the Jewish remnant. For some time the Kommando corresponded with the Rüstungskommando in Luxembourg and the railroads in Saarbrücken for allocation and transport of the lumber,¹⁵ but in May 1942 the Jewish apartments

7. Oppenheimer and Meyer to Hartmann, June 10, 1942, *ibid.*

8. Announcement by the Gemeinde, October 5, 1941, *ibid.*

9. Announcement by the Gemeinde, October 7, 1941, *ibid.*

10. Memorandum by the Gemeinde, October 13, 1941, and Oppenheimer to Einsatzkommando/2E, November 20, 1941, noting iron and wood requirements, *ibid.*

11. “Luxemburg judenfrei,” *Luxemburger Wort*, October 17, 1941. Oppenheimer to Jewish Community in Cologne, December 4, 1941, *ibid.*

12. Lodz Ghetto Collection, No. 58, pp. 11, 19. The number of deportees who arrived was 512.

13. Oppenheimer to Jewish Community in Cologne, December 4, 1941, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Accession No. 1997 A 0080, Roll 2.

14. Chef der Zivilverwaltung/Verwaltung des jüdischen Vermögens IV A/111 (signed Direktor Rabsch) to Generalbank Luxemburg, November 4, 1941, *Und. IV-A* was under Ackermann.

15. Einsatzkommando (signed Cimon) to Eisenbahndirektion Saarbrücken, April 10, 1942, *ibid.*

were marked,¹⁶ and finally the barracks were vetoed because the Wehrmacht needed the materials.¹⁷

Slowly the Luxembourg Jews disappeared. A few dozen were sent to the Lublin District and Auschwitz. Then several transports comprising almost all the others were directed to Theresienstadt. Some forty-two returned.¹⁸

Belgium

Turning from civilian-controlled Holland and Luxembourg to the military areas of Belgium and France, one encounters a different kind of German administration. The military governments differed from their civilian neighbors both in purpose and in character. The Netherlands and Luxembourg were “Germanic” areas; they were therefore made into a “protectorate” (*Schutzstaat*) and a quasi-incorporated territory, respectively.¹ That status was intended to be final. Belgium and France, on the other hand, were “Romanic” regions. Apart from the annexed provinces (Malmedy-Eupen in Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine in France), these countries were not destined to become administrative units in a Greater German Reich. They were to be placed in a separate, though subordinate, position by a victorious Germany at the end of the war. The occupation of Belgium and France was therefore meant to be temporary. The entire German administrative apparatus in these states was provisional in its aim, and the officers in charge of that apparatus were emergency wartime overlords.

In light of the overall purpose of the occupation, the German generals in Belgium and France were prone to regard their mission as one that comprised mainly the furtherance of military security and economic exploitation. To these generals the destruction of the Jews was bound to present itself as a secondary task. There is even some evidence that during the planning stage preceding the commencement of the western campaign the military had hoped to avoid an entanglement in Jewish matters altogether. Thus a directive by the Oberquartiermeister of the Sixth Army, dated February 22, 1940, stated:

An unrolling [*ein Aufrollen*] of the *racial question* is to be avoided because annexation intentions could be inferred therefrom. The sole

16. Oppenheimer and Meyer to Einsatzkommando/II B 3, May 20, 1942, *ibid*.

17. War Diary, Rüstungskommando Metz, Aussenstelle Luxemburg (signed Major Knorth), September 9, 1942, Wi/Ia 6.3.

18. Paul Cerf, *Longtemps jaurai mémoire* (Luxembourg, 1974), pp. 198-213.

1. Stuckart, *Neues Staatsrecht*, II, 121, 84.

circumstance that an inhabitant is a Jew must not serve as the basis for special measures directed against him.²

The generals in the West were not eager to proceed against the Jewish minority, because they already had their hands full with the “ordinary” functions of a military government. However, they do not appear to have been motivated by any humanitarian consideration. Their reluctant reception of a special assignment that intruded upon the basic tasks of occupation is not to be confused with a desire to preserve the Jewish community from utter destruction. The German army was not the protector of the Jews, and it was capable, under pressure, of solving also its secondary problems.

In prewar Belgium there were no census counts by religion. Most probably, the Jewish population of the country on the eve of the German invasion was over 65,000.³ Almost all the Jews lived in four major cities, principally Antwerp and Brussels, plus a few thousand each in Liège and Charleroi.⁴ The large majority of the Jews in Belgium did not possess Belgian nationality. Many were immigrants from eastern Europe and refugees from the Reich.⁵

As German forces began to cross the border, thousands fled south. The newly created German military government looked for a way to lighten its burden still more, and before long, another 8,000 Jews (mainly refugees from the Reich) were shoved into neighboring France.⁶ Subsequent registrations of Jews encompassed 55,670 and another 516 in two northern French départements attached to the *Militarbefehlshaber* in Brussels. Also noted were 1,078 Aryan partners in mixed marriages.⁷ The German administrators now had a statistical picture of their victims.

2. Directive by 6th Army/OQu/Qu 2 (signed by Oberquartiermeister Pamberg) for “Administration and Pacification of the Occupied Areas of Holland and Belgium” February 22, 1940, NOKW-1515.

3. See Serge Klarsfeld and Maxime Steinberg, *Mémorial de la déportation des juifs de Belgique* (Brussels and New York, 1982), introductory material without page numeration.

4. In 1936 about 53 percent of Belgian Jewry lived in Antwerp and 38 percent in Brussels. The percentages, calculated by R. Van Doorslaer, are cited by Lieven Sacrens, “Antwerp’s Pre-War Attitude toward the Jews,” in Dan Michman, ed., *Belgium and the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 159-94, on p. 160.

5. A recorded number from the Reich-Protectorat area was 8,216. See the consolidated figures, to October 31, 1941, prepared by the Reichsvereinigung for the Gestapo, Leo Baeck Institute microfilm 66.

6. Interior Ministry’ (signed Jacobi) to Foreign Office (att. St.S. Weizsacker) November 19, 1940, enclosing report by military commander in Belgium and Northern France for October 1940, NG-2380.

7. Klarsfeld and Steinberg, *Mémorial*, introductory material. After 1944, the Belgian Government identified 8,414 Jews not on German registration lists, *ibid.* In the main these were Jews who had fled or had been expelled from Belgium.

The principal personalities on the Belgian scene were representatives of the military, the SS, the Foreign Office, and private business. The official sector may be depicted in brief:⁸

Militarbefehlshaber	von Falkenhausen
Verwaltungsstab	Reeder
Deputy	Craushaar
SS and Police	Jungclaus
Plenipotentiary of Security	
Police and SD	Ehlers (Konstantin Canaris)
IV	Straub
Jewish section	
(in succession)	Asche, Erdmann, Weidmann
Foreign Office representative	von Bargaen

Within five months from the start of the occupation the work of these men was reflected in the first anti-Jewish measures in Belgium. In October 1940 the Militarbefehlshaber issued two decrees which ran the whole gamut of the preliminary steps of the destruction process. The concept of "Jew" was defined. Jewish lawyers and civil servants were ousted from their positions. Jewish enterprises and stocks were subjected to registration, and all transactions were made subject to official approval. Finally, the Jewish population was also ordered to register for future surveillance.

Evident was the fact that the Jews of Belgium did not have much wealth. A report of the Militarbefehlshaber for October 1940 mentions that "the influence of Jewry upon economic life in Belgium has been rather slight. Apart from the diamond industry in the Antwerp area, Jewish participation in the Belgian economy is hardly worth mentioning."⁹ Notwithstanding the trifling amounts of prospective loot, the German business sector evidenced considerable interest in the Belgian Aryanization market. In pursuance of an order by the Militarbefehlshaber, three German commercial banks were established in Belgium: the Conti-

8. The office of the Militarbefehlshaber was divided into two staffs: a *Verwaltungsstab*, headed by Reeder, and a *Kommandostab*, which was concerned with purely military matters. Regionally, the military administration branched out into *Feld-* and *Ortskommandanturen*. For details, see U.S. Army Service Manual M 361-2A, *Civil Affairs Handbook Belgium* (prepared by the Office of Strategic Services), May 16, 1944, pp. 15-19.

Ehlers had been in charge of Section IV of Einsatzgruppe B before his arrival in Belgium. Canaris (a nephew of the admiral) was IdS of East Prussia (with jurisdiction in the Bialystok District). In 1942 the Jewish section was under II. On the role of the Securite' Police and SD in deportations, see Serge Klarsfeld and Maximilien Steinberg, eds., *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Belgien* (New York and Paris, 1980).

9. Report by the Militarbefehlshaber for October 1940, NG-2380.

mentale Bank, the Hansabank, and the Westbank.¹⁰ They had hardly been organized for business when a number of customers appeared on their lists as parties interested in “useful hints”: the Schultheiss Brauerei, Krupp, Siemens, the Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (AEG), Brown Boverie, and Deutsche Asbest Zement A. G.¹¹

The overall campaign of capital penetration in Holland and Belgium was subject, in fundamental policy questions, to the approval of the Foreign Trade Division of the Economy Ministry.¹² In September 1941, after about a year of Aryanization in Belgium, the army made an unsuccessful attempt to secure a part of the Jewish business for its soldiers. Upon the occasion of a capital penetration conference in the Economy Ministry, the representative of the Militärbefehlshaber in Belgium, Kriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Pichier, suggested that 300 un-Aryanized wholesale and retail enterprises in his territory, with a yield of about 10,000 Reichsmark a year, be reserved for German war veterans. Dr. Pichier’s proposal was rejected decisively. It was pointed out that the war was still in progress, that trustee administration would have to be instituted until the veterans came back, and that such business enterprises — in which personal contacts between proprietors and customers were so important—were not suitable for trustee administration. It was therefore advisable, concluded the conferees, that these Aryanizations be conducted by German businessmen who were well provided with capital and who could withstand a Belgian boycott.¹³ There is no evidence that Kriegsverwaltungsrat Pichier made any further attempt to benefit the soldiers in the Aryanization campaign.

By the end of 1942 the Aryanizations in Belgium were largely completed. The data in Table 8-13, which were prepared in the Militärbefehlshaber’s office, indicate how many enterprises in each branch were

10. Continentale Bank/Abwicklungsstelle Reich to Devisenstelle Frankfurt, January 31, 1945, NI-10229. Statement by Paul-Georges Janmart (Belgian employee of the Continentale Bank), March 22, 1947, NI-13940. The Continentale Bank was a Dresdner Bank subsidiary.

11. Fritz André (Dresdner Bank) to Direktor Overbeck (future manager of the Continentale Bank in Brussels), August 15, 1940, NI-13827. For a typical operation of the Continentale Bank, see Overbeck to Georg Stiller (Sekretariat Dr. Rasche of the Dresdner Bank), July 21, 1941, enclosing report on attempt to acquire Grands Moulins de Bruxelles and other firms, NI-13831.

12. Directive by the Economy Ministry, May 28, 1940, NG-55. The Foreign Trade Division was under Unrersraatssekretär von Jagwitz. The Western countries were detailed to Ministerialdirigent Dr. Schlotteren. The *Referat* “capital-interlacing” in Schlottercr’s section was headed by Dr. Gerhard Saagcr. Affidavit by Saagcr, December 16, 1947, NI-13775.

13. Summary of Economy Ministry conference under chairmanship of Ministerialrat Schultze-Schlutius (deputizing for USt.S. von Jagwitz), September 23, 1941, NI-10699.

“dejewified” (*entjudet*, i.e., transferred), liquidated, or “floating” (*in Schwebe*, i.e., awaiting disposition) on December 31, 1942. The value of sequestered Jewish assets (*iiberwachtetes Judenvermogen*), in Reichsmark, is shown in Table 8-14.

It should be noted that the banks were slow in reporting Jewish accounts and that therefore the actual amount of cash they held, swelled by the proceeds from the sale of nearly 600 enterprises, was much greater than the 6,150,000 Reichsmark shown in Table 8-14. Nevertheless, the total deposit ultimately accumulated in Belgium must have fallen far short of the half-billion figure that was surpassed in Holland. The Belgian Jews had comparatively little cash to begin with. The 600 or so Aryanizations probably did not bring in vast sums, and the sale of securities and real estate posed very special difficulties to the German military administration.

During a conference in the Finance Ministry in December 1942, Kriegsverwaltungsrat Pichier revealed some of the administration's efforts to get rid of real estate, diamonds, and other items. The Belgian public, he said, had exhibited an “aversion” (*Abnetzung*) to the acquisition of Jewish real property from the Militärbefehlshaber. For that reason many real estate parcels had been exempted from confiscation. Their sale was accomplished by a state institution, the Brussels Trusteeship Corporation, which appeared in such cases as trustee for the Jewish owner. The proceeds were then confiscated. So far, however, the Militärbefehlshaber had not solved still another difficulty in the disposal of real estate. Prices had been frozen, and the official price ceilings were only 40 percent of current value. To alleviate that price retardation, the Trusteeship Corporation hoped to increase the mortgages on the Jewish houses to the greatest possible extent. Creditors were available in sufficiently large numbers, and the borrowed money could be confiscated at once.

Another item calling for caution in disposal was the stock of diamonds from liquidated shops in the Antwerp area. A small amount, reported Dr. Pichier, had been sold for foreign currency in southern France. Not much progress had been made as yet with the disposal of furniture. The Trusteeship Corporation was moving into the Jewish apartments as soon as they became empty. Nevertheless, some of the furniture had to be sold to pay back rent, and some of it was wanted by the Wehrmacht finance officer for the troops. Valuable furnishings would be sold in the Reich. Art objects were being handed over to Red Cross Oberfeldfuhrer von Behr, director of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in Paris. Gold and jewelry were melted down.

During the opening of safes, the military administration also had found securities in considerable quantity. An attempt was being made, reported Dr. Pichier, to collect large parcels of shares in order to secure

AWAITING
TOTAL PERCENTAGE TRANSFERRED LIQUIDATED DISPOSITION

Textile trade	1,220	15.8	22	1,161	37
Clothing industry	965	12.5	50	876	39
Commercial agents	685	8.9	23	599	63
Diamond industry	675	8.7	13	647	15
Leather industry	520	6.7	8	494	18
Diamond trade	500	6.5	14	469	17
Leather trade	453	5.9	20	399	34
Food products trade	383	4.9	12	361	10
Metal industry	163	2.1	56	87	20
Metal products trade	156	2.0	26	111	19
Chemicals	142	1.8	65	39	38
Nursing	137	1.8	5	124	8
Real estate	122	1.6	9	0	113
Miscellaneous	1,608	20.8	265	1,021	322
<u>Total</u>	<u>7,729</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>588</u>	<u>6,388</u>	<u>753</u>

Note: Report by Militärbefehlshaber on economic exploitation, April 1, 1943, Wi/LA 4.60. At the same time, the status of 652 Jewish enterprises in the two northern French *departements* was as follows: transferred, 33; liquidated, 207; awaiting disposition, 412. *Ibid.*

TABLE 8-14
VALUE OF SEQUESTERED JEWISH ASSETS

	END OF 1941	END OF 1942
Cash in banks	none	6,150,000
Securities and papers	80,000,000	70,650,000
Real estate parcels (2,814)	36,000,000	50,000,000
Total	116,000,000	126,800,000

Note: Economic report by Militarbefehlshaber, April 1,1943, Wi/IA 4.60.

“already the later influence of the Reich.”*¹⁴ However, the disposal of the unneeded securities in the Belgian market was to run headlong into a major obstacle. The president of the Brussels stock exchange, van Dessel, refused to accept the papers in the absence of the Jewish owners. Under the direction of the *Devisenschutzkommando West* (the agency in charge of securities and other papers in Belgium, France, and Holland), the shares were then stamped “property of the German Reich,” to be sold on the exchange or auctioned off to the highest bidder by the three German banks in the country.¹⁵ That was how the Germans attempted to loot what they could in Belgium.

When the Militarbefehlshaber in October 1940 laid the foundations for the economic destruction process, he instituted at the same time the first concentration measure: the registration of the Jews. In the following year attempts were made to establish a Jewish council, but all the Jewish leaders except two prominent rabbis had left the country at the beginning of the invasion. One of these rabbis (Dr. Salomon Ullmann, a former head of Jewish chaplains in the Belgian army) was chosen by the Jews after consultation with Belgian secretaries general and Cardinal van Roey, as *Grand Rabbi de Belgique*. He was to head a committee transformed on November 25,1941, into *the Association des Juifs en Belgique*, the Belgian Judenrat. All Jews were subjected to direction from this organization,

14. Summary of Finance Ministry conference with participation of MinRat Dr. Maedcl and several Kriegsverwaltungsrare from the West, December 11-12, 1942, NG-5369. The Finance Ministry was the ultimate booking agency for assets confiscated in favor of the Reich. Not mentioned in this conference was, among other things, an item of 1,000 women’s furs that had been “made available” from liquidated Jewish firms for the OKW. War diary RLi In Belgien, May 19, 1942, Wi/IA 4.69.

15. Memorandum by Count Philip Orssich (Continental Bank), undated, probably 1944, NI-5776. For statistics of transactions involving also securities transmitted to Belgium by Lippmann-Rosenthal in Holland and Bank der Deutschen Arbeit in Luxembourg, see Chief Inspector of Registry Office, Brussels (signed Hopchet) to Commissar with Audit General, Brussels (Jans), March 22,1947, NI-7358.

and local committees were created in Brussels, Antwerp, Liège, and Charleroi.¹⁶

In October 1941 the Militärbefehlshaber also instituted a curfew and ordered the restriction of all Jewish residences to the same four cities. As usual, the reason assigned for these measures was the allegation that Jews “still dared to engage in black-market activities.”¹⁷

In June 1942 the Jews were marked with a star,¹⁸ and thousands of men between the ages of sixteen and sixty, as well as women from sixteen to forty', were rounded up for forced labor projects of the Organisation Todt. In September, a regional construction office (Oberbauleitung) of the Organisation Todt at Audinghen used 2,000 of these Jews.¹⁹ The deportations, however, were already on the agenda and Belgium received its initial quota: 10,000.²⁰ The Security Police thereupon set up a transit camp for the prospective deportees at Mechelen (Malines in French), almost halfway between Antwerp and Brussels, and a short distance from both.²¹

On July 9, 1942, Foreign Office representative von Bargaen reported that Militärverwaltungschef Reeder was conferring with Himmler about the proposed deportations. Von Bargaen noted a number of obstacles in the path of the German administration: the Belgians had no understanding (*Verständnis*) of the Jewish question, the Jews themselves exhibited “unrest” (*Unruhe*), and the Germans suffered from a shortage of police forces. The seizures would therefore have to be directed first against the Polish, Czech, and “other” (*sonstige*) Jews.²² A few weeks later, the Armament Inspector, Generalmajor Franssen, observed a “strong rush”

16. *Civil Affairs Handbook Belgium*, pp. 38-39. For a concise history of the *Association des Juifs*, see Maxime Steinberg, “The Trap of Legality: The Association of the Jews of Belgium,” *Proceedings of the Third Yad Vashem International Conference, Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe, 1933-1945* (Jerusalem, 1979), pp. 353-76.

17. *Die Judenfrage*, October 14, 1941, p. 208.

18. On distribution of the stars, ultimately undertaken by the *Association des Juifs*, see Steinberg, “The Trap of Legality” *Patterns of Jewish Leadership*, p. 361.

19. Final report by the Militärbefehlshaber on wage policy and labor utilization, undated, after September 1944, pp. 78-79, 254-55, Wi/IA .24. The Oberbauleitung belonged to the Einsatzgruppe of the Organisation Todt in the West. The base at Audinghen was located behind the Cap Gris-Nez jutting into the English Channel, in occupied France. Franz Seidler, *Die Organisation Todt* (Bonn, 1998), p. 32. In the German records and Seidler's book, the place is referred to as Audinghem.

20. Eichmann to Rademacher, June 22, 1942, NG-183.

21. Judgment of Oberlandesgericht Schleswig to commence trial of Ehlers and others at Kiel, March 8, 1977, in KJarsfeld, *Die Endlösung in Belgien*, pp. 123, 126-28, 159.

22. Von Bargaen to Foreign Office, July 9, 1942, NG-5209. Eichmann to Fillers in Brussels, August 1, 1942, Israel Police Eichmann trial document 710.

of Jewish workers into local industry.²³ Propaganda officers pointed to “grotesque camouflage attempts” (*groteske Tarnungsversuche*), such as the conclusion of twenty-five to thirty intermarriages during a fourteen-day period in Charleroi.²⁴ Further compounding the problems of the German occupiers was a small group of Jewish partisans who invaded the offices of the *Association des Juifs* to burn lists of Jews destined for “labor” on July 25, 1942, and who assassinated the Association’s labor chief, Robert Holcinger, on August 29, 1942.²⁵

When the opening quota was filled in September, von Bargaen reported large-scale evasions. The Jews were hiding out with Belgian families. Many prospective victims had Belgian identification cards, and still others were fleeing to occupied and unoccupied France.²⁶

On the day on which this pessimistic report was sent to Berlin, Obersturmführer Asche called the members of the Association into his office and informed them that, in punishment for their passive resistance, all the Jews would be evacuated from Belgium. Rabbi Ullmann and four of his associates were then sent for a few days to the concentration camp of Breendonck, presumably so that they might think about the possible consequences of their intransigence.²⁷ Asche then ordered the Association to nominate a successor who could undertake its direction in “an orderly and energetic manner.”²⁸

On November 11, 1942, von Bargaen reported that the deportation figure had now reached 15,000 men, women, and children, among them a few Belgian citizens who had dared to remove the Jewish star from their clothes. Von Bargaen went on to describe the increasing difficulties faced by the machinery of destruction in the roundups. In the beginning, he said, prospective deportees had been served with a “report-for-work order” (*Arbeitseinsatzbefehl*) via the Association. After a while, however,

23. Armament Inspectorate Belgium to OKW/Wi Rii, August 1, 1942, Wi/Ia 4.64.

24. Morale report (*Stimmungsbericht*) Milirarbcfchlshabr Belgien/Propaganda, August 9, 1942, OKW-733.

25. Steinberg, “The Trap of Legality,” *Patterns of Jewish Leadership*, pp. 364, 368. On April 19, 1943, a Jewish résister and two of his non-Jewish friends halted a train, unlocked the doors of several cars, and freed two hundred deportees. Klarsfeld and Steinberg, *Memorial*, unnumbered page in introduction.

26. Von Bargaen to Foreign Office, September 24, 1942, NG-5219. Flights were reported also in *Donauzeitutuj* (Belgrade), August 9, 1942, p. 2.

27. *Civil Affairs Handbook Belgium*, p. 40.

28. Protocol of 48th meeting of the *Association*, October 26, 1942, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung in Belgien*, p. 49, and subsequent documents in the volume. Ullmann, who had tendered his resignation to the military authorities on September 8, was succeeded on December 3 by Marcel Blum. Steinberg, “The Trap of Legality,” *Patterns of Jewish Leadership*, pp. 368-70.

the intended victims had been dissuaded from obeying the order by rumors about die “butchering of the Jews, etc. [*Abschlachten der Juden, usw.*].” The last transports therefore had to be tilled by means of *razzias* and Einzelaktionen.²⁹

Shortly after this report was received in Berlin, Unterstaatssekretar Luther of the Foreign Office requested von Bargaen to ask the Militarbetehlshaber to deport the Jews of Belgian nationality too. Only complete deportation, said Luther, could put an end to the “unrest”: the Jews could in any case no longer be surprised, and “sooner or later” everything had to happen anyway.³⁰

The military administration appears to have tried its best. In April 1943, as children and old people were seized, the General Secretary' of the Belgian Justice Ministry addressed two letters to Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Thedieck in the Militarbefehlshabefs office, pointing out that many of the children were unaccompanied by parents and that old people, some of them over eighty, could hardly be put to work.³¹ Grinding on, the deportation machinery was making preparations for the roundup of Jews of Belgian nationality (Project litis) in Brussels and Antwerp. The “*Grossaktion*” was to take place with heavy reliance upon the personnel of the Devisenschutzkommando during the single night of September 3-4, 1943.³² Despite the elaborate planning, the arrests in Antwerp resulted in “accidents.” On a crowded truck taking Jews to the collecting point, nine of the victims were suffocated to death. Once again Belgian officials protested.³³

Deportations continued in 1944 until July 31, even though the round-ups were more difficult and transports became smaller.³⁴ The decreasing flow is traceable to the concealment of many thousands in Belgian institutions and homes. The plenipotentiary of the Security Police and SD estimated in June 1944 that 80 percent of all the Jews had fake identity cards. For camouflage, many wore blue working clothes.³⁵ There was also a privileged class that included foreign and intermarried Jews, but the immunity of Jews in mixed marriages was precarious. One of these people

29. Von Bargaen to Foreign Office, November 11, 1942, NG-5219.

30. Luther to von Bargaen, December 4, 1942, NG-5219.

31. Judgment by Oberlandesgericht Schleswig, March 8, 1977, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlosung in Belgien*, p. 139.

32. Memorandum by Hauptsturmfuhrer Erdmann, September 1, 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 78-80. Aschc, still in Belgium, was assigned to loading operations.

33. Report by Militarbcfchlshaber for July-September and November 1, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 81.

34. See statistics, *ibid.*, pp. 84-85, 88.

35. Report by Plenipotentiary of Security Police and SD(Canaris), June 15, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 86-87. The report noted also the discovery, in apartments where Jews had been hiding, of wall maps on which the progress of Allied forces was marked.

was a refugee who had been wounded during die First World War and who held the Iron Cross Second Class. Writing about this man on May 27, 1944, an SS race expert noted: “The idea of submitting to a voluntary sterilization is not repugnant to S.”³⁶

As late as August 1944 the Germans made an attempt to round up the personnel of the *Association des Juifs* and the remaining inmates of orphanages, welfare centers, and hospitals. For this venture, there was no longer sufficient time.³⁷ Belgium was overrun by the Allies in September 1944. Up to then the German agencies in Belgium had managed to deliver about 25,000 Jews to their fate in Auschwitz.³⁸

France

In France the anti-Jewish destruction process was a product of the Franco-German armistice. To the French authorities who in Vichy picked up die strands of government in June 1940, the defeat was decisive. The war was irrevocably lost. From 1940 to 1944, the unequal relationship between victor and vanquished manifested itself in a stream of German demands that could not easily be opposed. The destruction of the Jews in France was such a demand.

In its reactions to German pressure, the Vichy government tried to confine the destruction process to certain limits. These limits were set forth first of all with a view to arresting the destructive development as a whole. The French authorities sought to avoid drastic action. They recoiled from die idea of adopting measures that were unprecedented in history. When German pressure was intensified in 1942, the Vichy government fell back upon a second line of defense. The foreign Jews and immigrants were abandoned, and an effort was made to protect the native Jews. To some extent, that strategy met with success. By giving up a part, most of the whole was saved.

The Vichy regime’s ability to bargain with the Germans over the fate of the Jews rested on a simple fact: the Germans needed French help. In no

36. Office of Gruf. Jungclaus/SS-Führer in Race and Resettlement Matters (signed Stubaf. Aust) to RuSHA/Genealogical Records Office (*Almentratafclamt*), May 27, 1944, NO-1494.

37. Steinberg, “The Trap of Legality,” *Patterns of Jewish Leadership*, pp. 375-76. Judgment of Oberlandscgricht Schleswig, March 8, 1977, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung in Belgien*, p. 155.

38. An alphabetical list of the deportees was compiled by Klarsfeld and Steinberg, *Memorial*. The number from Belgium and the two *départements* in northern France is over 25,000. Fewer than 1,500 returned. To the 24,000 dead should be added several hundred who died as suicides, in the course of arrest, in prisons and Malincs, or as result of privation. There is no numerical breakdown by city, but Antwerp is believed to have lost a considerably higher percentage of its Jews than any of the other communities. Saerens in Michman, *Belgium*, p. 194.

territory that we have covered so far was German dependence on native administration so great as in France. To the French bureaucracy fell the burden of performing a large part of the destructive work, and the roster of Frenchmen in controlling positions of the machinery' of destruction is impressively long. Here is an abbreviated table of the Vichy machine:

Chief of State: Pétain

Vice President (to April 1942): Laval (Darlan)

Chief of Government (from April 1942): Laval

Commissar for Jewish Affairs (from June 1942): Darquier de Pellepoix

Section d'enquête et de contrôle (police): Galien (Antignac)

Occupied Zone: Schweblin

Unoccupied Zone: Antignac

Sendee du contrôle des administrateurs provisoires

(Aryanizations): Faramond (Bralley, Boué)

Delegate for the Occupied Zone: La Laurencie (de Brinon)

Foreign Affairs: Laval (Flandin, Darlan, Laval)

Armed Forces: Darlan

War: Himtziger (Bridoux)

Interior: Peyrouton (Darlan, Pucheu, Laval)

Commissar for Jewish Affairs (to May 1942): Vallat

National Police: Bousquet

Anti-Jewish Police (*Police des questions juives*): Schweblin

(transferred August 1942 as die *Section d'enquête et de contrôle* to the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs)

Delegate for the Occupied Zone: Leguay

Paris Prefecture of Police: Bussière

Municipal Police: Hennequin

Foreigners and Jewish Affairs (*Direction des étrangers et des affaires juives*), including internment camps:

François

Card Index: Tulard

Justice: Alibert (Barthélemy)

Finance: Bouthillier (Cathala)

Industrial Production and Labor: Belin (split into two états after February 1941)

Service du contrôle des administrateurs provisoires:

Fournier (transferred to the Commissar for Jewish Affairs by June 1942)

Industrial Production: (after February 1941): Pucheu (Lehideux, Bichelonne)

Labor (after February' 1941): Belin (Lagardelle, Bichelonne, Dear)

The government in Vichy was headed by a military icon in the person of Marshal Petain, and it contained political rightists like the anti-Jewish commissar Xavier Vallat, but it also included modernist technocrats like Pucheu, Lehideux, and Bichelonne who were trained in the *Grandes Ecoles*.¹ It was capable of building foundations of the destruction process in many pages of anti-Jewish laws and regulations, and at times it would take initiatives that were stronger than German coercion could have compelled.²

A closer scrutiny of the Vichy machine reveals a few administrative innovations. The first of these was the institution of delegates. Each ministry at Vichy maintained a special delegate in Paris through whom it controlled its regional machinery in occupied territory. Thus the delegate of the French police in occupied France was Leguay. The delegates of all the ministries in Paris were subordinated to a general delegate (General La Laurencie, followed by Ambassador de Brinon).

Another peculiarity of the Vichy regime was the installment of commissars for the handling of special problems, such as captive soldiers or French laborers in Germany. One of these commissars was in charge of Jewish affairs. The initial one, Vallat, was placed under the Interior Minister; his successor, Darquier de Pellepoix, served directly under the Chief of Government, Laval. Several other officials were concerned exclusively with the Jews, for example, the chief of the Aryanization agency (the *Service du Controle*), Fournier; the chief of the Jewish card index in the Paris prefecture of police, Tulard; and the chief of the Anti-Jewish Police, Schweblin. Indeed, the French outdid the Germans in developing administrative specialization in matters of destruction.

As a consequence of the armistice, most of France was covered by a German occupation regime made up of the following territorial jurisdictions: (1) the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, which were ruled as quasi-incorporated areas by Gauleiter Robert Wagner and Gauleiter Biirckel, respectively; (2) the Oberfeldkommandantur in Lille, under Generalleutnant Nichoff, which was subordinated to the *Militarbefehlshaber* in Belgium; (3) the main occupation area under die *Militarbefehlshaber in Fmnkreich*. Below is an abbreviated list of the *Militarbcfehlshaber*'s office.³

1. A concise description of the Vichy government is the work of Jean-Pierre Azema, *Front Munich to the Liberation, 1938-1944* (Cambridge, England, 1984).

2. See in particular Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York, 1981) and Serge Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1983, 1985). For a detailed view of the impact that German and French measures had on the victims, see Renee Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II* (Hanover, N.H., 2001). The book is focused on the Jewish community as such.

3. See the detailed work by Hans Umbreit, *Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944* (Boppard am Rhein, 1968).

Militärgouverneur in Paris: Gen. von Bockelberg (Junc-October 1940)

Militärbefehlshaber: Gen. Otto von Stülpnagel (October 1940 to February 1942), Gen. Heinrich von Stülpnagel (February 1942—July 1944)

Administrative Staff: Dr. Schmid (Dr. Michel)

Administration: Dr. Best (Dr. Ermert)

Economy: Dr. Michel

General: Sussdorf (Zee-Heraeus)

Aryanizations: Dr. Blanke

Finance: Dr. von Oertzen

Chief, Paris District: Staatsrat Turner (Glt. Schaumburg)

Stadtkommissar, Paris: Ministerialrat Rademacher

General railway transport, first under military control, was subsequently integrated into the Reichsbahn.⁴

Before June 15, 1942 — OKH/Chef d. Transportwesen

Eisenbahntransportabteilung (ETRA) West: Glt. Otto Kohl

Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion Brussels (covering Lille)

Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion Paris

Railway Division: Vizepräsident Hans Münzer

After June 15, 1942 — Transport Ministry/Reichsbahn

Hauptverkehrsdirektion Brussels: ORBR Bauer

Hauptverkehrsdirektion Paris: Münzer

31, 34, and 37: Never

33: (Möhl) Weckmann

The office of the Militärbefehlshaber was a skeleton organization that made use of the French bureaucracy in occupied territory for the enforcement of German policy. The administrative center for the formulation of occupation directives was the administrative staff. The head of the office, Dr. Schmid, was a former Württemberg Minister of the Interior and Economy. Below him was Ministerialdirigent Dr. Best, who had also handled administrative matters for Heydrich's prewar Security Main Office and who was to become still later the German plenipotentiary in Denmark. His colleague, Ministerialdirektor Dr. Michel, who was en-

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-44. Eugen Krcidler, *Die Eisenbahnen in Machtbereich der Achsenmächte während des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (Göttingen, 1975), pp. 60, 327-28. Nuremberg Verkehrsarchiv, Mappe w and Mappe ww. ETRA West had jurisdiction also over procurement of military' transports in Holland, Belgium, and France. Kohl retained this function after June 15, 1942.

misted with the direction of economic affairs in France, hailed from the Economy Ministry.

Regionally, the military government was made up of five *Militärverwaltungsbezirke* (military administration districts): A, B, C, Bordeaux, and Paris. The Militärbezirkschef of Paris was Staatsrat Turner. His successor, Generalleutnant von Schaumburg, had the title *Kommandant in Gross-Paris*. Below the level of the military districts, the regional network spread out into *Feldkommandanturen* and *Kreiskommandanturen*; the former controlled the French *départements*, the latter supervised the *arrondissements*. In the big cities the Germans had also established *Stadtkommissare*. One is listed above: the Stadtkommissar of Paris, Ministerialrat Rademacher.⁵

Within a short time after the establishment of the Militärbefehlshaber's office in France, two other German agencies made their appearance in the occupied territory. These agencies were to outflank and crowd out the Militärbefehlshaber to no small extent.

In June 1940 the name of Gesandter Abetz turned up in official army correspondence.⁶ Abetz was the Foreign Office designate for its newly established post in Paris, and his appointment rested on an oral agreement between Keitel and Ribbentrop. In Keitel's words, Abetz was "attached to the staff of the military governor." However, when Keitel uttered this formulation to Weizsäcker, hoping perhaps to receive some confirmation of that interpretation of the agreement, the Foreign Office Staatssekretär remained silent. As Weizsäcker reported the conversation to Ribbentrop: "This topic I did not care to discuss [*Auf dieses Thema Hess ich mich nicht ein*]."⁷

On August 3 Ribbentrop sent to Keitel a long list of powers that Abetz, newly elevated to the rank of ambassador, would henceforth exercise in France. In the concluding paragraph of that letter, Ribbentrop wrote: "The Führer has expressly ordered herewith that only Ambassador Abetz is responsible for the treatment of all political questions in occupied and unoccupied France. Insofar as his task should involve military interests, Ambassador Abetz will act only with the agreement of the Militärbefehlshaber in France."⁸ That directive hardly sounded as though Abetz was an assistant to General von Stülpnagel. It seemed, rather, that the Militärbefehlshaber had been attached to the ambassador.

5. Rademacher supervised the administration of the entire Seine prefecture, which comprised Paris and suburban areas. *Pariser Zeitung*, January 15, 1941, p. 4. For a general description of German administration in France, see *Krakauer Zeitung*, November 3-4, 1940.

6. Keitel to von Bockelberg, June 30, 1940, RF-1301.

7. Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, July 22, 1940, NG-1719.

8. Ribbentrop to Keitel, August 3, 1940, PS-3614.

Abetz, however, had a very small staff. Its most important members were deputy Schleier; Zeitschel and Achenbach in charge of Jewish affairs; von Krug in the Vichy office; and Rahn in Tunisia.⁹ Just as the *Militarbefehlshaber* was dependent on the French administration for the enforcement of his decrees, so Abetz had to rely on the *Militarbefehlshaber*'s office for the implementation of his policy. This was not a situation conducive to a complete harmony of purposes. Nevertheless, the arrangement did work, as the Jews were to discover in a short time.

The second agency that intruded upon the *Militarbefehlshaber*'s jurisdiction was the SS and Police. The Himmler men began attaching themselves to Abetz, and they ended up by dominating, in Jewish matters at least, a large part of the scene. The SS men arrived in France in a slow procession, experts first, the Higher SS and Police Leader last. The following is a very abbreviated outline of the SS organization in France:¹⁰

Higher SS and Police Leader	Brif. Oberg
BdS	Staf. Knochen
Deputy	OSTubaf. Lischka
II	Lischka
Deputy	Stubaf. Mayer-Falk
IV	Stubaf. Boemelburg
J	HStuf. Dannecker (OStuf. Röthke, HStuf. Brunner)
VI	Stubaf. Hagen
Delegation of German police in Vichy	HStuf. Geissler

Oberg had been an SS and Police Leader in Galicia and Radom. Lischka had directed the *Reichszentrale* for Jewish Emigration in Berlin, while Brunner had been in Vienna as well as in Berlin and Greece. The conduct of the anti-Jewish destruction process in France was to rest in experienced hands.

The object of all this machinery was the destruction of the largest Jewish community in the western arc. At the end of 1939 the Jewish population of France had reached about 280,000. More than 200,000 Jews lived in Paris alone. However, with the onset of the German invasion in May 1940, a number of changes took place. At first, a wave of

9. Abetz spoke French and was considered a lenient Francophile. Schleier was a former *Landesgruppenleiter* in France. Rahn, a Foreign Office troubleshooter, served briefly in Paris as well as in Tunisia.

10. Brif. Thomas in Brussels has jurisdiction over both Belgium and France until Oberg's arrival in March 1942. Umbreit, *Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich*, pp. 107-8. Chart of office of BdS as of June 16, 1942, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, document CCCXCV-1.

Jews streamed into France from Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Then, more than 50,000 Jews abandoned the cities of northern France and Paris for safer places to the south. The third upheaval began when the German administrators of Alsace-Lorraine decided upon a complete removal of their Jews.

In a maneuver reminiscent of the expulsions in Poland, the Jews of the incorporated provinces were moved to the unoccupied zone. The movements started suddenly, on July 16, 1940, when the Jews of Colmar (in Alsace) were rounded up and shoved across the demarcation line.¹¹ During the following months, quiet prevailed. By October 1940, however, local administrative pressure had been built up to such a point that General von Stiilpnagel, as chief of the German Armistice Commission, met with General Huntziger, French Minister of War and chief of the French Armistice Commission, to conclude an agreement providing for the deportation of all Jews of French nationality from Alsace-Lorraine to unoccupied France.¹² Twenty-two thousand Jews were involved in these movements from Alsace alone.¹³ The victims were piled on trucks, driven across, and dumped out at night on a deserted country road in Vichy France.¹⁴

The Alsace-Lorraine deportations, incidentally, had a by-product that was mentioned before. The chiefs of civil administration, Wagner of Alsace and Biirckel of Lorraine, had decided, in a very broad interpretation of the Stiilpnagel-Huntziger agreement, to deport not only the French Jews from the occupied provinces but also the German Jews from the home Gaue. Thus about 6,300 Jews from Baden and 1,150 Jews from Saarpfalz, were also dumped in unoccupied France.¹⁵

As a consequence of all these population shifts, a new situation had arisen in which the center of gravity had been moved a considerable

11. Trial of Robert Wagner, *Law Ripons of Trials of War Criminals*, III, 34.

12. Report on deportations received by Interior Ministry, October 30, 1940, NG-4933.

13. Trial of Wagner, *Law Repons*, III, 34. Most of the Alsace Jews lived in Strasbourg and Mulhouse. Few Jews lived in Lorraine. The Alsace expulsions of 1940 affected 105,000 people, including Jews, Gypsies, criminals, "asocials," mental patients, Frenchmen, and Francophiles. Other categories, including all the remaining Jews, were to be added in 1942. Summary of expulsion conference held on August 4, 1942, R-114. Memorandum by OStubaf. Harders (RuSHA/Rasseamt), September 28, 1942, NO-1499.

14. Jacob Kaplan (Acting Grand Rabbi of France), "French Jewry under the Occupation," *American Jewish Tear Book* 47 (1945—46): 73.

15. Report to Interior Ministry, October 30, 1940, NG-4933. Memorandum by Division Germany, October 31, 1940, NG-4934. Hencke (German Armistice Commission) to Foreign Office, November 19, 1940, NG-4934. Von Sonnleithner to Weizsäcker, November 22, 1940, NG-4934.

distance to the south. The occupied zone was left with 165,000 Jews (in Paris alone, 148,000), whereas the unoccupied zone had about 145,000, or almost half the total.¹⁰

In Paris, Ambassador Abetz was satisfied with this situation. He proposed that a reentry of Jews into the occupied zone be prohibited.^{16 17} (Abetz, like Frank, was thinking of Madagascar.)¹⁸ The demarcation line, however, proved to be a two-sided barrier. It was an obstacle not only for Jewish refugees, who in the beginning might conceivably have wished to return, but also for the German occupation authorities, who later sought to extend the “Final Solution” to the unoccupied zone.

No country in Europe posed such complexities in the territorial implementation of anti-Jewish measures as did France. The Vichy French legislation covered occupied as well as unoccupied territory,¹⁹ while the German regime was restricted to the occupied area. As a result, the Jews of the occupied zone suffered under a double oppression, French and German, while the unoccupied Jews were exposed only to the regulations of the Vichy regime. In 1942 the demarcation line collapsed, and French and German measures alike were enforced in all of France.

In 1940 the Vichy authorities enacted a few anti-Jewish decrees that revealed in barest outline the beginnings of a destruction process. The Jews were defined in accordance with the Nuremberg principle, and dismissals from government service went into effect. At the time of the expulsions of the Baden-Saarpfalz Jews in October 1940, the Vichy government foreshadowed its policy of separating the new Jews from the old by enacting a law authorizing the internment of foreign Jews.

Dismayed by these Vichy outbursts, Jewish leaders dispatched letters of bewilderment to Marshal Petain. It seemed to the Jews that the marshal must have made some kind of mistake. In one of the letters, Grand Rabbi Weill of Paris explained to the French Chief of State that “studies of anthropology have proved beyond a doubt that there is no such thing as a Jewish race.”²⁰ Why, then, all these decrees?

The Stiiplnagel machine, on its part, was ready to fill out the French

16. Statistics on occupied zone in letter by Danncker to Zcitschel, October 20, 1941, NG-3264. To the total should be added several thousand Jewish prisoners of war.

17. Memorandum by Best, August 19, 1940. Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, *La persécution des juifs en France*, 1947, p. 48. Abetz to Foreign Office, August 20, 1940, NG-2433.

18. Hitler told Abetz on August 3, 1940, of the plan to remove all Jews from Europe. Affidavit by Abetz, May 30, 1947, NG-1893; memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2686-J.

19. In some cases French law's were extended also to North Africa.

20. Kaplan, “French Jew ry,”ⁿ *American Jewish Tear Book* 47 (1945-46): 89.

framework of destruction with heavy measures in the economic sphere. On September 27, 1940, General von Stiilpnagel signed a decree that contained a definition and a provision for the registration of Jews. On October 18, 1940, he followed with the definition and registration of Jewish enterprises. The decree provided also for the avoidance of transactions and the appointment of trustees. The content of these measures was not new, but their implementation was novel.

For the first time in German experience a foreign authority had to be employed for the administrative paperwork. The initial task of the French bureaucracy was the enforcement of the registration provisions of the German decrees. In the entire occupied zone the prefects of the *départements* and the subprefects of the *arrondissements* were now mobilized for the registrations. The information received was to be collated on lists, to be prepared in four copies. One copy was to be submitted to the Vichy Undersecretary for Industrial Production and Labor; another copy went to the Undersecretary for Finance; two copies were to be handed over to the German command.²¹

On November 1, 1940, the economic chief of the Militärbefehlshaber's administrative staff, Dr. Michel, informed the regional offices of the military government that the German administration in occupied France was making use of the French authorities because it was not large enough to tackle the Aryanization problem alone. To assure control over the French apparatus, the prefects had been ordered to submit two copies of the lists to the Germans. One of these copies was to be kept in the competent Militärverwaltungsbezirk, the other was to be retained by the local Feldkommandantur. The German commanders were to make spot checks on their French collaborators and, independently of the lists, information was to be gathered and collected on enterprises under preponderant Jewish influence or affected by undercover arrangements.

In principle, said Dr. Michel, the French were to appoint their own trustees. "It will be endeavored," he explained, "to replace the Jews by Frenchmen in order to let the French population, too, benefit from the elimination of the Jews and to avoid the impression that the Germans want nothing but to get the Jewish positions for themselves." However, exceptions were to be made in all cases "where important German interests" were at stake.²²

A few days after the issuance of this directive, von Stiilpnagel informed

21. The Delegate General of the French government for the occupied territories (signed La Laurencic) to all prefects in the occupied zone, October 1940, NOKW-1237.

22. Militärbefehlshaber/Adm. Staff/Economy (signed by Dr. Michel) to Militärbezirkshäuptern A, B, C, Paris, and Bordeaux, and to all Feldkommandanturen, November 1, 1940, NOKW-1237.

the Militärbezirkschefs that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, had ordered the immediate Aryanization of all Jewish enterprises in the occupied territory. The prefects were now called upon to nominate trustees for appointment by the Distriktchefs. The installment and work of the trustees was subject to certain principles, the chief among which was speed.

Von Stiilpnagel ruled that enterprises with only minor Jewish participation were to be given an opportunity to eliminate their Jewish character by effecting the necessary sale of stocks or outster of key personnel. Such enterprises needed no trusteeship at all.

Firms that, by reason of their predominant Jewish influence, had to be placed under trustees could be disposed of in three ways. The first of these was the voluntary sale of the firm by its Jewish owners. This method was preferred, provided that it entailed no "loss of time." Trustees in such cases had to ensure only that the *buyers* were free from Jewish influence. Suspicious agreements could, of course, be voided by the Militärbefehlshaber. If the owners refused to sell, the trustee, with the prior approval of the Militärbefehlshaber, could conclude the transaction. If a sale was not possible because of a lack of demand, the trustee, after securing the authorization of the Militärbefehlshaber, could proceed with a liquidation. To make sure that the disposal of the Jewish enterprises was handled with a sense of immediacy, the trustees were instructed to make a report on the progress of the sales negotiations within four weeks after their appointment.²³

Within a matter of months the trusteeship apparatus was built up into a formidable machine, but it had come into being in a somewhat decentralized manner. The French government, with its long tradition of administrative centralization, decided to do something about this situation; accordingly, the Vichy regime established within the Ministry of Industrial Production and Labor a special *Service du Controle*, which was headed by a former governor of the Bank of France, president Fournier. The Service du Controle dealt centrally with trusteeship nominations; it briefed the trustees and ruled on the legality of transactions. In the German *Verwaltungsstab* Dr. Michel immediately recognized that the new agency would lighten the load of the Germans without depriving them of their ultimate veto. He therefore instructed his regional machinery to

23. **Militärbefehlshaber/Adm. Staff/Economy (signed Stiilpnagel) to chiefs of military' districts, November 12, 1940, NOKW-1237.** Von Brauchitsch wanted action, because he thought that the opportunity' might be lost in the event of a peace treaty'. Ulrich Herbert, "Die deutsche Militärverwaltung in Paris und die Deportation der französischen Juden," in Christian Jansen, Lutz Niethammer, and Bernd Weisbrod, eds., *Von der Aufgabe der Freiheit* (Berlin, 1995), pp. 427-50, on pp. 432-33.

make use of dais apparatus, which the French had created in a spirit of "collaboration" for the accomplishment of the Aryanization process.²⁴

To be sure, the willingness of the Germans to avail themselves of French collaboration had its limits. The French prefects and their superiors in Vichy were not to concern themselves with nominations for trustee appointments in Jewish-owned *industrial* plants. Factories were to be handled by the *Militarbefehlshaber* through his own channels.²⁵ The object of this important reservation was to retain an opportunity for German business interests to acquire Jewish industrial enterprises.²⁶

Two major difficulties arose during the administration of the Aryanization program. One was caused by the failure of the legal draftsmen to make a distinction between French Jews and foreign Jews. Needless to say, that failure was intentional: a German agency could not very well admit that the protections afforded by elementary rules of international law applied also to Jews. However, the experts in Paris decided to issue unpublished instructions to field offices exempting American Jews from the requirement (in the decree of September 27) of marking their stores with a Jewish star.²⁷

That unpublicized exemption was apparently not very effectual, for in December the United States complained of vandalism committed against establishments owned by American citizens.²⁸ When the protest was brought to Ribbentrop's attention, he declared that no exemptions should have been accorded to American Jews in the first place, and, pointing to the fact that protests of friendly nations such as Spain and Hungary had been rejected, he ordered that no reply be made to the U.S. note.²⁹ Ribbentrop's obstinacy worried Staatsminister Dr. Schmid in Paris and

24. Michel to *Militärverwaltungsbezirke* and *Feldkommandanturen*, January 28, 1941, NOKW-1270. On the trustees and subtle struggles between the Germans and the French over control of strategic Jewish firms, see statement by Xavier Vallat, November 14, 1947, in Hoover Institution, *France during the German Occupation, 1940-1944* (Stanford, 1957), vol. 2, pp. 626-49, particularly pp. 633-36. For a wider discussion of Aryanization interests in France, see Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, pp. 152-60.

25. *Militärbefehlshaber* j Adm. Staff/Economy (signed Stülpnagel) to French Ministry for Industrial Production and Labor, December 9, 1940, NOKW-1237.

26. In that connection, see, for example, the documents on efforts by Krupp to acquire by means of a "lease" the Rothschild-owned Austin automobile works at Liancourt. Affidavit by Alfried Krupp, June 30, 1947, NI-10332; Ing. Walter Stein (director general of Krupp SA in France) to Schiirmann, November 8, 1943, NI-7013; Stein to Direktor Schroder, November 25, 1943, NI-7012.

27. Schlicier (Paris) to Schwarzmann (office of Ribbentrop), October 9, 1940, NG-4893.

28. Luther to embassy in Paris, December 18, 1940, NG-4893.

29. Notation by Radmacher, December 19, 1940, NG-4893. Luther to embassy in Paris, December 23, 1940, NG-4893.

the Foreign Office's American expert, Freytag, in Berlin. Both feared anti-German repercussions in America.³⁰ But Ribbentrop refused to give in. The exemption of the U.S. Jews had to be canceled.³¹

More serious in its immediate import than the foreign repercussions was the attitude of the French themselves. On January 28, 1941, economy expert Dr. Michel of the *Militärbefehlshaber's* administrative staff warned the regional command offices that a propaganda campaign designed to deter potential buyers and to undermine the trustees had been launched in French business circles. "In particular," he wrote, "attempts are being made to raise doubts as to whether the contracts concluded by the trustees will be legally valid after the end of the occupation."

Dr. Michel believed that this propaganda could be countered with the following array of arguments: (1) The *Militärbefehlshaber's* authority to issue laws derived from international law and the armistice agreement. (2) Suitable provisions in the peace treaty would ensure against subsequent nullification. (3) The contracts were legally so complex as to make subsequent voidance difficult in any case. (4) The French government was collaborating in the Aryanzations; hence, the sales were based, in a manner of speaking, upon French law also. For the rest, Dr. Michel thought it best that the Jews themselves sell their firms. Such participation, he said, would "ease the mind of the French purchaser."³²

Dr. Michel's arguments were not potent enough to overcome the French reluctance to acquire Jewish property. Most of the early transactions were sales to former employees for sheer subsistence money (*für ein Butterbrot*).³³ After twenty-one months of Aryanzations in the occupied zone (and a year of such operations in the unoccupied territory), the German press published statistics revealing the state of affairs in the Aryanzation business (see Table 8-15).

In brief, only 21 percent of the Jewish enterprises under trusteeship in the occupied zone had been disposed of through sale or liquidation by August 1942. Although the operation was not over, its progress continued to creep along. By October 1943, 11,000 cases (or about one-third of the total) had been "finished" in the occupied zone; another

30. Schmid (chief of administrative staff in *Militärbefehlshaber's* office) to *Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of Foreign Office*, Februar' 22, 1941, NG-1527. Freytag (Pol. IX) via *Erdmannsdorff to Wormann*, February 27, 1941, NG-4406.

31. *Militärbefehlshaber/Administrative Staff/Administration to Bezirkschefs A, B, C, and Bordeaux, Kommandant Gross-Paris, Feld- and Kreiskommandanturen*, April 1941, NOKW- 1270.

32. *Militärbefehlshaber/Adm. Staff/Economy* (signed Dr. Michel) to *Militärverwaltungsbezirke and Feldkommandanturen*, Januars' 28, 1941, NOKW-1270.

33 Report by the *Militärbefehlshaber in France/Propaganda Division* (signed by Major Schmidtke) for April 7-14, 1941, OKW-578.

TABLE 8-15

THE PROGRESS OF ARYANIZATIONS BT AUGUST 1942

	OCCUPIED			UNOCCUPIED
	ZONE	PARIS	PROVINCES	ZONE
Under trusteeship	31,699	24,914	6,785	1,500
Sold	4,000	3,000	1,000	
Liquidated	2,800	1,700	1,100	
Trusteeship pending	2,000			
Status undetermined	600			

Note: Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung (Lutsk), August 4, 1942, p. 4; August 11, 1942, p. 4. Donauzeitung (Belgrade), August 28, 1942, p. 5. Insurance companies, utilities, and the French state itself were reported to have participated significantly in the purchase of Jewish property. The 2,000 enterprises which had not yet been placed under trusteeship were described as “insignificant (alltrdings bedeutungslos). The Aryanizations had been extended to the unoccupied territory by the French law of July 22, 1941.*

4,000 were completed in the Vichy area. The cautious French purchasers were forming an association of “owners of former Jewish enterprises.”³⁴ Evidently these Frenchmen were worried about trouble. Dr. Michel, however, was not troubled by their worries; his thinking was confined to the statistics of the sales. In the summer of 1944, at a time when Allied forces were already fighting on French soil, and when speculators were pressing for last-minute acquisitions, he expressed his satisfaction that the “de-Jewing of the French economy” was proceeding without change.³⁵ By August 1, a total of 42,739 enterprises (including real estate) had been placed under trusteeship. Over 7,500 were liquidated and a similar number were sold for 2.1 billion francs (140 million Reichsmark).³⁶

Under the impact of the dismissals and Aryanizations, increasingly heavy burdens fell upon the network of Jewish organizations in France. The most important of these institutions was the *Consistoire Central des Israelites de France*. Until 1940 the Consistoire Central was headed by Baron Edouard de Rothschild, a scion of the family that had played leading roles in French business and in Jewish life for a hundred years.

34. *Dotwuzeitung* (Belgrade), October 20, 1943, p. 8; January 14, 1944, p. 1.

35. Report by Militärbefehlshaber in France/MVZ Group 3 (signed chief of military administration Dr. Michel) for July 22-29, 1944, on administration and economy, July 30, 1944, Wi/1.288. Report by Michel, August 6, 1944, Wi/I.288.

36. Umbreit, *Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich*, p. 263. See also the completed compilation, to June 30, 1944, taken from documents CXIXa-7 and CXIXa-112 of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine by Joseph Billig, *Le Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1960), pp. 326-29.

Baron Edouard fled to the United States during the invasion, and his place was taken by Jacques Helbronner, who ruled until October 1943, when he was arrested and replaced by Léon Meiss.³⁷ Under Helbronner, in the winter of 1940-41, the Jewish organizations consolidated their resources for the purpose of helping the impoverished Jews. The product of these consolidations was the Jewish Coordinating Committee. The Committee soon had much to do.

On May 28, 1941, the Militärbefehlshaber ruled for the occupied zone that Jews were no longer permitted to dispose over their funds (in amounts exceeding normal transactions) without the consent of the Service du Contrôle. On July 1, 1941, the SS adviser in the embassy, Obersturmführer Dannecker, reported that with the help of Abetz, Schleier, and Zeitschel he had persuaded the Militärbefehlshaber to deal with no Jewish organization save the Coordinating Committee. At the same time, an agreement had been made with the French welfare system (the *Bureau de Secours National*) to deprive all Jews of French relief assistance.³⁸ On July 22, 1941, the French Aryanization law was enacted, with a clause that provided for the automatic blocking of the proceeds collected by the trustees in the disposal of Jewish enterprises. A portion of the blocked money was to be retained to defray administrative costs; the remainder was to be used for needy Jews.³⁹

The Jewish leadership was now faced with a difficult question. Should use be made of the blocked accounts accumulating from the sale of Jewish firms to help the poor and starving community? The capitalists of the Consistoire Central and the rabbis functioning under its direction decided against such a utilization, since it “would have constituted a new stage in the spoliation of Jewish wealth.” Accordingly, they launched an intensive fund-raising campaign under the title “Fund of the Grand Rabbi of France.” At the same time the French Jews enlisted the aid of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which promised to match the amount collected.⁴⁰

The dilemma of the Jewish leaders was not only financial. They found

37. Kaplan, “French Jewry,” *American Jewish TearBook* 47 (1995-46): 71-72, 75, 93, 109.

38. Unsigned report by an OStuf. (believed to be Dannecker), July 1, 1941, RF-1207. Notwithstanding the “agreement,” the bureau continued to give some help to Jews in distress. *Die Judenfrage*, November 15, 1942, p. 249.

39. Law of July 22, 1941, signed by Pétain, Darlan, Barthélemy, Bouthillier, Lchideux, Platon (colonic), and Pucheu, *Journal officiel*, August 26, 1941. In article 22 of the law, the yield after deductions was called *asurplus* and its purpose *un fonds de solidarité destiné à venir en aide aux juifs indigents*.

40. Kaplan, “French Jewry,” *American Jewish Tear Book*, 47 (1945-46): 78, 96.

themselves in a France that was arraying itself increasingly with the Germans against the Jewish community, fostering an anti-Jewish climate, issuing anti-Jewish laws, and establishing an anti-Jewish regime. The epitomization of this development was the creation of a central office for Jewish affairs. Ambassador Abetz requested the establishment of the agency at the beginning of March 1941.⁴¹ Admiral Darlan had the job of convincing a reluctant Pétain to accede to this step. When Pétain agreed,⁴² a commissariat of Jewish affairs was set up on March 29, 1941, with an old anti-Semite, Xavier Vallat, as commissar. His functions were twofold: he was to oversee the work of the trustees and the Jewish organizations, and to propose new anti-Jewish legislation. From the second function flowed increasingly tight economic restrictions, which culminated in the Vichy Aryanization and funds-control law of July 22.

To the Jewish leadership these developments were something unbelievable, a nightmare that did not make sense. On July 31, 1941, Grand Rabbi Jacob Kaplan of Lyon addressed a letter to Xavier Vallat that was designed to convince the Frenchman once and for all of the error of his ways. Kaplan pointed out that for a pagan or an atheist to defame Judaism was not strange and not illogical. "But," asked Kaplan, "on the part of a Christian, does not such an attitude appear spiritually illogical as well as ungrateful?" Kaplan then answered his own question. The Jewish religion, he said, was the mother of the Christian religion. The Ten Commandments were the moral and religious charter of civilized humanity. Jesus Christ and all his apostles were Jews. Therefore, Kaplan concluded triumphantly, did Vallat not realize that when he attacked the Jews he was assailing at the same time the founders of Christianity? Kaplan then inserted a number of quotations from Pascal, Bossuet, Fénelon, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Chateaubriand, Guizot, Renan, Léon Bloy, Ignatius de Loyola, Pope Pius XI, Lacordaire, and de Sasy.

Having nailed this point, Kaplan went on to discuss the Jewish military record in World War I, quoting statistics and tributes. While Kaplan had no figures for World War II, he assured Vallat that "when the final story is written, it will reveal that the Jews have done their duty like all other French citizens." The letter concluded with the statement that, in view of this overwhelming proof, Vallat no doubt would see the light and realize that the day would come when reason would prevail once more and anti-Semitism would lose out.

On August 5, 1941, Vallat replied through his *Chef de Cabinet*, Jarnieu. The letter read as follows:

41. Abetz to Foreign Office, March 6, 1941, NG-2442.

42. Abetz to Foreign Office, April 3, 1941, NG-2432.

Dear Rabbi:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 31, in which you quoted to me a certain number of texts which are of course quite well known. They would not have been refuted in any French legislation if there had not been, during the last few years, an invasion of our territory by a host of Jews having no ties with our civilization.

Having dealt with that argument, Jarnieu tackled the second:

I do not intend to refute in detail a certain number of your arguments, in particular the statistics you give of the Jews who have entered the armed forces and died for France. That is a matter which deserves too much respect to become the object of a controversy.

Not quite satisfied with the trend of that answer, Jarnieu closed abruptly :

Let me simply point out that in the government's attitude there is no anti-Semitism, simply the application of reasons of state.

Finished, he added the greeting:

Please be assured, Rabbi, of my genuine regard,

JARNIEU⁴³

Jarnieu's letter revealed that the anti-Jewish persecution had generated within the French bureaucracy a certain uneasiness as well as defensiveness. In August 1941 the French administrators had to ask themselves how far, as Christians, they could proceed against the Jews, and that question had to be faced in the very top strata of the Vichy regime. Only two days after Jarnieu dispatched his reply to Kaplan, Marshal Petain himself sent an inquiry to the French Ambassador at the Holy See, Leon Berard, to ascertain the Vatican's attitude toward the anti-Jewish laws.

The ambassador replied with a detailed exposition of the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who had long ago recommended that Jews be barred from government activity and limited in the exercise of their professions. Regulations for special dress, said Berard, were also not new to the Catholic Church. In light of that traditional policy, an "authorized person at the Vatican" had assured the ambassador that "they have no intention of quarreling with us over the Jewish statute." The Vatican had expressed only the desire that no provisions be enacted relating to [inter] marriage and that precepts of justice and charity be observed in the liquidation of business establishments.⁴⁴ Clearly, the French government

43. Text of correspondence in Kaplan, "French Jewry," *American Jewish Tear Book* 47 (1945-46): 113-17. See also statement by Vallat in Hoover Insrinicion, *Frame during the German Occupation*, vol. 2, pp. 626-30.

44. Excerpts from report by Ambassador Berard to Marshal Petain in Leon Poliakov, *Harvest of Fate* (Syracuse, 1941), pp. 299-301.

had not yet committed any “sins,” but it was close to having reached the limits of “permissible” action.

Almost from the beginning of the occupation, the Vichy regime sensed that under increasing German pressure it would have to shift to a second line of defense. If the destruction process could not be halted at a certain point, efforts would have to be made to deflect the full force of the attack from the old-established, assimilated Jews to the newly arrived immigrants and refugees. On April 6, 1941, the newly appointed anti-Jewish commissar, Xavier Vallat, declared before members of the press that there was no such thing as a “standard solution” of the Jewish question in France. So far as the Jews of North Africa were concerned, there was no Jewish problem at all. “We must also,” said Vallat, “take into account the old Jewish families, mostly of Alsatian origin, who appear to be assimilated.” Another exceptional group was composed of the front-line soldiers of 1914-18 and 1940. The eastern Jews, however, “who in the last few years have flooded France,” Vallat concluded without realizing the full import of his words, “will in all likelihood be shoved off again.”⁴⁵

The Jewish front-line soldiers were privileged to some extent in every European Axis state. Unlike the Reich veterans, who sought every privilege they could get, the Jewish veterans of the French army felt disposed to declare their solidarity with the rest of Jewry. On August 11, 1941, a delegation of eighteen veterans, headed by General Andre Boris, former Inspector General of Artillery and a member of the Consistoire Central, handed Xavier Vallat a statement that brought home the point that the anti-Jewish legislation was “valid only insofar as we are legally forced to comply with it and does not signify any agreement on our part.” Having stated their general attitude as forcefully as they could, the veterans continued their protest with the words: “Would the General Commissar for Jewish Affairs consider subversive a statement . . . in the following terms: We solemnly declare that we renounce any exceptional benefits we may derive from our status as ex-servicemen.”⁴⁶

The problem of the Jewish veterans was not confined to their treatment in France itself, since there was still a contingent of several thousand Jewish soldiers in German captivity. No records are available of any French interventions in behalf of these soldiers. To be sure, the German regulations against Jewish prisoners of war from the western armies were in no way comparable to the drastic measures that were applied to the Jewish prisoners from the Red Army. The only western Jewish prisoners subject to shooting were the emigrants from the Reich, who were shot immediately upon ascertainment of their identity at the army prisoner

45. *Die Judenfrage*, May 5, 1941, pp. 70-71.

46. Kaplan, “French Jewry,” *American Jewish Tear Book* 47 (1945-46): 91-92.

collecting points (*Armeijefatijjenensammelstellen*), that is, prior to the transfer of the prisoners to the permanent Stalags.⁴⁷ The former Reich Jews who were caught in this procedure were beyond help, but the main body of Jewish prisoners enjoyed relative immunity. Enlisted men in the Stalags and officers in the Oflags were to be separated from other French prisoners, and Jewish enlisted personnel were to be assigned to special work parties. However, there was to be no marking of the Jews.⁴⁸ Undoubtedly the fear of reprisals restrained the German generals in their operations against the Jewish prisoners of war.

During his interview with the press on April 6, 1941, Vallat had also mentioned that he could see no Jewish problem in Africa. This statement is wholly in conformity with what we would expect, for German influence as well as interest in Africa was comparatively remote. So far as the Germans were concerned, the African Jews could have been left alone. But they were not. The Catholic-military hierarchy in Vichy took its own measures against these people.

One of the first Vichy measures in Africa was the abolition of the so-called Cremieux Decree, under which the Jews of Algeria had enjoyed the status of French citizens since 1870. Next the Algerian Jews were hit by a number of provisions in French laws enacted for the metropolitan area but applied to Algeria as well, because that territory was an "integral" portion of France. Under these provisions, dismissals were effected in the civil service, limitations were placed on professional activity, and Aryanizations were introduced into business. Finally, a number of measures in Algeria and the neighboring "protectorates" of Morocco and Tunisia were prepared by the resident French military men who ruled North Africa during the early forties:

47. Directive by Army Group B, as transmitted by 4th Army Ic/AO Abw I (signed by Chief of Staff Gen. d. Inf. Brenecke) to divisions, June 18, 1940, NOKW-1483. The commander of Army Group B was von Bock, while the 4th Army was commanded by von Kluge. No records are available of the number of shootings, and it is likely that none were carried out after the conclusion of the French campaign. In 1944 a directive of the OKW/Chef Kgf., which had jurisdiction only over permanent camps in the rear, provided merely that the bodies of Jewish prisoners who had been deprived of German nationality by the 11th ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law were to be buried without military honors. OKW/Chf Kriegsgcfangenenwescn, Bcfchlssammlung No. 48 (signed Mcurcr), December 15, 1944, OKW-1984.

48. OKW/Chf Kgf., Sammelmittcilungen No. 1 (signed Obstl. Brever), June 16, 1941, OKW-1984. Befchlssammlung No. 11 (signed von Graevenitz), March 11, 1942, OKW-1984. Bcfchlssammlung No. 48 (signed Meurer), December 15, 1944, OKW-1984. A Red Cross delegation reported in March 1941 that it had seen about 50 Jewish prisoners in Stalag XIa with the large indelible inscription *Jud* on their French uniforms. International Red Cross report (signed Dr. Marti and Dr. Descoeurcs), March 16, 1941, NG-2386. The report may have contributed to the prohibition.

Delegate General Africa, Gen. Maxime Weygand
Resident General Moroccan "Protectorate," Gen. Nogues (200,000
Jews)
Governor General Algeria, Adm. Abrial (120,000 Jews)
Resident General Tunisian "Protectorate," Adm. Esteva (80,000
Jews)

Under the leadership of General Weygand little Jewish commissariats were established in Algeria and Morocco. Most of the discriminations in effect in Algeria were now enforced through "decrees" of the Sultan in Morocco. In addition, the Sultan forbade his Jews such activities as moneylending, while the Resident General of Morocco, General Nogues, was busy with plans for the establishment of compulsory ghettos and concentration camps up to the very moment when Allied forces invaded his domain.⁴⁹

The application of dismissals and Aryanizations to Tunisia led to difficulties with the Italians, who insisted upon the protection of 5,000 Italian Jews in the territory. These Jews, a seventeenth-century offshoot of the Italian mercantile community of Livorno, were important to the Italians. The ratio of French and Italian citizens in Tunisia had already tipped in favor of France in the 1930s, and the Italians were especially anxious, lest the enterprises of the Italian Jews fall into French hands.⁵⁰ Ambassador Abetz consequently found himself in a peculiar position of defending the French before General Gelich of the Italian armistice commission. Abetz wanted to know what sort of impression was created when France was persecuting and Italy protecting the Jews. He asserted that in Tunisia Italian Jews controlled almost all commercial activities and tried to talk Gelich into a scheme that would allow Italian Aryans to take over the property of Italian Jews.⁵¹ Qualified Italian Aryans, however, could not be assembled on such short notice,⁵² and the Italian government refused to assent to any such arrangement.⁵³ Thereafter, not much happened in Tunisia until German troops landed in the Protectorate in November 1942.

49. See, in general, *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 17, 1941, p. 2, and *Die Judenfrage*, September 10, 1941, p. 168; February 15, 1942, p. 37; April 15, 1942, p. 76; May 15, 1942, p. 101; October 15, 1942, p. 223.

50. Daniel Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler—The Jews and the Italian Authorities in France and Tunisia* (Hanover, N.H., 1994), pp. 200-227.

51. Abetz to Foreign Office, July 4, 1942, NG-133.

52. Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler*, pp. 223-24, 314 n., citing an "eyes only" addendum to a cable by Foreign Minister Ciano of August 9, 1942, to the Italian Embassy in Paris.

53. Weizsacker to Luther, political and legal divisions, September 2, 1942, enclosing note from Italian Ambassador Altieri of the same date, NG-54.

The most important remark by Vallat at the press conference following his appointment as commissar concerned the Jewish immigrants who had 'flooded' France between the two wars and who were now to be "shoved off" again. Here was the wedge that became the starting point of the "Final Solution" in France. At the time when Vallat took office, the general policy toward the foreign and stateless Jews had already been fixed. Under the law of October 4, 1940, the prefects were empowered to assign these Jews to forced residence (*résidence forcée*) or to intern them in special camps (*camps spéciaux*)*. Inasmuch as nearly half of all the Jews, including many postwar immigrants from eastern Europe and more recent refugees from Nazi Germany, did not possess French nationality,TM Vichy policy with respect to noncitizens became increasingly important. During 1941 and 1942, categories and subcategories of non-French Jews were spelled out with more and more refinement in several laws, decrees, circulars, and announcements. Basically the Jews were ranged, from most to least favored, somewhat as follows:^{54 55 56}

- Jews of French nationality, including mainly those born in France or naturalized for some time.
- Foreign Jews protected by a foreign country.
- Unprotected foreign or stateless Jews who entered France on January 1, 1936, or before.
- Unprotected foreign or stateless Jews who entered France after January 1, 1936, but who were wounded or decorated veterans of French or "ex-Allied" armies in 1939-40, or who were discharged with certificates of good conduct from the Foreign Legion.
- All Jews who entered France after January 1, 1936, and who had no favored veteran's status.

54. Law of October 4, 1940, signed by Pctain, Peyrouton, Bouthillier, and Alibert, *Journal Officiel*, October 18, 1940.

55. See Zosa Szajkowski, "Glimpses on the History of Jews in Occupied France," *Tad Vashem Studies* 2 (1958): 133-57, on pp. 150-57. Szajkowski produces figures of 85,664 French Jews and 64,070 foreign Jews in the Seine *département* as of October 20, 1940, and 59,344 French Jews and 50,639 foreign Jews in the unoccupied zone as of March 15, 1942. The data for the southern zone, however, are probably incomplete, inasmuch as foreign Jews interned in camps may not have been included. A further complication is the law of July 22, 1940, under which all naturalizations granted after June 10, 1927, whether to Jews or to non-Jews, were subject to reexamination and cancellation. As a result, several thousand Jews were in the process of being moved from the column of citizens to that of noncitizens.

56. See in particular Puchcu to regional prefects in the southern zone, January 2, 1942, in Centre de Documentation Juive, *Us juif sous Voccupatiim* (Pans, 1982), pp. 129-33. In the unoccupied zone, the prefect of one of the départements in a region was placed in charge of all police in the region. As a result of this designation, he was a regional prefect.

The last of these categories was subdivided according to economic criteria, from most to least favored, in the following manner:

- Jews usefully employed in the economy were to be permitted to continue in their jobs.
- Jews without such employment, but with some means, were to be assigned to forced residence (restyled *résidence assignée*). These Jews were eligible for exemption. Residences were to be established in small localities, and the Jews were not to leave these localities without authorization. This measure was applied principally in the southern zone.
- Jewish men without means of existence, aged eighteen to fifty-five, were to be assigned to *Groupements des travailleurs étrangers* (GTE), an organization of labor companies for foreigners, including not only Jews but also Spanish Republicans, and Dutch, Belgian, or Polish refugees. The Jews were eventually segregated into “Palestinian” companies. Labor camps of the GTE were located mainly in the southern zone. Outside of the framework of the GTE, the Organisation Todt utilized Jews in the occupied zone in labor projects from the Ardennes to the occupied British Channel Islands. Some of the laborers in the Organisation Todt had been recruited by the Jewish Coordinating Committee in the belief that a worse fate awaited idle, indigent Jews.
- Other Jews without means of existence were to be assigned to forced residence or to a camp.⁵⁷

Die 7,500 Reich Jews who had been dumped in unoccupied France from Baden and the Saarpfalz were promptly interned at a camp in Gurs. According to a report by Rabbi Kaplan, these Jews “lived in crowded barracks, sleeping on the ground, devoured by vermin, suffering from hunger and cold in a damp muddy region. During the one winter of 1940-41,

57. On assigned residences, the GTE, and camps, see Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, pp. 165-76; John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France* (New York, 1986), pp. 112-17, 120-27 (specifically about the Puy-de-Dôme in the southern zone, which included Clermont-Ferrand); and Zosa Szajkowski, *Analytical Franco-Jewish Gazetteer* (New York, 1966). Szajkowski identifies localities containing forced residences, labor companies, and camps in his index, and provides at least brief descriptions of these institutions in the gazetteer itself. The gazetteer is arranged alphabetically by prefecture. See also Charles Cruickshank, *The German Occupation of the Channel Islands* (London, 1975), pp. 197, 203-4, for the story of several hundred Jews in mixed marriages who were pulled out of the northern internment camp of Drancy and sent in 1943 to forced labor under the Organisation Todt on Alderney, one of the British islands off the coast of France under German military control until the end of the war.

they suffered 800 deaths.”⁵⁸ By 1941 the Vichy government had established in southern France a network of camps: Gurs, Rivesaltes, Noe, Recebedon, La Vernet, and Les Milles.⁵⁹ Besides the Baden-Saarpfalz Jews, the camps contained recent arrivals from the Reich-Austria-Protectorat-Polish area as well as an assortment of ‘stateless’ Jews of all kinds. The total number of inmates was 20,000.⁶⁰

In Paris the German administration watched these developments with approving acceptance. They saw in the French measure a basis for similar action in the occupied territory.⁶¹ Under the direction of SS Obersturmführer Dannecker, the Jewish expert detailed to the embassy, the Paris prefecture of police compiled a card index in which every Jew was listed (1) alphabetically, (2) according to street address, (3) by profession, and (4) in accordance with the crucial criterion of nationality.⁶²

The list was first put to use in May 1941, with a roundup of Polish Jews, and again in August, with a seizure of Jews who were involved in “Communist de Gaullist misdeeds and assassination attempts against members of the Wehrmacht.”⁶³ The victims of these raids were men only, and they were placed in three camps. After considerable delay it was discovered that the arrest figures totaled 7,443, distributed as follows:⁶⁴

Drancy	4,331
Pithiviers	1,560
Beaune la Rolande	1,552

According to nationality, the breakdown looked like this:⁶⁵

“Former” Poles	3,469
Frenchmen	1,602
“Emigrants”	368
Turks	365
Other nationalities	1,015
Nationality undetermined	624

The arrests of some of the foreign Jews led to protests from foreign consuls in Paris. The Militärbefehlshaber’s office and the SS were agreed that the release of individual Jews would create “precedents” which of

58. Kaplan, “French Jewry” *American Jewish Year Book* 47 (1945-46): 84.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Schlicer (embassy in Paris) to Foreign Office, September 11, 1942, NG-5109.

61. Summary of conference attended by Abetz, Dannecker, Achenbach, and Zcitschel, February 28, 1941, NG-4895.

62. Dannecker to RSHA IV-B, February 22, 1942, NG-2070.

63. Kaplan, “French Jewry,” *American Jewish Year Book* 47 (1945-46): 82-83. Schlicer to Foreign Office, October 30, 1941, NG-3264.

64. Dannecker to Zcitschel, October 20, 1941, NG-3264.

65. *Ibid.*

course were undesirable, and the German bureaucrats thought that the French law was quite sufficient to cover all the arrests.⁶⁶

Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office believed, however, that it was dangerous to detain Jews of die various American nationalities. He wanted these Jews released, lest reprisals be launched against Germans in America, in which case “we would get the worst of it.”⁶⁷ Ribbentrop, whose mind was well attuned to reprisal thinking, immediately put on the memorandum his *Ja*. The Paris Embassy followed suit, though somewhat reluctantly. When, some months later, the Foreign Office was prodded by a Chilean protest to request the release of one Norbert Goldflus, the embassy’s Dr. Zeitschel replied that Goldflus was a Jew, that this status had not been altered by his baptism in Vienna twenty-two years before, that his citizenship was French, and that his marriage to a “Chilean woman of high society” was really beside the point. Nevertheless, the embassy was going to do everything in its power to effect the man’s release, although the recent frequency of such requests was not making a “good impression” on the SS.⁶⁸

Since the internment camps were run by French personnel, a slight problem also developed in matters of administration. The *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung* in Lutsk one day featured an article entitled “Merry Concentration Camp [*Fröhliches Konzentrationslager*].” The camp was Beaune la Rolande. It seemed that the management of the camp was in the hands of a retired French captain who granted passes to inmates against payments of certain sums of money. The inmate roll had thus declined by 384. The “corruption” of the French personnel had also revealed itself in the successful attempts of relatives and friends of the Jews to smuggle food to the prisoners. Surely, wrote the *Ukraine Zeitung*, the Jews had no cause to be dissatisfied in such a concentration camp.⁶⁹

The circumstance that the arrested victims were heads of families developed into still another problem. A French informant of the German *Rüstungskontrollinspektion* (the Armament Control Inspectorate in the unoccupied zone) offered the opinion that the arrest of the men without their women and children had been a mistake. These women, said the French informant, were now wandering around in the streets of Paris and arousing the sympathy of “unknowing Frenchmen.” Other Jews, he said, were disappearing in Paris and the provinces under false names.⁷⁰

66. Schleier to Foreign Office, October 30, 1941, NG-3264.

67. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, November 1, 1941, NG-3264.

68. Zeitschel to Foreign Office, April 30, 1942, NG-5348.

69. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung* (Lutsk), March 28, 1942, p. 5.

70. Rüstungskontrollinspektion/Z (signed by Git. Stud) to Waffenstillstandskommission/Rii in Wiesbaden, December 4, 1941, enclosing special report by Sondcrfvihrer (Z) Rohden, Wi/IA 3.74.

On November 29, 1941, the Vichy regime forced the Jews into a new constriction by decreeing that all Jewish organizations (with the exception of religious associations, including the Consistoire) were to be dissolved and their property' turned over to a new council, the *Union Générale des Israélites de France* (UGIF).⁷¹ The UGIF was to be the Judenrat of France, and for the traditional Jewish leaders called upon to serve in its ranks, the summons from Vichy caused difficulties and dissention. The prospective nominees debated the issue in December, some of them offering a rejection with explanations, the others favoring an acceptance with conditions. The implication of a special status of French Jewry, more than a hundred years after its emancipation, prompted the resisters to remove themselves from any involvement with the new organization, but the danger of direct German control induced the compromisers to prefer French stewardship. At one point the conferees, spurred by René Mayer and Professor David Olmer, considered a collective letter of resignation. The prime mover among those who were inclined to cooperate was Raymond-Raoul Lambert, a forty-seven-year-old veteran of both world wars and a functionary of the *Comité d'Assistance aux Réfugiés* (CAR). On December 30, after "a week of Jewish diplomacy," as Lambert termed the internal debate, the formation of the UGIF was assured. René Mayer, the loser, did not participate. In the postwar era he was to be a premier of France. Lambert, the winner, could now be a Jewish leader. Before the war was over, he was to be gassed in Auschwitz.

The UGIF absorbed Jewish welfare organizations and their personnel, but it was a shaky holding company from the start. When CAR's president, Albert Lévy, was named president of the UGIF, he was called a toy in Lambert's hands. Moreover, the UGIF was divided into northern and southern sections corresponding to the occupied and unoccupied zones. It was led by the following men:⁷²

71. Law of November 29, 1941, signed by Pétain, Darlan, Barthélemy, Puchcu, and Bouthillier, *Journal officiel*, December 2, 1941.

72. Raymond-Raoul Lambert, *Carnet d'un témoin*, ed. Richard Cohen (Paris, 1985), pp. 138-49. The carnet (notebook) is a diary with long entries summarizing events of a week or more. The entries on the formation of the UGIF are for December 28, 1941, and January 8, 1942. See also Szajkowski, *Analytical Franco-Jewish Gazetteer*, pp. 39-63; Jacques Adler, *Face à la persécution* (Paris, 1985), pp. 71-95; Kaplan, "French Jewry" *American Jewish Tear Book*, 47 (1945-46); 78, 93-96; and the statement by Vallat in Hoover Institution, *France during the German Occupation*, vol. 2, pp. 636-42. On UGIF policies see Cynthia Haft, *The Bargain and the Bridle* (Chicago, 1983); her "L'Union Generale des Israelites de France et la politique de 'réduction,'" *Contemporary French Civilization* 5 (1981): 261-74; Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust* (Detroit, 1981), pp. 164-69, 236-40; and Richard Cohen, *The Burden of Conscience* (Bloomington, 1987). Baur and Lambert became deportation victims in 1943. Baur was deported after the arrival of Alois Brunner. On

Président général (in succession)

Albert Lévy (in Marseille; resigned)

Raymond-Raoul Lambert (in Marseille; acting [provisoire] from March 1943, arrested in August 1943 and deported in December 1943)

Georges Edinger (in Paris)

Vice-président: André Baur (in Paris; arrested July 1943 and deported to Auschwitz December 1943)

NORTH

Administrative Deputy (Administrateur délégué) : Marcel Stora (deported 1943 and replaced by Albert Weil)

SOUTH

Administrative Deputy (subsequently Directeur général) in Marseille: Lambert (replaced by Raymond Geissmann, acting)

From the first days of its existence, the UGIF faced mounting problems. On December 14, 1941, the Militärbefehlshaber made use of the pretext of an assassination attempt on a German officer to impose a billion-franc “fine” upon the Jews, and on December 17 he charged the UGIF with the task of collecting the money.⁷³ All decisions of the UGIF in pursuance of this directive were to be backed by the French administration in accordance with the tax statutes of France. Supervision was in the hands of Dr. Michel, particularly his Group IX (Finance). Michel, convinced that neither French nor Jewish agencies would have any interest in raising such cash expeditiously, asked the Reich Finance Ministry to lend him ten experts who could intervene as needed.⁷⁴ The French Finance Ministry was in fact uncooperative, but the UGIF, fearful of German reprisals, borrowed the requisite amount, pledging the entire proceeds from the Aryanizations of Jewish property as security for the loan.⁷⁵ In the end the UGIF tied up 895 million francs, or more than 40 percent of the sum accrued from the Aryanizations, to fund the payment of the fine.⁷⁶

A second curtailment of resources arose for the UGIF when the Ger-

Lambert's arrest, see Rorhke to Knochen, August 15, 1943, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Juden fröÙe in Frankreich*, pp. 210-13. All documents in the Klarsfeld volume are from the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine.

73. Decree of the Militärbefehlshaber, December 17, 1941, *Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich*, December 20, 1941.

74. Michel to Central Division (Haug), December 15, 1941, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Juden frage in Frankreich*, p. 17.

75. Szajkowski, *Franco-Jewish Gazetteer*, p. 61, citing minutes of the UGIF meeting of March 11, 1942.

76. Umbreit, *Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich*, p. 263. Marrus and Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, pp. 110-11.

man occupation of southern France in November 1942 cut off' French Jewry from major sources of outside assistance, notably the United States.⁷⁷ Although this was a time to dip into the Aryanization reservoir to help the indigent Jews, the chiefs of the community were determined to confine withdrawals to a minimum. In 1943 the Jewish leaders obtained from the French authorities a decree authorizing the UGIF to impose a monthly head tax on every Jewish adult. The tax amounted to 120 francs in the original occupied area and 360 francs in the old Vichy zone.⁷⁸ Its yield was supplemented by withdrawals from die blocked funds of 80 million francs.⁷⁹ At the end of 1943 the blocked accounts amounted to 485 million francs.⁸⁰

Even as the UGIF was wrestling with money, darker German plans were in the offing. As early as October 1941, the military administration in France approached Reichsminister Rosenberg of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories about the possibility of moving the Jews eastward.⁸¹ Nothing could be done at that moment, but when Stiilpnagel wrote to the Generalquartiermeister on December 5, 1941, to suggest the "fine," he added two other points: He wanted 100 Jews, Communists, and anarchists shot, and he proposed that 1,000 Jews and 500 Communists be deported to the East.⁸² Hitler approved all three requests in Stulpnagel's letter.⁸³

On December 12 about 750 Jews were arrested in Paris and taken,

77. American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee expenditures in France were close to \$800,000 in 1941 and close to \$900,000 in 1942. Bauer, *American Jenny and the Holocaust*, p. 159. The supply of funds (through Switzerland) was greatly reduced in 1943-44, but there was some local borrowing against promises of postwar repayments from abroad. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-44.

78. Decree of the Commissariat of Jewish Affairs, signed Darquicr de Pellepoix, May 11, 1943, *Journal officiel*, June 5, 1943.

79. Kaplan, "French Jewry," *American Jewish Tear Book 47 (1945-46): 78-79,95-96. Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 13-14,1943, p. 2.

80. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), January 14, 1944, p. 1.

81. Summary' of discussion held on October 13, 1941, between Rosenberg and Gencralgouverncur Frank, dated October 14, 1941, Frank Diary', National Archives Record Group 242, T 992, Roll 4.

82. Von Stiilpnagel to OKH/GenQu, December 5,1941, NG-3571. Von Stiilpnagel had become concerned about shooting hostages in large numbers, and he thought in terms of substituting deportations of Jews for an escalation of reprisals against Frenchmen. Sec Herbert, "Die dcutsche Militarverwaltung," in Jansen, Niethammer, and Weisbrod, *Aufgabe*, pp. 439-40, 447. Jews were subsequently deported, but there was no mitigation for the French. Defeated, von Stiilpnagel resigned.

83. GcnQu to Ambassador Ritter (Foreign Office), December 12, 1941, NG-3571.

with 300 others from the internment camp at Drancy, to Compiègne.⁸⁴ Two days later von Stülpnagel published his order. The French Delegate General in the occupied territory, Ambassador de Brinon, protested immediately against the shooting of the hundred “Jews, Communists, and anarchists” as hostages. His note failed to bring up the billion-franc “fine,” and it did not mention the proposed deportation of the thousand Jews.⁸⁵ The timing of the deportations, however, was ill chosen. The OKH informed the Militärbefehlshaber that December and January were overcrowded months for the military transport command and that the Jews would have to wait until February or March.⁸⁶ For Sturmbannführer Lischka, this delay was unwelcome news. The deportation, he wrote to RSHA IV-B-4, was urgently necessary (*dringend erforderlich*), lest French authorities view the pause as German weakness (*deutsche Schwäche*).⁸⁷

During the waiting period the chief of the French “social revolutionary” movement, Eugene Deloncle, decided to blow up a few Paris synagogues. In the ensuing demolitions a number of Wehrmacht members were hurt, and as a result, the Militärbefehlshaber angrily requested the withdrawal of the newly installed BdS, Dr. Knochen. The embassy now had to step in to protect this “politically experienced” man who was going to be needed so much in the coming operations, and von Stülpnagel agreed to accept an apology.⁸⁸ Mollified, the Militärbefehlshaber a few days later issued an ordinance imposing a curfew on the Jews.

By March 9, 1942, the transport problem was solved. Eichmann wrote to his counterpart in the Foreign Office, Legationsrat Rademacher, to inquire whether the diplomats had any objections to the deportations.⁸⁹ Neither Luther in Berlin nor Schleier in Paris could think of any objections.⁹⁰

Eichmann's Paris representative, in the meantime, thought that things were going a little too slowly. At a conference held in Eichmann's chambers on March 4, Hauptsturmführer Dannecker suggested that it would be necessary to propose to the French government “something really pos-

84. Kaplan, “French Juden,” *American Jewish Tear Book* 47 (1945-46): 82-83.

85. Memorandum by Welck on telephone conversation with Legationsrat Strack, containing text of French protest, December 16, 1941, NG-5126.

86. Militärbefehlshaber in France/Administrative Stall/Adm. (signed Best), to representative of RSHA in Paris, January 6, 1942, R-967.

87. Lischka to RSHA IV-B-4, February 26, 1942, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, p. 46.

88. Paris Embassy to Ambassador Ritter in the Foreign Office, February 2, 1942, NG-119.

89. Eichmann to Rademacher, March 9, 1942, NG-4954.

90. Luther to Paris Embassy, March 10, 1942, NG-4954. Schleier to Foreign Office, March 13, 1942, NG-4954.

itive, like the deportation of several thousand Jews [*etwas wirklich Positive, ivie etim den Abschub mehrerer tausend Juden*].” Eichmann thought that, subject to Heydrich’s approval, some preliminary negotiations could be instituted with the French for the deportation of about 5,000 Jews to the East.

Eichmann had in mind Jewish men, not over fifty-five years of age, who were capable of work (in short, the arrested Jews in the internment camps). The negotiations with the French, he believed, would also have to include the subject of the “service charge” that the Germans were to collect for removing the Jews. To determine the amount of the charge, one would first have to gain a picture of the total Jewish wealth in the county. These and other details, he said, would have to be settled in the next few months.⁹¹

On March 11 Eichmann decided to get the Foreign Office’s permission to deport the 5,000 Jews to Auschwitz, along with the 1,000 whose deportation was already scheduled.⁹² This request also went from hand to hand and was approved by Rademacher, Luther, Schleier, Weizsacker, and Wormann.⁹³

The deportation fever now increased in the ranks of the German bureaucracy in Paris. On March 18, 1942, an embassy official commented that the appointment of a Higher SS and Police Leader in France (Oberg) would have “an especially favorable effect on the Final Solution” in the country,⁹⁴ and on the 27th the first train left Compiegne for Auschwitz.⁹⁵ On May 5, 1942, Heydrich himself arrived in Paris. Speaking in a small circle of officials in the military administration, he said something about the implications of the final solution conference of January 20, 1942, and went on to reveal that, whereas gas van operations had yielded meager results, more promising, efficient solutions were in the making.⁹⁶ In a talk

91. HSruf. Dannecker to OStubaf. Dr. Knochen and Stubaf. Lischka, March 10, 1942, RF-1216. Dannecker, bom 1913, was not a fanatic before the Nazi period. See the biography by Claudia Stur, *Theodor Dannecker* (Stuttgart, 1997). In the 1930s he was an Oberscharführer in the Jewish Referat of the SD Main Office where he headed the section “Assimilationists” next to Eichmann’s section “Zionists.”

92. Eichmann to Rademacher, March 11, 1942, NG-4954.

93. Correspondence in NG-4954.

94. Embassy memorandum, March 18, 1942, NG-4881.

95. Serge Klarsfeld, *Memorial to the Jews Deported from France, 1942-1944* (New York, 1983). The volume contains lists of names, with nationalities, ages, and places of birth, by train in chronological order of departure. On the first train, see also order by Wehrmachtverkehrsdircktion Paris/Railway Division/33 (signed Möhfi, March 24, 1942, Case Ganzenmüller, Düsseldorf, 8 Js 430/67, Special Volume IV’, part IV, p. 5.

96. Herbert, “Die deutsche Militärverwaltung,” in Jansen, Niethammer, and Weisbrod, *Aufgabe*, pp. 448, 430 n.5.

with the French police chief, Bousquet, he announced that there was now sufficient transport to remove the stateless Jews interned at Drancy in the occupied zone. Nonchalandy, the French police chief asked Heydrich whether he could not also remove the stateless Jews who had already been interned for a year and a half in the unoccupied zone. Heydrich replied that it was all a matter of transport.⁹⁷

In this situation, Generalleutnant Kohl of ETRA West turned out to be more than willing to be of assistance. The general received Dannecker personally and, in a conversation of more than an hour, revealed himself to the Hauptsturmführer as an absolute opponent of the Jews and a wholehearted supporter of a “Final Solution to the Jewish problem” with a view to complete annihilation (*restloser Vernichtung*). Kohl then declared “verbatim” (*wortlich*): “I am glad that we met and that we are in contact. You may discuss future transport with my appropriate specialist. If you tell me ‘I want to transport 10,000 or 20,000 Jews from France to the East,’ then you can count every time on my allocating the necessary rolling stock and locomotives.” Further, the general declared that in Jewish matters he was going to adopt a radical position (*einen radikalen Standpunkt*) even if (*auf die Gefahr hin*) certain people would consider him “raw” (*rob*).^{98,99}

On June 3 the Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion Paris dispatched the second transport, DA 301. It was to leave on June 5 from Compiègne to Auschwitz via Metz, where German cars were to be substituted for the French rolling stock. In an important additional note the order stated that costs were to be borne by the Militärbefehlshaber."

Encouraged by these developments, the bureaucrats began to make preparations for concentrations and deportations on a major scale. By the middle of May the Militärbefehlshaber's office was hard at work on a decree compelling every Jew who had reached the age of six to wear a Jewish star with the inscription *Juif*.¹⁰⁰ Although the decree was to apply to French and foreign Jews alike, the treatment of some of the foreign nationalities had to be handled with caution. After consultations with the Foreign Office, the following nationalities were determined to be safe

97. Schleier to Foreign Office, September 11, 1942, NG-5109.

98. Dannecker to Knochen and Lischka, May 15, 1942, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, p. 56. The meeting took place on the 13th.

99. Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion (WVD) Paris/Railway Division/33 (signed Möhl) to Paris-Nord, Paris-Ost, Nancy, Lille, WVD Brussels, RBD Saarbrücken, Generalbetriebsleitung Ost/P and PW, Transport Ministry/21, and Wehrmachttransportleitung Paris, June 3, 1942, Case Ganzcnmüller, Special Volume IV, part VI, p. 12. On dispatch of the train, with names, see Klarsfeld, *Memorial*.

100. Abetz to Foreign Office, May 15, 1942, NG-2455.

targets for the measure: Reich, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, French, Croat, Slovakian, and Romanian.¹⁰¹

The decree was issued on May 29 and went into effect on June 7. Difficulties in its enforcement made themselves felt immediately. Some of the Jews decided not to wear the star. Others wore it in the wrong way. Still others wore several stars instead of one. Some Jews provided their star with additional inscriptions. Finally, a number of non-Jews took to wearing the star or something that looked like it. Angered, the Germans arrested some of the Jewish offenders and their French supporters to intern them in one of the camps.¹⁰²

In Berlin the machine ground on. On June 11 Eichmann called together his experts from The Hague, Brussels, and Paris to discuss further measures. The experts were considering statistics to be used in negotiations with ETRA West. The figure was an initial 100,000. The deportees were to consist of men and women in the age group 16-40, and a sum of 700 Reichsmark per person was mentioned as the transportation fee to be charged the French state. The first train was to roll on July 13.¹⁰³

Within a matter of days a major obstacle loomed on the horizon: ETRA West could not furnish the transport. The buildup of the spring offensive had resulted in the sudden transfer from the occupied zone to the Reich of 37,000 freight cars, 800 passenger cars, and 1,000 locomotives. The need for this equipment was so urgent that the trains had to be moved out empty. The remaining rolling stock was hardly sufficient to transport Gauleiter Saucke's 350,000 French laborers to the Reich. Complicating matters was the sudden transfer of jurisdiction over transport from ETRA West to the Reichsbahn. The implementation of the change (in the course of which the military Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion in Paris was being turned into the civilian Hauptverkehrsdirektion) was still in progress on June 16, 1942, and to Hauptsturmführer Dannecker the prospect of future Jewish transports had become uncertain.¹⁰⁴

The momentum, however, was not broken. On June 17, 1942, Dannecker noted that, despite all the difficulties, three special trains would

101. Zeitschel to Militärbefehlshaber von Stülpnagel and Higher SS and Police Leader Oberg, May 22, 1942, NG-3668.

102. Announcement in *Pariser Zeitung*, June 26, 1942, p. 4. The propagandists in the military administration thought that, for effect, Jews should also be barred from coffeehouses, boulevards, and so on. Morale report (*Stimmungsbericht*) by Militärbefehlshaber in France/Propaganda Division, July 8, 1942, OKAY-733.

103. HSmf. Dannecker to Staf. Dr. Knochen and OSmbaf. Lischka, June 15, 1942, RF-1217.

104. Dannecker to RSHA IV-B-4, June 16, 1942, RF-1218, reciting statistics of rolling stock. Dorpmüller order to Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektionen Paris and Brussels, June 13, 1942, in Kreidler, *Eisenbahnen*, pp. 356-57.

leave Drancy, Pithiviers, and Beaune la Rolande, where 3,000 Jews were “ready to march” (*marschbereit*).¹⁰⁵ The very next day the “Wehrmacht-verkehrsdirektion” in Paris informed him of the departure dates: June 22, 25, and 28. From Novak (transport specialist of RSFLAIV-B-4) he heard that the Transport Ministry was prepared to undertake Jewish transports from France “on a major scale” (*imgrösseren Umfange*).¹⁰⁶ Before the day was over there were more messages. A total of thirty-six trains was now being projected.¹⁰⁷ The three transports to Auschwitz, Eichmann informed Knochen, were cleared by the Transport Ministry, and technical details could be worked out with Hauptverkehrsdirektion Paris (Herr Niklas).¹⁰⁸ On June 19 the detailed order for the three trains was dispatched by HVD Paris.^{109 110}

The major transport program was locked into a directive signed by the Reichsbahn’s chief of operations, Leibbrand, on June 23, 1942. Ninety thousand Jewish deportees from France, Belgium, and Holland were covered by the order. The French quota was 40,000, including 35,000 from Paris, 1,000 from Rouen, 1,000 from Nancy, 1,000 from Dijon, and 2,000 from Bordeaux. From Belgium 10,000 were to leave; from Holland, 40,000. Generalbetriebsleitung West was charged with carrying out the transports in coordination with Generalbetriebsleitung Ost, using existing schedules so far as possible. It would be desirable, said Leibbrand, to begin on July 13 with six or seven trains carrying 1,000 persons each per week. Cars were to be supplied so far as possible by the western Hauptverkehrsdirektionen, subject to regulation by the Generalbetriebsleitung Ost/PW.¹¹⁰ Leibbrand, the recognized railroad specialist, no less than Kohl, the implacable opponent of Jewry, was finding the means to bring about the deportations from the West.

105. Dannecker to RSHA, June 17, 1942, Case Novak, Landesgericht für Strafsachen, Vienna, 1416/61, vol. 17, p. 297 ff.

106. Dannecker to RSHA, June 18, 1942, *ibid*.

107. Dannecker to Novak, June 18, 1942, *ibid*.

108. Eichmann to Knochen, June 18, 1942, *ibid*.

109. HVD Paris/33 (signed Never) to Eisenbahndirektionen Paris-Nord, Paris-Ost, Paris-Süd, and Nancy, with copies to Generalbetriebsleitung West (Essen) and Transport Ministry, June 19, 1942. Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, document XXV b-39. The trains left on schedule. Klarsfeld, *Memorial*.

110. Transport Ministry/21 (signed by E II Chief Leibbrand) to Generalbetriebsleitung West (Essen), Generalbetriebsleitung Ost/L and PW, Hauptverkehrsdirektionen Paris and Brussels, Railway Plenipotentiary in Utrecht, and Reichsbahndirektion Oppeln, June 23, 1942; and Schnell (21) to 16, July 11, 1942, enclosing directive for financial purposes, Case Ganzcnmüller, Special Volume IV, part III, pp. 57-58. Note also the accommodating spirit shown by Möhl (HVD Paris/33) in discussion about further transports with Stubaf. Mayer-Falk, as noted in Motifs memorandum of July 2, 1942, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, document XXV b-45.

Now the SS men could go ahead with their plans. On June 26, 1942, Dannecker drew up a set of rules (*Richtlinien*) for the deportation of the French Jews. He fixed the age limits at 16-45 and decided that the deportations could embrace Jews of French nationality as well as those "stateless" Jews who were not effectively protected by a foreign power. Next he prepared a list of things that the victims were to take along: two pairs of socks, two shirts, two pairs of underdrawers, a towel, a cup, a spoon, etc. For the guidance of the transport command, he itemized the quantities of food to be stocked in the supply car of each train. Since the trains were to be made up of freight cars, he directed that each car be provided with a pail. Finally, he dealt with the question of guards, who were to be furnished by the army's Feldgendarmerie in the strength of one officer and fort) men per train to the Reich border.¹¹¹

Railway assurances also enabled the SS to lay out a grand strategy for France. By the end of the month it was thought that shortly (*in Kürze*) 50,000 Jews could be moved out of the occupied zone of France. The implementation of the plan was expected to be unhampered (*reibungslos und klar*). The operation was to start in the provincial cities. The first transport was to leave Bordeaux on July 13, 1942. The following transports were scheduled to leave at two-day intervals: Bordeaux again, Angers, Rouen, Châlons-sur-Marne-Nancy and Orleans. The deportation machine was then to descend on Paris.¹¹² The Parisian quota was 22,000 Jews, who were to be seized in each *arrondissement* in proportion to the distribution of the Jews within the city.¹¹³

Now that the transport difficulty was partially overcome, the SS men in Paris were confronted by still another shortage: police. In all of occupied France the German Order Police had only three battalions with 3,000 men in all. (How weak these forces were in relation to their task may be glimpsed from the fact that Holland had more than 5,000 men.)¹¹⁴ Clearly, the Order Police could not be enlisted to help. For the relatively small operation of guarding the trains the RSHA had secured the assistance of the Feldgendarmerie, but for the major undertaking of conducting the seizures the SS men had to draw upon the French police.

111. Directive by Dannecker, June 26, 1942, RF-1221. Feldgendarmerie in such numbers were not needed in the end, because French gendarmes were available. Rothke to Kommandant of Gross-Paris/Kommandostab Ia/Stabsoffizier der Feldgendarmerie, July 16, 1942, requesting allocation of one officer and eight men for supervision of French personnel for train leaving July 19. Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, document XXV b-72.

112. Memorandum signed by Eichmann and Dannecker, July 1, 1942, RF-1223; Dannecker to Knochen and Lischka, July 1, 1942, RE-1222.

113. Memorandum by Dannecker, July 4, 1942, RF-1224.

114. Daluge to Wolff, February 28, 1942, NO-2861.

In the occupied zone the French police force was 47,000 strong.^{1 s} The Frenchmen were needed particularly in Paris, a city that in 1941 might still have had nearly two million people, including 140,000 Jews.

To secure the complete support of the French police, BdS Standartenführer Knochen stepped into the office of Chief of the French Government Pierre Laval and informed him that the German government had decided to deport every Jewish man, woman, and child living in France. No distinction was going to be made between Jews of French nationality and others. The prefect of police in Paris had already been notified by the German authorities of their decision in this matter. Laval thereupon interceded with Higher SS and Police Leader Oberg to save the situation.

Oberg made a compromise proposal. If the French police would cooperate in the operation, the seizures would be confined for the moment to stateless Jews. "The trains are ready" explained the SS man. "They have to be filled at any price. The Jewish problem has no frontiers for us. The police must help us or we shall do the arresting without any distinction between French Jews and others." Oberg then offered the assurance that the Jews were being sent to Poland, where a "Jewish state" would be set up for them.

Laval now had to make a "rapid decision." He decided to save the French nationals and involve the police in the roundup. Writing his memoirs in the death house after the liberation, Laval defended his decision in the following words:

I did all I could, considering the fact that my first duty was to my fellow-countrymen of Jewish extraction whose interests I could not sacrifice. The right of asylum was not respected in this case. How could it have been otherwise in a country which was occupied by the German Army? How could the Jews have been better protected in a country where the Gestapo ran riot?¹¹⁶

The compromise, which brought temporary immunity to the Jews of French nationality, had an upsetting effect on the German deportation strategy. For example, a transport scheduled to leave Bordeaux on July 15 had to be canceled because only 150 stateless Jews could be found in the city. The cancellation caused particular annoyance to Obersturmbannführer Eichmann. Calling his expert Röthke from Berlin, he demanded an explanation for this fiasco. The RSHA had conducted lengthy negotiations with the Reich Transport Minister to obtain the cars, and now Paris canceled a train. Such a thing had never happened to him before. He could not even report it to Gestapo Chief Müller, lest the blame fall on his

115. *Ibid.*

116. Quotation and account of meetings with Knochen and Oberg from Pierre Laval, *Diary* (New York, 1948), pp. 97-99.

own shoulders. Disgusted, Eichmann uttered the dire that he might even drop France as an evacuation land.¹¹⁷

If Laval had made a dent in the German plan by saving the French Jews, he made up for the loss in part by throwing in the children of the stateless victims. The question of the Jewish children remaining behind in the occupied territory' did not "interest" him.^{117 118} The Germans and their helpers among the French police could now proceed with the seizure of men, women, and children alike.

On the eve of the Paris roundup, a "working committee" met for the first time to discuss the "technical" details of the operation. The committee consisted of Dannecker and the following Frenchmen: the anti-Jewish commissar, Darquier de Pellepoix; the deputy of the French police chief in the occupied zone, Leguay; the director of the transit camps, François; the director of the Street Police, Hennequin; the director of the Jewish register in the Paris prefecture of police, Tulard; a representative of the prefect of the Seine *département*, Director Gamier; the director of the Anti-Jewish Police, Schweblin; the *Chef de Cabinet* of the Anti-Jewish Commissariat, Galien; and a staff officer of the Street Police, Guidot.¹¹⁹

In the course of the raids, French police rounded up 12,884 Jews, who were stateless "etc." in the capital. Many of these 3,031 men, 5,802 women, and 4,051 children (aged 2-15), thought Obersturmführer Röthke, belonged to the "lowest stratum" (*aus der untersten Schicht*). Jews with money, he surmised, had been warned by the French police, although he had no proof in the matter. Six thousand persons (single men and women and childless couples) were sent directly to Drancy. Families with children were routed through the race track (the *Vélodrome d'Hiver*) to Pithiviers and Beaune la Rolande. The Security Police in Paris had not yet received approval to deport the children, and during this hiatus the representatives of the French police asked the Germans repeatedly (*wiederholt*) to transport the children with the adults. (The green light came from Eichmann on July 20.)¹²⁰ At the Velodrome d'Hiver, near chaos prevailed, with scenes of crowding, people without food, unidenti-

117. Memorandum by Röthke on telephone conversation with Eichmann, July 15, 1942, RF-1226. Eichmann had called at 7 p.m. on July 14. See also Dannecker to Röthke, July 21, 1942, Israel Police 65. Testimony by Eichmann, Eichmann trial transcript, July 12, 1961, scss. 94, pp. Nnl, Ool.

118. Dannecker to RSHA IV-B-4, July 6, 1942, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, *La persécution des Juifs en France*, p. 128.

119. Dannecker to Lischka, Knochen, and Oberg, July 8, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 144.

120. Röthke to Knochen and Lischka, July 18, 1942, in Klarskid, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, pp. 91-92. Telephone calls from Eichmann and Novak approving the deportation of children were noted by Dannecker in his memorandum of July 21, 1942. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

tied small children (many ill with diarrhea), and fifty Jews dying in a corner of the stadium.¹²¹ There is some indication that the UGIF (which had to take medical responsibility for the internees and which had to engage in other tasks, including the supply of 800 pails for the trains) had knowledge of the roundup a day or so before it began.¹²² When André Baur, head of the northern section of the UGIF, appeared at the stadium on the afternoon of the 16th, he was booed.^{123 124}

After the seizures the Wehrmacht propaganda experts in Paris commented that a part of the population still had “no understanding” (*kein Verständnis*) of the proceedings, and that French offices and police had indicated by their conduct “that they could not recognize the necessity of these measures [*dass sie die Notwendigkeit dieser Massnahmen nicht anerkennen*]”¹²⁴ Before long, public agencies charged with insurance and pension payments were approaching the Police Prefecture in Paris for certification of the new addresses of the departed victims.¹²⁵ Eichmann sent word that under no circumstances was there to be any mention of evacuations or deportations. If absolutely necessary, as in the case of settling an estate, information was to be confined to the determination “that the Jew is gone and his present residence is unknown [*dass der Jude z. Zt. verzogen u. sein gegenwärtiger Aufenthalt unbekannt ist*].”¹²⁶

Throughout the period of feverish activity, the Germans did not forget the unoccupied area. As early as June 27, 1942, Hauptsturmführer Dannecker mentioned in a conversation with Legationsrat Zeitschel that he would need 50,000 Jews from the Vichy zone “as soon as possible.” Zeitschel communicated the matter immediately to Ambassador Abetz and Gesandtschaftsrat Rahn.¹²⁷ The diplomats and SS men now joined forces to apply the necessary pressure (*Druckarbeit*) upon Laval.

Not much pressure was needed. Laval declared himself ready to hand over the foreign Jews from the unoccupied zone and proposed that the Germans also “take along” the children under sixteen.¹²⁸ The Germans

121. For a vivid description of the roundup, see Claude Levy' and Paul Tillard, *Betrayal at the Vel d'Hiv* (New York, 1969).

122. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. The pails are mentioned in a memorandum by Röthke, July 11, 1942, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, pp. 89-90.

123. Levy' and Tillard, *Vel d'Hiv*, p. 67.

124. Militärbefehlshaber in France/Propaganda to OKW/W Pr If, August 13, 1942, enclosing report for July 8 to August 11, 1942, OKW-733; once in Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va. The report added that there were numerous daily denunciations of Jews.

125. Röthke to RSHA IV-B-4-a, November 18, 1942, Israel Police 253.

126. Eichmann to BdS in Paris, December 9, 1942, Israel Police 253.

127. Zeitschel to Knochen, June 27, 1942, RF-1220.

128. Dannecker to RSHA IV-B-4, July 6, 1942. Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, *La persécution des Juifs en France*, p. 128.

were elated. They were also surprised. After one meeting, a German negotiator, Gesandtschaftsrat Rahn, could not help remarking to Laval that the whole business was just a little unsavory. Irritated, Laval jumped at Rahn: “Well, what am I to do? I offered these foreign Jews to the Allies, but they didn’t take them off my hands.”¹²⁹

Rumors of the impending deportations reached the administrateur of the UGIF in the southern zone, Lambert. On July 28 in Vichy, Lambert obtained confirmation of the reports from the national police: Ten thousand foreign Jews whose residence in France had been established after January 1, 1936, were to be deported. In the course of this crisis, no collective decision was made by the Jewish leadership in Southern France. The members of the administrative council of the UGIF’s southern section were dispersed in several cities, and throughout the month of August the council did not meet. Lambert saw Laval by chance on July 31, but did not use the occasion to raise any questions. Writing in his diary some weeks later, he claimed that such an intervention was the prerogative only of Lévy, president of the UGIF, and Helbronner, president of the Consistoire. On August 2, in Lyon, Lambert stated this position to Helbronner, inviting him to do something. Helbronner—lawyer, politician, cousin of two Rothschilds, and twenty years older than Lambert — then spoke these “criminal” words: “If Laval wants to see me, he only has to call me, but please let him know that from the 8th of August to September I am going on vacation and nothing in the world can make me come back [St M. Laval veut me voir, il n’a qu’à me convoquer, mais dites-lui bien qu’à partir du 8 août et jusqu’en septembre je pars en vacances et que rien au monde ne pourra me faire revenir]”¹³⁰

One day after this conversation, Leguay informed Darquier de Pellepois about dates of forthcoming deportations from both zones. Still targeted were the foreign Jews, and first to be moved out were those already interned, including the children left behind in camps after their

129. Testimony by Rudolf Rahn, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 17581-83.

130. Lambert, *Carnet d’un témoin*, entry of September 6, 1942, pp. 177-80. See also Ycrachmiel (Richard Cohen), “A Jewish Leader in Vichy France, 1940-43: The Diary of Raymond-Raoul Lambert,” *Jewish Social Studies* 43 (1981): 291-31, particularly pp. 292, 300, and 309. Helbronner, who had met with Pétain repeatedly during the occupation, formed the impression that he could trust the Marshal and rely on his assurances. In these meetings Pétain did not reveal the role he had played in the drafting of the anti-Jewish statute and other matters. At a lower level, the apparent receptivity of French officials to Jewish arguments was similarly misleading. In effect, the tactic induced a narcosis in the Jewish representatives. Underestimating the danger, the Consistoire would attribute anti-Jewish measures to “the anti-Semites.” It protested against the growing restrictions but instructed the Jewish community to obey them, since they were issued as acts of the state. See Poznanski, *Jen’s m France during World War II*, pp. 76, 79, 88-94, 271.

parents had been placed on earlier transports.¹³¹ In a directive of August 5, precise specifications were spelled out. Deportable were Jews of ten foreign nationalities who were located in camps, the *jjroupes tm-vaiUmrs etrangers*, UGIF shelters, and other welfare institutions. Jews still living in their apartments were not to be sent out from the unoccupied zone, if they belonged to one of eleven categories, including persons over sixty, the fathers or mothers of a child under the age of five, and unaccompanied children under the age of eighteen. The instructions were to be kept strictly confidential and lists were to be prepared by August 16.¹³²

Secrecy notwithstanding, the content of the regulations was filtered to the Jewish organizations operating within the framework of the UGIF. Social workers of these agencies, who were admitted to southern internment camps to provide assistance to the detained families, began to remove children from the camps in order to qualify them for exemption. The youngsters had to be wrenched from their parents.¹³³

In the meantime the deportation machinery ground on. On August 13, Leguay declared in a conference with Dannecker and Rothke that the first transport with Jews from the unoccupied zone would cross the demarcation line on August 17. It was understood that the trains from southern France were to be routed to Drancy, where the deportees would be “mixed” with children from Pithiviers and Beaune la Rolande. The Germans suggested that Jewish children could be delivered also from the unoccupied zone. Leguay answered that roundups of “stateless” Jews had already been launched there and that he would try everything to assure a sufficient number. The Germans then stated that, as had already been made clear to Laval, this was a question of a “permanent Aktion,” which would eventually have to include the Jews of French nationality.¹³⁴

On August 18, Bousquet reduced the eleven categories of exempted Jews in the southern zone to six. From now on, small children under the care of a parent would be spared only if they were under the age of two,

131. Leguay to Darquicr dc Pellcpoix, August 3, 1942, text in Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschmütz 1942*, pp. 310-11.

132. Directive of the National Police/Direction dc la Police du Territoirc ct des Etrangers/9th Bureau (signed H. Cado) to regional prefects, August 5, 1942, in *ibid.*, pp. 318-19.

133. Hillel Kieval, “Legality’ and Resistance in Vichy France: The Rescue of Jewish Children,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 124 (1980): 339-66, particularly pp. 357-59.

134. Summary of Leguay’s meeting with Dannecker and Rothke (signed Rothke), August 13, 1942, RF-1234. Pure children’s transports were forbidden by the RSHA, but the children were not necessarily distributed evenly by car. For the August 21 train there are some car figures: 90 children/7 adults, 55 children/1 adult, 74 children/2 adults, and soon. See Klarsfeld, *Memorial*, pp. 191-92.

and the permissibility of leaving older children up to eighteen in the free zone was explicitly removed. (“*Faculté de laisser enfant de moins de 18 ans en zone libre supprimée.*”)^{135 136}

By September 1, Vichy authorities in the unoccupied area had handed over 5,000 Jews and had arrested another 7,100.¹³⁶ Jews who felt themselves in imminent danger scattered to the Spanish, Swiss, and Italian borders until Bousquet’s men tired of “mountain” climbing (*zum grossen Teil vom Bergsteigen schon ermüdet*).¹³⁷

Vichy could not conceal its spreading operations, and as awareness grew, so did an assortment of reactions in a variety of quarters. In the consistoire, the response was limited. Helbronner’s personal secretary, Robert Kiefe, who was an attorney and experienced petitioner, had made the rounds to see French officials many times, and as the crisis unfolded he approached a secretary of Laval on August 14, only to reiterate an old idea, favored by Helbronner, that Jewish French citizens be allowed to move from the occupied zone to the unoccupied one. Fie was told that such a transfer was now out of the question. Eleven days later, on August 25, 1942, the Consistoire sent a lengthy unsigned “solemn protest” (*protestation solennelle*), which it made public, to Laval. In this document, the Consistoire, with increased concern for all children and young women, as well as for the French citizens, requested that, if the deportations could not be revoked, the exceptions that were applied to the first five transports be given effect again.¹³⁸ Those trains, which had been sent out in the spring, carried in the main only young men who did not have French nationality.

In the southern city of Toulouse the archbishop instructed the clergy of his diocese to protest from their pulpits against the deportation of die Jews. When Laval heard of these instructions, he called a representative of the nuncio, Monsignor Rocco, and requested him to call to the attention of the Pope and Cardinal State Secretary Maglione die French government’s determination not to permit interferences of this type in the internal affairs of the state of France. Laval then warned Rocco that in the event of any attempt on the part of the clergy to shield deportable Jews in churches and cloisters, he would not hesitate to drag out the Jews with French police. In conclusion Laval expressed his surprise that die Church

135. National Police/9th Bureau (signed Bousquet) to regional prefects in the unoccupied zone, August 18, 1942, in Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz 1942*, p. 339.

136. Schleier to Foreign Office, September 11, 1942, NG-5109.

137. Röthke to Knochen, Lischka, and Hagen, September 9, 1942, Israel Police 1260. The goal was 14,000 to 15,000 arrests.

138. Poznanski, *Jews in France*, pp. 290-91. The text of the protest is in Klarsfeld. *Vichy-Auschwitz 1942*, pp. 360-61.

was so adamant in its attitude. After all, he said with reference to the “yellow hat,” anti-Jewish measures were not exactly new to the Church.¹³⁹

Laval implemented his threat. In the Lyon diocese a number of priests were arrested for reading protest declarations to the congregations and for harboring Jewish children on the church grounds.¹⁴⁰ Among the arrested men was the Jesuit Elder Chaillet, the “right hand” of Archbishop Gerlier of Lyon. Chaillet was accused of hiding eighty Jewish children.¹⁴¹

While Laval was fighting off the Church, counterpressure was also applied to him from the United States and Switzerland. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Vichy France persisted through the summer months of 1942, but the relationship was already strained when in August 1942 the Americans watched the preparations of the Vichy regime to return the Jewish refugees to the German Reich. When the delegate of the American Friends Service Committee protested against the impending deportations, he was told by Laval “that these foreign Jews had always been a problem in France and that the French Government was glad that a change in the German attitude toward them gave France an opportunity to get rid of them.” Laval asked the Quaker delegate why the United States did not take these Jews and concluded with “a rather bitter general discussion of the Jewish problem.”¹⁴²

The pressure continued. Donald Lowrie (International Committee, Young Men’s Christian Association) discovered that “in spite of attempted complete secrecy on the part of the police,” plans had been made to deport 10,000 Jews from unoccupied France to Poland.¹⁴³ Armed with this information, the U.S. charge d’affaires protested to Laval, and brought up the separation of 4,000 children between the ages of two and fifteen who had been separated from their parents in concentration camps of the occupied zone. Laval, addressing the Jewish fate, said that the Jews were too numerous in France. Questioning the reports about the chil-

139. Abetz to Foreign Office, August 28, 1942, reporting conversation of August 27 with Laval, NG-4578.

140. Bergen (German Ambassador at the Vatican) to Foreign Office, September 14, 1942, NG-4578. Texts of proclamations by Archbishop of Toulouse, Jules Gérard Salicgc; Archbishop of Lyon, Cardinal J. M. Gerlier; and Bishop of Montauban, Pierre Marie Theas enclosed by BdS/Kommando in Orleans to BdS in Paris/IV J, January 22, 1943, Israel Police 1258.

141. Abetz to Foreign Office, September 2, 1942, NG-5127.

142. Thompson (Second Secretary at Legation in Switzerland, temporarily in France) to Secretary of State Hull, August 7, 1942, *Foreign Relations of the United States ;942*, vol I (general, etc.), pp. 463-64.

143. Lowrie to Tracy Strong (General Secretary, World’s Committee, YMCA), August 10, 1942, Leo Bacck Institute, Konzentrationslagcr Frankreich, AR 1584/3987, folder VI.

dren, he demanded proof.^{144 145} In the United States, Secretary of State Hull informed the charge on September 28 that, subject to the agreement of the Vichy government, the United States was prepared to issue 1,000 visas to children and that 5,000 additional children's visas could be authorized.¹⁴⁶ By then, the concentrated children had been deported.

The government of Switzerland, casting its eyes upon the developments in neighboring France, had a momentary vision of a mass invasion of refugees. As frightened Jews from southern France and prospective Wehrmacht draftees from Alsace-Lorraine began to drift across the border, the federal authorities sent back a few of the Jewish arrivals on the ground that the Jews did not qualify for "political" asylum. Faced with considerable criticism of this action, the chief of the Federal Justice and Police Department declared that "we cannot turn our country into a sponge for Europe and take in for example 80 or 90 percent of the Jewish refugees."¹⁴⁶

While Swiss police were engaged in tightening the frontier, the Swiss Minister in Vichy, Walter Stucki, acting as the delegate of the International Red Cross Committee for France, stepped into the office of Pétain and, pounding the table, delivered his protest to the old French marshal. Pétain is said to have "deplored" the situation, adding that it was a matter of "internal concern." Stucki is reported to have replied that he disagreed and that, under the deportation measures, children were being taken from institutions where they had been cared for by Swiss charity.¹⁴⁷

For the Germans the increasing volume of the deportations created a different problem: the transport of so many Jews was going to be a major expense. A concession was made by the financial division of the Reichsbahn, which issued a directive on July 14, 1942, allowing—in the case of Auschwitz-bound special trains from Holland, Belgium, and France—the group rate of one-half of the regular third class fare for the distance to be covered on Reich territory, with billings and payments to be handled by the official travel bureau (*Mitteleuropäisches Reisebüro*).¹⁴⁸ Neverthe-

144. Tuck to Secretary of State, August 26, 1942, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1942*, vol. II, pp. 710-11.

145. Hull to Tuck, September 28, 1942, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942*, vol. II p. 713.

146. Harrison (U.S. Minister in Switzerland) to Hull, September 5, 1942, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942*, vol. 1, 469-70.

147. Harrison to Hull, September 26, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 472. See also the conversations carried on by French Protestant Pastor Boegner with Bousquet, Darlan, and Laval, in Alexander Werth, *France, 1940-1955* (New York, 1956), pp. 61-62.

148. Reichsbahn/16 to Reichsbahndirktionen Karlsruhe, Cologne, Münster, and Saarbrücken, copies to Hauptreisbahndirktionen in Brussels and Paris, Plenipotentiary in Utrecht, and Amtsrat Stange, July 14, 1942, Case Ganzenmüller, Special Volume IV, pt. III, p. 56.

less, the costs were still considerable. On August 17, 1942, the budget specialist of the Securin' Police in the RSHA, Dr. Siegert, wrote to the Finance Ministry that eighteen trains from France to Auschwitz had cost RM 76,000 to the German border, and RM 439,000 from the border to Auschwitz. A camp in western Germany was actually being planned to reduce such costs. In the meantime the Military Commander in France had declared his willingness to fund the transports to the border, and the Securin' Police itself was advancing the funds for the continuation of the trains on Reich territory in order that there might be no interruption of the "evacuation." Siegert wanted to know how much of the cost should be borne by the Military Commander.¹⁴⁹ At least part of the answer was clear. "The removal of the Jews" (*.Entfernung der Juden*) was a cost of the occupation,¹⁵⁰ and Ministerialdirigent Litter thought that the entire sum should be charged to the Military Commander, but his view was not shared by the majority of his colleagues.¹⁵¹ In the end the Finance Ministry decided that French francs should be made available as occupation costs by the Military Commander for the distances in his domain and that the remaining expense should be paid by the Security Police.¹⁵²

Expenses notwithstanding, the Germans were not wholly satisfied with the pace of the deportations. During an RSHA conference of Jewish experts in Berlin on August 28, 1942, the remark was dropped that other countries were ahead of France in "final solution" matters and that the French sector would have to catch up.¹⁵³ A few days later Untersturmführer Ahnert sent Oberg a compilation of figures which revealed that up to September 2, a total of 18,000 Jews had been deported from the occupied zone and 9,000 from the unoccupied area. Although operations were to be stepped up in September, said Ahnert, the Germans faced an obvious difficulty in the French insistence upon a distinction between French and foreign Jews. It would therefore be necessary to effect at least a French revocation of naturalizations granted to Jews after 1933.¹⁵⁴

During the following few weeks, BdS Knochen talked to French Police Chief Bousquet and to Premier Laval about the possible concentration of

149. Siegert to Finance Ministry, August 17, 1942, German Federal Archives, R 2/12158.

150. Kallenbach via Bender and Bussmann to Ministerialdirigent Litter, August 25, 1942, R 2/12158.

151. Summary of Finance Ministry conference of September 17, 1942, dated September 22, 1942 (signed Litter), R 2/12158.

152. Draft of Kallenbach letter to Himmler, September 28, 1942, R 2/12158.

153. Röthke to Knochen and Lischka, September 1, 1942, RF-1228.

154. Ahnert via Hagen to Oberg, September 3, 1942, RF-1227. The figure of 18,000 for the occupied zone includes the deportation of the 5,000 Jews who had been rounded up in 1941. Schleier to Foreign Office, September 11, 1942, NG-5109.

the Jews of French nationality. The talks were unsuccessful. Pétain was opposed to the deportation of French Jews, and the Vichy bureaucracy was reluctant to act in contravention to Pétain's wish. Higher SS and Police leader Oberg then informed Himmler of the situation. Himmler, backing down, agreed that for the time being no Jews of French nationality were to be deported. All efforts were now to be concentrated on the deportation of those foreign Jews who were protected only by Axis states: the 500 Italian Jews, the 2,000 Hungarian Jews, and the 3,000 Romanian Jews in France.¹⁵⁵

Again the Germans were checked. The negotiations with the Romanians and Hungarians turned out to be a slippery affair. The Romanians would agree to relinquish their Jews, only to turn around and withdraw their consent. When pressured, the Romanian negotiators would agree, subject to prior cooperation by the Hungarians, while the Hungarians insisted that the Romanians move first. In part at least, this reluctance was due to the Italians, who refused to move at all. The German Foreign Office did everything in its power to persuade the Italians to cooperate. From the pen of Unterstaatssekretär Luther flowed letter after letter on the need to do something,¹⁵⁶ but Germany's principal Axis partner remained absolutely firm.

In Paris the Italian Consul General, Dr. Gustavo Orlandini, exacted from Obersturmführer Röthke an agreement that no Italian subject in France would be touched by the Germans without prior Italian consent. In considering such consent the Italian consuls were going to be guided by the Italian "racial laws" and the higher directives received from Rome.¹⁵⁷ And in Rome even the highest circles had no sympathy with the killing of the Jews.

The increasing difficulties encountered with the attempted deportation of Jews holding French or Axis nationalities were reflected in a decreasing number of transports leaving France for the East. Instead of "catching up" with the rest of Europe, the French sector appeared to fall further and further behind. Then, one day at the beginning of November, an event in North Africa shook up the equilibrium. Allied troops had

155. Knochen to RSHA IV-B-4, September 25, 1942, NG-1971. Schleier to Foreign Office, March 13, 1942, in Randolph Braham, cd., *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry* (New York, 1963), p. 67.

156. Luther to Weizsäcker, July 24, 1942, NG-5094. Luther to Weizsäcker and Wormann, September 17, 1942, NG-5093; Luther via Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, October 22, 1942, NG-4960. Only about 500 Italian Jews were living in the occupied zone, "but this," said Luther, "docs not detract from the importance of the question." Luther to Ribbentrop, October 22, 1942, NG-4960.

157. Orlandini to Röthke, August 4, 1942, in Leon Poliakov, cd., *La condition des Juifs en France sous l'occupation italienne* (Paris, 1946), p. 149.

started landings in Morocco and Algiers. The Germans, in a lightning countermove, occupied Vichy France and the Protectorate of Tunisia. The demarcation line had disappeared.

A large new area was now under German control, but newly acquired opportunities were matched by a host of fresh obstacles and barriers. The first of these was the geographic factor. If the SS and Police had been stretched thin in the old occupied zone, there were now tens of thousands of additional square miles to cover. Another obstacle presented itself in the form of the Italian opposition, for if Italian influence was felt in Paris, it was felt much more strongly east of the Rhone and in Tunisia. A third and perhaps the most important difficulty was Vichy's realization that Germany had lost the war.

In Tunisia the German sphere of activity was most restricted. For one thing, the geographic position of the area was forbidding. The Germans knew that, in the event of an Allied breakthrough, they would not be able to evacuate the fighting army from there. How, then, could they ship out 80,000 Tunisian Jews? Besides, Tunisia was Africa, and the "final solution" by its very definition was applicable only to the European continent. These considerations, however, were not going to stop the German bureaucrats from inflicting upon the Tunisian Jews a certain amount of suffering. The bureaucrats were determined to start as quickly as possible, and they proceeded as far as they could.

Tunisia was a military area, and the German forces there were under the command of the *Oberbefehlshaber Süd*, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring in Rome. The first local commander was General Nehring. During the first month (to December 9, 1942) the setup was thus a simple one. By December 10, German forces in Tunisia had been built up to a point that permitted the establishment of the Fifth Panzer Army, commanded by von Arnim. This army was joined by another one retreating into Tunisia from Libya, the Panzer Army Africa under Rommel. By February 23, 1943, the two armies were placed under an army group, and this organization remained to the end:

OB Süd:
Kesselring
|
Panzer Group Africa:
Rommel
(succeeded on March 8 by
his deputy von Arnim)

5di Pz. Army Pz. Army Africa
von Vaerst Messe (Italian)

Although the generals were in control of the situation, they were not alone. The Foreign Office was represented by one of its troubleshooters. Minister Rahn; the SS and Police had sent down an Einsatzkommando under Ostubaf. Rauff; the French still had their Resident General, Admiral Esteva; and the Tunisians still had their Bey.

As soon as the German army was established in Tunisia, the Einsatzkommando arrested the Jewish community leaders. The arrest had hardly been made when an order was received from Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring to mobilize Jewish labor for fortification work. The local commander, General der Panzertruppen Nehring, now conferred with Minister Rahn, Resident General Esteva, and the SS men to find a way of implementing the order. It was decided that the Jewish community leaders would have to be freed in order to organize the labor service. To kill two birds with one stone, it was also decided to levy on the Jewish community a 20,000,000-franc "fine" as a condition for the release.¹⁵⁸ Since, according to the official report, "international Jewry" was responsible for the Anglo-American attack on North Africa, the money was handed over to a mixed Arab-Italian-French committee for immediate assistance to bombed-out people.¹⁵⁹ The released Jewish leaders were then made responsible, upon penalty of death, for the creation of the labor service.

The order, issued by Nehring on December 6, 1942, specified that the Jewish leaders were to select the manpower and that the Jewish communities were to furnish equipment and food for the men. The labor columns were to be detailed to the German commanders in Bizerte, Tunis-North, and Tunis-South for work on the main defense line (*Hauptkampflinie*).¹⁶⁰ Italian Jews had to be excepted upon protest of the Italian Consul General.¹⁶¹ The laborers numbered 3,000 initially, some 4,500 by January, and 2,500 by mid-March.¹⁶² In addition, the Italians employed about 1,000 Jews, but the Italian regime appears to have been more benign.¹⁶³

The Germans in Tunisia were not able to proceed beyond the forced

158. Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben* (Düsseldorf, 1949), pp. 203-4. Testimony by Rahn, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 17578-79.

159. Rahn to Foreign Office, December 22, 1942, NG-2676.

160. Order by Nehring, forwarded to Rahn, December 6, 1942, NG-2271. Rahn to Foreign Office, December 6, 1942, NG-2099. Nehring was a former Afrika Korps commander.

161. OKH/ChefGcnSt (signed Pomsch) to Rahn, with copy for 5rh Pz. Armv/Ia, December 9, 1942, NG-2360. Rahn to Foreign Office, Dec 11, 1942, NG-3150. The Italian Consul General in Tunisia was Giacomo Silimbani.

162. Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler*, pp. 234-36. Rauff dealt with the Jewish Community in this matter.

163. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

labor system. The Wehrmacht Propaganda Office of the OKW wanted the propaganda platoon in Tunisia to foment pogroms and the looting of Jewish stores, but Minister Rahn took a dim view of these instructions. He thought them unenforceable until such time as German troops stood "at least" at the Algerian border.¹⁶⁴

On the island of Djerba, off the eastern coast of Tunisia, the Germans managed to present to the Jews a parting gift. Some 4,500 Jews were living in two ancient ghettos there. A major in charge of the Kommandantur on the island is said to have approached the chief rabbi of the principal ghetto, the Hara Khebira, and demanded the deliver) within two hours of 50 kilograms of gold under threat of bombardment by two German planes. The major departed with 47 kilograms, leaving the community impoverished.¹⁶⁵

The Tunisian expedition was at an end. The 80,000 Jews were left there, benumbed by the German cyclone that had touched them.

While in Africa the Germans were confined to looting and labor exploitation, they hoped to accomplish something more in the newly occupied regions of metropolitan France. The Higher SS and Police leader, Brigadeführer Oberg, sent his Einsatzkommandos south. On the river Rhone he discovered an obstacle: a large area east of the river was occupied by Italian troops. Acting under the assumption that the Italian forces were under German command, Oberg asked Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, the Oberbefehlshaber West, to "pave the way" with the Italians for his Einsatzkommandos. Rundstedt, however, had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Italian divisions were under the command of the Italian Fourth Army, stationed in Turin.¹⁶⁶ In the new Italian occupation zone, the Jews were to enjoy complete sanctuary, and as the Germans turned toward the Pyrenees, Spain too became a place of refuge for some Jews.¹⁶⁷

The Germans now attempted to bring down as many police forces as could be scraped up on a moment's notice. The 3,000 men of the Order

164. Rahn to Foreign Office, December 22, 1942, NG-2676. Testimony by Rahn, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 17583-84. The SS and Police in Paris contacted the embassy with a similar request that a clandestine radio station, under control of the embassy, broadcast in Arab dialects to North Africa with a view to inciting natives to riot against the Jews and American occupation authorities. Schleier to Foreign Office, November 24, 1942, NG-57.

165. Mane Katz (Paris painter), "Bei den Juden von Djerba" *Aufbau* (New York), September 3, 1954, p. 9.

166. Oberg to Himmler, November 16, 1942, NO-3085.

167. Abetz to von Krug in Vichy, November 14, 1942, Schleier to embassy's Vichy branch, November 20, 1942, NG-3192. The small state of Andorra, wedged in the Pyrenees, was reported to be filled with Jewish refugees. *Die Judenfrage*, April 15, 1943, p. 136.

Police stretched out from the Belgian frontier to the Mediterranean were reinforced by a police regiment under Colonel Griese, and by January' 1943 another 2,000 men with heavy weapons were on their way.^{168 169}

Pressure was then exerted upon the chief of die French police, Bousquet, for his full cooperation. Bousquet appeared to agree. "The French police," reported Himmler, "are prepared to collect the Jews within the prefectures, from which we could then transport them to the East."¹⁷⁰ As if to show its good faith in the matter, the Vichy regime "of its own accord" forbade Jewish travel in the newly occupied zone and ordered identity' and food ration cards to be stamped with the /. The German Embassy, however, was afraid that without Italian cooperation east of the Rhone River the Jews would simply wander off from the German to the Italian occupation zone.¹⁷⁰ From the end of 1942 to the summer of 1943, therefore, the Germans attempted to secure the collaboration of their Axis partner. They failed.

On December 4,1942, the *Comando Supremo* in Rome had assured the German military attache that all Jews in the newly occupied Italian zone would be interned.¹⁷¹ The French prefects, in possession of their own orders to round up the Jews, attempted to proceed. Within a matter of weeks the Vichy authorities were confronted by a solid wall of opposition on the part of the Fourth Italian Army, the Italian Armistice Commission, and the Italian Foreign Office itself. French Police Chief Bousquet now turned around and handed to the Germans a written note of the Italian government dated December 20, 1942. In that note the Italians had expressed their protest against the attempt by the French prefect of Alps Maritime (Marcel Ribière) to intern Jewish refugees in his area.¹⁷² The prefecture, which contained the coastal cities of Menton, Nice, and Cannes, had a total population of about 22,000 Jews. In the wake of this Italian intervention, the controversy was shifted to the German Embassy in Rome for an airing with the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano.

On January 16,1943, Ambassador von Mackensen explained to Ciano the German "viewpoint" on the question of the treatment of the Jews in the occupied West. Ciano listened carefully and remarked that he person-

168. Dalucge to Wolff, February 28,1943, NO-2861.

169. Himmler to Ribbentrop, January 1943, NO-1893.

170. Schleier to Foreign Office, January 15, 1943, NG-3453. Staf. Knochen via Sriilpnagel to Gfm. von Rundstedt, February 3,1943, NG-2268.

171. OKW/WFSt/Qu via RSHA to OGruf. Wolff and Ambassador Ritter, December 4, 1942, NO-1118.

172. Schleier to Foreign Office, January 23,1943, NG-4959. Knochen via Stülpnagel to Rundstedt, February 3, 1943, NG-2268. See also Carpi, *Bet»»een Mussolini and Hitler*, pp. 87 ff''. The prefectural order affected the Jews who had entered France after 1937.

ally could understand the German viewpoint and that he shared it basically; however, the implementation of these measures touched a great many other agencies and would raise various questions. In view of these complications, Ciano suggested that the matter could be discussed at some other time by subordinates.¹⁷³ The issue was to be brought up again, but on the highest level.

The occasion for the new German move was a report received from the French *Intendant de Police* at Lyon, on February 20, 1943, about his attempt to implement a Vichy order for the arrest of 200 to 300 Jews in the regional prefecture of Lyon. The Jews were to be brought to an internment camp in order to be transported from there to Auschwitz "for labor." The Italian general in Grenoble protested against the order and demanded the release of the Jews. The police intendant was forced to comply. When Standartenführer Knochen saw this report, he wrote to Gestapo chief Müller: "I want to point out again that the French government, which approaches the solution of the Jewish question unwillingly enough, is actually strengthened in this attitude by the measures of the Italian administration." The Italian area was already "flooded" with Jews, and rumors had been received of Italian intentions to permit not only illegal departures to Switzerland but emigration to Italy itself.¹⁷⁴

On February 25, 1943, Ribbentrop himself produced the intendant's report in a conference with Mussolini. The Italian leader remarked that he was aware of the "radical" German position in the Jewish question. Ribbentrop replied that the Jews had to be evacuated. Now he realized that in "military circles" German as well as Italian, the Jewish problem was not fully appreciated. That was the only explanation he could offer for the Comando Supremo's cancellation of the French order in the Italian zone. At this point Mussolini broke in to contest the accuracy of the report. He attempted to trace it to the "French tactics of causing dissension between Germany and Italy." The Jews, thought Mussolini, had been concentrated in the Italian area, but the Foreign Minister was right in saying that military people did not understand these things. The military had a special education and mentality of their own. Ribbentrop then came back to the "Jewish danger" asserting that the retention of 100,000 Jews in the area was equivalent to the introduction there of 100,000 secret service agents.¹⁷⁵

One week after this discussion, another incident occurred. After an

173. Von Mackensen to Foreign Office, (Januar)' 16,1943, NG-5459.

174. Knochen to Müller, February 22, 1943, in Poliakov, *La condition des Juifs en France sous Voccupation italienne*, pp. 150-52. Note by Bergmann (Foreign Office), February 24, 1943, NG-4956.

175. Summary of Mussolini-Ribbentrop conference, held on February 25, 1943, in the presence of Bastianini, Alficri, and von Mackensen, February 27,1943, D-734.

attack on two German officers in Paris, the French police were requested to make available 2,000 Jews for a “penance” transport to the East. The French *gendarmarie* arrested Jews in various towns, including Grenoble and Annecy in the Italian zone. In the Grenoble area the Italian army promptly “blockaded” the hundred arrested Jews to prevent their departure. At Annecy Italian troops surrounded the French *gendarmarie* barracks and forced the release of the Jews who were held captive there.¹⁷⁶

On March 18, 1943, Ambassador von Mackensen approached Mussolini with the new evidence of Italian interference. Mussolini thanked him for the documents and pointed out that if his generals had made difficulties, it had happened because their “mode of thinking” prevented them from comprehending the scope of all these measures. This was to be taken not as an expression of bad intentions but simply as the “logical consequence of their mode of blinking.” To remove the possibility of any harder difficulties, the chief of the Comando Supremo, Colonel General Ambrosio, would receive orders not to allow any interference with the French police.¹⁷⁷

During the next twenty-four hours Mussolini instituted what seemed at first glance to be major changes in the Italian occupied zone. He transferred jurisdiction in Jewish matters from the Italian Army to the Interior Ministry in Rome. The ministry established a Commissariat for Jewish Questions in Nice and appointed as commissar a police inspector with general rank: *bo* Spinoso. Italian *gendarmarie* detailed to his command were constituted into a *Polizia Razziale* (racial police). Lo Spinoso was an experienced police officer who had served at the Italian consulate in Nice for twelve years before the war. He knew how to carry out his assignment.¹⁷⁸

Lo Spinoso’s task, as given to him by Mussolini on March 19, 1943, was the removal of all Jews from the coastal area to the interior within a month. A day after receiving these instructions, Lo Spinoso and Colonel Cremese of the General Staff met with the operations officer of the Fourth Army in the Italian zone, General Trabucchi. On that occasion, Cremese said that the purpose of the operation was to save the Jews.¹⁷⁹

Officially, the Jews were assigned to *residenza forzata* (forced residence) in easily guarded towns. The “dangerous” elements among the Jews were to be incarcerated in a concentration camp at Sospello. However, when Ambassador von Mackensen inquired at the Italian Foreign Office what would happen to all these Jews after they were concentrated,

176. Radmacher and Bergmann to Pol. II, March 3, 1943, NG-5087.

177. Report by von Mackensen, undated, NG-2242.

178. Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler*, p. 141.

179. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-44.

“that is, whether it was intended to ship them off?” the Italian official, Bastianini, replied that “this was not being considered at present.”¹⁸⁰

Bastianini’s remark was an indication of the manner in which the Italians were going to proceed in the matter. Early in April, Lo Spinoso detailed Lieutenant Malfatti of the Italian Embassy in Paris to discuss some problems with BdS Knochen. Standartenführer Knochen refused to deal with Malfatti. Indignantly he wrote to Müller of the Gestapo that he had declined “to enter into a discussion about this, after all, quite important problem with a first lieutenant [*dieses immerhin wichtige Problem mit einem Oberleutnant zu erörtern*]?”¹⁸¹

In May the Germans were disconcerted by a report that Lo Spinoso’s chief assistant was a half-Jew. The assistant, Donati, was a man who during World War I had served as a liaison officer between the French and Italian armies and who was later the manager of the Franco-Italian Bank in Paris. “Donati,” reported Obersturmführer Röthke, “is possibly even a full Jew [*möglicherweise sogar ein Volljude*]” and “maintains excellent relations with Italian officers.”¹⁸²

Subsequent discoveries made the Germans more and more uneasy. The elusive Lo Spinoso did not wish to confer with the Germans. On one occasion in July the chief of the Einsatzkommando in Marseille, Stubaf. Mühler, had to content himself with an interview of Tommaso Luceri, Vice-Questor of the Race Police, who promptly declared that in Jewish questions he was powerless to make any decisions. The Race Police, said Luceri, had registered 22,000 Jews in the coastal area of the Italian zone; these Jews were now on their way to forced residence in Megeve, St. Gervais, Castellane, and other places. To Mühler these towns sounded like “famous resorts.” The Italians, he concluded, were not serious; they revealed their pro-Jewish attitude “quite openly.” Thus the French police had been forced again and again to release Jews who had already been arrested, and so on.¹⁸³

To the Security Police in Paris the chief villain in this situation seemed to be Donati. Accordingly, a plan was laid for kidnapping him from Nice

180. Report by von Mackensen on conference of March 20, 1943, with Bastianini, NG-2242. Also: Italian liaison officer with OB West (Div. Gen. Marazzani) to Stubaf. Hagen, March 19, 1943, in Poliakov, *La condition des Juifs en France sous l'occupation italienne*, p. 154. OStuf. Moritz (Einsatzkommando Marseille) to OStuf. Röthke, May 26, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 156. Stubaf. MuchlroefEkdo. Marseille to BdS IV-B, July 10, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 161.

181. Knochen to Müller, April 8, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 155.

182. OStuf. Moritz (Marseille) to Röthke, May 26, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 156. Röthke to Knochen, May 27, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 160. On Donati, an Italian Jew, see Klarsfeld, *Vichy-Auschwitz, 1943-1944*, pp. 132, 407.

183. Mühler to BdS IV-B, July 10, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 161.

to Marseille. The plot did not succeed, because the German agents, who were under instructions to proceed with “the utmost care,” could not grab their victim before he flew to Rome on a business trip.¹⁸⁴

The Germans were completely stymied in the Italian occupation zone, and thousands of Jews found complete sanctuary there until the day of the Italian collapse. In the rest of France the continued German dependence upon the French police assured to the French Jews, both native-born and naturalized, a measure of immunity. Even among the stateless and foreign Jews there were privileged categories.

The Germans did whatever they could to cut down these protected groups. For instance, on March 19 Office IV-B of the BdS transmitted to the police prefecture of Paris a request to deport from a list of 720 Jewish for workers those whose nationality made them eligible for arrest. In the same communication the Security Police demanded the seizure of foreign Jews employed by the UGIF.¹⁸⁵ Some Iranian Jews attempted to stave off deportation by claiming that they belonged only to the Jewish religion and not to the Jewish race. In a two-and-a-half page letter Eichmann explained to the Foreign Office that the Jewish problem in Iran dated from the “case Esther” (*der Fall Esther*), that in the seventeenth century the Jews of Iran had been marked red and segregated, and that under the Militärbefehlshaber’s decree of March 24, 1942, all those were to be considered Jews who belonged to the Jewish community.¹⁸⁶ During this period of scraping the bottom of the barrel, the Foreign Office bureaucrats in Paris and Vichy did not hesitate to attempt the deportation of a seventy-five-year-old Jew, Edward Leyba, who was a native of Dutch Curasao and who was now the charge d’affaires of Paraguay. Only fear for the safety of “Germandom in Paraguay” restrained the German Foreign Office from violating the law of diplomatic immunity by “shoving” this man “off” or “rendering” him “harmless.”¹⁸⁷

The occupation of Vichy France had not been a true breakthrough, since the increased opportunities for pressure had been offset by new obstacles. There had been no “catching up” in France. Instead, the Ger-

184. Rothke to RSHAIV-B-4, September 26, 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 163-65.

185. BdS in France IV-B to police prefecture of Paris, March 19, 1943, Occ 17.

186. Eichmann to Klengenfbss, December 8, 1942, Israel Police 321. Very few of the oriental Jews were eventually deported. See Klarsfeld, *Memorial*, for names, and the article by Warren Green, “The Fate of Oriental Jews in Vichy France,” *Wiener Library Bulletin* 32(1979): 40-50. See also two personal accounts: Ix’vi Eligulashvili, on Georgian Jew s, “How the Jews of Gruzija in Occupied France were Saved,” and Asaf Atchildi (physician born in Samarkand), “Rescue of Jews of Bukharan, Iranian and Afghan Origin in Occupied France (1940-1944),” in *Tad Vashem Studies* 6 (1967): 251-55, 257-81. On the other hand, Jews born in North Africa, Svria, and Turkey were regularly deported. See list in Klarsfeld, *Memorial*.

187. Schleier to Foreign Office, January 31, 1943, NG-3377.

man Security Police in Paris had fallen further and further behind. The statistics of deportations reveal the full extent of the situation in France compared to the state of affairs in the much smaller Netherlands to the north. By December 31, 1942, 41,911 Jews had been deported from France, and 38,511 from the Netherlands. Three months later, the figures were 49,906 and 52,343, respectively.¹⁸⁸

The slowness of German progress gave hope to the UGIF's acting president, Lambert. In April 1943 he turned down the suggestion of an associate that the Jews of Marseille be warned to scatter.¹⁸⁹ Relying on French law and honor, Lambert concentrated on effecting the release of individual Jews from custody until, one day, he was arrested himself. From Drancy he then wrote letters to an assistant, making a veiled reference to Auschwitz and urging that Jewish children in UGIF shelters be dispersed.¹⁹⁰

In German eyes the major stumbling block was the reluctance of Vichy authorities to cooperate in the deportation of Jews who had French nationality. When two transports were scheduled for 2,000 Jews, 1,500 of whom were French nationals (albeit with "delicts"), Leguay declared upon orders of his superior, Bousquet, that "in this case" (*in diesem Fall*) the French police was asking to be excused from participating in the operation. Sturmbannführer Hagen thought this attitude "odd" (*verwunderlich*), since, after all, Jews were involved (*da es sich doch um Juden handele*).¹⁹¹

188. Report by Korherr, April 19, 1943, NO-5193. The Korherr report specifies "occupied France." However, a figure of 49,000 is given for all of France in a report by Röthke, dated March 6, 1943, RF-1230. In July, Röthke's figure was 52,000, including about 12,000 persons from the unoccupied zone before its occupation. Memorandum by Röthke, July 21, 1943, Israel Police 664.

189. Cohen, *The Burden of Conscience*, p. 127.

190. Letters to Maurice Brener, October 10 and 26, 1943, in Lambert, *Carnet d'un témoin*, pp. 241-42, 244-45. See also Cohen, "Diary of Lambert," *Jewish Social Studies* 43 (1981): 304-5. The left Jewish underground publication *J'accuse* had called attention to gas on October 20, 1942. In its December 25, 1942, issue it called Poland a *vaste abattoir des juifs*. Texts in Stéphane Courtois and Adam Rayski, *Qui savait quoi?* (Paris, 1987), pp. 155, 162. Its credibility, however, was low. Susan Zuccotri, *The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews* (New York, 1993), p. 149.

191. Hagen to Knochen and Oberg, March 25, 1943, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, pp. 190-91, and Yad Vashem 0-9/23. The conversation took place on March 22. There was a French administration in Drancy under Police Commissar Guibert. Röthke to Lischka and Hagen, March 23, 1943, Yad Vashem 0-9/23. A Jewish Order Service had been functioning in Drancy since September 1942. After June 30, 1943, the French administration withdrew from the camp entirely. The Order Service became the principal guard force, and the UGIF was responsible for provisioning. The new regime in Drancy coincided with the arrival of Hauptsturmführer Brunner (Vienna, Berlin, and Greece). Haft, *The Bargain and the*

On June 18, 1943, Standartenführer Knochen presented himself to Marshal Petain's private physician and confidante, Dr. Mcnetrel, and complained that the French government was hindering the implementation of the evacuations. Knochen said he was under the impression that the marshal "did not agree" with the solution of the Jewish problem. Menetrel replied that the marshal wished a solution in the form that Jews of the younger generation would be deprived of ever' opportunity to serve in important posts in France. One had to understand that, at his age, the marshal naturally preferred a "humane" solution to a "radical" one. He would not therefore like to throw out all the Jews from their jobs in order to let them perish from hunger (*um sie evtl, vor Hunger krepieren zu lassen*). Menetrel added "privately" that on his part he "admired" the German resolution to carry out the "final uprooting of Jewry."¹⁹²

Before the end of June, Laval and Justice Minister Gabolde signed a draft of a decree canceling naturalizations granted to Jews since August 10, 1927. Knochen, whose Security Police forces numbered little more than 2,000,¹⁹³ immediately asked for 250 additional men with "some language ability" (*einige Sprachkenntnisse*) with a view to making arrests "suddenly" (*schlagartig*) on the day of the decree's proclamation. ¹⁹⁴ He had made his request too soon. When the French heard of the German plan to seize the newly eligible Jews immediately, Laval declared to Sturmbannführer Hagen that he could not expose himself to the charge of issuing decrees to drive Jews into the hands of the Germans (*Er könne sich den Vorwurf nicht aussetzen, dass er Gesetze erlasse, um uns Juden zuzutreiben*).¹⁹⁵

On August 14, Hauptsturmführer Geissler and Obersturmführer Röthke met with Laval in Vichy to discuss the issue once more. The French Premier now claimed that he did not know what he had been signing, that he had not dreamed that the Germans were planning to arrest the denaturalized Jews en masse, that a law of such gravity would have to have the consent of the Council of Ministers, that Marshal Petain would have to approve it, that in the last analysis nothing could be done

Bridle, pp. 80-91, and her "L'Union Generale," *Contemporary French Civilization* 5 (1981): 267-69.

192. Memorandum by Stubaf. Hagen, June 21,1943, Occ 21.

193. Numerical compilation of civil personnel outside the Reich, spring 1943, listing 2,047 Security Police men in France. Zentralarchiv Potsdam, Collection 07.01 Reichskanzlei, Folder 3511.

194. Knochen to Müller, June 28,1943, Israel Police 1217. The Gestapo chief in a very cordial letter promised one officer and three noncommissioned officers. Müller to Knochen, July 2,1943, Israel Police 1218.

195. Memorandum by Hagen, August 11, 1943, in Klarsfeld, *Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, p. 209.

so long as there was opposition from the Italians, and that even without the Italians the law after its promulgation would have to be held in abeyance for three months to give individual Jews a chance to appeal.

When the German negotiators heard these arguments, they concluded that the French government “no longer wished to follow” them in the Jewish question. With unmistakable clarity Laval had told them that he was neither “anti-Semitic” nor “pro-Semitic.” The Germans had enough insight to understand that remark. “It is no longer possible” they concluded, “to count on any large-scale help from the French police for the arrest of the Jews, unless, a few days or weeks from now, the military situation in Germany changes radically in our favor.”¹⁹⁶

The military situation did not exactly change in Germany’s favor. At the beginning of September Italy surrendered to the Allies, and the Germans were left as the undisputed though overextended masters of all France. Within a matter of days the Security Police swept over the zone vacated by the Italians. Thousands of Jews were caught in Nice. Several hundred families who had taken refuge in Monaco left their sanctuary in fear of a German invasion. Many of these victims walked to their undoing as they tried to reach the frontiers of Switzerland or Spain.¹⁹⁷ Several hundred Jews who had taken refuge across the Alps in Italy were rounded up in Borgo San Dalmazzo, transported to Nice, and from there to Drancy. Commingled with other victims, they were sent on to Auschwitz.¹⁹⁸

Notwithstanding the temporary flare-up of activity in the former Italian zone, the German machinery of destruction in France was forced to slow down by an emergence of formidable barriers. Because of the increasing French reluctance to cooperate in arrests and seizures, the German police were gradually forced to rely upon their own resources. Raids were staged on arbitrary targets without much regard for the nature of the victims. One of these raids was described in some detail by the KdS in Lyon. In the early morning hours of April 6, 1944, Security Police in the Lyon sector had forced their way into the children’s home in Izieu-Ain

196. Rothke to Knochen, August 15, 1943, in Poliakov, *Harvest of Hate*, pp. 178-81, fn. Also, Pierre Laval, *Diary*, p. 96.

197. Between the Security Police and the Foreign Office a long correspondence ensued about the advisability of conducting seizures within Monaco: Von Thadden to Henck, September 21, 1943, NG-4978. Stoengrachr to Consulate General in Monaco, September 23, 1943, NG-4978. Von Thadden to Eichmann, October 25, 1943, NG-4978. German Consul General in Monte Carlo (signed Hellenthal) to Foreign Office, July 14, 1944, NG-4964. From the summer of 1942 to the end of the occupation in 1944, a maximum of 7,500 Jews escaped to or through Spain. Haim Avni, *Spain, the Jews, and Franco* (Philadelphia, 1982), pp. 94-147. Switzerland registered 21,858 Jewish escapees from France, Italy, and Germany. Alfred Hasler, *The Lifeboat Is Full* (New York, 1967), p. 332.

198. Alberto Cavaglion, *Nella nottestraniera* (Cunco, 1981).

and had moved out with fifty-one persons, including five women and forty-one children between the ages of three and thirteen. Cash or other valuables, according to the report, could not be secured.¹⁹⁹

While the Germans thus stepped into the open, the Jews, with the aid of French organizations, began to submerge.²⁰⁰ The growing tendency of the Jews not to move blindly to their death is illustrated by an incident reported by a sergeant of the Order Police who guarded a transport to Auschwitz. At Lerouville, reported the policeman, nineteen Jews had jumped off the train during the night. By way of self-defense, he pointed out that these Jews were the same ones who had previously tried to tunnel their way out of the Drancy transit camp. Those men, the report continued, should have been entrained without their clothes. The date of the report was December 3, 1943.²⁰¹

The increasing recalcitrance of the French administration and the organized submersion by masses of Jews finally resulted in a German decision to employ all the available forces of the Security Police for an all-out drive against the remaining Jews. This final phase of the French deportations was inaugurated with an order signed by the BdS, Standartenführer Knochen, and Hauptsturmführer Brunner on April 14, 1944, a little more than four months before the Germans lost France. The order directed the seizure of all Jews of French nationality save only those in mixed marriages. The targets of the raids were to be children's homes, prisons, labor camps, and—in residential areas—city blocks and whole villages. Significantly, the order cautioned the police raiders not to advertise their arrival in prisons and camps under French control lest the French release or transfer the inmates before the Germans could get there.

The Jews in mixed marriages were to take the place of deportable Jews in camps of the Organisation Todt. To get at the Jews in hiding, rewards were to be paid to Frenchmen who revealed hideouts or brought in victims. The amount of the reward was to be higher in the city than in the country. Payments were to be made, after seizure, from the effects of the arrested Jews. The guarding of the people who were rounded up and their transport to Drancy was to be accomplished with special care, for in

199. KdS Lyon IV-B (signed OStuf. Barbie) to BdS Paris IV-B, April 6, 1944, RF-1235.

200. Marie Syrkin, *Blessed Is the Match* (Philadelphia, 1947), pp. 294-95, 301. Kaplan, *American Jewish Tear Book* 47 (1945-46): 97-98. *Einsatzkommando* Marseille (signed Stubaf. Mühlcr) to BdS IV-B, November 18, 1943, Occ 20. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France*, pp. 127-36. On deportations from Marseille, see Donna Ryan, *The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille* (Chicago, 1996), pp. 176-206.

201. Meister der Schupo Friedrich Köhnlein (5./PI. Wachbarl. V) to OStuf Röthke, December 3, 1943, Occ 19.

the past most transports arriving at the transit camp had lost one or two Jews on the way. To prevent escapes, Knochen and Brunner recommended that the Jews be tied to each other with a long rope.²⁰²

When the last German drive was launched, Jews by the tens of thousands were hiding in Paris, sleeping in die Metro, under bridges, on roofs, and in dilapidated houses.²⁰³ Yet another 30,000 were still living openly in the city', many of them dependent on UGIF welfare.²⁰⁴ At the same time about 1,500 children were still kept by the UGIF in its care, and on July 21, Brunner caught 300 of them.²⁰⁵

More than 6,000 Jews were deported in the final phase. Three of the transports left during the interval between June 6, when the Allied invasion of France began, and the fall of Paris to the Allies in late August. The Germans had done what they could.

Counting the two zones, and the departements incorporated into the occupied Belgian area, the cumulative number of deportees was over 75,000, or nearly a fourth of the resident and refugee Jewish population that was in France during the summer of 1940. Two-thirds of those who were deported had been seized in the northern zone; half of all the victims had been rounded up in Paris itself. Considering the distribution of Jewish inhabitants at the time when the deportations began, these basic figures indicate that Jewish vulnerability was slightly higher in the north than in the south.

At least two-thirds of the deportees were foreign-born people who did not possess French citizenship. Their nationalities were Polish, German, Russian, Romanian, Greek, Turkish, Hungarian, and so forth. The remaining third comprised French-born children of foreign and stateless Jews; naturalized Frenchmen; and old established citizens of France.

In the total, men outnumbered women four to three. Children under thirteen were barely 9 percent, adolescents aged 13-18 somewhat fewer than 6 percent of the deportees. Two-thirds of die deported children were on transports in 1942; by contrast most of the older people over 59 were sent out in 1943 and 1944. Even though children had been specific targets of German and French pursuers from the beginning, they were also the beneficiaries of clandestine efforts by French and Jewish protectors at the end. Noteworthy is the fact that the percentage of children among the deportees was lower in France than in neighboring Belgium.

It would be difficult to establish a breakdown according to income,

202. Order by Knochen and Brunner, April 14,1944, NO-1411.

203. Statement by Margarct Schachnowslcy, January 1965, Yad Vashem Oral History 2334/209. Deponent, a Socialist German woman married to a Jew, ran a canteen in Paris.

204. Cohen, *The Burden of Conscience*, p. 98.

205. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

possessions, or wealth, but under any definition the poor and impoverished Jews were clearly a heavily disproportionate majority among the victims. The nature of the July 1942 roundup in Paris; the deportations from forced residences, labor companies, and camps; the arrests in shelters of the UGIF, and on the premises of UGIF offices where people stepped in to seek welfare payments; all point to a selection process that invariably began and often ended with the seizure of the most helpless elements of the community. Foreign and stateless Jews tended to be poorer at any rate, and those who had been the last to arrive in France were frequently the first to go.

The principal destination of the deportees was Auschwitz, which received 69,000. Lublin (Majdanek) obtained 2,000, Sobibor 2,000, Kaunas close to 1,000, and Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen several hundred each. Fewer than 3,000 survived.

Not to be forgotten are more than 3,000 Jews who died in France. Some 2,500 of the deaths occurred in camps, notably Gurs, where the toll was over 1,000. Another thousand Jews were shot, some as hostages. In addition, there were deaths as a result of privation and suicide outside of the French camp network, and in North Africa.²⁰⁶

The toll did not impress Reichsstatthalter Mutschmann of Saxony, who wrote a letter to Himmler on July 25, 1944, in which he referred to a press report to the effect that Jews had turned up in portions of Normandy occupied by the American and British armies. Mutschmann expressed his "astonishment" (*bin tatsächlich erschrocken darüber*) that there could still be Jews in France after all the years of German occupation. These Jews, continued the Reichsstatthalter, should have been removed a long time ago. So long as a single Jew was still living in Europe, wrote Mutschmann in his letter to Himmler, partisans, criminals, and saboteurs would always have leaders in the back of the German front.²⁰⁷ The embarrassed Himmler could only reply that the total removal of the Jews from France was "extremely difficult" because of the "very strained relations" (*sehr misslichen Verhältnisse*) with the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber there. However, continued Himmler in the same paragraph, in Hungary the SS was having much more success and was still continuing the operation.²⁰⁸

In Holland the Germans had deported more than three-fourths of all the Jews; in France the statistics were exactly reversed. Stalled in their efforts to effect a total deportation of the French Jews, the Germans threw themselves on the property of the community. In that area the German admin-

206. All the data are taken from Klarsfeld, *Memorial*.

207. Mutschmann to Himmler, July 25, 1944, NO-2779.

208. Himmler to Mutschmann, July 31, 1944, NO-2778.

istration was a little more successful, for while many Jews were able to hide themselves, they could not also hide their property'. In brief, the confiscatory' operation may be divided into three parts. It began with a hunt for art treasures, expanded into a seizure of furniture, and ended with a sequestration of liquid funds.

The collection of art may be traced to an order issued as early as June 1940, by Hitler.²⁰⁹ Art collection was in fact one of the original tasks of Ambassador Abetz.²¹⁰ The embassy staff, in cooperation with the *Devisenschutzkommando* and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, was conducting searches for art objects left behind by wealthy Jews who had fled the country.²¹¹ In the course of these operations some choice objects turned up, to the discomfiture of Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, as decorations in the offices of the Paris Embassy.^{212 213} Of the treasures which went to the Reich, some of the finest items were picked by Goring and Hitler for their personal collections.²¹² At the other end of the scale, unwanted items were to be disposed of by the Finance Ministry, which had "experience" in such matters.²¹⁴ The bulk of the loot was kept in storage, to be catalogued and studied by Rosenberg's experts.²¹⁵

As in the case of the property confiscations in Holland, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg moved from art collecting into the furniture business. All apartments that had been vacated by departed and deported Jews were to be cleaned out with "the least possible fuss" (*möglichst wenig Aufhehen*) by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.²¹⁶ The final report of the western office of

209. Keitel to Gcn.d.Art. Bockelberg, June 30, 1940, RF-1301.

210. Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, July 22, 1940, NG-1719. Ribbentrop to Keitel, August 3, 1940, PS-3614. Abetz to von Brauchitsch, August 16, 1940, NG-90.

211. Abetz to Major Hartmann of the Devisenschutzkommando, September 10, 1940, NG-2849. Memorandum by Galliske (Devisenschutzkommando), March 19, 1941, NG-4091. Zcitschel to BdS and OSruf. Danneckcr, June 20, 1941, NG-2851. Zeitschel to Gesandter Schleier, July 29, 1941, NG-2855. Schleier to Foreign Office, April 26, 1943, NG-3452. Report by Einsatzstab Rosenberg (signed Bereichsleiter Scholz) on art seizures, July, 1944, PS-1015-B.

212. Schleier to Foreign Office, July 31, 1942, NG-2970. Weizsäcker to Ministerialdirektor Schroder (Foreign Office personnel division), October 1, 1942, NG-2971.

213. Dr. Bunjcs (Einsatzstab Rosenberg) to Staatsrat Turner (military' district, Paris), February 1941, PS-2523. Rosenberg to Hitler, March 20, 1941, PS-14. Goring to Rosenberg, Mary 30, 1942, PS-1015-1. Rosenberg to Hitler, April 16, 1943, PS-15.

214. Mayer to Patzer, March 26, 1941, NG-4063.

215. Report by Scholz, July 1944, PS-1015-B.

216. Schleier to Foreign Office, copy via Strack to Abetz, January' 30, 1942, NG-5018. Schleier to Foreign Office, February 6, 1942, NG-3444. Schleier to Foreign Office, February 10, 1942, NG-3444. Luther via Rintelcn to Ribbentrop, May 19, 1942, NG-5018. Von Russenheim (Reich Chancellery) to Foreign Office,

the Einsatzstab reveals that 71,619 Jewish apartments had been seized, 38,000 of them in Paris. To crate all this furniture for shipment to Germany, the office drew upon Paris shippers, who made available daily up to 150 vans and 1,200 to 1,500 French workers. However, "sabotage" on the part of the French personnel was so great that the Einsatzstab hit upon the idea of employing 700 Jews for the sorting, packing, and loading operations. To prevent sabotage by French, Belgian, and Dutch railway workers, the Einsatzstab induced the *Reichsbahn* to supply German personnel. A total of 29,436 carloads was moved out in 735 freight trains for distribution to the following recipients:²¹⁷

Cities and Gaue	18,665
Depots	8,191
Reichsbahn	1,576
SS divisions	577
Police	231
Reichspost	196
Total	<hr/> 29,436

Much of the furniture was nevertheless disappointing. In Frankfurt an der Oder the first shipment was good, but the objects had been taken from better homes and did not fit into small apartments. Subsequent loads consisted of old pieces; ovens and ranges, badly shaken in transit, were scrap. In Hamburg, where furniture was auctioned off to bombed-out people, there were similar complaints. Some of the items were worn and damaged, and mattresses were even infested with lice; not even dealers would buy such merchandise.²¹⁸

At the end of 1942 the Militärbefehlshaber inaugurated the final phase of the confiscations. Having already raked in a billion-franc fine, he decreed the confiscation by the Reich of the property of all those stateless Jews whose last nationality had been German.²¹⁹ On September 15, 1943, he extended the decree to the property of "former" Polish and Protektorat Jews. A special commissioner, Ferdinand Niedermeyer, was

June 16, 1942, NG-5018. The chief of the Einsatzstab was Gerhart Utikal. See affidavit by Utikal, August 27, 1947, NO-5178.

217. Final report of Dienststelle West of Einsatzstab Rosenberg, undated, L-188.

218. Reports of Reich Security Service, September 27, 1943, and January 6, 1944, in Heinz Boberach, cd., *Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938-1945* (Herrsching, 1984), pp. 5821, 6228.

219. Decree of December 2, 1942, *Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich*, 1942, p. 451. From the billion-franc fine, the sum of 50,000,000 francs was made available at this time to the French government for the support of families whose breadwinners were working in Germany. Schlicer to Foreign Office, December 9, 1942, NG-3335. Nothing appears to have been charged to the French state for the transport of the Jews.

appointed to administer these assets. His final report, made on February 28, 1945, inside Germany, listed all the items with which he had dealt, including jewelry, silver, coins, and stamps.²²⁰

Italy

Moving from France to Italy, one may observe that the anti-Jewish regime in the Italian realm was established without German participation, and that the status of the Jews in Italy was not an easy subject in German-Italian negotiations throughout the duration of the Axis partnership.

The first Italian measures were as thorough in appearance as any that had been drafted by German hands, but the Italian government failed to follow up its decrees and, frequently, even to enforce them. In certain basic respects the Italian approach to anti-Jewish persecutions was similar to the Italian attitude toward the war. The Italians wanted to keep up with their powerful German ally; they strove, above all, to be taken seriously, like the Germans. As Foreign Minister Ciano once put it, "The Germans have loved us without respecting us."¹ But in the end the Italians did not match the Germans in expenditure of ferocity and the shedding of blood. Quite unlike the German Nazis, the Italian Fascists committed themselves in words without fulfilling themselves in deeds, for in their hearts the Italians had no use for the Germans and the German way of life. "We have respected them," said Ciano, "without loving them."²

In a more narrow sense, there is another reason why the Italian operation against the Jews never quite got off the ground. Not only was the Fascist government no ideal persecutor, but the Italian Jews were not its ideal victims. That is not to say that the Italians were wholly incapable of hurting subject peoples; there were incidents, too serious to be overlooked, against Yugoslavs, Greeks, and African inhabitants. Nor were the Jews in Italy more able to take care of themselves than Jews elsewhere. The Italian Jews turned out to be as vulnerable to *German* attack as Jews were everywhere in Axis Europe. But the relationship between Jews and Italians had progressed to a point which made Italian persecutions of Jews psychologically as well as administratively difficult. The Jews had rapidly and thoroughly been absorbed into Italian life.

The Jewish community of Italy was two thousand years old. From Spanish-controlled Sardinia and Sicily the Jews were expelled at the end of the fifteenth century, and from the Kingdom of Naples, subsequently also under Spanish rule, in 1541. Only very small numbers of Jews settled in these southern regions during the following four hundred years. In

220. Report by Niedermeyer, February 28, 1945, T 501, Roll 184.

1. Galcazzo Ciano, *Ciano's Hidden Diary, 1937—1938* (New York, 1953), entry for November 17, 1938, p. 195.

2. *Ibid.*

central and northern Italy, however, they continued to live, despite anti-Jewish measures that would first be enacted, then narrowed or widened, rescinded or reimposed. Urban districts set aside for Jews became compulsory residences, and in Venice, a Jewish quarter at a foundry was placed under guard at night as of 1516: the original “ghetto” that gave this kind of institution its permanent name.³

Yet Italian Jewry was not estranged from its Italian neighbors, whose language and culture it adopted, and Jews were not strangers when the Papal ghetto of Rome was abolished by a united Italy in 1870. Nowhere in the nineteenth century were Jews absorbed more rapidly into the fabric of everyday life and nowhere had such a small Jewish community produced so many individuals of rank or distinction in the arts, the sciences, commerce, and government. This emancipation was completed without delay or hindrance. Finally, there were but fifty thousand Jews in Italy, including refugees, some of whom had crossed the border from Germany without appropriate papers in reliance upon the “elasticity” of Italian officialdom.⁴

The situation of the Italian Jews is reflected to some extent in statistics. As of 1938, mixed marriages totaled almost 7,500, and the offspring of these unions consisted of 2,000 Jews and 7,000 Catholics.⁵ In a city like Trieste about 50 percent of all the married Jews had Christian spouses.⁶ Significant also was the occupational distribution, which in 1910 already looked like this:⁷

41.5 percent in trade and commerce

23.0 percent in professions, civil service, and military service

8.1 percent in agriculture

Jews were unusually active not only as officers in the armed forces but also as public servants in the highest positions of government. The Institute of Jewish Affairs provides us with an enumeration of Jews who in the brief history of modern Italy had held the offices of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Finance Minister, Labor Minister, Justice Minister, and Minister of Education.⁸ These, then, were the people

3. See Cecil Roth, *The History of the Jews of Italy* (Philadelphia, 1946).

4. Sergio della Pergola, “Appunti sulla demografia della persecuzione antiebraica in Italia,” *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* 18 (1981): 120-37.

5. Meir Michaelis, *Mussolini and the Jews* (Oxford, 1978), p. 233. See also detailed statistics in Sergio della Pergola’s article.

6. In 1927, Trieste had 255 mixed marriages per 100 Jewish marriages. Arthur Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden* (Berlin, 1930), vol. 1, p. 213.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

8. Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler’s Ten-Tear War on the Jews* (New York, 1943), p. 286.

who became the victims of a sudden hostile outburst in 1938. How did that happen?

Ciano's so-called *Hidden Diary* (1937-38) has preserved for us an inside story of the evolution of the Italian anti-Jewish laws. On December 3, 1937, just when the Italians began to feel a strong breeze from the north, Ciano made the following entry in his diary:

The Jews are flooding me with insulting anonymous letters, accusing me of having promised Hitler to persecute them. It is not true. The Germans have never mentioned this subject to us. Nor do I believe that we ought to unleash an anti-Semitic campaign in Italy. The problem doesn't exist here. There are not many Jews and, with some exceptions, there is no harm in them.⁹

A few weeks later Ciano refused to lend his support for an anti-Jewish campaign to Giovanni Preziosi, renegade priest and editor of the anti-Semitic periodical *La vita italiana*.^{10 11} On February 6, 1938, Ciano remarked in a talk with his father-in-law, the Duce Benito Mussolini, that he favored "a solution which will not raise a problem which fortunately does not exist here." Mussolini agreed. "He will pour water on the flames," wrote Ciano, "though not enough to suppress the thing altogether."¹ A few days later the Duce was already pouring so much water as to declare himself (in *Informazione diplomatica* No. 14) in favor of a Jewish state. Ciano thought that this was going too far.¹²

On June 3, 1938, Mussolini, in turn, was angry with Roberto Farinacci, a member of the Fascist Grand Council and leader of the anti-Semitic movement in Italy, for having himself a Jewish secretary, Jole Foa. This was the kind of thing, wrote Ciano, "which foreigners see as proof of a lack of seriousness in many Italians."¹³

In July Pope Pius XI made a speech "violently critical" of racism. The Pope's remarks were received with something less than good humor by the Fascist leadership, to whom racism implied not a mere assertion of power vis-a-vis Jewry but, much more important, a feeling of superiority over the recently conquered African populations of the empire. Upon hearing of the papal criticism, Foreign Minister Ciano called the nuncio, Borgongini-Duca, to express his displeasure. Ciano pointed out that the Duce regarded the racial question as fundamental. It was the lack of racial preparedness which had caused the Amhara insurrection in Ethiopia. Ciano's entry' continued: "I spoke quite plainly to Borgongini, explaining

9. Ciano, *Hidden Diary*, p. 40.

10. *Ibid.*, entry for December 29, 1937, p. 52.

11. *Ibid.*, entry for February 6, 1938, p. 71.

12. *Ibid.*, entry' for February 18, 1938, p. 75.

13. *Ibid.*, entry' for June 3, 1938, p. 93.

the premises and aims of our racial policy. He seemed pretty convinced, and I may add that he showed himself personally very anti-Semitic. He will confer with the Holy Father tomorrow.”¹⁴ Mussolini himself was worked up about the Catholic offensive and in a state of agitation gave his son-in-law Ciano an order for an anti-Jewish measure. He wanted all Jews to be struck off the diplomatic list.¹⁵

In September 1938 the Interior Ministry, under the direction of the Duce, was working on an anti-Jewish charter. In the months from September to November, the Fascist Grand Council met several times to discuss the law.¹⁶ At the council meeting of October 6, Marshals Italo Balbo and Emilio De Bono as well as the president of the Senate, Federzoni, spoke in favor of the Jews, but the Education Minister, Giuseppe Bottai, opposed any mitigation of the anti-Jewish measure. “They will hate us,” he said, “because we have driven them out. They will despise us if we let them in again.” Between speeches the Duce turned to his son-in-law and remarked that for now he was being conciliator), but that later he would be stern.¹⁷ When, on November 10, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Lieutenant General Achille Starace, as Secretary General of the Fascist party, suggested the unconditional expulsion of all Jews from the party, Mussolini, still not prepared for sternness, rejected the idea without ado.¹⁸

By the middle of November the anti-Jewish provisions were ready. They contained a curious mixture of all the influences at work on the Italian scene: “racialism,” anti-foreignism, clericalism, and bureaucratic paternalism. The definition of the term “Jew” was drawn up in such a way that any person was affected (a) if both of his parents belonged to the Jewish religion, or (b) if one parent belonged to the Jewish religion and the other was a foreigner, or (c) if the mother was Jewish by religion and the father unknown, or (d) if one parent was Jewish and the other Italian, provided, however, that on October 1, 1938, the offspring belonged to the Jewish religion, or was a member of the Jewish community, or “in some other way participated in some Jewish undertaking.”

The anti-Jewish decrees then went on to exclude the Jews from membership in the armed forces, the civil service, and the party, and from ownership or management of armament firms or enterprises of any other sort that employed at least a hundred Italians. Jews were also forbidden to own real estate in excess of 20,000 lire and agricultural property valued

14. *Ibid.*, entry for July 30, 1938, p. 141.

15. *Ibid.*, entry for August 8, 1938, p. 141.

16. *Ibid.*, entries for September 1 and 4, October 6 and 26, November 6 and 10, pp. 149-51, 174, 184, 190, 192.

17. *Ibid.*, entry for October 6, 1938, p. 174.

18. *Ibid.*, entry for November 10, 1938, p. 192.

over 5,000 lire. However, war veterans, old Fascists, and so on, and their children, grandchildren, parents, and grandparents were not affected by the restrictions on enterprises and immobile property.

In a later decree, dated June 29, 1939, the professionals (including doctors, lawyers, auditors, engineers, architects, etc.) were restricted “except in cases of proven necessity and urgency” to serving Jews. Once again, however, exceptions were made for war veterans, old Fascists, and others.

In the field of social concentration the Italian legislation was very detailed. Marriages between Jews and Italians were forbidden except on the point of death or to legitimize an offspring.¹⁹ The employment of non-Jewish household help was barred. The adoption or care by Jews of non-Jewish children was forbidden, and provision was made for depriving a Jewish parent of his Christian child if proof was adduced that the child did not obtain an education consonant with Christian principles or national aims. The basic law and the decrees that followed provided for expulsions from schools, revocation of name changes, and registration in the civil lists. The registration requirement had a latent meaning beyond the conceptions of 1938. It was a potential weapon for roundups. Centrally administered by a demographic office of the Interior Ministry (re-styled *Direzione Generale per la Demografia e la Razza*), the measure resulted in the establishment of files in the major cities, with addresses and information about citizenship, age, occupations, and eligibility for exemptions.

Finally, the law of November 17, 1938, ordered the nullification of all naturalizations obtained by Jews after January 1, 1919, and stipulated that all foreign as well as denaturalized Jews, except those who were over sixty-five or living in mixed marriage, were to leave Italy and its possessions by March 12, 1939.²⁰

19. The Pope's suggestion that an exception be made also for converted Jews was rejected. *Ibid.*, entry for November 6, 1938, p. 190.

20. For full texts of the decrees of November 17, 1938/XVII No. 1728 (basic law); November 15, 1938/XVII No. 1779 (schools); December 22, 1938/XVII No. 2111 (military pensions); June 29, 1939/XVII No. 1054 (professions); July 13, 1939/XVII No. 1055 (name changes); see the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 1938 and 1939. Complete German translations in *Die Judenfrage (Vertmüliche Beilage)*, October 15, 1942, pp. 78-80; December 1, 1942, pp. 91-92; December 15, 1942, pp. 94-96; March 1, 1943, p. 20. For summary and explanations, see also Emilio Cancvari, “Die Juden in Italien,” *Die Judenfrage*, October 1, 1940, pp. 143-46. On administration of expropriated agricultural property, see Radcmacher to Luther, November 14, 1940, NG-3934. On the lists, see Sergio della Pergola, “Appunti sulla demografia,” *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel* 18 (1981): 122 n. For commentary about the impact of the laws, see Camera dei deputati, *La legislazione antiebraica in Italia e in Europa* (Rome, 1989). The principal work about the fate of Italian Jewry is that of Renzo De Felice, *Storia degli Ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo* (Turin, 1988), first published 1961.

TABLE 8-16
JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM ITALY

	EMIGRATED BY OCTOBER 15, 1941	JEWISH POPULATION AT END OF 1941
Citizens	5,966	39,444
Foreigners	1,338	3,674
Total	7,304	43,118

Note: Die Judenfrage, March 15, 1942, p. 56.

When the drafting of the first two laws was finished, Benito Mussolini had a discussion with the man who had to sign his name to all the anti-Jewish decrees, King Victor Emanuel. Three times during the conversation the King remarked that he felt an “infinite pity for the Jews.” He cited cases of persecution, among them that of General Pugliese, “an old man of eighty, loaded with medals and wounds, who had been deprived of his housekeeper” Annoyed, the Duce pointed out that there were “20,000 spineless people” in Italy who were moved by the fate of the Jews. The King replied that he was one of them.²¹

It is perhaps unnecessary to stress that the Italian anti-Jewish code was not altogether mild. Its victims must have felt that code severely, precisely because in the past they had found in their country such complete acceptance. The provisions against employment by the state and possession of farms, for example, had an import more serious than that of similar decrees elsewhere, because in Italy a comparatively large number of Jews had found a livelihood as government workers and farmers. To be sure, the Italian laws allowed for many exceptions, and the implementation of the legislation as a whole was both slow and lax.

There is perhaps no better illustration of the total effect of the Italian laws than the figures on Jewish emigrations given in Table 8-16. Of the foreign Jews, most of whom had been obliged to leave, only about 27 percent had gone by 1941, but of the native Jews, who did not have to go, 13 percent had left as well. There were also less obvious signs of decline and insecurity in the Italian Jewish community, such as an excess of mortality over births amounting to several hundred a year, and a flight to Catholicism in the thousands.²²

21. Ciano, *Hidden Diary*, entry for November 28, 1938, p. 199.

22. Sergio della Pergola, “Appunti sulla demografia,” *La Rascona Mettsile dt Israel* 18(1981): 131, 134. The number of conversions from 1938 to 1945 was 5,705.

During the ensuing wartime period, measures were taken against Jewish refugees, Jews of Italian nationality, and Jewish inhabitants of Libya. By May 1942 about a thousand foreign Jews had been interned in camps at Salerno and Cosenza as well as in a women's camp at Chieti.²³ In the late summer of 1942 Jews of Italian nationality were called up for labor in Rome, Bologna, Milan, and the African colony of Tripoli.²⁴ The Jews of Rome were forced to wash the retaining wall of the Tiber River; for the Jews of Milan a work camp was erected in the city. Near the Tripolitanian town of Giado, between 2,000 and 3,000 Jews were incarcerated in a desert camp. When the British arrived at Giado early in 1943, they found that a typhus epidemic was raging there.²⁵ According to Jewish sources, 318 of the Giado Jews had died.²⁶

From the German viewpoint, however, all these measures were extremely inadequate. A large segment of the Italian Jews was almost wholly unaffected by anti-Jewish action, and the pace of the destruction process since the first laws had been issued in 1938 and 1939 was much too slow to suggest that the Italians would ever arrive under their own power at the critical point at which deportations would become a feasible proposition. In Italy there was as yet no total deprivation of Jewish property and no foolproof regulation of Jewish residence and movements. Yet the Germans were reluctant to interfere. Italy was still Germany's principal ally, and the Germans did not forget that fact.

On September 24, 1942, Ribbentrop called Luther on the telephone to issue instructions about the deportation strategy in various countries of Europe. With respect to Italy, Luther was to undertake nothing. That question was to be reserved for a personal discussion between the Führer and the Duce or between the Foreign Minister and Count Ciano.²⁷

The next important conversation, however, was occasioned by a visit of Heinrich Himmler to Rome. On October 11, 1942, he met with the Duce for almost two hours. Mussolini, concerned about the lot of the Italian population in the coming winter, talked about food, and Himmler brought up the Jews. They were being taken out (*herausgenommen*), said Himmler, from Germany, the Generalgouvernement, and all the oc-

23. *Die Judenfrage*, May 1, 1942, p. 92.

24. *Ibid.*, August 1, 1942, p. 172; September 15, 1942, p. 197; October 15, 1942, p. 223; September 1, 1942, p. 183.

25. Maj. Gen. Lord Rennel of Rodd, *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa during the Years 1941-1947* (London, 1948), p. 272. The Jews, from the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica, had been suspected of harboring pro-British attitudes. Cyrenaica, temporarily occupied by British troops, was recaptured by Axis forces before the final Allied victory in North Africa.

26. Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler's Ten-Year War*, pp. 294-95.

27. Luther to Weizsacker, September 24, 1942, NG-1517.

cupied countries, since they had been engaging in espionage and sabotage everywhere. In Russia not a few (*eine nicht unerhebliche Zahl*), both men and women, had to be shot because they were carrying messages for partisans. The Duce remarked on his part (*von sich aus*) that that was the only possible solution. Himmler went on to explain that politically implicated Jews were being sent to concentration camps and others were building roads, albeit (*allerdings*) with high rates of mortality inasmuch as they had never worked in their lives. Old Jews who were in Theresienstadt could lead their lives according to their own taste (*nach eigenen Geschmack*). The Duce amiably inquired about Himmler's stay in Rome and sent his best regards to Hitler.²⁸

By January 1943 the SS was exhibiting signs of impatience. Jews were being deported all over Europe, but Italian Jews in German-controlled areas continued to be immune. Their immunity made them more and more conspicuous. By January 13, 1943, Ribbentrop therefore instructed Ambassador von Mackensen to inform Foreign Minister Ciano that in German eyes Jews of Italian nationality were also Jews. In German-controlled territories, at least, the Germans wanted complete freedom of action after March 31, 1943.²⁹

In February Ribbentrop asked, in preparation for a visit to Rome, about the wishes of the SS in the Jewish question. Himmler replied immediately that he would like the Italians to cease sabotaging the measures of the RSHA in areas under German occupation. In Italy itself he wanted measures parallel to those in force in Germany.³⁰ The wishes of the SS were not destined to be quickly fulfilled. The Italians were not approachable in matters of destruction.

In May 1943 Dr. Zeitschel of the Paris embassy wrote a letter to his friend Dr. Knochen, who was the BdS in France, in which he set down his impressions of what he had observed during a visit to Rome. The German embassy in Rome, he wrote, had for years been in possession of instructions from Berlin in no case to undertake anything that could cloud the friendly relations between Italy and Germany. It therefore appeared utterly hopeless, he continued, that the German embassy in Rome would ever grasp so hot an iron as the Jewish question in Italy. The Italian government, on its part, was "not interested" in the Jewish question. As the RSHA representative in Rome, Obersturmbannführer Dr. Dollmann,

28. Himmler to Ribbentrop, October 22, 1942, enclosing memorandum of discussion with Mussolini, T 175, Roll 69.

29. Ribbentrop to embassy in Rome, January 13, 1943, NG-4961. Bergmann to embassy in Rome, Februar)' 18, 1943, NG-4958. Radcmacher to Foreign Office representative in Brussels, February 27, 1943, NG-4955.

30. Minister Bergmann to office of Ribbentrop, February 24, 1943, NG-4956.

had told Zeitschel, die Italian armed forces were “still shot through with full Jews and countless half-Jews [*noch mit Volljuden and zahllosen Halbjuden durchsetzt*]’ From the Fascist party itself action could be expected only under direct instructions from the Duce.³¹

But on July 25, 1943, the Duce was overthrown, and three days later the Fascist party was dissolved. As yet the new government of Marshal Badoglio made no other move. The war was still on, and the anti-Jewish laws were still in force.³² Then, suddenly, the Badoglio government surrendered to the Allies. The Germans reacted with lightning speed. The Italian forces were disarmed, and Italy became an occupied country.

As German troops (mainly SS units) moved through the province of Novara in the north, they killed Jews in several localities and took along Jewish property, including bank deposits. On Lake Maggiore, Jewish bodies weighted with stones on their legs were washed ashore.³³ It was a small beginning.

During September 1943 and the period that followed, a horde of German bureaucrats moved into Italy in order to direct its affairs. From the multitude of German agencies then in existence on the Italian peninsula, we select the three that appear to have had decisive functions in the attempt to destroy the Italian Jews:

The German General Plenipotentiary and Ambassador: Rahn

Police Attache (RSHA): OStuf. Kappler

The German Plenipotentiary General and Higher SS and Police

Leader: OGruf. Wolff

Chief of Military Administration: Gruf. Wachter

BdS: Brif. Harster

IV: Stuf. Kranebitter

IV-B-4 (Einsatzkommando): Dannecker, succeeded by Bosshammer. Under Dannecker, in 1943, the Einsatzkommando moved through various cities, including Rome, Florence, and Milan.

Regional

Group Upper Italy West: Staf. Rauff, with *Aussenkommandos* (AK) in Genoa, Milan, and Turin

31. Dr. Carltheo Zeitschel to BdS in France, May 24, 1943, in Leon Poliakov, *La condition des Juifs en France sous l'occupation italienne* (Paris, 1946), pp. 157-58.

32. “Judengesetz in Italien noch in Kraft,” *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 7, 1943, p. 1.

33. Militarkommandantur 1021/Verwaltungsgruppe (Administrative Group) in Novara to Military Commander of Upper Italy in Riva, October 21, 1943, T 501, Roll 342. See also the list of fifty names in Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *Gli ebrei in propinqua di Milano* (Milan, 1992), pp. 115-16.

Aussenkommandos placed directly under BdS in Rome, Florence, Venice, and other cities. AK in Rome headed by Police Attache Kappler
Oberbetehlshaber Süd and commander of Army Group C: Gfm. Kesselring
Commander, Fourteenth Army: Gen. von Mackensen
Commander, Rome: Gen. Stahel (Mälzer)

Italy thus had a civilian German overlord: the Foreign Office troubleshooter, Minister (later, Ambassador) Rahn, whose last post was in Tunisia. Then there was a military governor who also fulfilled the functions of Higher SS and Police Leader; this was the chief of Himmler's Personal Staff, Wolff. His chief of military administration, Wächter, came from Poland, where he had served as Gouverneur of Galicia. Finally, there was a commander of armed forces, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring.

This was not all. In areas that before the conclusion of World War I had been Austro-Hungarian, the Germans installed two special overlords who had the title *Der Oberste Kommissur*. One such Kommissar was the Gauleiter of Tyrol, Hofer; his added area was southern Tyrol. The other was the Gauleiter of Carinthia, Rainer, who acquired the operational zone *Adriatisches Küstenland* with the important city of Trieste. Under Rainer, Himmler had established a special Higher SS and Police Leader, none other than Odilo Globocnik, late of Lublin, now back in his hometown.

The new machinery went to work immediately. Characteristically, the Germans did not wait for the reestablishment of a shadow government under Benito Mussolini. Just as previously the Italians had been too powerful to be approached, they were now too weak to be consulted. On September 25, 1943, the RSHA sent a circular to all its branches at home and abroad specifying that, "in agreement with the Foreign Office," all Jews of listed nationalities could now be included in deportation measures. Italy headed the list. The circular continued: "The necessary measures will be carried out with regard to (a) Jews of Italian nationality at once. . . ." ³⁴

The Mussolini regime, reborn, was made up of reliable Fascists. The Interior Ministry was placed in the hands of Guido Buffarini who, as its former undersecretary, was a veteran of anti-Jewish activities, albeit specialized also in the policy of granting exemptions. The new police chief was Tullio Tamburini. The ministry's *Direzione Generale per la Demografia e la Razza* was reconstituted, and its registry' of Jews, maintained for

34. Von Thadden to missions abroad, October 12, 1943, enclosing RSHA circular dated September 23, 1943, NG-2652-H.

“vigilance and control,” became a ready-made tool for seizures and deportations.³⁵

Italian Jewry had its Union of Jewish Communities, an organization set up under law in 1930, to which all professing Jews had to belong and which had taxing power.³⁶ In 1943 the president of the *Unione* was Dante Almansi, a man who had brought to the office his credentials as a high, pre-1938 police official. The Rome *Giunta* was in the hands of Ugo Foa, a former magistrate. The *Unione* operated an agency to help Jewish refugees in Italy, the *Delegazione Assistenza Emigranti Ebrei* (Delasem), with offices in Rome and Genoa. The president of Delasem was Renzo Levi, and its secretary was Settimio Sorani. Finally, the Jews also had their rabbis, among them the chief rabbi of Rome, Israel (later Eugenio) Zolli.³⁷

Rome, with its Jewish community of about 10,000 (the 1931 census figure was 11,280), was the first major target. Many of the Jews in the capital were vulnerable, particularly the poorer half in the old ghetto section and an adjacent quarter across the Tiber. A sense of danger was not wholly absent. Levi and Sorani, by virtue of their positions in Delasem, were aware of what had happened elsewhere, and foreign-born Chief Rabbi Zolli was afraid enough to go into hiding immediately. He relates that he vainly urged *Unione* chief Almansi and *Giunta* president Foa to close the synagogue, remove the membership lists, and do everything possible to disperse the Jewish population in monasteries and convents. Foa denies having been approached by Zolli, and Almansi's son states that there is no record of any initiatives by the rabbi.³⁸ Certain is only the fact that the Jewish leadership clung to the status quo, determined to do nothing to provoke the Germans or to alarm the Jews. The temple was kept open during the entire month of September, with services for the Jewish New Year conducted by another rabbi.³⁹ When Zolli returned to his officiating duties during the High Holidays of 1944 in liberated Rome, he saw a vision of Christ, and shortly thereafter he was baptized a Christian.⁴⁰ In the intervening year, the Jews of Rome had suffered heavy losses.

35. On the use of lists, see Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *L'occupazione tedesca degli ebrei di Roma* (Rome and Milan, 1979), p. 18.

36. Michaelis, *Mussolini and the Jews*, pp. 53-54.

37. The Jewish officials are described by Robert Katz, *Black Sabbath* (New York, 1969), pp. 16-20, 31-34, 39-42, 77-78, 142-47.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-15, 31-34. Eugenio Zolli, *Before the Dawn* (New York, 1954), pp. 140-55. For Foa's denial, see Zolli, *ibid.*, p. 203. Dr. Renato Almansi's comments on his father in two letters to Guenter Lewy, July 6 and November 10, 1964, through the courtesy of Prof. Lewy'.

39. Katz, *Black Sabbath*, pp. 42-43.

40. Zolli, *Before the Dawn*, pp. 182-84.

The opening salvo was fired by Kappler on September 26, 1943, when he demanded 50 kilograms (134 pounds Troy) of gold, threatening as a penalty for nondelivery the taking of 200 hostages. Inasmuch as many well-to-do members of the community were already in hiding, there was fear that the amount could not be raised in full. Renzo Levi of Delasem was dispatched to the Vatican to negotiate for a loan of 15 kilograms, and the Pope agreed. In the end the Vatican's help was not needed. Ordinary Italian men and women came in from the street to add their donations, and 80 kilograms were collected in all. When the required quantity was delivered, the Germans insisted on accurate weighing, and the Jews wanted a proper receipt.⁴¹

Hardly had Kappler obtained the gold when a second blow was struck. Raiding the G junta's headquarters on September 29, a Security Police detachment accompanied by Order Police confiscated the community's file of its dues-paying membership. The Germans could now compare this religious list, which was incomplete when viewed under the Nuremberg principle but current as of 1943, with the Italian racial register, which was comprehensive enough as to criteria but not necessarily up to date.⁴² Already the situation was more menacing, and the Jewish leaders faced with increasing frustration their ancient blueprints for survival. Rome's Jews would not remain untouched, but the operation now in the offing was going to have a public impact far greater than similar deportations in other areas of Europe.

Rome was the city of the Catholic Church, and whatever happened there could not fail to concern the Pope himself. The Germans in Rome were aware of this situation, and they were not exactly enthusiastic about the prospect of a major clash with the Church. On October 6 Consul Moellhausen addressed a letter to Ribbentrop personally to tell him that Obersturmbannführer Kappler had received an order from Berlin to arrest the 8,000 Jews of Rome and to transport them to northern Italy, "where they are supposed to be liquidated [*wosie liquidiert werdensollen*]\T

41. Katz, *Black Sabbath*, pp. 79-102. A receipt was not given. Zolli asserts that upon hearing of the dilemma, he too negotiated with the Vatican. Zolli, *Before the Dawn*, pp. 159-61, 206-7. The gold episode was common knowledge in the German diplomatic corps in Rome. Testimony by Albrecht von Kessel (Embassy at Vatican), Case No. 11, tr. p. 9518.

42. Files in birth records office were also used. On all these lists, see principally Katz, *Black Sabbath*, pp. 105-9, 301-3. See also Michael Taglicozzo in Picciotto Fargion, *Uoccupazione tedesca*, pp. 153-55. On files of the directorate of demography and race for the city of Rome, see Sergio della Pergola, "Appunti sulla demografia," *Li Rassegna Mensile di Israel* 18 (1981): 122n. See also interview of Maresciallo Mario di Marco (Rome police), who prepared false identity cards for Jews, *maufbau* (New York), September 5, 1952, p. 11.

General Stahel had declared his intention to allow the implementation of this Aktion only if he had the agreement of the German Foreign Minister. "Personally, I am of the opinion," concluded Moellhausen, "that it would be better business [*dass es besseres Geschäft wäre*] to mobilize Jews for defense construction just as in Tunis, and will propose this together with Kappler to Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring. Please send instructions."⁴³ The answer from Berlin stated that, on the basis of an order by Hitler, the Jews of Rome were to be brought to the Austrian concentration camp Mauthausen as hostages. Rahn and Moellhausen were not to interfere with this matter under any circumstances (*sich auf keinen Fall in diese Angelegenheit einzumischen*),⁴⁴

On October 16, 1943, Bishop Hudal, rector of the German church in Rome, sent a last-minute appeal to General Stahel:⁴⁵

I have just been informed by a high Vatican office in the immediate circle of the Holy Father that the arrests of Jews of Italian nationality have begun this morning. In the interest of the good relations which have existed until now between the Vatican and the high German military command—which in the first instance is to be credited to the political insight and greatness of heart of Your Excellency and which will some day go down in the history of Rome — I would be very grateful if you would give an order to stop these arrests in Rome and its vicinity right away; I fear that otherwise the Pope will have to make an open stand, which will serve the anti-German propaganda as a weapon against us.

The Aktion could no longer be stopped. It began during the night of October 15-16 and was finished in less than twenty-four hours. For its implementation General Stahel made available to Obersturmbannführer Kappler Company 5 of the 15th Police Regiment, Company 3 of the 20th Police Regiment, and Company 11 of the 12th Police Regiment. Since Company 5 had been performing guard duties for General Stahel, he detailed a unit of the 2nd Parachute-Pursuit Regiment to relieve the policemen in their regular assignment. During the Aktion there were no "incidents." All together, 1,259 people were seized in the roundup. After the release of some half-Jews and Jews in muted marriages, a total of

43. Konsul Moellhausen (Rome) to Ribbentrop personally, October 6, 1943, NG-5027. On Moellhausen, whose mother was French and who grew up speaking Italian in Trieste, see Katz, *Black Sabbath*, pp. 56-58.

44. Von Sonnleithner to Bureau of the Foreign Minister, October 9, 1943, NG-5027. Von Thadden to Moellhausen, October 9, 1943, NG-5027.

45. Gumpert to Foreign Office, enclosing message from Hudal, October 16, 1943, NG-5027.

1,007 were shipped off' on October 18, 1943, to the killing center of Auschwitz.⁴⁶

The large majority of the city's Jewish inhabitants was able to hide during the Aktion. The Vatican itself sheltered Jews. Thus a raid by police of the Questor of Rome on the extraterritorial College at the Basilica of S. Paolo fuori delle Mura during the night of February 3-4, 1944, resulted in the arrest of military deserters, draft dodgers, disloyal Carabinieri, and Jews alike.⁴⁷ The Germans, however, were relieved that one of their greatest fears had not been realized. The Pope, despite entreaties, had remained silent.

One day after the completion of the roundup, the German ambassador at the Vatican and former Staatssekretär of the Foreign Office, Weizsäcker, reported to Berlin that the College of Cardinals was particularly shocked because the event had, so to speak, transpired under the windows of the Pope. (*Die Kune ist besonders betroffen, da sich der Vorgang sozusagen unter den Fenstern des Papstes abgespielt hat.*) The reaction, said Weizsäcker, might have been muffled if the Jews had been kept in Italy for forced labor. Now anti-German circles in Rome were putting pressure on the Pope to step out of his reserve. "It is said," reported Weizsäcker, "that bishops in French cities where similar things happened [*wo ähnliches vorkam*] had taken a clear stand." The Pope, as head of the Church and Bishop of Rome, could not very well do less. Already, said Weizsäcker, comparisons were being made between the present pontiff and the "much more temperamental Pius XI."⁴⁸

The pressure, however, was unsuccessful. "The Pope," wrote Weizsäcker on October 28, "although reportedly beseeched by various sides, has not allowed himself to be drawn into any demonstrative statement against the deportation of the Jews of Rome. Even though he has to calculate that this attitude will be held against him by our opponents and taken advantage of by Protestant circles in Anglo-Saxon countries for propagandistic purposes against Catholicism, he has also in this touchy matter done everything in order not to burden relations with the German government and German agencies in Rome." The *Osservatore Romano* (pro-Vatican newspaper in Rome) had printed a communique about the

46. War diary, German commander in Rome (Gen. Stahel), October 16, October 17, and October 18, 1943, NO-315. The figure 1,007 is taken from the report by Kappler to OGruf. Wolff, October 18, 1943, NO-2427. The arrival of the Rome Jews in Auschwitz on October 22, 1943, was noted by a Jewish doctor there, Otto Wolken. See Filip Friedman, *This Was Osmecim* (London, 1946), pp. 24-25.

47. German Commander in Rome/Administration to Plenipotentiary General of the Wehrmacht in Italy/Administration, February 14, 1944, T 501, Roll 334.

48. Weizsäcker to Foreign Office, October 17, 1943, NG-5027.

“benevolent activity of the Pope [*über die Liebestätigkeit des Papstes*],” but this statement was so “richly embroidered and unclear [*reichlichgewunden und unklar*]” that very few people would have been able to read into it a special reference to the Jewish question. The whole affair could therefore be looked upon as “liquidated.”⁴⁹

By November many Jews throughout occupied Italy were already in hiding. In Florence the prominent American art critic Bernard Berenson heard that the newly installed Fascist prefect was warning the Jewish residents to leave their homes and move into concealment. Berenson noted that ten or twelve Jews had found refuge in a single villa near Siena. Soon he heard also about gas.⁵⁰ Flight, however, was not all that simple. The exodus to villas and rural pensions, to apartments in small towns, or to rooms rented from friendly gentile neighbors was an option mainly for Italian-speaking Jews who had some money. Sometimes these middle-class fugitives obtained false identification papers, and in some cases they could pretend to be refugees from war zones. Several thousand Jews with fewer resources and opportunities received help from priests, monks, and nuns. For the very poor, the sick, the elderly, and foreign Jews in general, the prospects were bleaker.⁵¹ These individuals became the most vulnerable targets of Dannecker’s roaming Einsatzkommando and Italian collaborators, including newly formed autonomous Fascist legions,⁵² some of which were supported by the Interior Ministry, and newly recruited men of the Fascist Party’s *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale* under Fascist old-timer Renato Ricci.

On November 30, 1943, the Italian Interior Ministry issued instructions to provincial chiefs, stipulating that all Jews be placed in concentration camps and that their property be sequestered for the benefit of Italian air-raid victims.⁵³ From this moment, the entire apparatus of Italian po-

49. Weizsacker to Foreign Office, October 28, 1943, NG-5027.

50. Bernard Berenson, *Rumor and Reflection* (New York, 1952), entries for November 4 and 9, 1943, pp. 143, 147-48. In Florence a number of Jews listened to the BBC and “heard about the gas chambers.” Testimony by Dr. Chulda Campagnano, Eichmann trial transcript, May 11, 1961, scss. 36, pp. WI-XI.

51. Susan Zuccotti, *The Italians and the Holocaust* (New York, 1987), pp. 201-8. See also Alexander Stille, *Benevolence and Betrayal* (New York, 1991), who explores in his case studies the psychological makeup of the victims as well, and who deals with denunciations, which could trap rich and poor alike.

52. Notable legions were: “Ettore Muti” under Colonel Francesco Colombo in Milan, a legion in Florence under Mario Carita, and another in Rome (later Milan) under Pietro Koch. Zuccotti, *The Italians*, pp. 148-49.

53. Prefettura di Roma to Quicstorc di Roma, December 2, 1943, enclosing circular of Interior Ministry. Facsimile in Picciotto Fargion, *VOccupazione tedesca*, unnumbered page. Judgment against Bosshammer, p. 19.

lice forces was available for roundups: the legions; militia and Carabinieri combined into a *Guar Ain Nazionale Repubblicana* under Ricci; Fascist part)' members organized in the summer of 1944 into Black Brigades (*Brigate Nere*) under Fascist Party Secretary Alessandro Pavolini; and regular police in plain clothes and in uniforms.⁵⁴ At the same time, however, the order of November 30 was broadcast on the radio, thereby becoming a warning as well as a threat.⁵⁵ Everywhere Italians were taken aback and Jews were filled with panic. In Florence, Berenson wrote from his hideout that "even a Dominican of Hebrew origin had to flee his monastery for fear of arrest, and found his way here." He reported another incident in which a parish priest was seized for harboring a Jew. Elia Cardinal Dalla Costa of Florence himself was said to have intervened in this case, declaring himself to be the culprit and requesting to be jailed instead of the priest.⁵⁶ In Venice, where a roundup of 150 Jews, including the residents of an old-age home, was conducted by Italian police during the night of December 4-5, the Patriarch, Adeodato Cardinal Piazza, voiced a different reaction. He objected to arrests by Italian authorities as an injustice, because old and sick Jews were seized while rich people were allowed to remain at liberty. For him the solution of this problem was the implementation of anti-Jewish measures solely by German offices. Most appropriate, he said, would be the creation of a ghetto.⁵⁷

During November and early December the first two transports from Northern Italy departed with a total of a thousand Jews for Auschwitz.⁵⁸

54. Zuccotti, *The Italians*, pp. 148-53, 189-200. See also the extract from an order of the Prefect of Ferrara, February 1, 1944, in Liliana Picciotto Fargion, "The Anti-Jewish Policy of the Italian Socialist Republic (1943-1945)," *Tad Vashem Studies* 17 (1986): 17-49, on pp. 31-32. Carabinieri were deemed royalist and generally unreliable. In Rome they were disarmed. On varieties of Italian police, see an organization chart of the Highest SS and Police Leader, April 9, 1945, T 501, Roll 339.

55. Berenson, *Rumor and Reflection*, p. 163, referring to a broadcast on the morning of December 1. "Konzentrationslager für Juden — keine Ausnahmen mehr," *Donauezeitung* (Belgrade), December 2, 1943, p. 2. The measure was ordered by the Duce after a Fascist part)' manifesto had branded the Jews as "enemy foreigners." *Ibid.*, December 10, 1943, p. 2.

56. Berenson, *Rumor and Reflection*, p. 218.

57. Militarkommandantur 1004/Vcrwaltungsgruppe in Padua to Plenipotentiary General of the Wehrmacht in Italy/Administration, March 14, 1944, citing a Securin' Police report from Venice of February 4, 1944, T 501, Roll 339. On Venice roundup, see Picciotto Fargion, "Anti-Jewish Policy" *Tad Vashem Studies* 17 (1986): 22-23.

58. The first transport, from Florence and Bologna, left on November 9 and arrived in Auschwitz on the 14th. The second, from Milan and Verona, moved out on December 6 and reached Auschwitz on the 11th. For a list of transports from Italy, with dates and numbers, see Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDF.C), *Ebrei in Italia* (Florence, 1975), pp. 12-30. Data for this study, researched

In Berlin the chief of the Foreign Office's Inland II, Wagner, surveyed this situation with a mixture of hopefulness and anxiety. The RSHA had just notified him that the seizure of the Jews in Italy had failed to achieve any success worthy of mention (*zu keinem nennenswerten Ergebnis geführt*), because the Italian delays had enabled a majority of the Jews to find hiding places in small villages, etc. The available forces of the SS and Police were not sufficient for a thorough search of all Italian communities. Now, however, that the Fascist government had issued a law for the transfer of all the Jews to concentration camps, Inland II proposed, in agreement with the RSHA, "that Ambassador Rahn be instructed to convey to the Fascist government the happiness [*Freude* crossed out in the draft and 'satisfaction' (*Genugtuung*) substituted] of the Reich government" with the new Italian decree. It was advisable also, thought Wagner, to inform the Italian government of the necessity for a rapid construction of concentration camps in northern Italy and of the Reich's willingness to supply the Italians with "experienced advisers" (*erfahrene Berater*) for this purpose. Wagner believed that in such fashion the Einsatzkommando in Italy could be "built into" the Italian government, so that the entire Fascist apparatus could be mobilized to implement the anti-Jewish measures.

The RSHA, continued Wagner, had also proposed that a demand be made to the Italians for the subsequent surrender of the Jews to German agencies for shipment to the East. Inland II, however, was of the opinion that such a request had better be delayed. The experts of Inland II thought that the concentration would proceed with less friction if the transfers to the camps appeared to constitute a "Final Solution" rather than a "preparatory measure in the evacuation to the eastern territories." The RSHA, added Wagner, would have no objection to this tactical procedure.⁵⁹

Botschaftsrat Hilger replied on behalf of the Foreign Minister that Ribbentrop was in agreement with these proposals. "His agreement," wrote Hilger, "applies to the content of the instructions to Ambassador Rahn discussed in paragraph 2 of the proposal, as well as to the recommendation in the concluding paragraph of the proposal of Group Inland

by Giuliana Donati, arc based on transport lists, which arc not complete, and eyewitness accounts. See also chart prepared by Donati and published by the CDEC in Milan, 1975. Further, see indictment of Friedrich Bosshammer in Berlin, April 23, 1971, 1 Js 1/65 (RSHA), pp. 262-63, and judgment in Bosshammer case, Landgericht Berlin, (500) 1 Ks 1/71 (RSHA) (26/71), p. 19.

59. Group Inland II (signed Wagner) via Henckc to Ribbentrop, December 4, * 1943, NG-5026.

to delay for the moment the request for the removal of the Jews to the eastern territories.”⁶⁰

The precautionary assessment in the Foreign Office was borne out by developments in Italy. On December 10 Italian police chief Tamburini issued regulations that, in German eyes, were designed to reduce the scope of the roundups. He deferred Jews in mixed marriages and exempted Jews of Italian nationality if they were gravely ill or more than seventy years of age.⁶¹ The representatives of the German Security Police immediately took countermeasures. In discussions with and directives to Italian police officials, they insisted on the arrest of every family consisting of full Jews, regardless of the health or age of its members.⁶² When the Italian Interior Ministry reaffirmed its position, the Germans reiterated theirs, and when Italian officials added references to the Italian definition of the term “Jew,” the Security Police spelled out the German conception and demanded that all such Jews be seized, even if they happened to be Catholics. Of course, if a Mischling was considered Jewish only under Italian law, there would be no objection to his detention. The Italians were admonished to report their arrest figures to the Security Police every Friday.⁶³

Frequently the Security Police did not rely on the Italian dragnet but proceeded with its own personnel. In Rome, following the October transport, another 800 Jews were seized,⁶⁴ and in several cities Jews in mixed marriages were taken into custody, even though the Security Police had acquiesced in their continued freedom.⁶⁵

Detention was generally makeshift, and sometimes there were escapes. In Florence, a twelve-year-old boy climbed an eighteen-foot wall and

60. Hilger via Stcengracht and Henckc to Group Inland II, December 9, 1943, NG-5026.

61. Italian Interior Minis try/Police Chief to heads of provinces and *Questore* of Rome, December 13, 1943, confirming by letter previous telegraphic instructions. Facsimile in Picciotto Fargion, *UOccupazione tedesca*, unnumbered page. Later, Tamburini himself was a privileged prisoner in Dachau. See facsimile of a list, April 25, 1945, with names of prominent inmates to be transported to Innsbruck, in Barbara Distel and Ruth Jakusch, eds., *Concentration Camp Dachau* (Brussels and Munich, 1978), p. 111.

62. Hauptsturmführer Wilbertz (Aussenkommmando Bologna) to questors in his area, December 20, 1943, in large excerpt in judgment against Bosshammer, Landgericht Berlin, pp. 20-21.

63. Excerpts from directive of Italian Interior Ministry, March 7, 1944, and excerpts from directive of the Aussenkommmando in Bologna to questors in Bologna, Forl'i, Ravenna, Ferrara, Modena, Parma, Reggio Emilia, and Piacenza, April 4, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 26-31.

64. Figures by month compiled by Picciotto Fargion, *LOccupazione tedesca*, p. 41.

65. Judgment against Bosshammer, pp. 24-36.

jumped. Hurt, he was picked up by an Italian who happened to pass by on a bicycle.⁶⁶ But solid prisons with cells were also used: San Vittore in Milan,⁶⁷ Regina Coeli in Rome.⁶⁸

A small number of the Jews imprisoned in Rome's Regina Coeli became victims in a highly conspicuous operation. On March 23, 1944, a bomb exploded in the midst of a German police company marching through Rosella Street. Thirty-three men were killed. That same evening an order was transmitted from Hitler to Kesselring to "kill ten Italians for every German." A second order during the night specified that Kesselring charge the SD with the shootings. Both orders were passed down to General von Mackensen, commander of the Fourteenth Army, and General Mälzer, then military commander of Rome. The final recipient of the instructions was Kappler. Since the FÜhrer's orders had included a provision for "immediate" executions, Kappler had to carry out his task in twenty-four hours. The military desired that, so far as possible, only persons under sentence of death be included among the victims. Kappler, however, did not have a sufficient number of condemned men at his disposal. He therefore drew up a list of persons whom, for various reasons, he deemed "worthy of death." The shootings were carried out on March 24 in the Ardeatine Cave. When the job was done, army engineers blew up the cave entrance. Kappler had shot 335 people (five more than he had to) because there had been some mistake in the counting. More than seventy of the victims were Jews. One was Aldo Finzi, a convert to Christianity who had been a high-ranking official in the Interior Ministry during the early days of the Fascist regime.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, the deportations were pressed without letup. One train left

66. Deposition by Mina Goldmann, December 12, 1961, Yad Vashem Oral History 1794/135. The boy, who survived, was her son. His brother also escaped. Another survivor relates that she was arrested by Carabinieri in April 1944, told them when they demanded to know her identity that she was Jewish, and was let go politely. Deposition by Ester Zohar, undated, with enclosed diary, November 1941 to March 1945, Yad Vashem Oral History' 2453/72.

67. Indictment of Bosshammer, p. 305.

68. Several hundred original arrest cards with dares arc located at Yad Vashem. See also facsimiles in Picciotto Fargion, *UOccupazione tedesca*, unnumbered pages. Many arrests were made by IV-B personnel. Regina Coeli was designated an Armed Forces Arrest Institution (*Wehrmachtshaftanstalt*). In Verona, Jews were held in the cellar of SS headquarters. Judgment against Bosshammer, p. 35.

69. Trial of Generals von Mackensen and Mälzer, and trial of Albert Kesselring, *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*, vol. 8, pp. 1-2,9-10, 13. Robert Katz, *Death in Rome* (New York, 1967). Centro di Documentazione, *Ebrei in Italia*, p. 32. Of the victims, fifty-seven were killed as Jews, but the total number of Jews identified by Donati in *Ebrei in Italia* is seventy-eight. She does not include Finzi as a Jewish victim. On Finzi, see Katz, *Death in Rome*, pp. 67-68,118,264, and Michaelis, *Mussolini and the Jews*, p. 51.

Milan and Verona on January 30, 1944.⁷⁰ To concentrate the Jews for transport, a transit camp was set up under Italian authority at Fossoli di Carpi (near Modena, in the center of German-occupied Italy) in December 1943. The camp was placed under German command in the early spring of 1944.⁷¹ From Fossoli di Carpi more transports departed for Auschwitz.⁷² By the end of February 1944, Jews still living in Italy were beginning to assume that those deported were dead.⁷³ Indeed, few attempts were made by the Germans to hide the destination. Once, the word Auschwitz was written in chalk on a railway car.⁷⁴ In May the Security Police combed through hospitals, asylums, and convents, looking for Jews.⁷⁵ By July, Jews with nationalities of neutral countries were seized,⁷⁶ while Italian bureaucrats busied themselves with the confiscation of abandoned property.⁷⁷ In the course of the Allied summer offensive, as the front line was nearing Florence, Carpi was evacuated. On August 1-2, 1944, the last transport left the camp in two sections: cars with full Jews (including those in mixed marriages) were routed to Auschwitz,

70. Judgment against Bosshammer, p. 22. Centro di Documentazione, *Ehret in Italia*, pp. 15-18, and Donati's chart.

71. Indictment of Bosshammer, particularly, pp. 303, 331 ff. Arrest reports by Italian questors to camp Fossoli di Carpi, February-March 1944, Yad Vashem B 1415. The German commander of Fossoli di Carpi, Untersturmführer Karl Titho, had been Harster's driver.

72. The transports departed on February 22, April 5, May 16, June 26, and August 1-2. Deportees from prisons were added to the transport of April 5 at Mantua and Verona, to the transport of June 26 at Verona, and to that of August 2 at Verona. The average size of these transports was 600 to 700 persons. In addition, several hundred Jews were sent to Bergen-Belsen. Centro di Documentazione, *Ehret in Italia*, pp. 18-26, and Donati's chart. Trains were procured by Bosshammer from the regional Wehrmacht Transportkommandantur. Judgment against Bosshammer, p. 42. Transportkommandanturen under the Wehrmachtverkehrsdirektion were established in Rome, Milan, Bologna, and Trieste. Although the Jewish transports were a minuscule portion of the traffic from Italy to Germany, frequent Allied bombings created many problems. At times, most of the freight was routed north through Switzerland, but this option was naturally not available for the deportation of Jews. On the overall traffic situation, see the report of the General Plenipotentiary of the Armament Ministry in Italy (Generalmajor Leyers), May 27, 1944, T 501, Roll 338.

73. Quistoris office in Genoa to Italian Interior Ministry, February 28, 1944, in large excerpt in judgment against Bosshammer, pp. 25-26.

74. Statement by Eugen Keller (guard), October 29, 1970, reproduced in large excerpt in indictment of Bosshammer, pp. 353-58.

75. Judgment against Bosshammer, p. 38.

76. Stengracht to von Papcn (Turkey), July 29, 1944, NG-4993.

77. In Florence, where 500 out of 1,600 Jews had been seized, property amounting to 600 million lire (\$3,150,000) was sequestered. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), May 16, 1944, p. 3. On agricultural property and real estate, see *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), May 17, 1944, p. 2, and *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 23, 1944, p. 2.

Mischlinge to Bergen-Belsen.⁷⁸ Yet another camp was set up in Bolzano, in the Alps, and two small transports were assembled there during the fall. There was still time to dispatch one of them to Auschwitz.⁷⁹

The death camp of Auschwitz was also the destination of the Jews of Trieste and its environs, where Higher SS and Police Leader Globocnik was in charge. Within this zone Jews and non-Jews were herded into a transit camp at San Sabba and moved out in batches together. The number of Globocnik's Jewish victims was in the hundreds —not the hundreds of thousands to which he had become accustomed in Poland, but a significant figure for Trieste nevertheless.⁸⁰

In the end, more than 7,500 Jews were deported from Italy.⁸¹ Among the dead in Auschwitz were retired Adm. Augusto Capon, seventy years old, on crutches, deported in 1943 from Rome,⁸² and Lt. Gen. Armando Bachi, commander of a motorized corps until his forced resignation in 1938, deported in 1943 from Milan.⁸³ Some 800 of the deportees survived.⁸⁴

THE BALKANS

Within the German sphere of influence, the largest concentration of Jews was in the Balkans. About 1,600,000 Jews lived in the southeastern portion of Europe. The deportations there were accomplished with least

78. Judgment against Bosshammer, pp. 27-28, 40, 56-58. Florence fell in August, but Bologna was defended until April 1945. See also Giulia, Marisa, and Gabriella Cardosi, "La questione dei 'marrimom misti' durante la persecuzione razziale in Italia 1938-1945," Estratto dalla Rivista, *Libri e documenti* 3/80-1/81 (Milano). The authors deal with the deportation of their mother, Clara Pirani Cardosi, whose husband was a Christian.

79. Indictment of Bosshammer, p. 387. For a detailed history and description of Bolzano, which housed mostly non-Jewish prisoners, see Juliane Wetzel, "Das Polizeidurchgangslager Bozen," *Dachauer Hefte*, vol. 5 (Munich, 1994), pp. 28-39.

80. Centro di Documentazione, *Ebrei in Italia*, pp. 29-30, and Donati's chart. Donati calculated 837 Trieste deportees, but the figure includes 204 Yugoslav Jews brought there from occupied Croatia. See Daniel Carpi, "The Rescue of the Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia," in Israel Gutman and Efraim Zuroff, eds., *Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 502.

81. See Centro di Documentazione, *Ebrei in Italia*, pp. 7-41, and a list of 6,746 names (including refugees from France in Borgo San Dalmazzo deported to Drancy and refugees from Croatia in Trieste deported to Auschwitz) in Fargion, *Il libro della memoria*, pp. 94-632. Fargion could not identify another 900-1,100 deportees. She adds 303 shot in Italy or dead in prisons or transit camps. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

82. Katz, *Black Sabbath*, p. 190.

83. Entry by Lt. Col. Mordchai Kaplan of Israel Defense Forces in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*, vol. 4, columns 52-53. Also, Fargion, *Il libro della memoria*, p. 123.

84. Fargion, *Il libro della memoria*, p. 27.

difficulty in the military-controlled area of Serbia and Greece. The Jews of Serbia and Greece were annihilated.

Croatia and Slovakia, the two satellites that owed their very existence to Germany, presented to the Germans one major obstacle: the institution of "honorary Aryans" (*Ehrenarier*), "protective letters" (*Schutzbriefe*), and other devices for the exemption of influential, indispensable, or baptized Jews. The reason for these exemptions is that both Croatia and Slovakia were Balkan countries, somewhat backward and rigorously Catholic.

In Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary the Germans encountered considerable difficulties. These three countries were in the German camp because of their opportunism, and all three pursued a policy of maximum gain and minimum loss. They had no understanding for the German all-or-nothing principle. They realized sooner than Germany who was winning the war, and they tried to make arrangements accordingly. That opportunism was of the utmost importance for the development of the destruction process in the three countries.

The Romanians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians did not share the German conception of the "Jewish problem"; they regarded the Jews primarily as a strategic commodity to be traded for political gain. The governments in Bucharest, Sofia, and Budapest knew that Germany wanted to destroy European Jewry, but they also believed that the Allies wanted to preserve the Jews. Hence, when Germany was on the ascent, handing out territory' to her Axis associates, anti-Jewish measures were enacted in a spirit of closeness to the Germans. When Germany was losing and the necessity for some contact with the Allies became apparent, anti-Jewish measures were opposed to appease the Allies.

It is therefore understandable that in all three countries the destruction process was cut off just as soon as the tide had unmistakably turned. The Germans found that at a certain point they were completely stymied in Romania and Bulgaria. Ultimately these two countries slipped away from the Axis fold and joined the Allies as cobelligerents against Germany. Hungary too attempted to make the switch, but it did not succeed. In a daring and desperate maneuver the Germans moved into Hungary. Germany's unhappy ally was kept in the fight, and, as late as the spring of 1944, the bulk of Hungarian Jewry was destroyed.

Military Area "Southeast"

The Serbian-Greek section of the Balkans was, next to the military occupation zone in Russia and the military governments in the West, the third largest German army stronghold in Axis Europe. The planning and design of the anti-Jewish operations in this area followed the pattern of the West, although the conditions in the Balkans more closely resembled

the situation in the Russian East. In fact, so close was the resemblance of circumstances that in Serbia the operation began to look more and more like a replica of the mobile killings in the occupied USSR.

The military organization "Southeast" was established in Serbia and Greece after the smashing of Yugoslav-Greek resistance in the short Balkan campaign of April 1941. Table 8-17 indicates the changes in the southeast command from 1941 to 1944. Until August 26, 1943, military government, i.e., power over civilians (*die vollziehende Gewalt*), and troop command, or power over military units in the area, were concentrated in one person, first List, then Lohr. That same "personal union," or concentration of two offices in one man, applied also to the lower territorial commanders. However, from August to December 1943, military government and troop command were gradually separated.

As a result of this separation, power over civilians was exercised by Felber (who was responsible, in military government matters only, to Keitel), and Generalfeldmarschall von Weichs was confined to the command of troops. Von Weichs thus had no military government powers except in new territories wrested from the Italians as a consequence of Italy's collapse on September 8, 1943. Eventually most of the new territories too were placed, in civilian matters only, under the *Militärbefehlshaber Südost*, Felber. The newly occupied Greek mainland was transferred from Lohr's Army Group E (actually an army and not an army group) to General Felber on October 30, 1943. Six weeks later, on December 12, Montenegro and Albania, heretofore under Rendulic's Second Panzer Army, were similarly subordinated to Felber.

So far as the military correspondence indicates, von Weichs retained military government control only over the island strongholds Corfu, Crete, and the east Aegean group of Rhodes, Kos, and Leros. The islands remained under army group command because of their exposed position. In its entirety the southeast seemed never to have been permanently conquered.

Serbia

In Serbia, the number of Jews was barely 16,000.' Whereas the area was under German control for almost four years, the destruction of the Jewish community was accomplished by May 1942, save for the liquidation of

1. Radcmacher noted an estimate of 20,000 Jews and 1,500 Gypsies. See his memorandum of October 25, 1941, NG-4894. A later report by the Oberbefehlshaber Südost mentioned 16,000 Jews and Gypsies. OB Südost/la to WB Südost/Ic, December 5, 1941, NOKW-1150. The OB Südost was General der Pioniere Kuntze. The *rkmauseitvry* (Belgrade), July 3, 1943, p. 3, gave a figure of 15,000 Jews "according to last reports [*nach letzten Angaben*]

Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost
(12th Army)
List

OB Südost
Lohr

Oberbefehlshaber Südost
Kuntze

Serbia: Schröder, Danckelmann, Böhme, Bader
Salonika- Aegean: von Krenzki

Bader

Bader
von Krenzki

South Greece: Felmy
Croatia:
Crete:
Montenegro:

Felmy, Speidel

Albania:

East Aegean:
Corfu:

Hitler

— | —

ChefOKW:
Keitel

OB Südost
(Army Group E)
Lohr

Oberbefehlshaber Südost
(Army Group F)
von Weichs

Militärbefchls-
haber Südost
Felber

Army Group E 2d Panzer Army
Lohr Rendulic

Bader

Felber

Studnitz, Haarde 1
r Greece

Oct. 1943

Speidel —

— Speidel

Speidel J
Lütters
Brauer

Glaise-Horstenau

Brauer

Keiper
Dec. 1943
von Geib
Dec. 1943

— Keiper

— von Geib

Kleemann
Jäger

some Jewish property. The machinery which carried out that cataclysmic operation may be divided into live offices.

1. The keystone in the administrative structure was the military commander in Serbia: (in succession) Schröder, Danckelmann, Böhme, Bader. The first two of these commanders were called *Befehlshaber in Serbien*. In the fall of 1941 General der Gebirgstruppen Franz Böhme, a former chief of the Austrian General Staff, took over the command. He now had the title “Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia” (*Bevollmächtigter Kommandierender General in Serbien*). In reading documents it is important to keep this title in mind, because there was also a “Commanding General in Serbia” (without the “Plenipotentiary”). That was General Bader. When Böhme left at the end of the year, Bader became the highest territorial officer in Serbia, but he did not inherit Böhme’s title. In diagram form, the command structure under Böhme was as follows:

Böhme —> Chief of Staff: Pemsel
Chief of Administrative Staff
1 (military government): Turner

Bader —> Chief of Staff: Geitner

Two divisions, the 113th and 342d, were placed directly under Böhme; the other units were commanded by Bader. Staatsrat Turner, an old civil servant who had been chief of the Paris district in France, remained as chief of the administrative staff after Böhme’s departure. He played a crucial role in the destruction of the Serbian Jews.

2. Economic matters, particularly Aryanizations, were handled by a special office outside the military hierarchy and responsible to Göring: the General Plenipotentiary for the Economy in Serbia (Dr. Franz Neuhausen).

3. A watchful eye on general political developments was kept by the Foreign Office plenipotentiary, Minister Benzler.

4. Political security was a function of the SS and Police. Like many newly invaded territories, Serbia first had an Einsatzgruppe of the RSHA, commanded by Standartenführer Dr. Fuchs. In January’ 1942 a Higher SS and Police Leader (Meyszner) was installed in Serbia. Under him a Commander of Security Police and SD (Ostuf. Dr. Schäfer) took the place of the Einsatzgruppe commander Fuchs. The Order Police in Serbia consisted of Germans (ca. 3,400) and the Serbian State Guard (*Serbische Staatswache*, ca. 20,000).²

5. Finally, Serbia also had, after August 1941, a puppet regime headed by the former Yugoslav Minister of War, General Milan Nedic.

2. Dalugec to Wolff, February 28, 1943, NO-2861.

The destruction process descended upon the Jews of Serbia with immediate force. Meeting on May 14, 1941, representatives of the military, the economic staff, the SS and Police, and the legation achieved rapid agreement on policy.³ On May 30, 1941, the military administration issued a definition of the Jews (Losener principle), ordered the removal of Jews from public service and the professions, provided for registration of Jewish property, introduced forced labor, forbade the Serbian population to hide Jews (*Beherbergungsverbot*), and ordered the Jewish population to wear the star.⁴ In other words, the first three steps of the destruction process had been introduced in a single day. Of course the confiscation of Jewish property was a somewhat lengthy procedure.

Compulsory Aryanization was decreed on July 22, 1941. The General Plenipotentiary for the Economy, Dr. Neuhausen, slowly went about his business of providing for the transfer of Jewish enterprises to "Aryan" interests. The "Aryan" interests in this case were preponderantly, if not exclusively, German. For instance, the sixteen trustees (*kommisnarische Letter*) listed in the *Donauzeitung* of Belgrade from July 1941 to March 1942 do not include one with a Yugoslav name. The Ethnic Germans were in the saddle again. When houses, business inventory, and personal valuables were sold, Germans serving as occupation personnel were allowed to make purchases at bargain prices.⁵

The proceeds from the sale of the Jewish firms, and ultimately also of the Jewish furniture that was left behind, were confiscated. Serbs who had any kind of Jewish property in their possession were ordered to register such assets. Credits and debts, too, were to be registered. Officially, the beneficiary of the confiscated assets was die "Serb state" of General Nedic.⁶ The Germans, however, withheld 60 percent of the funds; that is, 600 million dinar out of about one billion, to cover claims for war damages suffered by Reich Germans in Serbia.⁷

3. Walter Manoschek, "*Serbien isjudenfrei*" (Munich, 1993), pp. 35-39.

4. In the town of Grossbetscherek (Petrovgrad), an SS unit (not identified) and the local military commander anticipated things. Barely two weeks after the occupation of the town, the local "well-to-do" Jews had to pay a "fine" of 20 million dinar (1 million Reichsmark), and the entire Jewish community (2,000) was ordered to wear a star and move into a ghetto. Hauptmann Rcntsch (Commander, Ortskommandanrur 1/823) to Militarbefehlshaber in Serbia, April 23, 1941, NOKW-1110.

5. Frank Bajohr, *Parvmis und Profiteure—Korruption in dirNS-Zit* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), p. 129.

6. *Dmauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 30, 1942, p. 3.

7. Militarbefehlshaber Sudost/Chef der Militarverwaltung/Wi to Reichsmarschall Goring, attention Ministerialdirigcnt Dr. Ing. Gornnert, March 16, 1944, Siidost 75000/31. One billion Serb dinar = RM 50,000,000 = \$20,000,000, at the official November 1941 rate of exchange. The booty consisted of 1,260 parcels of real estate and 580 firms. For final figures of sales and liquidations, see Karl-Heinz Sell la q\

While the bookkeeping could barely be finished before the occupation ended in 1944, the owners of the property were dealt with much more quickly. In Serbia there was less delay in the killing operation than almost anywhere else, for here the German machine of destruction worked with a particularly dedicated zeal and feverish endeavor to “solve the Jewish problem.”

In Russia the German army had been very nervous about the partisans, and diat same scourge struck the Germans in Serbia. The Serbs dislike foreign domination in practically any form, and German-occupied Serbia was consequently the scene of continuous partisan warfare. As in the case of Russia, so also in Serbia, the German army reacted to the rebellious outbreaks by shooting hostages, especially Jewish hostages.

In the beginning the shootings were carried out on a relatively small scale. For instance, ten Communists and three Jews were shot on July 5, 1941, after packages containing explosives had been discovered on a public square just before a mass meeting of Ethnic Germans was to get under way,⁸ and 122 Communists and “Jewish intellectuals” (mosdy the latter) were shot on July 28 on the ground that someone had attempted to set a German vehicle afire.⁹ During the late summer of 1941, however, two camps were set up, one in Belgrade, the other in Sabac. At the same time, systematic roundups of Jewish men were set in motion in the entire Serbian territory.¹⁰ Apparently the military' was already beginning to think in terms of large-scale shootings of Jews.

These measures attracted attention in the Foreign Office. At the beginning of September a traveling envoy from Berlin joined Foreign Office Plenipotentiary Benzler in Belgrade. The traveler was Edmund Vecsenmayer, a party member, businessman, and Foreign Office trouble-shooter.¹¹ On September 8, 1941, Veesenmayer and Benzler sent a joint dispatch to the Foreign Office, pointing out that, again and again, Jews had participated in sabotage and terrorist acts. Accordingly, Veesenmayer and Benzler proposed that 8,000 Jewish men be removed from Serbia,

Wirtschaft und Besatzung: Serbien 1941-1944 (Wiesbaden and Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 294-302.

8. Befehlshaber in Serbien Kommandnsrab la (signed Heimann) to Wehrmachtbctehlshaber Südost (12rh Army), July 5, 1941, NOKW-1057. War diary, commanding general and Befehlshaber in Serbien la, July 5, 1941, NOKW-902.

9. Befehlshaber in Serbien Ic to Wehrmachtbcbefhlshaber Südost (12th Army), July 27, 1941, NOKW-1057. Benzler to Foreign Office, July 28, 1941, NG-111. *Donauzeitunß* (Belgrade), July 29, 1941, p. 3.

10. Befehlshaber in Serbien la to Wehrmachtbcbfchlshaber Südost (12th Army), September 17, 1941, NOKW-1057.

11. On Veesenmayer career, see his affidavit of May 27, 1947, NG-1628. At the time of his arrival in Serbia, he was thirty-four years old.

perhaps in barges moving downstream on the Danube to the delta of the river in Romania.¹²

Two days later the two diplomats sent an even more urgent message to Berlin:

Quick and draconic settlement of Serbian Jewish question is most urgent and appropriate necessity. Request authorization from the Foreign Minister to put maximum pressure on Militärbefehlshaber in Serbia. No opposition is to be expected from the Serb [puppet] government.¹³

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was not enthusiastic about the plan. He indicated that one could not dump Serbian Jews on Romanian soil without Romania's consent.¹⁴ Undeterred by the lack of higher approval, Benzler sent another message to Berlin, explaining that the Sabac camp, then holding 1,200 Jews, was practically on the firing line and that the Jews had to be deported.¹⁵

Upon receipt of that communication, Abteilung Deutschland's expert in Jewish affairs, Rademacher, consulted Sturmbannführer Baatz (RSHA IV-D-4), who dealt with Gestapo matters in occupied territories, about the feasibility of the proposal. Baatz pointed out that deportations were out of the question; not even the Reich Jews could be deported yet. Rademacher then turned to Adolf Eichmann for advice. The RSHA's expert on Jewish affairs had a remedy: "Eichmann proposes shooting."¹⁶ The idea appealed to Rademacher very much, and on September 13 he wrote Luther that there was really no necessity for deporting the 1,200 Jews in the Sabac camp. The shooting of "a large number" of hostages would solve the problem just as well.¹⁷

On September 28, 1941, however, another message was received from Serbia. Benzler now explained that General Böhme, the plenipotentiary commanding general, wanted to deport all 8,000 Jewish men in Serbia. Böhme could not place 8,000 people into camps; besides, the general had heard that deportations had successfully been carried out in other countries, such as die Protektorat.¹⁸ The tone of the letter aroused Abteilung

12. Vecsncmayer and Benzler to Foreign Office, September 8, 1941, NG-3354.

13. Vecsncmayer and Benzler to Foreign Office, September 10, 1941, NG-3354.

14. Sonnleithner via Wormann to Weizsäcker, September 10, 1941, NG-3354.

Luther to Benzler, September 11, 1941, NG-3354.

15. Benzler to Foreign Office, September 12, 1941, NG-3354.

16. Notation by Rademacher on Benzler report, NG-3354. For details of this episode, see Christopher Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office* (New York, 1978), p. 58.

17. Rademacher to Luther, September 13, 1941, NG-3354.

18. Benzler to Rademacher, September 28, 1941, NG-3354.

Deutschland's Luther. Addressing Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, he wrote on October 2, 1941:

It is my opinion that the military' commander is responsible for the immediate elimination of those 8,000 Jews. In other territories [Russia] other military commanders have taken care of considerably greater numbers of Jews without even mentioning it.

Luther then proposed having a discussion with Heydrich (then Reichsprotektor in Prague, but expected to visit Berlin momentarily) for the purpose of clearing up the question.¹⁹ But on that very' day, October 2, 1941, things were already happening in Serbia.

At the town of Topola a truck convoy of Company 2, 521st Signal Battalion, was ambushed by partisans. Twenty-one men were killed immediately; another died later. Two days later General Böhme instructed the 342d Division and the 449th Signal Battalion to shoot 2,100 inmates of the Sabac and Belgrade camps.²⁰ The ice was broken.

The shootings started on October 9. To make sure that the victims were Jews and Gypsies only, a detachment of the Einsatzgruppe in Serbia screened the inmates and prepared them for killing. This was a reversal of functions, for in Russian camps the Wehrmacht had done the screening and the Einsatzgruppen the shooting. Now the army did the "dirty work."²¹

On October 10 Böhme decided to go all the way. He ordered the "sudden" (*schlagartige*) arrest of all Communists and suspected Communists, "all Jews" (*sämtliche Juden*), and a "certain number" of "nationalistically and democratically inclined inhabitants." The arrested victims were to be shot according to the following key: for every dead German soldier or Ethnic German, a hundred hostages; for every wounded German soldier or Ethnic German, fifty hostages. (This was the key Böhme had applied to the Topola ambush.) Limiting the role of the SS in the killings, Böhme specified that the shootings were to be carried out by the troops and that if

19. Luther to Weizsäcker, October 2, 1941, NG-3354. Also, Luther to Radeniacher, October 3, 1941, NG-5224.

20. Böhme to Chief of Military Administration, 342d Infantry' Division, 449th Signal Battalion, October 4, 1941, NOKW-192. Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost lc/AO to OKW / Wehrmachtführungsstab / Abteilung Landesverteidigung (Warlimont), October 9, 1941, NOKW-251. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 120, October 21, 1941, NO-3402. Reports from the Einsatzgruppe in Serbia were sandwiched into the reports from the Einsatzgruppen in Russia. Böhme availed himself of Keitel's instructions to shoot Communists as hostages. Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office*, pp. 60-61.

21. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 108, October 9, 1941, NO-3156. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 119, October 20, 1941, NO-3404.

possible, the executions were to be performed by the unit that suffered the losses.²² Straight revenge on the Jews. At first there was some doubt as to whether the hostage order also applied to women, but that question was clarified in the negative. Only men were to be shot.²³

The army was now fully involved in the destruction process. Having introduced the first steps into Serbia, the military was about to carry out the last steps also. The divisions were mobilized for the *schlagartige Aktion*, the sudden and quick roundup of the Jewish male population. Feldkommandanturen, Kreiskommandanturen, the police, and the Serbian mayors were pressed into service.²⁴

Staatsrat Turner, the chief of civil administration under Böhme, explained to the field commands the necessity for the Aktion. "Basically, one must remember that Jews and Gypsies quite generally are an element of insecurity and thereby a danger to public order and peace. It is the Jewish intellect that has brought on this war and that must be annihilated. The Gypsy," continued Turner, "cannot, by reason of his inner and outer makeup [*Konstruktion*], be a useful member of an international society [*Völkergemeinschaft*]"²⁵

Attending to the more immediate problems of the operation, Böhme issued "special instructions for the implementation of shootings [*Einzelanordnungen für Durchführung von Erschiessungen*]" These instructions equal in detail any order the Einsatzgruppen ever got. The shooting detachments were to be officer led, the shootings were to be carried out with rifles from a distance of eight to ten yards, there was a provision for simultaneous aiming at head and chest. "To avoid unnecessary touching of corpses," Böhme ordered that the candidates for shooting stand at the edge of the grave. In mass shootings, he said, it would be appropriate to have the hostages kneel facing the grave. Each Kommando was to be accompanied by a military doctor, who was to give the order for any mercy shots. Clothes and shoes were to be handed over to the local military officer, and under no circumstances were personal effects to be handed out to the population.²⁶

22. Order by Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia/Chief of Military Administration (signed Böhme), October 10, 1941, NOKW-557.

23. Git. Max Pemsel (Böhme's chief of staff) to Gfm. List, October 19, 1941, NOKW-197. Staatsrat Turner to all Feldkommandanturen and Kreiskommandanturen in Serbia (20 copies), October 26, 1941, NOKW-802.

24. Affidavit by Git. Friedrich Stahl (Commander, 714th Division), June 12, 1947, NOKW-1714.

25. Turner to Feld- and Kreiskommandanturen (20 copies), October 26, 1941, NOKW-802.

26. Böhme to LXV corps, 704th Division, 764th Division, October 25, 1941, NOKW-907.

The army's experience with the shootings was similar to that of the Einsatzgruppen in Russia. We have a report on such an operation by a company commander, Oberleutnant Walther, whose unit (Company 9 of the 433d Regiment) was engaged in extensive killings at the Belgrade camp. When Company 9 removed hostages from the camp enclosure, the wives of the Jews were assembled outside, "crying and howling" (*die heulten und schrien, als wir abfuhren*). Baggage and valuables of the victims were collected and delivered by truck to the NSV (*Volkswohlfahrt*, or Welfare Agency). At the killing site three light machine guns and twelve riflemen were posted as security. "The digging of ditches takes a long time," observed Walther, "while the shooting itself is very quick (100 men, 40 minutes)."

Walther then noted some differences in the behavior of Jews and Gypsies. "The shooting of Jews is easier than the shooting of Gypsies," he said. "One has to admit that the Jews are very composed when they go to their death [*sehr gefasst in den Tod gehen*] —they stand still —while the Gypsies cry out, howl, and move constantly, even when they are already standing on the shooting ground. Some of them even jumped into the ditch before the volley and pretended to be dead."

As for the effects of the shootings upon his own men, Walther had this to say: "In the beginning my men were not impressed [*nicht beeindruckt*]. However, on the second day it became obvious that one or another did not have the nerve to carry out shootings over a lengthy period of time. It is my personal impression that during the shooting one does not have psychological blocks [*seelische Hemmungen*]. They set in, however, if after several days one reflects about it on evenings, alone [*Diese stellen sich jedoch ein, wenn man nach Tagen abends in Ruhe darüber nachdenkt*]"²⁷

As the shootings took their course, the military administration was not unaware of a basic contradiction: the insurgents were Serbs and Croats;

27. 734th Inf. Regiment to 704th Division, November 4, 1941, enclosing report by Obit. Walther (Commander, 9th Company, 433d Regiment), dated November 1, 1941, NOKW-905. See also affidavit by a Yugoslav eyewitness, Milorad-Mica Jclesic, February 25, 1945, Nuremberg document J-29. Jclesic, a peasant who was employed to collect valuables at a shooting, observed Jews and Gypsies bound to stakes. He reports also that the Germans took many photographs of the event. For the background and details of the shooting operation, see Manoschek, "*Serbien istjudenfni*" pp. 55-102, 185-89. Manoschek points to the many Austrians in the military in Serbia. He also mentions, among the victims, several hundred Jewish men of the so-called Kladovo transport. Some thousand Jewish men and women had left Vienna in November 1939 for Palestine by slow boat via the Danube. When the river iced over in December, the group remained in Yugoslavia and was housed in Kladovo. About 200 succeeded in reaching Palestine, and the remainder was caught in the German invasion. The history of the transport is described by Gabriele Andrcrl and Walter Manoschek, *Gescheiterte Flucht* (Vienna, 1993).

the hostages were Jews and Gypsies. This awareness was revealed in a private letter written by Staatsrat Turner to the Higher SS and Police leader in Danzig, Gruppenführer Hildebrandt, on October 17, 1941. Turner thanked Hildebrandt for a birthday present, a little book, “which will be a welcome diversion in the eternal monotony [*in dem ewigen Einerlei*] of my present job.”

Having gotten over the introduction, Turner wrote: “That the devil is loose here you probably know [*Dass hier der Teufel los ist, weisst Du ja wohl!*]” There was murder, sabotage, etc. Five weeks before, Turner had put 600 men to the wall, then 2,000, more recently, 1,000; “and in between [*zwischen* durch] I had 2,000 Jews and Gypsies shot during the last eight days in accordance with the quota 1:100 for bestially murdered German soldiers, and another 2,200 again almost exclusively Jews, will be shot in the next eight days. This is not a pretty business [*Eine schöne Arbeit ist das nicht*]. At any rate, it has to be, if only to make clear to these people what it means to even attack a German soldier, and, for the rest, the Jewish question solves itself most quickly this way.”

“Actually,” Turner continued, “it is false, if one has to be precise about it [*wenn man es genau nimmt*], that for murdered Germans, on whose account the ratio 1:100 should really be borne by Serbs, 100 Jews are shot instead; but the Jews we had in the camps — after all, they too are Serb nationals, and besides, they have to disappear. At any rate, I don’t have to accuse myself that on my part there has been any lack of necessary ruthless action [*Rücksichtslosigkeit des Durchgreifens*] for the preservation of German prestige and the protection of members of the German Wehrmacht.”²⁸

In Berlin, Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office was troubled by still another question: Hadn’t the German Minister, Benzler, pushed things a little too much? Were shootings any business of the Foreign Office? In a carefully worded note to Abteilung Deutschland, Weizsäcker pointed out that Benzler had to concern himself with the transport of Jews from Serbia to other countries. “On the other hand,” said Weizsäcker, “it is beyond Benzler’s and the Foreign Office’s task to take an active part in decisions on how the competent military and interior jurisdictions should overcome the Jewish question within the Serbian frontiers.” The agencies involved were receiving their instructions from places other than

28. Turner to Hildebrandt, October 17, 1941, NO-5810. Reports on the German prestige were, incidentally, collected by the OKW/Ausland-Abwehr. Thus one informant, who was a lawyer and board member of various German firms, wrote after a trip to Hungary that “the shootings of the Jews in Belgrade were reported to me by three different Hungarians, in part with little friendly commentary [*Du* Judetierschiessungen in Belgrad ivurden mir von 3 verschiedenen Ungarn berichtet, tets mit ivenuj freundlichen Kommentar*].” Report by Amt Ausland-Abwehr, December 13, 1941, Wi/IF 2.24.

the Foreign Office. Weizsäcker had told Minister Benzler this very fact that day, and he thought it appropriate to repeat the rebuke in writing.²⁹

This time, however, Luther took Benzler under his wing. After all, it was Benzler who had urged deportation, and it was Luther who had rammed down the “territorial solution.” Luther therefore replied that in view of Ribbentrop’s decision to submit the question of the 8,000 Jews to a discussion with Heydrich (now no longer necessary), Benzler was acting in accordance with Ribbentrop’s wishes when he intervened “in this certainly rather delicate matter.”³⁰

The reason for Weizsäcker’s annoyance and for Luther’s reference to the “delicacy” of the matter was of course the fact that the publicized shootings had evoked protests from neutral countries. Weizsäcker was the recipient of these protests. In 1941, at any rate, most countries were still under the impression that the inordinate shooting of hostages was contrary to international law, and the Foreign Office was consequently deluged with representations from such states as Mexico and Haiti.

On December 5 the papal representative was about to make a protest. In Weizsäcker’s words: “The nuncio today groped around to the well-known subject of hostages, in order to determine whether a discussion between him and me about the question of shooting hostages — of late in Serbia — would be fruitful [*erspriesslich*]. I replied to the nuncio that, among all foreign governments that have concerned themselves with this question, the Vatican had conducted itself most cleverly [*am Klügsten*], in that it took the hint I had furtively extended to Papal Counselor Colli upon a social occasion. If the Vatican should nevertheless feel constrained to return to this subject, I would be obliged to give to the nuncio the same answer that Mexico, Haiti, and other governments had received already. The nuncio saw this point completely and pointed out that he had not really touched this topic and that he had no desire to touch it.”³¹

While the German army was completing the shooting of 4,000 to 5,000 Jewish men in their prime of life,³² it stopped short of killing the old men, the women, and the children, for “it was contrary to the viewpoint [*Auffassung*] of the German soldier and civil servant to take women as hostages,” unless the women were actually wives or relatives of insurgents fighting in the mountains.³³ The Jewish women and children consequently had to be “evacuated.”

29. Weizsäcker to Abteilung Deutschland, November 22, 1941, NG-3354.

30. Luther to Weizsäcker, December 12, 1941, NG-3354.

31. Weizsäcker to Wörmann, von Erdmannsdorff, and Legationsrat Haidlen, December 5, 1941, NG-4519.

32. Not 8,000, as had originally been planned — see memorandum by Rademacher, October 25, 1941, NG-4894.

33. Turner to Feld- and Kreiskommandanturen, October 26, 1941, NOKW-802.

At the end of October, Minister Benzler, Staatsrat Turner, and Standartenführer Fuchs, joined by the Foreign Office's Jewish expert, Radmacher, were considering various methods of quietly removing the women and children. The bureaucrats planned a ghetto in the city of Belgrade, but Staatsrat Turner, who did not like ghettos, urged the quick removal of the Jews to a transit camp on a Danubian island at Mitrovica, not far from the Serbian capital.³⁴ When the proposed Danubian island turned out to be under water, the choice fell upon Semlin (Zemun), a town (opposite Belgrade) originally under the jurisdiction of the Befehlshaber in Serbia but now transferred to Croatia. The friendly Croatian government gave its permission for the construction of a camp in Semlin.³⁵ The site consisted of former exposition grounds, which were converted into barracks by the Organisation Todt. The bill was sent to Turner and paid by Neuhausen, presumably from the proceeds of confiscated Jewish property.³⁶

On November 3, 1941, Turner instructed the Feld- and Kreiskommandanturen to start counting the Jewish women and children in all Serbian towns.³⁷ Preparations were completed in December.³⁸ Troop units began to move the families of the dead hostages to Semlin, where Commander of Security Police and SD (BdS) Schäfer waited for his victims. As the Jews arrived, they were accommodated in the camp. Food was shipped in by the Mayor of Belgrade, Jovanovic.³⁹ It consisted mainly of potatoes and cabbage, much of it rotted, some 7 ounces of daily bread per person, and 42 quarts of milk daily for 300 children.⁴⁰ The guards on the outside perimeter came from the 64th Reserve Police Battalion. Inside, a Scharführer, Enge, was in charge. At the end of January, his place was taken by an Untersturmführer, Andorfer, who reported to Schäfer's Gestapo chief, Sturmbannführer Sattler. Andorfer, an Austrian, sometimes played cards and drank coffee with Jewish women in the camp. In early March, a special vehicle arrived from Berlin. It was a gas van.⁴¹

34. Memorandum by Radmacher, October 25, 1941, NG-3354. On this mission Rademacher was accompanied by Sturmbannführer Suhr of Eichmann's office. Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office*, p. 62.

35. Rademacher to Luther, December 8, 1941, NG-3354.

36. Christopher Browning, *Fateful Months* (New York, 1986), p. 70.

37. Turner to Feld- and Kreiskommandanturen (20 copies), November 3, 1941, NOKW-801.

38. Oberbefehlshaber Südost/Ia to Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost (12th Amiv) Ic, December 5, 1941, NOKW-1150.

39. Browning, *Fateful Months*, pp. 70-71.

40. Menachem Shelach, "Sajmiste — An Extermination Camp in Serbia," *FloUmist and Genocide Studies 2* (1987) : 247, 257 n. Sajmiste = Semlin.

41. Browning, *Fateful Months*, pp. 75-80. Manoschek, "Serbien ist judenfrt,"

“It was certainly not easy for me,” Andorfer explained twenty years later, “to continue to be with these people, with whom I got along well and among whom I already knew some individuals, and to pretend in my conversations with them that they would be sent away for labor, when I already knew they would be killed.”⁴² Every day except Sundays and holidays, batches of women and children were loaded on the van and driven several hundred yards to a damaged Sava River bridge on which traffic had to alternate. On the Belgrade side, the hose was connected with the van’s interior and the vehicle moved with the dying Jews through the city to a shooting range where graves had been dug by Serbian prisoners. A small detachment of men from the 64th Police Battalion, under Polizeimeister Wetter, supervised the burial.⁴³

The depopulation of the camp proceeded apace. In March 1942 the inmate count fluctuated between 5,000 and 6,000.⁴⁴ In April the number dropped to 2,974, and on May 10 the operation was over.⁴⁵ Up to 8,000 died in the camp or in the van.⁴⁶ Counting those that were shot, the toll was close to 15,000. Gratified, Dr. Schafer reported that apart from Jews in mixed marriages there was no longer any Jewish problem in Serbia

pp. 175-84. On correspondence about the vehicle, see OStubaf. Schafer to Srubaf. Pradcl (RSHA II-D-3-a), which was the Technical Office/Security Police Motor Vehicles Referat, June 9, 1942, PS-501.

42. Statement by Herbert Andorfer, July 12, 1967, Landesgericht für Strafsachen, Vienna, 27e Vr 2260/67, in Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, E 20951.

43. Browning, *Fateful Months*, pp. 79-85. Manoschek, “Serbien ist judenfrei,” pp. 175-84. Detailed court statements by Edgar Enge and others may be found in the Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, E 20951.

44. Bader to Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost, copies to General Plenipotentiary for the Economy, Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office, Higher SS and Police Leader, *Abwehrstelle* (Counterintelligence Office) Belgrade, Ia, Qu, Ic, Adm., War diary, March 10, 1942, NOKW-1221. Bader to WB Südost (same distribution), March 20, 1942, NOKW-1221. Bader to WB Südost (same distribution), March 31, 1942, NOKW-1221.

45. *Kommandierender General and Befehlshaber Serbien*/Chief of Staff (signed Oberst Kewisch) to WB Südost, April 20, 1942, NOKW-1444. *Kommandierender General and Befehlshaber Serbien*/Chief of Staff (signed Obstlt. Kogard) to WB Südost, *Kampfgruppe* (Combat Group) General Bader, Plenipotentiary Foreign Office, General Plenipotentiary Economy, Higher SS and Police Leader, German Liaison Staff with 2d Italian Army, Counterintelligence Office Belgrade, German Liaison Officer with Bulgarian Occupation Corps, Adm. Staff, Ia, OQu, Ic, War diary, April 30, 1942, NOKW-1444.

46. Among the gassed were 700 patients and personnel seized in the Jewish hospital of Belgrade and some Jewish men from another camp. Shlach, “Sajmiste,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 2 (1987): 253. His numerical analysis leading to an 8,000 total is in *ibid.*, pp. 254-56. For inmate counts in German army reports not used by Shlach see NOKW-1221, NOKW-977, and NOKW-1444.

(keine Judenfrage mehr).⁴⁷ At the same time he returned to Berlin the gas van, which was to see further service in White Russia.^{47 48}

When Generaloberst Lohr took over as *Oberbefehlshaber Südost* in August 1942, Staatsrat Turner jotted down a few notes for a personal report to his new chief. In this report Turner itemized all the achievements of the previous administration. With considerable satisfaction he wrote down a unique accomplishment: “Serbia only country in which Jewish question and Gypsy question solved [*Serbien einziges Land in dem Judenfrage und Zigeunerfrage gelöst*],”⁴⁹

Greece

When Greece was overrun in 1941, it was carved into three sections. In the north, a large portion of Thrace, which held between 5,000 and 6,000 Jews, was incorporated into Bulgaria. The fate of these Jews was to be decided in the context of Germany’s relations with the Bulgarians. Outside Thrace, the country was divided into Italian and German zones, and a puppet government in Athens directed the Greek administration in both areas. The Italian region was more extensive than the German, in recognition of Italy’s primary interest in Greece. The Italian army had been the first to attack the Greeks, and notwithstanding its reverses on that front, Italy was still Germany’s most important ally.

Although the Italians held most of the Greek territory, the Germans had acquired most of the Greek Jews. About 13,000 Jews lived in the Italian zone, but the number of Jewish inhabitants in German-dominated Macedonia and eastern Thrace (Salonika-Aegean) was over 55,000. The prewar Jewish population of the city of Salonika alone was 53,000. That was geographic fate.¹

The Salonika Jews were no longer at their peak in 1941. At the beginning of the century, before the Balkan Wars, they were the largest group in a city of Jews and Turks, and they constituted a Judeo-Spanish-speaking enclave in what was then still part of the Ottoman Empire. During the First World War, under Greek rule, their decline began. In 1917 a fire gutted the city and the Jews literally became homeless. During the following years, much private land was expropriated for reconstruc-

47. Report by Hauptmann Lccb (OB Südost/Id), June 1942, NOKW-926.

48. Schafer to Pradel, June 9, 1942, PS-501. Rauff (Chief, RSHA II-D) to BdS Ostland, June 22, 1942, PS-501.

49. Note by Turner for personal report to Lohr, August 29, 1942, NOKVV-1486. To Nedic he expressed a similar sentiment. Memorandum by Turner, March 28, 1942, Südost 75000/2.

1. Based upon statistics compiled by Josef Nchama in Michael Molho, ed.. *In Memoriam — Hofnungfle aux victimes juives des Nazi en Grèce* (Salonika, 1948), vol. 2, p. 164.

tion, and the owners were paid in devalued currency. A population exchange with Turkey resulted in an exodus of the city's Turks and an influx of Greeks from Asia Minor. Anti-Jewish episodes occurred, and thousands of Jews, among them professionals and skilled workers, emigrated to Palestine and elsewhere.² This reduced community became the first object of the German assault.

As early as the beginning of October 1941, Himmler obtained Hitler's authorization to proceed against the Jews of Salonika,³ but for a long time there was no action. The delay may well have been the product of several factors, including the scarcity of SS and Police personnel, the logistics of transporting the Jews all the way to Poland, and a desire to coordinate measures with the Italians. At least, so far as the Italians were concerned, German efforts in Greece were as fruitless as they had been everywhere else.

On July 13, 1942, the German commander in Salonika-Aegean (Generalleutnant von Krenzki) struck the first blow at the Greek *Judenmetropole* ("Jewish metropolis"). On that day, at 8 a.m., 6,000 to 7,000 Jewish men between the ages of eighteen and forty-eight were lined up in huge blocks on "Liberty Square" in Salonika to be registered for forced labor.⁴ A large number of the "fit" Jews were sent to work in malaria-infested swamps, where many a victim perished from sickness and starvation.⁵ Others toiled in chromium mines.⁶ A few months later, the Jewish Community of Salonika paid a sum of money to the *Militarbefehlshaber* to buy the liberty of the forced laborers.⁷ When the Jews in the chromium mines were released, *Oberberghauptmann* Gabel of the Economy Ministry protested against the loss of this urgently needed workforce.⁸

As the forced labor system was put into effect, the Salonika Jews began

2. Steven Bowman, "The Jews in Wartime Greece," *Jewish Social Studies* 48 (1986): 45-62. "Salonika," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*. "Solonico" *Enciclopedia Italiana*.

3. Diary of Gerhard Engel (army adjutant in Hitler's headquarters), entry of October 2, 1941, in Hildgard von Kotze, ed., *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler* (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 111. Keitel was present at this meeting. The date is approximate.

4. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), July 14, 1942, p. 3. Photograph in *Donauzeitung* of July 26, 1942, p. 3.

5. Cecil Roth, "The Last Days of Jewish Salónica," *Commentary*, July 1950, pp. 50-51. The author, a historian, interviewed survivors and examined the community records after the war.

6. Memorandum of discussion between Gabel (Economy Ministry/Mincs) and Major Dr. Baetz, October 31, 1942, German Federal Archives, R 7/890.

7. Testimony by Yitzhak Nchama, Eichmann trial, Jerusalem, May 22, 1961, scss. 47, pp. SI, Ul.

8. Memorandum of discussion between Gabel and Baetz, October 31, 1942, German Federal Archives, R 7/890.

TABLE 8-18
DEPORTATION MACHINERY IN SALONIKA

Bfh. Salonika-Aegean/
 Military Administration Division
 KVR Merten-----

Aussenstelle SP u SD/
 IV-B-4
 HStuf. Wisliceny

President of Jewish Community
 Chief Rabbi Koretz

Note: The Befehlshaber was then Gen. Haarde. The chief of the Aussenstelle was Paschleben. During the middle of March, Wisliceny became independent of Paschleben by assuming the direction of a Sonderkommando für Judenanzußeßenbaten in Salonika.

to emigrate to the Italian zone.⁹ The Germans sought to check this flow by inviting the Italian administration to cooperate in the joint introduction of a Jewish star. The Italians refused any such cooperation.¹⁰

In January 1943, Eichmann's deputy, Günther, arrived in Saloniki to survey the situation. He was followed in early February by two RSHA emissaries, Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny and Hauptsturmführer Brunner (Vienna), who were accompanied by a small group of underlings, to carry out the operation.¹¹ As soon as the two men arrived, they went into conference with Generalkonsul Schönberg of the Foreign Office; Kriegsverwaltungstat Merten (representing the Befehlshaber Salonika-Aegean, then Generalleutnant Haarde), and Kriminalkommissar Paschleben, the local commander of Security Police and SD. There were no special problems. Merten demanded only the temporary retention of 3,000 Jews for railway construction by the Organisation Todt on the understanding that these Jews would be released for deportation before the completion of the Aktion.¹² The operation could begin.

The uprooting and deportation process in Salonika was accomplished with unprecedented rapidity in the space of a few months. Three men were instrumental in bringing the Aktion to such a speedy conclusion: Kriegsverwaltungsrat Merten, Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny, and Chief Rabbi Koretz. The hierarchical relationship between these three officials is shown in Table 8-18.

Dr. Merten was in charge of all civilian affairs in the district. He had

9. Luther via Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, October 22, 1942, NG-4960.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Testimony by Wisliceny, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, IV, 363. Hans Saffian, *Die Eichmann-Männer* (Vienna, 1993), pp. 229-3S.

12. Affidavit by Wisliceny, November 29, 1945, *Conspiracy and Aggression*, Mil, 606-21.

overall responsibility for what was happening to civilians in his area, and he never relinquished that responsibility. In fact, many of the orders received by the Jewish community came from Dr. Merten himself. All other orders were issued by Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny in pursuance of an express authorization by the Kriegsverwaltungsrat.¹³

Wisliceny was, of course, an expert in Jewish matters. His sole task was to see to it that all Jews were deported as quickly as possible. To fulfill this assignment, he made maximum use of the Jewish community leadership. The Jewish leader, Chief Rabbi Dr. Koretz, was an Eastern Jew with a Western education; the Salonika Jews had chosen him as their spokesman because they felt that a German-speaking emissary would be most effective in dealing with the German overlords. In Koretz the Jews actually had a leader who believed in “unquestioning compliance.”¹⁴ He was an ideal tool for the German bureaucrats.

The Salonika operation was launched by Kriegsverwaltungsrat Merten with an order to the Jewish community dated February 6, 1943.¹⁵ The directive contained two operative provisions: (1) All Jews, excepting only the possessors of foreign passports, were to be marked; similarly, Jewish stores were to be identified by means of shields bearing Greek and German inscriptions; (2) All Jews, again excepting the foreign Jews, were to move into a ghetto. Both orders were to be carried out by February 25, 1943.

Within the next few days implementation directives rained down upon the Jewish community. On February 12 Wisliceny communicated to Rabbi Koretz a definition in accordance with which a person was a Jew if he had three or four Jewish grandparents, or if he had two Jewish grandparents and (a) belonged to the Jewish religion on April 1, 1941 (that is, just prior to the German invasion of Greece), or (b) was the offspring of an extramarital relationship and was born after that date.¹⁶ In the same letter to Koretz the methodical Wisliceny also described the Jewish star, its size, material, and so on. He directed the Jewish community to hand out an identification card with each star. The cards were to be numbered consecutively, and the number on each card was to be inscribed on the yellow cloth star to be worn by the card-holder. Wisliceny ordered that every Jew who had reached the age of five wear the Jewish star and that in

13. Befehlshaber, Salonika-Aegean/Military Administration (signed Merten) to Jewish community in Salonika, February 6, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, p. 135.

14. Roth, “Salonica,” *Commentary*, July 1950, p. 51.

15. Merten to Jewish community, February 6, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, p. 135.

16. There was a minor omission in the definition. Wisliceny had left out Christian half-Jews married to Jews.

the case of mixed marriages the Jewish partner be marked. "Petitions for exemptions from the identification" wrote the all-powerful Wisliceny, "are useless."¹⁷ In a subsequent directive Wisliceny defined the term "Jewish enterprise," ordered Jewish doctors and lawyers to mount stars in their offices, and required Jewish tenants to identify their apartments.¹⁸

While the Jewish community was turning out 100,000 stars at top speed,¹⁹ orders were received to move into a ghetto. The Salonika Ghetto was to be divided into several noncontiguous sections, completely severed from one another.²⁰ Jews were forbidden to leave their quarters. The use of trolleycars, buses, and taxis was prohibited. Public telephones were closed to Jews, and all private phones had to be surrendered to the Greek telephone company, accompanied by payment of all outstanding bills.²¹

The division into ghetto sections was part of a definite plan. The poorest Jews were sent into the Baron de Hirsch quarter near the railway station. This particular section was fenced in, and at the three entrances signs were mounted forbidding passage in German, Greek, and Ladino.²² The Baron de Hirsch Jews were to be the first to go, and the emptied quarter was then to be filled with victims from the other ghetto sections. In short, the Salonika Jews were to be deported, section by section, via the Baron de Hirsch houses, which were to serve as a funnel leading to the death transports.

On February 13 Merten invested Koretz with authority over all Jews in the German Befehlshaber's area, both inside and outside the city, in order to facilitate a "uniform solution" of the Jewish question in the entire district.²³ Shortly thereafter Merten called Koretz for an audience. The German officer explained to the rabbi that the Jewish population had no

17. Wisliceny to Koretz, February' 12, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, pp. 136-37. Wisliceny's last pronouncement notwithstanding, petitions were not entirely useless. See, for example, the certificate signed by Merten and dated March 30, 1943, exempting the Greek Jew Morris Raphael from wearing the star because he was married to a non-Jewish Frenchwoman with whom he "possessed four children." *Ibid.*, p. 37.

18. Wisliceny to Koretz, February 17, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 140.

19. Apparently two stars per person. Roth, "Salónica," *Commentary*, July 1950, p. 52.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

21. Merten to Jewish community, February' 13, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, p. 138. Doctors and Jewish community officials were allowed to retain their vehicles.

22. Roth, "Salónica," *Commentary*, July 1950, p. 53. Ladino, a Spanish dialect mixed with Hebrew, was spoken by Greek Jews in Salonika.

23. Merten to Koretz, February' 13, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, p. 13^.

cause for worry. The Baron de Hirsch ghetto would have to be emptied because a large number of Communists in that section were threatening the safety of the occupation army, but these Jews would not be harmed. The emigrants would take up life anew in the Polish city of Krakow, where the local Jewish community would welcome them with open arms.²⁴

Koretz returned to the ghetto and informed the victims of their forthcoming trip to Poland. He assured them that they would find new homes there, that the Jewish community in Krakow would receive them with open arms, that each man would find employment in die Polish city, and so on. It was a disquieting explanation, but the Jews made their preparations. Polish paper money was distributed, the permitted items were packed, and the deportees were marched off to the trains.²⁵

Within hours the Germans struck again. The ghetto section in the Aghia Paraskevi district was surrounded, and its inhabitants were driven to the Baron de Hirsch quarter. Again the rabbi was summoned to German headquarters. This time he was told that all the common sections were infested with Communists but that the middle classes living in the center of the city had nothing to fear. Once more, feverish preparations gripped the Baron de Hirsch quarter. Family possessions were packed, plans were made, and young couples concluded hasty marriages to face life together in the East.²⁶ When the Aghia Paraskevi Jews were deported, the Germans seized the middle class.

In the course of these seizures, the Security Police arrested a Jewish physician, Dr. Cuenca, who had been exempted from the star as an employee of the International Red Cross. This man and his wife were quickly shipped to Auschwitz. When the International Red Cross representative, Roger Burckhardt, inquired about the Cuencas, the Germans asserted that the physician had fled.²⁷ Following this incident a special messenger brought Rabbi Koretz a note from Merten.²⁸ The Kriegsverwaltungsrat announced that twenty-five hostages would be seized, to be shot upon the slightest indication of any further Jewish "opposition" (*Zunderhandlung*). Henceforth Jews were permitted to be in the streets only between 10a .m. and 4 p.m., and anyone caught in the open outside these hours would be shot on sight by German and Greek police. The

24. Albert Menasche, *Birkenau* (New York, 1947), p. 12. Menasche, a Jewish doctor who resided in Salonika, was a survivor.

25. Roth, "Salomca," *Commentary*, July 1950, p. 53.

26. *Ibid.*, Menasche, *Birkenau*, p. 13.

27. Satnan, *Die Eitbmann-Mdnner*, p. 245.

28. Merten to Jewish community, March 21, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, p. 144.

Jewish police (*Ordner*) and the foreign Jews alone, he specified, were exempted from this provision.

By the middle of March no one was safe anymore, not the privileged Jews, not the professionals, and not the Jewish community leaders themselves. But the Germans did not cease their attempts to keep the populace quiet. At the end of May a transport was given to understand that its destination was Theresienstadt. The news caused a big commotion, as zloty were hurriedly exchanged for Reichsmark.²⁹ The Jewish community organization was kept busy. It was made responsible for the seizure of all movable assets left behind by the “resettled Jews” (*cmsgesiedelte Juden*),³⁰ and on March 29 Wisliceny sent to the chief rabbi a complete table of reorganization for die Jewish community, with a note requesting Koretz to submit by April 1 a statement of personnel needs and a work program for the future.³¹ Not to be disguised, however, was the usability of the new offices for deportations:

Koretz

Advisory Committee

Central Secretariat

Finance Division

Records Division (to keep records of the “population movement”)

Division for Resettlement and Commission for Labor Allocation in
Camp “Baron Hirsch”

Division for Health and Cemeteries

Division for Public Kitchens and Supplies

Jewish Police (*Ordner*) Division

Division for Cash and Valuables (to be headed by Koretz personally)

Following another meeting with Wisliceny and Brunner on April 4, Koretz concluded that the deportations would not stop. Now he sought the help of the Greek puppet government, and after a week of petitioning he was able to see Premier Rhallis in the palace of the Metropolitan of Salonika. There he apparently lost his composure and tearfully asked for Rhallis’s intervention, lest the two-thousand-year-old Jewish community be liquidated. The premier replied in a few words that he could do nothing in diis matter.³² After Koretz had failed in his feeble attempt to

29. Mcnaschc, *Birkenau*, pp. 15-17. The author was on this transport. It arrived in Auschwitz.

30. Merten to Koretz, March 13, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 1, p. 142.
Wisliceny to Koretz, March 15, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 143.

31. Wisliceny to Koretz, March 29, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 145.

32. Wisliceny to Merten and Consul General Schonberg, April 15, 1943, and Schonberg to Minister (*Gesandter*) Altenburg in Athens, April 16, 1943, T 1 ’5, Roll 409.

save die community, he was arrested and sent to Bergen-Belsen, where he survived, only to die shortly after his liberation.³³

The Italian Vice Consul Merci, concerned about Italian citizens among the victims, followed the deportations day by day. On April 5, Wisliceny complained to him that Italian soldiers had entered the ghetto and had kissed Jewish girls in the street. A week later, Merci noted in his diary that the Jews, guarded by German and Greek police, were "heaved, hastily and in great confusion," into the waiting cars.³⁴ The German guards were policemen specially imported from the streets of Vienna,³⁵ and some of the locomotive drivers were Greek.³⁶

From March to August, die operation was in full swing, as the trains, one after another, rolled from Salonika via Belgrade and Vienna to Auschwitz.³⁷ About 46,000 Jews were deported in all.³⁸

33. Werner Weinberg, "The Lost Transport" *Tad Vdshem Studies* 15 (1983): 283-326, on pp. 314,316. The transport, with "privileged" Jews, among them Korctz and some other Salonika residents, left Bergen-Belsen on April 10, 1945, for Threesienstadt and was overtaken by the Red Army cast of the Elbe River, where Korctz died.

34. "Excerpts from the Salonika Diary of Lucillo Merci," compiled by Joseph Rochlitz, with an introduction by Menachem Shlach, *Tad Vashem Studies* 18 (1987): 293-323, on pp. 305,308.

35. Safria|*DieEichmann-Mdnner*, p. 242.

36. Mark Mazowcr, *Inside Hitler's Greece* (New Haven, 1993), pp. 245-46.

37. Testimony by Wisliceny, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, IV, 365. Wagner to German Consul in Sofia, April 30, 1943, NG-4924. Affidavit by Heinburg (Foreign Office/Pol. IV), September 5, 1947, NG-2570. Report by Korherr, April 19, 1943, NO-5193. A Polish investigator concluded that there were nineteen trains from Salonika to Auschwitz. See detailed data by Danuta Czech, "Deportation und Vernichtung der grichischen Juden im KL Auschwitz," *Hefte von Auschwitz* 11 (1970): 5-37. Twenty special trains carrying Jews from Greece and Bulgarian-occupied territories are mentioned in a report for March and April by Reichsbahndircktion Vienna/33H (signed Eigl) to Dezcrnat 18, May 18, 1943. Three more Greek transports arc recorded by Eigl in his report for May-June 1943, dated July 12,1943, and two more (without indication of origin) in his report for July-August, dated September 23, 1943. Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen Ludwigsburg, folder *Verschiedenes* 301 AAe 112, pp. 260-65.

38. The breakdown is as follows:

City' of Salonika	43,850
Towns in vicinity of Salonika	1,132
East-Aegean area (facing Turkish border)	<u>1,002</u>
Total	45,984

Compiled from a detailed town-by-town deportation chart prepared by Josef Nehama in Molho. *In Memonam*, vol. 2, p. 164. The figures arc based on Jewish Community statistics. About 45,000 of these Jews went to Auschwitz. Only a few hundred privileged and foreign Jews (discussed below) were shipped to Bergen-Belsen. Roth, "Salónica," *Commentary*, July 1950, p. 55, Wisliceny mentions as many as 55,000

Short disposition was made of the property of the deported Jews. The cash sum of 280,000,000 drachmas (ca. RM 3,500,000, or \$1,500,000) was turned over to the military administration.*³⁹ The empty Jewish apartments were transferred to the Greek Governor-General of Macedonia, Simonides,⁴⁰ and the abandoned Jewish stores were magnanimously handed over to the governor to be run under “trusteeship” by the Agrarian Bank of Salonika in behalf of the Greek state,⁴¹ but then neither the housing nor the enterprises could be distributed in an orderly manner. Many of the apartments had become uninhabitable when looters removed wall and floor materials, and in the 1,898 stores a good deal of merchandise disappeared when it was sold off by the trustees, most of whom had been appointed, at the insistence of the Military Administration and the Security Police, for their political qualifications.⁴²

No payment was made for the transports. The fare owed to the Greek State Railways, as dispatcher of the trains for the benefit of all the participating systems (Greek, Serbian, Croatian, and German) along the route, was 1,938,488 Reichsmark. The Security Police, invoking the principle of Jewish self-financing, wanted payment to be made by the Military Commander out of confiscated Jewish funds. Because these funds were in Greek currency, they were not freely available. German exports to Greece were so low that local accounts in German hands were husbanded, under Finance Ministry regulations, for the most essential purchases in the Greek market. Deportations of Jews already carried out did not qualify for expenditures in accordance with this reasoning. The army’s General Quartermaster, on his part, declined any liability of the Wehrmacht to compensate the Reichsbahn for its services.⁴³

There were other problems as well. They were caused by two foreign representatives: the Italian consul general in Salonika and the Spanish

deportees. See his affidavit of November 29, 1945, *Conspiracy and Agression*, Mil, 606-21. According to the Nchama table referred to above, no more than about 55,000 Jews resided in the Salonika-East Aegean area in 1940. There was a slight decline of population between 1940 and 1943, due to excess of deaths over births. In addition, several thousand Jews had escaped to the Italian zone or had remained in hiding at Salonika.

39. Testimony by Wisliceny, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, IV, 363.

40. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 22, 1943, p. 3.

41. Merten to Governor of Macedonia/Office for Jewish Property in Salonika, June 15, 1943, in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 2, p. 179.

42. Mazower, *Inside Hitler’s Greece*, pp. 246-48.

43. Transport Ministry/17 (signed Rau) to High Command of the Army, March 1, 1944; OKH/GenQu to Militärbefehlshaber Südost, May 6, 1944; draft of finance Ministry memorandum to Foreign Office, September 28, 1944; and other correspondence in German Federal Archive, R 2/14133.

charge d'affaires in Athens. Through the efforts of these men the fate of the Salonika Jews was altered for at least two special groups.

In February the RSHA dispatched to the Foreign Office a note complaining that the Italian consul general was handing out Italian naturalization papers to Greek Jews in Salonika. The Foreign Office was requested to intercede with the Italian government to stop that development immediately and to effect a revocation of the naturalizations.⁴⁴ In April news was received that the Italian consul general was protecting 281 Jews whose Italian citizenship was uncontested, plus 48 more who had lost their Italian nationality and to whom he now wanted to restore citizenship. Wagner of Inland II immediately instructed German Consul General Schönberg to decline the Italian request. The Italian consul general, however, did not give up. With a "pointed hint" to "special Italian rights in the Greek sphere," he repeated his request, and Wagner thereupon decided to exempt the 48 contested Jews "for the moment." Appealing for support, he wrote to Unterstaatssekretär Hencke of the Political Division and Staatssekretär Steengracht himself to secure their approval for the deportation of these Jews. Hencke and Steengracht scribbled "agreed" (*einverstanden*) on the memorandum.⁴⁵ The Italian consul general, in the meantime, was taking some measures of his own. He put uncontested and contested Italian citizens on an Italian troop train and smuggled them to the Italian zone of Greece.⁴⁶

The Jewish community in Salonika also had about 600 Jews who were Spanish citizens. When the deportations started, the RSHA intercepted messages from the Spanish charge d'affaires in Athens (Eduardo Gasset) to the Spanish Foreign Ministry in Madrid which revealed that Gasset, with the aid and abetment of the chief of the Political Division of the Spanish Foreign Office (Doussinague), was trying very hard to save the Spanish Jews. It seemed that on April 1, 1943, the Spanish government had opened a branch of the Falange (Franco's sole political party) in Athens. The branch was directed by the counselor of the Spanish legation, Eugen Palssewsky, and was financed by "rich Jews."⁴⁷

44. Bergmann (Bureau of the Foreign Minister) and Womiann to embassy in Rome, February 15, 1943, NG-4957. The Italian Consul General was Guelfo Zamboni and, as of June, Giuseppe Castruccio. See Daniel Carpi, "Notes on the History of the Jews in Greece during the Holocaust. The attitude of the Italians (1941-1943)," *Festschrift in Honor of Dr. George S. Wise* (Tel Aviv University, 1981), pp. 25-62.

45. Wagner via Hencke to Steengracht, April 29, 1943, NG-5052.

46. Von Thadden to embassy in Rome, April 30, 1943, NG-5053. The Italian Jews were actually withdrawn in small batches. Memorandum by Erdmannsdorff, June 10, 1943, NG-5207.

47. Obf. Schellenberg (RSHA-V1) to Konsul Geiger (Inland II-B), June 22, 1943, NG-5352.

The German Foreign Office thereupon tried to pressure the Spanish government into withdrawing its 600 Jews to Spain. In making the proposal, the Foreign Office struck a telling blow, for the Spaniards did not want to accept such a large number of Jews. From Madrid, Gasset was instructed that his government would be willing to receive at most about fifty Jews. In Berlin a member of the Spanish embassy orally informed Inland II that Madrid would much rather transfer these 600 Jews to German jurisdiction if only “one could be sure that they would not be liquidated [*wenn man sicher wäre dass sie nicht liquidiert würden*].” Inland II then proposed as an interim solution the transport of the Jews to some camp in the Reich. Eichmann was requested to treat the Spanish Jews in a manner that would not, in the event of their later emigration, lead to “undesired atrocity propaganda.”⁴⁸

During the subsequent months the Germans and Spaniards continued to haggle about the Jews. The Spanish government was given “two or three” months to make up its mind.⁴⁹ On December 22, 1943, the secretary of the Spanish embassy in Berlin, Diez, requested that all Spanish Jews be “treated as Spanish citizens and be permitted to emigrate freely, for they were after all, neutrals and no enemies of Germany.” Von Thadden replied that “every Jew was an enemy of Germany, even if by chance he had a Spanish passport.” Free emigration from Salonika was out of the question, but, as an extraordinary concession, a collective transport might be organized.⁵⁰ The final outcome of these negotiations was the transfer of the Spanish Salonika Jews to a very favored “residence camp” in Germany, Bergen-Belsen.⁵¹ Three hundred and sixty-five of these Jews reached Spain at the end of the war.⁵²

While the Foreign Office had its hands full with foreign Jews in Salonika, it did not forget the Greek Jews in the Italian area. Before the deportation started in the German zone, Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome and Minister Altenburg in Athens attempted in vain to persuade the Italian government to deport the 13,000 Jews in its jurisdiction.⁵³ On March 13, 1943, von Mackensen reported to the Foreign Office that the Italian government had decided to intern its Jews either on the Ionian Islands or in Italy.⁵⁴ Ribbentrop was skeptical. He wanted to know whether the SS was satisfied with this measure and, if so, whether the

48. Von Thadden to Eichmann, July 24, 1943, NG-5050.

49. Wagner to consulate in Salonika, July 26, 1943, NG-5050.

50. Memorandum by von Thadden, December 22, 1943, NG-5262.

51. Von Thadden to von Erdmannsdorff, January 11, 1944, NG-5332.

52. Nchcmiah Robinson, “Die Juden in Franco-Spanien,” *Aufbau* (New York), September 11, 1953, p. 3.

53. Report by Minister Bergmann, February 24, 1943, NG-4956.

54. Von Mackensen to Foreign Office, March 13, 1943, NG-5051.

Italians actually planned to carry it out. "If that should not be the case," said Ribbentrop, "we on our part would have to take new steps."⁵⁵ Obersturmbannführer Eichmann pointed out unequivocally that the measure was "unsatisfactory" and that experience had shown the necessity for serious doubt of the "sincerity of implementation" on the part of the Italians. The Foreign Office's Jewish expert, Rademacher, agreed with that evaluation completely.⁵⁶

On May 7, 1943, the new Inland II chief, Horst Wagner, wrote a memorandum in which he voiced the opinion that the Italians could not be persuaded to agree to the deportation of their Jews to the East. Under the circumstances Wagner thought it advisable that the RSHA at least make sure that the Italians carry out what promises they made. The Italians, he said, were now beginning to make excuses —such as lack of transportation facilities — for going back on their word. If the Jews could not be removed right away, Wagner continued, the Italians should at least be prevailed upon to impress the Jews into forced labor, such as road construction, fortification work, and railway improvement projects.⁵⁷

Following the circulation of this memorandum in the Foreign Office, Wagner repeated his proposal in the form of draft instructions to the Embassy in Rome. The Italians, he reiterated, should be pressed to carry out "the deportation of the Jews to the Ionian Islands or to Italy"; in the meantime, use of the Jews in labor battalions for work on fortifications and railways would result in great savings of occupation costs.⁵⁸ Before these instructions were dispatched to Rome, the new Staatssekretär, Steengracht van Moyland, made a significant change in their meaning: in the phrase "deportation of the Jews to the Ionian Islands or to Italy," he crossed out the words "to the Ionian Islands or to Italy," leaving only "deportation of the Jews."⁵⁹ Steengracht still had not given up hope.

At the end of July Mussolini was succeeded by Marshal Badoglio, and by September 8, 1943, Italy had ceased to be an Axis partner. The German army now turned on its former ally. In the entire Mediterranean area Italian garrisons were overwhelmed and disarmed. All of Greece, together with Albania, Montenegro, and the Dodecanese Islands, came under German domination. Some 16,000 Jews were living in these areas.

The new territory of Greece was important enough for the assignment of a special plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office, Minister Neubacher, and the appointment of a Higher SS and Police Leader, Gruppenführer

55. Von Sonnleithner (Bureau of the Foreign Minister) via Weizsäcker to Minister Bergmann, March 16, 1943, NG-5051.

56. Bergmann via Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, March 17, 1943, NG-5051.

57. Wagner via Henckes to Steengracht, May 7, 1943, NG-5048.

58. Wagner to Rome Embassy, June 4, 1943, NG-5048.

59. *Ibid.*, Bielfeld to Wagner, May 13, 1943, NG-5048.

Walter Schimana. The entire Greek civil apparatus, the Albanian puppet government, and the Italian civil administration in the Dodecanese (*Ost-Aegaeis*) — which was responsible to the new Fascist regime in northern Italy — were now placed under the direction of the expanded military organization in the southeast. The new military overlord in Greece was Generaloberst Lohr (under Weichs). In October 1943 he transferred civil affairs to the *Militarbefehlshaber* in Greece, Speidel (under Felber). However, Lohr's Army Group E did not thereby pass from the scene; he retained complete control in the islands. The *Admiral Aegaeis* was responsible for the shipping that carried the island Jews to the mainland. On the mainland itself, the division and corps commanders continued to regard it as a matter of course that every move against Jewry was brought to their attention.⁶⁰

On October 3, 1943, Higher SS and Police Leader Schimana ordered all Jews to register. In Athens the Jewish Community organization was entrusted with the supervision of the registration; in the rest of the country the local Greek officials were designated for this task. It appears that registrations did not come up to expectation. In Athens, for example, the number of registrants was 1,200. Schimana, evidently not well informed, had expected 8,000. (There were 3,500 Jews in the city.) To "punish" the Jews for their failure to register, the *Militarbefehlshaber* in Greece, General der Flieger Speidel, in agreement with the Foreign Office Plenipotentiary Neubacher, confiscated the Jewish property and transferred it to the Greek state.⁶¹

The Jews were rather spread out on the Greek mainland, and for that reason it was necessary to mobilize trucks and guards in preparation for the roundup.⁶² In March 1944 the RSHA was ready to order the sudden (*schlagartige*) arrest of all Jews (except those in mixed marriages). The seizures were to be completed in three days, from March 23 to March 25.⁶³ One can form some idea about the precision work that was involved in this operation from a report about the removal of the Jews from the town of Ioannina.

The Ioannina operation was carried out by Major Hafranek of the Order Police with his own men, Greek police, Army *Feldgendanneru*

60. See XXII Mountain Corps/Ic (signed by Corps Commander Lanz) to Army Group E/Chief of Staff, November 8, 1943, NOKW-1915.

61. *Militarbefehlshaber* in Greece/Mil. Adm. to *Militarbefehlshaber* Siidost (Felber), December 18, 1943, NOKW-692.

62. War diary, Army Group E, March 15, 1944, NOKW-923.

63. *Militarbefehlshaber* in Greece/Mil. Adm. Ic/Ia (signed Speidel) to *Militarbefehlshaber* Siidost Ia, Ic, and chief of mil. adni., copies to Army Group F. and Higher SS and Police Leader, April 14, 1944, NOKW-2520.

(Military Police), Secret Field Police (Counterintelligence), and soldiers stationed in the area. At 3 a.m. Hafranek surrounded the ghetto, and at 5 a.m. the chairman of the Jewish community was informed that within three hours all Jews were to assemble at designated points for “evacuation.” Each family was allowed 100 pounds of luggage. Greek police and members of the Jewish council passed on the announcement to the ghetto residents. Strong detachments of Order Police patrolled the streets. There was “no incident” (*kein Zwischenfall*).

At 10 a.m. 1,725 Jews were moved out to Trikkala. About a hundred were retained to clean up. All furnishings and food in the vacated apartments were handed over to Greek offices for distribution to the Greek population. The purpose of this generosity was to combat hostile propaganda by the insurgent EAM organization (pro-Communist). From the EDES (nationalist anti-Communist organization) one could hear only “full approval” (*voile Zustimmung*):⁶⁴

When the German army had first moved into the Italian zone of Greece, the Jewish population of the prefecture of Ioannina had been estimated at about 2,000.⁶⁵ Six months later more than 90 percent of these people were caught in the Ioannina Ghetto. To be sure, that kind of performance could not be repeated with the same success at all the mainland points, but the March raids did result in the deportation of about 5,400 Jews.⁶⁶

The roundups spread from the mainland of Greece to neighboring areas. In April 1944 the commanding general in Albania reported that SS Division Skanderbeg (Albanian collaborators) had arrested 300 Jews in Pristina (“new” Albania, in Yugoslav territory, near the frontier of the

64. Report by noncommissioned officer Bergmayer (Secret Field Police Group 621 with XXII Mountain Corps), March 27, 1944, NOKW-1915. The history of the Greek underground movements ELAS-EAM and EDES is quite complex. By the spring of 1944 the former was Moscow-oriented; the latter was poised to fight the EAM, and later on did.

65. Memorandum by Major Brandner (1st Mountain Division), September 13, 1943, NOKVV-1104.

66. Nchama in Molho, *In Memoriam*, vol. 2, p. 164. In the Volos-Trikkala-Larisa area, as well as in Athens and the Peloponnesus, the seizures were less than 50 percent successful. Of several thousand Jews in hiding, an undetermined number found refuge with — and in some cases joined — the ELAS-EAM partisan movement. See Bowman, “The Jews in Wartime Greece,” *Jewish Social Studies* 48 (1986): 49, 54-57. See also the EAM pamphlet “The Fighter” of April 24, 1944, which claimed that the “Hitler-dogs” were carting away Jewish property to Germany, and which branded as a lie German assertions that Jews were responsible for price rises. T 314, Roll 1458. For German suspicions of Jewish support for partisans in the Ioannina area, see 1st Mountain Division report of August 15, 1943, T 311, Roll 179, and the report of Abwehr platoon 377, March 5, 1944, T 314, Roll 1458.

domain of the Befehlshaber in Serbia).⁶⁷ Between May 28 and July 5, 1944, the SS division rounded up another 510 “Jews, Communists, partisans, and suspicious persons” in the region. From that group, 249 were deported.⁶⁸

The removal of the island Jews was more complicated than the mainland deportations. Approximately 2,000 Italian-speaking Jews lived on the Ionian island of Corfu, close to 300 on Zante, a little over 300 on Crete, and up to 2,200 on the east Aegean islands of Rhodes and Kos. All these islands were under complete control of Army Group E (Generaloberst Löhr).

On April 25, 1944, the intelligence officer on Corfu reported that the Jews on his island had been registered (*karteimässig erfasst*) and that from his point of view there was no fundamental objection (*keinegrundsätzliche Bedenken*) to the removal of these Jews.⁶⁹ These impressions were confirmed by the corps intelligence officer who had visited Corfu on April 23 and 24. He thought that the deportation of the Jews would ease the food situation, and he requested the army group to “bring about implementation measures” by contacting the Security Police and SD.⁷⁰ On May 12 the Order Police in Athens approached the army group with a request for ships to transport the Corfu Jews to Patras and the Crete Jews to Piraeus. Army Group E/Operations approved of the request on the condition that the tactical situation would not be jeopardized by the diversion of transport.⁷¹

Two days later the commander of Corfu, Oberst Jäger, sent a long memorandum to the XXII Mountain Corps. Jäger reported, first, that the *Admiral Aegaeis* had been requested to dispatch the ships. On the day before (May 13) a Himmler representative, Obersturmführer von Manowsky, had arrived on the island; he had left as soon as he had arrived. Jäger then came to the main point. He was uncomfortable about the whole undertaking. In fact, he found seven good reasons why the Jews should *not* be removed from Corfu. He thought that the “Badoglio Italians” (demobilized Italian soldiers) should be taken off the island first.

67. Militärbefehlshaber Südost (signed Chief of Staff von Geitner) to Army Group F, copies to OKH/Gen Qu, OKW/WFSt, 2d Panzer Army, German Plenipotentiary General in Albania, German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia, Luftwaffe Commander in Croatia, V SS Mountain Corps, April 16, 1944, NOKYV-668.

68. Report by XXI Mountain Corps (signed Chief of Staff von Klocke), July 13, 1944, NOKW-838.

69. Oberleutnant König (Ic-Aussensrelle Korfu) to Corps Group Ioannina 1c, April 25, 1944, NOKW-1916.

70. Corps Group Ioannina Ic to Army Group F Ic/AO, April 28, 1944, NOKW-1985.

71. War diary'. Army Group F la. May 12, 1944, NOKW-885.

since they were “far more dangerous than the Jews, about whom, incidentally, there has never been a complaint.” The Jews had already been warned, and he feared that they would hide in the mountains. There was danger also that the Jews might bribe the Greek police. The Aktion could not be carried out quickly enough. Passive resistance by Greek sailors was a distinct possibility.

Next Jäger mentioned a most important consideration. Under an Allied-Nazi arrangement, Red Cross ships were permitted to enter Greek harbors with food in order to combat widening starvation among the Greeks. There was now such a Red Cross ship in the harbor of Corfu, where the visitors could observe everything and see to it that plenty of “atrocious propaganda” was spread about this matter. Finally, Jäger reminded the XXII Mountain Corps that Corfu was an exposed area (*militärisches Vorfeld*). For all these reasons he urged an indefinite postponement of the Aktion. Then he added in stenographic language: “Only if sudden (*schlagartige*) action possible, otherwise disadvantages.”⁷²

Corps headquarters took these objections seriously and sent them to Army Group E.⁷³ However, on May 15 Obersturmführer Burger (Theresienstadt) arrived on Corfu. The deportations could not be stopped any more; the machinery of destruction was in motion. On May 24 a fleet of six ships came in, and on May 26, in expectation of the arrival of Security Police personnel, the island commander ordered the printing of posters calling upon the Jews to assemble. On May 28, with no Security Police in sight, the *Admiral Aegaeis* withdrew the ships — empty.

The next day Obersturmführer Burger finally brought in a company of Feldgendarmarie and Secret Field Police dispatched from Ioannina, and the island commander immediately set aside an old fortress to accommodate the Jews. On May 30 Kapitän zur See Magnus arrived. He announced that another fleet was on the way and promised to use the ships for the “evacuation” in spite of the expenditure of another 2,600 gallons of gasoline.⁷⁴ By June 11 the Aktion was “rolling” (*im Rollen*).⁷⁵ On June 17 the Security Police could report that 1,795 Corfu Jews had been seized and transported from the island. Their property was given to the Greek governor of Corfu for distribution to the islanders.⁷⁶

More than a hundred miles south of Corfu, 270 Jews slipped off the

72. Jäger to XXII Mountain Corps, May 14, 1944, NOKW-1915.

73. XXII Mountain Corps/Ic to Army Group E, May 18, 1944, NOKW-1915.

74. Memorandum by Oberst Jäger (Commander, 1017th Infantry Regiment and Island Commander, Corfu) and Kapitän zur See Magnus (Naval Commander, Western Greece), June 1, 1944, NOKW-1915.

75. Jäger to XXII Mountain Corps, June 11, 1944, NOKW-1997.

76. BdS Greece/Ausschnitt Janina IV-B to XXII Mountain Corps/Ic and Feldkommandantur 1032/Ic, June 17, 1944, NOKW-1915.

Ionian island of Zante and escaped by sea to Italy. From Crete, however, the Germans deported some 260 Jews according to plan.⁷⁷

On the eastern Aegean islands the commander of the 999th Division (*Sturmdivision Rhodos*), Generalleutnant Ulrich Kleemann, was in charge. He reported directly to Generaloberst Lohr, commander of Army Group E. The eastern Aegean islands were exposed territory. In September 1943, barely two weeks after the Italian collapse, British forces had landed on Samos, Leros, and Kos. But the British could not hold the islands. Kleemann counterattacked and within two months overwhelmed the three British garrisons, one by one. He then turned his attention to the Jews.

The Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) speaking Jews of Rhodes were an isolated community. The Italian authorities had confiscated radios from the non-Italian population in 1941 and, according to a surviving Jewish community leader, the Jewish residents of the island had been kept in the dark about the fate that had overtaken continental Jewry.⁷⁸ They were ideal victims.

In June 1944 two SS officers arrived by plane on Rhodes to hold discussions with Kleemann.⁷⁹ On July 13 Kleemann issued an order designating the city of Rhodes and the towns of Trianda, Cremasto, and Villanovo as collecting points for the Jews. The entire Jewish population of Rhodes had to be in those towns by July 17 at noon.⁸⁰

The order had its repercussions not only among the Jews but also among the troops. On July 16 Kleemann was therefore forced to issue another order in which he stated that the Jewish question on Rhodes had apparently given rise to “doubts” (*Zweifeln*). A soldier, Kleemann pointed out, could not possibly judge this matter from a soldier’s narrow point of view. In the interest of the measures now started, the Jewish question on Rhodes and its solution were no longer to be made the topic of daily conversation among the troops.⁸¹

On July 19 all Jewish men aged sixteen and over were ordered to report to the Gestapo the next morning with their identity and labor cards for registration. After the assembly everyone was deprived of his documents, and the directors of the Jewish community were told that all the men had to come back with their families and their valuables. The Jews were to prepare themselves for a move to a neighboring island, where

77. Nchama in Molho, *In Memriam*, vol. 2, pp. 68-69, 72-74, 164.

78. Statement by Maurizius Soriano, September 1961, Yad Vashem Oral History document 1745/67.

79. Affidavit by Erwin Lenz (artillery man, *Sturmdivision Rhodos*), May 10, 1947, NOKW-1715.

80. Order by Kleemann, July 13, 1944, NOKYV-1802.

81. Kleemann to subordinate units, July 16, 1944, NOKW-1801.

they were to live off their savings. The surviving community director states: “Our panic became so great that we lost our ability to think and react functionally” The families were brought together, and the valuables (including watches) were taken away from them under threat of shooting.⁸²

A soldier who at that time went to the city of Rhodes to have his teeth fixed saw men, women, and children standing with faces to the wall in the blistering heat. Greek and Turkish civilians who wanted to hand food and drink to the deportees were kept away. (There was a food shortage on Rhodes also.) The visiting soldier noticed that the victims had very little baggage. He started to gossip with the German soldiers standing guard and was told that the Jews did not need any baggage since they would not, after all, live very long.⁸³

The Jews arrived in Auschwitz, a thousand miles from Rhodes, in mid-August.⁸⁴ The spoils they had left behind were the subject of contention between the Germans and local Italian officials.⁸⁵ When British troops occupied the island in May 1945, only a handful of Jews waited for their liberators in the city of Rhodes.⁸⁶

More than 60,000 Jews had been deported from the mainland, “New Albania,” and the islands. Perhaps 12,000 remained.

Satellites par Excellence

During the German march across Europe, some territories were occupied and others were allotted to Axis allies. Two areas were in a special category. Germany did not wish to incorporate them, but they were not to be absorbed by its partners. Hence these regions became countries themselves. The new entities — states by default and satellites par excellence — were Croatia and Slovakia.

82. Statement by Soriano, September 1961, Yad Vashem Oral History 1745/67. Soriano escaped with his wife by boat to Turkey. The other two directors were Franco (chairman) and R. Cohen.

83. Affidavit by eyewitness Lenz, May 10, 1947, NOKW-1715. In the Italian population, complained Kleemann, Germans were even called “barbarians” (*Ver einzelt wurden die Deutschen sogar als Barbaren bezeichnet*), and on the neighboring island of Kos, both Italian and Greek offices were noticeably reluctant to help when the Jews were “shoved off” (*auf Kos war das Bemühen zu erkennen, sich beim Abschub der Juden weitgehend zurückzuhalten*). Draft report by commander in the East Aegean Ic (signed Kleemann) to Army Group E Ic/AO, Südost 75000/34.

84. Danuta Czech, “Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau,” entry for August 16, 1944, *Hefte von Auschwitz* 8 (1964): 58.

85. Kreiskommandantur Rhodos to Sturmdivision Rhodos Ic, September 3, 1944, NOKW-1795.

86. Major General Lord Rennell of Rodd, *British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years 1941-1947* (London, 1948), p. 513.

Croatia

Although the State of Croatia was a German creation, its establishment was not planned very far in advance. In fact, it was a rush job. On March 25, 1941, Yugoslavia followed in the footsteps of some of its neighbors and joined the Axis. Two days later a new government in Belgrade repudiated the agreement, and that same day Hider decided to destroy Yugoslavia.¹ Military operations against the Yugoslavs began on April 6. By April 10 the German army had occupied the Croatian city of Zagreb. One day later the German Foreign Office troubleshooter Veesenmayer was in the city, discussing with Croatian leaders an "exact plan for the assumption of power."² By April 16 there was a Croatian government. Its most important personalities were:³

Chief of State and of the Ustasha movement	Dr. Ante Pavelic
Prime Minister	Dr. Pavelic (succeeded on September 4, 1943, by Nikola Mandic)
Foreign Minister	Dr. Pavelic (Mladen Lorkovic)
Commander of the Armed Forces and of the Gendarmerie	Marshal Slavko Kvaternik
Interior Minister and head of die Ustasha Control Office (<i>Ustasko Nadzorna Sluzba</i>)	Dr. Artukovic (succeeded in September 1943 by Niksic)
Director of Public Security	Eugen Kvaternik (son of the marshal, to the end of 1942, then Dr. Crvenkovic, Jurcic)
Justice Minister	Dr. Puk (Artukovic)
Economy Minister	Susie
Finance Minister	Kosak
Minister of Mines	Frkovic
Minister of Transport	Beslegic
Minister of Cults and Education	Budak

The underlying philosophy of the state was Fascist-Catholic. Its movement, the Ustasha, was an organization that in the Interior Ministry

1. Summary of Führer conference, March 27, 1941, PS-1746.

2. Veesenmayer ro Ribbentrop, April 11, 1941, NG-5875.

3. Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, *Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941-;045* (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 75-92, 134-37. Edmond Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941-1945* (Chicago, 1961), pp. 60, 70-71, 128-29. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), *passim*. The Ustasha movement had a twelve-man command, which included several cabinet members. Ustasha formations in the Interior Ministry (from May 1942, also the Gendarmerie) were gradually transferred to the Directorate for Public Securin'.

developed a uniformed force, somewhat analogous to the SS, which was performing police functions and running concentration camps.

At the time of its creation the new Croatian state had very uncertain boundaries. To the north the Germans annexed a good chunk of Slovenia, stopping only a few miles from Zagreb. To the west the Italians annexed Ljubljana, most of the Dalmatian coast, and a few Adriatic islands. To the east the German commander in Serbia held the town of Semlin (Zemun), while in the northeast the Hungarians annexed the basin between the Danube and the Tisza. The Croatian state itself was under occupation. Most of the country was host to the German army, but in the south-eastern part Italian units had taken up residence.

In spite of these unsettled conditions, the Croatian government lost no time in proceeding against its 35,000 Jewish inhabitants. On April 30, 1941, the three-week-old Croatian state issued its first anti-Jewish law, a definition of the term "Jew." As one might expect, the Croatian authorities dutifully followed, and even improved upon, the original Losener definition (see Table 8-19).

We need only recall the problems to which the original German definition gave rise to realize that the Croatian definition, with all its improvements, was drafted by expert hands. However, the Croatian decree-law contained an important excepting clause empowering the chief of state to grant to all non-Aryans who had made worthwhile contributions to the Croatian cause before April 10, 1941, the full rights of Aryans.⁴ As so often, the tightly shut front door concealed a wide-open back entrance.⁵

In a very short time the Croatian government also proceeded to enact all those measures which German bureaucrats had toiled over for eight years: the prohibition of intermarriage, of employing female Aryan servants under forty-five, of raising the Croatian flag; the revolution of name changes adopted since December 1, 1918; the marking of Jewish stores and persons; the registration of property; the removals from the bureaucracy and the professions; the termination of business activities; and transfer of enterprises.⁶ The impoverishing process spread with great rapidity. By the end of August 1941, after only four months of Croatian government, most Jewish enterprises worth less than 200,000 kuna (RM 10,000, or \$2,500) had been "Aryanized."⁷

The decrees had hardly been issued when the Jewish population was

4. *Die Judenfrage*, March 1, 1943, pp. 74-75.

5. The number of honorary Aryans increased steadily from month to month. RSHA IV-E-3 (signed Schellenberg) to Himmler, September 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 120.

6. *Die Judenfrage*, March 1, 1943, pp. 74-75.

7. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 23, 1941, p. 3.

TABLE 8-19**GERMAN AND CROATIAN DEFINITIONS OF “JEW”**

GERMAN	CROATIAN
1. A person who had at least three Jewish grandparents	1. A person who had at least three Jewish grandparents
2. A person who had two Jewish grandparents and who (a) belonged to the Jewish community on September 15, 1935, or joined it on a subsequent date, or (b) was married to a three-quarter or full Jew on September 15, 1935, or married one on a subsequent date, or (c) was the off spring of an extramarital relationship with a three-quarter or full Jew, and was born out of wedlock after July 31,1936	2. A person who had two Jewish grandparents and who (a) belonged to the Jewish community on April 10,1941, or joined it on a subsequent date, or (b) was married to a Jewish person on April 30,1940, or married a Jewish or half-Jewish person on a subsequent date, or (c) was the offspring of an extramarital relationship with a Jew, and was bom after January 31,1942, or (d) was classified as a Jew by decision of the Croatian Interior Minister acting upon a recommendation of a “race-political” commission, or (e) was born outside of Croatia of parents not resident in Croatia 3. Any child of an unmarried Jewish mother 4. Any person (including one-quarter Jews and full Aryans) entering into marriage with a Jew after April 30,1941

Note: Die Judenfrügc, March 1,1943, pp. 74-75.

drawn out of the cities and towns for deportation to internment camps. In the principal three cities, the major roundups were the following:⁸

Zagreb

May 1941, to Danica

Summer 1941, mass arrests

May 1943, most remaining Jews removed

Sarajevo

Early September 1941, to Krušcica

October 1941, large-scale arrests

November 1941, large-scale arrests

August 1942, arrests of skilled workers

Osijek

June 1942, to Tenje

The camps, which were controlled by the Directorate for Public Security and garrisoned by the Ustasha, held Serbs, Gypsies, and Croatian political prisoners, as well as Jews. Numerically, the Serbs were in first place as inmates and casualties, but for Jews and Gypsies, death was all but certain. The Jews were concentrated in the following enclosures:⁹

Early Camps

Danica factory (at Koprivnica, near the Hungarian border). Closed

July 1941. Surviving inmates transferred to Jadovno.

Pag Island. Men's and women's camps. Closed August 1941, when the Italians occupied the island. Men were sent on to Jadovno, women to Kruscica.

8. Zdenko Lowenthal, ed., *The Crimes of the Fascist Occupants and Their Collaborators against Jews in Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1957), pp. 10-14. *Die Judenfrage*, October 15, 1941, p. 209. Lionello Alatri (Unione della comunità israelitiche, Rome) to Cardinal Maglione (Vatican Secretary of State), August 14, 1941, about arrests, in *Secrétairerie d'État de sa Sainteté, Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale*, vol. 8 (Vatican, 1974), pp. 250-52. On Zagreb, see Ivo Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu* (Zagreb, 2001), pp. 247-476. For the action against the Sarajevo Jews on October 26-27, 1941, elements of the German 718th Infantry Division were assigned to seal off the city. War diary of the division, October 26, 1941, NOKW-1014. Generalmajor Hans Fortner commanded the division.

9. Lowenthal, ed., *Crimes against Jews in Yugoslavia*, pp. 11, 14-20, 23. Testimony by Alexander Amon (formerly, as Alexander Klein, Secretary of the Zagreb Jewish Community), Eichmann trial transcript, May 19, 1961, sess. 46, p. QI. *Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung* (Luck), February 22, 1942, p. 5. Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia*, pp. 127-61. Paris states that Ustasha General Vjekoslav Luburic was the director of the camp network. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29, 132. Two Jasenovac commanders identified by witnesses were Ljubo Milos (1941-42) and the Franciscan friar Miroslav Filipovic-Majstorovic (from the second half of 1942). See the books by Lowenthal and Paris, *passim*. On Franciscans in the Ustasha, see Carlo Falconi, *The Silence of Pius XII* (Boston, 1970), p. 298.

Jadovno (Velebit Mountains, about ten miles from the coast). Inmates were killed. The camp was closed in August 1941.

Kruscica (Bosnia). Closed at the end of September 1941. Surviving inmates to Jasenovac.

Later Camps

Dakovo (Slavonia, between Sava and Drava rivers). Surviving women and children were transferred in February 1942 to Stara Gradiska. Surviving men were transferred in June 1942 to Jasenovac.

Tenje (near Osijek). Jews only, from Osijek and surrounding area. In August 1942, a transport was sent to Auschwitz, followed by a second transport in August to Jasenovac. A third transport was directed via Loborgrad to Auschwitz.

Loborgrad (about twenty-five miles north of Zagreb). Women and children. One transport went to Auschwitz. The camp was closed in October 1942.

Death Camps

Jasenovac (on the Sava River along the Zagreb-Belgrade railway line). Camps I and II were flooded by the Sava in November 1941. Camp III existed until 1945.

Stara Gradiska (penitentiary twenty miles downstream from Jasenovac). Women and children.

More than half of Croatian Jewry had been delivered to these camps. Shunted from one to the other, the Jews were marked for attrition and annihilation. They died in this process of typhus, starvation, shootings, torture, drownings, knifings, and blows with hammers to the head.¹⁰ An indication of what was happening was given to Italian Foreign Minister Ciano on December 16, 1941, in the course of a visit by a high-ranking Croatian delegation to Venice. On that occasion Pavelic mentioned that the Jewish population of Croatia had already declined to little more than a third of its former size. In a memorandum of the conversation recorded in Ciano's diplomatic papers, the following sentence is added in parentheses: "Young Kvaternik explains this decrease with the word 'emigration' accompanied by a smile that does not leave room for any doubt."¹¹ In July 1942, when the Vatican's representative in Zagreb, Abbot Giuseppe Marcone, attempted to learn something about the fate of named individual Jews who had disappeared, he encountered an "inexplicable silence" in Croatian offices.¹² According to a postwar calculation by a

10. See particularly the photographs in Lowenthal, cd., *Crimes against Jews in Yugoslavia, and Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia*.

11. Malcolm Mugggridge, ed., *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), p. 471. Pavelic gave a figure of 35,000 prewar Jews, down to 12,000.

12. Marcone to Maglione, July 17, 1942, *Actes*, vol. 8, p. 601, and in John K

Croatian demographer, the number of Jewish dead in the camps ultimately reached 19,800, including 13,000 in Jasenovac alone.*¹³

By the summer of 1942 the depleted community was ripe for deportation. An emissary of the RSHA, Hauptsturmführer Abromeit, joined German Minister Kasche in the Croatian capital.¹⁴ Thousands of Jews had already been trekking to the Italian-occupied zone of Croatia¹⁵ and to the Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav Backa¹⁶ to find refuge. But now the German Foreign Office was moving ahead with clocklike precision.

Some time at the end of 1941 or beginning of 1942 the Croatian government was asked to express its disinterest in the fate of a few dozen Croatian Jews residing in the Reich. This request was always put into the form of a courteous question : Did the Croatian government plan to recall its Jews, or did it agree to their deportation?¹⁷ The Croatian government expressed “its gratitude for the gesture of die German government,” but indicated that “it would appreciate the deportation of its Jews to the East.”¹⁸

This reply doomed not only the handful of Croatian Jews in Germany but most of the remaining Jews in Croatia itself, for when consent has been given to the death of even one victim, the threshold has been crossed and the decisive involvement has begun. The killer of one person is no less a murderer than the killer of thousands, and, conversely, the mass killer is no more accountable than he who has killed only once. The experts of the RSHA and the German Foreign Office knew that principle better than anyone; therefore they always started a foreign campaign by applying pressure for the deportation of those few Jews who were already in the Reich.

The relinquishment of those Jews by the Croatian government required no administrative buildup and no bureaucratic action save a word of consent. Thus the initiation into the killing phase was brought about with ease, almost imperceptibly. The second request affected a much

Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust, 1939-1945* (New York, 1980) p. 152.

13. Josip Kolanovic (Croatian State Archives), “Shoah —In Croatia Documentation and Research Perspectives,” in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, *Les archives de la Shoah* (Paris, 1998), pp. 575-76. Kolanovic cites the demographer Vladimir Zerjavic.

14. Affidavit by Wisliceny, November 25, 1945, *Conspiracy and Aggression*, VIII, 606-21.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung* (Lutsk), January 28, 1942, p. 8.

17. Rademacher via Luther to Weizsäcker, October 28, 1941, NG-182. Mémo-randum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

18. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

larger group of people, but it was already routine. The Croatian government agreed and the Germans had free rein.¹⁹

The Vatican's representative, Marcone, was well informed of these developments. He had had conversations about the impending deportations with the chief rabbi of Zagreb and with Croatia's security chief Kvaternik. The latter told Marcone outright that the Germans had already killed two million Jews.²⁰ The abbot pleaded for delays, but the deportation machinery was geared for action.

On July 31, 1942, the Croatian Director for Security' ordered all Jews to register.²¹ By August 7 Eichmann's deputy, Günther, wrote to Abromeit that the Reichsbahn had confirmed departure dates for six trains, consecutively labeled DA 60/1, DA 60/2, and so on, each to roll for two days via Maribor to Auschwitz.²² In Zagreb there were arrests on the very next day,²³ and DA 60/1 left with 1,200 Jews on August 13.²⁴

There was, however, one complication: the several thousand Jews in the Italian zone. So far, not even the Croatian laws enacted in the German-dominated capital of Zagreb could be implemented in the Italian area. The Italian commander in Mostar, for instance, had promised equal treatment to all inhabitants, and he had even refused to evict Jewish tenants to make room for the German Organisation Todt. When asked for an explanation, he declared that anti-Jewish measures were "incompatible with the honor of the Italian army."²⁵ The Foreign Office experts were now encountering the same problem in Croatia that confronted them in southern France and Greece. In Croatia, too, the Foreign Office tried to goad the Italians into action, and in Croatia, too, the Foreign Office failed.

The German minister in Zagreb, Kasche, suggested that the deportation machinery start collecting Jews in the Italian zone without asking any questions. "We should take a chance," he said, "and see whether any complications would arise in the course of the operation."²⁶ Vortragende

19. *Ibid.*

20. Marcone to Maglionc, July 17, 1942, *Actes*, vol. 8, pp. 601-2, in Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, p. 153.

21. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 1, 1942, p. 3.

22. Günther to Abromeit, August 7, 1942, in a compendium of investigations by the chief prosecutor at the Kammergericht in West Berlin against Friedrich Bosshammer and others, April 30, 1969, 1 Js/65 (RSHA), pt. C, pp. 719-20, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, 1310/63.

23. Statement by Mitzi Abeles (survivor), 1958, Yad Vashem Oral History 530/32.

24. Günther to Auschwitz and Abromeit, August 14, 1942. Compendium of investigations in Bosshammer case, pt. B, p. 315.

25. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

26. *Ibid.*

Legationsrat von Sonnleithner (Bureau Ribbentrop) and Staatssekretär Weizsäcker thought that perhaps the German Ambassador in Rome, von Mackensen, should be heard first.²⁷ On August 20, 1942, Kasche wrote to the Foreign Office that the key man in the Italian zone was the Italian commander General Roatta. This was the man whose collaboration was required, and therefore it was necessary to convince the Rome government to issue the proper directives to him.²⁸

In Rome, Prince Otto von Bismarck (charge d'affaires, German embassy) had in fact presented such a demand to the Italian Foreign Ministry', which on August 21 referred the matter to Mussolini for a decision. The Duce, possibly buoyed by Axis successes in Africa and the USSR, wrote his *nihil obstat* on the memorandum, and the Italian Foreign Ministry passed on Mussolini's word to the Italian military. The generals did not interpret the Duce's permissiveness as a peremptory order. Since the Italian region in Yugoslavia was divided into annexed and occupied territories (Zones A and B), the Foreign Ministry's communication was construed to be applicable in any case only to Zone B. Among the Jews of that zone there were Italian citizens and those eligible for Italian citizenship who had to be protected. The status of the Jews would have to be determined case by case, and there had to be time for such investigations.²⁹

Ribbentrop, in the meantime, had decided against further pressure on Rome. In his view the deportations of the Jews from the Italian zone were "a matter concerning the Croatian government"; hence he thought that the Croatian government was the proper authority to carry on negotiations with the Italians.³⁰

Apparently the Croatian government did not do much negotiating, for on September 24, 1942, on the eve of a Führer-Duce meeting, Minister Kasche was instructed to draw up a memorandum for possible presentation by Hitler to Mussolini. The memorandum was to deal with two subjects: the Jews and the supply of bauxite from Mostar. Ambassador Ritter suggested: "The correct diplomatic language is to be adopted so as not to offend Italy and the Duce."³¹

The German-Italian negotiations continued for several months. The trend of these discussions shows a remarkable resemblance to the course

27. Handwritten notation by Weizsäcker, undated, NG-3560. Lohmann (Bureau Ribbentrop) via Weizsäcker to Luther, August 8, 1942, NG-3560.

28. Kasche to Foreign Office, August 20, 1942, NG-2368.

29. Daniel Carpi, "The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia," in Ysrael Gutman and Efraim Zuroff, eds., *Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 465-526. The Duce had written *nulla osta* (no objection).

30. Rintclen to Luther, August 25, 1942, NG-2586-K.

31. Note by Ritter, copy to Kasche, September 24, 1942, NG-3165.

of the Greek negotiations. The Italians first offered to take the Jews to Italy.³² Next the negotiators considered the possible removal of the victims to the island of Lopud, off the Dalmatian coast.³³ Finally, the Italian government promised to concentrate the Jews on the spot. However, it declined to permit Croatian confiscations of Jewish property and, more important, refused a German request for Jewish "labor battalions."³⁴ By that time the Italian Foreign Ministry had received a very brief but alarming message from the *Carabinieri* commander in Croatia, General Pieche, to the effect that Jewish deportees from the German zone of Croatia were "eliminated" with poison gas inside the train into which they had been locked.³⁵ Ultimately the German Foreign Office was blocked in its efforts. Several thousand Jews had been concentrated on the Italian-occupied island of Rab, from which they escaped to partisan-held areas in September 1943.³⁶

In the German zone, however, the deportations continued. Four trains with 4,927 Jews had left in the summer of 1942.³⁷ The Croatian government availed itself of these departures to publish its own version of the 11th Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law. All Jews leaving the country were to lose their Croatian nationality, in order that they might also lose their personal property. Again there was an improvement over the original German decree: any dependents left behind by the deported persons were also to lose their nationality.³⁸ On October 9, 1942, Finance Minister Kosak agreed to pay to the German government 30 Reichsmark for each deported Jew as compensation for the German contribution to the "final solution of the Jewish problem" in Croatia. The details were worked out by Kasche and Foreign Minister Lorkovic.³⁹

An attempt to deport the remaining Croatian Jews in the German zone was made at the beginning of 1943. Jews who had survived in Jasenovac and Stara Gradisca were to be "resettled," and those in the cities were to be removed as well.⁴⁰ In March 1943 the representative of the Reichs-

32. Kasche to Foreign Office, October 20, 1942, NG-2814. Klingcnffiss (D-III) to German Embassy in Rome, October 24, 1942, NG-2366. Kasche to Foreign Office, November 10, 1942, NG-2814.

33. Kasche to Foreign Office, November 20, 1942, NG-2345.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Italian Foreign Ministry note, November 4, 1942, stamped "Vistodal Duct facsimile in Carpi, "Rescue," in Gutman and Zuroff, cds., *Rescue Attempts*, p. 520.

36. Carpi, *ibid.*, pp. 499-504.

37. Report by Korherr, April 19, 1943, NO-5193.

38. *Donaueitung* (Belgrade), August 13, 1942, p. 3.

39. Kasche to Foreign Office, October 14, 1942, NG-2367.

40. Srurmbanntuhrer Helm to Croatian Directorate of Public Securin' (Dr. Crvcnkovic), with copy to Eichmann, January 27, 1943, Israel Police 1081.

bahn in Zagreb agreed to furnish cars, to be hooked to regularly scheduled trains, for the deportation of about 2,000 Jews via Austria to Auschwitz.⁴¹ On the occasion of these deportations, another vain attempt was made to induce the Italians to cooperate in their zone.⁴² In July 1943, Inland II chief Wagner urged Kasche to do his utmost to deport some 800 Jewish women and children who still remained in Croatian concentration camps.⁴³ In September the Italian zone disappeared, and the RSHA dispatched to Croatia a fourteen-man Sonderkommando under Obersturmbannführer Krumei to round up the Jews in the area.⁴⁴

In April 1944 Kasche and the police attache, Obersturmbannführer Helm, sent their final report to Berlin. The Jewish question in Croatia, said Kasche, had been solved, but for three general exceptions: Jews recognized as honorary Aryans, Jews in mixed marriages, and Mischlinge. Police attache Helm added that the problem of honorary Aryans was admittedly unsolved; some of them were still holding office. He thought that one Jew, Alexander Klein, had even been dispatched by Ustasha headquarters as a procurement official to Hungary and Italy. With respect to the mixed marriages and Mischlinge, Helm remarked that quite a few Croatian leaders had strong family ties with Jews (some cabinet members had Jewish wives). Furthermore, Helm pointed out, that question had not been solved in the Reich either. Nevertheless, he promised to make every effort to secure a "review" of every privileged case.⁴⁵ Neither Kasche nor Helm mentioned that many Jews had found refuge among Marshal Tito's partisans, who at that time had already liberated a considerable

41. Kasche to Foreign Office, March 3, 1943, NG-2348. The transports left in May. Their arrival in Auschwitz on May 7 and 13 was noted by the underground in the camp. Danuta Czech, "Kalendarij der Ereignissc ini Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkcnau," *Hefte von Auschwitz* 4 (1961): 97-98. See also Foreign Office/Inland II-A to Eichmann, May 26, 1943, Israel Police 342, referring to departure of the second transport on May 11.

42. Wagner to legation in Zagreb, April 10, 1943, NG-2347.

43. Wagner and von Thadden to Kasche and police attache in Zagreb, July 15, 1943, NG-2413. Jewish property in the Croatian areas wrested from the Italians became the subject of German-Croatian quarrels. See German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia/Ia to XV Mountain Corps, December 6, 1943, enclosing report by Vladimir Jonic (Ustasha commissar and representative of the Croatian civil administration in Dalmatia), November 8, 1943, NOKW-1419.

44. Sturmbannführer Dr. Ploetz (RSHA/Attache Group) to Helm, September 16, 1943, Israel Police 1094. Ploetz to Helm, October [15?], 1943, Israel Police 1095.

45. Kasche to Foreign Office, April 22, 1944, enclosing report by Helm, dated April 18, 1944, NG-2349. Klein (Secretary of the Jewish Community in Zagreb) had traveled to Budapest to obtain financial help for Jews. Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust* (Detroit, 1981), p. 282.

portion of Yugoslav territory.⁴⁶ When the war was over, about 20 percent of Croatia's Jews were still alive.⁴⁷

Slovakia

The Germans created two satellites in Europe: Croatia and Slovakia. Beginning with the Munich agreement in the fall of 1938, the Czechoslovak state was subjected to dismemberment. The Germans occupied the Sudetenland in the west of the country, the Hungarians marched into the southern portions of Slovakia, and the Poles acquired a small area at Tesin-Bohumin. At the end of 1938 the crippled remainder of Czechoslovakia therefore consisted of Bohemia-Moravia, the bulk of Slovakia, and the major part of the Carpatho-Ukraine. Even in October 1938 the German Foreign Office was drawing up plans for the final division of Czechoslovak territory. The Germans decided to acquire Bohemia-Moravia for themselves (that is how the "Protectorat" was born). The Hungarians were permitted to annex the Carpatho-Ukraine. Only Slovakia remained to be disposed of. The Germans did not want to incorporate it outright, nor did they wish to transfer it to the Hungarians, who were ready to take over anything. As a consequence, Slovakia was to become an "independent" state, a satellite.¹

Without waiting for the final breakup of Czechoslovakia, the Germans encouraged the formation of an "autonomous" Slovak government in Bratislava. In the winter of 1938-39, while the Slovak state was in its prenatal stage, Goring held a conference with the deputy prime minister of the autonomous government, Dr. ěWcansky. The Slovak representative promised that in Slovakia the Jews would be treated in the same way as in Germany.² On the eve of the destruction of Czechoslovakia

46. Affidavit by Wisliczny, November 25, 1945, *Conspiracy and Agression*, VIII, 606-21. Report by XV Mountain Corps Ic, December 2, 1943, on 4th Partisan Brigade, which contained a detachment of 160 Jews led by Captain Aaron Kabiljo (Captain, Yugoslav army) of Sarajevo, NOKW-1375.

47. In 1946, there was a count of almost 12,500 survivors (including returned prisoners of war) on Yugoslav soil, and an estimate of 2,000 Yugoslav Jews in Italy and elsewhere. Harriet Pass Freidenreich, *The Jews of Yugoslavia* (Philadelphia, 1979), p. 193. In seven major cities of Yugoslavia, the number was about 8,500. Three of the cities, which were Croatian (Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Osijek), contained up to about 3,900. Assuming proportionality in the distribution of the small town population and escapees, the Croatian share of the survivors would have been more than 6,000. City data in undated postwar letter from Federation of Yugoslav Jewish Communities (signed Bata Gedalja and Dr. Friedrich Pops) to American Jewish Committee, Archives of American Jewish Committee, EXO-29, Morris D. VYaldman file (Yugoslavia).

1. Wormann via Weizsacker to Ribbentrop, October 5, 1938, NG-3056.

2. Summary' of Goring-f)urcansky discussion, undated, PS-2801. On the German

(March 11, 1939), the German Foreign Office troubleshooter Veesenmayer cabled from Bratislava that things were going well and that he had “all Jews in hand [*aUeJudin in der Hand*]?”³ A few days later Slovakia was “independent.”

The Slovaks were now called upon to pay their debts to the Germans, and one of these debts was “the solution of die Jewish problem.”⁴ The Slovak government officials who were to concern themselves most intimately with the “Jewish question” are listed below:⁵

President: Dr. Jozef Tiso

Prime minister: Tuka (succeeded in 1944 by Stefan Tiso)

Foreign minister: Dr. i)urcansky (after 1940, Tuka)

Interior Minister: Mach

Jewish expert: (Konka) Dr. Vasek

War Minister: tatlos (Hassik)

Economy Minister: Medricky

Finance Minister: Pruzinsky

Transport and Public Works Minister: Stano

Central Economy Office: Moravek (chairman)

The Central Economy Office was an interesting institution. It was set up in August 1940 for the exclusive purpose of enforcing anti-Jewish measures, but its powers were *not* confined to economic matters. The Economy Office could deal with any matter placed into its sphere of competence by the cabinet: expropriations, labor certificates, direction of the Jewish community organization, and so on. In a sense, the Economy Office was almost a Ministry of Jewish Affairs. (We have already seen such an organization in France, and we shall find similar agencies in other countries as well.) But the Interior Minister, Sario Mach, was more powerful than the Economy Office officials. His jurisdiction comprised definition problems, the forced labor camps, concentration, and deportation. Since Mach was also commander of the Hlinka Guard (the Slovak counterpart of the SS), he combined in his offices the powers that in Germany were exercised by Frick and Himmler. In Slovakia, then, Jewry

side, Scyss-Inquart and the chief of the ethnic Germans in Slovakia, Karmasin, participated in the conference. frurcansky was accompanied by Saho Mach, later Slovak Interior Minister.

3. Sevss-Inquarr to Minister Schmidt (Foreign Office), March 11, 1939, NG-5135.

4. On the history of the fate of the Jews in Slovakia, based largely on Slovak sources, see Ladislav Lipscher, *Die Juden im Slowakischen Staat 1939-1945* (Munich, 1980). See also Livia Rotkirchcn, *The Destruction of Slovak Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1961), with texts of documents, most of them in Hebrew translation.

5. For a description of the Slovak government, see Jozcf Lertrich, *History of Modem Slovakia* (New York, 1955).

was caught between two swords, Moravek and Mach. The Jews were struck alternately by one, then the other.

Staying in the background but always present was the German legation in Bratislava. The legation supplied the initiative. From July to December 1940, the mission was headed by the aristocratic SA man von Killinger. He was succeeded by a nonaristocratic SA man: Hans Elard Ludin. On August 1, 1940, von Killinger requested the services of an “advisor on Jewish questions.”⁶ The advisor, Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny of the RSHA, arrived in Slovakia on September 1, 1940,⁷ and with his arrival, the machinery of destruction in Slovakia was complete.

Anti-Jewish measures were first considered while Slovakia was still autonomous. A commission, headed by Karel Sidor, held meetings between January 23 and March 5, 1939, to recommend a definition of the term “Jew,” a quota for Jewish professionals, and Aryan majority control of enterprises.⁸ Shortly after Slovakia declared its independence, several decrees cascaded on the Jewish community, but their effect was limited. Basically the Slovak bureaucracy was not a German machine. The Catholic Church, which was interested in the status of converts, was another limiting factor. The underdeveloped economy was an intrinsic obstacle to immediate Aryanization or Slovakianization. Finally, not everyone in the governmental leadership wanted Slovakia to be an exact copy of Nazi Germany. Thus moderate Fascist Italy, although not a next-door neighbor, could serve as an alternate model. For the SS men in Berlin, at any rate, Slovak hesitations to take prompt action against the Jews could be a sufficient reason to suspect an Italian influence at work.⁹

The position of the Church was reflected in the first anti-Jewish decree. The measure, adopted by the month-old Slovak state on April 18, 1939, contained a definition that could clearly not have been drafted in Nuremberg. A German writer who examined this provision observed in the manner of a master who is looking over the first product turned out by his apprentice that the measure had a “basic defect” (*grundlegenden Fehler*). In the main, it embraced only persons who were Jews by religion, those half-Jews who belonged to no religion at all, and “recent” converts to Christianity who had acquired their new faith since October 30, 1918.¹⁰

6. Von Killinger to Luther, August 1, 1940, NG-4399.

7. Affidavit by Wisliceny, October 7, 1940, NG-2867. Von Killinger to Himmler, January 9, 1941, Himmler Files, Folder 8.

8. Lipscher, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, pp. 25-28.

9. Gruf. Berger (Chief, SS Main Office) to Himmler, April 9, 1942, NO-3069.

10. *Dimauzeitung* (Belgrade), December 10, 1941, p. 3. The phrase “*der quasi Injende Fehler*” appears also in an undated long Security Service report covering 1939-42 from Vienna to Sraf. Ehlich (RSHA III B), received December 1st 42,

The “defect” was not removed until September 1941, when a new definition was adopted as part of the Jewry Code (*Jutknkodex*), so called because it contained no fewer than three hundred anti-Jewish paragraphs. Table 8-20 is a comparative chart of the original German and the new Slovak formulations. Now the Germans had no cause for complaint, but for the Vatican the change was a major reverse.¹¹

With the new definition came the expropriations. Slovakia was a small country with a population of 2,650,000, and the total number of Jews counted in the census of December 15, 1940, was 88,951.¹² About 12,300 Jews owned “enterprises” (that is, they were shopkeepers), another 22,000 were private employees, and a few thousand were government employees and professionals.

In Germany the expropriatory measures started with the dismissal of civil servants. The early Slovak decrees began in a similar way. The Jews were to be dismissed from government service and the army, and a 4 percent quota, subject to attainability, was set up for professionals, notably lawyers.¹³ The dismissal of Jewish governmental employees was reiterated in September 1941, but even then there were exceptions. Some Jews remained in the employ of the government, though at reduced salaries.¹⁴ Among professionals, physicians were shut out much more slowly than lawyers, but as of May 31, 1939, Slovakia had only 1,414 doctors, 621 of them Jews, and in 1941-42 several hundred of the Jewish physicians were still practicing.¹⁵

The Jewish entrepreneurs were to be ousted. The goal was set in 1939,

T 175, Roll 583. The German text of the decree is in T 175, Roll 584. It resembles an early Hungarian definition, similarly based on a compromise with the Catholic Church.

11. See Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione to Slovak Minister to the Vatican Sidor, November 21, 1941, pointing out that the legislation was contrary to church doctrine and expressing hopes for mitigation and ultimate revocation. Text in John F. Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews during the Holocaust, 1939-1945* (New York, 1980), pp. 221-23. For an extended discussion of Vatican-Slovak relations in Jewish matters, see Morley, *ibid.*, pp. 71-101.

12. *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, vol. 21, June 2, 1941, p. 244. More than 7,000 Jews emigrated between March 14, 1939, and the end of 1941. Lipscher, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, p. 49. Several thousand converts to Christianity defined as Jews in 1941 had not yet been counted as Jews in the census of 1940. Slovak officials were fond of talking about 100,000 Jews in their country.

13. See the German texts of the laws in T 175, Roll 584.

14. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), September 11, 1941, p. 3, and September 26, 1941, p. 3.

15. Lipscher, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, p. 33n. See also *Die Judenfrage*, December 10, 1941, pp. 231-32.

TABLE 8-20**GERMAN AND NEW SLOVAK DEFINITIONS OF "JEW"**

GERMAN	SLOVAK
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A person who had at least three Jewish grandparents 2. A person who had two Jewish grandparents and who <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) belonged to the Jewish community on September 15, 1935, or joined it on a subsequent date, or (b) was married to a three-quarter or full Jew on September 15, 1935, or married one on a subsequent date, or (c) was the offspring of an extra-marital relationship with a three-quarter or full Jew, and was born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A person who had at least three Jewish grandparents 2. A person who had two Jewish grandparents and who <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) belonged to the Jewish community on April 20, 1939, or joined it on a subsequent date, or (b) entered into marriage with a Jewish person after April 20, 1939, or (c) was the offspring of an unwed Jewish mother and was born after February 20, 1940, or was the offspring of an unwed non-Jewish mother and proven Jewish father, and was born after February 20, 1940, or (d) was the offspring of a mixed marriage concluded after April 20, 1939 3. A person who had one Jewish grandparent and who belonged to the Jewish religion on April 20, 1939, or joined it on a subsequent date

Note: Krakauer Zeitung, September 19, 1941, p. 3.

and by the end of 1940 the Central Economy Office was empowered to order the liquidation or Aryanization of any Jewish firm.¹⁶ In Slovakia, as elsewhere, this process contributed to a concentration within industry and commerce. Thus, by January 1942, 9,950 enterprises had been entirely liquidated, 2,100 had been transferred, and a few "complicated"

16. HStuf. von Nachtniann (Vienna) to SD-Lcitabschnitt in Vienna, November 21, 1942, enclosing speech by Vasek, T 175, Roll 583.

cases awaited disposition.¹⁷ Liquidation, which occurred in every branch of industrial and commercial activity,¹⁸ was the principal benefit accorded to the small competing Slovak entrepreneurs. Aryanization, on the other hand, was designed to serve larger Slovak firms. The takeovers of Jewish corporations or shares could be a means of aggrandizement for these Slovak interests and, not incidentally, a defense strategy against Protectorat firms or German economic penetrations and encroachments.¹⁹ To be sure, capital and know-how were scarce in Slovakia, and often enough deals were struck between Jewish owners and utterly inactive Slovak Aryanizers in such a way that little or no money was paid to the Jews, with the understanding that the Jewish owners and managers could continue in the business as nominal partners or employees of the Slovaks. German observers noted that such incompetent Slovak Aryanizers, interested only in a comfortable living without work, were draining the resources of the firms, thereby bringing about indebtedness to banks and producing arrears in taxes.²⁰

Special regulations pertained to agriculture. In this politically sensitive sector, there was to be “reform.” In effect, Jewish-owned land was subjected to confiscation by the state. Some parcels were then auctioned off, larger units were sold to larger landowners, and some significant holdings were rented back to the former Jewish possessors.²¹

Just like the German Finance Ministry, the Slovak government wanted to share in the profit making. Accordingly, in September 1941 the Jews were ordered to register their property in order that the government might find out how much the Jews owned. In Germany all Jews owning assets of more than 5,000 Reichsmark had to make a report. In Slovakia the amount was fixed at 5,000 crowns (that is, 430 Reichsmark or less than 200 dollars). In 1941, 52,000 Slovak Jews owned property worth 200 dollars or more, and the total amount registered, after deduction of

17. On Slovak Aryanization history, see *Krakauer Zeitung*, September 4, 1940, page *Wirtschafts-Kurier*; October 18, 1941, p. 7. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), September 11, 1941, p. 3; September 26, 1941, p. 4; October 21, 1941, p. 3; December 10, 1941, p. 3; January 25, 1942, p. 3. *Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung* (Luck), January 27, 1942, p. 8.

18. See the table, as of December 31, 1941, in Lipschcr, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, p. 67.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-73.

20. Undated Security Service report from Vienna, T 175, Roll 583. Lipschcr, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, pp. 73-75.

21. Lipschcr, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, pp. 73-75. A special fund, headed by Franz Bosnak, was created in September 1942 to administer confiscated Jewish agricultural property'. Security' Service in Bratislava to Security Service in Vienna, June 11, 1943, T 175, Roll 584.

debts, was 3,164,000,000 crowns (272 million Reichsmark, or a little over 100 million dollars at official rates of exchange).²²

More than one-fourth of the Jewish assets (861 million crowns) were invested in real estate. The Slovak government decided to confiscate this Jewish immobile property.²³ Needless to say, the real estate was not a cash acquisition; the houses and grounds had to be rented or sold to yield funds to the treasury. The Slovak government was hoping to sell the great bulk of the housing for the dual purpose of raising money and reducing inflation. By the fall of 1943, however, that program had hardly gotten started.²⁴ Apparently, real estate was as difficult an item to dispose of in Slovakia as it proved to be in the western areas and in the Reich itself.²⁵

Like the Germans, the Slovaks were also interested in valuables and other movables. In December 1941 the Bratislava police started to collect Jewish-owned typewriters and adding machines.²⁶ Next, the Hlinka Guard undertook a "fur-action" to relieve the suffering of Slovak troops fighting in the Russian winter.²⁷ Finally, the Central Economy Office "discovered" that the Jews had bought large quantities of clothes and other textiles. Accordingly, the Jews were ordered to surrender the "hoarded goods."²⁸

Although the collection of these items foreshadowed a considerable reduction in the haul of personal belongings in the killing centers, the Germans did not interfere with the Aktion. Only when the Slovak Consul General in Prague decided to extend the collection of furs and clothes to Slovak Jews residing in the Protektorat did Abteilung Deutschland of the Foreign Office become alarmed. Nevertheless, Luther felt inclined not to interrupt the Slovak drive, provided that Reich Jews in Slovakia were not required to make deliveries, for in the latter case Slovak confiscations in the Protektorat were "naturally out of the question."²⁹

The Slovak government was not satisfied with the confiscation of property, real and movable. Like other governments, the Slovaks needed some

22. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), December 10, 1941, p. 3. For more detailed statistics, see Lipschcr, *Die Juden im Slowakischen Staat*, pp. 64-66.

23. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), October 11, 1941, p. 3; December 10, 1941, p. 3; January 25, 1942, p. 3. *Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung* (Lutsk), January 27, 1942, p. 8.

24. Report by the German general with the Slovak Defense Ministry/Group Armament Economy, November 20, 1943, Wi/IF .2.

25. This was true even though the Slovakian mortgages were probably lower. The principal cause of the difficulty was in all likelihood psychological. Mobile property could be hidden in the event of a return of the former owners; houses could not.

26. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), December 18, 1941, p. 4.

27. *Ibid.*, Januarv 17, 1942, p. 3.


28. *Ibid.*, March 7, 1942, p. 3.

29. Luther and Rademacher to Representative of the Foreign Office in Prague (Gcrlach), February 5, 1942, NG-4555.

cash, and die Jews had registered assets valued at some 3,164,000,000 crowns. These assets were now subjected to a property tax, fixed at the traditional 20 percent and payable in five installments. The expected intake, about 600 to 700 million crowns (50 to 60 million Reichsmark), had to be collected by die Jewish community organization for the Finance Ministry.³⁰

While Slovakia had about 12,300 Jewish shopkeepers, it had 22,000 Jewish employees. The Central Economy Office undertook the task of reviewing the status of all these employees in order to bring about the gradual elimination of the unessential workers. By October 1941 the number of Jews still holding work permits was stabilized at about 3,500, and the maximum permissible monthly wage was fixed at 1,500 crowns (129 Reichsmark, or 52 dollars).³¹ Their low pay notwithstanding, the 3,500 Jews who remained in the free economy were privileged in several respects: they were not subject to forced labor in a camp, and diey were for a long time exempted from concentration and deportation measures. A destruction process is a step-by-step procedure, and it is usually impossible to enforce step 4 before having implemented steps 1,2, and 3. The Germans knew that and watched the privileged Jews with a wary eye.

The forced labor camps came into existence in the fall of 1941, when most Jews were already out of work. The camp network was rim by a government commissar in the Interior Ministry, who supervised the camp commanders. The Jewish Community organization stood by as an “auxiliary organ,”³² as shown below:



There were three camps (Sered, Novaky, and Vyhne) and eight satellite labor centers for heavy workers. A parallel labor organization was maintained by the Defense Ministry. However, unlike the labor camps, which

30. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), September 11, 1941, p. 3; September 16, 1941, p. 3; August 15, 1942, p. 3. Lipscher believes the actual payment to have been considerably smaller because of the progressive impoverishment of the Jews. *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, pp. 77-78.

31. *Krakauer Zeitung*, October 18, 1941, p. 7. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), October 21, 1941, p. 3.

32. Slovak government report, June 30, 1943, Occ E 7b-8.

contained entire families, the Defense Ministry employed only young men who would otherwise have been subject to military service. (Noteworthy is the fact that the forced labor system was not disbanded with the advent of the deportations. About 3,500 Jews remained in the camps in 1943, and the number of inmates was still growing when the Defense Ministry transferred its laborers to the Interior Ministry in a consolidation move.)³³

The Slovak government was also tardy in the enforcement of concentration. One of the first important ghettoization measures was the creation of a central Jewish organization, the *Judenzentrale*, or *Ustredna Zidov* (U£), to which all Jews were subject.³⁴ It was headed in succession by Heinrich Schwartz, an elected *starosta*; Arpad Sebestyen (appointed by the Central Economy Office); and Oskar Neumann, another Jewish choice.³⁵ As we have seen, the O£ had important functions in the expropriation process: it collected the property tax and helped administer the labor camps. To finance its own upkeep and pay out welfare funds to the poor, it also imposed a 20 percent tax on income.³⁶ The functions of the O£, in the concentrations and deportations were even more important. In fact, one of the first tasks of this Jewish machinery was the issuance of identity cards to the Jews.³⁷

The second major concentration step consisted of identification measures. The marking of the Jews started locally in eastern Slovakia,³⁸ but there was no extension of this regulation to the rest of the country until the appearance of the Jewry Code in September 1941. Even the code was not all-inclusive, for it exempted Jews who were working in the free economy and Jews (with families) who remained in government employ. Only on March 9, 1942, when the Jewish star was extended in diameter from 2 Vi to 4 inches, were the Jewish workers and the families of government employees (but not the government employees themselves) forced to wear that identification.³⁹

The code of September 1941 provided for the marking not only of persons but also of letters. The Jewish star had to be affixed to every letter sent by a Jew. The police were empowered to open such letters and to

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Krakauer Zeitung*, October 2, 1940, p. 2; *Die Judenfrage*, February 20, 1941, pp. 28-29. On the history' of the Ü£, see Oskar Neumann, *Im Schatten des Todes* (Tel Aviv, 1956). He describes departments of the Ü£ on pp. 38-48.

35. Testimony by Dr. Ernst Abels, Eichmann trial transcript, May 23, 1961, sess. 49, pp. Nnl, Ool.

36. M,p. Ppl.

37. *Die Judenfrage*, February 20, 1941, pp. 28-29.

38. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 30, 1941, p. 3.

39. *Ibid.*, March ?, 1942, p. 3.

destroy them, a measure not thought of even by the German bureaucrats in the Reich. In addition, the code provided for various regulations already traditional in Germany but new in Slovakia. For the first time intermarriages were prohibited, Jews were limited to travel in third-class railway compartments, they were not permitted to drive cars, and so on. Most important, however, was the provision empowering the Central Economy Office to assign new residences to Jews.⁴⁰ By October that power had already been put into effect.

In October 1941 the Jews were to be expelled from Bratislava. The Slovak capital had a Jewish population of about 15,000, but only 10,000 Jews were subject to expulsion. The remaining 5,000, comprising holders of work permits, government employees, entrepreneurs, and professionals (with their families), were permitted to stay. All others were scheduled for departure to provincial towns, labor camps, and labor centers.

To accomplish the smooth implementation of the resettlement (incidentally, a real resettlement rather than a “resettlement”), the Jewish Community organization had to create a new division for the processing of questionnaires required of all Bratislava Jews. The questionnaires were then handed to the statistical division of the Ü£, and from there to a special *Referat* for rechecking. The administrative division of the Ü2 designated the new residence of the victim and handed him over to the police. The last step of the procedure involved the dispatch of *Ordner* of the Ü2 to the apartments of the prospective expellees. There the Jewish *Ordner* divided the furnishings into two categories: personal things that could be taken along and belongings that had to be left behind to be confiscated by the state.⁴¹ On Tuesday, October 28, 1941, the first transport of 238 Jews left Bratislava, and during the next three months approximately half the capital’s Jews were ejected.⁴²

All these events were watched closely in Berlin. When the concentration process in Slovakia reached its height, the RSHA began to make inquiries in the Foreign Office with a view to deporting the Slovak Jews in the Reich. The Foreign Office expert on Jewish affairs, Legationsrat Rademacher, decided that in view of the harsh measures taken by Slovakia itself, the RSHA request could be granted. He proposed that Slovakia be subjected to a courtesy inquiry.⁴³ His proposal was endorsed by Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, Unterstaatssekretär Wörmann of the Political Division, and

40. *Krakauer Zeitung*, September 19, 1941, p. 3.

41. *Die Judenfrage*, December 10, 1941, pp. 231-32.

42. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), November 2, 1941, p. 4. *Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung* (Lutsk), January 27, 1942, p. 8. The Ü2, figure was 6,720. Lipscher, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, p. 84. Additional thousands were dislocated in more than fifty towns when they had to move from all streets named for Hlinka or Hitler. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

43. Rademacher via Luther to Weizsäcker, October 28, 1941, NG-182.

the director of the Legal Division. Shortly afterward, the German envoy in Slovakia, Harms Elard Ludin, reported that the Slovak government had consented to the deportation of its Jews in the Reich. The Slovaks were reserving only the right to confiscate the property of these people.⁴⁴ The next step was the deportation of the Jews from Slovakia itself.

As early as June 1940, the Slovak government had promised to send 120,000 workers to Germany.⁴⁵ In those days, several countries still had surplus labor, and the Reich could recruit the “cream of the unemployed.” By October 1, 1941, the number of Slovak workers in Germany was in fact 80,037.⁴⁶ At that point, however, the labor situation in Slovakia had changed and in November 1941 the Slovak government offered to substitute 10,000-20,000 Slovak Jews for Slovaks.⁴⁷ The Germans, still searching for places to deport the Jews from the Reich, did not react to the offer. In January 1942, the Slovaks repeated the tender, mentioning 20,000 Jews. This time Himmler seized the opportunity, instructing the RSHA to place a request through the Foreign Office for the deportation of “20,000 young, strong Jews” to the East. The Foreign Office thereupon drafted new instructions to its legation in Bratislava.

Again the papers were passed from desk to desk, this time to be signed and cosigned by Weizsacker, Luther, Wormann, and Heinburg. When the Slovak government expressed its “pleased concurrence” with the deportation of the “20,000 young, strong Jews,” Himmler proposed, without waiting for the deportation of these victims, that Slovakia be made free of Jews. Instructions were now drafted for a third time, and Slovakia agreed once more.⁴⁸

The deportation agreement contained two special provisions: one a concession to the Slovaks, the other an exaction by the Germans. The concession was a stipulation that no internal difficulties were to be permitted to arise from the deportations; that is, no measures were to be taken that would antagonize the churches to such an extent as to threaten Slovakia’s internal stability. The exaction consisted of a bill presented by the Reich to the Slovak government for “shelter, food, clothing, and retraining [*Unterbringung, Verpflegung, Bekleidung und Umschulung*],”⁴⁹

44. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

45. Yehuda Bauer, *Jews for Sale?* (New Haven, 1994), p. 65.

46. Edward Homze, *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, 1967), pp. 57, 65.

47. Ivan Kamenec, “The Deportation of Jewish Citizens from Slovakia in 1942,” in Dezider Toth, compiler, *The Tragedy of Slovak Jews* (Banka Bystrica, 1992), pp. 81-105, on pp. 83-86. Bauer, *Jews for Sale?* pp. 65-67.

48. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

49. Luther to legation in Bratislava, March 20, 1942, Case Novak, I., *Indesgericht für Strafsachen*, Vienna, 1416/61, vol. 17, p. 289.

For these fictitious expenses the charge was not less than 500 Reichsmark per head, or 45 million Reichsmark if all 90,000 Slovak Jews were to be deported. Since the total amount collected by the Slovak government in its tax upon the registered Jewish assets was only 56 million Reichsmark, the Germans were claiming up to 80 percent of the Slovak government's Jewish tax haul. As explained, however, by the RSHA, this sum was required because the productivity of Jewish workers in the beginning stages was always extraordinarily low.⁵⁰ To the surprise of the Foreign Office, the Slovak authorities agreed "without any German pressure."⁵¹ Only later were the Germans to discover that the combination of a payment provision with a church concession was poor diplomacy, for now the Slovaks had been told in effect that they could save money by exempting baptized Jews.

Agreement in principle having been reached, German-Slovak cooperation moved into the next phase: the scheduling of transports. On March 20, 1942, Luther wrote to Ludin about a railway meeting that was to take place in Passau within days to plan the first twenty trains for March and April. A representative of the Slovak Transport Ministry was to take part in the conference.⁵² The Germans wanted Slovak railroad cars, and Slovak Transport Minister Stano claimed that he did not have them. Because the Slovak car shortage was actual, the Germans could not be certain whether they had been given a reason or an excuse.⁵³ By mid-May, however, Sturmbannführer Günther in Eichmann's office was able to report that much to the relief of the Germans, who faced a strained traffic situation in the Reichsbahn, the Slovaks were supplying the rolling stock.⁵⁴ In June discussions about further transports were shifted to Bratislava. For these deliberations the following ranking German representatives arrived in the Slovak capital:⁵⁵

Reichsbahndirektor Koesters	Chief, GBL Ost/Operations/'M (locomotives)
Reichsbahnrat Bebenroth	Chief, GBL Ost/Operations/L

50. Wisliceny ro Ministerialrat Dr. Grüniger (legation), enclosing his draft of an agreement for checking of proper form, April 25, 1942, Israel Police 282. Stubaf. RR Suhr of IV-B-4 was expected in Slovakia for the actual negotiations. Foreign Office/Pol. IV-2 to German Legation in Bratislava, April 21, 1942, Israel Police 1272.

51. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

52. Luther to legation in Bratislava, March 20, 1942, Case Novak, vol. 17, p. 289.

53. Report of the German Security Service in Slovakia, March 25, T 175, Roll 584.

54. RSHA IV-B-4-a (Gunther) to Rademacher, May 15, 1942, Israel Police 839.

55. Foreign Office to legation in Bratislava, June 7, 1942, Case Novak, vol. 17, p. 294. See also summary of railway conference on DA trains in Bratislava, November 10, 1942, Yad Vashem M-5/18 (2).

Abteilungspräsident Scharrer	Chief, Gedob/Operations/ Locomotives
Oberreichsbahnrat Meyer	Chief, Gedob/Operations/33
Oberreichsbahnrat Rölimer	Chief, RBD Oppeln/Opera- tions/33
Hauptsturmflührer Novak	RS HA IV-B-4

There was also a financial component in the transport arrangements. The Slovak Transport Ministry had to compensate the Reichsbahn for a major portion of the distances covered in the deportations, namely all the track kilometers in Upper Silesia and (for trains to Lublin) also the routes in the Generalgouvernement. Trying to save money, the ministry asked for the 50-percent group-fare reduction, and both the Reichsbahn and the Ostbahn agreed to the request.⁵⁶ For Slovakia's major contribution, a small rebate.

Several weeks before the first train left Slovak territory, the Jews had received inklings of what was going to happen. They were put on notice by preparatory measures, official speeches, and rumors. At the beginning of March the Jewish star worn by prospective deportees was increased in size, and the Jews were prohibited to change their residence.⁵⁷ The purpose of these measures was clear, for identical regulations had preceded the deportations going on within the Reich itself. Also just about then, Interior Minister Mach, addressing a Slovak Gauleiter convention in the town of Trencin, declared that the Slovak people had become impatient in the matter of solving the Jewish problem but that it would be solved very definitely now.⁵⁸ In Budapest, the Papal nuncio, Monsignor Angelo Rotta, received an unsigned, undated Jewish note from Bratislava. It said: "We are condemned to destruction. With certainty we know that we are to be transported to Poland (Lublin)."⁵⁹ By the middle of March there were rumors in Slovakia that the deportations were imminent.⁶⁰

56. RBD Vienna (signed Dr. Bockhorn) to Slovak Transport Ministry, copies to RBD Dresden, RBD Oppeln, VK 1 Vienna, and Mitteleuropäisches Reisebüro, April 27, 1942, Yad Vashem M-5/18 (1). Slovak Transport Ministry' to Gedob, Krakau, and RBD Vienna, August 12, 1942, M-5/18 (1). RBD Vienna (signed Dr. Zacke) to Slovak Transport Ministry, August 22, 1942, M-5/18 (unnumbered folder). Gedob to Slovak Transport Ministry', September 23, 1942, M-5/19 (1).

57. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), March 7, 1942, p. 3.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, March 13, 1942, enclosing Jewish note, in *Secrétairerie d'Etat de sa Sainteté, Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifä la Seconde Guerre Mondiale*, vol. 8 (Vatican, 1974), pp. 457-58. See also Vatican Secretary of State to Slovak legation, March 14, 1942, expressing anxiety' about the imminent expulsion of 80,000 Jews to Galicia and Lublin without regard to religious adherence. *Ibid.*, pp. 459-60.

60. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), March 21, 1942, p. 3.

On March 25, the Security Service reported that the Vatican's representative, Burzio, had handed a protest note to President Tiso, a priest himself. In addition, the Catholic, Lutheran, and Greek Orthodox bishops had written to Tiso. All the preparations for the deportations had been completed now, and when Interior Minister Mach told the President that he was determined to go on, Tiso was said to have asked Mach somewhat vaguely not to report to him anything more about this affair; he did not want to know anything about it.⁶¹

On March 26 the deportations began.⁶² The roundup was conducted largely by part-time Hlinka guards paid on a per diem basis, full-time Slovak gendarmerie, and Ethnic German volunteer SS men (*Freimilijie Schutzstaffel*, or FS). From the Hlinka guards some of the "darkest elements" had volunteered for the job. They beat the Jews at random and took from them all kinds of personal belongings on the theory that whatever was not taken by Slovaks now was going to be collected by Germans later. Yet many onlookers viewed the bulk of the victims as ordinary working people like themselves, and during this brief final moment the poor tended to side with the poor.⁶³

The German Security Service itself sharply criticized the corruptibility of the Hlinka Guard, attorneys, and clergymen. It caricatured a Slovak lawyer for crying like a child and saying that the Jews were going to Ukraine, where the fat ones would be boiled into soap and the scrawny ones turned into synthetic manure.⁶⁴ At the same time the Security Service shared the assessment of local onlookers that the deported mass consisted of the poor, the "shabby caftan" Jews, the Jews without influence, the ones who looked like beggars with sacks (*Pinkeln*) containing all their belongings on their shoulders. The "rich Jewish major felons" (*Grossverbrecher*) had gotten away.⁶⁵

What did the Jews do in the face of catastrophe? The Central Jewish Council was drawn into the operation with all of its resources. From April 1941 to the end of 1943 it was headed by Arpad Sebestyén, a former principal of an Orthodox Jewish school and a man weak enough to have inspired a Jewish joke to the effect that if he were ever ordered to carry out

61. USruf. Urbantkc (Security Service in Slovakia), ro HSruf. Herrmann (Security Service in Vienna), March 25, 1942, T 175, Roll 584. This report is not identical to the other one of the same date.

62. *Donauzettutiff* (Belgrade), May 21, 1942, p. 3.

63. Undated report Security Service from Žilina dealing with the concentration of the Jews, in T 175, Roll 584.

64. Security Service report prepared in Talma on March 20, 1942, *ibid*. The lawyer, Robert Kubis, practiced in the city.

65. Undated Security Service report from Zilina covering deportations at the end of March; Urbantkc to Herrmann, August 22, 1942, *ibid*.

a sentence to hang all of the Jews of Slovakia, he would ask only whether the *Ústredna Židov* itself should supply the ropes. The joke, according to his successor, became reality when Wisliceny announced the impending deportations to the Central Council, and Sebestyén stated that the Zentrale would earn, 'out all the tasks and duties demanded of it to the best of its ability.'⁶⁰

Within the U2, two divisions became important during this period. One, on emigration, headed by Gisi Fleischmann, attempted to facilitate the flight of Jews and reported the movement of trains to Upper Silesia in correspondence with Jewish representatives in Geneva.^{66 67} The other, for special tasks, under the direction of Karel Hochberg, made up lists of victims in transit camps at Žilina, Novaky, and Patronka. Hochberg, as described by Sebestyén's successor (Neumann), was a young man who had begged the U£ for a job to support himself and his mother. He was placed in the statistical division and soon revealed himself as hysterical, paranoid, hungry for power, and given to intrigue. He ingratiated himself with Wisliceny and, says Neumann, owed his position to the SS man. The U£ at any rate, was incapable of removing Hochberg or of impeding his work.⁶⁸

The frequent reports of the special tasks division reveal something about its role. On June 12, for example, Hochberg wrote that the most recent transport had been the "best that we have put together out of the ca. 13,000 persons registered so far." He ascribed his success to pre-screening. All individuals with half-way well-founded claims for exemption had been set aside for a later transport, and as a result not one name among the 1,000 persons on the list had subsequently been struck off. To be sure, the special tasks division had for the first time raised the age limit to over sixty, and the categories were consequently the following:⁶⁹

A	men capable of work, 14 to 60	172
K	children to 14	278
F	women over 14	414
-	men over 60	136
		<hr/> 1,000

A majority of Slovakia's Jews were caught in this net, first at the moment of arrest and then in a transit camp, helplessly waiting for transport.

66. Neumann, *Im Schatten des Todes*, pp. 90-91.

67. Fleischmann to Dr. Adolf Silberschein (Geneva), July 27, 1942, Yad Vashem M-7/2-2.

68. Neumann, *Im Schatten des Todes*, pp. 74-78.

69. Activity report VI of *Ústredna Židov* 'Division for Special Tasks/Group I Hast in Novaky' (signed Hochberg), June 12, 1942, Yad Vashem M-5/18(7). See also other reports in the same folder.

A small minority, growing steadily, sought refuge in the woods, in Hungary, and with the churches. In the woods of Homenau, in eastern Slovakia, the deportation machinery suffered what was probably its only casualty: the Slovak *Gendarmerie* man Andreas Pazicky was shot and killed while searching for hidden Jews.⁷⁰ The flight into Hungary proceeded in steady trickles until, at the end of the year, about 7,000 Jews — nearly one-tenth of Slovak Jewry—had found refuge in that country.⁷¹ Many Jews who did not hide in the woods or flee to Hungary sought protection at home by becoming Christians. There are no statistics from which to calculate the exact number of conversions during the deportation phase, but it is certain that the figure was in the thousands.⁷²

Although the dominant church in Slovakia was the Catholic hierarchy, newspaper reports indicate that the lion's share of the conversions fell to the Protestant and Greek Orthodox Churches.⁷³ The rush to these faiths was hardly a matter of religious preference. The Jews were not interested in theology just then, and they did not embrace Protestantism or Christian Orthodoxy in lieu of Catholicism for reasons involving tenets of belief. Quite simply, the choice was dictated in large part by the Catholic Church, for it did not bestow baptism lightly. Expecting the applicant to be sincere, it insisted on religious instruction, preparation, and meditation.⁷⁴ In the wake of the deportations, the Jews could not satisfy such requirements. They could not muster the time.

One might ask why the Jews bothered to become Christians of any denomination. What protection could they hope to obtain from the churches? The Slovak code of 1941 had defined the term "Jew" in terms

70. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 17, 1942, p. 3. *Die Judenfrage*, May-15, 1942, p. 102.

71. *Domuzeitung* (Belgrade), May 1, 1942, p. 3. Moravck of the Central Economy Office reported that 5,000 had fled by mid-May. *Ibid.*, May 21, 1942, p. 3. Dr. Vasek (Jewish expert, Slovak Interior Ministry) reported 7,000 across the border in November. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1942, p. 3. Zionist officials in Budapest counted 6,000 to 8,000 refugees at the end of 1943. Rczsö Kasztner (Rudolf Kästner), "Der Bericht des jüdischen Rettungskomitees aus Budapest 1942-1945" (postwar, mimeographed, in Libran, of Congress), p. 9. Kästner was associate president of the Zionist Organization in Hungary.

72. Vasek put the number of Christian Jews converted after 1939 and not deported by November 1942, at 6,000. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), November 3, 1942, p. 3. Vcescnmayer estimated the total number of converted Jews in Slovakia at the end of 1943 at 10,000. Memorandum by Vcescnmayer, December 22, 1943, NG-4651. A somewhat earlier estimate in the *Dotuuzeitung* (Belgrade), May 18, 1943, p. 3, put the number at 15,000. None of these sources disclose how many Jews had been converted before 1939 and how many Christian Jews were deported during 1942.

73. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), September 1, 1942, p. 3; June 20, 1943, p. 3.

74. See the description of attitudes of the several Christian churches in the report by Urbantkc to Herrmann, September 3, 1942, T 175, Roll 584.

of the Losener principle, and the religion of the victim was not controlling in that definition. What was decisive was the religion of his grandparents. Indeed, the new converts were deported to Auschwitz and Lublin with the rest of Jewry to die there as Christians, but still the conversions did not halt. The Jews were clinging to a straw, although all around them “new Christians” were drowning.

Nevertheless, the conversions alarmed the Slovak government. On March 26, 1942, the day on which the deportations started, Interior Minister Mach spoke on the radio. The Slovak public, he declared, was not influenced by the whining of the Jews who on this day wanted to arouse pity, although they were in no danger save that of work. No one could save the Jews from this labor commitment, not even those clergymen who were now conferring baptism on the Jews. The Jewish question in Slovakia, concluded Mach, would be solved humanely, without doing violence to Christian principles.⁷⁵

From the Ethnic German organ, the *Grenzbote*, criticism was more vociferous. The baptisms were termed a blasphemy, and the churchmen who engaged in them were accused of having monetary motives.⁷⁶ Two Calvinist pastors, Puskas and Sedivy, were subsequently arrested, and Sedivy was accused of having performed no fewer than 717 baptisms.⁷⁷

In the meantime, what did the churches do to protea the *old* converts who had already been Christians before the onset of deportations? The churches were not sitting idly by, for on May 15, 1942, something happened: the Slovak Parliament issued a deportation law. In its main outlines the law was not extraordinary. It was a measure for the confiscation of abandoned Jewish property, in other words, the counterpart of the 11th Ordinance to the Reich Citizenship Law. However, the Slovak measure had a provision that came almost as a shock to the Germans: a new definition of the term “Jew.” This revision was a little late, for 30,000 Jews had already been shipped away.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, it had an immediate effect upon the progressing operation, for 60,000 Jews were still in the country. The law provided that henceforth a Jew was any person who belonged to the Jewish religion or who had been converted after March 14, 1939.⁷⁹

It should be noted that the third definition strongly resembled and in its leniency even exceeded the first. The law still did not exempt *all* con-

75. *Dcmazzeitung* (Belgrade), March 27, 1942, p. 3.

76. *Ibid.*, March 21, 1942, p. 3; April 17, 1942, p. 3.

77. *Ibid.*, March 27, 1942, p. 3; August 30, 1942, p. 3. The Protescanr conversions are mentioned prominently in a note by Sidor to Cardinal Secretary of Stare Maglionc, May 23, 1942. Text in Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, pp. 233-35.

78. *Dcmazzeitung* (Belgrade), May 21, 1942, p. 3. The figure, comprising deportations from March 26 to May 15, was given by Moravck.

79. *Die Judenfrage*, June 1, 1942, pp. 108-9.

verted Jews, but it did exempt all Jews converted before the founding of the Slovak state, and that formulation was far more palatable to the churches than the decree of September 1941. Moreover, the law contained a number of other exemptions that were numerically even more important. To begin with, the exemptions conferred on the Christian Jews were extended automatically to their family members, including wife (or husband), children, *and* parents. In addition, the law exempted from deportation so-called essential categories — professionals, labor certificate holders, and the remaining entrepreneurs. These people were allowed to stay, along with their wives and children. Finally, the law exempted all Jews in mixed marriages.^{80 81}

To the Slovak authorities it had become clear that the deportations had costs. One was the pressure of the church. Another was the required payment to the Germans for each deported Jew. A third was the growing recognition that replacing deportees and escapees would not be easy. Thus a German wholesale lumber trader reported to the Security Service after a trip to Slovakia that Slovak employees specialized in any trade, such as bookkeeping, were asking for and receiving “fantasy wages” (*Phantasie Gehälter*)*'

The Vatican, it should be noted, was unhappy despite the mitigations. The Slovak parliament had placed its stamp of approval on the deportations, and the priests who were members of the legislature had either voted for the law or abstained. To Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione such clerical collaboration was unsavory.⁸²

The Germans themselves did not know at first how many Jews were exempted by the deportation law, and the machinery of destruction plodded ahead until, at the end of June, it slowed down and almost ground to a halt. On June 25 Prime Minister Tuka, German envoy Ludin, and his expert in Jewish affairs Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny met in conference. Most of the talking was done by Wisliceny, who summarized the state of the deportations to date. A total of 52,000 Jews had been deported and 35,000 remained. Many of the remaining Jews were in possession of “protective letters” (*Schutzbriefe*) certifying that the bearer was essential to the economy. Those letters, Wisliceny pointed out, would have to undergo a review before he could proceed any further. The review was to be accomplished by inviting the Slovak employer to testify about the expendability of his Jewish workers. Wisliceny then praised the Jewish Division of the Slovak Interior Ministry (Division 14), which, he said,

80. *Ibid.*

81. Security Service in Hamburg to Security Service in Vienna, June 25, 1942, T 175, Roll 583.

82. Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, p. 86.

worked very well, apart from its director (Dr. Vasek). The Slovak Transport Ministry had also been very cooperative.

Prime Minister Tuka put in that in a cabinet meeting on the day before, the government had decided that every ministry that had issued protective letters to Jews was to notify the Interior Ministry of the persons involved, so that the ministry could undertake a "revision." Tuka then wanted to know what was wrong with the director of the Jewish Division of the Interior Ministry' (Dr. Vasek), whom Wisliceny had refused to praise.

Wisliceny replied that while Moravek (the chief of the Economy Office) was "clean and adamant" (*sauber und kompromisslos*), Dr. Vasek was a compromiser who had made agreements with everybody, so that his hands were tied. Vasek, in Wisliceny's opinion, would be unable to carry out the revision of the protective letters.⁸³ On this sour note the meeting ended.

That same day Ludin wrote to the Foreign Office that 35,000 Jews had received special legitimation, that the deportations were unpopular, and that British counterpropaganda had started in Slovakia. Nevertheless, the letter continued, Tuka was willing to press on and had in fact asked Ludin to arrange for strong diplomatic pressure to be put on the Slovak government.⁸⁴

The strange request by a prime minister for pressure on his own government can be understood only in terms of satellite mentality. A satellite official does not like to talk back to his master. He therefore says, in effect: "I would like to do it, but my colleagues are opposed. Put pressure on them." As soon as the pressure is exerted on someone else, the game starts all over again. In any case, the German Foreign Office decided to comply with the request. A note was drafted stating that the Slovak decision to exempt 35,000 Jews from deportation was making a "very bad impression" in Germany, particularly in view of previous Slovak cooperation. However, that draft was judged to be too harsh, and the words "very bad impression" were crossed out. Instead, the Foreign Office said that the exclusion of the 35,000 Jews came as a "surprise" to the Germans.⁸⁵ And, in a way, a surprise it was.

Following these efforts of the Foreign Office at the end of June, the operation was continued at a decreasing rate. In July some of the most vulnerable victims were assembled, including hospitalized and institutionalized people.⁸⁶ According to a final tally by the Slovak Transport

83. Summary' of Slovak deportation conference held on June 26, 1942, dated June 30, 1942, NG-4553.

84. Ludin to Foreign Office, June 26, 1942, NG-4407.

85. Weizsacker to Ludin, June 30, 1942, NG-4407.

86. Kamenec, "Deportation," in Toth, *Tragedy*, p. 95.

Ministry, fifty-seven transports had left from March to October 1942 with 57,752 Jews. Nineteen of the trains were dispatched with 18,746 deportees to Auschwitz, and thirty-eight with 39,006 to Nalyczow, a station about thirteen miles west of the city of Lublin.⁸⁷ In the Lublin District, about 9,000, mainly younger men, were sent on to the Lublin camp (Majdanek), and 30,000, mostly older people or families with children, were distributed in small towns and villages from which Polish Jews had already been deported.⁸⁸ A total of 24,378 of these 30,000 were moved to Sobibor for gassing.⁸⁹ Throughout this time, about 6,000 Jews fled to Hungary and at the end 24,000 remained in Slovakia.⁹⁰

The German diplomats never ceased to apply pressure. They even tried to make a concession. Coming back to the 500 Reichsmark per capita payment, the German Foreign Office adopted a benevolent attitude. Perhaps, it was reasoned, if the Slovaks could make a little more money, the Germans would get a few more Jews.

During the negotiations pertaining to Slovak Jewish property in Germany and German Jewish property in Slovakia, the Foreign Office (in accordance with established procedure) proposed the adoption of the "territorial principle." The Slovaks were suspicious. They thought that they might lose in the swap. The Germans thereupon suggested that the territorial principle might be agreeable to the Slovaks if the per capita payment for the deported Jews were reduced from 500 to 300 Reichsmark. That difference, it was argued, would certainly more than cover any discrepancy in the values of the abandoned properties.

At this point, however, the Economy Ministry noted that Germany already owed Slovakia 280 million Reichsmark and therefore could not "relinquish" any foreign currency (*auf keine Devisen verzichten*).⁹¹ Unstated in the official German correspondence was the further question

87. Vlasta Kladvova, "Flic Fare of Jewish Transports from Slovakia to Auschwitz," in Toth, *Tragedy*, pp. 143-73. SS Statistician Korherr listed 56,691 in a tabulation to December 31, 1942, and 57,545 to March 31, 1943. See his report, April 19, 1943, NCI-1943. A Jewish figure is 57,839. Testimony by Dr. Bedrich Steiner (Statistical Division, ÜZ), Eichmann trial transcript, May 24, 1961, sess. 50, p. WT.

88. Jo yet Marszałek, *Maydanek* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1982), pp. 74-75. From Majdanek, 1,400 Slovak Jews were transported to Auschwitz after a short stop. Danuta Czech, *Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau 1939-1945* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1989), entries for May 22 and June 30, 1942, pp. 215 and 238.

89. Adalbert Rückerl, *NS-Vernichtungslager* (Munich, 1977), p. 156.

90. Kamnec, "Deportation," in Toth, *Tragedy*, p. 101.

91. Luther via Trade-Political Division to Weizsäcker, January 29, 1943, NG-5108. In the meantime the Slovak National Bank appears to have allocated only 100 million crowns (about a third of the owed amount) for payment. Lipscher, *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, p. 119.

whether a reduction of 200 Reichsmark would induce the Slovak government to deliver more Jews in any case, if the Slovaks suspected the true nature of the “resettlement.” In this connection, Slovak Prime Minister Tuka had already made a peculiar request on April 18, 1942. He wanted Ludin to conclude a treaty with Slovakia in which Germany would obligate itself not to return evacuated Jews and which would also provide for a German renunciation of all claims upon Jewish assets in Slovakia.⁹² One could interpret such a proposal as a somewhat redundant precautionary measure to remove all legal obstacles to the Slovak confiscation of abandoned Jewish property. But what if the maneuver was prompted by a desire to set up a facade of ignorance? With such an agreement in hand, Tuka could always claim that he was completely unaware of the actual Jewish fate. Why else would he have exacted a guarantee against their return? The German minister, on his part, was taken aback by the request for written stipulations. In such matters, Ludin pointed out, the Reich did not conclude treaties, although he was prepared to request permission to extend to Tuka the desired assurances in the form of a verbal note.⁹³

Some time after the deportations had started, the Vatican stepped in. Two notes were handed to Tuka. In these notes the Vatican explained that it was not correct to suppose that the Jews were being sent to the General-gouvernement for labor service; the truth was that they were being annihilated there.⁹⁴

Soon enough, more news of killings trickled into Slovakia, not only into government circles but to the public as well. In July 1942 a group of 700 Ethnic German “asocials” were “resettled” from Slovakia. As the “asocials” were about to leave, a rumor began to circulate that the “resettlers” would be “boiled into soap” (*zur Seife verkocht werden*).⁹⁵ That rumor referred to the popular belief that the Germans in the killing centers were turning human fat into soap cakes.

The Germans were not unprepared for reports and rumors that the Slovak Jews were dead. To combat these revelations, the Germans spread false reports of their own. In great detail the German stories pictured a tolerable life of Slovakian Jewry in exile. The Jews were said to have rabbis, doctors, and officials. The converted Jews had priests. There was warm water and a children’s kitchen. There were meat, milk, and vegeta-

92. Ludin to Foreign Office, April 18, 1942, NG-4404.

93. *Ibid.* Verbal note from legation to Slovak Foreign Ministry, May 1, 1942, Israel Police 835.

94. Affidavit by Hans Gmelin, June 15, 1948, NG-5291. Gmelin was a member »4 the German legation in Bratislava.

95. Karmasin (Chief of Ethnic Germans in Slovakia) to Himmler, July 29, 1942, NO-1660.

bles in sufficient supply. The ghettos were equipped with stores. There was even a Jewish coffeehouse. The Slovak Jews were supporting themselves by their labor, and their chief justice, Moszek Merin, was receiving a monthly salary.⁹⁶

Such stories could not quell uneasiness and doubts about the fate of the deported Jews. The nuncio in Bratislava, Monsignor Giuseppe Burzio, had a long conversation with Tuka at the beginning of April 1943. Fearing more deportations, Burzio brought up the “sad reports” about Jewish deportees in Poland and Ukraine (*sic*). Everyone spoke of it (*Tutto il mondo ne parla*). Tuka replied that he was not going to be influenced by Jewish propaganda, from which not even the Vatican was immune. He attended mass every day, received communion, and relied on his conscience and his confessor. Exasperated, Burzio wrote to the Cardinal Secretary of State: “Is it worth the trouble to continue to explain to Your Eminence the rest of my conversation with this demented man?”⁹⁷

At this time, however, Tuka was under pressure also from Slovak bishops. Turning to Ludin, Tuka asserted that one bishop had brought reports of Jews shot in masses in Ukraine and that not only men but also women and children were killed. Before their execution the Jews had to dig their own graves. Those who were not buried were boiled into soap. Tuka wanted a Slovak commission, composed of a parliamentary deputy, a journalist, and perhaps a Catholic priest, to inspect the camps to which the Jews had been sent. The legation passed on the request to the Jewish expert of the Foreign Office, von Thadden, and, helpless, the Legationsrat transferred the burden to Eichmann.⁹⁸ This was Eichmann’s reply dated June 2, 1943:

With reference to the proposal put forward by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka to the German Minister in Bratislava to send a mixed Slovakian commission to one of the Jewish camps in the occupied territories, I wish to state that an inspection of this kind has already been undertaken recently on the part of Slovakia, by Fiala, die chief editor of the periodical *Der Grenzboten* [Ethnic German newspaper].

With regard to the description of conditions in Jewish camps requested by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka, attention should be drawn to the comprehensive series of articles by this editor that have appeared with

96. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), November 21, 1942, p. 3.

97. Burzio to Maglione, April 10, 1943. Text in Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, pp. 239-43.

98. Ludin to Foreign Office, April 13, 1943, and copy by von Thadden to Eichmann, May 15, 1943, Israel Police 1016. To Ludin, Tuka mentioned also his conversation with Burzio, elaborating on the Father Confessor. The latter, he said, had asked him whether he could in good conscience consider the Jewish resettlement as serving the welfare of the nation. When the answer was yes, Tuka’s priest was satisfied. *Ibid.*

numerous photographs, etc., in the periodicals *Der Grenzbote, Slovak, Slovenska Politika, Gardiste, Aiatjyar Hirlap*, and the *Pariser Zeitung*. . . .

For the rest, to counteract the fantastic rumors circulating in Slovakia about the fate of the evacuated Jews, attention should be drawn to the postal communications of these Jews with Slovakia, which are forwarded directly through the adviser on Jewish affairs with the German legation in Bratislava [Wisliceny] and which, incidentally, amounted to more than 1,000 letters and postcards for February-March this year. Concerning the information apparently desired by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka about the conditions in Jewish camps, no objections would be raised by this office against any possible scrutinizing of the correspondence before it is forwarded to the addressees."

A few weeks after this not very reassuring answer to Tuka's doubts, the Germans turned on the pressure again. In Bratislava a Foreign Office spokesman, Minister Schmidt (evidently the press Schmidt, not the interpreter), "discussed" the "Jewish question" with the press in the following terms: "The Jewish question is no question of humanity and no question of religion, but a question of political hygiene. Jewry is to be combatted wherever it is found, because it is a political infectant, the ferment of the disintegration and death of every national organism."^{99 100}

In the beginning of July 1943, Ribbentrop decided not to put any "official" pressure on President Tiso of Slovakia. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister had no objection to an "unofficial" attempt to influence the Slovak president to speed the "cleanup" (*Bereintzung*) of the Jewish question. In German Foreign Office parlance, the principal difference between "official" and "unofficial" pressure was that the former was written, whereas the latter was oral. Obviously the "unofficial" method afforded greater opportunity for maneuverability. Also, the "unofficial" emissary had to be a verbalist. The specialist appointed for this mission was Edmund Veesenmayer.¹⁰¹ The Slovak leaders did not give in. They no longer had the protection of ignorance, and they knew the war was lost.

In December, Veesenmayer went to Bratislava again. Standing in Ludin's waiting room, he demanded from Wisliceny a statistical report.

99. Eichmann to von Thadden, June 2, 1943, document Steengracht 64. The Foreign Office, not happy, commented on the negative effect of this refusal. Von Thadden to RSHA, January 14, 1944, Israel Police 1017. Note the copies, dated October 15, 1943, of several postcards sent by Else Grün from the "Labor Camp Birkenau" (the death camp of Auschwitz) in the Security Service in Bratislava, T 175, Roll 583.

100. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), July 3, 1943, p. 3.

101. Veesenmayer to von Sonnleithner, July 3, 1943, NG-4749. Sonnleithner via Wagner to Stcengracht, July 5, 1943, NG-4749. Wagner to Ludin, July 21, 1943, NG-4749.

Scanning the figures, he told Wisliceny that he had a Führer order to pay a visit to the Slovak president. This time, Veesebmayer said, he would talk with Tiso “bluiddy” (*Fraktur reden*).¹⁰²

At the conclusion of the Veesebmayer-Tiso “discussion,” the Slovak President agreed to place in concentration camps the remaining 16,000 to 18,000 *unconverted* Jews. No exemptions were to be granted in this operation, which was to be completed by April 1, 1944. The baptized Jews were not mentioned. (Tiso was a priest.) However, the Christian Jews were dealt with in a subsequent conversation between Veesebmayer and the Prime Minister Tuka. In that discussion it was agreed that the 10,000 or so baptized Jews would be concentrated in a camp of their own.¹⁰³

Slowly the Slovak administration started to make its preparations. In January 1944 all Bratislava Jews were ordered to register with the police,¹⁰⁴ and in February new movements of Jews to Hungary were observed by Slovak and Hungarian police authorities.¹⁰⁵ But by April 1, 1944, the Jews had not been concentrated. The Slovaks were plainly hesitant.

At the beginning of May, partisans made themselves felt in eastern Slovakia, and the Slovak government decided to evacuate Jews and Czechs from this region to the central and western parts of the country.¹⁰⁶ When Tiso visited Hider that month, the Führer was reported to have reassured the Slovak president, adding that more would have to be accomplished in the economic field and that “now one would have to do something about the Jews” (*Man müsse jetzt etwas mit den Juden unternehmen*).¹⁰⁷

In June, when deportations were already in progress in Hungary, Veesebmayer (then the German minister in Budapest) wanted to meet Ludin, the minister in Bratislava, for joint planning of the removal of Hungarian and remaining Slovak Jews.¹⁰⁸ The meeting did not take place, because Ludin had made it conditional on the presence of his indispensable assistant in Jewish affairs, Wisliceny, who was then in Budapest being just as indispensable to Eichmann.¹⁰⁹

The Slovak Jews now had another reprieve, but the fate of the refugees

102. Affidavit by Wisliceny, June 11, 1947, NG-1823.

103. Memorandum by Veesebmayer, December 22, 1943, NG-4651.

104. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), January 28, 1944, p. 3.

105. *Ibid.*, Februar' 6, 1944, p. 3.

106. Report by Security Service in Bratislava, May 13, 1944, T 175, Roll 583.

107. HStuf. Böhrsch (Security Service in Bratislava) to RSHAIII-B (Staf. Ehlich), May 18, 1944, T 175, Roll 583.

108. Altenburg to Veesebmayer, June 14, 1944, NG-2829. Altenburg to Ludin, June 16, 1944, NG-2261. Von Thadden to Personnel Division, July 5, 1944, NG-2261.

109. Affidavit by Wisliceny, June 11, 1947, NG-1823.

in Hungary' was sealed. The Germans and the Hungarians exerted pressure on the Slovak government to relinquish protection of its Jews in Hungary'. The Slovaks declared that they were interested in the repatriation of a few Jews but "disinterested" in the fate of the refugees, particularly the "orphaned children who had recently crossed the Hungarian border illegally."¹¹⁰

As the summer months rolled by, the Red Army came closer and closer to Slovakia's eastern frontier. At the end of August a revolt broke out in Slovakia, and within forty-eight hours the Slovak government descended from a puppet regime to a shadow. The Slovak army was disbanded, and a security force of diverse elements, including Hlinka guards, was built in its place.¹¹¹ The Germans were in complete control.

A new personality had now arrived: SS Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, chief of the SS Main Office, chief of the *Führungsstab Politik* in the Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories, chief of prisoner-of-war camps of the Wehrmacht, and now Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in Slovakia. Berger stayed in Slovakia for only four weeks, but his four-week stay was decisive.¹¹² Together with Berger, another SS officer had arrived in Bratislava: Obersturmbannführer Witiska, Commander of Security Police and SD, Slovakia, and chief of Einsatzgruppe H.¹¹³ Witiska's Sonderkommandos pushed forward into the new combat zone, while in the rear they rounded up all Jews. Assisting Witiska was an old hand in deportation matters: Hauptsturmführer Brunner (Vienna, Salonika, and France).¹¹⁴

In desperation the Jewish leaders in Bratislava aimed to the Germans with a ransom scheme. They proposed that their brethren overseas pay money in foreign currency in exchange for the safety of the remaining community. The Germans turned down the proposal. For years the Foreign Office and the SS had preached to allies and satellites that the deportation of Jews was a necessity, that if the Jews were not deported there would be unrest, trouble, and revolt. Now there *was* a revolt. The SS needed foreign currency very much, but Himmler needed even more a confirmation of his untested theory. Berger had reported to Himmler that the Jews had participated decisively in the revolt. That was enough confirmation for the Reichsführer-SS, who never doubted the word of his old

110. Vccscnmayer (in Budapest) to Foreign Office, June 13, 1944, NG-2563. Only a few hundred refugee Jews survived in Hungary'. Affidavit by Dr. Rudolf Kastner, September 13, 1945, PS-2605.

111. See the memorandum by OKW/WFSt/Op (H), February 26, 1945, T 77, Roll 1419.

112. Affidavit by Hans Gmclin (legation, Bratislava), June 15, 1948, NO-5921.

113. *Ibid.* Berger was succeeded by OGruf. Hoflc on September 20, 1944.

114. Affidavit by Wisliceny, November 29, 1945, *Conspiracy and Agprrrsion*, VIII, 606-21.

confidant.¹¹⁵ It should be noted that the “outside” Jews in Switzerland, who were in ignorance of Himmler’s adamant attitude, failed to come through with an offer of money in any case.

Einsatzgruppe H, augmented by Slovak police and Hlinka guards, struck in the Neutra region on September 7. This time, the Hlinka guard headquarters seemed to be less eager than in 1942, preferring to remain in the background and allowing the Germans to assume the leadership role.¹¹⁶ The Slovak population exhibited diverse reactions. When the roundup spread to the Slovak capital on September 29, “half of Bratislava” was on its feet watching the “show,” happy that the departure of the Jews from business enterprises would now force the newly rich Aryanizers to do some work themselves.¹¹⁷ At the same time, the upper levels of Slovak society were “struck like lightning” by the action and others were asking why the Germans carried it out without consulting the Slovak government.¹¹⁸

In the meantime the new Slovak Prime Minister, Tiso (no relation to the President), became worried about the German moves. On October 4, 1944, he told Ludin that some weeks before he had agreed to the concentration of the Jews within Slovak territory. Now, however, he had heard that the Germans, without even notifying the Slovak government, were about to transport the Jews from the country. Undoubtedly such a move would result in diplomatic difficulties, since protests could be expected from the Vatican and also from Switzerland. (By “Switzerland” Tiso actually meant the Western Allies.) Ludin replied that the “Jewish question” would now have to be “solved radically in any case [*auf alle Fälle radikal gelöst werden müsse*].” In the event of foreign protests, Tiso was to point out that the Reich demanded from Slovakia a radical solution. “In diat eventuality,” said Ludin, “we shall be ready to accept responsibility for the anti-Jewish measures undertaken here.”¹¹⁹ Ribbentrop and Hitler thought that Ludin’s explanation was very good.¹²⁰

115. Affidavit by Kurt Becher, March 1, 1948, NO-4548. Becher was a Standartenführer who had jurisdiction in ransom matters. See also affidavit by Dr. Rudolf Kastner (executive vice president of Jewish Relief Committee in Budapest), August 4, 1947, NO-4824. Lipscher calculated 1,397 men and 169 women with Jewish names in partisan units. Included is a Jewish unit formed in the dissolved labor camp of Novaky. Casualties were in the hundreds. *Die Juden im slowakischen Staat*, pp. 163-76.

116. Report by Einsatzgruppe H/III (signed Nagel), September 10, 1944, T 175, Roll 583.

117. Report by Security Service in Bratislava, September 29, 1944, *ibid*.

118. Report by Securin’ Service in Bratislava, October 3, 1944, *ibid*.

119. Ludin to Foreign Office, October 4, 1944, NG-5100.

120. Reinbeck (Bureau of the Foreign Minister) via Stengracht and Henckc to Wagner, October 10, 1944, NG-5100.

About six hundred appeals on behalf of individual Jews poured into the German legation from Slovak authorities and private persons. All interventions were in vain. Witiska would not consider them. He had orders, he said, to send everybody who was “suspicious” or who “sympathized” with the rebels to the concentration camp at Sered.¹²¹

Approximately 13,000 to 14,000 Jews were caught in the roundup. Of these victims, 7,936 were transported to Auschwitz, 4,370 were funneled to Sachsenhausen and the “Old People’s Ghetto” of Theresienstadt, still others were shot in Slovakia itself.¹²² A few thousand Jews were able to hide.

In the final hours of the war, the Slovak Transport Ministry was billed by the Reichsbahn for the costs of the 1944 deportations, to the extent that the movement of the Jews was carried out on German territory. The Slovaks referred to the fact that the trains had gone out as German military transports (*auf Wehrmachtfahrschein*). The German Plenipotentiary (*Bahnbevollmächtigter*) with the Slovak Transport Ministry pointed out that the trains had been processed with the Wehrmacht designation only to speed them on their way, and not for any abatement of a Slovak financial liability. Payment, he wrote, was to be made with funds from confiscated Jewish property, and the appropriate agency having jurisdiction in this matter was Division 14 of the Slovak Interior Ministry.¹²³

All told, about 70,000 Jews had been deported from Slovakia; 65,000 did not return.¹²⁴ And that was the “Final Solution” in this puppet state.

The Opportunistic Satellites

Something can always be learned about the destruction process in an Axis country by examining its attitude toward the war. Somehow the fate of the Jews in a German satellite state was always linked to the extent of war enthusiasm in that state. The implementation of the destructive program and the prosecution of the war show close parallels, primarily because both the Jews and the war were a measure of a satellite’s desire and ability to withstand German demands. In no country was this fact more evident than in Bulgaria.

121. Affidavit by Gmelin, June 15, 1948, NG-5291-.

122. Testimony by Dr. Bedrich Steiner, Eichmann trial transcript, May 24, 1961, sess. 50, pp. W1, XI. Among those seized were 172 Gypsies. Report by BdS-IVc, December 9, 1944, in Lcttrich, *Slovakia*, pp. 308-9. They were subject to deportation. Testimony by Adolf Rosenberg (survivor), Eichmann trial transcript, May 24, 1961, sess. 51, p>pl.

123. Plenipotentiary to Slovak Transport Ministry, March 1, 1945, in Rotkirchen, *The Destruction of Slovak Jewry*, facsimile facing p. 224.

124. Testimony by Steiner, May 24, 1961, Eichmann trial transcript, sess. 50, pp. W1, XI.

Bulgaria

The Bulgarians were part ally, part satellite. Unlike Slovakia or Croatia, Bulgaria did not *owe* its existence to Germany. It was in the German camp solely for opportunistic reasons. As a result of two lost contests, the Second Balkan War and the First World War, Bulgaria had territorial grievances against all its neighbors.

Under German patronage Bulgarian hopes for redress were realized to a far greater extent than any optimist in Sofia could reasonably have expected. In September 1940 Bulgaria received southern Dobrudja from Romania. In March 1941 the German army was admitted to Bulgaria, and during the following month the country acquired Macedonia from Yugoslavia and Thrace from Greece. The Bulgarian domain now extended to Lake Ohrid (on the Albanian frontier) in the west and to the Aegean Sea in the south.

It is important to note what the Bulgarians did after they had made these gains. There were, of course, Bulgarian occupation troops in Macedonia and Thrace. However, the Bulgarians were very careful to limit their military contributions to the territorial confines of "Greater Bulgaria." No Bulgarian armed forces were dispatched to fight on fronts outside the country, and no expeditionary forces were sent to Russia. When Germany opened its eastern campaign, Bulgaria did not even declare war on the "Bolshevik enemy." In the West, too, the Bulgarians were reluctant to acquire unnecessary foes. Declarations of war against the Western powers were postponed as long as possible, that is, until the United States became a belligerent.

For its part, the United States was in no hurry to reply to the Balkan declarations of war. On June 2, 1942, when President Roosevelt recommended to Congress that it recognize a state of war between the United States and the Balkan states, he said:

The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Roumania have declared war against the United States. I realize that the three Governments took this action not upon their own initiative or in response to the wishes of their peoples, but as the instruments of Hitler.¹

That was the kind of realization Bulgaria was eager to foster, for above all, the Bulgarians wanted to play it safe. They were unwilling to be involved in anything irrevocably. It was vital to them that the back door be open and the escape route be clear. They wanted, in short, to play the game in such a way that there was chance of gain but no risk of loss. And when the Axis powers were finally defeated, the Bulgarians emerged from their

1. Department of State, *Bulletin*, June 6, 1942, pp. 509-10.

adventure without Greek Thrace and Yugoslav Macedonia, but they kept southern Dobrudja, which they had annexed in 1940.²

The Bulgarian refusal to become a full-fledged Axis partner in war was mirrored in a similar reluctance to take irrevocable measures against the Jews. In the occupied territories of Macedonia and Thrace, where Bulgaria was, so to speak, really at war, the Jews were delivered into German hands for deportation to Poland. In Old Bulgaria, on the other hand, the destruction process was developed through definition, expropriation, and concentration, only to be broken off before the deportation stage. It was as though the degree of involvement had already been predetermined. The operation was brought to a halt as if stopped by an invisible sign which said, "So far and no farther."

Old Bulgaria had about 50,000 Jews,³ and approximately 15,000 more were added to the Bulgarian power sphere in the newly won territories of Macedonia and Thrace. During the war an American Jewish organization compiled a book⁴ in which the writers lamented the fate of the European Jewish communities by reciting the notable contributions by great Jews in Germany, France, Italy, and so on. When the editors came to the Bulgarian section, they found nothing special to say about the Bulgarian Jewish community, and so they noted somewhat apologetically that the Bulgarian Jews had no "spectacular" achievements.⁵

Indeed, the Bulgarian Jews were not "essential." They were not "indispensable." They were not especially talented or particularly well off. They attracted neither extraordinary sympathy nor exceptional hostility. There was no need to preserve them and no reason to destroy them. The Bulgarian Jews were a pawn in the hands of an opportunistic power. They were like a surplus commodity, to be traded for political advantage. The Reich could not completely destroy the Bulgarian Jews because it could not offer sufficient gain to the cautious Bulgarian rulers.⁶

On the German side, the chief protagonists who helped decide the fate of Bulgarian Jewry were Minister Beckerle, the Jewish Adviser Dannecker, and the Police Attache Hoffmann. Beckerle, like the other German

2. Under the peace terms, Bulgaria had to pay \$25,000,000 to Yugoslavia and \$45,000,000 to Greece as reparations. However, Bulgaria had done some looting in the occupied territories. Also, it is true that Bulgaria became a Communist satellite, but that is a fate which in eastern Europe overtook victors and vanquished alike.

3. The census of 1934 showed 48,565 Jews.

4. Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Hitler's Ten-Tear War on the Jew* (New York, 1943).

5. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

6. For a detailed history of the fate of Bulgarian Jewry, see Frederick B. Chary, *77« Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940-1944* (Pittsburgh, 1972). Chaw's book is based in large part on Bulgarian sources.

emissaries in the Balkans, was an SA man. His relations with the SS, however, were quite good. In fact, Beckerle was police president of Frankfurt when the Foreign Office snatched him from the Himmler hierarchy and appointed him Minister to Bulgaria.⁷ Dannecker did not come to Bulgaria until January 1943; he was in France until then. The other SS man, Hoffmann, represented the Attache Group of the RSHA in Bulgaria.⁸

The Bulgarian government's principal personalities in Jewish affairs were the following:⁹

King: Boris

Prime Minister: Filov (Bojilov)

Foreign Minister: Popov (Filov, Kirov)

Interior Minister: Gabrovski (Christov)

Justice Minister: Mitakov (Partov)

Finance Minister: Bojilov

Jewish Commissar (from 1942): Belev (Stomonjakov)

As an Axis country, Bulgaria had a few peculiarities. There was a parliament in Sofia (the *Sobranje*) that actually passed laws. Unlike the Slovak parliament, it was not entirely a rubber-stamp body, for it was the scene of discussion, debate, protest, and even amendment of policy. In June 1942, the Sobranje invested the Cabinet with plenary powers in Jewish affairs, reserving only a legislative veto over decisions made in the executive branch.¹⁰ At this point, however, yet another factor of some importance remained in the political arena: King Boris. The Bulgarian King (or *Czar*) was respected for his shrewdness even by Hitler.¹¹ Boris displayed some of that shrewdness in Jewish matters.

One of the most important personalities on the list was Commissar Belev, whose office was established in August 1942. Whereas King Boris was above the Cabinet, Belev was below it. Belev did not have unlimited

7. See memorandum by Weizsacker, April 5, 1941, NG-2064. Beckerle's predecessor was Richthofen.

8. A police attache was the counterpart of a military attache. A Himmler invention, police attaches were dispatched to some embassies and legations in pursuance of an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop. Himmler to main offices and Higher SS and Police Leaders, May 23, 1942, enclosing Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement of August 8, 1941, and supplementary agreement between Weizsacker and Hevdrich of August 28, 1941, NO-763.

9. See list of Bulgarian cabinets compiled by Char)', *The Bulgarian Jews*, pp. 216-18.

10. *Ibui*, p. 53.

11. Picker, *Hitler's Tschgespriuhe im Fuhrerhauptquartier 1941-1942*, entry' for April 2, 1942, p. 223.

authority in his sphere. He had to have authorization in law. Sometimes the law provided that he could take no action in a particular matter without the consent of the Cabinet, and once in a while the consent of the Cabinet was frustrated by action of the King. The Bulgarian machinery was thus precision designed for delaying and procrastinating tactics, a fact that the Germans did not discover immediately.

The first anti-Jewish law passed its first reading in Parliament in November 1940, as “representatives and ministers accused each other of having taken money from the Jews.”¹² The law was enacted on January 21, 1941, at a time when the Bulgarian regime was moving closer into the arms of the Germans, during the period after the acquisition of southern Dobruja but before the occupation of Macedonia and Thrace. In scope, the law was wide. It contained provisions for the definition, expropriation, and concentration of the Jews. In its effect it was not exactly a mild law, for the Bulgarians did not start out with mildness. Restraint was applied only afterward, when the prospects of a German victory began to fade. But, of course, the law was not written by the Germans. The Bulgarian authorship can be seen in the definition, which differed considerably from the Losener version.

In the Bulgarian law a person with three or more Jewish grandparents was *not* considered a Jew if he had been married in a Christian rite to a Bulgarian by September 1, 1940, and if he had been baptized at the time of the publication of the law (January 21, 1941). The Bulgarian law also specified that a person with two Jewish grandparents was not to be considered Jewish, even if married to a Jewish person, if he had been baptized by September 1, 1940. However, the law allowed for the possibility of classifying a quarter-Jewish person as a Jew if his half-Jewish parent had not been baptized before the marriage ceremony, or if he himself was not raised in the Christian faith as his first religion.¹³ In short, the Bulgarian definition was somewhat milder than the German in its total effect but

12. Foreign Mail Census Office (*Auslandsbriefprufstelle*) Vienna (signed by Obstlt. Gross) to OKW/Wi Rii, attention Obit. Beyer and Economy Ministry, attention MinRat Schultz-Schlutius, December 19, 1940, enclosing letter from Petraschka in Sofia to Jordan Tasscf in Berlin, November 30, 1940, Wi/Ic 5.19. See also report on “Bulgarian Press Circles” received by Reichsstelle fur Aussenhandel in Sofia on November 18, 1940, Wi/IC 5.35.

13. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 24, 1942, p. 3. The Grand Vicar and President of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Neofit of Vidin, writing to the Prime Minister on November 15, 1940, expressed dissatisfaction with the idea of making any distinction between converts and born Christians. In addition, he opposed any action taken against the Jews “as a national minority.” See the letter, in large extract, in Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Princeton, 2001), pp. 54-5“.

sharper in some of its provisions. The Germans, for example, exempted some persons because they did not belong to the Jewish religion; the Bulgarians freed some of their part-Jews only if they belonged to the Christian religion. That is an important distinction, for it reveals fundamentally different modes of thinking.¹⁴

One other divergence from German practice may be noted. The Bulgarians, like the Slovaks and Croatians, had privileged Jews —war volunteers, all veterans with certain decorations, war invalids, and war orphans. This group numbered about a thousand without dependents, or, if families are included, a little less than a tenth of the Jewish community.¹⁵

In expropriations the law provided for the summary dismissal of Jewish civil servants and the introduction of the *numerus clausus* among the self-employed, that is, a reduction of Jewish participation in the professions and enterprises to the proportion of Jews in the population. Jews were 1 percent of the population; hence the basic *numerus clausus* was also 1 percent.

What was the effect of that quota? Since Bulgaria was predominantly agricultural whereas the Jewish community was almost entirely urban, the application of the *numerus clausus* could have meant almost total expropriation. Actually, however, the *numerus clausus* was later modified so as to be based on Jewish population in individual cities, a rather significant change.¹⁶

The law also specified that privileged Jews were to have preference “in competition with” unprivileged Jews. This formulation was interpreted by the Interior Ministry as a directive to include to the greatest possible extent privileged Jews among the surviving Jewish professionals and businessmen. However, the supreme administrative tribunal ruled that privileged Jews were not to be included in the *numerus clausus* at all.¹⁷ That decision, which would have been inconceivable in a German court, was another important modification.

The final statistics were consequently as follows:¹⁸

14. Characteristically, intercepted mail from Sofia revealed that a “conversion epidemic” was rampant in the capital. Auslandsbriefprüfstelle in Vienna to Zentralauswertestelle, February 18, 1941, Wi/IC 5.35. In 1942 the definition was made sharper in that half-Jews were henceforth to be treated like three-quarter Jews. The basic emphasis on the Christian religion, however, remained. *Douauzeitmj* (Belgrade), August 28-30, 1942.

15. *Dotiauztitunff* (Belgrade), June 24, 1942, p. 3.

16. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1941, p. 3.

17. *Ibid.*, June 24, 1942, p. 3.

18. *Ibid.*, also February 20, 1942, p. 3. The discrepancy of 2 in the figure of 149 is unexplained.

	<i>Professions</i>	<i>Business enterprises</i>
Before the law	521	4,272
Admitted by <i>numerus clausus</i>	76	498
Privileged	71	263
Total remaining	149 [<i>sic</i>]	761

In spite of the modifications, therefore, a considerable reduction had been effected. What happened to the enterprises that were not permitted to continue? They were subjected to forced sale, or, as it would be biown in the Reich, compulsory Aryanization.

Implementation decrees put additional restrictions on the Jews in the economic sphere. Jews were barred from certain business activities altogether, the size of Jewish enterprises was limited to a certain capital, so-called mixed enterprises (Jewish-Bulgarian) were dissolved, and so on.¹⁹ Finally, the accumulated Jewish cash that accrued from the compulsory sales was confiscated by the government in quite the same way as the German Finance Ministry collected the money from the Jewish entrepreneurs in the Reich. The Bulgarian measure was not called a fine, however. It was simply a property tax, and it netted a total of 575 million leva (17.5 million Reichsmark, or seven million dollars).²⁰

The Bulgarian Jews were not rich, for they were primarily workers. It is therefore not surprising that, simultaneously with the expropriation of Jewish property, there was an exploitation of Jewish labor. At first Jews served with Bulgarians in the regular labor service maintained by the military establishment. The Jews wore Bulgarian uniforms and did the same work as Bulgarians.

The German Labor Service (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*) protested against this state of affairs and refused cooperation with the Bulgarian Labor Service in any function so long as Jews were receiving such favorable treatment. German Minister Beckerle informed Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov of this protest, and the Bulgarian agreed to do his best. The Jews were to be separated from the Bulgarian Labor Service; they were to be divested of the uniform and mobilized for “especially heavy labor” (*verschdrft zu besonders schweren Arbeiten herangezogen*).²¹ By August 1941, there was a special Jewish labor service.²² ²³ The Jews wore no uniform. Instead, they had to wear a star—the first instance of marking in Bulgaria.²²

19. *Ibid.*, December 16, 1941, p. 3; February 4, 1942, p. 4; February 15, 1942, p. 4; June 24, 1942, p. 3; August 13, 1942, p. 3; August 28-30,1942.

20. *Ibid.*, August 20, 1941, p. 4; September 5, 1941, p. 3; November 21, 1941, p. 3; June 24, 1942, p. 3.

21. Beckerle to Foreign Office, July 31,1941, NG-3251.

22. *Kmkauer Zeitutuj*, August 22, 1941, p. 4.

23. *Donauzcitutip* (Belgrade), May 13, 1942, p. 3.

Initially the Jewish labor draft: affected all Jews between the ages of twenty-one and diirty-one.²⁴ Later it was extended to men between the ages of thirty-one and forty-seven.²⁵ Numerically it expanded from about 3,300 in June 1942 to about 10,000 in the spring of 1943.²⁶ Like everywhere else in Europe, the Jews in forced labor were building roads and railroads for the Axis.²⁷

The first concentration measures in Bulgaria may be traced to the law of January 21, 1941, which prohibited, among other things, intermarriages between Jews and Bulgarians. In fact, it was to this provision that the law owed its title, "Law for the Protection of the Nation" (the counterpart of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor). But the law of January 21, 1941, also contained some more important stipulations, notably the prohibition to travel without police permit and a clause permitting the Cabinet, acting upon petition of the Interior Minister, to assign to Jews new addresses in specified towns and villages.²⁸

At first these two provisions were not operative at all. The police granted travel permits to Jews as a matter of course. By the spring of 1942, however, these permits were withheld.²⁹ The assignment of new addresses, which effectively could become operative only after the enforcement of travel prohibitions, was potentially a very dangerous measure, for in its very nature it could be merged with deportations. We have already seen how the Slovak expulsions of Jews from Bratislava to provincial towns and camps led to further deportations from those points to Poland. In Bulgaria this potentiality was even greater, for, while only one-sixth of Slovak Jewry lived in Bratislava, more than half of Bulgarian Jewry lived in Sofia.

However, in the hands of the Bulgarians this measure ultimately became a weapon of delay and procrastination, a justification for frustrating the deportations altogether. The Germans, in the meantime, were completely unaware of the possibility that the Bulgarians would not follow Germany to the end of the road.

On November 26, 1941, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov had a discussion with Ribbentrop, in the course of which Popov mentioned that the Bulgarian government was encountering certain difficulties in the enforcement of its anti-Jewish legislation. In particular, a large number of

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Die Judenfrage*, July 15, 1942, p. 151.

26. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 19, 1942, p. 3. *Die Judenfrage*, June 1, 1942, p. 113; July 15, 1942, p. 151. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 28, 1943, p. 3.

27. *Die Judenfrage*, July 15, 1942, p. 151. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 28, 1943.

28. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 24, 1942, p. 3.

29. *Ibid.*

countries, including Hungary, Romania, and Spain, were protesting against the inclusion of some of their citizens in the application of these laws. Popov suggested that this was undoubtedly one of those questions that all European countries should settle on a common basis.³⁰

The experts in Abteilung Deutschland were very enthusiastic when they read the Popov proposal, since they assumed that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister had asked Germany's help in acquiring a free hand over foreign Jews in Bulgaria.³¹ Indeed, the experts went to work right away and emerged with the "territorial principle" of property disposal.

Ribbentrop himself assured the Bulgarian Foreign Minister "that at the end of the war all Jews would have to leave Europe [*dass am Ende des Krieges sämtliche Juden Europa würden verlassen müssen*]." "That was an unalterable decision of the Führer [*Dies sei ein unabänderlicher Entschluss des Führers*]." Hence there was no need to listen to foreign protests. The Germans, at any rate, were not listening to protests anymore, not even protests from the United States.³²

The statement that "at the end of the war" all Jews would have to leave Europe was a reference to the resettlement legend in its most elaborate form. The Jews were to be deported to Poland as an "intermediary measure." In Poland the deportees would work in hard labor projects and would wait until, at the end of the war, they could be shoved out of Europe. By stating that this plan was an "unalterable decision of the Führer," Ribbentrop was in effect telling the Bulgarians that he anticipated no arguments and no difficulties and that, when the time came, the Bulgarians were naturally expected to hand over their Jews to the Reich for safekeeping, just as other European countries were doing.

However, the time had not yet come. The German killing centers were not yet in operation, and Bulgaria was not sufficiently advanced in its anti-Jewish measures to qualify as a deportation country. The measure for which the Germans were instinctively waiting was the concentration of the Jews, the assignment of new addresses. In June 1942 there were signs that a move was in the offing. A Bulgarian newspaper complained that Sofia had a housing shortage and suggested that an alleviation might be achieved by concentrating the Jews.³³ Later that month Interior Minister Gabrovski requested authorization to eject the Jews from the capital and other Bulgarian towns.³⁴

30. Summary of discussion between Ribbentrop and Popov held on November 26, 1941, in Berlin, November 27, 1941, NG-3667.

31. See memorandum prepared by Abteilung Deutschland for Weizsäcker and Ribbentrop, December 1, 1941, NG-4667.

32. Summary' of Ribbentrop-Popov discussion, November 27, 1941, NG-3667'.

33. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 3, 1942, p. 3.

34. *Deutsche Ukraine-Zeitung* (Lutsk), June 27, 1942, p. 2.

In Berlin, Luther promptly sent instructions (approved by Ribbentrop, Weizsäcker, Wörmann, Wörmann's subordinates, and the Trade-Political Division) requesting Beckerle to inquire in Sofia how the Bulgarians would feel about deportations. Beckerle was not to conclude any agreements or set any dates; he was merely to find out the Bulgarian attitude in the matter. The German Minister made the inquiry and reported that the Bulgarians were prepared to agree to deportations.³⁵ On July 6-7 there was an exchange of notes in pursuance of which Bulgarian Jews in the Reich were to be treated like Reich Jews and German Jews in Bulgaria were to be treated like Bulgarian Jews.³⁶ The main blow was now close at hand, but the Germans were still waiting.

In August 1942 the Bulgarians took several steps forward. The definition was tightened. The Office of the Commissar for Jewish Questions was formed. Blocked funds in the banks were transferred to a "Jewish community fund." (The object of this fund was to help the poor Jews and the Jews in forced labor, and —most important —to finance resettlements.) All unemployed Jews in Sofia were ordered to leave the city by September 1. Apartment restrictions were announced for the remaining Jews: for a family of two—one room, for a family of three or four—two rooms, for a family of five or six—three rooms, for a family of more than six—four rooms. At the same time the Jewish star, already worn by the Jews in forced labor, was introduced for the entire Jewish population. In fact, in the matter of the star the Bulgarians seemed to be going on a binge. Everything conceivably Jewish had to be marked: apartments, stores, business correspondence, bills, and even merchandise.³⁷

In Germany these developments were watched closely. As soon as the marking regulations had come out, Müller ordered his Gestapo offices to subject Bulgarian Jews in the Reich to marking and movement restrictions.³⁸ At the same time the RSHA approached the Foreign Office with a request to go into action. The legation had already sounded out the Bulgarians and reported that Sofia was ready "to come to an agreement with us."³⁹

35. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J. Luther's instructions were sent on June 19. There is no date for the Bulgarian acquiescence.

36. Rintclen to Luther, August 25, 1942, NG-2586-K. Memorandum by Klengenfuss, November 19, 1942, NG-3746.

37. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 27-30, 1942; September 2, 1942, p. 3; September 5, 1942, p. 3; September 9, 1942, p. 3. *Die Judenfrage*, October 1, 1942, pp. 209-10.

38. Müller to state police offices; central offices for Jewish emigration in Vienna and Prague; commanders of Security Police and SD in Prague, Metz, Strasbourg, Velde, Marburg, and Einsatzkommando Luxembourg, September 4, 1942, NG-3715.

39. Memorandum by Luther, August 21, 1942, NG-2586-J.

On September 11, 1942, Luther dispatched a cautious report to Weizsäcker and Ribbentrop. First he mentioned an incident that he considered disturbing. The Central Jewish Consistory of Bulgaria had transmitted birthday greetings to the young Crown Prince, and the Czar had thereupon sent a telegram to Josef Geron, chairman of the Consistory, thanking him and Bulgarian Jewry sincerely for the regards and best wishes. However, continued Luther, the anti-Jewish policy in Bulgaria had made notable progress.

Ludier then summarized all the recent Bulgarian measures, including the expulsion orders affecting the Jews of Sofia. "These resettlement plans," wrote Luther, "have prompted the Reich Security Main Office to raise the question whether the Reich should not, in view of the previously announced attitude of the Bulgarian government, interpose itself at this point and offer its services in the resettlement actions [*sich jetzt einschalten und seine Dienste bei der Aussiedlungsaktion anbieten soll*].V Accordingly, Luther requested Weizsäcker's and Ribbentrop's decision "whether Minister Beckerle may bring up before the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, in properly cautious form, the question of the resettlement of the Bulgarian Jews."

Luther thought that the Bulgarians would now accept a German offer to take over the Jews (*zur Übernahme der Juden*) with pleasure. Ribbentrop, on the other hand, did not think that the time was ripe, and so he scribbled two words on Luther's report: "*noch warten*" (wait some more).⁴⁰ Two weeks later Ribbentrop changed his mind and gave the go-ahead signal,⁴¹ but these two weeks made a difference.

While Berlin waited, Sofia took its time. The expulsions proceeded at a leisurely pace, and the marking ran into difficulties. On November 9, 1942, the RSHA's Foreign Intelligence chief, Schellenberg, sent a detailed account of Bulgarian anti-Jewish developments to Luther. In this report, which already revealed evidence of deliberate procrastination, the Bulgarian government was seen as having come to the conclusion that with the latest anti-Jewish ordinances the "point of toleration" (*das Mass des Erträglichen*) had already been exceeded. To the RSHA observers, the Bulgarian attitude had become manifest in a number of ways. On September 27, for example, about 350 Jews assembled in the courtyard of the Interior Ministry to deliver a petition for the extension of expulsion deadlines. Interior Minister Gabrovski stepped into the courtyard and, "to the amazement of all his officials and employees watching from the windows,

40. Luther via Weizsäcker ro Ribbentrop, September 11, 1942, NG-2582. Von Sonnleithner via Weizsäcker ro Luther, September 15, 1942, NG-2582. Luther ro Rademacher, September 15, 1942, NG-2582.

41. Luther to Weizsäcker, Wörmann, von Erdmannsdorff, Pol. I, Pol. IV, D II. D III, Legal and Trade Political divisions, September 24, 1942, NG-1517.

delivered a half-hour speech to calm the Jews.” On top of that, he said that “the worst was already over” and personally accepted the Jewish petition. The next day Gabrovski directed the press to cease discussion of the Jewish question, basing his order on the ground that die Jewish question had already been regulated and that the people were satisfied with these measures against the Jews. In addition, Gabrovski “hinted” repeatedly to Commissar Belev that the Cabinet and the Czar wished an alleviation of anti-Jewish activities. In accordance with that alleviation policy, Gabrovski had refused to sign an ordinance introducing certain movement restrictions in the capital.

Bulgarian procrastination, according to the account, was particularly noticeable in the matter of marking. The Bulgarian government had originally introduced a Jewish star, “albeit a little one” (*“alldings nur kkinen” Judenstem*). As of the moment, however, very few Jews were wearing the star. The opening salvo against the star had been fired by die “Anglophile” Metropolitan Stefan of Sofia, who on September 27 had delivered a sermon pointing out that God had already punished the Jews “for having nailed Christ to the cross” by driving them from place to place and allowing them no country of their own. God had thereby determined the Jewish fate, and men had no right to torture the Jews and to persecute them. This applied especially to Jews who had accepted Christianity. The metropolitan had then succeeded in freeing all baptized Jews from wearing the star. Prime Minister Filov on his own had liberated the Jews in mixed marriages. Thereupon, on September 30, Justice Minister Partov demanded that the wearing of the star should not be obligatory and that all expulsions should be halted.

By the beginning of October, the report continued, about a fifth of Bulgarian Jewry was wearing the emblem, and at that point the Bulgarian government halted star production by cutting off the electricity supply from the plant that was producing the badges. This measure was justified on the ground of the power shortage. Many Jews who had already been wearing the star took it off again, while others wore it in an “arrogant” manner, pinned next to a patriotic symbol such as a picture of the Czar or the Queen.

The RSHA experts thought that a partial explanation of these developments was to be found in the actions of some foreign powers — including Italy, Hungary, Romania, Vichy France, and Spain — which were putting “pressure” on the Bulgarian government. Italy in particular had handed four or five protest notes to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry. Popov had collected all these notes and had handed them to Commissar Belev to convey to the commissar which way the wind was blowing.⁴²

42. Schellenberg to Luther, November 9, 1942, NG-5351.

A few days after receiving this report from the RSHA, Abteilung Deutschland had a firsthand opportunity to observe that something had gone wrong. On November 18 the Bulgarian legation secretary inquired about the treatment of foreign Jews in the Reich. Legationsrat Klingencfuss pointed out that this question had already been settled by exchange of notes in July, but the Bulgarian replied that he had never heard about any exchange of notes.⁴³

There remained, however, one approachable spot in the Bulgarian picture: the occupied territories of Macedonia and Thrace. On June 10, 1942, a Bulgarian ordinance that regulated the acquisition of citizenship in the new territories had gone into effect. That ordinance was specifically inapplicable to Jews. According to "informed sources," the omission meant that the Jews would not stay long in those provinces.⁴⁴

In Januar) 1943 an Eichmann representative, Hauptsturmführer Dannecker, arrived in Bulgaria from France and was attached to the German police attache in the legation. Dannecker's mission was to deport as many Jews as possible, starting with the Jews in the occupied territories. The Bulgarian Interior Minister now declared himself willing to deport 14,000 Jews from Macedonia and Thrace. Commissar Belev, "a convinced anti-Semite," then proposed adding 6,000 "leading Jews" of Old Bulgaria (*die jüdische Führungsschicht*). Gabrovski also approved of this plan, and the cabinet concurred with Gabrovski's decision. On February 22, 1943, Hauptsturmführer Dannecker could therefore conclude with Commissar Belev a written agreement that provided for the deportation of 8,000 Jews from Macedonia, 6,000 from Thrace, and 6,000 from Old Bulgaria — a total of 20,000.

The agreement also contained detailed provisions for luggage, confiscation of property, the exemption of Jews in mixed marriages, and so on. The German side demanded that Bulgaria pay 250 Reichsmark for each deported Jew, but the Bulgarians considered this price a little too high, and the matter was amiably dropped. On March 2, 1943, the Bulgarian Cabinet approved the allocation of transports and at the same time drafted a law providing for the loss of Bulgarian nationality by deportees crossing the border. The nationality law was approved by the Sobranje but was not published in the official gazette.⁴⁵ The deportations could begin.

43. Memorandum by Klingencfuss, November 19, 1942, NG-3746.

44. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 11, 1942, p. 3.

45. Hoffmann (police attache in Sofia) to RSHA/Attache Group, April 5, 1943, NG-4144. The Hoffmann report was marked "Seen: Beckerle." Memorandum by Wagner, April 3, 1943, NG-4180. On Bulgarian politics leading to deportations, see Charv, *The Bulgarian Jews*, pp. 76-100. See also texts of Dannecker-Belev agreement of Februar) 22, 1943, and of Cabinet warrant of March 2, 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 208-11. Only a few Jews in Macedonia and Thrace had Bulgarian nationality.

The Jews of the new territories were concentrated, and their relatively meager property was seized. The confiscated assets (not counting impounded money and valuables) netted 57 million leva (\$700,000), while the expenses of the roundup and transport, met from these sums, amounted to 21 million leva.⁴⁶ Macedonian Jewry left Skopje on three trains to Treblinka. The tickets were purchased by the Commissariat from Balkan, a Bulgarian travel agency.⁴⁷ The Jews of Thrace were brought in two trains to the Danubian port of Lorn, loaded on four Bulgarian ships, and moved upstream past Belgrade and Budapest to Vienna, from where they were taken by rail to Treblinka. The Bulgarians were billed by the Germans for all transport provided by the Reichsbahn.⁴⁸ On April 5 Police Attache Hoffmann reported a total of 11,343 deportees, including 7,122 from Macedonia and 4,221 from Thrace.⁴⁹ Legationsrat Wagner noted that Jewish members of the intelligentsia, particularly physicians, had been exempted at the last moment.⁵⁰

Commissar Belev now ordered the internment of the “influential” Jews from the towns of Plovdiv, Kyustendil, Ruse, and Varna. But opposition was growing fast. A delegation from Kyustendil headed by the vice president of the Sobranje, Peshev, intervened with the Interior Ministry. Peshev, supported by forty deputies, then introduced in the Sobranje a resolution of censure accusing the government of atrocities alleged to have occurred during the deportations. Peshev was voted down and lost his office, but his intervention was followed by another one described only as a “hint from the highest quarter” (presumably from the Czar) to stop all planned deportations from Old Bulgaria. “Prominent” Jews who had already been interned were thereupon set free again.⁵¹

46. Chary, *The Bulgarian Jews*, pp. 126-28.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-26. For details of this deportation, see Aleksandar Matkovski, "The Destruction of Macedonian Jewry' in 1943," *Tad Vashem Studies* 3 (1959): 203-58.

48. Chary, *Ilse Bulgarian Jews*, pp. 101-22. See also account about Lom by Bulgarian eyewitness Nadjda Slavi Vasileva, "On the Catastrophe of the Thracian jews," *Tad Vashem Studies* 3 (1959): 295-301. In addition, note *Bahndiensttelegramm* by Gedob/9 (Tariffs/Passenger Trains), March 28, 1943, urging exact count of DA deportees from Bulgaria and Greece arriving in Treblinka. Facsimile in Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, *Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord* (Berlin, 1961), p. 353.

49. Hoffmann to Attache Group, April 5, 1943, NG-4144. Wagner's figure is 11,459. See Wagner's memorandum of April 3, 1943, NG-4180. Korherr listed 11,364 in his report of April 19,1943, NO-5193. Chary computes 11,393, including 7,160 from Macedonia, 158 from Pirot, and 4,075 from Thrace. Chary', *The Bulgarian Jews*, p. 127.

50. Memorandum by Wagner, April 3, 1943, NG-4180.

51. Hoffmann to Attache Group, April 5, 1943, NG-4144. See also memorandum by Wagner, April 3, 1943, NG-4180, and Chaw, *The Bulgarian Jews*, pp. 90-100,214-15.

In concluding his report about the deportations, Police Attaché Hoffmann explained that, considering the fact that nothing at all had yet been accomplished in ‘Italy, Hungary, Spain, etc.,’ the Bulgarians had done quite well. Furthermore, a ‘Jewish problem’ in the form in which it had existed in Germany was actually unknown in Bulgaria. The deportation of 11,343 Jews was consequently quite ‘satisfactory’ (*zufriedenstellend*). Based on the agreed total of 20,000, this meant an achievement of 56 percent, quite a normal “reduction” in a Balkan country.^{52 53}

Ribbentrop, however, was by no means satisfied with such reductions. When King Boris visited Berlin in the beginning of April, the German Foreign Minister had a chance to express his displeasure. Boris explained that he had given the order confining the evacuations to Macedonia and Thrace and that he intended to deport “only a small number of Bolshevik-Communist elements” from Old Bulgaria, because he needed the rest of the Jews for road construction. Ribbentrop replied that “in our view the only correct solution of the Jewish problem was the most radical solution [*class nach unserer Auffassung in der Judenfrage die radikalste Lösung die allein richtige sei*].⁵³

Under the application of new pressure from the German Legation in Sofia, Commissar Belev, a man with divided loyalties, prepared two alternate plans. One provided for the deportation of all Jews to Poland; the other allowed for the complete evacuation of the Sofia Jews to the country. The two plans were submitted to Boris, who chose the latter.⁵⁴ The new expulsion order was published on May 25.⁵⁵

For the Germans there was not much to be done any more. But the RSHA pressured the Foreign Office to pressure Beckerle into pressuring the Bulgarian government. On June 7 Beckerle replied: “I would like to assure you that we here are doing everything in our power to arrive in a suitable manner at a final liquidation of the Jewish question.” Unfortunately, Beckerle continued, direct pressure just didn’t work. The Bulgarians had been living with peoples like the Armenians, Greeks, and

52. Hoffmann to Attache Group, April 5, 1943, NG-4144.

53. Ribbentrop to Beckerle, April 4, 1943, NG-62. This tenor of the meeting is confirmed in a conversation the king had with Prime Minister Filov. Diary of Filov, April 5, 1943, in Todorov, *The Fragility of Goodness*, pp. 89-90.

54. Hoffmann to Attache Group, June 7, 1943, NG-2357. See also Chary, *The Bulgarian Jews*, pp. 147-51, for efforts by rabbis in Sofia and role of Metropolitan Stefan in this matter. On Boris, see also his speech to the synod displaying anti-Jewish rigidity and his meetings with Filov in which he favored keeping the Jews in Bulgaria. Todorov, *The Fragility of Goodness*, pp. 102-3 and 90-91.

55. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 26, 1943, p. 3; May 28, 1943, p. 3; June 1, 1943, p. 3.

Gypsies for so long that they simply could not appreciate the Jewish problem.⁵⁶

Police Attache Hoffmann was more optimistic. He reported that the expulsion of all but 2,000 to 3,000 privileged Jews from Sofia was now nearing its completion. The expelled Jews were quartered with Jewish families in the country and in schools. The schools, he reasoned, would have to be reopened in the fall. Hence there would still be an opportunity for deporting the Bulgarian Jews.⁵⁷

On June 24 Beckerle reported that the expulsions had been completed with the removal of 20,000 Jews from Sofia. He repeated that pressure at this point would not work, but he associated himself with the view of his police attache that the stoppage of the “final solution operation” (*Endlosungsaktion*) was only temporary, that the Jews would make such a nuisance of themselves in the country as to furnish before long the “precipitating factor for a further development in our sense.”⁵⁸

However, the summer ended without any change in Bulgarian policy, and on August 31, 1943, the chief of Inland II, Wagner (Luther’s successor), himself wrote the finish to the Bulgarian Aktion. Addressing himself to Kaltenbrunner, Wagner wrote that again and again the RSHA had approached the Foreign Office with requests for putting pressure on the Bulgarians. The RSHA had pointed out that with each passing week “a radical solution would become more difficult.” The RSHA had also told the Foreign Office that the dispersal of the Jews to the entire country was unwise (*bedenklich*) from the viewpoint of counterespionage and that, in the event of Allied landings in the Balkans, these Jews would be positively dangerous.

The Foreign Office, Wagner continued, had thereupon asked Minister Beckerle to explore the matter further, but the envoy had gained the distinct impression that every German “offer” (*Antrag*), no matter how strongly put, would be rejected by the Bulgarians. Wagner then explained the true reason for the Bulgarian refusal to deport the Jews: the Bulgarians were afraid of the enemy powers. There was in Bulgaria an “insane fear of air raids.” Just as the Bulgarians did not publish the fact that their pursuit planes had participated in the shooting down of American bombers during the attack on Ploiești, and just as all anti-Bolshevik propaganda was prohibited in Bulgaria (particularly propaganda directed against the person of Stalin), so the Bulgarian government was not inclined “to permit a continuation in the Jewish question.”

56. Beckerle to Foreign Office, June 7, 1943, NG-2357.

57. Hoffmann to Attache Group, June 7, 1943, NG-2357.

58. Beckerle to RSHA/Attache Group, June 24, 1943, NG-2753.

Wagner concluded that only one factor could influence the Bulgarian decision, and that was a “new activation of the German war effort [*eine neue Aktivierung der deutschen Kriegsführung*].” Doubtless the Bulgarians had also been influenced by the attitude of the Romanians and Hungarians, for Bulgaria, naturally, did not wish to stand out as an anti-Jewish power. But these influences would fall away once German successes stood “in the foreground again.” Meanwhile, Wagner could do no more than ask Kaltenbrunner for additional materials about the danger and noxiousness of Jewry in Bulgaria.⁵⁹

For twelve months the Bulgarian Jews remained subject to all the discriminations and persecutions of the disrupted destruction process.⁶⁰ Then, on August 30, 1944, one year after Wagner had written his letter and on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Bulgaria, the morning newspapers in Sofia displayed in prominent headlines the Cabinet’s decision to revoke all of the anti-Jewish laws.⁶¹

Romania

Like the Bulgarians, the Romanians joined the Axis for opportunistic reasons. Unlike Bulgaria, however, Romania became an ally of Germany only after the loss of considerable territory: northern Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR, northern Transylvania to Hungary, and southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. These territorial losses came like hammer blows in a period of two months.¹ Romania now had enemies east and west; Russia and Germany were responsible for her losses. The Romanians joined the Axis and reconquered the eastern provinces. When the fortunes of war turned and Bukovina and Bessarabia were irretrievably lost, the Romanians, moving with the tide, joined the Russians and recovered Transylvania.

However, there was more than mere opportunism in Romanian actions. The Romanians made more than a token contribution in their war against the USSR. Measured in sheer numbers, Romania was Germany’s most important ally in the East. The Romanian armies fought without restraint at Odessa and Stalingrad, and when the Romanians changed sides, they displayed the same ferocity in battles against the Germans and Hungarians.

In Jewish matters, too, the Romanian attitude was partly opportunis-

59. Wagner to Kaltenbrunner, August 31, 1943, NG-3302.

60. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), October 8, 1943, p. 3; October 13, 1943, p. 3; October 27, 1943, p. 3; November 9, 1943, p. 3; December 3, 1943, p. 3; December 14, 1943, p. 3; December 16, 1943, p. 3.

61. *Ibid.*, August 31, 1944, p. 3.

1. Bukovina and Bessarabia were lost on June 28, 1940; Transylvania, on August 30, 1940; Dobrudja, on September 12, 1940.

tic and partly something more. There were times, for example, when the Germans complained that the Romanians were exasperatingly slow. At one time, Eichmann even wanted to withdraw his expert in Jewish matters from Bucharest, on the ground that the Romanians did not follow the expert's advice. But there also were instances when the Germans actually had to step in to restrain and slow down the pace of Romanian measures. At such times the Romanians were moving too fast for the German bureaucracy. Not hasty measures but thorough ones were required by the Germans.

If the Romanians overstepped the bounds of opportunism in the speed of their action, they virtually forgot all motives of profit in the extent of their measures. What is significant in the case of the Romanians is not only how fast they were going but also how far.

In Old Romania (that is, the Romania without the lost provinces), the Jews were hardly ever concentrated. Although deportations from Old Romania were actually planned, the Romanian government abruptly changed its mind and virtually stopped the destruction process in its tracks. East of the Prut River, on the other hand, the picture was quite different. In Bukovina and Bessarabia, which were recovered from Russia in 1941, the Romanians took the most drastic action. In these provinces the Jews were transported to what might be called the Romanian "East," the territory of Transnistria (in the Soviet Ukraine), which was under Romanian occupation. In that region the Romanians also killed more than 100,000 indigenous Jews in the Odessa area and Goltz. No country, besides Germany, was involved in massacres of Jews on such a scale.

Characteristics of group activity and individual behavior are not always alike, but in the case of Romania there were pronounced similarities. Unlike the Germans, who did not ordinarily practice their official behavior patterns in private life, the Romanians were a fairly consistent lot. Opportunism was practiced in Romania not only on a national basis but also in personal relations. Romania was a corrupt country. It was the only Axis state in which officials as high as minister and mayor of the capital city had to be dismissed for "dark" transactions with expropriated Jewish property.²

The search for personal gain in Romania was so intensive that it must have enabled many Jews to buy relief from persecution. The institution of bribery was, in fact, so well established that it was diverted for the benefit of the state. The Romanian government permitted Jews to *purchase* ex-

2. The dismissed officials were the mayor of Bucharest, Modreanu; his deputy, Dollars; and the Colonization Minister, General Zwiedcnck, who was Ethnic German. German Legation in Bucharest/Military Attache (signed Spalck) to OKH/Attache Division, December 12, 1941, Wi/IC 4.66, p. 274.

eruptions from such anti-Jewish measures as forced labor and travel restrictions. However, what was true of personal opportunism in Romania was true also of personal involvement in killings. Repeatedly the Romanians threw themselves into Aktionen. Witnesses and survivors testifying to the manner in which the Romanians conducted their killing operations speak of scenes unduplicated in Axis Europe. Even in German reports there are criticisms of these operations, and in some cases the Germans stepped in to halt killings that seemed offensive even to so hardened an establishment as the German army.

In examining the Romanian bureaucratic apparatus, one is therefore left with the impression of an unreliable machine that did not properly respond to command and that acted in unpredictable ways, sometimes balking, sometimes running away with itself. That spurting action, unplanned and uneven, sporadic and erratic, was the outcome of an opportunism that was mixed with destructiveness, a lethargy periodically interrupted by outbursts of violence. The product of this mixture was a record of anti-Jewish actions that is decidedly unique.³

In December 1930 Romania had the third-largest Jewish population in Europe. The census count was 756,930. If one were to superimpose the boundaries created in 1940 on this community, its distribution would have been the following:⁴

Within regions subsequently lost	427,962
to USSR (Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Danube Delta)	278,943

3. A three-volume work about the destruction of the Jews in Romania has been published in the Romanian language. See Matatias Carp, *Cartea Neagm — Sufermtele Evreibrđin Romania 1940-1944* (Bucharest, 1946-48). Carp's volumes contain documents and commentary. See also the supplementary collection of facsimiles selected and edited by Jean Ancel, and published by the Beate Klarsfeld Foundation of Paris and New York, *Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust*, 12 vols. (no date, completed in 1986).

4. Memorandum by Instirutul Central de Statistica/Oficiul de Studii (undated) with detailed 1930 census data and calculations taking account of the territorial changes in 1940, in Ancel, *Documents*, vol. 10, pp. 46-64. During the 1930s there was a small overall decline of the Jewish population. The natural increase, less than 7,000, was outweighed by net emigration, a slightly higher figure. *Ibid.* The decline was noticeable in Northern Bukovia and Old Romania. A census conducted in Old Romania on April 6, 1941, yielded a preliminary total of only 302,092 Jews, even though "descent," which was supposed to include converts to Christianity, was used as a criterion. See the data enclosed by the statistical institute (signed Golopen(u) ns Hauptsturmführer Richter in the German legation, June 25, 1941, T 175, Roll 662. An apparently revised figure for April 1941 was 315,509. Publikationsstelle Wien, "Die Bevölkcrungszahlung in Rumänien 1941" (Vienna, 1943), in Ancel, *Documents*, vol. 1, pp. 325-50.

to Hungary' (Northern Transylvania)	148,173
to Bulgaria (Southern Dobrudja)	846
Within regions retained by Romania	328,968

In each of these areas the Jews suffered a different fate. The Jews in Old Romania survived on the whole; those in Transylvania were swept up in the Hungarian deportations; while in the two eastern provinces of Bukovina and Bessarabia, which were ceded in 1940 but reconquered in 1941, the Jews were subjected to die brunt of the Romanian destruction process.

At the time when the first anti-Jewish measures were launched, Romania had hardly emerged from an earlier system of ghettoization. The emancipation of the Jews had been a recent occurrence in most of Europe, but it was particularly recent in Romania. Most Jews had acquired Romanian citizenship after the end of World War I, in pursuance of a minority treaty concluded by Romania with the Allied powers as part of the price that Romania had to pay for its new-won territories. There was considerable sentiment in Romania against payment of that price, and in the 1930s the rise of the pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish Iron Guard cast a shadow on Jewish security in the country. In December 1937, when Romania acquired its first pro-Nazi regime under Prime Minister Octavian Goga, about 120,000 Jews lost their citizenship.⁵

The Goga regime fell. Iron Guard "legionnaires" were arrested by the thousands, and Iron Guard leaders were massacred while "try'ing to escape" but the Jews were not entirely forgotten. Under Goga's successors, Jewish engineers were excluded from the railways,⁶ the quota system was introduced into the labor force in industry,⁷ and dismissals were begun in the government service.⁸ These measures, incidentally, applied only to "Jews," that is, persons who belonged to the Jewish religion.

After Romania's frontiers in the east crumbled under a Russian ultimatum, the government of Prime Minister Gigurtu decided to move one step closer to the Germans and to take a big stride forward in the destruction of the Jews. On August 8, 1940, two laws were proclaimed which already contained the seeds of administrative continuity', and which for that reason may be said to have inaugurated the destruction process in Romania. For the first time the Romanian government adopted a definition that included, besides Jews by religion, some baptized Jews, such as the baptized children of unbaptized Jewish parents, and the baptized

5. *Die Judenfrage*, May 21, 1938, p. 10; December 22, 1938, pp. 1-2.

6. *Ibid.*, July 14, 1938, p. 5.

7. *Ibid.*, February 26, 1940, p. 20.

8. *Krakauer Zettutuj*, June 29, 1940; August 3, 1940, p. 1.

wives of Christian husbands in the case of women whose baptism did not predate by more than one year the formation of King Carol's Unit)' party.

In the economic sphere, Jews were dismissed from the army and from the civil service. They lost their jobs as editors and company board members and were restricted in the right to practice law and other professions. They lost their liquor licenses and were prohibited from acquiring real estate, industrial enterprises in the provinces, and so on. Two ghettoization measures were also included in the laws of August 8: the prohibition of intermarriage and the revocation of name changes.

Nevertheless, the effect of all those provisions upon the Jews was not necessarily decisive. The laws set up three Jewish categories. The most privileged were Jews who had possessed Romanian citizenship before December 30, 1918, and their descendants, as well as Jews who had been front-line soldiers in World War I and their descendants — about 10,000 people in all. Only a part of the discriminations applied to that group. The next category comprised Jews who were residents (but not citizens) of Old Romania before December 30, 1918. The least favored category, which was subject to all restrictions, consisted of the Jews in the provinces annexed after World War I, and immigrants.⁹ On the whole, therefore, the Gigurtu government's measures were still very mild by German standards. But the Gigurtu administration did not last very long.

At the beginning of September 1940, as Hungarian troops marched into Transylvania, Romania acquired a new government, which was to last for four years. At the head of that government was a man who called himself the "Chief of State": General (later Marshal) Ion Antonescu. His cabinet was called the "regime of the legionnaires" because never before had Iron Guard leaders held so many positions of power: the Vice-Premier was the Iron Guard commander himself, Horia Sima; the Foreign Minister was Iron Guardist Count Mihai Sturdza; the Interior Ministry was in the hands of another "legionnaire," General Petrovicescu; the Labor Minister was the Iron Guard commander of Bucharest, Iasinschi.¹⁰ In spite of the makeup of this regime, the center of power was soon revealed to be in other hands.

The Jews reacted to the new government with apprehension. In the fall thousands of them left Romania, some in unseaworthy ships bound for Palestine.¹¹ During that time, more anti-Jewish decree-laws were enacted.

9. *Ibid.*, August 3, 1940, p. 1; August 10, 1940, p. 2. *Die Judenfrage*, September 15, 1940, pp. 126-28.

10. *Krakauer Zeitung*, September 17, 1940, p. 2.

11. Ira A. Hirschmann, *Lifeline to a Promised Land* (New York, 1946), pp. 11 — 13. The author was the representative of the U.S. War Refugee Board in Turkey.

In one, the Jews were deprived of agricultural properties.¹² In another, named Romanians were appointed to operate selected Jewish enterprises under trusteeship.¹³ A third measure provided for the gradual dismissal of Jews employed in all of private business.¹⁴ The expropriations and dismissals were subsumed under the rubric of “Romanianization.” This term, rather than “Aryanization” was chosen for a reason. Many firms were in the hands of either foreign interests or members of local ethnic minorities. Those domestic owners who lacked Romanian ancestry or political protection were natural takeover targets, and they included not only Jews but also Greeks and Armenians.¹⁵

No attempt, however, was made to issue a law for the compulsory transfer of all the Jewish commercial and industrial enterprises. There was a secret regulation by the Finance Ministry partially blocking credits due to Jewish suppliers,¹⁶ and the Iron Guard did attempt to push the progress of voluntary Aryanizations. However, German observers watched these transactions with skepticism — apparently the new owners had neither capital nor business acumen. “Wise men raise a warning finger and shake their heads,” commented one German writer. In particular, he noted that the Ethnic German community had not gotten an even break. But these things, he concluded indulgently, were the inevitable attributes of a “revolution.”¹⁷

In the meantime, the Iron Guard “revolution” was still unfinished business. For one thing, the Iron Guard was only a minority in the cabinet, and for another, the Chief of State was not an Iron Guardist but an army general. On January 20 the Iron Guard launched a rebellion to overthrow General Antonescu, and for three days there was street fighting in Bucharest. The putsch was crushed, but before it was over it had been widened into a pogrom.

12. Text of the agricultural decree-law, October 4, 1940, signed by Marshal Antonescu and Economy Minister Leon, in Ancl, *Documents*, vol. 8, pp. 196-99.

13. Trustees decree-law, October 4, 1940, signed by Leon, *ibid.*, pp. 200-202.

14. Romanianization of labor decree-law of November 12, 1940, signed by Marshal Antonescu, Labor Minister Iasinschi, Finance Minister Cretzianu, Justice Minister Mihai Antonescu, and newly installed Economy Minister Cancicov, *ibid.*, pp. 209-15. Texts of other measures during this period are in the same volume.

15. *Domuzeitung* (Belgrade), February 3, 1942, p. 3.

16. For details, see Auslandsbriefprüfstelle Vienna to OKW/Abw'. III (N), attention Obstlt. Jacobsen, November 22, 1940, Wi/IC 4.66.

17. Michael Maier, “Beginnende Neuordnung in Rumänien,” *Volk im Osten* (Bucharest), January 1941, p. 37. The Ethnic German complaints with regard to Romanian discrimination in the distribution of Jewish property continued well into 1942. See report by VOMI to Himmler’s aide Rudolf Brandt, August 3, 1942, Himmler Files, Folder 8.

Iron Guardists had stormed into the Jewish quarter, burning down synagogues, demolishing stores, and devastating private apartments. For miles around the city, the Guardists had left traces of their revolution. On January 24, travelers on the Bucharest-Ploiești road discovered at Baneasa a sizable number of Jewish bodies without clothes. Gold teeth had been knocked out of the mouths of the dead. (Gypsies were believed to have been the looters.) On the road to Giurgiu passersby stumbled upon another group of Jewish slain. In the city itself the German military attache was busy collecting casualty reports. "In the Bucharest morgue," he wrote, "one can see hundreds of corpses, but they are mostly Jews [*doch handelt es sich meistens um Juden*]. Jewish sources report that the victims had not merely been killed; they had been butchered. In the morgue, bodies were so cut up that they no longer resembled anything human, and in the municipal slaughterhouse bodies were observed hanging like carcasses of catde. A witness saw a girl of five hanging by her feet like a calf, her entire body smeared with blood. The identified Jewish dead numbered 118.¹⁸

Two weeks after the putsch, Iron Guard leader Horia Sima blamed the Jews for his defeat. He complained to Himmler that Antonescu was really a friend of the British. Then he added: "Lacking political sense, General Antonescu did not realize that he was simply used as an instrument by the Jews and Masons."¹⁹ But Himmler did not interfere, for with every passing day Antonescu was moving closer to the German side. His regime was strong and unshakable. In a matter of months it was to become a fearful instrument of war and destruction.

The chief personalities of the stabilized Antonescu regime were:²⁰

Chief of State, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister : Marshal Ion Antonescu

President *ad interim* of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister *ad interim*: Mihai Antonescu

18. H/MA Auslandsdienst Report No. 185/41, January 27, 1941, Wi/IC 4.2-b. Reports on slaughterhouse in Institute of Jewish Affairs, *The Jews in Nazi Europe* (New York, 1941), p. 11. U.S. Minister in Romania (Franklin Mott Gunther) to U.S. Secretary of State Hull, January 30, 1941, *Foreign Relations of the United States, IV 41*, vol. II (Europe), p. 860. Published reports in the press listed 118 Jews killed and 26 wounded, 118 Romanians killed and 228 wounded. *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 6, 1941, p. 2.

19. Sima to Himmler, February 6, 1941, NO-488.

20. Based on lists in *Donauzeitung*, documents, and Carp, *Cartea Neajtra*, vol. 3, 17-21. The portfolio of Defense Minister belonged formally to Marshal Antonescu himself. The "Great General Staff" (*Marele Stat Major*), later transformed into the "Great Headquarters" (*Marele Cartier General*), was the Romanian OK\V. 'ITic Romanian army Chief of Staff (*Stand Major of Armatei*) occupied a position similar to the Chief of the General Staff in the German army.

Minister of Defense *ad interim* (in succession): Gen. Iosif Iacobici, Gen. Constantin Pantazi
 Chief of the Great General Staff: Gen. Ilie Steflea
 Chief of the Army Staff: Gen. N. Tataranu
 Interior: Gen. Dumitru Popescu
 Undersecretary for Police and Public Security (in succession): Gen. Ion Popescu, Gen. Constantin Vasiliu
 Justice (in succession): Stoicescu, Marinescu
 Economy (in succession): Leon, Cancicov, Potopeanu, Marinescu, Fin-tescu, Dobre
 Undersecretary for Romanianization (of property): Zwiedeneck (placed directly under Council of Ministers in 1941)
 Finance (in succession): G. Cretzianu, Stoenescu, Neagu
 Transport (in succession): Georgescu, Bușila, Constantinescu
 Labor, Health, and Welfare: Iasinschi, Tomescu
 Undersecretary for Labor and Welfare (in succession): Voiculescu, Danulescu, Enescu
 Romanianization (of labor): Cron((succeeded by Petrescu)
 Labor Camps and Columns: Mociulschi
 Undersecretary for Romanianization, Settlement, and Inventory (in succession) : Zwiedeneck, Dragoș, Vladescu
 Central Office of Romanianization/Chairman of Administrative Committee (in succession): Gorsky, Rizescu
 Director General of Romanianization (in succession): Theodorescu, Reuss, Cardaș, Popa
 Plenipotentiary for Jewish Questions: Radu Lecca (reduced to General Commissar and placed under the Labor Minister at the end of 1943)
 Territorial chiefs in provinces conquered during 1941:
 Governor, Bukovina (in succession): Gen. Alexandru Rio^anu, Gen. Corneliu Calotescu, Gen. Cornel Dragalina
 Governor, Bessarabia: Gen. Constantin Voiculescu
 Governor, Transnistria (in succession): Gheorghe Alexianu, Gen. Gheorghe Potopeanu

It may be noted that the new government had two Antonescus, the marshal and Mihai. A telling description of these two men appeared in a secret report by a German journalist, Dr. Hans-Joachim Kausch, who took a trip to Romania in 1943. Kausch wrote:

In many quarters we have been told that Marshal Antonescu has syphilis, a disease that is notoriously as common among Romanian cavalry officers as in Germany the cold [*der Schtiupfen*], but which attacks the marshal very heavily every few months and manifests itself in serious

disturbances of his vision. The most important political figure in Romania at the moment is his deputy, Mihai Antonescu, who controls, practically speaking, the entire administrative apparatus and who is on very good terms with the King and the Queen Mother. He concerns himself, to the point of detail, with every political development; and, while he agrees to the defensive battle against the Soviet danger, he remains with respect to the conflict with the Western powers an Anglophile.²¹

In the realm of anti-Jewish decree making the new Romanian government followed the path of its predecessors. It decided to take another economic step, for which it did not anticipate direct or indirect costs. This time the object was Jewish-owned real estate, and the decree-law was dated March 27, 1941.²² The houses were to be acquired by the state for an amount equal to eight times the gross annual rental income, and the owners were to receive bonds provided with an annual interest rate of 3 percent. The expropriated properties were to be offered for sale to ethnic Romanians who were allowed to make payments in installments with interest fixed at 5 percent. The government had to take over the mortgages, and prior to a sale, it had to fill vacancies. The administration of this undertaking was placed under an Undersecretary (*subsecretar*) of Romanianization, Settlement, and Inventory. In the early days this agency was headed by Zwiedeneck, who was succeeded by Dragoş. The subsecretariat, which was charged also with the control of expropriated agricultural properties under the same rules as those applicable to the urban real state, was fitted out with an executive committee, interministerial commissions, and a director general.²³ The size of this elaborate organization, and the turnover of its personnel, some dismissed for scandals, is a clue to the nature and duration of the operations in which it was engaged. Later its tasks were expanded further for the confiscation of Jewish community property, including schools, hospitals, old-age homes, slaughterhouses, and selected synagogues and cemeteries.²⁴

The position of Jewish business at this time remained virtually unchanged. Censored private correspondence in Vienna revealed that Jewish firms frequently could be bought only for dollars, pounds, or Swiss

21. Report by Kausch, June 26, 1943, Occ E 4-11.

22. *Die Judenfreuje*, April 25, 1941, pp. 57-58.

23. Decree-law of May 3, 1941, signed by Marshal Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, Stoicescu, and Stocnescu, T 175, Roll 659.

24. See the *Rukarester Tageblatt*, July 4, 1942, July 25, 1942, November 27, 1942, and Information Reports of the official Jewish Council (the *Céntrala F.ireilor din Romania*, which was set up at the end of 1941), July 7, 1942, July 27, 1942, and August 29, 1942, T 175, Roll 661.

francs. Moreover, the Romanians had trouble in managing their newly acquired enterprises.²⁵

The deliberate pace of the Romanian machine of destruction was changed suddenly into rapid action in June 1941. It is significant that the events of the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942 took place under a militaristic regime that only a few months before had rid itself of those elements (die Iron Guard) which —like the Slovak Hlinka Guard, the Croatian Ustasha, and the German SS —were die principal proponents and prime movers of anti-Jewish activity. Apparently the presence of uniformed ideologists is not necessary for the accomplishment of very drastic action. The mainsprings of such action do not lie in the mere agitation of part) formations. The impetus comes from deeper wells in the national character.

The immediate precipitating event for the new holocaust was the war against Russia. On the eve of the outbreak of war, the Interior Ministry' ordered the removal of Jews from the frontier areas as a “precautionary” measure against “sabotage and espionage.” That is to say, Jeyvs yvere to be transported in a *westerly* direction within Old Romania, from frontier districts to the interior of the country. In that highly charged atmosphere, on the night of June 25, 1941 (three days after the outbreak of yvar), a rumor circulated through Iași that Soviet parachutists had landed near the city. The army ordered an immediate search of Jeyvish homes.

At this point some deserters who were hiding in Iași and who believed that the search was designed to effect their arrest, fired on the troops. A report was then spread that the Jews were firing on the soldiers, whereupon the army, augmented by police, stepped up its action.²⁶ At that moment the 14th Romanian Division was stationed in the city, and its commander, General Stavrescu, ordered a roundup of the Jews. The Jewish population was marched by the tens of thousands to detention centers. Most of the women and children were released immediately, but quite a few of the men were shot and many more were kept under arrest. On June 30, two freight trains, one with over 2,500 Jews, the other with 1,800-1,900, were dispatched to the interior. The cattle cars were padlocked and the trains moved for days through the countryside without a destination. The Jews were dying of thirst and suffocation inside the cars, and at intervals the bodies were taken out to be buried in mass graves. Eventually the bigger train came to rest at Calarași and the smaller one at Podul Iloaiei. Each had lost just over half of its deportees. After some

25. Reports by Auslandsbriefprufstelle in Vienna, April 1, 1941, and April 30, 1941, Wi/IC4.2-b.

26. Eugene Lcvai, *Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry* (Zurich and Vienna, 1948), p. 68. While the bulk of the book is devoted to Hungary, pages 58-73 deal with Romania.

months, the survivors were returned to Iași.²⁷ The German minister in Bucharest, von Killinger, reported an overall toll of 4,000 without distinguishing between the dead in the city and those on the trains.²⁸

But these occurrences in Old Romania were a mere foreshadowing of things to come. A much greater upheaval was in store for the Jews of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the district of Dorohoi.

The Romanian census of 1930 indicated a Jewish population of more than 300,000 in these regions, as follows:²⁹

Bessarabia		206,958
City' of Chisinau	41,405	
Bukovina (nordi)		69,144
City of Cernaup	42,932	
Bukovina (soudi)		23,844
Dorohoi District		12,932
Hetya Region		1,940

The Soviet Union occupied Bessarabia and North Bukovina in 1940, and from both of these areas the Soviets deported thousands of people, Jews and non-Jews, in a purge that began as late as the middle of June 1941. The deportations were in progress when the Axis invasion began.³⁰ With the approach of the German and Romanian armies, the Jewish reactions in Cernaup (Bukovina) were markedly different from those of the Bessarabian Jews in Chisinau. The Cernaup Jews had been citizens of the Austro-Hungarian empire until 1918, and many of them belonged to the middle class. They still spoke German. When the Soviets started an evacuation of civil servants and party members, and when they then directed the university students to leave, an animated discussion of the order ensued in the university, and only a few of the Jewish students departed with the retreating Red Army. The others remained,³¹ and so did the vast

27. Carp, *Cartea Negrm*, vol. 2a (devoted entirely to Iași). Anccl, *Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 433-35, 448-50. Curzio Malaparte (Italian correspondent and witness), *Kaputt* (New York, 1946), pp. 122-24, 126-29, 137-43, 165-74. Anccl, "The Jassy Syndrome," *Romanian Jewish Studies* (Spring 1987): 33-49, and (Winter 1987): 35-52. Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania* (Chicago, 2000), pp. 62-90.

28. Von Killinger to Foreign Office, September 1, 1941, NG-4962. The preliminary tabulation of the April 1941 census showed 32,943 Jews in the city (later revised to 33,127) and 4,327 in its environs. Golopenpa to Richter, June 25, 1941, T 175, Roll 662. A Jewish census conducted in May 1942 revealed a total of 34,006 in the Iași district. Statistic of the Centrala, in Anccl, *Documents*, vol. 1, p. 305.

29. Carp, *Cartea Negrd*, vol. 3, p. 42.

30. Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1951), p. 224. Israel Chalfen, *Paul Celan* (Kassel, 1979), p. 113.

31. Chalfen, *Celan*, pp. 113-14. The poet Celan was a student at the university at the time.

majority of Cernăuți's Jewish inhabitants. In Chisinau, however, only about 4,000 Jews were found at the time of the city's capture on July 17.³² That number soon rose to more than 10,000, as fleeing Jewish families, overtaken by advancing German and Romanian troops, drifted back to their homes.³³

Precise figures of Jewish deportees, evacuees, and refugees from North Bukovina and Bessarabia during the last weeks of Soviet rule are not available, but it is likely that the total was more than 100,000. A larger number, still, was to be subjected to the German-Romanian destruction process.

From the very beginning of the Romanian offensive on July 2, there were shootings by Einsatzgruppe D as well as by Romanian soldiers and police in sporadic operations throughout the region.³⁴ The Einsatzgruppe also exerted influence on Romanian commanders to effect the ghettoization of Jewish communities. Thus it took credit for the establishment by the Romanians of the ghetto of Chisinau³⁵ and for the concentration of the Jews in Tighina.³⁶ At that time, however, something happened that caught even the Germans by surprise.

On July 8 Marshal Ion Antonescu declared at a meeting of the Council of Ministers that "now there exists in our history a moment most favorable" for the forced migration of the Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina.³⁷ On that very day, the Commander of Gendarmerie in Bessarabia,

32. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 63 (48 copies), August 25, 1941, NO-4538. Einsatzgruppe D attributed the low number to Jewish flight; Solomon Schwarz emphasized the Soviet deportations in June.

33. *Ibid.* A Romanian investigation commission listed 11,252 Jews in Chisinau. See its report, signed by G. Niculcsu and five others, December 1941, in Carp, *Cartea Neagra*, vol. 3, pp. 61-65.

34. The Einsatzgruppe shot 682 Jews, mainly leading personalities apprehended on the basis of lists, in Cerniufi. Einsatzkommando 10b to Army Group South, July 9, 1941, NOKW-587, and RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 40 (45 copies), August 1, 1941, NO-2950. It also shot 551 Jews in Chisinau and 155 in Tighina. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 45 (47 copies), August 7, 1941, NO-2948. In the region from Hotin to Yampol, its operations were more intensive. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 67 (48 copies), August 29, 1941, NO-2837. Its toll was apparently 4,425 as of August 19, and by then it was moving on. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 89 (48 copies), September 20, 1941, NO-3148. The Romanian contribution to the killings was probably greater. See Einsatzgruppen reports, *passim*, and estimates for July 2-12 aggregating ca. 6,000 in Carp, *Cartea Neagra*, vol. 3, pp. 29-36.

35. Ohlendorf to 11th Army Ic/AO, August 4, 1941, enclosing report by Stubaf. Zapp (Skdo. 1 la) to Ohlendorf, dated August 4, 1941, NOKW-3233.

36. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 45 (47 copies), August 7, 1941, NO-2948.

37. See extract of Antonescu's remarks in Carp, *Cartea Neagra*, vol. 3, p. 92.

Colonel Meculescu, ordered the arrest of all Jews in the rural areas of the province.³⁸ During the last week of July the Romanians, acting upon local initiative, began to shove some 25,000 Jews from Northern Bessarabian areas across the Dniestr into what was still a German military area and a German sphere of interest (*deutsches Interessengebiet*).³⁹ On July 29, the Ortskommandantur in Yampol, a small town on the east bank of the river, reported that several thousand Jews had arrived there. They were “left to their fate [*ihrem Schicksal überlassen*]” unable to buy food. To find shelter, they filled abandoned houses.⁴⁰

The German Eleventh Army, noticing heavy concentrations of Jews on the Bessarabian side of the Dniestr, attempted to block further traffic across the river. Bridges were to be closed.⁴¹ On August 7, Sonderkommando 10b reported that it had prevented the crossing of a large column of Jews at Mogilev Podolsky.⁴² Personnel of Einsatzgruppe D in Bessarabia observed “endless processions of ragged Jews, guarded by Romanian soldiers [*endlose Züge zerlumpter Juden, bewacht von rum. Soldaten*]” that had been turned back by German troops and Security Police at the Dniestr. The Einsatzgruppe thought that the Romanians were playing a deliberate game of driving the Jews back and forth, with the result that at intervals frail old men and women collapsed in the mud and filth (*dass in Abständen gebrechliche Greise und alte Frauen im Dreck liegen blieben*):⁴³

On the other side of the Dniestr the Germans were thinning out the massive column that the Romanians had already driven into the military area. Einsatzgruppe D reported that it had shot 1,265 Jews outright and that it had pushed back about 27,500. At Mogilev, 8,000 of these Jews were returned after a stand-off with the Romanian commander stationed on the west side of the bridge. From Yampol, a German field gendarmerie unit sent two reports stating that 18,000 Jews were moved back on August 17, and 2,000 more later that month.⁴⁴

38. *Ibid.*

39. 11th Army Ic/AO (signed von Schobert) to OKH/GenQu, August 19, 1941, Rumänien 30498/3. Folder once located at the Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 67 (48 copies), August 29, 1941, NO-2837.

40. Ortskommandantur 11/915 in Yampol to army rear area 553 (Obcrfeldkommandantur 553), July 29, 1941, T 501, Roll 50.

41. 11th Army Ic/AO (signed by Chief of Staff Wohler) to LIX Corps, Einsatzgruppe D, 11th Army/OQu, and Oberbaustab 19, July 29, 1941, Rumänien 30498/3. Order by Wohler, August 3, 1941, NOKW-2302.

42. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 45 (47 copies!), August 7, 1941, NO-2948.

43. Einsatzgruppe D to 11th Army, September 2, 1941, Rumänien 29222.

44. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 64 (48 copies), August 25, 1941, NO-2840. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report No. 67 (48 copies), August 2[^],

While the Germans were attempting to stem the flow of Jews (*Judenstrom*) into their area, the Romanians were making even bigger plans. On August 5, 1941, the police chief of Bucharest, General Pălăngeanu, ordered all Jews of military age to report for work.⁴⁵ A few days later, a report reached Berlin that Marshal Antonescu had directed that 60,000 Jews be transported from Old Romania to Bessarabia for “road construction.”⁴⁶ The Germans were now truly alarmed. They began to see a specter of more than half a million Jews driven across the Dniestr into the rear of the thinly stretched Einsatzgruppe D, which was already overburdened with the staggering task of killing southern Ukrainian Jews. The six hundred men of the Einsatzgruppe would be swamped with Jews, front and rear.

The Germans moved quickly. Less than a week after the labor mobilization order, the German legation advised Deputy Premier Mihai Antonescu “to proceed with the elimination of the Jewish element only in a systematic and slow manner.” The younger Antonescu replied that he had already recommended a revocation of the order, since the marshal had obviously “overestimated” the number of Jews capable of work, anyhow. The police prefects had accordingly been told to stop the measure.⁴⁷

Shortly after this intervention, the chief of the German army mission in Romania, Generalmajor Häufle, took steps to prevent the movement of Jews into the area of Einsatzgruppe D. To give the Einsatzgruppe a breathing spell, he fixed a line beyond which the Jews were not to be moved for the duration of the war against Russia. (The end was expected shortly.) Since the area between the Dniestr and the Bug rivers (Transnistria) was to be transferred to Romanian control, and since the Einsatzgruppe was already crossing the Bug, Häufle abandoned the Dniestr and held on to the Bug. On August 30, 1941, Häufle and Romanian General Tatarănu signed an agreement in the town hall of the Bessarabian town of Tighina. The agreement provided that no Jews were to be driven

1941, NO-2837. On the Mogilev bridge incident, see the affidavit by Felix Riühl (staff officer, Sonderkommando 10b), May 26, 1947, NO-4149. Report from Yampol by 1st Company, 683d mot. Field Gendarmerie Battalion (Abteilung), August 17, 1941 (signed Oberleutnant Wasikowski) and August 31, 1941, T 501, Roll 56. On the Romanian side, reports indicate that only 12,500 or 13,000 Jews were received at Cosaup (opposite Yampol) on August 17. See Romanian gendarmerie reports of August 17 and 19, 1941, in Ancel, *Documents*, vol. 5, pp. 44-47, 49-51.

45. *Krnkauer Zeitung*, August 5, 1941, p. 2. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 6, 1941, p. 4; August 7, 1941, p. 3.

46. Rademacher to Reichsbahnobcrinspektor Hoppe and Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat (Four-Year Plan), August 12, 1941, NG-3104.

47. *Ibid.* The Romanian government just then was negotiating with the Jewish community organization for a 2.5 billion-lei loan. Report by German military intelligence agent, Code Ru No. 62, Wi/IC 4.2-a, pp. 211-16.

TABLE 8-21
THE UPHEAVAL IN BUKOVINA AND BESSARABIA

Jews in the deportation area, early July 1941		ca. 185,000
July shootings	over 10,000	
August dead		
In transit camps	ca. 7,000	
In movements to and from Transnistria	ca. 10,000	
Remaining Jews, September 1, 1941		ca. 156,000
April 6, 1941, count		
South Bukovina and Dorohoi	29,687	
September 1, 1941, count		
North Bukovina	53,809	
Bessarabia	72,625	
September-October dead in transit camps	ca. 18,000	
Count of crossings, September to end of 1941	118,847	
Census of remaining Jews, May 20, 1942		19,576
Bessarabia	227	
North Bukovina	16,854	
South Bukovina and Dorohoi	2,495	
Deportations, June 1942	ca. 5,000	
Remaining, mid-1942		ca. 14,000

Note: Figures for April 6, 1941, September 1, 1941, and May 20, 1942, in Carp, *Cartea Neagm*, vol. 3, pp. 41-42. Figure of crossings in a report by Broșțeanu (Inspector of Gendarmerie in Transnistria) for December 15, 1941, to January 15, 1942, *ibid* pp. 319-20. An estimate of 25,000 dead or missing in transit was reported in the Commission of Inquiry into Irregularities of the Chișinau Ghetto (signed by G. Niculescu and five other officials), December 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 61-65. Deportations in 1942 estimated by Carp. *Ibid.*, pp. 231-32.

across the Bug “at present.” To make sure that the Jews would remain in Transnistria until “the end of operations,” Hauffe also specified that the Jews would have to be placed in concentration camps.⁴⁸


The deportations took place in a territory that was larger than the reconquered provinces. It included South Bukovina and Dorohoi, a district that had been incorporated into Bukovina in 1938. Table 8-21 shows the reduction of the Jewish community in the entire region in the course of a year.

At die time of the Tighina agreement, the number of counted Jews (including the census figure of the preceding April for South Bukovina

48. Brautigam (deputy chief Political Division, East Ministry) to Foreign Office, March 1942, enclosing Hauffie-Tataranu agreement signed at Tighina (Bessarabia) on August 30, 1941, PS-3319.

TABLE 8-22

DEPORTATIONS TO THE DNIESTR, PRINCIPAL ROUTES



Note: Recapitulations of transit camp figures in Inquiry Commission report, December 1941, Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, pp. 61-65. Crossing data in Brofteanu report, *ibid.*, pp. 319-20. See also map, *ibid.*

and Dorohoi) was approximately 156,000. During the summer and early fall, the Jews were gathered in ghettos and Bessarabian transit camps. Starting in mid-September, they were brought to crossing points on the Dniestr River. Most of the movements took place on foot through the camps along routes shown in Table 8-22.

Foot marches and transit camps were sources of a high rate of attrition among the deportees. In Edineț, where the estimated inmate population was 10,000 on August 9, a Romanian officer reported that possibilities for provisioning were minimal (*posibilitate de aprovizionare minime*).⁴⁹ In

49. Jean Poitcvin (*Armata 3-a Es 2 Servicial Pretoral*) to *Servicial Marelui Pretor* (General Topor), August 9, 1941. Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, p. 100.

Secureni, with a count of 20,852 Jews on August 11, feeding them was “impossible” (*Alimentarea lor este imposibila*).⁵⁰ Medicines were not available in either of these camps as epidemics began.⁵¹ Marculepi, a Jewish agricultural community, was deserted when thousands of deportees from Cernaup, Storojinep and other localities arrived. The local Jews had evidently been killed. A survivor recalls that in front of every house there was a grave (*vorjedem Haus befand sich ein Grab*).⁵² Vcrtujeni, largest of the transit camps, contained 13,500 Jews pushed back from Transnistria in August, and another 9,000 to 10,000 who had not yet been deported across the Dniestr.⁵³ Here, as in the other villages turned into transit camps, the congestion was such that people had to live in attics, cellars, chicken coops, or the gutter. Many of the inmates stayed in these camps for almost two months before the evacuations began in mid-September. A survivor of Edinep recalls the trek to the river. A Romanian officer, revolver in hand, collected gold and valuables from the marchers. Along the way, “countless bodies” (*unzählige Leichen*) and single limbs (*einzelne Glieder*) of adults and children from previous transports were lying by the side of the road.⁵⁴

On October 4 Marshal Antonescu decided that all of the Bukovina Jews were to be deported across the Dniestr in ten days,⁵⁵ and on the 6th, noting that approximately 10,000 Jews were left in Bessarabia (Chişinau), he spoke of their expulsion to Transnistria and, circumstances permitting, to the Ural mountains.⁵⁶ By the 9th, trains began to move from several Bukovina towns with deportees to Atachi.⁵⁷ Very few people tried to hide.⁵⁸

The Jews of Cernaup were subjected to ghettoization. The decision was made on October 9. On the morning of the 11th, a poster signed by General Calotescu, governor of Bukovina, appeared on the Cernaup

50. Colonel Manecufa (chief of Bessarabian Gendarmerie) to *Marek Pretar*, August 11, 1941. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

51. Manecufa to Topor, September 16, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 114-16.

52. Statement by Moshe Brunwasscr, July 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 916/74.

53. Poitevin to Topor, August 23, 1941, in Carp, *Cartea Neajm*, vol. 3, pp. 105—

6. Another 1,698 Jews who returned to Bessarabia were counted in Secureni. Manecufa to Topor, September 16, 1941. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

54. Statement by Josef Schieber, May 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 825/22.

55. *Marek Cartier General II-a* to Cernaup Command, October 4, 1941, in Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, p. 143.

56. Extract of Antonescu's remarks at Council of Ministers, October 6, 1941, *ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

58. The point is underscored in statements by Adolf Henner (deportee from Gurahumorului), April 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 794/34, and by Or. Gabriel Stier (Rostoki deportee), June 1963, Yad Vashem Oral History 2081/188.

streets with the announcement that a ghetto decree would be read to the Jewish leaders in the city and its suburbs at military' headquarters at 7 a.m., that its terms would be passed on to the Jewish population between 8 and 9 a.m., and that the move was to be accomplished by 6 p.m.⁵⁹ The order caused consternation, but it occurred to no one, states a survivor, not to move into the ghetto (*Es fieljedoch niemanden ein, nicht ins Ghetto zu ziehen*).⁶⁰ The section assigned to the Jews had a normal capacity for 10,000 people and now it was filled with 50,000. The Jews stayed in corridors, cellars, garages, and under bridges. Sanitary conditions rapidly deteriorated. The deportations, however, were to begin a few days later, street by street. At the last moment Marshal Antonescu, in a telephone conversation with Governor Calotescu, agreed to the exemption of 20,000 Jews. Lists were to be prepared by the Jewish Community. Most names were approved in Calotescu's office, the remainder by Mayor Popovici.^{59 60 61} The granting of exemptions, according to several accounts, was the product of a good deal of corruption.⁶²

Train after train left Cernaup for Marculești and direedy to die Dniestr crossing point of Atachi during October and November. One deportee, an engineer who kept a diary, reports that at 6 a.m. on October 29, soldiers, drumming, aroused the Jews and told them to be at the railway station at 10 a.m. There was chaos during the boarding of the train. Bribes were paid to travel in less crowded cars. While the train was en route, lurching and stopping, doors were unbolted from the outside, and valises fell out. Hands reached in and pulled out more luggage as the deportees heard shrill cries of women recede in the distance. At the Dniestr the Jews were told to jump out like hares, and baggage was dumped into a ditch full of water. His column had to climb a steep hill. Some people crawled on all fours, dragging along their belongings, while being beaten. He saw two women who had collapsed, one whose head had already been buried in clay, another who was trying to raise hers feebly, but who was held back by strands of her white hair meshed by some shoe into the ground. A thousand people were left waiting in the mud. A crater in the center of a square apparently led to a subterranean passage. He slid about six feet down the hole in order to relieve himself,

59. Text in Julius Fischer, *Transistria* (New York, 1969), pp. 65-66.

60. Statement by Regina Lewyn, July 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 915/69.

61. Statement by Dr. Traian Popovici (Mayor of Cernauti in 1941), Carp, *Cartea Neagra*, vol. 3, pp. 158-82. Extract in Fischer, *Transistria*, pp. 67-69.

62. Statement by Popovici in Carp, *ibid.* Deposition by Lewyn, July 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 915/69. Diary of Leopold Rauch (October 11-November 8, 1941) certified by Dr. Ball-Kaduri, December 23, 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 1024/55.

but recoiled when he saw half-rotted, naked corpses thrown on top of one another. The Jews of the Edinep camp had already been there.⁶³

The crossings into Transnistria took place on bridges and overloaded ferries, from which people fell off.⁶⁴ One survivor reports that a woman on a boat was holding an infant wrapped in a pillow. On the other side the mother noticed to her horror that the pillow was empty. The child had fallen out and had been trampled.⁶⁵

The deportations were watched by the Germans from a distance in Bucharest. On October 17, 1941, the following note was written by an official in the legation (probably Hauptsturmführer Richter):

According to information received today from Generaldirektor Lecca, 110,000 Jews are being evacuated from the Bukovina and Bessarabia into two forests in the Bug River area. So far as he could learn, this Aktion is based upon an order issued by Marshal Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these Jews [*Sinn der Aktion set die Liqttidierung dieser Juden*].⁶⁶

Echoes from Transnistria were heard also in other parts of Bucharest. Jewish pamphlets circulated during the Odessa victory parade in the capital charged that “our girls from Bessarabia are hauled to houses of prostitution on the eastern front.”⁶⁷ The German military attache in Bucharest reported that one of his agents, who had mingled with countless uniformed Romanians on furlough from the front, had discovered that every one of these Romanian officers was loaded down with rings, furs, silk, and other valuables taken from thousands of Jewish deportees.⁶⁸

On October 9 and 11, as the Bukovina and Chişinău Jews were being moved out, the president of the Federation of Jewish Communities, Filderman, directed two short appeals to Marshal Antonescu. Filderman was an experienced petitioner; only a few years before, he had protested in the League of Nations against Romania’s violations of the minorities treaty. Now he hammered the line: “This is death, death, death without

63. Diary of Rauch, Yad Vashem Oral History 1024/55. He did not survive.

64. Statement by Hermann Picker, June 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 868/88.

65. Statement by Klara Horn, February 24, 1958, Yad Vashem Oral History 299/12.

66. File memorandum by a HStuf. (probably Richter), October 17, 1941, PS-3319.

67. German translation of the pamphlet in enclosure to letter by a German businessman, December 1941, Wi/IC 4.66, pp. 278-85. The fate of these women is confirmed by the Italian war correspondent Curzio Malaparte. See his *Kaputt*, pp. 288-300.

68. German Embassy in Bucharest/Military Attache (signed Spalcke) to OKH Attache Division, December 2, 1941, Wi/IC 4.66, pp. 255-56.

guilt, without guilt other than that of being Jews [*Este moartea, moartea, moartea fãm vind, fãrdã altd vind deceit aceea de aß evrei*]”⁶⁹

On October 19 Antonescu answered Filderman at length, acknowledging receipt of the two petitions and quoting from the line in which death was mentioned three times. “You speak of tragedy,” said the marshal, “and appeal for the Jews. I understand your pain, but you should have understood, in time, the pain of the entire Romanian nation.” The Romanians, said Antonescu, had paid with their blood for the hatred of the Jews. In Odessa the Jews had “goaded” the Soviet troops into unnecessarily prolonged resistance, “merely in order to inflict casualties upon us.” In Bukovina and Bessarabia the Jews had received the Red Army with flowers, and during the “Communist terror” they had denounced Romanians, thus causing sorrow in many Romanian families. But when the Romanian army returned, it was not received with flowers. “Why,” asked Antonescu, “did the Jews set their houses on fire before abandoning them? Why have we found Jewish children of fourteen and fifteen who had hand grenades in their pockets?” Tirelessly, the marshal recited atrocity after atrocity. Then he concluded: “Have mercy, rather, for the mothers who have lost their sons, and do not pity those who have done this evil.”⁷⁰

Marshal Antonescu did not enjoy that sure-footedness of action that characterized Hitler. The German Führer did not have to answer petitions, for none were addressed to him. The German Jews did not “protest.” Filderman petitioned, and he received a reply. In his answer Marshal Antonescu had found it necessary to give reasons for his actions and had even concluded with a rhetorical appeal for Filderman’s approval. Two years later, the Marshal was to be even less self-assured.

Transnistria was a prolonged disaster. All told, some 160,000 Jews had been seized for deportation in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dorohoi, and 135,000 of them had reached the eastern shore of the Dniestr alive. The figure of net crossings includes about 4,000 Jews with so-called Popovici authorizations, who were expelled from Cernãup in June 1942, and hundreds more who were arrested in Bucharest and deported to a special Transnistrian camp, Vapniarca (Vapnyarka).⁷¹ Most of the Jews arriving at Mogilev and other crossing points were pushed farther, to villages and towns in northern Transnistria.⁷² Sometimes bribes were paid to reach a

69. See Filderman’s letters in Carp, *Cartea Neagrã*, vol. 3, pp. 152-53. It is the second letter, referring to Chişinau, in which the word *death* was repeated.

70. Facsimile in Carp, *ibid.*, and excerpts in English in Fischer, *Transnistria*, pp. 72-74. The Antonescu letter was released to the press. See *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), October 28, 1941, p. 3.

71. On the 1942 deportations, see Carp, *Cartea Neagrã*, vol. 3, pp. 232-40.

72. *Ibid.*, pp. 260-63.

“good locality.”⁷³ Eventually the Jews were distributed in more than a hundred towns, villages, and kolkhozes, with the largest concentrations in the towns of Mogilev, Bershadt, and Shargorod.⁷⁴ Local Jews, far outnumbered by deportees, became part of these communities, which were made fixed domiciles by a decree of November 11, 1941, signed by Governor Alexianu of Transnistria. Each “colony” was to elect a “chief,” and in each the Jews were liable to forced labor.⁷⁵

The Germans believed that the Romanians were planning to push these Jews across the eastern boundary of Transnistria into the German-occupied Ukraine. At the beginning of February 1942, the Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories informed the German Foreign Office that the Romanians had suddenly deported 10,000 Jews across the Bug in the Voznesensk area and that another 60,000 were expected to follow. The ministry asked the Foreign Office to urge the Romanian government to refrain from these deportations because of the danger of typhus epidemics.⁷⁶ The victims were in fact the Odessa Jews in Berezovka, but three Berlin experts put their heads together and drew out the Tighina agreement. They were Amtsgerichtsrat Wetzels of the East Ministry, Legationsrat Rademacher of the Foreign Office, and Obersturmbannführer Eichmann of the RSHA.⁷⁷ Eichmann was ambivalent in his attitude toward the Romanians. He could not bring himself to condemn them for calling upon the Germans to kill some Jews, but he felt that they were doing so in a disorderly manner. The Romanian deportations, he wrote to the Foreign Office, “are approved as a matter of principle,” but they were undesirable because of their “planless and premature” character.⁷⁸

In Bucharest, Vice-Premier Mihai Antonescu called in Governor Alexianu to report on the matter.⁷⁹ By that time the mass was shot in Berezovka. The Generalkommissar in Nikolayev reported that the movement of Jews across the border had stopped. Those who were already across were shipped back to the Transnistrian port of Odessa.⁸⁰

The improvised Transnistrian colonies were now becoming a Romanian institution. The conditions were grim from the start. In the town of

73. Statement by Hermann Picker, June 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 868/88.

74. Report by Jewish Commission, signed Fred Saraga, January 31, 1943, Yad Vashem M 20. The most heavily settled districts were Mogilev, Tulchin, and Balra. The districts were ruled by prefects who were Romanian army colonels. For a list of prefects, see Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, pp. 17-21.

75. Alexianu decree, November 11, 1941, in Carp., *ibid.*, pp. 395-97.

76. Luther via Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, February 11, 1942, NG-4817.

77. Bräutigam to Foreign Office, March 1942, PS-3319.

78. Eichmann to Foreign Office, April 14, 1942, NG-4817.

79. Rademacher to East Ministry and Eichmann, May 12, 1942, NG-4817.

80. Bräutigam to Foreign Office, May 19, 1942, NG-4817.

Mogilev, crowded to the hilt, a Jewish leader wrote a frantic letter on January 6, 1942, to a Zionist office in Geneva, stating that of 12,000 people, 5,000 were being fed in a public kitchen with a piece of bread, and that sixty were dying daily.⁸¹ Thousands of Mogilev Jews had typhus, and the mortality rate among the sick was 30 percent.⁸² The Romanians decided to expel some of the Mogilev deportees to surrounding villages, and Mogilev's prefect, Colonel Nasturaș, issued an order, in which he invoked the honor of the Romanian nation, for the ghettoization of the Jews in his district.⁸³

One of the ghettos was Djurin. Before the war, the dilapidated houses of that town were already on the verge of collapse.⁸⁴ The Jews had lived there five or six per room, and after the expellees arrived the density was even greater. Jewish police were posted inside the boundary, and the ghetto, not having indoor toilets, was encircled by latrines. "It stinks," said an inmate in his diary, "to high heaven in the literal sense of the word."⁸⁵ A survivor of the congested town of Shargorod reports that in the absence of toilets or sewers, a pond served as the only facility for thousands.⁸⁶ Of the twenty-seven physicians in the Shargorod colony, twenty-three had typhus, and twelve died.⁸⁷

As in the ghettos of Poland, the major initial source of income for many of the deportees was the sale of personal belongings.⁸⁸ In Mogilev an energetic chief of the Jewish colony, Jagendorf, an engineer, organized production,⁸⁹ but in many of the colonies disorganization and corruption in the council machinery were common. A mother reports that when she was abandoned, ill with typhus and not fully conscious, all three

81. Feiwel Lauffer to Hcchalutz Office in Geneva, January 6, 1942, Yad Vashem M 20. Notation on correspondence states that Lauffer died January 16.

82. Sec report by Jagendorf (chief of Jewish colony), Dr. N. Winkler (hospital chief), Dr. M. Wolf (medical coordinator), and Dr. J. Kessler (secretary) on typhus in Mogilev, June 10, 1942, in Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, pp. 362-63.

83. On expulsions, see Carp, pp. 267-69, 272-73, 287. Order by Nasruraș, June 16, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 359.

84. Mir'am Korber, *Deportiert* (Konstanz, 1993), with a text of her Djurin diary, entries of December 15, 1941, and March 1, 1942, pp. 63, 85.

85. Rolf Roscnstock, "Die Chronik von Dschurin" in *Dachauer Hefte* 5 (1994): 40-86, entries for August 3, August 14, and September 8, 1942, on pp. 65-67.

86. Statement by Scelig-Ascher Hofer, July 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 918/41.

87. See list of physicians, signed by colony chief Dr. Meyer Teich, in Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, p. 350.

88. Statement by Holer, Yad Vashem Oral History 918/41.

89. Statement by Moshe Kocmer, July 18, 1958, Yad Vashem Oral History 460/43. Jagendorf report to *Centrala Evrților din România*, September 16, 1942, in Carp, *Cartea Fieagră*, vol. 3, pp. 365-66. See also the memoir: Siegfried Jagendorf, *Jagendorfs Foundry*, ed. Aaron Hirt-Mannheimer (New York, 1991).

of her children died.⁹⁰ Another survivor states: “Whoever did not possess something or was not fit to beg, died of hunger.”⁹¹

Forced labor in construction projects of the Organisation Todt began in 1942. Jews were seized for this work by the Jewish police of the colonies. Again there was occasion for privilege, as those who were “prominent” or who had money were able to purchase exemption.⁹² Some of the work sites (in the Tulchin District and, to the south, at Trichati [Trikhaty]) were inside Transnistria; others, along Durchgangsstrasse IV, were across the Bug in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Several German construction firms first operated in these areas, among them Dohrmann-Schiitte, Horst Juessen, and Ufer.⁹³ A survivor of the Horst Juessen stone quarry in the Tulchin District reports that inmates were roused for work at 4:30 a.m. and that the noontime meal consisted of a slice of bread and a plate of soup containing cabbage and wormy peas.⁹⁴

Notwithstanding labor shortages, there were German shootings. At Bar (Reichskommissariat Ukraine, near the Transnistrian border), thousands of Jews, including Romanian deportees, were killed.⁹⁵ A survivor who was on the Romanian-controlled side of the border recalls having heard the cries of those being massacred.⁹⁶

There were also two concentration camps run by the Romanians in Transnistria. Several thousand Jews were incarcerated in Picziora (Peci-

90. Statement by Anna Locbel, September 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 958/12.

91. Statement by Baruch Rostoker (Kupaygorod colony), Yad Vashem Oral History 1224/74.

92. Statement by Hermann Picker (Shargorod), June 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 868/88. Statement by Hofcr (Shargorod), Yad Vashem Oral History 959/91.

93. On Tulchin, see statements by Julius Kronenfeld, July 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 869/73, and Mrs. Saly Gutmann, August 18, 1958, Yad Vashem Oral History 510/42. On Trichati, see statement by Jchuda Moskowitz, March 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 742/42; note by Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, p. 294; and Benjamin Fercncz, *Less Than Slaves* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 100-102. On projects in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, see Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, concluding report in the case against Franz Christoffel and others, 11 (4) AR-2 20/63, August 29, 1963 (signed Schuster). On Tcplik (Ukraine), see statement by Regina Lewyn, July 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 915/69.

94. Statement by Kronenfeld, Yad Vashem Oral History 869/73.

95. Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, p. 286.

96. Statement by Cilli Focrster, May 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 830/81 F. On shootings in the Tcplik area (Ufer firm) by Lithuanian battalion, see Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, final report in case against Christoffel, pp. 44-45. Selections for shooting affected particularly those under fifteen and over fifty. Witness Prangenbetg (Dohrmann firm) in Christoffel final report, pp. 35-36, and statement by Kronenfeld, Yad Vashem Oral History 869/73.

ora), a place in which hunger raged to such an extent that inmates ate bark, leaves, grass, and dead human flesh.⁹⁷ The other camp, Vapniarca, was reserved for about 1,000 to 1,400 Jewish political prisoners, many from Old Romania, as well as younger single people. Vapniarca was the site of a unique Romanian nutritional policy. The inmates were regularly fed 400 grams (14 ounces) of a kind of chickpea (*tathyrus savitus*), which Soviet agriculturists had been giving to hogs, cooked in water and salt and mixed with 200 grams (7 ounces) of barley, to which was added a 20-percent filler of straw. No other diet was allowed. The result manifested itself in muscular cramps, uncertain gait, arterial spasms in the legs, paralysis, and incapacitation. About a third of the Jews died and most of the remainder were killed.⁹⁸

By the summer of 1942 the deportees in Transnistria had become survivors of treks, epidemics, hunger, and shootings. Their eventual fate was to be decided by the Antonescu government as it considered the fundamental German demand for a “Final Solution.”

In Old Romania, in the meantime, the climax of events had not yet arrived. Developments in the Old Romanian areas lagged behind the swift deportation and killing operations in the eastern provinces. At the time when the first Bessarabian Jews were being driven across the Dniestr, the destruction process in Old Romania was still confined to the confiscation of agricultural and real estate properties and the Romanianization of the labor force. After the abandonment of the plan to hound the Jews of Old Romania across the Dniestr, the Romanians followed the German advice to adopt a more methodical approach to the “solution of the Jewish question.” Accordingly, the Romanian government tightened its economic measures against the Jewish community and instituted a Jewish council.

In the economic sphere, the Jews were ousted from the rural sector. The highest reported figures of expropriations for Old Romania include 141,000 acres of cropland and 163,000 acres of forests, plus 110 sawmills.⁹⁹ Abandoned land aggregating 979,000 acres in Bessarabia and 87,000 acres in North Bukovina were taken as well.¹⁰⁰

97. Statement by Kroncnfeld, Yad Vashem Oral History 869/73. Also Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, pp. 284-85.

98. Statement by Dr. Arthur Kessler (physician and survivor of Vapniarca), August 1959, Yad Vashem Oral History 957/78, and Nathan Simon (survivor), “. . . auf alle Vieren werdet ihr hinauskriechen” (Berlin, 1994). Also Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, pp. 366—67, 373-76, 378-79. The commanders of the camp were (in succession): Major I. Murgescu, Captain Sever Buradescu, Captain Christodor Popescu. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

99. Richter to Eichmann, March 23, 1943, T 175, Roll 659.

100. *Excelsior*, June 27, 1943, T 175, Roll 659.

The expropriation of real estate in Old Romania encompassed 31,000 buildings with a total of 75,000 apartments. The Jewish tenants in these houses were subject to eviction,¹⁰¹ unless they had possessed Romanian citizenship for many years or were essential doctors or dentists or had been decorated World War I veterans.¹⁰² The veterans, incidentally, had to have volunteered for service in the Romanian army, which fought against Austria-Hungary and Germany in the First World War, and not in the Austro-Hungarian army, which was allied with Germany—an irony not lost on German observers. Jewish tenants who were not privileged had to post a notice on their doors indicating that the premises were open to inspection by interested Romanians during prescribed hours. Twice a year during the course of 1941 and 1942, Jews could be evicted to make room for Romanian claimants.¹⁰³

Abandoned real estate in Bessarabia totaled 38,000 buildings, among them 4,000 that were destroyed. Of the remaining structures, 9,000 were urban, 9,000 rural, and the rest outhouses and the like.¹⁰⁴

The state also expropriated 146 vessels from Jewish and half-Jewish owners,¹⁰⁵ but manufacturers and distributors, despite some pressure and a number of “voluntary Romanianizations” financed by the state, remained in business.

The continued presence of Jewish enterprises annoyed German competitors. A German businessman in Romania, himself the owner of a lumber plant with 3,000 workers, complained bitterly that “the Jews” were largely responsible for an inflation that had tripled prices within a period of two years. The German military procurement agencies were bearing the brunt of that inflation, whereas the Romanian government was complacently profiting from it to the extent of an increase of 2.5 to 3 billion lei in the sales tax intake, enough to finance the entire Romanian war effort.¹⁰⁶ The Germans made an attempt to expel the Jewish entrepreneurs from the Romanian economy by means of trade agreements, but

101. Confidential weekly report of Sudosteuroopa-Gesellschaft (Vienna), December 3, 1943, T 175, Roll 659.

102. Information Report of the Centrala, April 1, 1943, T 175, Roll 660. *Bukarester Tageblatt*, March 26, 1943, T 175, Roll 659.

103. Information Report of the Centrala, June 2, 1942, T 175, Roll 661. Information Report of the Centrala, August 1, 1942, T 175, Roll 659. For partial statistics of apartments and stores rented to Romanians, see *Excelsior*, June 27, 1943, T 175, Roll 659.

104. *Excelsior*, June 27, 1943, T 175, Roll 659.

105. Report of the Sudosteuroopa-Gesellschaft, December 3, 1943, T 175, Roll 659. *Bukarester Tageblatt*, November 30, 1941, T 175, Roll 659.

106. Letter by a German businessman (signature cut out with scissors from original document), December 1941, Wi/IC 4.66, pp. 278-85. Sales tax receipts appear to have been counted monthly.

this effort was largely unsuccessful.¹⁰⁷ As yet, the local resources, either in capital or in know-how, were not sufficient for a complete replacement of the Jews.

“Romanianization” of employment was another matter. This operation was carried out by the Labor Ministry, which had its own Romanianization office. The target of ejecting the Jewish employees was originally set for December 31, 1941, a date that turned out to be an impossible goal. The Romanians tried “doubling,” that is the simultaneous employment of the Jew to be replaced and a Romanian learning the job.¹⁰⁸ By mid-1942, however, as shown in Table 8-23, the Romanians still had a way to go.

As Jewish employment decreased, forced labor came into its own. All Jewish men of military age, defined as 18 to 50, were liable to serve, but exemptions could be purchased from the Romanian state by all those who still had jobs or proprietary income and those who held academic or professional degrees.¹⁰⁹ The administration of the compulsory labor system was first in the hands of a Labor Ministry official (Mociulski). It was then transferred to the Defense Ministry.¹¹⁰ The inducted Jews were employed in various projects, such as road building (by the Transport Ministry), the construction of workers’ housing (by the Labor Ministry), and snow shoveling, rubble clearance, and the like (by municipalities).¹¹¹ After the Defense Ministry was placed in charge, the degree holders were required to perform intellectual labor in that ministry.¹¹² In principle, service was limited to three months, but by 1943, the Jews were no longer automatically released. About 40,000 men were engaged in daily labor near their homes. Sometimes these people were instructed to report in the morning with pickaxes and shovels. On occasion they were told to bring their lunch. With little help from the Jewish community, their physical condition deteriorated and their families became destitute. They would roam the streets begging for money from more fortunate Jews and escalating their demands with threats. Yet another 20,000 conscripts were sent out to thirty-one labor camps. Only a “faint rumble” from these

107. See the memorandum by the *Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier Kumanien/Abteilung Rohstoff*, on the Fabric de Cauciuc in Braşov, March 16, 1943, Wi/IC 4.51, Anlage 17.

108. *Rukarester Tageblatt*, October 2, 1942, T 175, Roll 659.

109. This arrangement was instituted after a discussion between Marshal Antonescu and unspecified Jewish leaders. See General Staff memorandum (signed General N. Mazarini and Colonel Borcescu), February 7, 1942, T 175, Roll 663.

110. Law of June 22, 1942, signed by Marshal Antonescu, Pantazi, Stoicescu, and Tomescu, T 175, Roll 662.

111. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), March 11, 1942; *Die Judenfrage*, March 15, 1942.

112. Ruling by General Pantazi, July 3, 1942, T 175, Roll 663.

TABLE 8-23
JEWISH UNEMPLOYMENT IN MID-1942

	EMPLOYED	PERCENT	UNEM- PLOYED	PER- CENT
Total	57,570	55.6	47,482	44.4
Artisans and laborers	24,608	62.9	14,506	37.1
Clerks	14,434	46.3	16,725	53.7
Entrepreneurs	9,903	47.6	10,908	52.4
Professions	3,417	63.9	1,931	36.1
Physicians	1,602			
Dentists	230			
Veterinarians	10			
Druggists	269			
Engineers	755			
Architects	93			
Lawyers	212			
Various	246			
Teachers and clergy	2,809	83.2	566	16.8
Various	4,399	60.7	2,846	39.3

Note: Compiled by Central Jewish Organization of Romania, Yad Vashem document M 20. For reductions of Jewish employees in firms, see *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 4, 1942, p. 3, and Cl. Usatiu-Udrea, "Der Abwehrkampf des rumänischen Volkes gegen das Judentum," *Volk im Osten* (Bucharest), May-June 1943, p. 38.

men was heard by the leadership of the Jewish council, the Centrala, in Bucharest.¹¹³

The privileged Jews who paid for labor exemption certificates (*iCarute de scutire*) numbered over 26,000 in 1943. This group was comprised of 12,000 wage earners, 9,000 proprietors, over 3,000 individuals associated with the Centrala, 1,600 professionals, and 400 employees of the Romanian railroads.¹¹⁴

Curtailments of food rations followed the development of the forced

113. See the report by David Roscnkranz, chief of occupational restructuring of the Centrala, August 6, 1943, T 175, Roll 660. The pickaxes are mentioned in the Centrala's Information Report of February 27, 1942, and the lunches in its report of April 14, 1942, both in T 175, Roll 663. For a list of Jewish detachments in thirty-one camps, see T 175, Roll 663. The Romanian railways were one of the major employers of Jewish camp labor.

114. File note, undated, in the Centrala, in *Ancl, Documents*, vol. 7, p. 583.

labor regime.¹¹⁵ Twelve privileged categories, including war veterans, Jews in mixed marriages, and so forth, were exempt.¹¹⁶

The Romanian government was not unmindful of opportunities to collect cash and personal belongings. The sums involved were not enormous by German standards, but they were not insignificant in terms of Romanian conditions.

The first of these measures was a military tax exacted from men between 18 and 50, whether or not they were inducted into the labor service. It consisted of a flat sum that was highest for the youngest age bracket and lowest for the oldest and, for those who were 21 or over, of an additional amount that was a percentage (also declining with age) of direct taxes on income.¹¹⁷ The labor exemption certificates, the price of which was generally proportional to the resources of the purchaser, were undoubtedly more lucrative to the Romanian state. They yielded probably three billion lei or more, a half billion of which appears to have been rebated to the Centrala for support of the needy. (Each billion lei was the equivalent of 16,700,000 Reichsmark at the official rate of exchange.)¹¹⁸ A forced loan to finance the "reintegration" of Bukovina and Bessarabia was imposed on the Jews in the spring of 1942. The fixed nominal amount was two billion lei and the list of expected subscriptions contained some large figures, including 400 million lei from Max Ausnit and 200 million lei from Baron Franz von Neumann.¹¹⁹ Effective net payments seem to have been much lower.¹²⁰ There was, however, a tax payable by all well-to-do Romanians for the "reintegration," and Jews were required to pay the fourfold amount, unless they had subscribed to such a sum at the time of the loan.¹²¹ Finally, in 1943, the Romanian state devised a special levy that was to bring in four billion lei from the Jewish community. The measure was cast into the form of a property tax affecting about 40,000 Jews.¹²² Liquidity was now a problem, and only three

115. *Bukarester Tageblatt*, May 26 and September 9, 1942, T 175, Roll 658.

Information reports of the Centrala, May 26 and August 22, 1942, T 175, Roll 658.

116. Information Report of the Centrala, July 19, 1943, and undated Information Report of the Centrala (October 1943), T 175, Roll 660.

117. Decree-law of January 20, 1941, signed Marshal Antoncscu, Mihai Antoncscu, and Finance Minister Cretzianu, in Anccl, *Documents*, vol. 8, pp. 222-24. In the age group 18-21, the youth and his parents were jointly responsible.

118. See figures for 1943 and 1944 of the Centrala, *ibid.*, vol. 7, pp. 750-51.

119. The list is in T 175, Roll 661.

120. See the figures of the Centrala in Anccl, *Documents*, vol. 7, pp. 750-51.

121. Decree-law of November 8, 1942, signed by Marshal Antoncscu, Neagu, and Fintescu, T 175, Roll 662.

122. *Die Judenfrage*, June 15, 1943, p. 205. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 27, 1943, p. 3; July 29, 1943, p. 3.

quarters of a billion lei were collected.¹²³ The shortfall was made up partially, however, with “contributions” and “donations” amounting to a billion lei that were exacted from the C ntrala.¹²⁴

The labor exemption certificate fees combined with the special tax were utilized for a variety of off-budget expenditures, including social welfare projects, the renovation of the opera house, and cigarettes for the Romanian army. The “contributions” were similarly earmarked for such purposes.¹²⁵

The seizure of personal belongings began in the fall of 1941 with a clodding drive that yielded 1,583,000 items, mainly for use of the Romanian army.¹²⁶ These articles were not limited to outer garments; pajamas and shorts were demanded as well.¹²⁷

Economic measures were a Romanian preoccupation, and the Romanian government did not need German assistance to invent taxes and exactions. The concentration of the Jews was different in character. Unlike dismissals, confiscations, and taxes, which could generate immediate short-term benefits, and which could be fine-tuned to limit costs and maximize gains, the concentration process was a methodical step that German experts considered essential in any intensification of anti-Jewish action. In this undertaking the Germans offered their experienced help.

At the end of 1941, the SS adviser Richter and the Romanian Plenipotentiary for Jewish Affairs, Lecca, visited Mihai Antonescu and convinced him to establish a Jewish council.¹²⁸ Without notice or warning, the troublesome president of the Jewish community network of organizations, Filderman, was removed from his post and his federation was dissolved. The newly established council, called the C ntrala Evreilor din Romania, was given a nominal president, Henry Streitmann, a Jew who was so pro-German that even Lecca considered him childish. The actual leader of the C ntrala was a young physician in his thirties, Nandor Gingold, a man with ambitions but not with ideas. He took orders from Lecca and carried them out. Dr. Gingold would write memoranda justifying the forced labor system and the special taxes as a Jewish contribution to the war effort. After all, the Jews were not fighting at the front. Quoting an old saying, he said that he who loses money loses nothing, he who loses his honor loses something, he who loses his life loses everything. There were other functionaries in the C ntrala who, like Gingold, remained patriotically Romanian, but there was also a group, taken over

123. Figures of the C ntrala in Ancel, *Documents*, vol. 7, pp. 750-51.

124. *Ibid.*

125. See correspondence in Ancel, *Documents*, vol. 7.

126. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), October 24, 1941, p. 4; July 18, 1942, p. 3.

127. Information Report of the C ntrala, May 5, 1942, T 175, Roll 661.

128. Richter to von Killinger, December 15, 1941, T 175, Roll 662.

from organizations of the former federation, that continued to be identified with Filderman.¹²⁹

The Centrala was involved in a great many' activities. It conducted a census of the Jewish population, reminded the Jews of their duties, and collected the payments for the labor exemption certificates, the forced loan, and the "four billion," handing over the money as directed by Lecca.¹³⁰ For its own budget it received permission to add surcharges to the "four billion" and it obtained rebates from the collection for the labor exemption certificates, but its expenditures for Transnistria deportees, the labor detachments, and destitute Jews in general were spread thin.¹³¹ The Chief of the Centrala's Division for Occupational Restructuring, Rosenkranz (a Filderman man), writing about the plight of the forced laborers, emphatically noted the insufficiency of funds and acidly pointed to cushioned ivory towers in which the Jewish leadership could not hear anything.¹³²

Not surprisingly, Filderman continued to be active, trying to ward off threats and disasters. At the time of the "four billion" Filderman and one of his allies, Schwefelberg, met with Gingold. Following this meeting, Filderman and Schwefelberg wrote memoranda arguing that the amount was an impossibility.¹³³ Filderman and his followers also organized private assistance to Transnistria. The donors of the lei, including Filderman, were compensated by foreign Jewish relief agencies with hard currency' kept outside of Axis territory.¹³⁴

While this complicated Jewish political structure emerged with its antipodal leaders, the defiant Filderman and the compliant Gingold, not much more was done by the Romanian government to impose physical restrictions on the Jews. Movement was hampered but not forbidden. The Jews had to pay for permits to travel on Romanian railways,¹³⁵ and

129. The saying is in an undated report by Gingold, T 175, Roll 661. On German evaluations of Jewish leaders, see T 175, Roll 660. A list of offices and their incumbents in the Centrala is in T 175, Roll 660.

130. See Ancl, *Documents*, vol. 7. See also the postwar Romanian indictment of Gingold and others, August 21, 1945, *ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 159-94.

131. *Gazeta Evreiasca*, June 4, 1943, T 175, Roll 661. Recapitulation of figures of the Centrala in Ancl, *Documents*, vol. 7, pp. 750-51.

132. Memorandum by Roscnkranz, August 6, 1943, T 175, Roll 660.

133. The meeting is mentioned in a note by Richter, May 26, 1943, T 175, Roll 660. On Filderman's protest, see *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 29, 1943, p. 3, and *Die Judenfrage*, June 15, 1943, p. 205. The memorandum by Schwefelberg, May 9, 1943, is in T 175, Roll 660.

134. Memorandum by Richter, January 31, 1944, and Jewish correspondence between Bucharest and Switzerland intercepted by the Germans, T 175, Rolls 659 and 660.

135. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), September 15, 1942, p. 3.

they were barred in several towns from markets and other areas during certain hours.¹³⁶ Much housing space was taken from the Jews. Thousands of families lost their apartments in Romanianized houses, and village Jews were pushed out of their homes after the Romanian entry into the war, pouring into crowded district capitals.¹³⁷ In fact, the Jewish rural population all but disappeared.¹³⁸ Yet there were no ghettos in Old Romania and there was no coherent policy to place Jews into special quarters or buildings. Displaced Jews could and did bid for vacant apartments, if they had the money. Of course, most were poverty stricken and their only hope was to be taken in by relatives or friends or to double up with other poor families.

Throughout Axis Europe, the Jewish star was a strong indicator of the stage that had been reached in the destruction process. In July and August 1941, Romanian military territorial commanders in regions adjacent to Bukovina and Bessarabia ordered the Jews to wear the emblem,¹³⁹ and by the beginning of September the Interior Ministry was going to extend the star to the whole country.¹⁴⁰ On September 8, Filderman was received by Marshal Antonescu. Filderman brought up the star and the marshal cancelled it.¹⁴¹

Romania never had a single controlling definition of the term "Jew." When the Centrala was formed, all persons who had at least one Jewish grandparent were required to register with the organization.¹⁴² At the same time, the old laws with their separate definitions and exemptions remained on the books without any reformulation.¹⁴³

136. Sec Information Reports of the Centrala, April 8, 1942, May 5 and 18, 1942, and July 21, 1942, T 175, Roll 658.

137. Information Reports of the Centrala, March 3, 5, 10, and 16, 1942, T 175, Roll 658.

138. In April 1941, no longer at its peak, it numbered 24,000. Publikationsstelle Wien, "Die Bevölkerungszahlung," in Anccl, *Documents*, vol. 1, p. 331. In May 1942 it was 2,400. Count of the Centrala, *ibid.*, p. 285.

139. See the facsimile of a proclamation by the police chief of the sub-district Bacau, signed Subinspector I. Cuptor, July 4, 1941, in Anccl, *Documents*, vol. 2, p. 441, and the facsimile of an ordinance by the military' commander of the Fourth Territorial Command (comprising the districts Iași, Baia, Botoșani, Balri, and Sorooca), signed General Cmatcscu, August 25, 1941, *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 75.

140. Order by General Ion Popescu, September [3], 1941, *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 105.

141. Note signed by Filderman and the architect Clejan (a Jew who built a villa for the Marshal), September 8, 1941, *ibid.*, pp. 130-32. Bucharest police prefect to the president of the Sephardic Jewish Community in Bucharest, September 10, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 137. Later, the star was introduced in the Cernaup Ghetto.

142. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), February' 15, 1942, p. 3.

143. See the unsigned undated German analysis of the definitions in T 175, Roll 658. Numerically the differences between definitions were not significant. In Old Romania there were only 4,000 mixed marriages and 3,000 half-Jews. Ironically, over

In spite of these rather incomplete preparatory measures, the Germans began to exert pressure upon Romania for the deportation of its Jews to Poland. The Germans could not afford to wait indefinitely. They had to take advantage of the Romanian government's readiness to take the most drastic measures against the Jews. In a destruction process, as in a military operation, it is sometimes necessary to seize a favorable moment to attack, even though the buildup phase may still be incomplete.

In November 1941, when Romanian operations in Transnistria were at their height, the German legation in Bucharest requested the Romanian government to express its disinterest in the fate of the Romanian Jews in the Reich. Although the number of Jews involved was far from negligible,¹⁴⁴ the Romanians gave their consent immediately and without reservation.¹⁴⁵ The Germans assumed that the Romanian approval automatically covered the Romanian Jews who were living outside the Reich itself, in the Protektorat and other German-occupied territories.¹⁴⁶ However, this assumption proved to be incorrect. As a result, interventions and protests were launched by various Romanian consulates and the Romanian legation in Berlin.

In fact, the deportations of Romanian nationals from the Reich and the occupied territories had reached a snag. On July 18, 1942, the First Secretary of the Romanian legation in Berlin, Valeanu, pointed out that the Hungarian Jews were not affected by the deportations and that as a matter of prestige Romania could not very well consent to worse treatment of its Jews. Furthermore, Valeanu claimed, Romania had no agreement with the Reich; hence the legation was powerless to give permission for the removal of these people. Taken aback, the German expert Klingeniuss of Abteilung Deutschland replied that the Jewish problem required a "European solution," and if the Romanian legation lacked directives, it could inform its government of the issues involved.¹⁴⁷ Finally, on August 17, 1942, Luther reported that the question had been ironed out in discussions with the Secretary General of the Romanian Foreign Office, Davidescu. The Jews in controversy could now be deported.¹⁴⁸

a thousand of the mixed marriages were with Ethnic Germans. Data for 1942 of the Centrala, in Ancel, *Documents*, vol. 1, p. 294.

144. More than 1,000 Romanian Jews were counted in the Reich census of 1939.

145. Von Killingcrto Foreign Office, November 13, 1941, NG-3990.

146. The number of Jews in the occupied territories was quite large; 3,000 Romanian Jews were counted in France alone. Staf. Knochen to RSHA IV-B-4, September 25, 1942, NG-1971.

147. Memorandum by Klingenfuss, July 21, 1942, on conversation with Valeanu held on July 18, NG-2355.

148. Luther via Wormann and Weizsacker to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, NG-3558; Klingenfuss to Eichmann, August 20, 1942, NG-2198.

The Germans could not immediately follow up their initial success of November 1941 (when they secured for the first time an agreement for the deportation of Romanian Jews in the Reich) by pressing for the deportation of all Jews from Romania. In November 1941 there were as yet no killing centers. Installations for mass killings were not set up in Polish camps until 1942, and these installations were for the most part not in operation until the spring of 1942. Thus there was an unavoidable delay of some months at a time when the Romanians were most amenable to German pressure. During this interval a few Jews tried to make a getaway.

On December 16, 1941, a broken-down vessel, the SS *Struma* (of Panamanian registry), arrived at Istanbul, Turkey, with 769 Jews from Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Old Romania aboard. The ship could not go any farther. It was totally unseaworthy. The passengers, however, could not be debarked, for they had entry permits neither to Turkey nor to Palestine. On February 24, 1942, the Turkish government ordered the ship to move out. When it did not proceed, a tug towed the vessel out of the harbor and cut it loose five miles from shore. That day, the SS *Struma* sank. In all probability it was struck, because of a mistaken presumption that it was an Axis transport, by a torpedo of the Soviet submarine SC-213. One man and one woman survived, 767 drowned.¹⁴⁹ There were no exit restrictions in Romania; yet the Romanian Jews were as securely trapped as were the Jews in the Reich.¹⁵⁰

On July 26, 1942, the Eichmann Referat of the RSHA reported that its representative in Bucharest, Hauptsturmführer Richter, had scored a complete breakthrough. "Political and technical preparations for a solution of the Jewish question in Romania," reported Eichmann, "have been completed by the representative of the Reich Security Main Office to such an extent that the evacuation transports will be able to roll in a short time. It is planned to remove the Jews of Romania in a series of transports beginning approximately September 10, 1942, to the district of Lublin,

149. Hirschmann, *Lifeline to a Promised Land*, pp. 3-8. For a description of the sinking and identification of the Soviet submarine, see Jürgen Rohwer, *Die Versenkung der jüdischen Flüchtlingstransporte Struma und Mejkure im Schwarzen Meer* (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), particularly pp. 31-34, 98, 112, 128.

150. When the Turkish Minister in Bucharest suggested to the American Minister there that some 300,000 Romanian Jews be transported via Turkey to Palestine, the European Division of the U.S. Department of State reacted with considerable antipathy to the idea. See memorandum by Cavendish W. Cannon of the European Division, November 12, 1941, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. II, 875-76. On British policy in the *Struma* affair, see Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1914-1945* (Oxford, 1979), and Martin Gilbert, *The Jews and the Allies* (New York, 1981).

where the employable segment will be allocated for labor utilization, while the remainder will be subjected to special treatment.”

Provision had been made to insure that the Romanian Jews would lose their nationality upon crossing the border. Negotiations with the Reichsbahn with respect to train schedules were already far advanced, and Hauptsturmführer Richter was in possession of a personal letter from Mihai Antonescu that confirmed all arrangements. Accordingly, Eichmann now requested permission “to carry out the shoving-out work in the planned manner. [*Ich bitte um Genehmigung, die Abschiebungsarbeiten in der vorgetragenen Form durchführen zu können, y*”¹⁵¹

Luther wrote to the chief of die Gestapo, Gruppenführer Müller, that “in principle” the Foreign Office had “no objection” (*keine Bedenken*) to the deportation of the Romanian Jews to the “East.” However, Luther felt that there were still some doubts about the circle of deportable people and the “attitude of the Romanian government” to the whole question. Pending the clarification of these matters, he requested the RSHA to undertake no action.¹⁵² At the same time Luther requested the legation in Bucharest to “clarify fundamentally the question of the transportation of the Jews from Romania.” Furthermore, he wanted to know whether a much-postponed visit to Berlin by the Romanian commissar for Jewish affairs, Radu Lecca, would now take place.¹⁵³

On August 17, 1942, Luther informed Wörmann, Weizsäcker, and Ribbentrop that Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu had now given their consent to the deportation of the Jews and had agreed that transports would begin to move out from the districts of Arad, Timisoara, and Turda. Romanian “Ministerialdirektor” Lecca wished to come to Berlin to discuss the details with the Foreign Office and the RSHA.¹⁵⁴ A few days later, Luther wrote to the legation in Bucharest that Lecca was definitely coming to the German capital.¹⁵⁵

In Romania the news was leaking out. Filderman heard it. Misu Benvenisti, president of the Zionist Organization of Romania until its official dissolution and subsequently an adviser in the Centrala, overheard a careless Radu Lecca talk into the telephone about impending deportations. A Jewish railway engineer saw a detailed plan with references to Arad, Timi-

151. Rintelen to Luther, August 19, 1942, enclosing Eichmann report of July 26, 1942, NG-3985.

152. Luther to Müller, August 11, 1942, NG-2354.

153. Luther to legation in Bucharest, August 11, 1942, NG-2354.

154. Luther via Wörmann and Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, NG-3558.

155. Luther and Klingenfuss to legation in Bucharest, probably August 20, 1942, NG-2198.

șoara, and Turda.¹⁵⁶ These three cities were in Southern Transylvania and the Banat, within areas that were close to the Hungarian frontier and that were inhabited by strong Hungarian-speaking minorities. The local district offices of the Centrala in these places had already become aware of Romanian intentions when they, and not other district offices, were instructed during the early summer to draw up tables of Jews by sex, age, occupation, and so forth. When there was no follow-up, the Jews in the affected territory breathed easier, but then rumors were published in newspapers. In a panic, the South Transylvanian Jews sold furniture and jewelry, and Jewish representatives traveled to Bucharest to make appeals to Romanian politicians from Transylvania, notably to Iuliu Maniu, the old liberal leader of the peasant movement, who was amenable to the idea that no distinction should be made between residents of Southern Transylvania and those of the Romanian heartland of Moldavia and Wallachia. From some of these emissaries a suggestion was heard that a transport be made up, not of Jews from a region, but of undesirable Jews from the whole country. At that moment a man accustomed to acting independently, Baron Franz von Neumann, arrived in Bucharest from Arad. Neumann, a thirty-one-year-old Catholic whose father, also a Catholic, had emigrated to America, was of Jewish descent. As principal shareholder in the firm Textilia Aradana, Neumann was reported to have been in the habit of commuting to his branch in Bucharest by air. On this trip, he was said to have spent a large sum of money in his quest to persuade high Romanian officials to postpone or desist from the action.¹⁵⁷

By then Lecca was in Berlin. It seems that in Abteilung Deutschland his visit was regarded as a mere formality. The two Antonescus had, after all, already voiced their agreement, and Lecca was not considered an important Romanian personage. In Berlin, Lecca therefore received the brushoff treatment. That was a mistake. When he returned to Romania on or about August 27, the German diplomats were already aware that things had gone wrong. The Foreign Office promptly dispatched a letter to the legation in Bucharest, blaming Minister von Killinger for his failure to properly conduct the preliminary negotiations and accusing him of

156. Testimony by Theodor Lowenstein-Lavie (former director of Education and Culture in the Centrala), Eichmann trial transcript, May 23, 1961, sess. 48, p. 51.

157. Unsigned report written in the "T" form and dated September 1, 1941, in the files of Richter, T 175, Roll 657. In the same file there is correspondence indicating that the principal informant was A. Willman (Matci [Mathias] Grünberg-Villmani, a pro-German official of the Centrala. See memorandum by Richter, September 8, 1942, T 175, Roll 657. See also Richter's memorandum of September 1, 1941, noting a report that the "notorious Jew" von Neumann was supposed to have offered 400 million lei to the Romanian Army to avert deportations of Jews from Southern Transylvania and the Banat, T 175, Roll 657.

leaving this important matter to Hauptsturmführer Richter. We do not have the text of the Foreign Office letter, but we may infer its contents from the reply sent by von Killinger to Berlin on August 28.¹⁵⁸

He could not understand, von Killinger wrote, how the Foreign Office could assume that he left it exclusively to an SS leader to settle such important questions. Referring to the letter Mihai Antonescu had handed to Richter, von Killinger noted: "Herr Mihai Antonescu may write letters to whomever he wants; that does not concern me in the slightest." It was a matter of course, he said, that his SS consultant should have done the "preliminary work" under his "orders." Then, coming to the most important point, he stated, "There can be no question of a conclusion of the negotiations." When Lecca had come back to Bucharest, he had complained of severe insults in Berlin. Luther had not received him, and during a conversation between Lecca and Rademacher, the latter had been called away, "purposely, as it seemed."

Under the circumstances, von Killinger had immediately handed a note to the Romanian government in which he announced that preliminary negotiations had been concluded and in which he asked the Romanian government for its opinion on all outstanding questions. Apparently, however, this note had not repaired the damage. "If such important personages as Ministerialdirektor Lecca come to Berlin" he wrote, "I ask that they should not be put off in such a way that the good relationship between Germany and Romania could be affected." Von Killinger then added a few remarks about the "gendemen of the SS" (*Herren der SS*) and particularly "Herr Eichmann" who, he said, had not found it necessary to contact the Foreign Office. "Besides," he continued, "I would like to remark that all matters that I report to Abteilung Deutschland get into the hands of the SD in the shortest possible time."

On September 7 von Killinger wrote a second letter expressing regret that the Foreign Minister had not learned of his "counterarguments" in the matter.¹⁵⁹ To this letter Foreign Office Personnel Chief Schröder added the notation: "Herr von Killinger does not *want* to understand at the present moment."¹⁶⁰

The German attempt had failed, and the Jews remained where they were. The Romanian reversal was not partial but complete. Could trivialities like Minister von Killinger's relations with the *Herren der SS* (von Killinger was an SA man) and the subsequent snobbish reception of a Romanian "Ministerialdirektor" have had an effect upon a decision to deliver more than 300,000 Jews to their deaths? The answer is that or-

158. Von Killinger to Foreign Office, August 28, 1942, NG-2195.

159. Von Killinger to Foreign Office, September 7, 1942, NG-2195.

160. Notation by Schröder, September 13, 1943, NG-2195.

dinarily trivialities do not matter, but even a slight incident can be decisive in a situation that is already in delicate balance. By August 1942 the Romanians were no longer at the peak of their enthusiasm. They had just about exhausted their exuberance, and their receptivity to German demands for destructive action was at an end.

The Germans at first refused to accept the fact that the Romanian reversal was final. The refusal to acknowledge defeat is evident in von Killinger's statement of August 28 that "there can be no question of a conclusion of the negotiations." As late as September 24, Luther made a short oral report to Ribbentrop "about the current evacuation of Jews from Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and the occupied territories [*über die im Gange befindliche Judenevakuierung aus der Slowakei, Kroatien, Rumänien und den besetzten Gebieten*],"¹⁶¹ as though Romania had already joined the club,¹⁶² and on September 26 and 28, Reichsbahnoberinspektor Bruno Klemm of the Generalbetriebsleitung Ost in Berlin chaired meetings about projected special trains (one every other day carrying 2,000 Jews each) from Romania to Betzec, although the Romanian railroad representatives, who had requested a postponement of the conference, did not join their German colleagues in the discussions.¹⁶³

By October the Germans were totally frustrated. On the 7th of that month, an angry von Killinger confronted Mihai Antonescu. What precipitated the visit was an event in the capital where Romanian authorities, searching the building of the former Soviet legation, had discovered lists of persons who for one reason or another had applied for permits to enter Bukovina and Bessarabia during the Soviet occupation of these provinces in 1940-41. On the basis of these lists, the Romanians had arrested hundreds of Jews for deportation to Transnistria.¹⁶⁴ Some of the arrested Jews had, however, been released. Von Killinger accused the Romanian captors of shipping off only those Jews who could not buy their freedom. He went on to say that he was well informed about the Jewish question in Romania and that he was well aware of those serfs of the Jews (*Judenknechte*) who were sabotaging its solution. One of these days, he said, those people were going to get the bill. Mihai Antonescu replied that the

161. Luther to Weizsäcker, copies to Wormann, von Erdmannsdorff Pol. I, Pol. IV, Legal and Trade-Political Divisions, D-II, and D-III, September 24, 1942, NG-1517.

162. See also a discussion about Romania in Budapest between YVisliceny and a Hungarian official, October 6, 1942, NG-4586.

163. See Romanian translation of conference summary in Carp, *Cartea Neapm*, vol. 3, pp. 252-53. The German original is not extant.

164. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), September 13, 1942, p. 3.

Marshal himself was of the opinion that the present situation was too delicate for more consequential action.¹⁶⁵

On October 22, Richter made his arguments. Mihai Antonescu, talking circles around the SS man, explained that it was Germany that had been inconsistent; on the one hand the Germans had insisted on a “resettlement” from Old Romania, while on the other hand they had opposed the deportations across the Bug.¹⁶⁶

The finality of the Romanian reversal was not immediately apparent, because none of the preparatory steps had been abandoned. The Jewish community' was still suffering in the grip of economic measures as thousands of Jewish families searched for a roof over their heads and Jewish forced laborers went barefoot. Yet despite the public continuation of expropriations and extortions, the Romanian government in its unpublicized moves was beginning to look in a different direction. The new goal was actually an old one. It was emigration.

On December 12, 1942, von Killinger reported to the Foreign Office that Lecca had told him of a plan by Marshal Antonescu to allow 75,000 to 80,000 Jews to emigrate to Palestine in return for a payment by the Jews to the Romanian state of 200,000 lei (that is, 3,340 Reichsmark, or 1,336 dollars) for each emigrant. Von Killinger added that in his opinion, Antonescu wanted to collect 16 billion lei (267 million Reichsmark, or 107 million dollars) and at the same time get rid of a large number of Jews “in a comfortable manner.” The German envoy concluded his message with the words: “I am in no position to judge from here as to whether it would be advisable to oppose this plan.”¹⁶⁷ Unterstaatssekretar Luther and one of his experts, Gesandtschaftsrat Klingenfuss, replied that the Foreign Office refused to believe in the seriousness of the project but that it had to be prevented by all means. Then they outlined a series of arguments for von Killinger's use (namely that the 80,000 Jews were enemies of the Axis, that the action would be construed as showing a lack of unity' in the Axis, etc.).¹⁶⁸

The feeling of alarm in Abteilung Deutschland was somewhat premature. Although the Jews could now buy their way out, any possibility of mass emigration was frustrated by two major obstacles: the lack of shipping and the lack of a destination. Neither Axis nor Allied shipping was available for the transport of the Jews. Only small, unseaworthy ships of neutral registry could be used, and passage even in such vessels was a

165. Notation by Richter, October 8, 1942, T 175, Roll 661.

166. Von Killinger to Foreign Office, November 26, 1942, enclosing report by Richter, Israel Police 572.

167. Von Killinger to Foreign Office, December 12, 1942, NG-3986.

168. Luther and Klingenfuss to von Killinger, January 3, 1943, NG-2200.

difficult proposition because of their great cost and the German unwillingness to grant them safe conduct. But even if the vessels could be procured and their departure secured, they had no place to go. Entry restrictions into neutral countries, Allied states, and Palestine were very tight. The fate of the SS *Struma* was still a vivid memory.

The Jews tried to overcome the shipping shortage by using the overland route across Bulgaria. They attempted to pry open the doors to Palestine by restricting the emigration to children, who could not be turned away so easily for lack of proper entry permits. To a very limited extent this solution worked. On March 11, 1943, Rademacher and Consul Pausch dispatched a communication to von Killinger in which they stated that seventy-two Jewish children from Hungary had arrived in Adit, Palestine, through Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey; that these were apparently a part of the 270 Jewish children from Hungary and Romania mentioned in the British House of Commons as having arrived in Palestine; and that von Killinger was to do everything possible to prevent any further emigration of Jews to Palestine.¹⁶⁹ A similar letter was sent by Rademacher to the German consulate in Sofia.¹⁷⁰

Apparently, however, the Foreign Office was not entirely successful, for on May 13, 1943, the exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin el Husseini, who had thrown in his lot with the Axis, wrote to the Foreign Office that 4,000 Jewish children accompanied by 500 adults had recently reached Palestine, and for that reason he asked the German Foreign Minister "to do his utmost" (*das Äusserste zu tun*) to prevent further departures from Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.¹⁷¹ The Germans now did their utmost. When, two weeks later, von Killinger reported that a representative of the International Red Cross had approached Marshal Antonescu with a request to permit the emigration of the Jews in Red Cross ships,¹⁷² the German Foreign Office applied the brakes by refusing safe conduct and proclaiming that Palestine was an Arab country.¹⁷³ There was much additional correspondence about Red Cross ships and about children, but nothing came of it.¹⁷⁴

While the Foreign Office was fighting off Romanian emigration schemes, the SS and Police hierarchy decided to pull up its stakes in

169. Rademacher and Pausch to von Killinger, March 11, 1943, NG-2184.

170. Rademacher to consulate in Sofia, March 12, 1943, NG-1782.

171. Amin el Husseini via Ambassador Prüfer to Ribbentrop, May 13, 1943, G-182.

172. Von Thadden via Political and Legal Divisions and Staatssekretär Srengrecht to Ribbentrop, June 1, 1943, NG-3987.

173. *Ibid.*, and correspondence in document NG-5049.

174. Correspondence in documents NG-5049, NG-4786, NG-5138, NG-I-1M, and NG-2236.

DEPORTATIONS

Romania. After a particularly pessimistic report by Gestapo Chief Müller in January 1943, Himmler decided that the situation was hopeless. In Romania, he wrote, nothing could be done anymore (*gar nichts zu machen*). He therefore suggested that the Jewish expert in Bucharest be withdrawn. Nothing, said Himmler, was going to happen there anyway, and if the expert remained, the only thing that could result “is that we are going to be accused of something.”¹⁷⁵ Himmler’s estimation of the situation was correct. The erstwhile Romanian collaborators were gradually turning away, and the years 1943 and 1944 revealed developments even more significant than Marshal Antonescu’s willingness to sell the Old Romanian Jews to the Allies. These developments began in Transnistria.

The Jews in Transnistria were still prisoners, but a slight improvement in their situation resulted from Marshal Antonescu’s acceptance of a Jewish offer to send clothes, medicines, and money to the victims. The money had to be changed into the local Transnistria currency (*Reichskreditkassenscheine*) at a two-thirds loss, but the transmission of these funds was of as much importance to the Jews as to the Romanian profiteers.¹⁷⁶ The government even allowed a commission established by Gingold to visit Transnistria in January 1943. The Jewish delegation, headed by Fred Saraga, was accompanied by a delegate of the Council of Ministers, Iuliu Mumuianu, who described the deportations as a “historical fatality” (*historische Fatalität*). The Jews requested that regular correspondence between Jewish inhabitants of Old Romania and deportees in Transnistria be permitted, pointing out that all letters to Vapniarca had been refused. They also requested a census of the survivors in the 101 colonies in order to provide more effective aid.¹⁷⁷

The census, completed on September 1, 1943, revealed that of the Bessarabian, Bukovinian, and Dorohoi deportees, 50,741 were left (about 5,000 of them orphans) and that in addition several hundred “Communist Jews” were in Vapniarca.¹⁷⁸ The meaning of this statistic was unmistakable. If about 25,000 Jews had died en route to the Dniestr, and about 10,000 were killed by the Germans in August 1941, followed by 119,000 crossings between September and November of that year and several thousand more (mainly from Cernăuți) in 1942 — a total of 160,000 —

175. Himmler to Müller (copy to Wolff), January 20, 1943, Himmler Files, Folder 8. The files do not contain Müller’s report, which was dated January 14.

176. Lcvai, *Martyrdom*, p. 67.

177. Saraga report, January 31, 1943, Yad Vashem M 20.

178. Report by Inspector General of Gendarmerie (General Tobescu), September 16, 1943, in Carp, *Cartea Neagră*, vol. 3, pp. 438-42, and undated (subsequent) report by Interior Ministry/Police (General Vasiliu), *ibid.*, pp. 447-51. Both documents list an arrival statistic of only 110,033 from Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Dorohoi.

then the 51,000 survivors were less than a third of those who had been engulfed in the upheaval.

When the German legation heard that the Romanians were relaxing their measures against the remnants of the deportees, it became alarmed. A report was requested from the German consul in Odessa. The consul was able to assuage the anxiety of his superiors. The Jews in Transnistria, he wrote, were receiving a thrashing now as before {“*Die Juden in Transnistrien bekommen noch; genau so viel Prügel wiefrüher*”).¹⁷⁹

In the Romanian government, however, the opposite concern was growing. The Red Army had massively crossed the Dnepr River, had recaptured Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk, and was nearing the Bug. Nervously, Marshal Antonescu explored the possibilities of returning the imprisoned Jews to Old Romania, for he was now afraid that the Germans, in their retreat across Transnistria, might kill these victims.

Antonescu’s fear is significant enough, but even more remarkable is the fact that the Marshal could no longer recall why so many Jews had died in Transnistria. He was disturbed and ill at ease because he had so many dead Jews on his hands, yet he seems to have forgotten who was responsible for these deaths. His searching remarks appear to have been an attempt to find a culprit who had perpetrated this dirty trick upon him, but he did not discover that culprit in himself. Verbatim excerpts from this historic conference have survived. A copy was sent to the General Commissar for Jewish Questions, who immediately passed on the manuscript, with his comments, to the Germans. Besides Marshal Antonescu, the Undersecretary for Security in the Interior Ministry, General Vasiliu, and the Governor of Bukovina, General Dragalina, participated in the discussion. The conference opened with an estimation of the number of Transnistrian survivors, a troublesome statistical problem with which the Romanians were obviously unable to cope.

marshal antonescu: I am now switching to the Jewish question. According to the latest statistics, we have now in Transnistria a litde over 50,000 Jews. [Notation by Lecca: “There are 80,000.”]

general vasiliu: Add to that 10,000 from Dorohoi; that makes 60,000.

antonescu: I think there are 70,000 to 80,000. But if there arc only so many, that means they are dying off too fast.

vasiliu: There was some mistake. We have talked with Colonel Radulescu, who has carried out a census. There are now exactly 61,000. [Notation by Lecca: “Inaccurate.”]

179. German Consul in Odessa (signed Stephanv) to German legation in Bucharest, September 9, 1943, T 175, Roll 663.

antonescu: These Jews of Transnistria are grouped in Vapniarca.

vasiliu: From Vapniarca they were moved to Grosulovo, diat lies near Tiraspol.

antonescu: That means they are saved!

vasiliu: In Vapniarca there are many Communists, 435 Jews from Targu-Jiu.

antonescu: Anyone who is a Communist Jew I don't bring into the country.

vasiliu: The rest stayed where they were.

antonescu: Also those from the Tiraspol camp do not get into the country' if they are Communists.

vasiliu: We have still another camp in Slivina, near Oceacov. These are criminals who have been accused fifteen times or more, convicts, etc.

antonescu: I am interested neither in the Communists nor in the criminals. I am talking about the other Jews, [for instance] those whom we forcibly removed from Dorohoi.

vasiliu: They [the Jews] have decided in a regular conference who is to have priority' in the evacuations. They want to start with the orphans, who number about 5,000.

antonescu: We want to establish a big sanatorium in Vijnita. There was a major Jewish center there that was dissolved long ago. There, too, we will bring a lot of Jews. Regarding the Jews who are in danger of being murdered by the Germans, you have to take measures and warn the Germans that I don't tolerate this matter, because in the last analysis I will have a bad reputation for these terrible murders. Instead of letting this happen, we will take them away from there and bring them into this area. There they will be organized securely in a camp, so that we can fill up Bukovina again. They should be organized for labor service there. We will pay them. Until they are organized, however, they will be supplied by the Jewish community. I have just talked with Mr. Lecca, and I told him he should call those from the Jewish community—he says he has already collected 160 million lei [2,672,000 Reichsmark, or slightly over a million dollars] — in order that clothing and foodstuffs become available. At the same time, the foreign countries should be informed, so that foodstuffs may be sent from there too — just like the shipments to the American prisoners of war—from Switzerland, and clothing, because I will not take anything from supplies allocated for the Romanian soldier, worker, and civil servant to clothe the Jews. I have sympathy also with the Jews, but more so with the Romanians. They will therefore be supplied from their own resources. We contribute nothing. They already have 160 million. If misfortune strikes and we have to withdraw from Vijnita,

then they stay there. From Vijnita I take no further step into the interior of the country.

v a s i l i u : All of them do not have room there.

a n t o n e s c u : Thirty to thirty-five thousand used to live there.

v a s i l i u : In the city were 5,000. It is a little town. We bring them only to cities from which they came, in Bukovina and Bessarabia.

ANTONESCU: HOW?

v a s i l i u : They have to return to the places from which they went.

a n t o n e s c u : Not only those who came from Old Romania?

v a s i l i u : In addition to those. But the majority are from Bukovina and Bessarabia.

a n t o n e s c u : And one brings them back to their places of origin?

v a s i l i u : To other places we can't bring them, because we have no room.

a n t o n e s c u : Let's bring them to Vijnita. Under what conditions? I also told Lecca he should send them supplies. Orezean[u] told me he will put railway coaches at their disposal in order to bring them there.

[There appears to be a gap at this point.]

a n t o n e s c u : I was told those in Golta [prefecture] were murdered.

v a s i l i u : It is not true, Marshal.

a n t o n e s c u : In any case the Germans should be warned that I don't tolerate such murders.

v a s i l i u : The Germans took only a few columns of Jews and drove them across the Bug.

a n t o n e s c u : Please tell the German Secret Service that I don't tolerate it that they are murdered.

v a s i l i u : Do you want to send all 60,000 Jews to Vijnita?

a n t o n e s c u : It is not possible, since all of them do not have room there. Those in the villages stay put until the front line is stabilized.

v a s i l i u : The Mogilev District, which has 39,000 Jews, must be relieved; then comes Balta with 10,000. Tulchin and Iampol no less.

a n t o n e s c u : Relieve Mogilev and bring the Jews to Vijnita.

v a s i l i u : Those who came from Dorohoi will return there.

a n t o n e s c u : Those from Old Romania, who have been removed by mistake, will be brought back to their homes.

v a s i l i u : Dorohoi was regarded as a part of Bukovina.

g e n e r a l d r a g a l i n a : In Dorohoi all Jewish stores are closed.

a n t o n e s c u : Now you are not going to give them permission anymore to open their stores. In Vijnita they will trade among themselves.

v a s i l i u : The Jews from Mogilev then will come to Vijnita; the

others will stay put. We will only select the intellectuals and skilled workers [from the other Jewish groups].

dragalina: It is to be observed that the Jews in Bukovina are attempting to travel surreptitiously to Bucharest. First they request a travel permit for thirty days; then they demand an extension of this permit. I hinder them as much as possible.

antonescu: You should hinder them completely.

vasiliu: We have checked all permits, and we sent them back immediately upon expiration.

antonescu: But how do they travel? I thought they should not travel at all.

dragalina: They have to have operations, doctors.

antonescu: Yes, if one sends them into a camp, right away they need doctors and dentists. Mr. Tatarescu now has a hernia; when he did what he did, nothing was wrong with him. Gentlemen, we have settled the mode of evacuation for all categories. This chapter is now finished.¹⁸⁰

The surviving Dorohoi victims and orphans were sent back to Romania.¹⁸¹ At the beginning of 1944, a total of 43,065 deportees remained in Transnistria. This figure included 31,141 from Bukovina, 11,683 from Bessarabia, and 241 from Old Romania.¹⁸² The numbers starkly underscore the special disaster of the Bessarabian Jews.

Marshal Antonescu's fear that the Germans would renew operations against the Jews during the retreat was not without foundation. At the beginning of May 1944, marking was introduced for the first time in the Old Romanian province of Moldavia, which adjoined Bessarabia.¹⁸³ The German commander in that sector, General Wohler, was very annoyed when he discovered that so many Jews were still around. The city of Iași, he said, should have been evacuated, but that was impossible

180. Basarabcanu (Council of Ministers) to Lccca, November 25, 1943, enclosing minutes of Transnistria conference held on November 17, 1943, in German translation in the files of the Bucharest legation, Occ E 5a-5. The confusion about numbers stemmed from the failure to distinguish between the 51,000 deportees and a larger total that included deportees and surviving indigenous Jews. See Lecca to Marshal Anronescu, November 20, 1943, in Ancl, *Documents*, vol. 7, p. 547.

181. Gingold to Lccca, January [11], 1944, noting 6,200 returnees, almost all of them Dorohoi Jews, in December 1943, *ibid.*, pp. 610-11.

182. Undated tabulation in the files of the Céntrala, probably enclosed by Vasiliu and Tobcsu in a letter to the Céntrala, February 10, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 680-81. In March, 1,696 orphans were approved for return. Tobcsu to the Céntrala, March 3, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 721.

183. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 9, 1944, p. 3.

because the Jews had made large payments of a special tax. In another Moldavian city, Bärlad, Wohler reported that Jews had tried to buy clothes and food from his men. "I ordered the arrest of these creatures," he wrote. Concluding, he said: "Jews must disappear. [*Zusammenfassung: Juden müssen verschwinden.*]"¹⁸⁴ A few weeks later, Wöhler organized a forced labor system for the Moldavian Jews — the German army's parting gift to the Jews of Romania.¹⁸⁵

In the closing days of Romania's war effort on Germany's side, another meeting was convened in Bucharest, this time under the chairmanship of Mihai Antonescu. The topic was Jewish emigration, particularly the emigration of children repatriated from Transnistria. The record of that conference, dictated by Mihai Antonescu, is even more remarkable in its distortion of past events than the minutes of the Transnistria conference. The text reads almost as though it had been prepared for postwar consumption. When Radu Lecca, a participant in the discussion, handed over a copy to the German legation, he remarked that alleged statements by Mihai Antonescu, Radu Lecca, and three other participants (Interior Minister Popescu, Undersecretary Vasiliu, and Marine Undersecretary Sova) had not been made at all but had simply been invented by the Romanian Vice-Premier.¹⁸⁶ Whether the distortion of past history had in fact occurred during the conference or whether it was created as an afterthought in a false summary, the record of that discussion remains a true indicator of how Mihai Antonescu and perhaps also his colleagues felt about the events that had taken place under their direction for the past four years.

Mihai Antonescu, according to his own summary, opened the talks by pointing out that even in 1940 a decision had been made not to impede any Jewish emigration. Von Killinger's and Richter's demands to place the Romanian anti-Jewish regime under German control had been rejected. The Office of the Commissar for Jewish Questions (Lecca) had never been a public office. When Ribbentrop had attempted to curtail emigration in 1943 by referring to the Arabs, the Romanians had replied that Romania had the same right to be spared from the Jews as the Arabs.

184. Armcegruppe Wohler/Ia (signed Wohler) to Army Group South Ukraine, May 31, 1944, NOKW-3422. *An Armeegruppe* was an improvised army organized in the field. Wohler is the same general who three years before had complained about Romanian atrocities.

185. Armeegruppe Wohler OQu/Qu 2 to Corps Group Mieth, Corps Kirchner, XVII Corps, XL Corps, XLIX Mountain Corps, Army Rear Area, and Army Engineers commander, copy to Ia, July 15, 1944, NOKW-3118.

186. Von Killinger to Foreign Office, July 17, 1944, enclosing summary by Mihai Antonescu dated July 15, 1944, NG-2704. The conference had been held on June 9, 1944.

The British government's inquiry whether the Romanian government permitted emigration was answered "positively." Only transport difficulties had frustrated a mass emigration. Romania naturally could not allocate its own ships, which were needed for national defense and therefore, it was left to the Jews to organize their own emigration. But very few ships had come to Constanta. The foreign maritime companies that sent these ships had collected "fantastic sums" from the Jews and had also exercised a bad influence on Romanian offices. Marshal Antonescu had consequently held up the ships in Constanta to check abuses.

General Vasiliu observed that no obstacles had been placed in the way of Jewish emigration. The Romanian government had merely collected 40,000 lei per person (RM 668, or \$267), a very low tax in view of the exemptions from military duty and labor service. In addition, the companies had to pay a profits tax to the state.

General Sova, the Marine Undersecretary, pointed out that Romanian ships could actually carry Jewish emigrants. Radu Lecca put in that since the sinking of the SS *Struma*, the Great Headquarters of the Armed Forces had prohibited transport in Romanian ships, but that prohibition did not apply to foreign ships. The Jews, said Lecca, had paid 600 dollars (U.S. currency) for passage on a Bulgarian or Turkish ship. But Lecca, too, agreed that there was no reason for preventing the use of Romanian vessels. The emigration, he said, could be organized by the Jewish leader Zissu (Romanian representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine).

Interior Minister Popescu also saw no reason why the Romanian ships lying at anchor in Constanta could not be used for the transport of the Jews, particularly children from Transnistria and refugees from Hungary. Any excess capacity could be used for emigrants chosen jointly by Mr. Zissu and Mr. Lecca. Everyone happily agreed with this solution.¹⁸⁷

No, the Romanian bureaucrats had never really done anything to the Jews, and now they even offered their own ships for the emigration of the survivors. However, that project never came to fruition, for soon afterward the Red Army broke into Old Romania. On August 24, 1944, Romania surrendered.

Hungary

As the German destruction process covered Axis Europe, one Jewish community after another was swept away. In country after country the Jews were caught by the machinery of destruction and died, helpless, in its grasp. By 1944 only one important area was still untouched by depor-

187. Mihai Antonescu reported the results of the conference in summary form to Zissu. See his letter to Zissu, June 17, 1944, NG-2704.

tations, only one community still intact. The area was Hungary, and 750,000 Jews had survived within its borders.

When the Hungarian Jews looked at a map of Axis Europe at the beginning of 1944, they could see that all around them Jewish communities had been attacked and destroyed. The cataclysmic German destruction process had struck the Jews as far east as Russia, as far north as Norway, as far west as France, as far south as Greece. Conversely, when a German official looked at his map in Berlin, he could see that everywhere “the Jewish problem” had been “solved” except in one relatively small area: Hungary. And when he looked at Hungary, he could see the largest concentration of Jews who still survived in the German sphere of influence. Truly, the Hungarian Jews were living on a land island, enclosed and protected by a political boundary. The Jews depended on that barrier for their survival, and the Germans had to break it down. In March 1944 the Hungarian frontiers began to crumble. The Germans overran the country, and catastrophe overtook the Jews.¹

Considering that Jewish communities had been crushed, one by one, what was so unusual in the fate of Hungarian Jewry? There is but one factor that distinguishes the Hungarian case from all the others: in Hungary the Jews *had* survived until the middle of 1944. They were killed in Hitler’s final year of power, in an Axis world that was already going down to defeat. In none of the countries dealt with so far was the “Final Solution” started so late. Hungary was the only country in which the perpetrators knew that the war was lost when they started their operation. The Hungarian Jews were almost the only ones who had full warning and full knowledge of what was to come while their community was still unharmed. Finally, the Hungarian mass deportations are remarkable also because they could not be concealed from the outside; they were carried out openly in full view of the whole world. The success of these operations, in the twilight of the Axis, says much about the Germans, who began the venture, about the Hungarians, who were drawn into it, about the Jews, who suffered it, and about the outside powers, who stood by and watched it come to pass.

Why, then, was Hungarian Jewry doomed to ultimate destruction? At the root of the development was the relationship between Germany and Hungary, starting in prewar days. The Hungarians were opportunists who had joined the German camp in order to gain territory. They had a strong desire to expand in three directions: north (Czechoslovakia), east

1. Several books have been written about the destruction of the Hungarian Jews. A penetrating early account is by Eugene Lcvai, *Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry* (Zurich and Vienna, 1948). Most comprehensive is Randolph Braham’s *The Politics of Genocide* (New York, 1981), 2 vols. The German role is the focus of Christian Gerlach and Gbtz Aly, *Das letzte Kapitel* (Munich, 2002).

(Romania), and south (Yugoslavia). With Germany's help the threefold expansion was accomplished in less than three years, but once they had committed themselves to action on the German side, they found that there was no easy escape from the fatal entanglement. Hungary was too close to Germany, too indispensable to the German war effort, to be able simply to surrender to the other side.

Thus in 1943, and increasingly in 1944, the Hungarians were subjected to the German vise. The Hungarian government was unable to reply to this threat with the language of force. The country was fettered in its striking capacity by its smallness and location, by its traditions and outlook. The Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, was a man in his seventies. The backbone of the Hungarian regime was a class of old-established and long-decayed generals and landowners. These men could not, ultimately, withstand German pressure. They swayed and faltered under German demands. From the beginning of 1938 to the end of 1944, the wavering reaction of the Hungarian leadership was reflected in a succession of prime ministers who were alternately pro-German personalities and reluctant collaborators (see Table 8-24).

This pattern was not just a matter of periodic reversals. As time went on, the pro-German prime ministers were increasingly pro-German, and the reluctant collaborators were more and more reluctant. The contrast widened with every change, because it reflected an increasing divergence of German and Hungarian interests. Germany fought for all or nothing; Hungary had more limited aims. The Germans wanted to make history; the Hungarians wanted only to annex territory. The Germans wanted to fight to the end; the Hungarians wanted to quit when the end was in sight. The pro-German prime ministers, appointed under German pressure, served the increasing German need to hold Hungary in line. The reluctant collaborators, who were appointed when the Germans were not looking, served the growing Hungarian desire to escape from the whirlpool of total defeat. In the final tally, German pressure triumphed.

As prime ministers changed, the fate of Hungarian Jewry changed also. There was a close correlation between the succession of Hungarian rulers and the pacing of anti-Jewish action. The moderate prime ministers slowed down and arrested the catastrophe; the extremists hurried it along. The destruction process in Hungary was therefore an erratic development in which periods of near tranquility alternated with outbursts of destructive activity. The Jews passed through cycles of hope and disappointment, relief and shock. No Jewish community in Europe was subjected to the hot-and-cold treatment to such an extent and for so long a time. The Jews of Hungary felt in the fullest measure, and to the very end, the effects of the wavering Hungarian reaction to overwhelming German force.

TABLE 8-24
THE HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTERS

BEFORE GERMAN INTERVENTION

To March 1939	Imredy (pro-German)
March 1939 to April 1941	Teleki (reluctant collaborator)
April 1941 to March 1942	Bardossy (pro-German)
March 1942 to March 1944	Kallay (reluctant collaborator)

AFTER GERMAN INTERVENTION

March to August 1944	Sztojay (pro-German)
August to October 1944	Lakatos (reluctant collaborator)
October 1944 to end of war	Szalasi (pro-German)

The destruction of the Hungarian Jews began as a voluntary Hungarian venture, and the first Hungarian measures were enacted without much German prodding and without any German help. The earliest law was drafted in 1938, when Hungary approached the Reich for help in the realization of Hungarian plans against Czechoslovakia.² The second law was presented to Ribbentrop in 1939, at a moment when the Budapest government was pleading with the German Foreign Office for its support in the liberation of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Yugoslavia.³ A third sequence of measures was taken when Hungary joined Germany in the war against Russia.

In these early decrees, which span the period of Imredy, Teleki, and Bardossy, little can be seen that set Hungary apart from its neighbors. Imredy started the destruction process, Teleki allowed himself to be dragged along, and Bardossy moved more rapidly toward a "final" goal. From the German viewpoint the Hungarians in those days were coming up to expectation. Little in that early history gave hint of the later convulsions on the Hungarian scene.

Like everyone else, the Hungarians started with a definition of the term "Jew." They wrote their first conceptualization into their first anti-Jewish law. That definition was changed slightly in the second law. (Both laws, incidentally, were the product of the Imredy regime, although the law of 1939, drawn up in the closing days of the Imredy government, was promulgated under Teleki.) A third law, written in 1941, represented a radical departure from the earlier formulations. It was an attempt to

2. Ribbentrop to Keitel, March 4, 1938, PS-2786.

3. Summary of discussion held on April 29, 1939, by Ribbentrop, Prime Minister Teleki, and Foreign Minister Csaky, prepared by von Kidinunnsdorf on April 30, 1939, D-737. The law was actually brought up as a bargaining point in this discussion.

approach and in some respects even to surpass the Nuremberg principle. Table 8-25 is a summary of the three laws, together with the corresponding German provisions.

A closer view of these Hungarian definitions reveals that they were the products of a struggle between pro-Nazi elements and the Catholic Church. A comparison of the first two laws shows that the changes in 1939 represented a partial victory, and thus also a partial defeat, for both sides. Under the law of 1938, for example, a person who had been converted at the age of twelve in the year 1900 was considered a non-Jew. Under the law of 1939 that same person was reclassified as a Jew. Clearly, such a change was a victory for the pro-Nazis and a defeat for the Church. Now, however, taking the case of a young man born as a Christian in 1920, whose parents were converted when he was born and whose ancestors had been residents of Hungary for a century, one will note that this man was a Jew under the law of 1938 but a non-Jew under the law of 1939. Here, then, was a defeat for the pro-Nazis and a victory for the Church. But was this Church victory permanent? Not at all, for the law of 1941 classified that same individual as a Jew again.

The definition of 1941 was adopted after an open controversy in the upper house of Parliament. The Hungarian upper house had 254 members, including a delegation of Habsburg royalty, a delegation of nobles, representatives appointed by Regent Horthy, representatives of public corporations, and members who held important positions in public life, among them 34 representatives of the Church. By 1941 the Jewish community representatives (a public corporation) were no longer present, but among the other members there were still eleven persons of Jewish descent, including eight who were baptized.⁴ This was consequently a unique struggle. The Church waged its battle as an integral component of the lawmaking apparatus, and eleven lawmakers were directly affected by the outcome of the argument. (The Jews, incidentally, continued to sit in the upper house after the argument was lost, for the Hungarians were slow in the dismissal process.)

When the law of 1941 was adopted, the Church suffered a bad defeat. Of all the definitions in Europe, the Hungarian one was probably the widest in scope; it reached out farthest in its application to persons who did not adhere to the Jewish faith. In Germany, for example, a half-Jew who did not belong to the Jewish religion and was married to a quarter-Jew was not considered a Jew. In Hungary', under the law of 1941, a half-Jew in the same position was considered a Jew.

The all-embracing character of the new Hungarian definition is most discernible in statistics. In 1941 about 725,000 persons in Hungary

4. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 9, 1941, p. 3.

LAW OF 1938

1. A Jew by religion
2. A person who left the Jewish communin' or was converted after July 31,1919
3. A person bom of Jewish parents after July 31,1919, regardless of his own religion

LAW OF 1939

1. A Jew by religion
2. Any convert who became a Christian on or after his seventh birthday
3. Any other convert (including even one who became a Christian before his seventh birthday) provided that he had a Jewish parent who was not converted before January 1,1939, or who did not come from a family resident in Hungary since 1849

LAW OF 1941

1. A person with three or more Jewish grandparents
2. A person with two Jewish grandparents
 - (a) who was himself born as a Jew, or
 - (b) one of whose parents was not baptized at the time of marriage, or
 - (c) who was married to a person with as much as one Jewish grandparent

GERMAN LAW

1. A person with three or more Jewish grandparents
2. A person with two Jewish grandparents
 - (a) who himself belonged to the Jewish religion on September 15, 1935, or later, or
 - (b) who was married to a person Jewish by definition on September 15, 1935, or later

3. The child of a Jewish mother and an unknown father
4. The child of a half-Jewish mother and an unknown father, if at time of birth either mother or child was not baptized
5. A person with a single Jewish grandparent, provided that the half-Jewish parent was Jewish by definition, and provided further that the offspring was born after the law entered into force

3. The child of a Jewish
mother and an unknown
father (only in certain cases)
4. A person who was the off-
spring of a forbidden inter-
marriage or extramarital
relationship

belonged to the Jewish religion,⁵ but an estimated 787,000 persons were affected by the law. Sixty-two thousand people were consequently non-Jews by religion and Jews by definition.⁶ Assuming that the share of each church in these 62,000 victims was directly proportional to its share in the total Christian population, then the law applied to roughly 43,000 Catholics, 12,000 Calvinists, 3,000 Lutherans, and 3,000 miscellaneous Christians.⁷ Unquestionably many of these Christians had already been classified as Jews under the law of 1938 or the law of 1939, but the definition of 1941 was still a blow to the churches. Especially after their partial success in 1939, they had expected nothing like this.

In waging the struggle for the baptized Jews, the church had implicitly declined to take up the struggle for Jewry as a whole. In insisting that the definition exclude Christians, it had stated the condition upon which it would accept a definition that set aside a group of people for destruction. This decision was only a prelude to what was to come. When the Hungarian destruction process came to its climax in 1944, the church battled even more fiercely for its Christian Jews and even less ardently for the Jews who were not in its fold.

The Hungarians completed only the first step of the destruction process under their own power. Far slower progress was made in the implementation of the subsequent steps. The expropriatory operations began at the same time as the first definition, but they took far longer to mature.

The Jews of Hungary, unlike the Jews of most other countries, were not merely a middle class. They were to a large extent the *only* middle class, the backbone of all professional and commercial activity in the country. In the 1930s more than half of the private doctors, nearly half of the lawyers, more than a third of the trading population, and nearly a third of the journalists were Jews.⁸ The Jews were truly indispensable to a normal economic life. The Hungarians therefore approached the expropriation problem cautiously, and no one was more heedful of the conse-

5. Vccsnmayer (German minister in Hungary') to Ambassador Ritter, June 8, 1944, enclosing 1941 census statistics, NG-5620. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 15, 1944, p. 3, also citing census statistics. Vccsnmayer's figure is 724,307; the *Donauzeitung* lists 725,007. The discrepancy is unexplained.

6. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 15, 1944, p. 3. The number of persons who had at least one Jewish grandparent but were not covered by the definition was estimated at 15,000. (Hungary' had no Mischlinge.) *Ibid.*

7. According to the 1941 census, reported by Vccsnmayer in NG-5620, there were 9,775,310 Catholics, 2,785,782 Calvinists, and 729,289 Lutherans. Other non-Jewish religions and persons belonging to no religion totaled 665,059. The total population (other than Jews by religion) was thus 13,955,440. The entire population of Hungary' was 14,679,747.

8. Israel Cohen, "The Jews in Hungary," *Contemporary Review* (London) (November 1939): 571-79.

quences than Horthy himself. Writing to Teleki, he affirmed that he had been an anti-Semite all his life and that the sight of “every factory,” bank, or business in Jewish hands was “intolerable” to him. But if the Jews were to be replaced in a year or two with “incompetent, mostly big-mouthed elements,” the country would become bankrupt. The proper changes, he felt, would require a generation at least, and although he had “perhaps” been the first to profess anti-Semitism, he could not look with indifference at inhumanity and senseless humiliations while Hungary still needed the Jews. Jewry was more loyal to its “adopted country” out of interest than the extreme right-wing elements, who would deliver Hungary to the Germans, could ever be out of their muddled convictions.⁹

Such considerations had prompted the Hungarians to begin their anti-Jewish drive with quota regulations specifying that in various fields of economic endeavor Jewish participation was not to exceed certain maximum percentages fixed by law. However, war veterans and their families were initially exempted from the quotas. A sense of national honor dictated that veterans were not to be forced to compete for economic survival in the ensuing reduction process. The quotas, as they were laid down by the Imredy regime in the laws of 1938 and 1939, are summarized briefly in Table 8-26.

If the percentages in the tabulation appear to be generous in relation to the numerical strength of the Hungarian Jews, which was approximately 5 percent of the country’s population, it must be remembered that the effect of a quota is to be measured not in a count of people that such a system accommodates but in the number it excludes. Considering the statistics of the Jewish economic position in Hungary during the 1930s, it becomes clear that the Hungarian lawmakers envisaged reductions in Jewish business and employment of at least 50 percent.¹⁰ Moreover, the quotas were in all cases maximum limits. Nothing in the law prevented the Hungarian administration from employing its licensing procedures for the purpose of restricting Jewish activities still further or of pushing the Jews out of certain lines of business altogether. The only difficulty was the practical necessity of replacing Jews with Hungarians, and that was in many cases an insurmountable obstacle.

In January 1941, Amt Ausland-Abwehr of the OKW received a report from a “reliable” executive of a German export firm who had just completed a trip to Hungary. The executive (a *Prokurist*) was in the textile

9. Horthy to Pal Teleki (draft), October 14, 1940, in Miklos Szinai and Laszlo Szucs, cds., *The Confidential Papers of Admiral Horthy* (Budapest, 1965), pp. 150-52.

10. The reductions became even more stringent when war veterans who were not disabled or decorated (originally exempt) were placed under the quota system in 1939 and when persons classified as non-Jews in 1938 and 1939 were reclassified as Jews in 1941.

TABLE 8-26
JEWISH QUOTAS IN HUNGARY

FIELD	JEWISH SHARE UNDER THE LAW OF 1938	JEWISH SHARE UNDER THE LAW OF 1939
Trading licenses		6 percent
Licenses for sale of state monopoly products		Complete withdrawal within 5 years
Public contracts		20 percent (after 1943, automatic reduction to 6 percent)
Agricultural property		Compulsory Aryanization authorized without time limit
Professions	20 percent	6 percent (total exclusion of civil servants, journalists, managers of entertainment establishments)
University students		6 percent
Private employees in industrial, commercial, and banking firms	20 percent of labor force in individual firms (5-year goal)	12 percent of labor force in individual firms (immediate goal)

Note: Based on Cohen, "The Jews of Hungary," *Contemporary Review* (London) (November 1939): 571-79.

business, and he was acutely interested in changes taking place in the Hungarian textile sector. He concluded quickly that there was no comparison between the Aryanizations in Germany and those that were now transpiring in Hungary. For the implementation of Aryanizations, he said, the Hungarians lacked two prerequisites: capital and brains. The upper class had an aversion to all participation in business activity. For example, one prominent Hungarian had confided that in his circles, he was looked upon as having "strayed" because he was now (Kcupving himself as a wholesaler in textiles. About 1,500 new textile licenses had been handed out to Aryans. Those who were worth)' of credit and trust in this group were believed to number thirty' or fort)', while reliable sources

DEPORTATIONS

had it that the names of over a hundred women of ill repute were represented on the new textile trading licenses (“*während, wie ich von ernst zu nehmender Seite hörte, die Namen von über hundert übelberichtigter Frauen auf den neuen Textilgewerbescheinen vertreten seien*”). The Jewish businessmen, in the meantime, were experiencing increasing difficulties in the procurement of import authorizations. As a result, the German suppliers were beginning to resign themselves to a partial loss of the Hungarian market. “No German exporter,” the *Prokurist* wrote flatly, “can be expected to take up connections with the questionable Aryan firms described above.”¹¹

So far as the Germans were concerned, the Aryanizations in Hungary were a hopeless proposition. In July 1942, when the topic was raised by Minister Clodius (Deputy Chief of the Foreign Office’s Trade Political Division) in discussions with Baranyai of the Hungarian National Bank, the Hungarian official pointed out explicitly that an elimination of Jews and of Jewish capital from the Hungarian economy was out of the question. So long as there was an independent Hungarian government, no responsible Hungarian figure could take such a step. For the independence of the Hungarian currency alone, it was vital to maintain exports to countries free of German influence and, if need be, to throttle such exports to Germany. Dr. Clodius could answer only that in this eventuality the Reich could block transit of Hungarian goods through German-dominated territory.¹²

Still in all, the Hungarian authorities slowly managed to make some inroads into Jewish economic life. The Jews were being hurt, and in some branches of commerce they were being ousted entirely. The complete cessation of Jewish business activity in the following lines was reported by May 1942 and January 1943:¹³

May 1942

Cattle trading
 Potato export
 Wholesale sugar
 Fruit export
 Wholesale gasoline
 Wholesale fodder

January 1943

Textile rag trade
 Fats and hogs trade
 Eggs and milk trade
 Trade in church articles
 Restaurants
 Cement trade

11. Abwehr-Nebenstelle in Cologne ro OKW/Ausland-Abwehr/Abw. Abt. I (I Wi), January 20, 1941, enclosing report by a *Prokurist* of a “known Rhenish Textile firm, reliable,” Wi/IF 2.24.

12. Confidential report by Franz Jung (Budapest representative of Siidostcuropa-Gescsllschalt c. V. [SOEG], Vienna, an economic intelligence agency) to “smallest circle” of the SOEG and Clodius, July 31, 1942, T 71, Roll 63.

13. *DotutuuiMng* (Belgrade), May 23, 1942, p. 3; November 20, 1942, p. 3; January 6, 1943, p. 3.

May 1942

Wholesale coal

Wholesale leather

Wholesale milk

January 1943

Onion and wine trade

Export of hay and straw

Curiously enough, German exporters and importers do not appear to have contributed much to this development. The Germans needed Hungarian currency, and they could not very well afford to stop shipments to Jewish customers.¹⁴ The boycott of Jewish suppliers in Hungary could be entertained to an even lesser degree, because the Jewish armament industry within Hungary was far from negligible in its volume and importance. The nature of German dependence upon Jewish producers may be glimpsed in the following excerpt from a report that the German Economy Officer in Hungary sent to the OKW on January 15, 1944:

The Jewish firm Tungstram A. G., in the course of negotiations conducted with it, has declined to accept further Wehrmacht orders for pipes. It based its refusal on the need for exporting its products to the foreign neutral market.¹⁵

An even more potent example of a need that drove Germans to do business with Jews was the harnessing of Hungarian bauxite production for Germany's aircraft industry. To raise Hungarian output of bauxite, 30,000,000 Reichsmark were to be invested by three German aluminum firms in three Hungarian bauxite enterprises. For this purpose, each German concern was teamed with one of the Hungarian companies in 1943. The largest and by far the most important of these associations was that of the Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke (VAW), headed by Generaldirektor Dr. Westrick, and the Hungarian Aluerz, run by the Jewish Generaldirektor Dr. Hiller. Although the "technical Generaldirektor" of Aluerz was an Ethnic German, Westrick relied entirely on Hiller and Hiller's managers, most of them Jews.¹⁶

14. When the Germans halted shipments in 1941, Italian and Swiss suppliers moved into the gap. Auslandsbricfpriifstelle Vienna to Zentralauswertestelle/Major Dr. Huth, November 4, 1941, Wi/IF 2.24. There was also a problem in that Hungarian firms could make the purchases for the Jews. Hans Vermehren Import-Fabrikation-Export (Berlin) to OKW/WWi, December 18, 1941, Wi/IF 2.24. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 22, 1943, p. 3. As late as April 1943, German exports to Jewish firms in Hungary were apparently still going strong. German Economy Officer in Hungary to OKW/WSt Wi/Ausland (draft), May 17, 1943, Wi/IF 2.13.

15. German Economy Officer (WO) in Hungary to OKW/WSt Ausland, January 15, 1944, Wi/IF 2.

16. The VAW-Aluerz investment agreement was signed on September 10, 1943. Ministerialrat Dr. Arlt and Bergrat Teicher (Economy Ministry-/Office of Oberberg-hauptmann Gabel) to Westrick, October 30, 1943, German Federal Archives, R

Whereas Aryanizations were floundering in the industrial sector, they proceeded with a little more ease in agriculture. The Hungarians were more interested in land, and the Jews were less involved in it. Only about 4 or 5 percent of the land was in Jewish hands when the law of 1939 authorized the government to order the sale of Jewish agricultural properties. From 1939 through 1942 the turnover of land (in acres) had reached the following proportions:¹⁷

	<i>Total in 1939</i>	<i>Sold by 1942</i>
Forests	373.000	213.000
Farmland	<u>914.000</u>	299.000
Total	1,287,000	512.000

Forest land went to the state, farmland to private interests. The 299,000 acres of farm property' were broken down as follows:¹⁸

Held in trust for veterans: 89,000 acres

“Free sale”: 85,000 acres

Smallholders: 85,000 acres

Land fund: 27,000 acres

Christian heirs of Jewish possessors: 13,000 acres

In October 1942 the administration was planning the distribution of another 276,000 acres of farmland according to the following key: parcels up to 5 acres (a total of 27,000 acres) were available to anyone, those from 5 to 107 acres (139,000 acres) were allotted to veterans, and those over 107 acres (90,000 acres) went to big landowners.¹⁹ Evidently the Hungarian upper class, which looked down somewhat on matters of business, did not display an equal aversion to the acquisition of land. The agricultural expropriations in Hungary' were not exactly a land reform.

As the Jews found themselves exposed to increasing economic restrictions, they made preparations to retrench. In the ensuing accommodation process, the Jews attempted to accomplish a large-scale occupational

7/761. When German forces entered Hungary in March 1944, Westrick was concerned, because Hiller's fate was in doubt. Arlt and Tcichcr to Staatssekretär Dr. Hayler, April 4,1944, R 7/761.

17. German Economy Officer in Hungary to OKW/WSt Ausland, December 14, 1943, citing figures presented by Prime Minister Kallay to Parliament, Wi/IF .2. The report docs not make clear whether totals for 1939-42 include annexed territories. The Hungarian *Joch* was converted here into acres at the rate of 1 *Joch* = 1.067 acres.
18. *Ibid.*

19. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), October 18, 1942, p. 3. For other statistics, see same newspaper, December 30,1941, p. 3; March 1,1942, p. 3; April 2,1942, p. 6; May 24,1942, p. 3; September 10,1942, p. 3; February 14,1943, p. 3.

shift. The following figures, showing Jewish enrollments in the commercial and trade schools of Budapest, are a partial indication of what was happening:²⁰

	1936	1942
Commercial schools	454	17
Trade schools	614	2,379

However, the occupational shift did not fill the ever-widening gap between the available Jewish manpower and the remaining opportunities for gainful employment. That gap was finally closed by a government measure: forced labor.

The basis for the Hungarian forced labor system was a provision of the mobilization law in accordance with which Jews were liable to be drafted into the army for “auxiliary service” as distinguished from “armed service.”²¹ Large-scale inductions began after Hungary’s entry into the war under *Honved* (War) Minister Bartha and his chief of staff, Colonel General Werth. At first the maximum draft age was twenty-five. In April 1943 the age limit was raised to thirty-seven;²² in April 1944 it was pushed up to forty-eight;²³ and in October of that year, to sixty.²⁴ Cumulatively, the strength of the labor auxiliary, including those men and women who were inducted in October 1944 and who retained civilian status, was more than 100,000. When the war ended, about 50,000 were dead.²⁵

The Jewish labor service men were employed within the framework of the army engineers in construction projects, mine-clearing operations, and miscellaneous dirty work. Thousands of Jews were sent to the front, where they served in the strength of one battalion per Hungarian division.²⁶ Many additional battalions were dispersed behind the lines and within Hungary.

20. *Ibid.*, October 31, 1942, p. 3.

21. *Die Judenfrage*, March 15, 1942, p. 58. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 11, 1942, p. 3; June 28, 1942, p. 3; July 16, 1942, p. 3; March 11, 1943, p. 3.

22. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 3, 1943, p. 3.

23. Vecsenmayer (German Minister in Hungary) via Ambassador Ritter to Ribbentrop, April 14, 1944, NG-5626.

24. *Donauzeitung* (Graz), October 24, 1944, p. 3.

25. Randolph Braham, *The Hungarian Labor Service System* (New York, 1977). See also Gavrieli Bar Shaked, ed., *Names of Jewish Victims of Hungarian Labor Battalions*, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, [1992]). Listed are names in Hungarian records of men missing or verified dead on the eastern front from 1942 to October 1944, plus the wounded and ill who were released. Not listed are the dead in Serbia, and most of the dead under German control at the end of the war. The average age of these people was relatively high.

26. Functionally the position of these Jews was equivalent to the Russian auxiliaries (*Hilfswillige* or *Hiwts*) in the German army. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that

The concentration of such a large labor force in Hungarian hands could not, of course, fail to attract attention in Berlin. The growing labor shortage in Germany and Germany's occupied territories furthered this interest to an acute degree. From early 1943 to the beginning of 1945, one man in particular attempted to integrate the Hungarian army's Jewish labor service into his industrial machine. This man was Reich Minister of Armaments and chief of the Organisation Todt, Albert Speer. Some very important developments during the "Final Solution" phase of the Hungarian destruction process are traceable to his efforts. In 1943, however, Speer made only one request: his Organisation Todt needed workers for the Serbian copper mines at Bor.*²⁷ Since all Jews in Serbia had been killed during the previous year and no other labor was available in the territory, Speer (with Himmler's consent) approached the Foreign Office with a request for 10,000 Hungarian Jews.²⁸ The negotiations were moderately successful. The Hungarians agreed to deliver 3,000 Jews in exchange for 100 tons of unrefined copper per month.²⁹ In September 1944, as many as 6,000 Jews were reported there.³⁰

While a strong exploitative movement developed in the Speer sector, a killer reaction made itself felt on the eastern front. Some Germans became uneasy at the sight of thousands of Jews in Hungarian uniform, moving about unmolested and virtually rubbing shoulders with German units. When the great retreat began in the winter of 1942-43, that uneasiness came to the fore. The Russians attacked the Hungarians at Voronezh and hurled them back toward Kursk. On the vast plain between the Don and Donets rivers, Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, and German armies retreated in panic and confusion. Significant losses were inflicted on the

the Second Hungarian Army in Russia maintained a highly skilled Technical company (analogous to the technical battalions in the German armies) for repairs and demolitions of public utilities, which in its personnel composition was 75 percent Jewish. Oberst von Ohcimb (German Economy Staff with Second Hungarian Army) to Wirtschaftsstab Ost, January' 1943, Wi/1.217.

27. In 1941 the copper mines were a French concern, the Conipagnie des Mines de Bor. Sec advertisement in *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), November 15, 1941, p. 9.

28. Bergmann (Office of the Foreign Minister) via Trade-Political Division, Wermann, and Weizsacker to Office of Foreign Minister, February' 23, 1943, NG-5629.

29. Germany Economy Officer in Hungary to OKW/WSt Ausland, June 15, and July 15, 1943, Wi/IF2.13.

30. Oberbefehlshaber Siidost / Chief of General Staff (signed General der Gebirgstruppen Winter) to OKW/WFSt/OP (H) (Generalmajor Horst Buttler-Brandcnfels), September 10, 1944, NOKW-981. The Oberbefehlshaber Siidost was Gfm. von Weichs. The Bor camp was liquidated a few days later. Some 2,000 Jews were marched out. At Cserevka (under Hungarian jurisdiction) they were shot by SS men. See the story of a survivor who crawled out of a death pit, "The Memoirs of Zalman Teichman" *Tad Vashem Studies* 2 (1958): 255-94.

Jewish labor companies, and many Jews, along with their Hungarian masters, were taken prisoner.³¹

From Kursk a German agricultural expert with the Economy Inspectorate reported that the Hungarians had in part released Jewish construction battalions who, with pieces of German uniforms, were moving “like marauders” through the countryside under the slogan, “The Hungarians are beaten, the Germans too; now we and the Russians are masters of the situation.”³²

In Budapest, Colonel Kéri, first adjutant of the War Minister, looked up the German military attaché and informed him that the army was planning to draft all Jewish men up to the age of thirty-seven. The Hungarians, he said, would have liked very much to detail to the German security divisions (*Sicherungsdivisionen*) in the Ukraine twelve construction battalions made up of Jewish labor companies. Budapest, however, had a few reservations (*gewisse Bedenken*) because of the exceptionally bad treatment German offices had accorded to Jewish companies during the withdrawal (*Rückmarsch*) from the Don. It had also happened that “in the general confusion of the retreat” (*in den allgemeinen Trubel des Rückzuges*) and in the course of partisan operations, the Germans, in particular the SD, had shot members of the Jewish companies. Therefore it would be “difficult” (*schwierig*) to detail Jewish labor companies to the Ukraine.

31. The losses of the labor companies on the eastern front, which included a small number of casualties in companies of pacifists and so on, were officially as follows:

	<i>Verified</i>		<i>Confirmed</i>		
	<i>Dead</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Prisoners of War</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Total [sic]</i>
1942					2,149
1943	3,786	1,035	1,633	19,003	25,451
1944	1,656	571	1,039	10,471	13,737

In Januar) 1943 alone, the total casualty figure was 23,308 and in Februar) it was 2,003. After the rout of January-February 1943, the Hungarians were virtually out of the fighting. They were in action again after the German occupation of March 1944. In mid-October 1944 the Jewish labor companies were shifted west into Germany. Data of losses from Tamas Stark, “Hungary’s Casualties in World War II,” in György Lengyel, ed., *Hungarian Economy and Society during World War II* (New York, 1993), pp. 171-260. It is likely that several thousand of the missing were killed or dead of wounds, but most were captured or went over to the Soviet side. On the treatment of the prisoners, see George Barany, “Jewish Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union during World War II,” in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 31 (1983): 161 — 209. At the end of the war, about 15,000 prisoners were reported to be alive. *Report by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry Regarding the Problem of European Jews and Palestine* (London, 1946), Cmd. 6808, p. 59. Counting those who died in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps, total fatalities on the eastern front were probably more than 20,000.

32. Sonderführer Bertram to Economy Inspectorate Don-Doners, February 2, 1943, Wi/ID 2.206.

However, the “difficulties” (*Schwierigkeiten*) would be removed by an assurance from the military attache that “nothing evil” (*nichts Böses*) would be done to the Jews. The German was evasive. He could not deny the Hungarian assertions, for he knew from reports by German liaison officers in the Hungarian High Command that there was at least a “possibility” that Jews had been shot by Germans.³³

The German attitude toward the Jewish labor service men revealed itself again and again in a series of small incidents. It seems that the Germans had a little difficulty in restraining themselves in the presence of these people. From Krakow, for example, the Foreign Office representative in the Generalgouvernement reported that a Hungarian Jewish construction battalion was quartered at Stanislawów, Galicia. The Jews had first been in civilian clothes but were now wearing Hungarian uniforms. There was a suspicion, said the Foreign Office man, that members of the construction battalion included Galician Jews who had escaped to Hungary in 1941. A Jew had walked up to a German police sergeant and had declared in Yiddish-German jargon: “Sergeant, I am a Jew, and you can’t do anything to me because I am a Hungarian soldier.”³⁴

Another episode involving labor service men was reported early in March 1944, when members of the Propaganda Office attached to the Generalkommissar in Volhynia-Podolia had to retreat from the seat of their activity at Brest-Litovsk. Moving southward toward Stanislawów, the propagandists ducked through several towns where Ukrainians were about to slaughter the local Polish populations (*die an Ort ansässigen Polen abzuschlachten*). While the slaughter was going on, the German officials observed that Jews belonging to the Hungarian army and acting explicitly upon orders by Hungarian officers had the “nerve” (*erdreisten sich*) to “steal everything within reach, from pots and pans to catde.” Looking in vain for Wehrmacht units to put an end to this requisitioning, the propagandists finally took matters into their own hands and “successfully stopped the Jewish mob [*dem jüdischen Raubgesindel erfolgreich entgegengetreten*].”³⁵

It appears as though the very existence of the Jewish labor service men offended the German onlookers. That was true especially because many of these men were outside of Hungary and thus particularly noticeable. But if the labor service men attracted attention because they were the sole

33. Legation in Budapcst/Military Attache to OKH/GcnStdH/Attache Division, April 5,1943, NG-5636.

34. Von Thadden to RSHA/Gruf. Müller, January 6, 1944, enclosing report by VAA GG (signed Klötzel), November 23, 1943, NG-3522.

35. Gencralkommissar Volhynia-Podolia/Propaganda Office (signed Maertius) to Propaganda Ministry/Eastern Division, March 31,1944, Occ E 4-2. Excerpts of the Maertius report were sent by the Eastern Division of the Propaganda Ministry to the OKW on April 14, 1944, Occ E 4-2.

Jews in a territory that had once had many Jewish residents, Hungarian Jewry as a whole became more and more conspicuous in a European continent that was rapidly being drained of its Jewish population.

The history of the “Final Solution” in Hungary is a long one. It had its beginnings in 1941 and early 1942, while the country was ruled by the pro-German Prime Minister Bardossy. During that period it seemed that Hungary would emerge as the first Axis satellite to become “Jew-free.” Two major incidents occurred under the Bardossy regime: the deportation of the “Eastern Jews” from the Carpatho-Ukraine and the killing of the Yugoslav Jews at Novi Sad.

In August 1941 the Bardossy government suddenly began a roundup of eastern Jews who had migrated to Hungary from Galicia many years before and who had not acquired Hungarian citizenship, with a view to shoving them into the newly occupied military areas wrested from the Soviet Union.³⁶ Jews in the Carpatho-Ukraine, which the Hungarians took from the Czechs in 1939, were particularly affected because the anti-Jewish law of 1939 had denied naturalization to those Jews if they could not prove that their ancestors had resided there since 1867.³⁷ The Germans were unprepared for the Hungarian push. The situation of the killing units near the Hungarian frontier, however, was unlike the position of Einsatzgruppe D, which operated in front of the Romanians. The Romanian Jews, it will be recalled, were pushed back—not so the Hungarian deportees.

On August 25, 1941, officers of the German army and representatives of the newly formed East Ministry met in the office of the Generalquartiermeister-OKH. The summary of the conference indicates that the participants briefly considered the problem created by the sudden appearance of Hungarian Jews in the new territories. “Near Kamenets-Podolsky” the conference record states, “the Hungarians have pushed about 11,000 Jews over the border. In the negotiations up to the present, it has not been possible to arrive at any measure for the return of these Jews. The Higher SS and Police leader [SS-Obergruppenführer Jckeln] hopes, however, to have completed the liquidation of these Jews by September 1, 1941.”³⁸ Three days later Einsatztrupp Tarnopol (a unit of the BdS Krakow) reported that it had turned back 1,000 Jews who had

36. *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 5, 1941, p. 2. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 5, 1941, p. 3; August 15, 1941, p. 3.

37. Cohen, “The Jews in Hungary,” p. 578.

38. Summary of conference held on August 25, 1941, in OKH/Qu on transfer of jurisdiction in the Ukraine, August 27, 1941, PS-197. The chairman was Major Schmidt von Altenstädt. Other participants were Ministerialdirigent Dr. Danckwerts, Oberst von Krosigk, Regierungspräsident Dargs, Oberregierungsrat Dr. I abs, Hauptmann Dr. Bräutigam, and Major Wagner.

been shoved across the Dniestr by the 10th Hungarian Pursuit Battalion.-³⁹ Several thousand expelled Hungarian Jews, confined to the southern Galician area, were subsequently concentrated in the Stanislawow Ghetto, where they were subjected to shootings in 1942. A local witness recalls that a grave was about to be covered by Jewish firemen from the ghetto, when a man shouted from the dead: "I am a Hungarian doctor, I live!"^{39 40} By the end of the summer, the Hungarian Jewish expellees were alive no more.

A second outburst occurred in occupied Yugoslavia, when the local Hungarian commander, General Feketehalmy-Czeydner, rounded up several thousand Serbs and Jews in the town of Novi Sad.⁴¹ Jewish survivors recall that on January 20, 1942, the resident population was ordered to pull the blinds as the victims were led to cabins of a public bath and shot naked on diving boards into ice holes of the Danube.⁴² This massacre had a curious aftermath. Following the Moscow declaration on war criminals in 1943, a scared Hungarian government indicted the general and two of his accomplices for the killing of 6,000 Serbs and 4,000 Jews. Feketehalmy-Czeydner and his helpers escaped before the trial to Germany, seeking refuge there under the protection of the Gestapo.⁴³ When the Hungarians wanted their men back, Hitler himself decided to give them sanctuary, as an example to all Europe of his readiness to stand by those who took action against the Jews.⁴⁴

The enthusiastic Bardossy regime, which was responsible for the organization of the labor companies, the deportation of the Eastern Jews, and the killing of the victims in Novi Sad, came to an end in March 1942. For the next two years, from March 1942 to March 1944, Hungary was ruled by a reluctant collaborator, Prime Minister Kallay. The Kallay government thus spanned the period during which Germany was attempting to

39. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Rcporr USSR No. 66 (48 copies), August 28, 1941, NO-2839.

40. Statement by Marck Langer (Jewish survivor), January 28, 1948, in T. Friedmann collection of Stanislawow reports, Haifa, October 1957, pp. 37-39. See also statement by Marie Durr (local Jewish survivor), December 1, 1947, in same collection, pp. 25-26.

41. The Nedic government cited as many as 13,000 victims, the Hungarians as few as 3,775. Hencke via Stcncgracht to Hilger, January 21, 1944, NG-2954. Most were Jews.

42. Statement by Gabtiela Balaz, March 15, 1961, Yad Vashem Oral History 1567/132. Statement by Slavko Weiss, May 8, 1961, Yad Vashem Oral History 1627/86. Statement by Eliczer Bader, December 21, 1962, Yad Vashem Oral History 2001/180.

43. Werkmcister (German legation in Budapest) to Foreign Office, January 16, 1944, NG-2594.

44. Hewcl to Ribbentrop, January 19, 1944, NG-2594.

organize deportations to the “East” from all parts of Europe. Naturally, the Germans wanted to include also Hungary in this scheme. Kállay was therefore the first Hungarian prime minister to be asked to deport the Hungarian Jews. Giving way in the smallest increments, he widened the expropriatory process and extended the labor companies, but he refused to yield a single Jew. For the entire two years of his reign he resisted German pressure. When he was finally deposed, the dam that had held up the German flood was broken.

The negotiations started in August 1942. On August 11 the Hungarian minister in Berlin, Sztöjay, protested to Unterstaatssekretär Dr. Martin Luther of Abteilung Deutschland that Jews of Hungarian nationality were being marked with the Jewish star in France, whereas Romanian Jews were not affected. Sztöjay added that the transmission of this protest was very distasteful to him. He had always considered himself an anti-Semite of the first rank (*ein Vorkämpfer des Antisemitismus*). Luther replied that the acceptance of this protest was indeed an unpleasant task for him too, because, as Sztöjay was aware, the Führer had ordered the speedy solution of the Jewish problem in Europe. Slovakia and Croatia had already agreed to the evacuation of their Jews, and even the French government was contemplating the introduction of anti-Jewish measures in its territory (unoccupied area).

Luther expressed special surprise that Hungary had based its protest on the fact that Romanian Jews in France did not have to wear the Jewish star, while a few days before the Romanian government had protested on the ground that Hungarian Jews had been exempted. No progress could be achieved in that manner. Sztöjay then requested that German agencies in Brussels refrain from confiscating the property of Hungarian Jews. His government intended to take this property for its own purposes. Luther promised that the matter would be settled in a satisfactory way and that present measures were designed only to safeguard the property.⁴⁵

On September 24, 1942, Ribbentrop ordered the Foreign Office to press for evacuations in Bulgaria, Denmark, and Hungary'.⁴⁶ Eight days later, on October 2, Luther had another conversation with Sztöjay. Luther began the discussion by demanding that Hungary' allow its Jews in German-occupied areas to be deported by December 31, 1942. The Hungarian Minister inquired whether Italian Jews would receive the same treatment. When Luther answered in the affirmative, Sztöjay' replied that his government would probably consent to the evacuation of Hungarian Jews from the occupied territories; Hungary' naturally did not intend to lag behind other states. Luther thereupon promised that the

45. Memorandum by Luther, August 11, 1942, NG-5085.

46. Luther to Weizsäcker, September 24, 1942, PS-3688.

property of the Jews involved would be placed under trusteeship administration and that Hungary would be able to participate in the disposal of the property.

Next Luther pressed for the deportation of Hungarian Jews from the Reich. He proposed the same deadline (December 31, 1942) but added that the property should fall to the Reich, in accordance with the "territorial principle." Again the Hungarian envoy wanted to know whether the same arrangements were being made for Italian Jews. When Luther assured him that Italian Jews would get the same treatment, Sztojaj remarked that his government laid great stress on the most-favored-nation principle.

Finally, the German Unterstaatssekretar mentioned the Jews in Hungary. He demanded that Hungary introduce legislation aimed at eliminating all Jews from economic life, that the Jews be marked, and that they be evacuated to the East. For the third time the Hungarian Minister asked whether the same measures would be taken in Italy, and once more Luther answered in the affirmative. Sztojaj thereupon stated that Prime Minister Kallay was disturbed by certain rumors (which he, Sztojaj, naturally did not believe) with regard to the treatment of Jews in the East and that Kallay would not want to be accused of having exposed the Hungarian Jews to misery (or worse) after their evacuation. In answer to this observation, Luther said that the Hungarian Jews, like all evacuated Jews, would first be used in road construction and would later be settled in a Jewish reserve.⁴⁷

A few days after this "pressure conference," another sort of discussion took place in Budapest. The SS adviser in the German legation in Bratislava, Hauptsturmfuhrer Wisliceny, had come to the Hungarian capital for a "private visit." On October 6, 1942, he had lunch at the Golf Club with the personal secretary to Prime Minister Kallay, a Baron "von Fay." The Hungarian interested himself especially in "the solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia." Wisliceny told him quite briefly and "without going into detail" how the "Jewish problem" in Slovakia was being solved.

Von Fay then wanted to know what Wisliceny thought about the Jewish problem in Hungary, and the SS man replied cautiously that he knew of the Jewish problem in Hungary only through "literary sources." The Hungarian thereupon launched into a lengthy description of his country's anti-Jewish measures, criticizing them as insufficient but explaining that a "resettlement" could be carried out only in stages. In that

47. Memorandum by Luther, October 6, 1942, NG-5086. The Kallay government did not ratify Szrojaj's tentative concessions in die matter of Hungarian Jews in German territories.

connection the baron asked whether the Romanian Jews were being resettled yet. Wisliceny answered that according to his knowledge, appropriate preparations were being made there.

Suddenly, Fay asked whether Hungary, too, could be included in the course of a general “resettlement” program. The Hungarians, he explained, wanted to deport first of all 100,000 Jews from the Carpatho-Ukraine and Transylvania. As a second step the Hungarian plains would have to be cleared and, finally, Budapest. Wisliceny, somewhat flabbergasted, said that he was in Hungary only for a private visit and that he could not give a reply to such a question. He did not know whether “reception possibilities” for Hungarian Jews existed in the eastern territories. Two days after this discussion, Wisliceny sent a report to Ludin, who after some further delay forwarded the memorandum to Berlin.⁴⁸

Even before the receipt of the report in the Foreign Office, the pressure in Berlin was intensified. On October 14, 1942, Staatssekretär Weizsäcker stepped into the picture. Speaking to Sztöjaj, the Staatssekretär quoted Ribbentrop to the effect that the Jews were spreading panic in Hungary.⁴⁹ On October 20, when the Hungarian Minister was about to make a routine visit to Budapest, Weizsäcker requested Sztöjaj to bring on his return trip the Hungarian government’s reply to the German proposals about the Jewish question.⁵⁰

The expected reply did not come. The Germans had not been speaking to the Hungarian government. They had addressed themselves to a few Hungarian anti-Semitic fanatics, who had listened sympathetically to every German demand but who did not have the power to bring these demands to fruition. The true position of the Kállay government was revealed clearly enough a few weeks later, when a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, Count Serenyi, demanded that the Jews be incarcerated in labor camps and ghettos. To this demand the Prime Minister replied in writing that “die incarceration of Jews in labor camps and ghettos cannot be carried out within the existing framework of legal norms.”⁵¹

The Germans did not give up. Every avenue of approach was explored.

48. Ludin (Bratislava) to Foreign Office, October 17, 1942, enclosing report by Wisliceny, dated October 8, 1942, NG-4586. The report was seen by Luther, Rademacher, and Hofrat Jüngling, all of Abteilung Deutschland. 'Hie “von Fay” mentioned by Wisliceny could either have been Gedcon Fay-Halasz in the Foreign Ministry, who was technically Kallav’s secretary, or (assuming the significance of the “von”i Baron Laszlo Vav, an anri-Jewish member of Parliament. See Braham, *I be Politics of Getiocide*, pp. 283-84.

49. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, October 14, 1942, NG-5085.

50. Memorandum by Weizsäcker, October 20, 1942, NG-5727.

51. *Donauzeitunef* (Belgrade), Decembers, 1942, p. 3.

and every sympathetic visitor was received. On December 11, 1942, the chief of the SS Main Office, Berger, reported that Archduke Albrecht von Habsburg had arrived from Hungary in Berlin hoping to meet all important personalities from Hitler down. Berger could not avoid meeting the Archduke. Albrecht had complained that the Hungarian government was not taking earnest action against the Jews and that the labor service was only a show, and he had suggested that Hitler exert pressure on Horthy and the Hungarian Prime Minister. Berger passed on the recommendation to his chief, Himmler.⁵² In March 1943 a member of the Kallay cabinet, Lukács, arrived in Berlin for talks with Bormann. The Foreign Office seized the opportunity to request Bormann to call the Hungarian visitor's attention to the three standard German wishes: (1) exclusion of the Hungarian Jews from economic life, (2) marking with the star, and (3) evacuation to the East.⁵³

During the following month, on April 17, 1943, the whole question was reopened on the highest level, by Hider and Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy. In preparation for the talks, Horthy's staff had provided him with detailed arguments for the status quo: the extent of measures already taken, including Hungary's distinction of having been the first state to institute quotas in universities (1920), the impossibility of introducing the star without provoking protests, and the lack of any legal or technical basis for evacuations.⁵⁴ When Horthy arrived at Klessheim Castle, he was alone. Hitler, with Ribbentrop and official interpreter Schmidt at his side, began the discussion by remarking that the English were suffering greater losses than the Germans during the raids upon German cities, because fliers were key personnel and also the best type of human material. Furthermore, severe German measures had put a stop to all crimes during blackouts. Horthy remarked that energetic measures had been taken also in Hungary but that, oddly enough, crimes of this nature were continuing. Hitler said that this was the work of asocial elements. He went on to describe the German rationing system and claimed that the black market had disappeared. Horthy put in that he could not master the black market, and Hitler answered that the Jews were at fault.

When Horthy asked what he should do with the Jews now that he had removed the base of their economic existence — he could not, after all, kill them all — Ribbentrop declared that the Jews either had to be annihilated

52. Berger to Himmler, December 11, 1942, NO-1117.

53. Bergmann (Office of the Foreign Minister) via Wczsacker to Ribbentrop, March 5, 1943, NG-5628. Bergmann to Bormann, March 9, 1943, NG-5628.

54. Notes by Andor Szentmiklossy (Hungarian Foreign Office/Political Division), beginning of April 1943, in Szinai and Szucs, eds., *Papers of Admiral Horthy*, pp. 362-73, particularly pp. 371-73.

(*vernichtet*) or placed in concentration camps. Another alternative did not exist. Upon Horthy's rejoinder that Germany had an easier job in that respect, since it did not possess so many Jews, Hitler recited statistics to prove how strong the Jewish influence in the Reich had been. Horthy replied that all this was news to him, and Hider thereupon began to make a speech about two cities: Nuremberg and Fürth. The former city stood in all its glory; it had not had so many Jews. The latter town had decayed; it had held too many Jews. Wherever the Jews were left to themselves, they brought brutal misery and depravity. They were pure parasites. In Poland this situation had been cleared up thoroughly. If the Jews there did not wish to work, they were shot; if they could not work, they had to rot away (*verkommen*). They had to be treated like tubercular bacilli that threatened a healthy body. That was not so cruel when one kept in mind that even innocent creatures like hares and deer had to be killed in order to prevent damage. Why should the beasts (*Bestien*) who wanted to bring in Bolshevism be treated any better? Nations that could not defend themselves against the Jews had to perish. The best example of that was the decline of once so proud a people as the Persians, who now had to continue their miserable existence as Armenians.⁵⁵

With Hitler's words still ringing in Horthy's ears, the Germans waited anxiously for a favorable reply. The chief of the SS Main Office, Gottlob Berger, was skeptical. The Hungarians, he wrote to Himmler, would not consent to the "liquidation" of the Jews during the war. To the contrary, he said, the Kallay government, in an effort to ingratiate itself with the "Anglo-Americans," would give to the Jews the best possible treatment.⁵⁶ Ribbentrop, too, thought that the Klessheim conference had not quite succeeded, and he therefore decided to give the follow-up treatment to the Hungarian Minister, Sztojaj.

The envoy was not hard to convince. On April 23, 1943, he wrote a letter to Kallay which was almost pleading in its tone. Several times, Sztojaj wrote, he had reported that the Reich considered itself "engaged in a life and death struggle" with the Jews and that the Reichskanzler had "decided to rid Europe of Jews." Hitler had decreed that by the summer of 1943 all Jews of Germany and German-occupied countries had to be removed to the East. Most Axis governments were already cooperating in

55. Summary' of Klessheim conference held on April 17,1943, signed by Schmidt, April 18, 1943, D-736. In testimony before the international military tribunal, Ribbentrop claimed that he had never made a remark to the effect that the Jews had to be annihilated, and that Schmidt had had the habit of writing summaries of discussions several days after they were held. Testimony by Ribbentrop, *Trial of the Major M tv Criminals*, X, 409-10. The summary of the Klessheim conference was written one day after it had taken place.

56. Berger to Himmler, April 19, 1943, NO-628.

this task. "In my report No. 23/Pol. 1943 I mentioned that competent German quarters had told me bluntly and without ado that the Jewish question was, so to speak, the only obstacle to intimate Hungaro-German relations." Several German interventions had already taken place. This time the German Foreign Minister himself had discussed the Jewish question with Sztojaj in a talk "lasting till long after midnight." Ribbentrop had complained that the Hungarian government was not passing any new anti-Jewish laws and that the existing ones had been allowed to fall into "a certain stagnation." This could not go on, because the Jews were undermining the morale of the people, etc.

Furthermore, Ribbentrop had mentioned "that according to reliable information, our former Minister in London, M. Barcza, had not long ago been received in audience by His Holiness the Pope." On that occasion Barcza had declared that Hungary did not wage war or light against the Anglo-Saxon powers. In support of this thesis and to stress Hungary's position in this question, "he is said to have declared — allegedly on Government orders — that Hungary offers safe asylum not only to its own Jews, but, moreover, to 70,000 Jews who have sought refuge here." Sztojaj could only say that, knowing the "mentality" of leading German circles, this question had better be solved speedily in a manner that would exclude the possibility of further German interventions.^{57 58}

Sztojaj's letter did not fail to produce a disturbing effect in the Hungarian capital, for on May 21, 1943, the Hungarian envoy mentioned to Luther's successor, Wagner, that Kallay was now ready "to consider seriously the implementation of decisive anti-Jewish measures." However, the Hungarian Prime Minister was insisting that the Jews have an "opportunity to exist" (*Existenzmöglichkeiten*). Kallay, reported the Hungarian envoy, was anxious and worried because the Führer and Ribbentrop, in "misconstruing" his intentions, had come to mistrust him (*dass er in Verkennung seiner Absichten bei dem Führer und RAM in einem sehr schlechten Ruf gekommen wäre*).^{57*}

There was, however, no misconstruing of intentions in Berlin, and even if there were, Kallay removed the last vestige of doubt about his stand in a public speech that was delivered at the end of May. A German newspaper, with that gesture of automatic praise so characteristic of a totalitarian press, printed his remarks verbatim and tided them "The Great Speech of Kallay [*Die Grosse Rede von Kallays*]\| This is what he said:

In Hungary live more Jews than in all of western Europe. . . . It is self-explanatory that we must attempt to solve this problem; hence the

57. See full text of the letter in Levai, *Martyrdom*, pp. 33-36.

58. Wagner to Stecngracht van Moyland, May 21, 1943, NG-5637.

necessity for temporary measures and an appropriate regulation. The final solution [*etidqultiqe Losutig*], however, can be none other than the complete resettlement [*restlose Aussiedlutiq*] of Jewry. But I cannot bring myself [*Ich kann mich aber nicht dazu herjjeben*] to keep this problem on the agenda so long as the basic prerequisite of the solution, namely the answer to the question [*die Becmtwortung der Frage*] where the Jews are to be resettled [*wohin die Juden auszusiedeln sind*] is not given. Hungary will never deviate from those precepts of humanity which, in the course of its history, it has always maintained in racial and religious questions.⁵⁹

In the shrouded terminology of die Axis world, a man could not have said “no” more clearly than Kallay had done in this speech. In fact, the speech marked the close of the diplomatic struggle over the Hungarian Jews. The talking phase of the German pressure campaign was over, and from now on the Kallay regime was to be faced with altogether different challenges.

The Germans were already convinced that the Hungarian refusal to cooperate in die “Jewish question” was based not solely on a humanitarian consideration. They perceived in that refusal the sign of a Hungarian desire to make peace with the Allies. Confirmation of that belief came to Berlin almost daily in reports about the lagging Hungarian war effort at home, the sparing use of Hungarian divisions on the front, and even the furtive attempts to contact the Western Allies in Turkey. The Germans were therefore beginning to think that Hungary would be lost and the German frontier opened to an Allied advance unless the Kallay regime were overthrown. The thought was quickly translated into action.

Shortly after the Klessheim conference, the Foreign Office troubleshooter Veessenmayer, who had already surfaced in Serbia and Slovakia, arrived in Budapest in order to investigate the situation.⁶⁰ He came for a second visit at the end of the year, this time to make contact with anti-Kallay forces.⁶¹ When Horthy became aware of Veessenmayer’s activities, he vowed never to grant him an entry visa again.⁶² But the German machine kept grinding. At the beginning of March 1944 the Reich Security Main Office felt that the time had come for intervention. The Security Police people drew up lists of acceptable Hungarian cabinet

59. *Donauzeitunji* (Belgrade), June 1, 1943, p. 3.

60. Sec report by Veessenmayer to Himmler, April 30, 1943, NG-2192.

61. Affidavit by Dr. Karl Werkmeister (Lcgationsrat in Budapest legation during 1943), September 23, 1947, NG-2969.

62. *Ibid.* The German Minister in Hungary, Jagovv, was not happy about Yecscniayer's presence, either.

members and carefully weighed the alternative methods of overturning the Kallay regime.⁶³

On March 15, Horthy was called to Klessheim Castle on the pretext of discussing with Hitler the withdrawal of the long-suffering and ill-equipped Hungarian divisions from the Russian front. At Klessheim a surprise awaited him. Bluntly, Hitler gave him the choice between a German military occupation and a German-approved government. Horthy chose the latter course.⁶⁴ Arriving in Budapest on March 19, Horthy experienced another surprise: a special sleeping car had been attached to the train, and the car carried the new German Minister to Hungary, the honorary SS-Standartenführer, Dr. Edmund Veessenmayer.⁶⁵

Immediately upon his return, Horthy informed the Crown Council of what had happened. He told them of what Hitler had demanded and then added bitterly: "Hitler also objected to the fact that Hungary has not yet introduced the steps necessary to settle the Jewish question. We are accused, therefore, of the crime of not having carried out Hitler's wishes, and I am charged with not having permitted the Jews to be massacred."⁶⁶ Following the report, the outgoing Kallay sought refuge in the Turkish legation, and Horthy began to negotiate with Veessenmayer about the appointment of a new Prime Minister. Veessenmayer proposed Imredy, and Horthy nominated the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Sztojaj. The choice fell upon the latter. During the next few days, Veessenmayer and Sztojaj drew up a list of Cabinet ministers. The list was approved by Horthy.⁶⁷

The new Hungarian government took office on March 22, 1944. It included the following important officials:⁶⁸

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister: Dome Sztojaj

Economy: Imredy

War: Csataj

Finance: Remenyi-Schneller

Agriculture and Supply: Jurcsek

Justice: Antal

63. RSHA memorandum, distributed to Kaltenbrunner, Hottl, Urban, Krallert, and Wencck, March 1944, D-679.

64. Testimony by Horthy, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 2703-4.

65. Affidavit by Wcrkmeister, September 23, 1947, NG-2969.

66. Quoted from the minutes of the Crown Council meeting of March 19, 1944, by Levai, *Martyrdom*, p. 78.

67. Testimony by Horthy, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 2707-8, 2724-25.

68. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), March 23, 1944, p. 1. Affidavit by Staf. Kurt Bchcr, February 7, 1946, NG-2972. Affidavit by Kastner, September 18, 1945, PS-2605. The Economy Minister, Imredy, was appointed subsequently.

Trade: Kunder
Industry: Szasz
Interior: Jaross

State Secretary in charge of political (Jewish) matters: Endrc

State Secretary in charge of Gendarmerie : Baky

Gendarmerie officer in charge of deportations: Lt. Col. Ferenczy

The new Hungarian government was not merely created by the Germans; it was to be responsible to its German masters for every step it took. On March 19, 1944, an army of German policy makers, supervisors, coordinators, and advisers swarmed into the country. These officials — representatives of the Foreign Office, the SS and Police, the army, the Pursuit Planes Staff, and private industry—directed Hungarian affairs from a multitude of offices in the Hungarian capital and in the provinces. Foremost among the offices of this shadow government was the German legation.

The man in charge of the diplomatic mission, who also claimed to be the supreme coordinator of all German agencies within Hungary, was Minister and General Plenipotentiary Veessenmayer. The charge d'affaires (his second in command) was Vortragende Legationsrat Feine. The legation's economic expert was Dr. Boden. The foreign Jews in the country were handled by Legationsrat Hezinger (after the end of May, by Legationsrat Grell). The expert on Hungarian legislation (particularly anti-Jewish legislation) was von Adamovic, a man of limited use because he suffered from arthritis and sciatica. There were also three propagandists: Triska, Brunhoff (press), and Ballensiefen (Anti-Jewish Institute). Finally, the legation had a liaison official, Consul Rekowsky.⁶⁹ To summarize:

Veessenmayer

Feine

Economy: Boden

Foreign Jews: Hezinger (Grell)

Propaganda:

Triska

Brunhoff

Ballensiefen

Consul Rekowsky

69. The composition of the mission is described in a letter by von Thadden to Wagner, May 1944, NG-2980. Also, von Thadden to Wagner, June 8, 1944, NG-2952. On Veescnmayer's appointment as minister and plenipotentiary, see Steengracht to East Ministry, March 20, 1944, enclosing appointment order by Hitler, March 19, 1944, NG-1543. The order also defined the (theoretical) relationship between Veessenmayer and other agencies in Hungary. On Veescnmayer's background, education, and career, see his SS personnel record, NG-3004. On Adolf Hczinger's role, see his affidavit of January 16, 1948, NG-4457.

Next to the legation, and perhaps even more important than the diplomats, was the SS and Police. This organization made its debut in Hungary on March 19, and so many SS and Police agencies were represented in the country that it was found necessary to appoint a Higher SS and Police Leader. Schematically, the Himmler organization in Hungary is represented in Table 8-27.

The *Sondereinsatzkommando*, formed shortly before March 19 in the Mauthausen concentration camp, was the most formidable component of the machinery of destruction in Hungary. Here, under the command of Eichmann himself, the top deportation specialists of the RSHA had been concentrated into a single, devastatingly hard-hitting unit. These men had hardly arrived, and the German regime in Hungary had barely been established, when the destruction process was set into motion with a speed and efficiency that displayed the accumulated experience of several years of European-wide deportations.

In two lightning moves the Germans maneuvered the Jewish community leadership into absolute submission and mobilized the Hungarian government for instantaneous destructive action.

To win the cooperation of the Jewish leaders, Eichmann had to dispel the doubts of a group of men who knew exactly what they could expect. In the words of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former associate president of the Zionist Organization in Hungary,

In Budapest we had a unique opportunity to follow the fate of European Jewry'. We had seen how they had been disappearing one after the other from the map of Europe. At the moment of the occupation of Hungary', the number of dead Jews amounted to over five million. We knew very well about the work of the Einsatzgruppen. We knew more than it was necessary about Auschwitz. . . . We had, as early as 1942, a complete picture of what had been happening in the East with the Jews deported to Auschwitz and the other extermination camps.⁷⁰

This "complete picture" now had to be dispelled completely. The Eichmann *Sondereinsatzkommando* succeeded in doing precisely that. That story was described in considerable detail by the historian Eugene Levai after the war.

During the evening of March 19 the Jewish community leaders were ordered to appear for a conference with the *Sondereinsatzkommando* at 10 a.m. the next day. The Jews arrived at the appointed hour and, after being allowed to cool their heels for a few hours, were received by a small delegation of SS men. The Germans were courteous. The president of the Jewish community, Dr. Samuel Stem, was addressed as *Herr Hofrat*.

70. Testimony by Kastner, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 3620-22.

TABLE 8-27**THE HIMMLER ORGANIZATION IN HUNGARY**

Higher SS and Police Leader, Hungary
 SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Otto Winkelmann

BdS Oberführer Geschke Sondereinsatzkommando Hungary Eichmann Seidl Krumey Dannecker Wisliceny Novak Hunsche Abromeit	KdS offices in Cluj Kosice Szeged and other points	Representative of SS Operational Office Standartenführer Becher (Representatives of other SS main offices omitted)
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Note: Affidavit by Kurt Becher, February 7,1946, NG-2972. Affidavit by Kastner, September 18, 1945, PS-2605. Affidavit by Wisliceny, November 29,1945, *Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. 8, pp. 606-21. Affidavit by Wisliceny, June 11,1947, NG-1823.

When Krumey noticed that the Jews had suitcases, he smiled and said: "No one is going to be arrested." The Jews were then informed that they would have to form a Judenrat. For the rest, the Germans wanted only a list itemizing the real estate owned by the Jewish community. With a reminder to stay in town, the Jews were dismissed.

On the following day the Jews were ordered to hand in some blankets and mattresses. The Jewish leaders were then addressed by Wisliceny, who told them, "Everything goes on as usual [*Allesjehet miter wie bisher*]." During the next few days there were more German requests for blankets, typewriters, mirrors, women's lingerie, eau de cologne, original Watteau landscapes, and so on. Once Hauptsturmführer Hunsche declared soulfully that it was his dream to possess a piano. He had hardly uttered this wish when no fewer than eight pianos were presented to him. This brought the laughing reply, "But gentlemen, I don't want to open a piano store, I only want to play the piano [*Meine Herren, icb willja kciti Klavur-;jeschafterdijhen, icb will nurKlavierspiekn*]\V

DEPORTATIONS

Eichmann himself expressed an interest in Jewish culture. He wanted to inspect the Jewish Museum and the Jewish Library. Then, on March 31, Eichmann invited the members of the Jewish council to attend a conference in the Hotel Majestic. During the meeting Eichmann performed one of the greatest shows of his career. In the words of Levai, "he virtually hypnotized the Jewish Council and, through that body, the whole of Hungarian Jewry."

Eichmann began his speech by giving the assembled Jews the bad news. First, he said, the Jewish labor battalions would have to be increased. However, he assured his listeners that the Jewish workers would be treated well and that they might even be permitted to return home at night. Second, a Judenrat would have to be formed with jurisdiction over all Jews in Hungary. The Judenrat would have to act as a channel for German orders, as a central financing and taxation agency, and as a central depository of information concerning Hungarian Jews. Third, the Judenrat would have to publish a newspaper that would contain all the German orders. The paper was to be self-financing and even profitable. At this point a representative of the Orthodox Jews inquired whether his group could publish a separate paper. Eichmann rejected the request. Fourth, the Judenrat would have to comply with all German requisition orders. The requisitioned articles, however, would be either returned or paid for.

So much, said Eichmann, for the German requests. He had nothing further to add except that the Jews had nothing to fear unless they refused to cooperate. No one would be shot for cooperating. No one was to try to mislead him, because in such matters he had much experience. The present measures were all temporary. After the war the Germans would be *quiescent* again. In the meantime he would not tolerate any molestation of Jews, and he wished to have any incidents reported to him.

The Jews were relieved. Now they knew what they had to do. Falling all over each other, they began to draw up plans for their Judenrat. Heated debates raged, and memoranda were written in great quantities. Finally the Jewish effort was crowned with success: the Judenrat was approved by Eichmann. Immediately the new council sent a letter to the presidents of the various Jewish communities in the provinces, calling upon them to obey all instructions emanating from Budapest.

At the same time the council addressed a manifesto to the Jewish population to maintain discipline and obey orders:

On receiving orders from the Central Council it is the duty of every person to report at the place and time indicated. The Central Jewish Council has been granted the right of absolute disposal over all Jewish spiritual and material wealth and over all Jewish manpower. You, women and girls, men and boys, are all the executors of the instruc-

tions issued by the Central Council. You must realize that ever)' decision, however momentous it may be, is the outcome of official intervention, and that the life of every individual and the existence of the community as a whole depend on such instructions being fully observed. May God guide you and give you strength to attend faithfully to your duty!⁷¹

The impossible had been achieved: the Jewish community leadership was a pawn in German hands. Now there remained only the conversion of the Hungarian government into a tool of the German machinery of destruction, and that task was easy. The Hungarian cooperation was secured by means of an agreement concluded by Veesenmayer and Sztöjay, in the presence of Winkelmann and Eichmann, during the deliberations preceding the formation of the Cabinet.⁷² The Hungarians could then be told to proceed with the necessary anti-Jewish legislation. On March 29 the new Cabinet, meeting under the chairmanship of Sztöjay, discussed the legislation in a marathon session that lasted, with but one interruption, from 11 a.m. to 10 p.m.⁷³

At the end of the month, Endre, the new State Secretary in the Interior Ministry, who handled Jewish affairs, declared with a satisfied air that the new Hungarian anti-Semitism was “no imitation” (*Der ungarische Antisemitismus keine Nachahmung*).⁷⁴ Just to make sure that the Hungarian laws would not become too original, however, Veesenmayer installed an RSHA man in Endre's office to advise the Hungarians “in steady personal contacts” (*in dauernder persönlicher Fühlungnahme*) on the drafting and implementation of ordinances.⁷⁵

The legislation was issued with what Veesenmayer described as “an unusual rapidity under local conditions [*mit einer für hiesige Verhältnisse ungewöhnlichen Schnelligkeit*].”⁷⁶ The impoverization process so arduously begun in the 1930s was now completed with a few giant strides. The Hungarians dismissed or struck from the registers the remaining Jewish

71. The preceding account is based closely on Levai's account in *Martyrdom*, pp. 79-98. The pianist, identified by Levai as Novak, was in fact Hunsch. As to the meeting with Eichmann of March 31, Levai states that the Vice President of the Jewish Council, Erno Boda, made stenographic notes and issued a summary of Eichmann's remarks.

72. Affidavit by Rudolf Kastner, September 13, 1945, PS-2605.

73. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), March 31, 1944, p. 1. A short meeting followed on March 31, between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1944, p. 3.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, April 22, 1944, NG-5725.

76. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, April 7, 1944, enclosing texts of first Hungarian decrees, Occ E 6b-2.

journalists, civil servants, notaries, patent lawyers, accountants, lawyers, even seventeen musicians of the Budapest Royal Opera House.⁷⁷

Significantly, the March-April decrees contained no provisions against doctors. Although the Interior Ministry would have wished very much to restrict the practice of Jewish doctors to Jewish patients, a “practical implementation” of that principle was not possible so long as 4,000 of Greater Hungary’s 13,000 doctors were Jews.⁷⁸ Accordingly, the Hungarian government decided to make use of its Jewish doctors as long as it could. That their withdrawal in the deportations was felt acutely is indicated by the appointment of a commissar for the more efficient utilization of the doctor supply, in June 1944.⁷⁹

Next the Hungarians turned their attention to the Jewish stores. Following the usual pattern, a decree was published that required the Jews to register their property. Trading with registered assets was prohibited, and all but normal transactions concluded after March 22, 1944, were declared null and void.⁸⁰ Barely a week after the issuance of the registration ordinance, the Ministry of Trade ordered the Jews to close their stores, offices, and warehouses. Out of a total of 110,000 establishments in Hungary, 40,000 were reported to be Jewish. Most of these stores were to stay closed. Only a few were to reopen under trustees appointed by the local mayors, after consultation with the local Chambers of Industry and Commerce.⁸¹

In Budapest, with 30,000 stores in all, the closing of 18,000 Jewish establishments caused “considerable disturbances” (*empfindliche Störungen*).⁸² Nevertheless, the Hungarians plodded on. Perishable goods in the closed stores had to be sold immediately to non-Jewish enterprises,⁸³ and nonperishable items were sold by government commissions, in cooperation with the appropriate trade associations, to non-Jewish merchants.⁸⁴ These sales took place at a time when most of the Jewish owners were already dead.

77. *Ibid.* For statistics see: Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, March 31, 1944, NG-5528. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 1, 1944, p. 3; April 2, 1944, p. 3; April 25, 1944, p. 6; May 6, 1944, p. 4. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 1, 1944, p. 3; April 2, 1944, p. 3; April 9-10, 1944, p. 3.

78. Interview of State Secretary Endrc in *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 18, 1944, p. 4.

79. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 11, 1944, p. 3; June 14, 1944, p. 3.

80. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 16, 1944, p. 3.

81. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1944, p. 3. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 25, 1944, p. 3; April 28, 1944, p. 4

82. Economy Officer in Hungary (Korvettenkapitän Krautsdorfer) to OKW/Feldwirtschaftsamt. May 14, 1944, Wi/IF .2.

83. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 23, 1944, p. 6.

84. *Ibid.*, June 22, 1944, p. 4; July 6, 1944, p. 3; September 30, 1944, p. 5.

Having shut the Jewish stores, the Hungarian government also dosed the Jewish bank accounts.⁸⁵ Then, stretching out their hands to take some personal property from the Jews, the Hungarians confiscated automobiles, radios, books, art objects, and old clothes, without distinction.⁸⁶ Finally the Food and Agriculture Ministry moved to complete the agricultural expropriations, a measure that left “without any actual management” (*ohne eigentliche Führung*) over 600,000 acres of land which had been owned or operated by Jews.⁸⁷ As if in retaliation, the Food Ministry issued instructions to deprive the Jews of all butter, eggs, paprika, rice, and poppy seeds; to restrict the Jewish meat supply to a few weekly ounces of beef or horsemeat; and to reduce the allocated quantities of sugar, fat, and milk. Special shopping hours in Budapest were added later.⁸⁸

While the Hungarians fell all over themselves capturing and consuming the haul of Jewish belongings, the German invaders quickly snatched from under their very noses a choice morsel of Jewish property. At the very beginning of the coup, around March 19, Himmler dispatched to Hungary a representative of the SS Operational Main Office with a special mission. This agent, Obersturmbannführer (later Standartenführer) Kurt Becher, was to secure for the SS the largest munition enterprise in Hungary, the Jewish-controlled Manfred Weiss Works.⁸⁹

Secretly, without even informing the Veesenmayer legation, Becher entered into negotiations with the Jewish owners. The SS man wanted to get hold of the enterprise before the Hungarians had an opportunity to frustrate the plan; the Jews wanted to leave the country before it was too late to leave. That was the basis of the bargain.

The Weiss-Chorin family, which owned the concern, was composed of prominent Jews who had intermarried extensively with Christians. The “Aryan” members of the family held 55 percent of the stocks. These “Aryan” stocks—which were believed to be unaffected by Hungarian restrictions on the transfer of Jewish property—were handed over to Becher, to be held by the SS under a “trusteeship” for a period of twenty-

85. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 28, 1944, p. 4. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), May 6, 1944, p. 4.

86. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, April 11, 1944, Occ E 6b-2. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 8, 1944, NG-5620. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 12, 1944, p. 4; June 16, 1944, p. 4. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 3, 1944, p. 3; May 19, 1944, p. 3; June 7, 1944, p. 3.

87. German Economy Officer in Hungary to OKW/Feldwirtschaftsamt/Ausland, May 14, 1944, Wi/IF.2.

88. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 23, 1944, p. 7; June 7, 1944, p. 4.

89. Affidavit by Becher, February 7, 1946, NG-2972.

five years. In return for these stocks, the SS permitted forty-eight members of the family, including “roughly thirty-six Jews and twelve Aryans,” to emigrate to Portugal, retaining, however, nine other family members as hostages to ensure the good behavior of the emigrated Jews. In addition the SS agreed to make available to the emigrants three million Reichsmark in foreign currency as partial payment for “lost profits.”⁹⁰ Chorin, on his way out of Hungary, wrote a letter to Horthy pointing out that the “gentlemen’s agreement” with the Germans providing for trusteeship had guaranteed the enterprise’s Hungarian character.⁹¹

Himmler in the meantime had to break the news to Veesenmayer. His explanation, as transmitted to Veesenmayer through the legation’s Consul Rekowsky, was somewhat as follows: The SS, said Himmler, had been committed unconditionally during this war. That was why he had decided to acquire an industrial concern which would assure to his SS men a dependable supply of the finest weapons for the remainder of the war and which would provide the basis for equipping the WafFen-SS to the greatest possible extent during the peaceful reconstruction effort (*Friedensaujbaubarbeit*) to follow. In short, the SS was to become self-sufficient. For this purpose he had taken over Hungary’s most important industrial concern under a trusteeship arrangement that was to last for twenty-five years. Binding contracts had already been signed, and a majority of the stocks were already in his hands.

When Consul Rekowsky returned to Budapest with this explanation, Veesenmayer wrote a letter to Ribbentrop personally, pointing out that Himmler’s transaction could jeopardize everything that had so far been accomplished in Hungary.⁹² Nevertheless, Veesenmayer dispatched his assistant, Rekowsky, and his economic expert, Dr. Boden, to Becher in order to smooth things over with the Hungarians. The three men concluded an agreement with Economy Minister Imredy. The agreement did not cover all outstanding questions, but it validated the deal in principle.⁹³ With the completion of negotiations Himmler appointed four men to the new Aufsichtsrat: the industrialist and honorary Brigadeführer Freiherr von Schroder; the chief of the SS Operational Main Office, Obergruppenführer Jüttner; the chief of the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office, Obergruppenführer Pohl; and the air force’s Generalfeldmarschall Milch.⁹⁴

90. *Ibid.* See also undated memorandum, (presumably from SS tiles), NO-1254.

91. Ferenc Chorin to Horthy, May 17, 1944, in Szinai and Szucs, eds., *Papers of Admiral Horthy*, pp. 291-93.

92. Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop personally. May 26, 1944, NG-2770.

93. Affidavit by Becher, February 7, 1946, NG-2972.

94. Identical letters of appointment by Himmler to Schröder, Jüttner, Pohl, and Milch, August 16, 1944, NO-601. Himmler to Schröder, August 16, 1944, NI-44.

While the SS sank its teeth into the richest prize of the Hungarian destruction process, the Hungarian administration continued to grind out anti-Jewish decrees. Almost nothing had been done before March 19, 1944, to effect a physical separation of Jews and Christians. The Bardossy regime had taken the first step in the concentration process when, as a by-product of the definition law, it prohibited marriages and extramarital intercourse between Jews and non-Jews.⁹⁵ At the end of March 1944, the Sztojay government continued where the Bardossy administration had left off: On March 29 the employment of non-Jews in Jewish households was prohibited.⁹⁶ Within a month the Jews were subjected to a central Jewish council, the Jewish star, movement restrictions, and finally ghettoization in designated apartments, city districts, and cities. The Central Council, incidentally, had been issuing orders for some weeks before the Hungarians got around to legalizing it.⁹⁷ The star decree, a measure for which the Germans had long waited, was issued on March 29. Marking was not altogether new in Hungary. The Jewish labor companies had at times been set off with a yellow armband,⁹⁸ and even in 1941 Jewish students in the Technical College of Budapest had made a “voluntary” agreement with “Aryan” students to wear special insignia.⁹⁹ Now, however, the decree provided that all Jews above the age of six had to wear a Jewish star on a yellow patch of cloth measuring four by six inches. The only people freed from the application of the decree were World War I veterans who were 75 percent disabled or who had received one Golden or two Large Silver medals (equivalent to the U.S. Distinguished Service Cross or Silver Star with cluster) in the case of enlisted men, or the corresponding decorations for officers.¹⁰⁰

The star decree hit the Catholic Church with considerable impact. It was now apparent that tens of thousands of Christians, including even

Schröder to Himmler, August 23, 1944, NI-45. Staf. Rudolf Brandt (Personal Staff, Reichsführer-SS) to Dr. Schmidt-Rohr (a curious inquirer), September 25, 1944, NO-595. Apparently Himmler had toyed with the idea of also appointing Staatssekretär Pleiger to the Aufsichtsrat, but Pohl objected strenuously to sharing the prize with a Goring man. Pohl to Himmler, June 15, 1944, NO-603.

95. Veescnmayer to Foreign Office, April 7, 1944, enclosing text of par. 9 of Law Article XV 1941, Occ E 6b-2.

96. Veescnmayer to Foreign Office, April 7, 1944, enclosing Ordinance No. 1200/1944 ME (signed Sztojay) of March 29, 1944, Occ E 6b-2.

97. Levai, *Martyrdom*, p. 130.

98. *Die Judenfrage*, March 15, 1942, p. 58. Jewish converts wore white armbands. TransiKean report, December 26, 1942, in Randolph Braham, ed., *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry* (New York, 1963), p. 97.

99. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), November 22, 1941, p. 3.

100. Veescnmayer to Foreign Office, April 7, 1944, enclosing Ordinance No. 1240/1944 ME (signed Sztojay), March 29, 1944, Occ E 6b-2.

members of the clergy, would soon appear in die streets wearing a Jewish symbol. This was too much for the Church to take silendy. Immediately upon publication of the decree on March 31, Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi, Prince Primate of Hungary, wrote a letter to Sztojaj in which he threatened to forbid his clergymen to wear the Jewish star.¹⁰¹ Sztojaj backed down. On April 4, one day before the Jews were to sew the patch on their clothes, an ordinance was issued that exempted members of the Christian clergy; the wives, widows, and children of exempted veterans; widows and orphans of *soldiers* (not labor service men) of the *Second World War*; Jews in mixed marriages; the Jewish widow of a Christian (provided that she belonged to the Christian religion and did not have Jewish children); and foreign Jews.¹⁰²

Cardinal Seredi now moved to protect the rest of the converted Jews. On April 23,1944, he handed Sztojaj a note in which he demanded that regulations concerning persons of the Jewish faith should not be applied to Christians. He considered it particularly offensive that people of the Christian faith should be represented on the same council with those of the Jewish faith. "It is not right," he said, "that Jews should have a particular power over Catholic priests or monks, or over Christians in general." Next he demanded that "Christians should no longer be obliged to wear the Star of David" because "the exhibition of this sign by Christians is tantamount to apostasy." Finally, Seredi requested that Catholic priests, aged people, and the infirm have the right to employ non-Jewish domestics and that the property of intermarried families remain untouched.¹⁰³

This time, however, the Cardinal did not succeed. It was clear that an exemption from wearing the star would result in an exemption from deportation, and Sztojaj knew full well that the Germans would not relinquish tens of thousands of their victims without an argument. Sztojaj accordingly turned down Seredi's request, and the Church was beaten. An almost predictable rumor reached the German Consul in Kosice (Kassa) to the effect that the Cardinal, as a last resort, had petitioned that permission be given to the converted Jews to exchange dieir Stars of David for white crosses.¹⁰⁴

Within days of the issuance of the star decree, the Jewish community was restricted in its movements. In one of its first "official" acts the newly formed Judenrat prohibited Jews to leave or enter Budapest without its

101. Levai, quoting excerpts from the Seredi letter, in *Martyrdom*, p. 92.

102. Veessenmayr to Foreign Office, April 7, 1944, enclosing Ordinance No. 1450/1944 ME (signed Sztojaj), April 4,1944, Occ E 6b-2.

103. The Seredi letter is quoted in lull in Levai, *Martyrdom*, pp. 118-20.

104. Affidavit by Hans Josef Count Matuschka (German Consul in Kosice), August 26,1947, NG-2440.

consent.¹⁰⁵ A few days later the civil defense-evacuation commissioner of the Hungarian capital ruled that no person who had to wear the star could henceforth leave the city,¹⁰⁶ and on April 7 the Hungarian government prohibited all Jewish travel without official permission by city police or rural Gendarmerie.¹⁰⁷ Jews who made application for permission to travel had to pay a fee of 10 pengő (RM 6 or \$2.40) and, in the event that such permission was granted, a further fee of 20 pengő.¹⁰⁸ City after city imposed a curfew barring the Jews from the streets at night.¹⁰⁹ In conjunction with these movement restrictions, the Hungarian Post Office confiscated all telephones in Jewish possession.¹¹⁰

The last stage of the concentration process began with a massive wave of arrests. The Eichmann Sondereinsatzkommando, in cooperation with the machinery of the BdS and the Hungarian police, seized all Jews moving without permission in and out of Budapest, plus a large number of Jews who were believed to be particularly dangerous.¹¹¹ The arrest figures reached 3,364 on March 31 and 8,142 on April 28.¹¹² Many of these Jews were slated to be among the first victims in the deportations.

The overall concentration of the Jews was effected on the basis of areas. The entire Hungarian territory was divided into five zones and the city of Budapest. In each zone a rapid ghettoization was to be followed by immediate deportation. The roundup and transport was to proceed from zone to zone, in consecutive operations, according to the schedule shown in Table 8-28. There was one deviation: In the south of Hungary, about 14,000 Jews were rounded up in April and May with the help of German Order Police.¹¹³

105. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 2, 1944, p. 3; April 16, 1944, p. 3.

106. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 5, 1944, p. 1.

107. The same decree contained restrictions on the use of trolley cars and withheld the right to drive automobiles from all Jews except doctors. Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, April 11, 1944, enclosing Ordinance No. 1270/1944 ME, April 7, 1944, Occ E 6b-2.

108. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 30, 1944, p. 4.

109. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), April 16, 1944, p. 3; May 9, 1944, p. 3; June 30, 1944, p. 3.

110. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), March 30, 1944, p. 2. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), March 31, 1944, p. 3. The use of public telephones was not restricted until August 1944. *Ibid.*, August 12, 1944, p. 3.

111. Affidavit by Kastner, September 13, 1945, PS-2605. 22d Jäger Division to XXII Mountain Corps, April 7, 1944, NOKW-1995. Vccsenmayer to Ritter, May 10, 1944, NG-5601. Vccsenmayer to Ritter, May 20, 1944, NG-5605.

112. Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, March 31, 1944, NG-5527. Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, April 28, 1944, NG-5595.

113. See the reports of the 2d Battalion of Police Regiment 5, April-May 1944, on seizing and guarding Jews in Siklos, Rares, and Darda, and their concentration in Bares. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives RG 48.004 (Military Historical

The order of the zones was determined by three considerations. The first of these was the approach of the Red Army, which threatened to enter Hungary through the Carpathian Mountains.¹¹⁴ The second was the belief that Hungarian cooperation could most easily be secured in the deportation of those Jews who had most recently been subjected to the Hungarian flag and who were therefore least identified with the Hungarian nation. In that connection we may recall that in 1943 the private secretary to Prime Minister Kallay had advised Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny to start the operation in the new territories (Zones I and II), continue in the old provinces (Zones III to V), and finish in the capital. The third reason for proceeding from the outer perimeter to the center was based on the premise that the Jews would have to be fooled as long as possible. While the Jews from the Carpatho-Ukraine and Transylvania were being removed, the Jews in Old Hungary could be assured that radical measures were being directed only at the non-Magyarized element of the Jewish population, and that the well-established Hungarian Jews would have nothing to worry about.¹¹⁵ In this sense the German plan was a most literal application of the rule "divide and conquer."

Ways and means of implementing the concentration plan were worked out by the Eichmann Sondereinsatzkommando and the Hungarian Interior Ministry at the beginning of April,¹¹⁶ and for the individual zones during periodic conferences thereafter. The roundup was to be carried out by Hungarian police and Gendarmerie. Eichmann's men were to stay in the background and act as advisers.¹¹⁷ In principle, all Jews living in towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants were to be transferred to larger cities and to camps. For this part of the operation the Sondereinsatzkommando needed a sociographic map, which it requested from the Jewish Council.

When the map was not produced by April 23, the Jews were summoned to a meeting. Wisliceny, Novak, and Hunsche sat around a table, while the Jews were forced to stand. Wisliceny announced that no Jews

Institute, Prague), Roll 2, Polizeiregiment Mittc. The 14,000 arrested in the south were deported at the same time as those of Zones I and II and were included in the statistic for these two zones. Stark, "Hungary's Casualties," in Lengyel, ed., *Hungarian Economy and Society*, pp. 208-9.

114. *Die Lage* (confidential circular of the part) propaganda office and the Propaganda Ministry), August 23, 1944, D-908.

115. An announcement to that effect was actually circulated through the Jewish machinery. Report by vonThadden, May 26, 1944, NG-2190.

116. Sec text of instructions by Hungarian Interior Ministry to Royal Police and Gendarmerie, April 7, 1944, in Levai, *Martyrdom*, pp. 111-13.

117. Directive by Hungarian Interior Ministry, April 7, 1944, in Levai, *Martyrdom*, pp. 111-13. Testimony by Horthy, Case No. 11, tr. p. 2735. Affidavit by Kastner, September 18, 1945, PS-2605.

TABLE 8-28
CONCENTRATION SCHEDULE

AREA	START OF SYSTEMATIC CONCENTRATION	F.ND OF DEPORTATION
Zone I Carpathians	April 16	June 7
Zone II Transylvania	May 4	June 7
Zone III North of Budapest from Kosice to Reich frontier	June 7	June 17
Zone IV East of Danube without Budapest	June 17	June 30
Zone V West of Danube without Budapest	June 29	July 9
Budapest	early July	end of July

Note: Veescnmaycr to Foreign Office, April 23,1944, NG-2233. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, May 4,1944, NG-2262. Von Thadden to Wagner, May 25,1944, NG-2980. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 10,1944, NG-2237. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 13,1944, NG-5619. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 30, 1944, NG-2263. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, July 11,1944, NG-5615.

would remain in towns of less than 10,000, then demanded angrily why the map had not been prepared. Criticizing the council for its slowness, he pointed in contrast to President Löwenherz of the Vienna community', who was "a fine fellow" (*ein braver Kerl*). Löwenherz was still in Vienna. On the other hand, Wisliceny knew full well what he had to do with Jewish leaders who would not obey—they would be sent to Dachau, like the "Jewish Führer" in Berlin.¹¹⁸

Frightened and dismayed, the Jewish Council now watched the unfolding of the ghettoization process. Trains were moving out of the small towns and dumping Jews in improvised camps. In the large cities the Jews were shoved into makeshift ghettos. At Oradea, Szeged, and Sighet ghettos were established in city sections. At Cluj, Uzhorod, and Kosice the Jews were pushed into brick factories. At Baia-Mare, Targu Murey, and Dej the victims were concentrated under the open sky'.¹¹⁹ Whereas a few essential workers and (in some cities) also the indispensable doctors were exempted from the roundup, the masses of men, women, children, converted Jews, and foreign Jews were packed indiscriminately behind

118. Lcvai, *Martyrdom*, p. 123. Baeck, rhc Jewish "Führer" in Berlin who had obeyed instructions to the hilt, was sent to Theresienstadt.

119. Affidavit by Kastner, September 18,1945, PS-2605. Affidavit by Hans Joset Count Maruschka, August 26, 1947, NG-2440. *Donauzeituna* (Belgrade), May 21, 1944, p. 3.

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barbed wire.¹²⁰ A lone official from the German legation, Legationsrat Hezinger (later Grell), circulated through the camps and ghettos to pull out the foreign Jews.¹²¹ The Hungarian authorities, in the meantime, reduced the food rations of the incarcerated victims to a daily allocation of one-fifth of a pound of bread and two cups of soup, for these Jews were not expected to remain in Hungary very long.¹²²

When the roundup in the provinces neared its completion, the compression of the Jewish population began in the capital also. Budapest, however, was to have no ghetto. The Hungarians were afraid that the establishment of a closed Jewish district would invite Allied retaliatory air raids upon the non-Jewish sections of the city. To preclude such a result, State Secretary Endre decided to crowd the Jews into apartment houses located near factories, railway stations, and other potential targets of “terror bombers.”¹²³

The German propaganda experts were not entirely happy with this Hungarian maneuver, which was almost an experiment to test the theory of world Jewish rule. If the raids were actually organized by world Jewry, presumably the Hungarian capital would henceforth be spared; if, on the other hand, allied Jewry were powerless, the Budapest Jews would be bombed. On May 4, 1944, the Reich propaganda office in Munich advised the newspapers that the transfer of Budapest Jews to areas threatened by bombing attacks was “for the moment not worth mentioning in the German press.”¹²⁴ The apprehensions of the propaganda experts turned out to be well founded, when at the end of June, in two consecutive raids, Allied bombers demolished eleven Jewish apartment houses, killing 116 Jews and wounding 342.¹²⁵

The officially proclaimed rhetoric that Jews should suffer “their share”

120. On essential workers, see order of Hungarian Interior Ministry, in Lcvai, *Martyrdom*, pp. 111-13. On doctor exemptions, see: Vccsenmayer to Ritter, May 6, 1944, NG-5600. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 21, 1944, p. 3.

121. Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, May 4, 1944, NG-2262. Report by von Thadden, May 26, 1944, NG-2190. Affidavit by Adolf Hezinger, January 16, 1948, NG-4457. The concentration and deportation of Slovak Jews in Hungary was protested by the Slovak legation in Budapest. The Slovaks, however, expressed their disinterest in Jews who had illegally crossed the Hungarian frontier, “especially orphans” (*namentlich eltemlose Kinder*). Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, June 13, 1944, NG-2583.

122. Affidavit by Kastner, September 18, 1945, PS-2605.

123. Explanation by Endre in *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 18, 1944, p. 4.

124. Confidential instructions (*Vertrauliche Informationen*) by Reich Propaganda Office (a party agency), May 4, 1944, NG-3413.

125. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 30, 1942, p. 3. See also the report of a raid on July 2, demolishing a single house with ninety-eight Jews killed, eight missing. Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, July 5, 1944, in Braham, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, p. 658.

of the “Anglo-American terror”¹²⁶ was not, however, the only consideration in the minds of the Hungarian planners. In early May they envisaged a shift of Jews from richer to poorer neighborhoods, from broad avenues to side streets, and from small houses to larger buildings. Mayoral regulations issued in June reveal an additional intention to move the Jews from outlying districts toward the center.¹²⁷ At the beginning of July a total of 2,639 houses containing 33,294 apartments with 70,197 rooms were set aside for the Jewish population. Some 19,000 Jewish apartments were won for bombed-out and overcrowded Hungarians. The Jewish apartment density was to reach about three per room. In principle, an ordinary Jewish family was entitled to only one room, although the doctors, lawyers, and engineers were permitted to apply for two rooms. All Jewish apartments were to be marked with a twelve-inch Jewish star.¹²⁸

Throughout the Hungarian domain, the roundup in each zone was to be followed by immediate deportations. There was to be no waiting until the last of the 200,000 Budapest Jews were assigned to their special houses. The deportations were to begin in the first two zones before the ghettoization in the third zone got under way, and the Jews were to be shipped out of the third zone before the seizures in the fourth zone began. The ghettos of the fourth zone were to be emptied before the roundup in the fifth zone was to start, and the Jews of the fifth zone were to be deported before the Jews of Budapest were ready. This type of operation required immediate preparations for transport.

On April 20 Veessenmayer wrote to the Foreign Office that he was experiencing the greatest difficulties in the procurement of freight cars.¹²⁹ The first breakthrough was the departure for Auschwitz of two transports with “work Jews” who were made available by the Hungarian War Ministry in the internment camps of Kistarcsa, near Budapest, and Topola, in territory seized from Yugoslavia. The Kistarcsa transport left with 1,800 Jews on April 28; the one from Topola was scheduled with 2,000 for April 29.¹³⁰ The arrivals were forced to write encouraging cards with datelines from “Waldsee” to relatives at home. The notes were brought by

126. Declaration by mayor of Budapest (Dr. Doroghi-Farkas) in *Dmauzcitutuj* (Belgrade), June 18, 1944, p. 3.

127. Tim Cole and Graham Smith, “Ghettoization and the Holocaust: Budapest 1944” *Journal of Historical Geography* 21 (1995): 300-316, on pp. 305-8.

128. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), June 18, 1944, p. 3. Budapest had 1,000,000 inhabitants and 270,000 apartments. Its 200,000 Jews had lived in 52,300. *Ibid.*, August 23, 1941, p. 3.

129. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, April 20, 1944, NG-5546.

130. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, April 27, 1944, NG-5535. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, April 28, 1944, in Brahm, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, p. 363.

TABLE 8-29
APARTMENT DENSITY IN BUDAPEST

	POPULATION	APARTMENTS	
		AUGUST 1941	JULY 1944
Total	1,000,000	270,000	270,000
Jewish	200,000	52,300	33,294

Note: Based on statistics in *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), August 23,1941, p. 4; July 11, 1944, p. 3.

an SS courier to Budapest, to be distributed there by the Jewish council.¹³¹ Members of the council examining the cards looked for the place on a map, but could not find it. Finally one card was spotted that bore the traces of the erased word “Auschwitz.”¹³² By then, however, the deportations were in full swing.

To bring about the rapid disappearance of Hungary’s Jews, the Germans wasted no time. A railroad conference was planned for May 4-5 in Vienna to consider the dispatch to Auschwitz of four daily transports, holding 3,000 Jews each, beginning in mid-May.¹³³ The Foreign Office foresaw difficulties with routes: Lvov might be unavailable for military reasons, Budapest-Vienna was undesirable because the Jewish community in the Hungarian capital might become alarmed, and the German legation in Bratislava was jittery about a traversal of Slovak territory.¹³⁴ The railway men, meeting in the offices of the Wehrmachttransportleitung Südost, hammered out the transport program with Slovakia, as the shortest way, in mind. The two-day conference was devoted to the whole range of train movements in the southeastern area: beets, foreign laborers, Jews. Given the military auspices under which the meeting was held, uniformed transport officers were the majority of those in attendance. Several civilian Reichsbahn specialists, two Hungarian timetable experts, and two delegates of the Slovak railways were also present. Hauptsturmführer Novak and his deputy, Untersturmführer Martin, had

131. Statement by Richard Hartenberger (courier, RSHA IV-B-4), September 22, 1961, Case Novak, Landesgericht Vienna, 1416/61, vol. 6, pp. 129-41. Affidavit by Kastner, September 18, 1945, PS-2262.

132. Testimony by Pinchas (Philip von) Freudiger (Orthodox member of the Council), Eichmann trial transcript, May 24,1961, sess. 51, pp. LI, MI.

133. Von Thadden to legation in Bratislava, May 2, 1944, NG-5565. Vccsenmayer to Foreign Office, May 4,1944, NG-2262.

134. Von Thadden to German legation in Budapest, May 5,1944, in Braham, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, p. 369.

arrived from the RSHA's IV-B-4, and Captain Lullay represented the Hungarian Gendarmerie. The deportation of the Jews was an important topic on the agenda. The conferees apparently discussed the number of trains (four versus five per day), settling on four. Forty-five cars were envisaged for each transport, and strong locomotives were needed to pull these loads. The Germans were to furnish much of the rolling stock, and the Hungarians were to load the deportees into the cars.¹³⁵ On the first day of the conference the roundup in Zone I was completed with the concentration of some 200,000 Jews in ten ghettos and camps.¹³⁶ ¹³⁷ Zero hour was approaching.

On die eve of the deportations, some of the participants in the destruction process felt clearly and deeply its meaning and implications. In the town of Dej two regional officials, the *Obergespan* and *Vizegespan* of the *Komitat Szolnok-Doboka*, went on sick leave. The two men, Count Bela Bethlen and Dr. Janos Schilling, did not "approve of" the Judenaktion that was in progress in their district. Count Bethlen declared that he did not want to become a mass murderer and that he would rather resign (*Graf Bethlen hat erklärt dass er nicht zum Massenmörder werden wolle und lieber zurücktrete*).¹³⁷ The Catholic Church, too, began to understand that it was facing one of its greatest challenges, and protested within the bounds set by its 2,000-year history.

There were, striedy speaking, two centers of Catholic influence in Hungary: the papal nuncio, Angelo Rotta, and the Prince Primate, Cardinal Seredi. The nuncio took die first step. On May 15, the day on which the deportations started in Zone 1, the Vatican representative handed the following note to the Hungarian Foreign Office:

The Hungarian Government is prepared to deport 100,000 persons. . . . The whole world knows what deportation means in practice.

135. Testimony by Franz Novak, November 16 and 18, 1964, September 26 and 28, 1966, December 4, 1969, March 20 and 21, 1972, transcripts of trial, 20 Vr 2729/63 Hr 28/64, Case Novak, vol. 13, pp. 39-68; vol. 14, pp. 293, 303-24; vol. 15, pp. 303, 304; vol. 18, pp. 96, 155-60. Statement by Dr. Laszlo Lullay (also spelled Lulay), February' 18, 1948, and his interrogation of July 17, 1960, Case Novak, vol. 15, following p. 425. Several regional Wehrmachttransportleitungen (WTL) were set up under Chef/Heerestransportwesen for military' traffic in 1943 and 1944. The WTL Südost was directed by Colonel Ludwigen A summary of the May 4-5 conference has not been found, and the suspicion that the Hungarian Jews were moved in trains designated as "military" for purposes of priority cannot be confirmed on the basis of available documentation. Gerlach and Aly note that military needs had in any case cased in May and June. *Das letzte Kapitel*, pp. 271-74.

136. Vecsenmayer to Foreign Office, May 4, 1944, NG-2262. Zone 1 included the Carpatho-Ukraine with contiguous areas in former Romanian territory.

137. Vecsenmayer to Ritter, May 8, 1944, enclosing report by Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann, NG-5510.

The Apostolic Nuntiature considers it to be its duty to protest against such measures. Not from a false sense of compassion, but on behalf of thousands of Christians, it once again appeals to the Hungarian Government not to continue this war against the Jews beyond the limits prescribed by the laws of nature and the commandments of God and to avoid any proceedings against which the Holy See and the conscience of the whole Christian world would be compelled to protest.¹³⁸

While this protest was delivered to the Sztojay regime, the Cardinal remained silent. He was tiring of the fight. The challenge, however, had not passed. On May 27 and again on June 17, Bishop Apor of Győr urged the cardinal to issue a public declaration, lest the “flock” equate silence with acquiescence. Stung, Seredi replied to the second letter in these words:

I also have a conscience and I am aware of my responsibility. That is why, for the duration of the discussion [with the government] I did not want to do what your Excellency urges, or carry out the actions I have prepared myself. I am now going to act, but expect no result from this step either.¹³⁹

A few days later a pastoral letter was drafted by Seredi, his deputy vicar Janos Drahos, “who tempered the stronger expressions,” and a number of archbishops and bishops who suggested minor changes. In its final form, signed by Jusztinian Seredi and dated June 29, 1944, the document was over three pages long. The letter began with a discussion of such subjects as wages, fixed working hours, insurance, and the bombardment of Hungarian towns, including “the disablement of innocent children by means of explosive toys scattered by aeroplanes.” One passage was devoted to the Jews. It read in part as follows:

We do not deny that a number of Jews have executed a wickedly destructive influence on the Hungarian economic, social, and moral life. It is also a fact that the others have not protested against the actions of their co-religionists in this respect. We do not doubt that the Jewish question ought to be settled in a lawful and just way. Consequently we raise no objections to steps being taken, so far as the financial system of the State is concerned. Neither do we protest against the objectionable influence being eliminated; on the contrary, we would like to see it vanish. However, we would be neglecting our moral and episcopal duties were we not to guard against justice suffering damage

138. Text in Lcvai, *Martyrdom*, p. 197.

139. Seredi to Apor, June 20, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 207.

and against our Hungarian fellow-citizens and our Catholic faithful being wronged merely on account of their origin. . . .

We were unable to achieve what we most desired, namely that the unlawful limitations of civil rights and especially the deportations are stopped. However, as we relied upon the Christianity and the humanity of the members of the Government, we had not given up all hope, in spite of the meager results obtained up to now. For this reason we issued no proclamation to you, but restrained ourselves, in the meantime taking all steps to achieve our purpose. . . . We see now, however, with great consternation, that despite our efforts all our negotiations on the most important points have up to now proved almost ineffective. Therefore we solemnly refuse all responsibility for the consequences. . . . Pray and work for all our Hungarian fellow-citizens and especially for our Catholic brethren, our Catholic Church and our beloved Hungary.¹⁴⁰

Since the letter was dispatched through the Hungarian postal censorship, only 700 copies were received by pastors to be read during the Sunday service. Sunday was July 1, the day after the fourth zone had been cleared of Jews. On July 6, at a time when the fifth zone was worked over by Hungarian Gendarmerie, Cardinal Seredi and Justice Minister Antal met to discuss the Church's complaints. Antal promised that the deportations of Christian Jews would henceforth cease, and during the next day (a Saturday) Seredi gave instructions that the pastoral letter be suppressed. There was considerable wrangling about the publication of a substitute letter, but no more letters were published.¹⁴¹

The Cardinal had had enough, but still the Church was not let alone. It was now plagued by new challenges. During the middle of July the chief of the Nazi-like Arrow Cross party in Veszprem demanded that the Franciscans conduct a mass to thank God for the removal of the Jews. The bishop, declaring that many Christians were among the deported victims, denounced the project, but the pressure from the Arrow Cross men increased. Finally the Church compromised by conducting the service without the *Te Deum*.¹⁴²

Another threat developed from the desire by the Jews of Budapest to

140. Text of complete letter with discussion of its history, *ibid.*, pp. 207-10.

141. *Ibid.*, pp. 211-12. For a personal impression of Seredi, see the interview of the Christian Jewish leader, Sandor Torok, in Sandor Szencs and Frank Baron, eds., *Von Ungarn ttaeb Auschwitz* (Munster, 1994), pp. 95-96. In June, Torok proposed to Seredi that Holy Communion be denied to gendarmes, policemen, functionaries, or railroad men assisting the Germans in anti-Jewish operations. Seredi replied: "If His Holiness, the Pope, is doing nothing against Hitler, what can I do in my narrow confines?" and angrily threw his birerta on the floor.

142. Vecsenmayer to Ritter, July 20, 1944, NG-5613.

acquire the protection of the Church through baptism. Conversions were not exactly new in Hungary; since 1941 the Hungarian Catholic Cross Society had been conducting two-month courses (two lectures per week) for prospective Christians.¹⁴³ During a single week following the Seredi-Antal conference, however, more Jews applied for baptism than had sought Christianity in the preceding fifteen years.¹⁴⁴

Laughing at the dilemma facing the clergy, State Secretary Baky of the Interior Ministry ordered police to guard the Jews standing in line in front of the churches, lest the public order be disturbed.¹⁴⁵ Shortly afterward the Vicar of Budapest issued two orders: one required a three-month preparatory course for the receipt of baptism;¹⁴⁶ the other demanded a release certificate signed by a rabbi.¹⁴⁷

While the Church was confronted with a battle for moral survival, the Jews were facing a threat to sheer physical existence. In the ghettos, however, there was still hope. On May 6, 1944, Veessenmayer reported to Ambassador Ritter that among the Jews in Targu Mureș (Transylvania), who had suddenly been hurled into a ghetto at 5 a.m. on May 3, excitement ran high. The Jews were still hoping for a “temporary concentration” (*zeitlich begrenzte Unterbringung*) and a “favorable solution” (*günstige Lösung*).¹⁴⁸ In the ghetto of Oradea 20,000 inmates were subjected to systematic questioning by the Hungarian Gendarmerie because of a suspicion that the Jews, probably in the hope of an early return to their homes, had hidden valuables with Christian families in the city.¹⁴⁹

There were indications also of apprehension within the Jewish community. A sizable number of Jews, acting individually, were attempting in various ways to evade the coming blow. Thus a Budapest newspaper, the *Magyar Szó*, complained that many people had recently advertised the loss of personal and family documents. These persons, said the paper, were Hungarians who had sold their birth certificates to Jews.¹⁵⁰ On April 30, Veessenmayer reported that many Jews were trying to take refuge in the labor companies and suggested that many who were not subject to induction might have bribed their way in.¹⁵¹

143. Veessenmayer to Ritter, May 20, 1944, NG-5604.

144. Declaration by a representative of the archbishop vicar in *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), July 14, 1944, p. 4.

145. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

146. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1944, p. 3.

147. *Ibid.*, July 30, 1944, p. 8. The Evangelical and Unitarian Churches followed suit in barring quick conversions. *Ibid.*, August 5, 1944, p. 3; August 15, 1944, p. 3.

148. Veessenmayer to Ritter, May 6, 1944, NG-5600.

149. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), June 1, 1944, p. 6.

150. *Donauzeitung* (Belgrade), May 9, 1944, p. 3.

151. Veessenmayer to Ritter, April 30, 1944, NG-5597.

In Zones I, II, and III a number of Jews attempted to flee to Slovakia and Romania.¹⁵² The movement to Slovakia apparently was large enough to induce Veessenmayer to urge the Foreign Office that preventive measures be taken by deporting the remaining Slovakian Jews.¹⁵³ In the ghettos of Mukachevo, Oradea, and Tiszabogdany, Jews walled themselves in and hid in earth holes. The Hungarian Gendarmerie was still discovering these hiding places long after the ghettos had been evacuated.¹⁵⁴

Yet on the whole the Jews were unable to extricate themselves from the net. This is how an SS observer on the scene, Sturmbannführer Höttl, described the victims' reaction:

Without resistance and in submission, they marched by the hundreds in long columns to railway stations and piled into the trains. Only very few gendarmes were supervising the operation; it would have been easy to flee. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, which contained numerically the strongest Jewish settlements, the forbidding mountains and forests offered an opportunity for prolonged hiding. But only few removed themselves in this way from their doom.¹⁵⁵

In Budapest the Central Jewish Council (or Union of Hungarian Jews, as it came to be called) found itself at a crossroads. The Jewish leaders felt that they had to do something, but even petitioning had become difficult for them. On May 3 the council wrote to Interior Minister Jaross:

We emphatically declare that we do not seek this audience to lodge complaints about the merit of the measures adopted, but merely ask that they be carried out in a humane spirit.¹⁵⁶

On May 12, 1944, the council sent the following communication to Jaross:

On the 9th inst. the Jews living in Heves were transported a distance of 80 kilometers to the abandoned mining settlement of Bagölyuk near

152. Veessenmayer to Ritter, May 2, 1944, NG-5598. Veessenmayer to Ritter, May 8, 1944, NG-5510. Veessenmayer to Ritter, June 17, 1944, NG-5567. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, July 11, 1944, NG-5586.

153. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, June 14, 1944, NG-5533. Altenburg to Veessenmayer, June 14, 1944, NG-2829. Altenburg to Ludin, June 16, 1944, NG-2261.

154. Veessenmayer to Ritter, July 20, 1944, NG-5613.

155. Walter Hagen (pseud. for Höttl), *Die Geheime Front* (Zurich, 1950), p. 39. The extent to which hidden Jews were denounced by the Hungarian population is not quite clear. See Altenburg to Veessenmayer, May 17, 1944, NG-2425. Also, Veessenmayer to Ritter, May 20, 1944, NG-5604.

156. Levai, *Martyrdom*, p. 134.

Egerseki. . . . We would take the liberty of mentioning that the town of Heves has, according to the 1941 census, a population of 10,597.¹⁵⁷

From mid-May to mid-June the Council watched the removal of the Jews from Zones I, II and III. On June 23 the Council finally dispatched a despairing letter to Horthy: "In the twelfth hour of our tragic fate we appeal to you in the name of humanity to influence the Royal Hungarian Government to cease immediately the deportation of hundreds of thousands of innocent people." The letter branded as "false" the explanations offered to the Jews that the deportations were dictated by military necessity and that the deportees would be engaged in forced labor. The Jews, wrote the Council, were being sent on a "fatal journey from which they will never return." The letter concluded with a detailed breakdown of deportation statistics and a plea that the Jews be allowed to use their strength and their labor "for the sake of defending our country and in the interest of production."¹⁵⁸

The masses of Jewish deportees, numb, fantasy-ridden, and filled with illusions, reacted with mechanical cooperation to every German command. The Jewish Council, hoping against hope for a postponement of the inevitable, woke up too late to act. Hungarian Jewry's last chance thus depended on a group of men who were awake from the start and who were disposed to undertake action. Such a group did exist in Hungary' when the Germans broke in, but its plans for action depended on outside help.

In January' 1943 a number of Zionists (mainly Transylvanians) had formed an assistance and rescue committee (*Vaadat Ezra v'Hazalab*) for the purpose of helping Jews who escaped to Hungary from Slovakia, Poland, and the Reich-Protectorat area. The chief personalities of the committee were the following:¹⁵⁹

President: Dr. Otto Komoly

Executive vice-president: Dr. Rudolf Kastner

Finance: Samuel Springmann

Tijul (underground rescue of Jew's from Poland) : Joel Brand

Komoly was to represent the committee in negotiations with the Hungarian government, whereas Kastner handled the Germans.¹⁶⁰ By the end of 1943 the committee had already come to the conclusion that the rescue

157. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

158. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-96.

159. Rczso Kasztner (Rudolf Kastner), "Der Bericht des jüdischen Rettungskomitccs aus Budapest (1942-1945)" (postwar, mimeographed, in Library of Congress), p. 7.

160. *Ibid.*, pp. xii, 20. Otto Komoly did not survive.

and relief work, would soon have to give way to the far greater task of dealing with the German threat in Hungary. To the committee the fulfillment of this task presented itself in three alternate forms which were tried concurrently,

The first plan called for the creation of a resistance organization. The committee members did not think that they could create such an organization themselves; they therefore called upon the Jewish Agency in Palestine for help. This move was initiated before 1943.¹⁶¹ The Jewish Agency, after lengthy negotiations with the British, managed to secure British consent for the dispatch of a few parachutists to Europe. However, the agreement provided that the parachutists were to carry out military missions before they were to concern themselves with Jewish matters. These terms were "strictly honored."¹⁶²

Three parachutists were dropped in Croatia on April 14, 1944, and crossed the Hungarian border on June 13. Under continuous observation by the SS and the Hungarian General Staff, the three were seized in Budapest, and Veessenmayer reported their arrest on July 8, 1944, the day before Zone V was completely cleared of Jews.¹⁶³ That was the extent of resistance activity in Hungary.

Another scheme was developed in May 1944, when a Slovak railway official furnished to the Jewish relief committee in Bratislava information about the number and the direction of the special trains scheduled to carry the Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. The Bratislava committee promptly transmitted the details to the committee in Budapest.¹⁶⁴ In the Hungarian capital the Jewish leaders recognized that a systematic bombing by Allied planes of two or three railway junctions on the Kosice-Presov-Èilina-Bohumin line could upset the entire deportation program and conceivably save hundreds of thousands of lives. Upon request of the Budapest relief committee, the Bratislava Jews telegraphed to Switzerland a request for the bombing of these railway junctions. From the Allies, however, there was no response.¹⁶⁵

161. *Ibid.*, pp. 15,70-73.

162. On the Palestine end of the negotiations and the assignment of the parachutists, see Marie Syrkin, *Blessed Is the Match* (Philadelphia, 1947), pp. 18-35.

163. Veessenmayer to Ritter, July 8, 1944, NG-5616.

164. Affidavit by Kastner, September 13, 1945, PS-2605.

165. Kasztner, "Bcricht," pp. vi-vii. On June 2, bombers ranged over railway installations at Miskolc, Debrecen, Oradea, Cluj, Szeged, and Szolnok, causing moderate to heavy damage. Veessenmayer to Ritter, June 2, 1944, June 4, 1944, June 14, 1944, in Braham, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jenny*, pp. 598-99,600-601,608-9. The targets form a triangle, one of whose sides is parallel with the Danube, flowing ca. 60 miles to the west down from Budapest. The area had already been worked over to some extent by deportations, which totaled 247,856 by that date. Subsequent transports do not seem to have been impeded by these raids.

The third effort of the relief committee was based on a direct approach to the Germans. At the beginning of April the vice president in charge of German negotiations, Dr. Rudolf Kastner, and the rescue expert Joel Brand established contact with Hauptsturmführer Wisliceny of the Eichmann Sondereinsatzkommando. There are two versions of the ensuing discussions.

According to Kastner, the SS man promised that, for 6.5 million pengo (ca. RM 4,000,000 or \$1,600,000 at the official rate of exchange), 600 Jews would be permitted to leave for Palestine. The committee immediately turned to the Central Council for financial help, and after weeks of canvassing, the Council managed to collect five million pengo from rich Jews. The committee itself added the missing million and a half. The Germans then raised the number of prospective emigrants by a thousand.¹⁶⁶ Eichmann stated in his memoirs that Kastner “agreed to keep the Jews from resisting deportation — and even keep order in the camps — if I would close my eyes and let a few hundred or a few thousand young Jews emigrate illegally to Palestine. It was a good bargain.”¹⁶⁷

The Jewish leadership now had to select from the 750,000 doomed Hungarian Jews 1,600 who were to live. Their first reaction was to select only children. Wisliceny, however, vetoed this plan on the ground that the Hungarians would notice a children’s transport. The Jews thereupon proceeded to compile a list of ten categories: Orthodox Jews, Zionists, prominent Jews (*Prominente*), orphans, refugees, Revisionists, and so on. One category consisted of “paying persons.” The geographic distribution was a bit lopsided: 388 persons, including Kastner’s father-in-law, came from the Transylvania city of Cluj. “Eichmann knew,” reports Kastner, “that we had a special interest in Cluj” (*dass Klausenburg uns besonders tiahstand*). The transport left, at the height of the deportations, for Bergen-Belsen. In die fall of 1944 some of the rescued Jews arrived in Switzerland.¹⁶⁸

On May 8, one week before the deportations were to start, Eichmann called Kastner’s colleague Joel Brand to discuss a new proposition. Eichmann acted upon Himmler’s direct orders and, as usual, without the knowledge of the German legation. He proposed a scheme whereby the lives of the Hungarian Jews could be saved for a price, to be paid in goods. The following quantities were mentioned: 200 tons of tea, 200 tons of coffee, 2,000,000 cases of soap, 10,000 trucks for the WafJen-SS to be used on die eastern front, and unspecified quantities of tungsten and

166. Kasztner, “Benefit,” pp. 24-27, 58,63.

167. *Life*, December 5, 1960, p. 146.

168. Kasztner, “Benefit,” pp. 41, 43—44, 46, 56, 90. Wagner via Hcneke and Steengracht to Ribbentrop. September 29, 1944, NG-2994. Wagner to Ribbentrop, November 11, 1944, NG-2994.

other war materials. The SS would be most interested in the trucks. To procure these items, Brand was to leave for Istanbul, Turkey, to contact the Western Allies. The Jews, in the meantime, would be sent to Auschwitz to be gassed until such time as a favorable reply was received.¹⁶⁹

On May 17, two days after the first transports had left Hungary, Brand (accompanied by a Jew, Grosz, who had once worked for the Canaris office) moved out of Budapest for Vienna, and from there the two men proceeded to Istanbul. Caught by British agents, Brand and Grosz were transported to Cairo, to be held in solitary confinement for several months by Deputy Minister of State Lord Moyne.

In Budapest the Jewish leadership waited in vain for some Allied counteroffer that might induce the Germans to stop the gassings. The relief committee did not expect the Allies to deliver actual war materiel to the German war machine; they hoped only for a verbal maneuver—a gesture, a promise—that would bring about protracted negotiations while the Jewish deportees in Auschwitz would stay “on ice” waiting for the arrival of the Red Army. But week after week passed, and there was no acceptance, no reply, no stir. Only silence. In Auschwitz death enveloped Hungarian Jewry.¹⁷⁰

The relief committee in Budapest was now thrown back upon its own resources. From the Allies it had received no backing; from world Jewry it had received no help. There was in Budapest particular recrimination for those outside Jews who had not done their utmost. “They were outside,” said Kastner, “we were inside. They were not immediately affected, we were the victims. They moralized, we feared death. They had sympathy for us and believed themselves to be powerless; we wanted to live and believed rescue *had* to be possible.”¹⁷¹

The Germans, too, somehow believed that the ransom idea was not yet dead. In holding on to that idea, the Germans reasoned that the Allies, who after all were fighting this war for the Jews, would not fail to rescue them in their hour of crisis. But behind this thought there was the consideration that the Allies were really afraid of Communist Russia and that at the last moment they would not be averse to making a deal with the Reich for the purpose of stopping the Red tide. That is why the SS and Police awaited with great interest the Western reaction to the proposal that 10,000 trucks be delivered for exclusive use on the eastern front. The

169. Affidavit by Kastner, September 13, 1945, PS-2605. Kasztner, “Bericht,” pp. 33, 36-37. Executive Director, War Refugee Board (William O'Dwver), *Final Summary Report* (Washington, D.C., 1945), pp. 39-40. Veessenmayer via Ritter to Ribbenrrop, July 22, 1944, NG-2994.

170. Kasztner, “Bericht,” pp. 36-38. Ira Hirschmann (special agent of the War Refugee Board), *Journey to a Promised Land* (New York, 1946), pp. 109-27.

171. Kasztner, “Bericht,” pp. 88-89.

Germans did not know, of course, that the Allies took far more seriously their alliance with Soviet Russia than the fate of Hungarian Jewry. In the meantime, however, the SS waited, and during the waiting period Himmler was susceptible to all sorts of financial discussions.¹⁷²

On June 7, 1944, the mayor of Vienna, the Honorary SS-Brigadeführer Blaschke, requested Kaltenbrunner to assign Hungarian Jews to labor-starved factories in the Viennese area.¹⁷³ At that very time the finance experts of the relief committee figured out that goods valued at four or five million Swiss francs (about 2.5 million Reichsmark, or one million dollars) could still be mobilized in Hungary. That sum was immediately offered to the Sondereinsatzkommando. On June 14 Eichmann declared himself ready to transport up to 30,000 Jews to the Vienna area. For five million Swiss francs he was prepared to make a start, and the remaining Jews (to a maximum of 30,000) were to be shipped to Austria just as soon as additional sums rolled in. The committee now promised to deliver everything it possibly could. The Kastner report does not make entirely clear how much was delivered to the Kommando. About 15 tons of coffee (“a little rancid”) could be placed at the disposal of the Germans at once; 65,000 Reichsmark were paid out in cash; and thirty Swiss tractors were promised, although the tractors never left Switzerland. Again, the Jewish sources make no mention of “keeping order in the camps.” Only Eichmann docs. The deal, at any rate, covered six transports with 17,500 or 18,000 Jews.¹⁷⁴

The committee now had the burdensome task of selecting the Jews to be saved. Lists were made in Budapest and in the provinces. The lists were altered, enlarged, cut down. There were original lists and replacement lists. In the end, accident also played a part. An SS man, whether by mistake or as a “little joke,” switched two trains. A transport from Gyor, and with it the rabbi of the Gyor community, Dr. Emil Roth, was delivered to Auschwitz. Instead of the Gyor train, another that had been scheduled to go to Auschwitz arrived in Vienna.¹⁷⁵

The Hungarian Jews in Austria were laid “on ice.” They remained

172. When, during the second half of July, the London radio broadcast an indignant reply to the ransom offer, Legationrat Grell in the Budapest legation conjectured that the Allies were still willing to enter into the transaction and that the report from London denying such an intention was camouflage designed to fool the Russians. Veesenmayer via Ritter to Ribbentrop, July 22, 1944, NG-2994.

173. Kaltenbrunner to Blaschke, June 30, 1944, PS-3803.

174. Kasztner, “Bricht,” p. 50. Eichmann’s story, *Life*, December 5, 1960, p. 146. In August the number of Jews was 14,700. Economy Ministry II 2/1 to Foreign Office, August 3, 1944, in Braham, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, pp. 465-66. See also list of deliveries in a letter by Andreas Biss to Sally Mavcr (Switzerland) and Kasztner, August 30, 1944, Israel Police 1053.

175. Kasztner, “Bricht,” pp. 48-55, 76, 151-52.

under the jurisdiction of the Sondereinsatzkommando, which dispatched Obersturmbannführer Krumei to head its new branch (*Aussenstelle*) in Vienna. The Jews lived there under a strict regime. They wore stars, were allowed to have no money, were not permitted to shop or to smoke, and were forced to work in industry for no wage. A thousand of the Jews died. A few were sent to Bergen-Belsen, a few to Auschwitz.¹⁷⁶

Eichmann, though the chief negotiator, performed his task with a sense of frustration. At heart, he preferred dead Jews to live ones. Once his attitude was said to have become so overbearing that Himmler told him that he, Himmler, had created the Reich Security Main Office and that if it were Himmler's pleasure Eichmann would have to become a nursemaid to the Jews.¹⁷⁷

The committee, in the meantime, had little reason to rejoice. Considering the impotence of Hungarian Jewry and the lack of all outside support, its success was remarkable, but weighed against the magnitude of the disaster, its accomplishment was very limited. When one must save lives, failure means death. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were now going through a nightmare on their way to be killed.

As the empty freight cars rolled into railway stations at the various cities of departure, the Hungarian Gendarmerie moved to complete the concentration by emptying the hospitals and institutions, dumping the sick, the newborn babies, the blind, the deaf, the mental cases, and prison inmates into the ghettos.¹⁷⁸ They were to be marched out, four abreast, in columns of 500; members of local Jewish councils, persons who were ill, and those of doubtful nationalities at the rear. Only essential physicians and their families were to remain.¹⁷⁹ The Gendarmerie subjected the deportees to thorough bodily searches, anxious lest all the valuables fall into German hands at Auschwitz. At the station an average of seventy victims were piled into a cattle car with a bucket of water, and the car was sealed.¹⁸⁰ The exact number in each car was marked with chalk on the outside.¹⁸¹ From Kosice the trains had to leave at night, for the railway yard in the brick factory where the Jews had been kept was connected with the main line by a track that bisected one of the city's main streets.

176. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-52.

177. Affidavit by Bccher, February 7, 1946, NG-2972.

178. Affidavit by Kastner, September 13, 1945, PS-2605.

179. Summary of Hungarian police conference at Munkacs (undated, first half of May 1944), in files of mayor of Nagybánya, Israel Police 1318. The German Security Police, reacting to these instructions, wanted old and ill people loaded first. Report by Fercenzy, May 29, 1944, Israel Police 1319.

180. The figure seventy may be calculated from a report by Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 13, 1944, NG-5619.

181. Summary of Munkacs police conference. May 1944, Israel Police 1318.

The population often heard the crying of women and children who could not stand the suffocating heat in the cars.¹⁸²

Under Hungarian guard the trains, forty-five cars to a transport, wound their way to the Slovak frontier.¹⁸³ There German Order Police replaced the Hungarian Gendarmerie, sometimes opening the doors and counting the deportees again.¹⁸⁴ While the trains were passing through the countryside, the Slovak intelligence service reported a disturbing incident. On May 24, German guards had entered three trains at the railway station of Kysak and, under threat of shooting, had taken money and valuables from the Jews. The Germans had then gone to the station restaurant to eat and get drunk. When one of the trains pulled out of Kysak, the Jews threw out jewelry, rings, and money—the latter mostly torn to shreds—which railway workers and children picked up on the embankment. The news of this occurrence had spread like wildfire.¹⁸⁵ Yet on other occasions German personnel would reflect about the fate of the Jews. One of the guards began to pray loudly as soon as his train moved into the vicinity of Auschwitz.¹⁸⁶ At the ramp the accompanying police noticed that some of the old people and small children had not survived the trip.¹⁸⁷

In Budapest the relief committee petitioned to the Sondereinsatzkommando for some alleviation of the suffering endured by the deportees. Kastner pointed out to Hauptsturmführer Hunsche that hundreds of Jews were dying on the way for lack of food and water, and Hunsche promised to look after the matter. A few days later he told Kastner: “Will you finally stop bothering me with your horror stories? I have investigated. Here are the reports: There are at most fifty to sixty persons per transport who die on the way.”¹⁸⁸

For Hunsche and Eichmann the deaths in the freight cars were a minor administrative detail not worth bothering about. The SS men were interested only in the total picture; they looked at the holocaust with statistical

182. Affidavit by Hans Josef Count Matuschka (German consul in Kosice), August 26, 1947, NG-2440.

183. Train length specified in Vccsenmayer report to Foreign Office, June 13, 1944, NG-5619. An average train carried 3,150 people.

184. Testimony by Hans Alt, April 6, 1972, Case Novak, transcript, vol. 18, pp. 325-27. In a few cases, Hungarian guards may have stayed on the trains all the way to Auschwitz. Olga Lengyel, *Five Chimneys* (Chicago and New York, 1947), pp. 114-15. The author was deported from Cluj.

185. Ludin (German minister in Slovakia) to Foreign Office, June 15, 1944, NG-5569.

186. Testimony by Ernst Gox, describing a pious comrade from Mannheim, April 6, 1972, Case Novak, transcript, vol. 18, pp. 330-32.

187. *Ibid.*

188. Kasztner, “Bricht,” p. 47.

TABLE 8-30
DEPORTATIONS FROM HUNGARY

ZONE	DATE OF COMPLETION	NUMBER DEPORTED
I and II	June 7	289,357
III	June 17	50,805
IV	June 30	41,499
V	July 9	55,741
All five zones	July 9	437,402

Note: Statistics for Zones I and II reported by Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 13, 1944, NG-5619. Statistics for Zones III and IV reported by Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 30, 1944, NG-2263. Statistics for Zone V reported by Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, July 11, 1944, NG-5615. It is almost certain that the Jews shipped to Austria are included in the totals. The two April transports from Kistarcsa and Topola are probably not included.

eyes and calculated that it would soon be finished. From Zones I and II an average of 12,000 people were being deported daily.¹⁸⁹ On the single day of June 1 nearly 20,000 Jews were deported.¹⁹⁰ The provinces were rapidly being emptied, and at the beginning of July the ring was already closing around Budapest. Table 8-30 shows the results for Zones I through V

At the end of June, when the first four zones were almost emptied, Veesenmayer requested the Hungarian Supply Minister Jurczek to send food shipments to the Reich corresponding to the amount that the deported Jews would have consumed. The Hungarian agreed to the demand.¹⁹¹ The Germans were now ready for the finish.

The evacuation of the 200,000 Jews of Budapest was planned for July. In a single day the Jews of the capital were to be transferred to an island above the city. All bus and streetcar traffic was to be halted. The Sonderinsatzkommando, strong units of Hungarian Gendarmerie from the provinces, and all Budapest mailmen and chimney sweeps were to be employed in the roundup.¹⁹² The Foreign Office was a little uneasy about the operation, since Budapest was too much in the limelight, too often

189. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 13, 1944, NG-SA19.

190. Veesenmayer to Ritter, June 1, 1944, NG-5622. Veesenmayer to Ritter, June 2, 1944, NG-5621.

191. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, June 25, 1944, NG-5571. Altcnburg to Veesenmayer, June 28, 1944, NG-5571.

192. Report by von Thadden, May 26, 1944, NG-2190.

the center of world attention. In Berlin, Minister Dr. Schmidt (Foreign Office, press division) pointed out to Staatssekretär Steengracht that the drive against the Budapest Jews would result in “atrocious propaganda” abroad. Schmidt therefore thought it advisable to discover explosives in Jewish clubs and synagogues, to unearth Jewish sabotage, plots, attacks on the police, illegal currency transactions, and so on.¹⁹³

On June 6, the day of the Allied landings in France, von Thadden suggested that the Budapest Aktion be so timed as to be drowned out by the invasion news.¹⁹⁴ Veessenmayer, however, did not see the need for special precautions, since he did not think that the world would be shocked.¹⁹⁵ But Veessenmayer *was* worried that the repeated press reports about concentrations and evacuations would lead to a “disturbance of the Jewish element,” and he wanted the Jews to remain quiet.¹⁹⁶ On June 30 Veessenmayer intimated that something had gone wrong. Horthy was restless and had objected to the deportations. The Budapest drive would therefore have to be postponed for a while.¹⁹⁷ At just about that time, Hungarian Gendarmerie began to arrive in the capital on the pretext of attending a festival. Horthy ordered the removal of the gendarmes.¹⁹⁸

On the evening of July 4, Veessenmayer had a two-hour discussion with the Hungarian Regent. Horthy started to talk about Sztöjay and indicated that he was not quite satisfied with the Prime Minister. He then characterized Imredy as a party politician. For the two State Secretaries of the Interior Ministry, Endre and Baky, Horthy reserved his sharpest criticism. The Regent described Endre as not quite normal and added “confidentially” that two of Endre’s uncles had died in an insane asylum. Nothing, said Horthy, could be expected from Baky, for Baky was a flag that would blow with the political wind: today he was with us, tomorrow he might be with the Bolsheviks.

With regard to the Jewish question, Horthy mentioned that daily he was being bombarded with telegrams from all sides, from the Vatican and the King of Sweden, from Switzerland and the Red Cross. He, Horthy, was certainly no friend of the Jews, but for political reasons he had to intervene on behalf of the converted Jews, the Jewish doctors, the Jewish labor companies, and the essential Jewish war workers. Horthy then lapsed into memories of past glories and also mentioned the possibility of resignation. Veessenmayer replied that the evacuation of the Jews was absolutely necessary for the conduct of the war. Furthermore, it was

193. Schmidt to Steengracht, May 27, 1944, NG-2424.

194. Von Thadden to Wagner, June 6, 1944, NG-2260.

195. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, June 8, 1944, NG-2260.

196. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, June 8, 1944, NG-5568.

197. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, June 30, 1944, NG-5576.

198. Testimony by Horthy, Case No. 11, tr. p. 2713.

precisely Horthy's name that had been associated with the battle against Jewry and Bolshevism since the First World War, and now the Germans were doing nothing else than to bring this picture of Horthy to its complete realization.¹⁹⁹

Horthy's ineffectiveness was to some extent a reflection of interventions by neutral states on behalf of surviving Hungarian Jews. The neutral countries, particularly Switzerland and Sweden, were now presenting specific demands. Negotiations were initiated for the purpose of enabling thousands of Jews to emigrate, and protective foreign passports were issued to individual Budapest Jews to shield them from the application of destructive measures. It was clear that through these neutral channels the British Foreign Office and the American War Refugee Board were applying pressure. The Sztojay government, no longer so sure of itself, wanted to give in. Veessenmayer, on his part, thought that the protection of a few thousand Jews was a small price to pay for the mass evacuation of Budapest Jewry. Even Wagner of Inland II felt that the Hungarian argument pointing to possible American reprisals against persons of Hungarian descent in the United States was "weighty" (*sebwerviegend*).²⁰⁰ But Ribbentrop did not agree.

On the evening of July 5, one day after the talk with Horthy, Veessenmayer showed Sztojay a telegram from Ribbentrop warning the Hungarians that it was "not opportune" to go into various offers from abroad to help the Budapest Jews. Shaken by the telegram, Sztojay urged a reversal of this German view for the following reasons: First, said the Hungarian Prime Minister, nothing was happening to the Jews in Romania. Second, nothing was happening to them in Slovakia. Third, the arrival of the Jewish millionaires (Manfred Weiss family) in Lisbon had caused a "sensation" about anti-Jewish measures here. If the Reich could permit the emigration of Jews, why not Hungary? Fourth, the Hungarian government was "deluged" with telegrams from the King of Sweden and the Pope. The nuncio was calling "several times" a day. The Turkish, Swiss, and Spanish governments had also intervened. All this did not include the protestations of influential Hungarians.

Finally, the Hungarian Prime Minister brought up his strongest point. In strict confidence Sztojay read to Veessenmayer three secret teletype messages sent by the U.S. and British missions in Bern to their governments and deciphered by Hungarian counterintelligence. They contained a "detailed description" of the fate of the deported Jews. They mentioned that one and a half million Jews (*sic*) had been killed before the Hungarian action started. The messages then suggested the bombing and destruc-

199. Veessenmayer via Ritter to Ribbentrop, July 6, 1944, NG-5684.

200. Wagner via Hencke and Stengracht to Ribbentrop, July 6, 1944, NG-2236.

tion of destination points and railroad lines, “target bombing of all collaborating Hungarian and German agencies, with exact and correct street and house numbers in Budapest,” and finally, “world-wide propaganda with detailed descriptions of the state of affairs.” In another teletype message seventy Hungarian and German personalities who were said to constitute the main culprits were mentioned by name.

Sztojaj hastily added that this threat left him personally cold, because in the case of an Axis victory he did not consider the matter interesting, and in the other case he had concluded his life anyway, but Veesebmayer gained the impression that the Hungarian Prime Minister had been unnerved by the intercepted messages. Later Veesebmayer heard that they had been submitted to the Ministerial Council, where they also had produced their “due effect.”²⁰¹

History plays strangely with its participants. The Jewish relief committee in Budapest had sent these requests to Berne to be transmitted through diplomatic channels to the Allied capitals, where no action was taken upon them. But fate had intervened. The Hungarians in their eagerness had intercepted the messages and had thereupon managed to frighten themselves.

On July 6 Veesebmayer was informed by Sztojaj that the Regent had ordered the deportations stopped.^{202 203} Three days later the Hungarian Interior Minister, Jaross, told Veesebmayer that he was worried that SS units might be introduced into Budapest to carry out the Judenaktion. In this connection, Jaross mentioned that he had completed the deportations in Zone V and the Budapest suburbs in violation of the Regent’s directives. Jaross also was willing to empty Budapest against Horthy’s wishes, but to avoid difficulties he would first have to remove the Jews to the provinces. Once this bluff was successful, the second lap of the journey would be easy. Veesebmayer listened to this plan with delight and immediately promised his assistance. Writing to Ribbentrop, he asked the Foreign Minister to see to it that no SS men were sent into the capital, because the legation had “all political strings tightly in hand *\alle politischen Driihfest in derHand*”?²⁰¹

Within a matter of days, however, the strings were slipping rapidly from Veesebmayer’s controlling palm. In a lightning move Horthy dismissed State Secretaries Endre and Bakv and issued warrants for the arrest of the two men. Veesebmayer protested immediately, menacingly point-

201. Veesebmayer via Ritter to Ribbentrop, July 6, 1944, NG-5523. See also message from British legation in Berne to Foreign Office in London, intercepted by German Foreign Office and enclosed by Wagner to Kaltcnbrunner, July 5, 1944, in Braham, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, pp. 734-35.

202. Veesebmayer via Ritter to Ribbentrop, July 6, 1944, NG-5523.

203. Veesebmayer via Ritter to Ribbentrop, July 9, 1944, NG-5532.

ing to the possible consequences of the action. Horthy retreated, reinstating the officials, but not without complaining that his personal influence had apparently declined to zero and that he could not even effect the removal of two State Secretaries. Repeating that he was swamped with messages about the Jews, he said that he had written a personal letter about the Jewish question to Hitler.²⁰⁴

Meanwhile, Eichmann fretted outside Budapest. Moving swiftly, he deported 1,700 Jews from the internment camp of Kistarcsa, which was located some seventeen miles from the capital. Horthy learned of the transport and gave orders that the train be stopped before it reached the frontier. Intercepted at Ratvang, the Jews were shipped back to Kistarcsa.²⁰⁵ A few days later the persevering Eichmann called the Jewish Council to his office and, while the Jewish leaders were detained, successfully emptied out the internment camps of Kistarcsa and Szarva.²⁰⁶

On July 16 Ribbentrop decided to break the stalemate. He instructed Veesenmayer to deliver to Horthy an ultimatum stating in blunt terms the German attitude toward the Sztojay government and the German terms with respect to the Budapest Jews.²⁰⁷ The warning began:

With utmost surprise the Führer noted in the *Reichsverweser's* [Horthy's] letter, transmitted by the Reich Plenipotentiary [Veessenmayer], that he intends to recall the present Sztojay government. . . . With still greater surprise the Führer learned from the report of the Reich plenipotentiary that the *Reichsverweser* issued warrants for the arrest of individual ministers and State Secretaries of the Sztojay government who recendy took measures against Jews.

Pointing out that any such move would result in total military occupation of Hungary, the ultimatum continued:

The Führer expects that the measures against the Budapest Jews will now be carried out without any further delay by the Hungarian government, with those exceptions allowed to the Hungarian government by the German government on principle, upon suggestions of Minister Veessenmayer [the protected Jews]. No delay of any kind in the execution of the overall measures against Jews must take place because of diese exceptions; otherwise the Führer would be compelled to withdraw his consent to these exceptions.

204. Veessenmayer ro Foreign Office, July 13, 1944, NG-5577. Ribbentrop to Veessenmayer, July 16, 1944, NG-2739.

205. Testimony by Horthy, Case No. 11, tr. p. 2713.

206. Testimony by Kastncr, Case No. 11, tr. p. 3626.

207. Ribbentrop to Veessenmayer, July 16, 1944, NG-2739.

Veesenmayer delivered this telegram to the Hungarian government on July 17.²⁰⁸

The threat was not successful. Already Russian troops were pouring into neighboring Galicia, and the entire southern front was in retreat. Interior Minister Jaross and his two State Secretaries lost their posts. On July 27 the Sztojay government, still in office but no longer enthusiastic, declared its readiness to transfer the Budapest Jews to camps within Hungarian territory.²⁰⁹ On August 2, Higher SS and Police Leader Winkelmann sent a note to Veesenmayer in which he voiced the opinion that a more reliable government had to be formed in Hungary at once.²¹⁰ Once again the Germans set up lists of candidates. But Veesenmayer did not form a new government. Horthy did.

During August 23-24 an event occurred in Romania that shook the German position in Hungary to its roots. The Soviet army had broken through the German-Romanian lines in Bessarabia and Moldavia. On August 23 ICing Mihai informed the Germans that he had to conclude an armistice and that they had three days to remove their army from the country. One hour after the receipt of this ultimatum, German bombers attacked the royal palace in Bucharest, and the consequences for the Reich were disastrous. Within a few weeks, twenty-six German divisions were hacked to pieces by the Soviets and their new Romanian allies. The German legation personnel were trapped, and their chief, von Killinger, committed suicide.²¹¹ It was during the Romanian turnabout, on August 25, that Horthy installed a new Prime Minister: General Geza Lakatos.²¹² Once more Hungary was ruled by a reluctant collaborator.

The government of General Lakatos was, in fact, unwilling to cooperate with the Reich in any matter whatsoever. When Lakatos was shown the agreement concluded by Sztojay to remove the Budapest Jews to the provinces, he pleaded that there was no transportation, that there were no guards, and that there were no camps.²¹³ Encouraged by the German inability to strike back, he instructed his minister in Berlin to demand "a free hand in the Jewish question."²¹⁴ Lakatos then asserted Hungarian

208. Memorandum by AJtenburg, July 21, 1944, NG-2739.

209. Affidavit by Kasrncr, September 13, 1945, PS-2605.

210. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, enclosing note by Winkelmann, August 3, 1944, NG-2973.

211. Rudolf Rahn, *Rubcloses l;ben* (Düsseldorf, 1949), pp. 268, 262. Kingdom of Romania, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Memorandum on the Military and Economic Contribution of Rim mam a to the War against Germany and Hungary* (Bucharest, 1946).

212. Affidavit by Lakatos, June 10, 1947, NG-1848.

213. *Ibid.*; Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, October 10, 1944, NG-4985.

214. Hoffmann (Hungarian Minister in Berlin) to Hcnnev (Hungarian Foreign Minister), September 22, 1944, NG-2604.

sovereignty by requesting the Germans to remove the Eichmann Sonder Einsatzkommando.²¹⁵ The Kommando was disbanded at the end of September,²¹⁶ but one of its leading personalities, Wisliceny, remained behind just in case. The presence of Wisliceny so disturbed the Jewish Council that it sent a deputation to the Hungarian Gendarmerie officer Ferenczy with a request to remove the Budapest Jews to labor camps in the country as a means of forestalling any deportations to Auschwitz.²¹⁷ Lakatos in the meantime sought with a few token measures to show exactly where he stood. Thus the curfew was relaxed,²¹⁸ and Jewish stores were permitted to reopen, provided that one of the managers was a non-Jew.²¹⁹

The Germans knew what these developments meant. The legation and the SS and Police watched closely every move of the Hungarian government. They observed the secret flight of high-ranking Hungarian army officers to undisclosed destinations. It was clear that the Lakatos regime had been appointed for only one purpose: to conclude an armistice with the Allies. It was also clear that this aim was being pursued by Horthy himself.

At the beginning of October the Red Army broke into southern Hungary, taking Hódmezővásárhely and Szeged. The spearhead of the Soviet Second Ukraine Army was now only a hundred miles from the capital. On October 14 the Germans sent into Budapest the 24th Panzer Division with forty Tiger tanks. The division's assignment, however, was not to reinforce the sagging front line but to overthrow Horthy and Lakatos. With the division three well-known personalities arrived to take charge: the anti-partisan chief, Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewsky; the Foreign Office provocateur, Ambassador Dr. Rudolf Rahn; and the RSHA man in charge of special tasks, Obersturmbannführer Skorzeny.

On the morning of October 15, Skorzeny succeeded in luring Horthy's son to a surrounded building. The younger Horthy was quickly wrapped in blankets, thrown on a truck, and brought to an airport to be flown to the Mauthausen concentration camp. That same day, while the Hungarian radio was preparing to broadcast an armistice appeal, Veessenmayer told the Regent that upon the least sign of "treason" his son would

215. Affidavit by Kastner, September 13, 1944, PS-2605.

216. Feine to Veessenmayer, September 29, 1944, NG-4985.

217. Grell to Veessenmayer, September 30, 1944, NG-4985.

218. *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), September 22, 1944, p. 3.

219. *Ibid.*, September 30, 1944, p. 5. Significantly, the reversal began in the last days of the Sztyjay regime when an ordinance was passed to confer exemptions from the effect of anti-Jewish decrees upon individual Jews who had made outstanding contributions in the fields of science, art, and the economy. *Ibid.*, August 23, 1944, P-4.

be shot. The old Horthy broke under the strain. “Horthy cried like a little child, held Rahn’s hand, promised to annul everything, ran to the telephone — without calling anyone, however — and in general appeared to be totally deranged.” During the next morning (October 16), under the guns of the Tiger tanks, Horthy and Lakatos surrendered.²²⁰

The new Hungarian “Führer,” who combined the offices of Regent and Prime Minister, was the Arrow Cross leader Szalasi. This man was no aristocrat. Once a major, he had been dishonorably discharged and in civilian life had served a prison sentence for three years.²²¹ To be sure, the Szalasi regime had not been chosen for its respectability. Szalasi was installed because in October 1944 he was the only pro-Nazi candidate in Hungary. For the Jews the coup could have only one consequence: they now had to go through another nightmare. New ordeals were in the making.

When the Szalasi government came into power, the killing center of Auschwitz was approaching its liquidation stage. At the same time, new scarcities of labor made themselves felt on a vast scale. Across the border in the Reich, the construction chief of the SS Economic-Administrative Main Office, Gruppenführer Kammler, was building large underground plants for the assembly of pursuit planes and V-2 weapons. Kammler needed laborers by the tens of thousands, and now that German control was once more established in Hungary, the underground chambers were to be fed with Budapest Jews. There was only one obstacle: the transportation system had broken down. Trains could no longer be dispatched, and the Jews had to be marched out on foot.

On October 18, Veessenmayer and the new Hungarian Interior Minister, Gabor Vajna, came to an agreement. A total of 50,000 Jews, men as well as women, were to be moved to the Reich. All other Jews capable of work were to be concentrated in four labor camps. For the remaining Jews a ghetto was to be created on the periphery of the city or in the outskirts. In his report to the Foreign Office, Veessenmayer added confidentially that Eichmann intended to press for another 50,000 Jews later.²²² Eichmann could not rest until all the Hungarian Jews were in their graves. From Ribbentrop there was no objection. The German victory in Hungary had to be exploited without restraint, and the Hungarians now had to “proceed with utmost severity against the Jews [*auf das allerscharjste gegen die Juden vergehen.*]”²²³

220. For the complete story of the putsch, see Winkelmann to Himmler, October 25, 1944, NG-2540. Testimony by Ernst Kicnast (Hauptsturmführer on Winkelmann’s staff). Case No. 11, tr. p. 7153. Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben*, pp. 265-71.

221. Testimony by Horthy, Case No. 11, tr. p. 2715.

222. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, October 18, 1944, NG-5570.

223. Ribbentrop to Veessenmayer, October 20, 1944, NG-4986.

On the morning of October 20, the Hungarian police knocked on doors marked with the star and seized all men aged sixteen to sixty who were fit for labor, whether converted or unconverted, protected or unprotected. By nightfall, 22,000 had been rounded up.²²⁴ During the next few days the drive was extended to women aged sixteen to forty', and by October 26 the reservoir of labor had grown by 25,000 men and 10,000 women.²²⁵

The German requirements were to be covered first by forced labor companies employed by industry and the Hungarian army itself. On October 26, the Hungarian War Ministry authorized the deployment of seventy of these companies.²²⁶ The "civilian" Jews were to follow on foot.

At the end of the month the treks began. Without food, the slave laborers walked over a hundred miles in snow, rain, and sleet to Austria. Riding in the opposite direction, toward Budapest, the chief of the SS Operational Main Office, Obergruppenführer Jüttner, spotted the long column of Jews driven on by Hungarian soldiers. Most of the trekkers, so far as he could see, were women. As the car made its way past the marching people, Jüttner noticed exhausted men and women in the ditches.²²⁷ On November 13 Veessenmayer reported that 27,000 Jews of "both sexes" had been marched off. He was counting on 40,000 additional Jews in "daily rates" of 2,000 to 4,000. The remaining Budapest Jews, about 120,000 in all, were to be concentrated in a ghetto. In an ominous tone Veessenmayer added that the "ultimate disposition" of these Jews depended upon the availability of transport facilities.²²⁸

The treks did not continue much longer, since Szälasi had become uneasy. On November 17 he referred to the trekkers as having been "lent" to the Germans (*Leihjuden*).²²⁹ Four days later, he cancelled all further foot marches because of the death rate of the Jewish women. The SS man in charge of Jewish labor on the Danube, Obersturmbannführer Höss, consoled Veessenmayer by informing him that he could not use women anyway; he could employ only men fit for the heavy subterranean work.

224. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, October 20,1944, NG-5570.

225. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, October 26,1944, NG-5570.

226. Text of the order in Braham, *The Politics of Genocide*, pp. 1187-88. Industrial users were Manfred Weiss, Peri Nitrogen, Bor mining, two breweries, etc. See also correspondence about withdrawal of two companies from Urkut manganese mining, January-March, 1945, German Federal Archives, R 7/764.

227. Affidavit by Jüttner, May 3, 1948, NG-5216.

228. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, November 13, 1944, NG-5570. Wehr-machtführungsstab/Qu 2(Ost) to RSHA, November 23,1944, T 77, Roll 1415.

229. Grell to Foreign Office, November 20, 1944, enclosing summary by Hungarian government of Szalasi decisions of November 17. Braham, *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, pp. 528-31.

In his message to the Foreign Office, Veesenmayer concluded that 30,000 marchers had been sent out so far and that it would hardly be possible to reach the figure of 50,000.²³⁰

The attrition in the labor contingents was extraordinarily high. The laborers were shot during the Axis retreat, and eventually large numbers of them were marched to Mauthausen and farther west, to a camp at Gunskirchen outside of Weis in Austria.²³¹ When American forces approached Gunskirchen on May 4, 1945, a powerful stench enveloped them, and the ground was “churned to a consistency of warm putty by the milling of thousands of feet, mud mixed with feces and urine.” Living skeletons, all looking alike and “insane” with hunger, greeted the Americans with “cheers, groans, and shrieks.” Some were eating the raw carcass of a horse that had been dead for some days. Liberated, they still “died like flies.”²³² And that was the end of the marchers.

The remaining Jews in the Hungarian capital were moved into a ghetto almost within range of Soviet artillery. The decision was communicated to the Jewish Council on November 18 and proclaimed on November 29. The Budapest Ghetto was sealed on December 10, and by January 1945 it held close to 70,000 people, but a large number, with false papers or in hiding, did not move in. A fence around the ghetto was erected at Jewish expense and with Jewish manpower, and a Jewish administration, complete with police carrying rubber truncheons, was established inside.²³³

Even as this movement was being prepared, some tens of thousands of Jews were still holding on to “protective passports.” The passports offered very little protection. The Szalasi government refused to recognize their

230. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, November 21, 1944, NG-4987. The SS, however, did not stop trying. In December the Hungarian Interior Minister, Gabor Vajna, had conferences with Himmler, Berger, and Kaltenbrunner about further removals of Budapest Jews by rail. Transport difficulties frustrated these plans. Affidavit by Gabor Vajna, August 28, 1945, NO-1874. On employment of Jews in west Hungarian fortifications project, see Army Group South/Wi (signed Zorner) to OKW/Feldwirtschaftsamt, January 10, 1945, Wi/1.226.

231. Gisela Rabitsch, “Das KL Mauthausen,” in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, *Studien zur Geschichte der Konzentrationslager* (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 891. Jeno Lcvai, *Fulmiann in Hungary* (Budapest, 1961), pp. 238-40. Yehuda Bauer, “The Death Marches, January-May, 1945? *Modern Judaism* 3 (1983): 1-21.

232. Pamphlet, introduced by Major General Willard G. Wyman (commander, 71st Division), *The Seventy-First Came*. . . , undated, printed in Augsburg, with testimony, drawings, and photos. Quoted material from account by Captain J. D. Pletcher, pp. 5-11. Through the courtesy of General Douglas Kinnard, who was a lieutenant in the division at the time.

233. See Braham, *The Politics of Genocide*, pp. 844-75. Also, Andreas Biss, *Der Stopp der Endlösung* (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 245-46, 259-60, 263-64, 278-87.

validity,²³⁴ and the Germans backed Szälasi. Thus, when the Portuguese Minister in Berlin interceded on behalf of his “protectees,” Staatssekretär Steengracht replied that he could not accept the intercessions, because the Hungarian government was “sovereign,” and “any intervention on our part in Hungarian affairs was out of the question.”²³⁵

In the Hungarian capital, the representatives of neutral nations resorted to some unorthodox methods to save Jews. A team of the Swiss legation caught up with a column of foot marchers and handed out protective passports, which were honored by the Hungarian guards.²³⁶ A young secretary of the Swedish legation, Raoul Wallenberg, who was a member of a Swedish industrial family and who had been assigned to the legation for the special purpose of rescue, organized Jews to help other Jews, set up soup kitchens, and “in one way or another” recovered 2,000 foot marchers.²³⁷ The Honorary Spanish Consul was an Italian, Giorgio Perlasca, who had volunteered for the war in Ethiopia and had fought on Franco’s side with Italian troops in Spain. His resources were far fewer than those of his Swiss and Swedish colleagues, but he did what he could, handing out Spanish passports to individuals who were “Sephardic” or who had any Spanish business connections. When the Spanish Chief of Mission, Angel Sanz Briz, left Budapest, Perlasca stayed, taking over what was left of the legation. On his feet every day, he gathered Jewish orphans, added protectees to the roster, and distributed medicinal products until January 1945.²³⁸ Twenty thousand passports had been handed by the papal nuncio to the baptized Jews. These Jews, said Veessenmayer in his report, could mark their houses in the ghetto with a cross instead of the Star of David.²³⁹

Many Jews in Budapest now had authorization to emigrate. During this last phase, the Szalasi regime was more amenable to foreign pressure

234. Declaration by Vajna reported in *Donauzeitung* (Graz), October 21, 1944, P-3.

235. Memorandum by Steengracht, November 10, 1944, NG-4988.

236. Wagner (Inland II) to Ribbentrop, November 6, 1944, and Ribbentrop to Veessenmayer, November 9, 1944, in Braham, ed., *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*, pp. 803-5.

237. See Steven Koblik, *The Stones Cry Out* (New York, 1988), particularly the text of Wallenberg’s memorandum of July 29, 1944, his report to Iver Olsen (U.S. War Refugee Board), October 7, 1944, and his report of December 8, 1944, pp. 255-58, 261-62, and 267-69.

238. Enrico Dcaglio, *Die Banalität des Guten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994). The book contains Perlasca’s entries in his diary from December 2, 1944, to January 13, 1945.

239. Veessenmayer to Foreign Office, November 21, 1944, NG-4987.

than was the Reich, as may be seen in the following statistics of exit permits authorized by the Reich and by Hungary, respectively:²⁴⁰

	<i>Reich</i>	<i>Hungary</i>
To Palestine	7,000	8,800
To Sweden	400	4,500
To Spain	3	300
To Portugal	9	700

The Reich list was the one that had originally been promised to Sztojaj. It goes without saying that an exit authorization, like a protective passport, no longer meant anything, for the Jews had nowhere to go. The neutral states were slow in admitting Jews, and the Soviet army was fast surrounding the Hungarian capital.

The Jews were besieged by captors who were now facing entrapment themselves. The Szalasi regime declared everything owned by the Jews, except religious articles, graves, family photographs, furniture, utensils, plus food and fuel to last fourteen days, to be property of the state.²⁴¹ Even as the Red Army closed the ring around Budapest on December 24, Jews with foreign documents in the protected houses along the east bank of the Danube, and those hiding wherever they could with false papers, became increasingly vulnerable to Arrow Cross men roaming in the streets.²⁴² The bodies of several thousand victims piled up in houses, streets, and the river. The Jews huddling in the ghetto were shivering and starving. The ghetto, along with the whole eastern section of the city known as Pest, was in Soviet hands by January 17. The fighting continued on the west bank until February 13, when the encircled German-Hungarian garrison surrendered.²⁴³

240. Vcesenmayer to Foreign Office, November 18, 1944, NG-4987.

241. *Donauzeitung* (Graz), November 5, 1944, p. 3.

242. Affidavit by Wilhelm Hottl (OSTubaf. RSHA, in Hungary), April 24, 1947, NG-2317.

243. For a complete story of the Budapest Jews under the Szalasi regime, see Levai, *Martyrdom*, pp. 335—421, and photographs. Jews caught outside the ghetto constituted a large part of the toll.